rated “ yon “ee einen pad aoa = a mg TOS NH } 4 Aires bilibeidneniadigatiadinents — aos coanttiag etl Gpbatadied yesewy wv p ve rim ae ann te % ya . enitadea eR is A i SN Tee wit ame £ 7 ited oe 8 ve ovpraecnarrs acne em } ae, Pe nan ‘ T1O NLS sé OU ke Pit po LEAT F sxavs rasciodh, bn PALEY’S ore? lite ILLUSTRATIONS. NATURAL THEOLOGY: OR, EVIDENCES OF THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY, COLLECTED FROM THE APPEARANCES OF NATURE. —<— BY WILLIAM PALEY, D. D. ARCH-DEACON OF CARLISLE. eee ILLUSTRATED BY THE PLATES, AND BY A SELECTION FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES PAXTON, Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London. WITH ) ADDITIONAL NOTES, ORIGINAL AND SELECTED, FOR THIS EDITION. And a Vocabulary of Scientific Terms. Boston: PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY LINCOLN & EDMANDS, No. 59 Washington-Street. 1829. Re 184 DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, to wit: District Clerks office. BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the fourteenth day of March, A. D. 1829, in the fifty-third year of the Independence of the United States of America Mincola & Edmands, of the said district, have deposited in this office the title of a Book, the right whereof they claim as Proprietors, in the words following, to wil: © Paley’s Theology, with Illustrations. Natural Theology : or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the Appearances of Nature. By William Paley, D. D. Arch-Deacon of Carlisle. Illustrated by the Plates, and by a Selection from the Notes of James Paxton, Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London. ‘With additional Notes, Original and Selected, for this Edition. And a Vocabulary of Scientific Terms.” In Conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, ** An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned ;?? and alsoto an Actentitled, S© An Act supplementary toan Act, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by se- curing the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies during thetimes therein mentioned: and extending the Benefits thereof to the Arts of Designing, En- graving and Etching. Historical, and other Prints.’? JNO. W. DAVIS, Clerk of the District of Massachusetts. or QO QOu:- PUBLISHERS’ NOTICE. To give this valuable work a more extended circulation in our Col- leges and High Schools, the Publishers engaged a competent profes- sional gentleman of Boston, to superintend this edition. And they feel confident that his Notes, and those he has selected—the references to the Plates—and his Vocabulary, will be found greatly to enhance the value of the book. They have been at much expense to procure the J/- lustrations ; butas these plates are as necessary to facilitate the scholar in his study of this work, as an atlas is to aid the pupil’s progress in geography, they believe they shall be remunerated by the patronage which a discerning public will bestow upon their endeavours to pre- sent a complete edition of this standard work of acknowledged merit. >> @QO<.- NOTE. The reader will please to supply ,the following references to plates, which were omitted in the text. p. 112, after the word package, insert (PI. xxii. Fig. 1.) 115, after mesentery, insert (PI. xxii. Fig. 2.) 130, after bill, insert (Pl. xxiii. Fig. 1.) 132, after place,* insert (Pl. xxiii. Fig. 2.) 162, after chameleon, insert (Pl. xxxi. Fig. 1.) 163, after sea-fox, insert (Pl. xxxi. Fig. 2, 3.) ¢ - PREFACE TO THIS EDITION. aes THE present edition of the Natural Theology of Dr. Paley was undertaken with the view of making this admirable work more ex- tensively useful than it could ever be under the form in which it has been usually circulated. A great proportion of those who have read it must have sensibly felt the disadvantage under which they labour in comprehending the descriptions; and of course the arguments of the author, from the want of a knowledge of the subjects to which they relate. No man could so well supply the want of this knowl- edge, by clearness of statement and description, as Dr. Paley; and itis probable that few other writers would have made a book so intelligible, which relates to subjects remote from common observation, without ie aid of plates and illustrations. Still it must be imperfectly com- »rehended in many important parts, except by those acquainted with ‘he sciences from which his illustrations are drawn. Enough it is - rue may be understood by all, to carry them along with the argument, and produce a general conviction of its truth. But the conceptions even of professional readers would be much more clear, definite, and satisfactory, were the description aided by visible representations. It was the original design of the publishers to have merely attached the plates and references of Paxton, which have been published in England and in this country in a separate volume, to’the text of Dr. Paley. It was, however, suggested to them that the value of their edition might be increased by the addition of Notes, and they had made arrangements for this purpose and were going on with the work, when Mr. Paxton’s edition of the Natural Theology fell into their hands, containing, beside the plates, a considerable number of Notes. From these Notes a selection has been made of such as seemed most valuable and interesting. A number of Notes have also been made up of quotations from the excellent treatise of Mr. Charles Bell on Animal Mechanics, published in the Library of Useful Knowledge ; a tract which cannot be too highly recommended to the perusal of those who take pleasure in studying the indications of a wise and be- nevolent Providence in the works of creation. A few additional Notes have also been subjoined, which have not been before published. It seems to be supposed by some, that the progress made in science ! since the writing of this work must have furnished ample materials for valuable additions to it, It will readily appear, however, upon re- e% oe « a iv PREFACE. flection, that this is not likely to be the case, and that no particular ad- vantage to the argument is to be expected from bringing it down, as it is often expressed, to the present state of science. The object of the work is, not to teach science in its connexion with Natural Theol- ogy, a plan entirely different, and one upon which distinct works may, and have been written, but to gather materials from the knowledge communicated by science, where with to construct an argument for the. existence and attributes of God. The excellence of such a work, then, will not consist in the number of illustrations, or in the copious- ness and completeness of the materials, but in the judgment with which they are selected, and the aptness. with which they are made to bear upon the question at issue. So far, therefore, as the argument is concerned, no additional strength will be given to it by new discoveries in science. As Dr. Paley has himself admitted, a single case thoroughly made out, proves all that can be proved, and, generally speaking, the most familiar in- stances which can be selected and made intelligible are the best for this purpose, and will have the greatest influence upon men’s minds. All the knowledge, therefore, which is necessary for the complete- ness and strength of the argument was possessed long ago. Still there is an advantage in selecting and arguing from a variety of examples, arising out of the different constitutions of men’s minds, or their different habits of thinking and reasoning. Some are more af- fected by examples of one kind, and some by those of another. In this way much more might be done in the way of illustrating and en- forcing the argument, and holding it up in every possible light, than has been attempted in the present edition. The principal object here had in view, has been to make such additions, as with the help of the engraved views, would bring the argument, as stated by the author, clearly within reach of all readers. To give a correct edition, various English and American copies have been consulted, in which variations have been found ; but those read- ings have been adopted, which appeared best to comport with that familiarity, and originalfty of expression, which gives its principal charm, and its great force and clearness to Dr. Paley’s style. J. WW: Boston, March, 1829. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND SHUTE BARRINGTON, LL. D. LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. _ My Lorp, TuHE following work was undertaken at your Lordship’s recommen- dation ; and amongst other motives, for the purpose of making the most acceptable return I could make for a great and important benefit conferred upon me. It may be unnecessary, yet not perhaps, quite impertinent, to state to your Lordship and to the reader, the several inducements that have led me once more to the press. The favour of my first and ever honoured patron had put me in possession of so liberal a provision in the church, as abundantly to satisfy my wants, and much to exceed my pretensions. Your Lordship’s munificence, in conjunction with that of some other excellent Prelates, who regarded my services with the partiality with which your Lordship was pleased to consider them, hath since placed me in ecclesiastical situations, more than adequate to every object of reasonable ambition. In the mean time, a weak, and, of late, a painful state of health, deprived me of the power of discharg- ing the duties of my station, in a manner at all suitable, either to my sense of those duties, or to my most anxious wishes concerning them. My inability for the public functions of my profession, amongst other consequences, left me much at leisure. That leisure was not to be lost. It was only in my study that I could repair my deficiencies in the church. It was only through the press that I could speak. These circumstances, in particular, entitled your Lordship to call upon me for the only species of exertion of which I was capable, and disposed me, without hesitation, to obey the callin the best manner that I could. In the choice of a subject I had no place left for doubt: in saying ‘which, I do not so much refer, either to the supreme impor- tance of the subject, or to any scepticism concerning it with which the present times are charged, as I do, to its connexion with the sub- jects treated of in my former publications. The following discussion alone was wanted to make up my works into a system: in which Vi DEDICATION. works, such as they are, the public have now before them, the evi- dences of natural religion, the evidences of revealed religion, and an account of the duties that result from both. It is of small importance, that they have been written in an order, the very reverse of that in which they ought to be read. I commend therefore the present vol- ume to your Lordship’s protection, not only as, in all probability, my last labour, but as the completion of a consistent and comprehensive design. Hitherto, my Lord, I have been speaking of myself and not of my Patron. Your Lordship wants not the testimony of a dedication, nor any testimony from me: I consult therefore the impulse of my own mind alone when I declare, that in no respect has my intercourse -with your Lordship been more gratifying to me, than in the opportunities, which it has afforded me, of observing your earnest, active, and unwearied solicitude, for the advancement of substantial Christianity : a solici- tude, nevertheless, accompanied with that candour of mind, which suf- fers no subordinate differences of opinion, when there isa coincidence in the main intention and object, to produce an alienation of esteem, or diminution of favour. It is fortunate for a country, and honourable to its government, when qualities and dispositions like these are placed in high and influential stations. Such is the sincere judgment which I have formed of your Lordship’s character, and of its public value: my personal obligations I can never forget. Under a due sense of both these considerations, I beg leave to subscribe myself, with great respect and gratitude, My Lord, Your Lordship’s faithful And most devoted servant, WILLIAM PALEY. Bishop-Wearmouth, July, 1802, TO THE HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND SHUTE BARRINGTON, LL. D. LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. My Lorp, To your suggestion the world is indebted for the existence of Dr. Paley’s valuable work on Natural Theology. The universal and permanent esteem in which it has been held in this country, and its favourable reception in France, even after the desolating influence of the Revolution, have abundantly approved your Lordship’s selec- tion both of the subject and of the person to whom you intrusted it. In looking round, then, for a patron for these ILLusTRATIONS, it was natural to have recourse to him who was the original sug- gestor of the work which it is their object to explain. Nor was I disappointed in my wish; your Lordship not only condescending to approve of the design, but to encourage me in its prosecution, by your very liberal support. For this distinguished honour you will believe me deeply sensible; and if I may indulge the hope that my humble efforts will increase the utility of so eminent a writer, I shall consider it the highest gratification. | I am, my Lor», With great veneration, Your Lordship’s most obliged, And obedient servant, JAMES PAXTON. Oxford, January 1, 1826. CONTENTS. CHAP. Page 1. State of the Argument, . - - - - 2 5 2. State of the Argument, continued, - - arti ma 3. Application of the Argument, - - - = a 13 4, Of the succession of plants and animals, _ - Saisie aia 2 5. Application of the Argument, continued, - - - 34 6. The Argument cumulative, - - 2 - = ae 7. Of the mechanical and omental pare and functions of Animals and Vegetables, - : . 45 8. Of mechanical Arrangement in the human Frime—Of the Bones, - - - - . if; nye ait cee 9. Of the Muscles, - - - - - - « % 14 10. Of the Vessels of animal Bodies, - u a 5 - 91 11. Of the animal Structure, regarded as a Mass, ee) 110 12. Comparative Anatomy, - - - “ a z - 128 13. Peculiar Organizations, - - e g i Bi 139 14. Prospective Contrivances, - - = = é - 146 15. Relations, - - - - . a ~ Z Z 151 16. Compensation, - - - - : 3 3 - 159 17. The Relation of animated Bodies to inanimate Nature, - 168 18. Instincts, - - - - - - = os Baw f:/) 19. Of Insects, - ° - - - - e é s 182 20. Of Plants, - - - - - - 3 3 - 196 21. Of the Elements, - - - - = “i : 210 22. Astronomy, - - ° - - = = s - 215 23. Personality of the Deity, - - - - 2 2 233 24. Of the Natural Attributes of the Deity, - - - - 249 25. The Unity of the Deity, ° - - ° - - 253 26. The Goodness of the Deity, - - - - . - 256 27. Conclusion, - - - ° - - - - 295 Vocabulary, SH hae ay ne ees et Ue NATURAL THEOLOGY. or @OO«.- CHAPTER I. STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. IN crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my, foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose | had found a watch upon the ground, and it _ should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had be- fore given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discov- er in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g.that they are so formed and ad- justed as to produce motion; and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or of a different size from what they are, or placed after any oth- er manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result: [See Plate I.]|—We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artifi- cially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating the ac- tion of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a B 6 STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. series of wheels, the teeth of which, catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the bal- ance,and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust ; the sprigs of steel, no other metal being so elastic ; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work ; but im the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an exami- nation of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowl- edge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but be- ing once, as we have said, observed and understood,) the inference, we think, is inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artifi- cers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actu- ally to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use. I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made: that we had never known an artist,capable of making one ; that we were alto- gether incapable of executing such a piece of workman- ship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious produc- tions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist’s skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our mind of the existence and agency of suchan artist, at some former time, and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing, in some respects, a different nature. If. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclu- sion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it sel- dom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. 7 ease supposed would be evident, in whatever way we ac- counted for' the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all. Ill. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concern- ing which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascer- tain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. for, as to the first branch of the case; if, by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts, which might be spared without prej- udice to the movement of the watch, and that we had prov- ed this by experiment—these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before. IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, ac- counted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other ; ; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited ; viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different struc- gure. V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfac- tion to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch _ made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct frum the intelligence of the watch-maker. 8 STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear, that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so. VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode, ac- cording to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for it is, the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both dis- tinct from itself, the /aw does nothing, is nothing. ‘The expression, ‘‘the law of metallic nature,” may sound strange and harsh to.a philosophic ear, but it seems quite as justi- fiable as some others which are more familiar to him ; such as “the law of vegetable nature”—“ the law of animal na- ture,” or indeed as “ the law of nature’ in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agen- cy and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these. . VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument. He,knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. ‘These points being known, his igno- rance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affects not the certainty of his reasoning. ‘The conscious- ness of knowing little, need not beget.a distrust of that which he does know. i ore @OO«- CHAPTER IT. STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch, should, after some time, discover, that, in ad- dition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed. in it, it possessed the unexpected property of producing, in the course of its movement, another watch like itself (the thing is conceivable ;) that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustment of lathes, files, and other tools, evident~ STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. ¥ ei i} ‘ } ly and separately calculated for this purpose; let us in- quire, what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion. I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration — of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether he regarded the ob- ject of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intri- cate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism by which — it was carried on, he would perceive, in this new observa- tion, nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had already done; for referring the construction of the watch to design, and to supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it, still more strong would ' the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this further property, the crown and pesigonion of all the rest. f II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, im some sense, the maker of the watch, which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that, in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its con- irivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second ; in no such sense as this, was it the author of the constitution and order, either.of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might pos- sibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn; but no latitude of expres- sion would allow us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair is nei- ther more nor less than this; by the application of an in- telligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged independently of it, and arranged by intelligence, an effect is produced; viz. the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not, the less neces- sary, for any share which the water has in grinding the 2 10 STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. corn; yet is this share the same, as that which the watclr would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section, ‘T'here- fore, TI. Though it be now no longer probable, that the | individual watch which our observer had found was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the pro-- duction. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now, than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of different properties. We may ask for the cause of the colour of a body, of its hardness, of its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are - now asking for the cause of that subserviency to an use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question by telling us that a preceding watch produced it. ‘There can- not be design without a designer; contrivance without @ contriver; order without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging ; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and, executing their office m accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated toit. Arrange- ment, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to an use, imply the presence of in- telligence and mind. No one, therefore can rationally be- heve, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the me- chanism we so much admire in it; could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assign- ed their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one re- sult, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. Allthese properties, therefore, are as much unaccounted for, as they were before. IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty farther back, 1. e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced from another watch, that from a former, - and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. .We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.- Ii by this supposition, nor dispensed with. If the difficulty: were diminished the further we went back, by going back. indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, there, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may con-: ceive the limit to be attained: but where there is no such tendency or approach, nothing is affected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in ques- tion, (whatever there may be as to many points) between one series and another; between a series which is finite and a series which is infinite. A chain, composed of an infinite number of links, can no more support itself, than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured, (though we never can have tried the ex- periment) because, by increasing the number of links, from ten, for instance, to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, &c. we make not the smallest approach, we ob- serve not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect (yet there may be a great difference in several respects) between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is infinite. This very much resembles the case before us. The ma- chine, which we are inspecting, demonstrates, by its construction, contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver; design, a designer; whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine or not. That circumstance alters not the case. That other machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a for- mer machine; nor does that alter the case; contrivance must have had a contriver. That former one from one preceding it; no alteration still; a contriver is still neces- sary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every succession of these machines; a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a thousand ; with one series as with an- other; a series which is finite, as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other respects they may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and design are unaccounted for. The question is not simply, How came the first watch into existence? which question, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the series of watches thus pro~ 12 STATE OF THE ARGUMENT. duced from one another to have been infinite, and conse- quently to have had no such first, for which it was neces- sary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been nearly the state of the question if nothing had been before us, but an unorganized, unmechanized substance, without mark or indication of contrivance. It might be difficult to ‘show that such substance could not have existed from eter- nity, either in succession (if it were possible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring from one another, ) or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the question now. ‘To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no difference whether we had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of that question have no place; for, in the watch which we are examining, are seen con- trivance, design; an end, a purpose, means for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question, which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts, is, whence this con- trivance and design? ‘The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question, this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number of succession of sub- stances, destitute of these properties; nor the more, by in- creasing that number to infinity. If it be said, that, upon the supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of that other’s movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we have a cause for the watch in my hand, viz. the watch from which it proceeded, I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to an use (all which we discover in a wateh,) we have any cause what- ever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a series of such causes, or to allege that a series may be carried back to infinity; for I do not admit that we have yet any cause at all for the phenomena, still less any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no contriver; proofs of design, but no designer. V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the mak- er of the watch before him, was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch produced from it; there being no difference, (except that the latter manifests a more ex- quisite skill,) between the making of another watch with his own hands by the mediation of files, lathes, chisels, &c. and the disposing, fixing, and inserting, of these instru- ments, or of others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made, in such a manner, as to form a new APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. 13 watch in the course of the movements which he had given to theold one. It is only working by one set of tools, in- stead of another. The conclusion which the first examination of the watch, of its works, construction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have had, for the cause and author of that con- struction, an artificer, who understood its mechanism, ana designed its use. This conclusion is invincible. A second examination presents us with a new discovery. ‘The watch is found, in the course of its movement, to produce anoth- er watch, similar. to itself: and not only so, but we perceive in it a system of organization, separately calculated for that purpose. What effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former inference? What, as hath al- ready been said, but to increase, beyond measure, our ad- miration of the skill, which had been employed in the for- mation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once, turn us round to an opposite conclusion, viz. that no art or skill whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other evidences of art and skill re- main as they were, and this last and supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained with- eut absurdity? Yet this is atheism. OB Qoe- CHAPTER III. APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. Tuts is atheism; for every indication of contrivance, ev- ery manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, ex~- ists in the works of nature ; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contriv- ances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the com- plexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism ; and still more, if possibly, do they go beyond them in number and variety : yet in a multitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evi- dently accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity. _ I know no better method of introducing so large a sub- ject, than of comparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the ex~ 14 APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. amination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it.. They are made upon the same principles; both being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves; but, such laws being fixed, the construction, in both cases, is adapted to them. For instance; these laws require, in order to produce the same effect, that the’ rays of light, in passing from water into the eye, should be refracted by a more convex surface than when they passed out of air into the eye. Accordingly we find, that the eye of a fish, in that part of it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial animals. [Plate IL. fig. 1.] What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this difference? What could a mathematical instrument maker have done more, to show his knowledge of his principle, his application of that knowledge, his suiting of his means to his end; | will not say to display the compass or excel- lency of his skill and art, for in these all comparison is indecorous, but to testify counsel, choice, or consideration, purpose 2 To some it may appear a difference sufficient to destroy all similitude between the eye and the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the cther an unperceiving instru- ment. The fact 1s, that they are both instruments. And, as tothe mechanism, at least as to mechanism being em- ployed, and even as to the kind of it, this circumstance va- ries not the analogy at all. For observe, what the constitu- tion of the eye is. [Plate II. fig. 2,3, 4.] Itis necessary, in order to produce distinct visjon, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bottom of the eye. Whence this mecessity arises, or how the picture is connected with the sensation, or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay we will confess, if you please, impossible for us to search out. But the present question is not concerned in the inquiry. It may be true, that in this, and in other instances, we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way; and that then we come to something which is not mechanical, or which Is in- scrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our inves- tigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic statue, consists in this,—that, in the animal, we trace the mechanism to a certain point, ang then we are stopped; either the mechanism becoming too subtile for our discernment, or something else beside APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. 15 the known Jaws of mechanism taking place ; whereas, in the automaton, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout. But, up to the limit, the reasoning is as clear and certain in the one case as the other./ In the example before us, it is a matter of certainty, because it is 2 matter which experience and observation demonstrate, that the formation of an im- age at the bottom of the eye is necessary to perfect vision. The image itself can be shown. Whatever affects the dis- tinctness of the image, affects the distinctness of the vision. The formation then of such an image being necessary, (no matter how,) to the sense of sight, and to the exercise of that sense, the apparatus by which it is formed is con- structed and put together, not only with infinitely more art, but upon the selfsame principles of art, as in the telescope or the camera obscura. The perception arising from the image may be laid out of the question ; for the production of the image, these are instruments of the same kind. The end is the same; the means are the same. ‘The pur- pose in both is alike; the contrivance for accomplishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses of the telescope, and the humours of the eye, bear a complete resemblance to one another, in their figure, their position, and in their power over the rays of light, viz. in bringing each pen- cil to a point at the right distance from the lens; name- » ly, in the eye, at the exact place where the membrane is spread to receive it. How is it possible, under circum- stances of such close affinity, and under the operation of - equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the one, yet to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been em- ployed, as the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the other ? | The resemblance between the two cases is still more accu- rate, and obtains in more points than we have yet represented, or than we are, on the first view of the subject, aware of. In dioptric telescopes there is an imperfection of this na- ture.—Pencils of light, in passing through glass lenses, are separated into different colours, thereby tinging the ob- ject, especially edges of it, as if it were viewed through a prism. To correct this inconvenience had been long a desideratum in the art. At last it came into the mind of a sagacious optician, to inquire how this matter was man- aged in the eye; in which there was exactly the same diffi- culty to contend with as in the telescope. His observation taught him, that, in the eye, the evil was cured by com- 16 APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. bining together lenses composed of different substances, i. e..of substances which possessed different refracting - powers. Our artist borrowed from thence his hint; and produced a correction of the defect by imitating, in glasses made from different materials, the effects of the different humours through which the rays of light pass before they reach the bottom of the eye. Could this be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to the optician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose ?* But further; there are other points, not so much perhaps: of strict resemblance between the two, as of superiority of the eye over the telescope, which being found im the laws that regulate both, may furnish topics of fair and just com- parison. ‘Two things were wanted, to the eye, which were not wanted, at least in the same degree, to the teles- cope; and these were the adaptation of the organ, first, io different degrees of light; and, secondly, to the vast diversity of distance. at which objects are viewed by the naked eye, viz. from a few inches to as many miles. These difficulties present not themselves to the maker of the telescope. He wants all the light he can get; and he never directs his instrument to objects near at hand. In *