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

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OF

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OBSERVATIONS

IN DEFENCE OF

THE LIBERTY OF MAN,

AS

A MORAL AGENT:

IN ANSWER TO

DR. PRIESTLEY'S ILLUSTRATIONS

OF

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

BY JOHN PALMER,

MINISTER OF NEW-BROAD-STREET.

——— not over-rul'd by fate
Inextricable, or ſtrict neceſſity;
Our voluntary ſervice he requires,
Not our neceſſitated, ſuch with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find.

PARADISE LOST, Book V. Line 527, &c.

If we can neither think nor act otherwiſe than we do, or rather, if we cannot act, in a true ſenſe, but are actuated by ſomething external, we muſt be juſt what we are, and power and liberty belong not to us. Let us be concerned about nothing, if our concern ſignifies nothing.

JORTIN'S DISCOURSES, 2d Ed. P. 237, 238, Note.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, No. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.

1779.

265. i. 198.

PREFACE.

AS the following publication is confined to the conſideration of Dr. Prieſtley's Illuſtrations of Philoſophical Neceſſity; all I ſhall, therefore, here ſay concerning his preceding Diſquiſitions, relating to matter and ſpirit, is, that they appear to me chiefly to concern mankind, as they affect human liberty or agency. The Dr. obſerves, in the Preface to his Illuſtrations, that "if man, as "is maintained in the *Diſquiſitions*, "be wholly a *material*, it will not "be denied but that he muſt "be a *mechanical* being." I beg leave to remark, and the reaſoning ſeems equally concluſive, on the other hand, that if, as is maintained in the following Obſervations, man be poſſeſſed of the power of moral agency, it will be as readily admitted,

that there is ſomething in the conſtitution of the being, to whom this power belongs, entirely diſtinct from matter, or that the ſpirit in man is properly immaterial. The peculiar importance of the ſubject treated of in the Illuſtrations, has led me to the ſeparate diſcuſſion of that argument. I am not inſenſible, that there are difficulties attending the ſcheme of liberty, ariſing from the unfavourable ſituation in which great numbers of the human race are placed, which it is not eaſy, perhaps not poſſible, for men of the moſt enlarged and beſt improved underſtandings to clear up to their own ſatisfaction, and much leſs to the general ſatisfaction of the thoughtful and inquiſitive. But it is one thing, to be able to anſwer every objection, which may lie againſt

any

any particular doctrine, and another, to diſcern ſuch evidence in favour of it, as ſhall appear greatly to overbalance the ſeeming difficulties which attend it; and be ſufficient to determine the judgment about it. In the controverſy before us, unable as we may be fully to account for the preſent circumſtances of danger attending man, as a moral agent; the exiſtence of a proper principle of agency, or a ſelf-determining power, in man, ſeems, notwithſtanding, to be among thoſe plain and important truths, which are inſeparably connected with the juſt idea of a divine moral government, and without which we cannot be at all accountable for any thing we do.

Puniſhment, on the ſuppoſition that the whole conduct of men

through

through life is determined by their Creator, and is, on their part, unavoidable, (as the doctrine of neceſſity teaches) appears as flatly repugnant to the juſtice, not to ſay, the goodneſs, of the ſupreme governor, when connected with characters uſually denominated morally evil or wicked, as if it had been denounced againſt men, for not ſtilling the raging of the winds, or making their way over a mountain, which was abſolutely impaſſable.

Nor can I help expreſſing very ſtrong apprehenſions of the dangerous tendency of the Neceſſarian tenet, as a practical principle: for, though Dr. Prieſtley has, with great ingenuity, endeavoured to ſupport the utility and importance of future retributions, on his ſcheme; I cannot yet but be of opinion, that the generality of mankind

mankind would be affected by the perſuaſion of it, in a very different manner from what he ſuppoſes; and that, if they could once be brought to believe that they were not moral agents, or could do nothing that implied in it real, perſonal demerit, they would very ſoon think themſelves fully warranted in concluding, that they could not, on any account, deſerve puniſhment, and had therefore nothing to fear.

But, reſerving the conſideration of that argument for its proper place, I take this opportunity of paying the juſt tribute of reſpect, which I think ſo highly due to the character of Dr. Prieſtley; who is, I doubt not, animated by the warmeſt love for truth, and the moſt affectionate concern to promote the beſt intereſts of mankind,

kind, in all his moral and theological writings, widely as he may differ, in ſome parts of them, from other judicious and eſteemed authors.

The following obſervations were nearly finiſhed before the publication of the correſpondence between Dr. Price and Dr. Prieſtley; though I have ſince given that performance a very careful peruſal, and cannot but recommend it to the attention of thoſe, who have leiſure and inclination for ſuch ſtudies, both in the view of it as a work, which manifeſts diſtinguiſhed ability in the defence of each ſide of the queſtion, reſpecting the two important ſubjects of Materialiſm and Neceſſity, and as exhibiting a ſpecimen of controverſial writing, the direct reverſe to what we commonly ſee, but much to be admired,

mired, and moſt worthy of imitation, for the liberality with which it is conducted.

If I have ſucceeded in my endeavours to ſet the beſt arguments for the liberty of man, as a moral agent, and the proper replies to thoſe inſiſted on by Dr. Prieſtley on the ſide of philoſophical neceſſity, in ſuch a point of view, as ſhall contribute to the facility of their being underſtood, my main end is anſwered.

The obſervations on Sections V. and VI. are chiefly in ſupport of what Dr. Price has advanced in proof of the doctrine of liberty in his review of the principal queſtions, and difficulties in morals. I ſhould not have touched on that part of the argument, had Dr. Price ſeen fit himſelf to engage in it; but at the ſame

time,

time, I am happy to find, that what I have ſaid on it, having been communicated to him, is deemed ſo fully ſatisfactory by that great maſter of the ſubject.

I have only to add, as an apology for the too frequent repetitions of the ſame ſentiment, in ſome inſtances, that I have been unavoidably led into it, by following Dr. Prieſtley through the ſeveral parts of his reaſonings; the nature of which ſeems to have required the application of ſome leading thoughts to different branches of the argument, for the fuller illuſtration and ſupport of the doctrine of liberty.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON SECTION I.

"OF THE TRUE STATE OF THE "QUESTION RESPECTING LIBERTY "AND NECESSITY."

DR. PRIESTLEY begins with obſerving that, "One of the chief ſources of "the difference of opinion reſpecting the "ſubject of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*, and likewiſe much of the difficulty that has attended the diſcuſſion of it, ſeems to have been a want of attention to the proper "ſtating of the queſtion. Hence it has "come to paſs, that the generality of thoſe, "who have ſtood forth in defence of what "they have called liberty, do in fact, admit every thing that is requiſite to eſtabliſh the doctrine of neceſſity; but they "have miſled themſelves and others by the "uſe of words; and alſo, wanting ſufficient "ſtrength of mind, they have been ſtag-

" gered at the conſequences of their own " principles." Whether the Dr. is right in the ideas here ſuggeſted of the inattention, miſtakes, and want of ſufficient ſtrength of mind, in the advocates for liberty, the impartial reader will beſt determine on a comparative view of what they and the Dr. have reſpectively advanced on the ſubject.

For the Doctrine of Neceſſity, as held by the Dr. I ſhall paſs on to the concluding paragraph of this ſection, p. 7. 8.—where we have the following account of it; " I " maintain that there is ſome fixed law of " nature reſpecting the will, as well as the " other powers of the mind, and every " thing elſe in the conſtitution of nature; " and conſequently that it is never deter- " mined without ſome real, or apparent " cauſe, foreign to itſelf, that is, without " ſome motive of choice, or that motives " influence us in ſome definite and invari- " able manner; ſo that every volition, or " choice, is conſtantly regulated and deter- " mined, by what precedes it. And this " conſtant determination of mind, accord- " ing to the motives preſented to it, is all

" that

" that I mean by its neceſſary determina-
" tion."

In the above ſhort paſſage, the Dr. has, I think, given a very clear and full view of his principles, as a Neceſſarian.

The Dr. here aſſerts " a fixed law of " nature reſpecting the will, and that it is " never determined without ſome real or " apparent cauſe, foreign to itſelf, and that " motives influence in ſome invariable man-" ner." So that, as the Dr. afterwards, in the ſame paragraph, expreſſes himſelf, " No event could have been otherwiſe than " it has been, is, or is to be."

With this idea of neceſſity in his mind, what end could it anſwer, for the Dr. previouſly to remark, that he allowed to mankind the " power of doing whatever they " will or pleaſe, both with reſpect to the " operations of their minds, and the mo-" tions of their bodies, uncontrouled by " any foreign principle, or cauſe," which, he ſays, is " all the liberty or power, that " is poſſible in itſelf." P. 2.

The Dr. does, indeed, here make uſe of the terms—" Liberty, will and pleaſe,"—

he alſo ſpeaks of mens doing whatever they pleaſe, " uncontrouled by any foreign prin-
" ciple or cauſe." And, at firſt ſight, he might be naturally underſtood to make ſome conceſſion in favour of liberty; but upon impartial examination, it will appear that he means nothing in all he ſays, but what is the effect of that unalterable neceſſity, which he afterwards more openly maintains. Though he allows to mankind the " power " of doing whatever they will or pleaſe," he yet makes that will or pleaſure ſubject to ſome fixed law of nature, ſomething foreign to itſelf, that is, the influence of motives, by which it is, in every inſtance, determined in an invariable manner. So that after all this ſeeming allowance of liberty to man, he really poſſeſſes no other power than that of doing what he is unalterably determined, or in other words, irreſiſtibly impelled, to do. It may be proper further to remark here, that when, in his firſt obſervation, the Dr. ſpeaks of mankind, as " uncontrouled " by any foreign principle or cauſe," he only means, that they are " uncontrouled" in what they *will*. Now the will, he afterwards

afterwards ſays, is always determined by ſome cauſe foreign to itſelf; ſo that they are, according to the Dr. only uncontrouled in what they are unalterably impelled to do, which ſeems to be ſaying no more than that they are not neceſſarily impelled in two contrary directions, or to do, and yet forbear ſomething at the ſame time.

I cannot but remark here, and it ſeems too obvious to eſcape the notice of any one who attentively conſiders this ſubject, that the language made uſe of by Neceſſarians reſpecting the will of man, is manifeſtly very unſuitable to the ideas, which are really couched under it. To *will* and to *pleaſe* denoting nothing but the effect of a phyſical neceſſity; they would certainly expreſs themſelves much more clearly and intelligibly, if they uſed ſuch terms, as are expreſſive not of *doing*, but *ſuffering*; not of *acting* but being *acted upon*. Men have, in truth, no more power or liberty of doing any thing, than a piece of iron, which is bent, had of bending itſelf. They are both neceſſarily acted upon, and bent by ſome external cauſes; and the only difference be-

determining power over our own actions, which is not at all applicable to that body, which is the object of compariſon in Mr. Hobbes's ſimile. He might, with equal propriety, have taken his illuſtration from the motion of light, or that of the planets, or any other object in nature; all which are merely paſſive, governed by certain, neceſſary laws, between which and the human mind, there does not appear to be the leaſt affinity or reſemblance. The ſame remark will apply to what Mr. Hobbes further ſays, at the cloſe of the illuſtration, p. 3.

"So alſo, we ſay, he that is tied wants "the liberty to go, becauſe the impedi-"ment is not in him, but in his bands; "whereas we ſay not ſo of him that is ſick "or lame, becauſe the impediment is in "himſelf." Now whether the man be tied, or be ſick or lame; that is, whether the impediment to his moving be in his bands or in himſelf; it is ſtill in both caſes an impediment ariſing from the ſtate of his body, which, by a phyſical neceſſity equally incapacitates him for motion; and the inſtance here produced has therefore nothing

to

to do with the queſtion concerning liberty or neceſſity reſpecting the mind.

We have already ſtated the natural and obvious meaning of the Dr's. poſition, when he ſays, that he acknowledges "in man a "liberty to do whatever he pleaſes," and it, in effect, amounts to a total denial of that liberty, which in the preſent argument ſtands oppoſed to neceſſity. It ſeems therefore not a little extraordinary that the Dr. ſhould add, p. 3. "I grant not only all "the liberty that the generality of man-"kind have any idea of, or can be made "to underſtand, but alſo all that many of "the profeſſed advocates for liberty, againſt "the doctrine of neceſſity, have claimed."

No man can indeed have a larger idea of liberty, than as conſiſting in a power of doing what he really pleaſes; but when it is conſidered, that by the pleaſure or will of man, in any given circumſtances, the Dr. means nothing more than a certain determination in the mind, which, in thoſe circumſtances, could not have been any other than it is; the difference between the idea which the Dr. entertains of the power of

man,

man, and the opinion of his opponents, is as great as between any two, the moſt contradictory, notions that can be named. Does the Dr. really think that mankind have no further idea of power or liberty, than that which he ſuppoſes, when they reflect on crimes which they have committed?

Has not every man, who feels remorſe for any evil he hath done, an idea that he had it in his power not to have done it? If ſo, which cannot ſurely be called in queſtion even by the Dr. himſelf, will not this undeniably prove that the generality of mankind have a very different opinion of the power or liberty which belongs to them from that which the Dr. allows? They not only believe that they poſſeſs the power or liberty of doing what they pleaſe; but alſo that the will or pleaſure, which is the ſpring of action, is itſelf under their direction, or ſubject to their own voluntary determination, and not to that phyſical neceſſity, ariſing from the unalterable influence of particular motives, which the Dr. contends for.

This

This ſeems evidently to have been the ſentiment of Mr. Wollaſton, and is clearly expreſſed in the paſſage quoted by the Dr.—In the ſixth edition in quarto, the paſſages referred to are in pages 64 and 184. In the former he ſays—"Sure it is in a man's "power to keep his hand from his mouth; "if it is, it is alſo in his power to forbear ex- "ceſs in eating and drinking. If he has the "command of his own feet, ſo as to go either "this way or that, or no whither, as ſure "he has, it is in his power to abſtain from "ill company and vicious places." And in p. 184.—"I can move my hand upwards "or downward or horizontally, faſter or "ſlower, or not at all, or ſtop it when it "is in motion, juſt as I will, &c. If then "I have (as I am ſenſible I have) a power "of moving my hand in a manner, which "it would not move in by thoſe laws, that "mere bodies already in motion, or under "the force of gravitation, would obſerve, "this motion depends ſolely upon my will, "and begins there."

No words can, I think, more clearly convey the idea of liberty as oppoſed to the

doctrine

doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity than the above. Mr. Wollaſton's whole argument, in the firſt of theſe paſſages, is deſigned to ſhew, that man has the power of forbearing exceſs and refraining from bad company, and of conſequence, of refraining from all other vicious indulgences and evil practices; and in the latter, he expreſsly aſſerts that motion "depends ſolely on the will and begins there." Whether Mr. Wollaſton's, or the Dr.'s opinion, concerning human liberty be juſt, is not the point here to be determined; but it will not ſurely admit of a doubt, that Mr. Wollaſton meant to maintain not merely a freedom of action but alſo of will in man, including the entire power of abſtaining from vice. Whether this be not claiming more liberty or power than is granted by the Dr. is ſubmitted to the judgment of thoſe, who will carefully compare their ſentiments.

Mr. Locke, the other advocate for liberty referred to by the Dr. in ſome parts of his chapter on power, has indeed expreſſed himſelf in ſuch a manner, as, in the opinion of ſome of his moſt judicious readers,

is

is leſs eaſy to be underſtood. It however ſeems clear, upon a careful attention to the whole of what he ſays, (ſo differently do we judge of authors) that the liberty he contends for is ſo far from being "perfectly "conſiſtent with the doctrine of philoſo- "phical neceſſity," that it cannot be reconciled with it. The Dr. ſays, (p. 5.) "The will, he (Mr. Locke) acknowledges, "is *always* determined by the moſt preſſing "uneaſineſs, or deſire;" for which the Dr. refers to p. 204. The edition of Mr. Locke's Works before me is the eighth and laſt, in quarto, printed anno 1777. Upon examination, I cannot find ſuch an acknowledgement, in the extent in which the Dr. underſtood him. But in the chapter on power, ſect. 47. he ſays, "There being in us a "great many uneaſineſſes always ſoliciting, "and ready to determine the will, it is "natural, as I have ſaid, that the greateſt "and moſt preſſing ſhould determine the "will to the next action; and ſo it does "*for the moſt part*, but *not always*. For "the mind having in moſt caſes, as is "evident in experience, a power to ſuſpend

"the

" the execution and ſatisfaction of any of " its deſires, and ſo all, one after another, " is at liberty to conſider the objects of them, " examine them on all ſides and weigh them " with others." Here Mr. Locke expreſsly aſſerts that the will is *not always*, but only *for the moſt part*, determined by the moſt preſſing uneaſineſs or deſire. And the exception he makes is, in thoſe inſtances where the mind has the power of ſuſpending the execution and ſatisfaction of its deſires, which, he ſays, it has in moſt caſes. That the mind can be *for the moſt part* determined by the moſt preſſing uneaſineſs or deſire; and yet poſſeſs *in moſt caſes* the power of ſuſpending the execution of its deſires; (both which propoſitions Mr. Locke here lays down) I do not comprehend. But thus much ſeems certain, that he does not maintain the invariable determination of the will by the moſt preſſing uneaſineſs, which the Dr. imputes to him. Now this ſuſpending power in the mind implies in it, as far as it extends, that very power of ſelf-determination on which the whole controverſy turns. For if the mind has ſuch a power, ſo that it can examine

amine the objects of its preſent deſires and compare them with others, it may then, in conſequence of ſuch examination, ſuppreſs the preſent deſire, and excite a contrary one; which is totally repugnant to the doctrine of Philoſophical Neceſſity. And this effect of the ſuſpending power Mr. Locke clearly maintains in the following paſſage; (ſection 46.) "Thus by a due conſideration, and "examining any good propoſed, it is in our "power to raiſe our deſires in a due pro- "portion to the value of that good, whereby "in its turn and place it may come to work "upon the will, and be purſued." Agreeably to which he further obſerves, (ſection 53.) "In this we ſhould take pains to "ſuit the reliſh of our minds to the true "intrinſic good or ill that is in things, and "not permit an allowed or ſuppoſed poſ- "ſible great and weighty good to ſlip out "of our thoughts, without leaving any "reliſh, any deſire of itſelf there, till by "a due conſideration of its true worth, "we have formed appetites in our minds "ſuitable to it, and made ourſelves uneaſy "in the want of it, or in the fear of loſing

"it.

" it. And how much this is in every one's " power, by making reſolutions to himſelf, " ſuch as he may keep, is eaſy for every one " to try. Nor let any one ſay, he cannot " govern his paſſions, nor hinder them from " breaking out, and carrying him into " action; for what he can do before a " prince, or a great man, he can do alone, " or in the preſence of God, if he will."

Mr. Locke's idea of the ſuſpending power in the mind, then, appears to be altogether incompatible with the doctrine of neceſſity. This power, he ſays, is the ſource of all liberty; and though he will not allow the propriety of the term free-will, as applicable to it, becauſe, as he ſays, the will is determined by the laſt judgment of the mind concerning the good or evil, that is thought to attend its choice; (ſee ſections 46, 47, and 48) he yet maintains that the previous acts of conſideration, which lead to a determination of the judgment, are within our power, and that theſe acts may be exerciſed, notwithſtanding the preſent urgency of any uneaſineſs or deſire: ſo that the mind, in his opinion, is to all intents

and

and purpoſes, free to direct and influence the conduct.

As the reſult of the foregoing remarks, the Dr. and the advocates for liberty, ſeem moſt eſſentially to differ in their ideas on the ſubject; and in brief the true ſtate of the controverſy appears to be this—The Dr. on one ſide maintains, that motives influence the mind in ſome definite and invariable manner, ſo that the determination of the will, in any given circumſtances, could be no other than it eventually is. The advocates for liberty, on the other ſide, hold, that the mind has the power of ſuſpending, and altering its determinations, ſo that in the very ſame circumſtances, in which its choice or determination was directed to one object of purſuit, it might have brought itſelf to will, or determine on, the purſuit of a different and contrary one. In other words, that the mind is free to deliberate upon, and in conſequence of this to chooſe and determine the motives of its conduct. Whether the one or other of theſe doctrines is juſtly grounded, is the point in diſpute.

On SECTION II.

" Of the Argument in Favour of " the Doctrine of Necessity from " the Consideration of Cause and " Effect."

THE argument treated of by the Dr. in this ſection, is the ſame with that on which Mr. Hobbes's illuſtration of the ſubject, quoted in the preface, p. 27, 28, is grounded, but is here more fully ſtated and largely purſued. It proceeds on this general ſuppoſition as its baſis, that " throughout " all nature the ſame conſequences ſhould " invariably reſult from the ſame circum- " ſtances " ſee p. 9. By " invariably," the Dr. p. 10, explains his meaning to be neceſſarily; for that connection between the cauſe and the effect, which is concluded to be invariable, is, he ſays, " therefore *ne-* " *ceſſarily*." The Dr. further adds, p. 11. " Theſe maxims" (that is, concerning the invariable, or neceſſary connection between cauſe and effect) " are univerſal, being " equally applicable to all things that be-

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" long to the conſtitution of nature, cor-
" poreal or mental." Again, p. 13. " To
" diſtinguiſh the manner in which events
" depending upon will and choice are pro-
" duced, from thoſe in which no volition is
" concerned, the former are ſaid to be pro-
" duced voluntarily and the latter mecha-
" nically, but the ſame general maxims
" apply to them both. A particular deter-
" mination of mind could not have been
" otherwiſe than it was, if the laws of na-
" ture reſpecting the mind be ſuch, as that
" the ſame determination ſhall conſtantly
" follow the ſame ſtate of mind and the
" ſame views of things."

From the above quotations, we are, I think, enabled to form a clear idea of the ſcope and deſign of the Dr's reaſonings in this ſection. He plainly conſiders every thing in the moral, as well as the natural world, as produced by the neceſſary influence of certain laws, ordained by the Creator and Governor of all; and which could not poſſibly operate to the production of any other effects, than thoſe which we ſee are actually produced. Every motion or determination in the mind

of man, therefore, as neceſſarily reſults from the circumſtances in which he is placed; "as the preciſe *ſpot* where a billiard ball "reſts is neceſſarily determined by the im- "pulſe given to it;" or the depreſſion of a ſcale by the force of the weight which is thrown into it. So that as the Dr. obſerves, p. 11. "In all caſes, if the re- "ſult be different, either the circumſtances "muſt have been different, or there were "no circumſtances whatever correſponding "to the difference in the reſult; and con- "ſequently the effect was without any "cauſe at all."

On this view of the argument of this ſection, it ſeems obvious that the whole of it ſuppoſes a ſimilarity in the conſtituent principles of matter and ſpirit; for by thoſe only, who confeſs that ſimilarity, will it be acknowledged that the ſame general maxims will apply both to effects mechanically produced, and thoſe which depend upon will and choice; as the Dr. aſſerts in a paſſage before cited. The Dr. in other places, reaſons on the ſame ſuppoſition, taking that for granted, which his opponents do not admit.

Effects

Effects mechanically produced are ſuch as reſult from one body's acting upon another, according to the laws of matter and motion. Now theſe laws are fixed and operate neceſſarily, ſo that in any given circumſtances, the effects which take place could be no other than what they are. And they who are agreed with the Dr. in the opinion of the materiality of the thinking principle in man, as they, of conſequence, ſuppoſe it to be ſubject to the influence of mechanical laws, as all matter undoubtedly is, may therefore very conſiſtently with their own ideas draw the inference, that to ſuppoſe the poſſibility of a different volition or determination in the mind, from what is actually formed, when the circumſtances are preciſely the ſame, is to ſuppoſe an effect to exiſt without a cauſe. But glaring as the abſurdity of ſuch a ſuppoſition would be on the principles of the materialiſt; they who hold the doctrine of philoſophical freedom, proceeding in their reaſonings on different views of the nature of the thinking principle, are by no means chargeable with it. They cannot but agree with the Dr.

that every effect muſt have a cauſe, and that the cauſe muſt be adequate to the effect produced. But differing widely from him in their notions of the nature of the cauſe of volitions or determinations in the mind, it is no wonder that they ſhould equally differ in their views of the effects which it is capable of producing, and that thoſe which to him appear cauſeleſs, and not to be accounted for at all, ſhould by them be thought moſt natural and reaſonable.

To a principle of thought, conceived to be material, a change of circumſtances may be eſſential to a difference of volition; but when the mind is conſidered as being in its own nature immaterial, and therefore not ſubject to the laws of matter, but as endued with a ſelf-determining power, a variety of volitition or determination in the ſame ſituation or circumſtances may ſurely be admitted, as poſſible, without any contradiction, or ſeeming difficulty at all. It is indeed eſſential to the idea of a ſelf-determining power, that it be capable of acting or not acting, of doing or forbearing, and this in all ſituations and circumſtances which can be

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ſtated: otherwiſe this power does not determine itſelf, but is determined by ſomething elſe foreign to it; that is, the being, in whom it is ſuppoſed to reſide, is, properly ſpeaking, no agent at all, but a mere paſſive inſtrument, ſubject to the power of ſome foreign cauſe, equally as a piece of lifeleſs or ſenſeleſs matter. It is not to be inferred from what has been now advanced, that the weight or influence of motives or external cauſes is wholly excluded. It is not their influence, but their neceſſitating influence, which is denied; and which is directly incompatible with the idea of human liberty or agency. Whatever power, arguments, or motives, or any external cauſes, may obtain over the mind, in directing or forming its likings or averſions; it muſt ſtill, (if man be free, or an agent) the mind muſt, I ſay, ſtill, in the choice of its objects, act for itſelf, that is, without compulſion, or a neceſſitating influence, from any thing that is without or foreign to it. This the notion of liberty or agency ſeems immediately to include in it. Arguments or motives therefore, (as many writers on this ſubject have

obſerved) may be the occaſion of a man's acting, or putting himſelf into action, though they do not, and cannot, compel, or in the way of phyſical efficiency, neceſſitate him to act: between which two things (though the Dr. conſiders the diſtinction as idle and evaſive) the difference is no leſs than between an action and a paſſion, acting and being acted upon, a ſelf-determiner, and a mere paſſive inſtrument.

It deſerves particular notice, that according to the notion of human agency which has been now ſuggeſted, it is only a mechanical impulſe on the mind, as the cauſe of its volitions or determinations, which is denied, and which appears to be directly incompatible with the idea of liberty or agency; while there yet remains a proper cauſe, a ſufficient and adequate cauſe, for every volition or determination which is formed. This cauſe is that ſelf-determining power, which is eſſential to agency, and in the exerciſe of which motion begins. Now that motion muſt have a beginning ſomewhere is ſelf-evident. For, otherwiſe we cannot avoid falling into that moſt flagrant of all abſurdities,

dities, that there has been an eternal ſucceſſion of effects, without any cauſe. And the being, who began motion, muſt be a ſelf-mover, that is, muſt be poſſeſſed of that ſelf-determining power, which is included in the idea of liberty or agency. Liberty therefore is certainly poſſible, and muſt indeed, neceſſarily be ſuppoſed to exiſt ſomewhere; and as it cannot be denied to exiſt in the firſt ſupreme cauſe of all things, may alſo be communicated to created beings, as all other Powers may, which do not imply ſelf-exiſtence, or independency.

I have only further to remark on this argument, that ſo far is the notion of philoſophical liberty from having that atheiſtical tendency, which the Dr. imputes to it, that the admiſſion of it as belonging to the ſupreme mind, ſeems to be intimately and inſeparably connected with the proof of his exiſtence, as the firſt cauſe of all things: while, on the contrary, the total excluſion of it, as an impoſſibility, will directly draw after it that dire conſequence, which the Dr. ſo forcibly urges on the conſideration of his opponents.

work contradictions, or what is really no object of power at all. Equally muſt it conſiſt with the omniſcience of the divine being to ſay, he cannot know that, which is impoſſible to be known, as it does with his omnipotence to aſſert that he cannot do that, which is impoſſible to be done.

Taking, then, into conſideration the conſequences ariſing on both ſides of this exquiſite dilemma, to which the Dr. ſuppoſes he has reduced the abettors of philoſophical liberty; it will not, I think, require a moment's heſitation to determine which of them may be eſpouſed moſt conſiſtently with the perfection of the ſupreme being; or on which ſide theſe conſequences are chargeable, which are really diſhonourable to God. The doctrine of preſcience, built on the ruins of liberty, can, at moſt, only ſerve to ſupport ſuch an idea of the divine government, as ſuppoſes all human actions, and all the effects reſulting from them to be ordained by God, and to be equally neceſſary, as the revolution of the planets, or any other effects which take place in the material world; which appears to be directly

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ſubverſive of all rational grounds for praying to God, and indeed of all morality of conduct: whereas the doctrine of human liberty, while it only excludes ſuch a preſcience in the divine mind, as if it be impoſſible, becauſe inconſiſtent with liberty, can be no perfection at all, does at the ſame time admit thoſe views of a divine government, which are of all others the moſt honourable and glorious; the government of free, and conſequently accountable, beings; and which is as far ſuperior to that all-controuling influence, which the ſcheme of neceſſity would eſtabliſh, as a rational agent is to a mere paſſive inſtrument, or to an atom of ſenſeleſs matter.

Such a government as has been juſt hinted at, a government which has for its object beings endued with liberty, or a power of ſelf-determination, and which ſeems to be the only juſt idea of a moral government, which we can entertain, is ſurely poſſible, notwithſtanding what the Dr. has advanced to the contrary. Even if preſcience, conſidered as an impoſſibility, be not admitted, ſtill the natural order and connection of things,

things, eſtabliſhed by the Deity, by which virtue is rendered productive of good, and vice of evil to mankind, will remain the ſame. And this, both upon the ſcheme of liberty and neceſſity, muſt be allowed to form a conſiderable part of the divine government over his creature man in this world. There will, moreover, ſtill be room for ſuch a direction in the adjuſtment of the circumſtances attending mankind, when the ends of infinite wiſdom require it, as ſhall be favourable to the cauſe of virtue and goodneſs. It cannot be impoſſible to almighty power, when the characters of men are known, becauſe really exiſting, to bring about by means, which previous to their operation we cannot foreſee, thoſe events which he judges fit and proper for the maintenance and promotion of the well-being of his rational creation. And after all, whatever preſent irregularities may be permitted to take place in the allotments of Providence to the ſons of men; the grand and ultimate part of the plan of God's moral government, in the exact and equal diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments in a future

a future ſcene of exiſtence, and to which the advocates for every ſcheme of religion muſt have recourſe, as the final iſſue and completion of all that we now behold and experience of the ways of Providence; this ultimate and crowning part of the plan of God's moral government will, I ſay, yet ſtand on the ſame firm and immoveable grounds, whether the contingent actions of men be foreſeen or not. The aſſertion of the Dr. therefore, p. 24, taken from his examination of the writings of Dr. Beattie, when ſpeaking on the ſubject of preſcience, he ſays, "than which nothing can be more "eſſential to the government of the uni-"verſe," ſeems to have been too haſtily made; though I will not uſe his own language to Dr. Beattie, and ſay, it was uttered, "in the blind rage of diſputation."

Preſcience is indeed eſſential to ſuch a government of the univerſe, as the Dr. contends for, which ſuppoſes every particular event to be fixed and neceſſary: but it is by no means eſſential to the government of free beings, which, if it be a moral government, ſeems to require liberty in the

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object of it, as really moſt eſſential to conſtitute it moral. And a government of this nature, though Preſcience ſhould be deemed inadmiſſible, as a contrariety to contingency in the event, may notwithſtanding be as compleat in its deſigns and operations, as the utmoſt poſſible extent of knowledge, that is, the moſt perfect knowledge, united with Almighty power, can make it.

The deſign of all that has been now advanced, on the ſubject of Preſcience, has been only to ſhew the invalidity of the argument drawn from it againſt the notion of philoſophical liberty; and that if it carries any weight in it, it will conclude, not againſt human liberty, but againſt the reality of that ſuppoſed foreſight with which the Dr. looks upon it to be altogether incompatible.

The doctrine of the divine foreknowledge, in itſelf conſidered, opens a wide field for abſtruſe and difficult diſcuſſion, into which I ſhall not enter. It has been the ſubject of much controverſy, and has employed many able pens. That the prophecies of ſcripture do imply it in certain inſtances, muſt be allowed. And many authors of the firſt character

character for judgment, learning, and integrity, have appeared in the defence of it in its utmoſt latitude, and as extending to all human actions, though free, and therefore in their own nature contingent. "Fore-"knowledge or Preſcience," it has been obſerved, "if it does imply certainty, does "yet by no means imply neceſſity; and that "no other certainty is implied in it than "ſuch a certainty as would be equally in "things, though there was no foreknow-"ledge of them."

But waving all ſpeculations on this difficult point; they, who chooſe to conſider it, may ſee the argument fairly ſtated and illuſtrated with his uſual clearneſs and penetration, in Dr. Samuel Clarke's Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God: 8th edit. p. 103, and following.

I would here only ſubmit it to the Dr's. conſideration, how far it would have been agreeable to his ideas of candour and civility, had any writer on the ſide of liberty, under the warm impreſſions of an honeſt zeal againſt the manifeſt tendency of his illuſtrations of Philoſophical Neceſſity, adopt-

ON SECTION IV.

" OF THE CAUSE OF VOLITIONS, AND " THE NATURE OF THE WILL."

THE Dr. begins this ſection with reminding us of a maxim, by which, he ſays, a philoſopher will conduct all his inveſtigations relating to human nature; and that is, " not to have recourſe to more " cauſes than are neceſſary to account for" *appearances*.

He will then not think it improper in an advocate for liberty juſt to remind him, that the admiſſion of that one principle of freedom in the human mind, of which mankind are univerſally conſcious, will ſufficiently account for all their actions, and that to ſeek after other cauſes, muſt, therefore, in his own way of reaſoning, be wholly unneceſſary,

The Dr. however, not admitting the reality of that one great principle juſt mentioned, proceeds in this ſection, to point out what,

what, in his opinion, are the true cauſes of human actions.

" Whenever (ſays the Dr. p. 26.) any " perſon makes a choice, or comes to any " reſolution, there are two circumſtances, " which are evidently concerned in it, name- " ly, what we call the previous diſpoſition of " the mind, with reſpect to love and hatred; " for example, approbation or diſapproba- " tion of certain objects, &c. and the ideas " of external objects then preſent to the " mind, that is the view of the objects " which the choice or reſolution reſpects." He then inſtances in two kinds of fruit, " apples and peaches," ſuppoſing a perſon to be fond of the former, and to have an averſion to the latter, and that he is alſo diſpoſed to eat fruit. In theſe circumſtances, he ſays, the moment theſe different fruits are preſented to a perſon, he will take the apples and leave the peaches. And this (the Dr. ſays) he would always infallibly do in the like circumſtances; from which he infers, that the cauſe of the choice was the predilection for apples. Now, granting that the liking to apples is the reaſon of this

choice, or the motive to it, it yet does by no means follow that it is the cauſe of it, that is, the phyſical efficient of the choice. The reaſon to which I have reſpect in any choice that I make, or the motive exciting me to make it, and the efficient cauſe of that choice, are ſurely very different things. To conſider reaſons and motives as proper phyſical cauſes, is, as Dr. Price and other authors on this ſubject have juſtly obſerved, to make them agents. They may be the occaſions of my choice, but ſtill the act of chooſing is my own, that is, the ſelf-determining power, which inheres in the mind, and that only, is the cauſe of the choice.

"Affection (Dr. Prieſtley ſays, on the "inſtance of the fruit, p. 27) determines "my choice of the apples, and gravity de- "termines the fall of a ſtone."—"Our "ideas of *both* are exactly ſimilar; the con- "nection between the two things as cauſe "and effect being equally ſtrict and ne- "ceſſary." Here the Dr. ſuppoſes affection to operate in the ſame neceſſary manner, as the law of gravity impreſſed on bodies, in

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conſequence of which they fall to the ground. But is gravity itſelf agency? Or rather is it not an effect, produced by an inviſible agent, giving the ſtone a motion towards the earth. The fall of the ſtone is nothing more than the neceſſary effect of a certain law impreſſed upon it, and which is in itſelf only an effect: or, in other words, the ſtone in its fall is merely paſſive, nor does the operation of gravity ſuggeſt the leaſt idea of agency in the body which is thus determined in its motion.

To make the influence of affection on the volitions of the mind ſimilar to that of gravity on a ſtone, is, then, to reſolve the whole proceſs of our volitions or determinations into a mere phyſical effect, entirely excluding the notion of any proper agency in man. And in order to eſtabliſh this doctrine, it muſt be firſt proved that there is the ſame phyſical connection between the determinations of the mind and its affections, as there is between the fall of the ſtone, and the power of gravity which determines it to fall.

The beſt reaſon which I can collect from all the Dr. has advanced on this ſubject, in favour of ſuch a phyſical connection reſpecting the operations of the mind, is the univerſality or certainty of the effect, that is, of the determination which takes place in any given circumſtances. But though it be allowed that any particular effect would ever ſo certainly follow, on a ſtate of mind, and a ſituation of external objects, correſponding with it, this will not prove the effect to be neceſſary. Certainty, that is, a moral certainty, which is all the certainty that volitions, or actions, properly ſo called, will admit of; ſuch a kind of certainty, and neceſſity, that is, phyſical neceſſity, or a neceſſity ariſing out of the nature of things, do, and cannot but imply in them, very different ideas; nor is the latter by any means the conſequence of the former.

I can find no difficulty in conceiving that an event of which there was the greateſt moral certainty, might yet not have been, or might have been otherwiſe than it is; which is only ſaying, that an event which

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is morally certain, may not be phyſically neceſſary.

This muſt ſurely be allowed with regard to the moral conduct of the Deity. That he will always do what is fit and right to be done, is morally certain, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, and in the higheſt poſſible degree: but this cannot be underſtood to imply in it, that he has not a phyſical power of doing otherwiſe; for this ſuppoſition, beſides that it entirely deſtroys the moral rectitude of the divine conduct, to which a phyſical power or liberty of acting otherwiſe, or doing what is morally wrong, is eſſential; beſides this, I ſay, ſuch a ſuppoſition muſt further involve in it the idea of ſomething extrinſic to the Deity, by which he is acted upon, and ſo, as was before obſerved, will directly lead us on to the greateſt of all abſurdities, that of an eternal ſeries of neceſſary effects, without any proper cauſe at all.

And the ſame diſtinction, muſt be equally applicable to all moral conduct, whether in God or man. For if the diſtinction be juſt, it muſt hold univerſally; it muſt

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be true in every inſtance, or it can hold in none. The foundation on which it reſts, is exactly the ſame in all caſes whatever. Moral certainty, and phyſical neceſſity, are in their own nature very different and diſtinct things. The latter ſtands directly oppoſed to liberty or agency, which is yet perfectly conſiſtent with the greateſt moral certainty.

The diſtinction, for which we have now been arguing, deſerves the utmoſt poſſible attention; as the want of paying a proper regard to it, ſeems chiefly to have occaſioned that miſunderſtanding, and difference of opinion, which have ariſen on this great and intereſting ſubject. It may, therefore, be of uſe a little more particularly to ſtate and illuſtrate the meaning of the terms certainty and neceſſity. We ſhall begin with the latter, becauſe our ideas of the former will be found to ariſe out of it, and to be regulated by it.

Neceſſity, then, has been uſually reſolved into theſe two kinds, phyſical and moral; and that there is a real and important difference between theſe two kinds of neceſſity,

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will, I think, be too plain to be juſtly diſputed, upon a little attention to them. Phyſical neceſſity is a neceſſity ariſing out of the nature of things, and immediately depending upon it; ſo that while things remain to be what they are, it would be a contradiction to ſuppoſe that the conſequences flowing from this kind of neceſſity can be different from thoſe which do actually reſult from it. To ſay that any thing is neceſſary in this ſenſe, is the ſame as ſaying, that it is a natural impoſſibility for it not to be, or to be different from what it is. Thus, the exiſtence of the Deity is neceſſary, it being a contradiction to the idea of ſelf-exiſtence, to admit the poſſibility that he ſhould not exiſt. In the ſame ſenſe alſo, thoſe perfections of the Deity, which we term natural, ſuch as omnipotence, omniſcience, and the like, are neceſſary; as they are attributes eſſentially connected with the nature of a ſelf-exiſtent being, or which it would be contradictory to his nature to ſuppoſe him not to poſſeſs.

In like manner, with regard to all thoſe effects, which are produced by phyſical

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cauſes, they alſo are ſubject to the ſame kind of neceſſity. Thus the fall of a ſtone is the neceſſary effect of that law of gravity which is impreſſed upon it. So when a body of leſs force is made to give place to another of greater force, in conſequence of the greater acting upon the leſs, this effect is produced by a phyſical neceſſity. In both theſe caſes, as long as the nature of things continues to be what it is, the effects would be no other than ſuch as we ſee actually take place. While the power of gravity remains the ſame, it is not naturally poſſible but that the ſtone muſt fall, and the motion of the leſſer body be effected by the ſuperior power of the greater. And the ſame holds true as to all phyſical effects whatever. The ſame phyſical cauſes muſt invariably produce the ſame effects. For if in any inſtance, theſe cauſes do not operate to the production of their uſual effects, it muſt be owing to the intervention of ſome other phyſical cauſe, which has power ſufficient to controul the former, in conſequence of which the effect, which would otherwiſe take place, ceaſes, or is varied. Still the

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ſame neceſſary connection between the phyſical cauſe and its effect remains; and the reaſon of the alteration or variation of the effect, in any ſuppoſable caſe, is a real difference in the phyſical cauſe, by which this variation is produced. The maxim, therefore, that the ſame phyſical cauſes will neceſſarily produce the ſame effects, is univerſally true: and to ſuppoſe otherwiſe is to admit what is naturally impoſſible, becauſe a contradiction to the nature of things.

Now this phyſical neceſſity is ſurely very different from that which we denominate moral, apply that or any other epithet to it which we pleaſe. This latter kind of neceſſity ariſes from the influence of reaſons and motives, which, as they are not phyſical beings, or ſubſtances, cannot poſſibly act as one phyſical being or ſubſtance does upon another. Can arguments or motives, that is, mere abſtract notions, or conſiderations, operate in the ſame manner as bodies or ſubſtances, which are real phyſical beings, and which have certain mechanical powers belonging to them? If they are not ſimilar to gravity, or

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have not the power of gravity belonging to them, ſo neither can they have the ſame compulſory or neceſſitating influence. In the ſtrict, philoſophical ſenſe, nothing can be neceſſary which is not phyſically ſo; or which it would not be a contradiction to the nature of things to ſuppoſe not to be, or to be otherwiſe than it is. Now this kind of neceſſity we clearly perceive in the caſe of one body acting upon another, and giving motion to it. In this caſe there is a cloſe and neceſſary connection between the operation of the body that is the mover, and the motion of the body that is acted upon, as between cauſe and effect. But do arguments and motives bear the ſame phyſical relation to the determinations of the mind? If they do not, and this they cannot, unleſs we make them to be phyſical ſubſtances; it ſeems then directly to follow, that the actions which are conſequent upon them, cannot be phyſically neceſſary: but that, for any thing that is contained in the nature of thoſe arguments or motives, by which the mind is ſuppoſed to be influenced, there was a poſſibility of the actions not taking place,

or that a different action might have followed.

Upon the whole, then, the neceſſity which we call moral, or that which ariſes from the influence of reaſons and motives, muſt be reſolved into a certainty attending the volition or action, which is conſequent upon them, to which volition or action, though we may be ever ſo ſtrongly urged or excited, we are not yet compelled. This certainty admits of an infinite variety of degrees, according to the character and circumſtances of the agent: but in every caſe, even where there is the higheſt conceivable degree of certainty, that the event will follow, there will always be a phyſical or natural poſſibility of its not following, or that the event might have been different from what it is.

Phyſical certainty, on the other hand, ſtands to expreſs ſomething abſolute, without variation or degree, and is, uniformly and in every inſtance, exactly the ſame. This kind of certainty, as well as the neceſſity out of which it ariſes, can have no relation at all to any effects, but ſuch as are

produced

produced by phyſical cauſes, between which there is ſuch a cloſe and inſeparable connection, that to ſuppoſe what does take place, not to have taken place, is to ſuppoſe a real, natural, impoſſibility. This idea of certainty is, in its own nature, a contradiction to the notion of proper agency, which, as has been obſerved, cannot but imply a power of beginning motion in the agent, independent of the phyſical, or compulſive influence of any foreign cauſes; excluſive of which power, the being whom we call an agent is converted into a mere paſſive inſtrument.

In the different views of man, as ſubject either to that phyſical or moral neceſſity, of which we have been ſpeaking, and of his actions, as being accordingly certain in a phyſical or moral ſenſe; are implied ideas of his nature and character the moſt oppoſite. On the ſuppoſition that all he does is by a mere phyſical neceſſity, we make him to be *no agent at all.* By conſidering his actions as neceſſary only in a moral ſenſe, that is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, as not neceſſary at all, but only attended with a degree of certainty

tainty, which is a juſt ground of dependance for the performance of them; on this view of human conduct, we allow to man a *power of agency*, that he is the *maſter of his actions*, or is the *doer* of them. And while we thus conceive of man, we ſhall open a wide field for that attention to motives, (properly an act of the mind) which will enable him to make a juſt diſtinction between them, and give due weight to thoſe that are reaſonable and beſt, as the grounds of action. But on the ſcheme of an unavoidable, that is, a phyſical, neceſſity, all is fixed. The motives upon which he acts, and the degree of attention which he employs in conſidering them, as well as the actions conſequent upon them, are alike invariable, that is, it is equally impoſſible for him, by any act of his own, to leſſen the influence of the worſt, or to add the leaſt degree of weight to ſuch as are beſt.

In the diſtinctions, we have now been illuſtrating, between phyſical and moral neceſſity, and the different kinds of certainty ariſing from them; we are, I think, furniſhed with a ſhort and eaſy anſwer, to all

that the Dr. has advanced, in this ſection, on the cauſe of volition.

Whether the choice be more deliberate or inſtantaneous; whatever be the proceſs of the mind, in the views it takes of arguments or motives; whatever impreſſions it may receive from its affections or inclinations, its deſires or averſions; ſtill, after all, it muſt be the ſelf-determining power, and nothing foreign to *that*, which is the cauſe of volition, or of the choice that is made, otherwiſe it is, properly ſpeaking, no choice at all. If we multiply ever ſo many other cauſes, or circumſtances, concurring with, and leading to the choice that is made; it is plain that they can only operate as moral, not as phyſical, cauſes. They will be occaſions or grounds of determination, but they do not form or neceſſitate the determination. If man be an agent, the determination muſt reſt with himſelf, the choice muſt be his own; and conſequently, cannot be phyſically neceſſary, that is, in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe, it is ſubject to no neceſſity at all.

The nature of the will is very different from that of the paſſions, and the judgement;

ment; and I cannot therefore (with the Dr.) conſider it as at all wonderful, that it ſhould operate in a different manner. Not that it is that vague, uncertain, and inconſiſtent principle, which the Dr. repreſents it,—p. 32.—"Of ſuch a nature as both to be "properly influenced, or acted upon by "motives, and likewiſe by ſomething that "bears no ſort of relation to motive, and "conſequently has a mode of action entirely "different from that of motive." The advocates for liberty allow that motives influence; but they do not allow that the will is acted upon by motives, or by any thing foreign to it, ſo as to effect its determinations. The will implies, in its very nature, a freedom from all controuling, neceſſitating, influence. It is a power of ſelf-determination belonging to an agent, the phyſical independency of which on any thing foreign to itſelf makes it to be what it is, or conſtitutes its very eſſence. Motives, or if you pleaſe, "deſire or averſion," may incline "us to decide on what is propoſed to us;" but ſtill we are the deciders, we decide for ourſelves. It is, in all caſes, not the mo-

tive, the deſire or averſion, but the ſelf-determining power, or the agent, that is, the proper efficient cauſe of every deciſion, volition, or action.

The different mode of operation, then, belonging to the will, as diſtinct from the other faculties of the mind, ariſes out of its different nature. The will is an independent, active, principle or faculty; the other faculties are dependent and merely paſſive. The paſſions are liable to be excited by objects that are without, and to be controuled by a principle that is within. In like manner, the faculty of judging concerning the truth or falſhood of propoſitions, the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, does not act, but is acted upon, by the evidence which is preſented to it; and according to the appearance of the evidence, the judgment, in its laſt operation, is determined on one ſide or the other. Attention is indeed (as was befote hinted) matter of choice, and is therefore a proper *act* of the mind; but the judgment is finally determined, by the view it then takes of the propoſition, or ſubject, which is before it, whatever

whatever acts of conſideration have preceded the determination, or to which ever ſide of the point in diſpute, they have been chiefly directed. The judgment, therefore, is in its very nature paſſive. In its exerciſe, it may not improperly be called, *intellectual viſion*, ſeeing things as they are, or as they are preſented to us. And where then can be the propriety of ſaying "it would be "very extraordinary," that if there be a ſelf-determining will, there "ſhould not "be a ſelf-determining judgment alſo." (p. 34.) It really ſeems to me no more extraordinary than that what is in itſelf paſſive ſhould not immediately change its nature and become active.

P. 41. The Dr. gives the caſe of "the "firſt motions of the fingers, or legs of a "child:" to which "motions," he ſays, "the term volition, or will, is certainly not "at all applicable." On this I would obſerve, that it does not ſeem at all unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, that a previous volition may be formed as the cauſe of ſuch motions; or, in other words, that theſe motions are the effects of the exertion of the ſame ſelf-de-

termining power, which is contended for, as belonging to man. The motion of the fingers or legs is very different from the circulation of the blood: the latter is a purely mechanical, phyſical, effect, produced by a phyſical cauſe. But, in the former, where no ſuch cauſe can be diſcovered, nor any external, compulſory, force is uſed, we ſeem incapable of giving any other proper account of this motion, than by aſcribing it to a ſelf-moving principle, eſſentially free in itſelf, inherent in children, as well as grown perſons. In ſhort, the power of ſelf-motion ſeems to be inſeparable from animal life; is what the brutes, in common with the human ſpecies, partake of, and co-eval with life itſelf. This does, however, by no means infer moral agency, for to *that* intelligence as well as liberty is eſſential. The ſelf-moving power *in the animal creation* is uſually expreſſed by the term ſpontaneity.*

* See Dr. Samuel Clarke's Remarks on a book entitled, A Philoſophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty, p. 27, 28; at the end of a Collection of Papers which paſſed between Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715, and 1716.

On SECTION V.

" Of the supposed Consciousness of " Liberty, and the Use of the " Term Agent."

IT may be true, " that the greateſt dif- " ficulties in the conſideration of the " ſubject of liberty have ariſen from am- " biguities in the uſe of terms." Can it, then, be proper, to uſe the term voluntary to expreſs what is phyſically neceſſary? &c. &c. &c. Every attentive reader muſt ſurely be of opinion, that the Dr. has himſelf (though undeſignedly) fallen into many ambiguities in this controverſy. See particularly ſection 1. on the ſtate of the queſtion, with the Remarks upon it.

The Dr. in the ſection we are conſidering, takes occaſion to reply to what Dr. Price has advanced on this ſubject, in his Review of the Principles of Morals, in which he ſuppoſes the Dr. to have been " miſled by " the uſe of ſuch (that is ambiguous) " words:" nay the Dr. is " confident that

" when the ideas are attended to, it will " appear that the writer is, in fact, a Ne- " ceſſarian; and, though unperceived by " himſelf, is in words only, an advocate " for the doctrine of metaphyſical liberty.' See p. 44, and 46.

The quotation from Dr. Price is as follows, p. 302, of his Review, ſecond edit. " We have, in truth, the ſame conſtant and " neceſſary conſciouſneſs of liberty, that we " have, that we think, chooſe, will, or even " exiſt; and whatever to the contrary men " may ſay, it is impoſſible for them, in " earneſt, to think that they have no active, " ſelf-moving powers, and are not the " cauſes of their own volitions, or not to " aſcribe to themſelves, what they muſt be " conſcious they think and do.

And p. 304, in a note, " A man's chooſ- " ing to follow his judgment and deſires, " or, his actually doing what he is inclined " to do, is what we mean, when we ſay, " motives determine him. At the ſame " time, it is very plain that motives can " have no concern in effecting his determi- " nation, or that there is no phyſical con-

" nection

" nection between his judgment and views,
" and the actions conſequent upon them.
" What would be more abſurd than to ſay,
" that our inclinations act upon us, or compel
" us; that our deſires and fears put us into
" motion, or produce our volitions, that is,
" are agents? And yet what is more con-
" ceivable, than that they may be the oc-
" caſions of our putting ourſelves into mo-
" tion? What ſenſe would there be in ſay-
" ing, that the ſituation of a body, which
" may properly be the occaſion, or account
" of its being ſtruck by another body, is
" the efficient of its motion, or its im-
" peller?"

Now, though Dr. Prieſtley thinks that Dr. Price, in what he has ſaid above, has really given up the cauſe of liberty, he yet allows that this objection to the doctrine of neceſſity cannot be " expreſſed in a " ſtronger or better manner;" and ſays, that he has " purpoſely made this quota-
" tion, in order to meet the difficulty in its
" greateſt force."

The Dr. then candidly acknowledges himſelf to be ſomewhat aware of a difficulty

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ariſing from the reaſonings of Dr. Price; and the weight of that difficulty will be beſt underſtood, by conſidering how far Dr. Prieſtley has ſucceeded in his endeavours to remove it.

Dr. Price maintains, "that we have the "ſame conſtant and neceſſary conſciouſneſs "of liberty that we have that we think, "chooſe, will, or even exiſt."

Dr. Prieſtley replies, generally, "that "there is always ſome reaſon for any ob- "ject, or any conduct, appearing deſirable, "or preferable." (p. 48.) And applying this remark to the particular inſtance of two kinds of fruit being propoſed, he ſays, (p. 47, and 48.) "All that a man can poſ- "ſibly be conſcious of is, that nothing "hinders his chooſing, or taking, which- "ſoever of the fruits appears to him more "deſirable, or his not making any choice "at all, according as the one or the other "ſhall appear to him preferable upon the "whole." Now, granting that "there is "always ſome reaſon for any object, or any "conduct, appearing deſirable or prefer- "able;" ſtill the view that the mind has

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of the object or conduct, as preferable, and the choice that is made upon this view; the reaſon or ground of the choice, and the act of chooſing; are very different and diſtinct things. In the laſt view, or judgment of the mind concerning any object, about which it is converſant; though the view or judgment will depend on the attention (which is an act) beſtowed on the different circumſtances relating to the object; yet, I ſay, in the laſt view, or judgment of the mind, as to any object, the mind is entirely paſſive: but this view, or judgment, is not the choice, nor can it have any phyſical connection with it. Choice implies action, and all action (properly ſo called) implies liberty, otherwiſe it is not action, but paſſion. I may make a choice conſequent upon the view of an object; but if I make the choice, I am then an agent; I act, but am not acted upon, or neceſſarily determined in the choice I make. Dr. Price, therefore, very properly expreſſes this act of the mind by "a man's chooſing to "follow his judgment and deſires, or his "actually doing what he is inclined to do." If, indeed, he be allowed to be really conſcious,

ſcious, " that nothing hinders his chooſing " or taking whichſoever of two fruits ap- " pear to him more deſirable, or his not " making any choice at all, according as " the one or the other ſhall appear to him " preferable upon the whole;" this is all that is contended for by the advocates for liberty. But here I am afraid we ſhall meet with an inſtance of the ambiguity which Dr. Prieſtley complains of. For, if the view of the fruit, which is the object of the choice, has the neceſſitating influence which the Dr. aſcribes to it; the chooſing it can ſtand to denote nothing but a mere paſſive effect. And where then, may it not be juſtly aſked, is the preciſion of language, in uſing the term " chooſing," which immediately conveys the idea of ſomething active, to denote that which is entirely paſſive? If the view of the fruit renders the choice phyſically neceſſary; it then moſt effectually hinders the choice, or, is ſubverſive of it: ſo that on this ſuppoſition, the mind, not being conſcious of liberty, is conſcious of no choice at all.

Dr.

Dr. Prieſtley obſerves further, p. 48.— "Whenever we either reflect upon our own "conduct, or ſpeculate concerning that of "others, we never fail to conſider, or aſk, "what could be the motive of ſuch or "ſuch a choice: always taking it for grant-"ed that there muſt have been ſome motive "or other for it; and we never ſuppoſe, in "ſuch caſes, that any choice could be made "without ſome motive, ſome apparent rea-"ſon, or other."

Allowing all that the Dr. here advances, what does it prove more, than that motives have ſome real influence, as reaſons of conduct. May not a man always act upon ſome motives, either good or bad, without being neceſſarily determined in his conduct by them? In actions of a moral nature, whatever the motives are, upon which we act, could there be any poſſible ground for approbation or cenſure, in reflecting on our own conduct, or that of others; if we were not conſcious, or had not an idea of a freedom of choice, or action, attending it? But not to purſue this argument further at preſent, as we may have occaſion to ſay more

more on it hereafter; there does not ſeem to be any ambiguity in the expreſſion, "The "conſciouſneſs of freedom," but what is introduced, by making it to ſtand for that paſſive effect of motives, which the ſcheme of neceſſity contends for. As uſed by the advocates for liberty, it invariably expreſſes what it literally means, a real liberty of will, or action, in oppoſition to an unavoidble, phyſical, neceſſity, which implies no freedom or power of acting at all. In conſequence of the remarks now made; it ſeems clear, that the fact, *of the conſciouſneſs of freedom*, is far from being as Dr. Prieſtley has ſtated it: and for the truth of the negative, I think I may ſafely venture to appeal, with him, to every man's experience. I cannot therefore but ſtrongly object to the inference which the Dr. deduces, namely, (p. 50) "that it muſt be quite "arbitrary, and can have no ſort of con- "ſequence, except what is merely verbal, "whether I ſay, that the cauſe of the choice "was the motive for it (which Dr. Price "very properly defines to be the judgment, "or the deſire) or the mind in which that choice

" choice takes place, that is myſelf; and " to this cauſe it is that we aſcribe the " agency, or determining power, &c."

Dr. Price, and all the conſiſtent advocates for liberty, conſtantly diſtinguiſh between *the cauſe of the choice, and the occaſion of it*, or the motive to which the mind has reſpect in the choice it makes. And there cannot poſſibly be a greater difference between any two caſes, than whether we aſcribe the choice to the mind, that is, the determining power, or to the force of the motive. If we refer it to the mind, or the determining power, then the mind, or that power inherent in it, is the cauſe of the choice. Nor do we at all conſider the motive as the cauſe of the agency, but the agency as reſting in the mind; as being a diſtinct power in itſelf, and exerting itſelf independent of any phyſical, or compulſory, power of the motive; though it be allowed that it has reſpect to the motive, in the exertion of its agency, or, in the choice which it voluntarily makes. If, on the other hand, we aſcribe the choice to the power or force of the motive, the judgment

or deſire, as the cauſe of it; we then make the motive to be the efficient of the choice, and entirely exclude that power of agency in the mind, which the advocates for liberty ſuppoſe to belong to it. Can it then be juſtly ſaid, that the diſtinction contended for is "arbitrary," and that "it can have "no ſort of conſequence but what is merely "verbal"? Is there not a real and moſt important difference in the ideas ſuggeſted by this diſtinction? Can any thing be more oppoſite or contradictory, than the notions of a determining power in the mind, and a determining, controuling power, in the motive? The doctrines of a proper agency in man, giving him the command over his own determinations and conduct; and a compulſory force in motives, rendering all his determinations, and his conduct in every inſtance, neceſſary and unavoidable? He who cannot ſee a difference in theſe views of the cauſes of action, muſt ſurely be of opinion, that liberty and neceſſity mean preciſely one and the ſame thing, and that there is really no ground at all of diſpute

diſpute between the abettors of the one and the other.

Dr. Prieſtley, however, deſirous to give the fulleſt refutation to all that Dr. Price has advanced by way of objection to the doctrine of neceſſity, goes on "to meet "him (as he ſays, p. 51.) upon his own "ground in this inſtance, namely, appeal-"ing to the eſtabliſhed uſe of words, with "reſpect to the proper cauſe of volitions "and actions."—"He (Dr. Price) ſays, "What would be more abſurd than to ſay, "that our inclinations act upon us, and "compel us, that our deſires and fears put "us into motion, or produce our voli-"tions." Dr. Prieſtley then remarks, "Abſurd as this language appears to Dr. "Price, it is, in fact, the common ſtyle in "which the conduct of men is deſcribed, "and certainly proves, that if men have "any ideas really correſponding to their "words, they do conſider the motives of "mens' actions to be, in a proper ſenſe, the "cauſes of them, more properly than the "mind which is determined by the mo-"tives. This alſo is common, popular

" language, and therefore muſt have a " foundation in the common apprehenſion " of mankind."

It is allowed, that, in common language, men do ſometimes ſpeak of their own actions and thoſe of others, as if they were forced or impelled to do them by the motive of them, that is, the judgment or inclination. But all they can poſſibly mean, by this language, is, to deſcribe, in a ſummary way, the weight or influence of the motive, as a ground or reaſon for the action, which they thus connect with it. That they have no idea of the motive, as the cauſe or efficient of the action, nor yet as " the cauſe " of the immediate cauſe," (ſee Dr. Prieſtley, p. 55) that is, the efficient of the determination of the mind, or will; or, when they ſay, they have been compelled to do any thing, that they have no idea of the action, which they thus repreſent, as unavoidable; is, I think, undeniably certain from a conſideration already hinted at, namely, the ſentence which the mind paſſes upon actions, in reflecting upon them, according as they *appear* to have been morally good or evil.

Praiſe

Praiſe and blame muſt ſuppoſe liberty, without which, there can be nothing deſerving either of the one or the other.

Dr. Prieſtley, proceeding with his author, Dr. Price, obſerves; (p. 52) "Dr. Price ſays, "If our inclinations compel us to act, if "our deſires and fears put us into motion, "they are the agents; whereas they are "properly only the occaſion of our putting "ourſelves into motion." "But what (Dr. "Prieſtley replies) can this be beſides a "mere verbal diſtinction. If it be univer- "ſally true, that the action certainly follows "the motive, that is, the inclination of "the mind, and the views of things pre- "ſented to it, it is all that a Neceſſarian "can wiſh for; all his concluſions follow, "and he leaves it to others to ring changes "upon words, and vary their expreſſions at "pleaſure."

The argument of Dr. Prieſtley, in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity, taken from the univerſality of the effect, or the certainty of the action, as conſequent upon the motive, has been already noticed in ſection 4th. Nor

have I any thing more to add to what was there ſaid. If certainty and neceſſity, as I endeavoured to ſhew, mean very different things; one, what is perfectly conſiſtent with liberty; the other, ſomething directly ſubverſive of it; univerſality, or certainty, will then by no means infer neceſſity; and by the help of this diſtinction, not "a mere "verbal" one, but a real diſtinction in our ideas; we ſhall be enabled to diſcern the propriety, and feel the force of what Dr. Price, in the paſſage now referred to, has advanced on this head.

Dr. Price, however, that "very able "Metaphyſician," the author, who has ſo well ſtated the objection to the doctrine of neceſſity, before referred to, that Dr. Prieſtley does not think, it "can be ex-"preſſed in a ſtronger or better manner:" even Dr. Price, notwithſtanding all, in the opinion of Dr. Prieſtley, (p. 52) "is "particularly unhappy in" what he advances in ſupport of, what Dr. Prieſtley calls, an "arbitrary and verbal diſtinc-"tion." Dr. Price's words are, "what "ſenſe can there be in ſaying that the ſitu-

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" ation of a body, which may properly be
" the occaſion, or the account, of its being
" ſtruck by another body, is the efficient of
" its motion, or its impeller?" " whereas
" (ſays Dr. Prieſtley) according to his own
" definition of motive, it includes both the
" inclination, or diſpoſition of the mind,
" and the views of things preſented to it,
" and this manifeſtly takes in both the im-
" pelling body, and the ſituation in which
" the body impelled by it is found; which,
" according to his own deſcription, includes
" the whole cauſe of the impulſe, or every
" thing that contributes to its being impel-
" led. And of theſe two circumſtances,
" namely, the inclination of the mind, and
" the view in which an object is preſented
" to it, it is the latter, that is generally,
" and in a more eſpecial ſenſe, called the
" motive, and compared to the impeller,
" (to uſe Dr. Price's language) while the
" inclination, or diſpoſition, of the mind,
" is only conſidered as a circumſtance which
" gives the motive an opportunity of acting
" upon it, or impelling it, and producing
" *its proper effect.* In this I appeal, as

" before, to the common ſenſe of man-
" kind."

Dr. Prieſtley, in this paſſage, appears to have miſrepreſented, (though I am perſuaded without deſign) Dr. Price's reaſoning, and to have blended his own views of the point in diſpute, with thoſe which Dr. Price gives of it. According to Dr. Prieſtley, indeed, " the inclination or diſpoſition " of the mind, and the views of things pre-
" ſented to it," include both " the impel-
" ling body, and the ſituation in which the
" body impelled by it is found." But Dr. Price, on the other hand, though he defines the motive to be " the judgment or deſire," including both " the diſpoſition of the
" mind, and the views of things preſented
" to it," does yet by no means allow either of theſe to be the impeller, or the efficient of the motion or action. With him, the ſole efficient is the agent, or the ſelf-determining power in the mind. " A man,
" (ſays he) chooſing to follow his judgment,
" and deſires; or his actually doing what he
" is inclined to do, is what we mean when
" we ſay motives determine him. At the
" ſame

" ſame time, it is very plain that motives " can have no concern in effecting his de- " termination, or that there is no phyſical " connection between his judgment, and " views, and the actions conſequent upon " them." Here Dr. Price clearly diſtin- guiſhes between the choice, and the mo- tive; the former of which he conſiders as being alone the cauſe, or the efficient of action; while he denies that there is any phyſical connection between the motive and the action; or, that the motive is at all con- cerned, as an efficient of the action. It is, as he afterwards ſays, nothing more than " the occaſion of our putting ourſelves into " motion." In this view of the Dr's. ar- gument, he is ſo far from being unhappy in what he advances, in ſupport of his diſ- tinction between the *efficient* of the motion, and the *occaſion* of it; that it ſeems to be the moſt appoſite illuſtration which he could poſſibly give of the caſe. " The ſituation of a " body, which is the occaſion, or the account " of its being ſtruck by another," correſponds with the judgment, or deſire, preceding the action, or determination. But, as the ſitu-

ation of the body, which is ſtruck, is not the impeller, or efficient of its motion; ſo neither is the judgment, or deſire, the impeller, or efficient of the motion, or determination in the mind. I cannot, therefore, conceive of any ſimile, which Dr. Price could have more properly or happily introduced, to give us a preciſe and clear idea of what he intended, or which could carry greater weight in ſupport of it. And, for this, I will again, with Dr. Prieſtley, venture "to appeal to the common ſenſe of "mankind."

Dr. Prieſtley "would ſtill further con- "ſider this matter with Dr. Price, as a "Mathematician and a Philoſopher, *thinking* "he can ſhew *the Dr.* that, according to "the mode of reaſoning univerſally received "by the moſt ſpeculative, as well as the "vulgar, we ought to conſider motives as "the proper cauſes of human actions, "though it is the man that is called the "agent." (p. 54.)

He then ſubjoins the following illuſtration, "Suppoſe a philoſopher to be en- "tirely ignorant of the conſtitution of the "human

"human mind, but to ſee, as Dr. Price "acknowledges, that men do, in fact, act "according to their affections and deſires, "that is, in one word, according to mo- "tives, would he not, as in a caſe of the "doctrine of chances, immediately infer "that there muſt be a fixed cauſe for this "coincidence of motives, and actions? "Would he not ſay, that, though he could "not ſee into the man, the connection was "natural and neceſſary, becauſe conſtant? "And ſince the motives, in all caſes, pre- "cede the actions, would he not naturally, "that is, according to the cuſtom of phi- "loſophers in ſimilar caſes, ſay, that the "motive was the cauſe of the action? And "would he not be led by the obvious ana- "logy to compare the mind to a balance, "which was inclined this way or that, ac- "cording to the motives preſented to it?"

In the paſſage now cited, the argument, which I cannot but look upon to be the beſt in favour of philoſophical neceſſity, is ſtated and illuſtrated in ſuch a manner, as to render it extremely plain and intelligible.

The

The argument itſelf, may, however, be reſolved into this ſhort queſtion, Whether certainty implies neceſſity? Or, whether that which is morally certain, is therefore phyſically neceſſary? Of this much has been already ſaid, nor have I any thing to ſubjoin, except it be to take ſome little notice of a caſe of the doctrine of chances, to which the Dr. conſiders that of the coincidence of motives and actions as ſimilar. Now, in a caſe of chance, where there is the utmoſt certainty of the event, there is yet a phyſical poſſibility of its happening otherwiſe. To borrow Dr. Price's illuſtration, which is very clear and appoſite: (ſee his Review, p. 412, and following.) "Suppoſe a die, or ſolid, having a million of "faces: it may be ſaid to be certain, that "an agent, void of ſkill, will not, the firſt "trial, throw an aſſigned face of ſuch a "die; for the word certain is often uſed "in a ſenſe much lower. But that ſuch "an agent ſhould throw an aſſigned face "of ſuch a die, a million of times to-"gether without once failing, few would

"ſcruple

" ſcruple to pronounce impoſſible. The " impoſſibility, however, meant in this " caſe, would plainly be very different from " an abſolute phyſical impoſſibility; for if " it is poſſible to ſucceed the firſt trial, " (as it undoubtedly is) it is equally poſ- " ſible to ſucceed the ſecond, the third, " and all the ſubſequent trials; and con- " ſequently, in this ſenſe of poſſibility, 'tis " as poſſible to throw the given face a " million of times together, as the firſt " time, &c."—" If any one thinks what " is now ſaid of no weight, and continues " yet at a loſs about the difference between " theſe two ſorts of impoſſibility, let him " compare the impoſſibility that the laſt " mentioned event ſhould happen, with the " impoſſibility of throwing any faces which " there are not upon a die."

Dr. Price purſues the illuſtration much further, in a moſt ingenious and maſterly manner; ſo as to render the whole eminently deſerving the attentive peruſal of the moral ſtudent: and then concludes with the following remark. (p. 414.) " Now he

" that

" that ſhould, in ſuch caſes, confound theſe
" different kinds of impoſſibility, or ne-
" ceſſity, would be much more excuſable,
" than he that confounds them, when con-
" ſidering the events depending on the de-
" terminations of free beings, and com-
" paring them with thoſe ariſing from
" the operation of blind and unintelligent
" cauſes. The one admits of endleſsly
" various degrees; the other of none.

ON

ON SECTION VI.

" WHETHER LIBERTY BE ESSENTIAL TO " PRACTICAL VIRTUE; AND OF MORAL " AND PHYSICAL NECESSITY."

DR. Prieſtley employs the chief part of this ſection in replying to what Dr. Price has further obſerved in ſupport of liberty; rightly judging, that it muſt add conſiderable ſtrength to the Neceſſarian cauſe, if he could overthrow the defence, which ſo able an advocate, as Dr. Price, has ſet up on the contrary ſide.

Dr. Price ſays, (p. 301, 302.) " that " practical virtue ſuppoſes liberty." For, that " a being who cannot act at all, moſt " certainly cannot act virtuouſly, or vi- " ciouſly." That, " as far as it is true of " a being that he acts, ſo far he muſt him- " ſelf be the cauſe of the action, and there- " fore not neceſſarily determined to act;" neither by motives, nor by any thing elſe foreign to the agent himſelf, whom he conſiders as the efficient cauſe of the action. This, in brief, is Dr. Price's argument;

and his reaſoning appears clear and deciſive. Notwithſtanding which, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, (p. 56.) "It is on a mere verbal diſtinc-" tion, alſo, on which every thing that Dr. " Price has advanced, in proof of liberty " being eſſential to practical virtue, turns." (And p. 57.) "Here we have the ſame " arbitrary account of agency that has been " conſidered before." As Dr. Prieſtley had given Dr. Price the character of "a very " able Metaphyſician;" methinks he ſhould have been rather more cautious of charging him ſo often with "mere verbal diſtinc-" tions," and "arbitrary accounts" of things; though he might not agree with him in his views of the ſubject. But let us now attend to what Dr. Prieſtley has offered to invalidate Dr. Price's reaſoning.

"In fact, if a virtuous reſolution be " formed, (ſays Dr. Prieſtley, p. 57.) the " perſon, by whom it is formed, is the ob-" ject of my complacence and reward, and " if a vicious choice be made, the perſon " is the object of my abhorrence; and there " is the greateſt propriety and uſe in puniſh-" ing him."

Theſe

Theſe poſitions are ſurely incontrovertible; that is, ſuppoſing there be "a virtuous reſolution formed," and "a vicious choice made," that the one is the object of complacence and reward, the other of abhorrence and puniſhment. But what virtue can there be in a reſolution, or vice in a choice, if in the ideas of reſolution and choice, you include nothing, but the mere paſſive effect of motives; and conſequently deny the being himſelf to be the efficient cauſe of the reſolution and choice. The nature of the reſolution, or the thing determined upon, may be ſuch as a being, in the given circumſtances, ought to have made; and the nature of the choice, or the thing choſen, may be ſuch as a rational being ought not to have made, or ought to have rejected; or, in other words, there may be abſolute virtue in the matter of the reſolution, and vice in that of the choice: but there will ſtill be wanting that power or liberty in the beings or perſons, to whom they are aſcribed, which is eſſential to all perſonal merit or demerit, or to the virtue or vice of the agent, and which can alone render the

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one an object of complacence and reward, and the other of abhorrence and puniſhment. So that as far as reſpects the perſons ſuppoſed to be concerned, take away liberty or agency, and there can be no virtuous reſolution formed, nor any vicious choice made; that is, neither does the reſolution imply any virtue, nor the choice any vice, in the perſons to whom they are reſpectively imputed.

Dr. Price has ſaid, (p. 302) "Who muſt "not feel the abſurdity of ſaying my vo- "litions are produced by a foreign cauſe?" meaning a motive. Dr. Prieſtley remarks, that it will by no means follow, "that "then the volition is not my own. It is "my volition, whatever was the motive "that produced it, if it was a volition that "took place in my mind." But can that be truly ſaid to be my volition, my act, which was produced by ſomething, over which I had no power? On that ground, every thing that takes place in my body, as well as my mind, may, with equal propriety, be called my act, or volition. If volition means nothing but the paſſive and neceſſary

neceſſary effect of motives, it then ſtands upon the ſame footing with all other phyſical effects; and ſo, the circulation of the blood and the pulſation of the heart, which take place in my body, may, with as much reaſon, be called my volitions, as any determinations which take place in my mind.

Dr. Price, with Dr. Clark and other eminent writers, diſtinguiſhes between a moral and a phyſical neceſſity; this Dr. Prieſtley (p. 59) calls a diſtinction, "equally uſeleſs as that concerning the proper "ſeat of agency, or cauſation." Phyſical and moral, are, in the Dr's. opinion, "but "words." For, ſays he, "if the choice "be certain, and truly neceſſary, it is a "proof that with that diſpoſition of mind "no other choice could be made; and "whatever conſequences are drawn from "the conſideration of the impoſſibility of "any other choice being made, applies to "this caſe, if to any."

It was by Dr. Prieſtley's ambiguous uſe of the term neceſſary, that we were before led to endeavour to ſtate and illuſtrate the diſtinction between moral and phyſical ne-

ceſſity. And in his remark now quoted, we have a freſh proof of a real difference of ideas, couched under this diſtinction, and of the importance of attending to it. In the ſuppoſition which the Dr. makes, "If "the choice be certain, and truly neceſ- "ſary," by certain, and neceſſary, the Dr. muſt mean phyſically certain, and neceſſary, (and indeed that only can be *truly* neceſſary, which is *phyſically* ſo) otherwiſe it will not warrant the inference he draws from it, namely, "that with that diſpo- "ſition of mind no other choice could be "made." Now the advocates for liberty, do not allow any choice to be neceſſary in a phyſical, but only in a moral ſenſe: and where there is the greateſt certainty, or neceſſity, of the latter kind, there is always a poſſibility of a different choice. Here, then, Dr. Prieſtley is reaſoning on the ſuppoſition of what his opponents do not admit; and of conſequence, the inference, which he deduces, muſt fail.

To this miſtaken conception, of moral for phyſical neceſſity, it is evidently owing, that Dr. Price is conſidered by Dr. Prieſtley,

ley, in a large extract made from the work before referred to, as " expreſſing himſelf " in a manner by no means ſuited to his " ſyſtem, but as if the proper cauſe of the " actions was the motives that led to them." (p. 69.)

Dr. Price, to prevent any ſuch miſconſtruction of the language he uſes, ſets out in this extract with obſerving, (ſee p. 350, and following) " by the neceſſity which is " ſaid to diminiſh the merit of good ac- " tions, muſt be meant, not a natural, " (which would take away the whole idea " of action, and will) but a moral neceſ- " ſity, or ſuch as ariſes from the influence " of motives and affections on the mind, " or that certainty of determining one way, " which may take place upon ſuppoſition " of certain views, circumſtances, and prin- " ciples of an agent."

When Dr. Price had given this key to open his meaning in what follows, it ſeems really not a little extraordinary, how a man of Dr. Prieſtley's diſcernment, ſhould ſo much miſunderſtand him. Dr. Price ſays, " Now it is undeniable, that the very

" greateſt neceſſity of this ſort, (moral ne-
" ceſſity) is conſiſtent with, nay, is implied
" in the idea of the moſt perfect and me-
" ritorious virtue; and conſequently can by
" no means, be what, *of itſelf*, ever leſſens
" it. The more confidently we may de-
" pend upon a being's doing an action,
" when convinced of its propriety, what-
" ever obſtacles may lie in his way, or, mo-
" rally ſpeaking, the more efficacious and
" unconquerable the influence of con-
" ſcience is within him, the more amiable
" we muſt think him."

—" In like manner, the moſt abandoned
" and deteſtable ſtate of wickedneſs, im-
" plies the greateſt neceſſity of ſinning, and
" the greateſt degree of moral impotence.
" He is the moſt vicious man, who is moſt
" enſlaved by vicious habits, or in whom
" appetite has ſo far gained the aſcend-
" ant, and a regard to virtue and duty is ſo
" far weakened, that we can, at any time,
" with certainty foretel, that he will do
" evil when tempted to it. Let me,
" therefore, by the way, remark, that
" every idea of liberty muſt be very er-

" roneous, which makes it inconſiſtent " with the moſt abſolute and complete " certainty, or neceſſity, of the kind I have " now taken notice of, or which ſuppoſes " it to overthrow all ſteadineſs of charac- " ter, or conduct. The greateſt influence " of motives that can rationally be con- " ceived, or which it is poſſible for any " one to maintain, without running into " the palpable, and intolerable abſurdity " of making them, phyſical efficients, or " agents, can no way affect liberty. And " it is, ſurely, very ſurprizing, that our moſt " willing determinations ſhould be imagined " to have moſt of the appearance of not " proceeding from ourſelves; or, that what " a man does with the fulleſt conſent of " his will, with the leaſt reluctance, and " the greateſt deſire and reſolution, he " ſhould, for this very reaſon, be ſuſpected " not to do freely, that is, not to do at " all."

This is the whole of the extract given by Dr. Prieſtley, and what there is in it, that is at all favourable to his doctrine of neceſ- ſity, I am not able, on the moſt careful

examination, to find out. I cannot, therefore, but expreſs my ſurprize at the remark he makes upon it. "As a profeſſed Neceſſarian, I would not wiſh to uſe any other "language than this." (Illuſtrations, p. 62.) Dr. Price does, indeed, ſpeak of "a moral "neceſſity, (but not of virtue) or, a neceſſity "ariſing from the influence of motives, and "affections of the mind," and of the efficacious and unconquerable influence of conſcience." But does he not clearly diſtinguiſh between this kind of neceſſity, and that which is natural or phyſical? Theſe, with Dr. Prieſtley, are preciſely, in idea, one and the ſame thing; and on that ground the main argument for neceſſity ſtands. Does not Dr. Price directly aſſert, that the latter kind of neceſſity "would take away the whole idea "of action and will?" Does he not maintain, that it is a "palpable and intolerable "abſurdity," to make motives "phyſical "efficients, or agents?" All the neceſſity, therefore, that Dr. Price can be ſuppoſed to allow, as ariſing from the influence of motives and affections, is ſuch as admits the natural, or phyſical poſſibility of a different

choice

choice from that which actually takes place, which Dr. Prieſtley holds to be impoſſible. In ſhort, Dr. Price allows only a neceſſity which is figurative, and which, ſtrictly ſpeaking, is no neceſſity at all: whereas Dr. Prieſtley, on the other hand, maintains the idea of an "abſolute neceſſity," and which muſt be that which is natural, or phyſical. In like manner, when Dr. Price ſpeaks of "the efficacious and unconquer-"able influence of conſcience," he introduces it with the clauſe, "morally ſpeak-"ing," purpoſely to reſtrict his idea, and confine it to that of a moral influence; which, though it may be attended with the greateſt degree of moral certainty, is yet carefully diſtinguiſhed from ſuch an influence, as implies in it phyſical efficiency, or neceſſity, which is the influence that Dr. Prieſtley every where maintains. Still, Dr. Price leaves amply ſufficient room for the exiſtence and operation of a ſelf-determining power, acting independently of all motives, of all judgment or deſire, conſidered as efficients of choice, or determination, though ſo far acting under

their influence, as to have a certain reſpect to them, as grounds, or reaſons of the choice which itſelf makes. Dr. Price does not ſay, that the moſt perfect, or any virtue does, or can ariſe from abſolute, that is, phyſical neceſſity, or from an influence of conſcience that is naturally, or phyſically unconquerable. From the whole ſcope of his argument it is plain, that the moſt efficacious and unconquerable influence of conſcience, which it is poſſible to conceive of, does, in his opinion, admit the poſſibility of a man's acting otherwiſe than he does, or of his counteracting the influence of conſcience, and doing that which is baſe or wicked. By the efficacious and unconquerable influence of conſcience, he evidently means no more than what we otherwiſe call *an inflexible integrity:* by which we commonly expreſs, an integrity which the ſtrongeſt temptations cannot, morally ſpeaking, corrupt; but cannot ſurely be ſuppoſed to intend, that a man, whom we believe to have attained to ſuch an eminent degree of integrity, has not a natural power of forfeiting it.

So

So, when Dr. Price ſays, "the moſt aban-
"doned and deteſtable ſtate of wickedneſs
"implies the greateſt neceſſity of ſinning,
"and the greateſt degree of moral impo-
"tence;" he evidently does not intend a phyſical, or natural, but merely, a moral, neceſſity. Though we can, according to the Dr's. views, "foretel with certainty, that "a man, if ſunk into ſuch a ſtate, will do "evil, when tempted to it;" yet it will not follow from hence, that he has not a natural power of withſtanding the temptation, and refraining from the evil. The contrary is manifeſtly implied in the Dr's. reaſonings already noticed.

Upon the whole of the view now taken of this extract, it appears throughout, inſtead of giving the leaſt countenance, either in itſelf, or by any juſt conſequence, to the Neceſſarian doctrine, to make directly, and forcibly, againſt it. Dr. Price ſeems to be ſo far from being "off his guard," and expreſſing himſelf "in a manner by no means "ſuited to his ſyſtem;" (as Dr. Prieſtley ſuppoſes him, p. 60) that he, on the contrary, well aware of every point on which

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the queſtion in diſpute turns, has fairly met, and fully obviated, the moſt material difficulties attending it; and will, I think, upon recollection, be acknowledged, even by Dr. Prieſtley, to be a moſt judicious and maſterly, if not a *convincing* defender of the doctrine of liberty.

Dr. Price, in another part of the ſame work, (p. 318) ſays, "Inſtinctive benevolence is no principle of virtue, nor are "any actions flowing merely from it virtuous." And again, "(p. 324) "the "concluſion I would eſtabliſh, *is*, that the "virtue of an agent, is always leſs in proportion to the degree in which natural "temper, and propenſities fall in with his "actions, inſtinctive principles operate, and "rational reflection on what is right to be "done is wanting." Dr. Prieſtley conſiders this, as inconſiſtent with what Dr. Price himſelf had before acknowledged; for, ſays Dr. Prieſtley, (p. 66) "what is the differ-"ence between affections of mind, from "which, he (Dr. Price) ſays, ariſes the "moſt perfect and meritorious virtue, and "inſtinctive

" inſtinctive benevolence, natural temper, " and propenſity."

Dr. Prieſtley here reaſons on the ſuppoſition of a conceſſion which Dr. Price, as I underſtand him, has not made. Dr. Price, as was before obſerved, does not ſay, that any virtue ariſes from the influence of affections of the mind. He only ſays, that " moral " neceſſity ariſes from the influence of mo- " tives, and affections," and " that the " very greateſt neceſſity of this ſort is con- " ſiſtent with, nay, is implied in the idea " of the moſt perfect and meritorious vir- " tue." But this is ſurely very different from ſaying, that virtue ariſes from this neceſſity. It may be implied in it, though it does not ariſe from it, or though the virtue is not conſtituted by it, as a proper cauſe or efficient. Dr. Price makes both intelligence and liberty to be eſſential to practical virtue. It is immediately conſtituted by the exerciſe of the ſelf-determining power, on a view or conviction of what is right to be done. He, therefore, very properly excludes, from the idea of virtue, inſtinctive benevolence,

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all inſtinctive principles, and all the actions which flow merely from them. And how can the reaſonableneſs of what he advances, on this head, be juſtly controverted? If this be not admitted, we muſt, by neceſſary conſequence, ſuppoſe, that a very good natured ideot is a very virtuous man.

But ſolid as the ground is on which Dr. Price proceeds, in denying any virtue to ariſe from mere inſtinctive principles, and allowing moral worth to thoſe actions only which are the effect of choice, founded on the conſideration of what is right to be done; this diſtinction is, by Dr. Prieſtley, imputed to nothing but a more than common refinement. "Mankind (ſays Dr. Prieſtley, "p. 67) in general, do not refine ſo much "as Dr. Price. Whatever it is within a "man that leads him to virtue, and that "will certainly and neceſſarily incline him "to act right, or to do what they approve, "they deem to be a virtuous principle, to "be the foundation of merit, and to in-"title to reward."

If *to think and write clearly* can juſtly be called refining, Dr. Price may, then, with

with the greateſt propriety, be ſaid to refine, but this is all the refinement, which is, I think, diſcernible in what he has advanced on this ſubject. He has ſeparated that from the idea of virtue, which appears, at leaſt to the judgment of a friend of liberty, not to belong to it. By an advocate for that ſide of the queſtion, which he has eſpouſed, it cannot be thought in the leaſt proper, to ſpeak of any thing within a man, "that will neceſſarily (in Dr. "Prieſtley's ſenſe) incline him to act right." To act, and to be neceſſarily inclined, ſeem to be ideas directly contradictory. *That, which neceſſarily inclines,* excludes the power of agency. It leaves no room for any action at all, properly ſo called. All, that can follow, muſt be merely paſſive, ſomething which it is not in a man's power to prevent, in which there cannot ſurely be any virtue, or moral deſert at all; any more, in what is thus done by man, as a mere inſtrument, than in any other natural and neceſſary effect which falls under our notice. For the ſame reaſon, thoſe principles, alſo, which are merely inſtinctive, cannot have the leaſt

ſition to what is right or good, as acquired, not as born with a man, or as neceſſary and unavoidable, in which they place the virtue, and which they conſider as the foundation of merit, whether the degree of virtue manifeſted, in conſequence of the facility or difficulty of the acquiſition, be greater or leſs. Men may be charmed with what carries the appearance of a virtuous conduct; but they can approve, or applaud it, as meritorious, or worthy of reward, only on ſuppoſition that the principle, or diſpoſition, from which it flows, is virtuous; that is, that it is practiſed on the view of it as right, and does not proceed from the impulſe of a mere involuntary inſtinct. In this view, they approve both the action, and the principle or diſpoſition which accompanies it, or from which it flows. But though ſeveral principles may concur in their operation, as motives to the action, there is yet only one cauſe of it, and that is, the voluntary determination of the agent.

Dr. Prieſtley further obſerves, "The "only reaſon why we are leſs ſtruck with "a virtuous action, proceeding from what is "called

" called natural temper, is becauſe we con-
" ſider it as a fickle principle, on which
" we can have no ſufficient dependance for
" the future. But let that principle be ſup-
" poſed to be really fixed and ſtable, and
" wherein does it differ from that diſpoſi-
" tion of mind, which is the reſult of the
" greateſt labour and attention?" It is unworthy of any enquirer after truth *to ring changes upon words*; but where there is a real difference in the ideas which they ſuggeſt, it is neceſſary that the difference be pointed out. I cannot therefore but remark that the expreſſion, " a virtuous action " proceeding from what is called natural " temper", conſidered as the cauſe of the action, appears to me to involve in it another contradiction. No effect which proceeds merely from natural temper, as its cauſe, can properly be called a *virtuous action*. We may be ſtruck or pleaſed with an effect, which we by no means approve or applaud, as having any degree of virtue in it. And though the principle from which the effect, or, as Dr. Prieſtley terms it, the action, proceeds, be ever ſo

" fixed and ſtable," this will not, of itſelf, prove the effect or action to be virtuous. Stability in the proper virtuous principle will, indeed, clearly manifeſt ſtrength in the principle, and conſequently increaſe the virtue or merit of it; and a courſe of virtuous action will certainly have more virtue in it than a ſingle action. But then, the principle and action muſt be virtuous in themſelves, or they can never become ſo, though the utmoſt degree of ſtability ſhould attend them. Hence ariſes a moſt important difference between what is called natural temper, and that virtuous diſpoſition, which is the reſult of choice, or culture. Though the one be, indeed, " a fickle prin-" ciple", and the other in its nature more " fixed and ſtable"; yet neither does the fickleneſs of the former make it not to be virtuous, nor the ſtability of the latter render it ſo; but the true diſtinction between them is, that *the mere inſtinctive principle*, or *natural temper*, wants that eſſential conſtituent of virtue—*choice*—which is the ſpring, or cauſe, of the *acquired principle*. The latter is formed by ourſelves, on the

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view of it as right and good: whereas in the former, we are entirely paſſive; it is imparted, not acquired; in the production of it, as agents, we have no concern at all.

In the remarks now made, we are furniſhed with matter for reply to Dr. Prieſtley's additional illuſtration of his argument. "If (ſays the Dr. p. 68.) two men be in "all reſpects the ſame inwardly, if they "feel and act preciſely in the ſame manner, "upon all occaſions; how in the ſight of "God or man, can there be more virtue "in the conduct of one, than in that of the "other, whatever difference there may have "been in the acquiſition of that temper?" Moſt certainly, there can be no difference at all in their virtue or moral deſert, if their inward principles and outward conduct be in all reſpects preciſely the ſame. But between the two caſes, in which the Dr. looks upon both the principles and conduct to be preciſely the ſame, there appears to be the greateſt difference conceivable in both theſe reſpects; and this difference immediately ariſes from the different origins of the diſpoſition, which is conſidered as the principle

of virtue. Where natural temper is the principle, it is, as was before obſerved, not an acquiſition but an endowment. Now where this is the operating principle, for inſtance, of what we call benevolence; though men may, for want of ſufficiently attending to what paſſes within them, miſtake this for the proper principle of virtuous benevolence; it cannot yet I think admit a doubt, ſince, as has been already ſhewn, the principles themſelves ſo widely differ, that the feelings, ariſing from the operation of them, muſt be no leſs different too. In the inſtances, in which natural temper alone operates, there can be no feeling but that of a certain eaſe or pleaſure, ſimilar to what we feel from a happy temperament of body, and in which there can be nothing more meritorious (though very agreeable) than there is in the latter. On the other hand, in the caſe of that virtuous benevolence, which is our own acquiſition, or where we act from a deſire to promote the happineſs of others, as what is in itſelf fit and reaſonable; there we feel not only eaſe or pleaſure, or the abſence of uneaſineſs

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or pain, but we have, moreover, the peculiar and inexpreſſible ſelf-ſatisfaction ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of a rectitude of diſpoſition, which we have been at the pains to cheriſh, and which makes the exerciſe of it to be, not a neceſſary and unavoidable effect of a phyſical cauſe, but a voluntary diſcharge of a moral and religious duty. So widely different are the feelings of that benevolence which proceeds from mere natural temper, and that which is founded on a regard to virtue.

Neither do two men, who are actuated by theſe different kinds of benevolence, any more act, than they feel, in the ſame manner. Though their conduct may be formally the ſame, it muſt, in a moral eſtimation, widely differ. He who is governed only by inſtinctive benevolence, and whoſe conduct, according to the Dr. unavoidably flows from it, does not act at all, but is acted upon: while the man, who promotes the happineſs of others, from a regard to morality, and the will of God, acts as becomes a rational being, and poſſeſſes real worth and dignity of character. When

paſſive, can be juſtly called virtue. This hath been repeatedly obſerved; and I look upon it to be a truth, which ſtands on a foundation that can never be moved. And for this plain, and, as it appears to me, moſt ſubſtantial reaſon, it may be allowed to be very abſurd to pray for virtue, as a mere communication, in which the agency of man is not concerned. But does it therefore follow that nothing is communicated, in aid of our own endeavours after virtuous improvements, and which is, a proper ground for prayer to God on this account. Dr. Price, and every friend of rational religion, may readily admit that much aſſiſtance is communicated, both external and internal, for the purpoſe of forming the *temper*, to direct the *will* in its voluntary exerciſes, and for the juſt regulation of the *conduct*; and may yet, at the ſame time, very conſiſtently maintain that "virtue is our own, and muſt ariſe from "within ourſelves." In ſhort, in a very proper ſenſe, every thing belonging to us, even *temper*, *will*, and *conduct*, may be conſidered as the gift of God; though not in

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ſuch a ſenſe as will make man nothing more than a paſſive inſtrument, which is ſuppoſing him as incapable of virtue, as even a ſtock or ſtone. The advocates for liberty may, therefore, ſtill continue to pray to God for virtue, that is, for his gracious, co-operating influences and aids, in the purſuits of virtue; as well as for external things; and the practice will be, not an abſurd, but a moſt reaſonable and uſeful, as well as a pious one. I cannot but add, that there does, indeed, appear to be a real and great abſurdity in prayer, on Dr. Prieſtley's ſcheme of neceſſity, while the principle itſelf alſo directly tends to indiſpoſe men for the performance of it. What room can there be to pray to God for any thing, when every thing, the whole plan of events reſpecting man, no leſs than all other creatures, is irrevocably fixed and certain, and all power of agency in man is excluded. In this view of the divine government, it appears to be utterly uſeleſs to aſk any thing of God. There is, however, not the leaſt juſt ground for any individual to be at all concerned, whether he live in the perform-

ance,

ance or neglect of it. For, if it be a part of the divine plan, that I am to pray, I ſhall find myſelf neceſſarily inclined to it, at the time, when it is ordained that I ſhould. If I am not inclined to it, or can ſatisfy myſelf in the neglect of it; it is a ſure and infallible proof, that prayer was never deſigned for me, during the time that this indiſpoſition to it continues, though that ſhould be ever ſo long, for a great part, or even the whole, of my life. I confeſs myſelf alarmed at the moral influence of ſuch an opinion, not on ſuch a philoſophic and enlarged mind as Dr. Prieſtley's, but on the generality of mankind, who cannot reaſon nor *refine* ſo much as Dr. Prieſtley; and who had they been left under (what Dr. Prieſtley, muſt think) the deluſion of that imaginary idea of liberty, for which Dr. Price is ſo ſtrenuous an advocate, would have had their minds open to the influence of a very conſiderable motive to the diſcharge of their moral and religious duty, which the doctrine of neceſſity does not merely enervate, but entirely deſtroy.

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All that follows in this ſection, is but a recital and ſummary view of the main points in Dr. Prieſtley's argument againſt Dr. Price, before ſtated, which he wiſhes Dr. Price to reconſider. I have only juſt to remark on the few pages employed for this purpoſe, that there are evidently ſome miſtakes in the repreſentation given of Dr. Price's reaſonings, or, in the conſequences which are annexed to them. Thus, (p. 70) becauſe the ſelf-determining power, according to Dr. Price's own confeſſion, is not— "judgment, conſcience, deſire, hope, or "fear, or any of the paſſions: it muſt, "therefore, (ſays Dr. Prieſtley) be mere "will, under no direction or guidance, be- "cauſe under no influence whatever." Dr. Price gives us a very different idea of the ſelf-determining power. He is ſo far from ſaying that the will is under no influence, that he, on the contrary, maintains, (p. 62 of Illuſtrations, before quoted) "the greateſt "influence of motives that can rationally "be conceived, or which it is poſſible for "any one to maintain, without making "them phyſical efficients, or agents, can

"no

" no way affect liberty." So, (p. 72) when Dr. Prieſtley calls, " a power of determin-" ing without motives, or a proper ſelf-de-" termining power, without any regard to " judgment, conſcience, or affection," an abſolutely chimerical thing, and what is abſolutely impoſſible—Granted—but it is a chimera which Dr. Price never thought of as a reality, an impoſſibility in what he never looked upon to be poſſible. Here, again, Dr. Prieſtley has forgot Dr. Price's very important diſtinction between his ideas of moral influence, and phyſical neceſſity; between having a regard to judgment, conſcience, or affection, and being phyſically or neceſſarily determined by them; and becauſe Dr. Price diſtinguiſhes an agent from a paſſive inſtrument, Dr. Prieſtley repreſents Dr. Price as maintaining the idea of a power of action, or ſelf-determination, without any regard to judgment, or conſcience: as if to determine for ourſelves, and to act the part of an ideot, were, with Dr. Price, preciſely, one and the ſame thing.

ON SECTION VII.

"OF THE PROPRIETY OF REWARDS AND "PUNISHMENTS, AND THE FOUNDA-"TION OF PRAISE AND BLAME, ON "THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY."

THE objection to the doctrine of neceſſity, which Dr. Prieſtley here conſiders; namely, that on this ſcheme "the "idea of reſponſibility, or accountableneſs "vaniſhes, and there can be no propriety, or "uſe of rewards or puniſhments," has, indeed very conſiderable weight with thoſe who have conſidered the ſubject. And the force of this objection may be compriſed in a few words. To be accountable for any thing, ſuppoſes that I have it in my power to do, or forbear that thing, whatever it be. That which I am under an abſolute neceſſity of doing, or which I cannot avoid, can neither be deſerving praiſe or blame in the ſmalleſt degree, and can therefore be no foundation for reward or puniſhment. In this brief illuſtration lies the whole weight

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of the objection; and it is founded on principles which apppear to be ſo ſelf-evident, that I am perſuaded the common ſenſe of mankind, if unbiaſſed, would immediately lead to an univerſal acknowledgement of their truth. But certain and plain as theſe poſitions are; Dr. Prieſtley hopes "to make "it appear, that when the caſe is rightly "underſtood, there can be no uſe or pro-"priety of rewards, or puniſhments, on any "other ſcheme, (but that of neceſſity) and "the greateſt poſſible upon this." (p. 74.) In order to make this clearly apprehended, the Dr. ſuppoſes "two minds conſtructed "upon the two oppoſite ſchemes of neceſſity "and liberty." To avoid circumlocution, he calls, the former A. and the latter B. ſuppoſing himſelf to be a father, and theſe two his children. "Knowing, ſays he, "their inward make and conſtitution, let "us conſider, how I ſhould treat them." As the illuſtration of theſe two examples is carried on for ſeveral pages, to avoid ſo large a quotation, I ſhall refer the reader to Dr. Prieſtley's work itſelf, for a full view *of it;* and ſhall content myſelf with point-

ing out ſuch parts of it, as ſeem materially to affect the argument. Dr. Prieſtley repreſents "all the determinations of the one "being A as invariably directed by its pre-"vious diſpoſitions, and the motives preſent-"ed to it;" while the other B is deſcribed as having "a power of determining, in all caſes, "in a manner independent of any ſuch pre-"vious diſpoſition;" which, ſays the Dr. "is preciſely the difference between the "ſyſtems of neceſſity and liberty, philoſo-"phically, and ſtrictly defined." Note here, that by the determinations of A being "invariably," the Dr. through the whole of his illuſtrations means *neceſſarily*, directed. And whereas he ſays, that B has "a power of determining, in all caſes, in "a manner independent of motives;" the advocates for liberty, only maintain a power of determining, independent of motives, as efficients of the determination by a compulſory influence, while they admit the greateſt poſſible influence, that is conſiſtent with agency in the being who determines. So that the difference between the conſtruction of the two minds, A and B on the

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ſyſtems of neceſſity and liberty, expreſſed in other words, is preciſely this; A has not the power of making any determination at all; all his determinations are made by the compulſory, neceſſitating influence of previous diſpoſitions and motives. B, on the other hand, has the power over his determinations, or of determining for himſelf, independent of any ſuch compulſory influence, as A is ſuppoſed to be governed by. In ſhort, B is an agent, while A is a mere paſſive inſtrument. Into this the difference between the two minds, as ſtated by Dr. Prieſtley, when fairly conſidered, muſt at laſt be reſolved. Now, on this view of the conſtruction of the mind A, the whole ſcheme of diſcipline, which the Dr. lays down, appears to be altogether futile and inſignificant. His object, indeed, is to make A virtuous and happy: but as to all the happineſs ariſing from conſcious virtue, he muſt ſurely miſs his aim. If virtue conſiſts (as certainly it muſt) in the choice of what is right, on the view of its rectitude; A is by the conſtruction of his mind, rendered incapable of it. He is neceſſarily determined, or acted

acted upon in all that he does. He can therefore determine nothing, or make no choice at all. How excellent ſoever, then, in themſelves, the precepts may be which are recommended to him, as rules of conduct; whatever addreſſes may be made to his hopes or fears; and whatever may be the effect of all the care and diſcipline that can be uſed; ſtill not the leaſt degree of perſonal virtue can be produced. Call the effects by what name you will, they can ſuggeſt no idea of virtue, or of virtuous ſatisfaction or happineſs. All is neceſſary and unavoidable. There is no choice, no power in the mind to form its own determinations, and conſequently nothing that, in a moral eſtimation, can in the leaſt deſerve praiſe or reward.

But from the child A, let us now turn our attention to B, whoſe mind is formed upon the principle of liberty, and conſider what may be expected, as the effect of proper inſtruction and juſt diſcipline, with reſpect to him. Now, though motives can have no ſuch influence upon his determinations, as the Dr. intends by the term ne-

teſſary; that is, though he will always have the power of determining for himſelf, independent of the phyſical or neceſſitating influence of motives; it yet does by no means follow from hence, that motives can have no influence at all upon his mind, or no ſuch influence as may not, in a moral ſenſe, be ſaid to be certain. Though he is not the ſame paſſive inſtrument as A, he is ſtill a rational being, who is endued with a faculty of intelligence, which, if it be properly cultivated, it is ſuppoſed will, as he grows up, enable him more and more to diſtinguiſh between the weight of different motives, as reaſons or grounds of determination or action. By the power of choice or determination, with which he is formed, he is not only rendered capable of virtue, of good or ill deſert; but has alſo the ability of exerciſing that act of the mind, which we call *attention*. In conſequence of this, as the faculty of thought and reaſon gains ſtrength, he becomes proportionably more capable, by the act of *attention*, of feeling the influence of juſt motives of conduct. *And*, in this way, it is eaſy to conceive of the

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reaſonableneſs of ſuch motives, if properly preſented to his mind, being diſcerned in a ſtill clearer manner, and conſequently the weight of them being more ſtrongly felt, as reaſons of conduct; till their influence riſes, to a conſiderable degree of what the advocates for liberty expreſs by *moral certainty*: which certainty will always increaſe, in proportion to the degree in which the reaſonableneſs of the motive is diſcerned, and to the ſtrength of the impreſſion, which, by attention, it makes upon the mind. Such then being the conſtruction of B's mind, and ſuch the allowed influence of motives; can it be juſtly ſaid, if due care be taken of his education, that "no ſort "of calculation can be made," or no reaſonable expectation formed, as to his future character and conduct? Though the influence of motives be not mechanical, or phyſically neceſſary, does this prove that they have no influence, or that there is no kind or degree of certainty attending their operation? Dr. Prieſtley, in his illuſtrations, conſtantly deduces this conſequence from the denial of phyſical or abſolute ne-

ceſſity, which the advocates for liberty do not admit. To be not phyſically determined by motives, is, with him, the ſame thing, as to have no regard to them at all, as reaſons of conduct. But not to enlarge on a point, on which ſo much has been already ſaid; let us return to the caſe of the child B.

He is by nature intelligent and free. He is capable of underſtanding, at leaſt in ſome degree, the nature of motives. As reaſons of conduct, they cannot but, morally ſpeaking, influence him, according to the view he takes, or the judgment he forms, of them. The clearer, then, his diſcernment is of the propriety of thoſe motives, upon which he ought to act, ſo much the ſtronger will be their influence over him. And he has, at all times, the power of determination and action in himſelf. Conſidering the conſtitution of B's mind in this point of view, which is no other than a repreſentation of what a mind, formed according to the ſcheme of liberty, really is; and I cannot conceive of a more proper ſubject of tuition or diſcipline, than B appears to be. He

has

has a power of choice or determination, and he has reaſon to direct him in the exerciſe of it. And can "no proviſion" be made againſt a wrong uſe of the determining power, or againſt wrong conduct, in a being of B's make? Though this is not to be prevented in a phyſical way, or no ſuch proviſion can be made, as will neceſſarily determine his conduct; and though a counteracting influence may defeat all that can be done for him; there are, however, means to be uſed, and thoſe too very probable in their effect, for leading him to act right; that is, to make a right determination for himſelf. As he is a rational being, may it not well be ſuppoſed, that rational conſiderations will have ſome influence on him? May it not alſo be ſuppoſed, that their influence will gradually increaſe with their evidence? And can promiſes or threatnings, the conſiderations of rewards and puniſhments, be uſeleſs to ſuch a mind as this? Or rather, is it not naturally capable of feeling their influence in the greateſt degree, as far as it can underſtand their nature, and *diſcern their evidence*? Upon the whole,

while the beſt inſtruction, and the moſt wholeſome and regular diſcipline, muſt be altogether ineffectual to the propoſed end, on a mind formed, as the doctrine of neceſſity ſuppoſes; on one conſtructed according to the principle of liberty, they muſt be likely and efficacious means of accompliſhing it. Out of the latter mind alone can virtue be produced; in that only can the ſatisfactions and joys of conſcious goodneſs find any place: and unleſs *reſponſibility* can conſiſt with the impoſſibility of acting at all, A muſt of conſequence be utterly incapable of it, on any principle of reaſon or juſtice; whereas B is, in the commonly received ſenſe, properly accountable for his conduct.

But Dr. Prieſtley, p. 78, has given us a very different idea of *reſponſibility* from that which is uſually annexed to it. For according to him, "to make us proper ſubjects of diſcipline, and thereby ſecure our greateſt happineſs, is all that, philoſophically ſpeaking, is really meant by making us accountable creatures." So that, according to the definition of *reſponſibility* here laid down, to be formed the paſſive

paſſive ſubjects of an uncontroulable influence, which is the Dr.'s own idea of diſcipline, and to have our greateſt happineſs ſecured to us by the agency of the Divine Being, without any power of choice or agency on our part, is to be an accountable creature. What there is then left to give an account of, I am utterly at a loſs to conjecture. Any further comment on this notion of reſponſibility ſeems unneceſſary.

The remarks, already made, will apply to all that the Dr. has further advanced, in his other view of the ſubject, which begins with p. 80. The whole is founded upon theſe two principles, firſt, That motives determine, or are efficients of the choice; and ſecondly, That if this power of determination be not allowed to them, they can then have no influence at all, but whatever is done is the effect of mere arbitrary pleaſure.

I have already endeavoured to ſhew, that the firſt of theſe tenets is incompatible with any idea of virtue, or of good or ill deſert; and that the other proceeds on a ſuppoſition of that, as maintained by the advocates for

liberty, which they conſtantly deny. I ſhall therefore only ſubjoin a few remarks on ſome paſſages in this part of the Dr.'s illuſtrations, which proceed on theſe principles.

To prove A deſerving of praiſe for his conduct, he obſerves, that it "proceeds "from his own virtuous diſpoſitions, and "that his good habits are ſo confirmed, "that neither promiſes nor threatnings are "able to draw him aſide from his duty." I anſwer, as before, that whatever A's diſpoſitions or habits may be, they cannot, with any propriety, be called virtuous or good, as implying any perſonal worth, or good deſert, in them; becauſe he had not, nor could he have, on the ſuppoſed conſtruction of his mind, any active concern in forming them; no more than in adjuſting the ſtature of his body, or the features of his countenance. And where then is the proper foundation for praiſe?

Concerning B the Dr. remarks, on the other hand, that he is no proper ſubject or object of praiſe. And why? Becauſe, let him do the ſame thing that A did, "the "*cauſe* of his right determination was not

"any

"any bias or diſpoſition of mind in favour "of virtue, or becauſe a good motive in- "fluenced him to do it; but that his de- "termination was produced by ſomething "within him of a quite different nature, "a mere arbitrary pleaſure, without any "reaſon whatever," &c. p. 81. Such is the manner in which Dr. Prieſtley accounts for B's conduct: but it is founded on principles very different from thoſe which are held by the advocates for liberty. On that ſcheme, all virtue is right determination on the view of the rectitude, or moral excellence, of what the mind determines upon: and though the approbation or liking of the action (which is the laſt judgment of it, and in which the mind is paſſive) is not the cauſe or efficient of the determination, the mind or ſelf-determining power is yet always ſuppoſed to have reſpect to that, in the determination it makes. Approbation precedes, and, as a reaſon or motive, has a real and conſiderable influence in exciting the mind to, though it does not controul or neceſſitate, the determination. Can the *mind, then,* in this caſe, be ſaid to act by

"a mere

" a mere arbitrary pleaſure?" Or does it not, on the contrary, in the exerciſe of its natural power, act with the greateſt reaſon, and on the beſt grounds? And what, if this does not, can merit commendation or praiſe? It is not, as Dr. Prieſtley repreſents it, p. 84, like "a fortunate throw" of the dice, which is a mere effect, over which the hand, that caſts it, has no power of direction at all; but is a real act, of which the mind itſelf is the cauſe, an act with deſign, and which proceeds on the moſt ſolid foundation, as to the nature of the choice or determination which it makes.

Dr. Prieſtley further obſerves, p. 82, concerning the conduct of a being, whoſe mind is formed on the principle of liberty; "There is nothing on which I can depend "for the future. Even a ſeries of good "actions, produced in this manner, gives "no ſecurity for a proper conduct in fu- "ture inſtances; becauſe ſuch actions can "form no habit, that is, no neceſſary ten- "dency to a particular conduct; but every "thing is liable to be reverſed by this ſelf- "determining principle, which can turn a

"deaf

" deaf ear to all motives and all reaſons." There is not, indeed, the ſame ground of dependance in the conduct of B as of A, that is, a phyſical or abſolute neceſſity; but does it therefore follow, that " there is " nothing, in the character of B, on which " I can depend for the future?" Is moral certainty no ground of dependance? This, as was obſerved in another place, is the ground on which we depend for the rectitude of the divine conduct. In this inſtance, the moral certainty riſes to the moſt perfect ſecurity. It amounts to a real, though but a moral, impoſſibility, that God can ever do any thing but what is right; excluding only that phyſical impoſſibility, which by not admitting the idea of agency, muſt be ſubverſive of all moral perfection in the ſmalleſt degree. As Dr. Price, in his clear and forcible manner, remarks, p. 430, and following, of his Review, " It may be " infinitely more depended upon, that God " will never do wrong, than that the wiſeſt " created being will not do what is moſt " deſtructive to him, without having the " leaſt temptation to it. There is, in

" truth,

" truth, equal impoſſibility, though not " the ſame kind of impoſſibility, that he, " who is the abſtract of all perfection, " ſhould deviate into imperfection in his " conduct, infinite reaſon act unreaſonably, " or eternal righteouſneſs, unrighteouſly; " as that infinite knowledge ſhould miſtake, " infinite power be conquered, or neceſſary " exiſtence ceaſe to exiſt." Here, then, is an inſtance, in which moral certainty affords a ground of dependance the moſt ſecure, and which, it may with the ſtricteſt propriety be ſaid, cannot fail us. Now, there is the ſame kind of ſecurity, though, comparatively, in as much lower a degree, as the difference is great between a created and an uncreated mind; a being ſurrounded with temptation, and one who is above the poſſibility of any temptation; I ſay, there is, though in this diminiſhed degree, the ſame kind of ſecurity attending our dependance on a human character, which has proved itſelf good by a ſeries of right actions.

Habits,

Habits, as they are commonly underſtood, conſiſt in a facility of doing any thing, acquired by repeated acts. And this facility ariſes from the influence which diſpoſitions towards ſuch acts, or the motives which were the grounds or reaſons of them, will obtain, by having been attended to, or made the grounds of determination or action before. The diſpoſition or tendency, therefore, towards any kind of conduct cannot but grow ſtronger, together with the habit or facility of doing the action: and though it can, in no caſe, be the phyſical cauſe of acting; will, however, in proportion to the degree of its ſtrength, increaſe the moral certainty of the repetition of the action, or of a continued purſuit of the ſame courſe of conduct. Can it, then, be juſtly ſaid, that "a ſeries of good actions gives no ſecurity "for a proper conduct in future inſtances?" A ſeries of good actions will certainly, in the common acceptation, form a habit of doing them. Strength of habit, alſo, implies proportional ſtrength in the diſpoſition to that which is good; and according to this, muſt be the ſecurity, or ground of depend-

ance,

ance, that a virtuous agent will continue to act virtuouſly: unleſs we ſuppoſe, becauſe he has the phyſical power of altering his conduct, that his having acted virtuouſly, when his diſpoſition ſo to do was weaker, renders it in no degree probable, or morally certain, that he will not ceaſe to act the ſame becoming part, when his diſpoſition to it is become ſtronger. The idea of a "ſelf-determining principle which can "turn a deaf ear to all motives and all "reaſons," if by *can* be meant, that there is no kind of certainty that it *will not*, may be Dr. Prieſtley's opinion of the ſelf-determining power, but is not the idea which the advocates for liberty have of it.

Dr. Prieſtley obſerves, (p. 83) that "by "ſelf-determination the world in general "always underſtands, a power of determi-"nation not ſubject to the controul of "others, but produced by cauſes operating "within a man's ſelf only." If theſe cauſes, whatever they be, within a man's ſelf, ſtand to expreſs ſomething over which the man himſelf has no power at all, ſomething which operates by an unavoidable neceſſity,

ceſſity, which the man cannot poſſibly prevent; for ought I can ſee, the term ſelf-determination, may, with equal propriety, be applied to a determination ſubject to "the controul of others," as to one "produced by cauſes operating within a man's "ſelf." The man himſelf is no agent, no determiner, in one caſe more than the other. The determination is produced by ſomething, over which he has no more power, than he has over the changes of the ſeaſons. Both are alike neceſſary; they are the effects of what he did not fix, and cannot alter. If this be "ſelf-determination, as the world "in general always underſtands it;" to talk in the manner I have now done about it, muſt, in the Dr's. phraſe, be *getting out of the road of common ſenſe*; and whether it be ſo or not, let every man of *common ſenſe* determine.

P. 84, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, "It has been "ſeen, that puniſhment would have no pro-"priety, or uſe upon the doctrine of philo-"ſophical liberty; blame alſo, upon the "ſame ſcheme, would be equally abſurd, "and ill-founded." That what cannot

be avoided, cannot be the ſubject of blame, and that where there is nothing deſerving blame, there can be no foundation for puniſhment—theſe poſitions are amongſt thoſe ſelf-evident maxims which no words can make plainer. To determine, then, whether puniſhment, can belong to A or B, the Dr's. two ſons of neceſſity and liberty, for any ſuppoſed wrong that either of them has done, the ſingle queſtion is, whether they had it in their power to avoid, or forbear, what they have done? If it be ſaid that either of them could not, it would, I believe, be univerſally acknowledged, by every unprejudiced perſon, that he was no object of puniſhment, and that it could, in no degree, without manifeſt injuſtice, be inflicted on him; but that it belonged ſolely to him, by whom the ſuppoſed wrong action might have been avoided. Upon theſe principles, in the caſe of the child of neceſſity, A, puniſhment can have no foundation, or propriety. With him every thing is fixed and unalterable, and entirely independent of any proper agency of his own, as the cauſe of it. Whatever is done by him, it was abſolutely

abſolutely out of his power to avoid; he may then deſerve *pity*, but not *blame*; *aſſiſtance*, but not *puniſhment*. Nor, in his caſe, can there be any more uſe or occaſion for puniſhment, as a moral diſcipline, than there can be juſtice or propriety in the infliction of it, as due to demerit. For whatever the indulgences may be, to which he has a propenſity, and how ſtrong ſoever that propenſity may be; neither the indulgences, nor the propenſity, can, in a proper or moral ſenſe, be called vicious. Of vice, or any thing morally evil, he is utterly incapable, having no power of choice, or agency. A, therefore, though he may be very unhappy, has nothing in him that is vicious to be cured; and on which there is any ground or occaſion for puniſhment to operate, in the way of moral diſcipline. All there can poſſibly be in A, which needs alteration, can only come under the denomination of certain conſtitutional diſorders, or the neceſſary conſequences of them; on which ſufferings, like a bitter potion, may have a

very ſalutary effect, ſo as to render A a mere comfortable, but can never make him a virtuous, being.

On the other hand, the child of liberty, B, if he has really done the wrong action which is laid to his account, he has done that which he had it in his power to have avoided, and is therefore deſerving of blame and, conſequently, puniſhment, according to the evil which he hath committed. Dr. Prieſtley, indeed, ſays of B, that though he has done what is wrong, "it was not from any bad diſpoſition of "mind, that made him ſubject to be in-"fluenced by bad impreſſions. No, his "determination had a cauſe of quite another "nature. It was a choice directed by no "bad motive whatever, but a mere will, "acting independently of any motive." (p. 85.) The direct contrary to the ſpirit and deſign, if not to the letter, of this repreſentation of B's conduct, appears to be unqueſtionably true of him. As he is by nature endued with a power of choice, or determination, whatever he does that is wrong,

wrong, cannot but involve demerit in it, provided he had it in his power to have known that it was wrong. In a being of his frame, to do a wrong thing is to make a wrong choice or determination. Now a right or wrong choice ſuppoſes ſome rule or ſtandard, by which the choice is to be made. Whatever that ſtandard be, if I am, or might make myſelf, acquainted with it, and yet do not bring my choice to this teſt, before I make it; whatever is wrong in my choice, as the conſequence of my neglect, I am certainly chargeable with it. As B, then, is allowed this power of choice, or determination, and is alſo ſuppoſed capable of knowing what he does, or of diſtinguiſhing between right and wrong; if he acts wrong, or makes a wrong choice, he muſt be ſo far criminal. Circumſtances will, indeed, increaſe or leſſen the criminality. If the action, or determination proceeded "from "any bad diſpoſition of mind, that made "him ſubject to be influenced by bad im-"preſſions," that is, according to the ideas of neceſſity, if he was determined by a diſ-

poſition which was by him unavoidable, or neceſſarily ſubject to the controuling power of bad impreſſions; this muſt, ſurely, in the eye of impartial reaſon and common ſenſe, not render B's conduct criminal and deſerving blame, but, on the contrary, take away all criminality from it. B is then changed into the child of neceſſity, who can be no proper object either of praiſe or blame. Make the reverſe of this ſuppoſition, that is, ſuppoſe B to have acted under the influence of a bad diſpoſition, which he had contracted; and that this diſpoſition, ſtrong as its influence might be, did not neceſſitate him to act, or had no abſolutely controuling influence over him, or in other words, that he had it in his power to forbear what he yet did under its influence; and he will then be accountable and deſerving blame, both for the wrong act or determination, and alſo for the bad diſpoſition which was the ground or occaſion of the act, or the motive exciting him to it. "A mere *will* acting independently of any motive," that is, without any bad previous diſpoſition, or any temptation

temptation to the act, is, again, a cauſe of action which the doctrine of liberty does not ſuppoſe. Further, if we view puniſhment, as inflicted upon B for his wrong conduct, in the light of diſcipline, for the purpoſe of reforming him; and in his character there is the proper and only foundation for it to work upon; B, conſcious that he might have avoided the act for which he ſuffers, and that what he ſuffers is upon account of his own wrong choice, may ſee his crime in his puniſhment; in conſequence of which, he may be ſo ſenſible of the evil of what he has done, as to guard againſt the repetition of it for the future.

Dr. Prieſtley remarks, (p. 86) "It is ſaid "that the nature of remorſe implies a ſelf-"determining power." I anſwer, (continues the Dr.) "that this is no other than "the ſame deception that I have explained "before. For blaming ourſelves, or blaming another, are things of the very ſame "nature, and depend upon the ſame principles. The ſenſe of ſelf-reproach and "ſhame is excited, by our finding that we "have a diſpoſition of mind leading to

" vice, and on which motives to virtue, " in particular caſes, have had no influ- " ence.

Here I am led, in reply, again to repeat, that Dr. Prieſtley, and the advocates for liberty, differ moſt eſſentially in their ideas of perſonal virtue and vice, or what it is that conſtitutes that good or ill deſert, which is the proper foundation of praiſe or blame, in relation to ourſelves or others. Dr. Prieſtley makes them to conſiſt in the controuling influence of good or bad diſpoſitions in the mind, introduced there by neceſſary cauſes, over which man has no power, which he can neither prevent nor alter. The advocates for liberty, on the other hand, ſuppoſe agency to be eſſential to all perſonal virtue or vice, merit or demerit, and that whatever the diſpoſitions are, which take place in the mind, no man can in the leaſt deſerve praiſe or blame upon account of them, any further than he has been concerned in the production of them, or in giving them the influence which they have obtained; in ſhort, no further than he had

the power over them. With ſuch different views of the eſſential conſtituents of moral character in general, it is no wonder that we judge ſo very differently of the merit or demerit belonging to any particular one; and that we account in ſo very different a manner for the feelings of mind, which are excited by reflection on any particular courſe of conduct. A miſtake there muſt certainly be on one ſide or the other. Let it be impartially conſidered, whether the Dr. has the reaſon, which he ſuppoſes, to think that the deception lies on the ſide of liberty.

To take the inſtance which the Dr. is here conſidering, that of remorſe or ſelf-reproach. The advocates for liberty ſuppoſe, when a man feels remorſe, or reproaches himſelf, for any thing that he has done, that he conſiders himſelf as having had the power of not doing it. And is there any thing that looks like deception in this? Is it not moſt natural and reaſonable, to view the man, who reproaches himſelf, as the real agent of the crime for which he reproaches himſelf? Or, has a man the leaſt reaſon to blame himſelf for an action, which

it was impoſſible for him to avoid? But, clear as it ſeems, that "a man, when "he reproaches himſelf for any particular "action," ſuppoſes he might have avoided it, and "that, if he was in the ſame "ſituation again, he would have acted dif-"ferently;" this, Dr. Prieſtley ſays, (p. 88) "is a mere deception." Let us, then, attend to what, in the Dr's. opinion, is the cauſe of ſelf-reproach. The ſenſe of ſelf-reproach and ſhame, he ſays, is excited by our "finding that we have a diſpoſition "of mind leading to vice, and on which "motives to virtue, in particular caſes, "have had no influence." But is not the diſpoſition of mind leading to vice, as well as every other, according to the Dr. neceſ-ceſſary and unavoidable? If I have a diſ-poſition, on which motives to virtue, in par-ticular caſes, at any time, or at all times, have had no influence; this diſpoſition is not of my own creating, but is the effect of the ſame unavoidable neceſſity. Why then ſhould I be aſhamed, or reproach my-ſelf upon account of any diſpoſitions, how bad or perverſe and obſtinate ſoever? They

are

are my misfortunes, but are neither my crime nor ſhame. On the ſcheme of neceſſity, both the actions which we call bad, and the diſpoſitions which lead to them, are alike neceſſary, and not to be avoided. And in this view of them, it does not ſeem poſſible that any ſenſe of grief or ſhame, in the loweſt degree, can be excited. On the ſuppoſition that we are really conſtructed and acted upon, as the doctrine of neceſſity teaches, if a man ever does reproach himſelf, it muſt be by forgetting, at the time, what ſort of a creature he really is, and imagining himſelf to be what he is not: that is, inſtead of conſidering himſelf as the child of neceſſity, he muſt believe that he is a ſon of liberty; in conſequence of which he will fancy, that he could have avoided that which he could not avoid; that he acted when he was only acted upon; that he really did thoſe vicious acts, of which he was the mere paſſive inſtrument. In this way alone, does it ſeem poſſible, on the ſcheme of neceſſity, that a man can ever blame himſelf. And, in this view of the caſe, may I not venture to affirm that the groſſeſt deception

is

is implied? Let me add too, that it is a deception, which reflects the greateſt diſhonour on the divine conſtitution and government. For what can be more diſhonourable to God, than to ſuppoſe, that he has ſo conſtituted his creature *man*, as that he ſhall feel that moſt painful and diſtreſſing of all ſenſations,—*ſelf-reproach*—for what it was abſolutely out of his power to avoid—that he may even experience all the pungent remorſe of the worſt of tranſgreſſors, when he has only been ſubject to the law of his nature, and, for the time, filled the part aſſigned him by his Omnipotent Creator.

The ſufferings, derived from this ſource, are very different from thoſe medicinal ones, which take their riſe from other cauſes: not only as they are more intenſe in degree, but as they are founded on an unavoidable deception, to which I am made ſubject, as to my character as well as frame; leading me to ſuppoſe that I am chargeable with that of which I was the mere paſſive inſtrument, and, in conſequence of this, cauſing me to feel as a criminal, when I am really innocent. It will, I believe, be found

found extremely difficult, to reconcile ſuch a plan of human nature with any ideas either of mercy or juſtice.

Dr. Prieſtley concludes this ſection with obſervations from ſome diſtinguiſhed writers, in favour of philoſophical neceſſity. There does not appear to be much in them different from what Dr. Prieſtley himſelf had before advanced. The principles and reaſonings are very much the ſame, only expreſſed in different words, or a little differently illuſtrated. To conſider particularly what they have ſaid, would therefore only be to go over the ſame arguments again. There are, however, a few things, which may deſerve ſome notice.

In the quotation given by Dr. Prieſtley from Mr. Hume's Philoſophical Eſſays, p. 155, Mr. Hume ſays, that "Actions "are by their very nature, temporary and "periſhing; and where they proceed not "from ſome cauſe in the character and diſ-"poſition of the perſon who performed "them, though the actions themſelves may "be contrary to the rules of morality and

"reli-

" religion, the perſon is not reſponſible for " them. And again, according to the " principle, which denies *neceſſity*, and " conſequently *cauſes*, a man is as pure and " untainted after having committed the " moſt horrid crime, as at the firſt moment " of his birth; nor is his character any way " concerned in his actions, ſince they are " not derived from it." To reply very briefly. All, that Mr. Hume here ſays, proceeds upon the principle, that the diſpoſitions of the mind conſtitute the character, and are the only cauſes of action. On this much has been already ſaid. Diſpoſitions are, no doubt, very much concerned in the idea of character; but this muſt go on the ſuppoſition that we are agents, and that the exiſtence, or eſtabliſhment, of our diſpoſitions, is owing to the culture we have given them on the one hand, or to the want of it on the other: while if, as Mr. Hume's doctrine teaches, theſe diſpoſitions are neceſſary, of whatever kind they are, they can form no character at all, as implying good or ill deſert; nor do they at all belong to the idea of it. Mr. Hume makes the diſpoſition

poſition to be the cauſe of the action: the doctrine of liberty makes the ſelf-determining power to be the cauſe. There is, therefore, a cauſe upon the latter principle, though it be a different one from that aſſigned by Mr. Hume; and, according to this principle, a man is reſponſible for his actions, though, in their "nature, temporary "and periſhing," becauſe he has the power over them; whereas, on Mr. Hume's principles, I cannot ſee, how, in any caſe, he can poſſibly be reſponſible either for his actions or his diſpoſitions.

Dr. Prieſtley makes two extracts from Lord Kaims. One from his Sketches on Man, vol. II. p. 300; the other from his Eſſays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, p. 177. The deſign of the whole is to vindicate the conſtitution of human nature on the plan of neceſſity, as being admirably well fitted to anſwer the purpoſes of human life and ſociety. In order to this, he contraſts it to what he ſuppoſes would be the caſe, if man was formed on the principle of liberty. And was the view, which he gives of man, juſt,

he

he might well call ſuch a creature, a "moſt "unaccountable being, a mere abſurdity in "nature, whoſe exiſtence could ſerve no "end." But the being, he deſcribes, is not the agent intended by the doctrine of liberty: he is the mere creature of his lordſhip's own imagination. Lord Kaims repreſents the operations of the human mind, on the principle of liberty, to be what they are not, nor were ever ſuppoſed to be. Thus he calls the ſelf-determining principle an "arbitrary power," the will "capricious," and ſpeaks of it as "doing good or ill by "accident;" as if the power of choice implied the abſence of reaſon; and becauſe theſe powers are diſtinct, that the former could not therefore act under the direction of the other; or as if that, which is not phyſically neceſſary, muſt be done without deſign or direction, or by accident. It is on this miſtaken notion of the ſelf-determining power, and its manner of acting, that he further obſerves concerning it. "At this rate no man could be depended "upon. Promiſes, [illegible] vows, would "be in vain; [illegible] ever bind or "fix

"fix a man, who is influenced by no mo-
"tive." Here is the ſame miſtake which has been before noticed in the reaſonings of Dr. Prieſtley. Lord Kaims will not allow any influence to motives, unleſs they render the act phyſically neceſſary: whereas the advocates for liberty allow them the greateſt poſſible influence, which is conſiſtent with freedom or agency; conſtituting that moral certainty of the action or event, which is a juſt ground of dependance, and is leſs or greater, according to the power of the motives preſented to the mind, or the degree of influence which they are fitted to have over it. Men, therefore, may be depended on for the performance of their promiſes, oaths and vows, in proportion to the ſtrength of thoſe ties, by which we ſuppoſe them to be held. The fear of diſgrace, or of civil puniſhment, will have conſiderable weight with ſome; a ſenſe of honour, and a love of virtue, will be the prevailing motive with others; while in minds religiouſly diſpoſed, a ſenſe of God, and a regard to his authority, will obtain the ſtrongeſt aſcendancy. Now the influence

of

of theſe conſiderations, cannot but afford ſome ſecurity or ground of dependance. And, in general, the better cultivated any mind is, the greater will be the ſecurity of its acting right; though, in every caſe, even where motives of any particular kind have the ſtrongeſt influence, there muſt be a phyſical power of reſiſting, or acting in oppoſition to them. This the idea of agency requires. Without this, well might we take up, in ſober ſadneſs, the plaintive reflections which Lord Kaims puts into the mouth of the advocates for liberty: "How hard is the "lot of the human ſpecies to be thus tied "down and fixed to motives, ſubjected by "a neceſſary law to the choice of evil, if "evil happen to be the prevailing motive, "or if it miſleads under the form of our "greateſt intereſt or good! How happy to "have had a free independent power of "acting contrary to motives, when the "prevailing motive has a bad tendency! "By this power we might have puſhed our "way to virtue and happineſs, whatever "motives were ſuggeſted by vice and folly "to draw us back," &c. Theſe reflections appear

appear to me extremely juſt and forcible, and notwithſtanding all that Lord Kaims afterwards ſays, to obviate the difficulty which they point out, it ſeems ſtill to remain in its full ſtrength. Far happier, ſurely, muſt be that conſtitution of the human mind, which gives to man the power of puſhing his way to virtue and happineſs, in oppoſition to the ſuggeſtions of vice and folly, than that which would cauſe him, in any caſe, to be unavoidably held back, and ſubjected by a neceſſary law to the choice of evil. For, whatever remedies may be provided for the cure of evil habits derived from the latter cauſe, out of the mind that is only acted upon, can ariſe nothing that deſerves the name of virtue, nor can it poſſibly enjoy any of that happineſs, which reſults from the conſciouſneſs of it.

On SECTION VIII.

" How far Mens general Conduct
" will be influenced by the Be-
" lief of the Doctrine of Neces-
" sity."

" It is imagined, ſays Dr. Prieſtley, by
" ſome, that the apprehenſion of all
" the actions of men depending upon mo-
" tives, which neceſſarily influence their
" determinations, ſo that no action or event
" could poſſibly be otherwiſe than it has
" been, is, or is to be, would make men
" indifferent with reſpect to their conduct,
" or to what befals them in life." p. 96, 97. This objection to the doctrine of neceſſity, and which is here fairly ſtated by the Dr. does, indeed, as well as the foregoing, appear to carry very conſiderable weight in it; as the idea of man's being under ſuch a government, directly draws after it the conſequence which is aſcribed to it, that of rendering " men indifferent with reſpect " to their conduct." What can poſſibly have a ſtronger tendency to produce this effect?

effect? Is there any thing that can ſo directly tend to prevent all human endeavours, as for a man to believe that he has no power over his actions; "ſo that no "action or event could poſſibly be other-"wiſe than it has been, is, or is to be." To obviate the difficulty ariſing from this effect, which the ſcheme of neceſſity has been ſuppoſed to have, the Dr. anſwers, "So it would, if their own actions and de-"terminations were not neceſſary links in "this chain of cauſes and events, and if "their good or bad ſucceſs did not, in the "ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, depend upon "themſelves." Now the conſideration of "the actions and determinations of men "being neceſſary links in this chain of "cauſes and events," is the very thing that inſtead of removing, conſtitutes the difficulty, which is ſuppoſed to attend the neceſſarian doctrine; ſince it will naturally operate as a means of producing the bad effect which the objection imputes to it. If all human actions and determinations are neceſſary, what is there, that, in any proper ſenſe, can be ſaid to depend upon a

man's ſelf? What, on this plan of human nature, are all endeavours or efforts which a man can exert, but impreſſions, or the conſequences of impreſſions, made upon him, in which he has not the leaſt concern as an efficient or agent. A philoſopher, who poſſeſſes Dr. Prieſtley's enlarged underſtanding, and noble firmneſs of mind, may, indeed, in defiance of his principles, continue to act and exert himſelf in the ſame wiſe and rational manner, as if no ſuch unavoidable neceſſity ſubſiſted. But, if we judge of mankind at large by what we ſee of them, the diſpoſition which they too commonly diſcover, to find apologies for neglecting the buſineſs and duties of life, and exceeding in their indulgencies and pleaſures, cannot but lead us to ſuppoſe, that they would avail themſelves of ſuch a ſentiment, as the doctrine of neceſſity propoſes to their belief, to be ſtill more negligent as to every important concern, and to allow themſelves much greater freedom in ev ry gratification to which ſenſe and appetite prompt them. To look upon every action and event as neceſſary, and that nothing could be otherwiſe than

than it is, is a much better ſalvo for all their follies and errors, than any other which they have yet been able to find out. All is then reſolved into a divine conſtitution, which is unalterably fixed. If any, therefore, are to ſucceed better, or be happier, in any part of their exiſtence, than others, their ſuperior proſperity and happineſs will be infallibly ſecured to them; and though there is a certain diſpoſition of mind and courſe of action, which are inſeparably connected with their ſucceſs and happineſs, as means to bring about thoſe events, yet the means as well as the end, are alike neceſſary; and having no power to make either the one or the other at all different from what they are, or are to be, their lot through the whole of their being is by them abſolutely unalterable. What, again I ſay, can have a ſtronger tendency to relax the mind, and ſink it into a ſtate of indolence and inactivity? In the caſe of the farmer's tilling and ſowing his fields, which the Dr. adduces, he ſeems to take the principle of neceſſity for granted, and then reaſons upon it, as if it was really true. To

make this example at all a caſe in point, it muſt be ſuppoſed, not only that "vegeta-"tion is ſubject to the eſtabliſhed laws of "nature," or, that there is a phyſical connection between ſowing and reaping, ſo that no produce can be expected where there is no ſeed ſown; but it muſt alſo be ſuppoſed that the farmer believes, that he himſelf is in the whole of his conduct ſubject to the like phyſical neceſſity, and that if he is to reap, he ſhall alſo find himſelf under a neceſſary, compulſive, influence to ſow. Whether this is a common opinion among that plain ſort of men, who are occupied in this buſineſs, let the Dr. himſelf, on impartial reflection, determine. But till that is firſt proved, no inference favourable to the doctrine of neceſſity, can be drawn from the pains they take, in making uſe of the means appointed for rendering the earth fruitful. The fact, I doubt not, is, that they do conſider themſelves as having it in their power to neglect or uſe the means; and did they believe the contrary, I have no leſs doubt, that their belief

lief would be too commonly attended with the ſame unhappy effects, as were before pointed out.

Some of the moſt ingenious and able advocates for neceſſity have been ſo ſenſible of the weight of this objection againſt it, that they could not avoid acknowledging, a feeling of liberty to be requiſite, in order to carry on that neceſſary plan of government for which they contend. So directly ſubverſive is the ſcheme of neceſſity even of its own ends, in promoting the welfare and happineſs of mankind, both in their perſonal and ſocial capacity.

Dr. Prieſtley, in the latter part of this ſection, arguing againſt the influence which a perſuaſion of the doctrine of neceſſity may be ſuppoſed to have on our behaviour with reſpect to God, ſays, "That it is impoſſi-" ble there can be any difficulty attending " the ſubject of prayer, or any branch of " it, upon the ſuppoſition of the doctrine " of neceſſity, that does not equally affect " it on the general ſuppoſition of God's " knowing all our wants, and being diſ-" poſed to ſupply them." Something has

already been ſaid on the ſubject of prayer, in the remarks made on Section VI. As was there obſerved, the belief of a neceſſity attending all actions and events muſt naturally indiſpoſe men for the performance of this duty: for whatever connection there may be between aſking and receiving bleſſings, yet as the aſking them is no leſs a part of the plan of neceſſity, than receiving; if, therefore, any are to be the recipients of any particular bleſſings, they will alſo find themſelves neceſſarily inclined to petition for them. Nothing then remains, but for every man to follow the preſent bent of his mind, whether it be, to pray, or not to pray. If he has no inclination to this exerciſe, it not being in his power to produce the diſpoſition to it, he may be ſure that it is no leſs fixed and neceſſary that he ſhould not pray, than that he ſhould not be a partaker of the bleſſings connected with prayer. The perſuaſion of this doctrine cannot, therefore, but have the ſtrongeſt tendency to make men of an irreligious turn of mind eaſy in the neglect of this duty; and to produce indifference in all *with reſpect* to the performance of it.

But

But let us now further attend to the influence of this doctrine on prayer, conſidered as a qualification for the divine favours, or the means of obtaining them. Dr. Prieſtley allows the propriety and importance of prayer in this view. Accordingly, in illuſtration of it, he obſerves, (p. 101) "Wiſe "parents often juſtly refuſe to ſupply the "wants of their children, till they ſolicit "for it, with a proper temper of mind." Now, what is there in prayer, as a religious or moral qualification for receiving favours from God, on the ſcheme of neceſſity? Is prayer, on that ſcheme, any thing more than the unavoidable effect of an irreſiſtible influence on the mind of the petitioner, in which he had no power of choice, or agency, but was a mere paſſive inſtrument? Can prayer, in this view, manifeſt the proper temper of religious dependance? Is there any religion where there is no proper choice; in impreſſions which were wrought in me, without any agency of my own? This ſeems entirely to deſtroy the wiſdom of that conſtitution, which has connected praying to God

God for the bleſſings we want, (conſidered as a qualification) with the receipt of them: ſince there is then no more of truly religious, or moral, goodneſs of heart in praying, than in neglecting to pray. When I have prayed, I have, in reality, done nothing but what it was impoſſible for me to have avoided; and if I have neglected prayer, I have omitted nothing which it was poſſible for me to do. To pray, and to omit to pray, are alike neceſſary, and take their riſe from a conſtitution, eſtabliſhed by the God who made me, which is abſolutely unalterable. But can the ſame be ſaid of this duty, on "the ſuppoſition of God's knowing all our "wants, and being diſpoſed to ſupply them, "as far as it is proper that he ſhould do it?" Prayer to God, if we ſuppoſe man to poſſeſs a power of choice, or agency, and that, in conſequence of this, the ſenſe of dependance, by which he is animated in the performance of it, is a diſpoſition which he has cultivated; I ſay, prayer, in this view of man, will be a truly religious ſervice, a ſervice which argues a moſt important difference of character between the man, who

employs

employs himſelf in this devout exerciſe, and him who allows himſelf to neglect it: and thus it affords a juſt reaſon, founded in wiſdom and goodneſs, for conferring bleſſings on the truly religious petitioner, which are withheld from him who neglects this moſt becoming expreſſion of his indigent and dependant condition.

As to all that Mr. Hobbes has ſaid on this ſubject, in the paſſage from his works, quoted by the Dr. p. 101, &c. he is ſo far conſiſtent with himſelf, as to exclude the idea of prayer, as "a cauſe or means" of our obtaining any thing we aſk. But as the view of prayer, as a means of obtaining, or a qualification for receiving, bleſſings from God, is, I think, the only rational ground on which that part of prayer, which comes under the denomination of petition, can be defended as a reaſonable ſervice; and as this is the light in which Revelation places it; I ſhall not, therefore, enter into the further conſideration of what he has advanced on this head.

ON SECTION IX.

" OF THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE " DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY."

DR. Prieſtley introduces this ſection with remarking, " It has been ſeen " that the principles on which the doctrine " of neceſſity is founded are equally thoſe " of the vulgar, and of true philoſophy." It ſeems, however, to deſerve notice, that though the Dr. thinks, the principles, which mankind in general hold, are ſo clearly in favour of the doctrine of neceſſity; he yet grants, that " they have no apprehenſion of " the real and unavoidable conſequences of " the principles they every day act upon." That, " they would even be alarmed, " and ſtaggered, if thoſe conſequences were " pointed out to them; and, perhaps, " from their unwillingneſs to admit the " conſequences, would be tempted to " diſguiſe their daily feelings and expe- " rience,

" rience, imagining them to be different " from what they really are." (p. 164.) Does not all this look, as if the conſequences of the doctrine of neceſſity were ſo repugnant to the common ſenſe and feelings of mankind, that, if they were really apprized of the conſequences, they would deny the doctrine which leads to them? But why ſhould they be afraid of the conſequences, if they every day act upon the principles? This ſeems to be no favourable omen on the ſide of philoſophical neceſſity. It looks, on the contrary, as if they had really no opinion that their determinations and actions were neceſſary, in the ſenſe in which the Dr. repreſents them; but they thought themſelves to be as truly free, as the ſcheme of liberty ſuppoſes them to be. I therefore cannot but ſee with the Dr. that " From this place the philoſopher, on his " ſide of the argument, muſt be content to " proceed by himſelf. Let us then examine, " whether his more comprehenſive views of " the ſyſtem of nature are not leſs, but " much more favourable, to his improve- " ment in virtue and happineſs, than the

" more

" more limited views of the bulk of man-
" kind," But here alſo the Dr. is not with-
out his apprehenſions, that even the neceſ-
ſarian philoſopher, as well as the vulgar, may
be miſled. Thus he ſays, p. 106. " But
" previous to this I would obſerve, that the
" practical uſe of theſe philoſophical views
" is confined to a man's cooler moments,
" when the mind is not under the influence
" of any violent emotion or paſſion: for
" ſince the mind of a philoſopher is formed,
" and the aſſociations by which it is influ-
" enced, are fixed exactly like thoſe of other
" men, he will not be able, in the general
" tumult and hurry of life, to feel, think,
" or act, in a manner different from other
" men." In the ſame paragraph he further
obſerves, that " his own actions alſo will
" be conſidered with the ſame mechanical
" feelings of ſelf-applauſe, or remorſe, as if
" he had not been a philoſopher." I can-
not help juſt remarking here, that this again
does not look at all favourable to the doc-
trine of neceſſity. Even a philoſopher, who
muſt therefore be ſuppoſed to have juſt views
of this ſcheme, and really to believe it, may
yet,

yet, according to Dr. Prieſtley, not be able to feel, think, or act differently from other men. Where then is the efficacy of his philoſophy? Is it not to be expected of him, that the belief of ſo admirable a ſyſtem ſhould have an all-controuling influence on his temper and conduct, ſo as to conquer every bad paſſion, and make him always calm and ſerene? The Dr. does indeed declare it may not; but does not this allowance carry ſomewhat of the appearance of an inconſiſtency with the ſentiments and views of a neceſſarian philoſopher? So when the Dr. conſiders him as capable of the feelings of ſelf-applauſe, or remorſe, does this ſeem to conſiſt with the character of a philoſopher of his ſentiments? To inſtance only in remorſe; ought a man, who poſſeſſes ſuch a belief, to feel in any ſuch manner? or have not his principles a direct tendency to prevent or ſuppreſs all ſuch feelings? If it be ſaid that he is ſo formed, that on the review of certain inſtances of conduct, he cannot but experience remorſe; is it not then more reaſonable to believe, that the miſconduct, which gave riſe to it, was ſome-

thing that he might have avoided, rather than to ſuppoſe, that he was formed neceſſarily ſubject to ſuch a feeling, when he had really done nothing to deſerve it. But theſe are only occaſional reflections, on which I ſhall not further inſiſt.

Let us now attend to the argument of this ſection, and conſider, whether the views of philoſophical neceſſity have, or have not, the good tendency which the Dr. aſcribes to them? or whether the belief of this doctrine will make the philoſopher "a better "or the worſe man, the better or the worſe "citizen."

The Dr. in his illuſtration of this argument, very properly begins with laying the foundation in piety, to which he ſays, p. 107. "In my opinion, his philoſophical "views will give an elevation and force, "that could not have been acquired in any "other way." "This," the Dr. thinks, "may be perceived in thoſe perſons whoſe "general view of things have approached "the neareſt to thoſe that are truly philoſo-"phical; by which I mean thoſe, who, "from a principle of religion, have aſcrib-

"ed

"ed more to God, and leſs to man, than "other perſons; which appears to me to "have been the caſe very remarkably with "the ſacred writers, and with other per- "ſons who have imbibed their devotional "ſpirit from an intimate acquaintance with "the ſcriptures."

To aſcribe unto God that which is worthy of his all-glorious nature, and for which we are indebted to him, as our creator or governor, is certainly reaſonable, and a part of our religious duty: and the fuller and more conſtant the ſenſe is which we have of our dependance upon God, as we are ſo much the more pious, ſo it is likely that we ſhall become proportionably better in all reſpects. But, in this religious acknowledgement of God, it muſt always be ſuppoſed, as was juſt now hinted, that what we aſcribe to God muſt be worthy of his perfections, otherwiſe we may really diſhonour, while we mean to glorify him. In this view, I am perſuaded the ſacred writers will be found, on impartial enquiry, to have advanced nothing that can afford the leaſt juſt cauſe of offence: and, in like manner, all,

who have imbibed that ſpirit of devotion, which the ſcriptures recommend, and which its genuine truths ſerve to inſpire, will be no leſs careful, that they always think and ſpeak of the great object of their homage in this moſt rational and becoming manner. For, as it is too common with men to aſcribe more to the creature, and leſs to the Creator, than they ought; ſo I cannot but conceive it very poſſible to aſcribe more to God, and leſs to man, than will conſiſt with divine perfection, or the apparent conſtitution of human nature. Of the latter, the doctrine of neceſſity ſeems to be a ſtriking inſtance.

Dr. Prieſtley ſays, p. 108. "It needs "no arguing, that the ſpirit of devotion "in general muſt be greatly promoted "by the perſuaſion that God is the proper "and ſole cauſe of all things." In the ſenſe, that God is the proper and ſole cauſe of all being, of all things, animate and inanimate; that he is likewiſe the original, or cauſe of all good, however derived to us, whether by means of our own agency, or

that

that of any of our fellow-beings—that God is, in this ſenſe, the proper and ſole cauſe of all things, is indeed a very plain and a no leſs important truth; and that the ſpirit "of devotion muſt be greatly promoted "by the perſuaſion of it," cannot need any proof. But under this very general expreſſion, "the proper and ſole cauſe "of all things," much more is included in the Dr.'s idea, than in the ſenſe before given of it. "Upon this ſcheme, the "Dr. adds, we ſee God in every thing, and "may be ſaid to ſee every thing in God; "becauſe we continually view every thing "as in connection with him, the author of "it." I need not be ſcrupulous of ſaying, that moral evil, or ſin, according to the doctrine of neceſſity, is admitted to be one thing of which God is the cauſe or author. This the Dr. ſeems afterwards openly to avow, p. 117. This, as well as every other things makes a neceſſary part of the plan of the divine government. But how this can at all promote the ſpirit of devotion, I am utterly at a loſs to account for. It has been generally

conſidered as eſſential to divine perfection, and forming a moſt glorious view of the character of the ſupreme governor, both upon the principles of reaſon and revelation, that "*God can not be tempted with evil, "neither tempteth he any man.*" The direct contrary to this is manifeſtly the doctrine of neſſicety. On that principle, ſin, as well as every thing elſe, is a neceſſary part of the divine conſtitution. To ſay that good will be produced out of it in the iſſue, does not appear in the leaſt to relieve the difficulty attending the firſt appointment of it, as a part of the divine plan. The queſtion is, how it can ever be reconcileable with the idea of perfect rectitude, to make that a neceſſary effect of his own operations, which is ſo eſſentially oppoſite to his own nature and character? The permiſſion of moral evil, though foreſeen, is a very different idea, and does not appear to involve any ſuch difficulty in it. For, according to the doctrine of liberty, though God does indeed permit ſin, or moral evil, to take place, he is yet in no ſenſe the author or cauſe of it. It is an abuſe of liberty made by the being to whom

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it is imparted, and with which the creature, not the Creator, is alone chargeable. The phyſical poſſibility of moral evil, or ſin, is inſeparable from the idea of freedom, or moral agency. He that is naturally capable of acting right, or virtuouſly, muſt alſo be capable of acting wrong or vitiouſly: otherwiſe he is not active, but merely paſſive in what he does. To be formed with a power of choice or agency, and yet made incapable of doing what is wrong, is a contradiction, a real impoſſibility. But, on the ſcheme of neceſſity, when man ſins, he does not properly commit ſin himſelf, but is the mere inſtrument of the agency of his Creator. God is the cauſe of all the evil, as well as of all the good, that is done by any of his creatures. And how this conſideration can ſerve to inſpire, or be the means of cheriſhing, ſentiments of piety and devotion, the believer of the doctrine muſt alone be capable of diſcerning. More, indeed, much more is aſcribed to God, on this plan, than on that to which it ſtands oppoſed; but it is aſcribing that to him, which ſeems to be flatly repugnant to every juſt idea of his mo-

ral character. It is transferring, together with the choice and act, which, upon this plan, are neceſſary and unavoidable, the charge of all the ſin, or moral evil, which ever did, or can take place. And will this improve or exalt; or rather will it not manifeſtly ſully and debaſe, in our conceptions, the object of our devotion? What is the humility which ſuch views of our Creator tend to produce? Certainly, not that which ſprings from, or is connected with, unworthineſs, or demerit of character on the part of man. Of this he can do nothing that is in the leaſt deſerving the name; ſince all was fixed and ordained by the God who made him. He may, therefore, humble himſelf, as a being of an infinitely lower order in the ſyſtem of nature; but as a penitent tranſgreſſor, who has incurred guilt, in the way in which men commonly think and reaſon, there can be no foundation or cauſe for any degree of humiliation at all. What, again, can reſignation be, on this plan, but ſubmiſſion to the will of a being infinitely above me, who has eſtabliſhed the whole chain of cauſes and effects; and who, in

conſequence

conſequence of this, may make me feel as a tranſgreſſor, for a depravity of heart, and baſeneſs of conduct, to which he has, by the law of my nature, made me unavoidably ſubject? What kind, or degree, of piety ſuch ſentiments may produce, I will not pretend to ſay; but that the piety, which they naturally tend to produce, is very different from that, for which the ideas of liberty, and a proper moral government, lay a rational and ſolid foundation, ſeems no leſs clear, than the difference between the principles themſelves of the two oppoſite ſchemes we are conſidering. On the latter ſcheme, while the Creator is acknowledged to be the author of all good, he is excluded from all agency in the production of moral evil. This is conſidered as ariſing ſolely from the creature, from his perverſion or abuſe of faculties, deſigned and fitted for the nobleſt purpoſes. The moral character of the object of his adoration, whatever evil of this kind may exiſt, ſtill remains in all its purity and perfection. He has, therefore, to adore a being, who neither is, nor in a proper ſenſe can be, the author or cauſe of ſin, in any in-

ſtance. Humility, conſidered as forming ing the temper of an offending creature, thus conſtituted, will imply in it, not only an infinite diſparity of nature, but alſo a ſenſe of guilt and demerit, producing a deep and penitent ſelf-abaſement, while he is contemplating infinite and perfect rectitude. Here, too, reſignation finds the beſt and moſt ſatisfactory reaſon for the intire and chearful exerciſe of it. The creature is at once freed from the idea of a poſſibility, that he can feel any impreſſions of criminality (the moſt painful and diſtreſſing of all impreſſions) which he has not deſerved, and brought upon himſelf by ſome real choice or act of his own. Nor is it admitted, on this ſcheme, that any "actual evil, unconnected with, and unproductive of good, does exiſt." Dr. Prieſtley in this, though undeſignedly, again ſuggeſts a wrong idea of the ſcheme of liberty. Though the character of every moral intelligence would certainly have been nobler, and, conſequently, his happineſs more exalted, if he had never ſinned at all; yet it will not follow from hence, on the doctrine of liberty, that real good may not be produced

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out of this evil. And both reaſon and revelation unite to aſſure us, that, under the government of an infinitely perfect being, the greateſt good will be made to ariſe out of all the evil, both natural and moral, which takes place; ſo far as is conſiſtent with that agency of man, and the nature and ends of that moral adminiſtration, which form the baſis of the whole plan. In ſhort, while the doctrine of neceſſity ſuggeſts thoſe ideas of the great Author of Nature, and of his government over mankind, which have a plain tendency to ſubvert the foundations of piety; the ſcheme of liberty, on the other hand, appears in every reſpect well calculated to ſtrengthen its obligations, and increaſe the diſpoſition to its higheſt and moſt pleaſing exerciſes.

But let us now turn our thoughts to the repreſentation, given by Dr. Prieſtley, of the influence which he ſuppoſes the doctrine of neceſſity will have, on our tempers and conduct in relation to our fellow-creatures. P. 109. he ſays, "With this diſpoſition of "mind towards God, it will not be poſſible "to bear ill-will to any of our brethren, his "offspring."

" ceſſarily ſoever they act, they are influenced " by a baſe and miſchievous diſpoſition of " mind, againſt which I muſt guard myſelf " and others, in proportion as I love my- " ſelf and others) I, on my ſyſtem, cannot " help viewing them with a tenderneſs and " compaſſion that will have an infinitely " finer and happier effect; as it muſt make " me more earneſt and unwearied in my en- " deavours to reclaim them, without ſuffer- " ing myſelf to be offended, and deſiſt from " my labour, through provocation, diſ- " guſt, or deſpair." A neceſſarian has no more reaſon to blame, in the common, than in the ultimate, ſenſe of the word. In a proper ſenſe, he has no reaſon to blame at all; becauſe, in the worſt things that can be done, he, who is a mere paſſive inſtrument, has really *done nothing*; conſequently, there can be no proper foundation for blaming him. If, in the common ſenſe, I blame him, on the neceſſarian principle; I muſt do it without the commonly ſuppoſed ground, namely, that he has done ſomething wrong, which he might have avoided. Beſides this, the conſideration, that he has done nothing, *but what he* was expreſsly deſigned and ap-

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pointed to do, muſt, I ſhould think, if it has any effect at all, naturally operate ſo as to prevent me from blaming him, in the common as well as the ultimate ſenſe. Though I cannot feel the injury that is done me as *friendly* on the part of him who was only the inſtrument of it, nor can, therefore, view him in a friendly or pleaſing light, it yet ſeems equally natural, as it is juſt, that my compaſſion for the innocent inſtrument of my ſufferings ſhould abſorb and efface every feeling of blame. Whatever meaſures I may think neceſſary to guard myſelf againſt further injury, ſhould the ſame conduct be repeated, all blame will ſtill be excluded. I cannot, therefore, ſee, if I act up to the principles of a neceſſarian, that there can be the leaſt danger of my being ſo offended, or my conceiving ſuch a diſguſt, as ſhall cauſe me to deſiſt from my endeavours to reclaim him. Pity, not blame, any more than love or reſpect, is all I ought or can be ſuppoſed to feel towards him, who has thus innocently done me wrong, or made me a ſufferer. But, though ſuch ſeems to be the natural and direct tendency of the doctrine of neceſſity,

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in the common way of reaſoning on the inſtance propoſed; it is yet groſsly inconſiſtent with the principles of a neceſſarian to countenance or ſupport any ſuch train of thought, as that which the Dr. purſues: becauſe it tends to ſubvert, in part, the very ſcheme which it means to defend. On the neceſſarian principle, the injury which is done to me or another, whoever was the inſtrument, is deſigned, appointed, and unavoidable. The blame which I caſt upon him, or the diſguſt I conceive at the ill treatment, is alſo a like *neceſſary* and *ſalutary* part of the plan. To offer any thing, then, that ſerves to obliterate the ſenſe of the injury, and, conſequently, prevent the blame from being thrown on the inſtrument of it, ſeems directly to make againſt the ſcheme itſelf, and to prove clearly, that the knowledge will by no means conſiſt with the practice of it.

Speaking of the vicious, the Dr. ſays, p. 113. "Looking beyond the preſent tem-
"porary ſcene, to a future period and their
"final deſtination, we may conſider them
"as brethren, even in virtue and happineſs.
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"Their ſufferings, however, in the mean "time, will be in proportion to their de- "pravity; and for this reaſon I cannot but "feel myſelf moſt earneſtly concerned to "leſſen it." The principle of benevolence, on which the Dr. here argues for the uſe of all proper means for reclaiming the vicious at preſent, is, indeed, a noble one. And, on that very principle, I cannot but look upon the promulgation of the ſcheme of neceſſity as highly exceptionable, becauſe it is likely to do unſpeakable miſchief. That men ſhould believe themſelves to be free, and conſequently accountable, ſeems to be a principle that lies at the foundation of all juſt hope of reformation; at leaſt with regard to the generality of mankind. Nor can any thing have a ſtronger tendency to confirm and harden men in their vices, than the ſentiment, that all which they now do, or can do, is by them unavoidable, and that they ſhall all inevitably be brought to virtue and happineſs at the laſt.

ON SECTION X.

"IN WHAT SENSE GOD MAY BE CONSIDERED AS THE AUTHOR OF SIN; AND OF THE OBJECTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY ON THAT ACCOUNT."

DR. Prieſtley ſays, p. 117. "Our ſuppoſing that God is the author of ſin, (as, upon the ſcheme of neceſſity, he muſt, in fact, be the author of all things) by no means implies that he is a ſinful being, &c." Here the Dr. ſeems plainly to admit what the objection ſtates as the difficulty, namely, that God is the author of ſin. In this the Dr. differs from ſome other writers on the ſame ſide of the queſtion, who, ſtartled at the idea which the objection ſeems to convey, or, however, aware that ſuch an idea would be ſhocking to the generality of mankind, who think at all on theſe ſubjects, have endeavoured to explain away what they or others might deem

deem moſt obnoxious in the charge here brought. Thus Mr. Hobbes, in his Leviathan, as quoted in the Preface, p. 28, ſays, "Though men may do many things "which God does not command, nor is "therefore the author of them, yet they can "have no paſſion, will, or appetite to any "thing, of which appetite God's will is "not the cauſe." What Mr. Hobbes here ſays ſeems really to amount to nothing, but a very poor evaſion of the difficulty; denying only the propriety of the term Author, while he admits the ſentiment couched under it, in all its force. In the ſection before us, we have another quotation from Mr. Hobbes, the deſign of which is, not to explain away, but to ſolve, the difficulty: of which ſome notice may be taken hereafter. The diſtinction which Mr. Edwards makes on this queſtion, when fairly examined, ſeems to be of little more conſequence than that of Mr. Hobbes. Mr. Edwards, as cited by Dr. Prieſtley, p. 122, ſays, (Inquiry, p. 363) "There is a great difference between God's "being the ordainer of the certain exiſtence "of ſin, by not hindering it under certain

" circumſtances, and his being the proper " actor, or author of it, by a poſitive agen- " cy or efficiency," &c. On the plan of neceſſity, between theſe two things, which Mr. Edwards thinks to be ſo very different, there ſeems to be really no difference at all: for, as Dr. Prieſtly obſerves, p. 123, " If there be " any foundation for the doctrine of neceſſi- " ty; that is, if all events ariſe from preceed- " ing ſituations, and the original ſituations " of all things, together with the laws by " which all changes of ſituation take place, " were fixed by the Divine Being, there can " be no difference whatever with reſpect to " his cauſation of one thing more than ano- " ther." I have only juſt to add here, that permiſſion and cauſation, on the ſcheme of liberty, ſtand to expreſs ideas, between which there is a real and very important difference; but, on the principle of neceſſity, the whole plan of things, and every part of it, takes its riſe from a proper cauſation. It muſt all finally be reſolved into the will, or appointment and agency, of the firſt Cauſe and Creator of all things. Now Dr. Prieſtley, inſtead of ſhunning, ſeems deſirous to " encounter

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" the difficulty in its greateſt ſtrength," that he might obtain the moſt compleat " maſtery " over it." Mr. Hume, alſo, before him, had ſhewn the ſame philoſophical intrepidity, and has, indeed, carried his ſpeculations ſtill further: for this writer, while he admits the fact to be, as ſtated in the objection, as little concerned about what it might draw after it, or any thing which might be imputed to it, " abandons," as Dr. Prieſtly ſays of him, " the doctrine of neceſſity " to the moſt immoral and ſhocking " conſequences." He ſays (Philoſophical Eſſays, p. 157) that, " upon the ſcheme of " neceſſity, human actions can either have " no turpitude at all, as proceeding from ſo " good a cauſe (the Deity) or if they can " have any moral turpitude, they muſt in- " volve our Creator in the ſame guilt, while " he is acknowledged to be their ultimate " cauſe and author." " It is not poſſible," ſays he again (p. 262) " to explain diſtinct- " ly how the Deity can be the mediate " cauſe of all the actions of men, without " being the author of ſin and moral turpi- " tude." For my own part, it appears to me,

that Mr. Hume has here done no more than purſue the doctrine of neceſſity into its natural and juſt conſequences. He has imputed nothing to it, but what is really implied in it, or directly follows from it. At the ſame time, I cannot but remark, that there muſt be ſomewhat very uncommon in the mind of a writer, who could allow himſelf to lay open to the public eye ſo very odious a view of the ſcheme, in which he profeſſed himſelf a believer, and for which he was an advocate. The ſtate of his mind muſt certainly be no leſs extraordinary than the theory of the ſyſtem, which he ſo ſtrongly defends, and yet ſo clearly marks out to the juſt indignation of every man, who has the ſmalleſt ſhare either of virtue or of common ſenſe. Not ſo our author. Dr. Prieſtley ſeems no leſs ſhocked with Mr. Hume's indecent avowal of the immoral conſequences of the ſcheme of neceſſity, than any other perſon, who was not a believer in it, would be; and, like an author whoſe firſt concern was to ſecure the love and practice of virtue amongſt mankind, carefully endeavours to obviate all ſuch conſequences ariſing from his opinions,

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as might be thought diſhonourable to the moral character of the Deity, or likely to have a pernicious influence on the tempers and conduct of his intelligent offspring.

Let us now attend to what the Dr. has offered for this purpoſe.

" When it is conſidered," ſays the Dr. p. 115, " that the diſtinction between " things natural and moral intirely ceaſes " on the ſcheme of neceſſity, the vices of " men come under the claſs of common " evils producing miſery for a time; but, " like all other evils, in the ſame great ſyſ- " tem, are ultimately ſubſervient to greater " good. In this light, therefore, every " thing, without diſtinction, may be ſafely " aſcribed to God. Whatever terminates in " good, philoſophically ſpeaking, is good." I can have no doubt, that when the Dr. wrote this, it appeared to him to be a clear and full ſolution of the difficulty before us; but though he might not be aware of it, what he has advanced in the above paſſage comes to much the ſame, as the conceſſion, before noticed, made by Mr. Hume, which the Dr. ſpeaks of as ſo very exceptionable. Mr.

Hume ſays, " Upon the ſcheme of neceſ-
" ſity, human actions can either have no
" turpitude at all, as proceeding from ſo
" good a cauſe (the Deity) or if they can
" have any moral turpitude, they muſt in-
" volve our Creator in the ſame guilt." Dr. Prieſtley grants, that, on the ſcheme of neceſſity, " the diſtinction between things na-
" tural and moral intirely ceaſes," and " the
" vices of men come under the claſs of
" common evils," &c. What then becomes of the moral turpitude of vice or ſin? According to the Dr. all is natural, and nothing moral, but in the ſenſe of natural, and the vices of men are common evils. For ought I can ſee, Mr. Hume and Dr. Prieſtley are here entirely agreed in opinion. Nor do I ſee how Dr. Prieſtley could well ſtop ſhort of this conceſſion: for, as the Dr. acknowledges the truth of the objection, or that the Diety really is the author of what we call ſin, or moral evil, there ſeems to be no other way of reconciling this with the perfection of the ſupreme mind, but by annihilating the idea of moral evil, as any thing different from natural; ſo that what

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to us appears to be morally wrong, is, in the view of Omniſcience, only a means of producing good, and is therefore good in itſelf.

I cannot but think ſuch ſentiments are as dangerous in their tendency, as they are falſe and abſurd in themſelves. They ſeem very materially, though undeſignedly, to affect the moral character of the Deity, and to be big with conſequences the moſt fatal to the virtue and happineſs of mankind. The Dr. indeed, himſelf allows that the above principle is better fitted for ſpeculation, than practice. Accordingly, he adds, "But this "is a view of moral evil, which, though "innocent, and even uſeful in ſpeculation, "no wiſe man can, or would chuſe to act "upon himſelf, becauſe our underſtandings "are too limited for the application of ſuch "a means of good, though a being of infi-"nite knowledge may introduce it with the "greateſt advantage." I cannot look on the view of moral evil, above given, as *innocent*, much leſs *uſeful*, even in ſpeculation. It does ſo far juſtify the conduct of the Deity, conſidered as the author of ſin, that it en-

tirely wipes off the ſtain of any moral turpitude in his conduct; but it does this only on the ſuppoſition that there is really no moral difference in things, and, conſequently, no foundation for any moral character at all. By this rule of judging, every thing is innocent which is conducive to natural good, or can be made productive of it. And why a man, who believes this to be the principle upon which the Deity, his Creator, acts, ſhould not chooſe to act upon it himſelf, I cannot conceive. Man has not, indeed, infinite knowledge, enabling him to ſee how it may be applied, ſo as to produce the greateſt good. But he has underſtanding ſufficient to diſcern, when, in any particular inſtance, and eſpecially with regard to himſelf, it is conducive to natural good; and as far, therefore, as his underſtanding and limited ſphere of action reach, there ſeems to be no leſs propriety, than on the ſuppoſition of infinite knowledge, in applying the ſame means to produce the ſame end. The conſideration that ſuch is the conduct of his Creator, the one independant ſource of life and happineſs, muſt naturally operate as a

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powerful incentive, to engage him to act in a ſimilar manner. It will be in vain to aſſert, as the Dr. does, p. 116. "That vice "is productive not of good, but of evil to "us both here and hereafter, and probably "through the whole of our exiſtence; "though good may reſult from it to the "whole ſyſtem." How is a vicious man, who finds that the preſent natural good of *pleaſure*, or *profit*, reſults from the gratification of his appetites, and from defrauding or overreaching his neighbour, to be perſuaded to think, that vice is productive of evil to him here? On the ſuppoſition, that there is no moral difference in things, all moral arguments againſt the courſe of conduct, to which his appetites or inclinations prompt him, immediately vaniſh. As long, therefore, as he can make his preſent conduct conſiſtent with what is his natural good, or which he looks upon to be ſo, that is, with ſenſitive pleaſure, or his worldly advantage; all is right and well, ſo far as regards the preſent ſcene of things. And in relation to futurity, it is naturally to be ſuppoſed, that a man of this diſpoſition will not concern himſelf

himſelf about it, or, if he does, his neceſſarian principle, by holding up to his view his future moral good or happineſs, as ſecured to him by his omnipotent Creator, will lead him haſtily to paſs over all the intermediate ſufferings, with which he is threatened, how long or ſevere ſoever; conſidering them only as natural evils, which he can no more avoid, than the courſe of action which is connected with them. So extremely dangerous, in its direct tendency, is that principle of neceſſity, which ſets aſide the diſtinction between things natural and moral, on which the Dr. thinks "every "thing may be ſafely aſcribed to God."

If, in reality, moral be only natural evil, it is then evident that, on this principle, there can be nothing more to vindicate in the conduct of the Deity, for the introduction of what uſually paſſes under the denomination of the former than of the latter. Moral is then only one ſpecies of natural evil. But, as a farther juſtification of the divine character, the Dr. obſerves, p. 117. "Our "ſuppoſing that God is the author of ſin, "(as, upon the ſcheme of neceſſity, he muſt,

" in fact, be the author of all things) by no " means implies that he is a ſinful being, " for it is the diſpoſition of mind, and the " deſign that conſtitutes the ſinfulneſs of an " action." If, indeed, the diſtinction between things natural and moral be not juſt, that is, if ſin be only a natural evil, then the introduction of ſin cannot be a ſinful, or morally evil, action; but whatever evil there is in ſin, he, who appointed and cauſed it to take place, muſt certainly be chargeable with the whole of it. The intention and the fact are, in many inſtances, very properly diſtinguiſhed. A being of limited underſtanding, as man is, and who is liable to miſtake, may, through unavoidable ignorance as to ſome circumſtances attending a caſe, do what is really wrong in itſelf, though he is not therefore chargeable with the leaſt degree of criminality. But this diſtinction cannot hold with regard to a being of perfect knowledge. Whatever he does, he muſt, in the ſtricteſt and fulleſt ſenſe, deſign to do. Here the action muſt entirely correſpond withthe diſpoſition, and be produced by it. If God, then, is the author

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of ſin, and has introduced it into his creation by his own appointment and poſitive agency; (as the doctrine of neceſſity teaches) whatever evil there is in it, whether natural or moral, as he could not but have a perfect view of it, both in its nature and tendency, it muſt all belong to him, as its proper cauſe. Admitting, as the neceſſarian tenet ſuppoſes, that his diſpoſition and deſign, in relation to the end, was good; it muſt ſtill be true, that he was diſpoſed and deſigned to introduce the evil of ſin as the means of good. If then, amongſt men, he who does evil, or a ſinful and wicked action, knowing it to be ſuch, though he may pretend to have, or may really have, ſome good end in view by it, is, notwithſtanding, as far as that action goes, really a ſinner, or tranſgreſſor of the law of rectitude; ſo, by parity of reaſon, if God is the original author of ſin, of all the ſin that ever did, does, or ſhall, take place, whatever ends it was deſigned to anſwer, he cannot, then, but appear to be, (horrid thought!) the moſt ſinful of all beings. Though the greateſt natural *good,* which it is poſſible for infinite Benevolence

volence to deſign, or almighty power to effect, ſhould be brought out of it; ſtill it muſt be in repugnance to every juſt idea of that moral rectitude, which renders him the moſt excellent and glorious of all beings, and is the only proper foundation of that love, reverence and confidence, which are due to him from all other intelligent natures. The only idea of benevolence that then remains, as a part of his character, is a diſpoſition to produce natural good, independant of any moral fitneſs, or at leaſt without a conſtant regard to it, either in the choice of the end, or the means to bring it about. The caſe of Joſeph and his brethren, which the Dr. enlarges on, as fully to his point, will by no means anſwer his purpoſe, but on the ſuppoſition that God ordained the cruel treatment which Joſeph met with from his brethren: whereas, on the ſcheme of liberty, nothing more than a permiſſion of their barbarity is admitted; and, on that principle, God overruled the evil, in which he had no concern as the author, ſo as to cauſe it to be, in the iſſue, productive of great and extenſive good.

Mr.

Mr. Hobbes, as was before hinted, to ſolve the difficulty, which the Dr. is here conſidering, " juſtifies the divine conduct, " not upon the principle of the goodneſs " of his ultimate deſigns in every thing that " he appoints, but on account of his power." p. 119. Whether Mr. Hobbes meant " power ſimply," which the Dr. ſays, p. 120. " it is poſſible he might not," is not very material to enquire. That goodneſs in the ultimate deſign, which is taken abſtracted from rectitude, or a regard to the moral fitneſs of the end, has really no more of moral perfection in it, than the attribute of power itſelf. Power employed to beneficial purpoſes will, indeed, make a very different impreſſion upon our minds, from that which we ſhall naturally receive, on the view of it as exerciſed in doing miſchief. But if it be ſuppoſed, that there is no proper moral principle directing the exerciſe of it in either caſe, the only difference in the effect, which theſe different exertions of power will have upon us, is, that the one will give us pleaſure, the other pain. Approbation, *as implying* moral worth of character, no

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more belongs to the one than the other. And what moral worth there can be, if there is no moral difference in things, or where a regard to that difference is not made the ground or reaſon of action; it ſeems impoſſible to conceive.

Dr. Prieſtley further obſerves, p. 125, &c. "That upon any ſcheme that admits "of the divine preſcience, the ſame conſe- "quences follow," as upon the doctrine of neceſſity. "For ſtill God is ſuppoſed to "foreſee and permit what it was in his "power to have prevented, which is "very ſame thing as willing and directly "cauſing it. If I certainly know that my "child, if left to his liberty, will fall into "a river, and be drowned, and I do not re- "ſtrain him, I certainly mean that he ſhould "be drowned; and my conduct cannot ad- "mit of any other conſtruction."

I have only to reply, as before, that preſcience, and cauſation or efficiency, are two very different things. The idea of a moral agent ſuppoſes a power of chooſing to act virtuouſly or vitiouſly. To put men, then, under the phyſical neceſſity of not chooſ-

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ing the latter, that is, to render ſuch a choice impoſſible, would be to take away their agency. Still, therefore, the Divine Being may, and cannot but will, that all men ſhould become virtuous and happy, though he may not chooſe to take away their freedom, that is, to make them different beings from what they are. In the caſe adduced, not to interpoſe for the preſervation of a life that is in danger, when it is in my power, is ſuffering an evil to take place which, becauſe it is in my power, it is my duty to prevent. But to lay a moral agent under a phyſical or abſolute neceſſity of not becoming vicious, would be to contradict or transform his very nature, or, in other words, muſt deſtroy that very power of agency which is here ſuppoſed. It muſt, however, be granted, that the particular diſadvantages for moral improvement under which ſome are placed, does, indeed, create a real and conſiderable difficulty in the plan of Divine Providence; though it is by no means attended with thoſe dire conſequences, on the ſcheme of liberty, which muſt directly follow on that ſolution of it, which

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the doctrine of neceſſity propoſes. This difficulty has been largely conſidered by Dr. Price, on the ſubject of Providence, in the firſt of his four Diſſertations, in which many ingenious and judicious remarks are made to clear this intereſting point, and the whole of the Eſſay is highly deſerving of a careful peruſal.

Upon the whole, Dr. Prieſtley, as far as it appears to me, inſtead of having given a ſatisfactory anſwer to the objection treated of in this Section, has, on the contrary, in his way of endeavouring to remove it, been led into the acknowledgment of principles extremely dangerous in themſelves (though differently viewed by him) both to the cauſe of piety and morality.

ON SECTION XI.

"HOW FAR THE SCRIPTURES ARE FAVOURABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY."

DR. Prieſtley introduces this Section with ſome general remarks, on the cloſe connection which he ſuppoſes to ſubſiſt, between the principle of devotion and the doctrine of neceſſity; and on the common language, in which pious and holy men, who have a ſtrong ſenſe of the providence and government of God upon their minds, expreſs themſelves on theſe ſubjects; which the Dr. thinks to be extremely favourable to the cauſe he eſpouſes. In reply to theſe remarks, it may be ſufficient to refer to the obſervations made on Section IX. We there endeavoured to ſhew, that the neceſſarian doctrine is ſo far from affording any ſupport to the cauſe of rational devotion either in its principles or exerciſes, that when fairly examined, it appears, in its tendency, to be directly ſubverſive of all *true* religion; and ſo utterly repugnant is

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this doctrine to the moral perfection of the divine character, that we cannot but ſuppoſe it muſt be entirely foreign to the ideas of thoſe holy men, whoſe piety is celebrated in Scripture, and, conſequently, of all, who have imbibed their principles and ſpirit of devotion. I ſhall therefore proceed to the conſideration of the proofs which the Dr. here brings from the Scriptures themſelves, in favour of the truth of the doctrine which he advances. But here I cannot avoid previouſly remarking, that the Dr. is very frank and ingenuous in acknowledging, as he does, p. 133. That he does not think "the ſacred writers were, ſtrictly ſpeaking, "neceſſarians. For, ſays he, they were "not philoſophers, not even our Saviour "himſelf, as far as appears; but their ha-"bitual devotion naturally led them to re-"fer all things to God, without reflecting "on the rigorous meaning of their lan-"guage; and, very probably, had they "been interrogated on the ſubject, they "would have appeared not to be apprized "of the proper extent of the neceſſarian "ſcheme, and would have anſwered in a

" manner unfavourable to it." This is a very liberal conceſſion on the part of the Dr. and all the uſe which I would make of it, is to obſerve, that there muſt ſurely be ſomething in the nature of this doctrine, which lies very much out of the road of reaſon and common ſenſe, if it be probable, as the Dr. acknowledges it to be, that the ſacred writers themſelves, with all that illumination which they muſt be allowed to poſſeſs on ſubjects of a religious kind, if interrogated concerning the neceſſarian ſcheme, would have anſwered in a manner unfavourable to it. What benefit, I would further aſk, can they be ſuppoſed to derive from the principle of neceſſity, in aid to their piety, or to animate their acknowledgements of the dependance of all things upon God, if they were ſo far from being apprized of the proper extent of it, that they were likely to expreſs themſelves in ſuch a manner, to any of their followers who ſhould enquire about it, as ſhould have a diſcouraging aſpect on the principle itſelf? Does not this ſeem, as if they were really unable to defend the doctrine; and that there was ſomething in it which was a groſs offence to their underſtandings?

ſtandings? In ſhort, a principle, in which they were ſo poorly inſtructed, and in the belief of which they were in danger of being ſo eaſily ſtaggered, could afford but a very feeble ſupport to their piety; and upon a fair expoſition of the Dr.'s own confeſſion, it ſeems to furniſh a ſtrong preſumptive argument againſt the truth of the doctrine. Having hinted this, I now go on to the Dr.'s Scripture proofs, which I ſhall conſider under the ſeveral claſſes, in which he arranges them.

The firſt claſs of texts includes thoſe, in which God is ſpoken of "as the author of "the good diſpoſitions and good works of "men," p. 134. That the good diſpoſitions and good works of men are, in the ſeveral paſſages here quoted by the Dr. and in numberleſs others, ultimately referred to God, cannot be diſputed. But it will by no means follow from hence, that the ſacred writers conſidered him as the author of them, in the neceſſarian ſenſe. One objection againſt that ſenſe of them, and which ſeems to be unanſwerable, is, that to ſuppoſe no proper choice or agency *in man, is directly* ſubverſive of all virtue or

goodneſs in him. Our ideas of moral agency, and of a government exerciſed by the Almighty, adapted to the nature of beings endowed with ſuch a power, ſtrongly militate againſt the neceſſarian view of theſe texts; in conſequence of which we are naturally led to ſeek out ſome other ſenſe of them. And ſuch a ſenſe is very obvious and clear, as will well accord both with the ideas of a proper agency on the part of man, in the acquiſition of the habits of religious goodneſs, and of the agency of God, as the original ſource of them.

To God man is indebted, both for the faculties which render him capable of virtue and goodneſs, and for all the means and aſſiſtances which he enjoys, to co-operate with his own endeavours, in the application of his powers to thoſe moral and religious purpoſes, for which they are imparted to him. Whatever there is in the rational and moral nature of man that is favourable to the attainment of goodneſs; all the aids of religious and moral culture, whether ſuch as ariſe from education or from any other cauſe; theſe are all the gifts of the Creator, or are owing

owing to the ſituation in which his providence has placed us. In connection with theſe means of forming good diſpoſitions and virtuous habits, it ſeems further no leſs reaſonable, than it is agreeable to the doctrine of revelation, to admit the belief of an internal influence of the great Father of Spirits on the minds of his rational offspring, in anſwer to their humble prayers to him for this purpoſe; preſenting motives before them, in ſuch a point of view, as ſhall cauſe them to be more deeply felt, and thus giving every needful aid, though in perfect conſiſtence with liberty, to the virtuous principle. Now, on theſe accounts, the good diſpoſitions and actions of men may be juſtly aſcribed to God. The ſame key will alſo ſerve to ſhew the propriety of the prayers, which we meet with in th Scriptures, for theſe diſpoſitions, and of the exhortations given us to pray to God for them. I cannot, therefore, think it neceſſary to ſpend any time in adverting to the particular paſſages which come under theſe two claſſes. The dictates of reaſon, and the doctrine of revelation, muſt, in themſelves,

be perfectly conſiſtent; and that view of any part of the latter, which ſets it at variance with the former, cannot but be falſe and erroneous. In the inſtance before us, while the neceſſarian tenet ſuppoſes the good diſpoſitions and actions of men to be aſcribed to God, in a ſenſe that is abſolutely repugnant to the nature of man, and of God's moral government over him; the view, which the ſcheme of liberty enables us to take of the doctrine of Scripture on this head, is at once correſpondent with the agency of the creature, and the obligations he is under to his Creator.

Another claſs of texts, pointed out by the Dr. to our conſideration, conſiſts of thoſe, which, he ſays, "abundantly prove, that "the evil actions of men alſo, which ne- "ceſſarily imply bad diſpoſitions, do, in the "language of Scripture, take place in con- "ſequence of the particular appointment of "God, and eſpecially ſuch actions as ter- "minate in great good or juſt puniſhment, "which is the ſame thing."

That the ſacred writers could not mean, by any language which they uſe, that the

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evil actions, or bad diſpoſitions of the perſons they deſcribe, or ſpeak of, were, in any inſtance, the conſequence of the particular appointment of God; ſo that they were neceſſary, and unavoidable, may, with the utmoſt certainty, be concluded from the abſolute contrariety of ſuch an appointment to the rectitude of the divine mind. Here, again, we are under the neceſſity of having recourſe to a very different interpretation of the Scriptures cited by the Dr. from that which he puts upon them. And nothing more can, I think, be meant in any of them, than that God permitted the evil actions, ſpoken of, to take place, intending, by the direction of his unerring wiſdom, to render them productive of good, in one way or other. Now, in all theſe inſtances, the agency of God is alone concerned in the appointment or accompliſhment of the end; of which the wickedneſs of man, permitted by God, but which he did not will or appoint, was by his providence converted into the means: whereas, in the caſe of good actions and diſpoſitions, they are referred to him, on account *of his* agency in the proviſion of

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the means by which they are produced, while it depends on the agency of man to apply thoſe means to their deſigned important ends. And thus, in order rightly to underſtand any author, we muſt always have reſpect to the characters of the perſons, and the nature of the ſubjects and things treated of.

Under this claſs, where the evil actions of men are deſcribed, it may not be improper to point out the different views, which the Scriptures, in ſome inſtances, give us of the ſame actions and events.

As to the caſe of Joſeph (which is the firſt inſtance mentioned) the favourable light, in which he repreſents to his brethren the tranſaction of their ſelling him for a ſlave, proves nothing but the amiable tenderneſs of his heart, and his great benevolence, in endeavouring to conceal from their view the cruelty of their behaviour towards him, the thought of which, he well knew, muſt fill them with the moſt painful ſenſe of their guilt. For this purpoſe, he directs their attention to the good and important ends, to which the over-ruling providence of the Moſt High rendered

his being ſent into Egypt ſubſervient. (" Gen. xlv. 5.) *Now therefore be not* " *grieved, nor angry with yourſelves, that ye* " *ſold me hither; for God did ſend me before* " *you to preſerve life: And again* (v. 8.) *It* " *was not you that ſent me hither, but God.*" Obſerve here the different language which Joſeph uſes, in deſcribing the concern which his brethren had in the tranſaction, and that of Providence, in giving ſo happy a turn to the event. " *Ye,*" ſays he of his brethren, " *ſold me hither;*" but of God, " *he did* " *ſend me before you to preſerve life:*" in which is clearly intimated, that his brethren were alone concerned in the tranſaction of ſelling him; though, as God permitted and over-ruled it for good, he might, on this account, be ſaid to have ſent him thither; and in this view only could it be juſtly ſaid, " *It was not you that ſent me hither, but* " *God.*" And to recur to the Dr.'s liberal conceſſion, before noticed; had Joſeph been interrogated concerning his meaning, in the paſſages we have been conſidering, I believe the Dr. himſelf will hardly doubt, that he would have given an anſwer by no means favourable

vourable to the doctrine of neceſſity, which the Dr. has notwithſtanding produced them to ſupport.

" The manner," ſays the Dr. (p. 139.) " in which God is ſaid to have hardened " the heart of Pharaoh, is very expreſs, " (Exodus vi. 21.) *I will harden his heart,* " *that he ſhall not let the people go*; and the " expreſſion is frequently repeated in the " courſe of the hiſtory." It muſt ſurely merit equal notice, that Pharaoh is, alſo, in a very expreſs manner, ſaid by the hiſtorian to have himſelf hardened his heart. Thus (Exodus viii. 15.) " *But when Pha-* " *roah ſaw that there was reſpite, he harden-* " *ed his heart, and hearkened not unto them;* " *as the Lord had ſaid.*" And (v. 32.) " *And Pharaoh hardened his heart at this* " *time alſo, neither would he let the people* " *go.*" Now, in this latter account, the hardneſs of Pharaoh's heart is clearly aſcribed to his own choice or agency. And how is this to be reconciled with the former repreſentation, but by admitting, that when " God is ſaid to have hardened Pharaoh's " *heart,*" nothing more is intended, than *that he* permitted the ſeveral meaſures of his

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providence to operate, as they naturally, though not neceſſarily, would, on a mind depraved as that of Pharaoh's was, ſo that, as the hiſtorian ſpeaks in another place (chap. ix. 35.) "*The heart of Pharaoh was* "*hardened.*" Both the temporary executions, and ſuſpenſions, of the divine judgements, were means well fitted to ſuppreſs an impious oppoſition to the will and command of God; and that they had not this effect on Pharaoh, was ſolely owing to that daringly wicked obſtinacy of heart which he had contracted; in conſequence of which, all the methods made uſe of by Divine Providence to reform his mind, ſerved only to render him more incorrigibly obſtinate; as the beſt means will, in common, be found to do, where there is an equally wicked diſpoſition. In this view of the caſe of Pharaoh, an entire harmony will be preſerved between the two accounts. While God, in the way of permiſſion, may be ſaid to have hardened his heart, it will, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, be true, that Pharaoh himſelf hardened his heart. If it be ſaid, that, according to this method of interpretation, we admit the li-

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teral ſenſe in the latter of the two accounts, while we reject it in the former; the anſwer is, that in both it cannot be admitted without a manifeſt contradiction; and that the imputation of Pharaoh's hardneſs of heart, not to God, but to himſelf, as the agent and proper cauſe of it, will alone conſiſt with the rectitude of the ſupreme mind.

The remarks, already made, equally conclude in favour of a ſimilar interpretation of all thoſe other paſſages, in which evil diſpoſitions or actions are deſcribed in ſuch a manner, as, at firſt ſight, may ſeem to refer them to God as their author. It is no leſs certain, that no ſinful diſpoſition, or act of wickedneſs, can be produced by the appointment or agency of God, than that he himſelf is an infinitely holy or righteous being. The one is the certain and neceſſary conſequence of the other. And though the agency of man may not, in ſome particular inſtances, be directly ſpecified, yet the general and current doctrine and language of the Scriptures, as will be ſhewn hereafter, are abundantly ſufficient to clear thoſe paſſages, in which a different mode of expreſſion is made

made uſe of, from any ſuch ſenſe as the neceſſarian tenet would lead us to put upon them.

When our Saviour thanks his Father, that he had "*hid theſe things from the wiſe* "*and prudent, and had revealed them unto* "*babes;*" Matt. xi. 25. to which the Dr. refers, p. 140. He is evidently ſpeaking of no other appointment of God than what concerned the nature of the chriſtian doctrine. This was of that pure and ſpiritual kind, that while men of craft and policy, blinded by their worldly prejudices, could ſee nothing in it to engage their regard; they, on the other hand, who reſembled babes in the ſimplicity of their minds, or, who were free from all corrupt, ſiniſter deſigns, diſcerned the beauty and excellence of this heavenly inſtitution, and cordially embraced it. That ſuch was the nature and tendency of thoſe truths, which our Saviour was appointed to communicate to mankind, he here makes the matter of his devout rejoicing, and of that grateful praiſe to God, which it ſo highly merited. See Luke x. 21.

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That the rejection of the gospel, wherever it took place, and in whatever manner it is described, is, as above, to be attributed to something wrong and criminal in the dispositions of men, which they had it in their power to have prevented; and was by no means "the consequence of the express "appointment of God," as Dr. Priestley maintains; seems undeniably clear from many declarations of Scripture, plain and determinate in their sense, which treat on this subject. Thus, John v. 40. "*And ye will* "*not come to me, that ye might have life.*" V. 44. "*How can ye believe, who receive ho-* "*nour one of another and seek not the honour* "*that cometh from God only.*" Chap. iii. 19. "*This is the condemnation, that light is come* "*into the world, and men loved darkness ra-* "*ther than light, because their deeds were evil.* "Again, Matt. xxiii. 37. "*O Jerusalem,* "*Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and* "*stonest them, which are sent unto thee, how* "*often would I have gathered thy children to-* "*gether, even as a hen gathereth her chickens* "*under her wings, and ye would not!*" These passages evidently resolve the unbelief of the Jews

Jews into their own choice, and evil diſpoſitions previouſly contracted, as the cauſes of it; and analogous to the ſenſe of theſe plain texts, muſt be the true meaning of all others which ſpeak on the ſame ſubject.

With reſpect to the apoſtacy of the latter time, referred to by the Apoſtle Paul, 2 Theſ. ii. 11. The introductory clauſe of this paſſage leads us to a very different view of it, from that in which the Dr. ſeems to have conſidered it. "*And for this cauſe,*" ſays the Apoſtle, "*God ſhall ſend them ſtrong* "*deluſion, that they ſhall believe a lie.*" &c. There is, we ſee, ſomething preceding as a cauſe of this deluſion, and we are told, in the 10th verſe, what that cauſe is, namely, that the perſons, ſpoken of, "*received not the love* "*of the truth, that they might be ſaved.*" The paſſage, viewed in this connection, will very naturally admit the following interpretation; that in the latter times, here deſcribed, a great diſaffection and averſion to the truth would become very prevalent; and that by way of puniſhment, they, who, under the influence of ſuch a diſpoſition, had abuſed the means of religious knowledge

and improvement, with which they were favoured, ſhould be deprived of them; in conſequence of which, they would be expoſed to the deluſions of a ſcheme of craft and worldly policy, which would be ſet up in oppoſition to genuine chriſtianity. Thus explained, the declaration of this paſſage is entirely conſiſtent with that other of the ſame Apoſtle, 1 Tim. ii. 11. "*Who,*" (that is, God) "*will have all men to be ſaved, and to* "*come unto the knowledge of the truth;*" with which latter aſſertion, the former, taken in the neceſſarian ſenſe, appears to be utterly irreconcileable.

Again, there does not ſeem to be any thing in the repreſentation, given in the paſſages next quoted, of the death of Chriſt, as entering into the plan of Divine Providence, but what will agree with the idea of permiſſion on foreſight, without any ſuch decree, or appointment and agency, as the doctrine of neceſſity ſuppoſes. Acts ii. 23. "*Him, being delivered by the determinate* "*counſel and foreknowledge of God, ye have* "*taken, and by wicked hands have crucified* "*and ſlain:*" and again, Chap. iv. 27. "*Of*

"a truth

" *a truth againſt thy holy child Jeſus, whom* " *thou haſt anointed, both Herod and Pontius* " *Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of* " *Iſrael were gathered together, for to do* " *whatſoever thy hand, and thy counſel, deter-* " *mined before to be done.*" In the former of theſe texts, the Jews are accuſed, as having ſlain Chriſt " *with wicked hands;*" which appears extremely favourable to the ſenſe of them above ſuggeſted: ſince there could be no wickedneſs, at leaſt as including demerit, in the part which men acted in accompliſhing this event, if the whole is to be conſidered as the neceſſary and unavoidable conſequence of the poſitive appointment of God.

" That God is conſidered as the ſovereign " diſpoſer both of goſpel privileges here, " and future happineſs hereafter," as the Dr. obſerves, p. 142. is allowed both on the ſcheme of liberty and neceſſity. The queſtion is concerning the way in which they are diſpenſed.

The obſervations before made, on the caſe of Pharaoh, will eaſily apply to that of unbelievers, in reference to chriſtianity, de-

ſcribed by St. Paul, in the paſſage cited by the Dr. p. 142. Rom. ix. 15. &c. And as to the ſeveral ſteps in the plan and operations of Providence, for the ſalvation of men, pointed out, Rom. viii. 29, &c. they are all, upon both ſchemes, reſolveable into the divine will or agency; though the manner in which the ſeveral effects, there deſcribed, are ſuppoſed to be brought about, will differ as widely, as the principles of liberty and neceſſity do, in the ideas which they ſuggeſt of the nature of man, who is the ſubject of this procedure.

P. 144, and following, the Dr. produces ſeveral paſſages to ſhew, "that ſuch things "as come to paſs in the common courſe of "Providence were conſidered by the pious "writers of the Scriptures as more imme-"diately adminiſtered by himſelf, overlook-"ing ſecond cauſes, and regarding only the "firſt and proper cauſe of all things." Thus "with reſpect to the general conſtitution of "nature the Pſalmiſt ſays (Pſalm lxv. 9.) "*Thou viſiteſt the earth, and watereſt it:* "*thou greatly enricheſt it with the river of* "*God, which is full of water,*" &c. (Pſalm

civ.

civ. 27. *Theſe all wait upon thee, that thou "mayeſt give them their meat in due ſeaſon."* &c. Again, "what we call common events, "and accidents of life, are all, in the lan- "guage of Scripture, the expreſs appoint- "ment of God." Matt. x. 29. "*Are not "two ſparrows ſold for a farthing, and not "one of them ſhall fall to the ground without "your Father.*" 1 Sam. ii. 6, 7. "*The Lord "killeth and maketh alive; he bringeth down "to the grave and bringeth up: he raiſeth up "the poor out of the duſt, and lifteth up the "beggar from the dunghill.*" Now, in theſe and ſuch like texts, though ſecond cauſes are overlooked, or no mention is made of them, the Dr. will himſelf allow, that ſuch cauſes are employed in bringing to paſs the ſeveral events here ſpoken of. In like manner, where what is done by men is aſcribed to God, the agency of man is to be ſuppoſed, though it be not ſpecified. In Scripture, every thing is referred to God, as well what he only permits, as what he appoints. And the nature of the reference which the ſacred writers have to God, in the language they *uſe, or the ideas* which they are to be ſup-

poſed to have entertained of the concern of Providence, muſt be determined by the nature of the ſubject or thing ſpoken of. Thus, when ſuch effects in the natural world are deſcribed, as proceed from the operation of natural cauſes, acting according to certain laws, to which they are made neceſſarily ſubject; there the effects are, in the ſtricteſt and fulleſt ſenſe, of God; he is the proper author, or cauſe of them. And, according to the ſame rule of interpretation, when the ſacred writers ſpeak of the actions of men, whether good or evil, they cannot be juſtly ſuppoſed to refer them to God in any other ſenſe, than will conſiſt with the perfection of the ſupreme mind, and with the moral and accountable nature of man. It can never, therefore, be intended that, in any inſtance of human conduct, God is to be conſidered as the author or cauſe, ſo as to exclude the proper agency of man. And in all caſes, in which the actions ſpoken of are morally evil, the all-perfect Being can have no other concern in them, than in the permiſſion of them, or in rendering them ſubſervient to thoſe uſeful deſigns, either in the way of

judgment

judgment or of mercy, which never entered into the thought of the agent. With this plain reference it is, that "ambitious and "wicked men are often ſpoken of as the "inſtruments of Divine Providence. Pſalm xvii. 13. "*Ariſe, O Lord, deliver my ſoul "from the wicked, which is thy ſword.*" And ſuch is evidently the meaning of the prophetical view, which Iſaiah gives of the character and conduct of the Aſſyrian monarch, as quoted by the Dr. p. 147, Iſaiah x. 5. and following.

Upon the whole, the remarks, which have been made, are ſubmitted to the careful attention of the reader, who will then determine for himſelf, whether the paſſages, cited by the Dr. have that favourable aſpect on the neceſſarian principle, which he ſuppoſes. But as it is fair and neceſſary to compare Scripture with Scripture; I ſhall now, for the concluſion of this Section, give a few ſpecimens of other texts, under ſeveral claſſes, which appear clearly and ſtrongly to decide againſt the doctrine of neceſſity, and in favour of human liberty.

1. Such texts as aſcribe holineſs, rectitude, or moral perfection to God.

Deuteronomy xxxii. 4. *A God of truth, and without iniquity, juſt and right is he.*

Pſalm cxlv. 17. *The Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works.*

Habakkuk i. 13. *Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canſt not look on iniquity.* And to mention no more.

James i. 13. *God cannot be tempted with evil.*

On the above claſs of texts I muſt obſerve, as my reaſon for introducing them, that I cannot but look upon a ſcheme, which conſiders ſin, or moral evil, as taking place in conſequence of the expreſs appointment of God, and as a deſigned neceſſary effect of his agency, to be a direct contradiction to thoſe ideas of the divine holineſs or rectitude, which the paſſages now cited lead us to form. The only character, which the neceſſarian tenet, if conſidered in its due extent, will admit of, as belonging to the uncreated mind, is a mixed one; in which, if I may ſo ſpeak, *matchleſs virtues* and *matchleſs vices* are blended together. On the one ſide, is a diſpoſition,

poſition, independant of all ideas of fitneſs or rectitude, to produce the greateſt poſſible natural good; and on the other, the appointment of all the ſin or moral evil, that ever did or can exiſt, as the means and for the ſake of that good. If then, what the Scriptures teach us concerning the ſpotleſs and perfect rectitude of the Deity be true; the doctrine of neceſſity muſt be falſe.

2. Paſſages of Scripture, which addreſs mankind, as poſſeſſed of a power of choice or agency; or in which that power is ſpoken of as actually exerted.

Gen. iv. 7. *If thou doſt well, ſhall not thou be accepted? and if thou doeſt not well, ſin lieth at the door.*

Deuteronomy xxx. 19. *I call heaven and earth to record this day againſt you, that I have ſet before you life and death, bleſſing and curſing: therefore chooſe life, that both thou and thy ſeed may live.*

Joſhua xxiv. 15. *If it ſeem evil unto you to ſerve the Lord, chooſe you this day whom ye will ſerve; whether the gods which your fathers ſerved, that were on the other ſide the flood, or the gods of the Amorites, in whoſe land ye dwell:*

but as for me and my houſe, we will ſerve the Lord.

Job xxxvi. 21. *Take heed, regard not inquity; for this haſt thou choſen rather than affliction.*

Pſalm cxix. 30. *I have choſen the way of truth.*

Pſalm cxix. 173. *I have choſen thy precepts.*

Prov. i. 29. *For that they hated knowledge, and did not chooſe the fear of the Lord.*

Iſaiah lxvi. 3. *Yea, they have choſen their own ways.*

Luke x. 42. *But one thing is needful, and Mary hath choſen that good part, which ſhall not be taken away from her.*

To this claſs, alſo, belong thoſe numerous paſſages, both in the Old and New Teſtament, in which men are commanded or exhorted to practiſe what is right, and to abſtain from that which is evil. Of theſe the Scriptures are ſo full, that it muſt be needleſs to make any further reference to them.

There are, moreover, ſome inſtances of the moſt pathetic expoſtulations with the wicked; which, if the miſconduct referred

to was really unavoidable, muſt be altogether deluſive. Such is that of God by the Prophet Ezekiel, addreſſed to the Jews, chap. xxxiii. 11. *As I live, ſaith the Lord God, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O Houſe of Iſrael?* Such alſo is our Saviour's lamentation over Jeruſalem, before quoted.

3. Texts, which repreſent men as blaming or reproaching themſelves for evil actions which they have done, or as making ſupplication for the pardon of them.

Thus 2 Samuel xii. 13. *And David ſaid unto Nathan, I have ſinned againſt the Lord.*

Job, Chap. vii. 20. *I have ſinned, what ſhall I do unto thee, O thou preſerver of men.*

Of Peter we are told, that when he remembered the words of Jeſus, *which ſaid unto him, Before the cock crow, thou ſhalt deny me thrice; he went out and wept bitterly.* Matt. xxvi. 75. And of Judas, that *when he ſaw* his maſter *was condemned, he repented himſelf, and brought again the thirty pieces of*

ſilver

ſilver to the chief prieſts and elders, ſaying, I have ſinned, in that I have betrayed the innocent blood, and he departed and went and hanged himſelf. Chap. xxvii. 3, 4, 5.

It is here, alſo, unneceſſary to recite more paſſages. The penitential Pſalms of David, all the confeſſions of ſin, and prayers for forgiveneſs, which we meet with in any part of Scripture, are the language of conſcious guilt, for which the doctrine of neceſſity leaves no room, becauſe it utterly deſtroys that freedom of choice and action, which is the only cauſe of it.

4. Paſſages of Scripture, in which God is conſidered as exerciſing a moral government over mankind; that is, as approving the good, and being diſpleaſed with the wicked, and diſpenſing, in the courſe of his providence, tokens of his approbation or diſpleaſure, according to their different characters.

Geneſis xviii. 25. *That be far from thee to do after this manner, to ſlay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous ſhould be as the wicked, that be far from thee: ſhall not the judge of all the earth do right?*

Job

Job. xxxiv. 10, 11, 12. *Therefore hearken unto me, ye men of underſtanding: far be it from God, that he ſhould do wickedneſs, and from the Almighty, that he ſhould commit iniquity. For the work of a man ſhall he render unto him, and cauſe every man to find according to his ways. Yea, ſurely God will not do wickedly, neither will the Almighty pervert judgment.*

Eccleſ. viii. 12. *Though a ſinner do evil an hundred times and his days be prolonged, yet ſurely I know that it ſhall be well with them that fear God, which fear before him: but it ſhall not be well with the wicked.*

Ezek. xviii. 29. *O Houſe of Iſrael, are not my ways equal?* And to mention no more,

Romans ii. 6. &c. *Who will render unto every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well-doing ſeek for glory, honour and immortality, eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteouſneſs; indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguiſh, upon every ſoul of man that doth evil, of the Jew firſt, and alſo of the Gentile. For there is no reſpect of perſons with God.*

There

There are a multitude of other texts which ſpeak the ſame ſenſe. Such are all thoſe in the New Teſtament, which teach the great doctrine of future retributions—all its promiſes of life and happineſs, as connected with obedience, on one hand; and its denunciations of miſery and deſtruction, as the puniſhment of unrepented ſin and wickedneſs, on the other.

I ſhall add no further remarks on the Scriptures, which I have now quoted or referred to. To have collected all that could be found, which come under one or other of the claſſes above-mentioned, would have been to tranſcribe no ſmall part of the Old and New Teſtament. Whether, in their plain meaning, or according to any juſt rules of interpretation, they countenance the doctrine of an uncontroulable neceſſity, attending the actions of men, or that of free agency, I leave to every one, who impartially conſiders them, to judge.

ON SECTION XII.

" THE CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE OF PRE-
" DESTINATION, COMPARED WITH THE
" PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE OF NE-
" CESSITY."

THE deſign of Dr. Prieſtley, in this Section, is to clear the doctrine of neceſſity from ſuch objections as might be ſuppoſed to lie againſt it, equally with the Calviniſtic doctrine of Predeſtination, to which the Dr. himſelf allows that it bears a good degree of reſemblance in ſome views. I cannot but be of opinion that the two ſchemes bear a much nearer affinity to one another, than the Dr. is aware of, and in thoſe very points too, which, in Calviniſm, the Dr. deems moſt obnoxious, becauſe of their hurtful tendency.

It cannot be denied, that in reference to the end propoſed, the doctrine of neceſſity has incomparably more in it that carries the appearance

appearance of benevolence, than that view of Calviniſm to which it ſtands oppoſed. On the latter ſcheme, only a ſmall number of the race of mankind are predeſtinated to final happineſs, while the far greater part are doomed to everlaſting miſery: whereas the neceſſarian principle, on the other hand, maintains a predeſtination including in its object the whole human race, who all, without exception, though at different periods, are to be finally made partakers of the deſtined good or happineſs. It will not, then, admit a moment's heſitation, which of the two ſchemes is moſt deſirable. If natural good, or happineſs, through endleſs duration, be preferable to miſery; moſt certainly the neceſſarian tenet has infinitely the advantage of the common Calviniſtic doctrine, in reference to its end. But important as the difference is between the two ſchemes, in this one reſpect; in all others, upon enquiry, they ſeem to be much more agreed, than, on a tranſient view of them, might be ſuppoſed. In both ſchemes, as the Dr. obſerves, p. 153, "The future "happineſs or miſery of all men are cer-

"tainly

" tainly foreknown and appointed by God." The Dr. might alſo have added, " without " any reaſon of preference." For it is manifeſtly no leſs true on the Neceſſarian, than on the Calviniſtic ſcheme, that the appointment of ſome to happineſs, and of others to miſery, is not founded on any perſonal worth or demerit. On both ſchemes, there is a certain number elected or appointed by God to happineſs or miſery in a future ſtate, and whatever difference there is in the diſpoſitions and conduct of the objects of theſe different appointments, that difference is not the cauſe, but the conſequence, of the divine appointment. In the view of the Neceſſarian, they who are appointed to future miſery, are alſo appointed to be vicious in the preſent ſtate. Unleſs, therefore, that courſe of conduct, which was of God's own appointment, and was therefore abſolutely unavoidable, can be truly ſaid to involve demerit in it; they, who are to undergo miſery in a future ſtate, have done no more to forfeit the divine favour than their elect brethren, who are immediately to enter into happineſs. As far, then, as reſpects the good or ill deſert

of theſe different claſſes of men, the preference that is given to the one is without any reaſon. It is ultimately to be reſolved into the ſovereign and uncontroulable will of God. Here is ſurely a very plain and ſtriking ſimilarity between the Neceſſarian and Calviniſtic predeſtination, as far as the former reaches. The duration of ſuffering, which this ſuppoſes, is, indeed, only temporary, and is to terminate in the happineſs of the ſufferer; while that of the latter is everlaſting and remedileſs. But even the temporary ſuffering, conſidered in the light of puniſhment, is the effect of an appointment of the ſame arbitrary kind with that, to which Calviniſm aſcribes the future miſery of the non-elect or reprobate: and when it is further taken into the account, that a great part of the future ſuffering, though only for a time, ariſes from remorſe or ſelf-reproach, without any thing done, that could have been avoided, and, conſequently, without any juſt occaſion or cauſe for this worſt of all ſuffering; excepting in point of duration of miſery, the one appointment is clogged with the ſame unſur-

mountable

mountable difficulties as the other. They are both repugnant to every idea of juſtice and goodneſs, in the way we uſually conceive of them.

Nor are the grounds of theſe two appointments, as exiſting in the divine mind, which are aſſigned by their reſpective advocates, ſo eſſentially different, as they may at firſt be thought. The Calviniſtic decree is, indeed, repreſented as having been made for God's own glory and ſovereign good will. But if the Dr. will only permit us to make the ſame allowance to the Calviniſts, that he did, in a former ſection, in favour of Mr. Hobbes (ſee Illuſtrations, Section X. p. 120.) and we may then ſuppoſe, however incautiouſly ſome writers of that denomination may have expreſſed themſelves on the ſubject, that they do not, any more than Mr. Hobbes, mean, when they ſpeak of the glory of God, or his ſovereignty, to include only the idea of his power, or dominion, as giving riſe to his decrees. Imperfect as their notions of the divine rectitude appear to be, from their aſcribing to God a meaſure ſo incompatible with the true idea of it; they

may yet not intend, and I believe, in general, do not intend, to repreſent the divine decrees, as a merely arbitrary exerciſe of power, but, on the contrary, conſider this attribute as acting in conjunction with all his moral perfections, under ſome idea of them or other, in every determination that he forms.

The reaſon or ground of the divine appointment, or predeſtination, on the Neceſſarian plan, is—a regard to the production of the greateſt good—Now though the good will, as oppoſed to injuſtice and cruelty, that appears in this principle of action, cannot but be pleaſing to a benevolent mind, there ſeems, however, to be no more of moral rectitude in this principle, than in the mere power or ſovereignty of God. It is a goodneſs of deſign which is abſtracted from, and independent of, every idea of fitneſs or rectitude; and muſt, therefore, be arbitrary in its nature, whatever beneficial effects it may produce: and in order to the accompliſhment of the end, it becomes an eſſential part of the plan, *to treat mankind as being what they really are not*. It confers

both

both rewards and puniſhments without any of thoſe conſtituents of character, which lay the proper foundation for either the one or the other; and, in the latter caſe, that of puniſhments, as was before obſerved, it ſuppoſes an oppoſition even to that great law of juſtice, which is ſo important a branch of moral rectitude. More to the ſame purpoſe was remarked on Section X. And, upon the whole, there appears to be a very conſiderable reſemblance between the two ſchemes, in the ends propoſed, and the principles on which they are ſuppoſed to be founded. Let us now proceed to the comparative view of the manner in which theſe ends are brought about.

Dr. Prieſtley ſays of this, p. 153. "The "difference in the manner by which the "end is accompliſhed, is ſo very great, that "the influence of the two ſyſtems on the "minds of thoſe that adopt and act upon "them, is the reverſe of one another, ex- "ceedingly favourable to virtue in the ne- "ceſſarian, and as unfavourable to it in the "Calviniſt." Now I would here deſire the moſt careful attention to this one ſingle

point—That both the Neceſſarian and the Calviniſt hold a predeſtination or appointment conſiſting of two parts; one reſpecting the end, the other, the means; and that, on both ſchemes, every thing which takes place, with regard to every individual, is the effect of a divine conſtitution, unalterable by man, and which could not poſſibly have been otherwiſe than it actually is—This Dr. Prieſtley has ſo repeatedly granted, in the courſe of his Illuſtrations, that I need ſay nothing to prove that ſuch is the Neceſſarian tenet; and if this be admitted, it ſeems very immaterial, as to its practical influence, what the manner be in which the end is brought about. On the Neceſſarian plan, the manner, or means, may be more agreeable to the ideas of a philoſopher, than on the Calviniſtic ſcheme; but ſtill, I ſay, the practical influence muſt be the very ſame. For upon both ſyſtems, man is a mere paſſive inſtrument of the divine will or agency. It is therefore to little purpoſe for the Neceſſarian to believe, "that his own "diſpoſitions and actions are the neceſſary "and ſole means of his preſent and future "happineſs."

" happineſs." Properly ſpeaking, there are no diſpoſitions or actions, which he can call his own: for there are none over which he has any power, or in the production of which he had any concern as an agent. Whatever, then, he may believe about his own diſpoſitions and actions, improperly ſo termed, it will not make him a whit more of an agent than he was before: and the agency of man being excluded, every bad conſequence, which can attend the Calviniſtic faith, follows upon the other. To ſay, as the Dr. does, p. 153. " that in the moſt proper " ſenſe of the words, it depends entirely " upon man himſelf whether he be virtu- " ous or vitious, happy or miſerable," and yet to maintain, that the happineſs and miſery of every individual of the human race, together with the means by which they are produced, are ordained and appointed by God, ſo as not to admit the poſſibility of any the leaſt alteration, in any part of our exiſtence, either preſent or future, ſeems to imply a contradiction of principles of the groſſeſt kind. What the Dr. ſays of man, p. 154. may be true in itſelf; namely, " that

" his ſucceſs is certain in proportion to " his exertion of himſelf." And that with " this exertion he cannot miſcarry, but " without it he muſt, unleſs the laws of " nature ſhould change, be inevitably mi- " ſerable." This, I ſay, may be true in itſelf, but it amounts to nothing, which will in the leaſt affect the main argument, ſince the exertions that are made are no leſs neceſſary and fixed, than the ſucceſs that is to attend them.—Allowing the agreement of the two ſyſtems in this one grand point; namely, that the manner in which the end is accompliſhed, as well as the end itſelf, is ordained and appointed by God; and much of what the Dr. obſerves, p. 154, 155. concerning Calviniſm, may, with equal propriety, be applied to the doctrine of Neceſſity. " I do not ſee what motive *a Neceſſa-* " *rian, any more than* a Calviniſt, can have " to give any attention to his moral con- " duct." " If a man be in the happy number of the elect," (*for an elect number there is on the Neceſſarian ſcheme to whom the preference is ſo far given, as that they are to become virtuous and happy in* this life) " he is

" ſure

"ſure that God will, at the appointed and "moſt proper time, work upon him, *by the "power of motives, ſo as to form his mind to "the love and practice of virtue*;" that is, in the Calviniſtic way of ſpeaking, "God will "work upon him his miraculous work "of *ſaving and ſanctifying grace*. Though "he ſhould be ever ſo wicked," *before this great* change, it makes nothing againſt the certainty of the change; ſince as it is a divine appointment, it muſt unavoidably take place. On the Neceſſarian principle, theſe reaſonings are to be extended much farther. For, though a man ſhould not be in the elect number, who are to be virtuous and happy in this life, he is not, however, for that reaſon, to deſpair. It is the appointment of the Creator and Lord of the human race, that all, without exception, ſhall be brought to virtue and happineſs at the laſt. There is, therefore, not merely an encouragement for hope, but an aſſurance of endleſs happineſs in the reſult, for the worſt ſinners. What the character is which any one is to ſuſtain on earth, is appointed by him who knows what is beſt: and what his

will

will concerning us is, we ſhall all be made to know, by the effects which we feel in ourſelves. The vicious, as well as the virtuous, are alike neceſſary in the plan of God's government; and whether he has aſſigned one or the other of theſe characters to any of us, it becomes us to acquieſce in our lot, and to conſider ourſelves, in all that we do, whether good or evil, as nothing more than inſtruments in the hands of our Maker, and as fulfilling his ſacred pleaſure.

As far as I am able to judge, the above reaſonings on the principle of Neceſſity are juſt and natural; and on this view of the direct tendency of the doctrine, I cannot but adopt the remark which the Dr. makes on Calviniſm, in the cloſe of his reaſonings on its principles, p. 155. "If any ſyſtem of "ſpeculative principles can operate as an "axe at the root of all virtue, and goodneſs "it is this," of *Neceſſity*.

"The Neceſſarian, alſo, (ſays the Dr. "p. 155.) believes nothing of the poſterity "of Adam ſinning in him, and of their be-"ing liable to the wrath of God on that ac-

"count."

" count." The juſt exception, which has been taken againſt this tenet, is, that beings are hereby conſidered as criminal, and liable to be treated as ſuch, for a fact in which they had no choice or agency, but which was done by the choice or agency of another. And is not this the very caſe with regard to all that part of mankind, who come under the common denomination of ſinners, or the wicked, on the Neceſſarian ſyſtem? Their ſuppoſed crimes, and the puniſhments annexed to them, on this principle, take place in conſequence of the original appointment of their Creator, are really affected by his agency, and on their part are abſolutely unavoidable.

The Dr. further obſerves, p. 158. " The " Calviniſtic ſyſtem entirely excludes the " popular notion of free will, namely, the " liberty or power of doing what we pleaſe, " virtuous or vicious, as belonging to every " perſon in every ſituation: which is per- " fectly conſiſtent with the doctrine of phi- " loſophical neceſſity, and, indeed, reſults " from it. And in this reſpect it is, that " *the language* of Scripture cannot be re-

" conciled with the tenets of Calviniſm." To this I reply, when it is recollected, that on the Neceſſarian principle, the liberty or power of doing what we pleaſe, implies in it no idea of ſelf-determination, but that to pleaſe means no more than to be inclined by a phyſical neceſſity; the only juſt, and which is alſo, (as was before ſhewn) the *popular* notion of free will, appears to be no more conſiſtent with the doctrine of Neceſſity than of Calviniſm, and the language of revelation ſeems equally repugnant to both. Neceſſitating motives, preſented to the mind, are ſurely as much the effects of a divine power, as that kind of agency which is ſuppoſed by the Calviniſt; and though one may be called a natural means, and the other a miraculous way of operating on the mind, for producing the deſigned change of diſpoſition and character, the effect is, however, equally neceſſary and unavoidable, and the operation in both caſes, may, with the ſame propriety, be termed—*irreſiſtible grace*. Neither the Neceſſarian, nor the Calviniſtic doctrine, admits of any other effect, than what *is* actually produced. There is no proper

power

power of choice or agency in man, on one plan more than the other: and what can it then be, but "tantalizing men," as the Dr. expreſſes it, on either ſcheme, to propoſe to them what *nothing but a divine power is able to effect; to exhort them to make that change in themſelves,* which they cannot make, nor do any thing towards producing? All, in both ſyſtems, is owing to the uncontroulable or irreſiſtible agency of God, in one way or other, and nothing to the choice or agency of man. According to the Calviniſtic doctrine, the power of doing good was loſt in Adam; and, on the Neceſſarian plan, man never did, nor can, poſſeſs a power of doing any thing that is morally right or wrong, or which is deſerving praiſe or blame, reward or puniſhment, at all.

There are ſome other points, in which Dr. Prieſtley has drawn the compariſon between the two ſyſtems, and endeavoured to ſhew—that the doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity moſt eſſentially differs from what is generally underſtood by Calviniſm. But, as theſe do not ſo immediately affect the grand queſtion of liberty, I have nothing to offer

upon

upon them. In thoſe moſt material reſpects which regard the preſent controverſy, I have conſidered both ſchemes with a good degree of attention; and notwithſtanding all that Dr. Prieſtley has ſo ingeniouſly ſaid, to prove there is a very important difference, I cannot but ſtill think, that there is a very conſiderable and ſtriking ſimilarity, between them. In thoſe moſt exceptionable and dangerous principles of Calviniſm, which maintain—That God has fore-ordained whatſoever comes to paſs, and that this predeſtination reſpects the characters and conduct, as well as the final ſtate of mankind——That the different parts which men act in life are not the cauſe, but the conſequences, of a divine appointment concerning the preſent and future ſtate of their being—And That it is not poſſible for any one of mankind to *do* or *be* any other, than what they *actually do* and *are*—I ſay, in theſe moſt exceptionable and dangerous principles of Calviniſm, the doctrine of Neceſſity, however it may ſeem to differ in the repreſentations that are given of it, is, when examined to the bottom, really the very ſame. And though, in the end it

propoſes

propoſes, it breathes a ſpirit of benevolence, which is the direct contraſt to the genius of Calviniſm; yet I cannot but be of opinion, that the perſuaſion of the final reſtoration of all the wicked to virtue and happineſs, which it ſupports, will, in its natural operation, have a very pernicious influence on the unſettled minds of the generality of mankind: while the doctrine of eternal, remedileſs, torments for the non-elect, taught by Calviniſm, horrible as it is in itſelf, may, in the way of reſtraint, have a conſiderable effect, and, in ſome inſtances, may probably produce an external reformation of life. For, notwithſtanding all the degrading reflections which ſome of the Calviniſtic perſuaſion may at times caſt on the moral and perſonal righteouſneſs of mankind, yet the more moderate among them, of whom the Dr. ſpeaks, do, I believe, maintain the inſeparable connection of holineſs here with happineſs hereafter; ſo that, on this ſcheme, the comfort of hope cannot be enjoyed without holineſs; that is, without thoſe very moral qualifications which they are apt ſo much to degrade, the belief

belief of which may operate on ſome minds, as a motive to the cultivation of them.

P. 160. Dr. Prieſtley obſerves—" The " doctrine of philoſophical neceſſity is, in " reality, a modern thing, not older, I be- " lieve, than Mr. Hobbes."——The Dr. might, I ſuppoſe, have traced the leading principles of the doctrine much beyond the time of Mr. Hobbes; though that author might conſiderably enlarge the view of them, and reduce them into ſo regular and refined a ſyſtem. * Spinoza, who wrote about the ſame time, has no leſs ſtrongly declared againſt the principle of liberty. Thus that author (as cited by Dr. Clarke, in his Demonſtr. p. 89. Margin.) ſays, in his Ethic. Part II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3. " Cor- " pus motum vel quieſcens, ad motum vel " quietem determinari debuit ab alio cor- " pore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem " determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud " iterum ab alio & ſic in infinitum." Id. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 32. " Unaquæ- " que volitio non poteſt exiſtere, neque

* Mr. Hobbes was born 1588, died 1679. Spinoza was born 1633, died 1677. See Bayle.

" ad

" ad operandum determinari, niſi ab alia " cauſa determinetur, & hæc rurſus ab alia, " & ſic porrò in infinitum." Id. Part II. Prop. 48. " In mente nulla eſt abſoluta ſive " libera voluntas: ſed mens ad hoc vel illud " volendum determinatur a cauſa, quæ etiam " ab alia determinata eſt, & hæc iterum ab " alia, & ſic in infinitum."

The clear ſenſe of which paſſages is, in Dr. Clark's words, as follows: " What- " ever body is moved, muſt be moved by " ſome other body, which itſelf likewiſe " muſt be moved by ſome third, and ſo on " without end. The will, in like manner, " of any voluntary agent, muſt, of neceſſity, " be determined by ſome external cauſe, " and not by any power of determining itſelf, " inherent in itſelf: and that external cauſe " muſt be determined neceſſarily by ſome " other cauſe, external to it; and ſo on " without end."

Dr. Macknight, in his Harmony, Vol. I. p. 98. informs us from Joſephus, Ant. 13. 9. That " the Eſſenes affirm, that all things " are ſubject to the government of fate, and " that *nothing* can happen to a man other-

on practice; it nearly concerns every friend of virtue, who treats on moral and religious ſubjects, to be extremely careful, that what he advances has a tendency, not to obſtruct, but to promote, the improvement of mankind. And, in this view, what Dr. Price obſerves on the writings of one ingenious advocate for neceſſity, merits the cloſeſt attention from every one, who eſpouſes the ſame ſide of the queſtion—namely, "If," as that Neceſſarian grants, "the divine plan required "that we ſhould be ſo made, as to ſeem to "ourſelves free; and the whole conſtitution "of things is as if we were free;" to endeavour to eſtabliſh the contrary opinion is an attempt "to conquer the neceſſity we are "under—to diſcover the ſecret, which, by "his account, was intended to be conceal-"ed from us—and to lay open the ſcheme "formed to deceive us," with the benevolent deſign, that we might not be injured by the knowledge of it. See Dr. Price's Review, firſt Ed. page 318, the note.

FINIS.

APPENDIX

TO THE

OBSERVATIONS;

OCCASIONED BY

DR. PRIESTLEY's LETTER

TO THE

AUTHOR.

[Price SIX-PENCE.]

AN

APPENDIX

TO THE

OBSERVATIONS

IN DEFENCE OF

THE LIBERTY OF MAN,

AS

A MORAL AGENT;

IN ANSWER TO

DR. PRIESTLEY'S ILLUSTRATIONS

OF

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY:

OCCASIONED BY

THE DR'S. LETTER TO THE AUTHOR.

BY JOHN PALMER,

MINISTER OF NEW BROAD-STREET.

Printed for J. JOHNSON, No. 72, St. Paul's Church-yard.

M.DCC.LXXX.

[Price SIX-PENCE.]

ADVERTISEMENT.

AFTER giving a cloſe attention to Dr. Prieſtley's Letter, I cannot think it neceſſary to enter into any fuller diſcuſſion of its contents, than what is contained in the following remarks. In them, thoſe parts of the Letter, which were deemed moſt material, are noticed. I have not, as far as I know, paſſed over any thing of the argumentative kind, which ſeemed to require a reply; and as to every thing elſe, I have aimed to be as conciſe, as was at all conſiſtent with a proper vindication of myſelf; deſirous to render the whole as uſeful, and as little offenſive, as poſſible.

JOHN PALMER.

REMARKS

ON

DR. PRIESTLEY's LETTER.

I CANNOT avoid juſt noticing the ſurprize, which the Dr. expreſſes in ſeveral parts of his Letter*, that I had not attended more to what he had ſaid, on ſome points of the controverſy, in the *Correſpondence*. It might have prevented the Dr's wonder, had he recollected, that I had ſaid in the Preface, p. 6. "The following Obſervations were "nearly finiſhed before the publication of "the Correſpondence between Dr. Price, "and Dr. Prieſtley; though I have ſince "given that performance a careful peruſal." The fact is as exactly as I have there ſtated it:

a

* See Pages 8, 22, 24, &c.

it: not, (as Dr. Prieſtley, by a moſt unaccountable miſtake, ſuppoſes me to have ſaid or intimated) that my publication was "compoſed more than a year ago;" that is, from the date of his Letter, which is Auguſt 1779*; but the compoſition was nearly finiſhed before the Correſpondence was publiſhed, which was not till December 1778; nor, as I have above ſuggeſted, did I read the correſpondence, till after I had finiſhed the Obſervations, which was towards the end of January 1779. My reaſon for deferring the peruſal of that performance was, that I ſuppoſed the leading arguments in favour of neceſſity were contained in the *Illuſtrations*; and that, as my firſt deſign was ſo nearly executed, it would be beſt to compleat it, before I entered into the conſideration of what had paſſed in the *Correſpondence:* though, at the ſame time, I determined to ſubmit it to the judgment of ſome learned friends, whether, after the publication of the *Correſpondence*, that of the *Obſervations* was not unneceſſary.

Conſidering the declaration in my preface, before

* See Letter, Page 2.

before cited, I cannot but think it a little extraordinary, that the Dr. ſhould ſay, as he does p. 22. of his Letter, referring to what I had obſerved on certainty and neceſſity: "Now, this is a caſe that I had conſidered "ſo fully in my late Treatiſe, in my Cor-"reſpondence with Dr. Price, and in my "letters to Dr. Horſley and Mr. Berington, "that I did not think I ſhould have heard "any more of it; and yet it ſeems you have "read part, at leaſt, of what I have advanced "on that ſubject." I have only to reply, that it would have been ſtrange indeed, if I had not read ſomewhat which the Dr. had written on a ſubject, about which I preſumed to reply to him. But need I aſſure him, that what I had read was in the Illuſtrations; the other pieces, to which he here refers, I had not then read. I muſt alſo take the liberty to add, that now I have read them, they appear as little ſatisfactory as the former: and that to all, which Dr. Prieſtley has advanced on this part of the argument, in the Correſpondence, Dr. Price appears to have given a very clear and ſufficient reply.

Dr. Prieſtley, in p. 3, of his Letter, ſpeaks

of the conſequences of the doctrine of neceſſity, as if they did not affect the real merits of the queſtion. "I ſhall, ſays the Dr. "confine myſelf chiefly to the diſcuſſion of "thoſe points, on which the real *merits of* "*the queſtion* turn, without replying at large "to what you have advanced, with reſpect "to the *conſequences* of the doctrine. In- "deed, if the doctrine itſelf be true, we "muſt take all the genuine conſequences, "whether we reliſh them or not." I muſt here obſerve, that the proof of liberty is far from being wholly reſted on the conſequences of not admitting it. But if thoſe conſequences will clearly and directly follow from neceſſity, which are ſubverſive of ſuch plain and important principles, as are intimately connected with the moral and accountable nature of man, and with the moral character and government of God; theſe conſequences muſt operate very forcibly, as proofs of the falſhood of the neceſſarian doctrine. "We "muſt, *no doubt*, take all the genuine con- "ſequences, whether we reliſh them or "not, if the doctrine itſelf be true." But conſequences, of the kind juſt mentioned,

ſeem

ſeem greatly to outweigh all ſpeculative reaſonings, of every ſort, which can be thought of; and inconteſtably to prove, that the doctrine, which ſuch conſequences attend, is not, and cannot be, true. They are alſo conſequences, implying in them ideas ſo abhorrent to my reaſon and feelings, and, in ſhort, to every principle in my mind; as muſt cauſe me not barely to diſapprove, but to reject, with the utmoſt deteſtation, the doctrine from which they follow.

In thus arguing from conſequences, I have done no more than adopt an uſual, and what has been generally deemed, a juſt mode of reaſoning. Dr. Watts, in his celebrated Treatiſe on Logick, or the Right Uſe of Reaſon, Edit. vii. p. 335. in a note, remarks, "It is a very common and uſeful "way of arguing to refute a falſe propoſi- "tion, by ſhewing what evident falſehood "or abſurdity will follow from it: for what "propoſition ſoever is really abſurd and "falſe, does really prove that principle to "be falſe, from which it is derived."

I muſt further remind Dr. Prieſtley, that the mode of reaſoning from conſequences,

which he ſeems, at times, ſo much to diſlike, is the very mode, which he himſelf has made great uſe of, and to which he is indebted for ſome of his principal arguments in defence of Philoſophical Neceſſity. Does not the Dr. take great pains to prove, that if the mind be moved, not as neceſſity, but as liberty teaches, *it would follow*, that the volitions, or actions of men, are effects, which exiſt without any proper cauſe to produce them? Does he not alſo lay the utmoſt ſtreſs on the denial of the Divine Preſcience, as the *immediate and neceſſary conſequence* of holding the doctrine of liberty? It is only in the ſame way of reaſoning, that I have endeavoured to ſupport the doctrine of liberty; and with no other difference that I can ſee, than that the conſequences depending are much more intereſting, and thoſe ariſing from the denial of it ſo peculiarly dangerous.

Page 23. The Dr. ſays, "You have indeed been able to collect, which was not "difficult, (for I had occaſion to repeat it "ſeveral times) that in favour of the *neceſ-* "*ſary* determination of the mind according

"to motives, I have urged the *certainty* and "*univerſality* of ſuch a determination; but "I wonder you ſhould not likewiſe have "obſerved, that, in farther ſupport of this, "I added, that *certainty or univerſality is* "*the only poſſible ground of concluding, that* "*there is a neceſſity in any caſe whatever*; "and to this, which you have not ſo much "as noticed, you ought principally to have "replied."

Inattentive as the Dr. thinks I have been, to the poſition which he here recites from his Illuſtrations; I was ſo far from overlooking it, that I regarded it as the baſis, on which his argument for the neceſſary determination of the mind reſted: nor could his reaſoning, in favour of ſuch a determination, carry the leaſt appearance of propriety in it, but on the ſuppoſition, that the idea of *neceſſity* did, in all caſes, immediately ariſe out of the *certainty* or *univerſality* of the effect produced; or, in the Dr's own words, that this "*is* "*the only poſſible ground of concluding, that* "*there is a neceſſity in any caſe whatever.*" I muſt therefore ſtill conſider myſelf, in all that I have inſiſted on, to eſtabliſh the

diſtinction between *phyſical and moral neceſſity*, as really replying to this very argument, which the Dr. ſays, "*I have not ſo much as noticed.*" The reader will judge, whether I have noticed it or not, from what is contained in the fortieth and nine following pages, of the Obſervations, which I muſt beg leave to recommend to his careful attention. I have only to add this one general remark, that, whereas Dr. Prieſtley makes *certainty* or *univerſality* to be the ground of his idea of neceſſity (and which, notwithſtanding his ſeeming allowance, in ſome places, of a diſtinction in the kinds of it, appears, upon examination, to be uniformly the ſame, amounting to that *neceſſity* which is *phyſical* or *abſolute*) I cannot, on the other hand, but conſider the *certainty*, both *natural and moral*, as ariſing out of the different ideas of neceſſity, which I have endeavoured to explain and ſupport; and, in conſequence of this, I am led to think, that the certainty is as different as the different cauſes or occaſions of it: and which of theſe is the moſt natural and reaſonable method of deduction, I muſt *likewiſe* ſubmit to the judgment of thoſe, *who will* be at the pains to examine what

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we have reſpectively offered on the ſubject.

Page 27. The Dr. ſays, "I hope to ſatisfy you, that even all that you deſcribe as moſt horrid and frightful in the doctrine of *neceſſity*, follows as evidently from your doctrine of *certainty*, provided it be a real certainty, though not ſuch as you would chuſe to call a *phyſical* one; and therefore that it can be nothing more than the mere *name* that you object to."

My reply is briefly this—*Certainty is a real certainty*, though it be only a *moral* one; and yet it is not a *phyſical* one. The difference is as great, as between my being perſuaded, excited, moved, influenced, by any arguments or motives, to do a thing; and my being impelled to do it, ſo as that it was out of my power *not* to do it. In a word, where *moral certainty* only takes place, the power of agency ſtill remains; whereas, by that, which is *phyſical*, it is entirely deſtroyed. To ſuppoſe the exiſtence of the one, in the latter ſenſe, is virtually, and to all intents and purpoſes, to contradict and deny the exiſtence of the other.

Page

Page 28, &c. The Dr. introduces the following caſe, which, that it may be fully underſtood, I will recite in the Dr's own words—"We will ſuppoſe that a child of "yours has committed an offence, to which "his mind was *certainly*, though not ne- "ceſſarily determined by motives. He was "not made, we will ſay, in ſuch a manner "as that motives had a *neceſſary* effect upon "his mind, and *phyſically* or *mechanically* de- "termined his actions, but only that his "mind would in all caſes *determine itſelf* "according to the ſame motives. You hear "of the offence, and prepare for inſtant cor- "rection, not, however, on the idea that "puniſhment is juſtifiable whenever it will "reform the offender, or prevent the of- "fences of others, but ſimply on your own "idea, of its having been in the power of "the moral agent to act otherwiſe than he "had done."

"Your ſon, aware of your principles, "ſays, dear father, you ought not to be "angry with, or puniſh me, when you knew "that I could not help doing as I have done. "You placed the apples within my reach,

"and

" and knew that my fondneſs for them was " irreſiſtible. No, you reply, that is not a " juſt ſtate of the caſe, you were not under " any *neceſſity* to take them, you were only " ſo conſtituted as that you *certainly* would " take them. But, ſays your ſon, what am " I the better for this freedom from neceſ- " ſity? I wiſh I had been *neceſſarily* deter- " mined, for then you would not puniſh " me; whereas now that I only *certainly* " determine myſelf, I find that I offend juſt " as much, and you always correct me for " it."

" A man muſt be peculiarly conſtituted, " if, upon this poor diſtinction, he could " ſatisfy himſelf with puniſhing his ſon in " the one caſe, and not in the other. The " offence he clearly foreſaw would take " place: for by the hypotheſis, it was ac- " knowledged to be *certain*, ariſing from his " diſpoſition and motives; and yet merely " becauſe he will not term it *neceſſarily*, he " thinks him a proper object of puniſhment. " Beſides, pleaſe to conſider whether, if the " child never *did* refrain from the offence, in " thoſe circumſtances, there be any reaſon

to

" to think that he properly *could* have re-
" frained."

The above caſe carries ſome appearance of novelty, but is as extraordinary as it is new. It involves in it many queſtions, and is too generally ſtated, to admit a particular diſcuſſion. All I can reply to it muſt be in general, and it is briefly this—Suppoſing the child to poſſeſs intelligence and liberty, both which I muſt conſider as eſſential to moral agency, and conſequently to reſponſibility; and I will then not ſcruple to ſay, that diſobedience to his father's orders, in taking the apples, which were forbidden, renders him, in a degree, culpable and deſerving puniſhment—In what degree he is ſo? and what allowances candour ſhould lead the father to make for the treſpaſs?—Theſe are other and different queſtions, the ſolution of which muſt depend on a variety of circumſtances; ſuch as—the abilities and temper of the child—his ſituation at the time—the degree of his fondneſs for apples—the nature of the prohibition—the manner in which it was urged and ſupported—and the like—All which, it is readily allowed, muſt have

ſome

ſome and a certain influence, ſo as materially to affect the degree of criminality, with which the child ſtood chargeable: but however thoſe circumſtances be ſettled, he muſt, after all can be ſuppoſed in his favour, be deſerving ſome blame, unleſs his fondneſs for the apples was really *irreſiſtible*, ſo that he had it not in his power to refuſe them. This I take to be the preciſe point on which the criminality depends: and if the offending child ſhould, therefore, be ſuch an adept in the art of ſelf-defence, as to reply, "What "am I the better for this freedom from "neceſſity? I wiſh I had been neceſſarily "determined, for then you would not puniſh "me; whereas now, that I only certainly "determine myſelf, I find that I offend juſt "as much, and you always correct me for "it,"—The anſwer to be returned him is a plain and convincing one, and it is this—That you are not the better for your freedom is owing to your not uſing it—Don't you, my ſon, ſee a vaſt difference between determining yourſelf, call it *certainly*, if you pleaſe, and being *neceſſarily* determined by ſomething

elſe? Nay, I appeal to yourſelf, whether you are not conſcious that you had it in your power not to have taken the apples? I ſhould hardly think that any boy of common underſtanding, if he attended, would call this anſwer, or the diſtinction on which it is founded, a poor one.

Dr. Prieſtley aſks, "if the child never "*did* refrain in theſe circumſtances, there "be any reaſon to think that he properly "*could*?"

My anſwer is, *all* that appears to me to follow, from a child's never having refrained, is not that there was no reaſon to think he could, but merely that he would.

I have only further to remark on this caſe, that the Dr. miſrepreſents me, when he intimates, p. 28. that I have no idea of puniſhment, as juſtifiable "whenever it will re-"form the offender, or prevent the offences "of others; but ſimply," on what he calls my "own idea, of its having been in the "power of the moral agent to act otherwiſe "than he had done." I muſt here refer to Section 7, of the Obſervations, where, on a careful reviſal, I ſtill think it plain, that I

am not ſpeaking of the ends of puniſhment, but the foundation of it in the moral character of the objects of it.—Had the Dr. conſidered this, he would have ſpared his remark.

Notwithſtanding all that the Dr. has ſaid, to urge the purſuit of the controverſy about preſcience; I am ſo far ſatisfied with what I have advanced on that ſubject, in the Obſervations, as to leave the argument in the ſtate, in which I have there placed it. I cannot, however, forbear adverting a little to the charge of "ſeeming *levity*, in treating "this moſt ſerious of all ſubjects," which the Dr. produces againſt me; and with which he owns, he "cannot help being extremely "ſhocked." See the Letter, page 44.

In anſwer to this formidable accuſation, I muſt obſerve, that it is in the parody I have given on the Dr's ſatirical invective againſt Dr. Beatie, where alone I can find any thing, in that part of the argument, which is capable of being conſtrued into a "ſeeming *levity*: and if any thing, which I have there ſaid, appears to the Dr. to merit that charge; I muſt then beg leave to aſk

him,

him, what ought to be his opinion of his own original, which I have ſo carefully endeavoured to copy after? If there is any reaſon for his being "extremely ſhocked" with my *levity*, how much greater cauſe has he to be ſhocked with his own, in ſetting before me ſo inviting a ſpecimen, which I have done no more than imitate; and this too, with no other view, than to form an appeal to the Dr's feelings, for the utter impropriety of any ſuch manner of writing?

Page 55. The Dr. makes a remark which I own I could little have expected from him. —I had repreſented the neceſſarian doctrine as having a tendency "to relax the mind, "and ſink it into a ſtate of indolence and "inactivity:" On which the Dr. obſerves, "Here then you reduce the Neceſſarian to a "ſtate of abſolute inactivity, that is, indiſ-"poſed to any *purſuits*, virtuous or vicious. "For your argument, if it goes to any thing, "goes to both alike."—Can this be deemed a juſt or fair conſtruction of the terms *indolence* and *inactivity*? When I had ſaid in the preceding part of the ſame argument, and in the very page before, "If we judge of

"mankind

" mankind at large by what we ſee of them, " the diſpoſition which they too commonly " diſcover, to find apologies for neglecting " the buſineſs and duties of life, and exceed- " ing in their indulgencies and pleaſures, " cannot but lead us to ſuppoſe, that they " would avail themſelves of ſuch a ſenti- " ment, as the doctrine of neceſſity pro- " poſes to their belief, to be ſtill more neg- " ligent as to every important concern, and " to allow themſelves much greater freedom " in every gratification, to which ſenſe and " appetite prompt them." Was not ſuch a previous explanation of my deſign ſufficient to clear me from the imputation, of having " reduced the Neceſſarian to a ſtate of abſo- " lute inactivity, that is, indiſpoſed to any " purſuits, virtuous or vicious?"

I had clearly expreſſed my meaning to be, not that the neceſſarian believer was in danger of becoming wholly ſtupid and motionleſs, but that his belief tended to indiſpoſe him for virtuous activity and ſelf-command. This, it was plain, was the only activity which I meant to exclude, as the effect of ſuch a belief; having all along ſuppoſed him

to be active enough in gratifying his irregular and vicious inclinations. Having hinted this; I ſhall not notice any of the Dr's reaſonings, and lively turns, on a ſuppoſed overſight of mine; but which are all ſo evidently founded on a palpable miſtake and miſrepreſentation of his own.

One of my arguments, the Dr. tells me, p. 73. of his Letter, he "really cannot "treat with ſo much ſeriouſneſs," as he ſuppoſes I ſhall "probably expect."

I had ſaid, in the Obſervations, that, according to the ſcheme of neceſſity, "every "thing that takes place in my body, as well "as my mind, may with equal propriety "be called my act or volition; and ſo the "circulation of the blood, and the pulſa-"tion of the heart, may with equal reaſon be "called my volitions."

Here the Dr. aſks, with an air of triumph, "Now, Sir, is not judgment always called "an *act of the mind*, as well as volition? "But has any man power over this? Is not "this neceſſarily determined by the view of "arguments, &c.? You will not deny it." To this I anſwer; I will not, indeed, nor will

will any one, deny, that judgment is, in common ſpeech, called an *act of the mind*, as well as volition: but I ſhall moſt certainly deny, that judgment and volition are always underſtood to expreſs *acts of the mind*, in the ſame, that is, a *philoſophical* ſenſe. The Dr. muſt ſurely have forgot that I had ſaid, in the Obſervations, p. 53. "The "judgment is in its own nature paſſive;" or he would not here have thought of my allowing judgment to be equally an act with volition. But he has himſelf furniſhed me with an anſwer to his firſt queſtion, that is, "Is not judgment always called an act of "the mind, as well as volition?" By the two before recited, which immediately follow it; namely, "Has any man power over "this? Is not this neceſſarily determined by "the view of arguments?" It is granted to the Dr. that man has no power over *judgment*, meaning by that the laſt act of it; and that it is ſo determined, as he intimates.— And what is the concluſion? Is it not, that, in this reſpect, being paſſive; it cannot, in a proper ſenſe, be *active*, or an *act*? How is

this concluſion to be avoided, unleſs to *act*, and to be *acted upon*, mean one and the ſame thing? When the Dr. has proved *that*, he may then with ſome reaſon ſuppoſe himſelf to have alſo proved, as he here thinks he has done, on my principles, "that whatever "paſſes in *my* body, as well as in *my* mind, "may with equal propriety be called an act "of *my* judgment; and ſo *that* the circula- "tion of the blood, and the pulſation of "the heart, may with equal reaſon be called "my judgment."—Till then the Dr's ergo, *that* judgments and volitions are the ſame things, will be plain only to a believer in neceſſity—And it is he only who can be affected by the paradoxical concluſion, which the Dr. ſubjoins.——On which I ſhall only add, that when he has proved *judgment* to be an *act*, he will then have ſet before the world a fair ſpecimen of a method of proving contradictions; and will find it not a whit more difficult to prove to mankind, that their "heads" are their "feet," and their "feet" their "heads," or that they have no heads at all. But to return to the argument; I wiſh the Dr. to reconſider

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the nature of the poſition, which he has repreſented as ſo very futile and ridiculous. It was, in ſubſtance, only this, "that if I had "no power over my own *volitions*, the term "(volitions) was no more applicable to what "paſſes in my mind, than to any thing "which takes place in my bodily frame." And what has the Dr. done to invalidate this reaſoning? He has taken it for granted, that I admit that to be an *act*, which is really, and which I maintain to be, a mere paſſive effect. The principle therefore which he has adopted, as the medium of proof for all his concluſions, is denied: and what then muſt become of the concluſions themſelves?

In all I have ſaid, *judgment* ſtill remains to be *judgment*, and *volition* is *volition*; or, in other words, according to my ideas of them, they are principles in the mental frame eſſentially different in their nature, the one active and the other paſſive: whereas, according to the Dr. they are both of the ſame general kind, that is, they are both really paſſive, or alike neceſſary in their operations; whatever verbal diſtinction he may chooſe to make between them.

Dr. Prieſtley, p. 77. recommends a cloſe attention to the "real *phænomena of human* "*nature*," as the only unexceptionable method of ſettling the debate concerning the agency of man. This is no other than the ſame rule of *philoſophizing*, which the Dr. ſo frequently and ſtrenuouſly inſiſts on, in his Illuſtrations: and to what I have ſaid in the courſe of the Obſervations, I muſt refer for an anſwer. I ſhall only add here, that if the "*phænomena of human nature*," are to determine the queſtion, we muſt certainly include the whole of the "*phænomena*;" one of which is, that, let the actions be ever ſo "*definite in definite circumſtances*," they are ſtill conſcious of having had it in their power to determine otherwiſe than they actually did. This ſeems incontrovertible, from what they feel, in conſequence of thoſe volitions, or actions, which are of a moral nature. This reply, I am aware, can have no weight with the Dr: becauſe he conſiders all theſe feelings as founded on a deception; a real, though a natural and neceſſary, deception. I muſt therefore be content with looking on the anſwer, which I have now given, as ſa-

tisfactory

tisfactory to myſelf; nor do I apprehend, that I herein materially, if at all, differ from Dr. Price, as Dr. Prieſtley ſuppoſes I do.

Dr. Price does not, as far as I can recollect, any where ſay or intimate, that the volitions or actions of men are ſo definite in any circumſtances, as that they are neceſſarily determined by the circumſtances: but only conſiders the circumſtances in the light of motives or reaſons of action, to which the agent has reſpect in the determinations he forms, while he yet determines himſelf, on the view of them. And the frequent, or even conſtant ſimilar determinations of men, in any given circumſtances, only render it morally certain, that is, probable, and this in proportion to the frequency of the prior volitions, that he will form the ſame again. Dr. Prieſtley has alſo very much miſtaken Dr. Price, when he repreſents him, which he does, p. 78. of the Letter, as "admitting that the ſelf-determining power is "wanted only, when the motives are equal." Dr. Price has, indeed, in the Correſpondence, put a caſe, in which he makes ſuch a ſuppoſition, that is, that the motives are, in fact,

equal: but this I underſtand Dr. Price to have propoſed only as one inſtance, in which Dr. Prieſtley himſelf muſt ſee, and be obliged to acknowledge, that without ſuch a power, as the advocates for liberty maintain, no determination at all could be formed: while he yet held the neceſſity of it, in all caſes whatever, to conſtitute proper agency; and that, in all our actions, it is *wanted* and uſed.

Dr. Prieſtley has further equally miſtaken me, when he ſays, p. 78. that I "generally "ſuppoſe the mind capable of acting contra-"ry to any motive whatever," by which the Dr. has, a little after in the ſame paragraph, explained himſelf to mean, acting "with-"out, or contrary to motives."—Anſwer—I never ſaid, or ſuppoſed, that a rational being can act without any motive, good or bad. But the moſt, I ever ſaid, was, "that in "the very ſame circumſtances, in which *the* "choice or determination *of the mind* was "directed to one object of purſuit, it might "have brought itſelf to will or determine on "the purſuit of a different and contrary "one." See the Obſervations on the ſtate of

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the queſtion, p. 17. So that ſtill the volition or determination would have ſome ground or reaſon for it; though that would have been as different, as the determination which was grounded upon it.

Dr. Prieſtley purſuing his idea of the "unalterable chain of *ſituations* and volitions." See the Letter, p. 77. comes at laſt, in p. 79, to this concluſion, "that "there can be no more than one proper "agent in the univerſe." On this I cannot avoid remarking, that, in the Dr's way of reaſoning, it ſeems impoſſible there ſhould be any one. Volition with him neceſſarily depends on motives, or ſituations, that is, on ſomething independent of itſelf, as the cauſe: and if this be true, it muſt hold univerſally, which will directly exclude, together with the idea of ſelf-motion, that of a firſt mover. And if, on the other hand, one ſelf-mover be admitted, I ſee nothing to hinder, why there may not be millions of ſelf-movers; unleſs the communication of the power could be proved to be a contradiction and impoſſibility.

Dr. Prieſtley, treating on "the preju-

"dice,

"ſame as the origin of the Deity, concern-
"ing which we know nothing at all."

It is common with philoſophers to ſpeak of the origin of created beings, but to ſpeak of "the origin of the Deity," that is, of an eternal, uncreated Being, ſeems to be a new mode of expreſſion, and peculiar to the Dr.—What origin could there be to a Being, who is unoriginated, or eternal? As ſuch is his nature, it is no wonder that "we know "nothing" concerning his "origin:" but thus much we know, concerning his power of volition and action, as well as concerning his exiſtence, that they are both uncauſed and eternal, that is, cannot poſſibly have any origin at all.

The Dr. further aſks, ſame page,—"How "can you think it any degradation to the "Deity, that he ſhould *act* neceſſarily, "when you allow that he *exiſts* neceſſarily? "And again—Is not the *exiſtence* of any "being or thing, of as much importance to "him, as his acting?

I ſhall only reply to theſe queſtions, by propoſing the following ones.—Is not neceſſary, that is, eternal exiſtence, the higheſt

poſſible

poſſible idea of exiſtence which can be formed?—And can that be a degradation, which implies in it the moſt abſolute perfection of exiſtence?—But if by "*acting* neceſſarily" the Dr. means, any way of acting incompatible with the idea of ſelf-motion, or perfect agency; I would then again ask—Is there any compariſon to be made, between "*acting neceſſarily*," or, in other words, being acted upon, and being perfectly free in all his volitions and actions?—I confeſs, for my own part, I cannot perceive the leaſt ſimilarity between the two things, which the Dr. ſeems here to conſider as ſo nearly reſembling one another.

Dr. Prieſtley, pages 92, 93, of his Letter, expreſſes himſelf in the following remarkable manner.—"I really think it (the doctrine of neceſſity) "the cleareſt of all "queſtions, the truth of it being as indu-"bitable as that the three angles of a right-"lined triangle are equal to two right an-"gles, or that *two* and *two* make *four*, and "therefore I have no feeling either of *fear* "or *arrogance*, in challenging the whole "world in the defence of it. This argu-

"ment

" ment I compare to ſuch ground as one
" man may defend againſt an army. It is,
" therefore, abſolutely indifferent to me by
" *whom*, or by *how many*, I be aſſailed. You
" would, probably, ſay the ſame with reſpect
" to the doctrine of liberty, at leaſt the ſtyle,
" in which your book is written, ſeems to
" ſpeak as much."

Probable as the Dr. may think it, that I would expreſs myſelf in the ſame manner on the ſide of liberty, as he has done in the above paſſage, in favour of neceſſity; in this I am clear, that it would be a mode of expreſſion very unbecoming me: and notwithſtanding the ſtrength of thoſe convictions on the ſubject, which I really poſſeſs, and which I have expreſſed in many parts of the Obſervations, and the confidence with which the Dr. has charged me; I would ſtill hope, that the ſtile of the Obſervations does appear to the generality of its readers, to be very different from that of the paragraph which I have recited from the Dr's. Letter; and not to render it at all probable that I would allow myſelf in any ſuch manner of writing, reſpecting the point of liberty, or any other

controverted

controverted point whatever.—Will the Dr. alſo excuſe me, if I take the freedom of entering into a little candid expoſtulation on the great impropriety of ſuch modes of expreſſion in themſelves?—Whatever the Dr. might ſay, or inſinuate, of ſome of the defenders of liberty, whom he thought by no means equal to the task they had undertaken; let him not deem me arrogant in asking, whether it might not have been expected, that the reverence due to ſuch authors as a Locke, Wollaſton, Clark, Foſter, and Price, ſhould have put ſome reſtraint on his pen? If the queſtion about neceſſity was, as the Dr. ſays, "the cleareſt of all queſtions," and ſo demonſtrable, and even ſelf-evident, as he makes it to be; will not the direct conſequence be (for here again I muſt hint at conſequences) will not, I ſay, the direct conſequence be, that all thoſe great authors, whoſe names I have mentioned, and very many others, which might be added to them, were either ſo very ſhort-ſighted, as to remain in all the darkneſs of the groſſeſt ignorance, reſpecting the cleareſt of "all queſ-"tions;" or elſe were ſo blinded by preju-

dice,

dice, as to controvert even a truth no leſs "indubitable" than any which are capable of ſtrict demonſtration, or diſcernible by immediate intuition.—If the Dr. had here "pauſed" a little, as he ſays, p. 94, the inſtances we every day ſee of "confirmed "judgments in things of the greateſt, as "well as of the leaſt moment, ought to "make the moſt confident of us" to do; though he might have remained equally and "neceſſarily determined by his own view of "the evidence before him;" I think I may yet venture to ſay, that the mode of expreſſing his convictions would have been conſiderably lowered, ſo as, at once, to have rendered it better adapted to the object of his zeal, and more conſiſtent with the reſpect which he himſelf muſt allow to be due to not a few, who are of the contrary perſuaſion.

Clear, however, as the evidence for the truth of the neceſſarian doctrine lies before the Dr's mind; his hopes of ſucceſs, in propagating it, are as moderate, as his declarations in its favour are ſtrong.

"Notwithſtanding, ſays the Dr. p. 96, "all that I ſhall ever be able to write in

"favour

" favour of the doctrine of neceſſity, your " ſuppoſed *conſciouſneſs of liberty*, and other " popular arguments (though when analiſed, " they really make againſt your hypotheſis) " will always ſecure *nine* out of *ten* of the " generality of our readers."

Not to enter into any further debate about the analyſis of the arguments I have inſiſted on; I cannot help expreſſing my wiſhes, that the " *conſciouſneſs of liberty*," or any other arguments, might ſecure not only *nine* out of *ten*, but, if it were poſſible, even the *tenth man* too, from the reception of ſo enſnaring a doctrine, as that of neceſſity: but I will not, at the ſame time, conceal my apprehenſions, that, though it be indeed, as Dr. Price juſtly calls it, " a deadly potion," it muſt yet be ſo very grateful to thoſe who want to find a plea for their vices, that the generality, who are unfortunate enough to get a taſte of it, will be too ready to ſwallow its worſt dregs; and that, having ſo done, they will be ſo far overcome by them, as to be confirmed in the practice of many vices, though they may not proceed to that outrage and violence, which the Dr. mentions: and even

againſt thoſe greater enormities, I cannot conſider neceſſarianiſm, but principles and feelings of a very different nature, as their ſecurity.

I cannot conclude theſe remarks without expreſſing a little wonder, that Dr. Prieſtley ſhould have given himſelf the trouble of writing ninety ſeven pages in reply to the "Obſervations;" when he ſays, p. 97, "I "ſee nothing *new* in any thing that you have "advanced.

I never, indeed, made pretenſions to the diſcovery of any of the great principles, on which the doctrine of liberty ſtands; and was clearly of opinion, long before the Correſpondence was publiſhed, that all the arguments, which were of importance, on both ſides of the queſtion, had been ably diſcuſſed by other writers. Dr. Price, alſo, with his uſual liberality of mind, obſerves, in a note to his additional Obſervations in the Correſpondence, p. 51. "It is, indeed, with "ſome pain I reflect, that much of this diſ-"cuſſion is little more than a repetition of "Mr. Collins's objections on one ſide, and "Dr. Clarke's replies on the other." The want

want of novelty, therefore, in the principles of the Obſervations is not peculiar to that performance: and was it requiſite to the utility of any publication, that the ideas ſhould be ſo entirely new, as to be different from any thing which had been before advanced; Dr. Prieſtley muſt admit, that the number of ſuch publications, as were fit to appear, would be very, very ſmall. The application, however, which I have made of the principles of liberty, in reply to Dr. Prieſtley, I hope I may be permitted to conſider as my own, whatever may be thought of my reaſonings.

Whether there is that "appearance of "*arrogance*" in the tone of the Dr's Letter, which he ſuppoſes, p. 90, I ſhall "probably think there is;" I will join iſſue with him in referring to the deciſion of indifferent perſons. I think it, however, proper to ſay for myſelf, that, having, in the beſt manner I was able, ſtated my views of the leading arguments both on the ſide of liberty and neceſſity; I now decline a controverſy, which, I am perſuaded, it can anſwer

ſwer no good end to continue: and ſhall, therefore, hold myſelf excuſed, in being entirely ſilent, ſhould "circumſtances determine" the Dr. to take any public notice of what is ſubjoined in this Appendix, or to advance any thing more on the ſubject.

FINIS.