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NATHANAEL

*TITLE:*

OF THE LIGHT OF  
NATURE ...

*PLACE:*

EDINBURGH

*DATE:*

1857

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

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


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OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE

A DISCOURSE

BY NATHANAEL CULVERWEL, M.A.

EDITED BY JOHN BROWN, D.D.  
EDINBURGH.

WITH A CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE DISCOURSE

BY JOHN CAIRNS, M.A.  
BERWICK-ON-TWEED.

EDINBURGH: THOMAS CONSTABLE AND CO.  
HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO., LONDON.

MDCCLVII.

"NOBIS RES SALUBRIS VIDETUR ET IMPRIMIS UTILIS, SI TRACTATUS INSTI-  
TUATUR SOBRIUS ET DILIGENS, QUI DE USU RATIONIS HUMANÆ IN THEOLOGICIS  
PRÆCIPAT. EJUSMODI TRACTATUM INTER DESIDERATA PONIMUS."—*Bacon*.

EDINBURGH: T. CONSTABLE, PRINTER TO HER MAJESTY.

11 May 94. 5K.

TO

HENRY ROGERS, Esq.

IN TOKEN OF THE EDITOR'S GRATITUDE

FOR THE INSTRUCTION AND DELIGHT

DERIVED FROM HIS WRITINGS.

12 APR 1854 Bangs 20

175734

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## THE PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

DURING the latter half of the sixteenth century, under the wise but arbitrary civil sway of the Maiden Queen, and the not less arbitrary, but much less wise ecclesiastical rule of Parker, and Grindal, and Whitgift, metropolitans of England, there lived in London a wealthy merchant citizen, Nicolas Culverwel, or, as it is sometimes written, Culverel, who, if we may judge from the history of his family, was, like many of his compeers, a devoted adherent to Puritanism; a circumstance which, when we consider how much that form of religion was discountenanced both by royal and episcopal authority, and how serious were the dangers and sacrifices to which its rich professors were especially exposed, must be allowed to be a presumption, at least, that Nicolas was a sincere, earnest man.<sup>1</sup>

Two of his daughters were married to distinguished Puritan ministers; one to Dr. Lawrence Chadderton, who was chosen by Sir Walter Mildmay, the founder of Emanuel College, Cambridge, to be the first master of that

<sup>1</sup> Clark's *Lives* at the end of his *Martyrology*.

institution, which, under his care, soon took so high a place among its academical sisters. From his modesty, which equalled his learning, Dr. Chadderton was extremely reluctant to accept a situation so high and responsible, and complied only on Sir Walter saying, 'If you will not be the *master*, sir, I will not be the *founder* of the college.'<sup>1</sup>

Another daughter became the wife of a still more celebrated man, Dr. William Whitaker, the nephew of Nowel, Dean of St. Paul's, and, in succession, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, and Master of St. John's College, in that University, whom Cardinal Bellarmine is said to have pronounced 'the most learned heretic he had ever read;' and of whom Bishop Hall says, 'Who ever saw him without reverence, or heard him without wonder?'<sup>2</sup>

A third daughter, the spouse of 'Mr. Thomas Gouge, a pious gentleman,' was the mother of Dr. William Gouge, for nearly half a century the venerated minister of Blackfriars, in London, author of a *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, in a folio volume of immense size, a member of the Westminster Assembly, and the father of Thomas Gouge, the nonconformist and philanthropist, the memory of whose rare excellence Archbishop Tillotson, so much to his own honour, has embalmed in a funeral sermon, describing him as 'having left far behind him all he ever knew in cheerful, unwearied diligence in acts of pious charity;

<sup>1</sup> Brook's *Lives of the Puritans*, ii. 446; Fuller's *Hist. of Cambridge*, 147.

<sup>2</sup> Churton's *Life of Nowel*, p. 64; Clark's *Ecc. Hist.*, p. 816, and pp. 15-17; Wood's *Ath. Ox.*, vol. i. p. 303; Leigh on *Religion and Learning*, p. 363.

having a singular sagacity and prudence in devising the most effectual ways of doing good, and in managing his charity to the best purposes, and to the greatest extent.'<sup>1</sup>

Two of his sons, Ezekiel and Samuel, devoted themselves to the Christian ministry. Of Samuel we know nothing, but what Clark tells us, that he was 'a famous preacher.'

Of Ezekiel we know a little more, but still we have but scanty information respecting him. He was educated under the care of his brother-in-law, Dr. Chadderton, at Emanuel's, Cambridge. That College was then commonly called 'the Puritan College.' It owed its name, it is said, to a remarkable conversation between Queen Elizabeth and its founder. 'Sir Walter,' said the Queen, with characteristic haughtiness, 'I hear you have erected a Puritan foundation at Cambridge.' 'Madam,' said Sir Walter, 'far be it from me to countenance anything contrary to your Majesty's established laws; but I have set an acorn, which, when it becomes an oak, God alone knows what will be the fruit thereof.' Its growth was rapid, and its produce rich; for the quaint Fuller says, 'Sure I am, it has overshadowed all the University; more than a moiety of the present masters of colleges having been bred therein.'

After finishing his university studies, Ezekiel became in succession Rector of Stambridge and Vicar of Felsted, in the hundreds of Essex, of which Sympton says, 'In regard of air unhealthy; yet that air was so sweetened with the savoury breath of the Gospel, that they were termed "the holy land."' During his last incumbency, we learn that

<sup>1</sup> Middleton's *Biog. Evang.* iii. 267; Clark's *Lives*; Tillotson's *Sermons*, Ser. xxiii.

he was honoured to be the instrument of the conversion of his nephew William Gouge, then at the free school of Felsted;<sup>1</sup> and that, in 1583, he was prosecuted for nonconformity, and suspended for some time, by Bishop Aylmer, for not wearing the surplice.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. William Gouge, in an address to the Christian reader, prefixed to the seventh edition of the *Treatise on Faith*, says of his uncle, that 'God sent Ezekiel Culverwel, as of old he sent Ezekiel Buzi, to set forth the promises of God more plentifully and pertinently than ever before; and that to breed faith where it is not, to strengthen it where it is weak, to settle it where it wavereth, to repair it where it decayeth, to apply it aright to every need, to extend it to sanctification as well as to justification, and to point out the singular use of it in matters temporal, spiritual, and eternal.' 'What I say of him, I know of him; for from mine infancy have I known him, and under his ministry was I trained up in my younger years, he being at least two-and-twenty years older than myself.' 'Among other evidences of the power of God's word among them (Mr. Culverwel's people), I will record one, a very remarkable one, and worthy to be had in more frequent use. It was this: In time of great dearth of corn and other food, there was order taken by public authority, that every family should forbear one meal in the week, and upon the Lord's day bring the value of it to the collectors for the poor. This being faithfully performed by them all, therewith they did provide good corn, which cost eighty-nine shillings the bushel, and sold it to the poor at twelvenpence the peck,

<sup>1</sup> Clark; Middleton, *ut sup.*

<sup>2</sup> Brook, *ut sup.*

and yet reserved a good stock to set the poor on with.' 'He was many years,' says Dr. Sibbs, 'God's prisoner under the gout and stone; such diseases as will allow but little liberty to them that are arrested and tortured by them. So fruitful an expense of time in so weak and worn-out a body, is seldom seen. Scarce any one came to him but went away better than they came. God gave him much strength of spirit to uphold his spirit from sinking under the strength of such diseases.'<sup>1</sup>

The time of his death is not exactly known. His book, entitled *A Treatise on Faith*, was printed 1623; and he lived to publish a defence of it against the charge of Arminianism, in a small pamphlet, 1626. He was certainly dead when Dr. Sibbs published his *Time well spent in Sacred Meditations; Divine Observations and Heavenly Exhortations*, 1635; and he must have been an old man when he died, as Dr. Sibbs says of that little book, that it was 'begun about forty years ago.' His only other writings are entitled, *A Ready Way to remember the Scriptures*, said by Brook to have been printed 1637; and a small tract of twenty pages, entitled, *The Way to a Blessed State in this Life*. His *Treatise on Faith* seems to have been popular, for it reached a seventh edition in 1633. It was highly esteemed by Mr. Robert Blair, who in his memoirs<sup>2</sup> says, that 'he was thereby much confirmed,' and is still worthy of perusal. Dr. Sibbs describes him as 'a man very well experienced in all the ways of God;' and Fuller classes him among 'the learned writers of Emanuel College,' but 'no fellow.'

<sup>1</sup> Dedication of *Time Well Spent*.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Robert Blair*. Wodrow Soc., Edinburgh, p. 32.

‘One generation goeth and another cometh.’ There appears now a second race of Culverwels on the stage, but in what relation they stood to those who preceded them is doubtful. There is Nathanael, the author of *The Discourse of the Light of Nature*; there is Richard, his brother, who subscribes a short address ‘to the Courteous Reader,’ prefixed to that discourse; and there is a William, of whom we know only, that about the time Nathanael was a Fellow of Emanuel College, Cambridge, he was a Fellow of Trinity College in that University, and tutor to a Mr. Robert Blunt, who was ejected from a living in Northumberland, for nonconformity, in 1662.<sup>1</sup> The name is uncommon, and he might be a cousin, if not a brother, of Nathanael and Richard. These seem to have been sons either of Samuel or of Ezekiel, probably of the latter.

We know that Nathanael died in 1650 or 1651, and that he died young, but we have no means of fixing the time of his birth. It is plain, however, from what has been stated, that he had ‘an honourable descent, and came of a stock of eminent preachers.’ From information kindly obtained from the College books by a member of the University, it appears that he entered Emanuel College, Cambridge, as a pensioner in 1633, when he probably did not exceed eighteen years of age.<sup>2</sup> He took his degree of B.A. in 1636, and of M.A. in 1640. He was chosen a Fellow, but when we know not; and for some time before his death he had been a regular preacher in the chapel of his college.

<sup>1</sup> Palmer, iii. 75; Calamy, iii. 504.

<sup>2</sup> Howe was only seventeen when he was admitted as a sizar of Christ Church College, Cambridge.—Rogers’s *Life of Howe*, p. 23.

The master of the college, for some time previous to Culverwel’s death, was Dr. Anthony Tuckney, who ‘had a considerable hand in the preparation of the *Westminster Confession and Catechisms*,’<sup>1</sup> and whose candour and learning, as well as zeal for orthodoxy, are strikingly manifested in his correspondence with Dr. Whichcote. Dr. Whichcote was a Fellow of Emanuel when Culverwel entered it, and continued so till 1644, when he became Provost of King’s College, so that he may have been Culverwel’s tutor. Henry More became a student in Christ Church College two years before; and John Smith, who had Whichcote for his tutor, joined Emanuel College two years after Culverwel. Smith died two years after him; so that considering their congeniality of mind, they could scarcely miss being intimate. Dr. Ralph Cudworth was his contemporary for seven or eight years at Emanuel’s. Jeremiah Burroughs, and Dr. Wallis, afterwards Professor of Mathematics, were also fellow-students.

From *Mount Ebal* (p. 89), it is obvious that Nathanael was a decided Parliament-man, and a friend of the Solemn League and Covenant. He calls on his audience to ‘bless God for men of public spirit, Zerubbabels and Jehoshuas—such as are building God a temple;’ puts them in mind of their sacramental vows to maintain the cause of God; and adds, ‘You cannot but remember a late vow you have made too, the very sum of which was this, to stand for the public good.’

<sup>1</sup> Palmer, i. 266. It deserves notice, that, notwithstanding this, the Doctor voted against imposing subscription to the Confession as the term of ministerial communion.—*Letters between Dr. Tuckney and Dr. Whichcote*, published by Slater at the end of Whichcote’s *Aphorisms*.

Some dark hints in his brother's address 'To the Reader,' seem to indicate that he had been characterized by something in his manner, which was misconstrued by some into haughtiness, and which is traced apparently to mental aberration, or some rather severe and uncommon bodily affliction, from which he did not recover. The passage referred to is as follows: 'I must say of him *ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἔπαθεν*. And as it is hard for men to be under affliction, but they are liable to censures, so it fared with him, who was looked upon by some, as one whose eyes were lofty, and whose eyelids lifted up, who bare himself too high upon a conceit of his parts; although they that knew him intimately, are most willing to be his compurgators in this particular. Thus prone are we to think the staff under the water crooked, though we know it to be straight. However, turn thine eyes inward, and censure not thine own fault so severely in others. Cast not the first stone, except thou find thyself without this fault; dare not to search too curiously into the *ἀνεξιχνίαστους ὁδοὺς* of God; but rather learn that lesson of the Apostle's in that elegant paronomasy, *Μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν*.' Dillingham, in the dedication to Tuckney, acknowledges his kindness to the author, 'especially when he lay under the discipline of so sad a providence;' and in his address 'To the Reader,' speaks of God 'having chastised him somewhat sharply.'

Luke xiii. 2, 4.

Rom. xii. 3.

Such are all the notices, few and fragmentary as they are, which I have been able to glean from numerous quarters, respecting one who plainly held a high place as a man of genius, learning, eloquence, and piety, in the

estimation of those who knew him best, and whose 'noble and gallant abilities' will not readily be questioned by any who, with the necessary information, have perused with due attention the little volume in which is enshrined all of his mind and heart which has been left among mortals.

Of Richard Culverwel, the sum of what we know is, that he obtained the living of Grundisburgh, in Suffolk, during the Protectorate; that he conformed in 1662, and continued there till his death in the year of the Revolution, 1688.<sup>1</sup>

Soon after Nathanael Culverwel's death, Dr. William Dillingham (of whom I know nothing, but that he succeeded to the Mastership of Emanuel's when Dr. Tuckney was made Master of St. John's, and that he is said to have been the author of a translation into Latin of the *Westminster Confession* and *Catechisms*, published in 1655, and reprinted in 1659;<sup>2</sup> from his not appearing either in Brook's list of Puritans, or Palmer's of Nonconformists, I conjecture him to have been a Conformist in 1662) published

<sup>1</sup> This information I owe to the kindness of the Rev. Henry More of Lowestoft, Suffolk, the author of a very just and elegant estimate of Culverwel and his work in the *Evangelist*, vol. i. pp. 375-377. The Rev. G. E. Webster, present Rector of Grundisburgh, has kindly furnished a copy of Richard Culverwel's epitaph. It is inscribed on a black marble slab, within the rails of the communion-table, on the north side, and is surmounted by a coat-of-arms: 'Here resteth the body of Richard Culverwel, who was minister of this parish for 40 years. He dyed the 4th of April 1688. Aged 67.'

<sup>2</sup> A Mr. Thomas Dillingham, of Dean, is among the ministers summoned for the Westminster Assembly; but he is marked by Neal among those who 'did not appear at all.'—*Hist. of the Pur.* vol. ii. p. 47. Lond. 1822. As the name is not a common one, he was probably a relation of Dr. William.

in 1651, a discourse of Mr. Culverwel's on 1st Corinthians xiii. 12, entitled *Sacred Optics*, which, being unfinished, seems to have been the last sermon he delivered in the College Chapel. The concluding words are, when the circumstances are taken into account, strikingly impressive: 'Thus have we shown you the several glasses through which "we see but darkly." There remains the *visio recta*, a sight of God "face to face," to "know as we are known." But of this hereafter.' The editor adds this distich,—

'What this "to know as we are known" should be,  
The author could not tell, but's gone to see.'

The intention of this publication was, as the editor says, 'only for a taste, and to bear the mace into the world before that learned and elegant treatise, which the ingenious author has left behind him, concerning the light of nature.' The reception of this little treatise was so favourable, that within the course of less than a year, Culverwel's Remains were published under the same editorship, with the title of 'An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, with several other Treatises: viz., The Schism, The Act of Oblivion, The Child's Return, The Panting Soul, Mount Ebal, The White Stone, Spiritual Optics, The Worth of Souls. By Nathanael Culverwel, Master of Arts, and lately Fellow of Emanuel College, in Cambridge. Imprimatur, Edm. Calamy. 4to, 1652.' The *Discourse of the Light of Nature* fills 215 pages. There are three other editions—one in 1654, another in 1661, and another printed at Oxford in 1669. The first

of these has been supposed to be surreptitious. The paper and print are greatly inferior to the edition of 1652, and it is ridiculously inaccurate. In the title-page, *fo* is printed for *of*, and *imrimatur* for *imprimatur*; and in the short dedication, *father* for *farther*, and *wroth* for *worth*. *Ex pede disce*—The fact that four editions, even though they should not have been large ones, were required in seventeen years, and one of these it may be a pirated one,<sup>1</sup> distinctly indicates that the work at its appearance had a considerable measure of popularity. Since 1669, I am not aware that the volume has been reprinted. An edition of the *White Stone* was printed some years ago.

The book can scarcely be called *rare* in the bibliographers' sense, for it frequently appears in booksellers'

<sup>1</sup> On comparing carefully the second, and third, and fourth editions, I think the probability is that they are all genuine. In the second edition, notwithstanding its press blunders, some more important oversights of editing in the first are corrected. Both the second and third editions are printed with the same letter, not however page for page; the paper of the third and fourth is even inferior to that of the second. *Some*, only some of the archaisms of the spelling are corrected; while in other cases a worse spelling is adopted, as *Cambridg* for *Cambridge*. The imprint of the second edition is, 'LONDON, printed by T. R. and E. M. for John Rothwel, at the Fountain and Bear in Cheapside, in Goldsmiths-row. 1654:' of the third edition, 'LONDON, printed by Tho. Roycroft for Mary Rothwell, at the Bear and Fountain, in Goldsmiths-row, in Cheapside, 1661:' of the fourth edition, 'OXFORD, printed for Tho. Williams, and are to be sold by Henry Dymock, Bookseller in Oxford. Anno Dom. 1669.' In the second edition, the discourse extends to 183 pages; in the third, it only reaches 175. The pagination of the fourth edition corresponds with that of the third. There is no substantial difference in the four editions, though the first is incomparably superior in appearance to the other three. From there being a change made in the close of Richard Culverwel's address 'To the Reader,' in the third edition, such as would have occurred to none but an author, I think it likely that that edition was printed under his care. The four editions have been carefully compared in preparing the present edition for the press.

catalogues; but it has been little noticed, and is very generally unknown. I have an indistinct recollection of meeting with a commendatory mention of the book in some writer of a period not long subsequent to that of the author; but after tasking my faculty of reminiscence to the uttermost, I cannot call up the name. I am not aware of having seen it quoted but by myself,<sup>1</sup> though it abounds in passages well worthy of being quoted, and singularly fit for quotation; nor of seeing it referred to in later writings, except in one instance, where the name of the author is not given, by one who, with a wider and yet more distinct view of the whole subject of Culverwel's principal work, has given so powerful a delineation of 'The Claims and Conflicts of Reason and Faith.'<sup>2</sup> The only bibliographical sketch of the work is that excellent one in *The Evangelist*, by the Rev. Henry More, already referred to.

Many of the minor articles in the volume are of high merit. In every one of them are to be found passages of great beauty and power; but there can be no doubt, that the *Discourse of the Light of Nature*, which now, after an interval of nearly two hundred years, we reproduce, as it is the longest, is, both as to thought and composition, by far the best of Culverwel's works.

That this work should have, on its first appearance, excited the degree of interest, which three editions in ten years, four in less than twenty, indicate, is not at all wonderful. It may seem more difficult to account for its having so soon sunk into comparative oblivion, and so long continued so. Evidence that it has so sunk is abun-

<sup>1</sup> *Expos. of 1st Peter*, i. 368.

<sup>2</sup> Rogers's *Essays*, iii. 174.

dant. It is not referred to by Baxter in his *Life and Times*. Doddridge does not mention it in his list of books on Christian Ethics, nor Kippis his editor. It does not appear in the ample list appended to Dr. Edward Williams's *Christian Preacher*. It is not noticed by either Dugald Stewart or Sir James Mackintosh, in their dissertations. And Hallam, who has seen and read so many books, does not seem to have met with this, else he could hardly have said, that 'Cumberland,' whose work *De Legibus* was not published till 1672, was 'the first Christian writer who sought to establish systematically the principles of moral right independent of revelation.'<sup>1</sup>

What is perhaps still more remarkable, Nathanael Culverwel's name does not appear in Fuller's *History* in the list of 'the learned writers' of Emanuel College, whether 'Fellows' or 'no Fellows,' though, as we have remarked, that of Ezekiel, an immeasurably inferior man, does. I have not found his name in any biographical dictionary; nor is he mentioned by Brook or Calamy, or Palmer or Bogue and Bennet. Dyer and Granger, and Noble and Brydges, have been examined in vain. His posthumous work is noticed by Watt and Darling, and that is all.

The causes why a book so instinct with literary life—a book which, if the world were but aware of its worth, they certainly would 'not willingly let die'—should have run so obvious a risk of being forgotten, are not however far to seek. There was but little taste for such disquisitions among the body of theologians with whom Culverwel's Calvinism, Puritanism, and deep spiritual religion con-

<sup>1</sup> Hallam, iii. 400.

nected him. Among the great men of that party, I do not know of more than Howe, and perhaps Bates, who could completely sympathize with him. Among their *Dii Minorum Gentium*, I can think only of Trueman, and still more of Shaw<sup>1</sup> (whose *Immanuel* breathes a spirit very like John Smith's, only more thoroughly baptized into the name of Christ), as men who would have found in Culverwel's peculiarities a recommendation of his writings.

It is not indistinctly intimated, both by Dr. Dillingham and Mr. Richard Culverwel, that Nathanael was an object of suspicion with some of his party; and I think there are symptoms of this feeling in Dr. Tuckney's letters to Whichcote, though the name of Culverwel, who was just dead when these letters were written, is not mentioned. On the other hand, those who, from their literary tastes and philosophical leanings, were most likely to take an interest in *The Discourse*, and were capable of appreciating and relishing its rare excellences, were divided from the author by a great gulf of difference in religious and political opinion, widened by prejudices, of the strength of which we, whose lot has been cast in better times, can form but an inadequate estimate.

The book, besides, from the strangely mosaic appearance it exhibits, in consequence of the innumerable Greek and Latin citations, to say nothing of Hebrew, with which the text is inlaid, was singularly unattractive. The

<sup>1</sup> Trueman, Shaw, and Bates, were all Cambridge men; the first of Clare-hall, and the second of St. John's College; Dr. Bates's college is not mentioned. They entered the University between 1640 and 1650, so that they probably might be among Culverwel's hearers, and imbibed in some measure his spirit.

familiarity the author discovers equally with the classics, the fathers, and the schoolmen, is marvellous:

'He knew each lane, and every alley green,  
Dingle, or bushy dell, of this wide wood;  
And every bosky bourne from side to side,  
His daily walks, and ancient neighbourhood.'

As but few of these citations are translated, to the ordinary English reader *The Discourse* 'was a sealed book;' while so recondite are many of them, especially as separated from their context, that even a scholar, in perusing the book, would require such frequent recourse to his lexicon, as to make it anything but light and pleasant reading.

Add to all this, the work bears proof that it is posthumous, and obviously has owed but little to editorial care. Perhaps the proper duty of an editor was at that time not so well understood as it now is. But assuredly Dr. Dillingham appears to have taken his work very easily. With the exception of the Latin and the Greek, which, generally speaking, are accurately printed, little attention appears to have been paid to the correction of the press. Sentences and paragraphs are often divided from, or run into, one another, in a way which at once injures the beauty of the composition, and obscures the course and connexion of thought.

The design of the treatise is well enough described by the original editor thus: 'The design of the *Discourse of the Light of Nature* was, on the one hand, to vindicate the use of reason, in matters of religion, from the aspersions and prejudices of some weaker ones in those times, who,

having entertained erroneous opinions, which they were no way able to defend, were taught by their more cunning seducers to wink hard, and except against all offensive weapons; so, on the other hand, to chastise the sauciness of Socinus and his followers, who dare set Hagar above her mistress, and make faith wait at the elbow of corrupt and distorted reason—to “take off the head of that uncircumcised Philistine with his own sword,” but better sharpened, and then to lay it up behind the ephod in the sanctuary. An enterprise, I confess, of no small import; which yet, he hoped, with God’s assistance to have effected, by giving unto reason the things that are reason’s, and unto faith the things that are faith’s. And had the world been favoured with his longer life, the height of his parts, and the earnest he gave, had bespoken very ample expectations in those who knew and heard him. But it pleased God, having first melted him with His love, and then chastised him, though somewhat sharply, to take him to Himself; from the contemplation of the *light of nature*, to the enjoyment of one *supernatural*, that *φῶς ἀπρόσιτον*—*light inaccessible*, which none can see and live, and to translate him from snuffing a candle here to be made partaker of the inheritance of the saints in light. So that all that he finished towards that undertaking was this *Discourse of the Light of Nature* in general, not descending so low as to show how the moral law was founded in it, or that gospel-revelation doth not extinguish it. Wherein, if, standing in the midst between two adversaries of extreme persuasions, while he opposes the one, he seems to favour the other more than is meet; when thou shalt observe him, at

another time, to declare as much against the other, thou wilt then be of another mind. Judge candidly, and take his opinion, as thou wouldst do his picture, sitting;—not from a luxuriant expression, wherein he always allowed for the shrinking, but from his declared judgment when he speaks professedly of such a subject. For instance, if any expression seem to lift reason up too high, you may, if you please, otherwise hear it confess and bewail its own weakness (chap. xii.); you may see it bow the head and worship, and then lay itself down quietly at the feet of faith (chap. xviii.) So that, if thou read but the whole discourse, thou wilt easily perceive, as himself would often affirm, that he abhorred the very thought of advancing the power of Nature into the throne of free grace, or by the light of nature [reason] in the least measure to eclipse that of faith.<sup>1</sup>

It is not my purpose to enter on the discussion of the merits of the *Discourse* as an exercise in ethical philosophy. That will be done immediately to good purpose, by one who, from the course of his studies, as well as for a deeper reason, is better able than I am to deal with such a subject. I may be permitted, however, to remark, that to form a fair estimate of the merit of the work, and the genius of its author, it is necessary to recollect, that it was published before any of the great works on morals, which illustrated the literature of England during the last half of the seventeenth century, had appeared. Dillingham informs us that it was written six years before the author’s death, that is, about the year 1646. Now Jeremy Taylor’s *Ductor Dubitantium*, Cumberland’s *De Legibus*, and Cudworth’s *Intel-*

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 8, 9.

*lectual System*, were all published posterior to this; the first in 1660, the second in 1672, and the third in 1678.<sup>1</sup>

Though he could not have read the works of that 'set of men' at Cambridge, 'who,' as Burnet<sup>2</sup> says, 'studied to assert and examine the principles of morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophic method,' he no doubt enjoyed the advantage of frequent and intimate intercourse with some of them; and though he differed from these great men on points of the quinquarticular controversy, he obviously had read the same books, cultivated the same studies, and cherished the same enlightened liberal spirit. It would be difficult to believe that John Howe, who entered the University in 1647, was not a great admirer of Culverwel, then one of the most celebrated of the university preachers; and that *his* influence, fully as much as that of More or Smith, contributed to turn Howe's congenious mind to those studies which gave his writings a character so different from that of any of those of the other great Nonconformists. Traces of Culverwel are to be found in Howe's works.

It only remains that I say a few words in reference to the manner in which this edition of the *Discourse of the Light of Nature* has been prepared for republication.

The citations from books in foreign tongues have generally been put into the foot-margin, and translations have taken their place in the text; so executed, I trust, as to leave little or no trace of the fact, that a distance of two centuries intervened between the author and the translator.

<sup>1</sup> Hallam, iii.

<sup>2</sup> *Life and Times*, vol. i. p. 188, fol. ed.

Considerable pains have been bestowed on properly placing the points, and dividing the paragraphs.

While the author's language has been scrupulously retained, the archaic and irregular orthography has been modernized and made uniform; and some affected colloquial abbreviations, which deform the writings of some of the authors of this period, have been removed. Indeed, anything more with regard to the language would have been worse than supererogatory. The style is admirable for its perspicuity, force, and elegance; and scarcely any either of the words or forms of expression, 'turns of phrase,' as Hallam calls them, have, through the mutations of language during two centuries, become obsolete. So much for the advantage of a man writing unaffectedly and in earnest, on a subject he understands, and with the importance of which, deeply impressed himself, he wishes to impress others.

Almost the only fault of the style is that referred to by Mr. More in his *Critique*—a superabundance of figurative expression. It is, as he says, to a great extent 'a book of poesie in prose compiled.' This *dulce vitium* may, no doubt, be carried too far; but in Culverwel's pages, as well as in Bacon's, figures body forth abstract thought more accurately, as well as more agreeably, than the most literal expressions could. Indeed Dillingham's encomium scarcely passes the bounds of truth, when he calls this little book, 'cloth of gold' 'weaved of sunbeams.' Culverwel was certainly an exception to Dr. Hey's sweeping charge, that 'the Puritans were void of what we call taste and elegance.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Lectures*, book iv. art. xx. sec. 1.

In the former editions, there are few if any references. It has been found impossible to verify all the citations, and to give in every case the correct reference; but a good deal has been done in this way, at an expense of time and trouble which I would almost blush to specify.

A few notes, chiefly in reference to some of the authors referred to, have been added. It would have been absurd to give notices of the leading philosophers of antiquity, as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, or of the Greek and Roman Classical Authors, or of the great Fathers of the Church, or even of the more distinguished schoolmen, such as Aquinas, Scotus, Anselm, and Bradwardine, or of those men nearer the author's own age, who have secured for themselves a high and enduring place in the remembrance of all generations, such as the two Bacons—the Friar and the Chancellor—Selden, Grotius, and Hooker; but in the present age, when a taste for such compositions as *The Discourse of the Light of Nature* is diffused far beyond the limits of academic education or professional scholarship, many will find it convenient to have an introduction to some of Culverwel's familiar acquaintance, to whom even the scholars of our times are all but strangers, and of whom the great body of readers have never heard the names: such as Suarez and Vasquez, Nemesius and Zabarella, Averroes and Prosper. For all the notes I am answerable—for Dillingham's edition is as unencumbered with these as the original texts of the Greek or Latin classics. It would have been an advantage to have had a few annotations written at the time. It would have saved a subsequent editor much trouble, and might have given

light to some expressions and references, which after all his attempts may still seem obscure.

In committing the work to the press, though I do not count on making what is called an impression on the public, I do indulge the hope that Culverwel, on his re-appearance, will find an audience, if not more *meet* than that which welcomed his original appearance, at any rate ultimately more numerous; and my hope rests on the conviction, that, on the one hand, the lovers of ethical science will not be deterred from the perusal of so admirable a treatise, because its author was a Calvinist and a Puritan; and, on the other, that these interesting studies have now no more enlightened and devoted cultivators than are to be found among the inheritors of Culverwel's faith and spirit. Earnestly do I desire that, in his case, the proverb may be verified: 'Suum cuique decus posteritas rependet.' His claim has long been in abeyance.

The time and labour bestowed on this work, in which I have gratefully to acknowledge the assistance of kind friends,<sup>1</sup> I have not grudged; for to use language, which I rather think is borrowed, though I know not from whence, 'I have felt as if I were doing an act of justice to long-overlooked merit, of a very high order; and as at the

<sup>1</sup> Next to the friend who has added so largely to the value of this volume, by furnishing a critique, every way worthy of *The Discourse*, my acknowledgments are due to my two esteemed kinsmen, Mr. John Brown of North Leith, and Mr. Robert Johnston, one of the Masters of Mill Hill School, Middlesex. I have also been indebted for useful hints, in conducting my investigations into the history of Culverwel and his works, to my ancient and esteemed friend, Principal Lee; hints which few but himself could have given.

same time conferring a favour on the literary and religious public, by calling their attention to what needs only to be read to be acknowledged a work of great beauty and solid worth.'

The other remains of Nathanael Culverwel, which, though bearing the strong impress of his genius and learning, are more fitted for the edification of ordinary Christians than *The Discourse*, have undergone a revision which, not less than the discourse, they greatly required. Their republication will in some measure depend on the reception which the present volume may receive.

ARTHUR LODGE, July 1857.

### CRITICAL ESSAY.

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THE work here reprinted is chiefly remarkable on three grounds, as a literary curiosity, as a monument of philosophical genius, and as a masterly discussion of the subject of which it treats, hardly surpassed in the course of British Ethics. The history of the Author, with all that makes the book singular in its fortunes, has been so amply illustrated by the Editor, that on that point nothing remains to be said. Nor can much be added respecting the writer's philosophical genius. I shall only touch on this subject, and then proceed to make some observations on the doctrines and principles, metaphysical, ethical, and theological, which entitle this unpretending and long-forgotten work to a conspicuous rank in philosophical literature.

While Culverwel, in point of philosophical genius, is visibly allied to the other Cambridge Platonists of his day, both in the cast of his speculation, and in the circle of his reading, there are points of marked distinction which are generally in his favour. His mind is much less burdened with the weight of his learning, which for his years is almost as vast as that of Cudworth himself. His reading

also extends more impartially than theirs over the polite as well as the philosophical literature of antiquity; and his sympathies are not only with the schoolmen but with the anti-scholastic writings of Descartes and Bacon, and the new growth of European philosophy under their influence. He is remarkably free from the prejudices of all schools. He is not insensible to the false idealism of Plato, and does not follow his compeers in aggravating the evil by Neoplatonic additions. While he defends 'the immortal name of Aristotle' against Bacon's unfounded charge of neglecting his predecessors, he is himself just to 'the great and noble Verulam,' 'that great advancer of learning.' Though a zealous Protestant, he is warm in his praise of the Jesuit Suarez; and his strong convictions, as a Christian and a Puritan, do not repress his cordial appreciation of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The soaring and passionate ideality of his nature, is tempered by something of the sound English judgment of Locke; and his rich and glowing fancy, in which he differs from all the Cambridge school but Taylor, though not always controlled by perfect taste, is in general happily wedded to masculine vigour of speculation.

The style of Culverwel can hardly be praised for its singularity, in an age which already possessed the masterpieces of Bacon and Hooker, and was soon to number the works of Hobbes among the models of philosophical English prose. Here, however, he will not suffer by comparison with any of the Cambridge school. Though loaded with quotations, and occasionally tinged with youthful redundancies, his expression is not only free and spirited,

but delicately accurate; and not a few of his sayings deserve to rank with the felicities of English literature. Take the following as examples:—'Reason is the first-born, but faith has the blessing.' 'I shall always reverence a grey-headed truth; yet prefer reason, a daughter of eternity, before antiquity, which is the offspring of time.' 'The Stoics were a kind of Pharisees among the heathen.' 'The Sceptics pretend to more ignorance than they have, nay, than they are capable of; they would take time to consider, and no less than their lifetime.' 'Transubstantiation, that cloud and heap of contradictions, doth very compendiously put out the eyes of sense and reason both at once.'

In endeavouring to form some estimate of Culverwel's views and opinions as relative to the development of English speculation in metaphysics, ethics, and theology, it is almost necessary to take them out of their original framework, as parts of a set of academic sermons on that text of Proverbs, which declares the understanding of a man to be 'the candle of the Lord.' No little strained ingenuity, it must be confessed, is displayed by the author in drawing out the parallel between the light of Nature, and that of a candle; and this is the weakest side of the performance. But if the reader will disregard this accommodation to the defective taste of the times, he will find in this somewhat fanciful and immethodical discussion—first, of what the light of Nature is; and then, secondly, of how it resembles that of a candle—a series of most important utterances upon all the fundamental questions of philosophy and theology. These may be arranged under three heads,

*the theory of knowledge, the theory of conscience, and the theory of faith.*

I. In regard to *the theory of knowledge*, we find already in Culverwel that balance and equipoise between the sensationist and intellectualist extremes, at which speculation has now with tolerable unanimity arrived. His whole treatise is an assertion of the existence of original elements of knowledge, both speculative and practical. This assertion is made with sunlike clearness, especially in the beginning of Chap. VII. 'There are stamped and printed upon the being of man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature.' 'All the fresh springs of common and fountain notions are in the soul of man, for the watering of his essence, for the refreshing of this heavenly plant, this *arbor inversa*, this enclosed being, this garden of God. And though the wickedness of man may stop the pleasant motion, the clear and crystalline progress of the fountain, yet they cannot hinder the first risings, the bubbling endeavours of it. They may pull off nature's leaves, and pluck off her fruit, and chop off her branches, but yet the root of it is eternal, the foundation of it is inviolable.' 'You must not, nor cannot think that nature's law is confined and contracted within the compass of two or three common notions, as with one foot it fixes a centre, so with the other it measures and spreads out a circumference; it draws several conclusions, which do all meet and crowd into these first and central principles. As in those noble mathematical sciences there are not only some first *αἰτήματα*, which are granted as soon as asked,

if not before, but there are also whole heaps of firm and immovable demonstrations that are built upon them. In the very same manner, nature has some *postulata*, some *προλήψεις*, which Seneca renders *præsumptiones*, which others call *anticipationes animi*, which she knows a rational being will presently and willingly yield unto; and therefore by virtue of these it does engage and oblige it to all such commands, as shall by just result, by genuine production, by kindly and evident derivation flow from these' (pp. 81, 82).

While these, and many similar expressions, guarantee the strength of Culverwel's adherence to the doctrine of *à priori* knowledge, he opposes the doctrine of *connate species* or innate ideas, as strongly as Locke himself; and affirms, that without the suggesting influence of sense and experience, our fundamental beliefs or primary notions would never come into consciousness. He ridicules the Platonic theory of pre-existence, and of knowledge brought ready made from an earlier consciousness; and happily expresses the mingled truth and error of that celebrated doctrine in these words: 'The Platonists in this were commendable, that they looked on the spirit of man as "the candle of the Lord," though they were deceived in the time when it was lighted' (p. 132). In like manner, in words that very nearly coincide with Locke's doctrine, that reflection is a source of distinct ideas, he says, 'No other innate light, but only *the power and principle of knowing and reasoning*, is "the candle of the Lord"' (p. 128). And the following passage contains the substance of Locke's polemic against innate ideas without its one-sidedness: 'Had you such notions as these when you first peeped into being? at the

first opening of the soul's eye? in the first exordium of infancy? Had you these connate species in the cradle? and were they rocked asleep with you? or did you then meditate upon these principles: "Totum est majus parte," and "Nihil potest esse et non esse simul?" Never tell us that you wanted organical dispositions, for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these lattices. Why else should not your candle enlighten you before? Who was it that chained up and fettered your common notions? Who was it that restrained and imprisoned your connate ideas? 'There is some time to be allowed for the promulgation of nature's law by the voice of reason. They must have some time to spell the νόμος γραπτός that was of reason's writing. The mind having such gradual and climbing accomplishments, doth strongly evince that the true rise of knowledge is from the observing and comparing of objects, and from thence extracting the quintessence of some such principles as are worthy of all acceptation, that have so much of certainty in them, that they are near to a tautology and identity; for this first principles are' (pp. 125-127).

In these two sets of extracts it is made apparent, that Culverwel had distinctly before his mind the whole truth in regard to what Cousin has styled (not very happily) the *logical* and *chronological* origin of our knowledge respectively, and had thus laid hold of results which it required many years of controversy to harmonize. It is true, indeed, as Sir William Hamilton, in his celebrated *Dissertation on Common Sense* (Reid's Works, p. 782) has remarked,

that Culverwel was anticipated in these views by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, to whom he makes honourable allusion; but there is evidence of independent and critical power, in his references to that author, which show anything but a blind adherence to him; and it must have presupposed the firmest grasp of these principles on their own authority, to unite Culverwel with Herbert, as to the metaphysical foundation, when they departed so widely from each other in respect of the theological superstructure. Had Locke built on the comprehensive foundation laid by this earlier English school, or had he developed more consistently the admissions and concessions of his own system, he would have escaped the reproach of sensationalism, somewhat unjustly cast on him, and have opened a quite different career to European philosophy.

While Culverwel is thus clear as to the existence of original knowledge, and yet free from any mystical exaggeration in regard to its date, it must be acknowledged that he is less precise and satisfactory in laying down the marks by which it is discriminated. In this respect he is more vague and rhetorical than Lord Herbert, though perhaps a candid reader might deduce all the criteria relied on by the earlier writer, from the casual statements, as well as the figures and illustrations, of the later. Like Lord Herbert, he lays the chief stress on universal agreement as the test of original knowledge; but this, like him, he bases on self-evidencing clearness or certainty: 'We cannot justly distrust, but that if there should new nations, nay, if there should new worlds appear, that every rational nature amongst them would comply with and embrace the

several branches of this law ; and as they would not differ in those things that are intrinsical to sense, so neither in those that are essential to the understanding' (p. 116). The same view is thus rhetorically expanded, 'Then look upon the diversities of nations, and there you will see a rough and barbarous Scythian, a wild American, an unpolished Indian, a superstitious Egyptian, a subtle Ethiopian, a cunning Arabian, a luxurious Persian, a treacherous Carthaginian, a lying Cretian, an elegant Athenian, a wanton Corinthian, a desperate Italian, a fighting German, and many other heaps of nations, whose titles I shall now spare, and tell me whether it must not be some admirable and efficacious truth, that shall so overpower them all, as to pass current among them, and be owned and acknowledged by them' (p. 113).

The deepest ground on which this certainty is made by Culverwel, as by Lord Herbert, to rest, is the impossibility of thinking at all without admitting these principles. This is admirably put in the following passage, which, however, is unjust to Descartes, who never meant anything so futile as to reduplicate on his own consciousness, but, like Culverwel himself, based knowledge on its ultimate clearness and certainty: 'Sense is but the gate of certainty—the understanding is the throne of it. Descartes, the French philosopher, resolves all his assurance into thinking that he thinks,—why not into thinking that he sees? and why may he not be deceived in that as in any other operations? And if there be such a virtue in reflecting and reduplicating of it, then there will be more certainty in a super-reflexion, in thinking that he thinks

that he thinks ; and so if he run *in infinitum*, according to his conceit, he will still have more certainty, though in reality he will have none at all, but will be fain to stop and stay in scepticism ; so that these refuges of lies being scattered, first principles and common notions, with those demonstrations that stream from them, they only remain, as the nerves of this assurance, as the souls of natural plerophory ; and he that will not cast anchor upon these, condemns himself to perpetual scepticism' (pp. 202, 203).

While universality and fundamental certainty are thus insisted on as *criteria* of primitive knowledge, there is no hint of that *necessity* (that is, *objective* necessity, or necessary connexion between the subject and predicate) which Leibnitz was the first to enounce as discriminating the truths of reason from those of experience ; and the great distinction of Kant between analytic or logical first truths, and synthetic or metaphysical, so far from being approached, is rather receded from in the unhappy statement of Culverwel, that first principles are 'near to a tautology and identity.'

With all these abatements, and even allowing for its posteriority to Lord Herbert's *De Veritate*, this treatise of Culverwel must ever assert a prominent place in English speculation on the origin of knowledge, and the foundation of certainty.

II. In relation to the *theory of conscience*, using the word in its widest sense, so as to include the theory of virtue, the work of Culverwel is not so marked and distinctive. Its doctrines are as just in morals as in metaphysics, but they do not anticipate in the same remarkable manner the

whole course of subsequent speculation. Perhaps it was no disparagement to an elevated mind, that it did not refute beforehand the paradoxes of Hobbes, or the various schemes of utilitarianism which have prevailed in British Ethics beyond the example of any other nation. Possibly also, the psychological investigations, as to whether conscience were made up of sense or sentiment, or judgment, whether it were simple or complex, original or acquired, and similar inquiries, were too nice and subtle, and too characteristic of long-developed science, to be expected in the revival and first awakening of European philosophy. Certain it is, that in all these respects the ethics of Culverwel bear the impress rather of the ancient and of the scholastic, than of the modern schools, and belong visibly to that primary formation, which, as Sir James Mackintosh has remarked, was so violently broken up by the revolutionary efforts of Hobbes, to be succeeded by the widely dissimilar age of Shaftesbury and Butler. As an ethical writer, Culverwel can hardly be regarded as standing on a different footing from Cudworth. A more genial nature, and a richer style, alone distinguish his treatise from the *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, which was, however, written a good many years later. Bearing this somewhat antiquarian character of Culverwel's ethics in view, the following points are not only well but admirably stated and enforced :—

1. *The universality of moral distinctions.* This followed as a corollary from his theory of original knowledge, which, indeed, is urged only for the sake of this moral result. Reason, in its moral application, discerns these

eternal differences, and the consent of all nations attests its operation. In the style of Grotius, the eloquent testimonies of heathen writers, Christian fathers, and leading schoolmen are amassed to confirm this fundamental principle ; and the author waxes especially indignant against those who would shut up within the Jewish soil, or the range of the written law, the moral revelation written on the heart : 'Yes, may some say, Pythagoras lighted his candle there, and Plato lighted his candle at theirs. But what, did they borrow common notions of them ? did they borrow any copies of Nature's law from them ? was this νόμος γραπτός only some Jewish manuscript which they translated into Greek ? Can Pythagoras know nothing unless by a present μετεμψύχωσις, a Jew's soul come and inform him ?' (pp. 93, 94). The author meets the difficulties arising from obliquities and perversions of moral judgment, in the usual way, by ascribing them to erroneous applications of right principles, and offers on this subject these pointed remarks,—'There are many wild and anomalous individuums amongst them, οἱ πόρρω βάρβαροι, Θηριώδεις, ἀλόγιστοι, as Aristotle calls them, οἱ διεφθαρμένοι, as others term them ; but are there not such also even amongst Jews ? nay, amongst such as call themselves Christians, that are lapsed and fallen below themselves ? Many natural precepts are violated even by them. Have you weeds, and briars, and thorns in a garden ? no wonder, then, that you meet with more in a wilderness. Are there some prodigies in Europe ? you may very well look for more monsters in Africa. Do Christians blur and blot the law of nature ? no wonder,

then, that an American seeks quite to raze it out. Does an Israelite put truth sometimes in prison? no wonder, then, that an Egyptian puts it in a dungeon. Yet, notwithstanding, amongst all those that have had so much culture and morality, as to knit, and embody, and compact themselves into a commonwealth, to become *τοῖς νόμοις ὑποκείμενοι*, to be regulated by a legal government, you will scarce find any nation that did generally and expressly, and for long continuance, either violate, or countenance the violation of any precept clearly natural' (pp. 117, 118).

2. *The foundation of morality in the Divine nature.* This position, so deeply rooted in the Platonic philosophy, and so eloquently asserted by Cicero, Plutarch, and other ancient moralists, had been nobly re-affirmed by Hooker, in the profound discourse on the Nature of Law, with which he opens his *Ecclesiastical Polity*. As a Platonist and a Christian divine, Culverwel eagerly propounds the same doctrine. He holds with Plato, that 'τὸ ὄν is the sure bottom and foundation of every law.' And speaking in his own name, he says, 'Now this eternal law is not really distinguished from God himself. For *Nil est ab eterno nisi ipse Deus*. So that it is much of the same nature with those decrees of His, and that Providence which was awake from everlasting' (p. 50). And again, 'As we ascend to the first and Supreme Being by the steps of second causes, so we may climb up to a sight of this eternal law, by the fruitful branches of secondary laws, which seem to have their root in earth, when it is indeed in heaven; and that I may vary a little that of the Apostle to the Romans, *the invisible law of God, long before the creation of the world, is now*

*clearly seen, being understood by those laws that do appear*' (p. 51). And once more, 'Wisdom and power, these are the chief ingredients in a law; now where does wisdom dwell, but in the head of a Deity? and where does power triumph, but in the arm of omnipotency? A law is born *ex cerebro Jovis*, and it is not *brachium sæculare* but *cæleste* that must maintain it; even human laws have their virtue, *radicaliter* and *remotè*, as the schools speak, from this eternal law' (p. 52). The objection, that morality cannot eternally exist there as law, Culverwel repels by distinguishing between the perceptions, so to speak, of the Divine reason, and the movements of the Divine will: 'It is an eternal ordinance, made in the depth of God's infinite wisdom and counsel, for regulating and governing of the whole world, which yet had not its binding virtue in respect of God himself, who has always the full and unrestrained liberty of His own essence, which is so infinite, as that it cannot bind itself, and which needs no law, all goodness and perfection being so intrinsical and essential to it; but it was a binding determination in reference to the creature, which yet, in respect of all irrational beings, did only *fortiter inclinare*, but, in respect of rationals, it does *formaliter obligare*' (pp. 53, 54).

3. *The dependence of moral obligation on the Divine will.* This has appeared to be the position of Culverwel, from the extracts already given; and he repeatedly, and with great emphasis, animadverts upon the shortcomings of Plato and the Aristotelian schoolmen, in dwelling exclusively upon the harmony and inherent reason of laws,

without deducing their formal obligation from a supreme will. Plato, he says, 'did not lay stress enough upon that binding virtue, which is the very sinew, nay, the life and soul of a law' (p. 44). Again, 'Not the understanding, but the will of a lawgiver makes a law' (p. 45). Again, 'So that by this you see how those eternal ideas in the mind of God, and this eternal law, do differ. I speak now of ideas, not in a Platonical sense but in a scholastical, unless they both agree, as some would have them. For *Idea est possibilium, lex tantum futurorum*. God had before Him the picture of every possibility, yet He did not intend to bind a possibility but only a futurity. Besides, ideas were situated only in the *understanding* of God; whereas a law has force and efficacy from His *will*; according to that much-commended saying, *In cœlesti et angelica curia voluntas Dei lex est*' (pp. 54, 55). The whole doctrine of Culverwel on this point is admirably expressed in the following passages:—'In the commonwealth of human nature, that proportion which actions bear to reason, is indeed a sufficient foundation for a law to build upon, but it is not the law itself, nor a formal obligation' (p. 74). 'God, therefore, when from all eternity in His own glorious thoughts He contrived the being of man, did also with His piercing eye see into all conveniencies and disconveniencies which would be in reference to such a being; and by His eternal law did restrain and determine it to such acts as should be advantageous to it, which, in His wise economy and dispensation He published to man by the voice of reason, by the mediation of this natural law' (p. 79).

This mention of the 'proportion which actions bear to

reason,' and of their 'conveniencies and disconveniencies,' will recal the 'eternal fitnesses' of Dr. Samuel Clarke; and it is worthy of notice, that he exactly follows Culverwel in distinguishing between the fitnesses as the ground of obligation, and obligation itself, the latter of which he expressly makes dependent on sovereign will. The more recent ethics of Kant, as is well known, even exceed those of the theological school in urging the imperative character of the moral law as its very essence, though by an unhappy exaggeration, that great moralist makes man too literally 'a law to himself,' and excludes all direct reference to a higher will as heteronomy.

III. This brief sketch may be closed by a notice of Culverwel's *theory of faith*, and more especially his doctrine of the *harmony of faith and reason*. In setting forth his views on this subject, it must be borne in mind, that we have only a fragment of the entire treatise which he had projected. His whole Essay on the Light of Nature is only a general introduction to a comprehensive work, in which he had intended to show, *first*, 'that all the moral law is founded in natural and common light—in the light of reason;' and, *secondly*, 'that there is nothing in the mysteries of the gospel contrary to the light of reason.' No part of this great work was written; and we have only a preliminary discussion of the general relations of faith and reason. It is also to be taken into account, that Culverwel's *Discourse* belongs to a very early stage of the great apologetic controversy, which may be said to have been opened by Grotius in his treatise *De Veritate*; and which, lasting down to our own times, has received innumerable

lights from the ablest minds of England, France, and Germany; and has become always more profound and exhaustive. Still, the prevailing sagacity and depth of this treatise are here also fully sustained; and our author's solution of the questions at issue will not suffer by comparison with the very highest works in this department. His theory of faith, or doctrine of the relations of faith and reason, may be stated in the following propositions:—

1. *The truths proper to faith are undiscoverable by reason.* This hardly needs any separate evidence. Culverwel is throughout so completely a supernaturalist, that his whole writings are cast in this mould. However, the following passage is to the point: 'Could the sons of men have extracted all the spirits of reason, and made them meet and jump in one head; nay, could angels and men have united and concentrated all their reason, yet they would never have been able to spy out such profound and mysterious excellencies as faith beholds in one twinkling of her eye' (p. 223). Not only does our author thus disclaim all sympathy with a Christianity falsely so called, which is the mere educt of metaphysics, but he also denies that reason can arrive by separate methods of its own at the results of revelation, even when the latter has led the way. 'I know there are some authors, of great worth and learning, that endeavour to maintain this opinion, that revealed truths, though they could not be found by reason, yet when they are once revealed, reason can then evince them and demonstrate them. But I much rather incline to the determinations of Aquinas, and multitudes of others that are of the same judgment, that human reason, when

it has stretched itself to the uttermost, is not at all proportioned to them, but, at the best, can give only some faint illustrations, some weak adumbrations of them. They were never against reason; they were always above reason' (p. 229). Culverwel, it may be added, glances but little, if at all, at the chief cause—why the truths of faith are undiscoverable by reason; viz., that they are essentially statements of fact, which, being contingent and dependent on the will of God, cannot be arrived at by any human argumentation, but must be known by Divine disclosure. This element of contingency must ever be an insuperable bar to a logically deduced and demonstrated Christianity.

2. *Faith is the reception of the Divine testimony; and this, remotely by its outward evidence, but proximately by its own inward light, as discerned through grace.* That faith is the reception of the Divine testimony, is simply and clearly asserted: 'This is the voice of nature itself, that whatsoever God reveals, must needs be true; and this common principle is the bottom and foundation of all faith to build upon. The soul desires no greater satisfaction than an *αὐτὸς ἔφη*; for if God himself say it, who can question it; who dare contradict it?' (p. 224.) 'God being truth itself—eternal, immutable truth; His word being *vehiculum veritatis*, and all revelations flowing from Him shining with the prints and signatures of certainty, His naked word is a demonstration' (p. 225). Among these 'prints and signatures of certainty,' outward evidence holds the most remote place. 'Nor yet is Providence wanting in external means, which, by the goodness and power of God, were annexed as *sigilla verbi*—miracles I

mean—which are, upon this account, very suitably and proportionably subservient to faith, they being above natural power, as revealed truths are above natural understanding' (p. 228). The Divine testimony, however, cannot be said to be received on the evidence of miracles, that is, faith has no existence, until the inward light of the doctrine attested commend it to the soul. Nor does this inward light shine, unless by the action of the Spirit of God. 'But miracles, though they be very potent, yet they are not always prevalent; for there were many spectators of Christ's miracles, which yet, like so many Pharaohs, were hardened by them; and some of them that beheld them were no more moved by them than some of them who only hear of them, and will not at all attend to them. So that only the seal of the Spirit can make a firm impression upon the soul, who writes his own word upon the soul with a conquering triumphant sunbeam, that is impatient either of cloud or shadow' (p. 228). 'This Holy Spirit of God creates in the soul a grace answerable to these transcendent objects; you cannot but know the name of it—it is called Faith' (pp. 228, 229). Culverwel, who dwells but little upon the outward evidence of revelation, which he yet admits to exist, reserves all his eloquence and fancy for the mutual play of this inward faculty or eye of faith, and the Divine beauty and glory of its objects: 'Revealed truths shine with their own beams; they do not borrow their primitive and original lustre from this "candle of the Lord," but from the purer light, wherewith God hath clothed and attired them as with a garment. God crowns his own revelations with his own beams. "The candle of the Lord" doth not discover them; it doth not

oppose them; it cannot eclipse them. They are no sparks of reason's striking, but they are flaming darts of Heaven's shooting, that both open and enamour the soul. They are stars of Heaven's lighting; men behold them at a great distance twinkling in the dark. Whatsoever comes in God's name does *aut invenire viam aut facere*' (p. 223.) Faith is thus a disposition, faculty, or exercise, which is special, distinctive, and superadded to reason. 'This withal lays down a higher and nobler principle than reason is; for in things merely natural, every rational being is there a competent judge; in those things that are within the sphere and compass of reason, the reason of all men does agree and conspire, so as that which implies an express and palpable contradiction cannot be owned by any: but in things above nature and reason, a paucity here is a better argument than a plurality, because Providence uses to open His cabinets only for His jewels. God manifests these mysterious secrets only to a few friends—His Spirit whispers to a few, shines upon a few, so that if any tell us that evangelical mysteries imply a contradiction, because they cannot apprehend them, it is no more than for a blind man confidently to determine, that it involves a contradiction to say there is a sun, because he cannot see it' (p. 231). This strong assertion of the essential supernaturalism (philosophically speaking, mysticism) of Christian illumination is in Culverwel no Puritanic peculiarity, but the echo of a profound conviction, which has expressed itself in all schools of Christian thought, from Augustine to Schleiermacher—a conviction proportioned in depth to the degree in which Christianity has not been a speculation, but a

living fact of experience. Nevertheless, it may be questioned, whether the difference between faith and unbelief is not exhibited by him too much in an intellectual, and too little in a moral point of view. He seems to lay hold of faith at its highest stage, where it resembles the action of the eye, and to overlook its lower, where it is better described by metaphors borrowed from the ear. Nor are the elements of faith intellectually considered so wanting apart from grace, as this style of representation would imply; for upon the highest authority, unbelief is not the negation, but the rejection of light. The universal attainableness of Christian faith, as conditioned by humility and prayer, a point not less vital to Christian theology than its more exclusive or mystical aspect, can apparently thus alone be maintained; and though this possibility is not denied in Culverwel's theory, it certainly does not receive its just prominence.

3. *The operation of faith is throughout consistent with reason, and so far from superseding it, demands its constant exercise.* The first part of this proposition, viz., that the operation of faith is throughout consistent with reason, has been incidentally vouched for in some of the passages already brought forward. Thus, the operation of faith in receiving a revelation is ultimately based upon a principle of reason, that God is true; and upon a further principle of reason, that God may communicate with His creatures by special channels. It is also by a principle of reason that faith repels the objection to the possibility of special illumination, viz., the principle of reliance upon personal experience rather than the experience of others;

and the further principle of analogy, which shows, that every kind, even of natural light, is not extended to all. These principles of reason warrant the procedure of faith in admitting any mysteries of revelation, however transcendent, that do not contradict reason, which, of course, no true revelation can do, and which our author intended to prove at length that the mysteries of Christianity had not done. As it is, he protests with equal justness and emphasis against the very idea of such a collision as nothing less than blasphemy. 'True religion never was, nor will be, nor need be, shy of sound reason, which is thus far *lumen dirigens*, as that it is obliged, by the will and command of God himself, not to entertain any false religion, nor anything under pretence of religion, that is formally and irreconcilably against reason; reason being above human testimony and tradition, and being only subordinate to God himself, and those revelations that come from God. Now it is express blasphemy to say that either God, or the Word of God, ever did, or ever will, oppose right reason' (p. 218.)

While the one half of the proposition is thus true, that reason entirely warrants faith, the other half is equally true, that faith constantly demands the services of reason. Faith demands the services of reason, according to the scattered notices of our author, in the following respects:—

(1.) *To evince the necessity of revelation.* 'Consider, that the very apprehending the weakness of reason, even this in some measure comes from reason. Reason, when awakened, feels her own wounds, hears her own jarrings, sees the dimness of her own sight. It is a glass that dis-

covers its own spots, and must it therefore be broken in pieces ?' (p. 20.)

(2.) *To test the evidence of revelation.* On this head our author unanswerably puts down the outcries of a blind faith : ' If they tell us that all reason is distorted, whether, then, is theirs so in telling us so ? If they say that they do not know this by reason, but by the Word of God ; whether, then, is reason, when it acknowledges the Word of God, distorted or no ?' (p. 22.) Though, as has been observed, our author exalts the internal evidence of the Gospel, as compared with the external, yet it is *as evidence apprehensible by reason*, apprehensible even by its superior splendour, that reason has to deal with it. And external evidence also, he admits, may be so great, as in the case of Abraham's offering his son Isaac, that reason must confess its force, and yield to its authority : ' All the stress and difficulty will be to know whether God reveals such a thing or not ' (p. 226). Thus the whole evidence of revelation must come before the tribunal of reason.

(3.) *To assist the interpretation of revelation.* Culverwel, indeed, holds, with all Protestants, that the Spirit of God is the ultimate interpreter of revelation, in the sense of being the author of the certainty of faith ; but he also urges the claim and need of reason to check and expose all departures from the verbal and literal sense. ' Though they be not come to such a height as this, yet, either by their flat and frigid explicating, they do endeavour to dispirit and enervate the Word of God ; or else, in a more violent and injurious manner, they do even ravish it, and deflower the virginity of it ; or else, in a more subtle and

serpentine manner, they seek to bend the rule, and expound it to their purposes and advantages. The letter of the Word, the *vagina verbi*, that does not wound them, that does not strike them ; and as for the edge, they think they can draw that as they please, they can blunt it as they list, they can order it as they will. But the law of sound reason and nature does oppose such unworthy dealings as these are ; for men look upon it very heinously to have their words misinterpreted, to have their meaning wrested and violenced ' (pp. 226, 227).

(4.) *To vindicate and harmonize the doctrines of revelation.* This was our author's chosen task ; and he magnifies his office in one prolonged strain of eloquence. As a sample of this vindication, he instances, as already stated, the reasonableness of Abraham's sacrifice, since human life depends entirely on the will of God, and His command altogether altered the moral character of this act ; whereas an act absolutely condemned by reason, such as an act of blasphemy, is not enjoined anywhere in Scripture. Thus ought reason to deal with all the aspersed facts and mysteries of revelation. ' It will be employment enough, and it will be a noble employment too, for reason to redeem and vindicate them from those thorns and difficulties with which some subtle ones have vexed them and encompassed them. It will be honour enough for reason to show that faith does not oppose reason ; and this it may show, it must show this ; for else *οἱ ἔσω*, those that are within the enclosure of the Church will never rest satisfied, nor *οἱ ἔξω*, Pagans, Mahometans, Jews, ever be convinced. God, indeed, may work upon them by immediate revela-

tion, but man can only prevail upon them by reason' (pp. 229, 230). In this way, too, will the infinite wisdom of the God of revelation fully appear. 'The more they exercise their own reason, the more they will admire and adore His. For none can admire reason, but they that use some reason themselves' (p. 163).

These extracts are probably sufficient to make good the assertion that a more just, temperate, and discriminating estimate of the relations of faith and reason is hardly to be found, either in our earlier or later theology. And it may add to the interest of this summary to remark, that Locke's celebrated comparison of the light of revelation to the telescopic light of a star, and of reason to the eye that descries it, whence he argues the folly of extinguishing the perceiving organ, is found in substance, and almost in words, in Culverwel. 'Did you never observe an eye using a prospective-glass, for the discovering, and amplifying, and approximating of some remote and yet desirable object? And did you perceive any opposition between the eye and the glass? Was there not rather a loving correspondency and communion between them? Why should there be any greater strife between faith and reason, seeing they are brethren?' (p. 222.)

In Culverwel, we thus see a noble example, rare in his age, and still more rare in his party, of a strictly supernaturalist theology, accurately defining its relations to philosophy without prejudice to either side, outflanking by anticipation the various objections of unbelief, afterwards concentrated in the sarcasm of Hume, 'that our holy religion is founded on faith,' and projecting its theory, by its own vital force,

onward into the exciting controversies of the nineteenth century. May it be given to all, who in our times take part in these struggles, on the one hand, to use our author's words, 'not to look on religion as a bird of prey, that comes to peck out the eyes of men;' and, on the other, to aspire after that bloodless victory of faith which Culverwel thus so warmly celebrates. 'If the cherubim be ambitious of stooping, if angelical understanding do so earnestly παρακίψαι, methinks then the sons of men might fall down at the "beautiful feet" of evangelical mysteries, with that humble acknowledgment, *Non sum dignus solvere corrigiam hujus mysterii*. Only let thy faith triumph here, for it shall not triumph hereafter; let it shine in time, for it must vanish in eternity' (p. 236).

J. C.

AN  
ELEGANT  
And Learned  
DISCOURSE  
Of the  
Light of Nature.

*186  
Here turn to p. 161, in substance of said 2<sup>d</sup> discourse.*

By NATHANAEL CULVERWEL, Master of Arts, and  
lately Fellow of EMANUEL Colledge in CAMBRIDGE.

*Imprimatur,* EDM. CALAMY.

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and Fountain in Pauls Church-yard. 1652.

TO THE  
REVEREND AND LEARNED ANTHONY TUCKNEY, D.D.,  
MASTER OF EMANUEL COLLEGE IN CAMBRIDGE,  
AND TO THE  
FELLOWS OF THAT RELIGIOUS AND HAPPY FOUNDATION.

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HONOURED SIRS,—The many testimonies of your real affection towards this pious and learned author, especially while he lay under the discipline of so sad a providence, deserve all thankful acknowledgment and grateful commemoration; which I doubt not but himself would have made in most ample manner, had it pleased God to have granted him longer life and farther opportunity. But since Divine Providence hath otherwise disposed, I thought it no solecism in friendship to undertake the executorship of his desires, and so far to own his debt of gratitude, as to endeavour some public acknowledgment of it, though the greatness of your benefits admits not of just recompense and satisfaction. Having therefore the disposal of his papers committed to me by his nearest and dearest friends, and finding them to be of such worth and excellency as ought not to be smothered in obscurity, I interpreted this a fit opportunity to let both yourselves and others understand

how deep an impression your kindness to him hath left in the apprehensions and memories of those his friends to whom God and nature had given the advantage of being more peculiarly interested in his welfare. Upon which account I do here present you with this elegant issue of his noble and gallant abilities, which, besides the relation it hath to you by the father's side, would gladly entitle itself unto your acceptance and protection, as having been conceived in your college, and delivered in your chapel; and, therefore, hope that you, who with much delight were sometimes ear-witnesses of it, will now become its susceptors.

And thus having lodged it in its mother's arms, I leave it to her embraces. On whose behalf I shall only offer up this serious and hearty wish, that as, by the blessing of Heaven upon her fruitful womb, she hath been made a mother of many profitable instruments both in church and commonwealth, so God would be pleased to make good her name unto her, and delight still to use her as the handmaid-instrument of His glory; that He would lay her top-stone in His blessing, as her foundation was laid in His fear.

So prays the meanest of her sons, and your humble servant,

WILLIAM DILLINGHAM.

Aug. 10, 1652.

### TO THE READER.

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COURTEOUS READER,—Not many months have passed, since I sent abroad into the world a little treatise, which knew itself by the name of *Spiritual Optics*, with intention only to make some discovery of the minds and affections of men towards pieces of that nature; which having met somewhere, it seems, with kind entertainment and acceptance beyond its expectation, hath now persuaded all its fellows into a resolution to take wing, and adventure themselves upon thy candour and ingenuity. I intend not here to hang out ivy, nor with my canvas to preface this cloth of gold. The work is weaved of sunbeams; to hang anything before it were but to obscure it: yet something here must needs be said for mine own discharge, and thy better satisfaction. Know, therefore, gentle reader, that these pieces were first intended as scholastic exercises in a college chapel, and therefore more properly suited to such an auditory; yet I make no question but some of them, the *White Stone* especially, may be read with much profit by those who are of meaner capacities and less refined intellectuals. The

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*Discourse of the Light of Nature*, which, though here it bear the torch before the rest, is younger brother to them all, was written above six years ago. The design of it was, on the one hand, to vindicate the use of reason, in matters of religion, from the aspersions and prejudices of some weaker ones in those times, who, having entertained erroneous opinions, which they were no way able to defend, were taught by their more cunning seducers to wink hard, and except against all offensive weapons; so, on the other hand, to chastise the sauciness of Socinus and his followers, who dare set Hagar above her mistress, and make faith wait at the elbow of corrupt and distorted reason; to take off the head of that uncircumcised Philistine<sup>1</sup> with his own sword, but better sharpened, and then to lay it up behind the ephod in the sanctuary. An enterprise, I confess, of no small import; which yet, he hoped, with God's assistance, to have effected, by giving unto reason the things that are reason's, and unto faith the things that are faith's. And had the world been favoured with his longer life, the height of his parts, and the earnest he gave, had bespoken very ample expectations in those who knew and heard him. But it pleased God, having first melted him with His love, and then chastised him, though somewhat sharply, to take him to Himself; from the contemplation of the light

<sup>1</sup> An unacknowledged reference to a passage in 'the Discourse,' (p. 23.) It is remarkable that Dr. Whichcote, in his second letter to Dr. Tuckney, written in 1651 or 1652, uses the allusion also. 'I deserve as little to be called a Socinian, as David for extorting Goliath's sword out of his hand, and cutting the master's head off with it, did deserve to be esteemed a Philistine.'—*Eight Letters of Dr. A. Tuckney and Dr. B. Whichcote*, appended to Whichcote's *Moral and Religious Maxims*.

of Nature, to the enjoyment of one supernatural, that φῶς ἀπρόσιτον—light inaccessible, which none can see and live, <sup>1 Tim. vi. 16.</sup> and to translate him from snuffing a candle here to be made partaker of the inheritance of the saints in light. So that all he finished towards that undertaking was this *Discourse of the Light of Nature* in general, not descending so low as to show how the moral law was founded in it, or that Gospel revelation doth not extinguish it. Wherein, if standing in the midst between two adversaries of extreme persuasions, while he opposes the one, he seems to favour the other more than is meet; when thou shalt observe him, at another time, to declare as much against the other, thou wilt then be of another mind. Judge candidly, and take his opinion as thou wouldst do his picture, sitting; not from a luxuriant expression, wherein he always allowed for the shrinking, but from his declared judgment, when he speaks professedly of such a subject. For instance, if any expression seem to lift reason up too high, you may, if you please, otherwise hear it confess and bewail its own weakness, (chap. xii.); you may see it bow the head and worship, and then lay itself down quietly at the feet of faith, (chap. xviii.) So that if thou read but the whole discourse, thou wilt easily perceive, as himself would often affirm, that he abhorred the very thought of advancing the power of Nature into the throne of free grace, or by the light of Nature in the least measure to eclipse that of faith.

I would not willingly by any prolepsis forestall thy reading, yet if thou shouldst desire a foretaste of the author's style, I would turn thee to the beginning of the seventeenth chapter; never was light so bespangled, never

did it triumph in greater bravery of expression. But I detain thee too long. Let this suffice thee as a coarse list to a finer web, or as waste paper to defend this book from the injury of its covers.—Farewell.

CAMBR., Aug. 10, 1652.

RICHARD CULVERWEL TO THE READER.

COURTEOUS READER,—This discourse, which had my brother for the author, might justly have expected me to have been the publisher. And I should think myself inexcusable, in this particular, did not the remote distance of my present abode, and the frequent avocations from study, by attendance upon my ministry, together with the ruins of a crazy body, somewhat apologize in my behalf.

That is obvious and ‘notorious’<sup>1</sup> in every man’s mouth, that the brother should raise up seed to the brother; but here, lo! a friend that is nearer than a brother, who rears up this living monument to the memory of his deceased friend. Deut. xxx  
5-10.

In this treatise we may perceive how the Gentiles’ candle outwent us with our sunbeams: how they, guided only by the glimmering twilight of Nature, outstripped us who are surrounded with the rays of supernatural light, of revealed truth. Thou mayest here find Plato to be a Moses ‘speaking Attic Greek,’<sup>2</sup> and Aratus, Menander, and Epimenides called into the court, to bring in their suffrages to St. Paul’s doctrine.

Here we may find reason, like a Gibeonite, hewing wood

<sup>1</sup> Πολυθρύλλητον.

<sup>2</sup> Atticissans.

Josh. ix. 23.  
Exod. xviii.  
17.

and drawing water for the sanctuary; Jethro giving counsel to Moses. God draws us with the cords of a man; He drew professed star-gazers with a star to Christ. Galen, a physician, was wrought upon, by some anatomical observations, to tune a hymn to the praise of his Creator, though otherwise atheist enough.

Reason, though not permitted, with an over-daring Pompey, to rush into the Holy of holies, yet may be allowed to be a proselyte of the gate, and, with those devoted Greeks, to worship in the court of the Gentiles.

Rom. i. 19.

Natural light, or the law written in the heart, improved by that 'knowledge of God'<sup>1</sup> which is written in the book of the creature in capital letters, so that he that runs may read, is that which this treatise bears witness to; where these 'heavenly twins,'<sup>2</sup> those heaven-born lights are set up in the soul of man; like those twin flames on the mariner's shroud, they presage a happy voyage to 'the fair havens.'

1 Pet. i. 12.

Rom. xi. 33.

As for the bosom-secrets of God—gospel mysteries, the mercy-seat itself, into which the angels desire 'to bend down and look,'<sup>3</sup> reason's plumb-line will prove too short to fathom them; here we must cry with the Apostle, 'O the depth!'<sup>4</sup> Reason may not come into these seas, except she strike her topsail; here we may say with Aristotle at the brink of Euripus, not being able to give an account of the ebbs and flows, 'If I cannot comprehend thee, thou shalt me!'

It is storied of Democritus, that he put out his eyes that

<sup>1</sup> Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> Διόσκουροι—Castor and Pollux.

<sup>3</sup> Παρακύψαι.

<sup>4</sup> Ὁ βάθος.

he might contemplate the better. I do not counsel you to do so; but if you would wink with one, the eye of reason—captivate every thought to the obedience of Christ—you might, with that other of faith, take the better aim at the mark, to obtain 'the prize of the high calling of God in Jesus Christ.'

Phil. iii. 14.

Possibly an expression or two, more there are not, may seem to speak too much in reason's behalf, but, if well examined, will prove nothing to the prejudice of free grace: the whole scope of the book endeavouring to fix those land-marks and just bounds between religion and reason, which some, too superciliously brow-beating the handmaid, and others too much magnifying her, have removed.

These exercises suit well with the place where, and the auditors to whom they were delivered; but, like Aristotle's 'physical lectures,'<sup>1</sup> these are not for vulgar ears. These lucubrations are so elaborate, that they smell of the lamp, 'the candle of the Lord.'

As concerning the author of this treatise, how great his parts were, and how well improved, as it may appear by this work, so they were fully known, and the loss of them sufficiently bewailed by those among whom he lived and conversed; and yet I must say of him, 'he suffered a misfortune incident to man.'<sup>2</sup> And as it is hard for men to be under affliction, but they are liable to censures, so it fared with him, who was looked upon by some, as one whose eyes were lofty, and whose eyelids lifted up, who bare himself too high upon a conceit of his parts; although

1 Cor. x. 13.

Luke xiii. 2, 4.

Prov. xxx. 13.

<sup>1</sup> Ἀκροῦσαι φυσικὰ.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀνθρώπων τι ἔπαθεν.

they that knew him intimately, are most willing to be his compurgators in this particular. Thus prone are we to think the staff under the water crooked, though we know it to be straight. However, turn thine eyes inward, and censure not thine own fault so severely in others. Cast not the first stone, except thou find thyself without this fault; dare not to search too curiously into 'the untraceable ways'<sup>1</sup> of God; but rather learn that lesson of the Apostle's in that elegant paronomasy, 'not to think of thyself more highly than thou oughtest to think, but to think soberly.'<sup>2</sup>

Rom. xi. 33.

Rom. xii. 3.

Thus not willing longer to detain thee from the perusal of this discourse, I commend both thee and it to the blessing of God, and rest

Thine to serve thee in any spiritual work or  
labour of love,<sup>3</sup>

RICH. CULVERWEL.

From my study at Grundisburg,  
in the county of Suffolk,  
August 18, 1652.

<sup>1</sup> 'Ανεξιχνιάστους ὁδοῦς.

<sup>2</sup> Μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν.

<sup>3</sup> 'Thine to serve thee in all Christian offices'—(third edition).

## OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE,

A DISCOURSE.

PROVERBS xx. 27.

נר יהוה נשמת אדם.—*Text. Heb.*

Φῶς κυρίου, πνοή ἀνθρώπων.—*Septuag.*

Λύχνος κυρίου πνοή ἀνθρώπων.—*Aqu. Symm. Theod. ap. Origenis Hexapla.*

Λαμπτήρ κυρίου πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπων.—*Alfus. ap. Origenis Hexapla.*

Lucerna Domini, spiraculum hominis.—*Vulg.*

Mens hominis lucerna Domini.—*Versio Auctoris.*

The lantern of the Lord is the breath of man.—*Coverdale.*

The light of the Lord is the breath of man.—*Genev.*

The lamp of our Lord, the breath of a man.—*Douay.*

The understanding of a man is the candle of the Lord.—*Author's Translation.*

The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord.—*The Authorized Version.*

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## OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

### CHAPTER I.

#### THE PORCH OR INTRODUCTION.

It is a work that requires our choicest thoughts, the exactest discussion that can be—a thing very material and desirable, to give unto reason the things that are reason's, and unto faith the things that are faith's; to give faith her full scope and latitude, and to give reason also her just bounds and limits. This is the first-born, but the other has the blessing:<sup>1</sup> and yet there is not such a vast hiatus neither, such a 'great gulf'<sup>2</sup> between them, as some would imagine. There is no such implacable antipathy, no such irreconcilable jarring between them, as some do fancy to themselves. They may very well salute one another 'with a holy kiss,' 'the kiss of peace.'<sup>3</sup> Reason and faith may embrace each other. There is a twin-light springing from both, and they both spring from the same fountain of light, and they both sweetly conspire in the same end,—the glory of that being from which they shine, and the welfare and happiness of that being upon which they shine. So that to blaspheme reason, is to reproach

Rom. xvi. 16.  
1 Cor. xvi. 20.  
2 Cor. xiii. 12.  
1 Thess. v. 26.  
1 Pet. v. 14.

<sup>1</sup> Note A.

<sup>2</sup> Μέγα χάσμα.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀγίῳ φιλήματι—osculo pacis.

heaven itself, and to dishonour the God of reason, to question the beauty of His image, and, by a strange ingratitude, to slight this great and royal gift of our Creator. For it is He that set up these two great luminaries in every heavenly soul,—the sun to rule the day, and the moon to rule the night; and though there be some kind of creatures that will bark at this lesser light, and others so severely critical, as that they make mountains of those spots and freckles which they see in her face; yet others know how to be thankful for her weaker beams, and will follow the least light of God's setting up, though it is but 'the candle of the Lord.'

But some are so strangely prejudiced against reason, and that upon sufficient reason too, as they think, which yet involves a flat contradiction, as that they look upon it not as the candle of the Lord, but as on some blazing comet that portends present ruin to the Church and to the soul, and carries a fatal and venomous influence along with it. And because the unruly head of Socinus and his followers, by their mere pretences to reason, have made shipwreck of faith, and have been very injurious to the Gospel, therefore these weak and staggering apprehensions are afraid of understanding anything, and think that the very name of reason, especially in a pulpit, in matters of religion, must needs have at least a thousand heresies couched in it. If you do but offer to make a syllogism, they will straightway cry it down for carnal reasoning.

What would these men have? Would they be banished from their own essences? Would they forfeit and renounce their understandings? or have they any to forfeit or disclaim? Would they put out this candle of the Lord, intellectuals of His own lighting? or have they any to put out? Would they creep into some lower species, and go a-grazing with Nebuchadnezzar among the beasts of the

field? or are they not there already? Or if they themselves can be willing to be so shamefully degraded, do they think that all others, too, are bound to follow their example? Oh, what hard thoughts have these of religion! Do they look upon it only as on a bird of prey that comes to peck out the eyes of men? Is this all the nobility that it gives, that men by virtue of it must be beheaded presently? Does it chop off the intellectuals at one blow?

Let us hear a while what are the offences of reason. Are they so heinous and capital? what has it done? what laws has it violated? whose commands has it broken? what did it ever do against the crown and dignity of heaven, or against the peace and tranquillity of men? Why are a weak and perverse generation so angry and displeased with it? Is it because this daughter of the morning is fallen from her primitive glory? from her original vigour and perfection? Far be it from me to extenuate that great and fatal overthrow which the sons of men had in their first and original apostasy from their God; that, under which the whole creation sighs and groans: but this we are sure, it did not annihilate the soul, it did not destroy the essence, the powers and faculties, nor the operations of the soul; though it did defile them and disorder them, and every way indispose them.

Well then, because the eye of reason is weakened and vitiated, will they therefore pluck it out immediately? and must Leah be hated upon no other account, but because she is blear-eyed? The whole head is wounded, and aches, and is there no other way but to cut it off? 'The candle of the Lord' does not shine so clearly as it was wont; must it therefore be extinguished presently? Is it not better to enjoy the faint and languishing light of this 'candle of the Lord,' rather than to be in palpable and disconsolate darkness? There are, indeed, but a few

seminal sparks left in the ashes, and must there be whole floods of water cast on them to quench them? It is but an old imperfect manuscript, with some broken periods, some letters worn out; must they, therefore, with an unmerciful indignation, rend it and tear it asunder? It is granted that the picture has lost its gloss and beauty, the orieny of its colours, the elegancy of its lineaments, the comeliness of its proportion; must it, therefore, be totally defaced? must it be made one great blot? and must the very frame of it be broken in pieces? Would you persuade the lutanist to cut all his strings in sunder because they are out of tune? and will you break the bow upon no other account but because it is unbended? Because men have not so much of reason as they should, will they therefore resolve to have none at all? Will you throw away your gold because it is mixed with dross? Thy very being, that is imperfect too; thy graces, they are imperfect,—wilt thou refuse these also?

And then consider, that the very apprehending the weakness of reason, even this in some measure comes from reason. Reason, when awakened, feels her own wounds, hears her own jarrings, sees the dimness of her own sight. It is a glass that discovers its own spots, and must it therefore be broken in pieces? Reason herself has made many sad complaints unto you; she has told you often, and that with tears in her eyes, what a great shipwreck she has suffered, what goods she has lost, how hardly she escaped with a poor decayed being; she has shown you often some broken relics as the sad remembrancers of her former ruins. She told you, how that when she swam for her life, she had nothing but two or three jewels about her, two or three common notions;<sup>1</sup> and would you rob her of them also? Is this all your

<sup>1</sup> Note B.

tenderness and compassion? Is this your kindness to your friend? will you trample upon her now she is so low? Is this a sufficient cause to give her a bill of divorcement, because she has lost her former beauty and fruitfulness?

Or is reason thus offensive to them, because she cannot grasp and comprehend the things of God? Vain men! will they pluck out their eyes because they cannot look upon the sun in his brightness and glory? What though reason cannot reach to the depths, to the bottoms of the ocean, may it not therefore swim and hold up the head as well as it can? What though it cannot enter into the 'holy of holies,'<sup>1</sup> and pierce within the veil; may it not, notwithstanding, lie in the porch, at the gate of the temple called Beautiful, and be a door-keeper in the house of its God? Its wings are clipped indeed; it cannot fly so high as it might have done; it cannot fly so swiftly, so strongly as once it could; will they not, therefore, allow it to move, to stir, to flutter up and down as well as it can? The turrets and pinnacles of the stately structure are fallen; will they therefore demolish the whole fabric, and shake the very foundations of it, and down with it to the ground? Though it be not a Jacob's ladder to climb up to heaven by, yet may they not use it as a staff to walk upon earth withal? And then reason itself knows this also, and acknowledges that it is dazzled with the majesty and glory of God; that it cannot pierce into His mysterious and unsearchable ways. It never was so vain as to go about to measure immensity by its own finite compass, or to span out absolute eternity by its own more imperfect duration. True reason did never go about to comprise the Bible in its own nutshell. And if reason be content with its own sphere, why should it not have the liberty of its proper motion?

<sup>1</sup> Sanctum sanctorum.

Is it because it opposes the things of God, and wrangles against the mysteries of salvation? Is it therefore excluded? A heinous and frequent accusation indeed, but nothing more false and injurious. And if it had been an open enemy that had done her this wrong, why, then she could have borne it; but it is thou, her friend and companion. Ye have taken sweet counsel together, and have entered into the house of God as friends. It is you that have your dependence upon her; that cannot speak one word to purpose against her, without her help and assistance. What mean you thus to revile your most intimate and inseparable self? Why do you thus slander your own beings? Would you have all this to be true which you say? Name but the time, if you can, when right reason did oppose one jot or tittle<sup>1</sup> of the Word of God.

Ps. lv. 12-14.

Certainly these men speak of distorted reason all this while. Surely they do not speak of 'the candle of the Lord,' but of some shadow and appearance of it. But if they tell us that all reason is distorted, whether, then, is theirs so in telling us so? If they say that they do not know this by reason, but by the word of God; whether, then, is reason, when it acknowledges the word of God, distorted or no? Besides, if there were no right reason in the world, what difference between sobriety and madness, between these men and wiser ones? How, then, were the heathen left 'without excuse,' who had nothing to see by but this 'candle of the Lord?' And how does this thrust men below sensitive creatures! for better have no reason at all than such as does perpetually deceive and delude them.

Rom. i. 20.

Or does reason thus displease them, because the blackest errors sometimes come under the fair disguise of so beautiful a name, and have some tincture of reason in them? But truly, this is so far from being a disparagement to

<sup>1</sup> Apex.

reason, as that it is no small commendation of it, for 'it is becoming to put a good face on things.'<sup>1</sup> Men love to put a plausible title, a winning frontispiece upon the foulest errors. Thus, licentiousness would fain be called by the name of liberty, and all dissoluteness would fain be countenanced and secured under the patronage and protection of free grace. Thus wickedness would willingly forget its own name, and adopt itself into the family of goodness. Thus Arminianism pleads for itself under the specious notion of God's love to mankind. Thus, that silly error of Antinomianism will needs style itself an 'evangelical honeycomb.' Thus all irregularities and anomalies in Church affairs, must pride themselves in those glittering titles of 'a new light,' 'a gospel way,' 'a heaven upon earth.' No wonder, then, that some also pretend to reason, who yet run out of it, and beyond it, and beside it. But must none, therefore, come near it? Because Socinus has burnt his wings at this 'candle of the Lord,' must none, therefore, make use of it? May he not be conquered with his own weapons, and beat out of his own strongholds? and may not the head of an uncircumcised Philistine be cut off with his own sword?

Or, lastly, are they thus afraid of reason, because by virtue of this men of wit and subtlety will presently argue and dispute them into an error, so as that they shall not be able to disentangle a truth, though in itself it be never so plain and unquestionable? But, first, reason itself tells them that it may be thus, and so prepares and fortifies them against such a trial; and then this only shows that some men's reason is not so well advanced and improved either as it might be, or as others' is. A sharper edge would quickly cut such difficulties asunder. Some have more refined and clarified intellectuals, more vigorous

<sup>1</sup> Πρώσωπον χρῆθόμεν τηλαυγῆς.

and sparkling eyes than others, and one soul differs from another in glory; and that reason which can make some shift to maintain error, might, with a great deal less sweat and pains, maintain a truth.

There is no question but that Bellarmine, and the rest of the learned Papists, could have, if they had pleased, far more easily defended the Protestant religion than their own. Besides, the vigour and triumph of reason is principally to be seen in those first-born beams, those pure and unspotted irradiations, that shine from it; I mean those first bubblings up of common principles that are owned and acknowledged by all, and those evident and kindly derivations that flow from them. Reason shows her face more amiably and pleasantly in a pure and clear stream, than in those muddied and troubled waters in which the schoolmen that have leisure enough are always fishing. Nay, some of their works are like so many raging seas, full of perpetual tossings and disquietings and foamings, and sometimes 'casting up mire and dirt;' and yet these vast and voluminous leviathans love to sport therein: and that which is most intolerable, these grand 'sages,'<sup>1</sup> that seemed so zealous for reason, at length in express terms disclaim it; and, in a most blindfold and confused manner, cry up their great Diana, their idol of transubstantiation. The Lutherans are very fierce against reason too, much upon the same account, because it would never allow of that other monstrous and misshapen lump of consubstantiation.

But why have I all this while beaten the air, and spilt words upon the ground? why do I speak to such as are incurable and incapable? for if we speak reason to them, that is that which they so much disclaim: if we do not speak reason to them, that were to disclaim it too. But I

<sup>1</sup> Σοφολ.

speak to men, to Christians, to the friends of learning, to the professors of reason; to such as put this candle of the Lord into a golden candlestick, and pour continual oil into it. Yet, lest any among you Athenians<sup>1</sup> should erect an altar to an 'unknown God;' lest you should 'ignorantly worship' him, we will 'declare him to you.'

Acts xvii.  
22, 23.

And that which we have now said, may serve as a porch and preamble to what we shall speak hereafter out of these words: 'The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord;' where we shall see,—1. How 'the understanding of a man is the candle of the Lord.' 2. What this 'candle of the Lord' discovers; where we shall find—(1.) That all the moral law is founded in natural and common light, in the light of reason; and, (2.) That there is nothing in the mysteries of the gospel contrary to the light of reason; nothing repugnant to this light that shines from 'the candle of the Lord.'

<sup>1</sup> The Cambridge Academics.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE EXPLICATION OF THE WORDS.

Now, as for the words themselves, we cannot better judge of the fitness of this expression, than by considering who it was that spoke it. Now, these words were spoken by him that had a large portion of intellectuals, one that <sup>1</sup>Sam. x. 23. was 'above the people by a head.' They were spoken by Solomon, in whom 'the candle of the Lord' did shine very clearly; one that had asked this as the choicest favour that he could expect from the bounty of Heaven, to have a glorious lamp of knowledge shine in his soul for the enlightening of it. And though the envious Jews would fain persuade the world that he lighted his candle at hell itself—for they esteemed him no better than a magician; as they esteemed Him also that was greater than Solomon—yet we know very well, that Solomon's was a purer candle than to be lighted at a lake of fire and brimstone. It was <sup>James i. 17.</sup> not of Lucifer's setting up, but it came from 'the Father of lights.' It was lighted with sunbeams from heaven.

And it is a modest and humble expression in him, to call his understanding 'the candle of the Lord,' when as the world looked upon him as a star of the first magnitude, nay, as a sun shining in the firmament, gilding the world with knowledge, scattering beams of light, sparkling

<sup>1</sup> Ἐξοχος ἀνθρώπων κεφαλή.

out in wise and proverbial sayings, so that the bordering princes and nations are ready to adore such an orient light; and the Queen of the South thinks it no small happiness <sup>1</sup>Kings x. to sit under the shadow of it. But yet to be sensible of his own narrow sphere, of his own finite compass and influence, did not at all take from his lustre, but did rather set it off, and add to his glory.

Thus that wise man among the heathen, Socrates, did so far complain of the weakness of his candle-light, as that he tells us his lamp would show him nothing but his own darkness. And though a wiser than Socrates be here, yet he is much in the same measure sensible of the dimness of his own intellectuals. And yet he was one that had made many discoveries with this 'candle of the Lord;' he had searched into the mines and several veins of knowledge; he had searched into the hid treasures of wisdom, he had searched to the depth of state affairs, he had searched into the bowels of natural causes, into the 'great things and mysteries'<sup>1</sup> of nature, as if among many other wives he had espoused nature also to himself; he had searched into the several tempers and intellectual complexions of men; he had searched long enough with this 'candle of the Lord,' to see if he could find any good under the sun; he went with his candle to find out a 'chief good';<sup>2</sup> he searched into all the corners of being; and at length, being sufficiently wearied, you may see him sitting down; you may hear him complaining, that he had but spent and wasted 'the candle of the Lord' in vain; for so much is implied in רעות רוח. This was but 'vexation of spirit,'<sup>3</sup> as he himself calls it. <sup>Eccles. i. 11.</sup>

Yet he was one that showed others how they might make better improvement of their intellectual lamp; and this was his wisest advice, that he gave upon his most mature and concocted thoughts—this was 'as it were the

<sup>1</sup> Magnalia et mysteria.    <sup>2</sup> Summum bonum.    <sup>3</sup> Depastio spiritus.

last gleam of a candle just about to be extinguished;<sup>1</sup> that men would only follow this 'candle of the Lord,' as it directs them in the ways of God, which are 'ways of sweetness and pleasantness,' for this was כל האדם<sup>2</sup>—the very end why God set up such a light in the soul, that it might search out his Creator with it.

Prov. iii. 17.

Eccles. xii. 13.

And as for the mind of the words, though one would think they were very clear, and shining with their own light, yet interpreters are pleased to cloud them, to turn light itself into a chaos, and to cast darkness upon the face of the text; like some unskillful ones, while they go about to snuff the candle, they put it out, but we will try whether it can be blown in again.

We shall reduce their several meanings to these three heads.

1. Some would have it thus:—'The candle of the Lord is in the understanding of a man';<sup>3</sup> as if the words did run thus, בנשמת אדם נר יהוה, that is, God with His candle discovers the very thoughts and intentions of men, He searches into every corner of the heart; He has 'a candle in the heart;' He spies out every atom, He perceives the first starting of a motion, the first peeping out of a thought. But this, though it be very true, yet is nothing to the purpose here.

2. Some gloss upon the words thus: The understanding of man, when it is enlightened with supernatural knowledge, is then 'the candle of the Lord;' but these do rather dictate to Solomon, and tell him what they would have him say; they do rather frame and fashion a proverb to themselves, than explain his meaning: and these are they that are afraid to give natural light and natural reason their due. But,

<sup>1</sup> Tanquam mox emorituræ lucernæ supremus fulgor.

<sup>2</sup> 'The whole of man.' <sup>3</sup> Lucerna Domini in mente hominis.

3. I shall fully agree with them that take this for the proper and genuine meaning of the place, that God hath breathed into all the sons of men, reasonable souls, which may serve as so many candles to enlighten and direct them in the searching out their Creator, in the discovering of other inferior beings, and themselves also; and this is that which is here implied by נשמת אדם, that same 'breath of life,'<sup>1</sup> nay, that same immortal breath, that (same rational Gen. ii. 7. breath quickened by God himself, and flowing from Him as a pure derivation from His own being, and thus the Hebrew doctors do still look upon this word נשמה, as that which expresses 'the reasonable soul,'<sup>2</sup> and, as they observe, it has a plain vicinity with שמים—heaven, but, to be sure, the *being* is derived from thence whether the *word* be or not. So then נשמה points out the supreme region, the very top and flower of a reasonable soul, 'the summit of the soul';<sup>3</sup> as נפש<sup>4</sup> does speak nothing but the dregs and bottom of it, the inferior and sensitive soul. The Apostle Paul, in his learned speech to the Athenians, Acts xvii. 25. mentions them both, and calls them very significantly 'life and breath';<sup>5</sup> and so some also take that other place of the Apostle in that accurate discourse of his to the Corinthians. That which he calls 'living soul,'<sup>6</sup> they call נפש, and that which he terms 'quickening spirit,'<sup>7</sup> they render נשמת חיים; though it be true also that sometimes they take the word נפש in a more generical sense;—for thus they tell us, there are in man three souls—נשמות. 1. הצמוחה, the vegetable soul, a soul in the bud, the very blossom and flower of life. 2. הבהמית—'the soul of the irrational,'<sup>8</sup> a soul looking out at the window of sense.

<sup>1</sup> Spiraculum vite.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸν νοῦν—animam rationis participem.

<sup>3</sup> Τῆς τῆς Ψυχῆς κορυφήν.

<sup>4</sup> Ψυχῆ—the animal soul.

<sup>5</sup> Ζωὴν καὶ πνοήν.

<sup>6</sup> Ψυχὴν ζῶσαν.

<sup>7</sup> Πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν.

<sup>8</sup> Anima bruti.

3. ההכמה נפש—a soul sparkling and glittering with intellects, a soul crowned with light; and this is the same with נשמה here. Now, as for that other word רוח—spirit, though sometimes the mind of man, his intellectual part, be expressed by it, yet the word in its own nature is a great deal more large and comprehensive; and as it extends to some material beings, so it reaches to all spirituals; hence רוח יהוה: רוח הקודש—‘the Spirit of the Lord,’ ‘the Holy Spirit,’ and the angels both good and bad, frequently come under this name; but when it is put for the mind and spirit of man, I find it yet very well differenced from נשמה; for רוח doth properly import ‘the vigour and energy of the soul!’—‘the soul’<sup>2</sup> (seat of feeling and passion), rather than ‘the mind’<sup>3</sup> (seat of reason); and the Hebrew doctors are pleased to tell us the several situations of these: רוח, they say, is ‘in the heart;’<sup>4</sup> נשמה ‘in the brain;’<sup>5</sup> נפש ‘in the liver.’<sup>6</sup>

Now, though I know that some places in the New Testament which speak of soul and spirit meet with this interpretation, that spirit there is the purest eminency, the most refined part of the soul; yet this is not at all prejudicial to what we now speak of. For, 1. they may take it for the regenerate part of the soul, that which the Apostle calls the new creature; or else, 2. suppose it to be spoken of the soul in its natural condition, it is worth the considering then whether it would not be better rendered by נשמה than רוח, as נשמה here is rendered the spirit of a man; but, 3. grant that רוח be more answerable to it, and that רוח should have the worth and precedency of נשמה, which yet will scarce ever be shown or explained; yet this is very sure and unquestionable, that נשמה does very properly speak a reasonable soul, and that the more

<sup>1</sup> Impetum animi, motum mentis.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸν θυμόν.

<sup>3</sup> Τὸν νοῦν.

<sup>4</sup> In corde.

<sup>5</sup> In cerebro.

<sup>6</sup> In hepate.

peculiarly, because when Moses speaks of that very moment when it was created, and breathed into man, he calls it נשמת חיים; and the Arabic interpreter keeps as close to the words as so vast a dialect will give leave, and styles it נשמה אלחיהא—‘breath of life.’<sup>1</sup> And it is sooth worth wondering at, that that learned interpreter of Genesis,<sup>2</sup> who is so well versed in rabbinical writings, should yet expound that of the sensitive; but they run as far into the other extreme that would understand נשמה of a soul advanced above itself by supernatural principles; and I think this sense will scarce be owned by any that can construe Hebrew.

So then, these words are a brief commendation of natural light, of the light of reason. For the further clearing of which we must inquire,—1. What Nature is? 2. What the Law of nature is? 3. What the Light of nature is?

Halitus vitæ.

<sup>2</sup> Hugh Broughton?

## CHAPTER III.

## WHAT NATURE IS.

THE words being to be understood of 'the light of nature,'<sup>1</sup> according to the minds of the best and most interpreters, it will be very needful to inquire what Nature is, and here we will be sure not to speak one word for Nature, which shall in the least measure tend to the eclipsing of Grace; nay, nothing but what shall make for the greater brightening and amplifying of the free grace and distinguishing goodness of God in Christ; and nothing but what an Augustine, or a Bradwardine, those great patrons of grace, would willingly set their seals unto.

Well then, as for nature, though it be not far from any one of us, though it be so intimate to our very beings; though it be printed and engraved upon our essences, and not upon ours only, but upon the whole creation; and though we put all the letters and characters of it together as well as we can, yet we shall find it hard enough to spell it out, and read what it is; for as it is in corporeal vision, the too much approximation and vicinity of an object does stop up and hinder sight, so also many times in intellectual optics we see something better at a distance. The soul cannot so easily see its own face, nor so fully explain its own nature. We need some scholiast or interpreter to

<sup>1</sup> Lumen naturale.

comment upon our own beings, and to acquaint us with our own idioms; and I meet with many authors that speak of the light of nature, but I can scarce find one that tells us what it is. Those famous and learned triumvirs: SELDEN, that has made it his work to write *De Jure Naturali*; and GROTIUS, that has said somewhat of it in his book *De Jure Belli et Pacis*; and SALMASIUS,<sup>1</sup> that has touched it in his late treatise *De Coma*, and in his little dialogue subordinate to it, in either of which, if he had pleased, he might have described it without a digression; none of these, as far as I can find, give us the least adumbration of it; which notwithstanding was the rather to be expected from them, because the philosophers had left it in such a cloudy and obscured manner, as if they had never seen nature 'face to face,' but only 'through a glass darkly,'<sup>1</sup> and 'in a riddle.' 1 Cor. iii. 12.

And as we read of a painter that represented nature appearing to Aristotle with a veil and mask upon her face, so truly Aristotle himself painted her as he saw her, with her veil on, for he shows her only wrapt up and muffled in matter and form; whereas methinks he that could set intelligences to the wheel to spin our time and motion, should have allowed them also some natural ability for performing so famous a task and employment, which his head set them about. And truly, why angelical beings should be banished from the commonwealth of nature; nay, why they should not properly belong to physics as well as other particular beings; or why bodies only should engross and monopolize natural philosophy, and why a soul cannot be admitted into it, unless it bring a certificate and *commendamus* from the body, is a thing altogether unaccountable, unless it be resolved into a mere arbitrary determination, and a philosophical kind of tyranny.

<sup>1</sup> See Note C.  
B 2

And yet Aristotle's description of nature has been held very sacred, and some of the schoolmen do even dote upon it. Aquinas tells us in plain terms, that 'people who wish to correct Aristotle's definition, are to be laughed at.'<sup>1</sup> The truth is, I make no question but that Aristotle's definition is very commensurate to what he meant by nature; but that he had the true and adequate notion of nature, this I think Aquinas himself can scarce prove; and I would fain have him to explain what it is for a thing 'to become known by the light of nature,'<sup>2</sup> if nature be only 'the beginning, or source of motion and rest.'<sup>3</sup>

Yet Plutarch also, on this point, seems to compromise with Aristotle, and after a good, specious, and hopeful preface, where he says that he must needs tell us what nature is, after all this preparation he does most palpably restrain it to corporeal beings, and then votes it to be 'the source of motion, and of the absence of it.'<sup>4</sup> And Empedocles, as he is quoted by him, will needs exercise his poetry and make some verses upon nature, and you would think at the first dash that they were in a good lofty strain, for thus he sings,—

" . . . Φύσις οὐδενὸς ἐστὶν ἐκδοτοῦ  
Θνητῶν, οὐδὲ τίς οὐλομένη θανάτου γενέθη"—

'It was not of a mortal withering offspring, nor of a fading genealogy;' but yet truly his poetical raptures were not so high as to elevate him above a body, for he presently sinks into 'matter,'<sup>5</sup> as opposed to 'mind,'<sup>6</sup> and makes nature nothing else but that which is ingenerable and incorruptible in material beings; just as the Peripatetics speak of their 'primary matter.'<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Deridendi sunt, qui volunt Aristotelis definitionem corrigere.

<sup>2</sup> Innotescere lumine nature.

<sup>3</sup> Principium motus et quietis.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, καὶ ἐρημίας.—Plutarch. *Adv. Col.*, p. 573. Lips. 1778.

<sup>5</sup> Τλῆ.

<sup>6</sup> Νοῦς.

<sup>7</sup> Materia prima.

But Plato, who was more spiritual in his philosophy, chides some of his contemporaries, and is extremely displeased with them, and that very justly, for they were degenerated into a most stupid atheism, and resolved all beings into one of these three originals, that they were either 'the workmanship of nature, or of fortune, or of art.'<sup>1</sup> Now, as for the first and chief corporeal beings, they made them the productions of nature; that is, say they, they sprung from eternity into being by their own impetus, and 'by their own virtue and efficacy,'<sup>2</sup> like so many natural automata, they were the principles of their own being and motion; and this they laid down for one of their axioms, 'that of the greatest and most lovely things nature and fortune are the authors, of the minor art.'<sup>3</sup> All the masterpieces of being, the most lovely and beautiful pictures, were drawn by nature and fortune; and art only could reach to some poor rudiments, to some shadows, and weaker imitations, which you will be somewhat amazed at, when you hear by and by what these 'minor matters'<sup>4</sup> were.

The foundation of being, that, they said, was natural; the mutation and disposing of being, that they made the employment of fortune; and then they said the work of art was to find out laws, and morality, and religion, and a deity; these were the 'minor matters' they spake of before.

But that divine philosopher does most admirably discover the prodigious folly of this opinion, and demonstrate the impossibility of it, in that excellent discourse of his, in

<sup>1</sup> Διὰ φύσιν, διὰ τυχὴν, διὰ τέχνην.—*De Legibus*, lib. x. Opera, tom. viii. p. 471. Lond. 1826.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀπὸ τινὸς αἰτίας αὐτομάτης.

<sup>3</sup> Τὰ μὲν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τυχὴν, τὰ δὲ μικρότερα τέχνην.

<sup>4</sup> Τὰ μικρότερα.

his work *De Legibus*,<sup>1</sup> where he does most clearly and convincingly show, that those things, which they say were framed by art, were in duration infinitely before that which they call nature; that 'soul is older than body';<sup>2</sup> that spirituals have the seniority of corporeals. This he makes to appear by their—1. 'being first in motion';<sup>3</sup> 2. 'power of self-motion';<sup>4</sup> 3. 'power of moving other existences';<sup>5</sup> for these three, though they be not expressly mentioned in him, yet they may very easily be collected from him. Souls move themselves, and they move bodies too, and therefore must needs be first in motion; so that 'intellect, art, and law, would exist before things which have the qualities of hardness or softness, heaviness or lightness.'<sup>6</sup> Reason and religion, laws and prudence, must needs be before density and rarity, before gravity and levity, before all conditions and dimensions of bodies. And laws and religion, they are indeed<sup>7</sup> 'the contrivances and productions of that eternal "mind and reason,"<sup>8</sup> the wisdom of God himself.'

So that all that Plato will allow to nature, amounts to no more than this, that it is not 'the maker of things,'<sup>9</sup> but only 'the handmaid and servant of the creating God.'<sup>10</sup>

Pa. cxliii. 2. 'As the eyes of a servant wait upon his master, and as the eyes of an handmaid look up to her mistress, so wait her eyes upon the Lord her God.' And he doth fully resolve and determine that God is the soul of the world, and nature but the body; which must be taken only 'in a

<sup>1</sup> *De Legibus*, lib. x. Opera, tom. viii. p. 477. Lond. 1826.

<sup>2</sup> Ψυχή ἐστὶ πρεσβυτέρα σώματος.

<sup>3</sup> Πρωτοκίνησις.

<sup>4</sup> Αὐτοκίνησις.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀλλοκίνησις.

<sup>6</sup> Νοῦς, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ νόμος τῶν σκληρῶν, καὶ μαλακῶν, καὶ βαρέων, καὶ κουφῶν πρότερα ἂν εἴη. <sup>7</sup> Τοῦ νοῦ γεννήματα. <sup>8</sup> Νοῦς and λόγος.

<sup>9</sup> Δημιουργός—opifex rerum.—Plato, *Dial. Sophista*. Opera, vol. ii. part ii. p. 234. Berolin. 1816-23.

<sup>10</sup> Deī δημιουργοῦντος, famula et ministra.

flourishing and rhetorical sense:<sup>1</sup> that God is the fountain of being, and nature but the channel; that he is the kernel of being, and nature but the shell. Yet herein Plato was defective, that he did not correct and reform the abuse of this word Nature; that he did not screw it up to a higher and more spiritual notion. For it is very agreeable to the choicest and supremest being; and the Apostle tells us of 'the divine nature.'<sup>2</sup> So that it is time<sup>2</sup> Pet. i. 4. at length to draw the veil from nature's face, and to look upon her beauty.

And first, it is the usual language of many, both philosophers and others, to put nature for God himself, or at least for the general providence of God; and this, in the schoolmen's rough and unpolished Latin, is styled *natura naturans*;<sup>3</sup> thus nature is taken for that constant and catholic Providence, that spreads its wings over all created beings, and shrouds them under its warm and happy protection. Thus that elegant moralist, Plutarch, speaks more like to himself than in his former description: 'Nature is in all things accurate and punctual; it is not defective nor parsimonious, nor yet sprouting and luxuriant';<sup>4</sup> and consonant to this is that sure axiom, 'Nature makes nothing in vain.'<sup>5</sup> Thus God set up the world as a fair and goodly clock, to strike in time, and to move in an orderly manner, not by its own weights (as Durandus would have it), but by fresh influence from himself, by that inward and intimate spring of immediate concurrence, that should supply it in a most uniform and proportionable manner.

<sup>1</sup> In sensu florido.

<sup>2</sup> Ἡ θεία φύσις.

<sup>3</sup> The principle creating and upholding; in opposition to *natura naturata*—things created and upheld.

<sup>4</sup> Πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβής, καὶ φιλότεχνος, ἀνελλιπής, καὶ ἀπερίτμητος.—*De Amore Proliis*, p. 195. Xyland.

<sup>5</sup> Natura nihil facit frustra.

Thus God framed this great organ of the world; he tuned it, yet not so as that it could play upon itself, or make any music by virtue of this general composure (as Durandus<sup>1</sup> fancies it), but that it might be fitted and prepared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of His powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creator in a most sweet and harmonious manner. And thus nature is that regular line, which the wisdom of God Himself has drawn in being, 'for nature is order, or a work of order,'<sup>2</sup> as he speaks; whereas that which they miscalled fortune, was nothing but a line fuller of windings and varieties; and as nature was a fixed and ordinary kind of providence, so fortune was nothing but a more abstruse and mysterious and occult kind of providence; and therefore fortune was not blind, as they falsely painted and represented her, but they themselves were blind, and could not see her. And in this sense, that speech of that grave moralist, Seneca, is very remarkable: 'Providence, fate, nature, chance, fortune, are but different names for one and the same God.'<sup>3</sup>

But then *secondly*, Nature, as it is scattered and distributed in particular beings, so it is the very same with essence itself; and therefore spirituals, as they have their essence, so they have their nature too; and if we gloried in names, it would be easy to heap up a multitude of testimonies, in which these two must needs be 'synonymous.'<sup>4</sup>

And thus nature speaks these two things,—(1.) It points out 'the origin of existence,'<sup>5</sup> it is the very genius of entity; it is present at the nativity of every being, nay,

<sup>1</sup> Note D.

<sup>2</sup> Τάξις γὰρ ἢ τάξεως ἔργον ἢ φύσις.—Plutarch., *ut sup.*

<sup>3</sup> Providentia, fatum, natura, casus, fortuna, sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina.—*De Beneficiis*, iv. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Ἰσοδυναμοῦντα.

<sup>5</sup> Originem entis.

it is being itself. There is no moment in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its nature.

(2.) It speaks 'the action of existence';<sup>1</sup> and it is a principle of working in spirituals, as well as 'the source of motion and rest'<sup>2</sup> in corporeals. All essence bubbles out, flows forth, and paraphrases upon itself in operations. Hence it is, that such workings as are facilitated by custom, are esteemed natural. Hence that known speech of Galen, 'Habits are second (acquired) natures.'<sup>3</sup> Customs are frequently adopted and engrafted into nature. Hence also our usual idiom calls a good disposition a good nature. Thus the moralists express virtues or vices that are deeply rooted, by this term—'become natural.'<sup>4</sup>

And so some, and Grotius among the rest, would understand that place of the Apostle, 'Does not even nature<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xi. 14. itself teach you,' of a general custom. But that word, 'nature itself,'<sup>5</sup> does plainly refuse that interpretation; and the learned Salmasius does both grant and evince that it cannot be meant of custom there.

And thus having seen what nature is, it will be very easy in the next place to tell you what the Law of nature is.

<sup>1</sup> Operationem entis.

<sup>2</sup> Principium motus et quietis.

<sup>3</sup> Ἐπίκτητοι φύσεις τὰ ἔθνη.—*Medd. Græc. Opera*, Hülm. vol. iv. p. 452.

<sup>4</sup> Περφυσωμένα.—*Aristot. Categ.* viii. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Ἄβτη ἢ φύσις.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE NATURE OF A LAW IN GENERAL.

BEFORE we can represent unto you the law of nature, you must first frame and fashion in your minds the just notion of a law in general. And Aquinas gives us this shadowy representation of it: 'A law is a certain rule and measure, according to which any agent is led to act, or restrained from acting.'<sup>1</sup> But Suarez is offended with the latitude of this definition, and esteems it too spreading and comprehensive, as that which extends to all naturals, ay, and to artificials too, for they have 'rules and measures of their operations.'<sup>2</sup> Thus God has set a law to the waves, and a law to the winds; nay, thus clocks have their laws, and lutes have their laws, and whatsoever has the least appearance of motion, has some rule proportionable to it. Whereas these workings were always reckoned to be at the most but 'tendencies and gravitations,'<sup>3</sup> and not the fruits of a legislative power. But yet the Apostle Paul, to stain the pride of them that gloried in the law, calls such things by the name of law as were most odious and anomalous. Thus he tells us of 'a law of death,'<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lex est quædam regula et mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur.

<sup>2</sup> Regulas et mensuras operationum.

<sup>3</sup> Inclinationes et pondera.

<sup>4</sup> Νόμος θανάτου.

and 'a law of sin'<sup>1</sup> though sin be properly 'lawlessness.'<sup>2</sup> Thus he mentions 'the law of our members,'<sup>3</sup> the same which the schoolmen call 'the law of excitement.'<sup>4</sup>

And yet this is sure, that a rational creature only is capable of a law, which is a moral restraint, and so cannot reach to those things that are necessitated to act 'to the utmost stretch of their powers.'<sup>5</sup> And, therefore, Suarez<sup>6</sup> gives us a more refined description, when he tells us, that 'a law is a certain measure of moral acts, of such a kind, that by conformity to it, they are morally right; by discordance with it, morally wrong.'<sup>7</sup>

A law is such a just and regular tuning of actions, as that by virtue of this they may conspire into a moral music, and become very pleasant and harmonious. Thus Plato speaks much of that 'melody and harmony'<sup>8</sup> that is in laws; and in his second book *De Legibus*, he does altogether discourse of harmony, and does infinitely prefer mental and intellectual music, those powerful and practical strains of goodness, that spring from a well-composed spirit, before those delicious blandishments, those soft and transient touches that comply with sense, and salute it in a more flattering manner; and he tells you of a spiritual dancing that is answerable to so sweet a music, to these 'most divine flutings.'<sup>9</sup> While the laws play in concert, there is a chorus of well-ordered affections that are raised and elevated by them.

And thus, as Aristotle well observes, some laws were

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος ἀμαρτίας.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀνομία.

<sup>3</sup> Νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν.—Legem membrorum.

<sup>4</sup> Legem fomitis—apud Rabbinn. יצר הרע.

<sup>5</sup> Ad extremum virium.

<sup>6</sup> Note E.

<sup>7</sup> Lex est mensura quædam actuum moralium, ita ut per conformitatem ad illam rectitudinem moralem habeant, et, si ab illa discordent, obliqui sint.

<sup>8</sup> Εὐρυθμία καὶ συμφωνία.—*De Legib.* lib. ii. *passim* lib. iii. par. ii. vol. ii. p. 304. Bekker. Berol.

<sup>9</sup> Τὰ θεϊώτατα ἀνλήματα.—Plato, *Μένος*, Opera, tom. iii. p. 75. Lond. 1826.

wont to be put in verse, and to be sung like so many pleasant odes, that might even charm the people into obedience. It is true, that learned philosopher gives as the reason of this, that they were put into verse 'that they might remember them the better';<sup>1</sup> but why may not this reason also share with it, that they might come with a greater grace and allurements, that they might hear them as pleasantly as they would do the voice of a viol or a harp, that has rhetoric enough to still and quiet the evil spirit?

But yet this does not sufficiently paint out the being of a law, to say that it is only 'a rule and measure';<sup>2</sup> and Suarez himself is so ingenuous as to tell us, that he cannot rest satisfied with this description, which he drew but with a coal as a rudiment rather than a full portraiture; and therefore we will give him some time to perfect it, and to put it into more orient colours.

And, in the meantime, we will look upon that *speculative* lawgiver, Plato, I mean, who was always new modelling laws, and rolling political ideas in his mind. Now, you may see him gradually ascending and climbing up to the description of a law, by these four several steps, and yet he does not reach the top and 'peak'<sup>3</sup> of it neither. First, he tells us that laws are 'such things as are esteemed fitting';<sup>4</sup> but because this might extend to all kind of customs too, his second thoughts limit and contract it more; and he tells us that a law is 'a decree of a state';<sup>5</sup> yet because the mass and bulk of people, 'the rude heap and undigested lump'<sup>6</sup> of the multitude, may seek to establish 'a wicked decree,'<sup>7</sup> as he calls it; therefore he thinks himself how to clarify a law, how to purge out the

<sup>1</sup> Ὅπως μὴ ἐπιδάθωνται.—*Prob.* 19, sect. 28. *Opera*, tom. ii. p. 919. *Berolin.* 1831. •

<sup>4</sup> Τὰ νομιζόμενα.

<sup>6</sup> Ovid. *Metam.*, i. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Regula et mensura.

<sup>7</sup> Δόγμα ποικρῶν.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀκμή.

<sup>5</sup> Δόγμα πόλεως—*Decretum civitatis.*

dross from it, and tells us, in the next place, that it is 'the finding out of what really is,'<sup>1</sup> where it is very remarkable what this philosopher means by 'that which is,'<sup>2</sup> by which he is wont usually to point out a Deity, which is styled by Aristotle 'the Being of beings';<sup>3</sup> but it is not capable of this sense here, for thus laws are not 'discoveries made of the Deity,'<sup>4</sup> but rather 'discoveries made by the Deity';<sup>5</sup> 'a law is an invention or gift of God,'<sup>6</sup> as the orator speaks. 'That which is,'<sup>7</sup> therefore, in this place, speaks these two particulars. (1.) 'The right,'<sup>8</sup> for all rectitude has a being, and flows from the fountain of being, whereas obliquities and irregularities are mere privations and non-entities; and it is a notable speech of Plato, 'the right is a royal law,'<sup>9</sup> the very same expression which the Apostle gives to the law of God, when he calls it 'the royal law.'<sup>James ii. 8.</sup> (2.) 'That which is,'<sup>10</sup> implies 'the useful.'<sup>11</sup> Everything that is profitable has a being in it, but you can gather no fruit from a privation; there is no sweetness in an obliquity, and therefore a law is a wholesome mixture of that which is just and reasonable, and that is 'the end of a law,'<sup>12</sup> as Plutarch speaks. Whereas, 'a wicked command is not a law, but an injustice';<sup>13</sup> for obligation is the very form and essence of a law. Now every law 'binds in the name of God';<sup>14</sup> but so glorious a name did never bind to anything that was wicked and unequal. 'All that is just is sweet,'<sup>15</sup> 'all that is just is useful,'<sup>16</sup> and that only

<sup>1</sup> Τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις—*Inventio ejus quod vere est.*

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ ὄν.

<sup>4</sup> Τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις.

<sup>6</sup> Lex est inventio, vel donum Dei.

<sup>8</sup> Τὸ ὀρθόν.

<sup>10</sup> Τὸ ὄν.

<sup>12</sup> Τέλος τοῦ νόμου.—*Ad Princ. Indoct.*, p. 780. *Xyland.*

<sup>13</sup> Turpe præceptum non est lex, sed iniquitas.

<sup>14</sup> Obligat in nomine Dei.

<sup>16</sup> Πᾶν δίκαιον ὠφέλιμον.

<sup>3</sup> Ὅν ὄντων.

<sup>5</sup> Τοῦ ὄντος εὐρήματα.

<sup>7</sup> Τὸ ὄν.

<sup>9</sup> Τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός.

<sup>11</sup> Τὸ χρηστόν.

is countenanced from heaven. The golden chain of laws is tied to the chair of Jupiter, and a command is only vigorous as it issues out, either immediately or remotely, from the great Sovereign of the world. So that 'The Being'<sup>1</sup> is the sure bottom and foundation of every law. But then because he had not yet expressed who were the competent searchers out of this 'Being,'<sup>2</sup> therefore he tells you in the last place, that laws are 'political ordinances,'<sup>3</sup> which he clears by other things; for 'medical ordinances'<sup>4</sup> are 'medical laws,'<sup>5</sup> and 'geometrical ordinances'<sup>6</sup> are 'geometrical laws.'<sup>7</sup> And he resolves it into this, that in all true kinds of government, there is some supreme power derived from God himself, and fit to contrive laws and constitutions agreeable to the welfare and happiness of those that are to be subject to them; and 'the better sort of men,'<sup>8</sup> as he speaks, are the fittest makers of laws.

Yet you must take notice here of these two things:—

(1.) That he did not lay stress enough upon that binding virtue, which is the very sinew, nay, the life and soul of a law. (2.) That these three descriptions, 'things esteemed fitting,'<sup>9</sup> 'a decree of the state,'<sup>10</sup> 'political ordinances,'<sup>11</sup> intend only human laws, and so are not boiled up to the purer notion of a law in general.

And though that same other branch, 'the finding out of what really is,'<sup>12</sup> may seem to reach farther yet, it is too obscure, too much in the clouds, to give a clear manifestation of the nature of a law. And yet Aristotle does not in this supply Plato's defects, but seems rather to paraphrase upon these descriptions of human laws, and tells in more

<sup>1</sup> Τὸ ὄν.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ ὄν.

<sup>3</sup> Πολιτικὰ συγγράμματα.

<sup>4</sup> Ἰατρικὰ συγγράμματα.

<sup>5</sup> Ἰατρικοὶ νόμοι.

<sup>6</sup> Γεωμετρικὰ συγγράμματα.

<sup>7</sup> Γεωμετρικοὶ νόμοι.

<sup>8</sup> Οἱ κρείττους.

<sup>9</sup> Τὰ νομιζόμενα.

<sup>10</sup> Δόγμα πόλεως.

<sup>11</sup> Πολιτικὰ συγγράμματα.

<sup>12</sup> Τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις.

enlarged language, that 'a law is a judgment determined by the common consent of the state, indicating how each thing must be done.'<sup>1</sup> Where yet he cannot possibly mean that every *individual* should give his suffrage, but certainly the representative consent of the whole will content him.

But I see these ancient philosophers are not so well furnished but that we must return to the schoolmen again, who by this time have licked their former descriptions into a more comely form. We will look upon Aquinas's first: 'Law,' says he, 'is a rational ordinance for the advancing of public good, made known by that power, which has care and tuition of the public.'<sup>2</sup> And Suarez's picture of a law, now that it is fully drawn, hath much the same aspect. 'A law is a public command, a just and immovable command, lifting up its voice like a trumpet;'<sup>3</sup> and in respect of the lawgiver, though it do 'presuppose an act of the intellect,'<sup>4</sup> as all acts of the will do; yet it does formally consist 'in an act of the will;'<sup>5</sup> not the understanding, but the will of a lawgiver makes a law. But in respect of him that is subject to the law, it does consist 'in an act of the reason,'<sup>6</sup> it is required only that he should know it, not 'in an act of the will,'<sup>7</sup> it does not depend upon his obedience. The want of his will is not enough to enervate and invalidate a law when it is made; all laws would then be abrogated every moment. His will indeed is required to the execution and fulfilling of the law, not to the validity and existence of the law; and thus all the laws of God do not

<sup>1</sup> 'Ο νόμος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁρισμένος καθ' ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μηδὲν πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα.—*Rhet. ad Alexand.* Par. I. tom. ii. p. 1420. Bekker. Berol. 1831.

<sup>2</sup> Lex est ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam habet communitatis, promulgata.

<sup>3</sup> Lex est commune præceptum, justum ac stabile, sufficienter promulgatum.

<sup>4</sup> Præsupponere actum intellectus.

<sup>5</sup> In actu voluntatis.

<sup>6</sup> In actu rationis.

<sup>7</sup> In actu voluntatis.

at all depend upon the will of man, but upon the power and will of the Lawgiver.

Now, in the framing of every law there is to be (1.) 'An aiming at the common good;'<sup>1</sup> and thus that speech of Carneades, 'utility may almost be called the mother of what is just and fair,'<sup>2</sup> if it be taken in this sense, is very commendable, whereas, in that other sense (in which it is thought he meant it), it is not so much as tolerable. Lawgivers should send out laws with olive-branches in their mouths; they should be fruitful and peaceable; they should drop sweetness and fatness upon a land. Let not then brambles make laws for trees, lest they scratch them and tear them, and write their laws in blood. But lawgivers are to send out laws, as the sun shoots forth his beams, 'with healing in his wings.' And thus that elegant moralist Plutarch speaks, "God," says he, "is angry with them that counterfeit his thunder and lightning, 'His sceptre, and His thunderbolt, and His trident,'<sup>3</sup> He will not let them meddle with these." He does not love they should imitate Him in his absolute dominion and sovereignty, but loves to see them darting out those warm, and amiable, and cherishing 'rays,'<sup>4</sup> those 'beamings out' of justice, and goodness, and clemency. And as for laws, they should be like so many green and pleasant pastures, into which these 'shepherds of nations'<sup>5</sup> are to lead their flocks, where they may feed sweetly and securely by those refreshing streams of justice that roll down like water, 'and of righteousness like a mighty torrent.' And this consideration would sweep down many cobweb laws, that argue only the venom and subtlety of them that spin them; this would sweep down many an Ahithophel's

Judg. ix.  
14, 15.

Mal. iv. 2.

Amos v. 24.

<sup>1</sup> Intentio boni communis.

<sup>2</sup> Utilitas justı prope mater et equi.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐ σκήπτρον, οὐ κεραυνὸν, οὐ τρίαιναν.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀκτινοβολία.

<sup>5</sup> Ποιμένες λαῶν.

web, many a Haman's web, many a Herod's web; every spider's web that spreads laws only for the catching and entangling of the weaker ones. Such lawgivers are fit to be Domitian's playfellows, that made it his royal sport and pastime to catch flies, and insult over them when he had done. Whereas a law should be a staff for a commonwealth to lean on, and not a reed to pierce it through. Laws should be cords of love, not nets and snares. Hence it is that those laws are most radical and fundamental, that principally tend to the conservation of the vitals and essentials of a kingdom; and those come nearest the law of God himself, and are participations of that eternal law, which is the spring and original of all inferior and derivative laws. 'All laws are made for the sake of advantage,'<sup>1</sup> as Plato speaks; and there is no such public benefit as that which comes by laws; for all have an equal interest in them, and privilege by them. And, therefore, as Aristotle speaks most excellently, 'law is intellect without propension.'<sup>2</sup> A law is a pure intellect, not only without a sensitive appetite, but without a will. A law is impartial, and makes no factions; and a law cannot be bribed, though a judge may. And that great philosopher does very well prosecute this; 'If you were to take physic,' says he, 'then indeed it is ill being determined by a book; it is dangerous taking a printed receipt; you had better leave it to the breast of the physician, to his skill and advice, who minds your health and welfare, as being most for his gain and credit. But in point of justice the case is very different; you had better here depend upon a rule, than leave it to the arbitrary power of a judge, who is usually to decide a controversy between two, and, if left to himself, were apt to be swayed and biassed by several interests and

<sup>1</sup> Τοῦ ἀρίστου ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ νόμιμα.—Plato, *De Legibus*, i. sect. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμος ἐστὶ νοῦς ἀνευ ὁρέξεως.—Aristot., *Eth. Nic.* I. 2. 1.

engagements, which might incline him to one more than another. Nay, now that there is a fixed rule, an immovable law, yet there is too much partiality in the application of it; how much more would there be if there were no rule at all?

But the truth is, the judge should only follow the 'last and practical dictate of the law';<sup>1</sup> his will, like a 'blind power,'<sup>2</sup> is to follow the 'last light of intellect'<sup>3</sup> of this 'reason'<sup>4</sup> that is to rule and guide him; and therefore Justice was painted blind, though 'the law itself'<sup>5</sup> be 'possessed of eyes,'<sup>6</sup> 'for the mind sees, the mind hears,'<sup>7</sup> and the will is to follow 'the last decision of the head,'<sup>8</sup> the meaning of the law in all circumstances.

(2.) In a lawgiver, there is to be 'judgment and constructive wisdom for making laws.'<sup>9</sup> The Egyptian hieroglyphic for legislative power was 'an eye in a sceptre';<sup>10</sup> and it had need be such an eye that can see both 'before and behind.'<sup>11</sup> It had need have a full and open prospect into public affairs, and to put all advantages into one scale, and all inconveniences into another.

To be sure, the laws of God flow from a fountain of wisdom, and the laws of men are to be lighted at this 'candle of the Lord,' which He has set up in them, and those laws are most potent and prevalent that are founded in light; 'the guidance of reason is golden and holy.'<sup>12</sup> Other laws are 'hard, and of iron';<sup>13</sup> they may have an iron and adamantine necessity, but the others have a soft and downy persuasion going along with them, and there-

<sup>1</sup> Ultimum et practicum dictamen legis.

<sup>2</sup> Novissimum lumen intellectus.

<sup>3</sup> Ipsa lex.

<sup>4</sup> Νοῦς ὁρᾷ, νοῦς ἀκούει.

<sup>5</sup> Judicium et prudentia architectonica ad ferendas leges.

<sup>6</sup> Oculus in sceptro.

<sup>7</sup> Ἡ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγή χρυσῆ καὶ ἱερὰ.

<sup>8</sup> Cæca potentia.

<sup>9</sup> Νοῦς.

<sup>10</sup> Oculata.

<sup>11</sup> Ultimum nutum capitis.

<sup>12</sup> Πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.

<sup>13</sup> Σκληροί, καὶ σιδήρεοι.

fore as he goes on, 'reason is so beautiful, that it wins and allures, and thus constrains to obedience.'<sup>1</sup>

(3.) There is to be 'the seal of a law,'<sup>2</sup> I mean 'the approving and passing of the law.'<sup>3</sup> After a sincere aim at public good, and a clear discovery of the best means to promote it, there comes then a fixed and sacred resolution, 'we will and decree';<sup>4</sup> this speaks the will of the lawgiver, and breathes life into the law, it adds vigour and efficacy to it. But yet notwithstanding,

(4.) There must be 'the voice of the trumpet,'<sup>5</sup> that is, 'the promulgation and recommendation of the law.'<sup>6</sup> The law is for a public good, and it is to be made known in a public manner; for as none can desire an unknown good, so none can obey an unknown law, and therefore invincible ignorance does excuse, for else men should be bound to absolute impossibilities. But whether it be required to the publishing of a law that it should be in the way of writing, which is more fixed and durable, or whether the manifestation of it in a vocal and oral manner will suffice (which yet is more transient and uncertain), I leave the lawyers and schoolmen to dispute. Of this I am sure, that all the laws of God are proclaimed in a most sufficient and emphatical manner.

<sup>1</sup> Τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πρῶτον δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου.

<sup>2</sup> Sigillum legis.

<sup>3</sup> Electio et determinatio legis.

<sup>4</sup> Volumus et statuimus.

<sup>5</sup> Vox tubæ.

<sup>6</sup> Promulgatio et insinuatio legis.

## CHAPTER V.

## OF THE ETERNAL LAW.

HAVING thus looked upon the being of a law in general, we now come to the spring and original of all laws, to the Eternal Law, that fountain of law, out of which you may see the Law of Nature bubbling and flowing forth to the sons of men. For, as Aquinas does very well tell us, the law of nature is nothing but 'the copying out of the eternal law, and the imprinting of it upon the breast of a rational being.'<sup>1</sup> That Eternal Law was in a manner incarnated in the law of nature.

Now this eternal law is not really distinguished from God himself. For 'nothing exists from eternity but God himself.'<sup>2</sup> So that it is much of the same nature with those decrees of His, and that Providence which was awake from everlasting. For as God from all eternity, by the hand of infinite wisdom, did draw the several faces and lineaments of being, which He meant to show in time: so He did then also contrive their several frames with such limits and compass as He meant to set them; and said to everything, 'Hither shalt thou go, and no farther.'

This the Platonists would call 'the ideal of laws,'<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Participatio legis æternæ in rationali creatura.

<sup>2</sup> Nil est ab æterno nisi ipse Deus.

<sup>3</sup> Ἰδέαν τῶν νόμων.

would willingly heap such honourable titles as these upon it, 'the guiding, originating, abstractly just, abstractly lovely, abstractly good, self-existent, germinating law.'<sup>1</sup> And the greatest happiness the other laws can arrive unto is this, that they be 'ministering and subservient laws,' 'waiting upon this their Royal Law ;'<sup>2</sup> or, as they would choose to style them, some 'shadows and appearances of this bright and glorious law,'<sup>3</sup> or at the best they would be esteemed by them but 'the noble offspring and progeny of laws ;'<sup>4</sup> blessing this womb that bare them, and this breast Luke xi. 27. that gave them suck.

And thus the law of nature would have a double portion as being 'the first-born of this eternal law,'<sup>5</sup> and 'the Gen. xlix. 3. beginning of its strength.' Now as God himself shows somewhat of His face in the glass of creatures, so the beauty of this law gives some representations of itself in those pure derivations of inferior laws that stream from it. And as we ascend to the first and Supreme Being by the steps of second causes, we may climb up to a sight of this eternal law, by those fruitful branches of secondary laws, which seem to have their root in earth, when as indeed it is in heaven; and that I may vary a little that of the Apostle to the Romans, 'The invisible law of God, long Rom. i. 20 before the creation of the world, is now clearly seen, being understood by those laws which do appear;' so that 'the knowledge of the law'<sup>6</sup> is manifested in them, God having shown it to them. Thus, as the schoolmen say very well, 'every derivative law supposes a self-existent law ;'<sup>7</sup> every

<sup>1</sup> Ὁ νόμος ἀρχηγός, πρωτουργός, αὐτοδίκαιος, ἀντόκαλος, αὐτογάθος, ὁ ὄντως νόμος, ὁ σπερματικός νόμος.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμοι δουλεύοντες, καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντες.

<sup>3</sup> Νομοειδεῖς· σκιαὶ νόμων.

<sup>4</sup> Lex primogenita.

<sup>5</sup> Omnis lex participata supponit legem per essentiam.

<sup>6</sup> Νόμοι ἐκγονοί.

<sup>7</sup> Τὸ γινώσκον τοῦ νόμου.

impression supposes a seal from whence it came ; every ray of light puts you in mind of a sun from which it shines. Wisdom and power, these are the chief ingredients in a law ; now where does wisdom dwell, but in the head of a Deity ? and where does power triumph, but in the arm of omnipotency ?

A law is born 'from the brain of Jove,'<sup>1</sup> and it is not 'the secular arm but the heavenly'<sup>2</sup> that must maintain it ; even human laws have their virtue, 'radically and remotely,'<sup>3</sup> as the schools speak, from this eternal law. Thus that famous and most renowned orator and patriot (Tully, I mean) does most admirably express the lineage and descent of laws in this golden manner. 'Wise men did ever look upon a law, not as on a spark struck from human intellectuals, not blown up or kindled with popular breath, but they thought it an eternal light shining from God himself, irradiating, guiding, and ruling the whole universe, most sweetly and powerfully discovering what ways were to be chosen, and what to be refused. And the mind of God himself is the centre of laws, from which they were drawn, and into which they must return.'<sup>4</sup>

Thus also that florid moralist, Plutarch, resolves all law and justice into that primitive and eternal law, even God himself, for even thus he tells us, 'Justice,' says he, 'does not only sit like a queen at the right hand of Jupiter when he is upon his throne, but she is always in his bosom, and one with himself ;' and he closes it up with this, that God

<sup>1</sup> Ex cerebro Jovis.

<sup>2</sup> Non brachium sæculare, sed cæleste.

<sup>3</sup> Radicaliter et remote.

<sup>4</sup> Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum ingenii excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia. Ita principem illam Legem et ultimam mentem dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei.—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. sect. 4.

himself is 'the oldest and most perfect of laws.'<sup>1</sup> As He is the most 'ancient of days,' so also is He the most ancient<sup>2</sup> of laws ; as He is the perfection of beings, so is He also the rule of operations.

Nor must I let slip that passage of Plato, where he calls a law 'the sceptre of Jove ;'<sup>2</sup> the golden sceptre by which God himself rules and commands ; for as all true government has a bright stamp of Divine sovereignty, so every true law has a plain superscription of His justice. Laws are anointed by God himself, and most precious oil drops down upon them to the skirts of a nation ; and the law of nature had the oil of gladness poured out upon it above its fellows.<sup>3</sup>

So then, that there is such a prime and supreme law is clear and unquestionable ; but who is worthy to unseal and open this Law ? and who can sufficiently display the glory of it ? we had need of a Moses that could ascend up into the mount, and converse with God himself ; and yet when he came down, he would be fain to put a veil upon his face, and upon his expressions too, lest otherwise he might too much dazzle inferior understandings ; but if the schoolmen will satisfy you (and you know some of them are styled angelical and seraphical), you shall hear, if you will, what they say to it.

Now this law, according to them, is 'a kind of eternal practical method of the whole distribution and government of the universe.'<sup>3</sup> It is an eternal ordinance, made in the depth of God's infinite wisdom and counsel, for regulating and governing of the whole world, which yet had not its

<sup>1</sup> Τῶν νόμων πρεσβύτατος, καὶ τελειότατος.—Plutarch. *ad Princ. Inerudit.*, ix. p. 573. Lips. 1778.

<sup>2</sup> Ζηρός σκῆπτρον.—*Alcibiades*.

<sup>3</sup> Æterna quædam ratio practica totius dispositionis et gubernationis universi.

binding virtue in respect of God himself, who has always the full and unrestrained liberty of His own essence, which is so infinite, as that it cannot bind itself, and which needs no law, all goodness and perfection being so intrinsical and essential to it; but it was a binding determination in reference to the creature, which yet, in respect of all irrational beings, did only 'strongly incline,'<sup>1</sup> but in respect of rationals, it does 'formally bind.'<sup>2</sup>

By this great and glorious law, every good action was commanded, and all evil was discountenanced and forbidden from everlasting. According to this righteous law, all rewards and punishments were distributed in the eternal thoughts of God. At the command of this law all created beings took their several ranks and stations, and put themselves in such operations as were best agreeable and conformable to their beings. By this law all essences were ordained to their ends by most happy and convenient means. The life and vigour of this law sprang from the will of God himself; from the voluntary decree of that eternal Lawgiver, minding the public welfare of being; who, when there were heaps of varieties and possibilities in His own most glorious thoughts, when He could have made such or such worlds in this or that manner, in this or that time, with such and such species, that should have had more or fewer individuals, as He pleased, with such operations as He would allow unto them; He did then select and pitch upon this way and method in which we see things now constituted; and did bind all things according to their several capacities to an exact and accurate observation of it.<sup>3</sup>

So that by this you see how those eternal ideas in the mind of God, and this eternal law, do differ. I speak now of ideas, not in a Platonical sense but in a scholastical,

<sup>1</sup> Fortiter inclinare.

<sup>2</sup> Formaliter obligare.

<sup>3</sup> Note F.

unless they both agree, as some would have them. For 'an idea has a reference to things possible, a law only to things future.'<sup>1</sup> God had before Him the picture of every possibility, yet He did not intend to bind a possibility, but only a futurity. Besides, ideas were situated only in the understanding of God; whereas a law has force and efficacy from His will; according to that much commended saying, 'In the heavenly and angelic assembly the will of God is law.'<sup>2</sup> And then an idea does 'rather have reference to the originator,'<sup>3</sup> it stays where first it was; but a law does 'rather have reference to an inferior';<sup>4</sup> it calls for the obedience of another, as Suarez does very well difference them.

Neither yet is this eternal law the same with the providence of God, though that be eternal also. But as Aquinas speaks, 'The law has the same relation to Providence, as a general principle to particular conclusions;<sup>5</sup> or, if you will, 'as the first principles of action to wisdom.'<sup>6</sup> His meaning is this, that Providence is a more punctual and particular application of this binding rule, and is not the law itself, but the superintending power, which looks to the execution and accomplishment of it; or as the most acute Suarez has it, 'Law means a scheme of right laid down generally, Providence the care which should be exercised in regard to individual acts.'<sup>7</sup>

Besides, a law, in its strict and peculiar notion, does only reach to rational beings; whereas Providence does extend

<sup>1</sup> Idea est possibilium, lex tantum futurorum.

<sup>2</sup> In cœlesti et angelica curia voluntas Dei lex est.

<sup>3</sup> Magis respicere artificem.

<sup>4</sup> Potius respicere subditum.

<sup>5</sup> Lex se habet ad providentiam, sicut principium generale ad particulares conclusiones.

<sup>6</sup> Sicut principia prima practicæ ad prudentiam.

<sup>7</sup> Lex dicit jus in communi constitutum, providentia dicit curam quæ de singulis actibus haberi debet.

and spread itself over all. But that which vexes the schoolmen most, is this, that they having required promulgation as a necessary condition to the existence of a law, yet they cannot very easily show how this eternal law should be published from everlasting. But the most satisfactory account that can be given to that is this, that other lawgivers being very voluble and mutable, before their mind and will be fully and openly declared, they may have a purpose indeed, but it cannot be esteemed a law.

James i. 17. But in God there being 'no variableness nor shadow of turning,' this His law has a binding virtue as soon as it has a being, yet so as that it does not actually and formally oblige a creature till it be made known unto it, either by some revelation from God himself, which is possible only, and extraordinary; or else by the mediation of some other law, of the law of nature, which is the usual and constant way that God takes for the promulgation of this His eternal law. For that 'written law,'<sup>1</sup> that sacred manuscript, which is writ by the finger of God himself in the heart of man, is a plain transcript of this original law, so far as it concerns man's welfare. And this you see does most directly bring me to search out the Law of Nature.

Rom. ii. 15.

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

## CHAPTER VI.

OF THE LAW OF NATURE IN GENERAL, ITS SUBJECT AND NATURE.

THE Law of Nature<sup>1</sup> is that law which is intrinsical and essential to a rational creature; and such a law is as necessary as such a creature; for such a creature as a creature has a Superior, to whose providence and disposing it must be subject; and then as an intellectual creature it is capable of a moral government, so that it is very suitable and co-natural to it to be regulated by a law, to be guided and commanded by One that is infinitely more wise and intelligent than itself is, and that minds its welfare more than itself can. Insomuch that the most bright and eminent creatures, even angelical beings, and glorified souls, are subject to a law, though with such a happy privilege, as that they cannot violate and transgress it; whereas the very dregs of entity, the most ignoble beings are most incapable of a law; for you know inanimate beings are carried on only with the vehemency and necessity of natural inclinations; nay, sensitive beings cannot reach or aspire to so great a perfection as to be wrought upon in such an illuminative way as a law is; they are

<sup>1</sup> Ἔστω σοι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν γινώσκων τί νόμος φυσικὸς καὶ τί τῆς δευτερώσεως.—'Be careful to understand what is the law natural, and what is superinduced on it.'—*Constitut. Apostol.*, i. 6; cited by Taylor.

Hosen xi. 4. not drawn with these 'cords of men,' with these moral engagements, but in a more impulsive manner driven and spurred on with such impetuous propensions as are founded in matter; which yet are directed by the wise and vigilant eye, and by the powerful hand of a Providence to a more beautiful and amiable end, than they themselves were acquainted with. But yet the lawyers, the civilians, would fain enlarge the law of nature, and would willingly persuade us that all sensitive creatures must be brought within the compass of it; for this they tell us, 'The law of nature is that which nature has taught all animals, for that law is not limited to the human race, but is common to all animals that live on the land, and in the sea, and also to birds.'<sup>1</sup> Nay, they are so confident of it, as that they instance in several particulars, 'the union of male and female,'<sup>2</sup> 'the begetting, upbringing, and preservation of offspring,'<sup>3</sup> 'very many things done for self-support and protection,'<sup>4</sup> 'the organized republic of bees, the marriages of doves.'<sup>5</sup> But not only the critics, but the schoolmen also, do sufficiently correct the lawyers for this their vanity; for certainly these men mean to bring beasts, birds, and fishes into their courts, and to have some fees out of them. Perhaps they expect also that the doves should take licenses before they marry; it may be they require of the beasts some penitential, or, which will suffice them, some pecuniary satisfaction for all their adulteries; or it may be the Pope will be so favourable, as

<sup>1</sup> Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, nam jus illud non solum humani generis est proprium, sed omnium animalium quæ in terra marique nascuntur, avium quoque commune est.—Ulpian, lib. i., *Off. de Justitia et Jure*.

<sup>2</sup> Maris et feminae conjunctio.

<sup>3</sup> Liberos procreatio, educatio, conservatio.

<sup>4</sup> Plurima in tutelam propriam facta.

<sup>5</sup> Apium respublica; columbarum conjugia.

to give his fellow-beasts some dispensation for all their irregular and incongruous mixtures.<sup>1</sup>

But yet, notwithstanding, they prosecute this their notion, and go on to frame this difference between 'the law of nations and the law of nature.'<sup>2</sup> The law of nature, say they, is that which is common with men to irrational creatures also, but the law of nations is only between men; but this distinction is built upon a very sandy bottom—what the true difference is, we shall see hereafter. Now, all that can be pleaded in the behalf of the lawyers is this, that they err more in the word than in the reality. They cannot sufficiently clear this *title* of a law; for that there are some clear and visible stamps and impressions of nature upon sensitive beings, will be easily granted them by all, and those instances which they bring are so many ocular demonstrations of it; but that there should a formal obligation lie upon brutes, that they should be bound to the performance of natural commands in a legal manner, that there should be a 'law written'<sup>3</sup> upon them, 'so as that they should be left without excuse,'<sup>4</sup> and lie under palpable guilt, and be obnoxious to punishment for the violation of it, this they cannot possibly find out, unless they could set up this 'candle of the Lord' in sensitive creatures also, whereas there are in them only some 'imitations of the life of men,'<sup>5</sup> as the philosopher calls them, which the orator renders 'resemblances of virtues,'<sup>6</sup> some apish imitations of reason, some shadows of morality, some counterfeit ethics, some wild

Rom. II. 15.

Rom. I. 20.

<sup>1</sup> The author is evidently of Valla's opinion, 'Jus naturale dicere quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ridiculum est.'—*Elegant. Ling. Lat.* c. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμιμον ἔθνικόν καὶ νόμιμον φυσικόν.—Jus gentium et jus naturale.

<sup>3</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>4</sup> Ὅστε εἶναι ἀναπολογήτους.

<sup>5</sup> Μιμήματα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς.

<sup>6</sup> Virtutum simulacra.—Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 15.

economics, some faint representations of politics, amongst some of them. Yet all this while they are as far distant from the truth of a law, as they are from the strength of reason. There you may see some sparks of the Divine power and goodness, but you cannot see 'the candle of the Lord.' Now these men might have considered, if they had pleased, that as for the prints and footsteps of nature, some of them may be seen in every being. For nature has stamped all entity with the same seal; some softer beings took the impression very kindly and clearly, some harder ones took it more obscurely.

Nature played so harmoniously and melodiously upon her harp, as that her music proved not only like that of Orpheus, which set only the sensitive creatures on dancing; but, like that of Amphion, inanimate beings were elevated by it, even the very stones did knit and unite themselves to the building of the universe.<sup>1</sup> Show me any being, if you can, that does not love its own welfare, that does not seek its own rest, its centre, its happiness, that does not desire its own good, 'which all things desire,'<sup>2</sup> as he speaks. Pick out an entity, if you can tell where, that does not long for the continuation and amplification, for the diffusion and spreading of its own being. Yet surely the lawyers themselves cannot imagine that there is a law given to all inanimate beings, or that they are accountable for the violation.

Let them also demur a while upon that argument which Suarez<sup>3</sup> urges against them, that these sensitive creatures are totally defective in the most principal branches of the law of nature; as in the acknowledging of a Deity, in the adoring of a Deity. Where is there the least adumbration

<sup>1</sup> Hor. *Ars. Poet.*, 391, 394.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐδὲ πάντα ἐφίερον.—Plato, 'the philosopher;' *vide* preceding page.

<sup>3</sup> *De Legibus*, lib. ii.

of Divine worship in sensitive beings? What do they more than the heavens, which 'declare the glory of God; or the firmament, which shows his handiwork?' Unless Psalm xix. 1. perhaps the lawyers can find not only a commonwealth, but a church also among the bees; some canonical obedience, some laudable ceremonies, some decency and conformity amongst them. We will only set some of the poets to laugh the lawyers out of this opinion; old Hesiod tells them his mind very freely:—

'Never by brutal violence be swayed,  
But be the law of Jove in thee obeyed;  
In these the brute creation, men exceed,  
They void of reason by each other bleed;  
While man by justice should be kept in awe,  
Justice, of nature well ordained the law.'<sup>1</sup>—

*Cook's Translation.*

What are those laws that are observed by a rending and tearing lion, by a devouring leviathan? Does the wolf oppress the lamb by a law? Can birds of prey show any commission for their plundering and violence? That amorous poet, Ovid, shows that these sensitive creatures, in respect of lust, are absolute Antinomians.

And what though you meet with some 'single cases,'<sup>1</sup> some rare patterns of sensitive temperance? A few scattered and uncertain stories will never evince that the whole heap and generality of brutes act according to a law. You have heard, it may be, of a chaste turtle,—and did you never hear of a wanton sparrow? It may be you have read some

<sup>1</sup> Τὸν δὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,  
'Ιχθύσι γὰρ καὶ θηροῖ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πεπενηνοῖς  
'Ἐσθμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτῶν,  
'Ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη.—

HESIOD. *Ἔργ. καὶ Ἡμέρ.*, i. 274-277.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀπαξ λεγόμενα.

story of a modest elephant, but what say you in the meantime to whole flocks of lascivious goats? Yet grant that the several multitudes, all the species of these irrational creatures were all without spot and blemish in respect of their sensitive conversation, can any therefore fancy that they dress themselves by the glass of a law? Is it not rather a faithfulness to their own natural inclinations? which yet may very justly condemn some of the sons of men, who, though they have 'the candle of the Lord,' and the lamp of His law, yet degenerate more than these inferior beings, which have only some general dictates of nature.

This is that motive with which the satirist quickened and awakened some of his time.

'This proves our spirits of the gods descend,  
While that of beasts is prone and downward bent;  
To them but earth-born life they did dispense,  
To us, for mutual aid, celestial sense.'—TATE'S *Translation*.

A law is founded in intellectuals, in the reason,<sup>2</sup> not in the sensitive principle.<sup>3</sup> It supposes a noble and free-born creature, for where there is no liberty there is no law,—a law being nothing else but a rational restraint and limitation of absolute liberty. Now all liberty is 'radically in the intellect';<sup>4</sup> and such creatures as have no light, have no choice, no moral variety.

The First and Supreme Being has so full and infinite a liberty, as cannot be bounded by a law; and these low and slavish beings have not so much liberty as to make

<sup>1</sup> 'Sensum e caelesti demissum traximus arce,  
Cujus egent prona et terram spectantia; mundi  
Principio indulsit communis conditor illis  
Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque.'—  
JUVENAL, xv. 146-9.

<sup>2</sup> נשמה.

<sup>3</sup> נפש.

<sup>4</sup> Radicaliter in intellectu.

them capable of being bound. 'Among brutes, laws have no voice.'<sup>1</sup> There is no 'base'<sup>2</sup> nor 'honourable'<sup>3</sup> amongst them, no duty nor obedience to be expected from them, no praise or dispraise due to them, no punishment nor reward to be distributed amongst them.

But as the learned Grotius does very well observe, 'Since crime cannot properly be attributed to beasts, when we have such a case as the killing of the animal according to the law of Moses, when a man had been guilty of bestiality, we must consider this as not really a punishment, but simply as an exhibition of man's lordship over the brute.'<sup>4</sup> For punishment in its formal notion is 'the avenging of a crime,'<sup>5</sup> as the Greek lawyers speak; or as the fore-mentioned author describes it, it is 'an evil of suffering, inflicted on account of an evil of action.'<sup>6</sup> In all punishment there is to be some 'measured return'<sup>7</sup> and 'retribution,'<sup>8</sup> so that every 'loss'<sup>9</sup> or 'inconvenience'<sup>10</sup> is not to be esteemed a punishment, unless it be 'for the avenging of an offence.'<sup>11</sup> So as for those laws given to the Jews, where sometimes the beast also was to be put to death, the most renowned Selden gives a very full and satisfactory account of it out of the Jewish writings, and does clearly evidence that the meaning was not this, that the beast was guilty of a crime, and had violated a law, and therefore was to be condemned and put to death, but it was in order to the happiness and welfare of men; for *bestia cum homine concumbens* was to be stoned, partly because it was the

<sup>1</sup> Inter bruta silent leges.

<sup>2</sup> Turpe.

<sup>3</sup> Honestum.

<sup>4</sup> Quoniam in bestias proprie delictum non cadit, ubi bestia occiditur ut in lege Moysis ob concubitum cum homine, non ea vere poena est, sed usus dominii humani in bestiam.—*De Jure. Prolegg.*

<sup>5</sup> 'Αμαρτήματος ἐκδίκησις.

<sup>6</sup> Malum passionis quod infligitur ob malum actionis.

<sup>7</sup> Ἀντάλλαγμα.

<sup>8</sup> Ἀμοιβή.

<sup>9</sup> Damnum.

<sup>10</sup> Incommodum.

<sup>11</sup> In vindictam culpae.

occasion of so foul a fact, and so fatal punishment unto man, and partly that the sight and presence of the object might not repeat so prodigious a crime in the thoughts of men, nor renew the memory of it, nor continue the disgrace of him that died for it. But there was another different reason, 'in the case of a butting ox,'<sup>1</sup> for there, as Maimonides<sup>2</sup> tells us in his *Moreh Nevochim*, it was 'to take satisfaction from the owner';<sup>3</sup> the putting of that to death was a punishment to the owner for not looking to it better; for I cannot at all consent to the fancy of the Jews, which Josephus mentions, 'that it was deemed to be not useful for food.'<sup>4</sup> Although the fore-named critic give a better sense of it, than it is likely the author ever intended: 'It ought not to be taken for food, since thus it would bring advantage to the owner.'<sup>5</sup> But how such an interpretation can be extracted out of 'useful for food,'<sup>6</sup> is not easily to be imagined; for those words of Josephus plainly imply, that the Jews thought such an ox could not yield wholesome nourishment; or, at the best, they looked upon it as an unclean beast, which was not to be eaten; which indeed was a fond and weak conceit of them, but they had many such, which yet the learned author loves to excuse, out of his great favour and indulgence to them. Yet, which is very remarkable, if the ox had killed a Gentile, they did not put it to death. It seems it would yield wholesome nourishment for all that. But this we are sure of, that as God does not take care for oxen, which the acute Suarez does very well understand of 'legislative

<sup>1</sup> In bove cornupeta.

<sup>2</sup> Note G.

<sup>3</sup> Ad pœnam exigendam a domino.

<sup>4</sup> Μηδ' εἰς τροφήν ἐυχρηστος εἶναι κατηξιωμένος.—*Antiq.* iv. 8, 36.

<sup>5</sup> Non in alimentum sumi debuit unde scilicet in domini commodum cederet.

<sup>6</sup> Εὐχρηστος εἰς τροφήν.

Exod. xxi. 28

1 Cor. ix. 9.

care,'<sup>1</sup> for otherwise God hath a providential care even of them, so neither does He take care for the punishment of oxen, but it is written for His Israel's sake, to whom He has subjected these creatures, and put them under their feet.

Neither yet can the proper end of a punishment agree to sensitive creatures; for all punishment is 'for the sake of (to produce) good,'<sup>2</sup> as Plato speaks, 'not on account of the transgression, for what has been done can never be made undone.'<sup>3</sup> It is not in the power of punishment to recall what is past, but to prevent what is possible. And that wise moralist, Seneca, does almost translate Plato 'word for word':<sup>4</sup> 'No wise man punishes because a crime has been committed, but that it may not be committed again; for past offences cannot be recalled, but future ones are thus prevented.'<sup>5</sup>

So that the end of all punishment is either 'for compensation,'<sup>6</sup> which is 'a retribution by the offender for the advantage of the punisher';<sup>7</sup> it is 'for the advantage of the injured party';<sup>8</sup> or else it is 'for improvement,'<sup>9</sup> and so 'for the advantage of the transgressor';<sup>10</sup> in respect of which that elegant moralist, Plutarch, styles punishment 'medical treatment of the soul,'<sup>11</sup> and Hierocles calls it 'medicine for wickedness';<sup>12</sup> or else it is 'for the sake of

<sup>1</sup> Cura legislativa.

<sup>2</sup> Ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐχ ἔνεκα τοῦ κακοῦργήσαι, οὐ γὰρ τὸ γεγονός ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτέ.—*Protagor.*

<sup>4</sup> Verbatim.

<sup>5</sup> Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur: revocari enim præterita non possunt, futura prohibentur.—*De Ira*, i. 16.

<sup>6</sup> In compensationem.

<sup>7</sup> Κακοῦ ἀνταπόδοσις εἰς τὸ τοῦ τιμωροῦντος συμφέρον ἀναφερομένη.

<sup>8</sup> In utilitatem ejus, contra quem peccatum est.

<sup>9</sup> In emendationem.

<sup>10</sup> In utilitatem peccantis.

<sup>11</sup> Ἱατρῆσαν ψυχῆς.

<sup>12</sup> Ἱατρικὴν πονηρίας.—*Com. in Aur. Carm. Pyth.*, 27-29.

Deut.  
xxxii. 12.

example, for the advantage of others,<sup>1</sup> as the Greek orator speaks, 'That others may exercise foresight and fear;'<sup>2</sup> the same which God speaks by Moses, 'That Israel may hear and fear;' and thus punishment does 'serve as a public example.'<sup>3</sup>

But now none of these ends are applicable to sensitive creatures, for there is no more *satisfaction* to justice in inflicting an evil upon them, than there is in the ruining of inanimate beings, in demolishing of cities or temples for idolatry, which is only for the good of them that can take notice of it; for otherwise, as that grave moralist, Seneca, has it, 'How foolish is it to be angry with objects that neither have deserved our anger, nor feel it!'<sup>4</sup> No satisfaction is to be had from such things as are not apprehensive of punishment; and therefore annihilation, though a great evil, yet wants this sting and aggravation of a punishment, for a [brute] creature is not sensible of it. Much less can you think that a punishment has any power to *mend* or meliorate sensitive beings, or to give *example* to others amongst them.

By all this you see, that amongst all irrational beings there is no 'lawlessness,'<sup>5</sup> and therefore no 'offence,'<sup>6</sup> and therefore no 'punishment';<sup>7</sup> from whence it also flows, that the law of nature is built upon reason.

There is some good so proportionable and nutrimental to the being of man, and some evil so venomous and destructive to his nature, as that the God of nature does sufficiently antidote and fortify him against the one, and does maintain and sweeten his essence with the other.

<sup>1</sup> In exemplum, in utilitatem aliorum.

<sup>2</sup> ἵνα ἄλλοι πρόνοιαν ποιῶνται καὶ φοβῶνται.

<sup>3</sup> Παραδειγματίζειν.

<sup>4</sup> Quam stultum est his irasci quæ iram nostram nec meruerunt, nec sentiunt.—Seneca, *Philos. de Ira*, lib. i. c. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀνομία.

<sup>6</sup> Ἀμαρτία.

<sup>7</sup> Τιμωρία.

There is so much harmony in some actions, as that the soul must needs dance at them; and there is such a harsh discord and jarring in others, as that the soul cannot endure them.

Therefore the learned Grotius does thus describe the law of nature, 'The law of nature is a streaming out of light from "the candle of the Lord," powerfully discovering such a deformity in some evil, as that an intellectual eye must needs abhor it; and such a commanding beauty in some good, as that a rational being must needs be enamoured with it; and so plainly showing that God stamped and sealed the one with His command, and branded the other with His disliking.'<sup>1</sup>

Chrysostom makes mention of this 'natural law,'<sup>2</sup> and does very rhetorically enlarge himself upon it in his twelfth and thirteenth orations 'concerning the statues,'<sup>3</sup> where he tells us that it is 'an instinctive (self-taught) knowledge of good and its opposite,'<sup>4</sup> a radical and fundamental knowledge, planted in the being of man, budding and blossoming in first principles, flourishing and bringing forth fruit, spreading itself into all the fair and goodly branches of morality, under the shadow of which the soul may sit with much complacency and delight. And as he pours out himself very fluently, 'There is no need of oratory to allure men to it, you need not heap up arguments to convince them of it; no need of an inter-

<sup>1</sup> Jus naturale est dictatum rectæ rationis, indicans actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem, et consequenter ab auctore naturæ ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut præcipi.—*De Jur. Bell. et Pac.*, lib. i. cap. 10. The rendering above is by the author.

<sup>2</sup> Περὶ Ἀνδριάντων. Νόμος φυσικός.

<sup>3</sup> Περὶ Ἀνδριάντων. In these two orations the *moral sense* is largely treated of.—*Ed.*

<sup>4</sup> Ἀποδιδάκτος ἢ γνῶσις τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν οὐ τοιοῦτων.

preter to acquaint them with it; no need of the mind's spinning, or toiling, or sweating for the attaining of it;<sup>1</sup> it grows spontaneously, it bubbles up freely, it shines out cheerfully and pleasantly; it was so visible, as that the most infant age of the world could spell it out, and read it without a teacher; 'without either Moses, or the prophets, or the judges.'<sup>2</sup> It was long extant before Moses was born, long before Aaron rung his golden bells, before there was a prophet or a judge in Israel. Men knew it, 'being taught within themselves by conscience.'<sup>3</sup> They had a bible of God's own printing, they had this Scripture of God within them. By this 'candle of the Lord,' Adam and Eve discovered their own folly and nakedness; this 'candle' flamed in Cain's conscience, and this law was proclaimed in his heart, with as much terror as it was published from Mount Sinai, which filled him with those furious reflections for his unnatural murder. Enoch, when he walked with God, walked by this light, by this rule.

<sup>2</sup> Pet. ii. 5. Noah, the preacher of righteousness, took this law for his text.<sup>4</sup> Nay, you may see some print of this law upon the

Exod. ix. 27. hard heart of a Pharaoh, when he cries out, 'The Lord is righteous, but I and my people have sinned.'<sup>5</sup>

Hence it was that God, when He gave his law afresh, gave it in such a compendious 'brachygraphy';<sup>6</sup> He wrote it as it were in characters, 'Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not

Exod. xx.  
13-15.

<sup>1</sup> Οὐ χρεῖα τῶν λόγων, οὐ τῶν διδασκάλων, οὐ τῶν πόνων, οὐ καμάτων.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐ Μωσῆς, οὐ προφήται, οὐ δικασταί.

<sup>3</sup> Οἰκοῦεν παρὰ τοῦ συνειδήτους διδαχθέντες.

<sup>4</sup> Ante legem Moysi scriptam in tabulis lapideis, legem fuisse contendo non scriptam, quæ naturaliter intelligebatur et a patribus custodiebatur. Nam unde Noe justus inventus est, si non illum naturalis legis justitia præcedebat? Unde Abraham amicus Dei deputatus, si non de æquitate et justitia legis hujus naturalis? — Tertullian, *Adversus Judeos*, cap. ii. — *Ed.*

<sup>5</sup> Hieron. *Ep.* 151, *ad Algas.*

<sup>6</sup> Shorthand.

commit adultery, thou shall not steal,'<sup>1</sup> without any explanation or amplification at all. He only enjoined it with an imperatorious brevity. He knows there was enough in the breasts of men to convince them of it, and to comment upon it; only in the second command there is added an enforcement, because His people were excessively prone to the violation of it; and in that of the Sabbath there is given an exposition of it, because in all its circumstances it was not founded in natural light. So that in Plutarch's language the Decalogue would be called 'a roughly hammered law,'<sup>2</sup> gold in the lump, whereas other lawgivers use to beat it thinner.

Of this law, as it is printed by nature, Philo speaks very excellently, 'Right reason,' says he, 'is that fixed and unshaken law, not writ on perishing paper by the hand or pen of a creature, nor graven like a dead letter upon lifeless and decaying pillars, but written with the point of a diamond, nay, with the finger of God himself, in the heart of man.'<sup>3</sup> A Deity gave it an *imprimatur*, and an eternal Spirit graved it in an immortal mind. So that I may borrow the expression of the Apostle, The mind of man is 'the pillar and ground of this truth.'<sup>4</sup> And I take it in the very same sense as it is to be taken of the church—it is a pillar of this truth not to support it, but to hold it forth.

<sup>1</sup> Tim. iii. 15.

Neither must I let slip a passage in Plutarch, which is very near of kin to this of Philo. You may take it thus: 'This royal law of nature was never shut up in a paper

<sup>1</sup> Οὐ φονεῖσεις, οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμος σφυρήλατος.

<sup>3</sup> Νόμος δ' ἀψευδῆς ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, οὐχ ἐπὶ τοῦ θείου θνητοῦ φθαρτοῦ ἐν χαρτίδιος ἢ στήλαις ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοία τυπωθεὶς.—Philonis τὰ εὐρισκ. vol. ii. p. 452. Bowyer, Lond. 1742.

<sup>4</sup> Στῦλος καὶ ἐδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας ταύτης.

prison, was never confined or limited to any outward surface; but it was bravely situated in the centre of a rational being, always keeping the soul company—guarding it and guiding it;<sup>1</sup> ruling all its subjects (every obedient action) with a sceptre of gold, and crushing in pieces all its enemies (breaking every rebellious action) with a rod of iron. You may hear the lyric poet singing out the praises of this law in a very lofty strain, ‘This law, which is the queen of angelical and human beings, does so rule and dispose of them, as to bring about justice with a most high and powerful, and yet with a most soft and delicate hand.’<sup>2</sup>

You may hear Plato excellently discoursing of it, while he brings in a sophist disputing against Socrates, and such a one as would needs undertake to maintain this principle, ‘That there was an untuneable antipathy between nature and law;<sup>3</sup> that laws were nothing but ‘the inventions of men of weaker capacity;<sup>4</sup> that this was ‘the most bright and eminent justice of nature,<sup>5</sup> for men to rule according to power, and according to no other law; that ‘the stronger’<sup>6</sup> was ‘the superior’<sup>7</sup> and ‘the better’;<sup>8</sup> that other laws were ‘all contrary to nature.’<sup>9</sup> Nay, he calls them cheatings and bewitchings, ‘not songs but incantations.’<sup>10</sup> They come, says he, like pleasant songs,

<sup>1</sup> Ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἔξω γεγραμμένος, οὐδὲ τισὶ ξύλοις, ἀλλ’ ἐμψυχος ὦν ἐαυτῷ λόγος ἀεὶ συνοικῶν καὶ παραφυλάττων καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐῶν ἐρημον ἡγεμονίας.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς  
Θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων,  
Ἄγει δίκαιων τὸ βίβρατον,  
Ἐπερτάτῃ χειρὶ.—

Pindari, *Opera Frag.*, tom. ii. p. 640. Lips. 1811.

<sup>3</sup> Ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος.—*Gorgias*, *Opera*, tom. iii. p. 244. Lond. 1826.

<sup>4</sup> *Hominum infirmiorum commenta.*

<sup>5</sup> Τὸ λαμπρότατον τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον.

<sup>6</sup> Ὁ ἰσχυρότερος.

<sup>7</sup> Ὁ κρείττων.

<sup>8</sup> Ὁ βελτίων.

<sup>9</sup> Παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντες.

<sup>10</sup> Οὐκ ἔφαδ’ ἀλλ’ ἐπώδαί.

whereas they are mere charms and incantations. But Socrates, after he had stung this same Callicles with a few quick interrogations, pours out presently a great deal of honey and sweetness, and plentifully shows that most pleasant and conspiring harmony that is between nature and law; that there is nothing more ‘according to nature’<sup>1</sup> than a law; that law is founded in nature, that it is for the maintaining, and ennobling, and perfecting of nature; nay, as Plato tells us elsewhere, that there is no way for men to happiness, unless they follow ‘these steps of reason,’<sup>2</sup> these footsteps of nature. This same law Aristotle does more than once acknowledge, when he tells us of ‘a private law’<sup>3</sup> and ‘a public law’;<sup>4</sup> a positive law with him is a more private law, ‘according to which, definitely written out, men live in society’;<sup>5</sup> but nature’s law is a more public and catholic law—‘The things which, though unwritten, seem to be assented to by all men,’<sup>6</sup> which he proves to be a very sovereign and commanding law; for thus he says, ‘The law that is most filled with reason, must needs be most victorious and triumphant.’<sup>7</sup>

The same philosopher, in his tenth book, *De Republica*, has another distinction of laws, one branch whereof does plainly reach to the law of nature. There are, says he, ‘laws in writing,’<sup>8</sup> which are the same with those which he called ‘private laws’<sup>9</sup> before; and then there are ‘moral laws,’<sup>10</sup> which are all one with that he styled before ‘public law.’<sup>11</sup> Now, as he speaks, these ‘moral

<sup>1</sup> Κατὰ φύσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Τὰ ἔχρη τῶν λόγων.

<sup>3</sup> Νόμος ἴδιος.

<sup>4</sup> Νόμος κοινός.

<sup>5</sup> Καθ’ ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται.

<sup>6</sup> Ὅσα ἀγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

<sup>7</sup> Ὁ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὦν ὑπο τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.—*Ethic. Nicom.*, lib. x. sect. 10. *Opera*, tom. ii. p. 1180. Berolin. 1831.

<sup>8</sup> Νόμοι κατὰ γραμματα.

<sup>9</sup> Νόμοι ἴδιοι.

<sup>10</sup> Νόμοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη.

<sup>11</sup> Νόμος κοινός.

laws<sup>1</sup> are 'more lordly,'<sup>2</sup> laws of the first magnitude, of a nobler sphere, of a vaster and purer influence. Where you see also that he calls the law of nature, the moral law, and the same which the Apostle calls 'written law,'<sup>3</sup> he with the rest of the heathen calls it 'laws unwritten,'<sup>4</sup> couching the same sense in a seeming contradiction.

Rom. ii. 15.

The orator has it expressly, 'A law not written, but innate.'<sup>5</sup> And amongst all the heathen, I can meet with none that draws such a lively portraiture of the law of nature, as that noble orator does. You may hear him thus pleading for it, 'Grant,' says he, 'that Rome were not for the present furnished with a positive law, able to check the lust and violence of a Tarquin, yet there was a virgin law of nature, which he had also ravished and deflowered; there was the beaming out of an eternal law, enough to revive a modest Lucretia, and to strike terror into the heart of so licentious a prince:' for, as he goes on, (his meaning is not much different from this,) — 'Right reason is a beautiful law; a law of a pure complexion, of a natural colour, of a vast extent and diffusion: its colour never fades, never dies. It encourages men in obedience with a smile, it chides them and frowns them out of wickedness. Good men hear the least whispering of its pleasant voice, they observe the least glance of its lovely eye; but wicked men sometimes will not hear it, though it come to them in thunder; nor take the least notice of it, though it should flash out in lightning. None must enlarge the phylacteries of this law, nor must any dare to prune off the least branch of it. Nay, the malice of man cannot totally deface so indelible a beauty. No pope, nor prince, nor parliament, nor people, nor angel,

<sup>1</sup> Νόμοι κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη.<sup>2</sup> Κυριώτεροι.<sup>3</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.<sup>4</sup> Ἀγραφα νόμιμα.<sup>5</sup> Non scripta, sed nata lex.—Cicero, *Orat. pro Milone*, sect. 4.

nor creature, can absolve you from it. This law never paints its face, it never changes its colour; it does not put on one aspect at Athens, and another face at Rome, but looks upon all nations and persons with an impartial eye: it shines upon all ages, and times, and conditions, with a perpetual light: "It is yesterday, and to-day, the same for ever." There is but one Lawgiver, one Lord and Supreme Judge of this law, "God blessed for evermore." He was the Contriver of it, the Commander of it, the Publisher of it; and none can be exempted from it, unless he will be banished from his own essence, and be excommunicated from human nature. This punishment would have sting enough, if he should avoid a thousand more that are due to so foul a transgression.<sup>1</sup>

Thus you see that the heathen not only had this 'written law'<sup>2</sup> upon them, but also they themselves took special notice of it; and the more refined sort amongst them could discourse very admirably about it, which must needs leave them the more inexcusable for the violation of it.

Rom. i. 20.

We come now to see where the strength of the law of nature lies, where its nerves are, where it has such an efficacious influence, such a binding virtue.

<sup>1</sup> Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna; quæ vocet ad officium jubendo; vetando a fraude deterreat: quæ tamen probos neque frustra jubet aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec propagari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet; neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus; neque est querendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius. Non erat alia Romæ, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna, et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit quasi communis magister et legislator omnium Deus: Ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; Cui qui non parebit ipse se fugiet, et naturam hominis aspernabitur; Hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit.—*De Repub.*, lib. iii. *Frag. in Lactant.* vi. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

And I find Vasquez<sup>1</sup> somewhat singular, and withal erroneous in his opinion, whilst he goes about to show that the formality of this law consists only in that harmony and proportion, or else that discord and inconvenience, which such and such an object, and such and such an action has with a rational nature; for, says he, every essence is 'a measure of good and evil,'<sup>2</sup> in respect of itself. Which, as he thinks, is plainly manifested and discovered also in corporeal beings, which use to fly only from such things as are destructive to their own forms, and to embrace all such neighbourly and friendly beings as will close and comply with them.

But he might easily have known, that as these material beings were never yet so honoured, as to be judged capable of a law, so neither can any naked essence, though never so pure and noble, lay a moral engagement upon itself, or bind its own being; for this would make the very same being superior to itself, as it gives a law, and inferior to itself, as it must obey it. So that the most High and Sovereign Being, even God himself, does not subject Himself to any law; though there be some actions also most agreeable to His nature, and others plainly inconsistent with it, yet they cannot amount to such a power, as to lay any obligation upon Him, which should in the least notion differ from the liberty of His own essence. Thus also, in the commonwealth of human nature, that proportion which actions bear to reason, is indeed a sufficient foundation for a law to build upon, but it is not the law itself, nor a formal obligation.

Yet some of the schoolmen are extremely bold and vain in their suppositions; so bold, as that I am ready to question whether it be best to repeat them; yet thus they say, 'If there were no God, or if He did not enjoy or make

<sup>1</sup> Note H.

<sup>2</sup> Mensura boni et mali.

use of reason, or if He did not judge rightly regarding matters; if, nevertheless, there were in man the same clear direction of right reason, which he has at present, he would have also the same system of law which he has at present.<sup>1</sup>

But what are the goodly spoils that these men expect, if they could break through such a crowd of repugnancies and impossibilities? The whole result and product of it will prove but a mere cypher; for reason, as it is now, does not bind in its own name, but in the name of its Supreme Lord and Sovereign, by whom reason 'lives, and moves, and has its being.' For if only a creature should bind itself to the observation of this law, it must also inflict upon itself such a punishment as is answerable to the violation of it; but no such being would be willing or able to punish itself in so high a measure, as such a transgression would meritoriously require, so that it must be accountable to some other legislative power, which will vindicate its own commands, and will by this means engage a creature to be more mindful of its own happiness than otherwise it would be.

For though some of the gallanter heathen can brave it out sometimes in an expression, that the very turpitude of such an action is punishment enough, and the very beauty of goodness is an abundant reward and compensation; yet we see that all this, and more than this, did not efficaciously prevail with them for their due conformity and full obedience to nature's law; such a single cord as this will be easily broken.

Yet there is some truth in what they say; for thus much is visible and apparent, that there is such a magical power in some good, as must needs allure and

<sup>1</sup> Si Deus non esset, vel si non uteretur ratione, vel si non recte judicaret de rebus, si tamen in homine idem esset dictamen rectæ rationis, quod nunc est, haberet etiam eandem rationem legis quam nunc habet.

attract a rational being; there is such a native fairness, such an intrinsecal loveliness in some objects, as does not depend upon an external command, but by its own worth must needs win upon the soul; and there is such an inseparable deformity and malignity in some evil, as that reason must needs loathe it and abominate it. Inasmuch, as that if there were no law or command, yet a rational being of its own accord, out of mere love, would espouse itself to such an amiable good, it would clasp and twine about such a precious object; and if there were not the least check or prohibition, yet in order to its own welfare, it would abhor and fly from some black evils, that spit out so much venom against its nature.

This is that which the schoolmen mean, when they tell us, 'some things are wrong because they are forbidden, but others are forbidden because they are wrong;'<sup>1</sup> that is, in positive laws, whether Divine or human, acts are to be esteemed evil upon this account, because they are forbidden; but in the law of nature such an evil was intimately and inevitably an evil, though it should not be forbidden.

Now that there are such 'things good in themselves,'<sup>2</sup> and 'things evil in themselves,'<sup>3</sup> as the schools speak, I shall thus demonstrate: 'What is not evil in itself, might have not been forbidden;'<sup>4</sup> for there is no reason imaginable why there should not be a possibility of not prohibiting that which is not absolutely evil, which is in its own nature indifferent.

But now there are some evils so excessively evil, so intolerably bad, as that they cannot but be forbidden. I

<sup>1</sup> Quædam sunt mala, quia prohibentur; sed alia prohibentur, quia sunt mala.

<sup>2</sup> Bona per se.

<sup>3</sup> Mala per se.

<sup>4</sup> Quod non est malum per se, potuit non prohiberi.

shall only name this one, 'hatred of God.'<sup>1</sup> For a being to hate the Creator and cause of its being, if it were possible for this not to be forbidden, it were possible for it to be lawful; for 'where there is no law, there is no transgression;'<sup>2</sup> where there is no rule, there is no anomaly;<sup>3</sup> if there were no prohibition of this, it would not be sin to do it. But that to hate God should not be sin, does involve a whole heap of contradictions; so that this evil is so full of evil, as that it cannot but be forbidden; and therefore is an evil in order of nature, before the prohibition of it. Besides, as the philosophers love to speak, 'The essences of things are unchangeable.'<sup>4</sup> Essences neither ebb nor flow, but have in themselves a perpetual unity and identity; and all such properties as flow and bubble up from beings, are constant and invariable; but if they could be stopped in their motion, yet that state would be violent, and not at all co-natural to such a subject.

So that grant only the being of man, and you cannot but grant this also, that there is such a constant convenience and analogy which some objects have with its essence, as that it cannot but incline to them, and that there is such an irreconcilable inconvenience, such an eternal antipathy, between it and other objects, as that it must cease to be what it is before it can come near them.

This Suarez terms a natural obligation, and a just foundation for a law; but now, before all this can rise up to the height and perfection of a law, there must come a command from some superior Power, from whence will spring a moral obligation also, and make up the formality of a law.

<sup>1</sup> Odium Dei.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις—Ubi nulla lex, ibi nulla prævaricatio.

<sup>3</sup> Ἄνομία.

<sup>4</sup> Essentiæ rerum sunt immutabiles.

Therefore God himself, for the brightening of His own glory, for the better regulating and tuning of the world, for the maintaining of such a choice piece of his workmanship as man is, has published this His royal command, and proclaimed it by that principle of reason, which He has planted in the being of man ; which does fully convince him of the righteousness, and goodness, and necessity of this law, for the materials of it ; and of the validity and authority of this law, as it comes from the mind and will of his Creator. Neither is it any eclipse or diminution of the liberty of that first being, to say that there is some evil so foul and ill-favoured, as that it cannot but be forbidden by him ; and that there is some good so fair and eminent, as that he cannot but command it. For, as the schoolmen observe, ' Though the will of God be completely free in respect of all His looks and glances towards the creature, yet notwithstanding, upon the voluntary and free precedency of one act, we may justly conceive him necessitated to another,'<sup>1</sup> by virtue of that indissoluble connexion and concatenation between these two acts, which does in a manner knit and unite them into one.

Thus God has an absolute liberty and choice, whether He will make a promise or no, but if He has made it, He cannot but fulfil it. Thus He is perfectly free, whether He will reveal His mind or not ; but if He will reveal it, He cannot but speak truth, and manifest it as it is.

God had the very same liberty whether He would create a world or not, but if He will create it, and keep it in its comeliness and proportion, He must then have a vigilant and providential eye over it ; and if He will provide for it, He cannot but have a perfect and inflexible providence, agreeable to His own wisdom, and goodness, and being ;

<sup>1</sup> Divina voluntas, licet simpliciter libera sit ad extra, ex suppositione tamen unius actus liberi, potest necessitari ad alium.

so that if He will create such a being as man, such a rational creature, furnished with sufficient knowledge to discern between some good and evil, and if He will supply it with a proportionate concurrence in its operations, He cannot then but prohibit such acts as are intrinsically prejudicial and detrimental to the being of it ; neither can He but command such acts as are necessary to its preservation and welfare.

God, therefore, when from all eternity in His own glorious thoughts He contrived the being of man, did also with His piercing eye see into all conveniences and inconveniences, which would be in reference to such a being ; and by His eternal law did restrain and determine it to such acts as should be advantageous to it, which, in His wise economy and dispensation, He published to man by the voice of reason, by the mediation of this natural law.

Whence it is, that every violation of this law is not only an injury to man's being, but, ' in addition to the wickedness of the thing itself,'<sup>1</sup> as the schools speak, is also a virtual and interpretative contempt of that supreme Law-giver, who, out of so much wisdom, love, and goodness, did thus bind man to his own happiness.

So much then as man does start aside and apostatize from this law, to so much misery and punishment does he expose himself ; though it be not necessary that the candle of nature should discover the full extent and measure of that punishment, which is due to the breakers of this law, for to the nature of punishment ' it is not necessary that the punishment should be foreknown, but that an act should be committed worthy of such punishment.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ultra nativam rei malitiam.

<sup>2</sup> Non requiritur ut præcognita sit poena, sed ut fiat actus dignus tali poena.

The lawyers and the schoolmen both will acknowledge this principle. For as Suarez has it, 'Responsibility for crime follows from its very nature; so that even if punishment be not fixed by a law, yet a crime may be punished according to the decision of a competent judge.'<sup>1</sup> Yet the light of nature will reveal and disclose thus much, that a being totally dependent upon another, essentially subordinate and subject to it, must also be accountable to it for every provocation and rebellion; and for the violation of so good a law, which He has set it, and for the sinning against such admirable providence and justice as shines out upon it, must be liable to such a punishment, as that glorious Lawgiver shall judge fit for such an offence; who is so full of justice, as that He cannot, and so great in goodness, as that He will not, punish a creature above its desert.

<sup>1</sup> Sequitur reatus ex intrinseca conditione culpæ; ita ut licet pœna per legem non sit determinata, arbitrio tamen competentis judicis puniri possit.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE EXTENT OF THE LAW OF NATURE.

THERE are stamped and printed upon the being of man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature. There are scattered in the soul of man some seeds of light, which fill it with a vigorous pregnancy, with a multiplying fruitfulness, so that it brings forth a numerous and sparkling posterity of secondary notions, which make for the crowning and encompassing of the soul with happiness. All the fresh springs of common and fountain notions are in the soul of man, for the watering of his essence, for the refreshing of this heavenly plant, this *arbor inversa*,<sup>1</sup> this enclosed being, this garden of God. And though the wickednesses of man may stop the pleasant motion, the clear and crystalline progress of the fountain, yet they cannot hinder the first risings, the bubbling endeavours of it. They may pull off nature's leaves, and pluck off her fruit, and chop off her branches, but yet the root of it is eternal, the foundation of it is inviolable.

Now these first and radical principles are wound up in some such short bottoms as these: 'We must seek good, and avoid evil;'<sup>2</sup> 'we must seek happiness;'<sup>3</sup> 'do not do to

<sup>1</sup> Note I.

<sup>2</sup> Bonum est appetendum, malum est fugiendum.

<sup>3</sup> Beatitudo est querenda.

Matt. vii. 12. others what you do not wish to have done to yourself.<sup>1</sup> And reason, thus, by warming and brooding upon these first and oval principles of her own laying, it being itself quickened with a heavenly vigour, does thus 'hatch the law of nature.'<sup>2</sup>

For you must not, nor cannot think that nature's law is confined and contracted within the compass of two or three common notions, but reason, as with one foot it fixes a centre, so with the other it measures and spreads out a circumference; it draws several conclusions, which do all meet and crowd into these first and central principles. 'As in those noble mathematical sciences there are not only some first 'postulates,'<sup>3</sup> which are granted as soon as they are asked, if not before; but there are also whole heaps of firm and immovable demonstrations that are built upon them. In the very same manner, nature has some *postulata*, some 'assumptions,'<sup>4</sup> which Seneca renders *præsumptiones*,<sup>5</sup> which others call *anticipationes animi*, which she knows a rational being will presently and willingly yield unto; and therefore by virtue of these it does engage and oblige it to all such commands, as shall by just result, by genuine production, by kindly and evident derivation, flow from these.

For men must not only look upon the capital letters of this 'written law,'<sup>6</sup> but they must read the whole context and coherence of it; they must look to every iota and apex of it, for heaven and earth shall sooner pass away, than 'one jot or tittle' of this law shall vanish. They must not only gaze upon two or three principles of the first magnitude, but they must take notice of the lesser celestial

<sup>1</sup> Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.

<sup>2</sup> Ὡσὸς κησε τὸν νόμον—Incubando super hæc ova.

<sup>3</sup> Διτάγματα.

<sup>6</sup> Epist. 117.

<sup>4</sup> Προλήψεις.

<sup>6</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

*Sporades*,<sup>1</sup> for these also have their light and influence. They must not only skim off the cream of first principles, but whatsoever sweetness comes streaming from the dug of nature, they must feed upon it, that they may be nourished with it. Reason does not only crop off the tops of first notions, but does so gather all the flowers in nature's garden, as that it can bind them together in a pleasant posy, for the refreshment of itself and others.

Thus, as a noble author<sup>2</sup> of our own does well observe, 'All morality is nothing but a collection and bundling up of natural precepts.'<sup>3</sup> The moralists did but 'enlarge the fringes of nature's garment';<sup>4</sup> they are so many commentators and expositors upon nature's law. This was his meaning, that styled moral philosophy 'that philosophy which is for the maintaining and edifying of human nature.'<sup>5</sup> Thus nature's law is frequently called the moral law. But the schoolmen, in their rougher language, make these several ranks and distributions of 'natural precepts.'<sup>6</sup> First there come in the front 'general principles,' as some call them, 'known instinctively; as, We must do what is honourable, and avoid what is wicked.'<sup>7</sup> Then follow next, 'particular and more defined principles; as, We must practise justice, we must worship God, we must live temperately.'<sup>8</sup> At length come up in the rear, 'conclusions clearly following from the foregoing, but which cannot be

<sup>1</sup> Small bodies like islets.—Pomp. Mela, lib. ii. ch. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Bacon.

<sup>3</sup> Tota fere ethica est notitia communis.

<sup>4</sup> Πλατῶνείν φυλακτήρια.

<sup>5</sup> Ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία.—Socrates.

<sup>6</sup> Τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν.

<sup>7</sup> Principia generalia, per se nota; ut honestum est faciendum; pravum vitandum.

<sup>8</sup> Principia particularia, et magis determinata; ut, justitia est servanda; Deus est colendus; vivendum est temperate.

discovered without reflection and reasoning; as, for instance, the wickedness of falsehood, theft, and the like.<sup>1</sup>

These, though they may seem somewhat more remote, yet being sketched from clear and unquestionable premises, they have nature's seal upon them, and are thus far sacred, so as to have the usual privilege of a conclusion, to be untouched and undeniable.

For though that learned author, whom I mentioned not long before, does justly take notice of this, that *discourse*<sup>2</sup> is the usual inlet to error, and too often gives an open admission, and courteous entertainment to such falsities as come disguised in a syllogistical form, which by their sequacious windings, and gradual insinuations, twine about some weak understandings; yet in the nature of the thing itself, it is as impossible to collect an error out of a truth, as it is to gather the blackest night out of the fairest sunshine, or the foulest wickedness out of the purest goodness. A conclusion, therefore, that is built upon the sand, you may very well expect its fall, but that which is built upon the rock is impregnable and immovable; for if the law of nature should not extend itself so far, as to oblige men to an accurate observation of that which is a remove or two distant from first principles, it would then prove extremely defective in some such precepts as do most intimately and intensely conduce to the welfare and advantage of an intellectual being. And these first notions would be most barren, inefficacious speculations, unless they did thus 'increase and multiply,' and bring forth fruit with the blessing of Heaven upon them.

Gen. i. 28.

So that there is a necessary connexion and concatenation between first principles and such conclusions. For,

<sup>1</sup> Conclusiones evidenter illate, quæ tamen cognosci nequeunt nisi per discursum; ut, mendacium, furtum, et similia prava esse.

<sup>2</sup> Reasoning.—*Ed.*

as Suarez has it, 'The truth of the principle is bound up in the conclusion;' <sup>1</sup> so that he that questions the conclusion, must needs also strike at the principle. Nay, if we look to the notion of a law, there is more of that to be seen in these more particular determinations, than in those more universal notions; for 'a law is the nearest rule of operation.'<sup>2</sup> But now particulars are nearer to existence and operation than universals, and in this respect do more immediately steer and direct the motions of such a being. The one is the bending of the bow, but the other is the shooting of the arrow. Suarez does fully determine this in such words as these, 'All these precepts,'—he means both principles and conclusions,—'come forth from God, the Author of nature, and all tend to the same result, namely, the due preservation, and natural perfection, or happiness of human nature.'<sup>3</sup>

This law of nature, as it is thus branched forth, does bind 'in the court of conscience;' <sup>4</sup> for as that noble author,<sup>5</sup> whom I more than once commended before, speaks very well in this: Natural conscience is 'the centre of natural knowledge;' <sup>6</sup> and it is a kind of 'common sense'<sup>7</sup> in respect of the inward faculties, as that other is in respect of the outward senses. It is a competent judge of this law of nature. It is the natural pulse of the soul, by the beating and motion of which the state and temper of men is discernible. The Apostle Paul thus felt the heathen's pulse, and found their consciences sometimes accusing them, sometimes making apology for them. Yet

Rom. ii.  
14, 15.

<sup>1</sup> Veritas principii continetur in conclusione.

<sup>2</sup> Lex est proxima regula operationum.

<sup>3</sup> Hæc omnia præcepta prodeunt a Deo auctore naturæ, et tendunt ad eundem finem, nimirum ad debitam conservationem, et naturalem perfectionem, seu felicitatem humanæ naturæ.

<sup>4</sup> In foro conscientiæ.

<sup>5</sup> Bacon.

<sup>6</sup> Centrum noticiarum communium.

<sup>7</sup> Sensus communis.

there is a great deal of difference between natural conscience and the law of nature ; for, as the schoolmen speak, Conscience is 'a practical dictate in a particular matter.'<sup>1</sup> It is a prosecution and application of this natural law, as Providence is of that eternal law.

Nay, conscience sometimes does embrace only the shadow of a law, and does engage men, though erroneously, to the observation of that which was never dictated by any just legislative power. Nor is it content to glance only at what is to come, but, Janus-like, it has a double aspect, and so looks back to what is past, as to call men to a strict account for every violation of this law.

This law is so accurate, as to oblige men not only 'to the act,'<sup>2</sup> but 'to the mode'<sup>3</sup> also ; it looks as well to the inward form and manner, as to the materiality and bulk of outward actions ; for every being owes thus much kindness and courtesy to itself, not only to put forth such acts as are essential and intrinsic to its own welfare, but also to delight in them, and to fulfil them with all possible freeness and alacrity, with the greatest intenseness and complacency. Self-love alone might easily constrain men to this natural obedience. Human laws, indeed, rest satisfied with a visible and external obedience, but nature's law darts itself into the most intimate essentials, and looks for entertainment there.

You know that amongst the moralists, only such acts are esteemed 'human acts'<sup>4</sup> that are 'voluntary acts.'<sup>5</sup> When nature has tuned a rational being, she expects that every string, every faculty, should spontaneously and cheerfully sound forth her praise. And the God of nature, that has not chained, nor fettered, nor enslaved such a creature,

<sup>1</sup> Dictamen practicum in particulari.

<sup>2</sup> Ad actum.

<sup>4</sup> Actus humani.

<sup>3</sup> Ad modum.

<sup>5</sup> Actus voluntarii.

but has given it a competent liberty and enlargement, the free diffusion and amplification of its own essence, He looks withal that it should willingly consent to its own happiness, and to all such means as are necessary for the accomplishment of its choicest end ; and that it should totally abhor whatsoever is destructive and prejudicial to its own being ; which if it do, it will presently embrace the law of nature, if it either love its God or itself ; the command of its God, or the welfare of itself.

Nay, the precepts of this natural law are so potent and triumphant, as that some acts which rebel against it, become not only 'illegal'<sup>1</sup> but 'vain,'<sup>2</sup> as both the schoolmen and lawyers observe. They are not only irregularities, but mere nullities ; and that either 'from want of power, and from the physical impossibility of the thing,'<sup>3</sup> as if one should go about to give the same thing to two several persons, the second donation is a moral nonentity ; or else, 'on account of the perpetual indecency and enduring baseness of the thing,'<sup>4</sup> as in some anomalous and incestuous marriages.

And this law of nature is so exact, as that it is not capable of a 'mitigation,'<sup>5</sup> which the lawyers call 'amendment of the law ;'<sup>6</sup> but there is no mending of essences, nor of essential laws, both which consist 'in a point, indivisible,'<sup>7</sup> and so cannot 'admit more and less.'<sup>8</sup> Nor is there any need of it, for in this law there is no rigour at all ; it is pure equity, and so nothing is to be abated of it. Neither does it depend only 'on the judgment of the law-giver,'<sup>9</sup> which is the usual rise of mitigation, but it is con-

<sup>1</sup> Illiciti.

<sup>2</sup> Irriti.

<sup>3</sup> Ob defectum potestatis et incapacitatem materiæ.

<sup>4</sup> Propter perpetuam rei indecentiam, et turpitudinem durantem.

<sup>5</sup> Ἐπιτελέα.

<sup>6</sup> Emendatio legis.

<sup>7</sup> In puncto indivisibili.

<sup>8</sup> Recipere magis et minus.

<sup>9</sup> A mente legislatoris.

versant about such acts as are 'in themselves such,'<sup>1</sup> most intrinsically and inseparably.

Yet notwithstanding this law does not refuse an interpretation, but nature herself does gloss upon her own law, as in what circumstances such an act is to be esteemed murder, and when not; and so in many other branches of nature's law, if there be any appearance of intricacy, any seeming knot and difficulty, nature has given edge enough to cut it asunder.

There is another law, 'the law of nations,' bordering upon and akin to the law of nature;<sup>2</sup> and it is 'a sort of middle system between natural and civil law.'<sup>3</sup> Now this *jus gentium* is either 'through likeness and agreement,'<sup>4</sup> when several nations, in their distinct conditions, have yet some of the same positive laws; or else, which indeed is most properly the 'law of nations,'<sup>5</sup> 'by communication and alliance,'<sup>6</sup> which, as the learned Grotius describes, 'has obtained its binding power from the consent of all or many nations';<sup>7</sup> that is, when all or many of the most refined nations, bunching and clustering together, do bind themselves by general compact to the observation of such laws, as they judge to be for the good of them all; as the honourable entertainment of an ambassador, or such like.

So that it is 'human law unwritten';<sup>8</sup> it is 'a discovery of life and time.'<sup>9</sup> For as Justinian tells us, 'At the call of advantage and necessity, the tribes of men have laid

<sup>1</sup> Per se tales.

<sup>2</sup> Jus gentium, juri naturali propinquum et consanguineum.

<sup>3</sup> Medium quoddam inter jus naturale et jus civile.

<sup>4</sup> Per similitudinem et concomitantiam.

<sup>5</sup> Νόμιμον ἔθνικόν.

<sup>6</sup> Per communicationem et societatem.

<sup>7</sup> Ab omnium, vel multarum gentium voluntate vim obligandi accepit.

<sup>8</sup> Jus humanum non scriptum.

<sup>9</sup> Ἐύρημα βίου καὶ χρόνου.

down certain laws for themselves,<sup>1</sup> whereas other human laws have a narrower sphere and compass, and are limited to such a state, which the orator styles 'national laws';<sup>2</sup> the Hebrews call their positive laws 'statutes,'<sup>3</sup> sometimes 'judgments,'<sup>4</sup> though the one do more properly point at ceremonials, the other at judicials. The *Septuagint* renders them 'commandments';<sup>5</sup> some others call them 'secondary,'<sup>6</sup> as they call natural laws מצוה, which the Hellenists render δικαιώματα. But, according to the Greek idiom, these are termed τὰ ἐν φύσει,<sup>7</sup> and the other τὰ ἐν τάξει.<sup>8</sup>

Now, though the formality of human laws do flow immediately from the power of some particular men, yet the strength and sinew of these laws is founded in the law of nature; for nature does permissively give them leave to make such laws as are for their greater convenience; and, when they are made, and while they are in their force and vigour, it does oblige and command them not to break or violate them, for they are to esteem their own consent as a sacred thing; they are not to contradict their own acts, nor to oppose such commands as 'by agreement' were framed and constituted by themselves.

Thus much for the law of nature in general. We must look, in the next place, to that 'light of nature,'<sup>10</sup> that 'candle of the Lord,' by which this law of nature is manifested and discovered.

<sup>1</sup> Usu exigente et humanis necessitatibus, gentes humanæ quædam sibi jura constituerunt.

<sup>2</sup> Leges populares.—Cicero, *De Legg.*, 2. 4.

<sup>3</sup> מִשְׁפָּטִים.

<sup>4</sup> חֻקִּים.

<sup>5</sup> Ἐπιτάλαι.

<sup>6</sup> Τὰ τῆς δευτερώσεως.

<sup>7</sup> 'Natural.'

<sup>8</sup> 'Ordered or appointed.'

<sup>9</sup> Ex pacto.

<sup>10</sup> Lumen nature.

## CHAPTER VIII.

HOW THE LAW OF NATURE IS DISCOVERED; NOT BY TRADITION  
NOR 'AN ACTING INTELLECT.'<sup>1</sup>

GOD having contrived such an admirable and harmonious law for the guiding and governing of His creature, you cannot doubt but that He will also provide sufficient means for the discovery and publishing of it; promulgation being pre-required as a necessary condition before a law can be valid and vigorous. To this end, therefore, He has set up an intellectual lamp in the soul, by the light of which it can read this 'written law,'<sup>2</sup> and can follow the commands of its Creator.

The schoolmen, with full and general consent, understand that place of the Psalmist of this 'light of nature,'<sup>3</sup> and many other authors follow them in this too securely. Nay, some critical writers quote them, and yet never chide them for it. The words are these, 'Lift upon us the light of thy countenance';<sup>4</sup> but yet they very ignorantly, though very confidently, render them, 'The light of thy countenance is stamped upon us,'<sup>5</sup> and they do as erroneously interpret it of the light of reason, which, say they, is 'a sort of seal

Ps. iv. 6.

<sup>1</sup> Intellectus agens.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>3</sup> Lumen naturale.

<sup>4</sup> נסח עלינו אור פניך—Eleva super nos lumen vultus tui.

<sup>5</sup> Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui.

and impression of uncreated light in the soul.'<sup>1</sup> So much, indeed, is true, but it is far from being an exposition of this place. Yet perhaps the *Septuagint* misled them, who thus translate it, 'The light of thy countenance is marked upon us,'<sup>2</sup> but Aquila, that had a quicker eye here, renders it 'lift up,'<sup>3</sup> and Symmachus 'mark.'<sup>4</sup> The words are plainly put up in the form of a petition to Heaven, for some smiles of love, for some propitious and favourable glances, for God's gracious presence and acceptance. And they amount to this sense, 'If one sun do but shine upon me, I shall have more joy than worldlings have, when all their stars appear.'

But to let these pass with the errors of their vulgar Latin, I meet with one more remarkable, and of larger influence, I mean that of the Jews, who, as that worthy author<sup>5</sup> of our own, in his learned book, *De Jure Naturali secundum Hebræos*, makes the report, do imagine and suppose that the light of nature shines only upon themselves, originally and principally, and upon the Gentiles only by way of participation and dependence upon them; they all must light their candles at the Jewish lamp. Thus they strive as much as they can to engross and monopolize this natural light to themselves; only it may be sometimes out of their great liberality they will distribute some broken beams of it to the Gentiles. As if these 'precepts of the children of Noah'<sup>6</sup> had been locked up and cabinetted in Noah's ark, and afterwards kept from the profane touch of a Gentile; as if they had been part of that bread, which our Saviour said was not to be cast unto dogs, and therefore they would make them be glad to eat of the crumbs

Matt. xv.  
26, 27.

<sup>1</sup> Signaculum quoddam et impressio increatæ lucis in anima.

<sup>2</sup> Ἐσημειώθη ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου σου.

<sup>3</sup> Ἐπαρον.

<sup>4</sup> Ἐπίσημον ποίησον.

<sup>5</sup> Selden.

<sup>6</sup> מצות בני נوح.—Præcepta Noachidarum.

that fall from their Master's table. As if they only enjoyed a Goshen of natural light, and all the rest of the world were benighted in most palpable and unavoidable darkness; as if this sun shone only upon Canaan; as if Canaan only flowed with this milk and honey; as if no drops of heaven could fall upon a wilderness, unless an Israelite be there; as if they had the whole impression of nature's law; as if God had not dealt thus with every nation; as if the heathen also had not the knowledge of this law. It is true, they had the first beauty of the rising sun, the first peepings out of the day, the first dawns of natural light; for there were no other that it could then shine upon. But do they mean to check the sun in its motion, to stop this giant in his race, to hinder him from scattering rays of light in the world? Do they think that nature's fountain is enclosed, that her well is sealed up, that a Jew must only drink of it, and a Gentile must die for thirst? Oh, but they tell you they are 'a darling and peculiar nation.'<sup>1</sup>

Ps. cxlvii. 20.

Mal. iii. 17.

Rom. iii. 1, 2.

We shall fully acknowledge with the Hebrew of Hebrews, that 'much is the advantage of the Jew,'<sup>2</sup> though not in respect of natural light, which doubtless is planted by nature in the heart both of Jew and Gentile, and shines upon both with an equal and impartial beam. And yet this must not be denied, that the Jews had even these natural notions much clarified and refined from those clouds and mists which 'the evil figment,'<sup>3</sup> original sin, had brought upon them, and this by means of that pure and powerful beam of heavenly truth which shone more particularly upon them; those laws which nature had engraven 'upon the tables of their hearts,'<sup>4</sup> sin like a moth had eaten and defaced, as in all other men it had done,

<sup>1</sup> עם סגולה.—Λαός περιούσιος.<sup>2</sup> Πολύ τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου.<sup>4</sup> Ἐν δέλτοις φρενῶν.<sup>3</sup> יצר הרע.

but in them those fugitive letters were called home again, and those many 'blanks'<sup>1</sup> were supplied and made good again by comparing it with that other copy (of God's own writing too) which Moses received in the mount; and, besides, they had a great number of revealed truths discovered to them, which were engrafted, indeed, upon the stock of nature, but would never have grown out of it; so that this second edition was 'enlarged'<sup>2</sup> also, as well as 'improved';<sup>3</sup> but yet for all this they have no greater a portion of the 'light of nature' than all men have. Thus Christians also are 'a peculiar people,'<sup>4</sup> and yet, in respect of their natural condition, have no more than others.

1 Pet. ii. 9.

Now, if the Jews have so many privileges, why are not they content? Why do they not rest satisfied with them? Why will they thus be claiming and arrogating more than their due? Are they the first-born, and have they a double portion, and do they envy their younger brethren their birth and being? Have they a bright and eminent sunshine, and do they envy a Gentile 'the candle of the Lord?'

No; as that learned author tells us, they will grant that the Gentiles had their candle and their torch, but it was lighted at the Jews' sun. They may have some bottles of water to quench their thirst, but they must be filled at their streams, 'from the Hebrew waters.'<sup>5</sup>

But, truly, if they were at their disposing, there be some that will question whether they would let them sip at their fountain or no; whether they would let them light a candle with them or no. Yes, may some say, Pythagoras lighted his candle there, and Plato lighted his candle at theirs.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lacunæ.<sup>2</sup> Auctior.<sup>3</sup> Emendatior.<sup>4</sup> עם סגולה.<sup>5</sup> Ἐκ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν ναμμάτων—Ex fluentis Hebraicis.<sup>6</sup> This notion is supported with more learning than judgment by Gale, in his "Court of the Gentiles."—Ed.

But what, did they borrow common notions of them? did they borrow any copies of Nature's law from them? was this 'written law'<sup>1</sup> only some Jewish manuscript which they translated into Greek? Can Pythagoras know nothing, unless, by a present 'transmigration of souls,'<sup>2</sup> a Jew's soul come and inform him? That Pythagoras should be circumcised by the persuasion of the Jews is not impossible; but that he could not know how to forbid blasphemy, without the Jews' teachings, deserves a good argument to prove it.

If they will but attend to Pythagoras himself, they shall hear him resolving these first notions of his and others into Nature's bounty, and not into the Jews' courtesy, for thus he sings,—

'. . . . Mortals spring from immortals,  
And to them Nature her holy things brings forth and exhibits.'<sup>3</sup>

And Hierocles, in his comment, which is as golden as Pythagoras's verses, does thus paraphrase upon his meaning, 'All men have among their innate principles impulses and aids to the knowledge of their own being.'<sup>4</sup> And these principles, which he calls here 'the inborn things,'<sup>5</sup> he not long after styles 'the natural ideas.'<sup>6</sup>

Then, as for Plato, to be sure, he will tell them, that he has connate 'ideas'<sup>7</sup> of his own, for which he was never beholden to the Jews. He will tell them, that he has many spermatical notions that were never of their sowing; many vigilant sparks that were never of their striking or

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>2</sup> Μετεμψύχωσις.

<sup>3</sup> . . . . . Δείον γένος ἐστὶ βροτοῖσι,  
ὡς ἱερὰ προφέρουσα φύσις δεικνυσὶν ἕκαστα.

Pyth. Aur., 63, 64.

<sup>4</sup> Πάντες ἀφορμὰς ἔχοντες ἐν συμφύτοις πρὸς ἐπιγνώσιν τῆς ἐαυτῶν οὐσίας.—Hierocles, *Comm. in Aur. Pyth.* p. 281. Lond. 1654.

<sup>5</sup> Τὰ σύμφυτα.

<sup>6</sup> Τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας.

<sup>7</sup> Species.

kindling. He will but set his reminiscence a work, and will visit his old acquaintance, recall many ancient truths that are now slipped out of his memory, and have been too long absent. And surely Aristotle never thought that his 'sheet of blank paper'<sup>1</sup> could have nothing printed upon it, till a Jew gave it an *imprimatur*; he little imagined that the motion of his soul depended upon these Oriental intelligences.

Therefore, if they please, they may spare that pretty story of theirs—which that learned author, whom I have so often commended, does acquaint us with, but yet withal esteems it fabulous—of Simeon the Just, the high-priest, reading of lectures to Aristotle a little before his death, of the immortality of the soul, and the reward and punishment which are reserved for another life, and that so powerfully, as that he convinced him, and converted him.

But certainly, that brave philosopher could easily spy out immortality stamped upon his own soul, though such a monitor had been absent, and did know long before that time by the improvement of his own intellectuals, that he must give an account of his being and operations to his 'Being of beings.'<sup>2</sup>

What means, then, that voice of the oracle?

'Wisdom the Chaldees alone have obtained, and with them the Hebrews,

Chastely who worship a self-existent King as their great God.'<sup>3</sup>

Truly, the oracle here is not so obscure, but that you may easily perceive that by 'wisdom'<sup>4</sup> it did not mean *intelligentia*, which is 'the knowledge of the first elements,'<sup>5</sup> but only *sapientia*, which is 'the knowledge of what is most

<sup>1</sup> Rasa tabula.

<sup>2</sup> \*Ὁν ὄντων.

<sup>3</sup> Μοῖνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίαν λάχον, ἧδ' ἀρ' Ἑβραῖοι,  
Ἀπτογένεθλον ἀνακτα σεβαζόμενοι Θεὸν ἀγνώως.

<sup>4</sup> Σοφία.

<sup>5</sup> Ἡ γνώσις τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων.

valuable.<sup>1</sup> Now, why they had more of this, the Apostle will give you the best account of it, 'Because that unto them were committed the oracles of God,'<sup>2</sup> because they had a better oracle to consult withal than this was.

Yet surely neither Jew nor Gentile need go to an oracle to inquire of common notions. But in respect of these, that anonymous author of the life of Pythagoras speaks an unquestionable truth, 'The Athenians had not an adventurous and precarious kind of knowledge; but that nature which gave them a being, gave them education also.'<sup>3</sup> As her womb bare them, so her breasts gave them suck. As they were 'children of their own soil,'<sup>4</sup> so likewise 'educated by their own nature.'<sup>5</sup>

But you shall hear a bragging and doting Egyptian telling you, 'The Greeks were always boys in knowledge.'<sup>6</sup> Grant that they were children, yet cannot they suck at nature's dug? Cannot they read nature's alphabet, unless a Jew come with his fescue and teach them? However, the Egyptian has little reason to triumph; for to be sure, if there be any light in Egypt more than this of Nature, they may thank Israelites for it; if there be any corn in Egypt, they may thank a Joseph for providing it. These, if any, lighted their candles at the Israelites', and received more precious jewels from them than ever they were robbed of by them.

This indeed must be granted, that the whole generality of the heathen went a-gleaning in the Jewish fields. They had some of their grapes, some ears of corn that dropped from them. Pythagoras and Plato especially, were such notable gleaners, as that they stole out of the very sheaves,

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ γνῶσις τῶν τιμωτάτων.

<sup>2</sup> Ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐκ ἐπεισάκτος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἡ παιδεία ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις, ἀλλ' ἐκ φύσεως ὑπάρχουσα.—Anon. de Vit. Pyth., sect. 22, p. 61, 4to. Amst. 1707.

<sup>4</sup> Αὐτόχθονες.

<sup>5</sup> Αὐτοδίδακτοι.

<sup>6</sup> Ἕλληνας δὲ παῖδας εἶναι.

out of those truths that are bound up in the sacred volume. Yet all this while they never stole first principles, nor demonstrations; but they had them 'at home,'<sup>1</sup> and needed not to take such a long journey for them.

Give, then, unto the Jew the things of the Jews, and to the Gentile the things that are the Gentiles'; and that which God has made common, call not thou peculiar. Acts x 15. The apostle Paul's question is here very seasonable, 'Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes; of the Gentiles also.'<sup>2</sup>

Rom. iii. 29.

There was never any partition-wall between the essence of Jew and Gentile. Now the law of nature is founded in essentials; and that which is disconvenient to that rational nature which is in a Jew, is as opposite and disagreeable to the same nature in a Gentile; as that good which is suitable and proportionable to a Jew in his rational being, is every way as intrinsical to the welfare of a Gentile, that does not differ essentially from him. So likewise for the promulgation of this law, being<sup>3</sup> it does equally concern them both, and equally oblige them both; it is also by nature equally published and manifested to them both. So that what the Apostle speaks in respect of the freeness of evangelical light, we may say the very same in respect of the commonness of natural light, 'There is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free';<sup>4</sup> but all these are one in respect of nature, and nature's law, and nature's light.

Col. iii. 11.

<sup>1</sup> Οἰκόμενοι.

<sup>2</sup> Ἡ Ἰουδαίων ὁ Θεὸς μόνον; οὐχὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν; ναὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν.

<sup>3</sup> Used as equivalent to seeing.—Ed.

<sup>4</sup> Οὐκ ἐν Ἕλλησιν καὶ Ἰουδαίοις, περιτομῇ καὶ ἀκροβυστία, βάρβαρος, Σκυθῆς, δοῦλος, ἐλεύθερος.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON.

THIS law of nature, having a firm and unshaken foundation in the necessity and conveniency of its materials, becomes formally valid and vigorous by the mind and command of the Supreme Lawgiver, so as that all the strength and nerves, and binding virtue of this law, are rooted and fastened partly in the excellency and equity of the commands themselves; but they principally depend upon the sovereignty and authority of God himself, thus contriving and commanding the welfare of His creature, and advancing a rational nature to the just perfection of its being. This is the rise and original of all that obligation which is in the law of nature. But the publishing and manifestation of this law, which must give notice of all this, flows from that heavenly beam which God has darted into the soul of man; from 'the candle of the Lord,' which God has lighted up for the discovery of His own laws; from that intellectual eye which God has framed and made exactly proportionable to this light.

Therefore we shall easily grant that the *obligation* of this law does not come from this 'candle of the Lord;' and others, I suppose, will not deny that the *manifestation* of this law does come from this 'candle of the Lord,' that

the *promulgation* of this law is made by the voice of reason.

In order of nature, this law, as all others, must be made before it can be made known; entity being the just root and bottom of intelligibility. So that reason does not 'make'<sup>1</sup> or 'propose the law,'<sup>2</sup> but only 'discover it,'<sup>3</sup> as a candle does not produce an object, but only present it to the eye, and make it visible. All verity is but the gloss of entity, there is a loving union and communion between them; as soon as being is, it may be known.

So that reason is the pen by which Nature writes this law of her own composing; this law is published by authority from Heaven, and reason is the printer. This eye of the soul is to spy out all dangers and all advantages, all conveniences and inconveniences in reference to such a being, and to warn the soul, in the name of its Creator, to fly from such irregularities as have an intrinsical and implacable malice in them, and are prejudicial and destructive to its nature, but to comply with, and embrace all such acts and objects as have a native comeliness and amiableness, and are for the heightening and ennobling of its being.

Hierocles does most excellently set forth this, while he brings that golden verse of Pythagoras to the touchstone:

'Train thyself, in nothing to act but as reason directs thee;'<sup>4</sup>

and does thus brighten it and display it in his full glory: 'There is a kind of canon law in the essence of men, and a rational tuning of all its faculties, according to those lessons which nature has set; it lives with a most grateful

<sup>1</sup> Facere.

<sup>2</sup> Invenire.

<sup>3</sup> Μηδ' ἀλογιστως αὐτὸν ἔχειν περὶ μηδὲν ἐθίξου.—

<sup>4</sup> Ferre legem.

Aur. Pyth. x. 14.

and harmonious life, pleasing both itself and others.<sup>1</sup> So whilst he weighs that other golden verse in the balance,

'Think aye, before thou act, lest foolish acts be performed;'<sup>2</sup>

he speaks very high, and gives us this learned account of it, 'To obey right reason, is to be persuaded by God himself, who has furnished and adorned a rational nature with this intrinsical and essential lamp that shines upon it, and guides it in the ways of God, so as that the soul and its Creator become perfect unisons, and being blest with the light of his countenance, it steers all its motions and actions with much security and happiness. But if this lamp of reason be darkened and obscured, the soul presently embraces a cloud, and courts a shadow; the blackest and most palpable atheism and wickedness must needs cover the face of that soul, that starts back and apostatizes from its God and its reason.'<sup>3</sup> Where you cannot but take notice that he calls the light of reason 'a man's own enlightenment,'<sup>4</sup> which is an expression very parallel to this of Solomon, 'the candle of the Lord.'

That wise heathen, Socrates, was of the very same mind, in whose mouth that speech was so frequent and usual, 'It is in vain to trust anything but that which reason tells you has the seal of God upon it.'<sup>5</sup> Thus that heathen

<sup>1</sup> Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς κανόνα τὴν οὐσίαν ἡμῶν ἀποβλέποντες, τὸ θεὸν ἐν πᾶσιν εὐρίσκομεν, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, συμφώνως τῇ ἐαυτῶν οὐσία διαζῶντες.—Hierocles, *Comm. in Aur. Dict. Pyth.* p. 101. Lond. 1654.

<sup>2</sup> Βουλεύου δὲ πρὸ ἔργου, ὅπως μὴ μῶρα πέληται.—*Aur. Pyth.* 29.

<sup>3</sup> Λόγῳ δ' ὀρθῶ πείθεσθαι, καὶ Θεῷ ταῦτόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν γένος εὐμοίρησαν τῆς οἰκείας ἐλλάμψεως, ταῦτα βούλεται ἃ ὁ Θεὸς ὀρίζει νόμος, καὶ γίνεται σύμψηφος Θεῷ ἢ κατὰ Θεὸν διακειμένη ψυχῇ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ Θεῖον καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀποβλέπουσα πράττει ἢ ἂν πράττη. ἥδε ἐναντίως διακειμένη πρὸς τὸ ἄθεον, καὶ σκοτεινὸν, εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἐτυχε φερομένη, ἅτε τῆς μόνης τῶν καλῶν σάδμης, τοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ, ἀποπειροῦσα.—*Hier., Comm.* 170, *ut sup.*

<sup>4</sup> Οἰκεία ἐλλάμψις.

<sup>5</sup> Οὐδενὶ χρὴ πείθεσθαι πλὴν τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ.

orator,<sup>1</sup> very fully and emphatically: 'Nature has distinguished good from evil, by these indelible stamps and impressions which she has graven upon both; and has set reason as a competent judge to decide all moral controversies, which by her first seeds of light plainly discovers an honourable beauty in goodness, and an inseparable blot in wickedness.'<sup>2</sup> Hence these three, 'To live according to nature, to live according to reason, to live according to God,'<sup>3</sup> are esteemed equivalents by that emperor and philosopher *Marcus Antoninus*.

But yet the Jews will by no means yield that there is light enough in the dictates of reason to display common notions, for they look upon it as a various and unsatisfactory light mixed with much shadow and darkness, labouring with perpetual inconstancy and uncertainty. What! are first principles become so mutable and treacherous? are demonstrations such fortuitous and contingent things? Had I met with this in a fluctuating academic, in a rolling sceptic, in a *Sextus Empiricus*,<sup>4</sup> in some famous professor of doubts, I should then have looked upon it as a tolerable expression of their trembling and shivering opinion. But how come I to find it among those divers into the depths of knowledge, who grant a certainty, and yet will not grant it to reason? I would they would tell us, then, where we might hope to find it; surely not in an Oriental tradition, in a rabbinical dream, in a dusty manuscript, in a remnant

<sup>1</sup> Cicero.

<sup>2</sup> Nos legem bonam a mala nulla alia nisi naturali norma dividere possumus; nec solum jus et injuria a natura dijudicantur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia. Nam et communis intelligentia nobis res notas efficit, ea que in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.—*De Legibus*, i. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ζῆν κατὰ λόγον, ζῆν κατὰ Θεόν.—*Antonin. τῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸν*, lib. vii. sect. 11, p. 62. Glasg. 1744.

<sup>4</sup> Note J.

of antiquity, in a bundle of testimonies; and yet this is all you are like to get of them, for they tell you this story, that these natural precepts 'were proclaimed by the voice of God himself: first to Adam in the first setting out of the world, and then they were repeated to Noah when there was to be a reprinting and a new edition of the world after the Deluge; and thus were in way of tradition to be propagated to all posterity.'<sup>1</sup> O rare and admirable foundation of plerophory!<sup>2</sup> O incomparable method and contrivance to find out certainty, to raze out first principles, to pluck down demonstrations, to demolish the whole structure and fabric of reason, and to build upon the word of two or three Hebrew doctors, that tell you of a voice, and that as confidently as if they had heard it; and they are intrusted with this voice, they must report and spread it unto others, though they do it like unfaithful echoes with false and imperfect rebounds.

Luke i. 1.  
Col. ii. 2.

This is to tell you that men have no 'candle of the Lord' within them, but only there must be 'a handing down of the lamp,'<sup>3</sup> a general and public light, that must go from one hand to another. This is to blot out the 'written law,'<sup>4</sup> to leave out canonical Scripture, and to give you apocrypha in the room of it. It is to set a Jew in the chair, dictating the law of nature, with the very same infallibility that the Pope promises himself in determining all points of religion.

Therefore some, it may be, will have recourse to such an 'acting intellect'<sup>5</sup> as must clear all things. Now this is another Oriental invention, for those Arabian writers,

<sup>1</sup> Tum in ipsis rerum initiis, tum in ea quæ fuit post diluvium instauratione, humano generi, ipsa sanctissima numinis voce fuisse imperata atque ad posteros per traditionem solum inde manasse.

<sup>2</sup> 'Full persuasion.'

<sup>4</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>3</sup> Traditio lampadis

<sup>5</sup> Intellectus agens.

Averroes and Avicenna, did not look upon the spirit of a man as 'the candle of the Lord,' but must needs have an angel to hold the candle to enlighten men in their choicest operations. Nay, Averroes will allow but one angel to superintend and prompt the whole species of mankind; yet Zabarella questions whether his bounty will not extend to two, the one for an 'active intellect,'<sup>1</sup> the other for a 'passive intellect.'<sup>2</sup> To be sure, Averroes fancied man as the most imperfect and contemptible being that could be, totally dependent upon an angel in his most essential workings; the whole sphere of his being was to be moved by an intelligence. He fancied him a ship steered only by an angel; he fancied him a lute that made no music but by the touch of an angel. It had been well if his genius would have tuned him a little better. It had been well if his pilot would have kept him from making shipwreck of reason; if his intelligence would but have moved his head a little more harmoniously. But by this, if he had pleased, he might have perceived that there were pluralities and differences of understandings, because there were so few of his mind.

Yet Plotinus and Themistius, that were his seniors, had more than a tincture of this error, and looked upon this 'acting intellect'<sup>3</sup> as if it had been 'a kind of spiritual sun, rising or setting in no one, but always and everywhere present in all.'<sup>4</sup> Which notion Cardan<sup>5</sup> prosecutes so far, as that he falls into this most prodigious conceit, that this *intellectus agens* does offer its light and assistance to sensitive beings also, but that the churlishness of the matter

<sup>1</sup> Intellectus agens.

<sup>2</sup> Νοῦς ποιητικός.

<sup>4</sup> Sol quidam incorporeus, nulli oriens aut occidens, sed semper et ubique omnibus præsens.—*De Subtilitate*.

<sup>5</sup> Note K.

<sup>2</sup> Intellectus patiens.

will not welcome and entertain such pure irradiations, for thus he speaks, 'That the same intellect hangs over, and goes about beasts also, but cannot find admission, on account of the unsuitableness of the matter; that it therefore shines *into* man, but *round about* beasts; and that the intellect of man does not differ from that of beasts in any other way; that therefore beasts have the elements of all which is found perfected in man.'<sup>1</sup> But Scaliger<sup>2</sup> has sufficiently corrected him for this brutish tenent,<sup>3</sup> so that I shall need only to add this,—Cardan's *intellectus agens* was so familiar, as that some question whether he were a good angel or no. Nay, some tell us that he was left him for an inheritance, shut up in a ring, enclosed in a golden circle—a goodly sphere for an intelligence to move in.

But there were many others also enamoured with this opinion of an *intellectus agens*; the Platonists were excessively inclinable to it, and were always so much conversant with spirits, which made their philosophy ever questioned for a touch of magic. Nay, Scaliger tells us of some others that will have this *intellectus agens* to be 'the contriver of the rarest and wittiest inventions,<sup>4</sup> the author of guns, of clocks, of printing, of the 'mariner's compass;'<sup>5</sup> and that

<sup>1</sup> Eundem intellectum etiam belluis imminere, easque ambire: at ipsi non patere aditum, propter materiæ ineptitudinem. Igitur hominem intus irradiare, circum belluas extrinsecus collucere. Neque alia re hominis intellectum ab intellectu differre belluarum. Idcirco belluas ea omnia habere inchoata, quæ in homine perfecta sunt.

<sup>2</sup> *De Subtilitate*, Exerc. cccvii.

<sup>3</sup> 'Tenent' seems to have been the ordinary spelling of 'tenet.' Roger Williams' tract against persecution, published in 1644, is entitled 'The Bloudie Tenent of Persecution Discussed.' Cotton's answer has for its title, 'The Bloudie Tenent Washed and made White in the Bloud of the Lambe,' 1647; and Williams' reply bears the name of 'The Bloudie Tenent yet more Bloudie, by Mr. Cotton's endeavour to Wash it White in the Bloude of the Lambe,' 1652.

<sup>4</sup> Caput et auctor consiliorum omnium,

<sup>5</sup> Pyxis nautica.

the material intellect is, as it were, a liferenter or pensioner of it.'<sup>1</sup>

The Jews especially admire and adore the influence of an *intellectus agens*; and not forgetful of their primogeniture and privileges, but being always a conceited and a bragging generation, they would fain persuade us that God himself is their *intellectus agens*, but to the Gentiles He sends only an angel to illuminate them.

The Jews indeed sometimes call every faculty an angel, as one of the best amongst them, Maimonides, tells us; but yet here they properly mean an angelical being, distinct and separate from the soul; and just according to Averroes' determination, the lowest intelligence, 'the last mover of the heavenly beings.'<sup>2</sup> Their own *intellectus agens* they call 'the presence and power of God'<sup>3</sup> dwelling in the understanding; the influence of it they term *שפע*, as the fore-mentioned Maimonides observes; that is, a copious and abundant supply of light shining upon the mind. According to which they understand that place of the Psalmist, 'In thy light we shall see light;'<sup>4</sup> which the schoolmen more truly expound of the 'light of glory,'<sup>5</sup> in the beatifical vision, though it may reach also to that joy and delight which saints have in communion with God here.

Amongst fresher and more modern writers, Zabarella<sup>6</sup> is very intense and zealous for this, that God himself is the *intellectus agens* of the soul; but being a most humble and devoted servant of Aristotle, he can by no means quiet and content himself, unless he can show the world that his

<sup>1</sup> Materialem vero intellectum esse quasi usufructuarium, et beneficiarium illius.

<sup>2</sup> Ultimus motor cælestium.

<sup>3</sup> באורך נראו אור.

<sup>4</sup> Note L.

<sup>5</sup> רוח הקדש ושכינה.

<sup>6</sup> Lumen glorie.

master was of the same judgment. This makes him to suborn two or three testimonies, or at least to tamper with a place or two; and then bravely to conclude, that without doubt was the mind of the philosopher, which is not only against the whole stream of other interpreters, but against the known and orthodox principles of him that was wiser than to countenance such a vanity.

It should seem by that eminent writer of our own, that Friar Bacon was of the same mind too, for whose words these are quoted, amongst many others, out of an Oxford manuscript, 'God, in the view of the soul, is like the sun to the eye of sense, and angels are like the stars.'<sup>1</sup> Now what angels they were that this Roger Bacon fixed his eye upon, whether they were not fallen stars, let others examine. I should think that Cardan's *intellectus agens* and his were both much of the same colour. But this you may perceive in him, and the rest of the great pleaders for an *intellectus agens*, that they found all their arguments in a pretty similitude of an eye, and light, and colours, as if this were some unconquerable demonstration. Whereas the great master of subtleties,<sup>2</sup> whom I have more than once named before, has made it appear, that the whole notion of an *intellectus agens* is a mere fancy and superfluity.

Yet this may be granted to all the fore-mentioned authors, and this is the only spark of truth, that lies almost buried in that heap of errors, that God himself, as He does supply every being, the motion of every creature, with an intimate and immediate concurrence every way answerable to the measure and degree of its entity, so He does in the same manner constantly assist the understand-

<sup>1</sup> Deus respectu animæ est sicut sol respectu oculi temporalis, et angeli sicut stellæ.

<sup>2</sup> Scaliger, *De Subtilitate*.

ing with a proportionable co-operation. But then, as for any such irradiations upon the soul in which that shall be merely patient,<sup>1</sup> God, indeed, if He be pleased to reveal Himself in a special and extraordinary manner, may thus shine out upon it, either immediately by His own light, or else drop angelical influence upon it; but that this should be the natural and ordinary way, necessarily required to intellectual workings, is extremely prejudicial to such a noble being as the soul of man is; to which God gave such bright participations of Himself, and stamped His image upon it, and left it to its own workings, as much as any other created being whatsoever. Nay, as Scaliger does most confidently object it to Cardan, you will not have one argument left by which you can evince the immortality of the soul, if you shall resolve all the excellency of its being and operations into an *intellectus agens* really distinct from it.

But then to make this *intellectus agens*<sup>2</sup> and *patiens*<sup>3</sup> only the various aspects and different relations of the same soul, is but a weak and needless device; and if it were Aristotle's, to be sure it was none of his masterpieces; for it is built upon I know not what phantasms and false appearances.

Whereas those species and colours, those pictures and representations of being that are set before an intellectual eye, carry such a light and beauty in themselves, as may justly ingratiate them with the understanding. And though some tell us that they have too much dross and impurity, that they are too muddy and feculent, not proportionable to the purity of a reasonable soul, yet let them but think of those many strainers they have gone through; those double refinings and clarifyings that they have had

<sup>1</sup> Passive.

<sup>2</sup> Νοῦς ποιητικός.

<sup>3</sup> Παθητικός.

from so many percolations ; and withal they may know that the understanding can drink in the most pure and flowering part of the species, and can leave the dregs at the bottom. Have you not thus often seen a seal stamping itself upon the wax, and yet not communicating the least particle of matter, but only leaving a form and impression upon it ?

However, there is as much proportion between these *species* and an *intellectus patiens*, as between these and an *intellectus agens*. Nay, there is more proportion between these *species* and the understanding, than between the soul and body, which yet are joined and married together in a most loving and conjugal union.

## CHAPTER X.

## OF THE CONSENT OF NATIONS.

THOUGH nature's law be principally proclaimed by the voice of reason, though it be sufficiently discovered by 'the candle of the Lord,' yet there is also a secondary and additional way, which contributes no small light to the manifestation of it: I mean the harmony and joint consent of nations, who, though there be 'no communion, nor commerce, nor compact'<sup>1</sup> between them, yet do tacitly and spontaneously conspire in a dutiful observation of the most radical and fundamental laws of nature.

So that by this pleasant concert of theirs you may know that the same nature did tune them all. When you see the same prints and impressions upon so many several nations, you easily perceive that they were stamped 'with the same public seal.'<sup>2</sup> When you see the very same seeds thrown in such different soils, yet all increasing and multiplying, budding and blossoming, branching out and enlarging themselves into some fruitful expressions, you know then that it was Nature's hand, her bountiful and successful hand, that scattered such seminal principles among them ; you presently know that is no enclosed way, it is a 'king's highway,'<sup>3</sup> in which you meet with so many travellers, such a concourse and confluence of people.

<sup>1</sup> Κοινωνία ἢ συνθήκη.

<sup>2</sup> Eodem communi sigillo.

<sup>3</sup> Via regia.

Amongst many others, the learned Grotius is full and express for searching out the law of nature in this manner. You shall hear his own words, which he speaks in that excellent work of his, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*. 'The existence of natural law is usually proved both *à priori* and *à posteriori*, the former being the more refined mode of proof, the latter the more suited for popular apprehension. The proof *à priori*, is by showing that something does or does not accord with our rational and social natures, and this of necessity. That *à posteriori* is by gathering together and reckoning, not perhaps with absolute certainty, but at least with great probability, as parts of a system of natural law, all points which among all nations—I mean all the more civilized—are considered as such.'<sup>1</sup> And he does annex this reason of it, 'A universal effect requires a universal cause.'<sup>2</sup> When you see such fresh springs and streams of justice watering several kingdoms and nations, you know that they are participations of some rich fountain, of a vast ocean. When you see so many rays of the same light shooting themselves into the several corners of the world, you presently look up to the sun, as the glorious original of them all.

Acts ii. 8-12.

Let me, then, a little vary that place in the Acts of the Apostles: You may hear every man in his own language, in his own dialect, and idiom, speaking the same works of nature; Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, in Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt,

<sup>1</sup> Esse aliquid juris naturalis, probari solet tum ab eo quod prius est, tum ab eo quod posterius; quarum probandi rationum illa subtilior est, hæc popularior. A priori, si ostendatur rei alicujus convenientia aut disconvenientia necessaria cum natura rationali ac sociali. A posteriori vero, si non certissima fide, certe probabiliter admodum juris naturalis esse colligitur id, quod apud gentes omnes aut moraliores omnes tale esse creditur.—*Prolegg.*

<sup>2</sup> Universalis effectus universalem requirit causam.

and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians, you may hear them speak in their own tongues the wonderful works of God and nature.

For whatsoever is natural and essential, is also universal in order to such a *species*. The philosopher<sup>1</sup> speaks to this very pertinently: 'Whatsoever is natural is immoveable, and in the same manner perpetually energetical; as fire does not put on one colour amongst the Grecians, and paint its face otherwise among the Persians; but it has always the same ruddiness and purity, the same zeal and vehemency.'<sup>2</sup>

As nature shows choice variety and needlework in this, in that she works every individual with several flourishes, with some singular and distinguishing notes, so likewise she plainly aspires to concord and unity, whilst she knits all together in a common and specific identity. Not only in the faces of men, but in their beings also, there is much of identity, and yet much of variety.

You do not doubt but that in all nations there is an exact likeness and agreement in the fabric and composure of men's bodies in respect of integrals, excepting a few monsters and heteroclitics in nature; nor can you doubt but that there is the very same frame and constitution of men's spirits in respect of intrinsics, unless in some prodigious ones, that in the philosopher's language are 'mistakes of nature.'<sup>3</sup> As face answers face, so does the heart of one man the heart of another, even the heart of an Athenian the heart of an Indian.

Wherefore the votes and suffrages of nature are no con-

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὡσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσῃσι καλεῖται.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀμαρτήματα τῆς φύσεως.—Aristot.

temptible things. 'No report quite dies out, which many nations spread,'<sup>1</sup> as the poet sings. This was the mind of that great moralist, Seneca, as appears by that speech of his: 'With us the fact of a thing appearing true to all proves its truth.'<sup>2</sup> But the orator is higher and fuller in his expression, 'But in everything the agreement of all nations must be believed to indicate a law of nature.'<sup>3</sup> And that other orator, Quintilian, does not much differ from him in this: 'We hold those things true, to which common opinion has given sanction.'<sup>4</sup> Or, if the judgment of a philosopher be more potent and prevalent with you, you may hear Aristotle telling you, 'It is best that all men should seem to agree to what shall be said.'<sup>5</sup> You may hear Heraclitus determining, that 'general opinion'<sup>6</sup> is an excellent 'test'<sup>7</sup> of truth; and therefore he was wont to lay down this for a maxim, 'Things generally believed are worthy of credit';<sup>8</sup> which may be rendered, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God';<sup>9</sup> yet upon this condition, that it be taken with its due restraints and limitations. If you would have a sacred author set his seal to all this, Tertullian has done it, 'That which is found agreed upon by many, is not a mistake, but a truth handed down to them.'<sup>10</sup>

Surely that must needs be a clear convincing light, that can command respect and adoration from all beholders; it must be an orient pearl indeed, if none will trample upon

<sup>1</sup> Φήμη δ' οὐτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἤντινα λαοὶ  
Πολλοὶ φημίζουσι.—Hesiod, Ἔργ. κ. Ἡμ. 762.

<sup>2</sup> Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri.

<sup>3</sup> Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.

<sup>4</sup> Pro certis habemus ea, in quæ communi opinione concessum est.

<sup>5</sup> Κράτιστον πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογούντας τοῖς ῥηθησο-  
μένοις.

<sup>6</sup> Ὁ λόγος ξυνός.

<sup>7</sup> Κριτήριον.

<sup>8</sup> Τὰ κοινῇ φαινόμενα πιστά.

<sup>9</sup> Vox populi vox Dei.

<sup>10</sup> Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est erratum, sed traditum.

it. It must be a conquering and triumphant truth that can stop the mouths of gainsayers, and pass the world without contradiction. Surely that is pure gold that has been examined by so many several touchstones, and has had approbation from them all. Certainly it is some transcendent beauty, that so many nations are enamoured withal. It is some powerful music, that sets the whole world a dancing. It is some pure and delicious relish, that can content and satisfy every palate. It is some accurate piece, that passes so many critics without any animadversions, without any 'various readings.'<sup>1</sup> It is an elegant picture, that neither the eye of an artist, nor yet a popular eye, can find fault withal. Think but upon the several tempers and dispositions of men,—how curious are some! how censorious are others! how envious and malicious are some! how various and mutable are others! how do some love to be singular, others to be contentious! how doubtful and wavering is one, how jealous and suspicious is another! and then tell me whether it must not be some authentical and unquestionable truth, that can at all times have a certificate and *commendamus* from them all.

Then look upon the diversities of nations, and there you will see a rough and barbarous Scythian, a wild American, an unpolished Indian, a superstitious Egyptian, a subtle Ethiopian, a cunning Arabian, a luxurious Persian, a treacherous Carthaginian, a lying Cretian, an elegant Athenian, a wanton Corinthian, a desperate Italian, a fighting German,<sup>2</sup> and many other heaps of nations, whose titles I shall now spare, and tell me whether it must not be some admirable and efficacious truth, that shall so overpower them all, as to pass current amongst them, and be owned and acknowledged by them.

<sup>1</sup> Variæ lectiones.

<sup>2</sup> Note M.

Yet notwithstanding, as we told you before; that the obligation of nature's law did not spring from reason, so much less does it arise from the consent of nations. That law, indeed, which is peculiarly termed 'the law of nations,'<sup>1</sup> has its vigour and validity from those mutual and reciprocal compacts which they have made amongst themselves; but the meeting of several nations in the observation of nature's law, has no binding or engaging virtue in it any otherwise than in an exemplary way; but yet it has a confirming and evidencing power, that shows that they were all obliged to this by some supreme authority, which had such an ample influence upon them all. Thus you know the sweetness of honey, both by your own taste, and by the consent of palates too; yet neither the one nor the other does drop any sweetness or lusciousness into the honeycomb. Thus you see the beauty and glory of light, and you may call most men in the world to be eye-witnesses of it, yet those several eyes add no gloss or lustre to it, but only take notice of it.

Man being, as the philosopher<sup>2</sup> styles him, 'a sociable and peaceable creature';<sup>3</sup> as that sacred orator<sup>4</sup> terms him, 'a congregating creature that loves to keep company';<sup>5</sup> he must needs take much delight and complacency in that in which he sees the whole tribe and species of mankind agreeing with him.

Why then do the Jews look upon the 'heathen peoples'<sup>6</sup> with such a disdainful and scornful eye, as if all the nations, in comparison of them, were no more than what the Prophet says they are in respect of God, 'as the drop

<sup>1</sup> Νόμιμον ἔθνηκόν—Jus gentium.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle.

<sup>3</sup> Ζῶον πολιτικόν, καὶ ζῶον ἡμερον.—*Hist. Anim.*, lib. i. par. i. 26, 27; Opera, tom. i. p. 488. Bekker, Berolin. 1831.

<sup>4</sup> Chrysostom.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀγελαστικόν καὶ συγγνωμὸν ζῶον.

<sup>6</sup> נַיִם.

of a bucket, as the dust of the balance,' that cannot incline them one way or other?

Do but hear a while how that learned and much honoured author of our own<sup>1</sup> does represent their mind unto you, 'The opinions, manners, constitutions, and measures of all, or at least many nations, are not at all regarded by the Hebrews, in decisions upon what they hold to be natural or universal law.'<sup>2</sup> These are the contents of that chapter which he begins thus: 'As the Hebrews do not consider that any system of natural law is learned from, or fixed by, the acts or practice of other animated beings, so in coming to a decision regarding the natural or universal law that has reference to man, they will have no regard paid to the practice and customs of other nations, whether these be the majority, or absolutely all.'<sup>3</sup> It seems the Jews look upon the Gentiles as if they differed specifically from them; as they do not search for the law of nature amongst sensitive beings, so neither amongst other nations.

But I had thought that the Jewish writers had promised the heathens an angel, an intelligence, to irradiate and illuminate them; and does he shine upon them no clearer? does he perform his office no better? The Jews told us, that they themselves were to inform them and instruct them; and have they taught them their lessons no better? They mentioned a voice that came to Adam and to Noah, and have they whispered it only in one another's ears? Why have they not proclaimed it to the rest of the world?

<sup>1</sup> Selden, *De Jure Heb.*

<sup>2</sup> Gentium sive omnium, sive complurium opiniones, mores, constitutiones, mensuræ apud Hebræos, in eo decernendo quod jus esse velint naturale, seu universale, locum habent nullum.

<sup>3</sup> Quemadmodum ex aliorum animantium actibus aut usu jus aliquod naturale disci, aut designari, nolunt Ebræi; ita neque ex aliarum, sive omnium sive plurimarum, gentium usu ac moribus, de jure naturali, seu hominum universali, decerni volunt.

How sad were the condition of the Gentiles, if they were to live upon the Jews' courtesy and benevolence; that would strip them of nature, plunder them of their essences, rob them of their first principles and common notions! But God has not left them like orphans to such unmerciful guardians. He himself has taken care of them, and has made better provision for them.

Now these several nations are to be considered, either in 'the common bulk and heap' of them, or else in 'the major part' of them, or in 'the noblest and most refined sort' amongst them.<sup>1</sup>

If we take them in the fullest universality of them, then that worthy author of our own says truly, 'It neither was in former ages, nor has it been up to our time, fully discovered by any one, either of what character, or how numerous these are or have been.'<sup>2</sup> Nor indeed is it at all material in respect of this, whether we know them or no; but having the formal consent of so many, and knowing that there is 'a like reason in the others,'<sup>3</sup> being that they have the same natural engagements and obligations upon them, we cannot justly distrust, but that if there should new nations, nay, if there should new worlds appear, that every rational nature amongst them would comply with, and embrace the several branches of this law; and as they would not differ in those things that are so intrinsical to sense, so neither in those that are essential to the understanding. As their corporeal eye would be able to distinguish between beauty and deformity, so their intellectual eye would as easily discern some goodness from some kind of wickedness.

<sup>1</sup> Οἱ πάντες and οἱ πολλοί, or οἱ εὐγενέστεροι and φρονιμώτεροι.

<sup>2</sup> Nec olim, nec hactenus, aut qualesnam, aut quot sint fuerint, est ab aliquo satis exploratum.

<sup>3</sup> Par ratio reliquorum.

But are there not many nations of them that live in the perpetual violation of nature's law? If you speak of the more capital letters of this 'written law,'<sup>1</sup> you find no nation so barbarous but that it can read them and observe them. I never heard of a nation apostatizing from common notions, from these first principles. But if you mean the whole context and coherence of nature's law, if you speak of those demonstrations that may be built upon these fundamental principles, of those kindly derivations and conclusions that flow from these fountain-notions; then this indeed must be granted, that it is the condemning sin of the heathen, that so many of them imprison this natural light,<sup>2</sup> and extinguish this 'candle of the Lord.'<sup>3</sup>

There are many wild and anomalous 'individuals'<sup>3</sup> amongst them; 'men quite barbarous, wild, and irrational,'<sup>4</sup> as Aristotle calls them; 'men ruined,'<sup>5</sup> as others term them; but are there not such also even amongst Jews? nay, amongst such as call themselves Christians, that are lapsed and fallen below themselves? Many natural precepts are violated even amongst them. Have you weeds, and briars, and thorns in a garden? no wonder then that you meet with more in a wilderness. Are there some prodigies in Europe? you may very well look for more monsters in Africa. Do Christians blur and blot the law of nature? no wonder then that an American seeks quite to raze it out. Does an Israelite put truth sometimes in prison? no wonder then that an Egyptian puts it in a dungeon. Yet, notwithstanding, amongst all those that have had so much culture and morality, as to knit, and embody, and compact themselves into a commonwealth, to

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>3</sup> Individua.

<sup>5</sup> Οἱ διεφθαρμένοι.

<sup>2</sup> Τὴν ἀληθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων.

<sup>4</sup> Οἱ πῶρῳ βάρβαροι, θηριώδεις, ἀλόγιστοι.

become 'regulated by a legal government,'<sup>1</sup> you will scarce find any nation that did generally and expressly, and for long continuance, either violate, or countenance the violation of any precept clearly natural.

This is that in which the learned Grotius satisfies himself, that 'all the more civilized and renowned nations'<sup>2</sup> gave due obedience and conformity to nature's law, so that all testimonies fetched from them are to have a high price and esteem put upon them.

But the famous Salmasius, in his late tractate *De Coma*, goes a far different way, and tells us that he had rather search for nature's law in a naked Indian, than in a spruce Athenian; in a rude American, rather than in a gallant Roman; in a mere Pagan, rather than in a Jew or Christian. His words are these, 'The more barbarous men are, the more happily and easily are they to be thought to follow Nature as their guide: the more polished nations turn her aside, or rather recede from her.'<sup>3</sup> Those nations that have more of art and improvement amongst them, have so painted Nature's face, have hung so many jewels in her ears, have put so many bracelets upon her hand; they have clothed her in such soft and silken raiment, as that you cannot guess at her so well as you might have done, if she had nothing but her own simple and neglected beauty. You cannot taste the wine so well, because they have put sugar into it, and have bribed your palate.

So that the learned Salmasius will scarce go about to fetch the law of nature from the Jews principally; you see he chooses to fetch it rather from a Scythian, from a bar-

<sup>1</sup> Τοῖς νόμοις ὑποκειμένοι.

<sup>2</sup> Omnes gentes moraliore et illustriore.

<sup>3</sup> Quanto magis barbari, tanto felicius faciliusque naturam ducem sequi putantur; eam detorquent, aut ab ea magis recedunt, politiores gentes.—An anticipation of Rousseau's theory.

barian; there he will see it without any glosses, without any superstructures, without any carving and gilding, a 'written law'<sup>1</sup> plainly written, without any flourishes and amplifications. Yet the author whom I but now commended, Salmasius I mean, neither could nor would go about to vindicate all those nations from some notorious rebellions against nature's law, but he would rather choose, as much as he could, to abstract their intellectuals from their practicals, and would look to their opinions and laws rather than to their life and conversation.

Indeed, Aristotle tells us, 'that many of the nations have a tendency to murder and cannibalism.'<sup>2</sup> That same phrase, 'have a tendency,'<sup>3</sup> does only speak a propensity and inclination in their vile affections to such wickednesses as these were; which sometimes also they acted in a most violent and impetuous manner. Though to be sure they could not be long a nation, if they did thus kill, and eat up, and devour one another.

But let us suppose that they dealt thus with their enemies, yet can it be shown us that they established anthropophagy<sup>4</sup> by a law? that their natural conscience did not check them for it? or, if their reason did connive at them, yet how comes it to pass that their angel did not jog them all this while, that their 'actuating reason'<sup>5</sup> did not restrain them?

But out of what antiquity doth it appear that any nation did favour atheism by a law? that any kingdom did license blasphemy by a statute, or countenance murder by a law? Out of what author can they show us a nation

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>2</sup> Πολλὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν πρὸς τὸ κτελεῖν καὶ ἀνθρωποφάγειαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει.—*Polit.*, lib. viii. p. 4; *Opera*, tom. ii. 1338. Bekker.

<sup>3</sup> Εὐχερῶς ἔχει.

<sup>4</sup> Cannibalism.

<sup>5</sup> Intellectus agens.

that ever did allow the breaches of solemn compacts, the dishonouring of parents; that ever made a law for this, that there should be no law or justice amongst them?

Till all this can appear, let the testimonies of Gentiles be esteemed somewhat more than the barking of dogs. Methinks, if they were mere cyphers, yet the Jews going before them, they might amount to somewhat. Let the prints of Nature in them be accounted sacred. A pearl in the head of a heathen, some jewels hid in the rubbish of nations, let them be esteemed precious. Whatsoever remains of God's image upon them, let it be loved and acknowledged. Their darkness and misery is great enough, let not us aggravate it, and make it more. To mix the light of their candle with that light which comes shining from the candle of a heathen, is no disparagement to Jew nor Christian.

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS A DERIVATIVE LIGHT.

Now the spirit of man is the 'candle of the Lord.' First, as 'a derivative light, a light from a light.'<sup>1</sup> Surely there is none can think that light is primitively and originally in the candle, but they must look upon that only as a weak participation of something that is more bright and glorious. All created excellency shines with borrowed beams, so that reason is but 'a spark of the Divine light';<sup>2</sup> it is but 'a faint breathing of the Divine breeze.'<sup>3</sup> This was the very end why God framed intellectual creatures, that He might communicate more of Himself to them than He could to other more drossy and inferior beings, and that they might in a more complete and circular manner, as the schoolmen speak, 'return into the bosom of the first and supreme cause,'<sup>4</sup> by such operations as should in some measure imitate and represent the working of God himself, who, being a most free and intellectual agent, would have some creature also, that should not only take notice of these His perfections, so as to adore and admire them, but should also partake of them, and should follow the Creator in His dispensations and workings, though still at an infinite distance and disproportion.

This moved Him to stamp upon some creatures under-

<sup>1</sup> Lumen derivatum—Φῶς ἐκ φωτός.

<sup>2</sup> Scintilla divinæ lucis.

<sup>3</sup> Divinæ particula auræ.

<sup>4</sup> Redire in principium suum.

standing and will, which in themselves make up one simple and entire print and signature of reason, though we break the seal for the better opening of them, and part them into two several notions. To this end He filled the highest part of the world with those stars of the first magnitude, I mean those orient and angelical beings, that dwell so near the fountain of light, and continually drink in the beams of glory, that are exactly conformable to their Creator in all His motions; for the same end He furnished and beautified this lower part of the world with intellectual lamps, that should shine forth to the praise and honour of His name, which totally have their dependence upon Him, both for their being, and for their perpetual continuation of them in their being. It was He that lighted up those lamps at first; it is He that drops 'the golden oil'<sup>1</sup> into them. Look then a while but upon the parentage and original of the soul and of reason, and you will presently perceive that it was 'the candle of the Lord.' And if you have a mind to believe Plato,<sup>2</sup> he will tell you such a feigned story as this: That there were a goodly company of lamps, a multitude of candles, a set number of souls lighted up altogether, and afterwards sent into bodies, as into so many dark lanterns. This stock and treasure of souls was reserved and cabined in I know not what stars, perhaps that they might the better calculate their own incarnation, the time when they were to descend into bodies; and when they came there they presently sunk into 'Hylé,'<sup>3</sup> they slipped into 'Lethé,'<sup>4</sup> which he terms 'the putting off of knowledge'<sup>5</sup> for a while, the clouding and burying of many sparkling and twinkling notions, till by a waking reminiscence, as by a joyful resurrection, they rise out of their

<sup>1</sup> הוהב.

<sup>2</sup> The reference seems to be, chiefly at any rate, to the *Phædo*, c. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Τλη—Matter. <sup>4</sup> Λήθη—Forgetfulness. <sup>5</sup> Ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολή.

graves again. Plato, it seems, looked upon the body as the blot of Nature, invented for the defacing of this 'written law,'<sup>1</sup> or at the best as an impertinent tedious parenthesis, that checked and interrupted the soul in her former notions, that eclipsed and obscured her ancient glory; which sprung from his ignorance of the resurrection, for had he but known what a glory the body was capable of, he would have entertained more honourable thoughts of it.

Yet Origen was much taken with this Platonical notion, it being indeed a pretty piece of philosophy for him to pick allegories out of. And though he do a little vary from Plato in a circumstance or two, yet in recompense of that he gives you this addition and enlargement, that according to the carriage and behaviour of these naked spirits before they were embodied, there were prepared answerable mansions for them. That such a soul as had walked with God acceptably, was put into a fairer prison, was clothed with an amiable and elegant body; but that soul which had displeased and provoked its Creator, was put into a darker dungeon, into a more obscure and uncomely body. That candle which had shined clearly, was honoured with a golden candlestick; that which had soiled its light, was condemned to a dark lantern. One would think by this that Origen had scarce read Genesis, he doth in this so contradict the sacred history of the creation. Nor is this the just product of Plato's opinion, but is pregnant with much more folly; he returns him his own with usury, gives him this as the just 'interest'<sup>2</sup> and improvement of it.

Aquinas doth clash in pieces all these Platonical fictions in his two books, *Contra Gentiles*; yet upon this sinking and putrid foundation was built the tottering superstructure of connate species.<sup>3</sup> For when Plato had laid down this error

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>2</sup> Τόκος.

<sup>3</sup> Ideas.

for a maxim, 'That the souls of men were long extant before they were born,'<sup>1</sup> then that other fancy did presently step in, 'That the soul was very speculative and contemplative before it was immersed in the body ;'<sup>2</sup> which made way for the next conceit, that the soul brought many of its old notions along with it into the body, many faithful attendants that would bear the soul company in her most withering condition, when other more volatile and fugitive notions took wing to themselves and flew away ; many a precious pearl sunk to the bottom of Lethe, but some relics of notions floated upon the top of the waters, and in the general deluge of notions, there was an ark prepared for some select principles, some 'precepts of the children of Noah,'<sup>3</sup> which were to increase, and multiply, and supply the wants of an intellectual world.

This makes the Platonists look upon the spirit of man as 'the candle of the Lord,' for illuminating and irradiating of objects, and darting more life upon them than it receives from them. But Plato, as he failed in corporeal vision, whilst he thought that it was 'by the sending out of rays,'<sup>4</sup> so he did not 'give up his error'<sup>5</sup> in his intellectual optics, but in the very same manner tells us that spiritual vision also is 'by the sending out of rays.'<sup>6</sup> And truly, he might as well fancy such implanted ideas, such seeds of light in his external eye, as such seminal principles in the eye of the mind. Therefore Aristotle, who did better clarify both these kinds of visions, plucked these motes out of the sensitive eye, and those beams out of the intellectual. He did not antedate his own knowledge, nor remember the several postures of his soul, and the

<sup>1</sup> Πριν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ.—*Phædo*.

<sup>2</sup> Ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> Præcepta Noachidarum.

<sup>5</sup> Ab errore suo recedere.

<sup>4</sup> Per extramissionem radiorum.

<sup>6</sup> Per emissionem radiorum.

famous exploits of his mind before he was born ; but plainly professed that his understanding came naked into the world. He shows you a 'blank sheet,'<sup>1</sup> a virgin soul espousing itself to the body, in a most entire, affectionate, and conjugal union ; and, by the blessing of Heaven upon this loving pair, he did not doubt of a notional offspring and posterity. This makes him set open the windows of sense, to welcome and entertain the first dawns, the early glimmerings of morning light.

. . . . . The windows it enters,  
Bright in the morning, and fills with its glory the crevices narrow.<sup>2</sup>

Many sparks and appearances fly from variety of objects to the understanding. The mind catches them all, and cherishes them, and blows them ; and thus the candle of knowledge is lighted. As he could perceive no connate colours, no pictures or portraitures in his external eye ; so neither could he find any signatures in his mind till some outward objects had made some impression upon his 'susceptible mind,'<sup>3</sup> his soft and pliable understanding impartially prepared for every seal. That this is the true method of knowledge, he doth appeal to their own eyes, to their own understandings. Do but analyze your own thoughts ; do but consult with your own breasts ; tell us whence it was that the light first sprang in upon you. Had you such notions as these when you first peeped into being ? at the

<sup>1</sup> Ἄγραφον γραμματεῖον—*Abrasa tabula*. This phrase has not been found in Aristotle, but the reference is probably to the following passage :—'Ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἔστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία οὐδὲν πρὶν ἂν νοῆ. Δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὡσπερ ἐν γραμματεῖῳ ὡ μὴθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. *De Anima*, lib. iii. p. 4 ; *Opera*, tom. ii. p. 1. Bekker.

<sup>2</sup> . . . . . *Clarum mane fenestras*

*Intrat, et angustas extendit lumine rimas.*

<sup>3</sup> Νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει.

first opening of the soul's eye? in the first 'beginning'<sup>1</sup> of infancy? Had you these connate 'ideas'<sup>2</sup> in the cradle? and were they rocked asleep with you? or did you then meditate upon these principles: 'The whole is greater than its part';<sup>3</sup> and 'Nothing can be, and not be, at the same time?'<sup>4</sup> Never tell us that you wanted organical dispositions, for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these lattices. Why else should not your candle enlighten you before? Who was it that chained up and fettered your common notions? Who was it that restrained and imprisoned your connate ideas? Methinks the working of a Platonist's soul should not at all depend on 'matter';<sup>5</sup> and why had you no connate demonstrations as well as connate principles? Let us but see a catalogue of all these truths you brought with you into the world. If you speak of the principles of the laws of nature, you shall hear the schoolmen determining,—'An infant, considering its state, is not bound by the law of nature, because it has not the use of reason and free-will.'<sup>6</sup> And a more sacred author says as much, 'The law of nature is the law of reason; which, however, boyhood is but partially acquainted with, and infancy knows not at all.'<sup>7</sup> There is some time to be allowed for the promulgation of nature's law by the voice of reason. They must have some time to spell the 'written law'<sup>8</sup> that was of reason's writing. The mind having such gradual and climbing accomplishments, doth strongly evince that the true rise of knowledge

<sup>1</sup> Exordium.<sup>2</sup> Species.<sup>3</sup> Totum est majus parte.<sup>4</sup> Nihil potest esse et non esse simul.<sup>5</sup> Τλη.<sup>6</sup> Infans pro illo statu non obligatur lege naturali, quia non habet usum rationis et libertatis.<sup>7</sup> Lex naturæ est lex intelligentiæ, quam tamen ignorat pueritia, nescit infantia.<sup>8</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

is from the observing and comparing of objects, and from thence extracting the quintessence of some such principles as are worthy of all acceptation; that have so much of certainty in them, that they are near to a tautology and identity; for this first principles are.

These are the true and genuine 'common notions';<sup>1</sup> these are the 'fundamental thoughts';<sup>2</sup> these are the props of reason's contriving, upon which you may see her leaning, about which you may see her turning and spreading, and enlarging herself. That learned knight,<sup>3</sup> in his discourse concerning the soul,<sup>4</sup> doth at large show the manner how the mind thus goes a gathering of knowledge; how like a bee it goes from flower to flower, from one entity to another; how it sucks the purest and sweetest of all; how it refuses all that is distasteful to it, and makes a pleasant composition of the rest; and thus prepares honeycombs for itself to feed on.

But if it were at all to be granted, that the soul had many stamps and characters upon it, that it had any implanted and engrafted 'ideas';<sup>5</sup> it were chiefly to be granted that it hath the connate notion of a Deity, that pure and infinitely refined entity, abstracted from all appearance of matter. But mark how the great doctor of the Gentiles convinces them of 'what may be known of God.'<sup>6</sup> He doth not set them a searching their connate species, but bids them look into the glass of the creatures. Oh but, might some Platonist say, why, He is all spirit and an invisible being,—what shall we find of Him amongst material objects? Yes, says the Apostle, 'The invisible things of God'<sup>7</sup> are made known by the things that do

Rom. i. 20.

<sup>1</sup> Κοιναι έννοιαι.<sup>2</sup> Λόγοι σπερματικοί.<sup>3</sup> Sir Kenelm Digby.<sup>4</sup> Printed at Paris, 1644.<sup>5</sup> Species.<sup>6</sup> Τὰ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.<sup>7</sup> Τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ Θεοῦ.

appear; for a being endowed with such a soul as man is, can easily, in a discursive way, by such eminent steps of second causes, ascend to some knowledge of a Prime and Supreme Being; which doth fully explain that he means by his 'written law'<sup>1</sup> those clear dictates of reason fetched from the several workings of the understanding, that have sealed and printed such a truth upon the soul; so that no other innate light, but only the power and principle of knowing and reasoning, is 'the candle of the Lord.'

Yet there is a noble author of our own,<sup>2</sup> that hath both his truth and his error, as he hath also written about both, who pleads much for his 'natural instincts,'<sup>3</sup> so as that at the first dash you would think him in a Platonical strain; but if you attend more to what he says, you will soon perceive that he prosecutes a far different notion, much to be preferred before the other fancy.

For he doth not make these instincts any connate ideas, and representations of things, but tells us that they are powers and faculties of the soul, the first-born faculties and beginning of the soul's strength, that are presently espoused to their virgin-objects, closing and complying with them long before discourse<sup>4</sup> can reach them; nay, with such objects as discourse cannot reach at all in such a measure and perfection; these instincts he styles 'gifts of nature, and a universal representation and admirable type of Divine Providence.'<sup>5</sup> Some of these are to be found in the lowest animate beings, which yet have no connate 'ideas'<sup>6</sup> among them; though they have powers and propension to

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Herbert. The works referred to are, *De Veritate*, published at Paris, 1624; and what soon followed it, *De Religione Gentilium, et Errorum apud eos Causis*; to which is appended, *De Religione Laici*.

<sup>3</sup> Instinctus naturales.

<sup>4</sup> Reasoning.

<sup>5</sup> Naturæ dotes, et Providentiæ Divinæ universalis idea et typus optimus.

<sup>6</sup> Species.

their own welfare, a blind tendency and inclination to their own security; for thus he speaks, 'That natural instinct, even when most imperfect, is wise for self-preservation;'<sup>1</sup> and such a noble being as man is must needs have it in a more sublime and eminent manner.

Therefore he terms these instincts in man, 'intellectual faculties, and powers resembling God;'<sup>2</sup> whereas those other inferior faculties are esteemed 'powers resembling the world.'<sup>3</sup> His words being somewhat cloudy, I shall thus paraphrase upon them: The soul is made with a through light, with a double window; at one window it looks upon corporeals, at the other it hath a fair prospect upon spirituals. When it takes notice of the material world, it looks out at the window of sense, and views 'the outward husks and shells of being;'<sup>4</sup> but not at all pleased or contented with them, those higher powers, those purer faculties of the soul, unclasp and disclose themselves, and extend themselves for receiving some delight more precious and satisfactory, being made in as harmonious proportion, suitable to spiritual objects, as the eye is to colours, or the ear to sounds. And, as you know, a corporeal eye is so fashioned and organized, that though it have no connate 'ideas'<sup>5</sup> of the sun, yet it is pleasant to behold it; so the eye of the soul doth willingly open itself to look upon God, 'as an object,'<sup>6</sup> and has all 'by reception'<sup>7</sup> from Him, fixing its eye upon so transcendent and beautiful an object, and viewing all those streamings out of light, those beamings out of eternal and universal notions, that flow from

<sup>1</sup> Instinctus ille naturalis, in quovis inarticulato licet et incauto elemento, sapiens est ad conservationem propriam.

<sup>2</sup> Facultates noëticæ, et facultates Deo analogæ.

<sup>3</sup> Facultates analogæ mundo.

<sup>4</sup> Putamina et cortices rerum.

<sup>5</sup> Species.

<sup>6</sup> Per modum objecti.

<sup>7</sup> Per receptionem.

Him as the Fountain of lights, where they have dwelt from everlasting, which now appear to it in time with a most powerful and enamouring ray, to direct the soul to that happiness it longed for, and to guide and conduct it in all its operations. If you ask when these highest faculties did first open and display themselves, he tells you, it is when they were stimulated and excited by outward objects; and it may be upon this account, that when the soul can find nothing there worthy one glance, one cast of its eye, impatient of such empty and shadowy sights, it opens itself to the 'things above,'<sup>1</sup> and warms itself in those everlasting sunbeams; but when it comes down from the mount, it puts on the veil of sense, and so converses with material objects.

Col. iii. 2.

Yet I do not here positively lay down this for a truth in all the branches of it, but only represent the mind of the fore-mentioned author, who himself doth acknowledge that the rise of these first principles is cryptical<sup>2</sup> and mysterious. His words are these: 'The fact of your not knowing how those common ideas are drawn forth, ought not to prove an obstacle; we have told you sufficiently before, that you are ignorant how taste, smell, touch, &c., begin to operate.'<sup>3</sup> By which you cannot but perceive, that he makes the conformity of such a faculty with such an object the spring and original of common notions. Yet this then had deserved a little clearing; whence the difficulty of understanding spirituals 'as such'<sup>4</sup> does arise, if there be such a present and exact analogy between them; whereas the intuitive knowledge of God, and viewing those goodly

<sup>1</sup> Τὰ ἄνω.<sup>2</sup> Secret.<sup>3</sup> Vos interea non morari debet, quod quomodo elicantur istæ notiæ communes nesciatis. Satis superque diximus vos nescire quomodo fiat gustus, odoratus, tactus, et cetera.<sup>4</sup> Pro hoc statu.

notions that are steeped in His essence, uses to be reserved as a privilege of a glorified creature. Yet this I suppose may be said, that herein is the soul's imperfection, that it cannot sufficiently attend both to spirituals and corporeals; and therefore, sense being so busy and importunate for the prosecution of her objects, no wonder that these noetical<sup>1</sup> faculties do faint and languish. So that if there be any whom the former discursive way will not suffice, it seems better for them to have recourse to an innate power of the soul that is fitted and fashioned for the receiving of spirituals 'as'<sup>2</sup> spirituals, than to fly to I know not what connate 'ideas,'<sup>3</sup> of I know not how long duration, before the soul was acquainted with the body. Yet that other noble author of our own,<sup>4</sup> that has the same title of truth, not without a competent mixture of error too, doth choose to resolve all into a Platonical remembrance, which yet that acute answerer of him<sup>5</sup> doth show to be a mere vanity; for as for matters of fact, to be sure they have no implanted ideas. And if historical knowledge may be acquired without them, why then should discursive knowledge have such a dependence upon them? And I wish that the Platonists would but once determine, whether a blind man be a competent judge of colours by virtue of his connate 'ideas,'<sup>6</sup> and whether by supply of these ideas

<sup>1</sup> Intellectual or discursive.<sup>2</sup> Quatenus.<sup>3</sup> Species.<sup>4</sup> Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, whom Milton so highly eulogizes in his *Areopagitica*. The title of the book referred to is, 'The Nature of Truth: its Union and Unity with the Soule, which is one in its Essence, Faculties, Acts: one with Truth.' Lond. 1641. 12mo.—See Walpole's *Noble and Royal Authors*. Park's edition, vol. ii. p. 341. Lond. 1806.<sup>5</sup> John Wallis, D.D., afterwards Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford; then minister of St. Gabriel's, Fenchurch, London. The answer was entitled, 'Truth Tried; or Animadversions on Lord Brooke's Treatise of the Nature of Truth.' Lond. 1643. 4to.—Aikin's *Gen. Biography*.<sup>6</sup> Species.

a deaf man may have the true notion of music and harmony? If not, then they must ingenuously confess, that the soul for the present wants so much of light, as it wants of the window of sense. But if they tell us that some outward objects must jog and waken these drowsy and slumbering notions, then they lay the foundation in sensitives; and withal let them show us, why the generality of men in their intellectuals are not equally improved, whereas they have the same objects to quicken and inflame them? In the meantime, we will look upon the understanding as 'a glass not prejudiced, nor prepossessed with any connate tinctures,'<sup>1</sup> but nakedly receiving, and faithfully returning, all such colours as fall upon it. Yet the Platonists in this were commendable, that they looked upon the spirit of a man as 'the candle of the Lord,' though they were deceived in the time when it was lighted.

Nor is this candle lighted out of the essence of God Himself. It were a far more tolerable error to make the light of a candle a piece of the sun's essence, than to think that this intellectual lamp is a particle of the Divine nature. There is but one 'brightness of His glory, and express image of His person,'<sup>2</sup> I mean the wonderful 'Word,'<sup>3</sup> not a candle, but a sun that shined from everlasting. But I find the Stoics challenged for this error, that they thought there was a real emanation and traduction of the soul out of God, 'out of the very essence of God';<sup>4</sup> and the Gnostics, the Manichees, and the Priscilianists, are looked upon as their successors in this folly.

Now, as for the Stoics, you will scarce find evidence enough to prove them guilty of this opinion. They have indeed some doting and venturing expressions, when they

<sup>1</sup> Speculum non coloratum.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτῆρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> Ὁ Λόγος.

<sup>4</sup> Ex ipsa Dei substantia.

Heb. i. 3.  
John i. 1.  
Prov. viii.  
22-31.

amplify and dignify the nobility of the soul; and will needs have some of the royal blood to run in every vein and faculty of it; nor are the Platonists defective in this, but lift up the soul to as high a pitch of perfection as the Stoics ever did; yet surely both of them but as a limited and dependent being infinitely remote from the fulness of a deity. Yet Simplicius, in his comment upon the grand Stoic, Epictetus, tells us, that that sect of philosophers were wont to call the soul 'a part, or limb of God';<sup>1</sup> which is a gross and corporeal conceit, not at all agreeable to the indivisibility of spirituals, nor suitable with the soul's immateriality, much less consistent with the transcendent purity of God himself. But the learned Salmasius, in his animadversions on both the fore-mentioned authors, though he spend paper enough in clearing some passages of the Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, concerning the nature of the soul; yet doth not in the least measure take notice of any such heterodox tenet among the Stoics; yet, if there had been any such, they had very well deserved animadversions; but he doth thus represent their philosophy to you: that whereas the soul is usually looked upon as 'tripartite,'<sup>2</sup> being branched out into the vegetative, sensitive, and rational; the Stoics chose to make it 'of eight parts,'<sup>3</sup> and would have 'seven parts serving,'<sup>4</sup> 'one commanding,'<sup>5</sup> which they reckoned thus: 'The perceptive faculties,'<sup>6</sup> they were five; then 'the vocal'<sup>7</sup> and 'the germinative,'<sup>8</sup> then 'the leading,'<sup>9</sup> which was all one with 'the reasoning,'<sup>10</sup> or 'the discursive,'<sup>11</sup> or 'the scientific.'<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Μέρος ἢ μέρος τοῦ Θεοῦ—Pars vel membrum Dei.—Διατριβ. i. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Τριμερής.

<sup>3</sup> Ὀκταμερής.

<sup>4</sup> Septem partes ancillantes.

<sup>5</sup> Imperatricem unicum.

<sup>6</sup> Τὰ αἰσθητικά.

<sup>7</sup> Τὸ φωνητικόν.

<sup>8</sup> Τὸ σπερματικόν.

<sup>9</sup> Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

<sup>10</sup> Τὸ λογικόν.

<sup>11</sup> Τὸ διανοητικόν.

<sup>12</sup> Τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν.

Yet as Plato and Aristotle, disposing the soul into three several ranks and distributions, would by no means allow of 'a triplicity of souls in one *compositum*,'<sup>1</sup> so neither would the Stoics admit any plurality of souls, but esteemed these, 'parts,'<sup>2</sup> or 'members of the soul,'<sup>3</sup> only as 'powers,'<sup>4</sup> 'not limbs but wits,'<sup>5</sup> as Tertullian terms them very significantly; styling the powers and faculties of the soul the several wits of the soul; so that it was but 'one essence with many powers,'<sup>6</sup> enlarging itself to the capacity and exigency of the body, but in such a manner as that it was 'distributed in an orderly manner, rather than hacked to pieces.'<sup>7</sup> The principal and hegemonical<sup>8</sup> power of the soul the Stoics situated in the heart, as Aristotle did, though very erroneously; and yet Plato had taught him better, for he placed it in the brain, as the proper tabernacle for reason to dwell in. But amongst the Stoics there are some expressions that seem to depress and degrade the soul, as much as others seem to advance and exalt it; for though some call it 'the part of God'<sup>9</sup>—the Divine part, yet others, and among the rest Zeno, the great founder of that sect, terms it 'connate breath,'<sup>10</sup> and 'a hot breath,'<sup>11</sup> which that stupid author of the soul's mortality, finding somewhere translated into English, catches at, and tells us that the Stoics hold the soul to be a certain blast, hot and fiery, or the vital spirit of the blood; whereas, at the most, they did only choose that corporeal spirit as 'a chariot for a more triumphant spirit to ride in,'<sup>12</sup> the prin-

<sup>1</sup> Τριψυχία.

<sup>2</sup> Τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς.

<sup>3</sup> Non membra sed ingenia.—*De Anima*, cap. xiv.

<sup>4</sup> Μία οὐσία πολυδύναμος.

<sup>5</sup> Dispensata potius quam concisa.—Tertullian, *ut sup.*

<sup>6</sup> Governing.

<sup>7</sup> Τὸ μέρος τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>8</sup> Θερμὸν πνεῦμα.

<sup>9</sup> Τὰ μέρη.

<sup>10</sup> Αἱ δυνάμεις.

<sup>11</sup> Σύμφυτον πνεῦμα.

<sup>12</sup> Vehiculum animæ.

cipal seat of the soul, which they did so much extol and deify. It is abundantly clear, that their Stoical philosophy was more refined and clarified, more sublime and extracted from matter, than to resolve the quintessence of a rational nature into I know not what muddy and feculent spirit. This they could not do, if they would be faithful and constant to their own principles. Nay, they were so far from thus vilifying the soul, and detracting from it, as that they were rather excessive and hyperbolic in praising it above the sphere of a creature. Thus that known Stoic, Epictetus, calls the soul of man 'akin to the Deity,'<sup>1</sup> which Seneca renders, 'A free soul is akin to the gods,'<sup>2</sup> and Arrian, in his comment upon the fore-mentioned author, doth thus diffuse and amplify it: 'There is a connexion and coherence of souls with a deity; there are mutual touches and embraces between them; they are some delibations and participations of himself.'<sup>3</sup> Thus that famous emperor, M. Antoninus, that had tasted of the Stoical philosophy, styles the soul, 'The genius that Zeus has given to each as chief and leader,—a fragment of himself: this is each one's intellect and reason.'<sup>4</sup> Where, at the first, one would think he had meant it in an Averroistical sense, but that he himself doth prevent the interpretation, by telling you that he intends nothing else but 'intellect and reason,'<sup>5</sup> which therefore he

<sup>1</sup> Συγγενης θεῶ.—*Διατριβ.* i. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Liber animus est Diis cognatus.—*Ep.* 31, *ad fin. de Consolatione ad Helviam*. xi.

<sup>3</sup> Αἱ ψυχαὶ οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μέρη οὐσαι, καὶ ἀποσπασμάτα.—Arrian, *Διατριβ.* Epict., vol. i. p. 81. Lond. 1741.

<sup>4</sup> Ὁ δαίμων ἐν ἐκάστῳ προστάτην, καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν . . . ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ· οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος.—Antonin. τὰ εἰς ἑαυτὸν, lib. v. sect. 27, p. 46. Glas. 1744.

<sup>5</sup> Νοῦς καὶ λόγος. The distinction referred to is fully discussed by Sir William Hamilton, in his edition of Reid, pp. 768, 769.

calls 'the genius,'<sup>1</sup> because that he knew the soul was separable from the body; and Pythagoras long before him had called it by the same name in his golden verses.<sup>2</sup>

But amongst all the rest, Seneca is the most high and lofty in magnifying, and very near deifying, of the soul; for thus you may hear him speak: 'What less title can you give the soul, than that of a god condescending to dwell in a house of clay?'<sup>3</sup> which is too near that of the Apostle,

<sup>1</sup> Tim. iii. 16. 'God manifested in the flesh.'<sup>4</sup> Nor yet was this any unwary passage that slipped from Seneca's pen on the sudden, but he will stand to it; for thus he saith again, 'Reason is nothing else than a portion of the Divine Spirit merged in a human body.'<sup>5</sup> From this last speech, that learned and eminent writer of our own doth endeavour to evince, that Seneca made God the actuating 'active intellect'<sup>6</sup> of the soul; whereas it is very evident, that this philosopher only prosecuted that stoical notion of the soul being 'a shred of God,'<sup>7</sup> 'a branch of a deity.'<sup>8</sup> Yet, notwithstanding, all these strains of stoical philosophy do not sufficiently declare that they thought the soul to be of the very same essence with God himself, but only that they perceived much similitude between the soul and a deity; many bright resemblances of God stamped upon it, which is not only sound philosophy, but good divinity too; that the soul was made according to the image of its Creator. Thus they made it not only 'a hot breath,'<sup>9</sup> but even 'the breath of a deity,'<sup>10</sup> 'stamped

<sup>1</sup> Ὁ Δαίμων.

<sup>2</sup> V. 62, p. 334. Lond. 1654.

<sup>3</sup> Quid aliud vocas animum, quam Deum in humano corpore hospitantem? Epist. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθεὶς.

<sup>5</sup> Ratio nil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars Divini spiritus mersa.

<sup>6</sup> Intellectus agens.

<sup>7</sup> Ἀπόσπασμα τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>8</sup> Πεπλασμένον ἐκ Διὸς ἔρνος.

<sup>9</sup> Θερμὸν πνεῦμα.

<sup>10</sup> Θεῖον πνεῦμα.

with the seal of God himself,<sup>1</sup> as Philo speaks. It was 'a partaker of the Divine splendour,'<sup>2</sup> as Damascen calls it; very agreeable to this of Solomon, 'the candle of the Lord.' It is the 'rational work,' as Gregory of Nyssa has it, 'The poem of God himself';<sup>3</sup> that whereas other creatures were as it were writ in prose, the souls of men were composed more harmoniously, in more exact number and measure.

No wonder, then, that the Stoics, spying out such spiritual workmanship and embroidery in the soul of man, did esteem it as an inferior kind of deity, a bud and blossom of divinity. As they meant by their 'parts of the soul'<sup>4</sup> nothing but 'the powers or faculties,'<sup>5</sup> so likewise when they call the soul 'the part of God,'<sup>6</sup> they need intend no more than the Pythagoreans do by their 'divine virtue and efficacy'<sup>7</sup> which the soul has, that makes it look so like its Creator. Thus the Pythagoreans were wont to call the higher region of the soul 'the divine';<sup>8</sup> and the lower, 'the brutal';<sup>9</sup> not understanding by the first any particle of a deity, though it may be by the last they might understand the soul of a beast, by virtue of their supposed 'transmigration of souls.'<sup>10</sup>

But I meet with none that doth so punctually and accurately determine this as Trismegistus does, who speaks so exactly as if he had spied out this difficulty and objection. His words are these: 'The soul was not framed and carved out of the essence of a deity, but it rather sprang from the dilatation and diffusion of His power and good-

<sup>1</sup> Σημειωθὲν καὶ τυπωθὲν σφραγίδι τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> Μετοχή τῆς Δελας ἐλλάμψεως.

<sup>3</sup> Ποίημα Θεοῦ λογικόν.

<sup>4</sup> Αἱ δυνάμεις.

<sup>5</sup> Θεία δύναμις.

<sup>6</sup> Τὸ θηριώδες.

<sup>4</sup> Τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς.

<sup>6</sup> Τὸ μέρος τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>8</sup> Τὸ Δεῖον.

<sup>10</sup> Μετεμψύχωσις.

ness, as beams do from the sun, when it spreads forth its quickening and cherishing wings.<sup>1</sup> Yet, when you hear the creatures often styled beams of a deity, and drops of a deity, you must neither imagine that there is the least division, or diminution, or variation in the most immutable essence of God; nor that the creature does partake the very essence of the Creator, but that it hath somewhat of His workmanship obvious and visible in it, and which, according to the degree of its being, doth give fainter or brighter resemblances of its Creator. As, suppose an accurate painter should bestow much of his skill in drawing a lively portraiture of himself, you would not think such a picture a piece of his essence; but you would look upon it only as the fruit and product of his skill, and as a witty imitation of himself. Now there is a far greater disproportion between God and any created being, than between the face and the picture of it: so that if you see any heavenly beauty, any Divine lineaments sparkling in the soul, you may presently conclude that it was 'the finger of God,'<sup>2</sup> nay, the *hand* of God, that drew them there, as the shadowy representations of His own most glorious being. It is the greatest honour that a creature is capable of, to be the picture of its Creator. You know the very formality of creation doth speak a being raised 'out of nothing';<sup>3</sup> creation being the production of something out of the barren womb of nothing; and if the creature must be 'out of nothing pre-existent,'<sup>4</sup> then to be sure it is not extracted out of the essence of God Himself.

<sup>1</sup> Ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποτετμημένος ἐκ τῆς οὐσιότητος τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἠπλωμένος καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς.—Ποιμανθ. c. 12, 1; tom. i. p. 32. Colon. 1630.

<sup>2</sup> *Digitus Dei.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ex nihilo.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ex nullo præ-existente.*

But the whole generality of the ancient heathen philosophers had a veil upon their face here. They had not a clear and open sight of the creation, but only some obscure and imperfect notions about it, which made them think that all corporeals were made 'out of some pre-existent material,'<sup>1</sup> co-existent with the Prime and Supreme Efficient; and because they could not fetch spirituals out of materials, nor yet conceive that they should be fetched out of nothing, this made them determine that they sprang out of the essence of God himself, who, as a voluntary fountain, could bubble them forth when He pleased; who, as a 'Father of lights,' could sparkle and kindle them when He thought best. But that fiction of 'eternal matter'<sup>2</sup> will do them no service at all; for either it was produced by God himself, and then it was created 'from nothing'<sup>3</sup> (for God himself was a pure immaterial spirit, and therefore must make matter where none was before); or else it was an independent eternal being, which makes it another deity, and that involves a flat repugnancy. Therefore, as corporeal and material beings were raised out of nothing, by the infinite vigour and power of God himself, so He can with the very same facility produce spiritual beings out of nothing too. Can He not as well light this lamp out of nothing, as build the goodly fabric of the world out of nothing? Cannot a creating breath make a soul, as well as a creating word make a world? He that can create the shell of corporeals, cannot He as well create the kernel of spirituals? He that created a visible sun, cannot he as well create an invisible, an intellectual spark? You may hear Aquinas disputing against the Gentiles, and most fully and strongly demonstrating, that God could not be either the 'matter'<sup>4</sup> or 'form'<sup>5</sup> of

<sup>1</sup> *Ex aliqua præjacente materia.*

<sup>2</sup> *Materia ab eterno.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ex nihilo.*

<sup>4</sup> *Materia.*

<sup>5</sup> *Forma.*

Rom. ix. 21.

any created being; for it is not imaginable how the Creator himself should 'enter into the essence of a creature.'<sup>1</sup> But his causality is, by way of efficiency, producing and maintaining beings. The best of creatures are but 'a potter's vessels.'<sup>2</sup> Now, a vessel, though 'a vessel of honour,' yet is no piece of the potter's essence, but only the subject of his power and will. One and the same seal may print all the wax that is possible, yet there will not be the least mutation in the seal, but only in the wax; nor yet doth the wax at all participate of the seal's essence, but only receives a stamp and signature made upon it. So that the seal was as entire and complete before it had imprinted the wax, as it was afterwards; and though all the signatures of the wax were defaced and obliterated, yet the seal would be as perfect as before.

Thus God, though He leaves prints of Himself upon all the souls in the world, nay, upon all the beings in the world, yet these impressions are not particles of Himself, nor do they make the least mutation in Him, only in the creature; for He was as full and perfect before He had printed any one creature; and if the whole impression of creatures were annihilated, yet His essence were the same, and He could print more when He pleased, and as many as He pleased. Yet all the entity, goodness, and reality that is to be found in the creature, was totally derived from Him, and is transcendently treasured up in Him, as the print of the wax, though it be really different from the print of the seal;—yet that very stamp and signature had its being from the seal; it was virtually and originally in the seal, and now gives some resemblance of it. All created goodness was 'produced and exemplified by God,'<sup>3</sup> as the schools speak, though not very elegantly. It is

<sup>1</sup> *Ingressi essentiam creaturæ.*<sup>2</sup> *Vasa figuli.*<sup>3</sup> *A Deo producta, et a Deo exemplata.*

'preserved by, and ordained for God';<sup>1</sup> yet all this while it has nothing of the essence of a deity; and, indeed, it cannot have any of His essence, unless it have all of it. He that calls the creature a drop in such a sense, may as well call it a fountain; he that thus terms it a ray of divinity, may as well call it a sun, for there are no particles in essentials. All essence is indivisible,—how much more the essence of God himself?

How fond is the fancy of a semi-deity! Away with the Stoic's 'parts and fragments'<sup>2</sup> here, if this be the meaning of them. Who ever heard of fragments in spirituals? Dares therefore any absolutely deify the soul? or make it co-essential or co-equal with God himself? Is not the soul a limited and restrained being? short and imperfect in its operations, a dependent and precarious being? and are these things agreeable to a deity? Is not the soul naturally united to the body for the quickening and informing of it? and is that a condition fit for a deity? nay, are not many souls guilty, defiled, miserable beings? and are they all this while spangles of a deity? They must have very low and dishonourable thoughts of God, that make any creature partner or sharer with Him in His essence; and they must have high and swelling thoughts of the creature. How proud is that soul that aspires to be a god? Is it not enough for a soul to approach unto his God, to see His face, to enjoy His presence, to be like unto Him, to be knit unto Him, in love and affection? Happiness doth advance a creature to its just perfection, but it doth not lift it above the sphere of its being. A glorified being is still a subservient and finite being. A soul, when in its full brightness, yet still is but 'the candle of the Lord. Let it come as near as it can, yet it will be infinitely

<sup>1</sup> *A Deo conservata, et in Deum ordinata.*<sup>2</sup> *Τὰ μέρη καὶ ἀποσπάσματα.*

distant from Him. Heaven doth not mix and blend essences together, but keeps them all in their just beauty and proportions; so that take a creature in what condition you will, and it is not the least particle of a deity.

There is another error, but it is scarce worth mentioning, of some that would have 'the candle of the Lord' lighted up by angels, as if they had created the soul. Nay, the Carpocratians thought that all the rest of the world was created by them. But as no secondary being could create itself, so neither can it create any other being. It was no angelical breath, but the breath of a deity, that gave life to the soul; and it was not made after the image of an angel, but of God himself. Angels and souls both came from the same almighty 'Father of spirits,' from the same glorious 'Father of lights,' who showed the greatness of His power in raising such goodly beings, not out of Himself, but out of nothing.

Whether, ever since the first creation, the souls of men be lighted in the same manner immediately by God himself, by that commanding and efficacious word—'Let there be light;'<sup>1</sup> 'let there be an intellectual lamp set up in such a creature;' or whether it be lighted by the parents, whether one soul can light another, whether one and the same soul may be lighted by two, as a candle is lighted by two; these are the several branches of that great question, which hath been frequently vexed and discussed, but scarce ever quieted and determined. The divines favour the way of creation, the physicians that of traduction. Nay, Galen tells in plain terms, that the soul is but 'a mere temper or complexion, the right tuning of the body;'<sup>2</sup> which is not far distant from the fiddler's<sup>3</sup> opinion

<sup>1</sup> אור יהי—Γενήθητω φῶς.

<sup>2</sup> Κράσις τοῦ σώματος.—Medd. Græc., Opera, Hulm. vol. iv. p. 785.

<sup>3</sup> Aristoxenus.

that Tully speaks of, that would needs have the soul to be a harmony.<sup>1</sup> His soul played him some lessons, and his body danced to them. And, indeed, some of the physicians are as loath as he was 'to depart from their own art;'<sup>2</sup> and therefore they do embody the soul as much as they can, that their skill may extend to the happiness and welfare of it, as if they could feel the pulse of the soul, and try experiments upon the spirits; as if they could soften and compose the paroxysm of the mind, and cure all the languors and distempers of the soul; as if their drugs would work upon immaterial beings; as if they could kill souls as fast as they can kill bodies; as if 'the candle of the Lord' did depend upon these prolongers; as though the lamp would go out, unless they pour in some of their oil into it. No doubt but there is a mutual communion and intercourse between this friendly and espoused pair—the soul and body; no doubt but there is a loving sympathy and fellow-feeling of one another's conditions; but it is not so strong and powerful as that they must both live and die together.

Yet I speak not this as though the maintaining of the soul's traduction did necessarily prejudice the immortality of it; for I know there are many learned doctors amongst them, and Seneca among the rest, that are for the soul's beginning in a way of generation, and yet do detest and abominate the least thoughts of its corruption. Nay, some sacred writers contend for the soul's traduction, who yet never questioned the perpetuity of it; not only the African Father Tertullian, but most of the Western Churches also; and the opinion of Apollinaris and Nemesius,<sup>3</sup> that one spiritual being might propagate another, I have not yet found sufficiently disproved, though it be generally reprehended.

<sup>1</sup> Tusc. Disp. i. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Ab arte sua discedere.

<sup>3</sup> Note N.

The truth is, the original of all forms is 'very latent and mysterious';<sup>1</sup> yet the naturalists must needs acknowledge thus much, that the matter and form of everything must have at least an incomplete being before generation; for by that they do not receive any new absolute entity, for then it would be a creation; but the parts are only collected, and disposed, and united by a strong and Gordian knot, by an inward continuity. So that in all such production 'the matter springs from the matter, and form from the form of the producer';<sup>2</sup> and thus forms are continued according to that degree of being which they had in the first creation.

Now, why there should not be such a 'handing over of the lamp'<sup>3</sup> in the souls of men, will not easily be shown; the nobility and purity of the soul doth not at all hinder this, for there is a proportionable eminency in the soul that doth produce it. One soul prints another with the same stamp of immortality that itself had graven upon it; but if any question how an immaterial being can be conveyed in such a seminal way, let him but show us the manner by which it is united to the body, and we will as easily tell him how it entered into it.

Yet Jerome was so zealous against this, that he pronounceth a present anathema to all such as hold the soul to be 'by propagation.'<sup>4</sup> But Augustine was a great deal more calm and pacate; nay, indeed, he was in this point 'in a kind of equipoise and neutrality';<sup>5</sup> and therefore with a gentle breath he did labour to fan and cool the heat of Jerome's opinion; and putting on all mildness and moderation, plainly confesses, 'that neither by reading,

<sup>1</sup> In profundo.

<sup>2</sup> Materia oritur ex materia, et forma ex forma generantis.

<sup>3</sup> Traditio lampadis.

<sup>4</sup> Ex traduce.

<sup>5</sup> 'Αμφιδοξος και διχογνωμων.

nor prayer, nor reflection, had he been able to discover how the doctrine of original sin could be maintained at the same time with that of the distinct creation of souls.'<sup>1</sup> It seems he could not solve all those difficulties which the Pelagians raised against original sin, unless he held the traduction of the soul. He could not perceive how the candle should be so soiled, if it were lighted only by a pure sunbeam fetched from heaven.

Yet that knot, which so skilful and laborious a hand could not untie, some others have easily cut asunder; and indeed there is no such cogency and prevalency in that argument, as can justly promise itself the victory. For the schoolmen, that are strong asserters of the soul's creation, do satisfy all such doubts as these. And the major part of modern writers do incline to this, that these lamps are lighted by God himself, though some indeed do 'defer judgment,'<sup>2</sup> and will determine nothing, as the acute Pemble does, among the rest, in his little tractate *De Origine Formarum*; and so doth that learned knight,<sup>3</sup> in his late discourse of the soul, where he doth only drop one brief passage that countenances the soul's traduction, upon which he that pretends to answer him takes occasion to huddle up no less than twenty arguments against it, which sure he should reckon by number, and not by weight. But that Oxford answerer of that brutish pamphlet of *The Soul's Mortality*, doth more solidly and deliberately handle the question;<sup>4</sup> yet being very vehement and intense for the soul's creation, he slips into this error, that the traduction of the soul is inconsistent with the immortality of it.

<sup>1</sup> Se neque legendo, neque orando, neque ratiocinando invenire potuisse, quomodo cum creatione animarum peccatum originale defendatur.

<sup>2</sup> 'Ερέχειν.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Kenelm Digby.

<sup>4</sup> Of the author and answerer of this 'brutish pamphlet,' I have discovered no trace.—*Ed.*

But it may be you had rather hear the votes and suffrages of those ancient heathen writers, that had nothing to see by but 'the candle of the Lord;' perhaps you would willingly know what their souls thought of themselves. You will believe Nature, the universal mother, if she tell you who is the father of spirits. We will begin with Pythagoras, and he tells you his mind freely and fully, whilst he gives you that piece of leaf-gold in one of his verses:—

' . . . . Courage! divine descent have we mortals.'<sup>1</sup>

Aratus is in the very same strain, and was honoured so far as to be quoted by an Apostle for it, 'For we are also his offspring.'<sup>2</sup> But if these seem somewhat more generally, not exactly pointing out at the soul, the Chaldee oracle will speak more punctually,

'These things the Father devised, and from Him man received his spirit.'<sup>3</sup>

The Father of spirits, by his thought and word, by his commanding breath, did kindle this lamp of the soul, for the quickening and illuminating of such a noble creature.

Zoroaster pours it out more at large, and does thus dilate and amplify it: 'O soul,' says he, 'why dost thou not aspire, and mount up to the centre and light of glory, to that fountain of beams and brightness, from whence thou wert derived, and sent down into the world, clothed and apparelled with such rich and sparkling endowments?'<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> . . . . Θάρσει, θεῖον γένος ἐστὶ βροτοῖσι.—*Aur. Pyth.* 63.

<sup>2</sup> Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

<sup>3</sup> Ταῦτα πατὴρ ἐνόησε, βρότος δὲ οὐ ἐψύχωτο.

<sup>4</sup> Χρὴ δὲ σπεύδειν πρὸς τὸ φῶς, καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς αὐγὰς.

Ἐνθεν ἐπέμθη σοι ψυχὴ πολὺν ἐσσαμένη νοῦν.

The consideration of this made the divine Trismegistus break into that pang of admiration, 'What womb is fit to bear a soul? Who is fit to be the father of the soul? What breast is able to nourish a soul? Who can make sufficient provision for a soul, but only that pure and invisible Spirit'<sup>1</sup> that shoots them, and darts them into bodies by His own almighty power? And as the fore-mentioned author goes on, 'God, the Father of being, the Father of life and nature, did frame and fashion man like Himself, and love him as His proper offspring;'<sup>2</sup> for those words of his, 'like to Himself,'<sup>3</sup> must be taken in an allayed and tempered sense; for they must by no means be understood of an equality, but only of a similitude. In the very same sense, he calls God 'the painter and trimmer'<sup>4</sup> of the soul; thus representing Himself to the life.

As for the mind of the Platonists and the Stoics, we have before acquainted you with it. The one looks so high, as if a creation would scarce content them, unless they may have it 'from eternity;'<sup>5</sup> and the other seems to plead for a traduction and generation of the soul, not from the parents, but from God himself, which makes Epictetus so often mention the affinity and consanguinity of the soul with the Deity; and to use such words as these, 'If the philosophers speak truth, when they tell us how near akin the soul is to God; why then doth such a soul straiten and confine itself? why doth it contract and imprison so vast an essence? why does it look upon some spot of ground, with such a partial and peculiar affection? why doth it love the smoke of its earthly country?'<sup>6</sup> why does

<sup>1</sup> Ποῖα μήτηρ, ποῖος πατὴρ εἰ μὴ Θεὸς ἀφανής.

<sup>2</sup> Ὁ δὲ πάντων πατὴρ ὁ νοῦς ὡν ζωὴ καὶ φύσις, ἀπεκύησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτῷ ἴσον, οὐ ἠράσθη ὡς ἰδίου τόκου.

<sup>3</sup> Τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτῷ ἴσον.

<sup>5</sup> Ab eterno.

<sup>4</sup> Ὁ ζωγράφος.

<sup>6</sup> Καπνὸν ἐπιθρόσσκοντα.

it not rather warm itself in the flame of its heavenly original? why does such a one style himself an Athenian, a Corinthian, a Lacedemonian? why does he not rather think that he hath a whole world within him? why does he not sum up all his happiness in this great and honourable title, that he is the Son of God?<sup>1</sup> and thus you see 'the man of the world'<sup>2</sup> will be the same with Socrates's 'citizen of the world.'<sup>3</sup>

Thus Philo, the Jew, too Stoical in this, calls souls 'brightnesses';<sup>4</sup> which is the very same title that the Apostle applies to God himself; and Plotinus gives as much to the soul as the Arians did to Christ, for he calls it 'of the same essence,'<sup>5</sup> which Plato styled 'having the same name as immortals';<sup>6</sup> but Epictetus, he goes on to keep 'the tokens of God,'<sup>7</sup> much in the language of the oracle, 'the paternal intellect scattered tokens in our souls.'<sup>8</sup> By 'the paternal mind,'<sup>9</sup> it can mean nothing else but God himself, the 'Father of spirits;' and these

Heb. i. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Εὰν ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τὰ περὶ τῆς συγγενείας τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, διὰ τί μὴ εἴη τις ἑαυτὸν κόσμον; διὰ τί μὴ νῦν τοῦ Θεοῦ.—Διατριβ. i. 9. The words will pass currently in the sense given above; but yet, if we may take the liberty of a conjecture, I am ready to think that the first negative particle doth intrude itself too unseasonably, against the drift and meaning of the place, and therefore is to be refused and rejected; so that were the words printed thus διὰ τί μὴ εἴη τις ἑαυτὸν κόσμον read διὰ τί εἴη τις ἑαυτὸν κόσμον, then they will run thus, 'Why doth he think himself a worldling; why doth he measure himself by earth, if he were born of heaven?' where yet the philosopher ascribes that to the first 'generation' (γένεσις), which is due only to the 'regeneration' (παλιγγενεσία), to be called a son of God; nay, which indeed is due only to the 'generation from eternity' (ἀειγενεσία) of the only begotten Son of God.—*Author's Note.*

<sup>2</sup> Ὁ κόσμος.<sup>4</sup> Ἀπαντάσματα.<sup>6</sup> Ἀθανάτοις ὁμώνυμον.<sup>8</sup> Σύμβολα πατρικὸς νοῦς ἐσπερε ταῖς ψυχαῖς.<sup>9</sup> Πατρικὸς νοῦς.<sup>3</sup> Κοσμοπολίτης.<sup>5</sup> Ὀμοούσιον.<sup>7</sup> Τὰ σύμβολα τοῦ Θεοῦ.

'tokens'<sup>1</sup> are such love-tokens as He has left with the sons of men to engage their affections to Him. These symbols are the very same which Moses calls the image of God; those representations of Himself which He has scattered and sown in the being of man, as this word 'sow'<sup>2</sup> does imply, which made the wise Grecian, Thales, conclude, 'That all men were brethren born of the same Supreme Being, that did educate and instruct them.'<sup>3</sup> This teaching is the same which the Persian Magi called a Divine inebriation;<sup>4</sup> it was replete 'with divine excellencies.'<sup>5</sup> You see, then, that the joint consent of the Chaldeans, Egyptians, Persians, Grecians, was for the creation of the soul; and if you desire more testimonies from them, you may consult with Eugubinus,<sup>6</sup> in his learned work *De Perenni Philosophia*, where you shall meet with whole heaps of them.

Gen. i. 27.

But as for Aristotle's opinion, you know that his custom was, when he could not beat out a notion into a rational account, fairly to pass it by, and not to piece it out with such fabulous inventions as Plato did abound withal; and though it is like he did often dispute this question in his thoughts, yet he makes no solemn entrance upon it in his works, but only toucheth it occasionally, and scatters a passage or two that seem very clearly to acknowledge the creation of the soul. For, not to speak of the place in his *Morals* where he calls the soul 'the mind very much akin to the gods,'<sup>7</sup> I shall only commend unto you those full and pregnant words in his two books, *De Generatione Animalium*—the words are these: 'It remains for the mind

<sup>1</sup> Τὰ σύμβολα.<sup>2</sup> Σπείρειν.<sup>3</sup> Ἀδελφοὺς εἶναι ἡμᾶς ὡς τοῦ ἐνὸς Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐνὸς διδασκάλου.<sup>4</sup> Θεῶν μεμέθυσται.<sup>5</sup> Τῶν θεῶν καλῶν.<sup>6</sup> Note O.<sup>7</sup> Τὸν νοῦν τοῖς θεοῖς συγγενέστατον.

alone to enter from without, and alone to be divine.<sup>1</sup> He had but a little before evinced, that the sensitive and vegetative souls were conveyed in a seminal way; like a couple of sparks, they were struck 'from the power of matter';<sup>2</sup> but, says he, the rational, that came 'from a higher place';<sup>3</sup> as Seneca speaks, the window of heaven was opened, and a present light sprang in, for the completing of those former rudiments and preparations; the misunderstanding of this 'mind from without,'<sup>4</sup> did, it may be, occasion, but it did at least corroborate the fancy of an angel's being an 'actuative intellect';<sup>5</sup> yet Simplicius, that known interpreter of Aristotle, does expound it of the soul's creation, 'For the soul is said to be enlightened by God,'<sup>6</sup> as he speaks. And this which Aristotle here calls 'the mind from without,'<sup>7</sup> Psellus,<sup>8</sup> the philosopher, styles 'the mind from above,'<sup>9</sup> Plato termed it 'a plant, not of earth but of heaven';<sup>10</sup> the Sibyl called it 'a fiery mind';<sup>11</sup> some other, 'an intelligent and incorporeal fire';<sup>12</sup> still conspiring with this of Solomon's, 'the candle of the Lord.'

Seneca, setting aside his Stoicism, has very gallant and brave apprehensions of the soul's nobility, and tells us that it was 'a draught from the Divine spring';<sup>13</sup> which Tully thus varies, 'A nosegay plucked from the Divine mind.'<sup>14</sup> Souls, like so many flowers, were cropped and gathered out

<sup>1</sup> Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον.

<sup>2</sup> Ex potentia materiae.

<sup>3</sup> Θύραθεν—Ex altiori sede.

<sup>4</sup> Ὁ νοῦς θύραθεν.

<sup>5</sup> Intellectus agens.

<sup>6</sup> Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ ἐλλάμπασθαι λέγεται.

<sup>7</sup> Ὁ νοῦς θύραθεν.

<sup>8</sup> Note P.

<sup>9</sup> Ὁ νοῦς ἀνωθεν.

<sup>10</sup> Φυτόν, οὐκ ἐκ γειῶν, ἀλλ' οὐράνιον.

<sup>11</sup> Πύρινον νοῦν.

<sup>12</sup> Νοερόν καὶ ἀσώματον πῦρ.

<sup>13</sup> Haustus ex Divina origine.—Seneca Rhetor. *Suasoria*. vi.; Opera, p. 34. Bipont. 1810.

<sup>14</sup> Ex mente Divina decerptus.

of the garden of God, and were bound up 'in the bundle of the living.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> San.  
xxv. 29.

And if ye will but attend to the noble orator and philosopher, you shall hear him thus pleading for the soul's divinity: 'It is in vain to look for the soul's parentage upon earth, for there is no mixing and blending of spirituals with corporeals; the earth doth not contribute for the fixing and consolidating of them; it is no airy puff will suffice for the swiftness and nimbleness of their motion; no drops of water will quench their thirst and longings; they have a purer light and heat than could ever be fetched from an elementary spark. In those humble and sordid beings there is nothing fit to represent, much less to produce, the clasping and retentive power of memory, the masculine and vigorous working of the mind, the refined and comprehensive virtue of those thoughts that can recall and look back to things past; that can interpret and comment upon all present objects, and with a prophetic glance can spy out futurities and possibilities, which are works not unworthy of a deity. Nor can it ever be shown that such rare privileges should be communicated to human nature any other way, than by the immediate bounty and indulgence of Heaven; there being such singular and inimitable idioms in the mind of man, as could never be extracted from those ordinary and vulgar entities. Though a sensitive soul may creep upon the ground, though it may roll and tumble itself in the dust, yet an intellectual being scorns to look lower than heaven itself; and though it be dated in time, yet it means to live as long as eternity.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In fasciculo viventium.

<sup>2</sup> Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animo mixtum atque concretum, aut quod e terra natum atque fictum esse videatur; nihilque aut humidum quidem, aut stabile, aut igneum; his enim in naturis

The poets had veiled and muffled up the same opinion in their mythology; while they tell us that Prometheus, which is all one with Providence, did work and fashion the bodies of men out of clay, but he was fain to steal fire from heaven for the quickening and enlivening them with souls, which made the prince of poets<sup>1</sup> sing,—

'The ethereal vigour is in all the same,  
And every soul is filled with equal flame.'<sup>2</sup>—  
Dryden's *Translation*.

And Ovid supplies them with a short verse,—

'Something Divine is in us, and from heaven.'<sup>3</sup>—  
Garth's *Translation*.

How often do you meet with this in Homer, that God is the Father of spirits, 'the Father of angelical beings and of the souls of men';<sup>4</sup> which Virgil renders,—

'The sire of men and gods.'<sup>5</sup>

Yet all this while, I know not whether you can, I am sure I cannot, sufficiently perceive, that the generality of the heathen did think that every soul was immediately created by God himself, but only that at the first there was bestowed more than ordinary workmanship upon them, which they knew principally by those generous

nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et præterita teneat, et futura prævideat, et complecti possit præsentia, quæ sola divina sunt, nec evincetur unquam unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo; singularis igitur quædam est natura atque vis animi, sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis; ita quicquid est illud quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cæleste et divinum est; ob eam rem æternum sit necesse est.—Cicero, *Tusc. Quæst.* i. 27; v. 13.

<sup>1</sup> Virgil.

<sup>2</sup> Igneus est ollis vigor et cælestis origo.—*Æn.* vi. 730.

<sup>3</sup> Sedibus æthereis spiritus ille venit.—*Ars Amat.* iii. 550.

<sup>4</sup> Πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.—*Il.* A. 544, Δ. 68, &c.

<sup>5</sup> . . . . . hominum sator atque Deorum.—*Æn.* i. 258.

motions which they found working in their own souls; and partly by some relics of Mosaical history that were scattered amongst them.

Thus, then, I have represented unto you, as indifferently<sup>1</sup> as I can, the state of this great controversy; and though I could easily tell you which part I do most easily incline to, yet I shall rather refer it to your own thoughts, with this intimation, that a modest hesitancy may be very lawful here; for if you will believe Gregory the Great, he tells you it is a question which cannot be determined in this life. However, it is enough for us that the spirit of a man, either by virtue of its constant creation, or by virtue of its first creation, is 'the candle of the Lord.'

As the soul is the shadow of a deity, so reason also is a weak and faint resemblance of God himself, whom therefore that learned emperor, M. Antoninus, calls 'the generative intelligence.'<sup>2</sup> It is God that plants reason; it is He that gives it an increase, 'The reason of men has sprung from the reason of God.'<sup>3</sup> The title of 'The Logos'<sup>4</sup> (word, intelligence) belongs to Christ himself, 'in whom are hid the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.' Reason first danced and triumphed in those eternal sunbeams, in the thoughts of God himself, who is the fountain and original of reason. And as His will is the rule of goodness, so His understanding is the rule of reason. For God himself is a most knowing and intellectual being; He is the first mover of entity, and does move determinately to a certain end,<sup>5</sup> which speaks an intelligent agent; He does 'propound most choice designs, and blessed ends to Himself,' and is not that a work of reason? He does contrive,

Col. ii. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Impartially.

<sup>2</sup> Λόγος σπερματικός.—Antonin. τὰ εἰς ἑαυτὸν, p. 28. Glas. 1744.

<sup>3</sup> Ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπων πέφυκ' ἀπὸ θεοῦ λόγου.

<sup>4</sup> Ὁ λόγος.

<sup>5</sup> Determinate tendere in aliquem finem.

and dispose, and order means for accomplishing of them ; and doth not that require understanding ? He makes all beings instrumental and subordinate to Him ; He moves all inferior wheels in a regular manner ; He moves all the spheres of second causes in a harmonical way. Such blind entities as want intellectual eyes, He himself doth lead them and conduct them ; and to others He gives an eye for their guidance and direction.

Now, He that hath framed an intellectual eye, shall not He see ? He that hath clothed the soul with light as with a garment, shall not He much more be clothed Himself with a fuller and purer brightness ? In that which we esteem reason amongst men, there are many clouds and blemishes, many dark spots and wrinkles, that are scattered and conquered by this more glorious light. The soul is fain to climb up and ascend to knowledge by several steps and gradations, but His understanding is all at the same height and eminency. Man's reason is fain to spend time in knitting a proposition, in spinning out a syllogism, in weaving a demonstration ; but He is infinitely beyond and above these first draughts and rudiments of knowledge ; He sees all 'in the twinkling of an eye ;'<sup>1</sup> at the first opening of His eye from everlasting, with one intellectual glance, He pierceth into the whole depth of entity, into all the dimensions of being. Man's understanding is fain to borrow a 'resemblance'<sup>2</sup> from the object which presents to the mind the picture and portraiture of itself, and strikes the intellectual eye with a colour suitable and proportionable to it. But the divine understanding never receives the least tincture from an object, no 'likeness from without,'<sup>3</sup> but views all things in the pure crystal of His own essence. He does not at all see Himself in the glass of the creatures, as we see Him, but He sees creatures in the

<sup>1</sup> 'Εν μίπτῳ ὀφθαλμοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> Species.

<sup>3</sup> Species ab extra.

glass of His own being. How else should He see them from everlasting, before they were extant, before they were visible by any species of their own ? God therefore doth primarily and principally look upon Himself, for He is 'the most illustrious of things conceivable ;'<sup>1</sup> He cannot have a more beautiful and satisfying object to look upon than His own face. 'The knowledge of God'<sup>2</sup> is an object fit to enamour all understanding ; for the more any being is abstracted from materiality, the more it is refined from material conditions, the more graceful and welcome it is to the understanding ;—for matter does cloud and darken the gloss of being ; it doth eclipse an object, and is no friend to intelligibility. So that God being a pure and immaterial spirit, must needs be 'the most excellent of conceivable,'<sup>3</sup> and a most adequate object for His own eye to look upon. And this understanding is Himself, it being 'immanent action,'<sup>4</sup> always dwelling with Him. 'The knowledge of God is the being of God,'<sup>5</sup> as the schoolmen speak. God is both 'all eye and all light ;'<sup>6</sup> as suppose the bright body of the sun had a visive faculty, so as it could view and survey its own light and beams, and could by virtue of them look upon all other things, which its own light does unveil and discover, it would then give some languishing adumbration of a Deity, who is always looking upon His own perfections, and seeing creatures by His own light, by His own uncreated beams. For 'the idea and likeness of all things is in the being of God.'<sup>7</sup> Thus God, looking upon His own omnipotency, knows all possibilities ; viewing His own determinations, He sees all futurities ; looking upon His own wisdom, He beholds all

<sup>1</sup> Nobilissimum intelligibile.

<sup>2</sup> Præstantissimum intelligibile.

<sup>3</sup> Dei scientia est Dei essentia.

<sup>4</sup> Species et similitudo omnium est in Dei essentia.

<sup>5</sup> Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>6</sup> Actio immanens.

<sup>7</sup> Ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, ὅλον φῶς.

varieties, all degrees and differences of being, which yet put not the least shadow of difference in Him; because the excellencies of all beings are treasured up in Him only by way of transcendency, not 'by collection, but by perfection,'<sup>1</sup> as the schools have it.

So that when God beholds all created beings by virtue of His own essence, yet you must not imagine that the formality of a creature is contained in an uncreated being, but only that there is enough of being there to give a representation of all being whatsoever. As when a glass reflects a face, there is not the least mutation in the glass, much less is the face any part of the glass's essence, though the glass give a sufficient resemblance of it; yet herein there is this disparity, that the glass of God's essence did represent a creature, before any created face could look into it; for God, looking upon Himself from eternity, did then know 'in what and how many ways anything could be made like to His own being;'<sup>2</sup> and did know how far such a being would imitate His essence, and how far it would fall short of it. He saw that this being would come nearer, that that being would be more distant and remote from Him; this picture would be liker Him, that would show very little of Him. Now the actuality and existence of such an object is not requisite to the understanding of it, for how then could we conceive of a privation or of nonentity? How can we otherwise apprehend this, than by framing the notion of something positive in our minds, and supposing a total deficiency from it?

Thus, as they used to speak, 'Right is the index of itself and of wrong, and in every kind of thing the most illustrious is the measure and pattern of the rest,'<sup>3</sup> that

<sup>1</sup> Per modum compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis.

<sup>2</sup> Quot modis aliquid assimilari posset Ipsius essentiae.

<sup>3</sup> Rectum est index sui et obliqui, et nobilissimum in unoquoque genere est mensura et exemplar reliquorum.

First and Supreme Being, by the great example and pattern of Himself, can judge of all inferior and imperfect beings. Nor could He see them 'from eternity'<sup>1</sup> any otherwise than in Himself, there being nothing else eternal but Himself; and in Himself He could clearly see them as we see effects in their cause. All created beings were eminently contained in the centre of one indivisible essence, who by His infinite virtue was to produce them all; who being an intelligent centre, did see those several lines that might be drawn from Him; and withal, being a free and a voluntary centre, did know how many lines He meant to draw from Himself.

Now you know, amongst men, a demonstration *à priori* is esteemed most certain and scientific: 'Science is knowledge of things in their causes.'<sup>2</sup> God thus knew creatures, perfectly knowing Himself, who was the first cause of them all. This doth much speak the immutability of the eternal reason and wisdom in the mind of God, and doth remove all imperfections from it. For you see He did not move in an axiomatical way, 'by composition and division,' or 'by synthesis and analysis,'<sup>3</sup> for He saw things by His own un-compounded and indivisible essence; much less did His knowledge improve itself in a syllogistical way, deducing and collecting one thing out of another. This is the schoolmen's meaning, when they tell us, 'God's knowledge is not ratiocinative,'<sup>4</sup> that is, 'is not discursive.'<sup>5</sup> They that will light a candle may strike such sparks, but the sun and stars want no such light. Angels are above syllogisms, how much more is God himself? Nay, even amongst men, first principles are above disputings, above demonstrations. Now all things are more naked in respect of

<sup>1</sup> Ab aeterno.

<sup>2</sup> Scire est per causas cognoscere.

<sup>3</sup> Per compositionem et divisionem.

<sup>4</sup> Cognitio Dei non est ratiocinativa.

<sup>5</sup> Non est discursiva.

God himself, than common notions are to the sight of men. It is a 'tortoise-like motion,'<sup>1</sup> 'a tardy and tedious work,' a fetching a compass, to gather one thing out of another. It is the slow pace of a limited understanding; but there is no succession in God, nor in the knowledge of God. There are no 'premises or conclusions,'<sup>2</sup> no 'passing from one thing to another,'<sup>3</sup> and no 'external medium';<sup>4</sup> for He does not 'know by a mediation distinct from Himself.'<sup>5</sup> There is a complete simultaneity in all His knowledge. His essence is altogether, and so is His knowledge.

Plurality of objects will confound a finite understanding, for they must be presented by different 'ideas';<sup>6</sup> and a created eye cannot exactly view such different faces at once, such several pictures at once. The understanding sometimes loses itself in a crowd of objects; and when such a multitude comes thronging upon it, it can scarce attend to any of them. But God seeing them all 'through one kind of idea, and one kind of operation,'<sup>7</sup> takes notice of them all with an infinite delight and facility. For He loves to attend to His own essence, which doth so admirably represent them all; hence His knowledge is always in act, because His essence is a pure act.

Human understandings have much of their knowledge stored up in habits, but there are no habits in a Deity; for knowledge is dormant in a habit, but His understanding never slumbers nor sleeps. There is no potentiality in Him, but He is always 'in a state of the highest perfection';<sup>8</sup> He is 'always in the act of understand-

<sup>1</sup> Motus testudineus.

<sup>2</sup> Prius et posterius.

<sup>3</sup> Transitus ab uno ad aliud.

<sup>4</sup> Externum medium.

<sup>5</sup> Cognoscere per aliud medium a seipso distinctum.

<sup>6</sup> Species.

<sup>7</sup> Per unicum speciem, per unicum operationem.

<sup>8</sup> In ultima perfectione.

ing,'<sup>1</sup> as 'the sun'<sup>2</sup> is 'always in the act of shining.'<sup>3</sup>

Human understandings are fain to unbend themselves sometimes, as if they were faint and weary; but Divinity is always vigorous, and eternity can never languish.

The understanding of God thus being filled with light, His will also must needs be rational, 'His knowledge being not blind, but possessed of eyes.'<sup>4</sup> This makes the schoolmen very well determine, that though there cannot be 'a cause of the Divine will,'<sup>5</sup> yet there may be assigned 'a reason of the Divine will.'<sup>6</sup> There can be no cause of His will, for then there would be a cause of His essence, His will being all one with His essence; but there cannot be 'a cause prior to the First Cause.'<sup>7</sup> Yet this account may be given of His will, that 'a good understood is the foundation of its being willed';<sup>8</sup> so that as God does primarily 'understand Himself,'<sup>9</sup> so He does understand other things, only 'through Himself';<sup>10</sup> so likewise He does principally and necessarily 'will Himself,'<sup>11</sup> and does will other things secondarily, and out of choice, 'on account of Himself.'<sup>12</sup> And as God hath set all other beings a longing after the perfection and conservation of their own beings, and has in a special manner stamped upon a rational nature an intellectual appetite of its own welfare and happiness, so as that it cannot but propound an ultimate scope and end to itself, and bend and direct all its desires for the hitting and attaining of it; so He himself also sets up Himself, as the most adequate and amiable

<sup>1</sup> Semper in actu intelligendi.

<sup>2</sup> Sol.

<sup>3</sup> Non cæca, sed oculata notitia.

<sup>4</sup> Ratio Divinæ voluntatis.

<sup>5</sup> Bonum intellectum est fundamentum voliti.

<sup>6</sup> Intelligere seipsum.

<sup>7</sup> Velle seipsum.

<sup>8</sup> Semper in actu lucendi.

<sup>9</sup> Causa Divinæ voluntatis.

<sup>10</sup> Causa prior prima.

<sup>11</sup> Per seipsum.

<sup>12</sup> Propter seipsum.

end of all His workings and motions, and does bend the whole creation, does suit every being, and order it, to His own glory.

Now, how rational is that will of His, that does chiefly fix itself upon the fairest good, and wills other things only as they are subservient to it? 'God wills His own goodness as an end, and all other things as means to that end.'<sup>1</sup> Out of the intense and vehement willing of Himself, He wills also some prints and resemblances of Himself. The beauty of His own face, of His own goodness, is so great, as that He loves the very picture of it. And because one picture cannot sufficiently express it, therefore He gives such various and numerous representations of it. As when men cannot express their mind in one word, they are willing to rhetoricate and enlarge themselves into more. God doth give many similitudes of Himself, for the greater explication of His own essence. His essence in itself not being capable of augmentation or multiplication, He loves to see some imitations and manifestations, to make known His own power and perfection in a way of causality.

Now the understanding of God being so vast and infinite, and His will being so commensurate and proportioned to it, nay, all one with it, all those decrees of His, that are the eternal product and results of His mind and will, must needs be rational also; for in them His understanding and will meet together, His truth and goodness kiss each other. And though these decrees of God must be resolved into His absolute supremacy and dominion, yet that very sovereignty of His is founded upon so much reason, and does act so wisely and intelligently, as that no created understanding can justly question it, but is bound obediently to adore it.

<sup>1</sup> Deus vult bonitatem suam tanquam finem, et vult omnia alia tanquam media ad finem.

The prosecution and application of these decrees is accompanied with the very same wisdom and reason; for what is Providence but 'an eye in the sceptre,'<sup>1</sup> a rational guiding and ruling all affairs in the world;—it is 'Divine reason in the Ruler';<sup>2</sup> it is 'the system of regulating things to a particular end.'<sup>3</sup> That which in man is called prudence, in God is called Providence; the right tuning and regulating of all circumstances, and making them to conspire and contribute to His own end and glory. And if men could but rightly interpret and comment upon Providence, what fresh discoveries, what bright displayings of Divine reason would they continually meet withal! What shinings and sparklings of Divine wisdom are there in some remarkable providential passages!

You that are most acquainted with the ways of God, tell us if you did ever find anything unreasonable in them? Inquire still more into His dealings, and you will see more of reason in them. Could you search deeper in the rich mine of His counsel, you would still meet with more precious veins of wisdom. The depths of His counsels, what are they but the very profoundness of His reason? 'The deep things of God,'<sup>4</sup> they are 'the deep things of reason.'<sup>5</sup> And whensoever this secret counsel of His issues out and bubbles forth, it is in most rational manifestations.

His commands are all rational; His word is the very pith and marrow of reason; His law is the quickening and wakening of men's reason; His gospel is the flowing out of His own reason—the quintessence of wisdom from above; His Spirit is a rational agent. The motions of

<sup>1</sup> Oculus in sceptro.

<sup>2</sup> Ipsa ratio divina in summo principe constituta.

<sup>3</sup> Ratio ordinandorum in finem.

<sup>4</sup> Τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ.

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1 Cor. ii. 10.

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<sup>5</sup> Τὰ βόθη τοῦ λόγου.

the Holy Ghost are rational breath; the revelations of the Holy Ghost a rational light, as rational as a demonstration: the Apostle calls them so. As when the Spirit of God overpowers the will, it makes a willingness where there was an absolute nolency, an obstinate refusal before; so when it overpowers the mind, it makes it understand that which it did not, which it could not, understand before. Spiritual irradiations stamp new light, create new reason in the soul. Nothing comes to man with the superscription of a deity, but that which hath upon it some signature of wisdom. God himself is an intelligent worker in His dealing with all beings, how much rather in His dealing with rational beings? By all this you see that God himself is the eternal Spring and Head of reason; and that human wisdom is but a created and an imperfect copy of His most perfect and original wisdom.

Now philosophy could dictate thus much, 'The end of all is to follow the gods.'<sup>1</sup> God loves to see such a noble creature as man is follow and imitate Him in his reason. 'All things strive to be assimilated to God,'<sup>2</sup> as the schoolmen have it. Now men cannot be more assimilated unto God, than by moving as intelligent agents. Does God himself work according to reason from eternity to eternity? And has He made a creature in time whose very essence is reason? Why then does it not open its eyes? why does it not use its lamp? and though it cannot discover all, yet let it discern as much as it can. Let it not act in the choicest points of religion out of blind and implicit principles, and huddle up its chiefest operations in I know not what confused and obscure and undigested manner. This neither becomes sons of light, nor works of light. The more men exercise reason, the more they resemble God

<sup>1</sup> Τέλος πάντων ἔπειθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. <sup>2</sup> Omnia intendunt assimilari Deo.

Himself, who has but few creatures that can represent Him in so bright an excellency as this—only angels and men; and therefore He expects it the more from them. And the more they exercise their own reason, the more they will admire and adore His. For none can admire reason, but they that use some reason themselves.

And this may suffice for the first particular, that 'the candle of the Lord' is 'a derived light;'<sup>1</sup> it was first lighted at a sunbeam.

<sup>1</sup> Lumen derivatum.

## CHAPTER XII.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS A DIMINUTIVE LIGHT.

THIS candle of the Lord is 'a slight and diminutive light.'<sup>1</sup> A lamp is no such dazzling object. A candle has no such goodly light, as that it should pride and glory in it. It is but a brief and compendious flame, shut up and imprisoned in a narrow compass. How far distant is it from the beauty of a star! How far from the brightness of a sun! This candle of the Lord, when it was first lighted up, before there was any thief in it, even then it had but a limited and restrained light. God said unto it, 'Thus far shall thy light go: hither shalt thou shine, and no farther.' Adam, in innocency, was not to crown himself with his own sparks.

God never intended that a creature should rest satisfied with its own candle-light, but that it should run to the Fountain of Light, and sun itself in the presence of its God. What a poor happiness had it been for a man only to have enjoyed his own lamp! Could this ever have been a beatifical vision? Could this light ever have made a heaven fit for a soul to dwell in? The sparkling seraphim and glittering cherubim, if it were possible that the face of God should be eclipsed from them, that they should have no light, but that which shines from their own essences—blackness, and darkness, and gloominess, a total and fatal

<sup>1</sup> Lumen tenue et diminutum.

eclipse, a present and perpetual night, would rush in upon them. If the heaven were fuller of stars than it is, and if this lower part of the world were adorned and illuminated with as many lamps as it is capable of, yet would they never be able to supply the absence of one sun. Their united light would not amount to so much as to make up one day, or one moment of a day. Let angels and men contribute as much light as they can, let them knit and concentrate their beams; yet neither angelical starlight, nor the sons of men, with their lamps and torches, could ever make up the least shadow of glory, the least appearance of heaven, the least fringe of happiness. Lucifer, that needs would be an independent light that would shine with his own beams, you know that he presently sank and fell into perpetual darkness. And Adam's candle, aspiring to be a sun, has burnt the dimmer ever since. God taking notice of it, and spying him in the dust: 'Lo,' says He, 'here lies the spark that would needs become a god. There lies the glow-worm that would needs become a sun.' 'Man is become like one of us.'

Gen. iii. 22.

Yet, notwithstanding, Adam's light at first was a pure light, till he had soiled it; it was a virgin-light, till he had deflowered it. The breath that God breathed into him was very precious and fragrant, till he had corrupted it. נִשְׁמַת אָדָם—'the spirit of Adam,' if we should render the words so, was in a special manner נֵר יְהוָה—'the lamp of the Lord.'<sup>1</sup> When God raised this goodly structure of man out of nothing, He built it most completely and proportionably; He left it 'in a state entire and perfect';<sup>2</sup> for you cannot imagine that any obliquity or irregularity should come from so accurate a hand as His. When God printed the whole creation, there were no *errata* to be found, no blots at all. Every letter was fair and lovely, though some

<sup>1</sup> Lucerna Domini.

<sup>2</sup> In statu integro et perfecto.

first and capital letters were flourished more artificially than others. Other inferior creatures would serve like so many consonants, but men were the vowels, or rather the diphthongs, to praise Him both in soul and body. When God first tuned the whole creation, every string, every creature praised Him; but man was the sweetest and loudest of the rest, so that when that string apostatized, and fell from its first tuning, it set the whole creation a jarring.

When God first planted the soul of man, it was the garden of God himself, His spiritual Eden; He loved to walk in it; it was full of the fairest and choicest flowers, of the most precious and delicious fruits; it was watered with all the fresh springs of heavenly influence—no weeds, nor briars, nor thorns, to be found there. The understanding, that tree of knowledge, was very tall and stately, and reaching up to heaven. There was in man a 'knowledge full and clear,'<sup>1</sup> as the schoolmen speak; 'a clear and steady contemplation of things comprehensible';<sup>2</sup> the eye of the soul was quick and clear, strong and fixed. God tried it by Himself as by a sunbeam, and found it genuine. How presently did Adam by this spy out the stamps and signatures that were upon the several creatures! when, by an extemporary facility, He gave them such names as should interpret and comment upon their essences. Nay, according to the schoolmen's determinations, man, in this his primitive condition, 'had a knowledge of all things which can be known by nature.'<sup>3</sup> As God framed him an elegant body, at its full height and stature, though not with his head reaching up to heaven, as some did ridiculously fancy, so He gave him also a

<sup>1</sup> Cognitio plena et lucida.

<sup>2</sup> Clara et fixa contemplatio intelligibilium.

<sup>3</sup> Habuit scientiam omnium naturaliter scibilium.

comely and amiable soul at its just 'height,'<sup>1</sup> endowed with all natural accomplishments and perfections. His dove-like spirit dwelt in a spotless and beautiful temple.

This makes the Protestant divines<sup>2</sup> very well determine, that 'tendency to evil does not spring from any element inherent in unfallen nature';<sup>3</sup> for it would be a thought too injurious to the God of Nature, to imagine He should frame evil. Yet some of the Papists and some others do constantly affirm, that such a rational being as man is, considered 'in his mere natural constitution,'<sup>4</sup> will have an unavoidable propensity unto evil, 'from the necessary conditions of matter';<sup>5</sup> and they bring forth such words as these: 'By reason of that intimate and essential conjunction of the sensitive powers with the intellectual, there must needs arise some ataxy and confusion in the being of man, and too great a favouring of sensitive objects,'<sup>6</sup> unless that inferior part of the soul be restrained 'by some kind of supernatural rein,'<sup>7</sup> as they speak; and, say they, it was thus chained up in a state of innocence, but now being let loose, it is extremely wild and unruly.<sup>8</sup>

How derogatory is this from the goodness and power of

<sup>1</sup> Ἀκμή.

<sup>2</sup> Vide Turretin, Opera, tom. i. pp. 513, 518-521; Spanheim, Opera, tom. iii. p. 1253.—Ed.

<sup>3</sup> Pronitas ad malum non fluit ex principiis naturæ integræ.

<sup>4</sup> In puris naturalibus.

<sup>5</sup> Ex necessaria materiæ conditione.

<sup>6</sup> Deum non posse creare hominem ex anima rationali et materiali sensibili compositum, quin præter divinam intentionem, homo ita constitutus habeat præcipitem inclinationem ad sensibilia.

<sup>7</sup> Supernaturali quodam fræno. Bellarmine (*De Grat. Prin. Hom.*, c. v. vi.) expressly says, 'In homine naturaliter pugna fuerit inter carnem et spiritum, rationem et appetitum, ex qua fluere morbus et languor quidam naturæ qui ex conditione materiæ oriretur; ideo Deus justitiam originalem tanquam frænum aureum addidit.'—Ed.

<sup>8</sup> Something like this lies at the foundation of the system which attempts to account for the introduction and existence of moral evil, by what is called 'passive power.'—Ed.

God's creation, and from that accurate harmony and immaculate beauty, that were to be found in such a noble being as man was in his native and original condition! 'Neither rein nor spur was wanted;'<sup>1</sup> for there was a just and regular tendency, without the least swerving or deviation. There was no such tardity in the sensitive part as should need a spur; nor yet any such impetuosity and violence as should require a bridle.

This indeed must be granted, that upon the knitting and uniting of such a soul to such a body, of sensitives to intellectuals, there will naturally follow 'a regard and tendency to things sensible;'<sup>2</sup> and this is not 'contrary to, but in accordance with, the intention of God;'<sup>3</sup> but that this should be 'a headstrong, rebellious, and unregulated tendency,'<sup>4</sup> is so far from being necessary, as that it is plainly contranatural. For this sensitive appetite of man is born 'under the rule of reason,'<sup>5</sup> and so is to be governed 'by her sceptre.'<sup>6</sup> By this golden sceptre, it was peaceably ruled in a state of innocence. 'The soul was not weighed down by the body,'<sup>7</sup> as the schoolmen say; the body, though it was not beautified and clarified in the same measure that a glorified body is, yet it was dutiful and obedient, and every way serviceable to the soul. The sensitive powers were not factious, but were willingly subject to the higher powers, to the intellectuals. The first bubblings of the soul were pure and crystalline, and streamed out very freely and fluently without any murmuring, without any wavering, without any foaming.

<sup>1</sup> Nec frænum nec calcar desiderabatur.

<sup>2</sup> Respectus et inclinatio ad sensibilia.

<sup>3</sup> Præter, sed secundum intentionem Divinam.

<sup>4</sup> Præceptis, rebellis, et inordinata inclinatio.

<sup>5</sup> Sub regno rationis.

<sup>6</sup> Sceptro rationis.

<sup>7</sup> Anima non aggravata erat a corpore.

There were no violent motions, no violent perturbations, which since have made such insurrections in the soul, and with their importunate breath endeavour, as much as they can, to blow out this intellectual lamp, this light of reason. There were 'no passions having a regard for evil,'<sup>1</sup> as the schools tell us. There was no slavish fear to bespeak and antedate grief. There was no paleness to be seen; no tremblings nor shiverings; no tears nor sighs; no blushes, nor the least tincture of shame. Paradise had so much of the lily, that it had nothing of the rose. Yet there were 'passions regulated for good.'<sup>2</sup> Joy would dance and leap sometimes, love would embrace and twine about its dearest good; such pure and noble affections as live and dwell in the breasts of glorified beings, were not banished and excluded from this state of integrity. The poets shadowed out this happy time in their golden age, though they mix some dross in the description of it.

Now, man being constituted in this state of natural rectitude, his candle shining clearly, his will following cheerfully, his affections complying most suitably, a sudden cloud presently rushed upon him, and blotted all his glory. And as the orator<sup>3</sup> styled that Roman magistrate that was suddenly turned out of his place<sup>4</sup> 'a most watchful consul,'<sup>5</sup> because he did not sleep all the time of his consulship, for he continued but a day in it; in the very same sense, and only in this sense, man also was 'most

<sup>1</sup> Nullæ passiones, quæ respiciunt malum.

<sup>2</sup> Istiusmodi passiones quæ ordinantur ad bonum.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero.

<sup>4</sup> *Epist. ad Familiares*, vii. 30, *ad Curium*. Culverwel, quoting from memory, gives only an approximate expression; and he does the consul referred to injustice, seeing that he was not turned out of his office, but from peculiar circumstances elected to office on the day when by law the consulship always expired, so that he never slept as consul.

<sup>5</sup> Consul vigilantissimus.

Ps. xlix. 12. *בל ילין*—'he would not abide in honour; he would not lodge one night in honour;'<sup>2</sup> though I am far from laying such stress upon these words as they do, that will needs from thence measure the time so exactly, as that they will tell you to a minute how long Adam enjoyed his first glory. This only we are sure of, it was a very brief and transient happiness, a fading and withering glory; he had wasted his oil presently, and the lamp was going out, but that God dropped fresh oil into it, by the promise of a Messiah.

The schoolmen are very solicitous and desirous to know how Adam's understanding, being 'in green vigour,'<sup>3</sup> that is, in the spring of its vigour, could be entangled in such a snare, and deluded with such a miserable fallacy. Aquinas, for his part, determines, 'that man in his primitive state could not be deceived;'<sup>4</sup> which yet is altogether inconceivable; for how could he fall unless his head declined? It is not very easily perceptible at any time, how there can be 'a failure in the will,'<sup>5</sup> and yet not 'a mistake in the understanding;'<sup>6</sup> much less can we tell how this should come to pass, when the will was so obediently disposed 'to the nod of the reason,'<sup>7</sup> when it gave such observance to all the commands and dictates of the understanding, as that did in a state of innocency. And to resolve the whole anomaly and irregularity of that first prevarication<sup>8</sup> only into the will's untowardness, what is it else than to say, that Adam sinned 'from pure wickedness of heart, contrary to the clearness of his judgment;'<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vigilantissimus in honore.    <sup>2</sup> Non pernoctabit.    <sup>3</sup> In vigore viridi.  
<sup>4</sup> Hominem in primo statu decipi non potuisse.  
<sup>5</sup> Defectus in voluntate.    <sup>6</sup> Error in intellectu.    <sup>7</sup> Ad nutum intellectus.  
<sup>8</sup> Used in the wider classical sense of 'transgression, breach of duty.'  
<sup>9</sup> Ex mera malitia, contra claritatem judicii.

which is to entertain a thought very groundless, uncharitable, and dishonourable to the first root of mankind, and to make his transgression of the same dye with those damned angelical spirits that were thrown into irrecoverable misery. Therefore, Zanchius,<sup>1</sup> that was one of the most scholastical amongst the Protestants, doth most judiciously conclude, that the understanding of Adam was defective in its office by a negligent non-attendance. The eye was clear enough, the bow was strong enough, but it was not vigilant enough, it was not bent enough; the balance was not deceitful, but he forgot to weigh things in it.

Now man, by this fall of his, was not only 'deprived of his supranatural endowments,'<sup>2</sup> but also 'wounded even in his natural properties.'<sup>3</sup> How soon is this beautiful creature withered! his spring is gone, his May is gone, his gloss and greenness gone; the flower droops, the tree is neither so flourishing nor so fruitful; an untimely and disconsolate autumn comes upon him. Thus the purest complexions are always most frail and brittle. Thus the highest conditions are most tottering and precipitous, and the noblest perfections, if built only upon Nature's bottom, are but voluble and uncertain. There arises a sudden 'distemper,'<sup>4</sup> a present 'want of symmetry,'<sup>5</sup> in the being of man.

The philosophers were very sensible of it, and groaned under it. You may hear them complaining of 'the languishings and faintings of the soul;'<sup>6</sup> of 'a spurious and adulterate kind of reason.'<sup>7</sup> You may hear them complaining of 'a moulting.'<sup>8</sup> The wings of the soul flag;

<sup>1</sup> Note Q.    <sup>2</sup> Ἀσυμμετρία.  
<sup>3</sup> Spoliatus supranaturalibus.    <sup>4</sup> Τὰ νοσήματα περι τὴν ψυχὴν.  
<sup>5</sup> Vulneratus in ipsis naturalibus.    <sup>6</sup> Νόθος λογισμὸς.  
<sup>7</sup> Δυσκρασία.    <sup>8</sup> Πτερορρύσησις—Defluvium pennarum.

many of the feathers are sick and drop away. And that soul which was wont to build its nest in the stars, is now fain to build it in the dust. You may hear one philosopher complaining of the 'headache';<sup>1</sup> his head, his understanding aches;—another of 'disease in the eye';<sup>2</sup> his eye, his reason, is dimmed;—a third of the 'heartache,'<sup>3</sup> 'palpitation';<sup>4</sup> his soul trembles with doubts and uncertainties. You may see one grasping a cloud of errors, another spending much of his time in untying some one knot, in solving some one difficulty; you may see some one pleasing himself, and sitting down in the shadow of his own opinion; another bending all his nerves and endeavours, and they presently snap asunder.

You may see Socrates in the twilight lamenting his obscure and benighted condition, and telling you that his lamp will show him nothing but his own darkness. You may see Plato sitting down by the water of Lethe, and weeping because he could not remember his former notions. You may hear Aristotle bewailing himself thus, that his 'potential reason'<sup>5</sup> will so seldom come into act, that his 'blank sheet'<sup>6</sup> has so few and such imperfect impressions upon it, that his intellectuals are at so low an ebb, as that the motions of Euripus will pose them. You may hear Zeno complaining that his 'porch'<sup>7</sup> is dark; and Epictetus confessing that he had not the right 'handle,'<sup>8</sup> the true apprehension of things. Look upon the naturalist's head, and you will see it nonplussed with an occult quality; feel the moralist's pulse, his conscience I mean, and you will find it beating very slowly, very remissly; look upon the most speculative eagles that stare the sun in the face, that

<sup>1</sup> Κεφαλαλγία.

<sup>2</sup> Ὀφθαλμία.

<sup>3</sup> Καρδιαλγία.

<sup>4</sup> Palpitatio cordis.

<sup>5</sup> Νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει.—*De Anima*, lib. iii.

<sup>6</sup> Abrasa tabula.

<sup>7</sup> Στοά.

<sup>8</sup> Ansa.

fly highest in contemplation, those that love to sport and play in the light; yet at length you may see the sun striking them through with one of his glorious darts, and chastising their inquisitive eyes with one of his brightest beams. The sun is ready to put out this 'candle of the Lord,' if it make too near approaches to it. Human understandings are glad to wink at some dazzling objects. As 'anything intense, subjected to the senses, destroys the sense';<sup>1</sup> so 'anything requiring intense exercise of intellect strains the intellect.'<sup>2</sup> For in all knowledge there is required a due proportion between the 'object to be known,'<sup>3</sup> and the 'knowing power';<sup>4</sup> but when the several powers and faculties of the soul lost that comely proportion which they had amongst themselves, they lost also much of that correspondency and conformity which they had to their several objects.

And the soul, besides its own loss, had a share in the body's loss also; for the body, wanting much of that accurate and elegant composure which once it had, knowledge itself must needs be prejudiced by it; that being amongst men founded in sense, and in some measure depending upon organical dispositions. So that the straitening and stopping of these windows must needs prohibit light. Sin entered in first at a corporeal, then at an intellectual window, and stole away the heart, and the windows have been broken ever since.

I know the generality of philosophers do partly excuse the understanding, and do blame the objects for their exility and poverty, for their little diminutive entity, for their want of intelligibility. But the subtle Scotus doth endeavour to invalidate that, by telling them that 'all

<sup>1</sup> Vehemens sensibile destruit sensum.

<sup>2</sup> Vehemens intelligibile perstringit intellectum.

<sup>3</sup> Objectum cognoscibile.

<sup>4</sup> Virtus cognoscitiva.

things are understood by God with the same readiness.<sup>1</sup> This much is evident and undeniable, that the spying out of a little lurking object, doth argue the strength, and quickness, and clearness of the eye. The sun discovers atoms, though they be invisible by candle-light, yet that makes them dance naked in his beams. Created understandings want spectacles to augment and majorate some objects.

But the soul never meets with more difficulty than in the understanding of spiritual beings, although they have most of entity, and so most of intelligibility; yet the soul, being imprisoned in a body not sufficiently clarified and refined, cannot so fully close and comply with incorporeal beings. This 'candle of the Lord' will discover more of spirituals when it is taken out of the lantern 'in the separate state,'<sup>2</sup> or when it is put into a clearer, 'in the perfect state.'<sup>3</sup> But, for the present, how little doth it know of itself! How little of angels! How little of God! And yet how much might be known of them!

Look but a while, if you can endure to look, upon so unlovely and unpleasant an object—I mean upon those black and prodigious errors, that cover and bespot the face of these times—and they will soon convince you of the weakness and dimness of this lamp-light of the spirit of a man. 'The candle of the Lord,' though it be amongst them, yet it is not so powerful as to scatter and conquer their thick and palpable darkness. It is not an easy, nor a sudden, nor a delightful work to number so many errors; yet if I could reckon them all up, from the blundering Antinomian, to the vagabond seeker, or the wild seraphic, set on fire of hell, they would all serve for so many fatal examples of the miserable weakness of men's understand-

<sup>1</sup> Omnia eadem facilitate intelliguntur a Deo.

<sup>2</sup> In statu separato.

<sup>3</sup> In statu consummato.

ing. It is true, they do not follow 'the candle of the Lord,' for then reason would have guided them better. But this very consideration shows the weakness of their candle-light, for if it had been brighter, it would not have been so soon put out. It is easy to blow out a candle, but who can put out a star? or who can extinguish the sun? And men can shut up natural light, but who can imprison a star? or who can shut up the sun? This faint and languishing candle-light does not always prevail upon the will, it doth not sufficiently warm and inflame the affections; men do not use to warm their hands at a candle. It is not so victorious and overpowering as to scatter all the works of darkness; it will be night for all the candle. The moralists were not only frigid in their devotions, but some of them were very dissolute in their practices. When you think upon these things, sure you will willingly subscribe to the forementioned particular, which you may do very safely, that the spirit of a man is but a candle—'a feeble diminutive light.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lumen exile et diminutum.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON DISCOVERS PRESENT, NOT FUTURE THINGS.

'THE candle of the Lord' is 'a light exhibiting present, not revealing future things;'<sup>1</sup> for did you ever hear of such a lamp as would discover an object not yet born, nor yet in being? Would you not smile at him that should light up a candle to search for a futurity? It is the glorious prerogative of the Divine understanding, to have such a fair, and open, and unlimited prospect, as that, in one glorious twinkling of an intellectual eye, He can see the whole compass and extent and latitude of being, and the whole duration of being; for eternity at one draught doth swallow up the whole fluency of time, and is infinitely above those temporal conditions of past, present, and to come. 'No time affects the king,'<sup>2</sup> say the lawyers; 'No time affects God,'<sup>3</sup> say the philosophers. An intellectual sun doth not 'set and rise again,'<sup>4</sup> but makes one bright and perpetual day, and, by its pure and uninterrupted irradiations, doth paraphrase and comment upon all objects, so as to uncloud and reveal the most obscure contingency, and to make it present, and naked, and visible; for, as the schoolmen tell us, 'the knowledge of God extends to all

<sup>1</sup> Lumen explicans præsentia, non aperiens futura.

<sup>2</sup> Nullum tempus occurrit regi.

<sup>3</sup> Nullum tempus occurrit Deo.

<sup>4</sup> Occidere et redire.

things as present;'<sup>1</sup> His knowledge being all one with His essence, without the least shadow of change. Inso-much, as that which with men is a futurity and contingency, with Him is always present and extant; which speaks for the certainty and infallibility of His prescience, though it be conversant about such things as seem to us most casual and fortuitous. For even we ourselves know these things certainly, when they are in act and in being, because then they lose their volubility and contingency, and put on reality and necessity; according to that unquestionable rule, 'Whatever is, necessarily is, when it is.'<sup>2</sup> A contingency, when it is 'beyond or out of its causes,'<sup>3</sup> when it is actually produced, having 'a determinate being,'<sup>4</sup> may then also have a determinate cognoscibility. Now God always thus sees a contingency 'in its issue;'<sup>5</sup> whereas created understandings look upon it 'in its progress.'<sup>6</sup> Nay, such is the poverty and imperfection of man's knowledge, that many things which are in their own nature necessary and demonstrable, may yet perhaps be known by them 'only as probable, not as necessary.'<sup>7</sup> But such is the height and transcendency of the Divine understanding, as that such things as are in their own natures most dubious and hovering between 'being'<sup>8</sup> and 'not being,'<sup>9</sup> yet God knows even these 'infallibly,'<sup>10</sup> and plainly perceives which way they will incline, when men see only an equipoise and neutrality. So that the whole rise of contingency flows from the wavering of second causes. And though 'God's know-

<sup>1</sup> Scientia Dei ad omnia præsentialiter se habet.

<sup>2</sup> Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse.

<sup>3</sup> Extra suas causas.

<sup>4</sup> Determinatum esse.

<sup>5</sup> In termino, in eventu, in periodo.

<sup>6</sup> In medio, in motu, in itinere.

<sup>7</sup> Per modum probabilitatis, et non per modum necessitatis.

<sup>8</sup> Esse.

<sup>9</sup> Non esse.

<sup>10</sup> Per modum infallibilem.

ledge<sup>1</sup> be 'the cause of things,'<sup>2</sup> yet being but 'the remote cause,'<sup>3</sup> it doth not take away contingency. But God Himself sees that some things will 'happen contingently';<sup>4</sup> for He doth not only 'know things,'<sup>5</sup> but 'the order and manner of things';<sup>6</sup> and knows that there are some 'intermediate causes,'<sup>7</sup> which are 'susceptible of hindrance,'<sup>8</sup> as the schoolmen speak somewhat rudely; and by virtue of these there arises a contingency. Thus, in a syllogism, though the *major* be necessary, yet if the *minor* be contingent, the conclusion will be so also, and will 'follow the worse premiss';<sup>9</sup> though the first cause be certain, yet if there be obstructions in the second, you cannot promise yourself what the effect will be. Though the spring of motion cannot fail, yet if the wheels may possibly break, the progress will be very uncertain to all but to God himself. For other understandings only know that the wheels may break, but God sees whether they will break or not; so that which, in respect of creatures, is 'a hazardous cast,'<sup>10</sup> in respect of God is 'all fixed and square,'<sup>11</sup> determined and immovable in His everlasting thoughts.

Angelical beings cannot reach to so high a perfection of knowledge as this is. For 'the future, as such,'<sup>12</sup> is 'an object not proportioned to the angelic intellect,'<sup>13</sup> as the acute Suarez doth abundantly evince. The philosophers find difficulty enough in explaining the manner how God hath a certain and infallible prescience of these future uncertainties: and they find it a plain impossibility for the angels to have any such knowledge, for they neither have

<sup>1</sup> Scientia Dei.

<sup>2</sup> Causa rerum.

<sup>3</sup> Causa remota.

<sup>4</sup> Evenire contingentem.

<sup>5</sup> Cognoscere res.

<sup>6</sup> Ordinem et modum rerum.

<sup>7</sup> Causæ intermediæ.

<sup>8</sup> Impedibiles, defectibiles.

<sup>9</sup> Sequi deteriorem partem.

<sup>10</sup> Periculosæ plenum opus alicui.—Hor. *Carm.* ii. i. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Fixum et *τετράγωνον*.

<sup>12</sup> Futurum quatenus futurum.

<sup>13</sup> Objectum improporionatum intellectui angelico.

'an eternity of intuition,'<sup>1</sup> which should 'remove all succession, all "priority and posteriority,"<sup>2</sup> and make a complete simultaneity';<sup>3</sup> nor yet have they 'a fulness of representative reason.'<sup>4</sup> They have no such boundless and infinite species, as the Divine essence is, by which God beholds all things. Angels have neither light enough of their own to manifest a future object, nor an eye strong enough to pierce into it. They cannot infallibly foretell their own motions, because God can alter them and overpower them; much less can they know the determinations of God himself, or any operations that depend upon a free agent, till they bud and blossom in some actual discoveries and appearances. Nor are they so well acquainted with the whole context and coherence of natural agents, with all those secret twinings and complications as to spy out beforehand those events which are brought forth in a casual, and unusual, and very unlikely manner. Whosoever, then, they have any prescience of future contingencies, it is only by revelation from God himself. They may see the face of a future object 'in God's mirror,'<sup>5</sup> but yet that is 'a mirror acting according to its own will,'<sup>6</sup> and shows only what it pleaseth, and when, and to whom it pleaseth.

The wicked angels know this well enough, that they for their parts have no knowledge of future uncertainties, though they desire to have it as much as any; and they pretend to it as much as any; yet you know how cautelous they were in their oracular responsals, as that elegant moralist, Plutarch, does most excellently show in several places. They always drew a curtain before their predic-

<sup>1</sup> *Æternitatem intuitus.*

<sup>2</sup> *Prius et posterius.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ambire in objecto suo omnes differentias temporis.*

<sup>4</sup> *Plenitudinem rationis representativæ.*

<sup>5</sup> *In speculo Divino.*

<sup>6</sup> *Speculum voluntarium.*

tions, and wrapt them up in obscurity, which plainly argued a consciousness of their own ignorance in respect of future events.

The good angels are so filled with their present happiness, they are so quieted with the enjoyment of God himself, as that they are not at all solicitous or inquisitive about future events, but they cheerfully entertain and drink in all those beams that come flowing from the face of their God, and they desire no more than He is pleased to communicate to them; nay, indeed, they can desire no more, for He gives them as much as they are capable of.

Now, if angelical understandings are not so wide and comprehensive as to grasp and take in such objects, what mean, then, the sons of men to aspire and reach after the knowledge of them? If those tall and eminent beings, standing upon the mount of God, cannot see them, how shall the sons of men, that are of a lower stature, hid in a valley, how shall they behold them? Yet there was always, in the generality of mankind, a prurient desire and hankering after the knowledge of future events. Men still stretch out the hand to the forbidden tree, they long for the fruit of it, and would fain be plucking some apples from it. Nay, men long for the greenest apples, for the precocious knowledge of events, before they come to their just ripeness and maturity.

The desire of this sets the astrologer a lighting his candle at the stars. Oh, how does he flatter himself in his own imaginary twinklings, and how does he persuade the more simple and credulous part of the world, that he can discover every future atom, that he can put those capital stars, those golden letters together, and spell out all the fates of kingdoms and persons? It makes the *Augur*, the 'raven-prophet,'<sup>1</sup> as the Greeks call him, chatter with

<sup>1</sup> Κορακομάντις.

the birds in their own dialect; and, as if he were their scholiast, he writes comments and expositions upon their language. Oh, how devoutly will he listen to a prophetic crow! how will he criticize upon the harsh accents of the screech-owl! upon the dismal and melancholy notes of the night-raven! It makes the *Auspex* watch the birds in their several postures, and to be as diligent and judicious a spectator of them as the other was an auditor. He can interpret every fluttering, he can tell you all their journeys, where they lodged, where they baited last, what tree they visited, what bough they stayed longest upon; and at length he will pluck some pens out of their sacred wings, for the writing of all his learned predictions. It moved the *Exspex* to consult with the inwards, to search into the bowels of things; he will but look upon a liver, and will presently tell you the colour and complexion of all affairs. It caused the *Aruspex* to behold the behaviour of the dying sacrifice, and from the quietness or struggling of those sensitive creatures, to foretell the reluctancies or facilities in higher matters. It set the *Chiromancer* a studying to read those lines that seem to be scribbled upon his hand, and to explain them with his own interlineary glosses, and to look upon them as Nature's manuscripts, as an enchiridion<sup>1</sup> of Nature's penning, in which she gave him a brief synopsis of all such passages of his life as should come into being afterwards. It moved the interpreter of dreams to set up his seat of judicature in those gates of fancy—the 'gate of horn,'<sup>2</sup> I mean, and the 'gate of ivory'<sup>3</sup>—and as if the night were to enlighten the day, he will regulate all his waking motions by those slumbering intimations; yet usually the interpretation of the dream is the more nonsensical dream of the two.

<sup>1</sup> Manual or hand-book.

<sup>2</sup> Porta cornea.

<sup>3</sup> Porta eburnea.—Virg. *Æn.* vi. 893-5.

Some others will needs cast lots for their fortunes, and thinking that the judgment of a die is infallible, will undertake no matters of moment till they be predetermined by it. 'The die is cast, and by the present lot they judge of the future.'<sup>1</sup> A rare device, to find out one contingency by another; to lose one arrow, and to shoot another after it!

These are some of those many methods and contrivances which the sons of men have contrived to themselves for the finding out of future events. What should I tell you of the rest of the geomancy ('earth prophecy'<sup>2</sup>), and the pyromancy ('fire prophecy'<sup>3</sup>), of the hydromancy ('water prophecy'<sup>4</sup>) and the necromancy ('prophecy by consulting the dead'<sup>5</sup>), and belomancy ('javelin-prophecy'<sup>6</sup>), of the libanomancy ('incense-prophecy'<sup>7</sup>), of the coscinomancy ('sieve-prophecy'<sup>8</sup>), which are all but the various expressions of the same madness? What should I tell you of those several nations that have been enamoured with these follies? The Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Persians, the Grecians, the Romans, have had always amongst them several professors of these vanities. You see how fain the sons of men would have some key or other to unlock and open these secret and reserved passages, which Providence hath wisely shut up, and hid from the eyes of men. But Aquinas passes this censure upon them all, 'Arts of this kind do not enjoy the patronage of an intellect virtuously disposed.'<sup>9</sup> And that sacred author is much of the same mind: 'In vain you seek that on earth, which God alone knows in heaven.'<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jacta est alea, et per præsentem sortem judicant de futura.

<sup>2</sup> Γεωμαντία.                      <sup>3</sup> Πυρομαντία.                      <sup>4</sup> Ὑδρομαντία.

<sup>5</sup> Νεκρομαντία.                      <sup>6</sup> Βελομαντία.                      <sup>7</sup> Λιβανομαντία.

<sup>8</sup> Κοσκινομαντία.

<sup>9</sup> Hujusmodi artes non utuntur patrocinio intellectus bene dispositi secundum virtutem.

<sup>10</sup> Frustra illud quæris in terris, quod solus Deus novit in cælis.

Yet this tree of knowledge is fair to the eye, and pleasant to the taste; the soul doth relish all notional dainties with delight; and these prenotions and anticipations of things are the more sweet and delicious to the palates and tastes of men, because most of their being is treasured up in their future condition. They have no satisfaction, no Sabbath, nor quiet in their present state, and therefore they would fain know what the next day, and what the next year, and what the next age will bring forth. The desires, the prayers, the hopes, the endeavours, the counsels of men, they all look towards the future. For, as *Mirandola*<sup>1</sup> the younger doth well observe, the soul of man is 'partaker of three times. Time past, answers to memory; time present, to understanding; time future, to will.'<sup>2</sup>

God, therefore, that He may keep such a creature as man is, in a waiting and obedient posture—in a posture of dependence and expectation, doth choose gradually and leisurely to discover to him, 'at sundry times and divers manners,'<sup>3</sup> those thoughts which He hath concerning him. God will have man, in this sense, 'to live for the day';<sup>4</sup> 'to entertain fortune by the day,' as the noble *Verulam* saith that *Prince*<sup>5</sup> did, whose life he writes and commemorates.

<sup>1</sup> 'I care for to-day; who knows the morrow?'

is a speech that may be taken in a better sense than *Anacreon* meant it. And so may that of the Latin lyric:—

<sup>1</sup> Note R. *Gian-Francesco Pico*, Prince of *Mirandola*.

<sup>2</sup> *Trium temporum particeps. Tempus præteritum memoriæ, præsens intellectui, futurum voluntati congruit et respondet.*

<sup>3</sup> Πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως.

<sup>4</sup> In diem vivere.

<sup>5</sup> *Henry VII.*

<sup>6</sup> Τὸ σήμερον μέλει μοι,

Τὸ δ' αὔριον τίς οἶδε.—*Anacreon*, Ode xv.

'To-morrow with its cares despise,  
And make the present hour your own.'<sup>1</sup>—  
Creech's Translation.

And the heroical poet shows them the necessity of this  
sobriety and temperance in knowledge, for, saith he,

'O man, to fate and future fortune blind!'<sup>2</sup>—  
Strahan's Translation.

For men's knowledge naturally enters in at the gate of  
sense, but a future object can have no admission there.  
And as the mind cannot recall 'an object totally gone,'<sup>3</sup>  
when there is no remaining 'idea,'<sup>4</sup> neither the least  
print or 'trace'<sup>5</sup> of it, so neither can it present an object  
that is altogether future, and hath no such colour as can  
move and strike the intellectual eye.

Such effects, indeed, as are stored up in pregnant and  
eminent and necessary causes, may be easily and certainly  
foreknown by visible and unquestionable demonstrations.  
The foretelling of an eclipse may be done without an  
oracle, and may be believed, though there be no miracle to  
seal and confirm it. Such effects as lurk in probable  
causes, that seem to promise very fairly, may be known  
also in an answerable and proportionable manner, by  
strong and shrewd conjectures; hence springs all the 'fore-  
knowledge of physicians, sailors, shepherds,'<sup>6</sup> as the fore-  
mentioned Mirandola tells us. Yet the great pretenders of  
the antedating knowledge do very frequently, 'and ac-  
cording to their custom,'<sup>7</sup> deceive both themselves and  
others in these more ordinary and easy scrutinies. This  
might clothe your almanacs in more red, and put them to

<sup>1</sup> Quid sit futurum cras, fuge quaerere.—Hor. *Carm.* i. ix. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futuræ.—Virgil, *Æn.* x. 501.

<sup>3</sup> Objectum totaliter præteritum.

<sup>4</sup> Species.

<sup>5</sup> Vestigium.

<sup>6</sup> Prænotiones medicorum, nautarum, pastorum.

<sup>7</sup> Et pro more.

the blush for guessing at the weather no better. You may  
write upon them, 'No day without a blunder.'<sup>1</sup> Did they  
never threaten you with thunder and lightning enough to  
make a Caligula prepare new laurels, when yet the heavens  
proved very pacate and propitious? Did they never tell  
you of a sad discontented day which would weep its eyes  
out, which yet, when it was born, proved a Democritus,  
and did nothing but laugh at their ignorance and folly?  
Did they never flatter you with fine, pleasant, temperate  
weather, 'and the rain descended, the winds blew,'<sup>2</sup> the hail  
beat? The prediction fell, because it was built upon so weak  
a foundation. So that Aquinas, for his part, thinks that  
the sensitive creatures, the crows, and the cranes, and the  
swallows, those flying almanacs, that know their appointed  
times, are more happy and successful in their predictions,  
and are better directed by their feeling the impression of  
some heavenly bodies than men are by their seeing of them.

Now, if these 'mirrors of the year'<sup>3</sup> be cracked and  
broken, and give such unequal representations of things  
most obvious, how then will they be ever able to show you  
objects far more imperceptible and immaterial, that depend  
upon the will and decrees of God himself, and upon the  
motions of most free and indifferent agents? This makes  
the great 'scourge of astrologers,'<sup>4</sup> I mean the most noble  
and eminent Mirandola, with indignation to conclude, that  
this blazing art of theirs—that is, astrology abused;<sup>5</sup> for  
so either he means, or ought to mean—is at the best but  
'the mistress and queen of superstitions';<sup>6</sup> and he breaks  
out into such words as these, 'Vanity of vanities is astro-  
logy; all superstition is vanity.'<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nulla dies sine errato.

<sup>2</sup> Καὶ κατέβη ἡ βροχὴ, ἔπνευσαν οἱ ἄνεμοι.

<sup>3</sup> Anni specula.

<sup>4</sup> Astrologo-mastix.

<sup>5</sup> Astrology in some of our older writers includes astronomy.

<sup>6</sup> Domini et regina superstitionum.

<sup>7</sup> Vanitas vanitatum astrologia, et omnis superstitio vanitas.

Yet, notwithstanding, God hath provided some that shall give some faint resemblances of Himself, in the knowledge of future things, by a participation of light from Him:

<sup>2</sup> Pet. i. 19. 'We have a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place,<sup>1</sup> that I may borrow these words of the Apostle. This 'prophetic light'<sup>2</sup> is 'a supernatural light.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Pet. i. 21. Prophetic springings come not from the will of man, but from the breathings of the Holy Ghost; they are 'impressions and signatures of Divine knowledge.'<sup>4</sup> As God himself is 'He which is, and which was, and which is to come,'<sup>5</sup>

Rev. i. 8. so He will have a prophet to be a shadow of Himself,

*"Ὅς τ' ἤδη τὰ τ' ἐόντα τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.—Il. i. 70.*

Which Virgil well translates,

*'Novit namque omnia vates,  
Quæ sint, quæ fuerint, quæ mox ventura trahantur.'*<sup>6</sup>  
*Georg. iv. 392, 3.*

God thus revealing and communicating His mind to His prophets, doth clearly manifest that He himself hath an exact knowledge of future events, He doth expressly show that He doth 'care for the affairs of men';<sup>7</sup> that He is the manager and arranger of the future;<sup>8</sup> that His providence doth overrule the greatest contingencies. He doth, therefore, upbraid the idols of the heathen with their

<sup>1</sup> Ἐχομεν βεβαιότερον τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον, ᾧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες, ὡς λύχνῳ φαίνοντι ἐν ἀσχηρῶ τόπῳ.

<sup>2</sup> Lumen propheticum.

<sup>3</sup> Lumen supernaturale.

<sup>4</sup> Impressiones et signature Divinæ scientiæ.

<sup>5</sup> Ὁ ὢν, καὶ ὁ ἦν, καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος.

<sup>6</sup> . . . . . The seer,

To whom all nature, and all times are known,

All past, all present, and all future shown.—Sotheby.

<sup>7</sup> Curare res humanas.

<sup>8</sup> Actor et ordinator futurorum.

ignorance of these things: 'Show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods.'<sup>1</sup> Isa. xli. 23.

Prophetic language is 'a mark of Divine communication,'<sup>2</sup> and doth necessarily require 'superhuman knowledge,'<sup>3</sup> which makes me wonder at the great doctor Ben Maimon, that resolves the power of prophesying into nothing else than a healthful temper, a lively complexion of body, and a vigorous mind advanced with study and industry;—an opinion which smells too strongly of the garlic and onions of that country, the Egyptian superstition I mean, with which he was sufficiently acquainted. Yet he tells us that it is the public tenet of the Jews, 'the sentiment of our law,'<sup>4</sup> for so he entitles it; and withal adds, that the art of prophesying—for though he does not style it so, yet he makes it so—is 'the highest position of man, and the greatest perfection of the race.'<sup>5</sup> The qualifications which he requires are these: men must be 'fit for prophecy from their birth';<sup>6</sup> there must be 'a natural skill';<sup>7</sup> there must be 'an admirable genius.'<sup>8</sup> The prophet must be 'excellent in intellect, and perfect in morality.'<sup>9</sup> But his principal condition is, that there must be 'the highest perfection of the imaginative faculty';<sup>10</sup> for, saith he, if the influence of an 'actuative intellect,'<sup>11</sup> such a one as he falsely and vainly supposes, be poured out only upon the rational part of the soul, and either by reason of the scarcity of oil, or the incapacity of the fancy, doth not

<sup>1</sup> הנידו האחיות לאחור ונדעה כי אלהים אתם—'Αναγγείλατε ἡμῖν τὰ ἐπερχόμενα ἐπ' ἐσχάτου, καὶ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι θεοὶ ἐστε.

<sup>2</sup> Divini sermonis character.

<sup>4</sup> Sententia legis nostræ.

<sup>3</sup> Superhumanam cognitionem.

<sup>5</sup> Supremus gradus hominis, et summa perfectio speciei.

<sup>6</sup> Idonei ad prophetiam ab ipsa conceptione et nativitate.

<sup>7</sup> Dispositio et dexteritas naturalis.

<sup>8</sup> Optimus humor cerebri.

<sup>9</sup> Optimus vir intellectualibus, et moribus suis perfectus.

<sup>10</sup> Summa facultatis imaginatricis perfectio.

<sup>11</sup> Intellectus agens.

drop upon the fancy, there will be only 'a sect of wise speculators.'<sup>1</sup> Such men may be eminent for deep contemplation, but they will never be famous for prophesying. If the fancy be only quickened or heightened, then there will be 'a sect of statesmen, lawyers, jugglers, magicians.'<sup>2</sup> But if the understanding and fancy be both heightened to their due 'elevation,'<sup>3</sup> 'suddenly prophets emerge.'<sup>4</sup> Only this I had almost forgot, which yet he thinks very convenient, that they should have good diet for the time of their prophesying; for, as he tells you, according to the mind of the Jews, 'prophecy dwells not 'mid sorrow and sloth.'<sup>5</sup> So that the 'sons of clay,'<sup>6</sup> the vulgar sort of people, are no more fit to prophesy 'than an ass or a frog.'<sup>7</sup>

These are his own words.<sup>8</sup> But surely this doctor himself did not prophesy, but dream all this while? How else did he think that such a noble and spiritual employment, such a great and glorious privilege as this is, could be raised by the power of man out of the strength of nature, that nature that is so fallen and degenerated? And what means he to 'limit the Holy One of Israel, and to restrain the Spirit of the Almighty?' Grant that Isaiah was a courtier, yet was not Amos an herdsman? and was not he also among the prophets? Did he never hear of the weaker sex sometimes prophesying? which yet was never famous for intellectuals. Does not this prophetic spirit breathe when it pleaseth, and where it pleaseth, and how it pleaseth? Methinks this second Moses should

Ps. lxxviii. 41.

Judg. iv. 4.

2 Chron.  
xxxiv. 22.

Isa. viii. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Secta sapientum speculatorum.

<sup>2</sup> Secta politicorum, jurisperitorum, præstigiatorum, incantatorum.

<sup>3</sup> Apex.

<sup>4</sup> Repente fiunt prophætæ.

<sup>5</sup> Prophetia neque habitat inter tristitiam neque pigritiam.

<sup>6</sup> Terræ filii—עַם אֶרֶץ.

<sup>7</sup> Quam vel asinus vel rana.

<sup>8</sup> The similarity between Maimonides's theory of inspiration, and that lately revived, is striking: 'There is no new thing under the sun.'—*Ed.*

not be offended, though some of the ordinary people be prophets. Or if natural endowments, or artificial preparations must be had, and if they of themselves be so potent and energetical, how then comes vision to fail, and how does prophecy cease? Are there none that have their imagination strong enough, that have their understandings raised enough? that are of unquestionable integrity, and are not wanting in study and industry, and yet are no prophets, nor prophet's sons? Let, then, this 'candle of the Lord' content itself with its proper object. It finds work enough, and difficulty enough, in the discovery of present things, and has not such a copious light as can search out future events.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS A CERTAIN LIGHT.

THE light of reason is 'a certain light.'<sup>1</sup> Lamp-light, as it is not glorious, so it is not deceitful, though it be but a faint and languishing light. Though it be but a limited and restrained light, yet it will discover such objects as are within its own sphere with a sufficient certainty. The letters of Nature's law are so fairly printed, they are so visible and capital, as that you may read them by this candle-light; yet some weak and perverse beings, not fit to be honoured with the name of men, slight all the workings and motions of reason upon this account, that they are rolling and fluctuating, that they are treacherous and inconstant. And they look upon logic, which is nothing else but the just advancement of reason, an art of ripening and mellowing reason, an art of clarifying and refining of the mind; they look upon it as an intellectual kind of juggling, an artificial kind of cheating and cozening their understanding.

—Nor were it a wonder if only the dregs of people, the rude lump of the multitude, if they only were sunk and degenerated into this folly. But I meet with a famous and ancient sect of philosophers that delight in the name of sceptics, who, by a strange kind of hypocrisy, and in an

<sup>1</sup> Lumen certum.

unusual way of affectation, pretend to more ignorance than they have, nay, than they are capable of. They quarrel with all arts and sciences, and do as much as they can to annihilate all knowledge and certainty; and profess nothing but a philosophical kind of neutrality and lukewarmness. Socrates did not please them; for he showed himself but a semisceptic, one that was too confident in saying that he did 'know this only, that he knew nothing';<sup>1</sup> for they will not allow so much knowledge as that comes to; this they tell you, that they do not know this, whether they know anything or not.

There was one sort of Academics, that came very near them; their motto was, 'I do not comprehend';<sup>2</sup> their meaning was, that they could not grasp or comprehend any object. Lucian, that unhappy wit, makes himself very merry with them, and laughs at one of them that had a servant that proved a fugitive and ran away from him. His master, says he, is very unfit 'to run after him';<sup>3</sup> for he will always cry, 'I cannot reach him, I cannot come near him.'<sup>4</sup> Yet if these Academics, by their 'want of comprehension,'<sup>5</sup> meant no more than this, that the whole intelligibility of any entity could not be exhausted by them, that they could not so perfectly and powerfully pierce into any object as to discover all that was knowable in it; their opinion then was not only tolerable, but very commendable and undeniable; for only God himself doth thus 'comprehend.'<sup>6</sup> There is not enough in any created lamp to give such a bright displaying of an object. Nor is there vigour enough in any created eye so to pierce into the pith and marrow, the depth and secrecy of being. But if their mind was this, as it is generally thought to be,

<sup>1</sup> Hoc tantum scire, se nihil scire.    <sup>4</sup> Οὐ καταλαμβάνω, οὐ καταλαμβάνω.

<sup>2</sup> 'I don't catch'—Οὐ καταλαμβάνω.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀκαταληψία.

<sup>3</sup> Δραπέτην μεταδιώκειν.

<sup>6</sup> Καταλαμβάνειν.

that there was nothing in being so visible, as that their understanding could pierce it with certainty and satisfaction; such an error as this was very derogatory to the plenitude and exuberancy of beings that streams out in a clear cognoscibility; and it was very injurious to their own rational capacities, which were not made so strait and narrow-mouthed as not to receive those notions that continually drop from being; but were contrived and proportioned for the welcoming and entertaining of truths that love to spin and thread themselves into a fine continuity, as if they meant to pour themselves into the soul without spilling.

But the sceptics will bid you 'rein up,'<sup>1</sup> and will desire you not to believe one word of this. They have no less than ten several bridles 'for restraining assent.'<sup>2</sup> Sextus Empiricus, that grand sceptic, will give you a sight of them all, from whence they were styled 'men that did check and constrain'<sup>3</sup> knowledge; that whereas 'the dogmatic philosophers,'<sup>4</sup> their adversaries 'diametrically,'<sup>5</sup> did lay down their determinations in a more positive and decreterious manner, these 'sceptics'<sup>6</sup> would take time to consider, and no less than all their lifetime. They chose to be so many perpetual questionists that would pose themselves, and rub themselves, and stay themselves finally, and would by no means be persuaded to commence or to take any degree in knowledge. 'All things are indefinite,'<sup>7</sup> that was the sum of all their philosophy. Their most radical and fundamental principle, if they may be said to have had any such, was this, 'that all propositions were *in æquilibrio*;<sup>8</sup> that there was nothing could incline the

<sup>1</sup> Ἐπέχειν.

<sup>2</sup> Ad compescendum et cohibendum assensum.

<sup>3</sup> Οἱ ἐφεκτικοί.

<sup>4</sup> Δογματικοί.

<sup>5</sup> Ex diametro.

<sup>6</sup> Σκεπτικοί.

<sup>7</sup> Πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα.

<sup>8</sup> Τῶ παντὶ λόγῳ τὸν λόγον ἴσον ἀντικείμεθα.

balance this way or that; that there was an 'exact equality of reason for the affirmation or negation of any proposition.'<sup>1</sup> Lucian brings in one of them with a pair of balances in his hand, crowding three or four arguments for the affirmative into one scale, and just as many for the negative into the other, and then telling them his meaning in these words: 'I have taken a great deal of pains in weighing of controversies, and yet find in them such an undistinguishable equipoise, as that there is not in me the least inclination to one side more than the other.'<sup>2</sup> This they term an 'indifference,'<sup>3</sup> an 'equilibrium,'<sup>4</sup> a speculative kind of 'impartiality,'<sup>5</sup> in respect of all things. In morals they call it 'carelessness,'<sup>6</sup> for as they would not acknowledge any 'true'<sup>7</sup> or 'false,'<sup>8</sup> so neither would they trouble themselves about 'the base'<sup>9</sup> or 'the honourable';<sup>10</sup> 'there is no *rather this way than that, or than neither way*.'<sup>11</sup> They had no better ethics than that speech would amount to; yet they had some laws amongst them, some customs and rules of life, but they did not observe them as 'things that were fixed and fit to be established';<sup>12</sup> they were far from being irreversible, like those of the Medes and Persians, but they put them under the head of 'things that appear,'<sup>13</sup> laws *pro tempore*; such shadows and appearances as they would for the present please themselves in. And, after all debates, after all their

<sup>1</sup> Ἴσοσθένεια μαχομένη πρὸς πίστιν καὶ ἀπίστιαν.

<sup>2</sup> Ζυγιστατῶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς λόγοις καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἴσον ἀπειθύνω, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀκριβῶς ὁμοίους τε καὶ ἰσοβαρεῖς ἴδω, τότε δὲ ἀγνοῶ τὸν ἀληθέστερον.—Βίων πρᾶσις, 27.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀδιαφορία.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀβρέψια.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀπροσωποληψία.

<sup>6</sup> Ἀπραγμοσύνη.

<sup>7</sup> Verum.

<sup>8</sup> Falsum.

<sup>9</sup> Turpe.

<sup>10</sup> Honestum.

<sup>11</sup> Οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐδετέρως.

<sup>12</sup> Τὰ βεβαίως γνωστα.

<sup>13</sup> Τὰ φαινόμενα.

siftings and discussings of affairs, they would conclude no otherwise than this: 'Perhaps it is, perhaps not; it is possible, or it is not possible; it may be, and it may not be;' <sup>1</sup> which were all but so many frigid expressions of their hesitancy and stammering opinion.

Yet this they called 'the standing still of the mind;' <sup>2</sup> a judicious pausing and deliberation, which they did far prefer, or rather seem to prefer, before the daring rashness of others that were more dogmatical and magisterial; 'swelling bladders, empty bottles,' <sup>3</sup> as they called them, that were sealed up as if they had some precious liquor in them, whereas they were filled with nothing but air and wind. There was more modesty, and less ostentation, as they thought, in their 'doubt,' <sup>4</sup> which they esteem no small temperance and sobriety in knowledge; an intellectual kind of continence and virginity, to keep their mind pure and untouched, when as other understandings were ravished and deflowered with the violence of every wanton opinion. Whereas demonstrations did not move these men at all; for, as they tell you, they always run either 'to the reasoning in a circle,' or 'carried out to infinity;' <sup>5</sup> they either rest in a *medium* equally obscure, which must needs be invalid and inefficacious, or else there will be no period at all, but a *processus in infinitum*. If you expect that they should acquiesce and rest contented with first principles, they know no such things; they tell you they are only some artificial pillars, which some faint and tired understandings have set up for themselves to lean upon; they will not be fettered with an axiom, nor chained to a

<sup>1</sup> Τάχα δὲ ἐστὶ, τάχα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἔξεστι μὲν εἶναι, ἔξεστι δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

<sup>2</sup> Στάσις διανοίας—as opposed to κίνησις, the movement of the mind.

<sup>3</sup> Κερεῖς οἰήσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀπορία.

<sup>5</sup> Εἰς τὸν διάλληλον, ἢ εἰς τὸν ἀπειρον τρόπον.

first principle, nor captivated by a common notion. As they break the most binding cords of demonstration asunder, so they threaten to make these pillars of truth to tremble. To prove, by a first principle, say they, is but 'begging the question;' <sup>1</sup> it is 'to seize what is to be sought for;' <sup>2</sup> it is 'to beg a truth,' not to evince it. If you tell them that these common notions shine with their native light, with their own proper beams, all that they return will be this, that perhaps you think so, but they do not. Yet that they might the better communicate their minds, they allowed their scholars to take some things for granted for a while, upon this condition, that they would distrust them afterwards.

But these doubters, these sceptics, were never so much convinced, as when they were quickened and awakened by sensitive impressions. This made some laugh at Pyrrho, though not the author, as is falsely supposed by some, yet a principal amplifier and maintainer of this sect—whence they had their name of 'the Pyrrhonists' <sup>3</sup>—who, when a dog was ready to bite him, beat him away, and ran as fast as he could from him. Some that took notice of it, gave him a smiling reproof for his apostatizing from scepticism; but he returns them this grave answer, 'How difficult it is to shake the man off entirely!' <sup>4</sup> Where he spoke truth before he was aware; for his words are 'a picture of Pyrrhonism,' <sup>5</sup> a brief description of the whole drift and intention of that sect, which was 'to put off the man;' <sup>6</sup> for they had sufficiently put off reason, and they did endeavour indeed to put off sense as much as they could. Yet the sceptical writer, Sextus Empiricus, confesses 'the

<sup>1</sup> Petitio principii.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ ζητούμενον συναρπάζειν.

<sup>3</sup> Οἱ Πυρρώνειοι.

<sup>4</sup> Ὡς χαλεπὸν εἶη ὀλοσχερῶς ἐκδῶναι ἄνθρωπον.

<sup>5</sup> Πυρρώνειας ὑποτίπνωσις.

<sup>6</sup> Ἐκδῶναι ἄνθρωπον.

vehemency and importunity of the sensitive;<sup>1</sup> 'they are,' saith he, 'so urgent and cogent, as that they do extort some kind of assent from us ;'<sup>2</sup> 'when we seem to be hungry, perhaps we go to our meat, and when thirsty to our drink,'<sup>3</sup> and when we have made a show of eating, at length we seem to be satisfied. All such matters of sense they resolve into some kind of 'appearances,'<sup>4</sup> that do for the present affect them. 'Honey seems to be pretty sweet and pleasant to them,'<sup>5</sup> but whether it do not dissemble, whether it be as it seems to be, that they question.

I find that Pyrrho, the great promoter and propagator of this sect, was at first a painter by his trade ; and it seems he was very loath 'to leave his art ;'<sup>6</sup> for he looks upon every being as a picture and colour, a shadow, a rude draught and portraiture, a mere representation, that hath nothing of solidity or reality. These pictures of his drawing enamoured many others ; for this sect was patronized by men of acuteness and subtlety ; the wits of the age ; 'bright geniuses, with a touch of madness ; pomegranates, but with a rotten stone.'<sup>7</sup>

I could name you authors of good worth and credit, who tell you that Homer, and Archilochus, and Euripides, and the wise men of Greece, were all sceptics ; yet those proofs which they bring to evidence and evince it, are not so pregnant and satisfying, but that you may very lawfully doubt of it, and yet be no sceptics neither. But Francis Mirandola reckons many very learned men that were deeply engaged in this sect, and some others that did very

<sup>1</sup> Ἀνάγκη τῶν παθῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀβουλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀγοῦσιν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν.

<sup>3</sup> Λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφὴν ἡμᾶς ὀδηγεῖ, δίψος δὲ ἐπὶ πόμα.

<sup>4</sup> Τὰ φαινόμενα.

<sup>5</sup> Φαίνεται ἡμῖν γλυκάζειν τὸ μέλι.

<sup>6</sup> Ab arte sua recedere.

<sup>7</sup> Magna ingenia, sed non sine mixtura dementiæ ; mala punica, sed non sine grano putrido.

near border upon it. Protagoras, among the rest, whom Plato frequently mentions, and whom Aristotle confutes, was of this mind, that all opinions were true. Sextus Empiricus passes this censure upon him, that he was too positive and dogmatical in asserting this ; but if he had only questioned and deliberated upon it, whether all opinions were not true, he had then been a rare and complete sceptic. The ground that Protagoras went upon was this, 'that man was the measure of all things.'<sup>1</sup> By 'measure'<sup>2</sup> he meant nothing else but 'test ;'<sup>3</sup> and Aristotle thus explains the words, 'for he made appearance of the whole essence and formality of truth.'<sup>4</sup> So that, according to him, several opinions were but the various discoveries and manifestations of truth. There was one 'truth, so far as you are concerned ;'<sup>5</sup> and another 'truth, so far as he is concerned.'<sup>6</sup> Honey was as truly bitter to a feverish palate, as it was sweet and delicious to an ordinary taste. Snow was as truly black, in respect of Anaxagoras, as it was white in the eye and esteem of another. 'Thus,' saith he, 'mad men, wise men, children, old men, men in a dream, and men awake, they are all competent judges of those things that belong to their several conditions ; for,' as he tells us, 'truth varies according to several circumstances ; that is true to-day which is not true to-morrow ; and that is true at Rome that is not true at Athens ; that is true in this age that is not true in the next ; that is true to one man that is not true to another.' There is none of you but can spy out such a weak fallacy as this is ; and if he meant to have spoken truth, he would have said no more than this, that every man thinks his own

<sup>1</sup> Πάντων πραγμάτων μέτρον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

<sup>2</sup> Μέτρον.

<sup>3</sup> Κριτήριον.

<sup>4</sup> Ὅποια γὰρ ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται πράγματα, τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι.

<sup>5</sup> Verum quod ad te pertinet.

<sup>6</sup> Verum quod ad illum pertinet.

opinion true. For as the will cannot embrace an object unless it be presented 'under the shadow of good,'<sup>1</sup> so neither can the understanding close and comply with any opinion unless it be disguised 'under the appearance of truth.'<sup>2</sup> But to make appearance the very essence of truth, is to make a shadow the essence of the sun; it is to make a picture the essence of a man. I shall say no more to Protagoras than this, that if any opinion be false, his cannot be true, but must needs be the falsest of all the rest.

Yet the end that these sceptics propound to themselves was, if you will believe him, 'a freedom from jars and discords,'<sup>3</sup> from heresy and obstinacy, to have a mind unprejudiced, unprepossessed; the avoiding of perturbations, a milky whiteness and serenity of soul—a fair mark indeed; but how a roving sceptic should ever hit it, is not easily imaginable; for what philosophy more wavering and voluble? Was there ever a more reeling and staggering company? Was there ever a more tumbling and tossing generation?

What shall I say to these old seekers, to this wanton and lascivious sect, that will espouse themselves to no one opinion, that they may the more securely go a whoring after all? If they be resolved to deny all things, as they can do it very easily, and have seemed to do it very compendiously, truly then they have taken a very sure way to prevent all such arguments as can be brought against them; yet because they seem to grant appearances, we will at least present them with a few 'appearances,'<sup>4</sup> and we will see how they will move them and affect them. It were well, then, if Pyrrho, the forementioned painter, would but tell us, whether a picture would be all one with a

<sup>1</sup> Sub umbra boni.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀταραξία καὶ μετριότητα.

<sup>2</sup> Sub apparentia veri.

<sup>4</sup> Φαινόμενα.

face; whether an appearance be all one with a reality; whether he can paint a nonentity or not; whether there can be an appearance where there is no foundation for it; whether all pictures do equally represent the face; whether none can paint a little better than he used to do; whether all appearances do equally represent being; whether there are not some false and counterfeit appearances of things. If so, then his 'indifference'<sup>1</sup> must needs be taken away; or, if there be always true and certain appearances of things, then his doubting and 'uncertainty'<sup>2</sup> must needs vanish. When he is thirsty, and chooses rather to drink than abstain, what then becomes of his 'indifference?'<sup>3</sup> if he be sure that he is athirst, and if he be sure that he seems to be athirst, what then becomes of his 'uncertainty?'<sup>4</sup> When the dog was ready to bite him, if he was indifferent, why did he run away? If it were an appearance, why did he flee from a shadow? Why was the painter afraid of colours? If his sense was only affected, not his understanding, how then did he differ from the sensitive creature, from the creature that was ready to bite him? If he tells us that he was the handsomer picture of the two, who was it then that drew him so fairly? was it an appearance also? Doth one picture use to draw another? When he persuades men to incline to his scepticism, what then becomes of his 'indifference?'<sup>5</sup> When he makes no doubt nor scruple of denying certainty, what then becomes of his 'uncertainty?'<sup>6</sup> But, not to disquiet this same Pyrrho any longer, I shall choose more really to scatter those empty fancies by discovering the true original and foundation, the right progress and method of all certainty.

Now God himself, that eternal and immutable Being,

<sup>1</sup> Ἀδιαφορία.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀπορία.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀπορία.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀδιαφορία.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀδιαφορία.

<sup>6</sup> Ἀπορία.

'that fixed and unshaken Entity,'<sup>1</sup> must needs be the fountain of certainty, as of all other perfections; and if other things be compared to Him, they may in this sense, without any injury to them, be styled 'appearances,'<sup>2</sup> in respect of the infinite reality, and weighty and massy solidity that is in His most glorious being, by virtue of which, as Himself hath everlastingly the same invariable knowledge of all things, so He is also the most knowable and intelligible object, a sun that sees all things, and is in itself most visible. An atheist must needs be a sceptic; for God himself is the only immovable verity upon which the soul must fix and anchor. Created beings show their face awhile, then hide it again; their colour goes and comes, they are 'in motion and flow.'<sup>3</sup> God is the only durable object of the soul. Now that the soul may have a satisfactory enjoyment of its God, and that it may be accurately made according to His image, God stamps and prints, as resemblances of His other perfections, so this also of certainty upon it. How else should it know the mind of its God? how should it know to please Him, to believe Him, to obey Him? With what confidence could it approach unto Him, if it had only weak and wavering conjectures?

Now God lets the soul have some certain acquaintance with other beings for His own sake, and in order to His own glory. Nor is it a small expression of His wisdom and power to lay the beginnings of man's certainty so low, even as low as sense; for by means of such a humble foundation, the structure proves the surer and the taller. It is true there is a purer and nobler certainty in such beings as are above sense, as appears by the certainty of angelical knowledge, and the knowledge of God himself;

<sup>1</sup> Τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ τὸ βεβαίως ὄν.

<sup>2</sup> Τὰ φαινόμενα.

<sup>3</sup> In motu et fluxu.

yet so much certainty as is requisite for such a rational nature as man's is, may well have its risings and springings out of sense, though it may have more refinings and purifyings from the understanding. This is the right proportioning of his certainty to his being; for as his being results out of the mysterious union of matter to immateriality, so likewise his knowledge, and the certainty of his knowledge, (I speak of natural knowledge,) first peeps out in sense, and shines more brightly in the understanding. The first dawns of certainty are in the sense, the noon-day glory of it is in the intellectuals. There are indeed frequent errors in this first edition of knowledge, set out by sense; but it is then only when the due conditions are wanting, and the understanding (as some printers use to do) corrects the old errata of the first edition, and makes some new errors in its own. And I need not tell you that it is the same soul that moves both in the sense and in the understanding; for 'it is the mind that sees, the mind that hears,'<sup>1</sup> and as it is not privileged from failings in the motions of the sense, so neither is it in all its intellectual operations, though it have an unquestionable certainty of some in both. The certainty of sense is so great, as that an oath, that high expression of certainty, is usually, and may very safely, be built upon it. Mathematical demonstrations choose to present themselves to the sense, and thus become ocular and visible.

The sceptics, that were the known enemies of certainty, yet would grant more shadow and appearance of it in sense than anywhere else, though erroneously. But sense—that racked them sometimes, and extorted some confessions from them which speculative principles could never do. Away, then, with that humour of Heraclitus, that tells us 'men's eyes are but weak and deceitful witnesses.'<sup>2</sup> Surely

<sup>1</sup> Νοῦς ὁρᾷ, καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει.

<sup>2</sup> Κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοί.  
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he speaks only of his own watery and weeping eyes, that were so dulled and blurred, as that they could not clearly discern an object. But he might have given others leave to have seen more than he did.

Nor can I tell how to excuse Plato for too much scorning and slighting these outward senses, when that he trusted too much inwardly to his own fancy. Sextus Empiricus propounds the question, Whether he were not a sceptic? but he only showed himself a sceptic by this, for which he moved such a question. It is sure that Plato was sufficiently dogmatical in all his assertions; though this indeed must be granted, that some of his principles strike at certainty, and much endanger it; for being too fantastical and poetical in his philosophy, he placed all his security in some uncertain, airy, and imaginary castles of his own contriving, and building, and fortifying,—his connate ideas I mean, which Aristotle could not at all confide in, but blowed them away presently; and perceiving the proud emptiness, the swelling frothiness of such Platonical bubbles, he was fain to search for certainty somewhere else; and casting his eye upon the ground, he spied the bottom of it lying in sense, and laid there by the wise dispensation of God himself; from thence he looked up to 'the highest top'<sup>1</sup> and 'pinnacle'<sup>2</sup> of certainty, placed in the understanding. The first rudiments of certainty were drawn by sense; the completing and consummating of it was in the understanding. The certainty of sense is more gross and palpable; the certainty of intellectuals is more clear and crystalline, more pure and spiritual. To put all certainty, or the chiefest certainty in sense, would be excessively injurious to reason, and would advance some sensitive creatures above men, for they have some quicker senses than men have. Sense

<sup>1</sup> Apex.

<sup>2</sup> Πτερίγιον.

is but the gate of certainty—I speak all this while but of human certainty—the understanding is the throne of it.

Descartes, the French philosopher, resolves all his assurance into thinking that he thinks,—why not into thinking that he sees? and why may he not be deceived in that, as in any other operations? And if there be such a virtue in reflecting and reduplicating of it, then there will be more certainty in a super-reflexion, in thinking that he thinks that he thinks; and so if he run *in infinitum*, according to his conceit, he will still have more certainty, though in reality he will have none at all, but will be fain to stop and stay in scepticism; so that these refuges of lies being scattered, first principles and common notions, with those demonstrations that stream from them, only remain, as the nerves of this assurance, as the souls of natural plerophory; and he that will not cast anchor upon these condemns himself to perpetual scepticism.<sup>1</sup>

This makes me wonder at a passage of a right honourable of our own, though, whether he be the author of the passage, you may take time to consider it; but this it is, the sense of it I mean, that absolute contradictions may meet together in the same respect. 'Existence and non-existence,'<sup>2</sup> it seems, are espoused in a most near and conjugal union, and live together very affectionately and embracingly. Oh, rare and compendious synopsis of all scepticism! Oh, the quintessence of Sextus Empiricus, and the Pyrrhonian 'outline'<sup>3</sup> of all their 'suspension of judgment,'<sup>4</sup> and 'uncertainty'<sup>5</sup> of their 'speechlessness'<sup>6</sup> and 'indefiniteness.'<sup>7</sup> That which is the most paradoxical of all,—you have all this in a book that calls itself by the

<sup>1</sup> The fundamental principle of the Scottish philosophy.

<sup>2</sup> Esse et non esse.

<sup>3</sup> Τποτύπωσις.

<sup>4</sup> Ἐποχή.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀπορία.

<sup>6</sup> Ἀφρασία.

<sup>7</sup> Ἀοριστία.

name of Truth;<sup>1</sup> yet let none be so vain as to imagine, that this is in the least measure spoken to the disesteem of that noble Lord, who was well known to be of bright and sparkling intellectuals, and of such singular and incomparable ingenuity, as that, if he had lived till this time, we cannot doubt but he would have retracted it, or at least better explained it before this time. However, I could not but take notice of so black an error, that did crush and break all these first principles, and had an irreconcilable antipathy against reason and certainty, though it hid itself under the protection of so good and so great a name. Certainty is so precious and desirable, as, where God hath given it, it is to be kept sacred and untouched; and men are to be thankful for these candles of the Lord, for this 'certain light'<sup>2</sup> set up not to mock and delude them, but to deal truly and faithfully with them.

<sup>1</sup> Lord Brooke.<sup>2</sup> Lumen certum.

## CHAPTER XV.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS DIRECTIVE.

THE light of reason is 'a directive light.'<sup>1</sup> This 'law written'<sup>2</sup> is a light for the feet, and a lantern for the paths; for the understanding is 'the leading and guiding power'<sup>3</sup> of the soul. The will looks upon that, as Leander in Musæus looked up to the tower for Hero's candle, and calls it, as he doth there,—

'Lamp, which to me, on my way through this life, is a brilliant director.'<sup>4</sup>

Reason 'carries a torch before'<sup>5</sup> the will, nay, more than so, it is an eye to the blind; for otherwise it were in vain to light up a candle for a 'blind power'<sup>6</sup> to see withal. Intellectuals are first in motion. These 'gates of light'<sup>7</sup> must first be set open, before any glorious and beautiful object can enter in for the will to court and embrace. The will doth but echo to the understanding, and doth practically repeat the last syllable of the 'final decision';<sup>8</sup> which makes the moralist well determine, that 'moral virtues cannot exist without intellectual powers';<sup>9</sup> for to the presence of moral virtues there are necessarily pre-required

<sup>1</sup> Lumen dirigens.<sup>2</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.<sup>3</sup> Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.<sup>4</sup> Λύχνον ἐμοῦ βιώτοιο φασσφόνον ἡγεμονῆα.<sup>5</sup> Facem præfert.<sup>6</sup> Cæca potentia.<sup>7</sup> Αἱ πύλαι φωτός.<sup>8</sup> Ultimum dictatum.<sup>9</sup> Virtutes morales non possunt esse sine intellectualibus.

'intelligence and wisdom ;'<sup>1</sup> the one being the knowledge of 'principles theoretical,'<sup>2</sup> as the other of 'principles operative.'<sup>3</sup>

That action must needs be hopeful and promising, when the understanding aims before the will shoots ; but he that in an implicit way rushes upon any performance, though the action itself should prove materially good, yet such a one deserves no more commendation for it, than he would do that first put out his eyes, and then contingently hit the mark. Other creatures, indeed, are shot more violently into their ends ; but man hath the skill and faculty of directing himself, and is, as you may so imagine, a rational kind of arrow, that moves knowingly and voluntarily to the mark of its own accord.

For this very end God hath set up a distinct lamp in every soul, that men might make use of their own light ; all the works of men, they should 'smell of this lamp'<sup>4</sup> of the Lord that is to illuminate them all. Men are not to depend wholly upon the courtesy of any fellow-creature ; not upon the dictates of men ; nay, not upon the votes and determinations of angels ; for if an angel from heaven should contradict first principles, though I will not say, in the language of the Apostle, 'let him be accursed,' yet this we may safely say, that all the sons of men are bound to disbelieve him.

All arguments drawn from testimony and authority, created authority I mean, were always looked upon as more faint and languishing than those that were fetched from reason. Matters of fact, indeed, do necessarily depend upon testimony ; but, in speculations and opinions, none is bound so far to adore the lamp of another as to put out his own for it. For when any such controversy is moved,

<sup>1</sup> *Intelligentia et prudentia.*

<sup>2</sup> *Principia operativa.*

<sup>2</sup> *Principia speculativa.*

<sup>4</sup> *Olere lucernam.*

when any author is quoted and commended, all the credit and esteem that is to be given him is founded either in the reason which he doth annex to his assertion, or else in this more remote and general reason, that such a one had a very clear and bright lamp ; that 'the candle of the Lord' did shine very eminently in him ; therefore what he says is much to be attended to ; for in his words, though there should not be 'a reason expressed,'<sup>1</sup> yet it is to be supposed that there is 'a reason understood.'<sup>2</sup> So that the assent here is ultimately resolved into the reason of him that speaks, and the other that receives it ; for he that complies with a naked testimony makes a tacit acknowledgment of thus much, that he is willing to resign up himself to another's reason, as being surer and fuller than his own ; which temper and frame of spirit is very commendable in a state of inchoation ; for 'a learner must have faith ;'<sup>3</sup> knowledge in the cradle cannot feed itself ; knowledge in its infancy must suck at the breasts of another. And babes in intellectuals must take in the 'sincere milk ;'<sup>4</sup> those spoonfuls of knowledge that are put in their mouths by such as are to nurse and to educate them. Paul, when he sits at the feet of Gamaliel, must observe the prints and footsteps of the Hebrew doctor, and must roll himself 'in the dust of the wise.'<sup>5</sup> Knowledge, in its nonage, in its pupilage and minority, must hide itself under the wing and protection of a guardian. Men use at first to borrow light, and to light their candle at the light of another's ; yet here I find some license and encouragement given to these first beginners, to these setters up in learning, to be 'modestly inquisitive'<sup>6</sup> into the grounds and reasons of that which is delivered to them.

Thus that sacred writer, Jerome, commends Marcella,

<sup>1</sup> *Ratio explicata.*

<sup>3</sup> *Χρῆ τὸν μανθάνοντα πιστεύειν.*

<sup>6</sup> *In pulvere sapientum.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ratio subintellecta.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ἄδολον γάλα.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ζητητικοί.*

though one of the weaker sex, upon this account, that she was wont to search and to examine his doctrine: 'So that I used to feel that I had a critic rather than a pupil.'<sup>1</sup> Nay, a far greater than Jerome honours the Bereans with the title of 'a more noble and generous sort'<sup>2</sup> of Christians, that would bring even apostolical words to the touchstone. Why is it not then lawful for them 'that are come to some pregnancy and maturity'<sup>3</sup> in knowledge to look upon the stamp and superscription of any opinion, to look any opinion in the face? The great and noble Verulam<sup>4</sup> much complains, and not without too much cause, of those sad obstructions in learning, which arose upon the extreme doting upon some authors, which were indeed men of rare accomplishments, of singular worth and excellency, and yet but men; though, by a strange kind of 'deification,'<sup>5</sup> a great part of the world would have worshipped them as gods. The canonizing of some profane authors, and esteeming of all other as apocryphal, has blasted many buds of knowledge; it has quenched many sparks and beams of light, which otherwise would have gilded the world with an orient and unspotted lustre.

Far be it from me to drop one word that should tend to the staining and eclipsing of that just glory that is due to the immortal name of Aristotle. There are those that are envious and ungrateful enough, let them do it if they please; yet this I shall say, and it shall be without any injury to him, that to set him up as a pope in philosophy, as a visible head of the truth-militant, to give him a negative voice, to give him an arbitrary power, to quote his texts as Scripture, to look upon his work as the irreversible decrees of learning, as if he had sealed up the canon; so

<sup>1</sup> Ita ut me sentirem non tam discipulum habere quam iudicem.

<sup>2</sup> Οἱ εὐγενέστεροι.

<sup>3</sup> In statu adulto.

<sup>4</sup> *Redargutio Philosophiarum*. Bacon's Works, vol. i. append. p. 107, fol. Lond. 1740.

<sup>5</sup> Ἀποθέωσις.

that whoever adds to him, or takes from him one word, must be struck with a present anathema; to condemn all for heretics that oppose him, for schismatics that depart from him, for apostates that deny him; what is all this but to forget that he was but the 'candle of the Lord,' and to adore him as a sun in the firmament, that was 'set to rule the day' of knowledge? It is to make him a 'being of beings,'<sup>1</sup> the 'first cause,'<sup>2</sup> the first mover of learning; or, at least, it was to make him such an 'actuating intellect,'<sup>3</sup> as Averroes<sup>4</sup> would have, that must inform and quicken all that come after him. Could that modest philosopher have foreseen and prophesied that the world would thus flatter him, it is to be feared that he would have thrown his works also, his legible self, into Euripus,<sup>5</sup> rather than that they should have occasioned such excessive idolatry and partiality. Yet it is no fault of his if the world would over-admire him; for that which first enhanced the price and esteem of Aristotle was that rich vein of reason that ran along and interlined most of his works.

Let this, therefore, and this only, commend him still; for this is of indelible and perpetual duration; yet if these blind admirers of him could have followed him fully and entirely, they might have learned of him a braver liberty and independency of spirit; for he scorned to enslave and captivate his thoughts to the judgment of any whatsoever; for though he did not deal violently and disingenuously with the works of his predecessors, as some affirm, yet he dealt freely with them, and was not over-indulgent to them. He came like a refiner amongst them, he purged away their dross, he boiled away their froth and scum, he

<sup>1</sup> Ὁν ὄντων.

<sup>3</sup> Intellectus agens.

<sup>2</sup> Causa prima.

<sup>4</sup> Note S.

<sup>5</sup> A reference to the story that Aristotle drowned himself in the Straits of Euripus, from vexation at not being able to account for its currents.

gathered a quintessence out of their rude and elementary principles. How impartially did he deal with his master Plato, and not favour him in any of his errors! And his words are answerable to his practices; you may hear him what he saith and professes: 'To have a reverent esteem of antiquity is but fitting and equal, but to stand in awe of it is base and unworthy.'<sup>1</sup>

'Senatorial power'<sup>2</sup> is very honourable and beneficial, but 'dictatorial power'<sup>3</sup> is not to be allowed in the commonwealth of learning; yet such hath been the intolerable tyranny and oppression of the Roman faction, as that they have enjoyed and engaged as many as they could to serve and torture their wits for the maintaining of whatever such a one as pleaseth them shall please to say; for they care not how prejudicial or detrimental they prove to learning, so that they may but train up their scholars in an implicit faith, in a blind obedience, in a slavish acknowledgment of some infallible judge of controversies; and may shut up and imprison the generality of people in a dark and benighted condition, not so much as allowing them the light of their own candle, this 'lamp of the Lord,' that ought to shine in them.

That great advancer of learning, whom I commended before,<sup>4</sup> takes notice, that by such unhappy means as these, the more noble and liberal sciences have made no progress proportionable to that which more inferior and mechanical arts have done; for in these latter 'the intellects of many are directed to one end;'<sup>5</sup> whereas, in the former, 'the intellects of many have bent under one.'<sup>6</sup> What brave improvements have been made in architecture, in manufactures, in printing, in the 'mariner's compass!'<sup>7</sup> For here

<sup>1</sup> Τοὺς παλαιούς αἰδεῖσθαι μὲν δίκαιον, φρίττειν δὲ οὐκ ἄξιον.

<sup>2</sup> Potestas senatoria.

<sup>3</sup> Dictatoria potestas.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Bacon.

<sup>5</sup> Ingenia multorum in unum coeunt.

<sup>6</sup> Ingenia multorum sub uno succubuerunt.

<sup>7</sup> Pyxis nautica.

is no limiting and restraining men to antiquity, no chaining them to old authors, no regulating them to I know not what prescribed forms and canons, no such strange voices as these: 'You must not build better than your predecessors have done; you must not print fairer than the first "Tully's Offices" that ever was printed.' It is not looked upon as a transgression and 'something requiring expiation,'<sup>1</sup> if they should chance to be a little more accurate than they were that went before them. But in speculatives, in mere mathematics, which one would think were far enough from any breach of faith or manners; yet here, if a Galileo should but present the world with a handful of new demonstrations, though never so warily and submissively, if he shall but frame and contrive a glass for the discovery of some more lights, all the reward he must expect from Rome is to rot in an Inquisition, for such unlicensed inventions, such adventurous undertakings. The same strain of cruelty hath marched more vehemently and impetuously in sacred and religious matters; for here Babylon hath heated her furnace seven times hotter; whilst under the pompous name of a Catholic Church, under the glittering pretences of antiquity and authority, they have, as much as they could, put out all the lamps of the Lord. And that bestial empire hath transformed all its subjects into sensitive and irrational creatures.

A noble author of our own tells us, in his book *De Veritate*,<sup>2</sup> that he, for his part, takes them for the Catholic Church that are constant and faithful to first principles; that common notions are the bottom and foundation upon which the Church is built. Excuse our dissidence here, great sir; the Church is built upon a surer and higher rock—upon a more adamantine and precious foundation; yet thus much is acceptable and undeniable, that whoever

<sup>1</sup> Piaculum.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Herbert.

they are that, by any practices or customs, or traditions or tenets, shall stop the passage of first principles, and the sound reason that flows from them, they are in this farther from a church than the Indians or the Americans, while they are not only Antichristian but unnatural.

And of the two, the Church hath more security in resting upon genuine reason than in relying upon some spurious traditions; for think but a while upon those infinite deceits and uncertainties that such historical conveyances are liable and exposed to,—I always except those sacred and heavenly volumes of Scripture, that are strung together as so many pearls, and make a bracelet for the spouse to wear upon her hands continually. These writings the Providence of God hath deeply engaged itself to keep as the apples of His own eye; and they do not borrow their certainty or validity from any ecclesiastical or universal tradition, which is, at the most, but previous and preparatory, but from those prints of divinity in them, and specially from the seal of the same Spirit that indited them, and now assures the soul that they were oracles breathed from God himself.<sup>1</sup> As for all other sacred antiquity, though I shall ever honour it as much as any either did, or can do, justly and with sobriety, and shall always reverence a grey-headed truth, yet if antiquity shall stand in competition with this lamp of the Lord,—though genuine antiquity would never offer to do it,—yet if it should, it must not think much if we prefer reason, a daughter of eternity, before antiquity, which is the offspring of time.

But had not the spirit of Antichristianism, by its early twinings and insinuations, wound and wrought itself, in

<sup>1</sup> See Owen's *Reason of Faith*, and *Of the Divine Original Authority, Self-evidencing Light, and Power of the Scriptures*; and Halyburton's *Essay on the Reason of Faith*, Prop. x. §§ 7, 8.—*Ed.*

most flourishing and primitive times, into the bosom of a virgin church; and had it not offered violence to the works of some sacred writers, by detracting and augmenting, according to its several exigencies; by feigning and adulterating, by hiding and annihilating some of them, as much as they could—the ordinary tricks of Antichrist, which he used always more subtly, though of late more palpably; had it not been for such devices as these, antiquity had come flowing to us in purer and fuller streams, in more fair and kindly derivations, and might have run down more powerfully and victoriously than now it will. But Antichrist hath endeavoured to be the Abaddon and the Apollyon of all sacred antiquities, though the very relics of those shining and burning lights that adorned the Church of God have splendour enough to scatter the darkness of Popery, that empty shadow of religion that arises 'from the deficiency of light';<sup>1</sup> yet antiquity, setting aside those that were peculiarly 'inspired,'<sup>2</sup> was but the first

Prov. iv. 18.

dawning of light, which was to shine out brighter and brighter till perfect day. Let none, therefore, so superstitiously look back to former ages, as to be angry with new opinions and displayings of light, either in reason or religion. Who dares oppose the goodness and wisdom of God? if he shall enamour the world with the beauty of some pearls and jewels, which in former times have been hid or trampled upon; if he shall discover some more light upon earth, as he hath let some new stars be found in the heavens; this you may be sure and confident of, that it is against the mind and meaning of antiquity to stop the progress of religion and reason.

But I know there are some will tell us of a visible tribunal, of an infallible head of the Church, born to determine all controversies, to regulate all men—it is a wonder

<sup>1</sup> Ob defectum luminis.

<sup>2</sup> Θεόπνευστοι.

they do not say angels too. Others more prudently and equally resolve the final judgment of controversies into a general and œcumenical council; but I shall speak to them all in the language of the philosopher, 'The law must rule all;' <sup>1</sup> and I shall explain it according to the mind of the learned Davenant, <sup>2</sup> in his discourse 'On the arbiter and rule of Christian faith and conduct.'<sup>3</sup> God only is to rule His own Church 'by a determining and legislative power.'<sup>4</sup> Men that are fitted by God himself, are to guide and direct it, 'in way of subserviency to Him, by an explication of His mind,'<sup>5</sup> yet so as that every one may judge of this 'by acts of their own understanding,'<sup>6</sup> illuminated by the Spirit of God; for there are no representatives in intellectuals and spirituals. Men may represent the bodies of others, in civil and temporal affairs, in the acts of a kingdom, and thus a bodily obedience is always due to just authority; but there is none can always represent the mind and judgment of another in the vitals and inwards of religion; for I speak not of representations in outward order and discipline. A general council does and may produce 'a public judgment,'<sup>7</sup> but still there is reserved to every single individual 'rational judgment';<sup>8</sup> for can you think that God will excuse any one from error upon such an account as this: 'Such a doctor told me this, such a piece of antiquity informed me so, such a general council determined me to this?' Where was thine own lamp all this while?

<sup>1</sup> Δεί τὸν νόμον ἄρχει πάντων.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most judicious theologian the Church of England has produced.—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup> De iudice ac norma fidei et cultus Christiani.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀυτοκρατορικῶς καὶ νομοθετικῶς—Judicio auctoritativo.

<sup>5</sup> Τηρητικῶς καὶ ἐρμηνευτικῶς—Judicio ministeriali.

<sup>6</sup> Ἰδιωτικῶς καὶ ἀκροατικῶς—Judicio privato et practicæ discretionis.

<sup>7</sup> Judicium forense.

<sup>8</sup> Judicium rationale.

Where was thy 'reason illuminated and directed according to the rules of good and necessary logic impressed on a rational creature?'<sup>1</sup>

Yet this must be gratefully acknowledged, that these general councils have been of public influence, of most admirable use and advantage to the Church of God, though they are not of the very essence of it; for it is well known that there was none of them till the days of Constantine. But herein is the benefit of councils, that they are, or ought to be, a comparing and collecting of many lights, a uniting and concentrating of the judgments of many holy, learned, wise Christians, with the Holy Ghost breathing among them, though not always so fully and powerfully as that they shall be sure to be privileged from every error; but being all of them subject to frailty and fallibility, and sometimes the major part of them proving the peyor part, there is none bound to give an extemporary assent to their votes and suffrages, unless his mind also concur with theirs.<sup>2</sup>

That worthy divine of our own, whom I mentioned before,<sup>3</sup> speaks very fully and clearly to this: 'There is no one who can believe at the simple dictate of another, without the exercise of private judgment, even if he were most anxious.'<sup>4</sup> The most eminent Mirandola will give you the reason of it; for, says he, 'Nobody believes a thing to be true, simply because he wishes to do so; for it is not in the power of a man to make a thing appear true to his

<sup>1</sup> Ratio illuminata et gubernata secundum normas bonæ et necessariæ consequentiæ, rationali creaturæ impressas.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Marvel does not think quite so well of councils as our author. See his *Short Historical Essay touching General Councils*, Works, 4to, vol. iii. p. 106.—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup> Davenant.

<sup>4</sup> Ad nudam præscriptionem aut determinationem alterius, sine lumine privati iudicii, nemo est qui credere potest, etiamsi cupiat maxime.

intellect when he pleases.<sup>1</sup> But before there can be faith in any soul, there must be 'a knowledge of the proposition to be believed;'<sup>2</sup> and there must be 'a tendency of the reason to give assent to this proposition when laid bare and known.'<sup>3</sup> Before you understand the terms of any proposition, you can no more believe it than if it came to you in an unknown tongue. A parrot may repeat the creed: thus 'you might imagine ravens as poets, and magpies as poetesses, to sing a song worthy of one who had drunk of Hippocrene.'<sup>4</sup> Though such at length may very safely conclude, as that talkative bird is reported to have done by a happy and extemporary contingency, 'I've lost my labour and my oil!'<sup>5</sup> This is the misery of those implicit believers amongst the Papists, and it is well if not among some Protestants too, that do 'go with their feet, rather than their hearts, into the opinions of others,'<sup>6</sup> dancing in a circular kind of faith: they believing as the Church believes, and the Church believing as they believe, &c. ; and this is with them כל האדם—'the whole of man,' the whole perfection of a Roman Catholic.

Eccles. xii. 13.

Yet let none be so foolish or wicked as to think that this strikes at anything that is truly or really a matter of faith, whereas it doth only detect the wretched vanity and deceit of a Popish and implicit credulity, which commands men to put out their lamps, to pluck out their eyes, and

<sup>1</sup> Nemo credit aliquid verum præcise quia vult credere illud esse verum, non est enim in potentia hominis facere aliquid apparere intellectui suo verum, quando ipse voluerit.

<sup>2</sup> Cognitio propositionis credendæ.

<sup>3</sup> Inclinatio intellectus ad assentiendum huic propositioni revelatæ et cognitæ.

<sup>4</sup> Corvos pœtas et pœtridas picas,  
Cantare credas Pegaseium melos.—Pers. *Prolog.* 13, 14.

<sup>5</sup> Operam et oleum perdidit.

<sup>6</sup> In aliorum sententias pedibus potius quam cordibus ire.

yet to follow their leaders, though they rush upon the mouth of hell and destruction; whereas it is better to be an Argus in obedience, than a Cyclops,

'A monstrous bulk deformed, deprived of sight.'—Dryden.

An eye open is more acceptable to God than an eye shut. Why do they not as well command men to renounce their sense, as to disclaim their understandings? Were it not as easy a tyranny to make you to believe that to be white which you see to be black, as to command you to believe that to be true which you know to be false? Neither are they at all wanting in experiments of both; for transubstantiation, that heap and crowd of contradictions, doth very compendiously put out the eyes of sense and reason both at once. Yet that prodigious error was established in the Lateran Council under Innocent the Third, which, as some contend, was a general and œcumenical council. And if the Pope, whom they make equivalent to all councils, nay, transcendent, if he, *in cathedra*, shall think fit to determine that the right hand is the left, they must all immediately believe him, under pain of damnation. So that first principles, common notions, with the products and improvement of them, must needs be looked upon as of bad consequence, of pernicious influence at Rome. What! to say that two and two make four, that 'the whole is greater than its part,'<sup>2</sup> especially if the Church shall determine against it,—Oh, dangerous point of Socinianism! Oh, unpardonable heresy of the first magnitude! Rebellion against the Catholic Church; a proud jostling against the chair of infallibility! Away with them to the Inquisition presently; deliver them up to the secular

<sup>1</sup> Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens; cui lumen ademptum.

Virg. *Æn.* iii. 658.

<sup>2</sup> Totum majus parte est.

powers ; bring fire and fagot immediately ; Bonner's learned demonstrations, and the bloody discipline of the scarlet and purple whore. No wonder that she puts out the candle, 'and loves darkness rather than light, seeing her deeds are evil.' She holds a cup in her hand, and will not let the world sip and taste, and see how they like it, but they must swallow down the whole philtum and potion without any delay at all. Thus you may see the weak reeds that Babylon leans upon, which now are breaking and piercing her through.

John iii. 19.

Rev. xvii. 4.

But religion, framed according to the gospel, did always scorn and refuse such carnal supports as these are. That truth that must look the sun in the face for ever, can you think that it will fear a candle? Must it stand in the presence of God, and will it not endure the trial of men? Or can you imagine that the spouse of Christ can be so unmerciful as to pull out her children's eyes, though she may very well restrain their tongues sometimes, and their pens, if they be too immodest and unruly? I shall need to say no more than this, that true religion never was, nor will be, nor need be, shy of sound reason, which is thus far 'a directive light,'<sup>1</sup> as that it is obliged, by the will and command of God himself, not to entertain any false religion, nor anything under pretence of religion, that is formally and irreconcilably against reason; reason being above human testimony and tradition, and being only subordinate to God himself, and those revelations that come from God. Now it is express blasphemy to say that either God, or the Word of God, ever did, or ever will, oppose right reason.

<sup>1</sup> Lumen dirigens.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS CALM AND PEACEABLE.

THE light of reason is 'a calm and friendly light;'<sup>1</sup> it is a candle, not a comet; a quiet and peaceable light. And though this 'candle of the Lord' may be too hot for some, yet the lamp is maintained only with soft and peaceable oil. There is no jarring in pure intellectuals; if men were tuned and regulated by reason more, there would be more concord and harmony in the world. As man himself is a sociable creature, so his reason also is a sociable light. This candle would shine more clearly and equally, if the winds of passion were not injurious to it. It were a commendable piece of stoicism, if men could always hush and still those waves that dash and beat against reason. If they could scatter all those clouds that soil and discolour the face and brightness of it; would there be such factions and commotions in the State, such schisms and ruptures in the Church, such hot and fiery prosecutions of some trifling opinions? If the soft and sober voice of reason were more attended to, reason would make some differences kiss and be friends; it would sheath up many a sword; it would quench many a flame; it would bind up many a wound. This 'candle of the Lord' would scatter many a dark suspicion, many a sullen jealousy. Men may fall out in the dark sometimes, they cannot tell for what. If the 'candle

<sup>1</sup> Lumen tranquillum et amicum.

of the Lord' were but amongst them, they would chide one another for nothing then but their former breaches. 'Knowledge establishes the soul;'<sup>1</sup> it calms and composes it; whereas passion, as the grand Stoic Zeno paints it, is 'an abounding and over-boiling impetus, a preternatural agitation of a soul;'<sup>2</sup> 'a commotion of the mind opposed to right reason, and contrary to nature,'<sup>3</sup> as the orator styles it. The soul is tossed with passion, but it anchors upon reason.

This gentleness and quietness of reason doth never commend itself more than in its agreeing and complying with faith, in not opposing those high and transcendent mysteries that are above its own reach and capacity. Nay, it had always so much humility and modesty waiting and attending upon it, that it would always submit and subordinate itself to all such Divine revelations as were above its own sphere. Though it could not grasp them, though it could not pierce into them, yet it ever resolved with all gratitude to admire them, to bow its head, and to adore them. One light does not oppose another; 'the lights of faith and reason'<sup>4</sup> may shine both together, though with far different brightness; 'the candle of the Lord' is not impatient of a superior light; it would both 'bear an equal and a superior.'<sup>5</sup>

The light of the sun, that indeed is 'monarchical light,'<sup>6</sup> a supreme and sovereign light; that with its golden sceptre rules all created sparkles, and makes them subject and obedient to the Lord and rule of all light. Created intellectuals depend upon the brightness of God's beams,

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἰσθῆσι τὴν ψυχὴν.

<sup>2</sup> Ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις.

<sup>3</sup> Animi commotio aversa a recta ratione, et contra naturam.

<sup>4</sup> Lumen fidei et lumen rationis.

<sup>5</sup> Ferre parem et priorem.

<sup>6</sup> Lumen monarchicum.

and are subordinate to them. Angelical starlight is but 'an aristocratic light;'<sup>1</sup> it borrows and derives its glory from a more vast and majestic light. As they differ from one another in glory, so all of them infinitely differ from the sun in glory. Yet it is far above the 'democratic light,'<sup>2</sup> that light which appears unto the sons of men; it is above their lamps and torches, poor and contemptible lights, if left to themselves; for do but imagine such a thing as this, that this external and corporeal world should be adjudged never to see the sun more, never to see one star more. If God should shut all the windows of heaven, and spread out nothing but clouds and curtains, and allow it nothing but the light of a candle, how would the world look like a Cyclops with its eye put out? It is now but an obscure prison, with a few grates to look out at; but what would it be then, but a nethermost dungeon, a capacious grave? Yet this were a more grateful shade, a pleasanter and more comely darkness, than for a soul to be condemned to the solitary light of its own lamp, so as not to have any supernatural irradiations from its God. Reason does not refuse any auxiliary beams; it joys in the company of its fellow-lamp; it delights in the presence of an intellectual sun, which will so far favour it, as that it will advance it, and nourish it, and educate it; it will increase it, and inflame it, and will by no means put it out. A candle neither can nor will put out the sun; and an intellectual sun can, but will not put out the lamp. The light of reason doth no more prejudice the light of faith, than the light of a candle doth extinguish the light of a star.

The same eye of a soul may look sometimes upon a lamp, and sometimes upon a star; one while upon a first principle, another while upon a revealed truth, as hereafter

<sup>1</sup> Lumen aristocraticum.

<sup>2</sup> Lumen democraticum.

it shall always look upon the sun, and see God face to face. Grace doth not come to pluck up nature as a weed, to root out the essences of men; but it comes to graft spirituals upon morals, that so by their mutual supplies and intercourse they may produce most noble and generous fruit. Can you tell me why the shell and the kernel may not dwell together? why the bodies of nature may not be quickened by the soul of grace? Did you never observe an eye using a prospective-glass, for the discovering, and amplifying, and approximating of some remote and yet desirable object? And did you perceive any opposition between the eye and the glass? Was there not rather a loving correspondency and communion between them? Why should there be any greater strife between faith and reason, seeing they are brethren? Do they not both spring from the same Father of Lights; and can the Fountain of love and unity send forth any irreconcilable streams? Do you think that God did ever intend to divide a rational being, to tear and rend a soul in pieces, to scatter principles of discord and confusion in it? If God be pleased to open some other passage in the soul, and to give it another eye, does that prejudice the former?

Acts vi. 26.

Man, you know, is ordained to a choicer end, to a nobler happiness, than for the present he can attain unto, and therefore he cannot expect that God should now communicate Himself in such bright and open discoveries, in such glorious manifestations of Himself, as He means to give hereafter. But he must be content for the present to behold those infinite treasures of reserved love, in a darker and more shadowy way of faith, and not of vision. Nature and reason are not sufficiently proportioned to such blessed objects, for there are such weights of glory in them as do 'weigh down the human mind';<sup>1</sup> there are such depths,

<sup>1</sup> Opprimere ingenium humanum.

such pleonasms, such oceans of all perfections in a Deity, as do infinitely exceed all intellectual capacity but its own. The most that man's reason can do is to fill the understanding to the brim; but faith throws the soul into the ocean, and lets it roll and bathe itself in the vastness and fulness of a Deity. Could the sons of men have extracted all the spirits of reason, and made them meet and jump in one head; nay, could angels and men have united and concentrated all their reason, yet they would never have been able to spy out such profound and mysterious excellencies as faith beholds in one twinkling of her eye. Evangelical beauties shine through a veil that is upon their face; you may see the precious objects of faith, like so many pearls and diamonds, sparkling and glittering in the dark. Revealed truths shine with their own beams; they do not borrow their primitive and original lustre from this 'candle of the Lord,' but from the purer light, wherewith God hath clothed and attired them as with a garment. God crowns His own revelations with His own beams. 'The candle of the Lord' doth not discover them; it doth not oppose them; it cannot eclipse them. They are no sparks of reason's striking, but they are flaming darts of Heaven's shooting, that both open and enamour the soul. They are stars of Heaven's lighting; men behold them at a great distance twinkling in the dark. Whatsoever comes in God's name does 'either find or make a way.'<sup>1</sup>

Whatever God reveals in His word is 'above the ordinary providence of the world,'<sup>2</sup> is not in the road of nature; and, therefore, for the welcoming and entertaining of it, as a noble author of our own<sup>3</sup> doth very well observe, 'a kind of supernatural and wonderful sense is developed.'<sup>4</sup> There

<sup>1</sup> Aut invenire viam aut facere.

<sup>2</sup> Supra providentiam rerum communem constitutam.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Brooke.

<sup>4</sup> Explicatur sensus quidam supernaturalis et θαυμάσιος.

is an opening of a new window in the soul, an intellectual eye looks out at the window, and is much pleased and affected with the oriency of that light that comes springing and rushing in upon it. As there is a 'law written,'<sup>1</sup> so there is a 'gospel written'<sup>2</sup> too; the one is written by the pen of nature, the other by the finger of the Spirit—for 'grace begins where nature ends';<sup>3</sup> and this second edition, set out by grace, is 'enlarged and improved,'<sup>4</sup> yet so as it doth not at all contradict the first edition that was set out by nature. For this is the voice of nature itself, that whatsoever God reveals, must needs be true; and this common principle is the bottom and foundation of all faith to build upon.

The soul desires no greater satisfaction than an 'ipse dixit';<sup>5</sup> for if God himself say it, who can question it; who dare contradict it? Reason will not, reason cannot; for it does most immovably acknowledge a Deity, and the unquestionable truth of a Deity. In all believing there is an assent, a yielding to Him that speaks by virtue of His own authority; though He do not prove it, though He do not evince it. Now men themselves look upon it as a contempt and injury not to have their words taken; and reason itself dictates thus much, that we are to believe such a one whom we have no reason to distrust; for without some faith there would be no commerce nor trafficking in the world—there is no trading without some trusting. A general and total incredulity would threaten a present and fatal dissolution to human society. Matters of fact are as certain in being and reality as demonstrations; yet in appearance most of them can never be proved or evinced any other way than by mere testimony.

<sup>1</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

<sup>2</sup> Εὐαγγέλιον γραπτόν.

<sup>3</sup> Ubi desinit natura, ibi incipit gratia.

<sup>4</sup> Auctior et emendatior.

<sup>5</sup> Αὐτὸς ἔφη.

Much historical knowledge, many a truth has been lost and buried in unbelief; whereas many a falsity, in the meantime, has proved more fortunate and triumphant, and has passed currently through the world under the specious disguise of probability. Yet because no created being is infallible or authentical, because the sons of men are so easily deceived themselves, and are so apt and propense to deceive and impose upon others; it will be very lawful to move slowly and timorously, warily and vigilantly, in our assents to them; for a sudden and precocious faith here is neither commendable nor durable. But God being truth itself—eternal, immutable truth; His word being 'the vehicle of truth,'<sup>1</sup> and all revelations flowing from Him shining with the prints and signatures of certainty, His naked word is a demonstration; and he that will not believe a God is worse than a devil; he is the blackest infidel that was ever yet extant.

This sin is so unnatural, as that none but an atheist can be guilty of it; for he that acknowledges a Deity, and knows what he acknowledges, sure he will not offer to make his God a liar. That which might otherwise seem to some to be against reason, yet if it bring the seal of God in its forehead, by this you may know that it is not against reason. Abraham's slaying of his son may seem a most horrid and unnatural act against the 'law written,'<sup>2</sup> against the 'candle of the Lord,' yet being commanded and authorized by God himself, the candle durst not oppose the sun. That pattern of faith, the father of the faithful, does not dispute and make syllogisms against it; he does not plead that it is against common notions, that it is against demonstrations, for he had said false if he had said so; but he doth dutifully obey the God of nature, that high and supreme Lawgiver, who by this call and

<sup>1</sup> Vehiculum veritatis.

<sup>2</sup> Νόμος γραπτός.

voice of His did plainly and audibly proclaim, that for Abraham to kill his son, in these circumstances, was not against the law of nature.

Gen. xxii.  
1-19.

So that all the stress and difficulty will be to know whether God reveals such a thing or not; for here reason, corrupt reason I mean, is wont to slip and evade; and when it cannot frame a conceit adequate and commensurate to some transcendent and superlative mysteries, it would then fain cloud them and eclipse them, that it may quench and avoid the dazzling brightness of them. It would fain make them stoop and condescend to its own capacity, and therefore it puts some inferior notion upon them. When it cannot grasp what God saith, it then presently questions whether God says so or not, whether that be the mind of His word.

Hence many may err very deeply and dangerously, who yet will acknowledge the Scriptures; they will own and honour them as the word of God; for they are not yet arrived to that full perfection of error, as those lumps and dunghills of all sects, I mean that young and upstart generation of gross antiscripturists,<sup>1</sup> that have a powder-plot against the gospel, that would very compendiously behead all Christian religion at one blow, a device which old and ordinary heretics were never acquainted withal. Though they be not come to such a height as this, yet, either by their flat and frigid explicating, they do endeavour to dispirit and enervate the word of God; or else, in a more violent and injurious manner, they do even ravish it, and deflower the virginity of it; or else, in a more subtle and serpentine manner, they seek to bend the rule, and expound it to their purposes and advantages.<sup>2</sup> The letter of

<sup>1</sup> The Deists, of whom Lord Herbert was the first, and in every way too favourable a representative.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> The 'Fratres Poloni,' and some of the Remonstrants.—*Ed.*

the word, the 'sheath of the word,'<sup>1</sup> that does not wound them, that does not strike them; and as for the edge, they think they can draw that as they please, they can blunt it as they list, they can order it as they will.

But the law of sound reason and nature does oppose such unworthy dealings as these are; for men look upon it very heinously to have their words misinterpreted, to have their meaning wrested and violenced. Can you think that the Majesty of Heaven will allow or endure that a creature should study or busy itself in perverting His words, in corrupting His meaning, in blending it and mixing it with the crude imaginations of its own brain?

That Spirit which breathed out the word at first, and which convinces and satisfies the soul that it is the word of God; the very same Spirit is the interpreter of it, He is the commentator upon it. The text is His, and the gloss is His; and whosoever shall call this a private spirit must needs be a bold blasphemer, a Jesuit, an atheist. But they that know what the Spirit of God is, will easily grant that the Spirit of God unsheathes His own sword, that He polishes evangelical pearls, that He anoints and consecrates the eye of the soul for the welcoming and entertaining of such precious objects. It is true, indeed, that some explications are so impertinent and distorted as that a profane and carnal eye may presently discern that there was either some violence or deceit used in them, as who cannot tell when any author is extremely vexed and wronged? but if there be such obscurity as may give just occasion of doubting and diffidence, who then can be fitter to clear and unfold it than the author himself? nay, who can explain his mind certainly but he himself? Is it not thus in spirituals much rather? When God scatters any twilight, any darkness there, is it not by a more plentiful shedding

<sup>1</sup> *Vagina verbi.*

abroad of His own beams? Such a knot as created understanding cannot untie the edge of the Spirit presently cuts asunder. Nor yet is Providence wanting in external means, which, by the goodness and power of God, were annexed as 'seals of the word'<sup>1</sup>—miracles I mean—which are, upon this account, very suitably and proportionably subservient to faith, they being above natural power, as revealed truths are above natural understanding. The one is above the hand of Nature, as the other is above the head of Nature. But miracles, though they be very potent, yet they are not always prevalent; for there were many spectators of Christ's miracles, which yet, like so many Pharaohs, were hardened by them; and some of them that beheld them were no more moved by them than some of them who only hear of them, will not at all attend to them. So that only the seal of the Spirit can make a firm impression upon the soul, who writes His own word upon the soul with a conquering triumphant sunbeam, that is impatient either of cloud or shadow. Be open, therefore, ye everlasting doors; and stand wide open, ye intellectual gates, that the Spirit of grace and glory, with the goodly train of His revealed truths, may enter in!

There is foundation for all this in a principle of nature; for we must still put you in mind of the concord that is betwixt faith and reason. Now this is the voice of reason, that God can, and that none but God can, assure you of His own mind; for if He should reveal His mind by a creature, there will still be some tremblings and waverings in the soul, unless He does withal satisfy a soul that such a creature does communicate His mind truly and really as it is, so that ultimately the certainty is resolved into the voice of God and not into the courtesy of a creature. This Holy Spirit of God creates in the soul a grace answerable to

<sup>1</sup> Sigilla verbi.

John xii.  
37-42.

Ps. xxiv. 7-10.

these transcendent objects; you cannot but know the name of it—it is called Faith, 'a supernatural form of faith,'<sup>1</sup> as Mirandola the younger styles it, which closes and complies with every word that drops from the voice or pen of a Deity, and which facilitates the soul to assent to revealed truths; so as that, with a heavenly inclination, with a delightful propension, it moves to them as to a centre.

Reason cannot more delight in a common notion or a demonstration, than faith does in revealed truth. As the unity of a Godhead is demonstrable and clear to the eye of reason, so the trinity of persons, that is, three glorious relations in one God, is as certain to an eye of faith. It is as certain to this eye of faith, that Christ is truly God, as it was visible to an eye, both of sense and reason, that He is truly man. Faith spies out the resurrection of the body, as reason sees the immortality of the soul. I know there are some authors, of great worth and learning, that endeavour to maintain this opinion, that revealed truths, though they could not be found by reason, yet when they are once revealed, reason can then evince them and demonstrate them. But I much rather incline to the determinations of Aquinas, and multitudes of others that are of the same judgment, that human reason, when it has stretched itself to the uttermost, is not at all proportioned to them, but, at the best, can give only some faint illustrations, some weak adumbrations of them. They were never against reason; they will always be above reason. It will be employment enough, and it will be a noble employment too, for reason to redeem and vindicate them from those thorns and difficulties with which some subtle ones have vexed them and encompassed them. It will be honour enough for reason to show that faith does not oppose reason; and this it may show, it must show this; for else, 'those that are

<sup>1</sup> Supernaturalis forma fidei.

within<sup>1</sup> the enclosure of the Church will never rest satisfied, nor 'those that are without,'<sup>2</sup> Pagans, Mahometans, Jews, ever be convinced.

God, indeed, may work upon them by immediate revelation, but man can only prevail upon them by reason; yet it is not to be expected, nor is it required, that every weak and new-born Christian that gives real assent and cordial entertainment to these mystical truths, should be able to deliver them from those seeming contradictions which some cunning adversaries may cast upon them. There are some things demonstrable which to many seem impossible, how much more easily may there be some matters of faith which every one cannot free from all difficulties? It is sufficient therefore for such that they so far forth understand them, as to be sure that they are not against reason; and that principally upon this account, because they are sure God has revealed them. And others that are of more advanced and elevated intellectuals, may give such explanations of them as may disentangle them from all repugnancy, though they cannot display them in their full glory.

Nor must the multitude or strength and wit of opposers fright men out of their faith and religion. Though the major part of the world do disesteem and look upon them as mere contradictions, yet this, being the censure of most unequal and incompetent judges, is not at all prejudicial to their worth and excellency; for to most of the world they were never revealed so much as in an external manner, and to all others that refuse and reject them, they were never powerfully revealed by the irradiations of the Holy Ghost. So that one affirmative here is to be preferred before a whole heap of negatives; the judgment of one wise, enlightened, spiritualized Christian is more to be attended to than the votes and suffrages of a thousand gainsayers;

<sup>1</sup> ΟΙ ἔσω.

<sup>2</sup> ΟΙ ἔξω.

because this is undeniable, that God may give to one that eye, that light, that discerning power, which He does deny to many others. It is, therefore, a piece of excessive vanity and arrogancy in Socinus, to limit and measure all reason by his own.

Nor does this put any uncertainty in reason, but only a diversity in the improving of it. One lamp differs from another in glory. And withal it lays down a higher and nobler principle than reason is; for in things merely natural, every rational being is there a competent judge; in those things that are within the sphere and compass of reason, the reason of all men does agree and conspire, so as that which implies an express and palpable contradiction cannot be owned by any: but in things above nature and reason, a paucity here is a better argument than a plurality, because Providence uses to open His cabinets only for His jewels. God manifests these mysterious secrets only to a few friends—His Spirit whispers to a few, shines upon a few, so that if any tell us that evangelical mysteries imply a contradiction, because they cannot apprehend them, it is no more than for a blind man confidently to determine, that it involves a contradiction to say there is a sun, because he cannot see it.

Why should you not as well think that a greater part of the world lies in error as that it lies in wickedness? Is it not defective in the choicest intellectuals, as well as in the noblest practicals?

Or can any persuade himself that a most eminent and refined part of mankind, and, that which is very considerable, a virgin company which kept itself untouched from the pollutions of Antichrist,<sup>1</sup> upon mature deliberation, for long continuance, upon many debatings, examinings,

<sup>1</sup> The Waldensian churches—

"Even them who kept the truth so pure of old,

When all our fathers worshipt stocks and stones."—MILTON, *Son.* xviii.

The persecutions by the Duke of Savoy had excited great interest in England.

discussings, constant prayers unto God for the discovery of His mind, should all this while embrace mere contradictions for the highest points of their religion? or can any conceive that these evangelical mysteries were invented and contrived, and maintained by men? Could the head of a creature invent them? could the arm of a creature uphold them? have they not a divine superscription upon them? have they not a heavenly original? or can you imagine that Providence would have so blessed and prospered a contradiction, as always to pluck it out of the paws of devouring adversaries? When the whole Christian world was ready to be swallowed up with Arianism, dare any to say that God then prepared an ark only for the preserving of a contradiction? Providence does not use to countenance contradictions, so as to let them ride in triumph over truth.

The most that any opposer can say, if he will speak truth, is no more than this, that they seem to him to imply a contradiction; which may very easily be so, if he want a higher principle of faith, suitable and answerable to these matters of faith, both of them, the principle and object I mean, being supernatural, neither of them contranatural; for there is a double modesty in reason very remarkable,—as it does not ‘assert many things,’<sup>1</sup> so it does not ‘deny many things;’<sup>2</sup> as it takes very few things for certain, so it concludes very few for impossible.

Nay, reason, though she will not put out her eye, for that is unnatural, yet she will close her eye sometimes, that faith may aim the better, and that is commendable. And faith makes reason abundant compensation for this; for as a learned author of our own,<sup>3</sup> and a great patron both

<sup>1</sup> Multa asserere.

<sup>2</sup> Multa negare.

<sup>3</sup> I cannot call up the passage quoted, but it is probably from Hooker, or still more likely from Jeremy Taylor, whose *Liberty of Prophecy* was published in 1647.—*Ed.*

of faith and reason, does notably express it, ‘Faith is a supply of reason in things intelligible, as the imagination is of light in things visible.’ The imagination, with her witty and laborious pencil, draws and represents the shapes, proportions, and distances of persons and places, taking them only by the help of some imperfect description, and it is fain to stay here till it be better satisfied with the very sight of the things themselves. Thus faith takes things upon a heavenly representation and description—upon a word, upon a promise. It sees a heavenly Canaan in the map, before an intellectual eye can behold it in a way of clear and open vision; for men are not here capable of a present heaven, and happiness of a complete and beatifical vision; and therefore they are not capable of such mysteries in their full splendour and brightness;—for they, if thus unfolded, would make it [a present heaven]; but they now flourish only in the lattices; as Christ himself, the Cant. ii. 9. Head of these mysteries, they do ‘tabernacle among us;’<sup>1</sup> John i. 14. they put a veil upon their face, out of pure favour and indulgence to an intellectual eye, lest it should be too much overcome with their glory. The veils of the law were veils of obscurity, but the veils of the Gospel are only to allay the brightness of it. It is honour enough for a Christian if he can but touch the hem of evangelical mysteries, for he will never see a full commentary upon the Gospel till he can behold the naked face of his God.

Yet the knowledge which he hath of Him here, ‘an imperfect knowledge of things most illustrious,’<sup>2</sup> is most pleasant and delicious. It is better to know a little of God and Christ than to see all the creatures in their full beauty and perfection. The gleanings of spirituals is better than the vintage of naturals and morals. The least Judges viii. 2.

<sup>1</sup> Σκηνοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν.

<sup>2</sup> Imperfecta cognitio rerum nobilissimarum.

spangle of spiritual happiness is better than a globe of temporal. This sets a gloss and lustre upon the Christian religion, and highly commends the purity and perfection of it above all other whatsoever, in that it hath 'the deep things of God.'<sup>1</sup>

1 Cor. ii. 10.

Christ tries all His followers by His own sunbeams. Whereas the dull and creeping religion of Mahomet has nothing at all above nature and reason, though it may have many things against both: no need of faith there; there are no mysteries in his Alcoran, unless of deceit and iniquity. Nothing at all, 'except what can with ease be comprehended by any moderately wise intellect,'<sup>2</sup> as that solid author very well observes. And, therefore, that stupid impostor did not seal his words with any miracles, for there was not one supernatural truth to be sealed; nor could he have sealed it if it had been there, but only he prosecutes it with a sword. Mahomet's loadstone does not draw men, but his sword conquers them; he draws his sword, he bids them deliver up their souls, and tells them, that upon this condition he will spare their lives. 'Those signs which tyrants and robbers never lack,'<sup>3</sup> as he speaks notably. But the very principles of Christian religion are attractive and magnetical; they enamour and command, they overpower the understanding, and make it glad to look upon such mysterious truths as are reflected in a glass, because it is unable to behold them 'face to face.'<sup>4</sup>

1 Cor. xiii. 12.

This speaks the great pre-eminence of Mount Sion above Mount Sinai. In the law you have the 'candle of the Lord' shining; in the Gospel you have 'the day-spring

<sup>1</sup> Τα βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> Nisi quod de facile, a quolibet mediocriter sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci potest.

<sup>3</sup> Signa illa quæ tyrannis et latronibus non desunt.

<sup>4</sup> Πρῶτον πρὸς πρῶτον.

from on high,' the sun arising. Nature and reason triumph in the law, grace and faith flower out in the Gospel. Luke i. 78.

By virtue of this wise and free dispensation, weak ones chiefly receive the Gospel, for they are as well able to believe as any others; nay, they are apter to believe than others. If it had gone only by the advancement of intellectuals, by the heightenings and clarifyings of reason, who then would have been saved but the grandees of the world? the Scribes, the Pharisees, the philosophers, the disputers? But God has framed a way that confounds those heads of the world, and drops happiness into the mouths of babes. There are some understandings that neither spin nor toil; and yet Solomon in all his wisdom and glory was not clothed like one of these: for this way of faith is a more brief and compendious way. 'The way through reason is long, through faith short.'<sup>1</sup> Very few understandings, much less all, can demonstrate all that is demonstrable; but if men have a power of believing, they may presently assent to all that is true and certain. That which reason would have been sweating for this many a year, faith sups up the quintessence of in a moment. All men in the world have not equal abilities, opportunities, advantages of improving their reason, even in things natural and moral, so that reason itself tells us, that these are in some measure necessitated to believe others. How many are there that cannot measure the just magnitude of a star, yet if they will believe an astronomer, they may know it presently; and if they be sure that this mathematician hath skill enough, and will speak nothing but truth, they cannot then have the least shadow of reason to disbelieve him. 1 Cor. i. 20-28  
Matt. xi  
25, 26.  
Matt. vi.  
28, 29.

It is thus in spirituals. Such is the weakness of human

<sup>1</sup> Longum iter per rationem, breve per fidem.

understanding 'in the present state,'<sup>1</sup> as that it is necessitated to believing here ; yet such is its happiness, that it hath one to instruct it who can neither deceive nor be deceived. God hath chosen this way of faith that He may stain the pride and glory of man, that He may pose his intellectuals, that God may maintain in man great apprehensions of Himself, of His own incomprehensibility, of His own truth, of His own revelations, as that He may keep a creature in a posture of dependency so as to give up his understanding, so as to be disposed and regulated by Him. And if the cherubim be ambitious of stooping, if angelical understanding do so earnestly 'stoop down and look into it,'<sup>2</sup> methinks then the sons of men might fall down at the beautiful feet of evangelical mysteries, with that humble acknowledgment, 'Of this mystery I am unworthy to unloose the shoe-latchet.'<sup>3</sup> Only let thy faith triumph here, for it shall not triumph hereafter ; let it shine in time, for it must vanish in eternity.

You see then that reason is no enemy to faith, for all that has been said of faith has been fetched out of reason. You see there are mutual embraces between the law and the Gospel. Nature and grace may meet together, reason and faith have kissed each other.

<sup>1</sup> Pro hoc statu.

<sup>2</sup> Παρακίψαι.

<sup>3</sup> Non sum dignus solvere corrigiam hujus mysterii.

Isa. ii.  
10, 11, 17 ;  
xxiii. 9.  
1 Cor. i. 29.

1 Pet. i. 12.

John i. 27.

Ps. lxxxv. 10.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS A PLEASANT LIGHT.

THE light of reason is 'a pleasant light.'<sup>1</sup> All light is pleasant ; it is the very smile of nature, the gloss of the world, the varnish of the creation, a bright paraphrase upon bodies. Whether it discover itself in the modesty of a morning blush, and open its fair and virgin eyelids in the dawning of the day, or whether it dart out more vigorous and spritful beams, shining out in its noonday glory ; whether it sport and twinkle in a star, or blaze and glare out in a comet, or frisk and dance in a jewel, or dissemble and play the hypocrite in a glow-worm, or epitomize and abbreviate itself in a spark, or show its zeal and the ruddiness of its complexion in the yolk of the fire, or grow more pale, pining and consuming away in a candle ; however it is pleased to manifest itself, it carries a commanding lustre in its face, though sometimes, indeed, it be veiled and shadowed, sometimes clouded and imprisoned, sometimes soiled and discoloured.

Who will not salute so lovely a beauty with a *Xaίρε φῶς* ! welcome thou firstborn of corporeal beings, thou lady and queen of sensitive beauties, thou clarifier and refiner of the chaos, thou unspotted beauty of the universe.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lumen jucundum.

<sup>2</sup> This calls up to the mind Milton's beautiful address to light—*Par. Lost*, book iii. 1-12 ; which, however, was written nearly twenty years later.—*Ed.*

Ecc. xi. 7.

Let him be condemned to a perpetual night, to a fatal disconsolate grave, that is not enamoured with thy brightness. Is it not 'a pleasant thing to behold the sun?' nay, to behold but a candle, a deputed light, a vicarious light, the ape of a sunbeam? Yea, there are some superstitious ones who are ready to adore it; how devoutly do they compliment with a candle at the first approach! how do they put off the hat to it, as if with the satyr they meant to kiss it! You see how pleasant the light is to them. Nay, that learned knight,<sup>1</sup> in his discourse of bodies, tells us of one totally blind, who yet knew when a candle came into the room, only by the quickening and reviving of his spirits.

Yet this corporeal light is but a shadow; it is but a black spot to set off the fairness of intellectual brightness. How pleasant is it to behold an intellectual sun! nay, to behold but 'the candle of the Lord!' How pleasant is this lamp of reason!

'Everything that is natural is pleasant.'<sup>2</sup> 'All the motions and operations of nature are mixed and seasoned with sweetness.' Every entity is sugared with some delight; every being is rolled up in some pleasure. How does the inanimate being clasp and embrace its centre, and rest there as in the bosom of delight! How flourishing is the pleasure of vegetatives! Look but upon the beauty and pleasure of a flower. Behold the lilies of the valleys, and the roses of Sharon; Solomon in all his glory was not clothed like one of these.

Matt. vi. 29.

Go then to sensitive creatures, and there you meet with pleasures in a greater height and exaltation. How are all the individuals amongst them maintained by acts of pleasure! How are they all propagated by acts of pleasure! Some of them are more merry and cheerful than the rest.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Kenelm Digby.<sup>2</sup> Πάν φυσικόν ἡδύ.

How pleasant and jocund is the bird! How musical is it! How does it sing for joy! Did you never see the fish playing in its element? Did you never see it caught with a bait of pleasure? Does not leviathan sport in the sea, and dally with the waves?

If you look up higher, to rational beings, to the sons of men, you will find there a more singular and peculiar kind of pleasure, while they have both a taste of sensitive delight, and a participation of intellectual. The soul and body enjoying a chaste and conjugal love, the pleasure of the soul is more vigorous and masculine, that of the body more soft and effeminate.

The nobler any being is, the purer pleasure it hath proportioned to it. Sensitive pleasure hath more of dregs; intellectual pleasure hath more of quintessence. If pleasure were to be measured by corporeal senses, the brutes, that are more exquisite in sense than men are, would by virtue of that have a choicer portion of happiness than men can arrive to, and would make a better sect of Epicureans than men are ever like to do. But therefore Nature hath very wisely provided that the pleasure of reason should be above any pleasure of sense; as much as, and far more than, the pleasure of a bee is above the pleasure of the swine. Have you not seen a bee make a trade of pleasure, and like a little epicure 'faring deliciously every day,' while it lies at the breast of a flower, drawing and sucking out the purest sweetness? And because it will have variety of dishes and dainties, it goes from flower to flower, and feasts upon them all with a pure and spotless pleasure; whereas the swine in the meantime tumbles and wallows in the mire, rolling itself in dirt and filthiness. An intellectual bee, that deflowers most elegant authors; a learned epicure, that sups up more orient pearls than ever Cleopatra did; one that delights in the embraces

Luke xvi. 19.

of truth and goodness, hath he not a more refined and clarified pleasure than a wanton Corinthian that courts Lais, than a soft Sardanapalus spinning amongst his courtezans, than a plump Anacreon, in singing, and dancing, and quaffing, and lascivious playing? 'In any one who exults in the greatness and superiority of the soul, the active and emulative pleasures put out of sight, and extinguish those of sense,'<sup>1</sup> as the elegant moralist hath it; and it is as if he had said, the delights of a studious and contemplative Athenian, or of a courageous and active Lacedemonian, are infinitely to be preferred before the pleasure of a delicate Sybarite, or a dissolute Persian. The delight of a philosopher does infinitely surpass the pleasure of a courtier. The choicest pleasure is nothing but the 'flowering of the true and the good.'<sup>2</sup> There can be no greater pleasure than of an understanding embracing a most clear truth, and of a will complying with its fairest good; this is 'to rejoice in spirit,'<sup>3</sup> as the Greeks call it; or, as the Latins, 'to be glad in the bosom.'<sup>4</sup> All pleasure consisting in that harmonious conformity and correspondency that a faculty hath with its object, it will necessarily flow from this, that the better and nobler any object is, the purer and stronger any faculty is, the nearer and sweeter the union is between them—the choicer must be the pleasure that ariseth from thence.

Now intellectual beings have the bravest object, the highest and most generous faculties, the strictest love-knot and union, and so cannot want a pleasure answerable to all this. Epicurus himself, as that known writer of the philo-

<sup>1</sup> Τῶν ἡδονῶν τὰς σωματικὰς αἱ πρακτικαὶ καὶ φιλότιμοι τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς δι' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ μέγεθος, ἐναφανίζουσι καὶ κατασθεννοῦσι.

<sup>2</sup> Efflorescentia veri et boni.

<sup>3</sup> Ἐν θυμῷ χαίρειν. The corresponding phrase in Hebrew is לֵב לֵב — 'glad of heart.'—1 Kings viii. 66.

<sup>4</sup> In sinu gaudere.

sophers' lives,<sup>1</sup> who himself also was a favourer and follower of the Epicurean sect, does represent him, that grand master of pleasure, though sometimes he seems to steep all pleasure in sense, yet upon more digested thoughts he is pleased to tell us, that the supreme delight is stored and treasured up in intellectuals. Sometimes, indeed, he breaks out into such dissolute words as these: 'I know no pleasure,' saith he, 'if you take away the bribes and flatteries of lust, the enticings and blandishings of sense, the graces and elegancies of music, the kisses and embraces of Venus.'<sup>2</sup> But afterwards he is in a far different and more sober strain, and seems to drop a pearl, though his auditors proved swine. His words were these: 'I mean not,' says he, 'the pleasures of a prodigal, or those that are situated in a carnal fruition,'<sup>3</sup> 'I intend a rational pleasure, a prudential kind of pleasure';<sup>4</sup> which makes him lay down this for an axiom, 'There can be no pleasure unless it be dipped in goodness';<sup>5</sup> it must come bubbling from a fountain of reason, and must stream out virtuous expressions and manifestations; and whereas others in their salutations were wont to write 'rejoice,'<sup>6</sup> he always wrote 'do well.'<sup>7</sup> But that ingenious moralist, whom I mentioned before, who could easily spy out the mind of Epicurus, and who was of greater candour and fairness than to wrong his opinion, doth yet so far lay it open and naked to the world, as that he notably detects the follies and vanities of that voluptuous philosopher, in that golden tractate of his, which he entitles, 'A man cannot live happily if he follow

<sup>1</sup> Diogenes Laertius.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ γε ἔχω τί νοήσω ἀγαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, καὶ τὰς δι' Ἀφροδίσειων, καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῶν.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς, καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας.

<sup>4</sup> Ἀλλὰ νήφρων λογισμοῦς καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρονήσιν.

<sup>5</sup> Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδὴς ζῆν ἀνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς.

<sup>6</sup> Χαίρειν.

<sup>7</sup> Εὖ πράττειν.

Epicurus;<sup>1</sup> where he shows that this jolly philosopher makes the body only the proper centre of pleasure; and when he tells you that the mind hath a more rarified delight, he means no more than this, that the mind perceives the pleasure of sense better than the sense does; which makes the fore-mentioned author pass this witty censure upon them, 'They pour no pleasure upon the soul, but that which comes out of the impure and musty vessel of the body.'<sup>2</sup> The whole sum of Epicurus's ethics, which he styles his canonical philosophy, is this, 'that pleasure was the "Alpha"<sup>3</sup> and "Omega"<sup>4</sup> of all happiness.'<sup>5</sup> To this purpose he wrote a multitude of books, and scattered them like so many of his atoms; and the greedy appetite of his licentious followers was easily caught with these baits of pleasure, which made his opinions to be styled 'meretricious doctrines,'<sup>6</sup> that curled their locks, painted their faces, opened their naked breasts, and clothed themselves in soft and silken apparel, to see if they could thus entice the world. They were 'doctrinal Sirens,'<sup>7</sup> that with a melting and delicate voice, did endeavour to soften and win upon the hearts of men as much as they could. The quintessence of all his doctrine was this,

'Pleasure, that guide of life, and mistress too,'<sup>8</sup>—(Creech.)

as Lucretius, the Epicurean poet, sings. The practice of that frolic<sup>9</sup> professor of pleasure, did sufficiently explain

<sup>1</sup> Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν κατ' Ἐπικούρου.—Non potest suaviter vivere secundum Epicuri decreta.—Plutarch.

<sup>2</sup> Τὴν ἡδονὴν καθάπερ οἶνον ἐκ τοῦ ποτηροῦ ἀγγείου διαχέοντες.

<sup>3</sup> Α.

<sup>4</sup> Ω.

<sup>5</sup> Τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

<sup>6</sup> Meretricia dogmata.

<sup>7</sup> Δογματικαὶ Σειρήνες.

<sup>8</sup> Dux vitæ dia voluptas.—*De Rerum Natura*, ii. 172.

<sup>9</sup> Frolic, as an adjective, is nearly out of use. 'We fairies are now frolic.'—Shakspeare, *Mid. Dream*. 'The frolic wind.'—Milton, *L'Allegro*. 'Frolic play.'—Collins, *Ode to the Passions*.

and comment upon his mind. His dwelling was in a garden, a fit place to crown with rosebuds, 'to crop the tops'<sup>1</sup> of pleasure, to let no flower of the spring pass untouched of him. Here he was furnished with all his voluptuous accommodations, and he might spread like a green and flourishing bay-tree. But amongst all his pleasure, methinks none should envy that—which yet the writer of his life is pleased to observe—that 'he was wont 'to vomit twice a day constantly after meals,'<sup>2</sup> by virtue of his excessive luxury. Oh, rare philosopher! that head of a vomiting sect, that licked up his and their own filthiness. Is this the work of an Athenian? Is this his mixing of virtue with pleasure? Will he call this 'living happily';<sup>3</sup> sure he will not call this 'living according to reason';<sup>4</sup> Yet his death was very conformable to his life, for he expired with a cup of wine at his mouth; which puts me in mind of the end of the other carousing epicure, that merry Greek, Anacreon, who, by a most emphatical tautopathy, was choked with the husk and kernel of a grape. So soon does the pleasure of an epicure wither, so soon are his resolves blasted; he eats, and drinks, and dies before to-morrow.

'Pleasures are like breezes';<sup>5</sup> they seem to refresh and fan the soul with a gentle breath, but they are not certain, not durable. Those corporeal delights, as that florid moralist, Plutarch, tells us, like so many sparks 'they make a crack and vanish';<sup>6</sup> like some extemporary meteors, they give a bright and sudden coruscation, and disappear immediately. The pleasures of taste are but 'on the end

<sup>1</sup> Δρέπειν κορυφάς.

<sup>2</sup> Δις τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμείν ἀπὸ τροφῆς.

<sup>3</sup> Ζῆν ἡδέως.

<sup>4</sup> Ζῆν φρονίμως.

<sup>5</sup> Αἱ ἡδοναὶ καθάπερ αἶθραι.

<sup>6</sup> Ἐξαψιν αἶμα καὶ σβέσιν ἐν σαρκὶ λαμβάνουσιν.

of the palate,<sup>1</sup> as that famous epicure, Lucretius, tells us :—

'The savours please within the mouth alone;  
For when the food's descended farther down,  
We taste no more, and all the pleasure's gone.'<sup>2</sup>—Creech.

Whereas intellectual joy shines with a fixed and undecaying brightness; and though these 'outward pictures of pleasure,'<sup>3</sup> as Plato calls them elegantly, lose their gloss and colour, yet the inward face of delight maintains its original and primitive beauty. Sensitive pleasure is limited and contracted to the narrow point of a 'now';<sup>4</sup> for sense hath no delight but by the enjoyment of a present object, whereas intellectual pleasure is not at all restrained by any temporal conditions, but can suck sweetness out of time past, present, and to come; the mind does not only drink pleasure out of present fountains, but it can taste those streams of delight that are run away long ago, and can quench its thirst with those streams which as yet run under ground. For does not memory, which therefore Plato calls 'the preserving of sensations,'<sup>5</sup> does it not reprint and repeat former pleasure? And what is hope but pleasure in the bud? Does it not antedate and prepossess future delight? Nay, by virtue of an intellectual percolation, the waters of Marah and

Exod. xv. 23:  
xvii. 7.

Meribah will become sweet and delicious. The mind can extract honey out of the bitterest object when it is past; how else can you construe the poet's words?

<sup>1</sup> In fine palati.

<sup>2</sup> Deinde voluptas est ð succo in fine palati.

*De Rerum Natura*, iv. 631.

<sup>3</sup> 'Ἡδοναὶ ἕξω γραφόμεναι.—*Philebus*, Opera, tom. v. p. 499. Lond. 1826.

<sup>4</sup> Τὸ νῦν.

<sup>5</sup> Δισθήσεων σωτηρία.

'An hour will come, with pleasure to relate  
Your sorrows past. . . . .'<sup>1</sup>—Dryden.

Corporeal pleasure is but drossy and impure; the wine is dashed with water. There is a 'sweet bitterness,'<sup>2</sup> as Plato in his *Philebus*, that book of pleasure, doth very plainly and fully explain it; and the instance that Socrates gives, is a quenching of thirst, where there is a very intimate connexion between vexation and satisfaction. Tell me, you that crown yourselves with rosebuds, do you not at the same time crown yourselves with thorns? for they are the companions of rosebuds. But intellectual pleasure, it is 'without grief, or suffering, or impurity,'<sup>3</sup> clear and crystalline joy; there is no mud in it, no feculency at all. Men are ashamed of some corporeal pleasures; the crown of roses is but a blushing crown, but who ever blushed at intellectual delights? Epicurus's philosophy was very well termed 'a philosophy of the night';<sup>4</sup> it was afraid to come to the light, whereas intellectual pleasure need not fear the light or the sunshine.

Men faint and languish with sensitive pleasures, as Lucretius himself upon much experience acknowledges:

Membra voluptatis dum vi labefacta liquescunt.  
*De Nat. Rer.* iv. 1108.

or, as the satirist speaks of the eminent wanton:

[Lassata viris, nondum satiata.  
Juvenal, *Sat.* vi. 130.

Nay, such is the state and temper of the body, as that it will better endure extreme grief than excessive pleasure.

<sup>1</sup> Hæc olim meminisse juvabit.—Virg. *Æn.* i. 207.

<sup>2</sup> Γλυκνικρότης.

<sup>3</sup> Ἄλυπος, ἀπαθής, εὐλικρινής.

<sup>4</sup> Νυκτερινή φιλοσοφία.

Did you never hear of the soft Sybarite, who complained in the morning of his weariness, and of his pimples, when he had lain all night only upon a bed of roses? But who ever was tired with intellectual pleasure? Who ever was weary of an inward complacency? Who ever surfeited of rational joy?

Other pleasures 'ingratiate themselves by intermission,'<sup>1</sup> whereas all intellectuals heighten and advance themselves by frequent and constant operations. Other pleasures do but emasculate and dispirit the soul, they do not at all fill and satisfy it. Epicurus may fill his with one of his atoms, as well as with one of his pleasures; whereas rational pleasure fills the soul to the brim; it oils the very members of the body, making them more free and cheerful.

Nay, speculative delight will make abundant compensation for the want of sensitive; it will turn a wilderness into a paradise. It is like you have read of the philosopher that put out his eyes, that he might be the more intent upon his study; he shuts his windows that the candle might shine more clearly within; and though he be rather to be wondered at than to be followed or commended, yet he did proclaim thus much by this act of his, that he preferred one beam of intellectual light before the whole glory of this corporeal world. How have some been enamoured with the pleasure of mathematics! When, says Plutarch, did any epicure cry out 'I've dined'<sup>2</sup> with so much joy as Archimedes did 'I've made the discovery?'<sup>3</sup> How have some astronomers built their nests in the stars, and scorned to let any sublunary pleasures rend their thoughts from such goodly speculations? The worst of men, in the meantime, glut themselves with sensitive plea-

<sup>1</sup> Voluptates commendat rarior usus.

<sup>2</sup> Βέβρωκα.

<sup>3</sup> Εβρηκα.

sure—'fools and knaves are merry,'<sup>1</sup> as he in Plato speaks. Apollo laughs but once in a year, whereas a fool laughs all the year long. And it is a great deal more consonant to sound philosophy, that rationality should be the spring of inward pleasure than of outward visibility.

Amongst all mental operations, reflex acts taste pleasure best, for without some self-reflection men cannot tell whether they rejoice or not; now these acts are the most distant and remote from sense, and are the highest advancements of reason. True pleasure is 'a serious matter,'<sup>2</sup> as the grave moralist Seneca speaks; and it is 'in the depth'<sup>3</sup> where truth and goodness, those twin-fountains of pleasure, are. Sensitive pleasure makes more noise and crackling, whereas mental and noetical delights, like the touches of the lute, make the sweetest and yet the stillest and softest music of all. Intellectual vexations have most sting in them, why then should not intellectual delights have most honey in them?

Sensitive pleasure is very costly; there must be 'much preparation and attendance,'<sup>4</sup> much plenty and variety:—

'I hate all the slaves that are sparing of labour;  
Give us roses abundant . . . . .'<sup>5</sup>—Francis.

It is too dear for every one to be an epicure—it is a very chargeable philosophy to put in practice; whereas rational delight freely and equally diffuses itself, you need not pay anything for fountain-pleasure; the mind itself proves a Canaan that flows with milk and honey.

Other pleasure a sick man cannot relish, an old man cannot embrace. Barzillai says he is too old to taste the

<sup>1</sup> Χαίρουσιν οἱ ἀφρονες καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί.

<sup>2</sup> Res severa.

<sup>3</sup> In profundo.

<sup>4</sup> Χορηγία πολυτελής.

<sup>5</sup> Parcentes ego dexteras

Odi; sparge rosas.—Hor. Carm. iii. xix. 21, 22.

2 Sam. xix.  
34, 35.

pleasures of the court. A crown of rosebuds does not at all become the grey head. But this noetical pleasure is a delight fit for a senator, for a Cato; it is an undecaying, a growing pleasure; it is the only pleasure upon the bed of sickness—the mind of him that has the gout may dance; it is the staff for old age to lean upon; these are the ‘Christmas (winter) roses’<sup>1</sup>—the delights of old age. How much is the pleasure of a wise Nestor above the pleasure of a wanton Menelaus!

The more rational and spiritual any being is, the larger capacity it has of pleasure. ‘The mind is lord of heaven and earth,’<sup>2</sup> saith Plato; and in a commendable sense it does ‘mix earth and heaven,’<sup>3</sup> and extract what sweetness it can out of both. The purer arts, the nobler sciences, have most pleasure annexed to them; whereas mechanical are more sordid and contemptible, being conversant about sensitive and corporeal objects. Seeing and hearing are the most pleasurable senses, because they receive their objects in a more spiritual and intentional manner, and are deservedly styled by the naturalist ‘the senses of enjoyment.’<sup>4</sup> Other senses are more practical, but these are more contemplative. ‘We call our perceptions through the eyes and ears sweet,’<sup>5</sup> as Aristotle tells us; for these are the ‘senses of instruction;’<sup>6</sup> they are the ‘direct informants of the mind;’<sup>7</sup> they contribute most to reason. The more any object is spiritualized, the more delightful

<sup>1</sup> Rosæ in hieme.

<sup>2</sup> Νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς.

<sup>3</sup> Terram cælo miscere.

<sup>4</sup> Sensus jucunditatis. The reference is to Aristotle’s expression, ὀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα ἡδέα, as no such phrase as *sensus jucunditatis* has been discovered in Pliny.—*Ed.*

<sup>5</sup> Φάμεν γὰρ ὀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα.—*Ethic. Nic. lib. x. 4; Opera, tom. ii. p. 1174.*

<sup>6</sup> Sensus disciplinæ.

<sup>7</sup> Ἀὐταγγελοὶ—mentis.

it is. There is much delight in the tragical representation of those things which in reality would be sights full of amazement and horror. The ticklings of fancy are more delightful than the touches of sense. How does poetry insinuate and turn about the minds of men! Anacreon might take more delight in one of his odes than in one of his cups; Catullus might easily find more sweetness in one of his epigrams than in the lips of a Lesbia. Sappho might take more complacency in one of her verses than in her practices.

The nearer anything comes to mental joy, the purer and choicer it is. It is the observation not only of Aristotle, but of every one almost. ‘Some things delight merely because of their novelty;’<sup>1</sup> and that surely upon this account, because the mind, which is the spring of joy, is more fixed and intense upon such things. The rosebud thus pleases more than the blown rose.

This noetical pleasure doth quietly possess and satiate the soul, and gives a composed and Sabbatical rest. So that, as the fore-mentioned philosopher has it, ‘Men that are taken up with intellectual joy trample upon all other inferior objects.’<sup>2</sup> See this in angelical pleasure. Those courtiers of heaven, much different from those on earth, neither eat nor drink, nor come near, nor desire to come near, any carnal pleasures. The painted and feigned heaven of a Mahomet, would prove a real hell to an angel or glorified saint. He plants a fool’s paradise of his own; there are trees of his own setting and watering—the fat and juicy olive, the wanton and sequacious ivy; and though he would not allow them vines on earth—such was his great love of sobriety, yet he reserves them for heaven. What means that sensual and sottish impostor, to give notice of

<sup>1</sup> Ἐνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα.—*Ethic. Nic. lib. x. 4; Opera, tom. ii.*

<sup>2</sup> Χαίροντες σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον.

heaven by an ivy-bush? Does he think that goats and swine, that Mahomets must enter into the new Jerusalem? This is just such a pleasure and happiness as the poets, that loose and licentious generation, fancied and carved out as most agreeable to their deities. They pour them out nectar, they spread them a table, they dish out ambrosia for them, they allow them a Hebe or a Ganymede to wait upon them, and do plainly transform them to worse than sensitive beings; such is the froth of some vain imaginations, such the scum of some obscene fancies, that dare go about to create an epicurean deity, conformable to their own lust and vile affections. Judge in yourselves, are these pleasures fit for a Supreme Being? Is there not a softer joy? Is there not a more downy happiness for a spiritual being to lay its head upon? That conqueror of the world<sup>1</sup> had far wiser and more sober thoughts, when he distinguished himself from a deity by his sleep and lust. And I began to admire the just indignation of Plato, who, though neither he himself, unless he be misreported, could content himself with intellectual pleasure, no, nor yet with natural, yet he would banish from the idea of his commonwealth all such scandalous and abominable poetry as durst cast such unworthy and dishonourable aspersions upon a deity, and make their god as bad as themselves, as if they were to draw a picture of him by their own faces and complexions.

Yet as all other perfections, so the perfection of all true and real pleasure, is enjoyed by God himself in a most spiritual and transcendent manner. That which is honour with men, is glory with Him; that which we call riches, is in Him His own excellency. His creatures are very properly, as the philosopher styled riches, 'a multitude of implements,'<sup>2</sup> all serviceable and instrumental to Him;

<sup>1</sup> Alexander the Great.

<sup>2</sup> Πληθος ὀργάνων.

and so that which among men is accounted pleasure, is with Him that infinite satisfaction which He takes in His own essence, and in His own operations. His glorious decrees and contrivances are all richly pregnant with joy and sweetness. Every providential dispensation is an act of choicest pleasure; the making of all beings, nay, of all irregularities, contribute to His own glory, must needs be an act of supreme and sovereign delight. The laughing His enemies to scorn is a pleasure fit for infinite justice; the smiling upon His Church, the favouring and countenancing of His people, is a pleasure fit for mercy and goodness. Miracles are the pleasure of His omnipotency; varieties are the delight of His wisdom. Creation was an act of pleasure; and it must needs delight Him to behold so much of His own workmanship, so many pictures of His own drawing. Redemption was an expression of that singular delight and pleasure which He took in the sons of men. Such heaps of pleasure as these are, never entered into the mind of an Epicurus, nor any of his grunting sect, who very near border upon atheism, and will upon no terms and conditions grant a deity, unless they may have one of their own modelling and contriving; that is, such a being as is wholly immersed in pleasure, and that such a pleasure as they must be judges of—a being that did neither make the world, nor takes any care of it; for that they think would be too much trouble to him, too great a burden for a deity; it would hinder his pleasure too much! May they not a great deal better tell the sun, that it is too much trouble for it to enlighten the world? May they not better tell a fountain that it is too much pains for it to spend itself in such liberal eruptions, in such fluent communications? Or shall natural agents act with delight 'to the utmost of their powers,'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ad extremum virium.

and shall not an infinite, and a free, and a rational Agent, choose such operations as are most delightful to Him? Would not Epicurus himself choose his own pleasure, and will he not allow a deity the same privilege? Will he offer to set limits to a being which he acknowledges to be above him? Must he stint and prescribe the pleasures of a god, and measure out the delights of the first being? Who should think that an Athenian, a philosopher, would thus far dim 'the candle of the Lord,' and could entertain such a prodigious thought as this, that the sun itself is maintained with the same oil as his decayed and corrupted lamp is?

That gallant moralist Plutarch does most notably lay the axe to the root of this abominable error; for, saith he, 'If Epicurus should grant a God in his full perfections, he must change his life presently; he must be a swine no longer, he must uncrown his rosy head, and must give that practical obedience to the dictates of a God which other philosophers are wont to do; whereas he looks upon this as his fairest rosebud, as the most beautiful flower in his garden of pleasure, that there is no Providence to check him or bridle him, that he is not so subject or subordinate as to stand in awe of a Deity.' But that brave author, whom I commended before, shows the inconsistency of this tenet with true and solid pleasure. For grant, O Epicure, that thou dost not care for a deity in a calm, yet what wilt thou do in a storm, when the north wind blows upon thy garden, and when the frost nips thy tender grapes? Thou dost not care for him in the spring, but wouldst thou not be glad of him in the winter? Will it be a pleasure then that thou hast none to help thee, none to guide thee, none to protect thee? Suppose a ship ready to be split upon a rock, or to be scooped<sup>1</sup> up of a wave, would this then be a comfort

<sup>1</sup> Another form of 'swoop' and 'sweep.'—Beaumont and Fletcher. *Philast.* v. 1.

and encouragement to it, or would it take pleasure in this, 'that it has no pilot to direct it, no tutelary deities to mind the welfare of it,'<sup>1</sup> but it must rush on as well as it can? Thou blind and fond Epicure, thou knowest not the sweetness of pleasure that might be extracted out of Providence, which is not 'a supercilious and frowning authority,'<sup>2</sup> but the indulgent and vigilant eye of a Father, the tender and affectionate care of a Creator. One blossom of Providence hath more joy and pleasure in it than all thy rosebuds. Where is there more delight than in the serving of a God? Look upon the sacrifices, what mirth and feasting are there! 'It is not the abundance of wine, nor the abundance of provision, that makes the joy and pleasure there;'<sup>3</sup> 'it is the presence of a propitious Deity, accepting and blessing his worshippers,'<sup>4</sup> that fills the heart with greater joy than an epicure is capable of!

Never was there a sect found out that did more oppose true pleasure than the Epicureans did; they tell us that they 'take pleasure in honour,' 'they reckon it sweet to be well thought of,'<sup>5</sup> 'they look upon it as a lovely and delightful thing;' yet by these tenets and practices of theirs, they quite stain and blot their honour, and so lose that piece of their pleasure which they pretend to. They say, if you will believe them, that they take pleasure in friends, when as yet they constitute friendship only 'by companionship in pleasures.'<sup>6</sup> Their friends must be boon companions, that must drink and be merry together, and run into the same

<sup>1</sup> Μήτε τινα κυβερνήτην ἔχειν μήτε τοὺς Διοσκούρους.

<sup>2</sup> Φοβερὸν τι σκυθρωπὸν.

<sup>3</sup> 'Αλλ' οὐκ οἴνου πλῆθος οὐδὲ βπτησις τῶν κρεῶν τὸ εὐφραῖνον ἐν ταῖς ἐορταῖς.

<sup>4</sup> 'Αλλὰ καὶ ἑλπίς ἀγαθὴ καὶ δόξα τοῦ παρῆναι τὸν θεὸν εὐμενῆ, καὶ δέχεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα κεχαρισμένως.

<sup>5</sup> Τὴν εὐδοξίαν ἢ δὴ ἡγοῦνται.

<sup>6</sup> Κατὰ τὴν κοινωμίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς.

excess of riot. Have not sensitive creatures as much friendship as this amounts to? They tell us they love the continuation of pleasure; why then do they deny the immortality of the soul? It is the voice of Epicurus and his swinish sect, 'There must be no eternity.'<sup>1</sup> What! are they afraid their pleasure should last too long? or are they conscious, as they may very well be, that such impure pleasure is not at all durable? It is the voice of the same impure mouth, 'There is no repetition of life.'<sup>2</sup> What! is he afraid of having his pleasures reiterated? Does he not expect a crown of rosebuds the next spring? or is he so weary, as well he may be, of his pleasure, as that he will prefer a nonentity before it? This sure was the mind and the desire of that Epicurean poet Lucretius, though a Roman of very eminent parts, which yet were much abated by a philtrum that was given him—a just punishment for him who put so much of his pleasure in a cup; and this desperate sligher of Providence at length laid violent hands upon himself.

Are any of you enamoured with such pleasure as this? You see what is at the bottom of an epicure's cup; you see how impatient a rational being is of such unworthy delights, and how soon it is cloyed with them. You see the misery of an epicure, whose pleasure was only in this life, and yet would not last out this life neither.

But all rational pleasure is not of a span long, but reaches to perpetuity. That moralist, whom I have so often mentioned, reckons up whole heaps of pleasure which spring from the continuation of the soul. 'There,' says he, 'shall I have the pleasure of seeing all my friends again;'<sup>3</sup> there I shall have the pleasure of more ennobled

<sup>1</sup> Δεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα μὴ εἶναι.

<sup>2</sup> Δὲς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι γίνεσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ 'κείθι φίλου μεμνήσοι' ἑταίρου.

acts of reason; 'there shall I taste the so much longed-for sweetness of another world.'<sup>1</sup> 'Neither Cerberus nor the Cocytus,'<sup>2</sup> &c. The fear of future misery cannot more terrify a guilty soul—the fear of which, it is like, made Epicurus put off all thoughts of another life as much as he could, for else the fear of that would have been a worm in his rosebud of pleasure; but the fear of that has not more horror and amazement in it—than the hope of future happiness has joy and delight annexed to it.

'The mind has this proof of being divine in its nature, that divine things please it,'<sup>3</sup> as that serious moralist Seneca speaks most excellently.<sup>4</sup> The soul by the enjoyment of God comes near the pleasure of God himself. The Platonists tell us that 'pleasure springs from the connection of the finite and the infinite,'<sup>5</sup> because the object of real pleasure must be 'sufficient in itself, perfect, satisfactory, pure, comprehensible, unmixed, indissoluble, essentially good.'<sup>6</sup> An intellectual eye married to the sun, a naked will swimming and bathing itself in its fairest good, the noblest affections leaping and dancing in the purest light, this speaks the highest apex and eminency of noetical pleasure; yet this pleasure of heaven itself, though, by a most sacred and intimate connexion, inseparably conjoined with happiness, is yet not the very essence and formality of it, but does rather flow from it by way of concomitancy and resultancy.

That which most opposes this pleasure, is that prodigious and anomalous delight, not worthy the name of

<sup>1</sup> Γλυκὴν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐδὲ ὁ Κέρβερος, οὐδὲ ὁ Κόκυτος, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>3</sup> Hoc habet animus argumentum divinitatis, quod eum divina delectant.

<sup>4</sup> Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* 1 praef.

<sup>5</sup> Voluptatis generatio fit ex infiniti et finiti copulatione.

<sup>6</sup> Αὐτάρκες, τέλειον, ἰκανὸν, καθαρὸν, νοητὸν, μονοειδὲς, ἀδιδλυτον, τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθόν.

delight or pleasure, which damned spirits and souls, degenerate far below the pleasure of Epicurus, take in wickedness, in malice, in pride, in lies, in hypocrisy; all which speaks them the very excrements of Beelzebub, the prince of devils.

But you that are genuine Athenians,<sup>1</sup> fill yourselves with noetical delights, and envy not others their more vulgar Bœotic pleasures, envy not the rankness of the garlic and onions, while you can feed and feast upon more spiritual and angelical dainties; envy not the wanton sparrows, nor the lascivious goats, as long as you can meet with a purer and chaster delight in the virginity of intellectual embraces. Do you devour with a golden epicurism the arts and sciences, the spirits and extractions of authors; let not an epicure take more pleasure in his garden than you can do in your studies—you may gather flowers there, you may gather fruit there. Convince the world that the very pith and marrow of pleasure does not dwell in the surface of the body, but in a deep and rational centre. Let your triumphant reason trample upon sense, and let no corporeal pleasures move you or tempt you, but such as are justly and exactly subordinate to reason. You come to Athens as to a fountain of learned pleasure; you come hither to snuff the candle of the Lord that is within you, that it may burn the clearer and the brighter. You come to trim your lamps, and to pour fresh oil into them. Your very work and employment is pleasure. Happy Athenians, if you knew your own happiness! Let him be condemned to perpetual folly and ignorance that does not prefer the pleasant light of 'the candle of the Lord' before all the pageantry of sensitive objects, before all the flaunting and comical joy of the world.

<sup>1</sup> An Address to the Cambridge Academics.—*Ed.*

Yet could I 'show you a more excellent way;' for the pleasures of natural reason are but husks in comparison of those Gospel delights, those mysterious pleasures that lie hid in the bosom of Christ, those rosebuds that were dyed in the blood of a Saviour, who took Himself the thorns and left you the roses. We have only looked upon the pleasure of a candle, but there you have the sunshine of pleasure in its full glory.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE LIGHT OF REASON IS AN ASCENDANT LIGHT.

✓ The light of reason is 'an aspiring light';<sup>1</sup>

'The genial flame, the love-enkindling light  
Which Jove, its friendly office to repay,  
Should plant all glorious in the realms of day,'<sup>2</sup>—(Fawkes.)

as Musæus sings in the praise of Hero's candle. Yet I mean no more by this than what that known saying of St. Augustine imports, 'Thou hast made us, O Lord, for thyself; our heart will be restless till it return to thee.'<sup>3</sup> 'The candle of the Lord'—it came from Him, and it would fain return to Him. For an intellectual lamp to aspire to be a sun, is a lofty strain of that intolerable pride which was in Lucifer and Adam; but for 'the candle of the Lord' to desire the favour, and presence, and enjoyment of a beatifical sun, is but a just and noble desire of that end which God himself created it for. It must needs be a proud and swelling drop that desires to become an ocean; but if it seeks only to be united to an ocean, such a desire tends to its own safety and honour. The face of the soul

<sup>1</sup> Lumen ascendens.

<sup>2</sup> . . . . . ὃν ᾤφελεν αἰθέριος Ζεὺς  
'Ἐννύχιον μετ' ἀέθλον ἀγειν ἐς ὀμήγγυριν ἀστρων.  
Musæus, καθ' Ἡρώ καὶ Λέανδ. 8, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Fecisti nos (Domine) ad te; irrequietum erit cor nostrum, donec redeat ad te.

naturally looks up to God. It is true of the soul as of the body:

'Man looks aloft, and, with erected eyes,  
Beholds his own hereditary skies.'<sup>1</sup>—Garth.

All light loves to dwell at home with the Father of lights. Heaven is 'the fatherland of lights.'<sup>2</sup> God has there fixed a tabernacle for the sun, for it is good to be there; it is a condescension in a sunbeam that it will stoop so low as earth, and that it will gild this inferior part of the world;—it is the humility of light that it will incarnate and incorporate itself into sublunary bodies; yet even there it is not forgetful of its noble birth and original, but will still look upwards to the Father of lights. Though the sun cover the earth with its healing and spreading wings, yet even those wings love to fly aloft, and not to rest upon the ground in a sluggish posture. Nay, light, when it courteously salutes some earthly bodies, usually meets with such churlish entertainment, as that by an angry reverberation it is sent back again; yet in respect of itself, it is many times a happy reflection and rebound, for it is thus necessitated to come nearer heaven.

If you look but upon a candle, what an aspiring and ambitious light is it! Though the proper figure of flame be globular and not pyramidal, as the noble Verulam tells us in his *History of Nature*, which appears by those celestial bodies, those fine and rarified flames, if we may so call them, with the Peripatetics' leave, that roll and move themselves in a globular and determinate manner: yet that flame which we usually see puts on the form of a pyramid, occasionally and accidentally, by reason that the air is injurious to it, and by quenching the sides of the flame crushes it, and extenuates it into that form, for otherwise

<sup>1</sup> . . . . . Cœlumque tueri  
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.—Ovid, *Met.* i. 85, 86.

<sup>2</sup> Patria luminum.

it would ascend upwards in one greatness, in a rounder and completer manner.

Heb. xii. 1.

It is just thus in 'the candle of the Lord;' reason would move more fully according to the sphere of its activity; it would flame up towards heaven in a more vigorous and uniform way, but that it is much quenched by that 'sin which easily besets us,'<sup>1</sup> and the unruliness of the sensitive powers will not allow it its full scope and liberty; therefore it is fain to aspire up, and climb up as well as it can in a pyramidal form. The bottom and basis of it borders upon the body, and is therefore more impure and feculent; but the *apex* and *cuspidis* of it catches at heaven, and longs to touch happiness, thus to unite itself to the fountain of light and perfection. Every spark of reason flies upwards. This divine flame fell down from heaven, and halted with its fall—as the poets in their mythology tell us of the limping of Vulcan;<sup>2</sup> but it would fain ascend thither again by some steps and gradations of its own framing.

Isa. v. 11.

Reason is soon weary with its fluttering up and down among the creatures; 'the candle of the Lord' does not waste itself in vain in searching for happiness here below. Some of the choicest heathens did thus spend their lamps, and exhaust their oil, and then at length were fain to 'lie down in' darkness and 'sorrow.' Their lamps did show them some glimmering appearance of a 'supreme good'<sup>3</sup> at a great distance, but it did not sufficiently direct them in the way to it; no more than a candle can guide a traveller that is ignorant of his way. You may see some of the more sordid heathen toiling and searching with their candle in the mines and treasuries of riches, to see if they could spy any vein of happiness there; but the earth

<sup>1</sup> *Εὐπερίστατος ἀμαρτία.*<sup>2</sup> Hom. *Il. A. sub fin.*<sup>3</sup> *Summum bonum.*

saith, 'It is not in me.' You may see others among them feeding and maintaining their candle with the air of popular applause, sucking in the breath and esteem of men, till at length they perceived that it came with such uncertain blasts, as that they choose rather to cloister themselves up in a lantern, to put themselves into some more reserved and retired condition, rather than to be exposed to those transient and arbitrary blasts, which some are pleased to entitle and style by the name of honours. You might see some of them pouring the oil of gladness into their lamps, till they soon perceived that voluptuous excess did but melt and dissolve the candle; and that pleasures, like so many thieves, did set it a blazing, and did not keep it in an equal shining. You might behold others, and those the most eminent amongst them, snuffing their candles very exactly and accurately, by improving their intellectuals, and refining their morals, till they sadly perceived that when they were at the brightest, their candles burnt but dimly and bluey, and that for all their snuffing, they would relapse into their former dulness. The snuffings of nature and reason will never make up a day nor a sunshine of happiness. All the light that did shine upon these Ethiopians did only discover their own blackness; yet they were so enamoured with this natural complexion, that they looked upon it as a piece of the purest beauty.<sup>1</sup>

Nature, Narcissus-like, loves to look upon its own face, and is much taken with the reflections of itself. What should I tell you of the excessive and hyperbolic vapourings of the Stoics in their adoring and idolizing of Nature, whilst they fix their happiness in the 'things in our own power'<sup>2</sup>—the things in their own compass and sphere. These were, as I may so term them, a kind of Pharisees

<sup>1</sup> 'Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.'—Shakspeare.<sup>2</sup> *Τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῶν.*

among the heathen, that scorned precarious happiness ; like so many arbitrary and independent beings, they resolved to be happy how they pleased, and when they listed. Thus do fond creatures boast of their decayed lamps, as if they were so many suns, or at least stars of the first magnitude. The Stoics spoke this more loudly, yet the rest of the heathen whispered out the same, for they were all of the poet's mind,—

. . . . . Nature to all men has given  
Power and means to be happy, if only we know how to use them.<sup>1</sup>

And they would all willingly subscribe to those words of Sallust, 'The human race complain of Nature falsely ;'<sup>2</sup> which, indeed, if understood of the God of Nature, were words of truth and loyalty ; but if they meant them, as certainly they did, of that strength which was for the present communicated to them, they were but the interpreters of their own weakness and vanity.

Yet it is no wonder to hear any of the heathen rhetorizing in the praise of Nature ; it may seem a more tolerable piece of gratitude in them to amplify and extol this gift of their Creator ; it is no wonder if such a one admire a candle, that never saw a nobler light. But for such as are surrounded and crowned with evangelical beams, for men that live under gospel sunshine, for them to promise themselves and others that they may be saved by the light of a candle, a Stoic, an Academic, a Peripatetic shall enter into heaven before these. Yet I find, that in the very beginning of the fifth century, Pelagius, a high traitor against the Majesty of heaven, scattered this dangerous and venomous error, endeavouring to set the crown upon

<sup>1</sup> . . . . . Natura beatiss  
Omnibus esse dedit, si quis cognoverit uti.

<sup>2</sup> Falso de natura queritur humanum genus.—Sallust, *Jugur.* præf. 1.

Nature's head, and to place the creature in the throne of God and grace. The learned Vossius, in his *Historia Pelagiana*,<sup>1</sup> a book full fraught with sacred antiquity, gives us this brief representation of him, that he was 'a trimmer of nature, and an affronter of grace.'<sup>2</sup> His body was the very type of his soul, for he 'wanted an eye ;'<sup>3</sup> to be sure he wanted a spiritual eye to discern the things of God. He was a Scot by nation,<sup>4</sup> a monk by profession, a man exemplary in morals, and not contemptible for learning ; for though Jerome vilify him in respect of both, yet Chrysostom gives him a sufficient *commendamus*, and Augustine himself will set his hand to it, that learned adversary of his, full of grace and truth, and the very hammer that broke his flinty and rebellious error in pieces.<sup>5</sup> If you would see the rise, and progress, and variations of this error, how it began to blush and put on more modesty in semi-Pelagianism ; how afterwards it covered its nakedness with some Popish fig-leaves ; how at length it refined itself, and dressed itself more handsomely in Arminianism, you may consult with the fore-mentioned author, who kept a relic of his Pelagian history in his own breast, whilst it left upon him an Arminian tincture. This spreading error leavened the great lump and generality of the world ; as the profound Bradwardine sighs and complains, 'Almost the whole world went into error after Pelagius ;'<sup>6</sup> for all men are born Pelagians. Nature is predominate in them, it has taken possession of them, and will not easily subor-

<sup>1</sup> 'Historiæ de Controversiis ; quas Pelagius, ejusque reliquæ moverunt, Libri septem.' 4to, Lug. Bat. 1628.

<sup>2</sup> Humani arbitrii decomptor, et divinæ gratiæ contemptor.

<sup>3</sup> Μονόφθαλμος.

<sup>4</sup> Pelagius was a native of Wales, not of Scotland. His vernacular name was Morgan, signifying sea-born, which he Græcised into Pelagius.—Cave, *Hist. Lit.* vol. i. cent. iv.

<sup>5</sup> Malleus Pelagianismi.

<sup>6</sup> Totus pæne mundus post Pelagium abiit in errorem.

dinate itself to a superior principle. Yet Nature has not such a fountain of perfection in itself, but that it may very well draw from another. This heathenish principle, after all its advancements and improvements, after all its whitenings and purifyings, must stand but afar off 'in the court of the Gentiles;'<sup>1</sup> it cannot enter into the temple of God, much less into the 'holy of holies;'<sup>2</sup> it cannot pierce within the veil.

The ennoblement of intellectuals, the spotless integrity of morals, the sweetness of dispositions, and the candour of Nature, are all deservedly amiable in the eye of the world. The candle of Socrates, the candle of Plato, and the lamp of Epictetus, did all shine before men, and shine more than some that would fain be called Christians. Nature makes a very fine show, and a goodly glittering in the eye of the world; but this candle cannot appear in the presence of a sun. All the paintings and varnishings of Nature please and enamour the eyes of men, but they melt away at the presence of God. The lamp of a moralist may waste itself in doing good to others, and yet at length may go out in a snuff, and be cast into utter darkness. The harmonious composing of natural faculties, the tuning of those spheres, will never make up a heaven fit for a soul to dwell in. Yet, notwithstanding, whatsoever is lovely in Nature is acceptable even to God himself, for it is a print of Himself, and He does proportion some temporal rewards unto it. The justice of an Aristides, the good laws of a Solon or a Lycurgus, the formal devotion of a Numa Pompilius, the prudence of a Cato, the courage of a Scipio, the moderation of a Fabius, the public spirit of a Cicero, had all some rewards scattered among them. Nor is there any doubt but that some of the heathens pleased God better than others. Surely Socrates was more lovely in His eyes than

<sup>1</sup> In atrio Gentium.

<sup>2</sup> Sanctum Sanctorum.

Aristophanes; Augustus pleased him better than Tiberius; Cicero was more acceptable to him than Catiline, for there were more remainders of his image in the one than in the other—the one was of purer and nobler influence than the other. 'The less wicked is, compared with the more wicked, good;'<sup>1</sup> the one shall have more mitigations of punishment than the other. Socrates shall taste a milder cup of wrath, whereas Aristophanes shall drink up the dregs of fury; if divine justice whip Cicero with rods, it will whip Catiline with scorpions. An easier and more gentle worm shall feed upon Augustus, a more fierce and cruel one shall prey upon Tiberius; if justice put Cato into a prison, it will put Cethegus into a dungeon.

<sup>1</sup> Kings xii. 11.

Nor is this a small advantage that comes by the excellencies and improvements of Nature, that if God shall please to beautify and adorn such a one with supernatural principles, and if He think good to drop grace into such a soul, it will be more serviceable and instrumental to God than others. Religion cannot desire to shine with a greater gloss and lustre, it cannot desire to ride among men in greater pomp and solemnity, in a more triumphant chariot, than in a soul of vast intellectuals, of virgin and undeflowered morals, of calm and composed affections, of pleasant and ingenuous dispositions. When the strength of Nature, and the power of godliness, unite and concentrate their forces, they make up the finest and purest complexion, the soundest and bravest constitution, like a sparkling and vigorous soul quickening and informing a beautiful body.

Yet this must be thought upon, that the different improvement, even of naturals, springs only from grace. For essentials and specificals, which are mere nature, they are equal in all; but whatsoever singular or additional perfec-

<sup>1</sup> Minus malus respectu peioris est bonus.

tion is annexed to such a one, flows only from the distinguishing goodness of a higher cause. That Socrates was any better than Aristophanes, was not nature, but a kind of common gift and grace of the Spirit of God ; for there are the same seminal principles in all. Augustus and Tiberius were hewn out of the same rock : there are in Cicero the seeds of a Catiline ; and when the one brings forth more kindly and generous, the other more wild and corrupted, fruit, it is accordingly as the countenance and favourable aspect of Heaven is pleased to give the increase ; for, as the philosopher tells us, ' the motion of the mover precedes the motion of the object to be moved.'<sup>1</sup> Was there any propension or inclination to goodness in the heart of a Cicero more than of a Catiline, it was only from the first mover, from the finger of God himself, that tuned the one more harmoniously than the other. As take two several lutes, let them be made both alike for essentials, for matter and form, if now the one be strung better than the other, the thanks is not due to the lute, but to the arbitrary pleasure of him that strung it ; let them both be made alike and strung alike, yet if the one be quickened with a more delicate and graceful touch, the prevailing excellency of the music was not to be ascribed to the nature of the lute, but to the skill and dexterity of him that did move it, and prompted it into such elegant sounds. The several degrees of worth in men that are above radicals and fundamentals of nature, are all the skill and workmanship, the fruits and productions of common grace ; for ' every particular action has its origin from a universal agent.'<sup>2</sup> Now if the universal agent did only dispense an equal concurrence in an equal subject, all the operations and effects that flow from thence must needs be equal also ; if, then, there be any

<sup>1</sup> Motio moventis præcedit motum mobilis.

<sup>2</sup> Omnis actio particularis habet originem ab agente universali.

eminency in the workings of the one more than of the other, it can have no other original than from that noble influence which a free and supreme agent is free to communicate in various measures, so that naked nature of itself is a most invalid and inefficacious principle, that does crumble away its own strength, and does wear and waste by its motions, and for every act of improvement depends only upon the kindness of the First Being. They that tell you Nature may merit grace and glory, may as well tell you, if they please, that a candle by its shining may merit to be a star, to be a sun.

Nor yet is Nature always constant to its own light ; it does not deal faithfully with its intimate and essential principles. Some darlings of Nature have abundantly witnessed this, while they have run into some unnatural practices that were the very blushes of Nature. If, then, Nature cannot tell how to live upon earth, will it ever be able to climb up to heaven ? ' If it knows not how to serve, it knows not how to rule ;'<sup>1</sup> if it be not faithful in a little, do you think it shall be made ruler over much ? No, Matt. xxv. 23. certainly ; moral endowments, when they are at the proudest top and apex, can do no more than what that great Antipelagian Prosper<sup>2</sup> tells us, ' They can make our mortal life distinguished, but cannot confer immortality.'<sup>3</sup> God has ordained men to a choicer end than these natural faculties can either deserve, or obtain, or enjoy. Nature's hand cannot earn it ; Nature's hand cannot reach it ; Nature's eye cannot see it.

That glorious and ultimate end which must fill and satiate the being of man, is the beatifical vision of God himself. Now there is no natural power nor operation proportioned to such a transcendent object as the face of

<sup>1</sup> Si nesciat servire, nescit imperare.

<sup>2</sup> Note T.

<sup>3</sup> Mortalem vitam honestare possunt, æternam conferre non possunt.

God, as the naked essence of a Deity. Inferior creatures may, and do move within the compass of their natures, and yet they reach that end which was propounded and assigned to their being; but such was the special and peculiar love of God, which He manifested to a rational nature, as that it must be advanced above itself by a 'supernatural aid,'<sup>1</sup> before it can be blest with so great a perfection as to arrive to the full end of its being.

Yet God has touched Nature with Himself, and draws it by the attractive and magnetical virtue of so commanding an object as His own essence is, which makes Nature affect and desire somewhat supernatural, that it may make nearer approaches unto happiness. For this end, God did assume human nature to the Divine, that He might make it more capable of this perfection, and by a strict love-knot and union might make it partaker of the Divine nature; not that it is changed into it, but that it has the very subsistence of its happiness by it. Every being does naturally long for its own perfection; and, therefore, a rational nature must needs thus breathe and pant after God, and the nearer it comes to him, the more intensely and vehemently it does desire him; for, as they tell us, 'the nearer a body approaches to its centre, the more cheerful and vigorous is its motion.'<sup>2</sup> The understanding that sees most of God desires to see more of Him; its eye will never leave rolling till it fix itself in the very centre of the Divine essence.

Nature, that has but some weak glimpses of Him, has but faint and languishing velleities<sup>3</sup> after Him. 'The heathens seem to nod after a *summum bonum*.'<sup>4</sup> What the state and condition of those heathens was and is, in

<sup>1</sup> Supernaturale auxilium.

<sup>2</sup> Motus naturalis velocior est in fine.

<sup>3</sup> 'The term used to signify the lowest degree of desire.'—Locke, *Hum. Und.* b. ii. ch. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως νεύουσι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν.

order to eternal happiness, we cannot easily nor certainly determine; yet this much may be safely granted, though we say not with the Pelagians, that the improvements of nature can make men happy; nor yet with the semi-Pelagians, that natural preparations and predispositions do bespeak and procure grace; nor yet with the Papists and Arminians, that works flowing from grace do contribute to more grace and glory; yet this we say, that upon the improvement of any present strength, God, out of His goodness, may, if He please, give more. As God freely gave them nature, which makes Pelagius sometimes call nature grace; and as He freely, and out of His grace, gave them some improvement of nature, so He might as freely give them supernatural strength, if it so please Him. Yet a creature cannot come to heaven by all those improvements which are built upon nature's foundation; for if it should accurately and punctually observe every jot and tittle of Nature's law, yet this natural obedience would not be at all correspondent or commensurate to a supernatural happiness, which makes Saint Augustine break out into such an expression as this: 'I doubt whether he who says that a man can be saved without Christ, can himself be saved by Christ;'<sup>1</sup> for this is the only way, 'the new and living way,' by which God will assume human nature to Himself, and make it happy. Heb. x. 20.

Yet, notwithstanding, their censure is too harsh and rigid, who, as if they were judges of eternal life and death, damn Plato and Aristotle without any question, without any delay at all; and do as confidently pronounce that they are in hell, as if they saw them flaming there. Whereas the infinite goodness and wisdom of God might, for aught we know, find out several ways of saving

<sup>1</sup> Qui dicit hominem servari posse sine Christo, dubito an ipse per Christum servari possit.

such by the pleonasms of His love in Jesus Christ; He might make a Socrates a branch of the true vine, and might graft Plato and Aristotle into the fruitful olive; for it was in His power, if He pleased, to reveal Christ unto them, and to infuse faith into them after an extraordinary manner; though, indeed, the Scripture does not afford our charity any sufficient ground to believe that He did; neither doth it warrant us peremptorily to conclude the contrary. These are 'secrets of God.'<sup>1</sup> It does not much concern us to know what became of them; let us then forbear our censure, and leave them to their competent Judge.<sup>2</sup>

But when we mention Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the more eminent and refined ones among the heathen, you must be sure not to entertain such a thought as this, that the excellency of their intellectuals and morals did move and prevail with the goodness of God to save them more than others of the heathen, as if these were 'dispositions having a congruous, though not condignous merit of salvation.'<sup>3</sup> This, indeed, were nothing but Pelagianism a little disguised; whereas you must resolve it only into the free grace of God that did thus distinguish them here in time, and might more distinguish them eternally, if it pleased Him to bestow a Saviour upon them. Which grace of God is so free as that it might save the worst of the heathen and let go the rest; it might save an Aristophanes as well as a Socrates, nay, before a Socrates, as well as a Publican before a Pharisee.

<sup>1</sup> *Secreta Dei.*

<sup>2</sup> To a flippancy young man, who asked the most Socrates-like Christian divine I ever knew, whether Socrates and Plato would be found in heaven? the reply was, 'Our first concern is to get there ourselves, and, if we succeed, we shall find these great men there, or a good reason why they are not there.'—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup> *Dispositiones de congruo merentes salutem æternam.* The reference is to the casuistic distinction between merit of congruity and merit of condignity.

Not only all heathen, but all men are of themselves in equal circumstances in order to eternal happiness; it is God only that makes the difference, according to His own determinations, that were eternal and unconditional. Yet I am far from the mind of those patrons of universal grace, that make all men in an equal propinquity to salvation, whether Jews, or Pagans, or Christians; which is nothing but dight and gilded Pelagianism, while it makes grace as extensive and catholic, a principle of as full latitude, as nature is, and resolves all the difference into created powers and faculties. This makes the barren places of the world in as good a condition as the garden of God, as the enclosure of the Church. It puts a philosopher in as good an estate as an apostle. For if the 'saving remedy,'<sup>1</sup> be equally applied to all by God himself, and happiness depends only upon men's regulating and composing of their faculties, how then comes a Christian to be nearer to the kingdom of heaven than an Indian? Is there no advantage by the light of the Gospel shining among men with healing under its wings? Surely, though the free grace of God may Mal. iv. 2. possibly pick and choose a heathen sometimes, yet, certainly, He does there more frequently pour His goodness into the soul where He lets it stream out more clearly and conspicuously in external manifestations. It is an evident sign that God intends more salvation there, where He affords more means of salvation; if, then, God do choose and call a heathen, it is not by universal but by distinguishing grace. They make grace nature that make it as common as nature. Whereas nature, when it was most triumphant, shining in its primitive beauty and glory, yet even then it could not be happy without grace.

Adam himself, besides his 'purity of nature,'<sup>2</sup> had also

<sup>1</sup> *Remedium salutiferum.*

<sup>2</sup> *Integritas nature.*

'the help of grace;'<sup>1</sup> for, as the schoolmen explain it, though he had 'strength fit for performing all natural duties, yet, in fact, he did nothing without the help of grace.'<sup>2</sup> As, if you expect any goodly and delicious clusters from a vine, besides its own internal form, which we will style Nature, there must be also 'the help of grace';<sup>3</sup> the sun must favour it and shine upon it, the rain must nourish it and drop upon it, or else Nature will never be pregnant and fruitful. Adam's candle did not shine so clearly but that grace was fain to snuff it. Nature, though it were complete and entire, yet it was fain to strengthen and support itself by its twinings about grace, and for want of the powerful support and manu-tenency<sup>4</sup> of grace, Nature fell down presently; it startled from itself, and apostatized like a broken bough.

What mean the Pelagians to tell us of a 'natural felicity,'<sup>5</sup> when Nature now is surrounded with so many frailties and miseries, so many disorders and imperfections? Yet were it as green and flourishing as ever it was when it was first planted in paradise, even then it would be too remote from happiness; for perfect happiness excludes and banishes all futurity and possibility of misery, which Nature never yet did, nor could do. And happiness never flows out till the sun look upon it, till it see the face of God himself, whom Nature's eye will never be able to behold. Yet, O how desirous is Nature of this! how inquisitive is human nature into the causes of things, and esteems it no small piece of its beatitude if it can find them out,—

'Happy is he who of things is able to find out the causes.'<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Adjutorium gratiæ.

<sup>2</sup> Vires idoneas ad prestanda omnia naturalia; reipsa tamen nihil præstitit sine auxilio gratiæ.

<sup>3</sup> Auxilium gratiæ.

<sup>4</sup> Holding by the hand—a word, I suspect, of the author's coinage, which has not become current.—*Ed.*

<sup>5</sup> Naturalis beatitudo.

<sup>6</sup> Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.—*Virgil, Georg. ii. 490.*

What a goodly sight is it, then, to behold the First Cause of all being, and its own being! how fain would an intellectual eye behold Him that made it! Nature longs to see who it was that first contrived it, and framed it, and fashioned it; the soul would fain see its Father of spirits; the candle would fain shine in the presence of Him that lighted it up.

Yet Nature cannot see the face of God and live—

'No one is blest till he leaves this life, his long home to enter.'<sup>1</sup>

The moralist's happiness is dormant in the night-time, for there is no 'action according to virtue'<sup>2</sup> then; nor can the soul, while it is clogged with a frail body, climb to the 'summit'<sup>3</sup> of goodness and happiness. The soul here has not a perfect enjoyment of inferior objects, much less of God himself; it has but a shadowy sight of angels, 'because our intellect is connate with phantasms';<sup>4</sup> and if Nature's eye cannot look upon the face of a twinkling star, how will it behold the brightness of a dazzling sun? that general knowledge which it hath of God here is mixed with much error and deceit.

Nor can faith look upon the Divine essence; it is a lovely grace indeed, yet it must die in the mount like Moses; it cannot enter into the land of promise; it is 'like hearing rather than vision,'<sup>5</sup> it hears the voice of its God, it does not see His face; it enflames the desire of his soul, it does not quench it; for men would fain see what they believe; the object of faith is obscure and at a distance, but the face of God is all presence and brightness. Happiness consists in the noblest operation of an intellec-

*Deut. iv. 22.*

<sup>1</sup> Ante obitum nemo supremaque funera felix.—*Ovid, Metam. iii. 137.*

<sup>2</sup> Operatio secundum virtutem.

<sup>3</sup> Ἀκρότης.

<sup>4</sup> Propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad phantasmata.

<sup>5</sup> Auditui magis similis quam visioni.

tual being, whereas in believing there is 'a most imperfect operation on the part of the intellect, though there is perfection on the part of the object.'<sup>1</sup>

Nor yet is the Divine essence seen in a way of demonstration, for then only a philosopher should see His face, such only as had skill in metaphysics, who yet may be in misery for all that, for demonstrations are no beatifical visions. The damned spirits can demonstrate a Deity, and yet they are perpetually banished from His face; there can be no demonstration of Him *à priori*, for He is the first cause; and all demonstrations fetched from such effects as flow from Him, do only show you that He is, they do not open and display the Divine essence; for they are not 'effects coming up to the power of the cause.'<sup>2</sup> To see God in the creatures, is to see Him veiled; it is to see Him clouded. The soul will not rest contented with such an imperfect knowledge of its God; it sees Him thus here, and yet that does not hush and quiet rational desires, but does increase and enlarge them. Such things as last long are perfected slowly, and such is happiness; the knowledge of men here is too green and crude, it will not ripen into happiness till the sun shine upon it with its blessed and immediate beams.

God therefore creates and prepares 'a light of glory'<sup>3</sup> for the soul; that is, such a supernatural disposition in an intellectual eye, by which it is clarified and fortified, and rightly prepared for beholding the Divine essence; which makes Dionysius, the falsely-supposed Areopagite, very fitly describe happiness by this, 'The soul's sunning of itself in the light of glory.'<sup>4</sup> Some will have that of the

<sup>1</sup> Imperfectissima operatio ex parte intellectus, licet sit perfectio ex parte objecti.

<sup>2</sup> Effectus adæquantes virtutem causæ.

<sup>3</sup> Lumen gloriæ.

<sup>4</sup> Στάσις ἐν δέσει φωτός.—Dion. Areop. *De Div. Nom.* ch. iv. § 6. Opera, tom. i. p. 469. Folio. Paris, 1644.

Psalmist to be sung in the praise of this light, 'In thy Ps. xxxvi. 9. light we shall see light.'<sup>1</sup> That seraphical Prophet does thus most excellently represent it: 'The sun shall be no more thy light by day; neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory.' You Isa. lx. 19. have it thus rendered in the Apocalypse: 'And the city had no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it; for the glory of God did lighten it.'<sup>2</sup> This 'light of Rev. xxi. 23. glory,'<sup>3</sup> which is 'a kind of likeness of the Divine intellect,'<sup>4</sup> as the schoolmen speak, is not so much for the discovering of the object, for that is an intellectual sun clothed with all perfection and brightness, as for the helping and advancing of a created understanding, which else would be too much oppressed with the weight of glory; but yet this augmentation of the visive faculty of the soul, by the 'light of glory,'<sup>5</sup> it is not 'the raising and screwing of nature higher,'<sup>6</sup> but it is 'the adding of a new and supernatural disposition'<sup>7</sup> that may close with the Divine essence; for, as Aquinas has it, 'Human understanding is as the matter accurately predisposed by the "light of glory,"<sup>8</sup> for the receiving of the Divine essence, as an intelligible form stamps an impression of itself upon it;<sup>9</sup> it prints the soul with that 'supreme good'<sup>10</sup> which it has so much longed for.

<sup>1</sup> In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.

<sup>2</sup> Καὶ ἡ πόλις οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ ἡλίου, οὐδὲ τῆς σελήνης, ἵνα φαίνωσιν αὐτῇ· ἡ γὰρ δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐφώτισεν αὐτήν.

<sup>3</sup> Lumen gloriæ.

<sup>4</sup> Similitudo quædam intellectus Divini.

<sup>5</sup> Lumen gloriæ.

<sup>6</sup> Per intentionem virtutis naturalis.

<sup>7</sup> Per appositionem novæ formæ.

<sup>8</sup> Lumen gloriæ.

<sup>9</sup> Ipsa Divina essentia copulatur intellectui, ut forma intelligibilis.

<sup>10</sup> Summum bonum.

So that though there be still an infinite disproportion between God and the creature 'in natural being,'<sup>1</sup> yet there is a fit and just proportion between them 'in intellectual being.'<sup>2</sup> Though an eye be enabled to behold the sun, yet this does not make it all one with the sun, but it keeps its own nature still as much as it did before.

Nor is this vision a comprehensive vision, for a finite being will never be able fully to grasp an infinite essence. It is true, indeed, it sees the whole essence of God, not a piece of His face only, for all essence is indivisible, especially that most simple and pure essence of God himself; but the soul does not see it so clearly, and so strongly, as God Himself sees it;<sup>3</sup> hence degrees of happiness spring; for the 'light of glory'<sup>4</sup> being variously shed amongst blessed souls, the larger measure they have of that, the brighter sight have they of the Divine essence. Several men may look upon the same face, and yet some that have more sparkling eyes, or that stand nearer, may discern it better; if a multitude of spectators were enabled to behold the sun, yet some of them, that have a more strong and piercing eye, might see it more clearly than the rest. In this glass of the Divine essence, glorified souls see all things else that conduce to their happiness. As God by seeing Himself, the cause and fountain of beings, sees also all effects that come streaming from Him; so these also, looking upon the sun, must needs see his beams—they see the sun, and see other things by the sun; they see there 'the genera and species of all things,'<sup>5</sup> they there behold 'the powers and order of the universe.'<sup>6</sup> Yet because they

<sup>1</sup> In esse naturali.

<sup>2</sup> In esse intelligibili.

<sup>3</sup> These principles are illustrated in Mr. Calderwood's ingenious work, *The Philosophy of the Infinite*. Edinburgh, 1854.

<sup>4</sup> Lumen gloriæ.

<sup>5</sup> Omnium rerum genera et species.

<sup>6</sup> Virtutes et ordinem universi.

do not see the essence of God clearly and perfectly, that is comprehensively, so neither can they see all those treasures of mysterious wisdom, of unsearchable goodness, of unlimited power, that lie hid in the very depth of the Divine essence. 'They do not see things possible, nor the reasons of things, nor those things which depend on the pure will of God,'<sup>1</sup> as the schoolmen do well determine; yet all that a glorified understanding sees, is in one twinkling of its eye, for it sees all by one single 'idea,'<sup>2</sup> by the Divine essence. It forgets its wrangling syllogisms, it leaves its tardy demonstrations, when it once comes to an intuitive knowledge. 'It moves not from one comprehensible to another, but rests in a single act,'<sup>3</sup> for the state of happiness is a Sabbatical state. The soul rests and fixes Heb. iv. 9. itself in one act of perpetual enjoyment, and by this participation of simultaneity it partakes of eternity, for that is 'all at once.'<sup>4</sup>

Whether this glorious happiness be more principally situated in an act of the understanding or of the will, I leave the Thomists and Scotists to discuss; only this I will say in the behalf of Aquinas, that the will cannot enjoy this happiness any other way than as it is a rational appetite. For there is a blind appetite of good in every being, which yet neither has nor can have such happiness. As therefore the operations of the will, so the happiness of the will also seems to be subordinate to that of the understanding. But it is enough for us that an entire soul, a whole rational being, is united to its dearest, fairest, and supreme object, in a way of pure intuitive speculation, and

<sup>1</sup> Non vident possibilia, nec rationes rerum, nec ea quæ dependent ex pura Dei voluntate.

<sup>2</sup> Species.

<sup>3</sup> Non movetur de uno intelligibili in aliud, sed quiescit in actu unico.

<sup>4</sup> Tota simul.

in a way of sweetest love and fruition. Nor could nature of itself reach this, for an inferior nature cannot thus unite itself to a superior, but only by his indulgence raising it above itself.

This 'candle of the Lord' may shine here below, it may and doth aspire, and long for happiness; but yet it will not come near it, till He that lighted it up be pleased to lift it up to Himself, and there transform it into a star, that may drink in everlasting light and influence from its original and fountain-light.

N O T E S.

## NOTES.

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### NOTE A.—CULVERWEL AND ROGERS RECONCILED.

P. 17, l. 6.—'This' (*i.e.*, reason) 'is the first-born, but the other' (*i.e.*, faith) 'has the blessing.' This is, so far as I know, the only passage in 'the discourse' which has been honoured by being referred to in any literary work of eminence, though even in this instance the reference is made without designating the author otherwise than by calling him 'one of our old divines.' Indeed, had the uncouth cognomen of 'the old Puritan' been uttered, some of the readers of the *Edinburgh Review* might have been disposed to say ξένων δαμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι. 'The image' is said to be 'ingenious, and the antithesis striking;' but, it is added, 'nevertheless, the sentiment is far from just.'

I demur to this finding. I insert the evidence on which it rests, both because I am glad of the opportunity of enriching these pages with a fine specimen of thought and composition, and also that I may set two clear thinkers and elegant writers at one with each other, which, if I mistake not, may be easily done.

'It is hardly right to represent faith as *younger* than reason; the fact undoubtedly being, that human creatures trust and believe long before they reason or know. The truth is, that both reason and faith are coeval with the nature of man, and were designed to dwell in his heart together. They are, and ever were, and in such creatures as ourselves, must be, reciprocally complementary; neither can exclude the other. It is as impossible to exercise an acceptable faith without reason for so exercising it—that is, without exercising reason while we exercise faith—as it is to apprehend by our reason, exclusive of faith, all the truths on which we are daily compelled to *act*, whether in relation to this world or the next. Neither is it right to represent either of them as failing of the promised heritage, except as both may fail alike, by perversion from their true end, and depravation of their genuine

nature; for if to the faith, of which the New Testament speaks so much, a peculiar blessing is promised, it is evident, from that same volume, that it is not a faith without reason, any more than a faith without works, which is commended by the Author of Christianity. And this is sufficiently proved by the injunction, "to be ready to give a reason for the hope," and, therefore, for the faith, "which is in us."

'If, therefore, we were to imitate the quaintness of the old divine on whose *dictum* we have been commenting, we should rather compare reason and faith to the two trusty spies, "faithful among the faithless," who confirmed each other's report of "that good land which flowed with milk and honey," and to *both* of whom the promise of a rich inheritance there was given, and in due time amply redeemed. Or rather, if we might be permitted to pursue the same vein a little farther, and throw over our shoulders that mantle of allegory which none but Bunyan could wear long, and wear gracefully, we should represent reason and faith as twin-born; the one, in form and features, the image of manly beauty, the other, of feminine grace and gentleness; but to each of whom, alas! is allotted a sad privation: while the bright eyes of reason are full of piercing and restless intelligence, his ear is closed to sound; and while faith has an ear of exquisite delicacy, on her sightless orbs, as she lifts them towards heaven, the sunbeam plays in vain. Hand in hand the brother and sister, in all mutual love, pursue their way through a world on which, like ours, day breaks and night falls alternate; by day, the eyes of reason are the guides of faith, and by night, the ear of faith is the guide of reason. As is wont with those who labour under these privations respectively, reason is apt to be eager, impetuous, impatient of that instruction which his infirmity will not permit him readily to apprehend; while faith, gentle and docile, is ever willing to listen to the voice by which alone truth and wisdom can reach her.<sup>1</sup>

Nothing can be more true and beautiful than all this; and had Nathanael Culverwel lived in our times, no man, I am persuaded, would have more readily acknowledged the truth, or more intensely admired the beauty; but I do not think he would have found anything really antagonistic to his dictum. The two knights are looking at opposite sides of the shield. And what Mr. Rogers says of reason and faith as coeval principles in human nature, is not more true than what Mr. Culverwel says of them, as channels through which truth about God, and the unseen and eternal, enter the mind. Generally, truth on these subjects, as exhibited in the works of God, comes, to some extent or other, through the channel of reason into the mind, before the fuller revelation of the truth in the Scriptures finds its way there through the channel of faith. Truth, as embodied in Nature and Providence, is presented to all men, and is apprehended by reason. Truth, in the Bible, is presented

<sup>1</sup> Rogers's *Reason and Faith; their Claims and their Conflicts*. Essays selected from contributions to the *Edinburgh Review*. Vol. iii p 174.

only to those 'to whom the word of salvation comes,' and is apprehended by faith. Surely, in this sense, 'reason is the first-born,' and surely too, 'the blessing,' by way of eminence, is not promised any more to him who reasons than to him who works, but 'to him who believes.' Reason in the individual, to allude to Mr. Rogers's fine allegory, sees God in His works, before faith hears Him in His word. And he in whom God is listened to by faith, is blessed in another guise from him in whom He is only known by the reason.

NOTE B.—REFERENCE BY HOWE.

P. 20, l. 2 from the foot.—HOWE seems to have had this passage in his eye when, in his matchless description of the ruined temple of God in the soul of man, he says, 'Look upon the fragments of that curious sculpture which once adorned the palace of the great King: *the reliques of common notions*, the lively prints of some undefaced truth.'—*Living Temple*, part ii. § 8.

NOTE C.—SELDEN, GROTIUS, AND SALMASIUS.

P. 33, l. 7.—For the character of SELDEN, as an ethical writer, the reader may consult Hallam's *Literature of Europe*, p. iii. chap. iv. § 28, vol. iii. p. 110. The following is not too high an eulogium on that not very readable, and now very little read author:—'Selden for scholarship, only not universal, and for his indefatigable researches into the original constitution of the State, must be consulted and venerated as a sage, to whom learning and the liberties of England are alike and largely indebted.'

The merits of GROTIUS, as a writer on morals, have been most judiciously and candidly estimated by Dugald Stewart, *Dissertation*, § iii. p. 84, etc.; by Sir James Mackintosh, *Dissertation*, § iv. pp. 315, 316; and especially by Hallam, *Literature of Europe*, part iii. ch. iv. sect. iii. § 80, vol. iii. p. 543, etc.

Had it not been for the transcendent fame of scholarship which then belonged to SALMASIUS, he would scarcely have been mentioned, we think, by Culverwel. A just estimate of his powers and attainments may be found in Hallam, part iii. chap. i. § 16.

NOTE D.—THE THREE DURANDS.

P. 38, l. 4.—WILLIAM DURAND was an eminent jurist of the thirteenth century. He was born 1237, and died 1296. His principal work is entitled *Speculum Juris*, from which he derived the name of 'Speculator.' He

wrote also *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum*. He died Bishop of Mende. He must not be confounded with his nephew of the same name, celebrated in his own time for a work *On the Manner of Holding a General Council*. Culverwel probably refers to a third WILLIAM DURAND, surnamed DE ST. POURCAIN. He was in succession Bishop of Puy and Meaux. Among the schoolmen he has the appellation, THE RESOLUTE DOCTOR. He was first a Thomist, and then a Scotist. His apostasy so offended the sect he deserted, that one of them wrote this epitaph for him,—

'Durus Durandus jacet hic sub marmore duro;  
An sit salvandus, ego nescio, nec quoque curo'

He died in 1332. The best edition of his great work, *Commentarii super Lib. IV. Sententiarum*, is that in folio, 1572. For fuller information, Tiraboschi, Moreri, and Aikin may be consulted.

## NOTE E.—SUAREZ.

P. 41, l. 7.—FRANCIS SUAREZ of Grenada (born, 1548; died, 1617) was, as Hallam (*Lit.* p. iii. chap. iv. § 15) says, 'by far the greatest man, in the department of moral philosophy, whom the order of Loyola produced in that age.' His great work is entitled, *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore*. Sir James Mackintosh (*Dissertation*, sect. vi. p. 315) remarks, 'Grotius, who, though he was the most upright and candid of men, could not have praised a Spanish Jesuit beyond his deserts, calls Suarez "the most acute of philosophers and of divines."'

## NOTE F.—ETERNAL LAW—SUAREZ, HALLAM, HOOKER.

P. 54, l. 30.—The following is Suarez's definition or description of eternal law:—'Lex aeterna est decretum liberum voluntatis Dei statuentis ordinem servandum, aut generaliter ab omnibus partibus universi, in ordine ad commune bonum, vel immediatè illi conveniens ratione totius universi, vel saltem ratione singularum specierum ejus; aut specialiter, servandum a creaturis intellectualibus, quoad liberas operationes eorum.'—*De Legibus*, cap. ii. § 6. This, certainly, not very perspicuous statement is thus translated by Hallam:—'Eternal law is the free determination of the will of God, ordaining a rule to be observed either, first, generally, by all parts of the universe, as a means of a common good, whether immediately belonging to it in respect of the entire universe, or, at least, in respect of the singular parts thereof; or, secondly, to be specially observed by intellectual creatures, in respect of their free operations.' It is justly remarked by him, that 'this crabbed piece of

scholasticism is nothing else in substance than the celebrated sentence on law, which concludes the first book of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*.—Hallam, ii. 505. The sentence referred to is certainly one of the most magnificent in the English language. 'Of law, there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage; the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of mercy, peace and joy.'

## NOTE G.—MAIMONIDES.

P. 64, l. 7.—MOSES MAIMONIDES, or BEN MAIMON, often termed, from the initials of his office and names, Rambam, is called by the Jews 'the Eagle of the Doctors,' or 'the Doctor,' and is certainly one of the most ingenious and enlightened of Jewish writers. It is a proverb among the learned Jews, 'A Mose ad Mosem par Mosi non fuit ullus.' He was born at Cordova in 1131, and died in Egypt in 1204 or 1205. His most important works are, *Moreh Nevochim*—the Guide to the Perplexed; and his *Sepher Hamitzoth*, or the Book of the Commandments.—Wolfii *Bib. Heb.*, Buxtorf, Pref. to his trans. of *Mor. Nev.* Basnage.

## NOTE H.—THE TWO VASQUEZ.

P. 74, l. 1.—There are two Spanish theologians of this name, Dennis, an Augustinian monk; and Gabriel, a Jesuit. It is to the last of these Culverwel refers. He died 1604. His works fill ten folio volumes.—Moreri.

## NOTE I.—ARBOR INVERSA.

P. 81, l. 12.—A learned friend has suggested that the reference may be to the *Arbor metallorum* of the alchemists, of which Hofmann, in the *Lexicon Universale*, so justly praised by Gibbon, says, 'Ludit mirifice ars in rerum natura, conerit et ad minima redigit quævis metalla, quæ mira fermentatione facta, ac vitreo vasi inclusa paulatim fermentationis incrementum percipiunt, atque in *gratam arborem* se hinc inde in vitreo vase dilatantem excrementumque extendunt.' This tree grows downward—*inversa*. Here we have an 'enclosed being,' nourished by the liquid in the midst of which it resides. I have no doubt this is the reference. A piece of zinc is suspended in a solution of lead in a phial, and in a short while the lead re-

appears in a metallic form, attaching itself to the zinc, and exhibiting the appearance of a shrub growing downwards.

The following passage occurs in Bacon's *Nov. Org.* lib. iii., Works, vol. i. p. 343, folio: 'Si quis enim accipiat ramum tenerum et vegetum arboris, atque illum reflectat in aliquam terræ particulam, licet non cohaereat ipsi loco, gignet statim non ramum, sed radicem. Atque vice versa, si terra ponatur superius, atque ita obstruatur lapide aut aliqua dura substantia, ut planta cohibeatur, nec possit frondescere sursum; edet ramos in aërem deorsum.' This also is an 'arbor inversa.' There is no enclosure here, however, and otherwise it affords no illustration of Culverwel's idea.

## NOTE J.—SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.

P. 101, l. 19.—SEXTUS EMPIRICUS was a Greek philosopher, and is supposed to have flourished under the Emperor Commodus. His works, which have come down to our times, are his *Pyrrhonianæ Hypotyposes*, in three books; and *Adversus Mathematicos*, in ten books. They are full of erudite discussions on the Greek philosophies, and contain a summary of the principles of the sceptics. The best edition of his works is that by Fabricius in 1718, in folio. Brucker in *Hist. Phil.*, and Haller in his *Bibl. Med.*, may be consulted for further details.

## NOTE K.—CARDANO.

P. 103 l. 26.—JEROM CARDANO, one of the most extraordinary characters of his age. (Born, 1501; died, 1576.) His autobiography is somewhat like the confessions of Rousseau. It exhibits a very strange picture of high, varied, misguided intellectual and moral power. The works referred to by Culverwel are his *De Subtilitate*—which was commented on at length by the younger Scaliger—and *De Vanitate Rerum*. An interesting account of him has been lately published by Mr. Morley.

## NOTE L.—THE FOUR ZABARELLAS.

P. 105, l. 25.—There are four distinguished literary men of the name of ZABARELLA—all of the same family. 1. Francis, Archbishop of Florence (born, 1339; died, 1417), the author of many books; among the rest, *Commentarii in Naturalem et Moralem Philosophiam*. 2. Bartholomew, the nephew of the Archbishop, who ultimately succeeded his uncle in his see. He seems to have been fully as much 'a man of affairs' as of letters. 3. James, the son of Bartholomew, a voluminous writer. Among his works are *Commen-*

*tarii de Anima*. 4. Julius, the son of James, a distinguished mathematician. From Culverwel classing Zabarella among 'fresher and more modern writers,' it seems probable that it is to James that he refers.—Moreri.

## NOTE M.—CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONS.

P. 113, l. 28.—In the *Preludia* to the *Chronicon Albeldense*, ascribed to a Spanish bishop of the ninth century, we have a curious enumeration of the distinctive qualities of different nations: (1.) Sapiencia Græcorum; (2.) Fortia Gothorum; (3.) Consilia Chaldæorum; (4.) Superbia Romanorum; (5.) Ferocitas Francorum; (6.) Ira Britannorum; (7.) Libido Scotorum; (8.) Duritia Saxonum; (9.) Cupiditas Persarum; (10.) Invidia Judæorum; (11.) Pax Æthiopum; (12.) Commercia Gallorum.—*Athenæum*, No. 1417.

## NOTE N.—NEMESIUS.

P. 143, l. 17.—NEMESIUS, an eminent ancient Christian philosopher, whose æra is not easily fixed. Some place him in the fourth century, others in the fifth. He is the author of a treatise *On the Nature of Man*, to which Culverwel refers. The best edition of it is that of Oxford, in 8vo, 1671.

## NOTE O.—EUGUBINE.

P. 149, l. 14.—Of EUGUBIUS (so the name is given in the second edition) and his work I could find no trace. I thought it likely that the word was Eugubinus, and that the author referred to was a native, or perhaps the Bishop of Gubio, which Hofmann says is a small episcopal city in Italy. I found my conjecture so far confirmed. In the editions of 1652, 1659, and 1669, the word is Eugubin; but still I could find no trace of Eugubin in Morhoff, or any of the ordinary Biographical Dictionaries.

Observing in a London catalogue a work on the Pentateuch by Eugubinus, I sent for the volume, and found that the full designation of the person referred to by Culverwel, was Augustinus Steuchus Eugubinus. From the following notices gleaned from Hofmann, Moreri, Morhoff, and Scaliger, he appears to have been a man of considerable note. He was a native of Gubio, in the Duchy of Urbino. In 1531, he was a canon of the Congregation of the Holy Saviour, and was afterwards chosen to be Keeper of the Apostolical Library at Rome; and being a distinguished Oriental scholar, he busied himself in arranging the MSS. in the Eastern tongues contained in that library. He was subsequently raised to the Episcopal See of Chiasmo, in Candia. In 1531 he commenced a work, entitled *Veteris Testamenti ad Veritatem*

*Hebraicam Recognitio*. The first volume contains the Pentateuch; but he was prevented from completing his plan, as we have only similar commentaries on Job, and on forty-seven of the Psalms, under the name of *Enarrationes*, which have the honour of being thus noticed in the *Index Expurgatorius*, 'prohibentur, nisi corrigantur.' Father Simon gives a favourable judgment of these exegetical works.—*Hist. Crit. Vieux Test.* lib. iv. ch. 12. Walch, in his *Bibliotheca*, merely notices the work on Job, vol. iv. 490. Possevin pronounces him 'vir æterna dignus memoria, et Italiæ verum ornamentum;' though Petavius calls his orthodoxy in question on the subject of the Divine omnipresence.

His other publications are *Adversus Lutheranos Libri tres, Cosmopœcia seu de Opificio Mundi*, an extended commentary on the first chapter of Genesis, and his *Magnum Opus*, referred to by Culverwel; *De Perenni Philosophia Libri decem*. According to Morhoff, who speaks highly both of the author and his work, Dr. Theophilus Gale has made liberal use of Steuchus's treatise in his *Philosophia Generalis*, and his *Court of the Gentiles*, though I have not noticed any reference to it in either of these very learned but not very readable works. The elder Scaliger, who might have been a Scotchman, so far as the *perfervidum ingenium* is concerned, placed the work *De Perenni Philosophia* next to the Inspired Writings. His son Joseph, in the first of his epistles, which contains a curious account of the Scaliger family, gives the following narrative of his father having successfully employed this work in the conversion of an atheist: 'In atheos quorum illud seculum feracissimum erat inexpiabili odio (Jul. Cæs. Scal.) flagrabat. Petrus Rufus consiliarius Aginnensis, qui illi ob doctrinam charissimus erat, ut qui et summus Peripateticus, et juris civilis Romani consultissimus esset, hoc morbo animi laborabat. Nunquam cessavit, donec anicum sæpe convivio adhibitum, aut disputationibus confectum, aut precibus delinitum, ad meliorem mentem revocasset; tradito illi Augustini Eugubini *De Perenni Philosophia* opere, quod illi viam ad veram cognitionem muniret, quando quidem a Rufo nunquam exprimere posset ut sacra Biblia consuleret, a quibus Rufi animus abhorreret. Et sane ea lectio Rufo salivam movit, ut totum se protinus ad Theologiæ studium converteret: in quo tantum profecit, ut nemo acrius, aut veram pietatem defenderet, aut atheismum oppugnaret; erat enim acerrimus, et acutissimus disputator.'—Jos. Scaligeri *Epistolæ*, Ep. 1, pp. 45, 46. Lugd. Bat. 1627.

There is another author, who lived nearly a century later, who is also termed, from the place of his birth, Eugubinus; P. Benius, who published a work on Divine grace and free-will in 1603; and a refutation of Casaubon's *Exercitationes in Baronium*, in 1617.

## NOTE P.—PSELLUS.

P. 150, l. 15.—MICHAEL PSELLUS, a Greek writer of the eleventh century; preceptor to Michael, the son of the Emperor Constantine Ducas, was a voluminous author on theological, mathematical, medical, and political subjects. He died in 1078. The best known of his works is a small tract, entitled *Dialogus de Energia et Operatione Dæmonum*.

## NOTE Q.—ZANCHIUS.

P. 171, l. 5.—JEROM ZANCHIUS (born, 1516; died, 1590), a distinguished Italian Protestant; a man of great learning, acuteness, and piety. His works fill five folio volumes, generally bound in three.

## NOTE R.—THE TWO PICI OF MIRANDOLA.

P. 183, l. 11.—There are two distinguished men known by this title, which properly designates their principality—uncle and nephew. The family name was Picius. Of the uncle there is an interesting account in Hallam's *Literature of Europe*, part i. chap. iii. §§ 94-96. It is of the younger Picius (born, 1470; died, 1533) Culverwel speaks. Inferior to his uncle in genius, his numerous works prove the extent of his learning, and intensity of his application.—Tiraboschi, Morhoff, Moreri, Aikin.

## NOTE S.—AVERROES.

P. 209, l. 10.—AVERROES, or AVEN ROSE, a famous Spanish philosopher of the twelfth century; by profession a Mohammedan. He was an idolatrous admirer and zealous follower of Aristotle, though he has speculations that are not to be found in his master. He appears to have been an unbeliever, both in Christianity, and in the religion he professed. Judaism, according to him, was the religion of children; Christianity he considered an impossible religion, as teaching that men ate their God; and Mohammedanism, as offering only sensual rewards, he called 'the religion of swine.' His exclamation in the prospect of death is said to have been, 'May my soul be among the philosophers!'

## NOTE T.—PROSPER.

P. 267, l. 23.—PROSPER, a native of Guienne, was a strenuous champion of the Augustinian theology. He was contemporary with its author, and corresponded with him. He was an able antagonist to the Pelagians and semi-

Pelagians of his native country. He is generally admitted to have possessed both learning and eloquence. His style is concise, vigorous, and elegant. Many supposititious works of an inferior character have been ascribed to him.—Fabricius, *Bib. Ecc.*; Cave's *Hist. Lit.*; Dupin, Moreri, Lardner's *Credibility*, part ii.

ADDITIONAL NOTE.—ARMINIANISM—ANTINOMIANISM.

P. 23, l. 9.—'Thus Arminianism pleads for itself under the specious notion of God's love to mankind.'—Culverwel refers here to a treatise in 4to, by Samuel Hoard, B.D., rector of Morton in Essex, published without his name, entitled, *God's Love to Mankind, manifested by disproving his Absolute Decree for their Damnation*. It was published in 1633, and was the first work in defence of the principles of Arminians that appeared in England. It had the honour of being replied to by two of the greatest theologians of that or of any age, Davenant and Amyraut. Davenant's work is entitled, *Animadversions written by the Right Reverend Father in God, John Lord Bishop of Sarisburi, upon a Treatise entitled, 'God's Love to Mankind.'* 8vo, Cambridge, 1641. Amyraut's still more elaborate treatise is entitled, *Doctrinæ Joannis Calvini de absoluto Reprobationis decreto defensio adversus Scriptorem anonymum. Auctore Mose Amyraldo.* 4to, Salmurii, 1631.

P. 23, l. 11.—'Thus, that silly error of Antinomianism will needs style itself an "evangelical honeycomb."'—The reference here is probably to the publications of John Saltmarsh, A.M., 'a mystic and fanatic,' as Orme says, 'who sported the wildest and most incoherent rhapsodies.' The following are the titles of some of his books:—*Free Grace, or the flowing of Christ's blood freely to Sinners*, 1645; *Dawnings of Light*, 1646; *Shadows flying away*, 1646; *Sparkles of Glory, or some beams of the Morning Star*, 1647. Eaton's *Honeycomb*, a work of the same complexion, is also likely alluded to.—Brook, iii. p. 74. Of these men, Edwards, the author of *Gangraena*, says, 'We see little wisdom, though perhaps some wit, in their inventing, as apothecaries are wont for their boxes, such specious titles for their books;' referring to Acontius, who, of a similar class of men in his times, says, 'Nullam ad rem ingeniosi sunt, praeterquam ad speciosos titulos excogitandum; quibus, ex hominum manibus, bonos libros extorqueant, et suos eorum loco obrudant; et tam stolidum est vulgus, ut quos expuere debuisset et suspiciat, nonnunquam et celebret.'—*Epist. ad Wolphium*. The remark is not inapplicable to some authors and publications of our own times.

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