βϑανανυρνν Library ct the Academy of Medicine Caraitto. XGSGD Presented by PLATE I. " ‘> - ] ' 3 4) ὃ. ‘ 4 ͵ -.-- γ᾽ Ly : 7 4 Εν"... ὅ““ “rue ΣΖΘΗ͂ΡΗΣ | "ἢ β : εἶ - Ἵ - Ὶ τὰ Διὰ ῇ : - Be δ Digitized by the Internet Archive — = in 2011 with funding from ἧς : University of Toronto | s ® τῶν " Ay a 5 ᾿ 5, ἰῷ ' : >. τ δὶ δι my ~ a ΨΩ PLATE IT. | \ \ ἡ i ] δὰ } hi AN Nt | \\\ δ ' ς ] ) "ἢ nN \ \ ἣν»: “a \ " Hit billy fe PPAR UTAPV LEAL ic \\v ‘ PLATE ΠΙ. tv PLATE V. PLATE IV PALEY’S NATURAL THEOLOGY, AND HORA PAULINA. a Py Μόν pee εν. ΛΑ νς NATURAL THEOLOGY. 1743-1805 BY WILLIAM PALEY, D.D “ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE. \ FROM A LATE LONDON EDITION. PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN TRACT SOCIETY, 150 NASSAU-STREET, NEW YORK. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. The stone and the watch, page 9; eight cases, 10-13. CHAPTER II. STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.------- 14 CHAPTER III. APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. Eye and telescope, 20; light—distance, 24; eyes of birds, 27; eyes of fishes, 28; minuteness of picture, 29; socket—eyebrow—eyelid—tears, 30; nictitating membrane—muscle, 31; expedients, 33; why means used, 33; ear, 90. CHAPTER IV. OF THE SUCCESSION OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS. No account hereby of contrivance, 41; plants, 41; oviparous animals, 42; viviparous—rational animals, 43; instance from the gardener, 44. CHAPTER V. APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. Repetition from Chap. I., 45; imperfection, 45; superfluous parts, 46; athe- istic argument, 47; remains of possible forms, 49; use arising out of the parts, 51; a principle of order, 54; of our ignorance, 55. CHAPTER VI. THE ARGUMENT CUMULATIVE.------------- 57 CHAPTER VII. THE MECHANICAL AND IMMECHANICAL PARTS AND FUNCTIONS OF ANIMALS AND VEGETABLES. Imperfection of knowledge no proof of want of contrivance, 59; on chemistry, 62; secretion, 63. CHAPTER VIII. MECHANICAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE HUMAN FRAME. Of bones. 68; neck, 68; forearm, 69; spine, 71; chest, 76; kneepan, 77; shoulder-blade, 78; joints, 79; ball-and-socket, 80; ginglymus, 81; knee, 81; ankle, 82; shoulder, 82; passage of bloodvessels, 83; gristle, 84; movable cartilages, 85; mucilage, 85; how well the joints wear, 86; bones of the skull, 86. CHAPTER IX. OF THE MUSCLES. Suitableness to the joints, 87; antagonist muscles, 88; not obstructing one another, 90; action wanted where their situation would be inconvenient, αλλ" he - 0 CONTENTS. 90 ; variety of figure, 91; how many things must be right for health, 92; variety, quickness, and precision of muscular motion, 93; tongue, 93; mouth, 94; nose, 96; music—writing, 96; sphincters, 97; combination of muscles, 97; delicacy of small muscles, 98; mechanical disadvantages, 98 ; single muscles, 99; lower jaw, 99; slit tendons, 100; bandage at the ancles, 101; hypothesis from appetency repelled, 101; Keill’s enumeration of mus- cles, 102; why mechanism is not more striking, 102; description inferior to inspection, 102; quotation from Steno, 103. CHAPTER X. OF THE VESSELS OF ANIMAL BODIES. J. The circulation of the blood, 104; disposition of the bloodvessels, 104; arteries and veins, 105. 11. Heart, as receiving and returning the blood, 106; heart, as referable to the lungs, 108; valves of the heart, 110; vital motion involuntary, 113; pericardium, 113. III. Alimentary system, 114; passage of the food through the stomach to the intestines, 114; passage of the chyle through the lacteals and thoracic duct to the blood, 115; length of intestines, 116; peristaltic motion, 116; tenuity of the lacteals, 116; valves of the thoracic duct, 117; entrance in the neck, 117; digestion, 117. IV. Gall-bladder, 120; oblique insertion of the biliary duct into the intes tines, 120. V. Parotid gland, 121. VI. Larynx, 122; trachea—gullet— epiglottis, 122, 123; rings of the trachea, 123; sensibility, 124; musical instrument, 124; lifting the hand to the head, 120. CHAPTER XI. OF THE ANIMAL STRUCTURE REGARDED AS A MASS. 1. Correspondence of sides, 127; not belonging to the separate limbs, 128, nor the internal contents, 129; nor to the feeding vessels, 129. 11. Pack- age, 130; heart, 131; lungs, 131; liver, 132; bladder, kidneys, pancreas, spleen, 132; omentum, 132; septa of the brain, 133; guts, 133. III. Beauty, 194: in animals, 130; in flowers, 135; whether any natural sense of beauty, 136. IV. Concealment, 137. V. Standing, 138. VI. Inter- rupted analogies, 140; periosteum at the teeth, 141; scarf-skin at the nails, 141; soft integuments at the skull, 141. CHAPTER XII. COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 1 Covering of animals, 144; of man, 144; of birds, 145; structure of feathers, 145; black down, 148. II. Mouths of animals, 149; bills of birds, 150; serrated bills, 150; affinity of mouths, 151. 111. Gullets of animals, 153. IV. Intestines of animals, 153; valves or plates, 103; length, 154. V. Bones of animals, 154; bones of birds, 104. VI. Lungs of animals, 155; lungs of birds, 155. VII. Birds oviparous, 155. VIII. Instruments of motion, 155; wings of birds, 156; fins of fish, 157; web-feet of water-fowl, 159. IX. Senses of animals, 160. i CHAPTER ΧΙΠ. PECULIAR ORGANIZATIONS. Pax-wax of quadrupeds, 162; oil of birds, 163; air-bladder of fish, 163; fan of viper, 165; bag of opossum, 165; claw of heron, 166; stomach of camel, 167; tongue of woodpecker, 167; babyroussa, 168. CONTENTS. 7 CHAPTER XIV. PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES. Teeth, 169; milk, 170; eye of the fetus, 171; lungs of the fetus, 172; fora men ovale, etc., 173. CHAPTER XV. RELATIONS. Alimentary system, 176; kidneys, ureters, and bladder, 179; eyes, hands, feet, 179; sexes, 180; teats and mouths, 180; particular relations, 180; swan, 180; mole, 181. CHAPTER XVI. COMPENSATION. Elephant’s proboscis, 184; hook in the bat’s wing, 185; crane’s neck, 185; parrot’s bill, 186; spider’s web, 186; multiplying-eyes of insects, 186; eye- lid of the chameleon, 187; intestines of the alopecias, 188; snail—mussel— cockle—lobster, 188; sloth—sheep, 190; more general compensations, 190; want of fore-teeth—rumination, 190; in birds, want of teeth and gizzard, 191; reptiles, 192. CHAPTER XVII. THE RELATION OF ANIMATED BODIES TO INANIMATE NATURE. Wings of birds—fins of fish—air and water, 194; ear to the air, 194; organs of speech—voice and respiration to air, 194; eye to light, 195; size of ani- mais to external things, 195; of the inhabitants of the earth and sea to their elements, 196; sleep to night, 196. CHAPTER XVIII. INSTINCTS. Incubation of eggs, 199 ; deposition of eggs of insects, 203; solution from sen- sations considered, 207. CHAPTER XIX. OF INSECTS. Elytra of the scarabeus, 211; borer of flies, 212; sting, 213; proboscis, 214; metamorphosis of insects, 215; care of eggs, 216; observations limited to rticular species, 217; thread of silk-worm and spider, 217; wax and oney of bee, 215; sting of bee, 220; forceps of the panorpa tribe, 220; brushes of flies, 220; glowworm, 220; motion of the larva of the dragon- fly, 221; gossamer spider, 221; shell animals, 222; snail shells, 222; uni- oe shell-fish, 223; bivalve, 223; lobster shell, 224; variety of insects, CHAPTER XX. OF PLANTS. Preservation, perfecting, and dispersing of seed, 227; germination, 234; ten- drils, 235; particular species, 237; vallisneria, 237; cuscuta Europea, 238; mistletoe, 238; colchicum autumnale, 238; dionwza muscipula 240. 8 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXI. THE ELEMENTS. Consolidation of uses, 242. I. Air, 242; reflecting light, 242; evaporating fluids, 242; restoratives of purity, 243. II. Water, 243; purity, 244; insipidity, 244; circulation, 244. III. Fire, 245; dissolvent power, 240. IV. Light, 245; velocity, 245; tenuity, 246; color, 246. CHAPTER XXII. ASTRONOMY. Fixing the source of light and heat in the centre, 249; permanent axis of rota- tion, 251; spherodicity of the earth, 252; οἵ centripetal forces, 253; attrac- tion indifferent to laws, 254; admissible laws, within narrow limits, 256; of admissible laws, the present the best, 257; united attraction of a sphere, the same as of the constituent particles, 257; the apsides fixed, 258; fig- ures of the planetary orbits, 260; Buffon’s hypothesis, 261. CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PERSONALITY OF THE DEITY. Not the object of our senses, 265; contrivance proves personality, 267 ; misap- plication of laws, 269; mechanism, 270; second causes, 271; of generation as a principle, 274; atheistic suppositions, 27); Buffon’s organic nodules, 276; appetencies, 279; analogies by which they are supported, 281; cam- el’s bunch, 281; crane’s thighs, 281; pelican’s pouch, 281; analogy strain- ed, 282; solutions contradicted, 283; by ligaments—valves, 283; by senses of animals, 284; by the parts without motion, 284; by plants, 284. CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY. Omnipotence, 287; omniscience, 287; omnipresence, 288; eternity, 289; self- existence, 289; necessary existence, 290; spirituality, 290. CHAPTER XXV. THE UNITY OF THE DEITY. ¥rom the laws of attraction, and the presence of light among the heavenly bodies, 291; from the laws of nature upon our globe, 291; resemblance of animals, 292; fish, 292; insects and shell-fish, 293. CHAPTER XXVI. GOODNESS OF THE DBHITY. From the parts and faculties of animals, 299; the actual happiness of young animals, 296; of winged insects and aphides, 296; of fish, 297. I. Proper- ties of old age, 298; of different animal habits, 299; prepollency of happi- ness, 299; causes of not observing it, 300; quotation, 501; apparent ex- ceptions, 303; venomous animals, 304; animals of prey, 306. II. Pleas- ures of sense, 311; adaptation of senses, 312; property, origin of, 317; physical evils of imperfection, 318; of finiteness, 319; of bodily pain, 320; of mortal diseases, 322; of death, 323; civil evils of population, 324; of distinctions, 326 ; of wealth, 327; of idleness, 329; objections from chance answered, 330; must be chance in the midst of design, 330; ignorance of observance, 331; disease, 333; seasons, 333; station, 334; acquirability, 334; sensible interposition, 335; probation, 337. CHAPTER XXVIII. CONCLUSION. Natural religion prepares the way for revelation, 344. NATURAL THEOLOGY CHAPTER I STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the contrary it had lain there for ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But sup- pose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, 1 should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone; why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive—what we could not discover in the stone—that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce mo- tion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other man- ner or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts and of their offices, all tending to one result: We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, 1* 1υ NATURAL THEOLOGY. which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain—artificially wrought for the sake of flexure—communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in and apply to each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance and from the bal- ance to the pointer, and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion as to ter- minate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in agiven time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to ‘keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. Thismechanism being observed—: it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it ; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood, the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker—that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which, we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction and designed its use. I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made—that we had never known an artist capable of making one—that we were alto- gether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was per- formed ; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts THE ARGUMENT STATED. 11 our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist’s skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time and in some place or other. Nor can 1 perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise con- cerning a human agent or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature. II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly ght. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer might be evident, and in the case supposed, would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is whether it were made with any design at all. vs Ill. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concern- ing which we could not discover or had not yet discovered in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or in- tention of these parts, although we should be unable to in- vestigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous ᾿ 12 NATURAL THEOLOGY. parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had institut- ed concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before. IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch with its various machinery account- ed for, by being teld that it was one out of possible combi- nations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configu- ration might be the structure now exhibited, namely, of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure. V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfac- tion, to be answered that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker. VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mech- anism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a mo- tive to induce the mind to think so: VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent ; for it is only the mode accord- ing to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the daw does nothing, is nothing. The expression, “the law of metallic nature,” may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as “ the law of vegetable nature,” ‘‘the law of animal nature,” or, indeed, as “‘ the law of nature” in general, when assigned THE ARGUMENT STATED. 13 as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these. VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion or from his confidence in its truth, by being’ told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument ; he knows the utility of the end; he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of know- ing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know. 14 NATURAL THEOLOGY. CHAPTER II. STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. Suprosg, in the next place, that the person who found the watch should after some time discover, that in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing in the course of its movement another watch like itself—the thing is con- ceivable ; that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts—a mould, for instance, or a complex adjustment of lathes, files, and other tools—evidently and separately cal- culated for this purpose; let us inquire what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion. I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether he regarded the object of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism by which it was carried on, he would perceive in this new observation nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done— for referring the construction of the watch to design and to supreme art. If that construction wthout this property, or which is the same thing, before this property had been no- ticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it, still more strong would the proof appear when he came to the knowledge of this further property, the crown and perfection of all the rest. II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were 27 some sense the maker of the watch which was fab- ricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair—the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second ; in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution THE ARGUMENT STATED. 15 and order, either of the parts which the new watch contain- ed, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might possibly say, but with great lati- tude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn ; but no latitude of expression would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair is neither more nor less than this: by the application of an unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it and arranged by intelligence, an efiect is produced, namely, the corn is ground. But the eflect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or the author of the eect; still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary for any share which the water has in grinding the corn; yet is this share the same as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Therefore, III. Though it be now no longer probable that the indi- vidual watch which our observer had found was made imme- diately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in anywise aflect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of diflerent properties. We may ask for the cause of the color of a body, of its hardness, of its heat ; and these causes may be all different. We are now asking for the cause of that subserviency to a use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question, by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer ; contrivance, without a contriver ; order, without choice ; ar- 16 NATURAL THEOLOGY. rangement, without any thing capable of arranging ; subser- viency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechan- ism we so much admire in it—could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependen- cy, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other bemgs. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before. IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty farther back, that is, by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the sub- ject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by this supposition nor dispensed with. If the difficulty were dimin- ished the farther we went back, by going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, there, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained ; but where there is no such tendency or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question, whatever there may be as to many points, between one series and another—be- tween a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite. THE ARGUMENT STATED. 17 A chain composed of an infinite number of links can no more support itself than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured, though we never caw have tried the experiment; because, by increasing the num- ber of links, from ten, for instance, to a hundred, from a hun- dred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect—yet there may be a great difference in several respects—between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, be- tween one that is finite and one that is infinite. This very much resembles the case before us. The machine which we are inspecting demonstrates, by its construction, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver, de- sign a designer, whether the machine immediately proceed- ed from another machine or not. That circumstance alters notthe case. That other machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor does that alter the case ; the contrivance must have had acontriver. That for- mer one from one preceding it: no alteration still ; a contriv- er is still necessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every succession of these machines—a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand; with one series, as with another—a series which is finite, as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other respects they may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and design are unaccounted for. The question is not simply, How came the first watch into existence? which question, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the series of watches thus produced from one another to have been infinite, and consequently to have had no such first, for which it was necessary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been nearly the state of the question, if nothing had been before us but an unorgan- ized, unmechanized substance, without mark or indication ee Ὁ ΌΝ ΒΟΡΨ >= s+” 18 NATURAL THEOLOGY. of contrivance. It might be difficult to show that such sub- stance could not have existed from eternity, either in suc- cession—if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unor- ganized bodies to spring from one another—or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether he had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place ; for, in the watch which we are examining, are seen contrivance, design, an end, a pur- pose, means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts is, Whence this contrivance and design? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapted hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off by increasing a number or succession of substances destitute of these properties; nor the more, by — increasing that number to infinity. Ifit be said, that upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another m the course of that other’s movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, namely, the watch from which it proceeded—lI deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to a use, all of which we discover in the watch, we have any cause what- ever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such causes, or to allege that a series may be carried back to infinity ; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all for the phenomena, still less any series of causes either finite or infi- nite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver ; proofs of design, but no designer. VY. Our observer would further also reflect, that the mak- er of the watch before him was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it : there being no dif- ference, except that the latter manifests a more exquisite skill, between the making of another watch with his own hands, by the mediation of files, lathes, chisels, ete., and the THE ARGUMENT STATED. 15 disposing, fixing, and inserting of these instruments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made, in such a manner as to form a new watch in the course of the movements which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of tools instead of another. The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must have had, for cause and author of that construc- tion, an artificer who understood its mechanism and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A second examina- tion presents us with a new discovery. The watch is found, in the course of its movement, to produce another watch similar to itself; and not only so, but we perceive in it a system or organization separately calculated for that pur- pose. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase beyond measure our admiration of the skill which had been employed in the formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once turn us round to an opposite conclusion, namely, that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, al- though all other evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained without absurdity ? Yet this is atheism. | ᾿ 4 20 NATURAL THEOLOGY. CHAPTER III. APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. Tus is atheism; for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature, with the difference on the side of nature of being greater and more, and that in a de- gree which exceeds all computation. I mean, that the con- trivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, im the complexity, subtilty, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety; yet, in a multitude of cases, are not less evi- dently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity. I know no better method of introducing so large a sub- ject, than that of comparing a single thing with a single thing : an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it. They are made upon the same principles ; both being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves; but such laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted tothem. For instance, these laws require, in order to produce the same eflect, that the rays of light, in passing from water into the eye, should be refracted by a more con- vex surface than when it passes out of air intothe eye. Ac- cordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this difference? What could a mathematical ‘instrument maker have done more to show his knowledge of his principle, his application of that knowledge, his suiting THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 2) of his means to his end—I will not say to display the com- pass or excellence of his skill and art, for in these all com- parison is indecorous, but to testify counsel, choice, consider- ation, purpose ? To some it may appear a difference sufficient to destroy all similitude between the eye and the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the other an unperceiving instru- ment. The fact is that they are both instruments. And as to the mechanism, at least as to mechanism being employed, and even as to the kind of it, this circumstance varies not the analogy at all. For observe what the constitution of the eye is. It is necessary, in order to produce distinct vision, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bot- tom of the eye.* Whence this necessity arises, or how the picture is connected with the sensation or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay, we will confess, if you please, im- possible for us to search out. But the present question is not concerned in the inquiry. It may be true, that in this and in other instances we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way, and that then we come to something which is not me- chanical, or which is inscrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our vestigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic statue con- sists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped; either the mech- anism being too subtile for our discernment, or something else * Prarel., Fie. 1. A section of the human eye. It is formed of various coats, or membranes, enclosing pellucid humors of different degrees of density, and adapted for collecting the rays of light into a focus upon the nerve situated at the bottom of the eyeball: a, is the aqueous humor, a thin fluid like water; 6, the crystalline lens, of a dense texture; c, the vitreous humor, a very delicate gelatinous sub- stance, named from its resemblance to melted glass. Thus the crys- talline is more dense than the vitreous, and the vitreous more dense than the aqueous humor. They are all perfectly transparent, and together make a compound lens which refracts the rays of light issuing from an object, d, and delineates its figure, e, in the focus upon the retina, inverted. 22 NATURAL THEOLOGY. besides the known laws of mechanism taking place; where- as, in the automaton, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout. But, up to the limit, the reasoning is as clear and certain in the one case as in the other. In the example before us it is a matter of certainty, because it is a matter which expe- rience and observation demonstrate, that the formation of an image at the bottom of the eye is necessary to perfect vision. The image itself can be shown. Whatever aflects the dis- tinctness of the image, affects the distinctness of the vision. The formation then of such an image being necessary—no matter how—to the sense of sight and to the exercise of that sense, the apparatus by which it is formed is construct- ed and put together not only with infinitely more art, but upon the selfsame principles of art, as in the telescope or the camera-obscura. The perception arising from the image may be laid out of the question; for the production of the image, these are instruments of the same kind. The ena is the same ; the means are the same. The purpose in both is alike; the contrivance for accomplishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses of the telescopes and the humors of the eye bear a complete resemblance to one another, in their figure, their position, and in their power over the rays of light, namely, in bringing each pencil to a point at the right distance from the lens; namely, in the eye, at the ex- act place where the membrane is spread to receive it. How is it possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal evidence, to exclude contriv- ance from the one, yet to acknowledge the proof of contriv- ance having been employed, as the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the other ? The resemblance between the two cases is still more ac- curate, and obtains in more points than we have yet repre- sented, or than we are, on the first view of the subject, aware of. In dioptric telescopes there is an imperfection of this nature. Pencils of light, in passing through glass lenses, \ THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 23 are separated into different colors, thereby tinging the object, especially the edges of it, as if it were viewed through a prism. To correct this inconvenience had been long a desid- eratum inthe art. At last it came into the mind of a saga- cious optician, to inquire how this matter was managed in the eye, in which there was exactly the same difficulty to contend with as in the telescope. His observation taught him that in the eye the evil was cured by combining lenses composed of different substances, that is, of substances which possessed different refracting powers. Our artist borrowed thence his hint, and produced a correction of the defect by imitating, in glasses made from different materials, the eflects of the different humors through which the rays of light pass before they reach the bottom of the eye. Could this be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose ? But further, there are other points, not so much perhaps of strict resemblance between the two, as of superiority of the eye over the telescope, yet of a superiority which, being founded in the laws that regulate both, may furnish topics of fair and just comparison. Two things were wanted to the eye, which were not wanted, at least in the same degree, to the telescope ; and these were the adaptation of the organ, first, to different degrees of light, and secondly, to the vast diversity of distance at which objects are viewed by the na- ked eye, namely, from a few inches to as many miles. These difficulties present not themselves to the maker of the tele- scope. He wants all the light he can get; and he never directs his instrument to objects near at hand. In the eye, both these cases were to be provided for ; and for the purpose of providing for them, a subtile and appropriate mechanism is introduced. ~ I. In order to exclude excess of light when it is exces- sive, and to render objects visible under obscurer degrees of it when no more can be had, the hole or aperture in the eye through which the light enters is so formed as to’ contract 24 NATURAL THEOLOGY. or dilate itself for the purpose of admitting a greater or less number of rays at the same time. The chamber of the eye is a camera-obscura, which, when the light is too small, can enlarge its opening ; when too strong, can again contract it; and that without any other assistance than that of its own exquisite machinery. It is farther also, in the human sub- ject, to be observed, that this hole in the eye which we call the pupil, under all its different dimensions, retains its exact circular shape. This is a structure extremely artificial, Let an artist only try to execute the same; he will find that his threads and strings must be disposed with great considera- tion and contrivance, to make a circle which shall continu- ally change its diameter yet preserve its form. This is done in the eye by an application of fibres, that is, of strings sim- ilar, in their position and action, to what an artist would and raust employ, if he had the same piece of workmanship to perform. II. The second difficulty which has been stated was the suiting of the same organ to the perception of objects that lie near at hand, within a few inches, we will suppose, of the eye, and of objects which are placed at a considerable distance from it, that, for example, of as many furlongs—I speak in both cases of the distance at which distinct vision can be exercised. Now this, according to the principles of optics, that is, according to the laws by which the transmis- sion of light is regulated—and these laws are fixed—could not be done without the organ itself undergoing an alteration, and receiving an. adjustment that might correspond with the exigency of the case, that is to say, with the different inclination to one another under which the rays of light reached it. Rays issuing from points placed at a small dis- tance from the eye, and which consequently must enter the eye in a spreading or diverging order, cannot, by the same optical instrument in the same state, be brought to a point, that is, be made to form an image in the same place, with rays proceeding from objects situated at a much greater dis- THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 25 tance, and which rays arrive at the eye in directions nearly, (and physically speaking) parallel. It requires a rounder lens to do it. The point of concourse behind the lens must fall critically upon the retina, or the vision 15 confused ; yet other things remaining the same, this poimt, by the immuta- ble properties of light, is carried further back when the rays proceed from a near object than when they are sent from one that is remote. A person who was using an optical instrument would manage this matter by changing, as the occasion required, his lens or his telescope, or by adjusting the distance of his glasses with his hand or his screw; but how is this to be managed in the eye? What the alteration was, or in what part of the eye it took place, or by what means it was eflected—for if the known laws which govern the refraction of light be maintained, some alteration in the state of the organ there must be—had long formed a subject of inquiry and conjecture. The change, though sufficient for the purpose, is so minute as to elude ordinary observation. Some very late discoveries, deduced from a laborious and most accurate inspection of the structure and operation of the organ, seem at length to have ascertained the mechanical alteration which the parts of the eye undergo. It is found, that by the action of certain muscles called the straight mus- cles,* and which action is the most advantageous that could be imagined for the purpose—it is found, I say, that when- ever the eye is directed to a near object, three changes are produced in it at the same time, all severally contributing to the adjustment required. The cornea or outermost coat of the eye is rendered more round and prominent, the crystalline lens underneath is pushed forward, and the axis of vision, * Pratre L., Fic. 2. There are four straight muscles, a, a, belong to the globe of the eye, each arising from the bottom of the orbit, where they surround c, the optic nerve. They are strong and fleshy, and are inserted by broad thin tendons at the fore part of the globe of the eye into the tunica sclerotica. Their use is to turn the eye in differ- ent directions; hence they are severally named levator oculi, depres- sor oculi, adductor oculi, and abductor oculi. Nat. Theol. 2 26 NATURAL THEOLOGY. as the depth of the eye is called, is elongated. These changes in the eye vary its power over the rays of light in such a manner and degree as to produce exactly the eflect which is wanted, namely, the formation of an image wpon the rett- aa, whether the rays come to the eye in a state of divergen- cy, which is the case when the object is near to the eye, or come parallel to one another, which is the case when the object is placed at a distance. Can any thing be more deci- sive of contrivance than this is? The most secret laws of optics must have been known to the author of a structure endowed with such a capacity of change. It is as though an optician, when he had a nearer object to view, should rectify . his instrument by putting in another glass, at the same time drawing out also his tube to a different length. Observe a new-born child first liftmg up its eyelids. What does the opening of the curtain discover? The anterior part of two pellucid globes, which, when they come to be examined, are found to be constructed upon strict optical principles— the selfsame principles upon which we ourselves construct optical instruments. We find them perfect for the purpose of forming an image by refraction ; composed of parts exe- cuting different offices; one part having fulfilled its office upon the pencil of light, delivering it over to the action of another part; that to a third, and so onward : the progressive action depending for its success upon the nicest and minut- est adjustment of the parts concerned ; yet these parts so in fact adjusted as to produce, not by a simple action or effect, but by a combination of actions and effects, the result which is ultimately wanted. And forasmuch as this organ would have to operate under different circumstances, with strong degrees of light and with weak degrees, upon near objects and upon remote ones, and these differences demanded, ac- cording to the laws by which the transmission of light is regulated, a corresponding diversity of structure—that the aperture, for example, through which the light passes should be larger or less—the lenses rounder or flatter, or that their THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 27 distance from the tablet upon which the picture is delineated should be shortened or lengthened—this, I say, being the case, and the difficulty to which the eye was to be adapted, we find its several parts capable of being occasionally chang- ed, and a most artificial apparatus provided to produce that change. This is far beyond the common regulator of a watch, which requires the touch of a foreign hand to set it ; but it is not altogether unlike Harrison’s contrivance for making a watch regulate itself, by inserting within it a ma- chinery which, by the artful use of the different expansion of metals, preserves the equability of the motion under all the various temperatures of heat and cold in which the instru- ment may happen to be placed. The ingenuity of this last contrivance has been justly praised. Shall, therefore, a struc- ture which differs from it chiefly by surpassing it, be account- ed no contrivance at all; or, if it be a contrivance, that it is without a contriver ? But this, though much, is not the whole: by different species of animals, the faculty we are describing is possessed in degrees suited to the different range of vision which their mode of life and of procuring their food requires. Birds, for instance, in general, procure their food by means of their beak ; and the distance between the eye and the point of the beak being small, it becomes necessary that they should have the power of seeing very near objects distinctly. On the other hand, from being often elevated much above the ground, living in the air, and moving through it with great velocity, they require for their safety, as well as for assisting them in descrying their prey, a power of seeing at a great distance—a power of which, in birds of rapine, surprising examples are given. The fact accordingly is, that two pe- culiarities are found in the eyes of birds, both tending to fa- cilitate the change upon which the adjustment of the eye to different distances depends. The one 15 ἃ bony, yet, in most species, a flexible rim or hoop, surrounding the broadest part of the eye, which confining the action of the muscles to that 28 NATURAL THEOLOGY. part, increases the effect of their lateral pressure upon the orb, by which pressure its axis is elongated for the purpose of looking at very near objects. The other is an additional muscle called the marsupium, to draw, on occasion, the crystalline lens dack, and to fit the same eye for the viewing of very distant objects. By these means, the eyes of birds can pass from one extreme to another of their scale of adjust- ment, with more ease and readiness than the eyes of other animals. The eyes of fishes also, compared with those of terrestrial animals, exhibit certain distinctions of structure adapted to their state and element. We have already observed upon . the figure of the crystalline compensating by its roundness the density of the medium through which their light passes. To which we have to add, that the eyes of fish, in their nat- ural and indolent state, appear to he adjusted to near ob- jects, in this respect differing from the human eye, as well as those of quadrupeds and birds. The ordinary shape of the fish’s eye being in a much higher degree convex than. that of land animals, a corresponding difference attends its muscular conformation, namely, that it is throughout calcu- lated for flattening the eye. The 9715 also in the eyes of fish does not admit af con- traction. This is a great difference, of which the probable reason is, that the diminished light in water is never too strong for the retina. In the eel, which has to work its head through sand and pravel, the roughest and harshest substances, there is placed before the eye, and at some distance from it, a transparent, horny, convex case or covering, which, without obstructing the sight, defends the organ. To such an animal could any thing be more wanted or more useful ? Thus, in comparing the eyes of different kinds of animals, we see in their resemblances and distinctions one general plan laid down, and that plan varied with the varying exi- gencies to which it is to be applied. THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 29 There is one property however, common, I believe, to all eyes, at least to all which have been examined,* namely, that the optic nerve enters the bottom of the eye not in the centre or middle, but a little on one side—not in the point where the axis of the eye meets the retina, but between that point and the nose. The difference which this makes is, that no part of an object is unperceived by both eyes at the same time. . In considering vision as achieved by the means of an image formed at the bottom of the eye, we can never reflect without wonder upon the smallness yet correctness of the picture, the subtilty of the touch, the fineness of the lines. A landscape of five or six square leagues is brought mto a space of half an inch diameter, yet the multitude of objects which it contains are all preserved, are all discriminated in their magnitudes, positions, figures, colors. The prospect: from Hampstead-hill is compressed into the compass of a sixpence, yet circumstantially represented. A stage-coach, travelling at an ordinary speed for half an hour, passes in the eye only over one-twelfth of an inch, yet is this change of place in the image distinctly perceived throughout its whole progress; for it is only by means of that perception that the motion of the coach itself is made sensible to the eye. If any thing can abate our admiration of the small- ness of the visual tablet compared with the extent of vision, it is a reflection which the view of nature leads us every hour to make, namely, that in the hands of the Creator, great and little are nothing. Sturmius held that the examination of the eye was a eure for atheism. Besides that conformity to optical prin- ciples which its internal constitution displays, and which alone amounts to a manifestation of intelligence having been exerted in the structure—besides this, which forms, no doubt, the leading character of the organ, there is to be seen, in * The eye of the seal or sea-calf, I understand, is an exception Mem. Acad. Paris, 1710, p. 123. ee ee ee eee ae | συν eS eee ee SS eee eee eo. hl ee ll ΤΣ ee SS. ee” h Se Ύ Ύ ὙΣ ῪῪ | pe ie a ee r 30 NATURAL THEOLOGY. every thing belonging to it and about it, an extraordinary degree of care, an anxiety for its preservation, due, if we may so speak, to its value and its tenderness. It is lodged in a strong, deep, bony socket, composed by the junction of seven different bones,* hollowed out at their edges. In some few species, as that of the coatimondi,} the orbit is not bony throughout ; but whenever this is the case, the upper, which is the deficient part, is supplied by a cartilaginous ligament, a substitution which shows the same care. Within this socket it is embedded in fat, of all animal substances the best adapted both to its repose and motion. It is sheltered by the eyebrows—an arch of hair which, like a thatched penthouse, prevents the sweat and moisture of the forehead from running down into it. But it is still better protected by its id. Of the super- -ficial parts of the animal frame, I know none which, in its office and structure, is more deserving of attention than the eyelid. It defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there in any work of art whatever, purposes more evi- dent than those which this organ fulfils; or an apparatus for executing those purposes more intelligible, more appro- priate, or more mechanical? If it be overlooked by the ob- server of nature, it can only be because it is obvious and familiar. This is a tendency to be guarded against. We pass by the plainest instances, while we are exploring those which are rare and curious ; by which conduct of the under- standing we sometimes neglect the strongest observations, being taken up with others which, though more recondite and scientific, are, as solid arguments, entitled to much less consideration. In order to keep the eye moist and clean—which quali- ties are necessary to its brightness and its use—a wash is constantly supplied by a secretion for the purpose; and the superfluous brine is conveyed to the nose through a perfora- * Heister, sect. 89. t Memoirs of the Royal Academy, Paris, p. 117. THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 91 tion in the bone as large as ἃ goose-quill.* When once the fluid has entered tne nose, it spreads itself upon the inside of the nostril, and 1s evaporated by the current of warm air which in the course of respiration is continually passing over it. Can any pipe or outlet for carrying off the waste liquor from a dye-house or a distillery, be more mechanical than thisis? It is easily perceived that the eye must want moist- ure ; but could the want of the eye generate the gland which produces the tear, or bore the hole by which it is discharg- ed—a hole through a bone ? It is observable that this provision 15 not found in fish— the element in which they live supplying a constant lotion to the eye. It were, however, injustice to dismiss the eye as a piece of mechanism, without noticing that most exquisite of all contrivances, the 22clviating membrane,t which is found in the eyes of birds and of many quadrupeds. Its use is to sweep the eye, which it does in an instant—to spread over it the lachrymal humor—to defend it also from sudden inju- ries; yet not totally, when drawn upon the pupil, to shut out the light. The commodiousness with which it lies fold- ed up in the inner corner of the eye, ready for use and ac- tion, and the quickness with which it executes its purpose, are properties known and obvious to every observer; but * Prate I., Fic. 3. a, is the lachrymal gland, which supplies this fluid ; it is situated at the outer and upper part of the orbit of the eye, and secretes or separates tears from the blood. There are five or six ducts or tubes, ὦ, which convey this fluid to the globe of the eye, for the purpose of keeping it moist and facilitating its movements : the motion of the eyelid diffuses the tears, and ¢, c, the puncta lachry- malia, take up the superfiuous moisture, which passes through d, the lachrymal sac and duct, into the nostril at e. 7 Prate L., Fie. 4. The nictitating membrane, or third eyelid, is a thin, semitransparent fold of the conjunctive, which in a state of rest lies in the inner corner of the eye, with its loose edge nearly ver- tical, but can be drawn out so as to cover the whole front of the eye- ball. By means of this membrane, according to Cuvier, the eagle is enabled to look at the sun. ἢ ' 92 NATURAL THEOLOGY. what is equally admirable, though not quite so obvious, is the combination of two kinds of substance, muscular and elastic, and of two different kinds of action, by which the motion of this membrane is performed. It is not, as in ordi- nary cases, by the action of two antagonist muscles—the one pulling forward and the other backward—that a reciprocal change is eflected, but it is thus: the membrane itself is an elastic substance, capable of being drawn out by force like a piece of elastic gum, and by its own elasticity returning, when the force is removed, to its former position. Such be- ing its nature, in order to fit it up for its office, it is connect- ed, by a tendon or thread, with a muscle in the back part of - the eye: this tendon or thread, though strong, is so fine as δ, not to obstruct the sight even when it passes across it; and the muscle itself being placed in the back part of the eye, derives from its situation the advantage not only of being secure, but of being out of the way, which it would hardly have been in any position that could be assigned to it in the. anterior part of the orb, where its function les. When the muscle behind the eye contracts, the membrane by means of the communicating thread is instantly drawn over the fore part of it. When the muscular contraction—which is a positive and most probably a voluntary eflort—ceases to be exerted, the elasticity alone of the membrane brings it back again to its position.* Does not this, if any thing can do it, bespeak an artist, master of his work, acquainted with his materials ? ‘Of a thousand other things,” say the French academicians, ‘‘ we perceive not the contrivance, because we understand them only by their effects, of which we know not the causes; but we here treat of a machine, all the parts whereof are visible, and which need only be looked upon to discover the reasons of its motion and action.” * Philosophical Transactions, 1796. {+ Memoirs for a Natural History of Animais, by the Royal Acad- emy of Sciences at Paris, done into English by order of the Royal So- ciety, 1701, p. 249. THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 33 In the configuration of the muscle which, though placed behind the eye, draws the nictitating membrane over the eye, there is what the authors just now quoted deservedly call a marvellous mechanism. I suppose this structure to be found in other animals; but in the memoirs from which this account is taken, it is anatomically demonstrated only in the cassowary. The muscle is passed through a loop formed by another muscle, and is there inflected as if it were round a pulley. This is a peculiarity—and observe the advantage of it. A single muscle with a straight ten- don, which is the common muscular form, would have been sufficient, if it had had power ἰο draw far enough. But the contraction necessary to draw the membrane over the whole eye, required a longer muscle than could lie straight at the bottom of the eye. Therefore, in order to have a greater length in a less compass, the chord of the main muscle makes an angle. This so far answers the end; but still fur- ther, it makes an angle, not round a fixed pivot, but round a loop formed by another muscle, which second muscle, whenever it contracts, of course twitches the first muscle at the point of inflection, and thereby assists the action designed by both. One question may possibly have dwelt in the reader’s mind during the perusal of these observations, namely, Why should not the Deity have given to the animal the faculty of vision αὐ once? Why this circuitous perception ; the minis- try of so many means ; an element provided for the purpose ; reflected from opaque substances, refracted through trans- parent ones, and both according to precise laws; then a complex organ, an intricate and artificial apparatus, in or- der, by the operation of this element and in conformity with the restrictions of these laws, to produce an image upon a membrane communicating with the brain? Wherefore all this? Why make the difficulty in order to surmount it? If to perceive objects by some other mode than that of touch, or objects which lay out of the reach of that sense, were the o* eS ao ‘ 34 NATURAL THEOLOGY. thing proposed, could not a simple volition of the Creator have communicated the capacity? Why resort to contriv- ance where power is omnipotent? Contrivance, by its very definition and nature, is the refuge of imperfection. To have recourse to expedients implies difficulty, impediment, restraint, defect of power. This question belongs to the other senses as well as to sight; to the general functions of ani- mal life, as nutrition, secretion, respiration ; to the economy of vegetables—and indeed to almost all the operations of nature. The question, therefore, is of very wide extent ; and among other answers which may be given to it, besides reasons of which probably we are ignorant, one answer is this: It is only by the display of contrivance that the ex- istence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity could be testi- fied to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends upon the phenomena or the works of nature. Take away this, and you take away from us every subject of observation and ground of reasoning ; I mean, as our rational faculties are formed at present. Whatever is done, God could have done without the intervention of im- struments or means; but it is in the construction of instru- ments, in the choice and adaptation of means, that a crea- tive intelligence is seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power, and to work his ends within those limits. The general laws of matter have perhaps prescribed the nature of these limits ; Its inertia ; its reiiction ; the laws which govern the communication of mo- tion, the refraction and reflection of light, and the constitu- tion of fluids non-elastic and elastic, the transmission of sound through the latter; the laws of magnetism, of electri- city, and probably others yet undiscovered. These are gen- eral laws ; and when a particular purpose is to be effected, it is not by making a new law, nor by the suspension of the old ones, nor by making them wind and bend, and yield to THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 90 the occasion—for nature with great steadiness adheres to and supports them—but it is, as we have seen in the eye, by the interposition of an apparatus corresponding with these laws, and suited to the exigency which results from them, that the purpose is at length attained. As we have said, therefore, God prescribes limits to his power, that he may let in the exercise and thereby exhibit demonstrations of his wisdom. For then—that is, such laws and limitations being laid down—it is as though one Being should have fixed cer- tain rules, and, if we may so speak, provided certain mate- rials, and afterwards have committed to another Being, out of these materials, and in subordination to these rules, the task of drawing forth a creation: a supposition which evidently leaves room and induces indeed a necessity for ¢on- trivance. Nay, there may be many such agents, and many ranks of these. We do not advance this as a doctrine either of philosophy or of religion ; but we say that the subject may safely be represented under this view, because the Deity, acting himself by general laws, will have the same conse- quences upon our reasoning as if he had prescribed these laws to another. It has been said, that the problem of crea- tion was, “attraction and matter being given, to make a world out of them ;” and, as above explained, this statement perhaps does not convey a false idea. We have made choice of the eye as an instance upon which to rest the argument of this chapter. Some single example was to be proposed, and the eye offered itself un- der the advantage of admitting of a strict comparison with optical instruments. The ear, it is probable, is no less arti- ficially and mechanically adapted to its office than the eye. But we know less about it; we do not so well understand the action, the use, or the mutual dependency of its internal parts. Its general form however, both external and inter- nal, is sufficient to show that it is an instrument adapted to the reception of sownd; that is to say, already knowing that sound consists in pulses of the air, we perceive in the 36 NATURAL THEOLOGY. structure of the ear a suitableness to receive impressions from this species of action, and to propagate these impressions to the brain. For of what does this structure consist? An ex- ternal ear, the concha,* calculated, like an ear-trumpet, to catch and collect the pulses of which we have spoken ; in large quadrupeds turning to the sound, and possessing a con- figuration as well as motion evidently fitted for the office : of a tube which leads into the head, lying at the root of this outward ear, the folds and sinuses thereof tending and con- * Prarr I., Fic. 5. a, the tube leading frora the external ear ; hay- ing little glands to secrete the wax, and hairs standing across it to exclude insects without impeding the vibrations of the atmosphere ; b, the membrane of the tympanum, drawn into the form of a funnel by the attachment of the malleus ; c, the chain of four bones lying in the irregular cavity of the tympanum, and communicating the vibrations of the membrane 6 to the fluid in the labyrinth; d, the eustachian tube, which forms a communication between the throat and the tym- panum, so as to preserve an equilibrium of the air in the cavity of the tympanum and of the atmosphere; e, 7, g, the labyrinth—consisting of a central cavity, the vestibule g, the three semicircular canals e, and the cochlea 7. Beginning from the left hand, (see also Fig. 6,) we have the mal- leus or hammer, the first of the chain of bones; we see its long han- dle or process, which is attached to the membrane of the tympanum, and moves as that vibrates; its other end is enlarged, and has a groove upon it which is articulated with the next bone. This second bone is the incus or anvil, to the grooved surface of which the malleus is at- tached. A long process extends from this bone, which has upon it the os orbiculare; to this third bone there is attached a fourth, the stapes, which is in shape like a stirrup-iron. The base of this bone is of an oval shape, and rests upon a membrane which closes the hole leading into the labyrinth. This hole is called the foramen ovale. The plan of the cochlea shows that one of its spiral passages, begin- ning in the vestibule e, winds round the pillar till it meets in a point with another tube. If the eye follows this second spiral tube, it will be found to lead, not into the vestibule, but into the irregular cavity of the tympanum. Sounds striking against the membrane of the tympanum, are propagated by means of the four small bones to the water contained in the cavities of the labyrinth; and by means of this water the impression is conveyed to the extremities of th> auditory nerve and finally to the brain. THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 37 ducting the air towards it: of a thin membrane like the pelt of a drum stretched across this passage upon a bony rim: of a chain of movable and infinitely curious bones, forming a communication, and the only communication that ‘can be observed, between the membrane last mentioned and the interior channels and recesses of the skull: of cavities similar in shape and form to wind instruments of music, be- ing spiral or portions of circles: of the eustachian tube, like the hole in a drum, to let the air pass freely into and out of the barrel of the ear, as the covering membrane vibrates, or as the temperature may be altered: the whole labyrinth hewn out of a rock; that is, wrought into the substance of the hardest bone of the body. This assemblage of connected parts constitutes together an apparatus plainly enough rela- tive to the transmission of sound, or of the impulses received from sound, and only to be lamented in not being better understood. The communication within, formed by the small bones of the ear, is, to look upon, more like what we are accus- tomed to call machinery, than any thing I am acquainted with in animal bodies. It seems evidently designed to con- tinue towards the sensorium the tremulous motions which are excited in the membrane of the tympanum, or what is better known by the name of the “drum of the ear.” The compages of bones consists of four, which are so disposed, and so hinge upon one another, as that if the membrane, the drum of the ear, vibrate, all the four are put in motion to- gether; and, by the result of their action, work the base of that which is the last in the series upon an aperture which it closes, and upon which it plays, and which aperture opens into the tortuous canals that lead to the brain. This last bone of the four is called the stapes. The office of the drum of the ear is to spread out an extended surface capable of receiving the impressions of sound, and of being put by them into a state of vibration. The office of the stapes is to re- peat these vibrations. It is a repeating frigate, stationed 38 NATURAL THEOLOGY. more within the line. From which account of its action may be understood how the sensation of sound will be excit- ed by any thing which communicates a vibratory motion to the stapes, though not, as in all ordinary cases, through the intervention of the membrana tympani. This is done by solid bodies applied to the bones of the skull, as by a metal bar holden at one end between the teeth, and touching at the other end a tremulous body. It likewise appears to be done, in a considerable degree, by the air itself, even when this membrane, the drum of the ear, is greatly damaged. Either in the natural or preternatural state of the organ, the - use of the chain of bones is to propagate the impulse in a direction towards the brain, and to propagate it with the advantage of a lever; which advantage consists in increas- ing the force and strength of the vibration, and at the same time diminishing the space through which it oscillates ; both of which changes may augment or facilitate the still deeper action of the auditory nerves. The benefit of the eustachian tube to the organ may be made out upon pneumatic principles. Behind the drum of the ear is a second cavity, or barrel, called the tympanum. The eustachian tube is a slender pipe, but sufficient for the passage of air, leading from this cavity into the back part of the mouth. Now, it would not have done to have had a vacuum in this cavity; for in that case the pressure of the atmosphere from without would have burst the membrane which covered it. Nor would it have done to have filled the cavity with lymph, or any other secretion, which would necessarily have obstructed both the vibration of the mem- brane and the play of the small bones. Nor, lastly, would it have done to have occupied the space with confined aur, because the expansion of that air by heat, or its contraction by cold, would have distended or relaxed the covering mem- brane in a degree inconsistent with the purpose which it was designed to execute. The only remaining expedient, and that for which the eustachian tube serves. is to open THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 39 to this cavity a communication with the external air. In one word, it exactly answers the purpose of the hole in a drum. The membrana tympani itself, likewise, deserves all the examination which can be made of it. It is not found in the ears of fish ; which furnishes an additional proof of what indeed is indicated by every thing about it, that it is appro- priated to the action of air, or of an elastic medium. It bears an obvious resemblance to the pelt or head of a drum, from which it takes its name. It resembles also a drum- head in this principal property, that its use depends upon its tension. Tension is the state essential to it. Now we know that, im a drum, the pelt is carried over a hoop, and braced as occasion requires, by the means of strings attached to its circumference. In the membrane of the ear the same pur- pose is provided for more simply, but not less mechanically nor less successfully, by a different expedient, namely, by the end of a bone—the handle of the malleus—pressing upon its centre. It is only in very large animals that the texture of this membrane can be discerned. In the Philosophical Transactions for the year 1800, vol. 1, Mr. Everard Home has given some curious observations upon the ear, and the drum of the ear of an elephant. He discovered in it what he calls a radiated muscle—that is, straight muscular fibres passing along the membrane from the circumference to the centre—from the bony rim which surrounds it towards the handle of the malleus, to which the central part is attached. This muscle he supposes to be designed to bring the mem- brane into unison with different sounds ; but then he also dis- covered that this muscle itself cannot act, unless the mem- brane be drawn to a stretch, and kept in a due state of tight- ness by what may be called a foreign force, namely, the action of the muscles of the malleus. Supposing his expla- nation of the use of the parts to be just, our author is well founded in the reflection which he makes upon it, “ that this mode of adapting the ear to different sounds, is one of «. 40 NATURAL THEOLOGY. the most beautiful applications of muscles in the body ; the mechanism is so simple, and the variety of effects so great.” In another volume of the Transactions above referred to, and of the same year, two most curious cases are related of persons who retained the sense of hearing, not in a perfect but in a very considerable degree, notwithstanding the al- most total loss of the membrane we have been describing. In one of these cases, the use here assigned to that mem- brane, of modifying the impressions of sound by change of tension, was attempted to be supplied by straining the mus- cles of the outward ear. ‘‘ The external ear,’ we are told, “had acquired a distinct motion upward and backward. which was observable whenever the patient listened to any thing which he did not distinctly hear: when he was ad- dressed in a whisper, the ear was seen immediately to move ; when the tone of voice was louder, it then remained altogether motionless.” It appears probable, from both these cases, that a collat- eral if not principal use of the membrane is to cover and protect the barrel of the ear which lies behind it. Both the patients suffered from cold: one, “ἃ great increase of deaf- ness from catching cold ;” the other, “‘ very considerable pain from exposure to a stream of cold air.” Bad effects there- fore followed from this cavity being left open to the external air; yet, had the Author of nature shut it up by any other cover than what was capable, by its texture, of receiving vibrations from sound, and by its connection with the imte- rior parts, of transmitting those vibrations to the braim, the use of the organ, so far as we can judge, must have been entirely obstructed. THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 41 CHAPTER IV. ON THE SUCCESSION OF PLANTS AND ANI- MALS. Tue generation of the animal no more accounts for the contrivance of the eye or ear, than, upon the supposition stated in a preceding chapter, the production of a watch by the motion and mechanism of a former watch, would ac- count for the skill and attention evidenced in the watch so produced—than it would account for the disposition of the wheels, the catching of their teeth, the relation af the sev- eral parts of the works to one another, and to their common end—for the suitableness of their forms and places to their offices, for their connection, their operation, and the useful result of that operation. I do insist most strenuously upon the correctness of this comparison ; that it holds as to every rnode of specific propagation ; and that whatever was true of the watch, under the hypothesis above-mentioned, is true of plants and animals. I. To begin with the fructification of plants. Can it be doubted but that the seed contains a particular organization ? Whether a latent plantule with the means of temporary nu- trition, or whatever else it be, it encloses an organization suited to the germination of a new plant. Has the plant which produced the seed any thing more to do with that organization, than the watch would have had to do with the structure of the watch which was produced in the course of its mechanical movement? I mean, Has it any thing at all to do with the contrivance? 'The maker and contriver of one watch, when he inserted within it a mechanism suit- ed to the production of another watch, was, in truth, the maker and contriver of that other watch. All the proper- ties of the new watch were to be referred to his agency: the design manifested in it, to his intention ; the art, to him as the artist ; the collocation of each part, to his placing; the 42 NATURAL THEOLOGY. action, effect, and use, to his counsel, intelligence, and work- manship. In producing it by the intervention of a former watch, he was only working by one set of tools instead of another. So it is with the plant, and the seed produced by it. Can any distinction be assigned between the two cases ; between the producing watch and the producing plant; both passive unconscious substances—both, by the organization which was given to them, producing their hike without un- derstanding or design—both, that is, instruments ? II. From plants we may proceed to oviparous animals— from seeds to eggs. Now I say, that the bird has the same " concern in the formation of the egg which she lays, as the plant has in that of the seed which it drops; and no other nor greater. The internal constitution of the egg is as much a secret to the hen as if the hen were inanimate. Her will cannot alter it, or change a single feather of the chick. She can neither foresee nor determine of which sex her brood shall be, or how many of either; yet the thing produced shall be, from the first, very different in its make, according to the sex which it bears. So far, therefore, from adapting the means, she is not beforehand apprized of the effect. If there be concealed within that smooth shell a provision and a preparation for the production and nourishment of a new animal, they are not of her providing or preparing ; if there be contrivance, it is none of hers. Although, therefore, there be the difference of life and perceptivity between the animal and the plant, it is a difference which enters not into the account: it is a foreign circumstance; it is a difference of properties not employed. The animal function and the veg- etable function are alike destitute of any design which can operate upon the form of the thing produced. The plant has no design in producing the seed—no comprehension of the nature or use of what it produces: the bird, with respect to its egg, is not above the plant with respect to its seed. Neither the one nor the other bears that sort of relation to what proceeds from them which a joiner does to the chair THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 43 which he makes. Now a cause which bears thzs relation to the efiect, is what we want, im order to account for the suitableness of means to an end—the fitness and fitting of one thing to another; and this cause the parent plant or animal does not supply. It is further observable concerning the propagation of plants and animals, that the apparatus employed exhibits no resemblance to the thing produced ; in this respect, hold- ing an analogy with instruments and tools of art. The filaments, anther, and stigmata of flowers, bear no more resemblance to the young plant, or even to the seed which is formed by their intervention, than a chisel or a plane does to atable ora chair. What then are the filaments, anthere, and stigmata of plants, but instruments, strictly so called ? 11. We may advance from animals which bring forth eggs, to animals which bring forth their young alive; and of this latter class, from the lowest to the highest—from irrational to rational life, from brutes to the human species, without perceiving, as we proceed, any alteration whatever in the terms of the comparison. The rational animal does not produce its offspring with more certainty or success than the irrational animal; a man than a quadruped, a quadru- ped than a bird; nor—for we may follow the gradation through its whole scale—a bird than a plant; nor a plant than a watch, a piece of dead mechanism, would do, upon the supposition which has already so often been repeated. Rationality, therefore, has nothing to do in the business. If an account must be given of the contrivance which we ob- serve ; if it be demanded, whence arose either the contriv- ance by which the young animal is produced, or the con- trivance manifested in the young animal itself, it is not from the reason of the parent that any such account can be drawn. He is the cause of his offspring, in the same sense as that in which a gardener is the cause of the tulip which grows upon his parterre, and in no other. We admire the flower; we examine the plant; we perceive the conduciveness of many 44 NATURAL THEOLOGY. of its parts to their end and office; we observe a provision for its nourishment, growth, protection, and fecundity ; but we never think of the gardener in all this. We attribute nothing of this to his agency; yet it may still be true, that without the gardener we should not have had the tulip. Just so it is with the succession of animals, even of the highest order. For the contrivance discovered in the struct- ure of the thing produced, we wart a contriver. The par- ent is not that contriver ; his consciousness decides that ques- tion. He is in total ignorance why that which is produced took its present form rather than any other. It is for him only to be astonished by the eflect. We can no more look, therefore, to the intelligence of the parent animal for what we are in search of—a cause of relation and of subserviency of parts to their use, which relation and subserviency we see in the procreated body—than we can refer the internal con- formation of an acorn to the intelligence of the oak from which it dropped, or the structure of the watch to the intel- ligence of the watch which produced it; there being no difference, as far as argument is concerned, between an in- telligence which is not exerted, and an intelligence which does not exist THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 45 CHAPTER V. APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. Every observation which was made in our first chapter concerning the watch, may be repeated with strict propriety concerning the eye ; concerning animals ; concerning plants ; concerning, indeed, all the organized parts of the works of nature. As, I. When we are inquiring simply after the existence of an intelligent Creator, imperfection, inaccuracy, liability to disorder, occasional irregularities, may subsist in a consider- able degree without inducing any doubt into the question ; just as a watch may frequently go wrong, seldom perhaps exactly right, may be faulty in some parts, defective in some, without the smallest ground of suspicion from thence arising that it was not a watch, not made, or not made for the pur- pose ascribed to it. When faults are pointed out, and when a question is started concerning the skill of the artist, or the dexterity with which the work is executed, then, indeed, in order to defend these qualities from accusation, we must be able, either to expose some intractableness and imperfection in the materials, or point out some invincible difficulty in the execution, into which imperfection and difficulty the matter of complaint may be resolved; or, if we cannot do this, we must adduce such specimens of consummate art and contrivance proceeding from the same hand as may convince the inquirer of the existence, in the case before him, of im- pediments like those which we have mentioned, although, what from the nature of the case is very likely to happen, they be unknown and unperceived by him. This we must do in order to vindicate the artist’s skill, or at least the per- fection of it; as we must also judge of his intention, and of the provisions employed in fulfilling that intention, not from an instance in which they fail, but from the great plurality of instances in which they succeed. But, after all, these 46 NATURAL THEOLOGY. are diflerent questions from the question of the artist’s exist- ence; or, which is the same, whether the thing before us be a work of art or not; and the questions ought always to be kept separate in the mind. So likewise it is in the works of nature. Irregularities and imperfections are of little or no weight in the consideration, when that consideration re- lates simply to the existence of a Creator. When the argu- ment respects his attributes, they are of weight; but are then to be taken in conjunction—the attention is not to rest upon them, but they are to be taken in conjunction, with the unexceptionable evidences which we possess of skill, power, and benevolence displayed in other instances ; which evidences may, in strength, number, and variety, be such, and may so overpower apparent blemishes, as to induce us, upon the most reasonable ground, to believe that these last ought to be referred to some cause, though we be ignorant of it, other than defect of knowledge or of benevolence in the author. - 11. There may be also parts of plants and animals, as there were supposed to be of the watch, of which, in some instances the operation, in others the use, is unknown. These form different cases; for the operation may be un- known, yet the use be certain. Thus it is with the lungs of animals. It does not, I think, appear that we are ac- quainted with the action of the air upon the blood, or in what manner that action is communicated by the lungs ; yet we find that a very short suspension of their office de- stroys the life of the animal. In this case, therefore, we may be said to know the use, nay, we experience the neces- sity of the organ, though we be ignorant of its operation. Nearly the same thing may be observed of what is called the lymphatic system. We suffer grievous inconveniences from its disorder, without being informed οἵ the office which it sustains in the economy of our bodies. There may possi- bly also be some few examples of the second class, in which not only the operation is unknown, but in which experi- THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 47 ments may seem to prove that the part is not necessary ; or may leave a doubt how far it is even useful to the plant o1 animal in which it is found. This is said to be the case with the spleen, which has been extracted from dogs with- out any sensible injury to their vital functions. Instances of the former kind, namely, in which we cannot explain the operation, may be numerous; for they will be so in propor- tion to our ignorance. They will be more or fewer to differ ent persons, and in different stages of science. Every im provement of knowledge diminishes their number. There is hardly, perhaps, a year passes that does not, in the works of nature, bring some operation, or some mode of operation, to light, which was before undiscovered—probably unsus- pected. Instances of the second kind, namely, where the part appears to be totally useless, 1 believe to be extremely rare ; compared with the number of those of which the use is evident, they are beneath any assignable proportion, and perhaps have been never submitted to a trial and examina- tion sufficiently accurate, long enough continued, or often enough repeated. No accounts which I have seen are sat- isfactory. The mutilated animal may live and grow fat— as was the case of the dog deprived of its spleen—yet may be defective in some other of its functions, which, whether they can all, or in what degree of vigor and perfection, be performed, or how long preserved without the extirpated organ, does not seem to be ascertained by experiment. But to this case, even were it fully made out, may be applied the consideration which we suggested concerning the watch, namely, that these superfluous parts do not negative the reasoning which we instituted concerning those parts which are useful, and of which we know the use; the indication of contrivance, with respect to them, remains as it was before. III. One atheistic way of replying to our observations upon the works of nature, and to the proofs of a Deity which we think that we perceive in them, is to tell us that all which we see must necessarily have had some form, and 48 NATURAL THEOLOGY. that it might as well be its present form as any other. Let us now apply this answer to the eye, as we did before to the watch. Something or other must have occupied that place in the animal’s head—must have filled up, as we say, that socket : we will say, also, that it must have been of that sort of substance which we call animal substance, as flesh, bone, membrane, or cartilage, etc. But that it should have been an eye, knowing as we do what an eye comprehends, name- ly, that it should have consisted, first, of a series of transpar- ent lenses—very different, by the by, even in their substance, from the opaque materials of which the rest of the body is, " in general at least, composed, and with which the whole of its surface, this single portion of it excepted, is covered : secondly, of a black cloth or canvas—the only membrane in the body which is black—spread out behind these lenses, so as to receive the image formed by pencils of ight trans- mitted through them ; and placed at tae precise geometrical distance at which, and at which alone, a distinct image could be formed, namely, at the concourse of the refracted rays: thirdly, of a large nerve communicating between this membrane and the brain ; without which, the action of light upon the membrane, however modified by the organ, would be lost to the purposes of sensation : that this fortunate con- formation of parts should have been the lot, not of one individual out of many thousand individuals, like the great prize in a lottery, or like some singularity in nature, but the happy chance of a whole species; nor of one species out of many thousand species with which we are acquainted, but of by far the greatest number of all that exist, and that under varieties not casual or capricious, but bearing marks of being suited to their respective exigences: that all this should have taken place, merely because something must have occupied these points on every animal’s forehead ; or, that all this should be thought to be accounted for by the short answer, that ‘‘ whatever was there must have had some form or other,” is too absurd to be made more so by THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 49 any argumentation. We are not contented with this an- swer; we find no satisfaction in it, by way of accounting for appearances of organization far short of those of the eye, such as we observe in fossil shells, petrified bones, or other substances which bear the vestiges of animal or vegetable recrements, but which, either in respect to utility or of the situation in which they are discovered, may seem accidental enough. It is no way of accounting even for these things, to say that the stone, for instance, which is shown to us— supposing the question to be concerning a petrifaction—must have contained some internal conformation or other. Nor does it mend the answer to add, with respect to the singu- larity of the conformation, that after the event, it is no lon- ger to be computed what the chances were against it. This is always to be computed when the question is, whether a useful or imitative conformation be the produce of chance or not: I desire no greater certainty in reasoning than that by which chance is excluded from the present disposition of the natural world. Universal experience is against it. What does chance ever do for us? In the human body, for in- stance, chance, that is, the operation of causes without de- sign, may produce a wen, a wart, a mole, a pimple, but never an eye. Among inanimate substances, a clod, a peb- ble, a liquid drop might be; but never was a watch, a tele- scope, an organized body of any kind, answering a valuable purpose by a complicated mechanism, the effect of chance. In no assignable instance has such a thing existed without intention somewhere. IV. There is another answer which has the same effect as the resolving of things into chance ; which answer would persuade us to believe that the eye, the animal to which it belongs, every other animal, every plant, indeed every or- ganized body which we see, are only so many out of the possible varieties and combinations of bemg which the lapse of infinite ages has brought into existence ; that the present world is the relic of that variety; millions of other bodily Nat. Theol, 3 50 NATURAL THEOLOGY. forms and other species having perished, being, by the de- fect of their constitution, incapable of preservation, or o1 continuance by generation. Now there is no foundation whatever for this conjecture in any thing which we observe in the works of nature; no such experiments are going on at present—no such energy operates as that which is here supposed, and which should be constantly pushing ito ex- istence new varieties of beings. Nor are there any appear- ances to support an opinion, that every possible combination of vegetable or animal structure has formerly been tried. Multitudes of conformations, both of vegetables and animals, may be conceived capable of existence and succession, which yet do not exist. Perhaps almost as many forms of plants might have been found in the fields as figures of plants can be delineated upon paper. A countless variety of animals might have existed which do not exist. Upon the suppo- sition here stated, we should see unicorns and mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, the fancies of painters, and the fables of poets, realized by examples. Or, if it be alleged that these may transgress the bounds of possible life and propa- gation, we might at least have nations of human beings without nails upon their fingers, with more or fewer fingers and toes than ten, some with one eye, others with one ear, with one nostril, or without the sense of smelling at all. All these, and a thousand other imaginable varieties, might live and propagate. We may modify any one species many different ways, all consistent with life, and with the actions necessary to preservation, although affording different de- grees of conveniency and enjoyment to the animal. And if we carry these modifications through the different species which are known to subsist, their number would be incal- culable. No reason can be given why, if these deperdits ever existed, they have now disappeared. Yet, if all possi- ble existences have been tried, they must have formed part of the catalogue. But moreover, the division of organized substances into THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. ol animals and vegetables, and the distribution and subdistri- bution of each into genera and species, which distribution is not an arbitrary act of the mind, but founded in the order which prevails in external nature, appear to me to contra- dict the supposition of the present world being the remains of an indefinite variety of existences—of a variety which re- jects all plan. The hypothesis teaches, that every possible variety of being hath, at one time or other, found its way into existence—by what cause or in what manner is not said—and that those which were badly formed perished; but how or why those which survived should be cast, as we see that plants and animals are cast, into regular classes, the hypothesis does not explain; or rather the hypothesis is in- consistent with this phenomenon. The hypothesis, indeed, is hardly deserving of the con sideration which we have given to it. What should we think of a man who, because we had never ourselves seen watches, telescopes, stocking-mills, steam-engines, etc., made, knew not how they were made, nor could prove by testimo- ny when they were made, or by whom, would have us be- lieve that these machines, instead of deriving their curious structures from the thought and design of their inventors and contrivers, in truth derive them from no other origin than this; namely, that a mass of metals and other mate- rials having run, when melted, into all possible figures, and combined themselves in all possible forms and shapes and proportions, these things which we see are what were left from the incident, as best worth preserving, and as such are become the remaining stock of a magazine which, at one time or other, has by this means contained every mechan- ism, useful and useless, convenient and inconvenient, into which such like materials could be thrown? I cannot dis- tinguish the hypothesis, as applied to the works of nature, from this solution, which no one would accept as applied to a collection of machines. V. To the marks of contrivance discoverable in animal 52 NATURAL THEOLOGY. bodies, and to the argument deduced from them in proof of design and of a designing Creator, this turn is sometimes attempted to be given, namely, that the parts were not m- tended for the use, but that the use arose out of the parts. This distinction is intelligible. A cabimet-maker rubs his mahogany with fish-skin ; yet it would be too much to assert that the skin of the dog-fish was made rough and granulat- ed on purpose for the polishing of wood, and the use of cab- inet-makers. Therefore the distinction is intelligible. But I think that there is very little place for it in the works of nature. When roundly and generally affirmed of them, as it hath sometimes been, it amounts to such another stretch of assertion as it would be to say, that all the implements of the cabinet-maker’s workshop, as well as his fish-skin, were substances accidentally configurated, which he had picked up and converted to his use; that his adzes, saws, planes, and gimlets, were not made, as we suppose, to hew, cut, smooth, shape out, or bore wood with, but that, these things being made, no matter with what design, or whether with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they were appli- cable to his purpose, and turned them to account. But, again, so far as this solution is attempted to be apphed to those parts of animals the action of which does not depend upon the will of the animal, it is fraught with still more evident absurdity. Is it possible to believe that the eye was formed without any regard to vision; that it was the animal itself which found out that, though formed with no such intention, it would serve to see with ; and that the use of the eye as an organ of sight resulted from this discovery, and the animal’s application of it? The same question may be asked of the ear; the same of all the senses. None of the senses fundamentally depend upon the election of the animal; consequently neither upon his sagacity nor his experience. It is the impression which objects make upon them that constitutes their use. Under that impres- sion he is passive. He may bring objects to the sense, or THE ARGUMENT APPLIED. 53 within.its reach ; he may select these objects ; but over the impression itself he has no power, or very little; and that properly is the sense. Secondly, there are many parts of animal bodies which seem to depend upon the will of the animal in a greater degree than the senses do, and yet with respect to which this solution is equally unsatisfactory. If we apply the so- lution to the human body, for instance, it forms itself into questions upon which no reasonable mind can doubt: such as, whether the teeth were made expressly for the mastica- tion of food, the feet for walking, the hands for holding ; or whether, these things as they are being in fact in the ani- mal’s possession, his own ingenuity taught him that they were convertible to these purposes, though no such purposes were contemplated in their formation. All that there is of the appearance of reason in this way of considering the subject is, that, in some cases, the organ- ization seems to determine the habits of the animal, and its choice to a particular mode of life; which, in a certain sense, may be called ‘“ the use arising out of the part.” Now, to all the imstances in which there is any place for this sug- gestion, it may be replied, that the organization determines the animal to habits beneficial and salutary to itself; and that this effect would not be seen so regularly to follow, if the several organizations did not bear a concerted and con- trived relation to the substance by which the animal was surrounded. They would, otherwise, be capacities without objects—powers without employment. The web-foot deter- mines, you say, the duck to swim; but what would that avail if there were no water to swim in? The strong hook- ed bill and sharp talons of one species of bird determine it to prey upon animals; the soft straight bill and weak claws of another species determine it to pick up seeds ; but neither determination could take effect in providing for the suste- nance of the birds, if animal bodies and vegetable seeds did not lie within their reach. The peculiar conformation of 54 NATURAL THEOLOGY. the bill and tongue and claws* of the woodpecker deter- mines that bird to search for his food among the msects lodged behind the bark or in the wood of decayed trees; but what would this profit him if there were no trees, no de- eayed trees, no insects lodged under their bark or in their trunk? The proboscis with which the bee is furnished de- termines him to seek for honey; but what would that sig- nify if flowers supplied none? Faculties thrown down upon animals at random, and without reference to the objects amidst which they are placed, would not produce to them the services and benefits which we see; and if there be that reference, then there is intention. Lastly, the solution fails entirely when applied to plants. The parts of plants answer their uses without any concur- rence from the will or choice of the plant. VI. Others have chosen to refer every thing to a prin ciple of order in nature.