ROTTERDAM TOKYO OSAKA Ports & Harbors • Ports & Harbors • Ports & Harbors !Il Volume 32, Number 3, ISSN 0029-8182 Oceanus The International Magazine of Marine Science and Policy Volume 32, Number 3, Fall 1989 Paul R. Ryan, Editor T. M. Hawley, Assistant Editor Sara L. Ellis, Editorial Assistant Jon Kohl, Intern Editorial Advisory Board / <^T*k 1930 Robert D. Ballard, Director of the Center for Marine Exploration, WHOI James M. Broadus, Director of the Marine Policy Center, WHOI Henry Charnock, Professor of Physical Oceanography, University of Southampton, England Gotthilf Hempel, Director of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar Research, West Germany Charles D. Hollister, Vice-President and Associate Director for External Affairs, WHOI John Imbrie, Henry L. Doherty Professor of Oceanography, Brown University John A. Knauss, U.S. Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere, NOAA Arthur E. Maxwell, Director of the Institute for Geophysics, University of Texas Timothy R. Parsons, Professor, Institute of Oceanography, University of British Columbia, Canada Allan R. Robinson, Gordon McKay Professor of Geophysical Fluid Dynamics, Harvard University David A. Ross, Chairman, Department of Geology and Geophysics, and Sea Grant Coordinator, WHOI Published by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution Guy W. Nichols, Chairman of the Board of Trustees John H. Steele, President of the Corporation Charles A. Dana III, President of the Associates Craig E. Dorman, Director of the Institution The views expressed in Oceanus are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 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[11 two years at $39.00 request prepayment) ..,.00 lime Library or Institution: 50.00 Please send MY Subscription to: Please send a GIFT Subscription to: Name (please print) Street address City State Zip ♦Subscribers other than U.S. & Canada please use form inserted at last page. 9/89 92 93 Name (please print i Street address Donor's Name Zip Address >/Books Received Gentrified COVER: The design and front cover art were done especially for this issue of Oceanus by Sig Purwin, a Cape Cod artist. For the rendering of the Bismarck on the bottom, he worked from a ®sketch provided by National Geographic. The work on the back cover is Purwin's "Night Trawlers." Copyright© 1989 by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Oceanus (ISSN 0029-8182) is published in March, June, September, and December by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 9 Maury Lane, Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543. Second-class postage paid at Falmouth, Massachusetts; Windsor, Ontario; and additional mailing points. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Oceanus Subscriber Service Center, P.O. Box 6419, Syracuse, N.Y. 13217. HAS THE SUBSCRIPTION COUPON BEEN DETACHED? If someone else has made use of the coupon attached to this card, you can still subscribe. Just send a check — $22 for one year (four issues), $39 for two, $56 for three — to this address: Ocean us magazine P.O. Box 6419 Syracuse, NY 13217-9980 Please make checks payable to Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution o^T^ 1930 PLACE STAMP HERE Oceanus magazine P.O. Box 6419 Syracuse, NY 13217-9980 tditonal correspondence: Oceanus magazine, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543. Telephone: (508) 548-1400, extension 2386. Subscription correspondence, U.S. and Canada: All orders should be addressed to Oceanus Subscriber Service Center, P.O. Box 6419, Syracuse, N.Y. 13217. Individual subscription rate: $22 a year; Libraries and institutions, $50. Current copy price, $5.50; 25 percent discount on current copy orders for five or more; 40 percent discount to bookstores and newsstands. Please make checks payable to the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Subscribers outside the U.S. and Canada, please write: Oceanus, Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU, England. Individual subscription rate: £22 a year; Students, £19; Libraries and Institutions, £40. Single copy price, £9. Please make checks payable to Cambridge University Press. When sending change of address, please include mailing label. Claims for missing numbers from the U.S. and Canada will be honored within 3 months of publication; overseas, 5 months. Undaunted Sunk M Rediscovered II |::::::::::: n Containerized W$t itomarcfe g>ap 27 Introduction: Sending "Sink the Bismarckl" to the Bottom The Bismarck Saga: 1941-1989 by Paul R. Ryan, Sara L. Ellis, and Jon Kohl 1 1 - The Bismarck and the Hood 14- American Catalina Pilot Spotted Bismarck on 26th 16-The Swordfish and the Modoc 18- Into the Water 20- U.S. Navy Captain's Tale of Bismarck's Final Days The Quest to Find the Bismarck - 1 988/89 30-Sunk or Scuttled? 32 — The Bismarck's Seaplanes 34 -Your Kids and the Sport of Discovery Ports & Harbors 36 47 51 59 66 74 79 Port Development in the U.S.: Status and Outlook by John M. Pisani Many Storms in a Port by John Ricklefs From Wharf Rat to Lord of the Docks by Mark Lincoln Chadwin Rotterdam: Quays to the Heart of Europe by T. M. Hawley Japan: Reberth of a Nation by Paul R. Ryan Puerto Quetzal, Guatemala: Container Cranes or Stevedores? by Amy Friedheim A Tale of Two Ports With "2020" Vision by James A. Fawcett CDODTKSCSIPrJuS 85 Naval Bases, Base Rights, and Port Access by Joseph R. Morgan 89 Port Concept Often Adrift in Waterfront Revitalization by Marc J. Hershman s/Books Received 92 93 Gentrified COVER. The des.gn and front cover art were done especially for this issue of Oceanus by Sig Purwin a Cape Cod artist. For the rendering of the Bismarck on the bottom, he worked from a ©sketch provided by National Geographic. The work on the back cover is Purwin's "Night Trawlers." Copyright© 1989 by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Oceanus (ISSN 0029-8182) is published in WnoH iU?e\/Pt6T ' December by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 9 Maury Lane Zrt L> ' ,MaSSfchusetts °2543' Second-class postage paid at Falmouth Massachusetts; Windsor, Ontario' p o.loZt Tyt^ep7y:!SuMASTER: Send address changes to °ceanus Subscriber s— Cent-- Introduction Sending "Sink the Bismarckl" to the Bottom /\s astute readers will have noted from the cover, this issue of Oceanus has two themes — the exciting discovery by a Woods Hole explorer of the World War II German battleship Bismarck, sunk by the British in 1941 in one of the greatest naval engagements in history; and the mounting pressures on ports and harbors, particularly in the United States, to turn more waterfront space into various forms of economic tattoo parlors. The nine-day pursuit and sinking of the Bismarck is one of the greatest sea stories of all time, ranking with Salamis, Lepanto, the Spanish Armada, Trafalgar, Tsushima, Jutland, Midway, and the Coral Sea. The saga, with fortunes veering from one side to the other, embraces many of the elements of ancient mythology- pursuit, discovery, escape, fear, courage, victory, defeat, and death. We hope you enjoy the Oceanus version of this classic confrontation, which comes on the 50th anniversary of the start of World War II. But before you begin, let us torpedo one myth that may prove as difficult to sink as the Bismarck. Everyone remembers the great Churchillian edict to "Sink the Bismarckl" After all, it appeared in the book and movie by the same name. In those accounts, the Flag Officer on duty in the Admiralty was summoned to the intercom shortly after the sinking of the Hood: From out of the box came the unmistakable tones of the Prime Minister's voice. "Your job is to sink the Bismarck/' said the box. "That is your overridding duty. No other considerations are to have any weight whatever. " "Yes, Prime Minister. " "What about Ramillies? What about Rodney?" "Orders are being issued at this moment, Prime Minister. " "Revenge? Force H?" "They have their orders. " "You're taking every possible step to see that Bismarck is going to be sunk?" "Yes, Prime Minister. " "Not only the possible steps, not only the easy steps and the obvious steps, but the difficult steps and the almost impossible steps, and all the quite impossible steps you can manage as well. The eyes of the whole world are upon us. " Sounds Churchillian to me, but perhaps you missed the small print at the beginning of C.S. Forester's "true story of Hitler's mightiest battleship." This is as it may have happened. The speeches are composed by the writer, who has no knowledge that those words were used... Alas, our research indicates that Churchill never uttered the famous cry attributed to him. In The Second World War, Volume 3, The Grand Alliance by Winston S. Churchill, we get a feeling for what really transpired: / went to Chequers on Friday afternoon (May 23). Averell Harriman and Generals Ismay and Pownall were to be with me till Monday. With the Battle of Crete at its height it was likely to be an anxious week- end. I had, of course, a most complete service of secretaries in the house, and also direct telephone connections with the duty captain at the Admiralty and other key departments. The Admiralty expected the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen to come through the Denmark Strait in the early dawn, and that the Prince of Wales and the Hood, with two or three cruisers, would bring them to battle. All our ships were moving towards the scene in accordance with the general plan. We spent an anxious evening, and did not go to bed until two or three o'clock. At about seven I was awakened to hear formidable news. The Hood, our largest and also our fastest capital ship, had blown up. Although somewhat lightly constructed, she carried eight 15-inch guns, and was one of our most cherished naval possessions. Her loss was a bitter grief, but knowing of all the ships that were converging towards the Bismarck / felt sure we should get her before long, unless she turned north and went home. I went straight to Harri man's room at the end of the corridor, and, according to him, said, "The Hood has blown up, but we have got the Bismarck for certain." I then returned to my room, and was so well tired out that I went to sleep again. At about half-past eight my principal private secretary, Martin, came into the room in his dressing-gown with a strained look on his ascetic, clear-cut face. "Have we got her?" I asked. "No, and the Prince of Wales has broken off the action. " This was a sharp disappointment. Had then the Bismarck turned north and gone home? Here was my great fear. We now know what happened. Our research indicates that Churchill did send a message on the final day of the saga to the Admiralty to the effect that the Bismarck was August, 1941. to be sunk at all costs and that the King George V was to keep shooting even if she ran out of fuel and had to be tugged back. The message was not received until after the Bismarck went down. For the most part, we have concentrated on giving you a historical view of the little-known American involvement in the Bismarck saga. You will find an account of the final days of the Bismarck by U.S. Navy Captain Joseph H. Wei lings aboard the HMS Rodney; the crucial spotting of the Bismarck by an American pilot flying as an observer in a Catalina flying boat; and the mistaken, near-sinking of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in the action. We, of course, also present our version of The Quest to Find the Bismarck ! As the articles in our section on Ports & Harbors point out, economic conditions are fostering fierce competition among those with waterfront development interests. This competition extends from Tokyo and Rotterdam to the more than 80 major seaports in the United States. On one side of the waterline, ports are the captives of the demands of shipping lines, the oil and gas trade, the critical-resources traders, cruise ship lines, fishing interests, and recre- ational users; while on the other side, pressures come from city merchants with dreams of condominiums, hotels, restaurants, museums, aquariums, and the like, capitalizing on a romantic notion of the rough-and-tumble waterfront of a bygone era. The fact that stevedores today can make up to $100,000 a year at their computerized cranes should be enough to prompt Hollywood to remake On the Waterfront with Kevin Costner in the role of a modern-day Marlon Brando. It could be an Academy Award contender. Seriously, the ports and harbors of our nation face many critical problems, ranging from defense to dredging. We hope that our coverage, which was guided by the advice, contacts, and editing of Michael Champ of the National Science Foundation, will acquaint you with some of these issues, not the least of which is the environmental component, and how other countries are preparing for trade in the 21st century. There is a bill before the Senate as I write this introduction that would create a National Maritime Enhancement Institute. The Institute would be charged with conducting research on methods to improve the maritime industry's performance, including assessing technological advancements and developing a management training program. The bill passed the House of Representatives. The leading contender to establish the new Institute is Louisiana State University, which, in conjunction with George Washington University, is now the home of the Ports and Waterways Institute. My Fulbright experience in Japan and China will be relatedin the winter issue of Oceanus, which will be devoted to marine affairs in the Pacific region. The focus will be on new Soviet and Chinese initiatives in this region and how the tragic events of Tiananmen Square may affect the balance of power in the upcoming Pacific Century. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Fred Golden, who stood in for me as Acting Editor during my nine-month leave of absence. It is no easy job to step into another's deck shoes as Fred did, but the three issues he commanded — the Update of the Oceans and Global Warming, Whither the Whales?, and the Alvin Anniversary Issue — speak for themselves. Fred reports that he is happily writing and free- lancing science articles from his boat in San Francisco Bay. "Don't worry. Be happy" is his message to all of us. -Paul R. Ryan Editor, Oceanus 4 The cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk sight the Ger- mans threading through a minefield May 23. The Bismarck opens fire on the Norfolk but the British retire safely. They follow the Germans despite rain and snow storms and dangerous ice floes. The Hood and Prince of Wales are about 250 miles away and closing in. 5 The Hood and Prince of Wales sight the Bismarck at 5:35 a.m. May 24. They open fire. The Bismarck and Prim Eugen return fire. At 6:01 a.m. a massive explosion erupts aboard the Hood. It sinks rapid- ly, leaving only three of 1,419 crewmen alive. The Bismarck suffers a ruptured fuel tank. 6 As the Bismarck engages the British again on the evening of May 24, the Prim Eugen escapes to the south. The Bismarck's com- mander has decided to make for a French port for repairs. A Brit- ish force including the aircraft carrier Ark Royal heads to the area from Gibraltar. 7 Around midnight May 24, amid raging seas, nine Swordfish biplanes from the carrier Victorious attack, causing little damage. About 3 a.m. the Bismarck evades its chasers and heads southeast for the safety of U-Boat patrols and Luftwaffe air cover. 8 A reconaissance plane from Ireland spots the Bis- marck May 26. In a last- ditch effort to stop the ship before it reaches safety, Sword- fish from the Ark Royal score two torpedo hits that wreck her steer- ing gear and jam her rudders, ef- fectively sealing her fate. IRELAN I - i/^REA l*T I ENLARGED \ /May 27 ARK ROYAL RENOWN SHEFFIELD 9 The main British force sights and opens fire on the Bismarck beginning at 8:47 a.m. May 27. The battleships King George V and Rodney turn south to give the north-sailing Germans broadsides. Two other vessels, the Norfolk and the Dorset- shire, join the attack. Turning north, the King George V and the Rodney quickly overtake the limping Bismarck. The Rodney zigzags in front, pouring on fire. After a few good early shots, the Bismarck's fire quickly becomes erratic. By 10 a.m. the ship is a battered hulk. By 10:39 a.m. she has capsized and sunk. On May 21, Spitfires over the Bergen-Korsfjord re- gion of Norway sight the Bismarck and Prim Eugen. Brit- ish Admiral Tovey sends the battle cruiser Hood to join other British ships on patrol in Den- mark Strait. On May 22, a re- connaissance flight determines that the two German vessels have sailed. More British forces head for the search zone. 2 A Swedish cruiser spots the Bismarck and its escort, the Prim Eugen, in the northern Kattegat off the coast of Sweden on May 20. A later sighting places them off the coast of Kristiansand, Norway. 1 Under construction at Hamburg since 1936, the Bismarck is launched on Valentine's Day, 1939, by Adolf Hitler. After more than two years in fitting and shakedown cruises, she sets sail May 19, 1941, from Gydnia, Poland, with orders to sink Allied shipping in the Atlantic. Last days of the Bismarck ««. fJlvv Valentine's Day, 1939. Countess Dorothea von Loewenfeld, granddaughter of - Prince Otto von Bismarck, smashes a bottle of champagne against the bow of the battleship Bismarck. Fifty thousand were in attendance headed by General Field Marshal Hermann Goering (behind Countess), chief ship builder Rudolf Blohm (top hat), Admiral Erich Raeder (behind Blohm), Adolf Hitler (center), and Rudolf Hess (left of Hitler). Bismarck slid into the Elbe River. (Bettmann Newsphotos) Y O "• fe v-rt\ 3tf)e ^tgmarcfe i§>aga 1041 - 1989 hp $)aul 3a. &pan, &ara H. eiliss, ant Jon Hcnjl ■ • -* .A Th*:: n -♦ - "••^i% !*fr -*•**& »?;■' VU an Pat// R. Ryan is Editor of Ocean us, published by the Woods Hole Oceanography Institution. Sara L Ellis is Editorial Assistant. Jon Kohl is a summer inte§Q from Dartmouth College. How much would the U-boat warfare reduce our imports and shipping? Would it ever reach the point where our life would be destroyed? Here was no field for gestures or sensations; only the slow, cold drawing of lines on charts, which showed potential strangulation. Compared with this there was no value in brave armies ready to leap upon the invader, or in a good plan for desert warfare. The high and faithful spirit of the people counted for nought in this bleak domain. Either the food, supplies and arms from the New World and from the British Empire arrived across the oceans or they failed. Winston Churchill From The Second World War, (Vol. II) One of the greatest air-sea searches in naval history occurred in the spring of 1941, when Britain's fortunes were at a low ebb in World War II. In the span of little more than a week, the huge German battleship Bismarck sank the proudest ship in the Royal Navy — the battle cruiser Hood— but within 72 hours she was crippled by the British Fleet Air Arm, pounded into a defenseless wreck by British warships, and scuttled by her own crew. The British lost 1,416 men when the Hood went down in the first engagement of the epic saga; only three survived. More than 2,200 men went down with the Bismarck; 112 survivors were picked up by the British, and a German U-boat saved another three. In a bombing raid after sinking the Bismarck, the British also lost the destroyer Mashona to the German Luftwaffe with the loss of one officer and 45 men. From March of 1940 until the encounter with the Bismarck, the Germans enjoyed a position of superiority on the high seas. The British were defending their important mercantile convoys with battleships. The German plan, known as the Rheinubung, or "Rhine exercise," was to attack the convoys with a superior force composed of the aircraft carrier Graf Zepplin and the pocket battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in a pincer movement out of their southern base at Brest, France, combined with their new warship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which would reach the Atlantic shipping lanes from the north. This, the Germans felt, would give them command of the North Atlantic, cutting off Britain's lifeline. The German plan, however, received a major setback in early April of 1941 when the Gneisenau was knocked out of commission during an RAF bombing mission that braved murderous antiaircraft and ship fire in an effort to disable the ships in for repairs at Brest. The RAF pilots were acting on an edict of Prime Minister Winston Churchill that "serious risks and sacrifices" had to be made to destroy the German ships. Guy Gibson, in Enemy Coast Ahead, a testament to the British Bomber Command, has written: "The crews couldn't see them [the German ships]. Moreover, not only the glare of hundreds of searchlights, the many decoys, coupled with the thousands of flak shells filling the skies above the very small target area, made it virtually impossible even to hit the docks, let alone the ships. Even when our bomber formations had bombed Brest by day, the Germans would fill the whole area with thick yellow smoke, which completely hid everything from view. When I say that in order to get to the docks it was necessary to do a five-minute timed run from an island nearby, it will possibly be realized why no serious damage was done." Flying into more than a thousand flak guns, apart from those of the ships themselves, a British bomber managed to put a torpedo into the Gneisenau seconds before the plane was shot down with loss of the entire crew. The Scharnhorst, meanwhile, needed an engine refit and would not be ready for service until June; and the Prinz Eugen hit a mine on 23 April, necessitating a 14-day repair. Despite these setbacks, the German High Command decided to press forward with the Rheinubung and have the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen break out into the North Atlantic. Meanwhile, the British Admiralty had intelligence reports that the Bismarck — the fourth ship to bear the name of the "Blood and Iron" Chancellor who ironically had seen no need for his country to possess a navy — was nearly ready for sea. Both the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen left the occupied Polish port of Gdynia on 19 May on the first leg of the saga. On the 20th, the British received reports via Sweden that the two warships had been spotted passing through the Kattegat, or "Great Belt," screened by 11 merchant ships. The British immediately launched an intense air search. The following day, the German ships were spotted by special RAF reconnaissance1 Spitfires in Grimstad Fjord, just south of Bergen, Norway, where the Prinz 8 Bismarck, /eft, /n Grimstad Fjord, from 25,000 feet up, 21 May 1941. Eugen was topping off with fuel for the breakout into the North Atlantic. The British Home Fleet, meanwhile, was located at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands, and was under the command of Sir John Tovey. The fleet was composed of two battleships, the King George V and Prince of Wales; two battle cruisers, the Hood and the Repulse; and one aircraft carrier, the Victorious. The Bismarck, however, was larger than any British battleship and carried a main armament of eight 15-inch guns, a caliber one inch larger than those of the British battleships. It also was faster than any of the British battleships afloat, and had a well- trained crew. On the British side, only the King George V, Admiral Tovey's flagship, was regarded as a fair match for the Bismarck. The Repulse was 25 years old with fewer big guns than the Bismarck, and the Hood was more than 20 years old with thinner armor. The Prince of Wales and Victorious were new ships to the fleet and far from combat readiness. Admiral Tovey was by no means sure at this point whether the German warships were indeed attempting a breakout into the North Atlantic to harass British shipping. They might have been acting only as a convoy escort to Norway and be planning a return to Germany, or as a cover for an attack on the Faroe Islands or Iceland. If it was a breakout attempt, there were four possible passages for the German ships to take: There was the Denmark Strait between Iceland and the east coast of Greenland — the most favored route for German breakouts in the past; there was the passage between Iceland and the Faroes; there was the strait between Faroes and the Shetlands; and there was the Fair Island Channel between the Shetlands and the Orkneys. The cruiser Suffolk was already on patrol in the Denmark Strait, where the ice pack had narrowed the navigable channel to 60 miles from a range of 250. Tovey told the Suffolk to keep a sharp eye out at the edge of the ice pack, and also dispatched the cruiser Norfolk to aid in the patrol. He also sent a battle squadron to Hvalfjord in Iceland composed of the battle cruiser Hood, under the command of Vice Admiral L. E. Holland, and the new battleship Prince of Wales with Captain J. C. Leach in command of a crew that sailed so hastily from port it contained civilian shipyard workers, plus six destroyers. Tovey himself remained in the battleship King George V in Scapa Flow with five cruisers and five destroyers. At this point, the weather closed in. For the next 24 hours, the British were effectively blind. In the Bismarck, the German Fleet Commander, Admiral Gunther Lutjens, seized Admiral Cunther Lutjens Captain Ernst Lindemann Admiral Sir John Tovey the opportunity. He ordered his Captain, Ernst Lindemann, to sail at once. They took a course heading for the Denmark Strait, relying on an erroneous Luftwaffe report that all the British battleships were still at Scapa Flow. It was not until the evening of 22 May that Admiral Tovey learned from a Royal Navy recon- naissance plane, braving extremely foul weather, that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were not in Grimstad Fjord or Bergen. Within three hours, 10 Admiral Tovey was at sea with the Home Fleet, heading for the southern exit of the Denmark Strait. But the weather was still a big problem — mostly rain and heavy mists, with visibility at times closing down to 150 yards. Admiral Tovey, of course, had no way of knowing for sure that the German ships were not anchored in some small Norwegian fjord, or heading back to Germany. Most of his air patrols were grounded. Thus, Admiral Tovey was forced to rely on the vigilance of his widely scattered cruiser force. On the evening of 23 May, the Suffolk was patrolling the open waters up to the edge of the Greenland ice pack, while the Norfolk was patrolling in the heavy mists which extended to the shores of Iceland. The Suffolk was outfitted with the latest radar, unbeknownst to the Germans who had launched the Rheinubung assuming that British radar was vastly inferior to their own. At 1922 hours on the 23rd, the Suffolk, whose radar had a blind spot when another ship was directly astern, suddenly sighted the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen bearing down on her at a range of seven miles on the same course. She beat a hasty retreat into the fog banks, notified the Norfolk, and both ships began shadowing the Germans. 600 miles southeast of the German warships, so he would have to rely on the Hood and Prince of Wales to engage the enemy. We'll all get promotion This side of the ocean When we've sunk the old Bismarck and all' — ditty sung aboard the Prince of Wales At 0535, the Hood spotted the Bismarck with the Prinz Eugen leading about 17 miles off the starboard bow. At 0546, Admiral Holland issued the order for the two British ships to join battle head-on. Because of the vulnerability of his ship's armor to long-range fire, he wanted to get as close as possible before turning broadside to open fire with all his heavy guns. The decision to maneuver the two ships as a single unit, speeding into action only 800 yards apart, turned out to be a fatal mistake. The Prince of Wales's The Bismarck and the Hood Bismarck Hood Keel Laid / July 1936 31 May 7976 Commissioned 24 August 7 9-70 75 May 1920 Displacement fully- loaded 53,500 tons 48,000 tons Overall length 820 feet 860 feet Beam 118 feet 104 feet Draft fully loaded 30 feet 29 feet Top Speed 30 knots 31 knots Crew 2,200 1,419 Guns Eight 7 5- 4- inch Twelve 5.9-inch Sixteen 4.1 -inch Eight 15-inch Twelve 5'/:-inch Four 4-inch Armor 40 percent of total weight 32.8 percent of total weight Deck: Belt: 8 inches 12.5 inches J .- inches 7 inches At 1939 hours, the Hood, about 300 miles due south, picked up one of the Suffolk's reports and immediately changed course to intercept the German ships at dawn the following day. Admiral Tovey, in the King George V, picked up his first sighting report at 2032 from the Norfolk, which had come out of a fog bank to find herself right under the guns of the Bismarck. She quickly laid down smoke and disappeared into the fog, followed by straddling salvos of 15-inch shells. Some shrapnel landed on deck, but there were no direct hits. At this point, Admiral Tovey was view of the enemy was reduced by the Hood's funnel smoke and by the shell splashes thrown up around the flagship, and the Hood began the engagement by firing at the lead ship, mistakenly thinking it was the Bismarck* when in reality it * Originally, the Bismarck was in the lead; but the shock caused by her firing on the Norfolk knocked the forward radar out of action. Prinz Eugen was ordered to use her radar in the lead (they almost collided when passing), while the Bismarck positioned herself astern, covering the shadowing ships with her big guns. 11 was the Prinz Eugen. Both German ships concentrated their firepower on the Hood. The battle was brief. At 0549, the Hood signaled for concentration of fire on the leading ship. At 0552, range 25,000 yards, the Hood signaled to "shift target right" onto the Bismarck. The first salvo from the Bismarck fell short of the Hood, but was close. At 0555, the Bismarck fired her third salvo, setting fire to ammunition on the Hood's boatdeck. The Hood signaled for a turn to port to open full broadsides on the Bismarck. The fourth salvo from the Bismarck straddled the Nothing is here for tears; nothing to wail Or knock the breast; no weakness, no contempt, Dispraise or blame, nothing but well and fair, And what may quiet us in a death so noble. —Milton Hood. With the Hood and the Prince of Wales still turning at 0600, the Bismarck's fifth salvo penetrated the Hood's deck armor, reached a main magazine, and blew her up. She split in two and sank immediately. But even as her bow half projected upwards, some of the Bismarck's crew saw a bright flash of orange from the Hood's forward guns. One last salvo! At 0602, the Prince of Wales received a bad hit on the compass platform, killing all crew members present except Captain Leach and a signalman. From 0606 to 0612, she was hit four times by the Bismarck and three times by the Prinz Eugen. At 0613, she broke off the battle and joined the Suffolk and Norfolk on shadow duty, but contact with the German warships was lost at 0306 hours on the 25th. The Prinz Eugen escaped the battle without suffering any hits. The Bismarck suffered three hits from the Prince of Wales, one of which was to change the course of the Rhein- ubung strategy. The hit from one British shell resulted in a flooded boiler room, dropping the German battleship's top speed from 30 to 28 knots, and another pierced a forward oil tank, causing the ship to trail an oil slick. This hit reduced Bismarck's long-range capabilities, thus forcing her (because she was so powerful, Admiral Lutjens insisted on referring to the ship as "he") to seek port repairs. The Admiral rejected his Captain's advice that they return to Germany, arguing that they had already accomplished part of their mission by breaking out into the North Atlantic; and he guessed that the British Home Fleet would be deployed in the Denmark Strait awaiting his return. By afternoon, he had decided to send the Prinz Eugen to refuel and raid the British convoys while the Bismarck headed for France. The Prinz Eugen was allowed a clean break as her "big brother" turned around and fired on the Suffolk. Around noon on the 25th, Lutjens spoke to the ship's company. According to surviving crew members, he said: Seamen of the battleship Bismarck/ You have covered yourselves with glory! The sinking of the battle cruiser Hood has not only military, but also psychological value for she was the pride of England. Henceforth, the enemy will try to concentrate his forces and bring them into action against us. I therefore released the Prinz Eugen at noon yesterday so that she could conduct commerce warfare on her own. She has managed to evade the enemy. We, on the other hand, because of the hits The battleship Bismarck's thundering salvos while engaging the HMS Hood in the Denmark Strait. The illusion of night is created by a time-exposure photo taken from the Prinz Eugen. 12 Bismarck and Hood 24 May 1941 06 20 SUFFOLK fi » BISMARCK \ PRINZ EUGEN PRINZ EUGEN and BISMARCK opens fire on HOOD 06-20 P 06-20 NORFOLK N Change of target to PRINCE OF WALES Evasive maneuvers from torpedo trac 6 PRINCE OF WALES 06 03. turns away 0609 05-58 HOOD burning \ I Hits on PR. OF WALES \ ■. .\.\ '•• HOOD and '• : 9 NORFOLK Y#/j . . V 9 SUFFOLK 0229\ f N 04-06,'~y>3 06 .\ •. """•»,, JL (MOOS' \ It;'- '• "\ rfc BISMARCK f °A /£ / X w turns around behind | "\ l° ' ' *N the enemy I * /6 •" S^ -27 kt. 0350\ \/g -. s N&o V 0306\'- . \ 03-40><:^^iJ * : •' X /suffolk's\ X X radar sweep x^x sectors X . / X BISMARCK I •' no contact % ■'04 00 04 06 AT SUFFOLK : signals Lost contact' ^04:00 : PRINCE OF WALES *" NORFOLK kt. = knot (speed) 0 i — 5 10 15 — i 1 1 20 25 — i 1 nautical miles 21 the Bismarck was headed for a Bay of Biscay port, probably Brest rather than St. Nazaire, because under the present unfavorable weather conditions Brest offered a much easier and safer entrance. Our decision was based on the following factors: a. The Bismarck received some damage in her battle with the Hood and Prince of Wales as evidenced by her trailing oil, and a reduction in speed after the battle. b. The hit by the Victorious torpedo aircraft may have compounded this damage. c. A return to Germany via the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, or via the Iceland Faroes Passage and the Norwegian Sea was too dangerous. d. Repair facilities were available in the general Brest and St. Nazaire areas. In addition the overhauls of the battle cruisers Sharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest were about completed. e. German aircraft, submarines and surface craft (mainly destroyers) could easily provide air, submarine and surface protection to the Bismarck within about 400 miles of the western coast of France. I remember distinctly my strong arguments in favor of the above decision. I believed without any doubt, the Bismarck was headed for a Bay of Biscay port, but I desire to reiterate that in many cases strategic decisions are not too difficult when you have all the factors bearing on the problem and the overall responsibility does not rest on your shoulders. Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton who bore all the Rodney responsibility listened to our discussions, asked several questions, and made the final decision to stay in the vicinity of our 0800 position for the time being and then act on the assumption the Bismarck was headed for a Bay of Biscay port if she were not sighted within the next two or three hours. Personal Diary, 25 May 1941 ...Still holding on to a westerly course. King George V should be the one to make contact at 0900 — At 0306 Norfolk & Suffolk lost contact. A search was organized. We changed course to about 060° to intercept if she headed for Brest. At 1330 D/F [direction-finder] bearings gave an indication of Bismarck's position. We steamed east (060°) until we got on a line with this position and Brest then headed towards Brest (120°). No further word of Bismarck. Will she get through. All kinds of excitement. Reminiscences, 25 May 1941 ...We were very much surprised to read a message from the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet shortly after 1 1 : 00 a.m. which said: "By radio direction-finder bearings estimate enemy position at 0952/25 was latitude 57° North, longitude 33° West. All Home Fleet units search accordingly." This message had a time of origin of 1047/25. Our surprise, of course, was due to the fact our plotted position of the ship as indicated by the radio direction-finder bearings was about sixty miles south of the position stated by the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet. We checked the navigator's position and believed his position to be correct. The Commander-in-Chief's Home Fleet message of 1047/25 was the unfortunate message which sent all the Home Fleet units except the Rodney, and perhaps the Edinburgh and Norfolk on the wild goose chase north and northwestward for about seven critical hours while the Bismarck was steaming southeastward toward Brest at 20-22 knots. Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton thought the Admiralty would send a correction to the Commander-in-Chief's 1047/25 message. The Commander-in-Chief's Home Fleet message of 1047/25 created a very difficult situation for Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton. Should he direct the Rodney to remain in the general area of our 0900 a.m. position? Should he order the Rodney to steer a course which assumed the Bismarck was returning to Germany via the Denmark Strait or the Iceland- Faroes Passage? Should he steer a course to arrive in the shortest possible time at the intersection of the track between the Bismarck's last reported position at 0200/25 by the Suffolk and Cape Finisterre? And if the Bismarck was not sighted within a reasonable time after passing through this intersection, then alter course to cross the Bismarck's track in the shortest possible time, on the assumption she was headed for Brest from her last reported [position] by the Suffolk at 0200/25? 22 Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton's firm belief that the Bismarck was headed for a Bay of Biscay port resulted in his decision to leave our general area, and direct the Rodney to steam toward the intersection of the track between the Bismarck's last reported position at 0200/25 and Cape Finisterre. The Rodney altered course to 030° at 11 :40 a.m., increased speed to 17 and then gradually to 20 and 21 knots. Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton, Lieutenant Commander Gatacre and I were extremely happy to receive an Admiralty message to the Rodney at 1158/ 25 which said: "Act as though the enemy is proceeding to a Bay of Biscay port." The Admiralty also sent the following message to a number of shore stations at 1200/25. The Rodney intercepted and decoded this message which read: "The Admiralty believes the Bismarck is headed for Brest." When the Bismarck was not sighted by 4:20 p.m. Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton, after consultation with Lieutenant Commander Gatacre and Commander Grindle, altered the Rodney's course to 055° in order to cross the Bismarck's track in the shortest possible time on the assumption she was headed for Brest from her last reported position by the Suffolk at 0200/25. When the Bismarck was not sighted by 9:00 p.m. Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton ordered the Rodney to change course to 118°, as we headed toward Brest at a speed of 21 knots. Personal Diary, 26 May 1941 ...Steaming as before looking for Bismarck. At 1030 Catalina flying boat sighted Bismarck — about 110 miles bearing 200 from Rodney. Continued on our course. At 1700 King George V (K.G.V) joined. Ark Royal's planes sighted Bismarck — torpedo attack at 1500 unsuccessful. Another attack at 2100 produced one & perhaps 2 hits. After this attack Bismarck made two complete circles then headed north, the only possible action she could take if we are to intercept. We headed south. Dark at 0100 — Commander-in-Chief decided to wait until morning to attack. The Rodney firing on the Bismarck. (British Imperial War Museum Photo) Personal Diary, 27 May 1941 Destroyers attacked (3 destroyers made independent attacks) 2 hits claimed. At sunrise- weather cloudy. Destroyers still shadowing. At 0708 we headed for Bismarck. Sighted Bis at 0843. At 0847 we opened fire. 1-15" later King George V opened fire. Bismarck & ourselves closed 27 minutes later. Bismarck's fire erratic. We closed to 2750 yds. & continued to fire silencing Bismarck. At 1039 Bismarck sank. King George V & ourselves headed north— Big show over. Second Bismarck salvo fractured hull above armor plate and at superstructure just forward of bridge particularly the forward antiaircraft control area. Fortunately no one injured. How lucky we were, if the second salvo landed about 20 yds. further aft our entire bridge structure would have been pierced & probably wrecked with the captain and other key personnel.... The executive officer 23 KING GEORGE V and RODNEY ^f J leove the scene __J?_ X' ,-" fi /C )\ / I t I / ^ NORFOLK / v^ I / .' / v^ opens fire ' ^^ \ / / / ^ 0854 / NORFOLK f i / , I --^ N at 08 08 \ / £• ■*•»„ / r i looo-^^ — \ J cease fire 10=16 ! -.A „-•*> \ / \.*~-^ "" /■". / "V^ -/0 36 DORSETSHIRE fires third torpedo at BISMARCK S port side RODNEY ) /iOT,,^)'! -^^ opens fire p' ..-^ H-l.L/f' ~\l0:20 DORSETSHIRE fires two torpedoes at BISMARCK'S ^ Oe^T' / /' Wb/SMARCkT'J S.-«^ starboard side "^ ^ ••■x / sinks about A- ■* ) \ ^ / \|6°I2 W ly-y^S X- 08-48*"^-- ■ ! rirotrJdlX)^) \ IOOO KING GEORGEV--. I i scuttli"9 / / V -O-^ opens fire \ \ I h.?''*!.* \^093l Turret C fires last salvo I \ • . detonated >— W BISMARCK silent ' \ \ ! I / ~\0927 Turret A or B fires I "»*. • ' \ I lost salvo • I / \/ V by 0921 Turret C ceases fire I *— . \ ^v ofter gun control disabled ' \ 09 40 \i \\ \09:I3 Turrets C and D fire ^DORSETSHIRE !/ \ • U independently at RODNEY ' V ii novi V / t>y 09 08\j?9 10 After gun control directs fire of - |V;. 09-17 / Forward gun ^V-. turrets C ond D ot KING GEORGE V ' V "*\ / control turrets Y 09-02 Foretop gun control I /37.51 "w_ / 1 I A ond B heavily domogedV out of action ^ BISMARCK T\. I Trouble with guns on J^ / sighted by ( I KING GEORGE V 08 49 * NORFOLK \ BISMARCK BISMARCK V. 1-0920 °^«rt°n KING GEORGEV " RODNEY ffODNEY ZZZZ DN°oR%?r£ The Final Battle, 27 May 1941 n n n n ,—h; c 20 15 10 5 16° 55 -48°I5' -10 ■48° would be CO. & yours truly ... would assist him in accordance with Capt. Dalrymple- Hamilton's desires. Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton presented me with Rodney plaque... in afternoon saying many thanks Wellings for all your assistance during an eventful week. Statement of Chief Petty Officer Miller, USN* Damage Sustained from Enemy Action The ship received four (4) hits — all 5.9" shells. Damage from these hits were very minor, no structural damage being sustained whatsoever. One (1) hit in H.A. Director, causing a small hole in the bulkhead — no damage. One (1) hit in the starboard Marine compartment, causing a 6" hole in the starboard side of the ship — above waterline— no damage. One (1) hit in a stateroom just abaft of the conning tower, causing a small hole by splinter— no damage. One (1) hit in the CPO mess, starboard side, causing a 6" hole, above the waterline — no damage other than to three lockers containing personal clothing. Self-inflicted Damage Damage sustained from contusion of broadsides was very considerable, causing undue discomfort to the personnel and much work on their part to make compartments habitable. Tile decking in washrooms, water closets and heads were ruptured throughout the ship. Urinals were blown off bulkheads, water pipes broken, and heads flooded. Longitudinal beams were broken and cracked in many parts of the ship having to be *Miller was a passenger on HMS Rodney returning to the United States. 24 shored. (Note: ship constructed with longitudinal beams instead of athwarthships as is the case in practically all ships.) The overhead decking ruptured and many bad leaks were caused by bolts and rivets coming loose. All compartments on the main deck had water flooding the decks. The British navy does not use swabs but wet rags to mop up any excess water, not only requiring considerably more man hours but also not accomplishing as efficient a job as a swab. Cast iron water mains were ruptured and in many instances broke, flooding compartments. Electric lighting in compartments was left on during the action. All electric lights were disintegrated and bulbs and sockets snapped off the leads causing live wires to be existent throughout the ship. Bulkheads, furniture, lockers and fittings were blown loose causing undue damage to permanent structures when the ship rolled. HMS Rodney, a Nelson-c/ass battleship, launched 17 December 1925 by Cammell Laird; length overall 710 feet; beam 106 feet; draft 28V2 feet; speed 23 knots; displacement 33,900 tons; Armament: nine 16-inch, twelve 6-inch, six 4.7- inch antiaircraft, twenty-four 2-pounder (shell weight) antiaircraft, twelve machine guns, two 24.5-inch torpedo tubes, two aircraft. Served Home Fleet, 1939-42; Force H, 1943; Home Fleet 1943-45; Scrapped 1948. (Courtesy of the Naval Historical Collection, W.L. Mull in Papers) 25 ■:■■■■*■ ml The Bismarck nt complete to her deck level. Barb the main and se batteries have b installed. (Court Wurttembergisci Landesbibliothe Stuttgart) CONFIDENTIAL- Tor&i7E PLAN BISMAJ^CK PRELIMINARY DESIGN BRANCH BUREAU OF SHIPS »vy p The ship's badge was (he coat of arms of (he Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. 1 / »l uulilJ c «-■ TITANIC BISMARCK Titanic and Bismarck: A Tale of Two Ships maiden voyages when they sank, were both gargantuan: The Titanic was 882 feet long and 92 feel wide; the Bismarck. 823 feet llded with an Iceberg on April 14. 1912, and sank the 15th, with the Dl u An antiaircraft gun points over the wreck of the Bismarck. During the battleship's last days, its batteries fired at British reconnaissance planes and Swordfish biplanes, f*' 7989 National Geographic Society) The aft fire-control station from which the highest-ranking survivor. Third Gunnery Officer Baron vor Mullenheim-Rechberg, directed gun turrets Caesar and Dora. (® 7989 National Geographic Society) Ballard (in jumpsuit) helping haul Argo aboard On this occasion, hundreds of yards of black polypropele of unknown origin were entangled around the back of the vehicle. (Photo by tack Maurer) Ballard directs a photographic survey of the Bismarck from the control room of the Star Hercules fav r. ing images sent from the deep-sea robot Argo. f* 7989 National Geographic Society) "/ was surprised to find the Bismarck sitting upright, proudly on the bottom. We found no human remains. We touched nothing and took nothing. " -Robert D. Ballard, 22 June 1989, Press Conference, Washington, DC The Quest to Find the Bismarck- 1 988/89 June 8, 1989, 0959 hours: British ship Star Hercules spots German battleship Bismarck. But there are no fearful lookouts peering through binoculars. Instead, eager ocean- ographers are scanning video monitors, watching images sent up from the dark depths three miles below. After 48 years in the cold bottom waters of the North Atlantic, the Bismarck comes under the floodlights of Argo, the undersea robot that three years ago found the broken hull of the British liner Titanic, lost in 1912. The modern search for the Bismarck actually began in July 1988. After completing a foray into the Mediterranean to look at ancient Roman wrecks, Robert D. Ballard of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) conducted his first expedition to find the supposedly invincible World War II battleship. The cry was "Find the Bismarckl" They found no sign. With continued funding from National Geographic, the Quest Group, and Turner Broadcasting System, the underwater explorer returned in May 1989 to the reported sinking site of the Bismarck. Ballard was inspired largely by his heritage — both German and English. Also, he was intrigued by parallels in the fates of the Bismarck and the Titanic. Both the largest ships of their time, they were considered unsinkable. The Titanic sunk on her maiden voyage, the Bismarck The bow of the Bismarck. (All photos in this section ®1989, courtesy of National Geographic Society) on her first campaign. In each case, their watery graves are more than two miles deep. Finding the German warship would prove the discovery of the Titanic had been no accident, and validate the $3.2 million spent during the last seven years by the Office of the Chief of Naval Research for the development of Argo and Jason. Ideally, Ballard would have liked to use the agile robot Jason, which earlier this spring had transmitted two weeks of live color video broadcasts from the floor of the Mediterranean to students around the United States and Canada as part of the Jason Project (box, page 34, and Oceanus, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 84-87). But without a three-mile fiber-optic cable, Jason could not be used on the Bismarck mission. Although not quite as maneuverable as Jason, Argo was still very well suited for the job. It could record top-quality black-and-white video images, and its still cameras could take high-resolution color photographs. Also, Argo could work at depth for days at a time (unlike manned submersibles such as Alvin). O n 11 July 1988, aboard the chartered I British ship Starella, Ballard and his team first positioned themselves over the general area 600 miles west of Brest, France, where the Bismarck had met her fate. Argo was lowered into the water at the point reported by the battleship Rodney, one of the British ships 27 that had pursued the Bismarck until her final agony on 27 May 1941 (article, pp. 20-26). The research team had only a general idea of the ocean floor in the area, so they carefully recorded the terrain as they searched. Below, the Porcupine Abyssal Plain stretched for miles in all directions. It was interrupted only by one small mountain range, roughly 1,800 feet high, called the Abyssal Hill Province. As Ballard says, "The last thing we wanted was for the Bismarck to have come down in here. And that's exactly what it did. We didn't know that at the time. When we began mounting the effort, we naturally picked the most benign terrain to begin the search." Argo has two different sensing modes. Its sonar systems can cover a wide range of terrain. These are useful for spotting large objects, like the hull of a ship. Alternatively, its camera systems cover a reduced area, but can detect the smaller debris from a ship, which is usually more widely dispersed. Most of the search for the Bismarck was performed visually, because past experience points to more success by following debris trails. (The side-scan sonars, meanwhile, keep Argo from bumping into things.) On 14 July, the crew picked up a debris trail that led to an impact crater "the size of a soccer field." Ballard and his team were convinced they had found the Bismarck. However, because of other commitments, they had to pull up their equipment and head for home on 21 July. Although they had not yet seen any distinctive features on video, they hoped unprocessed photographs would later give a definitive answer. And so they did, but not the answer the explorers were waiting for. "The real sword in our heart in 1988 was the image of a teak rudder. We knew the Bismarck did not have a teak rudder," Ballard says. "We later discovered that right where the Bismarck was supposed to be was a commercial four-masted clipper ship from the 1800s. A fascinating subject unto itself, but not what we were after." But 1988's search was not in vain. It taught the explorers about the conditions below. Since the clipper ship's debris trail lay north to south, they set up an east-west search grid in 1989. And since the clipper ship's trail had been strewn over V/* miles, they knew that a huge ship like the Bismarck would leave one as long or longer. To maximize their chances of finding it, they spaced their transects a mile apart. The combined search area was increased from 20 square miles to a total of 120 (a search area 20 percent larger than for the Titanic). This area now included the mountain range. In 1989, Argo first went down on 29 May. Soon into the search, Argo picked up signs of light debris. The trail petered out to nothing. This pattern played itself out four times. Then, four days before the expedition was scheduled to close, the researchers discovered yet another trail, finding increasingly larger In 1988, the image of a teak rudder proved that the researchers had not yet found the Bismarck. debris. Somewhat gun-shy, the team was not yet optimistic. Ballard worried that they might be looking at the remains of some other ship that had been torpedoed or lost during the war. German WHOI graduate student Hagen Schempf — dubbed "the spirit of the cruise" — was very familiar with the Bismarck from historical drawings and photographs. He was the first to link this debris trail to the Bismarck when Argo came across a large piece of superstructure. The positioning of two small portholes and a ladder was distinctive, and the jagged outer edges of the metal indicated a violent explosion. The team was finally on the right track. Soon the explorers could see that something had slid down the mountain range, "* '. '■■■ -^ In 1989, the portholes and ladder on this superstructure debris were the first tell-tale signs that the Bismarck lay nearby. 28 1989 Dorsetshire □ Rodney a King George V 1989 Approximate ship tracks of the two-year search. British ships that fought against the Bismarck reported three different sinking sites. The debris trail of a 19th-century sailing ship found in 1988 is shaded (left). The exact location of the Bismarck has not been disclosed by Ballard. causing a mile-long avalanche, but they could not tell whether it had been the ship itself or some other large structure, such as one of the four huge gun turrets that had fallen out of the ship. They circled the avalanche to see if there were any other impact craters nearby, but found none. After returning to the rut, they found a large object that they thought might be one end of the ship, but it turned out to be one of the turrets, lying upside down in the mud. On the morning of 8 June, the sonar suddenly indicated a large object ahead. Kirk Gustafson, the "flier" controlling Argo at the time, was ordered immediately to raise the robot. "Five seconds later, there she was," Ballard recalls. "The ship's hull came into view, and then the guns. We knew we had found the Bismarck." The gods of the seas, meanwhile, acted up. The calm weather that had blessed the explorers during the search phase suddenly turned around. "When we found the ship. ..the sea got very angry, very rough, very quickly," Ballard says. "For a short moment, we got up to 50-knot winds. The sea conditions were like when the Bismarck sank." W hen Argo next hovered over the wreck, the researchers examined it thoroughly. Almost sixteen-thousand feet below, the Bismarck lies serenely, hauntingly, imperially upright, her superstructure blown away, her heavily armored hull rusting but essentially intact. Only the upper 30 feet of the wreck rests above the mud, which now appears almost as a waterline. This means it is not possible to assess damage sustained from torpedoes. The fact that the Bismarck's hull is intact, according to Ballard, confirms that scuttling played an important role in her sinking (box, page 30). "I have looked at scuttled ships. I have looked at ships that have fought scuttling — ships that didn't want to sink. Scuttled ships, because they open up their compartments, are fully flooded and fully pressure-compensated.... "There are no air passages or compartments like those in the stern section of the Titanic, which fought the sinking. If the Bismarck was buttoned up and held onto an air pocket, an implosion would go off catastrophically. You would certainly see some evidence of that, in the surface deck, or somewhere. When you see catastrophic implosions, as I have, you see that they are very explosive. We saw absolutely no evidence of any implosions." From Argo's vantage point, the team recorded every square inch of the ship's upper surface on film. The mother ship for the 1989 expedition, Star Hercules, from Aberdeen, Scotland, was critical to such a complete survey. 29 Sunk or Scuttled? /xfter the Rodney arrived at Scapa Flow for refueling, after the Dorsetshire returned her German survivors to Newcastle, and after the Bismarck settled somewhere in the mud some 15,600 feet down, who can claim credit for sinking the Bismarck? The Rodney, King George V, and the other British ships blasted the Bismarck with 2,876 shells, and not one penetrated her hull. Vice-Admiral Tovey, from his flagship, King George V, had radioed to Vice-Admiral Somerville: "Cannot get her to sink with guns. " In all, the Prince of Wales fired the only two shells that exploded under the thick skin of the Bismarck, causing the oil slick and boiler damage during the Battle of Denmark Strait. William H. Garzke, Jr., Staff Naval Architect with Gibbs & Cox, Arlington, Virginia, points out that the Bismarck was extraordinarily sturdy, and it was unlikely that all the shells that hit could have sunk her. The following is the total shells fired during the last battle. Shell Type 16-inch 14-inch 8-inch 8-inch 6-inch 5 'A- inch Number 380 339 527 254 716 660 Ship Rodney King George V Norfolk Dorsetshire Rodney King George V After several British ships were forced to retire because of dwindling fuel, the heavy cruiser Dorsetshire was ordered to torpedo the Bismarck until she sank. The cruiser launched two torpedoes at the port side of the battleship and a third at the starboard. Two were confirmed hits. Soon after, the mighty battleship went down. Even these last, seemingly crushing blows are insuf- ficient evidence to give credit to the Dorsetshire. Scuttling, a procedure in which the crew floods the ship by reversing water pumps, opening seacocks, and exploding scuttling charges, was a routine in the German Navy, or Kriegsmarine, to assure that technology and material stayed out of Allied hands. The famous pocket battleship Graf Spee was ordered by Hitler himself to be scuttled to destroy its new technology. The aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, the pocket battleship Scharnhorst, and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper were all scuttled after their incapacitation by Allied forces. German Vice-Admiral Stiegel (chief of German battleships) prepared a now- declassified, postwar report on the fate of Germany's last four battleships (printed in Oceanus courtesy of the Operational Archives Branch of the Naval Historical Center). Therein he stated that one of Bismarck's two surviving officers, Lieutenant Gerhard Junack, was issued orders to scuttle the ship. Stiegel included some of the Lieutenant's testimony: "Junack received orders to carry out 'Measure V. ' This was an order which was to be executed after 10 minutes time if not previously counter- manded, and specified the measures for scuttling a ship. For the execution of this measure, Junack and his party went above in order to open some valves on the middle deck; here he observed lights burning all over this deck, just as if the crew had gone ashore on a Sunday afternoon. " Stiegel further noted that the ship capsized with her engines and electricity still on. If the ship had been sunk by the enemy, it is unlikely that these mechanisms would have still functioned. The eyewitness account of the other surviving officer, former adjutant to Lindemann and fourth gunnery officer Baron Burkard von MOllenheim-Rechberg, further supports that the Bismarck was scuttled. "I certainly was aware, as I left the aft fire- control station at about 1020 [the time when the Dorsetshire launched its torpedoes], that the Bismarck was very, very slowly sinking. Heavily down by her stern, she was behaving as though one compartment after the other was flooding, gradually but irresistibly. She showed all the effects to be expected after the scuttling charges had been fired and the seacocks opened somewhere about 1000. " So perhaps scuttling was responsible for Bismarck's sinking and the Germans can take the credit. But Garzke is quick to note that until the ship's underside, which is currently buried deep in mud, can be examined for metal rips bending outwards, we cannot be sure of the toll scuttling took, if any, in the Bismarck's demise. At the press conference of 22 June 1989, Robert Ballard said the Bismarck appeared from the outside to have been scuttled rather than sunk. "Only scuttled ships tend to make it to the bottom in one piece. " He also commented that it is "splitting hairs" to worry how the Bismarck went down: "Both of these things [torpedo- ing and scuttling] were going on at the same time. " MOllenheim-Rechberg feels the part of the torpedoes was small: "I am morally certain that the Bismarck would have sunk without these torpedo hits, only perhaps somewhat more slowly. " 30 To search for the Bismarck, the Star Hercules used an advanced method of navigation called dynamic positioning, which employs a computer linked directly to the ship's thrusters. Acoustic transponders on the bottom send distinctive sounds, and pick up sound from a hydrophone. To determine the ship's relative position, the computer monitors the time these "pings" take to travel to and from the ship. To move the vessel, scientists simply enter their desired position into the computer. It then makes calculations and sends instructions to the thrusters, constantly making adjustments whenever necessary. The ship — which Ballard fondly calls "a mud boat of the oil industry" — has advanced propulsion and dynamic positioning, an electronic method of controlling the ship and Argo. The researchers themselves can position the ship using a computer linked directly to the ship's thrusters. Before dynamic positioning, the researchers had to plot runs over a target and relay the data to the captain, who then had to try to keep the ship on course, fighting winds and currents. With dynamic positioning, the ship can follow search tracks very accurately, but more importantly, it can hover like a helicopter, or move a couple of feet at a time in any direction. Ballard and his crew were amazed to find that Bismarck's wooden deck appeared well-preserved, unlike Titanic's pine deck. The German warship sits 3,000 feet deeper, but wood-eating microbes are equally active at both depths, according to Holger Jannasch, a deep-sea microbiologist at WHOI (profile, Oceanus, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 79-84). He says that the more resinous the type of wood, the more resistant it is to decomposition, because resin is toxic to deep-sea bacteria. However, resin is distributed unevenly in nature. If the deck is as intact as it appears, the microbiologist suggests it may have been treated throughout with a resinous preservative. Historical research should reveal whether this was the case. The discoverers observed very few spots where shells had actually pierced the deck. This came as no surprise because of the close range at which the British were shooting; most of their fire traveled horizontally rather than in an arcing trajectory. On one dive, the explorers lowered Argo into the space where one of the gun turrets used to be. This was an unusual move for the robot, which was designed only to be towed horizontally. "We turned Argo into Jason, Jr.,*" Ballard recalls. "I guess that was just out of frustration for not having Jason, but it was safe. These turrets are 28 feet across and we were dynamically holding, so what the heck!" Periodically, the crew brought Argo to the surface to recharge its batteries and reload or check film. On one such occasion they remounted the regularly downward-looking cameras so they could look forward. Then Argo went down the side of the Bismarck and closed in on the armor plating. * Jason, Jr., the smaller prototype for Jason, was operated from Alvin on the second visit to the Titanic in 1986. It went right inside and made an eerie passage down the grand staircase. 31 Bismarck's Seaplanes The starboard side of the hangar. S. ome of the recognizable features on the Bismarck wreck were the hangars where her seaplanes were stored, the catapult to launch them, and the cranes to recover them from the ocean. The Bismarck carried four, single- engine Arado-196 aircraft with twin floats. While two were stored beneath the mainmast, the other two were in ready- hangars on either side of the stack. The catapult was between the stack and the mainmast. None of the seaplanes were launched during the last nine days of the Bismarck saga, but there were a few close calls. On 26 May 1941, a British Catalina spotted the Bismarck after her whereabouts had been unknown to British forces for more than 31 hours (box, pp. 14-15). The Germans fired on and considered sending their planes after it, but the seas were rough, and Captain Lindemann thought that recovery would be impossible. On 26 May, a Swordfish biplane landed a torpedo on the Bismarck's rudder, destroying her ability to steer. Anticipating the worst, Fleet Commander Lutjens tried to send the Bismarck's War Diary to safety. One of the planes was put into the catapult, but a compressed-air line had broken, preventing the launch. Rather than leave the plane in the catapult, where it would be a fire hazard during battle, they drilled holes in the floats and tipped it off the side of the ship where it sank. What became of the remaining three planes is as yet unknown. The discovery team saw no sign of them during their exploration of the wreck. Inside gun turret Bruno. The aft capstan. The bridge was reinforced with thick a 32 "Rounds literally hit like bugs on a windshield," says Ballard. "We saw no penetration of the armor, but we did not inspect all of the ship since we were not able to go below the water line." Once when the team was raising Argo, it suddenly became fouled in line. Their worst fear was that somehow the robot was attached irretrievably to the Bismarck. No one wanted to lose Argo, now valued at $300,000, nor the priceless data aboard. After painstakingly tugging the robot upward, Argo finally surfaced, along with hundreds of yards of entangled polypropylene — the origin of which is still a mystery. The weather, meanwhile, remained rough — so much so that the researchers had to sit it out one day. After making their final photographic surveys of the wreck on 12 June, they raised their equipment for the last time. Almost on cue from the gods, the weather turned around again. The sea returned to a flat calm. Next year Ballard will lead an expedition to the Great Lakes where Argo and Jason will probe ships lost during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. Since there are no deep freshwater animals that bore into wood, these ships should be in excellent condition. There's also very preliminary talk about looking for the huge Japanese battleship Yamato lost in 1945 off southern Japan. Several nations were represented in the crew aboard the Star Hercules, including Britain, West Germany, the United States, and Canada. While steaming away from the wreck, they held a memorial service for those lost from both the Bismarck and her adversary, the HMS Hood. Everyone aboard, many in naval uniforms (Ballard himself is a Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve), gathered on the fantail. British captain Derek Latter read the following commemoration, written by Schempf : Being gathered here today gives us the opportunity to remember those British and German seamen who lost their lives during the days of this tragic sea battle. * We have the opportunity here to put to rest all those souls lost at sea during that battle. May they rest in peace from here on forth. We should look at this ceremony as a moment of remembrance for those people caught up in the * Warships remain the property of their country, unlike commercial ships lost in the high seas, which are fair game for salvors and treasure hunters. In the past, the West German government has been adamant about leaving sunken ships in place as war memorials. According to Commander Jan Scharf, Assistant Naval Attache of the West German Embassy in Washington, DC, East Germany has no claim to warships from World War II, since West Germany is the only successor of the Third Reich. A Cape Verdean sailor prepares a makeshift wreath to honor those lost from the Bismarck and the Hood. (Photo by Joseph H. Bailey) turmoil of war, all of them having suffered; many of them dying. Let us hope that this kind of human sacrifice and suffering may never be asked of mankind again. A 30-second moment of silence followed. A makeshift wreath was thrown into the sea. □ A note to our readers: Ballard is writing his personal account of the quest for the Bismarck, to appear in the November 1989 edition of National Geographic. He is also the new host of the weekly television series, "National Geographic Explorer" on TBS SuperStation. This particular expedition will be recounted in a one-hour long episode entitled "Search for Battleship Bismarck," premiering on 29 October. We, the editors of Oceanus, thank the National Geographic Society for their cooperation in providing us with copyrighted visual material presented at Ballard's Washington press conference. 33 Your Kids and the Sport of Discovery I he discovery of the Bismarck is linked to a crisis in American education. The searches for the German battleship in 1988 and 1989 were made on the final legs of cruises for the Jason Project which aims to rectify this crisis. The United States is now ranked 1 7th in the world in scientific literacy. In U.S. colleges, 50 percent of graduate students in engineering, physics, chemistry, and math are foreign born. Many return home after completing their degrees, taking their newfound analytical skills and technical expertise with them. Robert D. Ballard, leader of the Jason Project, is certain these statistics do not result from problems during the college years, but rather much earlier. He observes that math is the favorite class of fourth graders, but by grade 12 it becomes the most dreaded. What is going on in between ? "Kids perceive science as something done by nerds sitting at computer terminals — sort of social misfits, " Ballard says. "Kids are deeply affected by peer pressure in making decisions. They're saying 7 don't want to be a scientist' not because it isn't exciting, interesting, and stimulating, but because they don't want to be one of those people. They're turning off to science. " Ballard's observations on childhood motivation come from close-hand experience, having two sons who have already passed through grade 12. His 20-year old son Todd* accompanied him on both years of the search for the Bismarck and was flying Argo when they found the Roman wreck I sis during the Jason Project. The culmination of the Jason Project was the first live video broadcast from the bottom of the sea. According to Ballard, during the first two weeks of May 1989, enough kids viewed the Jason Project to fill the Superbowl three times over. Students gathered in museums and other educational institutions around North America to watch Ballard and his crew use the robot Jason for exploring underwater volcanoes and studying a graveyard of Roman shipwrecks. The aim of this project is to show America's youngsters that science is a healthy contact sport, played by a team. Ballard and the major sponsors of the Jason Project (Electronic Data Systems, National Geographic, the Quest Group, Turner Broadcasting System, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution) are planning to set up a Jason Foundation to continue relating the adventure of science and engineering to school children. The goal is to turn a whole new generation on to science. "Todd was killed in a car accident on 25 July 1989. In May, thousands of school children gathered to watch live video broadcasts of Jason exploring the depths of the Mediterranean. (Photo by Tom Kleindinst, WHOI) 34 Seattle Ports & Harbors *nr " ^ Port Development in the illp* V *#*^ ^^ "-^£^. \7m Boston Harbor (® Photo by Spencer Grant) U.S.: Status and Outlook by John M. Pisani I he ports of the United States play a strategic role in the nation's trade, economy, and defense. Since its founding days, the United States has been dependent on water transportation for trade, and today every major metropolitan region of the United States centers around, or is closely linked by rail or highway with, a port. In addition to the coastal harbors and bays, port facilities have emerged along navigable inland rivers and the Great Lakes. The end result has been the creation of a vital network of ocean, Great Lakes, and inland river ports. Functionally, deep-water and shallow-draft ports are the conduits for transferring cargo between water and land carriers. Their principal reason for being, however, is to further the economic development of surrounding communities by creating jobs, income, and tax revenues. Thus, U.S. ports mirror the economies of the regions they serve. They are sensitive to population and industrial growth, raw material patterns, and government policy. Ports contribute significantly to the national economy as well. The U.S. Maritime Administration has determined that the total amount of economic activity generated by the U.S. port industry for the handling of waterborne cargo was $98 billion in 1988. This means that the total impact of U.S. ports on the economy averaged about $268 million a day last year. In addition, commercial port activities in 1988 generated 1.2 million jobs, a $50 billion contribution to the Gross National Product, personal income of $28 billion, federal taxes of $10 billion, and state and local taxes of $3.5 billion. Furthermore, approximately 70 percent of U.S. Customs revenues come from import duties collected at ports. This amounted to more than $13 billion last year. Ports are no longer viewed as backwater institutions. The days are gone when ports were just docks. They are now seen as revenue John M. Pisani is Director of the Office of Port and Intermodal Development of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC. This article had been drawn from a paper prepared for the 16th World Ports Conference of the International Association of Ports and Harbors held in Miami Beach, Florida, in April of 1989. 37 generators. Increasingly, ports are diversifying and becoming involved in nontraditional activities to enhance revenues. Boston and Baltimore are just two examples of several urban ports where waterfronts have experienced considerable mixed-use development and redevelopment in recent years with the construction of hotels, offices, condominiums, restaurants, and shopping malls. Ports also are essential to our national security. U.S. commercial port facilities are used routinely for the shipment of military cargoes. Major naval installations are located at a number of U.S. ports. That number will increase with the construction of the new bases envisioned in the U.S. Navy's strategic home port initiative, which aims at spreading the fleet among several ports to reduce vulnerability from air or missile attack. Furthermore, two dozen ports have been designated as national defense ports to support the mobilization, deployment, and resupply of U.S. forces abroad during a major conflict. The Present Port System Port development in the United States has been the responsibility of both the public and private sectors. The U.S. government, through the Army Corps of Engineers, performs the dredging and maintenance of federally authorized navigation channels, and the construction of breakwaters, locks, and jetties. It also provides navigation aids such as lights, channel markers, and buoys. Public port entities and private industry at the local level plan, develop, and manage landside terminal facilities and services. Bulk terminal facilities are usually built and operated by private companies, and public port authorities are the primary developers of transfer facilities for handling general cargo. The most common entity is the independent navigational district, administered as a public authority set up under state law to develop and manage a specific harbor area within defined political jurisdictions. With no central port planning body, the United States has a system of diverse local port organizations. Although creatures of government, these state and local agencies engage vigorously in competitive commercial enterprise — their most visible activity. This public-private role allows port authorities to respond more quickly to their customers' needs, while at the same time attracting economic development. Port and Waterway Channels While the federal and local port roles have been performed successfully side by side for many decades, the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-662) made significant changes in the roles, obligations, and opportunities of U.S. ports. This act altered the roles of federal, state, and local authorities in accomplishing harbor and waterway channel improvements and maintenance. It required that local interests assume a greater responsibility and share of the costs of channel improvements and dredged material disposal. The act further included the authorization of 48 new port and inland waterway projects at a total cost of $5.4 billion. A review of the progress made since the act's passage indicates that 23 navigation projects, both shallow- and deep- draft, are being processed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, including 12 projects already under construction. Historically, while Congress has delegated design, feasibility analysis, construction, and maintenance of these commercially navigable channels to the Corps of Engineers, it has appropriated the monies — with the exception of certain required local contributions and guarantees — from public revenues. This policy changed in 1978, when the 95th Congress approved P.L. 95-502, which requires user contribution to the construction of the inland waterway system by means of a fuel tax, now 10 cents a gallon. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 will incrementally phase in an increase in the fuel tax to 20 cents a gallon between 1990 and 1995. The public law that instituted the fuel tax, also established the Inland Waterway Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury. Revenues from the tax are paid into the trust fund and may be used by the Corps of Engineers for up to 50 percent of the capital costs of a project only after congressional appropriation for the project. In an effort to consider projects on a standardized biannual basis, Congress enacted the Water Resources Development Act of 1988. This act authorized three deep-draft harbor and three inland waterway navigation projects that would cost $827.8 million with a federal share of $418.8 million. An additional $387.5 million would be appropriated from the Inland Waterway Trust Fund to cover half of the construction cost of two locks and dams on the lower Ohio River. Deep-Draft Port Facilities There are 1,941 deep-draft marine terminals in the United States, with 3,214 berths for ships (Table 1). These figures include both publicly and privately owned facilities. The distribution of U.S. port terminals and berths among the four coasts is fairly even. The East Coast has the largest share of each, approximately 33 percent, with the Gulf and West Coasts accounting for about 25 percent each, and the Great Lakes totaling just under 20 percent. With respect to berth types, general cargo berths represent 38.4 percent of the total with no significant coastal concentrations. Dry bulk berths account for 22.5 percent with the heaviest concentrations in the Great Lakes (39.7 percent), Gulf (22.7 percent), and the North Atlantic (15.9 percent). Liquid bulk berths represent 19.9 percent with major concentrations in the North Atlantic (31.4 percent) and the Gulf (28.4 percent). Finally, passenger berths and other miscellaneous berths (barge, mooring, and 38 Table 1. U.S. port terminals by berth type and coastal range. Berth North South South North Great Berth Type Total Atlantic Atlantic Gulf Pacific Pacific Lakes General Cargo Berths: 1234 284 798 278 275 763 96 General Cargo 666 165 84 207 85 71 54 Container 140 43 17 12 48 20 - IASH/SEABEE 3 - 1 2 - - - Roll on/Roll off (Ro-Ro) 34 7 18 2 3 4 - Automobile 28 15 2 - 8 3 - General/Container 39 16 6 1 7 8 1 General/Ro-Ro 44 8 10 14 10 2 - General Cargo/Passenger 12 - 6 2 - 4 - General/Dry Bulk 139 17 21 18 25 23 35 General/Liquid Bulk 83 2 25 15 16 19 6 Container/Ro-Ro 45 11 8 4 13 9 - Container/Dry Bulk 1 - - 1 - - - Dry Bulk Berths: 722 775 34 764 45 77 287 Coal 58 16 - 11 2 - 29 Grain 95 10 1 30 10 9 35 Ore 66 11 3 6 - 6 40 Logs 15 - - - - 15 - Wood Chips 13 - - - - 13 - Cement 40 8 4 3 3 2 20 Chemical 78 8 4 49 3 6 8 Dry Bulk -Other 299 52 17 46 18 18 148 Dry Bulk/Liquid Bulk 58 10 5 19 9 8 7 Liquid Bulk Berths: 640 207 53 782 85 67 52 Crude 69 9 - 42 12 6 - Refined 294 122 30 36 31 37 38 Petroleum-crude/refined 159 27 15 63 29 19 6 Liquified Petroleum Gas 6 1 - 4 1 - - Liquified Natural Gas 5 3 1 1 - - - Liquid Bulk -Other 107 39 7 36 12 5 8 Passenger Berths: 72 77 77 5 77 73 9 Passenger 48 7 17 5 17 1 1 Ferry 24 4 - - - 12 8 Other Berths: 546 798 78 737 52 76 77 Barge 329 118 11 112 29 48 11 Mooring 101 35 6 11 7 18 24 Inactive 99 45 1 7 6 6 34 Other 17 - - 1 10 4 2 TOTAL 3214 809 320 760 414 396 515 Includes those commercial cargo handling facilities with a minimum depth alongside of 25 feet for ocean ports and 18 feet for Great Lakes ports. Ro-Ro is short for roll on-roll off type cargo, such as trucks filled with goods. Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Port and Intermodal Development, Port Facility Inventory inactive) account for 2.2 percent and 17 percent, respectively. The majority of marine terminals at U.S. seaports are owned by the private sector. They are predominantly dry and liquid bulk facilities. Public ownership, on the other hand, is heavily concentrated in general cargo and passenger facilities. Most of these publicly owned facilities are leased to and operated by privately owned terminal operators. Essentially, the operators of seaport facilities comprise 1) public entities or authorities, 2) independent marine terminal operators, 3) transport carrier-owned or related marine terminal operators, and 4) private industrial companies. The deepest onshore terminal facilities in the United States for oil tankers are located at the Port of Valdez, Alaska, and include one floating pier having a depth of 150 feet alongside. The ports of Seattle and Tacoma in the state of Washington have the deepest draft capability for loading grain vessels, while Hampton Roads, Virginia, is the deepest coal export port, having recently loaded a collier destined for a South Korean steel plant with a record 151,000 tons of metallurgical coal. Shallow-Draft Port Facilities U.S. inland river ports and terminals are distinct from coastal seaports in several respects. Aside from being shallow (14 feet or less), these facilities are less concentrated geographically. The inland system combines both port complexes and isolated terminal operations alongside its river banks. Inland ports developed around metropolitan areas, as did ports of the coastal regions. However, unlike the coastal regions, the inland river system provides almost limitless access points. Historically, this has permitted the selection of terminal sites to be determined by the needs and convenience of the private user, and today, 89 percent of inland facilities are 39 Table 2. Total U.S. domestic and foreign waterborne commerce from 1984 to 1987 (thousands of long tons). 1984 Percent 1985 Percent 1986 Percent 1987 Percent Foreign Trade 676.8 44 640.8 43 674.9 44 718.7 45 Domestic Ocean 365.2 24 361.8 25 356.5 23 379.2 24 and Great Lakes Domestic Inland 484.3 32 477.3 32 500.4 33 508.7 31 and Intracoastal Total 1,526.3 100 1,479.9 100 1,531.8 100 1,606.6 100 owned by private concerns. This compares with 64-percent private ownership at coastal ports. Bulk commodities represent about 89 percent of the business of these inland river terminals. The commodities are generally the products of, or raw materials for, the companies that built and operate the terminals. With so many terminals on shallow-draft rivers serving private users, handling capacity is adequate to meet the needs of commerce. At the remaining 11 percent of public terminals, the ability to handle needed commodities is sufficient because of a lack of congestion. Since most river facilities are private terminals rather than public ports, the concept of a modern inland port authority is just beginning to emerge. Inland river ports and terminals are, on the whole, a composite of truck, rail, barge, and pipeline facilities. Thus they tend to be critical junctures in the national transportation network. Comparative Commerce Movement U.S. waterborne commerce illustrates the important cargo handling role of the nation's shallow- and deep-draft ports. The waterborne traffic at U.S. ocean, Great Lakes, and river ports consists of three types: foreign trade, domestic ocean and Great Lakes commerce, and domestic inland waterway movements. Total domestic and foreign waterborne commerce handled at U.S. inland waterway, Great Lakes, and ocean ports ranged between 1.5 and 1 .6 billion long tons annually during the 1984-1987 period (Table 2). During this four-year span, all three types of waterborne traffic remained relatively stable. Foreign commerce was the largest category of waterborne movements (the top 25 U.S. ports in 1987 handled 72.6 percent of the foreign trade by tonnage and 86.6 percent by value [Table 3]) but, when totaled, domestic ocean, Great Lakes, and inland waterway traffic comprised 55 percent of total movements. (In 1987, the volume of domestic ocean and Great Lakes cargo accounted for 24 percent of total U.S. waterborne trade.) The inland and intracoastal waterways of the United States averaged 33 percent more tonnage than was moved in domestic ocean and Great Lakes commerce during the 1984-1987 period. The total transported in 1987 on the major waterways — the Mississippi River system anrd its tributaries, the intracoastal waterway systems of the Atlantic and Gulf, and the inland Table 3. U.S. oceanborne foreign trade for top 25 U.S. ports (1987). Rank U.S. Ports Total Value (millions) 1 New York, NY 2 Long Beach, CA 3 Los Angeles, CA 4 Seattle, WA 5 Houston, TX 6 Baltimore, MD 7 Tacoma, WA 8 Oakland, CA 9 Norfolk, VA 10 New Orleans, LA 11 Charleston, SC 12 Savannah, GA 13 Jacksonville, FL 14 Portland, OR 15 Philadelphia, PA 16 Miami, FL 17 Gramercy, LA 18 Boston, MA 19 Port .Everglades, FL 20 Corpus Christi, TX 21 San Juan, PR 22 Wilmington, DE 23 San Francisco, CA 24 Baton Rouge, LA 25 Texas City, TX $47.4 38.0 37.2 26.2 19.5 16.8 14.9 13.8 10.7 10.7 10.2 7.7 6.9 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.1 3.9 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 Top 25 Ports Total All Other Ports $311.3 $ 48.2 Total $359.5 Source: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. waterway systems of the north and south Pacific coasts — reached 508.7 million long tons. This compares with 379.2 million long tons for the domestic ocean and Great Lakes trades. Both dry and liquid commodities move on the inland waterways predominantly by barge, with dry cargo shipments exceeding the liquids on an approximate 60/40 ratio. The directions in which cargoes move depend on the product. Petroleum and fertilizers tend to move up the Mississippi River system from Gulf Coast processing facilities for agricultural and industrial users in the nation's heartland. Coal moves from the mining areas of Ohio, West Virginia, and Kentucky along the Ohio River for use in Midwest utility plants, as well as down the Mississippi to deep-water Gulf ports for export. Port Financing While absolute capital expenditures, improvements, and borrowing costs continue to rise, governmental subsidy and public support remain the same or decline. This inverse 40 relationship is pushing ports gradually to self- sufficiency. Ports must compensate for this widening income gap more from their own pockets and less from the outside. Public ports can expect to be asked by all levels of government to assume a greater "pay as you go" policy, depending where possible on the reinvestment of port earnings and the most effective use of other short- and long-term financial resources. Ports can and do discuss pricing among themselves with antitrust immunity. But many ports are very reluctant to raise their usage charges to cover their costs and increase revenues because of fierce competition. In fact, some ports can generate profits through commercial waterfront development that can be plowed back into maritime cargo investments. Today, many of the larger port authorities have the resources to issue tax-exempt revenue bonds, based on earnings and pledged assets of the port. This businesslike approach dates back to the mid-1970s and marks a clear shift from direct to indirect government assistance. Tax- exempt revenue bonds now represent about 60 percent of all financing for long-term capital improvement projects. Some ports have resorted to various other innovative financing methods, particularly short-term municipal market instruments, to offset rises in borrowing costs. Environmental, Safety, and Security Issues There are some major environmental, safety, and security problems that affect all U.S. shallow- and deep-draft ports. Erik Stromberg, President of the American Association of Port Authorities, at an international seminar sponsored by the International Maritime Organization, described five of the major environmental challenges facing commercial ports in the United States: Public Involvement in Environmental Law: Today, it is within the power of the most modest local interest group, let alone national environmental organizations, to stop a port project. The legal focus is on the process, and by allowing full utilization of complex and lengthy regulatory procedures, development interests are faced with major cost increases extending over uncertain time periods, which may result in no project at all despite substantial costs sunk into the effort. It is in this legal context that port development projects in the United States must now be planned and implemented. Dredged Material Disposal: The most prevalent single environmental issue facing ports in the United States is the proper disposal of dredged material, without which channel improvements would simply come to a halt. Ports are faced with a declining number of realistic disposal alternatives for the following reasons: upland sites are scarce; wetlands usually cannot be filled; acceptable mitigation opportunities are unavailable; there is a federal statutory presumption against open water disposal; where ocean disposal is the best alternative, sites are being designated farther out to sea; and state and local environmental agencies increasingly are advocating sediment testing and monitoring programs that could be more expensive than the dredging itself. The small volume of contaminated dredged material not only presents severe disposal problems, but the publicity, which this small fraction of the total volume of material generates, threatens the integrity of dredged material management strategies throughout the United States. The combined effect is quite serious for many ports as the cost of dredged material disposal becomes prohibitive, placing some port operations in jeopardy. Contaminated Sediments: A second, and relatively new, environmental problem facing ports involves contaminated sediments, both in shoreside development, as well as in channel projects. Over the past decade, federal and state laws have been enacted that have drastically increased the liability of port agencies. Ironically, ports are confronted with the cleanup of budget- breaking liability exposure when they initiate property that was polluted either as a result of traditional operating practices that were considered harmless, or by acts of negligence by former landowners or tenants. Under the new laws, current landowners cannot easily escape liability. Mitigation and Wetlands Preservation: Another serious nationwide challenge facing ports is the need to maintain and proceed with needed developments while at the same time meeting requirements to offset any resulting loss of critical wetlands. Today, ports must work within a system that prohibits filling even marginally valuable wetlands unless acceptable mitigation is undertaken. Unfortunately, land that could provide mitigation is nonexistent in most ports and harbors. As a result, ports are groping for local solutions without a coherent, long- range national policy, a situation which can lead only to needless delay and unnecessary expense in the search for acceptable mitigation. Reducing and Relocating Urban Ports: With the gentrification of urban areas and higher real estate values (concerns, pp. 91-93), the pressure on ports to reduce the scope or relocate their operations is growing from local communities. These concerns are a by- product of operating in the urban environ- ment where port practices can result in increased traffic near residential neighborhoods, a higher noise level, and lighted night operations. 41 Great Lakes and Inland River Ports I he Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway penetrate deep into the industrial and agricultural heartland of Canada and the United States. The invisible border snakes for 2,000 miles between eight states and two Canadian provinces. The recent Free-Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada has reduced the barrier to cross-lake transport. Also, new ice-breaking ships in these waters have lengthened the navigable season to beyond nine months. Alas, for all this system has going for it, its efficient use is scuttled by many factors. Competition is intense. Ocean ports offer shippers faster, cheaper, and more frequently scheduled vessel service in overseas trade. These coastal harbors are easier to reach, dock, and leave. Railroads offer better prices for carrying international freight arriving at ocean ports, so shippers have given Great Lakes ports very little incentive to provide intermodal container cargo facilities. With an increasing share of the world's vessels unable to navigate the Seaway locks, the waterway remains — almost exclusively— a passageway for dry bulk traffic. This trade is serviced by U.S. -flag vessels, including 1,000-foot self-unloading bulk carriers, and meets the large-volume shipping requirements of the U.S. steel, electrical power, and construction industries for coal, iron ore, gypsum, limestone, and cement ingredients. Canadian needs are similar. As the economic and demographic forces affecting these industries change, so will the shipping and port service demand on the Great Lakes. Difficulties, even on these assured routes, continually throw themselves in the path of progress. Regardless of the Free- Trade Agreement, Canadian shippers are likely to continue their preference for Canadian vessels to those of the United States in the cross-lake trade. The logistics of Seaway navigation will always remain problematic. Tolls, pilotage fees, extra fuel consumption on long, winding voyages, and bridges and locks diminish efficiency and sustain a market for other modes of trans- port. The prosperity of Seaway commerce greatly depends on grain export by both nations, because there is little likelihood that overall general cargo tonnage will increase significantly. Great Lakes ports have kept their modernization apace with demand, but for the foreseeable future physical improvements will likely take place in bulk cargo facilities. In addition to the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Great Lakes, inland ports and Additional Pressing Concerns Competition for waterfront real estate is becoming more intense in traditional urban port cities. Vacant or underutilized littoral maritime properties have become attractive investments for nonmaritime uses as the public and private interests seek access. The term "waterfront gentrification" is now a common term, describing the migration of urban populations to the waterfronts formerly devoted to commercial cargo operations. The maritime working waterfront must now share its space with commercial office buildings, retail centers, recreational facilities, and residential developments. This phenomenon has placed new pressures on the maritime industry and, in many cases, dislodged traditional activities, such as towboat and tugboat operations, barge fleeting areas, shipyards, and so on. Safe and environmentally sound management of wastes generated by vessels and facilities in ports is another major problem. Marine terminal and ship operators at U.S. ports are concerned about the potential economic impact of waste-reception facility regulations for oil, chemicals, and garbage under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships. These regulations implement the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, (MARPOL 73/ 78) in the United States. Their principal concern centers upon the potential hazardous waste liability issues related to the provisions of two important U.S. environmental laws, namely, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The control of air pollution caused by marine vessels will have significant impacts on U.S. port operations. Several states have included air quality standards for marine vessels in air pollution plans required by the Environmental Protection Agency. Additional states are expected to do so in the near future. The maritime industry favors federal preemption of state regulation of vessel air emissions in order to establish uniform nation-wide and 42 Are at a Difficult Crossroads terminals are located along many navigable rivers. The major system remains the Mississippi River and its tributaries, including the Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri rivers. Most rivers are controlled by locks and dams to access waters for commercial and recreational navigation. Private barge and towing companies move large quantities of bulk cargo to and from public and private terminals. Increased rail competition and containerization have reduced general cargo freight at many inland river ports. The Seaway has little fear of running dry, but during drought, which may become more frequent in the future (Oceanus Vol. 32, No. 2), river shippers can suffer heavy losses. During the summer of 1988, the Mississippi River system receded to its lowest level in 30 years. The resulting disruption and higher costs caused some shippers to opt for railroad transportation. Inland barge transport is also very sensitive to the export trade in grain, ana was hurt by the 1980 Soviet grain embargo. With few exceptions, the typical inland barge and towing company is in a survival mode — little capital and aging equipment. As a result, more companies may consolidate into fewer, larger companies. A similar situation has already occurred with railroads. More than the forces of economy and nature, clouds of confusion blur the organization and planning of inland shallow- draft ports. A lack of port planning has precipitated large increases in costs of barge fleeting and cargo handling. Industrial companies buy waterfront land parcels and build their plants and docks haphazardly along river banks. The industrial park-type of developments that have been built by port authorities usually service other transport modes, and offer significant potential for intermodal movement on the nation's river systems. There is a strong need for greater coordination between the inland waterway industry and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in scheduling lock repairs. Bad timing can put essential locks out of commission during the busiest part of the season. More military cargo travels on rivers now because it is cheaper; ports, however, are in danger of losing these customers. Thus inland waterways, although indispensable, are riddled with problems. Many of these problems can be mitigated and controlled with proper planning and communication. Attitudes and business practices must change with the times. But until such remedies are implemented, the full efficiency of inland waterway transport may not be realized. -IMP international standards. During 1988, heavy fines were levied on some major U.S. and foreign shipping companies carrying illegal drugs on trade routes between U.S., South American, and Caribbean ports. This unprecedented action by U.S. Customs drew the attention of the U.S. maritime industry to the need for improved cargo inspection procedures at foreign ports. Shipping lines generally are hiring trained security guards and sniffer dogs, and installing x-ray machines and closed-circuit television equipment to detect potential drug smuggling. Two key issues between the maritime industry and federal authorities are 1) the responsibility industry is to assume in the nation's antidrug effort; and 2) the liability of shipping companies when drugs are found. The vulnerability of U.S. ports to terrorist attacks is a constant concern of the U.S. Coast Guard. Using the International Maritime Organization's new preventive measures to protect passengers and crews, the Coast Guard has established maritime counter-terrorism contingency plans at a majority of U.S. ports. Coastal Seaport Issues Major shifts in world seaborne container movements have affected significant trade routes (article, pp. 47-50), and in turn, so has the directional balance of U.S. cargo flows with major impacts on land and water carriers, stevedores, terminal operators, and port authorities. To meet these changes, public and private entities are making decisions and investments in a deregulated marketplace, which will shape the future configuration of transport systems, both on water and on land, for the next decade. U.S. deep-water public ports and private terminal operators continue to respond to the pressures of shipping and new transport technology with increased automation, berthing space, terminal equipment, and storage capacity. In particular, larger container vessels, load-center ports, and increased use of double-stack container rail services have spurred the growing volume of intermodal freight. Container ships are becoming larger and more complex, and each ship imposes significant 43 demands on its ports of call. While some require a longer berth length, and a channel and berth depth of at least 45 feet, others require quay crane modifications in order to reach the farthest offshore containers on these vessels. These container ships also effect immense problems on shoreside operating logistics. Backup storage space for large numbers of boxes as well as intermodal container transfer facilities, especially for rail, all have to be improved. The load-center port -at which a carrier concentrates its operations by limiting port calls on a coastal range -has generated much concern within the industry. Indeed, the deployment of large container vessels is providing the driving force toward load centers. Despite their obvious economies of scale, these vessels are very expensive to operate. The largest are efficient enough that their high operating expenses can be controlled by fast port turnaround and high utilization. Therefore, the profitability level of these large container ships will determine the magnitude and pace of this evolution of port load centers in the future. Physically modifying terminal facilities to fit the needs of double-stack train technology is critical for many ports. To remain competitive, these major load-center ports are marshaling the technical and financial resources necessary to achieve efficient interchange of containers between rail and ocean carriers. The need to improve bridge and tunnel clearances on main and port-access lines is an issue that inhibits the growth of double-stack operations, particularly in the Northeast. Existing height, width, load limits, and curve radii restrict the use of double-stack equipment in this region. Rail access impediments occur in most U.S. container seaports. When they do, they impose additional drayage costs, which add to the total delivered price of the goods, and thus reduce their competitiveness. On-dock rail transfer facilities for containers eliminate some of these costs and improve service. Of equal importance to rail-marine access at ports is moving trucks to and from marine terminals. Perhaps, in terms of volume and the unitary nature of trucks, it is more important. Direct access to major highways and interstate routes is also critical to those ports experiencing major increases in container traffic. As the pace and volume of waterborne traffic have increased, so have reporting requirements, sometimes delaying shipment and creating port congestion and unnecessary storage charges. Thus the need for carriers, stevedores, terminal operators, and port authorities to automate and apply computer technology is significant, particularly in the management of cargo from origin to destination. Electronic information systems for rating and routing cargo, tracking shipments, stowing vessels, managing marine terminals, and releasing import freight are only a number of the technologies making up today's cargo automation mix. Progress has been slower, however, in developing computerized control of container handling equipment used in U.S. marine terminals. The tendency has been to stay with manually operated equipment. Marine container terminals worldwide are much alike in their capital-intensive develop- ment, despite drastically different labor costs. This is true because the entire system of containerized cargo transportation is extremely capital intensive and the essential elements of fast ship turnaround and high productivity are as vital in one port as they are in another. Labor costs now exceed 50 percent of the operating cost of major container terminals. At U.S. ports, longshoremen costs are significantly higher than at foreign container ports, particularly in Asia. Some skilled workers earn more than $100,000 a year (article, pp. 51-58), with the overall average of about $50,000 to $70,000. Acceptable productivity levels, therefore, can only be achieved with modern equipment and facilities, forcing capital-intensive developments in all areas, regardless of labor rates. Outlook What can public and private operators of marine terminals in the United States expect in the remaining years of the 20th century? Presently, these seaports are undergoing a period of prosperity. Revenues and traffic have increased from the depressed levels of the early 1980s. Public ports have experienced strong growth in international container freight and cruise passenger business. The end of the Persian Gulf War, improved U.S. -Soviet relations, and the U.S. -Canada Free-Trade Agreement should bolster the strength of the U.S. economy and trade, with concomitant benefits for its ports. Improvements in vessel technology will continue to require modern port terminal facilities. The number of ships calling on U.S. ports is likely to decrease, but larger and more automated vessels will increase the amount of cargo handled per ship. The result will be greater cargo tonnages handled by seaports and the need for faster vessel turnaround. Expensive, high-capacity cargo-handling equipment will be increasingly used, and port terminal operations will become even more automated, particularly in container handling where robot-controlled equipment will come into use in the next decade. Much of the stimulus for these developments will come from the steadily growing volume and changing nature of U.S. foreign trade itself, which is likely to exceed one billion tons in the early 1990s. The emergence of new trading powers during the next decade will partially account for this expanded cargo volume at the nation's seaports. Therefore, increased demand will be exerted on vessel and port terminal operators to become more productive, and hold down the costs of shipping this additional cargo. This translates into a steady pressure for new technology to increase the 44 5^ KLAND = 1ST GENERATION • Converted Dry Cargo Vessel (Pre-1960) (16 Knots) 450' • Converted Oil Tanker (1960-1970)(16Knots) 630' 2ND GENERATION • Cellular Containershlp (1970-1980)(23Knots) 3RD GENERATION • Cellular Containershlp Panamax Class (1980-1990) (23 Knots) 4TH GENERATION • Post Panamax (1988-1995)(23Knots) 700' 860' 965' 900- 1000' Containership Evolution Length © 1989 Port of Oakland Beam Size and Draft Converted to Containerships Cellular Containership Panamax * Post Panamax + II II pm\ HH'iM » "I E"" M Beam 76' 90' 90" 105' 135' Draft Less 30' 33' 38'-41' 38'-42' Than 30' © 1989 Port of Oakland 9/89 speed and efficiency with which these cargoes can be moved. The ability of U.S. seaports to proceed in a timely way with development projects in a climate of heightened public involvement and regulatory restrictions will be difficult, expensive, and complex. In the coming years, the environ- mental challenge will only intensify as port facility expansion and dredging needs come up against the proliferation of federal, state, and local laws. □ 45 Send $9.00 and your mailing address to: Oceanus Subscription Service Center P.O. Box 6419 Syracuse, NY 13217 Name: Address: City, State, Zip Make Checks Payable To: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution The Port Director's Dilemma Many Storms in a Port by John Ricklefs V_>ommercial ports are competitive entities. Competition is the driving force behind a port director's considerations; and in the United States, ports compete with each other to serve the same shipping lines. I recall the recent experience of a shipping line whose contract for service with a port on the South Atlantic was about up for renewal. The line received proposals from 12 other ports, many of which were located on totally different coastal reaches. Port competition is then not a simple function of geography, as innovations in transportation technology have changed the boundaries of traditional hinterlands. Boston's Massport, for example, struggles not only with its neighbors to the north and south — Halifax and New York — but also with ports on the Pacific west coast and the South Atlantic. In many critical ways, this competitive struggle is not simply to maximize market share, but often to avoid going out of business. Just as in the private sector, the market is never big enough to go around. The second thing to keep in mind about the port director's world is that in the port business it is always a buyer's market because of the overabundance of port facilities. Thus, knowledge of the market is fundamental; and in the container intermodal industry, the market is first, last, and always an international phenomenon. No cargo will flow across the berth that is not carried there by one of a relatively small set of international shipping companies. Each of these companies has its distinct corporate culture, serves shippers and consignees worldwide, calls on ports around the world, and operates in the United States with antitrust immunity. To gain their business is, for the port director, to stay in business. The shipping line is the customer. The Shifting Trade-Route Factor Traditionally, there were two key international factors that drove shipping lines to choose a string of ports that would form a trade-route loop. The first of these factors was the foreign origin or destination of cargoes carried on the loop. We can attribute much of the competitive disadvantage experienced particularly by North Hong Kong's towering skyline is an anachronistic backdrop for this traditional Chinese junk. Atlantic and Gulf Ports to the historic shift of a major share of the world's cargoes to Asia. In 1978, for the first time the tonnage of cargo traded between the United States and Asia eclipsed that traded with Europe. Trade parallels investment, and investment is forever searching the globe for higher productivity. I provide management advice to many ports in Asia. One of my favorite ports is Pinang, on the Strait of Malacca in Malaysia. Pinang is also a favorite of tourists visiting Southeast Asia. It is known as the city of a thousand Buddhas. I have spent many wonderful hours wandering along the tiny streets of Pinang, examining the wares in small market stalls and marvelling at the classical Chinese opera house and square. The city has always seemed to me to be antique, serene, and a bit sleepy — that is until it was discovered by global investment capital. Only a year ago, Pinang became a star in the electronics market. Recently, I visited a new electronics plant, built in about four months and employing about 1,000 people. The machines John Ricklefs is Vice-President of Frederic R. Harris, Inc., San Pedro, California, and is in charge of the company's worldwide port program. The material in this article was adapted from a speech given at the nth International Conference on Ports and Harbors, held in Boston, Massachusetts, October 1988. The conference was sponsored by The Coastal Society. 47 used by the workers were still on skids. 1 was told they would not be taken off, because the plant might have to move quickly to a more profitable location. Most of the output of the plant, and that of Southeast Asia in general, is destined for the United States. Typically, it is picked up at local ports such as Pinang, transshipped to larger carriers at Singapore, and often transshipped once more at Kaohsiung or Hong Kong before it is carried (at least 70 percent of it) to ports on the west coast of the United States. Once in the United States, the cargo is placed on double- stack rail cars and moved to cities in the Midwest or on the East Coast. But things change; and thanks to those skids, things are changing faster than ever. As investment in more-productive facilities moves from East Asia to Southeast Asia, and spills over into the Indian subcontinent, new trade routes form. Before long, cargo from Asia — together with European-destined goods — will travel via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, and be unloaded at U.S. east coast ports. If an east coast port director is on his toes, he is aware of these changes and is preparing now to offer the right steamship line the facilities it needs. Savvy west coast port directors are preparing to fight this tendency by offering new incentives designed to improve the competitive position of all-Pacific carriers. The Balance Factor The second factor that drives a shipping line to choose a specific port is the characteristics of the cargo that can be collected at the ports forming a possible trade route. These characteristics include the volume, value, and most importantly, the balance of loadings and unloadings. Everything remaining equal, a shipping line's profit is most affected by this balance. This means that the transportation equipment deployed over the trade route must be utilized to the maximum extent at all points on the route. The shipping line deploys its ships — known in the trade as "capacity"— over a trade route, which consists of nautical miles and ports of call. Each ship has technologically determined cost characteristics. The most important characteristic is the ship's size. The experience of the United States Lines proved, despite the line's demise, that bigger ships can possess significant economies of scale. In fact, in eight short years, the average size of mainline vessels has more than doubled. Recent orders are nearly all for ships able to carry more than 3,000 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU*). As ship size goes up, the cost per TEU-mile goes down, assuming that threshold load factors (capacity utilization) can be maintained. * A 20-foot Equivalent Unit is a unit of volume about 9 feet high by 8 feet wide by 20 feet long. It is a standard unit in the container-ship industry, although containers themselves can be 20, 40, and 45 feet long. 48 This is where balance comes in. Each port of call must not only be able to supply sufficient volume to maintain the load factor, but do so in terms of both loadings and unloadings. To do this, containers must arrive at the port from an extensive market area, or hinterland. As ship size grows, it takes an increasingly larger hinterland to supply on a regular, seven-day basis the large and balanced flow of containers required to maintain the level of load factor needed to qualify for profitable service. Achieving this results in a phenomenon called load centering. 49 Load centering has been with us for years and will continue at an ever-faster pace in the future- big ports will get bigger, faster. Smaller ports will increasingly convert to "feeder" status, or fall by the wayside. A New Factor -Domestic Containerization The origin of cargo and its balance over given trade routes — in the context of deployed vessel capacity— no longer represent the only factors that determine a shipping line's selection of its ports of call. A third factor is the growing use of containers for the carriage of domestic cargoes. The use of what is called "minibridge" rail service to move containers from west coast ports to the Midwest and East Coast, was an early attempt to confront the problem of cargo imbalance by attempting to load containers (that would have otherwise returned empty) with domestic cargo. But it was the innovation of the doublestack rail car that thrust this service into real competition with intercity motor carriers for domestic cargo. An examination of the financial returns of those lines that are active in providing domestic container service shows this business is a growing and important source of revenue. In all probability, as domestic cargoes grow, international cargoes will become increasingly marginal to container carriers. Increasingly, the pricing of international service will be a function of domestic factors. Thus, lines active in domestic service will manipulate their inter- national service to provide high-value and balanced cargoes for their inland trade routes. In the future, one of the prime factors in the selection of a port of call will be the correspondence of inland route service to high- density movements of intercity domestic containers. The wise port director is thus only too aware that his historic disdain for domestic freight may lead to his port's loss of international freight. Port directors must struggle with these forces if they are to protect their investment. They must compete. The basic response of any economic entity facing competition is to increase productivity. Ports can theoretically increase productivity by increasing operating efficiency and labor productivity, or by providing new facilities with improved technologies. There are approximately 80 seaports in the United States. A little more than half are landlord authorities — that is, they own but do not operate facilities. With few exceptions, the larger, load- center ports are landlord ports. A landlord port by definition does not have the ability to deal in any significant manner with either operational or labor productivity, because they neither operate nor control the labor at the berth. Thus, when faced with growing competition, the only direct outlet available to the landlord port is to invest. A Promise of Future Conflict In the future, I believe that we will see more innovation in the organization of U.S. ports, particularly as regards operations. The potential of productivity improvement derived from changes in operations and in the utilization cf labor, far outweigh those that could be derived from those facility-related technological changes on the horizon. Under present circumstances, however, most port directors are limited to one reaction in the competitive struggle — that is, to invest in bigger, deeper, and more sophisticated facilities. Inasmuch as facility development is so closely linked to competition, one can understand the port director's interest in being able to build, as fast as possible, that which is most advanced without regard to the actual increase in total available demand. We can expect to be faced with projects for extending and deepening berths and the addition of new, more advanced equipment. Even more significant will be the port's need for additional land. Beyond the addition of new terminals will be the demand for land to be used for on-dock rail yards and trade-related industrial parks. In ports where land for expansion is not available, we will see new projects for dredging and filling the harbor to create new land. Ports also will become increasingly involved in the improvement of highway and railway access to the hinterland. So the scene is set for conflict between the port and other users of our harbors. In my view, the achievement of consensus in this regard will be severely tested by the unyielding circum- stances in which today's port director must function. □ 50 fr° N tA* NV> .>> as «< " W*?£* ,* *' »«°v^ Vro o^ .tt°* ^e \\ I hree men share the same line of work. One is an accomplished yachtsman, who has raced his 38-foot sailboat to several regional champion- ships. Another likes to spend his evenings relaxing on the patio of his half-million dollar home overlooking the Atlantic. The third, a college graduate with a Phi Beta Kappa key, is a former captain in the U.S. Navy. Three engineers? Attorneys? Doctors? No. All three are longshoremen. Although they may not be typical, they are probably more representative of tneir fellow workers than the popular stereotype of longshoremen -illiterate, heavy-drinking, and combative men who earn an erratic living muscling crates, barrels, and bags of cargo to and from the holds of ships. The Origins of Stevedoring For the first three centuries of stevedoring in the United States, that stereotype was not far from reality. According to maritime historians, dock work began in this country as an occasional, part- time form of work. In pre-Revolutionary War times, when an incoming vessel was sighted, a bell would be rung, a flag raised, or bonfire lit. That would signal the need for "men along the shore" to load and unload cargo. Men whose basic livelihood was made in other ways would respond in hopes of earning a few coppers. Gradually, the work of the "alongshore men" became more specialized and more organized, especially in the major seaports of the new republic — Boston, New York, and Philadelphia-where cargo vessel arrivals were a frequent occurrence. Groups of men (called "gangs") coalesced and became identifiable — perhaps for their cleverness in stowing cargo securely in a ship's hold, or for their reliability and endurance. From within the gang, one or two individuals emerged as leaders or "bosses." They usually were men who were particularly clever at cargo handling, especially adept in bargaining with ship owners, or physically the toughest. Since there generally was intense competition for dock work, these "bosses" and their gangs understood that it was crucial for them to have one location where a ship's agent could find them quickly. Very often the place chosen was a tavern or inn close by the waterfront. Frequently, too, the bartender would serve as hiring agent and paymaster. When word came that a vessel was arriving, there would be a desperate scramble, especially when work was scarce. Whoever was first to the dock would often get the work. However, rival gangs could be played off against each other by the shipowners, and fights would sometimes break out between gangs or even between members of the same gang. With a Mark Lincoln Chadwin is a Professor in the College of Business and Public Administration at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia. He is a former director of the university's Maritime Trade and Transport program. continuous flow of immigrants arriving in the seaports, there usually were more men than there was work, and the owners, agents, and captains had the whip hand. The life itself (like stevedoring until recent times) was a matter of "hurry-up and wait." It might begin with days of restless uncertainty, as the members of the gang loitered at their chosen tavern or elsewhere, awaiting word of the next vessel's arrival. Then there might be a rush to their gathering place or to the dock in an effort to secure a job for the day. For those fortunate enough to be selected, more hours of waiting ensued before the vessel actually docked and unloading could begin. Then came a period of intense physical effort. It might last only an hour for some before they were laid off, or it might extend all day and night and part of the next day. Since the ship's captain or owner wanted the vessel "worked" and back to sea as fast as possible, only meal breaks would be permitted. When the vessel was done, the gang might wait days or even weeks for another job. The immigrants who began arriving in the seaports in the 1840s were different from their predecessors. They were predominantly Irish and Roman Catholic. Uneducated, impoverished, and the target of attacks by "Know-Nothings" and others, the Irish immigrants were viewed with suspicion and discriminated against. They sought to survive on what work they could find. For the men, the choice was either endless hours of dreary routine in a factory, or some form of outdoor, but irregular, physical labor, such as stevedoring. By the end of the Civil War, 95 percent of the stevedores in the ports of the Northeast were sons of Ireland and their progeny. The image of longshoremen that developed was, thus, an unattractive one — of brutish, alien, hot-tempered men, who were unable or unwilling to hold a steady job and who spent much of their time drinking and loitering in waterfront saloons. About the only time their activities came to the attention of newspaper readers and public officials was when a strike was called, and then, too, the publicity was largely unfavorable. A Century of Setbacks For dockworkers, the 19th century was a chronicle of efforts to organize and to improve wages and working conditions — all of which ended in failure. The first recorded dock strike (for an increase in hourly wages) occurred in 1836 in New York City. It spread to Philadelphia, but was quickly suppressed by the use of strikebreakers, who were protected by armed militia. The last third of the century has been characterized as the "Robber Baron" era. The prevailing public philosophy was Social Darwinism — survival of the fittest, with little concern for the human costs. It was a time of mass immigration, enormous exploitation in the workplace, and bloody labor strife. 52 On the docks, as elsewhere, workers responded to low wages, long hours, and dangerous working conditions by unionizing. Although each of the northeastern ports spawned several waterfronts unions, the Longshoremen's Union Protective Association of New York (LUPA) was probably the largest. LUPA, like the ethnic and neighborhood benevolent and protective societies which were proliferating, had among its aims the welfare of the families of its members and "the burial of the dead of our society." LUPA's stated purposes also included "regulating and protecting our interests, wages, and the manner and time of employment . . ." The effort soon suffered a major setback. In the aftermath of the Credit Mobilier scandal* and the bank closures that occurred during the panic of 1873, the economy staggered and waterborne commerce slowed. Shipowners, confronted with declining cargoes and falling freight rates, announced in New York that the pay for day work would be reduced from 40 cents an hour to 30 cents and that the rate for night work (which was more dangerous) would fall from 80 to 40 cents. "Those not agreeable to working at the stated rate," their announcement added, "need not apply at the piers." A strike ensued. Initially civil, it degener- ated into a series of riots and clashes among the strikers, strikebreakers (or "scabs"), and police. The dockworkers received no support from other unions, many of whose members crossed the picket lines to deliver and pick up cargo at the docks. The shippers, correctly assessing the dockworkers' economic and organizational weakness, refused all requests to negotiate. After a month, most of the strikers, their meager savings exhausted, accepted the lower pay scales and reapplied for work. Many strikers were blacklisted, wages were pushed down even further, and longshoremen's unions were moribund for a decade. The docks remained relatively quiet until the Depression of 1884. By this time, the Knights of Labor, intent on uniting all American wage earners into a single labor movement, had developed into a national organization with nearly a quarter of a million members. In 1884, they moved to organize dockworkers in the east coast ports. The Knights of Labor made remarkable gains in membership and strength along the docks until the "Big Strike" of 1887. As in 1874, the strike was precipitated by wage cutbacks, this time by the Old Dominion Steamship Line (which ran coastal vessels between Newport News, Virginia, and New York City) and by coal handlers in ports along the New Jersey shore. The famous scandal involved influential stockholders of Pacific Union Railroads who created the Credit Mobilier Construction Company, made contracts with themselves, reaped millions in profits, and depleted large congressional grants to Union Pacific, sending it into heavy debt. The strike spread until nearly all cargo movement in the ports of New York and New Jersey had stopped. Furthermore, the support of longshoremen in Newport News was secured. This was impor- tant because it deterred a traditional manage- ment tactic — playing off the dock workers of one port against another. This maneuver often involved diverting vessels headed for a northern port that was being struck to a southern port. There the cargo would be unloaded by lower paid, predominantly black stevedores and sent north by railroad. The companies responded to the 1887 strike by instituting lawsuits against the union, hiring Pinkerton guards and nonunion workers, and spreading rumors that the union intended to secure pay for southern black stevedores equal to that of white dockworkers in the North. A Knights of Labor leader was arrested and jailed for conspiring to damage Old Dominion Steamship Line property. As in 1874, lack of solidarity and tactical misjudgments led to the union's defeat. Strikebreakers protected by Pinkerton guards were used to bring coal from the New Jersey ports to the factories and power plants of Manhattan. The small union whose men ran the steam plants rejected pleas to support the strike by not burning the "scab" coal. The Knights, desperate for a settlement, reached an agreement with the coal handlers. Then, they declared the portwide strike a victory and called for a return to work. Demoralized and disillusioned with the union, the dockworkers came back to the piers in droves, accepting whatever terms the employers offered. The Rise of the ILA The longshoremen's organizations of today originated at the turn of the century. Curiously, their roots were not in the ports of the East Coast but in those of the Great Lakes, especially Chicago. There, Dan Keefe, a former tugboat crewman, founded what would become the ILA, the International Longshoremen's Association. Unlike many of his predecessors, Keefe was a realist, a pragmatist, and a diplomat, even with his adversaries. According to one biog- rapher, he "shrewdly assessed the power of his opponents — and good tugboat man that he was — charted a course of caution." By 1905, his union claimed more than 100,000 members, mostly in the Great Lakes, but also with locals in Canada, Galveston, Hampton Roads, and Baltimore. Shortly afterwards, the ILA was accepted into the American Federation of Labor (AFL). During the next decade, the ILA captured the ports of the Northeast as well, sometimes after a struggle. In New York, remnants of the old LUPA structure lingered on. Predominantly Irish in makeup, LUPA sought to keep Italians and other immigrants from southern and eastern Europe off the docks, preserving the work for themselves. As the ILA absorbed or overran the 53 LUPA units, the new union reached out to recruit these new Americans as well. Another competitor the ILA faced was the International Workers of the World — the IWW or "Wobblies." However, the IWW's atheistic and anarchistic tendencies did not engender wide- spread support among the predominantly Roman Catholic longshoremen of the Northeast. Furthermore, once the United States entered World War I, the Wobblies' militant pacifism outraged the patriotic dockworkers. Shrewdly playing on the rise in nationalistic fervor that accompanied the war, one ILA leader declared, "ILA means I Love America." Over the years, that slogan would be repeated again and again in ILA speeches. The war itself had an enormous impact on the docks. As many dockers departed for the service, the amount of stevedoring work to be done soared. This imposed an enormous workload on those who remained. However, it also made their services critically important to the war effort. That allowed the ILA to win wage increases and other concessions, such as a minimum two-hour shift. Prohibition, Depression, and War Always a rough place and sometimes a violent one, in the 1920s, the docks began to develop a reputation for hardened criminality. Some historians attribute this to Prohibition and the liquor smuggling that accompanied it. Cargo piers were, of course, a logical place for such illicit commerce, and gangster elements began to infiltrate the waterfront. As time went on, some ILA locals, especially in New York, fell under gangster control, and kickbacks, payoffs, loansharking, "sweetheart" contracts, and strong- arm tactics became widespread. An unsavory image was developing that would plague the shipping industry until at least the 1970s. The Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed threatened to tip the balance of economic power between dockworkers and management in favor of management again. As international trade dwindled and demand for dock labor declined, the longshoremen and their union seemed about to lose all that they had gradually gained during the prior 30 years. However, the advent of the New Deal and the labor laws of the Roosevelt administration shielded the dockworkers and the ILA from a recurrence of earlier setbacks. ILA membership tripled in South Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports. On the Pacific Coast, where company-controlled unions had long held sway, the ILA won election as the longshoremen's bargaining agent. ILA presence on the West Coast was short- lived, however. A faction under the leadership of Australian Harry Bridges, a Communist sympa- thizer at the time, took control of the ILA in San Francisco. During a strike in 1934, Bridges initiated a struggle with the national ILA and its president, Joseph Ryan. The conflict was partly about ideology and partly about strategy. (Bridges favored maritime industrywide action in fWrfrr ILA members picketing in San Francisco, 1934. (Courtesy of Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA) Strikers battle police in San Francisco; July 1934. (Courtesy of San Francisco Public Library) 54 (Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA) Bloody Thursday In 1934, maritime workers waged one of the great battles in the history of the American working class. The 83-day "Big Strike" transformed labor relations in the Pacific coast maritime industry and ushered in an era of militant unionism. On 5 July, the San Francisco waterfront became a vast tangle of fighting men as several hundred police tried to move scab cargo through picket lines in what became known as Bloody Thursday. Following is the eyewitness account of Donald M. Brown: Struggling knots of longshoremen, closely pressed by officers mounted and on foot, swarmed everywhere. The air was filled with blinding gas. The howl of the sirens. The low boom of the gas guns. The crack of pistol- fire. The whine of the bullets. The shouts and curses of sweating men. Everywhere was a rhythmical waving of arms — like trees in the wind — swinging clubs, swinging fists, hurling rocks, hurling bombs. As the police moved from one group to the next, men lay bloody, unconscious, or in convulsions — in the gutters, on the sidewalks, in the streets. Around on Madison Street, a plainclothes man dismounted from a radio car, waved his shotgun nervously at the shouting pickets who scattered. I saw nothing thrown at him. Suddenly he fired up and down the street and two men fell in a pool of gore — one evidently dead, the other, half attempting to rise, but weakening fast. A gas bomb struck another standing on the curb — struck the side of his head, leaving him in blinded agony. The night sticks were the worst. The long hardwood clubs lay onto skulls with sickening force, again and again and again till a face was hardly recognizable. At the end of the day, two workers, one a longshoreman and the other a strike sympathizer, lay dead. — From Workers on the Waterfront, 7988. collaboration with the seafaring unions.) It also was a clash of two determined men who were rivals for organizational power. In the end, the west coast unions under Bridges split off to form the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), which continues to represent Pacific coast dockworkers today. World War II, like its predecessor, reinforced both the legitimacy and the leverage of the dockworkers and their unions. Thus, they entered the postwar era at a pinnacle of power, self-confidence, and respectability. Corruption on the Docks In the early 1950s, however, that respectability was badly compromised when a series of investigations in the Port of New York-New Jersey generated months of public hearings and 55 FYI: It's Abe, Not Moscow In the face of a particularly virulent attack on the maritime unions by publisher Henry Sanborn and his right-wing weekly, the American Citizen, the publicity committee of the San Francisco International Longshoremen's Association local countered on 13 February 1936, with a lengthy statement outlining "the kind of Americanism which the Maritime Unions subscribe to": Labor is prior to and independent of capital . . . Inasmuch as most good things have been produced by labor it follows that all such things belong of right to those whose labor has produced them. But it has so happened, in all ages of the world, that some have labored and others have, without labor, enjoyed a large portion of the fruits. This is wrong and should not continue. To secure to each laborer the whole produce of his labor as nearly as possible, is a worthy object of any government. "For your information, " the I LA said to Sanborn, "this is not instruction from Moscow. This is a quotation from an American, an American President to be exact, Abe Lincoln. " — From Workers on the Waterfront, 1988 sensational newspaper headlines. The investigations led to the arrest and conviction of several ILA officials and the imposition of fines on both ILA locals and the national union. It also led to changes in waterfront hiring procedures and financial oversight. In retrospect, it appears the investigations sometimes violated norms of legal procedures. Futhermore, some of the investigators used the proceedings to grab for headlines and further their own political fortunes. However, corruption on the waterfront was undeniable. Even an author sympathetic to the ILA estimated that perhaps 10 of the 70 locals in the port had been gangster-controlled at one time or another. The AFL dropped the ILA from affiliation and even started a rival union, the International Brotherhood of Longshoremen (IBL). With Teamster support and police protection, the IBL sought to break the ILA's hold on the Hudson River and Brooklyn piers, and a series of bloody skirmishes occurred in 1954 when IBL members attempted to cross ILA picket lines. However, the ILA made changes in leadership at both the national and local levels and won a narrow victory in a bitterly contested election in New York. By the end of the decade, it had been readmitted to the AFL-CIO. Containerization The 1960s brought a development that profoundly and permanently altered the nature of dock work — containerization. Heretofore, all general cargo (cargo other than commodities that are shipped in bulk, such as oil, coal, and grain) had been handled "breakbulk" style. Since freight was usually handled one parcel at a time, the process was labor-intensive. At the docks, each crate would be hoisted by cargo net and crane onto the ship. In the ship's hold, each parcel had to be precisely positioned and then braced to protect it from damage during the voyage. All this was the work of stevedores. The introduction of standardized ocean containers — essentially truck bodies with locking mechanisms at each corner to attach them to chassis, railcars, or other containers — had enormous advantages for the ocean carrier and the shipper. Previously, a gang of about 20 longshoremen could load perhaps 20 tons an hour. Now one crane and maybe half that many men could load a container holding 20 tons every two or three minutes. Breakbulk freighters often took a week to unload and reload. A container- ship might take only four to six hours. Less time in port meant lower port costs and faster circuits. Faster circuits meant a ship line could carry the same amount of cargo to the same destinations using fewer vessels. For the cargo owner, less handling meant less chance of damage to the cargo. There also was much less pilferage, since containers could be sealed when they left the factory and not opened until they reached their ultimate destination. Packaging did not have to be as sturdy, and since the packages were lighter, they cost less to ship. Now, far fewer dockworkers were needed, and the skills required were different. Instead of men with manual ability and physical strength, the demand was for workers who could operate and maintain the sophisticated and expensive heavy equipment that moved the containers, and for "white collar" employees — women as well as men — who could collect, transmit, and utilize information about the containers. The longshoremen had struggled for a century and had finally achieved good wages and benefits and economic leverage. They were understandably reluctant to accept these changes. 56 4 A Yesterday... C*7Aehtafet#u>ptt ...and today / 1 i ^____ Collective bargaining over work contracts became particularly contentious again and was punctuated by dock strikes. Gradually, however, accommodations were reached. Generally, work rules, gang sizes, and compensation remained as they had for handling break-bulk cargo, even though this often meant oversized gangs and highly paid but underutilized workers. In the name of "work preservation," so-called "50-mile rules" were negotiated that reserved all "stuffing and stripping" of containers in or near port cities for unionized longshoremen. Similarly, agree- ments were negotiated with the major ship lines that required them to use union labor at every port of call. Workers with sufficient seniority became eligible for a guaranteed annual income program, which assured them a comfortable living regardless of the number of hours they worked. Jobs along the docks declined dramatically, even though the emergence of a truly global economy led to a sustained increase in the amount of general cargo. From 1970 to 1986, the number of dockworkers on the rolls in the Port of New York-New Jersey fell from 30,000 to 7,400 and the manhours worked dropped from 33 million to 11 million. Dock Work Today Today dock work is full of contrasts and ironies. For one thing, affluence coexists with under- and unemployment. Straight-time pay in ILA East Coast ports is $18 an hour, and in busy ports workers with seniority often get much more than 40 hours, with time-and-a-half pay for overtime, night, and weekend work. Thus, in the Port of Hampton Roads last year, 130 longshoremen earned more than $62,000. At the same time, ILA members in some ports had not worked at a marine terminal in months. Many longshoremen are performing difficult jobs that require intellect, great dexterity, and courage (for example, as shipside crane operators and repairmen, container lashers, stowage planners, and computer workers). For some, responsibility has increased dramatically: dropping a crate of break-bulk cargo might cause $1,000 in damage. Dropping a loaded container can destroy $100,000 worth of cargo and endanger a $5 million port crane. Meanwhile, other longshoremen are fighting boredom, doing jobs better done by machines, or spending too much of their time watching other people work because gang sizes are too large. The 1980s have seen four momentous changes in ocean shipping: • intensified competition between ports and between carriers, caused in part by federal deregulation; • the growth of intermodalism and, with it, the shift of some cargoes to trains and planes; • the widespread adoption by businesses of "just-in-time" inventory techniques; • and the application of advanced computer and communications technologies. These changes have imposed new pressures on dockworkers and their unions — to improve efficiency and reduce labor costs; to adopt new approaches regarding work schedules, pay scales, and job jurisdictions; and to provide people capable of operating the new technologies of the marine terminal. As this article goes to press, the ILA and the shipping associations of the Eastern and Gulf coasts have failed to negotiate a new multiyear contract. Instead, they have agreed to extend the existing master contract, in effect postponing decisions on wages, hours, manning levels, gang structures, and retirement benefits. This comes at a time when nonunion and non-ILA workers have reappeared in some seaports. Thus, it appears that developments during the next 14 months may well determine not only how the work on the docks is done, but even perhaps, who does it in the years to come. □ Selected Readings Barnes, C. 1915. The Longshoremen. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Chadwin, M. L, Pope, J. A., and Talley, W. K. 1989. Ocean Container Transportation: An Operational Perspective (in press). New York: Taylor and Francis. Nelson, B. 1988. Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen and Unionism in the 1930s. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Special Student Rate! We remind you that students at all levels can enter or renew subscriptions at the rate of $17 for one year, a saving of $5. This special rate is available through application to: Oceanus, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, MA, 02543. A Note to Teachers! We offer a 25 percent discount on bulk orders of five or more copies of each current issue. A discount also applies to one-year subscriptions for class adoption ($17.00 per subscription). Teachers' orders should be sent to Oceanus magazine, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, MA 02543. Please make checks payable to WHOI. 58 Rotterdam L. sandbanks that in previous centuries thwarted gvlgat bi ■ en the North Sea and Rotter- dam The N - Waterweg, opened in 1872, paled a lock-l n e and open connection to the coming one of the world's most important ports. Since l^OO, the port and indu have grown out from the city along the sol bank to the North Sea coast. At right, dark gray indicates residential areas, inset shows the city's center; medium gray indicates port and industrial areas; light gray indi rounding THE EVOLUTION OF SHIPS AND DOCKS IN ROTTERDAM Boompjes, 1850 ("Little along- side the Maas in the oldest part of Rotter- dam, just a few meters from the mouth of the Rotte River. The quay wall is brick < piles, with dumped underwater. Cargo ships like the shown here — a four- ,ted bark of 4,000- ton cargo capacity — tied up at a wooden scaffold- "». ing in about 6.5 meters IJselhaven, 1910 The IJselhaven opened in 1910, when 10,000 ships called at Rotterdam, and 425,000 people lived in the city. The qu wall is of concrete and basalt blocks on concrete caissons. The steamship show here has a cargo capacity of 20,000 ton By 1913, trains an were familiar sigh Today, the IJselha Eighth Petroleumhaven, 1984 The 8th Petroleumhaven, located on the Maas has a water area of 54 hectares and a depth of 24 meters. The quay wall is of concrete box construction t ete stakes that also support r ; bridge cranes It also is anchored own) by steel piles The container • of about 25,000 I '.J ROTTE R-DAM Quays to the Heart of Europe by T. M. Hawley I he Goeree Light Platform radar station is the first visible sign of the Port of Rotterdam for the 32,000 seagoing ships that make their way there each year. Into the beacon's 70-kilometer radius come the largest cargo vessels in the world: ultra-large tankers, dry bulk carriers, and con- tainer ships carrying the equivalent of 3,500 semi- trailers of cargo. A container ship, with a beam of more than 40 meters and drawing more than 20 meters, heads for the Europahaven. From there, its cargo will be dispersed and transshipped to places such as Stockholm, Basel, and Vienna — more than 250,000 inland and feeder vessels call at Rotterdam each year — and arrive at those places within a few days. With thousands of people working 24 hours a day in the tugs and cranes, at computer terminals and offices — overseen by port, city, and trade bureaucracies that work together better than most— Rotterdam is, in terms of total cargo tonnage, far and away the busiest port in the world. Rotterdam owes its position as the world's premier port to its link with the Rhine River and Germany's industrial heartland of the Ruhr Valley; but until a little more than 100 years ago its connection to the North Sea was a slow- moving, shallow river with dangerous, shifting dunes at its mouth — a treacherous stretch of coastland. Before the 1870s, seagoing ships reached the Rhine from the North Sea by way of the Hollands Diep. Rotterdam received its overseas trade by this route, coming into the city from the east after passing through the busier T. M. Hawley is Assistant Editor of Oceanus, published by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. port of Dordrecht, but even then the importance of trade to Rotterdam was evident in the names of the quays at the center of town: The Oude- and Nieuwehaven (Old and New Dock), Beer Dock, Wine Dock, Salmon Dock, and Ship- builders' Dock. The Railway Dock was a new development back then. In 1872, after six years of digging and dredging, Rotterdam opened the Nieuwe Waterweg, which gave the city its definitive connection to the North Sea. Pieter Caland directed the project. He was a young civil engineer who had studied how the Scottish and French managed to keep the mouths of the Clyde and Garonne from silting up. He made what was then the most extensive study ever of tidal currents in the various mouths of the Rhine and Maas, and developed a plan that would redirect their flows and cut through the dunes near Hoek van Holland. By 1880 the success of <^>»_ga* ^ o ( CS=» O.^ Dord echt y\ ^ of Germany Hollands V, Sou.sburg ^ *«*' »/^ i"V>- IS, ■^^ a — ^-\^r-» !.-—•> // \ 9^ *s Antwerp $1 \ ) »r\ f \ Sr — < iBonn */ ? .„_^ Belgium ' V, ( V +* N> "•> v> V»—- > \ \^ ) *~ > / ,0 "Z ,j J I f 1 ■ / France j-v_ \ Luxembourg The Rhine is navigable to the Swiss-German border at Basel. Rotterdam is the Rhine's link to the sea. the project was obvious; and since that time — despite the Depression, Nazi bombings, and oil and labor crises in recent years — the people of Rotterdam have seen and done what is necessary to make and keep their port a focus of world shipping and trade. The emphasis on work in the port city was such that the Dutch often said "you earn your money in Rotterdam, and go to Amsterdam to spend it." But the Rotterdammers one meets at cafes and theaters seem perfectly happy to leave the "museum-city" to the north for the tourists. Elephants at the Delta Terminal About half-way between the Goeree Platform and Hoek van Holland, the container ship picks up a Port of Rotterdam pilot. The pilot maintains radio contact with the outermost of the Port's three traffic centers, at Hoek, which collates data from eight radars and controls traffic around Europoort and up the Nieuwe Waterweg. He advises the captain of the ship on the best approach into the Europahaven and the Delta Terminal. The Europahaven is about 35 kilometers downstream from the Oudehaven, and is part of the Maasvlakte area, built between 1965 and 1973. At the Delta Terminal — leased and operated by Europe Combined Terminals (ECT) — if three cranes were to work on the ship at once, under ideal condition's the ship could be completely unloaded, and reloaded with 3,500 new containers in about 50 hours. The similar operation in a typical U.S. port would take about 80 hours. These cranes are among the largest in the world, able to reach across 40 meters and so service the largest container ships afloat without having them turn around. The crane operators sit in gondolas 30 meters above the quay, where they oversee the cranes' motions via computers and video monitors. Actually, each of these cranes is two cranes in one. While one "spreader" is moving a container from the ship to an intermediate platform, a second spreader moves the previous container from the inter- mediate platform to one of the seven chassis of a trailer system that carries containers from the cranes to the next item of heavyweight high-tech gadgetry, the straddle carrier. The straddle carriers are affectionately known as "elephants" at the Delta Terminal, since these massive vehicles are the primary beasts of burden there. As their official name The World's Busiest Ports Numbers represent 1985 totals for 1,000s of tonnes of foreign and domestic cargo handled, except for Rotterdam which reports only foreign traffic. (From the Institute of Shipping, Economics, and Logistics, Bremen, West Germany, 1987) dgfgfc 4»fWlt m; 1S( — ■eSSIl Tubarao, Brazil Osaka, Japan Antwerp, Belgium Marseille, France 60 implies, they straddle parked containers, pick them up, and transport them to and from the container storage, or stacking, yard. The elephants' mahouts are perched 20 meters above the pavement, where they have a good long- range view, but cannot see what's going on directly beneath them, so they are guided around the stacking yard by a grid of infrared lights embed- ded in the pavement. These lights are connected to one of ECT's computers, and using the same technology as a video remote control, they flash information to the drivers' video screens indicating their location, destination, and the route they should be following. When a trucker comes to the Delta Terminal to pick up a container, he uses a magnetic key card system to tell the straddle carrier driver which container he has come for, and where he is waiting for it. ECT was the first stevedoring company in Rotterdam to specialize in containerization, in 1967, and its two terminals and 22 cranes at the port now combine to handle an average of more than 120 containers an hour. Within the next few years, ECT will implement an auto- mated system of container movement at the Delta Terminal that will move the boxes from the quay by means of unmanned vehicles and deliver them to automated stacking cranes, which will in turn follow computerized instructions and place them at preassigned spots in the stacking yard. Unemployment is a problem in Rotterdam, and the port's commitment to containerization — it ranks second in the world, behind Hong Kong, in container tonnage handled — has added to the strain. While the city and the port have been beehives of construction projects ever since the KMMtUHE^MMMi£tl The petroleum storage tanks at Rotterdam are linked by pipeline to 14 refineries in Belgium, the Nether- lands, and West Germany. (Photo by B. Hofmeester) end of World War II, workers with outdated skills have found themselves joining unskilled immigrants from Holland's former colonies in queue for benefits at City Hall. That unhappy line lengthened when gangs of stevedores had their work taken over by a nerd of efficient and tireless Goliaths with ^^^^^^^^ digital brains and ■■»■>■ sinews of steel and wire. The continuing problem was eased to a degree when ECT restructured its work shifts and reduced the workweek; these innovations allowed more people to stay on the payroll, and set an example that steve- doring companies in the United States have followed. Industrial Landscapes and Lace Curtains A bargeman looks out a lace-curtained cabin window as his boat is moored near the end of the Hartelkanaal, the ultimate terminus of inland cargo traffic on the Rhine; he'll be carrying containers full of Japanese electronics to Basel, Switzerland. Barge- men like this one move cargo on the Rhine much as truckers move cargo on U.S. super- highways, but with a European difference: the window through which he watches the last container lowered aboard is adorned not only with lace curtains but a window-box full of nasturtiums as well. A few minutes later he pats his dog and embarks on his Rhine journey. The barge rounds the first bend in the canal, and a landscape comes into view that begs for a Hollywood-inspired chase scene or terrorist drama — Rotterdam Europoort. Europoort was built during the 1960s, and Kitakyushu, Singapore Nagoya, Japan Japan Yokohama, Kobe, Japan Japan Rotterdam, The Netherlands 61 The cars of the multi-trailer system employed at ECT's Delta Terminal have computer- controlled steering, allowing each car to follow precisely the path of the car preceding it. (Photo ® by Photo Sea Sky Martin) is sandwiched between the Hartelkanaal and the Calandkanaal 20 to 30 kilometers from the Oudehaven. It is, in a sense, a monument to the importance of oil to the Port of Rotterdam. Four sprawling petroleum terminals are there, as is a stretch of refineries operated by British Petro- leum, Shell, Exxon, Texaco, Kuwait Petroleum, and Mobil. Between 75 and 80 million tonnes of oil are imported into Rotterdam each year, where it is stored and refined in petro-industrial labyrinths like Europoort. Three pipelines tap the products of the refineries: one, with a capacity of 20 million tonnes a year, runs to the Federal Republic of Germany; the second, which can carry 39 million tonnes a year, runs to Antwerp; and the third carries aviation fuel to Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. Oil imports reached their peak in 1975, when 103 million tonnes were received. Since that time, imports from the Middle East have dropped to about half of what they once were, while British and Norwegian imports have nearly tripled. Twenty years ago, the petroleum giants leasing Europoort property thought that the boom would never end, and today find themselves renting many more hectares than they can use. Middle Eastern oil is increasingly refined prior to export, but Rotterdam's refining and storage capacity, and its pipelines, will continue to be used. The immense tankers that once carried crude into the port will soon be bringing in refined petroleum which will need further refining and blending before it goes into the pipelines and onto other barges plying the Rhine. So even though the refineries may have overreached a bit in former years, the port has kept them a vital and central part of the Rotterdam scene. Another factor keeping the petroleum business in town is the establishment of an oil futures exchange. The refineries and other chemical industries in the port have been looked at askance when weather conditions combine with their waste ga^es and particulates, and smog settles around Rotterdam. Two villages surrounded by the port- Rozenburg and Pernis- have at times expressed strong concern over environmental and safety issues; and Rozenburg has even succeeded in having the port reallocate the north side of the Brittanniehaven for general cargo handling when residents opposed planned chemical-plant expansion there. The flow of VCRs and CD players packed into the bargeman's containers, along with the flow of all the cargo moving through the Port of Rotterdam, is mimicked by a flow of information in computer memories. The various clients of the port developed individual computer systems to help them in their particular tasks, but the fact that many of these systems could not "talk" with each other presented a problem since these clients often work together. To facilitate the telecommunication of shipping information among clients — whether they're located in Bonn or Bangkok — the port set up a private company, International Transport Information System (INTIS). The company's computers are connected to the IBM inter- national network and the General Electric Information Systems, and use the United Nations International Standards for Electronic Data Interchange. INTIS's solid-state laser and fiber- optic network gives subscribers the signal strength and bandwidth necessary to work together at new degrees of intimacy, which allow the concept of "just-in-time" delivery to become a reality. Voice, data, text, and images can be received, sent, and relayed through the network. 62 On-line information on world commodity markets and market indices also are provided through INTIS, enabling manufacturers to use the transport chain as a means of stock control and respond to rapid changes in their markets. Like the oil futures exchange, INTIS is an example of how Rotterdam is considering the post-1992 European Community, and seeking to transform itself from "merely" the busiest port in the world to a major center of European business and distribution. Port officials see that economic growth through increased tonnage — experienced in a big way with petroleum until the 1970s, and now with containers — has limited possibilities. So "Rotterdam DistriPark" is now being built on a 35-hectare tract where new companies will stuff and strip containers, prepare imported autos for delivery to dealers throughout Europe, and provide other value-added services to customers of the port. Having access to the teleport facilities of INTIS makes keeping track of high volumes of goods and orders a realistic possibility. Municipal officials are doing what they can to make the city an attractive place for corporate relocations. The hoped-for transfor- mation from an "all work, no play" city to a business and cultural powerhouse is symbolized in a sculpture near a museum of maritime history in the center of town. Ossip Zadkine's "The Ruined City" was a response to the Nazi air raid of 14 May 1940, that left a 260-hectare wasteland where downtown used to be, and killed hundreds. A monumental figure, its chest torn out, raises its outstretched hands to the heavens vowing to do what it can to regain its heart. With the startling architecture of the rebuilt city center, film and poetry festivals, and a variety of other cultural and social opportunities, Rotterdam is becoming less a city attached to a port, and more of a city with a port. The point is driven home by the many upscale bridal, maternity, and infants' shops one sees while strolling through town. disappears behind greenery that is a stage for grazing herds of sheep, picnickers, European- style sun-bathers, and tractors harvesting hay. A stretch of parkland between the Hartelkanaal and the Brielse Meer holds a nine-hole golf course, with nothing in view but the typical trees, grass, sand, and water with nesting ducks and seabirds. At the east end of Europoort, even the port's functional anatomy can be mistaken for modern art: a 1,600-meter "wind wall" in the vicinity of the Calandbrug ("Caland bridge") leaves you wondering if Christo* visited Rotterdam, and abandoned his usual fabric in favor of monumental quantities of concrete. The wall consists of about 100 slabs of concrete, some rectangular, some semicylindrical, 10 to 18 meters across, reaching 25 meters above the The Calandbrug Wind Wall cu flow through the port. (Photo ts the force of heavy winds, permitting a hi by the author) traffic canal's banks. The Calandbrug was too narrow for ships to negotiate in winds of force seven or eight, and the wall reduces those winds to about force five, allowing the traffic to flow more regularly. By the time the bargeman has come to the end of the Hartelkanaal, he has entered the middle of Rotterdam's three Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) zones. This zone is named "Botlek," after the main harbor basin in the region. The VTMS is a model for other major ports around the world, and became operational in April 1987, replacing the chain of radar stations Eliminating High Winds and False Echoes As the bargeman moves up the Hartelkanaal, the hardware of the port and refinery business *A California-based artist whose large-scale, temporary works wrap monuments and landforms in vast quantities of textile fabric. 63 set up in 1956. From the Goeree Platform to the van Brienenoordbrug at the eastern edge of the city, traffic through the port is monitored in much the same way that air traffic is controlled in the vicinity of busy airports. But while air traffic is really controlled, the VTMS is more of an advisory authority, even though the largest ships in port and those carrying hazardous cargoes must have a certified Port of Rotterdam pilot aboard. The "Automatic Tracking System" is the brain of the VTMS. It provides traffic managers with a computerized image of their management area, synthesized from all the radars working in that area. The managers picking up our Rhine barge, for instance, see an image that combines information from nine radar beacons, since Botlek is a center of dangerous cargo traffic. False echoes are thus eliminated, and managers still see the images of ships that would be hidden from a single beacon. The system calculates the size of the ships, and displays them proportion- ately on a screen that is updated every three seconds. By touching the image of the barge with a light-pencil, a manager accesses detailed information about the actual barge — its bearing, speed, temporary identification number, whether it is channel-bound or carrying hazardous cargo, and so on. He can also see one-minute and three-minute projections of any ship's position, the distance between the ship and any other object on the screen — including other ships — and the point and time of closest approach between two ships at the Hoek van Holland center. By 1991, improvements to the VTMS data base will allow a direct identification of all ships in the port, without using Port of Rotterdam identification numbers. The ships' on-screen images will then be based on their actual dimensions, not on sizes calculated from radar data. All pertinent information about a ship — its name, its type, its destination, whether a pilot is aboard, if it is carrying dangerous cargo, and administrative and fixed data — will be accessible to managers through their light-pencils. New Land for Dredge Spoils and Sunbathers The dangerous cargoes of solid and liquid chemicals in the Botlek and elsewhere pose an obvious environmental threat, as do the refineries downstream; but these threats are limited somewhat by strict safety procedures and practices. The stickiest environmental problem for the port is what to do with contaminated dredge spoils. The Port of Rotterdam dredges 23 million cubic meters of silt each year just to stay in business, and more than 40 percent of it is too toxic for disposal in the North Sea. This heavily polluted silt consists largely of tiny soil particles with heavy metals and long-lived organic compounds adhering to them. The pollutants derive to some extent from port activities, and the port is working to curb these activities or limit their polluting aspects; but the Rhine carries much of the pollution into the port, as it drains perhaps the most industrialized watershed of its size on Earth. Rotterdam has identified many of the heavy polluters upstream, and is working to ensure they clean up their effluents and pay a fair share for removing this hazardous waste from the port's waterways. In the meantime, the toxic silt has to go into long-term storage. After a lengthy environmental impact study, the "Slufterdam Project" got under way in May 1986, in the Maas- vlakte area. The project consisted of digging a hole 28 meters deep and building a ring-dike 23 meters high to enclose an area of 260 hectares on land reclaimed from North Sea. It was finished in less than a year-and-a- half. By 1 1 years from now, it will be full. And while there are ideas in the air about how and where Barges carrying goods to and from the Port of Rotterdam are a familiar sight on the Rhine. to do it all over again, the cost of repeating the Slufterdam Project is something that no one really wants to face. Instead, discussions and negotiations continue at various levels to do what is possible, as quickly as possible, to clean up the Rhine. The project has been successful for other reasons besides the long-term storage of dredge spoils. When one stands at the top of the ring- dike, looking out to sea on a fine summer's day, one sees a parking lot full of cars in the fore- ground and a beach full of sun-loving Netherlanders down below. And with the sides of the dike planted in dune grasses and rugosa roses, the views from the parking lot and beach don't reveal the reason for the land being there. Through the City's Heart and Up the Rhine The bargeman is well on his way up the Nieuwe Maas by now, and four kilometers downstream from the Oudehaven, he passes the Waalhaven on his right. This harbor basin was dug between the wars, almost entirely by hand. It remains today the largest harbor basin in the world excavated in exchange for sweat and tired muscles, a testament to Rotterdammers working together to make their port work. Another bend in the river brings one of Rotterdam's start- ling downtown land- marks into view — the Willemsbrug. And while chugging toward the bridge, reminis- cent of Picasso's sculpture in down- town Chicago, the bargeman's vessel slips into and out of the view of a couple enjoying an aperitif in a cafe on the Spaan- sekade, or "Spanish Quay." Around the Oudehaven immedi- ately before them, all of old and new Rotterdam come together and blend in Above, Rotterdam's Oudehaven with The White House at left and the Cube Houses at right (Photo courtesy of Fotoburo Henk Timmer). Below, "The Ruined City" statue with the Prins Hendrik Maritime Museum in the background. (Photo by Marco de Nood) a way not possible downstream at Europoort. The contrast of ECT's giant cranes to the sunbathers, and the antique sailing barges across the Oudehaven to the cube-shaped apartments off to the right, aren't quite so sharp when you consider that the dignified, 11 -story building across the way, "The White House," was Europe's first skyscraper — for a time, the tallest building on the continent. The couple exchanges pleasantries with their waiter as they pay their bill. He wishes them "alle besten" as the bargeman heads for Switzerland. Acknowledgments This article was prepared from interviews with the Port of Rotterdam's Secretary General Robert T. Sperling, Telematics Expert Roel H. Chaudron, Nautical Systems Division Manager Jan C. M. de Keijser, Environment, Safety, and Port Planning Expert Mathieu J. K. Heinen, Technical and Managerial Port Assistance Office Director C. Bert Kruk, Research and Development Economist Jan van der Zande, the City of Rotterdam's Head of Ports and Transport Theo M. Schut, and Europe Combined Terminals' Marjilde Pors. I am also grateful for the assistance of the Port of Rotterdam's Office of Public Relations, especially that of Philip Brink and Mariane Roelofs. 65 rec^p§I5s( KANSAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 4370m / ■ Supply & Disposal Terminal Cargo Termina Train Station T< 4 44* ** *** -ih O CCCD CD CCD O C3> O O -i£ 44* 4^ ^ 4« *? •v.** CD CD CD CD C J (3500m x60m) Runway _^_^_^^^^__t^^^_ =^ « QopkQ BQy Japan Re berth of a Nation by Paul R. Ryan r\ major change is presently under way in the industrial structure of Japan -a change that is forcing a major revamping of two of the country's major ports and bays — Tokyo and Osaka. The once-strong emphasis on exports is shifting to imports as an affluent government deals with an expansion of domestic demand coupled with a cultural proclivity for relying as little as possible on foreign heavy industry. The best examples of Japan's planning for the 21st century -in which the world will be a far smaller place because of recent improvements in transportation and communications systems — are the Technoport Osaka Project and the Kansai International Airport. Both of these projects, Paul R. Ryan is Editor of Oceanus, published by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. He returned to Woods Hole this June following a Fulbright Fellowship in Japan to study marine affairs in the Pacific region. 67 along with the planned restoration of Tokyo Bay, receive science and engineering support from the Ports and Harbor Research Institute of the Japanese Ministry of Transportation. Japan is a small — about the size of the State of California — crowded nation of 140 million people. It has few natural resources. Much of its land is mountainous and therefore unlivable. It is a nation that looks to the sea for expansion, recreation, and food. In Japan, the utilization of space is an art form. The Technoport Osaka Project City fathers, industrial leaders, academics, and government officials in the Kansai region of Japan, which includes the City of Osaka, have come together with a vision that calls for the revitalization of the local economy so that it, along with Tokyo, can lead Japan into the new Pacific age. The basic plan for the Technoport Osaka Project was framed in July 1988. It calls for the concentration of research institutes and experimental facilities for the development of new techniques, products, and systems in electronics, biotechnology, new materials, and other fields, along with the construction of support facilities. At the same time, the Port of Osaka will be renovated to create a general distribution center for international and domestic land, sea, and air transport. The plan also calls for introducing the latest in information technology. A teleport will be constructed that will be a center of inter- national and domestic satellite communication, using fiber optics and other techniques, along with a digital networking system. The Japanese believe information-related businesses have great growth potential. International conference facilities, world-class hotels, sporting grounds, concert halls, and theaters will grace Technoport Osaka, all built on four artificial islands in the bay. There also will be suitable housing available and a marine museum. The completion of the project is scheduled for 2010. The cost is estimated at 900 billion yen in the public sector and 1.3 trillion yen in the private sector ($6.44 billion and $9.30 billion). The port will be divided into commercial, residential, and tourist districts, with a total daytime population of 200,000. The working population would be 92,000, with housing for 60,000. Some land reclamation for the project actually began in 1985. Some construction will begin in 1990 with all land reclamation to be completed by the year 2000. If all of this has the sound of a pipe dream, consider that the nearby city of Kobe more than 15 years ago dug out the side of a nearby mountain, made an artificial island out of it beyond the water's edge, built a complex of hotels and conference centers serviced by a nifty robotic train, put berths all around the island's outer edge, and came out with one of the world's largest and busiest container ports. All this was done by an enterprising mayor with little backing from the Japanese government. The Kansai International Airport The Kansai International Airport will be construc- ted on the world's first artificial offshore island for this purpose, which is presently under construction and is scheduled for completion by 31 March 1993. The island is being created in approximately 18 meters of water, five kilometers from the mainland in Osaka Bay. Similar artificial islands are planned for other locations around the nation. Both the island and the airport are being built by a private corporation at a cost of one trillion yen ($7.15 billion) in 1983 prices. The corporation was created by a special act of the Diet, the Japanese legislature. The airport will initially cover an area of 5.11 million square meters, with room for expansion to 12 million square meters. The airport will be open to cargo and airline traffic 24 hours a day. The island will be accessible by bridge and boat, with train service located in front of the passenger terminal. It is estimated that the airport will handle about 160,000 takeoffs and landings a year. The main runway will be 3,500 meters long. Geologically, a weak alluvial clay layer exists at the top of the seabed over which the island is being built. Under the clay layer, gravel layers and diluvial clay layers alternate to a depth of hundreds of meters. Because of its location in Osaka Bay, the island will be subjected to waves no higher than 50 centimeters for about 80 percent of the year. The seawalls, however, have been designed to Construction Schedule Construction schedule for the Kansai International Airport. 68 Osaka International Airport Technoport Osaka .Osaka Osaka Bay Route Kansai International Airport — ~-y ^.s Japan Osaka Bay Kinki Expressway « » » Railway «-—-•—» Railway (under construction or planning ) ^— ^— Expressway — — — — Expressway (under construction or planning) Osaka Bay, showing the location of the major coastal projects, the cities of Osaka and Kobe, and the area's transportation network. Insert shows major coastal cities of Japan. sustain the highest significant waves that have occurred during the last 50 years — 3.5 meters, with a period of 6.7 seconds in a west-southwest direction. The plans for the island and airport went through a severe series of environmental impact assessments in 1985 and 1986. The airport will meet local environmental criteria in terms of noise, air, and water pollution, and marine animal and bird habitation. A long series of talks have been held with local fishermen over compensation for the loss of fisheries in the waters around and where the island is being built. Agreement was finally reached in mid-1986. The Ports and Harbors Research Institute Science and engineering support for projects like the Kansai International Airport comes from the Ports and Harbor Research Institute (PHRI), about 35 miles south of Tokyo in a suburb of Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay. There are only three major research institutes for port and harbor construction in the world — the other two being the largely civilian research facility of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at Vicksburg, Mississippi, and the Maritime Research Institute Netherlands in Wageningen, near Delft in the Netherlands. Founded in April of 1962, PHRI conducts research on a wide variety of technologies relating to the construction of ocean and offshore structures, and maintenance of navigation channels. The waters around Japan can get very rough. Consequently, the characteristics of waves is one of the most important subjects studied at 69 Completed seawalls of Kansai International Airport island (as of April 1989). Insert shows excavation operation. the institute. And many ports are constructed on soft ground where earthquakes occur frequently. Port structures of great size and strength are often required. The institute is thus engaged in geotechnical and earthquake engineering. While touring PHRI, this author endured a simulated underwater earthquake of 8.6 on the Richter scale. The institute has a staff of 201, of which 151 are engaged in research. The budget for 1989 was 1.58 billion yen ($11.3 million). In addition, 1.4 billion yen ($10 million) is earmarked for research connected with actual port construction projects under way, such as those in Osaka. In conjunction with the Japan International Cooperation Agency, a quasi-governmental organization, the institute offers a training course in port and harbor engineering to people in developing countries worldwide. More than 500 trainees have participated in this course to date. In addition, staff members at the institute participate as consultants in studies for planned ports in other countries. In addition to the considerable research on the properties of waves and currents, the institute is also concerned with the latest ideas in breakwater development. The most common type of breakwater around the world is the rubble-mound breakwater. Mixed-type breakwaters that consist of a rubble-mound foundation and an upright section are very popular in Japan. PHRI has developed two new kinds of caisson-type breakwaters in the last few years. One is called a curve-slit caisson, the other a multicellular caisson. In addition, the Japanese scientists are exploring the possibility of extracting energy from these new types of Curved-slit caisson in Funakawa Port. 70 An artist's impression of the multicellular caisson. breakwaters. A prototype test caisson with a wave power to electricity convertor is scheduled to be installed this year in the port of Sakata for field tests. It is thought that these wave power breakwaters can produce enough electricity to run a lighthouse year in and year out. Another example of the type of research conducted at PHRI is a machine known as the Geotechnical Centrifuge, which is a huge spinning device used to create materials that will harden soft, clayey seabeds. In what is called the Deep Mixing Method, in situ soft soil is mixed with a cement milk and then run through the geotechnical centrifuge which can be accelerated to a force of 100 Gs, thus simulating underwater construction stress factors on the seabed. Institute engineers are presently engaged in research projects having to do with offshore floating structures, such as oil storage systems, a coal center, an offshore city, a floating pier, and a floating breakwater. The planning and design of these floating moored structures require both field tests and model laboratory experiments. The institute has a number of large-scale tanks where model experiments can be conducted with wave, current, and wind simulators. The trend in Japan as elsewhere is to construct port facilities in deeper and deeper water. In the past, most underwater survey work has been undertaken by divers. However, the move to deeper water has increased the risks for divers and lowered their working efficiency. To this end, PHRI has developed a six-legged Aquarobot that can crawl across the bottom like a large insect. It can walk in any direction and turn in its own space. All the motions of this tactile, tubular creature are controlled by computer. It can work in depths of up to 50 meters, over extremely rocky and uneven terrain. The institute also concerns itself with the overall design of ports and harbors, the auto- matization necessary, the finances of a port, the cargo flow, questions of economics, and the behavior of ships, to mention but a few of the topics related to ports and harbor development. The Geotechnical Centrifuge at the Ports and Harbors Research Institute, Yokosuka, Japan. 71 - The Aquarobot. The Restoration of Tokyo Bay One of the largest maritime projects facing the government of Japan is the restoration of Tokyo Bay, a body of water with six major ports and ship traffic so dense that 50 vessels pass through the mouth in any given hour. At present, 26 different waterfront development projects are in the works that will have a critical environmental impact on this gateway to and from East Asia. An overall concept for the restoration of Tokyo Bay is presently being developed by the Research Institute for Ocean Economics and the Oversea Coastal Area Development Institute, both headquartered in Tokyo. Tokyo Bay is situated in the central part of Honshu, the Japanese main island, and faces on the Pacific Ocean. The bay extends for about 50 kilometers from north to south and 15 to 20 kilometers across, narrowing to seven kilometers at one point. Almost 90 percent of the bay coastline has been artifically created and about 20 percent is accessible to the public. In the central part of the bay, depths are generally between 40 and 50 meters, with 18 meters the average depth. The six main ports are Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kawasaki, Chiba, and Kisarazu. The problems thus are enormous. Pollution must be decreased, maritime traffic either reduced or better controlled, and waterfront development projects better coordinated. Planners face increasing demands for recreational use of the bay's space. The loss of tideland as the result of large-scale reclam- ation projects in the period from 1966 to 1975 is another problem that has come home to roost for the Japanese. Restoration planners see the need for what they call "artificial tideland, seaweed forest, and shallow water" areas to cleanse the bay. These areas, plus increased sewage and waste disposal facilities, are considered cornerstones of the restoration plan, contributing to all the waterfront development projects. One of the newest development projects is the Tokyo Bay Crossing Way. This cross-bay bridge and tunnel project includes the construction of two man-made islands, one in Kawasaki waters and the other in Kisarazu. Bridges will connect the islands with the ports and an underground tunnel will link the central part of the way with the bridges. The Crossing Way is part of a broader coastal development plan that envisions communications, recreational, business, and tourist facilities on the artificial islands with links to the coastal ports. The 26 waterfront development projects presently under way and others in the planning stage could bring another 820,000 people to what is already one of the most crowded population centers in the world — one that lives with the constant threat of a major earthquake. The addition of this many people in the area will tax water supplies and add to sewage volume. But Japan is moving the world with its industrious- ness. Restoring a couple of bays to zen-quality level should just be a matter of some serious meditation on the type of life required by the forces of the 21st century. D Acknowlegements This article was prepared from material supplied by Susumu Maeda, Managing Director, and Akira Komatsu, Manager of the Design Division of the Kansai International Airport Co., Ltd.; Shin Sasaki, Director- General of the Ports and Harbor Bureau of the City of Osaka; Hajime Tsuchida, Director, and Yasufumi Umehara, Deputy Director, of the Ports and Harbor Research Institute, Yokosuka; and Tamotsu Okabe, President of the Oversea Coastal Area Development Institute and Chairman of the committee on Tokyo Bay Restoration Project, and Hiroyuki Nakahara, Secretary- General of the Research Institute for Ocean Economics. 72 i view or i oKyo , rom the Port of Yokohama. Chiba -*»- **&* ,1 Stevedores at work, Puerto Quetzal, Guatemala. (Courtesy of Inter-American Development Bank) Puerto Quetzal, Guatemala: Container Cranes or Stevedores? by Amy Friedheim In March 1983, a new port on Guatemala's Pacific coast, Puerto Quetzal, was declared open and ready for operation. The long concrete wharf offered an open view of the blue Pacific, unencumbered by much of anything — few ships, no cranes, no buildings, no boxes, and very little activity. Unfortunately, the situation is much the same today, and more unfortunate still is that many of Quetzal's problems are typical of Third World ports. Guatemala was then, and still is, faced with the familiar problem of how to make the most of its scarce capital resources. The government must choose between developing its ports, or developing other projects that are also sorely needed; and it must also decide on the balance of capital-intensive and labor-intensive means used to effect the developments. Guatemala spent $100 million on Puerto Quetzal, but ran out of funds before it could complete the project. Now, years later, the Guatemalans must decide whether to finish this project, reconstruct their Caribbean coast ports, or postpone action on their numerous port problems altogether. Guatemala is a small Central American country with a population of 8.5 million people. Despite an abundance of natural resources, it is a poor nation with an annual income of $1,155 per person. The economy relies heavily on trade with the outside world, and most of it is waterborne. In 1987, Guatemala produced $9.6 billion worth of goods and services. In the same year, the country conducted $2 billion worth of imports and exports, more than 20 percent of its total production. Critical Guatemalan imports include wheat, fertilizers, motor vehicles and accessories, and petroleum products. Like many countries in the Third World, the Guatemalan economy exports primary commodities such as coffee, fruit, Amy Friedheim is an economist in the Office of Transportation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC. vegetables, sugar, and petroleum, whose prices fluctuate in unstable markets. The value of many of these commodities has deteriorated markedly in the last decade, and as these values have declined, so has the financial health of economies tied to them. Guatemala, like many Third World countries, is experiencing serious economic difficulties. In 1987, it had a $104 million deficit of trade in goods and services. This economic pinch makes social choices, of which port development is a part, even more difficult than they would be otherwise. Quit ol Tmhumnfpmc The main port in the country is Santo Tomas de Castilla. Located on the lush tropical Caribbean coast, 307 kilometers from the nation's capital, Guatemala City, Santo Tomas handles about 80 percent of Guatemala's port traffic. There are numerous cranes, warehouses, pipelines, and railroad tracks. Off-port sites feature storage tanks, more warehouses, and a free-trade zone. There is little room for expansion on the immediate premises, and its frequent crowding forces ships and trains to remain idle until dock space or warehousing becomes available. Puerto Quetzal is only 67 kilometers from the capital, and despite the more than $100 million already invested by the government to develop the port, it is currently operating at only about 25 percent of its potential capacity. Quetzal's growth potential is limited without additional handling equipment and related facilities. To complete the port, an estimated $20 million would be needed to purchase dry bulk handling equipment including troughs, hoppers, conveyors, and grain elevators; liquid bulk handling facilities including tanks, pipes, and pumps; and container cranes. Modernizing Important Export Operations A look at possible modernization of sugar export operations shows some of the port development problems in Guatemala. Sugar production is a major source of employment and revenue in the Guatemalan economy. Nearly 12 percent of the population works in the fields and processing plants during harvesting season. The 400,000 tonnes of sugar exported in 1986 represented five percent of all export revenues, and nearly 60 percent of the export traffic at Puerto Quetzal that year. However, sugar, like many agricultural commodities, is a fragile source of income. In 1986, the world price of sugar declined to 20 percent of its 1980 market value (from 29.02 to 6.05 cents per pound). The world sugar market is very volatile. A small increase in the price of sugar can cause consumers to drastically reduce their purchases, either because they have found less expensive sources elsewhere, or because they have substi- tuted some other sweetener, such as high- fructose corn syrup, for sugar. Anything — and this includes outdated port handling facilities — that adds even a fraction of a cent per pound to the price of exported sugar can cost Guatemala these markets. Despite the importance of sugar to the economy, and the sensitive nature of the international market, Guatemalan sugar is handled by inefficient means. It is bagged at production sites, transported to the port by truck, hauled alongside the vessel, hoisted on deck by ship's gear, opened by hand, and dumped into the ship's hold. This extremely time-consuming process can require a ship to sit quayside for as long as 15 days. A mechanized loading process might shorten the dockside time to as little as one day. The cost of ship maintenance in port is almost as expensive as that at sea. Consequently, any loading procedure that adds time to the movement of any export, particularly one as price-sensitive as sugar, can add considerable, even prohibitive, expense to the cost of the export. Even so, there is resistance to mechanization in some sectors for fear of stevedore unemployment. There is a clear need to improve port facilities, but what is not so clear is which port to improve, which improvements to make, when they should be made, and who will finance and control the facilities. Obstacles to Mechanization Each port offers its own set of logistical advantages. Today's trading patterns, dominated by traffic with the U.S. Gulf Coast ports, favor the expansion or renovation of Santo Tomas de Castilla. But there is very little land near the port on which to expand. Completing Puerto Quetzal, on the other hand, would in effect "open" trade with Pacific partners. Furthermore, most of the productive resources, including the population, are located in the western region of Guatemala, and shorter inland transportation routes — which are mile-for-mile far more expensive than ocean transportation — are shorter. In the long run, completion of Puerto Quetzal is the better investment. Despite the clear national need for improved port capabilities, the Guatemalan government is unwilling or unable to finance any further investments in Puerto Quetzal. It is encouraging the private sector to do so. Guatemalan importers and exporters are considering investments in port facilities to maintain or improve their own businesses. Their main concern is how the new facilities would affect the profitability of their businesses. Presently, the congestion at Santo Tomas often results in penalties for keeping chartered ships in port longer than the contracted time. This adds to the costs of private businessmen, because 76 government ships have queuing preference at the docks. However, the cost of financing private port equipment is currently prohibitive. Many of the facilities or components would have to be obtained abroad, and interest charges can add 20 percent to the quoted prices. Other factors deter improvements. Although the government expects the private sector to make these investments, it is not willing to relinquish any control of the facilities; and yet the considerable instability of Guatemalan politics and economics makes the risk of losing investment money very high. The Guatemalan government has no clearly defined "port strategy" and does not plan to make further improvements in port handling equipment. It is, however, generally export- oriented and promotes public-private cooperation to increase exports and economic growth. It is also considering legislation to increase investment in Guatemala through the creation of free-trade zones and export incentives such as tax holidays. The Role of the World Bank The Guatemalan government is not alone in its lack of attention to, and long-term planning for, port development. The World Bank is a major source of funding for large-scale infrastructure developments such as roads, quays, electricity, education, and so on. The bank funded 170 port projects of one sort or another between 1980 and 1986. Lending decisions used to be made on an ad hoc, project-by-project basis; and until recently, the World Bank did not address many of the social implications of port development in the Third World, nor did it consistently assess international market conditions. Now the bank requires more complete appraisals of potential projects. A port must assess its internal resources, such as available services, facilities, managers, and operational personnel. In addition, a port must consider factors beyond its control, like primary demand for commodities, the competitors for those commodities, the strength of competing ports, shifting trade patterns, and changing technologies. Because of increasing labor costs and the slow pace of breakbulk* operations, there has been a worldwide trend toward capital-intensive port equipment — specifically, containerization. Almost 70 percent of all international cargo is now containerized. As this relatively new technology saturates the industrialized countries, many developing countries also are beginning to adopt these methods. Between 1980 and 1986, containerization featured in 15 of 34 Third World port projects financed by the World Bank, and 18 of the 34 explicitly addressed trade development. The recurring message is that if developing countries want to continue trading with the industrialized world, their chances of success increase with the ease with which they can fit into world trading patterns and technology. An American grain ship lashed to docks. (All photos by author, except as noted) A partially assembled liquid bulk trough. ! J. • ■MB * ! a * *"^L- K^^^^^k^^^z gy^ i \ H IK? 4 oi "" ~*uM A container ship at Santo Tomas de Castilla. * Breakbulk cargo is made up of uneven packages that travel in the hold or on the deck of a ship; compared with containerized cargo it requires more labor. 77 More Modernization Not Always Better That is not to say that modern technology will always benefit a country. The development of arterial river transport systems in Bangladesh is a good case in point. The government of Bangla- desh has established a set of policies and priorities that favor the adoption of mechanized boats over traditional "country boats." Country boats are made from local materials and built with local labor. They are often crewed by owner-operators and landless peasants who spend their pay in rural areas, and therefore tend to stimulate the local economies. Conversely, mechanized boats are built of foreign materials, and run with fuels and expertise purchased abroad — a clear drain on the nation's scarce hard currency. Mechanized boats are most often owned by wealthy city-dwelling businessmen. The government encourages the adoption of mechanized boats by dredging inland rivers, offering lower freight insurance rates for cargo carried by mechanized boats than for cargo carried in country boats, and granting mechanized boats queuing preference at docks. Country boats must wait for access to the docks, and they are not compensated for the time they spend waiting. The shift toward the use of mechanized vessels has lowered transportation costs, reduced transport times, improved the condition of goods on arrival, and increased the reliability of shipments. The producers and consumers of these goods, many of whom are wealthy city- dwellers, benefit from these innovations. But country boat operators have lost jobs, and those who can still ply the trades have lost income, since the freight rates have declined. This has had an adverse impact on the rural economy. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the Guatemalan and the Bangladeshi situations. The latter is a case of the transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich within Bangladesh, with no prospect of increasing national income. On the other hand, Guatemala's situation is directly linked to national wealth. Without change, Guatemalan participation in world markets could be threatened either because local practices might price their export commodities out of the fiercely competitive world market, or because their trading practices simply do not mesh with prevailing technologies. Market Ultimately Decides Profitability of Ports If mechanized loading operations for sugar were installed, there is of course no guarantee of improved trade; given declining world prices and increased world competition, the new facilities might only maintain the current level of sugar operations. But if trade did improve, benefits would go to the owners of the new facilities, and perhaps, to some of the employees of the sugar production and refining operations. This scenario would occur at the expense of the stevedores, but it would also create new jobs, as containers would be filled inland. Is it better to save the stevedore jobs in the short run, possibly at the expense of Guatemala's future access to the world sugar market; or to save the sugar production and refining jobs, and some of the sugar bagging jobs? International trade is a dynamic environment, and in order to participate, countries must face the prospect of change and competition, neither of which comes without both winners and losers. To date, two new bulk cranes and several warehouses have been installed at Puerto Quetzal, all financed with foreign aid. One tallow importing company has begun to build an installation there, but little else has happened since the port began operating in 1983. Location and ownership issues for a number of commod- ities have not been resolved, nor the financing considered, and the set of contentious issues involving appropriate technology and the sugar industry are still a problem. As is the case in many port development situations, there are many problems yet to be explicitly addressed, let alone in a timely fashion. The bottom line is that there is no formula that can automatically determine the best course for a particular country or port project. Rather, each country should set long-term national goals, and within that context, evaluate port development on a project-by-project basis. □ Selected References Engelmann, Peter. 1982. Development Issues in Latin American Ports. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Port Authorities. New York. Jansen, Eirik G., Antony J. Dolman, Alt Morten Jerve, and Nazibor Rahman. 1989. The Country Boats of Bangladesh: Social and Economic Development and Decision-making in Inland Water Transport. University Press Limited. Dhaka, Bangladesh. 254 pp. Peters, Hans J. 1988. The World Bank Croup's Involvement in Seatrade Logistics Management and Related Transportation Infrastructure and Services. The World Bank Policy Planning and Research Staff, Infrastructure and Urban Development Department, Report INU 11.3 pp. Snitzler, James R., and Keith A. Klindworth. 1986. An Assessment of Guatemalan Port Capacity. USDA Office of Transportation. 5 pp. USDA Office of Transportation. 1987. The Feasibility of Constructing Agriculturally-Related Port Facilities in Guatemala. 43 pp. 78 LA and Long Beach A Tale of Two Ports With // • • 2020" Vision by James A. Fawcett * In 1857, when Phineas T. Banning first envisioned a seaport in California's San Pedro Bay at Rattlesnake Island, he could not have imagined in his wildest dreams that one day two of the largest, most active seaports in the world would occupy that site. In the 132 years that have passed since Banning's vision, the independent ports of James A. Fawcett is Associate Director of the Sea Grant Program, University of Southern California, Los Angeles. Liquid bulk carriers pass each other in the main channel of the Port of Los Angeles. 79 This lot in the Port ol Angeles holds 5 inported^curs