OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
ATHENS- HER SPLENDOUR AND HER FALL
H.R.JAMES
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OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
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OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
BY
H. R. JAMES, M.A.
SOMETIME PRINCIl'AL, I'RESlDKi^CY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA
VOL. II.
PART III. ATHENS— HER SPLENDOUR AND HER FALL
WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
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PREFACE
The story of the Athenian empire is not, like the story of the Persian War, swift, clearly defined, straight-forward, and inspiring throughout, with a direct and simple interest which risec to a climax. It is a complex and tangled piece of history, long-drawn and chequered, closing in catastrophe. It is an essential tragedy, and a tragedy of the right Aristotelian pattern, for the hero, the Common- wealth of Athens, is illustrious and of noble dignity, but not free from fault. There is thrilling action in it and a height of splendour, followed by a poignant reversal of fortune. In Greek History it is only one episode ; but it is an episode which has largeness and unity and an abiding significance. It has not often — since Thucydides left the story of the culminating tragedy to be " a posses- sion for all time " — been separately handled as a dramatic whole. ^ The drama ends with the Peloponnesian wars and the downfall of Athenian dominion ; and good reason may be shown for regarding that downfall as a calamity for Hellas and for European civilisation. There were really two wars.^ In the first war from 431 to 421 B.C. Athens was victorious ; and but for the rash adventure of the Sicilian Expedition her empire might have continued. Peace in the year 421 B.C. must have seemed as weU secured as peace in Europe after the Treaty of Versailles, 2,300 years later. In the second war, 413 to 404, Athens
^ Bulwer-Lytton began, but did not finish, a history of Athens ; and there is also in English a history of The Athenian Empire by Sir George Cox in the series Epochs of Ancient History, published by Messrs. Longman.
^ Bury with much justice speaks of three, extending the duration of the struggle back to 459.
vi PREFACE
was beaten. She who had won Salamis and the Eury- medon, was overthrown by her own errors not less completely than was the Mede by his. The story of the rise and fall of the Athenian power will, therefore, always be one of the most vivid chapters in human history, and one of the most instructive ; and the inheritors of Greece and Athens — and these are all who participate in western civilisation all the world over — have in it a personal concern.
CONTENTS
PART III. ATHENS— HER SPLENDOUR AND HER FALL
PAGE
Chapter I. Athens in the Persian Wars - - 3
The Battle of Mycal6 — Athens the Saviour of Hellas — Ionia • Irredenta' — Misconduct of Pausanias — Aristides — The Confederacy of Delos — Objects of the League — Constitution and working — Relation of Athens and the allies — Achieve- ments of the Confederacy (1) Redemption of Ionia — (2) The Freedom of the seas — Battle of the Eurymedon.
Note on the Peace of Callias 20
Note on the Tribute Lists 20
Chapter II. The Path of Empire - - - - 21
The Re -building of the walls — The harbours of Athens — New strength of Athens — Athens and the confederate Greeks — The Ionian temperament — The question of secession — Allies or subjects ? — A divided Hellas — Dorian jealousy of Athens — The crowded years — Athens and Egypt — Athens and Boeotia — The Athenian empire at its height — Jurisdiction — Revenue.
Note on Themistocles - - 47
Chapter III. The City Beautiful ... . 50
Athens as it is and as it was — Athens to-day — The Acro- polis— The approach to the Propylaea — The Propylaea — The Parthenon — The Erechtheum — The temple of Athena Nike — The first splendour — Pericles and Pheidias — Pericles — Storm and stress — The Thirty Years' Peace — Pericles' peace schemes — Pheidias — The School of Pheidias — The Athenians of Pericles' day.
Note on the Elgin Marbles 78
viii CONTENTS
PAGE
Chapter IV. The Complete Democracy - - 82
Meanings of democracy — Principles of democracy at Athens — (1) Equal claims to office — (2) Personal sov- ereignty of the people — (3) Responsibility of magistrates — The sovereign people in their Ecclesia — The Council of Five Himdred — The magistrates — The Heliaea — The Heliaea and legislation — The strategi as heads of the executive — The chief of the people — National defence — The navy — Class distinctions — State services or ' liturgies ' — Life in de- mocratic Athens — The Athenian festal year — The ' Opposi- tion ' at Athens — Freedom in Athens — Pride in the city — Splendour of Athens.
Note on Chapter IV. 110
Chapter V. The League Against Athens - - 111
The price of empire — The enemies of Athens — The Boeotians — The Megarians — Corinth — Foes of her own household — Samos in revolt — Causes of the Peloponnesian War (1) The affair of Epidamnus (2) The revolt of Potidaea — Question of peace or war — Diplomatic fencing — The attempt on Plataea — War.
Chapter VI. The Lost Opportunity - - - 133
Riiined homes — A crowded city — Piagxie — The death of Pericles — A lesson in sea-power — The revolt of Lesbos — The betrayal of Plataea — A bid for life and liberty — The deprava- tion of Hellas — A lucky turn of fortune — High adventure at Pylos — Sphacteria — The longing for peace — Delium — Brasidas in Chalcidice — The Fifty Years' Peace — A Greek play of 421 B.C.
Note on Pylos and Sphacteria - - - - - 173
Chapter VII. The Gamble in Sicily - - - 177
An uneasy peace — Alcibiades and Argos — Melos — The lure of the West — Sicily — The fateful decision — Prepara- tions— A ' rag ' in ancient Athens — The sailing of the fleet — Syracuse — Wasted opportunities — Epipolae — The shadow from afar.
Chapter VIII. Disaster 205
Gylippus — Nicias' despatch — The tables turned — The spectre of defeat — Demosthenes to the rescue — The night attack on Epipolae — Dangerous delays — Defeat of the
CONTENTS ix
PAGE
Athenian fleets — The closing of the harbour gates — The agony in the Great Harbour — Despair — Retreat — Nicias — Ruin — The Quarries.
Chapter IX. The Passing of the Splendour - 232
Bad news at Athens — The shame of Sparta — The falling away of the allies — Samos — Oligarchical plots at Athens — Alcibiades — Intrigue at Samos — Revolution in Athens — Democratic reaction in the fleet — Alcibiades at Samos — Fall of the Four Hundred — Loss of Euboea — The rally of the democracy — Victories of Athens by sea — Arginusae — Aegospotami— The cup of humiliation.
Epilogue. The reign of terror — Thrasybulus — Phyle.
Outline of Dates 264
Note on Books 269
Index 271
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FACING PAGE
Athens and the Acropolis ..... Frontispiece
The Acropolis of Athens 64
The Parthenon 56
The Erechtheum - - 67
The Temple of Athena NikI: 68
The Peninsula of Pylos 156
The Great Harbour of Syracuse 210
The Fortress of PhylS - - 260
LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS
PAGE
The Confederacy of Delos .... between 14 and 16
Athens and the Piraeus (from Bury's " History of Greece ") 26
BoEOTiA (from Bury's " History of Greece ") - - - - 43 Athens ..--..--. between 52 and 53 The Athenian Acropolis (based on plcm in Bury's " History
of Greece ") 71
The Gulf of Corinth 139
Phormio's Second Sea-Fiqht in 429 B.C. .... 143 The Sieges of Pylos and Sphacteria (from Bury's " History
of Greece ") 156
Sicily and Magna Graecia (from Bury's " History of Greece ") 185 The Athenian Siege of Syracuse (based on plan in Bury's
" History of Greece ") 196
The Athenian Retreat (adapted from Freeman's " History of
SieUy," Vol. III.) 225
The Hellespont and Propontis 248
xi
NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS USED.
Translations from Thucydidea have been taken at discretion from Jowett, Crawley and the Loeb Classical Library Thucydides (C. Foster Smith). Translations initialled L. J. are by Lionel James, Head Master of Monmouth.
Quotation of Aristophanes^ Comedies is from the life work of Ben- jamin Bickley Rogers.
Translations of Plutarch and Xenophon are mostly from the Loeb editions :
Plutarch's Lives by Bemadotte Perrin ; Xenophon's Hellenica by Carleton L. Brownson. Li quoting from the anonymous tract on the Athenian Polity th& translation used is Dakyns'.
PART III
ATHENS— HER SPLENDOUR AND HER FALL
'* Athens has a place in the inner history of man which no other spot on earth can rival."
Freeman, History of Sicily ^ Vol. I. p. 330.
CHAPTER I
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS
" The History of Mankind contains few nobler pages than those which record the conduct of the Athenian people during the entire period of the Persian invasion."
Rogers, hiiroduction to the Clouds of Aristophanes, p. xx.
Marathon, Thermopylae, Salamis are imperishable names ; their glory is renewed from generation to genera- tion. Plataea does not ring down the ages with a renown equal to theirs, but no student of history can miss its importance. It is otherwise with the battle of Mount Mycale, which, according to a belief which Herodotus shared, was fought in the afternoon of the day on which Pausanias, the Spartan, shattered the strength of Mar- donius at Plataea. Yet the victory at Mycale was scarcely less important than Plataea or Salamis : for it signified definitely the transfer of the struggle between Greeks and Persians from Europe to Asia.
The Battle of Mycale. — After Salamis, in 480 B.C., the Greeks had not ventured to carry the pursuit of the enemy further than Andros, the island immediately south- east of Euboea. Early in the spring of the following year (b.c. 479) the Greek fleet, commanded now not by Eurybiades, the high admiral of the preceding year, but by the Spartan King Leoty chides, ^ advanced to Delos in the centre of the Cyclades, half-way across the Aegean. The Persians had stationed their fleet at Samos,
^ This Leotychides belonged to the younger of the two Spartan royal houses, the house of Erodes, not to that from which Leonidas and Pausanias came.
4 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
which lies close off the promontory of Mount Mycale where the lonians had their place of assembly, the Pan- ionium. ^ Obviously after the defeat of the King's fleet at Salamis the Persians were nervous about the loyalty of the Asiatic Greeks, and Samos was a convenient station from which to watch Ionia. The King's fleet there assembled numbered 300 ships of war ; the Greek fleet at Delos only 110. But the Persian fleet included an Ionian squadron, and it was much in doubt whether reliance could now be placed by the Persian admirals on any lonians.
While the Greek fleet lay inactive at Delos a deputation of three men came secretly from Samos and promised that all Ionia would break into revolt, if the Greeks did but show themselves off the coast. Leotychides gave ear to them and sailed for Samos. ^ Thereupon the Persian fleet was withdrawn to the mainland opposite Samos, where it would have the support of the Persian land forces, 60,000 in number, which were in occupation of Ionia. These forces were now concentrated under Mount Mycale on the promontory which looks towards Samos. When the ships reached the coast the crews disembarked, the ships were dragged ashore and a strong rampart of wood, strengthened in places with stones, was built round them. The Greek fleet disappointed of finding the enemy at Samos, after some debate, continued the pursuit to Mycale, and seeing on arrival how things were, the commanders disembarked their men and prepared to attack. The Persian admirals, embarrassed by their distrust of the lonians, made no attempt to oppose the landing, but, drawn up in front of their palisade, awaited the Greeks' onset. At the same time they took the precaution of disarming the Samians who were serving
1 Herodotus, i. 148. See vol. i. pp. 256 and 274. The channel between Samos and the shore under Mount Mycale is hardly more than a mile wide.
2 At first Leotychides was disinclined to any bold action ; but he happened to ask the spokesman of the envoys his name. ' Army- leader ' (Hegesi-stratos) replied the Samian ; and Leotychides hailed the omen, and gave orders forthwith for the fleet to proceed to Samos.
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 5
with them. Then they planted their shields in front of them, as Mardonius' men had done at Plataea, and prepared for resistance. The Greeks rushed forward to the attack with extreme eagerness. Herodotus relates that as they advanced a rumour spread through the army, passing quickly from rank to rank, that their fellow- countrymen at home had fought and won in Boeotia. This report excited the various contingents to intense emulation. The Athenians reached the enemy first as their line of advance lay along the shore ; the Spartans had hilly ground to impede them and a torrent bed to cross. For a time the Persians made a good fight : but the Athenians charged fiercely and beat down the barri- cade of shields. Then the Persian line gave way, and all fled to the stockade. The Athenians followed so closely that some of them entered the defences along with the fugitives. Inside the stockade the Persians, alone of all the royal troops, kept up the fight for a time : but when the Lacedaemonians and the rest of the Greeks came up, all resistance ceased as it had ceased in the fortified camp on the Asopus — and the stockade became a shambles. A few survivors escaped into the hills above the shore. All the ships were burnt by the victors, together with the wooden ramparts. The victory was complete, and was followed by the revolt from Persia of the islands, though not yet of Ionia.
It was found by subsequent enquiry, says Herodotus, that the battles of Plataea and Mycale had been fought on the same day ; Plataea in the morning, Mycale in the afternoon. The pious Greek of the fifth century B.C. saw in this double victory on one and the same day the manifest hand of Providence. About the time that the rumour of the victory at Plataea reached the Greeks at Mycale, a herald's wand was found lying mysteriously on the beach. " Many things prove to me," writes Herodotus, " that the gods take part in the affairs of man. How else, when the battles of Mycale and Plataea were about to happen on the self-same day, should such a rumour have reached the Greeks in that region, greatly
6 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
cheering the whole army, and making them more eager than before to risk their lives ? " ^
Athens the Saviour of Hellas. — The conflict at Mycale had the effect of raising still further the prestige of Athens, already heightened greatly by her behaviour throughout the two years of the war. In a remarkable passage of his seventh book ^ Herodotus, in introducing the story of the response of the Delphic oracle to the Athenians, says : " Here I am constrained to affirm an opinion which I know will be unacceptable to very many, never- theless, inasmuch as it appears to me to be the truth, I will not keep it back. If the Athenians, through dread of the danger which was approaching, had abandoned their country, or if, though they did not abandon it but stayed, they had made submission to Xerxes, there would have been no attempt at all to oppose Xerxes by sea. And if no one had tried to oppose Xerxes by sea, this is what must have happened on land. Though line beyond line of fortifications had been carried across the Isthmus, the Lacedaemonians must have lost their allies (not by wilful desertion but as a necessary consequence of the cities being reduced in detail one after another by the fleet of the barbarians) and been left to fight alone ; and left to fight alone, they would have died nobly after making a gallant resistance. Either this is what would have happened to them ; or, before this befell, they would have seen the other Greeks going over to the Persians, and made their own terms with Xerxes. So in either case Hellas would have come under the Persian yoke. What good the wall across the Isthmus would have been, when the King had command of the sea, I am unable to discover. If then we now said that the Athenians were the saviours of Hellas, we should not err from the truth. The conditions were such that the scale was bound to incline to the side to which they attached themselves. When they had made their choice that Hellas should remain free, it was they who roused to action the rest of the Greeks who had not
^ Herodotus, ix. 100 ; Rawlinson iv. p. 451. ^ vii. 139.
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 7
submitted, and, next to Heaven, it was they who repulsed the King."
When Herodotus was writing, Athens, imperial Athens, had lost much of the admiration won in the Persian wars, and become an object of detestation as well as of jealousy throughout great part of the Greek world. But we at once recognize the truth of his statement and it must have been patent to all the confederate Greeks in the year after Salamis. Every one knew it was the fleet of Athens that had saved Greece, the number of her ships, the skilly and courage of her seamen and the sagacity of her admiral, Themistocles. But it was not alone her material share in the victory, though that could not easily be overstated, that now raised Athens high in the estimation of all Hellas. It was at the same time the moral qualities the city and her people had shown, the dauntlessness, the ^ indomitable will, the self-control, the devotion to the national cause, the spirit of self-sacrifice. Sparta and the Peloponnesian states had made mistakes, had failed the common cause again and again, if they had not, like some other of the Greek name, stood aside altogether or gone over to the Mede. Athens had made no mistakes, had never faltered ; called to the extremity of endurance she had borne the test and come triumphantly through it. She had seen her land overrun by the enemy, her city itself occupied, its buildings razed to the ground, its sacred places desecrated ; had seen her people scattered homeless to find refuge as they could ; had seen her interests betrayed once and again by the selfishness or slowness of her allies. And she had not wavered, but endured the utmost with serenity, and at the height of her trial had rejected the offer of a noble enemy to win her to his side. She had shown, too, the less heroic, but not less useful, quality of a capacity for subordination in loyalty to the common interest. Herodotus has a story — which may or may not be true — of a dispute before Plataea between the Tegeans and the Athenians for the place of honour in the battle line, next after Sparta. And he makes the spokesman of the Athenians con-
8 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
elude the presentment of their claim with these words : " Nevertheless, Lacedaemonians, as to strive concerning place at such a time as this is not right, we are ready to do as you command, and to take our station at whatever part of the line, and face whatever nation, you think most expedient. Wheresoever you place us, 'twill be our endeavour to behave as brave men. Only declare your will, and we shall at once obey you." ^ Even if the story is not literally true, it has value as showing the spirit which could be thought in character with the Athenians at this time.
Ionia ' Irredenta.' — As soon as the allied fleet had won its brilliant success at Mount Mycale, — with all Ionia looking on and quivering with new hope — the question what was to be the future policy of the victors on the eastern coast of the Aegean at once became acute. Was there to be a new Ionian revolt ? Were Lade and Miletus to be avenged ? Were the confederate Greeks to undertake the liberation of all the Greek cities of Asia Minor, held in subjection to the Mede ? If so, and if the Greek towns in territories owning the Great King's sway were to be encouraged to rise against their Persian masters, what was the prospect of their being able to maintain their independence, when the Pan-Hellenic fleet was withdrawn again to Europe and dispersed ? Leotychides and the other Peloponnesian leaders answered with no uncertain voice that there was no such prospect ; and it did not come within their mental horizon to con- ceive of an allied fleet kept permanently on a war footing for the protection of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. " It appeared to them an impossibility," writes Herodotus, " that they should stay for ever on guard to protect the lonians ; yet if they did not protect them there was not the slightest expectation that the lonians would come off scatheless at the hands of the Persians." ^ They therefore made — quite seriously it would appear — an astounding proposal. They proposed that the Ionian
1 Herodotus, ix. 27.6 ; Rawlinson, iv. p. 395.
2 Herodotus, ix. 106.2.
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 9
land should be abandoned to the Persians, and the Ionian ^ Greeks — and presumably the Aeolian and Dorian Greeks with them — be transplanted back across the Aegean, reversing the process of emigration which had taken place some five hundred years earlier. New homes were to be found for them by declaring forfeit the seaport towns of the European Greeks who had traitorously joined forces with the invader, or had betrayed the cause of Hellas by failing to aid the Pan-Hellenic League in repelling him. Thus at one and the same time the Greeks who had medized would be punished, and a solution be found for the problem of Ionia. But the Athenians would have none of this. The lonians were their kinsmen, and the lonians were unwilling to leave the land which for centuries now had been their home. At the same time Athenian interests were closely involved ; for to the Athenians it was of vital necessity that the trade route from the Black Sea through the Hellespont and the Bosphorus should be in friendly keeping. The Peloponnesians gave way, and Samos and the other islands were admitted into the Pan-Hellenic alliance. Then the fleet sailed to the Hellespont with the object of destroying Xerxes' bridges. They occupied Abydos, but found the bridges destroyed already by the winds and waves. Leotychides and the Peloponnesian squadrons thereupon sailed for home ; but the Athenians under the command of Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, together with their new allies from the islands, crossed the channel of the Dardanelles and laid siege to Sestos. This city, which had been the European end of Xerxes' bridges, was held by a strong Persian garrison reinforced by refugees from the Chersonese (the Gallipoli peninsula). Summer passed into autumn and still Sestos held out. The men of Athens who were serving in the fleet grew impatient and demanded to be led home : for they had left Athens a city of ruin and their minds were haunted by remembrances of their devastated farms and home- steads. But Xanthippus stood firm, declaring that he could not withdraw from the siege without orders from
10 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Athens. Meantime the garrison were hard pressed for food, and presently were in the grip of famine. The Persian defenders then left the city and made an attempt to escape : whereupon the Greeks inside Sestos opened the gates and let in the Athenians. Within the town, of which they obtained possession in this way, the Athenians found the shore-cables which had been used to support Xerxes' bridges : these they conveyed as trophies to Athens. The effect of all this was to raise the prestige of the Athenians yet higher.
Misconduct of Pausanias= — Next year (478) the Spartan government sent out Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, with twenty ships, to take command of the allied fleet. To this fleet the Athenians, on their part, sent thirty ships under Themistocles' rival, Aristides. Pausanias sailed first to Cyprus, and drew most of the Greek cities in that island into the League. Thence he sailed on to the Hellespont, passed through the Sea of Marmora to the Bosphorus, laid siege to Byzantium and took it. The Greeks had now command of the entrance to the Bosphorus as well as of the passage of the Dardanelles. But the fair hopes that these successes opened out to the Hellenic League under Spartan leader- ship, were spoilt by the behaviour of Pausanias himself. Either his head was turned by the glory he had won at Plataea, or there was some congenital strain of madness in him which the excitements of the times had brought out. He began openly to imitate the bearing, and even the dress and equipment, of a Persian satrap, and while so doing managed to give offence to all the allies, officers and men alike. The rank and file he angered by the severity of the punishments he imposed for breaches of discipline ; the commanders he provoked by the haughti- ness of his demeanour and the open contempt with which he treated them. He soon had all the allied forces seething with indignation. When Aristides, as admiral of the Athenians, tried remonstrance, Pausanias turned his back on him. The truth was, he was indulging the evil dream of becoming literally a Persian satrap and the Great
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 11
King's son-in-law, and to realize this ambition he was wiUing to sacrifice the fair fame won at Plataea and undo the work he had there done for Hellas. The proof of this is found in a letter which, about this time, he had addressed to the King, the curiously worded text of which Thucy- dides has preserved. ^ It was the first example of what afterwards became notorious, — the failure of the admired Spartan discipline to fit those trained in it for novel . responsibilities in a wider sphere than Lacedaemon or the Peloponnese. This criminal folly led ultimately to Pausanias' ruin and death, ^ but the more immediate effect of his misconduct was to open for Athens further opportunities of action and achievement. For, in disgust at the overbearing manners of Pausanias and his Spartans, the lonians came to Aristides and openly urged that Athens should undertake the leadership against Persia in place of Sparta. They proposed to form a new con-^ federacy with Athens at its head, an organized league," both defensive and offensive, against Persia. It was thus that the great opportunity of her destiny came to Athens, and the Confederacy of Delos was formed.
^ Among the Porsiun prisoners captured lit Byzantium were some relatives of the King. It was given out soon after that those persons had escaped ; but the truth was that they had been secretly sent by Pausanias to Xerxes with a letter couched in the following terms : " Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to do you a favour, sends you back these men whom lie took with the spear. And I make the proposal, if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. And 1 am able, I think, to accomplish these things with the help of your counsel. If any of these things please you, send a trusty man to the sea, and through him we shall in future confer." Thucydides, i. 128 ; Loeb, vol. i. p. 217.
^ The Ephors some years later obtained proof of his treasonable designs and were preparing to arrest him, when Pausanias received warning in time to take sanctuary in a small building within the sacred enclosure of the temple of Athena at Sparta, known as the Temple of Athena of the Brazen House. The Ephors used no force against him, but they stripped the roof off the building and built up the doors so that no food could possibly reach him, and there Pausanias slowly died of starvation. When he was at the point of death, the Ephors had him carried out, thinking in this way to avoid the guilt of sacrilege. But in popular belief the guilt was already incurred, and the story was remembered as ' the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.' See also ch. V. p. 129 below.
12 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Aristides. — Athens was extraordinarily fortunate in the man who at this crisis was entrusted with the com- mand of her fleet. We have met Aristides already, as Themistocles' political rival, who had been banished by ostracism three years before the invasion of Xerxes and had returned just in time to inform Themistocles that all retreat from the narrow straits was blocked ; and that, whether they would or not, the Greeks must fight at Salamis.^ Aristides was leader of the conservative party at Athens, the party opposed to the further advance of democracy. He was himself of noble birth, an Eupatrid, but far from wealthy : indeed his honourable poverty is part of his title to remembrance. For Aristides' lasting fame is an integrity pure and unsullied throughout his life ; in ancient Athens unfortunately a rare integrity. His name comes down to posterity as Aristides the Just. At the time when the vote which sent him into exile was being taken at Athens, a peasant who had come in from the country to vote and who could not write, stopped him in the street and asked him to write a name for him on his voting tile. " What name shall I write ? " asked Aristides . ' ' Write Aristides , ' ' said the man . " Why friend, has Aristides done you wrong ? " " Oh no : only I am tired of hearing him called the Just ! " But Aristides' justice was a solid quality, and now in 478 B.C. it stood Athens in good stead. Aristides' fairness of mind and moderation were in marked contrast with the arrogance and violence of Pausanias. It was the attrac- tive personal qualities of Aristides, and of his noble colleague Cimon, son of Miltiades (who was beloved at Athens as a prince of good fellows), which in large measure induced the newly liberated Eastern Greeks to beg Athens to put herself at the head of a new organization for the assertion of Hellenic freedom. Above all it was their confidence in Aristides' 'justice.' If a permanent union for defence was to be organized, it would be neces- sary to assess carefully the contribution — whether in ships, or money, or both — to be made by each community.
1 See vol. i. pp. 347-8.
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 13
so that none should be taxed out of proportion to its resources and none get off too lightly : obviously a difficult and delicate task. But this delicate task the allies were, one and all, ready to entrust to Aristides, and pledged themselves to accept his assessment. The people of Athens consented and lent the services of Aristides. And so for a year or more, Aristides, with a staff of assist- ants, went about among the islands and the continental cities, carefully enquiring into and estimating the resources of the several members of the League and rating their contributions proportionately. His success was complete. " Aristides," writes Plutarch, ^ " being made responsible for this large exercise of authority, Hellas in a sense putting her entire administration in his sole hands, poor as he was going out came back yet poorer, after making his assessment not merely with absolute integrity and fairness but also with consideration for the wishes and convenience of all." This assessment of Aristides was accepted with contentment at the time and remained substantially unchanged for fifty years.
The Confederacy of Delos. — Athens accepted without hesitation the call of the Eastern Greeks to organize a machinery of defence in the struggle which still had to be fought out after Salamis and Plataea. Sparta, with a spirit less high than might have been expected, acquiesced in this transfer of responsibility without resistance, and even without protest. Many circumstances contributed to this complaisance. About the time that the newly liberated Greeks of Asia Minor were pressing their request on Athens, Pausanias had been recalled to Sparta. The scandal of his behaviour had reached the Spartan govern- ment and he was sharply ordered home to answer the charges brought against him. Next year other leaders were sent out, but in a half-hearted manner ; and when the new admiral found the confederate Greeks disinclined to accept his authority, he and his lieutenants went home. It was a little ignominious ; but, after her experi-
1 Plutarch, Aristides, 24 (L. J.).
14 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
ence of the conduct of Pausanias, Sparta was afraid of the effect of distance and relaxed control on the character of her commanders. And the truth was that Sparta had no real heart in this business of liberating the Asiatic Greeks — mostly lonians : any more than she had when Aristagoras pleaded for assistance in 500 b.c.^ Her interests were all on the western side of the Aegean and centred in the Peloponnese. There was excuse for her in her geographical position and the character of her polity. Sparta, moreover, had no navy ; and the Spartan government was aware that Athens was better equipped to continue the war against Persia, which must necessarily be based on sea-power. The feeling of the Spartans at the time was, as Thucydides has recorded, relief at being quit of the Median war.^ The path, therefore, was every way clear for Athens to step into the leading place among the Greeks who were actively continuing the contest, a place she had fairly earned by her conduct in the years of Xerxes' invasion and repulse. Objects of the League. — The Confederacy of Delos was primarily a union for defence and protection of all the Greek polities in the islands of the Aegean and on the coasts of Asia Minor, Thrace, the Hellespont and beyond, which by their position were exposed to the hazard of the Great King's vengeance if they had revolted, or which wished to revolt if they were still in subjection. But it did not stop at that. It looked also to the prospect of reprisals on the Persian empire and of making good, by plundering the King's territories, some of the loss incurred through Xerxes' invasion. Thucydides plainly says : " the avowed object being to compensate themselves and the allies by devastating the King's country." The work of organizing a confederacy on this scale was very great : the mere extent of territory, if we trace on the map the number of states included, is considerable : and that it was done by Athens in an enduring form — it lasted for over seventy years, 477 to 404 — was no mean achievement. The Confederacy of Delos was by far the
1 See vol. i. p. 271. 2 Thucydides, i. 95. 7.
:.6
The CONFEDERACY of DELOS
at the time of the conclusion of the
Thirty Years' Peace, 445 B.C.
English Miles o 10 20 40 60 So 100
■ ■ ■ ■ ' ' ■
Members of the League are shown in red
TaendmnizBKo
3E
Long^itude
Casfl^^gfU
EineryWalker Led.
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 15
most extensive union of Greek states ever formed in ancient times. No exact account of its constitution and working has come down to us. Thucydides tells us only (1) that the total amount of the original assessment was 460 talents ; (2) that the island of Delos was chosen for the treasury of the league ; and (3) that the synod or council of the league held its meetings in the temple there. 1 One authentic and most interesting source of information we owe to archaeological research in Athens. Fragments of broken marble, slabs and pillars found on the Acropolis have been pieced together with infinite pains (in one case the fragments are as many as thirty) and, though when put together still mutilated and imperfect, have been sufficiently deciphered to show that they contain accounts of moneys received from numerous states which were members of the League. They are just lists of contributing cities with the amount paid by each inscribed beside the name.^ By this means the names of between two and three hundred contributing states have been certified, some very familiar names like Ephesus and Miletus, some like Belbina and Pholegandros, quite obscure. To combine this prodigious number of individual autonomous states, varying greatly in size, character and resources, into a stable and efficient working whole, was a task demanding rare political sagacity, originality and tact ; and, above all, honesty of purpose. And this is what Athens, through the wise and conciliatory mediation of Aristides, accomplished in the years 477 and 476.
Constitution and Working. — Although the recorded details of the constitution, working and history of the
1 Thucydides, i. 96. 2.
2 With one exception these inscriptions are hsts not of the actual contributions paid by the several states, but of the proportion due to the temple for its use as a treasury. As, however, this proportion is always one sixtieth, the total contribution can in any case be reached simply by multiplying the amount given by 60. The one exception is the inscription of a decree of the year 425 which gives the actual con- tributions laid by assessment on the communities named. See also note at the end of this chapter, p. 20.
16 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Confederacy of Delos are few and fragmentary, neverthe- less these, taken with their implications, suffice to enable us to reconstruct the main outlines with reasonable certainty. All the members of the League were originally independent and autonomous city-states, which entered the confederation voluntarily and undertook the obliga- tions necessary for the fulfilment of its purpose. The island of Delos was chosen as the seat of the League on account of its central position and sacred character. The temple of Apollo and Artemis was the Treasury and there also the meetings of the Council were held. Each member of the Confederacy had one vote in the Council. The Council was the authority which guided the policy and acts of the League : and by common consent, not only was the presidency of the Council and the practical leadership assigned to Athens, but also the duty of enforcing the decisions of the Council. Athens was thus at one and the same time a member of the Confederacy, the equal and no more than the equal of each of the rest ; and she was more than a member. She was organizer, president, and responsible executive. The officers who collected the revenue, ten in number, were called Stewards of the Hellenes (Helleno-tamiae), but they were also Athenian citizens, accountable to the government and people of Athens. Her position in relation to the League was from the first unique, and there were dangers latent in this both for her and for the other members, which were not, perhaps, clearly discerned in the beginning, but which inevitably showed themselves in course of time. The success of the League necessarily depended on the loyalty, fidelity and energy with which the individual members carried out their obligations ; and on the combined strictness and self- restraint with which Athens exercised her controlfing function.
Relation of Athens and the Allies. — The obligations laid upon Athens by the express desire and will of the allies are plain from what has just been said. Her duty and responsibility were to see that the League did its work,
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 17
and to administer its revenues. The obligations of her numerous associates were determined by the survey and assessment of Aristides. The ultimate obligation was to wage war upon the Persians ; and for this three things were necessary — men, ships and money. From Thucy- dides we learn that from the beginning some of the members furnished ships and personal service, and some money in lieu of these. " The Athenians," he says, " assessed the amount of their contributions, both for the states which were to furnish money for the war against the Barbarians and for those which were to furnish ships." ^ The reason why some contributed money payments instead of personal service is not far to seek. " Most of the members," Bury says, " were small and poor ; many could not equip more than one or two ships ; many could do no more than contribute a part of the expense to the furnishing of a single galley. To gather together a number of small and scattered contingents at a fixed time and place was always a matter of difficulty ; nor was such a miscellaneous armament easily managed. It was therefore arranged that the smaller states, instead of furnishing ships, should pay a yearly sum of money to a common treasury." ^ Such an arrangement was, we can see, in the general interest, and in the circumstances of the several states, even inevitable.
Achievements of the Confederacy. (1) Redemption of Ionia. — No full history of the warfare with Persia following the constitution of the Confederacy of Delos was ever written. This is much to be regretted, for it must have been interesting and full of incident. There must have been a second, and this time a successful, Ionic Revolt. But for this we have not even so much as Herodotus' incomplete and confused account of the Ionic Revolt of 499. We know only that at the time of the Battle of Mycale all Ionia was still part of a Persian province and all the Greek cities of the Aegean coast were Persia's vassals. Thucydides gives us bare particulars of two or three
b
1 Thucydides, i. 96. 1. 2 Bury's Greece, p. 328.
IS Om HELLEXIC HERITAGE
striking incident* — the recovery of Sestos, the capture of Byzantium, the desperate defence of Eion on the Strynion ^ when besieged by (5mon in 476. And we know the broad result, that from this time no tribute was paid to Persia by the Greek cities of Asia so long as the imperial strength of Athens remained unimpaired. We may say with assurance that this deliverance could not have been effected without a good deal of fighting of which there is no record : " It is certain," says Grote, " that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of the most active warfare against the Persians.'' - In 47S the Persians were in occupation of Thrace and the shores of the Hellespont and Propontis. We learn from Herodotus * that even as late as the reign of Artaxerxes (464-425) the Persians still held possession of the fortified town Doriscus in Thrace, where Xerxes had numbered his host on the march into Greece.
(2) The Freedom of the Seas. — When the Greek cities which had been subjects of the Persian empire had been freed, it was the task of the Confederacy of Delos. firstly. to keep them free, and, secondly, to make the Aegean safe for the navigation of the Greeks. The conquest of the island of Scyros illustrates this second task, for the people of Scyros were given to piracy and it was a boon to the commerce of the Aegean when Cimon, in 474, rooted them out and the Athenians occupied the island with their own colonists. This much comes from Thucy- dides and Plutarch : * but no other details are on record of what it cost to maintain the freedom of the seas for Greek commerce. That the poUcing of the Aegean was done effectually may reasonably be inferred from the flourishing state of the Greek communities in the Aegean and on the route to the Black Sea. It must have been an exacting task requiring constant vigilance. For,
^ Boges. the Persian governor, rather than surrender when starved out, slew his children and the women of his family and threw the bodies on to a great fimeral pyre : then he cast all his treasure into the river, and himself leapt into the fltunes.
- Grote, Part 11. ch. 45. * Herodotus, vii. 106.
« Thucydides, i. 98.2 Plutarch, Cimon, 8.
»
ATHENS IN THE PERSIAN WARS 19
apart from the permanent danger of renewed activity on the part of the fleets of Persia, which means first and foremost of the Phoenicians, the untiring rivals of the Greeks, the piratical habits which Thucydides alludes to as prevailing \videly in early times, ^ lingered long among the Greeks themselves, so that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war we find the Athenians establishing a naval port off the coast of Locris to check the pirates who sailed out of Locrian harbours to plunder Euboea. Battle of the Eorymedon. — Fragmentary as is the story of the later phases of the struggle with Persia, we know that it culminated in another big fight by sea and land, the battle of the Eurymedon. The Eurj^medon is a river which flows into the Mediterranean out of Pam- phyha and Pisidia. Here Cimon, son of ^iiltiades, in the year 468, brought to battle a Phoenician fleet of 200 sail and destroyed them aU. After the sea-fight, as at Mycale, the troops disembarked and routed the Persian forces on land also. Immense booty was taken. " This victory,*' writes Bury, " sealed the acquisition of 'juthem Asia Minor, from Caria to Pamphyfia, for the Athenian federation." * This was not quite the end of the war of liberation. For eighteen years later — in b.c. 450 — Cimon led an expedition to C'j'prus (it was his last campaign). The siege of Citium was begun : and there Cimon died. But the fleet sailed on to C5T[)rian Salamis, and here once more a double victory by sea and land was won by the Athenians over Phoenician, Cilician and Cyprian forces. And after this there was peace to all intents and purposes between Hellas and Persia for many years, though it is improbable that any formal peace was ever definitely made.^ By mutual agreement two small groups of islands, one in the Black Sea just outside the Bosphorus, the other in the Mediterranean off the south-east comer of Lycia, were accepted as boundaries beyond which the war-vessels of the Great King must not sail. For the rest, as Plutarch writes in his Life of Cimon,
» Thucydides, L 5. See vol. i. p. 202 and 203. * Buiy's Greece, p. 337. • See note below on The Peace of CaQias.
20 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
" Asia from Ionia to Pamphylia was entirely cleared of Persian arms " : ^ and also of Persian tax-gatherers, " not one of whose scribes, nay, not so much as a horse, had been seen within four hundred furlongs of the sea." ^ This, too, was the achievement of Athens in the Persian war, her last and greatest.
Note on the Peace of Callias.
It is an extraordinary thing, yet nevertheless true, that it has never to this daj^ been determined whether peace was made between Persia and Hellas in 448 B.C., or not. Certainly neither Herodotus nor Thucydides mentions any such peace. But, later, famous orators, Lysias, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, refer to the peace as something well known ; and Plutarch in his Life of Gimon^ speaks of the peace as made after Cimon's earlier victory at the Eurymedon. Callias, son of Hipponicus, is said to have been sent to Susa to negotiate it, and a reference in Herodotus vii. 151, to the actual presence of this Callias at Susa is a curious confirmation. But the balance of evidence is against any formal conclusion of peace.
Note on the Tribute Lists.
The lists which record the sums dedicated to Athena as first fruits of the allied contributions stored in her temple, have been recovered from a number of marble blocks found among heaps of broken stone once scattered over the Acropolis. They form an almost complete series from B.C. 454 to b,c. 432. The lists are very imperfect, because the blocks were found in fragments and have only by great labour been pieced together, but they supple- ment each others' defects. The contributing states named make a total just short of 290. From the year 443 (the 12th in order) the contributing states are arranged in five groups which evidently formed divisions of the Athenian empire. These groups are the Ionian, Hellespontine, Thracian, Carian and Island. Later again, from B.C. 439, the five groups became four through the merging into one of the Ionian and Carian groups. The reference to the Corpus is C.I.A. i. 226-272 (Kirchoff). All the Quota lists are given in full in Hill's Sources for Greek History B.C. 478-431, pp. 43-81. Sample years will be found in Roberts and Gardner's Introduction to Greek Epigraphy, Part II., pp. 288-298, or in Hicks and Hill, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 33, 43 and 48, pp. 48-51 ; 70-73; 80-83. For the decree of B.C. 425 see Hicks and Hill, 64, pp. 112-122; or Roberts and Gardner, pp. 45-50; also Hill's Sources, pp. 426-430 (Addenda et Corrigenda).
1 Plutarch, Cimon, 12. Loeb, ii. pp. 439 and 441.
2 Cimon, 19. Loeb, p. 467. , ^ Plutarch, Cimon, 13.
CHAPTER II
THE PATH OF EMPIRE
"■ This dominion of ours was not acquired by force. . . . Cir- cumstances from the first compelled us to advance it, till it reached its present extent : — it was fear more than anything else that swayed us ; the motive of honour came in later ; and finally also the consideration of om* own advantage."
ThucydidG8, I. 75.
The Re-building o£ the Walls. — As soon as the peril of another invasion was over, the people of Athens set about the building up again of their ruined city, and to this task they brought the same fortitude and energy as that with which they had helped to crush the enemy. The ruin they found on the site of Athens was pretty complete. Walls, temples, dwelling-houses had all been destroyed : only a few of the larger buildings, which had sheltered Persians of high rank, were left standing. The work of restoration began as soon as the Athenians were once more in possession of the site of their city. And their first thought was for the rebuilding of their city's defences. By the direction of the government, in which the influence of Themistocles was still paramount, the lines of the new city wall were traced out so as to increase considerably the area enclosed ; and the whole population, bond and free alike, was set to work upon it. Scarcely had the building of the wall begun when an embassy arrived from Sparta to urge upon the Athenian government the " wisdom of stopping it. It would be far better, the Spartans argued, that there should be no fortified towns outside Peloponnese which an invader might occupy
21
22 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
and use for a base, as Mardonius had used Thebes. They therefore counselled the Athenians not only to give up their own purpose of re -fortifying Athens, but to join Sparta in pulling down the fortifications of other walled towns ^ — outside Peloponnese. The Peloponnese itself, they contended, would always be a sufficient place of refuge and base of operations for the rest of Greece. This unsought advice was extremely unwelcome to the Athenians. It was not difficult to see through the pretence of Pan -Hellenic interest and find the real motive in the newly-awakened jealousy with which the Pelo- ponnesians were already regarding Athens, because of the strength she had put forth in the defence of Hellas. But in the present unfortified state of their city it was scarcely prudent to give to the Spartans the straight- forward reply they would have wished. After their experience of two years of close alliance they had no great faith in Peloponnesian friendship. It was possible, if they simply told the Spartan envoys that they would not stop the re-building of their city wall, that the army of the Peloponnese would soon be over the border in such force as to make resistance hopeless. They there- fore made answer to the Spartan embassy that they would send a * mission to Sparta to discuss the ques- tion. In this way they got the Spartan envoys out of Attica.
Thucydides ascribes the whole conduct of this business to Themistocles and tells at length the story of what followed. And this is the story he tells. Themistocles urged the Athenians to appoint him a member of their mission and despatch him forthwith to Sparta, but to delay as long as possible the departure of the other envoys. Meantime the whole people, men, women and children, were to unite in a supreme effort to get the walls built to a height that admitted of defence. Accordingly Themistocles went to Sparta, and when he got there, used all his ingenuity to avoid an official audience.
1 It will be recalled that Sparta was herself a city without walls. See vol. i. p. 225.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 23
When his friends — at this time he had many admirers and friends at Sparta — asked him why he did not get his audience, he repHed that he was waiting for his colleagues ; that he expected them every day and was surprised that they had not come. At first the Spartan authorities accepted these explanations ; but presently people began to arrive who declared positively that the new walls of Athens were rising rapidly and had already attained a fair height. Themistocles begged them not to give credence to reports, but to send commissioners of their own who might see for themselves how things were at Athens : and the Spartans sent commissioners, as he advised. But Themistocles himself sent secret word to the Athenians to contrive the quiet deten- tion of these envoys, and not to let them go until he and his fellows of the Athenian mission were safe out of Spartan territory. These fellow-commissioners had by this time arrived in Sparta, and the fear was that the Spartans, when they learnt the truth, would decline to let them go. When Themistocles received word that the Spartan mission had reached Athens and were virtually hostages for his own and his colleagues' safety, he threw off the mask and spoke out. He told the Spartan authorities that the walls of Athens were high enough now to be defended, and that if the Lacedaemonians or their allies wished to negotiate further, they must for the future treat with the Athenians as with a people able to judge what was for their own interest, and for the interest of Hellas. " When the Athenians came to the resolve to leave their city and embark on their ships, they had^ he said, reached the decision to brave the danger without Spartan help ; and in all subsequent deliberations they had shown themselves second to none in judgment. For their part they considered it was better at the present time that their city should have walls : this was most for their own advantage and for the advantage of all the confederates." The eyes of the Spartans were opened, but they did not find it expedient to show outwardly the anger they felt. Themistocles and his two colleagues were allowed to
24 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
return to Athens. But the slow resentment of Sparta was one day to cost Themistocles his rights as a citizen of the country he had served too well.^
This is the story, and thus it was that the walls of Athens and the defences of the Acropolis were thrown up in hot haste, irregularly and of any materials that came to hand — rough stones, fragments of columns, broken slabs, sepulchral stelae, bits of ornamental work from houses and temples : solid stone of some sort to face the structure and a jumble of rubble inside. Even so you may see it with your eyes to-day in the stretch of the wall still standing between the Dipylon Gate and the Street of Tombs.2
The Harbours of Athens. — On his return to Athens Themistocles was free to mature his plans for the future safety of the city. The next step was to secure harbours for the fleet, which had by its achievements in the war acquired a new and vastly greater importance. The open Bay of Phalerum,^ which was all the harbourage Athens had up to the time of Salamis, was both inadequate and unsuitable now Athens stood pledged to defend with her naval strength the newly liberated cities of Ionia. But west of the Bay of Phalerum there projects into the Saronic Gulf a rocky promontory with a rounded head, which by turning further westward encloses between its northern end and the coastline of Attica a spacious sheet of water, 1400 yards long by 800 broad. This sheet of water was, and is, the harbour of Piraeus. There are two smaller basins on the outer side of the promontory,
1 See Note at end of the chapter, pp. 47-49.
^ The exact account of Thucydides (i. 93. 2) is : " the lower courses consist of all sorts of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just as they were when the several workers brought them, and many columns from grave monuments and stones wrought for other purposes were built in." — Loeb, i. p. 157.
3 Phalerum Bay is the nearest part of the coast from Athens and is visible from the city. Moreover, the open shelving beach there was suitable enough for the earlier kind of war -vessels such as the pente- conters or fifty-oared galleys used before triremes came in.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 25
which are the harbours Munychia and Zea.^ Of this magnificent suite of harbours Athens, up to the time of the Persian invasion, had made no use ; but at least one Athenian had realized the great natural advantages of the position. Themistocles, when archon in 493, three years before Marathon, had gained the assent of the people to a scheme for the fortification of the whole peninsula. This much Thucydides tells us. And now that the city itself was again safely enclosed within walls, Themistocles resumed his great scheme for providing Athens with harbours suitable for the first sea-power in Hellas. A wall was carried from the edge of the Bay of Phalerum round the complete circuit of the rocky peninsula, a total length of seven miles, to fortify and protect both the two outer basins on the east and south, and the great basin of Piraeus on the west. The wall was planned on a mighty scale : it was to be of a breadth and height to defy all attack. The whole was constructed of solid blocks of stone clamped together by metal. These harbour walls were exceedingly strong, stronger than the walls of the city itself. And within the space between the harbours, the outer and the inner, a new town sprang up a generation later, more commodious and well-arranged than the ' City ' — with wide straight streets diverging from a central market-place, which occupied much the same positions ^s the market-place and streets to-day. On one side, the eastern, nearest Athens, the rock rises to a height of 200 feet, thus forming a natural fortress,
^ It will be seen that this account does not follow Professor Ernest Gardnei'iAncient Athens, ch. xiv., and especially Note xiv a, pp. 562 and 3) in nialdjig Munychia the midmost of the three Piraic harbours (the modern Pasha Limani) and calling the most easterly (modern Fanari) Phalerum. The argument based on M. Angelopoulos' measurements has much force. But against the identification of Phalerum with Fanari are these considerations : ( 1 ) On any plain reading of Thucy- dides and Pausanias — and especially of Pausanias (i. 1. 2), Phalerum is separate from and contrasted with the three Piraic harbours and cannot also be one of them ; (2) Phalerum is described by Pausanias as in the part of the coast nearest the city ; and again as twenty stades (4000 yards) distant from the city (Paus. viii. 10. 4). Either of these descrip- tions applies aptly to the open Bay of Phalerum, or to the Chapel of St. George where Frazer places the ancient township of Phalerum, but not to the rocky basin now called Fanari.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 27
the hill Munychia . Themistocles was so convinced of the advantages of this harbour site that he counselled his countrymen to leave Athens and move to Piraeus. But this advice the Athenians could not follow ; the feelings which attached them to Athens and tlie Acropolis were too strong. Piraeus increased and flourished, outstripping in civic amenity the ancient city : but the systematic laying out of Piraeus as a town and the ample provision of shipbuilding yards and dockyard equipment which went with it, belong to a somewhat later time, when Pericles was the ruling spirit. Ultimately there were three war-harbours, with docks for nearly four hundred triremes, the foundations of the slips down which the triremes slid into the water from covered sheds (the roofs of which rested on a colonnade of pillars) may be traced along the water's edge in several places. The entrances to the harbours, Piraeus itself, Munychia, and Zea, were protected by moles, and could be closed with a chain.
The sea at Phalerum is three miles from the Acropolis rock ; Piraeus is rather less than five. A railway line nowadays connects Athens with Piraeus ; for the pedes- trian it is a dusty walk of six miles, and so it was in ancient times. The ground near the peninsula was marshy and the road had to be carried over this by a causeway. 80 even when the whole Piraic peninsula was fortified there was still danger that Athens might be cut off from the sea and starved. This danger was eliminated when, some twenty years later, Piraeus and Athens were made into one city by the building of the Long Walls. One wall stretched from the Piraic Gate of the city to the great engirdling wall of the peninsula ; the other to the north-eastern corner of the Bay of Phalerum, where ancient Phalerum was.^
^ Later, some time before 431 B.C., a second Long Wall was built almost exactly parallel to the northern Long Wall, at a distance of some 200 yards and known as the Middle Wall : and after this the northern or Phaleric wall became of less account and was allowed to fall out of use. See Bury, p. 377. Some writers, however, now deny that any Phaleric wall ever existed. This is contrary to the natural meaning of what Thucydides writes, though it is probable that in the Peloponne- sian War the Long Walls meant the two parallel walls as described above.
28 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
New Strength of Athens. — When these walls and harbours were built, the new Athens arising out of the ruins of the old was a very different Athens, and far more powerful. She was powerful already and endowed with the potentiality of much greater power. Destiny had called her to be champion of maritime Greece and chief of a widely extended confederacy. This extension of her influence eastward across the Aegean was simply a development of tendencies which were in operation before the Persian War. As early as the time of Pisistratus Athens had developed interests north-eastward across the Aegean and in the direction of the Hellespont. And the reason was a fundamental one, the need of her people for food. Attica, though the home of the olive and the vine, is as a whole too bare and rocky to support a large population from her own soil.^ But the population of Attica grew and there was more and more need to seek the means of buying corn through the commerce which Solon helped to foster. It is a sign of this that early in the sixth century B.C. the Athenians siezed and occupied Sigeum by force of arms, and fought a small war with the Mytileneans for its possession. Now Sigeum,^ we see from the map, is near the entrance to the Dardanelles on the Asiatic side. Towards the end of the same century Miltiades, afterwards victor at Marathon, was an inde- pendent prince in the peninsula of Gallipoli, as his father and uncle had been before him. Thus Athenian influence was at that time strong on both sides of the Hellespont channel, which means that Athens had control of the passage through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea. With the advance of the Persian power and the failure of the Ionian Revolt the Athenians no doubt lost to a great extent their command of the Dardanelles. We notice that as soon as the Persian fleet was destroyed at Mycale it is to the Dardanelles that the Greeks straightway sail : Abydos is occupied, Sestos taken after a siege ; and next Byzantium, which commands the Bosphorus,
1 Cf. vol. i. p. 237 and p. 240.
^ It was the town, we may remember (vol. i. p. 112), which Archaian of Miletus built out of the stones of Priam's Troy.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 29
is captured. When the Spartans withdrew from the leadership of Hellas in Eastern waters, Athens naturally reaped the full benefit of these acquisitions. The trade route to the Black Sea was once more secured to her. ' We may recall also Pisistratus' interest in the coast of Thrace and in the gold mines in the region of Mount Pangaeum. All through the story of Athens we shall see how important to her was the control of the Hellespont. The Athenian ' empire ' begins with the siege of Sestos, - and ends with Aegospotami ; the one at the mouth of the Dardanelles, the other half-way down its winding channel and not far from the modern town of Gallipoli.
Athens and the Confederate Greeks. — When the Greeks of the islands and of the Asiatic coast invited Athens to organize with them a league, defensive and offensive, against Persia, interest as well as honour urged her to take up the task. In all good faith she accepted as allies all the separate states, large and small, that were eager to join, Lilliputian units like Pholegandros and Belbina, as well as Lesbos, Chios and the other large islands. All alike took the oath of fidelity to the league and sealed it by the symbolic sinking in the sea of a mass of hot iron. Athens took her place among the rest in the Synod of the Confederacy at Delos and exercised her right of voting as one among equals. But in another aspect she was not, and could not be, merely an equal, nor did the Confederacy so regard her. They made her chief and president of the Synod. They asked her to accept the responsibility of assessing the proportion in which each member of the League was to contribute to its support, and they expected her to enforce by her preponderant strength v' the decisions of the League in council. The executive officers of the Confederacy, appointed to apportion and collect the revenue of the League, the Helleno-tamiae, were Athenian citizens.^ It was thus from the first a fellowship unequally yoked, and as such in danger of insidious transformation into something other than the free and equal alliance which it was in theory. There had
1 See ch. i. p. 16.
30 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
been a time when the larger islands had possessed stronger fleets than Athens herself. The Chians had sent 100 ships to Lade, Lesbos 70, Samos 60 : Naxos was able to resist successfully a Persian fleet of 200 vessels in the year before the Ionian revolt. On the other hand Athens, in 487 B.C., three years after Marathon, was glad to borrow twenty ships from Corinth to flght Aegina. The balance of naval power had greatly changed since then, and Athens now kept the seas with a fleet of 200 triremes, while the fighting strength of the islands had dwindled : the smaller islands and cities had no fighting ships at all. In order that all might contribute to the common cause, it was, therefore, as we have seen, agreed that the smaller states should make a money payment proportionate to their resources. It had been Aristides' task to estimate how much in each case this should be. There were also other states, which, though they were able to provide ships, by their own choice made a money payment in- stead. So from the beginning of the League there were two classes of members, (1) those who like Athens and Chios and Samos contributed ships ; and (2) those who commuted service for a money payment. The policy, conduct and strategy of the League depended upon Athens, and her lead was so energetic and so prudent that by the year 468, with Cimon's double victory at the Eurymedon, all fear of successful Persian aggression passed away — provided the League itself was kept in being.
The Ionian Temperament. — But there was another difference between Athens and her allies, more charged with destiny for both, than even the difference of size and strength. It is unjust to stigmatize the lonians and other Asiatic Greeks as altogether enervated and cowardly. They made a good fight for the recovery of their liberties in the years between 500 and 494 b.c.^ But we have seen also that there was in them a strain of slackness and indiscipline which was their undoing at Lade.^ They were the same lonians still. They were pleasure-loving, and disinclined to war-service with the discipline it called
1 See vol. i. p. 273. « gee vol. i. pp. 274 and 275.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 31
for. They preferred to get their fighting and training done for them. They liked to stay at home and have a good time. The Athenians, braced by the domestic freedom they had worked out for themselves, lifted above their nature by the remembrance of Marathon, steeled and tempered to endurance by the Persian invasion, were urged on to action and adventure as only perhaps the Northmen, the Spanish Conquistadores, and the English Elizabethans, have been at other times in the history of mankind. 1 Their greatest praise comes from the mouths of their enemies : " Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men ; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. ... To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business." ^ So said the Corinthian ambassadors at Sparta. Compare this temper with that of the lonians, who said of the training imposed by Dionysius the Phocaean, their chosen admiral : " We had better suffer anything rather than these hard- ships ; even the slavery with which we are threatened, however harsh, can be no worse than our present thraldom. Come, let us refuse him obedience." ^ Not only is it obvious that Athenians and the eastward Greeks were unequally yoked in alliance, but it might have been prophesied that more and more the real power of the League would pass to Athens, and more and more the weaker members would lean upon her strength. In what way could such a process end, but in the transforma- tion of Athenian leadership into Athenian lordship, while the allies were gradually lowered to the status of dependants ? It was not long before the course of events brought a critical turning-point.
The Question of Secession. — In 469, within ten years of Mycale, the large island of Naxos tired of the alliance
^ Tlie conquering energy of the Arabs after the death of Mohammed \\ as more wonderful still, but had more special causes.
2 Thucydides, i. 70. 6 and 8 (Jowett).
3 Herodotus, xi. 12. 3 (Rawlinson).
32 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
and attempted to break away. Athens refused to permit this and used the forces of the League to coerce Naxos. " Then the Naxians revolted," writes Thucydides, "and the Athenians made war against them and reduced them by blockade." When the Naxians surrendered, they were not restored to their former position of independent allies, but as a punishment were made a dependency of Athens, a subject state. Thucydides does not scruple to use of the condition in which they were placed the detested word ' douleia,' enslavement. " This was the first of the allied cities which was enslaved contrary to Hellenic right ; the turn of the others came later." ^ The issues involved are debateable. Were the members of the Confederacy of Delos, all of whom had joined the League of their own free will, equally free to secede from it at their pleasure ? Athens emphatically said, ' No ! ' ^ and apparently the other confederates were with her. Every member had taken an oath of fidelitj^ and the obligations of the League might be taken to last as long as the existence of the Persian Empire constituted a menace to Hellenic freedom, active or potential. But the strict application of this principle, combined with Ionian slackness, did certainly lead before very long to the conversion of the Ionian Confederacy into an Athenian * empire.' In the years which followed, one by one the numerous members of the League came into conflict with the controlling power, were reduced by force, and then became subject cities of Athens instead of independent allies. Thucydides sums up the process in a fev/ pointed sentences : " Among the various causes of defection the most serious were failure to furnish the contributions due in money and ships, and in certain cases refusalof service. The Athenians were strict in their insistence on the dis- charge of obligations, and gave offence by applying coercion to men unaccustomed to severe effort and averse to it. In other ways, too, Athenian leadership
1 Thucydides, i. 98. 4.
2 So also said Abraham Lincoln in a.d. 1861 when certain of the ' United States ' broke away from the Union.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 33
was no longer as welcome as it had been : they no longer shared service on equal terms with the allies, and it was becoming easy to reduce any who seceded. For this the confederates were themselves to blame, because most of them through dislike of military service compounded their share in the upkeep of the navy by a money pay- ment ; and consequently . . . when it came to seceding, found themselves without the necessary equipment and without training for war." ^ But if we grant the fitness and even the necessity of the maintenance by force of arms of the cohesion of the Delian League as a whole, and recognise Athens as rightfully its armed executive, there remains the further question whether the forfeiture of independence was the just and reasonable penalty of insubordination or secession. And that is much more doubtful, whether the question is regarded as one of equity or of expediency.
Allies or Subjects ? — A few years before the attempted secession of Naxos (probably in 472) Athens had made war at her own initiative against Carystus in Euboea — the city which in the year of Marathon had resisted for a time the whole power of Datis and Artaphernes * — and compelled the Carystians to join the Confederacy. This was a coercion which seems to have less justification. Yet all the Euboean towns but Carystus, it appears, had entered the Confederacy, and it might pertinently be asked why Carystus should get all the benefits which the League secured and make no sacrifice for them. This much, however, is clear : if once the principle of coercion was admitted in these two cases : (1) that states might be compelled to join the Confederacy, and (2) be punished if they seceded from it or failed in some point of obligation, Athenian domination was bound to come in time. For the penalty of subjugation after resistance was, as we saw above, that the state subjugated was no longer a free member of the League, but a subject state ; and a subject state not of the League but of Athens. The consequence
iThucydides, i. 99. » See vol. i. p. 281.
I
34 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
of this was that by the time of the Peloponnesian war, just j&fty years after Salamis, only two members of the Confederacy were left in the position of free allies, the islands Chios and Lesbos. All the rest were dependencies. The Confederacy of Delos had been transformed into an Athenian empire.
At every step probably a fair case could be made out for the action Athens took : but the net result was to place her in a position fatally opposed to the deep-rooted Hellenic sentiment for autonomy. Yet for a long time this result was not foreseen either by Athens, who was passing without any deliberate intention into the position of a ' tyrant ' state ; nor by the allies, who, by their slack- ness and folly, themselves brought about the loss of their independence. It was all so easy and convenient. The small states wanted to be protected from the Great King, but they did not like service on ship-board. It suited them to provide money instead, and let Athens build the ships and find the men to man them. They were quite content that the Athenians should do their fighting for them. They did not realize that they were thereby forging chains for their own binding. On the other hand it suited the Athenians to accept money contributions in place of personal service, because with the money they built ships and these ships formed part of their own navy' and strengthened it. At the same time the ships gave employment to a large part of the growing popula- tion ; ship -builders to build them and seamen to man them. So, while things went smoothly, both the allies and Athens were well pleased with the arrangement. It was only when disagreement arose that the fatal error of the small state was revealed. For then, whatever the merits of the dispute, the small state was helpless. It was too late, when the appeal to force came, to attempt to make good on a sudden the lack of ships and the want of experience and training. This transformation of the Confederacy of Delos into the Athenian empire came about, as we may see, gradually, almost insensibly. It was not formally completed by the time that the Peloponnesian
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 36
war began, but it was practically a reality long before that. The transference of the Treasury of the League from Delos to Athens was a definite outward mark of the change. The exact date of this transfer is not recorded. It is inferred on general grounds, and on the evidence of the quota-lists that it was in 454 B.C. or a little after. About the same time, too, the Federal Synod or Council must have ceased its meetings — there was so little of it to meet by this time that the only members left — besides Athens — were the islands, Chios, Lesbos and Samos, and
the cities of Euboea.
•
A Divided Hellas. — Along with the growth of this arbitrary power of Athens over subject Hellenic com- munities there went on a deepening and hardening of the differences which tended to divide Hellas into two hostile aggregates. There was on the one side the confederacy over which Athens presided, the Confederacy of Delos, or, as the enemies of Athens preferred to call it, the arcM or dominion of Athens ; and on the other a new Peloponnesian confederacy, the nucleus of which was the old Peloponnesian League under Sparta. Such a rivalry and division was foreshadowed when the Peloponnesian contingents withdrew from the Hellespont after Mycale, and when two years later the Spartans acquiesced in yielding to Athens the further conduct of the war with Persia. The division followed in the main the racial distinction of Ionian and Dorian, and, politically, democratic sentiment on the whole swayed the one, oligarchic the other. The causes of this cleavage lay deep in the past of Hellas and arose out of the historical relations of her peoples to each other. Athens was Ionian — that after all was the head and front of her offending.
Dorian Jealousy of Athens. — How quick the Dorians of the Peloponnese were to conceive a jealousy of the naval power of Athens is shown in Thucydides' account of the rebuilding of the walls of Athens. It was the Peloponnesians who urged on Sparta the proposal to stop the restoration of these defences, because already they had
36 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
begun to dread the strength of Athens' fleet and the daring spirit her people had shown in the war. The Spartans for their part seem to have conceived a genuine admiration for Athenian prowess, and for Themistocles personally. They had been offended, indeed, by the success with which Themistocles had "bluffed" them over the rebuilding of the walls, but their anger was directed rather against Themistocles than against Athens. The transfer to Athens of the leadership against Persia does not seem to have disturbed good relations between Athens and Sparta and, so far as we know, good relations continued for the next ten or twelve years. The first active hostility we hear of is in 465, when a dispute about the working of the gold mines of Thrace had arisen between Athens and the island of Thasos, which lay just opposite their settle- ment. The people of Thasos were defeated in battle and shut up within the walls of their town. When hard pressed in the siege they sent an appeal to the Spartans, begging them to invade Attica and so create a diversion. The Spartans are said to have given a promise that they would, but to have been unable to make it good owing to a calamity which befell Sparta in the year following, the year 464. There was an earthquake, the most terrible in human memory at the time. The ground yawned, the whole town of Sparta was levelled and there was much loss of life.^ At once the Helots rose in revolt. The immediate danger was averted by the presence of mind of King Archidamus.2 But, though their first attack
1 Plutarch writes (Cimon, 16) : "In the fourth year of the reign of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of Sparta, there happened in the country of Lacedaemon, the greatest earthquake that was known in the memory of man ; the earth opened into chasms, and the moiin- tain Taygetus was so shaken that some of the rocky points of it fell down, and except five houses, all the town of Sparta was shattered to pieces." (Clough).
2 When Sparta was in a turmoil of confusion, and most of the citizens were busy rescuing what property they could from their wrecked homes, he had the assembly sounded. The Spartans rushed to arms and gathered in a body. So when the bands of Helots swarmed down on Sparta, he was able to meet them with a body of troops in good order and put them to rout.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 37
failed, the revolted Helots seized Mount Ithome, the ancient stronghold of their race, and there held out. The situation was still critical, and Sparta appealed to her allies for help. At this time at Athens Cimon's influence was very strong, and he was an admirer of Spartan institutions and a firm advocate of friendship with Sparta. When a Spartan envoy came and made a special appeal for help, he persuaded the Athenians to send a force of 4000 men to co-operate in the siege of Ithome, and himself went in command. This friendly succour was, however, so far from drawing Athens and Sparta closer together that it led to a fatal estrangement. For the Spartans credited the Athenians with special skill in the conduct of sieges and looked for the speedy fall of Ithome after the arrival of the contingent. When this expectation was not fulfilled their disappoint- ment was keen. In their vexation they believed that the Athenians were purposely failing them, and even began to suspect that there was some secret understanding between the Athenians and the rebels. In this state of mind they suddenly intimated to the Athenian com- manders that they had no further need of their assistance. The Athenians were mortally offended and showed their resentment by immediately breaking off their alliance with Sparta and allying themselves with Sparta's tra- ditional enemy, Argos. This, according to Thucydides, was the beginning of the enmity which culminated in the Peloponnesian War. Meantime Thasos, after a two years' siege was forced to surrender. The penalties of defeat were severe. Her walls were pulled down, her fleet confiscated. A heavy indemnity was laid upon her and a yearly tribute. Her territory on the mainland, which Athens coveted, was declared forfeit. Athens had even sought to further her designs in this region by establishing a settlement three miles inland from Eion on the Strymon. The settlers numbered ten thousand, partly from Athens, partly from the allied states. All went well at first ; the settlement was planted at Nine Ways, where later the Athenians founded Amphipolis. Then came appalling
38 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
calamity. In attempting an advance further inland the settlers came to a place called Drabescus. There they were overwhelmed by a combined attack of all the tribes in that part of Thrace and perished to a man. The settlement at Nine Ways was wiped out. It was a heavy blow : but it hardly checked the astonishing activity that Athens was now showing in every direction.
The Crowded Years. — The twelve years from 459 to 448 are the years which most vividly illustrate the extra- ordinary energy put forth by the Athenian people in the period following their great deliverance. The wonder of it is the greatness of the output relatively to the numerical strength of the people, the extent of their home territory and the total of their fighting forces. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, that is in 431 B.C. the land forces of Athens have been calculated to reach a possible total of some 70,000 men,^ infantry, cavalry and light-armed — approximately the strength of the British Expeditionary Force to France in 1914 — they cannot well have been more thirty years earlier, and may have been considerably less. Her fleet at its greatest strength was 400 ships of war, and, reckoning a ship's company at two hundred, the personnel of this fleet would be 80,000 men. But Athens never had so many ships in commission at one time : the largest total we have the means of calculating is 300 ; so the figure for the fleet is nearer 60,000 than 80,000. These land and sea forces were her active service forces, her first, second, and third lines of defence. There were no reserves behind them. The total population of Attica was under half a million — perhaps a tenth of the present population of London : and of the half million, probably nearly half were slaves. Out of these limited resources in man power Athens had to provide all that was necessary for active service abroad and for garrison duty at home. In the year 459 B.C. an Athenian fleet won a victory off the island of Cecryphalae in the Saronic Gulf near Aegina ;
1 See Zimmern. The Athenian Commonwealth, p. 414. Cf. pp. 172- 175.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 39
her land forces suffered defeat at Halieis on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Argolis. Naupactus ^ in Aetolia, at the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, was captured from the Locrians and in it were planted the survivors of the gallant band of Messenians who had defended Ithome for five years against all the efforts of Sparta. Megara, that Dorian city which tradition said had once been Attic, and which from its position commanding the gate of the Peloponnese through the Isthmus of Corinth was of such fateful importance to Athens, was at her own request admitted into the Athenian alliance ; and the Athenians built for the Megarians walls a mile long to join Megara to Nisaea, her harbour on the Saronic Gulf. Most memorable of all, an Athenian expedition to Egypt, at that time in revolt against Persia, had sailed up the Nile to Memphis and captured the city with the exception of the citadel, known as White Castle. It was the annus mirabilis of the rising Athenian empire. A vivid memory of this year survives in a slab of marble, now at Paris, in the Louvre, which has inscribed upon it the names of 176 men of the tribe of Erectheiis, who in this year fell in battle for Athens, " In Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia, at Halieis, at Aegina, at Megara," - evidently just one of ten such slabs, one for each of the ten tribes.
In the next year (458) the Aeginetans and their Pelo- ponnesian allies were defeated on the sea with a loss of 70 ships, and Aegina itself was besieged ; the building of the Long Walls of Athens was begun, and Myronides with an army made up wholly of the older and the youngest classes of military age (because all the best troops were away fighting in Aegina and Egypt) twice defeated the Corinthian levies who had made a raid into the Megarid, in the confidence that Athens would be unable to find men to meet them without raising the siege of Aegina.
^ Naupactus, Ship-building-town, got its name from the beHef that it was here the Herachds built the fleet that conveyed their armed bands across the Gulf before the successful Dorian invasion of Pelop- onnese. See vol. i. ch. ix. p. 222.
2 See Hicks and Hill, 26. pp. 36-39, or Roberts and Gardner, 359 pp. 498-500. C.I.O. i. 165.
40 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
In 457 the Athenians, after being worsted at Tanagra in a stubbornly contested battle by the army of the Peloponnesian League, two months later marched into Boeotia led by the same Myronides, routed the Boeotians at Oenophyta near Oropus, and, as a result, gained complete political control over all the Boeotian land. About the same time the Long Walls were finished. The surrender of Aegina followed next year : the Aeginetans agreed to give up their ships, dismantle their walls and pay a contribution to the Delian Confederacy. In the same year (456) the Athenian admiral Tolmides sailed round the Peloponnese and burnt the Lacedaemonian dockyards at Gythium in Laconia. This was the moment when the fortunes of the Athenian empire reached their highest point.
Two of the episodes of these years of strenuous effort and enterprise, the expedition to Egypt and the conquest of Boeotia, are of such striking significance as to repay more detailed treatment.
Athens and Egypt. — The connection of the Greeks with Egypt dates from the beginning of Greek history and even earlier ; for instance the name of Egypt figures four times in the Odyssey. ^ Greek soldiers in the pay of an Egyptian king voyaged up the Nile as far as Abu Simbel (which is on the left bank between Korosko and Wadi Haifa). Of this we may be sure because their names are found there scratched on the gigantic figure of Rameses II. in front of a great rock-hewn temple. At Naucratis, near the western mouth of the Nile, the Greeks, some fifty years earlier had been allowed to form a settlement. ^ And earlier again (b.c. 635) Greek mercenaries had helped to set Psammetichus, founder of the 26th dynasty, on the throne of Egypt. Egypt with its strange customs
1 Odyssey, iii. 300 ; iv. 351 ; xiv. 275 ; xvii. 426.
* Excavations on a site conjectured to be that of Naucratis, imder- taken for the Egyptian Exploration Fund, 1884 to 1886, by Dr. Flinders Petrie, resulted in the discovery of the remains of several Greek temples and of a large fortified enclosure. The site was further investigated for the British School at Athens by Dr. Hogarth in 1899.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 41
and stranger deities, its stupendous monuments and venerable antiquities had a strong fascination for the Greeks, as it has for many moderns. Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, Plato were said to have visited Egypt and learnt of her wisdom. So, when in 459, while a powerful Athenian fleet of 200 sail was engaged in another attempt to win Cyprus for Hellas, ^ news was brought that Inaros the Libyan, who had raised successful revolt in Egypt, asked for assistance, it seemed to the Athenian com- manders (their names are not recorded) too good an opportunity to be missed. What advantages might not accrue to Athenian commerce from an Egypt delivered out of the power of the Mede, not to speak of the blow such a loss would be to Persian prestige ? The fleet sailed straight from Cyprus to the Nile, swept up the river to Memphis (which is fourteen miles south of Cairo), got possession of the whole of the town, but could not capture the citadel, known as the White Castle. For two years the Persian garrison, supported by a pro -Persian party among the Egyptians, held out stubbornly, beating back every attack. For two years the Athenians pressed the siege. Then there was a dramatic reversal of the position. Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, came with a great army across the Sinai desert (over which British airmen flew in the advance on Palestine in 1916), defeated the Egyptians in a pitched battle, raised the siege of White Castle, and so turned the tables on the Athenians that they were shut up in an island lower down the Nile, which Thucydides calls Prosopitis. Here for a year and six months the Athenians held out. Then Megabyzus diverted the water which defended the Athenian position, so that their ships were left high and dry and the island was joined to the river bank. This accomplished, the Persians had nothing to do but march straight upon the Athenians and overwhelm them by force of numbers. Before, however, the final assault was made a capitulation was agreed to and a remnant of the Athenian forces
* Phoenician influences were strong in Cyprus and the island was never brought effectually into the Hellenic confederacy.
42 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
withdrew across the Libyan desert and found a refuge in Cyrene. All the two hundred ships were destroyed. It was a very great disaster. Nor was this the end, for, unaware of what had happened, a reinforcing squadron of fifty Athenian and allied ships came sailing up and entered the Nile. They were attacked from the river and from the shore : most of the ships were destroyed, only a few escaped. How Athens bore up under so heavy a loss of men and material will never be known.
Athens and Boeotia. — The part of Boeotia in the Persian War had been one of mixed glory and shame. Seven hundred Thespians died with Leonidas at Thermo- pylae, though the caprice of tradition has given all the praise to Sparta. The Plataeans had a prime share in the glories of Marathon and Plataea. But Plataeans and Thespians were a minority among the Boeotians. All the rest had medized. Now Boeotia in contrast with Attica is a wide plain surrounded by hills. This plain is divided by a low hilly ridge into two parts, of which the southern is the plain of Thebes, containing besides Thebes, the towns of Thespiae, Leuctra, Plataea and Tanagra. Chaeronea, Lebadea, Coronea, Haliartus and Orchomenos are in the northern section, a large portion of which is taken up by the great marsh formed by the river Cephisus, and known as Lake Copais.^ Thebes, a city whose mythical renown ^ rivals that of Mycenae, was by far the strongest of the Boeotian cities and claimed through the historical period to be the rightful head of a Boeotian League. It was the support Athens gave to Plataea in resisting this claim that made Thebes so long the deter- mined enemy of Athens. And because of this enmity Thebes gladly made common cause with the Mede. The penalty Thebes paid for the defeat of Mardonius was that she lost for a time her supremacy in Boeotia. But as
^ Much of the area of the ancient lake (estimated at 61,750 acres) has been drained by a British Company and brought under cultivation.
2 With Thebes are connected the legends of Semele (mother of Diony- sus), Cadmus, Amphion, the terrible tragedy of Oedipus, and the stories of the two sieges of Thebes, the first of which happened a generation before the Trojan War.
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jealousy of Athens grew, it became the poKcy of Sparta to restore Thebes to her former position as head of a united Boeotia. It happened that in 457 the Phocians attacked the Httle neighbour state, Doris, which the Spartans regarded as their mother-city. Upon this the Spartans called out the Peloponnesian League and conveyed a force of 11,500 men (1500 being Lacedae- monians) across the Gulf of Corinth. The Phocians were soon brought to terms. The Spartans then used their influence to effect a settlement of Boeotia in accordance with their own interest. But when this was done they found themselves in difficulties about their return to the Peloponnese. For this interference in the affairs of Boeotia might well be — and was — regarded at Athens as hostile action. The Athenians had already a squadron of ships in the Corinthian Gulf, and it was out of the question for the Peloponnesian army to attempt to cross in presence of a hostile fleet. On the other hand, the difficulties of retirement by land were hardly less formid- able. The only road to the Isthmus lay through Mount Geranea, and Athens since her alliance with Megara had possession of the passes. The Spartans therefore waited in Boeotia, and all the more willingly because overtures were being made to them by a party in Athens who were opposed to the building of the Long Walls as an ultra-democratic enterprise, and were scheming for a revolution. To stop this intrigue the Athenians marched out in full force : their total strength was 14,000 men- at-arms, that is together with the troops sent by their allies, among whom 1000 Argives were included. In addition, they had with them a body of Thessalian cavalry. They found the Peloponnesian army at Tanagra ; a stubbornly contested battle followed with heavy loss on both sides. At a critical moment the Thessalian cavalry went over to the enemy and the Athenians were defeated. But the only use the Spartans made of their victory was to withdraw at once to the Peloponnese through Geranea, ravaging Megarian territory as they went. Sixty -two days after this defeat the Athenians again marched out of Attica
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 45
in full force under Myronides. At Oenophyta, between Oropus and Tanagra, they gained a complete victory over the forces of the Boeotian confederacy. This victory made Athens for the time being complete mistress of Boeotia, and seemed to foreshadow a land dominion for Athens complementary to her sea-dominion.
Athenian Empire at its Height. — This astonishing career of success was soon to suffer a severe check, but the power of Athens was now at its height (from 455 to 447). On the western side of the Aegean Athenian influence extended over all Boeotia and Phocis, as well as Megara, Aegina and Euboea. Naupactus, garrisoned by refugee Messenians, who were the mortal enemies of Sparta, gave her a commanding position at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. When in 453 Achaia also came into the Athenian alliance, Athens had almost as strong a position in the Corinthian Gulf as in the Saronic. The Isthmus was securely hers through alliance with Megara ; Argos and Thessaly were her allies. Her land empire, or confederacy, bade fair to be as powerful as her sea confederacy, which embraced the islands of the Aegean (except Melos and Thera) and all eastward Hellas. Her sea-power was by this time complete and undisputed. Already it was true that " the whole expanse of water, from Crete to the Crimea, with insignificant exceptions, had been converted into an Athenian lake." ^ It was still in name the Confederacy of Delos, but already for all practical purposes it was the Athenian empire.
Jurisdiction. — Another aspect of the transformation of the Athenian confederacy into an Athenian dominion was the judicial. It was natural enough, and a matter of public convenience, that early in the existence of the League questions in dispute between Athens, or individual Athenians, and the allies should be tried at courts in Athens. Athens in her law courts had all the required machinery, and through practice in these courts the ordinary Athenian citizens acquired a remarkable judicial
^ Zimmem, The Greek Commonwealth, pp. 374 and 375.
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competency. By degrees the custom hardened into a rule, and ultimately all legal business between Athens and her allies was transacted at Athens as a matter of obliga- tion, not of choice. It was but an easy extension of this principle that cases between any two members of the Confederacy came to be tried by Athenian judges in Athenian courts. Finally, other cases came to be tried at Athens, even when both parties to the suit belonged to the same state. We find an example from an inscrip- tion of a convention between Athens and Chalcis in Euboea, which happens to have survived, ^ that cases involving the death -penalty could be tried only at Athens. This, however, was when the allies of Athens had become practically her subjects. And as the system extended, and the first acquiescence changed into protest and dis- content, it became one of the grievances of the con- federate states that so much of their legal business must be done at Athens. It was one of the causes contributing to the conversion of the confederacy into an empire and also one of the results of the change.
Revenue. — Legal business brought employment to the Athenian law-courts (and how large a proportion of the citizen-body had a share in this we shall see later) ; it brought fees to Athens and it brought business in the wide sense to harbour-town and city, through the number of litigants who were forced to come to Athens and spend their money there. The maintenance of the confederate navy gave employment and pay to an increasing number of the less wealthy citizens, though a proportion of the seamen in the Athenian navy were mercenaries or slaves. The building and repairing of the warships kept large numbers of workmen and their overseers busy. Athens thus profited in various ways through the discharge of the onerous duties she had undertaken when the League was constituted in B.C. 478. And in addition she controlled the spending of the 460 talents, the sum total of allied contributions under
* Hicks and Hill, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions ^ 40. p. 65, 11. 71 to 76; G.l.A, vol. iv. p 10, 27a, 11. 71-76.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 47
Aristides' assessment. Even when the Treasury was at Delos, the control of the expenditure was Athenian, since the ' Stewards of the Hellenes ' who administered it, were all citizens of Athens. But at some time later, probably, as we have noted, in 454, after the Athenian disaster in Egypt, the treasury was removed from Delos to Athens and stored in the temple of Athena Polias. Whatever the reasons for this transfer, the result was to make Athenian control of the allied funds unchecked and absolute. " Ostensibly this meant no more than a change of banker, Athena taking the place of Apollo. But, practically, the result was to remove it once for all from the control of the Confederate Parliament, and to make every one see and feel, what they had known in their hearts long ago, that it was the money of Athens, with which she could do what she liked. The world is still blessing her for what she did with it." ^
Note on Themistocles.
When Pausanias the traveller came to Athens in the second century a.d. he saw, as he sailed from Suniiun round the peninsula of Acte into Piraeus, an ' altar-like structure ' behind which was a rock-hewn grave believed to be the grave of Themistocles. It was a fitting site for the tomb of the man who had seen the vision of the dock-yards and shipping, of the three harbours, and of the sea-power Athens was to found upon them, while the waves still lapped the bare rock :
" Fair lies thy tomb For it will speak to merchants everywhere ; It will behold the seamen sailing out and in. And mark the contests of the ships." ^
But Themistocles — the true founder of the imperial greatness of Athens — himself died in exile, a pensioner on the bounty of the son of the Persian king, to foil whose attempt to conquer Hellas he had done more than any other Greek. For the enemies of Themistocles in Lacedaemon contrived to implicate him in the treason of Pausanias the Spartan (above p. 11 note), and had he not escaped by flight he would have been tried on a charge
^ Zimmem, The Greek Commonwealth, p. 192.
2 Frazer's translation (Pausanias, ii. p. 21) of the lines by the comic poet Plato, quoted by Plutarch, Themistocles, 32.
48 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
of Medism and perhaps put to death by his own countrymen. Thucydides and Plutarch tell a romantic story of this flight and escape. Themistocles was living at the time at Argos, having been ostracized some time after 474 (probably in 471). When the charge was made against him at Athens by envoys sent from Sparta, Athenian officers set out along with the Spartans to effect his arrest. Themistocles learnt of the peril in which he stood in time to escape out of the Peloponnese. He went first to Corcyra because he had a claim on Corcyraean gratitude. But the Corcyraeans had not the courage to run the risk of offending both Sparta and Athens : so they conveyed him across to the mainland opposite their island, the country of Epirus. There the ruler was Admetus, prince of the Molossians, a chieftain whom Themistocles had some time before this thwarted in his plans for alliance with Athens. It was therefore doubtful what reception he had to expect. Admetus himself was away from home so Themistocles made his appeal first to the chieftain's wife, as did Odysseus to Arete (vol. i. pp. 148, 9). She told him to take in his arms her little son, Admetus' heir, and sit as a suppliant at the king's hearth. Themistocles did as she advised, and when Admetus returned, appealed to his generosity to befriend him, not keeping in mind old causes of resentment, because Themistocles was now in danger of his life. Admetus raised him from the hearth ; and when soon after the pursuers came and demanded his surrender, the king refused to give him up, and afterwards for safety sent him across the mountains to Pydna in Macedonia. Ultimately, after other hair -breadth escapes, Themistocles passed by sea to Ephesus and thence into the territories of the Great King. The Great King was now Artaxerxes, who not long before had succeeded to the throne of Xerxes his father. From him Themistocles claimed protection on the singular ground of services rendered to the royal house. Artaxerxes on his part was flattered at the prospect of having Themistocles to be his servant, received him into favour and gave him for maintenance the revenues of three great cities. Magnesia, Myus and Lampsacus. Themistocles died not long after at Magnesia and was buried there with great magnificence. His bones were afterwards brought to Attica by his kinsfolk, either secretly (as Thucydides says), or because (as Pausanias suggests) the Athenians ** repented of what they had done." *
The charge against Themistocles of treasonable correspondence with Pausanias the Spartan and the Persians was never proved, and we are under no obligation to believe it. The probabilities are strongly against it ; because, though Themistocles was no Aristides, and may have acquired wealth by doubtful means, he was no fool : he had no motive for intrigue with the Persians.
1 Pausanias, i. 1. 2.
THE PATH OF EMPIRE 49
There can be no question of the extraordinary quality of his genius. His character has been drawn by the one writer formed by nature to do it justice. Thucydides' character-sketch of Themistocles remains a consummate example of the expressive power of the Greek language. It is the despair of translators : the translation with which this note concludes is at all events the matured result of many years' trial.
" Themistocles gave the strongest proof of force of genius, of which he is a surprising and unique example. By his own mother-wit, to which neither education nor study contributed, he was an admirable judge of an emergency on a moment's consideration, and could forecast with rare insight the most distant future. With a gift of cleajr exposition when his plans were formed he combined an adequate power of decision in unforeseen contingencies ; when completely in the dark he could still foresee more surely than any one the better or worse plan. In a word, by strength of natural genius he could in a flash of intuition extemporise better than any man the required expedient." ^
1 Thucydides, II. 138 (L. J.).
CHAPTER III
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL
"... Athens, diviner yet, Gleamed with its crest of columns, on the will Of man, as on a mount of diamond, set ;
For thou wert, and thine all-creative skill Peopled, with forms that mock the eternal dead In marble immortality, that hill Which was thine earliest throne and latest oracle."
Shelley, Ode to Liberty, stanza v. 11. 9-15.
" That which brought to the city of Athens its most agreeable adornment and struck the world with wonder, that, too, which now alone bears witness for Hellas that the ancient power and splendour of which men speak was no mere fiction, was his con- struction of memorial temples."
" A man may be not at all points free of reproach, yet one of a noble spirit and of a soul that coveted honour."
Plutarch, Pericles, 12 and 10.
Modern Athens is a city worth visiting for the beauty of its situation J its fine streets and public buildings, the variety and interest of its life as the capital of an alert- minded and energetic modern people, who are playing a leading part in South -Eastern Europe to-day and are likely to play a greater. It is most of all worth visiting for the surviving memorials it contains of a greater glory in the past ; for these cannot be equalled anywhere else in the world. The Parthenon, the Propylaea, the Temple of Athena Nike, the Erechtheum, belong to Athens, peculi- arly, but they belong not to her alone. They belong to the whole world. They are part of our own inheritance. They belong to all who have the faculty to understand
50
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 61
and admire : for in those shattered buildings and the sorely misused fragments of sculpture found in them, the principles of beauty in architecture and sculpture may be studied as nowhere else. This is the unique glory of modern Athens, though among present-day capital cities she ranks high by right of her existing amenities. She reached her height of greatness in the fifth century B.C., and she has seen strange vicissitudes of fortune since. Her material prosperity, her reputation as a seat of learning and of the arts, (except for the havoc wrought by Sulla's siege and sack in 86 B.C.) increased rather than diminished under Macedonian and Roman ; Athens enjoyed the favour of a succession of Roman emperors and was adorned by them and by her own wealthy citizens with sumptuous buildings. She lost much of her wealth and dignity through the triumph of Christianity, especially when in the sixth century a.d. Justinian suppressed the schools of the philosophers on which her vogue as a university town depended. Yet she retained a moderate degree of prosperity down to the time of the Frankish Dukes of Athens. Then, with the coming of the Turk she sank into utter decay, so that when visited again in the seventeenth century by travellers from western Europe she was little better than a miserable village huddled under the north side of the Acropolis.
Athens to-day. — You may go to Athens all the way from Marseilles by sea, landing at the Piraeus after passing between the moles built to protect the harbour by Themistocles ; or by railway overland from Patras, skirting the Achaean land between the mountains and the Gulf of Corinth and crossing the Canal by a railway bridge. Not many, perhaps, have entered Athens for the first time on foot from Corinth, but there is much to be said for this manner of approach. You follow the road to Megara by the Scironian rocks, as did Theseus when he journeyed from Troezen to Athens to find his father, 1 first winding along by the blue waters of the
1 See Vol. I., pp. 69 and 70.
52 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Saronic Gulf, with the musical tinkle of goat-bells to cheer you on your way, and a profusion of wild-flowers by the wayside instead of adventures with evil men and monsters. You may even find a quiet beach to bathe from, if the day is hot. And from Megara you wander on by the sea to sacred Eleusis ; then strike inland to the Pass of Daphni and the highroad into Athens. It is a not-to-be-forgotten experience to enter unknown Athens in the deepening twilight, a little uncertain of the way to a night's lodging.
But by whatever means you come, you awake next morning to an astonishing combination of new and old. For Athens, north of the Acropolis is a thoroughly up-to- date modern town, with electric trams, broad thorough- fares, good modern shops and handsome public buildings. But when you round the Acropolis to the south-west you are in ancient Athens : not in ancient Athens humming with life as vivid and as varied as the modern, but the silent ruined shell of ancient Athens. For while the encircling walls of Themistocles' day formed a ring round the Acropolis, modern Athens has grown up almost entirely on the north and east. So now on the east and north you have the interlacing thoroughfares and streets of modern Athens, narrow and tortuous near the citadel rock, broad and spacious more to the north-east towards Lycabettus, where lies the most modern quarter, extending beyond the limits of the ancient city on that side : west and south you have a wide unoccupied space, including sites memorable in the life of the ancient city, the Areo- pagus, the Pnyx, and the Hill of the Muses, mostly empty now, not built over and not much strewn with ruins, but marked extensively with the traces of the excavator.
The Acropolis. — Between the two regions, joining the very old and the very new, and still the chief centre of interest, is the Acropolis rock with its monuments. The Acropolis, we may say, far more than any other part of Athens to-day, is ancient Athens. For through the sagacious diligence of archaeologists during the last
Emery Walker Ltd. sc.
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 63
sixty years tfte accretions of her later history have for the most part been cleared away/ and the traveller of the twentieth century sees the Acropolis more nearly as it was in the days of Pericles than it has been at any previous time since the dissolution of the classical world. More nearly — yet with how great a difference, since the Acropolis we see is but a ruin and a relic, the petrified body with the life gone out of it. Yet how beautiful in its desolation ! If, as in all likelihood, your hotel is near Constitution Square and the King's Palace, you will make your ap- proach to the Acropolis by the handsome Boulevard named after Queen Amalia.^ This takes you between the Palace Gardens and a well-to-do residential quarter, past, on the right, the English Church and on the left, the Arch of Hadrian and the stately columns of the Temple of Olympian Zeus, till presently it brings you under the S.E. corner of the Acropolis with the sweeping circles of the Theatre of Dionysus climbing high up under the bare rock. You pass along the whole of the south face and, curving round by the Odeum (Music Hall) of Herodes Atticus, you approach the ascent to the Acropolis by a modern road which partly follows the line of the ancient Panathenaic Way from the Market-place.
The Approach to the Propylaea. — The AcropoHs rock is one of those limestone ridges rising abruptly out of a plain which are so characteristic of Greece.^ It is of rugged, dark-coloured stone, and its top is between 250 and 300 feet from the ground below, and 512 feet above sea-level at its highest point. It extends nearly 350 yards from east to west, just short of 150 yards from north to south where it is broadest. Its shape is an irregular oblong ; but the rock has been so built up and cut away and filled in and buttressed out in the course of successive fortifications, that little of the original
1 Prints of mediaeval Athens will probably convince doubters of the immense gain of this clearance.
2 Wife of Otho, first King of the Hellenes after the constitution of the monarchy in 1834.
3 See vol. i. p. 203.
54 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
curved and indented outline is left to view ; ^nd the sides are crowned with a mighty face of walls which tower above the natural rock and — more especially on the east and south sides — sweep in long straight lines, and give the fortress its aspect of impregnable strength. It is the flat top which makes the Acropolis so suitable for a fortress-city, but the flatness is largely the result of suc- cessive levellings dating back from prehistoric times and continued to the building of the Parthenon. In fact the Acropolis, as we see it to-day, owes scarcely less to art than to nature. The cliffs below the walls are on three sides almost perpendicular ; they can only be climbed in places, and that with difficulty. The fourth side, the western, is less steep, and has its height diminished by the rock shelving up to it. This western end was, therefore, always the natural way up to the top, and when the Acropolis became a citadel was the side which most needed defence. Accordingly, in very early times, the times associated with the people known to the Greeks as the Pelasgians, there was an outwork at this end called later the Pelargicon,^ and a system of nine gates, arranged possibly one above another, like the seven gates of the hill-fortress of Gwalior.^ And so things continued till the time of the invasion of Xerxes.^ When Athens was re-fortified by Themistocles, so strong a wall was built about the lower town, that the Acropolis was no longer
1 This outwork is called by Thucydides ' Pelargicon,' which means * Fort Stork.' For a most interesting discussion of the position and extent of this earliest Athens see Dr. Jane Harrison's Primitive Athens as described by Thucydides, pp. 5-36. Frazer (Pausanias II. pp. 356 and 357) cites convincing evidence for placing the Pelargicon at the foot of the N.W. angle of the Acropolis only, not with Dorpfeld (whom Miss Harrison follows) giving it a wide sweep round all the west and south- west ends.
2 Gwalior is one of the Mahratta states. The fort of Gwalior is a rock of approximately the same height as the Acropolis (300 feet above the plain), but with a vastly more extensive area on the top. If miles by half a mile.
^ The Acropolis, it will be remembered, was captured by the Persians, not by direct assault through the gates, but by escalade of the pre- cipitous rock on the north side, at a point which was left unguarded. See vol. i. pp. 340 and 341.
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 56
regarded as a fortress ; and in the middle of the fifth century B.C. a grand hall of entry was constructed across the west end for splendour of architectural effect not defence, and called the Propylaea. But it is not the Propylaea that we come to first as we ascend the Acropolis rock to-day. What first meets the eye is a dull and heavy Roman gateway, called after the French archae- ologist who dug it out, the Beule Gate. A narrow opening six feet wide lets us in : immediately above, up over shelving rock and a long flight of steps, is the outer portico of the Propylaea, a row of six Doric columns leading into what was once a spacious hall.^
The Propylaea. — It is not difficult to apprehend the scheme of the Propylaea — no doubt Pericles' ; and to see that it was magnificent. The rock at its western ex- tremity is about 220 feet wide, and it was Pericles' design to occupy the whole breadth with a superb structure consisting of a central hall and two wings, the wings slightly thrown forward and faced with porticoes flanking the approach. This design was not carried out in its entirety : one wing is little more than a pretence to save appearances. Each wing should have consisted of a side- chamber with a porch in front of it facing inwards to the main ascent : in the southern wing, that on our right, the side-chamber is wanting ; there is just the porch and a back-wall a few feet behind it. This incomplete corre- spondence of the two wings is, however, very little felt in approaching the Propylaea from below. For one thing the eye is drawn by the brave aspect of the little Temple of Victory, boldly planted on the precipitous bastion to the right, nearly thirty feet above, which more than compensates for the comparative weakness of the right wing of the Propylaea. At the same time the non- conformity of the two wings is concealed by the appearance
1 This central portion of the Propylaea ought not, perhaps, to be called a ' Hall,' yet it is difficiilt to know what else to call it. Its front is open columns, and columns flank the central roadway on both sides. It is therefore a porch rather than a hall, — but a porch with the dimen- sions of a great hall. Gardner calls it " a great covered hall, divided into three aisles by rows of Ionic columns." (Ancient Athens, p. 224).
56 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
of correspondence which the portico gives. What mars the effectiveness of the Propylaea now is the ruin wrought by an explosion in the middle of the seventeenth century, when the eastern portico was being used by the Turks as a powder magazine. ^ The hall is roofless, the columns are without their capitals, some of them mere stumps. We pass within the outer portico and on between two rows of Ionic pillars which once supported a rich ceiling ; then through a lofty door, one of five, up a few steps, and out through the upper portico on to the sloping rock which leads to the summit. If we here pause, and turn, the view back through a vista of columns over the plain of Athens and the sea is entrancing ; but the Propylaea halls and columns themselves in their present state are less impressive than their fame.
The Parthenon. — It is otherwise when you ascend the slope and, turning slightly southward, come into full view of the Parthenon, a little to your right. There is a majesty in the wreck of the Parthenon, as it now stands, roofless and rent and broken, that even the Parthenon in its first glory, with its columns complete and the sculptures that adorned its front and sides clear-cut and fresh, could hardly have exceeded. Shattered and muti- lated as it is, grace and strength emanate from its form and outlines, proclaiming it the perfection of symmetry. The first full view of the Parthenon must affect with awe those who come to it with any feeling for human aspiration and achievement ; some even without that stimulus for the sheer graciousness of its lines and proportions.
We can walk round the temple and identify the frag- ments of original sculpture still in position. We may stand on the temple platform and on the pavement of its
^ The magazine was struck by lightning one night in the year 1656, and the Greeks had a story that the storm was sent by St. Demetrius, whose ch\irch, some 500 yards S.W. of the Acropolis, was threatened with destruction by the Turkish governor, who had guns ready trained upon it and intended to fire them next day. The governor, who had his residence in the Propylaea, himself with all his family perished in the explosion. The church has since been known as the Church of St. Demetrius Loumpardaris, that is, of St. Demetrius the Bombardier.
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 67
cella, the shrine of Athena — exactly a hundred Attic feet in length, like the old temple of Athena which was called on that account the Hecatompedon. Grievously little — practically nothing — is left of the noble figures sculptured in the round with massive, yet exquisite, art (as the surviving fragments show) ; the best of the Metopes have been taken away ; the slabs that remain are so broken and defaced that the subjects can scarcely be more than guessed at. But a good many of the most spirited and best preserved sections of the frieze are still in their places, especially on the western front of the temple, where all remain but one.
The Erechtheum. — The ruined Parthenon is the greatest of all the sights in modern Athens, but the Parthenon and the Propylaea do not exhaust the architectural glories of the Acropolis. North of the Parthenon, and close to the northern edge of the rock, is the Erechtheum, a temple, or rather a group of associated shrines, like nothing else in Greece, excelling in the rich elaboration of its decorative work as the Parthenon excels in the majesty of simple outlines and proportions. The form of this building is most unusual. A Greek temple is usually a plain rectangle, with either rows of columns at its eastern and western ends, or a portico of columns on all four sides. The shape of the Erechtheum departs widely from this norm. There is the usual portico at the east end ; but at the west end there projects on the north side a large portico which actually extends beyond the wall of the main building ; and on the south side a smaller portico. It is not for the symmetry of its shape that we are drawn to the Erechtheum ; its beauties are different. We study the Erechtheum for the marvellous richness and exquisite finish of its incidental decoration, the bands of carving along its walls, and on the capitals and bases of its columns — carving in stone " so delicate that modern hands, even with modern tools, have never been able to reproduce the fineness of the original." ^ Perhaps
^ Mrs. Bosanquet, Days in AtticOy p. 138.
58 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
its supreme beauty is the little portico projecting on the south side, the Caryatid Porch. The Caryatides, those gracefully poised female figures, types of patient and serene endurance, ^ catch the eye as one advances from the Parthenon. There are six of them, shapes of women serving as pillars (four in front, with a second figure behind each of the two outer ones), which support on their heads the entablature of this S.W. portico. The name is taken from Caryae, a town in Laconia on the Arcadian border and signifies merely ' the women of Caryae'. Fifth century Athenians, as inscriptions show, called them more simply ' the Maidens,' that is the hand-maids of Athena.
The Temple of Athena Nike. — And then there is the Temple of Athena Nike, commonly called the Temple of Wingless Victory, which we saw above us to the right as we ascended the Propylaea, as perfect in miniature as the Parthenon is in the grand style. Its platform is only 27 feet by 18, whereas the platform of the Parthenon is 228 feet by 102. The Temple of Nike has four Ionic columns at each end, east and west, and the columns are 13| feet high. The Parthenon has 58 Doric columns (double rows of 8 at each end, east and west, and 17 along the sides), and these are more than 34 feet high. It is to the Parthenon as the carved jewel to the marble statue. It is as gem-like among Greek temples as the Pearl Mosque at Agra is among Indian mosques. An astonishing fact in its history is that towards the end of the seventeenth century (a.d. 1684), the Turks puUed it all down in order to build a new battery, this point being from of old a vantage point for the defence of the Acropolis. ^
1 R. L. Stevenson writes in Our Lady of the Snows :
" For those he loves that underprop With daily virtues Heaven's top, And bear the falling sky with ease, Unfrowning caryatides."
2 It was originally an outwork planned in conformity with the early art of defensive fortification, so as to compel assailants, as they ad- vanced, to expose their right sides, the sides not covered by their shields (carried on the left arm), to the missiles of the defenders.
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 59
But the stones were not destroyed, only built into the defences. In 1835 this battery was in turn removed and the stones discovered. Then the little temple was care- fully built up again stone by stone from the original materials by three German archaeologists,^ with what success the visitor may see to-day.
If the view back from the Propylaea is good, that from the narrow bastion of the Temple of Victory is better. Looking south-west, you see outspread beneath you a fine panorama of the plain of Athens, Piraeus, Phalerum and the sea, the islands in the Saronic Gulf and the mountains of Argolis.
One beautiful decoration which the Nike bastion once had is absent to-day — a protecting parapet waU a little over three feet high, very richly sculptured. A large number of fragments (about forty in all) have been re- covered and are all now in the Museum on the Acropolis. The subject is some ceremony connected with the cele- bration of victory. Some of the Victory figures are of exquisite beauty : one of them, the Victory stooping to adjust a sandal strap is, perhaps, the very loveliest fragment of Greek sculpture extant.
The First Splendour. — This, briefly and imperfectly sketched, is what we experience in ascending the Propy- laea and moving over the levelled summit of the Acropolis to-day. But if we could call up the vision of it in its newly-finished splendour, how incomparably more brilliant would not the spectacle be ? We should see the Propy- laea, not as a vista of broken and roofless columns, but as a stately vestibule and entrance-hall, fifty feet deep by sixty broad, covered in by a panelled ceiling at a height of forty feet above the pavement, its fluted columns fresh from the chisel and glowing with colour. Left and right would be the porticoes of the northern and southern wings, the former leading to a picture gaUery (which contained paintings by Polygnotus and other famous artists). In front of the central hall is a wall
^ Ross, Schaubert and Hausen. Ludvig Ross was at the time chief conservator of antiquities at Athens.
60 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
pierced by five doorways, the great door in the middle twenty-four feet high, leading through to the upper portico (less deep than the western or lower, only thirteen feet) and out on to the slope of the rock. Here directly in front, but slightly to the left of the roadway, would be the Promachus, the colossal brazen statue of Athena, the Defender ; — ^her helmet's top and the point of her spear could be seen, when the sun caught them, from the decks of Attic ships on the homeward voyage after rounding Cape Sunium. And when we turned our eyes to the Parthenon, the fearsome rent beyond the sixth column 1 would be filled up and the temple would stand with its roof and gable end and incomparable sculptures whole and complete, the most magnificent work of the greatest artists in stone who have ever lived. The eye would first be caught by the splendid figures of the western pediment, grouped to represent the contest between Poseidon and Athena for the possession of Athens, the figures carved boldly in the round and standing out with striking effect. Below the pediment, but above the columns of the portico, in the intervals between the triglyphs would be the metopes, portraying Theseus' fight with the Amazons. If we walked forward, ascended the steps to the level of the temple platform, passed under the first row of columns and looked up, we should see — a little dimly in the lack of light from above — the beginning of that marvellous succession of figures which extends along the top of the side walls of the sanctuary and above the inner columns at both western and eastern ends :
1 The Parthenon stood whole and complete and little injured by time (for it was successively a Christian church and a Mohammedan mosque), till near the end of the seventeenth century. Then the Venetians besieged Athens, and their leader, the Christian Francesco Morosini, opened fire on the Parthenon, because he had information that the Turks had stored their powder there. One of his shells struck the Parthenon, exploded the powder and made the havoc of the centre of the structure which we see to-day. Morosini did further irreparable injury to the Parthenon by attempting to remove the central sciilptures of the eastern pediment and doing it so badly that the figures crashed to the ground and were shattered. The battery from which the shot was fired is said to have been near the church of St. Demetrius, the Bom- bardier (above, p. 56 n).
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 61
it represents in low relief the great Panathenaic procession : — not as now, just fragments of it in broken sequence with the marble slabs that are still in position (only a third of the original number) most of them worn, mutilated and imperfect, but a continuous band of sculpture — all vivid, clear-cut, fresh from the artist's hand — figuring in marble the stream of worshippers as it moved in procession from the western end along the two sides of the temple north and south, to unite in the imagined presence of the gods in front of the eastern entrance to Athena's shrine.
There was all this ; and there was besides the rich colouring which the Greeks (like the Christian builders and image -makers of the Middle Ages) used profusely to sharpen and deepen the lines of their temples and statuary, alike in column and architrave, triglyph and metope. There was the gold and ivory statue of Athena, the Maiden, within the Parthenon shrine ; there were the treasures behind the sealed doors of the back-chamber. There was life and movement round about the sanctuary ; the priests, the animals for sacrifice, the temple guards, the throng of worshippers coming and going.
When we realize all this and contrast the present with the past, we discover a deep pathos in the words of Plutarch, so often quoted : " Each one of them, in its beauty, was even then and at once antique ; but in the freshness of its vigour it is, even to the present day, recent and newly wrought. Such is the bloom of perpetual newness, as it were, upon these works of his, which makes them ever to look untouched by time, as though the unfaltering breath of an ageless spirit had been infused into them." ^
Pericles and Pheidias. — These buildings made Athens architecturally the noblest of earth's cities. They were the work of the Athenian people, a thank-oifering and memorial dedicated to the gods who had delivered Hellas from the invader. But as it was to Themistocles and
1 Plutarch, Pericles, 13. Loeb, iii. p. 41,
62 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Aristides, two of her citizens, that Athens owed her great achievements in the Persian wars, so it was to two of her citizens, Pericles and Pheidias, that she owed the glory of works of art which have long outlived her political greatness. It was the mind of Pericles which conceived the possibility of making the whole Acropolis one vast shrine of Hellenic religion, a monument of Athenian action and endurance. It was the artist soul and the artist hand of Pheidias which wrought out this sublime thought of Pericles in forms of surpassing beauty.
Pericles. — Pericles was by birth a Eupatrid ; on his mother's side an Alcmaeonid ; on his father's also of a very noble Athenian family. He is the most illustrious of all Athenian statesmen, perhaps the most lofty-minded of all the Greeks. He did great things for Athens in his life-time and would have done one greater thing for Hellas, had not the narrow political ideals of the Hellenes stood in the way. In his public career Pericles followed the example of his great-uncle Cleisthenes and carried through measures which may be said to have completed democracy after the Athenian model. Here, however, we are concerned only with the part he took in adorning Athens with splendid buildings and works of art.
Pericles first comes prominently into Athenian political history in connection with that struggle of parties at Athens which ended in the banishment by ostracism of Cimon, and the taking from the Council of the Areopagus,^ the last stronghold of aristocratic privilege at Athens, all its remaining political influence. Cimon's banishment was in 461, and when Ephialtes, who had led the demo- cratic attack, was assassinated, ^ Pericles, though still comparatively young,^ was left not only the leading statesman of the democratic party, but also the only statesman of great influence in Athens. Cimon came back in the year of the battle of Tanagra (457), but he no
1 See vol. i. p. 239.
2 Probably by some who resented as sacrilege the violence done to the venerable Council of the Areopagus.
* It is probable that the birth of Pericles was in 493 B.C.
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longer took any active interest in domestic politics. Consequently Pericles may be said to have guided the destinies of Athens, as her foremost citizen and chosen leader for over thirty years ^ (461-429). For nineteen of these years there was still a strong conservative op- position headed by Thucydides, son of Melesias ; ^ and this opposition was largely a personal opposition to Pericles' ' imperial ' policy. But in 442 Thucydides was ostracized, and then for the rest of his life Pericles swayed Athens without a rival. Year after year he was chosen one of the ten strategi, and as strategos, or general, he frequently exercised command of the military and naval forces of Athens. Thus in 453 we find him in command of an expedition to the Gulf of Corinth which obtained substantial successes. He is said by Plutarch to have set up trophies of victory nine times in all. But he was not a brilliant war-leader like Cimon. The Ecclesia was the scene of his greatest achievements. Pericles was a statesman and a thinker, and his greatness was shown most of all in the largeness and perspicacity of his views for Hellas and for Athens. At one time in his life he had seen the vision — a vision that mocks us across the centuries — of an organized and united Hellas, able not only to keep the Persian at bay, but to assume, as was her due, an undisputed preeminence among the nations of the world. The proof of this is that soon after the double victory of 449 in Cyprus had put an end to the fear of renewed Persian aggression, Pericles was the author of a memorable attempt to assemble at Athens a council, in which all Hellas east of the Ionian Sea should meet to discuss matters of common interest to the Hel- lenic race. The proposal came to nothing, for success depended on the spontaneous assent and sympathy of all the communities invited ; and Peloponnesian jealousy of Athens stood fatally in the way. But the interesting thing is that such an invitation should have been issued
1 Plutarch {Pericles, 16) says for forty.
2 To be carefiilly distinguished from Thucydides, the son of Olonis, the historian.
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and that the thought of it was Pericles'. We owe our knowledge of the incident to Plutarch only : Thucydides has no word of it. Now, though Plutarch was writing in the second century a.d., five hundred years after Pericles' death, and Plutarch's narrative lacks confirma- tion, it is not otherwise than credible in itself, and, there being no obvious motive for the invention of such a story, it may be regarded as probably true. It is, therefore, worth while to see exactly what Plutarch says. The passage is in his Life of Pericles : he writes " When the Lacedaemonians began to be annoyed by the increasing power of the Athenians, Pericles, by way of inviting the people to cherish yet loftier thoughts and to deem itself worthy of great achievements, introduced a bill to the effect that all Hellenes, wheresoever resident in Europe or in Asia, small and large cities alike, should be invited to send deputies to a council at Athens. This was to deliberate concerning the Hellenic sanctuaries which the Barbarians had burned down, concerning the sacrifices which were due to the gods in the name of Hellas in fulfil- ment of vows made when they were fighting with the Barbarians, and concerning the sea, that all might sail it fearlessly and keep the peace." ^ He goes on to de- scribe how four deputations, each of five members, all men above fifty years of age, were sent in different direc- tions ; and adds : " But nothing was accomplished, nor did the cities come together by deputy, owing to the opposition of the Lacedaemonians, as it is said, since the effort met with its first check in Peloponnesus. I have cited this incident, however, to show forth the man's disposition and the greatness of his thoughts."
The failure of this enterprise may well have convinced Pericles of the futility of hoping for a permanent union of Hellas by persuasion and a recognition of the common interest ; it probably confirmed him in his suspicions of Sparta and a determination never to trust her or let Athens yield to her for the sake of peace any point of grave importance. But he did not relinquish his ultimate
1 Plutarch, Pericles, 17. Loeb, iii. pp. 55 and 57.
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aim, only modified profoundly the method of its accom- plishment. Athens should more than ever embody the Hellenic ideal and set up a pattern for the rest of Hellas. The means, if other methods failed, must be the strength- ening and extending of the Athenian arche. It is at all events certain that Pericles' mind was exalted and filled with this conception of the worthiness of Athenian institutions, and it became the main purpose of his life to fit Athens in all possible ways for the high role which was her destiny. If the other states of militant Hellas would not come together at her bidding to deliberate concerning the Hellenic sanctuaries, and the fulfilment of vows made when they were fighting against the Bar- barians, Athens should do these things for herself first ; and in some sort, should take on her to do them for all Hellas — the Hellas she had saved from the Mede. This is, as Bury explains,^ the true key to the understanding of the great public works that were executed at Athens during the administration of Pericles, roughly between 447 and 431. Plutarch comments on the wonder of their swift execution. " Each one of them, men thought, would require many successive generations to complete it, but all of them were fully completed in the heyday of a single administration." ^ This is not true without qualification, but it is true enough to make good Plu- tarch's point. Pericles himself was filled with a lofty sense of the religious meaning of his great undertaking, and this zeal and enthusiasm were communicated to the Athenian people who voted the works, and to the masons and artificers who were set to work upon them. " So then the works arose," says Plutarch, " no less towering in their grandeur than inimitable in the grace of their outlines, since the workmen eagerly strove to surpass themselves in the beauty of their handicraft." ^ This
^ Bury's Greece, p. 367. " We shall miss the meaning of the archi- tectm-al monuments which now began to rise under the direction and influence of Pericles, if we do not clearly grasp their historical motive, and recognise their immediate connexion with the Persian war."
2 Plutarch, Pericles, 13. Loeb, iii. pp. 39 and 41.
3 Plutarch, Pericles, 13. Loeb, iii. p. 39.
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is the secret of the perfection of the Parthenon and the Temple of Victory, of the Erechtheum and the Propylaea : a united ^ people who had endured and conquered, and were still filled with the fervour of great striving and achievement, set about the building of them with one mind and purpose. The buildings they wrought illustrate the truth which Ruskin preached to his generation, that architecture is the expression of national life and char- acter. The ruins on the Acropolis are an abiding witness to the high temper and capacity for action of the people of Athens in the fifth century B.C. They express their passionate devotion to their city, their belief in their own powers and their zeal for their religion so closely bound up with both. For the building of the Parthenon and the Erechtheum was a new and more comprehensive consecration of the whole area of the Acropolis. The Propylaea formed a portal on a scale suited to the grandeur of the dedicated area ; nor is the position of the Temple of Victory on a forward bastion just in front of the Propylaea without significance. For it is victory over the Persian invader who had desecrated the Acropolis and its shrines, which the new consecration commemorated. How deeply the Athenians felt the destruction of their sacred places may be judged from the words used by Herodotus in giving their reasons why it was utterly impossible they should accept the tempting offers of Mardonius : " The first and chief of these," they are made to say, " is the burning and destruction of our temples and the images of our gods, which forces us to make no terms with their destroyer, but rather to pursue him with our resentment to the uttermost." ^ The Mede had been discomfited, and Athens was once more in possession of her citadel and its consecrated ground. But as yet there had been no restoration of the shrines that had been destroyed. It was time the vows and promises made in the hour of victory and
1 The unity has to be qualified, however, by what is said later in this : chapter, p. 72, of the opposition to Pericles' schemes.
2 Herodotus, viii. 144. Rawlinson. Quoted vol. i. p. 359.
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thanksgiving should be carried out. There was peace with the King of Persia since 448 — at least there was a cessation of active hostilities. And in 445 there was peace also between Athens and the enemies of Hellenic blood and speech, with whom she had been at strife since 459. The moment was every way opportune.
Storm and Stress. — The pacification of 445 b.c, known as the Thirty Years' Peace, was only reached after the Athens of Pericles had passed through an ordeal which left the main fabric of Athenian power, her sea federation, firmer than ever, but ended the predominance in Northern Greece which ten years before she seemed to have secured. This period of stress began in 447 with a serious reverse to Athenian arms in Boeotia. News had come that bands of exiles from the Boeotian cities were gathering head in Northern Boeotia. Tolmides, the hero of the raid on Gythium, hastened with insufficient forces to crush them. He was attacked on the march by superior numbers and his whole force annihilated. Many were killed, Tolmides himself among them ; and many were made prisoners of war. To recover these prisoners Athens agreed to evacuate Boeotia. Oligarchical governments, unfriendly to Athens, were once more established in all the Boeotian cities, with Thebes dominant among them. This was a blow to Athenian prestige ; and next year (446) Euboea revolted. Strong forces at once crossed into Euboea under the command of Pericles ; but no sooner were they there than further news came that Megara had again changed sides, that the Athenian troops occupying posts in the Megarid had been cut ofE and destroyed, all but a remnant that had escaped to Nisaea ; lastly that the army of the Peloponnesian League was about to invade Attica. Pericles at once conveyed his army back to meet the danger of invasion ; and the Peloponnesians, after laying waste the country as far as Eleusis, retreated. Pericles and the Athenians were then free to deal with Euboea. When the Euboeans made their submission, conventions were made with the cities individually, and, on the whole, the terms were
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lenient.^ One town, Histiaea, was treated with greater severity : the inhabitants were expelled and their territory divided among Athenian settlers. The name of the city was changed to Oreus. Plutarch gives as the reason for this that the Histiaeans had put to death the crew of an Attic ship which had fallen into their hands.
The Thirty Years' Peace. — Athens was. on the whole, well out of Boeotia and her ' land empire ' ; but the treachery of Megara was a permanent disaster and left bitter memories. With Megara as an ally, Attica need have no fear of invasion from the Peloponnese. With Megara hostile, she was always open to invasion on that side. It was this consideration, doubtless, together with a certain exhaustion after the almost superhuman effort of the preceding fifteen years — when she had practically been fighting Persia and the Peloponnesian League at the same time, — which induced Athens, still under the auspices of Pericles, to make peace in 445. She had to make sacrifices for it. She gave up Nisaea and Pegae, the harbours of Megara, which she still held, and Troezen, and Achaia. She renounced, in fact, all claim to terri- torial influence outside Attica. It was humiliating ; but she was the stronger for it. The treaty was for thirty years : and the peace is known therefore as the Thirty Years' Peace, though it did not last quite fifteen. The allies of both Athens and Sparta were included, that is the whole of the two confederacies ; and it was expressly provided that neither Athens nor Sparta might form an alliance with any state which at the time of the making of the treaty was on the other side : but this clause did
^ Two extremely interesting inscriptions illustrate these events in Megara and Euboea. One is a tombstone commemorating a Megarian, Pythion by name, who did Athens signal service by guiding an Athenian force out of Megarian territory safe back to Attica. It seems that on the outbreak of the Megarian revolt three tribal regiments had marched into Megara and been cut off there by the advance of the invading Peloponnesian army. Pythion had then guided the troops back by a roundabout route. The other is a copy on stone of the conven- tion between Athens and Chalcis one of the Euboean cities. This convention has been already referred to above, ch. ii. p. 46. The inscriptions are Nos. 38 and 40 in Hicks and Hill, pp. 61-65.
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not apply to neutral states which were left free to ally themselves as they pleased.
Pericles' Peace Schemes. — One of the motives that swayed Pericles in making this peace may well have been his longing to concentrate the resources of the city on his great plan for her adornment. The building of the Parthenon was begun in 447 : extant inscriptions establish this with approximate certainty. A full generation had passed since the sack of the Acropolis and the restoration of the temple of the guardian goddess had been too long deferred. A beginning had indeed been made in the time of Themistocles. Plans of a new temple had been designed on an ample scale, a new site was chosen ; and, because the rock there was not level, a mighty substructure was built. Then there was a check and the work ceased, till Pericles in the fulness of his power took the matter in hand. And Pericles thought of the glory of Athens as well as of what was owing to the gods. The design he adopted went beyond the design of that earlier time and was all that the most consummate architects of this culminating epoch of Hellenic architecture could make it. The substructure was modified to suit the new plan ; for the new temple was to be of a better pro- portioned shape, broader and a good deal less long : the marks of the necessary alteration in the substructure . are visible there. On these foundations Pericles built the Parthenon. In nine years (447 to 438) the structural work was finished ^ and the image, the great gold and ivory Athena, dedicated.
The building of the Propylaea was begun immediately after the dedication of the Parthenon, that is in 437, and the work continued to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. It was intended solely as a splendid forecourt to the consecrated area of the Acropolis. We have had occasion to notice already that the Propylaea was not built altogether in accordance with the architect's original design (above p. 55) : one of the two wings is much smaller
^ Inscriptions, however, show that work on the sculptures of the Parthenon was going on as late as 433.
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than the other, in fact just a hollow front to give the appearance of symmetry. But how greatly the existing Propylaea fell short of the architect's grand conception has only been discovered through detailed study of what is left of it. The walls as they stand have a tale to tell, and their tale is of a vast design thwarted and cramped by narrow prejudices. There are plain indications that it was at first intended to build two large eastern halls, one on each wing, on the further side of the western halls actually built. Mnesicles' original design for the Propylaea was thus at once simple and sumptuous : a central hall of entrance with porticoes at either end, upper and lower ; and double wings on either side, each consisting of two halls, a western and an eastern. Only one of these four halls was built in accordance with this plan, the north-western hall or Picture Gallery. The south-western hall is contracted in size, as we have seen. The north-eastern and the south-eastern halls were never built at all. But the cornices running along the top of what are now exterior walls ^ bear witness to the ampler project of the architect. Magnificent as was the Propy- laea, and great as was the Athenians' pride in it,^ it was an unfinished work, a fragment, a noble instalment of a mighty whole, — like some great things in our literature, Spenser's Faerie Queene and Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. It is not difficult to conjecture what the hindering causes were. We may see on any plan of the Acropolis how the Propylaea wing on the south side impinges on the precinct of Brauronian Artemis. The southern wing could not be carried out according to plan without cut- ting into this precinct : because of religious opposition based on this ground the original design had to be aban- doned. The architect modified his plan and did the
1 The point of course is, that only interior walls want cornices and that these exterior walls would have become interior had the eastern halls been built.
2 The Thebans are reported to have said (in the middle of the fourth century) that the only way to abate the pride of the Athenians was to remove the Propylaea bodily from the Acropolis to their own citadel, the Cadmeia.
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best he could with the space allowed to him. But even after this drastic modification on the south side, the design was not fully carried out on the northern. For the north-eastern hall was never built, though clearly intended (for on this side there are even holes ready made in the walls above the cornice to receive the roof -beams) : and the reason for this must be the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 43 1.^
We may infer a good deal more from these indications of thwarted purpose : we may infer, what indeed we know in part from Plutarch,^ that Pericles' great plans for the beautifying of Athens by the lavish adornment of the Acropolis were carried through in the teeth of a stiff opposition. It is even possible, though one would rather not think so, that we owe the Temple of Athena Nike to this opposition. We cannot wish the little temple away, yet its position, in advance of the Propylaea, can hardly be regarded as a natural part of Mnesicles' great design. There is plausibility then in the conjecture that it was due " to a party and to a wave of party feeling hostile to Pericles and his ideals." ^
The Erechtheum is admittedly of later date ; it was not completed till after 395 B.C., when the splendour of Athens was already past. We cannot with any certainty
^ On most of the blocks of stone built into the walls of each of the existing wings of the Propylaea are to be seen the knobs, which were left by the masons as handles to help placing the stones in position. These protuberances were intended to be chipped off later and the surfaces left smooth. The fact that this smoothing has not been done shows that the work was stopped on a sudden and never properly finished.
2 Plutarch notes {Pericles, 12) that it was his great public works which most of all made Pericles a mark for abuse and slander.
* Casson, Catalogue of the Acropolis Museum, Part II. p. 12. On the other hand an inscription found on the Acropolis in 1896, and ascribed to a date between 460 and 446 B.C., appears to prove that a new temple was part of Pericles' original scheme. For this inscription makes provision ( 1 ) for the appointment of a priestess of Athena Nike ; (2) for fitting her shrine with a door ; and (3) for building a new temple, in accordance with the plans of the architect, Callicrates. At all events it is clear that a shrine of Athena Nike existed on the site before Pericles' great plans were taken in hand. For the inscription see Hicks and Hill, 37, pp. 59-61, or Roberts and Gardner, pp. 8-10.
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know how far this temple, or another temple on the same site, found place in Pericles' original scheme. But here also in the problems which a study of the remains of the Erechtheum raises we encounter indications of the same conflict of ideals. The shape of the Erechtheum, as we noted, is puzzling. It is like no other Greek temple ; and as it stands it is glaringly unsymmetrical. It has been surmised that the Erechtheum, too, is an unfinished building ; that the original design, whether part of Pericles' great plan, or a project initiated by the con- servative opposition out of rivalry, included an extension of the structure westward to balance the larger chamber, or shrine, to the east. The north and south porticoes would then find place in the middle of the north and south sides, not at one end. This cannot be proved, but it solves the puzzle of the existing shape of the temple ; and assuming that such had been the original design the obstacle to carrying it out would again be found in a religious scruple, for immediately west of the Erechtheum lies the Pandroseum, ground consecrate to Pan-drosos (All-dew), daughter of Cecrops, and a prolongation of the Erechtheum westward must have trenched upon this ground.^
The duality of this building known to us as the Erech- theum is a fact of extraordinary interest. It is not only the Erechtheum but the temple of Athena Polias, and its character as the shrine of Athena Polias is far more important than its character as the shrine of Erechtheus.^
1 This theory about the plan of the Erechtheum was propounded and worked out in detail by Professor Dorpfeld.
^ This duality is also after all a unity ; for according to the oldest religious tradition, in the Iliad and Odyssey, the House of Erechtheus was the only place where Athena had her habitation. In the Odyssey (vii. 80 and 81), Athena, when she vanishes from Odysseus' sight in the streets of Phaeacia, is described as going to ' wide-wayed Athens ' and entering ' the strong built house of Erechtheus. ' Now Erechtheus was bom of Earth and is described as adopted by Athena and reared as her foster-son. He is also Ericthonius, who in the form of a snake lived in the temple of Athena and was regularly fed by the priests on sweet cakes. In the Catalogue of the Ships in the Iliad (ii. 11. 546-549) the Athenians are called " the people of Erechtheus — Erechtheus whom erstwhile Athena, daughter of Zeus, reared (though the bounteous Earth was the mother who bore him) and set him in her own rich temple."
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The Erechtheum is a small building compared with the Parthenon (its length is 71 feet against the Parthenon's 228), yet as the seat of the worship of Athena Polias it was the more deeply venerated shrine of the two. Though not built on the exact site of the old temple of Athena burnt by the Medes, it yet seems in the esteem of the Athenians to have represented that earlier and supremely venerable seat of worship. The Erechtheum, not the Parthenon, contained the most sacred image of Athena, the image of olive wood that men said had fallen from heaven. It was to this image in the Erechtheum, and not to the gold and ivory Athena in the Parthenon, that the Peplos carried in the Panathenaic procession was presented. Other objects of special religious interest were either in the Erechtheum or near it : the olive-tree created by Athena in her contest for Athens with Poseidon, the ' sea ' the production of which was Poseidon's rival feat and the marks of his trident in the rock.^ In the Erechtheum, too, were preserved the golden breastplate of Masistius and the scimitar of Mardonius ; a foot-stool made by the artist Daedalus (first of mortals to experiment in flight) and a wonderful lamp, the work of Callimachus, which went on burning for a whole year when it was filled.
There were thus really two temples of Athena on the Acropolis, and of the two, if the Parthenon was the more magnificent, the Erechtheum was the more revered. The Parthenon is the proud memorial of the imperial power of Athens, but it was to the shrine of Athena Polias that the religious emotions of the people were most deeply attached. For us the splendour of artistic achievement may be the dominant consideration ; for the Athenians it was the traditional associations. We can trace in all the buildings reared on the Acropolis of Athens in Pericles' age evidence of contending ideals. The ultimate result — however it was brought about — was to make the whole Acropolis an area consecrated
^ The trident marks were in a crypt under the north porch, and a hole was left in the floor of the porch, through which the pious could look down and see them.
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to the glory of Pallas Athena. Of the two splendid temples on the summit, one, the Parthenon, was dedicated wholly to Athena Parthenos, the Maiden Athena ; the other; the Erechtheum, was primarily the shrine of Athena of the City (Athena Polias) and only secondarily the shrine of Erechtheus, her foster-child, or of Poseidon, her defeated rival. And in front of the Propylaea was planted, like a sentinel, the little temple of Athena the Victorious. Athens was Athena's city, and on the Acropolis all lesser cults were absorbed into the worship of Athena.
Pheidias. — Ictinus is named as the architect of the Parthenon and Mnesicles of the Propylaea. They are names immortalized by the master works attributed to them, but beyond that nothing is known of either. Callicrates, who is said also to have laid out the Long Walls, is associated with Ictinus for the Parthenon, and is named in the inscription referred to above (p. 112 n.) as the architect of the Temple of Victory. The architect of the Erechtheum is not known. But by general tradi- tion and the express assertion of Plutarch, the great inspiring mind in the carrying out of Pericles' compre- hensive scheme for the Acropolis was Pheidias. " His general manager and general overseer was Pheidias," says Plutarch, " although the several works had great architects and artists besides." Pheidias, too, is only a name transcendently great ; of the circumstances of his life or personal characteristics little is recorded. He was an Athenian by birth, the son of Charmides, and he had a brother Panaenus, who painted the scenes of Marathon in the Stoa Poekile^ We know also that he was the personal friend of Pericles as well as his director of works. He was the maker of the famous gold and ivory image of Athena in the Parthenon, and of the yet more famous gold-and-ivory Zeus at Olympia : ^ also of the colossal Athena Promachos, which crowned the Acropolis. These are the only facts about him definitely authenticated. There is besides some poor gossip related by Plutarch
1 Vol. i. p. 291. 2 Vol. i. p. 38.
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and two contradictory stories (both unhappy) concerning his death. Much of the sculpture for the decoration of the Parthenon which survives is ascribed to him — or at least to his design and inspiration ; but of no single piece of it can it be affirmed with certainty that it is his handiwork.
The School of Pheidias. — In a general sense Pheidias is the author of all the Parthenon sculptures, of the pediment groups, the metopes and the Panathenaic frieze. But it is calculated that frieze and metopes together, without reckoning the great figures in the pediment groups (of which there must have been between forty and fifty) covered 4000 square feet of marble surface. Obviously all this cannot possibly have been the work of one man's hands. Some of the fragments of the East pediment group, now to be seen in the British Museum among the Elgin Marbles,^ show such mastery over stone (notably the drapery of the seated figures and the horses' heads in the right-hand corner) that it is tempting to call them the work of Pheidias. That work displaying such marvellous inspiration and dexterity should be left nameless, when an illustrious name offers so readily, is tantalizing. The same impulse must be felt when we look on many of the slabs of the frieze, whether it is the still grace of the processional figures, or the lifelike action, inexhaustible in its variety, of the prancing horses. But it has to be acknowledged that no warrant — except this inner feeling — exists for calling any particular piece among these sculptures the work of Pheidias. Undoubtedly, however, this much we may say on the authority of Plutarch, who was in touch with direct tradition, that the inspiring genius of all the decorative work of the Parthenon was the genius of Pheidias. His was the general responsibility for all that was done. And he had under him, we are told, ' great architects and artists besides.' We must conceive of what might well be called a school of Pheidias, a group of sculptors, who worked under his inspiration and guidance, and the
1 See Note at end of the Chapter.
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marvel is — almost the greatest marvel of all — that a sufficient number of ' great artists ' was found to catch the inspiration and carry out the ideas of the supreme master mind with such unity of effect that they appear to us (such at least would be the hypothesis that best explained them) the work of one great master-craftsman of infinite resource and inexhaustible energy. We have in this a substantial proof of the high standard of taste and culture and capacity attained at this period by the body of the Athenian people.
The Athenians of Pericles' Day. — For we must be careful to qualify our statement that Athens owed her splendid adornment in the third quarter of the fifth century B.C. to Pericles and Pheidias. This is true in so far as these great men directed and shaped the im- pulses which urged the Athenians to incorporate in the gleaming marbles of Pentelicus the force and energy and spiritual strength which had animated their common- wealth during and after the agony of their ' great war ' ; but it is only one side of the truth. These great achieve- ments in architecture and plastic art were not possible without the active sympathy of the rank and file of the Athenian democracy, who voted the moneys, approved the expenditure and placed the work in the hands of the men most capable of giving beautiful and stately form to the temples which were to be a monument at once of the greatness of their polls and of their gratitude to the gods. These matchless buildings bear their witness to the intellectual and moral endowments of the Athenian people, as much as do the dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes. For only in a highly gifted community could such works have found scope. " The golden age of Greece is, properly speaking, a golden age of Athens," says a scholar, writing recently of Athenian ' imperialism ' ; and he goes on to indicate that the decisive factor in producing this golden age at Athens was — along with the intensity of the national life — " an unrivalled facility for great leaders to get into effective contact with the masses under conditions in
k
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which there was the fullest opportunity for men in general to use their natural powers to the utmost." ^ And he adds, " This happy combination of creative genius and receptive multitude arose in the main from the democratic institutions of Athens." We are thus led on naturally from a consideration of the City Beautiful to a consideration of the forms of government and social institutions which the people of Athens had shaped for themselves.
Note on the Elgin Marbles.
For those who live in England it is possible to get vivid impres- sions of the sculptures of the Acropolis buildings, and some measure of the splendour of their setting, without ascending the Propylaea or leaving England at all. A large proportion of the surviving remains of the JParthenon sculptures, pediment groups, metopes and frieze are in London, in the Elgin Collection, housed since 1816 in the British Museum and arranged in their present positions in 1869. And in the Elgin Room at the British Museum, along with these priceless treasures, there are drawings, pictures, photographs, a model of the Parthenon in its present ruined state, and a model of the whole Acropolis, all helpful to the imagination and all conveniently handy to each other and to the original marbles.
Of the Parthenon Frieze there are in the Elgin Room more than 50 original slabs, casts of the 14 still in position at the west end of the temple and of the 22 in the Acropolis Museum at Athens : 413 feet of sculptured relief out of a total length of 523 feet, 241 being the original marble. Of the metopes which were set above the architrave of the Parthenon on all four sides, 92 in number, 15 are in the Elgin Room, all taken from the south side of the temple and representing combats between Centaurs and Lapithae. There are casts of five others, making 20 metopes in all. Practically all the remains of the Pediment groups — the exceptions being comparatively unimportant — are in the British Museum. In the Elgin Room they may be seen and studied at leisure, safe, one may hope, from further risk of injury.
It is no exaggeration to say that even in their maimed and battered state, these fragments of the pediment figures merit, on purely artistic grounds, the closest attention and study. There is not, it is true, one single whole figure among them : bodies without heads, heads and trunks without hands and feet, these are all the pediment sculptures have to offer. And yet !
* W. Scott Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, p. 41.
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. . . Look well at the folds of drapery and the graceful pose of the seated figures on the left side of the East pediment (E and F) recognized as Denieter and Persephone ; of the three associated figiu-es on the right (K, L, M), called conjecturally the Three Fates. Was loose drapery, and the rounded limbs beneath, ever rendered in marble with such miraculous grace ? Note the vitality, the lithe agility of the fragment (N) interpreted as Iris, on the right of the West Pediment. Note the sensuous ease of the reclining figures (D on the East Pediment and A on the West), identified the one with Theseus, the other with the river llissos. Marvel at the fire breathed from the cold marble nostrils of the horses of the Sun ; the more subdued energy expressed in the other horse's head, the head from the chariot -team of Selene. " I shall never forget the horses' heads — the feet in the metopes," wrote the painter, Benjamin Hay don, in 1808 when taken to see the marbles on their first being opened to private view. " I felt as if a divine truth had blazed inwardly upon my mind, and I knew that they would at last rouse the art of Europe from its slumber in the darkness." ^
The story of the acquisition of the Marbles and their conveyance by sea to London reads like a romance. In 1799, Thomas Bruce, seventh Earl of Elgin, at the time a comparatively young man, was appointed ambassador to Turkey. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries western Europe had been discovering Athens. Travellers journeyed to Greece, came back and wrote books, as did Sir George Wheler in 1682 and Richard Chandler in 1776. Stuart and Revett, the one a painter, the other an architect, had made a careful study of the existing remains of architecture and sculpture at Athens, and brought out a book in 1762, which has since been a classic. Lord Elgin went to the East imbued with a keen interest in the works of art which had made Athens famous above all other cities, and he formed a plan " to measure and to draw everything that remained and could be traced of architecture, to model the peculiar features of architecture." ^ With this end in view, while in Sicily on his way to Constantinople, he took into his service a small band of artists, a draughtsman, two architects, two formatori or moulders of casts — and put them under the orders of the painter Lusieri ( ' the first painter in Italy ' Lord Elgin calls him). These artists he sent on to Athens in 1800, when he went to his post at Constantinople. At first Lusieri and his associates met all kinds of opposition and obstruction in Athens, and the work of measuring and drawing proceeded slowly. But in July 1801 Lord Elgin obtained a ' firman ' from the Porte which gave him practically carte blanche
^ Life of B. R. Haydon, vol. i. p. 85.
' Report of the Coininittee of the House of Commons, p. 40, quoted on p. 189 of the Journal of Hellenic Studies for 1916.
Ik
80 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
to do as he pleased with old stones of every kind at Athens. i The Turks themselves had no interest whatever in the remains of Athenian art, and set not the slightest value on them. Their only motive in granting the firman was to gratify the British ambassador : and no doubt the victory of the Nile and the success of British arms against Napoleon in Egypt had a good deal to do with that. It was not, however, till he had observed what injuries the sculptures were exposed to and how real was the danger of their continued destruction that Lord Elgin entertained the idea of any wholesale removal. The marbles were suffering year by year, partly from exposure and neglect, partly from the depredations of travellers who broke off pieces to keep as relics. The Turks in their very indifference were capable at times of working havoc as extensive and irreparable as if it had been due to malice : they would pound up fragments of marble statues to make mortar, and they made a clearance of the Temple of Victory to use its site as a battery position. Moved in part by these considerations Lord Elgin was fired in the end with the project of removing all the best to England, so as to preserve what was best and greatest in Greek art for the delight and instruction of western Europe. This project he carried out with a thoroughness to which the collection in the British Museum bears witness. The work went on through the years 1801 to 1803. At every stage the difficulties to be overcome were great : first, the irrational obstruction of the Turks in possession of the fortress (the Greeks unfortunately did not count and were not consulted) : then the critical task of detaching and lowering heavy masses of stone from their position high on the Parthenon, carrying them to the harbour and shipping them for the voyage to England. 2 The voyage, too, was not without its dangers. One ship, the Mentor, a brig specially purchased by Lord Elgin, was wrecked with seventeen cases of marbles off the island of Cythera : the cases were ultimately, at great cost and after long- continued efforts, recovered by divers. The largest consign- ments were carried by the Braakel, which sailed for Malta in February 1803 with forty-four cases, and on the Prevoyante, which voyaged with fifty cases from Malta to England in 1804. Arrival in England began in 1803 and continued till as late as 1812.
Lord Elgin himself visited Athens in 1801 and made an ex- tensive tour in the Peloponnese and other parts of Greece. He returned to Constantinople by way of the islands and the coast
^ A clause in this firman (the second of two granted to Lord Elgin) says : " that they be not molested and that no one meddle with their scaffolding or implements, nor hinder them from taking away any pieces of atone with inscriptions or figures. ^^
2 From three to four hundred workmen were kept employed for several months ; and in special crises Lord Elgin was able to call in the aid of the crews of British warships at Piraeus.
THE CITY BEAUTIFUL 81
of Asia Minor ; not long after he was recalled. In passing through France on his way home, in May 1803, he had the ill fortune to be seized, like other English travellers, by Napoleon's orders on the sudden renewal of war, and was detained a prisoner in France till 1806. Consequently he was not in England when his cases arrived. They were unpacked, and the contents were first stored in the cellars of Lord- Elgin's house in Park Lane ; and afterwards displayed at Burlington House. In 1816 the collection was purchased by the nation for £35,000, a sum considerably less than what it had cost Lord Elgin to bring it.
There were those who passed severe judgment on Lord Elgin for removing the best of its sui'viving sculptures from the Parth- enon and conveying them to England. Byron denounced it in five bitter stanzas of Childe Harold '■ and in a satirical poem entitled The Curse of Minerva. And indeed the whole trans- action is open to question. Any such removal of works of art from the country which has an historic claim to them would be intolerable now. Had it been possible to foresee the resurrection of Hellas within twenty years, it would have been intolerable in 1801. The case was different, when Athens was in the power of the Turk, and no other prospect was discernible than that Athens should remain in the power of the Turk indefinitely. On the whole the fair and sober judgment seems to be that Lord Elgin's action was both enlightened and patriotic, and that he performed a magnificent service to European art.
For a first study of the Elgin ' Marbles ' the Short Guide to the Sculp- tures of the Parthenon, obtainable for a shilling at the British Miiseum, gives just the skilled assistance needed. For the serious student the great works are The Sculptures of the Parthenon published by the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities in 1910, and Michaelis' Der Parthenon : and, of course, the relevant chapters in Gardner's Ancient Athens, or Weller's The Acropolis and its Monuments. The magnificent work of Stuart and Revett — in five large folio volumes — The Antiquities of Athens, is still unsurpassed both in historic interest and for the beautiful reproduction of architectural detail. The whole story of the Elgin Collection is told exhaustively in A. H. Smiith's admirable monograph in the Journal of Hellenic Studies for 1916.
^ Childe Harold, Canto II., Stanzas 11 to 15.
CHAPTER IV
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY
" Let there be light ! " said Liberty; And, hke sunrise from the sea, Athens arose !
Shelley, Hellas, 11. 682-4.
" The Athenian community during the Periclean time must be regarded as the most successful example of social organization known to history. Its society, that is, was so arranged ... as to make the most and the best of the human inaterial at its disposal. Without any system of national education, in our sense of the word, it ' drew out ' of its members all the power and goodness that was in them."
ZiMMERN, The Greek Commonwealth, Note pp. 365 and 366.
" the city where men learnt to put the fair debate and the free vote instead of the brute force of tyrants, mobs, or oligarchs."
Freeman, History of Sicily, iii. p. 3.
\ When an Athenian spoke of democracy, he understood by\ the word something very different, at all events super- ficially, from what people mean (if indeed they mean anything), when they talk of ' making the world safe for I democracy.' By derivation the word merely signifies ' ' power of the people ' ; and in the last resort the principle of Athenian and of modern democracy is the same, l namely, that the ultimate authority in the state resides in the whole people, not in any particular person, or class \ of persons. But the manner in which effect is given to the principle differs greatly. In a modern democracy effect is given to the sovereign will of the people through /
82
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 83
what we call representative institutions. The Greeks, and in particular the Athenians, never explored the capabilities of the representative principle for the solution of the problem of popular government.^ In their experi- ence and belief the sovereignty of the people must be exercised directly and personally by the people themselves. With them every free-born citizen of age to share in the defence of the commonwealth was a member of the Ecclesia, or sovereign assembly of the Athenian people. "^
Principles of Democracy at Athens. — The Athenians carried out their idea of the sovereignty of the people with a logical thoroughness which is at first rather dis: ^ ^ - concerting. The ideas on which their fabric of democracy '^ ^ was reared were : (1) All citizens have equal rights ; r^ and therefore, not only must all have equal votes in the Ecclesia, but must also be alike eligible for all offices (with the exception of military command and of one or two others, for which special gifts and special training were seen to be indispensable) ; (2) Political duties must be performed direcTTy and personally by the indi- vidual citizen.
( 1 ) Equal Claims to Office. — At first sight the length to which the doctrine of equal eligibility for office was carried at Athens is barely credible. At Athens literally every citizen was eligibte for every post in the civil administra- tion with the exception of the very few just mentioned ; and a sweeping efficacy was given to this doctrine in practice by the almost universal employment for all appointments of election by lot. The ten Strategi, the Military Treasurer, the Superintendent__of Water-springs, were elected by open vote ; but with these exceptions all magistrates, all civilian officials, from the nine archons
^ This does not mean that the Greeks never had recourse to ' repre- sentation ' in practice. In some of the federal unions formed in the course of their history, — especially in the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, and in the religious federations called amphictyonies, there were rudiments of representative institutions. For an interesting dise\ission of the point, see Zimmem, The Greek Commonwealth, p. 157 and p. 159 n.
84 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
to the Market Commissioners and the Superintendents of Games, were selected simply by drawing lots among the candidates. There was further a rule that no citizen might fill the same_office more than once, except ~^at any one might, if the lot fell on him, be tvnce a member of the Council. It was much as it is in those clubs and associations in which all members hold office (Secretary, President and so on) in turn : only instead of there being a score or so of members there were between twenty and thirty thousand. The principle in both cases was the same, namely that every member of the association was adequately qualified for the discharge of the ordinary duties of office and that it was good for him to take his turn. At Athens the incumbents of all state offices were in theory chosen by lot out of the whole body of 25,000 citizens. Doubtless in practice the choice was very much more limited ; for presumably, though this is nowhere definitely stated, candidates were limited to those who voluntarily came forward, and, for reasons which will shortly appear (p. 86), no citizen would be likely to come forward for an office the responsibilities of which he was totally incapable of sustaining.
(2) The personal sovereignty ' of the Demos or Com- monalty of Athens was exercised through two institutions, the one found in some form in every. Greek state, the other peculiar to latter-day Athens. At Athens, as we have seen,^ the Ecclesia corresponded to the Agora of heroic Greece, which in some form or another survived in all or nearly all Hellenic polities. Only whereas at Sparta (for instance) the Apella numbered some G^e or six thousand members and had very limited powers, the Athenian Ecclesia had three or four times as many members, and had powers relatively unlimited. More- over, at Athens there was besides a distinct organization wherein and whereby the sovereign people discharged the judicial functions it had first had secured to it by Solon's legislation. In this judicial capacity the people was
1 Vol, i. p. 245, cf. p. 220.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 85
called the Heliaea.^ Solon organized the dicasteries or popular courts,^ and gave the poorer citizens equal rights to serve on these courts. But it is probable that in so doing he was only giving a more democratic character to some primitive form of trial before the people, or the tribe, such as we find conspicuous in Roman history.^ Pericles gave new efficacy to the principle of popular right in the Jury-courts by instituting payment for attendance. The amount paid was not large : it was three obols * at the time when Aristophanes was making fun of it in his comedies (about five shillings perhaps in present money values) ; not enough to compensate the well-to-do for their time and trouble, but large enough to enable poorer citizens who depended on their day's work for their livelihood, to serve in the courts instead of work- ing. In theory the Dicastery-courts were, each of them, the sovereign Demos sitting in the seat of judgment ; but for convenience sake, instead of the trial taking place before the whole body of citizens in the Ecclesia, it took place before a section of the whole body, from 200 to 2000 or more in number, selected for the purpose by the im- partial discrimination of the lot. Every year 6000 citizens above thirty years of age were registered in lists for the performance of these duties, and the whole number so chosen and registered was called the Heliaea.
Responsibility of Magistrates. — There was a third principle, subsidiary to these two, for securing the com- plete~~sovereignty of the people. This was the direct
1 By derivation the word Heliaea appears to be connected with a verb meaning to gather or assemble, so that its significance is ultimately the same as that of Agora and Ecclesia.
» Vol. i. p. 245.
' The right of popular trial was enshrined in the Lex Valeria de Pro- vocatione. See Myres, History of Rome, p. 68.
* Six obols went to a drachma. Obol means by derivation ' spit ' ; and drachma meant originally a ' handful.' The explanation is that iron spits were an early form of money, and six of them were treated as making a handful of spits. The modem Greek drachma about equals a franc. But money had in the fifth century at least ten times the purchasing power it has now.
86 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
subordination of all magistrates and officials to the Demos. The people of Great Britain are credited with a healthy distrust of officials as such ; but British jealousy of official persons and powers is mild compared with the Athenian. The Athenian safeguards against the abuse of official position were so rigorous that it is rather surprising that any one was found at Athens courageous enough to seek office at all. " All magistrates," writes Aristotle, " whether elected by lot or by open vote are examined before entering on their office." This was the Dokimasia or Testing. When his year of service was over the magistrate must render strict account of his conduct as an official to one board and submit his money accounts to audit by another, and while this Euthuna, as it was called, was in progress it was open to any citizen who considered himself aggrieved to lodge a complaint. Further, once every month at the first of the regular I meetings of the Ecclesia called kuria, or ' sovereign ' I meeting, the conduct of all officials was passed in review and a vote taken on their continuance in office. Doubt- less in most cases review and vote were formal : but it is obvious that public servants in the Athenian democracy were looked after by the public they served in a truly awe-inspiring manner. There was a test before they were admitted to office, an examination once a month during their year of office, and most formidable of all, a strict scrutiny before they were quit of their responsibilities. This strictness of account has to be weighed along with the rule of election by lot in judging of the efficiency of the Athenian democratic system.
The Sovereign People in their Ecclesia. — It is difficult at this time of day to form a conception of a deliberative assembly on the scale and with the powers of the Athenian Ecclesia in the latter half of the fifth century B.C. Every freerjnan in Attica of the age to bear arms (that is of eighteen years of age and over) was a member of this body. We have no exact census of the number of such citizens in Pericles' time, but we can infer that it must have been not less than 20,000^ and may have been very much
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY Si
greater. A Parliament of twenty or thirty thousand, all equally entitled to vote and to speak, the very notion seems preposterous ; and yet that is what the Athenian Ecclesia was, at least potentially. In practice, of course, so many as that never came together. Some were on active service abroad, or serving in the fleet ; some were unable to leave their farms in the country and come into Athens ; many more would keep away from slackness or disinclination. At ordinary meetings there may have been no more thap thrpp or four th on sand (we have hardly any figures at all to judge by,i it is mainly guess work) : for an ostracism six thousand,-, votes was the quorum required. But even an ordinary sitting of the Ecclesia must have been very like a Trafalgar Square meeting : only instead of listening to speeches and perhaps passing a fiery vote that means nothing, the great meeting in the Pnyx at Athens had tremendous powers. They voted war and peace ; they voted treaties ; they voted the life or death of public servants (ministers and generals) impeached before them ; they voted on the subsidies to be paid by subject communities ; they voted on the expulsion of undesirable aliens. The House of Commons does some of these things in England, but not a mass meeting of citizens. It seems a surprising system, open to damaging criticism — and indeed it had its weak points : yet under it Athens attained to that height of power and splendour at which we have been contemplating her, and under it she achieved and suffered much which we shall presently pass in review, before the days of her greatness were over.
The Council of Five Hundred. — There was no limit to the constitutional authority of the Ecclesia. So far as concerns sovereign power the Athenian constitution was a single-chamber constitution, and a majority of the Ecclesia could do anything whatever that it pleased. But in practice there were safeguards. Firstly by custom
^ Thucydides uses words in one place (viii. 72) which imply that during the Peloponnesian war meetings of the Ecclesia never reached so high a total as 6000.
i
88 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
, having the force of law nothing could come before the I Ecclesia which had not previously been considered by the I Boule or Council. The Council (or Senate) of the fifth century B.C. was a very different body from the Council of Solon's time or even of Cleisthenes', and still more unlike the ancient Council of the Areopagus. All these i were bodies of an aristocratic complexion. The later Council of Five Hundred was a thoroughly democratic institution ingeniously devised to ensure its being an epitome of the whole Demos. It was to all intents and purposes a Standing Committee of the Ecclesia with wide executive powers in addition to deliberative : in fact it was" the most important part of what we should call the government. The Boule unlike the Ecclesia (which met at intervals) was in permanent session : but because for practical purposes the whole five hundred was too large a number, subciiv^^ons of the Boule carried on the business of the state in turn. The Boule itself was made , up of ten bodies of fifty, each elected by lot out of one of i the ten Athenian tribes.^ Each of these groups of fifty discharged the active duties of the Boule for one tenth of the year (roughly a month, actually thirty-six or thirty- five days) and were called during their period of office Pryitmeis. A president was appointed by lot out of these fifty and held office for one day. A fresh president was elected daily ; and no councillor might hold office as president more than once.
The functions of the Boule were both deliberative and executive. The most important of them was that already mentioned just above — to prepare business for the Ecclesia. No business whatever could come before the Ecclesia which had not previously been discussed in (the Boule. The result of this discussion was then placed I before the Ecclesia in the form of a preliminary resolution i of the Boule, or probouleuma. On the executive side the Boule was the permanent co-ordinating agency in the government. " The Council," says Aristotle, " co- operates with the other magistrates in most of their duties."^
1 See I. p. 251. ^^istotle, Constitution of Athens, 47 (Kenyon).
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 89
Some of the functions which Aristotle specifies are un- expected. The Council exercised a general supervision over the ships of the fleet and their equipment : the Council built new ships. The Council looked into the condition of the cavalry horses provided by the state. The Council inspected public buildings : at one time it had examined and passed building plans. The Council received foreign ambassadors. It is not surprising that with these varied activities the importance of the Athenian Boule grew ; yet it never attained to anything like the dominant position in the state at one time occupied by the Senate of Rome. *
The Magistrates. — The Boule, we are told by Aristotle, ' co-operated ' with the other magistrates. He is speaking of civil affairs, and the most important magistrates of all in Pericles' time, the Str^i&gi, bore a military title, though their influence extended intg^civil administration also. Other public Tunctionaries in great variety are enumerated by Aristotle and most of them were probably in existence a century earlier. They were usually organized in Boards of ten, elected by lot one from each tribe, all holding office for one year only. There were City Com- missioners, Market Commissioners, Corn Commissioners, Commissioners of Weights and Measures, Superintendents of the Mart, Commissioners of Repairs, Commissioners of Roads, Commissioners of Games, Commissioners of Public Worship. All these were boards of ten and their functions are suggested by their names. There were several Financial Boards also : — Treasurers of Athena, Commissioners for Public Contracts, Receivers-General, Auditors, aU boards of ten_and- -appointed by lot. An exception in point of number was the ' Eleven,' the dread board known by that name, who had charge of prison management and, incidentally, of executions. Elected also in the same way and for the same period were certain special officers ; a Clerk to the Prytaneis, a Clerk of the Laws, a Demarch for Piraeus, an Archon for Salamis, The nine Archons were still el_e_cted annually and were still invested with the prestige of their title, but they had
90 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
wilxa_ shadow of their ancient power. The year still took its name froln' the" ArchonEp^^ The King
Archon discharged the religious obligations once associated with royalty. The Polemarch had become a sort of Protector of Immigrants. The Thesmothetae worked the machinery of the Dicastery Courts, but no longer themselves acted as judges. Aristotle gives a total of seven .hundred officers of the Civil Service of Attica and as many again for the? Civil Service of Athens abroad in her colonies and empire. All these officials were directly accountable to the sovereign people and must pass the ordeal of the Euihuna before they were freed from responsi- j bility. There was a monthly checking and confirming • of all officials (as we have seen) through the Ecclesia : but accountability to the sovereign people was mainly brought home to officials through the Euthunae, which were connected with the organization of the Demos of Athens in its judicial capacity as the Heliaea.
The Heliaea. — Five of the six thousand Athenian citizens
enrolled for the judicial work of the sovereign people,
and known as the Heliaea, were divided up into ten bodies
of 500. These were distinguished by the first ten letters
of the Greek alphabet. A, B and so on down to K, and told
off for work in the courts, while the remaining thousand
dicasts were held in reserve to make good casual vacancies
in the ten batches of five hundred. There were ten
Dicastery Courts, and the next ten letters of the alphabet
after K were used to distinguish them. To ensure freedom
from undue influence the method of assigning judges to
the several courts was curiously elaborate. No judge
I knew till the day on which a trial took place to which court
1 he would be assigned, who his colleagues would be, or
I what case would come before him. In the morning
of each day on which legal business could be done the
Thesmothetae decided what courts should sit, what
cases should be taken in them and how many judges
I should be allotted to the several courts. The number of
I judges might vary from 201 (there was always an odd
' number of dicasts) to as many as 2501. The minimum
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 91
for a public case was 501, but 201 or 401 was usual in a private suit. For each court a proportion of the judges! was taken by lot from each of the ten sections, so that eachj court, whether of two hundred judges or two thousand,! was representative of the whole body of citizens forming the Heliaea, which again represented the whole Athenian People. Each court further was marked with a dis- \ tinctive colour ; and every day counters of these various 1 colours in number corresponding to the number of judges required for the several courts (201, 401 and so on) were placed in an urn. Then the individual Heliasts came up, one by one, and drew a counter : the colour of the counter drawn determined the court in which he was to sit that day. He received a staff or baton of a corresponding colour, and a ticket. At the end of the day's sitting he gave up his ticket at a pay office and received his three obols. The same process was repeated the next day the courts were open and for every day throughout the year.
The business of the Athenian dicastery-courts grew to be very heavy, since — in addition to the mass of home- bred litigation — legal cases from the allies were brought to Athens in ever increasing volume, till the delays of the courts became one of the grievances of the subject states.
The Heliaea and Legislation. — Moreover, the Heliaea had another most important function of a regulative nature, in its capacity as guardian of the constitution. The Ecclesia had deliberative and executive powers. It was the final authority for state action and there was no limit but one to its initiative. " It was the deliberate intention of the Athenians," writes Ferguson,^ " that the ecclesia should consider everything it wanted to consider." And aU decisions of the Ecclesia were final. The one exception was new legislation. The Ecclesia passed decrees but had no strictly legislative function, that is no power to make new laws (nomoe). New laws could only be brought in by a legal process in judicial form, and that
'■ Greek Imperialiam, p. 54.
92 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
process took the shape of a trial before a committee of the Heliaea.i The law in regard to which change was proposed was formally indicted, pleas were heard for and against, and judgment was delivered by the dicasts. This procedure dates from the end of the fifth century, when a form of indictment was introduced by a statute to be used against any one who proposed a new law which infringed any existing law, an indictment for illegality — a graphe paranomon. This statute made it a hazardous thing to introduce any new legislation at all : for it was a hard matter to propose any new law which did not touch some existing law in a way that might be represented as infringement, and a vexatious law suit might ensue.
The Strategi as heads of the Executive. — The institutions we have passed in review provide an ample organization for the conduct of routine administration, but we are conscious of something still seriously wanting for the effective government of a great state : a central executive and leadership, such as is found in cabinet government in England, in the President of a republic, in a king and his ministers. At Athens this active ministerial function, once vested in the archons, was in the age of Pericles most nearly discharged by the Strategi. In title the function of the Strategos was military ; but in practice the Strategi for the year were the supreme ministers of the State, with functions civil as well as military, like the Consuls at Rome. There were ten such Strategi at Athens, usually, though not necessarily, one ftom each tribe, and elected not by the lot but by open voting.' The ten strategi formed a board ; and there is reason to conjecture, though it cannot be fully proved, that one of the ten each year was permanent president.^
The Chief of the People. — Moreover, in Athenian history down to the times we are now considering, there had always been some leader who had stood out as virtual,
^ Called in this capacity ' nomothetae ' or law -makers. 2 See Greenidge, Greek Constitutional History, pp. 181-2 and Appendix pp. 253-5
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 93
if not titular, chief of the state. There is a succession of great names, Cleisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aris- tides, Cimon, Thucydides (son of Melesias), Pericles. In Pericles the succession culminates. Thucydides (the historian) and Aristotle both give the name ' Chief of the people ' (Prostates tou demon) to such a natural leader, guiding the counsels and decisions of the ecclesia by force of character and the strength of his personal reputation. Of Pericles in particular, Thucydides writes that in his time Athens was in name only a democracy, but in reality the rule of the first man in the state.
National Defence. — Straiego&{a'Txny -leader) is a military title. It is not a little significant that at the height of her political development the title of the chief officers of the Athenian commonwealth was military. This emergence of the Strategi as the chief officers of state dates from a little before the Persian war.^ With the formation of the Delian League and the assumption by Athens of responsibility for the defence of the Greeks of Asia, military, and still more naval, organization naturally gained in importance, though it never assumed so rela- tively large a place in state economy as it did at Rome. It goes without saying that every Athenian youth, as he came to man's estate (and this was reckoned at eighteen years of age) aspired to be enrolled in the national militia. For two years he received military training among youths of like age (the Ephebi from 18 to 20) serving on outpost and garrison duty on the frontiers ; and through his prime of manhood and up to_..the.age of ..sixty he was liable to go on active service when called upon.^ Every Athenian citizen at all well-to-do, and able to provide himself with a full outfit as a man-at-arms, served as a, hoplite or shield-man. The sons of wealthier citizens were, to the number of 1200, privileged to serve in the cavalry, and were called Hippeis. They formed a crack |
1 B.C. 487 See I. p. 251.
2 Citizens' names were kept in a ' catalogos ' or roll, and whenever an expedition was voted by the ecclesia, a certain number of citizens ' on the roll ' were called up to serve.
(^'
94 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
corps and were permitted (like our Cavaliers in the seventeenth century) to wear their hair long and to put on a good deal of swagger. They figure as chorus in one of Aristophanes' comedies called after them the Hippeis, or ' Knights.' The poorer sort of citizens served as light- armed infantry, or in the fleet.
The Navy. — The manning of the fleet was, of course, in the fifth century B.C. a matter of supreme importance for Athens. The marines (epibatae), who were the fighting force on shipboard, archers and javelin men mostly, were through the most flourishing period of the Athenian navy, no more than ten.^ This was because the effective value of a trireme in naval war depended much more on the skill of the oarsmen who propelled it, and who were perfected by hard training in the difficult art of rowing in time under the given conditions : and these oarsmen, with ' spare oars ' nearly 200 in number,^ were in large proportion free men of Athens. Usually| they were citizens of the lowest of Solon's four classes, the Thetes. But, if the need were great enough, Athen-j ians of every class were apparently ready to serve. At the time of the Persian invasion Athenian citizens of all classes hurried on board ship and served as rowers. It is expressly related ^ to the glory of Cimon, son of Miltiades, that when Themistocles made his appeal for volunteers to man the fleet, Cimon as a Knight, for the sake of example, carried his bit and bridle to the Acropolis, and laid them up before the altar of Athena, as a sign that to help the state in her need he forsook land-service for sea- service. And in the latter half of the fifth century B.C. it appears that a large proportion of Athenian citizens had experience of sea-voyages, had acquired a measure
^ See Thucydides, iii. 95, and Dr. Arnold's note.
2 There were 62 Top-bench oars (Thranitae), 58 Middle -bench (Zeugitae) and 54 Lowest-bench (Thalamitae) — fewer on the lower benches because the cut of the trireme gave less length below. The Trierarch was captain of the ship. Other officers were the Helmsman or Pilot ; the Look-out Officer or ' Prow-man ' ; a Piper to give the time to the rowers, and a Boatswain to shout orders,
8 Plutarch, Gimon, 6.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 95
of seamanship and learnt how to row. The unknown author of the treatise on the Athenian Polity expressly says : "A man who is perpetually voyaging is forced to handle the oar, he and his domestic alike, and to learn the terms familiar in seamanship. ... So that the majority of them are able to row the moment they set foot on board a vessel." ^
To the less wealthy citizens naval service was made^ attractive by high rates of pay, a drachma a day, as against the three obols of the dicastery fee (just double). This high rate of pay was attractive also to foreign seamen, that is Greeks of other city-states. The personnel of the Athenian fleet at the height of her sea -power has recently been put as high as 100,000.2 This is hardly an over- statement if we must suppose that Athens kept the 400 war-vessels of her full naval strength (above, ch. ii. p. 38) continually on a war footing. But as this is not probable, an estimate of about half that total is nearer the mark. In the Peloponnesian war a considerable number of foreign seamen served in the Athenian fleet : we do not know in what proportion. But the obligation of personal service was universally recognized at Athens in the fifth century : of the highest classes in the cavalry, of substantial burghers and yeomen in the hoplites, of the artizan classes among the light-armed infantry or on shipboard, every man according to his ability. But so vital was the navy to the very existence of Athens, that in an emergency every man from the highest to the lowest was prepared to serve in the fleet. Thucydides records more than one instance of this.^ And in this willingness for personal service lay the safety of the state. Later there was a decline in public spirit and in the fourth century Athens waged her wars mainly by means of mercenaries. We find Demosthenes again and again lamenting this shirking of personal service and exhorting his fellow-countrymen to return to the braver practice
^ The Polity of the Athenians, i. 19 and 20. Dakyns vol. ii. pp. 281-2.
2 Stevens and WeBtcott, A History of Sea Power, p. 39,
3 Thucydides, iii. 16; viii. 94. 3.
96 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
of former days.^ By that time the splendour of Athens had passed : but universally we may lay down that the military power of any state (whether kingdom, republic or empire) is doomed in no long time to pass away, when its people are no longer willing — all classes alike according to their ability — to bear arms in her cause.
Class Distinctions. — There were wide differences of wealth at Athens and nobility of birth carried appreciable /weight in public life. But there were no rigid class ' distinctions, either politically or socially. In particular there was no class privileged politically. ' ' There never was a people which made the principle that all its citizens were equal a more live reality than the Athenians made it." ^ In Athenian social life there was little, if any, of the spirit we have come to call 'snobbery.' It is significant, for* instance, that the same Greek word means both a stone- mason and a sculptor. " The Greeks," says Zimmern, " never recognized any distinction between a craft or ' trade ' and a profession." ^ The only valid class distinc- tions at Athens were distinctions of obligation. The high-born had religious duties to discharge in relation to the state ; the rich had costly public burdens to shoulder. One distinction, however, there was, which fashion and common speech recognized, a distinction of manners..a_nd education, rather than of wealth or birth, a distinction comparable to the discrimination of character and status implied in the English use of ' gentleman.' People assumed to recognize certain higher standards of conduct and behaviour were called Kaloikagathoi, literally the ' noble and good.'
State Services or * Liturgies.' — It was a recognized custom at Athens to require the well-to-do to undertake on behalf of the state certain public duties involving considerable expense. These forms of costly state -
1 Demosthenes, 1st Philippic, 21, 24, 44, 47 ; 2nd Olynthiac, 24, 27, 31 ; 3rd Philippic, 70.
2 Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, p. 39. ' The Greek Commonwealth, p. 257.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 97
service were called Leitourgiae, from which we get our word 'Xiifcurgy.' The roost important of these was that of fitting-out a trireme and commanding it on service ; and this was called a trisrmchi^ There were four hundred | trierarchs appointed every year.^ Other kinds of state) service had to do with public festivals and games, musical j contests, races. One which occupied a very conspicuous place in Athenian life was the Choregia, the duty of trainifig the chorus required for the dramatic contests held in the course of the celebration of the Great Dionysia.^ It is not, perhaps, quite accurate to call these liturgies or state -services voluntary, since there was no choice in the matter. If you were a well-to-do Athenian citizen and a liturgy was assigned to you, you had to perform it whether you liked it or not.^ But it is a point very well worth remembering that so far as evidence goes these liturgies were not only willingly but zealously and gladly under- taken. There was a keen spirit of emulation in the dis- charge of some of them, and particularly in the presentation of choruses for the tragic stage or for comedy.^ The working of the system of liturgies in its relation to public finance at Athens is admirably summed up by Dr. Zimmern : "A large part of the public expenses of the Athenian State, the mounting of its plays, the equipment of its ships, the arrangements for its games and festivals, its chariot and horse and torch races, its musical contests and regattas both in city and township, were defrayed by private citizens, who came forward voluntarily, and took pride in vying with their predecessors or with a crowd of rivals in their performance of the task." * It was found that the choregus who fitted out a play was as eager as the poet who wrote it, that the play should win the prize for the dramatic contest for which it was pre-
1 See below p. 102.
2 See vol. i. pp, 55, 56 and 249.
' People at Athens did not theorize about the obligations and re- sponsibilities of wealth, but rich and poor alike assumed them as a matter of course, and acted on the assumption without fuss or contro- versy.
* The Greek Commonwealth, pp. 287 and 288.
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98 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
pared, and in later times a whole street in Athens, the Street of Tripods, took its name from the monuments which successful choregic competitors put up to celebrate their success. One of these monuments, the Choregic Monument of Lysicrates (a little east of the Theatre of Dionysus) is an object of interest for the visitor to Athens to-day.
*Life in Democratic Athens. — We may now in the light of the preceding paragraphs try to form some picture of what it was to be a citizen of Athens in the days of Pericles, and to be moulded by the institutions described. We will ask first what were, under the constitution, the advantages and opportunities of every citizen, even the meanest, apart from the adventitious aid of riches and nobility of birth. " All citizens sit in parliament ; every office from commander-in-chief to civil service clerk is open to talent ; an aristocrat, a grocer, an artisan may equally become premier : he has only to persuade parliament to elect him." ^ This is a vivid summary of the result ; but we see that it is true with some little qualification ; for provided a man's claim to full citizen- ship was undisputed, neither lowly birth nor narrow means was a bar to his candidature for office, and the lot was no respecter of persons. The qualification is that wealth and birth at Athens, as everywhere else in the world, were elements in the making of a successful career in politics. Pericles the son of Xanthippus, or Mcias the son of Niceratus, apart from natural endowments, had a better chance of rising to be a power in the Ecclesia than Ephialtes who lived and died a poor man, or Hyper- bolus who could always be reproached with his low birth, or Lamachus who was only a good soldier. Further every citizen of Athens was certainly born to extra- ordinary advantages, quite apart from the brilliant opportunities that were open to him in politics if he had the sort of ability that told in the Ecclesia. Even if he were born in too low estate to enjoy the full training in Music and Gymnastic which was peculiarly Greek, he
^ Jiivingstone (R. W. ), The Greek Genius, p. 209.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCKACY 99
received a liberal education of wide scope through the social and political institutions of his native city. Pericles when addressing to the people of Athens in the presence of the kinsfolk of the dead, at the close of the first year of the Peloponnesian war, his famous Funeral Speech, reminded them of the succession of public entertainments and spectacles with which the year at Athens was diversi- fied : "we have not forgotten," he said, " to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil : we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year." ^
The Athenian Festal Year. — There were some ihkty
festivals spread over the twelve months of the Athenian
year which began in July with the month Hecatombaeon,
and a good many of these lasted for more than one day ;
some for as many as five days. It has been reckoned that
the number of holidays at Athens came to seventy, which
is appreciably in excess of the total which our Sundays
make together with the other holidays recognized by law
(Christmas Day, Easter Monday, Whit-Monday, Boxing
Day and the other Bank holidays). But whereas there is
a certain sameness about our Sundays, all the Athenian
holidays were different, and had a distinctive character.
Some celebrated great victories. There was a Marathon
day and a day in memory of Plataea. Some were deeply
grounded in social and political history, like the Synoecia,^
the Theseia, the Apaturia, the Thesmophoria ; some were
associated only, or mainly, with the cult of some particular
god, the Diasia and the Diipolia with the worship of Zeus ;
the Thesmophoria and the Eleusinia with the worship
of Demeter ; the Delphinia and the Thargelia with the
worship of Apollo. Processions, games (that is, * athletic
sports '), musical contests, torch races, boat races,
variously accompanied these festivals. Above all there
were dramatic contests at two of the festivals of Dionysus,
the Lesser and the Great Dionysia. The boat-racing
in which trireme raced trireme from Piraeus to Munychia,
one for each of the ten tribes, took place on the last day
of the Panathenaea. Torch-races were a feature of the
1 Thucydides, ii. 38. 2 gee vol. i. p. 236.
100 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Theseia and the Bendidaea : ^ and of the Panathenaea also. There were processions at the Lenaea, the Great Dionysia, the Thesmophoria, the Eleusinia and most splendid of all at the great Panathenaea, once in four years.
, The chief events of the whole cycle were the Pana- ithenaea and the Great Dionysia, each occupying not less ithan five days. The Panathenaea may have taken eight, it is thought by some. For us the Great Dionysia have most interest because of their connection with Greek drama. It was for the prize competitions in the Great Dionysia that all the tragedies of the Attic drama were written and most of the comedies. To see these dramas acted the whole free population of Athens crowded to the Theatre of Dionysus in the early morning and stayed there till sunset, watching play after play ; and it remains an astonishment to all time how this great mixed con- course of Athenian citizens, high and low, rich and poor (women probably among them), had minds to follow and appraise dramas of such elevation of thought and language as Aeschylus' Agamemnon, Eumenides, or Persians, Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus or Antigone, or Euripides' Women of Troy. When we contrast this with the diffi- culty which any play of more than ordinary intellectual quality has in keeping the stage of any of the many theatres of London, astonishment grows. The comedies of Aristophanes demand for their appreciation mental endowments scarcely less high, and intelligence at least as quick as a Gilbert and Sullivan musical comedy or the Beggar's Opera,
But for the Athenian of the fifth century B.C. the greatest festival of all was the Great Panathenaea : this came once in four years, in the third year of an Olympiad. Every resource, spectacular, artistic, literary, religious, was used to heighten this, the culmination of the Athenian festal cycle. First came the competition between trained choirs of men and of boys (as in an Eisteddfod) ;
1 A festival in honour of Bendis, a Thracian goddess sometimes identified with Artemis.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 101
next athletic contests, and horse and chariot races. There was a ' manhood ' competition (Euandria) between re- presentative teams of two competing tribes : the prize was the honour of walking in the Panathenaic procession. There was a competition between bands of youths in war- dances, and, as we have already noted, a torch-race. These competitions took up four days of crowded interest. Then came the fifth and great day, the 28th Hecatombaeon. It began with an all-night vigil, and then with morning came the great Panathenaic procession, the representation of which is seen in the Parthenon frieze ; and after the procession high sacrifice. It was on the day after this that the people crowded down to the Piraeus to see the regatta and the race between picked war-ships.
These festivals, with their processions, musical com- petitions and dramatic performances, which were attended, and meant to be attended, by the whole body of the people, were an education of a potent kind, and in the full sense national. Nor was that all the education which the ordinary citizen got from the State. He received valuable education, political and practical, from the mere discharge of his duties as a citizen. And to the fulfilment of these political duties he was urged and even driven. If he lingered in the market-place on a day when the Ecclesia was sitting, or in the streets adjoining the Pnyx, he was swept into it by officers of the City Police holding the ends of a rope well plastered with red powder, and there in the Pnyx, hour after hour, he listened to the discussion of important public questions, and one day by good luck might hear a speech from Pericles. He spent many a long day in the Dicastery Courts, and besides earning his poor wage of three obols — which might or might not be a consideration with him — he became familiarized with a great variety of legal business and a multiplicity of matters of general interest, public and private. " Here are some of the cases which have to be decided on," writes the author of the treatise on the Athenian State, commonly printed with Xenophon's works, but not his, " someone fails to fit out a ship : the case must be
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102 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
brought into court. Another puts up a building on a piece of public land : again the case must be brought into court. Or, to take another class of cases : adjudication has to be made between the choragi for the Dionysia, the Thargelia, the Panathenaea, year after year. Also as between the trierarchs, four hundred of whom are ap- pointed each year, of these, too, any who choose must have their cases brought into court, year after year. . . • There are various magistrates to examine and approve and decide between ; there are orphans whose status must be examined ; and guardians of prisoners to appoint. These, be it borne in mind, are all matters of yearly occurrence ; while at intervals there are exemptions and abstentions from military service which call for adjudica- tion, or in connection with some extraordinary misde- meanour, some case of outrage and violence of an exceptional character, or some charge of impiety. A whole string of others I simply omit ; I am content to have named the most important part with the exception of the assessments of tribute which occur, as a rule, at intervals of five years." ^ We see from all this that frequent attendance in the law-courts, if it had other more questionable aspects, certainly gave the ordinary citizen a wide familiarity with practical legal business. Ferguson justly claims that " the normal town-meeting of the Athenians was, from one point of view, an assembly of experts . . ." ^
The citizen's war-service, military or naval, may count ■^' for something, too. As a young man from eighteen to twenty he learnt the rudiments of drill and the routine of frontier duty. If called on later in life to go on a military expedition over the frontier or across the seas, he received liberal pay. In peace time he enjoyed spacious social advantages in the public resorts at Athens, in the wrestling-grounds and gymnasia, in the market- place and even in the public streets. Among men at any rate — and perhaps because society at Athens, at least
1 Athenian Polity, iii. 4 and 5. Dakyns, ii. p. 289 (slightly altered).
2 Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, p. 57.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 103
respectable society, was an exclusively masculine society — social relations were easy and free. Life at Athens was lived largely in the open air, and abroad in the streets and exercising grounds and market-place you might talk with whom you would free of obstruction by irksome social conventions. Greek social life is aptly compared to club life — but without the rule ofj silence. '
The wealthy and high-born at Athens shared in all these advantages, and, in addition, though the laws gave them no special privileges either in political rights/ or in the national amusements, wealth and rank were an important supplement to natural ability, if they chose) to follow a political career. For the rest they enjoyed precisely the same privileges as poorer citizens. There is no sign of jealousy of wealth or birth as such in the Athenian democracy. For this the system of liturgies is largely responsible : the obligations of wealth to the state were thereby discharged automatically but in a way that made it easy to win popularity and that stands in poignant contrast to the thankless and ungracious way of an Income Tax, however artfully graduated. On the other hand there was extreme sensitiveness to anything that looked like disloyalty to democratic principles, and suspicion of any desire to narrow political privileges and substitute oligarchy for democracy. And for this suspicion of oligarchical intriguing the history of Athens shows there were good grounds. But in spite of! this the prestige of a great name still counted for very! much in the Ecclesia. Without doubt it helped Cimon! in his public career that he was son of Miltiades, and Pericles that he mingled the blood of the Butadae and the Alcmaeonidae. Again young men of wealth at Athens in the fifth centur3''B.c. — a Callias^ or an Alcibiades, a Glaucon or a Critias — could resort to the foreign teachers (Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Thrasymachus) who came | to Athens and professed to endow those who sought their I society with wonderful practical capacities, of which the
^ Xenophon, Symposium, i. 5.
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104 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
art of public speaking was one. The young men of the wealthier classes were able to serve as Hippeis in the cavalry, and they probably had a better chance of be- coming infantry officers, lochagi or captains and taxiarchs or colonels : as officers they would acquire some tincture of military science and so stand a better chance of being ultimately elected Strategos. But the true privilege of birth and wealth in democratic Athens was to be sought in the liturgies, the inestimable privilege of the opportunity for superior service to the State as trierarch, as choregus, as gymnasiarch.
The Opposition at Athens. — But freedom to use and enjoy what was theirs, along with the reality of demo- cratic equality in the essentials of political life, by no means contented all the well-born and wealthy at Athens. Continuously throughout Athenian history we trace the activities of a not uninfluential oligarchical minority, working sometimes in the open, but more often beneath the surface. These people had a way of arrogating to themselves the title ' the noble and good ' which had more properly the ethical significance we gave to it on p. 96. This opposition at Athens had two forms which we may distinguish as the loyal, opposition and the revolutionary. There was the lawful conservative op- position, represented by Aristides, Cimon, Thucydides (son of Melesias), and Nicias ; in Cimon and Nicias combined with mild Lacedaemonian sympathies ; which cherished the old ideals associated with the landed aristo- cracy, war service with spear and shield and memories of Marathon, and disliked the later developments of democracy, especially the growth of the power of the Dicastery-courts.^ And there w^as the revolutionary oligarchical faction, seeking the overthrow of the demo- cracy and always in a state of passive or active conspiracy. We see this disloyal oligarchical opposition intriguing with the Spartans before Tanagra (above, ch. ii. p. 44),
^ Three of the comedies of Aristophanes — the Acharnians, the Knights and the Wasps (especially the last) — express the standpoint of such honest conservatives with all the poet's vigour and wit.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 105
coming into the open in the ohgarchical revolution of 411, and in 404 triumphing for a time in the tyranny of the Thirty.
Freedom in Athens. — But though this oligarchical op- position was sometimes formidable in Athenian politics, and never negligible, on the whole democracy, as under- stood in Athens, was rooted firmly in the hearts and lives of the people. The great charm of living at Athens was freedom. Probably there was never a community in which there was less interference with men's thoughts, words and actions — outside the indispensable require- ments of law and order — than in the Athenian demo- cracy between 479 and 429 B.C. All Hellenes had a passionate love of liberty ; but at Athens liberty was clothed in more gracious forms and acquired a deeper meaning. The Athenians made it their boast that they were lovers of freedom in a richer and finer sense than other Hellenes.
Atossa in Aeschylus' Persians asks about the Athenians
* ' And who is shepherd of their host and holds them in command ? ' '
And the answer is returned
*' To no man do they bow as slaves, nor own a master's hand." ^
Theseus in Euripides' Suppliants makes the same claim :
Our state is ruled Not of one only man : Athens is free. Her people in the order of their course Rule year by year, bestowing on the rich Advantage none ; the poor hath equal right. ^
This is more than the autonomy which all Hellenes craved ; it is equality before the law, justice alike for Eupatrid and lowly-born. And in the same speech Theseus makes a claim beyond this :
Thus Freedom speaks : — "What man desires to bring Good counsel for his country to the people ? Who chooseth this, is famous : who will not, Keeps silence. Can equality further go ? " '
1 Aeschylus, Persians, 11. 243 and 4 (Morshead).
- Euripides, The Suppliants, 404-8 ; Way's translation, i. p. 381.
3 lb. 11. 438-441 ; Way, p. 382.
106 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
This is equality of political privilege and the right of free speech. There is an anticipation of this note, too, in the triumph-song in The Persians : ^
The whole land o'er Men speak the thing they will. . . .
But freedom, and freedom of speech, in imperial Athens went deeper than that. Nothing, perhaps, shows more astonishingly how deep than the ' Old Comedy ' as illustrated by plays written by Aristo- phanes between 430 and 410. Five that have come down to us have definitely political subjects (Acharnians, Knights, Wasps, Peace, Lysistrata). Like all Aristo- phanes' comedies they include a good deal of very plain-spoken indecency : but this, of course, is not the freedom that is meant. They contain much daring criticism of personages and events of the day — of Pericles, Cleon, Lamachus, the war, the sovereign Demos, the Dicastery-courts, along with noble patriotic sentiment, much wholesome advice and at least one superb appeal for peace and goodwill among Hellenes, which we shall notice in its place. ^ These plays of Aristophanes are contemporary documents of extraordinary interest, the veracity of which cannot be questioned. They carry us into the live atmosphere of fifth century Athens ; and in them we breathe air as free as blows in Great Britain or France to-day, or in the United States of America. In some respects it is freer.
A proof of the reality of Athenian freedom, no less telling than Aristophanes' presentment of its effects in thought and speech, may be found in the censure of philosophical critics who do not like it. Plato's gibe in the Republic,^ " a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality of equals and unequals alike," is possibly not quite apposite to the present point. But the satirical descrip-
1 Aeschylus, Persians, 11. 594 and 5 (Morshead).
2 Chapter vi. p. 165.
3 Plato, Republic, viii. 558 ; Jowett, vol. iii. p. 265 (3rd ed. 1892).
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 107
tion, a little further on in the same book — of liberty at Athens — is very much so : "no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State : for truly, the she- dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen ; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them : and all things are just ready to burst with liberty." ^
Most significant of all is the mock praise of Athenian liberty in the political tract found among the works of Xenophon to which we have more than once referred already : " Another point is the extraordinary amount of license granted to slaves and resident aliens at Athens, where a blow is illegal, and a slave will not step aside to let you pass him in the street." ^ This is not praise, but satire : we, however, see things differently and recog- nize with satisfaction that democratic Athens admitted slaves to be human beings with human claims and human rights in a fuller degree than other Greek com- munities.
All these considerations bear out the claim which Pericles makes for Athens in the Funeral Speech : " And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of everyday life ; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succour of the oppressed and those which, though un- written, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all
1 Plato, Republic, viii. 563 ; Jowett, iii. p. 271.
2 The Polity of the Athenians, i. 10 ; Dakyns, ii. 277 and 278.
108 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
men recognize. " ^ So when Nicias at a moment of extreme danger makes a last appeal to his sea-captains before going into action, the note he plays upon is just this : '' He reminded them that they were the inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man." ^
Pride in the City. — This many-sided freedom was one source of the pride which the Athenian felt in his city ; its new architectural glory was another ; but most of all it was her achievements — all that Athens had done and suffered since the Persians ventured to set foot on the shore of the Bay of Marathon. This pride was intense and concentrated to a degree difficult to realize in this day of more diffused patriotism. It was keen as a Public School boy's feeling for his school along with something of the largeness of patriotic English devotion to the ideals of the British Commonwealth. A complete expression of this pride is recorded in the Funeral Speech of Pericles,^ from which quotation has been made more than once. Passionate pride in the beauty and worthiness of Athens throbs through the quietest sentences in that speech and rings out in memorable phrases. " I say that Athens is the School of Hellas." " We love the fine arts, but study thrift withal : we love free speculation, but do not allow this to enervate our minds." " For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path to our valour ; and have everywhere planted memorials of our friendship or of our enmity." " I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her ; and when you are impressed with the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely
1 Thucydides, ii. 37. 2 and 3. Loeb, pp. 323 and 325.
2 Thucydides, vii. 69. 2. Jowett, vol. ii. p. 316 (2nd ed. 1900).
3 Thucydides, ii. chs. 35 to 46.
THE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY 109
gave their lives to her as the fairest offering they could make to her." ^ And in his last exhortation to the Athenians a short time before his death Pericles said : " Kjiow that our city has the greatest name in all the world because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has sacrificed more lives and endured severer hard- ships in war than any other ; wherefore also she has thei greatest power of any state up to this day ; and thej memory of her glory Avill always survive." ^ !
• Splendour of Athens. — Looking back across the score of centuries that have passed since Aeschylus, Thucy- dides and Aristophanes were writing their praise of Athens we can see that the most fervent expressions of this admiration and pride had their justification. We can see this, perhaps better than an average Athenian of Pericles' day, far better than Greeks of other cities, who, some with good reason, were stirred only to enmity. Zimmern in his Greek Commonwealth does not hesitate to speak of these great days of Athens as " perhaps the greatest and happiest period in recorded history." It is a high claim, greatly daring. He repeats it in his last chapter, restates his reasons with an eloquence as moving as it is true : and indicates the crisis to which Athens was brought in her endeavour to maintain her course along the pathway into which her destiny had led her. " For a whole wonderful half century," he writes, " the richest and happiest period in the recorded history of any single community. Politics and Morality, the deepest and strongest forces of national and of individual life, had moved forward hand in hand towards a common ideal, the perfect citizen in the perfect state. All the high things in human life seemed to lie along that road : ' Freedom, Law, and Progress ; Truth and Beauty ; . Knowledge and Virtue ; Humanity and Religion ! ' Now \ the gods had put them asunder. Freedom, Law, Virtue, ' Humanity and all the old forces of city life lay along one • road : Beauty, Knowledge, Progress, and all the new '
1 Thucydides, ii. 43 ; Jowett, i. p. 132. '
* Thucydides, ii. 64 ; Jowett, i. p. 147.
110 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
world of Civilization to which Riches and Empire held the key, along another. The gods had put them asunder. The gods have kept them asunder. Twenty-three cen- turies have passed ; the world has grown wiser than ever Greeks hoped, kinder than ever they dreamed, and richer far than ever they would have desired ; yet man has not learnt how to reunite them." ^
Note on Chapter IV.
There is no intention to shirk recognizing that there was another* side to the picture of the Athenian commonwealth, or that there were blemishes in the social and political life of fifth century Athens — in particular slavery, and the position of women (leading to the degradation of chivalrous love). These things are not included, because they do not come into the scheme ; they are no part of what we inherit from Hellas. Far and away the best discussion of this part of the subject will be found in the Spectator for April the 29th of this year, 1922, in a letter signed ' Outis,' p. 522, under ' Correspondence,' and the editorial comment on this letter in the article, p. 519, bearing the same title as the letter, Apologia pro anima Oraeca.
1 Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth, p. 430.
CHAPTER V
THE LEAGUE AGAINST ATHENS
" If our place were taken by others, we fancy they would afford the beet possible proof of our moderation. Indeed it is from GUI' very fairness that, so far from winning credit, we have most unreasonably got a bad name."
From a Speech of Pericles in Th^icydides, i. 76.
" Yet if in other days they showed themselves good men against the Mede, but are now behaving badly towards us, they deserve double pimishment, because they have turned to bad from being ^^^^' From a Speech of the Spartan Sthenelaidas,
Thucydides, i. 86.
The Price of Empire. — We have seen how Athens in fifty years of heroic action, and with many vicissitudes of fortune, had won undisputed control of a sea-power extending — to use Aristophanes' phrase — "from Sardinia to Pontus." But the price she had had to pay for it was heavy. The tax on her people's moral energies had been very great and the actual loss in men through the toll of war serious enough to make us wonder how the wastage was made good. The loss of life in regular warfare of the Hellenic type was not, it is true, usually more than moderate, and sometimes curiously slight. But we have always to remember that the total Athenian man-power, though large for an Hellenic city-state, was narrowly limited. The total of 70,000 men suggested in ch. ii. is an outside estimate ; ^ and during these fifty years
1 This is taking no account of any separate estimate for the fleet. It is impossible to reconcile satisfactorily the military and naval require- ments of Athens with the given total of 30,000 male citizens of full age. The balance, no doubt, is made up of privileged alien residents (metics), allied contingents, hired seamen and (sometimes even) slaves ; but in what proportions we have only scanty means of judging,
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Athens was often waging war simultaneously in several quarters. The ' roll of honour ' for the year 459-8, which was also cited in ch. ii. (p. 39), contains 176 names, but it is the list for one tribe only out of ten ; and if the roll for the other nine was in proportion, the total would be 1760, which is two and a half per cent, of 70,000, the estimated number of free men capable of bearing arms. If, however, we take for comparison the 30,000, which is the accepted upward limit of the total of full citizens, 1760 is one fifteenth, or nearly seven per cent. The grounds of inference are here, admittedly, very uncertain, but unless the indications found are altogether misleading, and if the year 459-8 may be taken as typical of some even of the ' crowded years,' we see at once how excessive was the drain on the manhood of Athens. But over and above the toll taken year by year through the waste of ordinary war, we read of disasters on a more calamitous scale. The loss in slain at Coronea (447) was especially heavy. In the disaster at Drabescus in 465 ten thousand colonists are said to have perished. These were not all Athenians, but, whatever the proportion of citizens of Athens, all were killed. In Egypt in the destruction of the great expedition on the island of Prosopitis by Thucydides' ; account nearly the whole of that great armament perished ; \ there were two hundred ships without counting the fifty I of the reinforcing squadron, most of which were likewise I destroyed, ' a few ' ships only escaping. The crews of two hundred ships, we may remember, amount to 40,000 men. A good many of these would be allied ships, manned by islanders and others, but a large proportion would have been Athenians and the loss to Athens alone must have been, relatively to her population, enormous. Again, at the revolt of Megara in 446 nearly the whole Athenian garrison was slaughtered, and its number must have run into hundreds. We see the tax on Athenian manhood in the half century following Salamis must have been prodigious ; and those who were taken were in great proportion her best. It would not be surprising if the quality of those who were left was deteriorating. Well
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might Pericles claim that Athens had " sacrificed more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other Greek city." ^
But more disastrous than the drain upon her strength in men and their valour was her loss of moral prestige through the insensible transformation into an Athenian! ' arche ' or ' dominion ' of the free confederacy of which I she was the chosen head in 478. Then for the part she had ] played in the repulse of the Mede, Athens was the admired of all Hellas. Jealousy on the part of the Dorian states was indeed already making itself felt. But Sparta had been won to honest admiration and had conceded to Athens the leadership in the continuance of the war in Asia. As for the Ionian and other Asiatic Greeks, there was no limit to their appreciation of the power and valour of Athens, and of the moderation and urbanity of her commanders. Best of all was the inner strength which Athenians felt in themselves as champions of Hellenic freedom. Among the Hellenes ideals counted for much. It was different in 440 B.C. Little by little Athens had noti only lost this brilliant popularity, but more and more had! incurred odium and ill-will. This had happened, as we i have had occasion to remark already, not either wholly through her own fault, nor yet through the fault of her allies, but largely through the inevitable drift of circum- stances. Under the given conditions, if the Delian League was to work at all, it was impossible but that offences should come : " for in various ways Athenian leadership was no longer as welcome as it had been." ^ The course of events inevitably roused and fostered Athenian ambitions by forcing them to act arbitrarily I in their conduct of the League, if they were to act with any | effect at all. This ambitious temper, once stimulated, | passed insensibly into high-handed dominance and the habit of command. What Athens had once received at the wish and request of friends who trusted her and desired to shelter in her strength, she now took as claims due to her superior power. She did not forget her duty of safe-
1 Thucydides, ii. 64. 3. 2 Thucydides, i. 99. 2.
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guarding Hellenic interests against Persian aggression, but as the price of this protection she exacted a submission to her orders which bore an ugly likeness to the vassalage from which she prided herself on having delivered the Asiatic Greeks. The jealous Dorian states began to protest, and the lax lonians and Islanders to whisper among themselves that Athens was herself now the tyrant city and was imposing on Hellenic city-states, which by natural Hellenic right were autonomous, a subjection as dishonouring as any imposed by the barbarians. The last stage was, when Athens, hearing herself so often called ' the tyrant city,' and seeing no way of escape from her existing commitments by any means which would not involve her in disaster, began herself to glory in the , title, so that we find Pericles (as interpreted by Thucy- 1 dides) arguing in the first crisis of the Peloponnesian War : " your hold of your empire is like a tyrant's of his power : men think it was wrong to take it but it is perilous to let it go." 1 If this argument could fairly be put into the mouth of Athens' leading statesman and champion, I small wonder if the enemies of Athens had no lack of I material for the indictment they framed against her. The Enemies of Athens. — It is surely, however, some- thing to the credit of Athenian statesmanship that the enemies who were most clamorous against her in the years preceding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war were ; not her ' down-trodden ' subjects, lonians of Miletus or Ephesus, Chalcidians from the Chersonese, or Hellenes from the distant cities of the Black Sea, but Dorians of the Peloponnese, who were not her ' subjects ' at all, but who feared her power. Broadly one might say that all the Dorians of the Peloponnese (Argos, Sparta's sullen rival, only excepted, and perhaps Troezen, Theseus' native place) were Athens' enemies, and in a sense we might say that Sparta was her chief enemy. But Sparta, though ultimately the protagonist on the other side, and always since the Persian war the recognized rival of Athens, was not the bitter enemy of Athens, nor always
1 Thucydides, ii. 632.
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her enemy. The chief enemies of Athens were the Boeotians, Megara and Coriiith.
The Boeotians. — The Boeotians, and more particularly the Thebans, were the oldest enemies of Athens, partly just because they were her next neighbours. There was an invasion of Attica by Boeotians in epic times, when Melanthus (of the house of Pylian Nestor) slew the Boeotian leader in single combat.^ But the more special hostility of Boeotia, or rather of Thebes as head of Boeotia, to Athens dates from the end of the sixth century B.C., a generation before Marathon, when Plataea asked the Athenians for protection against Thebes, and the Athenians marched out and routed the Thebans in battle, thus earning the undying gratitude of Plataea, but the lasting resentment of Thebes. Thebes tried in 506 to pay Athens out, but herself suffered a costly reverse. 2 Enmity to Athens may, in part, account for the conduct of Thebes in the Persian war : hatred of Athens made Thebes the zealous ally of Xerxes and Mardonius. We have seen (above, ch. ii. p. 45 and iii. p. 67) how more recently Athens for a time had won jDolitical control of all Boeotia by the victory of Myronides at Oenophyta, and had lost it again through the disastrous overthrow of Coronea. Since Coronea in 447 Boeotia had been free of Athenian influence, but jealousy of the power of Athens and fear of renewed alliance between Athens and the democratic parties in Boeotian cities kept Boeotian animosity alive. Boeotia was not free from political divisions because the oligarchies had been restored and the partisans of democracy were kept under.
The Boeotians were not Dorians, but Aeolians ; and they had migrated, Thucydides relates,^ from Thessaly. There appears to have been a special antagonism between the Athenian and Boeotian temperament. Boeotia is very different in climate and character from Attica, and this contrast was reflected in Boeotian manners. Hence the reproachful significance which the adjective ' Boeo- tian ' even now sometimes retains, as meaning, ' rude,'
1 Vol. i. p. 234. 2 Vol. i. p. 254. ^ Thucydides, i. 12. 3.
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' stolid,' ' rustic' But if we over use Boeotian in this sense we should remember that Hesiod, the poet of the Works and Days,^ was a Boeotian, and so was Pindar, and that Thebes produced two of the finest characters in Greek story, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Throughout the fifth century Thebes figures as the irreconcilable enemy of Athens ; but a day was to come when Thebans and Athenians should stand shield to shield on the field of Chaeronea and go down together in the last fight of free Hellas. But that was long after the dream of Athenian empire had been dissipated.
The Megarians. — Megara, her next neighbour on the other side, was another enemy of early times : for in the seventh century Megara had disputed with Athens the possession of Salamis. The recovery of Salamis by Athens belongs to the story of Solon. ^ A century later for a short time Athens and Megara had been close allies, a union of such importance to Athens that she had gladly built Long Walls to connect Megara with her harbour, Nisaea. But this short-lived love was changed to bitter hate, when in 446 Megara broke this new connection and slew most of • her Athenian garrison. The Athenians felt the loss, and the treachery, very keenly ; for Megara controlled the passes, and security on the side of the Isthmus meant so much to her. Her anger ultimately took a form which helped to precipitate the Peloponnesian war. But by the time the war came, and throughout the second half of the fifth century, the most active and malignant of the enemies of Athens was Corinth.
Corinth. — The position of Corinth, planted just within the Isthmus, on the one overland trade route between the interior of the Peloponnese and Northern Greece, ^ and with a port on either sea,* was one very favourable for com- merce. Above ancient Corinth to the south towered Acrocorinth, a fortress which dwarfs every other acropolis
1 Vol. i. p. 60 n. 2 Vol. i. pp. 252 and 3.
3 We saw, vol. i. p. 76 and p. 65, how the trade route from Argolis in epic times passed up by Mycenae through the Tretus Pass.
* Cenchreae on the Saronic Gulf, Lechaeum on the Gulf of Corinth.
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in Greece — close on 2000 feet higli, with fortifications on the top one and a half miles in circuit ; an acropolis one would have thought impregnable, if it had not as a matter of history been so often surrendered. The trade of Corinth at one time extended widely both east and west. East- ward it had been much diminished by the rise of the Athenian empire ; but westward, towards Sicily and Italy, Corinthian trade still flourished. The gulf named after her Corinth naturally regarded as her own home waters. Her colonies, Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, fringed the Ionian Sea. Syracuse in Sicily was a~Uorinthian colony. Up to the beginning of the fifth century Corinth was the com- mercial rival of Aegina and good friends with Athens. In 506 when Cleomenes had invaded Attica with a Pelo- ponnesian army for the purpose of driving out Cleisthenes and restoring Isagoras,^ the Corinthians refused to follow him and were the cause of the break-up of his army. A little later when the Lacedaemonians held a session of their league at Sparta and proposed to restore Hippias as despot of Athens, the Corinthians strongly opposed the plan and frustrated it.^ And in 487 we find the Corinthians actually helping the Athenians against^ Aegina by the loan of twenty ships.^ But after the' Persian war the expanding sea power of Athens was a real menace to the commerce and prosperity of Corinth. The trade of Corinth had extended both west and east, and both west and east it had been more extensive than the Athenian. With the new dominance of Athens in* the Aegean Corinthian trade naturally dwindled on that side, especially when after 459 there was war between Athens and Corinth. But Athens was not satisfied with I the lead in commerce with Asia Minor and the Black Sea. | She aspired to commercial expansion westward also, as 1 the whole policy of Pericles shows. Between 459 and ! 445 we see Athens gradually attaining a position of command on the trade route to Italy and Sicily, which i Corinth regarded as peculiarly her sphere. Naupactus,
1 Vol. i. p. 254. 3 Herodotus, v. 75 and 92. ^ Herodotuy, vi. 89.
118 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
garrisoned by Messenians (ii. p. 23), gave Athens a commanding port at the ^outh of the Gulf of Corinth. We have seen her gaining control for a time of Achaea and Troezen. It is not strange that Corinth watched all this with growing anxiety, and that even after the set-back to Athenian ambitions involved in the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace she still looked on Athens with suspicion and resentment. It needed but some new offence to rouse Corinth again to violent hostility. Causes were not long wanting.
Foes of her own Household. — Athens was hated by Thebans and Corinthians and Megarians ; and Sparta was her enemy. It is not true to say that she was also held in detestation by the allied cities and states of the Delian Confederacy, most of whom were subject to the sovereigri will of the Athenian democracy. Certain passages in Aristophanes' Wasps and Peace,^ and some sharp satire in the anonymous tract on the Athenian Commonwealth ^ would lead us to conclude that abuses in the administration of the empire existed and, in particular, that unscrupulous politicians at Athens were able at times to use the dicastery courts as a means of extortion. The allies had, it appears, grievances which the enemies of Athens could exploit for political purposes.^ But there is no evidence of any very deep-seated or wide- spread discontent. There was, so far as we have evidence,
1 Aristophanes, Wasps, 288, 9 ; 669-671. Peace, 639-647
2 The Athenian Polity, i. 14-18 ; Dakyns, ii. 279-281.
^ One hardship there undoubtedly was of which a great deal might be made — the necessity the allies were under of serving in distant wars, not against the Persian empire, as required by the constitution of the League, but on any military service into which the democracy of Athens chose to lead them. After 450 this was exclusively against other Greeks, either the Peloponnesian enemies of Athens or rebellious members of their own confederacy. We have no information about the principle on which contingents were furnished, but mention is repeatedly made of allied contingents in the accounts of the larger Athenian expeditions. There is no evidence tending to prove that such service was unwilling ; but in reading of an Athenian disaster, we may well wonder how the allies bore their share of it, when they had not patriotic devotion and a proud imperial spirit to uphold them.
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no oppression comparable, for instance, to that which Cicero denounces in his speeches against Verres. Athens had indeed enemies in every one of these subject states and cities, but they were mainly oligarchical minorities who were ever on the watch for an opportunity to seize! the reins of power, if they were not already the dominantl party, and if they were in power, to break away from the! association with the arch-democracy and assert their j complete autonomy. In the more notable cases of revoltj of which Thucydides gives the full story, it was a faction of the wealthier citizens who made the revolt, not the whole people. So far as we have means of judging, the general body of the people was in sympathy with demo- cratic Athens. 1 These oligarchical factions in the several states of the confederacy were to Athens ' foes of her own household.' Much more so was the oligarchical faction ill Athens itself, the faction that opposed the building of the Long Walls and had been ready to betray Athens in 457. In aU the dependent cities we may say with assurance that there were enemies of Athens, and also a party, usually a majority of the population, who were friendly to Athens. We shall find the people of Mytilene — when Lesbos revolted — as soon as they got arms in their hands insisting on coming to terms with Athens : the revolt of Lesbos had been the work of the oligarchy. In fact, all through the course of the struggle between the Athenian and the Peloponnesian confederacies, it is never a simple issue between Athens and Sparta, or even between Ionian and Dorian. There is a cross division which enters always as a factor in determining the side taken, the division of parties, in every Greek state. It would not, perhaps, be too much to say that this was the strongest factor of all. In every Greek city-state, whether ruled
^ In Thucydides, iii. 47, a speaker in the Athenian Ecclesia is made to say : "At the present time the populace of all the cities is well disposed to you, and either does not join the aristocrats in revolting, or, if forced to do so, is hostile from the beginning to those who stirred up the revolt ; and so, when you go to war, you have the populace of the rebellious city as your allies." (Speech of Diodotus in the Mytilenean debate, Loeb, vol. ii. p. 83.) See also Greenidge, pp. 203 and 204.
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democratically or by an oligarchy, there was an opposing faction, always ready to betray their country and join forces with the enemy, if only thereby they could secure the controlling power in their own state. Greek history jin the fifth century B.C. cannot be appreciated without taking account of this duality in every state. It was this which principally raised up for Athens enemies in every 'city of her empire. It was this which caused the Revolt of Samos in 440 B.C.
Samos in Revolt. — Samos is one of the largest Aegean islands. It lies close to the coast of Asia Minor, separated from the mainland only by a narrow strait, and across the narrow strait is Mount Mycale.^ Miletus is on the next headland a little further to the south. It was at Samos that the second revolt against Persia had begun. Earlier Samos had been for a short time the seat of a considerable sea-power, which reached its greatest strength under the tjraiit,EolyarateSj shortly before the Persian conquest of Lydia. Samos, as a free member of the Delian Con- federacy, retained sufficient naval force to go to war on her own account with Miletus five years after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace, that is in 440. This waging of private~waFlB'efween two meinbers of the League was certainly contrary to the spirit of the Confederacy of Delos, whether or not it transgressed any definite rule or provision. At any rate, when the Milesians got the worst of the fight they lodged a complaint against the action of Samos, and so also did certain Samians who wished to effect a change in their own government. Athens listened to the Milesians and to the Samian malcontents, sent a fleet to Samos, put down the existing government and established a democracy in its place. The leading oligarchs fled to the protection of the Persian satrap Pissuthnes, and with his help levied mercenary forces. With these they returned to Samos and effected a counter- revolution. On the news of this the Athenians sent Pericles with a fleet of sixty ships to Samos. With
^ See ch. i. p. 4 n.
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forty -four of these ships (sixteen having been detached to keep watch against the expected appearance of a Phoeni- cian fleet) Pericles intercepted a Samian fleet of seventy ships recalled from Miletus and defeated them. After this battle forty more triremes came from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians were shut up in their city and Samos was eventually reduced, but not till after the Athenian arms had suffered one serious reverse and many more warships had come to take part in the siege, two squadrons from Athens, one of forty the other of twenty ships, and thirty more ships from Chios and Lesbos. The Athenian defeat took place during Pericles' absence ; for on a report of the approach of the Phoenician fleet he had himself sailed with sixty ships to look for them. Samos surrendered after a siege of nine months. The terms granted to the Samiansj were that they should dismantle their walls, surrenden their fleet, give hostages, and repay by instalments thq cost of the war. Byzantium had revolted along with' Samos and now also made submission, resuming her former position without other penalty. The part played by the Persian satrap and the Phoenician fleet in this story shows that the danger to Greek independence from Persia was not altogether extinguished.
And now that Samos had lost her perilous independence and her fleet, C{iios and Lesbos were the only ' allies ' of Athens left in the confederacy members on an equal footing. We may note, however, that Chian and Lesbian warships took part in the reduction of Samos, and no hint is given in the pages of Thucydides that the service was reluctant.
Causes of the Peloponnesian War. — The conflict between Sparta and Athens which came a few years later must always have a profound human interest. It was a struggle not merely between Sparta and Athens, between a Peloponnesian League and a Delian, or between Dorian and Ionian confederations, but a conflict which shattered the older system of Hellas made up of numberless small autonomous city-states forming a world to themselves;;
H-
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warring one with another, gathering into allied groups for temporary ends, but not capable of permanent national union. The Peloponnesian war set seal to the impractica- bility of the development out of this welter of small autonomous states of an organic whole uniting the free states of Hellas into a true commonwealth of nations. There were too many of them, and separatist interests were too strong. The Delian Confederacy under the headship of Athens for a short time made the contingency seem possible : the Peloponnesian war, by disabling Athens for the national role her most far-seeing statesmen had marked out for her, made that impossible, and so [paved the way for the conquest of Hellas successively by Macedonia and Rome. The Peloponnesian war, in which this momentous issue was decided, arose, not so much out of the rivalry of Sparta, as out of the enmity of Corinth. Sparta had no quarrel of her own with Athens beyond a jealous regard for her claim to primacy among Hellenic cities and a touchiness about her relation to other Peloponnesian communities. Her policy was con- servative and unaggressive, and she was forced into war, as we see from Thucydides' careful narrative, by the importunity of Corinth and a rather reluctant acceptance of her responsibility as head of the Peloponnesian League and the traditional guardian of Dorian autonomy. She did not really care about the liberation of islanders and other Ionian ' trash ' : she hardly even pretended to ; and when the opportunity came blandly handed them back to bondage under the barbarian. But she did care very much about her own position in the Peloponnese and the course of events as between Athens and members lof Sparta's own confederacy. Thucydides distinguishes [between the causes of the war and the occasion of its outbreak ; and is the first to make this important dis- tinction. The ultimate cause of the Peloponnesian war was Dorian jealousy of the Athenian empire. The immediate cause, or occasion of the outbreak, was the exasperation of Corinth at the intervention of Athens in a quarrel which arose between her and her undutiful
THE LEAGUE AGAlS^ST ATHENS 123
colony, Corey ra ; and that was quickly followed by a second collision even more serious.
1. The affair oJ Epidamnus. — The first specific action leading to this conflict with Corinth was the conclusion by Athens in 433 B.C. of a defensive alliance with Corcyra, the island-state lying off the coast of Epirus which was a colony of Corinth, but at variance with the mother-city. Corcyra is the rich island of Corfu, with a traditional claim to identification with the happy kingdom of the Phaeacians,! and still an earthly paradise. Corcyra was colonized from Corinth in the eighth century B.C. and was early a rebellious daughter. There was remembrance of a sea-fight between Corcyra and Corinth in 664 B.C. ; Thucydides calls it " the earliest sea-fight of which we know " : and the hostility between mother-city and colony had continued since. In 433 the Corcyraeans, who hitherto had prided themselves on their freedom from treaty entanglements, and had played a double game at the time of Xerxes' invasion, ^ were driven to seek an alliance with Athens owing to the disadvantage in which they found themselves in a new war with Corinth : for Corinth had allies who supplemented her strength, whereas in her isolation Corcyra had none. Corinth and Corcyra were now at strife over Epidamnus (afterwards Dyrr- hacchium and now Durazzo), a colony founded by Corcyra, in which, however, Corinth, as mother-city to Corcyra, had by Hellenic custom also an interest. Corinth had undergone a humiliating defeat at Epidamnus and was making prodigious efforts to avenge it. The defeat was in 435. For two years the Corinthians matured their preparations, building ships and hiring seamen ; and these preparations were so formidable that the Corcyraeans began to repent of their isolation and sent envoys to
1 Thucydides, i. 25. 4. See vol. i. ch. vii., esp. p. 145.
2 When envoys came to Corcyra asking for help against Xerxes, the Corcyraeans spoke them fair and promised assistance. But when their fleet of 60 ships sailed southward in 481, it was with orders to wait to hear the issue of the conflict by sea before rounding Cape Malea. Herodotus, vii. 168.
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Athens begging for an alliance. The Corinthians also sent envoys to oppose this request. The Corcyraeans based their proposals frankly on interest : they needed support themselves, and the Athenians would, they argued, find it to their advantage to have the Corcyraean fleet with them rather than against them in that conflict with Sparta and the Peloponnesians which all men saw to be impending. The Corinthians opposed them on the ground that such an alliance was contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter of the treaty of peace. They reminded the Athenians of services which they claimed to have rendered to Athens in the past, and of one recent service in particular. When Samos revolted and appealed to the Peloponnesian states for assistance, Corinth had opposed in the counsels of the League the proposal to interfere on their behalf. In the end the peoj^le of Athens decided to make an alliance with Corcyra, but a defensive alliance only.^ In so doing they were within the letter of the Treaty : for the Treaty left it to the discretion of neutrals to join either alliance, or neither, as they pleased. But considering the state of feeling between Corcyra and Corinth it was certainly provocative and dangerous. The Corinthian armament sailed none the less against Corcyra. Ten ships had by that time been sent from Athens, with orders not to engage unless the Corinthians were actually sailing against the coast of Corcyra with intention to land. The fleet sent by Corinth numbered 150 ships, 90 only of these being Corinthian. The Corcyraeans mustered 110. The battle which followed was stubbornly contested : on one wing the Corcyraeans were victorious, chased the defeated ships to land and burnt and plundered a Corinthian camp. On the other wing the Corcyraeans were well beaten. But when the Cor- inthians sought to press their advantage, the small Athenian squadron sailed up and by their appearance and threatening attitude helped the defeated Corcyraean ships to get away. A little later there was a rally of both fleets ; the Corinthians were preparing to renew the
1 Thucydides, i. 44.
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attack when a fresh fleet was sighted coming up from the south-east. They were Athenian ships ; and though there were only twenty of them, the Corinthians, unable to gauge their number, drew off without further fighting. Athenian and Corinthian ships had actually met in hostile encounter, and this was an act of war.
2. The Revolt of Potidaea. — The second proximate cause of war arose out of the first. If Corinth and Athens were not yet openly at war, acts of war had taken place between them. The Corinthians were angry, and anxious to pay Athens back for this, as they held, gratuitous interference in their private quarrel with Corcyra. Now, Corinth had one colony on the other side of Greece, in the Aegean, Potidaea, planted just at the neck of the peninsula of Pallene, with a harbour on each of two seas like Corinth herself. And at the same time Potidaea was a member I of the Delian Confederacy, paying her quota into the Athenian treasury like other members and taking orders, on occasion, from Athens. On the other hand, as a colony of Corinth, Potidaea, this relation to Athens notwith- standing, received yearly by ancient prescription two officials, whose authority perhaps was ceremonial only, but who were Corinthian citizens. Up to this date the Athenians had raised no objection to this time-honoured custom ; but now they not unnaturally became anxious about the loyalty of the Potidaeans to the League . Potidaea had a good record for war service. When besieged by Artabazus after Salamis she had repulsed the Persian attack, and had sent a force of three hundred hoplites to fight at Plataea.^ There was now fear that out of sympathy with Corinth, their mother-city, the Potidaeans might revolt and set in motion a general rising among ' Thrace - ward cities.' Affairs were already critical in that region owing to the recent hostility of Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who was trying to make trouble for Athens. In these circumstances the Athenian people took strong measures. They sent a demand that the Potidaeans should demolish the wall which protected their
1 See vol. i. p. 310 n, and p. 362.
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city on the side of the peninsula of Pallene, give hostages for good behaviour, send away the magistrates from Corinth, and for the future decline to receive them. In vain thePotidaeans strove to avert the blow by negotiation. The Ecclesia refused to reconsider their demand. It is possible they had already certain intelligence of a treason- able understanding between the Potidaeans and Perdiccas. And when the Potidaeans failed to comply with these de- mands the Athenians sent a squadron of warships to enforce their order. Thereupon the Potidaeans entered into alliance with other cities of Chalcidice who were nursing grievances against Athens, and revolted. This was in 432. As soon as the revolt became known at Corinth, Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, one of the citizens of most distinction there, who had close ties with Potidaea, called for volunteers, and with a force of 1600 hoplitesand 400 light -armed men sailed with all speed to Potidaea to reinforce the garrison. A fleet of forty ships with 2000 hoplites arrived in the Thermaic Gulf soon after from Athens and proceeded first to act along with a force of a thousand hoplites and thirty ships which had been previously sent against Perdiccas. In a short time these forces had brought Perdiccas to terms, then they turned their attention to Potidaea. There was a battle just outside the isthmus on which the city stood : Aristeus the Corinthian, after some initial success, was defeated, the Potidaeans were chased within their walls and the siege of Potidaea began. Soon after the Athenians were further reinforced, and built walls on either side of the isthmus from sea to sea, thus completely blockading Potidaea. When this happened Aristeus escaped by sea to the mainland with the purpose of raising war there, and so helping Potidaea more effectually than by remaining cooped up within the town.^
The Question of Peace or War. — Both parties had now a new grievance : " the Corinthians being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieging Potidaea, a colony
^ Potidaea held out for over two years and was then (in 430) forced by starvation to surrender on terms.
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of theirs with men in it from Corinth and the Peloponnesus ; the Athenians, because the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans against themselves. "^ The Corinthians forth- with set to work to stir the Peloponnesian League to action. For this purpose they sent envoys to Lacedaemon to denounce the conduct of the Athenians as a breach of the Thirty Years' Peace and to demand war. They were seconded by emissaries from Aegina who came secretly, since as subjects of Athens they dared not come openly. The complaint of the Aeginetans was that the clause in the treaty which assured their autonomy remained a dead letter. After this the Spartans issued a summons to all the members of their league who considered themselves wronged by Athens. A number of delegates arrived and were called to a meeting of the Spartan assembly, the Apella,^ and bidden to lay their grievances before it. The most prominent of the accusers were the Megarians and the Corinthians. The Megarians had a sheaf of com- plaints to make, but that which they pressed most was that by a recent decree of the Athenian Ecclesia they were shut out of all the ports within the Athenian Con- federacy, and thereby reduced to the utmost straits for the very necessaries of life. But the most virulent attack was that of the Corinthians, who did not spare Sparta herself, charging her with slack leadership and neglect of the just interests of her allies. When the Corinthians had finished their vehement harangue, some Athenian ambassadors, who happened to be in Sparta on other business and present at this meeting of the Apella, asked leave to speak ; and leave was given. Thucydides has represented at full length in his history ^ the arguments of both Corinthians and Athenians, and these speeches help greatly to an understanding of the conflicting interests and passions which led to the Peloponnesian War. When all the complaints and the reply of the Athenian envoys
1 Thucydides, i. 66. 1. Loeb, pp. 107 and 109.
2 See vol. i. p. 226. ^ Thucydides, i. 68-78.
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had been heard the speakers were required to withdraw and the Apella proceeded to debate the momentous alternative of peace or war. One voice was raised for peace, or at least for patience and moderation and the exhaustion of every pacific means of getting redress before plunging into a war of which the limits could not be foreseen. This was the voice of Archidamus the king, now well advanced in years, he who as a young man had saved Sparta at the time of the earthquake by rallying the Spartans before the revolting helots swooped down.^ He was swayed partly by a clearer discernment of the strength of the Athenian empire and the difficulty for the Peloponnesians of assaihng it without a navy more fit to cope with the Athenian, and without money to provide the sinews of war ; partty by an uneasy feeling that the Athenian offer to submit the questions in dispute to arbitration was just and ought to be accepted. But the temper of the Apella as a whole was belhcose, and, after Archidamus, the Ephor Sthenelaidas made a brief harangue in the approved ' laconic ' style, meeting Archidamus' arguments and bluntly recommending war. Then a vote was taken. The method of the Spartan Apella was the method of the English folk-moot—' acclamation.' When the ' Ayes ' and the ' Noes ' rang out, Sthenelaidas, who was presiding, took the unusual course of ' dividing ' the assembly. "Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians," he said, " thinks that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, let him rise and go to yonder spot, and whoever thinks otherwise, to the other side." ^ There was a large majority who voted that the treaty had been broken. And after this vote had been taken the allies' representatives were called in. They were told that by a vote of the Apella the Athenians were adjudged to have broken the treaty, and that it was the intention of the Spartans to call a full meeting of the Peloponnesian Confederacy in order that the decision for war, if judged necessary, might be taken with all formality and after due
1 See above, ch. ii. p. 36 n.
2 Thucydvdes, i. 87. 2. Loob, i. p. 147.
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deliberation. A full conference of the Peloponnesian League was accordingly held later in the same year (432). The Corinthians were again the most vehement advocates of war. They canvassed the delegates beforehand to vote for war, and they urged war upon the conference in a carefully argued speech. A vote was taken of all the states represented at the conference, small and great voting on equal terms, and the majority voted for war.^
Diplomatic Fencing. — There was still an interval before the actual outbreak of hostilities. The Athenians had no wish to begin — they were on the defensive ; the Peloponnesians, who had willed the war, were not ready. In this interval the Spartan government was busy devising pretexts to give a plausible colour to their declaration of war. They first sent heralds bidding the Athenians drive out of their midst " the curse of the goddess." This was going back to the old story of Cylon's con- spiracy 2 and the violation of sanctuary, the guilt of which was fastened on the House of Alcmaeon — for Pericles was an Alcmaeonid on the mother's side. The Athenians retorted with a demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out * the curse of Taenarus ' and ' the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.' For the Lacedaemonians also had their tales of sacrilege. The sacrilege of the Brazen House was the violation of sanctuary attending the death of Pausanias, the victor at Plataea : ^ the sin of Taenarus was the violation of sanctuary perpetrated in putting to death certain helots who had revolted and fled for refuge to the temple of Poseidon. Nothing, of course, came of this interchange of religious pretexts, which was merely vexatious. Then the Lacedaemonians made their real demands : (1) that the Athenians should raise the siege of Potidaea ; (2) restore to Aegina her promised ' autonomy ' ; (3) rescind the decree against the Megarians. Later they gave the Athenians to understand that war might be avoided if only they would withdraw their de- cree against the Megarians. To all these demands the
» Thucydides, i. 119-125. 2 Vol. I. p. 241. ^ ch. i. p. 11 n.
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Athenians, acting under the advice of Pericles, returned a steady refusal. At last came an ultimatum quite differently worded : " The Lacedaemonians desire peace, and there will be peace, if you give the Hellenes their independence." ^ The Athenians replied once more, as Pericles counselled, that they would yield nothing to dictation, but, as they had said all along, were ready, in accordance with the treaty, to submit disputes to arbitration.
The Attempt on Plataea. — War was now all but inevit- able ; but there was not yet a state of open war : " the two parties continued to have intercourse with one another during these recriminations and visited each other without heralds, though not without suspicion ; for the events which were taking place constituted an annulment of the treaty and furnished an occasion for war." 2 The actual outbreak of hostilities happened in a dramatic and unexpected way. Early in the spring of 431 a body of men-at-arms, 300 in number, set out by night from Thebes and marched to Plataea. Arrived beneath the town walls they obtained entrance through the treachery of a party in Plataea friendly to Thebes and oligarchy, who opened one of the gates. They marched through the darkness to the market-place quietly and unopposed, and there grounded arms. Then they made proclamation by herald, inviting the Plataeans to embrace alliance with Thebes like the other Boeotians ; and they took this course trusting that conciliation would be effective, but contrary to the advice of the faction leaders at whose invitation they came : these wanted to hunt out their enemies one by one and slay them. The Plataeans, taken completely by surprise — for they had gone to rest in seeming security — were at first inclined to accept the offer of the proclamation. But while negotiations were proceeding, they became aware how small the number of the invaders really was. They took counsel together again and recovering their confidence made dispositions
1 Thucydides, i. 139. 3. 2 Thucydides, i. 146 ; Loeb, i. p. 255.
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for attack. To communicate more easily and collect together without attracting the enemy's attention, they broke a passage through from house to house. Then near the first dawn, but while it was still quite dark, they suddenly made their onset. The Thebans, though taken by surprise, closed their ranks and beat back the first attacks. But the Plataeans came on in increasing numbers and a shower of missiles rained down from above : for women and slaves came out on the roofs of the houses and with yells and screams began hurling down stones. The noise and uproar was bewildering, and to add to the difficulties of the Thebans a heavy storm of rain came on, beating in their faces and turning the road into mud. Seized with sudden panic they now gave way, and soon were being chased through the dark streets vainly seeking for means to escape. Some were struck down fighting ; some were pursued into corners and done to death ; some in desperation scaled the city wall and leapt down, only in most cases to perish. But a considerable number kept together and rushing along saw before them open doors, which the foremost took to be the gates of the city. They were really the doors of a large building near the wall, which happened to be open : the doors closed upon them and they were trapped. There was then debate among the pursuing Plataeans whether to set light to the building, or what to do. In the end these, and any other Thebans who still lived, were allowed to surrender at discretion.^
Morning was now at hand, and with morning light came a larger body of Thebans, who ought to have arrived in support during the night, but had been delayed at the crossing of the Asopus owing to the heavy rain. On learning what had happened in the night, they were proposing to take prisoner all the Plataeans they could catch without the city and hold them as hostages for the lives of their own Thebans captured in Plataea. The Plataeans, in alarm for their fellow-townsmen and for their property without the walls, opened negotiations with the
* Thucvdides, ii. chs. 2-4.
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new arrivals ; an agreement was reached, as a result of which the Thebans marched away at once without doing any damage. The Theban story — and the probabihties support it — was that they agreed to withdraw without doing any harm to property or person, on condition that their Theban comrades ^ prisoners in Plataea, were restored whole and sound, and that the promise given by the Plataeans was sealed with an oath. The Plataeans, in their version of what took place, contradicted this story in the crucial particulars of the promise and the oath. Be that as it may, what happened was that as soon as the Theban forces were gone, the Plataeans in all haste removed their property from the country into the city —and then put their prisoners to death. Scarcely had this rash and bloody deed been done, when a herald arrived from Athens with an urgent message charging them to do nothing about the prisoners without a reference to Athens. 1
Revenge is sweet ; the Plataeans had their revenge ; but they were to pay dearly for it in the end.
War. — After these doings at Plataea, which involved both Thebes and Plataea in guilt — the imminence of war could no longer be in doubt. Both sides pushed forward their preparations to the utmost, collecting money, building ships, urging their allies to zealous assistance. A Peloponnesian army, two -thirds of the fighting forces of each community, assembled at the Isthmus, ready to invade Attica. But Archidamus, who, as king of Sparta, was in command, first sent a Spartan named Melesippus, in hope that even now fresh negotiations might be opened. The Athenians sent him back without a hearing, and with a warning to cross the frontier before sunset. On reaching the frontier Melesippus is reported to have exclaimed, " This day will be the beginning of woe for the Hellenes." ^
1 Thucydides, ii. chs. 5 and 6. ^Thueydides, ii. 12. 3.
CHAPTER VI
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
" For mercy is the highest reach of wit, A safety unto them that save with it."
Fulko Groville, Lord Brooke, Mustapha.
"The last thing war does is to proceed according to rule."
ThucycUdes, i. 122.
Ruined Homes. — The war so long dreaded, and by many deemed inevitable, had come ; and once more Athenian country gentlemen and peasant farmers left their pleasant farms and homesteads and the life amid fields and vine- yards that they loved, as they had done fifty years before at the coming of the Mede. This time, however, it was not to take refuge overseas, but to crowd within the circuit of the walls of Athens and its harbour-town ; and the enemy was not the Great King and his myriads, who had come to subdue Hellas, but their own kinsfolk from the Peloponnesus, led by the Spartans, in close amity with whom Athens had faced the perils of that earlier time. Archidamus and his host came on slowly. Archidamus was a Hellene at heart, conscious of the enor- mity of the fratricidal struggle which was beginning, and he clung to the hope that the Athenians would even now make some concession to save their beloved fields from ravage. He first spent some time (his Peloponnesian critics said ' wasted ') in an attempt to carry by assault the strong border fortress, Oenoe. When all efforts proved abortive and no herald came from Athens to negotiate, he gave orders for an advance into the Thriasian
133
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plain which lies westward of Mount Aegaleos between Eleusis and Mount Parnes ; and the whole army sat down to systematic destruction. Then he advanced to Acharnae (now Menidhi), a township only seven miles from Athens, and again paused before giving orders for the havoc to begin. For Acharnae was a populous place : it furnished three thousand hoplites to the city's forces ; and Acharnae was almost in sight of the city walls. The men of Acharnae were noted for their fiery courage : the sight of their homes and crops burning before their eyes must surely be more than flesh and blood could stand. And since the hope of accommodation had failed, Archidamus' aim was, if possible, to bring on an engagement in which the superior strength of the Peloponnesian militia must necessarily tell. His expectations were well enough founded. Thucydides gives a vivid description of the excitement of the fighting men cooped within the walls of Athens. " When they saw the army in the neighbour- hood of Acharnae," he writes, " and barely seven miles from the city, they felt the presence of the invader to be intolerable. The devastation of their country before their eyes, which the younger men had never seen at all, nor the elder except in the Persian invasion, naturally appeared to them a horrible thing, and the whole people, the young men especially, were anxious to go forth and put a stop to it. Knots were formed in the streets, and there were loud disputes, some eager to go out, a minority resisting. . . . The excitement in the city was universal, the people were furious with Pericles, and, forgetting all his previous warnings, they abused him for not leading them to battle, as their general should, and laid all their miseries to his charge." ^ Then more than ever Pericles' strength of mind and purpose shone conspicuous, and his wonderful hold on the Athenian demos. He stood firm, and even used his position as Strategos to prevent any meeting of the ecclesia being held, lest the people " coming together more in anger than in prudence, might take some false step." As a slight outlet for pent-up
1 Thucydides, ii. 21 ; Jowett, 2nd ed. (1900), vol. i. p. 118.
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emotions, he sent out bodies of the Athenian horse (knights) to check phmdering near the city, and did what else he could to allay the popular anger. A measure on a more effectual scale was the despatch of a hundred ships-of-war, with 1000 hoplites and 400 archers aboard, to carry out round the coasts of Peloponnese reprisals for the ravaging of Attica. And when the summer was over and the invaders had withdrawn, Pericles himself as general, led out the whole of the city's forces, citizens and settlers alike, joined with the crews of the hundred ships returned from the Peloponnesus into the territory of Megara, and there they burned and harried and destroyed everything they could see, and sated their fierce anger for the injuries they had themselves suffered. And so they did year after year while the war lasted.
A Crowded City. — Thanks to the slow advance of Archidamus the Athenians had time to get their families and movable property into safety. Their families and household goods (and even, Thucydides relates, " the woodwork of their houses ") were brought into the city ; their flocks and cattle and beasts of burden they trans- ported into Euboea and other islands. But when these immigrants arrived within the protecting walls their position, as may be imagined, was one of intense dis- comfort. Only the few had houses of their own, or relatives and friends with whom they might live. The great mass of them had to find makeshift shelter, in any ground there might be not built over, in the turrets of the walls, in temple precincts, under the shelter of the Long Walls, wherever and however they could. The inconveniences of such accommodation were very great. On a sudden, without any adequate provision or preparation, the population of the city was doubled. It was an appalling state of things. And the distress was all the greater because most of the refugees were utterly unused to city life, and would have detested it even under favourable conditions : "for the Athenians," Thucydides tells us, " had most of them been always accustomed to reside in the country. This mode of life
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had been characteristic of them more than of any other of the Hellenes, from very early times." ^ The Syn- oecia, the union of the townships of Attica in Athens, had made little difference to the people in this regard. Though united in a single city, " they and their descend- ants, down to the time of this war, from old habit generally resided with their households in the country where they had been born. For this reason, and also because they had recently restored their country houses and estates after the Persian War, they had a disinclination to move. They were depressed at the thought of forsaking their homes and the temples which had come down to them froni their fathers and were the abiding memorials of their early constitution. They were going to change their manner of life, and in leaving their villages were in fact each of them going into exile." ^
Plague. — Next year the Peloponnesian army again invaded Attica, carrying their ravages not only over the plains as in the preceding year, but also passing down the whole length of the peninsula to Laurium and its silver mines, laying waste first one side of Paralia and then the other. But this year, hard on the heels of invasion came a more dreadful visitant — Plague. Plague ! — many Englishmen in the last twenty-five years have made acquaintance with plague in India. But when plague broke out in India in 1897 — as in the previous great visitations famous in history, the Plague of London, the Plague of Florence, the Black Death — the best way of combating plague was to flee before it : for the unstricken to take to the open country or to some hill refuge ; and to segregate the stricken areas and let no one come forth from them or enter in. In the Plague of Athens a whole population, 300,000 human beings or more, were from the first shut in within the walls of their fortified city. There was no escape to the open country, there was no possi- bility of segregation. The whole city was one colossal segregation camp, hideously overcrowded. This was the
1 Thucydides, ii. 14 and 15.
2 Thucydides, ii. 16 ; Jowett, vol. i. p. 115.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 137
supreme horror of the Plague of Athens, makmg it like no other plague : no one could escape from it ; there was no getting away from Athens. Thucydides has described the plague at Athens, how it came about, what the symptoms were and how fatal was its usual course ; what numbers perished and what horrible demoralization resulted. All this is to be read in the pages of his history, and it is not pretty reading ; but his clear and precise descriptions of the disease and its course ^ have been useful to modern physicians when called upon to face similar terrors. Thucydides himself suffered and re- covered. The mortality in the city was so dire that the Peloponnesians at last hastened their withdrawal ; but their occupation of the country this year continued forty days, a longer time than any other invasion during the war. There was one exception to the impossibihty of getting out of Athens. It was possible to send troops away on service, and in the midst of the invasion Pericles despatched one hundred ships with 4000 hopUtes on board and 300 horsemen. And this year the fleet acted with more vigour, making descents on the territory of Epidaurus, Troezen, Haheis, Hermione, and capturing and plundering Prasiae in Laconia.
This plague was an incident of warfare outside Pericles' reckoning, and it did more damage to the power of Athens than many invasions, not only, or so much, because of the calamitous loss of life, but most because of the demoralization. Athens was never quite the same again.
The Death of Pericles. — A little later Pericles died, while the clouds of misfortune still hung over Athens, yet with his own faith in the soundness of his i)olicy undiminished. For a time the sufferings of the people had overborne their better judgment : they had brought Pericles to trial and subjected him to a fine. Then in a short while they repented of their anger and made him again their Strategos ; and it was in this high office
1 Thucydides, ii. 47-53.
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that Pericles died. Thucydides pays eloquent tribute to his wisdom and integrity as a statesman : " For so long as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the city in safety, and it was under him that Athens reached the height of her greatness ; and, after the war began, here too he appears to have made a far-sighted estimate of her strength. Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the beginning of the war ; and after his death his foresight as to the war was still more fully recognized." ^ And he goes on to point out why Pericles' influence kept the Athenian people from mistakes which later proved fatal. " And the reason for this was," he says, " that Pericles, who owed his influence to his recognized standing and ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible in the highest degree, restrained the multitude while respecting their liberties, and led them rather than was led by them, because he did not resort to flattery, seeking power by dishonest means, but was able on the strength of his high reputation to oppose them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, whenever he saw them un- warrantably confident and arrogant, his words would cow them into fear ; and, on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. And so Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen." ^
A Lesson in Sea Power. — In this year 429 a remarkable demonstration was given to both contending parties of Athenian naval superiority. The Athenian admiral, Phormio, with tv/enty ships brought to battle a fleet of forty-seven enemy ships and defeated them severely. When the Peloponnesian fleet was raised by reinforcements to seventy-seven ships, Phormio achieved the feat of engaging the whole seventy-seven and again beating them. It came about in this way. Phormio with his squadron was
1 Thucydides, 65. 5 and 6 ; Loeb, p. 375. - Thucydides, ii. 65. 8 and 9 ; Loeb, p. 377.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
139
stationed at Naupactus/ and it was his business to watch over the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, so that ships of the Peloponnesian League might not pass in or out without molestation. This was important because of the trade with Sicily, in which Corinth had a large share. It happened that at this time the Peloponnesians, at the instigation of the Ambraciots, were attempting to reduce
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Acarnania, the firm ally and friend of Athens in western Hellas. Their fleet was to assemble at Leucas ; and to get there, the contingent from Corinth and other towns within the Gulf must needs pass Naupactus and Phormio's twenty ships : Naupactus is on the north shore of the Gulf. Phormio knew of the sailing of this contingent, and waited for them outside the entrance straits : for
1 Naupactus is Lepanto in the Middle Ages ; and besides being the scene of Phormio's victories the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth was to be the ^ene of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 a.d. when the Venetians and Spaniards broke the naval power of the Turks.
140 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
he relied upon his trained crews and their skill in man- oeuvring. The tactics of the Athenian navy had changed since Salamis. Athenian seamen, with their regular training year after year, now trusted to their speed and to the clever handling of their ships. The object of the captain of an Athenian warship was by a sudden turn to strike an enemy ship in the side, and either sink her by ramming, or disable her by breaking off the oars. This manoeuvre required plenty of sea room, and Athenian naval strategy was therefore now just the reverse of Themistocles' before Salamis ; that is, it was to avoid straits and fight always in the open sea. Now, the Cor- inthian squadron did not want to fight at all, but to get out of the gulf and join the rest of their fleet : and they did not think that Phormio with so great an inferiority of numbers would attack them. So they first tried sailing close along the coast of Achaea and slipping out unnoticed. When they found that Phormio had seen them, and that his ships were moving parallel with them along the opposite coast, and further, that when they turned north-westward and steered across the open gulf for Leucas, the enemy followed, they realized that a battle was inevitable. Upon this they drew together in the formation known as the globe, their light craft in the centre and the warships in a circle round them, with their prows pointing outward. Phormio's ships came on in single file, one behind another, and circled round the ' globe,' ^ threatening every moment to ram, but never quite driving the charge home. In this way they gradually forced the mass into a smaller space, so that the ships jostled each other and began to lose their formation. Phormio's men had orders to look to his signal before charging : for he was waiting for the morning breeze to spring up, which he knew would add to the difficulties of the enemy. Round and round the ships of Phormio circled, never giving the enemy a chance because his ships were the slower. Thucydides' description of the sequel is too good to miss : " When presently the breeze
1 See vol. i. p. 319.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 141
began to blow, the ships which were already too close together soon began to be in difficulties, partly through the force of the wind, partly through the small craft getting in their way. Ships ran against each other and were fended off by poles ; what with shouts and cries of ' keep away ' and abuse the crews could not hear a word of their orders, nor the boatswain's voice giving the time ; while the failure of their untrained rowers to clear the water in the heavy sea made the vessels unmanageable. This was the moment which Phormio was waiting for ; he gave the signal and the Athenians thereupon charged home. First they sank one of the admirals' ships, then proceeded to disable the rest, where- ever they were found, and so disordered them that no ship offered resistance any longer, but all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia. " ^ The total Peloponnesian loss in this fight is not given ; but in the pursuit the Athenians, we are told, captured twelve ships, crews and all.
The authorities at Sparta were very angry. They could not believe that the Athenian superiority at sea was so great, and put down this signal defeat to want of a resolute spirit in their own fleet. Accordingly they sent out a board of three officers as ' advisers ' to Cnemus who was in command of the Acarnanian expedition, with peremptory orders to fight again and win. Great efforts were made to collect more ships, with the result that in a short time a Peloponnesian fleet of seventy-seven ships was waiting at Rhium on the Achaean coast, just within the straits, while Phormio, still commanding only the twenty ships with which he had won his victory (for reinforcements despatched from Athens at his request had not arrived), was watching on the opposite coast from a position just outside. To understand what followed, it is necessary to get a clear idea of the relative position of the two fleets to the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth and to Naupactus. The straits by which the Gulf of Corinth is entered from the west are not much
1 Thucydides, ii. 84. 3.
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more than a mile wide at their narrowest,^ which is between two headlands both known to Thucydides as Rhium, and distinguished, that on the southern coast as the Achaean Rhium, that on the northern as the Molycrian Rhium (also known later as Anti -rhium). Naupactus is on the northern coast, six miles further within the straits. Phormio's object was to keep out in the more open water and fight there as in the first engagement. The Peloponnesians wished to avoid fighting in the open water. For six days the opponents watched each other, the Athenians declining to enter the narrow waters, the Peloponnesians fearing to trust themselves outside. Then Cnemus tried a new move. He ordered his fleet to put to sea and sail — not westward out into the open sea, but north-eastward within the straits along the Achaean coast. Now this was the direction of Naupactus, and seeing this Phormio in all haste also put to sea and began sailing along the opposite side of the straits to cover Naupactus. This was the opportunity Cnemus wanted. His fleet was proceeding in column four abreast, with the twenty fastest-sailing ships leading. Suddenly on a given signal the whole fleet turned and in four lines bore down on the Athenian line in single file on the opposite shore, every ship rowing at topmost speed : for in this way they hoped to cut off the whole Athenian fleet in the narrow waters. This manoeuvre was almost com- pletely successful : but not quite. The eleven leading Athenian ships by an effort of speed just rowed clear of the advancing right wing of the enemy, and got into the wider waters further within the straits ; the remaining nine were intercepted, forced ashore, and disabled. Some of the seamen swam to land, some were killed. The empty hulls were mostly saved by Messenian soldiers who had been marching parallel with the fleet along the shore, and who fought the Peloponnesians off them, as they were actually being towed away. Meantime the twenty fast-sailing Peloponnesians on the right wing
1 A mile and a half wide now ; but Thucydides makes it rather less than one mile.
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were in hot pursuit of the escaping eleven which were making for Naupactus. All but one got clear away, and on reaching Naupactus turned to face the enemy. The eleventh was some way behind and hard pressed. Again let Thucydides tell the story : " Soon after the Pelopon- nesians came up chanting the paean as they rowed in token of victory ; and much ahead of the others a Leucadian vessel was chasing the one Athenian ship which had been left behind. Now it happened that a merchantman was lying in the open roadstead : the Attic ship got home just in time to circle round her, strike the pursuing Leucadian amidships and sink her. At this unlooked-for and startling occurrence fear fell on the Peloponnesians : in their pursuit they had kept no order because they were winning, and now some of the ships' companies checked their course by holding water — a rash thing to do with the enemy so near and ready to attack — ^their object being to let the main body come up ; and others not knowing the coast, went aground. And when the Athenians saw all this they recovered courage and on the command being given dashed at the enemy with a cheer. Resistance was but brief : the Peloponnesians had made mistakes and were now in disorder : they soon turned tail and fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The Athenians gave chase, took the six ships that were nearest them and recovered their own ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning of the fight close inshore and taken in tow ,' and of the men they killed some and took others alive." ^
Such and so great was Athenian superiority at sea in the first years of the Peloponnesian War.
The Revolt of Lesbos. — In the fourth year of the war (b.c. 428) Lesbos revolted. This was a sore matter for the Athen- ians : they were feeling acutely the stress of war, intensified as it had been by plague : Lesbos was the biggest of the islands of the Aegean and had no real grievance, as she was one of the two states in the Confederacy still allied
1 Thucydides, ii. 91 and 92.
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to Athens on equal terms. So unwelcome was the informa- tion that the people of Mytilene, the chief city of the Lesbians, were planning this revolt, that at first the Athenians refused to believe it : when there was no longer room for doubt, they acted promptly. A fleet of forty warships was despatched, in some expectation of taking the Mytilenaeans by surprise. But the Myti- lenaeans got warning of this in time to put the fortifications they were repairing into a rough state of order, and they met the demand of the Athenians for complete sub- mission— which meant that they must surrender their fleet and pull down their city waUs — with a refusal. But they were really ill prepared for resistance and, on the failure of a feeble attempt at facing the Athenian fleet at sea, they had recourse again to negotiations. A truce was made while envoys went to plead their cause at Athens. Nothing, however, was effected, and hostilities were resumed. The Mytilenaeans made a sortie and held their own in an attack on the Athenian camp : but they retired again within their walls. On the other hand the Athenian forces were not strong enough to occupy the country effectively. All they could do was to hold positions in strength on either side of the town and shut the Mytilenaeans from the sea. On land the Mytilenaeans controlled the open country and even made an attack on the town of Methymna which had remained true to the Athenian alliance. But the real hope of the Mytilenaeans was in the coming of help from the Peloponnese. They had intrigued for Spartan aid even before the war, and at once on the arrival of the Athenian fleet, before a com- plete blockade was established, a ship had stolen out to ask help from Lacedaemon. By direction of the Spartan government the Mytilenaean envoys laid their request before the assembled Greeks at the Olympic Games (which were being held that year) and the decision was to help them. Attica, it was arranged, should be invaded a second time ; ships be carried across the isthmus on rollers for a simultaneous naval attack on Athens from the sea. This danger stirred the men of Athens to a special effort.
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They manned another hundred ships with volunteer crews of citizens and foreign residents, to show they were strong enough to meet the crisis without withdrawing a single ship from Mytilene. This display of power disconcerted the Spartan plans and had a decisive influence on the ultimate fate of Mytilene. A Peloponnesian squadron of forty ships did at last sail for Lesbos, but so tardily and cautiously that the fate of the city was settled before it arrived. For a time the Mytilenaeans kept command of the land, but in the autumn the Athenians despatched, under command of Paches as general, a thousand more hoplites, who themselves rowed the ships out to Lesbos. On the arrival of this fresh force the Mytilenaeans were driven within their walls and lines of investment were completed, so that by the time winter set in Mytilene was close shut in by land and sea. At this critical moment a Lacedaemonian named Salaethus crossed to Lesbos and managed to make his way into the beleaguered city, bringing assurance of the invasion of Attica and of the coming of a relieving fleet from the Peloponnese. The invasion of Attica duly took place next spring and was peculiarly rigorous. " They destroyed," says Thucydides, " any new life that had sprung up in the parts of Attica that had been devastated before, and all that had escaped ravage in previous invasions." ^ Yet this helped Mytilene very little. For no fleet came from the Peloponnesus and supphes were failing. In this extremity Salaethus attempted a remedy which proved fatal. He called to arms the body of the people. His object, of course, was to strengthen the defence ; but the effect was opposite. For the mass of the people, the demos, were friendly to the Athenian democracy ; and now they had arms in their hands they demanded that the government should bring out corn for distribution, threatening that if this were not done, they would make terms with the Athenians and surrender the city. Upon this those in power, in a panic, themselves made an agreement with Paches. For they knew their
I Thucydides, iii. 26. 3,
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position would be desperate if an agreement was con- cluded and they, the leaders of revolt, had no part in it. The agreement was that they should yield themselves at the discretion of the Athenian people. They were to open their gates to the Athenian forces and send envoys to Athens ; and until the envoys returned and declared the will of the Athenian people none of the Mytilenaeans should receive any hurt either by imprisonment, enslave- ment or death. On these terms the Athenians entered Mytilene. But all who had taken an active part in bringing about the revolt were now in great fear, and many took sanctuary at the altars. These Paches, without using force, removed to Tenedos, and subsequently to Athens, along with 8alaethus who had been found in hiding and made prisoner, and all others whom Paches thought to be implicated in the guilt of the revolt. Salaethus the Athenians put to death immediately, and then it was for the Ecclesia to settle the fate of the rest of Mytilene. The Athenians were in no mood for clem- ency : they were angry and they had reason to be angry, for they had suffered grievously through the revolt of Lesbos. Their anger found vent in a decree which they themselves next day saw to be monstrous : they decreed that all adult males in Mytilene (not only those sent by Paches for trial) should be put to death ; the women and children sold as slaves. A trireme was despatched forthwith to Lesbos to convey orders to this effect to Paches. But night brought reflection to the better- minded ; and next day " a feeling of repentance came over them and they began to reflect that the design they had formed was cruel and monstrous, to destroy a whole city instead of merely those who were guilty." ^ The friends of Mytilene, both the envoys who had come to plead their cause and Athenians who were acting with them, were quick to note this change in public feeling, and they induced the authorities to summon the Ecclesia and bring the case of the Mytilenaeans before it a second time. Thucydides has set out in full the chief arguments
1 Thucydides, iii. 36. 4 ; Loeb, ii. p. 57.
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used on either side, putting the plea for ' justice ' into the mouth of Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, the plea for mercy into the mouth of Diodotus ; with the result that the opinion of Diodotus prevailed, but only by a narrow majority. Then began a desperate race for the lives of the Mytilenaeans : for the first trireme had twenty-four hours' start. Great rewards were promised to the rowers if they reached Mytilene in time ; and as they rowed, they were fed with barley soaked in wine and oil to keep up their strength, and in turns they snatched a little sleep, while the rest rowed on. Fortunately no adverse wind met them, and as the crew of the first trireme had little heart for their mission, their progress was slow. In the end the second trireme made the harbour of Mytilene very shortly after the first had anchored there ; and while Paches, after reading the despatches, was making preparations to have the orders carried out. " So narrow was the escape of Mytilene from destruction."
The prisoners who had been brought to Athens, more than a thousand in number, were all put to death.
The Betrayal of Plataea. — In this year also (427) was consummated the crime by which Plataea— the site consecrated for ever as a memorial of Hellenic deliverance from Persia — was blotted from the map of Greece. The men of Plataea had stood by the Athenians at Marathon, and now in the Peloponnesian war Plataea was still found ranged by the side of Athens. In 429 Archidamus, instead of invading Attica, turned the whole force of the Peloponnesian alliance to the reduction of Plataea. No doubt this was largely due to the importunity of Plataea's irreconcilable enemy, Thebes. Plataea was but a little town, how small we are not told ; but the garrison that held it was under 500 — just 400 Plataeans and 80 Athenians : the women and children, and non- combatants generally, had been removed for safety to Athens immediately after the Theban attempt on Plataea in 431. On the arrival of the Peloponnesian s before the walls, King Archidamus made the Plataeans an offer :
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 149
if they would undertake to be neutral in the war, they should not only be unmolested but protected in their rights. The Plataeans sent to Athens to consult the Athenians, and the Athenians made this reply : " The Athenians assure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you became their allies, they have never on any occasion deserted you when you were being wronged, so now they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist you with all their might. They therefore adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to break off the alliance." ^ Accordingly the Plataeans rejected the Lacedaemonian offer, and hostilities began. After exhausting what skill they had in siege operations without success, the greater part of the Peloponnesian forces went home. A certain proportion of each contingent was left, and these set to work to build walls in a double circuit round the town. There was a space of sixteen feet between the walls and this space was roofed in, so that the structure had the appearance of a single wall of great strength. There were battlements all along the top and high towers at intervals, and the space between the walls was divided up and used as quarters for the troops. When the building was finished most of the troops were withdrawn and only a garrison left to maintain the blockade. The blockade of Plataea then continued through the winter of 429 and the whole of the following year. Towards the end of the year supplies were failing, and in the summer of 427, when they were altogether exhausted, the Plataeans surrendered themselves to the Lacedaemonians, on condition that they would be their judges, and that no one should be punished contrary to justice. Not all the original garrison thus surrendered ; nearly half of them — to the number of 220 — had made a daring escape in the preceding winter. Five commissioners came from Sparta to hold the trial, but when the prisoners were brought before this tribunal, they found that in place of any form of legal procedure, they were each, man by man (Athenians included), to be asked a single
1 Thucydides, ii. 73. 3 ; Loeb, p. 393.
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question : had they done any service to the Lacedae- monian cause in the war. They protested vigorously against the unfairness of this question, but their protest was overruled, and the trial proceeded in this form. " So they caused them to come forward again, one at a time, and asked them the same question, whether they had rendered any good service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war, and Avhen they said ' no ' they led them off and slew them, exempting no one." ^
This judicial murder was a black crime to be set to the account of Sparta. But it may be doubted whether the crime of Athens was not even worse. For there is no indication whatever in the record that the Athenians made any effort, at any time, summer or winter (though Plataea was within a day's march of the Athenian border), to break the cordon and rescue these faithful allies, and that despite the assurance quoted above (p. 149). It is a sorry story, relieved only by the stirring episode of the escape of half the garrison in the winter of 428.
A Bid for Life and Liberty. — When supplies were getting low and all hope of relief from Athens had been abandoned, the bolder spirits in Plataea matured a plan for breaking out over the besiegers' wall and escaping. A stormy night and ladders of a proper length were seen to be the conditions of success. The length for the ladders was arrived at by counting and recounting the number of bricks in a bit of wall that happened not to have been whitewashed like the rest, and so calculating the height of the wall : and then, having made all other dispositions necessary, they waited. The plan originally was for the whole garrison to make the attempt, but afterwards about half thought the risk too great and drew back. This in the end helped materially the success of the escap- ing party, because those who stayed were able to make a diversion at the critical moment. At last the night came, a wild night, tempestuous with wind and rain, in the dark of the moon, and those who were resolute to make the
1 Thucydides, iii. 68. 2 ; Loeb, ii. p. 123.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY l5l
attempt set forth. The leaders got safely across the space between the moat outside the wall of Plataea and the besiegers' lines, and planted their ladders against a stretch of wall between two of the towers. Those who went up first were armed only with corselet and dagger, or with short spears, in order that their movements might be unimpeded. When a few only had got up, one of the party happened to dislodge a tile and it fell to the ground with a clatter. An alarm was raised : guards and sentinels rushed to their posts, but on account of the darkness and the uncertainty of what was happening, stayed where they were without attempting to reach the point of danger. At the same moment the part of the garrison remaining in Plataea made an attack on the Peloponnesian wall at a point facing the opposite side of the town, and so effected a most timely diversion. Meanwhile those who were first up, turned right and left along the wall, made their way into the flanking towers and killed the guards. More ladders were brought up and the main body crossed the wall as rapidly as they could, while their comrades held the towers on either hand, and got down the other side. By this time the defenders were everywhere astir, and a picked band of three hundred men kept always ready for emergencies came advancing along the foot of the wall in all haste, carrying lanterns. But their lanterns did them no good, only made them a readier mark for the missiles of the Plataeans and Athenians. In the end the escaping party got over the wall and away, the last men with some difficulty : all at least but one, an archer, who was made prisoner. Once clear of the walls the fugitives moved off as fast as they could, not in the direction of Cithaeron, toward Attica, but in the opposite direction along the road which was the last the enemy would expect them to take, the road to Thebes ; and from this road they could see the lights of their pursuers glimmering along the road which led to the Oak-heads, ^ the main pass through the moun- tains. After following the Theban road for a time they
^ For the Oak-heads Pass see vol. i. p. 366.
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turned off along another road leading over Cithaeron, and ultimately got clear away.^
The Depravation of Hellas.~The wholesale slaughtering of the Mytilenaean prisoners by the Athenians, and of the garrison of Plataea by the Spartans, were acts of savagery, which the moral feeling of thinking Greeks condemned. Nor were these the worst atrocities per- petrated in Hellas in the course of the Peloponnesian war. The most horrible of all — and they are scarcely exceeded in all the blood-stained records of mankind — were done at Corcyra in a struggle between the oligarchical and demo- cratic factions there, which had begun before the war, were intensified after it broke out, and ended only with the massacre of the whole of the oligarchical party. Thucy- dides relates the story in full and makes one of his rare comments. He is not of those who believe in the refining and purifying effects of war : from his experience he regards war as demoralizing and depraving : " For in peace and prosperity," he says, " both states and indi- viduals have gentler feelings, because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity ; but war, which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition." 2
A Lucky Turn of Fortune. — The war went on from year to year with varying success, each side inflicting hideous damage on the other without, seemingly, bringing the conflict any nearer to a conclusion. There can hardly even be said to have been a clearly conceived and far- sighted plan of operations on either side. The struggle dragged on as a series of badly connected episodes, breaking out now on this side of Hellas, and now on that. Only year by 3^ear, regularly, Attica was invaded, and year by year an Athenian naval squadron went round Peloponnesus, wasting and plundering. And every year the Athenians further sated their anger at the damage done in Attica by the Peloponnesians on unhappy Megara, by burning and destroying in the Megarid, right up to the
1 Thucydides, iii. 20-24. ^xhucydides, iii. 82. 2; Loeb, ii. p. 143.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 153
city walls. Neither side had made any real progress towards victory. And then in 425 a dramatic change came over the scene, when suddenly, more by accident than design, Athens found herself in a position to dictate to Sparta almost any terms she pleased. This was because by an extraordinary stroke of luck the Athenians got into their hands as prisoners of war nearly three hundred Lacedaemonians, a good proportion of them Spartans of good family. The story is worth setting forth with some fulness, but no re-telling can approach the story as first told in Thucydides' pages.
High Adventure at Pylos. — On the west coast of Pelo- ponnesus, in the southern half of the district that was once the kingdom of Messenia, is the Bay of Navarino, where in 1827 the Turkish and Egyptian fleets were destroyed by the attack of British, French and Russian warships, and the Greeks rescued from Turkish oppressors. In front of the Bay of Navarino lies the island of Sphagia, anciently called Sphacteria, about 2 J miles in length and half a mile broad, with a wide channel into the bay at its southern end and a narrow channel at the northern. Opposite the northern end of Sphacteria, with just the narrow channel between, is another mass of rock, not quite a mile in length, joined to the mainland coast by a very narrow neck and with a shallow lagoon to the east of it. This rocky peninsula was in the fifth century B.C. called Coryphasion by the Spartans and by the Athenians Pylos : ^ and the lagoon, which has been gradually formed in the course of countless centuries by the deposit of silt, was then still practically part of the bay. It happened in 425 that an Athenian squadron under orders to sail to Sicily passed by this coast and that it had on board an enterprising Athenian commander who was a great friend of the exiled Messenians and was eager to serve his country by some valiant stroke. Demosthenes had
^ The Homeric Pylos, the home of PyUan Nestor, was somewhere along this coast, but the probabilities are against the identification of Coryphasion with Nestor's Pylos. See for Telemachns* journey to Pylos, vol. i. p. 137.
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no official position in the fleet, ^ but he was allowed to sail with it on the understanding that he should be supported in any service of which he saw opportunity, and it may be conjectured that he had all along a parti- cular opportunity in view. He had started, we may suppose, with a clear purpose in his own mind of making a land- ing and seizing Pylos ; but at first it seemed that he would have no chance of carrying it out. He put his request to the admirals in command, Eurymedon and Sopho- cles, but they would not hear of it. A storm, however, did for Demosthenes what Eurymedon and Sophocles would not do : it obliged the Athenian fleet to take shelter in the harbour. Even so for some time Demos- thenes was no nearer the accomplishment of his pur- pose, for neither commanders nor men would help him to fortify the position. Then further chance brought what he desired. The bad weather continued and kept the fleet at Pylos. The sailors had nothing to do, and to pass the time began to turn this headland of Pylos into a fortified post. This was easy ; for stones and wood in abundance were lying about and there was sand to serve for mortar. Warming to their work they ultimately made a creditable job of it, and by the time the fleet was able to sail Coryphasion was a defensible post. It may be seen from the map and illustration that the position was one which naturally lent itself to defence. The rock slopes steeply up from the channel separating Pylos and Sphacteria to a height of 450 feet ; then falls away abruptly to the isthmus, the curious sand-bar which in crescent shape joins the peninsula to the main- land coast on the north. The top forms a natural keep, where there are now extensive remains of a mediaeval castle built by the Venetians, and traces of an earlier stronghold which may possibly date from Mycenaean times. A cliff edge running continuously from east to west forms a line convenient to hold on the north. Nearly
1 The words used by Thucydides are curious : " Demosthenes also, ... at his own request, had permission, if he shovUd wish, to make use of the ships in the course of the voyage round Peloponnesus " (Thuc. iv. 2. 4.)
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155
the whole of the eastern side (above the lagoon), and great part of the western (towards the sea) are secured
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from attack by precipitous cliffs. There were only two places where attack was practicable : a strip of rock- strewn shore at the south-west end, and the western
156 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
side of the northern chff where a lower level makes approach from the sandy isthmus relatively easy ; and these no doubt were the points which Demosthenes and his men strengthened with their improvised defences. When finally the fleet sailed on, the commanders left Demosthenes behind with five ships and their crews.
Sphacteria. — The Lacedaemonians — they were cele- brating a festival — at first made light of the rumour of the occupation of Pylos. But when they realized what had happened, there was something like a panic. The annual invasion of Attica was going on ; the army of the League was hurriedly recalled ; Lacedaemonian troops from the neighbourhood marched to Pylos at once, and an urgent summons was sent to all the allied commanders and to the Peloponnesian fleet which was at the time at Corcyra to hasten with all speed to the Messenian coast. Demosthenes meantime had sent two of his five ships to report the danger to the Athenian fleet now arrived at Zacynthus : his remaining three ships he hauled ashore and prepared to hold the post with the scanty forces at his disposal. He had only forty Messenian hoplites besides the crews of his three triremes, and most of his crews, of course, were just unarmed seamen. The seamen he armed as well as he could with wicker targes, obtained from a Messenian privateer which happened to be at hand.^ The bulk of his forces Demosthenes posted to defend the northern end : for the defence of the strip of rocky shore he took sixty hoplites only and some bowmen. The Lacedaemonians delivered attacks at both points simultaneously with the utmost vigour. Especially determined was the attempt of the fleet to force a landing on the rocks, in spite of the risks the ships ran of being dashed to pieces. For the gallant Brasidas ^ was there, and he not only called on the ships' captains not to spare their vessels, but himself set the example by steering his own ship
1 Possibly this ' accident ' was also designed and part of Demosthenes' plan.
2 For Brasidas see below, p. 168.
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THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 157
straight for the shore with a view to making good a landing at any cost. But he was struck down as he stood on the gangway and lost consciousness. His men managed to carry him oif, but his shield fell into the water and the Athenians made prize of it. The attack was a complete failure. Thucydides notices the odd turn of fortune by which it came about that the Lacedae- monians were attacking from shipboard and trying to force a landing in their own country, while the Athenians were resisting them on land and that land part of Laconia.^ The attacks were repeated next day with no better success. On the third day the ships of the Athenian fleet, fifty in number, sailed in from Zacynthus, hot for an immediate engagement. They found themselves baffled by the dispositions made by the Lacedaemonian commanders. The Peloponnesian fleet was in the harbour and showed no wilUngness to come out and fight, while the shore of the bay was held by troops. There were troops also, a strong body of Lacedaemonian hoplites, lining the rocks along the northern end of the island of Sphacteria. For, like Xerxes at Salamis, the Spartans had landed men to give their side support in the event of a sea-fight ; and, like Xerxes also, they forgot to take into account the contingency of a reverse. But for the moment the Athenian admirals saw no means of attacking ; and with the whole Bay of Navarino and its shores occupied by the enemy in force, there was no place at all where they could find anchorage. They therefore withdrew, and sailing northwards along the coast of the mainland, put in for the night at an island named Prote. Next day they returned ; and this .time, since the Pelo- ponnesian fleet did not come out, they sailed straight into the Bay of Navarino through both entrances, the northern and the southern, engaged the enemy's ships, captured five, and drove the rest ashore. This victory, so easily obtained, at once effected a dramatic change in the situation. For now, since the Athenians were masters of the bay and of the channels leading into it,
1 Thucydides, iv. 12. 3.
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the Spartans posted on Sphacteria were cut off. This consequence, though it might have been foreseen as possible, filled with consternation both the Spartan troops on the spot and the authorities at Lacedaemon. Some of the men-at-arms now cut off in Sphacteria were scions of the noblest Spartiate families. We have seen before (ch. iii. p. 67), in what followed the battle of Coronea, the sacrifices a Greek city-state would make in order to ransom its citizens when prisoners of war. Now that the calamit}^ had happened at Pylos, the Spartans were quick to grasp its extreme seriousness ; for since they had lost the command of the channels and the bay, there was no means at all of succouring the men on Sphacteria, and there was nothing before them but a choice of starva- tion or surrender. For this reason they at once proposed a truce while envoys should go to Athens to treat for peace. Pending the return of the envoys, it was agreed that daily rations should be conveyed across to the garrison in Sphacteria, on condition that the Spartans handed over to the Athenians not only the whole of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Bay of Navarino but all other War-ships in Laconia as well. When the truce was over the ships were to be restored. These terms were agreed to ; the Peloponnesian fleet was surrendered ; Spartan envoys were conveyed to Athens on board an Athenian trireme. It was now that Athens had her great opportunity. The Spartan envoys appeared before the Ecclesia in very chastened mood and made offers to the Athenian people which would have secured to them all that they were fighting for. " The Lacedaemonians," they said, " invite you to accept terms and bring the war to an end, offering you peace and alliance, and apart from this the maintenance of hearty friendship and intimacy one with the other ; asking on their side merely the return of the men on the island." ^ It was a mag- nificent opportunity. If it had been accepted by the Athenian people in the spirit in which (apparently) it was offered, the whole course of Greek history might have
1 Thucydides, iv. 19 ; Loeb, p. 243.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 169
been altered, with far-reaching results for the history of the world. For as the Spartan envoys said : "if you and we agree be assured that the rest of the Hellenic world, since it will be inferior to us in power, will pay us the greatest deference." ^ But unfortunately this amazing turn of good fortune which had come to them disturbed the judgment of the Athenians, and it was no longer Pericles who had their ear, but Oleon, the son of Cleae- netus, mover of the decree against Mytilene. Cleon advised the Ecclesia to demand that, as a preliminary to any peace negotiations whatever, the Lacedae- monians in Sphacteria should deliver up their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war and be brought to Athens ; that when the prisoners had arrived in x\thens, the Lacedaemonians should put the Athenians in possession of Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia, of all in fact that Athens had given up twenty years earlier : ^ that then and only then, peace should be made for a term of years. The envoys met this demand with a request for the appointment of commissioners who might dis- cuss with themselves the points at issue and try and reach an agreement mutually acceptable. This gave Cleon the opening to denounce the envoys for attempting to overreach the Athenian people, and seeking to obtain by underhand means concessions they did not venture to ask for openly. If the purposes of the envoys were honest, they could speak out then and there before the people. Upon this the envoys withdrew and returned to Sparta with nothing accomplished ; for if they had publicly offered concessions, and yet after all had "failed to bring about peace, Sparta would have lost credit with her allies for nothing.^
On the return of the envoys to Sparta the truce was at an end and according to the compact made the ships held as surety by the Athenians must be given back. But the temptation to keep the enemy's ships now they had
1 Thucydides, iv. 20. 4 ; Loeb, p. 245.
2 Thucydides, i. 115 ; and see above, eh. iii. p. 68, » Thucydides, iv. 22.
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them was too much for the Athenians. They refused to restore them, giving as a pretext certain alleged breaches of the truce. The Spartans protested, but there was no remedy : merely hostilities were resumed. The Athenians kept patrol ships circling round Sphacteria by day, and at night the whole fleet, now raised by rein- forcement to seventy vessels, lay close anchored about Sphacteria, except that, if the wind rose, they had to leave the windward side of the island unguarded. ^ The Spartans on their side renewed their attacks on Pylos and at the same time strained every nerve to get food across to their men on Sphacteria ; for the island itself was utterly barren and uninhabited. They did this, however, with such success that the Athenian blockade proved quite ineffective. It was impossible for triremes to be moored on the seaward side of Sphacteria when the wind was blowing on shore, and on such nights daring blockade -runners, mostlj^ Helots spurred by the promise of their liberty, would start from some point on the Messenian coast, and, with the wind behind them, run their boats on to the rocky coast of Sphacteria at the most suitable points, where they were sure to find some of the hoplites on the look-out to receive them. So the days passed and the Athenians were no nearer getting the men on Sphacteria into their hands than they were when the blockade began. Meantime the summer was passing and the men of the Athenian fleet were enduring great discomfort and privation. Supplies were difficult, they had no proper anchorage, and, worst of all, no means of drawing water except from a single well in the acropolis of Pylos. Dissatisfaction at Athens at this want of progress was growing acute and the people began to repent of having listened to Cleon's advice. Upon this Cleon, after a vain attempt to discredit the truth of the reports, threw the blame on the generals of the year : it would be quite easy, he declared, if the generals were any good, with a suitable force to sail to Sphacteria and capture the Spartans : that is what he would himself
1 Thucydides, iv. 23.
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have done had he been in command. And then a strange thing happened. When there was a mocking outcry at this boastful statement of Cleon's, Nicias rose and in the name of the generals invited Cleon to take what force he would and make the attempt. Cleon, not thinking this seriously meant, at first professed himself ready to go ; but when he found Nicias was in earnest, he tried to back out of it. But this the multitude, finding amuse- ment in Cleon 's discomfiture, would not allow. The more he drew back, the more they clamoured that he should go. In the end this wild proposal was carried through. It seemed a mad freak ; for Cleon had no experience of command either military or naval. Cleon not only agreed to go, but declared that he would not take a single man from Athens, but only a body of Lemnian and Imbrian allies then in the city, a band of targemen and four hundred archers. If these forces were entrusted to him in addition to the troops already at Pylos, he undertook within twenty days either to bring the Lacedaemonians to Athens alive or to kill them there. ^
It is a strange story, and the strangest part of it is that Cleon after all made good his rash words. He sailed with his bowmen and peltasts and within twenty days he brought to Athens as prisoners of war all that remained alive of the Lacedaemonians who had been cut off in Sphac- teria. This result was achieved partly by good luck, partly through Cleon's shrewdness in choosing Demos- thenes for his colleague in the undertaking. Demosthenes had a plan for landing in Sphacteria and capturing the Spartans aU ready to put into practice before Cleon arrived. Sphacteria, we have already noted, was a barren uninhabited islet, and when the Lacedaemonians landed there, it was also for the most part thickly covered with bush — as it is again to-day. This growth of bush had been a great obstacle to the success of a landing ; for it obstructed the view and put the attacking party at a great disadvantage. But a little before this there had been a fire — accidentally caused by one of a party
1 Thucydides, iv. 27 and 28.
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of Athenian soldiers who had landed to cook their food — and much of the bush had been burnt. Here Demosthenes saw his opportunity ; and, as a matter of fact, when Cleon arrived, all Demosthenes' dispositions for an attack had been already made. Demosthenes meant to leave nothing to chance : he planned to use all the forces at his disposal and land troops in numbers so overwhelming as to make successful resistance impossible. The Lace- daemonians were in all 420 hoplites with, perhaps, the same number of light-armed Helots in attendance.^ The main camp was on comparatively level ground about the middle of the island, near a well. There was an outpost of thirty men near the southern end. The highest ground on the island at the north-east corner, opposite Pylos, was held by another small detachment as a strong- hold on which to retreat in case of necessity. ^
One day a little before dawn Demosthenes landed his hoplites, eight hundred in number, simultaneously on both sides of the island. With these forces he rushed the advance post and overwhelmed it : the defenders were killed before they were well awake. At dawn the rest of his troops disembarked, 800 archers, as many more targemen, and large part of the crews of all his seventy ships. These last must have amounted to some eight thousand men, so that the total force landed to deal with 420 Lacedaemonian hoplites and their attendant Helots must have been well over 10,000. The dispositions made by Demosthenes were certainly a superb compli- ment to the fighting valtie of Spartan training. These troops were divided up by Demosthenes into bands of about two hundred men ; and every point of vantage round the Spartan encampment was occupied by one or other of these bands, so that the Lacedaemonians could be assailed from all sides and exposed to a shower of missiles in whatever direction they turned.^ The
^ No account is taken by Thucydides in his description of the fighting
of light -armed on the Spartan side, but in giving the numbers of the
detachment cut off in Sphacteria (iv. 8. 9) he says " numbering four
hundred and twentj'^, besides the Helots who accompanied them. . . ."
2 Thucydides, iv. 31. ^ Thucydides, iv. 32.
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little compact band of Spartans, nothing daunted, formed up and advanced upon the Athenian heavy- armed men. At once they were assailed by a swarm of light-armed on both flanks : for the Athenian hoplites made no advance, but stood where they were. If the Spartans turned against the light-armed on either side, they easily retreated out of reach ; for it was vain to press the pursuit over the rough ground. And all the time, too, the enemy hung upon their rear and harassed them. This skirmishing went on for a long time, till the Lacedae- monians began to tire and their resistance weakened. Encouraged by their immunity from punishment at the hands of foes they had thought so formidable, the Athenian light troops pressed on. more boldly: "With a shout they came on all together, showering upon their foemen stones, arrows, and javelins, using severally the missiles that came to hand. The noise added to the terror of the charge and daunted troops unused to such fighting ; the ash from the recently fired woods rose into the air in clouds, and it was difficult for the men to see what was in front of them as the stones and arrows came hurtling through the ash-laden air. So the day now began to go hard with the Lacedaemonians. Their felt jerkins would not keep off the arrows, and the points of the javelins broke off short in those who were hit. Thus with their view ahead cut off, and the orders of their officers drowned by the deafening shouts of their assailants, with their position threatened in every direction and with no hope of beating off these attacks, they did not know what to do with themselves." ^ Then the surviv- ing Spartans closed their ranks and fought their way in slow retreat back upon their rocky citadel, followed by the swarms of enemies who pressed on after them more fiercely than ever. Some were overtaken and killed ; but the greater number reached the summit and were told off to hold their defences at all the assailable points. The Athenians came on with no less ardour than before, but now the Lacedaemonians were in a fortified posi-
1 Thucydides, iv. 34, 1-3 (L. J.).
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tion, no longer open to attack from all sides. The attack, therefore, this time made no progress, and the struggle went on through the long hot day without result. At last the commander of the Messenian troops ; with Demosthenes' consent, took a party of javelin men and archers, and they crept along under the great east cliff till they found a place below the crest of the hill where, out of view of the garrison, it was possible to climb, and reach a part of the summit which on account of its natural strength was undefended. In this way he and his men suddenly emerged in view of both friend and foe on the rocks above the Spartan position ; for the rough fort the Spartans held was on the top of the hill but not the actual peak. The position had been turned : it was Thermopylae over again on a smaller scale. ^ Resistance was now hopeless and the end had come : the defenders were weak from want of food and physical exhaustion, and now they could again be attacked from every side. In a short while they must all have been overwhelmed and killed. But this was not what Cleon and Demosthenes wanted. They wanted something far more valuable than three hundred dead bodies. They wanted living Spartan prisoners to use as a lever in negotiations with the Spartan government. So at the critical moment, while there was still time, the Athenian commanders sent forward a herald who made proclamation in the hearing of the Spartans, inviting them to surrender at discretion. The rank and file were exhausted in will as well as in bodily power, and when they heard these words most of them " lowered their shields and waved their hands, indicating that they accepted the terms proposed." ^ So the fight was stayed and in conference with the Spartan commander it was arranged that a message should be conveyed to the Spartans on the mainland asking what they on the island should do. Messengers passed backwards and forwards more than once : the final answer sent was : " The Lacedaemonians bid you consult your own safety, but do nothing dis-
1 The comparison is Thucydides', iv. 36. 3.
2 Thucydides, iv. 38. 1.
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graceful." ^ This was understood by the men on Sphac- teria as equivalent to an injunction to make the best terms they could for their lives : accordingly they gave up their arms and became prisoners of war. It was an event which struck all Greece with amazement. For it was at this time an article of faith in Hellas that Spartans died but never surrendered. Sphacteria brought dis- illusionment to the allies and was a shrewd blow to Spartan prestige. The Athenians were proportionately elated, and sailed away home with their prisoners on shipboard.
And now a second time Athens held in her hands the means of ending the war victoriously and of inaugurating a new era of peace for Hellas. For Sparta was tamed in spirit as never before. So great was the public anxiety to recover her men that the Spartan government was prepared to make great concessions. But the people of Athens were lifted above themselves by their unlooked-for success and their demands were extravagant. Spartan ambassadors came again and again, but every time they went away unsuccessful : the ' men of Sphacteria * remained as prisoners in Athens and the war went on.
The Longing for Peace. — But although the influence of Cleon and the ' war party ' frustrated the hopes of a good peace in 425, there were many in Athens who were thoroughly weary of the war, and who longed only for a return to the calm delights of peace. Especially was this true of the multitudes of honest farmers and country gentlemen who were living pent up within the city walls, cut off from their country homes. The feelings of such sufferers have been vividly portrayed by Aristophanes in the Acharnians, a comedy produced at Athens in this very year 425. In this play the demesman of Colleides, Dicaeopolis,^ insists on making a private peace for himself, in defiance of the furious indignation of the Acharnians, who cannot forgive the Lacedaemonians for cutting down their vines. Aristophanes depicts Dicaeopolis " gazing out into the country in a passion of desire for peace,
1 Thucydides, iv. 38. 3. ^ Aristophanes, Acharnians, 1. 406.
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hating the city and yearning for my own countryside." ^ He even has the courage to hint that perhaps all the guilt for the war was not Sparta's. ^ The play has been well described as "an ardent declaration in favour of peace." ^ It needed four more years of war to bring a majority in the Ecclesia to this frame of mind. But after Athens had suffered the severe defeat of Delium in 424 and had lost Amphipolis and other of the ' Thraceward ' towns through Brasidas' brilliant campaign, both sides were sufficiently inclined to peace to conclude an armistice for one year. When the j^ear was up, hostilities were indeed renewed (422) ; but in an action before Amphipolis, which Cleon had gone to recover for Athens, Cleon was killed outright and Brasidas mortally wounded. This removed on the Spartan side, as well as on the Athenian, the personal influence most inimical to peace ; and in 421 a peace for fifty years was negotiated between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies on the basis that each side should renounce its conquests. It was an uneasy peace, because there was no hearty reconcilement ; points remained in dispute from the very first and were never settled. But nominal peace between Sparta and Athens, between Athens and the Peloponnesian League, continued for eight years, from 421 to 413, and then there was again a general embroilment, league against league, as it had been in the Ten Years' War (431-421).
Before we leave this first period of conflict between Athens and Sparta, sometimes called the Ten Years' War, we may with advantage consider briefly two episodes of the last four years of it — the affair of Delium and the Thracian campaign of Brasidas.
Delium. — If the capture of Sphacteria did not secure for the Athenians peace from Sparta on their own terms, at all events it brought them sovereign relief in one respect : it freed them from yearly invasion. For they had their 292 Spartans and Lacedaemonians in Athens,
1 Lines 32 and 33. 2 Lines 509-514.
3 Croiset, Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens, translated by James Loeb, p. 52.
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and they let it be understood that if a Peloponnesian army entered Attica these 292 men (including the 120 of noblest Spartiate blood) would die. The run of luck meantime for Athens continued. In the year 424 the Athenians conquered Cythera (Cerigo, the island south of Cape Malea), not ten miles from the coast of Laconia. That was another humiliation and hurt to the pride of Sparta, hardly less serious than Sphacteria and Pylos. A little later they captured and destroyed Thyrea, the city on that border district so long in dispute between Sparta and Argos, which the Spartans had given to the Aeginetans when expelled from their island home by the Athenians. The inhabitants of Cythera they put to tribute, but left for the most part in possession of their island : all the Aeginetans captured they put to death . Then fortune took another turn. A promising intrigue with the democratic party in Megara proved abortive, ending in the ruin of the Megarian democrats. A larger enterprise, planned be- tween that embodiment of restless energy, Demosthenes, and the democratic parties in the Boeotian cities, ended in sheer disaster. The plan was for an Athenian force to seize a temple enclosure sacred to Apollo, called Delium, on the Boeotian coast opposite Euboea, and turn it into a fortress from which to foment revolution in the country. In order to distract the Boeotians and give the Athenians time to secure the position, Demosthenes with the fleet from Naupactus was to make a landing on the opposite side of Boeotia, where conspirators were prepared to put the town of Siphae into his hands. The scheme mis- carried owing to a wrong reckoning of days. Demos- thenes arrived too soon and the Boeotians were able to gather in great force to oppose him. In consequence of this the partisans of Athens and democracy inside the town made no movement and Demosthenes withdrew baffled. But meantime Demosthenes' colleague, Hippocrates, had made his coiip and seized Delium. He came round the shoulder of Mount Parnes with the full military strength of Athens, citizens and ' metics ' alike. His troops dug a trench all about the temple and made a rampart of
. 168 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
the earth extracted, and surmounted the rampart with a palisade. They spent four days and a half in advancing these fortifications ; then set off home, camping that night about two miles from DeUum on the Attic side of the border. In the meantime the Boeotian levies had come together under the Boeotarchs to the number of some 18,000, — hoplites, cavalry and light-armed. The Athenians were without their light-armed troops, as these had already marched off home : of hoplites and cavalry they had about the same number as the Boeotians. In the battle which followed the Athenians on the left were pushed back by the Thebans (who were massed twenty- five deep) ; on the right they were at first victorious, but w^hen some Boeotian cavalry suddenly appeared over a low ridge, they were seized with panic and turned in headlong fiight. In the end the Athenian army was routed with a loss of nearly one thousand dead. The loss of the Boeotians was rather less than ^ve hundred. The Athenian general, Hippocrates, was among the slain. A curious dispute, illustrative of Greek customs, arose over the dead. The Athenians sent, as was usual for the defeated side, a herald to ask permission to recover the bodies of those who had fallen. The Boeotians refused to give them up, unless the Athenians at once evacuated Delium. For they declared the occupation of Delium to be sacrilege. The Athenians denied the sacrilege and declined to do this ; on their part they reproached the Boeotians with violating the most sacred of Hellenic obligations. The dispute only came to an end when, seventeen days later, the Boeotians retook Delium. ^ They then restored the Athenian dead without further question.
Brasidas in Chalcidice. — The defeat at Delium was one severe blow to the overweening self-confidence of the Athenians after Sphacteria. Another followed that same year through the achievements of Brasidas. Brasidas,
1 It is interesting that for the capture of Delium the Boeotians used a rough form of flame-thrower. Thucydides' account of this is too long to quote and may be found, Bk. iv. 100. 2-4.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 169
son of Tellis, is, with possibly one exception/ the most human and attractive figure Sparta ever produced. He is the one Spartan in the fifth century who may be called the peer of the great Athenians — of Themistocles and Aristides, of Cimon and Pericles. Brasidas was a leader in war as brilliant and resourceful as Phormio or Demos- thenes, and he had that personal quality shown by all great commanders of rousing devotion in his soldiers. He has been called the most interesting of all the Hellenes of his time ; and indeed he had that touch of genius which enables a leader to do wonders with slender resources, to create the very material with which he achieves victory. Brasidas' first feat was to save the fortress in Laconia called Methone at the time of the earliest Athenian raids round the Peloponnese (431 B.C.). With a hundred men he dashed through the Athenian forces besieging the place and by his presence prevented its capture. It was Brasidas who in the fourth year of the war projected a daring raid on Piraeus — and nearly succeeded. Among Brasidas' other services to Sparta was his fearless attempt to land on the rocks of Pylos, in which he was severely wounded. ^ It was Brasidas who had saved Megara.^ After the saving of Megara and about the same time as the Athenian seizure of Delium, Brasidas set off for the Chalcidian peninsula with a force of 1700 hoplites. Of these 700 were Helots specially armed by the Spartans for the purpose ; the rest were volunteers from the Peloponnese serving for pay. His plan was to march north through Thessaly to Chalcidice and by his presence extend the revolt which had already begun among the Chalcidian cities. It was a bold plan ; for the sympathies of the Thes- salians were much in doubt and the body of the people at all events were with Athens. Brasidas carried his march through successfully by the speed with which he moved. At one point he was challenged by a body
1 Agis IV., the reforming king of the third century B.C. (reigned 244-240). See Plutarch.
2 See p. 156. ^geep. 167.
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of men belonging to. the opposite party. By the ex- ercise of tact he put them off, and then hastened on before opposition could gather in greater force. Per- diccas of Macedonia was his ally, so there was no difficulty in traversing the part of Macedonia between Thessaly and Chalcidice. Chalcidice is the broad upper portion of the peninsula which ends in the three promontories, Pallene, Sithonia and Acte, the last-named being the easternmost through which Xerxes cut his canal. ^ Once arrived in Chalcidice, Brasidas acted with swift decision. He found the people of Acanthus, the city just outside Acte ^ northwards, in two minds about welcoming him, and gave them the choice of making common cause with him or seeing their lands ravaged. After listening to his arguments (and for a Lacedae- monian he was not a bad speaker, says Thucydides),^ they agreed to receive him within their city. In the winter he made a sudden march and won Amphipolis. This was a severe blow to Athens, for they had founded Amphipolis at a great cost, and set great store by its possession.
Amphipolis commanded an important trade route into the interior. Aristagoras of Miletus had tried to build a city in the neighbourhood and had f ailed. ^ Athens had promoted the establishment of a colony there and had failed : the whole settlement was wiped out by the Thracians.* Then in 436 a colony was successfully founded with Hagnon, son of Mcias, as founder. The city was protected on three sides by a curve of the river Strymon, and on the fourth by a wall across the bend. Eion, three miles below, was the port of Amphipolis, and above Eion was a bridge over which passed the highway between Thrace and Macedonia. The time of year was winter and Brasidas' march was unexpected. He easily overcame the guard at the bridge and crossed the Strymon. There was much property of the Amphipolitans in the open country between the bridge and the city walls. All this property fell into Brasidas' hands. The town
1 See vol. i. pp. 301 and 302. ^xhucydides, iv. 84.
* See vol. i. p. 276. * See above, ch. ii. p. 38.
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was thrown into great commotion, but did not at once surrender, and might have been saved, as a majority of the townspeople were for Athens. But Brasidas had proclamation made promising security of property to any citizens, whether Athenians or not, if they stayed after a surrender ; or if they preferred it, leave to depart freely. This moderation had its effect, and when a vote was taken, a majority were for surrender. Thucydides explains that only a minority of the citizens were actually Athenian. The sequel has vivid interest for the reader of Thucydides. " Late the same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion. Brasidas was then just in possession of Amphi- polis ; Eion he missed taking only by a night. Had the fleet not come to its rescue with all speed, it would have been in his hands by morning." ^
The Fifty Years' Peace. — It was after Athens had suffered this further reverse that the truce for one year (above, p. 166) was concluded between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians on terms of keeping what they held. But two days later than the conclusion of this armistice, Scione, an Achaean city on the peninsula of Pallene, joined Brasidas. The Athenians demanded the exclusion of 8cione from the truce : Brasidas refused to hand it back. The Athenians were very angry, and on Cleon's proposal passed a resolution " to destroy the city of the men of Scione and put them to the sword." In conse- quence of this and other causes of disagreement, when the year of truce came to an end hostilities were resumed, and the chief scene of action was Chalcidice. The Athenians sent fresh forces there with Cleon in command, thirty war- ships, 1200 Athenian footmen and 300 cavalry. Cleon began with a notable success : he took Torone. Then he went to the mouth of the Strymon to deal with Amphi- polis. But there, unknown to him, a redoubtable foe
^Thucydides, iv. 106 (L.J.) "But who would guess," comments Livingstone {The Legacy of Greece, p. 273), " that the Athenian general Thucydides was the historian Thucydides who wrote these words, and that the episode which he here describes with such detach- ment and neutrality earned him perpetual exile under pain of death, from the coimtry which he passionately loved ? "
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awaited him to his undoing. For Brasidas heard of his coming and entered Amphipolis. Cleon was expecting reinforcements and not intending as yet to assault the city, but his men (who were the fine flower of Athenian manhood) murmured at the delay and spoke contemptu- ously of their leader's military competence. And Cleon hearing of this led out his forces, not for attack but reconnaissance. Anticipating this purpose Brasidas massed his best troops near the gates of Amphipolis and made dispositions for a sudden sally before Cleon should have time to withdraw. The plan succeeded perfectly. As the Athenian troops wheeled to march away, Brasidas' men charged out upon them and quickty threw them into disorder, because they were unprepared for fighting and even in act to retreat. Cleon, who ran away, was over- taken and killed. The total Athenian loss was 600 ; and of the victors 7. But among the seven was Bra- sidas, who fell mortally wounded in the first onset. He was carried out of the fight and lived long enough to die, like General Wolfe, in the consciousness of victory. But his death turned gain into loss. The soldiers followed his funeral in military array, and the people of Amphipolis made him their hero and the second founder of their city. 8o died these two men on one day, the one of too coarse fibre for an Athenian, the other in his personal attractive- ness unlike the typical Spartan. And with their passing, as we have already seen (above, p. 166), the way was smoothed to the Peace of Nicias.
A Greek Play o£ B.C. 421. — Of the thirteen surviving comedies of Aristophanes ^.ve belong to the years 425 to 421 — ^from the year of Sphacteria to the year of the Peace of Nicias. The " Old Comedy " of Attica is as much a mirror of contemporary history as Punch is with us ; and these five comedies (Acharniaiis, Knights, Clouds, Wasps, Peace) reflect the thoughts and feelings of the people of Athens during these eventful years in a manner most intimate. Of none is this more true than of the last of the series, Aristophanes' Peace, which was per- formed before the Athenian people, massed tier above
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 173
tier on seats under the south-east cliff of the AcropoHs, about eight months after the deaths of Cleon and Brasidas at AmphipohS; and a few days before the signature of the Peace of Nicias. It comes down to us white-hot with the emotions of the time, and gives expression to the intense longing for peace which possessed many at Athens, and many also in the other warring states. '* O most revered queen and goddess, our Lady Peace," cries Trygaeus, the hero of the play, the honest vine-dresser and cultivator, who stands for all the country and people of Attica, " mistress of the dance, mistress of wedlock, receive this our sacrifice." ^ And again : " Nay, rather in God's name, show thyself fully in thy noble graciousness to us who love thee — to us who have suffered sore tribulation these dozen long years past. Stay strifes and tumults, that we may call thee ' Strife-stayer.' End for us the fine-drawn suspicions, which keep us bickering one against another. Give once more, to us that are Hellenes, a taste of the good brew of ancient kindliness, infuse into our souls more of the spirit of forgiveness." ^ This was the spirit of Aristophanes in 421, when the Peace of Nicias was being made ; and there must have been some in Athens, and some in other parts of Greece who sym- pathized. Had there been more, the subsequent history of Greece would have been different.
Pylos and Sphacteria.
The topography of Sphacteria and Pylos is a fascinating subject. It was not convenient to introduce disputed points into the text and the full discussion of them is beyond the modest aim of this chapter. Happily the main questions have been completely settled. Two highly competent English archaeologists. Dr. G. B. Grundy and Dr. Ronald Burrows, visited Pylos and Sphacteria in the same year 1895, and within a fortnight of each other, but quite independently. Papers embodying their conclusions were published simultaneously in the Journal of Hellenic Studies for 1896.
The main result was the complete clearing up of the most important points ; namely,
{ 1 ) that Sphagia is indisputably Sphacteria ; (2) that Palaio-Kastro is indisputably Pylos ;
1 Lines 974-977. 2 Unes 987-998.
174 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
(3) that the Lagoon of Osmyn Aga is in process of being filled up and in the 5th century B.C. was deeper than now, and navigable, forming the most sheltered part of the Bay of Navarino, and therefore the harbour of Pylos.
The result is also to confirm in general, and illustrate, the accuracy of Thucydides' narrative both of the occupation of Pylos and the blockade of Sj^hacteria. One serious discrepancy, however, remains, the discrepancy which is responsible for there being a topographical problem. This is found inexplicable on any hypothesis but the simple admission that Thucydides made a mistake. The crucial passage (Book IV., ch. 8. 6 and 7) runs: " The island called Sphacteria extends lengthwise in front of the harbour and lies close to it, thus making the harbour safe and the entrances to it narrow ; on the one side, over against Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, allowing the passage of two ships abreast; on the other, towards the mainland, of eight or nine. Being quite uninhabited, the whole island was covered with brushwood and without path of any sort : its length was approxi- mately a mile and three quarters. Now it was the intention of the Lacedaemonians to close the entrances completely with ships moored lengthwise down the channels, and because they were afraid the enemy might use the island as a base for prosecuting hostilities, they conveyed over into it a number of hoplites, and posted others along the mainland."
There are here plainly two mistakes :
1. The length of Sphacteria is given as under two miles, whereas the true length is nearly three.
This is not a very serious mistake and more than one explanation is possible. Grundy suggests that the length given is the distance from the point where the Athenians landed to the cliffs of the north coast. On the other hand there is the possibility of an accidental textual error, {\JI represents 15. If we suppose that a A has dropped out, A All represents 25, approximately the correct distance. Or kc' (25) may have been changed into le' (15).i
2. The channels into the Bay of Navarino at either end of Sphacteria are both described as narrow, and an estimate is given of their width in terms of the number of triremes that could sail in abreast. The northern channel (next to Pylos) is said to admit two triremes abreast, the southern to admit eight or nine. The width now by measurement is for the northern channel 220 yards, for the southern 1400. The southern channel is wide, and is very inappropriately de- scribed as admitting eight of the nine triremes abreast. It would admit thirty. Much greater is the difficulty of
1 R. M. Burrows in J. H. S. vol. xvi. p. 76.
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 175
supposing such a channel blocked by " ships moored length- wise down the channels." There is no ground for supposing that this opening has appreciably narrowed since the fifth century B.C. Yet it is quite plain from the wording of the passage that the channels intended are the openings at either end of Sphacteria, north and south. There is there- fore no escape from the conclusion tliat Thucydides has made a mistake in his estimate of the breadth of the southern channel.
How ho came to make it is another question, an interesting question, but in itself, perhaps, not very important. Dr. Burrows made the acute suggestion that Thucydides based his estimates on statements made to him by ships' captains who had served at Pylos with Demosthenes, and tlmt what they told him was that the Athenian fleet entered the Bay of Navarino through the two channels simultaneously, two ships abreast in the one, and eight or nine in the other. That is perfectly possible, though it cannot be proved. If we ado])t this conjecture, we have to reject the whole story of the blocking of the channels by the Spartans, and suppose it an invention to account for the landing of Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria. Dr. Grundy, however, holds that there must have been some actual blocking of channels to account for the story, but conjectures that Thucydides was mistaken in describing the opening south of Sphacteria as one of them. He maintains that the sand-bar existed in the 5th century B.C. in the same position as now, though it shut in the harbour of Pylos less completely. He supposes that there was a channel close in under the S.E. cliffs of Pylos leading from the outer into the inner harbour, and that this was the other of the two channels which the Spartans intended to block. He supports those views by physiographical arguments which have great force. Several other interesting controversies have arisen out of the double visit to Pylos in 1895 and the papers in the Journal of Hellenic Studies. They concern the defences built up by the Athenians in Pylos, and the precise manner in which the light-armed Messenians gained the cliff top overlooking the position in which the Spartans were making their last stand. These will be found in four articles in the Classical Review, and four papers (one by Mr. R. C. Bosanquet, who visited Pylos in 1896 and took photo- graplis) in the Journal of Hellenic Stiidies for 1898. The photo- graphs, one of which is reproduced in this chapter, are specially note -worthy. There are also two interesting French prints at the end of Dr. Burrows' paper of 1896. The final Court of Appeal, even when his theories are called in question, is Dr. Grundy's careful survey, which has enduring value independently of all controversies. See Plate III. Pylos and Its Environs at the end of Dr. Grundy's article, J. H. S. vol. xvi. (1896).
176 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
The complete references are : — Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. xvi. (1896).
An Investigation of the Topography of the Region of Sphakteria
andPylos. G. B. Grundy, pp. 1-54. Pylos and Sphacteria. R. M. Burrows, pp. 55-76.
Classical Review.
G. B. Grundy (Pylos and Sphacteria), Nov. 1896, pp. 371-4. R. M. Burrows „ „ Feb. 1897, pp. 1-10.
G. B. Grundy „ „ April 1897, pp. 155-9.
G. B. Grundy (Note on the Topography of Pylos), Dec. 1897, p. 448.
Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. xviii. (1898).
Pylos and Sphacteria. R. M. Burrows, pp. 147-155. Notes by R. C. Bosanquet, pp. 155-9.
Battles Ancient and Modern, G. B. Grundy, pp. 232-8.
See also pp. 228-230 in Dr. Grundy's articles, immediately preceding, on A Suggested Characteristic in Thukydides' Work ; and Dr. Burrows' reply to Dr. Grundy's two articles, pp. 345-350. Bury's History of Greece contains a full and vivid re-shaping of the whole story in the light of these personal studies of the locality. A comprehensive summary of results is included in the Supple- mentary Notes in Volume V. of Frazer's Pausanias, pp. 608-613.
CHAPTER VII
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY
" He told them that if thoy kept quiet and looked well after their fleet, and refrained from attempting new conquests dviring the war and from taking grave risks, they would come through safely." Thucydides, ii. 65. 7.
" Adventures, so attractive to the romantic reader, are not for a great commonwealth."
Times Literary Supplement for Jime the 8th, 1922.
In 421 Athens had won her war. The aims of the Peloponnesian League had been to break the naval strength of Athens and end her control of the Confederacy of Delos. After ten years of conflict the navy of Athens was as strong as ever, she was still undisputed mistress of the seas ; her empire was intact except for the loss of Amphi- polis, and as a set-off to the loss of Amphipolis she held Pylos and Cythera.
An Uneasy Peace. — Scarcely, however, was the Peace of Nicias ratified, when fresh matter of contention showed itself. The treaty had stipulated that the conquests each side had made should be restored. Amphipolis was naturally the first place noted for restoration to Athens. But the people of Amphipolis had not been consulted, and when Spartan commissioners appeared before the place and Clearidas (who had succeeded Brasidas in command of the Peloponnesian forces in Chalcidice) received orders to hand the town over to the Athenians, he found the Chalcidians resolutely opposed M 177
178 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
to the transfer and was unable, or said he was unable, to compel the surrender of Amphipolis against the will of its inhabitants. Of course this explanation did not satisfy the Athenians. They complained that the treaty had not been carried out and refused to give up Pylos. Each side considered itself aggrieved.
Alcibiades and Argos. — The chapters of Thucydides which follow ^ present us with a curious tangle of intrigue among the states interested in the settlement with Athens. Corinth, Boeotia, Elis, Megara refused to sign the peace at all. When Sparta tried to use pressure, they threatened revolt. Sparta, whose main concern now was to get back Pylos, thereupon made a separate treaty with Athens. The Corinthians retorted by forming a league with Argos, the traditional rival of Sparta ; and with Mantinea, which, like all Arcadian cities, had reason to dread interference from her powerful neighbour. These allies tried to get Boeotia to join them ; but the Boeotians had too lively a sense of old dangers from Athens, and stood firm for Sparta ; and Sparta soon after concluded a separate pact with them. Argos, fearing the strength of this combination, herself began to seek an understanding with Sparta. Meantime the Athenians took umbrage at the pact between Sparta and Boeotia, as being incon- sistent with the treaty the Spartans had recently made with themselves,^ and this opened to Argos the much desired opportunity of alliance with Athens . The Spartans, genuinely alarmed at the prospect of a combination of Argos and Athens, sent a pacific embassy to Athens with instructions to make all possible concessions. So Athens now became the focus of intrigue. In the end the Athenians were induced to draw away from Sparta and to ally themselves with Argos through a trick of the rising young statesman, Alcibiades.
1 Thucydides, v. 22-48.
2 Thucydides (v. 39. 3) evidently considers that there was an actual breach of the treaty which Sparta had made with Athens ; but there is no clause in that treaty as given v. 23, which expressly forbids either party to enter into new alliances without the consent of the other.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 179
Alcibiades, at this time about thirty years of age, was kinsman and ward of Pericles. By birth and inheritance he had every advantage which could contribute to personal and public distinction. He had powerful family connections, great inherited wealth, and talents which must have brought him to the front even without these favouring circumstances. He had everything to make him successful for himself and useful to his country, — save and except a regard for what men call ' virtue.' He was the most ' brilliant ' of all the statesmen that Athens ever produced. He had by gift of nature all the qualities which most easily win popular applause. As boy and youth his cleverness and his beauty of face and form brought him general admiration. His success as an owner of race-horses, and winner of the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia, his foppery, his drinking-f easts, his very prodigalities, won the favour of the populace. The ultra-aristocrat Alcibiades became the hero of the Athenian demos. He was the spoilt child of Athens and of fortune. But he grew up — perhaps because of these profuse gifts of fortune — without scruple or sense of honour, with no principles to guide his life but self- glorification ; a patriot so long as it served the ambitions of Alcibiades ; afterwards the deadliest enemy Athens ever had. The leading statesman of the day was Nicias, who made the peace with Sparta — a man of great wealth, moderate talents, and of a very scrupulous and cautious temperament. It was Nicias who had conquered Cythera, and Nicias after whom the peace was called. Alcibiades, as was inevitable, was jealous of Nicias, all the more because each of the two was in his own way a Philo-Laconian. Nicias was of the school of Cimon, an admirer of Spartan morale, and one who desired friendship with Sparta. Alcibiades was hereditary ' proxenos ' or ' Consul-General ' for the Spartans, and he was piqued because in 421 the Spartan peace envoys had overlooked his claims and used the good offices of Nicias to bring about the peace. He saw his way now to avenging the slight, or, at any rate, to increasing' his own importance at
180 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Athens by breaking the ' entente ' with Sparta and bringing about a close alliance between Athens and Argos. When the Spartan envoys came to Athens with full powers to settle outstanding disputes between Athens and Lacedaemon, and gave this out publicly, Alcibiades, with an outward show of friendliness, promised to get back Pylos for them and effect all else they wanted, if when they were before the Ecclesia they would deny that they had full powers. They did as he advised ; and then Alcibiades turned upon them, denounced them for double-dealing, and easily brought the Athenians into a mind to throw Sparta over and enter into definite alliance with Argos and Mantinea. This made a breach with Sparta, but did not at once lead to war, not indeed for another six years.
Melos. — In these years Athens was strong, and in the year 416 she used her strength in a way which showed her the ^ tyrant ' city, such as her enemies called her. Melos is a small island in the Aegean, lying on the western rim of the Cyclades about fifty miles from the Laconian coast. ^ Among all the islands of the Aegean its political position was unique, for it was neither allied with nor subject to Athens. ^ " The Melians," Thucy- dides says, " were colonists of the Lacedaemonians " ; ^ but they were not subjects of Sparta, nor were they members of the Peloponnesian League. In the war they had been strictly neutral, till the Athenians came and wantonly ravaged their lands. And now the democracy of Athens had decreed against them a greater wrong. They had no other wars on hand in 416 and it pleased them to give an exhibition of the strength of Athens by
1 Melos is 52 square miles in area and has in it a mountain (Mount Elias) over 2500 feet high. Melos has considerable interest for the archaeologist. Excavations were carried out there by the British School from 1896 to 1899. See Excavations at Phylakopi in Melos, published by the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies in 1904.
2 It is an unsolved puzzle that we find the Melians included in the Tribute list of the year 425 B.C., and assessed at the rate of 15 talents (as much as the Naxians and Apdrians).
3 Thucydides, v. 84. 2.
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enforcing the submission of the little independent island state. They sent to Melos a fleet of thirty-eight ships (six of these being Chian and two Lesbian) with an army of 3000 men, half of whom were troops of their allies. Thucy- dides felt the iniquity of what was done as sharply as any one could to-day, and he brings this out in dramatic form in his history by means of a dialogue between envoys from the Athenian commanders and the chiefs of the Melian state. ^ The Athenians make their appeal to the doctrine of force in its nakedness, advising the Melians to submit on grounds of expediency, with open cynicism dismissing all pleas of justice as irrelevant and in the eyes of men of the world ridiculous. The Melians admit the de facto cogency of the argument, yet decide to take their stand on considerations of honour and justice. The demands of the envoys are refused, and war follows. After a gallant resistance, and not before the Athenians had twice suffered a reverse and been obliged to send out reinforcements, Melos is forced to surrender : all the men are put to the sword, and the women and children sold into slavery. The Athenian envoys seemed to have been right, when they said : ''As for the divine favour we think not that we shall miss our share of it. . . . Of men we know full well that by a law of their nature they enforce their will on those who are too weak to resist them." 2 A year later, in reliance on the same principles of action, they were fitting out an army and fleet for a larger enterprise, their expedition to Sicily.
The Lure of the West. — There were practical reasons for the Athenians' interest in Sicily. There was a great trade with Italy and Sicily, and with Sicily especially a corn trade. The Athenians drew their own supplies from the Black Sea ; but corn came to the Peloponnesus from Sicily and there were close bonds of union between towns in Sicily and certain Dorian cities. In especial, Corinth, now the settled enemy of Athens, was bound by intimate ties with Syracuse, her colony, the most powerful
» Thucydides, v. 86-112. ^^ Thucydides, v. 106.
182 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
of all the Sicilian states. Again, Athens herself was associated by old friendship and alliance with certain Sicilian communities, especially with Leontini,^ which had suffered severely in a conflict with her too powerful neighbour and looked to Athens for protection. The race difference of Ionian and Dorian divided the cities of Sicily and Magna Graecia, just as it did the states of central Hellas, and the Sicilian cities tended to be grouped in alliances in accordance with racial affinities. The Euboean colonies, Naxos, Leontini, Catana, Himera and Rhegium were inclined to friendship with Athens. The Dorian colonies, Tarentum, Megara Hyblaea, Selinus, Gela, Agrigentum, and above all, Syracuse, sympathized with Sparta and the Peloponnesians. At the beginning of the war the Peloponnesian League looked to getting not only corn from Sicily, but ships. " The Lacedae- monians," wrote Thucydides, "gave orders to those in Italy and Sicily who had chosen their side to build, in proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in ad- dition to those which were already in Peloponnesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would reach a grand total of five hundred ships." ^ It is true these ships were never built and the Sicilians took no part whatever in the Ten Years' War. Yet there was, we see, a justification when in 427 Athens sent a squadron of twenty ships to Sicily to help the Leontines in their struggle with Syracuse.^ In 424 they had despatched a larger fleet of just double that number : and it was out of the despatch of this fleet and the accident that Demos- thenes sailed with it, that the whole affair of Pylos had come about.* But in 425 there was a general pacification in Sicily after a conference at which Hermocrates of Syracuse was the principal speaker and the guiding spirit : and after that there was nothing for the Athenian admirals
^ Leontini, unlike most of the Greek cities of Sicily, is not on the sea coast, but eight miles inland, a little north of Megara and halfway to Catana.
2 Thucydides, ii. 7. 2 ; Loeb, i. p. 271. ^ Thucydides, iii. 86. 4.
* Thucydides, iv. 2.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 183
to do but to come away.^ After that date the Athenians for eight years took no part in the affairs of Sicily except that in 422 they sent an officer named Phaeax to make enquiries as to the possibility of forming alHances in Sicily to check the rising power of Syracuse and help the Leontines who were again in trouble. ^ After this there is no mention of Sicily again in Thucydides' pages till the year 416, when an appeal for help came to the Athenian people from the city of Segesta.
By this time there were people at Athens who were looking to larger enterprises in Sicily. Even in 424, when the generals came back with their report of the pacifica- tion of Sicily, the people of Athens were angry. The generals were called to account, and on a charge of bribery two of them were sent into banishment and the third was fined. ^ The incident is instructive. It shows how already the popular ear was open to the wild talk of ambitious schemers. The tide of Athenian good fortune was just then in flood. Pylos had been occupied, Sphac- teria captured, the Spartan prisoners were safe at Athens and it seemed as if Athenian ambition might ask any- thing of fortune. There were men who talked of bringing all Sicily under Athenian sway, of conquests beyond Sicily — Italy, Tuscany, Carthage. What bounds need be set to the destiny of Athens ? Segesta was not a Greek colony, but a city of the Elynii. There was a tradition that the Ely mi were fugitives from the sack of Troy, who settled in Sicily and changed their name. But in language and customs, as far as can be judged from coins and architectural remains, the Segestans were not very different from Greeks. The Segestans had an old quarrel with their neighbours of Selinus, and in 416 Selinus had the powerful support of Syracuse, so that Segesta was in a desperate plight. In their distress they turned to Athens, with whom they had earlier entered into alliance : they made a strong appeal for assistance, undertaking for their part to defray the cost of any armament sent. This appeal was far from unwelcome to the forward party
^Thucydides, iv. 58-65. * Thucydides, v. 4. ^ Thucydides, iv. 65. 3.
184 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
at Athens. It was the opportunity they were waiting for, a pretext for interference in Sicily. The decision for the time being was to send envoys to test the state- ment of the Segestan ambassadors that Segesta would defray the cost of the war.
Sicily. — Segesta and Selinus were only two out of the dozen or so city-states of Sicily, most of which were in- dependent of one another — Hellenic city-states^ on the pattern of those of the mother country. But in so far as public men or the populace at Athens found the pro- position attractive as likely to lead on to a conquest of Sicily and limitless possibilities beyond, it is plain that, as Thucydides says, such dreams were in great part the offspring of ignorance. Sicily is a large island, rivalling Sardinia in the claim to be the biggest island in the Mediterranean. Its greatest extent is 185 miles from east to west, from north to south 130. Its area is very nearly ten thousand square miles, more than ten times that of Attica. It is one of the most richly productive countries in Europe ; in climate Sicily rivals the Riviera. It is true it was divided up among independent com- munities, often at war with each other. But the greatest of them, Syracuse, which was by implication marked out as the principal object of attack, if an Athenian expedition sailed for Sicily, was singly no mean antagonist of Athens herself. She had a harbour, the Great Harbour of Syracuse, as commodious, if not as famous, as the Piraeus : her population, the circuit of her walls, can have been little less than those of Athens. And if Athens had behind her her maritime empire, Syracuse had the sym- pathy and might expect the armed support of other Dorian cities, with the not improbable chance of obtaining ultimately the help of the whole Peloponnesian con- federacy. It was a ' proposition ' to give any sober statesman pause. It was utterly contrary to the advice of Pericles inscribed at the head of this chapter.
^ Segesta, it is true, was not by race Hellenic, but as Freeman writes (vol. i. p. 203), " Had we not been distinctly told that Segesta was not a Greek city, we should hardly have found it out from the facts of her history."
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY
185
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186 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
The Fateful Decision. — Early in the following year (415) the Athenian commissioners returned from Segesta in company with the envoys who brought a sum of sixty talents as a months' pay for sixty ships. Stories, too, were told by some who had been with the commissioners in Segesta of the wonderful wealth displayed ^ in gold and silver vessels at banquets there. The result was that the sixty triremes asked for were voted, and Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus were appointed to command the expedition. Lamachus was a professional soldier of approved courage and capacity, but he had no political influence. Nicias and Alcibiades were public men, whose position as leading statesmen was recognized, the one head of the conservative party the other of the democratic, and in character and temperament as opposed as any two men could well be. It was into the hands of these two opponents that the fortunes of Athens were committed in the great adventure to which she had now bound herself. There was a clash of the two wills before ever the expedition started, indeed before the decision to send it was irre- vocably fixed. For Nicias was acutely aware that the undertaking on which Athens was about to embark was rash and hazardous in the extreme. This was what Thucydides thought too ; and the judgment holds finally, even though, as the story unfolds, again and again we are brought to confess that but for strange mismanagement and gross, avoidable mistakes, the adventure might, and would have been, successful. Five days after the voting of the expedition another assembly met to discuss details of equipment, and Nicias, who was from the first alto- gether opposed to the undertaking, had the courage to raise the question again from the beginning and endeavour to dissuade his countrymen from it. He dwelt on the magnitude of the enterprise and warned them of the enemies they already had at home, who would be lying
1 This impression of great wealth was produced by trickery. The Segestans gathered together all the gold and silver vessels in their own town and borrowed more from neighbouring towns, and sent all this round from one house to another where the Athenians were to be entertained (Thuc. vi. 46).
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 187
in wait for the opportunity which a reverse to the Athenian arms might give them. But it was all to no purpose ; the notion of splendid achievements in Sicily had caught the imagination of young and old : most of the speakers who followed were in favour of it, and Alcibiades, who had all along been the prime mover and fomenter of the active policy in Sicily, undertook a refutation of Nicias' objections point by point. Seeing there was no hope Qf dissuading the Athenians from their purpose by an appeal to reason, Nicias endeavoured to bring them to more sober views by insisting on the greatness of the provision that would be required. But in this also he was defeated. The only result was that he was pressed to state in definite terms what provision he considered necessary. And when he gave figures, so far from being deterred from the enterprise, the Ecclesia passed a vote giving authority to the generals to make arrangements such in all respects as the public interest required.
Preparations. — The die was cast ; and forthwith preparations for the Sicilian expedition began amid the greatest enthusiasm. Without doubt the imagination of the Athenians, young and old, had been caught by the dream of unlimited conquest. Plutarch in his life of Nicias describes the effect of Alcibiades' successful propa- ganda before the expedition was voted : " the youth in their training schools and the old men in their workshops and lounging-places would sit in clusters drawing maps of Sicily, charts of the sea about it, and plans of the harbours and districts of the island which look towards Libya." ^ Aristophanes in the Acharnians draws a lively picture of what happened in the docks and shipyards when the people in their assembly had voted for war :
" all the City had at once been full Of shouting troops, of fuss with trierarchs, Of paying wages, gilding Pallases, Of rations measured, roaring colonnades, Of winesldns, oarloops, bargaining for casks. Of nets of onions, olives, garlic-heads, Of chaplets, pilchards, flute-girls, and black eyes.
^Plutarch, Nicias, 12; Loeb, iii. p. 251.
188 OtIR HELLENIC HERITAGE
And all the Arsenal had rung with noise
Of oar -spars planed, pegs hammered, oarloops htted.
Of boatswains' calls, and flutes, and trills and whistles." ^
This bustle and business must have been intensified more than ever in the early summer of 415. For never had Athens undertaken an overseas expedition on so large a scale. The city was caught up in a wave of popular excitement. Every one connected with the expedition exerted himself in a spirit of emulation. Every trierarch was eager that his ship should be the best equipped and his crew the most perfectly trained. They willingly lavished money on additional fittings for the ships and extra pay for skilled rowers. It was the most splendid armament Athens had ever sent forth.
A " rag " in Ancient Athens. — These preparations were at their height and all seemed going well, when one morning all Athens was startled by the discovery that the Hermae, or square pillars supporting the bust of the god Hermes,^ set up in front of public and private buildings all over the city, had been disfigured in the night and left all chipped and battered. The Athenians were a religious people, in some respects even superstitious, and they were horrified at the sacrilege. The affair was very mysterious : no one knew who had perpetrated the outrage, nor what the motive could be. There was intense excitement and a general sense of suspicion and uneasiness. Some thought this ' mutilation of the Hermae,' merely an outrageous prank of the Athenian * bloods,' what we should call a ' drunken rag ' ; others suspected a political plot, more or less widespread. But there were no clues. In any case it was of ill augury for the enterprise they had in hand. A special commission was appointed with wide powers. Investigations were prosecuted with feverish energy and soon produced a crop of ' informations,' on the strength of which a number of men of good position, some, perhaps all, entirely innocent,
^ Aristophanes, Acharnians, 11. 545-554 translated by Rogers. 2 See vol. i. p. 47, n 4.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 189
were prosecuted, condemned, and, if they did not save themselves by flight, put to death.^ One unfortunate consequence for the Sicilian expedition was that Alcibi- ades, the most notorious of the city's golden youth, early came under suspicion ; not indeed of participation in the actual mutilation of the Hermae, but of sacrilegious doings of a kindred nature, all supposed to be mixed up with a widespread conspiracy for the overthrow of democracy. Alcibiades protested his innocence and demanded an immediate trial. But this did not suit his enemies ; for they feared that if put on his trial now at the height of his popularity as author of the great expedition to Sicily, he would be acquitted. With malevolent cunning they opposed Alcibiades' reasonable plea, con- tending that it was not fitting to put one of the com- manders of the expedition on trial when the country needed his services. Let him sail with the expedition to Sicily now. He could answer the charge on his return. In this way they would keep the charge hanging over him for future use and be more free to mature their schemes against him in his absence. The upshot was that Alcibiades was kept in his command and sailed with the expedition, but without being cleared of the accusation.
The Sailing of the Fleet. — May passed into June and it was high time to start for Sicily, if that year's campaigning season was not to be lost. The fleet was on a vast scale ; for the Athenians had not only to provide war-ships and a land army, but corn-ships, and merchantmen of all kinds carrying stores and tools and materials for siege operations, were to sail with the war-fleet. Corcyra was appointed the general rendezvous. And when at last the day of departure came, the Athenian war -ships and transports made a spectacular start from the Piraeus. All Athens came down to the harbour to see — " the* whole multitude of the city, native Athenians and strangers alike : the Athenians to give their men a send-off — friends, kinsfolk,
^ It was something like the reign of terror, infamous in English history, through the ' discovery ' of the ' Popish Plot ' by Titus Oates and Thomas Bedloe (1678). *
190 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
sons — accompanying them half in tears and half hopefully, full of visions of conquests, yet, when they thought to what a distance from their own country these loved ones were going, wondering whether they should ever see them again." " It was the most costly and the best appointed armament," says Thucydides, " that had ever up to that time started from any single Hellenic city." ^
" And when the men were aboard their ships and the baggage and cargo all stowed, a trumpet-blast gave the signal for silence, and the prayers customary at departure for sea were recited, not ship by ship separately, but for all collectively by the herald's voice : bowls of wine were mixed and the officers and marines stepped forward and from vessels of gold and of silver poured libations in view of all the host. The multitude crowding the shore joined in the prayer, not citizens only, but other well-wishers of Athens also who were there. When the paean had been sung and the libations finished, they put to sea, sailing out in single file ; then when clear of the harbour, the triremes raced to Aegina." ^
Syracuse. — That is how Thucydides describes the sailing of Athens' great armada. He was not there to see (being still a banished man) ; but he received accounts from many eye-witnesses. Meantime what of Syracuse ?
Syracuse, we have just said, was a city little less in size and population than Athens, and only a little less favourably equipped for defence. There are no statistics for accurate comparison, but roughly what Plutarch says of Syracuse — ' a city as large as Athens ' — may be taken to be true. The original settlement had been on the small island called Ortygia, which lies just off the coast between the Great and the Little Harbours : as the population increased suburbs were built on the mainland over the broad plateau of Epipolae, which rises from the coast and slopes back towards the west ; and these sub- urbs, Achradina, Tyche, Temenites, now formed part of the city. Syracuse, too, as well as Athens had had her
1 Thucydides, vi. 30. 2 and 31. 1. 2 Thucydides, vi. 32.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 191
heroic conflict and her day of dehverance, when in 481 Gelon had defeated at Himera the vast army (said to have numbered 300,000) with which Hamilcar had attempted to subject Greek civilisation in Sicily to Carthage. And in 480 this same Gelon is said to have offered an army of 20,000 hoplites — without counting archers, slingers and cavalry — and a fleet of 200 ships, to help Heflas, his mother-land, against Xerxes, provided he might hold the chief command of the Pan-Hellenes either on land or on the sea. Yet, though in a material aspect Syracuse may have been the equal of Athens, in the things that belong to the spirit, — in art and letters, in patriotism, in sober love of liberty, she was greatly below. ^ Syracuse, the proud Syracuse of history, is the city of Gelon and Hiero, of Dionysius and Agathocles — her despots — some of them monsters who incarnated all that gave to the Greek word ' tyrant ' its evil connotation ; not of a free people de- mocratically governed. In the year 415 Syracuse, freed from tyrants and for the time being a democracy like Athens, was considerably less powerful than Gelon 's Sjo-acuse. Still S5Tacuse in 415 was a great and populous city.
Wasted Opportunities. — The war-ships of Athens sailed on to Corcyra, where the allied squadron, mostly ships from Chios, the corn-ships and the merchant fleet, were waiting for them. The total war-fleet was 134 triremes, of which 100 were Athenian : there were besides 100 cargo-boats and 30 corn-ships. These were the fleets in the state service. There was in addition to these a swarm of vessels of various sizes and kinds which sailed after the fleets for private trading. From Corcyra the fleets struck across the mouth of the Adriatic and made for the nearest point in Italy : then coasted along and round the foot of Italy from the heel to the toe.^
^ In one branch of art, however, Syracuse was supreme, and left Athens far behind, as she left all other Greek cities, — the engraving of coins. The coins of Sicily excel those of other Greek states ; and the coins of Syracuse excel those of the rest of Sicily.
^ Thucydides, vi. 44.
192 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Strange as it may seem, the Athenian commanders when they left Corcyra had no plan. We find them a little later anchored at Rhegium (Reggio) on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina, and holding a conference to debate what plan to adopt. There can be little doubt, whether we look at the problem as presented to the generals in conference, or in the light of the subsequent course of events, that the best plan from a mihtary point of view was to sail straight to Sjrracuse and attack the city by land and sea with the least possible delay, while their own strength was fresh. This was the opinion of Lamachus, the professional soldier, and had it been followed, it seems that Syracuse must have fallen in a few weeks. For at that time the Syracusans were little pre- pared for resistance and badly organized. But Lamachus' plan found favour neither with Alcibiades nor with Nicias. Nicias, as we know, was averse to the whole policy of interference in Sicily ; it was little in accordance with his inclination that he had obeyed the people's mandate which gave him a share in the command. So now his one thought was to get through with the business quickly and without loss of credit ; to bring, if he might, that costly armament safe back to Athens. The pro- fessed object of the expedition was to help Segesta against Selinus. His proposal accordingly was to sail to Selinus and force the Selinuntians to make terms with Segesta. This course had the advantage of being strictly consistent with the Athenian government's disinterested professions and was also in accordance with Nicias' cautious and scrupulous character. We might have expected Alcibi- ades to favour the plan of Lamachus, or to propose one equally bold. But there was another side to Alcibiades' nature : he was a past-master of intrigue. And Sicily at the time when the Athenian fleet entered Sicilian waters appeared a most promising field for the exercise of these gifts. In this Alcibiades saw himself once more in the leading role. So the plan he advocated was negotiation with the Sicilian states (Selinus and Syracuse, of course, excepted) ; with a view to getting as many of
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 193
them as possible to side against Syracuse. When they had strengthened their position in Sicily by these alliances, it would be easy, he contended, to deal with Sjrracuse and Sehnus ; unless, as did not seem probable, they would yield to the demands made on behalf of Leontini and Segesta. This last, Alcibiades' plan, was the plan adopted. For Lamachus, when his own proposal failed to get the support of his colleagues, gave his voice for that of Alcibiades.^
In accordance with this decision a strong squadron proceeded to cruise along the east coast of Sicily, visiting in succession Naxos, Cat ana and Camarina and making proposals of alliance. They also, in passing, reconnoitred Syracuse and its harbour at their leisure and made procla- mation of what their intentions were in coming to Sicily ; but when the Syracusan fleet did not come out, they sailed away without beginning hostilities. The first results were disappointing ; but before the plan had been carried very far a dramatic change came over the position through the arrival of the state-trireme, the Salaminia,^ to summon Alcibiades and certain others back to Athens to be tried for sacrilege. The paradoxical result followed that while Alcibiades' plan was adopted in this first year of the war in Sicily, Alcibiades himself was not there to carry it out. Nicias and Lamachus made a progress along the northern shores of Sicily, and having failed to win over Himera, attacked Hykkara, a coast town inhabited by Sicani with whom Segesta was at war, took it and sold the inhabitants into slavery. When later part of the Athenian forces made a similar attack on Hybla they suffered a repulse. With this repulse the active operations of the summer of 415 B.C. came to an end. No wonder the Syracusans now ceased to take the Athenian invasion seriously and were as contemptuous as before, when first the Athenians came, they had been
1 Thucydides, vi. 46-50.
' The Athenians had two state despatch vessels, called from the districts where their crews were recruited, the Paraltce and the Sala- minia.
194 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
alarmed. Syracusan horsemen, who were free to scour the country since the Athenians had no cavalry, rode up to the Athenian lines near Catana and asked in mockery whether the Athenians had come to Sicily to make a settlement there. But as winter was beginning, Nicias did bestir himself and prepared a surprise for the people of Syracuse. He contrived by means of misleading information to get the bulk of the Syracusan mihtia away from Syracuse. Then with all his forces he sailed to the Great Harbour and landed on the inner shore somewhere near the point called Dascon, and encamped on ground which it was easy to secure against cavalry attack by improvised fortifications. The Syracusans returned in haste in a day or two, marched out and bivouacked in the plain under conditions which gave the Athenians opportunity of bringing on a battle when they chose. This they did next day. The Syracusans fought bravely, but they had much to learn before they were a match for the better disciplined Athenians, and they were defeated. This victory did something to restore Athenian prestige, but otherwise fulfilled no purpose. For within a couple of days the Athenians re-embarked and withdrew to Naxos and Catana for the winter. One result of importance, however, the Athenians had effected this year ; they had established a friendly understanding with the Sicel tribes of the interior who were from of old at feud with Syracuse. Nicias' land forces after the capture of Hykkara had carried out a march right across Sicily to Catana,^ a distance of about a hundred miles, and this was from any point of view a remarkable feat. But on the whole the results of the first year's campaign were in ludicrous contrast with the magnitude of the expedition and the expectations raised by its arrival. One lesson of importance also the year's experiences had taught, the indispensable need of cavalry. For the Athenians had brought only thirty horsemen ; and the Syracusan cavalry, who numbered more than a thousand, were undisputed masters of the open country and could
1 Thucydides, vi. 62. 3.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 195
anywhere confine the Athenians to the ground they occupied. The generals, therefore, along with their report, sent home an urgent request for cavalry. An attempt was also made in the winter to gain over Messana, for its great importance as commanding the approach to Sicily was fully realized. But here they failed. For Alcibiades, as he left Sicily on the summons to return to Athens, already in his bitterness a dangerous enemy of his country, had been beforehand with them and warned the opposing faction in Messana, who had there- upon conspired together and gained the upper hand in the town.
Epipolae. — The Syracusans had been greatly alarmed at the first coming of the Athenians ; but this alarm had gradually worn off, when it was found that the great armada did nothing but make demonstrations along the coast of Sicily and indulge in petty operations against small towns, most of which met with no success ; it had even at one time changed into derision. In the course of the winter, on the advice of Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, their ablest and most patriotic citizen, they took three measures of very great importance. They reformed their army system ; they sent ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon to ask for help ; and they built a new wall which considerably enlarged the fortified area of Syracuse, westward over Epipolae. Any plan of Syra- cuse which indicates the physical features of the site will show the critical importance of the plateau of Epipolae to the security of the city, when it was extended beyond the Island (Ortygia) along the broad headland to the north which forms the southern margin of the Bay of Thapsus. In fact ancient Syracuse, apart from the Island, may be regarded as built on a headland between two indentations of the coast, the Bay of Thapsus to the north, the Great Harbour to the south ; while the Island when artificially joined to the mainland became a peninsula, helping to shut in the Great Harbour. Epipolae is a triangular plateau of calcareous rock, which slopes gently upward from a three mile base along the
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THE GAMBLE IN SiClLY 197
coast (running south and north), with its apex and highest elevation due west, four miles inland. Syracuse at its furthest extent a dozen years later, when fortified anew by the tyrant Dionysius (in 402) included the whole of this plateau. But in 415, when the Athenians came to Sicily, the fortifications extended only over the easternmost strip of Epipolae, called Achradina, with an open suburb beyond the walls on the south- west, above the theatre. It was this suburb, Temenites (afterwards called Neapolis), which Hermocrates now included within the fortifications, and further linked with the fortified suburb Tyche on the northern side towards the Bay of Thapsus by a wall across Epi- polae in advance of Achradina. Outside this new wall the rough stony surface of Epipolae sloped gradually — very gradually ^ — upward, and contracted in width, till near its westward extremity, where it narrows to a point and was anciently called Euryalus, it attains a height of nearly 500 feet. The edges of this sloping plateau of Epipolae are bounded by cliffs, quite low about Achradina and higher towards Euryalus — cliffs not generally difficult of ascent, but mostly defensible. It is obvious that from a military as well as a physical stand- point the Heights of Epipolae ^ dominate Syracuse. For one thing, much of the water for the city came from the slope of the plateau and that supply could be cut off by an enemy occupying the heights. It was a per- ception, doubtless, of these facts, based partly on the experience of the Syracusans in the years we are describ- ing, which led Dionysius to enclose the whole western extent of Epipolae within his walls — a gigantic task — and to build a mighty fortress at Euryalus near the apex, the remains of which are one of the sights of modern Syracuse. When the Athenian commanders first realized
^ " In walking westward from Achradina to Enryalos, there is not — except in particular places — any marked feeling of going uphill ; but if you look round at any point, you see that you have gone up a good way " (Freeman's Sicily, iii. p. 673).
* The name Epipolae means ' Heights.'
198 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
that Epipolae held the key of their problem we do not know, but at all events they did realize it early in the spring of 414, when a decision to undertake forthwith the siege of Syracuse had been reached. The truth seems also to have dawned on the Syracusans about the same time (the new commanders had just entered upon their office), but they expected the Athenian attack to come from the south side, from the shore of the Great Harbour, where Nicias had made his landing in the winter. They accordingly marched out in full force to the low ground between the river Anapus and the city, and after a review of all their heavy-armed, encamped there for the night. They also chose out 600 men to form a picked corps for the defence of Epipolae and to act in a sudden emergency. It does not seem to have occurred to them that the attack might come, not from the harbour side, but from the north, by way of the Bay of Thapsus. But to surprise the Heights from the north side was just Nicias' plan.^ The fleet set out overnight from Catana and reached the Bay of Thapsus early in the morning. The troops were landed ; the fleet occupied the small peninsula of Thapsus and built a palisade across the isthmus to make the position more secure. The troops meantime made a forced march to Epipolae and climbed the ridge by the ascent which reaches the summit near the extreme western point called Euryalus. By good luck their arrival was not discovered till they were already in occupation of the ' Heights.' As soon as the news of this was brought the whole force of the Syracusans, including the Six Hundred, made an attempt to recover Epipolae by a hurried ascent from the south, but as the Athenians were already in possession of the higher ground, they suffered a severe defeat with a loss of three hundred dead, among them Diomilus, commander of the Six Hundred. Next day the Athenians advanced eastward down the slope of Epipolae towards Syracuse and offered battle under the walls of the city. When the Syracusans
1 Perhaps it is rather Lamachus' plan, the plan he would have tried the year before, had he been allowed.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 199
declined any further encounter, they marched back to the Heights and built a fort on the edge of the northern cliff, looking over the Bay of Thapsus where they had landed, at a spot which Thucydides calls Labdalum. This fort was to serve as a depository for stores while the main force began its siege operations. After this events moved fast. Three hundred horse came from Segesta ; another hundred from Naxos and the Siceli ; so that now with two hundred and fifty Athenian ' knights,' for whom horses had been found in Sicily, they had a body of 650 horsemen. From Labdalum (in which a garrison was left) they next marched forward in the direction of the city, and at a convenient distance from the new wall built by Hermocrates they constructed a circular fort, which was to be the base from which they would build lines across Epipolae to cut Syracuse off from the rest of the world ; for these lines when completed were to reach from sea to sea. The men of Syracuse saw with consternation a well-built fortress spring rapidly out of the stony surface of the plateau. They marched out in order of battle, but when their commanders noticed great unsteadiness in the ranks of the infantry, they ordered their retirement. Part of the cavalry remained to harass the Athenian working parties and cut off stragglers. Presently, however, the Athenian cavalry attacked in turn and with the support of a detachment of hoplites drove the Syracusan cavalry off the hill. The Syracusans now abandoned further ideas of interrupting the Athenian building work. Instead they concentrated their efforts on building a wall out from their own defences which should ultimately cross the Athenian lines between the Round Fort and the southern edge of Epipolae, and so prevent the completion of the investment. There was plenty of time for this ; for as yet the Athenians were working northwards from the Round Fort with the design of carrying their wall first to the Bay of Thapsus, where their fleet lay. The Syracusans completed their cross- wall to their satisfaction and manned the ramparts with a garrison, while their main forces returned to the city.
200 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
The Athenians watched their opportunity and when the defenders of the cross -wall were somewhat off their guard, sent a picked force, including a special corps of Three Hundred, to attack it, while strong bodies of troops marched in the direction of the city to repulse any attempted sortie. This attack met with complete success ; the defenders of the cross-wall fled and the victors pulled down the Syracusan counter- work at their leisure.
Next day the Athenians made a new start : they left their northern wall unfinished, and began building south- ward from the Round Fort towards the edge of Epipolae and thence to the Great Harbour.^ This (though Thucydides does not expressly say so) indicates a change of plan, or at all events a fresh phase in the general scheme of operations. For it implies a naval base in the Great Harbour instead of the Bay of Thapsus. And accordingly, not long after Thapsus was abandoned and the fleet brought round to the south. The Syracusans on their part began, in answer to this new menace, to build across the plain below Epipolae, through the marshy ground which there fringes the shores of the Great Harbour, a palisade and trench. The object of this second work was to prevent the Athenian wall reaching the sea on the Great Harbour side. When the Athenians had carried their wall to the edge of Epipolae, Nicias and Lamachus made preparations to attack and capture the Syracusan palisade, at the same time ordering the fleet to sail round from the Bay of Thapsus into the Great Harbour. The attack was made in the early morning and, so far as its immediate object was concerned, was completely successful. The assailants crossed the marsh where it was firmest by means of planks and stormed the palisade. They also defeated the Syracusan troops in the open ground beyond ; but the victory was spoilt by a
^Thucydides' words (vi. 101. 1) imply that the Athenians after destroying the Syracusan cross -wall first seized and fortified a point on the southern edge of Epipolae, in the line between the Round Fort and the sea. It may be inferred with great probability that this point on the edge of the cliff was the ravine now called Portella del Fusco.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 201
mischance which cost the Athenians dear. Part of the defeated force was making for the bridge over the river Anapus, doubtless with the intention of finding shelter in the fort called Polichna ; ^ which the Syracusans held on this side the valley, and the Three Hundred dashed forward to cut them off. In face of this danger the Syracusan cavalry swept down upon the Three Hundred and not only put them to flight, but threw the whole right wing of the Athenians into disorder. Thereupon Lamachus hurried up to stop the panic, was isolated with a few men, and killed. At this piece of good fortune the Syracusans* spirit revived ; they poured out of the city again and renewed the fight. At the same time a detachment was sent to attempt a surprise attack on the Round Fort left weakly held on Epipolae. This attempt very nearly succeeded. The outworks were taken, but the Fort itself was saved by the presence of mind of Nicias. Nicias was in the Fort, for he was ill and unable to take part in the attack on the Syracusan palisade. When he saw how critical the position was, he took the drastic step of firing all the woodwork used in constructing his siege-engines and so kept the enemy at bay till succour came. It was at this moment that the Athenian fleet appeared sailing into the Great Harbour. The Syracusans thereupon abandoned the struggle and withdrew once more into the city. The death of Lamachus was a severe loss to the Athenians : how much greater than we know, we can but surmise ; for we cannot tell how much of the energy and enterprise put into the Athenian operations before Syracuse was due solely to Lamachus. But except for this loss aU was now going well : the fortunes of Athens in Sicily had reached their highest point. Indeed all the signs now promised success, if the Athenians persevered. They were already at work on a double wall which was to extend from Epipolae to the Great Harbour, and so in a fair way to
1 Polichna was an outlying fort dating from early times. The name being a diminutive of Polis = Little City, or Little -ton. Within its defences was the Syracusan Temple of Zeus, the Olympieum.
202 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
complete their investing lines. Provisions were coming in freely ; allies were rallying to them. The Sicels of the interior showed zeal in a winning cause ; the Tuscans sent three fifty-oared long-boats. On the other hand the Syracusans were now thoroughly disheartened : they had ceased to hope for the arrival of help from the Pelopon- nesus. They were short of water, because the Athenians had discovered the aqueducts on Epipolae from which the city drew water, and had diverted them. There was free talk of surrender : overtures regarding terms had even been made to Nicias.
The Shadow from Afar. — Alcibiades had slipped away from the Salaminia at Thurii ^ in Italy and so escaped the nets of his enemies. When this became known at Athens he was condemned to death as a traitor, and so for a time disappears from the scene. But Alcibiades was very much alive, all the strength of his exuberant nature turned into vehement desire to do hurt to the country of his birth. His boundless dreams of ambition, whether for himself or Athens, were dissipated, and now, like another Achilles, he nursed the bitter resolve to make his countrymen repent that they had forced Alcibiades to be their enemy. One ill turn which he had done them appeared when their plans to win over Messana mis- carried (above, p. 195). They were now to suffer far more fatal hurt. Alcibiades and his friends in misfortune, in their flight, found their way from Thurii to Lacedaemon and were there when the ambassadors from Syracuse arrived to ask for help. It was at Alcibiades' urgent persuasion that the Spartans undertook to help the Syracusans, which implied a renewal of the Peloponnesian war ; and at his suggestion that they sent a Spartan to take command there, Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, a commander of proved ability. Gylippus was now voyag- ing towards Syracuse : the reports he received on the way were so discouraging that he had practically given up hope of being in time to help Syracuse and thought only of saving Italy. He was caught in a storm and
^ In Southern Italy, foiinded on the site of Sybaris.
THE GAMBLE IN SICILY 203
almost wrecked, but managed with difficulty to make the harbour of Tarentum. Nicias heard of the voyage, and took small account of it, so confident was he of the position at Syracuse. Nevertheless he sent out four triremes — but only four — to look for this new enemy. But at Locri in Bruttium Gylippus got accurate information of the position at Syracuse : he learnt that the Athenian lines across Epipolae were not, as he had been told, com- pleted. To a nature such as his, that was enough. Rapidly balancing chances — this new possibility of getting into Syracuse overland from some point on the north coast through the gap in the Athenian lines, and the chance of slipping into Syracuse from the sea by eluding the Athenian blockade — he decided for the attempt overland. In this way he avoided the four war-ships sent by Nicias ; for they had not got so far as the Straits of Messina and were waiting for him on the eastern coast of Sicily. Gylippus landed at Himera and gathered there a force of 3000 men, heavy-armed and light-armed together, and 100 horse. With these he marched across Sicily to Syracuse, as Nicias had marched to Catana. By this time word of the approach of succour from the Pelopon- nese had been brought to Syracuse by a daring Corin- thian ship's captain who ran the blockade and brought his vessel safely up to the quay of the Little Harbour. This happened on the very day which the Syracusans had fixed for the consideration in their Ecclesia of definite proposals for a capitulation. The proposed debate never took place, or was utterly changed in character. Gongy- lus, the captain of the ship from Corinth, announced that Gylippus was on his way and the Syracusans took fresh heart. In a little time after messages came through from Gylippus himself, to say that he was already nearing the city with his 3000 men. The Sjo-acusans marched out in force over Epipolae to meet him. Gylippus soon appeared on the Heights, having ascended by the same path the Athenians had climbed on their first arrival from the Bay of Thapsus. Why Nicias, why the Athen- ians, made no move to hinder either Gylippus, or the
204 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Syracusans from the city, we shall never know. All we know is that the Syracusans marched out and Gylippus marched over Epipolae to meet them, just as if no be- leaguering army had lain before Syracuse at all. The united forces of Gylippus and the Syracusans then approached the Athenian fortified positions. The Athenians drew up in order of battle, but did not come out to fight. Whereupon Gylippus sent forward a herald and made proclamation, offering the invaders an armistice, if they would agree to evacuate Sicily within five days. To this message the Athenians sent no reply. What reply could they send ? But the message itself shows how significantly the conditions were already altered through the mere presence of Gylippus.
CHAPTER VIII
DISASTER
" So much one man can do, That does both act and know."
Andrew Marvell, Horatian Ode.
" Vanquished completely at all points, after suffering every extremity, they came, as the phrase goes, to utter destruction — landsmen and fleet, to the last ship and the last man : and few indeed of the many who went forth reached home again."
Thucydides, vii. 87. 6.
Gylippus. — By the next evening Gylippus had captured Labdalum, the Athenian fort on the northern edge of Epipolae, and put the garrison to the sword. Then began a new contest of wall-building. The Syracusans, by the orders of Gylippus, set to work upon a third counter- work, with still the same purpose in view, — to carry their cross -waU beyond the Athenian lines and so make investment impossible. This third attempt was made north of the Round Fort ; for the southern wall of the Athenians had now been completed to the sea, and it only remained to finish the northern wall — ^which was the earlier begun. Much material for completion of this wall had been collected and was lying on the rocky ground ready to be used. The Syracusans worked at their cross- wall with feverish energy, often appropriating the stone and wood which the Athenians had placed in position for their wall. The Athenians continued building too ; but not with the same concentration as before, since their energies were partly expended on other activities.
205
206 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
For Nicias had once more changed the station of his fleet and brought his ships across from the beach in front of the Athenian camp and double wall to Plemmyrium, the broad headland at the mouth of the Great Harbour opposite Ortygia. He made this head- land now his naval base, and built three forts to strengthen it. Plemmyrium had the advantage of being more convenient for the maintenance of supplies, since it commanded the entrance to the Great Harbour. But — besides the dissipation of strength involved in this further scattering of the Athenian forces — it had one serious disadvantage. The new station was ill supplied with water ; the seamen were obliged to fetch it from a distance ; and as the open country between Plemmyrium and the Athenian camp was at the mercy of the Syracusan cavalry, who were now posted in considerable strength at Polichna, many were from time to time cut off and killed. The wastage from this cause, Thucydides tells us, did much to impair the efficiency of the Athenian fleet. At length, when he judged the moment opportune, Gylippus offered battle and was defeated. This fight took place over ground encumbered by building operations where no cavalry action was possible. Gylippus acknowledged his mistake to his men and a few days later fought again, choosing his ground more carefully, so that his horsemen were able to deliver a charge which threw one wing of the Athenians into disorder. This time it was a Syracusan victory : the whole Athenian army was driven in rout within their fortified camp. As a consequence the Syracusan cross-wall was next night triumphantly carried past the unfinished end of the Athenian lines, so that the hope of establishing a complete blockade of Syracuse by land and sea was all at once gone ; and therefore, in truth, all hope of ever taking Syracuse. Gylippus con- firmed his hold on the Heights by carrying his counter- work along the whole extent of Epipolae roughly parallel with its northern edge, right up to its extreme western point, Euryalus. At Euryalus he built a fort, and for the defence of his cross-wall established three fortified
DISASTER 207
camps at intervals along the line of the cross-wall towards the city.^
Nicias' Despatch. — The summer was now coming to an end and active operations for a time ceased. Both sides took breath, but were not idle ; they were preparing for a renewal of the struggle in the spring. Gylippus set out on a tour through Sicily to collect troops, stir the half- hearted to greater zeal and bring in waverers. Very significant is it that a squadron of ships from the Pelo- ponnese, the twelve companion ships of Gongylus, now reached Syracuse without being intercepted by the Athenian blockading fleet, and that the Syracusans once more manned their own fleet and commenced practising, with the obvious intention of challenging before long Athenian superiority at sea.
Nicias on his part sent home to Athens a letter which gave a faithful picture of the evil state to which the expedition was reduced and made urgent appeal, either for the despatch of reinforcements, or the immediate recall of the whole armament. The words of this despatch, as reproduced by Thucydides, exhibit in a most vivid manner the low ebb to which the fortunes of the Athenians in Sicily had sunk. The picture is in painful contrast with the fair prospects with which that year had opened. Nicias says : " After we had defeated the Syracusans in several engagements and built the fortifications we now occupy, Gylippus came with forces from the Peloponnese and from certain cities in Sicily. We beat him in one engagement, but the next day we were overborne by the multitude of his horsemen and javelin-men and withdrew within our fortifications. So now we have stopped our investment of the city owing to the number of our oppon- ents, and remain inactive. . . . They have built a single cross-wall past our lines, so that we are no longer able to carry out our investment, unless we attack this cross-wall in superior force, and take it. We are supposed to be besieging them, but it has come about that we are rather ourselves the besieged — at least on land ; since by reason
^ Thucydides, vii. 7. 1 and 43. 4.
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of the enemy's cavalry we cannot venture more than a little way into the country." ^ He goes on to describe how the Syracusans are soliciting reinforcements from the Peloponnese and from Sicily and that he may look before long to be assailed by land and by sea. He goes on : " And do not take it ill that I say ' by sea.' Our fleet, as the enemy too very well know, was on its arrival, in a high state of efficiency, the hulls sound and dry, the crews at full strength. But now the ships' planks are sodden through being too long in the water, and the crews are depleted. It has been impracticable to draw up our ships and dry them, because the enemy's ships are as many as ours and even more in number, and so are able to keep us in constant expectation of attack." ^ After further explanation of the extreme gravity of the position he puts before the Athenians the alternative of with- drawal from Syracuse, or the despatch of a second arma- ment on the same scale as the original expedition. The enemy's strength, he points out, is likely to increase and he can himself look for no succour in Sicily. He asks further for his own recall, since a wasting malady to which he is a prey makes it impossible for him to remain. " I claim this much indulgence," he says in conclusion, " since so long as I kept my health, I did you good service in several commands. And whatever you purpose, let it be done immediately on the return of spring : make no delay. The enemy will get their accession of strength from Sicily in a short while : the reinforcements from Peloponnese may take longer in coming, but unless you take good heed, they will get here without your knowing, as they did before, or before they can be stopped." ^
The Tables Turned. — What the despatch of Nicias said about the position of the Athenians at Syracuse was no more than the truth. The Athenians were now the besieged rather than the besiegers. Early in the spring of 413 Gylippus returned to Syracuse bringing with him considerable reinforcements. Then by a well-planned
1 Thuoydides, vii. 11. 2-4. « Thucydides, vii. 12. 3.
» Thucydides, vii. 15. 2.
DISASTER 209
coup he captured the three forts of the Athenians on Plemmyrium. This was a combined mihtary and naval operation. For the most ominous sign of change in the relative strength of the contending parties was that the S3^acusans were now thinking of disputing the Athenian command of the sea. For two whole years since the first arrival of the great Athenian fleet the Syracusans had not once ventured to try conclusions with the Athenians at sea. But now Gylippus encouraged them to try a sea-fight : it was taking a great risk, but the prize in the event of victory was worth it. Hermocrates urged that their most hopeful course was a bold initiative ; the Athenians, he argued, did not get their sea-craft by hereditary right, nor was their superiority inalienable ; there was a time when Athens had been as little a sea- power as Syracuse was now. Accordingly the Syracusans manned their ships and practised, and were eager to fight at sea : the attack on Plemmyrium was made under cover of a naval engagement. Simultaneously from the two sides of the ' Island ' the Syracusan galleys streamed out — a sight the Athenians had not seen since their first coming — five and thirty from the Great Harbour, forty-five from the Lesser. The Athenians had only sixty ships now to oppose to these eighty : with twenty -five they met the attack from the Great Harbour ; the residue sailed out against the squadron from the Little Harbour. The troops in Plemmyrium crowded down to the beach to watch the sea-fight, and while their attention was so engaged, Gylippus, who had moved forces from Syracuse the night before for the purpose, suddenly attacked and took first the largest fort on Plemmyrium, and then the other two. As for the sea-fight, at first it seemed going in favour of the Syracusans ; but the ships fighting their way into the Great Harbour lost their formation and fell into disorder, with the result that in the end the Sjrracusans were defeated with the loss of eleven ships. So at the end of the day the Athenians retained, though not so indisputably as heretofore, their supremacy at sea. But they had lost Plemmyrium. Now the loss of
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Plemmyrium was most serious. The loss of material was in itself calamitous — provisions, stores, money, sails for forty triremes, three ships of the line hauled up on shore. But worse than the loss of material was the change for the worse in the whole position. Plemmyrium commanded the entrance to the harbour ; with the loss of Plem- mjrrium the provisioning of the Athenian forces became much more difficult. The Syracusans now had a naval post there, and the Athenian supply-ships might at any time have to fight their way in.
The Spectre of Defeat. — The interest of the struggle is now concentrated about the Great Harbour, where the fight for Plemmyrium and the naval battle had taken place. The Great Harbour of Syracuse — a sheltered bay rather than a mere haven — is still potentially one of the finest in Europe. From the northern shore, where of old the Syracusans had their docks, there is a two- mile stretch of water ; from the entrance to the point of Dascon is nearly a mile and a half : the area is fully three square miles, and there is a good depth of water every- where— except along the northern shore and about the mouth of the Anapus. If we look at the plan, we see how straitened and uncomfortable the position of the Athenians now was. They occupied one strip of coast only on the western shore opposite the harbour mouth, roughly from their double wall to the Anapus. All the rest of the circuit of the harbour was in hostile occupation, and on the west of the Athenian position the Syracusans also had, as we have seen, an outlying fort, Polichna. Worst of all, the enemy was established on both sides of the entrance to the harbour ; on the north was Ortygia, the original Syracuse ; and since the capture of Plemmyrium the south side was Syracusan too. In the recent sea- fight the Athenians had held their own, and a little more. But it must have been obvious to all that the margin of superiority was dangerously slight. Already the shadow of calamity hung over the Athenians, clouding their spirits. The Syracusans were proportionately elated. It is a sign of the changed times that a squadron of twelve
DISASTER 211
ships sailed from Sjrracuse, and, after detaching one ship to cross to Greece, waylaid a fleet of supply-ships bringing stores to the Athenians and destroyed most of them ; and then made a landing on the Bruttian coast and burnt a quantity of timber for shipbuilding which had been destined for the use of the Athenians ; and that all but one of these ships got safely back, eluding the twenty ships the Athenians sent after them.^ There was daily skirmishing in the harbour, but for some time the Syra- cusans made no further attempt to challenge the Athenian mastery of the sea. Presently news came of the approach of a large Athenian fleet with reinforcements. The Syracusans thereupon hastened to try their fortune in a fresh fight before these reinforcements arrived. They were learning from defeat, and, with a view to counter- acting the superior skill of the Athenian seamen, they altered the build of their ships in a way which they hoped would bring them victory. Athenian superiority, as we saw in Phormio's sea-fights (Ch. vi. p. 140), depended on rapidity of movement and skill in ramming ; but in the Great Harbour, large as it was for a harbour, there was not enough space for hostile fleets to manoeuvre freely, and this would tell against the Athenians. The Syra- cusans proposed further to counter the Athenian mode of attack by charging prow to prow, and with this in view they strengthened the bows of their triremes with extra beams. Their expectation was that when a charge took place the bows of the lighter Athenian ship would be stove in, while their own ships, specially strengthened for such encounters, would take no harm. So one day the Syracusans began an attack on the Athenian camp from two sides, from the city and from the fort Polichna, while the fleet sailed out in battle array, eighty ships in all. The Athenians put to sea to meet them with seventy -five. The whole day passed in manoeuvring and skirmishing, but things did not come to a general engage- ment. Next day there was no renewal of the fight at all. On the third day the Syracusans again attacked in full
^ Thucydides, vii. 25»
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force by land and sea. And this time, at the suggestion of the Corinthian, Ariston, they tried a ruse. The morning passed as before in skirmishing without any close engage- ment and about mid-day the signal was given for the Syracusans to retire on their stations. The Athenians, supposing the fighting was over for the day, likewise withdrew to land and left their ships. But the Syracusans by arrangement snatched a hasty meal at the quay-side and went on board again. Suddenly they were seen to be bearing down upon the Athenian shore. The Athenian seamen, who were partly dispersed, hastily hurried back to their ships and re-embarked, most of them without having broken their fast. When the Syracusans still delayed their attack, the Athenians took the initiative and brought on a general engagement. The fight fell out as the Syracusans had planned. Whenever they got the chance, they charged prow to prow, and then the heavy bows of the Syracusan ship crashed through the bows of the lighter-built Athenian and disabled her. The Athenians on their ships suffered also from the missiles of javelin-men with whom the Syracusans had crowded their decks ; and still more from small craft, which in this fight daringly rowed about among the triremes and getting under an enemy's oars hurled their weapons into the waist of the ship at the seamen as they pulled. ^ In the end the Athenians gave way and fled to the protection of their palisade with the loss of seven ships. The Syracusans had won a victory at sea. It was the begin- ning of the end. The victors were overjoyed, and full of new confidence, prepared to renew the attack next day.
Demosthenes to the Rescue. — And then, to the con- sternation of the Syracusans and the immeasurable relief of Nicias and his army, Demosthenes and Eury- medon sailed into the Great Harbour with 73 fresh ships, 5000 heavy-armed footmen and large bodies of archers, slingers and javelin-men. ^
When Nicias' letter came to Athens and was read in the Ecclesia, the Athenians without hesitation and with-
1 Thucydides, vii. 40. 5. ^ Thucydides, vii. 42.
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out recrimination had voted new expeditionary forces very little inferior in numbers and equipment to the first. And now at the very moment of despair these lavish reinforcements had arrived. To the Athenians at Syracuse it was " like the return of health to one long sick." Above all, these new forces had with them a commander who was a born leader of men with a quick eye for a situation and resolution to carry through a plan once formed. Demosthenes could not fail to grasp the vital fact, that for any further prosecution of the siege of Syracuse the capture of Gylippus' cross -wall was essential : Nicias himself had seen that.^ But Demos- thenes saw even more clearly that, failing the recovery of the command of Epipolae by the capture of the cross - wall, the only course left was withdrawal from Syracuse : for the position of the Athenian forces there had become untenable. He urged that the struggle should be brought at once to a decisive issue by an attack on the cross-wall. If it succeeded, ultimate victory was assured. If it failed, they must sail away.
The Night Attack on Epipolae. — The obvious way to capture the cross-wall was by direct assault from the Athenian lines. For though the Athenians were pre- vented by the cross-wall from completing their plan for the investment of Syracuse, they still kept possession of a large part of Epipolae south of the Syracusan counter- work. The Round Fort remained in their hands and the stretch of wall southward from the Round Fort to the edge of the cliff. Demosthenes tried first a regular assault from this side with the help of military engines. Every attack was beaten back and his engines burnt. It seemed vain to make further attempts on the cross- wall from this side. But Demosthenes had in reserve another and bolder plan : to march round once more to the western extremity of Epipolae and get up, as Nicias and Gylippus had already done, by the paths leading over Euryalus. The assailants would then be, as we see from
A Above, p. 207.
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the plan, behi7id the Syracusan defence works. The cross -wall would be turned, and it was then a matter of defeating the Syracusans in a straight-forward fight on equal terms. The difficulty was how to get up on to Epipolae without being seen by the enemy. For if the Syracusans were aware that such an attempt was about to be made, they could easily repel it by occupying Euryalus in force. They already had a fort and a garrison there. The only hope of success lay in a surprise, and Demosthenes' plan was for a night-attack. There was hazard involved, as there is in all night-attacks ; but the risk was worth taking, Demosthenes argued, and Nicias and Eurymedon gave their consent. Demosthenes laid his plans with the utmost care. The troops were to take five days' rations and march about midnight along under the southern side of Epipolae to the western end, and then climb up. Workmen and masons and stores of all kinds were to go with the troops with the object of setting to work at once on the unfinished wall, should they succeed in driving the enemy off Epipolae and securing their own position. Then in no long time the northern section of the investing lines might be completed and Syracuse would at last be really shut in. It was a promising plan — if all went well.
It was a bright moonlight night, and when in tense excitement the Athenian columns started, this at first stood them in good stead. They marched for some time over the level of the valley parallel with the table-land of Epipolae, then wound into the more hilly ground, till they came under Euryalus itself and began to ascend more steeply. It was a long way round, but so far all was going well : they reached the top undiscovered, and surprised and captured the Syracusan fort. Many of the defenders, however, got away, and like wild-fire the alarm spread along the ridge. The special corps of Six Hundred, now commanded by Hermocrates,^ were the first to meet the attack. They were overborne and scattered. One detachment of the Athenians turned to
^ Diodorus, xiii. 11. 4.
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the demolition of the Syracusan wall ; the main body- pushed straight on. The defenders came swarming out of their camps headed by Gylippus, but they were at a disadvantage through the suddenness of the alarm and at the first shock gave ground. Demosthenes' men, in their eagerness to follow up these first successes, pressed on too impetuously and failed to keep their formation. Their foremost men now came up against a solid body of Boeotian hoplites,^ who checked their onset : then charged and put them to flight. At this point the fortunes of the fight completely changed. In their flight these routed men collided with their comrades still hurrying up to the attack and threw them in turn into disorder. The moonlight, which had been a help to the Athenians at first, now played them false. They could see men coming on, but could not distinguish friends from foes. Men shouted at the advancing figures demanding the pass-word : the air grew thick with confused outcries, incessant challenge and answer ; words of command became indistinguishable. Soon the enemy got to know the Athenian watch-word and used it either to lure small parties to destruction or to save themselves when outnumbered. The accident that some on the Athenian side were Dorian — Argives, Corcyreans and Messenians — completed the confusion. For hearing the Dorian battle-cry on the lips of their allies the Athenians were smitten with fresh dismay. Soon the slope of Epipolae was a scene of wild disorder, in which men hardly knew what happened, and among the Athenians all cohesion and sense of direction were lost. Many threw away their shields and leapt over the edge of the cliff, often losing their lives in this way. Many reached the level plain only to find themselves bewildered and lost, more especially those newly arrived with Demos- thenes ; and these next day were rounded up and slain
^ They were probably men of Thespiae. For the only Boeotians we hear of as arrived by this time were a body of Thespian hoplites, who, while the Syracusan squadron was on its cruise (above p. 211), had been transhipped from a merchantman and brought on to Syracuse.
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by the Syracusan horsemen. The night attack had ended in disastrous failure.^
Dangerous Delays. — Demosthenes was in no manner of doubt what ought now to be done. The one safe and reasonable course was to get away out of the harbour of Syracuse with the least delay possible. Demosthenes had deliberately staked all on the chance of re-capturing Epipolae. The judgment of the sword had gone against him ; he accepted the verdict and urged the necessity of immediate withdrawal from Syracuse. Eurymedon sup- ported him. But Nicias would not agree to it. By some strange fatality, or paralysis of will, he clung to this scene of his long martyrdom. The Syracusans, he argued, were in even worse case than the Athenians, bankrupt and exhausted, and would surrender if only pressure were maintained a little longer. He was relying on secret intelligence from Sjrracuse, where there had all along been a party favourable to Athens and ready to betray the city. At any rate it was impossible to leave Sicily without express orders from Athens. Perhaps the truth was there, Nicias dared not face his countrymen. Life had no value for him unless he could return to Athens once more a victor. ^ But if that was his motive, terrible is his responsibility. A little later when fresh reinforce- ments reached the Syracusans, and they were observed to be preparing a fresh attack by land and sea, Nicias gave way. Yes, they must go. Preparations for evacua- tion were expedited ; but as secretly as possible, to avoid interference from the enemy. All was ready ; and orders were even sent to Catana countermanding supplies. Then on August the 27th, 413, there was an eclipse of the moon. Great part of the army looked on this as a sign and a portent directed against the enterprise they had in hand ; and unfortunately among these victims of super-
1 Thucydides, vii. 43-45. Plutarch {Nicias, 21) gives the number of the Athenian dead as 2000 ; Diodorus (xiii, 11. 5) as 2500.
^ It had been Nicias' pride, before he went to -Sicily, that in every expedition in which he had commanded he had been successful. See Plutarch, Nicias, 2.
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stition was Nicias, the commander-in-chief. Nicias pro- nounced that there must not be a word more of departure till thrice three times three days had passed. Just a lunar month ! There were sane men in that armament who must have cursed the foUy of this decision ; but the reasoning were overborne by the unreasonable. This, however, it was which finally brought Nicias, Demosthenes, and every soldier and sailor in that great armada of Athens to destruction.
Defeat of the Athenian Fleets. — The Syracusans were kept informed of what was passing in the Athenian camp. They were elated at what they heard, as it confirmed their own feeling of having got the better of their adversaries and they were more than ever resolved that the hated foe should not escape. They practised sea tactics for some days ; then made an attack by land on the Athenian walls and cut off a party of Athenians who attempted a sortie. Next day there was a simultaneous attack by land and sea. In the sea-fight this time the Athenians had the advantage of numbers, 86 ships to 76. But they were beaten. Eurymedon in attempting to outflank the Syracusans on the right weakened the Athenian centre which the Sjn^acusans were then able to defeat ; got driven into the S.W. corner of the harbour (the Bay of Dascon) and was there cut off and destroyed with all his squadron. The rest of the Athenian fleet were chased to land, taking refuge behind the improvised defences which Nicias had made for them. It was but a small set-off to this shameful overthrow that the Syracusans met with a reverse on land in attempting to get possession of the Athenians' hulls which had run ashore between the Athenian lines and Syracuse. The number of Athenian ships captured that day was eighteen.
The Closing of the Harbour Gates. — And now the plight of the Athenians was bad indeed ; for the Syracusans had beaten in fair fight, not the water-sodden ships of Nicias' fleet only, but these together with the fresh fleet brought recently by Demosthenes. Their aim was no longer to
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save Syracuse, but to destroy the proud enemy who had sailed to Sicily to conquer her. If they pressed their advantage now, not a ship, not a man should escape. Already they were able to move freely once more about their great harbour without fear of molestation, and they now entertained the design of closing the entrance with a boom, so that the Athenian forces could no longer escape by sea. The way they did this was by mooring boats of all sorts lengthwise across the entrance from Ortygia to Plemmyrium and making them fast by chains. The distance is over half a mile, so it was no light under- taking ; but the work proceeded rapidly.
The Agony in the Great Harbour. — The significance of this last move of the enemy was not lost upon the Ath- enian commanders. They saw they must fight to prevent the closing of the harbour if that were still possible, or, if necessary, break through and force a passage out. As a preliminary to departure they now also entirely abandoned Epipolae, bringing what was left of their stores and material down to the camp by the Great Harbour. Then they made ready for battle, recognising that their fate depended on the issue of the next sea-fight. They were able to man 110 ships. They crowded the decks with archers and javelin-men, because they were now resting their hopes on clearing the enemy's decks with missiles in close fighting, not on superior skill in manoeuvring. At the same time, to countervail the advantage which the Syracusans had had in the last two fights from the artificial strengthening of the bows of their triremes, they fitted their ships with grappling irons which were to be let fall on the enemy's decks and hold the ships fast locked while the fighting men on board fought it out. When everything that could be thought of had been done to secure victory, Nicias harangued the crews in words which, as Thucydides reports them, reveal the tense emotion of the moment. After making all customary appeals, addressed alike to those who were citizens of Athens and those who were their allies — ^to patriotic pride, to memories of past
DISASTER 219
victory, to the hope of seeing their homes again, he touched one last chord of loftier patriotism, reminding the Athenians that Athens had no more ships in her docks like these that were now going into battle, no more soldiers in the prime of life. If their valour failed now, there was no prospect, for themselves or Athens, but servitude. " Therefore, since in this one last battle you contend both for yourselves and them, fight as never before, and keep in mind, man by man and all together, that on shipboard with you will be all the land forces of Athens, and all her fleet — yea the entire remainder of the commonwealth too, and the great name of Athens." ^
Gylippus and the Syracusan commanders were no less forward to encourage their men, appealing to the glory of what they had achieved already and to the fierce hope of glutting their vengeance to the full on the enemies who had wronged them. At the same time means were taken to neutralize the new device by which the Athenians sought to restore the chances of the fight. They covered the bows and great part of the decks of their ships with hides, so that the grapnels when dropped might fail to get a hold. Then both sides went aboard. Nicias in the extremity of his anxiety and fearing to leave any- thing unsaid that might avail, called his ships' captains round him again and conjured them by every tie they held sacred to quit them like men ; and it was then that as a climax he reminded them of all that liberty meant at Athens, how each might live his own life there, free of interference. 2
This time the disparity in number of ships was greater, for, whereas the Athenians had 110 ships, the Syracusans had about the same number as in the last battle, 75 ; but against this advantage must be set the deterioration in the crews now manning the Athenian ships. For when trained men fell short the generals completed the crews by pressing into the service any who were strong enough and of suitable age.^
1 Thucydides, vii. 64. 2. * Thucydides, vii. 69. 2. See also ch. iv. p. 108. 8 Thucydides, vii. 60. 3.
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The Athenians, led by Demosthenes, Menander and Euthydemus, charged straight at the boom : at the first onset they overpowered the ships stationed on guard before it and began to cut the fastenings. But at once the rest of the Syracusan ships swept down from all sides and the engagement became general. The whole harbour was fiUed with the turmoil of the struggle, for little less than two hundred ships in all were engaged. The desperate nature of the stake nerved both sides to supreme efforts : for the last hopes of the Athenians depended on it. And what gave this struggle its most moving aspect was that it took place — ^like a mock sea- fight in an amphitheatre — before the straining eyes of two bodies of spectators whose lives and fortunes depended on the issue. The harbour has a circumference of nearly six miles, and about half that circuit was lined with crowds of spectators. The sea-front and quays of the Island, old Syracuse — and the docks and esplanades to the westward and the terraces of Achradina above — were filled with the people of Syracuse, men, women and children, eager to see the destruction of the hated enemy. Along the shore to the south, beyond the double wall, came the Athenian camp, and on either side of it were extended by Mcias' directions all the Athenian troops not fighting on shipboard, so as to occupy as much of the shore as possible and give their own men any support they could. There was little manoeuvring in this fight and not much skilled ramming. For the most part the hostile crews just lay their ships one alongside the other and fought a ding-dong battle from the decks. It was more like a battle on land than a sea-fight. " It happened oftentimes," says Thucydides, " through the want of room that one ship rammed another on one side and was itself rammed on the other : two ships would be engaged with one, and sometimes several would unavoidably become entangled together, and the pilots must needs look to attack and defence not with relation to a single adversary, but to several together and from all sides : the din of the clashing ships was itseK terrifying
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and made it impossible to hear the words of command." ^ Especially vivid is Thucydides' description of the spec- tators' emotions and the changes of feeling varying with the swiftly changing fortunes of the fight. " They were too close for a general view, and were not all looking on the same part of the scene. When they saw their own side winning, they would take heart again and fall into a passion of appeals to heaven not to rob them of this deliverance ; while others, seeing the fight going against them, poured out cries and lamentations, and from the mere sight of the action were more overwhelmed than the actual combatants. Others again, who had before their eyes a struggle evenly contested, in an agony of suspense swayed their bodies to and fro in accord with the agitation which the long-drawn crisis induced, and were in a state of acute distress ; each moment seemed to bring them within an ace of escape or destruction." ^ At last after an obstinate struggle and much loss on both sides, the Syracusans fairly routed the Athenians, and, pressing upon them with triumphant outcry, chased them to land.
Despair. — There was a scene of frenzied activity for a time along the beach in front of the Athenian encamp- ment and on either side of it, while the soldiers who had been agonized spectators of the defeat gave what help they could to their comrades struggling to shore from disabled or abandoned triremes ; or hurried to man the defences of the camp, lest the Syracusans should follow up their victory in the Great Harbour by an attempt to storm them. Then despair settled down upon that mixed multitude of soldiers, seamen, artizans, traders and camp-followers. No means of escape seemed left to them, or only by one way most perilous ; and they had none of them any mercy to expect if they fell into the hands of the Sjnracusans. But there were brave men there who never lost hope, foremost among them Nicias himself, whose character shines brightest in this last dark page of his story, and who in spite of bodily infirmity
1 Thucydides, vii, 70. 6. ^ Thucydides, vii. 71. 3 (L. J.).
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seemed to gather strength and dignity as the abyss of disaster closed over him and his doomed army. Demos- thenes did even better. He came to Nicias and proposed that early next morning they should man their ships and make one more effort to fight their way out. For even now they had more ships than the enemy. ^ Nicias agreed ; but the seamen had utterly lost heart and would not go on board. There was but one thought in all that host— instant retreat by land to some friendly city. The stranded ships, their unburied dead, everything else was forgotten. And even now the destinies had kept one chance of escape open for them. The Syracusans in the exultation of victory and deliverance were that night so given over to feasting and riotous rejoicing, that their commanders could do nothing with them. If the Athenians had but retreated then and there without a moment's delay, they would have found the roads open and would probably have got away safely. There would have been no one to oppose their march. But again, and for the last time, there was delay. Hermocrates, like another Themistocles, tricked the Athenians into staying by a false message. When he could not succeed in persuading the other Syracusan commanders to take troops and beset with barriers and ambuscades all the routes by which the Athenians might attempt to retreat, he sent horsemen after dark to the Athenians' lines to warn Nicias from his friends in Syracuse not to march that night, since all the roads were blocked ; but to wait for daylight. It seems a simple trick. But the Athenian leaders were deceived, and waited. They waited not only that night, but the next day too — in order to sort and pack their baggage better ! When they did start on the second ^ day after the last battle in the Great Harbour it was too late, Hermocrates and the Syracusans had had time by then to make the preparations which finally sealed the doom of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse.
1 They had sixty ships, whereas the Syracusans could scarcely muster fifty.
2 The third by the Greek mode of reckoning, Thucydides, vii. 75. 1.
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Retreat. — Thucydides' account of the departure of the Athenians from their encampment is the most pathetic part of all the moving story told in his History with such incomparable skill : " After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged everything to be ready, the force was actually set in motion. This was the morrow of the day following the sea-fight. It was a terrible situa- tion, not from any one particular — the withdrawal with the loss of their whole fleet, the shattering of their hopes, the peril to themselves and their country ; the evacuation itself, meant to each man everything that was most painful for eye to see or mind to dwell on. The dead lay unburied, and as men caught sight of the bodies of their friends they were stricken with grief and terror ; the sick and wounded now being abandoned to their fate alive were far more distressing than the dead to their living comrades, far more pitiable than those whose troubles were ended. In blank despair they broke out into entreaty and lamentation, crying aloud to any friend or comrade they caught sight of and begging him to take them with him ; clinging to their departing shipmates and following to the limit of their powers ; and when their bodily strength gave out dropping behind, with here and there a ' God help me ! ' or a groan. Tears were in every soldier's eyes : there was no help for it but to go, but it was hard to break away, though it was from enemy soil, though they had already met with sufferings too deep for tears and feared still worse in the dread unknown. A sort of self -contempt too and self-reproach hung heavy over them ; they were for all the world just like a city that could hold out no longer seeking some escape — a great city too, for in all no less than two score thousand were starting on this march." ^
The contrast of this scene of misery and humiliation with the splendour and pride of that day on which the Athenian war-fleet sailed out of Piraeus was most poig- nant of all. " They had come intending the enslavement of others, they were leaving in fear of suffering this fate
1 Thucydides, vii. 75. 1-5 (L. J.).
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themselves ; they had put to sea amid prayers and songs of victory, the sounds amid which they were starting back were of very different import ; instead of voyaging on ship-board, they were marching on foot, their hopes dependent on infantry prowess, no longer on naval skill." ^
Nicias. — In this hour of supremest anguish Nicias himseK displayed a fortitude, and more than a fortitude — a spirit of heroic cheerfulness and self-forgetfulness, which redeems his memory, and goes far to lift the heavy burden of reproach which his faults of character and errors of judgment deserve. He went about from rank to rank, exhorting, encouraging, raising his voice to the utmost of his power, that more might hear him, refusing to give up hope and by his bearing inspiring others with hopefulness : " Men of Athens, and allies," he cried, " even in this plight you must keep up hope — men have ere now come safe out of dangers even greater than yours. Nor must you blame yourselves too much either for your disasters or for the undeserved distresses you now suffer. See ! I myself am neither better off than any of you for bodily strength — indeed, you see for yourselves how I am prostrated by my complaint — nor have I been second to any in the happiness of my private fortune or in any other respect, who now am tossing on the same deep and perilous flood as the humblest of you. Yet my life has been much spent in obedience to God's laws ; much too in just and blameless dealing with my fellow men. And this gives me, in spite of all, sure confidence in what is to come, and calamities do not daunt me in proportion to their terrors." ^
Ruin. — The plan of the generals was to march inland as directly as possible to the territory of the friendly Sicels.^ The most direct way to reach it was to strike up into the hills to the west beyond Euryalus. It would
1 Thucydides, vii. 75. 7.
2 Thucydides, vii. 77. 1-3 (L. J.). The ' speech ' ends with a phrase which has become immortal : " It is men who make a city, and not walls or ships with no men in them."
^ The ultimate goal of the retreat was Catana,
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have been quite an easy undertaking had the march been unopposed. Nor was the Sicel country altogether strange and unknown, since Nicias during the first summer had ordered a march right across Sicily from
The
ATHENIAN RETREAT
from Syracuse
English Miles
° I i 2 1 5_
Line of retreat -rt=
Emery Walker Ltd. sc.
Adapted prom E. A. Freeman.
Himera (above, ch. vii. p. 194). They marched in two divisions, one under the command of Nicias, the other of Demosthenes in hollow square formation, with the bag- gage and non-combatants inside. The division of Nicias led. Progress was very slow ; for every one, officers
226 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
as well as men, must carry everything for himself, rations, water, cooking vessels. The Syracusan cavalry and light-armed were swarming over the plain to impede and harass the retreat ; the Athenian columns had to fight even to cross the Anapus. That day they made forty stades (about five miles) and halted for the night on rising ground. Next day they started early, but being short of food, halted after going twenty stades (2| m.), in order to requisition any provisions they could find in the villages round about, and especially to obtain a supply of water. For there was difficult country ahead. The road up into the mountains led through a ravine among precipices and water -falls. This defile, called by Thucydides the Acraean Cliff, was already occupied and fortified by the Syracusans, so that the Athenians had really very little chance of breaking through. This they did not know, and spent three days in resolute but vain attempts to storm the passage. After the third day's repulse the generals reluctantly concluded that to force the pass was a sheer impossibility. There was still one chance left. They might march southward along the coast and turn off up into the hills by one of the river valleys. So next night, leaving their camp fires burning to deceive the enemy, they marched back towards the sea, then diverged by a road to the right. In the night there was a panic which threw the whole division of Demosthenes (in rear and nearest the enemy) into confusion, so that it lost its formation and feU so far behind that next day at dawn the distance separating the two divisions had become considerable. It was now the sixth day of the retreat. Both divisions had a good start of the enemy and reached the Helorine road — the road along the sea-coast leading to Helorum — without molestation ; and not long after the leading division under Nicias reached the river Cacyparis, where they expected to be met by Sicel guides. But, instead, they found the river held by the Syracusans in force, and the way up the valley barred by artificial defences. All they could do was to effect the passage of the river after
DISASTER 227
a fight, and march on by the coast. In the evening of the same day they came to another river, the Erineus. This also Nicias crossed ; and halted his men for the night on rising ground near it. Demosthenes' division meantime had fared very differently. They never re- covered from the panic of the night before and were overtaken by the pursuing Syracusans towards evening. The country here being comparatively level, the Syra- cusan horse got in front, and soon the whole division was in difficulties with the enemy all round. Nicias and the leading division were too far ahead now to lend any succour. Demosthenes' task had been the more difficult all along ; his division being in rear, it had to bear the brunt of the fighting, his men had to think all the time of repelling attacks as much as of getting away. And now by an unfortunate blunder they had entered a large walled enclosure,^ exit from which was difficult. At once the enemy closed in upon them, and from all sides poured in missiles which struck down many. The tactics of the Syracusans were to avoid coming to close quarters, and to wear the fugitives down by persistent assaults from a distance. They could afford now to be sparing of their own lives and began to think of capturing instead of killing their adversaries. The method proved quite effective. Demosthenes' men bore up under this punish- ment for the rest of the day, till they were utterly worn out. Then Gylippus sent a herald with an offer of terms : surrender on condition that all lives should be spared : no one was to be put to death either by the sword or by ill-treatment. On these terms Demosthenes and the survivors of his division gave up their arms and to the number of 6000 men surrendered. ^
Next day, the seventh of the retreat, news of this surrender was carried to Nicias by the Syracusans along with the demand that he should surrender in like manner. At first Nicias refused to believe the report : he was
1 Plutarch {Nicias, 27) has preserved the exact name of this spot — the OUve-yard of Polyzelus.
« Thucydides, vii. 82,
228 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
allowed to send a horseman to enquire, and his messenger brought back confirmation of the worst. Nicias, still unbroken in spirit, proposed his own terms : he would undertake that Athens would repay to Syracuse the whole cost of the war, if he and his men might go free. This proposal Gylippus and the Syracusans rejected and attacks began again. The distress of Nicias' men was now extreme, yet they bore up to the end of that day. At dead of night they attempted to steal a march on their pursuers ; but the movement was discovered and had to be given up.^
Next morning, the eighth day of the retreat, Nicias once more led on his exhausted soldiery. The enemy pressed after them ; arrows and javelins rained upon them from every side. The Athenians struggled on, till famished, exhausted, and wild with thirst, they reached the next river along the coast, the Assinarus. Then came the end. Hard pressed as they were by the enemy's attacks, there yet seemed hope of escape if they could but reach and cross the river ; and raging thirst drove them on. By a common impulse the foremost ranks made a headlong rush for the river. It was but to end their march in a scene of unresisting bloodshed. " On reaching the river they threw themselves in ; all order was abandoned, each man eager to be first over ; and this, and the enemy on the bank above, increased the difficulty of the crossing. Crowded inevitably in mass, they kept knocking down and trampling on each other ; in the con- fusion some were spiked on the javelins, others tripped up on pieces of their kit and fell. Meanwhile the Syra- cusans, from the cliff -like farther bank which they lined, were firing down on the Athenians, who were most of them greedily drinking all jumbled together in the river bed. It was the Peloponnesians mainly who went down and made a shambles in the stream. The water was im- mediately fouled, but was none the less eagerly drunk — in most cases, indeed, fought over — all muddy and blood- stained as it was. At last, when the dead lay in heaps
1 Thucydides, vii. 83. 4 and 5.
I
DISASTER 229
one upon another in the bed of the stream and the whole force had come to ruin, any survivors from the slaughter in the river being ridden down by the enemy's horse, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans : 'for himself, Gylippus and the Lacedaemonians might do with him as they pleased if they would but stop the slaughter of his men. Then Gylippus gave the order to take the men alive." ^
There were not many ' official ' prisoners, since there had been no formal capitulation as of Demosthenes' division : but a great number were surreptitiously carried off by private persons, so that — as Thucydides says — " all Sicily was filled with them." ^ A certain number, however, managed to hide and were not captured at all ; these, together with any who escaped later from captivity, found a refuge at Catana.
The Quarries. — Yet one more scene and the tragedy of the Athenians in Sicily has an end.
If to-day you cross from Siracusa (modern Syracuse), between the Great and the Little Harbours, by the bridges connecting the Island with the mainland, and follow the carriage-road round the coast above the Little Harbour for rather over a mile, you come to the Convent of the Capuchins on your left. Within a stone's -throw is the place where the prisoners captured with Demosthenes and Nicias were confined after their surrender — a place so remarkable that it might be counted among the wonders of the world. It is a series of excavations of vast extent, cut down into the limestone rock, with perpendicular sides some sixty feet deep. It is not one single pit, but a succession of chambers opening one out of the other, and forming an underground labjrrinth. The whole of this deep-sunk area has been turned into gardens by the labours of the former owners of the Convent, the Capu- chin monks, and now forms a scene of exquisite beauty. "It is a solemn and romantic labyrinth, where no wind blows rudely, and where orange-trees shoot upward
1 Thucydides, vii. 84. 3-86. 2 (L. J.). "Thucydides, vii. 86. 3.
230 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
luxuriantly to meet the light. The wild fig bursts from the living rock, mixed with lentisk shrubs and pendant caper-plants. Old olives split the masses of fallen cliff with their tough, snake-like, slowly-corded and compacted roots. Thin flames of pomegranate flowers gleam amid foliage of lustrous green ; and lemons drop unheeded from fragile branches. There too the ivy hangs in long festoons, waving like tapestry to the breath of stealthy breezes ; while under foot is a tangle of acanthus, thick curling leaves of glossiest green, surmounted by spikes of dull lilac blossoms. Wedges and columns and sharp teeth of the native rock rear themselves here and there in the midst of the open spaces to the sky, worn fantastically into notches and saws by the action of scirocco. A light yellow, calcined by the sun to white, is the prevailing colour of the quarries. But in shady places the limestone takes a curious pink tone of great beauty, like the interior of some sea-shells. The reflected lights too, and half- shadows in the scooped out chambers, make a wonderful natural chiaroscuro." ^
Such, described by one great English master of words, is the modern aspect of the strange prison in which the captives of the Syracusans were confined after the destruction of the Athenian expedition to Sicily. " The prisoners they had taken, Athenians and allies of the Athenians alike, they put down in the stone-quarries, as the securest place in which to keep them : Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite of the opposition of Gylippus, they put to death." ^
*' The place was deep down in the ground, and the space too small for numbers so great. It was open to the sky, so the sun's rays, and the stifling heat which came later, caused cruel suffering. Conversely, the nights — since it was late autumn and they were chill — brought on illnesses through the violent contrast. The prisoners were crowded together and everything must be done
1 J. A. Symonds, Sketches and Studies in Italy and Greece, third
, pp. 328-9. » Thucydides, vii. 86. 2.
DISASTER 231
just where they were. Men died, some from wounds, some from the various ill-effects of this confinement, and their bodies lay heaped one upon another : the stench was intolerable. Hunger and thirst together tormented the prisoners ; for their allowance was half a pint of water a day, and a pint of corn. They were spared no form of suffering that might be expected to afflict men cast into such a prison." ^
For seventy days all the prisoners, 7000 in number, were confined under these conditions. Then those of them who were not Athenians, or Sicihan or Italian Greeks, were — as an act of mercy — sold into slavery. The Athenians were kept in torment six months longer before they were brought out — such as survived — to work for the rest of their days in penal servitude.
It was disaster, as Thucydides says, surpassing in scale and completeness anything that had happened up to that time in Greek history : indeed, it is not easily paralleled in all history. But for us its peculiar interest and pathos is that it was Athens that suffered this hideous overthrow, that the men who died in the gorge of the Assinarus and in the charnel-house of the Latomia were the countrymen of Sophocles, of Pericles, of Plato.
1 Thucydides, vii. 87. 1 and 2.
CHAPTER IX
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR
" Nevertheless, desperate as things were, they resolved not to Sive in." • Thucydides, viii. 1. 3.
" The Lacedaemonians refused to sell into slavery an Hellenic city which had done great service to Hellas in time of utmost
P®^^^-" Xenophon, Hellenica, ii. 2. 20.
" Yet though those glories endured only for a brief space of time, their significance is one which outweighs the history of centuries." Curtius, History of Greece, iii. p. 553.
No messenger brought to Athens swift tidings of the destruction which had befallen her great Sicilian expedi- tion. For no ship of hers had escaped from that ruin, and it was long indeed before the scattered fugitives of the retreat dribbled back to Athens by devious ways. And that was after the stupor of the first awakening to the reality had passed.
Bad News at Athens. — If Plutarch may be believed/ the first whisper of the calamity reached the Athenians in a curiously fortuitous manner. No news from Sicily had been received for some weeks. Yet there was no special alarm, though the failure of the night attack on Epipolae and Demosthenes' proposals to abandon the siege were known. Then one day a man sitting in a barber's shop, a visitor to Athens, just come ashore, spoke of the complete destruction of the expedition as
1 Plutarch, Nicias, 30. 232
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 233
of a thing well known. The barber rushed off to the magistrates with his startling news, and the magistrates forthwith called a meeting of the Ecclesia. The barber was brought before the assembly and told his tale. The people would not believe it and treated him as an impostor. When presently full confirmation came, alarm and distress overwhelmed the people of Athens. " They were heavily afflicted, by personal bereavements individually, and all by the pubUc loss — knights and men-at-arms in such number, the flower of their manhood, the like of which they looked for in vain among those who were left ; and further, when they saw that they had not ships enough left in their sheds, nor money in the public treasury, nor seamen to man the ships, all hope to be saved seemed gone. They quite expected that their enemies in Sicily, after a victory so decisive, would sail straight for the Piraeus ; and that their enemies at home, now redoubUng their preparations, would assail them in force by land and sea, aided by their own allies, who would revolt from them." ^ It seemed indeed to all Hellas, friends and foes ahke, and to the Athenians themselves that Athens had received a hurt to which she must rapidly succumb. In this extremity the real greatness of the Athenian people was once more displayed. As soon as they had time to recover from the first bewildering effects of the blow, they set to work to build and equip a new fleet (in spite of the difficulty of finding timber or money) ; and with the ships they built they gained notable victories — at Cynossema, at Cyzicus, at Arginusae ; and once more restored something like the old Athenian superiority at sea. This they did, moreover, in the face of revolt abroad (for in 412 revolt broke out as expected in the islands and in Ionia) and of revolution at home, the temporary reign of the oligarchy of Four Hundred. It was only through the inexcusable remissness, or treachery, of the Athenian commanders which preceded the one overwhelming Peloponnesian victory at Aegospotami, that Athens was at last beaten to her kness. The Athenian
1 Thucydides, viii. 1. 2.
234 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
democracy had made many mistakes, and was guilty of more than one crime in those eight years from the autumn of 413 B.C. to the late summer of 405 ; but Athens made a gallant fight, and as we watch her splendid effort at recovery, and her last grim resistance when all hope was gone, we are compelled again to admiration, and confess that Athens, supreme in arts and literature, was for a time unsurpassed in the field of action.
The Shame of Sparta. — The moment Athenian power v/as shaken to its base in 413 by the ruin of the Sicilian expedition, Persia's claim to the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks revived. Thucydides relates ^ how in the winter of 413 there came to Lacedaemon (in company of envoys from Chios seeking to revolt) an ambassador from Tissa- phernes, satrap of the coast districts, promising liberal money support if the Spartans would prosecute the war against Athens on the Asiatic side of the Aegean. Tissa- phernes had beeA incited to this course by demands recently pressed from Susa for payment of the arrears of tribute which had been accumulating since Ionia had been ' liberated ' by Athens. We could scarcely ask for a more convincing vindication of the policy which had guided Athens in her control of the anti-Persian confeder- acy. While the Athenian empire was strong, not a whisper of the tribute due to Persian overlords : as soon as disaster to Athens weakened the strength of the confederacy, instantaneous revival of the claim. And to the eternal shame of Sparta she yielded readily to the temptation. 2 In the following year a treaty was concluded between Sparta and the Persian king, the first clause of which ran : " Whatever country or cities the king has, or the king's ^cestors had, shaU be the king's." 3 If that clause was to be literally interpreted, not only Ionia, the Thracian Chersonese, Chalcidice and
1 Thucydides, viii. 5. 4 and 5.
^ Is it more defensible, one might ask, in the twentieth century a.d., to hand back Greek cities that have been freed to other barbarian overlords ?
3 Thucydides, viii. 18. 1.
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 235
Macedonia were Persian territory, and most of the islands of the Aegean, but Thessaly, Phocis and Boeotia — even the sacred soil of Delphi itself. There were Spartans who saw the turpitude and the ignominy of this treaty, and it was twice revised, each time in the direction of limiting this betrayal of Greeks by Greeks. But even the third and last form of the treaty did not wholly remove the stigma of handing back under the yoke of Persia Greek cities which had once been free, and which had been freed anew by the warfare following the creation of the Delian Confederacy. The clause then ran : ^ " The country of the king in Asia shall be the king's, and the king shall treat his own country as he pleases." This did indeed remove part of the reproach that one sturdy Spartan had urged against the treaty in its earlier forms, " that it was monstrous that the king should at this date pretend to the possession of all the country formerly ruled by himself or by his ancestors — a pretension which implicitly put back under the yoke all the islands, Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far as Boeotia . . ." ; ^ but it still left out of this exception the Greeks of Asia and virtually consigned the lonians and others who had been fain to throw off allegiance to the Athenian confederacy, to absorp- tion in a Persian satrapy : it still made the Lacedaemonians " give to the Hellenes instead of liberty a Median master." ^
The Falling away of the Allies. — For under the false lure of freedom held out by the enemies of Athens a great number of the subject states were in the spring of 412 scheming to break away from her. Already in the winter of 413 envoys from several places sent to Agis at Decelea *
1 Thucydides, viii. 58. 2. *Thucydides, viii. 43. 3.
3 Thucydides, viii. 43. 3.
* Decelea (now Tatoi, where the king of the Hellenes has a country estate and a villa), 15 miles from Athens, a position commanding the route from Boeotia by Oropus, had — at the malevolent suggestion of Alcibiades — been occupied and fortified by the Spartans in the spring of 413, and was thenceforth to the end of the war held permanently by a Peloponnesian garrison commanded by the Spartan king Agis, thereby causing new and acuter distresses to the people of Athens. Thucydides, vii. 19. 1 and 2 ; cf. vii. 27 and 28.
236 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
and to the Spartan government at Lacedaemon in eager competition for Peloponnesian aid in their revolt. Chios revolted first, the one surviving independent member of the Delian Confederacy ; then Erythrae, then Miletus ; and after that Lesbos and Clazomenae. The Athenians, spurred by the imminence of the danger — ^for the whole fabric of their empire was crumbling — rescinded the penalties which overhung any one who proposed to touch the special reserve of a thousand talents which had been set aside by Pericles' advice at the beginning of the war, and safeguarded by law against the occurrence of some extreme need. With the help of these funds they fitted out a fleet to check the spread of revolt. They were able to stop the revolt in Lesbos and to recover Clazomenae. But the disaffection spread to Byzantium and other cities of the Hellespont, to Rhodes, and even to Euboea.
Samos. — A remarkable exception was Samos, which had revolted and been reduced thirty years earlier. In 412 at Samos — where, since the struggle of 440-439 no less than before, the government had been oligarchical, there was revolution, violent and bloody, not from democracy to oligarchy, but from oligarchy to demo- cracy. We are not told the circumstances very fully ; it was " a rising of the commons against the upper classes,"^ and the crews of three Athenian warships, which happened to be at Samos, took part in it. For the unfortunate * upper classes ' at Samos it was a terrible calamity — two hundred were put to death, four hundred were banished ; the property of all (they appear to have been an exclusive landed class) was confiscated and re-divided among the people. But the result, as far as Athens was concerned, was a close union and understanding which lasted to the end of the war. The Samians were released from their condition of dependence and restored to the status of free allies : and this seems to show that all the severities attributed to the Athenian democracy in the regulation of the confederacy of which they were the
1 Thucydides, viii. 21,
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 237
chosen head arose from considerations of domestic politics and the impossibiHty of reposing any settled trust in governments of oligarchical constitution and, conse- quently, Peloponnesian sympathies. It resulted also, that in the political crisis through which Athens herself was about to pass, Samos became the very centre and rallying point of the democracy of Athens. For naturally as soon as the loyalty of Samos was assured beyond doubt by the democratic revolution, Samos became the base for the operations of the Athenian navy and army in the struggle to reduce her revolted dependencies, and most of aU Miletus
Revolution at Athens. — For the traditional government of Athens this turned out to be a saving circumstance. The disastrous ending of the Sicilian adventure had at the same time discredited the dearly loved Athenian poUty. The censurers of the democracy had now such license of criticism as never before. The most loyal adherents of the democratic faith were staggered and reduced to silence. The men of wealth and family — not all of them, but those whose profession of the democratic creed was lip-service, who, Uke the satirist of the Xenophontic Politeia, thought scorn of the artisans and sailor-men who made up the majority of the voters in the Ecclesia and the judges in the dicastery-courts and valued them- selves as ' the noblemen and gentlemen ' of Athens, could not fail to see their opportunity. Always they had been well organized for party purposes with their political clubs and brotherhoods (hetairiae). Already, when the full extent of the disaster had come to be recognized, a special board of ' elder statesmen ' had been appointed with exceptional advisory powers ; and at once on the restriction of full democratic sovereignty implied in the appointment of these Probouli the clubs became more active. It was easy to make it appear a duty of sound patriotism to take the control of affairs out of the hands of the bUnd and ignorant masses, whose mismanagement had brought Athens to the brink of destruction, and establish in its place the government
238 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
of a moderate democracy, in which only men of birth and education with a stake in the country should share political power. In name the plan was for a reformed democracy ; in reality the leaders who pulled the strings and their active partisans were high-handed aristocrats with a craving for oligarchical power.
Alcibiades. — The oligarchical intrigue as it developed was complicated by another for the recall of Alcibiades. That colossal and incurable egotist, having inspired all the measures of the enemy that had done Athens the most fatal hurt, had through his profligate self-seeking now brought himself into disfavour with his patrons, the enemies of Athens. The Spartan government had ceased to trust him ; King Agis for good reasons was his personal enemy. Alcibiades was looking round for an opportunity of again changing sides. For after all the social and political atmosphere of Athens and the tone and temper of Athenian society suited his mercurial temperament better than anything the Spartan alliance had to offer. Alcibiades was versatile enough to be able to affect Spartan manners and endure to live at Sparta and in the company of Spartans, but he could never be at ease under such conditions. Already he had been paying court to Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of the coast, and had no more difficulty in ingratiating himself with an oriental magnate than some clever western ad- venturer in India in the eighteenth century. Tissaphernes listened with complacency to the suggestion that it was most to the advantage of Persia to allow neither Sparta nor Athens to gain a decided ascendency in the war, but to keep the balance nicely in suspense so that each might weaken the other by continual conflict. But this playing with Tissaphernes was to Alcibiades only a means to an end. Alcibiades' passionate desire was to win his recall to Athens. By this he could at once most effectively triumph over the enemies who had sent him into exile, and attain what was really his own heart's desire, a return to Athens. For, next to himself, Alcibi- ades loved Athens, and in so far as he was capable of a
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 239
genuine attachment, it was for this city of his birth. For all his brilliant qualities on their better side were characteristically Athenian. He managed the intrigue with such extraordinary dexterity, that while it was he who set going the movement for a revolution in the direction of oligarchy, he ultimately returned to Athens as the champion of democracy.
Army Intrigue at Samos. — The conspiracy began at Samos, not in Athens. It was given out by agents of the chief conspirators that Alcibiades had great influence with Tissaphernes, and was able to bring him and his pay-chest over from the Peloponnesian to the Athenian side, if in place of democracy there were a government Tissaphernes could trust. The anger of the rank and file, which ordinarily would have blazed out at any meddling with the constitution, was checked by this talk of pay from Persia, and the conspirators were emboldened to go forward. They sent an influential deputation to Athens to arrange a change in the constitution and the recall of Alcibiades.^
Revolution at Athens. — At Athens the conspirators proceeded with the same mixture of boldness and caution. Their proposals for a modification of the constitution were openly made, but they were grounded upon the desperate state of the city's resources and the relief which the help of Persia offered. " The safety of the state," they argued, " not the form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like." ^ This argument disarmed opposition. Next an atmosphere of uneasiness and suspicion, even of terror, was created in the general body of the citizens, partly by the osten- tatious display of the numbers of the revolutionary faction, partly by the secret putting away of any loyal citizen who made himself conspicuous in opposition. There was no certainty who was, and who was not, in the conspiracy, and ordinary people knew not whom to trust.
* Thucydides, viii. 49, ^ Thucydides, viii. 63. 3,
240 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
In the end there was something like a cowp d^etat. An assembly was held, not in the Pnyx but at Colonus, a good mile outside the city. A resolution was passed suspending the law against unconstitutional proposals ^ and enacting heavy penalties against any one who should attempt to put the statute into force. Then a bill was brought in to abolish aU the existing machinery of govern- ment— council, dicasteries, ecclesia and all — and elect five commissioners, with power to nominate a hundred councillors, each of whom was to choose three colleagues. The Four Hundred, so appointed, were to take the place of the Council of Five Hundred and govern with full powers. Behind them was to be an Ecclesia, Umited in number to five thousand and convened at the pleasure of the Four Hundred. These proposals were unanimously accepted and the meeting was dissolved. So far con- stitutional forms had been outwardly observed. Then the newly appointed Four Hundred, secretly armed with daggers and escorted by a band of hired bravos in their employ, proceeded to the Council Chamber and ordered the members present to receive their pay and begone. Each councillor had the rest of his year's allowance paid to him in fuU as he went out ; and the revolution was accomplished. The Four Hundred were now the government of Athens : and that was a very long way from democracy. For they had no intention whatever of calling into reahty the Five Thousand. Though constitutional forms had been observed, the new oligarchy really ruled by force. The Four Hundred imprisoned political opponents at their pleasure, and put to death some few : yet on the whole acted with moderation. The principal thing they did was to try and make peace mth Sparta ; and this failed. ^
Democratic Reaction at Samos. — But while the revolu- tion was thus easily effected at Athens, the affair had meantime taken an altogether different turn at Samos. Though, as we have seen (p. 239), the first motion for a change of government came from Samos, when attempt
* See above, p. 92. * Thucydides, viii. 71. 3.
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 241
was made to carry through the revolutionary movement there, the army and fleet declared unequivocally for democracy. Not only so, but when news of the coup d'etat of the Four Hundred was brought to Samos and was followed by exaggerated accounts of the violent doings of the oligarchs, the men of the army and fleet bound each other by solemn oaths to maintain demo- cracy at Athens, to carry on the war with energy, and to make no terms with the Four Hundred.
There now arose a struggle " between the army trying to force a democracy upon the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp." * Samos had become, for the time being, the true, the better Athens : the greater part of her military and naval strength was there, and the army and navy at Samos were better able to carry on the war and to shift for themselves than the non-combatants, the old and infirm, and the disaffected oligarchs, enclosed within the walls of Athens. And this was what the sworn confederates of the Army at Samos themselves thought. Under the leadership of Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, staunchest of patriots, and Thrasyllus, they purged the army command of disaffection to democracy, in a formal assembly deposing any generals and ships' captains who were suspected of oligarchical leanings. Next at the instance of Thrasybulus they took steps for the recall of Alcibiades.
Alcibiades at Samos. — In this wise it came about that Alcibiades, who had been the first instigator of the oligarchical conspiracy, was actually brought back as the saviour of the democracy he had plotted to subvert. Undoubtedly what weighed most aUke with the original oligarchical conspirators, the democratic war-leaders, and the ordinary citizens serving in army and navy, was the belief that Alcibiades, and Alcibiades alone, could ward off the destruction which manifestly overhung the Athenian cause, if Tissaphernes, in accordance with his promise to the Spartan chiefs, brought up the Phoenician fleet. Since the disaster in Sicily the Athenians had only
1 Thucydides viii. 76. 1 (Crawley). Q
242 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
been just able to hold their own at sea without being able to gain any decisive advantage. The Phoenician fleet numbered close on 150 ships, fuUy manned and fresh. 1 If the strength of the Phoenician fleet were added to the strength of the Peloponnesian fleet, the odds must be overwhelmingly against Athens. She would not have a chance ; she must at once be irretrievably defeated ; Athens would be lost. The Spartans knew this ; Tissa- phernes knew this ; and the Athenians all knew this. Hence the intensely critical character of the intrigue now centring in the question whether Tissaphernes would bring up the Phoenician fleet or not. The Phoenician fleet was a little shadowy, but it served the purposes of intrigue none the worse for that. It served Tissaphernes as a bait to keep the Peloponnesians to the zealous prosecution of the war at sea : it served Alcibiades for the double game of playing off the Athenians against Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes against the Athenians. Accordingly when Alcibiades was brought by Thrasybulus to Samos and introduced to a formal assembly of the Athenian forces, he was not only well received, but actually elected Strategos. Soon after a deputation sent by the Four Hundred in Athens to explain the meaning and purpose of the change of government to the fighting forces at Samos and reconcile them to it, arrived and attempted to carry out their mission. They had a very stormy reception : they were greeted with outcries demanding that they should be put to death, and it was with difiiculty they got any hearing at all. Their plea that the change of government had been made to save Athens, not to injure her, was ill received ; and so was the contention that the change was after all slight, because the Five Thousand would exercise the wonted powers of the Ecclesia. Angry clamour arose, and from all sides came the demand that the fleet should sail forth- with to the Piraeus. Then it was that for once in his life Alcibiades did his country a genuine service. He calmed down the excited soldiers and induced them to realize
1 Thucydides, viii. 87. 3,
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 243
the madness of what they asked. For, if once the Athenian fleet left its station at Samos, not only was Ionia lost, but the Hellespont too, and the Black Sea route : the Athenian empire would be at an end. This is Thucydides' testimony ; and he adds : " There was no one else at the time who could have restrained them ; but Alcibiades put a stop to all thought of sailing against Piraeus, and by his vehement speech silenced those who were moved by personal animosity to the envoys." ^ He further took upon himself to give the deputation their answer ; he approved the abolition of payment for civil offices, offered no objection to the limitation of political rights to the Five Thousand, but insisted that the arbitrary rule of the Four Hundred must cease and the Council of Five Hundred be restored.
Fall of the Four Hundred. — In the end the oligarchical revolution at Athens coUapsed without any direct inter- vention from Samos. The immediate effect of Alcibiades' message was to create a division in the ranks of the Four Hundred. A large number of them were already uneasy at the course events had taken and anxious to return to constitutional government. These now under the leader- ship of Theramenes, son of Hagnon, and others, formed a Moderate party within the oligarchy ; the policy they advocated was to give immediate reality to the Five Thousand. The extremer oligarchs under the original chiefs of the oligarchical conspiracy, Pisander, Antiphon and Phrynichus, made a desperate effort to get peace made with Sparta on any terms barely tolerable. At the same time they began to turn the rocky spit of land which protects the entrance to Piraeus on the north-west into a fortress by adding a wall on the side towards the harbour. 2 The alleged purpose was to strengthen the
1 Thucydides, viii. 86. 5.
2 " Eetionea is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of the harbour, and was now fortified in connexion with the wall already- existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be able to command the entrance ; the old wall on the land side and the new one now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending in one of the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the harbour, '" Thucydides, viii. 90. 4 (Crawley).
244 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
defences against a possible attack on Piraeus from Samos. Theramenes, however, declared that the real purpose of the work was to give the Oligarchs command of the entrance to Piraeus, so that, when it suited them, they could admit the Spartans. This suspicion appeared to receive confirmation when a fleet was reported to be gathering off the coast of Laconia, its destination was said to be Euboea, but obviously it could just as readily sail against the Piraeus. Thucydides is of opinion that the more fanatical oligarchs did really cherish the project of calling in the enemy, in the event of their first plans miscarrying. The work at Eetionea, at all events, was being pushed on with feverish energy and the excitement in the city grew. It is a sign of the rising tide of popular passion that at this conjuncture Phrynichus was assassin- ated openly in the Agora. News of a raid by the enemy's fleet on Aegina brought matters to a head. The two parties confronted each other in the streets, and it was only with the greatest difficulty, through the good offices of those who saw how fatal civil strife must be with the enemy at their gates, that a conflict was avoided. In the end the hoplites employed on the oligarchs' work in the Piraeus took matters into their own hands and, with Theramenes' approval, themselves demolished the offend- ing fortifications.
Next day there was a renewal of the tumult. A large body of hoplites marched from the Piraeus into the city and demanded the immediate publication of the roll of the Five Thousand. They were calmed with a promise of compliance, and with a view to the restoration of civic harmony, a day was fixed for holding an Ecclesia in the Theatre of Dionysus. The day, when it came, proved one of unexpected excitement. Just at the time when the assembly was to meet news came that the Peloponnesian fleet (which had moved on to Megara) was off the coast of Salamis. It seemed as if Theramenes' warning was about to come true, and that in the absence of the effective fleet of Athens on the other side of the Aegean, the Piraeus was at last to experience direct
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 245
attack by the enemy. The citizens en masse rushed to the harbour town : " some went on board the ships akeady afloat, while others launched fresh vessels, or ran to defend the walls and the mouth of the harbour." ^ But the forty-two enemy ships passed on down the coast, and rounding Sunium sailed along the eastern side of Attica and made for the town of Oropus. It then appeared that their destination was, as had been given out, Euboea. But this menace was scarcely less alarming than an attack on the Piraeus itself. For in Euboea were the flocks and herds which had been removed from Attica : " Euboea was everything to them now that they were shut out from Attica." ^ Every ship that could be manned was sent out in haste to fight for Euboea. A fleet of thirty-six ships (against the Peloponnesian forty -two) was assembled at Eretria ; but the crews were untrained men. They were forced to engage almost immediately on arrival there ; and unfortunately they were not ready. The Eretrians played traitor and made it impossible for the crews of the Athenian fleet to obtain food near the shore. Just when the men were scattered about the outskirts of the town over their marketing, the Peloponnesian fleet was descried sailing to the attack. Oropus is only seven miles off across the Euboean channel and the traitors in Eretria raised a signal to notify the Pelo- ponnesians of the moment to attack. So the Athenian ships put to sea in a hurry and before the crews had taken any food, with the natural result that they were dis- astrously defeated with the loss of twenty-two ships out of thirty-six. Immediately after all Euboea revolted — with the exception of Oreus (formerly Histiaea, above, p. 68), which was now an Athenian settlement.
1 Thucydides, viii. 94. 3 (Crawley).
2 Thucydides, viii. 95. 2. They were shut out from Attica because of the fortified post estabUshed by the enemy at Decelea, which intensified acutely the distresses suffered by the Athenians in this second war, sometimes on this account called the Decelean War. Thucydides draws a lurid picture of these distresses in chs. 27 and 28 of Book vii. It was much worse than the annual invasions of the first period of the war.
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Thucydides asserts that the alarm, which ensued at Athens when the news became known, was greater even than that which followed the knowledge of the disaster in Sicily. Though the loss in Sicily was far greater, this blow struck nearer home. " The camp at Samos was in revolt ; they had no more ships or men to man them ; they were at discord among themselves and might at any moment come to blows ; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on the top of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of aU Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica, could not occur without throwing them into the deepest despondency." ^ It might well seem that the Peloponnesians had but to follow up their victory by sailing into the Saronic Gulf and threatening Piraeus, and Athens was done. For either the city must fall straightway ; or, if the army and fleet at Samos should leave the seat of war in Asia and come to the rescue, there was an end of the Athenian empire. Indeed, Thucydides is at a loss to understand how these conse- quences did not foUow, and can only account for it by Spartan incapacity to rise to the occasion. " But here, as on so many other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in combating them." ^
The Rally of the Democracy. — This was the lowest point the fortunes of Athens reached in the disastrous years 413 to 411. Wonderful as it may seem, there was now for the last six years of the war a recovery which for a time even gave promise of final victory to Athens. While the enemy at Oropus delayed to strike their blow
1 Thucydides, viii. 96. 2 (Crawley).
2 Thucydides, viii. 96. 5 (Crawley).
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 247
at Piraeus, the Athenians, again showing their greatness in adversity, raUied their forces to meet the crisis. For the defence of Athens they manned yet another twenty ships and soberly proceeded to set their house in order. The people returned to its time-honoured meeting-place, the Pnyx, and in session there passed a series of resolutions for the restoration of constitutional government. The Four Hundred were formally deposed and a new citizen- body was constituted under the name of the Five Thousand, but consisting of all citizens able to provide for themselves a shield and a suit of body armour. The abolition of payment for state service of all kinds was formally confirmed : in other respects the familiar polity was revived. This was, it will be seen, a compromise in the shape of moderate democracy, and it earned the un- qualified approval of the historian to whom we owe these details. " It was during the first period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time. For the fusion of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head after her manifold disasters." ^ Another measure now determined was the recaU of Alcibiades and other exiles. A report of these trans- actions was sent to the naval base at Samos together with encouragement to press the war with new vigour.
The Victories of Athens by Sea. — Prospects at the seat of war were already since the reception of Alcibiades at Samos taking a turn for the better. Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesian leaders were completely at odds. There was no sign of the appearance of the Phoenician fleet, nor did Tissaphernes himself return from Aspendus. The Spartan commanders in disgust now took into consideration the invitation of another Persian satrap, Pharnabazus, who wished them to come to the Hellespont which was in his satrapy, and bring about the defection of the cities confederate with Athens there. Mindarus, the Spartan admiral recently appointed in succession to
^Thucydides, viii. 97. 2 (Crawley).
248
OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Astyochus, listened to these persuasions, abandoned active operations off the Ionian coast, and sailed for the Hellespont with the design of effecting the revolt of all
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the cities of the Athenian empire from the Hellespont to the Bosphorus. He tried to evade the Athenian fleet altogether, but was discovered and pursued. Ultimately
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 249
there was a general engagement of the fleets off Abydos — eighty-six ships on the Peloponnesian side ; on the Athenian seventy-six ; and in spite of some ill success at first the Athenians were completely victorious : twenty-one ships of the Peloponnesians were captured with a loss of fifteen ships by the victors. This was a new turning- point in the war. News of the victory was received at Athens with a joy proportionate to the alarms and distresses through which the whole people had recently passed : it " gave them fresh courage, and caused them to believe that if they put their shoulders to the wheel their cause might yet prevail." ^
This battle of Abydos, or of Cynos-sema as it is also called, from the promontory on which the victors set up their trophy, was the first of a series of brilliant victories which shed a departing glory on the last years of the Athenian empire. Towards the end of this year 411 they were victorious a second time off Abydos, this time capturing thirty ships of the enemy. Early in 410 they won a much more signal victory off Cyzicus. In this battle the Athenians had the advantage of numbers, for they had eighty-six ships and the Peloponnesians only sixty ; but not one of these sixty ships escaped. Most of the empty huUs became prizes ; but the men of the Syracusan squadron (for the Syracusans had by this time sent a contingent to help in the overthrow of Athens) burnt their ships rather than that they should fall into the hands of the enemy. As a result of this victory the Athenians regained undisputed control of the Black Sea route, and they established a new port at Chrysopolis, on the Asiatic side of the entrance to the Bosphorus, to enforce the payment of the customs duty of ten per cent, on all goods passing through the Straits. At Cyzicus the Spartan admiral Mindarus was among the slain, and it was after this battle that the famous despatch of his second-in-command was intercepted and brought to Athens. The despatch is a good example of Spartan brevity. It ran : " The ships are gone. Mindarus is
1 Thucydides, viii. 106. 5 (Crawley).
250 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
dead. The men are starving. We know not what to do." ^ For the moment the Peloponnesians were without a fleet in Asiatic waters. It is characteristic of the com- parative ease with which a navy could be replaced, provided wood were obtainable, that Pharnabazus bade the Peloponnesians not to be discouraged, since, so long as the men were safe, timber did not matter, for there was plenty of that in the king's land. And he was as good as his word, and had a new fleet built for the Pelo- ponnesians at Antandros from wood cut on Mount Ida.
Arginusae. — It was not till 406 that another general action was fought, and then the Athenians won the great victory at Arginusae, notorious in history for the out- rageous treatment of the admirals who won it. But in the intervening years important things had happened which bore upon the ultimate result ; and in particular, Alcibiades had been a second time banished. For a time after his arrival in camp at Samos everything he touched had prospered. It was he who, coming up at the critical moment with a fresh squadron of eighteen ships at Abydos,^ had decided the battle in favour of the Athenians. Cyzicus was deflnitely his victory. He caught Mindarus out at sea manoeuvring, cut him off from the harbour and, as we saw, destroyed his whole fleet. In contrast with this briUiant success was a defeat of other Athenian forces under Thrasyllus at Ephesus : the attempt on Ephesus met with even less success than the Ionian attack on Sardis in the Ionian Revolt.^ In 409 again Alcibiades defeated Pharnabazus at Abydos and he recovered Chalcedon and Byzantium which had revolted in 410. So great was his reputation and popularity at this time that in 407 he was invited back to Athens and landed at the Piraeus. This was the great day of Alcibi- ades' life. A vast crowd had gathered to see the famous Alcibiades, and he was escorted in triumph by a band of friends to a meeting of the Ecclesia and there was chosen
* Xenophon, Hellenica, I. i. 23 ; Loeb. p. 11.
« Xenophon, Hellenica, I. i. 6. » yoi, i p. 272«
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 251
general-in-chief with absolute authority. But his triumph was short-lived ; a little later his star deserted him ; he was unsuccessful in an attack on Andros, and then during his absence on state business the officer left in charge of the fleet, against his express orders, offered battle to the Peloponnesians, was defeated, and lost fifteen ships, " And it would seem," writes Plutarch, ^ " that if ever a man was ruined by his own exalted reputation, that man was Alcibiades. His continuous successes gave him such repute for unbounded daring and sagacity, that when he failed in anything, men suspected his inclination ; they would not believe in his inability." This was the nemesis at once of his brilliancy and of the instability of his character. The people chose other commanders in his place, and Alcibiades once more left his countrymen and betook himself to a stronghold he had built in the Chersonese, and " there assembling mercenary troops made war on his own account against the Thracians, who acknowledge no king." ^ To whatever causes this new breach between Athens and her brilliant but erratic son was due, it was soon to prove fatal both to him and to Athens. But first came the victory of Athens at Arginusae.
In 407 Lysander had come from Sparta as admiral, and it was he who defeated Alcibiades' lieutenant, Antinous, at Notium. Lysander was both cautious and capable, and he had the good fortune to win the friendship of Cyrus, prince of the royal house of the Achaemenidae, who here makes his first appearance in Greek history. ^ Lysander was succeeded by CaUicratidas, a leader of true Spartan courage, but without the qualities which made success easy for Lysander ; and he suffered from the handicap that Lysander, and Lysander's friends, were intriguing against him. CaUicratidas acted with vigour, captured Methymna, and blockaded an Athenian squadron under Conon in the harbour of Mytilene. The
^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 35 ; Loeb. iv. p. 103. 2 Plutarch, Alcibiades, 36; Loeb. iv. p. 107. * He is the CJyrus of Xenophon's Anabasis.
252 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Athenians made a special effort to rescue Conon and his squadron ; " they voted to go to the rescue with 110 ships." In the end they gathered together a fleet of 150 ships, Callicratidas went to meet them with only 120, and in a hard-fought action was defeated and himself lost his life. It was the biggest naval action of the war, for nearly 300 triremes were engaged. There should have been boundless rejoicing at Athens and honours for the victorious admirals, eight in number. But the public joy was clouded by one unfortunate circumstance. A storm had come on afser the battle, and the crews of the Athenian war-ships dis- abled in the fight had not been rescued, though orders for their rescue had been given. There were twenty -five Athenian ships lost, so the death roll was considerable, some 5000 men. Even this great loss would have been not irremediable had it been met in a proper spirit ; but through the machinations of certain interested persons the populace were, quite unjustifiably, stirred to indignation against the generals, and through the accident that the festival called the Apaturia (when families were united for worship as at Christmas with us) occurred at the time, this indignation got completely out of hand. Demands were made that the admirals should be tried for their lives, and tried, not separately man by man, as Athenian law required, but collectively in a batch. The madness of the hour prevailed, and — though the people afterwards repented of it — this was done. The Ecclesia voted in- stantly upon the illegal resolution, and the vote was for death. All the admirals but two, who had previously effected their escape, were put to death. Among the six put to death was a son of Pericles and Aspasia. The whole story is told at length by Xenophon ; ^ it is a strange story, barely credible, were not the truth of history so often stranger than fiction.
The people of Athens are said to have repented of this injustice to their victorious generals, but little place was left for repentance. The hour was at hand, when through the incredible carelessness and folly of other commanders
1 Xenophon, Hellenica, I. vii.
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 253
her whole fleet was to be betrayed into the hands of the enemy, and Athens left with nothing between her and surrender through starvation. Whether this betrayal was due to deliberate treachery or only to criminal negli- gence and ineptitude cannot be known.
Aegospotami. — In the year 405, the year after Arginusae, Lysander came back to command the Peloponnesian fleet at the urgent request of the allies, and with a view of striking at the Athenian corn supply he sailed for the Hellespont. The Athenians followed with their whole fleet, now raised to 180 ships. Lysander attacked and took Lampsacus. The Athenians were then at Elaeus, and on receiving news of this loss they sailed up the Hellespont, and as all the Asiatic shore was now hostile territory, took up their station at a place called ' Goat's-rivers ' — Aegos-potami — on the European shore opposite Lampsacus. The position was a bad one — an open shore, and no market near ; the seamen of these two hundred ships were obliged to seek their food at Sestos, quite a long distance away. Alci blades, who could see the Athenian fleet from his fort, advised the commanders not to stay there. He was repulsed with insult, and no precautions were taken to guard against surprise, though Lampsacus, where the Peloponnesians had supplies close at hand, was little over two miles away. Lysander laid his plans accordingly. When on the day after his arrival the Athenians put out to sea, rowed across and offered battle outside the harbour of Lampsacus, Lysander had his ships all manned and ready, but would not allow them to move out and fight. When late in the day the Athenians, seeing that the enemy declined battle, rowed back to Aegospotami, he sent swift-sailing ships after them to note exactly what they did, and till the return of these scouts he kept his fleet ready manned and afloat. The scouts reported that as soon as the Athenian ships reached the shore at Aegospotami, the crews disem- barked and scattered along the coast in search for food. Next day and for three days more after that this pro- cedure was repeated, and each day the Athenians grew
254 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
more careless. On the fifth day Lysander changed his orders. As soon as his scouts saw that the Athenian crews had disembarked and scattered they were to hoist a shield as a signal. When the signal appeared, Lysander with his fleet behind him dashed straight across the Hellespont, and bore down upon the Athenian fleet. Conon, one of the admirals, made strenuous efforts to call the seamen back and get the ships manned. But there was not time. The Athenian war- ships were caught, some half manned, some hardly manned at all, some quite empty. Of all that fleet nine ships only escaped — eight ships of Conon's squadron, and the Paralus. All the rest fell into Lysander 's hands. Some of the crews escaped to forts held for Athens ; but most of them were made prisoners. This was ruin final and irretrievable. For all Athens' naval strength, the fleet that kept the seas open for the corn- ships and guarded Piraeus, was there at Aegospotami. These were all captured without one blow struck in defence : and there were no others.
The Cup of Humiliation. — Thucydides is no longer our main authority, but Xenophon in his Hellenica ; and for once at least Xenophon 's account of the reception of the fatal news at Athens is Thucydidean in its force and brevity. " It was at night that the Paralus arrived at Athens with tidings of the disaster, and a sound of wailing ran from Piraeus through the Long Walls to the city, one man passing on the news to another ; and during that night no one slept, all mourning, not for the lost only, but also, and far more, for their own selves, thinking that they would suffer such treatment as they had visited upon the Melians, and upon the Histiaeans, and Scion- aeans, and Toronaeans, and Aeginetans, and many other Greek peoples." ^ Yet even in this extremity the old spirit nerved the remnant of her fighting people left in Athens. " On the following day they convened an Assembly, at which it was resolved to block up all the
^ Xenophon, Hellenica, II. ii. 3 ; Loeb, pp. 103 and 105. Thucydides' History breaks off iinfinished in the autumn of the year 411,
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 255
harbours except one, to repair the walls, to station guards, and in all other respects to get the city ready for a siege." ^
Lysander came on leisurely ; there was no need to hurry. Time was his most effective weapon, and he knew it. Famine would do his work for him more surely than siege engines or storming parties. So wherever he found an Athenian garrison, and whenever he fell in with Athenians anywhere he sent them with a safe conduct to Athens that they might augment the number of mouths to be fed there. At length, after laying Salamis waste, Lysander anchored with a fleet of 150 ships in front of the Piraeus, and closed the harbour against all entrance, while a large Peloponnesian army under the Spartan king Pausanias lay encamped in the district called the Academy, close under the city walls. And now *' the Athenians, being thus besieged by land and by sea, knew not what to do, since they had neither ships nor allies nor provisions ; and they thought that there was no way out, save only to suffer the pains which they had themselves inflicted, not in retaliation, but in wantonness and unjustly upon the people of small states, for no other single reason than because they were in alliance with the Lacedaemonians." ^
Resistance was hopeless from the first, but the Athe- nians held out indomitably notwithstanding. People were dying daily of starvation, and at last supplies were all but exhausted. An attempt was made to nego- tiate terms of peace, but the Athenian spirit was as yet unbroken, and they asked simply to be admitted to alliance with Sparta, keeping their walls and harbours intact. To this the Spartan government would not listen. Then Theramenes offered to go to Lysander and find out what terms really were obtainable ; and as the best means of bringing his countrymen to a frame of mind which might incline them to submit to the inevitable, he stayed three months with Lysander
^ Xenophon, Hellenica, II. ii. 4 ; Loeb, p. 105. 2 Xenophon, Hellenica, II. ii. 10 ; Loeb, p. 107,
256 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
before he returned. Matters were then quite desperate, and in this extremity the people of Athens sent Theramenes and nine other envoys with full powers to make what terms they could. The Ephors, seeing that the Athenian envoys were now in earnest, brought them to Lacedaemon. " When they arrived, the Ephors called an assembly, at which the Corinthians and Thebans in particular, though many other Greeks agreed with them, opposed making a treaty with the Athenians and favoured destroy- ing their city. The Lacedaemonians, however, said they would not enslave a Greek city which had done great service amid the greatest perils that had befallen Greece, and they offered to make peace on these conditions : that the Athenians should destroy the long walls and the walls of Piraeus, surrender all their ships except twelve, allow their exiles to return, count the same people friends and enemies as the Lacedaemonians did, and follow the Lacedaemonians both by land and sea wherever they should lead the way. So Theramenes and his fellow- ambassadors brought back this word to Athens. And as they were entering the city, a great crowd gathered around them, fearful that they had returned unsuccessful ; for it was no longer possible to delay, on account of the number who were dying of the famine. On the next day the ambassadors reported to the Assembly the terms on which the Lacedaemonians offered to make peace ; Theramenes acted as spokesman for the embassy, and urged that it was best to obey the Lacedaemonians and tear down the walls. And while some spoke in opposition to him, a far greater number supported him, and it was voted to accept the peace. After this Lysander sailed into Piraeus, the exiles returned, and the Peloponnesians with great enthusiasm began to level the walls to the music of flute -girls, thinking that that day was the begin- ning of freedom for Greece." ^
Epilogue. — This was the end of Athens as an imperial city ruling over subject states and of the dream of an
^ Xenophon, Hellenica, II, ii. 19-23 j Loeb, 111 and 113.
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 257
united Hellas confederated under her leadership. She had fought a losing fight gallantly. But the odds were too heavy against her. The democracy of Athens had n\ade foolish mistakes, and in their pride of power had committed crimes at variance with the mild and generous spirit of her best days ; but the sheer exhaustion of material and moral forces in the wearing struggle of those twenty-seven and a half years is explanation enough of the deterioration of which we are spectators, and of her ultimate defeat. Yet the story does not close in unrelieved gloom. There is an epilogue which is prelude to a long and strangely varied history leading on through the centuries to the Athens we may visit to-day. There was a revival of Athens as a political power, even of Athens as head of an Hellenic confederacy, a second Athenian empire, though it was not the Athens of Pericles and Cimon and Themistocles.^ This revival, too, came within a dozen years of Aegos-potami.
The Reign of Terror. — But before this revival the Athenians passed through evil days. After the surrender of the city and the destruction of the Long Walls, while all real power was in the hands of Lysander, thirty citizens of high rank had been chosen to form a special com- mission for the framing of a constitution in accordance with the ancient laws ; and that meant a constitution somewhat on the pattern of the democracy as it was left after the reforms of Clisthenes. These thirty came ultimately to be known as the Thirty Tyrants, and their memory was accursed. The Thirty set up a Council and appointed magistrates, but delayed to proceed further with the framing of a constitution ; and as the Council and magistrates were entirely subordinate to them, their rule was irresponsible and arbitrary. To make their
^ For all this the measure of what had happened to Athens, and through Athens to Hellas, is only taken, when we see how, not quite a hundred years later, in the Athens of Cimon and Pericles, two Mace- donians, Demetrius the Besieger and his father Antigonus, were not only hailed as saviours with extravagant flattery, but actually worshipped as gods. This is the true measure of the tragedy of Aegospotami.
258 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
arbitrary power secure they asked and obtained from Lacedaemon, with Lysander's aid, a Spartan force to garrison Athens. In reliance on the support of this garrison they introduced a reign of violence and injustice. A great number of people were put to death by their orders. First it was politicians on the popular side, who under the democratic regime had made a profession of watching over the public interests, calling officials to account and instituting prosecutions of the rich, not infre- quently on insufficient grounds . They were commonly called ' informers ' (sycophant ^ was the Greek word for them) and held in detestation by the well-to-do classes. Public feeling on the whole approved the judgment with which they were now visited. But the Thirty went on from this to proscribe political opponents and even doom to death citizens whose sole crime was that they were not of a rank or character to submit quietly to the total de- privation of political rights. Finally the Thirty killed their fellow-citizens merely to obtain possession of their property. It became a veritable reign of terror. This wickedness was too much for one of their number, Thera- menes, whose name appears in the history of his times in curiously contrasted lights, good and evil. He was of very distinguished birth, son of Hagnon, founder of Amphipolis, and we have seen the part he played in setting up and pulling down the Four Hundred. ^ He was a man who shrank from extremes, and whether justly or unjustly, had earned the nickname of ' the Buskin ' — a buskin being a boot which fits either foot. It is arguable that this nickname does no more than illustrate the penalty the moderate man has to pay in trying to mediate between violent extremes. A more sinister doubt, however, attaches to Theramenes' conduct at the time of the trial of the admirals after Arginusae.^ Theramenes appears among their accusers ; and it was to Theramenes as a trierarch, along with others, that the task of rescuing the
^ Literally ' fig -shower ' ; but how from this it came to mean ' in- former ' is not known.
* Above, p. 243. ^ Above, p. 252.
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 259
men on the disabled ships had been committed by the admirals. But whatever the final judgment on his character, Theramenes at all events played a worthy part now. He boldly opposed Critias, the most high-handed of the Thirty and instigator of the worst atrocities, a man without scruple and without pity, but of undaunted will and great intellectual force. ^ Save these two, Critias and Theramenes, the rest of that Thirty are to us mere names. A duel now went on for a time between Thera- menes and Critias in the counsels of the Thirty. Thera- menes urged the necessity of widening the government by extending political privileges, as originally proposed when the Thirty received their commission. Critias gave way and the Thirty enrolled a body of Three Thousand, who were to fill the same role in the new Oligarchy as the Five Thousand under the government of the Four Hundred. Then by a trick, the rest of the citizens who had the status of hoplites were deprived of their arms. "And now, when this had been accomplished, thinking that they were at length free to do whatever they pleased, they put many people to death out of personal enmity, and many also for the sake of securing their property. One measure that they resolved upon, in order to get money to pay their guardsmen, was that each of their number should seize one of the aliens residing in the city, and that they should put these men to death and con- fiscate their property." ^ This Theramenes would not do, and Critias made up his mind to be rid of him. He de- nounced him in the Senate as a turncoat and traitor ; and when the senators showed signs of sympathy with Theramenes' defence, overawed them by means of the Spartan guards and a band of his own partisans armed with daggers ; ^ and by the simple expedient of strik- ing Theramenes' name out of the roll of the Three
^ A famous dialogue of Plato is named after him.
* Xenophon, Hellenica, II. iii. 21 ; Loeb, p. 123.
' The dagger at Athens, we see, plays the same part as the revolver in modem Europe : it is the weapon of extremists, revolutionary or reactionary.
260 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
Thousand, dispensed altogether with any legal forms, merely ordering Theramenes off to execution ; for it had previously been enacted that the Thirty were to have absolute power of life and death over all citizens outside the roll of the Three Thousand. The scene in the Senate House is vividly portrayed by Xenophon.^ After this murder proscriptions and confiscations went on apace. The number of victims done to death by the Thirty is estimated at 1500.^ These were the slain. A great number were banished or fled the country. The exiles found a refuge wherever they could, and especially at Megara and Thebes.
Thrasybulus. — Among the exiles was Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, the soldier statesman who had taken a leading part in thwarting the oligarchical conspiracy at Samos in 411, and in the subsequent recaU of Alcibiades. He had been Strategos in 411. Thrasybulus was at Thebes ; and one day with a band of 70 fugitives of a like resolute spirit he climbed the defile of Mount Parnes and took possession of Phyle, one of the Athenian border fortresses, in a position singularly bold and dominant above the mule -track which is the shortest route between Athens and Thebes. The position is so strong that only part of the summit needs the defence of walls ; for nearly haK the circuit the precipitous cliff is defence enough ; the walls that protect the rest are of the finest Hellenic masonry, course above course of squared blocks regularly laid. And to one who looks southward from the summit the Acropolis of Athens is visible at a distance of some thirteen miles, and beyond the Acropolis the sea. Hither Thrasybulus came and gazed and waited ; and his band of patriots grew gradually from 70 to 700. But it was not long before the Thirty, fully alive to the danger, marched out against Thrasybulus with all their cavalry and the
^ Xenophon, Hellenica, II. iii. 50-55.
* " And some of them actually joined the Thirty, who killed more than fifteen hundred of the citizens without trial, before they had even heard the charges on which they were to be put to death ..." (Aeschines, Speech against Ctesiphon, 235 ; Loeb, p. 493).
Angle of the Fortress of Phylk. which looks down the Pass, towards Athens. From a photograph by Lionel James.
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 261
Three Thousand. A direct assault failed ignominiously, and the plan of investing the stronghold and cutting off supplies was frustrated by an exceedingly heavy snow- storm which came on in the night and compelled a retreat. When a httle later the main body of the Spartan garrison and a portion of the cavalry were sent to patrol the country around Phyle and prevent plundering, their camp was surprised by Thrasybulus at early dawn, and they were chased away with considerable loss. When his numbers had grown to a thousand, Thrasybulus took the initiative and marched by night to Piraeus. Next day he occupied a strong defensive position on the hill Munychia, and though the partisans of the Thirty from the city attacked him with greatly superior numbers, they were defeated and Critias himself was slain. It was some time yet before the civil conflict ceased and the democracy was restored ; and before this was achieved the Spartans once more intervened. The ultimate deliverance from arbitrary rule was only accomplished with the friendly consent of Sparta, who through all this time, it must in fairness be acknowledged, played on the whole a generous part towards her great antagonist. But the end finally reached was the triumph of Thrasybulus and the restora- tion of democracy : " and the men from Piraeus went up to the Acropohs under arms and offered sacrifice to Athena." ^
The restored democracy, in spite of the bitter things done, set an example of moderation in victory, so that Xenophon could write : " pledged as they were under oath, that in very truth they would not remember past grievances, the two parties even to this day live together as feUow-citizens and the commons abide by their oaths." ^ There could be no better tribute to Athenian democracy
Phyle. — A peculiarly romantic interest attaches to Phyle, the inspiration of which Byron felt ; and saw his
^ Xenophon, Hellenica, II. iv. 39 ; Loeb, p. 169. ' Xenophon, Hellenica, II. iv. 43 ; Loeb, p. 171.
262 OtfR HELLENIC HERITAGE
vision of freedom and by it helped in some measure to forward the deliverance of a later Athens from tyranny more grievous even than that of the Thirty. The place has ennobling associations and the scene is strikingly char- acteristic of Greece. Perhaps I may be pardoned if I conclude with a description written after a visit made many years ago, but remembered as well as yesterday.
" Finer situation for a fortress could hardly be. It stands out defiantly on the top of its rounded, pine- clothed hill, amid scenery which is on all sides wild and impressive. It is the very place for a robber stronghold or the last sanctuary of free men who disdain submission at the price of liberty. Deep ravines run past it on all four sides — more open and even cultivated in front of the pass, grimly abysmal behind. On one side only is the hill accessible, that by which we have come through the thick screen of pines ; a steep slope, but not abrupt as on the other sides. Looking forth from the ramparts in any direction, we face lofty ridges of grey rock, inter- mittently wooded, while on the lower steeps the patches of corn between the pines make a fine contrast of colour. The rock on the ridge and where it crops out through the green below is mostly grey, but up the great ravine west the russet red prevails. The outlook back south-east over Chasia is (in the immediate foreground) exceedingly stern and rocky ; but beyond the rugged edge of rock Athens and the sea are, we know, somewhere in the haze, just visible on a clear day over the great wall that shuts out most of the plain."
To Thrasybulus, doubtless, that glimpse of Athens through the haze brought vision of restored demo- cracy and hope of a revival of the material splendour which Athens had lost. To us it may rather sug- gest thoughts of the more enduring empire of the mind which, even in defeat, Athens had won. This she will never lose as long as western civilization continues ; and we have our part in it. For in this spiritual realm Athens was destined to effect what she had failed to effect in the political sphere — a union of all Hellas under
THE PASSING OF THE SPLENDOUR 263
her hegemony. Greek literature and art culminate in fifth -century Athens, and in the ages which follow the unity of Greek art and literature is the unity which Athens gave to them. This achievement in its leading aspects will be the subject of the fourth and concluding division of this book.
OUTLINE OF DATES
Note. — It is to be understood that many dates are approximate only. Dates in Greek history are difficult to fix with exactitude and are often matter of controversy. In this outline the Table in Bury's History of Greece has generally been followed. It is well also to remember that the Athenian year began nominally with the Summer solstice (now June the 21st) and that allowance has to be made for this, just as in earlier English history for the beginning of the year with March instead of January. Thucydides reckons the years of the Peloponnesian war by campaigning seasons.
Dates in Literature or Art are indented, and the event is in Italics.
B.C. 480. Battle of Salamis.
479. Battles of Plataea and Mycale.
Capture of Sestos by Xanthippus and the Athenians. 478. Pausanias commands the Greek fleet and takes By- zantium.
Rebuilding of the walls of Athens.
Misconduct and recall of Pausanias.
Confederacy of Delos formed. 477. Spartans withdraw from the contest with Persia.
Fortification of Piraeus begun. 476. Eion on Strymon captured by Cimon. 473. Reduction of Scyros by the Athenians. 472. Carystus compelled to join the Confederacy of Delos.
472. The Persians of Aeschylus. 471. Themistocles banished by ostracism. 469. Secession and reduction of Naxos. 468. Battle of the Eurymedon. 465. Secession of Thasos.
Athenian disaster in Thrace (at Drabescus). 464. Earthquake at Sparta followed by Helot revolt. 463. Surrender of Thasos. 462. Mycenae reduced and depopulated by the Argives.
Democratic assault on the Areopagus led by Ephialtes.
Pericles enters upon public life.
Remuneration introduced for dicastery-service. 264
OUTLINE OF DATES 265
B.C. 461. Ostracism of Ciinon.
460. Athens breaks with Sparta and aUies with Argos. 469. Athens acquires Naupactiis and settles Messenians there. Megara invites alliance with Athens. Long walls from
Megara to Nisaea built by the Athenians. Athens at war with Corinth and Epidaurus. Battles
at Halieis and Cecryphalea. Athenian expedition to Egypt. Capture of Memphis. 458. War with Aegina. Defeat of the Aeginetans at sea. Two victories of Myronides over the Corinthians. Building of the Long Walls of Athens begun. 458. The Oresteia of Aeschylus. 457. Athenian defeat at Tanagra.
Athenian victory at Oenophyta. Athens in control of Boeotia. 456. Surrender of Aegina.
Tolmides sails round the Peloponnese and burns Gythium. 454. Destruction of the Athenian forces in Egypt.
The series of Temple Tribute lists begins. 453. Achaia aUied with Athens. 452. Truce for five years between Athens and the Pelopon-
nesians. 450. Cimon's last campaign and death in Cyprus. 449. Double victory by land and sea at Cyprian Salamis. 448. Suspension of hostilities with Persia. So-called * Peace of Callias.' Pericles' unsuccessful effort to bring about a Pan- Hellenic Conference at Athens. 447. Athenian defeat at Coronea. Athens loses control of Boeotia.
447. Parthenon begun. 446. Revolt of Euboea.
Treachery of Megara. Reduction of Euboea by Pericles. 445. Thirty Years' Peace. Atliens relinquishes Nisaea,
Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia. 443. Foundation of Thurii on the site of Sybaris.
Five * regions ' distinguished in the Tribute hsts. 442. Ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias. 440. Secession of Samos and Byzantiimi. 439. Reduction of Samos. Submission of Byzantium. 438. Dedication of the Parthenon. 437. Propylaea begun. 436. Amphipolis founded.
435. Quarrel of Corinth and Corcyra over Epidamnus. Naval victory of the Corcyreans. 435,4. Vigorous preparations at Corinth for revenge on Corcyra.
266 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
B.C. 433. Defensive alliance between Corcyra and Athens.
Naval victory of the Corinthians off Sybota.
Megarian decree passed at Athens. 432. Revolt of Potidaea and beginning of the siege.
Debates on peace or war at Sparta. 431. First year of the Peloponnesian war.
Theban surprise attack on Plataea.
Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians.
Expulsion of the Aeginetans from Aegina. 430. Second invasion of Attica.
Plague at Athens. 429. Victories of Phormio in the Gulf of Corinth.
Siege of Plataea begun.
Death of Pericles. 428. Third invasion of Attica.
Revolt of Lesbos. 427. Fourth invasion of Attica.
Surrender of Mytilene. Decree against the whole population passed at Athens, but next day rescinded.
Surrender of Plataea and judicial murder of the garrison. 426. Athenian disaster in Aetolia.
Purification of Delos. 425. Fifth invasion of Attica.
Seizure of Pylos by Demosthenes.
Blockade and capture of Sphacteria.
Athenian fleet in Sicilian waters.
Pacification of Sicily. Athenians withdraw. 425. Acharnians of Aristophanes. 424. Capture of Cythera by Nicias.
Capture of Nisaea and the Long Walls of Megara.
Athenian defeat at Delium.
Brasidas in Thrace wins over Acanthus and Amphipolis.
Eion saved by Thucydides, the historian.
Thucydides banished for failing to save Amphipolis. 424. Aristophanes' Knights. 423. Truce for one year between Athens and the Pelopon- nesians.
Revolt of S clone.
Leontini seized by the Syracusans.
423. The Clouds of Aristophanes. 422. Deaths of Cleon and Brasidas at Amphipolis.
422. The Wasps of Aristophanes. 421. Peace of Nicias. End of the Ten Years' War. 421. Aristophanes' Peace. Euripides' Suppliants.
S clone taken and destroyed by the Athenians.
Separate treaty between Athens and Sparta. 420. Alliance of Athens with Argos : breach with Sparta.
OUTLINE OF BATES 267
B.C. 418. Battle of Mantinea. Spartans victorious over Argos and her allies. 417. Ostracism of Hyperbolus. 416. Athenian conquest of Melos.
Embassy from Segesta to the Athenians. 415. Euripides^ Trojan Wcxinen. 415. The Sicilian Expedition sails from Athens. Mutilation of the Hermae.
Arrest of Alcibiades in Sicily, and escape to Sparta. Victory of the Athenians before Syracuse and sub- sequent withdrawal into winter quarters. 414. Landing of the Athenians in Thapsus Bay and seizure of Epipolae. Siege of Syracuse. Destruction in succession of two
Syracusan counter-works. Death of Lamachus. Nicias left in sole command. Arrival of Gylippus from Sparta. 414. The Birds of Aristophanes. 413. Peloponnesian war renewed and Decelea occupied.
Demosthenes with Athenian reinforcements arrives at
Syracuse. Failure of night attack on Epipolae. Battles in the Great Harbour. Attempted retreat of the Athenians. Total destruction of the Sicilian Expedition. Persian claim to tribute revived. 412. Chios, Erythrae, Miletus, Lesbos, Clazomenae revolt. Treaty between Sparta and the Persians. Alcibiades breaks with the Spartans and intrigues with Tissaphemes. 411. Oligarchical conspiracy in Samos and at Athens.
Revolution at Athens. Rule of the Four Hundred
established, and after three months overthrown. Alcibiades recalled to the army at Samos. Athenian defeat off Eretria. Revolt of Euboea.
Athem'an victory at Cynossema in the Hellespont. Victory of the Athenians at Abydos. 410. Athenian victory at Cyzicus.
Democracy fully restored at Athens. 409, Pylos recaptured by the Spartans. 408. Athens recovers Byzantium and Chalcedon. 407. Alcibiades lands at Piraeus and is received with acclamation. Lysander comes from Sparta as admiral and wins the
friendship and support of Cyrus. Athenian defeat at Notium. Alcibiades once more in exile.
268 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
B.C. 406. Great Athenian victory at Arginusae. The victorious admirals condemned and six of them put to death. 405. Lysander again in command.
The whole Athenian fleet surprised and captured at
Aegospotami. Blockade of Athens. 404. Siu-render of Athens. Long Walls pulled down.
Rule of the Thirty Tyrants. 403. Thrasybulus at Phyle.
March of Thrasybulus on Piraeus and victory of the
exiles in the battle of Munychia. Restoration of democracy at Athens.
NOTE ON BOOKS
Two books, in particular, are of inestimable value to the student of Athens and her empire. The one is Zimmem's Greek Commonwealth ^ — which with an inspired sureness of touch portrays stroke by stroke the ideal city-state, as actuaUzed for some brief moments of history in the commonwealth of Athens : the other is Hill's indispensable Sources.*
For the light which the recovery of inscriptions has thrown on his- torical probleins the student may most conveniently consult Hicks and Hill, Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford University Press, 1901) ; or, as an alternative, Roberts and Gardner's Introduction to Greek Epigraphy, Part II. (Cambridge University Press, 1905). All topo- graphical points which come within the limits of Pausanias' Itinerary are explained and discussed with astonishing insight and completeness in the four volumes of Sir James Frazer's Commentary (Macmillan 1898) and are readily traceable by means of the full Index to Notes in Vol. VI. The maps and plans, too, are excellent. For formal study of the topography and archaeology of Athens we naturally go first to Professor Ernest Gardner's Ancient Athens (Macmillan, 1902), and may supple- ment with Weller (C. H.) Athens and its Monuments (The Macmillan Company, 1913) or D'Ooge's The Acropolis (Macmillan, 1908). Other books which incidentally reveal aspects of the charm of Athens are : Mahaffy, Rambles and Studies in Greece (Macmillan 1876) ; Mrs. Bos- anquet's Days in Attica (Methuen, 1914) ; and, in another way, Carson (Stanley), Catalogue of the Acropolis Museum, Vol. II. (Cambridge University Press, 1921). For a sympathetic understanding of the Athenian democracy ample help will be found in Greenidge (A. H. J.), Handbook of Greek Constitutional History (Macmillan, 1902), especially the section on the Athenian Empire, Chapter VI., 5, pp. 189-204, and there is a brilliantly suggestive chapter in W. Scott Ferguson's Greek Imperialism (Constable, 1913). For social and domestic life there is Tucker's Ldfe in Ancient Athens (Macmillan, 1907), and for the deeper meanings of this study Dickenson's The Greek View of Life (Methuen, 1896) and Livingstone's The Greek Genius (Oxford University Press, 1912 and 1915). Whibley's Companion to Greek Studies (Cambridge University Press, 1916) will be found useful under a variety of heads.
The standard Greek History for the purpose of this note is Bury's (Macmillan, 1900 and 1913). It does for the twentieth century what Grote's Greece did for the second half of the nineteenth. It co-ordinates
* Zimmern (A. E.). The Greek Commonwealth, Clarendon Press, 2nd edition, 1915. » Hill (G. F.). Sources far Greek Eiatory 478-431 B.C., Oxford University Press, 1907.
269
270 OUR HELLENIC HERITAGE
in a narrative of sustained interest and charm the results of contempor- ary archaeology, epigraphy, travel and criticism. The story of Athenian ambition in Sicily and its ruinous ending has been told by Freeman with all the master's eloquence and thoroughness of research in the first four hundred pages of the Third Volume of his History of Sicily (Oxford University Press, 1892).
But the ultimate satisfaction comes only from a recourse to the original sources, even if the reading must be done in translations. For the whole period 478-403 Thucydides' History is, of course, the capital authority, till in 411 it breaks off abruptly and Xenophon takes up the tale in the first two books of his Hellenica. Translations of Thucydides and Xenophon are, therefore, of first necessity to the student who cannot read the original Greek. There are happily several good translations of Thucydides in English. The most recent, Foster Smith's in the Loeb Classical Library, is completed only to the end of Book VI. It has the great merit of being presented, page by page, alongside the Greek original : as a translation it is sometimes better than, sometimes not so good as, other current translations. Jowett's (Clarendon Press, 2nd Edition, 1900) has, on the whole, the highest claim as literature ; but Crawley's revised lay R. Feetham for the Temple Classics (Dent) in 1903, is very good and for terseness and vigour often holds the palm. Thomas Hobbes' seventeenth century translation is racy, if by modern standards sometimes inaccurate, and still very readable. Xenophon has a delightful translator in H. G. Dakyns, whose work in four volumes includes all Xenophon's varied writings. The Hellenica are also trans- lated by C. L. Brownson in the Loeb series (Heinemann).
Thucydides relates at full length only the story of the first twenty years of the Peloponnesian War, B.C. 431-411 : yet he is our chief authority also for the fifty years from 478-431, which he merely sum- marizes. Thucydides died without completing his history Xenophon takes up the story roughly where Thucydides drops it in the autumn of 411, and he takes us to the end, the restoration of the democracy in 403. Diodorus the Sicilian, who composed a Universal History in the time of Augustus, covers the whole ground in his 11th, 12th and 13th books, but adds comparatively little to our knowledge. A good deal more may be gathered from seven of Plutarch's Lives — Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lysander. For constitutional history Aristotle's Constitution of Athens ^ has, since its recovery from an Egyptian tomb, been our chief authority. Aristophanes' comedies ^ — Acharnians, Knights, Wasps, Peace — are in an especial degree illumin- ating ; and occasionally a ray of light comes from one or other of the great tragedies.
» Translated by Sir F. G. Kenyon, its first editor (Oxford University Press, 1890).
* B-ogers' translations of Aristophanes corne nearest to completeness. Hookham Frere made spirited translations of four including the Acharnians and the Knights, and of parts of the Peace : and earlier than Frere as a translator is Mitchell.
INDEX
n refers to footnotes. ^ over final * e ' indicaiea that the * e * is separately sounded.
Abu Simbel on the Nile, 40.
Abydos, captured by the Greek fleet, 9, 28 ; two battles of, 249, 250.
Academy, 255.
Acanthus, 170.
Acarnania, 139, 141.
Achaean League, 83 n.
Achaemenidae, 251.
Achaia, 45, 68, 118, 159.
Achamae, 134.
Achilles, 202.
Achradina, 190, 197, 220.
Acraean Qiff, 226.
Acrocorinth, 116-7.
Acropolis, physical character of, 53-4 ; capture by the Persians, 54 n ; buildings described, 55- 59 ; their original perfection, 59-61 ; Plutarch's praise, 61 , their significance as national memorials, 61-2 ; Pericles' full purpose, 65-6 ; opposition to his plans, 69-73 ; worship of Athena, 73-5 ; the architects, 75-7.
Acropolis Museum, 59, 72 n, 78.
Acropolis Museum, Catalogue of
^ the, 72 n.
Acte, peninsula of, (1) Chalcidice, 170 ; (2) Piraeus, 47.
Admetus, prince of the Molos- sians, 48.
Adriatic Sea, 191. Aegaleos, Mount, 134. Aegean Sea, 3, 18, 28, 45, 117, 234, 244.
Aegina, 30, 39-40, 45, 117, 129.
Aeginetans, 127, 167, 254.
Aegospotami, 233, 253-4.
Aeolian Greeks, 115.
Aeschines, Athenian orator, quoted, 260 n.
Aeschylus, 77, 100 ; Persians^ quoted, 105-6.
Aetolian League, 83 n.
Agathocles, despot of Syracuse, 191.
Agis, Spartan king, 235, 235 n, 238.
Agora, Phrynichus killed in the, 244.
Agrigentum {Acragas in Greek), 182.
Alcibiades, advantages of birth and fortune, his brilliant gifts, lack of principle, jealousy of Nicias, 179 ; misleads the Spar- tan envoys and brings about alliance between Athens and Argos, 180 ; appointed along with Nicias and Lamachus to command the expedition to Sicily, 186 ; his success in rousing enthusiasm for the expedition, 187 ; charged with sacrilege, but refused a trial before the expedition sails, 1 89 ; his plan of operations adopted through the support of La- machus, 192-3 ; recalled for trial but escapes, 193 ; ruins the Athenian cause at Messana, 195 ; stirs up the Spartans to 271
272
INDEX
help Syracuse and to occupy Decelea, 202, 235 n ; seeks to change sides again and schemes for recall to Athens by first gaining influence with Tissa- phemes and fomenting oli- garchical conspiracy at Samos, 238-9 ; invited to Samos by the democratic leaders there, and elected strategos, 241-2 ; his good service and successes, 242- 3, 250 ; his recall to Athens and his election as general -in-chief, 250-1 ; banished 'again and withdraws to a stronghold in the Thracian Chersonese, 251 ; his warning before Aegospo- tami disregarded, 253.
Alcmaeonidae, 62, 103, 129.
Amazons, Theseus' fight with the, 60.
Ambracia, colony of Corinth, 117.
Amphictyonies, 83 n.
Amphion, 42 n.
Amphipolis, founded by the Athenians on the site of ' Nine Ways,' 37 ; won over by Bra- sidas, 170-1 ; deaths of Cleon and Brasidas at, 166, 172 ; subject of dispute between Athens and Sparta on the con- clusion of the Peace of Nicias, 177-8.
Anapus, 198, 201, 210, 226.
Andrians, 180 n.
Andros, 3, 251.
Angelopoulos, M., 25 n.
Antandros, 250.
Antigone of Sophocles, 100.
Antigonus, Macedonian king, 257 n.
Antiphon, leader in the oligar- chical conspiracy, 243.
Antirrhium = the Molycrian
Rhium, 142.
Apaturia, 99, 252.
Apella, 84, 127-8.
Apollo, 16, 47.
ApoUonia, colony of Corinth, 117.
Arabs, 31 n.
Archidamus, Spartan king, by his presence of mind saves
Sparta after the earthquake, 36, 36 n ; advocates peace in the Apella, 128 ; leads the Pelo- ponnesian army into Attica, but delays operations in the hope of peace, 132-3 ; ad- vances to Aehamae, 134 ; offers terms to the Plataeans, 148-9.
Archons, 89.
Abginusae, battle of, 250-2.
Argos and the Argives, 37, 44, 45, 48, 114, 167, 178, 180, 215.
Aristagoras of Miletus, 170.
Aristeus of Corinth, 126.
Aristides, called the Just, in command of the Athenian squadron in 478, 10 ; his repu- tation for integrity, 12 ; organ- izes the Confederacy of Delos, 12-3. Also 62 and 104.
Ariston, the Corinthian, 212.
Aristophanes, 77, 85, 100, 106, 118, 165-6, 172-3 ; quoted, Acharnians, 165-6, 187-8 ; Clouds, 172 ; Knights, 172 ; Peace, 118, 172-3; Wasps, 118, 172.
Aristotle, quoted, 88, 89, 90.
Artabazus, 125.
Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, king of Persia, 18, 48.
Artemis, 16.
Artemis of Brauron, 70.
Asopus, river near Plataea, 131.
Aspasia, 252.
Aspendus, on the Eurymedon in Pamphyha, 247.
AssiNARUs, 228, 231.
Astyochus, Spartan high admiral, 248.
Athena, 57, 58, 60, 73 n, 14, 75 ; Nike, 58, 66, 72, 75 ; Parthenos, 61, 75 ; Polias, 73-5 ; Pro- machus, 60, 75.
Athenian arche, or empire, 65, see also, 34-5.
Athenians, break through the Persian shield -barrier at My- cale, 5 ; saved Hellas in the Persian War, 6-8 ; refuse to permit the transference of the lonians to European Hellas, 9 ;
INDEX
273
continue the war in Asia after the departure of the Pelopon- nesians and capture Seatos, 9- 10 ; invited to form the Con- federacy of Deles, 11 ; appoint the Hellenotamiae and control the administration of the league, 16-7 ; capture Eion on the Strymon, 18 ; suppress piracy in the Aegean, 18 ; win the battle of the Eurymedon, 19 ; win a double victory in Cyprus, 19 ; suspend hostilities with Persia, 19-20 ; reduce Naxos on attempted secession, 31-3 ; com- pel Carystus to join the league, 33 ; send 4000 hoplites to assist the Spartans in the siege of Ithome, 37 ; reduce Thasos to submission and attempt a settle- ment at Nine Ways, 37-8 ; acquire Naupactus, build Long Walls for Megara and fight battles in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoe- nicia and the Peloponnese, all in one year, 38-9 ; build Long Walls for Athens, 39, 40 ; reduce Aegina, 40 ; in Egypt take Memphis but subsequently meet with overwhelming dis- aster, 41 ; defeated at Tanagra, 44 ; victorious at Oenophyta and win control of Boeotia, 45 ; by transfer of the treasury from Delos to Athens gain com- plete control of the revenues of the league, 47 ; suffer a reverse in Boeotia, 67 ; reduce Euboea on its revolt in face of a treacherous attack from Me- gara and a Peloponnesian inva- sion, 67-8 ; agree to the Thirty Years' Peace giving up Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, 68 ; the buildings on the Acro- polis their national achieve- ment, 77-8 ; conclude a defen- sive alliance with Corcyra and support the Corcyraean fleet after its defeat at Sybota, 124 ; send forces to coerce Potidaea, 126 ; reject the Lacedaemonian
demands, 129-30 ; crowd into the city on the invasion of Attica, 133-6 ; their terrible sufferings from the plague, 136- 7 ; turn against Pericles for a time, but again restore him to power, 137-8 ; win naval vic- tories in the Gulf of Corinth, 138-44 ; man a hundred fresh ships to meet the crisis of the revolt of Mytilene, 146 ; pass and afterwards rescind a savage decree against the Mytilenaeans, 147-8 ; promise help to the Plataeans, 149 ; seize Pylos, 153-5 ; cut off and ultimately capture the Spartan force in Sphacteria, 157-65, reject Spar- tan overtures for peace, 165 ; conquer Cythera, 167 ; foiled at Megara, 167 ; routed at Deli um, 168 ; lose Amphipolis, 170-1 ; banish Thucydides the historian, 171 n ; conclude, for fifty years, the Peace of Nicias, 166, 172 ; on failure of the Spartans to restore Amphipolis refuse to give up Pylos, 178 ; conclude a separate treaty with Sparta, break with Sparta and form a new alliance with Argos, 178 ; attack and conquer Melos, 180-1 ; receive an appeal from Segesta in Sicily, 183-4 ; decide on the expe- dition to Sicily, 186 ; unde- terred by the ' mutilation of the Hermae ' despatch their great armada, 188-90 (for the opera- tions in Sicily, see Sicilian Expedition) ; send the Sala- minia to arrest Alcibiades, 193 ; on receipt of an urgent despatch from Nicias, vote a second expedition on a large scale, 212-3 ; learn of the total des- truction of both armaments, 232-3 ; appoint a board of Probouli and use their reserve of 1000 talents to build a new fleet, 236-7 ; on the occurrence of a democratic revolution at Samos restore to the Samiaps
274
INDEX
their independence and make Samos their miHtary and naval base, 236-7 ; distracted by oli- garchical intrigues and the revolution of the Four Hundred, 237-40 ; overthrow the Four Hiuidred and form a moderate democracy, but lose Euboea by revolt, 243-7 ; win naval victories at Cynossema, Abydos, and Cyzicus, 247-50 ; man a fresh fleet to rescue Conon and gain a great victory at Argi- nusae, 251-2 ; put their vic- torious admirals on trial and condemn them to death, 252 ; lose all their ships at Aegospo- tami, 253-4 ; prepare for the defence of Athens against Lysander, 254-5 ; vain efforts to conclude peace on their own terms, 255 ; reduced to ex- tremity by starvation, 256 ; accept Spartan terms which include the destruction of the Long Walls, 256 ; suffer from the tyranny of the Thirty, 257- 60 ; democracy restored through the heroism of Thrasybulus, 260-1. Athens, gains great prestige for her part in the Persian War, 6, 11, 13-4; her walls rebuilt, 21-4 ; provided with new harbours, 24-7 ; her interest in the Black Sea trade, 28 ; head of the Confederacy of Delos by choice of the allies, 29 ; her leadership insensibly changed into an arche or empire, 31-5 ; incurs Peloponnesian jealousy, 35 ; her marvellous output of energy, 38 ; her ' annus mira- bilis' (B.C. 459-8), 39 ; her land empire, 45 ; her revenue from the league, 46-7 ; her Acropolis adorned with splendid works of art, 55-62, 65, 69-75 ; demo- cracy at, 83-93 ; hturgies, 96-8 ; festivals, 99-101 ; freedom, 105- 8 ; her splendour, 109-10 ; drain on her man-power and
moral energies, 111-14 ; her enemies abroad and at home, 114-20 ; crippling of her powers by the plague, 137 ; her superiority in naval tactics, 138-44 ; her good fortune at Pylos and Sphacteria, 153 ; her victory in the Ten Years' War, 177; abuse of her strength, 180-1 ; her western ambitions, 181-4 ; her overthrow in Sicily, 231; her greatness in adversity, 233-4, 246-7, 255, 257 ; her enduring spiritual achievement, 262-3. Attica invaded, 67, 133-4, 136, 146, 155, 255.
Bedloe, Thomas, 189 n.
Beggar's Opera, The, 100.
Belbina, small island south of C Sunium, 15, 29.
Bendidaea, 100.
Beule Gate, 55.
Black Sea Trade, 8, 9, 18, 28-9, 249, 253.
Boat-racing at Athens, 99, 101.
Boeotia, 42-45, 178, 235.
Boeotians, 115-6, 215.
Boges, heroic Persian governor, 18 n.
BosANQUET, Mrs., quoted, 57.
Bosanquet.Mr.R.C., quoted, 175.
Bosphorus, 9, 28, 248, 249.
Boule, or Council at Athens, 88- 89, see also Council of Five Hundred.
Braakel, the, man-of-war, 81.
Brasidas, son of Tellis, Spartan leader ; early exploits, 169 ; wounded in attempt to force a landing on the rocks at Pylos, 156-7 ; his march to Chalcidice, 169-70 ; wins over Acanthus and Amphipolis, 170-1 ; death, 166, 172 ; honoured as a hero at Amphipolis, 172.
Brauronian Artemis, 70.
British Expeditionary Force, 38.
British Museum, 76, 78, 81.
Brooke, Fulke Greville, Lord, quoted, 133.
INDEX
275
Bruce, Thomas, Lord Elgin, 79-81. Bruttian coast, 211. Burlington House, 81. Burrows, Dr. Ronald, on Pylos
and Sphacteria, 173-6. Bury, Professor J. B., quoted,
17, 19, 27 n, 65, 65 n. Butadae, noble family at Athens,
103. Byron, Lord, 81, 261. Byzantium, 18, 28, 121, 236, 250.
Cacyparis, river in Sicily, 226.
Cadmeia, 70 n.
Cadmus, 42 n.
Callias, son of Hipponicus, 20.
Callicrates, 72 n, 75.
Cat.licratidas, Spartan high ad- miral, 251-252.
Callimachus, 74.
Camarina, 193.
Capuchins, Convent of the, 229.
Carthage, 183, 191.
Caryae, town in Arcadia, 58.
Caryatides, 58, 58 n.
Carystus, 33.
Casson, Stanley, quoted, 72.
Catana, or Catane, 182, 193, 194, 216, 224 n, 229.
Cecrops, 73.
Cecryphalae, 38.
Cephisus, river in Boeotia, 42.
Chaeronea, 42.
Chalcedon, 250.
CHALCiDicfe, 126, 168-171, 2.34.
Chalcis in Euboea, 46, 68 n.
Chandler, Dr. Richard, 79.
Charmides, father of Pheidias, 75.
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, 70.
Chersonese Thracian (=2Gallipoli peninsula), 9, 234, 251.
Childe Harold, Byron's, 81.
Chios and the Chians, 30, 34, 121, 181, 191, 234, 236.
Choregia, 97.
Chrysopolis, 249.
CiMON, son of Miltiades, captures Eion on the Strymon, 18 ; conquers Scyros, 18 ; destroys a Phoenician fleet at the Eury- medon, 19 ; induces the Athe- nians to help the Spartans in
the siege of Ithome, 37 ; banished by ostracism, 62 ; his amiable qualities, 12 ; his patriotic example of sea-service, 94; his death in Cyprus, 19; see also, 63, 93.
Cithaeron, Mount, 151.
Citium, town in Cyprus, 19.
Classical Review, quoted, 175, 176.
Clazomenae, 236.
Cleaenetus, father of Cleon, 148, 159.
Clearidas, Spartan commander in Chalcidice after the death of Brasidas, 177.
Cleisthenes, democratic reformer at Athens, 117, 257.
Cleomenes, Spartan king, 117.
Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, defends the Mytilenaean decree, 148 ; causes the failure of the Spartan peace offers, 159; goes to Pylos and adopts Demosthenes' plan for a landing in Sphacteria, 161-2 ; captures the Spartans in Sphacteria, 165 ; sent on an expedition to Chalcidice, 171 ; reconnoitres Ainphipolis, 172 ; surprised by a sally of troops under Brasidas and slain, 172. Also, 106.
Clouds of Aristophanes, 172.
Cnemus, 141, 142.
Colleides, deme of Attica, 165.
Colonus, Ecclesia held at, 240.
Confederacy of Delos, proposed by the lonians out of dissatis- faction with Spartan leader- ship, 11 ; assessment made by Aristides, 12-3 ; objects and constitution of the league, 14-6 ; duty and responsibility of Athens, 16-7 ; success, 17-20 ; qviestions of the rights of re- cession and of refusal to join, 31-3 ; the constituent members become one by one dependencies of Athens, 34-5 ; Boeotia, Phocis, Megara, Aegina, and Achaia for a time included, 45 ; finally transformed into an
276
INDEX
Athenian ' arche,' 113-4 ; hope of the union of all Hellas des- troyed by the Peloponnesian war, 122 ; necessity of the league shown by the revival of the Persian claim to tribute, 234.
CONON, 251, 254.
Conquistadores, the Spanish, 31.
Copais, Lake, 42, 42 n.
Corcyra and the Corcyraeans, 48, 123-5, 152, 155, 189, 191, 215.
Corinth and the Corinthians, bitterest of the enemies of Athens, 116 ; reason found in the westward extension of Athe- nian influence, 117-8 ; her colonies, 117 ; her quarrel with Corcyra over Epidamnus, defeat and preparations to avenge it,
123 ; opposes the Corcyrean request to Athens for alliance,
124 ; defeats the Corcyraeans off Sybota, but hindered by an Athenian squadron from follow- ing up her victory, 124-5 ; further incensed by the coercive measures of Athens against Potidaea, 125-6 ; sends volun- teers under Aristeus to Poti- daea, 126 ; twice defeated by Phormio in the Gulf of Corinth, 140-4 ; refuses to be a party to the Peace of Nicias, 178 ; sends ships to the help of Syracuse, 203, 207 ; advocates the des- truction of Athens, 256. See also 30 and 39.
Corinth, Gulf of, 44, 45, 51, 63, 139. CoRONEA, 42, 112, 115, 158. Coryphasion, Spartan name of
Pylos, 153, 154. Council of Five Hundred, 87-
89, 240, 243, 260. Counterworks, Syracusan, first,
199-200 ; second, 200-1 ; third,
205-7. Crete, 45. Crimea, 45.
Critias, 103, 259, 261. Curse of Minerva, Byron's, 81. Curse of Athena of the Brazen
House, 129 ; Curse of the
House of Alcmaeon, 129 ; Curse
of Taenarus, 129. CuRTius' History of Greece, quoted,
232. Cyclades (the Circle Islands), 3,
180. Cynossema, battle of, 233, 249. Cyprus, 10, 19, 39, 41, 41 n, 63. Cyrene, 42. Cyrus, young prince of Persia,
251. Cythera, 81, 167, 177, 179. Cyzicus, battle of, 233, 249-50.
Daedalus, 74.
Daphni, Pass of, 52.
Dardanelles (Hellespont), 9, 28, 29. See also Hellespont.
Dascon, bay of, 217 ; point of, 194, 210.
Datis and Artaphernes, 33.
Decelea, 235, 235 n, 245 n.
Decelean War, 245 n.
Delium, 166-8.
Delos, 4, 15, 16, 35, 47.
Delphic Oracle, 6.
Delphinia, festival at Athens, 99.
Demeter, 79.
Demetrius, St., Loumpardiaris, 56 n, 60 n.
Demetrius, the Besieger, 257 n.
Demos, the Athenian,- 84-5, 90 ; also 134, 179.
Demosthenes, (1) Athenian states- man and orator of the fourth century B.C., 20, 96 n.
Demosthenes, (2) Athenian general, as a volunteer accom- panies a squadron bound for Sicily, 153-4 ; seizes and forti- fies Pylos, 154-5 ; repels Spar- tan attacks, 155-7 ; plans and carries out the attack on Sphac- teria, 161-5 ; his attempt on Boeotia in concert with Hippo- crates miscarries, 167 ; sent to the relief of Nicias in Sicily, 212 ; his night attack on Epi- polae, 213-6 ; on its failure urges immediate withdrawal from Syracuse, 216-7 ; takes part in the sea-fights in the
INDEX
277
Great Harbour, 217-21 ; wishes to fight again, 222 ; leads the rear division in the retreat, 225- 7 ; accepts the terras of sur- render offered by Gylippus, 227; death, 230.
Diasia, festival at Athens, 99.
Dicaeopolis in The Acharnians, 165-6.
DiCASTERY -COURTS, 85, 90-1, 101,
104, 118. Diipolia, festival at Athens, 99. Diodotus, 148. Diomilus, 198. Dionysius (1) the Phocaean, 31 ;
(2) tyrant of Syracuse, 191, 197. Dionysus, 42 n. Dipylon Gate, 24. Dokimasia, 86.
Dorian Greeks, 9, 35, 114, 215. Dorians and lonians, 182 ; also
35, 121. Doris, 44. Doriscus, 18.
D6RPFELD, Dr., 54 n, 73 n. Drabescus, 38, 112. Drachma, 85 n. Dyme, 141. Dyrrachium (Durazzo), 123.
EccLESiA, the Athenian, 84, 86-7;
debates in, 147, 159, 180, 212,
244, 252, 256. See also, 63, 83. Ecclesia, meetings of the Syra-
cusan, 203. Eclipse of the moon in 413 B.C.,
216. Eetionea, 243-4, 243 n. Egypt, 39, 40-2 ; Napoleon in, 80. Eion on the Strymon, 37, 170-1. Eisteddfod, 100. Elaeus, 253. Eleusinia, 99. Eleusis, 52, 134. Elgin Marbles, 76, 78-81. Elgin, Thomas Bruce, Lord,
79-81. Elis, 178. Elizabethans, 31. Elymi, 183. Epaminondas, 116. Ephesus, 15, 48, 250.
Ephialtes, Athenian statesman, 62, 98.
Ephors, Spartan chief magis- trates, 1 1 n, 256.
Epidamnus, 117, 123.
Epidaurus, 137.
Epipolae, Heights of, described, 195-7 ; surprised by the Athe- nians, 198 ; siege operations and battles, 199-202 ; Gylippus marches over, 203 ; carries a cross -wall past the Athenian Hnes, 206 ; Athenian night attack on, 213-6 ; abandoned by the Athenians, 218.
Epirus, 48, 123.
Erechtheum, 57-8, 66, 72-4, 73 n, 75.
Erechtheus, 73 n ; tribe of, 39.
Eretria, 245.
Erichthonius = Erechtheus, 73 n.
Erineus, river in Sicily, 227.
Erythrae, 236.
Euandria, manhood competition, 101.
Euripides, 77 ; Suppliants of, 105 ; Trojan Women, 100.
EuRYALUs, 197, 197 n, 198, 206, 213-4.
Eurymedon, Athenian admiral, 154, 212, 214, 217.
Eurymedon, river in Pisidia, 1 9.
Eurymedon, Battle of the, 19, 30.
Euthima, 86, 90.
Euthydemus, Athenian admiral, 220.
Faerie Queene, Spenser's, 70. Fanari, modern name of the
harbour of Munychia, 25. Ferguson, W. Scott, quoted, 77,
91, 96, 102. Firman, 79-80, 80 n. Five Hundred, Council of, 87-9,
240. 243, 260. Five thousand, the, 240, 243, 244,
247. Folk Moot, 128. Four Hundred, the, 240, 241,
243-7, Frankish Dukes of Athens, 51.
278
INDEX
Frazer, Sir J. G., quoted, 25 n,
47, 54, 176. Freedom at Athens, 105-8, 219. Freedom of the seas, 18. Freeman, Prof. A. E., quoted,
1, 82, 184 n, 197 n. Frieze of the Parthenon, 57, 60-1,
76, 78. FuLKE Greville, Lord Brooke,
quoted, 133. Funeral Speech of Pericles, 99,
107, 108.
Gallipoli Peninsula (Thracian Chersonese), 9, 28, 29.
Gardner, Prof. Ernest, quoted, 25, 55.
Gate, Dipylon, 24 ; Piraic, 27.
Gela, 182.
Gelon, 191.
Geranea, Mount, 44.
Gilbert and SuUivan, 100.
Gongylus, Corinthian sea-captain, 203, 207.
Gorgias, 103.
Graphe paranom6n, 92.
Great Dionysia, 100.
Great Harbour of Syracuse, described, 184, 210 ; temporary landing of Athenians in, 194 ; Athenian naval station removed from Thapsus to, 200 ; battles in, 209, 211-2, 217, 220-1 ; the entrance closed by a boom, 218 ; scene at the final sea- fight in, 220.
Great Panathenaea, 100-1.
Greenidge's Greek Constitutional History, quoted, 92 n.
Greville, Fulke, Lord Brooke, quoted, 133.
Grote's History of Greece, quoted, 18.
Grundy, Dr. G. B., on Pylos and Sphacteria, 173-6.
Gwalior, 54, 54 n.
Gylippus, Spartan commander at Syracuse ; sent to Sicily at the urgent suggestion of Alcibiades, 202 ; eludes Nicias' war -ships and lands at Himera, 203 ; marches across Sicily and
reaches Syracuse over the heights of Epipolae, 203-4 ; takes Labdalum, 205 ; carries a cross -wall past the Athenian investing lines, 205-6 ; en- courages the Syracusans to fight at sea and captures the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium, 209 ; prepares the Syracusans for the last fight in the Great Harbour, 219 ; offers terms of surrender to Demosthenes, 227; at Nicias' prayer stops the slaughter in the Assinarus, 229 ; tries to save the lives of Nicias and Demosthenes, 230. See also Sicilian Expedition. Gythium, Lacedaemonian dock- yards at, 40, 67.
Hagnon, founder of Amphipolis and father of Theramenes, 170.
Haliartus, town in Boeotia, 42.
Halieis, 39, 137.
Hamilcar, Carthaginian general defeated at Himera, 191.
Handles left on the stone blocks of the Propylaea, 72 n.
Harrison, Dr. Jane, 54 n.
Haydon, Benjamin, the painter, 79.
Hecatombaeon, 99.
Hecatompedon, 57.
Hegisistratus, 4 n.
Heights of Epipolae, see Epipolae.
Heliaea, 85, 90-2.
Heliasts, 91.
Helleno-tamiae, revenue officers of the Delian confederacy, 16, 29, 47.
Hellespont (Dardanelles), 9, 18, 28, 29, 236, 248, 253, 254.
Helorine Road, 226.
Helorum, 226.
Helots, 36, 160, 162, 169.
Hermae, mutilation of the, 188-9.
Hermione, 137.
Hermocrates, ablest and most patriotic citizen of Syracuse, brings about a general pacifi- cation in Sicily, 182 ; organizes the defence of Syracuse, 195 ; fortifies the suburb Temenites,
INDEX
279
197 ; encourages the Syracu- sans to attack the Athenians by sea, 209 ; in command of the picked Six Hundred, 214 ; de- lays the retreat of the Athenians by a false message, 222.
Hermon, father of Hermocrates, 195.
Herodotus, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 20, 66.
Hesiod, 116.
Hetairiae (political clubs at Athens), 237.
Hicks and Hill, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 20, 39 n, 46 n, 68 n, 72 n.
Hiero, despot of Syracuse, 191.
Hill's Sources for Greek History , 20.
Himera, 182, 191, 193, 203, 225.
Hippeis (Horsemen), Athenian cavalry or knights, 93, 94, 104, 199, 260-1.
Hippias, tyrant of Athens, 117.
Hippocrates, Athenian commander slain at Delium, 167, 168.
Hogarth, Dr., 40 n.
Hybla in Sicily, 193.
Hykkara, town of the Sicani, captured by Nicias, 193, 194.
Hyperbolus, 98.
Ictinus, architect of the Parthe- non, 75.
Ida, Mount, 250.
Iliad, Catalogue of the Ships in the, 73 n.
Ihssos, 79.
Imbrians, 161.
Inaros the Libyan, 41.
Ionia, 4, 5, 8, 20, 234, 248.
Ionian Revolt, 8, 17, 250.
Ionian Sea, 63, 117.
lonians, 4, 8, 9, 11, 30-1, 113, 114, 132.
loNiANS AND DoRiANS, 182 ; also 35, 119, 121.
Iris, 79.
Isagoras, 117.
Island, the=Ortygia, 195, 209, 220.
Isthmus of Corinth, 6, 39, 44.
Italy, 117, 181, 183, 191, 202.
Ithome, 37, 39.
Journal of Hellenic Studies,
81, 173, 175, 176. Justinian, 51.
' Kaloikagathoi,' 96.
Knights, Athenian (Hippeis), 93,
104. Knights, The, of Aristophanes, 94,
172. Knobs, or handles, on stone blocks
of the Propylaea, 72 n. Korosko, 40.
Labdalum, 199, 205.
Lacedaemonians, 5, 8, 44, 117, 128, 129, 150, 155, 162, 180, 256.
Laconia, 40, 157.
Lade, battle of, 8, 30.
Lagoon of Osmyn Aga, 153, 174.
Lamachus, Athenian general, ap- pointed to joint command in the Sicilian Expedition, 186 ; proposes immediate attack on Syracuse, 192 ; comes over to AJci blades' plan, 193 ; death of, 201 ; also 98, 106, 198 n, and see Sicilian Expedition.
Lampsacus, 48, 253.
Latomia, or stone-quarry, of the Capuchins, 231.
Laurium, 136.
League, Achaean, 83 n ; Aetolian, 83 n ; Delian, see Confederacy of Del OS ; Peloponnesian, see Peloponnesian League.
Lebadea, 42.
Lemnians, 161.
Leonidas, 3 n, 42.
Leontini, 182, 182 n, 193.
Leotychides, 3, 4, 4 n, 8, 9.
Lesbos, sent a squadron of 70 ships to Lade, 30 ; free ally of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 34 ; re- volts except Methymna, 144-5 ; revolt again attempted but stopped, 236; also 119, 181, and see under Mytilene.
Leucadian ship sunk at Naupac- tus 144.
Leucas, 117, 139, 140.
Leuctra, 42,
^80
INDEX
Lex Valeria de Provocatione, 85 n.
Libya =• Africa, 187.
Libyan desert, 42.
' Lilliputian units,' 29.
Lincoln, Abraham, 32 n.
Little harbour of Syracuse, 190, 203, 209.
Liturgies, 96-8, 103, 104.
Livingstone, R. W., quoted, 171.
Lochagi, infantry officers, 104.
Locri in Bruttium, 203.
Locrians, 19, 39.
Long Walls of Athens, built, 39, 40 ; used to shelter refugees on the invasion of Attica in the Peloponnesian War, 135 ; broken down, 256. Also 44 and 254.
Loumpardaris, St. Demetrius, 56 n, 60 n.
Louvre, inscription in the, 39.
Lusieri, painter employed by Lord Elgin, 79.
Lycabettus, Mount, 52.
Lycurgus, the orator, 20.
Lycus, father of Thrasybulus, 241.
Lysander, Spartan high admiral, defeats the Athenians at Not- ium, 251 ; forms close friend- ship with the Persian prince Cyrus, 251 ; intrigues against Callicratidas, his successor, 251 ; reappointed to the naval com- mand, sails to the Hellespont and takes Lampsacus, 253 ; by a stratagem surprises the Athe- nian fleet at Aegospotami and captures all the ships but nine, 254 ; blockades Piraeus with a fleet of 150 ships, 255 ; compels the surrender of Athens by starvation, 256 ; sets up the government of the Thirty and procures them a Spartan garri- son, 257-8.
Lysias, the orator, 20.
Lysicrates, Monument of, 98.
Macedonia, 170. Magna Graecia, 182. Magnesia, 48.
Malta, 81.
Man -power at Athens, 38, 111-3, llln.
Mantinea, 178, 180.
Marathon, 3, 42, 99, 104, 148.
Mardonius, 5, 22, 66; scimitar of, 74.
Marvell, Andrew, quoted, 205.
Masistius, breastplate of, 74.
Megabyzus, Persian general, 41.
Megara, importance of its posi- tion as commanding the Isth- mus of Corinth, 39 ; its Long Walls to Nisaea built by the Athenians, 39; also 112, 244.
Megara Hyblaea, 182.
Megarian decree, shuts Megara out of all ports in the Con- federacy of Delos, 127 ; its withdrawal demanded by the Spartans, 129.
Megarians, by their own request admitted into the Athenian alliance, 39 ; slaughter their Athenian garrisons, 67 ; shut out from sea commerce by a decree of the Athenians, 127 ; frustrate democratic intrigues for alliance with Athens, 167 ; refuse to sign the Peace of Nicias, 178.
Megarid, the, ravaged yearly by the Athenians during the Pelo- ponnesian War, 39, 44, 67, 152!
Melanthus, 115.
Melesippus, Spartan envoy, 132.
Melian debate, 181.
Melos, 45, 180-1.
Memphis, 39, 41.
Menidhi, modern name of Achar- nae, 134.
Mentor, wreck of the, brig, 81.
Messana or Messene, 195, 202.
Messenians, 39, 118, 142, 164, 215.
Methone in Laconia, 169.
Methymna, town in Lesbos, 145, 251.
Metopes of the Parthenon, 60, 78 ; also 57.
Middle Wall, 27 n.
Miletus, 8, 15, 120-1, 236.
Mindarus, Spartan high admiral, 247, 249.
INDEX
281
Mnesicles, architect of the Pro- pylaea, 70, 72, 75.
Morosini, Francesco, 60 n.
Mokshead's translation of The Persians, quoted, 105, 106.
Mount Aegaleos, 134 ; Cithaeron, 151 ; Geranea, 44 ; Ida, 250 ; Lycabettus, 52 ; Mycale, 4, 120 ; Pangaeum, 29 ; Parnes, 134, 167, 260 ; Pentelicus, 77.
MuNYCHiA, harbour, 25, 25 n, 27 ; hill, 27, 261.
Museum, Acropolis, 59, 72, 78.
Museum, British, 76, 78.
Music and Gymnastic, 98.
Mycale, battle of, 3-6, 28.
Mycale, Moimt, 4, 120.
Mycenae, 42.
Myres' History of Rome, 85 n.
Myronides, Athenian general, 39, 40, 45, 115.
Mytilene, chief city of Lesbos ; revolt of, 145 ; defence by Salaethus, 146; surrender out of fear of the commons, 147 ; debate concerning fate of, 147 ; race for its deliverance from death, 148 ; Conon blockaded at, 251. See also 119, 159.
Myus, 48.
Napoleon, 80, 81.
Naucratis, Greek settlement in the
Delta of Egypt, 40, 40 n. Naupactus, 39, 39 n, 45, 139, 144,
167. Navarino, Bay of, 153, 157, 158,
174-5. Naxos (1), one of the Cyclades, 30,
31-2. Naxos (2), town in Sicily, 182, 193,
194, 199. Neapolis, later name of Teme-
nites, 197. Nestor of Pylos, 115. Niceratus, father of Nicias, 98. NiciAS, his position at Athens as
a conservative statesman of
birth and wealth, 98, 104 ;
offers the command at Pylos
to Cleon, 161 ; negotiates the
Fifty Years' Peace, 172, 179; his cautioxis temperament, 179 ; opposes the Sicilian Expedition, but appointed to joint command in it, 186-7 ; his plan of cam- paign overridden by Alcibiades and Lamachus, 192-3 ; inca- pacitated by illness, but saves the Round Fort from a surprise attack, 201 ; fails to stop Gylippus from reaching Syra- cuse, 203 ; his outspoken letter to the Athenians, 207-8 ; re- fuses to leave after the failure of Demosthenes' night -attack, • 216 ; his appeal to the ships' captains, 219 ; rises to a new heroism in face of defeat and disaster, 221-2, 224 ; leads the leading division in the retreat, 225 ; surrenders personally to Gylippus in the midst of the carnage at the Assinarus, 229 ; put to death by the Syracusans, 230.
Nike bastion, 59 ; and see 58 n.
NiKt, Temple or Athena, 58-9, 72, 75.
Nile, 39, 40, 41, 42.
Nile, Battle of the, 80.
Nine Ways, on site of Amphipolis, 37-8.
Nisaea, harbour of Megara, 39, 67, 68, 159.
Northmen, the, 31.
Notium, sea-fight at, 251.
Oak-heads Pass, 151 and 151 n.
Gates, Titus, 189 n.
Obol, 85, 85 n.
Odysseus, 48, 73 n.
Odyssey, 40, 40 n, 73 n.
Oedipus, 42 n.
Oenoe, 133.
Oenophyta, 40, 45, 116.
Old Comedy, 106, 172.
Olive-yard of Polyzelus, 227 n.
Olorus, father of the historian,
Thucydides, 63 n. Olympia, 75, 179. Olympic Games, 145.
282
INDEX
Olympieum, Syracusan Temple
of ^ens, 201 n. Orchomenos, 42. Oreus=Histiaea, 245. Oropus, 40, 45, 245, 246. Ortygia, the Island, oldest part
of Syracuse, 190, 195, 206, 210,
218.
Paches, Athenian commander at Mytilene, 146-8.
Palaio-Kastro=Pylos, 173.
Palestine, 41.
Pallas Athena, 75. • Panaenus, brother of Pheidias, 75.
Panathenaia, 99, 100, 102.
Panathenaic Frieze, 76.
Panathenaic Procession, 61, 74, 101.
Panathenaic Way, 53.
Pandroseum, 73.
Pangaeum, Mount, 29.
Panionium, 4.
ParaHa, 136.
Paralus, 193 n, 254.
Parnes, Moimt, 134, 167, 260.
Parthenon, 50, 54, 56-57, 58, 60-1, 60 n, 69, 74.
Pasha Limani =Zea, 25 n.
Patrae, modern Patras, 51, 141.
Pausanias (1), Spartan regent, 3, 10, 11, 11 n, 13, 47, 129.
Pausanias (2), the traveller, 25 n.
Pausanias (3), Spartan king, 255.
Peace, of Aristophanes, 172-3 ; Fifty Years' Peace of Nicias, 166, 172, 173 ; Thirty Years', 67-8, 118, 120, 127, 128.
Pearl Mosque at Agra, 58.
Pediment sculptures, 60, 76, 78-79.
Pegae, harbour of Megara, 68, 159.
Pelargicon, 54, 54 n.
Peloponnesian League, called out to protect Doris against the Phocians, 44 ; invades Attica, 67 ; action against Athens demanded by the Corinthians, 127 ; a conference of delegates votes for war, 129 ; expects ships to be built for it in Sicily, 182 ; its support of Syracuse, 184, 202.
Pentekonters, 24 n, 202.
Pentelicus, marble of, 77.
Peplos, 74.
Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, 125, 170.
Pericles, son of Xanthippus, birth and early career, 62 ; leads the democratic party on the death of Ephialtes, 62 ; his long unchallenged authority at Athens, 63 ; his hopes of common Hellenic action, 63-4 ; his plans for giving splendour to Athens, 65 ; significance of his public works as a thank- offering for national deliverance, 65-6 ; his conquest of Euboea after its revolt, 67 ; his reasons for concluding the Thirty Years' Peace, 68-9 ; his struggle with the conservative opposition, 72- 3 ; his friendship with Pheidias, 75 ; his conquest of Samos after revolt, 121 ; his policy of resistance to Sparta, 130 ; on the invasion of Attica persuades the Athenians to remain within their walls and trust to their fleet, 134-5 ; his loss of popular favour and its recovery, 137-8 ; his death in the third year of the war, 137 ; the sources of his influence, 138. See also 9, 55, 64, 179, 184, 252.
Persephone, 79.
Persians, bravery in the battle of Mycale, 5 ; problem of the protection of the lonians from their vengeance, 8-9 ; aims of the Delian Confederacy against, 14 ; their defeat at the Eury- medon and in Cyprus, 19 ; the Aegean coast cleared of their tax-gatherers, 20 ; latent danger from, shown in the Samian revolt, 120-1 ; by treaty with Sparta obtain a recognition of the King's claims, 234-5 ; Greek intrigues with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, 238, 247.
Petrie, Dr. Flinders, 40 n.
Phaeacia, 73 n, 123.
INDEX
283
Phaeax, Athenian commissioner to Sicily, 183.
Phalerum Bay, 24, 24 n, 25, 27 ; Harbour, 24, 25 n, 27.
Pharnabazus, Persian satraj), 247, 250.
Pheidias, son of Channides, en- trusted with the supervision of all the great works projected by Pericles and Pericles' per- sonal friend, (32, 75 ; maker of the gold and ivory image of Athena and of the gold and ivory Zeus at Olympia, 75 ; inspirer and guide of other sculptors working under his direction, 76-7.
Phocians, 44.
Phocis, 235.
Phoenicians, 19, 41, 121.
Pholegandros, 15, 29.
Phormios sea-fights, 138-44; 169, 211.
Phrynichus, oligarchical leader, 243-4.
Phylakopi in Melos, 180.
Phyle, border fortress in Mt. Parnes seized by Thrasybulus and held against the Thirty, 260-1 ; described, 262.
Picture Gallery in the Propylaea, 70.
Piraeus, fortified by Themis- toclea, 24-7 ; trireme race from, 101 ; Brasidas' raid on, 169 ; fleet sails from, to Sicily, 189 ; alarm caused by the fortifica- tion of Eetionea, 243-4 ; tu- mults in, 244 ; fear of attack on, 245-7 ; landing of Alcibiades at, 250 ; blockaded by Lysander, 255 ; occupation bv Thrasy- bulus, 261. Also 47^ 51, 184.
Piraeus, peninsula of, 24, 27, 47.
Piraeus, town of, 25, 27.
Pisander, oligarchical leader, 243.
Pisistratus, 28, 29.
Pissuthnes, Persian satrap, 120.
Plague at Athens, 136-7.
Plataea and the Plataeans, surprised at night by a Theban force and at first make terms
with them, but afterwards attack and ro\it them, 130-1 ; put their prisoners to death, 132 ; attacked by the whole Peloponnesian army in the third year of the war, 148 ; by the advice of the Athenians refuse the terms offered and are besieged, 149 ; half the garrison break out over the besiegers' wall and escape, 150-2; the remnant surrender and are put to death by the Spartans, 149-50.
Plato, 41, 106-7.
Plemmyrium, 206, 209, 210, 218.
Plutarch, quoted, 13, 20, 61, 64, 65, 72, 75, 76, 187, 227 n, 251.
Pnyx, traditional meeting -place of the Athenian Ecclesia, 87, 101, 240, 247.
Polemarch, one of the nine archons, 90.
Polichna, 201, 201 n, 206, 210.
Poly crates of Samos, 120.
Polygnotus, famous painter, 69.
Polyzelus, Olive-yard of, 227 n.
Popish Plot, 189 n.
Population of Attica, 38, 111.
Porte, the, 79.
Port«lla del Fusco, 200 n.
Poseidon, 60, 74, 75, 129.
Potidaea, colony of Corinth, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallene, 125-6, 126 n, 129.
Prasiae in Laconia, 137.
Prevoyante, the, 81.
Probouleuma, or draft resolution of the Coimcil at Athens, 88.
Probouli, special advisory Board appointed in 413 b.c. at Athens, 237.
Procles, son of Aristodemus, founder of the younger house of Spartan kings, 3 n.
Prodicus, sophist, 103.
Propylaea, the, 53, 55-6, 59-60, 69-70, 75.
Prosopitis, island of, in the Nile, 41, 112.
* Prostates tou demou,' 93.
284
INDEX
Prote, island on the Messenian coast, 157.
Prytaneis, 88.
Psammetichus, Egyptian king, 40.
Punch, 172.
Pydna in Macedonia, 48.
Pylos (Coryphasion), described, 153, 154-5 ; roughly fortified by the seamen of the Athenian fleet, 154-5 ; held by Demos- thenes against attack, 155-7 ; badly supplied with water, 160 ; Dr. Grundy and Dr. Burrows on the topography of, 173-6 ; also 153 n, 177, 180, 182, 183.
Pythagoras, philosopher of Samos, 41.
Pythion of Megara, 68 n.
Quarries, The, 229-231.
Rameses II., king of Egypt, 40. Rawlinson's Herodotus, quoted
5-6, 8, 66. Recovery of the dead after battle,
168. Representative principle at
Athens, 83, 83 n. Rhegium (Reggio), 192. Rhium, Achaean, 141, 142. Rhium, Molycrian=Antirrhium,
142. Rhodes, 236. Riviera, 184. RoGEEs, Benjamin Bickley,
translator of Aristophanes, 3,
187-8. Roll of Honour, Athenian, for the
year 459 B.C., 39, 112. Ross, Ludvig, 59 n. Round Fott, the, 199, 200, 201,
205. RusKiN, John, 66.
Sacrilege, at Deliiun, 168 ; Tae- narus, 129 ; of the Alcmaeoni- dae, 129 ; of Athena of the Brazen House, 129.
St. Demetrius Loumpardaris (the Bombardier), 56 n, 60 n.
Salaethus, Spartan defender of Mytilene, 146-7.
Salaminia, state despatch ship, 193, 202.
Salamis, battle of, 3, 4, 157.
Salamis, Cyprian, 19.
Samos, offers to revolt from Persia, 4 ; admitted into the Hellenic alliance, 9 ; described, 120 ; wages war with Miletus and on intervention of Athens revolts, 120-1 ; reduced by Pericles, 121 ; democratic revo- lution at, 236 ; becomes the Athenian base, 237 ; oligarchical intrigue at, 239 ; events at, after the democratic reaction, 240-3.
Sardinia, 184.
' Sardinia to Pont us,' 111.
Saronic Gulf, 24, 45, 52, 116 n, 246.
' School of Hellas,' Athens the, 108.
School of Pheidias, 76-7.
Scione, destruction of, 171, 254.
Scironian rocks, 51.
Scyros, 18.
Sea power, of Athens, 45, 138-44.
Segesta, in Sicily, city of the Elymi, 183, 184 n, 186, 192, 193, 199 ; and see Sicilian Expe- dition.
Selinus, city in Sicily, enemy of Segesta, 182, 183, 192, 193.
Shelley, quoted, 50, 82.
Sicani, early inhabitants of Sicily, 193.
Sicels, people from whom Sicily gets its name, 194, 199, 202, 224-6.
Sicilian Expedition, 181-231 ; Athenian interest in Sicily, 181- 3 ; appeal of Segesta, 183 ; expedition voted, 186 ; Nicias against his wish appointed to the command along with Alci- biades and Lamachus, 186-7 ; excitement of the Athenians over the preparations, 187-8 ; alarm roused by the mutilation of the Hermae, 188-9 ; spec- tacular departure of the war- fleet from Piraeus, 189-90 ; the
INDEX
285
crossing of the Adriatic to Italy, 191 ; discussion of plans at Rhegium, 192-3 ; demonstra- tions along the coasts of Sicily and petty operations, 193 ; arrest of Alcibiades and his subsequent escape from Thurii, 193, 202 ; landing in the Great Harbour and defeat of the Syra- cusans, 194 ; after wintering at Catana and Naxos the Athe- nians seize Epipolae and rout the Syracusans, 198 ; build Labdalum and the Round Fort and from the Round Fort con- struct investing lines north and south, 199-200 ; take in suc- cession two counter-works of the Syracusans and reduce the city to great straits, but lose Lamachus, 200-1; Athenian fleet moved into the Great Harbour from the Bay of Thapsus, 200 ; Gylippus, sent out from Sparta, avoids the war- ships despatched to intercept him, lands at Himera, marches across Sicily, ascends Epipolae by Euryalus and reaches Syra- cuse, passing the unfinished end of tlie Athenian lines, 202-4 ; Gylippus takes Labdalimi and begins a third Syracusan coimter-work, 205 ; Nicias moves his fleet to Plemmyrium, 206 ; Gylippus defeats the Athenians and carries his cross - wall beyond their unfinished lines, . 206-7 ; in the winter Gylippus collects fresh troops, Nicias sends to Athens an virgent request for reinforce- ments, and for his own recall, 207-8 ; in the spring of 413 Gylippus captures Plemmy- riimi, while the Athenians are narrowly victorious in a naval action, 209 ; on news of the approach of the Athenian re- inforcements the Syracusans bring on a new fight in the Great Harboiir and are vic-
torious, 211-2 ; next day a fresh Athenian fleet sails up under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, 212-3 ; Demosthenes attempts a night attack on Epipolae, but fails disastrously, 213-6 ; on Demosthenes' advice Nicias con- sents to a withdrawal from Syracuse, but is stopped by an eclipse of the moon, 216-7 ; the Syracusans attack by land and sea, and defeat the Athe- nians in the Great Harbour, 217 ; the Syracusans proceed to close the mouth of the Great Harbour, 218 ; the Athenian fleet attempts to force the passage, but after a desperate struggle is totally defeated, 218- 21 ; the Athenian retreat is delayed by a false message, 222 ; the Athenian forces abandon their sick, wounded, and dead, and to the number of 40,000 men commence a retreat in two divisions, one under Nicias, the other under Demosthenes, 223- 5 ; they are turned back after vainly attempting to penetrate into the hill country westward, 226 ; Demosthenes, overtaken and surrounded on the 6th day of the retreat, surrenders on terms, 227 ; Nicias' division overtaken and slaughtered at the Assinarus, 228 ; the slaughter stayed at Nicias' personal entreaty and the sur- vivors made prisoner, 229 ; fate of the prisoners, 229-31.
Sicily, described, 184.
Sigeum, 28, 28 n.
Sinai desert, 41.
Siphae, in Boeotia, 167.
Six Hundred, the, 198, 214.
' Snobbery,' 96.
Solon, 28, 41.
Sophocles, (1) the tragic poet, 77, 100 ; (2) Athenian admiral, 154.
Spakta, withdraws from the struggle with Persia on the
286
INDEX
formation of the Confederacy of Delos, 13-4 ; earthquake at, followed by Helot rising, 36 ; forced into the Peloponnesian war by her allies, 122; meeting of the Apella at, 127 ; alarm at the occupation of Pylos, 155; shock to her prestige from the surrender of the men in Sphac- teria, 165 ; shame of her treaties with the King of Persia, 234-5 ; magnanimity to Athens in defeat, 256, 261.
Spartans, take part in the battle of Mycale, 5 ; oppose the re- building of the walls of Athens, 21-2; offend the Athenians over the siege of Ithome, 37 ; march with the forces of the Pelopon- nesian League to the help of Doris, their reputed mother- land, 44 ; win the battle of Tanagra, 44 ; invade Attica, 67 ; agree to the Thirty Years' Peace, 68 ; listen to the com- plaints of their allies, 127 ; vote for war with Athens, 128 ; devastate Attica, 134, 146 ; send Salaethus to Mytilene, 146 ; put their Plataean prisoners to death, 149-50 ; offer terms of amity to Athens during the blockade of Sphacteria, 158-9 ; vainly seek peace, 165 ; agree to the Peace of Nicias, 166, 172 ; make a separate treaty with Athens, 178 ; once more es- tranged through Alcibiades' double-deaUng, 180 ; send Gy- lippus to Syracuse, 202 ; occupy Decelea, 235.
' Spectator,' quoted, 110.
Spenser's Faerie Queene, 70.
Sphacteria (Sphagia), island of, described, 153 ; Spartan troops landed on, 157 ; cut off by the victory of the Athenian fleet, 157-8 ; Spartans propose a truce and surrender their fleet, 158 ; on the failure of negotia- tions the Athenians unjustly retain the Spartan fleet and
resume the blockade, 159-60 ; food conveyed across by blockade -runners, the blockade protracted and the Athenians grow impatient, 160 ; Cleon blames the generals and is offered the command, 161 ; by adopting Demosthenes' plans, Cleon brings the Spartans on the island back prisoners to Athens within twenty days, 161-5 ; . Also 166, 167, 172, 183 ; Dr. Grundy and Dr. Burrows on topography of, 173-6.
Stevens and Westcott's History of Sea Power, quoted, 95.
Stevenson's, Our Lady of the Snows, quoted, 58 n.
Sthenelaidas, Spartan ephor, 128.
Stoa Poekile, 75.
Straits of Messina, 192, 203.
Strategi, 83, 89, 93.
Street of Tombs, 24.
Street of Tripods, 98.
Strymon, river in Thrace, 18, 170, 171.
Stuart and Revett's, Antiqui- ties of Athens, 79, 81.
Sulla's siege of Athens, 51.
Sunium, Cape, 60, 245.
Superintendent of Watersprings, 83.
Sycophant, 258, 258 n.
Symonds, J. A., quoted, 229-230.
Synoecia, 136.
Syracusan cavalry, 194, 199, 201, 206, 215-6, 226, 227, 229.
Syracusan squadron on the Helles- pont, 249.
Syracusans, their quarrel with Leontini, 182 ; their support of Selinus, 183 ; their lack of discipline causes their defeat, 194 ; adopt measures for better defence, 195 ; prepare to secure Epipolae, but are forestalled by Nicias, 198 ; greatly disheartened by their defeats and even think of sur- render, 202 ; learn from Gon- gylus of the coming of Gyhppus,
INDEX
287
203 ; march out to meet him,
204 ; use Athenian materials for their third counter-work, 205 ; on the advice of GyUppus and Hermocrates man their ships and prepare to fight in the Great Harbour, 207 ; beat the Athe- nians by strengthening the bows of their ships, 212 ; plan the total destruction of the Athenian armaments, 217-8 ; block all possible ways of re- treat, 222 ; keep up harassing attacks for eight days till all the retreating forces are des- troyed or surrender, 226-9 ; take cruel vengeance on their prison- ers, 230-1. See also Sicilian Expedition.
Syracuse, described, 190-1 ; also 184 ; a colony of Corinth, 117, 181 ; scene at the last fight in the Great Harbour, 220.
Tanagra, 40, 42, 44, 62, 104.
Tarentum, 182, 203.
Tegeans, 7.
Tellis, father of Brasidas, 169.
Temenites, suburb of Syracuse, 190, 197.
Temple of Athena Nike, 55, 58-9, 66, 72, 75, 80.
Ten Years' War, 166, 182.
Tenedos, 147.
Thales, Ionian philosopher, 41.
Thapsus, Bay of, 195, 197, 198, 199, 203.
Thargelia, Athenian festival, 99, 102.
Thasos, resists Athens in a dispute over gold mines and is subdued after a two years' struggle, 36-7.
Thebans, claim the headship of all Boeotia, 42 ; their enmity to Athens, 115 ; their surprise attack on Plataea, 130-2 ; press the Spartans to lay siege to Plataea, 148 ; advocate the de- struction of Athens, 256.
Thebes, her mythical fame, 42 ; 42 n ; her headship of Boeotia lost through her Medism, 42 ;
restored through Spartan influ- ence, 44 ; in political subjec- tion to Athens after Oenophyta, 45 ; recovers her dominant position after Coronea, 67.
Themistocles, outwits the Spar- tans, 21-4 ; carries through his plan of fortifying the Piraie peninsula, 25-7 ; accused by the Spartans of complicity in the treason of Pausanias, 47 ; flies for his life, is befriended by Admetus, prince of the Mo- lossians, and ultimately escapes to Ephesus, 48 ; admitted into the service of the Persian king and dies at Magnesia, 48 ; his ashes brought to Athens and buried at the entrance to the Piraeus, 47 ; his character drawn by Thucydides, 49 Also 7 and 12.
Thera, 45.
Theramenes, son of Hagnon, heads the moderate party in the Four Hundred, 243 ; opposes the fortification of Eetionea and acquiesces in its destruc- tion, 244 ; one of the trierarchs ordered to rescue the wrecked crews at Arginusae, 258 ; absent three months on a mission to Lysander, 255 ; sent to treat for peace and on his return counsels submission, 256 ; as one of the Thirty opposes Critias, 258-9 ; denounced and ordered to execution, 259-60.
Thermopylae, 3, 164.
Theseia, Athenian festival, 99.
Theseus, 51, 60, 79.
Thesmophoria, Athenian festival, 99.
Thesmothetae, 90.
Thespians, 42, 215 n.
Thessalians, 44, 169.
Thessaly, 235.
Thirty, The, 257-261.
Thirty Years' Peace, 67-8, 118, 120, 127, 128.
Thracian Chersonese =Galli- poh peninsula, 9, 28, 234, 251.
288
INDEX
Thracians, 38, 170, 251.
Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, takes a leading part in resisting re- volutionary intrigue at Samos, 241 ; seizes Phyle and repels the attacks of the Thirty, 260-1; marches to Piraeus, occupies the hill Munychia and defeats the forces of the Thirty ; instru-
, mental in restoring democracy at Athens, 261.
Thrasyllus, 241, 250.
Thrasymachus, sophist, 103.
Three Hundred, the, 200, 201.
Three Thousand, the, 259, 260, 261.
Thriasian Plain, 133.
Thucydides (1), son of Melesias, 63, 104.
Thucydides (2), the historian, son of Olorus, in local command when Brasidas appears before Amphipolis, saves Eion, but fails to save Amphipolis, 171 ; his banishment, 171 n ; his judgment of the Sicilian Ex- pedition, 186 ; still in exile when the fleet sails from Piraeus, 190 ; his belief that the ex- treme party among the Four Hundred intended to call in the Spartans, 244.
Thurii, 202, 202 n.
Thyrea, 167.
TisSAPHERNES, Persian satrap, promises money support to the Spartans, 234 ; welcomes the counsels of Alcibiades, 238 ; importance of his command of the Phoenician fleet, 241-2 ; quarrels with the Pelopon- nesians, 247.
ToLMiDES, burns Gythium, 40 ; killed at Coronea, 67.
Torone, on the peninsula Sithonia, taken by Cleon, 171 ; see also 254.
Trafalgar Square meeting, 87.
Treasury of the Confederacy of
Delos, 15, 16 ; transferred to
Athens, 35, 47. Treatise on the Athenian State,
101, 107, 118. Trident marks in the Erechtheum,
74, 74 n. Trierarchy, 97, 102. Trireme race, 101 ; also 47. Troezen, 51, 68, 114, 118, 137,
159. Troy, Elymi supposed fugitives
from, 183. Trygaeus, the hero of Aristo-
phanes' Peace, 173. Turks, the, 51, 56 n, 60 n, 80, 81,
234 n. Tuscans and Tuscany, 183, 202. Tyche, suburb of Syracuse, 190,
197.
United States, 32 n.
Venetians, 60 n, 154. Verres, 119.
Wadi Haifa on the Nile, 40. Walls of Athens rebuilt, 21-4. Wasps of Aristophanes, 172. Way's Euripides quoted, 105. Wheler, Sir George, 79. White Castle, the, 39, 41. Wolfe, General, 172. Women of Troy, Euripides', 100.
Xanthippus, father of Pericles,
captures Sestos, 9-10. Xenophon, 252, 254, 260, 261. Xerxes, 6, 18, 54, 123, 157. Xerxes' Bridges, 9, 10 ; Canal,
170.
Zacynthus, 155, 157.
Zea, Harbour of, 25.
Zeus, image of, at Olympia, 75.
Zimmern's Greek Commonwealth,
quoted, 47, 82, 83 n, 96, 97,
109, 110.
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