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


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





IN

OCCASIONAL

LETTER, &c.





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AN  
OCCASIONAL  
LETTER

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FROM  
A GENTLEMAN in the Country,  
TO  
His FRIEND in Town.

CONCERNING

The TREATY negotiated at *Hanau*, in the Year 1743; the Manner in which it was *rejected*; and the fatal Effects. which that *Rejection* has produced.

---

“ You, who must well remember the Clamour raised  
“ against Lord G——, and against his —— himself,  
“ on Account of this Transaction, will undoubtedly stand  
“ amazed, nay will hardly think it possible, for the Two  
“ B——rs, to have been, in Fact, the Authors of con-  
“ tinuing the War, which might have been happily and  
“ honourably ended at that Time.

*Examination of the Principles of the Two B——rs, &c. P. 9.*

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L O N D O N :

Printed for A. BRITON, near *Temple-Bar*.

M, DCC, XLIX.

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AN  
OCCASIONAL  
LETTER, &c.

Dear SIR,

**Y**OU have so often obliged me, and of late so particularly, in sending me the *Enquiry into the Conduct of the Two B——rs*, that I cannot prevail on myself to refuse the Request you make, “ That I would give you my Thoughts on such of the Transactions discountred of in that extraordinary Performance, as are of the most Consequence to the Public.”

But, then, you must give me Leave to suit the Manner of my Compliance to my own Leisure and Inclination ; and be content with such *occasional* Communications, as, from Time to Time, may be the Result of both.

L

For

For the present, I purpose to confine my Reflections to the Treaty of *Hanau*, and the inexpressible Surprize of the World upon it; which puts me in Mind of Lord *Wharton's* Puppies, that open'd their Eyes, when they were sinking.

But, in order to be the more thoroughly understood, it will be necessary to look back to the Commencement of the War upon the Continent; and to take a Survey of the Principles and Views of that Part of the Ministry which was for it; and also of That which, for *fear it should succeed*, were against it: For as to Those who, not being of the C—b—t, opposed that Measure elsewhere, from more disinterested Motives, they are not concerned in the Question before us; though none are more concerned in the Consequences, which have proved so injurious to the Honour, and so fatal to the Interest of the Nation.

But that I may discharge myself on this Subject in the most candid and unexceptionable Manner, I shall do it in the very Words of a Writer, who, from his Situation, could not but be in the *Secret*; and by him this unanswered and unanswerable Fact is thus stated.

“ The *Coalition* being thus made, the next  
 “ great Point, was to *obtain the Fruits* of it,  
 “ by

“ by *persuading* his — to *give up the War* :  
 “ But when that came under Consideration,  
 “ the whole *Cabal* affected to entertain such  
 “ a Distrust of their own Abilities, that not  
 “ one would make Proof of them in so des-  
 “ perate a Service. The only Method that  
 “ remained then, was to raise such *Difficul-*  
 “ *ties* and *Discouragements* in the Prosecu-  
 “ tion of the War, so to prepare his — for  
 “ an *unprosperous Issue*, and to make such an  
 “ Use of that Issue when it *actually arrived*,  
 “ as should, by Degrees, put him out of Con-  
 “ ceit with his own *Favourite Measure*, and  
 “ the *Person* who became a *Favourite* by es-  
 “ pousing it.” *Apol. for a late Resig.*

Thus an *Apology* for one Man, serves to  
 expose the whole *Brotherhood* : And in this  
 frank, fair, and full Acknowledgment, we  
 find, the Cause of the War, the Cause of that  
 Opposition which it met with in the C—b—t,  
 and the Cause of its being afterwards carried  
 on by the same Persons who had so opposed  
 it, (and who had obtained all they wanted by  
 that Opposition) till they could carry it on no  
 farther, for want of Money to defray the Ex-  
 pence of it ; which was the Goal that from  
 the very Beginning they drove to ; though in  
 the whole Course of their Career, they could  
 not but see, That, in so doing, they betrayed  
 their M——r, sacrificed his Allies, and beg-  
 gar'd the Country that gave them Being.

But I ought not to dispatch an Article which contains so many important Particulars, in this summary Way.

We have here satisfactory Evidence, That, though both Parts of the Administration successively prosecuted the same Measure, they did not prosecute it on the same Principles, or for the same Ends: And it is fit the Difference between them should be thoroughly consider'd and understood.

Now the Latter had declar'd, in Effect, during the Ascendancy of their Rival, That there was no Prayer in the Service of the Church, in which they concurred with so much Zeal and Devotion, as that which says, *Give Peace in our Time, O Lord!* And yet it appears by their Conduct, that they were either for Peace or War indifferently, as either best served to rivet their Interest, or establish their Power.

Thus, notwithstanding all their Declarations with regard to the Latter, and the Pains they had taken to convince both their Followers and Allies, and through them the whole Nation, of the Impossibility of carrying it on, with any Probability or Prospect of Success, no sooner was the whole Game in their own Hands, than they undertook to carry it on, desperate as it was become, at any Expence, at any Hazard ;

Hazard ; and avowed, in the most profligate and scandalous Manner, that they had nothing in view, but to engross all the Power of the Kingdom, and the Favour of the ——n, and to prostitute Both to such Purposes, as imply the worst of Treasons ; though for want of *Precedent*, it hath, as yet, no Definition in our Law Books.

And in this lay their Security, That what rendered them odious without Doors, they could make use of as Matter of Recommendation and Endearment within : For when they had raised *Difficulties* and *Discouragements*, and prepared his —— for *unprosperous Issues*, it was but natural for them, when those *Issues* arrived, to lay the Blame of all upon their Rival, and to enhance the Merit of their own Obedience.

“ That we ever testified any Dislike of  
 “ this Measure, (they might say, and proba-  
 “ bly did say,) or shewed any Reluctance to  
 “ join with his L—p in the Prosecution of it,  
 “ did not arise from any Defect either of Du-  
 “ ty or Disposition, to serve you, in any Pur-  
 “ pose whatsoever ; but a thorough Convicti-  
 “ on, that the Purpose proposed to be served  
 “ by it, is, at present, unattainable : And,  
 “ That, against our own Conviction, and with  
 “ a Foresight of the Worst that can happen,  
 “ we have now taken upon us, to push it at  
 “ double

“ double the Expence, and with a Resolution  
 “ to stake the last Shilling upon the Issue, we  
 “ hope will manifest, That we are the most  
 “ devoted of your Creatures.”

I would not have you suppose, Sir, that I mean to put this upon you for a *verbal* Transcript of the Language they made use of on such Occasions: But that they did occasionally make use of some such Language, can scarce be doubted: And if they did, we shall be forced to conclude, That the Price of their Power was the dearest that ever was paid by any Nation in the Universe.

If, therefore, their Rival was blameable for bidding so high for *Favour*, they were ten Times more so: He had torn an old Minister from the —'s right Hand, who had endeared himself in the most effectual Manner, by carrying on *every favourite Measure* that was proposed for twenty Years together; and had forced himself into Employment: Whence it must be presumed, that the — at first regarded him more as an Adversary than a Minister: And if so, it will follow, that except by *temporising*, he had no Way to conquer that Prejudice, or obtain that Place in his —'s Confidence, which he sought.

As a Project of the same Kind, in which he himself had a considerable Share, had also  
 suc-

succeeded in a former Reign, it was not unlikely, that his sanguine Imagination might, for a while, get the better of his Judgment: But then, as no Man had ever any Reason to think him a Fool, it was utterly inconceivable, That he should resolve to risque his Favour, Fortune, and Character, his ——'s Cr—n, and his Country's Safety, in the Pursuit of what he *found* impracticable: Or that, after the Experiment had been try'd, he should pursue it at all, with any other View, than to snatch the first favourable Opportunity that offered, to give it over.

Whereas his Successors (who are such a Species of Ministers as the World never saw before) with the Evidence of their own Declarations and Avowals against them, the Speeches and Writings of their Allies, and even that Glare of Facts, which stared them in the Face, not only undertook to carry on a Measure, which they held to be impracticable, and, as wantonly as wickedly, rejected every Opportunity of delivering their Country from such a Curse, but acted so much the more lavishly and absurdly, as it became so much the more visible, That all the Progress they made, was towards the Ruin of their Country.

Are you shocked at these Expressions? So am I: But then I am shocked infinitely more  
at

at the Enormities that provoked them. For so fond were they of being *Favourites*, and so determined to become *Favourites*, that they held on the same frantic Course, till *Ways* and *Means* could be found to defray the Expence of it no longer: And, when they had made one common Sacrifice of our Allies, our Commerce, and our Glory; insulted our Misery, and mocked our Downfal, by telling us, in Effect, That the Peace was good, because it was necessary; and necessary because the War had so totally exhausted us, that the Nation was at Death's Door.

But, to return to the Subject-Matter immediately before me; I am willing to think, that the *Favourite* they supplanted, designed to cut his C—b—t-Compliment as short as possible, and to avoid a Rupture with *France*, if any such Opportunity as above mentioned, should offer, to restore the Peace of *Germany*.

The Action at *Dettinghen*, in which, as he himself was so careful to remember, the *French* were the *Aggressors*, furnished him with a sufficient Pretence for a Rupture, if he had been inclined to make use of it: And in the next Month (*July*) when the Conferences at *Hanau* furnished the first Opportunity to obtain an Accommodation, he shewed a proper Disposition to embrace it: And nothing was more reasonable, than that



that he should do so: For supposing him ever so sanguine in the Beginning of the Broil, his own Experience by that Time, must have helped him to a truer Judgment of Things.

*France* had already shewn an Eagerness to come to Action, and *Prussia*, in the *January* and *February* preceeding, had solemnly declared, both at *London* and the *Hague*, That in Case any new Measures should be taken to disturb the Repose of the Empire, he would immediately send his Contingent of 15000 Men to the Service of the Emperor; and that if those should not be found sufficient, he would follow them in Person with 50000 more.

The Weight of *France* and *Prussia* in the same Scale, could not be balanced: It was the Hope and Prospect of an Accommodation, that alone kept his *Prussian* Majesty in suspense: And when, upon the rejecting the Treaty of *Hanau*, he did become a Party in the Quarrel, as an Auxiliary to the Head of an Empire, in his Appeal to the Public, he founded his Justification on that very Proceeding.

That, however, I may deal fairly by your Scruples, and not predetermine a Point which I undertake to explain, I must refer to your Letter, in which, admitting that there was  
 C such

such a Treaty, and that it was rejected by somebody, you proceed to say :

“ I cannot believe it was rejected by the  
 “ Two *B—rs*, because I well remember, (and  
 “ so must many other Gentlemen, as well  
 “ their *Creatures* as their *Confederates*) I st,  
 “ That one of the perpetual Topics of  
 “ Clamour from that Quarter against L---  
 “ G——, was, That he never vouchsafed to  
 “ send them a SCRAP OF PAPER, during  
 “ the whole Time of his being Abroad : And  
 “ 2dly, That the whole Talk of the Summer,  
 “ after the Publication of the King of *Prussia*’s  
 “ Papers, and before the Session of 1744, was,  
 “ of impeaching his L----p, for having re-  
 “ jected the Treaty of *Hanau*, for the Sake  
 “ of precipitating the Nation into a general  
 “ War, by the Treaty of *Worms*.

These, Sir, are your Words ; and the Facts are true, though the Inferences are otherwise ; that is to say, you remember right, though you reason wrong. They did talk in this Strain ; they did affect a total Ignorance of all that was doing abroad ; and they did suffer the Notion of an Impeachment to be entertained ; though, we shall find, they durst not set it on Foot : But then it was in order to put the Public on a wrong Scent, and to transfer the Ignominy of their own Guilt, at least,

to their Rival ; though it was impossible, in like Manner, to transfer the Punishment.

And, it appears, that the Success of their Artifice was partly owing to the Effronterie of it, and partly to the mysterious Conduct which was observed throughout the whole Course of the Affair.

Nobody could imagine, that those who had been the Authors of a Measure, would be the first to condemn it ; much less that they would accuse another of what they had done themselves ; and least of all, that those who had raised so fierce an Opposition to the War, should be the very Persons to reject a Peace.

And that we on this Side of the Water, were so long and so effectually deceived, will be so much the less to be wonder'd at, when it is considered, that even Prince *W--* of *H--*, who acted as a Sort of Mediator in those Conferences, and who was so irritated and injured by the Disappointment, was so little in the Secret, that he thought himself authorised to ascribe that Disappointment to *L--- G-----* : As also, that the King of *Prussia*, who was so deeply concerned in the Event, and who had a Minister residing at our Court, both then, and for a long Time after, did not, in Thirteen Months, discover the least Glimpse of the Truth ; as appears by his *Exposition* of the  
*Measures*

*Motives* that obliged him to supply the Emperor with Auxiliaries, annexed to his *Rescript* to that Minister, and signed by his Majesty August 8, 1744; in which he expresses himself to the following Effect :

“ These advantageous Terms, though full  
 “ of Moderation, were yet flatly rejected by  
 “ the *English* Ministry; which was a sure  
 “ Sign, That the INTENTION of the KING  
 “ of *England*, was not to restore Tranquility  
 “ to the Empire, but rather to take Advan-  
 “ tage of its *Troubles*.”

It was, besides, too soon as yet for these *Tricksters* in *Politics* to pull off their Masks : They had not avowed that leading Principle of their Conduct, to put his ——— out of *Conceit* with his own favourite Measure, whatsoever they had done with regard to the *Person*, who was become a *Favourite* by espousing it.

All that was known here (in 1743, that is to say) of the whole Transaction, was, That there had been a Negotiation at *Hanau*, and that it had not succeeded.

When also a transient Mention was made of it in the next Session of Parliament, it was said, *The Terms were such, as no English Minister dared to set his Hand to* ; which confirmed

firmed every Body in the Notion they had entertained, That L--- G----, who was the Minister that negotiated the Treaty, and was to have signed it, had been the *Rejector* of it; and that this was his Vindication.

To which may be added, that the Treaty of *Worms*, which was clapp'd up with the utmost Expedition on the Ruins of the other, engrossed all our Attention, and left no manner of Doubt upon Men's Minds, That the Former was rejected for the Sake of the Latter, and with a deliberate Purpose to precipitate us into a general War.

What is yet farther worthy of Observation, because it contributed to the same Delusion, it was upon the signing the Treaty last mentioned, and which probably was signed without a formal Notification of the whole Process in detail to the Two *B---rs*, &c. that, with *so little* Truth, they gave out that strange Declaration, of not having received a SCRAP OF PAPER from L---- G----, during the whole Time of his Absence: Whether merely to skreen the Affair of *Hanau*, or to make their Rival answerable for all that was done, as well as for all that was frustrated, is not material.

This, however, is certain, that the same Persons, who rejected the former Treaty, roundly

ly embraced the latter: And that when it came to be debated in Parliament, the Y—r B—r took upon him to inform the House, (if such *Jargon* can be called *Information*) concerning it, as follows.

“ *France* and *Spain* had offered the same  
 “ Terms to the King of *Sardinia*, and the  
 “ Emperor too; who was to grant him the  
 “ Right to *Final*, in the same Manner the  
 “ Queen of *Hungary* did: It was, therefore,  
 “ necessary to conclude that Treaty, and to  
 “ give him *Final*; he being peremptory for  
 “ our Answer, *if we would do the same*, and  
 “ pressing for it, and the Time appointed be-  
 “ ing come, they were forc’d to sign it the  
 “ Day they did; though the full Powers for  
 “ it to the Queen of *Hungary’s* Minister  
 “ were not arrived, though they did the very  
 “ Day after the Signing it.”

But to return: If the whole World was deceived, with respect to this Affair, (of *Hanau*) there was a Concurrence of Circumstances to deceive them: And this Concurrence will serve for the Justification of the King of *Prussia*; who, being ignorant of the real Fact, thought himself authorized to lay such an Imputation upon his ———y, as gave the most sensible Concern to every true *Englishman*, and astonished all *Europe*; namely, that all Tenderness and Regard for his People, for the Preservation of his Allies, and for the Re-  
 pose

pose of *Europe*, was swallowed up in the Pursuit of those Advantages to himself, which he hoped to derive from the *Troubles* of the *Empire*.

It was not once imagined, that a Prince of such Penetration and Vigilance, could either be misinformed, or half-informed; or would be guilty of the least Misrepresentation: And thus his high Character help'd to propagate a Slander of the most malignant and dangerous Kind, which only the Two *B——rs*, and their Creatures, were answerable for.

How could either he, or the *P—* of *H—*, who saw, or believed he saw, the Management of all Things in the Hands of *L— G—* at *Hanau*, acting as chief Favourite, as well as chief Minister, and supposed to be altogether as fond of a War as his *R—l M——r*; I say, how could They help concluding as They did, That the *Rejection* arose from him? They had no Idea, that a *subordinate English M—y* at *London*, by what *Names* or *Titles* soever distinguished, would have dar'd to reject what his ——— in Person, and his Favourite, had signified their Approbation of; or that Those who had divided the *C-b—t*, the two *H—s*, and the whole Kingdom, by their Clamours for *Peace*, should now turn the Tables, and, of their own mere Motion, *refuse* a *Peace* when it was offered, and force both his ——— and  
his

his *Favourite*, whether they would or not, upon all the Uncertainties, Difficulties, and Dangers of a *general War*.

But, ignorant as his *Prussian Majesty* manifestly was, of the true Secret of the *Rejection*, what he thought fit to publish concerning it, made Way for farther Discoveries: Nothing was kept a Secret which his Ministers came to the Intelligence of: Repeated Charges made Replies necessary; and, by Degrees, from out of the Rubbish of Squabble and Altercation, Truth made her Appearance.

How unwilling then soever the Two *B—rs* were to be dragged into Day-light upon this Occasion, dragged into Day-light at last they were; and when called upon for the Reasons of their Conduct, had nothing to alledge, but the most ridiculous of all ridiculous Pretences, *That they did not believe, that L— G— was in earnest*; which you will find sufficiently exploded in the Sequel.

Cunning Men have no Conception of a frank, open, undefigning Demeanor; and always cheat themselves by their own Refinements when they meet with it: They have no Notion of any Man's altering his Pursuit from a Principle of Reason, or Conviction; but, judging of all by themselves, take every new Direction for a new Delusion.

That



That a War was the ——s *favourite Measure*, for the Sake of availing himself of the Troubles he had caused, in no Respect disconcerted either their Morals or their Politics; but that a *wild* and *drunken* Minister, as their Partisans were pleased to call him, should soberly and deliberately relinquish the *favourite Measure*, by which he became a *Favourite*, wholly confounded them.

But the more at a Loss they were to account for his Conduct, and the Conduct of their M——r, the more solicitous they became for their own Preservation: That is a Principle which always operates, but which operates most in dark, diffident, and perplexed Minds; and what Effect it produced in them, we shall see in its Place.

What occurred to them first, on the Recollection of their Spirits and Faculties, we may reasonably suppose were such Thoughts as these.

“ If neither the ——, nor G——, is in  
 “ Earnest, this Measure is a Snare for us:  
 “ And if so, our Business is to avoid it with  
 “ all the Dexterity we are Masters of; as also,  
 “ to draw all the Merit we can from that  
 “ Dexterity.

D.

“ If

“ If G---- is in earnest, and not the ----,  
 “ we shall then make our Court to the one,  
 “ at the Expence of the other, by rejecting  
 “ it.

“ But as that which we have taken, and  
 “ have taught all the World to take, for the  
 “ *favourite Measure*, is not answered by the  
 “ Plan before us, neither can the ---- be *sa-*  
 “ *tisfied*, nor G---- so intimidated (*for we*  
 “ *should not*) by the little Expence already in-  
 “ curred in the Adventure, as to give it over,  
 “ without procuring him that *Satisfaction*.

“ The whole Process must therefore be  
 “ a Trick, and to over-reach him in his  
 “ own Artifice, we have nothing to do, but  
 “ to reject the Treaty.”

Hitherto I have only *supposed* that they  
 proceeded on such Thoughts as these; but  
 in the Course of this Deduction, it will be  
 made appear, That they could proceed on no  
 other; as also that these Surmises of Theirs,  
 both with Respect to the ----, and L--- G---,  
 were utterly void of all Foundation.

But in Order to have the Prospect clear  
 before us, we must first take a Survey of our  
 Situation and Conduct, during the Time that  
 the Treaty was depending.

It is within the Reach of every Body's Re-  
 collection,

collection, That Negotiations for a Peace were set on Foot, and carrying on, before the Attack of *Dettinghen*; nor is it possible to forget the general Surprize which was caused by the Inaction which succeeded it.

That a Prince esteemed so fond of military Glory, should reject all the Proposals, made to him by Lord *Stair*, to improve the Advantage which he had obtained, such as the seizing *Hoechst*, and throwing over a Bridge at that Place, in order to cut off the Enemy's Retreat; the bringing up the Artillery from *Coblentz*, &c. &c. was what the wisest Heads amongst us, could not *then* account for.

But the Knowledge we have *now* acquired concerning the Treaty, affords us an apt Solution for every Part of that political Problem: And what is more to our immediate Purpose, the Inaction, which was then so unaccountable, affords us the strongest Proof which can be required, That both the K. and his Minister were never more in earnest, than in the Prosecution of that Treaty; and that they had a thorough Dependence on the Success of it, which alone could induce them, to neglect so many Opportunities, and sacrifice so many Advantages, which never were to be recovered.

What is yet farther remarkable, *France*  
D 2 having

having miscarried in her great Purpose at *Dettinghen*, and growing uneasy for the Issue, was become as much in earnest for an Accommodation, as They: The Treaty was finally agreed to on the 16th of *July*, N. S. And on the 26th following, *M. de la Noue*, the *French* Minister at *Frankfort*, presented a Memorial to the Diet, expressing the King his Master's Satisfaction, That the Diet had offered their Mediation, for terminating the Troubles of the Empire, on Account of the *Austrian* Succession and that the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*, had entered into a Negotiation: As also declaring, That as his Majesty's Troops entered *Germany* as Auxiliaries only, and at the Requisition both of the Emperor, and several Princes of the Empire, and as his Imperial Majesty's Troops were already neutral, he had not delayed sending Orders to his Armies to return home; being very glad to give the *Germanic* Body, on that Occasion, so public a Testimony of the Uprightness of his Intentions.

To shew us the Connection between this Memorial, and the Treaty itself, it is moreover necessary to observe, That by one of the Articles of the latter, the Emperor engaged for the *French*, That they should immediately evacuate the Empire: And this Proceeding at *Frankfort* undeniably manifests how readily they complied with that Engagement.

Lastly

Lastly, to make it as manifest, that, even in Point of *Performance*, the ----- and L----- G----- were not behind Hand with the Court of *France*, the Treaty was no sooner agreed to, than They caused 100,000 Crowns to be remitted to *Frankfort*, for the use of his imperial Majesty, in Virtue of that Stipulation, by which it was provided, that we were to pay him the Sum of 300,000.

Upon the whole, therefore, it appears as plain as any Demonstration in *Euclid*, That the Pretence of the B-----rs, before mentioned, for rejecting the Treaty, *viz. That they did not believe L--- G---- was in earnest*, was as groundless in point of Fact, as it was disrespectful in point of *Manner*, to the Person of their R---l M---r: For not to name him upon the Occasion, was scarce to allow him to be a *Name*; and that he has been *no more*, ever since they have us--ped *his* Power, the whole Kingdom is sadly sensible.

But that I may not leave the Shadow of a Doubt upon your Mind, I will now lay before you all those several little Circumstances, which they, afterwards, made use of, in Justification of that frivolous Pretence: For they are, to the full, as frivolous as the very Pretence itself; and, consequently, must evince, that it was merely for Want of better Supports, that they attempted to save themselves, by  
laying

laying hold on such Feathers and Straws as it will be shewn they were.

First, then, you are to understand, it is alledged, when the Treaty was reduced into Form, and approved on the said 16th of *July*, That L--- G--- desired fourteen Days Time, to send a Courier into *England*, for the Approbation of the L--- J--st--s, before it was executed: And this is true: As also, That the P--- of H----, who was impatient for signing, not only looked upon this Delay, as an Artifice to gain Time, but intimated as much on the Spot; and pressed the immediate Execution, with all the Arguments he could devise.

It is, moreover, extremely probable, that the Prince said, upon this Occasion, no more than he thought: It was but natural for him to think, that all the Authority of our Government was centered in the Person of the S-----n, and his First Minister: And if he knew any thing of our Affairs, he could not but think, that a Peace would have been so welcome, both to the L--ds J-----s and the People, that it was utterly needless to consult the Opinion of either.

And, in this Light, we cannot be surpris'd to find, that he carried his Suspicions and Resentments so far, as to cause the Minister of H----, at the Court of *London*, to make an Enquiry,

quiry, whether the said Treaty was ever communicated to the said L\*\*ds J—s; and afterwards to withdraw his Troops from that which was, so ridiculously and absurdly, called the *Common Cause*.

2dly, It was farther alledged, That, the Day before the Return of the Courier from *England*, with the Resolution of the L\*\*ds J—s upon the Treaty of *Hanau*, M. *Wafner* arrived at that Place with, the Treaty of *Worms* in his *Pocket*: And that two Days after, L-- G. acquainted the P--- of *H.* by Letter, with the Return of the said Courier, and the *Rejection* of the Former, which he ascribed to the L\*\*ds J——s.

Now, if the mixing these different Facts in this Manner together, can prove any thing, it is, That the Delay of 14 Days was requir'd for M. *Wafner*'s Arrival with the Treaty of *Worms*: And that his Arrival with the said Treaty, produced the said *Rejection*; not the Disapprobation of the L\*\*ds J——s: But, according to this very State of the Case, the Courier arrived there from *England* before M. *Wafner* arrived from *Worms*: And neither his Arrival with the Treaty in his *Pocket*, nor the Suspicions of the Prince of *H.* were known in *England* at the Time of the *Rejection*: Consequently, the Pretence, That their Ex——s rejected

rejected it, *because* L--- G. was not in *earnest* in negotiating it, falls to the Ground.

Besides, in order to explode the ridiculous Circumstance of M. *Wafner's* bringing the Treaty of *Worms* to *Hanau* in his *Pocket*, the Day after the Arrival of the Courier from *London*, we need only refer to the *Information* given in Parliament, by the y---r B---r, concerning the said Treaty, before cited; which, at the Time of starting these notable Surmises, it must be supposed, they had either forgot themselves, or hoped nobody else remembered: For, therein, we find, That the whole Process was carried on with so much Precipitation, that the Queen of *Hungary's* Minister (this very M. *Wafner*) was forced to sign it, *before* he had received his *full Powers* for that Purpose: And the Treaty itself bears witness, That it was not signed till the 2d of *September*; whereas, according to the above Legend, the whole Affair was completed by the last Day of *July*.

The same Course of Reasoning holds good with regard to another Suggestion, which has been made use of in Aid of the former; namely, That if his Lordship had really been in earnest, he would have signed the Treaty of *Hanau*, without waiting for their Approbation, as he afterwards did the Treaty of *Worms*; for this is altogether as manifestly an  
*After-*



*After-Thought*: How, or in what Manner, he would proceed, in relation to a subsequent Negotiation, they could not possibly foresee, at the Time of their rejecting the former: If he was, besides, so sparing of his *Paper*, as they had represented, they could not be surpris'd, that he had any such Expedient in Reserve; and, if not, the very Fact they refer to becomes doubtful.

Those who once give into such a licentious Manner of asserting, may be very justly suspected of asserting any Thing that will answer a present Purpose: And if, upon the whole, it could be ever so thoroughly clear'd of all the Suspicions which their Characters and Conduct justly expose it to, the only natural Inference that could be drawn from it, would be, That the Treatment L-- G-- met with in the Affair of *Hanau*, had convinced him of the Necessity of not running the like Risk in any other Measure.

Lastly, It is well known, That, above a Year afterwards, when the Ferment ran highest against L— G-----, on the *Supposition*, That he had been the *Rejector* of that Treaty, he avowed to the *Imperial* and *Prussian* Ministers residing here, That the said Treaty was a good Treaty for *England*; and, that his Purpose was to have carried it into Execution,

cution, if the L--- J---s had not put it out of his Power.

And this leads us to observe, That all this while we have heard of no one Objection against the Treaty itself: On the contrary, from the Art and Craft which were made use of to transfer the Odium of *rejecting* it from *Them* at home, to *Him* abroad, we have all the Reason imaginable to conclude, that, upon the whole, every *other* Minister thought as L--- G. did, That it was a good one for *England*.

But, whatsoever their real Thoughts were concerning it, or to what Dilemma soever they were reduced at last, it is not to be suppos'd, that they did not accompany their *Rejection* with some plausible Colour of Excuse: Nay, it is not unlikely, that, having a double Game to play, the C—t to bid for, and an Opposition to temper with, they furnished themselves with more Colours than one, to be severally applied, as Opportunity offered: For the Service of the C—t, they might have it in Reserve to say, That they rejected it, because it contained no better Provision for the *favourite Measure*; and to figure with, in case of an Opposition, they might affect to be governed by *economical Considerations*.

It seems one of the great Objects of the Treaty, was to make such a Provision of Revenue for the then Emperor, during Life, as should enable him to support the Imperial Dignity: This Revenue was stated at Six Millions of Florins a Year: For the raising this Revenue, certain Provinces were to be assign'd to him, which he was to hold till another Provision could be made, by the Secularisation of the Bishopricks of *Saltzburg* and *Wurtsburg*, (which though understood, was not however expressed in the Treaty): And in case the Produce of these Bishopricks, or those Provinces, fell short of that Sum, *England* was to make good the Difficiency.

And, though I never was, nor ever shall be, an Advocate for such Measures as have a Tendency to encumber this Kingdom, for the Sake of *purchasing the Peace* of the Continent, I shall always prefer that Road of Policy, which leads to the least Evil, as often as it appears that we are so bewildered, that we have no other Choice.

Nobody, I believe, will dispute, that it is not more eligible to *purchase a Peace*, than to *purchase a War*; more especially if the *Purchase-Money* of the latter, almost out of Calculation, exceeded the former.

What

What we were to pay for a Peace, depended upon Contingence after Contingence ; the Territories successively in question, *might* have furnished the whole Sum ; in which Case, we should have been exempt from any Payment at all : And if not, our Obligation extended no farther than one Life ; and, in all Probability, even while that Life lasted, might have been answered, according to the usual Rate of *modern* Estimates, by a very inconsiderable Sum.

Whereas, by the Rejection of the Treaty of *Hanau*, when we were forced upon the Treaty of *Worms*, we were also forced to give the King of *Sardinia* his *own Price* : That is to say, 200,000 *l.* a Year, as long as the War should last ; which encouraged the Queen of *Hungary* to insist on the same Sum, on the same Terms, before she would ratify the Treaty : And though she did carry her Point her own Way, she obtained a Promise to the same Effect ; and she was accordingly furnished with as much or more during the same Term.

But *O Economy* is one of those Words which the Persons we are treating of never make use of, but in a *prostitute* Sense ; as appears by the whole Course of their profligate Ad——n ; as appears by what has been already  
ready

ready said of the two Treaties ; and as appears by the Estimates laid before P———t, for the extraordinary Charge of every Year, after that fatal Period : For in every one of those Years, the said extraordinary Charge greatly exceeded all imaginable Deficiencies, that *England* could be liable to, in consequence of the poor, *rejected* Treaty of *Hanau*.

Thus, Sir, I think I have performed my Promise, with respect to that mysterious Transaction, in the clearest Manner ; have shewn you by whom it was rejected, upon what Motives, and for what Ends and Purposes ; and have also fairly stated, and fully answered, all that ever has been advanced, or perhaps can be, for their Justification.

But, lest they for themselves, or any of their Creatures for them, presuming on the Ignorance or Inattention of Mankind to those Occurrences, in which their own nearest and dearest Interests are most essentially concerned, should insinuate ever so remotely, That it is still in their Power to blanch their Conduct, with regard to this Affair, I will add to all I have already said, the two or three following Questions ; to let them see that, shadowed as it has industriously been, with all the Clouds that their political Magic could conjure up, to much Light has nevertheless broke in upon it,

as

as will expose it sufficiently to the Indignation, if not to the Vengeance, of a deluded People.

Did the B——rs, when they received the Treaty of *Hanau* (and L— G——'s Dispatches relating to it), which was sent expressly for the Approbation of the L—ds J——s, summon the said L—ds J——s, and submit the same to their Consideration?

Were the said Dispatches and Treaty submitted to the Consideration of any more than FOUR of the said L—ds J——s?

Can it be said, That, without sending any such Summons to the rest of the L——ds J——s, the said FOUR were in any Sense authorised to act as L——ds J——s; or to take upon THEMSELVES the Decision of so important an Affair?

If these Questions, Sir, were answered; as they ought to be, nobody need to ask any more.

But as that is not to be expected, I will be at the Trouble of proposing yet another, *viz.*

What was the Reason, that a Treaty, which his ——— had approved, which L——  
G——

G— had advised, and whose Head was to answer for that Advice, and which must have been immediately made public, in case it had been approved here, was so long secreted ?

That it was out of *Kindness* to that Minister, will scarce be surmised by any Man, in the least acquainted with our political Connections, and Oppositions: And if it was really such a Treaty as no *Englistman* ought to have signed, nothing could have so much contributed to the raising their own Characters, and the ruining HIS, as the making the whole World acquainted with the whole Affair.

But the Truth of the Matter is, that such an open Proceeding did not agree with their close Designs: It would have torn off the Mask too soon; and shewn that L — G — was not such a Bigot to the War, as they chose to have it thought; nor they themselves, such Idolaters of Peace.

Thus it appears, not only, that the Guilt and Shame of the *Rejection* rests upon them, but also with Aggravation upon Aggravation: If, therefore, when L — G — lay under the Suspicion of having been the Author of that Measure, it was in any Degree warrantable, to talk of *impeaching* him for it,  
what

what must our Conclusions be, on a Recollection of all the Circumstances which lye before us?

The Records of Parliament furnish us with the Precedent of Four Lords impeached in the Reign of King *William III.* for having, among other Things, acted irregularly and unconstitutionally with Regard to the *Partition-Treaty.* Of these Lord *Somers* was one ; and the *second* and *fourth* Articles against him were, for sealing blank Commissions for signing that Treaty ; and for ratifying the said Treaty, He being then ONE of the Lords Justices of the Kingdom, without communicating the same to, or advising with the REST of, the Lords Justices or his Majesty's Privy Council thereon : And if the King's express Command, which it was known, he had to urge in his Justification, was not looked upon as a sufficient Authority in *that Case*, to dispense with the usual Forms, what shall be said in the *present*, where no such Plea can be urged, either to divert the like Process, or even to mitigate the Effects it ought to produce.

It is now to be observed, That with the *Rejection* of the Treaty of *Hanau*, ended L—G—'s War, no matter whether from Conviction of the Impracticability of his former Schemes, or Persuasion, that he had obtained the Favour he aspired to, here it ended:



ended: And, from hence forward, the Continuation must be distinguished by *another Name*: For the Minister who rejects a Peace, at least the Minister who rejects it in a clandestine Manner, from Cl--s--t-Motives of Ambition, or Favour, or Jealousy, is from that Moment the Author of the War, and answerable for all its Consequences.

How the B-----rs will be affected by this Conclusion, I know not; how they ought to be affected, is easy to imagine: For the Consequences of rejecting the Treaty of *Hanau*, may justly be ranked amongst the most ruinous and deplorable, that ever the Weakness or Wickedness of Man produced.

To trace them through all their various Branches, would be to give an History of the Times; and not to give a Sketch of their Operation, with respect to ourselves, would leave my Essay imperfect.

I shall, therefore, proceed to give you such a Sketch: But first it may not be improper to touch upon the extraordinary Turn which the ambiguous Conduct of the Two B-----rs incidentally produced at C-----t.

The Discovery of so much of the dark Secret I have been discoursing of, as fell within the Knowledge of the King of *Prussia*, in  
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his *Rescript*, and his engaging anew in the War, in Consequence of the *Rejection*, put the Nation into a violent Ferment: And as the Storm had been hitherto, as artfully as iniquitously, directed at the *Head* of the *supposed Rejector*, those who had more openly undertook for the Public, would be amused no longer with vain and deceitful Expectations: but insisted on searching the whole Mystery to the Bottom, and proceeding to an *Impeachment*, which all seemed to be of Opinion there was Matter enough to warrant.

And now it was that the *B—rs* found themselves entangled in the Maze of their own Cunning; and, upon looking round on all Sides, discovered no Hope of attaining that Summit of Power, which they had by so many various Methods aspired to, nor even of extricating themselves, but by taking that desperate Step, of acquainting the —, That if he did not remove *L— G—*, they could serve him no longer.

Accordingly, the *P——t* being to meet *December 1, 1744*, and all the Business of the *S——n* as yet unsettled, they surprized his — with that Declaration; which, more from the Crisis, the many important Matters depending upon it, and the unprepared Condition of *L— G—* to make Head against them, than from any Motives

tives of Regard to them, had all the Effect that could be desired : L— G— was removed ; all talk of the *Rejection*, and of the *Impeachment* it was to occasion, subsided at once ; and the whole Session passed over in *reaping* the Ministerial Harvest.

The Sketch I promised is now all that remains to be added : And though I cannot insist, that this sudden Elevation of the Two *B——rs*, almost to the Height of all their Wishes, was a necessary Consequence of the *Rejection*, I am confident it ought to be placed at the Head of all our Misfortunes : But such Particulars, as cannot be controverted, are as follow.

*France*, who had so readily performed what had been stipulated for her, in the Treaty of *Hanau*, by withdrawing her Forces out of *Germany*, now seeing a War unavoidable, and believing that if she could open a Vein in *England*, it would be the shortest Way of Decision, first meditated an Invasion ; and then declared against us in Form.

*Prussia* was the next Power that drew the Sword, agreeable to his former Declarations ; and on the same Principle created a dangerous Diversion in *Bohemia*.

The Rebellion in *Scotland*, which wore so  
con-

contemptible an Aspect at first, and which, more by *Neglect* and *Connivance* at Home, than the Countenance and Succour it received from Abroad, was suffer'd to become so formidable at last, was the next Visitation that befell us: And though the Wound is closed, the Scar, the Weakness, and many other calamitous Effects, we have still Reason both to apprehend and bewail.

Our Veins were then opened indeed; opened by our own Hands; and all the *British* Blood, that was so prodigally spilt, was lost.

These are Scenes, one would forget, if possible, because they can never be recollected without Horror: But every Year's Estimate, for the future, will put us in mind of them, whether we will or not: That very Rebellion which our M——rs were so loth to suppress, is now to furnish an annual Pretence for a m——l Army, (for that is the Name which it best deserves) and we shall be annually required, to pay for our own Fetters.

I pass over our Conduct Abroad, the Massacres of *Fontenoy* and *Val*, our Conventions, our Contracts, and Negotiations, for Expedition Sake; and shall close all I have farther to say, with a Hint or two, as to Money-Matters.

In

In the Year 1740, the national Debt was *about* 47 Millions; the Debt incurred in the three following Years, was *about* Six Millions; and, if the Treaty of *Hanau* had been accepted, the Produce of the Sinking Fund might have reduced it, by this Time, to 47 Millions again :

Instead of which, as it stands now, it may be fairly computed, at *Eighty Millions*.

*Difference* : BUT *Thirty-three Millions*.

Nor is this all: Had the Treaty of *Hanau* been accepted, there might have been a Saving of Two Shillings in the Pound, on the Land; which, in five Years, would have amounted BUT to *Five Millions* more.

This is an Article, that I recommend in a particular Manner, to the serious Consideration of our Country-Gentlemen and Landholders.

And, as to the Labourer, Husbandman, Manufacturer, Merchant, &c. let them reflect on the Accumulation of Duties, which have been imposed in that Interval, upon Wine, Glass, Houses, Coaches, the Continuation of that heavy Duty upon Salt, at *Ten Times* the Value of the *Commodity itself*, for so many Years

to come; and the additional *Five per Cent.* upon Trade, enacted with those dreadful Words, FOR EVER.

Lastly, let the whole Nation, if they have any Understanding, any Spirit, any *Feeling* remaining, with one Voice, call upon their M—rs, to settle the Account between them; to shew in what Services so many Millions have been laid out, and such a Deluge of Blood has been shed; and in what Particulars the *Definitive Treaty* of *Aix*; has justified the *Rejection* of the Preliminary Treaty of *Hanau*.

And if they should be deaf to that Call, as you may be certain they will, read over the said *Definitive Treaty* once more, and ask yourself, what the Nation has obtained by it, in Exchange, for the almost total Dissipation of our Wealth, the Ruin of our Allies, the SACRIFICE of our COMMERCE, the Prostitution of our HONOUR, and the Establishment of the DICTATORIAL POWER of *France*, over the rest of EUROPE, BUT Time and Opportunity for the Two B——rs to become our Masters, and to complete their *System* of U—rp—n over both P—— and People.

I am, Dear SIR,

Your most affectionate

Humble Servant.

## P O S T S C R I P T.

Who the *Four* L—ds J—s were, that are supposed to have *usurped*, in so flagrant a Manner, the Authority of the whole *Nineteen*, Time, no doubt, will discover: But, if any Man, in order to exonerate the Y—r B—r from his *Share* of that supposed *Usurpation*, and the *fatal Use* that was made of it, should be *mean* enough to pretend, That he was no *C-b—t-C—r* at that Time, because he was not such, by Vertue of his Office, till the *next Month* afterwards, let it be only recollected, That he was nevertheless a L—d J—ce, and the *Fallacy* will stand sufficiently exposed to all the Contempt and Disdain it deserves.

F I N I S.

