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1. At Newell, in a letter  
Nov. 6, 1850, says: "We found a  
of the size of a slipper, & large & conspicuous  
cup of acorns, Anabaptists, & other pests, which  
I know not how, but so much common spring up in  
the night & in darkness, so they spring up in  
the darkness & untroubled night of the Marian times."

Ibid. Letter [Parker's] p. 92  
Hence the addition in Art 2. "By whom from everlast-  
ing Father, the very & eternal God, of one substance  
with the Father."







L E C T U R E S  
I N  
D I V I N I T Y,

DELIVERED IN THE  
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

BY  
JOHN HEY, D. D.

AS NORRISIAN PROFESSOR.

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VOLUME THE SECOND.

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C A M B R I D G E,

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MDCXCVII.

## A D V E R T I S E M E N T .

**T**HE Author thinks it necessary to declare, that the patronage of the Syndics of the University Press was founded on their confidence in him, and not on a previous perusal of his manuscript. This declaration seems requisite, lest the Syndics should be considered as giving a sanction to some opinions advanced in the first thirteen Chapters of the third Book.



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# L E C T U R E S

I N

## D I V I N I T Y, &c.

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### B O O K III.

OF RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES IN GENERAL.

**T**HE title of this Book must be understood as opposed to that of the fourth Book; "*Of particular religious Societies:*" as the particular Societies with which we are chiefly concerned, are Christian Societies, our general observations may sometimes relate only to such; and may set forth things which are common to them only. It is natural to use the enlarged expression, because Christian Societies have really [many things in common with other religious Societies; though in strictness, no observation should be made under our Title which is not applicable to every religious Society whatsoever.

## C H A P. I.

## ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.

I. **I**N treating of religious Societies in the present Times, the great business seems to be, to give a right account of what are called *Articles of Religion*; including under that name, Creeds, Confessions of Faith, and all declarations of opinion or doctrine by which one religious community is kept distinct from another. These therefore must be considered as the *principal* objects of our attention. They may be so considered safely, as their nature cannot be explained without introducing all subjects which relate to religious Society.

II. It is sometimes found useful to consider a subject in two different and opposite methods:—according to the first, we begin with the present fact, inquire the *cause* of it, and mount up, from cause to cause, till we come to first principles: according to the second method, we begin from first principles as the original cause, and trace out a series of *effects*, till we come to that which is the object of our researches. Let us not neglect either of these methods.

We find *Articles* of religion subsisting; we ask what is the *cause* of their being made?—the first answer is, because without them we could not have one body of Doctrine taught to all the people: we next ask, why do we want to have such *unity of doctrine*?—in order to keep men from *dissensions*.—Where is the great good of keeping men from dissensions? because while they are disputing and doubting, their principles are unsettled, and they  
cannot

cannot have right religious *sentiments*.—And what is the great importance of their having right sentiments? because from their sentiments men *act*.

III. If we begin from first principles, we say, to bring men to right *conduct* is the design of all religious institutions: (*religious* conduct, when regulated by reason, will be *right* conduct): in order to bring about religious actions, we want religious *sentiments*: or, trying to form religious sentiments is the *effect* of endeavouring to bring about religious conduct: to form and strengthen religious sentiments, we want the mind to be free from *doubt* and perplexity, we want an *uniformity* in *teaching*; in order to secure uniformity in teaching, we want *assent* to one body of doctrines from every teacher belonging to any one Society.

This latter method we shall, in effect, pursue; though we shall sometimes seem for a while to deviate from it.

IV. According to this method then we must first mention, a little more particularly, the general *end* or design of religious *Societies*.—It is, to make men perform all their several *Duties* with *spirit* and *constancy*: to give them *motives*, and inspire them with *sentiments* and affections, for that purpose: affections so well directed, as never to carry them into any *hurtful* measures; so strong and powerful, as to enable them to overcome all difficulties and temptations.—This supposes that men can be brought to agree in using the same modes of religion: when they cannot, the end or design of forming a particular religious society, is to associate as many as can agree, so far as to use the same form of worship and instruction, and to abstain from all *disputes*.

If any one says, what need is there of *Religion* in order to make men perform their duties? why

cannot morality and laws answer the purpose? we refer him to what has been said before in the 19th Chapter of the first <sup>a</sup> Book.

v. Articles of Religion must be considered as means of answering the ends of religious Society; if they are used for any other purpose, they are abused: when men are called upon therefore to join in one form of instruction, and as a security, to give their assent to a collection of opinions, every thing ought to be done with a view to the end now described.—And as they should be called upon by those in *Authority* to declare their opinions with this view, so when they do declare them, they should give some attention to the same purpose.—Indeed all men should be as open and frank as possible; and when they can chuse their expressions, they should take those which are the most simple and proper; but if forms are fixed upon for them, and one and the same form for many different ranks and sorts of persons, they should then consider the *reasons* for which they were fixed upon: expressions seemingly absolute have very frequently a particular reference, and by that they are to <sup>b</sup> be limited and interpreted: so that assent must be guided by the *purpose* which men in authority have in view when they require it.—This will be seen more plainly hereafter; it is now affirmed chiefly with a view of properly laying out our subject.

vi. There is one difficulty which may be mentioned now:—assent must depend upon the design and purpose of Articles of Religion; but who is competent to *judge* of Articles of Religion as means of promoting right conduct? is *every man* to take for granted that he understands their end and design, and the manner in which they attain it? or are there but *few* that can limit and interpret the expressions

<sup>a</sup> Sect. 16 and 17.

<sup>b</sup> Book 1. Chap. x.

expressions contained in them by such considerations? Perhaps the best answer which we can give to these questions, may partake of the imperfection of human things. The common people should be directed by the informed, (or Philosophers<sup>c</sup>); both as to doctrines and the manner of assenting to them: and such common people will, in effect, treat a Body of Doctrines only as a discriminating mark of the community to which they belong: the best informed should search to the bottom of the matter: intermediate persons must go partly upon the judgment of others, and partly upon their own; in different degrees, according to the degrees in which they are informed.

The greatest nicety seems to arise in the case of the *Ministers* of Religion; they seem to have pretensions to judge of reasons, and yet their chief business is to *teach* what is prescribed by authority. —In reality, they seem likely to be in *three* different capacities at different times; they will sometimes be *philosophers*, sometimes *teachers*, sometimes *men*. When they are to act as Philosophers, they should examine into the foundations and reasons of things; when as teachers, they have only to deliver established doctrines; when as men, they must avoid doubts and perplexities as much as possible. It will require some fairness of mind to distinguish the occasions on which they are to assume these different characters, we can only say, they must distinguish them as well as they are able. And, I should imagine, that they should give different *sorts of assent* in these different capacities;—when they are so old and so informed as to come into our class of Philosophers, their assent will imply their having examined into the grounds of the opinions to which they subscribe: when they are less informed,

<sup>c</sup> B. II. Chap. IV. Sect. 3.

ed, but sufficiently so to commence teachers, their assent will imply that they have considered the opinions in a competent degree, that they are willing to teach according to them as far as their teaching goes; and that they have not any decided opinion against any of them. When they attend public worship as mere men, they will repeat Creeds chiefly for edification and devotion. A Creed will become a kind of Hymn; a grateful recollection of God's mercies.—On this principle it may be, perhaps, that Creeds are sometimes *sung*. Yet even the ordinary people may give a wrong assent: and their assent will be wrong if they do not really prefer, on religious considerations, their Church to others.

VII. But a plain honest man will say, I can tell when I speak truth and when I speak falsehood; and that is the main matter in giving my assent to any thing.—We answer, we certainly are not to forget the duties of *Veracity* whenever we make any declaration: we are sincerely to say whether the meaning of the Articles is *our* meaning, so as to deceive no intelligent person whom we undertake to inform; but the meaning of the Articles will depend upon *circumstances* as well as upon words;—and veracity itself, though plain in many cases, is not so in all: there is *real falsehood*, and there is *apparent falsehood* which is not real.

If this is a right representation of the case, (whether it is or not will appear better hereafter,) assent to Articles of Religion must be regulated by the nature of *Veracity* in general, and by the particular *ends* for which Articles were contrived; or, to speak more fully, by the nature of veracity, and the nature of religious *Societies*; that is, on the nature of religious *sentiments*, the efficacy of *unity of Doctrine* in promoting such sentiments; and the need there

is

is of Articles of Religion in order to maintain such Unity.—Let us then take our subjects in the order here mentioned; beginning with *Veracity*.

But if any one will *persist* in saying, that nothing can properly be concerned in assenting, but Veracity; I would not directly contradict such person; I would indulge him so as to *express* the thing differently:—and I would say, that the occasion and purpose in view make *a part of the sense*, and therefore, that speaking according to them makes *a part of veracity*. Still it will suit *us* best, in examining the nature of religious Society, to take the occasion of it, and its end and purpose *separately* from other parts of Veracity.



## C H A P. II.

## OF VERACITY.

I. **V**ERACITY may perhaps be most conveniently defined, ‘an habitual abstinence from *falsehood*’; though that definition will bring on another; ‘*falsehood* is deceiving those whom we undertake to inform, by the use of signs, agreed upon between us.”

II. This manner of defining, will shew us the difference between *real* and *apparent* falsehood: which it is often of great importance to know. For it follows from the definitions, that we cannot be guilty of real falsehood if we deceive no one; (nor attempt to deceive): nor if we only deceive those whom we have not *undertaken* to inform: nor lastly, though we do happen to deceive those whom we are engaged to inform, if it be by the use of *signs* whose meaning has not been sufficiently *agreed* upon between us:—or without those signs whose meaning has been sufficiently determined.—Yet we may be guilty of *apparent* falsehood, even though we deceive no one, though we do not attempt to deceive, if our words, or other signs, are such as appear likely to deceive; such as might through custom deceive, if some particular circumstances did not prevent it.—We may be guilty of apparent falsehood, if we deceive persons who depend upon us, though in reality we have not, expressly or tacitly, undertaken to inform them:—or if, when it is clear that we do address ourselves to them, the signs which we make use of, are hastily and rashly interpreted, on a presumption that their meaning is known,  
though



though in reality nothing has passed to settle it. In the first case, we apparently intend to deceive; in the second we seem to undertake to inform; in the third we seem to use signs in a sense agreed upon; though we really do not any of the three.

That we are not guilty of *real* falshood in the three cases now mentioned, may farther appear from the consideration, that *confidence*, the mutual confidence of men, is not hurt or diminished in any of them. He who is not deceived, will continue to trust what men say:—he who is deceived by listening to what is said to other men, or by relying on information for which no one is accountable to him, will soon recollect that he has deceived himself: and so will he who has trusted to signs, the purport of which has been conjectured, not agreed upon:—He may be vexed for a while, but his disappointment will generate caution and prudence, not distrust.—Now the great evil of real falshood is, that it destroys confidence, and hinders men from uniting with each other, or profiting by each other's experience.

Another material deduction from our manner of defining is, that no one can speak real falshood but to some particular person: no one can be charged with falshood *absolutely*; the charge must exhibit a misleading of some person whom the speaker has undertaken to inform, and with whom he has agreed, expressly or tacitly, about the meaning of certain signs. I use *person* in the singular number, but our person may be an artificial person, a society or *body* of men, consisting of any number of individuals.

III. One cause of error, with respect to veracity, is, that *custom* is apt to pass for *nature*; I mean, that the connexion between *words* and the *ideas* annexed to them, which is merely *arbitrary*, and the work  
of

of custom, is looked upon as something in the nature of things. Not that persons do not know and understand the contrary, when they think; but they suffer habit to prevent their thinking.—Even *visible signs* are arbitrary, and so may emblematical actions be called properly, though there is some faint analogy between the sign and the thing signified<sup>a</sup>: some sort of natural connexion;—but between words and ideas there is none at all: (for it is not worth mentioning that some few words are made to express something by a sound; so that the sound is an echo to the sense.) Yet custom ties words and ideas so closely together, that thinking men do not always separate them; the unthinking scarce ever.

When those who have not been used to examine into these matters, are put in mind that any sound might have been made to stand for any thing, or idea, they will be apt to ask; *how* has an agreement been made that a certain word shall be a sign of a certain thing? and what is the nature of such agreement?—We may answer, probably a word has come to stand for a certain idea imperceptibly, by a great number of trials, the nature of which cannot be described; it is most likely, that those who made such trials could not have described them, even at the time they were made; so that the manner in which words were fixed upon as signs, makes a separate and curious subject<sup>b</sup>. It is enough for us, that the connexion between a word and its meaning has been very frequently recognized; and the reasonable expectation which men have, that it will be continued, is a claim to have it continued, when nothing is said to the contrary. An agreement

<sup>a</sup> See Book I. Chap. xvii. Sect. 6 and 18.

<sup>b</sup> The *precious metals* have, by a like series of trials, come to be given and taken in exchange for all valuable commodities.

agreement very frequently executed, is an agreement *ratified*.—The agreement of which we now speak, is, in its origin at least, of the *tacit* sort, but that tacit agreements are valid, both moralists and Lawyers teach. If every idea had its own sign, I do not see why this agreement would not be strict and definite; but as far as the senses of words are indefinite, so far must the agreement be indefinite, by which any word is made a sign:—but agreements not well defined, are valid, though more easy to be evaded than such as are definite.

IV. The agreement (that a certain word shall be a sign of a certain idea) may be *changed*, either *tacitly* or *expressly*. The tacit changes in the allowed sense of a word, are brought about in the same manner in which a sense is first given to a word: perhaps not without some falshood in those who *begin* changing. Words in old English have very different meanings from what they have in modern English. The word *Knave* used to signify merely a servant; St. Paul<sup>e</sup> was once the Knave of Jesus Christ: and *Villain*<sup>d</sup> meant formerly only a very low kind of *Tenant*, not indeed very much above a *slave*: something like one of the Spartan *Helotes*.

*Express* changes may be made for various *purposes*, as for that of writing in *cypher*.—And for whatever purpose they are made, if the rules expressed are observed, (and affirmations are according to *Fact*) no falshood can ensue. Suppose you and I agree to call the *Sun* by the name of *moon*, and the *moon* by the name of *Sun*; then I speak truth, to *you*, if I say, ‘The Moon is many times greater than the Sun; the Sun is an opaque body, and shines only by the light falling upon it from the moon, and reflected to the earth:’ but if I say, ‘the Sun is  
many

<sup>e</sup> Rom. i. 1.

<sup>d</sup> Blackstone, Index, *Villain*.

many times larger than the moon; the moon is opake and visible only by means of light coming from the Sun,'—I speak falsehood.—*Cyphers* might thus be made, so that known words should be used in interchanged senses; or that *negative* expressions should be understood affirmatively:—and these might happen to deceive those who accidentally saw them, but if the agreement made was observed, they would contain no falsehood, on that account.

Hence we may see, how some propositions may be true, which according to the Letter are false. In this case, customary words are used, but not in their first customary sense; they have acquired a new sense by some agreement, (probably of the tacit sort,) and yet they have not quite lost their old one: an habitual feeling remains, by which the old one is deemed the right one.—'My Master is not at home,' says a Servant, when his master is really within; this proposition is false according to the Letter, that is, according to the old customary signification; but it is true according to the new meaning, which fear of offending has forced upon the words; this new meaning is, 'my master cannot receive you at this time;'—in which a doubt is left, whether real absence, or business, &c. is the cause of the refusal. I have been told that Archbishop *Secker*, being asked about this matter, answered, 'The first man that used this excuse when he was really at home, told a Lie.' *Ironic* expressions may be ranked under this head, and such writings as *Gulliver's Travels*.

v. If any one imagines that I lightly esteem the duty of veracity, or that I look upon it as any mark of an improved mind to be careless about it, he mistakes me exceedingly. Nothing is farther from my wishes, than to lay any foundation for subterfuge

subterfuge or evasive pretences<sup>e</sup>: I should be sorry to have any man in the world thought a warmer friend to sincerity and simplicity, than myself. I honour and adore them; I abhor deceit; I never deceive any one; at least it is my study to avoid deceiving; I would not deceive a child, nor, when many other men would, a sick person. When I think of the evils which mankind bring on themselves by duplicity and artifice, by simulation and dissimulation, I feel greatly dejected; when I think of the happiness which they might procure by an universal sincerity, nay, which they might immediately enjoy, by a general openness, frankness, and a genuine effusion of their hearts and minds, I feel myself filled and elated with pleasure.—Let no one think so ill of me as to conceive me saying this through ostentation; it is a necessary declaration; made necessary first by the likelihood that the scope of my reasoning may be misapprehended; and next by the alarm which this third book has actually given to some persons of great learning and eminence; who judged of it from the printed Heads of Lectures<sup>f</sup>.

## VI. This

<sup>e</sup> Bishop Law talks of leading the members of the Church “into all the labyrinths of a loose and a perfidious casuistry.”

On Subscription, p. 22.

<sup>f</sup> When published in 1783;—Bishop Porteus and Bishop Halifax in particular expressed themselves, in Letters to me, as entertaining apprehensions concerning some parts of the Heads relating to Veracity. And I have been lately advised to omit some things, which had been reported from the Lectures: no one can be more willing to *retract* any mistaken position than I am; I claimed the liberty of retracting at the opening of the Lectures; (see Book 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 6.): but, if I have publicly delivered any thing, it seems best either to retract or publish it. All I say in this Book about Veracity, seems to me quite a plain series of arguments or observations: not being able to retract what I deem to be such, I think it best to submit them to the judgment of others.—I once had a glimpse (in a Review, I believe,) of something said by Mr. Dyer against this book; and I had intended to examine it; but, in country retirement, I have not opportunity; and, as I remember, the expressions were chiefly declamatory.

VI. This Apology will receive great help from considering, in the last place, the consequences of not seeing clearly the distinction between real and apparent falshood. They seem to be these; that those who are not scrupulous, run the more easily into real falshood; and that those who are scrupulous, suffer poignant unhappiness because they have been almost unavoidably drawn into that which is only apparent.—First, when men find that they are in some sense violating the obligations of veracity, and yet that they did not mean to do wrong, and are not blamed, if they have not an idea of the boundaries between real and apparent falshood, they pass imperceptibly from apparent to real, and then think they are as little wrong, and will be as little blamed, as before: and so they get confirmed in habits of real falshood. It is the same thing in *Justice*, or *Honesty*; injustice may be, and is often, apparent when it is not real; and seeming injustice gets excused, till men who have not studied the difference, come to allow themselves in that which is real. Nothing could better serve the cause of Justice than to mark out the distinction between real and apparent so plainly, that no one could avoid seeing it: for real injustice would not then be tolerated. In like manner nothing can be of greater service to Truth than to shew plainly the nature of apparent falshood: for when that is clear, real falshood has no excuse.

Those, who are very desirous of doing their duty in all things, and are scrupulously anxious about every seeming transgression, suffer as great unhappiness about any apparent falshood, which they may have run into, as if it were real;—if they are not duly aware of the distinction. The case of a person in this situation is truly worthy of compassion, whether he foregoes advantages which he might lawfully enjoy, or possesses them with secret misgivings,

misgivings, or under compunction and self-condemnation. And that man who should neglect to comfort the feeble-minded<sup>s</sup>, and support the weak, when so worthy of relief; or who should avoid describing apparent falshood lest he himself should be suspected of insincerity, would deserve a greater torment, if greater there can be, than that of a mind disquieted by unsettled scruples, and fluctuating remorse.

<sup>s</sup> 1 Theff. v. 14.



## C H A P III.

## OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS.

I. **I**N the *first* place we may take notice of the effects of sentiments in general.—If we speak of mankind from a general view of them, and found our observations upon experience, we may say, that they act from their habitual sentiments. Their vices arise from vicious sentiments, indulged so as to be unduly prevalent: their virtues arise from good sentiments, to which habit has given power and authority.—Religious sentiments, of various sorts, have been found by experience uncommonly forcible.

This is so clearly seen, that corrupting a man's sentiments, is regarded by Lawgivers as causing him to commit wickedness; and therefore punishments are decreed against the cause, as well as against the effect; and those are deemed offenders who *seduce*<sup>a</sup>, *bribe*, *suborn*.

Not that there is an absolute *necessity* that a man to whom a bribe is offered should be dishonest, or wicked in any way;—when we look at the nature of things, and at actions, beforehand, we see a possibility that an impulse of passion or sentiment may be resisted and overcome: but when we look *back* upon facts, we naturally *expect* that which has happened, to happen again: and all *provisions* should be made on probable expectations: provisions, of public Laws, and private prudential maxims.

II. The sentiments which arise in the human mind are *innumerable*; and, we might say, of innumerable

<sup>a</sup> Mentioned B. II. Chap. IV, Sect. I.



numerable *kinds*, if we made every minute difference to constitute a new kind. *Longinus* was sensible of this, and expresses it clearly<sup>b</sup>: Πολλα γαρ και αναριθμητα παθη, και εδ' αν ειπειν τις οποσα δυναιτο. In order to treat of them, we divide them into classes; which indeed is the case in many other things; no two individuals of any class being perfectly like each other.

III. Religious sentiments seem as if they might most commodiously be formed into *two* classes, one called, in an extensive sense, *Fear*, the other, *Love*.—All sentiments of the respectful sort might be ranked under *Fear*; all those of a more kind and tender sort, under *Love*.—The former sort would arise from contemplating the power and justice of God; the latter, from attending to the Divine Benevolence.

The Church of England seems to acknowledge such a method of classing; in the Litany we beseech God, that it may please him to give us an heart (the seat of the sentiments and affections) to *love* him, and to *dread* him: and in the Collect for the second Sunday after Trinity, we beg, that he would “make us to have a perpetual fear and love of” his “holy name.”—By putting fear and love so close together, the compilers of our Liturgy might have some idea of a sentiment compounded of them as being proper for general use.

Under the head of *Fear* then, we rank respect, reverence, veneration, admiration, awe; besides what we call *Fear* usually.

And under the head of *Love*, complacency, gratitude, confidence, resignation, and *Love* properly so called.

IV. It

<sup>b</sup> De Subl. Sect. 22. de Hyperbatis.

iv. It may be as proper here as any where, to take notice of the effect of *Doubt* upon the sentiments and affections<sup>c</sup>.—When doubt and perplexity set the understanding at work, the affections will not rise to any considerable height: they flourish in tranquillity of mind, and security.

This observation may seem to contradict one of Mr. *Hume*<sup>d</sup>, that suspense and uncertainty *heighten* the passion of fear: but in the sort of situations from which Mr. Hume draws his opinion, the intellectual powers are not strongly exerted: a person just makes suppositions, which instantly excite passion; ‘my friend is in pain and misery;’—‘he is attacked and overcome;—he is gone, lost for ever:’—these are so many views of misery; so many *scenes* which must move and affect: but if a man under such fears were to set himself fairly to *reason*, or to estimate probabilities, I doubt not but the mere exertion of his understanding would moderate his apprehensions.

v. We must now consider how a due strength of the religious affections can be attained. Our proper business being with social institutions, we must not dwell on the measures to be used for this purpose by the private individual: we must be content with briefly observing, that he has it in his power to use methods which may be called internal and external: he has a power of turning his mind to such meditations as will warm his affections; and he has also the power of throwing himself into such scenes<sup>e</sup> and such society, and of reading such books, as will answer the same end.

But

<sup>c</sup> We have had occasion to hint at this before.

<sup>d</sup> Essay on the *Passions*, near end of Sect. 1.—No. 8. 8vo. Vol. ii. p. 189, 190. In Mr. Hume’s quotation from Hor. Lib. 5. Od. 1. for *pullus* read *pullis*.

<sup>e</sup> Contemplation of the Heavenly Bodies raises and sobers the mind.

But if we think only of our own proper business, of the manner in which *social* authority shall be used in order to excite devout affections in numbers of men; we must consider and study chiefly the principles of *Affociation* and *Sympathy*.

VI. Two *ideas* are said to be *affociated*, when, if one of them comes into the mind, it will bring the other along with it.—That Ideas do get to be so affociated, is plain from experience; the affociation is formed after the manner of *habits*: and, considering the innumerable and perpetual instances which we have of it, it is wonderful, that Mr. *Locke* should be the first philosopher who made regular observations upon it: this seems to have been the case, by his manner of introducing the <sup>f</sup>subject.—When we come into any *place* where we have conversed with a person, the *idea* of the *person* recurs with that of the *place*. And not only ideas recur thus, but they revive the old *sentiments* and *affections*.—We feel *terror* <sup>g</sup> at the appearance of an object which we saw when we were terrified; we feel *pleasure* at the sight of any thing which once made us happy. *Love* and *hatred* seem to be generated by habitual affociations between pleasure and a certain person; and pain and a certain person.—*Grief* is sometimes so strong, on coming into a room where one has attended a dying friend, that many persons have been obliged to avoid such scenes, for a great length of time, or for their whole Lives<sup>h</sup>.

#### Affociation

<sup>f</sup> Hum. Und. B. 2. Chap. xxxiii. See also Prelim. Diss. to King's Origin of Evil, Sect. 14.—ascribed to Mr. Gay; and Hartley's Preface.

<sup>g</sup> A friend of mine used to be under terror during an high wind: the house where he had boarded when at school had been blown down; he had left it a few minutes before.

<sup>h</sup> I remember when I was a Boy seeing a young man fall into a fit on the sound of the word *Dantzick*: he had been very ill, with fits, and a soldier had amused him with stories about *Dantzick*; after he got better, the mention of that City recalled the *stories*, and with them, the *illness*; repeatedly.

Affociation seems to be one foundation of our *habits*.

VII. *Sympathy* need not be defined; it is feeling as others feel; or having a *sensation* or *sentiment* merely because another person has the same, or something very near it; something rather *strouger* of the same sort. When a stroke<sup>i</sup> is aimed at another, we draw back our own leg or arm;—when a dancer on a rope twists himself, those of his spectators who are quite artless, do the same:—even robust men have, on seeing inflamed eyes, felt their own eyes in some degree as it were inflamed.—Grief and Joy, well<sup>k</sup> expressed, excite grief and joy. When we see benevolent actions, we sympathize both with the benefactor and the object<sup>l</sup>; and these sympathies forward each other. Sometimes we first conceive others to sympathize with us, and then we feel with them. A son who, by distinguishing himself, gives his Parents pleasure, sympathizes with their sympathy, or congratulation. Pleasures are heightened by Sympathy; we relish music, prospects, painting, poetry, or the chase, more in company with those who have the same tastes with ourselves, than with others. And if a man dislikes what we like, he lessens our pleasure; this, being opposite to Sympathy, might be called *Antipathy*.—Seditions are the more violent through Sympathy.—I think Sympathy is spoken of as having had great effects in the Crusades.—Sympathy seems to be the ground of our principle of *imitation*.

But we must not proceed farther with Affociation and Sympathy in general: whoever wishes to see those subjects treated at large, may consult Hartley on Man for the former, and Smith's Theory of moral

<sup>i</sup> Smith's Theory of moral Sentiments, p. 3. 8vo.

<sup>k</sup> Ib. p. 6. Rom. xii. 15.

<sup>l</sup> Ib. p. 81.

moral Sentiments for the latter. Both these works seem very useful for analyzing sentiments; and each author finds so much matter, as to think that what he has is sufficient: but *united*, they would be still more useful than separate: probably most of our sentiments and affections would be found, upon examination, to be owing to *a great number of both associations and sympathies*.

VIII. If we apply to *Religion* what has been said about Association, we observe, that whatever has been used for purposes of religion only, will immediately bring religious sentiments into our minds: or, in other words, our ideas of such a thing will be associated with our ideas of loving or fearing God.—This is applicable to buildings, vessels, robes, persons.—If, for instance, a Church had been always used by any one simply as a place of worship; if his mind had always, whilst he was in it, been wholly given up to thoughts of God and Religion; if his thoughts had never wandered to other subjects; if he had never considered the building as in any manner connected with his worldly interests; &c.; every part of it, every pillar in it, would seem to be in a manner animated; every part of it would seem to breathe a spirit of devotion:—one might almost say, it would be as a Body of which the Divinity himself was the Soul.

It may be asked, would not a particular *closet* in an House, if set apart, answer the same purpose? in some degree it would: but we have previously a general association between the rooms of a family mansion, and the cares, riches, pleasures, follies of this world:—however this would have some effect.

In short, Association is that on which we must chiefly depend for getting our attention at any time taken from worldly and sensual objects, quickly, immediately: and for getting it at once fixed on

the business of Devotion: though its effects by no means end here.

ix. Sympathy serves to heighten our affections, in a variety of ways. Not only in prayer, but in receiving instruction. It acts powerfully, not only on those who pray or give thanks with one mind, but on those who hear with one mind. Nay, instructors themselves are animated by a good audience; and the audience sympathize with their animation: so that new sympathies between the hearer and the speaker, keep continually arising.

It is a remarkable effect of Sympathy, that it not only hinders our affections from being too *dull*, but from being <sup>m</sup> *wild* and violent; from running into any extravagant vehemence, any impotent or effeminate excesses. In solitude, a man will be at one time phlegmatic, or melancholy; at another, enthusiastic, or frantic:—but when many others are present with him, the idea of their presence will both rouse him from *Lukewarmness*, and *restrain* him from excess of passion: will make him ashamed of stupidity, and yet afraid to venture beyond the boundaries of sobriety and common sense.

One cause of public worship might *in fact* be, that desire which men naturally have of communicating and sympathizing with one another in all matters of importance; in all transactions which have any thing noble or sublime in them.

x. Lastly, Association and Sympathy heighten one another, in Religion as well as in other things. If a man came into a church, and it had its proper effect upon him in the way of *association*, he would more freely *sympathize* with the rest of the congregation: and, on the other hand, the recollection of his having sympathized, would add strength to the association between the building and the worship.

The

<sup>m</sup> Book II. Chap. I. Sect. VII.

The sect called *Quakers*<sup>n</sup>, have sometimes *silent meetings*; that is, they assemble *together*, and in *buildings appropriated to religion*; such meetings may have all the benefits of *association*, and some of *Sympathy*, though none of *instruction*: and one does not see why a *public meditation* in a *place* of worship, might not *nourish* religious sentiments, though I am at a loss to conceive why it should be *preferred* to instruction and express worship of the Deity: the benefit of such a meeting may afford a sufficient *answer* to those who plead mediocrity of talents, &c. in the officiating minister or preacher, as an *excuse* for *absence* from Church.

<sup>a</sup> Though we are upon religious Society in *general*, we may mention particular sects, heathen or Christian, as *examples*, for the sake of illustration.



## C H A P. IV.

## OF UNITY OF DOCTRINE.

IT is a satisfaction to find that this expression, *Unity of Doctrine*, which when I first used it arose from the nature of the thing to be expressed, is one which was used at the time of the Reformation; this appears by the orders, or advertisements, or Articles, published by Queen Elizabeth in the year 1564<sup>a</sup>.

1. Our first business, in treating of unity of *Doctrine*, is to distinguish between that and unity of private *opinion*. Sterne says, all who think, think alike; we say, no two men think alike: but he means, in one thing, we mean in all things; or at least in all the doctrines of any one sect. Probably he would not have asserted, that in fact many are to be found who in his sense can be said to *think*; if any: his assertion seems rather to belong to theory than practice. That the nearer men approach to thinking with simplicity and precision, the nearer they are to unanimity, I doubt not; but we are more remote than we are aware of, from pure and accurate reasoning, free from rhetoric and declamation. If men thought alike in one thing, they might possibly in all things: but, in the present state of things, experience forbids us to hope that any two men will think so reasonably as to agree in such a number of opinions as generally constitute the Body of Doctrines of a religious society.

This

<sup>a</sup> See Bishop Sparrow's Collection, p. 122, 123.



This being the case, it follows, that if men must hold all the same opinions in order to worship together, no two men could join in religious duties. But, properly speaking, it is not unity of *opinion* that we want, but united *action*. Adopting, by social authority, a certain set of ceremonies, instructions, repetitions; and obeying that authority, is properly *action*. It is acting as politicians act, who agree upon, and follow one set of measures, though they think and judge differently from one another. Governors of Armies and of Communities of different kinds, act in the same manner.

*Some* likeness of opinion may be wanted in every one of these cases; but not a *total* coincidence.— We may say something more on this hereafter<sup>b</sup>; at present the business is only to *conceive*, that you and I and five thousand more, may agree to *unite* in public worship; may jointly enact, that a certain mode of instructing shall be pursued, that no confusion or wrangling shall be allowed in religious assemblies; and yet that each of us may differ from the rest in several *opinions*<sup>c</sup>.

II. We need not have a more proper place than this to mention the good of Uniformity in *Ceremonies*. Uniformity in ceremonies is extremely useful, and in a manner necessary to religious worship; without it, all things cannot be done “decently<sup>d</sup> and in order.” A ceremony affects both him who performs it, and him who sees it: and in congregations, each person is both a performer and a spectator. If in one’s closet kneeling generates humility,

<sup>b</sup> Sect. IV. of this Chapter.

<sup>c</sup> Baxter is very unwilling to suppose, that, though men differ about such a Doctrine as that of *Perseverancē*, a Doctrine, in his estimation, very important, they should not be in every thing as members of the same *Church*.—on *Persev.* prop. 6.—What is meant by this Doctrine, will appear under Article 16 of the Church of England.

<sup>d</sup> 1 Cor. xiv. 40.

lity, it will, by the help of sympathy, generate a stronger sentiment when many join in the same posture; though a weaker, if many are present, and some kneel whilst others stand: in that case, there will be what we have called an *Antipathy*. A ceremony regularly performed by a large number, if mild, simple, expressive, has a fine effect on all minds, from the most rude to the best informed: it pleases, it elevates, yet it calms or checks any turbulent emotions; it sobers the thoughts, and makes them orderly and decent.—To those who cannot read, or are apt to be inconsiderate, it affords a species of instruction: what the Psalmist says<sup>e</sup> about the language of the heavenly bodies, might be said of the language of ceremonies. “There is neither speech nor language, but their voices are heard among them:”—in whatever way men speak or write, the language of ceremonies is intelligible to them and affecting<sup>f</sup>.

III. We come now to the principal proposition, that Unity of doctrine is necessary towards procuring the Benefits of social Religion. The truth of this will appear from considering, that dissention in public teaching, 1. Deprives us of the benefit of those principles which were before spoken of as instrumental in promoting religious *sentiments*;— 2. That it obliges men to exert their intellectual powers; and 3. That it often raises passions which are incompatible with devotion. 1. Where dissention prevails, it is evident, that *Sympathy* cannot have place: strings in unison help each others vibrations, but when discordant, they check and obstruct one another; I might not run so immediately into this illustration, were there not a possibility

<sup>e</sup> Psalm xix. 3.

<sup>f</sup> It is a pity when *Pews* destroy the uniformity of the church ceremonies.

bility that it might prove more than a mere illustration, as we became better acquainted with the nervous system; and saw more distinctly the manner in which vibrations of the nerves and emotions of the mind are connected.

*Association* would not answer our purpose if the place of worship reminded us only of perplexity, dispute, and acrimony: while these filled the mind, we should have little feeling of the divine power or goodness. 2. *Dissension* must, moreover, set our *reasoning* powers in motion; and, as the arguments used would be very subtle, must put them upon the <sup>st</sup> stretch. And 3. it is scarce conceivable, that we should keep clear of party zeal and bitterness ourselves: these would effectually prevent any devout affections from springing forth, and flourishing in our breasts.

We have three capital Discourses from Dr. *Bal-guy* on things relating to religious society; in these there are several passages on our present subject, highly worthy of our attention.—In the octavo vol. of 1785, see p. 91. 92. 93. 99. 121. 255. 256. 257. 259.

In the above-mentioned Orders, &c. of Queen Elizabeth, published in 1564, provision is made in the first page, against dissension in the congregation; yet we find an instance of it in 1597, when Bishop *Bilson* preached one doctrine about the Descent into Hell, and another minister an opposite one in the same pulpit<sup>h</sup>; and with a design of disputing.

IV. As dissensions then are of so much importance, we should consider the *nature* and *effects* of them more particularly, and how they may be *avoided*. Though unity of Doctrine does not require

<sup>g</sup> B. III. Chap. III. Sect. IV.

<sup>h</sup> At Paul's Cross; see Strype's Whitgift, p. 502.

quire perfect unity of private opinion, yet it requires some likeness<sup>i</sup>; there are some differences of opinion which may be deemed inconsistent with unity of Doctrine. Supposing any such differences, of a striking sort, there must be a *separation*; and then each of the differing opinions may perhaps find favourers sufficient to form a society;—there is no very great difficulty in this; but there may be some cases where Diffensions *need not* occasion a separation, and others where it may be doubtful whether the differences in private opinion are consistent with unity of Doctrine, or not. Let us consider what may be done in doubts and difficulties of this nature.

You and I may differ about some *one* point which we may think *essential* to right worship, or right conduct; the Unity of God, worshipping him in spirit, human sacrifices, &c.—or we may differ about so *many* points, that omitting them all, might leave us too few subjects of public instruction, or too few expressions for public devotions: which would give too much to private devotion and meditation. In such cases, we had best see whether we can form two religious societies; if numbers are insufficient, that will be reason enough for our uniting, though we differ very considerably, as Christians would do in a *Heathen country*.—Breaking the Unity of the Catholic Church lightly, or without sufficient reason, is what has been called *Schism*, and is an important offence.

In general, Separations are apt to seem more necessary than they really are: it is not about fundamental doctrines, or about doctrines level to the human judgment, which men are apt to divide; but about those which are most peculiar to a few, and most obscure and difficult: yet it can scarce ever

<sup>i</sup> Dr. Balguy, Ser. vii. p. 119.

ever be really important to divide about these: it is rather impatience under our own ignorance, and pride, disdaining to submit, than *Reason*, which occasion diffensions about them, and, therefore, which occasion separations: we should avoid separations, if possible: especially as religious societies, like others, have many advantages by being extensive. Let us then consider the best methods of preventing separations, and such *Diffensions* as have been shewn to hurt religious sentiments.

1. Those whose business it is to *frame* any body of doctrines, or forms of devotion, ceremonies, &c. might contribute a good deal towards uniting men, and keeping them united, by being discreet in their expressions, and liberal in their notions; not encouraging contracted ideas, but the most enlarged and comprehensive. 2. When those who had framed doctrines, &c. had been too confined in their notions, separations and hurtful diffensions might sometimes be avoided by moderation in *inforcing* or carrying into execution. 3. Some good might follow from prudence in the public *teachers*, particularly in chusing such topics<sup>k</sup> as were least likely to give offence. 4. Separations and hurtful diffensions might be avoided by patience, forbearance and candour on the part of private *individuals*: when any thing occurred, in a religious assembly, which they wished to have been omitted, as bearing hard on their private opinions, they might be contented to suspend their assent and concurrence, for a time,—as is done in the Church of England by some, when the Athanasian Creed is read, or the Communion.

It could not but tend to keep men united in society, if it was generally considered, by all ranks and orders, what great force there is in *speaking alike*;

<sup>k</sup> Dr. Balguy allows this, Disc. vii. p. 118.

*alike*; how much it contributes either to make men *think* alike, or to forget that they differ, which comes much to the same thing in the present case.—Such is the habitual connexion between our words and ideas, that those who use the same words, cannot easily persuade themselves that they have not the same *ideas*: sometimes this connexion is an evil, when disputes want deciding, and you wish to shew that the same words are used in different senses; but here it would be a good.

Archbishop *Sharp* shews<sup>1</sup>, that if men would speak alike, they would ere long find that they had *already* thought alike, and that they had been hindered from perceiving it by different modes of expression; and by the different points of view in which they had placed the same thought.

Dr. *Powell* opens his second Discourse with a remark to our purpose; and the earnestness of St. Paul in his<sup>m</sup> text should not pass unnoticed.—One of the Fathers asks<sup>n</sup>, *rogo vos, cum sensu incolumes fitis, cur vocibus infantis?*—those whom he addresses, might be safe as to their meaning, if they did not *materially* differ from each other: some difference it is evident they had.

We have before<sup>o</sup> mentioned from Mosheim, that the followers and opposers of *Nestorius* held opinions the same in effect.

v. As what has here been offered, or recommended, may be thought more difficult in *practice* than it really is, it may be proper to mention a few *instances*.

In

<sup>1</sup> Vol. i. Ser. 1. 3d rule. This is not the *expression* of Abp. Sharp, but what he says *shews* this.

<sup>m</sup> 1 Cor. i. 10.

<sup>n</sup> Vigilius ad Eutych. L. 2. quoted in Pearson on the Creed, Art. 2. p. 141. Fol.

<sup>o</sup> B. 11. Chap. v. Sect. 111. or Mosheim, Cent. 5. 2 5. 9. Vol. ii. 8vo. p. 70.

In primitive times, though men had different ideas when they<sup>p</sup> said that Christ was the *Logos*, yet they called him so, and agreed in expression as if they had agreed in idea; so that no dissension ensued.

The Ebionites and Nazarenes called Christ “the *Son of God*,” but in different senses.

Some persons understand the petition in the Lord’s Prayer “deliver us from *evil*,” as if the evil were *natural* evil, contradistinguished to *temptation* or *moral* evil; others as if evil meant the *evil one*, or Satan; yet these join in the prayer without inconvenience<sup>r</sup>.

Bishop Burnet, speaking<sup>s</sup> of those who held different opinions concerning Predestination, adds, “how much soever they may differ and dispute in the Schools, their worship being the same, they do all join in it.”—He tells us also that the Lutherans and Calvinists agree in “*acts of worship*” with regard to the Eucharist, though they differ in *opinion* as to the manner in which Christ is present.

Clement the 9th made peace in his Church, by only substituting the word *sincerely*, in a declaration of faith, for the words *purely* and *simply*.—The question related to the Divine Decrees, and influence on the human will.—In such questions as the three last referred to, if dispute begins, there is nothing likely to end it; therefore discretion should be used to prevent its beginning: at such a time the alternative is, perpetual peace, or perpetual discord; or, in effect, perpetual encouragement or perpetual discouragement of religious principles.

## VI. One

<sup>p</sup> See Michaelis’s *Introd. Lect. Sect. 100. end.* Quarto.

<sup>q</sup> See Lard. *Works*, Vol. iii. p. 541. transl. from Beaufobre.

<sup>r</sup> People differ about *charity* covering sins, yet worship together, and use prayers, &c. concerning Charity.

<sup>s</sup> Pref. to Art. p. 17 and 18. 8vo.

<sup>t</sup> Voltaire’s *Louis 14. Jansenisme.* p. 276. 12mo.

VI. One thing which has stood in the way of such Unity of Doctrine as we are treating of, is the *right of private judgment*, the defence of which is always very popular:—On this right there has been much unsatisfactory arguing. Some have argued as if this right was always infringed when men were required to submit to the Rules of the *Society* to which they belonged: though those men enjoy the greatest possible freedom who live in well-ordered society. (Dr. Balguy, p. 121.) Some, as if it was violated when men were refused as *Ministers* in certain churches whose doctrines they would not teach: that is, were *prohibited* in certain societies, from teaching their own opinions: some, as if no man could have right of private judgment, who judged it best to act after the opinion of another. But such reasoning seems subversive of all religious Society; nay, of all social action whatsoever. Are the rights of private judgment violated because a man cannot speak as long as he pleases in certain clubs?—or because a farming servant may not use a drill plow?—or because a messenger is forbidden to deliver any message but that which his employer sends?

Neal, in his History of the Puritans, has something upon the right of private judgment, which seems to me inapplicable to religious Society. Vol. 1. 4to. p. 161.—Is each man to worship alone? are a thousand men to worship, each in his own way, and call themselves a Society? a Church? Suppose a man to speak in favour of private judgment about the *diseases* of the Body; it would be immediately asked, do you mean that no man shall follow the judgment of a Physician? that every Shop-keeper shall dissect? every Farmer study the materia medica? Chemistry, Botany, &c.?—no one would think it reasonable: therefore it is not merely truth  
and



and equity that those persons aim at, who plead for private judgment in religion; there is either interest or ambition at the bottom, though they may not know it: or a plan of evading Duties, and indulging in Vice: or of recommending particular alterations under general expressions of Liberty and Right<sup>u</sup>. Any one who is really desirous of keeping clear of error must be aware, when he hears encomiums spoken generally of religious Liberty, that they may mean no more than Liberty to *change* a present establishment into a new one.

VII. Another thing which has been a great hindrance to men's acquiescing in the kind of situation here recommended, is the notion, that establishments, by cramping men's freedom of inquiry, prevent improvement; that they are modes of Tyranny exercised by Priests; and that under Tyrants no powers of improving can be exerted. Whereas, establishments seem as if they were in reality the best means of improvement:—they may have been abused, and may be liable to abuse; Bigotry and Priestcraft may have tyrannized over consciences, and kept them confined in fetters, though even this has been chiefly in times of ignorance, when priests possessed most sorts of useful knowledge in being, and the people were very little able to guide themselves; but now no mischief of this kind is to be apprehended from them.—Suppose no establishment, all is confusion; from which no improvement can arise: suppose an establishment, all is orderly and quiet: the people follow their several occupations,

<sup>u</sup> I have heard Unitarians speak much of Liberty, right of private judgment, &c.; but, on asking them whether *Papists* were to be free from all tests and restraints, I never found them consistent with their own principles, generally expressed.—See Dr. Balguy, p. 273. 278. 279, and the opening of my 5th of November Sermon.

occupations, and improvement comes into the hands of those, who are best qualified to promote it. Some of these may be too forward to reform, others too backward; but, when improvement has been made by the most enlightened, it will be sure to descend to the People, as they are able to bear it; a little sooner or a little later.—Other things are under establishments as well as religion<sup>\*</sup>; they improve, and the more for being so; why may not religion? In Physic, men have kept observing received maxims in most things, and improving them in something; Heat, in the small-pox and fevers, used to be prescribed generally; but compliance with established rules has not prevented their being improved; those established rules were always capable of improvement; but to follow them, was always better than to set them wholly aside.—I have met with persons, who look upon the Newtonian Philosophy as only established for a time; who think, that it will be superseded, as the Cartesian has been:—it is needless to enter into the question: supposing this not improbable, yet still I should now say, study the Newtonian Philosophy; it is the *established* Philosophy; whatever improvements it may hereafter receive, you will profit most by learning what it teaches: if you neglect it, you will, comparatively, know nothing.—The same kind of reasoning might be applied to Agriculture; if I wanted to educate a person even for the very purpose of making improvements, I would put him first under some Steward or Farmer, who followed established rules. Established agriculture cannot be improved till it is practised; neither can established Virtue, or Religion.—In Religion, men have or affect something of a false pride or a false shame about being directed; but there seems no reason

<sup>\*</sup> Book II. Chap. IV. Sect. IV.

reason for being more ashamed of trusting to a Priest, than a Cobler: from whence it is natural again to conclude, that, when men are more ashamed, it is not merely through reason.—The result of what has been said seems strongly in favour of Religious establishments.

VIII. It follows from this view of religious establishments, that a man may, reasonably and lawfully, live under any one, and conform to it, who is not against reforming it; and who allows, that it has imperfections: for one use of establishments is, to promote improvements, or reformations, with the least disturbance possible.

But moreover, many persons have *two capacities* to improve in, indeed all those have, who are likely to improve establishments: those of the *Man* and the *Philosopher*. As a religious Philosopher, it has just now appeared, that I may improve myself under an establishment; but, as a man, I stand no chance of improving without one: my principles can in no other way have any likelihood of being nourished and supported; were I ever so desirous, in the character of a Philosopher, to reform and improve the establishment to which I belong, yet I must act under it regularly, as a man. Nay, I must take care, while I am pursuing improvement in the former capacity, that I do not forget my interests in the latter. A man may look so much beyond his establishment, as to lose a great deal of private improvement; and indeed he may so give himself up to his private improvement, and confine his views so much to his present establishment, as never to improve that.

But suppose a man had not these views to improvement, in becoming a member of religious society, but only found himself settled in an establishment, he knew not why, by birth, education,

&c. imperfections in it would not, always at least, afford any good reason for his removing: yet, whenever he finds an imperfection, he must wish it altered. All human institutions will be imperfect<sup>y</sup>, and the particular regulations of every religious society are human. He is under establishments in Law and Physic, these are imperfect, but that is no good reason for throwing them aside. Who dare break through all established rules of what we call Fashion, in dress, &c. on the plea of their being imperfect? a man may be thoroughly convinced, that it is absurd to cut away the beard, to throw<sup>z</sup> white dust into the hair, and use a tenacious fluid to keep it there; but a wise man will judge, that more good will arise from compliance than from singularity: yet, at the same time that he complies, he will be making some advances towards reformation.

Men of the world seem very unreasonable, in not submitting to act under religious establishments; they think themselves above it; all are quacks in Divinity; men in active life will talk as Reformers, lightly and frivolously; and they would not scruple to undertake the task of reforming, without judgment, knowledge, or any consistent plan; and without any probability of not falling into great errors. Would they not act more reasonably, if they conformed to establishments, and only mentioned their ideas of improvement to those, who were prudent and informed enough to judge of them maturely? only pressing them if they saw, that they

<sup>y</sup> Dr. Balguy, p. 125. Discourse VII.

<sup>z</sup> "In the days of Clemens Alexandrinus, the Christians thought it a very horrible thing to wear false hair; and  
Calvo turpius est nihil comato,  
suid Martial to Marinus," &c. (Lib. x. Epigr. 83.) see Taylor's *Ductor dubitantium*, 3. 1. 5. p. 434.

Did not Charles the 2d write some Letter against perukes to the University of Cambridge?

they were opposed more through indolence than reason.

IX. When a body of Doctrine is to be fixed upon, in order that unity of teaching may have place, it may happen, that several doctrines will be set up or proposed, in competition with each other. In this case, it may sometimes promote unity to have different parties enter into a *compromise*. It seems *odd* at first, that men should presume to settle truths, as if they could order a proposition to be true or not true, as they pleased: and Mr. *Voltaire* ridicules such kind of compromise: speaking of the Jansenists and Jesuits, and of one Jesuit *Achilles Gaillard*<sup>a</sup> in particular, he says, “Il proposa gravement d’accepter la predestination gratuite, à condition que les Dominicains admettraient la science<sup>b</sup> moienne; et qu’ on ajusterait ces deux systèmes comme on pourrait.” This at first has the air, as if the Jesuits could allow Predestination to be true in what degree they chose, and in like manner the Jansenists the Doctrine of Grace: but, though this might be ridiculous in theory, yet in practice something of the sort might reasonably take place. Suppose the Jesuits not to allow gratuitous predestination in their private opinion, they might agree, for the sake of peace, not to oppose it, or require subscriptions or declarations in *contradiction* to it: and so might the Jansenists do, with regard to the Jesuitical notion about the assistance of the Holy Spirit.—And accordingly, in consequence of this compromise, we are told, “On<sup>c</sup> composa

<sup>a</sup> *Siecle de Louis XIV.*, *Jansenisme*, not far from the beginning, p. 263. 12mo.

<sup>b</sup> For *scientia media* see *Vitringa Theol.* Vol. 1. De attributis—(Sapientia.)

<sup>c</sup> See *Voltaire’s Jansenisme*, in *Louis XIV.* towards end. p. 206. 12mo.

Dr. *Balguy* allows of “mutual concessions:” p. 125. in *Disc.* v 11.

composa un *corps de doctrine*, qui contenta presque les deux partis.”

Allied to mutual concessions, is obedience to *injunctions* of the civil power to put an end to disputes on speculative doctrines: in this, the open profession and maintaining of opinion, is sacrificed to good order, and to that good turn of mind, which arises from order and peace. It might seem, as if no earthly Governor had a power to silence the preacher of truth; as if he might follow the example of <sup>d</sup> Peter and John, who preferred the command of God to that of the Council:—but the business of the ordinary teacher, in the cases we speak of, is not to propagate a system of religion like the Christian; nor has he miraculous power, to shew that he is to judge for himself; he should think what is the least evil, to obey the Magistrate, or to destroy the peace of the Church.

Injunctions of the kind we speak of are, that of <sup>e</sup> Charles 1st. prefixed to our Articles; and those of several Popes, who endeavoured to bring the Jansenists and their opponents to teach the common moral duties.—The title of our Articles shews, that they were made “for avoiding of diversities of opinions, and for the establishing of *consent* touching true religion.”

Dr. Balguy should be read; particularly his seventh Discourse.

<sup>d</sup> Acts iv. 19. Dr. Balguy, p. 119.

<sup>e</sup> That this was by Charles 1st. see Pamphlet called “A Diss. on the 17th Art. &c.—Oxf. 1773.

## C H A P. V.

## OF ARTICLES OF RELIGION.

1. **W**E have now, according to our plan, shewn, that the way to promote right *conduct* is, to study the nature of *Sentiments*, religious ones in particular: and that the way to promote good sentiments is, to maintain *unity* of doctrine; the last thing is to shew, that the way to maintain unity of Doctrine is, to require, from those who are to teach, some kind of *assent* to that which is to be taught.

Attempts have been made to shew, that such assent is *needless*<sup>a</sup>; if it is so, it must be owned that they do wrong, who insist upon it. The Remonstrants in Holland<sup>b</sup>, a very respectable set of people, made one attempt of this sort; the Ministers of our own Church made another, not many years ago: but I consider both as mere expedients of Reformers, aiming to change particular Doctrines, not as coming from objections of mere reason to all Articles. If reformers can get rid of one establishment, they can more easily introduce<sup>c</sup> another; and I have no idea, that either the Dutch Remonstrants or our own countrymen would have gone  
on

<sup>a</sup> See end of Jefferson's Notes on Virginia: the experiment is not yet fully tried there, and whilst it is trying, it comes under an observation to be made in this Chapter.

<sup>b</sup> See Dr. Jortin's Six Dissertations, p. 104, 105. The Synod of Dort was in 1618 and 1619.

<sup>c</sup> Were ever any persons known to wish to throw off subscriptions to any doctrines, who meant to continue the profession of the same doctrines? these would be the persons to be heard against *subscriptions*.

on without one, or without declarations on the part of the teachers, for any length of time<sup>d</sup>.

II. Not but there are some specious things to be said in favour of leaving men at liberty; there are some suppositions on which, and some circumstances in which, assent to doctrines would be needless; and we shall not go to the bottom of the subject, if we do not inquire what they are. Till it is shewn, that none of them can be expected to be realized in the present state of things, they will be perpetually urged as objections to our manner of managing religious Society. Besides, to conceive different cases, must enlarge the mind, and let us see the nature of all religious establishments, without the peculiarities of any one. If we do not think in this way, we do not distinguish between peculiarities, and those properties which are inherent in the nature of Religious Society as such.

Dr. *Powell* says<sup>e</sup>, very sensibly, “ Since it cannot be imagined, that men should explain with clearness, or enforce with earnestness, or defend with accuracy of judgment, such doctrines as they do not believe; the Church requires of those, who are appointed to teach religion, a solemn declaration of their Faith.” When Dr. *Powell* says, “ it cannot be *imagined*,” he does not say it is *impossible*; he reasons from experience, his conclusion is *probable*.—Dr. *Balguy*, in that admirable composition his fifth Charge, does, as I conceive, the same. This method was best suited to their purpose;—we have only to hope, that *our* plan may be suitable to a course of Lectures. I know not that there is amongst us any difference of opinion.

III. The most obvious, though not the most probable, supposition is, that there was no material

<sup>d</sup> Oliver Cromwell was for making an ecclesiastical establishment, or national Church, at last. See Hume, A. D. 1656.

<sup>e</sup> Disc. p. 33.



rial difference of *Opinion* amongst the students of religion in any number of men who lived together. None which could occasion any *dissensions* hurtful to religious *sentiments*; none which *seemed* to the persons concerned inconsistent with the carrying on of a religious Society. This may seem too improbable a supposition to bear mentioning; but yet it should be made, as no assent to doctrines need be given in such a case: and we should observe, that it would come to much the same thing, if there was great *moderation* about the different modes of expressing those doctrines, which we cannot comprehend; for it is chiefly about these <sup>f</sup> that any dissensions arise, which disturb the peace of the Church, so as to defeat the *ends* of religious society. We and the Socinians are said to differ, but about what? not about morality, or natural religion, or the divine authority of the Christian Religion; we differ only about what we do not understand: and about what is to be done on the part of God: and, if we allowed one another to use expressions at will, (and what great matter could that be in what might almost be called unmeaning expressions?) we need never be upon our guard against each other: a heathen Socrates, I think, would be surprized at those, who agreed in so many things, requiring declarations and subscriptions in order to exclude one another; he would judge, that we might worship together, and even have the same body of doctrine: each party thinking freely in private, and using discreet expressions in public<sup>g</sup>.

IV. The

<sup>f</sup> Chap. IV. Sect. IV.

<sup>g</sup> The Epistle of the Emperor Constantine to the heads of the parties when Arianism first broke out, does him honour. It is easily found in Eusebius's Life of Constantine, or in Socrates's Ecclesiastical History. Lardner commends it; Works, Vol. IV. p. 188 and 200. It is mentioned again, in our B. IV. Art. I. Sect. XV. end.

IV. The second supposition, on which no solemn assent need be given, or no Articles subscribed, is, that no *disturbance* has happened;—mere apprehension of the possibility of disturbance, without experience, is not a sufficient reason for laying restraints: by disturbance we mean, such as would prevent the growth of religious sentiments. Our Church has not published any new articles since 1562, when the national Religion was *changed*, (and then they cut off some few of 1552) yet, if they had given way to every apprehension of disturbance, they probably would have framed some new Confession.—Nevertheless, though mere suspicion is not sufficient to justify restraints, strong marks of a turbulent disposition may; such as in Law are, with regard to Treason, called *overt acts*<sup>h</sup>: a man may not attack an ill-looking person whom he meets, merely because he is afraid of being attacked by him; yet he may take *some* signs as proofs of an hostile intention; if he stays till he has certainty of an attack, self-defence may be impossible.

v. A third supposition, on which assent to doctrines need not be required, is, that there were some *mechanical* way of spreading those which were established. *Homilies* are something of this sort, supposing them wholly to exclude preaching. If the whole duty of a teacher consisted in reading an Homily, it would be matter of little moment whether his opinions exactly coincided with those he read. And it would be much the same, if he would look upon himself as a mere instrument in the hand of the Church: or as having no concern with truth, as not being accountable for falshood, in the mere character of a teacher. — This need only relate to the more obscure doctrines; in points not controverted, he might be warm and earnest.—I have

<sup>h</sup> Blackstone. Index, *Overt act*.

have sometimes told my Congregation, in Sermons, that I speak as a minister, and not as a man; that, though I believe the doctrines I preach, I deliver them not as my own, but as the doctrines of the Church: and on this account such doctrines demand greater attention.

It would come to much the same thing, if teachers agreed in judgment to what has been here laid down, and looked upon themselves as *bound* to promote unity of Doctrine: of that Doctrine, which was prescribed by the Authority under which they taught: if they were convinced, that peace of mind, by producing good sentiments, was of greater consequence than the difference between this mysterious opinion and that, whilst it generated discord and disunion.

VI. If then we find no great difference of *opinion*,—or, if men suffer one another to *express* themselves as they please about doctrines above the reach of man;—or, if difference of opinion occasions no *disturbance* or confusion; or, if *mechanical* ways of spreading doctrines are contrived and enjoined, or teachers turn *themselves* into mere instruments;—or, lastly, if teachers highly esteem *unity* of doctrine, and maintain it conscientiously; in any of these cases, assent to articles of religion is not to be required:—each set of people must ask themselves, therefore,—*are* we nearly of the same opinions? *do* we leave men to express themselves as they please about mysteries? have we any mechanical contrivances for teaching what authority prescribes?—do teachers consider themselves as mere machines in the hands of the Church? are they strongly impressed with the infinite importance of unity of doctrine? Upon the answers, which we are able to give to these questions, must our conduct depend, in particular churches;—but the actual state of particular

ticular churches is not now the subject of our consideration. One word may be said on the expedient of spreading Doctrines by means<sup>i</sup> of *Homilies*: it seems easy, but it does more harm, when a number of good preachers can be had, than restraining those preachers to deliver the same doctrine, and taking the security of their private judgment that they will do so. There would be, from time to time, if preachers were encouraged, new illustrations of virtue and religion; of natural religion as well as revealed: there would be, probably, in the natural course of improvement, numberless new lights thrown upon the Scripture:—now the constant use of Homilies would preclude all this: and to reform them would be nearly as difficult as to reform Liturgy, or Articles, even though they would become insipid by frequent repetition.

Dr. Balguy says<sup>k</sup>, “It should never be forgotten by ministers, that they are subject to higher authority. They are to execute Law, not to make it.”—And afterwards<sup>l</sup>, “Every word that comes from our mouths in opposition to the established faith, is a violation of the most solemn engagements, and an act of disobedience to lawful authority.”—Though this is said with particular relation to the Church of England, in which Ministers make express engagements, yet it would be just, though our engagements were only tacit and implied: it expresses perfectly well the general rights of religious Society over its ministers; but rights are not the whole matter; on the present subject, we would see moreover some *security*, that such rights will not be lost, or violated.—The kind of security to be required, in any particular case, will depend upon the answers which can be given to the questions  
just

<sup>i</sup> Mentioned Sect. 5.

<sup>k</sup> P. 113. Ser. vii.

<sup>l</sup> P. 119. See also p. 118

just now proposed; but something may be observed upon general considerations.

If a new religious society was to be formed, quite as a *res integra*, of persons well disposed, but unconnected, if they were tolerably well informed, though some Body of doctrine should be constructed, the teachers should be left to their own consciences to deliver it faithfully.—And this should continue till some abuses should arise, which were likely to disturb men's minds, and defeat the ends of religious society<sup>m</sup>.

But, if men began to contend, got to be vehement, to form separate parties, to prefer men of their own religious persuasion, even in civil offices, in all sorts of employments of trust or profit, to exert themselves in shewing such preference; if they were found labouring secretly to gain proselytes, and insinuating themselves amongst those, whom they accounted enemies, as spies, or seducers; then the public tranquillity, and the nature of religious principles, would require, that those of one party should be rendered *discernible* from those of another, by certain *marks*. And, as it is not to be supposed, that any man would be ashamed of his own opinion, or afraid to own it, what mode of distinguishing religious parties could be so simple and natural, as drawing out a list of the opinions of one or more parties, and asking any man, who seemed likely to occasion any disturbance by his situation or employment, whether those opinions were his? whether, if he was a teacher, he would teach those opinions? whether, if he was a common  
man,

<sup>m</sup> This is the observation promised in Note to Sect. 1. about America. Let the experiment of requiring no judgment on the Doctrines to be taught, be tried there: but let us not be impatient whilst we are watching the issue: nor, if the Spirit of Party suffers it to succeed there for a considerable time, let us be rash in concluding our situation to be exactly similar to theirs.

man, he would chuse to be ranked with such as held those opinions, and be a member of their Society?

This may give an idea of what might occasion Articles of religion to be made, and assent to them to be required. One of these parties might perhaps be very opulent, another very poor; and, in the course of a few years, they might change situations with respect to wealth and poverty; but all this is merely *incidental*, and does not at all affect our reasoning.



## C H A P VI.

OF ARTICLES OF RELIGION, WHICH HAVE BEEN CONTINUED FOR A LENGTH OF *TIME*, WHILST OTHER THINGS HAVE BEEN CHANGING.

**W**E have now completed our Plan; we have proposed what is the main consideration in religious Societies of modern times, that is to say, assent to Articles of Religion; we have shewn, from the nature of Veracity, what is the nature of such assent, and, from the general nature of religious society, when such assent may be requisite<sup>a</sup>, when it may be dispensed with.

But what has been advanced in this Book, has all gone upon the supposition, that Articles of Religion are composed at the time they are assented to; whereas, in fact, there are so many difficulties in forming a Body of Articles, that, once made, the same continues for a great number of *ages*. And yet, in a great number of ages, great *changes*, of one sort or other, generally take place. If the faculties of the mind are well employed, great improvements; if otherwise, great abuses, founded on great errors.

If the Forms to be assented to continue the same, while many things relating to them change, the nature of the assent will change; and so may its expediency.

Something therefore remains to be said, on supposition of long continuance of Articles of Religion; and *the whole of what is to come*, in the present Book, will consist of observations either arising immediately

<sup>a</sup> Chap. v.

mediately out of ſuch ſuppoſition, or in ſome meaſure connected with it. Other ſubjects may be introduced which might, in part, be treated independently, but none which will not be treated to more advantage by being made to belong to it.

It may be proper to ſuggeſt a caution, that every thing that is ſaid be not applied, or thought applicable, to the Articles of the Church of England in particular. I am not the perſon, who would inſinuate, that any of our own Articles ſtand in need of any thing beyond plain interpretation; but ſome may think, that ſome of them do: and it cannot but be uſeful to thoſe, who ſubſcribe Articles made 230 years ago, to purſue a train of *general* reaſoning, concerning the effect of antiquity on fixed forms, whether any one applies it to his own forms or not.

The foundation of every thing, which I have to obſerve on this ſubject, is what I would call a *Tacit Reformation*: let us therefore examine the nature of that.

1. Our firſt ſtep may be to take a *general idea* of the effects of *age*, in Articles of Religion. It has appeared, in the firſt Book<sup>b</sup>, that few if any propoſitions are ſtrictly univerſal; things expreſſed as if they were univerſally meant, have generally ſome particular *references*, by which they are to be *limited*; now, when propoſitions are *new*, theſe references are perfectly intelligible; nay, they ſeem to be no references at all; the mind makes them ſo eaſily, as not to be conſcious of making them: but, when the propoſitions are *old*, the circumſtances, to which reference is made, are no longer ſeen; the references therefore are loſt, and the propoſitions come to be interpreted in a more ſtrict and literal ſenſe, with fewer exceptions and limitations than any one

would

<sup>b</sup> Chap. x.



would have interpreted them with, at the time they were made. Or, if it is seen that the strict literal universal sense could not originally be the true one, and allowances are made on that account, such allowances must be made at random, and must often be wrongly imagined or conjectured; still, therefore, the old references are different from the new; and therefore the old *sense*. Instances would illustrate this to those, who thought it obscure; but, in the first book, so many were brought, that I am unwilling to add more.

But, moreover, supposing the propositions themselves to continue intelligible, and to be understood in their right sense; yet still changes in *other things*, in other parts of knowledge, would set them in a different point of view. There is such a connexion and affinity between different parts of knowledge, that whatever much affects one part will, in some degree, affect another.

II. Besides these changes in the sense of expressions which arise in a general way, in the natural course of things, we may, without improbability, suppose some particular researches to bring to light some *particular error* in the forms, to which assent is to be given, or which are used in public worship. This might happen from the study of manuscripts, or other parts of criticism:—it seems really to have happened with regard to 1 Pet. iii. 19. which, in the third Article of the Church of England, as made in 1552, is interpreted of Christ's descent into Hell. It did indeed happen, that the reformed doctrine of the English Church was not finally settled in 1552; and, therefore, ten years afterwards, this Article was altered; but we may easily suppose such alteration not to have taken place: and, in truth, this part of Scripture is still used as the Epistle for Easter Even; if there is any

particular propriety in using it on that day, the same construction must remain. Denouncing sentence of eternal *damnation* upon unworthy receivers of the Lord's Supper, is now acknowledged to be an error, but the forms are not changed.—Praying that Magistrates may maintain *Truth* (as we do in our Litany) was best suited to times prior to the settlement of Toleration<sup>c</sup>.

When these things happen, what is to be done? an unthinking man would say, *repeal*, alter, when you find errors; this is the most obvious measure to suggest, but it is often extremely difficult to practise: so difficult, that it may be best in many, nay in most, instances, to let the errors *stand* as they did, in the *Letter*, and only depart from them in the *Spirit*.

III. The *Reasons* for this had better make a separate consideration; here we will observe, that, when forms are left in *words*, but taken away or altered in *meaning*, it may be either said, that they grow *obsolete*, or that the *Law* which enjoins them is tacitly *repealed*. And we will add, that a tacit repeal is of equal <sup>d</sup> *validity* with an express one. The authority of the Lawgiver is on the same footing with that of the Master, or Proprietor; it may be relaxed in different degrees, it may be withdrawn totally, and yet in silence; and, when authority of any kind is withdrawn, in any way, subjection, or obligation to obey, can no longer subsist. Right to command may be *relinquished* in the same manner with right to possess or enjoy; and, with right, must cease its correlative, obligation: that which is relinquished requires no attention, as a matter of duty.

But

<sup>c</sup> See Dr. Balguy; opening of 3d Charge: and Chap. xiv. Sect. 11. of this Book.

<sup>d</sup> My Assize Sermon, p. 4.

But the reasons for leaving errors uncorrected, and suffering forms to grow obsolete, or repealing only *tacitly* the Laws which enjoin them, are to be considered more particularly.—It must not be understood, that this method is recommended as positive good in itself; it is only recommended as negative good, or as the *least evil*. It occasions the least interruption of Peace, and therefore of religious affections and principles. It seems strictly defensible and right; and capable of being explained to those, who have scruples about its rectitude. Errors of the kind we speak of generally make part of a *system*; and the authority of a part cannot be destroyed, without first acting contrary to the authority of the whole: when that habitual veneration for the system of doctrines, on which religion so much depends, must be broken in upon, and greatly damaged. When the parts of any machine are separated, it is found, that taking to pieces is a much easier work than putting together. And the difference is at least as great in a religious machine, or system, where every part may be *changed*, as in any other: it has been found, that, when such a system has been dissolved, all men turn Lawgivers, Reformers, founders of sects:—and the most quiet can agree on rejecting an error, when they cannot agree upon accepting a substitution in its place.—In order to settle such substitution, numbers must consult together; these it will be often difficult to assemble, often difficult to dissolve: they get into debates on subjects, which were, in many conjunctures, better left untouched; they run into strife and contention, to which there is no end; Solomon says<sup>e</sup>, “the beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water;” and his saying is not more applicable to any kind of strife than to religious.

But,

<sup>e</sup> Prov. xvii. 14.

But, though a council would probably be numerous, they would have to satisfy a much greater number than themselves, whose *acceptance* is necessary: the *people at large* must be satisfied, whether those in authority are many or few. Here we come into the regions of *ignorance* and *prejudice*; amongst those, who act from their habitual *feelings*. Reason and good sense will not prevail here against established custom<sup>f</sup>: the sudden imposition of new Laws will exasperate and revolt the generality of those, whose minds are unprepared<sup>g</sup> to receive them: but, leave erroneous notions to shew themselves gradually, and esteem<sup>h</sup> for them will decay; and others adopted in their place will at last be quietly received. Nay, if the people were to be told this, and were determined to throw aside custom, and follow reason, the matter would be full as bad. All would run into confusion.

Those, who were enemies to this method, if continued for a great length of time, must, one would think, allow of it as a *temporary* expedient. Teachers of religion must not stop; a succession of them must be ordained; though some things appear, in the forms to be used or assented to by them, which want amendment. And, if things go on thus for a while, it must appear, that they might go on longer: making alterations cannot seem a work of immediate necessity.

#### IV. If

<sup>f</sup> There is an old story of a Romish Priest, who had in his Book *mumpsimus*, instead of *sumpsimus*; the error was pointed out to him, but he declared he would never give up his *mumpsimus* for the *sumpsimus* of any man, let him be who he would.

The change of *Stile* (from O. S. to N. S.) produced many murmurings, and superstitious terrors; some anile personages have thought, that nothing has ever gone quite right, since that change was made.

<sup>g</sup> Spirit of Laws, B. xix. Chap. ii.

<sup>h</sup> My Assize-Sermon, p. 7.

IV. If we conceive a *number* of improvements to be made in the manner here described, we may conceive what I should call a *tacit Reformation*: the reasons for continuing a number of errors are the same as for one: when the number is sufficiently large, and has continued a sufficient time, it may produce an *express* reformation; but so long as, on a footing of probability, we should judge, that it would produce more mischief than the continuance of the errors in form or appearance, so long we are to avoid making *express* alterations.—In *practice*, there will be a difficulty to know and settle what to allow as an improvement: or as an improvement duly ratified: the best method seems to be, to observe what the generality of learned and judicious men allow to be such; only they should be men, who shew no particular love of innovation; no ambition to distinguish themselves by reforming; no restlessness under authority, no want of respect to the wisdom of preceding generations. In general, such as have these faults are but few in comparison of the steady, prudent, and sober-minded. And therefore we may say, without thinking much of exceptions, that the most rational and improved are to be attended to; that what they adopt may be established as an improvement; or even what they do not oppose, when suggested by others. These are those, who *ought* to take the lead, and they will do so after a time, if not at first.

V. It is possible to conceive such a series of improvements, that *all* the Laws enjoining forms should be repealed; in this case, there would be a *perfect Liberty*. And one does not see why that Liberty might not continue, till fresh dissensions and disturbances<sup>k</sup> called for fresh restraints and declarations of opinion. This conception may seem

extravagant,

<sup>i</sup> Powell, p. 35.

<sup>k</sup> Chap. v. Sect. IV.

extravagant; but one case, which will be mentioned amongst the instances in the next Section, seems to come very near it. The mere conception may give us an *idea* how tacit improvements generate *Liberty*. Whatever is expressed in words lately settled, must require obedience without abatement; whatever is old, becomes more indefinite, and is to be construed with greater latitude. If you expunge any thing, and substitute something else in its place, what is substituted must be construed literally, or what would be called so; with only such references, as the words at the time are seen to imply. It was uncertain what references the expunged words implied, and therefore a reasonable freedom of interpretation might be allowed, lest they should lay a greater restraint than they had been intended to lay.—Dr. *Powell* says, at the end of his second discourse, something to the same purpose.—This liberty is only to be considered, I think, as an *incidental* advantage; not as one, which would determine men to avoid express improvements.

VI. After all, it is not perhaps to be expected, that all persons will be *satisfied* with this reasoning, and with the method of tacit Reformation. Some will see, that it is liable to *abuse*; others will call it crafty, evasive, and Jesuitical. It *does* seem liable to abuse; but what is not so? Every duty may be evaded by an unfair mind, and a fair ingenuous mind will not treat rules and forms as obsolete, which are really still in force. Cautions may be made so determinate, as to serve for guides and directions in doubts concerning this matter, full as well as concerning many others. As to the reasoning being evasive and Jesuitical, that cannot be said from an attentive consideration of the argument; it will bear that test very well; but such blame may arise from a slight view of it; from reflection

flexion upon it cut short by passion or sentiment; by abhorrence of duplicity and deceit:—it may arise from that honest abruptness, which will not listen to any thing that seems calculated to perplex plain integrity, to entangle common sense, to confound truth with falshood.—Now, nothing can obviate difficulties of this kind better than a few *facts*: and amongst facts may be reckoned *sayings* of eminent persons, who spoke with no view to the present inquiry. We will first then mention some instance or two of *civil* Laws losing their force tacitly and gradually; then a few *facts* relating to matters *ecclesiastical*; and lastly we will produce a few *sayings* to shew, that our notion is such as has been recognized and approved by men of sense and judgment.—We have before<sup>1</sup> mentioned the tenure of lands called *Villanage*; in the 15th and 16th Centuries, *Improvements* took place in deriving benefit from land, both to the Owner and Tenant: the consequence was, that “Villanage<sup>m</sup> went gradually into *disuse* throughout the more civilized parts of Europe.”—“And, though<sup>n</sup> the ancient statutes on this subject remain still unrepealed by Parliament, it appears that, before the reign of Elizabeth, the distinction of Villain and Freeman was totally though insensibly abolished.”—In 1529, *Cardinal Wolfey* was indicted on a Statute of Richard 2d. for procuring Bulls from Rome: on this Indictment, Mr. Hume remarks<sup>o</sup>, “besides that this statute was fallen altogether into disuse, nothing could be more rigorous and severe than to impute to him, as a crime, what he had openly, during a course of so many years, practised with the consent and approbation of the King, and the acquiescence of the Parliament and Kingdom.”

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<sup>1</sup> Chap. 11. Sect. 1v.      <sup>m</sup> Hume, Vol. ii. 4to. p. 444.

<sup>n</sup> Ibid. p. 445.      <sup>o</sup> Vol. iii. 4to. p. 162.

The *disuse* was sufficient proof, that this statute was virtually repealed: the acting contrary to it, with approbation or acquiescence, was demonstration. Instead, therefore, of calling the Indictment “rigorous and severe,” I should call it unjust and iniquitous in the greatest degree. The same statute of Richard 2d. (called the Statute of Provisors) was afterwards<sup>p</sup> made use of to depress the Clergy in general.—We find a similar instance of injustice, in the conviction of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, recorded in the Life of *Bishop Pearce*<sup>q</sup>.

In *ecclesiastical* matters, nothing is more to our purpose than seeing, that the *difficulties* of altering forms have been really such as we have supposed them; an instance of this might be, the troubles and disturbances occasioned by substituting the French for the Spanish Liturgy or Mass, called the *Mosarabic*<sup>r</sup>, or Liturgy of Toledo; or those occasioned by our Charles 1st. attempting to establish the use of the English Liturgy in *Scotland*<sup>s</sup>.—In 1780, the *Protestant Association* occasioned dreadful Riots in London; how far attachment to the Protestant Religion was concerned in these, may be difficult to determine. *Zuinglius*, the Reformer at Zurich, in 1523 preached against the established Religion, the Roman; the Senate ordered him to continue to do so, at the same time that they continued the same<sup>t</sup> outward worship, which was contrary to the preaching that they themselves ordered. But, in the modern Church of *Geneva*, the most complete *tacit Reformation* seems to have taken place.

Geneva

<sup>p</sup> Ibid. p. 170. Jan. 16, 1531. <sup>q</sup> P. xiv.

<sup>r</sup> Gomecius de rebus gestis Ximenis, Lib. ii. Card. Bona Liturg. Lib. 1. Cap. xi. Sect. 3.

<sup>s</sup> Hume, Vol. v. 4to. p. 214. A. D. 1637. The Jealousies might be mentioned occasioned by Charles 1st.'s Queen being a Papist. Ibid. p. 189.

<sup>t</sup> Dupin's comp. Hist. Cent. 16. Chap. vii.



Geneva was the metropolis of Calvinism; Calvin himself taught there; and, after him, Beza: but the Genevete have now in fact quitted their Calvinistic Doctrines, though in *form* they retain them: one reason for retaining the form is, lest they should be thought Heretics by the Dutch Churches.—When the Catechumens are admitted to the Sacrament, they only give an assent to the Scriptures, and the Apostles' Creed; but, when the Minister is admitted, he takes an oath of assent to the Scriptures, and professes to teach them ‘according to the Catechism of *Calvin*;

but this last clause, about Calvin, he makes a separate business; speaking lower, or altering his posture, or speaking after a considerable interval.—There seems still to be some obligation to read public *Lectures* at Geneva on Calvin's Catechism, for the Lecturers propose a part of it as a *subject* or text; but then they immediately go off to something else: they do not adhere to it, nor even treat of it.—The Youth are chiefly taught Ostervald's Catechism, which seems to contain what may now be called the *real* religion of Geneva<sup>u</sup>.

Lastly, I will mention a few *sayings* or expressions, which may shew, that the notion of tacitly repealing, or of *desuetude*, has been professed by men of judgment. Cicero says<sup>x</sup>, “Non vides veteres leges aut ipsâ suâ vetustate consenuisse, aut novis legibus esse sublatas?”—In the Digests, we have, “Rectissimè etiam illud receptum est, ut leges non solum iussu Legislatoris, sed etiam tacito consensu omnium, per desuetudinem abrogentur.”

<sup>u</sup> This account is taken from a Letter written by a late Minister of Geneva, to a respectable Fellow of a College in Cambridge: written, I believe, for my information; with a view to my History of Predestination.

<sup>x</sup> Cic. de Oratore, 1. 58.

gentur." Here, the Laws must be supposed to keep their place in the Code, and in their old forms. Bishop *Taylor*<sup>y</sup> seems to say, that, when a *custom* gets established, though against Law, it is valid, if the Supreme Magistrate suffers the Law to go for nothing; which he may do by his *tacit* consent or secret approbation of the custom, "as by not punishing, by not complaining, and by silence."—He says, indeed, that a "*curious conscience*" might not be at *peace* in such a case,—and he says, that doubt may arise (when a custom is against a Law) "whether for the abrogation of the Law<sup>z</sup> a mere *Desuetude* or omission is sufficient;"—but this manner of speaking rather confirms our general principles.—Dr. *Balguy*<sup>z</sup>, in his heads of Moral Lectures, treating of Society *in general*, has the following title; "The obligation men are under of supplying the defects and correcting the errors of established Laws; whilst the Laws themselves continue in *force*."—This being relative to Society *in general*, must relate as much to ecclesiastical society as any other.—What Puffendorf says of Interpretation is easily applied to the present subject:—"eximendi sunt illi casus, quos exempturus fuerat ipse Legislator, si super tali casu consultus fuisset:"—we are to conceive the Lawgiver to be *consulted*, and, if it is clear, that he would wish a certain Law to be neglected, we may neglect it, though in *words* it is not altered. It was once<sup>b</sup> Heresy to assert the being of Antipodes; suppose a person to have founded a College, when that notion prevailed, and to have required his Fellows to abjure, detest, and

<sup>y</sup> Ductor dubitantium, 3. 6. 8.      <sup>z</sup> 3. 6. 7.

<sup>a</sup> Part 2. Chap. i. ii. These have not been printed, but I can depend upon my authority, as he lent me his own copy to read Lectures from, which I did for some years.

<sup>b</sup> B. 11. v. xi.

and abhor, as impious and heretical, the doctrine of Antipodes; I say, that, when it came to be universally agreed, that any inhabitants of the earth might have Antipodes, such requisition became *obsolete*, or was virtually *abrogated*: for, if the Founder could have been <sup>c</sup> *consulted*, he would undoubtedly have ordered it to be expunged. Yet the *words* of the Statute ought for ever to continue. It seems, that, when a Reformation took place in our national Religion expressly, a *tacit* reformation might be conceived to take place in those religious seminaries, which were used to prepare men for the Ministry in the national Church. In our *University* indeed, it seemed to our Governors worth while to make an *express* Reformation; Statutes were given by Queen Elizabeth;—but, the Statutes of particular *Colleges* undergoing no alteration, the reformation in *them* was *tacit*;—many Statutes, I presume, are now to be found in Books of College Statutes, which have lost their force. Preaching at Paul's Cross, I have heard, is enjoined in some Statutes.

The learned and worthy Dr. *Law*, late Bishop of Carlisle, *seems* to have intended what he says in his *Considerations*, &c.<sup>d</sup> on Subscription to Articles of Faith, as a stricture on my Affize-Sermon. But, if he did, he mistook the tendency of my observations. He is speaking of *penal* Laws against *Dissenters*, of which I had no thoughts. “We are told indeed,” says he, “that it is sometimes better and safer to let a Law drop by disuse, than to abolish it by a formal repeal. But no example of this is given:”—no example seemed required; none of what

<sup>c</sup> I was glad to hear Sir William Wynne and Mr. Christian (Professor of English Law in Cambridge) agree, June 30, 1793, in thinking this a right principle, in interpreting Statutes.

<sup>d</sup> *Considerations*, &c. p. 29, 30.

what his Lordship meant *could* be given, for it was not in my thoughts; I did not advise having penal laws to hang over Dissenters; I only wanted to comfort the feeble-minded and scrupulous, who feared, that they must offend against the *spirit* of a Law, if they offended against the *letter*. His Lordship goes on. “It is so far from being the general sense of our Legislature, that hardly a session is suffered to pass without expunging from their Statute Books some or other of these *antiquated*<sup>c</sup> *ordinances*.” I know not that I said any thing about our Legislators in particular; and I am not well skilled in the Statute Law; but I really do not think, that they do much attend to expunging old Laws; they make new ones, which supersede the old ones of course; or they reduce several old Laws into one new one; but, supposing I did speak of our Legislators, and supposing they did expunge some old Laws every session, yet that cannot affect me, while they leave *any* old ones unexpunged, which they never mean to enforce. I would have all old Laws repealed, that can be repealed without inconvenience. The worthy Prelate (for such he really was) concludes by saying, with a sort of a controversial sneer, “And we may well presume they” (our Lawgivers) “would have thought it no good objection to a repeal of the Laws against *Witches* or *Gypsies*, that it had been many years since one of that sort of criminals suffered under such Laws.” I never, in strictness, said a word against the repeal of any Law: but, on supposition that some Laws *could* not be conveniently repealed in form, or were not repealed, when some parts of them were *virtually* repealed, I exhorted all honest persons not to make themselves unhappy about neglecting

<sup>c</sup> The title of my Assize-Sermon is, “The Nature of Obsolete Ordinances.”

neglecting such parts as were so virtually repealed. To shew that such supposition was reasonable, indeed, it was proper, to shew how and why laws *might*, in *some* cases, be left in the Code, when they were virtually repealed. There was not the least inconvenience or difficulty in repealing expressly the Statute against Witches or Gypsies, and therefore that Statute was not to the purpose. Had any people been uneasy in *mind* about neglecting it, and could it not have been expressly repealed, without great mischiefs and inconveniences, then it would have afforded a pertinent instance.



## C H A P. VII.

## OF TRUTH OPPOSITE TO THE LETTER.

I. **H**AVING got an idea of a tacit Reformation, let us *pursue* our train of thought, and see what will result from it.—Time, or that change of circumstances which usually attends it, may take away the first meaning of a set of words, and may give them a new meaning; that is, they may *acquire* a new meaning by various accidents, in a course of time. We have mentioned the separate words, <sup>a</sup>*Knave* and *Villain*; and it is full as easy to conceive a *form* of words to change their meaning by a tacit reformation, as to conceive these to change their meaning without one; the cause of the change being known, the change becomes more intelligible.—If words, acknowledged to contain an error, are still to be used, repeated, or assented to; they must be used either in *no* sense, or in a *new* sense.—It will, I think, more frequently happen, that they will contain *some* sense; as the substance of the same duty or observance, in different circumstances, or something of that sort.—An instance of a tacit Reformation changing a sense might be conceived to take place in the doctrine of the descent of Christ into Hell: by *Hell* is most usually meant the habitation of those who, after death, are in a state of condemnation and punishment; ‘Christ descended into Hell,’ taken literally, might mean, he descended thither; and taken in the new sense, he descended into the *Grave*, or was *buried*. ‘I will say so many masses for the Soul  
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<sup>a</sup> Chap. II. Sect. IV.

of Henry VI,' may come to mean, 'I will perform the religious duties required of me by those who have authority.'—'I will commonly wear a gown with standing collar; in my journies a Priest's cloak, without gards, welts, long buttons or cuts.' This may come to mean, 'I will observe a decency in dress suitable to my profession.'—'I will preach at Paul's Cross,' may mean, I will endeavour to propagate true religion.

II. The primitive sense is called the *literal* sense, because made according to common custom of language, plainly and simply; the new sense is often made through necessity, or to avoid a greater evil; sometimes, on purpose to avoid plainness of speech, in cases where plainness would give offence.

Any one may adopt the new sense without real falsehood; (always supposing it is agreeable to his opinions:) he may speak what would, according to the literal sense, be false, if only he does it so as not to deceive any one, whom he undertakes to inform. The instance of '*not at home*' may be mentioned again<sup>b</sup>.—It seems to have been, of old, allowed on all sides, as we say the *Good Ship*, &c. to call in a *form* of advertisement, any Farm House (or Country House) exposed to sale, *a good and well-built house*:—qui proscribunt, *Villam bonam beneque ædificatam*, non existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est, nec ædificata ratione<sup>c</sup>.—A man may truly say he is the *servant* of another, though he does not mean to carry his burdens, if only he is willing to perform all customary offices towards him of courtesy and civility: indeed it must be supposed, that the person, to whom he makes the profession, will be ready to understand it in that sense.

<sup>b</sup> Chap. II. Sect. IV.

<sup>c</sup> Cic. de Off. 3. 13. This notion is mentioned by Cicero as what no disputants would contradict.

sense<sup>d</sup>. And the reason of this extends to religious forms.

III. This brings us, from considering the speaker, to consider how far veracity, in assenting to forms, depends upon the *Hearer*, or person addressed.

What was said on the subject of *veracity* in general, may be applied here. As, in common discourse or correspondence, it was in the power of the speaker<sup>e</sup> and the person addressed to use words in any sense they pleased, so the sense of a declaration of religious opinions, made according to a form, must depend upon *agreement* between him who makes it, and him to whom it is made, as to the signs by which ideas shall be communicated: no one else can be concerned. This is founded on the nature of falshood, which is deceiving those, whom we *undertake* to inform: if you express your real mind in any manner, which will not deceive those, whom you undertake to inform, you speak truth.

The ideas affixed to signs, or the meaning of signs or words, may be changed *tacitly* in expressions of religious doctrine, as well as when *common words* are used; as has appeared in Chap. vi. This mode of change is somewhat less definite than the express one at first, and till after pretty long experience: but this makes no difference as to the right or wrong. Notwithstanding the likeness between this and what was observed before, it seems proper to say what we now say; because, in common speaking, we have no doubt to whom we speak, or whom we undertake to inform: in making a declaration of religious opinions according to a fixed form,

<sup>d</sup> I would be willing to understand a *Pope* to mean something by his being *Servus Servorum*, if he was very humble to those, who did their duty to him.

<sup>e</sup> Chap. II. Sect. IV.



form, that matter is less evident and striking. It may be matter of inquiry, not only what our declaration properly means, but *to whom* it is directed, or who has authority to receive it.

IV. If then you ask, who is the person addressed, or the person I undertake to inform, when I give assent to a set of religious propositions; it is most obvious to answer, the *Church*: that artificial person: your concern is only with the Church; you can hurt no other person; nor has any other person any right to enquire into your opinions. A church indeed may be a large body, too large to concert with you in what sense your declaration shall be understood. Let us, for the ease of our minds, conceive some *small number* of persons to possess the mind of the Church, in the way of committee or representation; let the number be *nine*: (fixed upon only as a *name*, for convenience in speaking and reasoning:)—now, if he who gives his assent explains to these nine the sense in which he gives it, and they accept that sense, it is impossible for him to deceive, or to be guilty of falshood.—Others, who are not concerned, may possibly take up wrong notions of the opinions of him, who makes the declaration; but that is their own fault; they deceive themselves. Were the sense, in which he assents, ever so far from the literal sense, I cannot see any breach of veracity in his conduct. He might assent to new doctrines in old words; and it might be as necessary, if dissension was thought likely to hurt religious principles, to require such assent, as any other.

Having, by means of supposing a small number, got clear ideas of the case, we may substitute, in the place of our *nine*, those with whom we are in reality to agree, though their situation will make our duty and our views more indefinite. I mean,

according to what was said in the<sup>f</sup> last Chapter, the generality of *learned* and *judicious* men; of those, who *ought* to take the lead in ecclesiastical affairs: *ceteris paribus* those must have the greatest weight, who are invested with ecclesiastical authority:—these must, in practice, be conceived to possess the mind of the Church: and the multitude, to act on their authority.

It is not our present business to speak of the customs of particular churches, except in the way of illustration. In that light it must be considered, if we mention, that, in England, a national Synod, or the *Convocation* has been<sup>g</sup> considered as the Church, though now its authority seems obsolete: and that Dr. *John Burges* considered so small a number as the *King* and the Archbishop of Canterbury, (Abbot) as capable of accepting his explanations of his assent, and of affirming “them to be the true sense and intention of the Church of England<sup>h</sup>.”—This last is a smaller number than even our *nine*: consisting only of the Heads of the *Church* and *State*.

It may not be amiss to add here, that, in *other* institutions besides a Church, where tacit reformation has taken place, if it can be settled who has a power of receiving a declaration, whether of opinion, or of purpose of conformity to rules and customs, the person who makes it may lawfully make it in that sense, in which it will be received. This applies to what is called matriculation in Universities, engagements to obey Statutes in Colleges, orders of Knighthood, Chapters, and other ancient associations. There seem, in forms of Indentures,  
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<sup>f</sup> Chap. vi. Sect. iv.

<sup>g</sup> Canon. 139. about a *national Synod*. King's Declaration prefixed to 39 Articles.

<sup>h</sup> Dr. John Burges's Answer rejoined, &c. London, 1631. p. 26.

to be very old expressions; though one would think they might be drawn up according to modern customs; but there is some use in seeing examples of ancient regularity and frugality.

v. Where it is not easy to ascertain the person, who has authority to receive a declaration, it may be very useful to consider the *end* for which it is required<sup>i</sup>. There is nothing which will bring us nearer to a right conception, and one on which we may rely. The ideas of those, who require our assent, must appear in a good degree from the purpose for which they require it<sup>k</sup>. The *general end and design* of requiring assent to a body of religious tenets is, to maintain *Unity of Doctrine*<sup>l</sup>: if then such Unity is maintained, the principal end is accomplished. But is not that, in other words, to say, it is more the design of Articles of Religion to make men *agree*, whatever may be the opinions in which they agree, than to make them agree in any particular opinions?—Most principles may be carried too far; but if the case be as we state it, the views of those in authority will generally be, to have that sense taken, in which *all agree*: or as nearly all as may be. This reasoning will make our sincerity to be intimately connected with our conformity. . . . We are plainly told, that our 39 Articles are “for the avoiding of *Diversities of Opinions*, and for the stablishing of *consent* touching true religion;” — (every man calls his own religion true religion;) so as there is no diversity of opinions, so as there is consent, the main end is answered.

<sup>i</sup> Chap. I. Sect. v.

<sup>k</sup> A commander at sea, a very long way from home, must make use of this rule in interpreting and applying his orders. A man, who has a Body of Doctrine before him, is sometimes very far from having those at hand, who have authority to determine its precise sense.

<sup>l</sup> Chap. I. and III. and v.

answered. It is to our present purpose to remark, that a *preamble* to a Law, or a *preface* to a body of Statutes, is a good ground of interpreting any ambiguous passages, as it shews the *end and design* of the Lawgiver. But it happens, that the King's declaration or injunction prefixed to our 39 Articles speaks of the *literal sense*; the *general, plain, full, grammatical sense*: what it has particularly in view<sup>n</sup>, can be determined only by History: but we may say, in general, that the literal sense of any form can be the right sense only whilst it is *new*<sup>o</sup>. And, though the Preamble of any Statute is a great help to the right interpretation of it, by shewing us the end and design for which such Statute was made, yet it must always be supposed, that such preamble was first made and published *with* the Statute; whereas, our Articles were made in 1562, and the Injunction most probably not till 1628.—But, had the Preamble been made *with* the Articles, yet, in whatever degree they grow obsolete, the Injunction must grow so, notwithstanding it commands interpretation in the literal sense.

vi. What has been said, may tend to explain a passage in Dr. Powell's second Discourse<sup>p</sup>. “How unjust then is the charge brought against the English Clergy that, having departed from the meaning of their articles, they all continue to subscribe what none believes! The accusation is not only false, but the crime impossible.” The English Clergy comprehends both parties; that which *makes* the Declaration, and that which *receives* it. If these are agreed, there *can* be no fallhood.—This shews how a Minister of the Church of Geneva is *now* clear of the crime of prevarication, though there is so strong an appearance of it in the manner  
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<sup>n</sup> See Bingham, Vol. ii. p. 745.

<sup>o</sup> Most likely Predestination.      \* See Chap. vi. Sect. 1.

<sup>p</sup> P. 37.

of assenting<sup>9</sup>. I do not say, that at *first* every Minister there was innocent; new senses have generally their origin in some degree of falshood<sup>r</sup>; but, when any man comes to be perfectly understood, he cannot deceive. This may explain the passage of Dr. Powell, immediately following the last. "That cannot be the sense of the Declaration, which no one imagines to be the sense; nor can that interpretation be erroneous, which all have received. With whatever violence it was at first introduced, yet possession is always a sufficient title; and a long and quiet possession renders that title indisputable."

VII. In some circumstances, it might be thought hurtful to reason in this manner openly; the very end of tacit improvements is, to keep things in a train of that quiet and tranquillity, which is requisite for the encouragement of religious<sup>s</sup> sentiments: and, while errors are newly discovered, and few in number, it may be the least evil to observe a degree of *reserve* and prudence about them. The principal ends of religion continue to be answered, though some few enlightened persons have discovered errors, with which the common people are unacquainted. But, when calumny begins to fall heavy upon Ministers, as if they were consulting private, not public good, as if they were guilty of falshood, for the sake of honours and emoluments; and, when weak brethren begin to be scandalized, and honest men avoid the Ministry, because ancient constitutions do not exactly suit their judgment; then, it becomes the less evil to speak plainly, and shew, that those who assent, are as honest as those who do not assent; that they go upon principles, which will bear rational examination, though, to the unthinking, they are not strikingly evident.

<sup>9</sup> Chap. VI. Sect. VI.    <sup>r</sup> Chap. II. Sect. IV.

<sup>s</sup> Chap. III. Sect. IV.

## C H A P. VIII.

OF FALSHOOD IN SPEAKING ACCORDING TO  
THE LETTER.

1. **H**ERE we have no concern with plain wilful falshood; we conceive men to speak their real opinions, only to use words so as to deceive others, and to think it a sufficient excuse for such deception, that their words bore the literal sense.

We first affirm, that, when words have acquired a new meaning, what in the new sense would be truth, may, in the primitive or literal sense, be *falshood*: this seems to follow immediately from what has been said; most men would say, not only may, but must be falshood. Yet sentences may be so constructed, that a proposition may be true in *both* senses. ‘My Master is not at home,’ may be so: as also *Villam bonam beneque edificatam*.

II. A few *instances* may be proper to shew the nature of the kind of falshood, of which we are speaking; yet instances do not seem numerous; the reason may be, because occasions for them are not numerous. Such instances are all reducible to one general form, using words in the literal sense, when that sense must deceive; which it must do, when they would be understood in the new or acquired sense. Suppose, when Captain Henry Wilson brought *Lee boo* from the Pelew Islands to England, he had shewn him King George, saying “that is the *King of France*,” he would have been guilty of falshood, though, according to the titles of our King, his words were true.—Suppose a Gentleman said, in public company, speaking of one  
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who was his *Steward* and *Tenant*, that he was a *Knave* and *Villain*; and, upon being sued for defamation, alledged, that Knave only meant *Servant*, and Villain, *Tenant*; would he be allowed to have spoken the plain harmless *truth*, because he used these words in their primitive literal sense?—Supposing the third Article (of the English Church) of 1552 had been *tacitly*, instead of expressly, repealed, and a Minister had been of opinion, that 1 Pet. iii. 19. was there rightly applied; yet, if he declared his assent to the Article in that sense to a Church, in which it was unanimously agreed, that it was wrongly applied, I should say he was guilty of *falsehood*.—Such an instance of falsehood would do no harm, and therefore would not be treated as falsehood; but, if a Papist was to admit himself of a *Colledge*, which had been founded before the Reformation, and excuse himself for doing so as intending to say *Mafs*, and do every thing exactly as prescribed by the Statutes, I apprehend he would be *treated* as *false* and prevaricating: and yet, by the way, what should hinder this, if there were no tests? Nevertheless, some distinguished enemies to Popery are for wholly removing them.

III. Men have certainly a *prejudice* in favour of the literal sense, and against all such departure from it as we are describing; and some notice should be taken of it, lest it should prevail farther than it ought. This prejudice may be considered as general, and as particularly forcible in matters of religion.—As to the general prejudice in favour of the literal sense, it may be said, that mere habit makes prejudice; and habit is certainly on the side of

<sup>a</sup> One receives Letters from an Housekeeper: she signs herself one's "obedient humble servant"—which is just as false as if she had written, 'I am a Gentlewoman, and *not* your servant, but willing to shew you any *civility*.'

of the primitive meaning.—This primitive or literal meaning is moreover associated in the mind with *truth*, and is therefore esteemed and honoured: the new sense, having originated in some degree in fallshood, is associated with *falsehood*. The one is always *like* keeping one's word, the other has always the *appearance* of quirk and evasion: it is indeed invented, in order to avoid offensive plainness.

Prejudice is also on the side of the literal sense in *religious* matters particularly; a man, who seems to act without artifice and duplicity, is judged to be more pious and religious than one, who seems to be evading his duty. And he, who follows the literal sense, in religious forms, does nothing which in effect counteracts this prejudice, even when he is less strictly right than he, who uses the new and acquired sense: he mixes with those, who differ from him, and there is nothing which hinders them from worshipping together; nay, from sympathizing in many parts of devotion. To require from any one an interpretation of his form of assenting would be, to impose a new form.

IV. We have<sup>b</sup> already mentioned the possibility, that a tacit reformation might be total; as each part might become obsolete, every part might become so; or at least every distinguishing part: in this case, a religious society would change its doctrines, and yet retain the expressions by which they were defined. But now, at the same time that one society did this, another might adhere to the old sense of the forms; this last will be easily allowed; but, if both happened together, there would be *two religious societies*, dissenting from each other, yet using the *same Articles of Faith*. We have seen the more strange of these suppositions exemplified

<sup>b</sup> Chap. VI. Sect. V.



plified in the Church of Geneva; the multitude may possibly retain the Calvinistic notions, especially if any teachers do: and then the whole case would be exemplified.

I have heard it said, that those, who have been commonly called Methodists amongst us, have spoken of themselves<sup>c</sup> as the true Church of England, and have said, that we have departed from the true sense of our Articles, &c. which they retain: I do not derive this from any undeniable authority, but by way of illustration we will suppose something of the kind to be true:—as far as I can judge, Mr. Wesley, Mr. Whitfield, &c. give too *literal* a construction to expressions of *Scripture*, which should be understood popularly or figuratively: they may therefore understand articles too literally, into which those expressions of Scripture are introduced: but no matter: supposing they understood parts of our Articles in a literal sense, which we assent to in a different sense, we are two different Churches of England, using the same forms<sup>d</sup>.—Which is the true Church may not be clear; we might be called the *present* Church, and they perhaps the *antiquated* Church; each party may be sincere; in each the Minister may assent in the sense in which he is *understood* to assent by those, whom he accounts the most judicious.—Amongst the ancient *pagans*, we are told, that the Philosophers, or initiated, had one religion, and the

<sup>c</sup> See Burn's Eccles. Law, under *Dissenters*, in his explanation of Sect. 8. of the Toleration Act.

Warburton on Grace, p. 264. 12mo.

<sup>d</sup> In Wesley's Letters, Mr. Samuel Wesley writes thus: p. 113—or Lr. 27. “It is in vain for Whitfield to pretend he is of the Church of England, unless there be *two*, one subordinate, the other opposite, to the present ecclesiastical establishment and authority; one within doors, the other without.”

<sup>e</sup> So, at *Geneva*, there may be a *present* Church, and an *antiquated* Church.

the profanum vulgus another; and these seem to have gone on together as one, in some respects.— Could the Elect and auditors amongst the Manicheans be mentioned as a similar instance?

v. Here, another passage of Dr. Powell's second Discourse occurs<sup>f</sup>, which used to seem difficult to me. "That he may understand them (the Articles) in their most obvious and primitive signification, will scarce be doubted. And yet, if there is any place for doubt, it can be only here." This may mean, common men will scarce doubt, that a man speaks truth, who speaks according to the literal sense; but those, who have considered the nature of veracity and of tacit reformations, will see, that a man, by speaking according to the literal sense, may speak falsehood.

vi. I will conclude this Chapter with some illustrations of some things, which have been advanced in this and the two foregoing chapters. Let any one read the 74th Canon of our Church; and keep in mind, that every Minister is under <sup>s</sup>engagement, made expressly or tacitly, to obey canonical *authority*<sup>h</sup>.—It appears, First, that a *tacit reformation* has, since

<sup>f</sup> Vol. of Disc. p. 36.

<sup>s</sup> It may be convenient to conceive this engagement to be made with regard to every particular separately; as a general promise is the same thing, in effect, with a number of promises to perform each particular; and as then the obsolete duties would be distinguished from those which were still in force.

<sup>h</sup> "The true, ancient, and flourishing Churches of Christ, being ever desirous that their Prelacy and Clergy might be had as well in outward reverence, as otherwise regarded for the worthiness of their ministry, did think it fit, by a prescript form of decent and comely apparel, to have them known to the people, and thereby to receive the honour and estimation due to the special Messengers and Ministers of Almighty God. We therefore following their grave judgement, and the ancient custom of the Church of England, and hoping that in time new-fangledness of apparel in some factious persons will die of itself, do constitute and

since 1603, taken place in the Church of England, with regard to the *habits* of its Ministers. 2. That he, who engages himself to obey the laws with regard to Apparel, is understood to engage himself according to present notions of *decency* and gravity, that is, in the new and acquired, not in the literal sense of such engagement: and therefore that the person, who does act after the new and acquired sense, speaks truth though contrary to the Letter; whereas any one, who should make the engagement in the literal sense, would speak falsehood though according to the Letter. He would deceive those, who were authorized to receive his promise: nor would his deceit be wholly harmless; as it would bring

and appoint, That the Archbishops and Bishops shall not intermit to use the accustomed apparel of their degrees. Likewise all Deans, Masters of Colleges, Archdeacons, and Prebendaries in Cathedral and Collegiate Churches (being Priests or Deacons) Doctors in Divinity, Law, and Physic, Bachelors in Divinity, Masters of Arts, and Bachelors of Law, having any ecclesiastical living, shall usually wear Gowns with standing collars, and sleeves strait at the hands, or wide sleeves, as is used in the Universities, with Hoods or Tippetts of silk and farcenet, and Square Caps. And that all other Ministers admitted or to be admitted into that function, shall also usually wear the like apparel, as is aforesaid, except Tippetts only. We do further, in like manner ordain, That all the said Ecclesiastical Persons above-mentioned shall usually wear in their journeys Cloaks with Sleeves, commonly called *Priests Cloaks*, with guards, welts, long buttons, or cuts. And no Ecclesiastical Person shall wear any Coif or wrought Night-cap, but only plain Night-caps of black silk, sattin, or velvet. In all which particulars concerning the apparel here prescribed, our meaning is not to attribute any holiness or special worthiness to the said Garments, but for decency, gravity, and order, as is before specified. In private houses, and in their studies, the said Persons Ecclesiastical may use any comely and scholar-like apparel, provided that it be not cut or pinkt; and that in public they go not in their Doublet and Hose, without Coats or Cassock; and that they wear not any light-coloured Stockings. Likewise poor beneficed Men and Curates (not being able to provide themselves with long Gowns) may go in short Gowns of the fashion aforesaid."

bring contempt and disgrace on the Church.—

3. That, in the case of a tacit reformation, if any one said, that all the Ministers subscribed what none believed, there would be just as much force in the observation as if he said, all the English Ministers engage to dress as none of them intend to dress; the remark would be true, but trifling: they all do engage to dress, as they are *expected* to dress, according to present ideas of clerical *decency*.

4. It is conceivable, that there might be *two sets* of Ministers obeying the Canon, one dressing according to it, literally, the other obeying it according to modern customs of grave cloathing for religious ministers;—in this case, it might be questioned which set were the *true* Ministers of the Church; and it might be found more discreet to wave that question, and call one set the *present*, or modern, the other the *antiquated* Ministers of the Church.—

5. A perusal of this Canon might illustrate the nature of that *Liberty*, which arises from continuance of the same Laws for a length of *Time*. The most decent of the Clergy, in point of dress, is not at present so much confined, as any one would be, who obeyed the Canon literally; or who was obliged to conform strictly to any new Canon.—6. It might shew how *custom*, in things naturally arbitrary and indifferent, once prevalent, is *right*, though *at first* it was *wrong*: for the departure from the precise dress of the Canon, has, in all probability, been *faulty at first*.—7. Lastly, it is not the least important thing for us to learn, that, while particulars of an indifferent nature vary, *general principles* continue firm and immoveable; and are of *eternal obligation*.—Our obligation to be subject to ecclesiastical authority is not in the least impaired: the duty of decency, of providing things <sup>i</sup> honest in the

<sup>i</sup> Καλα, Rom. Chap. xii. verse 17.

the fight of all men, is as necessary as ever; and indeed these general principles are well laid down in the Canon.—To act according to these principles, is the *true intent and meaning* of our engagements, and that must always be observed; that is wholly *indispensible*. *In all changes* and relaxations, we must be extremely cautious that our *principles* of honesty and sincerity do not get weakened or relaxed. And, if doubtful cases arise, it must be our constant care to keep on the safe side, and never to venture nearer than we can help, to the limits and boundaries of our duty.



## C H A P IX.

OF THE USE OF *HISTORY*, IN DETERMINING THE  
SENSE OF ARTICLES OF RELIGION.

**F**IRST, let us take a *general* view of the subject of this Chapter.

I. We now seem to have treated *sufficiently* on such senses of Forms, as may sometimes be acquired by time and change of circumstances; let us return to the *primitive sense*, against which no prejudice is entertained: which seems the most common, and most free from evil.

It is an important mistake which men are apt to make concerning the primitive sense of ancient forms, that they are to apply themselves wholly to Grammar and Etymology, in order to understand them; whereas, some of the greatest difficulties, which attend the construction of them, are to be obviated by *History*. To illustrate this, is now our proper business: but, before we wholly quit our connexion with the foregoing Chapter, let us observe, that History must be of great use in giving us a right idea of the new and acquired meaning of words, when any change has taken place: this is too evident to need any full explanation; it must be History, which must shew us the nature of each tacit reformation, its causes and effects; and on these must the new and acquired sense of words always depend.

Nor shall we have a better opportunity than the present to observe, that there is one way, in which words acquire, or, more strictly, seem to acquire new senses, not yet mentioned; by readers attending

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ing to grammar and etymology and custom, while they neglect history: etymology may make a sense seem to be a right one, which really was not the sense of the writer: and modern customs may make us affix modern meanings to old words, when those meanings were not really in the minds of the persons, who used those words. These are not so properly new senses, as mistakes of the primitive sense: and these mistaken senses are always taken for primitive senses<sup>a</sup>.—A man might use the terms *Knave* and *Villain* with modern ideas, and think he used them in the primitive sense.

This observed, we may proceed to our proper business.—In what way History is wanted for investigating the primitive sense of ancient forms, has been<sup>b</sup> already in some degree explained. All expressions contain references to circumstances, which History only can point out. Indeed, History can only point them out imperfectly, but it can approximate nearer to a right conception of them, than any thing else can. The word “*accursed*” occurs in one of our Articles: if we depend upon Etymology to teach us its meaning, we shall be misled: but, if we apply to History, we may get a competent notion of it. History will teach us the customary manner of condemning errors, and custom is the *jus et norma*<sup>c</sup> loquendi. We shall see, that *anathemas* usually accompanied such condemnation, especially when Heretics were *excommunicated*;

<sup>a</sup> People who read the English Bible sometimes affix modern ideas to ancient words;—φωνη, *Voice*, Act. xxiv. 21.—ἡ ὁδος, *Way*, Act. ix. 2. *Lust*, passim; Ps. lxxviii. 18. *meat* for your lust: the lust of the eye, world.—Καρδια, *Heart*, for conception, 1 Cor. ii. 9.—διδασκτικος, *apt* to teach, 1 Tim. iii. 2. 2 Tim. ii. 24.—Νομικος, a *Lawyer*, Matt. xxii. 35. Tit. iii. 13.—provide things, καλα, *honest*? Rom. xii. 17.—*Worship* (with my Body, &c.) Luke xiv. 10.

<sup>b</sup> Chap. vi. Sect. 1. referring to B. I. Chap. x.

<sup>c</sup> Hor. Art. Poet. l. 71.

communicated; and therefore, that “*accursed*” means only unworthy, on account of some supposed error, to be a member of some Christian Church supposed to be particularly pure.—Bishop Pearson shews us<sup>d</sup>, that we are to consider the History of the Septuagint, in order to acquire a right notion of the word *Κυριος*.—The title *Defender of the Faith* is not taken in its true sense<sup>e</sup> by those, who are not aware, that it was given by Pope Leo x. to Henry VIII. for defending the *Papish* Religion by a small treatise.—We may add, that the true meaning of the King’s Declaration prefixed to our 39 Articles is to be investigated by considering the occasion of it.—*Calvinism* seems to have been growing, from the time of Queen Mary, when several Protestant Divines were obliged to take refuge in foreign countries, where it flourished, down to the reign of Charles 1st; in the third<sup>f</sup> year of which, (I take for granted) the Declaration, or injunction, was published. About this time, the Calvinists found, that our Articles were not *strong* enough for them, in favour of predestination, irresistible grace, and other doctrines heightening the divine agency in the salvation of man. They began to enlarge their meaning, and turn it to their own purpose, in various ways; which caused strong opposition from other Divines; I cannot say, that I know very particularly how far they went beyond any thing, which is found in the Articles; nor might it be proper to dwell upon the subject in this place; but the declaration was made to prevent such freedoms; and,

<sup>d</sup> On the Creed: under “*Our Lord*,” p. 146, fol.

<sup>e</sup> This title is used in the King’s Declaration prefixed to the Articles; and in Bp. Burnet’s Dedication of his Exposition of the Articles;—but it can only be proper by some kind of analogy: it misleads.

<sup>f</sup> Chap. VII. Sect. v. See the end of the Oxford Pamphlet on the 17th Art.



and, as it was prefixed to a *fresh publication* of the Articles, there is an appearance, as if they were coming to be much neglected or abused.—Archbishop Laud was an Arminian, and he, with some other Bishops, framed the declaration: the expressions therefore contained in it about *plain, literal, grammatical sense*; about Preachers and Readers (or those who read Lectures) in the Universities affixing *their own meaning, drawing aside articles, &c.* are all to be understood with a particular reference to what the authors had in view.—What confirms this notion is, that we find the Puritans (who were rigid Calvinists) *complaining* of this declaration, as abridging their Liberty of Preaching.—Neal, in his History of the Puritans, says, “surely there was never such a confused, unintelligible declaration printed.”—It does indeed use *general* expressions with *particular* meanings: it speaks also as if some teachers *neglected* the articles, and yet maintained, that they were *favourable* to them; but this was an inconsistency in the Puritans, rather than in the Declaration; it thwarts the Puritans, and yet forbids affixing new senses “*either way,*” that is, either in favour of Calvinists or Arminians; but this might be for the sake of appearing impartial, and of promoting silence on inexplicable doctrines.

An additional reason for concluding, that Predestination, &c. are particularly aimed at in this declaration, is the quotation from the 17th Article, and the expression “*curious points, in which the present differences lie:*” the word “*curious*” occurs several times.

The declaration relates to *discipline* as well as doctrine; but the parts of discipline, infringed by the

\* See Collier's Eccles. Hist. Vol. ii. p. 746.

the Puritans about 1628, must be understood a particularly meant.

I will say no more on the general nature of the subject immediately before us; but proceed to other reflexions; only observing first, that I would engage, if I was possessed of a perfect historical knowledge, to make every thing in our Articles clear, intelligible, and familiar<sup>h</sup>;—not to make every *doctrine* so, but every manner of *stating* a doctrine. But then, by historical knowledge, I must be understood to mean, not only a knowledge of facts, but of opinions and feelings. Indeed it may be deemed a knowledge of *facts*, if we know, that such an *opinion* had, in fact or reality, many favourers at such a time; that such an affection or sentiment, as zeal, disgust, &c. was actually prevalent in such a set or party of men. If any one finds any expression obscure or uncouth in our articles, he may venture to ascribe the obscurity to the imperfection of his historical knowledge.

II. We might open what we have now to say, by observing, that the Articles of one sect may be, in some measure, affected, as to their sense, by changes in *other* sects. We have hitherto conceived the meaning of words to be affected only by the discovery of errors inherent in them; by internal faults, and internal changes;—we now would conceive how their meaning may be affected by *external* changes. To say, that the force of words expressing our doctrines *must* continue the same, whatever changes happen in other doctrines, is to forget the end and design of Articles of Religion, and all that has been explained in the first and fifth Chapters.—In order to see this, let us recollect what that end or design is.

III. The

<sup>h</sup> Strype's *Annals* for 1562. Chap. xxvii. p. 282.

III. The end or design of a body of doctrines is to maintain unity of doctrine; the intention of each particular article is, to find a *remedy* for some actual error, which occasions some disturbance, so as to frustrate some end of social religion, or which seems very likely to do so. This it is, which distinguishes a set of Articles from a system of Theology, or a Sermon: and a very important distinction I take this to be. The design of a System and a Sermon is, to explain and enforce all doctrines; whereas, Articles only mention those, by which one Society is kept separate from another. A set of Articles is, as it were, a partition wall; not intended for war, so much as to keep all things *quiet*: like the walls of one's *house*, to let the domestic society within pursue its proper business in security.

IV. If this notion be allowed, each article should be interpreted, and understood, and assented to, as it would have been, if the error at which it aims had been specified; that is, however general the expression of any Article may be, the interpretation of it should be limited and restrained to particular cases. This appears from hence, that, as soon as the Article was made, it would be so interpreted; the reasons of its being made would *appear* to every one, and no one would think of extending it beyond those reasons: and, if this would be the case, whilst the Article was most clearly understood, it certainly ought to be at all times, as far as we are able to make it so. Propositions ought not to grow more general and unlimited in their interpretation by age: but there is a false appearance, which misguides; they seem<sup>1</sup> to grow more general, as references are forgotten, and that false appearance ought to be *corrected*.—It seems to deceive many; insomuch that they would be inclined to say,

<sup>1</sup> Chap. VI. Sect. I.

say, 'shall I assent to an erroneous proposition, expressed in general terms, which has a plain meaning, merely because I see, that some particular errors, condemned by that general proposition, have been rectified? because it is in part useless? We may at least answer to such a question, let our reasoning be remembered, let it be brought to bear, let it do what it can: and the consequence would generally be, in practice, that the difficulty would be solved, and the general proposition given up, as unmeaning.—But the reasons for such restricted interpretation of Articles, as is here mentioned, will allow of a fuller explication.

v. 1. If propositions are to be understood absolutely, and not as aimed at any particular errors, those who compiled them must have acted wrongly, and have laid a greater restraint than they had any right to lay. Those, who require declarations of opinion, are only to require them, when some good end is to be answered by them; when they are in a manner necessary to promote the ends of social religion<sup>k</sup>. And, when we look back upon men's actions, in all doubtful cases, they are not to be supposed to have meant what it would have been *wrong* for them to mean. *Id voluisse intelliguntur, quod velle eos oportuit*<sup>l</sup>.—What men had no right to do, is treated as if it had not been *done*. If a man had no right to execute a *deed of gift*, such a deed is unmeaning; and, if he had in part only such a right, the validity of the deed will be *partial*.

vi. 2. Another reason why we should interpret any body of doctrines, to which assent is required, by a reference to the times, is, because we find that something of the sort has been done even by *compilers* of Articles themselves: I mean to refer to the 35th Article of our Church, but only as I would refer

<sup>k</sup> Chap. v.      <sup>l</sup> Powell, p. 358.

refer to any other fact. A set of very learned and prudent men say, that certain compositions, by which the doctrines of a Church are to be taught to the people, are peculiarly suited to the times; that is, are, probably, more suited to one situation of things than another. By such an expression we are called upon, in assenting, to see how long the suitability lasts; we can tell that only by History; and, if we find the times wholly to *change*, so must the force of the Article<sup>m</sup>.—It may indeed be said, why is reference to times here expressed, if it is always implied? does not its being expressed here prove, that it would be always expressed, if it was meant? I presume the answer to this objection is, that, in the particular expedient of teaching by Homilies, a change was to be clearly *foreseen*. Though there was a very great scarcity of approved preachers then, (for the Papists and Puritans were possessed of a great share of the clerical learning) yet it was not probable, that this would *continue*: and a change distinctly foreseen was to be provided for. Our natural conclusion is, that, had other changes been foreseen, some provision would have been made for them also: and that what *could not be foreseen*, must be provided for, when a provision appeared to be wanted. But we should often deprive ourselves of the power of making such provision for changes, if we interpreted articles universally, and not as provisions for particular exigencies.

VII. 3. It is always a fair way of judging of the sense of any compositions (if we use it fairly,) to put ourselves in the place of the Authors. If we do this, in the present case, to the best of our power,

we

<sup>m</sup> Dr. Balguy thinks, that we *now* are allowed, *not required*, to read Homilies instead of Sermons. Something was said on teaching by Homilies, Chap. v. Sect. v. and vi.

we must conclude, that the compilers of articles would not provide any, would not *desire* to provide any, but as remedies for pressing inconveniences. We have before said, that they *ought* not; now we say that, of choice, they *would* not. Let us conceive a council compiling Articles; they condemn and exclude several errors and heresies; they get warm; a Zealot says, ‘let us proscribe this error;’ ‘who professes it?’—‘no one at present, but some one *may hereafter*, and we had better anticipate and provide a remedy beforehand:’ what can we conceive the wiser part of the Council to urge, but something of this sort? ‘No! we have errors sufficient to proscribe, which really exist; we will not imagine new ones; if any should arise in future, we will leave them to posterity: perhaps our provision might suggest an error, which would not else have been thought of; and involve our successors in many needless difficulties.’ If such would be the determination, we should receive and *interpret* Articles as formed after this manner.—And we may add, that the 41st Article of our Church, as it stood for ten years, against *Millenarians*, was expunged when it seemed (probably) to be unnecessary, though the *Doctrine* of a Millenium would continue the same; nay, was not revived when the new Millenarians or fifth Monarchy men arose in the 17th Century.

An additional consideration is, that, if Articles are supposed to be in force, where no remedy is wanting, why should so *few* Articles be made? why leave so many parts of a religious system not enforced<sup>n</sup>?—Why make *new* ones in our Church in 1562, and never since? and then only on a  
very

<sup>n</sup> The Puritans have complained of the number of Doctrines which are omitted in our Articles. See Bingham’s Apology, B. 2. Chap. xiii. or Works, Vol. ii. p. 745.

very particular occasion? on occasion of a change in the national religion? Bishop Burnet<sup>o</sup> shews, that our Church was compelled, by the exigency of the case, to make Articles when it did.

VIII. 4. The last reason I shall mention why we should interpret human expressions of doctrines, with a strict reference to the occasion is, because the words of Christ and his Apostles are undoubtedly to be so interpreted. This has been shewn<sup>p</sup>, but it will be proper to repeat an instance or two, because that kind of restricted interpretation, which we say is reasonable, will not, after all we can urge, appear nearly so much so without as with such instances.—Take Acts x, 34<sup>q</sup>. and Matt. xviii. 3. (compare 1 Cor. xiv. 20.)

IX. From these reasons we conclude, that, notwithstanding Articles of Religion are expressed in general terms, we should interpret them as mere antidotes against particular religious maladies, actually existing at the time when they were formed, of which we can get no knowledge but from History.

If our reasoning has been just, we may deduce from it some *Inferences*, which may tend to rectify our notions, and free each honest mind from groundless doubt and anxiety.

1. We may deduce, that an article of religion, or a clause of a Creed, or Liturgy of any church, may become a *dead Letter*, merely by improvements in the forms used by other Churches. For, if the malady no longer exists, the prescription against it becomes useless and of no force: if the *Heresy* ceases, the provision to keep a church clear from it ceases, in effect, to all intents and purposes.

We

<sup>o</sup> Introduction to Art. p. 5. 8vo.

<sup>p</sup> B. 1. Chap. x.

<sup>q</sup> B. 1. Chap. x. See also Balguy, Charge 2d. p. 196. 197.

We have before<sup>†</sup> spoken of forms losing their force, but that was in a different way; by *internal* corrections; we now speak of *external* corrections.—In our form of Infant-Baptism, the Sponsors are enjoined to provide, that the Infant be taught the Creed, &c. “*in the vulgar tongue;*” this is a *remedy* against teaching the Creed in *Latin*; but, as Sponsors have now no idea of any such thing, the direction (as far as respects Latin) is become a *dead Letter*; and so would the whole 24th Article, if the Papists came to “have public prayer,” and “minister the Sacraments” in the vulgar tongues<sup>‡</sup>. Some clauses of the Athanasian Creed are opposed to the Nestorian and Eutychian doctrines; but, if no one professed those doctrines, such clauses are virtually extinct: not false; for, what is extinct can contain neither truth nor falsehood.—An Heresy, which is forgotten, is extinct to those who have forgotten it;—and so it should be deemed to those, who have had no opportunity of knowing it.

This reasoning affects chiefly the main design of an article; perhaps little expressions, thrown in with a view of making the composition totus teres atque rotundus, may not have been intended as antidotes; but still, as they make parts of articles which were so, and as the compilers had no right to impose what was not so, they should be considered as obliterated with the main substance.—Indeed some Articles might have been inserted, because others would be maimed without them: but should not these be considered as incorporated with the rest, and share their fate?

x. 2. It follows from what has been said, that Articles are not to be considered as inconsistent with any doctrines, which were *unknown* to the compilers

† Chap. VI. Sect. 1. Chap. VII. Sect. 1.

‡ See also the 33d Article, Sect. 9. “*rightly cut off.*”



compilers of them. It is doubtful, whether such doctrines would have been thought erroneous; or, if they had been, whether they would have been thought likely to occasion any disturbance: nay, if they would, still no remedy was provided by those, who alone had authority to provide one: and therefore, if articles are remedies, such doctrine has nothing to do with Articles. Our 6th Article says, "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to Salvation:" is it therefore wrong for one of our teachers to enforce *moral* obligations? Dr. Balguy seems to think it is not:—but yet Dr. Balguy does not go against our 6th Article; it was a remedy against *Popish* traditions: and suppose nothing said in Scripture against gaming, duelling, suicide, &c. yet a Minister of our Church might lawfully preach against them, and on moral principles, notwithstanding, at least, the 6th Article; conceiving the Article to have only Popery in view. Bishop *Pearson*<sup>u</sup> professes to reason with even Atheists on principles, which they would allow;—and also with Jews.—It is conceivable, that our Reformers, though excellently well skilled in the Scriptures, might not attend sufficiently to *morality*, nor see how the study of it conspired with Scripture to make men good and happy; nor perceive, that improvements in morality afforded additional internal evidence of the truth of Christianity.

xI. 3. If articles are not inconsistent with new doctrines, they cannot be with new solutions of old doctrines, such as predestination, Trinity, &c.—compilers could not provide a remedy against a poison unknown:—if it be said, it is clear that they *would have* provided against a certain solution, if it had been published soon enough, then I should say

<sup>t</sup> Charge 2d. p. 188. but chiefly see p. 134.

<sup>u</sup> Preface to Creed.

say, that such solution could not strictly be called *new*.

XII. 4. Lastly, it seems to follow from what has been said, that, when any common person, without any fault of his, is *ignorant* of heretical notions aimed at in any clause of any confession of faith, he need not be scrupulous of giving a verbal assent to it. We have lately observed, that, when a person has no opportunity of knowing an heretical notion, the case is the same as if that notion did not exist; and therefore any Article against it becomes a dead Letter; and, what a person has no opportunity, humanly speaking, of knowing, he is ignorant of without any fault of his own.—If so, it may be urged, why should we study these matters?—“If ignorance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise.”—But, if a man be ignorant *through* his own fault, he is punishable; though rather for negligence than for *insincerity*: but, as that cannot be supposed to lessen his punishment, it is best to consider only the case of harmless ignorance. As far as a man is innocently ignorant, so far he may trust, that he need not trouble himself about either his assent or dissent. I suppose all men are ignorant in some degree of the references, by which the sense of words is to be limited, though different men in very different degrees. Every degree of such ignorance will throw a kind of a mist over the expressions used; the general effect of which will be, that a man will have no decided opinion *against* a proposition or doctrine, and yet will not be clear for it. Even a *teacher* of religion may content himself under such a state of mind (as every one must be under it in some measure), so long as he is quite satisfied, that he does what can be required of him, in reason, to inform himself, according to the opportunities which his situation affords him, and to  
clear

clear up his obscurities and the indistinctness of his notions, more and more, from time to time.

I conclude this Chapter with once more observing, that the thing which of all things will be the *most* effectual towards giving us right notions of Articles, Creeds, confessions of Faith, is, the study of *History*: the parts of Scripture, on which they are built, must be known; but that part of our duty is more easy, and better defined, than the duty of searching into History.



## C H A P. X.

OF ASSENTING TO PROPOSITIONS, WHICH ARE  
UNINTELLIGIBLE.

1. **T**HE transition from the last Chapter to this is not difficult: in the last, we left the person, who was not much conversant in History, treating some parts of forms as unmeaning, because he did not know what disorders they had been intended to remedy: words which are unmeaning must be on the same footing with such as are *unintelligible*. And, in Chapters VI. VII. VIII. and IX. we treated of Propositions which had lost their meaning.

It may perhaps occur, that all the subjects in this Book<sup>a</sup>, since the beginning of the sixth Chapter, were to have some relation to antiquated forms; to forms, as having continued for a great length of *time*. Any one who recollects this may say, what have unintelligible propositions to do with age? but we were to be allowed to introduce subjects, which might be treated independently, so long as there was any advantage in introducing them in this place rather than in any other, where religious society was treated. Now it seems as if mysterious doctrines would be more calmly considered, when they were old, than when they were new: when new, people are violent about them, and the terms in which they are expressed are so often repeated, so echoed and re-echoed, that they grow familiar, and people can scarce persuade themselves, that they do not understand them.

It

<sup>a</sup> Preface to Chap. VI.

It is proper, that unintelligible propositions should be treated somewhere in the present Book, as they materially affect religious Society; and men may run into two faulty extremes about them: too easily receiving them leads to error, and fruitless controversy; and sometimes to needless anxiety:—and too easily rejecting them, tends to ignorance and disorder; and finally to the obstruction of religious authority.

II. We may open the subject by observing, that many unintelligible propositions may arise in *natural* religion, and in other subjects connected with it.—Things have been affirmed of the *soul* without distinct ideas; and propositions have been made this way and that, as if it was more known than it is.—The Soul is the *Heart*<sup>b</sup>, the *blood* surrounding the Heart; it is the *brain*, seated in the brain; it is *fire*, it is *harmony*, it is *number*; all these things, and more, have been said:—“God is *eternal*,” for, “*ex nihilo nihil fit.*” *Fate* governs all things, even those beings, who can *chuse* how they will act. That Deity, which created all the sources of *evil*, is infinitely *good*. The same Being acts by *fixed Laws*, and interferes perpetually by his particular *providence*. No rational man will say, that he clearly understands these propositions.—*Velleius*, the Epicurean, in Cic. de Naturâ Deorum, says, the immateriality of God, or his freedom from *Body*<sup>c</sup>, is unintelligible; *we* should find it very difficult to conceive the Supreme Being clogged with a *Body*.

III. Many of the same propositions arise in *revealed* religion: but the enquiry into their meaning

<sup>b</sup> Tusc. Disp. 1. 9, 10.

<sup>c</sup> Quòd verò sine corpore ullo Deum (Plato) vult esse, ut Græci dicunt ἀσώματος; id quale esse possit, intelligi non potest. De Nat. D. 1. 12.

ing assumes a different shape: because, when we have things communicated to us from above by Language, we have to consider and investigate the precise meaning of expressions. In natural religion, we have no words or expressions to consider. Revealed religion adds moreover to the mysteries of natural—"In the beginning was the Word"—"and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Jesus Christ is the *Son* of God—he is called God—the Angels of God worship him. The Creator made the worlds by his Son.—The *Holy Spirit* abides with us, guides us, inhabits our Bodies, the bodies of *all* men at once: as his *Temple*.—There is a connection between the *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, which makes it proper, that Christians should be *baptized* in their joint names, and that those names should be frequently mentioned together in a solemn manner, to the exclusion of all others.—A *Virgin* was overshadowed by the Holy Ghost, and brought forth a Son without having known man; that Son was both perfectly *human* and perfectly *divine*<sup>d</sup>. *Prayer* is to be offered to an all-wise Being, who will give us what is best for us.

The difficulties attending these propositions have engaged men in *solving* them. Sometimes it has been seen, that solutions were *wrong*, even when no distinct idea could be attained of what was *right*; and attempts to explain, with defences of the solutions, have greatly increased the number of unintelligible propositions. It seems as if we should add, to the number of unintelligible propositions, many *human* forms of speaking, particularly those hinted at in the beginning of this Chapter; such as have become unmeaning; either by tacit re-

mations,

<sup>d</sup> *Translators* of Scripture, if honest, will sometimes leave unintelligible propositions.—See about Symmachus, B. I. Chap. VI. Sect. VII.

mations, or by the extinction of those errors, which they were intended to remedy.

IV. What has been said shews the importance of trying to make unintelligible questions as little inconvenient as possible. They have proved inconvenient, not only in occasioning dissension and violation of charity, but also in causing a greater degree of *uneasiness*, when assent has been required to them, than reason and good sense could justify.

It might lessen this last-mentioned evil (of uneasiness) to consider, that, if propositions are wholly unintelligible, they really express *nothing*; if they seem to wear an affirmative shape, they *affirm* nothing; if a negative, they *deny* nothing.—Animal spirits are *εΥΤΕΛΕΧΕΙΑ*:—does not differ from, animal spirits are *not* <sup>c</sup> *εΥΤΕΛΕΧΕΙΑ*. The Gods are Images flying off from bodies<sup>f</sup>; so affirmed Democritus:—no, says Parmenides, I deny it; God is a *Crown*<sup>g</sup>, surrounding the Heaven, and by the brightness and ardor of its light keeping the orb together: will you assent to the *affirmative*, or the *negative*?—they seem equally unintelligible. Indeed, if either *subject* or *predicate* is unintelligible, the *proposition* must be so.

Yet it may be proper to observe, according to what was just now hinted, that propositions unintelligible on the whole, or what would be allowed unintelligible if taken absolutely, without any particular respect or relation to others, may be intelligible relatively, or in *some respects*, as, for instance, in *denying errors*. The Son of God was *begotten from eternity*, is unintelligible taken absolutely; but it is intelligible considered as *denying*, that any time can be assigned, when he began to exist.

This may be applied to the argument for the Eternity of God; *ex nihilo nihil fit*. How God is eternal,

<sup>c</sup> Tusc. Disp. 1. 10. <sup>f</sup> De Nat. Deorum. 1. 12. <sup>g</sup> Ib. Sect. 11.

eternal, cannot be understood; yet this proves, that it is absurd to say, that he had a beginning.

v. When propositions are so unintelligible, that they neither affirm nor deny any thing, a man, by repeating them, whatever other folly he may run into, cannot be guilty of any breach of *Veracity*: he can deceive no one: unless indeed he professes to understand them; if he says that, he introduces a *new* proposition, and one which is *intelligible*.—Not long after the middle of the last century, the Clergy in France were obliged to sign a form to this purpose. ‘I heartily condemn the five propositions contained in *Jansenius’s* Book; his doctrine, though pretended to be taken from Augustin, is not really Augustin’s:’—now it did not appear, that the five Propositions *were* in *Jansenius’s* Book (called *Augustinus*); that was questioned, and the passages never found: this form the Nuns of St. Cyran, whose convent was at *Port Royal* in the Fields, were called upon to sign, they being great favourers of the *Jansenists*:—we sign this? say they; how should we know whether the propositions are really in the Book or not? it is a great Folio, written in Latin, and we do not understand Latin; we will not assent to what we do not at all understand! they persisted in their refusal till, at last, their Monastery was wholly destroyed<sup>h</sup>. Voltaire’s remark is, ‘one does not know which is more singular, the confession which was required of women that five propositions were contained in a Latin Book; or the obstinate refusal of these Nuns.’—The requisition was certainly very strange: Voltaire did not think the refusal less so:—the Form was *unintelligible*, but it was known by all men to be

<sup>h</sup> Mosheim, 17th Cent. 2. 1. 1. 47. Voltaire—Louis XIV. *Jansenism*. p. 271. 281—12mo,



be so; Veracity was not concerned with assenting to it: such assenting would have deceived no one<sup>1</sup>.

VI. If the end of assenting to unintelligible propositions is not *truth*, what is it? it can only be some species of convenience, or *utility*: that is, avoiding some *evil*, or attaining some *good*: to impose assent to them without some such view, would be foolish, and oppressive; nay, considering them as of a religious sort, impious or presumptuous.

VII. The principal question is, wherein can that Utility *consist*? what is the nature of the evil to be avoided, and of the good to be attained? It is an evil to neglect or throw aside any thing, which it has pleased God to reveal to mankind: if he sends a message, whether it be understood or not, it is to be carefully preserved; it is to be noted and registered faithfully and simply: nay, the more exactly, for not being understood; if we write what we understand, we may safely alter several little points and dots; we know what we are doing; but, if we copy a language which we have never learnt, we must copy every thing, even blots and mistakes.—All that we can strictly say, in such a case, is, that we do not *at present* understand what God is pleased to say to us; we do not know how soon we may. It may be objected here, keep the scriptural information faithfully, only do not require *assent* to it: but it is not conceivable, that we should value Scripture, and not throw the expressions of it into some forms; of doctrine, or devotion: into sermons, prayers, hymns, &c.—these are necessary, if we were only to remind men of what

<sup>1</sup> Had they signed, they would have thought, probably, their assent equivalent to saying, ‘we Jansenists condemn Jansenius;’—but *need* they have had this difficulty; suppose they had signed and said publicly, ‘we do *not* condemn Jansenius?’—or some other contrivance of that sort might have been hit upon.

what has been revealed : and to make them feel its value and importance : these must be the ordinary means of exciting religious sentiments.—Care must indeed be taken, at the same time, that no one deceives himself, or imagines that he understands what he really does not.

If we throw away what comes from above, because we do not thoroughly see the meaning of it, we know not what we lose. Suppose a people, who were pretty much uncivilized, had an offer of a good body of *Laws*, and accepted them: there is no doubt but there would be several regulations, of which they would not see the scope: but would they therefore be wise for expunging those regulations?—contests might arise from prejudices against such new Laws, which might occasion some kind of *assent* to be given to the superior wisdom of the new Laws: it would scarcely be a sufficient objection to giving such assent, to say, that some of the new Laws were *unintelligible*. Who indeed amongst the ordinary people (I do not mean the ignorant multitude) understands *law-deeds*, when he signs them, even in the most important concerns? To throw aside the notices from heaven, because we did not understand them, would be to act like Savages, who threw gold and jewels into the sea.—And we must throw such notices aside, if we never insert any of them into our forms.—And it is the same thing if, in order to avoid difficulty, we *lower* the things revealed to what we fancy is common sense.—Sometimes, one set of men are compelled to use unintelligible forms, by other men's perverting or lowering Scripture; if, by such a measure, we can prevent such perversion, the evil which we incur, must be less than that which we avoid.—And the same, if we prevent dissension.

I think

I think we may safely say, of the Nuns of St. Cyran just now mentioned, that the evil of their refusing to assent to an unintelligible proposition was, in fact, much greater than that of their assenting would have been; even if we allow, that they were to be commended for conscientiously adhering to what they thought right.

But the utility of assenting to unintelligible propositions may consist in attaining positive *good*, as well as in avoiding evil. There is no greater good to human kind than that, which might arise from a Religious Society well conducted, which should include the young and the old, the wise and the unthinking. Now, it is not conceivable, that such a Society could be carried on, without some members assenting to what they did not understand: for, what would be intelligible to some, would be unintelligible to others; and yet there must be an *uniformity*; all ranks must join in creeds, catechisms, and Liturgies<sup>k</sup>; on this uniformity depends that ease and composure, which is so necessary to encourage religious sentiments, and to heighten devout sympathy. And, (we might add) as it will frequently happen, that forms of words, confessions, &c. continue a long time after they have been found faulty or unnecessary, on this account, *verbal* affirmations must be made, after the meaning of the words made use of is evaporated.

VIII. It will add force to this reasoning, if we consider, that a person, who did assent to unintelligible propositions for the reasons we offer, could not be said to lie “unto *God*,” or to injure *Man*. To allow this, we need only conceive such a person

to

<sup>k</sup> It might be here recollected, that the *Copts* in *Ægypt* have divine service in a language they do not understand; Book 1 Chap. 1x. of this, from Poccocke's Travels.

<sup>1</sup> Acts v. 4.

to enter into a solemn meditation, as in the sight of God; and to say, 'I have given my verbal assent to what I did not understand; but I have done this with a good intention; I have done it, in order to avoid religious evil, and to attain religious good; I have used no words of my own chusing, but only such words as have been appointed for me by those in authority; I have pretended to know nothing more than I really did know: every one, who was concerned, was aware of my ignorance. Perhaps, in time, that ignorance may receive some information; perhaps several of those, with whom I am, for the best purposes, united in Society, may already see more than I do: my conscience tells me, that, whilst I act with such sincerity, the omniscient Being will not be offended with my conduct.'

As to *Man*, there seems no foundation for his taking offence; he receives no harm; he is neither injured nor deceived.

IX. It will confirm and illustrate what has been said, if we consider the manner, in which God has acted with mankind in the revelation of his will: ever since the Creation of the world, he has been revealing it *gradually*; at all times giving intimations of the whole of his plan; but those intimations were at first very faint and obscure, afterwards by degrees more and more clear:—this being the case, different things, at different times, must have been unintelligible; or must have been mysterious; for the true scriptural notion of <sup>m</sup> *μυστηριον* is, a design of God not yet executed, or made manifest. Mysteries, according to this notion, may both be "kept secret" since the world began,"—and be revealed or made known.—Yet, at *all* times, what was known, though not clearly comprehended, might be generally professed; and, if that be true, then,

<sup>m</sup> Locke on 1 Cor. ii. 1, 7.    <sup>n</sup> Rom. xvi. 25.    Eph. iii. 4.

then, at all times unintelligible propositions would be professed by *some* persons; though, what was once so, would gradually lose its nature.

To confirm the notion, that parts of Scripture should not be thrown aside, because they are not intelligible, I will mention Eusebius's<sup>o</sup> account of *Dionysius of Alexandria*, with regard to the Book of *Revelation*:—and I will make use of Lardner's Translation. “Some, who were before us, have utterly rejected and confuted this Book, criticising every chapter [or paragraph] shewing it to be throughout unintelligible and inconsistent;” “But, for my part, I dare not reject the Book, since many of the Brethren have it in high esteem: but, allowing it to be above my understanding, I suppose it to contain throughout some latent and wonderful meaning: for, though I do not understand it, I suspect there must be some profound sense in the words; not measuring and judging these things by my own reason, but ascribing more to faith, I esteem them too sublime to be comprehended by me.”—As Dionysius reasons on the mysteries of the Apocalypse, we might reason on any other mysteries. It is highly probable, he would not have been averse to throwing expressions of the Apocalypse, or even others equivalent to them, into Forms, to be used or assented to, when any good seemed likely to arise from such a measure.

x. What has been said, concerning the gradual opening of Revelation to mankind, is in a good measure applicable to the gradual increase of knowledge in *each human being*, in any given state of general improvement: Each man has continually something unintelligible immediately before him, though the number of those things, which he understands, is continually increasing.—And, when  
he

<sup>o</sup> See Euseb. Hist. or Lard. Works, Vol. iii. p. 104, 105.

he mixes with other men, he finds others comprehending what is unintelligible to him; infomuch that, if he acts with them, he must admit propositions (for all motives and principles seem resolvable into propositions) which he does not comprehend; and have frequent occasion to assent to their truth. —Nay, I can fancy, that all conclusions of his experience, after which he constantly *acts*, concerning substances, laws of nature, &c. if formed into propositions, would appear, as propositions, to be *unintelligible*.

XI. There is nothing, perhaps, which will make our reasoning more readily accepted, than conceiving a child to repeat his *catechism*.—At first, the whole is unintelligible to him, and always some part: yet it is right, upon the whole, that he should repeat it. The very sound of the words, of which he hears some account at other times, makes some impression upon him; and there is scarce a part, which is not the vehicle of some good sentiment. —Sentiments of order, decency, duty, are inculcated, as well as those more immediately religious. But, as catechizing has been practiced in all ages of the Christian world, the benefits of it must have been experienced, and the wisdom of it may be taken for granted; and, as it deceives no one, the innocence of it is evident; I mean, as being clear of any violation of *veracity*.

XII. It may be proper not wholly to omit all mention of different *orders in the Church*: of old, the lowest were the *κατηχουενοι*, the next the *πιστοι*, the highest the *ηγουενοι*:—the catechumens, the faithful, and the leaders: we have just now spoken of catechumens, only we must conceive, that, when men of maturity embraced Christianity from conviction, they were better acquainted, even while catechumens, with its principles than children are: nevertheless,

nevertheless, a plain man is only a degree higher: very few common men would explain our catechism well. The catechumens would have the greatest number of unintelligible doctrines to profess, the faithful more than the Leaders; but all would have some. Even the teacher cannot be exempt: in many things he is, and must be, as those that are taught: and the different ranks of teachers must differ, as the different ranks do of those, whom they instruct.

XIII. It may be asked, whether some propositions are not *partially* unintelligible? I should be inclined to say, some are.—The prophecy, that the seed of woman should bruise the <sup>p</sup>Serpent's head, may be reckoned of this sort: it seems to mean something, some privilege to man; but what privilege it is, could not be understood, at least for some thousands of years.—It is intelligible to say, that no time can be assigned, when God was ignorant what you would chuse; yet, when it is added, you might have chosen otherwise than you did, the moment before you fixed your choice, this, being equally intelligible, throws an *obscurity* over the whole. If propositions are taken as partly unintelligible, the natural consequence seems to be, that they must partake of the nature of those, which are wholly so: the less distinct ideas we have to any proposition, the less difference will there be between the affirmative and negative side of it; the less opposition or contradiction: consequently, assent to it means less; and losing the good of social religion, or incurring any evil, on its account, is less excusable<sup>q</sup>.

XIV. Since

<sup>p</sup> Gen. iii. 15.

<sup>q</sup> *Fait-on mourir des gens pour avoir dit que Jesus est un Verbe?* Voltaire, 4to. Vol. xxvi. p. 129.

XIV. Since I first formed the reasoning in this Chapter, I have been alarmed by a passage in a Charge of Dr. Balguy's, delivered to the Clergy of his Archdeaconry in 1769, and published in 1785: in which there seem to be some things contradictory to what I have advanced: as I distrust my own conclusions more than his, if, upon consideration, you do not judge that they are reconcilable, I must exhort you to confide in him, rather than in me.

When the *views* of writers are very different, they may say things, which seem to contradict each other, though they really do not. This great man speaks to the enlightened about the most perfect principles of reasoning in the mind: I take the ordinary course of things, suppose mere common men to have authority, and refer all to social action.—One great end we have in common; to hinder men from fancying they understand what they really do not: this end he pursues, as a preventive of error: I, lest men should suffer needless uneasiness, when they assent to what they do not understand; or be afraid to enter the Ministry; in short, lest they should be too backward, as well as too forward, to make use of reasonable liberty.

This difference of views affords hope of reconciliation: let us read the passage<sup>r</sup>. A proposition not understood, cannot be believed, or be an object of faith; in strictness, it cannot: yet we may believe, that it may be *valuable*; that it *may* have a *meaning*, though *we* do not see it; (this indeed Dr. Balguy allows<sup>s</sup>)—and this must incline us to *retain* unintelligible propositions, and even *use* them in some way, before we come to understand them.

Dr. Balguy instances in Transubstantiation; that instance seems too remote from scriptural expressions

<sup>r</sup> Dr. Balguy, p. 234.

<sup>s</sup> Dr. B. p. 238.



sions to rank with mine: yet I would not condemn a Romanist who, as one of the people, gave a verbal assent to it, merely in submission to authority, if he did not pretend to understand it—I hope the remarks of us both tend to hinder mysterious doctrines from perplexing weak minds, and bringing contempt upon Religion.

Dr. Balguy says, that what is even owned to come from God, must be understood before we can believe it: in strictness, this is true. Yet, without understanding it, we may *respect* it, bring it into *notice*, keep it unadulterated, even write or repeat it, if our Governors think fit, amongst things to which we give our assent<sup>4</sup>.

What is the most difficult to reconcile with my account is, that Dr. Balguy knows *no medium* between understanding perfectly, and not understanding at all. I cannot see how this is wrong; yet I think there are propositions, which *seem* to be *partially* unintelligible, and which, in fact, will be treated by men as such: if so, provision should be made for them, as if they really were such: *obscure* propositions may possibly be made clear, by rightly stating what they really mean, but then it requires very great clearness and acuteness to do this.—“Christ is the Author of eternal salvation,” would commonly seem obscure, or partially unintelligible; though Dr. Balguy makes it seem intelligible, by clearing it of all extraneous matter: but a common man could not have done this.—We ourselves have seen how a proposition which is, when taken absolutely, unintelligible, may be intelligible taken relatively.—“In the beginning was the Word”—  
“Christ

<sup>4</sup> Dr. B. says, that ordinary men *must* take their opinions from others. (see p. 255, Charge 5.)—Parents, teachers, &c. must “determine for them, what they are to *believe*.” &c.—See also Disc. vii. p. 124.

“Christ is the Son of God.—“Whom God of old ordained to this condemnation.”—Perhaps each of these propositions might be exhibited in a form perfectly intelligible; (sometimes, taking a *negative* form will give distinctness;) but, as this is very difficult, it seems right, with a view to *practice*, to determine how propositions partly intelligible should be treated.

Notwithstanding this, it does seem useful, that men should be aware, how one word may render a whole sentence unintelligible, and lead to falshood.

There is no difference between Dr. Balguy’s explanation and mine, with regard to the sense of *μυστηριου*; but, though mystery does not always imply present ignorance, yet what is now past ignorance was once present; and present ignorance may be enlightened: in a state of ignorance, at *any* time, intimations of future knowledge might be couched in propositions not wholly to be understood.

Dr. Balguy says, “no advantage can arise from the use of words without ideas:” here, our different views may occasion the seeming contradiction: in reasoning, none; in practice, it seems as if there might be some. As, for instance, in catechizing. In Dr. Powell’s Sermons<sup>u</sup>, published (and probably selected) by Dr. Balguy, there is mention of a *child’s* repeating his *creed*, and no mark of disapprobation.

In the particular case, in which St. Paul forbids speaking in an *unknown tongue*, it would have done great *harm*; it would have defeated the ends of religious society: we recommend the not rejecting of unintelligible propositions, upon the ground, that they may promote the ends of religious society.

On the whole, I do sincerely hope, that, notwithstanding the seeming opposition between Dr. Balguy’s

<sup>u</sup> P. 40, 41.

Balguy's Charge and my Lectures, there is not any real one. If one could have his remarks upon what I say here, I doubt not but they would be very improving.

xv. I will conclude this Chapter with a few practical *inferences* from what has been laid down in it: they may be useful, both as practical directions, and as proofs of the justness of our reasoning.

1. Any Church may reasonably admit some unintelligible propositions into its forms; that some are found there, is no proof that such church is erroneous.

2. It is most immediately to our present purpose, to observe, that though, in assenting, unintelligible propositions are wont to give us the most care and uneasiness, they ought to give us the least.

3. In settling principles of action in our minds, we ought to be very cautious, lest we take for granted, that we understand what in reality we do not. We should be aware, that most propositions relating to religion, if we include all particulars in them which can be included, contain something, which is above our comprehension.

4. Lastly. When we are obliged to engage in *controversy*, we should never indulge any malevolence, or any intemperate zeal, particularly about mysterious doctrines. We are most apt to fall into disputes about those subjects, which we understand the least. We do not know enough of the mysterious doctrines of religion, to quarrel about them. Were we to see two children fighting about their creeds, we should think them too ignorant to be champions of orthodoxy; but they seem almost as well qualified to be so, as we are to contend, with violence, about the eternal generation of Christ, when opposed to his creation before<sup>\*</sup> all worlds. //

It

\* See Arius's Letter in Epiphani, Her. 69. (7. and 8.). See also Pearson on the Creed.

It may be said, though both these doctrines are mysterious, yet one may be *nearer* to the truth than the other:—If you are at the top of a steeple and I at the bottom, it is never worth our while to quarrel about which is nearer to the Sun.

The truth is, that, in the eyes of superior Beings, we are none of us right; and that a superior being would have difficulty in pronouncing which of us is *nearest* to being right; I mean, in mysterious doctrines: in ceremonies, and other things of an arbitrary nature, (the other thing we quarrel about) we are *all* right; so long as we do not dispute.—I should wish to mention here the story of three Ladies, who were reading about Cupid and *Psyche*: one called Psyche, *Fisk* (Phyſch); the second reprimanded her, and called it *Fish* (Phyſch); the third snatched the Book, and insisted on the word's being called *Skerw* (Pſchew): the dispute ran high; at last, an agreement was made to refer it to a gentleman of the University, (for in the midst of an University the dispute is said to have happened:) the Academic arrived: which is *right*? why I cannot say *any* one is *right*:—which is *nearest* right? that is a point too difficult to be determined. Now, suppose each of these Ladies to have a number of followers in her pronunciation, and we have *three sects*; what might be the event of a violent *controversy* between *such* sects, it is impossible distinctly to foresee: they might want Dr. Balguy's advice, “least of all to censure and persecute our brethren, perhaps for no better reason, than because *their* nonsense and *ours* wears a different dress.”

Finally, if it *should* ever be our fate to be engaged in controversy on incomprehensible doctrines, let us “read, mark, learn,” that beautiful passage of Augustin,

Augustin, about his own controversy with the Manicheans.—“*Illud, quovis<sup>z</sup> judice, impetrare me à vobis oportet, ut in utrâque parte omnis arrogantia deponatur. Nemo nostrûm dicat se jam invenissè veritatem. Sic eam quæramus quasi ab utrisque nesciatur. Ita enim diligenter et concorderiter quæri poterit, si nullâ temerariâ præsumptione inventa et cognita esse credatur.*”

Thus may we speak the truth in <sup>a</sup> Love, search for it as friends and brethren, and, at length, come to hold it in the unity of Spirit and bond of peace.

<sup>z</sup> See the end of Lardner's Account of the Manicheans, from Aug. *Contra Ep. Fund. Cap. 2. n. 2. 3, 4.*

<sup>a</sup> Eph. iv. 15.



## C H A P. XI.

## OF CHUSING THE LEAST EVIL.

I. **W**E have been treating of using and assenting to Forms: and we have been examining into those Liberties, which arise from changes in the meaning and force of such forms; either by tacit improvements in the Religion, to which they belong; or by the decay or extinction of the Heresies, which they are adapted to correct.—We have also considered other Liberties, which arise from the imperfection and indistinctness of our conceptions. These liberties may all together seem to be numerous; but yet, in practice, more may be wanted:—after they have been all used, there may be some things in the religious society, to which we belong, that we cannot approve; something that we wish to have changed.—Even a considerable number of the members may wish for change; or the governing part may be satisfied, and lower orders dissatisfied; in such dissatisfaction, what is to be done?—the most obvious thing to suggest is, chuse another church; but, it does not follow, as a matter of course, that a person, who desires to have some things changed, must necessarily quit his religious society;—and, if he does not quit it, he must continue under obligation to do every thing as a regular member; amongst other things, he must assent to use *Forms*, when that is required of him by Authority; either as a private man, or a Minister.

Whether he must quit his society or not, must depend on this principle; he must chuse the *least evil*;

*evil*: of which principle, more hereafter; now we only say, if, on the whole, it is the least evil for him to quit, he must do so; if, to continue, he must continue, whatever difficulties he may have about assenting in form to Doctrine, which does not coincide with his private opinion: I say assenting *in form*, because, when he has his choice of words, he must declare his private opinion plainly, and say what his real meaning is, in using expressions inconsistent with his private opinion; namely, to comply with rules of a Society, of which he thinks it his duty to continue a member:—he must declare, that he speaks as he would act in any office, without interposing his private judgment: as an *Herald* would perform ceremonies, which he thought had better be altered or omitted, or would proclaim unmeaning *titles* of a King.

II. But, how are *evils* to be *calculated*, so that he may know, whether his retiring or his continuing will be attended with greater? I apprehend this should be done by the principles already laid down in the present Book; and by considerations of public and private utility; to mankind in general, and to religious society in particular.—*Schism* is the term commonly made use of to express needless division of the whole Society of Christians, or needless separation from any Church<sup>a</sup>: and the *evil* of it is extensive; it consists in interrupting uniformity, making Christians consider each other as enemies, or rivals; unhinging men's principles, lessening the number of those, who assist each others religious sentiments by sympathy; taking attention from practice to speculation. To these should be added, harm to civil government, and detriment done to the principles of the individual himself, who separates.

III. However

<sup>a</sup> Just mentioned Chap. IV. Sect. IV.—*μη η εν υμων σχισματα*.  
1 Cor. i. 10.

III. However just this may be, and however plain it is that all men must chuse the least evil, yet many seem as if they would not allow it without some *reluctance* in matters of religion: it does indeed, when assenting in form to things, which do not satisfy us, is a consequence, wear the appearance of prevarication, and men are much to be commended, who examine all such appearances with the greatest nicety.

But the chief thing, which would obstruct the reception of our maxim, chuse the least evil, is, that it implies great *imperfection* in religious societies; it implies, that a man may find imperfection in his own church: and, if he attempts to quit it on that account, he may find, that other churches are still more imperfect than his own: whereas, we are habituated to look up to our church with the utmost veneration. We are brought up to hear nothing but good of the religion to which we belong; its doctrines, its regulations, nay its ceremonies and habits, are recommended to us, and strongly inculcated, without any distinction being made between them and Religion in the strictest sense; between them and that which is most substantial, essential, indispensable. And this is found necessary for maintaining religious sentiments in the minds of the generality of people. Such commendations may sometimes make us have more respect for Religion; but they may also give us some wrong notions and prejudices; and prevent our doing what is best upon the whole.

IV. And some men increase this veneration for religious Society in general, by considering, that the Catholic Church, or society of Christians, was founded by Christ himself. From whence also this conclusion may seem deducible, that, if any particular Church has any material imperfection, it cannot



cannot be a part of the Church of Christ.—Let us then inquire first, how far Christian churches are of human institution; and then we can more freely speak of their imperfections.

That Christ might be said to form his Disciples into a Church, has been mentioned in the first<sup>b</sup> Book; but, if a great number of Christians were to assemble, and set themselves to reduce into a practical form all that he has said, and act upon it, they would find themselves much at a loss, if they added nothing; they would be scarce able to stir a step: the obstruction would be of the same sort, though in a less degree, if they selected all passages relating to the ecclesiastical government of the Apostles:—they would find societies instituted, and conducted, officers or magistrates named, their qualities mentioned; but all incidentally, without system: and they would be in danger of misinterpreting ancient names or terms, by affixing to them modern<sup>c</sup> ideas.—Some have<sup>d</sup> thought, that the Apostles *accommodated* the form of ecclesiastical government, in any place, to the form of *civil* government prevailing there, as falling in best with habitual notions;—without proving this, we may say, that no church could be carried on, without more rules than the Apostles have laid down; and that new rules or laws ought to depend upon particular circumstances.—Baptism and the Lord's Supper Christ himself has appointed; besides these, and preaching the<sup>e</sup> Gospel to all men, requiring them to act on Christian principles, and labouring to make them “careful to maintain<sup>f</sup> good works,” nothing at this moment occurs to me, which is so essential to a Christian church as to admit of no variation;

<sup>b</sup> Chap. xix. Sect. xvi.    <sup>d</sup> Bingham, beginning of Book 9.  
<sup>c</sup> Chap. ix. Sect. i.    <sup>e</sup> Mark xvi. 15.    <sup>f</sup> Tit. iii. 8.

variation: nay these, though invariable in themselves, allow of variety in the modes of executing and encouraging them.—As far as these things go, a person, in deliberating about a removal from one church to another, may conceive himself as going upon divine authority; — farther, all is *human*. About the rest then, we may reason freely, and compare one human institution with another. Men used, in former times, to deduce the particulars of *civil* society from the Scriptures; that is now given up; but Scripture being about Religion, a prejudice still remains for recurring to Scripture about *ecclesiastical* society; this however is not supported by reason, except as far as we can reason by analogy from one situation to another, according to the principles of Book 1. Chap. xi.—If an architect was to consult Scripture, in order to determine whether he should build a Church of brick or stone, he would not be more unreasonable than some men have been in their consultations.

v. As, then, we may compare one human institution with another, and a Church is, in many respects, an human institution, let us suppose a society to meet, which had been instituted for effecting an inland navigation: it is debated, whether certain sluices shall be made in certain places? you are a member, and you have your opinion, grounded on reasons: you hear, in the course of the debate, notions, or doctrines, from which you dissent, and these are ratified by the majority; do you refuse to act after them, or to continue a member of this Society? a Church is a corporation or society contriving human means of answering a good end: though you disapprove of some of the means (and what are professions of doctrines but means?) you have no more reason to quit it, merely  
on

\* See Dr. Balguy, Discourse 6. near beginning.

on that account, than you have to quit the other.—When an order is made by a Society, sometimes persons, members of that Society, who have voted against it, hesitate to sign it; but this is esteemed weakness; for signature does not, in such a case, imply private opinion.

VI. If it is once properly felt, that Churches are, in most things, human institutions; to consider their imperfections will give no offence, and to act upon them will occasion no difficulty.—Nay, we may go one step farther; human means of answering the ends of religious society, must needs be more imperfect than any human means, because religion is the most difficult of <sup>h</sup> subjects.—In most cases, we make attempts to improve things, and gain a greater good than we at present possess; they are but rude attempts in general; we know so little of the internal nature of things, that we are obliged to grope our way in the dark, and take what knowledge we can get from experience; though that experience sometimes costs us dear. If this be the case, what can be expected in our pursuits of improvement in Religion? where we know our way so little; where almost every thing is above our comprehension?—Those, who find it difficult to allow of uncertainties in Religion, might perhaps assist themselves, by imagining two contending parties to refer their disputes to superior beings: they might by that means get an idea, that, in all probability, superior beings would determine (according to the ludicrous story before mentioned) that neither party was right: and that, which party was the nearest to being right, could not very easily be determined.

VII. Notwithstanding our reasoning may be thought not unjust, it may be thought better omitted.

<sup>h</sup> Balguy, Charge 5. p. 258.

omitted. If mens religious conduct depends on their veneration for their religion, is it not *imprudent* to lessen that veneration?—We may answer, that sometimes it is necessary to enter into the grounds of all duties, though, while we are considering them, we have less sentiment than accompanies the performance of them at other times, when every thing is in its settled state: when a servant is contracting with his master, or negotiating about quitting his service, he does not feel the sentiments of a servant; and so in other cases; but, when things recover their usual train, the sentiments recover their usual strength. In the present case, when quitting a church is in question, considering its imperfections is absolutely necessary; in order to prevent taking a greater evil instead of a less; and in order to comfort those, who comply without a clear insight into the grounds of their compliance;—but, when questions and doubts are at an end, veneration for the church regains its wonted strength and efficacy: that which is fallible may be the best we can attain; and, though the forms of any church should be in some things exceptionable, yet they may be exceedingly edifying upon the whole: nay, we can even admire that, which our reason tells us is in some respects imperfect. ‘How noble, how beautiful, we say, is such a thing! what a pity that it has such an imperfection!’—No Poet is more admired than Shakspere, even by those, who think him faulty in several respects.

VIII. It follows from these considerations, that continuing members of a Church whose Doctrines seem imperfect, when that appears to be the least evil, cannot interfere with our Duty to God or man.—As far as we can enter into the views of the Supreme Being, we must conceive, that he cannot  
disapprove

disapprove of our approaching as near as we can to promoting the general good: In the case supposed, there is an appearance of falshood to the eye of man, but there can be none to the all-seeing eye of Him, who judgeth righteous judgment<sup>i</sup>: to scruple and decline chusing the least evil, on account of such appearance, would be running into mischief wilfully.

Amongst *men*, there seem none, who could be offended with our chusing the least evil, by complying with some things against our private opinion, except the *Church* in which we continue;—to the church all deceit might be avoided, by explanation of the real state of the case. And it is not likely, that any church would take offence at such an irregularity; or would wish to exclude any Person on its account. I suppose the person peaceable in his conduct, and not doing more to unsettle the minds of other members of the church than is necessary. If he was factious, offence might be taken at his factiousness, but that is not what we are speaking of.

ix. Nevertheless, the Liberty here allowed may undoubtedly be carried too far: abuse of it would consist in continuing members of a Church, when that was the greater evil on public principles, though the less on private and interested ones. In early times of Christianity, all intercommunity<sup>k</sup> of Pagan and Christian rites was utterly unlawful to Christians. And I cannot conceive, that I could consciontiously continue in any Church, where either Baptism or the Lord's Supper was wholly<sup>l</sup> omitted.—Calculations must be formed on particular circumstances in each case.

x. But

<sup>i</sup> John vii. 24.

<sup>k</sup> Warb. Div. Leg. Index. Powell, p. 186. Disc. xi.

<sup>l</sup> Instances will appear of such under Art. 27 and 28.—*Quakers* might be just mentioned here.

x. But, though calculations must be formed chiefly on public principles, yet private and *temporal* evil need not be wholly neglected in them. Religion is intended to oppose the things which are not <sup>to</sup> seen to those which are seen, when men are hurried away by unlawful passions; but, in virtuous pursuits, it has the “promise of the Life that *now* is;” as well as “of that which is to come:” and therefore may be conceived to aim at temporal good, as well as eternal. It is applauded and protected by civil governments, because it makes men just and charitable, that is, because it has a good effect on men’s property and present convenience: and whatever aims at present good, must be supposed to avoid present evil. If then you should inhabit a country, where you cannot have that worship which to you seems right, or if, having it in some way, you cannot have it in that perfection, in which you might have it where it is established, it does not seem necessary, that you should remove, and give up your temporal prosperity, or sacrifice the good of a Family, on that account. The general principles of religion being the same in most religions, if not in all, you may get some good to your sentiments, affections, motives, if you make the best possible use of *any* religion. If your property and connexions are in Pennsylvania, or in Scotland, or even in a Popish country; it does not seem needful to remove from thence to that country, whose religion you most approve. It seems to be taken for granted, that, if you in any degree communicate with a Church, you must profess her errors, and partake in her sinful practices; but this is taken for granted without reason.—(See Archbishop Sharp, Sermon 1.) There is indeed a difference between attending any  
church

<sup>m</sup> 2 Cor. iv. 18.

<sup>n</sup> 1 Tim. iv. 8.

church occasionally, and being a Member of it; but what we have said of the former case will, in *some* degree, apply to the latter. For, wherein do Churches chiefly differ from each other? Not in those things, which we have mentioned as essentials, but in things above human comprehension<sup>o</sup>, or in things arbitrary; such are ceremonies, and such, I conceive, are modes of government. And really a man of an enlarged mind might bring himself to great compliances, either in one sort or the other. Dr. Powell maintains in his Thesis, with regard to government, that neither the English nor the Scotch Form contains any thing repugnant to either the Law of Nature or the Scriptures. And I should be inclined rather to extend than to confine his observation. Bingham observes<sup>p</sup>, that, though French Protestants differ from English in some respects, yet they hold, that the Church of England is a safe and rational Church.—Now, whatever reduces churches nearer to an equality, gives temporal evil a greater weight in the scale, when a person is deliberating how, in quitting or adhering to a church, he shall fix upon the less evil.

XI. After all, if you are still haunted with scruples and misgivings, pursue your own course; and see what will be the result. You are discontented with something in your own church; look out for another; supposing you found one perfectly to your mind, yet even then you ought not to join it, except the change will compensate for the mischief of Schism, and for any accidental inconveniences, such as increase of distance, &c. But the supposition of a Church perfectly unexceptionable  
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<sup>o</sup> Chap. iv. Sect. iv. and Chap. v. Sect. iv.

<sup>p</sup> End of Vol. 2. also p. 723. Col. 2. indeed the whole 1st Chap. of B. 2. of *Apology*.

is not to be admitted; such perfection is so improbable, that, guiding ourselves by experience, we must expect, that if you find any number of errors or faults in your own church, you will find some in other churches; perhaps as many as in your own, or more: you cannot be consistent, in that case, except you quit them all:—the question then would be, whether you may quit *all* religious societies, and worship God in solitude? We answer, every thing in the nature of the thing, every thing in the expressions of Scripture, is against such a measure. If you are alone, you lose most of the Benefits of Religion; instruction and sympathy wholly; and association<sup>a</sup> in a great degree:—even reading and meditation grow either dead, or extravagant<sup>r</sup>.—And the pretence is trifling: nor are you at liberty to act upon it, except you determine also to retire from civil society, and to fix yourself in some desert, or on some uninhabited Island, because in Monarchies you have found some oppression, in Democracies some turbulence, and in every form of civil government something inconsistent with your ideas of perfection.

In short, the prejudice, that we are not to chuse the least evil in spirituals as well as in temporals, is without foundation in reason: it is in effect saying, that we must voluntarily promote error and misery, instead of truth and happiness. Perfection is not to be had; but at the same time that we chuse a small evil in some respects, we may get great good in others. In conducting things in human life, we continually use expedients, in which we see some imperfection; because by them we avoid some great inconvenience, or attain some considerable

<sup>a</sup> Chap. III.

<sup>r</sup> See Dr. Balguy, p. 90. Then a man should act so that, if other men followed his example, the general good would be promoted.



considerable good. What is *hereditary succession*, especially in *Kings*, but an expedient of this sort?— And, as to ecclesiastical matters, we have already instanced in adopting tacit reformations instead of express ones, and in using Homilies\* instead of Sermons, when good Sermons cannot be expected: and, on the same principle, we should chuse the religious society to which we will belong.

The conclusion, which I once made in Lectures on *Morality*, may be adopted here: be of the established religion, when it is not intolerably at variance with your opinions; when it is, be of that, *ceteris paribus*, from which you differ least;— which you can join with the least disturbance to the minds of other men; with the least interruption of any thing that is useful: but be of any religion rather than none†.

\* Chap. v. Sect. v. and vi. Chap. ix. Sect. vi. See also Rutherford's Charges, p. 1.

† Dr. Balguy, p. 258.



## C H A P. XII.

OF THE ASSENT OF THE CLERGY TO ARTICLES  
OF RELIGION, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM  
THAT OF THE LAITY.

1. **S**UCH are the *Liberties* in giving assent to Articles of religion, arising from the nature of human affairs; another liberty is sometimes claimed, founded on this question: have not the *Laity* more liberty, in assenting to Forms of Doctrine, than the *Clergy*?<sup>a</sup> is not the assent of those, who are taught, to be considered in a different light from that of those, who are qualified to teach? Some persons have made such a distinction, and it seems worthy of notice.

Lucifer of Cagliari, about the middle of the fourth century, “and his followers” “were willing to receive the *Laity*, who came over from the Arians, upon renouncing their error: but they would not consent that *Bishops*, who had complied with the Arians, should be received *as such*. They might, upon returning to the Catholics, be received *as laymen*, but they were not any more to officiate in the Church.”—“This occasioned a Schism<sup>b</sup>.”

Bishop Burnet, in his Introduction to his Exposition of the 39 Articles<sup>b</sup>, says, “As to the *Laity*, and the whole body of the *People*, certainly to them these are only the Articles of Church Communion; so that every person, who does not think, that there is some proposition in them that is erroneous to so high a degree, that he cannot hold communion

<sup>a</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 4. p. 372, *Works*. <sup>b</sup> P. 7. 8vo.

communion with such as hold it, may and is obliged to continue in our communion."

II. There seems to be no doubt but there is *some* difference between Clergy and Laity, as to subscribing or assenting to Articles of Religion; but the nature of that difference may occasion some doubt.—The question seems to be, whether it is a difference in *kind* or only in *degree*. It appears to me rather of the latter sort; but our best method will be, to examine the principal things, in which we see the difference consist; from such an examination, the nature of the difference will best appear; if we find that, in some cases, the assent is exactly the same, and in others the difference can be accounted for, without having recourse to different kinds of assent, the conclusion will be, that the assent differs only in degree.

III. One difference between Clergy and Laity is, that all the clergy give a solemn assent to a body of Doctrines, and only part of the Laity; so that many Laymen never assent expressly at all.—Nor is this peculiar to any one country; the reason of the difference is general, and lies in the ends or purposes, for which assent is required;—the end of assent or subscription in the Clergy is, that there may be unity of Doctrine, or teaching; all being teachers, all must subscribe: but the design of assent in the Laity is only to prevent<sup>b</sup> competitions, cabals, animosities, &c. when power or authority is used to favour opposite parties; therefore, only those Laymen need assent to established doctrine, who are entrusted with authority. Others seem to be concerned with it, only as it is taught to them. Thus, a private man may pass his whole life, without once solemnly declaring his opinions, and they therefore may continue unknown.—It may indeed

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<sup>b</sup> Chap. v. Sect. vi.

be said, that the mere declaration, or subscription, makes no difference to an honest man; whether called upon or not, he will think himself bound to comply with the Laws of his Society, or to withdraw from it: in some cases, this idea is very proper and pertinent, but not in the present: as a man may perhaps obey all Laws, without declaring his opinion. Good governors will not require an unity of opinion, except where they are obliged to it; and therefore, when they do not require it, any man may conclude, that it is not necessary, and that it is not expected; nor will there be any grounds for thinking it is tacitly engaged for.

iv. Another difference between Clergy and Laity is, that, when the Laity do subscribe, or give a solemn assent, they are not conceived to have so distinct an understanding of the doctrines they assent to, as the Clergy. More doctrines are to them upon the footing of *unintelligible* doctrines, and, on that account, they have greater liberty. When a man's occupation, be it bodily labour, or science, or government, prevents him from understanding a doctrine, that doctrine should be, humanly speaking, called *unintelligible*. Not that he is allowed to be insincere, or careless; he is to judge as well as he can, partly from grounds and reasons, and partly from the authority of others: and such judgment as he does form, he ought to declare sincerely. The difference here stated, is a difference in degree only; for the same difference is allowed amongst different *ranks* of Clergy<sup>c</sup>. If we begin from the child repeating his creed<sup>d</sup>, and rise through all higher orders, the assent keeps constantly varying, but only in degree;—this it does, though one form of words is used by all who give their assent.

v. When

<sup>c</sup> Book III. Chap. x. Sect. xi.

<sup>d</sup> Powell, p. 40, 41.

v. When we speak of men as prevented by occupations from seeing minutely the nature of religious doctrines, we only speak in general: there may be some individuals, who have opportunities of knowing as much of religion as professed Divines<sup>e</sup>: when these men subscribe to articles of religion, they seem to subscribe exactly on the same footing with Clergy. In what would the assent of Mr. *Locke*, Lord *Lyttelton*, Mr. *Nelson*, Mr. *Boyle*, Sir *Isaac Newton*, or Mr. *West*, differ from that of a Clergyman? in nothing that I can see.— Yet here the difference of assent must continue, if it depended only on Clergy and Laity.— The reason, which Dr. *Powell* gives for the subscription of the Clergy, might be extended to the Laity<sup>f</sup>. It cannot be imagined, on a footing of probability or experience, that *Magistrates* (and Laymen only subscribe when they are such) would encourage, or even protect, the favourers of opinions, which they did not favour themselves, or at least believe so far as not to reject or disapprove them: supposing *Magistrates* to enter fully into the grounds of such opinions.

vi. The last difference between Clergy and Laity, that I shall mention, is that of the *effect* of a given disapprobation of the Doctrines of any Church: suppose Mr. *Locke* dissented from the Church of England in six points, and his Antagonist, the Bishop of Worcester, in the same number; though their declaration of opinion would be of the same nature, the *effect* of their dissent might be different. Each of them is to chuse the least evil; but, supposing the Prelate uneasy about his six points, he might find it the least evil to quit the *Ministry*; and yet Mr. *Locke* might not find it the least evil to quit the *Church*.— Or, what comes to  
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<sup>e</sup> B. 11. Chap. 1v. Sect. 1v.      <sup>f</sup> *Powell*, p. 33.

the same thing, the Bishop might quit the Ministry, and yet continue in the Church. He, who quits the ministry, only quits an occupation; and, if he is diligent, may find another;—he, who quits the church, may find it impossible to meet with another, which will answer his purpose; or at least may be put to very great inconvenience, if he attempts it.—As a clergyman, a person lives under the condition of his subscription; and, if he would not subscribe, at any time, he does not at that time lawfully hold that which, without subscribing, he could not have acquired: but the Layman may retire, so as never to subscribe again; and may live in that situation, for which subscription would never have been required.



## C H A P XIII.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASSENTING,  
AND DETERMINING TO CONFORM.

1. **T**HE last liberty, which has been claimed, turns, in some sort, upon the distinction now mentioned: Burnet claims it for the *Laity* (as we have seen), but some claim it even for the *Clergy*. He however refuses it to teachers of Religion<sup>a</sup>. According to our account, in the preceding Chapter, they are reduced to one: but we now must have the clergy chiefly in view: what is said may be easily applied to Laity, if occasion should require it. Bingham says (Apology, Book 2. Chap. 1. or Works, Vol. 2. p. 723,) “What is meant by subscription to articles of our Church, is not exactly agreed by those that subscribe them. Some take them only for Articles of *Peace*; and they by subscription mean no more than this; that they will so far own and submit to them, as not publicly to dissent from them, or *teach* any doctrine that is contrary to any thing contained in them. This seems to have been the judgment of Archbishop *Bramhall*, Bishop *Fowler*, and others. But generally, subscription is considered in a stricter sense; as implying a declaration of our own *opinion*, and not as a bare obligation to silence only: and this seems rather to have been the intent and meaning of the Church.” //

In order to explain more fully the nature of our present distinction, we may suppose a Clergyman, or one about to enter into the ministry, to say in his

<sup>a</sup> Introd. to Articles, p. 7. 8vo.

his own mind, Articles of Religion are intended to produce unity in teaching; and assenting to them answers no other purpose; if then I determine to preach only established doctrines, what does it signify whether I believe them or not? A man might wish to adopt such reasoning, particularly if he found himself only half satisfied about some points; and he might confirm himself in it, by saying, that his opinion was a matter of little consequence: the Church professed the points; that is, a set of learned and able men believed them; whether such an insignificant individual as he did, was not worth enquiring.

11. Now, though it is self-evident, it may be worth while to observe, that, if it were allowed by the particular Laws of any Church to promise compliance, instead of professing opinions, sincerity would not be violated by a person's promising to teach that, of which he was not well satisfied: it is worth while to observe this, because there is an appearance of duplicity or insincerity in such conduct, in teaching doctrines and performing ceremonies, which you do not approve: and there are limits, which ought not to be exceeded, in teaching and acting contrary to our opinions; no man ought to promise to teach any thing contrary to what he esteems fundamental principles of natural or revealed religion; or inconsistent with men's being "careful to <sup>b</sup> maintain good works."

111. The principal thing which seems wanting in some, who mention this subject, is, attention to different situations.—It is one thing to *make* laws, another to *obey* them. If we are in a council of those, who are making Laws for the government of a church, we may urge, let not needless restraints be

<sup>b</sup> Titus iii. 8. The essentials of a Christian Church were mentioned Chap. XI. Sect. IV.



be imposed; if it appears, that teachers will faithfully teach none but established doctrines, and will teach them with zeal, and diligence, and unanimity; let them not be pressed to define and declare minutely their opinions;—but, if it seems probable, that they will not confine themselves to established doctrines, or that, if they do, they will be remiss in teaching them; still more, if different teachers seem likely to enter into disputes<sup>c</sup> about the doctrines they teach, no remedy seems adequate to such a disorder, but having men of the same opinion; not in every thing, but in all things which distinguish and separate one Church from another. I may say this in this place, because it seems wanted; though it more properly belongs to Chap. v.

iv. But, whatever might be right in a council of legislators, when a law is made, and continues in force, it is to be *obeyed*: and that is properly the situation, which we now suppose.—If then a Law exists, requiring assent to certain doctrines, or agreement in opinion, we now enquire, whether a man's honest intention to teach the doctrines faithfully will excuse his want of believing them:—when all has been recollected, which has been said about unintelligible doctrines, and all the liberties allowed, which have been explained in this book, we maintain, that such intention will *not* be sufficient, without such *belief* as will remain after all those liberties have been taken.

In order to see the ground of this assertion, we observe, that assent is required as a means of maintaining unity of doctrine, and as a *security* that it shall not be infringed. Dr. Powell's<sup>d</sup> manner of expressing this has been already mentioned; we will consider the notions of *means* and *security* separately;

<sup>c</sup> Chap. v. Sect. vi.

<sup>d</sup> Chap. v. Sect. vii.

rately;— though certainly a security might be ranked amongst means.

v. When certain *means* of answering any end are fixed upon by authority, private judgment ought not to aim at answering that end without those means. For wisdom is as much shewn in fixing upon good means, as in aiming at good ends; nay, there are many, who could perceive certain ends to be good and useful, and desirable, who could do very little towards attaining those ends; that is, towards inventing proper means, and rendering them efficacious in practice. It is therefore great rashness and presumption to alter fixed means; by such indiscretion, the best ends may be frustrated: and consequently, authority is as much to be obeyed in respect to means, as to end. But this is particularly to be observed, when the person principally concerned is much prejudiced or interested; he, who is to obey, might better be trusted to alter any means for others, than for himself.—If you entrust a matter of consequence to any one, you wish to see how he is qualified; it is not enough for him to say, “ I will take care;” you want to know what reason he has to be confident; how he has been brought up, what experience he has had; but, above all, what turn or disposition<sup>e</sup> he has for the kind of undertaking: what his habitual tastes, feelings, opinions are; on these you ground your hopes of success: and, if he has *no turn* for the thing, if his notions run in a different channel, you dare not trust to his mere *industry*, and sense of *duty*; when a task is *irksome*, it seems drudgery; and

<sup>e</sup> Inquiries like the following are always esteemed proper, or even necessary: If any one desires to be a Sailor, does he *relish* a seafaring life?—if to be a Groom, does he *like* Horses?—if to be a Nurse, does she *like* children?—if to be a Poet-laureat, has he a *turn* for Poetry? and so on.

and every opportunity is taken of evading it, even, it is to be feared, by those, who profess to follow the dictates of duty.

VI. In like manner, we may observe, that, when a certain *security* is fixed upon by authority, it ought not to be neglected, under pretence, that the danger may be otherwise avoided.—It has been owned, that a pledge or security for the performance of any covenant is one of the means of getting it performed: but yet it seems worth some distinct consideration. Put the case, that a man left his fortune to his son, on condition, that he gave a *Bond* of 500*l.* to an old servant to pay him an annuity for life of 50*l.* a year<sup>f</sup>: the son would not satisfy his father's will, by determining to pay the annuity; he must also give the *Bond*; if he does not give that particular security, he is not in justice entitled to his fortune.—He, who presumes, that he may neglect his promise of that agreement of *opinion*, on which the Church depends chiefly for the performance of the pastoral duty, cannot consistently require a promissory note or legal receipt for any sum which he pays.

VII. It follows from what has been said, that, while articles of faith exist, any one, who is lawfully called to assent to them, must, in strictness of duty, not only determine to act regularly, but to declare his real opinion. It must not however be forgotten, that the true intent and meaning of all engagements and promises depends on the sense, in which they are understood by those, to whom they are made; if, therefore, the Church shews any marks of change in action or measures, it may be presumed, that it makes some change in the security which it requires; if they grow remiss  
about

<sup>f</sup> This was a bequest of a person, to whom I was executor; and I insisted on the *Bond*.

about certain doctrines being *taught*, he may be the less nice about his opinion of such doctrines.

And, though certain doctrines were not given up, yet, if it appear that some *change* has happened, which makes it evidently less *needful* for the Church to require *security*, it may be fairly presumed, that less security is required; and therefore, during such change, those opinions, which relate to it, need be less strictly examined; for the opinions are the security. Certain doctrines of a Church may be opposed to some particular heresy; that heresy ceases; though the Church continues to profess the same doctrines, yet it does not so much want them to be taught, nor therefore does it want so much security, that they will be taught. — But these changes only affect men's assent, or the necessity of their settling their *opinions*; they do not affect the determination to conform; nothing relaxes that determination, though conformity may vary in some particulars.

Again. It has been laid<sup>s</sup> down, that, if Ministers would all be regular, and unanimously teach the established doctrine, and this could be depended on before hand, there need be no articles of religion made: if, therefore, a general spirit of submission to rule and order shews itself, where they have been made for a length of time, the Church must be presumed to approach nearer and nearer to that disposition, in which they would have made none: and, whenever the Church shews itself at ease about security, the Clergy may be less nice about their opinions; these being, as before, the security.

VIII. It must not however be thought, that any relaxation, remissness, or indulgence, in a Church, can justify any attempts against its welfare.

The

<sup>s</sup> Chap. v. Sect. v.

The moment any Clergyman thinks of acting the part of an enemy, the old security becomes necessary, and therefore all the original strictness of obligation revives; opinions must be professed, and no want of attention to them can be presumed.

To make use of any appearance of indulgence, so as to do harm to him, who is inclined to shew it, and so as to neglect his rights, is both unjust and ungenerous. Would any one think of justifying a servant, who received wages of his master and betrayed him? especially if, besides paying his regular stipend, his master placed confidence in him? the master's being an individual or a society can make no difference.—Confidence may give liberty, as to particular means; but it ought to make the *end* more certainly to be depended on; otherwise, he who is trusted is doubly blameable;—for breach of fidelity, and for breach of confidence.

I have already produced some passages of Dr. Balguy to our present purpose<sup>h</sup>.

Bishop Burnet agrees in opinion<sup>i</sup>; he also lays down the distinction, though somewhat faintly, between making Laws and obeying them.

Bingham only mentions<sup>\*</sup> the two different ways of engaging to obey the Laws of the Church; he gives the same judgment that we do, though with great moderation; but, as he only remarks by the way, he does not enter into the difference arising from a Law having or not having been made.

Bishop *Lew*<sup>1</sup> confines himself wholly to the business of legislation, as indeed his subject naturally led

<sup>h</sup> Chap. v. Sect. vi.

<sup>i</sup> Introd. p. 7. 8vo.

<sup>\*</sup> See the passage beginning of Chap. XIII.

<sup>1</sup> Considerations on the propriety of requiring a Subscription to Articles of Faith: p. 23.

led him to do: he does not seem to allow, that *any* case can justify requiring a declaration of opinion, and in that he contradicts what little we have said on that part of the subject: as he gives no reasons, our arguments remain in full force.—Dr. Balguy, in his admirable Charge<sup>m</sup>, has in view the making of Laws, not what is our principal point, the nature of obedience.

<sup>m</sup> Charge v.



## C H A P. XIV.

OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE,  
AS INFLUENCING RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.

1. **N**OTHING has hitherto been said, in treating of religious Society, about the *civil Magistrate*; he is not indeed essential to religious society, yet his influence upon it is so powerful, and has occasioned so many disputes, (which are still very warm,) that he must not be passed over.

Hitherto, religious society has been considered simply in itself: every society is carried on by a common understanding; and the modes, by which it attains its ends, must be prescribed by *Laws*.—Ecclesiastical society can have no *power* but over the *minds* of its members; nor can that power be *enforced* any other way than by expulsion, or *excommunication*; there may be trials, sentences, censures, punishments in such society; but they must all be submitted to, as being less evils than excommunication.—The obligations to submit arise from the benefits of the kind of society; and the evils of being<sup>a</sup> excluded from it, both to the individual and to the public, make it every one's duty to submit to every thing, which can possibly be reasonable, rather than bring on an exclusion.—Whatever alterations a church may happen to undergo,  
through

<sup>a</sup> Chap. xi. Sect. 11.

through the influence of civil power, this notion of it is always to be kept in mind.—But to enter on the perilous subject.—When we say the civil Magistrate, we mean that person, or those persons, be they few or many, in whom the power of the State is vested.

11. The civil Magistrate cannot be supposed to overlook or neglect Religion: it is very powerful, both in doing good and harm to civil communities. This has been always so evident, that no magistrate was ever<sup>b</sup> known, who did not establish some religion or other. A magistrate, as a magistrate, is not to be supposed to prefer any one on account of truth, but utility; his view is to benefit the *State*, and therefore he must fix on that society, which will be most advantageous to the state; that is, generally speaking, on the *largest*, though some doctrines are better suited to civil government than others<sup>c</sup>.—If it seems strange, that regard should not be paid to *truth*, we must consider, that the difference between religious Societies consists generally in things mysterious, or things arbitrary<sup>d</sup>; that a mere Statesman will not be nice about either: and, if he is, it is in his private capacity, of which we here take no account; and moreover, that great harm has arisen from a Magistrate's being supposed to encourage opinions as truths, or discourage them as errors. He, in his civil capacity, is no judge of such things; he is only to encourage what will be useful to the state, and discourage what will be hurtful<sup>e</sup>: opinions of dissenters should be regarded

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<sup>b</sup> Warb. All. Append. p. 5.

<sup>c</sup> See Dr. Balguy's 5th Charge, p. 265.

<sup>d</sup> Chap. xi. Sect. 10.

<sup>e</sup> It would be better (according to Chap. xii. Sect. 6.) that Magistrates should really favour established opinions, when they come,



(so long as they are harmless) as equally true with opinions of members of the established Church. One may conceive a Justice of Peace, with us, to say, in any dispute, to a dissenter, ‘whatever I may think of your notions, you are as much under the protection of the Law, as any other subject can be; when I act as a private man, I go to another religious assembly rather than your’s, but, when I act as a Magistrate, all stand before me on an equal footing, as far as regards mere opinion.’ Were it not so, men might be properly said to be persecuted for opinion: such persecution is always unjust.

III. But let us more particularly consider how religion may be a powerful *friend*, or *enemy*, to the Magistrate or State.

Religion makes the Magistrate to be *respected*, sets him in the light of a *sacred* character; it affords him the sanction of *oaths*;—it gives his subjects such *motives* of action, as no civil expedients could give: makes them do what he would wish to be done, through the belief of an omniscient Being, perpetually present, who will reward and punish beyond any assignable limits; a Being, whom they may love with great warmth of affection, whom they may fear to any degree.—From these motives good actions arise, which no civil law can enforce or even describe; much less reward; and bad actions are avoided, which no civil law could punish.—Thus Religion supplies every defect of civil government, and transfers to the Magistrate even the power of the supreme Being himself.

Religion may also be a powerful *enemy* to the Magistrate. It sometimes acts so violently as to overpower

come to be established; but we are now speaking of *fixing upon* a religion, in order to establish it. *In practice*, the Religion would often *precede* the election of Magistrates; they would be elected so as to suit it.

overpower all human resistance. When men fancy themselves inspired by God, they fear nothing that man can do unto them; and though religion, when well regulated, aims to promote virtue; yet it can, in its disordered state, perform the worst services of vice, and effect the most dreadful mischiefs<sup>f</sup>.— And, though religion should not attack the Magistrate, or act in direct opposition to him; yet, if it only agitates different sects, and exasperates them against each other, it will make all regular government impracticable.

IV. Religion then cannot be a thing indifferent to a Magistrate; if he has but one society in his dominions, he will *regulate* it; but, if he has several, his conduct may require consideration. What *we* say is, that he should make an *Alliance* with the most powerful, (except its tenets are some way particularly unfavourable to Government), or, to use the common term, should make it the *Establishment*; should protect, encourage it, as his Ally; and *leave the rest as they were; independent, secure*, capable of every religious act, of which they were capable before the Alliance. In order that they should be so, he must take care, that no one interrupts them with impunity: they still consist of subjects, who ought to be protected in their religious acts, as well as in their agriculture and commerce.—This protection has usually amongst us the name of *toleration*; a term, which might not have been used, if, in fact, it had not been preceded by prohibition of religious acts interfering with the universality of the establishment.

When religions are tolerated, it is supposed, that they do no harm to the civil constitution; if  
their

<sup>f</sup> Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum.

Lucretius.

their tenets are such as to have a strong tendency to injure that, it would be perfectly just for the Magistrate to defend himself against them, by restraints suited to particular occasions; or even to banish them<sup>g</sup>:—but he will generally forbear to do that, in as great a degree as he dare, till the danger is near: during such forbearance, such hurtful sects are not said to be tolerated. *Connivance*<sup>h</sup> is applied to them, rather than toleration.

v. But farther, we would affirm, that, wherever there is an established religion, there the Magistrate *has* made an *Alliance* with that Religion; and, from the *nature* and *terms* of that Alliance, all their relative *duties* must be derived.

*Has* made an alliance! you will say; fanciful and visionary!—nothing is more clear than that, in fact, no such alliance was ever made; what right can any one have to use such language? this we will endeavour to shew.

Men acquire their knowledge gradually, by experience; the first attempts are almost in the dark, they feel after it, if haply<sup>i</sup> they may find it, and they find a little here, and a little there, encumbered with error or perplexity at first, though afterwards it gets cleared away: when they have acquired a good deal, they can look back, and see how they could have acquired it better.—This is the case in acquiring notions of an useful intercourse amongst men, as well as in other things; one man gets *power* over another, at first a little too much, some is taken away, then he has rather too little; it vibrates for a while, and then settles in the right point. *Retrospect* shews by what method or plan this might have been settled sooner, or from the first; when this is seen, the only right conduct

<sup>g</sup> Balguy, Charge 3.      <sup>h</sup> Warb. Alliance; p. 304. 312.

<sup>i</sup> Acts xvii. 27. See Parkhurst's Lexicon, under *Ἐπιλαφάω*.

conduct must be, to act after this plan; and to conceive it to have been *all along* agreed upon: in truth, it is valid and obligatory: what ought to have been *always*, ought to be *now*: to make it obligatory now, is only to wave all advantage from *ignorance* of those, who have been gradually learning what ought to be done<sup>k</sup>.

This reasoning may be applied to the *civil compact* between Magistrate and subject: by long experience it is found out (in good measure perhaps) what *they ought to have stipulated at first*, had they known their own interests; such stipulation is *supposed* to have taken place, and questions are decided by it. As to *past facts*, this may be considered as a *supposition*, but it is all founded on *experience*; on *practice*, and not on *Theory*. If any disputes arise about what ought to have been originally stipulated, they can only be decided by referring to the general good of mankind<sup>l</sup>.

The same reasoning may be applied to the *Alliance*, which we suppose to have been made between *Church and State*. The Magistrate would never, in fact, leave religion entirely to itself;—he would interfere with it more than he ought; then the Church would declare its divine<sup>m</sup> origin, and claim independence:

<sup>k</sup> This is something of an *Hypothesis*, but rather differs from that about ridicule in the 2d Book. (Chap. iii. Sect. v.)—that accounts for phenomena of *nature*; this for things contrived by *art* of man.

<sup>l</sup> In recapitulating this, Jan. 31, 1794, I supposed two persons, one higher and better informed than the other, to go together into the interior parts of *Africa*; not knowing what stipulations to make with each other before they set out, but only agreeing, that, when they came to know by experience what agreement they ought to have made, they would treat one another as if it *had been* made from the beginning:—would this be mere *Theory*?

<sup>m</sup> Ου γαρ τι σοι ζῶ δέλος, ἀλλὰ Λοξίχ—Soph. Œd. Tyr. 418.  
I am Apollo's servant, and not thine. Franklin.

independence: and so on, till it appeared what kind of agreement ought to have been made, and then that would be *supposed* to have been *always* in force. The supposition should decide all particular questions; though some inconveniences and imperfections might remain; of which it could only be said, they must be put up with; they are the *least evil*. Bishop Warburton's supposition of an Alliance seems to answer this description, and therefore on that we may proceed.

VI. It is not to be supposed, that an alliance was made, with advantages only on *one* side: we have mentioned only the benefits received by the Magistrate; but the Church receives protection and encouragement;—the worldly advantages to the ministers are apt to be reckoned great advantages; but I would chiefly consider those, which enable religious society to pursue and accomplish its peculiar ends. Rational religion can only bud and blossom in a calm; storms cut off all its vegetation; and yet religious society (as such) can in no degree secure itself. It is a great thing to be able to pursue improvement of the understanding and the heart; to have all aids of universities and books for the first; and of buildings, embellishments, refinements for the latter: to have leisure, liberal conversation, &c. &c.—the Church also borrows a *coercive* power from the State, for the sake of more effectually promoting good morals. Religious society has no such power; it has a power of excommunication; but even that is different from such as takes place, when the State accompanies it with temporal penalties.

VII. Now this seems to be properly the *whole* of the subject: many other things have been added about it, but they all must be referred to what has now been said.—It will, however, be proper to mention

mention a few of them, particularly as they have occasioned disputes.

The *Supremacy*, or the King being the Head of the Church, has occasioned disputes. I use *King* in the same sense as Magistrate, and only use it at all, because it is familiar to us of this nation. All society is meant to reduce many to *one*; so therefore must alliance; there must be *one head*; the only question can be, whether it must be *King* or *Priest*: the King being able to protect both, the Priest to protect neither, the question seems determined<sup>n</sup>.—It does not, however, follow, that the King ever acts as *Minister* in religious assemblies; he is not qualified, he is better occupied for the common good: It is not in that way, that the Church have need of him, or have desired his alliance.

VIII. The *maintenance* of the established clergy has also occasioned disputes. When the Magistrate allies himself to a church, he must wish to make the ministers of the church *respected*. If his Government is a Democracy, the ministers need not have much distinction, for that purpose; but, if it is a Monarchy, with a nobility of different ranks, it will be necessary to raise some clergy to each of those ranks; otherwise, there would be some subjects, who would treat in a contemptuous manner the whole body of Clergy; and affectation of the manners of the Great, would make their example hurtful. Besides these dignitaries, there should be other ranks, corresponding to the several ranks of subjects; so that each rank of laymen should have some Clergy, whom they should respect; and that should be effected with as little expence to the nation as might be. I am speaking of respect as paid to  
*worldly*

<sup>n</sup> Warb. All. p. 200. Dr. Balguy, p. 101.

*worldly* consequence<sup>o</sup>; it is so in fact, and provision should be made according to fact, whatever *ought* to prevail. We may add, that a seat amongst *Legislators* is due to the Church in some degree; otherwise, there would be no *Alliance*, but an *annihilation* of the Church.

But the most dangerous question is, who should pay this expence? the answer must be, the *Subjects*. What? dissenters? those, who are separated from the established church? and have teachers of their own to pay? yes, so it should seem;—for they pay towards the support of the established ministers, as *subjects*; towards the support of that, which supports *Government*.—Its being a religious support, misleads the judgment, but that is merely *accidental*. All must contribute to it, as to an Army or *Navy*. If sectaries contributed nothing, it would be a powerful temptation to all to quit the established church; and one, which would not fail to thin it very soon.

But, do not the teachers of Sects support government, by supporting the *general principles* of Religion and morality? why should not taxes, &c. levied on Dissenters, be paid to *them*? The answer is, whatever is paid to teachers by means of taxes, is paid by the Magistrate; and, if the Magistrate pays all religions, how is he allied to one? If he supports *all* societies, they become all *political* in some degree; he leaves none as merely *religious*. In that case, he supports <sup>p</sup> *opposite* religions, *hurtful* religions, and religions *subversive* of his own authority; for the plea extends to *all*<sup>q</sup> religions. Such a measure

<sup>o</sup> Poverty is a great temptation to unmanly *submission*, which would occasion *contempt*.—Titus ii. 15.

<sup>p</sup> Dr. Balguy, Charge v.

<sup>q</sup> How would it be if the experiment were tried of taxing every congregation to pay its own Ministers?—care must be taken, in that case, to check payment of those, that taught *hurtful* doctrines, or doctrines *subversive* of civil government: would that be *practicable*? who could *judge* in such matters?

sure would occasion competition for the higher offices, and generate disturbances which would defeat the ends of religious Society.

IX. The *Independence* of the Church has occasioned dispute.—*Our* idea is, the Church is, *in itself, independent*; that is, before any alliance takes place; and therefore each church is independent, which is only *tolerated*; but, though one man may be independent of another, he is not therefore at liberty to injure him: so no tolerated church has a right to interfere with or endanger the safety of the State. An *established* Church, by alliance, gives its power into the hand of the Magistrate, and becomes *dependent*, (as Ireland may be on England) but does not lose all its *rights*: it is dependent for the purposes of the Alliance, and no farther: the alliance may be called perpetual, because no duration is specified, no limit is fixed; but it is *revocable*<sup>r</sup>, if the conditions are not observed, on which it was made:—failure of protection makes void *allegiance*.

Easy as this seems, many *mistakes* have been made about it: some have held the Church to be *always* independent, because it was so *before* the Alliance; the *Papists* and *Puritans*, though opposed in most things, both hold this. It is said to be held in Theory by th Church of Scotland.

Some, seeing the Church governed by the Magistrate, and useful for political purposes, have called it a creature of the State, and have thought of governing it merely with political views<sup>s</sup>, not with any religious ones. One would not think, that any considerate man could deny, that every religion must spring up of itself:—did the Magistrate invent the notion of Deities, and get men to teach his notion to the common people, as you talk to a child of a bugbear? did the Magistrate invent enthusiasm

<sup>r</sup> Warb. Alliance, p. 287.

<sup>s</sup> See Warb. Alliance, p. 28.



thufiasm and fuperftition? above all, did the Magiftrate invent the *Chriftian* religion? which made its way to the imperial throne, in fpite of all the oppofition which Magiftrates could make to it?— And, if a church had a being of itfelf, it muft have *rights*, and ends of *its own*, which certainly fhould be confulted as well as the rights and benefits of a State<sup>t</sup>.—The *Jews* had a perfect incorporation of church and ftate; for fuch is a *Theocracy*; but their cafe was fingular.

x. Laftly. *Tests* have occafioned many controverfies. A test is an action, or declaration, from which it can be concluded, that a man is a member of the eftablifhed church: the word may mean any trial or criterion; and, even when applied to eftablifhments, it may mean, an evidence given by any perfon, that he is of the eftablifhed church; but it moft ufually means, fuch an evidence when given by one, who is about to take upon himfelf fome authority. The general intention of fuch evidence has been mentioned before<sup>u</sup>; it is to prevent contentions between thofe in power; arifing either from rivalfhips about worldly grandeur; or from prefumption, that a certain religion is the only one that can be deemed pure and perfect. Tests make a part of the plan, which divides the religions in one nation, into the eftablifhed and the tolerated; and they contribute to the peace aimed at by that plan, though they occafion fome murmurings and difcontents. They give fecurity to Church and State at the fame time; for, as all difsenters make a common caufe, they muft overturn the eftablifhed Church, if they could get into power; and,

<sup>t</sup> Our State has no right to make the King Archbishop of Canterbury; or to change the Doctrines: it might ally itfelf to a new Church.

<sup>u</sup> Chap. v. Sect. vi. Chap. xii. Sect. iii.

and, if they overturned the Church, they would throw the State into disorder. It must be better for the State to have those in power use all their power in Government, than to have them use a good deal of it in trying to defeat one another.—The Church has a right to this protection from inroads of enemies: and indeed the discrimination is a great advantage to those amongst Dissenters themselves, who wish chiefly for peace and comfort.

Numberless *objections* have been made to Tests; it would carry us too far out of our way to examine them all.—Tests are not to be considered as positive *good*, but only as inconvenient means of preventing *great evils*: if we look forward to *perfection*, we must conceive them abolished before <sup>x</sup> we can arrive at it. That is no reason why they should not be used, while they do really prevent great evils.—Bishop Warburton mentions a memorable instance of a <sup>w</sup> Popish Peer of England, who ingeniously owned the necessity of them.

The only objection I shall mention is, that they *punish* opinions, which a man forms involuntarily, according to the evidence before him.—Now I own, that no one ought to be punished for what he does not do wilfully; but then I say, that tests are not *punishments*, but only *restraints*<sup>z</sup>, acts of *self-defence*. He, who punishes, inflicts evil which he might avoid inflicting; he, who restrains, inflicts only that evil which is necessary in order to ward off the danger. Punishing aims at deterring others; restraint does not. Punishment implies<sup>a</sup> crimes; restraint, only mischiefs. However innocently mischiefs

<sup>x</sup> See before, Chap. v. Sect. 1.

<sup>y</sup> Lord Digby, Alliance, p. 289. Hume accounts for this, partly on political principles.

<sup>z</sup> Warb. All. B. iii. Chap. iii. p. 302.

<sup>a</sup> Alliance, p. 302.

chiefs arise, they are to be restrained, and repelled. — Error is certainly not to be punished, but the mischief arising from any erroneous opinion may be restrained<sup>b</sup>.

But Dr. Balguy's explanation of tests seems well worthy of attention<sup>c</sup>: they are only evidence to shew whether a person is *qualified* or disqualified for an office; *capable* of doing the duties of it, or incapable. A *Quaker* is disqualified from being a *General*; by his religious principles he is incapable of doing military duty; before therefore he is admitted to that office, he is asked to *declare*, by words or by actions, whether he is qualified or not. It is no *punishment* to exclude a man from an office, for which he is not qualified:—any more than to exclude a man from preaching to a very large congregation, because his voice is so weak, that he cannot be heard; or because he cannot speak the only language, which the congregation understands: or to exclude a blind man from being a guide.

The only difficulty here is, to see how *every one*, who is not of the established Church, should be disqualified for every office. Whoever by his principles would, in all probability, exercise a considerable part of his authority, otherwise than in enforcing the Laws of the State, is *unfit* to hold that authority; more especially if he exerts it against the views of the State:—besides, in the case supposed, a man  
not

<sup>b</sup> Leaving churches *where they were* (Sect. IV.) cannot be *punishing*. It may be said, indeed, it is not punishing them as religious, but it is as politic persons, as citizens: this is as it happens: exclusion from offices is often a great privilege; heavy fines are paid to avoid offices; and dissenters should have all advantages as well as disadvantages, of freedom from state-authority: one might conceive a rational dissenter to make an handsome speech; 'as we are more at leisure, we will help the *general* cause of Religion,' &c. &c.

<sup>c</sup> Charge 3d. p. 214.

not only disqualifies himself by his principles, but also others, whom he in a manner obliges to exert power, given for the public good, in opposition to him.

XI. If difficulty should arise from the same persons composing *two* societies, it must be recollected, that there is no man, who has not very frequently occasion to act in different capacities: the Father may be a General, and the Son an inferior officer; nay, the Son might be the commander, and the Father the subaltern.—A son may be a judge, or a spiritual pastor, and his father a criminal, or a plaintiff, or a parishioner:—and a *number* of men acting socially may likewise act in two different capacities: as a *family*, the members of which are *partners* in commerce.

Bishop *Warburton* shews<sup>d</sup>, more regularly, that two such Societies as Church and State have really two wills, and can contract with each other; this is easy to be conceived, when each is represented by a few; as Parliament and Convocation (if we may use those terms as general) are never likely to be the same persons:—and it is very improbable, that either Church or State should act otherwise than by Representation.

XII. I will not pursue this subject farther; only I will observe, that, in reading controversy on it, some specious arguments will be met with, wearing a general form, which are inapplicable to *practice* in any known state of things: so clearly impracticable,

<sup>d</sup> Warb. All. B. 2. Chap. v. The Illustration of *Lord* and *Rector* of a Parish, might shew how naturally temporal and spiritual power might combine in reforming men and keeping them in order; this combination may be in one person; but, if the alliance be made by two distinct persons, it is one which seldom fails, when it takes place, to effect a great improvement in manners; improvement continuing for several generations.—And it is almost the only method of reforming a country Parish.

cable, that those, who use them, would not think of practising them: I mean, not universally; but only just so far as their particular views or prejudices required.—Dr. Balguy has exposed this inconsistency with great success<sup>e</sup>:—and it is apparent in the determinations of those, who had overturned our established Church, on principles destructive of all establishments, in order to establish their own<sup>f</sup>.

I do not mean to accuse any one of wilful inconsistency: many religious persons and parties deceive themselves; and some allow, and some half allow, of pushing a weak argument as far as it will go: but it is proper we should be aware of the fact, because it will let us into the particular extent and meaning of many general expressions and arguments.—The affectation of being free from Government and Laws, in some religious societies and assemblies, is one thing, which shews the inconsistency I speak of. Quakers are supposed (as I have been told) to speak without order or rule, though the speakers sit upon a distinguished bench. An eminent preacher tells his hearers, “your congregations have *order*, but no *authority*g.” I fancy, if he was to harangue them from the pulpit in the dress of a Newmarket Jockey, they would *find* some authority to turn him out of the ministry<sup>h</sup>. The *mode* of governing need not be written on tables, while the *effects* of it are unquestionable. If people are

<sup>e</sup> See p. 221. 273. 277. 278. Blackstone, 4to. Vol. iv. p. 53.

<sup>f</sup> See Warb. Alliance, Postscript, p. 6. and Alliance, p. 288.

<sup>g</sup> Mr. Robinson on Tests, Oct. 30, 1788, at Cambridge, p. 12. top.

<sup>h</sup> At a town, near which I have resided, Mr. T. a dissenting Minister, as I have been credibly informed, was in *some* way punished for burning a cat to death in an oven, to satisfy his wife, who fancied herself bewitched by Mrs. G. of the same town, and thought nothing but such a sacrifice of a Cat could dispel the charm.—I *think* Mr. T. was of the same class of Dissenters with Mr. Robinson.

are orderly without authority, the end of authority is answered: but such people are unlike what we have met with; and, as reasoning, such as the present, is built upon experience, we cannot reason about them: we have seen children obey Parents in a free and unconstrained manner; but this implies very *great* authority, instead of none at all.

XIII. Permit me, by way of clearing up what I have delivered, (perhaps with some degree of embarrassment,) to read to you Bishop Warburton's own account of the contents of his alliance<sup>1</sup>; and that part of Dr. Balguy's 6th Sermon, which<sup>k</sup> treats of the effect of the intervention of the Magistrate on religious society; as also that part of his third Charge<sup>l</sup>, which relates to freedom of opinion, and freedom of worship.

XIV. We will close the subject by a few remarks on Mr. *Robinson's* "Discourse on Sacramental Tests, delivered at Cambridge, Thursday, October 30th, 1788, at a general meeting of Deputies of the Congregations of Protestant Dissenters in the County of Cambridge."<sup>m</sup>

XV. It may not be improper here, to take a short review of the manner, in which the theory here described has been observed in *practice*, in our own country.

*Heresy* was once considered as a crime worthy of death; the writ *de heretico comburendo*, has been frequently

<sup>1</sup> Postscript to Alliance, p. 8, 9.

<sup>k</sup> P. 100—105.

<sup>l</sup> P. 212—222.

<sup>m</sup> This Session consisted of an Examination of Mr. Robinson's Discourse, and of the authorities to which he referred, particularly Scripture and the works of Augustin: no part of this examination had been *written*, except some short notes on the margin of the discourse. The Examination took up at least two Lectures, of an hour each: I had the satisfaction to be afterwards informed, that it had answered its purpose. Mr. Davy of Caius College was so obliging, as to give me his approbation in writing.

frequently carried into execution, against Papists by Protestants, against Protestants by Papists, and by Protestants against each other: two *Arians* suffered under it in the time of James I, and the laws authorizing it were not finally repealed till the 29th of Charles 2d.—the idea had probably been taken from the Jewish Law, without allowance for difference of circumstances<sup>n</sup>: and, considering how indefinite the notion of Heresy was left, the cruelty of the punishment was great: under the Mosaic Law, blasphemy, &c. were definite; under the English, any thing might be Heresy as parties changed:—severe punishment was necessary amongst Idolaters, &c.—not now.

From the Reformation to the Revolution, there seems to have been no such principle as letting every man enjoy his own opinions, and worship his Maker according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience. The whole design was, to make Englishmen of *one Religion*<sup>o</sup>; but, to say nothing of illiterate sects, two powerful Parties counteracted, as far as they were able, this design; the Papists and the Puritans: the Papists were discontented at the Reformation's going so far; the Puritans were very zealous to carry it farther.—Yet these two parties were not exactly upon the same footing: the Papists owned a foreign power superior to their own King; the Puritans were real English subjects, and benefited English Protestant Clergy, though they held, that the King ought not to be reckoned the Head of the Church:—they were therefore to be treated in a different manner; and the difference between them is still more striking

<sup>n</sup> Of this, B. 1. Chap. xi.

<sup>o</sup> I suppose, all Englishmen *had been* of one Religion; and probably some became Protestants in such a manner, as to raise expectations, that all would become so, if the Protestant religion once prevailed.

striking since the Revolution, when Puritans were tolerated, and Papists only connived at: we will take them separately.

First of Papists: Queen Elizabeth endeavoured at first to do as King *Edward* 6th had done; to influence the Ministers only; to enjoin them to read the reformed service, and to require only quietness from the People: but the Popish power engendering Plots against her, she was obliged to oppose it by laws growing stricter gradually.—And this is a general<sup>p</sup> idea of the English Laws against Popery: they were made, when attempts were made to restore it: and, when those attempts were frustrated, they were executed more and more remissly as the danger grew more remote. Queen Elizabeth did not at first exclude Papists from her councils, and they remained members of Parliament till the 30th of Charles 2d: attempts to restore Popery have been but little discontinued; the year 1745 is within the memory of many men: and, since that time, it has seemed worth while to keep an account of the numbers of Papists, and of the conduct of their Priests: though the Legislature has ventured upon some relaxations<sup>q</sup>.

With

<sup>p</sup> Gibson's 5th Pastoral Letter, Postscript: see *Contents* of the same.

<sup>q</sup> Since June, 1791, all, who swear to be good *subjects*; that is, who renounce the Pope's Supremacy in civil matters, are allowed to use their worship publicly, to keep schools for Papists, to come to Court, &c.—but the margin of the Act of Parliament, taking place June 24, 1791, will easily supply particulars. Such Papists call themselves *protesting Catholics*: about 1700 of them, I think, petitioned Parliament. *Blackstone* seems to have pointed out (B. 4. Chap. iv. p. 54. Quarto) the ground, on which this liberty might be given. In *Ireland*, Papists can now vote for members of the House of Commons: can be members of the University; can be Advocates at the Bar: though they cannot yet be Members of Parliament; or Judges; or Officers in the Army or Navy.



With regard to Protestant dissenters, as the Puritans might be called, though beneficed in the Church of England, the general view was, to make their religion, or every departure from the established worship, uneasy to them, by disabling them from doing things, which others might do (practising Law and Physic in James 1st.) and by fining, and in some cases imprisoning them. And their behaviour was so stiff and ungracious, that the sentiment of hatred conspired with political prudence (or artifice) against them. And I should conceive, that the want of a test would, by encreasing their power, embitter their zeal, and that of their opponents: very soon after the Restoration, the *Act of Uniformity* took place; by which all ministers, who were not ordained in our manner, or who refused to use our service, and give their assent to it, were deprived of their benefices: on the 24th of August, 1662 (well called Black Bartholomew) not less than 2000<sup>r</sup> Ministers lost their livings, and other preferments; a considerable proportion of them men of ability and diligence in their profession;—it is shocking and mortifying to think, that safety to the Church could not, or seemed as if it could not, be purchased at an easier rate!

At the *Revolution*, however, it was intended to give all Protestants full liberty, with regard to Religion, though the liberality of the King's designs got narrowed by Parliament and Convocation: but what would then be liberty to the chief part of Dissenters, is not so now; they did not object to the Doctrine<sup>s</sup> of the Trinity; whereas Socinians are now considerable, in numbers and literature. The Toleration Act, though it gives up the contested  
points

<sup>r</sup> Hume, Neal, &c.

<sup>s</sup> See 15 first Articles as modified by the Assembly in 1643. They are in Neal. Appendix.

points about ceremonies, forms of church-government, and even about infant baptism, and oaths to those who have scruples, yet gives up nothing with regard to the Trinity; not having occasion to give up any thing;—and, as qualifying according to that act, that is, taking oaths and making declarations, is necessary in order to have the benefit of it, the Socinians are, in strictness, as if the Toleration Act had not been made. So I understand the matter.—At least, they were so till the present reign. In 1792, Mr. Fox moved the Commons to give relief in the matter of assenting to the doctrine of the Trinity, but they were immovable.

The principal thing aimed at by Protestant dissenters is the repeal of the Corporation and *Test Acts*;—and their attempts being with a view to *temporal* advantages, and influence in the *State*, will of course cause a jealousy in the Magistrate: when they shew no desire of having their own sects powerful in *politics*, then they will have every possible relief.

The *Corporation*<sup>t</sup> and *Test*<sup>u</sup> Acts of Charles 2d continue in force; it seems likely that, if they had not been thought necessary, they would have been repealed at the Revolution. The immediate occasions of them may be now extinct, and yet the general principles of them may make them fit for other occasions. The first, forbidding all but members of the established Church to hold any office in the Government of any City or Corporation, was necessary to dispossess of power, of power particularly of electing members of Parliament, those, who were disaffected to Government at the Restoration, and who had before *excluded* all but those of their own principles: *the second*, forbidding all but members of the established Church to hold any office, civil or military, was necessary in order to

prevent

<sup>t</sup> A. D. 1661. 13 Cha. 2. St. 2. c. 1.      <sup>u</sup> 25 Ch. 2. c. 2.

prevent Charles 2d. from dispensing with Law by his Proclamation, and granting indulgence to the Papists. These two Laws now join in keeping *all*, who are not of the established Church, out of power; in *Corporations*, (as having an effect on the Legislature,) and in the *executive* government.— How far they are capable of extension or relaxation, or of alteration as to the mode: is a question of importance, and of *difficulty*. A man is deemed a member of the Church of England, who takes the *Sacrament* according to the usage of the Church of England, and declares against Transubstantiation; from whence the Tests are called *sacramental tests*. According to the Corporation Act, a man must already have shewn himself a Member of the Church of England: according to the Test Act, he must shew himself such within six months after his appointment. The Test Act was made twelve years after the Corporation Act.— Many persons of eminence seem to wish, that some, who are now dissenters, could be employed in the service of government; and something has been done in the present reign: what expedients should be adopted, may be thought the business of a Statesman, rather than of a Churchman, to determine; were I to hazard a proposal, it should be, that the Church should be enlarged, and the Executive Government still confined to that Church: with the most perfect toleration to opinions and worship, that could be given. But deliberations of *councils* must be wanted to settle such weighty matters as these: and even their decisions should be executed at first only in the way of trying experiments. Some eminent Dissenters neither wish for an enlargement, or what is called a *comprehension*<sup>\*</sup>, nor think it practicable.

<sup>\*</sup> The best proposal for a comprehension seems to have been that of 1689; in which Tillotson, Scot, Sharp, Compton, Stillingfleet, Beveridge, were engaged: and Burnet, &c.—Convocation stopped it.

## C H A P. XV.

## OF IMPROVING RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

1. **W**E shall now bring our reflexions on the nature of religious Society to a conclusion, by considering how such society may be put into a train of perpetual *Improvement*: how it may be made, though always imperfect, to approach continually nearer and nearer to Perfection.—That all *human* institutions admit of improvement, will scarce be disputed: the progress of experience in learning Duties, was traced out in the first Book<sup>a</sup>: and sometimes improvements must be reckoned as beginning from some corrupt state of things. We need not make any elaborate proof of our present assertion; we need here only recollect how far religious societies, even under the Christian dispensation, are of *human*<sup>b</sup> institution; and express a caution, that every change be not considered as an improvement. There are always men to be found, who are impatient under old institutions, and desirous of new, without any reason: through caprice, or unbounded love of novelty; or through a desire of distinguishing themselves, and of being lawgivers, original thinkers, leaders of parties, &c.—Men of this turn rush into change, ignorant and thoughtless, — without mature deliberation, without insight into the nature of man, or the interests of Society.—We would not be thought to speak of any improvement, but such as moderate men, of judgment and information, have agreed to adopt; have agreed for a considerable time.

II. When

<sup>a</sup> Chap. xix, Sect. iii.

<sup>b</sup> Chap. xi. Sect. ix.

II. When such an improvement is in view, the first and most obvious method is, to adopt it openly and *expressly*: if this can be done, all is right; it is certainly the best and most desirable method, on many accounts.—It requires no explanations, and is liable to no charges of Sophistry: but alas! it is seldom that this method will succeed in practice; the obstacles to it have been already<sup>c</sup> described. Nevertheless, whenever it appeared at all probable, that it could succeed in any degree, it might be prudent to have a perpetual Committee, empowered to examine all pretensions to improvement, and adopt such as appeared reasonable on mature deliberation, and could be adopted without disturbance and confusion.

III. When express improvements, or reformations, (for a number of improvements make a reformation,) cannot be adopted, the best way is, to make some alterations *tacitly*; this may be carried to a great length, as appeared in Chap. vi; what we now wish to observe is, that tacit reformations serve very well to *prepare* the mind for such as are express. For, when these have continued for a while, prejudices and attachments will be weakened, the inconveniences, which are to be remedied, will be more sensibly felt, and more openly acknowledged; though Laws are violated, yet the violation will excite less and less resentment: improvements, when they have continued in sight for a length of time, will come to be desired, and assume a pleasing appearance.—How long this state of things must continue, will depend upon particular circumstances; if persons of consequence grow uneasy under it, hazards must be run to make the Reformation *express*.—We before referred to the chapter of the Spirit<sup>d</sup> of Laws, which treats of preparing

<sup>c</sup> Chap. vi.

<sup>d</sup> B. xix. Ch. ii.

paring men's minds for any Laws which they are to receive.

IV. That we here go on in a right train, seems to be confirmed by Dr. Balguy's Heads of Lectures concerning *Society in general*, one of which was quoted<sup>e</sup> before.

“ 10. The obligation men are under of contributing their endeavours for the *improvement* of the Laws, under which they live; and the establishment of the *whole* System of the Laws of Nature.”

“ 11. The obligation men are under of supplying the defects and correcting the errors of established Laws; whilst the Laws themselves continue *in force*.”

These two heads being about *Society in general*, are as much applicable to *ecclesiastical* society as to any other: the former corresponds to *express*, the latter to *tacit* reformations.—As many if not all improvements must interfere with some *rights*; or rather, with some established *privileges*, considered as rights;—it seems needful to obviate any difficulty, which may arise from the infringement of these: for this purpose, it should be considered in general, that, whenever there is good evidence that a thing ought to have been done formerly, that thing ought to be done now, on producing such evidence:—otherwise (as was said with regard to the civil<sup>f</sup> compact, &c.) advantage is taken of men's *ignorance*, which cannot be for the general good. Whatever would have been done, had men known their own interests, ought to be considered as having been done, when they come to know them.—Sometimes, this may seem to be contradicted, when it is not in reality: and possibly it may in some cases want defining and limiting: for, though it be generally true, that, if a thing ought

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<sup>e</sup> Chap. vi. Sect. vi.

<sup>f</sup> Chap. xiv. Sect. v.

to have been your's, had all circumstances been known, then, when they come to be known, it is your's; yet, in the mean time, something may have happened to impair your title; it may be thrown into the sea, or consumed; or so much labour and expence may have been bestowed upon it by the possessor, that, by some other rule, it ought not to be your's<sup>2</sup>. In the case before us, when any undeniable improvement appears, something appears which ought to have been done sooner; therefore that ought to be done now; and, though some steps may have innocently been taken *bonâ fide*, which may reasonably obstruct the adopting of the improvement, at least for a time; yet the general consideration ought to make men more ready to suffer inconvenience for the sake of forwarding such improvement: more ready to give up what they have been used to call their rights.

Our Saviour had a notion of the evil usually attending religious improvements, when he said, that he came not to bring Peace, but a *sword*: to divide *Families*, and set near relations against each other<sup>3</sup>.

v. If it were settled, that a reformation *ought* to be made, it would be natural to ask, *by whom?*—I should answer, from the<sup>1</sup> second book, *Philosophers* are to make improvements; the *People* are always to be under *establishments*. Who then, in the present case, are Philosophers?—those who are enabled, by education and leisure, to examine into the

<sup>2</sup> In our Cambridge Paving Act (which is owned to be an *improvement*) short possession is over-ruled;—but long possession (of seven years) is allowed, and compensation made for violating it.

A man builds an Inn next a great road; a great advantage is seen in turning that road: the Innkeeper loses his custom, but is he *injured*? No agreement, express or tacit, seems to justify such a notion: he is indeed *unfortunate*, and, by a liberal and generous nation, may be relieved as such; but he took his chance.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. x. 34, 35.

<sup>1</sup> Chap. iv. Sect. ii.

the grounds of religion. Are *teachers* (or clergymen) to be reckoned in the number?—their proper business is, to teach established doctrines to the people: true; and, if a set of Philosophers can be found, who are not by profession teachers, let them make the improvements: in fact, this cannot be expected, (though such may be found to help), and therefore as teachers, in order to instruct the people, must examine grounds of religion, and are naturally led to think more deeply than the generality, they must have some concern: the business will be, to keep the characters of teacher and reformer as distinct as possible: there will be <sup>k</sup> a time to teach, and a time to reform; a place or a company proper for one, and improper for the other<sup>l</sup>:—and the more discretion will be requisite, as an improvement, admitted amongst Philosophers, should be imparted to the more improved first; and should afterwards descend gradually to the less improved, and so finally to the people.—As any principles are better than none, no one should have his old principles taken away, when that is practicable, till he is prepared to receive the new<sup>m</sup> ones in their room.—How different is this from the conduct of teachers, who, in spite of every obligation of honesty and fidelity, unsettle, in the most open and abrupt way, the established principles of the lowest of the people!

But here it may be urged, did not our *Reformers*, eminently so called, do the same? were not they ministers of the Romish Church, when they preached against the corruptions of Popery; let us say they were; as it might be difficult to settle precisely how far

<sup>k</sup> B. ii. Ch. iv. Sect. iv.

<sup>l</sup> If a Judge wanted to reform penal Laws by abolishing capital punishments, he would continue to pass sentence of death till he had convinced the Legislature.

<sup>m</sup> B. I. Chap. xix. Sect. x.



far some of them might have relinquished virtually the ministry: was not *Zuinglius* a Romish minister, when he preached at Zurich? as mentioned before<sup>n</sup>? let us say he was: whatever effect the encouragement of the *Senate* might have<sup>o</sup>:—in such conduct, there was an *irregularity*, and certainly our Reformation was attended with a great deal of unnecessary mischief; owing, probably, to a neglect of the discretion here recommended: but to whom was the fault to be imputed? to those, who made such irregularity *necessary* for the promoting of truth: had the Reformers been allowed to deliver their sentiments with a decent plainness, only by giving up the emoluments of the established Church, I should have held them very blameable if they had acted as they did; that is, had they not quitted all connexion with the Romish Church before they preached against it;—and, whenever *toleration* prevails, whether in theory or only in practice, I hold every man extremely blameable, who keeps possession of any emolument, which he could not have without being a member of a certain Church, at the same time that he preaches to the people against that Church.

VI. It is in vain to think of reforming, except we begin the work in right *temper*. We ought to have a strong love for *truth* and *virtue*; a strong sense of the importance of religion; of the general and fundamental parts of religion, as opposed to those parts, about which disputes have usually arisen.—Our minds ought to be in a state of calmness and moderation; cautious and diffident; not hasty or presumptuous in forming our own judgment;

<sup>n</sup> Chap. vi. Sect. vi.

<sup>o</sup> The State, which might ally itself to *any* Church, had begun to ally itself with a Protestant Church.—Moreover, the Reformers were open, sincere, free from dissimulation and duplicity.

ment; candid and respectful in estimating the judgments of others. The qualities of the good controversialist, as described in the second<sup>p</sup> Book, would be qualities of a good reformer. Indeed, it is not easy to describe the previous disposition of a good Reformer better than it is described in the beautiful passage of Augustin, before<sup>q</sup> recommended. Only this may be a proper place for an account of the religious fault called *Bigotry*.—"Bigotry," says Mr. Travis, "may be defined to be a perverse adherence to any opinion of any kind, without giving to the evidence on the contrary part, an open hearing, and a candid judgment<sup>r</sup>." In religion, this "perverse adherence" will be generally attended by a principle of using means of defence not allowed to others. That we ought not to do any thing in promoting our own opinions, which we will not allow our adversaries to do in promoting theirs, is evident enough in itself; but men, heated by zeal for what they take for granted is truth, are perpetually doing unfair things, contrary to all rules of liberal and equitable contention. Their holy vehemence makes them deceive themselves, and requires, that they should be reasoned with, in cases otherwise too plain to admit of reasoning<sup>s</sup>.—If a member of an established religion had our right disposition, he would say, "It may be, no doubt, that my religion wants improvement; at present, I see no other religion, for which I ought to change it, all things considered; but I am very willing, that all men should believe as they can, and worship as they please; and should express their objections to my religion with a decent plainness. I will pay them attention, and will endeavour

<sup>p</sup> Chap. ii. and v.      <sup>q</sup> End of Chap. x.

<sup>r</sup> First Letter to Mr. Gibbon, p. 15. Svo. 1785.

<sup>s</sup> Book ii. Chap. ii. Sect. x.

endeavour to improve and profit by them: only let us not set about improvement *rashly*; let us not treat with a boyish flippancy all who have gone before us; let us allow them as much wisdom and integrity as ourselves, though, in some arbitrary customs of inferior moment, they may seem out of *fashion*.—With regard to the *temporal benefits* attending any particular religious community, I look upon them as *accidental*.—I wish to exclude no man from the advantages, which I happen to possess; I desire no *Laws* to be made, but such as are necessary for the public *safety*; and such as I should be willing to allow, if my religion should come to be *tolerated*, instead of being established; a thing which, at any time, may very soon happen: this I say, because those, who are only tolerated, always consider themselves as proposing necessary *improvements*.”

A rational *Dissenter* would say, ‘ I wish I *could* be a member of the national Religion; I endeavour to reconcile myself to it, but conscience forbids my compliance: I know in this case what political prudence requires<sup>t</sup>, and I cheerfully submit: every station hath in it something peculiarly good: I must consider how I can improve mine to the greatest advantage: I am free from temptations to luxury, and from secular cares; as well as from the calls of custom to the more frivolous kinds of intercourse with what is called the world: let me employ my leisure in the pursuit of religious knowledge: so may I profit, not only myself, but all my Christian Brethren<sup>u</sup>: this will be most likely also

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<sup>t</sup> As in the case of *Lord Digby*, Chap. xiv. Sect. x.

<sup>u</sup> *Dr. Lardner*, *Dr. Taylor*, *Dr. Dodderidge* could not well have done so much service to Christianity as they have done, if they had had all the avocations of the established Clergy.—That enjoyment of leisure for religious purposes, has been a thing

to bring me a contented mind.—That there is a future state, I *must* assure myself; otherwise, all my objections and difficulties are vain, and the whole business of different religions is vain: and, if there is, how shall I ever know, that any condition can be better for me than that, in which Providence has been pleased to place me? I am neither in affluence, nor in want; God has given me neither Poverty nor Riches, but he feeds me with food convenient for me: if I murmur, it must be because I prefer a turbulent passage through this life, to one during which I can keep my attention fixed without distraction on a blessed immortality.’

VII. The mind, thus opened and awake to improvement, would soon discern the *particulars*, of which such improvement would consist. Those, who were rightly disposed, must not give themselves up to any visionary schemes, but must study *human nature*, and not even that in a manner merely speculative, but by facts and *experiments*: They must cultivate the *understanding* with a particular view to religion: must refine and regulate the *imagination*; must prune away all the luxuriances of devout *affections*, and lastly, must form systems of wholesome *discipline*, and edifying *ceremonies*.

Let us consider these things *separately*.

VIII. First, as to an experimental knowledge of *human nature*\*. The end and purpose here in view, must

thing really *aimed at*, appears from the conduct of some of the Romish Clergy, who have voluntarily secluded themselves from secular cares.

That so much good has arisen either from voluntary or involuntary seclusion, is no excuse for any abuse of *Patronage*. The worst of men cannot prevent *incidental* good from arising out of their iniquity: that good can be no excuse to them; it is the immediate effect, and the irrefragable proof, of the superintendence of a benevolent Deity.

\* Dr. Balguy, p. 170, top.

must be *success*; which will depend on knowing well the grounds of probability; and we can only tell what is probable for the future, by knowing what has happened in time *past*.—Yet the result of our experiments may be so arranged, as to make a kind of theory<sup>y</sup>; which may relate to the general nature of man, that is, to all men, in all states and situations; or to his principles of action, propensities, tendencies, in particular circumstances. We shall be more likely to be successful in promoting and improving religion, as we get to understand more clearly what are the component parts of the human constitution; Understanding, Will, Passions, Imagination, Conscience;—what subordination Nature intended to institute amongst these; which are most apt to prevail in the undisciplined mind:—what are the powers or faculties of the Body; what strength and refinement they are susceptible of; what is the nature of the connexion between the bodily and mental faculties, and how one affects the other: what are the sources of human happiness; what kinds of happiness are the most valuable in an improved state, what are the most attractive in an unimproved state: how the attraction will grow more powerful, as the distance grows less: in what way any powerful attraction or repulsion is to be overcome; how mental pleasures are to be made to prevail over sensual, and benevolence over self-love:—how prejudices are to be weakened, and how they and all kinds of habits are to be unsettled and removed, and new ones formed in their place. How men are to be made to love instruction and reproof; and to acquire a relish for order and decency. How they are to be prevailed upon to encounter a present evil, for the sake of avoiding a greater at a distance; to face danger

<sup>y</sup> The Theory of *Hydrostatics* is reasoning on Experiments.

danger and perfecution, to bear ridicule, overcome sloth and indolence; and persevere in duty, when it is irksome, or insipid.

At any *particular* juncture, we shall be more likely to be successful in promoting and improving religion, if we are very accurate in observing wherein peculiarities of situation consist: so as not to think that common to all men, which is peculiar to a few: and if we know how to apply our general knowledge to each particular instance, in that degree, and with those variations, which it may chance to require.—To do this, we must inquire how men would be influenced by different means, as they differ in civilization, and of consequence in education, bodily and mental; in strength, health, activity, exercises, diet; in habitual notions, received traditions, ruling passions; in what is called taste, fancy, inclination, temper; in established virtues and vices<sup>z</sup>; in climate; in forms of Government, civil and religious; in customs merely arbitrary, and not to be thoroughly accounted for, or reduced to any class.

If we were possessed of powers to treat men with peculiar propriety in all these particular varieties of situation, we should avoid many hurtful mistakes, and useless expedients. We should never confound the treatment proper for the savage and the civilized; for the hardy and effeminate; for the ignorant and the learned; for the temperate and the luxurious; for the mild and the irascible; for the avaricious and the profuse; for the peaceable and the warlike; for the orderly and the irregular; for the subject of a republic and of a despotic government: for the member of an episcopal church and the Presbyterian.—We should steer between unthinking confidence in a good cause, and scrupulous

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<sup>z</sup> Appendix to B. I. Sect. xi.

or mean timidity about surmountable difficulties. We should attend not only to sets of men collectively, but study the minutiae of character in separate individuals, especially when any one seemed likely to influence a number. And we should carry on our attention beyond the general good conduct of those, whom we attempted to influence in the first place, to the particular circumstances of those, towards whom they were to perform duties.

The *Scriptures* are by no means averse to such prudence, as has now been described: every precept of holy writ about preaching sacred truth, is adapted to particular circumstances. The twelve Apostles were to be wise as serpents and harmless as doves, *because* they were sent forth in the midst of *Wolves*<sup>a</sup>. Our Saviour said to his Disciples, when he was comforting them on the prospect of his departure, <sup>b</sup>“ I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now.”—St. Paul calls the Corinthians “ Babes in Christ<sup>c</sup>,” adding, “ I have fed you with milk, and not with meat; for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able.”—We are told, not to give “ that which<sup>d</sup> is holy to the dogs;” nor cast our “ pearls before Swine;” and that from prudential motives, relating to ourselves. What can be more truly discreet than the specimens of conveying unwelcome truths, given us in the beautiful parables of the Ewe Lamb, and the good Samaritan<sup>e</sup>? yet, on some occasions, we are to “ rebuke sharply<sup>f</sup>;” and John the Baptist, when the occasion required that he should rouse men to a sense of their duty, exclaims, “ O generation of Vipers! who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come<sup>g</sup>?”

IX. Moreover,

<sup>a</sup> Matt. x. 16.      <sup>b</sup> John xvi. 12.      <sup>c</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 1.

<sup>d</sup> Matt. vii. 6.      <sup>e</sup> Luke x. 30.      <sup>2</sup> Sam. xii. 1.

<sup>f</sup> Titus i. 13.ii. 15.      <sup>g</sup> Matt. iii. 7.

IX. Moreover, if we wish to make improvements in religion, we must cultivate our *understandings* with a particular view to it. That we must enrich them with a knowledge of Languages, History, and Antiquities, has been fully shewn in the first book; we may add, that we should endeavour to *simplify our ideas*, so as to admit nothing confused or indistinct into our reasonings: we should have, to use Dr. Balguy's words, "a *clear head*<sup>t</sup>, unembarrassed by *scholastic terms*."—Something of this sort was recommended in the 10th Chapter: we ought to see the real meaning of words, which we use commonly and habitually; that confined meaning, which is so much more narrow than the words seem at first to convey: we ought not to be carried away by sounds, so as, when we hear mention of the *Son of God*, or of a *Person* in the Holy Trinity, to fancy we know as much, as when the same terms *Son* and *Person* are used in common life.

It will tend also much to improvement of real knowledge, if, in our investigation of it, we study things and facts with *simplicity*; so as never to conclude more from them than we are <sup>2</sup> sure of.—And we should follow the same plan in reading the Scriptures; we should read them without superstitious or enthusiastic emotions; without raising fanciful notions out of plain words; we should read them as we would read any thing written in mere popular language.

But one thing should be still farther suggested, though it is not certain that more can be derived from it than caution and discretion:—a man, who thinks on a subject of religion, may get into a *train* of

<sup>t</sup> Charge 2d. or p. 193. this might be a proper place for some account of the *Hutchinsonians*: see Dr. Balguy, Charge 1st. —Vol. p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> See Dr. Balguy's 5th Sermon.



of notions and conclusions, go from one to another, without any thing which can be called false reasoning, and find nothing to stop him;—he may do the same in thinking on another subject; and yet these *trains* of thought at last appear to be *inconsistent* with one another, he knows not why:—for instance, the Creator of all things must *know* all things; his knowledge must be *unlimited*, and he must know, not only past events, but *future*; who dare say, that he did not know yesterday what happened to-day? or a longer time before it happened? and who will say *how long* before? who will presume to say, that God was *ignorant* of it a year, two years, before? nay, an hundred, a thousand, a *million* of years?—it must be allowed, that God's *foreknowledge* is *infinite*; “known unto God are all his works<sup>h</sup> from the beginning of the world:”—but he cannot know an event, and yet that event happen *differently* from what he foresees; therefore, all events are *fixed* and *necessary*: our *best actions* are necessary; and we ought to refer all our best actions to the divine *decrees*: God certainly made all things for his own *Glory*; he *influences* us, for his own glory, to do well; and how can we resist? God is *all*, and we *nothing*.

With equal reason, a person might say, God is *just*, he will “reward every man according<sup>i</sup> to his works;” every wise man, therefore, that knoweth “to refuse<sup>k</sup> the evil and *chuse* the good,” will *chuse*, “by patient continuance in well-doing<sup>l</sup>,” to “seek for glory and honour and immortality:”—yes, men *chuse*, certainly; both reason and scripture declare it: events therefore must depend on the choice or *will of man*, and therefore must be *unfixed* and *uncertain*: God may *help*, encourage, but he cannot  
be

<sup>h</sup> Acts xv. 18.

<sup>i</sup> Matt. xvi. 27.

<sup>k</sup> If. vii. 15.

<sup>l</sup> Rom. ii. 7.

be supposed to over-rule us; were that the case, we should be mere *machines*, not *accountable* for any thing, and his acts would contradict his word.—No; whether we perish, or reign in eternal glory, it is all *our own* doing.

In whichever of these two *trains* we set out, we may continue: and the same thing would happen in some of the other subjects mentioned as <sup>m</sup> unintelligible: all that can ever be expected in such cases is, that a man should not go on in one train without recollecting, that there is another, in which he might have gone on as smoothly.—This, though no great improvement in knowledge, except in the knowledge of our ignorance, would be an improvement in satisfaction, and might produce brotherly agreement; for the way, in which one man is led into a different doctrine or party from his neighbour, is, by his getting engaged in one of these trains, and seeing no fallacy: this makes him neglect to *compare* it with the other; and he answers all arguments by saying, ‘mine must be *right*, therefore whatever is *inconsistent* with it, is *wrong*.’—Whereas, one has as much right to say this, as another.—I believe, in fact, most arguments in favour of Necessity are answered, by only saying, they are inconsistent with virtue; and most arguments in favour of Liberty, by saying only, that they are inconsistent with the Divine Omniscience.

x. With the same view of improving religion, we must endeavour to improve our *imagination*. What I mean, is to be done by improving the *fine arts*, and by applying them to religious uses.—By the fine arts, are usually understood painting, music, poetry, eloquence, sculpture, architecture, and perhaps some others; these give the mind ideas of beauty, sublimity, grandeur, order, symmetry, harmony,

mony, rythm, &c. and ſerve to excite and ſtrengthen *ſentiments* of various kinds:—if theſe are in an improved ſtate, they refine and poliſh, and, as it were, enrich and ennoble the mind, ſo long as they are applied to any ſubjects which are moral, or only innocent;—but they are far more uſeful, and do much more good to the mind, if they are employed in the ſervice of religion: religious paintings are very improving; ſacred muſic, even in its plaineſt kinds, ſoftens and ſoothes the heart, and makes it feel a warm and affectionate piety; and, when it becomes ſublime, it exalts the mind to heavenly conceptions: when pathetic, it melts the heart with “godly ſorrow,” in a manner not to be deſcribed;—and ſimilar obſervations might be made on poetry, eloquence, and the reſt; though there may be a difference in degree<sup>n</sup>.

It ſeems to be undeniably true, (and ſurely it proves how great and noble a thing religion is in itſelf, and how congenial to the human mind,) that the fine arts are (generally ſpeaking) infinitely more efficacious, when exerciſed on religious ſubjects, than any others. The paintings, which have the greateſt effect, are on religious ſubjects; I ſhould be curious to compare the ſeveral works of the beſt maſters in the Art of Painting, and ſee whether the beſt work of each is not religious; the Nati- vity, by Sir Joſhua Reynolds, ſtrikes me more than any other piece of his that I have ſeen. I doubt whether the art of ſacred poetry has as yet been well ſtudied. Eloquence of the pulpit is not at preſent what it might be, or even what it has been: though it ſeems improving, yet ſome faults are uſually admitted into it, which leſſen its effect; and can be removed only by an enlightened and philoſo- phical criticiſm. But ſacred *muſic* has been very ſucceſsfully

<sup>n</sup> Hartley on Man. Vol. 2. p. 254.

ſucceſsfully cultivated: and therefore, though our obſervation is true as to all the arts, when equally improved, yet its truth appears moſt evident in the inſtance of Muſic.—It has been ° ſaid, that the *Opera* is the higheſt entertainment ariſing out of the polite arts, as uniting muſic, painting, poetry, fine and graceful action, grandeur, dancing, &c. all which are ſuppoſed to heighten one another, and to receive additional effect from the ſympathy of the ſpectators; but what *Opera* had ever the effect of the ſacred muſic in *Westminſter Abbey* for four years together? I ſincerely believe, that nothing of the kind, but what is founded on religion, will ever be able to attract ſuch numbers, to produce ſuch expenſive contributions, to delight and elevate for ſuch a length of time<sup>p</sup>.

XI. It cannot be conceived, that improvement in Religion can go on, without our giving attention to our religious ſentiments, or *affections*; without, in the firſt place, watching their *faults*, and endeavouring to keep them in their *right ſtate*; neither

° By Diderot, in his criticifms after his *Comedies le Fils Naturel*, and *le Pere de Famille*. And Rouſſeau, in his *Muſical Dictionary*, ſeems to have much the ſame idea.

<sup>p</sup> Something ſhould be ſaid of Sculpture and Architecture, as they are in the enumeration. With regard to Sculpture, I muſt confeſs, that I have ſeen much better Statues profane than ſacred: why it ſhould be ſo, I cannot conceive, ſuppoſing Chriſtian artiſts equal to Heathen.—Of religious Architecture there are many excellent ſpecimens, though I fear we are degenerating in reſpect to it. King's College Chapel at Cambridge is, in my judgment, the moſt excellent of thoſe which I have ſeen, for producing the right kind of effect. Several of our Cathedrals are ſolemn; thoſe at Lincoln and York in particular; but King's College Chapel has its ſolemnity ſo refined by elegance and lightneſs, and ſo heightened by its unity of deſign, and by being ſeen all at once, that it excites ſentiments not leſs noble, and yet more pleaſing, than any other building. St. Paul's in London is excellent in a different way. St. Peter's at Rome I only know by deſcription.

neither soaring into extravagance, nor sinking into lukewarmness and indifference.—Indeed, our chief business at present will be, to get precise ideas of their *faults*; which we cannot be said to have, unless we see the evil consequences of those faults; nor can we well see those evil consequences, without at the same time getting some notion of the manner, in which those faults may be remedied.—Faults there certainly may be in religious, as well as other affections; in every thing we are in a state of discipline and trial, and therefore every faculty is liable to abuse; no exception is made in favour either of our moral faculty, or of our religious affections.—These affections have been described and classed in the third Chapter: we may proceed immediately to their *Faults*. The principal seem to be *Superstition—Enthusiasm—Mysticism*, and *Lukewarmness*.—*First of Superstition*: what it is; what are the *evils* or mischiefs of it; and what their *remedies*.

It is not easy to define a word, which has been used inaccurately and unsteadily; words are generally used before they are defined; in moral and religious subjects at least: and all that can be done is, to include, in a definition, all the instances in which a word has been used by those, who express themselves carefully.—According to this, we may say, first, that, when a man is called superstitious, something is meant respecting both his *understanding* and his *feelings*.

A man is superstitious in respect of his *Understanding*, or his notions, when, on seeing an event, he imagines, that he knows the will of God, or the rules or laws of his Government, so well, as to see his *design* in that event; particularly how it is made use of to produce *good* or *evil*, *reward* or *punishment*.

Or,

Or, if a man only presumes, that he knows the meaning of any subordinate invisible Beings from an event, he is still called superstitious. I say *presumes*, for his conclusion cannot be made by his reason; it can only be the work of fancy.

An instance may be found in the scriptural account of the barbarous inhabitants of the Island of Melita, or Malta, upon occasion of a viper's coming out of the fire, and fastening upon St. Paul's hand: "when the Barbarians saw the venomous beast hang on his hand, they said among themselves, No doubt<sup>a</sup> this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the sea, Vengeance ( $\delta$  Διξη) suffereth not to live." "No doubt," is the true language of superstition; these barbarians presumed, that they knew the *laws* of the government of superior Beings, with regard to Murder: And, to be consistent, when they "saw no harm come to him," they concluded, that he must be a *God*.—The case is the same in *augury* and divination; in conclusions drawn from situations, attitudes, and various appearances and sounds.

To this account it may be objected, Does not God really govern the world? do not the most rational allow, that he punishes vice, and rewards virtue? drawing their conclusions merely from experience? are not the virtues settled by such observations? do we not, from the rules of God's government, deduce his Attributes and the truths of natural religion? it is true, we do; yet we may go too far, and imagine we know what we really do not. From what we observe, we have reason to believe in a general Providence, and in a particular Providence: but we must not speak decisively of any *single event*.—The Tower in Siloam<sup>n</sup> fell: how? why? as a punishment upon the eighteen?<sup>o</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Acts xxviii. 3.

<sup>n</sup> Luke xiii. 4.

teen? that conclusion would be superstitious; it is too particular: reason cannot make it; imagination must not be listened to. But, with an awful doubt, we may say, God governs by his general providence, he interferes by his particular providence; this *may* be an act of either; how far it *is*, I cannot see distinctly; but let me be on the *safe side*. By this reasoning, we are led to practical caution; to feel the full force of what the fact should principally suggest,—“except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.”

Again, may we not, by avoiding superstitious conclusions, miss making reasonable conclusions from the phænomena of Nature? both follow from observation and experience; how shall we know the difference?—the difference may be seen in some degree, by what has been already said: but we may say farther, Reason notes all circumstances carefully, but only grounds, on phænomena observed repeatedly, *expectation* of a still farther repetition: Superstition, by too readily admitting events to be similar, forms *groundless* expectation; and, by neglecting distinctions, gets still farther into delusion and error. But even this does not mislead so much as inferring design from a naked event: amongst men, the more ignorant scarce ever guess right at the *designs* of the most wise and knowing, from a *single* action: how then can any man, from an act of the Divinity? The reasonable man owns his ignorance, the superstitious man knows the mind\* of the Lord. When the *thunder* rolls, or the lightning flashes, it is heard, or seen, by both: but the reasonable man only observes accurately, and expects to see again what he has generally seen; whilst the superstitious man *interprets*, and makes out of the awful sounds a judicial sentence  
against

\* Rom. xi. 34.

against particular individuals; makes the Deity to express disapprobation, prohibition, menace, against those, who happen to be his own adversaries.

Though superstitious conclusions must be generally *false*, as being in their nature arbitrary, (non causa, pro causâ) yet they should not be considered as only false in *speculation*, they are seldom made without some view to *action*, and that action is accomplished by means of superstitious *feelings*.

The superstitious man is not only so with respect to his *understanding*, but with respect to his passions, sentiments, *feelings*. Those, who form superstitious *conclusions*, feel superstitious *fears*.—Fears? why not *hopes*? Hopes are not inconsistent with the account now given? I would not answer this question, without expressing some diffidence: it seems certain, that we are more accustomed to hear of superstitious fears, than of superstitious hopes; and it is natural to inquire into the reason. Sometimes, favourable omens excite superstitious hopes, but the mind labouring under this infirmity generally, on the whole, shews a propensity to imbibe some species<sup>t</sup> of *fear*. Let us consider this matter.

Superstition attends to *external* phænomena: it pretends to discern the design of God, but at an awful *distance*; not to be actually present in the divine councils, or to learn the result of them without the intervention of *signs*, and those generally of a *tremendous* nature: reserve is apparent in the Deity, and has a great and majestic appearance: the judgment formed is not wholly clear of doubt and misgiving: he, who forms it, does not presume,

<sup>t</sup> Mr. Hume has a short Essay on Superstition and Enthusiasm; he speaks of *Terror* as belonging to Superstition: so does Hartley: they both saw the nature of Superstition better than Bacon, in my judgment. I judge from his Essays, published by Willymott,



sume, that he is distinguished by Heaven, or that any thing is imparted to him, which is withheld from the rest of mankind: his reverence must generally approach near to dread; and obscurity<sup>u</sup> must heighten it. As superstition attends to external phænomena, it must be most affected by those phænomena, which are most striking; now the more sublime phænomena of nature must make, on the mind of every man, a deeper impression than the more tame and gentle; and sublimity is allied to fear:—what pleasing or favourable appearance can be so striking as an earthquake, deluge, lightning, hurricane, conflagration, volcano? the dread, which will be excited by these in the superstitious mind, will easily overpower and banish any more pleasing sensations; or any *hopes*. But moreover, it is to be considered, that the tendency to superstitious conclusions is greatest in a mind *previously timid*: such conclusions heighten the timidity, and the timidity produces more conclusions. Then there is nothing, which makes us so ready to interpret unfavourable events into designed reproofs, or punishments, as remorse, or an uneasy conscience<sup>x</sup>; and the more timid any one is by nature, the more forcibly does remorse act upon his mind: put these things together, and you will own, not only that fear must be the predominant feeling of the superstitious mind, but that, when scruple and religious melancholy join themselves to an infirm bodily constitution, and a timid mind, and sym-

pathy

<sup>u</sup> Isaiah xlv. 15.

<sup>x</sup> I have been told of a Boy of the name of *Yerke*, who, when at School, went out of *bounds*; he began to feel some *remorse*; presently a crow, or raven, began to make its usual noise, *Caw, Caw*; the guilty conscience made this sound into *Yerke, Yerke*; and the alarmed wanderer returned within his prescribed limits.—Experiments on *Youth* are generally perhaps the fairest and most satisfactory of any.

pathy lends its aid, there is no degree of *panic*, to which superstitious feelings may not rise.

From superstitious *dread*, the mind is easily drawn into *abhorrence*; even from dread of superior beings to abhorrence of men like ourselves, when they are once conceived to be offensive to those superior Beings: passions once raised find themselves objects, very different in many respects from those, by which they were first excited<sup>y</sup>.

Such is superstition; as to *opinion*, and *passion*.

That superstition is *hurtful*, must already appear; but it will be proper to mark out some of its evil consequences more particularly.

1. The superstitious man is *unhappy* in himself, diffident, scrupulous, full of disquietude; fearing that he has offended God, and construing every thing, that he sees or hears, into an intimation of the divine vengeance.

2. Superstition is an enemy to *Benevolence*: the superstitious are morose; cowards are cruel: arbitrary conclusions, drawn by different men, must be different. Each superstitious person presumes he has the will of God; one is opposed to another with a zeal, which no natural affection or kindness can withstand. Friendships, family connexions, associations, all fall before it: even nations lose useful intercourse, hate one<sup>z</sup> another, may proceed<sup>with</sup> to actual injuries, because they have adopted different sorts of superstition.

3. Superstition is an enemy to *reason*, and to arts and *sciences*. Reason is dull and tedious, in comparison of the Imagination; and their dictates will thwart and contradict each other. Reason thus becomes despised and abhorred, and, if it pretends

to

<sup>y</sup> Venger Dieu. Esprit des Loix, Livre 12. Chap. 4.

<sup>z</sup> Esprit des Loix, Liv. 24. Chap. 22. fin.

to make much resistance, gets persecuted<sup>a</sup>. If the fine arts are only neglected by the superstitious, they are fortunate; they may easily get reckoned supporters of impiety: and then they will suffer persecution.

4. Lastly, Superstition is unfavourable to *Virtue* in general. This must be the case with every thing that is unfavourable to Benevolence: virtues are species of benevolence; “Love is the fulfilling of the Law:”—but moreover, it diverts men from founding their religious hopes on the performance of their duty. It makes them indeed think much of the divine vengeance, but it leads them to appease it by externals, which do not mend the heart. The King of Moab offers to bow himself “before the high God” with the most costly superstitions, or even with the sacrifice of his Son<sup>b</sup>: the Prophet disclaims them all, and enjoins only the fundamental principles of moral duty<sup>c</sup>.

By these remarks we are naturally led to the *remedies* for superstition.—They may be applied to the *Understanding*, or to the *Heart*. It is most practicable to clear the understanding of this fault;—and that will tend also to keep the heart clear of it.—These *distinctions* must be made familiar:—between *expecting* a sort of event, and knowing the *use* of a particular event, as a reward or punishment:—between saying, ‘*there is* a judge of all men,’ and ‘*this is* a judgment on a particular man:’—or between ‘*this is* a judgment,’ and, ‘*this may be* a judgment.’ And we might sometimes check our presumption, by making it a rule, to allow ourselves

<sup>a</sup> The instance of *Galileo* was mentioned in the last Chapter of the second Book.

<sup>b</sup> Micah vi.

<sup>c</sup> Mr. Hume has something to this purpose; *Natural History of Religion*, latter end.

selves no conclusion, from any event, or appearance, which we would not allow Barbarians to make from Thunder or an *Eclipse*.—The happiness of man shews us best the will of God.

If the *Heart* is already infected, some remedies may be applied to that.—It is in our power to hinder our sentiment of *respect* from becoming *excessive*; we need not indulge it. It is in our power to make that degree of *self-esteem* and *confidence* habitual, which reason recommends in an hour of calmness and serenity. “If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God<sup>d</sup>.”—“We trust we have a good conscience, in all things willing to live honestly<sup>e</sup>.”—It is in our power to *dwell* on texts like these, till they strengthen our minds; as also to dwell on instances of God’s *goodness*, paying for a while less attention to instances of his power<sup>f</sup>: if means were used to strengthen the *nervous* system of the body, that would strengthen the mind; as would the exercise of our reason.—*Ridicule* might, in some cases, dissipate superstition; but perhaps it may be too dangerous a remedy to be recommended to all indiscriminately.

To conclude this subject of superstition; I would not be thought to say, that every degree of awe, on seeing evils and calamities, or great instances of divine power, is wrong; a serious question, whether God *may not* intend any evils as warnings or punishments, is right and reasonable; and its effect upon our conduct may be as great as a positive decision that he *does*;—without seeing God in the clouds, and hearing him in the wind, we may “believe that he *is*, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him<sup>g</sup> :” nay, we may set God always before us: we want not *panics* to make us

<sup>d</sup> 1 Johu iii. 21.

<sup>e</sup> Heb. xiii 18.

<sup>f</sup> See Chap. III. Sect. III.

<sup>g</sup> Heb. xi. 6.

us admire and adore him; much less to make us pay him a pleasing and reasonable service.

*Enthusiasm* in some things is allied to superstition: for a man may be called an enthusiast, either with respect to his *intellects* or his *passions*; there is an enthusiastic *conclusion*, and an enthusiastic *affection*. A man makes an enthusiastic conclusion, when, upon any sentiment arising in his mind, he so presumes God to be the cause of it, as to take for granted he sees the *design* of God in exciting it: not merely so as to acknowledge God to be author of Nature; not as if the sentiment arose according to any Law, by which his mind or body was formed; but as if the divine will was imparted to him by it, as a man's will by his words.—The conclusion is also enthusiastic, if the sentiment be only presumed, in the same particular manner, to have been excited by inferior spirits:—some believe *only* in what may be called *Dæmons*.

From this account, Superstition and Enthusiasm may seem at first more alike than they really are. They are both wrong ways of fixing upon God as a cause; but superstition attends to *external* effects, enthusiasm to *internal*. And this difference causes many others. Indeed they may *jointly* influence the mind, and then perhaps, or when either is supposed to influence, without determining *which*, would be the proper use of the term *Fanaticism*.—The immense army of *Crusaders*<sup>b</sup> seem to have been Fanatics in this sense; superstitious and enthusiastic at the same time.

It may be objected to our account of enthusiasm, Can it be wrong to dwell on the notion, that God is the cause of our thoughts? is he not so? in some sense he is: but yet it is one thing to say, in general, 'we have no power of thinking independent

of

<sup>b</sup> Near the end of the 12th Century; in 1190, &c.

of God,' and another to say, of a particular thought, 'this thought is *now* dictated to me with such a *design*;' 'this thought,' as distinguished from other thoughts; 'to *me*,' as distinguished from other persons.—It cannot be wrong to say, 'may not this thought or feeling be excited for an encouragement or discouragement?' but to decide, is enthusiastic. We have no safe way of arriving at such conclusion, in the present state of our knowledge.

Objections may be made, not only on principles of natural, but of revealed religion: not only relating to mere thoughts, but to moral sentiments and resolutions. Are we not told, that our good thoughts and purposes are *inspired*? yes, we are to be humble in all things, and give God the glory; and virtue seeming more in our power than any thing else, we are enjoined to ascribe even that to the Supreme Being in some way or other; in some indistinct way, merely with the *practical* view of making ourselves sober-minded, diligent, thankful, pious.—Besides, what is told us only enables us to form a *general* proposition, that *all* our *virtues* ought thus to be ascribed to God; not to say of an *action*, merely as an *action*, that it is inspired. Till we know whether an action is *good*, we do not know whether God is to be thanked for it as inspired; if we were desirous to form a judgment whether a particular action was inspired, we must first, from principles of morality, endeavour to determine whether it was a *good* action; and even then we can only say, *as far as it was good*, so far we are told to thank God for it, (though in a very indistinct manner) lest we should be *proud* even of our Virtue. Though an action were called by a good *name*, it might not be really good:—what so likely to be good as a *zeal* for religion? yet one may have a  
zeal

zeal “not according to knowledge<sup>i</sup>.”—Nay, we cannot, even taking for granted the goodness of an action, determine how *far* the declarations of Christianity are to be applied to it;—you find a treasure; you might conceal it, but you restore it to the owner; thank God that you do so! yet an heathen might have done the same: how far was your good action owing to *heathen virtue*? how far to Christian *inspiration*?

In every instance then of enthusiasm, there is an arbitrary conclusion, which we may reckon as an *error*. But, as in the case of superstition, such conclusions seldom, if ever, terminate in speculation<sup>k</sup>; they lead to some *action*, which is carried on by the enthusiastic *feelings*.

An Enthusiast is such, not only with respect to his intellects, but also with respect to his feelings, or *affections*. The ground-work of the enthusiastic passion is *presumption*: but zeal, and love, and hope enter into the composition: and the compound is powerful; runs into ecstasy and rapture. That this is so, is matter of observation; why it should be so, deserves to be considered; that is, why taking for granted that God suggests our sentiments, should generate such a compound affection.

We cannot well be persuaded, that God suggests a particular thought, without imagining, that we have “known the mind of the Lord” after the manner of Counsellors or distinguished Friends; this must immediately make us feel presumption; and we must naturally be zealous to propagate what has been entrusted to us in so flattering a manner: we must love him, by whom we are so graciously distinguished; and strongly hope for a  
 continual

<sup>i</sup> Rom. x. 2.

<sup>k</sup> Battle of Dunbar. Whitfield's Journals. Bishop Gibson's 4th pastoral Letter.

continual increase of his favour. An affection or sentiment so compounded must easily mix with every species of self-esteem: with pride, vanity, self-approbation: and, from the mixture, we may conceive its strength: sanguine persuasion of the approbation of God, must needs be a strong sentiment of itself; but, mixed with the others, its strength must be greatly increased. Then, it is chiefly men, whose temperament is naturally sanguine, that are apt to encourage enthusiastic conclusions: and they will be apt to ascribe to God those of their feelings, which are most *bold* and elevated: whoever reflects on all these things, and considers, that many enthusiasts may sympathize with each other, (though each regards himself as superior to the vulgar) will see, that enthusiastic passion may rise to any degree of *fervor*.—Not that God is really more likely to excite a strong sentiment than a mild one; but bold enthusiastic men will be apt to think so.

As to the *evils* of enthusiasm; that and superstition being only different modes of presuming, that we know the designs of God, are likely to produce some of the same effects, though in different ways.

1. Enthusiasm lessens the *happiness* of the enthusiast *himself*. He is tossed by violent passions; sometimes elevated, sometimes dejected: a stranger to that cheerful even serenity, which is the best sort of happiness this world affords<sup>1</sup>.

2. Enthusiasm is unfavourable to *Benevolence*:—not but the enthusiast sometimes loves man, as well as God, but his affection is not pleasing and attractive: he is either affectionate to excess, and so disgusts; or he is very morose. He is also too overbearing, too deficient in candour, for any durable connexion; all such are maintained by delicate

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Butler.



cate respect, and mutual attentions. And, if even his Brother differ from him in Religion, he is ready to treat him as his enemy, because he is the enemy of God; and to consider him as a proper object of persecution.

3. Enthusiasm is an enemy to *reason, arts, sciences*, much in the same manner with superstition. But it seems still more an enemy to *experience*, which is really the source of almost all our practical knowledge; and even of morality itself.—I know not whether some things, which have the form of mathematical reasoning, do not owe the conviction they give, partly to being tried.

4. Enthusiasm is an enemy to *authority* and subordination, the benefits of which are very solid and extensive. The principle of doing things “right in the sight of God<sup>m</sup>,” against the authority of man, may be very easily misapplied.

5. But it should be made a separate remark, that Enthusiasm prevents a just interpretation of *Scripture*, and, by occasioning, in different minds, arbitrary conclusions, which cannot coincide, makes dissensions unavoidable, at the same time that it renders men more unfit to engage in them.

Those *remedies* for enthusiasm are most easy to administer, which keep the *understanding* clear of error, and these may prevent the *passions* from taking any wrong turn. They appear from what has been said. We should never rashly assign *causes*, particularly for what happens in our *minds*, of which we know but little. We should be aware, that it is one thing to say, ‘we cannot think or feel without the help of God,’ and another to say, ‘God suggests *this* thought or sentiment, with such a particular *design*. We may allow, that such a thought or sentiment *may* be intended for such a purpose,

purpose, but we must never affirm that it *is*. We must keep in mind, that vehemence is no real mark of the Divinity: above all, that an act, or resolution, is only to be called *inspired*, as far as it is right: that no man is to say, ‘this action was inspired, therefore it is right;’ but only, I believe such an action right, and on that supposition I thank God for it.

Something may be done to the sentiments or *affections*. Humility should be encouraged, in order to obviate presumption; and make our love respectful. Our *respect* might be increased by dwelling rather on instances of the *Power* of God, than of his goodness.—And such measures should be taken, not only at the moment when we are most inclined to enthusiasm, but according to some constant regular *plan* of religious discipline: they would indeed affect, not only the heart, but the head also, and the heart through the medium of the understanding.

It would guard both head and heart, if we studied *men* and *things*. The works of the *creation* would make us admire the Divine Wisdom, and be sensible of our own ignorance, at the same time that it took us from the business of engendering fancies in our own brain. But we should not content ourselves with a mere inactive contemplation of the works of nature; we should study their powers and uses, and measure the quantities of those powers; which is done by mathematics.—It would have the same kind of effect, if we conversed much with men in active life; men of no theory, guiding themselves wholly by practical maxims.

Lastly, after using these methods by way of preparation, we should read the Scriptures as they were intended to be read; as “the words of truth  
and

and soberness<sup>n</sup>;" without any fanciful constructions, any chimerical applications to ourselves.—I believe any person, who was inclined to enthusiasm, might do himself much service by reading some of the most rational interpreters of it: some of those, who have been called divine Philosophers<sup>o</sup>, and philosophical Divines.

The next fault of the religious affections, is *Mysticism*, This may be considered as a sort of enthusiasm, but yet it seems to require a separate mention: if it did not, it would not have, probably, a separate name.—I call it a *fault*, but it is not always acknowledged to be one: some persons profess themselves to be mystics, but none call themselves superstitious, or enthusiastic: to avoid any dispute about *words*, we will say then, that we mean *false*<sup>p</sup> mysticism, or the faulty excess of it;—any thing that is praise-worthy in it, may be mentioned afterwards.

Mysticism, in this sense, seems to be a very strong devout affection, carrying men from action and reasoning to passionate and rapturous *contemplation*: sometimes to *fits*<sup>q</sup>, or *ecstasies*<sup>r</sup> which deprive men of the use of reason.

As the word affection sometimes includes religious fear, hope, and other sentiments, it may be proper to say, that it is here used in the sense of *Love*: Mysticism seems to be an excess of the love of God; with some perversion: excluding<sup>s</sup> hope,  
and

<sup>n</sup> Acts xxvi. 25.      <sup>o</sup> Hurd, Vol. 3. Ser. 11th. p. 207.

<sup>p</sup> The Authors of the Dict. Acad. Fran. make a difference between *vrai* mystique and *faux* mystique.

<sup>q</sup> Voltaire about Mad. Guion; Louis xiv. p. 305, 306. 12mo. she married Christ in an ecstasy. p. 308.

<sup>r</sup> Dionysius Carthusianus was "*Doctor extaticus.*"—Bona, Chap. 2.

<sup>s</sup> Maxims, end of 1st Art. *true*. Volt. p. 303. Summary of Swédenborg, p. 81.

and all view to *rewards*:—pure, disinterested: such love is also to be shewn by mystics to *man*.

Men seem to be tempted into it by various inducements;—partly by vanity, or a desire of soaring above vulgar devotees: partly by pleasure; the devout affections are pleasurable, as well as others; and there is always something tempting in a very specious pretence for evading moral duties, and living in a continued indolence: not to mention, that love of one sort is not wholly unconnected with love of another sort: there is 'some connexion between spiritual love and carnal: it will always be worth while for mystic voluptuaries to be cautious of taking liberties, or running hazards, with those of a different sex.—Besides, in mysticism, the fancy is warmed, and finds a boundless field, in which it may expatiate: those, who have indulged in reverie, know the charms of this.

We must distinguish between inducements to mysticism, and pleas by which it is defended. Those who run into it are apt to dwell, as much as infidels, on the folly of controversies about religion; and say, that Religion is not intended to perplex or employ the *Head*, but to mend and purify the *Heart*: That Philosophy is vain; the work of weak and fallible man: Doctrines are to be taken on authority; God should be listened to, and God alone. With regard to Christianity, the first teachers of it had no learning, how can we think it necessary for us? languages are a dead letter"; and so on.—

Possibly

\* See Voltaire about parodying *Love-songs*, p. 308, Louis XIV. 12mo. About Moravians, see Maclaine's *Mosheim*, 18th Cent. Vol. 6. 8vo. p. 23.—Also see Rimius p. 55, &c.—Augustin's account of Manichean Sacrament proves a connection in thought of some one's.—Swedenborg has also a pretty deal of reference to *Loves and Marriage*: Summary, p. 64 8o. 83.

† Behmen, 2d Book, concerning three principles, margin 25 the end of Preface,

Possibly the Fall of *Angels*<sup>x</sup>, and the *origin of evil*, may have engaged some in deep visions and contemplations concerning Angelic Beings and the soul of man; and the seeming necessity of solving these, may have appeared to justify the solutions. —The same may be observed of the more wonderful parts of Nature, particularly <sup>y</sup> *Fire* and <sup>z</sup> *Light*: fantastic reveries on these, connecting them with the Deity and inferior Spirits, have seemed to be disquisitions, which man ought not to neglect. Chemical mysteries, made religious, seem to have constituted the fancies of the *Rosicrucians*.

Expressions of *Scripture* are frequently brought to justify mysticism. Indeed it may *begin* with *Scripture* in its right sense; (a common case:)—all Parables must have a meaning besides the literal one, this may be called *mystical*; Prophecies have double senses; action sometimes expresses important truth; St. Paul uses a continued allegory<sup>a</sup> of a refined sort: types must have mystical meanings: —Christ is the head of the Church; the church therefore is his mystical (not real) body; the Church is his mystical Spouse, and so on.—But the mystics carry this on, as I conceive, from parables, &c. to what does not admit of it, History and Morality: and in every thing carry it to excess.

And in texts, where they do not multiply meanings, they increase the *intensity* of the signification beyond all reason:—as in those about the assistance of the Spirit; no man can come unto me except the Father<sup>b</sup> draw him: in those about the carnal man<sup>c</sup>, or natural man:—in those which relate to  
peace

<sup>x</sup> Böhmen, 2d Book “Concerning 3 Principles:” title page, and Index.

<sup>y</sup> Deut. iv. 24. Böhmen’s 40 questions: Quest. 1st.

<sup>z</sup> John i. 7—9. <sup>a</sup> Gal. iv. 21, &c.

<sup>b</sup> John vi. 44. xii. 32. <sup>c</sup> Rom. viii. 6, 7. 1 Cor. ii. 14.

peace of mind; as if “the peace of God, which passeth all understanding,” excluded all action, of body and mind, and was an union with God:—and in those which relate to Love; as that it is the fulfilling of the law, &c.—that on the Love of God and Man depend all the Law and the Prophets;—as if love were the end, and not the cause of kind actions.—“*Seeking*” is a favourite word: I do not see rightly how it has become so.—“Will *seek* (Luke xiii. 24.) to enter in, and shall not be able.” Also Matt. vii. 13.

Mysticism has the name of *Quietism*, from the idea, that Christian perfection consists in the quiet and repose of the soul, in <sup>d</sup>indifference, and annihilation; as far as relates to worldly business: in calling it off from secular cares, and devoting it wholly to God.—In what is called *passive contemplation*.

Specimens of mysticism may be found in the works of Jacob <sup>e</sup>*Bachmen*, published or prepared in two Volumes quarto, by his advocate William Law; of the Hon. Emanuel *Swedenborg*; and others;—but Archbishop Fenelon’s *Maxims of the Saints* will seem more worthy of attention; on account of the character of the Author, and the disturbance which it

<sup>d</sup> Dict. Acad. *Quiétisme & Quiétude*.—Volt. Louis XIV. *Quiétisme*. And Fenelon’s *Maxims of the Saints*. Art. 21. and conclusion, or Preface: Bona calls Mysticism, *via quietis*. beginning Chap. 3. p. 109.

<sup>e</sup> He signs Jacob *Bachmen*, in Pref. to 40 questions. Mosheim calls him Behmin, Böhmius, Boemen and Boehmen; and in one place a *Shoemaker*, in another a *Taylor*.—Ladvoeat writes *Boehm.* of Lusatia; Shoemaker: M. 1624. *Fluad*, who is mentioned in Wood’s *Athen*. Oxon. is called by Mosheim the Master, or Model, or &c. of *Bähnen*.

I. P. who takes the title of M. D. has published a little Vol. 12mo. about Jacob Behmen, with extracts; not more intelligible than Jacob himself.—Dr. Balguy calls something “*impent-urable nonsense*”: my candour has made me labour to penetrate here; but all in vain.

it occasioned<sup>f</sup>.—The preface of itself gives a good idea of Fenelon's sort of mysticism, if we take care to understand the words rightly: teachable, illusion, manners, &c.

The *Quakers* are reckoned a species of mystics, and most of their errors may be referred, either to what we have said of enthusiasm, or else of mysticism: το Φως, they make inward illumination:—But I will only mention *Barclay's Apology* as the principal Book in defence of Quakerism, and *Bennet's* confutation of Quakerism at present as a Book which may be consulted.—Barclay (who died near the end of the seventeenth century) is very different from *Behmen*, in as much as he has all the appearance of *reasoning*; and some knowledge of Scripture is required to confute him.—The *Methodists* used, about thirty years ago, to apply texts of Scripture in the manner above mentioned; I *imagine* they do it now in a less degree; but I am not quite *certain*<sup>g</sup>. The names of *Bourignon* and *Leadley*, would lead to more instances of mysticism, if authors of ecclesiastical History were consulted.

But there are various *degrees* of mysticism;—and persons of cold temperaments, confined to intellectual attainments, void of taste, and dull in sentiment, may call by that name every act of kind or grateful affection towards the Supreme Being. As there is a great variety in the tempers, tastes, and sentiments of different men, considerable *latitude* should be allowed in such matters as these:  
the

<sup>f</sup> See Voltaire's History of L. XIV. Quiétisme. Mosheim, &c.—and in some editions of the Maxims of the Saints, some History of it appears.—(G. 12—78. Cambr)

<sup>g</sup> Here would be the place to read John Wesley's account of Mysticism in the 13th Letter published by Priestley. The Methodists used to have *Classes* formed from *experiences*. Rimius speaks of the *Moravians* as Mystics; Narrative, p. 70. And I think he speaks as if Mystics were of very different sorts.

the philosophical speculatist should not condemn all warmth of devout <sup>h</sup> affection; nor the affectionate Devotee think, that he, who keeps God's <sup>i</sup> commandments calmly, and interprets Scripture rationally, is rejected of God, because he shews but little taste or sensibility.—Amongst the Mystics of the <sup>k</sup> 15th Century, we find men of great 'eminence: "*Thomas a Kempis*, the author of the Germanic Theology so highly recommended by Luther,"—*Savonarola*; and, as a favourer, may be mentioned the learned Marcilius *Ficinus*, the great commentator on Plato.

Cardinal *Bona* <sup>m</sup> has given a regular *system* of Mysticism: a cursory reader may consult the contents of his Chapters, and the third section of his first Chapter; in which section he lays down several distinctions between the *slow* way to God, and the *short* way; he has given indeed a system of both; calling his first system (that which I conceive to be the same with this *slow* way) *manuductio ad cælum*, the latter, *via compendii ad Deum per motus anagogicos et ignitas aspirationes*.—Madame Guion called her treatise *Moyen* <sup>n</sup> *court*, &c.; that treatise which occasioned the contest between *Fenelon* and *Bossuet*.

There

<sup>h</sup> See Butler's Sermons on the Love of God, and the conclusion of his Preface, about them.

<sup>i</sup> 1 John v. 3.

<sup>k</sup> See Mosheim, Cent. 15. Part 2. Chap. 3. Sect. 11. p. 455 of Vol. 5. 8vo.

<sup>l</sup> Though the Authors of Dict. Acad. make a difference between *vrai* mystique, and *faux* mystique; and probably make it in *compliance*; but they would not comply with every body; their making the difference shews that they thought some mystics of consequence.

<sup>m</sup> Died 1674, aged 65: of Mondovi — Studious, so as to correspond with Literati.

<sup>n</sup> Maxims, &c. p. 173. G. 12—78. Cambr.

Voltaire, Louis XIV. p. 303.—Quiétisme.



There is something in mysticism, into which men at *all times* are apt to fall; I mean those of fine imaginations and warm passions: to bring it to a great height, other circumstances must join; as retirement, security, abstinence, leisure, &c.—What was said at the end of the first Book, concerning the early Heresies<sup>o</sup>, will confirm this sufficiently; and there might be a *continued History* of Mysticism down from the earliest ages<sup>p</sup> of Christianity to the present times.—Indeed, no man can be prepared to enter on the religious world, who is a stranger to the manner, in which it has operated, and is likely to operate in future.

What has been said, though immediately intended as definition or description, will give us an idea of the *evils* of Mysticism in its faulty state. It seems to be an enemy to rational religion, to reason in general, and to virtue.—To Religion, as it hinders men from studying<sup>q</sup> it: to Reason, as it hinders them from respecting and cultivating<sup>r</sup> it: to Virtue, in several different ways. It makes men useless, when it runs to great excess; it furnishes them with means of evading such duties, as they cannot be ignorant of; and it prevents them from learning many others. I believe those, who understand morality best, find great attention necessary to make them see their *Duty* in all circumstances, and the secondary or instrumental methods of performing it: and those, who attend to it but little, are for ever getting into wrong conduct.—Mysticism encourages vanity or spiritual pride: and  
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<sup>o</sup> One might compare the Valentinian Æons with Bæhmen's Angels: and the fire of some Orientalists with his fire.

<sup>p</sup> Maxims, &c. Pref. p. 4, 8.

<sup>q</sup> Mystics are mentioned in this respect afterwards, B. IV. Art. VI. Sect. II. and Art. VII. Sect. III.

<sup>r</sup> See Rimius's Narrative, p. 47, bottom; and p. 82.

in general I fear it is but too true, that those, who give themselves up much to religious passion, are found deficient in that, to which religion is intended to lead us,—purity of manners, approving things excellent, and carefulness in maintaining good works: they pervert the means, so as not to attain the end\*.

The *remedies* of these evils seem rather obvious. —It would be of itself sufficient for those, who have a tendency to mysticism, to consider, that one man, or one Christian, has a right to do what another has; and what would be the consequence of *all* giving themselves up to passive contemplation, indifference, and to an annihilation of all their faculties?—Those, who were not far gone, might profit from *exercise*, of body and mind; and from mixing in active life; from those bodily *hardships*, which give *courage* and vivacity; from those *mental* investigations, and trials of ingenuity, which give *acuteness* and discernment. And such as are too far gone to adopt these remedies, can only be regarded with silent \* pity and benevolence.

In laying out my plan, I mentioned *Lukewarmness* as one of the *faults* of the devout affections; but this I need not dwell upon; in every thing that has been said, it has been implied, that our affections may be too weak as well as too strong; especially in the third Chapter, and the three last sections of the present one.—It need only therefore be

\* I would not say, that Mystics are of course vicious.—The moderate ones with their Disciples to do good offices and works from mystic motives. See Swedenborg, Summary View;—“of Charity and good Works,” p. 85.—but the *tendency* of Mysticism may be here rightly described.—And that tendency may be confirmed by a sufficient number of examples. Even Swedenborg mentioned a *spiritual* life separate from a *moral* life.—See Dialogues concerning him: p. 95. 97:

\* Dr. Balguy, p. 106. and p. 116.

be just mentioned, that there is such a fault as *Lukewarmness*, in order to make our enumeration complete.—There are a set of men in active life, who go to church as a matter of form or decency; to these Bishop *Gibson* addresses the first part of his fourth Pastoral Letter, on *Lukewarmness*.—Though some latitude may be allowed, yet every man should have a religious *principle*, and some degree of religious *affection*: *Fear* of God is the *beginning* of religious wisdom, afterwards it may admit of a greater and greater mixture of *Love*, and *approximate* towards that *perfect* Love, which casteth out *Fear*. The manner of nourishing a passion, externally and internally, has been mentioned; and what encourages one passion, may discourage another. It must be required of every Christian to perform his duties on religious and on *Christian*, as well as on moral principles: “as unto God.” It must be required of him also to “grow in grace, and in the knowledge of his Lord and Saviour as in a state of discipline: this is very different from acquiescing in a mere routine of religious observances. Nevertheless, though a man may in some sense be dissatisfied, he ought not to *neglect* public worship, because he has happened not to relish it for a few times: that would be to say, I will not take the Bark, because I have the Ague.

XII. In the last place, it cannot be conceived, that Religion can go on improving, without some improvements taking place in *discipline* and *ceremonies*.

If any persons were to set themselves on improving *Discipline*, they must pay great attention to particular situations, hereditary notions and prejudices; to the force of habits; to principles of association<sup>u</sup> and sympathy, imitation, love of order, and

<sup>u</sup> Chap. III.

and the fine arts; to the effect of frequent instructions and worship; of acts of penitence and submission; of their gradual increase in severity; to the efficacy of shame in enforcing censures.— They must be well aware of the strength of that mutual affection, which may arise between the Pastor and his flock, and of the benefits resulting from a due regulation of it:—of the utility of uniting many pastors in *council*, for the good of many neighbouring congregations:—they must be able to discern what kind of authority is most likely to be successful in uniting all the congregations in a large district into one: giving power with such provisions and checks, as shall hinder it from being abused.

Those, who should undertake to improve ecclesiastical discipline, must also have clear notions of the difference between a Church considered merely in itself, and a Church connected with a state: one power should govern the former, free from bodily coercion; another the latter, enforced by civil authority in many particulars.

*Ceremonies*<sup>x</sup> may admit of improvement, though there is benefit arising from their being settled, *ceteris paribus*. They are a part of discipline, and therefore what has been just now said on discipline may, in part, be applied to them. Moreover, they should be decent, expressive, plain, with a noble simplicity; graceful, yet modest; mild and reserved, yet capable of producing lively sentiments. *Romish*<sup>y</sup> ceremonies seem to me to want *expression*; though magnificent, they are insipid;—one is most interested in them, when one calculates the expence, which they have occasioned. The ceremonies of the *Quakers* are simple in the extreme;

<sup>x</sup> *Uniformity of Ceremonies*, Chap. IV. Sect. 11.

<sup>y</sup> See Sir Edwin Sandys's *Speculum Europæ*, p. 3. 8. 9.

treme; and those of the *Moravians* excite no idea but of *order*: yet it must be owned, that animation without foppery or ridiculous blundering, is difficult to accomplish. At Torgau<sup>z</sup>, or Gouda, I once saw a funeral-ceremony void of all pathos and solemnity; and the modern *Jews* seem to walk about their synagogue in London, at religious meetings, as if Religion was not at all in their thoughts. Picart's Book of religious ceremonies might afford some hints to promote improvement in that particular.

XIII. Thus have we gone through all the particulars proposed. If they were all put in a right train, they would mutually *assist one another*; and we should, ere long, have arguments which would convince, eloquence which would persuade, music and painting which would charm, forms of devotion which would purify and exalt the soul; we should love God, not only with all our *heart*, or affections, but with all our *mind*, or intellectual faculties.—We should *pray* with the spirit, we should pray with the understanding also: and these things, all together, would generate in the heart principles and motives, which would render us “*steadfast, immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord.*”

<sup>z</sup> June 7, 1771.

## B O O K IV.

## OF PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

## I N T R O D U C T I O N.

I. **I**T seems the best plan, in our circumstances, to treat of the distinguishing doctrines of particular Societies, by considering the *Articles* of our own Church. If we followed a *system*, we should naturally select some doctrines as worthy of peculiar attention; and it is best to select those, with which we are most concerned; these will of course be most interesting, and the more they interest us, the better shall we study and understand them. Whatever has immediate relation to fact, is more lively and striking, than what terminates in mere speculation; and especially if it be foreseen, that we ourselves are likely to be called upon to act in consequence of our reasonings; occasion prompts men to great exertions; while occasion is in view, most men can prevail upon themselves to do much more than they can when it is past.

I should imagine, that the general reasonings, which we have had in the third Book, would have been more tedious, if some application of them to fact did not seem possible while they were going on. They, I should presume, may have a tendency to dissipate groundless scruples and difficulties, as well as to prevent the opposite fault; but a social,  
open,

open, candid inquiry into the Articles themselves, must have that same tendency in a greater *degree*.

The Founder of our Institution wished to have young persons in the University duly prepared for the Ministry; this his general design cannot, I think, be better answered, than by considering attentively those Articles, to which such persons are to give their assent. He has indeed specified some subjects, which he desires to have treated; but they may be all introduced in one part or other of our plan. His intention seems particularly to have been, to have the doctrine of the *Trinity* taught as it is summarily laid down in the Formularies of our Church; and surely that intention cannot be more directly executed, than by reading Lectures on the Articles themselves. I think he had some doubts about some doctrines contained in the Articles; and (as he was not inclined to Popery) I should judge it must be about the Agency of God in promoting the salvation of man; which will include the 13th and 18th Articles, seemingly condemning good men, if not true Christians; but there is no reason to think, he was averse to any doctrines of the Church of England being candidly considered; rather the contrary: there is much greater reason to think, he would wish to have all the Articles discussed, than that he would chuse to leave those, who were designed for the Ministry, prejudiced against them, or mistaking their force, and the nature of the assent to be given to them.

It is not a thing to be neglected, that many are desirous, at this time, to make a *change* in the doctrine of the National Church: some of these are philosophers and scholars; some even Ministers of the Church. Now, whether we suppose them to have reason on their side or not, nothing can be

more reasonable than our design: if their complaints are without foundation, nothing can shew it more clearly; if a change is really wanted, that which is to be altered should be understood before it be altered.—One would not pull down a venerable old house without examining it, and seeing whether a few trifling changes, a little cleaning and lighting, and perhaps pulling down a superfluous room or two, would not make it a much more eligible dwelling than any which would be built according to the new plan. Hitherto, whatever imperfections our doctrines and forms may have, nothing has been *proposed*, which appears to me, on the *whole*, to be worthy to supersede them; or which is likely to be agreed to by those, who are averse to innovations in general, or to the newly proposed schemes in particular. Those, who have proposed change, appear to me far inferior in solidity of judgment to those, who have resisted it:—this is not reasoning, to be sure, but it is natural for me to speak my opinion, when I am explaining my own methods of proceeding; and I do believe, that the most improved *comments* on the Scriptures would rather confirm our Articles than overthrow them.

Bishop Burnet speaks as if a person, who attempted an explanation of our Articles, might be accused of *presumption*.—We see here the good of constituting *Offices!* a man may, without imputation of presumption, do many things in *office* which, as a private individual, he might be blamed for undertaking:—thus the appointment of offices calls forth the services of many, who would be useless, and prevents that modesty, which in reality qualifies a man for an undertaking, from acting as a reason why he should decline it.



II. We determine then on the *Articles*.—The first thing which strikes us is the *number* of them: Bishop *Burnet* gives us some satisfaction on this head:—and *we* may say, that, generally speaking, the more *Articles*, the smaller the number of those, who can unite under them; and yet it seems a right method to unite as many Christians as possible; that is, as many as can go on together in peace, and attain the ends of religious society. Therefore, the first profession attempted should be a short enumeration of those essentials, by which a Christian is distinguished from an Heathen or a Jew; but, if this enumeration is taken in different *senses*, and those who maintain them cannot *unite*, or be silent, they must *separate*<sup>a</sup>; and then, to prevent confusion, and going backwards and forwards without principle, *declarations* must be made to render the separation intelligible, definite, practicable; and all parties quiet; declarations may be repeatedly made in different senses, till it may happen, that one Church may have occasion to distinguish itself from a number of other Churches; this may cause a great variety of articles of faith, none of which could be deemed superfluous. Now I apprehend,

<sup>a</sup> Whenever men have been free from the restraint of a religious establishment, they have broken out into strange notions and fancies, which have prevented their uniting with rational, sober-minded men. This happened particularly on the first publication of Christianity, and at our Reformation. (See *Burnet* *Introd.* 8vo. p. 5.) This makes it very probable, that a very short Creed is not a practicable expedient in the present state of things.—Men deceive themselves by taking for granted, that *Articles* and *Confessions of Faith* were made *before* any religious societies were formed; *voluntarily*, and not of necessity. They might as well take for granted, that *cannons* and *gunpowder* and *weapons* were made before there were any contentions; and then exclaim, what a shame, that implements for the destruction of mankind should be in constant use! no; weapons were invented from time to time as war made them requisite.

apprehend, that it is in this manner that *our* Church comes to have so many.—Some are against one sect, some against another: our Reformers wanted to separate from the Church of *Rome*, and yet to avoid running into any opposite extreme. Now surely, if we had no Articles but what must naturally arise in such a situation, we could not be said to have too many. Let any man then, in going through them, examine, whether this is not the truth. The Church of England has no Articles but such as 1. might seem necessary to make a separation from the Church of *Rome*, and prevent Papists from prevaricating<sup>b</sup>.—2. Such as might seem necessary to hinder the Church from falling into the opposite extreme, of Puritanism.—3. Such as every religionist would require to have settled in one way or other, as being universally objects of *dispute*;—and lastly, such as, when a *Body* of Doctrines or Truths was to be compiled, could not be omitted consistently with such a design.—If this prove to be the truth, our Church seems defensible; and one thing in favour of the notion is, that some Articles, which were made in 1552, were cut off in 1562<sup>c</sup>.

Hence it seems a fallacy, when any person complains, that, in order to be a member of our Church, a man must have thirty-nine difficult metaphysical propositions, each containing<sup>d</sup> many more, to assent to: to any *one man*, a great many articles are not to be reckoned as any thing: what signifies it to a *Puritan*, who abhors every thing which comes at all near Popery, how many Articles our Church has against the Church of *Rome*? It would never burthen his conscience, if every  
Romish

<sup>b</sup> See Book III. Chap. IX. Sect. V. or Burnet, 8vo. p. 5.

<sup>c</sup> III. IX. VII.

<sup>d</sup> Ep. Law's Considerations on Subscriptions, p. 6.

Romish superstition, and every Romish Saint was condemned by a separate Article. The same may be said of the *Socinian*; there are three or four Articles, which relate to him, all the rest he ought to speak of as having no being<sup>e</sup>.

I would not be understood to say, that, if our national Doctrine was to be new-modelled, *all* our present Articles must be retained; that would depend on circumstances: but I believe, that, if our circumstances required thirty-nine, as much as those of our Reformers did in 1562, it would not be right or prudent to have a less number. Bishop *Hurd* in the 11th Sermon of his third Vol. seems inclined to retrench Articles about mysterious or difficult doctrines; and he would *now* be a leading man in any *councils*, in which he would think proper to engage.—I *conjecture*, that, if it were entrusted to *me* to form a new set of Articles, in order to separate the Church of England from all those, which are incapable of carrying on the purposes of religious society with it, I should myself simplify some parts of our present confession; but whether that would be a real improvement, is another question. And that I should do so, can only be matter of *conjecture*, till I fairly discuss the question in my own mind.—So long as our present Articles continue, I must honour them highly, looking back to the times when they were made, whatever might be spared of them in the present times, could men be *unanimous* about them.

III. The next thing to the number of our Articles, is their *worth* or value.—In my own opinion, they are very much *undervalued*; more than  
I can

<sup>e</sup> The Socinians have no objection to excluding Papists: see their Petition to Parliament. Dr. Balguy's 5th Charge. p. 278. 263.—If indeed they had, every Article against Papists would be a burthen to their Consciences.

I can well express. Bishop Burnet says, in one place, “How or by whom they were prepared, we do not certainly know;”—some lines afterwards he says, “they were prepared, as is most probable, by *Cranmer* and *Ridley*;”—“questions were framed relating to them, these were given<sup>f</sup> about to many Bishops and Divines, who gave in their several answers, that were collated and examined very maturely: all sides had a free and fair hearing, before conclusions were made.”—From those, whose works we know, we can judge of the rest: and it seems sufficiently clear, that the persons, who compiled our Articles, were men of the first *ability*:—as *scholars* (if we except a few, though mere linguists ought not to be reckoned) we are mere children to them: the Scriptures they were conversant in to a degree, of which few now have any conception, (so at least I believe:) Ecclesiastical History, of facts and opinions, lay open before them; yet, they were not mere scholars, nor monks, nor monkish men; but skilled in government, knowing men and manners, liberal in behaviour; free from all fanaticism; full of probity, yet guided in their measures by prudence.—Conceive all these roused, animated, by the grandeur and importance of the occasion; all their powers exerted to the utmost, with diligence and ardour, and you will agree, well might Dr. Balguy say, “The age of Ridley, Jewell, and Hooker<sup>g</sup>, will be revered by the latest posterity.”—And of the *Articles* in particular we may say, there is not an Article composed in any

<sup>f</sup> Introduction, p. 6. 8vo.

<sup>g</sup> Charge v. p. 271. Bishop Hurd calls the Reformers “a few divine men,” p. 206, Vol. 3. Ser. 11th. See last Chap. of 2d Book of Bingham’s Apology; and beginning of the 1st Chap. Works, Vol. 2d. p. 723. *Le Moyne*.

any spirit of opposition or contradiction: <sup>h</sup> moderation continually prevailed: indeed it *must* have prevailed; for the end in view was to retain as great a number as possible of the most moderate amongst both Papists and Puritans: and the complaints of both parties prove this: enemies to Calvinism have complained, that our Articles were Calvinistic; but not more strongly than the Calvinists have <sup>i</sup> complained, that they were *not* so. No set of men could be chosen, nor any circumstances, more *likely* to form a good set of Articles. — They would fall short of nothing attainable, through indolence or cowardice; they would set down nothing carelessly, on the presumption of its passing unexamined; they would overshoot nothing, in hopes of catching a few. They had nothing for it but to fix on that, which right reason and good feelings would embrace.

If it be asked, why men do not commonly *esteem* our Articles according to this account? I would answer, perhaps partly because they and the writings of the age are in a language now become <sup>k</sup> *uncouth* and antiquated: but really the chief thing, which hinders us from esteeming them, is our own *ignorance*: Christians are to be united by hitting off a due medium between two opinions, and we are ignorant what the opinions are. And yet we proceed in a petulant manner, reasoning superficially, and despising what we ought to venerate.—Let us then first suspect ourselves; and then, after examination of ourselves, we may freely try *them*. It frequently happens, that we find fault with others, (especially

<sup>h</sup> Fuller's *Moderation of the Church of England*, is worth consulting.

<sup>i</sup> See last Chap. of 2d Book of Bingham's *Apology*. Collier's *Eccles. Hist.* quoted before: viz. Vol. 2. p. 746.

<sup>k</sup> Even Bp. *Law* could fancy there is something ridiculous in "*understanded*."—Subscriptions, p. 6, note.

(especially if they are plain and unassuming) when the fault is only in ourselves.

Yet, after all, the compilers of our Articles, and the authors of the Reformation, were but *men*; and, if they had imperfections, absolute or relative, we ought not to shut our eyes against them. Their relative imperfections will arise from *improvements* made since their time: in what then are we improved?—Perhaps we cannot say, that any *one man* now is a better Divine than one man then, upon the whole; but we may say, that improvements have been made in some particular criticisms and expositions<sup>1</sup>: though possibly such men as the Reformers might have made as great, at least, in the same time.—Whether improvements have been made in Logic, or even in Mathematics, as far as relates to theological reasoning, I doubt; but *mortality* has been improved (and would be much more so, if we had Dr. Balguy's explanation of his Heads of Moral Lectures), and natural<sup>m</sup> religion, and metaphysics<sup>n</sup>:—It may be worth adding, as a thing greatly affecting Religion, that we are much improved in seeing, conceiving, and allowing the rights of *toleration*: and in the whole matter of uniting civil power with ecclesiastical; the more I see of the controversies about the King being head of the Church, the independency of the Church, &c. the more I am convinced of the worth and excellency of Bishop Warburton's Alliance of Church and State.—I think also, that we are improved, with respect to *Superstition* and *Enthusiasm*; for, though we have many, who run into those faults, they are not persons of much eminence.—The abolition of the Law against *witches* is one good

<sup>1</sup> By Locke, Taylor, &c. and in many Sermons.

<sup>m</sup> By Clarke, Boyle, Ray, Derham, Balguy.

<sup>n</sup> By Locke.

good proof of this. The *proofs* also of the truth of Christianity are improved by controversy with *Deists*; but then Articles are not aimed at either *Deists* or *Atheists*.

Dr. *Balguy* seems<sup>o</sup> to hint at some *ambiguities* and *inaccuracies* in our Articles; and to insinuate, that some things are *unphilosophical* in them; and that some things may *mislead*, or draw men into erroneous opinions: I do not at present recollect instances, but we must keep this in mind as we go along.

IV. Our next business may be to see how we can ascertain, or approach to, the *primitive sense* of our Articles.—This must be done, by putting ourselves in the place of those, who compiled them: History only can<sup>p</sup> place us in past ages; in short, we may say, that we should study the History of the Reformation.—This would inform us how doctrines were gradually propagated.—We have a Book<sup>q</sup>, printed in 1543, called “*a necessary doctrine*,” &c.<sup>r</sup> which, though it has many doctrines of the Church of Rome in it, was intended to instruct the *people*, was in the vulgar tongue, and was chiefly prepared by Archbishop *Cranmer*<sup>s</sup>: some judgment may be formed from this, early as it was; in some points, a *good* judgment.—In 1549, an Act of Parliament passed for the King (Edward VI.) to impower, for three years, thirty-two persons, half clergy, half laity, to reform the ecclesiastical Laws of England: their laws are in being, though

<sup>o</sup> P. 293.      <sup>p</sup> B. III. Chap. IX.

<sup>q</sup> For an account of Books published by Authority at this time, see Fuller's Church History; particularly the 7th Book: that Book is on the reign of Edw. VI.

<sup>r</sup> Burnet, p. 6. 8vo.

<sup>s</sup> Heylin, Hist. Quinqu. 2. 8. Hen. VIII. said it was Cranmer's own Book. Burnet's Records, Vol. 2. p. 238. quoted in Diss. on 17th Art. p. 32.

though never enforced, and make a Book entitled *Reformatio Legum*; from which the mind of the Reformers may be seen in several doctrines; the commission is dated two years after the Act, and one before King Edward's Articles<sup>t</sup>.

As our Articles were taken in part from the confession of *Augsburg*, and as that was composed by *Melancthon*, we might clear up in some points the primitive sense of our Articles, if we consulted either that confession, or the writings of that Divine.—*Erasmus* was Professor in the University of Cambridge; and his *Paraphrase* on the Gospels was placed<sup>u</sup> in the English Churches at the time of the Reformation; that therefore must have expressed the mind of the Reformers. And their meaning is partly to be collected from some of their own writings, and from their *Lives*: some of which are written by *Strype*<sup>x</sup>; all to be found in the *Biographia Britannica*. I speak particularly of Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, Hooper, and Jewell.

The *Homilies* must, of course, shew the meaning of the Reformers; the *second* book of which, published 1560, is said to have been written chiefly by Jewell:—the first book, published in 1547 (1st Edward vi.) was written chiefly by Cranmer, assisted probably by several persons commissioned for that purpose: Latimer is thought likely. There is a *Life* of Ridley, by Mr. Gloucester Ridley<sup>y</sup> in Quarto;—and Heylin's *Historia Quinquarticularis*, Part 2. Chap. 8. is well worth consulting: as is the

<sup>t</sup> One might compare that part of the *Reformatio Legum*, which is called the *Epilogus* to the Chapter *de Hæresibus*, with what comes before it in the Volume.

<sup>u</sup> See Ed. vi. Injunctions; in Sparrow's Collection, or Fuller's History.

<sup>x</sup> Fox's Acts and Monuments, has some Disputations, &c. in which opinions and proofs appear.

<sup>y</sup> See particularly, Book v. Sect. vii.



the Introduction to his *Life of Laud* (Cyprianus Anglicus.)<sup>z</sup>

I think it is not to be conceived, that the primitive sense of any expression is always one *single* sense; the Reformers very probably left some expressions open, to be taken in some few different senses<sup>a</sup>: so that proving, that a certain sense may be called the primitive sense, is not proving that another cannot be called so. And a distinction is to be made in some points, between the first Reformers and those in the latter end of Elizabeth, &c.<sup>b</sup>: in Mary's reign, as was observed before, the English refugees imbibed *Calvinism* abroad<sup>c</sup>. A distinction is also to be made between the primitive and the *literal* sense: they may coincide at first, because allusions are then adopted intuitively; but, after a length of time, they will differ, because allusions will then be lost<sup>d</sup>.

The *Original* of our Articles perished in the fire of London, but there are copies, manuscript and printed; in these are some *various readings*, but not any of consequence. If the original had been preserved, only one reading could have been right, now different readings may contend:—but the case is

<sup>z</sup> There is a Latin book, published in Quarto at London in 1617, called *Doctrina et Politia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*, &c. containing Jewel's Apology, two Catechisms, in Latin, our common one and a fuller, the common prayers, &c. which mentions, in the title of the 39 Articles, the Heretics, against which they were made: Sabellians, Manicheans, Arians, Tritheists, Macedonians, Ebionites, Nestorians, Eutychians, Novatians, Donatists, Pelagians, Semipelagians, Papists, Servetians, Anabaptists, and others.

<sup>a</sup> See Powell, Disc. 2. p. 36. and Nicholls on the *Title* of the Articles.

<sup>b</sup> See Oxf. Pamph. on 17th Art. p. 1. and 79. Bishop Hurd seems to make this distinction, Vol. iii. Ser. xi. p. 206, 207.

<sup>c</sup> Book III. Chap. VIII. Sect. v.

<sup>d</sup> See before, Book III. Chap. VI. Sect. 1.—And : III. IX. 1.

is the same with the sacred writings themselves. *Bennet's* collation of the various readings will be mentioned by and by.

v. No person will think of reading the Articles carefully without paying some attention to the *Injunction* or *declaration* which is prefixed to them. But I have <sup>e</sup> already said enough of this.

vi. I will now mention a few *writers* on our Articles.—There are more than I have seen, or than I can now remember by name. *At first*, the Articles wanted but little explanation; the chief thing they wanted was Scriptural *proof*: what opinions and practices they meant to refer to, was, I imagine, generally known. The most complete *collation* of different copies, which I have seen, is in *Bennet's Essay*; he has also given a good History of their *formation*, and some remarks on the nature of the *assent* given to them. *Bennet's Essay* is to be distinguished from his *Directions* for studying the Articles; in this last, he refers to *the* confutation of Popery, &c.—meaning *his own*.—Anthony *Collins* Esq. the Freethinker, seems to have written something upon the Articles; against them probably; but I have not been able to meet with it.—I have an exposition by *Veneer*, one by *Rogers*, a very small one by *Ellis*, proposing and briefly solving some objections: *Welchman* is in every one's hands. *Rogers* gives *historical* hints, which may be pursued.—*Dr. Nicholls*, at the beginning of his Book on the Common Prayer, has explained the first fourteen Articles, and in some respects very successfully. *Bingham*, about the *French* Protestant Church, may be read with satisfaction, as to those things which relate to Protestant *Dissenters*<sup>f</sup>.

Dr.

<sup>e</sup> Book III. Chap. VII. Sect. v.—And III. IX. I.

<sup>f</sup> This is published separate.

Dr. John *Burges* may be considered as a writer on those Articles, about which he expressed his doubts to the Heads of the Church. And his remarks are worth reading.

Information may be derived from *Neal's* History of the Puritans<sup>g</sup>, only allowance must be made for his prejudices in favour of those people, of which he himself was one.

This list may perhaps hereafter be enlarged; I mean of the writers on the Articles *known to me*<sup>h</sup>.

I will conclude with the mention of Bishop *Burnet*. I have not lately read his work on the Articles, but it seems the most esteemed of any. He must have been possessed of <sup>k</sup> matter for a very masterly exposition; and, I should think, with his theological and historical knowledge, he might have put his readers more *in the place* of the Compilers than he has done. Probably, though our religion has always had its opposers, he was not so much pressed as we are now. He professes<sup>l</sup> to be a collector; and, in truth, it seems as if he might sometimes have made a little philosophical reasoning of great service: those, who prepared the Articles, might not reason in form; but they reasoned *nicely*, though silently; and some metaphysics, well applied, would bring our minds nearer to the state of theirs<sup>m</sup>.—His reading was judicious and extensive;

<sup>g</sup> In Grey's Notes on Hudibras, an Answer to Neal is often referred to.

<sup>h</sup> I have seen other writings on the Articles mentioned in the Catalogues of Booksellers, but I have neglected, I perceive, to enter them here.

<sup>i</sup> Scotch—died 1715.

<sup>k</sup> See his Preface <sup>l</sup> Pref. p. xv.

<sup>m</sup> I reasoned simply, from the nature of things, on the subjects of voluntary actions, and predestination, and I think my reasonings have developed some thoughts and ideas, which were in the *minds* of the Reformers, though not drawn out into *form*.

five; but, when he got into the mazes of different opinions, he seems to have wanted a *clue*.—But I will read his work again;—certainly our Church is much obliged to him;—nevertheless, a work much inferior might be useful, after a change of circumstances.

VII. After what has been said, in the ninth Chapter of the third Book (at the close of the first Section), on the use of *History* in clearing up the obscurity of any expressions in our Articles, by shewing us the *views* of those who compiled them, and the *circumstances* to which they meant to refer, it will not seem strange, if I endeavour to open the subject of each Article by some historical remarks. Nothing, I am persuaded, can be more effectual in taking off any apparent uncouthness, or in making the reasonings, which follow, appear interesting and important. Yet, before such reasonings occur, it will generally be found needful to give an *explanation* of some expressions, though even explanation must be in a good measure historical. Thus prepared, we may come to a *proof* of the truth of the several propositions contained in each Article: but, as a long time has elapsed since the last publication of our Articles, and as many changes have taken place, both in men's notions and situations, it will be satisfactory to compare the age of the Reformation with our own; and so to make an *application* of what may have been said, to the present state of things.—Of what parts such application should consist, will best appear when we first come to make one.—In some Articles, which now seem to us of but secondary importance, this method may not be constantly observed in all its strictness.

In this fourth Book, every *Article* may be conceived to make a *Chapter*.

## ARTICLE I.

## OF FAITH IN THE HOLY TRINITY.

**T**HERE is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the maker and preserver of all things, both visible and invisible. And in unity of this Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.



I cannot enter upon such a work as the consideration of the Articles of our Church, without some expressions of diffidence; nor without claiming a right to retract any opinion, which improvement in reasoning and knowledge may, at any time, shew me is groundless. Let not this be deemed affectation; it would really be *painful* to me not to indulge myself in some such declaration; and indeed it is only saying, now we enter on our present subject, what was said on the first entrance on our whole plan<sup>a</sup>.—It is only expressing a temper, which has been recommended as always proper in the discussion of doctrines above human comprehension<sup>b</sup>.—It has indeed seldom *happened* to me to retract an opinion; which I impute to reasoning with simplicity, and endeavouring not to deceive myself, in order to defend any received or established Doctrine.

The

<sup>a</sup> B. I. Chap. I. Sect. VI.    <sup>b</sup> B. III. Chap. x. Sect. xv.

The principal thing, in which I feel myself (and every one must feel himself) deficient, is *History*; indeed, I do not see how any one can ever attain such a knowledge in History, as might be wished: or such as has before been briefly described; of facts, opinions, passions.—Yet it is History, which is to give us, as was very lately observed, the design of each Article; and the particular expressions are to be interpreted by the design, as a statute by its preamble.—Bishop Burnet, in treating on our first Article, enters into discussions of *natural* religion; they seem to me unseasonable; though nothing can be more valuable than good discussions on that subject. Articles of Faith must turn on interpretations of *Scripture*. The Unity of God is indeed to be proved, because it makes a part of the Doctrine of the Trinity; but on principles of revealed religion.—The design of the first Article is, to guard against all errors and heresies of *Christians*, with regard to the Holy Trinity; as the title sufficiently declares.

1. I am now therefore to enter on the difficult subject of the *History* of the Doctrine of the *Holy Trinity*.—And here it seems proper first to say something of some notions, which have been ascribed to *Heathens*, in a degree resembling ours.—Mr. *Voltaire* mentions as what have been, in some sort, three Deities in one, *Jupiter, Neptune, Pluto*: and again, *Isis, Osiris, Horus*:—and, *Birma, Brama, Vishnou*. I think it is said, that Servetus compared our Trinity to *Geryon*<sup>c</sup>.—Dr. *Potter* observes, that *three*<sup>d</sup> was a sacred number.

These

<sup>c</sup> For *Geryon*, see Spence's *Polymetis*, the ninth of Hercules's Labours, and the 16th Dialogue, about the Lower World. In that Dialogue, are several instances of Triads, p. 272: (see also p. 284): or abridgment, p. 175. *Cerberus* (Spence) represented

<sup>d</sup> Potter's *Antiquities*, 1. 358.

These it may not be worth while to dwell upon; *Jupiter* seems to have been God of all *above* the surface of the Earth, *Neptune* of the Sea, *Pluto* of all *under* the earth; but their *unity* does not appear to have been insisted on.—The notions of *Plato* seem to approach nearer ours, and, on other accounts, to be better worth considering.—Bishop *Horsley* recommends<sup>e</sup> the study of his works.—*Heathens*, *Jews*, and *Christians* have highly extolled him.—Cicero de Naturâ Deorum<sup>f</sup> seems to speak only a general opinion, when he calls him “quendam Deum philosophorum.” The *Jews* are said to have studied and imitated him; particularly Philo<sup>g</sup>. Many eminent *Christians* have admired and commended him.—Allix<sup>h</sup> says, on account of his *morals*; but Jerom and Augustin speak more with relation to his reasoning and doctrines: Jerom says, that he is, “divinum<sup>i</sup>, profundum, nec a juvenilibus intelligi posse.” Augustin seems to declare, that he himself should not (when he left the Manicheans) have professed the Divinity of the Logos, and that the word was really made flesh, if he had not read the *Platonists*; this he says in his *Confessions*<sup>k</sup>, which seem to be a sort of continued prayer; ascribing his meeting with them to the Divine Providence.—“Et primo (tu) volens ostendere mihi,—quòd Verbum tuum caro factum est, et habitavit inter homines, procurasti mihi, per quemdam

past, present, and future; Spence says, in Pref. that the Romans had *three* principal Deities. There is a *Diana Triformis*; Abr. of Spence, p. 37.—Horace (Od. ii. xiv.) calls Geryon *ter amplus*. Virgil has *tergeminus*.

<sup>e</sup> In his Charge. <sup>f</sup> Lib. ii. Cap. xii.

<sup>g</sup> See afterwards Sect, 111. Note about Numenius.

<sup>h</sup> P. 355. Chap. xxiii. of his *Jews* against Unitarians.

<sup>i</sup> Ad Jovin. (quoted by Vossius, about Plato.)

<sup>k</sup> Confess. 7. 9. 13, 14. and 8. 2. 3. quoted Lard. Works, Vol. iii. p. 541.

quendam hominem,——Platoniorum libros ex Græcâ linguâ in Latinam versos. Et ibi legi, non quidem his verbis, sed hoc idem omninò multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quòd in principio erat Verbum," &c.—It is observed, that *Chrysoſtom* speaks as much *against* Plato as *Augustin* for him: *Dacier* solves the difficulty by saying, that *Augustin*, &c. commend the *doctrines* of Plato, as *leading* to Christianity, and *preparing* the mind for it: and *Chrysoſtom*, &c. reprobate the *morals* of Plato; not as being bad, but as claiming to equal the morals of Christianity, and render Christianity needless.—(Dac. disc. on Plato, p. 13. English.)—*Dacier* observes, that, when the Jewish *Prophets* ceased, Plato arose. To what height some persons have carried their notions of him, one may see in *Dacier's* account of *Martilius Ficinus*; (Engl. p. 159, also p. 141, about *Augustin*, &c.) where *Dacier* disclaims Plato's foretelling the sufferings of Christ. (p. 5. and 6.)—I doubt not but there are very noble doctrines in Plato, and fine and charming sentiments; but these are scattered, dispersed; and mixed with many things strange (if not immoral, p. 51. 52. *Dacier*), fanciful, unintelligible: so that very different sorts of men might be Platonists, as they took their notions and feelings from the better or worse parts of Plato's writings.—*Cicero*, Mr. *Gibbon* observes, did not, in his *Book de Naturâ Deorum*, take notice of any Platonic Trinity. He might consider the idea as too indefinite, and rank it amongst the Platonic unintelligibles. (Plato *designedly* obscure, Dac. p. 72. 140. and *Warb. Div. Leg.*)

Some<sup>1</sup> Infidels have affected to call all Christians *Platonists*; as if they had no doctrines, or but few, relating

<sup>1</sup> *Voltaire*, Quarto, Vols 24. 26. 27. See Contents. From whom Mr. *Gibbon*: seems to take his opinion, Vol. ii. 4to. p. 237, &c.



relating to the nature of God, except what they had derived from *Plato*:—of this we shall take no farther notice at present than to observe, that the mere *charge* must make the knowledge of *Plato's* notions interesting to the learned Christian.

I will now mention a *few Trinities* such as Mr. Voltaire takes, as I remember, from *Plato's Timæus* chiefly, and from his other works; *Parmenides*; *Epinomis*:—If I wished to make any nice deductions from them, I should certainly refer you to the original; but that would detain us a longer time, without making us amends.

Unbegotten<sup>m</sup>, *αυτο αγαθου*—first understanding—first Life.

First cause—Reason—animal life or Spirit.

Plan (*Voltaire's* Interpretation) — execution — animation.

*Λογος ενδιχθεις*<sup>n</sup>—Word internal—*Λογος προφορικος*.  
—Word external,—World, or Spirit of World.

God—Word—World.

Power—Wisdom—Goodness.

Indivisible—Divisible—both Indivisible and Divisible.

Demiurge—Idée Archetype—Universal Mind.

This serves to shew in what manner *Plato* runs into *Triads*; his *ear*, or his *fancy*, not his reason, I should think, led him into these<sup>o</sup>.—There is

more

<sup>m</sup> Pope has, First good, first perfect, and first fair,—or something near that. And there is something to the present purpose, *Dacier*, p. 140—The Christian Fathers believed, that *Plato* had an idea of the Trinity, p. 141.

N. B. Our references to *Dacier*, are to his accounts of *Plato*, prefixed to his Translation of some select Dialogues into French: the *pages* may be those of an *English* Translation from his French.

<sup>n</sup> See *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 81. Oxon. 1684.

<sup>o</sup> *Epiphanius* treats the ancient *Heathen Sects* of Philosophers as so many *heresies*; at the beginning of his *Book of Heresies*. In speaking of *Plato*, he says, that he held a first *αριστον*, a second, and a third.

more foundation in reason, in his Triad relating to the *Mind*: according to Cicero<sup>p</sup>,

Ratio,—Ira,—Cupiditas.

But his ear and fancy are very much guided by *numbers*, as any one may see in his *Timæus*<sup>q</sup>; or in *Diogenes Laertius*.

As I mean to avoid controversy with regard to Plato, on his very indefinite notions about the Deity, I will only farther mention a few things, which seem to have been in a great measure, if not wholly, agreed upon.

It seems agreed, that Plato (of Athens, about 430 years before Christ), when he professed but *one God*, has spoken of him making use of the number *three*<sup>r</sup>.

It seems also agreed, that this notion of a Triad in the Divinity was *not his own* originally; but from whom he derived it, is disputed. Infidels say, from <sup>s</sup> *Timæus*, who might derive it from Orpheus: the orthodox say, from the *Jews*; either immediately, or through the medium of Pythagoras and Parmenides<sup>t</sup>: some include *Pherecydes*.

It seems also agreed, that Plato had not *distinct* ideas, or a fixed system, on this matter.—“De Platonis inconstantia longum est dicere.”—His imagination seems to have been rich, and his feelings

<sup>p</sup> Tusc. Disp. 1. 10. Smith's Theory of moral Sentiments has, I think, something to the purpose. Dacier, p. 121.

<sup>q</sup> Numerum quinarium compositioni animæ convenire, tribus de causis, arbitramur. Ficini compendium in *Timæum*. c. 27. See *Plutarch* de procreatione animæ, ex Platonis *Timæo*; and Dacier, p. 103.

<sup>r</sup> Many Authors might be consulted on Plato: as *Diogenes Laertius*, *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrius*, *Proclus*, *John Baptist Crispus*, *Cudworth*, *Brucker*.

<sup>s</sup> See *Voltaire*, Vol. xiv. Quarto. and *Gibbon*, Vol. ii. p. 243. quarto.

<sup>t</sup> See *Lardner's Tests*. under *Numenius*; (a Syrian, not probably before Christ); or *Lard. Works*, Vol. viii. p. 168.

<sup>u</sup> Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 12.

ings warm, which must have greatly affected his disquisitions on mysterious and sublime subjects. Any one may say this, and yet admire his Apology of Socrates;—as any one may neglect the natural philosophy of Aristotle, and yet admire his Poetics and Rhetoric.

I can conceive, that it must have been a delightful thing to have *lived* with this Philosopher; (Plato), the friend and disciple of Socrates; so earnest in his researches after knowledge, so sweetly chearful, so warmly benevolent; so enriched with ideal beauty, so strong and powerful in reasoning!

II. We will now pass on to notions ascribed to *Jews*. The word *Elohim*, or *Aleim*, having a plural termination, and being used with a verb *singular*<sup>x</sup>, has been<sup>y</sup> thought to denote some kind of plurality in the *Unity* of God. And the *Cherubin*<sup>z</sup> overshadowing the Ark, have been thought symbols of the Trinity. Moreover, it has been ably argued, “that the Jews *before Christ’s time*”, according to the received expositions of the Old Testament, derived from their Fathers, had a notion of a plurality of persons in the unity of the Divine Essence; and that this plurality was a Trinity.”—The old Jewish Books or writings adduced, as containing the received sense, or as proving what it was, are some of our Apocryphal Books, the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, &c. the Chaldee paraphrases, and the writings<sup>b</sup> of Philo.

I would

<sup>x</sup> Like *means* in English.

<sup>y</sup> See Allix’s *Jews against Unitarians*, p. 116. or Chap. ix.

<sup>z</sup> Parkhurst, כַּרְבִּי— and אֱלֹהִים—Lex. Buxt. 12mo. p. 159. Some one refers to Le Clerc’s *Ars Critica*, p. 150—156.

<sup>a</sup> Allix, Chap. 1. p. 6.

<sup>b</sup> Philo has a sort of Trinity near the beginning of his work about *Names*, which he compares with the three *Patriarchs*, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;—this cannot have been the idea, or at least not the comparison, of Plato. Ὁ θεὸς τῶν τριῶν φύσεων, διδασκαλίας, ὁσιότητος, ἀσκησεως.

I would here also avoid controversy if possible, as carrying us too much out of our way; therefore I will suppose, that grammatical criticism leaves it in doubt, whether the *words* of the Hebrew Language do clearly imply a Trinity in the Unity; yet I would be permitted to observe, that there is *a something* in the Old Testament, rather varying from the grand fundamental peculiarity of the Mosaic religion, the *Unity of God*;—and that *obscure* notices are suitable to the nature and genius of a preparatory dispensation; and therefore, that there might be an obscure intimation of a Trinity. The coming of the Messiah is not the less certainly foretold, because it was at first foretold obscurely:—how common it is to have the name of the Supreme Deity a plural, the linguist must determine:—as the general end of the religion of Moses was to separate the chosen race from *Polytheists*, the teachers of it must have had some particular end in view, in not always using those names of God, which were of the singular number.

III. Having then taken some notice of notions of a Trinity ascribed to Heathens and Jews, I come to the *Christian* doctrine. The question here is, whether the Christian doctrine is an *original* one, or *borrowed* from the Platonists in *Ægypt*?—What Mr. Gibbon says, may seem to come too near the subject of the second Article to be dwelt on here; but yet his main point is ‘the Trinity: This question an infidel would answer one way, a believer another. An Infidel would say, the doctrine is *borrowed*; St. John was conversant in Platonic writings, adopted Platonic notions, with the term Logos, and applied them to Christ: nor does it avail to urge, that he was conversant only in *Jewish* writings; for those old Jewish writings, which we call

call Apocryphal, and the Paraphrases of the Old Testament, were all formed (says the Infidel) in the Platonic<sup>d</sup> school of Alexandria; and that is also the source of the notions and language of *Philo*. On the contrary, a believer would say, the Christian doctrine is not borrowed from any school whatever; it is *revealed*, and cannot be called the less original for having been obscurely intimated under the Mosaic dispensation, whether by the construction of *words*, or by *tradition*, partly written, partly oral. It is not probable, that St. John<sup>e</sup>, a Fisherman, read Plato or his followers; or that he read even *Philo*: the term he uses, *Logos*, was in common use amongst<sup>f</sup> his countrymen; and, though it was to be found in some writings, which might have been composed since the time of Plato, yet it was used by Jews, before Plato was born<sup>g</sup>.

Here a Traffic between *Judaism* and *Platonism* is acknowledged on both hands; and the only question is, which was the *lender*, and which was the *borrower*?—perhaps, on such a question, the proofs being at a great distance, each side will retain its

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<sup>d</sup> Gibbon, Vol. ii. Quarto, p. 238.

<sup>e</sup> This is an argument in the character of an *Orthodox*; as to possibility, one does not see why one, who could write such an History as St. John's Gospel, in Greek, might not *possibly* read Platonic writers, or even Plato himself, in the original; or *Philo*; but we should consider, whether leisure would allow it; or circumstances made it probable:—John was a young man, engaged in a constant occupation; of an incurious country; rather likely to despise heathens, than read them; he knew Greek as a general language, but he was no Hellenist: nor ever lived near Alexandria.

<sup>f</sup> Tillotson on John i. 14.

<sup>g</sup> I *suppose* our present Chaldee paraphrases may not be much older than Christ; but then they are looked upon as expressing *traditional* ideas of very remote antiquity; ideas at least as old as the return from Chaldea: under Nehemiah: about 350 A. Chr. see Allix. Chap. ii. p. 27. Plato died 348 before Christ. æt. 81. — Blair.

own opinion; yet it may be worth a few words to state the ground of ours.—That St. John got his notions *immediately* from *Jews*, and Jewish writers, and Chaldee paraphrases, will scarcely, I think, be disputed: the question will be, whence did *Jewish writers* get their notions? We say, that Plato most probably borrowed from <sup>h</sup> the Jews: waving particular *passages*, it seems best to observe, that this is more *likely* than that the Jews should borrow any of their more important doctrines from Plato:

1. Because Judaism had been established above a thousand years before Plato lived.
2. Because Judaism was a *national* religion, Plato's only what may be called a *personal* one; it is more likely, that a private man should hear of and adopt the religion of a nation, than that a nation should hear of and adopt the tenets of an individual.
3. Plato was curious and inquisitive after different religions; the Jews were incurious. He travelled into Ægypt on purpose to study religion; to such an inquirer, Judaism must have been always within reach in Ægypt.—He travelled into Italy; and where the Pythagorean doctrines were so well known as they were in Magna Grecia, the Jewish would not probably be wholly unknown.
4. It is allowable to say, that, supposing any one con-

vinced

<sup>h</sup> Dacier's Plato, Engl. p. 7. 8. 34. 72. 83. 94. (called Ægyptian) 100. 123. (woman made out of man) 141. 142, &c. 146. Pherecydes and his scholar Pythagoras mentioned as bringing wisdom into Greece from the East, and from Ægypt; p. 67. Pherecydes a Syrian; Pythagoras's country uncertain.

Here might be placed Numenius's observation, Τι γαρ εστὶ Πλάταν ἢ Μωσῆς ἀπτικίζαν; "What is Plato but Moses in Greek?" Numenius was a Pythagorean Philosopher: time uncertain: he might live before Christ.—See Lard. Test. Chap. xxxv. (Works, Vol. viii. p. 168.) called by Porphyry a *Platonic*, Philosopher:—he used writings of Moses and the Prophets, and allegorized some of them; as seems clear from Origen. Ibid.

vinced of the divine origin of the Religion of Moses, such an one could not think that religion the borrower, in any thing *fundamental*; and, if ever religion could prove *itself* divine, by its mere subsistence, the Jewish did<sup>i</sup>; a spiritual religion single in the midst of idolatries;—a religion founded on the unity of God, surrounded on all sides by various species of polytheism; its professors no higher in philosophy or arts, than their neighbours:—*all Jews and Christians* therefore must believe, that revealed Religion did not borrow its doctrine of a Trinity from Heathenism; and every proof of the truth of the Mosaic or Christian Religion, must operate as an argument on our side of the present question. But this is not the *place* for proving the truth of the Mosaic religion:—let us rather then observe, that, to require us to prove *how* Plato borrowed of the Hebrews, is unfair; he might, and yet it might be impossible for us to tell how, at this time. Neither is it at all likely, that we should be able to ascertain the manner, in which different religions in remote times *mixed* together; we do not say, Plato was a Jew, or adopted the Mosaic religion systematically: we only say, he borrowed from that as well as other religions: but we do not pretend to point out the particular manner, in which the *Ægyptian* and Oriental philosophy, the tenets of Pythagoras and Plato, derived perhaps from Timæus, Parmenides, Pherecydes, and one knows not how many more, mixed themselves in *Ægypt*<sup>k</sup>:—an ingredient, more or less, might make a great difference; and each ingredient

<sup>i</sup> Something of this we had occasion to produce before. B. I. Chap. XVI. Sect. VIII.

<sup>k</sup> That the *Ægyptian* and Oriental philosophy were much the same, was observed in the Appendix to the first Book. Sect. XII.

dient might be infused in a great variety of proportions: Religious<sup>1</sup> tenets, and so also political opinions, get mixed and blended together before our eyes, in modern life, till we can analyse none of them exactly.—Nevertheless, we may conceive, that, if the Jews, in Ægypt, or elsewhere, found that Plato, or his followers, admired, imitated, or in any part adopted their religion, they would be much inclined to favour his:—and his religion is of so noble and captivating a nature, as to tempt both Jews and Christians, of more lively imaginations and warm affections, to *mix* its tenets with their own.

The conclusion seems to be, that we may venture to proceed in our old path; and look upon Plato as having borrowed from Judaism, or, at least, on Judaism and Christianity as not having borrowed from Plato, though Jews and Christians have *mixed* some degree of Platonism with Judaism and Christianity. And this method of regarding the subject must make us consider our own doctrine of the Trinity as coming immediately *from Heaven*.

We may well claim it as our own, on the footing of its being a single one, and of a determinate sort; Plato was aiming at something<sup>m</sup>, he knew not what; and made a *number* of different Trinities, as his ear or fancy led him; and, if we had followed the ear, or the imagination, we also should have had a *multitude* of Trinities; but ours is one, and only one.—His were formed out of his imagination, ours arises out of the *nature of the thing*,  
according

<sup>1</sup> The Dissenters in England, popularly so called, have run through a great many variations in opinion: the expression “carried about by every *wind* of Doctrine,” implies such unsteadiness.

<sup>m</sup> Dacier’s Discourse on Plato, p. 9. expresses this prettily, relative to his aiming at something indistinctly.



according to principles of reason and *utility*. God would instruct and protect mankind, in their religious capacities; who are to appear as principals in such an undertaking?—First, he who is the *fountain* of all good; next, that personage whom he commissions as actual *instructor*, who is to be of the *same species* with those he instructs; and lastly, a *perpetual agent*, who is to promote with constant assiduity the proper effects, the success of the instruction: the *Sovereign*, the *Instructor*, and the *Resident*, are the persons to be chiefly distinguished, according to all the dictates of *common sense*, whether their number pleased the ear, as a Triad, or not<sup>n</sup>.

We have given into an argument relating only to St. *John*, as if he alone laid down the doctrine of the Trinity; as a *Trinity*, the other evangelists lay it down equally, and indeed proofs of the *Divinity* of the several persons are taken from St. Paul more than from St. John.—But, while we are only comparing the Christian with Heathen notions, the Divinity of the Persons does not seem to make a part of our considerations.—Yet the Divinity of the several persons is a principal matter in the Christian Religion, and that is signified in many parts of Scripture which, taken separately, give no idea of a Trinity.

IV. We now come to the inquiry, whether in any sense it may be asserted, that the doctrine of the

<sup>n</sup> Suppose a Sovereign wanted to civilize a newly discovered Island, would not these characters or persons be natural? and supposing it practicable, not hindered by the perverseness and wickedness of man, for the *Son* of the Sovereign to go to the Island and make one with the Islanders, would not that be best? and every *resident* or vicegerent, though a common man, is *conceived* as constantly communicating with both Sovereign and subjects.

the Holy Trinity did not exist till the *fourth century*?—There can be no doubt but that, if we waive the dignity of the Persons, who composed the Trinity, and only speak of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as making a Triad, without considering them as in the *Unity* of the Godhead, there *was* a Trinity from the *earliest* times of Christianity. In the New Testament, these three are introduced jointly *forty-eight* times, according to Dr. Samuel Clarke's enumeration. And it does seem, that the word *Trinity* was at first used for mere convenience, to avoid a repetition of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; as the word *Triumvirate* was used to avoid the repetition of Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus; or of Octavius, Anthony, and Lepidus.—The very early use of *Doxologies* confirms this, as well as the form of *Baptism*. Our question properly is, whether, before the fourth Century, the *Divinity* of the Son and Holy Ghost was acknowledged in that distinct and full manner, in which it is now acknowledged; and whether the Divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, was publicly, distinctly, and expressly *recognized*, and combined with the *Unity* of the Godhead, in the same manner, in which it is at present?

When I *first* ° read Lectures upon this Article, it appeared to me, that the Doctrine of the Trinity had scarcely reached such maturity, and got such general establishment in the Church, before the fourth Century: but a controversy between Dr. Priestley and some eminent persons of our Church, on the antiquity of Doctrines by which the Socinians are distinguished from us, occasioned some dissidence: I read some parts of it; but not the whole, so as to form a judgment of every argument made use of; however, I attended the more carefully

carefully to the expressions made use of by such *ancient* Christian writers as fell in my way. If my principal business was now merely that of an Historian, I should consider the controversy more exactly; at present I can only say, that I do not seem to have changed my opinion in any great degree; if at all.

My general idea was, that the early Christians took words and phrases of Scripture, and, by the guidance of good feelings and plain sense, used them in right circumstances, without forming speculative propositions out of them, or combining them into systems, or even syllogisms. They might therefore, *in some sense*, be said to *know* the doctrines, and profess them; but, in some sense, they might be said not yet to have moulded them into perfect *form*. I conceived, that *controversy* during the first three centuries had been the occasion of their being examined with a view to *speculative* truth; of *errors* being rejected one after another, till perfect orthodoxy had at length been *ascertained*.

Being not free from doubt about a thing so little admitting of precision, I was glad to meet with a passage from Augustin, (born about the middle of the fourth Century) which seemed to express my own opinion. “*Multa latebant in Scripturis, et cum præcisi essent (excommunicated) Hæretici, quæstionibus agitaverunt Ecclesiam Dei. Aperta sunt quæ latebant, et intellecta est voluntas Dei. Numquid enim perfectè de TRINITATE tractatum est antequam oblatrarent Ariani? Numquid perfectè de Penitentia tractatum est antequam obfisterent*

<sup>P</sup> Tertullian seems to have disputed with the *Unitarians* (Praxeas, &c.) properly about the *Trinity*; but this was *controversy*; and then Aug. says, *numquid perfectè?* Aug. must have known all Tertullian's writings: both Africans.

rent Novatiani?—Sic non perfectè de *Baptismate* tractatum est, antequam contradicerent foris positi, rebaptizatores.—Nec de *Unitate Christi* (of the body or *Church* of Christ), nisi posteaquàm separatio illa urgere cæpit Fratres infirmos<sup>a</sup>.”

This passage will give me courage to proceed. *Theophilus*, Bishop of Antioch, (placed as flourishing in the year 181), uses the word *Trinity* or *Triad*:—He is speaking of the six days of the Creation; the first three, he says, are types of the *Triad*, *God*, *his Word*, and *his Wisdom*<sup>b</sup>; the fourth is a type of man: the reason he assigns is, because, during the first three days, there were no Luminaries; God, his Word, and his Wisdom, wanted none. On the fourth, the luminaries were made, which were suitable to Man. But we find Λογον εσχευ υπεργον<sup>c</sup>: and I think there is not sufficient reason for calling this *Triad*, our present *Trinity* in its *full form*. It seems rather to answer the description given above<sup>d</sup>; and not to be more explicit than *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*. And the more *fanciful* the occasion of introducing it, the less precise are the ideas to be deemed, which are annexed to it. The word Τρειας<sup>e</sup> would not convey to Autolicus, or to any reader of *Theophilus*, what the word *Trinity* would to us.

It

<sup>a</sup> This passage is quoted in Forbes's *Instruct. Histor. Theol.* 8. 20. 4. (but be aware of false prints in the *numbers*): the little omissions are his.

<sup>b</sup> Ad Autolicum, Lib. 2. p. 106. Ed. Ox. 1684.

<sup>c</sup> P. 81. Edit. Oxon. 1684. See also p. 9. where *Theoph.* seems to make φως, λογος, πνευμα, σοφια, only *attributes* of the Supreme God.

<sup>d</sup> At the beginning of this Section.

<sup>e</sup> H. Stephens does not, in his *Greek Lexicon*, refer, under Τρειας, to either Plato or Philo. Mr. Gibbon says, p. 242, Note 31, that Τρειας was already (before 181) “familiar in the Schools of Philosophy.” It is not in Du Cange. It is in Suicer.

It would confirm the general notion just now mentioned, to conceive *how* it is likely, that controversy should bring the Doctrine of the Trinity into its present form: after what has been said, it is natural to ask, if the Doctrine of the Trinity was not immediately taken from Scripture, when Christians *first* studied it, how did it become general? The Scriptural expressions concerning the Father, when compared with those concerning the Son, and with those concerning the Holy Spirit; and with those texts, which strongly insist on the Unity of God, must occasion *difficulties*. Men would not be content to use the expressions *separately*, as the Scriptures do, but would bring them *together*, and endeavour to make a *System* out of them, so as to *solve* all difficulties. They could seldom do this without getting into other difficulties, which would be opposed, and in return defended. One man, fearing to infringe upon the fundamental doctrine of all rational religion, the Unity of God, would neglect all distinction of persons: this *Sabellius* and those called *Patripassians*, Praxeas, &c. are supposed to have done; and so to have taught *one* God with *three names*. Another, convinced that the Scriptures make a *distinction* between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and seeing that distinction in a strong light, in order to secure it, makes a *subordination*: makes the Son \* subordinate to the Father, and the Holy Ghost to the Son: this did *Arius*. A third, shocked at the idea of an inequality, determines, that the Son must be *equal* to the Father, and the Holy Ghost to the Son; and insists upon  
this

\* The Apologist for *Origen* mentioned by Photius, Cod. 117. imputes his having made the Son unequal to the Father, to his zeal against the error of Sabellius;—and says, that Origen's other errors were owing to a like cause. See *Cave's Account of the Doctrines of Origen*. Hist. lit. 1. p. 115.

this in such unqualified terms, as to constitute in effect *three distinct Gods*. This some of those Fathers are said <sup>y</sup> to have done, who are commonly called *Orthodox*. When the moderate and reasonable Christians saw men running into error in these different ways, they would naturally endeavour to *check* them: and the expressions, which they fixed upon in order to answer that end, would contain the *doctrine* of the Trinity as we now profess it. These expressions would serve to retain those within the Society of the Orthodox, who were tractable, and keep them from being carried to and fro with every wind of doctrine: and would keep the intractable at a distance, so that they would breed no confusion.—Whatever of this sort was carried on in the three first centuries, seems to have occasioned no *disturbance* till the *fourth*.

Bishop Burnet says<sup>z</sup>, that “this doctrine” “was universally received over the whole Christian Church, long before there was either a Christian *Prince* to support it by his authority, or a *Council* to establish it by consent.” The first Christian Prince was *Constantine* the Great, who from 306 gradually increased his protection of the Christians, but did not give it fully, till about two or three years before the Council of Nice, held in 325. He was not baptized till a few days before his death, in 337.—The *Council* alluded to by Bishop Burnet, must be the *Nicene*. He does not say, before the Christians had a Council,—but, “before they had a Council to establish it by consent;” meaning, I suppose, a *general Council*: the word “*received*” seems to want explaining: if the Doctrine was received *as*  
*an*

<sup>y</sup> See Gibbon, Vol. ii. p. 249. Note 51. Allix, Pref. p. viii. Bingham, 11. 3. 4.

<sup>z</sup> Bp. Burnet, towards the close of the first Article. p. 49.—*Octavo*.

*an established Doctrine*, why was it not put in some *Confession of Faith*, or stated by such Councils as were held before the fourth Century?—The Doctrine was far from being received, in this sense: nay, in my opinion, even the Nicene Council did not *establish* the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, though it might that of the *Divinity of Christ*. Indeed Bishop Burnet<sup>a</sup> owns, that the Doctrine of the Trinity can only be *deduced* from the *Nicene Creed* as a *consequence*.—But drawing a consequence, in things above our reason, is making a *new Doctrine*: what indeed is making any doctrine, but drawing a consequence from some expressions of Scripture?—sometimes, in order to make a doctrine, one need not go so far: one need only *arrange*<sup>b</sup> expressions. If, by a doctrine's being "*received*," is only meant its being mentioned in writings, or the parts of it, from which it may be made up; I suppose, the Doctrine *was* received in that sense.—At the time of the Nicene Council, many expressions were probably to be found in<sup>c</sup> Books, denoting the relations of the several Persons of the Trinity to each other: *filiation*, *generation*, or possibly even *procession*<sup>d</sup>, were expressed in one way or other:—the question is, whether, in any public confession of Faith, they found the *Trinity in Unity*, exactly as we profess it? *Tertullian*, in his controversy with Praxeas

<sup>a</sup> P. 49. Octavo.

<sup>b</sup> For instance, arranging Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, (as they are not always in the same order in Scripture) is making Doctrines about their precedence.

<sup>c</sup> The notion of Paul of Samosata, placed in 260, seems too indistinct to found History upon: it relates only to Christ: and Paul abjured or recanted his heresy: however, Councils *did* meet: a good deal seems to turn on Paul's private character; which was probably misrepresented. He is more particularly mentioned, Art. 11. sect VI.

<sup>d</sup> Instances may be seen in Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp; or in Bingham, 13. 2. 1, &c.

Praxeas the Unitarian<sup>e</sup>, comes the nearest it<sup>f</sup>, if not quite up to it; but, supposing *one* writer, *in controversy*, to hit off expressions a few times containing the very doctrine afterwards professed publicly;—that falls far short of that doctrine being solemnly professed in a *Church*, though it is a *step* towards it: there are many sayings in modern controversial writers, which are estimated no higher than the illustrations of a private man; and are not admitted into any Confessions, Creeds, Articles, Catechisms; and yet they may represent the sense of *Scripture* very justly:—But, till notions are publicly professed, the generality of men are ignorant of them: and it is not known for certain, whether such notions ever will become *doctrines*, properly so called. Controversy may more properly be said to be bringing the Doctrines into form, than to have already established them. *Warburton* says true things in controversy, which cannot be called received *doctrines*; as, that there is no promise of a *future state* in the dispensation of *Moses*.

*Bingham*<sup>g</sup> says several things of weight, to prove the early reception of the Doctrine of the Trinity; but perhaps nothing more forcible than that the Orthodox were reviled by the Sabellians, and other Unitarians, as *Tritheists*. But, does this prove, that the Trinity was fully professed? not entirely. Celsus reviled Christians for being *Polytheists*; does it therefore follow, that they had *many* objects of worship?

<sup>e</sup> Cap. 2. 3. 13. See Bingham, Vol. 1. bottom of p. 572. col. 2. 13. 2. 4.

<sup>f</sup> Dr. Priestley thinks, that even Tertullian had not the same idea affixed to the word Trinity, which we have. Because, though in one passage he speaks as if he had, in others he speaks as if he had not: whereas, a modern would speak as if he had, in *all* passages.

<sup>g</sup> 13. 2. 2, &c.



worship<sup>b</sup>?—it seems to prove, that addressees were offered up to Christ; and perhaps to the Holy Spirit; but these might be offered in an artless and affectionate manner, without speculative system, or dogmatical precision; which is all that we call into question.—These very Sabellians, &c. who charged the Catholics with Tritheism, though more open to the charge themselves, were called *Patripassians*;—would they allow that to be a proof, that they really said the Father suffered on the Cross? and that they made no distinction whatever between the Father and the Son? It is very unsafe to argue upon opprobrious terms; reviling is rhetoric; moreover, it seems possible, that the Catholics, or orthodox, might restrain the forwardness of the Sabellians on the one hand, and of the Arians on the other, before the right doctrine was fully settled: we have supposed, that such restraining was the means of settling the right Doctrine. You may see one man carry a notion too far one way, another run into the opposite extreme; you may pronounce both in fault or error, and yet never determine the right medium precisely. If this be so, the Catholics might, in answer to their opprobrious arguments, be called Tritheists, before the Doctrine of the Trinity could be said to have come to maturity. Indeed, their being called Tritheists as much proves, that they denied the *Unity* of God, as that they, properly speaking, professed the *Trinity*. Besides, it should be considered, that some have been *really Tritheists*; and that those, who were so, were as far removed from the true doctrine of the Trinity as Arians or Sabellians. If we  
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<sup>b</sup> The Heathens spoke of Christians as Polytheists, on account of this Doctrine. Theodoret says, the Trinity was not clearly revealed to the Jews, lest they *should* be Polytheists.—See Lard. Works, Index. *Trinity*.

are to conclude any thing from the Catholics being called Tritheists, why not that they were *really* Tritheists?

This seems the proper place to mention the *Priscillianists*, they being reckoned a sort of Sabellians: but as *Mosheim* says, that none of the ancients have given a satisfactory account of them, and as *Lardner* found it necessary to collect *every thing* in antiquity concerning them, in order to get an idea of them, there being no writings of their own extant, I must content myself with a conjectural solution of an expression in the Athanasian Creed, which seems to be levelled at their error: I mean the conclusion, “ So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.” It seems not improbable, that the Priscillianists, as a sort of Sabellians, might be represented as so completely taking away all distinction between the Persons of the Trinity, that it was the same thing to them of which Person any thing was affirmed; whatever might be affirmed of the Father, might be affirmed equally of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost: Hence it would be deduced, that a Sabellian Trinity consisted of “ three Fathers,” or “ three Sons,” or “ three Holy Ghosts.” The next step to which would be, that the Priscillianists made three Fathers, *and* three Sons, *and* three Holy Ghosts. At least, I see no better way of accounting for the expression of *τρεις παρακλητας* in the second Anathema of the Council of Bracara, A. D. 563: or for “ *Trinitas Trinitatis*” in the 49th Apostolical Canon.

Hitherto, we have referred more to the second person of the Holy Trinity than to the Third: we may therefore take notice of the notion of *Erasmus*<sup>i</sup>, that the *Holy Ghost* was not called *God* till the *fourth Century*;

<sup>i</sup> See Bingham, 13. 2. 4. Vol. 1. p. 572.

*Century*; if we err with such great authorities as Augustin and Erasmus, we shall suffer no great disgrace.—We are not indeed now speaking immediately of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, but yet it may be proper *here* to say something of that Doctrine, as one constituent part of the Doctrine of the Trinity.—Bingham's chief argument against Erasmus is, that *Adorations* were paid to the Holy Ghost long before the fourth Century: it is not here wholly improper to say, that, though the Holy Ghost were *called* God at any time, and were *proved* to be God; it does not follow, that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was professed; for *Tritheists* would allow the Holy Ghost to be God, and they are by no means *Trinitarians*. But what we would chiefly observe, as being most pertinent to the observation of Erasmus, and most useful for getting an idea of the *History*, is, that adorations might be paid to the Holy Spirit, and yet his *Divinity* not acknowledged, as a *Doctrine*. From the earliest times of Christianity, high strains of Devotion were used, either to God, without distinction of persons; or to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, or to the only-begotten Son, or to the Paraclete, which is the Holy Ghost; or to two or all of them: and these were used rightly; in right circumstances; and the connexion and precedence of the several Divine Persons was artless but natural, and such as the subject, or the course of the expression, happened to require: without reserve, without speculation: gratitude, admiration, devout love, kept the understanding from running into dry disquisitions.—When Christians were accused of the errors of Polytheism, they denied them, and shewed, that their theory was to worship *one God* in *Unity*; this they said, so long as they were obliged to attend to theory;—but, at other times, they  
caught

caught the glorious hymns of Scripture, and uttered them fervently; without cold hesitation, or metaphysical distinction<sup>k</sup>.

With regard to the Holy Spirit, it may not be improper farther to *add*, that what we have as the original *Nicene* Creed, contains nothing about the Holy Spirit, except these words; *καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα*<sup>l</sup>: from which his Divinity could only be *collected*, at most. I know it is urged, that the remaining part of what we now use as the *Nicene* Creed, was only omitted, as unnecessary, because the dispute with the Arians was only about the Son:—but does not this shew, that a doctrine was not usually declared and established, till controversy made such declaration needful?

*Lactantius*, placed in the year 306, seems to speak with some degree of indifference<sup>m</sup>, as if it were enough for Christians to worship two persons of the Trinity instead of three, the Father and the Son. Indeed, the objection, which had been made, did not force him to introduce the duty of worshipping the Holy Ghost; but yet it would *now* seem very unnatural and unorthodox to say, that we ought to worship the Father and the Son; and then add nothing concerning the Holy Spirit.—*Jerom* and others reckon *Lactantius* not quite right in his opinions concerning the Holy Ghost; and speak of him as taking what is said of the Holy Ghost, as if it were said of the Father or of the Son; and denying (in effect at least) the Personality of  
of

<sup>k</sup> It does not follow, supposing the Holy Ghost not to have been called God at first, that he *might* not have been called so with propriety; if occasion had so required.

<sup>l</sup> For what is here said concerning the *Nicene* Creed, see *Usher de Symbolis*, p. 13, and 17. *Rutherford's Charges*, p. 84, 85, and 70. *Lardner*, Vol. 4. p. 191.—*Lord King on the Creed*, p. 319.

<sup>m</sup> *Inst.* 4. 29.

of the Holy Ghost: that he could do this in 306, without being noticed as an Heretic, confirms our notion, that *our* doctrine of the Trinity was not then fully settled. (See Lardner's Works, Vol. 4. p. 60.)

What we are told, with regard to the form of *Doxology*, seems to make for our supposition: that, till the fourth Century, Christians were permitted either to use our present form, or, "Glory be to the Father, in, with, by the Son and the Holy Ghost." And that no Christian was molested for using that form, which he liked best, till the times of the Arian Controversy<sup>a</sup>.

The *Manicheans* had a *Trinity*<sup>o</sup>, and they are considered as flourishing before the end of the third century; but no one will say, that their Trinity is *ours*; we have allowed, that many *Triads* have been adopted at one time or other; and that, in some sense, Christians always held a Trinity.

Some learned men have considered Lucian's *Philopatris* as a proof, that the Trinity was professed amongst Christians so early as the time of Lucian, who is placed as flourishing in the year 176: but I cannot think this Dialogue really written by Lucian. It is unlike his manner: it was written by some one, who knew more of Christians than he appears, from his other works, to have known.

If it be said, what does it signify by whom it was written, if it was written about Lucian's time? I answer, imitations come after originals: spurious after genuine; often so long after, that the genuine afford no proof of the time of the spurious. Lardner conceives, from the matter of this Dialogue, that

<sup>a</sup> Bingham, 14. 2. 1. Gibbon, Vol. 2. p. 293. Note. Broughton's Dict. *Trinity*.

<sup>o</sup> Aug. contra Faustum, Lib. 20. See Lardner's Works, Vol. 3. p. 459. And Appendix to B. 1. Sect. 17.

that it is more suitable to the fourth century, than to the age of Lucian; which is some confirmation of what we are endeavouring to prove<sup>p</sup>.

On the whole; though it seems clear, that the *materials* of the Doctrine of the Trinity were in some readiness before the fourth century; it may be matter of doubt, whether they were put together so soon; and the Doctrine perfectly constructed.—And explaining such doubt, seems to be the best method of giving the History of the Doctrine.

v. This may be a proper place to remark the difference between the *ancient Unitarians* and the modern.—The account I should be inclined to give, from expressions found in most <sup>a</sup> writers, is, that the ancient Unitarians, at the same time that they were alarmed at infringing on the Doctrine of the Divine Unity, or on the Unity of God the Father, had no idea of denying the *Divinity of Christ*; and so made the Father and Son the same person. The modern Unitarians, equally shocked at the idea of denying the Divine Unity, secure it by making the Father and the Son infinitely *different*. But Lardner will have it<sup>r</sup>, that Praxeas only supposed the Divine Nature, (that is, the *Divine Wisdom*, which he thought was the meaning of the *Word*,) in the *Man Jesus*: who, having been born of a Virgin, by the Holy Spirit, was called the Son of God. To avoid controversy, I will only lay down, that ancient Unitarians made the *Son of God*, after *Jesus* had become so by his being conceived of the Holy Ghost, and by the union of the Word with the human nature, much nearer to equality

<sup>p</sup> Lardner's Testimonies, under *Lucian*; end. Works, Vol. viii. p. 81.

<sup>q</sup> See *Peayson* on the Creed, He "was conceived," &c. Note on *Patripassians*.

<sup>r</sup> Lard. Her. Praxeas, Sect. 7, and 8.

equality with God the Father, than the modern Unitarians do, who conceive Jesus Christ to be nothing more than a mere man. Nay, I think we might go so far as to say, that the ancient Unitarians exerted themselves to secure the *Unity* of God, by making the Father and the Son as nearly the *same* as possible; and that the modern Unitarians try to secure the same fundamental doctrine, by making the Father and the Son as *different* as possible.

VI. I must now give a sketch of the History of the Doctrine of this first Article down to the present time; but I will be very brief<sup>s</sup>.

Arianism got to be supported by some of the Roman Emperors, and occasioned wars, till the end of the 7th Century<sup>t</sup>: it then became wholly extinct. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity prevailed from that time till the Reformation:— Upon great religious revolutions, custom, prejudice, authority, &c. losing their hold, numbers of men set up for teachers, and leaders of new sects. At our Reformation, *Socinus*, Uncle and Nephew, attacked every thing, which seemed difficult to human reason; and endeavoured to remove every mystery. It has been said<sup>u</sup>, that they were induced to do so, by abhorrence of the slavery to the authority

<sup>s</sup> On review, it seems as if some idea of the *Roman Laws* (Codex, Lib. 1.) should be given here;—and the beginning of our Reformatio Legum read.

<sup>t</sup> Gibbon, Vol. iii. p. 552, quarto—after the conversion of the Lombards.—Voltaire, Vol. xiv. Quarto, p. 63, bottom, says, (neglecting seemingly the distinction between Arians and Socinians) “Le parti d’Arius apres trois cens ans de triomphe, et douze siècles d’oubli, renaît enfin de sa cendre.” But *Allix*, in his Preface to *Jews and Unitarians*, p. ix. says, “Within 150 years, or thereabouts, after their first rise, there hardly remained any Professors of it.” (of the Arian Sect.)—Perhaps *Allix* might reckon the later Arians too barbarous to be spoken of,

<sup>u</sup> *Allix*, Pref. p. xi.

thority of the Romish Church, under which reason had long groaned.—At first however, the Socinians called Christ *God*, and offered *adorations* to <sup>x</sup> him; but this was soon altered, even in the life-time of Faustus Socinus; and since that time, Christ has been, with them, a mere man, and the Holy Spirit no *Person*.—They have been so pressed with Scripture, that they have been obliged to have recourse to that desperate expedient, of lessening its authority, so rashly made use of by ancient Heretics. At the latter end of the 17th Century, St. John's Gospel (or rather the opening of it,) had been attributed<sup>y</sup> to Cerinthus, (the very man, against whom many persons have judged it to have been written); and, at present, we find the inspiration of Christ and St. Paul<sup>z</sup> estimated much lower than, as far as I know, they ever before have been, by any writer zealous for the honour of Christianity<sup>2</sup>.

Pretty early in the 18th Century (the present,) there was a very extensive Trinitarian Controversy<sup>b</sup>: Mr. Whiston, Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in Cambridge, maintained what was called *Arianism*, that the *Logos* was to Christ in the place of a rational Soul; but this seems to have been the opinion of *Apollinarius*<sup>c</sup>. Dr. Samuel Clarke was thought not quite orthodox, with regard to the generation of the Son of God, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, which he explained so as to make a greater subordination than some strict Trinitarians

<sup>x</sup> See Racovian Catechism.      <sup>y</sup> Allix's Preface.

<sup>z</sup> Dr. Priestley's Letters, mentioned again Sect. xvi.

<sup>a</sup> It might have been mentioned, that, about the time of the Reformation *Serwetus* and *Valentinus Gentilis* suffered death for their notions about the *Trinity*;—this is mentioned under the 2d Article.

<sup>b</sup> Maclaine, in his Notes on Mosheim, gives some account of this Controversy, Vol. vi. 8vo. p. 40.

<sup>c</sup> See afterwards, Art. II. Sect. xiv.



nitarians approved; he was threatened by a *Convocation*<sup>d</sup> in 1714, and his preferment was impeded: but, I suppose, any one might now preach his doctrine without being thought irregular: he calls the Son and Holy Ghost *Divine Persons*; and thinks, that addressing *prayers* to them is warranted by Scripture<sup>f</sup>. He seems to differ very little from Bishop Pearson, if at all. Voltaire, with his usual inaccuracy, calls him, “le plus ferme patron de la Doctrine Arienne<sup>g</sup>.”

In the summary of the Doctrines of *Swedenborg*, we find this<sup>h</sup> account of the Trinity, “There is a Divine Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; or, in other words, of the all-begetting Divinity, the Divine-Humanity, and the Divine-proceeding, or Operation; and that this Trinity consisteth not *therefore* of three distinct Persons, but is united, as Soul, Body, and operation in Man, in the *One Person* of the Lord *Jesus Christ*, who therefore is the God of Heaven, and *alone* to be worshipped, being Creator from Eternity, Redeemer in Time, and *Regenerator* to Eternity<sup>i</sup>.”—I mention this notion

<sup>d</sup> An Apology for Dr. Clarke gives the records.

<sup>e</sup> It is said, that Clarke’s Book about the Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity prevented Queen Anne’s making him Archbishop of Canterbury, and that Bishop Gibson told the Queen, “He is the most learned and honestest man in the Nation; he only wants one thing.”—“What is that?”—“to be a Christian.”

<sup>f</sup> He once declared, “in a Paper laid before the Bishops, that *the Son of God was eternally begotten by the eternal* incomprehensible power and will of the Father.”—See Waterland’s Arian Subscr. p. 33.

<sup>g</sup> Voltaire’s Works, quarto, Vol. xiv. p. 63.—This makes Voltaire’s confounding Arian and Socinian appear ill: Dr. S. Clarke was very far indeed from being a Socinian. Yet Arian, it is said afterwards, was a *generic* term. Art. 11. Sect. VI.

<sup>h</sup> P. 49.

<sup>i</sup> Compare this expression with Theodoret’s account of Sabellianism. Her. Fab. 2. 9. it is translated under Laidner’s Dionysius of Alexandria: Works, Vol. iii. p. 78.

tion chiefly on account of its making the *Father* no object of our worship; and dropping also all worship to the Holy Ghost.

I have no authentic account of the *Moravian* notion concerning the Trinity, but, from what I have seen of their worship, and heard, when attending their meetings, of their Sermons and Hymns, I should conclude, that they take but little notice of the *Father* of Jesus Christ. The English Law, made even since the Revolution, (see Blackstone, Index, *Trinity*) punishes as Heresy any denial of the doctrine of the Trinity; that is, either denying any Person of the Trinity to be God, or denying the Divine Unity. But this Law is not now enforced, though Parliament has refused to repeal it.

VII. Having finished the *History* of this first Article, we come to the *Explanation* of the particular expressions contained in it: but this need not be long. In a System of religious truths, it seems necessary to begin from the Nature of God: so that we might have expected such an Article as the first, had there been no particular occasion for it. It is however probable, that the compilers would have in their minds the chief of those, who had denied any of the Attributes of God, as learnt either from natural religion, or revealed.—*One God* may be opposed to two original principles; “living,” to Idols; “true,” to false Gods;—the Unity is opposed to all kinds of Gods of Polytheists: “everlasting,” to *made* with hands, *deified*, and perishable: “without Body” may also be opposed to Pagan Deities; or to Anthropomorphites; “parts,” to those who thought Christ was <sup>k</sup> a *part* of God: without “*passions*” is in Latin *impassibilis*, which  
may

<sup>k</sup> Pearson on the Creed, p. 270, first Edit. or p. 135, fol.—For *impartibilis*, see Forbes, Vol. i. 1. 34. 3, &c.

may mean incapable of *suffering*, or may be opposed to the *Patripassians*; or those so called. Affirming God to be the Creator, is opposing those, who held matter eternal; and those, who held that the World was created by inferior *Spirits*, or *Æons*, not commissioned by the supreme benevolent Being:—affirming God to be the Preserver, is opposing Epicureans, and all who should deny a Providence.—The profession of a Trinity in Unity, is opposed to all, who held three Gods, or one God with three names; or who held the Son to be a mere Man, or inferior to the Father, as to his Divinity. The word “*Person*” is not to be understood in its usual sense, but as a Term borrowed from common language, and used in a sense not very remote from its usual sense, to express a distinction, which must be expressed in some way, and of which we have no clear comprehension. For the *hands*, *wrath* of God, &c. see Book I. Chap. XIX. Sect. v. about *Displeasure*.

VIII. After the explanation, comes the *Proof*; but here we will confine ourselves to that subject, which is expressed in the *Title* of the Article<sup>1</sup>: the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is all that will at present stand in need of proof.—A regular proof of this doctrine would consist of *five parts*; all taken from Scripture. 1. A proof of the Unity of God. 2. Of the Divinity of the Father. 3. Of the Divinity of the Son. 4. Of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost. And the proof, that these might be put together, would make a fifth part.—1. The Unity of God is so clear from Scripture, that proof of that is surely needless. 2. The Divinity of the Father, says Bishop<sup>m</sup> Burnet, is denied by none. Or, if we conceive

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Burnet is mentioned, at the opening of this Article, as proving truths of *natural* religion under it.

<sup>m</sup> Burnet on Articles, p. 50. 8vo.

conceive any Christian Myſtics to deny it, we need only adduce the prayers of Chriſt to his heavenly Father, as a proof of his Divinity. 3. The Divinity of the *Son* is to be proved under the ſecond Article; 4. that of the Holy Ghoſt under the fifth: therefore, 5. nothing remains but to ſee the Scriptural manner of putting theſe *together*; and I know not that we can ſee that better, than by reading Dr. Samuel *Clarke's* collection \* of Texts, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are mentioned jointly. It would appear, from ſuch reading, that a Chriſtian may be permitted to give precedence ſometimes to the Son, ſometimes to the Holy Ghoſt, as occaſion may require.—If this form of proof ſeems at firſt ſight imperfect, I think one might venture to engage, that it will not ſeem ſo, if, after going through the ſecond and fifth Articles, we return to the point where we now are.

I will, therefore, in order to a regular proof, only make one more obſervation.—I believe many have a notion, that the Doctrines of the Trinity is formed in an arbitrary and preſumptuous manner, by going beyond what is revealed, and taking human imaginations for divine inſtructions or commands. My notion differs from this: I believe, that the Scripture is the ſource of the Doctrine in every part. The ſcriptural expreſſions are examined, they are conſidered as ſo many facts or phænomena, which muſt be conſiſtent, in ſome way or other, though we know not how. What can be done? what does the beſt and calmest *reaſon* dictate to be done in ſuch a caſe, but that we ſhould endeavour to *claſs* theſe facts or phænomena, and then aſk, whether there is not ſome *ſuppoſition*, on which they might all be accounted for? which would make them all *unite*, ſo far as to make different

\* The number is 48, as I reckoned them up.

different parts of *one plan*? Is not this the same process as solving any phenomenon of *nature*, by observation and experiment? what other method did Sir Isaac Newton pursue, when he solved the phenomena of the *Rainbow*?—he observed the *colours*, their order, their breadth, the magnitude, the centers of the bows, and so forth; he considered the manner, in which rays of light are affected by passing through globes of water; he formed a *supposition*, which should *tie* all these phenomena *together*, and reduce them to *one plan*: he tried whether it would suit, he formed or heard objections, or, in other words, proved his supposition by controversy; the thing, which at last proved that he was right, was, that *all* appearances came into his *plan*, and none was left without a place, and as it were a provision. The case is the same with the Doctrine of the Trinity; a number of texts are examined, their consistency is not seen; some supposition is to be formed, which shall bring them all into one plan: and that supposition is to be received as truth, which answers the end°. This is the force of saying, what I say with great assurance, that, if all expressions of Scripture, relating to the divine attributes, are classed according to the Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity, they are interpreted in the best, most easy, most natural manner, according to the soundest principles of Grammar and Criticism; so as they would be interpreted separately, if no particular end was in view; taking each text with its context.

#### IX. Having

° A supposition, which makes all texts consistent, may, no doubt, be *possibly* a *false* supposition: it is not *likely* to be so; but it may be so. Yet such an one is to be received for truth, for the present; and to be acquiesced in, in some degree, till some other hypothesis appears to be preferable to it:—Sir Isaac Newton's 4th Rule of Philosophizing seems not unlike this.

IX. Having now gone through the History, Explanation, and Proof, it remains, that we make the *Application*.

The *Application* will consist of the following particulars: First, the sense in which a rational Christian may now be supposed to give his *assent*, in the present state of knowledge:— 2. The *concessions* which might possibly be made, and the expedients which might be used, on *our* part, if those who differ from us were desirous to make peace, and agree upon some terms of union. 3. The *concessions* and accommodations, which might be required of *Dissenters*, in such a case: 4. And, lastly, the *Improvements* which might possibly arise from a right investigation of our subject.

x. First then, we are to consider in what sense a rational Christian may now give his *assent* to the first Article of our Church.—But here it seems necessary *previously* to reflect on the sense, in which thinking and rational men use some words in speaking of the Supreme Being. Particularly the words *infinite*, and *divine*.

Sometimes, the word *infinite* has an unphilosophical idea affixed to it, as if it expressed something *positive*; but its proper sense is <sup>p</sup> *negative*, as the etymology itself declares; it means, *without limit*: when the mind enlarges *number*, for instance, and sees, that it can still enlarge, and that there is no appearance of any limit, at which it must stop, it infers infinity of number. The same may be said of power, duration, or even of intimacy of *connexion*. So that if a man ascribes infinity to any thing, he does no more than express a simple fact; an operation of his mind: he says, that his mind has attempted

<sup>p</sup> Locke, B. ii. Chap. xvii. Sect. 8. says “negation of an end.”

attempted to assign a limit to that thing, but has returned disappointed from the attempt.

If we once quit this simple conception, we run into absurdity;—and, though we may despise such kind of absurdity in more gross instances, as when a person talks of an infinitely long *stick* with a candle at the end of it; or of the *bottomless pit* being paved <sup>a</sup> with scholars' skulls;—yet it is well, if we keep perfectly clear of all degrees of it ourselves in cases less striking. I myself have heard a preacher, who was by no means deficient in eloquence, speak of an Angel (or some other being) “flying from one end of infinite space to the other.”

In order to obviate mistakes, it may not be improper to hint, that when, in *mathematics*, a quantity is called infinitely great, or infinitely small, the expression is to be considered as technical, and is to be explained, by shewing, mathematically, some particular properties in the *increase* or *decrease* of such quantities; such as make that increase or decrease unlimited, in some particular way. And, that when it is said, that the *fixed stars* are at an infinite distance, it is only meant, that they are at an *immense* or unmeasurable distance: that is, that men happen to have no measure now known, by which that distance can be ascertained; no line so long, that by its being taken any number of times, the distance of the fixed stars can be made definite: or, the distance of the fixed stars is so great, that no known distance bears any assignable proportion to it.

When we say, that a Being is *Divine*, what is it that passes in our mind? Is it not this? We take all the faculties and excellencies, of which we have  
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<sup>a</sup> Expressions which used to be mentioned amongst young Scholars at Cambridge, as used by a preacher in a Conventicle.

any idea, unite them together, consider them as belonging to *one* Being; we conceive them to be improved, refined, purified, enlarged, to the greatest degree possible; beyond any limit, which we can assign or imagine. The Being possessing these, we account divine:—it is possible he may have other faculties and excellencies, of which we have no conception, but these cannot make part of *our* idea of a Divinity.—And, as we acquire an idea of a Divine Being by collecting and uniting his Attributes, so, if we find instances of such attributes exerted, we *ascribe* Divinity to the Being, in whom they are found. If there is imperfection in doing so, it lies in the human understanding (as far as we yet know it), not in our use of the powers which God has given us<sup>a</sup>.

These things premised, we may use fewer words in our declaration equivalent to our first Article; and make that declaration more simple.—Let it be then something of this kind.

‘ As to the Existence and Unity of God, when my business is only to interpret his word, I have no difficulty. Nor do I hesitate about his being free from the imperfections and impurities of *Body*, (or of whatever is divisible) and the impotencies of human *passions*.—And how inadequately soever I may be able to comprehend his infinite duration, power, wisdom, and goodness, yet I cannot doubt, that they are declared and published in the *Holy Scriptures*, or that He is there represented as the *Creator* and *Preserver* of all things.—Indeed, for such opinions as these, I shall never have need to *separate* myself from any religious Society, which is at all rational; and therefore, however important they may be as subjects of meditation, it is needless for me to enter minutely into them, when I am only comparing different interpretations of Scripture; and

<sup>a</sup> B. I. Chap. III. Sect. I.



and that merely as they distinguish one *Church* from another.'

' But, when it is proposed to me to affirm, that " In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost;" I have difficulty enough! my understanding is involved in perplexity, my conceptions bewildered in the thickest darkness: I pause, I hesitate; I ask what necessity there is for making such a declaration. And my difficulty is increased, when I find, that making this declaration *separates* me from Christians, whom I must acknowledge to be rational and well-informed; from those, who have studied some parts of Scripture with singular success.'

' When I have continued in this state for some time, I recollect, that every man in Society, when knowledge is progressive, may have occasion to go upon propositions<sup>r</sup>, which only Beings superior to himself fully comprehend, for the present:—and I see, that, if either such a declaration must be made, or some parts of Scripture must be neglected, or wrested from their natural sense, that then obscurity ought not to deter me from making it; and that I must content myself with lamenting a separation, to which I must submit, as without it the ends of *religious Society* cannot be obtained. Things of a great and solemn nature cannot be recorded in the Scripture for no end or purpose. All therefore seems now to depend upon what the *Scriptures* really teach.'

' I search then the *Scriptures*;—of the *Father* I find many things said, which belong to none but God.—To the *Son* and *Holy Spirit* I find such *titles* given, as seem to me due only to Divinity; and moreover such intimacy of *connexion* with the Father

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<sup>r</sup> As *Mariners* calculate by rules, which they do not understand.

is ascribed to them, as I can put no *limit* to: and the same is true of the *power* shewn in their various acts, and of the *duration* of their existence. I can conceive no *titles* above their titles; no *intimacy* of connexion beyond theirs with the Father; no *power* above their power, no *duration* before or after their duration.\*

‘ If I had my choice, I would thus express myself *negatively*; I would say, the *connexion* between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is such, as I can set *no bounds* to; I cannot make any *separation* between them;—*neither* can I *limit* their power or duration;—but, if I am called upon by authority to use a *positive* expression, I use one, but necessarily in the same *sense*: and thus I speak of their being “*of one substance, power, and eternity.*” Such indeed they are to me; to me they are divine; how they are *in themselves*, it is impossible for me to comprehend\*.

‘ I am moreover very forcibly struck with finding a kind of settled custom in Scripture of mentioning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost together, on the most solemn occasions: of which *Baptism* is one; not more persons, not fewer: to what can this be ascribed?

‘ Still there is one thing never to be forgotten for a moment; that is, the *Unity* of God; Scripture and Reason jointly proclaim, there is but ONE GOD: however the proofs of the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghost may seem to *interfere* with this, nothing is to be allowed them but what is *consistent with it*:—the divine nature, or substance, can

\* In Ser. 236 (or 191) de Tempore, Sect. 2. to be found in the Works of Augustin, the eternal generation of Christ is expressed by, “*non aliquod tempus ascribimus.*”—It is also implied, that we take mysterious doctrines in order to *avoid* absurdities;—“*non possumus aliter confiteri eternum Patrem.*—I speak rather of the *general* form or idea, “*non possumus aliter confiteri, &c.*—than of this particular argument.

can therefore be but “*one substance*;” the divine power can be but “*one power*.”

‘ But, does not this confound all our conceptions, and make us use *words without meaning*? I think it does; I profess and proclaim my confusion in the most unequivocal manner: I make it an essential part of my declaration. Did I pretend to understand what I say, I might be a Trinitist, or an infidel, but I could not both worship the one true God<sup>t</sup>, and acknowledge Jesus Christ to be Lord of all<sup>u</sup>. In using words with *wrong ideas*, I might express error and *falsehood*; but, in using words *without ideas*, I profess no falsehood; I only *unite* the different *sayings* of Scripture in the best manner I am *able*, though in a manner confessedly imperfect: but this imperfection I adopt, lest I should run into a *greater evil*, by putting a forced and wrong construction on scriptural sayings, in order to reduce them to the level of my human capacity.’

Thus may any man assent to the first Article; supposing him convinced of the truth of the second and fifth. It is not at all to be wished, that assent should be given with less *Diffidence*: such assent would be more open to cavil and objection than ours: but still it may be allowed to take some notice of certain *illustrations* of the Doctrine of the Trinity, as not wholly unworthy of attention; these might be *considered*, though they ought not to be admitted as authentic: they might serve to lessen the uncouthness of the Doctrine, though they could not make it clear. They might prevent men from being so disgusted as rashly, suddenly, to throw all thoughts of it aside.—Thus, <sup>x</sup>*Athanasius* makes

<sup>t</sup> John xvii. 3.

<sup>u</sup> Acts x. 36.

<sup>x</sup> 1st Dialogue de Trinitate: quoted in the Preface to Episcopius, Sect. vi.

makes Peter, Paul, and Timothy to be three Persons (*ὑποστάσεις*) *in one*, because of their unanimity, or having only one mind. Two *Parents* are often to be considered as one by the Child. A *Body corporate* are many or one, as they are considered in different lights.—“Ourselves, our Souls and Bodies;”—sometimes, in popular language, (and the Scripture language is popular), the *Body* is spoken of as the *self*; sometimes the Soul; sometimes the compound of Body and Soul:—yet there is but *one* self.—Such notions may have some good effect, in preventing the bad effects of *prejudice*; but a respectful *suspense* is all that a reasonable man will afford them.—The same may be said of the *uses*, which the Doctrine of the Trinity has seemed to be of;—as that of multiplying our *relations*, preventing the *excesses* of devout Fear and Love, &c.—but, of the presumed *uses* of revealing the Doctrine of the Trinity, *hereafter*<sup>y</sup>.

XI. We now come to consider what could be done *on our part*, if those who *dissent* from us were desirous to agree upon some terms of Union.—Not that *success* has generally<sup>z</sup> attended *moderation*, but it must be a satisfaction to have endeavoured to prevent the excesses of zeal without knowledge.

It often happens in disputes, that a *term* gets *odium* annexed to it, and then the *use* of that term increases that odium. This has happened in the case of names, used as opprobrious, though harmless in themselves; as *Whig*, *Tory*, &c. And I suppose it has happened with regard to the Term *Trinity*; a Term which does not at all imply our Doctrine, but is only used (as before-mentioned), like

<sup>y</sup> The last Section of this Article. We might also refer back to the concluding part of Sect. III.

<sup>z</sup> See Mosheim under *Calixtus*, and *Syncretism*. Index.

like *Triumvirate*, to save repetition of particulars (Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), and at the same time to mark their connexion: to prevent a number of words. It is not a *scriptural* term, and our Doctrine might be expressed without it. Some have thought, “ Præstaret sacrae scripturae verbis adhærere in tanto mysterio <sup>a</sup> explicando.”—But it is conceivable, that any new word, with which no odium had been associated, though answering the same purpose, might be allowed by all parties.—See Voltaire, Quarto, Vol. 24. p. 462.

XII. It might tend to promote moderation, and, in the end, agreement, if we were industriously on all occasions to represent our own Doctrine as wholly *unintelligible*. Something of this has been hinted before<sup>b</sup>: the plan would be useful, as it would put us upon the footing of those, who profess unintelligible Doctrines, and give us all the Liberties described in the tenth Chapter of our third Book. It would also oblige our adversaries, who were disposed to continue the combat, to oppose us on ground less advantageous to themselves; on the ground of expediency: at the same time that it would dispose others not to attack us at all. I fear we in general pretend too much, that our Doctrine is intelligible; or we use language, which seems to *imply* such pretension: Bishop Pearson and Dr. Waterland would have written with greater effect, if they had taken occasion, from time to time, to say, that, though they exposed the misrepresentations of others, they did not pretend to have any clear ideas of their own Doctrine.—Whilst we

<sup>a</sup> Seder Olam. By the way, Buxtorf, in his Bibliotheca Rabbinica, does not speak, as if the Author of *either* Seder Olam had been at any time a *Christian*. Dr. Maclaine condemns using unscriptural terms. On Mosheim, Cent. v. ii. v. x.

<sup>b</sup> In Section x.

we speak as if we understood our Doctrine, the difference between Dissenters and us is a difference of *Opinion*; but, when we own, that we have no ideas to the Doctrine, though we think it our duty to retain it, the difference may be merely a difference of *words*; for which the injunction to “speak the same thing<sup>c</sup>,” may be a complete remedy. The words of our Article might be made to express the difficulty of the Doctrine more strongly, than they do at present, but the meaning would, in reality, be the same with the present meaning. “There is an *inconceivable* connexion, it might be said, between the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, more intimate than can be *defined*; and each of these has *infinite* power and wisdom, *as far as* is consistent with the infinite power and wisdom of the other two, and with the *Unity* of God. —And each has existed for a *time* without *limit*.” — This language does not pretend to convey clear ideas; that of our Article rather does.

XIII. I apprehend, that our Divines do not dwell sufficiently on that fundamental principle of both natural and revealed religion, the *Unity* of God: they run out into proofs of the Divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, as if these Doctrines were not limited by each other, and by those of the Divinity of the Father, and the divine *Unity*. To dwell frequently on the divine Unity, to recur perpetually to it, is necessary, in order to keep our trinitarian doctrine in its right form; to omit the mention of it at any time, is really *misrepresentation*: the Divinity of the Son is a doctrine of a *part* of Scripture, more properly than of the whole; and therefore it must be always so understood, that it may be consistent with other parts. Though, for the sake of distinctness, the Divinity of the Son is considered

<sup>c</sup> 1 Cor. i. 10.

considered separately in the second Article, and that of the Holy Ghost in the fifth.—Moreover, dwelling much on the Unity of God would be useful, with respect to our *adversaries*. Those, who were most candid, and most inclined to concord, would find their minds softened, and their prejudices against us weakened: And those of a more contentious nature would lose some advantages, which they at present possess: they call themselves *Unitarians*; a favourable name! since all Polytheism is undoubtedly error and barbarism: but are they more Unitarians than we are? that is what they would insinuate; but their pretensions to the title would appear the more feeble, the more frequently we insisted on the Unity of God. *Anti-trinitarians* would be a fair honest name for them to give themselves. The Father of Gregory of Nazianzum Cave speaks of as “*virum optimum, at Hypsistariorum erroribus miserè seductum;*” and then he adds an explanation of what he means by *Hypsistarii*. “*Secta ea erat ex Judaismo et Gentilismo conflata, quæ tamen summum illum et Ἰψιστον Θεον, unde sectæ nomen, unicè colebat.*”

I suppose the main objection of moderate, private men, of those, who are to be reckoned neither friends nor enemies to the Doctrine of our Church, is, that it interferes with the Divine Unity; this is an objection continually operating, therefore no occasion should be neglected of convincing them, that no set of men are more strenuous than ourselves in maintaining that fundamental doctrine.

XIV. In bringing our Church and its adversaries to an agreement, one principal difficulty would arise from our addressing ourselves to the Son and Holy Ghost in *Prayer*. As we hold them to be divine, we must think ourselves obliged to pay them

them divine honours: such Dissenters as account them *not* divine, would look upon it as a profanation to address them in prayer.—I do not see how this difficulty is to be obviated, except it were to be allowed, that any Being may be addressed *as what he is*; and then *scriptural* expressions were to be used in the form of addresses. In this case, the addresses might be offered in different senses by different persons; but this need occasion no disturbance or confusion; as was shewn from the instance of “deliver us from evil,” and other instances in the third Book<sup>d</sup>.—And why may not any Being be addressed as what he *is*? Protestants are against offering up prayers to *Saints*, or any being except the Supreme; but then is it not because, in the prayers usually offered, something is implied, which really is not true?—as that the persons addressed can hear and assist, when they cannot? We are, at least, in no danger of *such* error, if we adhere to words of Scripture. Our addresses might be called *prayers* by those, who thought the Son and Holy Ghost Divine Persons; by others they might be called *petitions*, or by any other name.—Perhaps those, who would not allow the Holy Ghost to be a *Person*<sup>e</sup> of any kind, might decline addressing any thing to him; and there might be some, who conceived the Son to be incapable of hearing them; yet he engaged to be with the Church “*always*,” “*even unto the end of the world*.” The *Vine* must needs be as much alive as the *branches*; the *Shepherd* as the *flock*:—the *Head* of the Body as the *members*. Possibly, the  
more

<sup>d</sup> See B III. Chap. IV. Sect. IV. v. IX.

<sup>e</sup> Dr. Priestley, in illustrating Matt. xxviii. 19, uses language as if the Holy Ghost was a person. See Familiar Illustrations, p. 36.

<sup>f</sup> Matt. xxviii. 20.



more candid and complying might address themselves to the Holy Spirit in their own sense; that is, make it a mode of addressing themselves to the *Deity*: and might conceive that the *Son*, he who was at the right hand<sup>s</sup> of the Majesty on high, and who was highly<sup>h</sup> exalted, so that at his name every knee should bow, might be addressed without profanation. Socinus himself allowed Christ to be divine (as he is called in the Racovian<sup>i</sup> Catechism) and disputed with Francis David in favour of offering up devotions to him: and, though this was changed, yet the use of terms wholly scriptural might have some effect.—Why should any Christian object to such an address as the following?

‘ O thou, who in the beginning wast with God, and wast God,—Thou, by whom all things were created, that are in Heaven and Earth—Thou, in whose name all men are by Baptism admitted into the new and last dispensation of God;—and made partakers of the new covenant:—at thy name every knee shall bow:—hear us; intercede for us; mediate between our Judge and us; be thou our Advocate with the Father; thou, who sittest at the right hand of the Majesty on high:—send to us the *Comforter*, which is the Holy Ghost:—thou, who knew no sin, and hadst power on earth to forgive sins, help us, who are concluded under sin; O Lamb of God, that takest away the sin of the world, let us not lose any of the benefits of thy stupendous sacrifice!’—This form of address might content *us*, and need not, one would think, disgust those who *dissent* from us —It might be much enlarged, without departing from Scripture.

xv. It

<sup>s</sup> Heb. i, 3.      <sup>h</sup> Phil. ii. 9.

<sup>i</sup> Sect. vi. See Mosheim's Hist. Cent. 16. Sect. 3: 2. 4: 22, &c.

xv. It could not be expected, that we should take so much pains to accommodate and recommend ourselves to those, who dissent from us, without expecting something from them *in return*. They might say, that, whilst we were bringing our doctrines, &c. nearer theirs, we were *improving* them; but this is not to be supposed; according to our notions we should be making them worse: if in any instance we conceived ourselves to be improving, that ought not to be reckoned amongst our compliances.—It might also be urged, that, if our side complied sufficiently, their's need not comply at all; but one side must feel reluctant and mortified, if the other does nothing; and experience tells us, that, in all disputes, if we would effect a reconciliation, we must provide more than what is barely sufficient; we must take for granted, that some part of what we provide will be wasted and lost.

I apprehend, that the Church of England and the generality of those who dissent from it, *might* unite and worship together, if they were properly disposed and directed: it would be a different thing to say, it is *probable*, in the present state of things, that they will; but it seems owing to faults and imperfections on one side or the other, that they do not:—I collect this from several things, which have been already considered;—as, that mutual concessions even in speculative doctrines, though we have not power to alter what the Scriptures declare, are <sup>k</sup> allowable for the sake of unity; and practicable;—that for social worship it is not perfect unity of private opinion, but only unity of Doctrine or Teaching <sup>l</sup> which is required: that the same forms of expression may be used by different persons

<sup>k</sup> B. III. Chap. IV. Sect. IX.

<sup>l</sup> III. IV. I.

persons in different *senses*<sup>m</sup>:—that we actually agree with many dissenters in all the *fundamentals*<sup>n</sup> of natural and revealed religion; and differ in scarce any thing, which the human mind can comprehend; in scarce any thing, except what belongs to the *Essence* of God, or what is to be done on the part of God.—How childish were it, for instance, not to allow those faculties to be *infinite*, to which *no limit* could be assigned! The Dissenters cannot limit the *duration* of him, who was “in the beginning,” nor the *power* of him, by whom all things were created, nor the *majesty* of him, to whom every knee shall bow; why then not allow them unlimited? that is, infinite?

But our *proper* business is now with the doctrine of the *Trinity*; and that as distinct from the doctrine of the Divinity of the Son or Holy Ghost:—the chief business, in mysterious doctrines, seems to be, to get *scriptural forms* of expression, which all might agree to, though in different senses;—we have already mentioned a form of address to the Son of God, and we will endeavour to imagine one to the Holy Ghost under the 5th Article. The term *Trinity* not being scriptural, we cannot adhere to Scripture and use that; but, as we recommended to our Church to drop it, we may recommend to Dissenters not to *quarrel* with it; the thing is in scripture, what signifies the word? why reject Trinity, and use *Triumvirate*?—it does not of itself imply, that the three Persons are divine; it only implies, that they are, in Scripture, (and ought to be, by Christians) so frequently mentioned together, as to make it worth while to have a *collective* name for them. If it is said, that, when our Church drops the term, the Dissenters need not adopt it, the answer is already given; both measures need not be practised,

but

<sup>m</sup> III. IV. V.

<sup>n</sup> III. V. III.

but both may be recommended, till one is practised. Each would make the other more readily submitted to. And recommending both is the most likely method to accomplish one.—Even if no other sense could be annexed to the word Trinity but our orthodox one, the most that could be said would be, that we wish Dissenters not to reject a word, which is *unmeaning*, and which expresses briefly a doctrine, that we think it our duty to *record* and *proclaim*, though we do not comprehend it.

In the present case, the Dissenters, as it seems from the nature of the thing, might more easily come over to us, than we to them. If we join them, we must deny to the Son and Holy Ghost that honour, which appears to us to be due to them; this we cannot do without violating those relative duties, which we conceive *may* be important. The Son and Holy Ghost seem to be set forth in Scripture as *instrumental* in the salvation of Mankind; we dare not prefer any plan of our own to that, which seems to us *divine*. But, if they join us, all they need do is, to use, or perhaps be present while we use, a few unmeaning words; every one gives up something as an individual for the good which he receives as a member of society; what easier sacrifice than this can be made to social religion? so long as we clearly maintain the *Unity of God*, why need others scruple a few unmeaning sounds merely because they *seem* to interfere with it? If they draw up any other forms of words to contradict ours, those forms must have as little meaning as ours<sup>o</sup>, considered *only* as a contradiction:—and can it be conceived possible, that the omniscient Judge would condemn any person for such a compliance as is here meant, when his only motive for making it was a desire to promote the

<sup>o</sup> See B. III. Chap. x. Sect. III.

the influence of Religion, by strengthening religious society?—and, when he does no more from that motive, than he probably does on other <sup>p</sup> occasions for less important ends?—It seems agreed, that giving a verbal assent in *ordinary* matters is innocent, as being needful, though we do not understand what we assent to (as in law-forms); but it is never more needful, never more requisite, nor therefore ever more excuseable, than in matters of Religion.

I should imagine, that a perusal of *Constantine's Letter* <sup>q</sup> to Alexander and Arius, might afford some pleasure to such as were inclined to adopt these sentiments. It is curious to see how Voltaire <sup>r</sup> forgets all his contempt of Constantine, when he would give force to this Letter as bearing hard on theological disputes.

xvi. The last part of what we have called the Application is, to inquire whether our researches have given us any reason to think, that any *improvements* may be made relative to the subject of our Article.—It seems possible, that more attention may be paid to the number of *Trinities*, which occur in ancient writings, and that some better account may be given of them than has hitherto been given; but this is mentioned cursorily; some things may deserve a more careful and distinct attention.

It seems as if improvement might be made in the manner of applying *philosophy* to the Scriptures; or in hindering it from being wrongly applied; such improvement I mean as might tend particularly

<sup>p</sup> B. 111. Chap. x. Sect. 1. and 11.

<sup>q</sup> See Eusebius's Life of Constantine: Book 2d. partic. Chap. 64. 69. 70.—mentioned in Lardner's Account of the Council of Nice.

<sup>r</sup> Works, 4to. Vol. xxvii. p. 452.

particularly to settle the doctrine of the *Trinity*. In the present age, we are proud of our philosophy, and we encourage it so much as to make it sometimes run out into luxuriance; to reduce and prune luxuriant shoots, is certainly to improve:—indeed Christians in all ages, especially those who have prided themselves on any opinions, have made too free with Scriptures; and many parts of the Canon have been rejected, at different times, because they were, or seemed, contrary to certain favourite preconceived notions. The *Manicheans* had an abhorrence of *matter*, and therefore all parts of Scripture, which mentioned the uses of matter, were rejected as *spurious*; the whole Old Testament was cut off at one stroke; our *modern* Philosophers are prodigious *friends* of *matter*, and therefore Scripture must be construed so that even the *Soul* may be *material*. To *set aside* whole books of Scripture seems something more gross than to interpret; yet, if we set aside the genuine *sense*, we may as well set aside words too; for, deprived of their right sense, words must either be useless, or mislead.—But we have a *new* way of lessening the force of Scriptures, which do not favour us; instead of treating Books as *spurious*, we diminish the degree of *Inspiration*.—A sacred writer, we say, might be biased by his *prejudices*; he might be mistaken! we must not in *all* cases trust too implicitly! &c.

Surely, when our Adversaries go these lengths, they do not perceive, that they are in reality *confirming* those doctrines, which they confess themselves unable to overthrow, without measures which take away the whole matter in dispute. All that we affirm is, that, *supposing* the Scriptures, as we have them, to be divinely *inspired*, so that every thing in them is *truth*, such and such doctrines are contained

\* Priesley's Letters, p. 149. 159. p. 122. is strong.

contained in them:—the moment that our adversaries change any part of this supposition, there is no longer any question between us.—Dean *Allix*, in the Preface to his Book already quoted, speaking of the Socinians, says, that their divisions occasioned their want of success; and those divisions, he says, “will unavoidably follow, till they can agree in unanimously rejecting the authority of Scripture.”—The Book was published in 1699, and whoever compares the event with the prediction, will be struck with the sagacity of the Author.

The implicit reverence, which we ought to shew to the Scriptures, is well expressed in a piece about *Noëtus* the Patristian, ascribed to *Hippolytus*, according to Lardner's <sup>u</sup> Translation. “The Scriptures speak truth, but Noëtus does not understand them. But though Noëtus does not understand, the Scriptures nevertheless are not to be laid aside.” Noëtus was an Unitarian of the <sup>\*</sup> ancient sort: substitute a modern one, the passage is still applicable. Dr. Powell, who had as good pretensions to the character of a Philosopher as any man, has written a Charge “on the use and abuse of Philosophy in the study of Religion,” in which he says<sup>y</sup>, that “the English Clergy” “have wisely avoided the application of it, (Philosophy) where such application is impertinent or profane: impertinent, as in interpretation <sup>z</sup> of Scripture; profane, as in the judging of God's decrees.”

If

<sup>t</sup> P. xiii.

<sup>u</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 3. p. 16. where there is more said to the purpose than is here quoted.

<sup>\*</sup> Sect. v.

<sup>y</sup> P. 349.

<sup>z</sup> In some ways, and some cases, I am apt to think, Philosophy may be of use in interpreting Scripture; as for instance, about voluntary actions of man: Scripture speaks *common sense*, but it is *perverted*, by enthusiasm, or superstition, or by being taken too literally; perhaps there is no *remedy* here like true Philosophy:

If I may speak frankly, the truth of the matter seems to be this; the Trinitarians have *formed* their doctrine in one way, and the Anti-trinitarians in another: the Trinitarians have collected their doctrine from *Scripture* only; the Anti-trinitarians, disgusted with the difficulties attending that method, or with abuses of it, and hoping to soften and moderate what appeared to them harsh and uncouth, have set out from notions of common sense, reason, natural religion; and, taking for granted, that *Scripture*, if rightly interpreted, must coincide with these, have interpreted it by bringing it as near to them as possible. I should imagine, from their writings, that they themselves would *own* this, but, if any of them disown it, nothing more can be said. However, I will refer to a few *authorities*<sup>a</sup>, and then observe, that this is not simple, genuine interpretation; that, though it be true in theory, that Reason and *Scripture* coincide, yet in practice we are not to take for granted, that our present reason is perfectly right reason; (experience is against that;) and supposing God to inform us of  
any

phy: for that alone can unfold the real meaning of popular expressions, used from mens feelings. I had some such idea, when I said that Ep. *Burnet* sometimes seems to want Philosophy.—*Introduct. Sect. vi.*

<sup>a</sup> See Socinus on John i.—where he expresses a fear, lest Christianity should become *contemptible* in the whole world: the same thought appears in modern Socinian writings: see *Short Defence of Div. of Christ.* p. 25, 27.

See also *Mosheim*, Vol. 4. 8vo. p. 517. (or Cent. 16. Sect. 3. Part 2. Chap. 4. Sect. 15)—*Macknight* somewhere agrees with *Mosheim's* account; viz. that the Socinians take that sense, which is most agreeable to *reason*, without nicely observing the expression; but I do not now find the place, not having made my reference exactly.

*Tillotson* says, they attend to *words*, as opposed to the *intention*, with which those words are introduced: but that I conceive to be only the *means* of getting their *reasonable* opinion received. (Vol. 1. Fol. p. 412. on John i. 14.)



any thing, it probably would be something, which our reason would be unlikely soon to find out.

XVII. If we could accomplish what has just now been recommended, an honest simplicity of interpretation, we should naturally advance in improvement, by attending more and more minutely to the particular *circumstances*, in which any expressions were used, which seemed to interfere with each other.—In *popular* language, seeming contradictions and inconsistencies perpetually arise, or contradictions in words, when there is no inconsistency whatever in the meaning<sup>b</sup>. A large list of such contradictions might be taken out of Scripture, as all sects will allow; why then might not those seemingly opposite declarations concerning the *Divine Nature*, which have given occasion to different sects amongst Christians, be in some measure reconciled, if we attended to circumstances with sufficient exactness?—It seems to me as if much might be hoped for from this method.—The Scriptures do not, in different circumstances, speak in the same way of the equality or subordination of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and sometimes one situation succeeds another almost imperceptibly. The 17th Chapter of St. John's Gospel may afford an instance. When Christ prays to the Father in the character of a *man sent* to teach, &c. he speaks, with propriety, as if the Father were "*the only God*," and he himself a man. But, when he speaks in circumstances, which imply his earthly office to be *expired*, then he makes himself *equal* with God. In this light, compare verse 3 with verse 4, and verse 11, looking back to John x. 30, with a reference to Leviticus xxiv. 16.—In verse 3, he says, "this is life eternal, that they might know thee the *only true God*, and Jesus Christ

Christ

<sup>b</sup> E. 1. Chap. x. Sect. x.

Christ whom thou hast sent:"—But, when he has once said, "I have *finished* the work, which thou gavest me to do," (verse 4.) then *another scene* opens upon us; we are *in Heaven*, Christ is ascended to the "right hand of the Majesty on high;" the *earthly* things, the earthly offices of the *Messiah* are vanished; and, if we give into this conception, we shall rightly feel and understand what follows; "And *now*, O Father, glorify thou *me* with thine own *self*, with the Glory which I had with thee *before* the World was." In like manner verse 11. "And *now* I am no more in the *world*; but these are in the world"—keep them—"that they may be *one*, as *we* are."—Christ had before said, (John x. 30.) "I and my Father are *one*," and had been near being stoned, (according to Lev. xxiv. 16.) for using an expression so like blasphemy.

*Macknight* looks<sup>c</sup> upon this *oneness* as not being unity of *Person* (or perhaps *we* should say, of *substance*;) but only "a perfect union of *counsels* and *designs*."—Yet St. Paul says, "who, (what *man*, or *finite* being) hath known the mind of the Lord? or<sup>d</sup> who hath been his Counsellor?" I, for my part, can put no *limit* to the *wisdom* of him, who has "a perfect union of counsels and designs" with the Deity.—I think no *finite* being could use such language as Christ uses, though it may not convey a definite idea to *us*, about being *one* with the Father, without the greatest arrogance and presumption: was Christ then arrogant? consider the lowliness of his character, the humble simplicity of this affecting prayer. Read verse 21 and 22.—He, who had a right to utter such things, and was *humble* while he uttered them, can have nothing too great conceived of him. But we must not inroach too much on the subject of the second Article.

St.

<sup>c</sup> On the place, p. 569.

<sup>d</sup> Rom. xi. 34.

St. Paul says<sup>e</sup>, “to us there is but *one God*, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and *one Lord*, Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him.” This verse, taken by itself, might lead us to think, that the Father only was to be considered as *God*, and the Son as having some kind of authority, *not* divine, which made him to be entitled *Lord*. But, if we consider the *circumstances*, in which the verse is introduced, I think it will clearly favour *our* doctrines. St. Paul is giving his directions to the Converts about their partaking of the heathen *sacrifices*, or *feasts* upon the sacrifices, or, as our Bible expresses it, eating things “*offered in sacrifice to Idols*.” He tells them, “an Idol is *nothing* in the world,” no real object of worship; there is but *one object* of reasonable worship, the *one* supreme *God*;—but then, as if recollecting, that this saying, however true, might mislead the Converts, with regard to the dignity of the character of Christ, now in Heaven, and prevent their addressing any adorations to him, he proceeds to mention *Christ* as a right object of worship, (the worship of him being supposed some how consistent with the worship of the *one* true God) only making some variety in his expression. He calls him *Lord*, instead of *God*; the word *God* having been used before, the repetition of it, in this case, might sound unpleasing; or even like Polytheism; but he calls him by a title, which had belonged to *Jehovah*, and by which the *one* supreme God might at any time be lawfully addressed.—Nothing can be more clear to me, than that St. Paul meant to *oppose* right objects of *worship* to wrong ones; and that he mentions *Jesus Christ* as a  
right

<sup>e</sup> 1 Cor. viii. 6.

P. S. Bp. Pearson has a short remark on this text, p. 251, on Creed, 1st. Ed.—or p. 126, *Fcl.* Ed.

right one. By calling him *Lord*, he could not mean to deny, that he was *God*; any more than by calling the Father *God*, to deny, that he was *Lord*. If *Christ* is not *God*, because there is but *one* *God*; we must say, that the *Father* is not *Lord*, for St. Paul tells us here expressly, there is but “*one* *Lord*.”

St. Paul says, that, amongst the *Heathens*, there are “*Gods many*, and *Lords many*,” and then adds, that we *Christians* have but *one* *God*, and one *Lord*; making the Father correspond, in some sort, to the *Heathen* *Gods*, the Son to the *Heathen* *Lords*; this induces Mr. Locke<sup>f</sup> to conclude, that *Christ* is called *Lord* here only as our *Mediator*, not in his *divine* character: though there does seem some analogy intended between the *heathen* *Lords*, or “*Lords many*,” and our *Lord* *Christ*, yet that, I think, cannot destroy the force of the reasoning just now used. I should rather say, therefore, that *Christ* is *Lord* *both* as mediator, and on account of the *Glory* which he had with the *Father* “before the world was<sup>h</sup>.” This is also *Bishop Pearson*’s<sup>i</sup> opinion, and the most scriptural. Besides, the description immediately following the mention of *Jesus Christ* does not agree so well with the idea of *Mediator*, as of *Creator*: “by whom are all things, and we by him.”—And let any one compare this with what is said in like manner of the *Father*:

<sup>f</sup> Locke on 1 Cor. viii. 6.

<sup>g</sup> Hume (Nat. Hist. of Rel. Sect. 4.) shews, that Deities were not always considered as Creators of the World. Mr. Locke’s distinction is, into Θεοί, Gods, who were supposed to reside in Heaven, and Δαίμονες (answering to *Baalim*) Lords, or *Jord-agents*, who were supposed to reside on earth, and do all business between men and the Θεοί: the Θεοί being too great to transact business with men immediately.—Locke refers to *Mede*.

<sup>h</sup> John xvii. 5.

<sup>i</sup> See the passage just now referred to.

*Father*: “of whom are all things, and we in him:” —let him, who can, interpret these two descriptions, so as to shew, that the one belongs to a Being purely divine; the other to a Being merely human.—I do not say, that these descriptions convey distinct ideas, or are intended to do so;—but they prevent our assigning *limits* to the attributes of the Persons described.

More instances might be produced of the Son being spoken of differently in different circumstances; in which the consideration of the circumstances would remove, or account for, any seeming inconsistency: but, the notion being sufficiently opened, I will confine myself to remarking, that Dr. Samuel Clarke, that learned, candid, and valuable writer, might have corrected and improved, as it seems to me, some of his observations, relative to our present subject, by that attention to circumstances, which we are now recommending.—He quotes many texts, in which he seems to think, that the word “*God*” is equivalent to the *Father*: but at the same time it should be observed, that *God* is very frequently spoken of in Scripture without any relation to the distinction of Persons in the Holy *Trinity*; as we should speak of him in reasonings on *natural* religion, in shewing his power and wisdom in the works of the Creation<sup>k</sup>. To  
introduce

<sup>k</sup> In 2 Cor. xiii. 14. (“the Grace of our Lord,” &c.) and in other places, (see Clarke’s Scrip. Doctrin. Trin. Part 1. Chap. 4. also Part 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 1, 2.) The word *God* does seem to be used where the *Father*, a Person of the *Trinity*, might be used; but my idea is something of this sort; suppose three persons joined in a *civil Government*, after the manner of the Roman *Triumvirate*, and two of them went out in certain *offices*, (to head an army, treat with foreign Princes, &c) then he who remained, and was merely Sovereign, might be called *Sovereign*, when the others were called *General*, *Admiral*, *Ambassador*, or &c.—Nor would it follow, that those who were from home had no sovereign power,

introduce the distinction of persons seems often unnecessary, (always perhaps, except when we are concerned with the Christian plan of sanctifying and saving mankind); and, when it is unnecessary, it may also sometimes be improper. However, I should think the word “*God*” must be, generally speaking, rather equivalent to the *three* Persons of the Trinity, than to any *one* of them<sup>1</sup>.

With regard to *Christ* in particular, when he addresses himself in his human character to God, or speaks of him to the Jews, he calls him not so much his *God* as his *Father*; sometimes *the* Father. — But even this word “*Father*” does not seem always to mean *the* Father in the Trinity. I should conceive it to mean, in many cases, God *in general*, if we may so speak; God, as independent of the trinitarian distinction of Persons. — When we say, “*Our Father, which art in Heaven,*” we mean the *one* Supreme<sup>m</sup> *God*, not one person of the Trinity; and Christ would naturally use the term more frequently than we: though not so often as he does, I should think, if the Socinian hypothesis were well founded; if Christ were a mere man, and only an human teacher, supernaturally assisted: he would, in that case, rather call God his *Lord*, his *Sovereign*, or &c. In some places, particularly where the Son speaks of his existence “*before the world was,*” or after the consummation of all things, the word “*Father*” may signify the Person of the Holy Trinity so called; but that the word “*God*” should denote

<sup>1</sup> Bp. Pearson (Creed, Art. 1. p. 59, 1st. edit.) has this distinction, which he calls “*vulgar,*” that is common; between the Father personally considered, or as a person of the Trinity; and *essentially* considered, “*as comprehending the whole Trinity.*”

<sup>m</sup> This language is used by *Pope* in his *Universal Prayer*; “*Father of all,*” &c. by *Milton*, “*These are thy glorious works, Parent of good.*”

denote the *Father* in ordinary discourses in the New Testament, seems very unlikely.

St. Mark gives an account of a Dialogue between our Saviour and a Jewish *Scribe*; they seem to agree about the Unity of God. Christ says, "The Lord our God is one<sup>n</sup> Lord:" or, he is *one*: the Scribe says, "there is one God, and there is none other but he."—But this has no more concern with the doctrine of the *Trinity* as it appears to *me*, than if that doctrine had never been revealed; the Unity of God is here only opposed to Polytheism and Idolatry; the Scribe could have nothing else in his mind:—yet Dr. Clarke says, that, in this place, what is said of *God*, is predicated ° of the *Father*; that is, of the Person of the Holy Trinity usually mentioned first. Surely, a due attention to circumstances would have prevented this remark. The Scribe knew, that the fundamental principle of the Mosaic Law was, 'avoid the Polytheism and Idolatry of your Neighbours.' When, therefore, he heard Jesus quote out of the Book of Deuteronomy<sup>n</sup> "Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord;" he could agree to the notion, that this was "the first commandment of all," in no sense but this;—'the command, which we Jews ought to consider as principal, is to keep clear of the Polytheism and Idolatry, with which our neighbours are corrupted: *Jehovah* is the only object of rational worship; Chemosh, Moloch, Remphan, are all abominations: nay, even the Host of Heav-

VEN,

<sup>n</sup> Mark xii. ver. 29. 32.

° Clarke's Scripture-doctrine of the Trinity, Part 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 1 and 2, where the Texts stand in the order of Scripture. By the way, it appears, I think, from this part, that *Athanasius* overlooked the distinction between *God*, considered independently of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the *Father*, a Person of the Trinity.

<sup>p</sup> Deut. vi. 4.

ven, though they declare the Glory of God, are not themselves to be worshipped:

Dr. Clarke has not noticed the difference of circumstances mentioned above in explaining the 17th Chapter of *St. John's Gospel*.

I may be permitted to add, that the *Council* <sup>3</sup> of *Carthage* ordered all prayers offered at the *Altar* to be addressed to the *Father only*. I presume, that the notion of the Council might be this;—that, when we are at the *Altar*, while we keep up the strict notion of an *Altar*, we look upon *Christ* in the light of a *Victim*; of the *Lamb* of *God*, sacrificed for the sins of the world: now no men ever pray to a *Victim*.—*Bingham* says much the same<sup>4</sup>. *Mr. Gibbon* will have it, that *Christians* have the same Being for *God* and *Victim*:—*Christ* is *God* in one view, and *Victim* in another view; but these are not to be confounded: and the Council might aim at avoiding such confusion.

XVIII. It would be a considerable improvement, if we were to increase our caution (and we could not easily increase it too much) in connecting any propositions, which we do not understand; or in forming them into any kind of syllogism, or argument. For, when we do so, our reasoning is merely verbal, it has no meaning: and yet by the use of it, we may get into hurtful absurdities, which may disgust religious and rational men. Some great writers seem to have fallen into this fault; and they have done harm by it to the general cause of Christianity. I fear, I might instance in *Bishop Pearson*, *Bishop Burnet*, and *Dr. S. Clarke*, as well as in ancient writers.

The

<sup>4</sup> *Bingham*, 13. 2. 5. refers to the *third* Council of *Carthage*, (*Can.* 23,) which according to *Cave*, (*Hist. Lit.*) was held A. D. 252.

<sup>5</sup> *Bingham's Antiquities*, 13. 2. 5.



The *Patripassians* were so called from their being said to maintain, that the *Father suffered* on the Cross. I suppose, they were Unitarians of the 'ancient sort; they made too little (or no) distinction between the Father and the Son; from whence, it seems probable, that their adversaries made them reason thus. 'The Son suffered; the Father and the Son are one; therefore the Father suffered.' Whoever reasoned thus, the fallacy is the same<sup>c</sup>. The reasoning may not be illogical in its *form*, but two ideas could not be compared with a middle term, when in reality there were no ideas to compare; but only *words* standing in the place of ideas. When we say, 'the Father and the Son are one;' we have not comprehension enough of the meaning, to ground any reasoning upon.—By the way, it has not always been thought proper to say, even that the *Son suffered*; if we mean by the Son one person of the Holy Trinity; though Jesus Christ, who, in some sense, was the Son of God, suffered indisputably. But I do not wish to revive the controversy of the 6th Century, *De uno ex Trinitate passio*<sup>d</sup>.

In the time of *St. Ambrose*, Baptism was sometimes administered only in the name of Christ:—that great Father, wishing probably to soften contention, runs into the fallacy here spoken<sup>e</sup> of, when he urges, that baptizing in the name of Christ only is, in effect, baptizing in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *because* they are *one*.—*Origen* seems more reasonable, when he<sup>f</sup> says,  
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<sup>a</sup> Sect. v.

<sup>c</sup> See Aug. H. er. 41. or Lard. Works, Vol. 3. p. 13.

<sup>d</sup> Card. Noris wrote an History of this Controversy, which is quoted by Mosheim—6th Cent. Vol. 2. 8vo p. 137.

<sup>e</sup> De Spiritu sancto, Lib. 1. Cap. 3. See Bingham, 11. 3. 3.

<sup>f</sup> See Bingham, 11. 3. 10.

it would have been improper in St. Paul, speaking of baptizing into the *Death*<sup>2</sup> of Christ, to mention the Father and Holy Ghost; they having nothing to do with *Death*: Origen here suits himself to *circumstances*.

In this train of thinking, we cannot but pity the sufferings of *Nestorius*; he would not call the Virgin Mary Θεοτοκος, though he had no objection to calling her Χριστοτοκος. ‘What perverseness!’ his adversaries would say: ‘Mary was the Mother of Christ; Christ is God; therefore was not Mary the Mother of God?’—but the fault was more in this syllogism than in Nestorius:—when we say, ‘Christ is God,’ our ideas are not distinct; we cannot argue on such a proposition<sup>3</sup>. Nestorius probably *felt* or *saw* this; an human being the mother of her own Creator! was more than he could admit, and his sufferings are a disgrace to the Religion of his age: Christ, when considered as the Son of Mary, should not be *confounded* with Christ as being in the form of God, *before* his Incarnation; or as being “King of Kings, and Lord of Lords,” *after* his ascension. The orthodox language is, that Christ had *two natures* in *one Person*: to which I have no objection, as things *divine* and things *human* are predicated of Christ, as of *one* agent or person; and this language brings all the texts into *one* view; but still it is barbarous to persecute a man, because he cannot get over such difficulties as those of Nestorius just now mentioned. Neither do we say, the Son and Holy Ghost are *Gods*; though we say the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost God.

This will let us know what we are to think of some expressions, which we meet with now and then,

<sup>2</sup> Rom. vi 3.

<sup>3</sup> Bp. Pearson calls the Virgin Mary, “the Mother of the Son of God”—on Creed, p 346. 1st Ed.

then, particularly in infidel writers; about Papists eating <sup>b</sup> *their God*; a *crucified God*—our saying, that the Jews were *murderers* of God; &c.—our having the same Being as God and Victim. (Gibbon.)—“Decree of the Holy Trinity<sup>c</sup>.”—They are all *wrong* expressions, as arising from inferring where inference cannot be admitted.

I cannot say but I feel some difficulty about Acts xx. 28:—and some indulgence for those, who derive expressions from that passage, which do not seem justifiable. Bishop <sup>d</sup> Pearson and Bishop <sup>e</sup> Burnet both use this expression; “*the blood of God<sup>f</sup>*.” I should not dare to use it; I should be more inclined to say, there is no such <sup>g</sup> expression in Scripture; in strictness there is not; nay, I do not believe, that any of the sacred writers would have used it: they seem to come very *near* it in the passage now referred to; but it seems to be, because

<sup>b</sup> Hume’s Nat. Hist. of Religion, Sect. 12. paragraph 2 and 4.

<sup>c</sup> Heylin Quinq. 2. 8. 5.—“*Suscipe sancta Trinitas,*” p. 37 of *Présent spirituel*.—and p. 58, “*placeat tibi sancta Trinitas.*”—p. 20, “*Seigneur, je vous ai reçu.*” *Présent spirituel* is a little French prayer-book.

<sup>d</sup> On Creed, p. 257. Fol.

<sup>e</sup> On Article 2d. p. 57. Octavo.

<sup>f</sup> Bp. Pearson says (Creed, Art. 4. *Deed.* p. 434, 1st Edit.) “*God died for us,*” has been the constant language of the Church. Whereas Lardner says, (Her. Praxeas, Sect. 8.) “no man ever allowed, that proper Deity suffered.” Bp. Pearson means, *that person* died, of whom things *both* divine and human are predicated, so that in *one person* he is said to have *two natures*: so that birth, suffering, and death, &c. are all predicated of him. We should be aware of the *reading* of Acts xx. 28; *δια τε αιματος τε ιδιου*.—as well as that Bp. Pearson says, and proves, that the *Divine Nature* cannot suffer, and that Christ did not suffer in his *Divine Nature*: see Art. 4. p. 379, 380, &c. 1st Edit. or p. 187, &c. Fol.

<sup>g</sup> P. S. In this, I find myself agreeing with Dr. Priestley, and disagreeing with the author of the Short Defence of the Divinity of Christ, near end of Appendix.

because the course of the sentence led them to it; “*God*” was in the first part or member of the sentence, and perhaps “*Christ*” would have been put in the second part, if it had required no *force* to make the change; but, as Christ was God *as well* as man, and as *no wrong notion* could arise out of the expression, the reasons might seem strongest *against* interrupting the course of the sentence: but this I am no way positive about;—the ‘Church<sup>b</sup> of Christ’ might have been a very good expression; but St. Paul was very earnest;—wanted to use as strong an expression as possible:—however all this may be, I am in general against changing the expressions of Scripture in *any* degree, in things above our comprehension, when it can be avoided<sup>i</sup>.

Is not this speaking against the Doctrine of the *Trinity*?—I imagine many Trinitarians would allow, that it might have been as well, if the Doctrine had continued in that *indefinite* state, in which it was before Christians engaged in controversy about it; to *assent* to it is not to declare, that you would have put the Doctrine into its present form, had you had your choice. It is not to approve of such a measure, though I think it may be approved on a principle of *self-defence*. As to the word *Trinity*, though it be not scriptural, and though I would give it up, I think it perfectly harmless and unexceptionable;—on the principle already mentioned, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost occur so often in Scripture, and ought to occur so often in discourses on Baptism, &c. that a collective name for them is highly proper and reasonable.

As

<sup>b</sup> Acts xx. 28.

<sup>i</sup> What I have said on Acts xx. 28. does not prevent its being used as an argument for the *Divinity* of Christ: because it seems clear, that such language would not have been used, if Christ was not, in some views, to be considered as *Divine*.

As to 1 John iii. 16. as the word *Deus* is not in our Testaments, and therefore the words “ of God” are in Italics, we need not dwell upon it.

xix. I do not see why it might not be a subject of *inquiry*, whether the word *God* is always used in the *same precise sense* in Scripture; as implying the same power, wisdom, &c? such an inquiry ought not to *determine* any thing, but only to *open* our views; we do not want it for ourselves, as our arguments go to prove the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghost in the highest sense; but only to give some ease and relief to those, who are shocked with our Doctrines; to open a path, by which they might possibly be able to *join* us: particularly such an inquiry might be a means of uniting different sects of Christians in that, which seemed most difficult, in offering up *addresses* to the Son and Holy Ghost. I use the more words for fear an innocent expedient should give *offence* to any well-meaning person. Those who should engage in such an inquiry would examine John i. 1. where it is said, that the same Being (the Word) “ was *with* God” and “ *was* God:”—they would consider, whether this could be without a plurality of Gods, if the word *God* was used both times in precisely the same <sup>k</sup> sense.—They would consider John x. 34. (with Psalm lxxxii. 6.) where Christ tells the Jews, that they could not consistently stone him for Blasphemy, in calling himself the Son of God, because they acknowledged those persons to be Gods, who were inferior to him; who could not do the works that he did:—Christian readers would see, that the reasoning of our Saviour had in it something of the nature of the argumentum  
ad

<sup>k</sup> See Theophylact’s answer to Porphyry’s cavil, mentioned in Lardner’s Works, Vol. 8. p. 211.

ad hominem, and therefore they would think whether he would have blamed the Jews for calling him *God*, in an inferior sense:—It would occur to them, that, in the imperfection of human language, a word was often used to express one kind of thing in different degrees; as a *King* of Spain and a *King* of Cherokees, have very different degrees of power, though both are called *Kings*:—and also that one person had in Scripture different titles in different circumstances, without any change taking place in that person; as *Moses* was a *God* and a *Servant*<sup>1</sup>, without any actual alteration in his condition. Such Inquirers might debate, whether things might not be represented *to us* with some accommodation to our faculties; as if when it was said such a Being was Divine, the meaning was, in strictness, only that *we* should *act and speak* as if he was so.

Perhaps nothing material could be objected to an *inquiry* of this nature; nevertheless, the *result* of it could scarcely be more than this;—‘We do not absolutely *conclude*, that understanding the word *God* in different degrees, as it were, *would solve* difficulties relating to the Trinity, but every opportunity of freely thinking, whether something of this sort might not possibly have some concern with the matter, must needs occasion a degree of ease and satisfaction to a mind fatigued with doubt and perplexity<sup>m</sup>.’

xx. The last improvement I shall mention is what consists in discerning more and more clearly  
the

<sup>1</sup> Exod. vii. 1. Hebr. iii. 5.

<sup>m</sup> Ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆ καὶ θεοῦ μετέχει. Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 14. —  
Transl. Anima hominis de Divinâ Naturâ participat.

—divinæ particulam auræ. Hor.

Could these expressions be of any use?

the *uses*<sup>n</sup> of the Doctrin of the Trinity. These should always have our diligent *attention*; but, at the same time, we should be very *cautious*, lest we lay too much stress upon our own conjectures.—I have already said, that our Christian Trinity does not seem to have sprung from the *fancy*<sup>o</sup> or the *ear*, but from the nature of things. I have mentioned some reasons, why we are unwilling to give it up to our dissenting brethren<sup>p</sup>; but I have hinted, that the *uses* ascribed to the Doctrin are only to be put on the footing of the *Illustrations*<sup>q</sup>; not to be considered as perfectly understood, but only as tending to abate men's prejudices against it. I have but little to add: only as the difficulty of the doctrine arises from seeming contradiction and inconsistency, it might be expected, that, when we came to *act* upon the different parts of it, we should find ourselves entangled and impeded by interfering duties and *obligations*; but that is not the case: we may *act* and *pray*, to God; to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; as we are commanded in Scripture, and never find ourselves, in fulfilling one duty, neglecting another. On this account, I should say, that, though the Doctrin of the Trinity be unintelligible in speculation, it is *intelligible in practice*.

<sup>n</sup> Cornish on the Pre-existence of Christ, and Waterland's Importance of the Doctrin of the Trinity, might be consulted.

<sup>o</sup> Sect. III. near the end.      <sup>p</sup> Sect. xv.

<sup>q</sup> Sect. x. end. See Jonathan Edwards's Sermons, on Faith, p. 141.

## A P P E N D I X

CONCERNING THE GENUINENESS OF I JOHN V. 7<sup>a</sup>.

I MIGHT now proceed to the second Article; but the famous disputed text, 1 John v. 7. being usually accounted one main support of the doctrine of the Trinity, I may be expected not to pass it over, or leave it undistinguished amidst the forty-eight already mentioned. Whether that text is genuine, being a *critical* inquiry, belongs properly to our first Book; but it will *seem* most worthy of attention in this place; especially as the controversy on this subject is revived.

It has been said<sup>b</sup>, that some Anti-trinitarians have in some degree favoured the genuineness of this text, and that some Trinitarians have thought it spurious: who the former are, I do not happen to know, or remember, at this time; but amongst the latter may be reckoned Bentley<sup>c</sup>, Michaelis<sup>d</sup>, and, for a time, Erasmus, and even Dr. Waterland: Dr. S. Clarke<sup>e</sup>, I should add, as I never conceive him to be what I should call an Arian.—We should also add the great Martin Luther: and Bishop Burnet<sup>f</sup> seems inclined to reject the Text.

*Infidels*<sup>a</sup> This Appendix was written in October, 1789.<sup>b</sup> Bengelius, Appar. Crit.<sup>c</sup> See Biographia Britannica, end of his life.<sup>d</sup> Introd. Lect. Sect. 151.<sup>e</sup> Vol. 4. Fol. p. 121.<sup>f</sup> On 1st Art. p. 49, octavo.



*Infidels* seem fond of opposing the genuineness of this Text, taking that occasion to revile the orthodox for fraud and forgery. Voltaire blunders<sup>e</sup> most terribly about it; and Mr. Gibbon has been thought very hasty in his assertions respecting it; though I think some Christians seem inclined to defend him<sup>h</sup>. Voltaire dates the forgery about the time of Lactantius, who is placed in 306; Mr. Gibbon says, the Text was first alledged to Hunneric at Carthage, 484.—His date, in his Table of *Contents*, is 530; but he says, p. 544, and 545, “It (the Text) was first alledged” at the Council of Carthage, which, I think, was 484.

This Text has occasioned much controversy in modern times<sup>i</sup>, but the ancients do not seem to speak, as if there had been any disputes amongst them relative to it; nor do I happen to remember any controversial language about it in the short writings of the famous Editors soon after the invention of printing.

The chief *opposers* of the genuineness of the Text are Emlyn, Wetstein, Michaelis, Benson, and Sir I. Newton:—the chief *defenders*, Martin and Twells (who converted Waterland): Bengelius is very candid, but favours the verse on the whole; and *Mill* does so decidedly, after reckoning up an host of arguments against it, which one would think invincible.

The

<sup>e</sup> See his Works, 4to. Vol. xxiv. p. 459; and Vol. xxvii. p. 426. In one place, he makes the 7th the disputed verse; in another, the 8th.

<sup>h</sup> See his History, Vol. iii. p. 544. Quarto.—*Cantabrigienfis* in *Gent. Mag.* 1788, and 1789.

<sup>i</sup> 1794. Mr. Porson in his Letters, published 1790, speaks as if this controversy had then continued two centuries and an half; see p. 69; it seems to have begun with Erasmus's publishing his first Editions without 1 John v. 7. and the Editors of *Alcala*, and Stephens *with* it. In the English Bibles of Hen. VIII. it is in a different *Character*; see Clarke, *Scrip. Doctr.* Part 1. Chap. iv.

The question seemed going against the genuineness, till Mr. *Travis*, in 1784, published some Letters to Mr. Gibbon, in quarto, on the subject. in a spirited and eloquent style. The year after, he published a second edition, in octavo, with corrections and additions. These have occasioned some remarks; the most formidable of which, that I have seen, are published in the Gentleman's Magazine for 1788 and 1789, under the signature of *Cantabrigiensis*. This Author professes to offer nothing *new*<sup>k</sup>; but I suppose his animadversions may not be yet (Oct. 28, 1789) completed; and what he has written he has made his own; he has not the style and manner of a *compiler*.

This is all the *History* of the dispute, which I will trouble you with; the arguments on the different sides are very numerous; I must content myself with giving general views of them, and then making a few remarks.

1. In order to prove, that the verse in dispute is not genuine, it is urged, that it is not found in any *Greek* MSS, or, not in any of any consequence. One at Dublin and one at Berlin are not reckoned to be worth mentioning<sup>l</sup>.—*Voltaire* says, it is found in modern MSS, but not in ancient ones: but he does not specify, nor must we take our facts from him, as he appears ignorant of the question.

It is also urged, that the verse is not in those ancient *writers*, where one might *expect* to find it; as in those, who commented on Scripture, or who were

<sup>k</sup> See Gent. Mag. for Feb. 1789, p. 101. beginning.

<sup>l</sup> In the Gentleman's Magazine for June 1789, I see it is said (p. 514. Col. 2d.) "four of which" (eleven) "omit the disputed passage:" are we to conclude, that it was found in *seven*? These MSS. are (or were) in the King of France's Library. The account is given by Le Long, who is supposed adverse to the passage, and who says, these MSS were what R. Stephens used for his edition of the Gr. Test. 1550.

were engaged in controversy about the Doctrine of the Trinity. *Bede*, for instance, placed by Lardner in 701, comments on the verses immediately before and after it, without noticing it. And the number of these Fathers, who have omitted this verse, is considerable: indeed amongst the Greek Fathers, the number is extremely small of those, who have introduced it into their writings.

As to *Versions*, there is doubt, whether it was in the old Italic; or whether it was in the Armenian; it confessedly was not in the Syriac, or the Coptic. Other versions are mentioned, as omitting it; but they do not seem to have been taken from the original, but from preceding versions.

Sometimes, the 7th verse is *marginal*; sometimes, the order of that and the 8th is<sup>m</sup> changed, which indicates an unsteadiness; something respecting it, unfixed, unsettled; sometimes, the 7th verse appears as a sort of mystical interpretation of the 8th.

*On the other hand*; Mr. Travis reckons up twenty-three private persons, or writers, who introduce or acknowledge the disputed text; these are all of the *Latin* or Western Church, except as Jerom declares that he had consulted Greek MSS.—Private persons, or individuals, are here opposed to *Bodies* of men: of *Bodies* of men *ten* are enumerated, who use or exhibit the Text; including the *Apostolus*, that is, the collection of Epistles, in Greek, which were read in the Service of the Greek Church. In this number are also included three versions, out of five original versions, the Armenian, Jerom's Latin, (or the Vulgate), and the old Italic. And a number of omissions are shewn in the Syriac and Coptic, such as to take away the effect of their omitting 1 John v. 7.—Only *two* Greek Fathers are adduced as having this verse, and one of those is of the 11th Century.

<sup>m</sup> Bengelius thinks it *should be so*.

Century. It is said, that the Complutensian Editors and Robert Stephens, (and Valla and Erasmus before them) all followed Greek Manuscripts; they all undoubtedly have the verse in question; though Erasmus had it not in his two first editions.

And now, what *judgment* is an impartial man to form on these grounds? it is not easy to be quite impartial, but a man may feel more freedom, when his determination will not involve him in any difficulties, on which side soever it is made.

First, as to MSS, particularly the Greek; it seems to me, that the text had been wanting in some early ones, and of course, in all those transcribed from them. But it might nevertheless be afterwards admitted reasonably, or restored, into the Canon of Scripture: many things are in our Scriptures now which have been found wanting in some MSS, and those MSS neither modern, as I conceive, nor of bad authority: Instances may be, Acts viii. 37.—John v. 3, 4.—John vii. 53.—Matt xvi. 2, 3.—Luke xxii. 43.—And the account of our Saviour's treatment of the woman taken in adultery, John viii. 3—11. These instances make me more easily fall into the notion, that passages really written by the sacred Penman may have been wanting in MSS older than any now in being. And this I apply to 1 John v. 7.—But, though our passage may have been wanting in some early Greek MSS, I cannot read what is said by the Complutensian Editors, R. Stephens, Beza, and Erasmus, nor by Valla, whose work Erasmus published, without believing, that they did see it in several valuable Greek MSS. And I observe the same of Jerom. All that can make any doubt, with regard to these persons, is the force of preconceived notions, or that these learned men might have an opinion, that, by forcing the  
Text

Text into their Books, they were doing service to the pure doctrine of the Catholic Church, as they would speak.—But the number of the Editors at Alcala is against this; and so is the number of the Divines of Louvain; (see Travis, p. 296, octavo:) and the characters of the others, their regard for literature in general, and particularly for sacred learning; and the circumstance, that no Doctrine would fall to the ground by this text being cancelled.—On the whole, it seems to me rather probable, that the passage was in *some* MSS as ancient as any of those which the Church used, when it fixed upon four Gospels and twenty-one Epistles, out of a large mixture of writings, genuine and spurious; though at the same time it might be wanting in others.—Mr. Travis supposes those Greek MSS, which were used by the first Editors, or printers, to be *lost*; and that they might be lost by being neglected after they had been used. Jerom's in Palestine could not be expected to survive to this time; but destroying MSS after printing from them seems too common a practice, in general. The best judgment, that I can form out of what is urged on both sides relative to *Versions*, is, that our disputed verse *was* in the old Italic, because several of the passages of the Latin Fathers, in which it is introduced, seem to have been written before that ceased to be the Scripture of the Latin Church. About Jerom's Vulgate, there is no doubt.—To consider the *Armenian*, would introduce too long a discussion for *us*. The omissions in the Syriac and Coptic do seem very numerous.—The old Italic is of consequence; it was much older than any of our Greek MSS; nay, it seems to have been the Scripture of the Western Church from the earliest times.

It does seem strange, that the passage in question should not have been more frequently introduced by the *Fathers*.—Its being omitted in a continued commentary is the greatest objection to it.—Indeed Chrysostom comments in Homilies, and he seems to go no farther than the Epistle to Hebrews; but Bede's is a direct and pointed omission. In such a case, we may suppose, that, on the whole, those MSS were preferred, which omitted the verse: *Bede* must rank with *Bentley*; though Mr. Travis does not allow this; he thinks Bede would have mentioned the omission, if there had been one.—Or he might rank with *Luther*, who certainly must have known many arguments on both sides, before controversy began, by being conversant in the works of the ancients.

Of Fathers not commentators, it may be said, that their works are only *fragments*, generally speaking: (the losses which we have had of the works of *Origen* are particularly to be lamented:) and that there might be good reasons for not quoting our passage, which we cannot conceive:—that the readings of it might be *unsettled*, and perplexed; and being so, that the sense of it might seem difficult, when put in its place:—that, before controversy arose, it is not a likely passage to be often quoted;—and that, after controversy arose, that controversy was not so much about the *Trinity* as is commonly said; the *Arian* controversy was more about the Divinity of the Son of God, of which this Text could not be any *favourite* proof.—Tertullian did dispute with Unitarians, as such, and he seems to me to have interwoven the Text in his writing, according to the manner of the early Fathers<sup>a</sup>; though others seem in the same case,<sup>o</sup>

to

<sup>a</sup> See accounts of what Scriptures the early Fathers owned, in Lardner's *Credibility*.

<sup>o</sup> See Mill on the place.

to have passed it by, as if it was not so much noticed formerly as now. This text is undoubtedly a very good one to justify our speaking of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost *together*; and the union mentioned implies great dignity of character in the Son and Holy Spirit; but yet the *Divinity* of the Son and Holy Ghost (which is included in *our* Trinity) appears more satisfactorily from other parts of Scripture, where their attributes are described separately. Indeed I should doubt, whether the belief of it ever would have arisen from this passage, especially as many learned commentators <sup>p</sup> look upon the Union as meaning only what we call unanimity.

But, supposing the Doctrine of the Trinity ever so clearly set forth in this Text, yet it might not have been frequently quoted, if it be true, that there was a *reserve* in the leaders of Christianity about publishing *mysteries*. Christ himself <sup>q</sup> and St. Paul <sup>r</sup> certainly offered Doctrines gradually:—and I am clear, that, if I was a missionary, or was to be employed in making converts, I should be a good while before I insisted on this verse.—Though I should not wish to <sup>s</sup> expunge it, as there are so many other texts, which join the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

And, after all, we have no Fathers, Greek or Latin, before or after the time when it confessedly appeared, that make the least *objection* to this text, or to its authenticity; so that the silence of its friends is to be set against the silence of its enemies. That the Arians should not deny its authenticity, is a phænomenon, which should be accounted for; and, if it is said (what is but too true) that many writings

<sup>p</sup> Beza is one, I think. Bp. Horsley is of this opinion.

<sup>q</sup> John xvi. 12.      <sup>r</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 2.

<sup>s</sup> See Bengelius on this passage.

writings of reputed heretics have been destroyed through mistaken prudence, yet we might answer, that great numbers of arguments of Heretics are preserved in the writings of those who answer them; and that, particularly, it is improbable, that the Bishops should have given in so long a confession of faith at the Council of *Carthage*<sup>u</sup>, and should have made use of the text in question, without giving any intimation, that the Arians disallowed it. Of all times for its being *first* alledged, that is the most improbable, which Mr. Gibbon fixes upon.

The Argument arising from the *connexion* of the contested verse is urged on both sides: those, who reject it, say, that the insertion of it <sup>x</sup> hurts the sense of the whole passage; those, who are for adopting it, say, that the sense is quite maimed and imperfect without it.—Bengelius, as I remember, grounds his admission of it chiefly on it's suitability to it's place. To me the whole passage seems so difficult, as to admit of different interpretations: yet that given in the paraphrase <sup>y</sup> of Erasmus pleases me most. Every one, in such disputes as these, tells his own judgment simply as a fact; claiming liberty at any time to retract it.

In forming this or any other judgment, I may be prejudiced; those, who have got warmed in the controversy, shew a considerable bias, I think, one way or the other; a thing which ought to be attended to: yet I would, if possible, acquit them all of intentional deceit; all have faults: Mill indeed is dispassionate; Bengelius seems warmly candid;

<sup>k</sup> Aug. contra Faustum, &c. Origen contra Celsum.

<sup>u</sup> See Travis's Appendix, No. xiv.

<sup>x</sup> Michaelis, Introd. Lect. p. 382. Quarto. Sect. 151.

<sup>y</sup> Travis, p. 336. P. S. Sir Isaac Newton's seems good: and Clarke's, Scrip. Doctr. Trin. Part 1. Chap. 4. would not have been objected to, if it had occurred first.



did; even Sir Isaac Newton, in some passages, seems approaching to a kind of perihelion. Mr. Gibbon is disdainful; Voltaire is pert and flippant; but I am very desirous, if possible, to acquit them all of deliberate fraud:—To be sure, when a man, fixed in an opinion, sees a passage that suits him, he seizes on it as his prey, turns to his own writing, and thinks not of going any deeper: if, in such a case, going a page or a sentence farther would have shewn him, that he is totally wrong; he does incur some suspicion of having concealed, what perhaps he never knew: but, as this happens to all sides, and as there is no end of critical researches, let us take for granted that degree of innocence, which will ensure liberal treatment and liberal language. Only let every one beware of his own *hypothesis*; of his own manner of accounting for the text being in, or out.—An hypothesis is a favourite child;—must not be blamed though ever so blameable.

Thus self-cautioned, I will make only general suppositions:—either this contested verse must be *genuine* or *spurious*: if genuine, it must have been *expunged* unfairly; if spurious, it must have been *admitted* unfairly: which is easier to conceive? Could it be expunged?—many passages, we find, have been, though we cannot now tell why:—so might this; the ancients made very free with Scripture; even whole books have been rejected, when they stood in the way of settled notions: while a number of writings of doubtful authority were claiming attention, the judgment of private individuals had more scope than now<sup>2</sup>. Whoever first omitted any passage in any copy, it would be omitted by all transcribers

<sup>2</sup> Yet Luther is said to have rejected the Epistle of James; and Michaelis the Epistle of Jude: well might they reject a single verse.

transcribers from that copy, and from theirs. Some seem strongly persuaded, that governors of a Church, or leading men amongst Christians, might *order* some things to be omitted in some copies. When those who transcribe do not understand what they write, if two things are *like*, (as the 7th and 8th verses are), one of them gets omitted<sup>a</sup>.— Though, therefore, there are other passages to the same effect with this under consideration, it might be genuine, and yet get expunged.

Now suppose it *spurious*; then it must have got *admitted* unfairly: is this equally easy? why should it be forged? Voltaire says, a man would be mad to forge it; but he did not understand the subject: we may say, that no one would think of forging such a passage, till it was wanted in <sup>b</sup> controversy: but *then*, enemies would be upon the watch; and they, by objecting, could stop the forgery: Mr. *Gibbon* says<sup>c</sup>, this forgery was committed about the time of the Council of Carthage; but, durst the African Bishops forge it at that time? would not the Arians, who were then in power, have been clamorous?— of such a forgery at such a time, I see no degree of probability.

If this Text might be more easily expunged unfairly, than admitted unfairly; it is more easy to conceive it genuine than spurious.

Perhaps this question may be determined satisfactorily *hereafter*; new MSS may be found; in the East, where Jerom was; in Spain, where Cardinal Ximenes had MSS; or in other places.—At present, I should think Mr. Travis's book might be recommended

<sup>a</sup> "There are three that bear record," the scribe writes; looks up again, takes the second for the first; goes on, "in earth."

<sup>b</sup> Some suppose it to have been written *marginally* first, as a gloss upon the 8th verse, and afterwards to have been taken into the Text; as before-mentioned.

<sup>c</sup> Vol. iii p. 544. Quarto.

recommended to the perusal of those, who wished to learn something of the critical part of Theology, and yet did not relish a book if it had not animation and acuteness.—Till farther satisfaction be obtained, may all controversialists be careful in their researches, humble in their pretensions, candid in their judgments, and benevolent in their expressions<sup>d</sup>.

<sup>d</sup> 1794, March 24. This day, in my Lecture, I read to my Auditors this Appendix on 1 John v. 7. first written in 1789, and observed, that, supposing the evidence on which the remarks in it were built, as good as it might appear to be to any reasonable man, there was little in them to be ashamed of: then I mentioned in what points Mr. *Poyson's* Letters called that evidence into question: Stephens's MSS, Erasmus's Codex Britannicus, &c. &c. were mentioned; and I read part of Sir I. Newton's Stricture on Beza; and some passages from Marsh's Michaelis. I said, that, as Mr. Travis was about to publish, it would be indecent and unfair to come to any decision at present. I recommended the *εως χειρ* on some occasions, and observed that many errors had arisen from impatience under suspense. (See B. 11. Chap. 11. Sect. 1.)



## ARTICLE II.

OF THE WORD, OR SON OF GOD, WHICH WAS  
MADE VERY MAN.

**T**HE Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took Man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance: so that two whole and perfect Natures, that is to say, the Godhead and Manhood, were joined together in one Person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God, and very Man; who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for actual sins of men.



I. This Article, if we were to attempt to treat it *fully*, would carry us too far, considering that we are not to fix our attention upon any one Article, so as to neglect the rest. The volumes, which have been written upon the Doctrine contained in this second, are innumerable. Our business must therefore be to select such considerations as seem most essential, and belong most immediately to us.—In order to do this, we may observe,

1. That what has been said under the *preceding Article*, need not be repeated under this;—and the Doctrine of the Trinity is so intimately connected with our present Doctrine, that many things have been  
been

been said already, which might have been now said with at least equal propriety.

2. That every thing relating to the *last clause* of this Article, which affirms, that Christ was a *victim* both for *original* and actual sin, may properly be omitted till we have gone through the *ninth* Article: especially as it will have a place under the *eleventh*.

3. That we may leave the minuter parts of Controversy to those, who make the Doctrine of this Article their sole object, and content ourselves with more *general* views of the matters, on which *disputes* are apt to turn.

Our plan may nevertheless be the *same* as in the preceding Article. First, to take an *historical* view of our subject. Secondly, to give an *explanation* (which will be chiefly historical) of the expressions of the Article. Thirdly, to *prove* the truth of the propositions contained in it. And, lastly, to make an *Application* of the whole to the present situation of things.

First then, we are to take an *historical* view of the Doctrine contained in the second Article of our Church: first, of the Orthodox Doctrine; afterwards, of the deviations from it.

The *Jews* seem to have had some notion of a *Son* of God before the Christian æra, and to have applied the term *Λογος* to him; as also to have, in some way, connected their ideas of their expected *Messiah* with the same Personage.—It is scarcely to be expected, that their notions should be found definite and *distinct*, as they had not distinct information, but only obscure intimations: if they only afford a sufficient apology for St. John's mentioning the *Word* so <sup>a</sup> *seldom* as he does, that will, I presume,

<sup>a</sup> Four times; or however in only four different *verses*. John i. 1.—John i. 14.—1 John v. 7.—Rev. xix. 13. Abp Tillotson talks of St. John's *frequent* mention of the Word; he must mean his repetition in John i. 1. surely?

I presume, be deemed sufficient;—and for giving a title to so sublime a character without any preparation, or explanation.—If he addressed himself to those, to whom his term was *familiar*, he had no need to explain it.

Whence we collect what were the notions of the Jews, has been already <sup>b</sup> shewn.

That what I have affirmed is true, must appear from consulting a number of passages in the most ancient Jewish writings; I will therefore content myself with *referring* to those *writers*<sup>c</sup>, who have collected such passages; only I will *read* some of them to those, who may not happen to have the Books in which they are contained.

There are some passages, especially of the Old Testament, which mention the *Word* of God, so as to give me no idea of that Word's being a *Person*; and the same of the *Breath* or Spirit <sup>d</sup> of God: Lardner seems to speak <sup>e</sup> of these, as if there were no others; but there are some passages of the ancient Jews, which I can understand only as making the Word a *Person*. These may be seen in *Allix*, before referred to.

It must be confessed, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, when they came to fact and practice, seem to have not been much influenced, at one time, by these habitual notions, received by tradition; they seem to have given themselves up to the

<sup>b</sup> Art. I. Sect. II. Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, might be added.

<sup>c</sup> *Allix* on Unitarians, beginning: p. 2. 102. also Chap. 12. p. 181. Chap. 16, and 17. p. 253, and 265. Tillotson, Vol. 1. Fol. p. 410. Pearson on the Creed, p. 117, Fol. or 233. Quarto. Grotius de Ver. 5. 21. Parkhurst's Gr. Lex. under *λογος*.

<sup>d</sup> Psalm xxxiii. 6. Yet those, who were upon the watch for intimations, might consider "*Word*" as meaning the Son of God; and "*breath*" as meaning his Holy Spirit.

<sup>e</sup> Works, Vol. 6. p. 216.

the delusive hopes of being rescued from their state of dependence, by a temporal Prince; but that only proves, that their notions of *Logos*, and *Son* of God, as connected with *Messiah*, were not *definite*, and *distinct*, (as was just now allowed) but to be confirmed by *facts*, like prophecies: and therefore were such as might be set aside, at times, by the force of *passion*. See Dr. George Campbell's Essay on *Kyrios*, p. 316; and Waterland's Answer to Dr. Whitby's Reply, p. 51.

But we are told<sup>f</sup>, that *Jews* and *Christians* have both borrowed notions of *Λογος* from *Plato*:—our answer to this has been already given, under the preceding Article.

The opinions of *Christians*, with regard to the *Word*, seem to correspond to their several opinions of the Person and dignity of *Christ*.—Even Dr. Priestley<sup>g</sup> says, “the *Word*, or *Christ*,” as if he did not disown, that the *Word* might mean *Christ*, as Socinus<sup>h</sup> himself supposed; yet he rather follows the more modern Socinian notion, that the *Word* means only “the *Power* or *Energy* of God.”—As the word *Λογος* may mean either *inward reason*, or *audible speech*, two *epithets* have been added to it, in order to distinguish these senses; *λογος ενδιδακτος*, or *inward reason*, has been opposed<sup>i</sup> to *λογος προφορικος*, or *speech pronounced or set forth*;—but using *λογος* in either of these senses, seems to interfere with the *Personality* of the *Word*: on which account, I suppose, the Council of *Sirmium* condemned

<sup>f</sup> Gibbon's Hist. Vol. 2. Quarto. p. 237, &c.

<sup>g</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 30.

<sup>h</sup> “*Verbum vel Filium*” Cat. Racov. p. 61. and see Allix, p. 2. See also Lardner's Works, Index Logos: and Vol. 3. p. 76. Vol. 6. p. 215, bottom.

<sup>i</sup> These two sorts of *Λογος* are found in the *Trinitics*, Art. 1. Sect. 1.

condemned both<sup>k</sup>.—"Si quis inſitum vel prolativum, verbum Dei, Filium dicat; anathema fit."

The *orthodox* hold the *Λογος* and the *Son* of God to be the ſame; yet this does not occur in our *Creeds*.

Some writers, as Epiphanius and Philaſter, ſay, there was a ſect called *Alogians*, from their rejecting the *Logos*, and thoſe parts of *Scripture* where he is mentioned. Lardner thinks (Her. end) there is not ſufficient *teſtimony* of the exiſtence of ſuch a ſect;—it does not in itſelf ſeem unlikely; and the evidence is not bad.

Indeed, our proper buſineſs is now with the *orthodox* Doctrines; though, that we might not need to return to the *History* of the *Λογος*, I have mentioned ſome notions of thoſe, who were not *orthodox*.

II. What was before ſaid of the Doctrines of the Trinity, may be ſaid of that of the Divinity of Chriſt; which makes a part of it; that it ſeems, in ſome ſort, to have exiſted at all times, though not to have been made up into a ſpeculative, ſyſtematic form, till it was diſcuſſed in *controversy*<sup>l</sup>. As, in different parts of *Scripture*, written on different occaſions, and in different circumſtances, ſome expreſſions ſeem to favour one Doctrine, ſome another; ſo it is in the writings of the early Fathers<sup>m</sup>;—and, whiſt this was the caſe, it may either be ſaid, that the Doctrine exiſted, or that it did not exiſt; though more properly perhaps, that is, more according to the cuſtomary uſe of words, it might be ſaid not to exiſt, or at leaſt not to have come to maturity;—but then the ſame may be ſaid of any Doctrine *oppeſed* to that of the Divinity of Chriſt:

<sup>k</sup> Hilary's Works, p. 1175, 8th Anathema. A. D. 357.

<sup>l</sup> Art. 1. Sect. 1v.

<sup>m</sup> Bingham has collected the orthodox paſſages. 13. 2. 1, &c.



Christ: when one could be said to exist, in any sense, its opposite might be said to exist in the same sense.—However, I look upon the Doctrine of the Divinity of Christ to have come to maturity *before* that of the *Trinity*, as seems to appear from the Nicene Creed; which dwells most particularly on the Son of God.

We may reason thus: the establishment of a doctrine must depend, not only on its being discussed in controversy, but on the *extent* of that controversy. Though we suppose Tertullian and Praxeas to have discussed the Doctrine of the Trinity ever so accurately, yet, if the dispute was known to but *few* Christians, and was not noticed by the *main body* of the Church, it might not produce a *Doctrine*, in the common sense of the word. Now, the extent of the controversy concerning the Son of God was very great, so that whatever opinion was fixed by that, might properly be called a *Doctrine*; an *established* Doctrine of the *main body* of Christians; who would, of course, call themselves the *Catholic Church*<sup>a</sup>.

If we wished to see particularly the nature of the *progress*, which our Doctrine made, we need only put ourselves in the place of the early Christians, and think what they might naturally do. They might at first use warm and lofty expressions of *Scripture*, addressing themselves to the Father or the Son, as the occasion dictated. Then they might *vary* or paraphrase these expressions a little, so as to make them suit their own circumstances, without intending to introduce any new meaning: when variations were used, different people would use *different* variations or phrases; according to their  
views

<sup>a</sup> Bp. Burnet talks of the Trinity being *universally* received, &c. on the Articles, p. 48, Octavo; near close of first Article. This mentioned Art. 1. Sect. iv.

views and dispositions: this would produce mutual *remarks*; and remarks would produce *controversy*. What began in sentiment, would end in *speculation*, and so religion would be transferred from the Heart to the Head.

III. But I will not dwell longer on the History of the orthodox Doctrine:—I will now endeavour to look so far into the history of other opinions, or fancies, as may suffice to give us the *same views* which the *compilers* of our Article had, while their attention was confined to the business of forming it.

It seems probable to me, that all the notions, ancient and modern, respecting the Son of God, have arisen from a desire and hope of *solving* the difficulties naturally arising from the scriptural accounts of his Person and character<sup>o</sup>:—these difficulties are no doubt very great; nay, the only way to conquer them is to allow them to be *insuperable*; yet, as allowing that might be the effect of carelessness and indolence; attempts to clear them up cannot be universally blameable.

It is not easy to determine what method to pursue in reducing to order accounts so heterogeneous, so distant in time and situation, as those relating to Christ; but it seems as if we had best first mention what are the *Points*, on which difference can arise; and what are the *Sects* and *persons*, who have held any opinions with regard to those points.

The points, on which men have differed, when they thought on the subject of the nature and character of Christ, have been these. 1. His *Consubstantiality*

<sup>o</sup> Could it be said, that there is no one of the solutions of Heresies, which we should not be desirous to adopt, while we only considered the arguments *for* it, and *for* it *alone*? before we came to see what *difficulties* arose out of it, from its inconsistency with some parts of Scripture?

*stantiality* with the Father. 2. His<sup>p</sup> *pre-existence*, before his nativity. 3. The manner of his *Incar-nation*; or the manner in which the Word was made Flesh. 4. What is called the Hypostatic Union, or the conjunction of the Divine and human natures<sup>q</sup>, (Φυσεις) in one Person (ὑποστασις) or agent, called Christ; ἐνωσις καθ' ὑποστασιν<sup>r</sup>.

The *sects*, or persons, who have differed on these different points, I should reckon as *eleven*; dividing all the *early* Christian Heresies into two classes, and reckoning them only as two. We should notice then, 1. The Oriental, 2. The Jewish Heretics of the two or three first centuries. 3. The Arians. 4. The followers of Photinus. 5. Nestorians. 6. Eutychians. 7. The Monothelites. 8. The Adoptionarii. 9. The Socinians. 10. The Anabaptists. And lastly, some particular *persons*, who may not have given a name to a sect.—Though these may seem numerous, there is no doubt but the compilers of our Articles had them<sup>s</sup> all in view; indeed their views were much more extensive than

<sup>p</sup> This does not mean pre-existence as mere *man*, a thing which the Jews were inclined to believe; see Macknight on John ix 2.

<sup>q</sup> Whoever denies the second point must deny the first; — who ever grants the first must grant the second.

<sup>r</sup> Ὑποστασις is used for a *Divine Person* of the Holy Trinity, see Nicholls, Fol. on the 1st Art. p. 27. Yet what is here said *must*, I think, be right in *Doctrine*: it must be the ἐνωσις of two natures in ἑνῇ ὑποστάσει, though not of the Trinity.—I see, in Nicholls, Nestorius was blamed for holding two ὑποστασεις or two Persons; two Christs: p. 40. col. 2. ὑποστασις in Suicer, signifies this same thing called *Person* (as in Heb. i. 3.)—and, in one quotation, it is said, that one *person* of the Trinity took man's nature, united it with the Divine Nature (without confusion) and yet still was but *one* Person — Under ἐνωσις, there are mentioned several unions: ἐνωσις κατὰ φύσιν, ἐνωσις κατ' ἔσταν; and the hypostatic union is called ἐνωσις καθ' ὑποστασιν.

<sup>s</sup> See Title to *Doctrina*, &c. Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ, and the title of the Articles in that Collection: or Sect. iv. of the *Introd.* to this Book iv.

than ours will be merely for having considered these.

IV. We are to consider, or recollect, what the *Oriental* early Heretics held concerning our present subject; concerning Christ.—Here I would wish to have it seen, that men do not in general pay respect enough to their adversaries: instead of declaiming against those who oppose us, we should endeavour to find out what misled them, supposing their intention good: we should put ourselves in their place, and endeavour to see with their eyes.

This is difficult with regard to *Eastern* Christians, we have such different habits and prejudices from theirs: and I suppose that even Travel would not put us in their place, because most of their notions have taken their rise in remote antiquity.—All that we can now do is only to refer to the account of early Heretics given in the *Appendix* to our first Book, and select what is to our present purpose. The Oriental sects were strongly tinged with notions of a number of *Æons*: some of them from being accustomed to the worshipping of the *Sun*, let their fancies run to the heavenly *Luminaries*: most of them, if not all, had some abhorrence of *matter*: these notions subsisted, in some degree, before the coming of Christ; and those, who were unwilling to relinquish them, endeavoured to incorporate them with Christianity. The consequence was, that they had doctrines, which seem to us strange, concerning the creation of the world, the nature of Christ's *Body*, and of his residence after his ascension.—They held, that the material world was framed by *Æons*, or Spirits, amongst whom they reckoned *Logos*, *Monogenes*,  $\Phi\epsilon\gamma$ , and many<sup>t</sup> others; or that some inferior art-

ficer

<sup>t</sup> Lord King mentions *three* principles; from Origen. King on the Creed, p. 93.

ficer or *Demiurgus* in particular, was employed in that imperfect work: not any being so perfect as Christ. They maintained, that Christ had not a real body, but only an apparent one; and they were, on that account, called *Docetæ*, or *Phantasiastæ*: this was denying our Saviour's humanity: and they were obliged, in order to be consistent, to carry on their notions, by saying, that the accounts of the *crucifixion*, &c. were allegorical, or *mystical*;—this was of course to deny a proper *nativity*. Lastly, endeavouring to *connect* their notions of Christ with their notions of the luminaries, some of them held, that Christ was taken from the Sun<sup>u</sup>, or Stars, and was to return to them; in which case, Christ was only supposed to pass through the Womb of the blessed Virgin, as through a tube. This was an old notion; see Lord King on the Creed, p. 116. 157.—See Div. Leg. Index, “*Soul*.”—*Mani* made the second person of the Trinity to reside *in* the Sun, and made him correspond to the Persian *Mithras*. Some conceived Christ to come not from Heaven, but from the four *Elements*; and to be *resolved*<sup>x</sup> into them again. *Valentinus* is also said to have supposed Christ, as the Son of God, to be *cut off*, as it were, or separated<sup>y</sup> from the Father; so that a *part* of the Father was (or must be) taken away.

v. As the Oriental early Heretics denied the humanity of Christ, the *Jewish* denied his<sup>z</sup> divinity.

<sup>u</sup> Valentinus; Lard. Works, Vol. 9. p. 444.

<sup>x</sup> Lord King on Creed, p. 277.

<sup>y</sup> See Lord King on Creed, bottom of p. 133.

<sup>z</sup> Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. 3. 27. calls Ebionites and Nazarenes two sorts of Ebionites; see Lardner's Works, Vol. 7. p. 20. The former thought Christ merely human, though they had an high opinion of him as a *man*: the latter held Christ to be born supernaturally, but did not allow his pre-existence.—Lardner says, that there were *few* of the former sort, and that their notion is not maintained in any Christian *writing*.

vinity. But as what was said<sup>3</sup> in describing these related wholly to our present subject, we cannot *select* from it, and therefore must refer to it. — Possibly, the Ebionites might think of nothing, with regard to the Messiah, but that he was to be a temporal Prince, and a mere man. — The Nazarenes might be more impressed with the notions of the Logos, and the Son of God (John i. 49.) being the same with the “King of Israel,” or Messiah.

We might mention, as before, some Christians, who seem to have *mixed* Oriental and Judaical notions: *Cerinthus* and *Carpocrates* may perhaps be mentioned in this class. It was not uncommon, amongst the early Heretics, to make a difference between *Jesus* and *Christ*: and some made *two* Christs even on *Jewish* principles, one suffering, another triumphant: Pearson on the Creed, p. 371, 1st. edit.—And we may, lastly, repeat a remark on the difference between those, who held *two Principles*, and those who held *one*; that the former used to deny the *humanity* of Christ, and the latter, his *Divinity*.

We have now finished our references to the *Appendix* of the first book; it relating only to the *early Heretics*.

VI. We pass on to the *Arians*.—*Arius* seems to have been an *African*: he is placed in 316; it is well known, that he was a presbyter at Alexandria; a man of parts, and of commanding appearance, though affable; particularly ready at dispute. The name of his Bishop, that is, the Bishop of Alexandria in his time, was Alexander: by degrees, Arius got into a dispute with this Alexander, concerning the nature and dignity of the Son of God; which spread, till the whole Christian world was involved in

<sup>3</sup> Appendix to Book 1. Sect. xx1. See also Lardner's Works, Vol. 7. p. 20.

in it: Constantine ordered the Council of *Nice*, in order to settle it; but without effect: he has been reckoned too partial on the orthodox side, though his Epistle before mentioned shews some moderation: other Emperors favoured the Arians, but moderation was but little practised in those days.—We have already <sup>b</sup> taken a slight view of Arianism from the Council of *Nice* down to the present time: we may just add the name of Dr. *Price*, as Dr. Priestley's Letters to him give that description of Arianism, which is most recent.

As to the *Doctrines* of Arius, I do not see, that we can learn them better than from *two Epistles* of his own, written with great care, the one to Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, who was of his own way of thinking. complaining of persecution, and mentioning the particular opinions, on account of which he suffered;—the other to his own diocesan, Alexander, apologizing for himself and his doctrines, which had probably been misrepresented<sup>c</sup>. This latter is signed by fourteen others as well as Arius.

That there should have been so much acrimony and virulence in the Arian controversy, and so much misery arising out of it, seems the most strange when we observe, how very near Arius comes to the truth, and reflect, that the difference between the orthodox and him relates to a thing, of which we have not distinct ideas. He seemed to think, that, if the *Son* could in any sense be called by that name, or could be said to have been *begotten*, the Father must have existed *before* him: i. e. there must have been some *time*, when the Father *was* and the Son was *not*: he was willing to  
put

<sup>b</sup> Art. I. Sect. vi.

<sup>c</sup> Epiphanius, Hær. 69. mentioned by Lardner, Works, Vol. 4.

put that time as far *back* as any one pleased; he would call the Son *αχρονως γεννηθεις, προ των αιωνων*, and the *Nicene* Creed only says, “begotten before all *worlds*;” *προ των αιωνων*; we do not conceive Christ to be unbegotten; only as we want ideas, we do not dare to *reason*, or make the least *variation* in what the Scripture seems to represent.—The same may be observed of the reasoning of Arius, when he says, that, as Christ came *from* the Father, if he was *consubstantial* with him, a *part* of the Father must have left the rest; he must be *divisible*. A saying *accommodated* to inferior intellects is not to be taken or used as a *plain* saying *not* accommodated, to which we have *adequate* ideas.—Indeed Arius does call the Son a *Creature*, or *κτισμα*, but then he says, that he is not on a footing with other creatures; going probably upon the text, which calls Christ “the *first-born* of every creature<sup>d</sup>:—and besides, it seems to be indifferent to him, whether he uses the word *γεννημα*, or *κτισμα*, he uses them promiscuously; *κτισμα τῶ θεῷ τελειον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὡς ἐν τῶν κτισματων, γεννημα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὡς ἐν τῶν γεννηματων*.—And, though he had not used any word but *creation*, yet the difference between his *creation* before all ages, and our *generation* “before all worlds,” would not be great to those, who estimated ideas by their distinctness: it needed not surely to have been a cause of *war* and *persecution*.—But we are now only concerned with *History*;—we see then, that Arius and his followers denied the *consubstantiality* of the Son with the Father, but acknowledged his *pre-existence*.

There is another opinion *sometimes* ascribed to the Arians, and that is, the opinion, that Christ had not properly an *human soul*; on this account,  
the

<sup>d</sup> Col. i. 15.



the Arians are sometimes<sup>e</sup> joined with the *Apollinarians*; which will be a sufficient reason why we should mention the Apollinarian Doctrine at this time.—Indeed, the word Arian has sometimes been used as a sort of *generic*<sup>f</sup> term including even *Socinians*.

*Apollinarius* (or Apollinaris, for the name is differently written) is placed in the year 362: he is called Bishop of Liodicea, but there is some doubt whether he ever was Bishop. He seems to have been a great man, and a great writer; the loss of his thirty books against Porphyry is particularly lamented; the more, as they seem to have been destroyed merely on account of his solutions of the Incarnation. It seems to have occurred to this eminent man, that, if Jesus was informed by the *Word* dwelling in him, it was needless for him to have the use of human reason; nay, *impossible* for a being, who saw and knew as the Son of God, to investigate slowly after the manner of men. He therefore held, that the Logos must, to Jesus Christ, *supply the place of an human*<sup>g</sup> *soul*.—I see nothing like folly in the notion taken separately, nor do I find any reason why Lardner should speak of it as a fancy of old age<sup>h</sup>; its weakness consists in

<sup>e</sup> Lord King on the Creed, p. 181, 182. Pearson on the Creed “He was conceived”—p. 324, 1st Edit. see also p. 380, about the *Λογος* suffering: Lardner’s Works, Vol. 11. p. 80.

<sup>f</sup> Mosheim, 17th Cent. end of Chap. 6. This may perhaps be some defence of Voltaire. See Note on Art. 1. Sect. VI.

<sup>g</sup> This is the most common idea, of the doctrine of Apollinarius, but in the Serm. 191 or 236 de Tempore, where the Creed of Pelagius is introduced, that doctrine is described as consisting in this; that the *assumed* man is only a *part* of the ordinary natural man, whether deficient in carne, animâ, or sensu. Which agrees with Waterland on the Athanasian Creed.

<sup>h</sup> Lardner (Works, Vol. 4. p. 387)—only says, “latter part of his life,”—but at the same time he expresses an *infirmness*

in its being inconsistent with some parts of Scripture, which describe Christ as "*perfect man*," in body and mind.—Bishop Pearson<sup>1</sup> makes Arius's notion to be this which we have now described; and that of Apollinarius (as differing from Arius's) to consist in a distinction between the *animal* and *rational* soul; but body with animal soul seems to me to mean only the body *living*. And, when the ancients called the followers of Apollinarius *Dimæritæ*, I understand them to mean, that the Apollinarians held Christ to be what was really only <sup>k</sup> *two thirds* of Christ; that is, Body and Λογος, instead of *Body* and *Soul* and Λογος.

*Apollinarius* seems not then to differ from the Catholics, as to the consubstantiality or pre-existence; but as to both the other points, the Incarnation and Hypostatic Union.

*Semi-arians* are said<sup>1</sup> to have allowed, that Christ was ὁμοσιος with the Father, but not by *nature*, only by *privilege*. We will not be more particular about the followers of Arius, who softened his doctrine, and approached nearer to orthodoxy than their Master.

## VII. We

about relating the opinion: that is perhaps as a sort of Socinian, or Nazarean: he has written against it; on occasion, probably, of Mr. Whitton's reviving it. See his Works, Vol. 11. p. 80. Lardner's *own* notions appear in the same tract or Letter; Works, Vol. 11. p. 110. lowest line (of text). p. 97. 104. The *Word* is not a *Person*, does not mean the *Son* (97).—The *Son* and *Messiah* are the same: The *Son* was miraculously conceived (99); yet he was a *Man* (104); but they are very wrong who thought him born of Joseph and Mary (110).—Lardner disapproves Interpretations of *professed* Socinians as far as he has read them (112), but he has not read much of them; has not read Crellius de Uno Deo Patre (112).

<sup>1</sup> On Creed, p. 324, 1st Edit. p. 160. Fol.

<sup>k</sup> When διμοιρία signifies a *double* portion, there seems to be an idea of dividing the thing between *two* persons, giving one of them double the other, that is, *two thirds* of the whole.

<sup>1</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 1v. Part 2. Chap. 5. Sect. 16.

VII. We are next to mention the notions of the followers of *Photinus* relative to our present subject.—This Person was of Galatia, and is placed A. D. 431; he was a Bishop, an eloquent speaker, and a good writer; and extremely beloved in his diocese;—he had followers, so as to make a *sect*, called, after him, *Photinians*. He seems to have been *convinced*, by the plainness of the scriptural accounts, concerning the miraculous *birth* of Christ, but to have been *confounded* by the majesty of those expressions, which proclaim the condition of our Lord before he came into this world: and thus to have fixed his doctrine; that Christ could not be called the *Son* of God, till he was born; and that he was called so, *because* he was born of a *Virgin*, by the operation of the *Holy Ghost*.—So that *Photinus* denied the *pre-existence* of Christ, and therefore his *consubstantiality* with the Father. His enemies called him an *Ébionite*, but this was reviling<sup>n</sup>.

As *Photinus* was condemned for following the errors of *Paul* of Samosata, and of *Marcellus*, they may be mentioned here. *Paul* of Samosata (on the Euphrates, near Antioch) was Bishop of Antioch in 260; a good deal is said of him, because, by his eloquence and ostentation, he had gained a popularity, which made him troublesome: His enemies differ in their representations of him, and we have no accounts of his own. On the whole, I see nothing better for *us* to conclude, than that his doctrine was really much the same with that just now described; agreeably to what is said by *Augustin*<sup>o</sup>; the Paulians were, in his time, called *Photinians*.—*Marcellus* is placed in 320; he was Bishop of Ancyra, and, as such, a countryman of *Photinus*;

<sup>n</sup> See Vincent. Lirin. Cap. 17. Lardner's Works, Vol. 4. p. 361.

<sup>o</sup> Har. Sect. 44. Augustin died A. D. 430.

Photinus; he was also his master.—It does not seem as if there was any difference between their Doctrines, which we can now ascertain, on good grounds.—I have read somewhere, that Paul took the term *Λογος* in the sense of *Λογος ενδιαιτητος*, or internal reason; and that Marcellus said the *Λογος* was to be finally *absorbed* in the *Father*: which implies, that Marcellus made the *Logos*, the *Son*, or a *Person*,<sup>1</sup> though *Paul* did not.

VIII. The next opinions are those of *Nestorius*. We have already<sup>†</sup> mentioned him; but with a different view from our present one.—In *Scripture*, we find many things predicated of *Jesus Christ*, which cannot be predicated of *man*; and many, which cannot be predicated of *God*; and yet, though he is sometimes said to do *divine* things, sometimes *human*, there is only one *subject* to those different predicates; he is only spoken of as *one* agent, or person. The Church has no better way of expressing this matter, though it is unintelligible to all men, than by saying, that *two natures*, the *divine* and *human*, are united in *one person*.—In this, *Nestorius* fancied he saw some great *difficulties*; for though it be true, that things both *divine* and *human* are predicated of *Christ*, yet this seems to be under certain regulations or limitations of reason and common sense: would any evangelist have said, that *Mary* was the mother of her *Creator*?—that the *Divinity* *died*?—that the *blood* of the *Deity* was shed on the *Cross*? that the same person was *God* and *Victim*? if they would not, then it cannot be laid

<sup>1</sup> See Bp. Pearson on the Creed; Note about Marcellus;—“*Sitteth on the right hand*,” &c. “*Whose Kingdom shall have no end*.”—Marcellus thought, that *Christ* should reign for ever after his ascension, but that his *human* nature should have an end.

<sup>†</sup> Art. I. Sect. xviii.

laid down, that all language is proper, which suits the Hypothesis of two Natures in one Person. No; says Nestorius, there would be less difficulty in saying, ‘*divine* Jesus Christ knew men’s thoughts, &c; *human* Jesus Christ was *hungry* and *thirsty*.’ ‘Though there is certainly but one outward *appearance* :’—But, however such a language might solve any difficulties, the Church was right in not adopting it, because it is not the language of *Scripture*: nevertheless, it is a lamentable thing, that any man should suffer so much as Nestorius did, for an opinion so *near* to Orthodoxy as his was, and differing only in what was unintelligible. For *we* say, that Jesus Christ has some things mentioned of him *as God*, and some *as Man*, so that he may be said to have two *characters*; he knew thoughts *as God*, had appetites *as man*; the former, *by virtue* of his *Divine Nature*; the latter, by virtue of his *human nature*. Thus Nestorius leaves our two first *points* untouched; but he differs from Catholics, as to the incarnation and the hypostatic union:—For his notion led him on to say something, which *we* should understand thus; the *divine* Christ was not *born*, Mary was only the Mother of the *human* Christ: she was Χριστοκος, not Θεοκος; though the divine Christ was united with the human Christ in one *visible* form<sup>s</sup>.

But we have not mentioned, that Nestorius may be placed in 428, when he was made Bishop of Constantinople. He was a Syrian. He was condemned in 431, at the General Council of Ephesus, and was banished to Ægypt; the town where he resided

<sup>s</sup> See Mosheim, Cent. 5. Part 2. Chap. v. Sect. 12. Mac-laine’s Note.—Bp. Pearson does not seem to have been aware, that Nestorius used *πρωσωπον*, instead of Syriac *Barjopa*, to signify an *outward* appearance; and therefore he says (on Creed, p. 331. 1st edit.) that Nestorius contradicts himself.

resided being attacked, he wandered about in want and misery till he died! Though Vincent of Lerins speaks † of him as an enemy, we may collect, from what he has said, that Nestorius was a man of great abilities, which he applied with diligence to the service of Christianity, and was very much revered and beloved.

IX. *Eutyches* was only the Head of a Monastery at Constantinople. We may place him in 451, the time of the General Council of Chalcedon, by which he was condemned.—The errors of Nestorius are said to have animated his zeal so much, as to make him run into an opposite extreme: but, in order to be as candid as possible, let us, as in other instances, put ourselves in his place, and conceive how he might be drawn into his peculiar opinions.—‘Nestorius certainly,’ we may imagine him to say, ‘breaks through all scriptural expressions and ideas, in making *two Christs*; nothing can be more plain, than that there is but one; nay, it seems impossible in itself that there should be more than one; I should rather be inclined to say, Christ had but one *Nature*; for, if the Divine Nature is united to the human, what alas! can the human be in such a compound? it must be as *nothing*! nay indeed, if you suppose it to have any magnitude, or any efficacy as an ingredient, must it not be as so much *alloy* to lower and debase? but the Divine Nature is *incapable* of being debased; therefore the human nature must be annihilated, or *swallowed up* in the Divine<sup>u</sup>.’—However Eutyches

† P. 330. Edit. Paris. 1669.

<sup>u</sup> I should rather be apt to conjecture, that Eutyches *had* made use of some illustration taken from *metals*, so much is said of *inconfusè*, and other words from *confundo*; which seems to imply putting into *fusion*, or pouring together two things, so that they become *one*: the Athanasian Creed says, that Christ is “one, not

ches reasoned, this was his *opinion*.—It does not interfere with orthodoxy, as to the points of consubstantiality, or pre-existence; but it does, as to those of *Incarnation* and Hypostatic Union. For Eutyches was obliged to have a particular theory, as to the *conception* and *Birth* of Christ. It was obvious to ask him, ‘if Christ is all divine, by the Divine Nature swallowing up the human, how could he be born?’ To this Eutyches must find some answer: but it does not seem agreed, whether he said, that the *Λογος* entered into the Virgin’s Womb, and grew in it, as an human being would do; or that the Logos *joined* himself to an human embryo, *converting* it, by the union, into divine. In the *former* case, his notion would be the same in effect with the old one mentioned before<sup>x</sup>, as having been ascribed to Valentinus.

Eutyches seems to have been near the orthodox, “taking the manhood into God.”

The followers of Eutyches were called *Monophysites*; and we are told, that the Eastern Christians are still divided into *Nestorians* and *Monophysites*<sup>y</sup>.—But I suppose, that the latter do not acknowledge

not by *confusion* of substance” (or nature) “but by unity of Person.”—Livy has “confundere in unum corpus”—to consolidate. Photius, in his account of Theodoret’s 2d Dialogue, uses the expression, ἡ ἀσυγχύσις ἰνῶσις.

<sup>x</sup> Sect. iv. and Ld. King on Creed, p. 116. 157.

<sup>y</sup> Called so, in effect, by Asseman: In Asseman, T. 3, there is a catalogue of 198 writers (besides Appendix), who are called Syrian *Nestorian* writers: but the New Testament is one book reckoned, and Clemens Romanus one Author. The Syrian Nestorians reckon the Apostles to have been of their Sect. See T. 3. Part 2.—In the 2d Tom. there is a Catalogue of 48 Syrian writers, *Monophysites*; the source of whom was *Eutyches*.

Dr. Joseph Asseman is spoken of by Lard. (Works, 4. 425) as alive when he wrote.

acknowledge any veneration for Eutyches, or even own that they hold his opinions<sup>z</sup>.

x. On the *Monothelites* we need not dwell much; they did not exist till the seventh Century: they held, as I understand, that, as Christ was but one *Person*, he of course could have but *one Will*; and one *Operation*, or act<sup>a</sup>;—this was not an unnatural idea; but then, on the other hand, how could the *two Natures* of Christ be perfect, if there was not a Will of *God*, and a will of *Man*?—For my own part, I think we understand so little of the Hypostatic Union, or of the Will of God, or even of our own Will, that a man might be doubtful, which side of this question would be reckoned orthodox, and which heretical. The notion of *two Wills* might seem to approach as near to *Nestorius's* two *Persons*, as that of *one Will*, to Eutyches's one *Nature*: yet the notion of each Nature having a Will, seems the *orthodox* notion. I mention the question partly to shew the wisdom and moderation of *our Church* in not meddling with it; though partly because it concerns our present subject, and was once thought important.—When it was agitated, it occasioned several *Councils*, though nothing more seems to have been urged (in substance) than what I have now mentioned. Pope Honorius, who died in 638, happened to be a Monothelite<sup>b</sup>, and his Heresy has been quoted against the Pope's Infallibility; otherwise probably the debate had been dropped.—This Pope was condemned at the sixth

<sup>z</sup> The more steady or bigotted Monophysites losing their Leaders or *heads*, who chose to come into terms and keep their bishopricks, called themselves *ακεφαλοι*, Acephali, under which name they are often mentioned in History. See Mosheim, Index, *Acephali*.

<sup>a</sup> See Mosheim, Index, *Monothelites*.

<sup>b</sup> See Forbes's Instruct. Hist. Theol. Lib. 5. Mosheim, 8vo. Vol. 2. 189. i. c. Cent. 7. Part ii. Chap. v. Sect. 4.



sixth General Council, held at Constantinople, in 680; which demonstrates, that the authority of one of them (Pope, or General Council,) is fallible.

XI. The notion of avoiding all difficulties respecting the miraculous conception of the Son of God, by considering him only as an *adopted* Son, was held by *Elipand* in the eighth Century<sup>c</sup>. It was of consequence enough to occasion the Council of *Frankfort*, in 794.—*Elipand* was Archbishop of *Toledo*, and he was joined by *Felix*, Bishop of Urgel in Catalonia; but these two only solved the *birth* of Jesus by their Hypothesis of adoption; they owned the Son of God to be really and naturally such, in his pre-existent state<sup>d</sup>. Thus they interfered with the Catholic Doctrine only as to the Incarnation, and with that chiefly in words. They would probably urge, that, though Christ in his divine nature was properly called the Son of God, yet it was absurd to say, that a *man* was begotten by God; when therefore Christ in his *human* nature was called the Son of God, the words must not be taken literally; *Jesus* might be an *adopted* Son, but not a real one.

XII. The *Socinians* have been mentioned before<sup>e</sup>. I do not know, that I need add any thing here. *Socinus* is said to have allowed, that Christ was born of a *Virgin*<sup>f</sup>, by the Holy Ghost; and that he was a God, so that he might be adored:—Dr. *Priestley's Letters* to Dr. Price give us the most recent ideas of Socinianism, and shew the *degrees* of

<sup>c</sup> Some *earlier* writers ward off, or reject, this notion, as appears from Bp. Pearson's Note. Creed, p. 281, 1st edit.—which seems to imply that it had been *held* before.

<sup>d</sup> See Mosheim, Vol. 2. 8vo. p. 274. or Cent. 8. 2. 5. 3. and Forbes's Instruct. Hist. Theol.—and Bp. Pearson as above.

<sup>e</sup> Art. 1. Sect. v 1.

<sup>f</sup> See South's Sermon. 7, of Vol. 3.

of it<sup>g</sup>. In the lowest kind of Socinianism, he says, “Christ is considered as a mere man, the Son of Joseph and Mary, and naturally as fallible and peccable as Moses, or any other Prophet.” All this is to banish *superstition*, it would be said, and foolish admiration; and to restore the authority of *Reason* and common sense<sup>h</sup>.

XIII. With regard to *Anabaptists*, as they are expressly mentioned in <sup>i</sup> another Article, we may hereafter have occasion to give some account of them. *Menno*<sup>k</sup> denied, that Christ derived his Body from his Mother; said that he *assumed* it:— it was *created* out of nothing; created in his mother’s womb — The Anabaptists in general, at the time of the Reformation, held the old doctrine <sup>l</sup> of Christ passing through the Womb of his Mother, as through a tube. *Joan of Kent* was burnt<sup>m</sup>, because she would not, after a twelvemonth’s trial, renounce this doctrine. Bishop Pearson, from Episcopius, speaks <sup>n</sup> of *Flandrian Anabaptists*, who took this phrase, “The Word was made Flesh,” in a sense strictly literal: who supposed a “conversion of the Godhead into Flesh.”—And this expression of the Creed seems to shew, that the same opinion had been declared before<sup>o</sup>.

XIV. Lastly, we were to mention the notions of a few *individuals*. *Servede*, or Servetus, held some extravagant notions at the time of the Reformation, and suffered death for them at Geneva

<sup>g</sup> See p. 101 of Dr. Priestley’s Letters. <sup>h</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xvi.

<sup>i</sup> Art. 38. <sup>k</sup> Lived A. D. 1505—1561.

<sup>l</sup> Sect. iv.

<sup>m</sup> Nicholls on Articles, p. 37. col. 1. Hume’s Hist. Edw. vi. Chap. 1. end. Fuller, B. 7. 398. K. Edw. vi. Diurnal.

<sup>n</sup> Creed, Art. 3. p. 326, 1st edit.

<sup>o</sup> See Serm. de Tempore, 236 (or 191) Sect. 4. “Qui afferere conantur omnia quæ erant Divinitatis in hominem demigrasse.” Amongst the works of Augustin.

neva in 1553, on the prosecution of Calvin; but, as our <sup>p</sup> Article does not certainly allude to them, and as they are to me <sup>q</sup> unintelligible, I will not transcribe any Historian about them; he was a Spaniard, a famous Physician<sup>r</sup>, and much noticed in his time.

Mr. Whiston<sup>s</sup>, well known at Cambridge, in his day, adopted the opinion of Apollinarius.—This was mentioned before, as also the opinion of Emanuel Swedenborg.

The notion of *Valentinus* Gentilis, who, after recanting, relapsed, and suffered death at Geneva, in 1566, would probably be known in 1562<sup>t</sup>.

Here we close the History of the second Article: and I think it will appear, from our manner of describing Heresies, that *Heretics* might <sup>u</sup> *honestly mean*, in forming their several hypotheses, to avoid difficulties, which had given uneasiness, and to give *solutions*, which would afford relief and comfort to the doubting mind. And moreover, that they have used some arguments, which are powerful (sometimes irresistible) in themselves, when only the *For* is considered, and we attend only to their *words*, though they failed by overlooking some parts of Holy Writ, or reasoning without intelligible

<sup>p</sup> That some of our Articles were made against *Servetians*, see *Doctrina & Eccles. Angl.* 1617. Contents.

<sup>q</sup> Mosheim's account might be read; see his Index, under *Servetus*.

<sup>r</sup> Dr. Hunter said, that *Servetus* saw enough to find out the circulation of the *blood*, but did not infer properly from what he saw.

<sup>s</sup> Art. 1. Sect. vi. A remarkable mixture of science and heated melancholy imagination. He was deprived of his Mathematical Professorship, and expelled Cambridge University. Died 1752.

<sup>t</sup> His opinions are best seen in his recantation. See Cheynell's *Rise of Socinianism*, p. 9.—His death is mentioned, p. 13.

<sup>u</sup> Sect. 111.

ble propositions:—Ought such persons to be persecuted? ought they not rather to be respected and pitied? ought we not to own ourselves indebted to them for the services they have done to the common cause, on many occasions? ought we not to be kindly affectioned towards them, with brotherly love?—If indeed they attack us, or disturb our social devotions and instructions, we may defend ourselves; and acts of defence must precede the actual attack, otherwise they come too late; but, even in this case, we must not be impatient, nor timid; we must hope all things, and endure all things, as far as is consistent with our safety as members of a religious society.

But I have said such strong things, pleading the cause of those who maintained heretical tenets, that I am afraid of being thought to favour them too much: such a suspicion would however do me wrong:—No; I wish all Christians happy, but my own opinions coincide with those of *our Church*; and I think, that our Church, in forming its doctrines, has acted as wisely as possible. All the parts of Scripture relating to any particular subject, have been, seemingly, collected and \* arranged: an opinion has been formed out of them *all*; so that none have been neglected. If any doctrines have only had strong reasons urged on their side, but have been formed by those, who overlooked some parts of Scripture, these have been rejected.

Whatever clamours may have been made by some about our neglecting *Reason*, we can say, that we have been far from undervaluing it: nay, we have, in the method of acting just now described, done what the most enlightened Reason would dictate. We do indeed object to reasoning by means of unintelligible propositions, because reason tells

us,

\* Sect. VIII.

us, that we cannot reason without ideas; and experience proves, that we get wrong whenever we attempt it. We object to calling pre-conceived notions at any æra the dictates of Reason, in the more difficult doctrines of Scripture; because reason tells us, that we are not to trust our preconceived notions against the Scriptures<sup>y</sup> in things, which relate to the Nature of God, or to the manner, in which he is to act, in order to promote the happiness of his creatures; especially in cases out of the common course of Nature.

xv. Having finished our historical view of this Article, we come to the *Explanation* of the expressions contained in it. This will be little more than a brief recapitulation of the historical remarks already made, taking the order of the expressions as they stand. We *prove* nothing now; nay, we *affirm* nothing: we only shew what is affirmed or implied; what rejected. Indeed, the best idea of all explanations of Articles is, that they shew what particular *Errors* or *Heresies* are intended to be *rejected* or denied by the words made use of. The language of each Article is affirmative, but the true meaning *negative*.—In some cases it may perhaps, in strictness, mean only, that no one has a *right to affirm* that which we reject.

Our Church first declares, that the *Λογος* is not merely either *reason* or *speech*, but a *Person*, the same, who is called the *Son* of God; who is not to be on a footing with what have been called *Æons*, except in the same sense in which the Scripture says, that “God is a <sup>z</sup> *Spirit*.”—When it is said, that this person is “*begotten*” of the Father, the meaning is, to *acknowledge* the *relation* of *paternity*

<sup>y</sup> See a passage to this purpose translated in Lardner, Works, Vol. 3. p. 16.

<sup>z</sup> John iv. 24.

nity and filiation, without pretending to have any distinct or adequate ideas of it; to acknowledge it as what has been mentioned to us by authority, as the thing most proper *for us* to conceive as far as we are able; as least likely to make us run into impiety or profaneness: the relation itself may possibly bear some *analogy* to that, which we call by the same name; this we say with *diffidence*;— but we use the word “*begotten*” with more *confidence* to *deny* and *reject* the notion, that this Person was *created*, at any time whatsoever, either “before all worlds,” or in the Virgin’s womb: to deny, that the Son can with propriety be said to be *cast forth*, or *separated*<sup>a</sup> from the Father; to come from the *Stars*, or the *elements*.

When it is said, that this generation was “*from everlasting*,” it is meant, not only to *reject* the notion, that Christ might be called the Son of God merely because he was conceived by the *Holy Ghost*; but to deny, that any *limit* whatever can be assigned to the duration between the generation of Christ and his birth of the blessed Virgin: which is to declare, that duration to be *infinite*<sup>b</sup>.

“*Of the Father*” serves to make the Generation just now mentioned still more definite; and to distinguish it still more clearly from that operation of the *Holy Ghost*, by which the Son of God “took man’s nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin.”

When our Church calls this Person “*the very and eternal God*,” the meaning is, that he is not only divine, or *a God* in some inferior sense, but that we have no right to distinguish between him and *the real God*; that *we* are incapable of settling any

<sup>a</sup> This explains *impartibilis* in the first Article; and may afterwards be of use, when the words “of one substance with the Father,” occur.

<sup>b</sup> Art. 1, Sect. x.

any *precedence* between them, so as to say, with Arius, that the Father was *before* the Son. Whatever the truth may be, we declare against that being *professed* by any *Christian*: and, in several points, we may perhaps be said not so much to reject a *notion*, because we see it to be *false*, as to declare, that no man has a *right to hold* such a notion.— Any of these expressions must of course disclaim the notion, that the first existence of Christ was upon *earth*.

The expression, “ of one *substance* with the Father,” one spiritual substance, was explained under the last <sup>c</sup> Article. This seems opposed to the notion, that the Son was (a *προβολη*) *cast forth*, or *separated* from the Father. A *Son* is always of the same *rank* with his Father: and in this rank there is but *one* Being.

This divine Person, our Church affirms, took *human* nature in the Virgin’s womb; in opposition to those, who held only the *Divinity* of Christ.— The words “ of her <sup>d</sup> *substance*” mean to *reject* several errors: they deny, that the Logos or Word passed through the womb of the Virgin as through a *tube*; that Christ was *created* in her womb, and every fancy, which describes her as different, in her conception and nutrition of her unborn embryo, from a proper human *mother*: they also seem to deny, that the human nature of Christ was, from the time of conception, *swallowed up* in the divine.

The next words at least do this undeniably; “ *two whole and perfect natures*;”—they also reject the error, that the *Λογος* was literally made flesh, or *converted*, or transubstantiated, into the bodily substance of man; as well as that the divine and  
human

<sup>c</sup> Art. 1. Sect. x.

<sup>d</sup> Ser. de Tempore, 193, (or 238), Sect. 3.

human natures were *melted down*, as it were, into one.

The words “*one Person*,” or ὑποστασις, reject the idea, that, because there are two natures conjoined, there must of necessity be *two agents*, or persons; and imply the same as if it had been said, all is predicated of one, all was performed by *one*. And therefore, that Christ, both in his pre-existent and present state, should be called the *Son of God*.

“*Never to be divided*,” in Latin “*inseparabiliter*,” seems to *reject* the imagination that Christ will finally be absorbed in the *Father*, or restored to the *Luminaries of Heaven*, or the *Elements of Earth*;—it seems also calculated to hinder us from presuming to assign any *time*, when Christ will become intirely *unconnected* with human <sup>o</sup> nature:—but we ought not here to encroach on the 4th Article.

“*One Christ*”—the one person, of whom we have spoken, is called Jesus and Christ, Jesus being his name, and Christ the name of his Office; but yet Jesus is not to be looked upon as a different character from *Christ*, much less as a character opposed to Christ; nor can it be properly said, that Jesus suffered and Christ did *not* suffer; or that Jesus suffered when *deserted* by Christ: neither is any one, in imitation of Nestorius, to imagine *two Christs*.

“*Very God and very man*,” this expression implies, that the Person, of whom we are speaking, is not more truly and really God, than he is *man*; both in *soul* and *body*. And therefore, with regard to the human *soul*, it sets aside the notion, that the Λογος supplied the place of the rational faculty to our

<sup>o</sup> See Marcellus's notion, Sect. v 11. One of *Cerinthus's* notions was, I think, that Christ was not, after his death, any longer the *Son of God*: But I do not see this in Lardner's *Heresies*; nor in Lord King on the Creed.



our Lord; and, with regard to the *body*, it declares, that there was no *deception* in appearances, no continued *trope* or mystical expression in the evangelical History, relative to the body of Christ<sup>f</sup>.

This last thing, with regard to the *Body*, is more particularly marked in the word "*truly*;" Christ suffered, &c. not *εν δοκησει* in appearance only, as the Docetæ, Gnostics, or Oriental Heretics thought, but in reality: and not only *Jesus* but *Christ* may be properly said to have suffered, though it cannot properly be said, that the *Deity*<sup>g</sup> suffered.

If the *remaining* expressions want any explanation, it must be deferred till after the *ninth* Article, for the reason already mentioned, at the opening of this Article.

xvi. Having then offered an explanation of the expressions found in our Article, we come, in the next place, to attempt a *proof* of the propositions, of which it is made up.—And here our best method seems to be, to prove first the principal doctrine of the Article, *the Divinity of Christ*, and afterwards the secondary, incidental, or subordinate Doctrines.

In proving the Divinity of Christ, I will beg leave to make use of a small *pamphlet*, printed in 1772 at Leeds, which seems to me to give the arguments or proofs in a good form. The *Title* is, "A short Defence of the Doctrine of the Divinity of Christ<sup>h</sup>:"—the Author's idea of the manner of proving

<sup>f</sup> Every English Academic will here recollect the title of *Corpus Christi* given to a College in each of our Universities.—As also Tertullian's writing *De Carne Christi*.

<sup>g</sup> Impassibilis, Art. 1.

<sup>h</sup> Written by my Brother, *William Hey*, Surgeon at Leeds, Yorkshire.—Several years after I first used it, I asked and received permission to mention his name: the following is an extract from a Letter of his.—"The occasion of my writing the

proving any Being to be divine, agrees in a good measure with that, which I have already mentioned<sup>1</sup> as my own.

That Being is declared by the Scriptures to be divine, to whom the Scriptures ascribe the distinguishing perfections and qualities of Divinity.—Such are the following. 1. Eternal existence. 2. Power of creating. 3. Power of preserving things created. 4. Omnipresence. 5. Omniscience. 6. A right to be worshipped.—It is now to be shewn, that these perfections and qualities are really in Scripture ascribed to Christ.

1. Eternal existence. John i. 1.—John xvii. 5.—John viii. 58.—(with the interpretation of the Jews, shewed by their stoning Christ). Phil. ii. 6.—Col.

the *Short Defences* was as follows. A large number of penny pamphlets against the leading doctrines of Christianity were published here, and were circulated with great industry. Without entering fairly into the controversy, they were calculated to unhinge the minds of the unwary. A very zealous man, but a wild enthusiast, who lived here then, published an answer, which Dr. Priestley, the supposed author of the short tracts, seemed to glory in.—Indeed it was most injudiciously written. Other short answers afterwards came out; but these were so defective in argument and so acrid in style, that they were clearly a matter of triumph to the Socinians. Having for many years carefully considered the subjects for the satisfaction of my own mind, and being urged by some friends, with whom I had conversed on these subjects, I ventured to submit to the public my thoughts on Dr. Priestley's Arguments. I first intended to have published three penny pamphlets on the subjects of the Divinity of Christ, the atonement, and man's moral depravity. But the two first swelling out unavoidably beyond my design, I would not any farther break in upon my professional studies.—Whether future leisure may ever tempt me to finish my original plan, I cannot say. At present, I have laid aside all thought of proceeding. What I have said proceeded from the fullest conviction of my judgment; I wish it may do good."

The above Letter was written in 1789, seventeen years after the publication of the pamphlet.

<sup>1</sup> Art. 1. Sect. x.

Col. i. 17.—Rev. xxii. 16. Add If. xlv. 6. compared with Rev. i. 17. and xxii. 13. also Micah v. 2.

If any of these texts seem only to prove pre-existence, but that not eternal, it may be considered whether, in any of them, Christ is made inferior to the Father: as he so frequently is, when his earthly situation is described.

2. Creative power. Heb. iii. 4. both as a proof and a principle.—Heb. i. 10. &c.—John i. 3, 10.—Col. i. 16.—Rev. iv. 11.—these are *direct* proofs;—but 1 Cor. viii. 6. and Heb. ii. 10. might be reckoned<sup>k</sup>; and it might be observed, that using different prepositions is like trying to catch something beyond our grasp.—Does not the miracle of Loaves imply a creative power?

3. Power of preserving. Heb. i. 3.—Col. i. 17.

4. Omnipresence. John iii. 13. with circumstances. Matt. xviii. 20.—1 Cor. i. 2. (invocation in any place, implies presence in that place).—Matt. xxviii. 20.—compared with Acts iii. 21.—Heb. ix. 24. and i. 3. and parallels:—Both Omnipresence and Omniscience are implied in the 6th, a right to be worshipped.

5. Omniscience. John xxi. 17.—then with 2 Chron. vi. 30, compare Matt. ix. 4. and parallel passages.—John ii. 25. (contrast Luke ii. 52. and Mark xiii. 32).—Col. ii. 3.

6. A right to be *worshipped*. John xx. 28.—Matt. viii. 2.—Matt. xv. 22, 25, 28. (contrast Acts xiv. 14.—Acts x. 25.—Rev. xix. 10).—Matt. xxviii. 17.

Before the name of Christians was given at Antioch, *calling* upon (or<sup>l</sup> invoking) the name of Christ

<sup>k</sup> A comparison of these two with Rom. xi. 36. and parallels, would be useful in shewing, that the same high and lofty expressions are used of the Father and the Son.

<sup>l</sup> Parkhurst, *επικαλεομαι*.

Christ served as a *title*. 1 Cor. i. 2.—(1 Cor. i. 3. is a species of prayer, and has parallel passages.)—Acts vii. 59, leaving out the word “*God*.”—Heb. i. 6. compared with Psalm xcvi. 7.—Rev. v. 8.—add 2 Cor. xii. 8<sup>m</sup>.

In general, or collectively; 1 John v. 20.—1 Tim. iii. 16.—Rom. ix. 5.—Heb. i. 8.—Matt. xxviii. 19. (compared with 1 Cor. i. 14, 15.—Col. ii. 9.)

If these proofs should not be thought sufficient, any one might consult Bishop Pearson on those words of the Creed, “*his only Son*;” or Waterland’s Sermons at Lady Moyer’s Lecture; or other works.—The confirmations and illustrations of our Doctrine arising from a continued study of the Old and New Testament; from sometimes taking comprehensive views, and sometimes examining minutely; would prove inexhaustible: this may appear from Bishop Pearson on the Creed. Here might be recollected<sup>n</sup>, that the Son of God is divine, as far as is consistent with the Unity of God, and the Divinity of the Father and of the Holy Ghost.

The next thing to the proof of the principal proposition, must be the proof of the *subordinate* propositions contained in the Article. Of these I can conceive *thirteen*.

XVII. 1. The *Word* is a *Person*; not merely a Power or ° Wisdom:—there are but four verses, in which

<sup>m</sup> In this proof, we must regard something more than the English word *worship*; as that *sometimes*, in old English, signifies no more than respect. A *worshipful* Justice of Peace, or Mayor. “With my body I thee *worship* ;” &c. &c: we must therefore take notice of the *thing*, and the original language, as well as the English *word*. Yet Christ refuses to *worship* Satan. Matt. iv. 9.

<sup>n</sup> Art. 1. Sect. XIII.

• Lardner’s Works, Vol. II. p. 97.

which the Word is mentioned; as has been <sup>p</sup> already observed: John i. 1.—John i. 14.—1 John v. 7.—Rev. xix. 13. Now, that the Word means a Person in the *last*, I think even the Socinians <sup>q</sup> do not doubt.—We will only say then first, *might* not St. John use the same term in the same way, in other parts of his writings? But every one must look at the context of the other passages for himself, and see whether he thinks, that what is said of the Word can be meant of a *Quality*. Tropes, no doubt, will do a great deal in making things into Persons, but it must be considered, how little figurative St. John's language is in general, in other parts of his Narrative.

In the way of *direct* proof we can only say then, look at John i. 1.; read on; judge, without wishing to confirm any particular opinion, whether St. John was likely to be so very figurative, as to relate what he does of the Word, if he did not mean, that you should have a feeling or conception of some *Person*: consider what could induce him to say, that the *power and wisdom* of God were *with* God, and *were* God: what *end* he could have in view, in giving a serious account at the opening of his *Gospel*, or *History*, of the World being *made* by these divine attributes. (“He came to his own.”)

The Arians and Socinians give different constructions of these words, in order to suit them to their respective opinions; and so do those, who are between these, whom *Lardner* seems <sup>r</sup> to call *Nazareans*,

<sup>p</sup> Sect. 1.

<sup>q</sup> Where is the passage, in which a Socinian says, that *because* the Word *is* a person here, he is *called* so elsewhere?—I do not find this in Priestley's Letters to Dr. Price.—See Famil. Illustr. p. 32, something like this.

<sup>r</sup> Vol. x. Works, p. 619, 626.

*zareans*, himself one of the number:—considering these constructions *now* would be rather answering *objections* than giving *direct* proof; yet, as there may be no other opportunity, I will now say, that Lardner's Paraphrase on John 1. (Vol. II. p. 95, &c.) seems to me very forced and confused: when he is not able to avoid allowing, that some *Person* is spoken of, he makes that *Person* to be *God* in general:—when he comes to some place, where *God* in general cannot be meant, he puts, instead of *God*, the *power* and *wisdom* of *God*: though the same subject, or nominative case, is continued; *our* construction is, at least, more *consistent* and simple; and, in my opinion, more honest or downright: neither of them is perfectly *clear*, to any human being.

As to the *next* passage, in which *Logos* occurs, “the Word was made *Flesh*,” this may come under the observations just now made on John i. 1.—indeed it is a part of the same passage; I see no material break between them.

If this arguing seems *slight*, it must be considered what the nature of the question allows of; and that more solid argument is not used on the other side; we only consider which side *preponderates*, not how much weight there is in either scale.

Of the other passage, in which the term *Logos* occurs, 1 John v. 7, “There are three that bear record in Heaven; the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost:”—we may say, the *Father* here is a *person* beyond dispute; why not the *Word*? if he is not, is he a *Witness* in the same sense with the *Father*?—but then, alas! this goes to prove the *Holy Ghost* to be a *Person*, which must be denied, it seems, at all adventures; so we must leave this, till we come to the 5th Article.

It is to the purpose to observe, that St. John meant to *adopt* a notion already received, which  
was,

was, as we have <sup>s</sup> ventured to conclude, that the Logos was a Person.

2. The *Word* means the *Son* of God.—I suppose it would not be questioned, that, if the Word was a Person, he must be the same as the Son of God: therefore, if we have proved the Word a Person, we have proved our point.—But our arguments may not convince every one; therefore we will endeavour to prove, that the Word means the Son, and so infer from *thence*, that he is a Person.

By the way, *Lardner*, who allows <sup>t</sup> no pre-existence to the Son, rejects the Socinian interpretations of John i. and holds, that the expressions, in which the *Word* is spoken of, imply proper *eternity* and *Divinity*: therefore, if any one is convinced, that the Word is the Son, he must, according to the interpretation of one of our most able adversaries, allow the Son to be eternal and *Divine*: according to the interpretation of one, who probably would be much *inclined* to adopt those senses, which he rejects.

That the Word means the Son, must appear from observing the connexion and consistency of different parts of Scripture. In John i. 15, it seems to be allowed by <sup>u</sup> our Adversaries, that the Son is meant; therefore every one must look back, (with as little prejudice as may be) from that verse to the beginning of the Chapter, and see whether he can find *two different agents* mentioned<sup>x</sup>.—Only let him not determine to find two, because the notion of one would occasion him some *difficulties*; that  
would

<sup>s</sup> Sect. 1.

<sup>t</sup> Works, Vol. 11. p. 95. Dr. Priestley says the same, as to the Divinity of the Logos.—Letters, p. 114.

<sup>u</sup> Lardner, Works, Vol. 11. p. 97.

<sup>x</sup> Dr. Priestley makes but *one* agent. Famil. Illustr. p. 31.—“*Christ* being called the Word of God,” &c.

would be to *make* a revelation, not to *interpret* one made by the Deity.

A comparison of *other passages* with the first Chapter of John, would influence *me* very strongly: compare verse 3 with Col. i. 16, and with Heb. i. 2<sup>y</sup>: the same effects and operations seem to be ascribed to the Word, and to the Son; yet these could only proceed from *one*. Compare also 1 John v. 7. with Matt. xxviii. 19:—the Word in the former answers to the Son in the latter; and, in that case, there can be no difference between them; when, in near fifty places<sup>z</sup>, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are mentioned together, it is not likely, that, in this, two of them should be the same, and the third different.

XVIII. 3. Our Church is justified in using the term “*begotten*,” by John i. 14, and Heb. i. 5, 6, were there no other texts to the purpose; but “*begotten*” is *implied*, whenever *Father* or *Son*<sup>a</sup> is mentioned; and in the high sense of our Article, when a time is supposed *prior* to the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem<sup>b</sup>. One might add John i. 18.—iii. 16, 18.—1 John iv. 9.

XIX. 4. Our Church is to be justified in using the expression “*from everlasting*:” the expression occurs several times in our Translation, but, with regard to the *Son* of God, perhaps only in *Micah* v. 2. before<sup>c</sup> quoted. Indeed, the other texts  
before

<sup>y</sup> If it be said, that *αιωνας* must be translated *ages*, (Dr. Priestley’s Letters, p. 119) compare Heb. xi. 3. there it seems to mean *worlds*.

<sup>z</sup> Art. 1. Sect. viii.

<sup>a</sup> Every sonship implies a generation; the *kind* of generation must correspond to the kind of sonship.—St. Paul calls some Christian *converts* his sons; *Onesimus* was *begotten* in his bonds. Philemon, ver. 10. (Parallels are 1 Cor. iv. 15.—Gal. iv. 19.)

<sup>b</sup> John xvi. 28.—Rom. viii. 32. &c.

<sup>c</sup> Sect. xv. 1.



before quoted to prove the *pre-existence* of Christ, belong to this point. Add John xvii. 24.—The ancients used to say, that, as Father and Son are *correlatives*, the Father could not be eternal, except the Son was; there cannot be a *Father* without a *Son*<sup>d</sup>.—Neither, we may add, can there be a Son without *generation*.

xx. 5. “*Of the Father :*” —though Father is a correlative term to Son, and therefore implied in it, yet it seems proper for our Church to take notice of the different circumstances, in which it is said, that the Son is *begotten* of the *Father*, and *conceived* by the *Holy Ghost*. If it appeared, from a survey of the Scriptures, that the former mode of expression was chiefly appropriated to a state *pre-vi-ous* to that described by the latter, such a survey would confirm the notion of our Church, that Christ is described as having existed before his coming into this world, for a time unbounded.

° XXI. 6. “*Of one substance :*” this is an expression, which has occasioned much dispute : the word *ἰουσοιως* was that, on which debates chiefly turned at the Council of *Nice*, and even at the Council of *Antioch* fifty years before : and those debates have never yet been wholly given up<sup>f</sup>. We see that, in 1552, the Article seemed to avoid them.

That the Son of God can *properly* be called of one substance with the Father, is not said in Scripture in *so many words* : if it had, however difficult the conception, *disputes* must have been terminated before this time : it is rather *implied* than expressed.

Supposing

<sup>d</sup> Ser. de Tempore, 236 (or 191). Sect. 2. Append. to 5th Vol. Aug. “qui semper pater fuit semper filium habet.”

<sup>e</sup> “*The very and eternal God ;*” these words contain the *main* proposition of the Article, the proof of the truth of which was given first.

<sup>f</sup> See Petavius de Trinitate.

Supposing the Divinity of the Son to have been proved, we say, the Son is God, and the Father is God, and yet there is but one God, therefore they must be “of one substance.” Or supposing only, that we have proved Christ to be properly called the *Son* of God, antecedent to his being concerned with humanity, then we say, it is implied in the *idea* of a Son, that he is of the same *species* with his Father: in the species of the Divinity, there is but *one individual*; therefore the Son must be of the same substance with the Father.

How much is implied in “*only-begotten!*”

But, however exact our arguments may be as to *form*, we are to use them as sparingly as possible, when we have not <sup>s</sup> *distinct* ideas. Therefore we will mention some passages of *Scripture*, which declare the Father and the Son to be *one*, referring to what has been <sup>h</sup> before said to shew that, though the union *expressed* may be thought by some not to be, beyond a doubt, unity of *substance*, it yet *amounts* to an intimacy of connexion beyond our defining; one quite out of our reach, one which we can only look up to with silent awe and admiration. The following passages are of the sort now mentioned; John xvii. 11, 21, 22, 23.—in John x. compare verse 30, with 38; remarking the stoning for Blasphemy.—After these, consider John xiv. 28. and xvi. 28. as pointing out a *derivation* of the Son from the Father, of a sort consistent with the preceding passages, and with John xiv. 9, 10, 11. which are so strong, that any candid man will at least pardon their having given occasion to the profession of what we call consubstantiality. Those, who account 1 *John* v. 7. genuine, will consider that also: “these three are *one*.”

It

§ Art. 1. Sect. xviii.

h Art. 1. Sect. xvii.

It seems as if *Athanasius* had thought, that persons might be called ὁμοῦσιοι, who were of one mind<sup>i</sup>, if they were of the same *species*; and *Curcellæus*, who quotes him in his Preface<sup>k</sup> to the works of *Episcopius*, says, of the ancient Fathers in general, that they held this notion; and blames the moderns for not confining themselves to it, as if *their* consubstantiality was Sabellianism: — but this solution, though intended to avoid difficulties, would make the thing no easier to me (except it came from the same *authority* with the Scriptures,) than what I just now observed, that if two could, in any sense, be of the same species, when there was but one individual of that species, they must be of the same substance: for the difficulty still remains, of reconciling this solution with *all* the Scriptures. Therefore I still seem compelled to maintain consubstantiality, though I am ready to own, that perfect union of *will*, in infinite wisdom, and spirituality, seems to my mind not distinguishable from unity of *substance*. However, when I say this, I am in no danger of *Sabellianism*, because I never think any thing in Scripture relative to the Trinity is repeated or applied in a proper and legitimate manner, except when the *Christian*<sup>l</sup> scheme is in view, and the different *provinces* of the Son and Holy Ghost are plainly seen and acknowledged: and then, there is not so much danger of confounding the Persons, as of dividing the Substance.

After all, though the expression of our Church seems defensible and justifiable, yet I can conceive a very well-meaning and a thinking man to say,  
‘ had

<sup>i</sup> Art. 1. Sect. x. towards end.

<sup>k</sup> Preface to *Episcopius*, Sect. vi. *Athanasius*, (as *Curcellæus* here says) called Father, Son, and Holy Ghost consubstantial only “ quia in eadem *specie* Deitate convenient, et summa inter eos sit *voluntatis* consensio.”

<sup>l</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xvii.

‘ had not such obscure and difficult expressions better be *avoided*?’ I should answer, ‘ yes;’ but only in the same sense, in which I should say, all *wars* and all *law-suits* had better be avoided; that is, without meaning to blame every Prince, who enters into war, or every private man, who engages in a law-suit. The truth seems to be, that such expressions, as we are apt to be shocked at, or discontented with, have been adopted only in the way of *defence*; and it is of consequence to be *aware* of this, because the meaning of expressions, in such forms as Articles of Religion, depends upon the *occasions* on which they were made, and the *errors*<sup>m</sup> which they were intended to obviate.

The doctrine of *eternal generation* is certainly what the mind of man will never clearly comprehend; we are lost, if we think on a being existing from eternity; yet there seems additional difficulty with regard to an *event* (and generation is an event) happening from eternity, or having happened an infinite time ago:—if any one chose to attempt a direct or positive solution of the difficulty, he might perhaps say, that the Generation of the Son of God may not perhaps be an event in strictness, though in some respects like our generation; or that even an event, such as a communication of power, &c. may have happened so that it may be represented as eternal to *us*; it may have happened before any time assignable by the human faculties; the duration between that and the Incarnation may be one, to which any duration relating to human affairs may bear no proportion.—In like manner, the direct proofs of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, just now urged, may not be without weight; yet I should prefer, as more reasonable and just, as entering better into the minds of those,  
who

<sup>m</sup> B. 111. Chap. ix.

who have expressed these difficulties, a <sup>n</sup> *negative* solution of both. I should therefore say, that the true intent and meaning of laying down the doctrines of the eternal Generation of the Son, and his consubstantiality with the Father, was, because no other method could prevent the opinions of those from spreading, who gave *positive* representations of his nature, which the Scriptures did not seem to warrant; who declared, that he was a *creature*, that a *precedence* might be made out; or that the Son *came out* from the Father, as something is cast out of an engine (*προβολη*); or was *separated* from him, as a *part* is from the whole; or had no being before he was man.—In such a negative way, may the words of our Nicene Creed “*God of God,*” &c. be understood.

It may seem strange, that, in our second Article of 1562, there should be these *additional* expressions, which were not in the former Article of 1552; “begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, of one substance with the Father:”—but I take for granted, that the History of the growth of *Socinianism*, during those ten intervening years, would fully account for the addition, which perhaps the Puritan Interest might contribute to secure. I do not mean to say, that the growth of *Socinianism* made it absolutely *necessary* to insert these words; it might, or might not; but I believe, that in *fact* it occasioned the insertion.—Religious men are sometimes too impatient and indignant; too apt to consider attacks on their own opinions as attacks on the Honour and Majesty of the Supreme Being.

But it is one thing to say, that possibly expressions might have been safely omitted, and another to  
desire

<sup>n</sup> Under Art. 1. Sect. x. See quotation from Ser. de Tempore.

desire to eject them because they contain what is not agreeable to *Reason*°. To do this, when the expressions are collected from Scripture by a comparison of different passages, is to run into several faults and errors. It is to run into the fault of an *officious* friend, who frustrates all your good plans by intermeddling, without a sufficient knowledge of your intentions:—it is presumption; it is to intrude into the place of him, who reveals knowledge, instead of studying what revelation truly means:—nay, in effect, it is to *mislead* and *deceive*; for the chances against a man's judging right, when he follows his own acquired notions about what it is fit for God to do, are infinite; and, if once it is resolved to support one false opinion, a number of other false opinions are propagated as arguments to support it.—Nay, I might have said, that the person, who does this, acts *insincerely*; for he pretends, that he believes that to be the true sense of words, which he adopts for a different reason.—If men often dealt out their own Revelations (as we might call them) in this manner, we should have Revelation a very variable thing; it would vary with every change of fashionable philosophy; it would veer about with every wind of Doctrine.

Let a man then, if he pleases, meditate upon the incomprehensible Doctrines of Religion with awful *diffidence*, and lowly suspense; but, if it be proper for the good of religious Society, that he should give some *preference* of one opinion to another, let him not presume, that the true meaning of Revelation *must* be something that is level and familiar to his ordinary habitual conceptions.

But let us return to the original Article, and *proceed* with our subordinate propositions.

XXII. 7.

° Sect. XIV. towards end.

XXII. 7. Christ “took man’s nature:” was a real *human* being, in *soul* and *body*:—“of a reasonable soul, and human flesh subsisting.”—Luke ii. 40, 52.—Mark xiii. 32.—he had the *appetites* of hunger and thirst, Matt. iv. 2.—John xix. 28.—was *wearied*, John iv. 6.—He *wept*, Luke xix. 41. John xi. 35. this implies both body and *affections*.—He *slept*, Mark iv. 38.—And, as a *reason* for the fact must confirm the fact, take Hebr. ii. 17, 18.—iv 15.—v. 2<sup>p</sup>.

XXIII. 8. Our Church is not wrong in saying, that the Personage before described “took *man’s nature* in the *Womb* of the blessed Virgin.”—The thing to be observed here is only, that Christ *began* to be an human being before he was *born*, as other human creatures begin to be.—If he had not, he must not have been at *first* properly *human*, and therefore some *change* would have been announced, when he became so. To which we need only add, that we have plain accounts of his conception and birth. Matt. i. 18—23.—Luke i. 26—38.—ii. 5, 6. His conception was supernatural; but that is told us plainly; so that we have no reason to think, that any thing farther was out of the course of Nature.

XXIV. 9. We have ground to say, “of *her substance*.”—Here we may mention John i. 14.—Gal. iv. 4.—Rom. ix. 5.—Heb. ii. 14.—1 John iv. 3.—but, if any one should urge, that these passages do not expressly say, “of her substance,” in so many words; I should answer, that, if even these passages were *wanting*, we might conclude, against heretics, that, if Christ was human, and *began* to be so from his conception, it must be understood, that he received that nutrition from the  
substance

<sup>p</sup> Lardner’s Works, Vol. II. p. 84.—where the humanity of Christ, as a favourite point, is well proved.

substance of his Mother, which an human mother commonly gives.—To assert the contrary, would be *arbitrary*, and without foundation, and going contrary to all analogy of Nature. In all reasoning, we must take for granted, that effects are produced by their usual *causes*.—In order therefore to disprove any notion, that Christ merely passed *through* the Virgin's womb, we need only prove, that he was very man, or really man.—Phil. ii. 7. end, would be sufficient.

xxv. 10. Amidst the difficulties, which arise from the description of Christ, the best language we can use is, that he had *two natures in one Person*. This is not a scriptural expression, but a kind of *classing* of many different scriptural expressions, or a reducing of them into a small compass. Not that it would have been used merely on that account: it was intended to keep the Church clear of the errors of *Nestorius* on the one hand, and of *Eutyches* on the other; though every such classing, when judiciously made, must greatly *relieve* the mind, labouring amongst a number of texts seemingly inconsistent; afraid to omit any, or to take any one in so strong a sense, as to inroach upon the true meaning of others. Of *one person*<sup>a</sup> we find it said in Scripture, that he existed *before Abraham*, and yet that he was the *seed* of Abraham; that he was the *Lord* of *David*, and yet his Son, or descendant; that “all things were *made* by him,” and yet that he was “compassed with infirmity;” that he knoweth all things, John xxi. 17.—that all the world must stand at his judgment-seat; and yet that he was ignorant when his judgment would take place.

How

<sup>a</sup> See John viii. 58. Matt. i. 1. Matt. xxii. 45. John i. 3. or Col. i. 16. Heb. v. 2. 2 Cor. v. 10. Mark xiii. 33.



How can we express these seeming inconsistencies (which could not possibly be *real* ones) better than by saying, that the divine and human natures were joined in one Person? If such an expression will *reconcile* all expressions of Scripture, and *no other* will, our Church must have sufficient warrant for using it.—But we have already<sup>r</sup> mentioned this expression repeatedly. One of our Creeds means to lay down something equivalent to it, when it says, that Christ is one, “not by confusion of *substance* (not by confounding the divine and human *natures*, or conceiving them to be *melted*<sup>s</sup> down, as it were, into one) but by unity of *Person*.” Confounding the divine and human natures, would bring on a denial of either the Divinity or the humanity of Christ; and speaking of a plurality of Persons, would be going contrary to the tenor of the Scripture language.

XXVI. 11. The divine and human natures, united in Christ, are “*never to be divided*,” are “*inseparabiliter conjunctæ*.”—This part seems little attended to by Commentators. I know not whether it would not be enough for the *words*, to prove, that this union will continue as long as *we* have beforehand any distinct views;—but there is not occasion to mention any limitations.—It is not disputed, that Christ had honours and dignity as a *reward*<sup>t</sup> for his obedience in his human condition: it is not to be conceived, that there will be any time, when he will be *deprived* of these; and yet, according to our doctrine, they must be, in some way, attached or annexed to his *humanity*; for, independently

<sup>r</sup> Art. I. Sect. XVIII. Art. II. Sect. VIII. and XV.

<sup>s</sup> ἡ ἀσυγχυτος ἕνωσις, the unconfounded union, is mentioned by Photius, in his account of Theodoret's 2d. Dialogue.—See before, Sect. 111. towards beginning.

<sup>t</sup> Phil. ii. 9. Hebr. xii. 2. ii. 9. Ephes. i. 20, &c.

dependently of that, we do not conceive him to stand in need of additional Glory, or to admit of any.—*Some* authority he is to give<sup>u</sup> up; but no hint is given of any *division* to take place in the Person of Christ. “Blessing and honour,” &c. are to be given both “unto him, that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the *Lamb*, for ever and ever<sup>x</sup>.”—1 Tim. ii. 5. Acts iii. 21. xvii. 31. confirm this.

But, if it seems above our comprehension to know *how* Christ, being Divine, enjoys *additional* glory, though we might urge, that Christ as the Son of *Man* may possibly enjoy glory or rewards of a peculiar *kind*, answering purposes of some gracious dispensations, perhaps to many more worlds than ours; yet we seem to be on firmer ground, when we use the words, as before, in a *negative* sense, as *excluding* the notions and fancies mentioned in the *explanation*; or as affirming, that no one has a *right* to hold them; and put it upon our opponents to prove, that a separation will take place.—That Christ, considered as *man*, may receive additional glory, dating the account from his residence on earth, is perfectly intelligible.

XXVII. 12. Our Church is right, in insisting upon the expression “*one Christ*;” but enough has been said upon this, under the tenth of these subordinate propositions, and in the *Explanation*.

“Very God and very man,” has already occurred, in other words.

XXVIII. 13. *Lastly*, the Article takes the true sense of Scripture, when it considers the accounts of the *suffering*, *crucifixion*, *death*, and *burial* of Christ, as plain narratives of *facts*.—If we have proved, that Christ had a real human *body*, we have, in effect, proved all the rest; for no one

ever

<sup>u</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 24—28.

<sup>x</sup> Rev. v. 3.

ever doubted the reality of his *sufferings*, &c. who did not doubt the reality of his *Body*.

However, the *sufferings* of Christ are particularly described by the *Evangelists*<sup>y</sup>, and referred to in the *Epistles*<sup>z</sup>. They are finely enumerated and represented by Bishop *Pearson*.

His *crucifixion* is also expressly *related*, and *alluded* to<sup>a</sup>. That he was “*dead*,” is not only related, but referred to as a fact unquestioned: illustrations and exhortations are founded upon it.—See Luke xxiii. 46.—John xix. 33.—Also Rom. v. 7—10. Rom. vi. 4, &c. 1 Cor. xi. 26, &c.

The same may be said of the *Burial* of Christ; it is both related with many circumstances; and made the ground of spiritual advice and persuasion. See the close of any of the Gospels;—and Rom. vi. 4. Col. ii. 12<sup>b</sup>.

If any one was to suggest, that Christ might not suffer, &c. though he appeared to do so; I would answer, that there is no reasoning against such an *arbitrary supposition*; to suppose, that common phænomena are not to be solved by ascribing them to their established <sup>c</sup> *causes*, is to take away all power of concluding any thing from experience. It is like saying, there is *no matter*, when all the properties of matter are observed: such an hypothesis makes no difference: every thing must go on in the same train, whether it is admitted or not. Indeed, none but the enemies of *matter* ever denied, that the Body of Christ was material. Not that

<sup>y</sup> Matt. xxvi. and parallels.

<sup>z</sup> Hebr. v. 7, 8.

<sup>a</sup> Gal. v. 24, (or 11.)

<sup>b</sup> It might have been said, in short, that *all four* (suffering, crucifixion, death, and burial) are *related* and *alluded* to:—as some passages allude to more than one.

<sup>c</sup> As was observed before, Sect. xxiv.

that they denied the *existence* of matter; they only held it in abomination, as the source of *evil*.

XXIX. What relates to *Atonement*, or implies *original Sin*, is deferred, as before.

XXX. Thus have we gone through the *direct* proofs of all the propositions contained in our Article:—but still a great quantity of argument remains; I mean, the answering of *objections*; these are innumerable. Not one of the texts, of which we have given an interpretation, but has had different constructions put upon it by our adversaries: and, though these constructions appear to *me* forced, inadmissible, what such able men as those who have made them could not have run into without a design of obviating difficulties, yet others may think differently: the question is, what course to take:—answering objections is certainly a part of *Proof*; and, as we blame our adversaries for using arguments already answered, so may they blame us, if we pass by their reasonings without notice: especially if we neglect what they may call *improvements*: and yet to answer *all* objections, in the present case, should be a *separate* undertaking; not only on account of their *number*, but because, in many of them, truth and error are got so entangled, that they cannot be disentangled in a little time. We must therefore hit upon some middle way.

The best medium seems to be, to give up the idea of answering *single* objections, and only lay down a few *general* rules or observations, each of which may be applied on more occasions than one.—It will be found then, that several objections may be solved, by attending to the following things:

XXXI. 1. By attending to the three several *conditions*, in which Christ is mentioned. *One*, in which he existed *before* he assumed man's nature,

in which he is spoken of as *equal* to the Father, though some kind of communication or *generation* had taken place, from unbounded time, which we can only confess, not understand:—a *second*, in which Christ was a partaker of human nature and lived upon *earth*:—a *third*, in which he is said to *sit* at the right hand of the Majesty *on high*, invested with dignity as Head of the Church, or general Society of those, who worship God under the Christian dispensation; interceding for sincere believers, and looking forward to the time, when he will pass judgment upon them.

It is not likely, that these three conditions should be *all* mentioned, whenever *one* of them is; nor that it should be expressly declared to *which* of them any account of Christ belongs, which is introduced *incidentally*, as it were, in the course of an easy and artless *Letter*, or exhortation: this is to be discovered from the *context*, from the *occasion* on which such account is introduced.—We should always keep them *all in mind*, and let circumstances determine of which we should understand any particular saying. In the Epistle to <sup>d</sup> the *Philippians*, Christ is set forth as an *example* of condescension: the very idea takes in an *higher* and a *lower* state; and the *reward* points out a *third*, which must be more *exalted* than the second.—In the first Chapter of the Epistle to the *Colossians*<sup>e</sup>, the intention might probably be, to give the converts high ideas of the *Son of God*, in comparison of those *Æons*, to which many of them ascribed the *Creation* of the World, and, I believe, continued superintendence over their favourites. Here, the humiliation of Christ would be less to the purpose than his *first* condition, when “all things were *made* by him,” and his *last*, when  
he

<sup>d</sup> Phil. ii. 5—11.<sup>e</sup> Col. i. 16—20.

he protected the Saints:—though his suffering was not to be wholly omitted.

The opening of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, or Jews, was probably meant to obviate the low notions, which the *Ebionites* entertained of the character of Christ; in which case, the dignities belonging to the *first* state naturally came to be mentioned; the *second* state must be mentioned at least as a connecting link, and the *third* subjoined:—the third is not probably very unlike the first (John xvii. 5.) in our conceptions; and what difference there is, was not to be marked out *here*:—To the *first* state belong, “let all the angels of God worship him,” (Heb. i. 6.): to the *second*, “who was made a little lower than the Angels;” and, “for the suffering of death”—“crowned him with glory and honour,” (Heb. ii. 9.) to the *third*. John xiv 28, Christ is speaking as being in the form of *man*, and as going to quit this world; he is therefore in his *second* state, and what he says is suitable to our notions; “my Father is *greater* than I.”—The Epistle to the Ephesians seems intended to induce the Jews to admit other men into religious society besides those, who had lived under the law of Moses: and therefore what is said of Christ, in the first Chapter of that Epistle, commences<sup>f</sup> from his resurrection, and relates wholly to his *third* state or condition.

Now, many objections to our doctrines concerning the dignity of Christ may be solved, by attending to the difference of these *three states*: as our adversaries make their arguments against us, by confounding them together, and taking what is said of one, as if it belonged to another. Dr. Priestley

<sup>f</sup> Eph. i. 20, &c. to the end.

Priestley makes "being in the <sup>g</sup> form of God," to belong to Christ *after* he had been on earth; and describes his power in his *third* state, as if it was all the kind of power he ever had.—He also makes the glories ascribed to Christ, Heb. i. 10. to have been conferred on him in *consequence* of his suffering<sup>h</sup>; though the sixth verse mentions bringing him *into the world*. An hint has been already<sup>i</sup> given of something like this rule, with relation to John xvii.—but he, who would see these three conditions described in a masterly manner, must read Bishop *Sherlock's* first discourse in his fourth Volume; in four parts.

XXXII. 2. Objections may be answered, by attending to the two *characters* or *natures* of Christ, divine and human. The *meaning* of these has been sufficiently explained. But, though our adversaries will agree, no doubt, to reconcile Christ's being called a *Lion*, with his being called a *Lamb*; and, though they would not object to uniting all the characters of a *suffering* and a *triumphant Messiah* in the person of *Jesus*<sup>k</sup>; yet they are not willing, in like manner, that we should unite the marks of Godhead and manhood in the person of one Christ.—I confess, I do not understand *how* the divine and human natures are joined in him; but yet the mode of expression seems necessary (as before mentioned) to collect into one agent all the acts and qualities ascribed to Christ. *Socinus* declares against this—as any one may be apt to do, who denies the *divinity* of Christ—for his

<sup>g</sup> Phil. ii. 6. Familiar Illustr. p. 23, 46. the latter is from 1 Pet. i. 20, 21. which gives hints of all *three* states. See also Priestley's Letters, p. 119.

<sup>h</sup> Ill. p. 35. <sup>i</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xvii.

<sup>k</sup> Reconciling passages about *Faith* and works, and making *one* doctrine out of them, is a process of the same nature.

his divinity is *pre-supposed*:—and Dr. Priestley (Letter 5. to Students, p. 80, 81.) says things against it something like what I have said in Sect. VIII. in the character of Nestorius.—But no one should say any thing upon it, who does not previously acknowledge the divinity of Christ; it concerns only our method of classing texts, which, *supposing some* of them to express the divinity of Christ, seem *contradictory*, by sometimes making him God, sometimes man: till any one thinks, that there are some texts, which represent Christ as divine, he has no concern with our method of *classing* . . . or settling a seeming inconsistency, which he does not allow to *exist*. This remark may possibly preclude some *dispute*.

The *form* of the *objections*, which I am now speaking of, is this; Christ is spoken of in Scripture as mere *man*, as *inferior* to the Father, and so on; therefore he cannot be *equal* to the Father. Our *answer* is, we acknowledge Christ to be human, and inferior to the Father as much as *you* can; but *besides* those passages, which you alledge in order to prove him man, there are *others*, which seem to us to speak him *divine*.—Dr. Priestley seems to argue in this manner<sup>1</sup>, from John v, where he says, “that the honour to which Christ is intitled is” (&c.) “on account of what he derives from God, as his *Ambassador*.”—No doubt, his being the *sent of God* is *one* reason for his being honoured.—To argue from human qualities of Christ against divine ones, would be the same as to argue from marks of a *suffering Messiah* against his being triumphant: or to infer, from Christ’s *divine* qualities, that he was not *human*. To prove that we are *inconsistent* is

<sup>1</sup> Familiar Illustr. p. 25, top: see also Letters, p. 71. 1 Tim. ii. 5. p. 144. “How could he be” “our Brother, if he was our *Maker*?”



is nothing in this case; we own, that we cannot reconcile Christ's divine qualities with his human. Suppose, on a *Law trial*, that the evidence of *Marcus* seemed inconsistent with that of *Quintus*, that these witnesses were men of equally good character, but that the Judges had made out the best decision in their power: what would be thought of a man, who dwelt upon the evidence of *Quintus* as certain? and insisted, that the evidence of *Marcus* *must* be false, because it contradicted that of *Quintus*, as *Quintus* was a man of good character: would this be entering into the difficulty?—would not there be the same ground for arguing, that *Quintus's* evidence was false, because it contradicted that of *Marcus*? would such arguing prove any thing wrong in the *Judges*?

The text before mentioned, Mark xiii. 32. having always appeared to me the most difficult of any of those quoted in the Socinian Controversy, I am inclined here to take some notice of it. This text may be considered in *two lights*, as the word "*Son*" is understood to mean Christ as *superior* to the *Angels*, (Heb. i.) or as mere *man*; his being mentioned, in rising to the Father, *after* the *Angels*, makes some (as Macknight) conceive him here in a rank higher than the *Angels*; his being said to be *ignorant*, makes him seem mere *man*. Now, in the *former sense*, as above *Angels*, the passage may afford an argument against the *divinity* of Christ, and in the latter sense, the difficulty is to conceive, how one *person* could, at the same time, know and be ignorant of the same event. If Christ had the divine nature joined with the human, he knew all <sup>m</sup> things; yet, at the same time, he did *not* know the day of judgment.—Taking the text in the *first* light, one might say, First, supposing

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<sup>r</sup> John xxi. 17.

one text inexplicable, that does not seem a sufficient reason for giving up a doctrine built on many others. The Text might be left in *suspense*. 2. *Macknight* understands the verse to mean, that the Son of God was not to *make known* the time of his coming to judgment, but by uncertainty was to keep up the *vigilance* of his disciples: on the principle, “*watch, for ye know not,*” &c.—3. The stile is *prophetic*; and probably the passage has a *double sense*; which puts it upon a different footing from other descriptions of Christ. 4. It may mean to describe the *office* of the Son of God, as *Ambassador* from Heaven to Earth, who might not in that *Office* have the fixing of the day of Judgment in his *Department*. But the text *may* be taken in the *second* light, as speaking of the Son of *Man*, notwithstanding his being mentioned between the Angels and the Father: had the gradation been, ‘Man, the Son, Angels, the Father,’ it would have been much more harsh and *uncouth* than as it is now; ‘Man, Angels, Son, Father;’ nay, it is scarcely conceivable, that an *artless* writer, who had a good *ear*, would not prefer the second series to the first, except *falsehood* was clearly declared by it: but, when we consider, that *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost* are not always mentioned in the same order, in different passages, we must not lay very great stress upon order in the present case; especially when we consider, that the *Son* must be in some respects higher, though in others “lower than the Angels:”—and that here Christ is not spoken of in his *pre-existent* state. The Socinians will allow “*the Son*” to mean here the Son of *Man*, though a good part of our difficulty arises from there being this gradation; “no man,” “not the Angels;”—“neither the Son;”—“but the Father:”—Man, Angels, Son, Father. Let us then suppose  
“*the*

“*the Son*” to mean here the Son in his *human* nature; our observation, founded on this supposition, may be of *general use*.—We cannot conceive how the same person can *know* as God, and yet be *ignorant* as man?—I apprehend it might be sufficient to observe here, that there is the *same difficulty* in conceiving how the same person can be *strong* and weak; have dominion over the elements, and yet be <sup>n</sup> *wearied* with a walk; for this would put us on seeing, that the *Hypostatical Union* is, what it might be expected to be, totally above our comprehension; and therefore, that we cannot reason about it: when we presume to think and perplex ourselves about any part of it, we deceive ourselves, by fancying that, because we have an expression, we have some sort of idea: but we should never fancy this, if we did not forget how it was, that we *arrived* at that expression.—We find different qualities, some divine, some human, predicated of the same person; we want to express this briefly, in order to *relieve* the mind, and preserve *unity of Doctrine*: we get a mode of *speaking*<sup>o</sup>, but that is all: we cannot stir a step farther. If we kept this process in mind, we should never expect to solve any such question as the present; therefore it would never give us any pain or perplexity: we should aim at nothing but noting accurately, and recording faithfully.—This seems the true answer to the *Nestorian*<sup>p</sup> difficulties, and to Dr. *Priestley's*<sup>q</sup>.

When we reason in mathematics, or in any subject which we really comprehend, if we arrive at  
some

<sup>n</sup> John iv. 6.

<sup>o</sup> Something like this has been said before (see Art. I. Sect. xviii.); yet the idea was not precisely that of *getting up to* what would be called a Doctrine, and being unable to *proceed* upon it as a *principle*.

<sup>p</sup> Sect. viii.

<sup>q</sup> Letters, p. 81.

some proposition, we can *go on* from it as an axiom: but when, as in the present case, we arrive only at a *verbal* proposition, though it may be very useful, we cannot *proceed* any farther. This thought ought to *cut short* our arguing on the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, as well as on that of the Incarnation. For in neither do we do more than *collect* various texts of Scripture, and *arrange* them, so as to *ease* the mind, and ward off *error*; so as to promote, or not obstruct, religious *sentiments*. So that Mark xiii. 32. does not contain a *peculiar* difficulty: every particular union of qualities divine and human, which have any correspondence, contains the same.

XXXIII. 3. We may, not unfrequently, solve objections, by attending to the difference between the Deity of natural religion, and a divine person of the Holy *Trinity*.—We may give the *form* of these objections, and an *instance* at the same time. Dr. Priestley \* says, with regard to John xvii. 3. “How can the Father be *the only true God*, if the Son be true God also?” Here, “the only true God” is opposed to *false* Gods, and means the Deity in natural religion; the Divinity of the *Son* is, according to our doctrine, entirely consistent with the Unity of the Supreme Being; that unity is a *part* of our Doctrine of the *Trinity*.—It may indeed seem at first, that, if Christ prays to the *Father*,

\* This paragraph might be better put:—The substance is this;—sometimes the word *God* means God in *general*, sometimes a person in the Holy *Trinity*:—and sometimes the word *Father* likewise signifies *God* in general, sometimes a *person* in the *Trinity*. We have then *four* propositions, all proved or illustrated here, or under the first Article; but the proofs might be better *arranged*.—In which sense *God*, or *Father*, is to be taken, at any time, must depend on *context* and *circumstances*: *God* in general will be always in some way plainly or tacitly *opposed* or *contradistinguished* to *Idols*; a *Person* of the *Trinity* will always be *contradistinguished* to *other Persons* of the *Trinity*.

\* Famil. Illustr. p. 33.

*Father*, he must mean a person of the Trinity; and therefore, if the Father be the *only* true God, another person of the Trinity cannot be God: but yet I think we have before<sup>t</sup> shewn, that Christ, as *the sent*, or the *Ambassador* of God, may call God his Father, meaning God *in general*, as it were, and not a Person of the Holy Trinity. A Prince calls his Father sometimes his *King*, sometimes his *Father*: and if, as in the first Article (Sect. xvii.) one of a *Triumvirate* went on an Embassy, having himself a share in the Government, his dispatches might, if any one pleased, be said to be directed *to<sup>x</sup> himself*.—And the same, if any one of a commercial *partnership* travelled abroad as *agent*, and sent home accounts of his negotiations. There are sometimes stories of a *King's Son* being a *Servant*; he would always have *Royalty*; he would *rule* (in right and justice) as a *Prince*, and *serve* as a *servant*.

1 Cor. xi. “The head of Christ is God;”—certainly no member of the Church of England conceives, that the Deity is not superior to the *Messiah* as such:—or to Christ considered as the Head of the *Church*, or “the Head of every Man.”

xxxiv. 4. Objections may sometimes be answered, by examining *quotations* made from Scripture to support them, and seeing, whether they are *complete*, or *partial*. Thus, when Dr. Priestley quotes Phil. ii. 8—11<sup>y</sup>, we say, the quotation is *incomplete*, as leaving out the account of Christ's *pre-existent* state. He ought to have begun with the 5th verse. As incomplete quotations are frequent in controversy, it should be a general rule always to read what comes immediately *before* and *after* any passage that is quoted.—Not that all partial

<sup>t</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xvii.      <sup>u</sup> John xx. 17.    2 Cor. xi. 31.

<sup>x</sup> Dr. Priestley's Letters, p. 83.

<sup>y</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 45, bottom.

tial quotations must be deemed to be made so *purposely*.

xxxv. 5. Objections may often be solved, by attention to that imperfection of *language*, which consists in the same word being the sign for several different ideas.—The general *form* of such objections is this; ‘an expression has sometimes *this* meaning, therefore it can never have *that*.’ As if a man were to say, ‘*momentum* signifies sometimes a small portion of *time*, therefore it can never signify *force*.’—This is not *said* quite plainly, only you see, by the conclusion, that it is implied or *insinuated*: the kind of argument is not wholly wrong, but it is not wholly right; for an expression may mean one thing in one case, and another thing in another case: and the meaning is to be determined, in each case, by circumstances, and legitimate interpretation. But, when a mind is on the stretch, anxious, scrupulous, feeble; and has been used to affix a certain sense to an expression; this kind of argument, which proposes another sense, and supports it by instances, gives a shock, unhinges, unsettles; and therefore its effects ought to be obviated.

It is said, that we take the expression *the Son of God* in too high a sense; *men*<sup>2</sup> are the Sons of God; &c.—no doubt, God is the *common Parent* of mankind, and Christians are his *adopted Sons*; as opposed to those, who laboured under *bondage* to the elements of the world, (Gal. ii. 4.—iv. 3, 9, 25.) and as they will inherit eternal life, it is a fair topic of holy eloquence to say, that they are “*heirs of God, and therefore joint heirs*<sup>3</sup> with Christ:”—but may not the *first-begotten*, whom all the *Angels* were to *worship*, be Son in an higher sense? if not, how is he the *only-begotten*?—but, instead of criticising

<sup>2</sup> John iii. 2. Famil. Illustr. p. 23.      <sup>3</sup> Rom. viii. 17.

ticising on *words*, we will bring the testimony of the *Jews*, who understood the force of the language used, and the Mosaic Law.—“The Jews sought to *kill*” our Saviour, because he said, “that God was his Father, making himself *equal*<sup>b</sup> with God.”

It is said, that *εγω ειμι* means nothing more than ‘I am he,’ and is so translated, except in the contested place, John viii. 58<sup>c</sup>.—Here, the shortest way would be to call in the same interpreters, the *Jews*; they took up stones to punish Christ for blasphemy according to their law. That *εγω ειμι*<sup>d</sup> might be *translated* here, so as to exhibit an uncommon expression, is plain enough, because the passage, *quoted* as it were from the Book of Exodus, was uncommonly expressed.—And, supposing we were to adopt “I *am* he,” instead of “*I am*,” the confusion of *tenses* remains; “before Abraham was, I am he;”—the meaning, we are told, is, ‘before Abraham was, I was *intended*, fixed upon in the Divine Counsels, as the Messiah:’—the probability of our Saviour’s expressing such a thought by such words, shall be left to every one’s private judgment.

We say, that *επικαλεομαι* signifies to *invoke*; but we are told, in answer, that it signifies to ‘*surname*:—why may it not signify *both* one and the other?—and also to *appeal*?—there seems good reason to think, that the LXX often used it to imply invocation, and therefore the *Jews* would be accustomed to it in that sense. I refer to Parkhurst’s Lexicon.

*Creation*<sup>f</sup> sometimes is used in a comparative or *metaphorical* sense; may it not therefore be sometimes used in a plain and *proper* sense, even with regard to the Son of God?—that it should be understood

<sup>b</sup> John v. 18.

<sup>c</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 41.

<sup>d</sup> Sect. xvi. before.

<sup>e</sup> Ill. p. 40.

<sup>f</sup> Famil. 37. 3.

understood figuratively in *Col. i. 16.* seems<sup>f</sup> strange to *me.* It appears to *me,* that it would not have been so interpreted, if any other way of denying Christ's pre-existent state could *possibly* have been invented.—*Bishop Pearson* has replied to this interpretation, in his masterly manner, long ago<sup>g</sup>: but it is urged again and again.

XXXVI. 6. As the force of objections often depends upon authorities, and the credit of witnesses, we may not unfrequently obviate them, by attending to the particular situations and *views* of those witnesses. Such attention will sometimes enable us to *confirm* an evidence, which is reckoned *weak*; weaker than it really is: sometimes to *overturn* one, which is accounted *stronger* than it really is. In *both* ways obviating that *prejudice*, by which men are led into error.

If, in an objection, the *Fathers* are spoken of as credulous, attention to circumstances will enable us to *confirm* their evidence: by shewing, that *Pliny* and *Plutarch* were<sup>h</sup> equally weak; and therefore, that the charge falls on the *age*, without affecting the character of the *Persons*; who therefore may be deemed credible witnesses in all things not connected with the vulgar errors of the *times.* If it is said, that the *Jews* were unpolished and ignorant, we can ask, were they ignorant of those *Laws* against blasphemy<sup>i</sup>, which they themselves executed? or were they, in general, more ignorant in matters of Religion, than *Idolaters*?—*Oneirocritics* are folly, but do they not shew us the language<sup>k</sup> of Symbols?

<sup>f</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 44. See Dr. Priestley's fifth Letter to Dr. Price, p. 120.

<sup>g</sup> Pearson on the Creed, p. 227, first Edit. or p. 114, Fol.

<sup>h</sup> Book I. Chap. xii. Sect. xvi.

<sup>i</sup> John viii. 58.—v. 18.

<sup>k</sup> B. I. Chap. xvii.



Symbols? most men are weak in some things, but were those, who attest any thing, weak in the *principal* matter?—A doctrine is confirmed by a *writing*; it is objected, that that writing is *spurious*: what then? did not many ancients put the names of famous authors to their works rather than their own names? and that with a good <sup>1</sup> *intention*?

Attention to circumstances and views will sometimes enable us to *overturn* an authority, which seems *stronger* than it ought. Sir Isaac Newton<sup>m</sup> has proved, that such a text of such a MS has been corrupted; which way did the *prejudices* of that great man (mentioned by our adversaries, because he was a great man) particularly incline him?—Hume was indeed a philosopher, but an *infidel*; Whiston had studied Church history, and read the Scriptures, but his Apollinarian Hypothesis drew every thing into its vortex.

xxxvii. 7. Lastly, we may often solve objections, by *substituting* the interpretation instead of the words interpreted.—We have already asked, what could induce St. John to say, that the *power and wisdom* of God were with God in the beginning<sup>n</sup>.—*Socinus* himself, as I remember, makes the *Word* to mean the *Mandate* of God. An *Academic* might say, in the same way, the King's *Mandate* is the same as the King; a *Degree* by *Mandate* is a *Degree* by the King; but would he say, In the *beginning* (before *Mandate-degrees* began to be taken) was the *Mandate*, and the *Mandate* was with the King, and the *Mandate* was the King:—the same was in the beginning with the King? would he, particularly, say this in the opening of an *History*?

We

<sup>1</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 2. p. 310. Of this, Book 1. Chap. XII. Sect. IV.

<sup>m</sup> Fanil. Illustr. p. 38.—twice.

<sup>n</sup> Sect. XVII.

We have an instance of the effect of substitution in the *Short Defence*, &c. recommended before, in which the Socinian Interpretation of Matt. xxviii. 19. is put instead of the text<sup>o</sup>.—Let us try its effect now, while we are suggesting this caution.

These are all the Rules or observations on the Controversy concerning the Son of God, with which I shall trouble you. In several arguments, our adversaries *prove* what *we hold* as well as they: (see *Short Defence*, p. 29, and Note,) which is sometimes an insinuation, that we do *not* hold what they prove; and, when it is so, it is a *misrepresentation*, and an unfairness and *injustice* to us. They prove what we call the *third condition* or state of Christ, (Lard. Vol. 11. p. 91); they prove, that Christ is *inferior* to the Father;—that the *Unity* of God is maintained through the Scripture (Lard. Vol. 10. p. 619, &c.)—that *creation* does not always mean *literal* creation; that Christ's being *worshipped* is not *reconcilable*, in our minds, with his *creating* all worlds. All these things we are far from denying: to prove them, in controversy with us, is to misrepresent us: nor must they say, that we *cannot* hold these things, because they are *inconsistent* with our other tenets; we must not be charged with any *consequences* of our Doctrines, except those which we ourselves acknowledge: we may speak foolishly or inconsistently; but what we *profess* to hold we should be *allowed* to hold. I could have wished to say something on 1 Tim. iii. 16. but it would lead us into discussions too like those on 1 John v. 7.—and what observations I had to make, I made in reading to you Bishop Pearson's Note upon it. Dr. Priestley seems to<sup>p</sup> refer to the *Alexandrian MS*, when he speaks of it: I produced Dr. Woide's fac-simile, and gave my opinion on the  
modern

<sup>o</sup> *Short Defence*, p. 32.

<sup>p</sup> *Famil. Illustr.* p. 38.

modern appearance of the word *θεός*. Bishop Hurd has a Sermon on the verse, and Mr. John Berriman has published an Octavo Volume upon it, which seems to contain much useful instruction to the *critical Divine*.

XXXVIII. Having now finished the Proof of our Article, we come to what we have called the *Application*, which will consist of the same parts as before.

XXXIX. We are first to consider, in what sense a thinking man would now assent to this second Article. Let us conceive such an one meditating upon it in his closet, with a view to determining, whether he should give or withhold his assent.—‘Let me reflect, he might say, can I with a safe conscience subscribe to what is now proposed to me for subscription?—“*The Son, which is the Word of the Father:*”—yes, it appears to me much more probable, that the Logos means a *Person*, than that it denotes only the *Power* or *Wisdom* of God, or his *Mandate*: and I do not see, from the connexion of expressions, that any Person can be meant different from him, who is called the *Son*.—That this Person may be said to have been “*begotten* of the Father,” is plain from the very appellation of *Son*, and from many passages of Scripture. But, “*from everlasting!*” that may require a pause. I find the idea of *eternal Generation* too much for my grasp: yet I can say, that, according to the Scriptures, the Son was begotten of the *Father* before he was conceived by the *Holy Ghost*.—Nay, it seems to me, that no man has a right to assign any time as *prior* to that derivation or communication, which is represented to us as in some sort *parental*: or to say, that the Son of God is a *creature*: I so far understand what I say, as to deny that; and I apprehend, that such *negation*

was what the compilers of the Article principally intended.’

“*The very and eternal God!*”—The Son seems to me to have the *title* of *God* given to him several times, though verbal criticism has contended to the contrary, in some instances; but besides that, he, who could do what Christ did, could, as far as my notions reach, do *every thing*: he, who *knew* what Christ knew, must know every thing: and he, who is able to *do* all things, and who knows all things, and has existed “from *everlasting*,” and moreover is set forth as *preserving* all things, is, to me *God*<sup>a</sup>. Superior Beings may have different views, but I think I may *deny*, that any *Man* (and this was the thing chiefly intended, in the framing of the Article) has a right to refuse that title to Christ, or even to call him *a God*; that is, a God of some inferior sort; the worship of whom would be a kind of *Hero-worship*; or to fix any priority or precedence between the Father and him, considered as *Divine*.—Expressions relating to these high matters might, for me, have been left *indefinite*, as promoting rather a devout *heart*, than a speculating head; but, when I am called upon to *prevent* the spreading of what appears to me *error* and *heresy*, I must reason and define as well as I am able.’

“*Of one substance with the Father!*”—here again I pause:—but, if I may proceed at all upon the notion of Christ’s being the *first-begotten* or *only-begotten Son* of God, I must say, that the Son is universally of the same *species* with the Father; and here, in this species it is the fundamental principle of all rational religion to assert, that there is but *one individual*. I do not *understand* this, but I see, that, if this is not allowed, the Church must either  
make

<sup>a</sup> Art. 1. Sect. x. towards beginning.

make the Son of a *different species* from the Father, or make a *plurality* of Gods; and I *conjecture*, that this might induce the *ancient Christians* to insist so much upon the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father;—and I must have as great an insight into the subject as those have, who would make the Father and Son of *different substances*; which I must declare *against*; and the *intimacy* of connexion between them being unbounded or *infinite*\*, I am willing to express that infinity, by the *affirmative* expression prescribed by *Authority*†.

“*Took man’s nature* in the Womb of the blessed Virgin”—however wonderful, it seems clearly set forth in *Scripture* (and I am now thinking of nothing else,) that this great Personage became a real man, in *soul* and *body*.—This settled, I should consider it as implied, that he *became* an human being, when others became so, that is, before Birth.—His *conception* indeed, on the part of the Holy Ghost, was supernatural; but there is no reason to doubt, that, on the part of his *Mother*, it was *natural*; as was all that *followed*; some have been shocked at this idea, and have proposed their suppositions in order to avoid it; but, if Christ was real man *after* his birth, why not *before*? and, if he received not from his Mother what is usual before parturition, how could he be said repeatedly to be the seed of a *woman*, and a *fetus* according to the *Flesh*?

“*Two perfect natures*” “were joined together in *one Person*.”—This is *difficult*; and, when I try to *conceive* the *knowledge* of God, *co-existing* in Christ with the ignorance of man, the *power* of God with the weakness of man, I find my rational faculties feeble and impotent: yet I *acquiesce* in this mode of *stating* the matter, in *preference* to any other, because

\* Art. i. Sect. x. beginning.

because it is *simply* and fairly taken from Scripture; from the *whole* of Scripture: and because I think it most dangerous and presumptuous to modify, or tamper with, Scripture, where we understand the least, and are *likely* to understand the least. Nevertheless, I feel neither surprize nor indignation at those Christians, (I mean *now* such as have previously allowed both the Divinity and humanity of Christ), who have proposed methods of avoiding difficulties so striking. The supposition, that the human nature of Christ must be swallowed up in the Divine, may solve *some* difficulties; imagining *two Christs*, two Agents, or Persons, the one Divine, the other human; the former all-wise, the latter ignorant; the former powerful, the latter weak; may solve *other* difficulties; and the same may be said of other suppositions (such as the *confusion* of the two natures, or the *conversion* of one into the other): but yet all these suppositions have one radical fault, that they *neglect* some parts of Scripture, in attending to others. I cannot but prefer abiding by the *whole* of Scripture, leaving the difficulties of doctrines evidently above our comprehension to that time, when we shall know even as <sup>6</sup> we are known.<sup>7</sup>

“ *Never to be divided:*”—‘ If Christ, after his ascension is called *man*, even as *Mediator* and *Judge*; and if *Honour* shall be ascribed to the *Lamb* for ever and ever; I am clearly *against* any man’s presuming to *assign* any time, when the Divine and human natures in Christ shall be finally separated. Which seems to coincide with the *true intent* and meaning of the expression, “ never to be divided.”

‘ There is then but “ *one Christ*;”—‘ truly Divine, truly human.—That he “ *truly suffered*,” died, and was buried, can be denied only by mere  
arbitrary

*arbitrary* supposition, or by the extravagance of *mystical* interpretation; except indeed by those, whose principle it is to hold all *matter* in abomination, with whom I have nothing to do. Concerning the *reality* therefore of Christ's sufferings, death, and burial, I have no doubts or difficulties, (except such as have been already considered, arising from the union of the two natures in him); I reject all suppositions, which are perfectly arbitrary, when they are opposed to *analogy* and experience; I allow no *mystical* exposition, except where it is warranted by the soundest reason: and I account every *work* of God good in its kind. — The rest I will consider *hereafter* <sup>1</sup>.

XL. After determining in what manner one of ourselves may be supposed to give his assent to the Article under consideration, we come to consider how it seems possible, that any *mutual concessions* should take place between our Church and those who dissent from it, tending to an union.

The *general end* and design of such concessions (it must always be remembered), is not to produce perfect unity of *private opinion*<sup>2</sup>, but only *unity of Doctrine* and *worship*.

In what remains to be said on this second Article, there is such a resemblance and connexion between it and the first, that we must be brief, in order to avoid repetition. — There is the same reason here, as in the first Article, why we should profess our doctrine to be *unintelligible*, why we should constantly make public claim to the title of *Unitarians*, and why we should consider the nature of *Invocation* of the Son of God: and what might be expected from Dissenters, in *return* for concessions and healing expedients on our part, is much the same

<sup>1</sup> See opening of this Article.

<sup>2</sup> B. III. Ch. IV.

same as under the preceding Article.—Nay, we may extend the observation even to *Improvements*; these must arise here, as well as before, from attending to the true nature and use of *Philosophy*; from watching nicely the *circumstances*, in which expressions are introduced; from being cautious of forming unintelligible, that is verbal, propositions into *Syllogisms*, or arguments; from investigating the different scriptural senses of the word *God*; from attaining a clearer notion of the *uses* of our Doctrine. Moreover, we *might* make a critical inquiry into 1 *Tim.* iii. 16. an *Appendix* to this Article, as we made an inquiry concerning 1 *John* v. 7. an *Appendix* to the last. The *difficulty*, in short, is, how to keep up our *Form*, and suggest any thing *new*.

XLI. What was said, under the preceding Article\*, of the *general* effect of *invidious names* and appellations, is applicable here; but the *particular* word there specified, viz. *Trinity*, does not belong to us at present. As it seems to be of great consequence, that we *Speak* the *same* thing, and as men are generally more affected by *sounds* than ideas, we might propose it as a question, whether the word *God*, in such expressions as “*God the Son*,” and “*God the Holy Ghost*,” could be omitted, in our Offices, without a material fault. Though Christ seems to us to be *called God* in several places, yet there is some *dispute* on that head; and, for the sake of *Unity*, we would pay all possible *respect* to the opinions of our adversaries. I should imagine, that such an omission would tend, almost as much as any thing, to mollify and conciliate. There is not perhaps any express *command* to invoke Christ under the title of *God*. The *early Christians*

\* Art. 1. Sect. XI.

† 1 Cor. i. 10.



*Christians*<sup>z</sup> used to invoke Christ, and Pliny says, *tanquam Deum*; yet *Pliny's idea* of a God was not confined to the *one* supreme invisible Being. St. *Stephen* addresses Christ, but does not use the word *God*, though it is found in our translation, in *Italics*; and his address is the ejaculation of a man dying in the Christian cause. If Christ was to be *worshipped on earth*, he must be a proper object of *worship* when ascended into heaven; but it may be considered, whether he might not be entitled *Mediator*, *Intercessor*, *Judge*, *Head of the Church*, instead of *God*. The equality of Christ to the Father was most perfect in his *pre-existent* state:—In his state after his ascension, in which he *now* exists, he deigns to be called *man*<sup>a</sup> in some sense; he has not entirely put off his human nature.

XLII. It might tend to promote unity, as far as it is necessary for the purposes of religious *Society*, if we brought some of our *Forms* nearer to expressions of *Scripture*: not only those which we are to use in *prayer*, but those which contain *confessions* of Faith. We have already<sup>b</sup> given a scriptural address to Christ.—But to be frank here, I suppose, that some might hope for more from this measure than it would in fact produce. All Christians will assent to Scripture, but then we do not use the Scriptures in the original languages, and different parties *translate* differently: and, even according to our own translation, Dr. Balguy's observation has great<sup>c</sup> weight. "Subscription to the Scriptures is absolutely *nothing*. It is consistent with every imaginable absurdity and mischief," &c.—We may add, that the manner of *placing* and *introducing* passages of Scripture is, in a way, interpreting them:

as

<sup>z</sup> 1 Cor. i. 2. Book I. Chap. xviii. Sect. xiii.

<sup>a</sup> Acts xvii. 31. 1 Tim. ii. 5. <sup>b</sup> Art. I. Sect. xiv.

<sup>c</sup> 8vo. p. 277.

as would appear from comparing two scriptural *Catechisms* together in disputed <sup>d</sup> points.—Nevertheless, I should imagine, that *some good* might be attained, in some instances, by the measure here proposed.—It was, I doubt not, an ease of mind to Eusebius to use *πρωτοτοκονοῦ πάσης κτίσεως*, as he thereby suited his own opinions, and avoided any invidious opposition to them.—And “the *Son of God*” has been used by different persons, united in worship, in different <sup>e</sup> senses.—The more *candid* people are, the more use will they make of this expedient.

*Episcopius*, as a Leader of the *Arminian* sect, has composed (or was greatly instrumental in composing) a confession of Faith, in terms chiefly scriptural: the intent of this was to comprehend men of different religious opinions in one religious *Society*: and the *effect* has been in some measure answerable to the design. For the leading writers of the *Arminians* do *differ* in many points, though they unite in public *Doctrine*. However, this agreement has its *limits*; *Papists* are excluded from Arminian Societies as *Persecutors*, and those Protestants who favour *Predestination*<sup>3</sup>.

In my Sermon on the Athanasian Creed, I have recommended inserting Mark xvi. 16. repeatedly, instead of the damnatory clauses.

XLIII. With

<sup>d</sup> Compare an orthodox scriptural Catechism, with *Biddle's*; in Cambr. Library, the former is E—5—72; the latter C—14—66. Dr. *Priestley* has compiled a scriptural Catechism.

<sup>e</sup> Eusebius's Creed is in Socrates, L. 1. c. 8; and a Translation into English, in Dr. Rutherford's last Charge, p. 82. And in the *Histories* of the first Nicene Council.

<sup>f</sup> Book 111. Chap. 1v. Sect. v.

<sup>3</sup> See *Episcopius*, T. 2. part 2. p. 69.—An *account* of the Confession, Part 2. p. 169. Also *Molheim*, 8vo. Vol. 5. p. 461. Cent. 17.—2. 2. 3. 12. The Pref. of *Curcellaus*, Sect. vi. was mentioned before; Art. 1. sect. x. near end; and Sect. xx1. of this Art

*Arminius* died in 1609; *Episcopius* in 1643.

XLIII. With regard to what might be done by *Dissenters* towards a coalition, little need be *added* to what was said under the preceding <sup>i</sup> Article. It appears from thence, that they may *more*<sup>k</sup> *easily* yield than we. Such is the nature of what we hold, that they might suffer us to proceed in our own way, though with contemptuous *pity*. They might suffer us as *fools* gladly, seeing they themselves are wise.—But Dissenters from the Church of England are not all upon the *same footing*. The ancient Arians<sup>l</sup> (and some, I suppose, of their way of thinking continue), spake high things of Christ: the original Socinians<sup>m</sup> did the same:—But, with regard to Dissenters *in general*, on the subject of the second Article, we may say, that our *claim* to their assistance in reconciling and uniting, is built on the *nearness* of our Doctrines to theirs; particularly in all points nearly affecting *Piety*<sup>n</sup> and *Virtue*; on our not having, in many of the disputed points, what can properly be called an *Opinion*; and on their relating not to man, and what he has to do; but to the Divine nature, and what is to be done on the part of God. But I do not perceive, that Dissenters are contriving healing measures; they seem all mere *Advocates*.

The doctrine of *Atonement* we take no notice of at present.

XLIV. We

<sup>i</sup> Sect. xv.

<sup>k</sup> 1794. I am mortified to find, that Dr. Priestley holds the contrary: Letters, p. 20, 22; and expresses wishes of being accommodated.

<sup>l</sup> Lard. Vol. 4 p. 127. Dr. Priestley's Letters, p. 100: and other Letters to Dr. Price. Waterland's Case of Arian Subscription, p. 33.

<sup>m</sup> See Cat. Racov. p. 52, 53, and 115, with preceding. For *modern* Socinians, see Sect. xii. or Dr. Priestley's Letters, p. 101.

<sup>n</sup> B. III. Chap. iv. Sect. iv. and v. quoted Art. i. Sect. xv.

XLIV. We are, in the last place, to see what openings there seem to be for *improvements* relative to the subject of our Article. Here again, as I have lately observed, we have anticipated, under the first Article, what might have been offered under the second.

XLV. But yet it seems as if some improvement might possibly arise from examining, whether the expressions of Scripture, about which we contend, are to be studied in a *scientific* manner?—whether they are not some of them rather expressions of strong *affection* and sublime *devotion*?—Consider the case; in the first ages of Christianity, Christians seem to have *felt* a great deal of pious<sup>o</sup> gratitude, and devout admiration; and to have uttered what they felt, in an artless manner. *Passionate* expressions are always understood as *indefinite*, and the language of Scripture being natural language, must be interpreted as such. Expressions that are merely *sublime* must be indefinite, I mean such as, in human language, relate to the nature and counsels<sup>p</sup> of God; because they cannot convey distinct ideas; and they are the more indefinite, because they are affecting, or excite *passion*. Now, if the expressions of the earliest Christian writers were at first indefinite, they certainly ought always to *continue* so; to give any such a definite sense, is to misinterpret them. We have mentioned the word  $\omega\lambda\kappa\rho\omega\mu\epsilon\alpha$ , as an<sup>q</sup> instance; others<sup>r</sup> might be added; only there is

<sup>o</sup> Art. 1. Sect. 1v.

<sup>p</sup> John iii. 12. might be applied here; substituting for *belief*, a necessary previous step, *understanding*: “If I have told you earthly things, and ye” understand not, how shall ye understand, “if I tell you of Heavenly things?”

<sup>q</sup> Sect. xvii. of Appendix to B. 1.

<sup>r</sup> Heb. i. 3. brightness of his glory. Eph. i. 23. the fulness of him that filleth all in all. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Heb. ii. 10. the prepositions: see before Sect. xvi. They shall be as the *Angels*. John xxi. 25. the world would not contain the books.

is danger lest it should be thought, of any one instance, that its being indefinite is too positively asserted. Instances here are only to give a general idea.

Making expressions to be, after this manner, taken in an indefinite sense (supposing that their *right* sense) would not only be an improvement in interpreting, but it would probably tend greatly to lessen dissension, and to promote devotion. People would not quarrel about the sense of a passage, which would only be understood as sentimental and affecting, any more than about an exclamation or an interjection. And, if senses of expressions were indefinite, they would be *pliable*; all might adopt them, in one way or other, without finding fault with their brethren: there would be no dread of consequences, and probably no jealousy or bitterness.—Then, Devotion arises naturally on the absence of dispute<sup>2</sup>; and we should have a great number of fine sublime and pathetic expressions, which we have not now, to help our devotion<sup>1</sup>.

XLVI. And, when we are looking forward to imaginary improvements, it is natural to consider, not only what will *probably* happen, but what may *possibly*. Now there seems nothing out of the reach of *possibility* in supposing, that persons, differing in the points which we have now been discussing, and even in other points, may join in divine *worship*, and with a *sufficient* agreement in opinion. A *perfect* agreement seems beyond all *possible* expectation; but a perfect *ease*, composure, and quiet of mind, and freedom from actual *dissension*, does not seem so. Such reflexions as we have been making must shew the mode of beginning, and the instances formerly produced

<sup>1</sup> B. III. Chap. III. Sect. IV.

<sup>2</sup> It might be worth while to read here a passage, which Dr. Burney quotes from Augustin: see his account of the Commemoration of Handel, p. 90. and Hist. Music, Vol. 2, p. 172.

produced must afford hopes of success. Some *forbearance* is certainly required, but not more than might be attained.—The truth is, most men are under the dominion of some *Hypotheses*; in most things perhaps; but particularly in the mysterious parts of Religion, where education<sup>u</sup> has given a particular view of the Scriptures, and controversy has fixed us in our favoured notions. After this, we are never so easy as in our own habitual train of ideas and conceptions. If this was once universally allowed, and thoroughly acquiesced in, it would be so far from dividing us, that it would be the means of our living quietly together, and even uniting in religious *worship*, without taking offence at each other's peculiarities. We should let the *Quaker* and the Dutchman keep their *hats* on, and they would let us take ours off. And the same mutual indulgence would take place in expressions of Devotion, and declarations of Faith, though made in the presence of all parties.

If it would not seem extravagant, I would propose, as a question for discussion, how much greater forbearance it would require for men, who differed in religious notions, to worship together, so as to attain the proper ends of religious society; than for men, who differed in their manner of eating and drinking, to partake of the same meal, so as to attain the proper ends of convivial society? Eating and drinking different things, you will say, arises only from a difference of *taste*, it is a matter of liking and disliking, it would be very idle, if people were to eat at separate tables, because they did

<sup>u</sup> See Dr. Priestley's Letters, p. 168.—In this passage I have the satisfaction to agree with this Author; not in many: I mean, of his controversial writings; in things unwritten I agree with him, I suppose, generally.—For the instances just now mentioned, see Art. I. Sect. xv.

did not all prefer the same dish:—but have liking and disliking, have taste and distaste, nothing to do with religion? in the extended sense, a great deal. One man loves sacred *music* above all things; another abominates an organ: one is edified and moved with a fine *picture*, of a nativity, or a taking down from the Cross; another would banish all pictures from every place of worship:—and *hymns*, and Sermons, or *pulpit-eloquence*, and even the eloquence of *Prayers*, are much connected with *taste*; and, if some of the lofty sayings, on which speculative doctrines have been built, are really expressions of *sentiment* and affection, the reception and application of them may be guided by taste, in a considerable degree. Those, who are of noble and generous dispositions, and have been liberally educated, give into doctrines, which are sublime and pathetic: whilst the more cold, precise, barren minds rather give into those doctrines, which lower the dignity of Christ, and reduce all religious notions to vulgar and ordinary conceptions.—Gloominess of temper has probably often made a man embrace the doctrine of absolute *Reprobation*, of condemnation by a direct decree of God to eternal misery. But moreover, dissensions concerning meats and drinks, though perhaps they really *arise* from taste, may be supported by much philosophical *reasoning*. What may not be urged concerning *acids*, and *alcalis*, and inflammatory liquors? what concerning concoction and digestion? the effects, natural and *moral*, of *animal* and *vegetable* sustenance? The Rules of different Convents, Orders of Monks, &c. &c. are founded on these principles. If people were as much inclined to *bigotry* and persecution about these things, as some have been about *spiritual food*, a convivial meeting would be a thing impracticable.—And  
now,

now, suppose men divided into *small parties*, refusing to eat, except with those who used the same quality and quantity of nourishment with themselves, what would you say to them? if your exhortations to *unity of repast* be in *general terms*, observe whether many of them are not applicable to *unity of worship*.

I conclude these remarks with observing, that what has been said in order to shew, that men might possibly *unite in worship*, though they differed greatly in opinion, does not affect the force of any thing, which has been urged in defence of the doctrines of the Church of England, either as to their *truth* or *importance*. It supposes each person to rest in his peculiar notions, upon what seem to him *good grounds*: but only to shew great *candour* and forbearance towards the opinions of *others*, notwithstanding all his reasoning in favour of his own.

If agreement in *mind* and *judgment*, as well as in teaching and worship, is finally to be accomplished in any way, it must be in this.





## ARTICLE III.

OF THE GOING DOWN OF CHRIST INTO HELL.

**A**S Christ died for us, and was buried; so also is it to be believed, that he went down into Hell.

I. In treating on this Article, we shall follow our usual *plan*; attempting history, explanation, and proof; and then some application to the present state of things.

*History* is the first thing. The case seems to be the same with the doctrine of Christ's descent into Hell, and many others; they were *believed* in an *indefinite* way, before they were publicly and formally *professed*. The passage of Augustin seems to be well known; "Quis ergo nisi infidelis negaverit fuisse apud Inferos Christum?"

This continued for some Centuries; perhaps, if we speak with respect to the Church at large, we may say, till the beginning of the fifth Century; that is, as far as we are informed by the ancients. At length, the doctrine got to be inserted in *Creeds*. It is <sup>a</sup> said to have been inserted as an antidote to the *Apollinarian* Heresy<sup>b</sup>, as it is inconsistent with the notion, that Christ had no *human* soul, and that the functions of the soul were performed by the *Λόγος*. Yet, though the Apollinarians had some affinity to the Arians, the doctrine of Christ's descent into Hell does not seem to have entered into the

<sup>a</sup> Lord King, Chap. 4.

<sup>b</sup> Art. 11. Sect. vi.

the *Arian controversy*. It was in some *Arian Creeds* before it was (seemingly) in any that were <sup>c</sup> orthodox; yet it was not to be called an *Arian Doctrine*, because several *Arian Creeds* omitted it. The *Arian Presbyters*, who write to Alexander Bishop of Alexandria<sup>d</sup>, have it not; neither is it in the Creed delivered by Arius and Euzoïus to the Emperor <sup>e</sup> Constantine.

It appears, that the *descent* of Christ into Hell has been confounded with his *burial*. So that it has happened sometimes, that, where one of these was inserted in a Creed, the other was omitted. Our *Nicene Creed* has the burial without the descent; and the *Athanasian Creed* has the descent without the burial.

As this may seem unaccountable, we will just mention here, that the words ψυχῆ and ἄδης have been used in various senses. Ψυχῆ has been sometimes rendered the *Body*, as the context in some passages<sup>f</sup> of the LXX fully allows. That it should be rendered *Soul*, will seem obvious. Ἄδης is several times in Scripture translated *Grave*, on account of the meaning of the sentence, in which it occurs; and it is frequently translated *Hell*: ἡ ψυχῆ εἰς ἄδης, then, may be construed according to these senses, either the *Body* in the *Grave*, or, the *Soul* in *Hell*; and therefore those, who thought it meant the one, might think it could *not* mean the other; and consequently, if they made profession of the burial of Christ's *Body*, might pass over the descent of his *Soul* into Hell.—Perhaps more satisfaction may be had with regard to ψυχῆ, as understood to mean the body, when we come to the *Explanation*.

Bishop

<sup>c</sup> Bingham, 10. 3. end. Pearson, Creed, p. 472. 1st edit.

<sup>d</sup> Epiphanius, Art. 2 Sect. 6. <sup>e</sup> Socrat. Hist. 1. 19.

<sup>f</sup> Lev xxi. 1, 11. Numb. v. 2.—vi. 6. These passages had better be considered in the *Explanation*.

Bishop Pearson, in his exposition of the<sup>g</sup> Creed, says, very truly, that “The first place we find it” (the Article of the descent into Hell) “used in, was the Church of Aquileia:” he means, about the year 400. Though this is true, yet perhaps caution may be required, lest it should induce us to think, that our first observation is ill-grounded: or, that the Doctrine was then *invented* (Voltaire), or not *expressly acknowledged* before.—Eusebius<sup>h</sup> gives a very short explication of the Christian Faith, which he reckons very ancient, and says, he translated it from the Syriac, as what had been given by St. Thaddæus to the people of Edeffa: In this, we find *κατεβη εις τον αδην*.—And Lord King<sup>i</sup> mentions the Article or Doctrine as in a Creed of *Epiphanius*<sup>k</sup>, and in an Arian Creed delivered to the Council of Ariminum, held under Constantius in 359.—*Ruffinus* does indeed mention, that it was *not* in the *Roman*, nor in the *Oriental* Creeds in his time: on which we may just remark, that the Roman Church was not then so extensive as it was afterwards:—and that there might possibly be Oriental Creeds *unknown* to Ruffinus, a Presbyter of Aquileia: and lastly, that the doctrine might be *taught* at many places, and even at Aquileia, before the time of Ruffinus.

Should this caution with regard to Bishop Pearson be thought unnecessary, yet it will be thought right to say something of Bishop Burnet. He has, in his *contents*, “Ruffin first *published* this in the Creed;” which must not give us an idea, that it

was

<sup>g</sup> Opening of 5th Article.

<sup>h</sup> Euseb. 1. 13. cited by Bingham, 10. 4. end. Eusebius is placed in 315.

<sup>i</sup> On the Creed, p. 261.

<sup>k</sup> Hær. lib. 3. Epiphanius is placed in 368. Ruffinus, in 397.

was not publicly *rehearsed* before: but only, that the first *Book we* find it in is Ruffin's exposition; which indeed is rightly expressed by Bishop Burnet afterwards<sup>1</sup>; where he owns, that Ruffin *found* the doctrine in the Creed of his own Church.—The same Prelate speaks <sup>m</sup> as if Ruffinus confounded the Descent with the burial in his *own* opinion, whereas he held them to be distinct events; only he thought, that when any *Church*, which had the Descent, omitted the burial, it was because *that Church* confounded <sup>n</sup> the two together.—Bishop Burnet also says, that though the descent was in the *Aquileian* Creed, “there was no <sup>o</sup> other Article in that Symbol, that related to Christ's *burial*,” which does not seem accurate; as the word SEPULTUS is in capital Letters, as part of the Creed expounded<sup>p</sup>.

11. The Doctrine under consideration was at first founded on some *texts*, which have since been thought not intended to support it.—Eph. iv. 9.—Col. ii. 15.—1 Pet. iii. 19.—The only Pillar, on which it *now* rests, is Acts ii. 24—31. But, when we come to our Proof, I hope that we shall find that Pillar sufficiently strong.—It is probable, that *controversy* and discussion have reduced it into its present shape. And I think there is an appearance of ingenuoufness and fairness in dismissing texts, as it were, and retaining only one, at the same time that the Doctrine is thought so essential a part of the History of our Lord, that it is not to be omitted even in our *shortest Creed*.

The more settled the *general* doctrine of Christ's Descent into Hell was in the mind of any one, the more

<sup>1</sup> Art. III. opening.      <sup>m</sup> Art. III. end.

<sup>p</sup> See Bp. Pearson, p. 472, first Edit. or 332, sixth Edit.

<sup>o</sup> Burnet on Art. 3. first paragraph.

<sup>2</sup> See also Bingham; who gives “sepultus, et descendit ad Interna.”

more he suffered his imagination to wander in search of *particulars*: the idea of *Marcion*<sup>9</sup> was, that Christ preached in Hell to the *good* spirits without success, as they suspected him; but that the *damned* spirits, confined by the *Creator*, Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, heard him, and were rescued. Other Divines asked *questions*, and answered them according to their own fancies. Did Christ really *descend*? to what *place*? in what *manner*? to what *beings*? with what *views*? these questions might admit a variety of answers. *Philosophers* had liberty to get wrong by taking popular words in a philosophical sense. *Judaizers* might follow the Jewish *traditions* about Paradise and another world:—and, to come nearer ourselves, we find, that men of gloomy and *austere* tempers, who conceived ill enough of the Deity to hold the Doctrine of absolute *Reprobation*, determined, that Christ went to the place of the damned, and suffered their *pains*; and that it was highly proper he should do so, in order to complete the *Redemption* of Mankind.—Such were *Calvin* and *Beza*, and the other Divines of *Geneva*.—Those of *milder* dispositions (I suppose) held, that Christ went only to *Paradise*. And possibly it might be a *noble* turn of thinking, which set others on maintaining, that Christ descended to Hell in order to *triumph* over the Hosts of Satan and the powers of darkness.

But we should not entirely pass over the *Limbus Patrum*; yet it is scarce worth while studying it, so as to get a precise idea, though it is irksome to lay down any thing incorrectly. Before the coming of Christ, there were the *Patriarchs*, and many *well-meaning* men; they surely could not be all *damned*; though we must not think, they were sent to absolute

<sup>9</sup> Lardner's Her. Marcion, Sect. 18.

solate *Paradise*: nor could they reside amongst *vulgar*, ordinary spirits; they must be, then, in a *Limbus*, an outer *border*, in the suburbs, (*περὸ ἄστεως*); the Purlieu of Paradise. And Christ must have *descended* to Hell, in order to transport them from thence to a better place.—It would be hard too, that harmless *infants*, when they die, should go into a place of torment: and therefore this Limbus may supply a suitable accommodation for *them*: though it be properly the *Limbus Patrum*.—So considerate and provident were some of the ancients in their pious reveries!

The Article of 1552 differs from our present one, in making the Doctrine more particular, and to be built upon a particular *text*; so that no one could subscribe to it, who did not believe, that the Spirit of Christ, between the time of his Death and Resurrection, *preached* to the Spirits in Prison, and that 1 Pet. iii. 19. referred to Christ's descent into *Hell*. The Leaders of the Church in the time of Queen Elizabeth seem to have been very wise in the alteration they made; and in leaving the Doctrine grounded on the Scripture at large, and on the nature of the thing: more especially as the text, of which every subscriber to the Articles was supposed to form a judgment, is, by some<sup>r</sup>, accounted one of the most difficult passages of Scripture.—It is possible, that the *Puritans* may have contributed to the alteration, as they were *Calvinists*, and therefore probably adopted the notion of Calvin just now mentioned; that Christ went down to Hell, not to *preach*, but to *redeem*.

If we look into *Strype's* <sup>s</sup> Life of Archbishop *Whitgift*, we shall see, that the notions of *Calvin* and the *Geneva Divines* continued to be popular, and occasioned some disturbance: occasioned a breach in the

<sup>r</sup> See Poole's Synopsis.

<sup>s</sup> B. IV. Chap. XXI.

the *Unity of Doctrine*.—Though no opinions appear there, but such as have been already mentioned, it may be interesting and useful to read a page<sup>u</sup> or two, in which the disputes on this head are described.—It may also afford a reason why Bishop Pearson and Lord King treat so largely on this subject.

The *Americans* leave out this Article, in the Apostles Creed of their new Liturgy.

III. I have now finished my History, and therefore will proceed to *Explanation*.—But, though our Article is expressed in general terms, and may therefore admit of several meanings, yet I will confine myself to that, which seems to me the right one; as it is the one now generally *received*.—It is here then declared, as what every Christian should believe and profess, that the *Humanity* of Christ was uniformly maintained, from the time of his death to the time of his Resurrection. As his *Body* was in the *Grave*, during that time, so every thing happened to his *spiritual* part, which is naturally incident to *man*.—Our Church avoids all particulars, as to the meaning of Hell, its inhabitants, &c; nay, does not so much as mention the *Soul* of Christ, only says, “*He* went down,” &c; yet, as it seems decisive, that the Descent is something *distinct* from the Burial, we may well suppose, that by “*He*” is meant his *Soul*. “*As Christ*” “*was buried, so also*”—“*he* went down into Hell.”

Were not the expression limited by the context, it *might* signify, either that his *Body* went down into the *Grave*, or that his *Soul* went into the usual habitation of departed Souls, or *both*: and ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτῆ κατέβη εἰς τὸν ᾄδην, admits of all these senses; which

<sup>t</sup> B. III. Chap. IV. Sect. III. end. A. D. 1597.

<sup>u</sup> Partic. the first halves of p. 502, and 504.

which is the thing that is now to be shewn\*. It does not seem to me to be said quite accurately, that ψυχη means the *Body*, but it means the *animal*, the *man*<sup>y</sup>, the same as *ipse*, or as *He* in our Article; and therefore it may denote either part of the man, according to the *circumstances* in which it is introduced. The case is the same of the word or noun *man*, and its *pronouns*. ‘I saw a *dead man*,’ does not mean a *dead soul*; ‘I have been conversing with a *wise man*,’ does not denote a *wise body*. So ψυχη τετελευτηκυια, as it means a *dead man*, may mean a *dead Body*, but that is not quite the same as that ψυχη properly means a *body*:—we find εἰς ψυχην ξωσεν, Gen. ii. 7. and 1 Cor. xv. 45. If it be said, ψυχη primarily signifies *soul*, I do not deny it; it may signify first the *animal Soul*, then be put for the *Man: Soul*, in *English*, means the *Man*, in familiar language; ‘when I went into Church, not a *Soul* was there.’ See Lev. xxiii. 30. Indeed, *body* sometimes stands for the whole *man*, as when we speak of *somebody* and *nobody*: but this is not *carried on*, so that these *familiar* words denote either *part* of the man: that is, *Body* is not used to signify *Soul*, nor *Soul* to signify *Body*. In Syriac ܢܘܚܐ<sup>z</sup> is used as a reciprocal *pronoun*, i. e. for *myself*, *itself*, &c.<sup>a</sup>

We

\* Mentioned, Sect. I.

<sup>y</sup> This remark may seem to be contradicted by Lev. xix. 28. where επ. ψυχη signifies a *dead body*: (compare Deut. xiv. 1.) but my idea is this; the Jews had a *number* of things to observe with regard to the *dead*, or to *dead men*; and therefore the expression for a *dead man* would occur *frequently*; and expressions, which occur frequently, a’ways get *shortened*: in a more formal way, the expression for one *dead*, or a *dead man*, was Ψυχη τετελευτηκυια; but the long participle seems sometimes to have been *omitted* for convenience.

<sup>z</sup> Mascler’s Grammar, Vol. 2. p. 145.

<sup>a</sup> Hence, by the word “*He*,” in our Article, may be understood the *Soul* of Christ; though the word “*us*,” 1 Cor. vi.



We <sup>b</sup> have now only to apply to *ἀδης* the *general* remark, that, when a *word* stands for any thing which is *compounded*, it may, in particular *circumstances*, stand for either component part.—The *true sense* of *ἀδης* seems to be *the habitation of man after death*; the habitation of a *Body* after death is the *Grave*; the habitation of a *Soul* after death has unfortunately *no name* <sup>c</sup> in our Language; and that must cause the more words to be used in explanation; but I think, that what I laid down is now intelligible, that ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς ἀδης may either mean, the

14. in the expression God “will raise up us,” must denote the *Body*, (the soul is *re-united* not raised); and Virgil has the phrase animam sepulchro condere, (see Ormerod’s Remarks on Pictley, p. 13.) yet *mens cujusque is est quisque*.

<sup>b</sup> The *fact* is, ψυχή sometimes is understood to signify *Body* (Lev. xxi. 1, 11. Numb. v. 2.—vi. 6.)—sometimes *Soul*. In like manner *ἀδης* sometimes signifies, or is *taken* to signify, the *Grave* (as will appear by and by), sometimes the receptacle of departed *Spirits*:—accounting for this fact is another business: every one must use his *own* solution. My *conjecture* is this: in every language, when a thing consists of *two parts*, especially if it be not well understood, that *word*, which expresses the *whole*, may come to express *either part*; as that part happens to be *principally noticed*. Thus, *Man* may mean either *body* or *soul*, as in a *dead man*, ‘a *wife man*,’ or ‘*man is immortal*.’ Also, the word, which expresses either *part*, may stand for the *whole*; and, as signifying the *whole*, may, as before, denote *either part*:—as in ‘*not a soul*,’ ‘*simbody*, *nobody*.’ Thus ψυχή denotes first the *Soul*, then the *Man*, (Gen. xlvii. passim.) then the *Man* in that state, in which his soul is *not* noticed; and so may be *said* to signify *Body*. The same reasoning applies to *ἀδης*; only that is, I think, *primarily* the place of the *dead man*; after he disappears on earth.

<sup>c</sup> There is a difference, which seems neglected, between not having a word, in a modern language, answering to *ἀδης*, and not having a word expressing the receptacle of departed *Souls*.—A word answering exactly and properly to *ἀδης* would express the habitation of *Man* after Death, and so include the receptacle of *Bodies* as well as of *Souls*.—Lord King reckons *ἀδης* to mean the receptacle of departed *Souls*; scarce correctly, in my opinion.

the *Body* in the *Grave*, or the *Soul* in the *place* of departed Souls, or both: that is, the *Man* in the *state of men* after Death<sup>d</sup>.

IV. Nothing farther seems to be wanting in the way of Explanation; therefore I will go on to the *Proof*. We have here, according to this explanation, only *one proposition* to prove.—‘The Soul of Christ went into the ordinary receptacle of departed *human* Souls.’—Now, though the Scripture were silent on this head, this might be *presumed*, in the same manner as that Christ was of the *substance* of his Mother: except indeed it appeared, that Christ was to put off *human nature* when he gave up the Ghost. But, as the contrary appears<sup>e</sup>, as to his state after his resurrection, either our proposition must be true, or Christ must have *ceased* to be man on his death, and have again *become* Man upon his Resurrection; which is a supposition not to be admitted without particular proof; and therefore our proposition is *true*.

But now let us examine Acts ii. 24.—31. and see, whether it does not prove what we want to demonstrate. Ver. 25. is not only “*concerning*” Christ, but is spoken in his Person. Ver. 27. is part concerning what we call the *Soul*, and part about the *Body*: which appears plainly enough from the verse itself, though the expression for the *Body*, “this holy one,” is the title of the whole *man*; but indisputably, in my opinion, from the *resuming* of the subject in ver. 31. where the word *flesh* is used. The words “*soul in hell*,” ψυχὴ ἐν ᾅδου, cannot *here* (for the same reason as in our Article) have any meaning as to the *Body* of Christ, or the

<sup>d</sup> With regard to Body or Soul being *self*, Epictetus might be read, concerning Socrates. 1. 29. 3. with Mrs. Carter’s Note. See Carter’s Epictetus, p 86.

<sup>e</sup> Art. 11. Sect. xxvi.

the *Grave*. This appears, in some measure, from ψυχη being translated *Soul* and *anima*, in the 16th Psalm. Why is it not translated *Body*, or *the dead*, as in other places, but that the sense requires *soul*? St. Paul, in Acts xiii. 34—37. speaking only of the *resurrection*, omits that part of the Prophecy, which relates to the *Soul*; and mentions only what is liable to *Corruption*.

v. *Voltaire* says<sup>f</sup>, “ en effet, ni les Evangiles, ni les actes des Apôtres ne disent que Jesus descendit dans l'enfer.” I think we have shewn, that the *Acts* of the Apostles *do* say, that Christ descended into Hell, or what is *equivalent* to saying so. It is not indeed in the way of direct *narration*, but by an authoritative interpretation or application of a *Prophecy*. And it must be owned, that the *Evangelists* do not relate this descent; not even St. Luke, the Author of the Acts of the Apostles: it is not likely it should be related in the *Epistles*.—But yet I apprehend, we have sufficient foundation to build our doctrine upon.—The Descent into Hell is an event, of which the Evangelists could not possibly be *witnesses*; and therefore, that they do not relate it, is rather a proof of their general *veracity*, than of the fallshood of our opinion:—we value their testimony, because they speak<sup>g</sup> what they have known. And they have the greater right to our esteem, if (when it can be) they forbear to speak what they have *not* known.—Indeed, the miraculous *conception* is an event, which the sacred Historians could know only by immediate Revelation; but it is one, on which so much *depends*, that we cannot conceive how they could have been left ignorant of it. With regard to the Descent into Hell, it seems to me *more satisfactory*

<sup>f</sup> Vol. 24. quarto, p. 430.

<sup>g</sup> John iii. 11. xv. 27. xix. 35. Luke i. 2.

to be informed of it by an application of a prophecy, than by a Relation of *such* a fact.

VI. After the proof comes the *Application*. — And first, we are to consider, in what sense a thinking man can *now* give his *assent* to the Article under consideration. The principal *nicety* is this; may a person subscribe to the assertion, that Christ went down into *Hell*, who only believes, that his soul went into the *receptacle* of departed Spirits?—I apprehend he may, for the following reasons.

1. Any sense, which is *agreed* upon between the Person who *makes* and the person who *receives* the declaration, may be considered as a *right* sense.— And those, who may be looked upon as receiving a declaration in our present case, are the generality of *learned*<sup>h</sup> and *judicious* men in our Church: what they agree upon may be looked upon as the *sense of the Church*, and the *Church* may be considered as receiving a meaning, which is offered to *them*, and accepted, though *tacitly*. Now, since Bishop Pearson's exposition of the Descent into Hell, all other eminent writers have agreed with him, and adopted his opinion, which, I think, agrees with ours.—*Whitby* does this;—and Dr. S. *Clarke*<sup>i</sup>;—and Bishop *Burnet*.

2. Supposing our construction of going down into Hell was *not known* to the compilers of our Articles, yet they are not to be supposed to have made Articles so as to preclude *improvements*; or new solutions of difficulties<sup>k</sup>.—3. It being evidently the intention of our Church to *translate* *adms*, and there being no word in *English*, *French*, or *Dutch*<sup>l</sup>, answering to it, the subscriber must have a greater *liberty* in *translating it for himself*. At present, for  
want

<sup>h</sup> B. III. Chap. VII. Sect. III, IV. Powell, p. 35.

<sup>i</sup> Sermons, Vol. 5. 8vo. Ser. 14.

<sup>k</sup> B. III. Chap. IX. Sect. XI.      <sup>l</sup> Lord King, Chap. 4.

want of such a word in English, our translation appears *unsteady*; sometimes the word *grave* is put for it, sometimes the word *Hell*.—4. But, though there is this variety, our sense of *ἀδης* will make the passages, in which it is differently translated, perfectly *consistent*. In 1 Cor. xv. 55. it is *Grave* in the text, and *Hell* in the margin; “O grave, where is thy victory?”—In Matt. xvi. 18. we have “the Gates of *Hell* shall not prevail,” &c. Whereas in Isaiah xxxviii. 10. the same words are translated the gates of the *Grave*. In Psalm lxxxix. 48. we have the word *grave* in our *Bible*, and the word *Hell* in our *Book of Common Prayer*. “Shall he deliver his Soul (Ψυχην) from the hand of the Grave?”—we may also compare Prov. xxx. 16. where one of four things never satisfied is “*the Grave*,”—with Prov. xxvii. 20. “*Hell* and destruction<sup>m</sup> are never full.” Luke xvi. 23. mentions inhabitants of *ἀδης*, who are *good* and *bad*;—*Abraham* who was happy, and the *rich man* who was *tormented*; though a *χασμα* was between them. And Rev. xx. 13, 14. when “*death and Hell*” (or the *Grave*, in the margin) had “*delivered up the dead which were in them*,” still these dead were to be “*judged, every man according to their works*.”—*Αδης* therefore does not imply the *goodness* or *badness* of its inhabitants; nor can it in our sense, as ‘the habitation of *man*’ after death.’—It seems to comprehend

<sup>m</sup> To find these two passages in the LXX, look first between Chap. xxiv. and xxv; and then, after Chap. xxv. Prov. xxx. 16. in Mill’s Sept. 12mo, appears p. 198; and Prov. xxvii. 20, appears page 203.

<sup>n</sup> Parkhurst published his Greek Lexicon in 1769, and his Hebrew one in 1778; if one compares his 4th sense of *ψυχη* and his first sense of *ἀδης*, with his sixth sense of *שׁוּן* and his sixth sense of *שׁוּן*, it looks as if he had changed his opinion in the nine intermediate years: and thought Ps. xvi. 10, and Acts ii. 27. related more to the *Soul*, at last, than he had done before.

comprehend *Paradise* (sometimes called *Abraham's bosom*) and *Gehenna*<sup>o</sup>:—and our judgment seems confirmed by *Heathen*<sup>p</sup> Authors.

5. A fifth reason why we may subscribe to this Article, though we do not understand the word *Hell* to mean the place of *Torment*, is this: “*ad Inferos*” is the expression in the Latin Article, which is reckoned *authentic*: “*Inferi*” seems to be used in an *indefinite* sense, for *any* place, to which *men* go after Death, when they *disappear*; though in its etymology it implies some *subterraneous* place; it was probably first used when the fancy was, that every thing belonging to man was after death disposed of *under ground*<sup>q</sup>.—6. When I say, there is no word in *English* answering to Hades, I mean in English at this *time*, or at the times when our Bible was translated, and our Articles composed. We are<sup>r</sup> told, that the *very ancient* word *Hell* (*Saxon*, rather than English) had the sense, which we have affixed to *ᾠδης*; and this might always *prevent another* word from being used in that sense.

Bishop Burnet gives<sup>s</sup> *three senses* of the Descent into Hell; 1st. Going to preach to the Spirits in prison. 2d. Burial. 3d. Our sense; and thinks a person

<sup>o</sup> Dr. S. Clarke's 14th Ser. Vol. 5 8vo.

<sup>p</sup> See Pearson on the Creed; Nicholls on this Article: Ormerod's Remarks on Priestley's 14th Sect. p. 12, &c.—and Parkhurst's Lexicons.

<sup>q</sup> This reminds one of Pope's Indian, who was to go to some distant invisible Island; his faithful Dog to bear him company.—Essay on Man. Ep. 1, line 95, &c.

Children are dug out of the Parsley-bed: the Parsley-bed before an human Being appears; the *Inferi* after he disappears: both underground: out of sight: Psalm cxxxix. 14. about the *Body* being formed in the lower parts of the earth, is to be understood in this negative indefinite sense, and means only, *invisibly* formed.

<sup>r</sup> See Lord King, Chap. 4. p. 194. Parkhurst under *ᾠδης*.

<sup>s</sup> Introduction: see Contents.

person may subscribe in any of them; but I think I could not subscribe in the *second*; as that would annihilate the Article, which says, *as* Christ “was buried, so *also*” he “went down into Hell.”

VII. *Mutual concessions* need not be considered on our present subject, as our Church is not engaged in *controversy* about it.

VIII. With regard to *Improvements*, I will not propose any myself, but rather consider whether our *language*, about the *soul* and its *local* motion, can stand against *refinements* proposed by others. I have not here a proper occasion to go into a proof of the *immateriality* of the soul; for that I refer to Bishop *Porteus's* Sermons; at the same time I recommend the Pamphlet of Mr. *Ormerod*, entitled, Remarks on the 14th Sect. of Dr. Priestley's Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit.

I, for my own part, have no objection to using the word *Soul*, or to saying it *descends*, or it is in a *place* of Happiness. I only describe *facts*, which *must* be described very imperfectly.—A dead body has all its *Nerves*, &c. but *that is gone*, which makes it an *animal*; this is *fact*: why may I not say, its *soul* is *departed*?—To prevent this *something* from being thought to be *omnipresent*, I am apt to speak as if it was *somewhere*; I am *habituated* to have a *place* for every *thing*, and every *action*, and so, as we conceive the Soul capable of happiness and misery, I say, this Soul is in a state, or *place*, of *happiness*; if I conceive it to enjoy happiness. Not that my *locality* is *strict*; it is indifferent to me, whether

\* In what animate things differ from inanimate, τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ—Bp. Pearson on Creed, p. 429, 430. quotes this from Sallust De Diis et Mundo, c. 8. Cicero has, with regard to Souls, “cum e corpore excesserint.” Tusc. 1. 17. 11. efflare animam, ib. Sect. 9.—And a *Man* is said excedere e vitâ.—And “animus in locis cœlestibus habitaturus.—Also, Ubi ubi sit animus, certe in te est.” Tusc. 1. 29.

whether Paul <sup>u</sup> *ascends* into *Paradise*, or Christ *descends* into *adns*, which includes *Paradise*. To take locality of spirits exactly in the same sense with locality of bodies, is only for the lowest *vulgar*<sup>s</sup>. I would adopt the *notions* of the most improved Philosophy, not that “falsely so called;” but, as to *language*, I would have *popular language* to express things really felt; though not philosophically viewed: and such language is pretty nearly as good as scientific language.—‘*Iron is hot*’ expresses all *facts*, as well as ‘*Iron raises heat in me:*’—in like manner, you cannot use language more taken from *things*, than that the *Soul* is *departed*, and will be for ever in a state or *place* of torment, or bliss; though it is certainly wise not to *deceive one’s self*, by fancying, that one has more *ideas* affixed to such language (or to *any* language), than one really has.

<sup>u</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 4. In the Greek, I do not see any thing that certainly implies upwards, or *ascent*: ἀναρροζ�ω is used with ερω; and εις; why not snatched away to, or, as far as, *Paradise*? p. 233, Lord King cites from Cic. Tusc. 1. Anima cum è corpore excefferint, in *jublime ferri*.

<sup>x</sup> Use might here be made of the language concerning the *mind*, borrowed from sensible objects. The soul is *dejected*, why may it not *descend*?



## ARTICLE IV.

## OF THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.

CHRIST did truly rise again from death, and took again his body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of Man's nature, wherewith he ascended into Heaven, and there sitteth, until he return to judge all men at the last day.



Before we enter upon the consideration of this Article, we may as well observe, that it does not exactly conform to the *idea of an Article* given in the *third*<sup>a</sup> *Book*. *An Article*, as such, is not against *Infidels*, but against such *Christians* as, allowing the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, *interpret* them differently from ourselves. Yet, in some enumerations, we cannot<sup>b</sup> omit doctrines, which are essential and fundamental, merely because they have not been much contested. Here, in this fourth Article, we *continue* the *History of Christ*; which was probably put into *several* different Articles, because the arguments about the Divinity of Christ and his Incarnation, had best not be confounded with those about his Descent into Hell and his Resurrection. Though an Article is not properly directed against *Infidels*, yet, if any arguments against them are introduced more conveniently and effectually under an Article than elsewhere; (i. e. in our

<sup>a</sup> Chap. ix. Sect. x.<sup>b</sup> Ibid.

our *fourth* book than in our *first*,) the general nature of an Article need not prevent our introducing them. What we shall have to say on the sixth Article, concerning the authority of the Scriptures, will, in a good measure, suit all Sects of Christians, and therefore might have come into the first Book. Nevertheless, *some* opinions of Christians might be aimed at by those, who compiled this Article.

We may also previously remark, that it will be best to keep the subject of the Resurrection of *Christ* distinct from that of the Resurrection of the *Body*, or the *general* Resurrection: they are nearly *connected* in most writings, which treat of either of them; but it seems best to keep them so far separate, as to throw the latter into an *Appendix* to this Article.

I. These things being premised, there is nothing to prevent our adhering to our old *Plan* in treating this Article. We begin therefore with *History*.

The *History* of the Article now before us, regularly and fully treated, should consist of *four parts*; relating 1. to the *Resurrection* of Christ: 2. to his *Ascension*: 3. to his *Session*, as it is called: and 4. to his coming to *Judgment*.

With regard to the *Resurrection* of Christ, the *Docetæ*, as holding that our Saviour had not a proper material body, must of course deny, that he rose from the Grave, in the ordinary sense of the words; but moreover, they are said to have insisted more frequently than common on this part of his History. With the *Docetæ* we may join all those, who are called *Allegorists*<sup>c</sup>; all those, who interpreted

<sup>c</sup> See Rogers on the Articles, p. 17. and Woolston, Letter 6. beginning. *Allegorists* must take the metaphorical resurrection mentioned Rom. vi and elsewhere, to be meant also in the Gospel *Narratives*: as the *Socinians* make the *Creation* by Christ to be all moral. Woolston was famous for allegorizing.

interpreted facts allegorically. Under Docetæ are included the *Manicheans*.

Of *Cerintus* and his followers Augustin<sup>d</sup> says, “Jesum hominem tantummodo fuisse, nec resurrexisset sed resurrecturum, asseverantes.” But I would always wish any *single* authority respecting an early Heretic, to be compared with other authorities as collected by Lardner.

I might have mentioned the *Prejudices*, which St. Paul had to encounter, when he preached *Jesus* and the Resurrection, from doctrines of Heathen *Philosophers* and the Sects of the *Jeros*; but these are more nearly connected with the subject of the *general* resurrection.

Early in the fifth century lived *Synesius*, a man of uncommon character, whose ordination, as contrary to rules of Church discipline, has occasioned several Books<sup>e</sup>: this man had his doubts about the Resurrection, calling it *ἕρποντι καὶ ἀπορρητόν*, which Bingham<sup>f</sup> well translates, “a sort of mystical and ineffable

<sup>d</sup> Aug. Hær. 8. see also Lard. Vol. 9, p. 325, 326.

<sup>e</sup> This part of Ecclesiastical History is interesting, especially to young people. *Synesius* was a man of liberal sentiments, and one, who indulged himself in innocent pleasures: he was so beloved, or esteemed, that the people of Ptolemaïs demanded him for their Bishop. When it was proposed to him to be ordained for that purpose, he said, that he could not give up his wife, nor play of some sort, nor the chase. Moreover, that he held some *opinions*, which he could not disclaim, though they would be objected to.—Nor *did* he give up his correspondence with the learned Hypatia. Notwithstanding these things, which would be striking at the time, he was ordained, and made Bishop of Ptolemaïs; about the year 410. Probably men had an high notion of his abilities, pleasing qualities, integrity, and honour. His *Epistles* are extant: the 105th, out of which I read some passages at Lecture, is pleasing; the part about refusing to put away his wife, is beautiful and noble. Mention of him may be found in Lardner's Works, by the Index.

<sup>f</sup> Antiquities, 4. 3. 3.

ineffable thing." But I do not see, even from his own expression, whether he meant the Resurrection of Christ, or the general Resurrection: rather, I think, the latter; but they are nearly related.

In the sixteenth Century, Gaspar *Schwenkfeld*, a Silesian Knight, is said to have held, that Christ was not a real man *after* his resurrection. In general, he seems to have *magnified* the character of Christ, by supposing him something above human; though he would not own, that he adopted the notions of Eutyches.—Our Reformers must have known of this man, when they composed this Article, as he was very eminent<sup>g</sup>: it is said, that there are still some of his followers<sup>h</sup> in Silesia.

11. Some notions of the Ancients, with regard to the *Ascension* of Christ, have been mentioned under the *second*<sup>i</sup> Article.—We are moreover<sup>k</sup> told, that *Carpocrates* and *Montanus* denied the ascension of Christ's *body*, and maintained, that only his *soul* ascended into Heaven.—Some have wanted to set aside the ascension *entirely*, and, in order to support their notion, have said, that the scriptural expressions might be interpreted of Christ's rising, or ascending, from the *Grave*.—The idea, that Christ ascended into Heaven with *flesh and bones*, was condemned in the second Nicene Council in 787, and in a Council at Constantinople next before<sup>l</sup> it.—*Socinus*, in order to evade the force of John vi. 62. as proving the pre-existence of Christ, feigned what he called a *preparatory* Ascension, which, though not the Ascension here meant, may be mentioned for

<sup>g</sup> Yet he is not mentioned amongst those, against whom our Articles were composed, in the *Politia Eccles. Angl.*—A *single* notion would not entitle him to mention.

<sup>h</sup> Mosheim, 8vo. Vol. 4. p. 317.—or Index. He died in 1561.

<sup>i</sup> Art. 11. Sect. 1v. and xv.

<sup>k</sup> Phil. i. 11. Theodoret; see Rogers.

<sup>l</sup> See Bingham's Apology. Works, fol. Vol. 2. p. 724.

for the sake of *distinctness*<sup>m</sup>. Christ ascended, according to Socinus, before he began his *ministry*, in order to be instructed in the nature of it.—Was ever any fancy more arbitrary? how unfuitable to a sect pretending eminently to reason and common sense!—I apprehend, that this strong hold of Socinianism has been abandoned.

III. With regard to the *Session* of Christ, we may mention, that, in the time of Tertullian, there were some who, though they believed in the Ascension, thought that what is said of *sitting* implied, that the mere *Body* of Christ was placed at the right hand of God, void of animation, or emptied of *Christ*<sup>n</sup>, as they used to speak, and of course not employed in the exercise of government.—The idea, that dignity and pre-eminence are shewn by indolence and freedom from care and action, has frequently been favoured.—It seems to have been a fundamental idea with the Epicureans.

IV. There<sup>o</sup> have been some different notions held, with regard to Christ's returning "to *judge* all men at the last day." I believe, this is called by some the *second coming* of Christ, but that expression has sometimes a more extensive meaning<sup>p</sup>. The horror of *eternal punishment* has set several persons on imagining ways of avoiding it. Very early Christians thought, that the Being, who was the

Author

<sup>m</sup> Op. Socini, T. 2. p. 380. col. 2. See also Pearson on Creed, p. 108, fol. or 216, 4to.

<sup>n</sup> Tert. de carne Christi, p. 24. cited by Lord King, p. 285.

<sup>o</sup> It might explain some expressions, to notice the *German* and *Popish* notions of the *Bodily Ubiquity* or omnipresence of Christ. (See Rogers on the Art. and Reformatio Legum, de Trin. Cap. 4. Chambers's Dict. under *Ubiquity*:—Also, for corporal ubiquity, Fulke's Rhem. Test. on Matt. xxvi. Sect. 4.) though this properly belongs to Art. xxviii. Sect. x.

<sup>p</sup> Hurd on Prophecy, opening of Ser. v.

Author of Christianity, was too benevolent to condemn<sup>q</sup> any one: and some evaded the dreadful sentence of eternal fire, even by *fatality*<sup>r</sup> itself: infomuch that, in some very ancient Creeds, there was what seems now a redundancy of expression on this head, which has since been *discontinued*<sup>s</sup>.

The *Manicheans* have been said to deny a future judgment: but<sup>t</sup> Lardner has brought passages from their writings, found in the controversial works of Augustin, which prove the contrary.—Yet they seem to have denied the *eternity* of *Hell-torments*, or to have maintained, that all men will be *saved finally*.—It is owing to the moderation of our Church, that we are not called upon to subscribe to the eternity of *Hell-torments*<sup>u</sup>: nay, we are not required even to condemn those, who presume to affirm, that all men will be finally saved, though that was required in the last Article of Edward VI. and I think reasonably. Though one were inclined to *hope*, with Dr. Hartley<sup>x</sup>, that all men will be happy ultimately; that is, when punishment has done its proper work in reforming principles and conduct; yet, to *affirm* it, must always be presumption<sup>y</sup>.—A sect, which subsisted in this country at the time of the Reformation, called the Family of Love, or *Familists*, held, that wicked men will be *annihilated*<sup>z</sup>: as did some *Gnostics* of old.

v. It

<sup>q</sup> Lord King, Cr. p. 290.      <sup>r</sup> Ib. p. 304.      <sup>s</sup> Ib. p. 313.

<sup>t</sup> Works, Vol. 3. p. 440, 478.

<sup>u</sup> There is an expression of the *Athanasian Creed* about “*everlasting fire*,” but it seems only a *quotation* of Matt. xxv. 41. so must be understood in the same manner.

<sup>x</sup> On Man, Sect. v. Prop. 94. See also *Origeniani*, in Aug. Hær. 43.

<sup>y</sup> The *title* of the Article, “All men shall not be saved at length,” seems inaccurate; as, I think, the meaning is, It is not to be *affirmed*, that all men *shall* be saved finally; or after a *definite* time.—This appears from the Body of the Article.

<sup>z</sup> See Lord King, p. 407. Though this may belong to the Appendix, yet it annuls future judgment.

v. It is natural here to mention the *Millenarians*, or *Chiliafts*, who believed, that Christ would come to reign, with his Saints, a *thousand* years upon earth; and would gratify them with *sensual* pleasures. This was to take place before the general resurrection, though there must be a resurrection of Saints previous to it. This notion was founded on the 20th Chapter of Revelation<sup>a</sup>; and one can scarce wonder, that the passage should occasion some expectation, though, as all prophecies should be interpreted by their completion, it must be rash to act, or dispute in a peremptory manner, upon any prophecy not completed. Irenæus and Lactantius were Chiliafts; and Nepos, a Bishop in Ægypt. Some passages in Lactantius are sanguine enough<sup>b</sup>, though his ruling ideas seem to be *peace* and *concord*<sup>c</sup>. When the Chiliafts came to imagine *particulars*, I suppose there was a great difference between them: *Cerintlus* is said, by some, to have taught, that the pleasures of the Millennium would be very gross<sup>d</sup>. But others, of respectable character, conceived, that, though *sensual*, they would not be *vicious*: that they would consist in eating and drinking, and marriage<sup>e</sup>. The name of the *New Jerusalem*<sup>f</sup> being used, those, who were inclined to Judaism, flattered themselves with the hopes of a *literal*<sup>g</sup> restoration of the Jewish polity: this makes *Eusebius*<sup>h</sup> say, that the promises made

to

<sup>a</sup> Add 1 Theff. iii. 13.—iv. 14, &c.

<sup>b</sup> Lard. Vol. 3. p. 114. Lact. de vitâ beatâ, conclusion. Lard. under Dionysius of Alexandria, who opposed Nepos about the Millennium.

<sup>c</sup> Quieta et placida erunt omnia.

<sup>d</sup> Aug. Hær. 8.

<sup>e</sup> Lard. Vol. 3. p. 112.

<sup>f</sup> Rev. xxi. 2.

<sup>g</sup> Lard. Vol. 3. p. 114.

<sup>h</sup> L. 7. c. 24. quoted by Lardner, Vol. 3. p. 103. And Jerom says, speaking of the Apocalypse, “quam si juxta literam accipimus,

to the Saints had been expected (by Nepos) to be fulfilled “in a *Jewish* sense;” and this makes the Article of *Edward VI.* say, that the Millenarii, or they who encouraged the revival of their doctrine, cast themselves headlong “into a *Jewish* dotage.” In the time of our<sup>1</sup> Charles II. some *fanatics* were called Millenarii, but they were low and illiterate persons, not such as would take any pains to follow ancient models, or even to study the Scriptures with exactness.—*Mosheim* seems not to speak of Millenarians after the time of Dionysius of Alexandria. And the accurate *Tillemont*<sup>\*</sup> seemed to think, there had nothing passed about Millenarians from the time of *Augustin*; though in his own time<sup>1</sup> he heard, that they were reviving in Sweden and Brandenburgh.

VI. I am not aware, that any thing more need be said on this Article, of the historical sort; I should therefore proceed to an *Explanation*; but I do not see, that there is any thing explanatory to be offered here, which will not be better offered hereafter. Something might be said of the nature of the *Session* of Christ, and of the expression, “*the last day*;” but, if any little difficulties relating to them are thrown into the form of *objections*, they will be more thoroughly discussed, and will fall in better with the course of our reasoning.

VII. We come then to the *Proof* of the propositions contained in the Article, which may here, as in the historical part, be reduced to *four*.—

1. Christ did *rise* from the dead as a being truly *human*. 2. He did *ascend* into Heaven, without any change in his person. 3. His *Session* was from  
that

accipimus, *judaizandum est*;" &c. The *Allegerists* then were those, who did *not* judaize: as appears by Lardner's account of Dionysius of Alexandria.

<sup>1</sup> Hume, 1660.

<sup>\*</sup> Vol. 2.

<sup>1</sup> He died 1698, aged 71.



that time till his return to judge the world. 4. He will return to *judge* all mankind.—The *proofs* of these propositions must be wholly taken from *Scripture*; the authenticity of which must therefore be taken for *granted*; or must be considered as having *been proved*. This is mentioned, because Bishop *Burnet*, on this Article, goes back to first principles.

We must distinguish, as before, between *direct* and *indirect* proof: The *direct* proof in this Article will consist of *texts* of Scripture, such as are in general so well *known*, that some of them perhaps need not now be adduced, were it not for the sake of *regularity*. The *indirect* proof, or answering *objections*, will, in our present subject, occupy more of our attention<sup>m</sup>.

VIII. 1. For the direct proof of Christ's *resurrection*, I refer to the 24th Chapter of Luke's Gospel; verse 3—6; 39, 40, 42, 43.—John xx. 28, and preceding. Acts ii. 29—31. and Acts xiii. 30—37. Also to 1 Cor. xv. 5—8. To which might be added a passage or two, which takes the Resurrection for *granted*, and *reasons* upon it: such as Rom. vi. 4 —1 Cor. xv. 13.—Col. iii. 1. &c.—or Rom. iv. 25.—2 Tim. ii. 8.

IX. 2. For

<sup>m</sup> Bp. Burnet's proof is addressed to Infidels; ours will only shew, to *them*, that the Resurrection of Christ is *affirmed* in Scripture; their disbelief of the Gospel History will be combated in our *indirect* proof, (indeed Bp. Burnet obviates *difficulties*); though even that must be only looked upon as an occasional *supplement* to our reasoning in the *first Book*. Our scriptural proof is applicable to *Woolston's* arguments, as he only wants to set aside the *literal* sense, in favour of the mystical (see the opening of his 6th Letter, and my account of him B. 1. Chap. xv 1. Sect. v 11):—and his *Jewish Rabbi*, in his 6th Letter, argues on the absurdity of Christ's Resurrection, from the account of it given by the Christian Evangelists (p. 5) And indeed *any person* may argue upon an account of facts, as given by those who believe them.

IX. 2. For proof of the *Ascension*, we may refer to Mark xvi. 19.—Luke xxiv. 51. and Acts i. 9. &c.—one might also add (or take first) John xx. 17. and vi. 62. and afterwards, Eph. iv. 8.—Col. iii. 1. &c.—Heb. vi. 19, 20.

X. 3. For proof of Christ's *sitting* at the right hand of God, we may have recourse to Mark xvi. 19.—Acts ii. 34. &c.—Ephes. i. 20. &c.—Heb. i. 3, and 13. And afterwards, to Eph. ii. 6.—Col. iii. 1. observing, that the sitting does not imply *indolence*, but *government*.

XI. 4. The proofs of Christ's *returning to judgment* are numerous. The 25th Chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel, from the 31st verse, is a capital one. The 24th Chapter has two senses<sup>n</sup>; Mark viii. 38. Add John v. 22.—Acts i. 11.—x. 42.—xvii. 31. Rom. xiv. 10. or 2 Cor. v. 10.—to which should be added some texts expressing Christ's *coming*, or his *returning*, more absolutely or independently; as that is an expression of the Article: such as 1 Cor. xv. 23.—1 Theff. iv. 15. and iii. 13.—v. 2, 3, 23.—James v. 7, 8.—2 Pet. iii. 4. &c. Though Acts i. 11. *does* express the *return* of Christ; so does Matt. xxv. 31.

XII. All the proof requisite for the question respecting the *Millemium*, is only to recollect what has been said before about the premature application of *Prophecies*, and to observe, with Bishop *Gibson*<sup>o</sup>, that there is no appearance, that the pleasures of such a state, whenever it may take place, will be *sensual*. And, with Lardner<sup>p</sup>, that *impurity* is represented as a *disqualification* for the State. Whether the enjoyment of *sensual* pleasures, not reckoned vicious, can be called impurity, in any sense, is a question, about which all men may not be

<sup>n</sup> See Book I. Chap. xvii. Sect. x.                      <sup>o</sup> P. 209.

<sup>p</sup> Vol. 3. p. 112. Rev. xxi. 27.—xxii. 14, 15.

be perfectly agreed; the marriage-service of th Church of England calls married persons “*undefiled members of Christ’s Body*”<sup>¶</sup>.

XIII. Having then gone through a *direct* proof of the Doctrines of our Article, we come to the *indirect*; or to the answering of *objections*. These have been numerous; we must, as in the second Article, make a selection.

This part of our subject has been more fully treated since the time of Bishop *Burnet*, than before it; by the publication of Mr. *West’s* book on the resurrection, and of the pamphlet ascribed to Bishop *Sherlock*, called the *Trial* of the Witnesses, &c. which has something particularly interesting in its stile and plan; it was written against the objections of Mr. *Woolston*, of whom we once gave an account<sup>†</sup>.

XIV. I. The first objection I shall mention, may be thus expressed; It is more likely, that the Body of Christ was *stolen* by his Disciples, than that it revived. This is the objection, which the *Jews* made *at the time*; nay, St. Matthew tells<sup>§</sup> us, that the *Priests* thought it worth while to bribe the Guards to testify the fact, on which it is founded; and that the people were credulous enough, or enough prejudiced, to *believe* the fact, and so adopt the objection. Certainly, if the Disciples of Christ wanted to use any *deceptions*, and by any false appearances make men believe what they themselves knew to be false, they could much more easily do that, if they had the *Body* of Christ, than if it was in the possession of their enemies, so that it might, at any time, be *produced* against them. But how  
could

¶ See about Paphnutius, Art. xxxii. Sect. iii. Cohabiting with a virtuous wife, he said, (though a Monk himself) is chastity itself.

† Book 1. Chap. xvi. Sect. vii. § Matt. xxviii. 12—15.

could they *procure* the Body?—they would not attempt to *force* a guard of sixty men.—No, say the Jews, it was not *force* that was used, it was *flight* and *cunning*; the guards were *asleep*:—could the Disciples *expect* that? or be *prepared* to take advantage of it? or, would they dare to run the hazard of *awakening* them?—But is it *credible*, that they were *asleep*? a guard of sixty men all asleep! or even a sixth part of them!—nay, suppose they were asleep, can they be admitted as competent *witnesses* of what passed during their slumbers?—no more, I think, need be said on this<sup>t</sup> objection.

xv. 2. It has been objected, that Christ was not in the grave a sufficient length of *time* to answer the *predictions*; or that he rose *too soon*: then he *did* rise? We *might* say, that is the *principal* thing; whether, in an affair so very extraordinary, some *circumstances* were just as might be expected, is a matter of secondary consequence. If a man only performed a *journey*, or any very ordinary act, and performed it too soon, or too late, it might not answer its purpose; but, if Christ did really rise from the dead, the main purpose *must* be answered, whether we can clear up all circumstances or not.

But you reply, though we could not find out the fallacy of evidence any other way, yet if we find *inconsistencies* in it, they invalidate the whole. It had been said *beforehand*<sup>u</sup>, that Christ would be in the Grave *three days*, or three days and three *nights*; whereas he was but *one whole* day. We answer; there are in Scripture *four* different forms of expressing the time, during which our Lord was to lie in the Sepulchre: he was to rise the *third*<sup>x</sup> day,

<sup>t</sup> See Trial, &c. p. 36. 43.

<sup>u</sup> Matt. xii. 40. Matt. xx. 19. and other passages; or Matt. xxvii. 63. with Parallels.

<sup>x</sup> Matt. xx. 19.

day, *in* three<sup>y</sup> days, *after* three<sup>z</sup> days, and it is said, “the Son of Man” shall be “*three days and three nights* in the heart<sup>a</sup> of the earth.” Now these expressions *must* mean the *same thing*, if the Evangelists *invented* their narrations; because no persons ever write inconsistencies purposely, or except where something *escapes* them; or seems likely to escape others; never, where the inconsistencies must be glaring to every eye. And, if they mean the same thing, there is no inconsistency amongst *them*<sup>b</sup>. And our remark may be extended to the seeming inconsistency between these expressions and the *fact*; suppose the Evangelists to be inventing, and so writing what would best promote their *cause*, nothing so easy as to *fit* the event to the *prediction*: it must be as easy to make Christ rise<sup>c</sup> on the *fourth* day, as on the third: upon a supposition then of the narratives being *feigned*, the *fact* was agreeable to the predictions in that one sense, in which they would all be understood. No one can say, these accounts are inconsistent, and *therefore* invented; for, if they had been invented, they would *not* have admitted the inconsistencies now under consideration.

If we put the supposition, that the narratives were *not* feigned, we are rid of our *principal difficulty*; we have only to consider the question before us as a *critical* question, which we should be *glad* to resolve,

<sup>y</sup> Matt. xxvii. 40.      <sup>z</sup> xxvii. 63.

<sup>a</sup> Matt. xii. 40. the word *three* is a leading word in them all.

<sup>b</sup> It has occurred to me, that the common phrases about a musical *octave* might seem contradictory, or inconsistent, when they were not so; and much in the same *manner* with the phrases about a number of days — An octave comprehends *three thirds* and one *second*; the mind sums these into *seven*: — yet it is sometimes said, an octave contains only *seven* tones, even reckoning as tones the two *semitones*.

<sup>c</sup> Woolston, Letter 6th, p. 13.

resolve, if we can; but which we may leave as a difficulty in suspense, if we cannot.—On this footing, it is comfortable to remark, that, when we say two events were distant three days, we may mean *inclusively*, reckoning, into the number three, the days on which both events happened: and the very existence of the word *inclusively*, in this sense, shews, that this mode of reckoning is common: this will be admitted still more easily of the expression “the *third* day.”—Yet, if we compare the 63d and 64 verses of Matt. xxvii. we shall see, that this expression means the same thing with “*after* three days;”—which will be confirmed by observing, that, in John xx. 26. “*after eight days*” means the day *se’night*, as we call it; the two days meant were (most probably) two successive *Sundays*<sup>d</sup>. The only expression remaining therefore is, “three days and three nights:” but this means the same as “three *days*;”—*evening-morning* is a Jewish expression for a *day*<sup>e</sup>; *three* evening mornings for *three* days: and “three days and three nights” means only the same as three ‘*evening-mornings*,’ or three *day-nights*, which may be reckoned *inclusively* as well as three *days*. Our word *day* is of *itself* often taken for the whole 24 hours; if we had a compound word something like *ημερονυκτιον*, day-night, three day-nights would seem familiar, and reckoning them *inclusively* would occasion no difficulty: such a word would have been equivalent to the expression ‘three days and three nights.’

That

<sup>d</sup> We might add the reckoning of the day of *Circumcision*. Tryal, p. 49. Gen. xvii. 12. “eight days old.” Luke i. 59. I ev. xii. 3. “in the eighth day:” and Phil. iii. 5. Luke ii. 21. “when eight days were accomplished:”—to which add, that (14th night) fortnight in English, is *quinze* jours, fifteen days in French.

<sup>e</sup> Gen. 1. passim.

That the time elapsed was, in the event before us, expressed by the Jews according to what has been said, appears from the words of *Cleopas*, “*to-day is the third day since those things were done*.”—The reckoning *after* the event is the same as *before* it.

But it has been <sup>s</sup> urged, that, if the Body of Christ had laid a day longer, *witnesses* would have attended on the spot, who would have disproved our present account: in this argument, something in the Gospels is *allowed* to be *true*;—Christ had been really *buried*, and his body *missing* on the third day;—if so, *either* it must have been *stolen*, or it must have *revived*; the former having been disproved, the latter remains *true*.

xvi. 3. It has been objected, that Christ appeared only to *select witnesses*<sup>h</sup>. Their being *chosen* has probably an air of art and *contrivance*. But surely there is no fact, which requires, in order to its being credible, that all men, who lived when it happened, should have seen it. In the case of the Resurrection of Christ, supposing it really to have happened, it was proper, that those should be witnesses, who had not only eyes to see, but candour to embrace truth on sufficient evidence, and resolution to persist in the profession of it in spite of all dangers.—Those, who ascribed the Miracles of Christ to Beelzebub, might have rejected even sufficient evidence of the Resurrection. Those, who would have shrunk at persecution, or betrayed their cause, like Judas, for money, would have been improper witnesses, however true the accounts committed to them.

But, might not some *indifferent* persons have been witnesses? not if the fact was *true*: what man

fit

<sup>f</sup> Luke xxiv. 21.      <sup>g</sup> Tryal, p. 37.      Woolston, p. 13.

<sup>h</sup> Acts x. 41.      Tryal, p. 55, and 76.

fit to be a witness, could have known the resurrection of Jesus to be real, and have been indifferent about the success of his religion? such an one must have embraced the Christian religion, and then he would have been as *partial* as any other Disciple.

We are not here considering the *force* of the evidence in favour of the resurrection of Christ; for that we refer to the 16th Chapter of the first Book; we are only considering *one particular*, the *selection* of certain persons for the purpose of bearing testimony to it.

The Jewish *magistrates* have been mentioned<sup>i</sup> as those, to whom Christ ought to have shewn himself; but to say this, seems at least *presumptuous*. It is right to see whether we have *sufficient* evidence, but we cannot fix upon any *specific* evidence, or *mode* of proof, and say, that God *ought* to have made use of that. A fact may be *true*, and we may have *reason* to think it so, though many sources of proof may have been left untouched.—If the fact before us be *true*, we need inquire no farther. *Magistrates* are often worldly-minded men; and want to keep things in their old course at all hazards. Some of them, though moved by the arguments of the Apostles, might have gone away *sorrowful*, like the *young man* in the Gospel; or, like *Agrippa*, have been only *almost* persuaded to embrace Christianity.

Bishop Sherlock, or the Author of the *Tryal* of the Witnesses<sup>k</sup>, makes an *important* observation on this matter: he suggests, that Christ took a solemn *leave* of the Jews when he spoke what is written at the close of the 23d Chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel; that he had then *finished* his commission to the *Jews*, as their Messiah;—that, after his *Resurrection*,  
he

<sup>i</sup> *Tryal*, p. 55, and 77.

<sup>k</sup> P. 79.



he opened a *new commission*, addressed to the *World* at large. When that was once opened, all preference of them was at an end; all men became upon the same footing; and therefore if Magistrates, as such, were to be made witnesses of sacred truth, newly revealed, the *Roman* Magistrates should have had the preference.—Indeed, the Jewish had been *found*<sup>1</sup> too much *biased* to be entrusted with *such* truth as Jesus had to offer. But the argument of the Infidels would prove *too much*; that no country, no age, should be left without original Testimony<sup>m</sup>.

XVII. 4. The next objection seems as if it might proceed from a mind neither disingenuous nor captious. If we take the incidents of the life of Jesus after his resurrection, there is something in them uncommon and *extraordinary*. They give him the air and appearance of not being so strictly and properly *man*<sup>n</sup>, as he had been before his death. Some incidents and circumstances must be here *enumerated*.—The “*noli me ° tangere*:”—the two Disciples not *knowing*<sup>p</sup> Christ in going to *Emmaus*:—his being said to appear “*in another<sup>q</sup> form*,”—to vanish out of their<sup>r</sup> sight,—to stand in the midst, when the *doors were<sup>s</sup> shut* for fear of the Jews.—At the mountain in Galilee, “*some<sup>t</sup> doubted*;”—very *few transactions* are recorded, considering our Lord passed *forty days* on earth after his resurrection; and seemingly only *three<sup>u</sup> appearances*.—To which must be added, the *ascension* of the *Body* of Christ.—I do  
not

<sup>1</sup> Witnesses their whole conduct on the Trial: though Pilate thought Christ innocent, they cried out, “crucify him.” They ascribed too his *Miracles* to the Prince of the Devils.

<sup>m</sup> Tryal, p. 80.

<sup>n</sup> See Sect. 1. the notion of Schwenkfeld.

<sup>o</sup> John xx. 17.      <sup>p</sup> Luke xxiv.      <sup>q</sup> Mark xvi. 12.

<sup>r</sup> Luke xxiv. 31.      <sup>s</sup> John xx. 19, 25.

<sup>t</sup> Matt. xxviii. 17.      <sup>u</sup> John xxi. 14.

not remember seeing it noticed in any objection, that the *wounds* of our Lord were fresh, though he walked \* to Emmaus; and suffered Thomas, in a week's time, to thrust his hand into the *scar* † in his side.

Before we attempt to account for these appearances, we must observe, that their not being perfectly accounted for, is not a sufficient reason why the Gospel History should be rejected: all that we have a right to require, is sufficient evidence on the whole.

i. If we might suppose, that Christ had the *glorified* or *spiritual* body of a man, after his resurrection, it seems as if none of these incidents or circumstances would give us much trouble<sup>z</sup>. Their probability, on such a supposition, and our ignorance of the nature of such body, would partly satisfy, and partly silence us; we should receive what is written, and wait for a clear understanding till we ourselves were clothed with our heavenly tabernacle.—That the human body, in its existence in a future state, is of such a sort, as to be properly called a “*spiritual body*,” is clear from many texts of Scripture; but they will most properly be produced, when we treat of the *general* resurrection:—that *Christ did assume* his spiritual body before his *ascension*, is a supposition somewhat countenanced

\* The wounds of Christ are mentioned several times in the Trial.

† John xx. 27.

<sup>z</sup> Does not Epiphanius seem to have thought, that Christ had his spiritual Body after his Resurrection? Hær. 64. Sect. 64. (*Origeniani*). Works, Vol. 2, p. 538, about Origen's notion of 1 Cor. xv. 7.—though Epiphanius is writing against Origen in the passage above mentioned. Origen had denied the resurrection of the Body, or had been said to do so: Epiphanius obviates his objections by saying, that the body of Christ, after his resurrection, was of such rarefied, ætherial matter, that it could pass through a *door*, &c.

countenanced by 1 Cor. xv. 50. "Flesh<sup>a</sup> and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." This is a *general* assertion; we have no reason to think Christ an *exception* to it. In Phil. iii. 21. we are told, that Christ "shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto *his glorious body*;" but we are not told the *time* of his assuming that glorious body: if it was not before his ascension, when *could* it be?—not, I should think, at his *transfiguration*; the change in Christ's body made *then*, seems to have been *external* and *superficial*<sup>b</sup> only; and *partial*. *John* does not record the transaction; the three other Evangelists *all* speak of the garments being changed; *Mark* of the garments *only*; and the other two mention nothing in the *Body* or *Person* of our Saviour as changed, but the face or countenance.—By *analogy* we should judge, that, as Christ was perfect man in life, in death, and in Hades, so he would, after his resurrection, assume such a body, as *all men* will assume *after* the general resurrection.—Besides, he is represented (1 Cor. xv. 20. and Acts xxvi. 23.) as "the *first fruits*;" and (Col. i. 18.) as "the *first-born* from the dead." Ignatius confirms this, Ep. ad Trallianos, p. 34. Oxon. 1709. See Rutherford's Charges, p. 87. It must not be asked here, whether *Lazarus* and others<sup>c</sup> had spiritual bodies after they arose from the grave; they were to *die* again, in the common manner of other men, and to take their spiritual bodies at the same time with the rest of their *species*.

I do

<sup>a</sup> Here "flesh and blood" means what is *commonly* so called; the *natural* body; though even the spiritual body may be *said* to consist of all parts, which are essential to an human body. But it would be *premature* to dwell on this just at present.

<sup>b</sup> Take the accounts, as in Macknight's Harmony. Sect. 72.

<sup>c</sup> Matt. xxvii. 52.

I do not know, that this hypothesis is *inconsistent* with Scripture, or with our Article<sup>d</sup>: but it will probably be rejected, from a general idea of its being too *bold* and fanciful. If men come to particular reasons for rejecting it, they will urge seemingly one of these *three* things. 1. That it is inconsistent with the scriptural expression adopted by our Article, about *flesh and<sup>e</sup> bones*. Or 2. That the *time*, in which it supposes the body of Christ to have been changed, is much less than that between death and the general resurrection. Or 3. That, according to it, Christ might not be strictly the *same* man before and after his resurrection:—at least, a moment's consideration of these three things may have its use.

1. The spiritual body of an human being must have *flesh and bones*, as well as his natural body: at least, so we must always *express* ourselves. We have no idea of any human body without flesh and bones, they are *constituent parts* of it, and essential to it; in whatever *sense* therefore we say, that we have *bodies* in heaven, in the same sense we must say, that we have whatever are the constituent *parts* of bodies.—*Flesh and bones* cannot be supposed to be the *same things* in natural and spiritual bodies, but there is no reason why we should change our *terms* in speaking of them.

2. The *time*, during which Christ was in the *Grave*, seems sufficient for his changing his natural into a spiritual body. St. Paul says<sup>f</sup>, “we shall all be changed in a *moment*, in the twinkling of an eye.”

If any one preferred the hypothesis, that Christ assumed his spiritual body *gradually* between his resurrection

<sup>d</sup> When I first offered this hypothesis, it was my own thought; but it seems to have been (like many original thoughts) mentioned in antiquity.

<sup>e</sup> Luke xxiv. 39.

<sup>f</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52.

refurrection and his ascension, we should have no occasion to object. Such an one would watch whether the things related of Christ become gradually more spiritual. St. Thomas's handling of his body, John xx. 27. was about a *week* after his refurrection: in John xxi. 13. it is not expressly affirmed, that he eat; whatever may seem to be implied. "Jesus then cometh, and *taketh* bread, and *giveth* them, and fish likewise."

3. Though it were true, that Christ changed his natural body for a spiritual one before his ascension, yet he might, in common propriety of speech, be spoken of as still the *same man*: or, the body he had after his refurrection might be called "*his body*." Whenever *we* make such change, we must continue each the same man; otherwise we could not be susceptible of *rewards* and punishments, supposing the Deity a just Being.—*Identity* is so far from excluding all change, that, in common questions concerning it, it *presupposes* some<sup>g</sup>; and when identity is destroyed, seems to depend more upon *convenience* and custom of *language*, than upon the quantity of change. A *reptile* may undergo less change in becoming an *insect*, than a man undergoes while he continues to be called the same man; or, I should rather say, than another animal of its own *size* undergoes without being accounted to lose its identity.

By the way, it may be considered, whether this notion of identity will not sufficiently obviate those *difficulties*, which arise from the parts of man's body becoming <sup>h</sup> parts of *vegetables*, and so of *animals* which

<sup>g</sup> When you ask, whether such a thing continues *the same*, the meaning is, can it be *called* the same notwithstanding such and such *changes*?

<sup>h</sup> Voltaire, Vol. 26. 4to. p. 411.

which feed upon those vegetables; or even of *other men*.

It does not then appear impossible, that Christ might assume his spiritual body before his ascension, *notwithstanding* his body is said to consist, in part, of *flesh and bones*; notwithstanding he lay but a short time in the Grave, and must undergo, on that supposition, some very material *changes*<sup>i</sup>.

But still we must remember, that the Scripture does not plainly inform us of such an event; and therefore we must not *rest* here; we must inquire farther, how the incidents and circumstances just now mentioned, as giving an air of something extraordinary to the person of Christ, may be accounted for.

The power, by which Christ was *raised* from the dead, must be accounted a *miraculous* power: may we then be allowed to suppose, that such a power was exercised *after* his resurrection, as well as in effecting it?—if we may, our present difficulties will, in a great measure, receive a *solution*. And a miraculous power does not interfere with the *humanity* of Christ, which is now our principal concern<sup>k</sup>;—nor is it for us to say, *à priori*, when God shall, and when he shall *not*, make *use* of such a power. The history of the resurrection of Christ may be a *true* history, and yet it might please God to use miraculous power in some incidents subsequent to it.

But

<sup>i</sup> Ep. Pearson, on the words “*From the dead,*” quotes Greg. Hom. 26, in Evang. “*corpus suum et ejusdem naturæ et alterius gloriæ.*” The *nature* is proved by the *handling*; the new *glory* by the entering in while the doors were shut. Creed, p. 517, first edit.

<sup>k</sup> There are miraculous events interspersed through the Life of Christ.—He passes safe through a multitude, he walks upon the sea, &c.

But some are most inclined to solutions, which keep clear of every thing *supernatural*. "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father," 'may mean<sup>1</sup> only, pass not this precious time in *salutations* (such as embracing the knees); it will be some time before my ascension takes place; there will be opportunities to shew your rejoicing, when there is no particular business to prevent it.'—Again, two disciples might walk with Jesus, side by side, and not know him; they might never look at<sup>m</sup> him; or not see him clearly; especially in the dusk of the evening; their minds might be intent upon something<sup>n</sup> else; he would speak in a *style* different from that, in which they had usually heard him speak: why not purposely?—and yet, when *lights* were brought, at supper, and they sat opposite to him, they might *know* him. As to their eyes being *holden*, ver. 16. (Luke xxiv), and *opened*, ver. 31, that is only Jewish *phraseology*; it means nothing *supernatural*.—Minerva held the eyes of Penelope, that she did not know her husband.—His being in *another form*,  $\mu\omicron\epsilon\phi\eta$ , might mean only the effect of a different *dress*. His *vanishing*, or becoming invisible, ( $\alpha\phi\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \epsilon\gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$ ), might only be his retiring out of the room<sup>o</sup>, while they were attending to something else, expecting him to return.—He might, consistently with the Scripture *expressions*, enter by the *door* in a common way: who, that would stop the Jews, would stop *him*?—Though it seems strange, that *any* of his disciples should *doubt* at the interview in Galilee<sup>p</sup>, yet it might

<sup>1</sup> See Trial of Witnesses, p. 68.

<sup>m</sup> See Macknight's instance (p. 647) of Odyfsey, B. 19th, (or T), line 479. And another, Trial, p. 70.

<sup>n</sup> Luke xxiv. 14, 15. <sup>o</sup> Macknight.

<sup>p</sup> Lardner says, that *Theophylact* is well worth reading on this passage: see his Cred. on *Juvenius*; *Works*, Vol. 4, p.

might only mean *had* doubted, (Grotius); or it might only be some of inferior note; some, who had not been at Jerusalem, had not weighed the evidence, and whose minds were possessed with ideas of Ghosts and *Apparitions*. The greatness of so wonderful an event might terrify men out of their judgment, and make them distrust even their senses. It is better they should doubt, than be too hasty to believe.—Though no great *variety* of *transactions* is recorded, as having passed during the forty days, yet we find nothing *wanting* in particular: no Evangelist ever composed a *Journal*; and detached facts, if of a wonderful nature, have a romantic air and appearance. What could Christ do more in his then situation, though it would produce no *variety* of incidents, than employ himself in “speaking of the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God?” Macknight reckons up *seven* appearances which he made, in all; it may moreover be considered whether, if the Evangelists had invented their histories, they would have abstained from throwing in more incidents in this part of their fable:—whether we should not have had prodigies, discourses, ænigmas, in abundance. Of the *Ascension* we will speak by and by.

As to the *wounds* of Christ, we know so little of a miraculous revival, that we are not able to give a solution of their being healed, on our present plan of avoiding every thing supernatural. It does not seem *likely*, that a Body should be supernaturally restored to Life, and the wounds remain. Whatever events were natural and ordinary, we are sure, that the restoration of life and health to the Body of Christ was not one of them. He was  
“ put

207.—(Theophylact on Matt. xxviii. 17. In Evangelia, p. 183.) It seems a good exposition.

<sup>9</sup> Acts i. 3. See also John xx. 30. “Many other signs,” &c.



“ put to *death* in the *flesh*,” but was “ quickened by the *Spirit*.”

Thus, here are *three* ways of solving the difficulties proposed; it is possible, that some might make use of *more than one* of them; i. e. might allow some of the incidents to be *common*, some *miraculous*, and others to imply a *spiritual body*.— But let every one consider, whether the remark before made on the *time* of Christ’s rising might not be extended to every one of them; whether they might not all have been easily *avoided* by any one, who was *inventing* a narration merely to serve some purpose. If so, the conclusion is, as before, the narratives which *we* have are *not fictitious*.

I mentioned \* the *ascension* of Christ as one of those things, which gave our Saviour’s Body an air of being not perfectly human. This will come best under a *separate* observation; especially as our *Article* has been *objected to*, on account of what it affirms respecting the Ascension of Christ†. It has been mentioned before‡, that two *Councils* condemned the notion of our *Article*, that *flesh and bones* \* were parts of that Body, wherewith Christ *ascended*. These *Councils* may, on that account, *seem* to consider the human *Body* of Christ as *inconsistent* with his *Ascension*; but I should rather say, that they only adopted our *first solution* of the difficulty in preference to any other; that is, they thought, that Christ must assume his *spiritual Body* some time before his *Ascension*. When they decreed against *flesh and bones* being admitted into the heavenly mansions, they most probably meant

to

\* 1 Pet. iii. 18.      † P. 401.

‡ Bingham, Vol. 2. p. 724. part of his Apology.

§ P. 338.

\* I follow Bingham’s expression, though I do not see *Bones* mentioned in the Acts of the Councils.

to speak of the Body in its present corruptible state; as St. Paul does, when he speaks of “flesh” and blood.” And<sup>z</sup> indeed there may be some ambiguity, when the parts of the body are mentioned; there may be a *doubt*, whether the *natural* Body is spoken of, or the *spiritual*; as we must use the same terms for both; which can only be resolved by the connection and design of the expressions. I think we have sufficiently shewn, that any component parts of an human body, which are necessary to our idea of such body, may be spoken of as belonging either to heavenly or earthly bodies.

In the Ascension then of our Lord, he might have an human body, though it were a spiritual one; or, in other words, the difficulty we are speaking of may admit of our first solution: can the second or third be applied to it?—First, could the Ascension be miraculous? I should rather say, it might be *supernatural*; it might be *above* any law of our nature; and yet it might not be a *violation* of any law; which every miracle seems to be.—Neither do I see how the third solution can be of any use to us; the Ascension of Christ cannot be an event of an ordinary nature;—it is wholly out of the reach of our common experience.

I shall not mention any more *objections*, as what may be strictly called such: but I said, that, instead of directly *explaining* some expressions of the Article, I would propose any difficulty contained in those expressions, in the form of objections, that the explanation of them might be the more distinct.

XVIII. 1. The first of these *explanatory objections* may be this; our Article speaks of Christ as *sitting* on the right hand of God; whereas he is represented

<sup>y</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 50.

<sup>z</sup> This conjecture is confirmed by the *expressions* of the Council (or Councils, for the latter adopts the words of the former).

presented in Scripture as *standing*<sup>a</sup> at the right hand of God. Whatever difficulty there is here, is a difficulty of *Scripture*, for we have shewn, that Christ is frequently described as sitting; which however does not afford a reason why it should be passed over. In truth, all we want, at present, is to improve our own conceptions. We must therefore again apply what was formerly<sup>b</sup> laid down. when we use our own language concerning any thing spiritual or heavenly, any thing which we express, not properly, but in borrowed terms, we mean something of the following sort:—when we say the *hand* of God, we mean that *cause*, in the Supreme Being, of certain effects, which, if produced by man, we should ascribe to his *hand*. When we speak of the *Providence* of God, we mean that cause in God of effects, which, in man, would be ascribed to *foresight*.—In like manner, when we speak of *sitting*, we mean that *state* of things, which would *produce* sitting in man; and so of *standing*:—by *Christ's sitting* at the *right hand* of God, we mean that state of *dignity*, authority, equality of rank, which, according to our customary notions, would occasion a person to sit at the right hand of a great Personage. By *Christ's standing*, Acts vii. 55. that *state* of shewing *protecting* care over a *dying* servant, which would cause the same person, if man, to stand.—The postures therefore are only *different circumstances*; and the descriptions of them no more contradict one another, than a man contradicts himself by sometimes giving orders to his servant, and sometimes paying him his wages. Tell a *Painter* to draw a picture of a Prince exercising his authority, and another of the same Prince shewing a compassionate tenderness for a servant, who has been wounded in his defence; giving him no directions

<sup>a</sup> Acts vii. 55.<sup>b</sup> Book I. Chap. XIX. Sect. 5.

rections about particular postures; and he will, of course, draw his Prince *sitting* in the former picture, and in the latter *standing*<sup>c</sup>.

XIX. 2. Another explanatory objection may be this: why should our Article use a different language from every one of our three *Creeds*, with regard to the persons, whom Christ is to judge? The Article says, “*all men*;” the *Creeds*, “*the quick and the dead*.” But certainly the expression of the Article is the *less ambiguous*; and therefore, if any thing more be said upon the difference, it will be, not so much to explain the Article, as the *Creed*; or rather the *Scriptures*; for from *Scripture* the expression of ‘*quick and dead*’ is derived<sup>d</sup>.—Nevertheless, as we subscribe to the *Creeds*, it may not be improper briefly to observe, that by “*the quick*,” are probably meant those, who will be “*alive*” at the time of Christ’s coming to judge the world: though I should not blame any one, who thought it was not intended to declare *positively*, that any *would* be then alive; but only to affirm, that Christ would judge “*all men*,” *whether* any happened to remain alive, or all had paid the debt of mortality.—To those, who favour this sense, the *Creeds* and the Article *coincide*.

XX. 3. The *last* explanatory objection I shall mention, is the following.—Is there not a material difference between the Article, which speaks of Christ as sitting only *till* the last day; and the *Creed*, which describes him as one, “*whose kingdom shall have no end*?”

The short answer is, that our Article seems only to reach, as it were, to the day of *judgment*, but the *Creed* to that *eternity*, which follows it; in contradiction

<sup>c</sup> See Pearson on the Creed, p. 560, first edit.

<sup>d</sup> Acts x. 42. 2 Tim. iv. 1. 1 Pet. iv. 5.

1 Theff. iv. 15, 17. 1 Cor. xv. 51.

tradiction perhaps to the error of *Marcellus* and *Photinus*, who thought “*the* <sup>f</sup> *end*” (so I conceive) to mean the end of Christ’s kingdom; which, in one sense, it is. The general *judgment* is at a distance not to be defined by *us*: but it *will* happen, and then is the end of *time*, “the last *day* :” but a proper *eternity* follows; and one, to our views, unvaried. When judgment has been executed (so I understand), “then cometh the *end* ;” the end of God’s dispensation towards man; the end therefore of all Christ’s mediatorial offices; as *prophet*, he will no longer *instruct*<sup>g</sup>; as *priest*, he will no longer avert punishment; as *King*, he will no longer *protect*. *Sitting* may be no longer ascribed to him:—yet, as *God the Son*, he may reign for ever: nay, he may, though it be unintelligible to us, still retain some connexion with *humanity*<sup>h</sup>; still enjoy the *rewards* of his sufferings and obedience. I own this connexion with humanity, and enjoying rewards, to be above my comprehension; and I believe it to be above the comprehension of every man; but I can see clearly, that it is our business to keep *in view*, at the same time, what *St. Paul* delivers to the *Corinthians*<sup>i</sup>, and what *St. John* teaches in his *Book of Revelation*<sup>k</sup>: the *joint effect* of which passages I can no better express than by saying, after the last day, God “shall be all in all;” shall rule no more by a Mediator, but immediately<sup>l</sup>; Christ, as he who *was* Mediator, shall be *subject*, shall no more retain even his *kingly* office; yet, as *God the Son*, he “shall reign for ever and ever,” King of Kings, “and Lord of Lords<sup>m</sup>.”

xxi. Thus

<sup>f</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 24. See Pearson on the Creed. And Art. II. Sect. VII.

<sup>g</sup> Pearson. <sup>h</sup> Art. II. Sect. xxvi.

<sup>i</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 24—28. <sup>k</sup> Rev. xi. 15.

<sup>l</sup> Whitby in 1 Cor. xv. 28. <sup>m</sup> Rev. xix. 16.

XXI. Thus we have gone through our History, explanation, and proof.—Our *Application* will be short. In giving *assent*, a question might arise, how far any one was at liberty to understand what is said of the *Body* of Christ, of his *spiritual* body. But, as every *human* body, natural and spiritual, must have something to be called *flesh*<sup>n</sup>, &c. and as *identity*<sup>o</sup> of person is consistent with the *change* of Body from natural to spiritual, it seems as if he who assents might either take the Body of Christ (and its parts), as denoting its ordinary corruptible state on earth, or as being the same with our future spiritual bodies; or as being, indeterminate, either one *or* the other, as a truly human body would be in like circumstances.

XXII. *Mutual concessions* may here be passed over, for the same reason which was mentioned under the third Article; because our Church is not engaged in *controversy* concerning it.

XXIII. *Improvements* may arise from new *objections*; as they have done before. It is scarce possible to answer a new and specious objection, without diving deeper into a subject;—without making something more clear and definite; without getting a more perfect knowledge of the sense of Scripture, and a stronger relish for its excellencies.—The Harmonies in the parts of Scripture, which give an account of the Resurrection, and which should assign the series of events as they really happened, are as yet unsettled: Macknight's is very ingenious, but Lardner is dissatisfied with it in some respects: a comparison of these two, and others, would scarce fail of producing improvement in one way or other.

<sup>n</sup> Sect. xvii.

<sup>o</sup> Ibid.

## APPENDIX TO THE FOURTH ARTICLE.

## OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

**T**HERE is an intimate connexion between the resurrection of Christ and the general resurrection. St. Paul reasons from the one to the other,<sup>a</sup> and indeed<sup>b</sup> this appears from several things already mentioned.—On this account, we may say something of the latter here, as well as any where; and it cannot be considered as a digression to do so, because we assent to the resurrection of the Body in two of our Creeds, and to the resurrection of the *dead* in the third: and to these Creeds we assent in the eighth Article.

No one can think attentively concerning the nature of Man, without inquiring what will be his fate after Death.—Amongst the *Philosophers* of old, the *Stoics* thought, that the soul continued after death, though it was corruptible, (*φθαρτον*); but the *Epicureans* rejected totally the notion of a *future state*. Accordingly, when St. Paul preached “Jesus and the resurrection” at<sup>c</sup> Athens, the *Stoics*<sup>d</sup> said, they would hear him again, but the *Epicureans* “mocked<sup>e</sup>.”

Amongst the *Jews*, a similar difference prevailed between the *Pharisees* and the *Saducees*. *Bayle*<sup>f</sup> calls the *Stoics* *Pagan Pharisees*; and *Josephus* calls the *Pharisees*

<sup>a</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 13, 49.

<sup>b</sup> Phil. iii. 21. Col. i. 18, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Acts xvii. 18, 32.

<sup>d</sup> Parkhurst, Στωϊκοί.

<sup>e</sup> For the notions of *modern Philosophers*, see Bp. Porteus's Charge of this year, 1794.

<sup>f</sup> Under Epicurus.

Pharisees *Jewish Stoics*. “The *Saducees*<sup>s</sup> say, there is no resurrection, neither Angel nor Spirit” (human soul); “but the Pharisees confess both.”—The *Essenes*, favouring *Oriental* notions, thought the *Body* would be annihilated after death, though the *Soul* would be rewarded or punished.

Permit me, as I have not mentioned it before, just to observe, that the three Jewish sects were confined to what we call the *Gentry*, and collectively opposed to the *People*; whereas our sects reach to the very bottom of the people:—and I have a notion, none but people of liberal education were *Stoics*, &c.<sup>h</sup>—The *Pharisees* were grave and regular; and in general were Magistrates: opulent rather than noble; yet numerous; stately, but preserving order; adopting maxims *established* amongst the people, yet not very popular; or however rather respected than beloved. The *Saducees* were but few in number; rather affecting the importance of high rank than of opulence; too insolent and haughty to bear the drudgery and formality of administering justice; affecting to think in a singular manner, without low prejudices; and to despise all established notions, as vulgar and barbarous.—This is, in substance, the representation of

<sup>s</sup> Acts xxiii. 8.

<sup>h</sup> Mr. T. Twining, the translator of Aristotle's *Poetics*, with original Notes and Dissertations, on account of a Note on his Sermon, preached Sept. 29, 1794, says, in a Letter dated Colchester, Nov. 7, 1794, “In those times” (the times of Xenophon) “there was, I think, nothing of that moral and intellectual *level* among the members of a State, which education, *reading* (in consequence of printing), &c. has produced in later times. *All*, then, was divided nearly into *educated* Gentlemen, and ignorant *Mob*: Patricians, and Plebeians: ὁ δῆμος and οἱ ἐλευθέροι, &c. &c.—There was very little among them, I apprehend, of that respectable sort of Persons, whom we call the *middle rank*.”



of *Josephus*; but perhaps something is to be allowed for his being a Pharisee himself.

With regard to our present subject, we may say, in general, that mere Philosophers have been too ready to give up the Body to destruction in the Grave; and the people have been too ready to transfer the present imperfections to the future. How Christianity has reconciled the dictates of Reason with the feelings of simple nature, is well shewn by Bishop *Sherlock*<sup>g</sup>.

To come then to *Christianity*; it seems to be well proved by Lord King and Dr. Rutherford, that the resurrection of the Body or *Flesh*, was a part in orthodox confessions of Faith, from the earliest times<sup>h</sup>: even Clemens Romanus and Ignatius mention it in their artless manner<sup>i</sup>, but in a manner sufficiently plain. As to *Heretics*, we may be sure, that such as we have called *Oriental*, would be invincibly averse to every thing *material* entering into the Kingdom of Heaven; accordingly, Augustin says of Simon Magus, “negabat etiam carnis resurrectionem;”—and of Carpocrates, “resurrectionem corporis simul cum Lege abjiciebat.”—Those, who thought the Soul was taken from *Stars* and restored to them, did, in effect, deny the eternal existence of a *living* Body.—Those, who said the Resurrection was already *past*<sup>k</sup>, got rid of their difficulties about *matter*, by taking the *moral* comparisons and allusions to the resurrection, as descriptions of plain *fact*. This is the nature of *allegorical* Interpretation.

*Origen*

<sup>g</sup> *Sherlock*, Vol. 1. Disc. 6. p. 199, &c. Also Vol. 3<sup>d</sup> Disc. 17.

<sup>h</sup> Lord King on Creed, p. 402, 403. Dr. Rutherford's 4th Charge.

<sup>i</sup> Dr. Rutherford's Charges, p. 86, 87.      <sup>k</sup> 2 Tim. ii. 18.

*Origen* is accused by Epiphanius of having denied the Resurrection of the Body (see Epiphanius. *Hær.* 64. p. 532, 539, 556, 591, 592); but an account of one single ancient is seldom to be depended on without comparing it with others. *Huet* has entered into the subject of *Origen's* opinions, in his *Origeniana*; *Cave* gives a good short account of them. He holds *Origen* to have maintained, that the Souls of good men shall be clothed with bodies refined and ethereal; and that the Souls of bad men shall suffer punishments after death.

The orthodox doctrine, once settled, continued so uniform, that we may pass on to the times of our *Reformation*. What was the case then appears best from our Articles of 1552, and the *Reformatio Legum* before<sup>1</sup> mentioned: from which we perceive, that the prevailing error was what we have mentioned last of all; the error of *Hymeneus* and *Philetus*. There seem also to have been opinions concerning the *sleep of the soul*, and the resurrection of the soul, which our Reformers thought too much fixed; but they are not a part of our *present* subject<sup>m</sup>.

Of the early *Socinians* it has been said, that “they” deny the Resurrection of *these* Bodies:” which seems to be a revival of an ancient distinction of *Origen's*, between the resurrection of *a* Body, and the resurrection of *this* Body<sup>o</sup>:—*Origen* is said to have held, that each man shall have *a* Body, but not the *same* he has here; he shall have “*aëreum corpus*”

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to this Book, Sect. 4.

<sup>m</sup> See Reform. Legum, de Hæresibus, Cap. 12.—and the 39th and 40th Articles (the last but two) of 1552.

<sup>n</sup> Cheynell on Socinianism, p. 24.—but I do not see this notion in the works of Socinus; judging by the Index.

<sup>o</sup> See Lord King on the Creed, p. 401, 402, and 403; from different authors.

corpus et paulatim in auras <sup>p</sup> tenues dissolvendum;" against this was introduced into the Creed, the expression of the Resurrection of the *Flesh*: for even *air* is a *Body*.—Indeed, there has but been one difficulty on this subject, properly speaking; that arising from the gross impure nature of our Body here, and the idea, that "flesh and blood," such as ours, cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. And people may dispute for ever, if, while they maintain, that our future bodies will be the *same*, they allow, that the qualities of the same body will be *changed*<sup>q</sup>.

So much for History. An *explanation* of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body could consist in nothing but describing the glorified Body; and that could only be described in *negative* terms, by removing all the imperfections of our natural Body.—"Resurgent," says Augustin<sup>r</sup>, "*corpora sine ullo vitio, sine ullâ deformitate, sicut sine ullâ corruptione, onere, aut difficultate.*"—And even this removal of imperfections may be called *imaginary*<sup>s</sup>. It admits therefore of various *degrees*; and hence all the disputes, which have arisen on this head.—Imagine the spiritual body very *refined*, and the plainer orthodox are alarmed for its *identity*; they fear it should not be left *corporeal*, or carnal:—Speak of the spiritual body in terms usually denoting *solid* matter, talk of *flesh* and *bones*, and the  
more

<sup>p</sup> Lord King, p. 401; from Jerom on If lxvi.

<sup>q</sup> See Lord King on the Creed, p. 404, 405, from Augustin.

<sup>r</sup> Enchir. c. 19. cited by Lord King, p. 406.

<sup>s</sup> Epiphanius (Hær. 64. Sect. 63.) makes animal and spiritual bodies to consist in this; that *animal* bodies have propensities and *appetites*, which may carry men to evil; *spiritual* bodies have none.—And it may be true, that, where men neither marry nor are given in marriage, their propensities may be suited to their condition; but even this must imply some change or refinement in the body itself.

more *philosophical* orthodox are alarmed for its *spirituality*; they say, you want to have our future bodies too gross; “flesh and blood cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.”—The rational man leaves the whole matter to the disposal of God.

The Doctrine before us can only have a *proof* from Scripture, though Bishop *Sherlock* has given good illustrations and confirmations of it, from the nature of *the thing*: as indeed did the 39th Article of 1552, in very few words; “that the *whole man*,” &c.—Dr. Rutherford<sup>c</sup> has confined himself to scriptural proof.—Supposing the Resurrection of Christ sufficiently proved, the passages quoted at the beginning of this Appendix<sup>u</sup> would be a sufficient proof of ours. To which we may add 1 John iii. 2. “we shall be *like him*.”—Matt. xxvii. 52, 53, may shew a case not exactly similar to that resurrection, which brings men into a state of immortality; yet it seems improbable, that the *Bodies* of Saints, or Christians, would have been raised, if there was afterwards to be no resurrection of the Body. Indeed it may not be certain what *kind* of Bodies these persons had: they “*appeared* unto many,”—how different they were from Christ in the nature of their bodies cannot, probably, be determined. John v. 28. seems a proof of the resurrection of the Body; the Grave (*μνημειον*, not *αδης*) is not the receptacle of the *Soul*.—Rom. viii. 19—23, is not a perspicuous passage, therefore it is rather to be recommended for study, than to be quoted; those who read it attentively should compare with it 2 Cor. v. 1—4.—1 Cor. vi. 13, 14, is sufficiently plain; but 1 Cor. xv. 35—49, is a capital

<sup>c</sup> Charge 4th.

<sup>u</sup> Acts xvii. 31, 32. is to this purpose: ver. 31, is about raising Christ as a *proof*: in ver. 32, it is “the resurrection of *the dead*.”

capital passage to our purpose.—And, as the difficulty arising from the gross nature of our Body is properly the *only* one incident to our present subject, it will be proper to go on, and read ver. 50, as expressing that difficulty, and ver. 53, with Phil. iii. 20, 21, as giving a *solution* of it. 2 Pet. i. 14. probably means the same thing, but might want explaining and defending, if any one should be contentious about it.

Though I have said, that the grossness of our present bodies is the only difficulty, which has occasioned divisions amongst *Christians*, yet that of *Voltaire* \* (and of others) mentioned in the 17th Section, might be mentioned here.—It appears to our judgments more easy to collect particles, sufficient to constitute identity, than to *create* out of nothing.—And *Identity*, as before, is consistent with many and considerable changes:—God only knows what changes of material particles is consistent with that sameness, which is requisite for the purposes of a just retribution.

\* Voltaire, Vol. 26, quarto, p. 411.



## ARTICLE V.

## OF THE HOLY GHOST.

**T**HE Holy Ghost, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of one substance, majesty, and glory with the Father and the Son, very and eternal God.

1. In treating this Article, we will follow our usual method, and therefore begin with *History*.

The expressions of Scripture concerning the Holy Ghost being of various kinds, and varying, like those concerning the Son of God (Art. 11. Sect. xxxi. xxxii.), almost imperceptibly, with the circumstances in which they are used, nothing better could be done at first than to use them in the same manner. This would be done of course, through the mere help of *feeling* or sense, so long as the circumstances implied were plainly perceived; but, when circumstances began to be seen more faintly, or to be forgotten, then a greater degree of attention would be required. And therefore the inattentive would come to use expressions of Scripture perversely; perhaps too *literally*, as that arises from neglecting circumstances; so as to require correction; which would give occasion to *controversy*, and that to precise and systematical use of terms, though in different or opposite senses. — One of the most obvious faults, in such a case, would be using indefinite, popular, passionate expressions,

pressions, as if they had been used originally in a literal, philosophical, *scientific* sense<sup>b</sup>.

From such wrong interpretation of *expressions*, must arise wrong notions and *doctrines*; what those were, which were professed in very early times of Christianity, it may sometimes be difficult to ascertain. In order to approach as near as possible, let us first consider the *sources* of information, and next the particular information which they yield, in the matter before us.—*Orthodox* writings expressed the same notions, which we now maintain; writings deemed heretical, used to be destroyed.

We have already<sup>b</sup> mentioned *Doxologies*; and the conclusions to be drawn from them. We will now shew, how something may be learned from acts of ancient *Councils*:—an error would not have been condemned, if it had not actually *existed*; not merely because it might exist: this we may at all times take for granted; but a difficulty sometimes arises from errors being condemned without any mention of the *names* of those, by whom they were held: however, circumstances will sometimes solve this difficulty.—One kind of order of *Councils* should be here mentioned particularly; that is, the order for *re-baptizing* Heretics. When any persons had been baptized in a sect, which was thought to have something radically and essentially wrong in the form of its baptism, if such persons wished to quit that Sect, and come to the main Body of Christians, or the Catholic Church, it was decreed, that they should be baptized afresh. Now, as regular baptism was in the name of the Father, Son, and *Holy Ghost*, re-baptizing must be owing to an omission of something in this form; which would

<sup>a</sup> Of this before, Art. I. Sect. IV. and Art. II. Sect. XLV.

<sup>b</sup> Art. I. Sect. IV.

would be *caused* by some heterodox *opinion*; probably either concerning the *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*; but errors were more frequent and more likely to happen concerning the latter, than the former. The scriptural ground of re-baptizing was what is recorded Acts xix. 5. of baptizing, in the name of Jesus, those who had before only received “*John’s Baptism*.”

It may also be mentioned here, that several persons, in different ages of the Church, seem to have run into an *analogy* between the Son of God and the Holy Ghost, with respect to the union of *two natures* in one Person. So that, as the *Word* was made *Flesh* and was <sup>d</sup> *sent*, the Holy Ghost became an *human Comforter*, or *Paraclete*. Some seem to have said, that, as Christ acted with men as a *Man*, so the Comforter, sent by Christ, may be, and probably is to be, a *Man*. The famous Peter Lombard might have an idea of this sort, when he made “a double *proceeding* of the Holy Ghost; one temporal, the other <sup>e</sup> eternal.—Here is fine scope for enthusiasm! a man of an heated imagination, who was settled in this notion, that there must be an human Comforter, or Holy Ghost, might find no great difficulty in persuading himself, that *he* was this human Comforter:—and this several Fanatics seem to have done. But, when it is said, that they pretended to be the *Holy Ghost*, the account seems to me rather inaccurate; they probably pretended to be nothing more than *men*, though each fancied himself the Comforter, or Paraclete.

Those, who have been less used to read the Scriptures in the original than in our Translation, may not have observed, that the word παρακλητος, when

<sup>e</sup> Mentioned in Lord King on the Creed, p. 318.

<sup>d</sup> John ix. 7.—et passim.

<sup>c</sup> L. Senten. 1. 14.—quoted by Rogers on this Article, p. 25.



when applied to the *Son* of God, is rendered *Advocate*, and when to the Holy Ghost, *Comforter*. Yet, though these *words* are different, the fundamental *ideas* are much the same. The *Paraclete*, who is *above*, pleads with the *Father*; the *Paraclete*, who is *below*, pleads with *men*: though the happiness of mankind is the object of both.

II. These things premised in general, we might divide our *historical* observations into *three parts*: the first taking in the *first four* Centuries, or perhaps part of the fifth.—the next relating to the eighth and ninth Centuries: the last regarding the age of the *Reformation*.

We must not speak of very early times of Christianity without *diffidence*; but still it seems as if it might be useful to mention, in a cursory way, that *Simon Magus* has been *charged* with making the pretensions now described<sup>f</sup>.—*Menander*, his follower, was thought worthy of notice<sup>g</sup> on account of his errors, and particularly on account of his saying, that *baptism* was valid if administered in the name of *Menander*.—*Montanus* is said by *Augustin*<sup>h</sup> to have called himself *Paraclete*, and to have affirmed, that the *promise* of the Holy Ghost was fulfilled in *him*: as *Comforter*, I suppose.—He is also said to have *baptized* his followers in the name of the *Father*, *Son*, and *Montanus*; which receives some confirmation from his Followers being ordered, by

two

<sup>f</sup> Aug. Hæc. 1. Simon affirmed “postea” (after he had given the Law as Moses, and appeared on earth as Christ) “se in linguis igneis spiritum sanctum super Apostolos venisse.”

<sup>g</sup> What Bingham says, II. 3. 5. I have found confirmed by writers on Heresies; Aug. Theod. Philaster, &c. Aug. calls Montanus’s Sect *Cataphryges*, No. 26. Aug. makes *Cataphryges* different from *Peuziani*; but Lardner makes them the same; the latter name from a village in Phrygia, which the Montanists held sacred; a sort of Jerusalem. Aug. indeed mentions, that some persons thought them the same.

<sup>h</sup> Hæc. 26.

two Councils<sup>i</sup>, to be re-baptized. Sometimes he used to put the name of one of his *Prophetesses*, (Priscilla and Maximilla), instead of his own; (could this be in baptizing *females*?)—*Mani* has been charged with making the pretensions here spoken of; (to be Paraclete;) but Lardner defends him; and says, that he pretended to nothing more than *communication* with the Deity. We have had his *Trinity*<sup>k</sup> before: he supposed the residence of the third Person to be in the *Air*; a thing not unlikely to occur.—His oriental philosophy did not immediately suggest this; in that, the Spirits are said to be called  $\Phi\omega\alpha$ <sup>l</sup>, or *lights*; to which *St. John's*<sup>m</sup> use of the word *Light* may refer.

Christians have been said to *judaiize*, when they have used the word *Spiritus* in the sense, in which the Jews used  $\kappa\omega\omega$ , for an *energy* of God, particularly that by which the *Prophets* prophesied. Its sense in *Acts*<sup>n</sup> sometimes seems to approach to this.

The connexion between *Paul* of Samosata, *Marcellus*, and *Photinus*, has been shewn<sup>o</sup> under the second Article. Their works not being extant, we may aim at a general idea of them all taken together. They seem to have held, that the *Holy Spirit* in Scripture does not mean a *Person*, but some *efficacy* of God; some effect of his goodness, some specimen of his divine *power*, which probably it *sometimes does*.—*Augustin* says<sup>p</sup>, that the *Pauliani* were ordered by the Council of *Nice* to be *re-baptized*;—but the acts of that Council are not all extant<sup>q</sup>, nor does it, I think, appear what it was, which vitiated the Paulian Baptism.

*Origen's*

<sup>i</sup> That of Laodicea, and the first of Constantinople.

<sup>k</sup> Sect. 111. of Appendix to Book 1.

<sup>l</sup> Michaelis, Sect. 100, p. 245, quarto.

<sup>m</sup> John i. 4, 9.

<sup>n</sup> Acts xix. 6.      <sup>o</sup> Art. 11. Sect. v 11.

<sup>p</sup> Hier. 44.

<sup>q</sup> The Creed, Synodical Epistle, and 20 Canons, remain. Lard. Vol. 4. p. 191.

*Origen's* works have been so mangled and interpolated, that I will only recommend it to the Student not to depend absolutely on any *single* passage of his works, in points which have been much disputed; except he should wish to enter *fully* into the subject, and then I would refer him to *Huet's Origeniana*.

The *Sabellians*, of whom we have spoken <sup>r</sup> before, were to be *re-baptised*<sup>s</sup>; but their particular form of baptism is not extant: and the *Priscillianists* have been reckoned a species of Sabellians<sup>t</sup>.

*Laëtantius* has been mentioned <sup>u</sup> before.

The *Arians* were so much engaged in controversy about the *Son* of God, that they attended less to fixing a doctrine concerning the *Holy Ghost*: yet *Augustin* says <sup>y</sup> of them, that they called him "*creaturam creaturæ*;" which, by the way, allows to the Son a creative power. This agrees too with *Epiphanius*<sup>x</sup>, and might be taken from him. However, only the *Eunomians*, of the Arian sects, seem to have been *re-baptized* by the Catholics. They baptized into the *Death*<sup>z</sup> of Christ only; though the following was a form ascribed to some of them;—in the name of the uncreated God, the created God, and the sanctifying Spirit, created by the created Son.

But the Christians most distinguished for their opposition to the Holy Spirit, were the followers of *Macedonius*; called on that account *πνευματομαχοι*. *Macedonius* was a Patriarch of Constantinople, and deposed by a Council there in the year 360; his followers were the more noticed for their heterodoxy

<sup>r</sup> Art. 1. Sect. IV.

<sup>s</sup> Seventh Canon of first Council of Constantinople.

<sup>t</sup> Aug. Hær. 70, end. Also Art. 1. Sect. IV.

<sup>u</sup> Art. 1. Sect. IV.      <sup>x</sup> Hær. 49.

<sup>y</sup> See Lard. Works, Vol. 4, p. 113.

<sup>z</sup> See Bingham, 11. 3. 10. Rom. vi. 3.

odoxy in regard to the Holy Ghost, because they were orthodox with regard to the Son, and could urge, in their own defence, that they received the *whole* of the *Nicene Creed*<sup>a</sup>. What the precise idea of the Macedonians was, we do not seem to know certainly: Augustin reckons them only Semi-arians; and Sozomen<sup>b</sup> says, that they looked upon the Holy Ghost as a kind of *Servant*; *διδουρον και υπηγετην*: but our Reformatio Legum only says<sup>c</sup>, *illum pro Deo non agnoscentes*; speaking of those Christians, who *conspire* with Macedonius against the Holy Ghost.

III. We will now take some notice of the disputes of the *eighth and ninth* Centuries; Mosheim, a professed Historian, acknowledges<sup>d</sup>, that the origin of them “is covered with perplexity and doubt;” and the occasion and rise of a dispute generally influences the whole of it: so that, if the occasion is doubtful, there will be doubts and different opinions concerning the rest. What opinion I have formed of this part of History, from the materials which have come in my way, I will give you frankly. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, various disputes took place with the followers of *Macedonius*, with respect to the nature and *procession* of the Holy Ghost: it might be particularly mentioned, with a view to what followed, that, so soon as the years 430 and 431, in the Councils of Alexandria and Ephesus, it was declared, that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the *Son* as well as from the Father. In order to terminate these disputes, the Church in general made a sort of settlement or determination what should be accounted the Catholic doctrine; and, to avoid farther

<sup>a</sup> See Lord King, p. 319, from Epiphanius.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. 24. Cap. 27.

<sup>c</sup> De Hæresibus, Cap. 6.

<sup>d</sup> Mosheim, Vol. 2. 8vo. p. 268.

ther adjustings of formularies, agreed, that nothing should from that time be *added* to those then under consideration. It is probable that, at that time, the question, whether the Holy Ghost should be spoken of as proceeding from the Father *and* the Son, (*Filioque* is the famous word) did not occur to mens minds; *Filioque* was *not in the Creeds*, though it was not new. The Students in the *Western Church* seem to have ere long contracted an opinion, that it was proper for them to profess in a Creed, that the Holy Ghost proceeded *from the Son*: they therefore inserted (or one might say, *restored*<sup>e</sup>) *Filioque*, meaning, probably, no harm:—and then the Eastern Church thought as little of complaining, as the Western of offending. Afterwards, however, contentions for *worldly grandeur* produced contentions about theological truth. Rome and Constantinople were *Rivals*; not only for imperial, but for spiritual pre-eminence.—The Patriarch of Constantinople stiled himself *Episcopus Æcumenicus*: Gregory the Great, Bishop of Rome, was more lowly in the *title* he assumed; he was “*Servus servorum*”<sup>f</sup> scilicet Dei; but, in his pretensions to authority, he was equally ambitious. The Patriarch was the head of the Eastern Church; the Pope of the Western.—This rivalship made the Churches seek occasions of blaming each other; and thus the insertion of *Filioque* came to be complained of as a breach of Faith. It was defended by the Western Church, because the word contained right *doctrine*; this was enough to make the Eastern Church dispute the *doctrine*; they did so, and the dispute still subsists, and still causes a separation

<sup>e</sup> See Long's Councils, p. 104.

<sup>f</sup> Bp. Hallifax's Sermons on Prophecy.—Ser. 11th, p. 341, Note; where he shews, that “*Vicarius Dei*,” means the same with “*Servus servorum Dei*.”

ration betwixt the Eastern and Western Churches. —One Pope (Leo 3d.) did once, for the sake of peace, order *Filioque* to be put out of the Creed, at the same time ratiſying the doctrine, which it comprehends;—but he could only prevail in thoſe Churches, which were under his moſt immediate inſpection; and that only for a time.—The obſtinate reſiſtance of the Greek or Eastern Church to the inſertion of *Filioque*, is the more likely to be owing to ſome worldly conſiderations, as ſeveral of the Greek Fathers have the doctrine in their works, clearly expreſſed<sup>g</sup>

IV. The doctrine, which has the beſt claim to be called Catholic, is that, which our Church profeſſes: but, in the age of the *Reformation*, when every one was heated, and eager to diſtinguiſh himſelf, ſome extravagancies broke forth; ſome of the old enthuſiaſtic pretenſions ſhewed themſelves again. Moſheim does not ſay, that *Servetus*<sup>h</sup> pretended to be the Paraclete, but I think others do: and *he* ſays, that *Servetus* pretended to a divine *commiſſion* to explain genuine Chriſtianity, which had been long *loſt*.—*Gentilis's* ſcheme before<sup>i</sup> mentioned makes the Holy Spirit diſtinct from the divine *effeſſe*; he has alſo been ſaid to deny, that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the *Son*<sup>k</sup>.

In the Book mentioned in the Introduction to the Articles<sup>l</sup>, called a *neceſſary Doctrine*, &c. the words made uſe of ſeem calculated to expreſs both the perſonality of the Holy Ghoſt and his being<sup>m</sup> an *energy*. He is holy and “holineſſe *itſelfe*;”—“*full* of all goodneſſe and benignitie, yea goodneſſe *itſelfe*;”—and ſo, “*charitie* *itſelfe*.”—In the *Reformation*

<sup>g</sup> See Nicholls on this Article.—Epiphanius, Cyril, and Baſil.

<sup>h</sup> Index, *Servetus*.

<sup>i</sup> Art. II. Sect. XIV.

<sup>k</sup> Long's Councils, p. 104. <sup>l</sup> Introd. to Book IV. Sect. IV.

<sup>m</sup> See on the *Credo*.

*matio* <sup>n</sup> *Legum*, those were to be subject to all the pains and penalties of Herefy, who denied the *Divinity* of the Holy Ghost.—Yet our present Article was not in those of 1552; perhaps the main substance of it was considered as already in the first Article; but, as that did not then prevent the second from being made separately, so neither need it have prevented the fifth: though there is certainly more fresh matter in the second, than in the fifth.

The *Socinians*, though they changed their language concerning the *Son* of God, seem always to have denied the *Personality* of the Spirit. Even in their *old* Catechism, we have “*Spiritus Sanctus est Virtus Dei.*” And the Racovian catechism says the same, and denies, that the Holy Spirit is “*in Deitate Personam.*”

Lastly, Mosheim<sup>p</sup> mentions *Paul Maty* as having published at the Hague, in 1729, an hypothesis, that the Holy Ghost has *two natures*, as before<sup>q</sup> mentioned; which hypothesis he is said to have adopted from Dr. Thomas Burnet.

I think, pretensions to being the Paraclete were not uncommon amongst the enthusiastic *Anabaptists* in the age of the *Reformation*, but I have no instances before me at present.

v. Having finished our History, we come to the *Explanation*: which will be confined to the meaning of the *term Holy Ghost*, or *Spirit of God*.—*The Holy Spirit* is the same as the *Spirit of God*.—“*The Holy One*” was one of the *names* of God. Luke i. 49, we have “*Holy is his Name.*”

When

<sup>n</sup> De Hæresibus, Cap. 6.    <sup>o</sup> Cap. 6, p. 167, Edit. 1657.

<sup>p</sup> Index, *Maty*. The account is rather Maclaine's, but from a work of Mosheim's.

<sup>q</sup> Sect. first of this Article.

When we compare this Article concerning the Holy Ghost with the *second* concerning the Son, this seems the *more difficult* as to the principal term made use of; but I much question whether it *ought* to seem so. *Ghost* is only (as appears from Skinner's Lexicon) an old word for *Spirit*; and of Spirit we talk continually; and, though there may be *something* in it, which is unintelligible, yet there is also something that is clear. Whenever we use any word familiarly, it is to express something, which very frequently comes in our way: and so long as we keep to that, which occasioned its being used, it is intelligible; though there is nothing so plain but we may perplex ourselves about it, if we endeavour to view it on that side, which is hid from us in ordinary life.

Now, as God calls the second Person of the Holy Trinity his *Son*, in order to give us some faint idea of his Nature, by comparing what we cannot comprehend with what is familiar to us;—it is highly probable, that, when he calls the third Person his *Spirit*, he means to answer the same purpose;—to give us some obscure conception of his nature, by *comparing* him to something, of which we speak *familiarly* every day.—It is our business then to take both the words *Son* and *Spirit* in that view of them, which is most familiar to us; otherwise we pervert their meaning. Son and Spirit may both be made unintelligible. Though we can talk to the plainest man about his *Son*, there are inexplicable mysteries in *Generation*; in like manner, though every man knows, that he has *Life* to be preserved, and a *Soul* to be saved, nothing is easier than to lose ourselves in metaphysical labyrinths about Spirit; the *popular* sense and views of Son and Spirit are the only right ones in reading the Holy Scriptures.

But



But though we say, that, in getting an idea of the Spirit of God, we ought not to think metaphysically, but think, or rather *feel*, popularly; yet we do not say, that the word Spirit has only one *single* sense, either in ordinary discourse, or in Scripture. The most familiar terms have often more meanings than one; especially if they denote things, which are not the objects of our senses.—The way to investigate those *different meanings* is, with common men, to trust to *common sense* and common feelings; but, with thinking and philosophical men, it is to trace out the natural *progression* of our thoughts and feelings; if we could find out that progression, different meanings would not perplex or embarrass the mind. One proof, that affixing different senses to one word is owing to such progression, is this: that in *different languages*, the same train of ideas is expressed by a single word in each; —רוח has the same meanings, or nearly all, with πνευμα, and with spiritus; which could not be, except the *mind* affixed the meanings by some *acts common* to all men. If a new idea occurs, which is *independent* of other ideas, we give it a *new name*; but, if an idea occurs by means of its connexion with another idea, we more easily make some use of a known word, than invent one quite new; except indeed our two ideas are to be contradistinguished; in that case, we are sure to use two different names, though we may not in other cases.—The *connexion of ideas* is a curious thing; it is only by experience and observation, that we can judge how one idea *introduces* another.—Mr. Hume seems to have given this matter due attention: he observes<sup>f</sup>, that one idea introduces another by *resemblance, contiguity, and causation*. Let us see how this

<sup>f</sup> Inquiry—Understanding, Sect 3.

this has place in the different significations of the word *Spirit*;—remarking first, that, as all our ideas are acquired originally by sensation, the *primitive* signification of every word must be something, which is the object of our *senses*.

VI. 1. Then it seems as if the primitive meaning of the word *Spiritus* were a current of air, or a *wind*. In this sense  $\pi\pi\pi$ ,  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ , *spiritus*, are used Job. i. 19. John iii. 8.

2. It may be owing to *resemblance*, that *spiritus* means *breath*; that important current of air, which proceeds from the lungs. *Spiritus* and *spiro* are related in Latin, like  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  and  $\pi\nu\epsilon\omega$  in Greek.—If any one chose to call this the *primitive*\* sense, I should not contend with him; both this and the last meaning belong to the *senses*; and the mind might be led by resemblance from either of them to the other:  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  signifying breath, 1 Kings xvii. 17.—Job xvii. 1. &c.

3. When words come to express things *not objects of sense*, they do it by some kind of *comparison*: and comparison implies *resemblance*. Here we should observe, that, when any words are *first* transferred ( $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\phi\epsilon\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ ) to stand for new ideas, by comparison, all men, that write or speak accurately, keep up in their minds a constant reference to the original proper idea. Such an one would not say, a man had *sagacity* to *see* a thing, but that he had sagacity to *smell* it out, or *find* it out:—thus the word *spirit* has always, at least after its first translation (as Cicero would call it), a tacit reference to moving as a *current*, or *proceeding* forth as *breath*†.

In

\* Junius calls this the primitive sense of *Gheest*. And *Breath* comes before “*air, wind*,” Ormerod, p. 53, on Priestley.

† The Schoolmen used to call proceeding, *Spiration*. (Burnet.) Acts ii. 2. “a rushing mighty *wind* accompanies it. When a Being

In this way, *proceeding* may have come to be used, probably, with regard to the *Holy Spirit*:—at least, how far *proceeding* implies this idea, should be attentively considered.

4. Breath is the *cause* of *Life*: the *causa sine qua non*. Hence it becomes natural to use breath for *Life*, and losing breath, or spirit, for losing *Life*: we call it *expiring*. And in Scripture ἐξέπνευσεν<sup>u</sup>, and ἀφῆκε τὸ<sup>x</sup> πνεῦμα are used in the same manner. To *expire*, is the same thing as to give up the *Ghost*. Breath is used for *Life*, in many passages of Scripture<sup>y</sup>.

5. But, when we die, we not only lose *life*, but *all* our *incorporeal* faculties; understanding, will, affections; these therefore, taken *collectively*, are sometimes denoted by the same name. This collection of the incorporeal qualities of each man is sometimes called *his soul*; as making a *part* of the man: and so spirit, in one sense, becomes synonymous with *Soul*<sup>z</sup>, or *Mind*:—though sometimes there may be occasion to separate *Soul* into ψυχή and νῆς, animal and intelligent.

6. The soul, or spirit, being supposed to have *quitted* the Body, is conceived as having a separate existence, or as being a distinct *Person* or *Agent*; though, for a while, it is conceived, as well as the  
Body,

Being has been called the *Son*, to call his derivation by the term *Generation*, is only going *on*, with the *same* idea; it cannot be called any thing *new*: so, when a Being has been called Spirit, his derivation will, *of course*, be called something different from generation, more nearly belonging to a current of *air*.

<sup>u</sup> Luke xxiii. 46.

<sup>x</sup> Matt. xxvii. 50. See also Acts vii. 59, and James ii. 26.

<sup>y</sup> The end of the *Psalms*. (πᾶσα πνοή) Eccles. iii. 19.—πνεῦμα opposed to θάνατος—&c. 1 Kings xvii. 17. might be here as well as before, under the second sense, (πνεῦμα.)

<sup>z</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 11. former part of the verse: Rom. viii. 16. Acts vii. 59. may belong to our fifth or sixth observation.

Body, to *belong* to the *Man*. Thus it is said, *his* body is buried <sup>a</sup> in peace, but *his* soul liveth for evermore. Heb. xii. 23. we read of “the spirits of just men made perfect;” but Luke xxiv. 37. and 39, Spirit is spoken of as more independent; “*a* Spirit,” that is a *Man’s* Spirit, “hath not flesh and bones.”—And in this sense we speak of the *Habitations*, or receptacles, of our Souls or Spirits.

7. From calling the incorporeal part of *Man* spirit, we are led, by *resemblance*, to give the name to *any* incorporeal agent whatsoever; to make a genus or *species* of *Spirits*. And thus we say “*God* is a <sup>b</sup> Spirit,” and, “he maketh his *Angels* Spirits<sup>c</sup>.” Nor is it necessary, that incorporeal beings should have any particular *moral* character, in order to be called by this name: there are not only good but *evil* *Spirits*.

8. It is not material, but we may as well add, that the *Spirit* is sometimes <sup>d</sup> opposed to the *Letter*. In this case, the *Letter* is compared to the *Body*, and the *Meaning* to the animal *Soul*, or ψυχή.—This sense may be conceived therefore to *branch* off from the fourth sense; and indeed it is only mentioned in order to shew, that, from *any* of our senses, others may divaricate, which it is not to our purpose to specify.

And now, from the instances given by the way, it must appear, that the language of the Scripture is *accommodated* to the natural feelings and operations of the *human* mind. But this will appear more fully, if we recollect, that the *sacred writers* do not only *comply* with our imperfect conceptions in speaking of things *human*, but in their descriptions of the actions and qualities of the Supreme Being.

<sup>a</sup> Imitated from Ecclesiasticus xlv. 14.

<sup>b</sup> John iv. 24.

<sup>c</sup> Pl. civ. 4. See also 1 Pet. iii. 19.

<sup>d</sup> 2 Cor. iii. 6.

Being.—1. The invisible *influence* exercised by God on the Heart of Man, is illustrated by being compared to the *Wind*: as in John iii. 8, where πνευμα is first translated “wind,” and then, “Spirit.”—2. (and 4.) *Breath* is not only very frequently put for *Life*, (which is sometimes called “the breath of life”) but God himself is said, in giving life, to breathe into <sup>e</sup> man’s nostrils the breath of life. And the Son of God performs <sup>f</sup> the *act* of breathing, emblematically, when he bids his Disciples to receive the holy πνευμα;—the *Christian* life.—3. The Spirit is said to proceed<sup>g</sup>: in what way, remains to be considered<sup>h</sup>.—5. The “*mind*<sup>i</sup> of the Lord” is several times mentioned in Scripture: the original being sometimes πνευμα, and sometimes νους: let any one compare Rom. xi. 34. with the 2d Chap. of 1 Cor. from the 10th verse, and he will acknowledge the propriety of our present method of investigating the Divine mind, by a comparison with the human.

6. The Spirit of God is sometimes spoken of as a distinct *Person*; but this, having been questioned, must be reserved for the *Proof*: though we may mention a *sense*, in which πνευμα is taken by a great number of Christians.—To those, who acknowledge the personality of the Holy Spirit, we may say *here*, that, when the Spirit of God is spoken of as a distinct Person, it is so as to be consistent with the *Unity* of God; in like manner as we speak of the Spirit of a *man*, so as to be consistent with the *Unity* of a *Man*.

7. God is a <sup>k</sup> Spirit.

It

<sup>e</sup> Gen. ii. 7. πνοην ζωης.

<sup>f</sup> John xx. 22.

<sup>g</sup> John xv. 26.

<sup>h</sup> See p. 434, Note.

<sup>i</sup> Lev. xxiv. 12.—Rom. xi. 34.—1 Cor. ii. 16.

<sup>k</sup> John iv. 24.

It may be a separate remark, that in *Scripture* the word *Spirit* often stands for the *efficacy*, effects, or, as it is usual to speak, the *Gifts* of the Spirit. This may easily happen by *causation*; but, whether we have a sense of *Spirit* in *common life* answering to this, will perhaps be doubted. In *other* things, the same word, which signifies the *cause*, is put also to denote the *effect*. ‘This is your *kindness*,’ means often ‘this is the *effect* of your kindness;’—the Greek word, which signifies the *pangs* of parturition, is used also for the *young* brought forth.—Whether *Spirit*, in the sense of vivacity or animation, will be reckoned to come under this remark, I do not determine. The gifts of the Spirit mentioned in *Scripture*, are either miraculous *powers*, or good *dispositions*. The gift of *Tongues* seems sometimes to take the name of the *Holy Spirit* or Ghost, by way of *eminence*, as it was conferred *first* in a most *striking* manner, and served afterwards almost to distinguish Christians from Heathens, as well as to propagate the Christian Religion. In this sense may be taken the expression, “whether there be any Holy Ghost;”—compare Acts xix. 2. with viii. 16.

On the whole, I hope it appears, that the Author of the Christian Revelation, by calling the third Person in the Holy Trinity his Spirit, or *the Holy Spirit*, did not intend to increase our perplexity, but *illustrate* to us what we cannot directly comprehend, by a *comparison* with that, which we constantly speak of as *familiar*.—And this is all that I can conceive necessary to be said, in *explanation* of our present Article.

VII. I therefore now proceed to the *Proof*.

All

<sup>1</sup> ὁδὸν, ἡὸς, ἀδύνας: see Parkhurst's Lexicon ἡὸβλ, sense ii; or ἀδύνας.

All the propositions of this Article may be reduced to four.

1. The Holy Ghost is set forth to us in Scripture as a *Person*, or Agent.

2. We are authorized to say, that he *proceedeth* from the *Father*..

3. Also, that he proceedeth from the *Son*.

4. It is the meaning of Scripture, that Christians should treat this Person as *Divine*.

VIII. 1. The Holy Ghost is set forth to us in Scripture as a *Person*.—It must be owned, that this proposition is not expressly mentioned in our present Article; but yet it is clearly implied in it, and expressed in the first Article.

The following passages represent the Holy Ghost as a *Person*. Matt. xii. 32.—xxviii. 19.—John xiv. 16, 26.—xvi. 8, 13.—Rom. viii. 26.—1 Cor. xii. 11.—Eph. iv. 30<sup>m</sup>.—1 John v. 7<sup>n</sup>.—Vener observes (p. 113), that the *Holy Spirit* is opposed to *evil Spirits*; who are *Persons*.

IX. 2. This Person is rightly said, in any Christian confession of Faith, to proceed from the *Father*. This appears by John xiv. 26.—xv. 26.—and 1 Pet. i. 12. where the word “*Heaven*” is equivalent to the *Lord* of Heaven.—It appears also by all those passages, in which the Holy Ghost is called the “*Spirit of God*,” or the “*Spirit of the Lord* :” as Matt. iii. 16.—Acts v. 9.—1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 14.—1 Cor. iii. 16.—1 Cor. vi. 19<sup>o</sup>.—For, if the Spirit of *God* did manifest his influence on *earth*, he must have proceeded from *God*. If you say, that is not from the *Father*; I answer, if it was from *God*, and not from the *Father*, it must be “*from the Father and the Son*,” as the Article says.

<sup>m</sup> See Dr. Priestley's Familiar Illustration, p. 36.

<sup>n</sup> See Art. 11. Sect. XVII.

<sup>o</sup> See Parkhurst, πνευμα.

says. The Holy Ghost, however, is called the Spirit of the *Father*, Matt. x. 20.—And the same in *effect*, Rom. viii. 11.

x. 3. The Holy Ghost ought to be confessed by Christians to have proceeded from the *Son*.—John xv. 26. is of itself a sufficient call upon Christians to acknowledge this. But we may add the authority of John xvi. 7.—xx. 23.—and Acts ii. 33.—As also of those passages, in which the Holy Spirit is called the *Spirit of Christ*, as Rom. viii. 9.—Gal. iv. 6.—Phil. i. 19.—1 Pet. i. 11; arguing as about the Spirit of the *Father*.—These texts seem quite sufficient to justify the Western Church, in point of *Doctrine*, for inserting *Filioque* in the Creed: though, with Bishop *Burnet*, we would judge the Eastern Church with candour.—Two of the texts proving the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, prove also the procession from the Father; namely John xv. 26. and Rom. viii. 9.—Does not this look as if the Holy Spirit might be said to proceed from *either*, or *both*, as was most suitable to circumstances?—and is not that a farther proof of the propriety of our speaking as we do of the Holy *Trinity*?

xi. 4. It is the meaning of Scripture, that Christians should consider the Holy Ghost and treat him as *Divine*. One single passage of St. Paul seems sufficient to prove this: namely 1 Cor. ii. 11. since, according to all *our notions*, which he well knew who was both the Author of our Nature and of Revelation, as the Soul or Spirit of *Man* is human, the Spirit of *God* must be *divine*.—But we might use the plan, which we used in the *second<sup>d</sup> Article*; and prove the Divinity of the *third Person* of the Holy Trinity, as we proved that of the *second*. 1. The Holy Ghost is called *eternal*,  
Heb.



Heb. ix. 14.—2. For *creative* power, see Gen. i. 2.—3. We have instances of his *Power*, equivalent to a power of *preserving*; 1 Pet. iii. 18. he is said to have raised Christ from the *dead*.—4. His *omnipresence* is frequently mentioned. John xvi. 13. He is to *guide* us into all *truth*. He is to be a *Comforter*, not to *one* Christian, but *all*.—5. His *Omniscience* sufficiently appears from his omnipresence; and from his being Guide and Comforter to all *Christians*, which *may* be to all *men*. And 1 Cor. vi. 19. we are told, that our Bodies are inhabited by him as a *Temple* by its Deity. Besides, He who is called the Mind or Spirit of God, an omniscient Being, must be omniscient. 1 Cor. ii. 11.—6. Lastly, He is a proper object of *worship*; so must every one be, who has properly a *Temple*. Matt. xxviii 19. implies this; Rom. ix. 1. is a kind of *Oath*.—2 Cor. xiii 14. a *benediction*.

Besides what proof arises under this plan, we may urge, that *Blasphemy* against the Holy Ghost implies that he is divine.—Especially as it is an *unpardonable* sin, either absolutely, or comparatively.

In Acts v. the 3d verse compared with the 4th, seems a full proof, that we ought to consider the Holy Ghost as God.—As also 1 Cor. iii. 16. “the temple of *God*” compared with 1 Cor. vi. 19. “the temple of the *Holy Ghost*.”

Supposing it made out in general, that the *Holy Ghost* is *God*, there needs not any particular proof, that he “is of one substance, majesty, and glory with the Father and the Son.” They have been proved divine, and the *Unity* of God is confessed. What was<sup>2</sup> before said of *infinite intimacy*, may be applied here, with great propriety, to him who knows the mind of God; and perhaps received  
with

<sup>2</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xv 11. and Art. 11. Sect. xxi.

with the less *difficulty*, on account of the freedom of the Holy Ghost from the imperfections of *matter*.

XII. Here then I close the *direct proof* of the truth of our Article.—We must next proceed to the *indirect proof*, or to answering *objections*:—not that we need examine *every* objection; we may content ourselves, as under the *second Article*, with *arming* ourselves in such a manner, that we may be able to resist any particular attack as occasion may require.

XIII. 1. We will take notice of what our adversaries say, with regard to rhetorical personification, or *Προσωποπαία*. The Holy Ghost, say they, is no more a *Person*, than *Charity*, or *Sin*; or than the *Wind*, which “bloweth where it listeth.” “*Charity*’ suffereth long, and is kind,” &c; that is, the charitable *man*:—his actions are, by *Προσωποπαία*, ascribed to the *virtue*.—*Sin* deceived St. Paul (or some one in whose person he speaks) and *stew*’ him: that is, sinful *principles*, ascribed rhetorically to *Sin* as a *Person*. In like manner, they urge, that what is said to be done by the *Spirit*, is really done by an *inspired*’ *man*:—or else by *God himself*\*, whose *energy*, or *virtus*, is personified.—We own, that the *Spirit* does not *always* mean a *Person*, in speaking of Deity, any more than *πνευμα*, in what is said of man. We might own farther, that those, who profess the personality of the *Spirit*, may sometimes take passages as implying that personality, which really do not;—but that, which chiefly keeps us to our old opinion, still remains;—it is, that there are some passages of Scripture, which, supposing them figurative, would neither have rhetorical *beauty*, nor in truth, com-  
mon

’ John iii. 8.            ’ 1 Cor. xiii. 4.            † Rom. vii. 11.

’ Acts x. 19.—xiii. 2.            \* 1 Pet. iii. 18.

mon sense. In Rom. viii. 26, 27<sup>y</sup>, the Father must make intercession to himself; or the *Saints* for themselves:—In John xv. 26. Christ must send the Father *from* the Father; and according to John xvi. 13. he must speak not of himself, but only what was dictated to him.—Bishop Pearson dwells on John xvi. 14. “*He shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you.*” *God*, in the Socinian sense of the word, could not *receive* of Christ’s; nor could an *inspired man* shew it unto *himself*.

How then, you will say, *shall we know*, when a *real* person is spoken of, and when one merely rhetorical?—from particular *circumstances*; as in the instances now produced. We could sometimes judge from the *general style* of the composition or passage, of which any doubtful expression made a part; the whole air or manner of an *eloquent* passage is very different from that of an *argumentative* or historical one.—But, if there were *no criterion*, which would take away all doubt in all cases, no argument would arise against what we have said; we every day allow, that some things are *beautiful* and proper, other things deformed and improper; yet no criterion seems yet discovered, by which, in all cases, we can distinguish beauty or propriety beyond a doubt. Nay, all men are not yet come into one criterion of *Virtue*; may we not venture to say, nevertheless, that some things are *right*, and others wrong?

XIV. 2. Again, it may be urged, how can the Holy Spirit *proceed* from the *Son*, if, in many places, the Spirit is described as *superior* to the Son?—Places of this <sup>2</sup> sort are Matt. i. 20.—iv. 1.—xii. 28. 32.—  
John

<sup>y</sup> There is something about this passage in Short Defence of the Atonement; p. 85.

<sup>2</sup> Nestorius cited some of these passages against the *Arians*: also 1 Tim. iii. 16. “justified in the Spirit.”—See Cyril’s 4th book against Nestorius, Vol. 6. p. 103.

John i. 33.—Acts i. 2.—But, in such an economy as that described in the doctrine of the Trinity, it may happen, that any one person, who has an *office*, may be spoken of sometimes as superior, sometimes as inferior to another: in general, he who *gives* a commission, is superior to him who receives it: and therefore, if either the *Son* or the *Holy Ghost* take upon him some *commission* from the Deity, he, in executing that commission, may be considered as inferior to that Being, who appoints to it;—or, a Person of the Holy Trinity in office, though he be divine, is, *as* in that office, below Divinity. I would not fix upon this solution positively, but I think I dare recommend to the Student to make *trial* of it.—And I should hope some advantage, as to the clearing up of difficulties, might result from the experiment.

xv. With regard to other objections, I will only refer to the general *precautions* mentioned under the second<sup>b</sup> Article: I was so full upon them, that any one would easily apply them to the present subject; that is, transfer them from the second Person of the Holy Trinity, to the third:—a few *hints* will now be sufficient. 1. Fallacies are apt to arise from not attending to the *state*, in which the *Holy Ghost* is supposed to be, when any thing is said of him. 2. Or, *particularly*, from not observing, whether he is spoken of in his *divine*, or his *official* capacity. 3. If in the latter, it is to be kept in mind, that the *Father and the Son* may *then* be said to constitute the *Deity*, while that case continues; and therefore that it may be a matter of indifference, whether the Holy Ghost be said to *proceed* from the Father, or the Son, or both. 4. Partial or *incomplete quotations* may mislead on any subject whatsoever. 5. As the word *Spirit* has so  
*many*

<sup>a</sup> See Art. II. Sect. XXXIII.

<sup>b</sup> Art. II. Sect. XXX.

*many senses*, that kind of fallacy, which arises from implying, that, because such a word has such a particular sense in one place, it cannot have a different sense in another place, is one which may occur still more *frequently* under this Article than under the second. 6. The caution about attending to the *views* of those, who are cited as witnesses, or authorities, seems just of the same force here as before. 7. *Substitution* of the interpretation for the words interpreted, may be here also equally useful. Indeed, one substitution before<sup>c</sup> mentioned, did extend to our present subject.—Any one might substitute, either in Matt. xxviii. 19. or 1 John v. 7. for the Holy Ghost, either the *Virtus*<sup>d</sup> Dei of the Socinian Catechisms, or *emanation*, or *activity*, or any other word which was exclusive of *personality*.

xvi. The *proof*, direct and indirect, being now concluded, we come to the *Application*; consisting of the same *parts* as before.

First then we ask, in what sense a thinking man would, at this time, *assent* to this Article.—Conceive such an one, in his retirement, informed as we now are, seriously examining, whether he could sincerely subscribe to it or not.—‘Let me consider,’ he might say, ‘to what I am about to give a solemn assent: of the *Holy Ghost* I certainly have not a clear and *distinct idea*; but is it *possible*, that I should have?—No; the nature of God *must* be above the comprehension of man. Yet, when I am told, that the Being, in whom I am to believe, is to be considered by me as the *Mind* or Spirit of God, I understand this as an *Illustration* of something in the *Divine Nature*, by a comparison with something *human*. An human mind I do not understand

<sup>c</sup> That in the form of *Baptism*, Matt. xxviii. 19. Art. II. Sect. xxxvii.

<sup>d</sup> This Article, Sect. iv.

derstand perfectly, nor indeed an human body, nor any thing else; but *practically*, I can speak of it with ease and consistency: the notion, in which I so speak of it, is the one which I ought to have in view, when I compare it with the Divine Mind; else it is I, who make my own difficulties:—not that the most popular and practical way of viewing my own mind can make that, which is illustrated, even so clear as that, *by* which the illustration is made.

‘ When I speak of Spirit with regard to things *human*, the word has *various senses*. So may it, when applied to things *divine*;—sometimes it may denote things, which are *effects* of the divine mind: be it so;—yet, when I consider *all* the passages of Scripture, in which Spirit occurs, I find some, which seem void of rational meaning, if I do not conceive the Holy Spirit to be a *Person*. I cannot, without the greatest violence of interpretation, reject the personality of the Holy Ghost, and therefore I do acknowledge it;—my ideas here are certainly *inadequate*; but so are they with respect to the *Son of God*; especially when I conceive him independently of his *human nature*.

‘ This incorporeal person is said to *proceed* from the *Deity*; or from *two Persons*, which (according to the Doctrine of the Trinity) may be conceived to *constitute the Deity*, when the third Person is commissioned to execute any *office*; or from *either* of them; here again my ideas are *inadequate*; but yet, in *some sense*, that the Holy Spirit proceeded, or was sent, or commissioned, is declared: and, if it had not been expressly declared, it would have been *implied*: as that divine person, who was called the *Son of God*, must, of course, without any *new* idea, be said to be *generated*; so He, who is called the *Spirit*, must, of course, be said to have *some other*

other derivation: to *proceed*, is as well as any thing else. *How* then might this be? I know not.— Might it be as *breath* proceeds? or “like a rushing mighty *wind*?” Might it be as an *Ambassador* is commissioned? I know not; and it probably imports me not to know.’

‘Of this Person things are affirmed in Scripture, which are peculiar to the *Divinity* himself.—Indeed, the *mind* of *God* must be divine. I therefore, with sacred awe, acknowledge the *Divinity* of the Holy Ghost; in such a way, that it may be *consistent* with the *Divinity* of the *Father* and the *Son*, and with the *Unity* of *God*.—Some more expressions, I see, are contained in the Article; but I see not, that they increase my difficulties; I have no idea of any difference of “*substance*,” or any inequality of “*Majesty and Glory*,” amongst those Persons, whom I acknowledge to be *divine*; when I at the same time profess, that there is but *one* *God*.—I mean well, and therefore, if I err, I shall hope to be forgiven.’

XVII. (2d and 3d of the four parts, of which the *Application* consists.) The next thing to be considered is the nature of any *mutual concessions*, which might be adopted in order to bring about, amongst those who differ in private opinion, a sufficient agreement in doctrine, for the purpose of social worship. But I have enlarged on this head under the first and second Articles, and there is such an affinity between the doctrines of those Articles and the present, that to enlarge again would be useless repetition.

Our doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost seems rather to afford *additional* motives to good *conduct*, than motives to action, which are *opposed* to any practical principles of our Adversaries. And this seems to afford a reason why, if we were mutually candid

candid and accommodating, we might coincide in *worship* tolerably well.—At least, *additional* motives to virtue in one party, cannot hinder a coincidence so much, as motives or rules of action in that party, which were contradictory to some held sacred by the opposite party.

XVIII. In the last place, we come to the subject of *Improvements*.

XIX. The passages of Scripture, from which the Doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost is derived, may possibly admit of a more exact and *minute attention* than has hitherto been paid them, with regard to the circumstances in which they occur. It is from *circumstances*, that a judgment must be formed as to personality, and as to any difference, which may arise from his being spoken of as engaged *officially*.

XX. More may be done in ascertaining, whether expressions relating to the Holy Ghost, are to be considered as *indefinite*, and in what *degree*. It is not impossible, that *expressions* may be (I do not say they *are*) more definite about the Holy Ghost, than about the *Son*; though the *illustration* from Sonship is more definite than that from *Mind*. We find the expression *seven<sup>e</sup> spirits* in five or six places of Scripture; if that expression be *indefinite*, (as *forgiving* seven times, and seventy times seven, seems to be), it may be admitted into expressions about *the Spirit* of God.

XXI. Perhaps a *criterion* to distinguish *rhetorical* from real *Persons* might be found out. Or, at least, we might *approach* towards one, so as to be nearer to one than we are at present.

XXII. It would be an improvement, if *Forms* could be invented, in which Socinians could join: in which, while we addressed ourselves to the Holy Ghost, they should use the same words and address themselves

• Pee Park. Hebr. Lexicon, under כַּרְב.



themselves<sup>f</sup> to *God*, independently of the Holy Trinity. While we took some expressions as *plain*, implying a *real* person, they should take them as rhetorical, or as instances of the *prosopopœia*, or metonymy.—Under the first Article, I gave a short prayer<sup>g</sup> addressed to the *Son*, in *scriptural* terms; and in a manner *promised*<sup>h</sup> a similar one addressed to the Holy Ghost. The difficulty, as before<sup>i</sup> mentioned, is, that those, who did not own the Holy Ghost for a *Person*, would think they had no object to address.—And perhaps there may be few, if any, who own him for a *Person*, and deny his being *divine*<sup>k</sup>. Nevertheless, I will perform my promise, and exhibit a short specimen, in order that it may be improved upon:—it may be useful as briefly expressing the attributes, &c. of the Holy Ghost.

‘ O thou Spirit of God! *foretold* by the Prophet! Thou, by whom our blessed Saviour was *conceived*, thou, who presidedst at his *Baptism*; by whom he was even *raised* from the<sup>m</sup> dead; by whom he wrought his *miracles*<sup>n</sup>; in whose name we are *admitted* into the community of Christians;—do thou be ever our *Comforter* and *guide*!—do thou, who art the Spirit of *Truth*, guide us into all truth: teach us to acknowledge Jesus for our<sup>o</sup> *Lord*!—O may we be *renewed* and *born again* of thee! may thou enable us to *mortify* the deeds of the *Body*! of those *Bodies*, which are ennobled by being thy *Temples*! may we be so *led*<sup>p</sup> by thee, that we may be truly the *Sons of God*!—then shall we be also  
*heirs*;

<sup>f</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xiv.      <sup>g</sup> Ibidem.      <sup>h</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xv.

<sup>i</sup> Art. 1. Sect. xiv.

<sup>k</sup> The Macedonians did this, if any. See this Art. Sect. 11. end.

<sup>l</sup> Ezek. xxxvi. 27.      <sup>m</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 18.      <sup>n</sup> Matt. xii. 28.

<sup>o</sup> 1 Cor. xii. 3.      <sup>p</sup> Rom. viii. 14.

*heirs*; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ! and we shall finally receive “an *inheritance* <sup>9</sup> incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved” for us in Heaven.

XXIII. As our *affections* seem to depend on *associations* <sup>r</sup> and sympathies, it might be inquired, whether increasing the number of our *Relations* to the Deity, would not heighten our *devout affections*?

XXIV. Lastly, it might be considered, whether our *difficulties* respecting the Holy Trinity, in all its parts, do not depend greatly on our not confining ourselves to those *views*, and those modes of *thinking*, which are most properly *human*?

<sup>9</sup> 1 Pet. i. 4.

<sup>r</sup> Book III. Chap. III. Sect. x.



## ARTICLE VI.

## OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES FOR SALVATION.

**H**OLY Scripture containeth all things necessary to falvation: fo that whatfoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it fhould be believed as an Article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or neceffary to falvation. In the name of the holy Scripture we do underftand thofe canonical Books of the Old and New Testament, of whofe authority was never any doubt in the Church.

## Of the Names and Number of the Canonical Books.

Genesis,  
Exodus,  
Leviticus,  
Numeri,  
Deuteronomium,  
Iofhua,  
Judges,  
Ruth,  
The 1 Book of Samuel,  
The 2 Book of Samuel,  
The 1 Book of Kings,  
The 2 Book of Kings,

The 1 Book of Chronicles,  
The 2 Book of Chronicles,  
The 1 Book of Efdras,  
The 2 Book of Efdras,  
The Book of Hefter,  
The Book of Job,  
The Pfalms,  
The Proverbs,  
Ecclefiastes, or Preacher,  
Cantica, or Songs of Solomon,  
4 Prophets the Greater,  
12 Prophets the Lefs.

And the other Books (as Hierome faith) the Church doth read for example of Life, and instruction of Manners; but yet doth it not apply them to eftablifh any doctrine; fuch are thefe following;

The 3 Book of Esdras,	Baruch the Prophet,
The 4 Book of Esdras,	The Song of the three Children;
The Book of Tobias,	The Story of Susanna,
The Book of Judith,	Of Bel and the Dragon,
The rest of the Book of Hester,	The Prayer of Manasses,
The Book of Wisdom,	The 1 Book of Maccabees,
Jesus the Son of Sirach,	The 2 Book of Maccabees.

All the Books of the New Testament, as they are commonly received, we do receive, and account them Canonical.



Preface. Our Church, having laid down some fundamental doctrines, comes to settle the principles, on which any disputes are to be carried on. This might have been done first; but the Articles being formed with a view to a separation from the Church of *Rome*, it might seem most proper to lay down, in the first place, such things concerning the nature of the *Deity*, as had not occasioned any controversy with the Romish Church.

It is always useful to put ourselves in the place of those, who wrote what we are to subscribe, by means of *Historical* reflexions;—but the present Article *differs* from the preceding in respect to History. Generally, we have only to take one station, as it were, and look back into past times; but here we must take *several stations*; a circumstance, which will be the occasion of our using a different *method*, in treating of the present Article, from that to which we have adhered in the five preceding Articles.

I. A person well informed in History, if he was to read our Article, would *first* cast his eyes on those, whom the reformers had most *immediately in view*; and run over the different notions of men, who lived at the time of the *Reformation*. Then, when he saw a set of Books mentioned as sacred, the last of which had been published above 2000 years, he would find himself, in the *second* place, carried back to those remote times; nay, to all the ages, of which those Books gave an account.—When he perceived, in the *third* place, a question, whether a certain number of Books should be ranked in this *old* class, or not; he would contemplate those events, persons, circumstances, by which such question should be decided:—And *lastly*, when he read of another set of Books, which had been gradually received as of Divine Authority in the earlier times of *Christianity*, he would examine the state of things in those times; as relating to Christians, Jews, and Pagans.

These four different views, or *stations*, will divide our considerations on the present Article into *four parts*: in each of which, *historical* reflexions will naturally occur before others.

II. I. Let us first then consider those, whom the authors of our Article had most *immediately* in view. And here, I think, we need do little more than look into the earlier sessions of the *Council of Trent*, especially the fourth<sup>a</sup>. This Council met Dec. 13, 1545, for the purposes of reformation, &c. and “ad extirpationem *heresum*,” but ad-  
 journed

<sup>a</sup> It might be proper to oppose to the Romish Council, our *Reformatio Legum. De summâ Trinitate; and De Hæresibus, Cap. 3.*

journed till after the holidays:—at their second session, Jan. 7, 1546 (N. S.) they settled the manner of conducting the Council;—at the *third*, Feb. 4, they fixed upon a *Creed*; and at the fourth, (April 8), they settled their *Canon of Scripture*.—But, besides *Scripture*, they mention, as the ground of their faith, *Traditions*; and pronounce an *Anathema* on those, who do not receive both *their Scriptures*<sup>b</sup>, according to the ancient Latin *Vulgate*, and their *Traditions*. They mention also<sup>c</sup> the *Fathers*, the *Councils*, and the *Church*: sometimes these seem to be *separate* from the traditions, and sometimes they look as if the traditions were made up of them, or things contained in their records.—Our Reformers would have all these in view; the Canon of Scripture will come under our second part; at present, we may confine ourselves to *tradition*: for we have treated<sup>d</sup> of the *Fathers* in the first Book; and the subjects of the *Church* and *Councils* will occur in the 20th and 21st Articles.

It is natural to ask, whether there are any *collections* of traditions, as there are with us of maxims of unwritten law? The Council of Trent mentions none, nor Calmet, under Traditions: several doctrines founded on tradition are to be found in the *Rhemish Testament*<sup>e</sup>, and Bishop Burnet speaks<sup>f</sup> of several of those doctrines, which our Articles oppose seemingly, as having this origin. Bishop Porteus, from Archbishop Secker, mentions<sup>g</sup>

“ the

<sup>b</sup> Our Art. of 1552 seems to take for granted, that the Romish Church and ours hold the *same* Scriptures, by saying only *Scriptura sacra*, and not giving a *list*.

<sup>c</sup> See fifth Session, and safe conduct in the 15th.

<sup>d</sup> B. I. Chap. xii. Sect. xi. — xvi.

<sup>e</sup> The *Index* to Fulke's *Rhem. Test.* shews one what things are founded on tradition.

<sup>f</sup> Burnet on Art. 6, p. 97, Octavo.      <sup>g</sup> Chap. 4. p. 7.

“the Popish *Creed*,” as composed of a great number of doctrines (amongst others) *founded* on tradition; but I suppose this is not meant of any written Creed, properly so called<sup>h</sup>.

Perhaps traditions are only proved *occasionally*, from Fathers, &c.

One might mention here the *Legends* of the Romish Church.—*Legends* were originally only things *legenda*, to be read, at religious meetings; chiefly narratives, either from Scripture, or from accounts of devout men, or Martyrs. Ere long, the histories of Saints seem to have superseded the Scripture, probably by being made more striking or extravagant, better suited to a weak judgment, or a vitiated taste. What is called the *Golden Legend* was a collection of these Histories of Saints made by an Archbishop of Genoa, near the end of the 13th Century. Some legends used to be printed in the *Breviaries*, or abridgments of Liturgies; but, at the revival of learning, people began to be ashamed of them; and even Prelates began to be ambitious of shewing themselves enlightened, by lopping off a Legend.

But, when the Reformers opposed the authority of Traditions, is it to be conceived, that they despised *all* traditional knowledge? not so; but the number and the folly of things built upon tradition had got to be so great, and they had become of such high authority, that it was necessary to rescue the judgment from the slavery, under which it laboured, to papal decrees, canons of councils, and passages of Fathers, genuine and spurious. Else, while every thing else became improved and enlightened, Religion would have continued in darkness: however, it is to be remembered, that these,

<sup>h</sup> In Books of *Travels*, one finds many traditions mentioned.—See also Broughton's Dictionary, *Legends*.

those, who did thus labour to free the judgment from the decisions of barbarous ages, and give scriptural authority its due pre-eminence, were *not* of the *common people*; they were no *mob*; they were so qualified to judge, that no man had a right to impose any *human* judgment upon them, so as to check the course of their own. And, though decrees, &c. profess to be founded on Apostolical authority, yet we consider them as merely *human*. Bishop Pearson insists on the perpetual *Virginity* of the Mother of our Lord, as proved by tradition; but then this is not made, by our Church, an Article of Faith “necessary to salvation.”

Such was the situation of those, whom the authors of our Article had most *immediately* in view. As to *explanation*, this part does not seem to admit of any, except what arises from the historical account. Under the 34th Article, indeed, we shall see a different *kind* of tradition mentioned; such as our Church approves, in its way: relating to *customs* in matters of inferior moment.—And it might here be observed, with regard to the *doctrinal* tradition now before us, what is the real *state of the question* between us and the Romanists;—we are not contending, that *all* regard to Councils, Fathers, ecclesiastical decrees, traditional notions (really such) should be set aside; in our Article, it is *implied*, that *both sides respect* all these highly: the question is only, whether they should be *obeyed* implicitly as *divine*, or only *reverenced* as human; reverenced, when it appears to our reason, that they are *worthy* to be reverenced. If the Romanists are right, these things are to judge *us*; if *we* are right, we are to judge *them*<sup>1</sup>.

Some

<sup>1</sup> In this place, we might refer to B. III. Chap. IX. Sect. X. and we might compare the Articles of 1552 and of 1562.



Some Christians have undervalued the study of Scripture, who have been no particular friends to tradition; these are some species of *Mystics*; but, as we have treated largely of mysticism in the last Chapter of the third Book, and as Mystics will be mentioned under the seventh Article, we need not consider them here;—we may however refer to *Reformatio Legum, de Hæresibus, Cap. 3.*

III. We might now proceed to prove the truth of the first part of our Article; but, as the proof must be taken from what is said in Scripture with regard to the *Traditions of the Jews*, it will be requisite to give some idea of them; and, when we have once begun, it will be natural to go on, so as to take in the Jewish traditions *after* our Saviour's time, as well as before it; indeed they are, in themselves, much the same.

Long before our Saviour's time, it seems probable, that the Jews had some sort of traditions;—traditional narratives, prophecies, or modes of interpreting prophecies; modes of arranging, construing, applying the Psalms, and other parts of Holy Writ; methods of allegorizing;—all these our Saviour and his Apostles seem to have so far *adopted*, as to make *use* of them in reasoning with the Jews. It seems generally allowed, that we see, in the New Testament, instances of referring back, and quoting, which imply some old writing allowed as authentic by the Jews, when we do not find in the *Old Testament* the passage <sup>k</sup> quoted or referred to. For a more particular account of this, I refer to *Allix's Judgment of the Jews, Chap. 2, 3, 4*; from which I will read a passage <sup>1</sup> or two by way of illustration—Besides these traditions, the Jews seem

<sup>k</sup> See B. I. Chap. xvii. Sect. xix.

<sup>1</sup> These passages of Allix, Chap. 2, 3, 4, will easily appear from running over the heads, or paragraphs.

seem to have had some, which they made a *bad use* of, and which seem indeed to have been, for the most part, faulty in themselves, or of a bad tendency. Allix reckons *five* sorts of traditional subjects, which the Jews profess to study: 1. Inferences from the Law, though of these he approves, supposing them to be rightly drawn. 2. Ceremonics and rites. 3. Judicial cases, like law precedents. 4. Constitutions, intended as a fence or fortification to the law. 5. Customs<sup>m</sup>. All these *might* contain something reasonable, supposing no want of reason in using them;—but, in the hands of a people, who prided themselves on productions of religious fancy, it is easy to imagine, that these latter sorts of traditions, especially the two last, would get *too far* from the Law of God, and become fanciful and trifling, or pernicious. Nay, probably they would many of them be mere *evasions*<sup>n</sup> of the law: however, as what is most *outré* generally strikes and takes most, one may conceive how it came about, that these traditions were even *preferred*<sup>o</sup> to the law. Though, besides evading the law, and indulging foolish fancies, there was the spirit of contradiction to help them forwards; I mean in the controversy with the *Caraites*, who denied the authority of tradition wholly.—Here we see what it principally was, that our *Saviour* so much *condemns*.—Those, who are opposed to the Caraites, are called *Rabbanists*<sup>p</sup>; but the “Pharisaical innovations” were rejected by the *Shammeans*<sup>q</sup>.

Though

<sup>m</sup> Allix, p. 12. See Wotton, Misna, Chap. 2. Wotton has *five* orders, as well as Allix, and there is a considerable likeness between them; but some difference.

<sup>n</sup> Wotton, p. 68, 69.

<sup>o</sup> See Wotton, p. 69. Collier's sacred Interpreter, Vol. 2.

p. 21.

<sup>p</sup> Wotton, Chap. 6. or p. 72.

<sup>q</sup> Wotton, Preface, p. xlvi. Note.

Though we may make a distinction between the times before and after the time of Christ, yet the same traditions seem to have been continued: except that they *multiplied*, and at last got *recorded*.—About the middle of the <sup>r</sup> second Century, (or, according to Lardner, in the year 180) R. Judah, surnamed the Holy, gathered the Jewish traditions into one volume, consisting of six books, containing 63 treatises. This is called the *Misna*<sup>s</sup>, or *secondary Law*. As soon as it was published, it was studied and commented upon: the comment is called *Gemara*, or the *completing* of the *Misna*. Indeed the Jews of *Judea* made one *Gemara*, by about A. D. 300, called the *Jerusalem*, those of *Babylonia* another, by about A. D. 500, called the *Babylonish*.—The word *Talmud* is not used steadily and uniformly; it sometimes signifies the *Misna*, or text; sometimes the *Gemara*, or completion, or comment; and sometimes the *whole*, consisting of *Misna* and *Gemara*. However, when we read of the *Jerusalem Talmud*, we must understand only the *Gemara* made by the Jews of *Judea*: and so of the *Babylonish Talmud*: the former is in *one* Volume folio, the latter in twelve Volumes folio.—The *Babylonish* is the most fanciful and extravagant, and the most followed.—I will now only add how this tradition is supposed by the Rabbanists to have been carried on. “Many things were delivered orally to Moses from *Mount Sinai*, which were not written in the Law. These he delivered to *Joshua*, and he to the Elders, and they to those that came after them, one generation after another; and these were

<sup>r</sup> Prideaux. See Lardner's Test.—Works, Vol. 7, p. 138.

<sup>s</sup> By the Jews, the plural word *Misnaicth* is more commonly used; see Wotton, Note to the beginning of 2d Chapter.—  
 שנה to reiterate, do a thing a second time. נגמר perfect, &c. למד didicit, docuit.

were thus orally delivered, till this [oral] Law was [in danger of being] forgotten, and then the men of the age thought it proper to *write* them with ink in a book, as every man had received them from those that were 'before him.'

iv. We may now proceed to the *Proof* of the first part of our Article; namely, of this Proposition; 'no doctrine is *necessary*, which is not supported by the *written* word of God.'

i. We have sufficient reason to think, that whatever was necessary to be known or done, would be written in the Christian Law, from what was done with regard to the *Jewish*. In the earliest times indeed, the will of God *must* (humanly speaking) be taught *without* writing; and simple manners, with great length of life, might, for a while, keep such teaching tolerably incorrupt; but it seems as if writing had been used as soon as *possible*. What could be more likely to be remembered than the Law delivered at Mount Sinai? yet it was written, or engraved. What could make a deeper impression than the deliverance from *Ægyptian* bondage? yet it was *written*, even though ceremonies were appointed to renew annually the sense of it.—While the *Urim and Thummim* might be consulted, why write so much, if oral Law could be so perfectly preserved?—If you say, the danger of *Idolatry* made writing the more needful, you only give another general reason against trusting to tradition: yet nothing could make writing so necessary, in the Jewish religion, as it is in the *Christian*. The Jews were a small body, kept united by a number of ceremonial observances, separated more from other nations, than any other people ever were. Christianity was to be preached to all nations,

<sup>t</sup> Wotton's *Misna*, p. 72. See Maimonides's account, p. 10, which is longer and more Rabbinical.

nations, was to mix with all kinds of customs and manners, with all sorts of philosophy, all sorts of business and pleasure; it was to be supported by a very small number of *external duties*; only two indeed that were positively enjoined. What tradition could withstand so many shocks?

2. We may collect, that oral Law would not contain any thing *necessary* to Salvation, from our *Saviour's* practice and discourses. Though he does sometimes, seemingly, adopt some traditional rules, in arguing with the Jews, it does not appear, that he would have used the same in converting the *Gentiles*, though he *would* have mentioned the prophecies of the Old Testament. His preaching tended much more to invalidate tradition, than to confirm it. What was his Sermon on the *Mount*<sup>u</sup>, or the chief part of it, but rectifying errors of tradition? If he had intended, that his Religion should be grounded on tradition in any considerable degree, would he have spoken of tradition in the manner he has<sup>x</sup> spoken? of *any* tradition whatsoever?—But, say the Romanists, the tradition spoken against in Matt. xv. is either “repugnant to God's<sup>y</sup> Laws,”—or “frivolous, unprofitable,” &c. not like theirs!—then we are to judge of the *rectitude* and *utility* of tradition? we wish nothing more. May we not judge of *evidence* too?—a *real* tradition, that is virtuous<sup>z</sup> and useful, no reasonable man can object to: but, if we are to *judge* tradi-  
tion,

<sup>u</sup> Collier, Vol. 2. p. 21.

<sup>x</sup> Matt. xv. 1—9.

<sup>y</sup> Rhemish Test. on Matt. xv. 9.

<sup>z</sup> Our Art. of 1552 seems to allow something to tradition, which that of 1562 does not; perhaps the *order* and *decorum* might be thought to belong more properly to the 34th Article than to this?—no; rather see afterwards Art. xx. Sect. 1. where this being left out is thought one possible reason why the first clause in the 20th should have been inserted.

tion, its authority is gone : that is, if we are only to adopt it, when we think it useful.

3. The *Apostles* do not give encouragement to tradition. They taught indeed first by preaching; but they took opportunities of writing to their converts, and more fully, as it should seem, than they would have done, if they had meant to leave an oral Law. Four Disciples, that we know of, undertook to write the acts and discourses of their Lord; and one of them records the acts of the Apostles also: might not many things, which are written, have been as well trusted to tradition, as those things, which have been *said* to be trusted to it?—Had we sufficient evidence, that the Apostles really did *preach* a particular doctrine, we should accept it as well as those persons, who were told it half an hour after it was preached: but we hope we shall not be blamed for searching whether things reported are really true; we hope we shall be reckoned, like the Bereans, “ more noble” (*εὐγενεσ-εργοί*) for our disposition to examine.—The Apostles, like their master, seem inclined to reason with the Jews on their own principles, and received Histories; but I do not remember their saying, or implying, that the Jews would lose the favour of God, or be accursed, if they neglected some particular traditional observance.—When they seem to adopt traditions, they do it in things *not*<sup>a</sup> *essential*; and even then some have thought they referred to some part of the *Old Testament*<sup>b</sup>; if they did *not*, they might only argue with the Jew from what he would allow.—Augustin might often admit traditions, though he did not think himself  
*bound*

<sup>a</sup> See Hammond's Note on 2 Tim. iii. 8. Parenthesis about Jannes and Jambres.

<sup>b</sup> See Lardner, Suppl. to Cred. Works, Vol. 6, p. 618.  
620.

*bound* to admit them. “*Quia canonicum non est, non me constringit*.”

It appears to me, that some passages are urged on the side of our Church, in this question, which have not much weight. As Deut. iv. 2. and xii. 32. which seem only to mean, ‘It is *God*, who gives laws to the Israelites; he does not intrust *men* as legislators; they therefore can neither *make* new laws, nor *repeal* old ones.’—Yet they might *interpret*, and even make *bye* Laws, so long as they grounded them on the old ones, or only applied the old ones to particular *cases*, and settled the *means* of executing them;—such sayings might be added to bodies of *College Statutes*, &c. Indeed, when the Jews came to *evade* their written law, they then disobeyed these precepts; but many *bye* laws *might* have been made, without doing that. They disobeyed the rest of the Law, in general, when they disobeyed these precepts.—St. Paul may mean no more by Gal. i. 8, 9, than to exclude all subsequent *Gospels*: nor, by 2 Tim. iii. 14, 15, &c. than to desire his assistant to adhere to the Old Testament, rather than favour any of the notions of the *Gnostics*, &c. And, by Rev. xxii. 18, 19, nothing more may be meant than, that the *Apocalypse* was to be the last public *Prophecy*<sup>d</sup>. To make these passages exact to our purpose, the scriptural authors and those who were cautioned, or forbidden, to *add*, should *both* have a *respect* and reverence for that which was forbidden, so long as it was not carried *too far*: whereas St. Paul had no respect

<sup>c</sup> Contra Faustum, l. 9, in Pearson, Creed, Art. 3, p. 346, 1st Edit.

<sup>d</sup> It is natural, on putting the finishing stroke to *any* great and important work, to feel, with the glow of self-applause, some fear, lest the busy and impertinent, by their forward attempts to rectify and amend, should destroy the effects of industry and ingenuity.

respect whatever for a *new Gospel*; and so of the other passages.

v. I shall add nothing to what I have now said, in the way of *direct* proof; but it may be proper to mention an *objection* or two.—It may be said, that St. Paul introduces a saying of our Lord; “it is more blessed to give than to receive<sup>e</sup>,” which may be considered as traditional. We might reply, 1. That these words, of themselves, do not contain “an article of *Faith*,” which could not be derived from Scripture. But 2. They are a *part* of Scripture; St. Luke might have his choice, whether he would put them into the mouth of *Christ*, in his *Gospel*, or into the mouth of St. Paul, in his History of the Acts of the Apostles. 3. Now again suppose the clause a mere tradition, we say, give us as good *evidence* of a saying of our Lord, as St. Paul had of this, and we will accept it joyfully<sup>f</sup>.

Again, it may be urged, that, even in Scripture, traditions are sometimes *commended*.—*First*, take 1 Cor. xi. 2.—“keep the *ordinances*,” as I have delivered them to you”—in Greek παραδοσεις, and indeed in our margin “*traditions*,” though the *Rhemish* Testament blames<sup>h</sup> us for concealing *traditions*.—There is no doubt but every founder of a Church must make *bye-laws* and give *directions* not worth writing down, which yet it is laudable to observe, and blameable to neglect. That ordinances here relate to matters of *inferior* consequence, is very probable from the whole *passage*, consisting of sixteen verses.—But this objection belongs properly to the 34<sup>th</sup> Article, about *customs*.  
“ We

<sup>e</sup> Acts xx. 35.

<sup>f</sup> See what Menard says, Lard. Vol. 2, p. 22, on a saying of *Barnabas*, which he (Barnabas) probably heard from his Lord.

<sup>g</sup> 1 Cor. xi. 2.

<sup>h</sup> On 2 Theff. ii. 15. where, in our *present* translation, the word *tradition* is used.



“ We have no such *custom*, neither the <sup>i</sup> Churches of God.”

Another instance, in which traditions are commended, is 2 Theff. ii. 15.—“ Stand fast, and hold the *traditions*, which ye have been taught, whether by *word* or our Epistle.”—Nothing is more clear, than that the Theffalonians must have had *verbal* as well as written instruction: but the difficulty with *us* is, to know what the verbal instruction *was*: this to *them* was no difficulty at all. Let us know any thing, that St. Paul said, as well as they knew what he had delivered to them “ *by word*,” and we shall raise no dispute about receiving it.—St. Paul had been represented as encouraging a notion, which was propagated in the Church of Theffalonica; he means only to disclaim giving such encouragement; and to exhort his converts to abide by what he had *really* taught them: for *παρὰδοσις* here seems to denote *whatever* had been *delivered*: it clearly includes whatever had been taught by *writing*.

Here an objection occurs of a very different nature from the preceding.

It is the nature of *morality* to keep constantly improving, if men make a right use of their experience. Now, suppose any *new virtue* to appear, are we not to practice and enforce it, because it is not in *Scripture*? will not disobedience to it be *punished*? even in a *future state*? or will it be said, that *Scripture now* contains a *perfect* morality?—I answer, I suppose, that scripture-morality may, in some sense, be considered as *imperfect*. It is not *systematical*, it does not describe *limits*, &c. of *rights* and *obligations*; it rather *enforces* what it takes for *granted*<sup>k</sup>, than *teaches* what is perfectly *new*. But this

<sup>i</sup> 1 Cor. xi. 16.

<sup>k</sup> Balguy, p. 87, 194, 196. Eph. vi. 1.

this is not any reason against its *divine* original. Why should *moral* philosophy be revealed all at once, rather than *natural*? we improve *gradually* in making natural bodies promote our happiness, why should we not improve gradually in making our own *conduct* promote happiness? indeed improvement in morals is sometimes *impossible* without improvement in understanding the powers of nature; as in the case of *temperance*. Shall virtue be so revealed, that man shall have no occasion to *study* it? that is against all our ideas of the government of the world. Besides, all the dispensations of *Grace* are progressive<sup>1</sup>; why not the improvements of natural *virtue*? Indeed the lower degrees of virtue, as well as of Revelation, seem necessary in order to *prepare* us for the higher. The uncivilized can neither conceive nor feel the refinements and delicacies of the improved heart and mind.

Well, but now give us an *instance* of a virtue invented within these last 1800 years (surely a sufficient time) and not to be found in Scripture, nor “proved thereby;”—dare any system of *philosophy* make pretension to such a virtue? As we are at liberty to prove by inference, it is probable, that we shall find your virtue in Scripture: for Scripture searches, rectifies, and warms the *heart*, from which all particular modes of conferring happiness flow. There it fixes principles, that act incessantly; love of God—of man—(and love worketh *no ill* to his neighbour;) forgiveness of injuries; overcoming evil with good—doing to others as you would they should do to you:—being pitiful, courteous; pleasing your neighbour to edification; sympathizing with the happy and the miserable;—give us your newly-invented virtue; let us try whether an heart  
warmed

<sup>1</sup> Law's Theory of Religion.

warmed with these sentiments and impelled by these motives of Scripture, would not have practised it, in the proper circumstances.

Suppose we fail, yet the failure could not affect any one, who was only inquiring whether he could *assent* to our *Article*, though we own, that the new virtue ought to be practised: for the case has nothing to do with the *purpose*<sup>m</sup> of the *Article*: nor can any dispute about it turn upon opposite interpretations of *Scripture*, which is the case with all our Christian Articles of Religion.

Lastly, when you have found a virtue, which you fancy is not supported by Scripture, you have no authority to *inforce* it: can you say, it is “*necessary to Salvation?*”—all men have a right to oppose you, and to question such necessity; and run what hazards they please. You cannot “*require*” of any man, that he should believe what you assert: and therefore our present proposition remains unshaken.

But how *wonderful* is it, that the moral part of the Scriptures should be so framed as continually to give a *sanction* to virtue, of every *kind*, and in every stage of its progression! whether its improvements happen to be quicker or slower! how astonishing, that moral precepts, published as these were, should be thought more and more excellent, in proportion to the advancement men make in virtue, taste, and wisdom! I verily believe this to be the fact; and, if it is, how absurd does it make the supposition appear, that such morals could be *invented* by a set of Fishermen and *Mechanics*<sup>n</sup>!

To

<sup>m</sup> See B. III. Chap. IX. Sect. X.

<sup>n</sup> This last thought is much the same, or intirely the same with Book I. Chap. XII. conclusion; but it is wanted in both places, and cannot appear uninteresting any where.

To conclude this first part of our Article, concerning Tradition.—Whatever particular traditions we may think it right to set aside, it does not seem as if we ought to entertain any *general* prejudice against every thing that is *unwritten*. In times of simplicity and unimproved ignorance, all knowledge and all laws must be unwritten, or traditional; and in every state of literature, there must be some bye laws, some particular methods of obeying general rules, which cannot well be committed to writing; and which had better be left unwritten and changeable; there will also be respectable interpretations of what has been written, and customary practices implying unwritten regulations:—sometimes we only collect previous regulations from their present presumed effects.—This is applicable to *Christianity*. For some considerable time, there were comparatively very few written records in the Christian Church; during that time, a good deal must go on tradition. If we had any verbal directions, which had been really given, by Christ or his Apostles, to the newly-formed Churches, we should value them very highly; these indeed seem advantages not to be expected in any degree; but very early *customs* and *practices*<sup>o</sup> in such Churches, afford so strong a presumption of their having been owing to such *directions*, as to demand our highest respect. And writings of *Fathers* and decrees of *Councils* are to be considered in the same light; that is, as conveying an evidence of something *unwritten*: early *comments* also are esteemed as telling us *received* interpretations. All these ought to have weight, whenever there is no appearance of *indirect* motives; and when the persons, whose accounts we receive, were competently qualified to inform us.

But,

<sup>o</sup> *Wall* reasons about Infant-Baptism on this principle.

But, whenever we have any reason to distrust, we should be at full liberty to neglect every thing of this kind: which is a very different thing from its being held "necessary to salvation." And herein consists the happiness of us reformed Christians, that we have got rid at once of an enormous quantity of such tradition, as we could not but believe to be corrupt. In a course of years, there will generally be a good deal to be rejected; but, if there have been ignorance and superstition and interest to generate, and artifice, party zeal, ambition, and enthusiasm to nourish, there is no saying to what degree the corruption may have increased. At our reformation, it was high time to extirpate *all* that diseased tumor, which had been formed: the same notices are still to be examined as at first, and the same respect to be paid to whatever appears to be credible evidence; but now we are not *afraid* of examining freely; be our minds ever so improved, we can make use of all their powers, to judge of the past, and provide for the future.

Yet, when we say, that *we* can do this, we must not forget the distinction<sup>p</sup> between those, who are qualified to judge for themselves, and those, who ought to be guided, in a good measure, by the judgment of others, between *Philosophers*, as we have called them, and *People*. Indeed, the distinction is never more wanted than here; for all imperfect reasonings with regard to traditions seem, on both sides, to owe their imperfections to the want of it. Those, who are against<sup>q</sup> all traditions, reason as if all men were Philosophers: those, who plead most strongly for<sup>r</sup> traditions, reason as if all men were ordinary people.

VI. 2. We

<sup>p</sup> Book II. Chap. IV. Sect. III. &c.

<sup>q</sup> See Lardner's article of Vincent of Lerins. Works, Vol. 5.

<sup>r</sup> Popish writers: See also Vincentius Lirinensis, p. 360.

VI. 2. We come now to take our *second station*, and consider the Books of the *Old Testament*. The difference between our Old Testament and that of our adversaries, will easily appear, from a comparison of our Article with the acts of the fourth Session<sup>s</sup> of the Council of *Trent*; but any reasoning concerning that difference will come under the *third* part of our Article; about what we call the *Apocrypha*.

If we were here to attempt to deliver *all the historical* reflexions, which might occur to the mind of a thinking person very conversant in history, we must stop short; the field is too wide for us; and I should hope, that we might receive satisfaction concerning the truth of every part of our Article, without involving ourselves in perplexed and intricate disquisitions concerning events of very remote antiquity<sup>t</sup>.

VII. With regard to *explanation* of this second part of our sixth Article, I do not see that it is wanted, except with regard to the word "*canonical*," which has been considered in the *first*<sup>u</sup> Book. It may be as well to add *here*, that, in the Article, those Books are called the first and second Book of *Esdra*s, which we commonly call the books of *Ezra* and *Nehemiah*. *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* were employed much in the same way; and the *Book* called *Nehemiah* is a sort of continuation of the *Book* of *Ezra*; hence, the Jews often counted them

as

Edit. Baluz. though, in the *Gallican* Church, the Bishops and Doctors claim a right to think and judge for themselves and the common people: but the Popes do not approve. Mosheim, Svo. Vol. 4. p. 209.

<sup>s</sup> Council of Trent, Sess. 4th, Decree 1st.

<sup>t</sup> What Collier says, Vol. 1. p. 284, about the settlement of the Canon by *Ezra*, &c. might be read here.

<sup>u</sup> Chap. xii. Sect. 11.

as one Book; and hence, they have been named as two parts of the same Book: its name taken from the principal person concerned. *Esdra* is the way, in which the LXX write the Hebrew name *Ezra*, עזרא;—but, in the Hebrew Bible, the second Book is called *Nehemiah*, נחמיה. The Council of Trent, Session 4, say, *Esdrae* “secundus qui dicitur Nehemias.”

VIII. We will come then to that, which seems our principal concern, the *truth* of this second part of our Article; and we will endeavour to *prove*, that we may have sufficient reason for receiving, as sacred and authentic, those ancient writings, which we commonly call the Books of the *Old Testament*.

Perhaps, if we wanted no more than a strict proof, it might be sufficient to use the single argument, which we used formerly<sup>\*</sup>; that, as Christ and his Apostles acknowledged the authority of these Books, we ought also to acknowledge it: this argument we must use of course; but there seem to be some reasons independent of this, which are not to be neglected: let us first conceive these to be weighed by some one *before the coming of Christ*, and then let us see what reasons a *Christian*, as such, has for adopting the same conclusion.

Before the coming of Christ, those, who were not Jews, were *Idolaters*; yet some there might be ready to acknowledge, that “an Idol is<sup>y</sup> nothing;” and desirous to worship, at least principally, a supreme invisible God. Nothing could be more natural for a person so disposed, than to endeavour to unite in divine worship with those, who would take no offence at his opinions.—Let us conceive what would be his reflexions.

‘ Here

<sup>\*</sup> Opening of Introd. to Book I. Chap. XIII.

<sup>y</sup> 1 Cor. viii. 4.

‘ Here is a people wonderfully separated from the rest of the world! they worship no *Idols*, but acknowledge *one* supreme Deity, *spiritual* in his nature: how could this happen? they are no way improved beyond their neighbours, in philosophy, or arts. The account they give of this matter themselves, is quite out of the course of common experience; but yet I see no other, which can solve the difficulty; and, if I allow theirs, I must confess all is at least consistent. Here is a system of government, which no lawgiver can have invented; and it has been carried on for a long succession of ages. The Founder of it, as far as any *man* is entitled to be called a founder, seems to have something in common with the *Ægyptians*; but yet he contradicts the notions of *Ægypt* in several important <sup>2</sup> particulars.—According to the history of this singular people, a series of *miracles* has been performed in their favour and support, which would exceed all credibility in common cases, but here it seems to make an indispensable part of the whole plan;—the religion would be more strange without the miracles, than the miracles would be without the religion. And these miracles are believed, not, like prodigies amongst us, only by the vulgar, but by all the most eminent, by the rulers themselves. Nay, at this time, the Teachers seem not only to be sublime and pathetic beyond any thing I can conceive, but seem also to be continually supported by divine power; and to consist of a regular succession; many of them seem to have had a supernatural power of foretelling future events.

‘ What am I to think of this people? if what they say is not true, the wonder is greater than the  
 aggregate

<sup>2</sup> Div. Leg. B. 4. Sect. 6. Prop. 3.



aggregate of all the miracles, of which they boast. I therefore give myself up to worship their God; whose unity and spirituality accord with all my best notions.'

'Now this people have a number of *Books*, which they account sacred:—these they have preserved carefully, and read<sup>a</sup> publicly; and a number of copies of them have been in different families<sup>b</sup>:—am I to make any question of the authenticity of these Books? if I do, I must give up all my reasoning, and revoke the belief of every thing, which I have now concluded to be credible.'

Can we doubt, that a person, who reasoned thus, *before* the coming of Christ, had sufficient ground of assent to the authenticity of our Books of the Old Testament? and there is nothing in the reasoning, which any person may not make use of *at this time*.

Indeed it should be observed, that, if our examiner was supposed to live after the building of the *second Temple*<sup>c</sup>, there are some of the above expressions, which he could not use with strict propriety<sup>d</sup>; namely, those which imply a set of *Prophets* actually existing; but then he has a longer series of proofs. And he might have the advantage of this material question, why, if the *Prophets* were *impostors*, should no man prophecy of the Messiah after *Malachi*<sup>e</sup> who lived 450 years<sup>e</sup> before Christ.

We,

<sup>a</sup> See Deut. xxxi. 10.

<sup>b</sup> See Deut. vi. 7. The account of the single copy in the time of *Josiah* (2 Kings xxii. 8.) is understood in different senses; (see Collier, 1. p. 263): supposing it literally true, copies would multiply afterwards.

<sup>c</sup> Built 415 years before Christ. Blair.

<sup>d</sup> Collier's sacred Interpr. Vol. 1, p. 281.

<sup>e</sup> Josephus contra Apion. lib. 1. p. 1333. Edit. Hud.

We, at this time, though we may not see this evidence in so striking a light, nor be so much affected by it, have a strict *right to make use of it* in all its parts.

ix. We are next to see what reasons a *Christian*, as such, has for receiving the Books of the Old Testament as sacred and authentic.—And it must be enough to say, that our *Saviour* and his *Apostles* constantly acknowledge them as sacred. The Jews are commanded to “search the Scriptures<sup>f</sup>;” Timothy is told particularly their beneficial effects<sup>g</sup>. Prophecies are frequently applied to Jesus, and, with regard to the greater and more extraordinary events, the Jews are called upon to acknowledge, that “thus it was <sup>h</sup>written;” that it *beloved* Christ (the expected Messiah, whenever he came) to suffer; and so on. And St. Paul expressly calls the Jewish Scriptures, “the *Oracles*<sup>i</sup> of God.”—A point so clear need not be laboured.

But it may be said, this is only to acknowledge the volume *collectively*; not to tell us, that the particular Books, which we receive, were those meant. The answer to this is, that we receive *the same* Books, which the Jews<sup>k</sup> received, and their Scriptures are authorized by our Saviour without any *exception*.—When he blames the Jews for superseding their Scriptures by their *traditions*, he gives no intimation of their having added to their Scriptures, or diminished, or in any way corrupted them. And St. Paul’s calling them the “Oracles of God,” in the manner he does, seems also to imply, that he found no fault with the usual number; nor had any difficulties on that head.

One

<sup>f</sup> John v. 39.                      <sup>g</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 15.

<sup>h</sup> Luke xxiv. 26, 46.                      <sup>i</sup> Rom. iii. 2.—ix. 4, 5.

<sup>k</sup> “Jerom’s Canon of the Old Test. was that of the Jews.” Lard. Vol. 5, p. 21. and there have always been Jews.

One passage of the New Testament contains a *division* of the sacred Books of the Old Testament into the “*Law of Moses*,” “the *Prophets*,” and “the *Psalms*”<sup>1</sup>. But it may be said, are not the *Historical* Books here omitted? First, we might say, that if there were any books merely historical, the rest might be considered as the *Scriptures*, in the strict sense, and the historical Books as an *illustration*. What the Jews did, is not always what they were commanded to do; and History relates what they *did*. The *Scriptures* were the same, whatever *use* was made of them. But I know not that this remark is of much *use*; the books called historical are not merely such; and the authors of them were Prophets in the scripture sense; that is, *inspired* persons, and *teachers*: consequently, the historical Books must either come under Law, Prophets, or Psalms.—We can immediately see how these three *kinds* of sacred books must be the most *eminent* and *important*:—Law commanded; Prophecy was requisite to shew the plan of God’s dealings; and such parts of the Psalms as were not prophetic, would act as incitements to piety and virtue.

Different solutions have been here<sup>m</sup> offered; but the true answer to this question concerning our Saviour’s omission of the historical Books of Scripture must seemingly come from *Josephus*, though he does not fully explain himself. In his first Book against Apion, he says, that the Jews have only 22 Books; which he divides into *three* Classes; the first contains the *Law*, the second the *Prophets*, and the third the *Psalms*. In the first class, he reckons *five* books; in the second, *thirteen*; in the third, *four*. How our 39 books are more particularly reduced to this number, does not seem to

be

<sup>1</sup> Luke xxiv. 34.

<sup>m</sup> See Lardner, Vol. 5, p. 24.

be settled by any <sup>n</sup> *authority*; but we have evidence enough, from the *modern Jews* compared with Josephus, that *all our Books* are comprehended in the three classes. The Jews used to be desirous to reduce their sacred Books to 22, because that was the number of <sup>o</sup> letters in their *Alphabet*; but now, we are <sup>p</sup> told, they make *twenty-four Books*. This is easily accomplished, as the *Chronicles* may be either as two Books or one; the *minor Prophets* are reckoned as making one Book; and so of Ezra and Nehemiah; &c.

It may be objected to our present argument for the authenticity of the Books of the Old Testament, namely, their being acknowledged by Christ and his Apostles, that our Saviour might mean only to argue with the Jews on what they acknowledged, in order to convince them they were wrong in some respects. And it does indeed seem as if he had <sup>q</sup> *sometimes* this end in view; but it cannot thence be concluded, that he *always* had. That would be to admit the fallacy before marked out<sup>r</sup>, that because a remark is true in some cases, it is true in all.—Besides, how could it answer any purpose to apply *prophecies* to Christ, if they were not to be understood<sup>s</sup> as really divine? and, in other

<sup>n</sup> See ways of reducing them in Hudson's Josephus, Fol. Vol. 2, p. 1333. Also in Lard. Works, Vol. 5, p. 25.

<sup>o</sup> Jerom's Prol. Galeatus; beginning.

<sup>p</sup> Broughton's Dictionary; under *Bible*.

<sup>q</sup> Matt. xii. 27. John x. 35. See Div. Leg. Vol. 4, Svo. p. 366. Sherlock's Discourses, Vol. 2, p. 3, top.—Also Book 1. Chap. xvii. Sect. xix. of this; and II. II. XIII.

<sup>r</sup> Art II. Sect. xxxv. and Art. v. Sect. xv.

<sup>s</sup> Book 1. Ch. xvii. something was said of Collins's scheme, now and then; that is, as the Prophecies are applicable to some event *before* Christ, it is not right to apply them to *him* also:—they ought therefore to be applied to Christ only in an argumentum ad hominem. But *here* we do not want to see how Christ

other things, we cannot conceive our Saviour to carry compliance with Jewish notions so far as to mislead a great number of his Disciples.

The Mosaic Dispensation receives great support from the 16th Chapter<sup>c</sup> of *Grotius's* first Book *De veritate religionis Christianæ*;—the Chapter is entitled, *Testimonium extraneorum*, and the matter of it seems well *digested*.—The passages referred to may exercise the diligence of the Student, if he endeavours to form a judgment concerning the weight, which ought to be allowed to each. To co-operate with him in such a work would carry us out too far. The authorities are now reduced into a small compass, and the work is in<sup>u</sup> every one's hands.

x. 3. We now take our *third Station*.

After considering what our Article affirms with regard to the Books of the Old Testament, we come to what it lays down respecting those Books, which have made *pretensions* to be ranked in that number; those, which we commonly call collectively the *Apocrypha*.

As our *proof* of what is affirmed will be chiefly *historical*, we shall not need to give much *previous history*. If a person, in our present situation, were well *versed* in history, he would naturally take a view of all the sorts of writings, which had been thought divine by some, and not by others; or which had been composed with a view of being admitted into the sacred Canon, or read in religious assemblies,

Christ *ought* to have applied Prophecies to himself; but only how he *did* apply them. If he considered the sacred Books as authentic, that is enough for our argument.

<sup>c</sup> Grotius de veritate, Lib. 1, cap. 16.

<sup>u</sup> Could any thing be formed out of the ancients, *Diodorus Siculus*, &c. in defence of the Old Testament and the Mosaic Dispensation, similar to Lardner's *Heathen Testimonies* to the Truth of the *Christian Religion*?

assemblies, but had failed of success. Now this might in a great measure be done by recollecting what has been mentioned in our first Book; both as to the several *kinds* \* of writings, which come under this description, and as to the means of *distinguishing* between them, and such as ought to be deemed canonical.

There were *nine* sorts of writings mentioned: on the present occasion, the sixth sort would be particularly recollected, those composed by weak and *credulous* men: also the seventh sort, called *heretical*.—The idea would also recur, that writings may be *useful* in some respects, though some foolish or hurtful things have crept into them; that some writings have acquired respect by bearing respectable *names*; and that some anonymous writings have got to be read with great veneration, or even in religious assemblies, by a successful *imitation* of some writers already deemed in a manner sacred.

But, though any one should take this review of writings already described, and in some degree, or by some persons held *sacred*; yet, in the first Book, we were attending solely to the canon of the *New Testament*;—our view is *now* to be confined to such as have pretended to be parts of the *Old Testament*, or *Jewish* Scriptures, before the time of Christ; and such as we exclude from the canon, although we give them a recommendation as moral writings.

All the Books enumerated in our apocryphal catalogue, are mentioned as canonical in the 4th Session of the Council of *Trent*, (though they never before were received by any formal act into a Church, on the same footing,) except the third and fourth Books of *Esdra*s and the prayer of *Manasses*, which are not mentioned at all. I do not see, that  
the

\* Book I. Chap. XII. Sect. IV. v.

the Romanists have any thing in the way of our Apocrypha; though they publish these two or three Books after the Apocalypse, in the Latin translation, which they authenticate; alledging, that they would not have them *perish*, as they have been quoted by some Holy *Fathers*, and are found in some Latin Bibles, printed and manuscript.

*Jerom* translated some of these books, *Tobit* and *Judith*, but, as he says, at the desire of *Friends*<sup>7</sup>;— and he takes care to prevent any one from concluding, that he thought them authentic.

*Grotius* has thought fit to write a comment upon them, but he<sup>2</sup> calls some of them, the Book of *Wisdom* in particular, I think, *interpolated by Christians*. As his Socinian principles led him to lay this charge, and he seems<sup>3</sup> to fail in the proof of it, he incidentally proves, that the Books contain some things, by which orthodox Christians are supported in their opinions.—These I take to be descriptions of the *Λόγος*, and the Spirit of God, which are used to shew, that St. John spoke of the *Word*, and others of the *Spirit personally*, according to notions already established amongst the Jews<sup>4</sup>.

As the Papists receive our apocryphal Books, those, who have desired to separate the farthest from them, have been most averse to these Books: as Puritans, Presbyterians, &c; accordingly, they have been a subject of *dispute*<sup>5</sup> amongst Protestants, whenever

<sup>7</sup> See Lard. Vol. 5, p. 21. *Jerom's* Preface to *Tobit*. The friends were, *Chromatius* and *Eliodorus*.

<sup>2</sup> See *Grotius's* opening on *Wisdom*.

<sup>3</sup> See *Allix's* Judgment of the Jews, Chap. 5.

<sup>4</sup> For *Son*, see *Wisd.* x. 5.—*Ecclus.* xlvi. 10.—For *Spirit*, see *Jud.* xvi. 14.—*Wisd.* i. 7.—vii. 7.—ix. 17.—xii. 1.—*Ecclus.* xxxix. 6.—xlvi. 12.—For *Word*, see *Wisd.* xvi. 26.—*Ear.* v. 5.

<sup>5</sup> See *Neal's* Hist. Puritans, Index; and *Candid Disquisitions*, Appendix, Sect. 6.

whenever any change in our English forms of worship has been debated.

XI. For the reason already given, we say no more of History at present.—*Explanation* will turn chiefly on the word *Apocryphal*. It has had <sup>d</sup>several meanings given it; one thus;—Apocryphal writings are writings *απο της κρυπτης*, removed from the *place*, receptacle, chest, where the sacred books were commonly kept: but apocryphal is generally considered as coming from *αποκρυπτω*, to conceal, or hide. Yet this derivation does not reduce the senses to one; for a book may be *hidden* or *secret* in different *respects*. Perhaps the most ancient idea of an apocryphal or secret book is, that it was *concealed* from the *People*; according to this, books were apocryphal, when they were thought such as *ought* not to be *read*: which agrees with the *ancient division*<sup>e</sup> of Books, into *canonical*, and such as were to be *read*, and such as were *apocryphal*:—the foolish and hurtful writings would be amongst the apocryphal, in this sense: and it has been thought, that some books were kept secret from the *People*, though received by the Church. (See Lardner, Vol. 3, p. 529, bottom).—Our Apocalypse and Canticles are in England very little read to the *People*.—But a book may be hidden or *secret*, in respect of the *name* of its *author*;—though this is not so likely to occasion any difficulty in the case of *anonymous* books, as when a name is affixed to it, which there is reason to think is not really the name of its author: consequently, secret or apocryphal, in this way, will be nearly equivalent to *spurious*; and will soon *come* by custom to be fully equivalent to it. In this sense, apocryphal is sometimes

<sup>d</sup> Broughton's Dict.

<sup>e</sup> See Notes on Cyril's 4th Catechesis, Edit. Mill. Oxon.



times used<sup>f</sup>. Lastly, a Book may be secret or hidden, in respect of that *authority*, to which it pretends; this sense is associated with the preceding, as *authority* is with *author*. In this sense, apocryphal is used by *Augustin*, who thinks it worth while to reject one of the senses just now<sup>g</sup> mentioned;—viz. that Apocryphal Books were such, as were purposely kept secret from the *People*. His idea of apocryphal books is, whose *origin* was hidden to the *Fathers*; wanting *testimonials*; by authors unknown; of character suspected.—This sense is nearest ours<sup>h</sup>, already given<sup>i</sup>.

We may close this explanation by observing, that the words in our present paragraph, “*the Church*,” do not seem to mean *our* Church, the Church of England, but the Christian Church at large.—However, it may be proper to observe, that *our* Church does not read the *whole* of the Apocrypha in religious assemblies. We do not read either Book of *Esdra*s, nor either Book of *Maccabees*; nor *Hester*, nor *the Song of the three Children*, nor the *Prayer of Manasses*.—Our Article, or Jerom quoted in it, means, probably, that Christians do not *object* to this *body* or collection of writings, so as not to read them publicly: not that *every* Christian Church reads them *all*. Even the Romanists seem to omit some.

XII. We come next to our *Proof*.

There seem to be but *two propositions* in the part of the Article now before us, which require proof.

The Books here opposed to those called canonical, ought not to be applied “to establish any *Doctrine*.”

The

<sup>f</sup> See Lard. Vol. 2, p. 363.

<sup>g</sup> Lard. Vol. 3. p. 529, 530.

<sup>b</sup> Book 1. Chap. XII. Sect. 11.

<sup>i</sup> Lardner, Vol. 6, p. 8, end of Sect. 3, gives as good an account as I have seen, of *canonical*, *ecclesiastical*, and *apocryphal*. It is very short.

The Church doth read these as moral:} and *Jerom* affirms the same.

The first of these is the principal proposition. And I should think no farther proof of this is absolutely needful, than that the *Jews* did never receive the books in question as canonical. What judgment can any one now form, which shall be compared to that of the ancient Jews? nothing can be more definite than *Josephus's* <sup>k</sup> receiving the usual 22, and then rejecting all others.

These apocryphal books are probably not directly *quoted* in the New Testament: Allix speaks of St. Paul's quoting them, but I do not see of what *passage* of St. Paul he affirms <sup>l</sup> this: and I observe, that, in the *Vulgate*, though there is a regular list of places of the Old Testament, which are cited in the New, there is not one citation from any of the Apocryphal Books. The Romanists, who must have made this list, would have rejoiced in any instance of Christ or his Apostles giving credit to the disputed books.

Of the *early Christians* I think it may be fairly said, that they prove no *doctrine* by them; though they sometimes *introduce* passages on account of some *moral* sentiment. That this is not giving *authority* to such Books, appears from St. Paul's doing the same at Athens with Heathen Poets. "It was no unusual thing," says Lardner<sup>m</sup>, "for the ancient Christians

<sup>k</sup> Contra Apion 1. p. 1333, Ed. Hudson.

<sup>l</sup> Wisd. iii. 8. has been *borrowed* by St. Paul, 1 Cor. vi. 2. so says Allix, p. 113. *borrowing* is not *quoting*. But he says *quoted*, p. 74. I do not see why 1 Cor. vi. 2. may not come from Dan. vii. 22. Matt. xix. 28. Luke xxii. 30. and Rev. passim.—I should conceive rather, that Wisd. iii. 8. might come from Daniel vii. 22.

<sup>m</sup> Vol. 2. p. 65; end of Herma.

Christians to quote *Jewish* as well as *heathen* books, without intending to give them any authority."

Those Christian writers, in early times, (suppose the first four Centuries), who give *Catalogues* of canonical books, may be said to omit them; though exceptions may sometimes be found of a single book or so. Bishop Burnet mentions <sup>n</sup> several such Catalogues; made by Melito<sup>o</sup>, Origen, (quoted probably by Eusebius <sup>p</sup> Hist. 6. 25), Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzum, and Jerom. He might, I think, have added *Augustin*, though he, a Latin Father, admits some of our Apocrypha: Bishop Burnet closes with the Catalogue of the Council of <sup>q</sup> *Laodicea*, on which he dwells;—and indeed its decrees are of great weight, though the Prophecy of *Baruch* (with the Epistle of Jeremiah) is, in its Canon, not separated from the Prophecy of Jeremiah, as it is in *Cyril's* Catalogue. Any little *exception* of this kind will seem more strange to us, than it would do to the ancients, as they had not, even in the time of Augustin (who died 430), a regular established catalogue of sacred books; but were searching after them amidst a crowd of false pretenders.

*Ambrose* seems to have had more relish and more respect for apocryphal books, than the generality of the Christian Fathers. Lardner<sup>r</sup> mentions one passage, in which he quotes Ecclesiasticus in the way

<sup>n</sup> P. 110, 111, Svo.

<sup>o</sup> Melito, in some editions of Euseb. (4. 26.) calls Proverbs by the *additional* name, of the *Wisdom of Solomon*: see the note in Reading's edit. Cant. 1720.

<sup>p</sup> See Lard. 2. 509. <sup>q</sup> Lard. Vol. 4, p. 309.

<sup>r</sup> Vol. 4, p. 448, from Ambr. on Psal. 118, (*our* 119) T. I. p. 1224 E;—the passage quoted is Ecclus. ii. 5. Pf xviii. 153; vide humilitatem meam et erue me, or something like that:—Ambrose says, one may use *humilitatem* meam in trials, in martyrdom, &c. as appears from Ecclesiasticus ii. 5.

way of *proof*; but Ecclesiasticus ii. 5. is merely *moral*, and “testimoniis *scripturarum*” may only mean, the witness or weight of good *moral writings*. — The word *Prophet* he uses in a large sense, if he does not mean to make some of these books sacred; but he speaks with *warmth*, and *unsteadily*.

Ambrose was far removed from Judea, and, being converted late in life, had probably not much *Jewish* learning; none at all before he was Bishop; but Jerom was distinguished for Jewish learning, and is called the most learned<sup>2</sup> of all the Fathers. I should think his authority decisive in our present question. In his Prefaces, which are published with the Vulgate, it is easy to see, that he expressly sets aside every one of our apocryphal books; or, if he does not set aside those, which the Church of Rome gives up, it is only because he despised them; for, in other<sup>3</sup> parts of his works, he speaks of them more slightly than I could have imagined.

The reasons for rejecting some of the apocryphal books, are mentioned in the *Titles*, respectively. Jerom gives the same; entirely or chiefly<sup>4</sup>.

We seem now to have shewn, that the Books in question ought not to be admitted into the Canon. But our conclusion will scarce be satisfactory, unless we

<sup>2</sup> Good moral *writings*, used to have the name of *Scripturæ*. B. I. Chap. xii. Sect. iv.

<sup>3</sup> Hurd on Prophecy, p. 221.

<sup>4</sup> See Lard. Works, Vol. 5, p. 17—20.

<sup>x</sup> *Hesher* is said, in the title, not to be found in the *Hebrew*; so are the Song of the three Children, Susanna, and Bel and the Dragon.—Wisdom is called the Wisdom of Solomon; but does not that mean an *Imitation* of Solomon?—The *Prologue* to Ecclesiasticus, by the Son of Sirach, gives us the idea of the *Law* and the *Prophets* being *distinct* things; and *Law* and the *Prophets* sometimes meant the *whole* Old Testament; and of *others* writing in order to *second* their purposes.—It professes Ecclesiasticus, as we have it, to have been published in *Greek*.

we add to what is here said *negatively*, something of a *positive* or *affirmative* sort.

Although Christians might sometimes write apocryphal Books belonging to the Old Testament, yet it seems agreed, that *ours* were all written by *Jews*: even *Grotius*<sup>y</sup> allows this, who would have wished to have them prove the works of Christians.

They appear to me *imitations* of some part of Scripture, or something in the way of supplement, or *sequel*. The third and fourth Books of *Esdras* profess themselves to be such; they were probably written from a natural desire, in persons attached to their country, of enlarging on any interesting part of its history: and the latter of these might be a supplement to the first. The Book of *Tobit* reminds one of *Ruth*; and *Judith* of *Deborah*; and of *David* and *Goliah*; as also of the distresses of *Hezekiah* from the *Assyrian* armies. Of *Hester* there can be no question.—The books of *Wisdom*<sup>z</sup> and *Ecclesiasticus* seem evidently imitations of the works of *Solomon*; and *Baruch's* prophecy has been owing to his having been a secretary to *Jeremiah*:—the three writings cut off from the Book of *Daniel*, shew plainly to what stock they belong, and what they were intended to imitate, or fill out. The Prayer of *Manasses*, and we may add the *Epistle*<sup>a</sup> of *Jeremiah*, may have been attempts to succeed on the credit of the fine Psalm, “By the waters of *Babylon*,” &c.—The first Book of *Maccabees* has some appearance of an original narration, composed on the principle just now noticed, of relating handsomely an interesting piece of national history: the

<sup>y</sup> *Allix*, p. 67.

<sup>z</sup> The first prologue to *Ecclesiasticus* says, that the author of that Book “did imitate *Solomon*.”

<sup>a</sup> In the 29th Chap. of *Jeremiah*, there is an *Epistle* from *Jeremiah* to the captives in *Babylon*.

the second Book of Maccabees is a supplement, as before. The latter *Esdra*s seems to me sometimes to imitate *Ezekiel's* manner.

What I have farther to mention may be introduced in the way of remarks on two expressions of *Bishop Burnet's*. He says, with regard to the *Jews*, it is not pretended, that ever these books "were so much as *known* to them<sup>b</sup>."—And afterwards, "the *Christian Church* were for some ages an utter stranger" to them.

As to *early Christians*, I have refreshed my memory in *Clement's* first Epistle to the Corinthians, and in *Polycarp's* to the Philippians, which are always reckoned genuine, and I find quotations from some books of our Apocrypha, made with the same degree of exactness as those from the canonical books.—In the former, *Wisdom* xii. 12. is quoted, and afterwards the heroism of *Judith* is described. In the latter, there is a quotation from *Tobit*, (xii. 9.)—And, though some *interpolations* have been suspected, I should think, from the context, that sentence about Judith unlikely to be one. Not that it proves *Clement* to have thought the Book of Judith on a footing with the *Scriptures*, because he first mentions <sup>c</sup> *Heathens*, who have run into danger in order to save their country, and then *Judith*. But, supposing these passages genuine, which I see no reason to doubt, the Christian Church could not for some ages be an "utter stranger" to our Apocrypha.

Lardner says, in several<sup>d</sup> places, that there are no quotations of apocryphal books in the Apostolic

<sup>b</sup> On the Articles, p. 110, 8vo.

<sup>c</sup> The same thing has struck a commentator in *Russel's Patres Apostolici*.

<sup>d</sup> Vol. 6, p. 662. Vol. 5, p. 358, 412, &c.

lic Fathers; but he means apocryphal books written in the early times of *Christianity*. That these writings should not be “so much as *known*” to the *Jews*, appears to me improbable. The writings of the *Jews* have been more *destroyed*, in proportion at least, than those of any ° other people: yet we still seem to have some testimonies. Allix says<sup>f</sup>, that *Philo* quotes our apocryphal Books.—*Josephus*, in the part where he mentions the 22 books of Scripture, and adds, that *other* books had been written after the time of Malachi, does not, to be sure, mention any *names* of authors; but he describes the *kind* of Books according to our idea of the more valuable parts of our Apocrypha: he disowns their being so sacred as to be *authentic*; but he seems to treat them as *next* to divine: nay, as if nothing hindered them from being accounted divine, but a failure in the regular succession of *Prophets*.—In his History of the *Maccabees*<sup>g</sup>, he is thought to have followed our first Book of Maccabees; and in his account of *Zorobabel*, to have adopted the ideas of the author of the third Book of *Esdra*s. In Hudson’s *Josephus*, the *texts* are put in the *margin* of the History; so any one may *compare* them, and judge *for himself*.—Both the *Prologues* to Ecclesiasticus seem to speak the same language with *Josephus* about “*other books*.”—And *Jerom* says<sup>h</sup>, that some ancient writers thought, that *Wisdom* was written by *Philo*; but probably it was written earlier; however, *Jerom* must think it was known to the *Jews*.

Allix

° See Chandler on Prophecy, Pref. p. xiv, mentioned B. I. Chap. v. Sect. VIII. of this.

<sup>f</sup> P. 73.

<sup>g</sup> The genuineness of this work is suspected; see Lard. Works, Vol. 7, p. 35.

<sup>h</sup> Pref. to Books of Solomon.

Allix says<sup>i</sup>, that *Ramban*<sup>k</sup> speaks of Ecclesiasticus as being in *Chaldee*, and quotes Jerom for *Tobit's* having been in the same<sup>l</sup>; now<sup>m</sup>, whatever books have been in Chaldee, originally, or by translation, must have been *known* to the Jews. He<sup>n</sup> accounts for their having been *laid aside* by the Jews, from those passages, which Grotius affirms to be interpolated; which favour the Christian cause. The Jews are said to speak unfavourably of *Josephus*; probably because so many testimonies<sup>o</sup> are accidentally to be deduced from him in favour of Christians, though he was no Christian himself: this is no reason why he should be *generally* undervalued:—then he was a kind of *Roman*; actually with the Romans in camp during the siege of Jerusalem: and he is valued by *Heathens* as well as *Christians*: this may account for the Jewish prejudice.

Allix, in his 5th Chapter, goes through the whole catalogue, and speaks more learnedly than I have done of *each book*, except perhaps the prayer of Manasses; but, after what has been said, I will content myself with referring to him for particulars, and will only take the *result* of his inquiries and my own.

It seems probable, that, under the *Ptolemies* in *Ægypt*, and the *Seleucidæ* in Syria, authors amongst the Jews were *numerous*; not only in Alexandria, but

<sup>i</sup> P. 68, 69.

<sup>k</sup> Ramban, R. Moses the son (Ben.) of Nachman. "Gerondensis Hispanus." Claruit, 1212. See Buxtorf's Abbrev. (Gironne, near the Pyrenees and Mediterranean.)

<sup>l</sup> See Jerom's Preface to Tobit.

<sup>m</sup> From the Author's Prologue to Eccles. it appears, that his Grandfather collected the matter of that Book in *Hebrew*.

<sup>n</sup> P. 23.

<sup>o</sup> See authorities collected, Lard. Vol. 7, p. 34.



but at Jerufalem, and Babylon;—and that their chief purpose in writing was, to promote good *morals*; but that they executed their purpose always with fome fort of view to their *Scriptures* and national *history*; enlarging, imitating, fupplying, as their judgment and imagination dictated. Some wrote in *Chaldee* (or poffibly Hebrew) but more in Greek: and it feems conceivable, that fome works might be original in *both* Hebrew and Greek<sup>p</sup>.—Some of thefe authors had more folid underftanding, others lefs; but they all delivered fomething of what was *customary* in the notions of the Jews, which turned frequently on the expectation of a *Meffiah*.—A great number of their writings have been deftroyed; of the few remaining, fome feem to *us* valuable; but the Jews do not *value* them as they ought, being determined to reject Jefus as *Meffiah*, and indulging themfelves, efpecially fince the coming of *our* *Meffiah*, in an immoderate regard for *traditions*, and a boundlefs range of childish conceits and fancies. The ancient Jewish writings in our Apocrypha are too *rational* for them, as well as too *moral*:—I fpeak of the more respectable part.

As to the manner, in which Apocryphal books got in fome places into the *Canon* of Scripture, I agree with Bifhop Burnet<sup>q</sup>;—they were firft efteemed as pious, and as related, as it were, to Scripture; then they were *read* in Churches; and the canonical Scriptures being read there alfo, thefe got affociated in men's minds, till, at laft, they came to be upon one and the fame footing.

It might greatly facilitate their reception amongft Chriftians, if they feemed, in any way, to favour the Chriftian caufe.

XIII. The

<sup>p</sup> This is mentioned B. I. Chap. VI. Sect. I.

<sup>q</sup> P. 111, 8vo.

XIII. The second proposition remains: that is, the *Church* reads the Apocryphal books as *moral*; and *Jerom* affirms the same.

It may be thought of little moment to prove this, unless it were proved, that the Church *ought* to read them for such purpose. But the practice of those, whom we are to respect, is a strong argument of itself for the continuance of such practice.—The passages already mentioned in *Clemens* and *Polycarp* may answer our purpose. *Athanasius* says<sup>r</sup>, that these Books “were appointed by the Fathers to be read by those, who first come to be instructed in the way of *Piety*.” What *Jerom* says, in his Preface to the Books of Solomon, is *doubly* to our purpose, as it proves both *parts* of the proposition now before us. “Sicut ergo Judith, et Tobix<sup>s</sup> et Macchabæorum Libros *legit* quidem ecclesia, sed eos inter canonicas scripturas non recipit, sic et hæc duo volumina (*Wisdom* and *Ecclesiasticus*) legat ad ædificationem plebis, non ad auctoritatem Ecclesiasticorum *dogmatum* confirmandam.”—And lastly, Bishop *Burnet* proves<sup>t</sup> the *general* custom of reading things not canonical in the Church.—Indeed, calling some writings *ecclesiastical*, which were not accounted *canonical*, shews pretty plainly what we mean to prove.

With regard to *present times*, though there may be some *doubts* about reading in Church the spurious additions to the Book of *Daniel*, yet I think it would not tend to edification to banish *Ecclesiasticus* and *Wisdom*<sup>u</sup>. The more *Grotius* insists on  
some

<sup>r</sup> See *Burnet*, p. 110, 8vo.

<sup>s</sup> *Jerom*, Pref. to his Translation of the Books of Solomon from the Hebrew. In English, *Lard. Works*, Vol. 5, p. 18.

<sup>t</sup> *Articles*, p. 111, 8vo. See also of this. B. 1. Chap. XII. Sect. IV.

<sup>u</sup> At the *Reformation*, when men had been brought up to revere them, it would have been both *imprudent* and *cruel* to set them aside.

some passages being interpolated by Christians, the more plainly do we see the propriety of reading those books, which contain those passages, in *Christian Congregations*.—And the recommendations which we find of them in the Christian Fathers, must at least make us judge candidly and cautiously of any of our Christian brethren, who are inclined to pay them great attention, as books of *morality*: though the truth probably is, that the Christian Fathers were much better judges of the Scriptures, than of *Ethics*.

XIV. 4. We are now come to our *fourth* and last *station*; where we are to consider, what our Article affirms with regard to the Books of the *New Testament*; whether our Church rightly *receives* them, and accounts them *canonical*.

As, in this, our Church agrees with other Churches, we might have discussed this subject in our *first book*; but as mention *was* to be made of these books in an *Article*, it seemed as well not to anticipate *every* thing that should be said upon it. No *Church* can well compose a set of Doctrines, without settling a *Canon* of Scripture.

But, though something has been deferred, yet we have employed eight Chapters of the first Book in proving the authority of the New Testament. The only question is now, of *what writings* does the New Testament *consist*? Besides those, which have been universally *acknowledged* as divine, there are some now found in our volume, whose authority has been *controverted*: a thing so well known, as to divide the writings of the New Testament into *two classes*; the *ὁμολογούμενα* \* and the *αντιλεγόμενα*.—Are we safe in admitting these last into our Canon? some examination of this point may be proper, in order to dispel doubts and suspicions; it

\* Richardson calls them the first *Canon* and the second Canon.

it may also be useful as a *specimen* of the manner of inquiring into the authority of particular books.—What writings we mean was mentioned formerly<sup>y</sup>.

xv. Here, our first reflexions must be *historical*. We have not any exact and *minute* accounts of the publication and reception of the controverted books or writings: we are only told, after a considerable time, that doubts *had* been entertained about them at some times and in some places, though they had been received by <sup>2</sup> *many*. These doubts do not seem to have been *quite* cleared up, in *all places*, even in the fourth century, nor, with regard to the Apocalypse, till later<sup>z</sup>. But this is exaggerated and misrepresented by Mr. Toland, when he says<sup>b</sup>, of the books in question, that “they were *rejected* a long time by *all* Christians, almost with universal consent.”—I do not understand, that any of them was ever *rejected*, properly speaking, because rejection implies previous examination; and, I think, we have no account of any of them being first examined, and then set aside. They seem to have continued without sufficient notice; too little distinguished from the *crowd* of writings, with which they had got mixed: but that only in *some places*; they were *always* received by *many*, (as was just now observed from Eusebius<sup>c</sup>). At length however they attracted notice, they

<sup>y</sup> B. I. Chap. xii. Sect. iv. Heb.—James—2 Pet.—2 and 3 John—Jude—Rev.

<sup>z</sup> Euseb. 3. 25.

<sup>a</sup> Bishop Hallifax on Prophecy, p. 209.

<sup>b</sup> Amyntor. See Leland's *Deist*, Letter 3; or rather Richardson's *Canon*, &c. p. 3, and 39: mentioned Book I. Ch. xii. Sect. iv.

<sup>c</sup> Of the Apocalypse Eusebius says, ἀδιτεσι, Euseb. 3. 25: which is translated, ex albo scripturarum *extrungunt!*—some say Eusebius, ἀδιτεσι the Apocalypse, and some reckon it among the ὁμολογημένα: ἀδιτιν seems opposed to ὁμολογηῖν: translated

they were all examined, by different persons successively, till they were all found to merit what they claimed; and then they were separated from the crowd, and received due honour from the *Universal Church*. The *delay* in each place was probably *proportioned* to the difficulty of getting due *information* there; whether that difficulty depended upon *distance*, or *prejudice*, or *indifference*, as to the *subject* of the writing neglected.

This sounds well; but still you will say, why were these writings ever controverted at all? I would answer briefly, because they were<sup>d</sup> *Catholic Epistles*: and on this will a more particular answer turn. But, in opposition to this account, it must immediately occur, that the *Apocalypse* is not an Epistle at all, and that the second and third Epistles of John are each of them addressed to a private person. One word, to *obviate* this difficulty, will leave us *free* to pursue our intended reply.—Suppose the *Apocalypse* authentic, yet can you wonder at its not being generally received all at once? if you had seen it amongst eighty<sup>e</sup> or an hundred books, all claiming to be received, would you have

translated twice in Lard. Works, Vol. 4, p. 229, and Vol. 6, p. 391. Lardner uses the word *reject*; I mean in the passage about the Ep. to *Hebrews*. Euseb. 3. 3. The above passage, Euseb. 3. 25. about the *Apocalypse* is translated, Lard. Vol. 4, p. 227, and the word *reject* is used. On reflexion, it seems as if the controverted pieces, or some of them, might *sometimes* be rejected after being noticed; though they might be more frequently neglected, or considered slightly.

<sup>d</sup> It occurred to me here, that 1 *Pet.* and 1 *John* are also *Catholic Epistles*, yet were never controverted.—That *might* happen, and yet the others might be obstructed by being *Catholic*: the first writing of Peter, and the first of John, might come out under circumstances, which might occasion immediate success; and yet the worth of the subsequent ones might be less striking: and more *spurious* writings might rival them.

<sup>e</sup> Leland, p. 44. Of this B. 1. Ch. XII. as before: 40 Gospels, 36 Acts, *known*; and many must have been *lost*.

have dared to take it out of the crowd, except you had received particularly good information concerning its *author*? With the progress of the Apocalypse there was some *regress*; its claim to be treated as Scripture was sacrificed to a controversy about the *Millennium*; as was that of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* to a dispute about the efficacy of *Repentance*. And certainly, the Apocalypse was *Catholic*, though not an *Epistle*; no particular Church had the charge of it, or the care of circulating it.—And, if the second and third Epistles of John are not properly *catholic*, (though the ancients call them <sup>f</sup> so), they must be *private* Letters; would not that have been sufficient to have prevented your making them canonical? Hebrews, James, 2 Pet. and Jude, are *Catholic Epistles* undoubtedly. It has been generally understood, that they were addressed to *Jews* wheresoever *dispersed*; but, though we take *Lardner's* opinion, that the Epistle to the Hebrews was addressed to Christians *in Judea*, who had been Jews: James, to all descendants of *Jacob*, whether converted to Christianity or not:—2 Pet. to all converts, but particularly to those, who had been *Gentiles*;—and *Jude* to *all* converts: still the principal idea remains unaffected; that the persons addressed were not *collected* in any one City, but were *dispersed* without regularity through a *number* of places. So that it was no one's *particular business* to accomplish or promote their universal reception.

<sup>f</sup> See Lard. Vol. 6, p. 592.

## E R R A T A.

Page	Page
19. l. 6 from bottom, read <i>minutes</i> .	249. l. 23, dele <i>that</i> .
34. and a few other places, for practiced r. <i>practised</i> .	257. l. 26, for <i>knew</i> , r. <i>knewest</i> .
75. l. 14 from bottom, for with guards, r. <i>without guards</i> .	287. l. 16, r. <i>so</i> .
90. l. 10, r. <i>heretical</i> .	290. l. 27, r. <i>spurious</i> .
111. note, r. <i>σχίσματα</i> .	293. l. 15, for <i>too</i> , r. <i>to</i> .
117. l. 8 from bottom, r. <i>conscientiously</i> .	294. l. 1, after <i>for</i> , insert <i>his</i> .
122. lowest line, dele <i>works</i> in Italics, and place a period after 372.	344. l. 5, r. <i>say</i>
124. l. 22, r. <i>Science</i> .	367. l. 5, r. <i>edified</i> .
129. l. 17, after <i>legislators</i> , insert <i>yet</i>	375. lowest line of text, for <i>in</i> , r. <i>eis</i> .
140. l. 6, before <i>ignorance</i> , insert <i>the</i> .	376. l. 14, r. <i>ζωσαν</i> .
144. l. 26 and 27, r. <i>the Church</i> .	377. l. 1, r. <i>ἀδντ</i> .
163. note, r. <i>Dr. Doddridge</i> .	378. l. 28, for <i>this</i> , r. <i>thine</i> .
169. l. 5, after <i>last</i> , insert <i>may</i> .	384. Note <i>u</i> , for <i>Anima</i> , r. <i>Animas</i>
171. l. 3 from bottom, r. <i>enlightened</i> .	392. l. 14, r. <i>Augustin</i> .
181. l. 11, after <i>be</i> , insert <i>the</i> .	393 l. 10, r. <i>Article</i> .
187. Note <i>s</i> , after <i>Maxims</i> , insert, by <i>Fenelon</i> .	— l. 30, r. <i>occasional</i> .
192. Note <i>h</i> , l. 2, r. <i>about</i> .	407. l. 24, r. <i>invisible</i> .
211. l. 7, for <i>which</i> , r. <i>whom</i> .	416. l. 1, r. <i>Sadducees</i> .
225. l. 3 from bottom, r. <i>refident</i> .	425. l. 27, r. <i>something</i> .
	433 l. 3, r. <i>feel</i> .
	439. l. 5 from bottom, r. <i>Father</i> .
	449. l. 27, for <i>may</i> , r. <i>mayest</i> .
	467. l. 16, r. <i>question</i> .
	477. l. 5, r. <i>Grotius's</i> .
	484. l. 2. from bottom, r. <i>second</i> .
	486. ends of lines 21 and 22, r. <i>that</i> and <i>not</i> .

Circumflexes are omitted in several Greek words.—Some few times, the *ae* is put where the *ce* ought to be; as in *Oecumenicus*, p. 429. and in *Profopocia*, p. 442, 449.















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