PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

CRITICALLY EXAMINED

PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM
CRITICALLY EXAMINED

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR

GEORGE HENSLOW, M.A. F.L.S. F.G.S.
1

AUTHOR Ol--

Evolution and Religion ; Christ iaii Beliefs Reconsidered
in the Light of Modern Thought, etc.

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JENNINGS AND GRAHAM

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THE NEW YORK

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ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS

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THE ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS LIMITED

PREFACE

The present work is an attempt to point out
and refute some of the fallacies of Present-day
Rationalism and Materialism/

Since the Rationalist Press Association was
established in 1899, and has for its object the
diffusion of cheap editions of Rationalistic and
Atheistic works, it is worth while trying to explain
to unscientific readers the erroneous assumptions
made in their reasonings.

Of course, many Secularistic and Rationalistic
writings are directed against Christian theo-
logical dogmas, especially, perhaps, those of the
late Mr. Bradlaugh's days in the "Seventies".
I do not enter upon this field of controversy,
beyond stating the bases of belief in God, Free
Will and Immortality.

I particularly emphasise Inductive Reasoning ;

' 1 Haeckel in his Riddle of the Universe calls it " Monism," but he
means Materialistic Monism.

vi Preface

for some Rationalists insist upon "observation
and experiment" as the only acceptable kind of
proof of God — a method of evidence obviously
out of the question — and they moreover assert
that whatever cannot be brought within these two
things is not to be accepted as science or know-
ledge.

As Materialistic Monists, such as Haeckel and
Biichner, state categorically that "Darwinism"
forms the basis of their Atheistic views, it is
necessary to discuss the principles of Evolution
and its methods. It will be seen that certain distinct
assumptions were made by Darwin — upon which
his special theory of TAe Origin of Species by
means of Natural Selection, known as " Dar-
winism," is founded — but they have no foundation
in fact.

On the other hand, his alternative explanation —
which he for the most part regarded as too rarely
occurring to be worthy of consideration at any
length, viz., by what he called the " Definite action
of the Environment" has been now proved to be
really the true and only method in the origin of
species. This I have called the " True Darwinism,"
but it has already received in Botany the title of
" Ecology ".

Then, as Dr. Weismann has asserted, contrary to
Darwin's opinion, as also of Haeckel's, that char-
acters acquired by the soma cannot be hereditary.

PREFACE vii

it is necessary to prove by examples that this view
is fallacious.^

After pointing out the absurdities in Haeckel's
theory of the origin of living protoplasm, Evolution
carries us direct to and inclusive of Man. There
does not seem to be any necessity of a "break"
in the continuity as some suppose, but Man alone
has acquired the power of making abstractions
objects of thotight. This lies at the base of all
his superior "God-like" powers. It forms the
sharp line of demarcation between him and the
animal world. ^

Man is thus enabled (i) to be self-conscious ; (2)
to be conscious of other "selves," hence to be
altruistic ; (3) to realise the conception of God ; (4)
to be conscious of having the power to choose, i.e.,
a Free Will or Volition ; (5) to acquire a belief
in Immortality.

As inductive evidence accumulates in favour of
the belief in God, so does it for a future existence,
while Faith in spiritual matters is shown to be

^I have been accused of insisting upon "Adaptation," i.e., Darwin's
alternative method, as if it were my own theory. I have never done
so. I would rather insist upon the reader as regarding it as Darwin's, for
it will be found clearly stated in his works. What I did was, in reading
Darwin's books, to collect all the facts I could read of or observe,
coupling them with experimental proofs. Then, after about fifteen years,
I published The Origin of Floral Structures in 1888, and The Origin
of Plant Structures in 1895, as well as papers in Natural Science.

2 While writing this book I found both Locke and Schopenhauer, as
well as others, have held their view.

viii PREFACE

based on inductive evidence, just as Conviction is
in the scientific world.

This line of argument running through the book
was embodied in a lecture delivered before the
University College Christian Association on ist
May, 1903.

Lord Kelvin, who kindly proposed a vote of
thanks, expressed himself as thoroughly in accord
with it, and strongly corroborated my contention
that modern Natural Theology or Theism is based
on strictly scientific methods of reasoning. His
observations will be found following my address
(the first of six) in the volume entitled Christian
Apologetics (J. Murray, 2s. 6d,).

CONTENTS

PART I

Nature
Chapter I

PAGE

The Old Secularism of the " Seventies " 3

Chapter II
The New Secularism of To-day 11

Chapter III

Rationalism and Materialistic Monism professedly based on

Darwinism . . . . . . . . . • 17

Chapter IV

Materialistic and Theistic Views of the Evolution of the Inorganic

World 28

Chapter V
Haeckel's Materialistic Theory of the Origin of Living Beings . 38

Chapter VI
Life and its Phenomena 49

b

X CONTENTS

Chapter VII

PAGE

Life and its Phenomena (continued) 60

Chapter VIII

"Directivity" a Witness of Mind, in Evidence throughout the

Living World .......... 69

Chapter IX

The Principle of Least Action in the Evolution of Organic Struc-
tures 87

Chapter X
The Abandoned Argument of Design q\

Chapter XI
Pseudo-philosophic Views of Evolution 107

Chapter XII
Final Causes 114

Appendix to Part I

Darwinism
I. Darwinism based on Erroneous Assumptions .... 145

II. The True Darwinism or the Natural Law of Adaptation . . 161

III. Adaptation (continued) 174

IV. Heredity of Acquired Characters, a Fundamental Principle of

Evolution 183

V. Heredity of Acquired Characters (continued) .... 195

CONTENTS xi

PART II

Man
Chapter I

PAGE

Man's Origin by Evolution 207

Chapter II
Rationalistic Views of Science and Knowledge . . . .221

Chapter III
Rationalistic Views of Psychology, Reason and Instinct . . . 232

Chapter IV
Metaphysical Conceptions of the Senses 251

Chapter V
Inductive Reasoning and the Faith of Theists 265

Chapter VI
Free Will and Automatism 273

Chapter VII
The Ethics of Rationalism and Christianity 294

Chapter VIII
Religion and Rationalism 311

Chapter IX
The Origin of Moral Evil * 317

Chapter X
Rationalistic Views of Physical Evils ; and the Law of " Inideality " 327

xii CONTENTS

Chapter XI

PAGE

Ether as the Vehicle of Divine Power and the Human Soul . .341

Chapter XII
Rationalistic Criticisms upon the Theological Aspect of God . , 350

Chapter XIII

Inductive Evidence the Basis of Belief of the Theist in Human

Immortality 358

PART I

NATURE

CHAPTER I

THE OLD SECULARISM OF THE "SEVENTIES"

Some thirty years ago we heard a good deal of Secular-
ism, when Mr. Bradlaugh was a prominent figure before
the world and was promulgating his atheistic views.^

Mr. G. W. Foote defined Secularism as " Naturalism
in Morals as distinguished from Supernaturalism "."-

Speaking of Mr. Bradlaugh, Mr. Foote said : " Filled
with Republican and Atheistic Faith he stands upon the
cardinal assumptions of human greatness and power, and
the impossibility of supernatural knowledge ; and he
trusts in them as eternal and unassailable verities ".

" Mr. G. J. Holyoake, although an Atheist, puts for-
ward a philosophic theory of human life and duties,
which he terms ' Secularism '.^ From this, three pro-
positions are deducible — Science is the only Provi-
dence, Reason the sole guide. Happiness the sole end."
" The invariability of Nature's methods of operation,
the inviolability of the law of universal causation — be-
longs peculiarly to Secularism." ..." In the realm of mind,
as in the realm of matter, everything works in accordance
with definite laws. The science of psychology is win-
ning a definite place for itself." [Haeckel now merges

1 Such as A Plea for Atheism and Is there a God ?

^ Secularism Restated, 1 874.

^i.e., as concerning this world only.

(3)

4 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

it in physiology.] ..." In Secularism Reason is the sole
guide." ..." Whatever in any of the supposed sacred
writings of the world is good, pure, elevating and in-
spiring, Secularism thankfully accepts and assimilates.
Whatever is evil, corrupt, ignoble and degrading it sternly
rejects."

With regard to Happiness as being the sole end of
action in Secularism, all sensual pleasures were regarded
as degrading, and rational pleasures were to be aimed
at. They are " by no means comparable to those of the
great-minded philosopher who penetrates into the pro-
foundest mysteries of Nature, or to those of the large-
souled philanthropist whose whole life is a loving
ministration to wants of suffering humanity ".

" To the utilitarian standard all actions must be
made to conform ; all other standards are the veriest
delusions, as inconsistent as they are misleading. Mo-
rality cannot be founded upon the will of God, for no
power can decree morality. If God has a claim upon
my gratitude, or reverence, or worship, it can only be
because he is himself gracious, adorable and worshipful,
and not because of his power to exact from me a
reluctant prostration. So it is not power but goodness
which entitles God to reverence, and therefore, at bottom,
goodness and not God is the object of adoration."

" Secularism is utilitarian, regarding happiness as the
aim of action ; happiness pursued through Duty, not
because Duty possesses a distinctive and inherent sacred-
ness, but because it is the necessary road to happiness.
Duty is imperative upon all because it implies the per-
formance of such actions as are absolutely necessary to
the preservation of society, and without which retrogres-
sion and anarchy would inevitably ensue."

" Secularism being concerned only with the region of

THE OLD SECULARISM 5

morals it has no message respecting the great problems
of theology."

With regard to immortality, "The mere naked belief
in it may be entertained by a Secularist without any
detraction from essential Secularism ; but the very
moment it interferes with the principles of Secularism,
that very moment the doctrine of a future life becomes
pernicious ".

" Similarly with the belief in an intelligent controlling
Power in the universe, Atheism and Theism are alike
distinct things from Secularism. They have no relation-
ship whatever to the practical duties of life."

" In Secularism there is a mutual platform for Atheists,
Theists and Pantheists, for all, in fact, who have fully
recognised t/ie Universality of Causation^ the Supremacy
of Reason and the Independence of Ethics on theological
dogmas!'

Such is an outline of the main contentions of the
older Secularists ; and the first question which naturally
arises in one's mind is : What is the motive power for
obedience to Duty spoken of? — for such seems to be no
more than the laws of the land or the Decalogue enforced
by punishment if they be violated, such being social
laws. The answer Mr, Foote gives is : " To the charge
that Secularism is cold and dreary, devoid of feeling and
imagination, we reply, The history of humanity lies open
to us as a rich treasure-house of noble example and
generous inspiration. . . . From the history of every
heroic martyr to the cause of truth and human deliver-
ance we receive sustenance, inspiration and hope. Our
cheeks tingle and flush as we peruse the page which
records how noble sufferers have laid down their bodies
in the breach in order that others might use them as
stepping-stones to final victory over error and wrong.

6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

If men cannot be moved to passionate enthusiasm and
ardent hope and heroic daring by these things, they are
impervious to all pure and holy influences. . . . The
Heavenly Paradise has been dreamed of by imaginative
theologians and longed for by the votaries of supersti-
tion ; for Secularism it remains to realise the Earthly
Paradise for men, where the flower and fruit of happi-
ness shall bloom for the delight and sustenance of
all."

Two things are herein very apparent. First, what-
ever moral conduct is upheld by Secularists, it does not
differ from what is commonly accepted by Christians.
Secondly, the stories of noble heroes of the past have
never yet created an enthusiasm for practical goodness
in posterity ; with the exception of Jesus Christ, who for
nearly 2000 years has been a Power for Holiness in all
who will accept Him.

Mr. Holyoake averred that Secularism and Christi-
anity could not exist compatibly with one another ; but
true Christianity is solely the CJirist-like Charactei-, which
Secularism would seem inclined to imitate but cannot
improve.

The above quotations will show what Secularism was
in the seventies. All that is good in it is borrowed
from Christianity and not solely obtainable from Nature
or Reason.

We shall presently see its position after thirty years,
as described by writers of to-day ; but a few more obser-
vations by Secularists, in order to point out their illogical
character, may be advisable.

There was an expression used by Rationalists : " I can-
not believe in that which I cannot comprehend". Such
were the words of Mr. Austin Holyoake on his deathbed
in 1874, on which the editor of the Christian Evidence

THE OLD SECULARISM 7

Journal^ remarks : " A vast amount of scepticism is based
upon this same idea, yet it is one of the most delusive
that can be entertained, and one upon which we do not
act in ordinary life nor in science and philosophy. We
all believe daily in what we cannot comprehend, and to
look for an exception in the domain of religion is a fatal
error."

What does the latest writer on Freethought say ?
Exactly the reverse of Mr. Austin Holyoake's assertion.

Mr. G. Forester in his book, The Faith of an Agnostic^
or First Essays i?i Rationalism, 1902, observes : " We are
compelled to believe in the reality of that which to us is
inconceivable".^

" The Unknowable is not synonymous with the Non-
existent." '^

" In the regions of transcendental thought, far beyond
human ken, and for which human language is utterly
inadequate, there may be that explanation for which
religion and philosophy have ever sought, and ever
sought in vain." "*

It were easy to show that Mr. Austin Holyoake, and
I suppose he only represented many other Secularists in
his day, was utterly inconsistent. Did he, and do others
now, not believe in Electricity? Yet those who know
most about it cannot comprehend it. They can no more
answer the question, " What is Electricity ? " than they
can tell you what the Ether is ; yet every physicist
believes in both. Electricity like Gravity is a poiver ;
that is all. So there is a Power behind all Nature, as
incomprehensible as Electricity ; yet all believe in it
whether they regard it as conscious or not.

^ Number for May, 1874, p. 80.
"^The Faith of mi Agnostic, p. 177.
3/6id., p. 180, •'/izd., p. 182.

8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

This self-limitation on the part of the Secularist is a
perfectly gratuitous one. To summarise the old Secu-
larism we shall see that the sole reliance upon Science
and Reason is in agreement with the Rationalists and
Haeckelian Monists of to-day, and we shall also see how
far this, their prop and stay, is trustworthy.

The proposed means of securing happiness was ap-
parently much the same as now. It is also noticeable
that the want of enthusiasm in Secularism is also still
existing.

Why Secularism should claim the invariability of
Nature's laws as peculiarly its own is not very clear ;
since that invariability has existed ever since the world
began.

Secularism might be called simple morality based on
Utilitarian principles of social duties, for the sake of the
happiness which Duty brings. Our jails and police courts
have something to show in opposition to this.

Secularism differed from Materialism of to-day in that
it permitted belief in a God and immortality as harmless
ideas, unless " interfering with the principles of Secular-
ism".

On the other hand Monists like Haeckel ridicule both
as superstitions.

When the Secularist says, " Theism has no relation
whatever to the practical duties of life," the greatest
motive power for a good life is gone ; and the weakness
of Secularism lies in the want of any efficient motive.
This becomes at once apparent in the inefficiency of
Secularism to gather in the multitude; as it was in the
seventies, so, as we shall see, is it now.

To hold up the ideals of goodness and virtue as
stimulating abstractions will never appeal to the masses
of mankind. Nor will reading the stories in Fox's Boo^

THE OLD SECULARISM 9

0/ Martyrs have any really moral effect, nor even has it
been able to kindle much, if any, enthusiasm ; even al-
lowing for what the actual witness of a martyr's death
might have had and undoubtedly did have upon others
during times of persecution.

It is interesting to read the expedients to which
writers are put for motives. Mr. Mallock thus writes :
" In all the annals of intellectual self-deception it would
be hard to find anything to outdo or even to approach
the fantastic absurdities of Mr. Spencer in search of a
religion. He invites each man to consider and to rever-
ence himself as one of the ' myriad causes through which
the Unknown Cause works '....' It is not for nothing that
the Unknowable has implanted in man certain impulses.'
Surely (says Mr. Mallock) here is anthropomorphism
with a vengeance ! . . . What idea could be more incon-
sistent with the whole teaching of Monism ? " ^ Huxley
said that " Obedience to the moral law is producible only
by the prevalence of the idea of Duty. . . . And the
motive is to be found," says Prof. Huxley, " in the beauty
of conduct which is ' to devote oneself to the service of
humanity,' 'to pity and help all men to the best of one's
ability, to be strong and patient, to be ethically pure and
noble,' and 'to push our devotion to others to the ex-
tremity of self-sacrifice'. Religion, in fact, is nothing
more than ' that reverence and love for the ethical ideal,
and the desire to realise that ideal in life, which every
man ought to feel '. ' That he ought to feel it is surely
indisputable ; and Agnosticism has no more to do with
the matter than it has with music or painting'."^

But the " man in the street " will not be satisfied with
this. He wants a permanent, efficient motive power and

^Religion as a Credible Doctrine, pp. 265, 266.
- Mallock, op. cit., p. 256.

lo PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

this can only be found in a Living Person} which no
one of the atheistic -isms can supply.

No wonder is it that Secularists complain that they
cannot " annex the masses," as we shall see in present-
day Secularism of 1903.

' Harnack in his What is Christianity ? in reply to Rationalists who
repeatedly ask " What is new in Christ's teaching ? " strongly emphasises
His " Personality," as the source of goodness in the Christian followers of
Jesus.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW SECULARISM OF TO-DAY

Thirty years have nearly elapsed, and we now find Mr.
F. J. Gould writing on "' The New Secularism " in the
Agnostic Annual (an ethical review, 1903). He dis-
tinguishes present-day Secularism from the old by " the
almost complete disappearance of the appetite for theo-
logical debate " ; and he asks the question : " By what
other methods shall Rationalism be propagated ? "

He wonders what it has been doing for the last
thirty years.

" We need an aim, an organic association, a moral
and intellectual solidarity which will supply the appeal,
the motive, and the force."

Secularism must be in a poor way if it have none of
these three things, all of which are to be found to the full
in Christianity.

" The age of analj'sis is passing and the age of
synthesis is demanded."

Mr. Gould proceeds to complain that " those who
have been bred in the old school are too content to live
as disparate units".

" The supreme test of Secularism is revealed in the
question : What will it do with religion ? — that is, with all
the emotions, habits and ideals which are grouped to-
gether under that name in the Churches. . . . Orthodoxy
has been defeated in controversy, but it remains in
possession of the soul of the million."

(II)

12 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Now follows an astonishing remedial proposition :
" We ought to give the people a modified and rational-
ised Church, with all the apparatus of symbol, ceremony,
music and parochial institution ; and among the parochial
activities of the Church I should recognise a systematic
effort to encourage the ethical aspect of every political
and industrial movement. . . . Religion and the Bible
having been rejected on account of their irrational claims
to divine origin, must be re-inserted, so to speak, in the
secular development of mankind as moral and intellectual
factors of high importance."

Surely we have here the Christian spirit reasserting
itself in spite of Rationalism ! Apparently, then, the
masses are to be allowed to have the Bible, perhaps
after being carefully annotated — whence all the myths, all
the miracles, all of Jesus Christ as a myth too, according
to Mr. J. M. Robertson, will be carefully excised !

But the average man, working or not, is now often
quite as well able, and perhaps sometimes much better,
than the Secularists, to judge for himself.

Secularism, with its " coldness " and " want of rever-
ence," based on pure Reason and Science, will no more
raise the masses, much less the submerged tenth, in the
twentieth, than it did in any century B.C.

" A common complaint against the meetings of Free-
thought societies," continues Mr. Gould, " is that they are
cold and that they lack reverence."

Reverence for what or whom, one is inclined to ask ?
His reply is. Because they are losing sight of " the vital
principle of association " ; the very basis of Christianity
or the Brotherhood of Man,

He is beginning to fear for the masses just as Aristotle
did. He suggests " art, literature and education " where-
with to raise "the Human ideal to the same level of honour

THE NEW SECULARISM 13

as the Divine once occupied, so that human passion,
labour, sorrow and beauty shall now be elevated by art
and literature to the supremacy formerly held by gods,
spirits and the fictions of a remote Beyond ".

It is all a vain delusion! The call for "reverence"
comes from a deep-rooted instinct for Some One, greater
than himself, whom man can look up to and revere.
Art, science, politics, literature, etc., will never fill the
void of an aching heart which cannot find a Person to
love, pray to and obey.

Mr. Gould suggests as a stimulus, " We do need a
larger recognition of the call to municipal and national
service ". Why is it that we have not all felt this need
before ? Such is his substitute for religion ! But it will
never supersede the call of Jesus Christ to faith and
holiness, nor lead men to be religious, for faith is loyalty
to the Person. Jesus Christ, and He alone, has done
this for nearly 2000 years.

One seems to be able to read pretty plainly between
the lines of Mr. Gould's remarkable paper. He is evi-
dently beginning to realise the weakness of, and a decided
want in, Freethought. After thirty or more years what
has it done ? He complains of a want o{ coherence, a want
of motive, aim. His remedy is a desperate one : External,
sensuous paraphernalia, symbols, ceremonies, music, etc.
Does he think that these things help to make men really
and truly honest, pure and good ?

" Music and Morals " is a well-sounding alliteration,
but — there they begin and there they end !

It is a fatal error to try and make men moral, much
less religious, without an adequate motive. Let us hear
Aristotle's pathetic lament : " Is the end in practical
matters, not the contemplating and knowing all things,
but rather the practising them ? If so, it is not suf-

14 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

ficient to know the theory of virtue, but we must endea-
vour to possess and employ it ; or pursue whatever other
means there may be of becoming good. Now, if mere
treatises were sufficient of themselves to make men good,
justly ' would they have received many and great re-
wards,' as Theognis says, and it would be our duty to
provide ourselves with them. But the truth is, that they
seem to have power to urge on and to excite young men
of liberal minds, and to make a character that is generous
and truly fond of the honourable, easily influenced by
virtue ; but that they have no power to persuade the
multitude to what is virtuous and honourable." ^ The
commentator observes : " The very fact of loving virtue
for virtue's sake presupposes a proficiency in morals far
beyond the general state of mankind. Some other motive
was then clearly necessary for men sunk in vice as the
heathen world, a powerful motive, which no heathen, no
human philosophy could supply."

Sir John Seeley called attention to the same fact after
our Lord came. He says : " Stoicism and Christianity
existed side by side at the end of the first century. Was
their view of the obligations resting upon them similar?
It was totally different. The Stoic rules were without
sanctions. If they were violated what could be said to
the offender ? All that could be said was, * Chrysippus
non dicet idem. '. To which how easy to reply, ' I esteem
Chrysippus, but on this point I differ from him!' To
Christian /apsz it was said, ' You have renounced your
baptism ; you have denied your Master ; you are cut off
from the Church ; the Judge will condemn you '. Is this
distinction a verbal or a practical one ? " -

' The Nicomachean Ethics, bk. x,, chap. 9. Translated and annotated
by R. W. Browne, 1853.

'^Ecce Homo, Preface, p. xi.

THE NEW SECULARISM

15

No wonder is there that the meetings of Secularists
are cold and lack reverence ! It is because they have
discarded the only Person who has been able to stimulate
mankind to revere Him. That is the secret of true
Christianity ; which the Secularists have thrown aside as
a myth, and now find they have thrown away the one and
only motive capable of kindling the hearts of men into
warmth and reverence ; which, too, could bind them into
one Brotherhood instead of their remaining, after thirty
years, disconnected units only.

Mr. Gould's paper is most significant, and if he could
only see that our evidences for the historical personality
of Jesus Christ are as sound and logical as he thinks they
are illogical^ he may yet find it necessary not only to
come to us for ritual and music, but for the " Motive " for
goodness as well.

In Mr. Bussell's admirable account of Socrates, he
shows some curious parallels, with differences, to Modern
Secularism.

Like the Sophists (he says) Socrates was " as hostile
to indolent acquiescence in convention ". So are the
Secularists to complacent believers in dogmatic theology.
" Yet, unlike the Sophists, a constructive, 2, positive process
of instruction succeeded to this preliminary purgative.
. . . He seems to postulate a power for the conscientious
student, the earnest thinker, of reaching, of having contact
with what was True and Good. This power he thought
was inherent in Soul as such." ^

" He strives, as the chief task of education, to make
his pupil interested in himself He appeals to the under-
lying sense, in each man, of duty, of a love for beauty and
goodness, which once fully realised (too sanguine op-
timist !) cannot but take effect in action." -

1 The School of Plato, p. 84. 2 gp. dt., p. 88.

i6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

" He felt sure that if any one could once be brought to
consider his own nature ^ ... he would never recur to
those perilous errors of convention, but would live stead-
fastly, a law to himself, happy (because self-respecting and
trustful) in this world and the next. These principles
never came from pure Reason ; but rather from an
instinct of sonship, a religious instinct, suggesting to the
soul as probable far more than it can prove by argu-
ment." 2

" Pure reason cannot tell him of this : its mission is
purgative not dietetic, negative, not constructive. A
scientific definition of a practical thing only removes
error ; it does not teach Truth." ^

Thus, as I have shown above, has it been and is it
still with Secularism. The instructive essay by Mr. F.
J, Gould on "The New Secularism" proves it ; in which
he speaks of the old Secularism of Mr. Bradlaugh's days
in the " seventies," as characterised by " destructive argu-
ments," not only against theology, but even among them-
selves. It was all "purgative," as Mr. Bussell says ; but
during the last thirty years it appears not to have offered
anything substantial in the constructive line. Hence
Mr. Gould suggests, as a beginning, to build Rationalistic
churches with organs and ceremonies and ritualism
complete !

' Apparently as Bradlaugh and Herbert Spencer did also.
2 Op. cit., p. 89. ■■' Op. cit., pp. 91, 92,

CHAPTER III

RATIONALISM AND MATERIALISTIC MONISM PROFESSEDLY
BASED ON DARWINISM

The Rationalist Press Association is largely responsible
for the present diffusion of Rationalism in England.
One of its objects is the issue of " Cheap Rationalistic
Reprints".

The "Memorandum of Association" of the R.P.A.
(Limited) states the objects for which the Association
was formed. They are nine in number. The three
most important are as follows : —

{a) To stimulate freedom of thought and inquiry in
reference to ethics, theology, philosophy and kindred
subjects.

{b) To promote a secular system of education, the
main object of which shall be to cultivate in the young
moral and intellectual fitness for social life.

{d) To publish and distribute books, pamphlets and
periodicals designed to promote the above objects.

" Rationalism may be defined as the mental attitude
which unreservedly accepts the supremacy of Reason,
and aims at establishing a system of philosophy and
ethics verifiable by experience, and independent of all
arbitrary assumptions or authority."

The reader will not easily gather from the above
objects that atheism, denial of freedom in man, as well
as the complete annihilation of man's soul at death, form
2 (17)

18 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the creed of Rationalists ; while Christian Theism, the
divinity, miracles and resurrection of our Lord are
regarded as utterly vain superstitions.

That is the main position of the present-day Rational-
ism and the question is, Which is most probably right —
Rationalism or Christianity ?

In considering this recrudescence of Rationalism, I
shall have to consider among others such important
matters as — the basis of Rationalism and Monism, the
origin of the world and life on earth, the evolution of
living things, Darwinism and Adaptation, till we come
to the Origin of Man. Then follows the sharp line of
demarcation between man and animals, seen in his
capability alone to entertain abstract ideas ; animals
being limited to objects of sense and reasonings upon
them. This leads to human psychology including the
Will or Volition and Automatism. Lastly is the sur-
vival of Man after Death.

Throughout will appear, as occasion arises, inductive
evidence as to the existence of an Omnipotent, Conscious
Mind in Nature, or God.

" Rationalism " is also known under the phrase " Ma-
terialistic Monism," with which Buchner adds " Material-
ism" as a synonym.^

In order to understand clearly what is meant by
Materialistic Monism, I will take Haeckel as the expon-
ent. He says : " All the different philosophical tendencies
may, from the point of view of modern science, be
ranged in two antagonistic groups ; they represent either

1 Monism as a philosophical term is used in three if not more senses.
One is the matcrialhtic or that of Haeckel; the second is idealistic,
regarding all phenomena as spiritualistic, and the third is pantheistic,
neither mind nor matter being substantial, but both being referred to one
original substance.

RATIONALISM BASED ON DARWINISM 19

a dualistic or a monistic interpretation of the Cosmos.
The former is usually bound up with teleological and
idealistic dogmas, the latter with mechanical and realistic
theories. Dualism in the widest sense, breaks up the
universe into two entirely distinct substances ^ — the
material world and an immaterial God, who is repre-
sented to be its creator, sustainer and ruler. Monism,
on the contrary (likewise taken in its widest sense)
recognises one sole ' substance ' in the universe, which
is at once ' God and Nature ' ; body and spirit (or matter
and energy) it holds to be inseparable. The extra-
mundane God of Dualism leads necessarily to Theism ;
the intra-mundane God of the Monist leads to Pan-
theism." -

Haeckel devotes a chapter^ to a fuller explanation of
" the Law of Substance." " Under this name," he writes,
" we embrace two supreme laws of different origin and
age — the older is the chemical law of the " conservation
of matter " and the younger is the physical law of the
" conservation of energy," that is to say, the sum of
matter and the sum of force are alike unchangeable :
so that " the whole marvellous panorama of life that
spreads over the surface of our globe is, in the best
analysis, transformed sunlight," and " no particle of living
energy is ever extinguished ; no particle is ever created
anew ".

All the different forces of Nature are reducible to one
common original force {prodynaiiiis). " This fundamental
force is generally conceived as a vibratory motion of the
smallest particles of matter — a vibration of atoms." ^ In

1 This word is used here partly in a metaphysical sense, not a con-
crete or material one, only.

"^The Riddle of the Universe, Eng. ed., p. 20.

^Op. cit., xii., p. 214. ^Op. cit., pp. 217, 221,

20 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

further elucidation of his views Haeckel says: ""The
two fundamental forms of substance, ponderable matter
and ether, are not dead, and only moved by extrinsic
force ; but they are endowed with sensation and will
(though, naturally, of the lowest grade) ; they experience
an inclination for condensation, a dislike of strain ; they
strive after the one and struggle against the other." ^

With regard to the metaphorical expression of
chemical " affinities," which Haeckel regards as actual,
he says : " Every shade of inclination from complete
indifference to the fiercest passion is exemplified in the
chemical relation of the various elements towards each
other, just as we find in the psychology of man, and
especially in the life of the sexes. . . . The irresistible
passion that draws Paris to Helen, and leaps over all
bounds of reason and morality, is the same powerful
' unconscious ' attractive force which impels the living
spermatozoon to force an entrance into the ovum in the
fertilisation of the egg of the animal or plant — the same
impetuous movement which unites two atoms of hydro-
gen to one atom of oxygen for the formation of a mole-
cule of water. . . . Even the n^oui is not without a
rudimentary form of sensation and will. The same
must be said of the molecules which are composed of
two or more atoms." - Hence Haeckel deduces the
presence of a universal "soul," both in atoms, molecules
and their compounds ; and subsequently in living cells
up to man.

With regard to ether he says : " Ether is boundless
and immeasurable, like the space it occupies. It is in
eternal motion ; and this specific movement of Ether (it
is immaterial whether we conceive it as vibration, strain,
condensation, etc.) in reciprocal action with mass-
> op. cit., p. 224. '^Op. cit., pp. 228, 229.

RATIONALISM BASED ON DARWINISM 21

movement (or gravitation) is the ultimate cause of all
phenomena." ^

Haeckel concludes the chapter on " the Law of Sub-
stance " with the following words : " Our Monistic view,
that the great cosmic Law applies throughout the whole
of Nature, is of the highest moment. ... It marks the
highest intellectual progress, in that it definitely rules out
the three central dogmas of metaphysics — God, freedom
and immortality. In assigning mechanical causes to
phenomena everywhere, the law of substance comes into
line with the universal law of causality."

Such is the fundamental position of Haeckel's monis-
tic theory, and the question to be answered is : Which is
the more probable, that the evolution of the universe is
worked out by self-acting, blind and unconscious forces,
or by an Omnipotent, Intelligent First Cause? If there
be no consciousness in the energy at work ; whence came
consciousness in the product?

Before proceeding further, it will be as well to make a
few comments upon this extraordinary theory of Materi-
alistic Monism. It at once gives one the impression
that, by starting with a disbelief in a Creator, Haeckel
is compelled to try and square the universe with his
atheism. He cannot ignore life, for it is in evidence in
his own person, therefore, to avoid its entrance into the
world in time, he relegates its existence to all matter
and ether as a kind of eternal living essence or substance.

A true scientist always looks for some kind of evidence
in support of his working hypothesis. He is bound to
base it on some facts, however slight they may necessarily
be, where he wishes to bring the " unknown " within the
region of the " known ". In this Materialism there are
none : everything is assumed. All scientists have always

J op. cif., p. 233.

22 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

sharply separated the organic world from the inorganic ;
because of the ample evidences of life in the one, and the
total absence of such in the other. This difference sup-
plies a stronger basis of such being true, than to assume
the inorganic world to be alive, in spite of the total
absence of all the familiar phenomena by which we
regard the presence of life to be indicated ; such as
absorption of food, digestion, growth, development, re-
production, etc., etc. With regard to prodynamis or
original vibrating force of atoms, one naturally asks
whence it arose. The only answer appears to be that,
like ether (from which matter is supposed to emerge),
it was eternal and that ether never began to vibrate ; but
always has done so.

In the next place, how did a uniformly vibrating
motion become changed into all the forms of energy
with which we are familiar? What determined the first
changes of character in this primeval force, while acting
on a uniform ether ?^

" Atoms," he says, " experience an inclination for con-
densation and a dislike for strain." If this idea be based
on oiir experiences in physics ; then we find that
" inclination " varies with temperature ; for example,
water shows a decided " inclination " for condensation
at about 39° F. ; but at 212° the "inclination" is all the
other way ; for it goes off as steam by expansion.

How, too, came chemical forces into existence as
shown by their so-called " affinities " ? Here, again, we
have Haeckel's process of fitting the Cosmos on to his
atheism. Man loves, therefore love must have been an
eternal property of matter. Therefore, it is seen in all
chemical affinities and soon backwards till it is traceable

' We shall sec later what lias lo lie said on " Vortex-rings".

RATIONALISM BASED ON DARWINISM 23

into ether. He conveniently fits on traits of character
observable in man and animals to molecules and atoms.
But if he compares the love of Paris for Helen with the
" affinity " of one atom with another, how does he account
for the extreme rarity of one atom only of one kind of
element uniting with one atom only of another kind ?
By far the commoner process is for a molecule to be
composed of more than one, often many times more
than one atom. Thus with water, two atoms of hydrogen
are always in "love" with one atom of oxygen. While
in living albuminous protoplasm the number of element-
ary atoms in love with each other are represented by
the formula C^oHjQjjN^gO.^o- Can absurdities gravely put
forth in the name of science go further ?

Then comes the question of the soul. Once more,
starting from his own (he only allows psychology to be
a branch of physiology), how did he get it ? As there is
only one substance in the universe, the soul, like every-
thing else, must be referred back, first to the primitive
living cell, thence back again to inorganic molecules of
some sort, then to atoms and finally to ether ; as being
" the ultimate cause of all phenomena ".

Any idea of the advisability, not to say necessity, of
looking for evidence, seems to be quite unnecessary to
Haeckel. Let us now compare this Monism with Secu-
larism.

We have seen that Mr. Bradlaugh, Mr. Foote, Mr.
Holyoake and others were at least Secularists, if they
repudiated the actual title of Atheists ; but Mr. Brad-
laugh said that Secularism was on the high road to
Atheism. They were what Huxley subsequently called
Agnostics ; for as Mr. Foote said, there might be a God,
but he knew nothing about Him, and therefore the
moral life is entirely bound up with this world and un-

24 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

influenced by any belief in a God or a hereafter ; hence
the term " Secularism ".

If we ask why they assumed this attitude, it would
seem, as far as Mr. Brad laugh was concerned, from his
treatises Is there a God} and A Plea for Atheism, etc.,
that it was the study of metaphysics which led him
astray. Thus, after a long discussion as to the nature
of God — in whom he did not believe — he emerges with
the following conclusions : that " God cannot be intelli-
gent," " can never perceive anything," " He cannot re-
collect or forget," " He cannot have the faculty of
judgment " and " He cannot think ".

It is generally considered to be impossible "to prove
a negative " ; but Mr. Bradlaugh did it to his own satis-
faction, although he professes not to know what one
means by the word " God ".

It seems that the absence of anything of the nature of
objective proof of the existence of God was the cause
of the atheistic view in the seventies ; and this is still
maintained to-day. Thus the anonymous author of Mr.
Balfour s Apologetics, to whom I shall refer again, says
nothing can come under the head of Knowledge which
does not fall within observation and experiment.

This demand is obviously unreasonable, nor is it fair ;
for no force or energy comes within " observation ".
Gravitation, heat, electricity, etc., are unknown in their
nature, but recognisable only by their effects. More-
over, one man's consciousness is only inferred by another,
by his acts. It is inductive not expcrinietital evidence
upon which such "knowledge" is based. Consequently
in " proving " the existence of God from Nature's works
we have no other than inductive evidence or the ac-
cumulation of coincidences and probabilities ; so that
when they are fully grasped by the mind they form a

RATIONALISM BASED ON DARWINISM 25

" moral conviction " which is equivalent to a demon-
stration.

The presence of Law and Order is obvious every-
where now in the universe ; yet this same universe, we
are told by scientists, was originally a homogeneous fiery
vapour. This " proves " to most minds the necessity of
a " Law-giver " and " Order-maker ".

But, strange as it may seem to those who knew
Darwin in the fifties, Materialistic Monists have seized
upon "Darwinism" as the very basis of their Monism.
" Darwin gave us the clue to the monistic explanation
of organisation . . . mechanism alone can give us a true
explanation of natural phenomena ; for it traces them to
their real efficient causes, vzs., to blind and unconscious
agencies." ^

So, too, Biichner says in his Las^ Words on Material-
ism : " Darwinism is the chief support of Materialism or
Monism ".^

It is, therefore, necessary to consider how it came
about that Darwin's theory — which he himself thought
when he wrote it to be perfectly compatible with a belief
in the Creator — came to furnish the very groundwork of
the most uncompromising Atheism ever known.

Some may think that I spend too much time over
Haeckel's " puerile argument for Atheism from Darwin-
ism," as it has been called ; but Haeckel is an eminent
biologist, and by no means stands alone in making this
deduction.

Darwinism has led many scientists to refer all phe-
nomena, both of the organic and the inorganic worlds,
to physico-chemical forces only. Such a conclusion has
landed them in Agnosticism if not Atheism ; because the

' Haeckel's Riddle, etc., pp. 264, 265. '^ Ibid., p. 139.

26 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

legitimate philosophical inference of a Conscious Power
in Nature is ignored as being outside the province of
science ; which Rationalists claim as the sole source of
knowledge.

Thus Prof. Karl Pearson says : " An explanation is
never given by science. The whole of science is descrip-
tion, mechanism explains nothing."

" The Grammar of Science confines the sphere of
knowledge to the world of perceptions and the concep-
tions drawn from it."

" The mind is absolutely confined within its nerve-
exchange ; beyond the walls of sense-impression it can
logically infer nothing.^ . . . Briefly, Chaos is all that
science can logically assert of the supersensuous — the
sphere outside knowledge, outside classification by
mental concepts.'"-

" No human concept, such as order, reason or con-
sciousness can be logically projected into it."^

But it is not merely an academical question whether
Haeckel and other biologists are right or wrong. His
books, especially the Riddle of the Universe, are eagerly
read by young men of the lower orders, who boldly pro-
claim atheism in the London Parks, etc., on the supposi-
tion that Haeckel is an infallible authority! Haeckel's
theories may seem wild enough, it is true, to all who
know ; but it is not so to those who only take their
" science " second-hand from him.

I feel, too, that it is unfortunate that I have to con-
test a purely scientific deduction from " Darwinism" in a
work, the purport of which is to contravene such abstract
conclusions as atheism, disbelief in man's free will and
immortality ; but the burden must rest on the shoulders

' The Chances of Death and other Studies in Evolution, ii., pp. 381, 382.
'^Thc a ramwor of Science, p. 108. ^ Ihid., p. 112,

RATIONALISM BASED ON DARWINISM 27

of the Rationalists and Haeckel. It is they who go out
of their way to deny the existence of any scientific proof
of a God, of freedom and of immortality ; because these
things cannot be brought within the range of observation
and experiment.

Moreover, as Haeckel and others avowedly base their
Materialism on Darwinism, I cannot avoid discussing
this latter subject on the present occasion.

In order, however, to preserve more continuity in
what is intended to be apologetic, I propose relegating
my purely scientific discussion of Darwinism to an
appendix.

If the reader prefer to do so, he might read that
appendix at this point of the argument with advantage.

CHAPTER IV

MATERIALISTIC AND THEISTIC VIEWS OF THE EVOLUTION
OF THE INORGANIC WORLD

In anticipation of what Haeckel has to say about the
evolution of animals and plants as well as the psycho-
logical phenomena of man's " soul," he is obliged to look
somewhere for a natural source of life in organisms.
But besides this he must also find a source of sensation
and will^ and generally for a soul.

He starts with the fundamental ether filling all space
and permeating all bodies, being infinite and eternal.
He says : " The existence of ether as a real element is a
positive fact. ... As we assure ourselves of the exist-
ence of ponderable matter by its mass and weight, by
chemical and mechanical experiments, so we prove that
of ether by the experiences and experiments of optics
and electricity." ^

The reader will observe that the nature of the proofs
is not identical. The former is experimental verification,
the latter induction, the ether being assumed to exist in
order to account for the transmission of light ; the pro-
babilities of its existence being of such a high order, that
its absence becomes unthinkable.

Let us now follow his assumptions and we shall then
be able to form some estimate of the probabilities of
their being true or otherwise.

' Op. cit., pp. 230, 231.
(28)

THE INORGANIC WORLD 29

Ether and force appear to constitute his primary
" Substance ".

With regard to the origin of evolution in ether,
Haeckel thus describes the process : " This universal
movement of substance in space takes the form of an
eternal cycle or of a periodical process of evolution.

" The phases of this evolution consist in a periodic
change of consistency, of which the first outcome is the
primary division into mass [matter?] and ether — the
ergonomy of ponderable and imponderable matter.

" This division is effected by a progressive condensa-
tion of matter as the formation of countless infinitesimal
' centres of condensation,' in which the inherent primitive
properties of substance — feeling and inclination — are the
active causes." ^ Of course this theory of a homogeneous
ether forming local thickenings by some spontaneous
" feeling and inclination " at certain " centres of conden-
sation " is an hypothesis without a shadow of even a hint
of a proof, much less explanation how they came about.
When condensation is going on physicists call it gravity ;
but what sets up a centre of attraction, as in our sun, is
not known. And there we must leave these speculations
as involving at present insoluble problems.

Haeckel does not seem to have heard of vortex-
rings in ether as the origin of matter ; about which
something will be said below, as well as of the very latest
hypothesis of the present year (1903). Two great
questions, therefore, arise at once. How had the in-
organic universe, to which our earth belongs, a beginning
in time and space ; and how did Life appear upon this
earth ?

What has modern science got to say, first, as to the

1 op. cit., p. 248,

30 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

former question of the two? We start with the hitherto
accepted beh"ef in the universal existence of ether, im-
ponderable and immaterial, pervading all space and all
material objects. Prof. Dolbear says that from experi-
ments in a vacuum " one is led to infer that matter is not
the agent that transmits light". Hence the universal
ether is hypothecated to account for the transmission of
the waves of light, magnetism, electricity and gravitation.

" Ether is not atomic in structure, presents no friction
to bodies moving through it, and is not subject to the
law of gravitation, it does not seem proper to call it
' matter '. We might speak of it as a ' substance ' if
we want another word than its specific name for it. As
for myself, I make a sharp distinction between the e^/ier
and matter, and feel somewhat confused to hear any one
speak of the ether as matter. " ^

Similarly, Tait says : " If we adopt Sir W. Thom-
son's [Lord Kelvin] supposition that the universe is filled
with something which we have no right to call ordinary
matter (though it must possess inertia) but which we may
call a perfect fluid ; then, if any portions of it have vortex-
motion communicated to them, they will remain for ever
stamped with that vortex-motion ; they cannot part with
it ; it will remain with them as a characteristic for ever,
or at least until the creative act which produced it shall
take it away again. Thus this property of rotation may
be the basis of all that to our senses appeals as matter'^ ^

It is thought that " atoms " of matter are made out of
ether.

The artificial manufacture of "vortex-rings" (such as
may be sometimes seen in smoke-rings from a tobacco-

^ Matter, Ether and Motion, p. 35.

- Lectures on Some Recent Advances in Physical Science, by i'. G.
Tait, 1876, p. 294.

THE INORGANIC WORLD 31

pipe or in the vapour from the funnel of an engine, or
from the smoke in firing a cannon, etc.), shows how it is
conceivably possible that they can be formed in ether.
" If such a ring could be produced in a material not
subject to friction, none of the motion it possesses could
be dissipated, and we should have a permanent structure,
possessing several properties, such as definite dimensions,
volume, elasticity, attraction, and so on, all due to the
shape and motions involved." ^

" Imagine, then, that vortex-rings were in some way
formed in the ether, constituted of ether. If the ether be,
as it is generally believed to be, frictionless, then such a
thing would persist indefinitely : it would have just that
quality of durability that atoms seem to possess."

" It may be asked how one vortex-ring can differ
from another, so that there could be so many as seventy
or more different kinds of atoms [elements]. To this it
may be said that such rings may differ from each other
not only in size but in their rates of rotation ; the ring may
be a thick one or a thin one, may rotate relatively fast or
slow, may contain a greater or less amount of the ether." ^

"Motion is the chief characteristic of matter. Chemists
have discovered that both the chemical and physical
properties of all kinds of matter are functions of their
mass or relative atomic weights, and that they may be
arranged in a harmonic series. Harmonic relations may
imply relations either of position or of motion. But the
fundamental properties of matter do not change by a
change of its position, and one is therefore led to the
conclusion that one must look to the various kinds of
motion involved among atoms for the explanation of all
their properties and all their phenomena."

1 op. cif., p. 39. 20/. cit., pp. 40, 41.

32 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

" One, however, must not infer that this represents
knowledge of a demonstrated kind, for it does not."
Yet Prof. Dolbear finally observes : " It is either that
theory or nothing. There is no other that has any
degree of probability at all." ^ Though Prof. Dolbear here
writes somewhat decidedly, one must add that it is not all
physicists who accept the theory of atomic vortex-rings.
Writing to Lord Kelvin to ask him how far, if at all, the
discoveries about radium affected the theory, he has been
so good as to reply as follows : " In answer to your letter,
radium has nothing to do with vortex-rings. About
1886 I utterly abandoned the idea that atoms of matter
could be vortex-rings ; or that the theory of vortex-rings
(a beautiful and admirable result of mathematical work in
the dynamics of an ideal perfect liquid) could contribute
anything towards an explanation of the atoms of matter
and their mutual actions. I had occupied myself much
with that idea for about twenty years ; but I abandoned
it when I became convinced that there was no truth or
help towards truth in it."

Since the above was published, Prof. O. Reynolds,
F.R.S., has delivered the Rede lecture at Cambridge,
and broached a new theory in it, that ether consists of in-
conceivably small grains. Matter represents a deficiency
of these grains [how were they lost ?] causing a strain in
the medium and thus accounting for the law of gravita-
tion, etc.

Experts only can determine what degree of proba-
bility Prof. Reynolds's theory may have to support it ;
or how far it interferes with that of vortcx-rings. At all
events, at a later date (ist May, 1903) Lord Kelvin
had occasion to say that he was " horrified to read in the

1 Matter, Ether and Motion (S. P. C. K., 1899).

THE INORGANIC WORLD 33

press that he had spoken of ether-atoms. Ether was
absolutely non-atomic ; it was absolutely structureless
and homogeneous."

What physicists may finally determine as to the
nature of electrons and ions, must be left to their re-
searches.

These latest deductions of scientists seem to bring us
to the Origin of the Universe.

If we may assume the existence of an infinite and
eternal ether, perfectly homogeneous but replete with
motion, we thus arrive at the primary condition of
matter and motion, as being all that pure science can
imagine or detect.

If we think that an Omnipotent, Conscious, Intelli-
gent Power is present in the Universe as well as a limit-
less ether ; then if that Power be supposed to be infinite
in space, we might express this as regarding ether as
the " vehicle " of that Power. Science suggests, as we
have seen, that matter (represented by the seventy or
more "elements" known to physicists) was the first
result of some special kind of motion set up in ether,
which resulted in the production of vortex-rings ; these
vortex-rings being atoms of the known elements.

How vortex-rings are set going in ether is unknown.
All that Prof. Dolbear says is : " Imagine then, that
vortex-rings were in some way formed in the ether, con-
stituted of ether". They then appear to have all the
physical peculiarities claimed for atoms of matter as
ordinarily known to physicists.

Atoms once formed in this way, when suitable condi-
tions, as of heat, occur, enter into combination with one
another and produce molecules composed of two or more
different elements, and in various proportions.

As soon as this is the case the substances exhibit

3

34 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

phenomena quite unknown in the individual atoms them-
selves. Thus nitrogen and oxygen mixed mechanically
constitute the atmosphere ; but if one atom of nitrogen
and one of hydrogen be chemically combined with three
of oxygen, we get the powerfully corroding substance
called " nitric acid ".

How do these properties arise ? I am not aware that
any one knows.

We need not proceed further at present, for enough
questions begin to crowd upon one, but the fundamental
one is: How do vortex-rings arise in ether? Did they
arise spontaneously? If not, what caused them, and
what was the antecedent cause, and so on ad infinitum ?
Dr. Charnock thus writes : " The proof of the beginning
of the world is affirmed with good reason ". This is
abundantly corroborated by modern science. " If it had
a beginning, it had also some higher cause than itself;
every effect hath a cause." Similarly, " all motion hath
a beginning".^

The question, therefore, is, Was the origin of vortices,
as well as of subsequent phenomena attending atoms of
elements, which come under the sphere of chemical
investigations, from nebula to granite, as well as gravita-
tion, rotation, etc., etc., all purely mechanical under the
action of blind forces ; or are we justified in recognising
a Conscious, Omnipotent Power acting as the Originator of
special forms of force, or of the first impulse in making
vortex-rings, thence atoms, thence all the material sub-
stances in the universe with their respective properties ?

The, answer depends upon two factors — the amount
of probabilities, and the receptivity of evidence in the
human mind.

' Complete Works, vol. i., pp. 144, 145. He was born in 1628.

THE INORGANIC WORLD 35

The cumulative evidence of the existence of a Deity
seems ample to one mind ; whereas he who will not rise
beyond sensual perceptions of physical phenomena, of
course, closes his mind to all other evidence which is
based on a totally different and more abstract line of
reasoning.

To the one a large part of " proof" is inductive ; or
what is called " Faith ". To the other this is purposely
excluded as not evidential at all, and the man prefers to
be Agnostic in the sense that " he does not know," as the
evidence does not appeal to him as sufficient.

Dr. Charnock thus continues : " We must come to
something that is first in every kind, and this first
must have a cause not of the same kind, but infinite
and independent ; otherwise men run into inconceivable
labyrinths and contradictions. ... If the world were
uncreated, it were then immutable, but every creature
upon the earth is in a continual flux, always changing
[this has been corroborated and greatly intensified by
evolution]. If things be mutable, they were created ; if
created, they were made by some author ; whatsoever
hath a beginning must have a maker. If the world hath
a beginning, there was then a time when it was not ; it
must have some cause to produce it. That which makes
is before that which is made, and this is God. No
creature can make itself: the world could not make
itself. . . . Whatsoever began in time, was not ; and
when it was nothing^ it had nothing and could do
nothing ; and therefore could never give to itself nor
to any other to be, or be able to do ; for then it gave
what it had not, and did what it could not." Dr.
Charnock here argues on the old hypothesis of the

1 For " nothing " may be substituted " ether ".

36 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

creation of the world out of nothing ; but if we substitute
a homogeneous ether, it is difficult to realise how man's
mind could be potentially in it, if there be no Creative
Mind at all. " If it were," he proceeds, " as some fancy,
made by an assembly of atoms, there must be some
infinite intelligent Cause that made them, some cause
that separated them, some cause that mingled them
together for the fitting up so comely a structure as the
world. It is the most absurd thing to think they should
meet together by hazard, and rank themselves in that
order we see without a higher and a wise agent, so that
no creature could make the world. For supposing any
creature was formed before this visible world, and might
have a hand in disposing things, yet he must have a
cause of himself, and must act by the virtue and
strength of another, and this is God," ^

So now, if atoms are vortex-rings, whence came the
initial power to make the rings in ether ? Those atom-
rings were made in time, and if a nebula consist of
millions of glowing hot vortex-rings of hydrogen, whence
the " Directivity " '^ which has produced the planetary
order out of them ? Dr. Charnock then concludes his
argument : " To conclude this ; as when a man comes
into a palace, built according to the exactest rule of art,
and with an unexceptionable conveniency for the in-

' op. cit., vol. i., p. 150.

2 I am indebted to Prof. A. H. Church, F.R.S., for this very useful
and expressive word. It seems a better one than Jas. Croll's " Determin-
ing Power "referred to below and employed in his paper — What Determines
Molecular Motion, the Fundamental Prohlem of Nature ? Prof. Church
writes me, " I coined it many years ai;o to avoid the use of ' force,'
'energy,' etc., when describing in lectures on organic chemistry the
parallelism between the chemist directing in his laboratory physico-
chemical forces in the making of a true organic compound, and that
mysterious "something" which employs the same forces to make the
same compound in the plant or animal."

THE INORGANIC WORLD 3?

habitants, he would acknowledge both the being and
skill of the builder ; so whosoever shall observe the
disposition of all the parts of the world, their connection,
comeliness, the variety of the seasons, the swarms of
different creatures, and the mutual offices they render to
one another — cannot conclude less that it was contrived
by an infinite skill, effected by infinite power, and
governed by infinite wisdom." ^

Since this chapter was written, we have learnt a
great deal about Radium and radio-activities, which
seem likely to revolutionise previous conceptions of the
nature of atoms ; but the only question which arises in
connection with my present argument is : Are these
complicated phenomena more or less likely to favour
Rationalism or Dualism ?

One cannot say more than, that in proportion as
the complexity of an atom and its activities appear to
increase, so much the more difficult, if not incompre-
hensible is it, to believe that its structure and powers
should have arisen sicd sponte, without some Directive
Agency.

' Op. cit., vol. i., p. 158,

CHAPTER V

HAECKEL'S MATERIALISTIC THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF

LIVING BEINGS

The following are a few passages from Haeckel's Riddle
of the Universe bearing on the origin of life.

" Max Verworn showed as a result of an ingenious
series of experimental researches that the 'theory of a
cell-soul ' is completely established by an accurate study
of the unicellular protozoa, and that ' the psychic phe-
nomena of the protistae ' form the bridge which unites the
chemical processes of inorganic nature with the mental
life of the highest animals." ^

" I restrict the idea of spontaneous generation — also
called abiogenesis or archigony — to the first development
of living protoplasm out of inorganic carbonates and
distinguish two phases in this ' beginning of biogenesis '
— (i) autogony or the rise of the simplest protoplasmic
substances in a formative fluid, and (2) plasinogo7iy, the
differentiation of individual primitive organisms out of
these protoplasmic compounds in the form of 7no?iera." -

" Modern physiology teaches us that the first source
of organic life on the earth is the formation of protoplasm,
and that this synthesis of simple inorganic substances,
water, carbonic acid and ammonia, only takes place
under the influence of sunlight."'^

' Riddle of the Universe, pp. 48, 49, 155.
2 Op. cit., p. 263. ■' Op. cit., p. 288.

(3«)

ORIGIN OF LIFE 39

It will be observed here that Haeckel does not say
where the sulphur and phosphorus are to come from
which protoplasm and its nucleus require.

In referring to the necessity of sunlight, such is only
necessary for plants provided with chlorophyll which can
live on the inorganic world. Colourless animals and plants,
like monera and bacteria, do not require it ; for they can
only live upon already prepared organised food. Where
this is to come from for his primitive beings Haeckel
neglects to tell us, for no such organisms can live upon
mineral food.

According to Haeckel, therefore, protoplasm, the only
known substance which can be alive, was originally
derived from the inorganic world ; and he does not
hesitate to explain from what mineral materials he
believes it to have been evolved. We know that it re-
quires carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen and sulphur,
and we might add phosphorus for the nucleus. Haeckel
supplies us with carbonic acid, ammonia and water, but
here he forgets the sulphur (though he has previously
mentioned it), together with a hypothetical " formative
fluid ". What this is, of what it is composed and where
it occurred, we are not informed.

Haeckel then appears to combine these compounds
somehow ; for he calls the primitive inorganic substances
" nitrocarbonates ".

Surely it would be strange if carbonic acid and
ammonia did not form common " smelling salts " rather
than protoplasm !

Searching among minerals for one containing the
same elements in its composition as protoplasm, we
seem to approach it in a comparatively rare one called
mascagnite, a product of volcanic action, being found at
Etna, Vesuvius and the Lipari Islands. It is described

40 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

as a "hydrous ammonium sulphate," that is to say, it
contains water, ammonium and sulphur in its composi-
tion but not carbon. However, there is plenty of car-
bonic acid produced by volcanic action ; so with that
we have got all we practically want of the elements of
protoplasm. Thus we are better off than Haeckel ; but
the question is, How are we to get the right proportions
of these elements for building up protoplasm ?

Mascagnite contains in one molecule NoHj^^O^S. But
protoplasm requires them to be in much higher propor-
tions. The composition of albumen, which is a near
ally of protoplasm, is said to contain C,,(,H,QQNigO.20 ;
while the nucleus is reported to have a still more com-
plicated composition.

" The result of an analysis of the plasmodium of a
Slime-mould {AitJialuaii septicuni) showed 71 '6 per cent,
water and 28'4 per cent, solid matter. The latter was
composed of 30 per cent, of nitrogeneous compounds : e.g.,
plastine, vitelline, myosine, pepsine, lecithine, guanine,
sarcine, xanthine and ammonia carbonate ; 41 per cent,
was composed of ternary compounds, including parachol-
sterine, resin and a yellow pigment, sugar (non-reductive),
various fatty acids and neutral fatty substances. The
remainder was composed of mineral substances, includ-
ing calcium combined with various acids, phosphates of
potassium and magnesium and chloride of sodium. . . .
This illustrates the extraordinary complexity of the proto-
plast, and the impossibility of obtaining more than an
approximation of its chemical composition." '

Protoplasm, therefore, does not seem to be quite so
simple a substance as Haeckel would like us to suppose !

It may be added that " the Slime-fungi occupy quite

M University Text-book 0/ Botany, by D. H. Campbell, Ph.D., 1902.

ORIGIN OF LIFE 4I

an isolated position in the vegetable kingdom. They
are, perhaps, the most nearly related to the group of
Rhizopods in the animal kingdom. They live in and on
organic remains, especially rotten wood and leaves, etc.
They are without chlorophyll, consisting of masses of
protoplasm without cell wall (Plasmodia)!' ^

Dr. Vines has lately investigated the physiology of
the yeast-plant, Saccharoniyces Cerevisice ; and drew atten-
tion to the remarkable fact that though this plant consists
of but a single minute cell, it is known to produce a variety
of enzymes or ferments ; diastase, that converts starch
into sugar ; invertine, that splits cane-sugar into glucose
and fructose ; glucase, that converts maltose into glucose ;
zymase, that decomposes glucose into alcohol and carbon
dioxide ; as well as an undefined ^myv^Q, protease, which
digests proteid matter.

There is nothing — .any more than with slime-fungi
or bacteria — to enable it to live on mineral food alone;
nor are any of these enzymes known in the inorganic
world.

Lankester (article " Protozoa ") says : " A conceivable
state of things is that a vast amount of albuminoids and
other such compounds had been brought into existence
by those processes which culminated in the development
of the first protoplasm ; and it seems, therefore, likely
enough that the first protoplasm fed upon these ante-
cedent steps in its own evolution just as animals feed on
organic compounds at the present day, more especially
as the large creeping plasmodia of some Mycetozoa feed
on vegetable refuse ".

It will be observed that the question of the origin of
life is not solved, but only pushed further back ; for

1 Systematic Botany (Warming and Potter), p. 5.

42 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Lankester offers no explanation as to the origin of the
albuminoids.

To bring this question up to date " a new suggestion
as to the nature and origin of protoplasm has been made
by Herrara.i By triturating the acetate, carbonate, or
chloride of calcium with glacial phosphoric acid, and
then treating the resulting substance with salt solutions,
the author obtains a mass which behaves under the
microscope very much as does protoplasm. It shows
amoeboid motion, a vacuolar or granular structure, plas-
molyzes in certain cases when treated with plasmolyzing
solutions, can be stained with methyl green, has its
movements accelerated by sodium chloride, etc."

But, in reality, we are still no nearer to answering the
question : How was protoplasmy?rj-^ made in Nature ? In
all attempts at its artificial construction, Man replaces
Natural Directivity, and supplies the materials together,
which as far as we know, Nature does not ; certainly not
in all the compounds mentioned in this extract from the
Gardener's Chronicle, p. 459 (Dec. 20, 1902).

Haeckel also says that the element carbon is the
effective one in making protoplasm according to his
" carbon theory " ; but nitrogen is really the one which
allows of the " facility of decomposition ".

It is the presence of this element which accounts for
the explosiveness of gunpowder, gun-cotton, etc. It is
also nitrogen which facilitates rapid decomposition of
organic matters. If white of egg or albumen be treated
in the same way as to temperature, etc., with sugar, it is
the former (not the latter, which consists of water and
carbon only) which decomposes.

Neither Haeckel nor Lankester has brought us one

' A. L. Herrara, " Le protoplasnia de mttaphosphate de chaux,"
Mem. Rev. Soc, Sci., " Antonio Alzate," Mexico, 17, 201-213, 1902.

ORIGIN OF LIFE 43

whit nearer to the solution of the problem of the first
origin of protoplasm.

But besides protoplasm there is the ever-present
nucleus to be considered. Even if the primordial proto-
plasmic being contained no nucleus — as the bacteria are
at present supposed by some to be without it ^ — how did
it arise? Every living being, animal or plant above
those most degraded forms of fungi cannot be formed at
all without one.

The nucleus is now known to be a highly complicated
body, and passes through an elaborate series of evolu-
tions, when undergoing division for the making of new
cells. It is never known to arise spontaneously in
protoplasm, but always from pre-existing ones. Hence,
whenever the first protoplasm was formed, it must either
have had a nucleus within it, or very soon acquired one ;
otherwise Evolution, as we know it, could never have
proceeded at all.

It is in the behaviour of the nucleus that we first begin
to see marked directivity in the evolutions of its structure.
The spirem stage or chain with chromosomes divides
into a definite number, these arrange themselves in a
definite manner, in a certain place. They then undergo
certain changes, certain tracks are prepared like single rails
on a spindle, each travels along a line of the spindle, half
of them going one way, half the other, till the individual
parts of the two groups of bodies meet and fuse, forming
two fresh "daughter" nuclei one at one end, the other at
the other end or "pole". After these daughter nuclei
are formed, the second act of the drama begins, and a
cell-plate is laid down between the two, which gradually
extends from one side to the other of the original cell.

^ They contain chromosomes, thought to be either the beginning of a
nucleus or degradations.

44 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

According to observers various little difficulties are
surmounted by modifications in the method of laying
down the cell-plate ; just as an engineer will overcome
some local difficulty by skill and ingenuity.

" Directivity " is thus very apparent at the very be-
ginning of life-work,

Haeckel totally avoids touching upon the structure
and behaviour of the nucleus. He boldly assumes that
protoplasm arose by aittogony, i.e., it was " self-begotten ".

Rationalists are fond of arguing that if there be a
God, there must be an antecedent Cause of God ; so we
might ask them in return, What is the cause of autogony ?

What were the first organisms supposed to be like ?
Haeckel boldly tells us they were " monera (for instance
Chromacea and Bacteria) which consist only of primitive
protoplasm and arose by spontaneous generation from
inorganic nitrocarbons ".

Unfortunately he gives us no proof, though he speaks
very categorically here. In the first place, he cannot
prove that these creatures are not degradations from
higher forms rather than primitive types. Knowing,
as we do, how degeneration has always accompanied
evolution, both in the animal and vegetable world,
and considering the millions of years we believe life to
have been on this world, it would seem that the pro-
bability is in favour of their being degenerations rather
than unchanged, original beings. But there is something
like proof that such is the case, for Haeckel has overlooked
the fact that these creatures cannot live on water, stones
and air, but must (as already observed) have organised
substances for their nourishment. Thus, some bacteria
cause diseases in trees, others, putrefactions, others, again,
are pathogenetic in man and animals, etc., but none of
them can live and thrive on purely inorganic matter.

ORIGIN OF LIFE 45

Haeckel does not provide his first evolved beings with
anything which they can assimilate as food ; an essential
characteristic of all living beings.

As far as we know it is only chlorophyll-bearing
organisms which can decompose carbon dioxide ; and,
although nitrogenous compounds are in some mysterious
way made out of ammonia salts by the " nitrifying "
species of bacteria, these are not supposed to live so/e(y
on inorganic matters.

Hence the first beings must have been g-reen algce or
something of the sort, judging by our existing know-
ledge.

The group of plants known as Schizophyta, i.e.,
plants multiplying by " fission " only (or else by spores),
are divided into two groups.

Schizophycce, of the nature of algse with green chloro-
phyll, and Schizomycetes, colourless fungi. These may
be regarded, Strasburger observes, as derivative forms
of the former.

The Bacteria belong to this latter group.

Prof. Vines says of the Schizomycetes : " They multi-
ply by cell-division, the nucleus undergoing 'mitotic'
division in connection with this process." That is the
complicated process already referred to.

Strasburger says that the nuclei have not been
observed in many forms ; but were seen in certain species
examined by Hegler.

If it should be proved to be actually wanting, such
must be due to extreme degradation, and not a character-
istic of a primitive type.

The SchizophyccB, therefore, might be more probably
nearer to the original type.

Much has been written for and against the conception
of a " Vital Force " in organisms. Haeckel, of course,

46 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

ridicules it ; but whatever nanie be proposed for it, there
is undoubtedly a " Directivity " in living beings of a kind
which is not observable in inorganic matter. It has also
been described as "Dominant". Each of these two
words expresses observable phenomena.

Thus when a new variety of a plant or animal
appears, it is due to alterations in the structure, so that
the external visible organs appear different in some
degree from the corresponding organs of the parent.
The internal anatomy may undergo parallel changes.
That is to say, the tissues within are different ; and as
these tissues are made up of cells, which again arise
by divisions of nuclei, we arrive at the fundamental
sources of the changes of form ; and the conclusion is
expressed by saying that the protoplasm and nucleus
respond to the direct action of the environment, and at
once build up cells and tissues so as to make the organs
suitable, or in harmony with, the new conditions of life
supplied by the environment. Here, then, we have in-
ternal "Directivity" constantly displayed.

The word " Dominant " might be used to represent
the " over-ruling " power of Life.

And here it may be added that this innate power of
adaptation is as perceptible in microscopic fungi, as it is
in trees and herbs ; for there is, for example, a parasitic
fungus, Erysiphe graniinis, which attacks species of the
genus Bromns among grasses. The ob.server, Mr. E. S.
Salmon, F.L.S., remarks that specialisation has involved
the evolution of a considerable number of " biologic
forms" of the fungus, specially adapted to eight distinct
species o{ Bronius, respectively.

Now supposing protoplasm were evolved from
minerals, there is much more to be accounted for and
explained than mere structure, such as all the enzymes

ORIGIN OF LIFE 47

mentioned ; and in addition this inherent power of
adaptability to host plants in such as are parasitic.

Again, although chemical forces are active all over
the body, especially observable, perhaps, in the processes
of digestion and respiration, yet /i/e is always more or
less dominant, for these chemical processes cannot go
on if life be withdrawn. As long as life is present,
those bacteria which cause putrefaction are powerless,
though they must invade all living beings by tens of
thousands.

Again many combinations of elements occur in living
bodies, forming substances which are never formed
naturally outside an organism. Life, therefore, is a
dominant power ordering as it were chemical combina-
tions to be made, which the unassisted inorganic forces
cannot accomplish. Materialistic Monists try to make
much of the fact that several vegetable products, as in-
digo, madder, etc., and the waste product urea of the
animal kingdom, can be made in the laboratory, and
they look forward with confidence to the time when
chemists will succeed in making albumen and then, at
last, protoplasm itself When this is done, they say, all
the phenomena of life will appear ; since (they assert)
all vital phenomena are but the results of the molecular
composition of substances in the body.

But supposing protoplasm were made artificially, why
must it be instantly alive ? Protoplasm can be killed
readily enough. Dead protoplasm exists as well as living
protoplasm.

But there is a still more important fact which Ma-
terialistic Monists completely overlook : and that is that
the Chemist takes the place of the Directivity of the living
cell, in making vegetable products ; and if the former
were to make protoplasm artificially, whose place does

48 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

he then take ? — for such would be a very different thing
from protoplasm making itself de novo by autogony.

Let the chemist do for Nature a good turn in provid-
ing all the elements required, each being in as nearly the
exact proportion as is known to be in protoplasm, mix
them all together, then leave them to themselves^ and see
if they will make protoplasm or even albumen. That
would at least be helping autogony if such exist, by
providing all the materials for life.

The assumption of Lankester of a quasi organic sub-
stance on the road to the formation of protoplasm is, of
course, a pure assumption to support the theory that
living protoplasm arose out of the inorganic world by
some natural process.

All I contend for is, that, at present, we are in total
darkness ; but people who know nothing of science are
only too ready to accept as truths whatever an eminent
man such as Lankester or Haeckel chooses to say.

Surely it is more philosophical to call oneself an
Agnostic where we " do not know," than to hazard base-
less hypotheses to be accepted by people who have no
knowledge to enable them to see their baselessness.

CHAPTER VI

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA

We will now suppose the first living organism to have
appeared upon this earth somehow ; but as to the method
of procedure by which it came into existence, it seems
wiser to confess our entire ignorance than to frame im-
possible theories when we have no facts to go upon.

At this point Darwin enters upon the scene, as his
theory of the " Origin of Species by Means of Natural
Selection " was concerned with the evolution of animals
and plants since the commencement of life upon earth.

Comparing Evolution with the previous conception of
Creation by Design, he wrote as follows at the close of
his work : —

" There is a grandeur in this view of life, with its
several powers having been originally breathed by the
Creator into a few forms or into one ; and that, whilst
this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed
law of gravity ; from so simple a beginning, endless
forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been
and are being evolved." ^

It will be here seen that Darwin believed in a Con-
scious, Omnipotent Creator, and evidently did not realise
when he wrote his books that his own theory in ex-
planation of Evolution would supply a basis for the
Atheistic Monism of to-day which ignores the existence
'^Origin of Species, 6th ed., 1878, p. 429.

4 (49)

50 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

of a Conscious Creator altogether. His previous mental
training saved him at that time from the Agnosticism of
modern Rationalists, scientific or otherwise ; though their
conclusion, so far as his theory is concerned is a legiti-
mate one, had Darwinism any real foundation in fact.

It need hardly be added that the belief in a Creator
was and is held by astronomers, physicists, chemists and
others who are not biologists. Inductive evidence of the
existence of an Omnipotent Power is not confined to the
living world, but is based on the widest series of facts.

When, however, we turn to Darwin's " Life," we read
a somewhat different story. He tells us that when
standing in a Brazilian forest he wrote in his diary :
" It is not possible to give an adequate idea of the higher
feelings of wonder, admiration and devotion which fill
and elevate the mind "}

" But now," he continues, "the grandest scenes would
not cause any such convictions and feelings to rise in
my mind." I will not quote his description of his
mental atrophy for art, etc, nor more of his conversion
by his own theory of Natural Selection to Agnosticism.
It appears to me that this resulted from, as I shall show,
the total absence of Natural Law in Natural Selection,
as an element in the Origin of Species. For — and I wish
to emphasise this fact as it is so important to bear it
in mind — there is no rclationsiiip at all between the ac-
cidentally arising, favourable variations (out of imaginary
indefinite variations among a group of offspring) and the
requirements of the beings in adaptation to their new
conditions of life.

This is the fatal want in Darwinism ; and at once
stamps it with an atheistic character in the eyes of those

' Life, vol. i., p. 311.

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 51

who are predisposed to look upon all processes in Nature
as being the result of chemico-physical forces alone.

There are no facts known to occur in Nature in
support of Darwinism.

We can see, too, how the error of Darwinism misled
Romanes, who in referring to the well-known argument
of the watch with which Paley begins his work on
Natural Theology, says that he " will suppose the dis-
coverer of the watch to proceed to the sea-side and to
examine a bay. He would note the corresponding con-
figuration of the cliff's, the river with its suitable bed
entering the bay and many other details, etc. . . . Now I
think that our imaginary inquirer would be a dull man,
if he failed to conclude that the evidence of design
furnished by the marine bay was at least as cogent as
that which he had previously formed in his study of the
watch. . . . The teleologist would feel that he must
abandon the supposition of any special design in the
construction of that particular bay." Then in turning
from the phenomena of the inorganic world to those of
organisms, Romanes observes : " The mere fact that we
meet with more numerous and apparently more complete
instances of design in the one province than in the other
is, ex hypotJiesi, merely due to our ignorance of natural
causation in the more intricate province," by which he
means " Natural Selection "}

Romanes thus tries to bring the inorganic into line
with the organic by means of Natural Selection. But in
drawing a comparison between a sea-beach and a watch,
which is supposed to represent an organism, Romanes
strangely failed to see that the two things are not really
comparable ; for purely physical forces, provided with

' Thoughts on Religion, pp. 57, 65.

52 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the same kind of materials to work upon, always pro-
duce precisely the same general results, and have done
so since the foundation of the world. Old sea-beaches
very similar to existing ones are in evidence, which were
probably laid down millions of years ago ; with the
impress of rain-drops and ripple-marks of the retreating
waves stamped indelibly upon them. Rivers flowed in
their beds to the sea then, just as they do now. So, too,
chemical combinations and crystallisations went on at
all ages, exactly as they do to-day, with as exactly the
same results.

But when we turn to living organisms, all is changed.
The great groups of animals and plants, it is true, have
existed in past ages ; but, nevertheless, they have changed
in detail again and again, through the epochs of the
world's history ; and it is only the very latest of the
earth's strata which contain organisms identically the
same as existing ones.

This profound difference between the results of
physical forces acting on inorganic bodies as distinct
from the effects of life, has to be accounted for. On
merely a priori assumptions, one would deem it probable
that some different or additional powers must have come
into play, where the results are so profoundly different.^

Romanes thus went beyond Darwin in tr>ing to
unite the physical world with the organic, as if both
alike depended upon Natural Selection, and as ejecting
" Design " from the world altogether.

If Darwin be right that all animals and plants in the
past, present and future are evolved from " few " or " one "
original being, that being might have been a simple
microscopic germ for all we know. Then, when we think

' I have here quoted from my little book entitled, The Argument of
Adaptation or Natural Theology Reconsidered (Williams and Norgate, is.).

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 53

of this, does it not excite our wonder to an astonishing
degree, on witnessing the practical omnipotence of proto-
plasm and its nucleus, and to imagine how it could have
acquired it? Materialistic Monists and Rationalists, like
Romanes, try to bring life into the same category as all
physical forces ; but, as pointed out, we see a feature
altogether unknown in the inorganic world. All physical
forces act in precisely the same way now as ever before.
It is just because they do so that we can interpret the
past physical phenomena of the world by means of the
present.

It is not so with living beings. Evolution shows us
that so far as organisms go, though the same type is
produced by heredity, generation after generation, as
long as the conditions of life are constant ; yet change
is really the order of the day sooner or later.

Moreover, contrary to the behaviour of physical forces
which tend to dissipation, the commonest result being
heat, animals and plants have gone on getting more and
more complicated as the world grew older. The law
of adaptation has ever added new features as required,
though usually coupled with degeneracy whenever any
special structure is no longer useful. Thus have been
left the numerous rudimentary organs in animals and
plants still present, or, as in many cases, they have gone
altogether.

In whatever way we compare living beings with non-
living we see striking contrasts both in structures and
energies concerned with them, which have to be accounted
for, if it be thought that all the phenomena of life can be
relegated to purely physical procedures.

All the way from primitive protoplasmic beings to
man there is that Directivity which refuses to be ex-
cluded. It thrusts itself upon our notice, as I have said,

54 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

even in the process of cell-division by the nucleus, in the
formation of suitable tissues and organic substances, and
also in the construction of entire organs, producing results
which Paley and the teleological school of old thought
must have been designed.

Whether created all at once by a ^at, as Milton but
too graphically describes it, or evolved by adaptation,
the result is precisely the same, forcing on every one
who is not blinded by the preconception of Atheism, a
Dominant or Directive Agent in every particle of living
matter.

It is sometimes desirable to supply concrete illustra-
tions, as many readers may not be scientific ; and so may
not see the significance of the above remarks. Let us
take, for example, an illustration of use and disuse and
their effects. The familiar increase of the size of the
muscles of the arm by exercise is a case in point. How
is it done ? The living protoplasm responds to the call
upon the activities of the muscle to meet them. It sets
to work and builds up fresh cells and muscular fibres,
and so strengthens the arm. The bones, if required to
do so, will as readily respond to efforts and increase in
size. Thus, in consequence of the great weight thrown
upon them they are enormous in the elephant as com-
pared with those of a horse or gazelle. The formation
of the foot corresponds with the habits of the animal
and nature of the ground it frequents. Thus, the so-
called " cloven hoof," really consists of two effective
toes which are spread out in animals living on soft soil,
while their tongue is correlated with the foot in adapta-
tion to the requirement of grasping long grass, as may
readily be observed in grazing oxen. On the other
hand, the horse has lost four toes from each foot and now
stands upon the middle toe only of the original five.

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 55

This is better adapted for a harder soil, while the
incisors can nibble short grass, as on downs ; and it does
not require the use of the tongue for " licking " up the
grass.

Huxley said somewhere that even if such Lamarckism
were true, it could only apply to half the living world ;
but he was not then aware that " use and disuse " are
equally applicable to the vegetable kingdom.

Thus, if weights be attached to young parts of plants,
as growing shoots or leaf-stalks, just insufficient to break
them, they soon acquire a much greater strength than
they would have done, had they been not so weighted.
Thus, e.g., the little stem of a seedling sunflower,
which would have broken under a weight of 160 grms.,
bore a weight of 250 grms., after having been subjected
to a strain of a weight of 150 grms. for two days. The
weight was subsequently increased to 400 grms. without
injury. Leaf-stalks of the Christmas rose, which broke
with a weight of 400 grms., were able to resist one of
35 kils., after having been subjected to a strain for five
days.^

Wood is formed more or less in most stems growing
in the air, to resist the strain of gravity. But in aquatic
plants, since the water supports the submerged parts as
well as air within them, the stem ceases to form wood
by " disuse," since it is no longer called upon to support
itself.

The bodies of animals and plants are thus living
automata. Their protoplasm spontaneously responds
in hundreds of ways to whatever stimulus comes from
without, and the response evinces itself, as if by an im-
material Directivity which meets the irritations, environ-

^ I am here quoting from my book, The Origin of Plant Structures,
p. 204, where further illustrations will be found.

56 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

mental forces, or whatever we call them, in the most
admirable manner. Then if the stimulus be kept up
by the organism and its offspring continually living
under the same conditions of life, the changed organs
become fixed and hereditary, as is abundantly seen under
cultivation and domesticity.

Man has often found that he cannot do better than
imitate natural phenomena ; whenever he wants some
special contrivance as in engineering structures. If I
remember rightly, the iron " cells " on the top of the
Menai bridge were suggested by the structure of a bar-
nacle. Fox's iron-fluted stays of the umbrella are
precisely like hundreds of leaf-stalks ; in which the
edges are raised forming lateral flanges, thereby resisting
the downward tendency to snap through the weight of
the blade. Girders are found in some climbing stems
as the " monkey's ladder," buttresses are added to trunks
of trees, etc.

The structures of flowers possess adaptations to in-
sects, which furnished Darwin and others with admirable
illustrations of what one would have formerly said were
undoubtedly designed.

The Argument of Design was considered by Huxley
to have received its death-blow by Darwinism ; and so
undoubtedly it would have been slain, had Darwinism
been true ; but, as I have elsewhere shown, ^ it does not
exist at all. Nevertheless Design must give way to
Adaptation.

For if we accept Darwin's own alternative, namely, of
Definite Variations arising in response to the Direct
Action of the environment, we discover that if the

' See address on Present Day Rotionnlism, ifilh an Examination of
Darrvinism, in " Christian Apologetics" (J. Murray), and in the Ap-
pendix, below, p. 145.

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 57

Argument of Design be not restored, that of Adaptation
under Directivity takes its place ; and Paley's argument,
readapted to Evolution, becomes as sound as before ;
and, indeed, far strengthened as being strictly in accord-
ance with facts. What then is the source of this Direc-
tivity which runs through the whole of the organic
world ?

Rationalists demand evidence of God, such as a
chemist might give for a new product, or " experimental
verification " ; but it is absurd to ask for it. They forget
that scientific truths are, as often as not, entirely based
on inductive evidence ; and such too is the only " proof"
of the existence of God from Nature.

Scientists, as Tyndall, H. Spencer, Huxley, etc., all
recognised a " Power " behind Nature ; and the real
question is — Is that Power conscious or not?

If man were not conscious himself, of course he could
not conceive of any other being as possessed with con-
sciousness. Moreover, it is impossible to think of
minerals being conscious, or of consciousness residing in
physical forces, as gravitation, or even in the vegetable
kingdom.

In our present state of knowledge, as we only know
of Life proceeding from Life, so too we can only con-
ceive of consciousness proceeding from some Conscious
Being who could impart it.

The answer to the above question, therefore, is that
as far as our existing knowledge will take us, the pro-
babilities of there being a " Conscious Power " whom we
call " God " are a hundred-fold greater than that every-
thing is due, as Haeckel says, to some " blind, unconscious
forces ".

We can only build on our own experience by a process
of analogy. We know that order can only come out of

58 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

disorder in our temporal affairs by man's mind and
directivity.

Now, we have every reason to believe physical as-
tronomers who tell us that our own universe was origin-
ally a fiery vapour, or cosmic nebula. It has somehow
become arranged into a beautiful order of sun, planets
and satellites ; and, as far as the earth is concerned,
with many series of living beings terminated by Man.

Once given protoplasm we find all plants, animals
and man can have been evolved out of it.

If man wields limited powers as inventor and con-
structor to meet wants and requirements, that is, adapta-
tions to the needs of his environment ; he sees very
similar processes going on all around him in the past
and present. He, therefore, is justified in logically con-
cluding that there must be some conscious Directivity
akin to his own behind the infinite adaptations to needs
in all organic beings.

One notices that man himself never gets perfection
all at once. In music he began with, we will say, a tom-
tom, but he has now got to an orchestra. In drawing,
prehistoric man began by scratching the figure of a
mammoth on a flat bone. He now fills galleries with
beautiful compositions ; and so is it with the appliances
of forces, electricity, etc.

Just so is it with Nature. We notice that the adu//
stages of her earliest efforts in the various groups of
animals represented the embryonic conditions of later
ones of the same kinds.

A progress from simple to compound has always
taken place, just as man progressed himself in his know-
ledge of the sciences and in the progress of the arts.

He at once recognises a Mind akin to his own in
such parallels in the working out the structure of pro-

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 59

gressive, organic beings, just as he did in working out
the problems of art.

In this way — and illustrations may be multiplied in-
definitely— does man gradually accumulate probabilities
arising from the number of evidences between the work-
ing's of his own mind and what he sees in Nature, that
the power behind Nature is gradually forced upon him,
as a Being who is conscious as himself, and that it is Go/:^
who must be the source of the Directivity so apparent
in all beings that are alive.

On the other hand, the stronger this impression grows
upon him, the more incompatible does it become to
identify this Power with " blind forces " acting by fixed
laws unchangeable in their effects ; as is apparent in the
workings of all purely physical forces in the inorganic
world.

CHAPTER VII

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA {Continued)

Living beings were formerly supposed to possess a
"Vital Principle or Force," ^ as of a special kind "con-
ceived to exist apart from any material organisation as
a kind of entity. A difference between a living and a
dead animal was thought to be simply one of the presence
or absence of that entity called life."^

Prof. Dolbear quotes the opinions of fifteen modern
scientific authors, who all agree in regarding the phe-
nomena of life as comparable or identical with the
physico-chemical processes well known in the mineral
kingdom. For example: —

Haeckel says : " We can demonstrate . . . the physi-
cal and chemical properties of the albuminous bodies to
be the real cause of organic or vital phenomena ".

But since no albuminous bodies are ever formed
without a precedent life, how is it possible to demonstrate
as a cause that which depends upon the other ?

Hofifding says : " The aim of modern physiology is to
conceive all organic processes as physical or chemical ".

' A good account of Barthez' theory of the " Vital Principle " will
be found in E. T. Withington's Medical History from the Earliest Times,
sec. "Vitalism," p. 338. " He repeatedly protests that he does not mean
to explain anything by his ' vital principle,' which is simply a short way
of expressing his belief that life is not the result of either bodily or mental
action." This will equally apply to " Directivity " in plants and animals.

" Dolbear, op. cit., p. 277.

(60)

LIFE ANDlITS PHENOMENA 6i

It is difficult to conceive how alteration in structure-
buildinir under new conditions of life can be accounted
for without Directivity.

B. Sanderson says : "In physiology the word Life is
understood to mean the chemical and physical activities
of the parts of which the organism consists ".

Lankester says: "Zoology, the science which seeks
to arrange and discuss the phenomena of animal life and
form [?] as the outcome of the operation of the laws of
physics and chemistry ".

Lastly, Huxley says : " It must not be supposed that
the differences between living and not-living matter are
such as to justify the assumption that the forces at work
in the one are different from those to be met with in the
other".

All the fifteen authorities would reduce " vital phe-
nomena " to " chemical and physical forces ".

No one to-day can possibly deny the fact that an
organism cannot be kept alive, whatever that word
means, without food ; and that by means of chemico-
physical processes going on within the body it breathes
and digests that food, which is converted into other sub-
stances which build up the structures of the body till it
be adult and then repairs the daily waste as well as
supplies the whole organism with energy till it dies.

But there is one thing omitted, and that is Directivity,
which is obvious in every organism and every part of it.
To take an illustration, Prof. Lankester inserts the word
" form ". He will admit that the form of a hawk is very
different from that of a cat ? What causes the difference ?
If a young kitten and a young hawk be fed on precisely
the same food until they are adults, it is obvious that the
same food has built up two totally different " forms ".

As the molecules of the food passed through several

62 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

physico-chemical processes till it became flesh, bone,
skin, hair or feathers, etc., what kinds of physical or
chemical forces were they which brought about two so
diiiferent results as the " form " of a cat and that of a
hawk, one having hair and the other feathers, not to add
that these animals develop different habits and different
methods of propagation ?

From having been molecules of food such become
molecules in the blood, ready to be located in their proper
places in the animals' bodies. They then require some
directing to put them there ; so that every part, bone,
claw, feather, teeth or beak, etc., receives just what it
wants and no others ; as on repairing a house, stones,
bricks, wood, slates, etc., are placed by the builder wher-
ever a house may require any restorations. What purely
chemical or purely physical force (such as occurs in the
inorganic world) is capable of carrying out this selective
process and whence arises the very obvious Directivity ?

Now all this is greatly extended by Evolution. It is
not enough to explain how the same form is reproduced
by heredity as kittens or young hawks, but variation
occurs when the environment is changed. Adaptive
variations appear through the responsiveness of proto-
plasm to the direct action of the new conditions of life.
Here again Directivity asserts itself The direct action
is upon the surface of the organism externally or in-
ternally as food ; but the response is deep-seated in the
nuclei of the merisinatic cells, which divide and build up
tissues in adjustment to new requirements. It is the
nuclei which are the ultimate originators of cells ; but,
having made them, the cells during growth assume the
necessary forms to meet the new requirements.

Thus, as stated, if strains be put upon stem, petioles,
etc., beyond what are normally sustained by a plant.

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 63

more wood-fibres and other mechanical tissues are
developed to meet the strain ; just as bones and muscles
are formed wherever they may be required in animals.
A large series of experiments with plants has lately been
made by M. Ph. Eberhardt/ to show the adaptations in
the minute microscopical characters of the tissues of
plants subjected to drought and moisture. In every
case the artificially induced results were precisely the
same as observable in plants growing in arid and desert
regions on the one hand and in marshes and in water on
the other. In all cases the changes are just those most
suitable to the conditions under which the plants grow.

Can, therefore, alterations of structure in response to
external forces and in adaptation to them be accounted
for solely by means of the physico-chemical processes
involved in their manufacture ? There is no such Direc-
tivity ever observable, I repeat, in the mineral kingdom.
The nearest approach to it is seen in the angular
symmetry of crystals ; but this is constant.

Why are the molecules of living bodies being con-
stantly arranged differently ? No two peas in a pod are
precisely alike, showing a variability which becomes very
pronounced under cultivation.

On the other hand molecules of all inorganic sub-
stances assume constant forms when crystallised. A
crystal of salt made artificially is exactly like their
" casts " found in the Triassic strata. Every substance
that can be crystallised can be referred to its "system,"
whether it be quartz from the silurian rocks or of any
later strata.

Evolution, on the other hand, shows constant change
in living organisms. Whence is this difference .?

^ Ann. des Sci. Nat., xviii,, p. 61, 1903.

64 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

No one would deny that the execution of the work
or organism-building is carried out by means of chemico-
physical forces ; but there is abundant evidence of a
Directivity which is wanting in inorganic structures.
And the questions are, What is it ? Whence is it ? It is
perceptible, I repeat, even in cell-building. Though
the process of karyokinesis may go on regularly and
mostly in the same way, yet it has been shown that the
nucleus sometimes has to overcome difficulties. It is
not mathematically and accurately placed in the middle
of the cell. It is often at one side ; so that to make a
cell-plate across the cell, as it divides into two daughter-
nuclei, they can travel across laying down the cell-plate
between them, till they get to the other side. Or, as an
alternative, the " equator " of the spindle or barrel may
become so inordinately extended as actually to stretch
from one side of the cell to the other. Here, then, is
Directivity displayed in the very fundamental stage of
tissue-making, not to add the behaviour of the curved
V like chromosomes, which arrange themselves in an
orderly way, and travel up the lines, as if they thoroughly
understood what is expected of them to accomplish.
Can all this complicated process be brought under
chemico-physical forces of the inorganic world ?

One is inclined to wonder what these fifteen writers
would have to say about Directivity. May not the
suspicion be correct that their overlooking this special
peculiarity of living beings arises from Darwinism lying
behind their views ? Is it not this which thus causes
them to approximate Haeckel's and Biichner's ideas,
even if they do not go so far as to acknowledge them-
selves Atheists ?

I will now return to Prof. Dolbear. He says in
speaking of protoplasm: "It is entirely structureless,

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 65

homogeneous, and as undifferentiated as to parts, as is
a solution of starch or the albumen of an egg".^

" The protoplasm organises itself into cells and tissues
in the same sense as atoms organise themselves into
molecules and molecules into crystals of various sorts
having different properties that depend upon the kind of
atoms, their number and arrangement in the molecule." -

In an appendix he somewhat corrects this utterly
false statement, which, by the bye, agrees with Haeckel's,
who also ignores the phenomena of karyokinesis in the
nucleus, for on p. 369 Prof. Dolbear informs us : " Histo-
logists find that protoplasm consists of a kind of net-
work of less fluid material, the interstices being filled
with more fluid material . . . hence if there be so-called
'structureless' protoplasm, it is only apparently so, because
the meshes are too fine to be seen."

But this is nothing nezu, and it is a pity the author
had not made himself better acquainted with physiology
before he wrote the chapter on " Physical Life ". He
appears not to be aware of the phenomenon of " cell-
rotation " and other well-known peculiarities of proto-
plasm.

When he uses the word " organised " for inorganic
molecules, he is totally misusing the term. It is only in
living beings that " organisation " takes place. It im-
plies a locating of molecules as a definite means for an
"end".

In crystals, there is only an increase in size by super-
ficial accretions, with no "end" at all in view, and, of
course, no internal organisation.

Like Haeckel and others. Prof Dolbear alludes to
the fact that chemists have succeeded in making many

1 Op. cit., p. 280. ^ Op. cit., p. 281.

66 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

substances in the laboratory, " which were not long ago
believed to be formed only by living things ; and there
is but little reason to doubt that, when [?] they shall be
able to form the substance protoplasm, it will possess all
the properties it is now known to have, including what is
called its life ; and one ought not to be surprised at its
announcement any day." ^

In another appendix he describes Prof. Quincke and
Biilschle's experiments with emulsions of soap, oils,
H^CO^ etc., which show " amoeboid " motions and
"streaming" movements something like protoplasmic;
but no intelligent reader will be deceived by them as
being identical. For there is no nitrogen present, the
most important element, with carbon, of the constituents
of protoplasm.

He finally closes his book with the sapient remark :
" It is evident that in a chemically homogeneous mass
there can be no occasion for changes of any kind within
it ; and chemistry alone cannot give us any substance
which can give characteristic vital actions ".

One feels inclined, therefore, to ask what is the use of
his giving an illustration of the plume-like figures formed
by frost on a window pane ? — under which he writes :
"The similarity it presents to vegetable forms is very
striking. . . . Such fantastic imitations of inorganic
things forcibly suggest vitality. They are too common
to be considered coincidences."

I reply there is no resemblance beyond a slight imita-
tion. It is a "chemically homogeneous" structure con-
sisting throughout of H.^O and therefore " cannot give
characteristic vital actions ". We might compare it with
an ostrich feather, the inflorescence of the reed or a fern.

' Op. cit., p. 283.

LIFE AND ITS PHENOMENA 67

It is as much like one as the other. To which of the
two organic kingdoms would Prof. Dolbear compare it ?

All modern biologists attack the question as to /ww
the processes of growth, etc., go on in the body. That
they grow by means of chemical processes is obvious ;
that the purely chemical process of oxidation of carbon
underlies respiration is perfectly clear. That electrical
phenomena are seen in the actions of muscles is well-
known ; that the phenomena of heat are patent to
every one in his own body, etc. No one now will dispute
all this. But it is all beside the question, What is Life?
There 2S a something which sharply separates a mouse
from a lump of granite, or an organic molecule from a
crystal.

Why does biology form a study by itself independ-
ently of physical geology ?

The term " Vital Force " may be objectional or not ;
but some name is wanted to account for the Directivity
observable in every organ of every living being.

Prof. Dolbear quotes several definitions of life ; but
they only state what is obviously seen. Thus Bichot
says, " Life is the sum of the functions by which death is
resisted". But the " functions " can only be carried on
as long as life is present, and " organs " wherewith they
can be done. What makes the organs ?

Dreges calls life " the special activity of organised
beings " : but it is only organised beings which are alive
and exhibit activities.

H, Spencer's is " the continuous adjustment of in-
ternal relations to external relations ". That is true, and
the practical basis of Evolution ; but it is no definition of
Life ; only a description of what takes place as long as a
being is alive.

All definitions, however, show that Life is recognisable

68 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

by its effects and that those effects never occur away from
any being which is alive.

It is easy to show that Prof. Dolbear is wrong when
he says : " All physiological phenomena whatever can be
accounted for without going beyond the bounds of
physical and chemical science "} For Directivity, which
always co-ordinates means with ends, cannot be a purely
chemical or physical force ; though those " ends " be
brought about by chemical and physical agencies.

It is just those "ends," which Darwin called "pur-
poses," though he would insist upon the word being
metaphorically accepted, that sharply separate the organic
from the inorganic world.

The late James Croll published an article entitled —
What Determines Molecular Motion ? — tJie Fundamental
Problem of Nature.

I would add. What is the final cause or source of
Directivity in the organic world ?

^ Op. cit., p. 279.

CHAPTER VIII

"DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND, IN EVIDENCE
THROUGHOUT THE LIVING WORLD

As I regard Directivity as one of the most important
of the numerous Hnes of argument in proof of a conscious
Power behind Nature, I propose devoting a chapter to it,
in order to enable the reader to thoroughly grasp its
significance.

Of course, we learn nothing as to the nature of that
Power. All we can attempt to prove is its existence, by
the accumulation of probabilities ; which then amount
to a moral conviction, which, however, is equivalent to a
demonstration.

I would first emphasise the fact that " Life ''per se must
be distinguished from purely physical forces. Whether
it will ever be proved to fall into line with the correla-
tion of physical forces, it is impossible to say ; but its
phenomena at present lead one to suspect such will not
be the case.

I will herein quote what the learned authors of the
Unseen Universe have to say upon the subject.

Starting with " the principle that life proceeds from
life, or to speak more accurately, that a conditioned living
thing proceeds only from a conditioned living thing . . .
if we assume the truth of this principle, it appears to
lead us directly to infer that life is not merely a species
of energy, or a phenomenon of matter. . . . Life, how-

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70 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

ever, can be produced from life only, and this law would
seem to give an indication that the solution of the mystery-
is not to be found by considering life as merely a species
of energy. It is some time since we gave up the idea
that life could generate energy ; it now seems that we
must give up the idea that energy can generate life." ^

Now in order to show how the various functions of the
body are procurable out of food which is " matter stored
with energy," Prof. Dolbear asks, " How is this trans-
formation of energy in the body effected ? " " Roughly,"
he says, " there are five different kinds of motion to trace
the antecedents of, in the body of any of the higher
animals." (i) mechanical; (2) muscular; (3) tempera-
ture; (4) transpiration [osmosis?]; (5) nervous.

As an example of (i) we will say a man walks, i.e.,
his bones move by mechanical force. For this muscular
action (2) is brought into play. To do this nerve force
(5) is required. But what sets the nerves working?
The Professor does not answer that question. There are
two causes : either the mitomatic action of the brain,
when a man runs away from an angry bull ; the other is
volitional when, after careful deliberation, he chooses to
take one road rather than another. He is conscious of
the power to choose.

Prof. Dolbear refers to the senses as recipient of
waves, etherial for sight, aerial for hearing, but until
these waves reach the brain along the nerves there is
neither "light" nor "sound".

He says all organic phenomena are reducible to
physical processes. What physical process is able to
convert " waves " into " sensations," or into " conscious-
ness " of those sensations ?

' The Unseen Universe, p. 228,

"DIRECTIVITY'' A WITNESS OF MIND 71

He says of nerves : " The activity of protoplasm in
the various cells transforms the various food stuffs into
the proper substances needed.

" The energy is already present ; it is only differently
distributed by protoplasm ; and nervous action deter-
mines what changes, if any, shall go on at a given place." ^

He here recognises a sort of "Directivity" and places it
in the nerves, while protoplasm is charged with the power
of making assimilable molecules.

This may be true as far as the results come about.
But how can the same kind of protoplasm — for no two
sorts are known ^ — make a great variety of different sub-
stances, and what sets the nerves into action ?

There is " something " behind all these curious pro-
cesses which is not touched ! Nothing could better
display the powerlessness of the attempt to reduce all
vital phenomena to physics and chemistry than Prof.
Dolbear's description of the germination of a grain of
corn and the evolution of a chick from the egg. The
grain and the egg, he says, differ from the plantlet and
the chick in that the former may remain even years with-
out germinating, and " when growth has once really begun
it must keep on growing or die, arrest is impossible,^
which seems to show that life is a process rather than
a condition, and the grain of corn is simply a combination
of materials where, under suitable conditions, life may
begin ".*

The last three words beg the question. If life be only
a physical force it cannot begin. It could only appear

1 Op. cit., p. 290.

'^Haeckel invents terms such as "neuroplasm" for nerves.
^Arrest in plant-growth often occurs when the temperature in spring
falls between 40° and 32° F.
* Op. cit., p. 292.

72 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

by its effects as transposed physical force. However,
no biologist will admit this supposition at all. More-
over, there is nothing resembling germination in the
inorganic world. Whence arises the profound difference
between them ?

Speaking of the reserve-food materials in the endos-
perm he says: "There are not only molecular groups of
many sorts, but they are segregated into families, so that
bodies of one constitution are all in one locality, and
bodies of other constitutions in other separate localities,
but definitely arranged so as to be available when the
life process begins ". ^

There could hardly be a better illustration or better
description of Directivity than this passage ; while the
reader will also perceive that Prof Dolbear shows the
"ends" secured by "means," all for the definite purpose
of nourishing the embryo when it begins to sprout. It
is not only the making of the starch, the oil, the nitro-
geneous aleurone grains, etc., which require chemical
processes for their manufacture, but the presence of
ferments or enzymes to render them assimilable, also
chemical products, but necessary as solvents before the
embryo can utilise the reserve food at all.

The mere physical and chemical processes will not
per se account for all this Directivity and Object. He
then asks : " What is the distinction between what is
called living and dead matter ? One is able to transform
energy for its maintenance and the other seems to be
wholly inert; yet, if analysed, both may be reduced to pre-
cisely the same amount of elements ".'- All this we knew
before ! Let us see if Huxley can enlighten us : " It must
not be supposed that the differences between living and

' op. cit., p. 292. ^Op. cit., p. 294.

"DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND 73

not-living matter are such as to justify the assumption
that the forces at work in the one are different from
those to be met with in the other ".^ Is that true? An
obvious difference is that the forces in dead protoplasm
are excited by microbes which cause putrefaction. They
play no similar part in a living organism, though other
kinds of microbes can act pathologically. Again, the
forces of protoplasm bring about the formation of starch,
sugar, oil and hundreds of other substances in living
vegetable cells. The forces of dead protoplasm do no
such work, but destruction only. They may be, broadly
speaking, " chemical " or " physical " in both, but the
above statement of Huxley's requires demonstration m
details. Living protoplasm transforms energy from food
and utilises it in various ways. Whatever forces may
be at work in dead protoplasm nothing of the kind is
possible.

Prof. Dolbear commits himself still further by com-
paring an electrical machine with a living being. He
observes that all the parts are made separately and then
put together, yet no electricity appears ; but " if the
proper kind of energy is spent upon it, it at once be-
comes electrified, and electrical energy may now be got
from it in indefinite quantity, dependent wholly upon
the proper turning of the crank. , . . One might speak
of the whole machine as an organism, its wood and glass
and brass as its molecular composition, its function
depending upon each of these being in its appropriate
place, and nothing more. It can only exercise that
function when energy of the proper sort is turned into
it." 2

Precisely so, but what Prof. Dolbear does not see, is

^ op. cit., p. 359. ^Op. cit., p. 295.

74 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

that man has assumed, as Prof. Church points out,
the position of the Directivity in the living organism ;
or as we say, Life. If protoplasm once artificially made
could spring into life, and the electrical machine set up
electricity of itself, as soon as made, some analogy
might be drawn, but no more electricity can come out
of it than its equivalent to the muscular force derived
from the man's arm that turns the crank.

We come back to the unanswerable original question
— What determines molecular motion which brings about
purposeful results in living organisms ; so that plants
and animals can not only reproduce themselves, but
evolve differently formed beings in adaptation to their
environments ?

There tmist be a something in the background which
causes it ; as there cannot be an "effect," viz., variation,
without a "cause" ; which, as far as we can see, resides
in protoplasm and its nucleus and nowhere else.

The above conclusions of physiologists seem to have
been arrived at from the belief in Darwinism. This was
said by Huxley to have given the death-blow to the
Argument of Design,

Now, if all adaptations seen in living beings arose by
means of Natural Selection, then it is easy to see that
Directivity has no place in the construction of animals
and plants ; consequently all the processes of growth
and development must be referable to physics and
chemistry.

Since, however. Natural Selection has no place in the
Origin of Species, but only in their Distribution in time
and space ; while all adaptations issue from the respon-
sive power of protoplasm to the definite action of the
environment. Directivity is reinstated as before ; Design
giving place to Adaptation.

"DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND 75

I have alluded to an important paper by the late
Mr. James Croll in the Philosophical Magazine for July,
1872 ; and as this is not readily accessible to every one,
I propose making extracts from it ; as they convey
precisely what I could have wished said on the present
occasion. The title of the paper I have already given,
but will here repeat — What Deten^iines Molecular Motion ?
— the Fundamental Problem of Nature (1872).

" Physical inquiry in every direction is converging
towards Molecular Physics, is resolving itself into ques-
tions regarding the dynamical action of the ultimate
particles of matter.

"To determine (i) the constitution of the ultimate
atoms and molecules of matter, what they really are, and
(2) the laws of their motions, are two great problems of
Molecular Physics.

" With regard to all physical change or motion . . .
there are at the very outset two fundamental questions :
(i) what produces the change — causes motion? (2) what
determines or directs it ?

" All agree that what produces change or causes
motion is Force.

" What determines or directs the motion, is not so
easily answered.

'• In the production of all physical phenomena we
have two distinct elements, viz., force, and the way or
manner in which force acts ; in other words — Force and
the Laws of Force ; or as Mr. Lewes expresses them —
' the paths along which they travel to their particular
results '. What determines the paths along which force
acts? It is not what gives existence to the motion, but
what detennines its direction, is the great question."

Mr. Croll thus arrives at the first most important dis-
tinction ; —

76 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

(i) " T/ie Production of Motion and the Determination
of Motion are absolutely and essentially different!'

Applying this to living beings Mr. Croll rightly
observes: "In the production of organic forms from the
simplest up to the most special and complex in the
vegetable and animal kingdom two things require to be
accounted for, viz.: (i) the motion of the matter of
which they are composed, and (2) its disposition or
arrangement with reference to time and space. . . .
Not only must something produce the motion, but some-
thing must determine it also. . . . To assign a sufficient
cause for the one does not in the least degree satisfy the
mind as to the presence of the other. To account for
the motion of a ball does not account for why it moves,
say, east rather than west or in any other possible
direction.

" The grand and fundamental question then is, What
is it that determines or directs the action of the forces
concerned in the production of molecular change ? . . .
We must not only know the paths taken by the particles,
but must be able also to explain why the paths are
taken. . . What causes the molecules and particles of
living nature to arrange themselves into organic forms ?
Is it a Force ? "

These questions bring Mr. Croll to his second con-
clusion : —

(2) The action of a Force cannot be Determined by
a Force nor can Motion be Determined by Motion : —

"That the action of a force cannot be determined by
the action of a force is demonstrable thus. If the action
of a force is determined by an act, then this determining
act must itself have been determined by a preceding
act, and this preceding act by another, and so on in like
manner to infinity.

''DIRECTIVITY'' A WITNESS OF MIND 77

" Hence in any exhibition of force in action we have
to account (i) for its production, (2) for its determina-
tion. ... It must be evident that whatever this cause
may have been, it was not an exertion of force. . . . By
no possible means can we conceive [original ?] determina-
tion to be the result of an act, or exertion of force."

He proves this by supposing a number of bodies A,
B, C, etc., each acting in turn upon the other ; A being
the final recipient of the force. The direction of move-
ment of A in time and space is determined by that of
B, and so on backwards, till we come to the primary
director, so to say, or the original directivity , as some-
thing quite different from the actual force which sets the
series in movement with definite directions in time and
space.

" Motion cannot possibly take place without its being
in some particular direction. But this does not prove
that the two things are the same. It only proves that
they are inseparably connected.

" The mystery is not what are the forces which move
the particles but what is it that guides and directs the
action of the forces, so that they move each particle in
the particular manner and direction required. ... A
molecule may move without moving in the /rt'/'^r direc-
tion, . . . What is it that determines that the forces
shall act in the proper way ? Out of the infinite number
of different paths, what is it that directs the force to
select the right path ? It follows that there is something
else to be known than mere force before we can penetrate
the mystery of Nature.

" The simple truth is, in attempting to account for the
determination of motion by referring it to 2i force, we are
attempting an absolute impossibility. The production of
motion and the determination of motion are two things

78 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

absolutely different in their essential nature. Force pro-
duces motion ; but it is as impossible that force can
determine motion as that two can be equal to three, or
that a thing can be and not be at the same time. The
necessity is as absolute in the one case as in the other."

In order to show that s/iape or form of any thing in
Nature could not be the sole product of a force, Mr.
Croll takes a crystal for illustration. He observes : " All
that force does is simply to move or draw the molecules
and hold them together in the crystalline state. The
crystalline T^rw is therefore not due to the force, but to
that something, be it what it may, which is the cause
why the molecules have a [certain] shape, and why their
attraction is confined to the definite points on the sur-
faces of the molecules.

" What, then, is the cause of determination ? This
is the all-important question, whether as regards life-
theories, theism or evolution."

Mr. Croll is now led to his third proposition as
follows : —

(3) " A/l the Energies and Forces of Nature are pro-
bably tJie same, and differ only i?i regard to their modes
of operation.

" This proposition follows as a consequence from the
principle of the Conservation of Energy.

" The only difference between chemical, electric, mag-
netic and heat energy is merely in the mode of operation.
The difference lies, therefore, not in the force or energy
itself, but in its determination, that is, not in the mere
exertion of force, but in the way or manner in which
force is exerted."

Mr. Croll then proceeds to consider the bearing which
these propositions have on theories regarding the so-called
" Vital Force " and the Mystery of Life.

''DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND 79

" The various theories may be divided into two classes
— 'the advocates of the one class maintaining that all the
phenomena of life, all the changes which take place in
organic nature, are the result of purely chemical and
physical agencies ; while the other party maintain that
there must be something more than the ordinary chemical
and physical forces at work."

From what I have said above it will be gathered that
Materialistic Monists, like Haeckel and many physiolo-
gists of different countries, appear to repudiate everything
except chemical and physical forces ; taking no account
of this Determination which Mr. Croll insists upon, or
what I have called Directivity in the building up the
structures of animals and plants.

That life in any organisation is maintained by the
assimilation of food is obvious. Hence we might say
that " vital force " is chemical force transformed. The
same remark holds true of the mechanical and other
physical energies of the body. The energy by which the
arm is raised or by which the heart beats is derived from
the food. Animal heat is derived from chemical com-
bination, and so on.

" So far as all this is concerned the advocates of the
physical theory of life are evidently correct. But are
they warranted in affirming, as they do, that all the
energies of plants and animals are either chemical or
physical ? . . . Are the known forms of energy mani-
fested in the inorganic world sufficient to account for the
phenomena of life and organic nature ?

" Chemistry and physics are insufficient because they
do not account for the Objective Idea in Nature.

" Whatever may be one's opinions regarding the
doctrine of Final Causes and the evidence of Design in
Nature, all must admit the existence of the Objective Idea in

8o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Nature." We see everywhere not only exquisite order and
arrangement in the structure of plants and animals, but a
unity of plan pervading the whole. We see, in endless com-
plexity, beauty and simplicity, the most perfect adaptation
of means to ends. The advocates of the physical theory
are at least bound to show how it is probable that this
exquisite arrangement and unity of plan could have been
produced by means of chemical and physical agencies.

Mr, Croll here instances the formation of a leaf of a
tree, but as Prof. Dolbear referred to the reserve-food
material in the grain of corn, I will take that as an
illustration of Determination and Directivity,

The odj'ect of the grain is, of course, reproduction.
Having this, so to say, in view, Nature secures the im-
pregnation of the female germ-cell by the male sperm-
cell contained in a separate organ, the pollen grain.

There are two fertilising bodies in this latter, so that
when the origin of the new plant or embryo is thus
secured, the other "fertiliser" pays attention to another
body in the same chamber or embryo sac. This latter
having been, so to say, impregnated, undertakes to make
the reserve-food material for the embryo. Both proceed
to grow and develop independently of each other ; so that
when the grain is ripe the embryo lies freely at one end
of the grain with the "endosperm," as it is now called, at
the back of it.

The endosperm consists of a great number of chambers
called cells in which the food is stored up ; but how came
it there ? The main ingredient consists of starch grains.
This was piade in the leaves, but being solid was changed
into .soluble sugar, conveyed away by proper tubes, etc,
to the growing grain, where the sugar is re-formed into
starch in view of the resting period the grain goes through
before it germinates in the following year. Besides starch

"DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND 8i

(which contains no nitrogen) other granules are made
containing nitrogen and certain minerals which will be
required in due course. In some grains and seeds oil is
present instead of starch.

When the time comes for the seed to germinate, the
embryo can make no use of these permanent forms of
food until they have been changed into liquid states
capable of being assimilated. This is done by means of
ferments or enzymes, which convert the starch into sugar,
the " gluten " into " peptones," etc. The embryo now
absorbs them, and the starch ultimately goes to build up
the cell-walls and the nitrogenous gluten to increase the
quantity of living protoplasm.

The above is but a sketch : a number of other facts
might be mentioned, every one implying directivity or
determination of the paths along which molecules have
to travel to carry out the above and many more peculi-
arities of a grain of corn, all conspiring to secure the
most perfect adaptation of means to ends.

Generalising these observations over the structure of
many kinds of plants or animals, Mr. Croll says : " In
Nature we have a group of molecular movements corre-
sponding to the objective idea of each particular object
that is being formed. In objects of the same species the
groups of molecular movements have a specific resemblance
to one another, while in the formation of all objects of the
same genus there is a genuine resemblance between the
groups of molecular movements. In the formation of ob-
jects of the same family we have a still higher unity, com-
prehending a still greater number of groups of molecular
movements. We go on in like manner till we reach a
unity which comprehends under it all the groups of
molecular movements occurring in the vegetable or in
the animal kingdom. The unity which pervades the

0

82 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

endless diversity of molecular movements must be as
perfect as the unity which we find to pervade the endless
diversity of organic forms. In fact, the two are insepar-
able, because the unity which exists amongst organic
forms is the e^ect of the unity which exists among
molecular movements. It is because these molecular
movements are determined according to a unity of plan
that their effects (viz., organic objects) have a unity of
form. It is the particular determinations of the move-
ments of the molecules that give the particular form to a
tree."

I will hereafter show^ that "Darwinism," or "The
Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection," does
not exist in Nature, and that it represents no Natural Law
by which the accidental, favourable variations could be in
correlation with the requirements of the being, so as to
be in harmony with new surroundings.

Mr. Croll drew the same conclusion in 1872, for he
thus wrote : " Natural Selection never can explain the
objective idea in Nature unless we suppose the selection
to be made according to a design or plan. Mr. Darwin's
theory can never, from its very nature, explain the mystery
of the organic world. There must be a determining cause
in the background of all natural selection working out the
objective idea."

That is to say, Mr. Croll demands some Natural Law
governing the process by which new species arise : and
that we now know is expressed by saying the living proto-
plasm responds to the direct action of the neiv conditions of
life ; and molecular motion takes place in accordance
with Directivity towards adjustment.

"•But there is not merely a unity oiplan to be accounted

' See Appendix, p. 145.

"DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND 83

for, but also a unity of purpose. Things in Nature are
not only related to one another in form, but they stand
related as means to ends. And this relationship is as
all-pervading as that of form. There is not an object in
Nature that does not stand in the relationship of a means
to something as an end. And there exists a unity in the
ends as well as in the forms. All molecular motions
must consequently have this double relationship of plan
and purpose. How, then, is all this order and unity both
of plan and purpose in molecular motions to be accounted
for?"

Mr, Croll concludes his paper with the following
heading — " Molecular Motion in Relatioii to Ihtity of
Plan".

" The form assumed is due, not to the motion of the
molecules, but to the determination of that motion — to
the way in which the motions are guided and adjusted in
relation to one another. It is not the energy which con-
veys the bricks that account for the form of the house,
but that which guides and directs the energy. So far as
the form of the house is concerned, it is a matter of in-
difference whether the bricks are conveyed on the backs
of labourers or transported by a steam crane. In like
manner, in accounting for organic forms, we must exhibit
not the mere energy which moves the molecules, but that
which directs and guides the energy."

Of the fifteen authors quoted by Prof. Dolbear,
Lankester is the only one who includes "form" as the
" outcome of the operation of the laws of physics and
chemistry " ; all the others omit this fundamental word,
upon which Evolution depends.

The question to be considered is. Can this marvellous
adjustment of molecular motions be explained by any-
thing which is found within the domains of chemistry and

84 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

physics ? The advocates of the physical theory must afford
us some explanation of the cause of the determination of
molecular motion derived from physics and chemistry, if
their theory in reality rests upon a true foundation.

" The chief argument in favour of this theory seems
to be that a// the energies in Nature to which the term
' vital ' can be applied evidently have a chemical or
physical origin. For example, the vital energies of our
bodies are derived from the food we eat, the water we
drink and the air we breathe ; they, therefore existed
first under the form of chemical affinities. The same is
the case in regard to plants ; all the energies in operation
in the plant are in like manner derived from the nutri-
ment received through its leaves and rootlets. But the
energy is no longer chemical or physical after it has
changed its mode of operation. If energies are to bear
names according to their mode of operation (which is the
practice in science), then energies differing from those
of chemistry and physics must have a name by which
they are to be distinguished. Why then, not call them
' vital energies ' ?

" The terms light, heat, electricity, magnetism, etc.,
are diff"erent names which we apply to different modes of
molecular motion ; and it is true that at present little is
known regarding the nature of their modes of motion ;
but notwithstanding this we have reason to conclude that,
although we knew all that absolutely can be known re-
garding them, yet zV ivould not afford us any explanation
of the cause of the determination of molecular motion in
organic nature.

" If one plant or animal differs from another, or the
parent from the child, it is because in the building-up
process the determinations of molecular motion were
different in the two cases ; and the true and fundamental

"DIRECTIVITY" A WITNESS OF MIND 85

ground of the difference must be sought for in the cause
of the determination of molecular motion.

" Here in this region the doctrine of Natural Selection
and the struggle for existence can afford no more light on
the matter than the fortuitous concourse of atoms and the
atomical philosophy of the ancients."

Mr. Croll's imagery of a house recalls that of Darwin's
to which I shall refer, where I endeavour to show that if
naturally made fragments of rocks — supposed to represent
casual, favourable variations in organisms — were taken
with the purpose of building a "noble and commodious
edifice," such was impossible ; for no such house has ever
been built nor could be, with undressed stone.

Mr. Croll introduces another point. Supposing the
fragments were suitable, how are they to move from the
base of the cliff and find their proper places in the edifice
without a "director" who fits them in just where they
are to go? If the analogy between Darwin's noble and
commodious house and an organism be carried out, then
the bricks must be made for walls of the house, just as
molecules of cellulose must be made for cell-walls of
plants or of bone and enamel for teeth of animals.

Secondly, being made, the former have to be located
on the periphery of the protoplasm, and those required
for the teeth to be placed in those organs and nowhere
else.

There is first the preparation of the right chemical
molecules out of food to be gone through, and, secondly,
Directivity or Determination to locate them in the being.

A writer of an article on "The Atomic Theory of
Lucretius " observes : " It is a principle of mechanics that
a force acting at right angles to the direction in which a
body is moving does no work, although it may continu-
ally and continuously alter the direction in which the

86 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

body moves. No power, no energy is required to deflect
a bullet from its path, provided the deflecting force acts
always at right angles to that path "}

The author then applies this to man's free will : " The
will would add nothing sensible to nor take anything
sensible from the energy of the universe".

Similarly Directivity may be present everywhere in the
organic world, but neither exert nor neutralise any force.

^ North British Review, March, 1868.

CHAPTER IX

THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST ACTION IN THE EVOLUTION
OF ORGANIC STRUCTURES

In drawing attention to Directivity, so conspicuous
throughout the whole of the organic world, there is a
feature very observable in the structure of organs of all
kinds, which adds an additional value to the importance
of Directivity as one of the many coincident lines of
indubitable evidence which leads to the conclusion that
the Power behind Nature is not only conscious but
Omnipotent. It is, that in making organs for which
physical force has been employed, the responsive power
of protoplasm is seen in its forming the organ not only
to be admirably constructed for fulfilling its purpose but
m proportion to the need required.

It has not infrequently been found necessary in
engineering and other constructions to endeavour to dis-
cover methods of securing the greatest possible strength
with the least amount of substance and more especially
the least waste of force. This is called the " Principle of
Least Action ".

One of the most interesting discoveries in animal
mechanics is that the muscles and bones are invariably
constructed and placed on this principle, and often secure
ends far more effectively and perfectly than man has
succeeded in doing in architectural and engineering
works.

(87)

,88 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Rev. S. Haughton, D.C.L., F.R.S., a divine, mathe-
matician and medical man, investigated this subject, and
he found " that in every arrangement of bones, muscles,
joints and parts of animals the motion must be such as
it would be on the hypothesis that the muscle were a
living intelligent thing, trying to save itself trouble.
We can calculate with a certainty as perfect as we can
calculate the path of a planet the positions of bones and
sockets as we find them in Nature ".^

The law is familiar to every one on a little reflection.
Thus no one, not even a dog, would go round two sides
of a triangular field to get to another corner. Though
Euclid took the trouble to prove that any two sides of
a triangle are together longer than the third yet it is
practically axiomatic. With all people there exists the
universal habit of abbreviating words. We say, for
example, " won't " and " can't " for " will not " and " can-
not," and many other instances will occur to the reader.

The bee supplies a good instance in making its honey-
comb. The cells are constructed on strictly mathematical
principles. It has been ascertained by mathematical
calculations that no other form of cells in combination
could give the maximum capacity with the minimum of
material ; yet the bee is quite unconscious of the fact.
All that it does is to build cells on opposite sides of
a sheet of wax, only taking care that each cell stands
over the space between three cells on the other side.
The cells being then erected on both sides result in the
usual hexagonal form.

Similarly with regard to muscles, Dr. Haughton ob-
serves, " Nature aims at producing a given quantity of

^ The Principle of Least Action in Nature, illustrated by Animal
Mechanics ; being three lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great
Britain, 1871.

PRINCIPLE OF LEAST ACTION 89

work with the least quantity of material, and their forms
are precisely those which the principle of least action
takes in muscular mechanics".

The first thing to do in investigating this subject was
to obtain the " coefficient " of muscular force, which
represents the number of lbs. weight necessary to break
the muscle across, as if it were a rope. Dr. Haughton,
by an elaborate series of experiments, found that " 947
lbs. per square inch is the weight that the arms of a
young man accustomed to athletic exercises are capable
of lifting. iiO'4is the corresponding coefficient for the
muscles of the legs of a similar class, and 107 for the
muscles covering the abdomen."

In concluding his first of three lectures Dr. Haughton
observes: "I have shown you that a planet moves in its
orbit as a lazy intelligent creature would, who was anxious
to perform an allotted task with the least trouble to itself;
that the bee constructs its wonderful cell so as to produce
a given amount of storage for its honey with the least pos-
sible amount of trouble to itself Similarly, I will show
you how the tendons of the legs and arms of animals are
constructed with a wonderful economy of the same kind
as that with which the bee constructs its cell. ... Is it
by the intelligence of the planet that it moves in its orbit ?
Who has weighed out and regulated the weight of the
tendons of our arms and hands ? By what force or by
what intelligence do the limbs of animals describe their
proper paths ? Who places the socket of each joint in
the exact position (which can be calculated with un-
erring certainty by mathematics) which enables the
muscle to perform its allotted task with the least amount
of trouble to itself?"

The answer which the Doctrine of Evolution by self-
adaptation gives is, that protoplasm at once responds to

go PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

exercise. The effort made by the creature is at once
answered by that response, and whatever be the object
the creature wants, protoplasm automatically, instantly
sets to work to construct the muscle necessary and suffici-
ently strong and applicable for the purpose. The re-
sponse is always approximately proportionate to the
effort, so that no great excess of structure is made and
the principle of least action is acted upon.

But Directivity is here most plainly discernible in the
results ; which Paley selected as proving, from his point of
view, that they were " designed ". We shift the point of
sight and say they were evolved.

In his second lecture Dr. Haughton selected the
muscles and tendons of the feet of monkeys of the old
and new worlds, calling attention to a difference between
them correlated with their habits. Two tendons pass
into the palm and then branch into five for the digits.
In both classes the two main tendons are joined at the
base of the thumb (or No. i digit) and in both a tendon
crosses the palm from No. i into No. 5 ; the difference
lies in the fact that in the old world monkeys the tendon.
No. 2, coheres with the tendon in the thumb ; whereas it
is free from it in the foot of the new w^orld monkeys.

" In the South American monkeys, best known by
those beautiful little capuchins, the natural action is to
place the first and fifth together or the first, second, third
and fourth. The monkey of Africa prefers to grasp with
the first, second and fifth toes."

Dr. Haughton then proceeds to classify muscles as :
"(i) prismatic, in which the muscular fibres run parallel
from bone to bone ; (2) pcnniform, where the fibres
radiate at equal angles from a common tendinous line
and are inserted, of course, at each extremity into the
bone ; (3) triangular, where the muscular fibres proceed

PRINCIPLE OF LEAST ACTION 91

from a fixed line and converge to a very short one,
practically a point ; (4) quadrilateral is the same as the
triangular, but in which the short line is longer, so that
the whole makes a four-sided figure ; (5) sphincter and
ellipsoidal, which surround a circular or elliptical space".

The quadrilateral muscle is peculiar in that if the
bones be not in the same plane the fibres instead of
being parallel now take up the position forming a " skew
surface" precisely on the same principle as of a skew
bridge. Dr. Haughton observes : " I have succeeded in
discovering that the particular skew surface, of which
muscles are capable of assuming the shape, is the
beautiful surface known to geometers by the name of
the hyperboloid of one sheet.

" This is not a mere fiction of geometers. The adductor
magnus muscle in the leg of man, and the great pectoral
muscle in the wing of every bird, are living examples of
the reality of this curious fact, that Nature constructs
not merely plane muscular structures but that she is
capable of constructing muscular surfaces belonging to
the most beautiful and elegant forms that have been
studied and invented by abstract geometers.

" The prismatic muscle and the penniform muscle
possess the remarkable property, which can be demon-
strated mathematically, that in their contraction no loss
whatever takes place . . . whereas in the triangular,
quadrilateral and skew muscles we can demonstrate that
in the use of every such muscle there is a necessary loss
of force ; but these are only used under great necessity.

" The most wonderful triangular muscle in the world
is the biceps femoris or the flexor of the thigh of a tiger.
In the leg of a man it is like a rope of parallel fibres,
but a tiger's habit is to leap from the jungle at its prey.
The weight of muscle to give the tiger the spring is

92 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

enormous, and if it took the form of a rope would
greatly impede it.

" The most remarkable example of the penniform
muscle in Nature is the muscle which lifts the wing of
the bird. The bird's wing is depressed by great and
powerful muscles but it is lifted by a small compact
muscle. . . . The nature of a bird's flight is this : The
depressor muscles of the wing must be made enormously
great, to strike the air with the utmost force ; the muscles
which lift the wing must be made as light and small as
possible. Therefore we find that Nature always employs
the penniform muscle to lift a bird's wing. Thus no
force is lost and the bird is enabled to repeat the down-
ward stroke much faster than if the prismatic form of
muscle had been retained."

Dr. Haughton concludes his lectures by describing
an " ellipsoid muscle that surrounds a cavity" — a muscu-
lar bag. "In attempting the solution of the problem of
an ellipsoid muscle, I found myself brought into contact
with a problem in architecture which has baffled archi-
tects for many years. I mean the problem of the
equilibrium of an elliptical dome. Every portion of
a curved ellipsoidal muscle forms a portion of a small
flat dome ; and to determine the equilibrium of tensions
and strains among the muscular fibres of such an animal
structure, is the same thing as solving the problem in
architecture of what are the strains in various directions
in an elliptical dome. The difficulty of constructing
equilibrated domes may be illustrated by the fact that,
with the exception of the Pantheon in Paris, there is not
a truly equilibrated dome in existence. The dome of St.
Paul's is braced up with double chains of iron, and other
chains of timber and lead put on to cover the defects in
the original structure of the dome. No case exists, I

PRINCIPLE OF LEAST ACTION 93

believe, of a self-supporting perfectly equilibrated spherical
dome but that of the Pantheon at Paris. ^ A perfect
ellipsoidal muscle is found in placental animals for
expulsion of the young in which there is a perfect
adaptation of force to resistance."

Dr. Haughton's three lectures on " Least Action "
would have furnished Paley with admirable materials ;
but the question is : How can chemico-physical forces
alone be made responsible for the Principle of Least
Action ?

It is paralleled in the vegetable kingdom. Every
tree puts on wood sufficient to support its own weight.
Lianes or woody climbers of tropical countries make
" cables " and " girders " to resist such strains as they
are subjected to ; while experiments of weighting stems,
leaf-stalks, etc., show that such strains as are produced,
instantly call out the responsive powers of the plants to
meet them. If a bough be bent and tied back in that
position, it will be found after a ^q\v years to be perma-
nently fixed, the strain having been met and completely
overcome.

From a simple experiment of tying a weight on to a
leaf-stalk to the formation of the skew, or ellipsoidal
muscle, the structures produced under strains, etc., are
all traceable to the responsive power of protoplasm to-
gether with its nucleus.

But there is Directivity throughout, as seen by the
Objective Results, in the development of the tissues of the
skew or muscle, out of molecules of matter derived from
food.

^ This was written in 1871. I am under the impression that the
large dome of the church at Musta in Malta, entirely built of stone, is
self-supporting.

CHAPTER X

THE ABANDONED ARGUMENT OF DESIGN

With regard to this subject, the doctrine of Evolution
has quite altered our perspective. Nevertheless, Paley's
well-known argument of the watch only requires readjust-
ment to be as sound as ever.

Huxley said that the argument had received its death-
blow, on the appearance of Darwin's Origin of Species by
Means of Natural Selection. Possibly such might have
been the case, if Natural Selection had anything to do with
the Origin of Species.

A remarkable anticipation of Darwinism even in the
use of the word " indefinite " occurs in Paley's Natural
Theology (chap, v.).

" The division of organised substances into animals and
vegetables, and the distribution and subdistribution of
each into genera and species, which distribution is not an
arbitrary act of the mind, but founded in the order which
prevails in external nature, appear to me to contradict
the supposition of the present world being the re^nains of
an indefi?tite variety of existence [here Darwin would say
'the survival of the fittest from " indefinite varieties,"'] ;
of a variety which rejects all plan. The hypothesis
teaches that every possible variety of being hath, at one
time or another, found its way into existence (by what
cause or in what manner is not said), and that those which
were badly formed [Darwin's ' injurious variations ']

(94)

ARGUMENT OF DESIGN 95

perished, but how or why those which survived [Darwin's
' survival of the fittest '] should be cast, as we see that
plants and animals are cast, into regular classes, the
hypothesis does not explain, or rather the hypothesis is
inconsistent with this phenomenon."^

In another passage (chap, xvi.) he brings forward a
well-known objection to Darwinism. In speaking of the
elephant's trunk, he says : " The short unbending neck of
the elephant is compensated by the length and flexibility of
his proboscis. . . . If it be suggested that this proboscis
may have been produced in a long course of generations,
by the constant endeavour of the elephant to thrust out
its nose (which is the general hypothesis by which it has
lately been attempted to account for the forms of animated
nature) I would ask, How was the animal to subsist in the
meantime during the process until this prolongation of its
nose were completed ? What was to become of the
individual whilst the species was perfecting ? "

This is a reasonable and, indeed, often suggested
question for Darwinism ; as there is no relationship be-
tween the accidental, favourable variation, which may
appear in one year, without any guarantee of its being
improved upon, even if it reappear in the next or any future
year; but with " definite " variations, the case is different,
the continued change in one direction, not of one, but of all
the individuals, year after year or generation after genera-
tion, is secured, provided the same inciting conditions of
life be constant.

Besides the presence of the " Object," as Croll says,
or Purpose in organic structures, there is their arrange-
ment and order to enable them to execute their functions
together for the well-being of the organism, Paley sup-

' The italics in^this passage are mine.

96 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

poses some opponent — it might be a Monist of to-day —
to argue that "there existed in things a principle of order,
which had disposed the parts of the watch into their
present form and situation ; " but as Paley observes, it is
inconceivable for a man at least to conceive of a principle
of order " distinct from the intelligence of the watch-
maker ". Darwinism, however, does not even admit such
an hypothesis of a " principle of order". The mechanism
of an animal, far more profoundly complex than a watch,
is supposed to have been evolved by "chance improve-
ments " occurring over immensely long periods ; but the
more the ininiiti(B of living beings are studied, the more
inconceivable is it that such a process could be effective.
As an example, I will here quote Paley's observations on
the structure of the eye and leave it to the reader's judg-
ment to decide which is the more probable hypothesis,
that all the adjustments have been developed together,
in response to the external stimulus, that being, in the
case of the eye, simply, light, to which the protoplasm
responds, and builds up the necessary tissues under that
mysterious Directivity already spoken of — or, as accord-
ing to Darwin, each of the details appeared as a chance
favourable variety, to wait for improvement till another
chance favourable variety should appear, and so on and
so on till that most elaborate structure in its entirety
might be perfected.

Paley thus begins chapter vi. on "The Argument
Cumulative " : " Were there no example in the world, of
contrivance, except that of the eye, it would be alone
sufficient to support the conclusion which we draw from
it, as to the necessity of an intelligent Creator. It could
never be got rid of, because it could not be accounted for
by any other supposition, which did not contradict all the
principles we possess of knowledge ; the principles ac-

ARGUMENT OF DESIGN 97

cording to which things do, as often as they can be
brought to the test of experience, turn out to be true or
false. Its coats and humours, constructed, as the lenses
of a telescope are constructed, for the refraction of rays
of light to a point, which forms the proper action of the
organ ; the provision in its muscular tendons for turning
its pupil to the object, similar to that which is given to
the telescope by screws, and upon which power of direc-
tion in the eye the exercise of its office as an optical
instrument depends ; the farther provision for its defence,
for its constant lubricity and moisture, which we see in
its socket and its lids, in its gland for the secretion of the
matter of tears, its outlet or communication with the nose
for carrying off the liquid after the eye is washed with
it ; these provisions compose altogether an apparatus, a
system of parts, a preparation of means, so manifest in
their design, so exquisite in their contrivance, so success-
ful in their use, as, in my opinion, to bear down all doubt
that can be raised upon the subject."

Had Paley lived now he could have added a great
deal more. He would probably have compared the eye
with a photographic camera, for it is a dark chamber
with the lens in front and a sensitive plate at the back :
upon which the external image is focussed as a minute
picture in a similarly inverted position. From this plate
(the retina) the optic nerve carries the vibrations to the
brain, where the picture is reversed, and the sense of
vision beholds, not the tiny image at the back of the
eye, but its source outside, as a house, in its proper
dimensions.

Can all this and much more be acquired by chance
variations, the few which are favourable occurring from
time to time ? Indeed, there is no guarantee that they
will occur at all in the succeeding generations ; when

7

gS PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

perhaps, according to Darwin, injurious ones might come
in, and the being perish ; so that the beginning of im-
provements would be lost for ever.

Paley sums up the " cumulative argument " thus :
" The proof is not a conclusion which lies at the end of
a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of
contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail,
the whole fails ; but it is an argument separately supplied
by every separate example. An error in stating an
example affects only that example. The argument is
cumulative in the fullest sense of that term. The eye
proves it without the ear ; the ear without the eye. The
proof in each example is complete ; for when the design
of the part, and the conduciveness of its structure to that
design is shown, the mind may set itself at rest ; no
future consideration can detract anything from the force
of the example."

This passage is, of course, equally applicable to the
evolutionary origin of the eye and ear by protoplasmic
adaptations instead of being designed.

Darwin — in spite of the logical conclusion to which
Natural Selection might have brought him, as it did
Haeckel and Biichner — could not refrain from exclaiming,
in comparing Evolution with Creation by fiat : " There
is a grandeur in this view of Life, with its several powers
having been originally breathed by the Creator into a
few forms or into one ; and that . . . from so simple
a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most
wonderful have been and are being evolved." ^

Through all the illustrations which Paley gives, there
is in the background that Directivity or Determination
towards an object, which we have seen to be so obvious

1 Origin of Species, 6th cd., 1878, p. 429.

ARGUMENT OF DESIGN gg

in the muscles as described by Dr. Haujjhton, and em-
phasised by Mr. James Croll.

Natural Selection in sweeping away Design was'sup-
posed to have swept away Determination with it ; so that
all animals and plants, including, of course, all their
internal anatomical structures, were supposed to have
arisen by the chance appearance of favourable variations,
accumulated through generations.

As, however, Natural Selection, so far as it was supposed
to be concerned with the Origin of Species, has not a
shadow of a foundation in Nature, the Law of Direct Ad-
aptation to the conditions of life is substituted ; and all
these wonderful structures which Paley thought to have
been designed, are now regarded as having arisen by
Evolution instead ; but there is everywhere present the
evidence of Determination or Directivity as patent as ever.

The human eye was undoubtedly evolved from a
pigment spot on the skin of some far distant creature at
the beginning of the series which led up to that of the
mammalia, which was sensitive to light ; such perhaps as
is found at the ends of the rays of a starfish ; so that
while there is hardly anything in these to be called
structure, in the human eye we attain to all the elements
of a self-acting photographic camera !

Paley observes that if a man discovered the use of a
watch picked up on a heath, not knowing what it was,
it would raise his admiration still more if he found that
the watch could reproduce itself by young ones, as a living
organism does.

We may add here, that if he found that, by placing
young watches in various localities some would eventually
become " time-pieces," " eight-day clocks," " alarums,"
"chronometers," etc., his admiration of the power of the
original watchmaker would be still more enhanced.

5

r^ IT. e O r> A
« kJ \j c* ;v •-•*

loo PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Now this is precisely what Evolution represents.

There may yet be added another feature. If a watch
gets out of order it has to be taken to a watchmaker to
be repaired ; but organisms have self-reparative powers,
so that a wound will heal up without external assistance.

However clever a human watchmaker may be, Nature
is incomparably the better of the two ; even though not
a single structure in the world may be regarded as ideally
perfect.

Darwin gives us his ideas of how he conceived a human
eye was evolved from a pigment spot by means of Natural
Selection, first observing : " I have felt the difficulty too
keenly to be surprised at others hesitating to extend the
principle of Natural Selection to so startling a length ".

" If we must compare the eye to an optical instrument,
we ought in imagination to take a thick layer of trans-
parent tissue [itself as well as the following having arisen
through Natural Selection] with spaces filled -w'lih fluid,
and with a no^e sensitive to light, beneath, and then
suppose every part of this layer to be conti^inally changing
slowly into density, so as to separate into layers of dif-
ferent densities and thicknesses, placed at different distances
from each other, and with surfaces of each layer changing
inform. [We may ask where are all these things to be
got, and why do they arise in Nature ?] Further we must
suppose that there is a power, represented by Natural
Selection or the survival of the fittest, always intently
watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers ;
and carefully preserving each which, under varied cir-
cumstances in any way or in any degree, tends to produce a
distincter ijnage. We must suppose each new state of the
instrument to be multiplied by the million [this is impos-
sible unless this sequence has occurred in a multitude of
individuals instead of one only] ; each to be preserved

ARGUMENT OF DESIGN loi

unttV a better one is produced, and then the old ones to be
all destroyed. In living bodies, variation will cause the
slight alterations, generation will multiply them almost
infinitely [why so, if they only appear in a few favoured
offspring ?], and Natural Selection will pick out with un-
erring skill each improvement. Let this process go on
for millions of years ; and during each year on millions of
individuals of many kinds ; and may we not believe
that a living optical instrument might thus be formed
as superior to one of glass as the works of the Creator
are to those of man ? " ^

It did not seem to occur to Darwin, that if the eye
is a work of the Creator, as the reader infers such to be
Darwin's belief from the last sentence, why should He
proceed in this roundabout process of making innumer-
able variations in which some twenty suppositions are
included, and so necessitating a " power " to pick out the
best ones. Why cannot the Creator make only the best
quality at once ? Why not let all the individuals enjoy
the best variations, instead of a few only, without ruth-
lessly destroying millions of living beings unblessed with
favourable variations ? ^

^ Origin of Species, p. 146. I have indicated by italics seventeen
suppositions. The above paragraph is reproduced from my address in
Christian Apologetics (J. Murray).

"When I first read the Origin of Species, etc., in i860, I had
misgivings long before I came to this passage ; but this hypothetical
argument was sufficient to clinch the matter in my mind. I have never
accepted Darwinism at all. I was fortunate in gaining one of the two
" Actonian Prizes," for an essay on the subject — " The Theory of Evolu-
tion of Living Things," offered by the Royal Institution in 1872. 1 chose
Palseontology as the subject for illustrating Evolution ; but never referred
to Natural Selection at all as an instrument in the process.

The other successful essayist was Mr. B. T. Lowne (as there were
two prizes of a hundred guineas each given in that year). The authorities
showed their impartiality, for his essay was based entirely on Darwinism.

I02 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

In describing anatomical structures illustrating Di-
rectivity (I will not now say Design) Paley notices cases
where mechanical principles are brought into play ; thus
there is a pulley in the muscles of the eye, levers in the
feet and arms, etc.

We have seen how a skew bridge is imitated in a
bird's wing and a man's leg, and the thigh bone has,
internally, the structure of an arch.

In the vegetable kingdom we find the principle of
springs to be frequent in flowers and mechanical traps
in insectivorous plants, as the Venus' fly-trap, which
resembles a rat-trap ; while a lever is seen in the stamens
of Salvias.

Where engineers and architects construct machines or
erect buildings, arches, bridges, etc., they do so on precisely
similar principles. They do but imitate, consciously or
unconsciously, what Nature has done before them.

Man, therefore, is much more a reveahr than an
original inventor; for his inventions are all based on
principles discovered to exist in Nature's works. In-
deed, the primary meaning of "Invention" is "Dis-
covery," 1 and is a better description of man's work than
the ordinary meaning.

If a man "invents" the telescope, it is because he
has " discovered " the action of lenses in combination.
Similarly he may invent mathematical formulae, using
letters of alphabets, but they only represent illustrations
of the natural laws of Numbers, of Geometry, etc. They
were all there from the beginning, but no creature before
man arrived could reveal them.

When we turn to Astronomy we find the forms and
motions of the heavenly bodies to be strictly bound by

^ For example, "The Invention of the Cross" signified its discovery.

ARGUMENT OF DESIGN 103

mathematical laws capable of being expressed in technical
terms. The question then arises : What was the primary
origin of " Natural " Mathematics and Geometry ; of the
natural laws of Physics and Chemistry? Are they all
self-existent and self-caused ?

What is the difference between the amount of pro-
babilities of the pre-existence of an Intelligent Power,
and those of blind forces producing those laws of com-
binations of numbers in mathematics ; or of vibrations of
Sound-producing Air and of Light-producing Ether or of
Light itself in producing colours only appreciable by an
eye ?

In chapter viii. Paley describes the mechanical action
of the human bones and alludes to that of the elbow. He
says : " In the fore-arm, for the perfect use of the limb,
two motions are wanted ; a motion at the elbow backward
and forward which is called a reciprocal motion, and a
rotatory motion, by which the palm of the hand, as occasion
requires, may be turned upward. How is this managed ?
The fore-arm consists of two bones, lying alongside each
other, but touching only towards the ends. One, and
only one, of these bones is joined to the cubit, or upper
part of the arm, at the elbow ; the other alone to the
hand at the wrist. The first, by means at the elbow of
a hinge -joint (which allows only of motion in the same
plane) swings backward and forward, carrying along
with it the other bone, and the whole fore-arm. In the
meantime, as often as there is occasion to turn the palm
upward, that other bone to which the hand is attached
rolls upon the first, by the help of a groove or hollow near
each end of one bone, to which is fitted a corresponding
prominence in the other. If both bones had been joined
to the cubit or upper arm at the elbow, or both to the
hand at the wrist, the thing could not have been done.

to4 present-DAY rationalism

The first was at liberty at one end, and the second at
the other ; by which means the two actions may be
performed together. The great bone which carries the
fore-arm may be swinging upon its hinge at the elbow,
at the very time that the lesser bone, which carries the
hand, may be turning round it in the grooves."

According to Paley all this would be supposed to have
been designed by the Creator antecedently to the creation
of man and in anticipation of his future requirements.
Evolution Inverses this conception, in that no structure,
however much it may be exquisitely adapted to its use,
is ever originally begun in anticipation of its use. The
effort to effect some purpose calls out the responsive
power of protoplasm and the organ is then and there
originated. Then, by the effort being constantly renewed,
the organ is developed upon the " principle of least
action " ; that is to say, it somewhat exceeds rather than
just exactly meets the requirement ; since the use of any
organic structure is never absolutely the same on two
occasions, or the number of pounds weight represented
is not mathematically always the same to an ounce ; so
Nature takes care to supply rather more than is usually
required.

A remarkable instance of a relatively quick response
to use occurred to a patient at St. Bartholomew's Hospital,
London, a few years ago. A railway guard had his elbow
crushed. The bones at the joint were excised and he
subsequently returned to resume his former occupation.
This often necessitated his reaching his compartment
after the train had started. To do this he had to walk
along the footboard and swing himself, so to say, by
means of the rail on the carriage. This required a con-
stantly repeated bending at the elbow. Nature at once
responded to the action, and supplied him with a per-

ARGUMENT OF DESIGN 105

fectly efficient and flexible elbow, though probably not
at all like the bony structure that had been excised.

This case reminds one of the fact, a very common
feature in Nature, that the same result can be produced
by very different 7neans. Thus flight is secured in very
different parts of the fore-limb in the extinct Pterodactyle,
the existing bat and the bird.

Similarly, in plants the tendril of a pea closely re-
sembles that of the vine ; but while the former is a
metamorphosed leaf the latter is homologous with a
flowering branch. In saying that Evolution never antici-
pates the use of a structure, I repeat, this only applies to
its origin. Once formed, heredity tends to preserve it,
and continual use to improve it ; we thus obtain organs in
every animal and plant now, which are built up during
the development in anticipation of their use later on — as
the eye in the foetus in total darkness — because the
Evolution of any individual being re-capitulates the de-
velopment of the race.

Hence Paley's fourteenth chapter on " Prospective
Contrivances," in which he alludes to the eye, must be
read in the light of Evolution to understand the real
significance of prospective structures.

Paley has an interesting chapter (xv.) on " Rela-
tions". By these he means what are now called " Cor-
relations". Thus he says: "The aptness of the jaws
and teeth to prepare the food for the stomach is, at least,
as manifest as that of the cider-mill to crush the apples
for the press. The concoction of the food in the stomach
is as necessary for its future use, as the fermentation of
the stum in the vat is to the perfection of the liquor, etc."

" Spallanzani has remarked a circumstantial resem-
blance between the stomachs of gallinaceous fowls and
the structure of corn-niills. Whilst the two sides of the

io6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

gizzard perform the office of the mill-stones, the craw or
crop supplies the place of the Jiopper.

" Nor does the gizzard belong to birds as such. A
gizzard is not found in birds of prey. Their food re-
quires not to be ground down in a mill. The comparatory
contrivance goes no farther than the necessity."

In other words, it is an illustration of the Principle of
Least Action.

Degeneration, so commonly occurring in organs of
animals and plants, was a great stumbling block as long
as every kind of structure was supposed to be created as
it now is and " very good ".

Of course the interpretation by degeneracy under
Evolution is perfectly sufficient. It is one of the several
lines of evidence which together prove inductively that
man is descended from the animal world.

CHAPTER XI

PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHIC VIEWS OF EVOLUTION

Having surveyed the animal and vegetable kingdoms,
as coming into existence as soon as protoplasm with the
nucleus appeared upon this earth, by Evolution ; it is
necessary to pay some attention to what certain Ration-
alists and others have to say upon the subject.

Being profoundly impressed by the continuity which
pervades Nature, many eminent scientists, as Huxley,
Tyndall, Herbert Spencer as well as Haeckel and
Biichner, would see no " break " at the origin of life
in organisms ; which, to satisfy the law of continuity,
7nust, according to their views, have proceeded from the
inorganic world.

When, however, we read what those philosophers
have to say on the subject, we find nothing beyond
suggestions, or what they imagine, on a priori grounds,
as to what was the case. Not one can be accepted as a
scientific truth based on inductive evidence.

Dr. Tyndall, for example, wrote ^ as follows : he saw
in matter, "the promise and potency of all terrestrial
life " ; " Life under all its forms has arisen by an un-
broken evolution, and through the instrumentality of
what are called natural causes ". First there is " a
nebular haze," then this becomes a " molten mass,"
wherein are all forms of life, man included, " potentially "

^ The following references are to his Fragments of Science.

(107)

io8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

existent — "the human mind itself — emotion, intellect,
will and all their phenomena ... all our philosoi)hy, all
our poetry, all our science, and all our art are potential
in the fires of the sun." ^

" Having determined the elements of their curve [in
allusion to the discoverable path of a comet] in a world
of observation and experiment, they [i.e., those who hold
the doctrine of evolution] prolong that curve into an
antecedent world, and accept as probable the unbroken
sequence of development from the nebula to the present
time." 2

The question arises, whether this is a legitimate " scien-
tific use of the imagination," or is it not rather an a priori
deduction without any efficient data whereon to rest the
theory? Let us see, then, what Tyndall could bring
forward in the way of concrete phenomena. He proceeds
to say : " The matter of the animal body is that of inor-
ganic nature. There is no substance in the animal tissues
that is not primarily derived from the rocks, the water
and the air. Are the forces of organic matter, then,
different in kind from those of inorganic matter ? The
philosophy of the present day negatives the question.
It is the compounding, in the organic world of forces
belonging equally to the inorganic, that constitutes the
mystery and the miracle of vitality. Every portion of
every animal body may be reduced to purely inorganic
matter. A perfect reversal of this process of reduction
would carry us from the inorganic to the organic ; and
such a reversal is at least conceivable " [?]."'

In the present state of our knowledge I, for one, flatly
deny that a living organism can be conceived as arising
out of its inorganic constituents, without the aid of Life ;

' Scientific use of the Imagination, p. 453.

'^ Ibid., p. 456. ^ Vitality, p. 463.

PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHY log

or even of a dead body coming back to life again of any
of Nature's millions of plants and animals.

Finally, he says : " Not with the vagueness belonging
to the emotions but with the definiteness belonging to the
understanding, the scientific man has to put to himself
these questions regarding the introduction of life upon the
earth. . . . As far as the eye of science has hitherto
ranged through Nature, no intrusion of purely creative
power into any series of phenomena has been observed." ^
What did Tyndall understand by a " purely creative
power " ? Presumably, the " God of Design " ; but if the
making of one species out of another may be called
" creative," we find that protoplasm with its nucleus is
perfectly well able to do it.

If Tyndall meant some direct interference of an ex-
ternal, conscious Creator, working upon matter and force
from without physical nature ; then we have no direct
evidence of any such interference throughout the whole
period of the world's history ; since Evolution first began
to work out the life histories of plants and animals, includ-
ing man, from tJie first appearance of protoplasm on this
earth.

But when we turn from useless speculations of the
imagination, however scientific they may be thought to
be, to positive facts capable of investigation, we at once
come upon a phenomenon which is 7iot discoverable in the
inorganic world, namely, that Directivity within proto-
plasm, to which I have abundantly alluded.

This Directivity is only associated with Life ; ^ and
these two things have been in close operation through
all organisation. Both, like physical forces, are only

1 Apology for the Belfast Address, p. 547.

^ I do not here include the arrangements of molecules to form crystals
in the mineral kingdom under the term ; though Croll would do so.

no PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

recognisable by their effects ; and as Croll said are just
as worthy of the term " Vital Force " or " Vital Energy "
or any other like expression, as are Gravitation, Electricity
and Magnetism are of their special names.

Now let us see if Huxley can help us. He says : " A
sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the
properties of the molecules of that [cosmic] vapour, have
predicted, say the fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much
certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapour
of the breath in a cold winter's day.^

" Were it given to me to look beyond the abyss of
geologically recorded time to the still more remote
period when the earth was passing through physical and
chemical conditions, which it can no more see again than
a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a
witness of the Evolution of living protoplasm from non-
living matter." ^

The reader will here note that he derives nothing of
any scientific value from this utterance any more than
from Tyndall's. The "man in the street" asks iox facts,
and they both supply him with imaginations.

It naturally occurs to one, Why is it necessary to go
back to so early a period for life ? We still have both
degrees of heat and cold beyond which no living being
can exist ; we know the external conditions of air, light,
moisture and food which are necessary for plant and
animal life ; why then cannot a living being arise now, or
at any time along the evolutionary history of the world ?

A very obvious answer appears to be that once ivas
enough. Given the tiniest speck of living protoplasm
with its nucleus, and all the living world can have come
out of it.

^ Gencaloff}' of Animals.
"^Critiques and Addresses, p. 239.

PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHY ui

It is of no use saying with Tyndall " on tracing the
line of hfe backwards, we see it approaching more and
more to what we call the purely physical condition "} It
really does nothing of the sort. An amoeba, a monera or
a bacterium is as much alive as a man. The protoplasm
of which it is made (as Huxley observes) is the same.
It shows no approximation whatever to the inorganic
world. Because it is small such is no proof that it ap-
proaches the composition of any mineral. This, surely,
is a most unscientific use of the imagination !

Lastly Mr. Herbert Spencer observes : " That the
forces exhibited in vital actions, vegetable and animal,
are similarly derived, is so obvious a deduction from the
facts of organic chemistry, that it will meet with ready
acceptance from readers acquainted with the facts." ^ As
an illustration, we may take his description of the assimi-
lation of carbon dioxide by plants. " To overcome the
powerful affinities which hold their elements together,
it requires the expenditure of force, and this force is
supplied by the sun". He does not seem to consider
how it is done by means of living, green-coloured proto-
plasm only. Sunlight supplies the energy, but proto-
plasm is the manufacturer.

The preceding authors do not emphasise sufficiently
the significance of Natural Laws. Dr. Whewell in his
" Bridgewater Treatise " on " Astronomy and General
Physics" calls attention to the metaphorical use of the
term " law " in Nature. Contrasting it with Moral Law
he says : " The language of moral law is ' Man shall not
kill : the language of a Law of Nature is, a stone will fall
to the earth '." In other words, a moral law states what
a man always ought to be, a natural law, wha,t always is.,

^Belfast Address, p. 524.
2 First Principles, p. 271,

112 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

If men were perfect, then, their actions due to their
moral character would become a natural law.

Now, the Laws of Nature have always struck theolo-
gical thinkers as being, per se, a witness to Mind. Thus,
if it be true that the universe originated out of a homo-
geneous cosmic vapour, it is inconceivable (judging by our
own minds, and we know of no others for comparison)
how the laws, as of gravity, heat, light, electricity and of
evolution itself, could have origi7iated, except from an
Omnipotent Mind or Will.

The whole universe is subject to laws ; as Dr. Whewell
observes : " The whole course of the visible universe is
but the collective result of such laws ; its movements are
only the aggregate of their working. . . . The number
and variety of the laws which we find established in the
universe is so great, that it would be idle to endeavour to
enumerate them. In their operation they are combined
and intermixed in incalculable and endless complexity,
influencing and modifying each other's effects in every
direction. . . . Yet, in so far as we consider the bearing
of one part upon another, we receive an impression of
adaptation, of mutual fitness, of conspiring means, of
preparation and completion, of purpose and provision.
This impression is suggested by the contemplation of
every part of Nature." ^

All this will be equally true whether Evolution of
Animals and Plants or the instantaneous creation by a
Fiat were the method. The innumerable adaptations
and correlations are precisely the same. And it is the
wonderfully complete adjustments between the organic
and inorganic kingdoms, wrought out as we now know,
in large measure by the self-adapting powers of proto-

■Pp. 7. 12.

PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHY 113

plasm, that impress the mind with the necessity of an
over-ruHng " Adapter ".

Let us follow out briefly the interdependence of the
three kingdoms. A man must live. He must breathe,
he must eat and drink. To do the first the air must
be so constituted as to supply him with the necessary
oxygen. Water is a necessity of life ; and if he eat
animal food, the sheep or ox had to live upon the vege-
table kingdom ; but grass or wheat, if man eat bread,
requires various mineral salts ; nitrates, phosphates, etc.,
and potash, iron, etc., or it cannot grow. All green
plants require carbon dioxide from the air, or they could
not build up their tissues. To do this they require heat
and light from the sun, the energy of which is stored up
in plants ; these have been converted into coal. Man
extracts it, lights a fire and roasts his meat, thereby
liberating sun-light and sun-heat ; or he may utilise the
stored up solar energy in driving his motor car or any
kind of engine.

The question is. Which is more probable : that the
innumerable adaptations between the three kingdoms
was foreseen by a Master Mind before protoplasm ap-
peared on this earth, or whether the exquisite adjustments
between Matter, Force and Life came about by chance ;
i.e., without any natural laws in mutual correlation, just
as natural selection is supposed to have brought about
Evolution, without any connection between the appearance
of favourable variations and the environment.

I prefer to regard this interaction as one of the many
coincidences which supply inductive evidence in support
of the proof of a Creator, both seen in the Origin of Life,
and the Origin of Species.

8

CHAPTER XII

FINAL CAUSES 1

The argument from design, which proved so fascinating
a subject to writers on teleology of the old School, has
been thought to have received its death-blow by Darwin-
ism.2 This doctrine, as propounded by Mr. Darwin, is
now forty years of age. In the year 1878 appeared
probably the most elaborate work on Final Causes which
has ever issued from the Press. It contains two books.
The first treats of the Law of Finality, the second of the
First Cause of Finality. This term is defined as follows :
" It signifies the end (finis) for which one acts, or towards
which one tends, and which may consequently be con-
sidered as a cause of action or of motion ". Hence it
would seem that a sharp distinction should be drawn be-
ween Finality and Causality ; that while every pheno-
menon demands a cause of some sort, it is only a certain
number which have an cnd^ this notion being " produced

1 Filial Causes. By Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Professor
at the Faculte des Lettres of Paris. Translated from the French by
William Affleck, B.D., with preface by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh,
1878.

This chapter recapitulates to a certain extent several observations made
throughout this book. I do not think this is any objection to its inser-
tion. It was written more than twenty years ago, but the arguments
are, I believe, as sound to-day as they were when it was written.

^Lay Sermons. By T. H. Huxley, p. 330.

(114)

FINAL CAUSES

115

with an imperious and irresistible force ". Thus, for
example, that a peeble should be round and smooth is
a result of friction ; but we see no " end " in its round-
ness or smoothness. The eye-ball is also round and
smooth, and we rightly or wrongly do infer an end in its
spherical form ; for we recognise its use for rotation.
This " imperiousness," however, is not argument, and the
question may be asked. How is any supposed end to be
distinguished from a mere result?

The reply is, that in every case where an end is
recognised there is a multiplicity of coincidences which
have by their mutual interaction brought about that end ;
while the probability of their occurring at haphazard, or
as uncorrected coincidences, and yet collectively produc-
ing such a structure as the eye, is one to infinity that
such should be the case. It is on these grounds that the
order of the planetary system, as well as the organs of
animals and plants, imply ends ; but we cannot recognise
any end in the way a stream of lava pours down one side
of a volcano rather than the other.

We may, however, here ask what degree of complexity
is requisite to constitute or illustrate an end ? If there is
an indubitable end in the human eye, is there not a like
end in the pigment cell attached to a nerve ? or, if there
is an end in the limbs of a vertebrate, is there no end in
the shapeless pseudopodia of an amccba ?

Now, the formation of pseudopodia may be claimed
by the Rationalists as illustrating the inherent properties
of protoplasm, and as such they are simply results and
not ends.

Even sex, so obviously an end, as Janet thinks, if
traced to elementary forms, is foreshadowed in the ac-
cidental fusion of two vegetative zoospores. Hence
although ends may seem very apparent in highly organ-

ii6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

ised beings, the organs exhibiting these ends may be
traced back to states where those " ends," by a gradual
process of minimisation, seem to pass into accidental
" results," and so one cannot at last draw any sharp line
between them.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in tracing conduct from such
random motions as are executed by pseudopodia, to the
actions of higher animals, which seem to show definite
ends, points out how the gradations are complete — say,
from the swimming of an infusorium to the habits of a
cephalopod, or from those of an ascidian to an elephant.
It is just this which renders the attempts to limit finality
with any degree of precision so difficult a task.

This difficulty, if I mistake not, is scarcely brought
out with sufficient precision by M. Janet. It may, there-
fore, indicate a line of objection to finality, as it un-
doubtedly would be to the old views of teleology.

In his sixth chapter of the first book on " Objections
and Difficulties," M. Janet refers to M. Littre's view that
" the property of matter of accommodating itself to ends
— of adjusting itself, as he says — is one of the properties
of organised matter. It is of the essence of this matter
to adapt itself to ends as it is of its essence to contract
or expand, to move or to feel." ^ Our author takes M.
Littr^ to task for this expression. It is not Matter, but
Directivity, which guides matter to " ends ". Otherwise
the very existence of the animal and vegetable kingdoms
as they now are, cannot be accounted for. If Littr^
meant that the protoplasm, say, of some reptile, through
some inherent power of adaptation, developed wings
instead of forelegs, and so produced a bird, such a de-
scription may sound absurd. But every evidence yet

IP. 221.

FINAL CAUSES 117

discovered goes to prove it to be true, though the process
may have been a gradual one, and only perfected through
very many generations.

In fact. Evolution is based on tlie principle that
protoplasm /ms within it an infinite potentiality of adap-
tation ; and when our author objects to M. Littre's
expression about organised matter having the power of
adapting or adjusting itself, he does not refute it by say-
ing, " Let men but think of it, and they will own that
there does not exist a sort of entity called organised
matter, endowed, one knows not why or how, with the
property of attaining ends ; what really exists is a
totality of solids, liquids, tissues, canals, hard parts and
soft parts — in a word, an incalculable totality of second
causes and blind agents, that all unite in a common
action, which is life".^ Now, this, in a sense, is true ; but
it is not one whit the less true that it is, so to say, a
plastic whole ; for, although when a creature is once born
into the world, and has grown to maturity, it can rarely
change its form much after that, any more than " the
leopard its spots " ; ^ yet, by the power of inherent ad-
aptability, its offspring can during growth acquire a form
and structure different in some degree from the parent's ;
and so after several generations can produce a new species,
abounding in so-called "ends" which were not to be
found in the original ancestral form.

It is, in fact, just this plasticity of organised matter
(for want of a better expression), to which is due the
marvellous results which, per se, have all the appearance

ip. 221.

^ This expression, as symbolical of fixity, is singularly inappropriate,
for the colour of the skin of even one and the same animal is extremely
variable, according to circumstances, as is the case with trout, frogs, and,
above all, the chameleon,

Il8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

of ends. M. Janet finally asks : " Wherein is it more
absurd to admit in matter the property of healing itself
than the property of adjusting itself to ends?" Neither
one nor the other is absurd for both are equally true.
To the famous argument of the watch it might be added
that, if a watch could heal up an injury to its wheels, it
would imply a vastly increased skill in its artificer. But
this is just what the highest kinds of organised matter
can do, and are doing every day !

Hence, if on the one hand, a large class of phenomena
do not instantly convey to our mind the idea of end,
whereas another large class imperatively force it upon us ;
we must bear in mind that the doctrine of Evolution,
without destroying that force as far as it acts per se, has
proved that, in all instances, we can actually or presumedly
pass from the highly complex organ, or organism, so to
say, crammed with ends, to seemingly a mere lump of jelly,
with, apparently, none at all ; and that by development,
whether studied historically in palaeontology or in embry-
ology, we pass by many gradations from what we call
a priori, " results," to what we a priori, call " ends ". It is
this discovery coupled with, or rather based upon Darwin-
ism, which has (it is supposed) given the death-blow to
teleology. For tracking them up from below, who can
say where " ends " begin ? And we may therefore, and
finally, ask — Is it not somewhat arbitrary to assert such
or such a structure to be an end and not a result ?

Before attempting to reply to this, let us return to our
author. He gives, as another basis of finality, the correla-
tion of the end with the future, which implies the existence
of the future phenomenon as the efficient cause ; and he
adopts the old illustration of the eye being fully developed
in the womb, though the use of it is solely for the future.

It seems to me that a line of argument may be

FINAL CAUSES 119

followed which will eliminate this dilemma. It is based
on the fact that function precedes structure, by which I
mean that functions now performed by well-differentiated
and specific organs, were undertaken by more generalised
structures before these organs existed ; just as, for ex-
ample, the membrane of a sea-anemone performs functions
of both digestion and respiration.

Again, when a new function is required by even a
highly organised being, that function is, so to say, under-
taken for a time by some existing organ (of totally
different function), until such modifications have occurred
in successive generations, as will ultimately enable the
organ (thus metamorphosed into a new form) to execute
its new functions exclusively. For example, the tendrils
of Naravelia are foreshadowed in the sensitive climbing
petioles of Clematis, and the seed-carrying expanded leaf
of Cycas is preliminary to the ordinary closed seed-vessel,
such as the pod of a pea.

Now, these principles of differentiation and meta-
morphosis which run through the organised world, imply
a universal potentiality of acquiring new functions, which,
at the same time, proceeds to modify structure, and so
gives rise to new organs.

May we not, then, legitimately pass from a considera-
tion of finality in the actual organ to a finality in this
very power and potency inherent in organised matter ?
Whence it comes is unsearchable and past finding out.
All we can say is, that inorganic matter shows no sign of
it whatever, whereas organised matter, or its ultimate
elements, protoplasm with its nucleus, would appear to
have it to an infinite degree.

Grant finality in this marvellous power, and the whole
question would seem to at once meet with its ultimate
solution.

I20 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Further illustrations will not be unadvisable.
If one contemplates the eye as it is, without regard
to its evolutionary history, the idea of finality, if not
design, is very " imperious " ; but by tracing that history
from a mere pigment cell in contact with a nerve, and
then by imagining almost microscopic improvements, so
to say, to have taken place, the idea of finality seems
frittered away, while the notion of design vanishes alto-
gether. Such we have seen is the Darwinian view.

But it seems to return again under the aspect now
considered ; for granting the pigment cell and a nerve,
beyond which analysis is unable to proceed, and mere
sensation as a result, " we maintain that, what occurs
first as an ejfec^ takes thereupon the character of an end,
by reason of the number and the complexity of the com-
binations which have rendered it possible ; " ^ and we
may ask. Why should the more complex eye issue at
all out of the simpler condition ? Finality, as expressed
by the inherent potentiality of protoplasm, seems to be
the sole answer.

Again, our author lays stress upon the sexes, as
illustrating the most remarkable fact of co-ordination ;
for it is not merely a case of adaptation of one organ to
its function, but of one organ to another. Neither is one
the effect of the other. " Those two organs are two
distinct and independent effects, and yet they can only
be explained the one by the other, which is precisely
the relation of finality."^

"It cannot be said," M. Janet observes, "that this
adaptation has been made in course of time ; for as the
species could not subsist without it, it would have perished
before it had been formed." ^

ip. 39. 2 p. 52. ':P. 53-

FINAL CAUSES 121

No doubt existing species could not exist without
their full amount of correlative structures ; but it is just
because the sexes have been, as it is believed, differenti-
ated in course of time, that the supposed finality becomes,
like that of the eye, attenuated by being prolonged back-
wards into history ; for by travelling historically backwards
we can theoretically, if not always practically, see species
getting simpler and simpler, and more and more general-
ised, till in every organism the sexual process would be
represented by a mere accidental fusion of two identically
similar protoplasmic masses ; while one stage further
brings us to an entire independence of such conjugations,
and the being propagates by fission of its vegetative
system only.

Instead, however, of thus eliminating by degrees every
trace of finality in sexuality till we merge into merely
mechanical results ; is it not just as logical to say that
the sexuality of mammalia and flowering plants was
potentially visible in the conjugation of monera and
Plasmodia ? and that the " sexual idea " has reigned
throughout, function ever dominating structure till the
latter had conformed to the more complete function by
becoming specialised more and more ; or, in the words
of M, Janet, " The agreement of several phenomena,
bound together with a future determinate phenomenon,
supposes a cause in which that future phenomenon is
ideally represented, and the probability of this presump-
tion increases with the complexity of the concordant
phenomena, and the number of the relations which unite
them to the final phenomenon." ^

M. Janet devotes the second chapter to an elaborate
investigation of the structure of the eye, ear, tooth, etc,

^P. 55-

122 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

and sees finality in all, just as the older teleolo^rists saw
design, in "that when a complex combination of hetero-
geneous phenomena is found to agree with the possibility
of a future act, which was not contained beforehand in
any of these phenomena in particular, this agreement
can only be comprehended by the human mind by a
kind of pre-existence in an ideal form of the future act
itself, which transforms it from a result into an end — that
is to say,, into a final cause." ^

If this be a correct account of finality, then the inter-
crossing of flowers would be a most pertinent illustration
of it. For the conclusion Darwin arrived at was that
plants, to be perpetuated, musl be crossed at least
occasionally, that Nature " abhors perpetual self-fertilisa-
tion," that "self-fertilisation is injurious," etc., such being
expressions to be found in Darwin's writings.^ We have
a " complex combination of phenomena" in the structure
of the flower of an orchis. This structure is correlated
to an insect which must convey the pollen-mass from one
flower to another, or the seed will not be set. Here,
then, is exactly what M. Janet defines as finality ; for
the structure is found to agree with the possibility — nay,
necessity — of a future act, that performed by the insect,
which was certainly not contained beforehand in the
structure itself. Such, then, is clearly finality in the
structure of many flowers as they now exist. How their
peculiar structures were obtained is another question,
which I will not discuss at present.

One of the most patent facts in Darwin's expositions

1 P. 85.

2 As, for example, repeatedly in his work " Cross and Self-Fertilisation
of Plants". I have given reasons for dissenting strongly from these
expressions, in my book The Origin of Floral Structures and in " Self-
Fertilisation," Trans. Lin. Soc, 2nd Ser. Bot., vol. i., p. 317, 1877.

FINAL CAUSES 123

is that almost every detail of structure is presumed to
have a use, excepting, of course " rudimentary organs,"
whose use is now gone, as it is superseded by that of
other organs, notably so in the structure of flowers ; and
he sets himself the task of discovering such use. This is
an a priori conclusion which he then proceeds to test by
trying to discover the use.^ His language could be very
appropriately adopted by a teleologist ; but we know he
does not believe in direct design. All the minute details
of structure which seem so "imperiously" to force
finality, if not design, upon the mind, have been acquired,
according to Darwin, by the unintentional acts of natural
selection. All the characters by which a specific form is
known, he compares, as will be seen,^ to chance frag-
ments of stone, broken from a mountain rock, but of
which natural selection has picked out and preserved
those most suited to render the creature the fittest to
survive ; just as a man may select stones of different
shapes wherewith to build his house, without having
previously shaped them himself

The exquisite detail of structure of a flower of the
field, like to which Solomon in all his glory was not
arrayed, is much more comparable to a highly finished
and beautifully designed architectural pile, than to such
a rough building as that to which Darwin would have us
liken it. If it be necessary to prepare intentionally Qzch.
stone for its future position in the structure, so by ana-
logy it might be reasoned that Nature had intentionally
caused each detail to develop with the ultimate end of
forming a " complex heterogeneous whole ". No doubt
Darwin's simile is correctly apposite to his theory of

^ See, for example, his remarks on " Momordes Ignea " in Fertilisa-
tion of Orchids, p. 249, first edition.
^ See Appendix, p. 145.

124 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

indefinite variations, out of which natural selection takes
the best ; but, as already stated, naturalists are by no
means at one in adopting this view. The one I am
advocating in this book is Darwin's alternative to natural
selection, vz's., that variations do not occur until external
conditions have incited them to appear ; and that when
they do, it is in response to, and they are then con-
sequently correlated with, the environment ; in other
words, the organism becomes more and more adapted
to the environment, so that natural selection has
nothing to do.

Darwin would seem to lay much more stress upon
the inherent, spontaneous powers of variation than upon
the environment as an inciting cause ; for he expresses
himself as inclined " to lay less weight on the direct
action of the surrounding conditions than on a tendency
to vary, due to causes of which we are ignorant." ^ We
shall see that he came to modify this view in 1876 in
favour of direct adaptation.

I have always adhered to the opposite view, and
regarded the environment as by far the most important
"cause" of variation, in that it influences the organism,
which, by its inherent but latent power to vary, responds
to the external stimulus, and then varies accordingly.

This view was very strongly insisted upon by Dr.
Aug. Weismann, who thus speaks: "A species is only
caused to change through the influence of changing

or? 00

external conditions of life, this change being in a fixed
direction, which entirely depends on the physical nature
of the varying organism, and is different in different
species, or even in the two sexes of the same species.
According to my view, transmutation by purely internal

' Origin of Species, p. 107. Sixth edition, 1878,

FINAL CAUSES 125

causes is not to be entertained. If we could absolutely
suspend the changes of the external conditions of life,
existing species would remain stationary. The action of
external inciting causes in the widest sense of the word
is alone able to produce modifications." Dr. Alfred R.
Wallace, who quoted the preceding in his review of Dr.
Weismann's work, Studies in the Theory of Descent, said
that he had " arrived at almost exactly similar conclusions
to these ".^

Whichever theory be adopted, the outcome is, of
course, the same — viz., structures which/^r se imperiously
suggest finality or design. But since the special creation
hypothesis is out of court, and Evolution only accepted,
design may be excluded, and the question stands. Does
finality remain ? If M. Janet's definition be accepted,
then as "ends " abound everywhere in organisms, finality
is qXso passijn. We are not concerned, be it remembered,
at present with the investigation as to how the complex
correlated structures do arise in response to either an
external or internal stimulus.

Now, assuming finality to be recognised in Nature, it
must be either intentional or not. In the first book M.
Janet does not concern himself with intentionality. He
does not therein raise the question as to how the first
cause acts, but whether the second causes, as they are
given to us in experience, act for ends or not. Within
these limits, then, is the analogy between the industry of
man and that of Nature legitimate ?

Taking as a starting point the consciousness of
personal finality in ourselves, we infer by analogy a
similar finality in other men ; " from finality in the in-
dustrious actions of other men, we pass to finality in the

^Nature, vol. xxii., p. 141. Cf. p. 161.

126 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

industrious actions of animals, whether these actions
present the appearance of some foresight and reflection,
or appear to us absolutely automatic. We have now to
pass from the external actions of the animal, which are
called its instincts, to its internal operations, which are
called its functions. This is the kernel of our whole
deduction." ^

In tracking finality thus downwards, the reader will
at once perceive that the author considers finality as
equally characteristic of the voluntary and the automatic
acts of man, as well as the acts of all other animals
whether external and instinctive, or internal and func-
tional.

He notices a " profound difference between functional
industry and human — namely, that artificial industry
constructs the machines it has need of to perform its
operations, while the animal functions are only the opera-
tions of machines already constructed. The man makes
pumps, but the animal has received from Nature a natural
pump, the heart. . . . Whatever be the cause that has
constructed it . . . is of little consequence ; in any case,
this cause in constructing this machine has performed a
series of operations entirely resembling those of a work-
man constructing analogous machines." ■-'

The author then pertinently asks, " How could the
same machine be considered here as a collection of means
and ends, there as a simple coincidence of causes and
effects ? " Why is a spider's web a mere effect, but a
fishing net an end ? " Can we thus assign two absolutely
identical causes to two absolutely identical actions ?" And
M. Janet redefines finality under this comparison, observ-
ing that " in both cases there is-a twofold common char-

1 P. 97. "" P. 99.

FINAL CAUSES 127

acter : (i) the relation of the parts to the whole ; (2) the
relation of the whole to the external medium. . . . There
is no part which has not its reason in the whole. . . .
Now, is not that the essential and distinctive character of
finality? It is not, then, the more or less of internal
activity or of spontaneity that is here in question ; it is
\hsX pre-established harmony of the part and the whole,
which, common at once to the works of art and to the
works of Nature, confers upon them, on the one as on the
other, an incontestable character of finality." ^

The two words I have italicised in this quotation may
possibly give rise to a misconception ; for whatever " pre-
established harmony" may be seemingly present in the
correlation of organic structures, Evolution will not per-
mit of any correlated structures having been made
primarily in anticipation of fulfilling a want. They may
be made so now in the development of existing species —
say the eye in a foetus — but when originally differentiated,
it was in accordance with intjnediate wants, or in response
to external stimuli — e,g.^ light in this case.^ But once
formed, it becomes hereditary, and then ever afterwards
will be formed in apparent anticipation.

Finality is certainly not destroyed, whether we believe
organs to have been developed by Evolution, or to have
been created in some analogous manner to the fabrication
of a steam-engine by man. For my own part, I still
hold to the theory that uses cause adaptations, on the
principle that function precedes structure. Thus as a
graminivorous animal has its food already (so to say) cut

IP. lOI.

* If total darkness causes eyes to atrophy, as in fishes, etc., in caves,
light is evidently essential to keep the structure of the eye in its normal
state. Hence it is legitimately to be inferred that light has "caused"
them. The eye of a blind man atrophies.

128 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

up into slices in grass-blades, it does not require scissors
to reduce it to small pieces in order to make a convenient
mouthful. But a carnivorous animal has a large lump of
flesh in the shape of a carcase. It requires to cut it up.
The action of biting in order to do this, previous to its
consumption, has converted its teeth into scissors-like
carnassials, and as it can no lonrer masticate it bolts
the pieces whole.

So, too, man would never have thought of making
scissors unless he had had something that he wanted to
cut up. The object induced the manufacture, " Necessity-
being the mother of invention ". The parallel is com-
plete ; only, in the one case it is spontaneously effected
by the plasticity and adaptability of living matter ; in the
other it is artificially produced by the consciousness and
skill of man.

Not only, then, do we recognise finality in the func-
tions of the completed organs, but in the very formations
of the organs themselves.

But now, asks M. Janet, " Is this analogy between
human industry and the industry of Nature, though
justified by theory, also justified by science ? " Accord-
ing to the older methods of interpretation, the form of
the organs was supposed to imply their function, l^ut at
the present day we have reason to believe the reverse,
or, as I have expressed it, W\7[.\. function prccedes^stnictuic.
In generalised animals different functions are often
executed by one and the same organ ; and it is not till
later — i.e., higher in the scale of life — that differentiation
of a common structure into special organs occurs, each
organ now taking on its special function, according to
the principle of the division of labour.

The present method of investigation does not limit
itself to organs, but presses on to the ultimate analysis,

FINAL CAUSES 129

till it reaches the fundamental and physical basis of life,
or the protoplasmic cell ; and science declares that this
analysis leaves no room for ends, but can find nothing
but causes and effects. Hence once more do we ulti-
mately arrive at the potentiality of protoplasm, and all I
claim is, that, given certain, nay, almost any, combinations
of conditions of the environment, protoplasm will respond
and do such or such a work, the outcome of which is an
organ adapted to its environment, and finally an organism
which then "imperiously" asserts to us its finality.

We thus arrive at the last question, Whence comes
this potentiality of protoplasm ? or, How is it that
orderly differentiation comes out, and not perpetually
changing states of chaos ? As a fact, the more differ-
entiation has set in, the more wonderful are the structures
produced ; so that, casting the eye back through the
vista of past ages, from the most primitive creature to
man, we see as a rule nothing but ascending series in
every direction.

Science knows nothing of "must". All that we can
say is, that such or such organs do grow in an embryo,
and that collectively they do make an organism, but
they may at any time make a monster instead.

Thus normally the tissue of a leaf-bud is formed in a
certain way ; but a cynips punctures it and deposits an
sgg within. The tissues now grow abnormally and pro-
duce a gall. The inner layers of this contain nutritive
food suitable for the grub, and upon which it lives. If
the nourishment were not specially provided by the
tree, the grub could not live. This is a case which
shows how the gall is apparently nothing but an
effect or result of a mechanical injury caused by the
puncture. But looking at the gall per se, we find it
furnishes board and residence for the cynips. Here

9

I30 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

there are at least two " ends " in the structure ; and why
may we, then, not regard it as one of those " imperious "
cases of finality? Yet the whole structure was simply
an outgrowth in " response " to, or a " result " of, a
minute injury.

This case would seem to furnish a good illustrative
example of many others, of which the only interpretation
would seem to be that protoplasm is endowed with the
property of producing tissues in response to stimuli, and
that when the organ composed of those tissues is com-
pleted, it has all the appearance of having had an end
in view during its entire structure. And what is true of
single organs is true for their totality or a living being.

I have dwelt upon this potentiality of protoplasm, be-
cause, contrary to M. Janet's opinion, it seems to me that it
affords the only true resting-ground upon which to base
the doctrine of Finality. It is an objective fact which is
indisputable. Recognise it as such, and then all forms
of finality will flow from it.

Having pretty well exhausted the subject of finality as
apparent in organs, M. Janet observes that as animals and
plants cannot live without a suitable environment to furnish
them with adequate food, "we are thus brought to the
notion o( extertial or relative finality". " It is strange,"
he adds, in speaking of external finality, "that it did not
strike Kant from this point of view, that internal finality
is in reality inseparable from external, and cannot be
understood without it. The organised being, in fact, is
not self-sufficient, and it only exists by means of tha
medium in which it lives. Nature, then, would have
done an absurd thing if, in preparing an organism, it had
not, at the same time, prepared besides the means neces-
sary for that organism to subsist." ^

1 P. 157-

FINAL CAUSES 131

But is he not here inverting the process ? Nature
did not prepare grass /or herbivorous cattle, nor did she
develop herbivorous cattle /or the carnivora. Every
organism was, of course, independent of all others that
came into existence after it, as they entered the world in
an ever-ascending scale ; though each one is now depend-
ent upon some other or others if regarded in the reverse
order. Thus the lamb was not made for the wolf, but
the wolf's teeth have been secured to it as the best
adapted for tearing flesh of some kind. Teeth are an
internal finality, but the lamb cannot be regarded as
external finality for the teeth.

The oak-gall produced specially by and for the cynips
would seem to be a much better case of external finality ;
or again, the honey of flowers for insects. Organic
internal finality is the result of adaptation to the environ-
ment, but the environment cannot adapt itself to the
organism.

The eleventh chapter is devoted to the consideration
of various forms of objections which the author describes
with his usual acumen. He shows, for example, that
when Descartes objects because, as he says, we cannot
find out God's ends, he confounds absolute with relative
ends. The former, he observes, may well be beyond our
reach, but the latter are matters for investigation, and
come within the region of experience.

The objection of Mdupertuis, quoted as follows by
M. Janet, is based upon the conditions 0/ existence, and,
is singularly like Darwinism : " Might it not be said," he
writes, " that in the fortuitous combination of the produc-
tions of Nature, as it was only those in which certain
relations of convenience were found that could exist, yt is
not wonderful that this convenience is found in all the
species that actually exist? Chance, it might be said,

132 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

had produced an innumerable multitude of individuals ;
a small number were found constructed so that the parts
of the animal could satisfy their wants ; in an infinitely
greater number there was neither convenience nor order ;
all these last have perished.

" This hypothesis of a groping of Nature, and of a
period of disordered parturition, said to have preceded
rational productions such as we see them now, is con-
trary to all that we know of the processes of Nature.
No trace subsists of this period of chaos, and everything
leads to the belief that, if Nature had begun by chaos, it
would never have come out of it." ^

His idea appears to have been general in ancient
cosmogonies, that as long as a chaotic state of things
existed, nothing but monstrous beings could be or were
produced. Hence, the strange beings described by
Berossos : " There was a time in which all was darkness
and water, and in these were generated monstrous
creatures having mixed forms. Men were born with
two and some with four wings, bulls were produced
having human heads, and dogs with four bodies having
fishes' tails . . . and horses with dogs' heads, and
other creatures having the shape of all sorts of beasts,"
etc.^

But this is only a concrete ideal representation of a
fundamental conception, that order is incompatible with
chaos or chance, i.e., the undesigned and undirected
clashing of Nature's forces. And although expressed in
so quaint a form, it undeniably involves a great truth,
which was early grasped by the mind of man.

' Pp. 205, 206.

'^ Quoted from Max Miiller's Lectures on the Science of Religion, ^.
50. See also Sayce's The Religions 0/ Ancient Egypt and Babylonia, p.

377-

FINAL CAUSES 133

Darwinism is essentially a similar theory, though in a
very different dress. The reader will detect a similar
ring in the following tones : "Of tens and hundreds of
thousands of intermediate forms we know nothing by
direct observation. They have perished as better fitted
forms ousted them in the never-ending conflict." ^

The idea underlying these words is closely akin to
that of Berossos — vis., "intermediate forms unfitted to
survive ".

The Planetary system furnishes another illustration,
and seems ever to have been taken as indicating order.
The following is from the fifth tablet of the Cosmogony
discovered by Mr. G. Smith. In the sixth and seventh
lines we read —

He marked the positions of the wandering stars to shine in their courses,
That they may not do injury and may not trouble any one.

Just as chaos and disorder, or their spiritual represent-
ative, the great dragon of the sea, are considered as the
source of evil, so where order reigns no harm follows.
Psalm cxxi. 6, 7, has a somewhat similar idea — " The sun
shall not smite thee by day, nor the moon by night.
The Lord shall preserve thee from evil ; He shall pre-
serve thy soul ".

It seems to me that the same problem is offered both
by chaos and by Darwinism — namely. How can order
and admirable adjustment issue out of either chaos on
the one hand, or out of innumerable chance variations
on the other? If, however, we recognise in protoplasm
(as we must) a power of development in conformity or in
adaptation to a changeable environment, the change in
the right direction being set tip by the environment, then
the difficulty of the " tens or hundreds of thousands of

'^Degeneration, by E. Ray Lankester, p. 17.

134 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

intermediate forms " vanishes ; for they were but the
creation of the brain — not of Nature.

And we may carry the problem further back, and
observe with M. Janet that, " It still remains to explain
how a conflict of forces can, at a given moment, have
brought about a result so complicated, and requiring so
appropriate a mechanism as life".^ " Everything leads to
the belief that if Nature had begun by chaos, it would
never have come out of it." '^

M. Janet does not seem to be a palaeontologist, or
probably he would not have misunderstood the expres-
sion that "fossils are embryos of actual species," or have
said of Aristotle's, remark — "the animal is an unfinished
man " — " as a metaphorical and hyperbolical expression,
this is an admirable thought ; as an exact theory, it is
very disputable."^ Every naturalist will recognise the
author's difficulty, which leads him into false inferences ;
for he says : " No doubt the inferior species have im-
perfect forms in relation to the superior. It is better to
have the wings of the bird than the flaps of reptiles ; the
brain of man than that of the oyster." Such is, how-
ever, not better if taken alone. With the conditions of
life required by the oyster or the reptile, brains and wings
respectively would be utterly useless and superfluous. He
is more accurate when he says : " Every being that lives,
being even thereby organised to live, be that life humble
or powerful, contains relations of finality and design [?] ;
between this being, however humble, and a purely for-
tuitous product, a freak of Nature, there is already an
abyss, and the latter can never have served as a transition
to the former. In the polyp I see finality as well as in
the vertebrates, and the tentacles by which it seizes its

1 P. 207. 2 p_ 206. 3 p 209.

FINAL CAUSES 135

prey are as appropriate to their use as the claws of the
tiger or the hand of man." ^

M. Janet next considers Spinoza's objections. The
latter " explains the belief in final causes as he explains
the belief in liberty — i.e., by ignorance of causes. When
we act without knowing what determines us to act, we
think ourselves the masters of our actions, and we say
that we act freely. So when we do not know how
Nature acts, we suppose that it acts voluntarily, and in
order to be useful to us." '^

No doubt an enormous percentage of our acts are
automatic, as 1 shall show in the second part of this work,
even though we should know — if we tJiought about them —
the cause, in many instances ; yet we do these acts spon-
taneously. But — and this appears to me to lie at the
root of so-called free will — we can make any motive an
object of thought ; and so far as we do so, we are not
ignorant of the cause, as in all cases of deliberate choice.
A selection between two acts may be purely automatic, and
we may call it unconscious natural selection, and we act
purely and simply in obedience to the strongest motive
and we are then automata. But we can bring motives to
bear upon the question by a determined reflection, and
not merely through automatic memory. We then make
the selection an object of deliberate thought. This is
volition, or free will.

Conscious of this, we can, by analogy, infer it in finality.

Spinoza's objection, moreover, would prove too much,
for, as M. Janet observes, " There are thousands of pheno-
mena whose causes are unknown, and which are by no
means, therefore, given as examples of finality, such as
showers of meteors, volcanoes, etc.".

IP. 209. 2p, 211.

136 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The author next notices M. Littres objection to fin-
ah'ty. " The property of accommodating itself to ends," ^
to which I have ah-eady alluded. . . . " In another writing
M. Littre had opposed with eloquent vivacity the vis
medicatrix of the school of Hippocrates. Wherein is
it more absurd to admit in matter the property of
healing itself than the property of adjusting itself to
ends ? " '^

As long as we merely investigate the structure of
organised matter — say, protoplasm, which certainly " does
exist," — and record our observations upon zvhat it can do,
apart from all considerations of finality, it is impossible to
escape from either the vis medicatrix, or some equivalent
expression or from M. Littre's "property of adjusting;"
for we find a seemingly homogeneous mass of jelly capable
of secreting the most beautifully symmetrical shells con-
ceivable, as in the case of the Radiolaria, Diatomacece, and
others ; and when we contemplate a complicated organ-
ism, such as one of the vertebrates, it is simply a highly
differentiated mass of protoplasm ; every atom of which
has furnished its individual quota towards the complex
structure of the whole. As the whole is an organism
adjusted to its environment in all its organs, so are its
organs, and so on till we have dissected out its ultimate
elements of cells and fibres, and come at last to the
physical basis of life itself. Nothing is more remarkable
in the analogy between Nature's organism and man's
works, than that whereas the latter cannot spontaneously
repair an injury, the former can ; hence the final question
of M. Janet .seems singularly inappropriate ; for it is just
the property of healing itself residing in a living organism
— at least in the animal kingdom — that stands out as

IP. 221. -P. 222.

FINAL CAUSES 137

SO complete a contrast to the powerlessness of human
works of art to repair an injury.

Rudimentary organs, so abundant in Nature including
man himself, difficult as they are to reconcile with any
argument of direct design, are discussed by M. Janet
with ability, and are considered by him as affording no
objection to finality — rather the reverse ; for they were
of use formerly, but have become rudimentary through
disuse, other uses having superseded them. " Nothing
conforms more to the theory of finality than the gradual
disappearance of useless complications,"

Lastly, the production of monsters calls for some
attention as bearing upon finality.

The existence of monsters raises no great problem
when we consider the relatively perfect state in which
every organism finds its existence to be ; or what I have
called " Inideality" (see Part II, Chap. X).

Were every environment absolutely and perfectly
adapted to a being's welfare, and were every condition
for the development of a perfect being secured to the
parents, then monsters would be impossible. Since,
however, under existing circumstances, such a Utopian
idea cannot be realised, monsters and abnormal growths
of all kinds, as well as diseases, are simply the outcome
of the clash of accidentally conflicting forces. They are
"errors of Nature," caused, as M. Janet observes, "by
the predominance of the laws of Nature in general over
the interests of living Nature ". This was Plato's view,
and Aristotle explained evil in the same way. And \{
men would but clearly distinguish between moral evil {i.e.,
conscious abuse of Nature's laws) and physical evil {i.e., the
production of effects which man — chiefly — dislikes), there
would not have been so many attempts to prove a separate
author of "evil " from that of "good " in the world.

138 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

In the second book the author addresses himself to
solve the question whether there is a First Cause of
finality. Finality being a law of Nature, what is the first
cause of that law? The reply has ever been, Intellig-
ence. Is this conclusion legitimate ?

The old teleological argument has ever been met by
the Epicurean view of chances. Atoms have an eternal
motion ; their fortuitous concourses must have already
exhausted infinite combinations, so that the one which
now exists is simply one of them. But this theory re-
quires infinite time for its accomplishment, and the most
modern views of the period spent in elaborating the
universe from nebulous matter still make it finite. But,
further, we are told that the existence of such combina-
tions of atoms fortuitously, as exist, is possible, because
it is. This is obviously to beg the whole question, for
the theory assumes that the universe is possible without
an intelligent cause. M. Janet justly remarks, "This
picture is possible, because it is ; it has, therefore, had
no painter," is just as logical. Logical possibility and
real possibility are confounded.

The whole argument is, however, antiquated, and so
may be dismissed. The modern form of the objection
is that raised by Kant and other metaphysicians, who
point out that the argument of analogy cannot do more
than suggest an Architect, but not a Creator. It cannot
rise beyond suggesting a relatively wise, skilful, or power-
ful cause, but not an absolute one. This, however,
implies, observes M. Janet, that only the form of things
is contingent, and that matter is not so. " If matter is
not contingent, that means that it is necessary, — it exists
of it.self, it has in itself the reason of its existence ; . . .
for the same reason we must suppose the cause that
gives the form to be necessary on the same ground as

FINAL CAUSES 139

the matter itself, and that it is self-existent. How, in
short, can it be admitted that a non-necessary cause
would have the power to act on a necessary matter and
to give it orders ? . . . The processus in injinitiivi would
here avail nothing, for by hypothesis the matter supposed
necessary is also a last term ; therefore, on the other
hand, the cause must likewise be a last term." ^

This argument strikes one as irrefragable, and the
conclusion is obvious, that the organising cause of the
world is a cause of itself or an Absolute Cause.

Kant's second objection falls with the first, namely,
that "from a contingent world we cannot rise to an
absolute cause". "But the first objection," says our
author, " by the hypothesis of a pre-existent — that is,
necessary — matter, furnishes the material of the absolute
idea of which I have need. If the first cause is absolute,
it will be so in all its attributes : being by hypothesis
intelligent, it will be omniscient ; being powerful, it will
be omnipotent ; being good, it will be perfectly good,
and so on." -^

These two objections of Kant, however, do not touch
the very essence of the argument, that Law and Order
imply Intelligence.

Three solutions have been offered to account for the
existence of finality : the hypothesis of subjective finality,
that of immanent, and that of unconscious finality.

The first is the doctrine of Kant, and M. Janet fully
admits " that there is something subjective in this doctrine,
namely, the part that is insusceptible of demonstration
and verification, and also the unknown part that goes on
always increasing in proportion as we approach the very
source of the creative activity. But then, again, the

ip. 335. 'P- 336.

140 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

same doctrine is objective where it represents facts ; it
is real on the same ground as all induction that rises
from what is seen to what is not seen ". ^

That finality is internal or immanent is perfectly ad-
missible, " but this relative immanence of natural finality
does not imply an absolute immanence, and, on the contrary,
can only be comprehended by its relation to a transcendent
terminus. These two difficulties overcome, we are now
face to face with the true problem : Is the supreme
cause of finality an intelligent cause — a Mind? This
will be the object of our last inquiries." ^

Hegel says that finality is not merely immanent, it
is uncottscioiis. A striking illustration of unconscious
finality is seen in the instincts of animals ; which will be
sufficiently discussed hereafter.

An unconscious finality, says Frauenstadt, is no con-
tradiction of terms, just as " the Aristotelian opposition
between the efficient and final cause is in no way identical
with the opposition between the unconscious and the
intelligent cause. For the final cause itself may be
unconscious." ^

" To attribute to Nature an instinctive activity is to
say that Nature acts like bees and the ant in place of
acting like man ; it is zoomorphism substituted for anthro-
pomorphism. We see no advantage in it.

" In fact, the true difficulty, the profound difficulty,
in this question is that we can only explain the creative
activity of Nature by comparing it to something that is
in Nature itself — that is to say, which is precisely one of
the effects of that activity. . . . The true difficulty evi-
dently applies to the hypothesis of a primitive instinct
quite as well as to that of a primitive intelligence."'

' Pp- 352, 353- '^ P- 375- " P- 377- "• P- 379-

FINAL CAUSES ^ 141

Still we have not reached the primary activity yet ;
the source, perhaps common, both of instinct in animals
and intelligence in man. M. Janet says that what is
called Inspiration perhaps comes nearest to our conception
of a creative intelligence, or the inventing at once both
the means and the end, by a single thought, in which
foresight may be regarded as identical with immediate
conception ; as, for example, the entire air dominates the
very first notes of a musical composition. M. Janet
considers the products of a genius as vastly superior to
the unconscious products of instinct. He says, " The
soul inspired by sentiment is not a blind activity. It is
conscious of itself ; it has a vivid and profound intuition
of its end ; it is quite full of it ; and it is precisely this
vivid sentiment of the end that evokes in it its own
realisation. Instinct, on the other hand, not only is
ignorant of the means, but of the end." ^

Is not our author here adducing what is accidental to
man as grounds for regarding genius as essentially and
per se intelligent ? I cannot help thinking that M.
Janet does not attribute enough to the wonderful powers
of the automatic properties of the brain. " Calculating
boys " can give no rationale of the marvellous feats per-
formed by their own brains. A half-idiotic person may
be an extraordinary musical performer, like the negro,
" Blind Tom," who used to play in public some fifty
years ago. Remarkable powers of improvisation are
perfectly spontaneous and automatic, often enkindled by
artificial means, which specially excite the automatic
action of the brain. It would seem very difficult to
separate flights of genius from automatism, when we
put aside the consciousness of man and his powers, and

^ P. 394-

142 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the knowledge that he can cultivate and improve those
powers. It was pure automatism that led Mozart, when
four years old, to compose a piece of music far too diffi-
cult to be played, but perfectly correct in harmony.^

While, therefore, I should lay less stress on man's
genius than M. Janet does as implying great intelligence, I
would see in it the highest concrete manifestation of the
infinite genius of the Immanent Worker of Nature, so that
whereas different forms and varieties of genius are ex-
hibited in different men, I would regard them collectively
as the common characteristics of the Power which under-
lies Nature itself, and which thus shines through those
favoured human beings whom we call geniuses.

"Then, what of Intelligence? This is not identical
with genius. Perhaps one definition of intelligence is the
power to distinguish means from ends, and thus to pre-
pare the means with the view of accomplishing the ends.
Thus, intelligence is distinct from tendencies. Hunger,
for instance, is a tendency. It is not the same thing as
the industry that finds food."" But both are really
equally automatic, and I do not see that our author clears
up the difficulty when he asks finally : " Is there not
something that represents what we should call foresight,
if the divine act were translated into human language ?
This is the question." •'' After discussing the nature of
human foresight trammelled by accident, M. Janet com-
pares it with God's " foresight," which means complete
vision of present and future at once, as " the act that
perceives the end, and the act that distinguishes the
means ".

" Thus, the doctrine of the Novs, or of intentional
finality, has for us no other meaning than this — that intelli-

^ I quote the story from memory, not remembering where I read it.
2 P. 408. •■'P. 410.

FINAL CAUSES 143

gence is the highest and most approximate cause we can
conceive of a world of order." ^

" The doctrine of final causes, however, cannot escape,
as it would seem, a final problem. If each of the things
of the universe, taken separately, has been produced for
another, for what, and to what end, have they, taken to-
gether, been made ? " - To be brief, the sole explanation
is in the doctrine of Divine Love. " It is by goodness
that Plato, as well as Christianity, explains the produc-
tion of things."^ Knowledge is not the absolute end of
the universe ; but, as Kant says, the end is found in
morality or a Moral Being — i.e., Man. "The end of
Nature is, therefore, to realise in itself the absolute as far
as possible, or, if you will, it is to render possible the
realisation of the absolute in the world. This is brought
about by morality. . . . Morality is, therefore, at once
the accomplishment and the ultimate proof of the law of
finality." ^ Man is the on/y moral being upon earth. All
others are non-moral.

iP. 415- ^P. 443- 'P. 447- *P. 455.

APPENDIX TO PART I
DARWINISM

DARWINISM BASED ON ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS

The first thing to do, now, appears to be to show that this
assumed basis of modern RationaUsm, MateriaUsm or Material-
istic Monism is a fictitious one.

"Darwinism" is the name given to Darwin's theory, ex-
pressed or defined by the title of his book, The Origin of
Species by means of Natural Selection. It must be carefully
distinguished from "Evolution," which is often spoken of as
" Darwin's Theory ".

Evolution is a thoroughly established fact^ based on the
strongest inductive evidence, as well as proved by an abund-
ance of experimental verification.

Darwinism is a theory or hypothesis to account for it. It
is an imaginary process to account for Evolution.

When Darwin propounded his theory, he gave us an alter-
native; but having his mind so concentrated upon "Natural
Selection," he did not then see that the evidence for his second
one was at all sufficient.

It is this alternative which I propose to call the " True
10 (145)

146 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Darwinism,"^ and is rapidly gaining ground among observers,
especially, perhai)s, in France and the United States.

Let us consider what really takes place in Nature.

As long as animals and plants live for generations under
the same conditions of life their forms are constant, allowing
for trivial individual differences, which supply no basis for
classification. But when they migrate and their ofiTspring grow
up under a new set of conditions, markedly different from those
formerly surrounding the species, Darwin supposed that the
new conditions stimulated the latent variability (or innate
capacity for varying) and that as they grew up to the adult
stage, they varied " indefinitely," some variations being in-
different, others useless or even injurious ; while a few only,
perchance, varied in such a way as to be slightly beneficial.
These alone, he said, would survive, and all the others die
before reaching maturity. That imaginary process he called
" Natural Selection," with the " Survival of the Fittest ". Then
by the accumulation of favourable slight variations a new
" species " would be established after many generations ; but
it must be carefully observed that there is no Natural Laiv
connecting such chance favourable variations with the re-
quirements of the organism under the new conditions of
hfe.

No evidence has ever f^een forthcoming from Nature in sup-
port of this theory of ^' the Origin of Species by means of Natural
Selection ". v

The difficulty of accidental variations being sufficient has
been observed by many. Weismann asks how we can account
for " the occurrence of the right variations at the right place? "
How is it that "the useful variations were always present, or
that they always existed in a sufficiently large number of indi-

•

' It has already acquired a name in botany, viz., " Ecology " (or
Oecology, as some prefer it), i.e., " the study of the homes " of plants, in-
cluding their adaptive structures to their environments, respectively.
The latest work is Dr. Schimper's Plant Geography on a Physiological
Basis.

DARWINISM 147

viduals for the selective process?" . . . "Something is still
wanting to the selection of Darwin and Wallace."^

Prof. Cope said — " The survival of the fittest does not
explain the origin of species until we explain ' the origin of
the fittest?'" Asa Gray assumed that the variations must be
" led along certain beneficial lines ".-

Dr. G. Fk. Wright observes : " The difficult question for
those who deny any purposive element at the bottom of
organic evolution is how to secure the complicated co-ordina-
tion of results involved in the development of any decidedly
advantageous anatomical variations"."^

Now the following is Darwin's alternative process : " By
the term ' Definite Action ' I mean that when many individuals
of the same variety are exposed to any change in their physical
conditions of life, all or nearly all the individuals are modified
in the same manner. A new sub-variety would thus be pro-
duced without the aid of Natural Selection." *

Many observers soon discovered that the evidence of " de-
finite action " was abundant. It was ultimately seen that such
represented a Natural Law, viz., that the organism responded
directly to the environment, and so grew up in harmony with it,
all the offspring of any species thus varying alike in adaptation.
None died through want of it.

It may be added that it is perfectly true that " the struggle
for life," "natural selection" and the " survival of the fittest"
occur everywhere in Nature. These things, however, are con-
cerned with the Distribution of organisms. They account for
the presence or absence of species in any given area ; but they
have nothing to do with their origins, as these are based on
structure alone.

It is a common mistake to suppose that Natural Selection
is still required even if il be admitted that plants and animals
can grow in response to the environment ; so that all the

^ Monist, 1896, pp. 261, 263, 264. "^ Darwiniana.

^Scientific Aspects of Christian Evidences, p. 94.

* Animals and Plants under Domestication, ii., p. 271.

148 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

individual offspring are in adaptation to the new conditions
of life, "without the aid of Natural Selection," as Darwin
says.

Thus Biichner writes : " There seems to be no fundamental
opposition between Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckism, and one
may rather be considered as the complement of the other "^

Dr. Vernon, who accepts hereditary variations which have
arisen from direct action on the soma — i.e., the vegetative
system in plants and the bodies of animals, asks : " Are we to
agree with Henslow that the close adaptation of plants to their
environment is due entirely to the responsive power of proto-
plasm to the external environmental forces, and that it is
absolutely unnecessary to call in the aid of Natural Selection ?
By no means. Adaptive variation may be responsible for a
good deal of the adaptation observed in plants, and for a very
small part of that observed in animals, but probably [why?]
in each case by far the larger portion must be ascribed to the
ever-present and ever-acting agency of Natural Selection." -

This author does not perceive that when a// the offspring
vary alike under the definite action of the environment there
are tto variations for Natural Selection to select from. Hence
Darwin says, " a new sub-variety will be formed zvithout the. aid
of Natural Selection ". That is, so far as a new variety is con-
cerned. Still, out of, say, 100 seedlings, though they all vary
alike, 95 may perish from various causes, but they have nothing
to do with the production of the variation. The mistake is due
to the fact that he does not distinguish between Natural Selec-
tion as supposed to weed out all the imaginary individuals less
fitted in strticiure {i.e., Darwi7iism), and Natural Selection as
being concerned with those individuals which are unable to
withstand the struggle from various reasons, but altogether irre-
spective of structure.

Natural Selection is always present, wherever some die and

' hast Words on Materialism, p. 194.

* Variation in Animals and Plants (Int. Sci. Ser.), p 391.

DARWINISM 149

Others live, but has nothing to do with structure when it is
concerned with the origination of new varietal characters. This
was evidently perfectly clear to Darwin himself, for he more
than once insists upon the fact that "■ Definite Variations "
have nothing to do with Natural Selection or vice versa.

Having stated the case thus briefly with regard to the
present position of Darwinism, it will be as well to discuss the
question more fully in order to show how the materialistic
reasoning of Haeckel found a basis in Darwin's theory of
Natural Selection.

M. Leon A. Dumont published an interesting resu?ne of
'HdiQckeVs Matiiral History of Creation in 1873, entitled Z^(Z(?(ry^^/
et la Theorie de f Evolution en Allemagne, in which he observes
that of all countries Darwinism was best received in Germany ;
for it appealed more than any other to the pantheistic aspira-
tions of that country. Not only did it apply to natural science,
but one tried to extend it to most diverse facts — languages,
formation of intellectual faculties, politics, morals, history and
the theory of progress. Indeed, Darwinism and its applications
gave birth to an entire literature. Thus, Schleicher^ a dis-
tinguished professor of languages in the University of Jena,
who had already, before Darwin, taught the theory of Evolution,
explained by Natural Selection, as soon as it was known to him,
the development of languages.

A little reflection, however, will show that the " struggle for
existence" with "Natural Selection" has nothing to do with
the changes in words. Philologists invented the word " Brachy-
logy " (Short-speech) to express the cause of changes. For
whatever happens to be the easier to pronounce takes the place
of what is less easy. It is for this reason that the initial aspirate
h has vanished from most words in French which commence
with it. In England, however, though it is often dropped in
some places, as London, it is not yet recognised as correct not
to pronounce it. Spelling is much slower in following suit.
Ruthven is pronounced " Rivven," Cholmondeley, " Chumley,"
etc., but there is nothing of the nature of a struggle for exist-

150 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

ence about it. Similarly hour (aspirated) is easier to say than
Hora, and 'our becomes easier still. So Dies Dominica has
been welded into Dimanche. Why some nations find it easier
to say b for /, d for /, and g for ch (hard) q or k, it is difficult to
say ; but such is the case. Thus what a Frenchman calls
boutique, a German pronounces apoiheke, and a Spaniard bodega.
Each has found what is easiest for himself to pronounce ; but
there was no struggle for existence between these three words
in as many countries, not to add the English apothecary.

Letters get transposed if it be found easier to pronounce
the word with the vowels in a different order. Thus Curasao
and Cacao have become Curagoa and Cocoa ; having changed
both in spelling and pronunciation.

Nor has Natural Selection got anything to do with the
origin of new words, idioms, etc. They arise automatically or
are invented as the want is felt. Once in a way an alternative
is proposed, and while one stays the other disappears. Thus
the words " telegram " and " telegrapheme " were both sug-
gested when the telegraph was first employed. The latter
may be more correct etymologically, but the shorter word was
quickly adopted. " Wireless telegram " of five syllables is
being subjected to the same process to-day, and will probably
yield to " Marconigram " of four.

A new meaning is often added to an old word. Thus
several Greek words acquired new meanings under Christianity.
'AyttTTTj is the word in the LXX, in the Song of Solomon, as the
love of lovers for each other. In the Christian dispensation,
it became Brotherly Love and human reverence for God.

Evolution, per se, undoubtedly may be applicable to the
origin of languages ; but Darwinism is not. New words,
changes of old ones, different pronunciations, etc., all arise
as "definite variations" in adaptation to new circumstances
when old ones become obsolete and disappear ; so that whole
languages, like whole families of animals and plants, become
extinct in the course of ages. Natural Selection may be called
the descriptive phrase of that process ; but it has nothing to do

DARWINISM 151

with the origin of the changes, which give rise to new languages,
animals and plants, and does not act as " means " in the pro-
cess.

The conception of Evolution was impressed upon Darwin's
mind by his numerous observations made during his voyage
round the world ; but his theory of Natural vSelection as afford-
ing the means, for the Origin of Species was suggested by
Mai thus' Essay upon the Principle of Population (1798). "It
is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the
whole animal and vegetable kingdoms."^ Darwin, however,
introduced an element which Malthus had nothing to do with,
namely, variatiofts in the structure of organisms.

According to Malthus, population tends to increase by
geometrical progression, while the quantity of the means of
subsistence is more or less in accordance with an arithmetical
one. It is not clear on what grounds this is based. Man
being an organism like other animals, he and they as well as
plants must follow the same laws ; and taking wheat as an
important food, it certainly increases by very high geometrical
ratios : they may be thirty- sixty- or a hundred-fold. His
theory might be true in a limited area, and when no foreign
supply of food is accessible.

Moreover, as populations increase, more of Nature's waste
lands can be brought under cultivation, as we are now doing
in Egypt, and doubtless shall do in South Africa by irrigation.

But the question of the Evolution of Species is not solely
concerned with the fact that more animals and plants are born
annually than the world can provide for, so that many fnust
die or the world would be overstocked. This would be the
sole matter for consideration, if offspring were always like
their parents ; but Malthus did not consider, and Darwin had
no grounds for inserting in his theory, anything to do with new
points of structure in the offspring of organisms. It is upon
these alone that varieties and species are based.

Hence, Darwin's theory of " the Origin of Species by

1 Origin of Species, 6th ed., p. 50.

152 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

means of [indefinite variations of structure and] Natural Selec-
tion," is not "the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold
force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. As many
more individuals of each species are born than can possibly
survive ... it follows that any being, if it vary however
slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex
and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better
chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the
strong principle of inheritance any selected variety will tend to
propagate its new and modified form."^

I have italicised the unwarranted intercalation into Malthus'
theory.

The mistake Darwin here makes is to suppose that life and
death depend upon slight changes of Structure ; whereas they
are far more concerned with constitution, which has nothing to
do with the origination of changes of Form.

In the case of plants growing thickly together, the strongest
plants survive by crowding out the weaker.

Darwin very often alludes incidentally to " constitution,"
as a factor in the struggle for life; but it has nothing to do
with the origin of new " variations of structure," upon which
alone new varieties are formed. I must repeat this, to make it
emphatic.

Of course, if it could be proved that new variations of
structure and form are in any way or always in correlation with
an enhanced vigorous constitution, there might be a shadow of
support to his theory ; but there is nothing to say for such
correlation as necessarily occurring. Hence, Darwin's applica-
tion of Malthus' theory to variations is an illegitimate one ;
for it will in no way account for them : nor when they arise
does it explain why they should survive. The transferring the
struggle for life from the constitution to variation is an
illegitimate procedure.

Now let us see what Darwin has to say about Natural
Selection. I have mentioned that as long as animals and

' Origin of Species, p. 3.

DARWINISM 153

plants live under precisely the same conditions of life, respec-
tively, they show no signs of changing. They only exhibit
trivial individual, mostly inconstant differences, of which no
systematist takes any notice. Though it was upon these that
Darwin laid stress.

He thus wrote : " No one supposes that all the individuals
of the same species are cast in the same actual mould. These
individual differences are of the highest importance for us, for
they are often inherited . . . and they afford materials for
Natural Selection to act on and accumulate." ^

" Let it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and close-
fitting are the mutual relations of all organic beings to each
other and to their physical conditions of life ; and consequently
what infinitely varied diversities of structure tnight be of use
to each being under changing conditions of life. Can it, then,
be thought improbable, seeing that variations useful to man have
undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful in some way
to each being in the great and complex battle of life, should
occur in the course of many successive generations? 7/" such
do occur can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals
are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having any
advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best
chance of surviving and of procreating their kind? On the
other hand, we may feel sure that any variation in the least
degree injurious wo2ild be rigidly destroyed.

"This preservation of favourable individual differences and
variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious,
I have called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest." ^

Besides differing from Darwin as to cultivation and domes-
tication affording any basis for comparison with wild plants
and animals, Dr. Wallace does not accept these " individual
differences " as means for originating species. He thus writes :
" In securing the development of new forms in adaptation to

1 Origin of Species, p. 34. I would refer the reader to my paper on
" Individual Variations," in Natural Science, vol. vi., p. 385.
"^Origin of Species, p. 623. The italics are mine.

154 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the new environment, Natural Selection is supreme. Hence
arises the real distinction, though we may not always be
able to distinguish them, between specific and non-specific
or developmental characters. The former are those definite
though slight modifications through which each new species
actually becomes adapted to its changed environment. They
are, therefore, in their very nature, useful. The latter [i.e.,
individual differences] are due to the laws which determine the
growth and development of the organism, and, therefore, rarely
coincide exactly with the limits of a species." ^

Now, the first thing which strikes the reader is the ex-
tremely hypothetical style of the whole of this passage on
Natural Selection, as shown by the words I have italicised.
After having collected thousands of facts, published in the two
large volumes. Animals and Plants Under Domestication (upon
which the Origin of Species was based) it seems somewhat
curious that Darwin could not write more confidently than he
has here done.

Moreover, there is another fallacy lurking behind unseen.
At what period of life does the struggle for existence mostly
take place ? It is during the growth to maturity. If the off-
spring do grow to maturity, so as to be able to propagate, they
are ipso facto naturally selected. If they do not, but perish
prematurely, death takes place before any important variation
has arisen ; as, for example, in the flowers and fruits of plants;
since specific characters are not looked for, nor based by
systematic botanists and zoologists on immature features, which
may change or be lost before the fixed adult stage is reached.

It is worth while considering this important point some-
what fully.

Specific and still more generic characters, I repeat, are, as
a rule, taken from ihQ flotuers dci\(\ fruits, much more than from
the vegetative organs.

The struggle for existence takes place mainly amongst
seedlings ; for if an annual can succeed in flowering, or a
1 Fortnightly Review, March, 1895, p. 444.

DARWINISM 155

biennial and still more a perennial, which may not blossom
for several years, as trees, then such will obviously have
survived in the struggle for existence.

Darwinism asserts that specific characters (taken from the
flowers and fruit, for example) are secured by Natural Selection
weeding out less favourable varieties and intermediate forms.
The problem then is this : —

How is it that characters which as yet do not exist [i.e., in
seedlings before they blossom] can be an important, if not the
main, agent in selecting the species?

The struggle is amongst the young seedlings of the same
species competing with one apother whenever a large number
are scattered within a limited area ; or they are struggling with
the seedlings or adults of other species or genera. In any case
the particular morphological characters on which the species is
founded, are not formed till long after the struggle has practi-
cally ceased to exist. For if a plant is able to produce its
flowers and seeds, as stated, it has proved itself fit to survive.

Hence, this survival has obviously nothing to do with the
morphological peculiarities of its flowers or fruit, upon which
its varietal, specific or generic characters depend.

It must be distinctly remembered that if a plant succeed in
producing its flowers and fruit, its " end " in life has thereby
been secured. If it die before it produces flowers and fruits,
then, it cannot be said that its death was due to any less
adapted or less complex character of its flowers or fruit, by
which its specific characters were known ; for they were not in
existence.

The conclusion from this logical analysis seems inevitable
that the Origin of Species cannot be aided by, much less due
to, Natural Selection.

However different their flowers and fruits may be, various
seedlings are often well-nigh indistinguishable in form. Even
as adults it is often impossible to tell one species or even genus
from another, as among grasses, without the flowers or fruit.
Hence it may be recognised as a truth, that when the struggle

156 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

obtains, it is mainly during the early period of life and long
de/ore the principal specific or generic characters are formed
at all.

We come then to the question, Why do some seedlings
survive and others do not when they struggle together? It
appears simply to be due to a more vigorous constitution.
Assuming an entire absence of all mechanical injuries or of
parasites, etc., and that a batch of seeds are all equally healthy,
there are seemingly but two causes for a relatively less vigorous
constitution. One, when the embryo has been accidentally less
provided with reserve food materials in the seed. The second
is, where there happens to be less external available nourish-
ment or something prejudicial in its environment superadded.

Here, then, we may recognise a true basis for Natural Selec-
tion ; and so limit it to its legitimate sphere of action.

But it has nothing to do with the origin of morphological
structures, upon which specific characters are based.

It has been said : " If we ask for the actual observations of
the process of Natural Selection on which the Darwinian theory
is based, we find what appear to be very slender foundations of
fact for a very large superstructure. There are the experiences
of the breeder, and very little more. The real data which
support the weight of the theory consist in the nature of the
actual products which the process is assumed to explain — the
actual constitution of animal and vegetable species in their
higher and lower forms." ^

In other words, assume Darwinism to be true, then, every-
thing follows ; just as all a priori assumptions satisfy the
thinkers, that they have the exact clue, cause and interpreta-
tion of any problems in question.

I had not intended writing anything more on Darwin's

' Stout's Manual of Psychology, p. 17. I would here refer the reader
to my reply to Dr. Wallace's criticisms, entitled, "The Origin of Species
without the Aid of Natural Selection," Natural Science, vol. v., p. 257,
1894 ; and also to " Does Natural Selection play any part in the Origin of
Species of Plants ? " Natural Science, vol. xi., p. 166.

DARWINISAf 157

mistake in basing his theory upon " Individual Differences " ;
but Dr. Vernon's new book having just appeared, it becomes
necessary to show how he confirms, though it be quite uninten-
tionally, the statement that individual differences do nof, as a
rule, help one to discover the origin of variations.

He commences his first chapter as follows : " If a number
of individuals of any species be compared, it will be found that
they all show differences from each other either in size, shape,
colour, etc., . . . in fact, no two of them are exactly alike. . . .
These differences constitute what is known as Variation, and it
is into the facts of this variation, and its importance as the
corner-stone of the whole fabric of Evolution, that we shall
briefly inquire in the following pages."

Dr. Vernon proceeds to give us illustrations of the many
results of observers who represent individual differences by
mathematical curves.

Similar curves can be made from shots at a target ; since
no organ of a plant or animal ever grows absolutely like
another, no two leaves are alike, because there is always an
inequality in the forces of growth, the amount of food supply,
etc., etc.

Hence Wallace is right in saying that " they rarely come
within the hmits of a species ".

These observers of numerical statistics seem to have in
some cases overlooked i^co fundamental conditions for varia-
tions in a true, classifactory sense of the word ; viz., changed
conditions of life or the nature of the environment, and
hereditary constancy.

There is no use in collecting hundreds or thousands of
animals, such as crabs, shrimps, etc., or heads of daisies,
marigolds, etc., all coming, respectively from the same locality.

No systematist takes any notice of individual differences ;
because they are too slight and too inconstant.

Variations which systematists can only recognise must have
more pronounced differences, and there ?nust be hereditary
constancy.

158 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Dr. Vernon quotes several instances of the mathematical
statistics of the parts of flowers giving maxima and minima.
But they are just what a botanist would anticipate. In fact,
I did so before studying the tables, because, knowing the
origin of the normal number of parts in floral whorls, the
maxima only mark off phyllotactical "cycles". Dr. Vernon
makes no mention of phyllotaxis ; I can only conclude, there-
fore, that he is not aware of the peculiarities of leaf-arrange-
ments.

Thus, we are informed that Ludwig counted the number of
pedicels or "rays" of the umbel of Torilis Anthriscus and
de Vries the ray florets of Chrysanthemmn segetiim. In the
former the maxima were 5, 8, 10 (= 2 x 5). In the latter, 13,
21, 26 (= 2 X 13), 34. In the case of the stigmatic rays of
poppies, 13 is the maximum.

Now, these numbers do nothing more than indicate the
prevailing phyllotactical cycles corresponding to the " angular
divergencies " of the series : —

1 1 2 .J 6 8 c^^r-
•2.1 3^' ¥' F' T¥' ^T' ^'^^*

If the object of these investigations be a search for the
Origin of Varieties, they will not afford much help, and
generally none at all.^

Since the above paragraph was written, a friend in Australia
has communicated to me an interesting fact, which bears out
the origin of variations by adaptation. He found the phyllo-
tactical cycles of the Mediterranean species of marigold
{Calendula) to be localised according to the nature of the
environment. He has observed that the large orange Calendula
has normally twenty-one ray florets ; but near the sea it is pre-
paring to develop a thirty-four-rayed form, many individuals
having reached twenty-six {i.e., 2 x 13). He adds that the point
he wishes to bring out is that the number of ray-florets in
different composites varies with their habitats. " Thus, the ox-
eye daisy has generally twenty-one ray-florets at the level of Lake

' The reader is referred to Biometrika for other examples.

DARWINISM 159

Como ; but at a height of 400-500 feet up the mountain side
above Cernobbio a form is developed during the height of the
flojiiering season with thirty-four rays, reverting at the end of it
to the twenty-one-rayed type. On the Mount Resegone above
Lecco, there is a still larger species, presumably with thirty-four
or more rays, which being called a species, is, I suppose, more
or less fixed, but I have not found it. At Taormina, where
the extensive observations on Calendula were made, I think, at
the end of them, if a batch of flowers gathered in one spot had
been given me, I could have inferred the habitat, at all events
approximately, by counting the rays."

This writer does not allude to the biometrical observations
going on in Europe, but has studied them, independently, from
the adaptive point of view ; i.e., upon which I have urged the
importance above.

The following, however, gives an illustration of an attempt
to combine locality with numerations.

In a paper on the Variation and Correlation in Lesser
Celandine, from Divers Localities, ^ the study of the table gave
the following conclusions : —

" I. Local races in plants cannot be defined or distinguished
by the existence of differences many times the value of their
probable errors between the means, variations or correlations.

" 2. The influences of environment and season are for
plants of supreme miportance and very widely or indeed
entirely screen any differences due to local race."

As an example : While three sepals with eight petals were
common in Dorsetshire ; five sepals with ten petals prevailed
at Gais (Switzerland).

Again, selecting poppies from five different localities ; their
different standards of deviation became apparent from i"4S5
to I '898 upon which Prof. Karl Pearson observes : —

" We have here illustration of how race, environment, selec-
tion, correspond to numerical differences in type and variability."

He also suggests that one should "count in some hundreds

^ Biometrika ii., p. 144.

i6o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

of individual cases the petals or florets of some simple wild
flower, and observe the differences which occur when the group
is taken from a field with one soil, aspect or altitude, and then
from a second wherein all these things are changed." ^

He here introduces the precise cause of variation which
Darwin insists upon, or " changed conditions of life " with their
" definite action ".

However, many of the " calculators " do not seem to have
considered differences of locality at all or changes in the
environment as important or necessary.

When such are observed, then Natural Selection, of course,
is altogether a superfluity.

I will conclude this section with a summary of the false
data upon which Darwinism is based.

1. The intercalation of Structure or Form into Malthus'
Theory of Natural Selection in humanity.

2. Individual Differences are not a source of variations, as
a rule, the necessary " changed conditions of life " and
"hereditary constancy" being mostly neglected by present
mathematical observers.

3. The non-existence of Itidefinite variations in Nature.

4. The assumption that death follows unfavourable varia-
tions in form.

5. The analogy between man's extermination of forms he
does not require, with a destruction in Nature through the
struggle for existence. For man takes care that a selected
being should have no struggle at all.

6. Any correlation between the subsequent appearances of
varietal characters (say of flowers and fruits) months or years
after the period when the struggle has taken place, i.e., during
infancy.

7. That " Natural Selection " can be regarded as an agent
or as possessing any power to effect anything : since it might
be called Nature's registrar of births, deaths and survivals ; but
is unconcerned with the cause of any one of them.

^ The Grammar of Science, p. 388.

II

THE TRUE DARWINISM OR THE NATURAL LAW OF

ADAPTATION

Before entering on this important matter I must beg the
reader to dissociate my name altogether from what I here call
the " True Darwinism ". I have been so often credited with
the theory of " Evolution by means of direct adaptation to the
environment," that I wish here to insist upon the fact that
it is not I but Darwin who is the original author of it.

In studying his books many years ago it seemed to me
that it was more probably the true interpretation of Evolution
than by means of Natural Selection. I therefore looked out for,
and collected, all the evidence I could find among published
writings, as well as made my own observations and experiments.
It soon became apparent that proofs of "direct action," as
Darwin calls it, were not only " plentiful," as he had discovered
by 1876, but utiiversal.

It was not, however, till long afterwards that were published
my two volumes in the International Scientific Series^ as well
as several papers in the Journal of the Linnean Society and in
Natural Science, etc.

No serious attempt has ever been made to refute this view,
excepting one by Dr. Wallace in Natural Science, but more
than one who did me the honour to read my " Reply " remarked
that it was " crushing ".^

In 1876 Darwin came to regard his neglect of this alterna-
tive as his "greatest mistake ". Those significant words satisfy

'^e.g., Dr. St. G. Mivart.
II (161)

i62 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

me that had he hved till to-day he would have seen that it
is universally true, and his habitual candour would have led
him to substitute Self-adaptation for Natural Selection.

It will be desirable now to enter more fully into this aspect
of the question, for it has been abundantly shown by observers,
especially in France and America, by following up the results
of the direct action of the environment, that Lamarck's theory
was fundamentally correct if a few aberrations be eliminated.

"The effects" [that is, of the conditions of life], writes
Darwin, " are either ' definite ' or ' indefinite '. They may be
considered as definite when all or nearly all the offspring are
modified in the same manner. Indefinite variability is a much
more common result of changed conditions than definite vari-
bility ".^ In speaking elsewhere of Definite variation he said :
" I will give in detail all the facts which I have been able
to collect rendering it probable that climate, food, etc., have
acted so definitely and powerfully on the organisation of our
domesticated productions that they have sufficed to form new
sub-varieties or races without the aid of selection by man or
of Natural Selection ".^ Darwin then gives about thirty in-
stances only, but many other cases occur incidentally in his
books. In 1876 he had become convinced that " definite varia-
tion " was far commoner than he had supposed, for he thus
wrote to Prof. Moritz Wagner, of Munich, in that year: "The
greatest mistake I made was, I now think, that I did not
attach sufficient weight to the direct influence of food, climate,
etc., quite independently of Natural Selection. When I wrote
my book [T/ie Origin of Species, in 1859], and for some years
later, I could not find a good proof of the direct action of the
environment on the species. Such proofs are now ])lcntiful."^

^Origin of Species, p. 34. This last statement is quite contrary to
what takes place in Nature.

"^Animals and Plants under Domestication, vol. ii., p. 272, 1868; cf.
Origin of Species, p. 107.

•''Quoted by Biichner in Last Words on Materialism, p. 194. It is
also in his Life, vol. iii., p. 159.

TRUE DARWINISM 163

Of course they have always been plentiful, but his attention
was not drawn to them ; yet, strange to say, it was due to the
"direct action of the environment" that all our domesticated
animals and cultivated varieties have arisen. As his mind ran
on " Selection " he overlooked " Adaptation ".

In discussing any question as to the origin of species the
first question to ask is, What is a Species ? Darwin himself
did not define it, but rather left his readers to infer or draw
their own conclusions as to what he meant by the term. The
following, however, will answer the question as systematists
regard it. A species is known by a collection of relatively
constant, morphological characters. In the case of plants these
may be taken from the forms of any or all of their organs, i.e.,
roots, stems, leaves, flowers, fruits and seeds.

Whenever a plant is found to depart somewhat but con-
stantly from the typical description of the species, in any one or
more of its characters, such is called a " variety," and varieties,
according to Darwin, are "incipient^ species".

The second question to ask is, What causes organisms to
vary ? Most biologists appear to be agreed that the cause is,
primarily at least, due to the environment taken in its widest
sense. Thus, Dr. Weismann says : " We are driven to the
conclusion that the ultimate origin of hereditary individual
differences lies in the direct action of external influences upon
the organism ".^ If the surroundings remain permanently the
same then there is little or no inducement for the organism to
change. Thus it has been noticed that the flowers found in
wreaths in the Egyptian tombs are exactly like those of to-day,

^ I doubt the correctness of this word. The difference between a
"variety" and an allied "species" is one of degree, it is true, but the
origin of both is due to the relative amount of the "direct action" of
the environment together with the response to it. If this be comparatively
slight a variety results ; but as long as it remains, generation after genera-
tion, under the same conditions it will not advance to acquire a specific
form, but remains permanently a variety. Many such are recorded in
Floras.

"^Essays on Heredity, etc., Eng. trans., p. 279.

i64 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

because the climate of Egypt has never altered. If seeds,
however, be transferred to some quite new and different climatic
conditions they are often found to vary very much as they grow
to maturity. In agreement with this it has often been observed
that most varieties are found on the confines of the geographical
areas of any particular plants.

Hence is the discovery that organisms are mostly very
plastic and possess "variability," i.e., a capacity for varying
which is incited into action by the direct influence of the
environment.

Coupled with the power to vary from the characters of the
parents, offspring always have a tendency to reproduce the
parental form, so that they grow up under the two antagonistic
influences, viz., atavism or heredity, and variability.

In studying the variations of animals and plants under
domestication, Darwin noticed that offspring seemed to vary
" indefinitely," as he called it ; that is to say, when a large
number, say, of seedlings, are raised in a border, though the
majority resemble the parent, several may differ more or less
obviously from the parental type. If the raiser see one which
he thinks will be of advantage to him, he will " select " this
individual, either by removing all others from its neighbour-
hood and letting it grow by itself; or he removes the plant to
a locality far away from the rest, so that no insects may cross
it with pollen from others of the same species, but unlike the
particular individual. This is called "artificial selection ".

Now, it is the peculiarity of the artificially prepared soil of
a garden with its variety of ingredients, to so stimulate the seed
of a wild i)lant sown in it (which may never vary at all in
Nature, as the cabbage), that its seedlings may grow up
into several and differently constructed plants. Thus, to give
two examples : M. Carri^re ^ cultivated the wild radish, Raph-
anus Raphanistrum. In a few years he obtained the garden
or " ameliorated " forms of root, and he found that by sowing

' Origine des Plantes Domestiquts demontrce par la Culture du Radii
Sauvage.

TRUE DARWINISM 165

the seed in a light soil the long form prevailed, while in a stiff
soil the turnip-rooted was predominant. Moreover, in five
years he obtained a great variety : in the light soil only white
and rose-coloured roots appeared ; but elsewhere, besides
violet and very dark or almost black, there were others, as he
says, " de toutes les couleurs et de toutes les formes possibles ".

The late Mr. Jas. Buckman,i Professor of Natural History
at the Royal College of Agriculture, Cirencester, carried out
similar experiments with cabbages, carrots and parsnips, com-
mencing in the year 1847. In 1850 he had succeeded in
raising three distinct types of parsnip from the seed of wild
plants. He describes them as follows : (i) The round-topped,
long-rooted form, resembling the Guernsey parsnip {Panais
long of the French). (2) The hollow-crowned long-root ;
" Hollow-headed " of gardeners {^Panais Lisbonais type). (3)
The short, thick, turnip-shaped root, or "turnip-rooted" of
gardeners {Fa?iais rond form). He finally continued his ex-
periments with the second only, which he called, " The
Student ", Messrs. Sutton & Sons on receiving seed from
Prof. Buckman still further "improved" it, and it is now con-
sidered, after fifty years of cultivation, the best in the trade.

The differences presented by garden races are not strictly
" varietal " as a rule, i.e., in the sense which a systematic
botanist would apply the term ; but " individual differences,"
only slightly exaggerated, as compared with the fluctuating
individual differences of wild plants.

Sir J. D. Hooker, for instance, in alluding to cabbages
under Brassica oleracea in his Student's Flora calls them
" Forms ".

Mr. W. B. Scott, in a paper on "Variations and Mutations,'"^
observes: " Bateson's entire argument is founded upon the
assumption that individual variations form the material out of
which species are constructed, an assumption which has almost
passed into an axiom ".

'^Journ. Roy. Agric. Soc. 0/ England, vol. xv., pt. i, p. 125, 1854.
^Amer. Jonrn. Sci., 3rd ser., xlviii., 1894, p. 355,

i66 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Mr. Bateson's words are : " It is upon the fact of the
existence of this phenomenon of variation that all inductive
theories of Evolution have been based ".^

I have already quoted Wallace's opinion as opposed to this
view of Bateson and Darwin. True varietal and specific
differences are due to more profioimced variatmis in Nature
than "individual differences" give rise to; and are induced
to appear by changed conditions of life.

The exaggerated individual differences of cultivation do
not occur in the wild state. The wild species of cabbage,
parsnip, carrot, radish have no varieties ; and if a systematic
botanist found them wild, they would be still regarded as one
species, respectively.

Beyond exaggerating the differences in such plants under
cultivation, or evolving more pronounced differences in pigeons.
Nature is not pursuing a new course totally different from her
methods in the wild state. If instead of man interfering and
selecting any he wants, suppose he left them to grow as they
pleased, none of Buckman's forms of parsnip would have died
and only one or two survive. They were all equally adapted
to the changed conditions of life.

It is a false analogy to compare man's selection with
Natural Selection ; because he takes care there shall be no
struggle, while Nature makes a struggle ; the conditions are thus
precisely the reverse, according to the theory ; yet Nature
knows no two methods of evolving new forms.

According to Darwinism, then, a number of seedlings of
parsnip, carrot, radish, etc., ought to die, a. few only surviving,
but they refuse to do so. Every one of the forms would tend
to form a race. Human selection has nothing to do with the
origin of the forms, any one of which might have been chosen
instead of another.

On the other hand, certain wild species of plants have
developed several varieties in different places, as Blackberry,
Rose, Hawkweed, Willow, Knotgrass, etc.

^ Materials for the Study of Variation, p. 3.

TRUE DARWINISM 167

But here lies a difference. In garden plants the seeds
taken from o^ie individual parent-plant may grow up into
several different forms in the same garden. Thus an eminent
agriculturist speaking of the great variability of wheat, said
that one could almost raise a new variety from every grain in
an ear ! In Nature nothing of this has ever been observed ;
but the many varieties of the above-named plants, as recorded
in our " Floras," are found scattered over the country, and are
often known as "local varieties". Thus, Sir J. D. Hooker
observes ^ of the innumerable forms of Hawkweed (Hieraciuni)
— " variable as the genus is, the sequence of its forms is so
natural as to have been recognised by all botanists. This
sequence represents to a considerable extent the spread of the
forms in altitude and area in the British Isles."

I will take another instance from Sir J. D. Hooker's Studenfs
Flora, viz., the Knotgrass {Polygonum Aviculare). Speaking
of its varieties he refers them to their localities as follows :
P. Aviculare, proper; Var. P. littorale, littoral, the passage to
P. maritif?ium ; Var. agrestinum, field form ; arenastrum, sand-
loving form ; inicrospermuni, small-fruited ; rurivagum, a way-
side one, sub-sp. P. Roberti ; Var. P. Raii, sandy shores.

The simple interpretation of all these "forms" or "varie-
ties," is that they have been evolved under and through the
conditions of the particular localities in which they are found
respectively.

While some genera would, therefore, seem to be endowed
with a very active variability, quickly incited into action by
local circumstances; others, like the daisy, bluebell, heath,
plantains and grasses remain the same wherever they grow.

We do not know why some plants vary so greatly under
cultivation and others do not; nor why some species have no
varieties, while others have many in Nature. Such, however,
are observed and well-known facts.

I would now emphasise more particularly the marked
differences noticeable between variations under cultivation and

^ Student's Flora, 3rd. ed., p. 232.

i68 PRESBh7T-DAY RATIONALISM

variations in Nature. There is no evidence to show that all
the seeds of any individual plant, say of one season, when
sown in a new, but all in the same, environment ever grow up
with appearances markedly different from one another, as they
often do when they are sown in a rich and artificially prepared
soil of a garden. All experiments prove that if the seedlings
vary at all, ikey all vary alike in the same locality ; or as
Darwin says, in the passage quoted, they vary, "definitely,"
i.e., in direct adaptation to the conditions of their new sur-
roundings.

Now when we turn to Nature, bearing this in mind, we
seem to see a distinct cause and effect in the following facts.
Not only do we find plants of one and the same kind to be all
alike when growing under the same conditions ; but a vast
number of totally different kinds have strong points of re-
semblance in many ways, as long as they are all growing in
the same environment ; i.e., their vegetative system assumes
the same fades. Thus, if we turn to hot sub-tropical deserts
we are at once struck with the general spinescence prevailing ;
and the dense clothing of hair giving a blue-grey appearance
to nearly all the plants. Again, many plants growing by the
sea-side or in salt marshes are fleshy, like the samphire.

Hence, it has long been noticed that plants growing in
variously composed environments are correlated with a peculiar
fades, respectively.

On observing the universality of these correlations between
climate and form ; or the environment and the structure of plants,
one is led to infer — by inductive evidence based on numerous
coincidences — that there must be some common cause to bring
about these similar "adaptations" in so many different kinds
of plants, but all of which are growing under the same condi-
tions." I say "adaptations," because all those features which
collectively conspire to make up \!t\^ fades of the floras, are so
many peculiarities of structure which enable the plants to live
under the special conditions in which they find themselves.
Thus a submerged leaf living naturally under water perishes

TRUE DARWINISM 169

if brought above the surface ; similarly a leaf ordinarily fitted
for living in air, soon perishes if kept under water ; but if
either plant be allowed to develop its leaves from the leaf-bud
stage in the medium, opposite in kind to its usual one, it may
grow and adapt itself during its development to that medium till
it is fully developed, as often occurs with the water-crowfoot.

In order to ascertain, therefore, whether the peculiarities
of any plant are really due to the environment, as the efficient
cause to incite the variability of the plants, many experiments
have been made, and in each case the results invariably showed
that when a plant is grown out of its usual surroundings and
in another of a very different kind ; it either fails to grow, or,
if it succeed, it does so by putting on just those structures
characteristic of the plants normally growing in the environment
in question.

Thus, with regard to each of the groups above mentioned,
it is found, e.g., that if spiny plants of a dry soil or climate be
grown in a moist atmosphere and soil, the development of
spines is at once checked; the plants become less and less
spinescent until the spiny processes cease to be formed al-
together. If very hairy plants, characteristic of a dry locality,
be grown in water or in a constantly moist situation, they lose
their hair to a greater or less degree and so resemble water
plants which are normally hairless. If a plant usually developing
a tall flowering stem in lowlands be planted on high altitudes,
as of the Alps, it cannot develop it ; but becomes a dwarf, like
ordinary Alpine plants, the anatomy changing correspondingly.
If garden or wild plants like cress be watered with a solution
of salt, the leaves develop themselves thick and fleshy like
those of an ordinary maritime plant subject to the salt spray
of the sea. Conversely the samphire has borne flat and thin
leaves when cultivated in a garden far from the sea-side.
These are but a very few samples of an abundance of illustra-
tions furnished by experiments, which fully justify the belief
that the normal characteristics of plants are in every case due
to the environment, as Dr. Weismann maintains ; but contrary

170 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

to the belief of that eminent Darwinian, who would say that
plants vary "indefinitely," so that Natural Selection might
select about i per cent, as " best fitting to survive ". The en-
vironment really so acts upon plants, that they all respond to
its influence, in a strictly definite and adaptive manner ; so that
they develop just those structures which supply them with the
best possible conditions for flourishing under the circumstances.

Having thus proved by experiments how certain character-
istic features, which we find in plants growing in the same
surroundings, can be produced or withheld at will, we are
justified in concluding that \}i\^ fades of desert, aquatic, mari-
time, alpine plants, etc., have been produced by the direct
action of the environment upon all the wild plants normally
growing in those diff"erent regions, respectively ; and that by
a long continuance, they have acquired relatively, but not
absolutely fixed, hereditary characters varietal or specific.

Further, when we examine the minute anatomy of the
tissues, the invariable law is soon discovered that their peculi-
arities are always precisely those which are best fitted for the
circumstances under which the plants live.

The fact is that Darwin made an unfortunate mistake. He
thought that plants varied " indefinitely " in Nature, deducing
his conclusion from the numerous instances of what I prefer to
call "exaggerated" individual differences, called "Forms"' by
Sir J. D. Hooker, in cultivation. He purposely limited his
observations to cultivated plants and domesticated animals so
that he was not prepared to receive the overwhelming amount
of evidence to the contrary from Nature; and although Dr.
Wallace is our greatest champion of Darwinism, for he said,
and I suppose would still say — " Natural Selection is supreme," ^
he was undoubtedly right when he opposed Darwin on this
point in his original paper published conjointly with Darwin's
in 1858.2

^Fortnightly Review, March 1895, p. 444.

^" On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart from the Original Type,"
youni. Lin. Soc, 1858, p. 53.

TRUE DARWINISM 171

I repeat his words: "We see, then, that no inferences as
to varieties in a state of Nature can be deduced from the ob-
servation of those occurring among domestic animals ". He
does not say so, but I presume that this is supposed to apply
to plants as well as domestic animals.

To account for variations he said :" We believe we have
shown that there is a tendency in Nature to the continued pro-
gression of certain classes of varieties further and further from
the original type ". Darwin, on the other hand, would not
admit of this " tendency" to vary. He says : " Some authors
. . . look at variability [he would seem to mean " variations "]
as a necessary contingent on reproduction, and as much an
aboriginal law as growth or inheritance . . . but falsely, as I
believe ''.^ Variability , is an inherent property, but variations
will not arise, unless the environment calls the former into
action.

I would repeat — as the fact completely nullifies Darwin's
theory of the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection —
that there is no evidence to show that where the seeds of
any plant are sown in a natural environment, they grow up
" indefinitely," that is, with many variations ; but, on the con-
trary, if they vary, the offspring all vary alike ; and to use
Darwin's words : " A new sub- variety would be formed without
the aid of Natural Selection ".^

^Animals and Plants under Domestication, ii,, pp. 250, 253.

"The reader will find abundance of illustrations with both inductive
and experimental proofs of The Origin of Species by Self-adaptation to
the Environment in my books entitled — The Origin of Floral Structures
and The Origin of Plant Structures (International Scientific Series, vols.
Ixiv., 1888; and Ixxvii., 1895. References to other writers are given, es-
pecially to M. J. Costantin's works Les Vegetaux et les Milieux Cosmiques,
etc., and Dr. Warming's Lagoa Santa.

Since the preceding note was written (1903) a magnificent work has
appeared by Dr. Schimper full of photogravures, etc., in thorough corrobor-
ation of the contention in the text. It is called Botanical Geography
upon a Physiological Basis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904).

M. Eberhardt has also published an article in Ann. des Sci. Nat.,
xviii., p. 5i (1903), upon experiments made upon numerous plants grown

172 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

In proving that Natural Selection has nothing to do with
" Selecting " the best fitted to survive out of an imaginary
series of " indefinite " variations, I would emphasise the fact
that it must not be thought that this phrase " Natural Selec-
tion " stands for nothing at all. The datum which both
Darwin and Wallace start with is perfectly true, viz.^ that more
plants and animals are produced annually than can possibly
live to maturity.

Even if they were all to vary " definitely," and be therefore
in complete adaptation to the environment, still the majority
7nust die, and that is what Natural Selection represents.

Then, again, it plays a large part among adult animals and
plants which are not concerned with the process of evolving
themselves into new varieties. It is their offspring whose
business it is to do that.

There was a great plague of voles in Scotland a few years
ago, as also of ladybirds in South England in 1868. But any
great excess occasionally occurring is soon checked and Nature
returns to the normal supply. Natural Selection, but of course
only metaphorically, may be said to have rearranged these
matters.

Similarly among ourselves an epidemic takes place ; one or
two victims are carried off from several families ; while the rest
are " selected " and survive.

A few years ago, I had two sorts of strawberries, there being
three rows of each kind. When in fruit the mycelium of a
fungus formed itself over all the berries of one sort, but not at
all on the other kind.

One more illustration : Many European weeds have found
their way into our colonies; and it is notorious how vigorous

artificially in a very dry and a very, moist air. The structures, morpho-
logical and anatomical, especially developed under these conditions,
were precisely those characteristics of desert and marsh plants respec-
tively, so that this experimental verification thoroughly corroborates the
inductive evidence drawn from the study of plants growing naturally in
dry and moist places.

TRUE DARWINISM 173

they have become, often completely ousting some of the native
plants ; such are watercress and Dutch clover in New Zealand.

In various ways, therefore, the " struggle for existence "
takes place, with " the survival of the strongest or fittest " as
the case may be.

But in no case has it anything to do with any supposed
" selection " out of many indefinite variations of structure, as
Darwinians say, with the end of establishing a new variety or
species.

As an illustration of the misuse of the term, I will quote
the following passage : —

" The general effect of natural selection, at least as regards
higher animals, is to produce in the individual organism the
power of varying proportionately . . . in response to stimulation,
etc"''

Read the words I have italicised and the absurdity comes
out, for variability, or " the power of varying " is an inherent
property of organisms.

It is the changed conditions of life which call variability
into action.

^ The Present Evolution of Man, by G. A. Reid, p. 116.

Ill

ADAPTATION (Continued)

The reader may be thinking that I have wandered away from
my "Critical Examination of Modern Rationalism " ; but since
Haeckel and Biichner avowedly base their Monism and Materi-
alism upon Darwinism, and other rationalistic writers dwell
much upon it, my object has been through the preceding
sections of this Appendix to show conclusively, first, that
Darwinism was founded upon errors ; so that the main prop
and stay of Materialistic Monism has no foundation in fact.
Secondly, that Darwin's alternative to Natural Selection is,
after all, the true and correct interpretation of the origin of
species by Evolution.

The reason why Darwinism is accepted by Materialists as
the foundation of their system, appears to be because the
whole process of Evolution, if based on Natural Selection, is
not reducible to any natural law. It is a mechanical hap-
hazard system, which Huxley called a " method of trial and
error ".

Since Natural Selection requires indefinite variations, out
of which one or two individuals are selected, the rest perishing,
there is no definite relationship between the accidental, favour-
able variations and the being's recjuirements in adaptation to
the new environment. If such happen to occur, so far so good;
but if they do not, then all must perish.

There could scarcely have been a better illustration to dis-
prove the whole process of Darwinism, than Darwin's own
description of an imaginary "noble and commodious edifice,"

(174)

ADAPTATION 175

supposed to be built of unprepared stones, in order to explain
the process by which he thought species — represented by the
edifice — arose by Natural Selection of accidental variations — i.e.,
the fragments of rock picked up at the base of a cliff.

" If an architect were to rear a noble and commodious
edifice, without the use of cut stone, by selecting from the
fragments at the base of a precipice wedge-formed stones for
his arches, elongated stones for his lintels and flat stones for
his roof, we should admire his skill and regard him as the
paramount power.

"Now, the fragments of stones, though indispensable to
the architect, bear to the edifice built by him the same rela-
tion [literally, there is none at all] which the fluctuating varia-
tions of each organic being bear to the varied and admirable
structures ultimately acquired by its modified descendants." ^

Darwin admits that, with regard to the use to which the
fragments of stone may be put, " their shapes may be strictly
said to be accidental " ; just as he acknowledges the favourable
variations to be accidental, and not occurring in any necessary
connection with the requirements of the organism.

The essential feature which Darwin overlooked is, that if
is qjiite impossible to construct a " noble and commodious
edifice" out of unhewn and unprepared stones and with no
prepared mortar. No one except prehistoric man or his immedi-
ate successors has ever so built a house at all.

Consequently the argument defeats itself, and, in fact, may
be utilised by the Theist who believes in Evolution by natural
law ; that as all noble and commodious edifices must be built
with stones and bricks prepared by man, so the structure of
organisms shows definite natural laws in the evolution of the
tissues out of which the organs are built up.

We see here, as throughout the whole of the organic world,
a marked Directivity of a special kind not observable in the
inorganic or mineral kingdom.

Moreover, the further inference is that the architect himself
^ Animals and Plants imder Domestication, ii., p. 430,

176 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

supplies the directivity in the construction of the house, just
as the mason and brickmaker do in the manufacture of the
materials.

Hence, by analogy, there must be Mind, somewhere, be-
hind the responsive power of protoplasm in making cells, in
building up tissues and in the construction of organs and
thereby evolving a new variety.

Now let us turn to Haeckel and see what use he makes of
Natural Selection to furnish his Monism with its foundation.

He has many references to Natural Selection, especially
when he treats of man's mental and moral traits. The follow-
ing quotations will illustrate what he has to say on this element
of Darwinism.

(i) "No authority can be acknowledged by Rationalism
which is not prepared to show that its claims and teachings
are consistent with fact and reason."

(2) " The tyrant who is prepared to ' wade through slaughter
to a throne ' becomes an angel of wisdom and love when com-
pared with an Almighty designer who plans Evolution of a race
of perfect beings from a speck of protoplasm by the tedious,
wasteful and agonising process of Natural Selection."

The two passages here quoted suggest the following re-
marks : —

(i) If Rationalists are prepared to follow this sound piece of
advice, it is for them to show that the claims of Darwinism are
consistent with fact ; for Haeckel and others base their Ration-
alism upon it.

(2) This is a sample of a common style of writing of
Rationalists, when they state that it is impossible to reconcile
the slaughter of animals and plants with a beneficient Creator.
This will be considered on another occasion later on.

" Darwin gave us the key to the Monistic explanation."
" Mechanism alone can give us a true explanation of natural
phenomena, etc." ^ He quotes an observation of Kant's that " It
is impossible to explain the origin of a single blade of grass

1 See supra, p. 25.

ADAPTATION 177

by material laws uncontrolled by design," and adds : " Seventy
years afterwards Darwin achieved the task which Kant deemed
impracticable ".^

" Darwin has not only proved by his theory of selection that
the orderly processes in the life and structure of animals and
plants have arisen by mechanical laws without any preconceived
design ; but he has shown us in the ' struggle for life ' the
powerful natural force which has exerted supreme control over
the entire course of organic evolution for millions of years." "

" He discovered in the principle of selection that direct
cause of transformism which Lamarck had missed." ^

Other Rationalistic authors, as Biichner and the anonymous
author of Mr. Balfour s Apologetics and many others, write in
the same strain, endeavouring to account for everything,
material, physiological and psychical by the Deus ex Machind —
Natural Selection.

It is, therefore, most important to lay emphasis on the fact
that not only has Darwin, Wallace, or any of their followers
never brought forward a single instance of the evolution of a
plant or animal in the wild state, which could be shown to be
in accordance with Darwinism ; but, on the other hand, all
positive evidence — inductive and experimental — establishes the
totally different method of procedure which Darwin himself
foreshadowed.

Indeed, Evolution by Adaptation, on the one hand, and
Natural Selection on the other, afford good illustrations respec-
tively of the Inductive and Deductive methods of reasoning,
when nothing but probabilities are to be had instead of axiom-
atic truths-
Evolution, per se, is based on an enormous number of
facts, of great variety and world-wide distribution, as well as
revealed in the past history of life by palaeontology. This
inductive evidence is most strongly corroborated by " experi-
mental proof" derived from cultivation and domestication ; so
that at the present day Evolution stands on an impregnable

1 Op. cit., p. 266. 2 p, 276. ° P. 80.

12

178 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

basis ; and the very suggestion of any alternative is quite un-
thinkable.

When, however, we turn to Nature and try to discover how
Evolution has come about ; that is to say, how and under what
circumstances, variations of structure make their appearance,
become fixed, and so give rise to new varieties and species, we
have the two alternatives which Darwin laid before us — Adap-
tation and Natural Selection.

The former is based on as innumerable a supply of facts
as Evolution itself, because, as we have seen, it lies at the
foundation of Evolution or may be said to be identical with it.
Given the responsive power of protoplasm and some new con-
ditions of life — Evolution is the result.

On the other hand, Natural Selection is based on two as-
smnptions : (i) that individual differences give rise to variations
of a sufficient amount and constancy to have a selective value ;
(2) that when new conditions of life are present, the offspring
vary indefinitely. On these two hypothetical "axioms"
Natural Selection was considered as solving all problems in the
organic world, including man and his psychological phenomena,
and even to include death !

Natural Selection is thus quite comparable to the numerous
"final causes" or "designs" of the older teleologists' a priori
assumptions without an inductive basis — they easily explained
everything by assuming that it was "designed". Such, at
once, put a barrier to all further investigations ; and so does a
belief in Natural Selection.

Bacon saw the utterly unphilosophical character of this
deductive method of reasoning : " The handling of final causes,
mixed with the rest in physical enquiries, hath intercepted the
severe and diligent enquiry of all real and physical causes, and
given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and
specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further
discovery " }

Natural Selection has had a precisely similar effect. It has

' De Augment. Sc, ii., 105.

ADAPTATION 179

been invoked at every turn and step in biological inquiries.
It has been assumed that any result, bodily or mental, could
be attributed to Natural Selection.

The following example, will illustrate the difference between
the ways a teleologistand an Evolutionist would regard the same
phenomenon, Rev. W. Kirby, in the second volume of his
Bridgewater Treatise, dealing with ihe history, habits and
instincts of animals (1835), says of the hermit crabs, " whose
abdomen being naked, and unprotected by any hard crust, their
Creator has given them an instinct, which teaches them to com-
pensate this seeming defect, by getting possession of some
univalve shell, suited to their size, which becomes their habi-
tation, and which they carry about with them as if they were its
proper inhabitants. These crabs are particularly formed for
the habit that distinguishes them." After describing several
points of structure in adaptation to their abode, Mr. Kirby
concludes, " This whole structure proves that they are formed
with this particular view of inhabiting shells of a very different
tribe of animals".

An Evolutionist inverts this interpretation. The "crabs,"
having chosen to live in shells for some reason or other,
possibly for concealment to catch their passing prey, just as
some fishes bury themselves in the mud for a similar purpose,
degeneration from disuse has set in, and the hinder part
has modified itself as to become adapted to the shell ; so
that now the hermit crabs cannot exist without such a pro-
tection.

Design is always in anticipation of a use ; adaptation is
always the result of it whether it bring about degeneration or
enhancement ; usually both occur simultaneously.

Hence under Evolution, as I have already stated, structure
is never made at first in anticipation of a future requirement ;
but when once established by use or adaptation, then it is
developed before its use can be employed, as in the forma-
tion of the eye of a mammal while as a foetus.

Natural Selection does not hesitate to use teleological

i8o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

language, and, unwittingly it may be, is sometimes as teleolo-
gical as Paley himself.

Indeed, if Natural Selection gave the death-blow to teleology,
it also revived it ; for it is somewhat astonishing to read the
many a priori assumptions of writers who attribute uses to
structures without testing them by experiment. Thus one
asserts that holly has spinescent leaves up to a certain height to
keep off browsing animals, but that it bears non-spinescent
leaves at heights they cannot reach. Not only is this by no
means a common condition, for trees are often entirely
spinescent from twelve to twenty feet in height ; but cows will
sometimes destroy a holly bush. Moreover, when the leaves are
young the spines are no protection whatever, being as flexible
as india-rubber.

Mr. Poulton in his Colour of Afii/nals writes : " A very
beautiful and familiar illustration is given by Mr. Wallace —
the white, upturned tail of the rabbit, by which the young and
inexperienced or the least wary individuals are shown the way
to the burrow. . . . The tail of the rabbit only becomes con-
spicuous when it is needed by other individuals of the same
species, and when the animal is already alarmed and in full
retreat for a place of security ". Upon which Dr. James
Iverach observes : ^ " Another interpretation cjuite as plausible,
though lacking in the conspicuous element of utility to the
rabbit, is that the tail of the rabbit is of great advantage to
the dog who pursues it, for it directs his path straight to the
mark ; or to the sportsman who knows at once where to shoot.
In these instances the possession of the white tail is of disad-
vantage to the rabbit."

I quite agree with Dr. Iverach when alluding to the free
use Darwinians make of Natural Selection : " Natural Selection
is itself described as a metaphor ; but as soon as we begin
to work with it, its metaphorical character disappears and it
becomes intensely real, and is quite capable of doing anything".^

This is illustrated by Darwin's attempt to account for the

^Evolution and Christianity, p. 119. ' Up. cit., p. 121.

ADAPTATION i8i

structure of the mammalian eye, as comparable with the
structure of an optical instrument. If the reader will refer
back to my quotation of it he will find at least twenty supposi-
tions. Granting these, he concludes : " May we not believe
that a living optical instrument might thus be formed, as
superior to one of glass as the works of the Creator are to
those of man ? " ^

On the other hand, I would say, recognise the universal
pov/er of response in protoplasm to external conditions — in
the case of the eye it is light — ^then the human eye could be,
and has been, evolved probably from some pigment spot on
the skin.

Since the preceding was written, the second edition of
the Text-book of Botany, by Strasburger, Noll, Schenck and
Schimper has appeared (1903).

In the first edition (1898) after describing Darwin's theory,
the authors mention some difficulties, such as the one often
made that "organs which would be incapable of exercising
their functions until in an advanced state of development," etc.

This paragraph is replaced by another in which they adopt
the view of Evolution by direct Adaptation as follows : " It
would appear . . . that the starting point for the origin of
new species is not afforded by the ' fluctuating variations '
[individual differences] which continually occur, but by
more marked variations which have been termed ' Mutations '.
[They are here referring to Hugo de Vries' Die Mutations-
theorie, 1901.] The tendency is to assume the existence of
a development of the organic world due to original innate
capabilities of the living substance and not dependent on
selection.

" The origin of the large subdivisions of the animal and
vegetable kingdoms, the 'archetypes,' would be due to this sort
of Evolution. These archetypes have been, and are still, con-
tinually influenced by the environment, and by their reaction
to external conditions organisms have become more or less

^Origin of Species, p. 146.

i82 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

directly adapted. In this way striking resemblances in ex-
ternal form have arisen between organisms living under similar
conditions although belonging to different archetypes. [Com-
pare Cactacece of Mexico with Euphorbias, Stapelias, etc., of
South Africa.] The progressive Evolution of the archetypes
as well as the direct adaptations to external conditions shown
by them [cultural experiments] are independent of selection." ^

M Text-book of Botany, Introduction, p. 3 (1903). I have already
called attention to Dr. Schimper's Botanical Geography on a Physiological
Basis. In other words, it is interpreted by " Adaptation to the Environ-
ment ". He was one of the contributors to this Text-book.

IV

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS, A FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF EVOLUTION

As the raison d'etre of this book is the refutation of the basis
of MateriaUstic Monism, this chapter must be considered as
subsidiary to Evolution by Adaptation.

Darwin saw clearly that Evolution could not go on unless
acquired characters were hereditary. But Weismann steps in
with his theory of germ-plasm and limits heredity to its agency,
denying that the soma can acquire characters which can be
communicated to the germ-plasm, as being too deep-seated, and
so become hereditary.

My object, therefore, is limited to proving that the soma
does acquire characters, and that too in plants long before there
are any reproductive organs present. These latter, however,
viz., the flowers and fruits, do reproduce the characters, when
their seeds grow up, which were acquired by the vegetative
organs of the parents.

In the third page of The Origm of Species, Darwin
speaks of " the strong principle of inheritance so that any
selected variation will tend to propagate its new and modified
form ".

This " tendency to heredity " was fully corroborated by M.
E. A. Carrifere so long ago as 1865, in his work, Production et
Fixation des Varietes dans les Vegetaux, in which he says :
" Faisons aussi remarquer que les diverse combinaisons faits
pour en obtenir de nouvelles, reposent sur cette loi generale que,
dans la nature tout tend a se reproduire et meme a s'etendre,

(183)

i84 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

que par consequent les modifications preuvent non-seulement
devenir hereditaires, mais qu'elles preuvent encore servir de
moyen pour arriver a d'autres modifications, a etendre et a
multiplier de plus en plus les series typiques."

Weismann and those who agree with him, contrary to
Darwin and H. Spencer, maintain that " characters acquired
by the soma are not transmissible ". Darwin based his theory
on a vast accumulation of facts derived from the cultivation of
plants and the domestication of animals, and thence deduced
the above opposite conclusion. Take, for example, the cab-
bage. Brassica oleracea produces no varieties in the wild
state. It has done so to a very large extent under cultivation.
They have developed or " acquired " characters thereby,
through the complex and richer soils, as compared with that
of their native habitat.

The "acquired characters" of broccoli, Brussels sprouts,
greens, savoys, etc., are now fixed and hereditary.

What is true for the cabbage is true for all other garden
races.

If evidence is required from natural conditions, it is
abundantly forthcoming. Indeed, how Evolution could exist
at all without the transmission of characters acquired by the
S07na is inconceivable.

It is asserted by the present Darwinians that the earlier
writers, as Herbert Spencer, Cope and Darwin, as well as the
later, Haeckel, Buchner, assume the point; but bring forward
no experimental evidence.

The probability is that the inductive evidence is so over-
whelming that it becomes a " moral certainty " and axiomatic,
and so needs no " demonstration ". Hence Darwin never saw
any necessity for demonstrating so obvious a fact.

Still, as Weismann and others have put in a negation, one
must attempt to show where the fallacy lies.

Mr. Adam Sedgwick, for example, in a paper read before
the British Association, 1899, and published in Nature, 21st
September, 1899, asks the question: "Is it possil^le by sub-

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 185

mitting an organism to a certain set of conditions, and thus
causing it to acquire certain characters, so to modify its repro-
ductive organs, that the same characters will appear in its
offspring as the result of the application of a different and
simpler stimulus ? " ^

He then sums up "the argument as it at present stands :
(i) A change in conditions cannot affect the next generation
unless the reproductive organs are affected ; (2) from a con-
sideration of the facts of the case, it is almost inconceivable
that the effect produced upon any organ of a given organism
by a change of conditions should so modify the reproductive
organs of that organism as to lead to a corresponding modifica-
tion in the offspring without the latter being exposed to the same
conditions [my italics] ; (3) the only effects which are certainly
known of changed conditions upon the reproductive organs
are {a) the production of sterility ; {b) an increase in genetic
variability."

Of these three propositions the first and second are
hypothetical.

Would it not have been better to study Nature to see what
happens ; and then argue from facts, so as to discover whether
the reproductive system does or does not bring out acquired
characters in the offspring ?

In the first place, to demand the re-appearance of characters
acquired by an adult parent, i.e., during its growth from infancy
to maturity, in the first getieration, is to ask for what Nature
does supply in full measure ; as for example in experiments
with the seed of wild parsnips, carrots, radishes, etc. Not
only does the increase in the size of the root " acquired " by
the first seeds sown reappear in the next, but it becomes
intensified ; i.e., of course, when sown in good garden soil.

But to ask if the acquired characters appear when the
offspring is removed to another environment is simply to ask
Nature to undo all that the parent had done for the next

1 It is not very clear what is meant by "a different and simpler"
stimulus.

i86 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

generation. It is to demand Nature to violate her own
natural laws.

The rule is simply this, at least for plants : " Seeds are
sown in a new soil. They may grow up in some respects
different from the parent form by acquiring new characters.
If f/teir seeds be sown iti the same soil, under precisely the same
conditions^ the characters acquired by the parent will not only
be repeated by inheritance but intensified in the next, and
still more so in each succeeding generation. They then tend
to become fixed ; so that after five or six years the characters
are fully formed, fixed and become permanently hereditary.
Such is the experience of agriculturists and horticulturists.

Any demands outside these conditions are hypothetical
and unreasonable.

The reader will observe that certain points are overlooked
by the Darwinian. First, the acquiring any new character is
done by the individual during the period of its development
from seed to maturity. Secondly, the seed of the next year
7nust be sown in the satne cotiditions. It is useless to ask for
proof when the arbitrary condition of removing the offspring
to new conditions is demanded. Thus the late Prof. Jas.
Buckman, experimenting with seed from the wild cabbage, soon
secured several varieties under cultivation, "the tendency to
vary being much increased by repeated transplantation". On
the other hand, he adds: "It may be remarked, as throwing
light on the nature of the changes by which the cultivated
varieties of this genus have been attained, that experiments
with seeds of plants showing any particular tendency, and
especially if repeatedly ^row7i in the same soil, will ever result
in an increase of the peculiarity ".^

It may be added that if the offspring did not reproduce the
character at all, but had to acquire the same amount of change
as the parent, how could the full amount seen in our established
races of plants and breeds of cattle ever be obtained ? Each
generation adds an increment to its predecessor. I would call

^ The Treasury of Botany, s. v. " Brassica ".

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 187

attention to the fact that in all the cabbage tribe the acquired
characters are secured before the flowers are developed.

I have no right to call upon a Darwinian who does not
believe m the heredity of acquired characters to "prove a
negative". It therefore is incumbent upon me to show, as
I have done above, on what grounds I most undoubtedly hold
to the view which Darwin maintained ; so I will now state the
position of a Darwinian as given to me by letter.

He says : " What is really in question is the power of the
individual to transmit to its descendants, not the tendency to
modification, but the actual modifications themselves ".

It is easy to see how this difficulty arises in the mind of
a Darwinian, for since any character which happens to have
appeared was a favourable one and preserved by Natural Selec-
tion, he has nothing to account for its appearance nor why
it may not be a fluctuating and transient " individual differ-
ence," or why it should reappear, especially if the conditions
of life be changed.

On the other hand, according to the law of self-adaptation
to the environment, it is totally otherwise.

To my correspondent's observations I would remark that
the transmission of the " tendency" is only recognised by the
reappearance of the acquired character, and the parent has
no other means of imparting the "modifications themselves"
than by giving its offspring the "tendency" and power to
reproduce them.

But this is hardly a correct way of stating the case. It is
not so much an inherited as an inherent tendency to respond
to the environment ; but having done so in one generation the
next has an increased power of response, since it not only
reproduces the amount acquired by its parent but adds to it.

Let us consider what really takes place. All organisms
arise from ova. When the egg is discharged or laid by the
parent, as in all oviparous creatures, or when the seeds and
spores are shed in the vegetable kingdom, they are no longer
under the influence of the parent. How, then, can any " actual

i88 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

modification " which may not appear till long after the offspring
is hatched have been directly transmitted ? Is it not obvious
that the only thing which the parent can communicate to the
egg is the tendency, coupled of course with the capacity, i.e., in
a potential way, of reproducing the modification in due course?

In the water- crowfoot, to be described below, the modifica-
tion, which has arisen in consequence of submergence, is the
dissected foliage, and this "actual modification" is not in the
seed ; nevertheless it appears subsequently.

If it be a viviparous being, in which the "actual modifica-
tions" are looked for, as transmitted by the parents to the off-
spring when born ; then I would say that we must still look to
the ovum for any potentialities in \}ciQ. fxtus?-

To return to my correspondent, he says : "It may be
sufficient to observe that no ' Darwinian ' doubts that the in-
dividual organism can be modified directly or by the action
of the environment ; or that the tendency to modification
[variability], being part of the congenital endowment of the
individual, is subject to heredity ; and jnay be strengthened
during successive generations by selection, whether natural or
artificial. . . . The results of cultivation, as carrots and
radishes, have been reached by the aid of selection."

With the sentence which I have italicised I would at once
join issue. " Artificial Selection," which really means merely
" isolation," by the removal of others, has nothing to do with
any " strengthening," as he calls it.

It is inconceivable to me how the mere pulling up of all its
neighbours, so as to leave a plant alone, can be supposed to

^ One generally expects the best and truest criticisms in Nature ; in
which journal the reviewer of my little book, The Story of Wild Flowers,
thus writes : " Most open to criticism are the explanations offered of the
origin of certain structural and habitual features, by the inheritance of
the effects of repeated stimuli ".

If the words I have italicised mean that " the origin " of anything
is due to " inheritance," a moment's thought would have told the writer
that " the origin of structural features " must come before they can be
inherited. The cart has somehow got in front of the horse !

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 189

act in any such process. Indeed, the neighbouring plants
need not even touch or be near the individual to be selected.
There need be no struggle for existence at all.

What really takes place is, I repeat, the continuance of the
direct or definite action of the environment ; which first induced
the modification to arise ; and brings about an increased re-
petition of the acquired character in the offspring.

The garden parsnip, raised from seed of a wild plant,
described above, would grow bigger and bigger in every genera-
tion, if only one seed were planted so as to avoid selection
altogether.

My Darwinian correspondent appears to fall into the
common error of attributing some influence to natural and
artificial selection. All that selection does is to record what
lives and tuhat dies. Hence, its province in Nature is confined
to the Distribution of animals and plants alone.

It is for the present Darwinian to prove what influence it
can have, especially as Darwin distinctly describes it as being
only a metaphorical expression.

Natural Selection, if we retain the phrase, of course, occurs
everywhere. It is a " natural law," but a natural law only means
"an observed order of facts ".

Thus it is easily seen to be a universal feature in Nature
that wherever beings are crowded, many die and a lesser number
live, whether they be animals or plants. If a fever breaks
out in any district in London, some catch it and perhaps die,
others do not.

The causes of death may be due to constitution, etc., but in
no case is it due to injurious varietal structural characters.

That is all that is meant by Natural Selection.

If it be maintained that Natural Selection implies more or
has any " strengthening " powers, it is for the Darwinian to
prove it.

I will now proceed to give concrete examples in illustration
of the preceding remarks. There are two lines of " proof " open
to a scientist ; who, however, should, wherever it be possible,

igo PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

try to combine both. One is Inductive, the other Experi-
mental evidence. Now, I seem to notice that it is mainly
zoologists who deny that "acquired characters" are hereditary.
Whether this is because they lay little or no value on inductive
evidence — at all events, they do not always realise the fact that
sufficient inductive evidence requires no experimental proof in
addition — or whether it be because animals do not lend them-
selves so readily to experimental verification as plants, I cannot
undertake to say. The latter, however, as it seems to me, afford
overwhelming proof along both lines of evidence. I shall give,
therefore, what I regard as convincing examples of both
methods, thereby demonstrating the heredity of acquired
characters.

First, with regard to experimental verification. Darwin
based his theory mainly on observations upon Animals and
Plants U7ider Domestication^ which he published in two volumes
with this title.

I will therefore take one or two cases from the cultivation
of plants.

If seed of the wild radish, carrot, parsnip or cabbage be
collected and we sow them in a well-prepared garden soil they
will all grow very vigorously. They need not be crowded ;
and at the end of the season the roots of the first three kinds
instead of being slender in size but tough and wiry in texture
will be found to have "acquired " a certain degree of fleshiness.
Taking seed from one such plant and sowing it as before,
under the same conditions, the roots of the second generation
will be larger than those of the first generation ; an increment
has been added to what was acquired by the first generation.
Repeating this process for some five or six generations a fine
kitchen-garden "root" will be obtained. It will then have
become "fixed," having arrived at what may be called the
" average maximum " size.

Such, then, is an experimental proof of the heredity of
acquired "somatic" or "vegetative" characters.

Similar experimental proof is applicable to all root crops,

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 191

as well as to all the many forms of cabbage, kale, cauliflowers,
etc., which are derived from the wild plant of our sea-cliffs,
Brassica oleracea. It applies to the various forms of parsley,
beans, peas, etc., and, among flowers, to wallflowers, nasturtiums,
snapdragons, foxgloves and many others which have produced
"races'" without the element of hybridisation, with which I
am not now concerned.

If a Darwinian says that these results have been reached
by " Artificial Selection " then it is for hitn to prove that it has
anything to do with them.

The following are illustrations proving how a merely
mechanical force can affect plants, producing characters which
can not only be acquired but become fixed and hereditary.

Pliny tells us that in his day the Greeks had discovered
a way of converting the " female " or long-rooted rape into the
" male " or turnip-rooted form by sowing the seed in a stiff
soil. I have already had a previous occasion to mention
the fact that M. Carriere in raising " radishes " from the wild
Raphafius Raphanistriim, which has a long wiry root, also
found that he obtained a larger proportion of long-rooted
forms in a loose soil, and of turnip-rooted ones in a stiff soil.^

Lastly, M. H. de Varigny refers to M. Languet de Sivry's
experiments with the wild carrot, and who met with precisely
similar results. ^

At the present day these various forms of roots have become
" fixed" and "come true" by heredity. We seem, therefore,
to have incontrovertible evidence of the heredity of somatic
characters originating from a merely more or less obstructive
soil.

Moreover, these characters are all acquired long before
any sexual apparatus is present in the plants themselves that
first acquired them.

^ Origiyie des Planies Domestiques demontree par la Culture du Radis
Sauvage. See above, p. 164.

'^Experimental Evolution, by H. de Varigny, quoting from Societe
Royale et Ccntrale d^Agriculture, ser. 2, vol. ii., 1846-47, p. 539.

192 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Let us now take a case of a suddenly "acquired size"
in a native plant. M. Hugo de Vries collected seed from
semi-wild plants of (Rnothera Lamarckiana and sowed them in
the Botanic Garden of Amsterdam in 1887. In 1888 a new
and dwarf form appeared among them. "Ces nains m'ont
donn^ de leurs grains une race que j'ai cultivee jusqu'en 1894."
He named it nanella.

Similarly, in 1895, a new variety appeared which he called
gigas. By self-fertilisation he secured 450 plants in 1897, which
"sans aucune exception, avaientles caracteres decrits . . . pour
r (E not her a gigas. ... La nouvelle espece etait done constante
des la premiere generation, sans trace d'atavisme."

He regards nanella as a " variety," but gigas and five others
he names "mutantes," as being of a higher character and equiva-
lent to new " species ". " On appelle ces nouvelles productions
des mutantes, comme on appelle des variantes les individus
differant du type moyen sous le rapport de la variabilite in-
dividuelle. Les mutantes sont les produits directs des muta-
tions, elles proviennent d'une autre espece et n'ont eu, parmi
leurs aieux, autant qu'on connait leur histoire, aucun qui ait
eu la meme forme."

In M. Hugo de Vries' experiments ^ here quoted, he found
that actually new species — according to his opinion — appeared
suddenly (such was Qinothera gigas, a robust plant) and re-
mained fixed from the very date of their appearance. Darwin
had a somewhat similar experience with a tall white-flowered
Mimulus luteus, which came up in the third year, among his
sowings. It was so prolific by self-fertilisation that it com-
pletely outstripped the intercrossed plants in the proportion of
147 capsules to 100 of the latter.'^

The first and important observation is that selection had
nothing to do with either the appearance or continuance of
these forms.

1 " Recherclies Expdrimentales sur I'Origine des Especes," Revue
Generale de Botanique, vol. xiii., p. 5 (Jan. igoi).
"^ Cross and Self-fertilisation of Plants, pp. 79, 348,

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 193

The second is that none of the six or seven " mutantes " of
M. Vries ever occurred wild ; but resulted from their being
cultivated under the artificial conditions of a garden. Such has,
of course, been the case with all cultivated races of flowers,
fruits and vegetables.

Hence, their characters were in all cases "acquired" in
response to the direct action of the environment ; and as M.
H. de Vries proved, the acquired characters reappeared from
the first generation onwards, and so proved themselves to be
hereditary.

The idea that " the reproductive organs cannot be affected "
is at once disproved by the acquired characters reappearing in
the seedlings.

I had much talk with the late Prof. Sickenberger, of the
School of Medicine, Cairo, when in Egypt some years ago ;
and he was good enough to give me the following information :
" I have read with great interest your publication on Dr.
Weismann's theory, and I am very glad to see that your con-
clusions are entirely in accordance with my own observations.
I believe, if Weismann had had more special knowledge of
botanical matters he would not have undertaken to apply
his theory to plants. You have completely refuted ^ by your
explanations his assertion that a continuity of germ-plasm
exists in a certain series of somatic cells only. I cannot admit
any essential difference of characters between species and
varieties. Such being only due to greater or less degree of
qualities acquired by the influence of external conditions in
a longer or shorter time. Hybridisation comes in, in a second-
ary way, mixing those acquired qualities with another series.
Hereditary persistency is, I believe, nothing else than the
maintenance of those acquired qualities under the power of
inertia (gesetz der Tragheit). The more any acquired qualities
have changed the anatomical and chemical constitution of a
plant, so much the more will those qualities be persistent. If

1 " Dr. Weismann's Theory of Heredity applied tO Plants," Natural
Science, vol, i., p. 171, 1882.

13

194 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Weismann says 'acquired characters cannot be transmitted at
all,' every day in Egypt contradicts this opinion, and the fact
that ' species of plants in Egypt have remained unchanged for
thousands of years ' proves only that the climatic conditions
of Egypt have remained all the time unchanged.

" On the other hand, seeds of ' gignut,' a variety of Cannabis
sativa from Europe, produces by the third generation the true
Cannabis sativa yarn. Black mustard, Brassica nigra, is trans-
formed into the endemic B. bracteolata^ Mayer, in the second
generation. Also the thick-rooted celery assumes in the first
year the much foliated form with a thin root-stock, like the
summer spontaneous form of Egypt.

" I have had myself the opportunity of substantiating these
facts several times.

" On the other hand, it must be proved that external influ-
ences are acting in other ways upon the germ-plasm than
upon the somato-plasm. All action in Nature is based upon
chemical and physical forces — so that really the constitution
of the pretended germ-plasm must be different from that of the
somato-plasm."

V

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS

{Continued)

The mass of evidence now to be considered is the " induc-
tive". Scientists are perfectly willing to accept this line of
proof in other branches of knowledge than biology.

Thus, physicists tell us they know a good deal about the
composition of the sun. Experimental chemical proof is ob-
viously out of the question. Their knowledge is based on the
accumulation of coincidences. The first discovered was that
between the line D in the solar spectrum and the mono-
chromatic yellow bar seen in vapourised soda. So far, it was
a single or merely remarkable coincidence and nothing more.
But when it was found that numerous other elements could be
" paralleled " with lines in the spectrum, the coincidences
became so numerous that physicists accepted this induction as
ample evidence to "prove" that the same substance existed
in the sun.

Similarly is it with all the influences deducible from palaeont-
ology, as, e.g., the famous genealogy of the horse from the
five-toed primogenital Eohippus, or whatever it may be called,
in the eocene strata through a succession of three-toed forms,
as the Hipparion, etc., till the one-toed Equus is reached.

This satisfied Huxley that it undoubtedly indicated the
line of Evolution of our domesticated horse of to-day.

But this conviction is based on purely inductive, that is,
accumulative evidences. Any experimental verification of ex-
tinct animals is obviously impossible,

(195) -

196 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

So, too, we may apply this line of argument to existing
plants and animals. The difficulty only lies in selecting from
the enormous mass of such evidence at our disposal.

Since it has been found experimentally how easily most
plants will change their structures and forms as soon as they
are grown in very different soils and climates from those of
their natural habitats, one naturally infers that they will behave
in Nature in a way analogous to that which they do under
cultivation ; provided the change of environment can furnish
a sufficient stimulus, as does a richly prepared garden soil.

Linnaeus long ago (1763), noticed that when he studied
batches of plants received from foreign countries, there was
often a certain superficial fades or likeness between many of
them ; though there need not have been any real affinities :
" Primo intuitu distinguit saepius exercitatus botannicus plantas
Africae, Asiae, Americae, Alpiumque, etc. " ^

Modern botanists have applied the term "representative"
to plants when they live in widely different countries and may
be either different species of the same genus or plants of no
affinity, but assume similar vegetative forms or physiognomy.

Thus many members of the family Cactacece. inhabiting hot,
dry, rocky districts of Mexico, strikingly resemble species of
the genus Euphorbia in the hot but dry regions of Africa, as
well as the Stapelias of South Africa and Adenium of Arabia, etc.
All these, though belonging to totally different families, yet
have similar columnar, thick, fleshy, leafless but spiny stems.

In all species of Euphorbia living in Europe, there is no
tendency whatever to produce the cactus-like stem. It only
appears under similar climatic and other conditions of life in
which the cacti themselves live.

The induction, therefore, is that, first, the tendency to pro-
duce the fleshy stem has arisen through the influences or
"direct and definite action," as Darwin called it, of the
specially dry environment.

But this tendency has now become z fixed character, im-

' See Origin of Plant Structures, p. 13.

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 197

manent in the life of the plants, so that the fleshy stem, to-
gether with its other characteristics, are reproduced whenever
the plants in question are raised from seed as in England, that
is under totally different conditions of life from those of their
natural habitats.

So that not only the tendency but the power to produce
the actual modifications is hereditary.

The above cases illustrate what happens to plants where
they grow in very dry, hot and barren regions. Let us now
see what takes place in water.

A common feature in aquatic dicotyledonous plants is to
have the blades of their submerged leaves finely divided into
capillary segments. This occurs in numerous plants of as many
famiUes and of no affinity between them. The following are a
few examples : the water-crowfoot [Ra?iu?tculacece) ; Caboinba,
{JVymphceacece) ; water milfoil, {HaloragecE) ; Helosciadium in-
undatum {^UmbellifercB) ; water violet {Primuiaceae) ; Cerato-
phyllum {Ceratophyllece) ; and many others might be named.

Moreover, not only do we see completely formed leaves or
leaflets in allied terrestrial species as of buttercups compared
with Ranunculus trichophyllus, or in Helosciadium nodiflorum,
etc., but both forms of leaf may be borne by the same plant, if
it have some floating on or raised above the water, and others
below it ; as in Raiiunculus heterophyllus, Cabomba, Proser-
pinaca, etc. .

Indeed, it frequently happens that a leaf is so situated that
half of it develops under water and the other half in the air.
When this is the case, the former is divided into fine, thread-
like segments, and the latter half is flat and complete. More-
over, the anatomical tissues of the former are adapted to a sub-
merged life, while these of the latter are equally so for the air.

It not infrequently happens when Ranunculus trichophyllus,
which is normally entirely submerged, is growing very crowded
in a small pond, that some of its branches are forced upwards
so as to grow into the air; then all parts above the water-line
grow in adaptation to an aerial existence ; all below the line

igS PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

being suited for a submerged life. Other plants, as the water
milfoil, do the same thing.

On the other hand, some species have degenerated to a
greater degree so that they have lost this power of adaptation.
Such I found to be the case with 7?. circinatus (?) and Elodea
canade7isis, both of which sent up several shoots into the
air when grown in a bowl of water ; but in no case were aerial
leaves produced, as they shrivelled up at once and perished
just as sea-weeds do.

I think the reader will now see that coincidences between
the divided modification of the leaf-blade with normal sub-
mergence are as numerous as the agreements between the
absorption bands in the solar spectrum and the coloured bands
of vapourised elements.

If the induction is perfectly legitimate in the latter it must
be equally so in the former, which has the additional aid of
experimental corroboration. The inevitable conclusion is that
the dissected type of foliage seen in these submerged leaves is
the " actual modification " produced by the watery medium in
which the plants live. That is to say, the latter is the stimulus
to which the living protoplasm responds and has brought about
the structure in question.

Mr. Herbert Spencer expressed this in his generalisation :
" Under new conditions the organism immediately begins to
undergo certain changes in structure fitting it for its new con-
ditions ".

The next point to notice is that the dissected leaf is
hereditary. When I brought this case of the dissected foliage
of submerged plants before my Darwinian friend he observed :
" Experimental evidence of the truth of your view as to the
submerged leaves of dicotyledons is still lacking". He is not
alone in not realising the fact that the above inductive evidence
was amply sufficient to establish a natural law, and really needs
no experimental evidence ; still, as such has now been obtained,
it is satisfactory to find that the inductive evidence was correct
and conclusive without any experiment at all.

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 199

The proof has been found in experiments with Proserpi7iaca
palustris, a plant of the United States of the same family as our
water milfoil and mare's-tail [Halorageoi), This plant is am-
phibious ; when the leaves are in the air, they are completely
formed, being of a narrowly lanceolate type, with a serrated
margin ; but when submerged the plant bears leaves consisting
of the midrib and lateral veins only, so that it acquires a
"pectinate" or "comb-like" form.

In order to ascertain the actual cause of the change of form,
Mr. McCullum experimented in various ways, finding that even
a saturated air produced the submerged form ; and that by
eliminating all other probable or possible causes, water only
could be credited with inducing the submerged type of foliage.
He thus writes : —

" The essential feature common to the water and moist air
is the inhibition of transpiration and the consequent choking
of the cells and diluting the protoplasm with water. This can
be tested by growing the plants entirely under water and at the
same time drawing the water out from the protoplasm ; or in
reality causing evaporation or transpiration by means of high
osmotic pressure. Plants producing water-leaves were placed
in nutrient solutions of a strength not quite sufficient to plas-
molyze them : also in very dilute solutions made up to the
same osmotic pressure with KCl and also Ca(N03).2. These
were allowed to evaporate down, becoming gradually stronger.
When they reached a strength of solution equal to about half
N salt solution the water leaves ceased to form, ajid the air
type of leaf appeared. " ^

Here, then, we have the desired experimental evidence that
the dissected form of foliage found in so many submerged
plants is actually caused by the superabundance of water
saturating and weakening the protoplasm.

Now let us return to Ranunculus heterophyllus or R. tricho-

' " On the Nature of the Stimulus causing the Change of Form and
Structure in Proserpinaca palustris" Bot, Gaz., vol. xxxiv., p. 93.

200 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

phyllus ; for these prove that this " acquired character " of the
dissected foliage is hereditary.

If the seeds of these plants be sown in a garden border
they all come up and grow perfectly well. They first put forth
finely dissected foliage by heredity ; and the first named
subsequently bears complete forms of leaf-blade, as if the plant
had by that time grown so as to reach the level of the surface
of the imaginary water. Hence, the acquired characters are
thus proved to be hereditary ; and not caused in each genera-
tion by its growing in water.

The whole plant, however, is altered in its anatomical struc-
ture in order to fit it for an aerial life. If it be transferred to
water when full grown, all the leaves perish ; but a new set are
soon produced in adaptation to a submerged life.

This experiment will be enough, as Nature has not two or
more methods of procedure in acquiring, fixing and making
characters hereditary.

Without the possibility of doing this, Evolution would come
to a standstill.

The Darwinian says : " .'\ change in conditions cannot
affect the next generation unless the reproductive organs are
affected ". But this is exactly what does happen. The en-
larged fleshy root of a parsnip is the character acquired by the
parent. It is formed long before the reproductive organs exist
at all. Nevertheless it reappears in the offspring of the first
generation ; so that an increment is successively added in the
second, third, fourth, etc., generations until the maximum size
is secured and fixed, when it is hereditary.

If it be said that only the tendency to make a fleshy root
was started in the parent and conveyed to the offspring and
then " strengthened " by selection in the subsequent generations,
how could this tendency be accounted for, any more than the
actual character itself, if it be acquired be/ore the flowers and
fruit are made ?

Surely the experiment proves that the whole constitution of
the plant is so effected, that when the flowers and fruit of the

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 201

parsnip are subsequently formed, they too partake of the in-
fluence.

If it were not so, not even the tendency to produce a large
and fleshy root would be hereditary or, as it is suggested,
" strengthened by selection ".

The same sized root could only be reproduced as that of
the original parent.

I will now give an interesting case from, the structure of
tendrils.

The Virginian creeper of America (Ampe/opsis hederacea)
bears a branched tendril, homologous with, that is formed out
of, flowering branches. Each little branchlet terminates in a
hooked point. As soon as one of these hooks catches a de-
pression in a rough wall the irritation induces it to swell and
grow into an adhesive pad ; which is never formed unless con-
tact is secured.

In the Japanese species {A. Veitchii) the tendril develops
half- formed pads on the tips of its branchlets, before any contact
has been made with the wall.

They can only become effectively adhesive after contact
has taken place.

The first-named species proves that the merely mechanical
contact is necessary for the very commencement of the develop-
ment of the pads.

The second proves that the tendency to produce them is so
strongly hereditary, that they now appear without any contact
at all ; i.e., the actual modification itself is, therefore, heredi-
tary, and only requires contact to perfect it, so as to become
an adhesive organ.

A similar difference resides between genera of Bignoniacece
as Darwin has pointed out.^

The few cases I have given are but samples. Similar lines
of inductive evidence can be applied to all the organs of plants
— and it might be added to animals. Experimental proof is

^ Climbing Plants, p. 102, note.

202 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

often impossible ; nor ts t'^ neede/f -whenever inductive evidence
is abundant.

It fully accounts for the numerous " representative" plants
and animals, as the " ericoidal " or heath-like forms so abun-
dant in South Africa and South-West Australia, the " cupres-
soidal " or cypress-like trees and shrubs and even herbs, as of
junipers, Alpine veronicas of New Zealand, and our own lyco-
podiums. The " junceous " type is seen in the rush-like forms
which betray many marsh plants, and the " muscoidal " of
Arctic and Antarctic, as well as of very high Alpine forms of
moss-like plants.^

In conclusion, then, I would say that I understand by
heredity — (i) that offspring, as a rule, resemble their parents
in every important feature, a/ways allowing for " individual "
but trivial and inconstant variations.

(2) When the seed or even bulbs of ])lants are sown in
some surroundings, markedly different from their native habi-
tats, they usually «/ once begin to vary, often in all parts,
from the wild types. If many seeds of the same kind are
sown tkey all vary alike or " definitely " in all main particu-
lars, and not "indefinitely," to use Darwin's term and as he
supposed to be the case. Still, they may always show individual
variations of no importance, i.e., from a classificatory point of
view.

In five or six generations the new and " acquired char-
acters " become relatively " fixed " ; so that they will subse-
quently be reproduced by seeds, even when the surrounding
conditions, which first incited the protoplasm to bring about
these adaptive modifications, no longer exist.

Hence I maintain that "acquired characters " are heredi-
tary. Thanks to this, not only do so large a number of " races "
in flowers and vegetal^les " come true " by seed under cultiva-
tion, but Evolution in Nature could not exist without it.

I deal mainly with plants, as that is my special province,

* See my paper on " Mimetic Resemblances in Animals and Plants,"
Natural Science, February, 1899, p. 121.

HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS 203

but the argument of Adaptation applies equally well to animals.
Thus just as the dissected type of foliage has been acquired
under water, so the "paddle" form of limb has been evolved
by use in aquatic animals, or in some of an amphibious habit.
Thus it occurs in the Crustacea, in fins of fishes, in extinct
marine reptiles, as the Ichthyosaurus and Flesiosaurus, etc., in
modern cetacea, the seals, in penguins and auks, and in the
tail of the beaver.

Similar adaptations are seen in the bilobed tail of fishes,
reptiles and cetacea.

Though organs may be similar in appearance and acquired
for the same purpose they may be of different origins and
differently constructed. Thus the tendril of a vine is a meta-
morphosed flowering branch, but that of the pea is a metamor-
phosed leaf.

To make the tail of a cod, Nature has run the spine into
the upper lobe, the lower lobe being made with " hypural "
bones ; but in certain extinct marine reptiles, a similar bilobed
tail was made by the spine penetrating the lower lobe. Lastly,
in the horizontal bilobed tails of cetacea, the spine terminates
at the base, the tail having no bone within it at all.

One more instance out of thousands, which I will leave the
reader to follow out for himself. If a lad wishes to walk fast,
he often does so on his toes ; and in a walking match the rule
is insisted upon that both heel and toe must be on the ground
at every step. Now, all running animals stand on their toes,
as horses, dogs, gazelles, etc., the heel being permanently up-
lifted in the air.

Inductive evidence, based on innumerable instances, leads
to the conclusion that the habit of running being habitual, the
bones of the foot have become permanently adapted to the
action ; thereby supplying great rapidity either in escaping from
the carnivorous enemy or in the latter following its prey.

I mention these few instances to show the versatile power
of protoplasm ; which can turn any organ to account for con-
structing something different, if some change is desirable, and

204 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

a new structure is to be acquired to suit the habit and conveni-
ence of the organism.

Besides hereditary structures and habits, hereditary skill
must be observed. Young birds can build just as good nests,
as a rule, as the old ones. "Trap-door" spiders can make
exquisite " retreats," when they are quite young, in no way
inferior to those of adults ; though it is said that they are not
always equally so ; and are consequently sometimes more easily
discoverable by their enemies. Still the difference between a
"good" nest or retreat made as a first attempt, by an animal,
and the period covered by a son in learning the trade of his
father is very different.

It is impossible, too, for silkworms raised in paper trays
from the egg to have learnt how to make their exquisite silk
cocoons, or spiders their geometrical webs.

Skill is thus equally hereditary with the art itself; though
there is no reason for supposing these instincts to have been
directly impressed upon them by the Creator, but that they
have been acquired and perfected through generations, and the
skill has then become a fixed trait of their constitution and a
hereditary feature.^ I shall have more to say upon Instincts in
Part II.

^ As I have discussed and criticised Dr. Weismann's theory of heredity
elsewhere, I need only refer the reader to my paper in Natural Science,
vol. i., p. 171.

PART II

MAN

CHAPTER I

MAN'S ORIGIN BY EVOLUTION

We do not know, nor can we conceive, how the first
protoplasmic h'ving being appeared on this earth. I am
as convinced of continuity as any one, wherever there is
evidence of it ; but I refrain from forcing my belief in it,
where there is absolutely no evidence, as at the origin of
terrestrial life. A time may come when the problem will
be solved and continuity may bridge the gulf between
the non-living and the living, but we have not yet arrived
at that period.

Once grant the Origin of Life, and I see no necessity
for any break whatever. Man has closed the series of
living beings, as the latest and most complete.

In Genesis (i. 26) we read : " And God said, Let us
make man in our image, after our likeness : and let him
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and
over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.
So God created man in his own image, in the image of
God created he him ; male and female created he them."

Such is the Elohistic account of the creation of man.
The second or Jehovistic history runs as follows (ii. 7) :
" The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground,
and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man
became a living soul ".

It may be noticed that the ideas of God are here

(207)

2o8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

quite differently expressed. In Gen. i. 26 God is a
spiritual Being ; but in Gen. ii. 8 God is human.

The first is only compatible with a tolerably highly
intellectual conception of Deity, and itself marks an ad-
vanced stage in man's mental development.

On the other hand, God being represented as a man
appears to be a more child-like and primitive conception ;
and perhaps comes nearer to what was probably the
earliest idea of a Deity, namely, a human ancestor.

Prof Sayce has shown how the religion of Babylonia
was essentially anthropomorphic,^ and that there is a
strong parallel between the story of Eden and the
cosmogony of Eridu, the capital town on the shores of
the Persian Gulf, as the sea was one hundred and more
miles further north than it is now, some thousands of
years ago.

On the other hand, the cosmogony which the late Mr.
G. Smith deciphered has many points of contact with the
first chapter of Genesis. Prof Sayce says, "It belongs to
an age of religious syncretism and materialistic philosophy,
and is of late date ".^

Both accounts, of course, represent the ideas of early
thinkers about the origin of man ; and how he came into
existence. What truths can we discover in them ?

In the first, the central idea is man's mental, not
bodily, kinship with the Deity ; as shown by his powers
of Domtnton over the world. It does not require much
experience to know that there is something in man which
imparts his superior power over animals. Indeed, St.
James says : Man has tamed every kind of animal, but
the tongue no man can tame (iii. 7, 8) ; that is, he cannot
tame himself! Moreover, animals know that man is

1 The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia, p. 498.
?0^«<., p. 387.

ORIGIN OF MAN 209

superior to them ; we shall see later how this comes
about.

However, I will so far anticipate what I shall have to
say about man's mind hereafter, by observing that what
separates man from animals is his power of making
abstract ideas, objects of thought. This lies at the root of
all his higher qualities. Hence he alone has volition
while all animals remain sense-ate t07f lata and non-moral.

The writer of Gen. i. probably had not thought this
fact out ; but he was quite aware of the supremacy of
man ; and he seems to have considered that it was in
this feature that he must be like the Deity.

Hence, he represents God as making man in his own
likeness.

The mental supremacy of man, therefore, is the special
characteristic of the first or Elohistic account of his
creation.

In the second or Jehovistic, more attention is paid to
the body, both of Adam and Eve. While the supremacy
of man is only feebly represented in his naming all the
animals; still, his becoming "a living soul" seems to
indicate the desire of this writer to emphasise his mental
qualities as being in some way different from those of
animals of which nothing of this kind is mentioned.

Evolution now teaches us that man was the result of
successive generations, or by " descent with modification,"
as it has been expressed, from the lowest animals ; but
we have not yet discovered the missing links to prove by
objective evidence the genealogy of the genus Homo
from the common stock with the existing ape-family.

Unscientific people often suppose that Darwin meant
that existing apes, or some one of them was the ancestor
of man. This is not the case ; what Evolutionists main-
tain is that there was a common stem which embraced

14

210 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

both simian and human characteristics, de/ore they be-
came differentiated along separate lines. The letter Y
will represent it. The stem is the so-called " generalised
type," which gave rise to two, or very likely more than
two branches, one of them ending in man, the other in
forms of the existing monkey tribes.

If it be asked when this took place, the answer can
only be based on analogies. Thus, in Greece, for ex-
ample, a large number of fossil remains of mammalia
have been unearthed.

They belong to the later Miocene or early Pliocene
period, according to geologists. Not one single species
there found is now living. Moreover, several of them are
" generalised types," embracing features of what are now
distinct genera of animals, which appeared in the next
period or later Pliocene. Thus, the Ictitherimn com-
bined characters of the hya;na and civet. Hyaenarctos
unites — as the name implies — the hyaena and bear.
Kuonarctos combines the dog with the bear, and so on.

Now, in the next or Pliocene period, we find the
animals becoming differentiated ; and the existing genera
appearing. Thus, Equus the horse, occurs here for the
first time; whereas his three-toed ancestor, HipparioHy
was among the remains of the preceding period.

Hence, judging by analogy, as the horse, hyaena, bear,
etc., are existing now, so man may have appeared well
differentiated from the Simiada, for the first time, in the
later Pliocene epoch.

Geologically speaking, this period immediately pre-
ceded the Glacial epoch, in the northern hemisphere ;
and from other evidence there is every reason to suppose
man to have been preglacial.

Something akin to a missing link is thought by
some scientists to have been found in Java, and has

ORIGIN OF MAN «1

been called Pithecanthropus erectus, meaning " erect-
monkey-man ".

Haeckel does not hesitate to consider lit to be at least
one of the long-desired missing links ; but Haeckel is apt
to deduce conclusions which he wishes to have !

Whether it will turn out to be such or not remains to
be seen ; for the fragments are really insufficient to prove
conclusively whether it be " man " or " monkey," or both
combined; but that there was a long line of ancestry is
fully believed in by scientists on inductive evidence ; for
embryology, human and comparative anatomy, as well as
man's numerous " rudimentary organs," supply such an
enormous amount of facts, that the probabilities are
overwhelming of man's descent from the animal world.

These facts need not be repeated here, as they are
well known, and may be found in Haeckel's History of
the Creation and Huxley's Man's Place in Nature, etc.
Such have established the affinities between man's body
and those of other vertebrates beyond all dispute.

The most important question about man is : How
comes it that he has developed a mind so much in
advance of that of all other animals ? Is it different in
kind as well as greater in degree ?

We may note that man's body differs in the much
longer time it takes to reach maturity, occupying many
years, whereas a dog and a horse arrive at the adult
stage in a very {^w. Similarly man's mind follows suit
in requiring a lengthened period for its development.

The late Dr. W. B. Carpenter suggested an explana-
tion as to how this mental difference may have come
about. Animals, such as monkeys as well as the car-
nivora, use their teeth for offensive purposes. This re-
quires not only large canine teeth, but very powerful
muscles to work the lower jaw.

2t2 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

These "temporal" muscles have broad bases on the
external surface of the skull, one on either side, requir-
ing large and deep depressions in which they are fixed.

These external depressions necessitate a small internal
brain cavity and a correspondingly small and more or less
lowly developed brain.

Now, a young monkey often has a quite globular
skull ; but as it grows to maturity, it assumes a longer
form with the above-mentioned external depressions.

Some unknown conditions of life, perhaps insular,
probably prevailed in which there was a comparative
freedom from enemies, and consequently a less struggle
for existence ; so that as a consequence a disuse of the
jaw for fighting purposes allowed the skull to retain the
more globular form when adult. The brain now followed
suit, and not only became larger, but more developed, in
having more numerous convolutions and an increase in
the amount of " grey matter " accompanied, as a correlated
result, with an increase of intelligence ; to which both
skull and brain reacted.

A time arrived when a new mental power was evolved,
or superadded to that which man still has in common
with animals, that of realismg abstract ideas.

As a human being epitomises the history of vertebrates
in his development from an " &^^ " to his adult stage ; so
do we see in the development of a child these mental
stages in progress. At first the infant is simply a living
automaton with no mind at all. It soon begins " to take
notice," i.e., a dawning intelligence of the outer world
awakens through the senses ; but for a long time it is
utterly powerless to realise an abstration ; and if you try
to explain to a little child the idea of God, who does not
appeal to its senses, it cannot conceive anything beyond
a Being something like its own father.

ORIGIN OF MAN 213

A time comes, however, in its mental development —
but you cannot say when — that its power of grasping the
idea of things which do not solely appeal to the senses
is attained.

At this point it passes the limits of all animals ; which
stop short at sense perceptions with a corresponding
reasoning power upon concrete things only.

This conclusion is the result of the study of the habits
of animals. It becomes more and more apparent that
their reasoning powers, which are often very considerable,
always concern concrete objects, which appeal to their
senses. But, besides doing this, man, and man alone, can
reason in abstract ideas as well.

To make this clearer, I will quote a passage from my
book Christian Beliefs Reconsidered in the Light of Modern
Thought (1884, p. 61).

" There is no reason, e.g., to suppose that any animal
in the wild or natural condition ever eats except when it
is hungry ; ^ and as soon as the instinct of hunger is
satisfied it ceases to do so. It undoubtedly derives a
certain amount of pleasure from the act of eating, as shown
by such as a man-eating tiger ; so far man may do the
same, but here enters the sharp line of distinction between
him and them, and upon which his whole moral nature
hinges ; a moral nature which no other being can acquire.
He alone can think of or make the abstract idea of Plea-
suj^e an actual object of thought. He can remember and
estimate the pleasure of eating, as an abstract idea super-
added to the recollection of the physical act of eating.
He can, in a word, convert the pleasure of eating into an
end, instead of eating with the natural motive of nourish-
ing the body. He can thus ab7.ise that gift of Nature,

^ Domesticated animals, like pigs and oxen, are in an abnormal con-
dition of life.

214 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the pleasure which accompanies eatin<T, and even h've to
eat, instead of eat to live. Such is the glutton, the epi-
cure or gourmand. I do not mean to say one should
never eat anything simply for the pleasure of eating, but
it is the aduse of this pleasure which constitutes the moral
evil or the vice ; which no wild animal can entertain in
thought.

" Animals, however, having no power of abstract
reasoning, cannot abuse natural laws. They cannot be
moral or immoral, but remain non-moral, living auto-
mata, void of all volition."

What I have here said of the evolution of man's
mental powers from a consciousness of the Concrete only
to that of the Abstract, and his passing from being an
Automaton only to a Volitional Being, is reproduced in
history. Thus Mr. Bussell uses precisely the same terms
as the above in his work on the different philosophers of
Greece.^ He speaks of the " individual " rebelling against
political restraints hitherto borne in a quiescent sub-
mission as being " now mature and fully self-conscious,"
and illustrates it by the Chinese : " We call the Chinese
civilisation immature, because the sense of individuality
there is not yet awakened, but lies sleeping — buried in
the torpor of immemorial traditions, and bound with the
fetters of unreflecting civic morality. Man is here almost
an automaton, a puppet, guided by the unseen influences
of ancestral example, the spirit of the state-inherited
tendencies ; he has all but lost his gift of spontaneous
initiative."

This last phrase is equivalent to Volition which is
opposed to Automatism.

But we may go further. Every one of us is more

1 The School of Plato, p. 66.

ORIGIN OF MAN 215

than half an automaton in all we do day by day. All
routine is done without giving us any call for reflection,
choosing or changing the order of routine. We dress in
the morning automatically, it may be thinking about
other things all the time, we eat our breakfast, go off to
the city, work for hours, as matters come before us, as
clerks or managers ; we regularly return by the same
train, seizing our familiar corner, and so on till we go to
bed. It is practical automatism throughout. Volition is
more or less in abeyance and is rarely called upon for a
deliberate choice.

Nevertheless the will is there, always ready at a
moment's notice to decide upon an act of importance
which brings alternatives of procedure before us. We
pass out of the automatic into the volitional state at a
moment's notice as occasion requires. Animals never
can. They are always automatic.

Now let us see what are the consequences of this con-
sciousness of having the power of being able to grasp an
abstract idea ; that is one about anything which does
not come within the cognisance of the senses. ^

The first result is that Man can think of himself, that
is, his " conscious soul," as we call it, or the Ego. Hence
man alone can be self-conscious, realising his own person-
ality as something other than his body.

The next step is that he realises the existence of
similar souls in his fellowmen and women ; that each has
his or her Ego, too.

Next, when he sees works in Nature very much after
the fashion of his own or of other men, or when he
realises that he has power to move himself and other

^ For convenience I limit the meaning to this application ; though
of course the word " goodness " is an abstraction in a different sense
from " God ".

2i6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

objects, and sees objects in Nature moving, as the clouds,
trees waving their leaves, the sun and moon crossing the
heavens, etc., he begins to imagine the existence of some
beings doing these things. Some bodiless beings which
he calls spirits.

The other source of spirits is believed to be ancestral ;
and possibly this was a more primitive one than the pre-
ceding.^

Early man, like modern savages, whether as the result
of dreams or otherwise, somehow conceived men to live on
after death, and to become more powerful when freed
from the body ; and as savage men are far oftener more
cruel than beneficent, so there arose the idea of the
necessity of appeasing them by offerings of roast meat
and choice vegetables, incense and drink, whereby they
were pleased and appeased. An instructive instance of
this is seen on the occasion of the exit from the ark. I
will quote a short passage from one of the Babylonian
Deluge stories which the reader can compare with that
in Genesis.

" The ark reached Nizir and rested on the mountain
unable to pass. Day after day for six days the ark rested
on the mountain of Nizir. On the seventh I sent forth a
dove which flew hither and thither, and finding no resting
place, returned. I sent forth a swallow which also found
no resting place and returned. And I sent forth a raven
which wandered to and fro, devouring and floating on the
waters, and did not return. Then I sent the animals

I Prof. Sayce in his last work, The Religions of Ancient Egypt and
Babylonia, shows how fundamental this idea was in the religion of the
latter (p. 280 et seq.)

Col. J. Gamier endeavours to show that even celestial deities were
human beings, subsequently located in the heavenly bodies. — The Wor-
ship of the Dead,

ORIGIN OF MAN 217

forth to the four winds, and poured out a libation on an
altar built on the peak of the mountain, an offering of
herbs in sevens, with reed, pine and simgar. The gods
gathered at the smell, yea, the gods gathered at the
savour, like flies they gathered at the sacrifice." ^

Mr, Herbert Spencer accepted the theory that traces
religion to the worship of ancestors,'-^ the deities being
the spirits of ancestors.

Dr. Morris Jastrow ^ observes that this theory implies
that " the personification of the powers of Nature likewise
rests upon ancestral worship, for the dead having powers
denied to the living, their spirits may choose a tree or a
stone as an abiding place, and even the large heavenly
bodies are conceived as remote ancestors of the living,
under the influence of a primitive theory of emanation ".

Dr. Jastrow observes, however, that : " Apart from the
unsatisfactory character of any attempt to derive Nature-
worship from ancestor-worship, there is no reason why
one should be dependent upon the other.'^

The story of the flood would, however, seem to show
something of the sort ; for while a sacrifice of roast meat
would imply the presence of a once human being, who
alone could appreciate it ; yet the gods are supposed to
be aloft and come down to enjoy it, and in the Biblical
account the Deity has power " to set the bow in the
heavens " as being an Omnipotent Celestial God.

Man's automatism includes his emotions, grief, fear,
joy, love, and others are spontaneously excited by
approjDriate causes, and form no part of his volition ;
though this may be brought into play to control them to

' Chaldean Flood Story, in The Composition of the Book of Genesis,
by E. T. Fripp, p. igo.

^See Principles of Sociology , chaps, viii. to xvii.

^The Study of Religion, p. 184. *0p. cit., p. 186.

2i8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

some degree. It is often observed that animals share
most at least of these, omitting laughter for example,
while Evolution recognises their origin in man as a result
of their existence in mammalia. Indeed, since man's
emotions are similar to those in animals, it has often
been stated as a proof that his mental qualifications have
been evolved as well as his body. Thus Romanes in his
works on Mental Evolution in Animals and Mental
Evolution in Man, shows that, just as man does, so do
animals manifest surprise, fear, parental affection, jealousy,
affection, sympathy, emulation, grief, revenge, shame and
remorse. These are all automatic emotions and are
identical with the same feelings in man. But they are
outside the consciousness of abstract reasoning, the pe-
culiarity of man. They deal with concrete objects as a
rule in both animals and man ; but man can also entertain
some at least of these emotions for abstract reasons, which
do not appeal to the senses ; as a fear of hell, the hope
of heaven, emulation for honour, shame before God, etc.

As long as an animal, as a dog, can bring a caiise
within the region of the senses, by automatic reasoning
of course, he is not afraid ; as when the wind blows the
leaves about ; but a dog lying by a wall was terrified
when he saw an open parasol, lying on the ground, roll
along by itself, for he did not know the wind had arisen.
Another dog lying on the beach began to bark furiously
at the wheels of a bathing machine which began to move
up the beach, being drawn up by a long rope ; for the
dog could not understand how it could (apparently) move
of its own accord.

There does not appear therefore to be any difference
in kind between an animal's emotions and man's ; it is
only when man brings his higher conscious reasoning to
bear upon them, that their effects may be altered.

ORIGIN OF MAN 219

This is the only difference in kind, if it be so allowed,
vis., that between concrete and abstract.

Whence arises this power which man alone possesses ?
Perhaps Dr. Iverach is not far wrong when he says :
" Perhaps the greatest feat ever performed in psychology
is performed by Mr. Spencer when he affirms : ' Not only
do feelings constitute the inferior tracts of consciousness,
but feelings are in all cases the materials out of which, in
the superior tracts of consciousness, intellect is evolved by
structural combination ' {Psychology, vol. i., p. 192). That
is something worth knowing ! " ^

For my part, I prefer to be an Agnostic as to how
consciousness arose, and still more how self-consciousness
was superadded ; but facts seem sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that while the higher animals have only the
former, man has both.

Mr. H. Spencer's interpretation conveys no definite
meaning to me.

Romanes tried to throw light upon it as follows :
" Receptual or outward self-consciousness is the practical
recognition of self as an active and a feeling agent ; while
conceptual or inward self-consciousness is the introspective
recognition of self as an object of knowledge and there-
fore as a subject, etc.".

What does all this — and a great deal more — mean
but that / am conscious of Myself, can mentally talk
about myself, compare myself to other selves, etc., etc. I
am tiot conscious, however, of having two sorts of self-
consciousness. Everything outside of Ego comes under
"consciousness" without the "self". Dr. Iverach, I
think, rightly observes : " At all events, Dr. Romanes
has not made clear what he means by conceptual self-

1 Op. cit., p. 164.

220 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

consciousness. Nor has he made good the distinction
between outward and inner self-consciousness." ^

" Following Locke, he [Romanes] makes the power
of forming abstract ideas to belong only to man. ' There-
fore, 1 think,' says Locke, ' beasts compare not their ideas
further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the
objects themselves. The other power of comparing,
which may be observed in man, belonging to general
ideas, and useful only in abstract reasonings, we may
probably conjecture brutes have not.' But does not the
distinction between conscious and self-consciousness begin
at an earlier stage? "^ asks Dr. Iverach.

I would regard Locke to be the more correct, because
self-inspection or self-consciousness is a particular instance
of the more general property of making an abstraction, in
this case, the Ego^ an object of thought.^

The two remaining consequences of Man being alone
able to entertain abstract ideas are the Consciousness of
having the power to choose or "Free Will," and the con-
ception of " Immortality ", These will be considered
hereafter.

^Op. cit., p. 170. ^Op, cit., p. 171.

* I was not aware that Locke had forestalled me ; for I drew this
distinction between man and animals in myActonian Prize Essay, £7)o/m-
tio)i and Religion, p. 151 (1873), and emphasised it in Christian Beliefs
Reconsidered in the Light of Modern Thought, pp. 63 et seq. (18S4). I gave
Romanes a copy of this latter work ; and he said he fully agreed with me
as to what I had written. He had previously regarded " Speech " as the
fundamental dilference ; but animals of the same kind have indubitably
some power of communication between them, though it may always con-
cern matters of sense.

I have no intention of entering upon the field of discussion about the
connection between mind and "grey matter," or of consciousness and
brain. The reader will find the true theories of Materialism, interaction
and parallelism well discussed by Mr. Stout, who himself adopts the last
as a provisional hypothesis (Manual of Psychology, Introduction, chap, i.,
p. 3, on " Mind and Body ").

CHAPTER II

RATIONALISTIC VIEWS OF SCIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

Modern Rationalists not only take their name from
Reason, but exalt it as almost omnipotent, at least as far
as the material world is concerned. Thus Mr. C. T.
Gorham says : " Knowledge ends with the material pheno-
mena ; beyond, conjecture holds the field, and explana-
tion becomes guesswork ".^ In fact, whatever cannot
have a rational explanation by observation and experi-
ment is not to be accepted as a scientific truth according
to him and other Rationalists.

Science and reason doubtless might be infallible, if
only we were always quite sure of our facts ; for Facts are
Truth ; but science, as representing co-ordinated human
knowledge, is always progressive. Truth is only ulti-
mately secured, not only by observation and experiment
with verification, to which these authors seem to limit us,
but by inductive evidence coupled with a continual eli-
mination of unsupported deductions, a priori assumptions
and errors.

The following will supply the reader with some of
the anonymous author's descriptions of science occurring
in Mr. Balfour's Apologetics.

( I ) " Science assumes the Universality of the Law of
Causation,"

1 Faith, its Freaks and Follies, p. 44. This author completely fuses
" Faith " " belief " and " credulity ".

(221)

222 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

(2) " Science lays bare the natural causes of all pheno-
mena "?

(3) " Knowledge courts the most rigorous investiga-
tion." ^

(4) " The fabric of science is based on the evidence of
the senses, and on inferences which are drawn from
them." 3

(5) " Science remains firmly planted on the im-
pregnable ground of experience." *

(6) " The facts and theories of science receive daily
an overwhelming confirmation from general consent, from
success in practice, and from common sense." ^

(7) " Science is the one thing certain " (L. Stephen).^

(8) " Knowledge can only be gained by means of
observation, corrected and verified by experiment." "

" If any such knowledge of the supernatural can be
shown to exist it must take rank as scientific truth."

" The so-called knowledge [of God] must be sub-
mitted to the tests of observation and experiment ; if it
is knowledge at all it is capable of verification." '^

(9) " Reason declares with overwhelming force that
everything which cannot be proved by scientific means is
incapable of proof" '•'

(10) "Science is knowledge verified and reduced
to system." ^''

(11) " Life in its lowest forms involves relations and
correspondences with the surrounding world. And what
are these but incipient knowledge ? . . . From this we
get brain ; and we have thus living illustrations of the fact
that reason has proceeded from non-reason." ^^

(12) " The moral ideal of Rationalism is truth, and on

' Pp. 20, 21.

2 P. 24.

' P. 26.

* P. 26.

»P. 31-

0 P. 32.

' P. 34-

"Pp. 34, 103

"P. 34.

i» P. 102.

"P. III.

RATIONALISM AND SCIENCE 223

no other foundation than truth can any lofty or durable
system of ethics be reared."^

(13) " Human reason is the highest product of earthly
evolution, the apex and not the ground of man's exist-
ence. ^

I do not think this author can be a scientifically
trained man ; for he would have known that science can
by no means be trusted so far as he writes about it.
The very term " provisional or working hypothesis,"
which scientific men constantly employ, indicates the
uncertainties associated with the pursuit of various
branches of science. Some have never got beyond it,
as the proving the existence and nature of ether.

This author appears to limit science to " observation
and experiment" (4, 5, 8,) and says it "lays bare the
natural causes of all phenomena".

No scientific man will endorse that statement. We
can readily recall a few phenomena of which science has
never yet laid bare the cause.

In astronomy, what was the original cause of rota-
tion?

In chemistry, what is the cause of chemical affini-
ties ? Haeckel's erotic theory is too puerile for con-
sideration.

In physics, what is the cause of gravity and the cor-
relation of forces generally ?

In biology, what is the cause of the translation of
molecular vibrations in the brain to consciousness ?

Science may try to lay bare these causes, but she has
never yet succeeded and probably never will.

We all know that science is not infallible now : what
what was it before the nineteenth century ? A mass of

1 P. 151. ^Pp. 212, 213.

224 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

empiricism. Compare the science of medicine, say of the
fourteenth century, with that of to-day. Thousands of
drugs and recipes as well as charms, then used in all
faith, have been utterly discarded. Many were based on
the a priori notion that " like cures like," so that ground
up cherry-stones were supposed to be a remedy for stone ;
plants with a yellow juice, as the celandine, would cure
jaundice, etc.

Who will pronounce the science of medicine to-day
as infallible, or as " the one thing certain (7) " ?

Has science solved all the problems of any one branch
of knowledge to-day ? Experts in every line know that
theories and working hypotheses are all that can be held
on many points.

Or again, Does modern science know no reed, broken
or unbroken, upon which it leans ?

Let us follow the author's words : " Science courts the
most rigorous investigation ". Well, I have given it in
the matter of Darwinism ; and the result of the investiga-
tion is that this much-valued basis of Rationalism and
Materialistic Monism has not a particle of evidence to
support it.

The author of Mr. Balfour s Apologetics replied to
my observations that he ignores too much the evidence
of inductive evidence (i.e., the accumulation of coinciden-
ces and probabilities), and says, " I do not ignore this
fact, but I would point out that all inductive evidence
rests ultimately on a basis of observation and experi-
ment Induction is a generalisation from experience."
Experience, however, is not cxpcriinent. We experience
the difference between day and night ; but no experiment
can prove that the sun does not go round the world in
twenty-four hours. A pendulum set swinging north and
south will soon appear to be swinging between north and

RATIONALISM AND SCIENCE 225

east ; but this is no proof ; it is only a corroborative
probability that the earth is rotating under it. He denies
that my illustration of the spectroscope is a just one, and
says : " We actually subject the photosphere of the sun to
observation and experiment". I unhesitatingly deny
this ; for if the photosphere be composed of gaseous iron,
sodium, etc., not one of these elements ever reaches us.
Nothing but ethereal vibrations arrive at the spectroscope.
These, we believe, indicate the presence of those elements ;
but it is only an inference. My object in quoting the
above paragraphs is to show, first the exaggerated value
put upon Reason by Rationalists, and their inconsistency
in not recognising the importance of inductive evidence
where experiment is impossible.

Now let us turn to Haeckel's views on science.^
(i) "Truth unadulterated is only to be found in the
temple of the study of Nature ; and that the only avail-
able paths to it are critical observation and reflection —
the empirical investigation of facts and the rational study
of their efficient causes. . . . The Goddess of Truth
dwells in the Temple of Nature. . . . The rich gifts which
the Goddess of Truth bestows on us are the noble fruits of
the tree of knowledge and the inestimable treasure of a
clear unified view of the world." ^

These quotations will be sufficient. Other Rational-
istic authors write in the same strain ; but all true scien-
tists will recognise this as hyperbolic language, which far
exceeds the modesty of a Newton ! The serious omis-
sion, however, which I have emphasised, and shall do so
again, is the almost invariable want of any due apprecia-
tion of inductive evidence ; which can be quite equivalent
to a mathematical demonstration ; as in the Truth of the
rotation of the earth,

1 The Riddle of the Universe. ^Fp. 345, 346.

15

225 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

If we turn to metaphysicians, we find, on the other
hand, that reason is from one cause or another somewhat
slighted in certain directions. Thus Prof H. Jones says:
" No age has employed reason more, nor trusted it less,
than our own ".' He contrasts the estimate of reason
in two regions by saying : " If, on the one hand, the great
mass of the ' expert evidence ' of philosophers, psycholo-
gists and theologians is condemnatory of human reason,
the practical confidence of the day in the uses of the
intelligence remains, on the other hand, quite unshaken,"
. . . but " scientific men themselves are unable to deny
that their premisses are only ' working hypotheses,' and
their whole procedure, in the last resort, only tentative ",

He is here encroaching upon, if not contradicting, the
Rationalist's creed. For Materialistic Monists, as we have
seen, base everything on what they believe has been
thoroughly " reasoned out," vi^., Darwinism, though it
is proved to have been based on a false premise.

Then Prof Jones adds : " Thus at the very moment
when human reason is charged in the high places of
abstract thought with every weakness, it is believed to
be bringing in a richer harvest of practically valid truth
than the world has seen at any other period of its history ".

He then classifies the sciences as follows : " It may
be maintained, and with some truth, that it is only in the
field of physical inquiry that man's natural powers have
unequivocally proved their strength. The supraphysical
sciences, such as Biology, Physiology, Psychology, An-
thropology, Political Economy — not to mention Ethics,
Social and Political Philosophy, Theology and Meta-
physics— lack the demonstrative security and the predic-
tive power of the Mathematical and Physical sciences."

1 " Reflective Thought and Religion," Hibbcrt Jourii., i., p. 229, etc,

RATIONALISM AND SCIENCE 227

This quotation brings us to the point. He appears
to be comparing, or contrasting, if he be not putting one
against the other, vis., Deductive and Inductive reason.
He does not recognise the value of the latter in these
so-called " supraphysical " sciences. The former is that
employed by Euclid and other mathematicians. It is
safe for them to do so, because there are only a few
axioms or postulates upon which the whole of the super-
structures are built ; and if the steps in their logical
sequences of any proposition are correctly made, they
cannot arrive at any other conclusion than a Q. E. D.

In astronomy the occurrence of eclipses can be fore-
told with accuracy hundreds of years in advance, if neces-
sary.

The laws of heat, light, electricity, and magnetism are
known ; so that they can be trusted to do their work, and
utilised, as their effects are constant. But in biology it
is not always so. Data are more complex on which to
reason ; but inductive reasoning now meets the case, so
that to an enormous extent the conclusions of biological
scientists are perfectly sound and equivalent in value to
mathematical demonstrations.

In astronomy it has to be trusted ; thus, I repeat, the
conviction that the earth revolves on its axis in twenty-
four hours is solely founded on inductive evidence.
Similarly is our knowledge of the elements in the sun
established on faith in the accumulation of coincidences,
on which probabilites are based. These are of so high
an order, that they force the moral conviction, and any
alternative becomes unthinkable.

It is solely on inductive evidence that the Copernican
system has superseded the Ptolemaic.

In biology the great doctrine of Evolution is largely
based upon induction ; for probabilities pour in from all

228 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

quarters — palaeontology, comparative anatomy, embry-
ology, transitional forms of living beings, etc. ; such are
more than ample to establish the truth of it ; so that any
alternative proposed at the present day to Evolution
(whatever be the actual process in Nature) is absolutely
inconceivable.

In fact, we live upon inductive evidence every day of
our lives. We trust ourselves in trains because the pro-
bability that we shall arrive at our destination safe and
sound is of a high order, i.e., a practical but not absolute
certainty.

Circumstantial evidence is another example. No one
saw the crime committed ; but the supposed criminal was
condemned from the accumulation of facts which all
pointed to the one probability of the man having done
the deed.

Now Rationalists are inconsistent ; the}' cannot but
admit the foregoing, yet refuse to believe in God, free-
dom and immortality, because they (as they assert) escape
" practical demonstration," but they can be all shown to
be overwhelnimgly probable : and that is all we want in
this world. We must live by faith {i.e., inductive evidence)
in the spiritual world and not only by sight.

Darwinism, however, was not based on inductive
reasoning, but solely on a priori assumptions, that is,
deductive reasoning, on an assumed basis ; but without
any axiom or postulate which could not be gainsaid.
" Indefinite variations " might be called Darwin's axiom ;
but unfortunately they only existed in his own imagination.

Now it is strange to find Rationalists so strongly
maintaining the supremacy of reason, yet all bowing
down in abject obeisance to authority in the form of
Darwinism ; which they regard as the very " basis of
Monism ".

RATIONALISM AND SCIENCE 229

Natural Selection of Darwinism is, in fact, a Dens ex
inachind for Haeckelian Monists and Darwinians like
Weismann. It comes in handy whenever and wherever
some explanation is wanted. It can do anything and
everything, without giving one the trouble of thinking or
investigating the causes of phenomena.

Thus, the Mind and Reason are equally regarded as
being due to Natural Selection ; so too is the aesthetic
sense, while Morals follow suit. Thus it is said : " The
capacity of the human intellect is in conformity with
what we might expect, on the theory that it has been
evolved for practical purposes by the process of Natural
Selection " }

" Reason is ' the roof and crown of things ' ; it is the
final result of a long process of Natural Selection." '^ " The
development of the aesthetic sentiments may be explained
as one of the inevitable results of the operation of Natural
Selection." ^

Since, however, Darwin came to see that self-adapta-
tion to the "definite" action of the environment is the
cause of new variations in animals and plants : experience
shows us that aestheticism and tastes for forms of art are
matters of cultivation. This means that the more we
exercise our brains in studying these things, the more the
brain will respond and become educated.

Such is only a particular instance of the universal
process of " response to the environment," perfectly
analogous to the education of reason and other mental
traits by practice. It thus falls under the law of use, by
which structure is developed in the bodies of animals and
plants.

As another trait of the mind, is the love of beauty.

^Mr. Balfour'' s Apologetics, p. 87.

■•^ Op. cit., p. 93. 3 p_ yj_

230 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Here Materialism enters into the strangest opposition to
Christianity it is possible to conceive. This is what
Haeckel says : " Monism enters into its strongest opposi-
tion to Christianity on the question of beauty. Primitive
Christianity preached the vvorthlessness of earthly life,
regarding it merely as a preparation for an eternal life
beyond. Hence it immediately followed that all we
find in the life of man here below, all that is beautiful in
art and science, in public and private life is of no real
value. The true Christian must avert his eyes from
them ; he must think only of a worthy preparation for the
life beyond. Contempt of Nature, aversion from all its
inexhaustible charms, rejection of every kind of fine art,
are Christian duties."^

Could anything be more grotesque ? What do all the
art galleries of England and the Christian world mean ?

Haeckel has an eloquent passage upon the lovely
forms of life discovered during the nineteenth century ;
but says : " This progress of modern times in knowledge
of the true and enjoyment of the beautiful expresses, on
the one hand, a valuable element of our Monistic religion
[?] but is, on the other, in fatal opposition to Christianity." ^

Every reader will perceive what a travesty this is of
true Christianity. Whence Haeckel derived this absurd
idea, I know not. Christianity not only prepares man
for the next world, but ennobles his life on earth. A
true Christian enjoys his life in company with his Maker ;
for he reads " sermons in stones and good in everything ".
Not a flower or an insect, nor the lilies of the field and
the fowls of the air, but tell him of his Creator as well as
remind him of Christ.

The very fact that he can enjoy life, as well as all

> The Riddle of the Universe, p. 347. ^Op. cit., p. 352.

RATIONALISM AND SCIENCE 231

creatures, each in its several way, is a witness to the
presence of a Mind who could evince His love for all his
creatures, by evolving a nervous system as the physical
basis of mental enjoyment.

But Monists see nothing of this ! They must have
physical proof of God.

" Science," writes the anonymous author of Mr. Bal-
four s Apologetics^ neither affirms nor denies the exist-
ence of God ; she has no need to trouble herself about
any such hypothesis. ... It is altogether excluded from
the domain of science, which can recognise nothing that
is not based on knowledge. . . . The so-called knowledge
must be submitted to the tests of observation and ex-
periment ; if it is knowledge at all, it is capable of
verification, and the verdict must be final."

Inductive evidence is here, I repeat, utterly ignored.

1 P. 102.

CHAPTER III

RATIONALISTIC VIEWS OF PSYCHOLOGY, REASON AND

INSTINCT

After having accumulated /r?f/j-, as a basis of know-
ledge, and then co-ordinated them according to their
various relationships, and so classified them scientifically ,
we endeavour to trace out the natural laws or the in-
variable orders of sequences.

In so doing one observes not only distinct causes and
their effects ; but definite objects secured by the various
forces at work. This is called Reason in Man.

When we look for evidences of reason in Nature,
other than man, such being acts done with some appar-
ently special motive and not merely automatic repetitions
only, we find it exemplified through the whole of the
organic world, not only in animals but in plants. As
reasoning in animals has been denied by some, it is as
well to give an instance recorded by Romanes which that
observer regards as distinctly proving reason in a dog.
His definition is that " for an action to be rational it must
be performed with conscious deliberation, or with thought-
ful adaptations oi means to ends ".

" I drove with the dog from its country home, as a
present to a friend who lived in a town some ten miles
distant. Several weeks afterwards I again drove to visit
this friend, and when my horses were being harnessed for
the return journey the terrier must have reasoned from

(232)

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 233

analogy that I was about to return home, and thereupon
formed the resolution of accompanying me to the hunting
ground of his puppyhood. But he must further have
reasoned that since on the occasion of my previous visit
I had purposely left him behind as a present to my friend,
I should not on this occasion be inclined to take him
home. Lastly, he must have reasoned that there was
one expedient whereby he could solicit my protection
on the homeward journey without the danger of being
imprisoned, and this expedient he adopted ; for after
we had vainly searched for Skye, to prevent his follow-
ing my dog-cart, I started, and when two miles on my
way home, I overtook him, lying in the middle of the
road, with his face towards the town, evidently expecting
my approach. And as the dog had clearly contemplated,
the distance was too great for me to return with him to
town, so that, as he had clearly intended, I had to take
him with me to his old home in the country." ^

He gives another story of a dog lying down in a
kitchen while the cook was trussing a fowl. As soon as
she left the room, he seized it, carried it out and buried
it. He then came back and lay down as before, mimicking
innocence. Unfortunately for the dog the gardener saw
him bury it, and brought it back.

The following is reproduced from the Daily Telegraph
of 9th March, 1903 : "A burglar has just been detected,
a fortnight after he had assisted in the work of the
robbery, by a wonderfully sagacious dog belonging to the
gentleman at whose expense the depredation had been
committed. The owner lives in Paris, and his villa at
Charenton having been ransacked, he had stocked it with
new furniture. After a heavy morning's toil, he was pro-

^ "Animal Intelligence," a lecture by G. J. Romanes, 1879.

234 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

ceeding to a restaurant to recruit exhausted nature when
the spaniel suddenly ran after a well-dressed man who
was walking about fifty yards in front and began to bark
loudly. The owner hurried after the animal to call it
back, but, instead of obeying him, it attacked the stranger,
fixing its teeth into his trousers and holding on for all it
was worth. The gentleman then perceived that this was
one of his garments, which had disappeared on the night
when his villa was pillaged, so he spoke to a wood-
ranger who happened to be passing, and the man was
conducted to the police station, where he was forced to
confess that he had had a hand in the burglary, though
he declined to give the names of his accomi^lices. So
the dog had turned out to be an excellent dectective."
If one may recognise reason in animals whenever such
" reasonable " acts are done, i.e., when certain means are
employed to secure special ends, which are outside their
normal procedures, then we apparently can see such in
the actions of animals which possess no brains at all,
but only a nervous system.

Thus, if the head of a frog be cut off, and a little acid
be rubbed on the inner side of one of the legs, the other
leg is instantly drawn up and turns the foot to try and
rub off the acid from the other leg.

This may be called a " reasonable " act, but it is
simply an unconscious, mechanical, reflex action from the
spinal cord ; for if a long needle be now thrust down and
destroy the cord, all action of the leg ceases immediately.
A frog which has been deprived of its cerebral hemi-
spheres, swims perfectly in water and is indeed obedient
to all sorts of stimulus. The reflex action which accounts
for all its movements shows an entire want of any spon-
taneity, and is purely automatic, as it takes place precisely
in the same way under the same stimulus. Unlike

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 235

Stimuli associated with consciousness it can learn nothing
by experience.

If there be any feeble consciousness associated with
such reflex action, it cannot be determined ; but the
consciousness of the higher animals and man, which is
often obviously accompanied with reflex action, depends
upon the efficiency of the superficial grey matter of the
brain over and above the sub-cortical tissues.

Thus is it all through the animal kingdom from man
to an amceba, that innumerable actions evincing all the
characteristics of reason are done by unconscious proto-
plasm alone.

Even in the actual construction of cells, the rule is for
the nucleus in the middle to divide into two leaving a
space between them. Then a " cell-plate," to form a new
wall, is laid down between them ; thus dividing the cell
into two. This process is repeated ad infinitum till the
animal or plant ceases to grow.

Two special cases have been described above,^ but I
will here repeat where difficulties had to be met. When
the nucleus was situated at the side of the cell, it began
to divide into the two halves which travelled across the
cell, laying down the cell-plate as they went along, until
they reached the opposite side.

In another case the cell-plate was made by means of
the nucleus bulging out into a flattened spheroid till it
touched the opposite sides.

Practical protoplasmic reasoning might very well
define this behaviour ; though it was undoubtedly due to
unconscious automatism which performs these apparently
rational proceedings. That is precisely what it is, from
the formation of cells to the habits of a monkey.

^ Part I., chap, xii., pp. 62, 64.

236 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The reasoning is always automatic and connected
with concrete matters, which suggest to the nervous
system or the brain or protoplasm generally what should
be done, and the protoplasm in every case does it accord-
ingly.

Similarly nine-tenths of man's reasoning is of the same
kind, and is known as " common-sense " when external
objects and circumstances suggest to the brain a course
of action which it follows at once. He does many
reasonable acts from morning till night, as already ex-
plained, but none of them make any special call upon
his volition. His will, however, is always ready to
respond, if there is any occasion for choosing between
two courses of action, which may involve or require some
abstract motives wherewith to decide upon the most
desirable.

The question arises, Does this inherent property of
reason, seen in all organic beings and in the very cells of
which they are built up — not to add the inherent power
the nucleus possesses to build up different forms in re-
sponse to new conditions of life, the basis of evolution —
indicate Mind though " the reasonable acts " be them-
selves automatically done (whether consciously or uncon-
sciously) ?

One writer I have quoted would ask after the manner
of Philip, " Show us your God ? " Of course, this is im-
possible ; but may we not say in the words of Sir Oliver
Lodge : " Look for the action of the Ueity, if at all, then
always ; not in the past alone, not only in the future, but
equally in the present. If His action is not visible now,
it never will be, and never has been visible." •

If Paley's watch did not require a visible watchmaker

' Hibbert Journal, i., p. 214.

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 237

to substantiate the Argument of Design, neither does the
doctrine of Evolution require God's visible presence to
substantiate His Reason in Nature.

I need only refer the reader to Paley's work for in-
stances in the animal kingdom ; so now let us take a few
illustrations from the vegetable world.

If a man has to cross an arid desert, he carries water
with him. If plants live in dry rocky places, where rain
falls for a few weeks only in the year, they provide them-
selves with water-storage tissues.

If plants have weak stems, they often convert their
leaves or flowering branches into tendrils, and moreover
provide them with a sensitiveness to touch, so that they
coil spirally around any object with which they may
come into contact. So, men make rope ladders.

As the embryo of seeds would perish on germination
if they had not food to live upon until roots and leaves are
made, Nature provides them with the necessary substances
in resei-ve, wherewith to fight the battle of life ; just as a
convoy accompanies soldiers on the march.

Similarly many plants have found out methods of
propagation without seeds, as potatoes. To do this
reserve food materials are stored up for the " eyes " or
young shoots to live upon until they have roots and leaves,
like germinating seeds. These are but a few of " reason-
able " processes whereby " means " for " ends " are provided
by the plant in view of future contingencies, etc.

Such processes are all effected by automatic proto-
plasmic " reason," if it be permissible to use the term in
this sense where consciousness is absent.

Haeckel, indeed, does attribute a " soul " with all
its properties to primordial cells, that is, in fact, to proto-
plasm ; but I should prefer to limit " reason " to acts
associated with co7isciousness, and use the word " adapta-

238 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

tion," which covers the whole crround, however " reason-
ably " the process of adaptation be carried out.

Now the question follows : Suppose we use the
word reason, first, for its recognised use by a most ac-
complished metaphysician, who deals entirely with ab-
stract thought. Secondly, with the concrete applications
of man in everyday life ; as well as on the part of the
higher animals, who never get beyond such concrete use
of it.

We then pass it on to apparently " reasonable acts "
of reflex action and instinct, till at last we find it in
the protoplasm of a cell ; for " means " to secure " ends "
occur throughout from top to bottom of the living world.
Then are we not justified in concluding that the highest
form of reason as seen in man, substantiates the belief
that an even higher Mind than his is behind the whole
series ; that this Logos or " Directivity " proves by inductive
evidence a conscious reason in the recognised Power be-
hind Nature ?

This conclusion Rationalists may not regard as scien-
tific, but it is philosophical.

There is a type of reasoning which is called " common-
sense," to which I have just alluded. This appears to be
" reasoning about very obvious matters and experiences ".

An example is the best way of illustrating this ; as it
is simply a generalisation from experiences.

Suppose it has been showery in April all the morn-
ing but clears up about noon, and the sun breaks out. A
man and his young son go out for a walk. The father
puts on his greatcoat and takes his umbrella.

The son seeing the sun shining docs neither. Another
shower comes up in an hour. The father says : " Why
didn't you put on your coat and bring an umbrella ? You
might have known (or ' your common-sense ' might have

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 239

told you) that another shower was likely to come up in
April."

The father had " common-sense " based on experience ;
the boy had none.

If an adult be deficient in common-sense, we call him
" stupid," and we commonly say " he did not stop to
think ". The boy acted on a deduction from insufficient
data — Because the sun was shining, therefore it will be
fine. The boy went through a process of intuitive or
automatic reasoning ; but as it was a pure deduction, it
was fallible.

This covers a large field of man's imperfect reasoning,
lying between conscious, reflective reasoning, where all
the data available are mentally collected ; and the pro-
cess of " jumping to conclusions," i.e., deductive and a
priori assumptions, which generally turn out to be er-
roneous.

If the word reason be only legitimately restricted to
conscious acts performed with some definite end in view ;
then instinct in many cases also stands for many acts
performed with some definite ends in view, but without
the creature knowing what the " ends " may be. It par-
takes therefore, of an automatic character, due to some
inherent directivity independent of the creature's know-
ledge.

In themselves the acts may have apparently all the
characteristics of reason. This leads one to suppose that
they were truly reasonable acts in the ancestral per-
formers ; but have now become fixed and inherited traits
or instincts.

This may not imply to all, for some are at present
quite inexplicable. With regard to Instinct, there are dif-
ferent views. Herbert Spencer has described it as " com-
pound reflex action " ; but Mr, Ronianes would add the

240 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

element of " consciousness ". Mr. Reid would define it as
follows : " The faculty which is concerned in the con-
scious adaption of means to ends, by virtue of inborn
inherited knowledge and ways of thinking and acting ".

He then gives an example : " The young alligator or
the young turtle instinctively seeks the water on emerging
from the egg, i.e., they seek it by virtue of their inborn
and inherited knowledge and ways of thinking and acting.
Instinct is clearly transmissible." ^

In this case Instinct seems synonymous with inherited
memory of the water as the medium in which the parental
alligator and turtle lived.

But numerous instincts— z>., at least habits, which
would be now called "instinctive," can be grouped or
classified with what must have been " reasonable " acts
and done through " conscious adaption of means to ends ".
I will take one or two instances.

Little pigs go at once to the sow's teats. That is
instinct ; but the sucking process itself is regarded as due
to rejiex action. The calf's habit of butting the udder
is common to all and can only be instinctive ; certainly
it is not taught to do so by the mother cow.

Prof A. Newton regards the instinct of the cuckoo in
putting its egg in the nest of some other bird as an in-
herited habit. " Everyone who has sufficiently studied
the habits of animals will admit the tendency of some of
these habits to become hereditary. That there is a
reasonable probability of each cuckoo most commonly
putting her eggs in the nest of the same species of bird,
and of this habit being transmitted to her posterity, does
not seem to be a very violent supposition," ^

Mr. O. H. Latter after criticising the above observes :

^Ob. cit., p. 137. ^Dictionary of Birds, p. 123.

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY z^i

"In spite of these criticisms I am compelled by the re-
sults of my investigations to admit that I now believe
Prof. Newton's theory to be, in the main, correct "}

If hermit crabs, to which I have already alluded,
now supply instances of an hereditary instinct converted
into an absolute necessity, their enemies supply reasoning
in adapting their habits towards them ; for it has been
noticed that a very young octopus will at once seize a
hermit crab; but as the latter had fixed stinging zoo-
phytes over the shell [by reason], the octopus recoiled
and let its prey escape. Subsequently it was observed
to avoid hermit crabs. But older animals of the same
species managed cleverly to pull the crab out of its house
without being stung.-

If the acquiring of any habits come under what Mr.
Reid calls " psychological change," i.e., from a previous
state, when no such habit existed ; and the habit in this
case probably arose from the direct, conscious adaptation
of means to ends ; then, such are obviously inherited, and
the fact that these habits run in direct descent of par-
ticular genera or species is an additional evidence that
they have become fixed, automatic traits in the race in
question. Hermit crabs now have the instinct to go
searching for " houses to let ".

Let us take another example.

Soles, as fry, are, like other fishes, bilaterally sym-
metrical ; but they soon assume the generic habit of
lying flat on the ground more or less embedding them-
selves in the shingle. The bodily form changes in con-
formity with this changed and acquired habit ; as the
form of the fry indicates the ancestral type.

Their present habit suggests the primary purpose of

^Biomctrika, i., p. i66.
2 Stout's Manual of Psychology, p. 257.
16

^42 Present-day rationalism

trying to hide themselves at the bottom of the watei*
to escape their enemies. Both form and habit have now
become perpetuated and hereditary.

For a hen to scratch up the ground is a reasonable
procedure. It was a direct act Of reason in the first that
did it. Experiments prove that it is now instinctive in
chickens ; as Mr. Reid shows in the following instance.
" Without any opportunities of imitation when kept quite
isolated from their kind, chickens begin to scrape when
from two to six days old. Generally, the condition of
the ground was suggestive." Some chickens were hatched
on a carpet, where they were kept for several days.
" They showed no inclination to scrape, because the stimu-
lus supplied by the carpet to the soles of their feet was of
too novel a character to call into action the hereditary in-
stinct ; but when a little gravel was sprinkled on the carpet,
and so supplied the appropriate or customary stimulus, the
chickens immediately began their scraping movements." ^

In this case, therefore, we have a primary act of
Reason to start with. It becomes an Instinct in the
race ; which is then performed by Reflex Action.

Dogs bury bones. Such an act is due first to reason-
ing powers, with the object, presumably, of keeping them
hidden from other dogs, so that they may eat them on
some future occasion. This has now become a hereditary
habit. Even a puppy in a room has been watched trying
to bury a biscuit in the corner, first, by scratching at the
boards to make a hole ; then after placing the biscuit
where it imagined the hole to be, it tried to bury it by
pressing it down with its nose. It came away apparently
quite satisfied with the result. Any "common-sense"
was conspicuous by its absence.

'Experiments of Dr. Allen Thomson, F.R.S., op. cit., note, p. 159.

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 243

Mr. Reid compares the three processes as follows : " It
is to be noted that instinctive action is as sharply divided
from reflex action by the fact that it results from con-
sciousness, as it is divided from rational action by the fact
that it is due to inborn not acquired knowledge and ways
of thinking and acting." ^

If he means " not acquired " by the individual itself,
he may be right, though prolonged habit may become
instinctive in animals, as it does automatic in man ; but
from the cases given, instincts seem certainly in some
cases to be hereditary reasonable acts, but done auto-
matically, the adaptation of means to ends being lost or
grotesquely imitated. Thus a tame beaver kept indoors
is said to have made a " dam " in the corner of a room by
collecting all the small articles it could get, such as
brushes, sticks, etc. This seems to be a case of " instinct
at fault ".

Some writers say " instinct never fails," but this is
incorrect ; for example, I have found the solid spine of
an echinoderm pierced by the boring of some carnivorous
univalve. Woodpeckers have injured telegraph poles.

Again one instinct may clash with another. Thus
swallows which had built and hatched eggs too late in the
season, abandoned the brood when the instinct to migrate
was present.

A great deal has been written on Instinct in animals ;
the majority of cases (if not all) seem to be hereditary
habits originally acquired by use and adaptation to the
surroundings. I think we may regard this principle of
Adaptation to the Environment as applicable to the origin
of habits as well as structures, as explaining at least most
of them. Thus various kinds of birds always build pre-

1 Op. cit., p. 147.

244 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

cisely the same kinds of nests, as of thrushes, blackbirds,
rooks, etc., respectively. Evolution will not allow that
any particular kind of bird ^rst built one of the shape
and structure now peculiar to the species, other than as
a result of experiment. I mean, the bird could not have
had any previous instruction as to how it should be built.

But having once succeeded to its satisfaction, the
same nest becomes, so to say, an hereditary feature ; and
the power to make it an heirloom.

It is thought the young birds receive instruction from
their parents. It is very possible, not to say likely, that
such is the case ; but experiments have shown that it is
not always necessary. Thus a greenfinch's &^^ hatched
under a canary proved to be a hen and subsequently
built a normal greenfinch's nest, A young bullfinch
taken early has been known to do the same thing.

Whether trap-door spiders learn how to make nests,
I do not know, but those of very small spiders I possess
are just as beautifully made as if by full-grown individuals.

Similarly, habits of instinct seen in insects seem to
have been originally successful experiments, which having
proved to be useful are repeated ad infinituvi by heredity.
Thus certain wasps paralyse spiders, but do not kill
them, for food for their grubs. The exact spot where
the nerve ganglion is may have been originally found by
" trial and error " ; but once discovered, the stinging the
victim there has become hereditary.

Birds and insects are said to change their usual habits
if they alter their habitats, if it be necessary to do so,
under the influence of the environmental conditions ; just
as their own bodies become modified giving rise to new
varieties or species.

It is said, for example, that the hive-bee has been
known to abandon the hexagonal cell, and lapse into

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 245

forming the circular form, after the ordinary type of the
humble-bee. While trap-door spiders make excellent
doors to their chambers in Mentone, our English species
makes none, but simply tears a hole in the wall to drag
its prey inside and then mends it again.

This method appears to have now become a fixed
and instinctive habit.

On the other hand, there are some instincts which are
still inexplicable such as the so-called " homing " of
animals. Dogs and cats have been taken long distances
by train, and yet have found their way back across
several counties. No one at present seems able to
explain how it is done.

With regard to the homing instinct Romanes records
" Evidence of a cat finding its way home from London
to Huddersfield, a distance of 200 miles ; of a dog
returning to its home in Sutherlandshire from Berwick-
on-Tweed, having been taken to Berwick by sea, and
returning by land, etc. In such cases short cuts are often
made over third sides of triangles ; but it is interesting
that in one of my cases, communicated to me by an
intelligent correspondent, some horses, in taking a short
cut for home, were brought up, after a journey of several
hundred miles, on the end of a peninsula, where they do
not seem to have had sense enough to double back."

Homing instinct cannot be identically the same thing
as that of a carrier pigeon ; for as Prof Loeb says : " It
seems to be certain that the carrier pigeon finds its way
back by the visual memory of the locality from which it
started." He says the same thing of solitary wasps, bees
and ants.i

Prof Loeb remarks : " It always seemed to me one

^ Comparative Physiology of the Brain, p. 196.

246 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

of the most wonderful arrangements in Nature that, in
many species, the female lays her eg^c; in places where
newly born larvae find just the kind of food they require.
The fly lays its eggs on decaying meat, etc., and it is on
these substances that the young larv.ne feed." ^

I cannot see where the difficulty lies, for the fly was
a grub itself once : and has only to remember what it fed
on before it fell asleep and woke up as a fly !

Another instinct is that of amusement. Probably all
animals, if we did but know their habits sufficiently, amuse
themselves in some way or another. It is particularly
noticeable in domesticated animals, especially the young.
It is also very patent in insects, as gnats, flies, butterflies,
etc. But what is very apparent is that each kind of
animal plays in precisely the same manner generation
after generation. We never seem to see any initiative
now, though their games must have originated at some
time. Thus, flies darting backwards and forwards,
pirouetting when they meet, is a familiar instance. Such
is a habit which is now evidently hereditary.

Dogs, cats, and savages as well as mediaeval knights
at " play " mimic fighting. This suggests the probable
origin of that custom ; while the sexual instinct may
account for the "pirouetting" peculiarities of insects.

Birds again afford many curious habits, each kind
amusing themselves after their fashion. Thus the
peculiar custom of constructing and decorating " runs "
of the bower-birds is characteristic of the genus and
an hereditary instinct.

They know exactly what they like and where to put
it. If the bird has placed a brightly coloured object at a
particular spot, and it be intentionally shifted by the

^ Comparative Physiology of the Brain, p, i86.

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 247

owner of the birds (in captivity), it is at once put back
into its place.

Instincts have often been confounded with reflex
actions ; and it is, indeed, not always easy or possible to
differentiate them. A moth flying to a candle has been
called an instinct ; but Prof Loeb shows that it is pro-
bably nothing but a mechanical response to the excite-
ment of light. ^

V. Hartmann would define instinct as " purposeful
action without consciousness ". This definition, however,
would apply equally well to shrinking in one's sleep from
a touch, or a frog trying to remove a drop of acid from
its leg, without a head, or swimming without a brain ;
those being obviously reflex actions.

Darwin's greatest difficulty was the cell-making in-
stinct of worker bees, which can never leave offspring
to inherit the habit.

A very simple theory will explain it. Eimer has
shown that when a female grub, which would become a
worker, is made to become a queen bee, she attains not
all the many points of structure but the physiological
peculiarities of a queen.

In other words, these latter are potentially present in
every female egg the queen lays.

Hence, all that is required to be assumed is that the
ancestral queen used wax to make hexagonal cells and
collected honey and pollen ; but queens have now ceased
to do these things, it having been taken over by the
workers, in whom these traits are hereditary. In the
case of wasps of the genus Vespa, not only do the
workers but the queen still makes hexagonal cells.

My sole object in discussing thus briefly the question

^Comparative Physiology of the Brain, pp. 179-183.

248 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

of instinct is to show that the idea of Natural Selection
having anything to do with it is superfluous.

Leaving animals and coming to man we observe that
all children pass through the various stages of reflex
action, instinct and reason, first in concrete matters, then
finally with abstract ideas.

As an illustration of the first, if one places the fore-
finger across the open palm of a baby's hand, its fingers
at once close upon it, like the tendril of a pea on a stick.
Such an act is simply due to reflex action in consequence
of the stimulus excited by touch.

As an example of childish instinct a little child will
run away from a stranger like any wild animal, through
instinctive fear.

A little girl in a poor cottage was observed nursing a
hearth-brush ; its parents were too poor to buy it a doll —
The " maternal instinct " was there but somewhat mis-
applied !

A child seeing his father going out goes and fetches
his stick. It has automatically reasoned that its father
will want it on his walk. So far its reason is concerned
(like that of all animals) with a concrete matter ; but if it
be old enough, it will reason, still automatically, that its
father will be pleased at its thoughtfulncss. The child is
then entertaining an abstract idea, but it is not conscious
of reasoning it out.

To make my position clearer, and in order to show that
conscious reasoning may pass into unconscious automatic
reasoning, let us suppose a man looks at his watch. It is
11.30 P.M., his usual bed-time. He takes out his watch
key and proceeds deliberately, attentively and consciously
to wind up the watch. At that moment a servant enters
the room, his attention is called to the servant. When
he has gone, he cannot be sure that he wound up his watch

RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 249

or not, and tries it with the key, and finds that it Jias been
wound up.

Hence his hand had automatically done the reasonable
act which his consciousness had previously determined
to do.i

An interesting passage in St. John's Gospel illustrates
three stages of mental perception which may be described,
first as merely a sense-percept ; secondly, where mental
attention is added ; thirdly, an abstract rejiection is super-
added to the previous observations. Casual and attentive
observation are both possible in animals, but the third is
not.

I allude to the account of John and Peter going to the
tomb of our Lord.^ John arriving first, looks in and in
the semi-darkness " sees " the linen cloths " lying ". Peter
enters and " beholds " them as well as the napkin that
was about His head, not lying with the linen cloths, but
"rolled up" in a place by itself, i.e., on the usual head-
rest.

The meaning of this is that the long linen bands with
which a corpse was bound, as referred to in the case of
Lazarus, were still " lying " {Keifxeva ra oOovta) flat on the
stone slab, just as [{ they were still bound round the body
of Jesus, enclosing, it is presumed, the spices, as no
mention is made of them being scattered about. The
napkin too, retains its form (ivTervXiy/xevov) as if it were
wrapped about the head. In a word, t/ie body had dis-
appeared zvitJioiit disturbing the cloths and the napkin.

The disciples leave the tomb, and John, at least, now
not only " sees " or " beholds," but " knows " the meaning
of it all. He realises for the first time (for as yet they
knew not the Scriptures) that the Lord has risen indeed.

^ I have frequently done this myself. ^ John xx. i-io.

250 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Observe the three words used for " seeing ". John
first " sees " (/SXeTret) — i.e., he saw the cloths lying but
they implied nothing peculiar. Peter enters and " be-
holds " (decopet)' — i.e., his attention is aroused by some
strange fact. Lastly, John comes awa}' having " seen
with his mind " (etSe) and understood the meaning of
what he saw.

CHAPTER IV

METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE SENSES

A RATIONALISTIC author says : " We deny that the
senses even occasionally deceive us "} Let him place
his hand in water at 35° F., and then in water of 60°,
when the water will feel decidedly warm ; but if he had
first placed it in very hot water and then transferred it to
water at 60°, this latter temperature would feel quite
cold. " Colour blindness " most certainly does " occasion-
ally deceive us," and hearing sounds is by no means
infallible.

So again he says, " The testimony of the senses is
ultimate and irrefragable truth," ^ and that there is "no
such firm basis in Religion ".

It is easy enough to deceive the senses, not only that
of touch but that of sight. A person looking in a stereo-
scope for the first time would suppose the single object
was one of three dimensions or solid ; whereas he would
find two pictures and both of them flat.

Again, looking at a mask on the hollow surface or
inside, with a strong light upon it, the mask will appear
solid like a face, so that to say the senses are an ultimate
test and irrefragable is scarcely true. One sense must be
corrected if possible by another, but this is not always
practicable.

By reducing psychology to physiology Haeckel would

1 Mr. Balfour's Apologetics, p. 22. "^Op. cit., p. 28,

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252 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

bring all mental and moral phenomena into line with
bodily secretions. But it cannot be done. Worship and
bile are as incompatible as to ask for a gallon of know-
ledge or reduce life to foot-pounds in weight.

So with Religion, it is said we gain nothing by calling
" force " " God ". Names are not of importance : but it
is, to believe in God as a Living Being, whom you, at
least, think you can trust and look to for help in distress
— not for temporal matters, as Rationalists suppose we
only do — but for spiritual help to bear up against the
trials and troubles of this world, the continual source of
wholesome discipline for man's soul. Those who know
what this means, laugh to scorn the impotent wailings of
the Rationalist ; who is continually carping at the so-
called "physical evils of this world (as incompatible with
a " good and merciful God ") because he has not perfect
conditions about him.

The Christian can no more escape from tribulation
than the Materialistic Monist, and, from his point of
view, it would not be the best thing for him if he could.
" No Cross, no Crown " is the Christian's motto ; while
faith leads him to believe that " eye hath not seen,
nor ear heard, nor hath it entered the heart of man to
conceive what God hath prepared for them that love
Him ".

His experience is that it is better to live by faith as
well as, and not only by sight — with the sure and certain
hope of Everlasting Life. Far better and happier and
encouraging than to look forward to annihilation at
death !

The intellectual Rationalist and Haeckelian Monist
may do so philosophically ; but his creed will not help
the untutored masses to be pure in heart and body and
righteous as a "social duty " only. If you have no taste

METAPHYSICS 253

for virtue, why be virtuous at all, as long as you do not
violate the laws of the land?

" If by ' religious truth' be meant the doctrine of the
existence of God and of human immortality, we think it
would be difficult to show that there is any general ' need '
to believe in these things " (Mr. Balfour s Apologetics,
p. 28).

It is easy to say this ; but the whole history of man
belies it. I will contrast two writers on this point. No
one will gainsay that Prof. E. B. Tylor's authority is
practically final : " The assertion that non-religious tribes
have been known in actual existence, though in theory
possible, and perhaps in fact true, does not at present
rest on that sufficient proof which for an exceptional
state of things we are entitled to demand. The evidence
given is often mistaken, and never conclusive." ^

On the other hand, Haeckel, to support his monistic
views, boldly asserts : " It has been absolutely proved by
modern comparative ethnology that many uncivilised
races of the earliest and most primitive stage had no
notion either of immortality or of God "? He mentions
"the Veddahs of Ceylon," "several of the earliest groups
of the nearly related Dravidas," " the Indian Seelongs,"
"some native Australian races," " several of the primitive
branches of the American race in the interior of Brazil,
on the upper Amazon, etc., have no knowledge either of
gods or immortality". I have no means of verifying or
disproving this ; but am inclined to trust Tylor rather
than Haeckel,

It is admitted that the senses are developed by Evolu-
tion. The eye came from a pigment spot. The ear from a
feeble perception of aerial vibrations, etc. The author

'^Primitive Culture. ^ The Riddle of the Universe, p. 196.

254 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

alluded to reminds us that " Helmholtz has shown that
there is a mathematical correspondence between the
atmospheric vibrations which produce exquisite har-
monies and the physical effects of these vibrations on the
nervous system. Thus in all his musical developments
man has done little more than lay bare [and develop ?]
the natural correspondences which exist between himself
and the universe." ^

We all know that a man's " ear for music " can be
cultivated ; that is to say, it responds to the more and
more highly complex musical compositions that it hears.
The "definite action " of the orchestra plays upon the
protoplasm of the ear, which thus responds more and
more to it, thereby building up structures which enable
the man to appreciate " classical " compositions more than
he did at first.

The author is right, as I have already shown, in saying
man can only " lay bare " or reveal the eternal har-
monies of sound waves, which must have existed potenti-
ally ever since air came into existence.

The question arises, Did harmony between certain
notes arise sud sponte in accordance with eternal laws of
vibrations ; but the air which conveys them was not
eternal ; or did some conscious Power have something to
do with it ? Had He any intention in framing the laws
of sound for man's delectation ; as he is the only being
who can discover and reveal them ?

Of course. Nature gives no answer. " Notes " certainly
give pleasure to birds, and possibly to other animals
which cannot sing,^ but they are onl>' sequences of dif-
ferent wave lengths, without the order in which man alone

^Mr. Balfour's Apologetics, p. 76.

^A friend had a mare which became very unmanageable in her stall
when the band played in the street, till she was taken out to hear it.

METAPHYSICS ^55

Can Arrange them. No two birds have ever been known
to sing a duet.

But when we see what intense pleasure music affords
man, from the tom-tom to Handel's " Messiah," we take
it as one of the innumerable coincidences which point
to Intention between the supposed Creator and His
creation.

The same argument applies to the appreciation of
works of art — the " aesthetic sense " from, the primitive
drawings of animal forms on bones by pre-historic man to
the pictures in the National Gallery.

Further, as C. Kingsley thought, we cannot exclude
Fun and Humour from our list of " Intentions". Fun is
abundantly displayed among animals, but humour, wit
and laughter appear to be confined to man. Certainly
it is so when based on abstract ideas. But monkeys seem
to be humorous about concrete things ; as when I saw a
monkey at the Zoo snatch a lady's pocket-handkerchief,
wrap his head up in it and then bound off from perch
to perch.

Man is often spoken of as the only laughing animal.
It mainly arises in consequence of strong incongruities
presented to the sight or imagination ; but why we
should laugh — though it gives us pleasure — is inexplic-
able. Thus, a clergyman had hung a number of pictures
of sacred subjects in his vestry for some time for the in-
struction of his villagers. The village attendant on
coming in after their removal, burst out laughing and
said : " How funny the vestry looks without the pictures ".
Is it possible to explain why one should laugh at any
unaccustomed contrasts? At all events it is -a. natural
law that they somehow cause us amusement. This is
why conundrums hold their ground so tenaciously among
us ; and they are especially " funny " when the abstract

256 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

and concrete are brought violently into contrast ; thus,
to avoid being either too suspicious or too credulous when
attending a spiritualistic seance, you should try to " /ii^
the happy medium ".

With regard to the preceding and all other kinds of
" play of our feelings " the author quoted says : " We
know that any explanation lies within the realm of
physiology"; but physiology and psychology are only
names for co-ordinated observations on the phenomena of
life. What is it which has primarily caused the pheno-
mena which we group under the terms of physiology and
psychology? All the examination of brain and nerves
would never have suggested the results of pleasure and
enjoyment, of wit, fun and laughter and all the aesthetic
pleasures.

The author makes the postulate, "given life and
feeling," then everything else follows. Possibly so ; but
Who first gave the Life and the Feeling ?

We have now seen what a Rationalist has to say about
the senses and God. The Monist Haeckel declares that
there is no God ; while Secularists and Agnostics assert :
" I do not know what you mean by the term. There
may be one but the word God conveys nothing to my
mind " (Bradlaugh).

Now let us turn to a Metaphysician. The latest
exponent of a conception of God is given in a work by
Mr. Herbert Rix.^

He begins by saying that there is " the need of a
Faith " ; a statement which no one will dispute ; and he
recognises enthusiasm, as in art, etc., as worthy of the
name of religion. In this he has followed the late Sir J.
Seeley in his Natural Religion ; but this is jiot what

^ A Dawning Faith, or The World as a Spiritual Organism (1903).

METAPHYSICS 257

ninety-nine people out of a hundred understand by the
term.

" We need rehgious thought and theory ; a view of
the universe as vital and as the expression of a living
Power." ^ This may be thought acceptable in a way ;
but he soon tells us that in his view the " universe is
nothing else than the manifestation of a Living God ".^
One notes the change of terms I have italicised.

He starts to prove this by misusing the word " uni-
verse". "It implies unity, but to most people it is a
' sum-total ' ".3 He thus omits the " — verse" while re-
taining the " uni — ". Prof. Skeat, however, says that the
word means " combined into a whole " ; and that is a
" sum-total" of innumerable differentiated units.

" Faith in a universe obliges you to believe that there
is but one self-existing being. Call it God, call it Matter,
call it Mind . . . there is only One." * So, too, Haeckel
reduces everything to Matter and Force and calls them,
One Substance.

To prove his theory Mr. Rix tells us to suppose a
number of independent realities, as souls. Souls are
finite, such as men, and if existent without bodies, will
still presumably be finite \ but the author suddenly
shifts his ground and adds : " If there are more than one,
they must in some sense or other be mutually exclusive ".^
But this would be characteristic of "'infinite or self-
existent souls," not " souls " as we understand the term,
as signifying independent realities.

He says, then, of " souls," " If they be in space they
are not independent, your beings are not self-existent ".

If we assume them to be human souls — indeed, we
know of no other kind — the consciousness of one soul is

^op.cit.,Y>.i^. -P. 58. 3 p. 33,

^P. 36. 6 0/. «7., p. 38,

17

258 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

independent of the consciousness of another soul ; and
no one supposes human souls to be self-existent.

Consequently, being no metaphysician, I am at a loss
to understand the use of the original supposition of im-
agining what does not exist.

If he means that there cannot be two infinite souls
co-existent in space and time, why not say so, and the
matter is settled ?

He further adds : "Annihilate space and they fall
into identity or nothingness" ; but as it is impossible to
annihilate space even in thought, no finite mind can
foresee what would happen, z/" Diatter be not annihilated
too, of which he makes no mention.

He thus seems to begin with what is finite, quickly
changes it into the infinite, and then imagines what will
happen, if all be swept away, apparently, very like a
conjurer's trick.

Mr. Rix then describes in detail the Conservation of
Energy as reducible to One, and all matter equally so to
a possible single element ; then he fuses matter and
force together and so, Hi presto ! gets his " uni — "
omitting the " — verse ".

In doing this he makes two strange errors : one, that
nitrogen is peculiar to the animal kingdom and that an
"atom" resembles the '^ x" of an algebraical equation
in being "no more a real thing than that". But x has
a very real value, namely, the answer to the equation ;
it only represents it, as long as it is unknown.

" Either Matter or Energy," he says "is, taken by itself,
an abstraction and not a reality." ^ Is there nothing " con-
crete" in the Universe? "Motion apart from matter is,
in fact, unthinkable." But it is perfectly conceivable

' P. 56.

METAPHYSICS 259

as vibrating in ether, and ether is not regarded as
Matter.

Hence Mr. Rix comes to the conclusion of " One
Entity, that of Energised Matter = Universe = God ".

He then discusses the universe as an "organism " and
says there can be unity with diversity. He starts with
the assumption " Nature lives ". . . . " It is all life . . .
nothing is inert, even a stone is not inert." But non-
inertness is not what we understand by " life ". He is
here merging or confounding physical molecular motions
with life. A stone is no^ all alive, as he asserts. To say
so is one thing, but to correlate its internal vibrations
with life in any organism, is quite another matter : and so
he comes to the conclusion that " the Universe which we
call material is in every particle and shred of it alive ".^
It can only be said so, by quite illegitimate abuse of
terms and their meanings. Stones do not grow and
propagate as all animals and plants do, and until Mr.
Rix or other metaphysician can find flints breathing,
digesting or breeding, I, for one, utterly refuse to recognise
molecular vibrations as synonymous with the above
phenomena, characteristic of life.

Haeckel traces " soul " to a protoplasmic cell and
" life " to ether ; but has scarcely reached Mr. Rix's
position.

His next point is " the world you see is not so certain
as the visual sensation itself". ..." Sight is more certain
than the existence of anything that is seen ".^ He says
there is no place for that which we call matter, it is a
phantom and a dream.

But is he right ? How about colour, which is a purely
"visual sensation". Indeed the author disproves his

1 P. 67, he is by no means alone in this idea. 2 p^ g^.

26o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

own statement by confessing to be himself " colour-
blind " !

For, in the first place, how can we have any visual
sensations at all, if there be no objects external to cause
it ? We only see them by aid of the light derived from
them, and light imtst have a source.

But, secondly, the structure of the eye, the optic
nerve and the brain itself, all being composed of matter,
fall under his expression " the world you see," and are
therefore nothing but pJiantoms. How can the " visual
sensations " themselves, which depend entirely on things
which he admits are " uncertain," " phantoms," " dreams "
be more certain than these things themselves ?

Similarly with touch, taste, smell and hearing. They
are all only " feelings ". He says " even in forms (as of a
book) there is nothing but feeling, nothing but mind or
spirit, whichever you like best". "The only thing of
which we have any certainty is spirit."

How Mr. Rix can say this, when his own eyesight
habitually deceives him, is incomprehensible.

But how is it that he can write about " mind " or
"spirit" at all ? If a man had no senses he could have
no "mind". He would be a blank. His mind and
spirit have to thank his senses for their very existence
in a practical sense. He certainly could never be a
metaphysician or realise the Universe as an Organism.
Metaphysics, he tells us, supply the only proof. And
that proof arises by mental concepts, that must be,
therefore, by means of phantom eyes and phantom ears.
How, then, are metaphysicians to be trusted any more
than their bodily senses, upon which they primarily
depend ?

Mr. Rix makes no allusion to the theoretical origin
of matter from vortex-rings of ether ; about which Prof.

METAPHYSICS 261

Dolbear is so far convinced that he says : " It is either
that theory or nothing, there is no other that has any
degree of probability at all "}

If matter be really composed of vortex-rings out of
ether, then it might be called '' etherial " instead of
"material" ; just as we speak of a "copper" because it
is made of copper ; but both words are necessary ; for it
is not usual for us to call any manufactured article by
the name of the material of which it is composed ; but
the very fact of there being any visual perceptions at all
possible, implies something external to the eye, corre-
sponding to these perceptions of the mind. All that
reaches the retina are vibrations, which, the reader
will remember, collectively make a minute inve7'ted
picture on the sensitive membrane of the retina. This
is mysteriously present to consciousness as an erect
picture, not microscopically small, but in full dimensions
of the objective source of light as a landscape.

Defects of structure make the picture sometimes
untrustworthy or mental hallucinations create non-ex-
istent, but apparently true, external objects. But in-
ductive evidence based on sound conditions of eyes,
nerves and brains of the whole human race, furnished
by the widest experience of ourselves and others, establish
the truth of an external world beyond all question ; cor-
responding to what our "visual perceptions" mentally
realise.

As long as a man is a compound being of matter
and mind, not to add a bundle of physical forces, it seems
to one who is no metaphysician somewhat absurd to
confound these two things, and ignore one at the
expense of the other.

^ Op. cit., p. 43 ; see above, Part I., chap. iv.

262 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

As long as they are obviously mutually dependent in
a living being, so must they stand or fall together.

Though Mr. Rix approaches very near to the
" Monistic Religion " of Haeckel, who sees nothing but
" blind and unconscious " matter and force, he tells us,
"There is a Universe and ... it is spiritual, and this
spiritual universe or universal spirit is what we mean by
' God.'^ Is it a Self-conscious Being? "

"In ourselves," he adds, "we all recognise within
the circle of conscious experience two dissimilar kinds of
experience ; which we term psychical and physical, mind
and matter or self and not-self."^

Haeckel, we may remember, unites them, making
psychology a branch of physiology.

" But this distinction fails in the Universe," because,
" if the universe is indeed one, then to that one there
can be no beyond. . . . He [God] is the Universe. . . .
To Him, there is no matter as distinct from mind."^

Now Mr. Rix, as before, so here, overlooks one
phenomenon, and that is ether, which is not matter.
Matter may perhaps be formed out of etherial vortex-
rings, but ether is ether and not matter. As it is the
great vehicle of forces, pervading the universe, inclusive
of all material objects, so God is a Spiritual Energy as
well. Hence, if we may use the term, I repeat, ether
would seem to be " the vehicle of Divine power ".

Still, the question is not yet answered — " Is God a
Person who thinks and loves? " ^ " Of course He can —
He thinks in j'ou, thinks in me and in every thinking
being. Your thought is God's thought. . . . He becomes
the individual and sets that individual thinking."^

An obvious question arises — Why, then, can two

1 o/). cj^, p. 137. '^P. 139- 3 P. 141.

*P. 147. 'P. 149.

METAPHYSICS 263

persons be ever totally at variance in their opinions
upon the same subject ? Why do men tell lies if it be
God who speaks their thoughts ?

I suppose we must discover, if we can, some sort of
answer in Mr. Rix's statement that "the Universal
Spirit has all that we have, but without its imperfections
and its bonds." But if the Universe is God, "all our
imperfections and bonds " must be part of the Universe
as much as all that is perfect and free, and therefore part
of God.

Mr. Rix finally attacks the question of a future life.
He says : " Death absolute, both our scientific creed and
our idealistic philosophy entirely deny".^ Haeckel,
however, says that " immortality is that highest point
of superstition which is regarded as the impregnable
citadel of all mystical and dualistic notions ".^

He first alludes to the decomposition of the body at
death, and its elements passing into other compounds,
but never becoming annihilated. This, of course, is
true; but the "body" is annihilated as much as a
house is destroyed when pulled down and its bricks are
used again for building some other and totally different
structure. Then he argues by analogy, that the soul
follows a similar course. " The individual (like matter)
cannot die absolutely. ... It may lose its present in-
dividuality and mingle with other and diverse individuals ;
but no particle of it can cease to be." ^

If that be true, then the individuality is lost, just as
that of the house or body is at death. It will afford no
satisfaction to know that one's individuality is dissipated,
whether by transmigration or any other sort of trans-
fusion, into some other soul.

1 P. 192. "^ Riddle of the Universe, p. 192. ^ P. 197.

264 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The Other alternative Mr. Rix offers, is for the indi-
vidual " to lose itself in the Universal Soul," and he com-
pares us with buckets of sea-water let down again into
the ocean. " Well ! " he says, " this is the worst that can
happen, this mingling with the infinite."

In conclusion, Mr. Rix makes many statements
which I cannot agree with or refute ; because they
convey no sense to my unmetaphysical comprehension ;
such as : " What we call ' matter ' is only ' soul ' mis-
apprehended " ; " there is no gulf between matter and
mind " ; " matter is but the plane where the mind of God
meets the mind of the creature," etc., etc.

If all this and much more be edifying, instructive or
consoling, I am glad I am not a metaphysician.

I have taken Mr. Rix's book as a type ; for others
write in much the same strain.

CHAPTER V

INDUCTIVE REASONING AND THE FAITH OF THEISTS

Turning now to the consideration of the question
how far Science and Reason are compatible with Faith or
vice versa : I will take Prof Henry Jones' article ^ as a
basis for a short discussion.

Prof. Jones tells us that philosophers and theo-
logians level charges against the ratiocinative use of the
intelligence, especially in regard to the " principles of our
moral and religious life " ; and he speaks of "our failure
to justify the faith that founds our practice, etc. ".

Now is not the controversy between " Science and
Faith," 2 based on a misunderstanding of the term
" Faith " ? What the Church has too often demanded of
the "faithful" is not "faith" but "belief," if not "cre-
dulity ". Prof. Jones quotes Mr. Balfour as saying "the
causes of belief are not Reasons. It is Authority rather
than Reason."

It is well, therefore, to be clear as to what one means
by the terms used. The Century Dictionary says " Faith
is a firm belief based upon confidence in the authority
and veracity of another, rather than upon one's own
knowledge, reason or judgment ". But with the Disciples

1 " The Present Attitude of Reflective Thought towards Religion,
Hibbert jfournal, i., p. 228.

^ The subject of Sir Oliver Lodge's paper in the same journal, i., pp. 46,
209.

(265)

266 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

it was based not solely on our Lord's authority, but on
His whole life, as He stood confessed before them. They
knew Him, they reasoned owX. that He was the Christ ; and
His life was, in Wi€\x judgment, the life every one should
imitate. This was pure inductive reasoning, upon which
they resolved to die for Him if called upon to do so.
The result of their Faith was loyalty to Christ. It was
reasoning, but coupled with personal love ^ and aspira-
tion, though this latter was at the time misdirected.^

First, then, by " Credulity " I mean accepting anything,
merely because somebody has asserted it utterly regard-
less of there being any likelihood of its being true. Thus
are gross superstitions spread ; all reasoning is totally
absent. " Belief" is the acceptance of a statement in the
same way, but there is some show of authority for the
statement. Thus the Creeds are presumably based on
Scripture, but are enforced on the authority of the
Church.

Thirdly, "Faith" is a totally distinct matter. One
of the best descriptions of Faith is given by the late
author of Ecce Homo. It runs as follows : —

" When Christ rejected the test of right conduct which
society uses. He substituted the test of faith. It is to be
understood that this is not strictly a Christian virtue ; it
is the virtue required of one who wishes to become a
Christian. . . . He who, when goodness is impressively
put before him, exhibits an instinctive loyalt}' to it, starts
forward to take its side, trusts himself to it, such a man
has faith, and the root of the matter is in .such a man."^

If we ask why should any man do this, or what
reasons has he for so doing, the answer is that it was

' John xxi. 15-17 ; note, our Lord uses the verb a^aTrS;/ but Peter, <pi\i'kv.

''■ Matt. XX. 20, 21.

'Ecce Homo, chap, vi., on " Christ's Winnowing Fan ".

INDUCTIVE REASON AND FAITH 267

really inductive but nevertheless automatic reasoning,
tinged with the emotions and aspiration of love for
Jesus, evincing itself in perfect loyalty to Him.

When the Apostles said," Lord increase our faith," ^
this request, following our Lord's remarks upon forgive-
ness as often as a man repents, was an outburst of long-
ing to attain to that perfection, which they saw in their
Master, so far above their own powerlessness to forgive.
It was a proof, too, that they saw Jesus was right and
that the thing was possible.

This is but a sample of what Jesus appeared to the
Apostles. They, as we say, instinctively felt, i.e., they
automatically reaso7ied, that His character was perfect,
and that it was their duty to imitate Him. Their faith
was reasonable confidence, based on experience in Him
and intensified by love. The basis of their induction as
to Christ's perfection was the innumerable points of
character and conduct, His manner of speech and teach-
ing. It was, adds Sir J. Seeley, especially "the tem-
perance in the use of supernatural power, the masterpiece
of Christ. . . ." It was " the inimitable unity" in His
Love and Power combined that made Him unique,
indicated by the word fiovo^evi')<i. It was, in fact, the
accumulation of coincidences all conspiring to this one
end, which constituted their inductive reasoning, which
we call " Faith in Jesus Christ ". To say, therefore, that
reason is not to be trusted, is to say that nine-tenths of
man's intelligence is useless. Of course, if the premises
be insufficient or false, then the reasoning based upon
them is false too ; and it is this which throws so much
discredit upon deductive reasoning. Thus Queen Mary
is reported to have said that she could not be doing

^ Luke xvii. 3-5.

268 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

wrong in burning heretics, as God would otherwise do it
in hell.

" Credulity " requires no Thought; neither Head nor
Heart is concerned in it.

" Belief" is based on Head Knowledge only.

" Faith " combines Induction and the emotions of the
Heart as well.

My object in making these remarks is to lead up to
my contention that there need be no hostility between
Science and Faith, Christian Ethics and the three doc-
trines of God, Freedom and Immortality ; for Reason
has the same basis for all, namely Induction.

And, further, as Science looks to find experimental
proof in addition, so does Religion. St. Paul repeatedly
tells his readers " to prove," " themselves," or " what is
good," or "their own work," and lastly he writes to the
Thessalonians : " Prove all things ; hold fast that which
is good ".^

St. James boldly identifies Religion with practical ex-
periment, namely, by maintaining purity in oneself and
showing love towards others.- The knowledge gained
by this practical experiment in ethics confirms the in-
ductive evidence or Faith, and ratifies the promise that
" if any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the
teaching whether it be of God ". ^

By Faith and experiment in holy living man dis-
covers a Natural Law unknown to him before, which is
called " Regeneration". He wants no authority of man
or the Church. He only wants, as Sir J. Seeley said,
" Goodness placed impressively before him," and ex-
periment soon proves that his inductions were sound,
represented by his " P'aith " ; namely, that the Christ-

1 I Thess. V. 21. ''Jas. i. 27. ^John vii. 17.

INDUCTIVE REASON AND FAITH 269

life is the best for him to live, as long as he is on this
earth.

Prof Jones says: "The 'true' derives all its value
from the 'good'. In itself it is an abstraction . . . and
is incapable of satisfying the spiritual needs of man."
Of course it is. No abstraction can possibly do so.
That is just why the preaching of morals will never
regenerate the masses of mankind, as Aristotle said.^
It is just because the 'true' must come down from the
clouds of metaphysics and take a concrete form in a
Person; Who zV— not the "true" but— the "Truth,"
that " Faith " may grasp it as a living principle. The
experiment has been tried. Jesus Christ was, and is
accepted, not as the "true," or as the "good," but solely
on the grounds that He was the living Truth and living
Goodness personified.

Rationalists are repeatedly asking. What is there new
in Christ's teaching? The following is Harnack's reply:
" You ask, ' What was there that was new ? ' The question
is out of place in Monotheistic religion. Ask rather:
' Had what was here proclaimed any strength and any
vigour ? ' I answer : Take the people of Israel and search
the whole history of their religion. Take history gener-
ally, and where will you find any message about God and
the good that was ever so pure and so full of strength —
for purity and strength go together — as we hear and read
of in the Gospels ? . . . Pharisaical teachers had proclaimed
that everything was contained in the injunction to love
God and one's neighbour. They spoke excellently, the
words might have come out of Jesus' mouth. But what
was the result of their language ? That the nation con-
demned the man who took the words seriously. All

^Ethics, book X., chap. ix.

270 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

that they did was weak, and, because weak, harmful.
Words effect nothing : it is the power of the Personality
that stands behind them. But He ' taught as one having
authority and not as the Scribes ', Such was the impres-
sion of Him which His disciples received. His words
became to them ' the words of life,' seeds which sprang
up and bore fruit. That was what was new."^

Prof. Jones says : " Truth is not an end but only
means ". This does not seem to have been St. Paul's
idea. " I count all things to be loss for the excellency of
the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord ; " ^ who was
the Truth. What he meant was that he longed to arrive
at, and embody in himself to the full, the " Truth " or the
Perfect Character and Conduct, as represented in Jesus
Christ. That was the " end " of his aims.

Nor am disposed to admit that " even Natural
Science now acknowledges that its province is limited
and that within that province itself its premises are
assumptions and its conclusions only proximately valid ".
It is certainly limited by the number of known animals
and plants and objects of the inorganic world ; and as
investigations proceed, assumptions are of course neces-
sary as " working hypotheses " ; but a vast number of
conclusions are perfectly valid. The Doctrine of Evolu-
tion, for instance, has long passed out of the stage of an
hypothesis, and any alternative is now unthinkable.
"Darwinism," on the other hand, or the theory of the
" Origin of Species dy means of Natural Selection" was a
pure assumption and based on errors ; as I have shown
above. J^hysics are a branch of Natural Science, and
our knowledge of the laws of physical forces is valid ;
and with regard to biology and physiology, which Mr.

1 What i% Christianity ? p. 48. « Phil. iii. 8.

INDUCTIVE REASON AND FAITH 271

James calls "supra-physical," and says they "lack the
demonstrative security of the mathematical and physical
sciences," he seems to completely ignore the process of
induction, upon which the laws of living beings are
based. New truths, t'.e., facts, are added to our know-
ledge every day. Formerly plagues and zymotic diseases
were thought, on a priori grounds, i.e., deductive reason-
ing on insecure data, to be visitations of Providence. We
now know that they are due to microbes and insanitary
conditions; and if natural science has not the" predictive
power of mathematics," it is a pretty safe conclusion that
if vaccination ceased the small-pox would flourish.

Inductive evidence is practically equivalent to a
Demonstration. Prof. Jones admits that " the age of
Faith in natural science is also an age which believes in
God ". Whence arises that faith in science, if it be not
itself inductive proof?

Apart from growing Rationalism, this may be true ;
but the growing Ritualism indicates a degeneracy from
faith, through belief to credulity. But if there is a faith
in natural science, it is simply because inductive reason-
ing is regarded as conclusive. Even in the exact sciences
it is present. We interpret all the physical phenomena
of the rocks seen in the various strata deposited through
geological ages of the past by induction alone.

Prof. Jones seems to me to ignore inductive evidence
when he says : " We do not seem to have the necessary
data for dealing with God, freedom and immortality".
" Reflective men are not able to give a reason for their
faith."

With regard to the first, Evolution has greatly
strengthened Paley's argument, which is mainly con-
cerned with biological facts, while the moral argument
is as strong as ever or stronger.

272 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

If omnipotence be regarded as an attribute of God ;
then we can see it practically conferred on protoplasm.

To judge by the past and present, it is not too much
to say, Given but a single speck of living protoplasm
together with its nucleus, nothing more is wanted, from
which the whole of the animal kingdom, including man,
and the vegetable also, past, present and future, has
been, is being and will be evolved.

The " creative capacity " of protoplasm is practically
infinite. It has perpetually evolved structures with all
the appearances of design. Hence the belief in God as
the First Cause behind the veil of the Living World is
based on inductive evidence of a very high order indeed.^

With regard to Freedom and Immortality, these will
form the subject-matter of other chapters.

The matters dealt with in this chapter are most ably
discussed by the late Auguste Sabatier in his Religions
of Authority and The Religion of the Spirit (Rook iii.,
chap, iv.), Williams & Norgate. The reader might also
profitably consult Pfleiderer's Evolution and Theology
and other essays (A. & C. Black), especially No. ix.,
"Is Morality without Religion Possible or Desirable?"
In this he points out both the untenability as well as
the impossibility of such ethics as Secularists and
Rationalists profess being accepted permanently by the
masses without any religious sanction.

' I make no apology for repeating this and other arguments for em-
phasis sake; as a friend says " You would make Theism stand or fall by
Darwinism". It stands on a far wider basis than Adaptation ; but I am
not concerned at present with other lines of induction.

CHAPTER VI

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM

It will now be as well to say a few more words on Voli-
tion, or Free Will as it has been called, for some mis-
understanding appears in the writings of Rationalists.
They deny it altogether, because they say it is regarded
as being " free " from all " motives " and " circumstances ".

If such be thought to be the condition of Free Will,
nothing is more absurd.

The will cannot be in evidence at all, unless some
circumstances call forth its exercise. There must be, at
least, two courses of action, or the possibility of doing or
abstaining from doing something. Moreover, there must
be some motive for one or the other course of action.
A man's will is only " free," in my estimation, in that
his volitional actions are not automatic.

A dog may have two objects before it, say a plate of
meat and to go for a run with its owner. It automatic-
ally leaves the plate and obeys the whistle, solely because
the latter acts automatically upon him as the more
powerful stimulus at the moment.

Another dog will run after a fowl and kill it if it can
catch it ; all the whistling in the world may not stop it ;
for the fowl is a greater attraction than the whistle.

But suppose a man has a chance of making money by
cheating another under certain circumstances. He is
i8 (273)

274 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

conscious of the power to choose. It is this consciousness
(being an abstraction) of which a dog knows nothing.

The man then balances in his mind abstract motives
and probable consequences, the sense of right and wrong,
the influence upon character, etc., etc. He then ment-
ally returns to the choice and finally sacrifices the desire
for illicit gain and refuses to cheat the man.

The word " free " may not be a good adjective for
will ; but all it means, as I, at least, understand it, is that
man is conscious that he can deliberately choose ; whereas
a dog is bound by determinism and is therefore not
"free" at all.

Both man and dog are finally guided by the strongest
motive ; but in different ways, viz., by Volition and Auto-
matism, respectively.

Let us suppose, as another illustration, that a man
drives up to a door and leaves his horse and carriage
outside the house, for he knows the horse will remain
there. After a time the horse gets impatient and paws
the ground as a sign it wants to be off; but it cannot
move. Why does it not go off on its own account ?
Solely because it is an automaton and cannot realise that
it has the power to go ; nor has it the will to move, how-
ever much it may have the wisJi to do so.

The late Dr. W. B. Carpenter has developed this
subject admirably in his Mental Physiology, wherein he
says : " The Power of the Will is exerted in the pur-
posive selection (from among those objects o^ consciousness,
which Sensations from without and the working of the
internal Mechanism of Thought and Feeling within,
bring before the Ego) of that which shall be determinately
followed up. This state is what is termed Attention.

" It is solely by the Volitional direction of the Attention,
that the Will exerts its domination.

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 275

" It is in virtue of the Will that we are not mere think-
ing Automata, mere puppets to be pulled by suggesting-
strings capable of being played-upon by every one who
shall have made himself master of our springs of action " }

Since the above-mentioned book was published, I
find Locke, Schopenhauer and other writers have enter-
tained the same idea. Thus the German philosopher,
writing on Reason, says : " It has always been understood
to mean the possession of general, abstract non-intuitive
ideas, named concepts, which are denoted and fixed by
means of words. This faculty alone it is which in reality
gives to men their advantage over animals."^

As an illustration of what I call " automatic reasoning,"
I should regard tactfulness. Some people have, as we
say, " great tact," in others it is often conspicuous by its
absence. The former seem to do or say just the right
thing at the right moment ; the latter generally do the
wrong one. Why is this? Neither have time deliber-
ately to think out the situation, and choose the wisest
words or best thing to be said or done on the spur of the
moment. The spontaneity of tact is its charm.

In the one person the mental qualification is present,
in the other the brain is lacking something. Such a
tactless person is one of whom it is sometimes said that
" he has not two ideas in his head," i.e., consecutive ones.
He blurts out his first thought.

In a tactful person, the same thought might arise, but
it is instantly and spontaneously checked by a following
tactful alternative ; so that the thought may occur to the
tactless man afterwards, when he sees the result of his ob-
servation, " what a fool I was to say that " ; but he could
not help it, for his volition was not equal to the occasion.

* P. 258. ' The Basis of Morality, p. 71.

276 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Mr. Mallock in writing upon " the seemingly absolute
dependence of mental conditions on physical," alludes to
the deterioration or absence of the will in certain cerebral
diseases as a proof of such dependence. He says : " Since
the brain is shown to control the will in those very
domains of conduct in which freedom is most vehemently
claimeJ for it, to suppose that the will is a separate and
independent force which imposes its orders on the organ-
ism of which it shows itself so frequently to be the slave,
is to indulge in a supposition for which science not only
affords no evidence, but which all the evidence collected
by science contradicts "}

It is an axiom now that all the mental phenomena,
whether ot man or animals and the physical basis of the
brain are intimately connected, and can mutually influ-
ence one another. Thus a tendency arising from some
abnormal cell-development can be suppressed by the
will, as that for drink, too often hereditary ; then the
abnormality after a time ceases to have the same power-
ful effect on the inclinations. Similarly, in a healthy
brain, study will affect the molecular structure of the
brain itself, the corresponding section was perhaps feebly
developed, physically ; but it will become strengthened
in response to mental efforts determined by the will.

Hence, as to the question of the brain determining
the will under w^r;«rt/ conditions of health, the very fact
that Mr. Mallock has to appeal to diseased conditions
for his evidence — when a man is an idiot, mad or a con-
firmed drunkard, etc., and has no will at all ; but is
simply an automaton — is pretty conclusive that it is not
so under normal conditions of health. It is not the
" will " which becomes the " slave " ; for the man's will is

^ Religion as a Credible Doctrine, pp. 141, 142.

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 277

in abeyance; he "lets himself po" and merely follows
the automatic impulses of his brain.

Ph}-siologists have done much to localise sections of
the brain as controlling various actions of the body, and
thus undoubtedly are they also the physical bases of
many traits of character which are often hereditary.

Now this is absolutely necessary with animals. Thus,
for example, if one is attacked by another, it should
have combativeness and courage. These traits are at
once automatically called out by the onslaught of its
enemy.

Again, animals are automaticall\' impelled by the
sexual instinct (based on the cerebellum) at certain
periods.

In graminivorous animals the fighting instinct has
degenerated ; anger and courage are more or less confined
to the males. Timidity is developed instead, and has
induced them to crowd together, not for any altruistic
or mutual aid ; but for self-interest and self-protection ;
as the chance of being caught by a carnivorous enemy is
greatly reduced for each individual.

Dr. F, Galton observed in South Africa that if a
particularly timid individual happened to find itself at
some distance from the herd, it rushed back, and was
not satisfied until it had " bathed itself" in the midst of
the others.

It is admittedly true according to many persons that
fixed regions of the brain of man are correlated with
traits of character as well as necessary bodily actions.

But the difference between Man and Animals is that
while these traits are entirely automatic in animals —
certain traits for example are peculiar to certain breeds
of dogs, respectively — in man they would also be so
precisely as in animals if he had no self-consciousness ; so

278 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

that he alone can, so to say, look in upon himself, make
each trait of his character an object of thought and dis-
cuss with himself their effects as being good or bad, as
he is conscious of their relative powers and effects. He
then regulates their automatic action by volition.

This consciousness may have a definite tract to itself — but
it is not known where — and when that section is abnormal
or diseased, the man becomes an automaton like an
animal, his volition or will being arrested.

In health, however, it is the will which controls the
automatism of the brain and makes him a moral being.

Huxley was the great champion for automatism in
man ; and no one can deny that he brought a formidable
array of argument to prove that he is — but not entirely
— an automaton.

Huxley argued on the grounds of human and com-
parative physiology, from his evolutionary history and
from the remarkable case of a French sergeant who had
been shot in the head and recovered. In his normal
state he was perfectly sane and a moral man ; but he
had fits of abnormality when he would make cigarettes
of shavings, etc., and steal everything he could lay his
hands upon.

Now, the immediate inference from this case is that
men are not altogether automata, if they only become
such when suffering from brain lesions, when volition is
wanting or is in abeyance ; as in the case of the criminal
here mentioned ; for the following is a good illustration
of the difference between Automatism and Free Will. It
was presented to the judge trying a man for snatching a
scarf pin from an carl.

The prisoner handed in the following extraordinary
document : " My Lord, — Before passing sentence, I think
it but justice to myself that I should honestly and sin-

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 279

cerely tell you what motives led me to commit the crime.
In the first place, I candidly admit that the robbery was
deliberately planned. I saw the Earl go into a shop,
but I waited till he came out. I had time to reflect on
the crime and its consequences, but the devil was too
strong for me. I felt reckless with the recklessness of
despair. I snatched the pin and made off, but an un-
known irresistible power made me turn back and walk
into the gentleman's arms (laughter). In the whole
course of sixteen years of crime and infamy I have never
felt so unutterably miserable and so hopelessly cast
down. . . . My lord, the desire within me to commit a
theft is great, but believe me to be sincere when I tell
you that sorrow and remorse are not strangers to me.
How often the thought has flit across my mind that if I
only had the will and determination to reform and amend
my life I would brighten the last days of my old parents.
I would be good, but evil is strong within me. Many
and many a time, when coming out of prison, I have
formed good resolutions for amendment of my life. I
have tried over and over again to get an honest living,
but always failed for want of a helping hand."

But if my position be granted that when the brain
had reached a stage of development, beyond that of all
other animals, it permitted man to reason abstractedly —
so that he alone, it might be added, can be a meta-
physician— we obtain the clue to what is called " Free
Will," but which I should recognise simply as the con-
sciousness of the power to choose, whether they be concrete
objects or abstract motives, presented to the mind.

Besides Huxley, we find by their writings that the
Haeckelian Monists or Materialists, all deny the Freedom
of the Will in Man.

It is as well to consider therefore the untenableness

28o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

of their position. It seems based upon the idea of the
inevitable actions of natural law and the obvious auto-
matism in the greater part of man's behaviour.

But no one will deny that man is answerable to law
for his actions, vis., civil laws of his country and the
moral laws of religion. If he break the former he is
guilty and is punished by the Court. If he break the
latter he sins and has to answer to his God.

Now, insane people often do those things which in a
sane man would make him guilty or a sinner. We do
not recognise them to be so. Similarly, animals often
do what look like guilty acts ; as when a horse viciously
kicks his master and lames or kills him ; or a dog which
bites a man. We may muzzle it, but we do not punish
it.

It is, therefore, quite clear, and the reader could easily
multiply similar cases, that our universal practice is to
regard animals much in the same light as the insane, so
far at least as that " they are not responsible for their
actions ". What do we mean by that expression ?

What is that something which is equally wanting
in the insane man and in animals ? We never consider
a horse or a dog to be a morally responsible being.
Why has common consent established this distinction in
practice in the treatment of the insane and animals alike ?
The underlying cause of the difference is the wmit of
a consciousness of volition.

The term " Free " seems to have misled some writers.
They regard it, I repeat, as meaning " free from motives "
and " free from circumstances ". Thus the writer referred
to says : " The most ardent advocate of Free Will would
be annoyed if he were told that his choice was undeter-
mined by reasons and motives. ... A man's choice is
wholly determined by circumstances and motives, over

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 281

which he has no control."^ The author here begs the
question, and leaves out of sight the man's consciousness
of the motives and the consciousness of the power to choose
one of two or more courses. If he would recognise the
fact that man can select his own reasons and motives for
doing one thing rather than another, he would see that
it is just that wherein his " freedom " comes in.

On the other hand, no animal has this consciousness
of the power to reflect upon courses of action ; but simply
rushes blindly to the strongest motive of the moment
which appeals to his senses. Such is pure automatism,
which makes all the difference between man and animals.
The former alone has volition.

To give an example of human automatism. The
late Prof Adam Sedgwick was apt to be very " absent-
minded". One day he was walking up and down his
room, thinking perhaps of the Silurian strata with his
mind in Wales. Every time he approached the fireplace
he rang the bell. Again and again the servant came ;
for he said he had not rung it ; but at last he noticed
that the cord was still oscillating. The fact was the
sight of the bell-rope automatically suggested to his
brain the act of pulling. His volition was in abeyance
during his reverie. It was a purely automatic action,
there being no attention, as Dr. Carpenter says, or con-
sciousness present. We thus see that precisely the same
act may be done under two totally distinct states of the
mind. On the occasion mentioned Sedgwick was for
the time a pure automaton.

But suppose he wanted his servant at half-past one
o'clock. He would go to the bell to ring it, but suddenly
remembering that his servant might be at his dinner, he

1 Mr. Balfour's Apologetics, p. 56.

282 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

hesitates. Herein steps in a new element that is the
conscioiiS7iess of choice. And abstract reasoning deters
him.

A Determinist would say that he was just as much
restrained automatically as when he rang the bell auto-
matically. It is perfectly true that he had a motive for
not ringing the bell ; and that motive was based on
circumstances ; but his attention was awakened, and he
would be perfectly conscious of the choice before him.
And that is all, as I understand it, that is meant by
Free Will.

I will now make some quotations from Mr. Mallock's
Religion as a Credible Doctrine^ wherein he states the
case of the Determinist, and see where he appears to me
to be wrong.

" The act of will, as known to us by our own experi-
ence, is an act which invariably is determined by the
strongest motive ; and motive, again, is determined by
two things — the talents and temperament with which an
individual is endowed at his birth, and the circumstances
by which, from his birth onward, he is surrounded." ^

He would thus reduce Volition to Automatism ; but
the reader will have seen that an act is precisely the
same whether it be done unconsciously or done with
attention frnd co?isciously, as in pulling the bell-rope.

In the latter case Will or Volition is present ; in the
former it is in abeyance. As soon as Attention and
Consciousness of the power to choose come into the
mind. Volition decides the act.

The story of the ass placed between two bundles of
hay and starving because both were equally tempting is
grotesque, but theoretically true — for an ass ; because it

^ P. go.

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 283

is an automaton. Practically, the slightest turn of the
head would be sufficient to save his life, for it would
attack the bundle then seen.

But put a tempting dish of oysters as well as some
other equally tempting before a man. He might reflect
upon the possibility of the oysters being contaminated
and the consequent probability of some " illness " (an
abstract idea) accruing. His attention, conscious con-
centration of thought, are awakened. Abstract motives
enter his brain. He is fully alive to the importance of
exercising a prudent course of action ; and thus Volition
decides the choice.

Besides our natal characteristics Mr. Mallock adds :
" As surely as our characters determine our will and our
brains determine our character, so do our physiological
antecedents determine the idiosyncrasies of our brain ".^

But we are not altogether and entirely so auto-
matic as all that ; though nine-tenths of all we do is
probably done automatically. Consciousness saves the
situation.

It is quite true that a man known to be thoroughly
honest is certain to act honestly next week ; but we do
not know what contests he went through, what resolu-
tions his will had made, before he became the man we
know him as " automatically honest ".

A man grows up it may be with certain inherited
qualifications (as drunkard's children are often predis-
posed to drink) but he was not born with his environment.
He grows up to be a man, and goes into business ;
temptations to dishonesty surround him. He sees others
dishonest and thriving accordingly ; but he fights the
inducements to go wrong. If he were solely an auto-

'^Op. cit., pp. 93, 94.

284 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

maton he would yield ; but he gets the mastery by his
Volition, and so acquires the character and the reputation
for honesty. All through the struggle there was the
consciousness of the power to choose. The abstract ideas
of " honour," "honesty" are continually forcing them-
selves upon his attention. All this and much more may
form motives, before he has deliberately " made up his
mind " to be always honest.

Something like this appears to have been the process
our Lord's mind went through in His temptation in the
wilderness. " This," writes Sir John Seeley, the late
author of Ecce Homo, " was the excitement of His mind
which was caused by the nascent consciousness of super-
natural power." ..." He is awe-struck rather than
elated by His new gifts ; He declines to use for His own
convenience what He regards as a sacred deposit com-
mitted to Him for the good of others. In His extreme
need He prefers to suffer rather than to help Himself from
resources which He conceives placed in His hands in
trust for the kingdom of God. Did ever inventor or
poet dare to picture to himself a self-denial like this ?
The chief point in His temptations was to use force (as
was expected of the Messiah of the Jews) in the establish-
ment of His kingdom."

No one can read that wonderful " Temptation in the
Wilderness " and regard it merely as a piece of automat-
ism on the part of Christ. Attention, concentration of
mind, powerful, abstract motives, circumstances. Con-
scious Power of Choice, firm deliberation and final issue,
all conspire to illustrate one of the most powerful displays
of Volition that the world has ever heard of.

Mr. Mallock says : " Any act which we consciously
will to perform and do not perform automatically, or
under presence of physical coercion, we perform and will

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 285

to perform because our nature is such that we look on
the results of such an act as desirable "}

The latter part of this sentence seems to refute the
first, for if " our nature " is the mainspring of the action,
then what we have done z's performed " automatically " ;
though his expression : " Any act which we consciously
will " removes it from automatism. And he further
concludes : " The bondage of our wills, in every act
of willing, to the sole desire, or the strongest desire of
the moment is absolute, necessary, invariable. It admits
of exceptions no more than does the law of gravitation
itself." 2

But there is no " bondage " in a conscious choice of
motives ; the bondage comes in when you have not the
power to choose and are unconsciously bound by the ex-
ternal and strongest motive; when your will is wanting
or too weak to protest ; and you allow yourself to be
an automaton, as the criminal described above.

A hypnotised person when told to clap his hands
will go on doing it until the hypnotiser stops him. I
have witnessed this ; and the performer's attention being
elsewhere directed, the man fell exhausted under the
table but could not cease clapping his hands. He was
then an automaton, pure and simple. On the other
hand the hypnotiser, when his attention was drawn to
him, and was conscious of the possible harmful effect,
at once brought his volition to hear and un-hypnotised
the man.

Mr. Mallock^ refers to a work by Dr. Ward, in which
that author says that desire is of two kinds. He calls
one " spontaneous impulse," the other he calls " resolve ".
These are only other phrases for " Automatism " and

^O^. cif., pp. 96, 97. "^Op. cit., p. loi. ^Op. cit., p. 106.

286 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

" Free Will " ; and Mr. Mallock in combating it falls into
the error of supposing " freedom " means " irrespective
of circumstances ".

It is here where, as it seems to me, lies the funda-
mental error ; namely, in assuming that because the word
" free " is attached to " will," that it must mean " free from
motives and independent of circumstances ".

It is only by the circumstances that the attention is
aroused. Then follows the consciousness of the power to
choose and the mind enters upon a train of abstract
reasoning about motives, etc., which finally settle the
question of Volition.

Mr. Mallock may well ask : " How is it possible that
the desire which we call resolve can arise independently
of the circumstances ? "

I should not make " resolve " a synonym for " desire,"
but the final result of a mental procedure of which
"desire" was the first term. For we may put the two
alternatives thus. Some circumstance occurs which
raises a desire. We may follow it blindly, i.e., auto-
matically, without making any resolve at all.

Or, we may reflect upon the consequences of pur-
suing that desire and then make a resolve not to
follow it up. In that case it has passed under the
Volition.

Is not the Determinist, then, misled by the term
"Free"? Whoever first suggested it, could not have
thoroughly grasped the real conditions of the "will ". I
repeat that the very same act may be done, on the one
hand, automatically ; or, on the other, with the attention
and conscious intention. In the first case Volition is in
abeyance, in the second it is present.

There are thus two very distinct conditions ; and
the Determinist has no right to confuse them as one.

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 287

I will take one more illustration from Mr. Mallock's
book.^

"In reality, so far as reason and observation can guide
us, the one is the result of circumstances no less than the
other ; both are equally mechanical ; and if resolve
differs from spontaneous impulse at all, it differs only
as a donkey engine differs from the main machinery of
a locomotive with parts of which it now and then puts
itself into gear."

But a donkey engine is of the same nature as a loco-
motive ; both work automatically as soon as an impulse
has been received from without; they both illustrate the
unconsciousness of human automatic actions.

But neither of them can represent the presence of ^Z-
tention or of a Consciousness of the power to choose ; or
the mental, abstract deliberations undergone by what we
call Volition.

Automatism may be considered as having different
degrees, according to the amount in the wa?it of attention,
and when there is none.

The extreme condition is that of the hypnotised
person clapping his hands or one in reverie like Prof.
Sedgwick ringing the bell quite unknowingly. In both
cases the acts are done through suggestion.

But it often happens that we do things, while thinking
of something else, but do not altogether lose sight of what
we are doing ; as in eating one's dinner and talking to one's
neighbour simultaneously. One remains still conscious
of the plate of food, but the process not requiring special
attention, the eyes and the hands do their work almost
entirely on their own account, and the teeth follow suit.

Similarly a whole page of a book may be read aloud,

1 Of. cit., p. 115.

288 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the correct modulations of the voice according to the
sense being given ; yet the mind may have wandered
away and be thinking of something else ; and the reader
at the end may not have the slightest idea of what he
has been reading about. I have often done this myself.

I have repeatedly wound up my watch while going
upstairs to bed ; but on reaching my bedroom could not
say whether I had done it or not, and had to try the key
to find out.

On the other hand, as an illustration of Attention and
Volition, Dr. Carpenter alludes to a person learning to
play the piano. At first great attention has to be paid
both to the notes and fingers. These are compelled by
volition to go down on to the right keys. But a practised
musician has been known to play waltz after waltz when
actually asleep. All the dancers had to do was to begin
another tune when a change was wanted, and the sugges-
tion was automatically followed up by the sleeper.^

To illustrate these stages, Dr. W. B. Carpenter
distinguishes the automatic cough as arising from some
irritation in the throat. This may take place in sleep
with unconsciousness ; or when we are awake, with con-
sciousness. He compares this with the volitional cough ;
when an audience intentionally cough to interrupt a prosy
speaker. But even this, as it seems to me, need not be
volitional ; the inducement to stop the speaker sugi^^ests
to the brain to cough, and the cough automatically
follows.

But suppose one of the audience says to another,
"Don't cough, it's rude, and he is doing his best" ; then
volition wakes up, the man hesitates, and finally deliber-
ately suppresses the rising cough.

' Dr. Carpenter told me of this incident which he had received from a
correspondent after reading his book.

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 289

The controversy between the Determinists and
VoHtionists is interminable. Why is it confined to man
alone ? No allusion is ever made to free will in animals,
yet if man has it not, why is he not classed entirely with
them ; as he would be a pure automaton. But let that
pass.

The matter is put thus : — ^

" There is no effect without an antecedent cause." —
Granted.

" What then of the human will ; does it act without a
cause ? " — Certainly not.

" Does it cause itself? " — Certainly not.

" Is the will merely the result of forces — namely de-
sires [or motives] ? " — Yes, the strongest motive prevails.

" Consequently the action follows the strongest in-
clination, i.e., the man yields to the most powerful
influence?" — Yes, certainly.

And so the Determinist claims the victory!

But he has overlooked the most important element
of Consciousness in the process of a deliberate selection of
motives suggested by the circumstances.

Precisely the same act may be done when the man
is automatically impelled by the strongest motive, just as
when the elements of mental attention, consciousness and
deliberation are present.

Take the case described by Mr. Forester. He says :
" A man with a liking for spirits deliberates [but to
' deliberate ' at once destroys determinism] as to whether
he shall drink a glass of brandy. He has been told by
his doctor not to drink brandy. He thinks it will pro-
bably do him harm [here we have abstract reflection^ and
may be a downward step in a course which will ultimately

1 See The Faith of an Agnostic, by G. Forester, chap, xii., " Some Old
Riddles ",

19

ago PkESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

be his ruin [here motives begin to appear]. He has a
strong desire to avoid such evils. On the other hand,
he has a physical craving, a strong desire to drink the
brandy [here he is conscious of choice ; and of the power
to choose\ According as the one or the other of these
desires prevail, so must he act." ^ Precisely so ; but the
presence of consciousness makes all the difference between
acting "deliberately," as Mr. Forester admits, and acting
"automatically" where there is no "consciousness of
choice," but merely involuntary impulse ; as that which
impels an habitual drunkard, who seizes the glass and
drinks it ; having allowed himself by degrees to be
automatically impelled by the very sight of liquor.

To continue arguing against the volitionist, by saying
the will acts without a motive or free from circumstances
seems to be absurd and useless.

No act can possibly be done without them. You
cannot be angry " without a cause " } But you can
allow your temper to rise in the heart without suppressing
it, and give vent to angry words and deeds. Or, on the
other hand you can restrain the impulse and show no
outward signs.

Something or some one gave occasion for your angry
feelings to assert themselves within you. That was the
" circumstance ". You had abstract reasons for thinking
it was wrong to give way to angry passions. There was
the " motive ". You were conscious of the choice, and by
an effort of will restrained yourself.

A dog camiot do this. Being a pure automaton, his
exhibition of temper is in exact proportion to the in-
ternal excitement which has been aroused in him,

Man alone can be conscious of the power to restrain

1 op. cit., pp. 265 et seq.

2 These words are struck out of the revised version (Matt. v. 22).

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 291

himself, or else to give vent to his passions ; and ^/^ai
makes just all the difference between Volition and
Automatism ; between morality and immorality in man
and the non-morality of an animal.

The difficulty in which a Determinist is landed by
trying to reconcile moral responsibility with automatic
response to influences is well seen in Huxley's conten-
tion : —

" A man's moral responsibility for his acts has nothing
to do with the causation of these acts, but depends on
the frame of mind which accompanies them ". Mr.
Forester, who quotes this, well observes that " the ' frame
of mind ' is, like other things, the effect of antecedent
causes ; and how is it alleged that one is morally re-
sponsible for such causes or their effects ? "

It is sometimes asserted by Determinists in proof of
his complete automatism, and that the will is not really
" free," if one knew a man's character, one could foretell
what his actions would be under every circumstance.

This is only partially true. Take, for example, ex-
treme cases. It is perfectly certain that a habitual
drunkard will drink a glass of spirits if offered to him.
It is equally certain that a thoroughly honest man will
not take a bribe. But with nine-tenths of mankind, it is
quite uncertain how a man will behave under certain
previously untried circumstances ; and it is not until the
critical moment arises, that the very question of Free Will
may come in at all (see below, p. 323).

Determinists argue as if man was altogether auto-
matic. Nine-tenths of his daily routine may be ; but
there is the fact of our not being able to foresee which of
two choices — both equally moral or non-moral, both
equally useful or equally anything else, as far as an out-
sider could judge — the man will decide upon ; inasmuch

292 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

as zve cannot follow the abstract reasoning in his mind,
which supplies him with the final motive for choice.

All this is common experience, and the two extremes
prove it; because the drunkard has "let himself go".
He has allowed the law in his body to get the upper
hand ; and has not willed the law of his mind to contest
the lust for drink. He has become a complete automaton.
What volition he had is practically gone.

On the other hand, the true Christian has overruled
the law of his body. He has acquired such an ascendency
over his inclinations to evil, so that he too has also become
an automaton ; but for goodness ; such is now habitual to
him, and all inclination for wrong-doing has gone. He
will now certainly act righteously when a choice is pre-
sented to him.

He has become a " natural law " for good unto
himself, as the drunkard has become a natural law to
himself for drunkenness, though they stand at the very
opposite poles of conduct.

I think we may also see how Altruism could now
arise from abstract reflection. We start from parental
affection in animals, and the automatic care for offspring,
till they become independent ; but rarely longer ; for
although it is said that weak animals, as Ccrvida, Bovidce,
etc., herd together for mutual aid ; yet if one is sick the
others worry it to death ; or if a wolf of a hunting pack be
shot, the others fall upon it as prey. These facts show
that there is more self-interest than altruism in herding.

But when we come to man, who can entertain ab-
stract reflections about other men as well as himself, his
first altruistic idea would probably be " do not do to
others what you do not wish them to do to yourself".

This is the primitive and purely negative law, ex-
emplified in the old Jewish morality.

FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 293

The next stage appears to be that of the Greek
philosophers — to do good to blood relations. Thus a
speaker in the Republic of Plato defines " Justice " as
doing as much good as one can to one's friend and as
much harm as possible to one's enemy.

In both stages foreigner and enemy were identical,
as seen by the words e/c^po? and hostis.

Christ's " new commandment " was " Love your
enemies ". The word for " personal love " in Greek was
(fyiXla ; but it was Christ who converted it into an " Enthu-
siasm for Humanity," and He sanctified the word 'AyaTrrj.

Agape \s philia spiritualised.

CHAPTER VII

THE ETHICS OF RATIONALISM AND CHRISTIANITY

With regard to ethics and their origin, Haeckel regards
psychology as a branch of physiology, and invents a
form of protoplasm which he calls " neuroplasm " or
nerve-plasm, as the organic source of it.

The author of Mr. Balfour s Apologetics does not
touch upon this physical origin of ethics, but remarks
that, " The human heart has a deep reverence for justice,
love and mercy — a reverence which in higher natures is
instinctive, and which has been engendered in the whole
race, in varying degrees of strength, by millions of years
of family and social life." ^

The following are passages dealing with ethics : —

(i) "If Rationalism may be said to include a religion
at all, one half of it at least consists of ethical truths and
ideals, and no impartial observer would deny that leading
Rationalists have been distinguished by an intense devo-
tion, both in conduct and in precept, to the great moral
principles which embody the highest wisdom and the
loftiest aspirations of the race." ^

(2) " The moral law has grown out of the needs of
man, and springs from the human heart. That man
should do justice, love mercy, speak truth, and help his
needy and suffering fellows, are injunctions which are

' 0/. c»/., p. 29. ""Ibid.

(294)

ETHICS 295

valid, binding and beautiful, because, if they are set at
naught, human society becomes impossible."^

(3) " However men may differ as to the origin of
morality, they tacitly unite in subjecting all ethical
maxims to the test of practice, and in judging them by
the standard of results." ^

(4) " It is the struggle for existence which gives these
things all their force and meaning, and which alone
makes possible the existence of vice and virtue." ^

(5) "By 'holiness' we mean high moral character,
and affirming that morality could be developed only
under such chequered conditions as this world affords,
we hold that altruism or holiness loses none of its beauty
when we discover that its origin may be found in the
instinctive yearnings of lowly parent organisms towards
their helpless offspring, and that it forms part of the
machinery of natural selection which aims at the pre-
servation and elevation of the race." ^

(6) " The ages of faith were ages of ignorance, im-
morality and crime. The growth of civilisation is de-
pendent upon the growth and spread of Rationalism ; and
few persons will deny that the modern rise of the ration-
alistic spirit has been accompanied by a slow but sure
uplifting of the manners and the morals of the people.
Sound rationalist doctrine has a wider and firmer hold
of the human mind than at any previous period in the
history of mankind, and we think no well-informed
observer will deny that in the Western world the aver-
age ethical standard is higher than it has ever been
before." '

(7) " The Rationalist hopes and believes that while
at present the reconciliation between Egoism and Al-

1 O/-. cjf., pp. 41, 42. "Op. cit.,p. ^3, ^Op. cit.,p. ^g.

* Op. cit., p. 50. ^Op. cit., p. 60.

296 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

truism may not be possible in the case of each individual,
it will one day be effected for the race."i

(8) " Considering that man is the denizen of a universe
which can only be known to him through sense-percep-
tion , . . supernatural religion may perish at its touch,
but the religion of duty and virtue will become more virile,
and will acquire a firmer hold upon the human heart.
The moral ideal of Rationalism is truth, and on no other
foundation than truth can any lofty or durable system of
ethics be reared." ^

(9) "Taking the human race as a whole, it is clear
that Christianity cannot be specially identified with ' the
main stream of religious advance' (Balfour)."^

(10) "Other things being equal, a man's happiness is
in direct proportion to his virtue." *

The author's appreciation of the New Testament can
be gathered from the following passage : —

(11) "The New Testament contains nothing original
or important in the shape of speculation. The system
which we find in its pages is mainly a compound of
Jewish theology and demonology with the myths of
Paganism, modified by some admixture of neo-Platonic
philosophy, and the ethical maxims which had filtered
slowly into the Greek and Roman world from the Far
East, It is one of the commonplaces of criticism that
Christianity possesses nothing of ethical importance
which is not shared to an equal degree by other religions,
such as Buddhism and Zoroastrianism." ''

(12) Speaking of Christ's death the author puts it in
this form : "It is conceivable that one of the Caesars
might have sacrificed his only begotten son for the sake
of some petty hamlet containing not more than twenty

Wp.cit., p. 62. "Op. cit., p. 151. ^ Op. cit., p. iSi.

*0p. cit., p. 190. ''Op. cit., p. 187.

ETHICS 297

inhabitants. . . . This would be infinitely larger in pro-
portion to the Roman Empire than is the earth in pro-
portion to the Universe. If there be a personal being
who has created all things and who sustains them by
the force of his will, it is antecedently incredible that
such a being would assume the form of one of his
humblest creatures, and would allow himself to suffer
an ignominious death while thus transformed, in order
to save these creatures from his own eternal venge-
ance." ^

The author concludes his book with the following
sentiments : —

(13) "Men are turning with disgust from the dark
jungles and miasma-laden valleys of supernaturalism
to the sunny plains and green hill-sides of Nature, il-
lumined with the light of Science, and glowing with t/ie
ever-expanding influence of universal brotherhood and
love. . . Theology may perish, but humanity will survive,
and will work out its salvation from ignorance and wrong
not with the aid of mystic doctrines and narrow religious
dogmas, but through the magic power of science, joined
with tJie wondrous force of human self-sacrifice and lovey^
The reader will note that the sentences italicised are en-
tirely due to Christianity alone.

I now propose to make some comments upon the
passages quoted and numbered.

To begin with his preliminary observation, I do not
know whence the author obtained his idea of "millions
of years for the human race ". Man could not have ap-
peared earlier than the Pliocene epoch at most, judging
by analogy with other mammalian animals all of the
preceding or Miocene epoch being now extinct, whereas

1 Op. cit., p. 197. 2 op. cit., 228. (My italics.)

298 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the Pliocene saw the introduction of man's contemporary
the horse, etc.^

This, however, is not a point of any great importance.

(i) The reader will note the author's insertion of the
word "leading" before "Rationalists". They may be
what he describes ; but the old question arises, How
about the "masses," the "millions" that Mr Gould
would wish to annex ?- The great complaint is the want
of enthusiasm among the followers of Rationalism ; and
as we have seen in the first two chapters of this book,
the past thirty years have proved the powerlessness of
Secularism or Rationalism to satisfy the demands of
the feeling of reverence in the heart of man.

(2) The author here says, " The moral law springs
from the human heart ". Religion, as Christ taught us,
does, but pure morality was a matter of discipline.
Love, justice, mercy, truth, helping the needy and suffer-
ing are no doubt now valid and binding ; but were not
so universal as he would seem to imply. History,
certainly, does not support this idea ; pity for a foe was
regarded with contempt.

As an example, where the above traits would be ex-
pected to be first seen, as a broad general rule the wife
was bought and remained a chattel or slave — as with the
Kaffirs of to-day. The children were no better off; the
Roman parent had the power of life and death over
them ; and female infants were regularly exposed to
death, if not wanted, as they are in China to-day.
"Millions of years" have not done away with this
abominable custom.

The true family life began with Christianity. Yet

' See above, p. 210.

2 " The New Secularism," Agnostic Annual, 1903, p. 16 ; see above,
pp. 11 et scq.

ETHICS 299

Monistic writers show a strange distortion of this obvious
truth. Thus Buchner says : " It is clear from many
passages in the Gospels that the founder of Christianity
was an enemy of the Family. . . . One day, when he
was teaching the people and was called by his mother
and brothers during his discourse he asked, annoyed at
the interruption [?], ' Who are my mother and brothers ? '
and answered himself by pointing to his disciples. Ac-
cording to Luke (xiv. 26) he made the hatred of one's
own parents and sisters a condition of discipleship, etc."i
To such absurdities will literalism carry people, who
cannot " read between the lines," or see deeper than
the actual words.

The reader will find the true interpretation of our
Lord's words in Seeley's Ecce Homo : " He could have
neither part nor lot with men destitute of enthusiasm . . .
and once when it seemed that the magic of His presence
and words would draw His entire audience into the
number of His followers, alarmed lest He should find Him-
self surrounded by half-hearted or superficial and merely
excitable adherents, He turned suddenly upon the crowd,
and with one of those startling expressions which He
seldom, and yet all great reformers sometimes, employed,
declared that He could receive no man who did not hate
his father and mother and his own life." ^

Illustrations of this come only too often in practical
life : for it is a common thing for one member, say, the wife,
to see no harm in smuggling lace ; but it jars against the
husband's conscience, or vice versa ; and unpleasantness
at least ensues : or a husband tries to pass his son as
under age when over twelve. The wife is the more con-
scientious and remonstrates. It is not the person one

^ Last Words on Materialism, p. 88. ^ P. 138.

300 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

is called upon to hate, but his or her want of a truly
Christian conscience.

Again, with regard to nations, in all the past history
of the world, love and mercy were practically unknown
virtues. To show pity for a conquered foe was thought
contemptible. It was not done till Christ came and taught
mankind the true nature of brotherly love {Agape in
Greek) which lies at the root of the Christian family, race
or nation ; as well as international comity.

It was this which broke down the wall of partition,
first between Jew and Gentile, and then between all
Gentile nations, respectively.

The author says that one half of Rationalism, at least,
consists of ethical truths and ideals, which he describes in
the words of Jesus. It is remarkable that the ethics of
Jesus Christ are found to be enforced by Unitarians as
Channing and Martineau, by Renan, whose Jesus is an
"impossible man"; and now by Monists, Secularists,
Rationalists, etc. In fact, Christ's ethics have lived in
spite of erroneous creeds and persecutions. They have
outlived disbeliefs, and are accepted by modern Agnostics,
Secularists, Materialists, Monists, Rationalists and avowed
Atheists !

Never was a prophecy more completely fulfilled than
that even the Gates of Hell should not prevail against
them ; for they are the Spirit of His Church !

Modern Rationalism here asserts that moral truths
and ethics have been ."dimply developed out of the needs
of man ; that certain rules of conduct as, " Thou shalt not
kill," etc., have been formulated by human societies for
their well-being and maintenance. . . . "The Jewish laws
of the Old Testament well represent this origin, so does
the Roman law, etc. . . ." This is quite true ; but the
ethics of Jesus Christ stand on a different level. They

ETHICS 301

are nof simply moral maxims or a code of laws like the
Decalogue.

It is repeatedly urged by Rationalists that Jesus
Christ said nothing new; that all His moral teaching is
to be found in that of the past reformers of the world
who preceded Him.

But there is this fundamental difference. No re-
formers had previously been able to enfoixe their moral
maxims upon the great majority of their contemporaries.
They have all died and left no important religious results.
It was so, first because they never possessed any suffi-
ciently strong motive power wherewith to enforce them.

Philanthropic maxims, for example, fall unheeded
upon the ears of the masses of mankind, because no
altruistic spirit is universally present in man. The beauty
of virtue and purity may help a noble-minded man,
already predisposed to be virtuous, " to keep himself
unspotted from the world " ; but it is waste of words to
tell this to the selfishly vicious man ; or indeed to the
multitude.

Moreover, it was never Christ's intention to give us
moral maxims only ; but Living Principles. In fact, as
the author of Ecce Homo so well says : " On the greater
number of questions on which men require moral guid-
ance, He has left no direction whatever ".^ Seeley, too,
has well described the profound difference between
Christ's method of moral legislation and that of the
philosophers. He says : " Instead of giving laws to His
society, He would give to every member of it a power of
making laws for himself. ... A man's actions result
from the state of his mind ; and if that is healthy they
will be right, if not, they will be wrong. Such language

ip. 135.

302 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

was new in the mouth of a legislator. . . . Philosophers
had always made it their study to bring their minds into
a healthy condition . . . but we do not find Him in agree-
ment with philosophers, . . . They placed it in reason
. . . He in enthusiasm." ^

The ancient Greek philosopher who succeeded by aid
of his reason to control his passions from committing
acts which according to his ideas of morality were un-
advisable was called " virtuous ". But " Christ went
further and pronounced the desire in the heart, when the
gratification of it would be culpable, to be sin ". Such a
man as subdues his tJioughts and not merely suppresses
the outward act is called in Christian language " holy ".

Seeley contrasts the two thus : " The one, so far as
he is virtuous, is incapable of crime ; the other, so far as
he is virtuous, is incapable of temptation ". Again — " A
virtuous man is one who controls and coerces the anarchic
passions within him, so as to conform his actions to law ;
a holy man is one in whom a passionate enthusiasm
absorbs and annuls the anarchic passions altogether, so
that no internal struggle takes place ; and the lawful
action is that which presents itself first and seems the
one most natural and most easy to be done." '^

What then was the " enthusiasm " which carries all
before it? The law-making power or root of morality
in human nature, trained and developed into the Christian
spirit, was if^airr) ; " the love not of all men nor yet
of every man, but oi the 7nan in every man". ..." It is
natural to man to love his kind, and Christ commands
us only to give nature play." " What the law of love
and the golden rule did for mankind was to place for the
first time the love of man as man distinctly in the list of

iPp. 136, 137. 2 P. 141.

ETHICS 303

virtues, to dissipate the exclusive prejudices of ethnic
morahty and to give selfishness the character of sin." ^

Now follows the important question, how is this
enthusiasm for purity and love to be kindled ; when we
think of "What an ardent enthusiasm He demanded
from His followers, and secondly, how frail and tender
a germ this passion naturally is in human nature ".^

It was by the force of example : ^ " The most lost
cynic will get a new heart by learning thoroughly to
believe in the virtue of even one man. Our estimate of
human nature is in proportion to the best specimen of
it we have witnessed. This then it is which is wanted
to raise the feeling of humanity into an enthusiasm ;
when the precept of love has been given, an image must
be set before the eyes of those who are called upon
to obey it, an ideal or type of man which may be
noble and amiable enough to raise the whole race and
make the meanest member of it sacred with reflected
glory.

"Did not Christ do this ? Did the command to love
go forth to those who had never seen a human being
they could revere? Could His followers turn upon Him
and say. How can we love a creature so degraded, full
of vile wants and contemptible passions, whose little life
is most harmlessly spent when it is an empty round of
eating and sleeping ; a creature destined for the grave
and for oblivion when his allotted term of fretfulness and
folly has expired ? Of this race Christ Himself was a
member, and to this day is it not the best answer to all
blasphemers of the species, the best consolation when

ip. 151. 2p_i32.

'As many Rationalists and others may not have seen this passage, I
quote it in full as one of the many eloquent ones in Sir J. Seeley's Ecce
Homo.

304 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

our sense of its degradation is keenest, that a human
brain was behind His forehead and a human heart beating
in His breast, and that within the whole creation of God
nothing more elevated or more attractive has yet been
found than He ? And if it be answered that there was
in His nature something exceptional and peculiar, that
humanity must not be measured by the stature of Christ,
let us remember that it was precisely thus that He wished
it to be measured, delighting to call Himself the Son of
Man, delighting to call the meanest of mankind His
brothers. If some human beings are abject and contempt-
ible, if it be incredible to us that they can have any high
dignity or destiny, do we regard them from so great a
height as Christ ? Are we likely to be more pained by
their faults and deficiencies than He was ? Is our standard
higher than His? And yet He associated by preference
with these meanest of the race ; no contempt for them did
He ever express, no suspicion that they might be less dear
than the best and wisest to the common Father, no doubt
that they were naturally capable of rising to a moral
elevation like his own. There is nothing of which a man
may be prouder of than this ; it is the most hopeful and
redeeming fact in history ; it is precisely what was
wanting to raise the love of man as man to enthusiasm.
An eternal glory has been shed upon the human race by
the love Christ bore to it. And it was because the
Edict of Universal Love went forth to men whose hearts
were in no cynical mood but possessed with a spirit of
devotion to a man, that words which at any other time,
however grandly they might sound, would have been but
words, penetrated so deeply, and along with the law of
love the power of love was given. Therefore also the
first Christians were enabled to dispense with philo-
sophical phrases, and instead of saying that they loved

ETHICS 305

the ideal of man in man, could simply say and feel that
they loved Christ in every man." ^

But there was something more. " Christ believed it
possible to bind men to their kind, but on one condition
— 'that they were first bound fast to Himself".

The history of Christianity is replete with characters
in whom " self was lost and found in Christ " from St.
Paul to to-day.

Christ Himself has been the One and only Motive
which has been all sufficient for a holy life. Well, again,
does Seeley remark : " Among all the men of the ancient
heathen world there were scarcely one or two to whom
we might venture to apply the epithet ' holy '. In other
words, there were not more than one or two, if any, who
besides being virtuous in their actions were possessed
with an unaffected enthusiasm of goodness, and besides
abstaining from vice regarded even a vicious thought
with horror. Probably no one will deny that in Chris-
tian countries this higher-toned goodness, which we call
holiness, has existed. Few will maintain that it has been
exceedingly rare. Perhaps the truth is, that there has
scarcely been a town in any Christian country since the
time of Christ when a century has passed without exhibit-
ing a character of such elevation that his mere presence has
shamed the bad and made the good better, and has been
felt at times like the presence of God Himself, And if
this be so, has Christ failed or can Christianity die ? " ^

(3) It is quite true that practical experience is the
only test of the worth of any maxim. Hence was it
that our Lord said : " If any man willeth to do His will,
he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or
whether I speak from Myself".^

1 Pp. 154-156. 2 p_ i5i_ sjohnvii. 17.

20

3o6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The whole Christian world has thus verified Christ's
words, and Rationalists also recognise them as true in
spite of their rejecting Him as the Divine Master.

(4) This author, like Haeckel and Biichner, attributes
everything to Natural Selection as having caused it.
There is an intense " struggle for existence " between
what St. Paul calls " the law in his members " and " the
law in his mind," or between the tendency of evil and
the aspiration to goodness. That is the sphere of the
struggle, and the issue is either debasement or nobility,
which may be called the " survival of the fittest," if the
latter prevail through the power of the will.

The primary cause, however, is overlooked ; and that
is the consciousness of the struggle, and of the power to
determine which of the two " laws " shall win the battle.
Therein lies man's moral responsibility. Animals can
entertain no such struggle ; they are non-moral.

(5) In this paragraph he speaks of "holiness," but
does not seem to realise that, as Seeley says, it was a
word unknown and unsuited to man before Christ came.
As in the use of this word, so is it often the case that
Rationalists adopt the Christian phraseology, but attribute
Christian ethics to natural causes rather than to Jesus
Christ, the true source. Though altruism may find its
natural source in parental love, and in what Seeley calls
a spark of " natural kindliness," it could never have been
formed into a flame of enthusiasm by any other means
than by a Divine Personality. Plato saw that and Christ
proved it to be true.

The ethics of Jesus supply the clear historical origin
of the development of Christian love, or 'AydTrrj.

It was intensified in the family circle ; as shown by
the elevation of the wife to her proper sphere as a help
meet for man ; in the realisation of the sacredness of

ETHICS

307

child-life. It was expanded in the relationship between
master and man, b}^ the abolition of slavery. It closed
up the breach between them, and destroyed the natural
hatred among nations ; or, as it is described, Jesus broke
down the partition wall between Jew and Gentile, for
Christianity regards all men as brothers in Christ.

It is the beneficent Gesta Christi to which we look
for all this and much more. Natural Selection, which
has nothing whatever to do with the origination or the
development of anything, could never do anything of
itself. It was Christ who poured this Spirit of Love
upon the world. In His short life on earth the funda-
mental principles of all true spiritual religion were
founded. No further developments are needed or pos-
sible. Christianity is Fvial.

(6) In this paragraph the Rationalist takes credit
for what is really due to Christ. It is perfectly true that
when Christ came, Greece and Rome were sunk in
ignorance, immorality and crime ; but it was the leaven
of Christ's teaching that in time brought about a revolu-
tion in these things. It was by the example of all that
was pure, good, loving and noble as seen first in Jesus
Christ, and afterwards in the followers and martyrs that
won heathendom from vice and immorality. It is due
to this and not to Rationalism that the " average ethical
standard is higher than it has ever been before ".

(7) In this paragraph we have a good example of
the common fallacy about the " race ". Like the terms
genus, " crowd," " congregation," a race is only a word to
stand for a multiplication of the individual. Thus a pug
dog is an individual, all pug dogs form a " race " or
" breed ".

The Church of England limits a "congregation" to
three individuals.

3o8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The very essence of Christianity is that the race, i.e.,
all men, is " saved " by the salvation of each, individually.
Salvation is simply the Christ-like character and conduct.
No "race" can be saved if its individuals be not ; for the
term is simply an abstraction. How then can the author's
hope for the reconciliation between egoism and altruism
be true for the race, if that reconciliation be not found in
the heart and life o{ each individual oi ihe. race?

It has been said that Nature is regardless of the in-
dividual, but is careful of the type. No biologist can
endorse that. The type is the " species " or " genus," or
whatever word stands for a " group " of individuals. How
then can Nature care more for the type than for the in-
dividuals of which it consists?

But what does Evolution say ? Travelling back
through the past history of the world we find types have
come and gone over and over again. They have been
swept away as soon as the individuals vanished.

It has often been observed that Christianity differs
from Judaism, in that Christ proved the love of the
Father and Himself for each individual soul ; whereas
a Jew was a unit in the race, for which Jahweh only
cared. That may have been generally the human way
of thinking ; but there is plenty of evidence that many
regarded the God of Heaven otherwise — as a God of
mercy, the God of the fatherless and the widow ; as One,
who though inhabiting Eternity, could yet dwell with
the humble and the contrite man.

It is this trait of the Deity which Christ especially
taught by imparting a new meaning to " Father ". In
the Old Testament as "Father," He was the Creator
only, as Father in the New Testament, we have a living
Parent who will, so to say, speak to us face to face.

(8) Though supernatural religion may not be ap-

ETHICS 309

preciable to sense-perception, to which Rationah'sts and
Materialistic Monists would seem to reduce everything,
yet we may reasonably ask — knowing the past history of
Christianity — why will Duty become more virile than it
has been among Christians ? Duty to whom, we ask ?
Who or what is there that can command Duty, if there
be no God to whom obligations are due ?

The Secularist would reply — Duty to one's fellow-
creatures : so does Christianity.

History does not corroborate the author's conclusion.
A mentally strong and naturally virtuously disposed
person — such as the author may be — must not judge of
the masses of mankind by himself. He says : " The moral
ideal of Religion is Truth " : so is it with Christianity ;
which is based on Christ, who proved Himself to be the
Way and the Truth ; and we may adopt his words —
" On no other foundation than Truth can any lofty or
desirable system of ethics be raised " — no other name
under Heaven is there by which man can be saved.

The author need not claim for Rationalism what his-
tory distinctly proves to have been due to the Spirit of
Christ.

(9) It IS Christianity alone with which the main theme
of religious advance can be identified, as Mr. C. Loring
Brace has so admirably shown in his Gesta Christi.

(10) That a man's happiness is in direct proportion to
his virtue is not a discovery of Rationalism ; but the
assurance of Jesus, who told His disciples that " their joy
should be full " ; though men — as He warned them —
might kill them thinking they were doing God service.

This result of His ethics — the peace He left with us —
is a natural law and as such is to be traced to God as its
author, whose " peace passeth all understanding ".

(11) If there is really nothing original or important in

3IO PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the New Testament, why was it written ? Why has more
literature been written about that little cluster of writ-
ings than on any subject in the world ? How is it that
men, far more learned than this anonymous author — who
is perhaps wise in not disclosing his name — have unani-
mously found proof of a revealing of God the Father in
the " Unique " Person {Movoy€vr]<i) of Jesus Christ ; as
well as of the promulgation of the Brotherhood of Man
{'Aydirr]) ; and the means of reconciling man to God
(the great At-one-ment) ?

(12) To write in the year 1903 that Christ died "in
order to save these (humblest creatures), from His own
eternal vengeance" simply shows a profound ignorance
of the truth, and is self-condemnatory, and needs no
comment.

(13) Nature never supplied " the Universal Brother-
hood and Love " nor " the wondrous force of human self-
sacrifice and love ". He may not know it, but strange
to say they were first promulgated and established by
Jesus Christ in these Gospels, of which he speaks so
slightingly !

If this author and other Rationalists wish to know
what is meant by " the Spirit of Christianity," I would
strongly recommend the three following books — Sir John
Seeley's Ecce Homo, Harnack's What is CJiristianity'i
and the third book of A. Sabatier's Religions of AutJiority
(Books I, and H.), and the Religion of the Spirit (Book
HI.).

CHAPTER VIII

RELIGION AND RATIONALISM i

We are now approaching the all-important question as
to the use of Religion. Monists like Haeckel, who put
God aside as non-existent, and regard the universe as
the issue of blind unconscious forces, can have no religion
at all in the ordinary sense of the word, which always
implies the existence of some spiritual Power upon whom
man believes himself to be in some way dependent.
The Power is always supposed to be conscious, in some
sort analogous to man who possesses consciousness.

Nevertheless, Haeckel devotes a chapter to the
"Monistic Religion". Let us see, therefore, what he
has to say about it. In drawing a comparison between
Science and Christianity, he says : " One of the most
distinctive features of the existing century (nineteenth)
is the increasing vehemence of the opposition between
Science and Christianity ".^

This is a somewhat too strong expression ; for many
scientists have been, and many are now Christians. But
is not Haeckel here confounding Christianity with eccles-
iasticism or perhaps Roman Catholicism of the continent
including his own country ? Did he clearly perceive

1 1 would refer the reader to Pr. Loof s Anti-Hacckel, for a refutation
of Haeckel's chapter xvii., on " Science and Christianity " in his Riddle
of the Universe. It is published by Hodder and Stoughton, 6d.

^ The Riddle of the Universe, p. 316.

(311)

312 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

that Christianity, in the only true sense of the word, is
nothing else than the Christ-like character as seen in
and taught by Jesus Christ Himself and His apostles ;
and the pure religion is that defined by St. James,^ the
bitter opposition which Rationalists, Monists and others
express towards the Christian religion would greatly
subside.

" Primitive Christianity " is discussed by Haeckel and
he adds: "Christ Himself, the noble prophet and en-
thusiast, so full of the love of humanity, was far below
the level of classical culture ; he knew nothing beyond
the Jewish traditions." ^

It is a common thing to depreciate Christ among
Rationalists ; thus, e.g., Mr. Charles Watts writes of
Him : ^ His character was " weak ". His teaching " objec-
tionable"; there is nothing "original" in His ethical
teaching, His conduct was " narrow-minded ". He was
in " no sense perfect". His precepts are "unreliable".
His language was "unrefined". He lacks "a true
method of reasoning and a uniformity of character ". He
exhibited an " injudicious example". He was "severe"
when He should have been " gentle ". When He ought
to have been "firm" He was " vacillating and cowardly,"
etc. Then Mr. Watts asks: "Who would really be-
lieve in His teaching to practice self-mutilation or to hate
one's relations, or to accept a premium for deserting
wife ? "

If Mr. Watts and Haeckel are right, have all
Christians, learned and unlearned, been stupidly blind,
awaiting for nearly 2000 years downwards, for Mr. Charles
Watts' interpretation ?

Will Rationalists ever be able to learn that Christ

1 Chap. i. 27. ^0/». «<., p. 319.

* The Miracles of Christian Belief.

RELIGION AND RATIONALISM 3I3

spoke metaphorically and not literally ? " Without a
parable spake He not unto them."

Haeckel's observation — that Jesus Christ knew noth-
ing beyond the Jewish traditions — is so remarkable that
it is difficult to conceive, not only how he came to make
it, but that he could believe any intelligent reader of the
New Testament could accept it.

To take one point only. The religion of Judaism
was based on a ritual of outward forms and ceremonies
as well as traditions. Christ placed religion in the
heart within, on principles, abolishing the whole of the
Jewish ceremonial as well as the traditions of the elders
altogether.

In alluding to St. Paul Haeckel says : " The remark-
able personality of Paul, who possessed much more
culture and practical sense than Christ, is extremely
interesting, from the anthropological point of view,
from the fact that the racial origin of the two great
religious founders is very much the same. Recent his-
torical investigation teaches that Paul's father was of
Greek ^ nationality and his mother of Jewish."

" The statement of the apocryphal gospels, that the
Roman officer Pandera was the true father of Christ,
seems all the more credible when we make a careful
anthropological study of the personality of Christ."
Later on, Haeckel puts the supposition as a certainty —
" The name of Christ's real father, ' Pandera ' points
unequivocally to a Greek origin ". ^

Every reader of St Paul's epistles knows that what
Haeckel said of him was not his own estimate of him-
self, that his great ambition was " to apprehend Christ,"
and feared lest he might be considered " reprobate ".

1 Op. cit., p. 321. ^Op. cit., p. 337.

314 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Haeckel's appeal to the Apocryphal Gospels for evi-
dence must be a somewhat desperate resort !

He goes on to say : " The ethical craving of our
emotion is satisfied by Monism, no less than the logical
demand for causality on the part of Reason "}

The ethical craving may be perhaps satisfied in highly
intellectual individuals ; but neither Haeckel nor English
Rationalists can bring forward any proof that it is so
among the masses of men and women. If the preach-
ing of Morality has been found to fail, Monism will
certainly not succeed. As with Rationalism, there is the
want of Motive Power ; which, as we have seen, is felt so
keenly by Rationalistic writers.

" We do not seek a mighty revolution but a rational
reformation of our religious life. And just as 2000 years
ago, the classic poetry of the ancient Greeks incarnated
their ideals of virtue in divine shapes, so may we, too,
lend the character of noble goddesses to our three
rational ideals. We must inquire into the features of the
three goddesses of the Monist — Truth, Beauty and
Virtue ; and we must study their relation to the three
corresponding ideals of Christianity which they are to
replace." ^

The fallacy underlying all this is that the average
man cannot worship an ideal or an abstraction. He can
feel no emotion for them any more than for Comte's grand
etre ; or than one can for gravitation. Religion cannot
stand upon any other basis than reverence for a Con-
scious Being.

But Haeckel rejects the only Being who has and can
excite enthusiastic reverence.

" We must reject what is called " Revelation," the

^ Op. cit., p. 340. 2 Qp cit., p. 344.

RELIGION AND RATIONALISM 315

poetry of faith, that affirms the discovery of truth in a
supernatural fashion, without the assistance of reason.
... In this respect it is quite certain that the Christian
system must give way to the Monistic. ... In our
search for truth we have to devote ourselves solely to the
study of Nature." ^

But the Christian system of religion is something
which will not fall under observation of, or experiment
with, Nature. It deals largely with spiritual matters
which do not appeal to the senses. But, to say that the
belief in a Conscious Being we call God, which lies at
the basis of Religion, is not founded on reason, is not
true. It is the object of this book to show that many
lines converge to establish the belief in God by inductive
evidence ; for we have no other. It is, however, ample ;
and this process of reasoning in the spiritual world is
known as Faith — " the proving of things not seen," ^ i.e., it
is the accumulative proof or " moral conviction " of Truths
which cannot be brought within the sphere of the senses.

" The idea of the good, which we call Virtue, in our
Monistic religion coincides for the most part with the
Christian idea of virtue ; viz., of the primitive and pure
Christianity of the first three centuries. . . . The best
part of Christian morality, to which we firmly adhere, is
represented by the humanest precepts of charity and
toleration, compassion and assistance."

" However, these noble commands . . . are by no
means original discoveries of Christianity. They were
derived from earlier religions."

" Moreover, Christian ethics was marred by the great
defect of a narrow insistence on altruism and a denuncia-
tion of egoism." ^

^ 0/>. cjf., p. 345. 2jjeb xi. I. 2 0/. «7., p. 346.

3i6 PRESEMT-DAY RATIONALISM

Of course, one has no quarrel with Materialistic
Monism or Rationalism for accepting Christian ethics.
So far, they are Christians in spite of their infidelity ; but
when Haeckel says Christ insisted upon a " narrow "
kind of altruism with a "denunciation of egoism," he is
conspicuously in error. Duty to oneself is as much in-
sisted upon as duty to one's neighbour ; whether the
former be purity and honour, to which St. James refers
in his well-known definition of religion ; ^ or to working
for a livelihood.^ Where the "narrowness" of altruism
appears in 'AyaTrr) one is at a loss to comprehend. The
Christian knows nothing of it.

" Two things certainly remain beyond dispute — the
lofty principle of universal charity and the fundamental
maxim of ethics, the ' golden rule,' that issues therefrom ;
both, however, existed in theory and in practice centuries
before the time of Christ." ^

" In this greatest and highest commandment our
Monistic ethics is completely at one with Christianity."*

It is gratifying to hear this conclusion of Monism ;
but it is quite obvious from all ancient history that the
" golden rule " was practically a dead letter, both among
individuals and between nations. Moreover, if the truth
could be recognised by Haeckel and Rationalists, the
above lofty sentiments would never have been known to
them had not Christ come.

^Chap. i. 27. 2Eph iv 28.

'Op. cit., p. 322. " Op. cit., p. 359,

CHAPTER IX

THE ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL

Volumes have been written on the origin of moral evil
and sin in man. Until the middle of the last century
the story of the fall as given in Genesis was supposed to
be historically true. Therefore, all the literature which
was based upon the theory of original sin is now out of
date and superfluous.^ The question at the present day
is — What has Evolution to say upon the subject ?

It is simply this — We have seen how man's power of
realising an abstraction in his mind at once and entirely
separates him off from all the rest of the animal creation ;
in that consequently he alone can form some conception
of God. He is conscious of the power to choose, or
what is called free will.

Then he finds out for himself, or is told by others
from their experience, that he will suffer if he does
certain things. Such is his first idea of a natural law :
but so far there is nothing moral or immoral about it ;
just as all animals are non-moral.

But when a community or tribe is formed, it is soon
found that certain restrictions are necessary to be put
upon each individual. Then a moral law is framed ;
such as "Thou shalt do no murder," i.e., within the
community. Such may be enforced by penalties.

^ I would strongly recommend to the reader Mr. F. R. Tennant's
book on The Origin and Propagation of Sin.

(317)

3i8 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

We thus get at the stage known as " guilt," z'.e., the
violation of a duty to the state.

The higher stage, in which a man believes himself
bound to duty to a God, brings with it the sense of
" sin ".

So that what we call " falling " is really, and indeed
obviously, " a conscious violation of law ". It is just what
the serpent is represented to have foretold ; that being
possibly the familiar experience of the writer of the
story.

Most of the acts of guilt, as theft and murder, were
not considered such in early days when every man's
hand was natui-ally against every other. Even nearly
up to our Lord's time, every nation of the East had been
naturally hostile against every other whom they might
attack, slay, despoil at will, not because of any quarrel —
there need have been none — but solely because they
were foreigners and that there had been no treaty. It
was Rome which gathered together into one hetero-
geneous mass all the nations of the then world ; and so
made a rough field more or less prepared to be sown with
the seed of the gospel.

Now, the whole matter as to the origin of evil is put
into the short sentence of St. Paul : " I had not known
sin but by the law ... for without the law sin was
dead ".1

The story of Adam and Eve puts the case very
clearly. The writer, apparently wishing to account for
the origin of wickedness prevalent in his day, invents the
story and shows how the First Law given to man,
brings in the possibility of Sin^ by its violation. The
command is like an order given by a parent to his

' Rom, vii. 7, 8,

ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL

319

children playing in an orchard ; who were never told
before not to do anything.

Adam and Eve were non-moral before ; but the
moment they receive the command, " Thou shalt not eat
of the fruit of the tree," potential morality and immorality
is present ; so that what would have been a non-moral
act becomes an immoral one.

Law, therefore, is the indirect cause of guilt and sin,
by pronouncing certain previously non-moral acts to be
immoral.

It is not that man " fell," but that his eyes were
holden till he realised, as soon as he experienced it, what
would be the effect of violation of law on himself.

The story, then, represents t/ie Discovery of Conscience
after the pronouncement of law, the possibility of guilt
or sin, with its concomitant shame.

With the powerful aid of a " conscience towards God,"
constantly warning and shaming man, he has learnt how
he is now able to rise to a divine height ; though he is
equally conscious that he may sink lower than the beasts
that perish ; for without law man would for ever remain
on the same dead level of animal non-morality, when
nothing is good, nothing is evil. There would be no Con-
trast and no need for Volition.

Let us then consider this all-important Law of Con-
trasts, which supplies the basis both for man's moral
elevation as well as for his possible degradation, since
no evolution ever takes place without a possible devolu-
tion or degradation in some other direction.

A most important result of man's powers of abstract
reasoning, and of his consciousness of the power of
choosing, is the origin of this conception of evil —
whether that word be his estimate of physical occurrences
without, or what is called " sin," within himself.

320 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The so-called " physical evils " in the world are those
events which he does not like ; but they are relative
matters. A storm ruining his nearly ripe corn he calls
an "evil"; but coming after a drought has prevailed,
when the seed is germinating, it is a " blessing ".

The old saying " It is an ill wind which blows no-
body any good," implies how rare such an occurrence is.
It represents the fact that all events imply their contrasts.

If there were never these uncertainties in Nature, we
could not, e.g-., speak of good and bad weather. If we
were never ill, we should not know what to be unwell
meant and we could not speak of health as " good," for it
is only by comparison that we are aware of health at all ;
as we are perfectly unconscious of the working of the
internal organs of our body until something goes wrong.

Such contrasts prevail everywhere, and we talk of
heat and cold, light and darkness, etc.

Similarly with regard to man's moral conduct, we
describe it as good or bad. But why? What regulates
Conduct? The answer is " Law". "I had not known
sin but by the law," writes St. Paul ; ^ but laws, as made
by man, at least, are very variable not to say capricious
or even contradictory ; for we often find one race of men
regarding as correct what another thinks incorrect, as
the " religious " practices of the ancient Greeks compared
with Christian conduct.

Thus, if a comparison between Judaism and Chris-
tianity be made, we find rites and ceremonies to be
the essence of the one, their utter abolition to be a funda-
mental feature of the other. The highest ideal of a
Rabbi was to multiply and endeavour to perform the
greatest number of the traditions and religious ceremonies

^ Rom. vii. 7.

ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL 321

possible. Such was his idea of the " Righteousness
of the Law ".

We turn to Christianity and we find the whole
of the ceremonial law was a mistake, and " Righteous-
ness of Faith " takes its place.

Hence we discover a fundamental contrast between
these two laws of Judaism and Christianity, respectively.

If it be asked why some men follow one line of
conduct and others follow a quite different one ; both
thinking they are right in obeying law, it is just be-
cause human-made laws are never perfect nor universal ;
whereas Spiritual laws — as revealed by Jesus Christ
— are found by experience to be applicable to all races
at all times.

But whatever law men believe to be right and obey,
that is, act up to their light, feeble though it may be,
they cannot be called in question. If he obeys, we may
call him relatively moral, and relatively immoral if he
disobey it.

But Law may be " natural " as well as human.

By "natural law" is only meant an "observed order
of facts " ; that is, certain events always take place under
the same circumstances. This uniformity is said — meta-
phorically— to be in obedience to law. It represents
what always is. It only differs from human laws, in that
these represent what man always ought to be.

Now animals, by not having the power of abstract
reasoning and possessing no consciousness of the power
to choose, i.e., volition, cannot be moral or immoral, but
are simply non-moral or living automata.

Man, alone, on the other hand, can be both moral or
immoral, for he alone is conscious of the universal law of
contrasts, and can use or abuse nature's laws, say of health ;
and he can also obey or disobey human laws.

31

322 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Herein, then, lies the application of Free Will to the
spiritual world.

It is the consciousness of having the power to restrain
oneself from abusing natural or other laws, whenever
circumstances demand our attention to decide upon our
course of action, and to do so from strong motives.
Those — as far as Christians are concerned — are love to
God and His Christ ; for this includes all terrestrial
motives, as of nobility of character, and love to fellow-
creatures (agape).

If a man restrain himself from violating human laws,
through fear of punishment on breaking them, he ex-
hibits an outward, formal or prudential morality only.
If he restrain himself for the love of God, he is guided
by a religious motive and the aspiration for holiness.

Thus do we realise the difference between guilt and
sin. A law court only knows the former ; whereas the
latter implies a previous firm conviction of the existence
of a Holy God.

Consequently, no nation in the world realised to the
full what sin meant before Christ came, unless we except
the psalmists and prophets ; but even they had not
reached a full realisation of sin against the Father. The
words in Hebrew and Greek meant " missing one's aim " ;
and mainly referred to failures in ceremonial duties.

Whatever man-made law lays down at any period,
such, of course, must be obeyed at the time ; but such
laws become obsolete, are repealed, and new ones sub-
stituted to fit later times and conditions.

On the other hand, God's laws, moral or religious, are
eternal. Such are the Laws of Philanthropy, Edification,
Mercy and Forgiveness.^

' As enumerated by Seeley [Eccc Homo).

ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL 323

Such are only appreciable by their contrasts ; and it
is our free will which is called upon to decide our actions
in obeying these laws and to overcome the inducements
to abuse instead of use them, i.e., to be loving and
philanthropic instead of churlish and selfish ; instead of
boldly resenting it, acquiescing feebly in wrong-doing.
To forgive seventy times seven, if an erring man repent,
rather than harbouring an unforgiving spirit in the heart.
It is only by thus ruling ourselves, that we gradually
tend to become at last automatically pure, holy, loving
and forgiving. Such is the highest possible state for
man to acquire — " To be perfect as the Heavenly Father
is perfect," or as St. John says : " A child of God cannot
sm .

Determinists say, as a proof of a man having no
" free " will, that you can tell beforehand how a man will
act if you know his character. This is perfectly true,
and especially so of the perfect Christian ; because what-
ever a man's character Jias become, it is finally the issue
of his own will. The perfect Christian of forty years of
age has passed through the period when his will deter-
mined that he would not be immoral. Another may, at
the same age, have the character of a roue ; because he
made no effort to restrain his passions, but gave full rein
to the " law of the flesh " ; which now, at forty, has the
mastery, and he cannot restrain himself any longer.

Now, is it only Utility which lies at the bottom of
conduct, or is the motive power for self-restraint the
duty to self and others ? The former is the Secularist's
assertion. Is it only because " honesty is the best
policy " that a man does not defraud his neighbour ?

There is something else, and that is Conscience ; we
recognise it by sensations, either an unpleasant feeling
arises in the mind on one occasion or a self-satisfied one

324

PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

on another, following certain actions we have done,
respectively.

Whence does it arise ?

As long as we are compelled to obey man-made laws
for fear of punishment, conscience is for the most part a
very feeble affair if it exist at all. The Greek could only
say, " I know nothing against myself," ^ if he had done
the prescribed duties of the state ; just as the young
man said to Christ, " All these have I kept from my
youth up ". Similarly, schoolboys are, as a rule, obedient
to the master's orders, through fear of punishment ; but
if they can find a quiet corner where they can light a
cigar, they do not hesitate to break the rule, and think
none the worse of themselves for so doing.

Again, many people, even in Christian England (to
say nothing of Orientals), "see no harm" in cheating the
Government, by evading taxes in part, in smuggling, or
a railway company, by trying to pass a child over age,
as if he were under, etc. Though the same persons
would hesitate before doing a "dirty trick" to their
neicjhbours.

A fully developed conscience is only in correlation
with the belief of a Holy God.

A dog will sneak away ashamed of itself, ii found out
in having done something for which it has been beaten.
So, too, to be discovered is in the eyes of a non-consci-
entious person the real " crime," not the act itself.
Shame only follows on discovery, if it come at all.

But with a "conscience towards God," as soon as
reflection follows the act, shame is felt, whether one's
fellow-men know of it or not.

Herein is seen the keen insight into human nature

' The verb (svv^i'^ivo.i.

ORIGIN OF MORAL EVIL 325

of the writer of the story of Adam and Eve ; for he
represents shame as following the act of disobedience
before its discovery by God.

A beautiful picture by Mr. Long called " Christ or
Diana," well illustrates the awakened conscience. A
girl, who has become a Christian, refuses to put incense
on the altar of the goddess. A score of figures at least
are around her ; but not one understands why she refuses.
It is merely a state ceremony ; a state law orders her to
do it ; it is a political test. To put some incense on the
altar was less as an honour to Diana than obedience to
the state. That young girl, alone of all the crowd,
knows what conscience means.

The state, of course, has no alternative but to send
her to the arena.

The occasion has arisen ; the " circumstances " are
all there. She is conscious of the power of her will to
submit or to refuse. The conscience supplies the motive
for refusal. A more powerful motive than that of obey-
ing the state is present in her mind, viz., the Abstract
Co7iception of Duty to her Master, Christ. The Will has
been called into action, and she refuses to belie her con-
science^ at the expense of saving her life.

It is hardly necessary to add much on Original Sin.
The conception that all men became tainted through
being descended from Adam and Eve is, of course, a pure

^ The Greek word for "conscience'" is a-uueiSriffis. It does not ap-
pear to be of common occurrence in Greek literature, being only known
in a passage quoted from the lost works of the poet Menander. St. Paul
uses it, and even quotes a line from Menander — " Evil communications
corrupt good manners ". This shows that the idea of conscience was not
at all prominent to the Greek. Nor, indeed, could it have been, when we
consider what the moral conduct of the gods and goddesses was supposed
to be. It was Christianity which brought about the development of a
" pure conscience towards God ".

326 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

fiction ; but all men can fall by excessive yielding to
their natural and />er se sinless feelings; that is by adus'
ing and not using natural laws of their body and mind.

Asa rule these lower properties are stronger than the
tendency or wish to rise above them ; and every one will
readily echo the words of St. Paul : " Oh, wretched man
that I am, who will deliver me from this body of death ?"
And the remedy is supplied by himself; while prayer
will strengthen the will to restrain oneself instead of
yielding automatically to impulses.

It has been said by a believer in Natural Selection,
that the animal " propensities are inevitably strong in
man, because they are, or once were, useful or necessary
to life, and were therefore through countless ages inten-
sified by Natural Selection ; so there is no reason left
for referring their clamorous importunity to an evil bias
or a corrupted nature".^

If the habits of animals be observed their instincts
are so completely regulated by natural laws that they
are strictly periodic and never abused^ for it is " use," as
the ancient philosopher said, not " Natural Selection,"
which strengthens any habit.

Man alone can think of the abstract idea of" pleasure,"
and can therefore abuse natural law, by exceeding and
repeating the use to an abnormal and excessive degree.
It is this which intensifies the craving whether it be drink
or the sexual passion. Natural periodicity has been
completely broken down, or at all events not observed.

The tendency to possess the "craving" becomes only
too often hereditary ; and it is in this limited sense and
degree to which science would abbreviate the term
" Original Sin," and convert it into " parental taint ".

' The Origin and Propagation of Sin, F. R. Tcnnaiit, p. 93.

CHAPTER X

RATIONALISTIC VIEWS OF PHYSICAL EVILS; AND THE
LAW OF "INIDEALITY"

All Rationalists make much of so-called " physical
evils," and ridicule the idea of their being consistent with
a good, just and Loving God who cares for Humanity
and other creatures He has made.

For if God be the author of Creation, He must
knowingly have made the world so that man should
suffer by catastrophes, such as storms, deluges, volcanic
outbursts, etc.

Of course, this so-called paradox has perplexed men
from time immemorial, before and after the days of Job.

The question is. What is the Christian interpretation ?

The Old Testament idea of "judgments" has long
ceased to be held, since our Lord alluded to the Tower
of Siloam ; but He taught us to read a moral lesson from
accidents and catastrophes.

Why is it that some men, such as Rationalists, seem
to see something very terrible and inconsistent in Nature's
forces, when man suffers from them ; but Christians, who
see them too, do not feel them to be so heavy a burden
on the mind ? May not the answer be that the Christian
has no fear of death ; while the man who believes that
he will vanish altogether and not survive it, regards it as
terrible ?

(327)

328 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

There may be no hereafter or there may ; but the
Christian has an ideal life in prospect in hope.

He knows he must die sooner or later, according to
natural law, and he is prepared to go, whenever his turn
may come. As long as he is in this world he uses it
without abusing it. All his faculties, aesthetic, pursuit
of knowledge, love of science, etc., as well as moral and
ethical traits are exercised to the full. Why should he
fear death ? " Perfect Love casteth out fear. "

Why is it that so many Rationalists write pages of
pessimistic words about physical evils ? Thus writes the
anonymous author in one of several passages of his
book : " Does God, as revealed in Nature, show more
regard for the moral growth of man than for the stability
of the heavens ? The answer of every thoughtful and
candid observer must be that he recks no more of man
and his physical and moral growth than of the flies
which in early autumn are swept out of existence by the
blighting frost of a single night. What does God care
for the moral growth of the multitudes of human beings
whom he destroys by the frightful agency of earthquakes
and volcanic eruptions?" . . . "Mr. Balfour may reply
that this physical destruction is not of cardinal impor-
tance in connection with his argument, and that the
moral growth ceases here only to be resumed in some
celestial sphere. But how does he know this ? ... In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are bound to
conclude that death is the end of man, and that the
moral growth which is extinguished on earth is extin-
guished for ever." ^

This is the writer who says : " This so-called know-
ledge [he is speaking of the knowledge of God] must be

^ Mr. Balfour's Apologetics, p. 201.

PHYSICAL EVILS AND "INIDEALITY" 329

submitted to the tests of observation and experiment ; if
it is knowledge at all, it is capable of verification, and
the verdict of science on the subject must be final." ^

I have already had occasion to point out that science
is ready to accept inductive evidence as equivalent to a
demonstration where none other is possible ; that
science by no means limits her requirements of proof
to " observation and experiment " ; and it is perfectly
obvious that the " proof" of immortality cannot be so
tested ; but, like the rotation of the earth, the probability
is of a very high order, and has proved amply sufficient
for millions of believers in a hereafter.

That probability will be considered later on.

Three papers appeared in the first number of the
Hibbert Journal, p. 114, upon "Catastrophes and the
Moral Order" (Martinique and St. Vincent, May, 1902).
In the first, by Prof G. H. Howison, that author says,
in referring to Monists and Rationalists who assert the
incompatibility of catastrophes with a good Providence,
and ask, " Can such things be, and the supposed Author
and Ruler of Nature still be merciful and just and good ? "

— " In this outcry we come upon the real burden of the
problem of Evil, and discover its source. Its source is
the traditional form of our Theism, and its burden comes
from attributing to God the authorship of Nature, with
all its apparatus for cruel torture, as we know these now.
To Materialism, to sheer Naturalism, to Atheism, there is
no enigma of Evil ; thinkers of all these types have Evil
before them as a fact simply ; they have no Almighty
Intelligence to blame for it ; their only business with it
is to avoid it so far as man can, and to bar it finally out
of life, if perchance that be possible." If not, then the

^ op. at., p. 103.

330 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

words may be said — " But brothers, you can end it when
you will ".

But to the Theist the question remains : " Can this
problem of Evil be solved ? " This author seems to
think not ; that attempts hitherto have all been failures
and " must forever remain a failure". "The fatal mis-
take has been the attempt to unite this universal causality
of God with His essence as Love."

He concludes by saying : " Indubitably, we stand in
need of a new idealism, which shall be so thoroughly
pluralistic, as to avoid both forms of literal Creationism —
whether the Dualism of the Hebrew or the Monism of
modern thinking — and which, while it refers Nature and
all its woes derivatively to minds, presents as the minds
other than God, and places God in a purely ideal or final-
causal relation to them, and thus to the system of Nature
dependent upon them ".

This appeal to " minds other than God " does not
seem feasible in the face of the Laws of Continuity and
the Conservation of Energy.

Rev. R. A. Armstrong in the second essay begins by
reminding us that the St. Vincent catastrophe is by no
means peculiar, and that 215,000 people were overwhelmed
by a wave in the Ganges in 1891. "In fact they are
no more terrible or more sad than the normal," and
minimises the effects by adding : " Death left mourners
few and rare. A multitude were spared the sorrows of
orphanage or widowhood. Where for these was death's
sting ?"..." We have not to ask ' Were these men of
Martinique sinners above the rest?' but rather, ' What
were these husbands and wives, parents and children,
lovers and beloved of Martinique, that God blessed them
thus above the rest, robbing death of its sting, the grave
of its victory ? ' "

PHYSICAL EVILS AND "INIDEALITY" 331

If the author himself were asked, which would he
prefer — to die peacefully of old age, i.e., normally ; or be
burnt up by a fiery hot blast as the victims were in that
volcanic outburst, what would be his reply ? I am not
surprised that this statement met with rather severe
criticism in the second number of the Hibbert Journal.
But he admits " they are only pleas in mitigation of
judgment ; and the arraignment still lies against an
Almighty God that He might have arranged things
otherwise than He has ".

" One consideration indeed there is for the special
comfort of him whose trouble lies in the contemplation
of catastrophes. It is of their very essence that, in
human history, they are exceptional." So are railway
accidents and falling towers, as of Siloam and others ;
still such catastrophes do occur.

In conclusion, he leaves the concrete physical side of
the question and observes : " But the main trust of
Theism must for ever be in the spiritual experience of the
individual man. ... If the witness of the Spirit be with
him, if he has known God working in him in his sorrow,
in his temptation, in his remorse, in the blessed experience
of reconciliation, the fires of all the volcanoes will not burn
nor the waters of all the floods avail to quench his faith."

The third writer is Rev. Dr. R, F. Horton, who observes
that men do not seem to remember that catastrophes
are part of natural law. " On every occasion of sudden
disaster the mind feels bound to discuss the question
again ab initio.'' He agrees with the previous writer in
saying : " It is surely illogical and childishly inconsistent,
accepting the fact that some 30,000,000 of people perish
by old age, disease, accident or their own fault every
year in the ordinary way, to see in that nothing to shake
one's faith in Providence."

332 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

" But the value of such a catastrophe, from an intel-
lectual and spiritual point of view, may be, that it calls
our attention to the catastrophic nature of human life, and
requires us to settle our accounts with the fact, which is
forgotten because it is not regular but intermittent."

This, of course, is in accordance with our Lord's
remark : " Unless ye repent, ye shall all likewise [spiritu-
ally] perish ".

He alludes to the power of the will to mitigate pain ;
as seen in the calmness of the martyrs at the stake,
justified by the consciousness of righteousness, and in
Jesus Christ on the cross ; but his critic rightly observes
that there is the element of free will present, whereas at
Martinique and St. Vincent the deaths were involuntary.

Lastly, he refers to the belief in a future life as the
key to the problem : " The Stoic saw half the truth when
he knew that the just and resolute man cannot be shaken
by the ruins of a falling world. The Christian sees it
all when he says, ' Nevertheless we, according to His
promise, look for new heavens and a new earth wherein
dwelleth righteousness'."

Mr. C. Cohen criticises the last two writers in the Hid-
bert Journal (vol, i., p. 360). He observes generally, if
man did the things which catastrophes do, he would be
regarded as guilty: why then is not God?

" The Apologia of Messrs, Horton and Armstrong does
not touch the really vital issue , . . which is, Why
should they occur at all ? . , . " It is the duty of the
Theist to justify in God a method of working or of instruc-
tion that would be condemned in man,"

"The argument does show that the Martinique
disaster is in line with the general course of Nature ; but
this only amounts to saying that if ' Providence ' is at
fault here, it is at fault everywhere else."

PHYSICAL EVILS AND "INIDEALITY" 333

I will now add some remarks and begin by criticising
the critic. Mr. Cohen says that if such a slaughter were
cruel in a man, it must be so in God.

But he overlooks the fact that ten times greater
slaughter by man has never been regarded as cruel, but
the right thing to do !

If there is any one thing that man has gloried in from
the remotest times to the present day, and from the
lowest savage to the highly civilised Englishman, it is
War.

Is not there, therefore, a ring of disingenuousness
about the whole argument ? Men cry aloud against the
holocausts on those West Indian islands ; but as long as
men persist in inventing the most horrible engines of
warfare and try to sink or set on fire ships, laden with
hundreds of human beings, do their best to mutilate
their fellow-creatures with cordite, lyddite, and I do not
know how many more inventions, surely it is scarcely
apposite to complain of catastrophes as executed by
God, when they do their very utmost to surpass Him in
destruction !

But what is the true situation ? Death is a law of
Nature. No one complains of that. At eighty years of
age, all of us will be pretty ready to go, being tired of
this world, finding ourselves isolated — nay, we shall pro-
bably /on^ to go !

The Rationalist's complaints, therefore, seem to rest
on two grounds. One is that the young and middle-
aged do not wish to go yet. The other is that no one
likes to feel bodily pain, nor, I will add, give a cause of
grief to others.

If any be Atheists, they can quit the world painlessly
at any time. It is curious how pessimistic they are.
Haeckel writes a long passage, and the author of Mr.

334 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

Balfour s Apologetics^ pages — repeating himself — in de-
scribing the physical evils of the world.

With regard to pain, we must remember that man
could not have pleasure without the possibility of pain.
Death by catastrophe is not of longer duration than by
disease or old age ; it is generally exceedingly short if
not instantaneous.

I take it, that pessimism about catastrophes arises
from a want of Faith and a belief in a future life.

If Christ's teaching be true, and the promise that
" he who willeth to do of the teaching shall know if it be
of God," has over and over again been verified by ex-
perience ; then His conduct bears witness to another truth
— that He showed Himself to be superior to all "evils,"
throughout the whole period of His ministry. He not only
taught His disciples to care nought for them, even if they
should be scourged and killed^ but gave Himself up as an
example to a torturing death, in full faith of an Eternity.

It is worth while observing that there is a perfect
analogy between external Nature and the internal
nature of man. Within the latter are joy and grief,
enthusiasm and pessimism, pleasure and pain. So too,
is it externally : Nature surrounds us all with untold
blessings and sunshine, lor the greater part of mankind
and the greater part of their lives.

But, on the other hand, we are from time to time re-
minded that there are and may recur at any lime,
volcanic eruptions, storms at sea and floods.

But man risks them. He builds towns on the flanks
or foot of volcanoes. He sends his .^hips all over the
oceans, etc. So, too, he travels by rail, knowing all the
while that there is always a chance o: an accident. But
hj does not care about it in the least. Nothing of these
things deters him.

PHYSICAL EVILS AND "INIDEALITY" 335

Do we not thus begin to see a certain natural law in
us and about us ? 1 call it " The Law of Inideality,"
meaning that nothing in this world ever reaches the Ideal
which man can conceive of what he would like.

I quote the following from a paper I wrote upwards
of thirty years ago.^

" One of the Arguments of Design was supplied by
The Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical Con-
dition of Man. This was the title of the volume of the
Bridgewater Treatises, by Dr. J. Kidd, F.R.S.

" I cannot but think that many adaptations of man and
animals and plants, as well to their sphere of existence,
have been much overrated ; for, in fact, they are greatly
limited. The conclusion arrived at from a study of such
adaptations has been expressed by science somewhat as
follows : Animals and plants, and we may include man,
do not necessarily live where conditions may be best
suited to them, but where other animals and plants, as
well as inorganic or physical conditions, will let them
live, when they cannot migrate or get away from
them.

" This is the result of the intense struggle for exis-
tence and survival of the strongest which obtains every-
where. 1 his is a universal fact, and covers the sphere of
man's existence as well as that of all other organisms.
It requires but a slight observation, provided the mind
be free from preconceived ideas, to see that no animal or
plant is absolutely or perfectly adjusted to its sphere of
existence for every day of its life. These adjustments
are ever varying round a mean condition of a fair state
of comfort and happiness. Avera_ies in this world must
be looked for only. A vast amount of very imperfect

^•'Natural Theology cons'dered with reference to Modern Philo-
sophy," Journal of Transactions of the Victoria, Institute, 1873.

336 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

adaptations must be taken into account in considering
the conditions of life upon this planet.

" I will confine my remarks here to the relative con-
dition of man, in his adaptation to his environment ; for
this element of adaptation in the Argument of Design
seems to have been too much depended upon. Moreover
Dr. Kidd's remarks will afford a good illustration of the
faulty a priori or deductive reasoning of the teleologists
of the old school.

" Starting with the truism that man can now exist upon
this world — a possibility which, perhaps, did not exist
during the greater part of the world's history — we have
to consider the degree of perfection to which this adapt-
ability has arrived ; and a careful scrutiny will not bring
out more than a relatively perfect view. Consider his
wants. Food stands foremost. Now his calculations on
the produce of his fields can never be absolute. He may
be in no way to blame ; but after all his care and striving,
his harvest may be ruined. Again : one of the most
essential elements which furnishes to sustain our immense
manufactures is coal. We may regard coal as ' provi-
dentially ' stored up for man's use ; but we can conceive
— if it be there by God's providence — that it might have
been far more accessible and less dangerous to procure ;
for even with the most careful processes being adopted
for its extraction, an enormous loss of life has occurred.
So, too, with regard to calamities by fires, earthquakes
and storms. Who can foretell the fate of man, who is
ever liable to destruction from natural causes which he
cannot always avoid, and has no power to control ? Not
to mention diseases, hundreds of instances show an absence
of a conceivably perfect adaptation between himself and
his environment. In Dr. Kidd's contribution to the Bridge-
water Treatises, he alludes to the beneficial effect of wind

PHYSICAL EVILS AND "INIDEALITY" 337

in dissipating intense heat, and as a preventive against
the evils of a stagnant atmosphere, ' those currents of air
which administer in various modes as well to the luxury
and comfort of man, as to his most important wants '.
But in his description he alludes as much to the destruc-
tive effects of wind as to its benefit, and to the existence
of ' stagnant air producing [?] horrible effects, as goitre in
Switzerland ' ; ^ while of hurricanes he can only say, ' but
on some occasions we have immediate demonstration of
their remedying a greater evil [than the destruction of
life and property which hurricanes cause] ; viz., dissipating
swarms of ants in the island of Grenada ! ' It may be
questioned whether the latter is really a greater evil than
the destruction of hundreds of human beings ! Again,
of Swiss valleys, all he can say is, ' We may well be
thankful that our lot has not been cast in certain regions
of the earth, in those Alpine valleys, for instance, whose
scarcely human inhabitants attest the dreadful conse-
quences of a confined atmosphere '. He seems to forget
that if God be the Author of Nature, He must have
arranged the ' stagnant air as much as the hurricane '.

" But what do we infer from all this — and much more
might be added as to the atmosphere being charged with
pathogenic microbes, etc. — but that the physical adjust-
ment of man to the atmosphere is anything but abso-
lutely satisfactory?"

Now, an Atheist or modern Rationalist might easily
appeal to Dr. Kidd's descriptions, and tauntingly ask :
" Is this the work of your beneficent God ? "

Moreover, if we consider man's adjustments to ex-
ternal conditions, everything else besides the atmosphere
furnishes similar, so-called " evils ".

^ So common is this complaint among women, that a girl who had
not one used to be ridiculed by her companions !

22

338 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

In Other words, there are the same, only " relatively
perfect," i.e., imperfect conditions, those, than which he can
always conceive far better, wishes for far better, and
hopes for far better hereafter.

The philosopher is thought to have said a clever
thing when he remarked on the structure of the eye that
had a manufacturer brought it to him, he would be
ashamed to show so imperfect an instrument. This may
be somewhat of an exaggeration, but the truth underlying
it is that nothing is absolutely perfect but everything
may be nevertheless " very good," and good enough for
this world.

Imperfect adaptations are the invariable law of this
world. Now, many may feel disposed to ask : " Is not all
this very derogatory to the Deity, who is a God of love
and mercy? " I, at once and unhesitatingly, say " No ! "
It is not for man to pronounce what may or may not be
derogatory to God, if he believe in His existence. The
finite mind cannot estimate the wisdom of the Infinite.
It is this unphilosophical way of weighing God's actions
in our own mental balance, which has brought so much
contempt upon the methods and assertions of the tele-
ologists,

I would maintain that Natural Theology, as a science,
must be studied " objectively," that is itiductively and
not "subjectively" ; that is arguing deductively on an
assumed datum. Theologians must not shirk a full and
thoroughly impartial observation of the phenomena of
the world. We can only discover His laws by a close
examination of His works, their interactions, and their
actions upon ourselves, and the universal presence of
law — applicable to all cases of what was called design,
including the adaptation of man and animals to their
sphere of existence, I include under the Laiv of Inideality ;

PHYSICAL EVILS AND " INIDEALITY" 339

by which, I repeat, I would signify that nothing in
Nature ever reaches that idea/ state of perfection which
is conceivable. It expresses what I have called a relative
state of perfection. I call it a natural law, because law is
expressive of an order of facts, and this law admits of
universal application, applies to everything thought to be
" designed " though now known to be " evolved," and is,
therefore, like other natural laws, a universal witness to
the will of God.

Under this same head of Adaptation, I would allude
to a statement of Mr. Herbert Spencer, who in his usu-
ally powerful reasoning in support of Evolution, has made
a slip (as it seems to me) in dealing with this subject in
his article on the special creative hypothesis.^

In speaking of the parasites to which man is sub-
jected, he asks : " Shall we say that man, ' the head and
crown of things,' was provided as a habitat for these
parasites ? or shall we say that these degraded creatures,
incapable of thought and enjoyment, were created that
they might cause unhappiness to man ? One or other
of these alternatives must be chosen by those who con-
tend that every kind of organism was separately devised
by the Creator. Which do they prefer.? With the
conception of two antagonistic powers^ which severally
work good and evil in the world, the facts are congruous
enough"

I italicise the last sentence as seeming to me to be
bordering on absurdity, under any hypothesis. For, if
parasites be an " evil " and man the " good," the argument
cannot stop with man ; and we shall soon become utterly
perplexed to know which animals are " good " and which
are " evil ". If those which prey on others, such as

'^Principles of Biology, ist ed,, vol. i., p. 344.

340 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

parasites on man, be (as is evidently intended by Mr.
Spencer) evil ; then a fortiori, all carnivorous animals
must be "evil" and we must presume all herbivorous
animals "good," and man himself must therefore be
" evil " too. But we have started with the idea that he
was " good " and his parasites " evil ". Of what character
then are those animals, besides man, that partake of a
mixed diet, as the rat and pig ?

Let us recognise this world as never furnishing more
than a relative condition of things ; while the "purpose"
of that, too, is not difficult to see, now that we have the
light of Christ's revelation as to the meaning of the
world thrown upon it ; namely, as a state of probation
for man to fit him for a higher destiny than any which
this world can furnish. If we accept tJiis as a universal
truth, we shall not discolour our view of creation by
erroneous views of God's goodness, much less by ration-
alistic, monistic or atheistic ideas.

CHAPTER XI

ETHER AS THE VEHICLE OF DIVINE POWER AND THE

HUMAN SOUL

I HAVE had something to say upon the origin of matter
out of vortex-rings of ether. I now wish to show that
the theory is feasible which supposes God to be wherever
ether is supposed to be. That is, they are both infinite
in space.

Ether penetrates all matter, inorganic and organic
alike ; and as it is the vehicle for all kinds of physical
forces, so it may be the instrument of the soul of man
when parted from the body. It, therefore, may be the
universal inter-communicating medium of all conscious
beings in the universe.

I do not think, therefore, that we can conceive of
anything in Nature better than the ether, capable of
" imaging," so to say, an Infinite Spiritual Power.

If ether be a fact, then it must be practically infinite
and eternal, and is not matter, as we understand matter.
The evidence of its existence depends upon induction
based on the transmission of light and other vibratory
forces. We do not think of those which cause light in
our brains as self-conscious ; but that own self-concious-
ness may be dependent, not so much on the matter of
our bodies, as upon the ether which inter-penetrates the
substance of our brains ; hence, we can begin to imagine

(34i;

342 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

the Infinite Ether as the Vehicle of an Infinite Conscious
Being.

The idea of " God residing with the humble and
contrite heart," and our Lord's expression : " We will
make our abode with him who loves," etc., may have
a physical as well as spiritual interpretation. We all
do practically assume it, by praying in silence^ fully
believing that there is a sympathetic Spirit which can
help our mental aspirations. Our souls must "vibrate
in unison with God," and response comes as truly as
when a note struck on a violin causes the same to sound
in a distant piano.

Our own vibrations are constantly changing. God's
are permanent and uniform. " With Him there is no
variableness nor turning of the shadow," i.e., on the
dial ; for God is, so to say, always on the meridian.

It is for us to put ourselves in unison with Him ;
that is "at one" with Him, not for Him to be reconciled
to us.

Again, it is well known that two waves may meet,
whether air-waves giving sound or ether-waves giving
us light, and if they do not coincide, silence and dark-
ness may be the result, respectively ; so that we seem to
see an analogy with St. Paul's expression, " Quench not
the Spirit ".

A pure and loving heart vibrates in unison with
God. A lustful and rebellious thought produces discord
with, it may be, direful consequences.

It may be suggested that this "ethereal " notion may
be all fanciful, and only a picturesque if not grotesque
analogy ; but there would seem to be some basis for
believing that our "soul" or the Ego is not so much
dependent on the body made of flesh, as one of ether
permeating it.

ETHER THE VEHICLE OF THE SOUL 343

To supply some, perhaps only a slight ground for
this supposition, I will describe briefly the result of
careful observations on experiments made by a gentle-
man who possesses the powers of revealing (not reading
any thought), whatever was within the brain of any
person in the form of a mental picture. It may, perhaps,
in a way, lend some countenance to the ethereal theory
of soul-vibrations occurring in an ethereal counterpart
of the body.

The gentleman in question admitted that he had no
power to read any abstract thought passing through the
mind, so styled his entertainment — " Thought Reveal-
ing ". From, a careful study of all his successes as well
as failures, which were just as instructive, it became per-
fectly clear to me that whatever formed a nie^ital pictiire
in the mind of the " Transmitter," as he called the person
operating with him, he, the " Revealer," could see and
describe it ; so that if you thought of a particular photo-
graph among a group of portraits lying on the table, he
would at once select it from any number.

His method of operation consisted first, in being
blindfolded ; for he said, though not necessary, it helped
him not to see. Then he would hold with his left hand
the right hand of the transmitter. He usually first
pressed his own palm strongly upon that of the trans-
mitter, often with a sliding motion. They then grasped
hands firmly. This was not, however, necessary, for
after pressing the palm he would sometimes withdraw
his hand to a distance of about twelve or fourteen inches,
so that the outstretched palms of both men faced each
other. They were then kept in this position. Under
this condition, without actual contact, he could "reveal"
just as readily. He told me that it produced a sensation
of taut cords, as it were, extending from palm to palm.

344 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

but that if he removed his hand further away the " cords "
on the circumference began to " snap ".

His failures were as interesting as his successes ;
because they were always the fault of the transmitter
in consequence of his not following the direction, which
was that the transmitter should always imagine himself
doing whatever he wished the revealer to do ; so that he
thereby formed a mental picture of the act in his own
mind which the revealer then reproduced by doing it.
A few examples will illustrate some failures.

A scarf-pin was placed in the breast-pocket of a
gentleman's coat, the pocket being in the inside of the
coat, which was buttoned up. The revealer felt over the
spot, but outside the coat. His failure in extracting the
pin arose from the fact, elicited by questioning the trans-
mitter, that the latter forgot that he would have in
imagination to unbutton his coat and feel in the inside
pocket to get it, so that the revealer, of course, omitted
this part of the performance.

As another example : A gentleman having arranged
to think of something, stared at the wall. The trans-
mitter (being always blindfolded) at once began stroking
the wall at the spot. The experiment was abandoned,
as the transmitter said the action was incorrect. On
subsequently asking him what it was he wished the
revealer to do, he replied that it was to stroke the head
of a little dog which was in the arms of a lady standing
by. The transmitter had, therefore, failed to comply
with the revealer's primary condition, which was that he
should imagine himself looking at and stroking the dog's
head. Instead of that, by gazing hard at the wall instead
of at the dog, he introduced a disturbing element into
his own mind. The result was a combination of trans-
missions, for the revealer stroked the wall.

ETHER THE VEHICLE OF THE SOUL 345

Another example may be added. The gentleman
in question said he could tell the name of my watch, or
number of a bank-note, or anything else which / knew
myself; provided I imagined myself writing it in the air,
as it were. Standing before a wall, and holding my
hand, he wrote in large letters with his finger, as I myself
thought of it, the name TUPMAN, on the wall. He
could not have guessed it, as the watch was made in the
early part of last century by a watchmaker of that name
living in Great Russell Street, and long since dead ; and
no watchmaker of that name exists in London.^

On telling the revealer that I once transmitted a
wish upon a revealer in a hypnotic or somnabulistic con-
dition, with the aid of a copper wire some two yards
long, one end being bound round the hand of the
revealer, the other being in my own, he assured me that
he had done the same thing, but with a fine wire used for
electrical purposes, about twenty feet in length, between
himself and the transmitter ; and he named Mr. Carlisle,
the manager of the Irish Times, as the transmitter, and
a person with whom he could instantly and clearly reveal
anything.

There were, therefore, three distinctly different means
of communication from the transmitter to the revealer.

(i) By contact, by holding hands.

(2) Without contact, after previous contact of hands.

(3) With the connection by wire between them.

It is difficult to suppose that the body {i.e.^ a material
communication) is the instrument ; since experiments (2)
and (3) show that the body is unnecessary.

It would seem, therefore, that the body is, as it were,
a necessary " outer case " as long as we are alive in this

1 An account of this and other experiments is given in Borderland^
No. iii., p. 260, 1894.

346 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

world ; but that the Ego is really dependent upon an
" ethereal " structure permeating and perhaps exceeding
the material body in dimensions.

The authors of T/ie Unseen Universe, take this view,
as the following quotation proves : " Let us begin by
supposing that we possess a frame, or the rudiments of a
frame, connecting us with the invisible universe, which
we may call the spiritual body ".^

Again they write : " Thought conceived to affect the
matter of another universe with this may explain a future
state ". That is, by our having an ethereal body in con-
nection with the surrounding ethereal world. ^

Mr, H. S. Olcott, in his paper entitled " Psychometry
and Thought Transference," arranges experiments of the
latter phenomenon under five heads : " The transference
of Directions ; the transference of Visual Impressions ;
the transference of Sensation ; the transference of Words,
Names, Sentences, Tunes, Concrete Ideas, such as Histori-
cal Scenes, Apparitions ; and lastly Abstract Thoughts
and Ideas.

With regard to the last, however, all he can say is :
" It not infrequently happens that when two persons are
thinking out the same problem, the solution seems to
come to both simultaneously, so that both begin to utter
it at once. Or that if one is thinking on some philo-
sophical subject, the other begins to discuss the same
subject. However, this branch of thought-transference
does not very readily lend itself to experimentation."

The phenomenon called Psychometry appears to afford
another illustration of the probability that mental phe-
nomena are expressible as vibrations. The following is
a case : I sent a portion of a letter from a gentleman
abroad to an unknown lady in the north of England who

' The Unseen Universe, p. 299. ^ P. 200,

ETHER THE VEHICLE OF THE SOUL 347

possessed the psychometric powers. Nothing in the
writing could afford the least clue as to the writer or to
his whereabouts. All that she had to do was to hold the
latter, when his "aura," as it is called, influenced her in
some mysterious way that not only did she perceive that
the writer was in a village in India, but located it as some
forty miles from Madras ; which was correct.

If the writer had derived pleasure or sorrow from
certain events, the corresponding sensations are felt by
the psychometrist.

If such are referable to vibrations in ether " clinging "
to the object held in the hand, then we seem to have an
analogy with light ; that as the letter, so to say, was
charged with vibrations by the writer, these were repro-
duced as conscious sensations by the receiver ; just as
ether-vibrations are translated into light by the brain.

A passage which seems to bear on this subject is by
the authors of T/ie Unseeyi Universe who observe : ^ " We
may go even further than luminiferous vibrations which
take their rise chiefly at the surfaces of bodies, and extend
our speculations into the interior of substances, since the
law of gravitation assures us that any displacement which
takes place in the very heart of the earth will be felt
throughout the universe, and we may even imagine that
the same thing will hold true of those molecular motions
which accompany thought. For every thought we think
is accompanied by a displacement and motion of the
particles of the brain, and we may imagine that somehow
— in all probability by means of the medium — these
motions are propagated through the universe." Views of
this nature were long ago entertained by Babbage, and
they have since commended themselves to several men
of science, and amongst others to Jevons. " Mr. Babbage,"

1 P. 198.

348 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

says this author,^ " has pointed out that if we had power
to follow and detect the minutest effects of any disturb-
ance, each particle of existing matter must be a register
of all that has happened." ^

Mr. Frederic W. H. Myers writes as follows on his
experience of thought transference : —

" We find that it is occasionally possible for an experi-
menter to produce by effort of will a hallucinatory image
of himself in the perception of a friend at a distance, with-
out any previous suggestion or anticipation that such an
image would appear. This fact, of which we have several
instances attested by trustworthy persons at each end of
the chain, forms a transition between ordinary experi-
ments in thought-transference and those spontaneous
hallucinatory images which occur so frequently at or about
the moment of death, and represent the dying person to
a distant friend who is often not even aware of the
illness." ^

The late Rev. H. R. Haweis was on one occasion too
unwell with a severe cold to be in his place in the pulpit
of St. James's Church, Westmoreland Street ; so a friend
preached instead. More tJian one of his congregation
told him the next day that they saw him in the pulpit by
the side of the preacher, and asked why he did not preach
and why he was there. Haweis, as he informed me him-
self, was sitting all the morning over the fire bemoaning
his absence from the pulpit !

Mr. Myers' interpretation seems to be the most likely
one ; not that Haweis unconsciously projected an appear-
of himself into the pulpit, but two of his congregation
were en rapport with him, received the ethereal waves,

^Principles of Science, vol. ii., p. 455.
^ Ninth Bridgcwater Treatise.
" Science and a Future Life, p. 26.

ETHER THE VEHICLE OF THE SOUL 349

and their brains translated them into a vision of Haweis
where they were accustomed to see him. If this hy-
pothesis be true, it would be, of course, exactly parallel
to any visual object ; as only waves reach the eye, but
are translated by the brain into the object which trans-
mits them. It will also interpret the appearance of
wraiths of friends on the point of death.

CHAPTER XII

RATIONALISTIC CRITICISMS UPON THE THEOLOGICAL

ASPECT OF GOD

There is a tolerable uniformity in writers of the Mon-
istic, Rationalistic and other kindred schools as to the
non-acceptance in the belief of God ; because it is want-
ing in such proof as they will only accept.

Some, as Huxley, content themselves with the word
" Agnostic " ; Haeckel goes further and denies the ex-
istence of a conscious God altogether.

The question, therefore, arises : What sort of proof
do they require to satisfy them ?

I will select the author of Mr. Balfour's Apologetics,
and quote some paragraphs as representative of a typical
Rationalist's views.

(i) " To describe Theology as a department of know-
ledge is to beg the whole question at issue between
Rationalism and Religion." ^

(2) " Knowledge courts the most rigorous investiga-
tion. . . . What single fact or statement is there in the
realm of Theology which can be successfully submitted
to these conditions and may, therefore, be entitled to
rank as knowledge ? " ^

(3) " Science remains firmly planted on the impreg-
nable ground of experience. . . . Theology consists of

1 Op. cit.y p. 24. '^ P. 24.

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RATIONALISTIC CRITICISMS 351

doctrines and speculations which are based on imagina-
tion and vain desire." ^

(7) " If by religious truth be meant the doctrines of
the existence of God and of human immortality, we
think it would be difficult to show that there is any
general ' need ' to believe in these things." ^

(8) " All faith which is not an inference from know-
ledge should be regarded with suspicion and distrust."^

No doubt many doctrines or dogmas propounded by
the Church in past centuries were based on erroneous
interpretations of the Scriptures. These are gradually
being eliminated whenever modern scientific investiga-
tions into the true meaning of the documents reveal their
unsoundness. But there are some which the more they
are investigated the sounder appears to be their tena-
bility. The two alluded to above, vis., the existence
of God, and human immortality ; and we may add man's
Will are based on inductive evidence of the highest
order ; for the first two are outside the sphere of " ob-
servation and experiment ".

I would, however, maintain that these do come within
the range of human knoivledge as much as the Rotation
of the Earth ; which cannot be proved to be true by
either observation or experiment. According to Ration-
alists Ptolemy must have been right, and Copernicus
wrong.

As the opinions of a Monist, Haeckel speaks as
follows with regard to the Deity of Christians : —

(i) " He is always conceived in a more or less human
form, as an organism which thinks and acts like a man — ■
only on a much higher scale."*

" The * Trinity ' is not an original element in Chris-

ip. 27. 2 p. 28. =* Pp. 33.34.

•* The Riddle of the Universe, p. 283.

352 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

tianity. Like most of the other Christian dogmas, it
has been borrowed from earlier religions." ^

" ' God the Father,' the omnipotent creator of heaven
and earth — this untenable myth was ref ited long ago by
scientific cosmogony, astronomy and geology." ^

" In the higher and more abstract forms of religion
[than anthropomorphic ideas], this idea of bodily ap-
pearances [as in the old Egyptian cult, in animals] is
entirely abandoned, and God is adored as a * pure spirit '
without a body. ' God is a spirit, and they who worship
him must worship him in spirit and in truth.' Never-
theless, the psychic activity of this 'pure spirit' remains
just the same as that of the anthropomorphic God. In
reality, even this immaterial spirit is not conceived to be
incorporeal, but merely invisible, gaseous. We thus
arrive at the paradoxical conception of God as a gaseous
vertebrate y ^

In reply to the sentiments expressed in these quota-
tions, I would observe that the various conceptions of God
or of gods, seem always to have been in accordance with
the intellectual stages of man. It is man, in fact, who
conceives of his God in his own image. Thus the
immoralities of the deities of ancient Greece reflected
those of the Greeks themselves.

Man cannot possibly conceive of the nature of a
Spiritual Being not appreciable by the senses. He must
be anthropomorphically expressed ; but as man rises in
the scale of knowledge and of ideas of morality, so does
his idea of God become more and more refined. But
through many stages, morality, as we understand it, was
not necessarily associated with a divine nature at all.
Religion consisted solely of ceremony.

^ The Riddle of the Universe, p. 285. '^ Ibiil., p. 284.

^Ibid., p. 295.

RATIONALISTIC CRITICISMS 353

Hence in the Old Testament, we find the conception
of God passing through various grades, so to speak, till
we come to the psalmists and prophets, who speak of
Him as loving and sympathetic towards man, the widow
and the orphan, as well as having righteous and merciful
traits of character taken from the improved condition of
man's mind and heart.

The important question which concerns us now is :
Are all these anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity
purely Subjective creations of man's brain, or is there any
Objective reality corresponding to them ?

The Christian says " Yes " ; but the Monist and
Rationalist say " No ".

I maintain that Xho. probabilities of a Conscious Mind
in Nature are as great as those in other matters which
men accept as undeniable truths ; but cannot prove by
experimental evidence.

It is worth while considering a few of them, to show
that the belief in God being based on parallel lines of
inductive evidence is quite as reasonable as many which
scientists hold.

It is advisable to select these from scientific conclu-
sions, because Monists and Rationalists assert that
science is par excellence the one thing to be trusted ; and
whatever cannot be brought within the pale of her
region, need not be accepted as infallible truth.

I have already alluded to the fact that the rotation
of the earth cannot be proved by observation and ex-
periment ; for it is only believed because it is infinitely
more probable that the earth revolves on its axis in
twenty-four hours, than that the sun and stars should
do so, considering their distances are so great or in-
calculable.

As another instance of Inductive Evidence let us

354 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

turn to geology. Geologists tell us that the crust of the
earth is composed of " aqueous strata " and " igneous
rocks," etc. How do they know that these descriptive
adjectives are applicable and correct ? Solely by analogy
with existing processes going on in the world. As
geology represents past history, it cannot be recalled
and tested experimentally. And so we remain perfectly
satisfied with inductive evidence. The same reasoning
applies to the fossils upon which palaeontological evolu-
tion is based, and Hu.xley's interesting genealogy of the
horse from a small animal with five toes on each foot to
our own one-toed useful animal is entirely based on
inductive reasoning.

The establishment of Evolution generally is as largely
founded on inductive evidence as that of man is, by
embryology and anatomy ; but this great doctrine is
equally well based on experimental evidences of culti-
vation and domestication, and so when we have to draw
conclusions about prehistoric remains, we conclude that
flint weapons were made artificially by the flat facets or
planes all over them, even on the rudest palaeolithic ones,
showing longitudinal surf aces ; which cannot be accounted
for by the action of running water or other physical
forces in Nature.

We can imitate them closely, as the celebrated " Flint
Jack " did, who used to impose upon the unwary, but still
the conviction that they were artificially made by man out-
weighs any improbability that might rise in some people's
minds in consequence of their vast antiquity — as seen in
their being associated with the sub-glacial mammoth and
woolly rhinoceros, etc., etc.

I hardly think the author of ATr. Balfour's Apologetics
will deny that these conclusions of science are as perfectly
sound and acceptable as if they were the " evidences of

RATIONALISTIC CRITICISMS 355

the senses," which they are not, or " proved by experi-
ment," which they cannot be.

This being the case, neither he nor any Rationalist
can claim the right to refuse similar lines of evidence for
the belief in God and immortality of man if they can be
forthcoming.

Many theologians have written upon the Being of
God, and brought forward reasons which appeared to
them conclusive. Thus, Mr. S. Charnock, B.D., in the
middle of the seventeenth century, wrote a long treatise
entitled. Discourses on the Divine Providence and the
Existence and Attributes of God, from which I have
already had occasion to quote freely. Many of his
arguments are, as might be expected with the progress
of science and biblical study, out of date ; but some are,
and always will be, permanent, as long as the mind of
man remains as it is ; such as the production of " Order"
out of " Chaos," now called " cosmic vapour " ; the " origin
of living beings" in the world ; the argument of" Adap-
tations " and the presence of " Directivity " ; the existence
of Volition and Self-consciousness and the " Moral
Nature of Man," generally, etc.

Charnock quotes from several writers of early date
— and we might go as far back, not only as Socrates,
but to the earliest dates known in history — to show the
generally believed existence of a Deity of some sort.

David declares that the heavens and the firmament
witness to a Creator.^ So does Isaiah ■'' and St. Paul,
but modern Rationalists can also see the heavens and
the fruitful seasons ; but they carry no weight as evi-
dencing a Mind. They demand "scientific proof". If
they want " experimental " proof, it is not to be had ;
but inductive evidence there is in ample abundance.

1 Ps. xix. 2 jg_ xl, 12, 13, 18.

356 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews says : " By
faith we understand that the worlds have been framed
by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not
been made out of things which do appear ; " ^ and by
faz/k he means what we now call " inductive evidence "•
It is not mere belief on slight grounds or probabilities,
much less crediility on a mere statement without any
sort of proof or evidence, but only in some fallible
authority.

" How could this great heap be brought into being
unless a God had framed it ? " asks Charnock. " Every
plant, every atom, as well as every star, at the first
meeting whispers this in our ears, ' I have a Creator,
I am witness to a Deity'. Who ever saw statues or
pictures, but presently thinks of a statuary and limner ?
Who beholds garments, ships or houses, but understands
there was a weaver, a carpenter, an architect ? " ^

In a previous chapter I have carried this argument
further down, wherein we saw that every part and atom
of structure in living beings betrays Directivity ; which
cannot be accounted for by any known actions of purely
physical and chemical forces : and if a chemist can make
in the laboratory any organic substances, then he himself
is assuming the place of that Directivity which univer-
sally pervades the organic world.

If any one refuses to recognise the Power in Nature,
he violates the laws of his own mental constitution.

It is foreign from my province in this book, to combat
atheistic views, apart from the method I have followed in
^xc)\!\x\^\\\.Q. positive position by inductive evidence; nor
do I touch upon Mr. Robertson's revival of the mythical

1 Ileb. xi. 3.

2 Philo, ex Petav. Theol. Dog., torn, i., lib, 1. cap. i, p. 4. [Ref. in
Charnock. vol. i., pp. 143, 144.]

RATIONALISTIC CRITICISMS 357

idea of Christ ; nor to substantiate the Christian's belief
in a Personal God of Love.

Consequently I shall not do more than call attention
to the late Mr. Grant Allen's works. He is no doubt
right or most probably so in thinking that the primitive
idea of a God was an ancestral spirit ; ^ but this does not
prove that there is no God in reality.

His formidable work on The Evolution of the Idea of
God has for its object " the proof that in its origin the
concept of a God is nothing more than that of a dead
man, regarded as a still surviving ghost or spirit, and
endowed with increased or supernatural powers and
qualities,^

That one^ if not the, most primitive idea was ances-
tral is obvious. It explains the meaning of sacrificial
offerings of roast flesh, vegetables and incense ; but if it
be implied that there is no God at all, then I would reply
the universal consensus ol opinion, collected by Mr. Grant
Alien, though \i per se may be no proof yQt it shows the
universal " feeling after God " through all time and space
since man has peopled this earth. It has been a groping
in the dark, till men gained a clearer light by philosophy
and science, apart from anything supposed to have been
revealed.

Having " proved " by inductive evidence the over-
whelming probability of the existence of a conscious
Mind or God in Nature, then all attempts to discover
Him are but progressive efforts and strivings to establish
what man has all along been intuitively convinced to
have existed, but could not prove, only realising Him in
his mind, anthropomorphically, according to his light, in
time and space,

1 So too Col. Gamier in his Worship of the Dead. ^ P. 19.

CHAPTER XIII

INDUCTIVE EVIDENCE THE BASIS OF BELIEF OF THE
THEIST IN HUMAN IMMORTALITY

The Soul as well as Life is not material, though inti-
mately bound up with it ; therefore it must be of the
nature of energy of some sort, perhaps a bundle of
vibrations of ether.

If a vibration be set up in a medium, that vibration
must go on for ever, if no other force intervene to stop it.

The same medium may be in motion with several
vibrations at the same time ; as we are all familiar with
the effects of an orchestra, the same air which enters our
ears carries many notes at once. Similarly the ether
carries many colours at the same moment into our pupils
when looking upon a picture or scenery.

Hence if our souls have an ethereal basis (perhaps
identical with St. Paul's "spiritual body") there is
nothing inconceivable in the portion of ether constitut-
ing our soul-frame being agitated by numerous and
separate vibrations, recognisable as emotions, intellect,
conscience, etc.

As our whole soul is bound up with the whole body,
so each individual element of the former would seem to
be specially correlated with localised portions of the
brain, so that mental inequalities are due to unequal
developments of their respective sites.

We know from the sizes of the brain cavities of the

(358)

IMMORTALITY 359

mammalia from the Eocene period to man that as their
evolution proceeded so did the development of the brain
as far as size is concerned ; but intelligence is correlated
not only with size but also with structure, such as an
increase in convolutions and grey matter, etc.

As Evolution proceeds in accordance with use, and
the structure of their limbs, peculiar to each kind of
animal, are formed in direct response to the animals'
physical activities, according to the " principle of Least
Action," so brains develop in response to mental use;
and the brains of animals were presumably evolved in
accordance with an increasing intelligence simultane-
ously ; and not much exceeding their requirements for
efficiency.

With man, not only has all this been equally true ;
but having acquired the power of realising abstract,
mental ideals, he can bring about an alteration in the
brain by volitional thought alone ; and secondly, in the
shape of his skull in adaptation to the increasing size of
the brain within it.

I know a man who as a boy had a remarkably re-
treating forehead. His former schoolmaster met him
when he was fifty-five. He said in my presence, " Let
me look at your profile, for it was a remarkable one when
you were at school ". He found, however, that there
was nothing to remark about it. The boy had grown
into a great reader and student. His brain had de-
veloped in response to use, and something like a hemi-
sphere had grown where a retreating forehead had been.

Darwin somewhere alludes to the same phenomenon.

Here, then, the Soul acted as a power over the
material structure of the brain and skull ; just as
muscular exercise develops the muscles and bones of
the limbs ; but while actual movements of these bring

36o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

about an enlargement of the muscles ; so thought causes
the brain to respond and develop itself accordingly.

Conversely, disuse will cause atrophy of both the body
and brain.

Materialists base their disbelief in the possibility of
immortality of the soul on its intimate connection with
the physical nature of the brain ; but they have nothing
to say about the possible existence of a " spiritual " or
more accurately "ethereal " body; to which I have alluded
in speaking upon " Thought Revealing". If the living
soul consist of ethereal vibrations, there is nothing to
disprove the possibility or probability of thought being
transmitted to a distance as ethereal waves of a peculiar
length, and thus establish telepathic communications,
somewhat like wireless telegraphy in physics.^

If the preceding be any approximation to the truth,
then the essential thing is that the soul and its ethereal
counterpart may be separated from the grosser material
one which it is obliged to have in this world in order to
hold ordinary intercourse with other souls and apprehend
all terrestrial phenomena.

Rationalists and Monists would limit all possibilities
of acquiring knowledge to the senses ; and what they
cannot take in, they say, need not be believed in as true ;
but our senses are greatly limited. In sight we only see
a fragment of the spectrum ; a cat is better off than we
are. A dog's perception of smell is far keener than ours.-

But there are higher perceptions than mere response
to sight, sound, smelling, etc.

' The reader will find this discussed by Dr. Minot Judsoii Savage in
his Life beyond Deaths who " knows beyond question a case of telepathy
between the Indian Ocean and New York," p. 263.

'^ As the authors of The Unseen Universe have replied to ten objec-
tions to an immaterial existence, I will content myself by referring the
reader to their refutation (pp. 202-210).

IMMORTALITY 361

One man /lears music, but it is but little more than
noise to him. In another it excites a rapturous emotion,
though both hear precisely the same notes. So is it with
painting. Again, one man has the emotion of philan-
thropy, which would embrace the whole world if possible ;
another feels nothing of the sort, and only cares for his
family ; or it may be even for himself alone.

Are these emotions to be limited to the senses, or are
they ethereal, psychical vibrations, though they may have
been set in motion through the material agency of the
senses ?

If it be said a man would not have had them at all
without a brain ; the answer is. Could they have come out
of a material chaos? It is more probable that they are
part and parcel of Life. They are in accordance with
natural laws in the ethereal world, and are echoes in
man's spirit of the Universal Spirit of God.

" Harmonies," whether in colours or sounds as compared
by men, are but revelations of possibilities of natural laws
framed by God.

If Evolution has been necessary to develop Man from
a Monad, why should it stop ? That it should cease as
far as the body goes is reasonable ; because man can
make loo/s and so there is no need to convert his limbs,
mouth and teeth into instruments ; but he has passed
the boundary line, not only in corporeal manufacture, but
in acquiring self-consciousness based on the power of
realising abstract ideas. This has opened out a new
science — Human Psychology — and as physiology is the
science dealing with the evolution of bodily life, so human
psychology is the science of the evolution of the human
soul ; and the great question is, if man's body has reached
the terrestrial goal, may not man's soul be just beginning
a corresponding career to be pursued hereafter ?

362 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

As in the history of animals and plants there are
graduations in the phenomena of life ; so do we see
numerous stages of psychical progress in man in this
world. Some men have been and are highly intellectual
giants, others are religious saints. From them are all
stages downwards, whether as individuals or races. Some
are " survivals " with only " rudimentary ideas," just as
there are still living lowly organised plants and animals.

When is psychical evolution to end ? If it has taken
millions of years to evolve the body of man, may it not
take millions of years to perfect the human soul ? It is
very far from perfection now ? We must live in Faith
and Hope and not on/y by Sight.

Now let us turn to Monists and Rationalists and hear
what they have got to say. I will take Haeckel's views
first.

He calls the conception of the immortality of the soul
the " highest point of superstition, which is regarded as
the impregnable citadel of all mystical and dualistic
notions ". He attributes the belief to " the selfish interest
of the human personality, who is determined to have a
guarantee of his existence beyond the grave at any price "}

" Thanatism," as he calls the mortality of the soul, " is
the opinion which holds that at a man's death not only
all the other physiological functions are arrested, but his
" soul " also disappears — that is, that sum of cerebral
functions which psychic dualism regards as a peculiar
entity, independent of the other vital processes in the
living body ", . . . " Personal psychic activity is extin-
guished like every other physical function." '^

' Op. cit., p. 192.

^ I am not concerned here with Weismann's theory that unicellular
organisms, multiplying by division, are immortal. Ilacckcl repudiates it
altogether {op. cit., pp. 193, 194, 195).

IMMORTALITY 363

The Materialist who builds his argument against
immortality solely on the destructibility of the body at
physical death, cannot refute the suggestion of the
ethereal body, the evidence for the existence of which has
been already given ; and if we ask, if man should rise
again, why should not all animals as well, it may be
replied that, although, as Butler argued, that for all
v/e know, animals may do so, yet a reasonable objec-
tion to this hypothesis is that they are not mentally
fitted for it. Since their minds are limited to the appreci-
ation of concrete terrestrial matters only, or to objects
which merely appeal to their senses, any mental con-
ception of " Life," abstractedly considered is,perse, either
here or hereafter precluded.

They would all be like " fish out of water " in a spiritual
world, where bodily organisations are non-existent.

Conversely, the very fact that Evolution has brought
about the power of conceiving abstractions, places man
completely above the animals ; and so, in a way, fits
him for a spiritual environment, beyond any which this
earth can supply.

If he were solely adapted for a terrestrial life, he is
no better off, but rather worse than the animals ; as they
are unable mentally to realise their own existence and
position here. Consequently a future existence is in-
conceivable, and, as far as can be seen or conjectured,
useless to them.

Now, are there any conditions requisite for man to
enjoy a future life?

The following words of St. John seem to throw some
light upon this important question, from a psychological
point of view : " He that hath the Son hath the Life ; and
he that hath not the Son of God hath not the Life ".

These words are a paraphrase of what St. John

364 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

reports our Lord to have Himself said : "This is the will
of My Father, that every one that beholdeth the Son, and
believeth in Him, should have eternal life ; and I will
raise him up at the last day "}

Man may resemble the animals, and live a purely
automatic existence, their consciousness of volition being
arrested, dormant, or in the worst cases, practically ex-
tinct. They are what St. Paul calls " natural " as op-
posed to the " spiritual ". They allow themselves to
become automata like all animals ; namely, swayed by
the stronger motive at the time of temptation or other
occasion, without allowing themselves to reflect upon
their actions.

' The germ or spark of the higher life may be there —
that potentiality of holiness — which requires to be fanned
into a flame of enthusiasm for righteousness.

This possibility of Regeneration is in every one, or
the living the higher life in Christ.

Every one who lives up to his light is on the high road
to " have the Son," whether he ever heard of Him or not,
like the Good Samaritan.

St. Peter's vision revealed this truth to Him.

On the other hand, every one who refuses to live up
to his light, and persistently follows the ways of dark-
ness, repudiates the Son, "quenches the Spirit" within
him, and so he ivill not have Life or the Son.

Hence, and all the New Testament supports this
view, that it is the cultivation of the Spiritual Life which
ensures Immortality for man and man alone.

It may be said that many men are forced into evil
lives, by their environments ; that infants and children
have died, never having had the opportunity of a moral
education, l^ut may not this be an argument for a future

' John vi. .)().

IMMORTALITY 365

life, that the opportunity will then be provided ? The
" germ " had no chance of growing here. It is said that
a// will rise again, but while so;ne rise to eternal life,
others do so to judgment ; and a "second death" is
alluded to.

If the latter is to be the punishment for evil lives
spent on earth, we may ask why does it not coincide
with physical death ?

On the other hand, may not this intermediate period
— the length of which is not stated — be just what is wanted
to give all m^n another chance of redeeming their char-
acters and accepting the Son ?

If they do perish — be annihilated — such an end would
be due to their own fault.

It would be unwise for me to lay any stress on the so-
called " proofs " of the continuous existence after death,
in the "spiritualistic" phenomena exhibited by mediums.
I would refer the reader to Dr. Savage's Life Beyond
Death for the opinions of one who has studied the
subject as scientiTxally as it seems possible.^

There is, however, one curious phenomenon with
which I am familiar, though I cannot do it myself — I
allude to automatic writing ; and the question arises : Is
it due to the automatic action of the "sub-conscious"
part of the brain ; or is it due to intelligences which are
independent of the " operator," as I will call the writer ?

The first noticeable fact is, that the writers are In-
telligences of some sort. The operator is quite ignorant
as to what his or her fingers are going to write. More-
over, they will write of themselves, while the operator's
mind is occupied on other matters — as when holding a
conversation with any one present.

1 Mr. William James in The Will to Believe, has also something to
say about it.

366 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

The question is, how is it to be tested as to which
source it must be referred ?

In the case of the person (a lady) to whom I refer,
the hand-writin^fT is not at all like hers. The formation
of the letters is quite different, often very quaint, as in
making little spirals or helices at the bottom of capital
letters ; or by beginning the circle of round letters as a,
0, g, etc., from left to right and then reversing it suddenly.

Sometimes a word is spelt wrongly, a few letters only
being made ; the hand stops, pauses as if for reflection,
then begins again to spell the word rightly. A sentence
may be half written when the writer stops, dashes a line
to a distance and writes no more.^

Sometimes it shows humour. It wrote a sentence
very minutely; the lady said: "Why do you write so
small?" It immediately went on in a large childish
round hand. Such replies as " Don't be so inquisitive,"
" Be patient," etc., come after questions, etc., etc.

The subject-matter of the sentences often differs toto
ccelo from the lady's ordinary mental characteristics.
Thus, for example, when her second daughter was married
her hand wrote : " My word, you have put your foot into
it this time ! " I need hardly say there was nothing
whatever to justify this rude remark ; and it is difficult
to reconcile it with her own brain's automatic action !

On another occasion the lady asked some question
and the reply came, " Oh ! go to blazes ! " Could that
have been her own subliminal consciousness ; or the
subsequent communication in another hand-writing, " We
apologise for that rude remark " ?

The writers'^ almost invariably say, "We"; e.g.,

1 Other " writers " have experienced this same peculiarity.

2 There are several distinguishable by the various kinds of expres-
sions, etc.

IMMORTALITY 367

"We think" — so and so, is a common commencement to
some trivial remark.

It does not hesitate to tell falsehoods about people :
and when asked "if it is true," adds " No we were only-
funning ".

Like the experience of other automatic writers, the
Intelligences always say they are not allowed to say any-
thing about themselves or their condition either now or
formerly, one observing, " It's against the rules ",

On one occasion the " Intelligence " said she was
the lady's mother, and to prove her identity, told the
lady (her daughter) to remember a gentleman whom she
knew as a little child in Brussels. The question her

mother put was : " Do you remember Dr. and what

he used to say about his violin ? " For the first time
since she was ten years old, the lady recalled the fact
that he said he believed his violin had a "soul".

The " Intelligences " sometimes have names ; and one
failed for some time to write ; so the lady asked what
had become of him ? The reply was : " He is gone to be
an inspector of spirits ! " One of the lady's married
daughters is named Marion, but from a child she has
never been addressed by it, but has always been called
Maggie ; yet one of the writers persists in speaking of
her as " Mrs. Marion ".

These are but a few samples of what comes spon-
taneously from the lady's fingers. It is all trivial enough,
if not false ; but it is intelligejit.

The following cases were communicated to me by
friends who vouched for their accuracy. The late Rev.
H. R. Haweis informed me that a relative of his used to
amuse himself by seeing what his hand would write. On
one occasion he asked what the carriage builder was
doing to his carriage, sent to be repaired, at that particular

368 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

moment — " Mending the hood," came the reply. He
had the curiosity to ask the carriage-builder if that was
true. It proved to be quite wrong. On the next occasion
he asked why the writer had told him wrong. The reply
came very deliberately — " F-O-O-L ! " The gentleman
asked no more questions.

Another gentleman well-known in the horticultural
world told me that a " spirit " said on one occasion — " X
is dead, you will hear by the next mail from America".
He had no idea that his relative (X) was even ill. He
dated the paper and showed it to the late Dr. Hogg, who
corroborated the fact to me. On the day when the mail
was due, a black-edged envelope arrived at breakfast time.
He told me : " I handed it to my wife saying, ' you need
not open that ; X is dead. I knew it some time ago.' "
It proved to be true.

Another curious instance was the following : A party
of young people were amusing themselves one evening
with planchette. The pencil wrote, " Jack will be here
to-night". This caused great amusement because Jack
was in India, or thought to be. But within half an hour
" Jack " walked into the room !

The following account of a "communication" by
automatic handwriting is given by Sir Horace Rumbold,
Bart., in his work Recollections of a Diplomatist} It oc-
curred at the house of the American minister " Governor "
Curtin, as told by himself to Sir Horace : " At the very
eve of the great war, he was hard at work one day in the
government offices at Philadelphia, when he was told
that a person wished to speak to him on important busi-
ness. Although very busy, he consented to see the
applicant for a few minutes. The man ushered in was
unknown to him, apparently in [)oor circumstances,

^ Vol. ii., page 286.

IMMORTALITY 369

while he evidently hailed from some Western State.
' Mr. Curtin,' he said, ' I have a very urgent message
for you which I must put in writing.' He forthwith sat
down and began to scribble, Curtin watching him with
feelings that turned to utter amazement when he recog-
nised, in what flowed from the pen of this entire stranger,
the unmistakable handwriting of the mother he had lost
not long before, and to vv^hom he was devotedly attached.
The message was not lengthy, but of an extraordinary
character. The man repeated that he had simply been
impelled to deliver the message in this form.

" What he had written was a rough forecast of the
chief events of the great contest which then had not
yet broken out. Curtin was so struck by the circum-
stances that he imparted them in confidence at the time
to friends in Philadelphia ; who, with him, afterwards
watched with intense interest the developments predicted
in the message. That Mr. Curtin told me this singular
story in perfect faith I cannot for a moment doubt."

These are a few " inexplicable " cases where no fraud
was possible ; as no knowledge of the events was pos-
sessed by any one in England or America.

The question, then, remains, which is more probable
— that it is merely the automatic action of the brain, as
in dreams ; but, unlike dreams, the writing is always
intelligent, and without any of the incongruities that are
associated with dreams — or is it really the work of
spiritual intelligences acting through the brain and
fingers of the operator?

Regarding the writing alone — z,e., if it were not known
whose fingers wrote it — the conclusion would certainly
be that it could not be that of the lady in question, as
it is always so completely different to her characteristic
features both in handwriting and subject-matter.

24

370 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM

If it be the sub-conscious or automatic brain, then
there are at least two if not more and totally different
intelligences within one and the same head.

I leave the reader, now, to draw his own conclusions,
only guaranteeing for the genuineness of the phenomena
above described which I have myself witnessed.

Mr. Frederic W. H. Myers, who has studied this
subject, attributes it as theoretically referable to "(i)
automatist's own mind, i.e., things known and forgotten ;
(2) telepathic — facts unknown to the automatist, but
known to some living person in his company or con-
nected with him ; (3) messages which contain facts ap-
parently not known to the automatist nor to any living
friend of his, but known to some deceased person,
perhaps a total stranger to the living man whose hand is
writing. I cannot avoid the conviction that in some
way — however dreamlike and indirect — it is the departed
personality which originates such messages as these." ^

Conclusion. — This brings me to the end of my task,
viz., to meet the objections of Rationalists raised against
the Belief in God, Free Will and Immortality, and to
emphasise the method of inductive evidence as supply-
ing ample "proof" to substantiate all these; inasmuch
as the demand for " observation and experiment " is
irrelevant ; since that method of verification is obviously
out of the question.

' Op. cit., p. 33 (see Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research,
pt. xvi., etc.)

INDEX.

A.

Abstract ideas, peculiar to man, 212 ;
the Basis of the Moral Sense, 213 ;
consciousness of, 213 ; Locke on,
220.

Acquired characters, heredity of,
proved, 195 ff.

Adaptations, in fungi, 46 ; in plants,
55 ft"., i6g; contrasted with Crys-
tals, 63 ; Weismann on, 124 ; to
environment, 124 ; experiments
on, 170 ; and Natural Selection
contrasted, 177 ; substituted for
Natural Selection by German bot-
anists, 181 ; illustrations of, 196
ff. ; in aquatic animals, 203 ; in
Reason, 237.

^thalium, composition of, 40.

Affinity, Haeckel's theory of, 20 ff.

Agape, or enthusiasm, true meaning
of, 302 ff.

Allen, Grant, on God, 357.

Altruism, wanting in animals, 292.

Analogy, argument of, 58.

Ancestral origin of gods, 216 ff.

Animals, generalised types of, 210.

Anticipatory functions and struc-
tures, 118 ff.

A priori assumptions, 239.

Aquatic animals. Adaptations of, 203.

Aquatic plants, 197 ff.

Architect or Creator, 138.

Argument Cumulative, Paley's, 96.

Aristotle on inadequacy of moral
teaching, 13.

Artificial, organic products, 64, 65 ;
selection, 164-166; and natural,
166.

Atoms, sensation and will of, 20.

Attention and Will, 274.

Author's experiences of Automatism,

287, 2S8.
Autogony, 44.
Automatism and Volition, 135 ; of

musicians, 141 ; powers of, 141 ;

contrasted with Volition, 214 ff. ;

and Reason, 248; and Free Will,

273 ff. ; illustrations of, 273 ff. ;

Huxley on, 278 ; of a prisoner.

278 ; and Prof. A. Sedgwick, 281 ;

and Hypnotism, 285 ; author's

experiences of, 287, 288 ; Dr. W.

B. Carpenter's illustrations of,

288 ; religious, acquired, 323 ; in

handwriting, 365, ff.

B.

Babylonian account of the deluge,
216.

Bacteria, 44, 45.

Bateson and Scott on Individual
Variations, 165.

Bees' cells, 88.

Belief, in Deity, universal, 252 ff. ;
and Faith defined, 266-268.

Biblical origins of man, 208 ff.

Birds' nests, formed by hereditary
habit (instinct), 244.

Body, annihilation of, Rix's view
of, 263.

Brain, development of, 359.

Biichner on Darwinism, 25.

Buckman, experiments of cabbage,
carrot and parsnip, 165 ; belief in
the heredity of acquired charac-
ters, 1S6.

Busseil, on Socrates, 15, 16 ; on the
Chinese, 214.

(371)

372

INDEX

C.

"Calculating" boys, 141.
Carbon theory, Haeckel's 42.
Carriere, origin of radishes, 164 ; and
heredity of acquired characters,

183.

Causality and Finality, 114 ff.

Cause, primeval. Divine Love, 143.

Causes, Final, 114 ff.

Cell-making Bees, 247.

Cells, Directivity in, 64.

Chances, epicurean view of, 138.

Chaos and monsters, 132 ; and Dar-
winism, 133.

Charnock, on the Origin of the
World, 34 ff.

Children, Instinct and Automatism
of, 248.

Chinese, Bussell on mind of,
214.

Christ, Personality of, 269, 270;
temptation of, 284 ; as example,
270; Ecce Homo on, 284, 303
ff. ; the true and only sufficient
motive power, 303 ; or Diana,

325-

Christianity, Rationalistic misrepre-
sentations of, 230, 299 ff., 310 ff. ;
and acceptance of, 316.

Church, Prof. A. H., and Directivity,

36.

Common Sense, 238.

Conscience, a weak, 324, a strong,
325; origin of, 319 ; requires be-
lief in God, 324.

Consciousness and Abstractions,
213, 283.

Constitution, basis of Natural Selec-
tion, 152-156.

Creator or Architect, 138.

Credulity defined, 266-268; in Ritual-
ism, 271.

Criticisms on Rationalistic views of
knowledge, 223.

Croll, on Molecular Motion and Ob-
ject in Nature, 75 if. ; illustrations
of Directivity, 75 ff.

Crystals and Adaptationscontrasted,

63.

Cuckoo, instinct of, 240.

Cynips and Galls, 129.

Darwin, on Evolution and Design,
49; mental change to Agnosticism,
50; contrast between "definite"
and " indefinite " variations, 162 ;
letter to Wagner, 162 ; illustra-
tion of Natural Selection, as a
" Noble Edifice," 175 ; belief in
the heredity of acquired charac-
ters, 183.

Darwinism, basis of Monism, 25 ;
Romanes, on, 51 ; anticipations of,
by Paley, 94 ff. ; and Chaos, 133 ;
defined, 145 ; the " True," 145 ;
explained, 146, 147 ; in Germany,
149 ; summary of false data of,
160 ; no Natural Law in, 174 ;
abandoned by Schimper and
other German botanists, 181.

Death, not absolute (Rix), 263 ; the
Christian view of, 328.

Definite action, of the environment,

147 ; Biichner on, 148 ; and Natu-
ral Selection, mutually exclusive,

148 ; Vernon on, 148 ; Darwin's
illustrations of, 162 ; Darwin's
letter to Wagner on, 162.

Deity, cumulative evidence for belief
in, 35 ; inductive proof of, 57 ;
belief in, 252 ff.

Deluge, Babylonian account of, 216.

Descent of Man, explained, 209 ff.

Design and Evolution, 49; aban-
doned argument of, 92 ff. ; con-
trasted with Evolution, 179.

Determinism, views of, 282, 323 ;
argument for, refuted, 289 ; For-
ester on, 289 ; and Huxley, 291.

Directivity, term inventedby Church,
36; described, 46, 53, 57, 69 ff. ;
the origin of form and variation,
61 ff. ; in cells, 64 ; illustrated by
Dolbear, 72 ; by Croll, 75 ff. ; or
Logos, 238.

Distribution, by Natural Selection,
147.

Divine intentions, 255.

" Doctrine, Religion as a Credible,"
282 ff.

Dolbear, on protoplasm, 65 ; on
transformation of energy in or-

INDEX

373

ganisms, 70 ; on germination, 71 ;
on endosperm, 72 ; in life, con-
trasted with electricity, 73.
Duty, Secularist's view of, 4 ; Ab-
stractions as Motives, inadequate,
8, 9 ; to humanity, insufficient,
309-

E.

Eberhardt, on Adaptations, 171.

Ecce Homo, quotations from, 299 ff.

Ecology, 146.

Elbow, structure of, 103 ; restora-
tion of, 104.

Electricity contrasted with life, 73.

Emotions, origin of, 218 ff.

Ends, recognised by coincidence,
115; and results, 116 ff., 126;
absolute and relative, 131.

Environment, Adaptations to, 124 ;
definite action of, 147.

Energy, transformation of, in
animals, 70.

Eohippus, 195.

Epicurean view of chances, 138.

Equus, Evolution of, 195.

ErysiphcE, Evolution of, 46.

Ether, Haeckel, on, 20, 28 ff. ; nature
of> 33 ; vehicle of Divine power,
262, 341 ff. ; of human soul, 341 ff.

Ethics, Rationalistic, 294 ff. ; criti-
cisms on, 298 ff, ; experimental,

305.

Evils, physical and moral, 137 ;
meaning of, 320 ; Rationalists on,
327 ff.

Evolution, nature of, 28 ff. ; inor-
ganic, Materialistic view of, 28 ;
Haeckel's view of, 29 ; true method
of, 146 ; contrasted with Design,
179.

External world, proved by induction,
261.

Eye, its Evolution, 96 ff. ; Darwin's
hypothesis of, 100.

F.

Faith and Reason, Prof. Jones on,
265; of Christ's disciples, 266,
267 ; described in Ecce Homo, 266 ;

in Old Testament and New Testa-
ment, 308 ; identical with induc-
tion, 315.

Fall, meaning of, 318.

Final Causes, 114 ff.

Finality and Causality, 114, 121 ;
external, 130 ; hypothesis of, 139
ff.

Forces, chemico-physical, as life,
Rationalists' view of, 60 ff.

Foresight, in God and man, 142.

Forester, Mr., on Determinism, 289.

Free Thought, weaknesses of, 13.

Free Will, and Automatism, illustra-
tions of, 273 ; requires Motives,
289 ; requires Circumstances, 290 ;
explained, 291.

Function precedes Structure, 179.

Fungi, Adaptation in, 46.

G.

Galls and Cynips, 129.

Generalised types of animals, 210.

Genesis, truths in, 208 ff.

Genius, automatic, 141.

Germination, Dolbear on, 71.

God, Bradlaugh on, 24 ; inductive
proof of, 24 {ct passim) ; Rational-
ists'demand of experimental proof,
24; ancestral origin of idea of,
216; a Self-conscious Being?
(Rix), 262.

Gorham, and others, on Knowledge,
221 ff.

Gould, remedy for Secularism, 12.

Grain of corn, formation of, 80.

Guilt and Sin compared, 318.

H.

Habit and Skill, hereditary, 204.

Haeckel, on Origin of Protoplasm,
38 ff. ; Carbon Theory, 42 ; appli-
cation of Darwinism, 176 ; on
Origin of Life, 38 ; View of
Science, 225 ; and Tylor on belief
in deities, 253.

Harnack, reply to Rationalists,
269.

Hartmann, definition of instinct,
defective, 247.

374

INDEX

Haughton, on the Principle of Least
Action, 87 ff.

Heredity of Acquired Characters,
denied by Weismann and others,
183 ff. ; proved from nature and
cultivation, 186, i8g, 195 ff. ; in
Skill and Habit, 204 ; in making
nests, 244.

Hermit Crabs and Instinct, 241.

Herrara, on protoplasmic imitations,
42.

Hipparion, 195.

" Holy," Seeley on, 302, 305, 306.

Homing instinct, 245.

Hooker on Forms, 165.

Horse, Evolution of, 195.

Human mind, origin of, 211.

Humanity, enthusiasm for, 302 ff.

Humour, in Creation, Kingsley on,
255-

Huxley, on Vital Forces, 72, 73 ; on
Origin of Life, no ; on Evolution
of the Horse, 195 ; on Automa-
tism, 278; on Determinism, 291.

Hypnotism and Automatism, 285.

I.

Immortality, and superstition (Haec-
kel), 263, 358 ; impossible for
animals, 363 ; conditions of, 363
ff.

Individual Differences, inapplicable
to Origin of Species, 153 ; Vernon
on, 157; Bateson on, 165.

Induction, 177; illustrated, 197 ff.,
353 ff- ; by Pala^ntology, 195 ; by
the Sun, 195 ; value of, 226 ff.,
265 ; all-sufticient, 271.

" Inideality," Law of, 137, 327 ff. ;
explained, 335 ff.

Inorganic, world, 28 ; and organic,
contrasted, 51.

Instinct, Janet on, 141; Kirby on,
179; inherited memory, 239 f f . ;
of cuckoo, 240 ; in hermit crabs
and soles, 241 ; in chickens, dogs
and hens, 242 ; at fault, 243 ; v.
instruction, 244 ; homing, 245 ;
in animal amusements, 246 ; de-
fective definition of Hartmann,
247 ; in children, 248.

Intelligence, meaning of, 142.
Intentions of the Deity, 255.

J.

Janet, views on Instinct, 141.

Jones, Prof., on Reason, 226; on
Reason and F"aith, 265.

Judaism contrasted with Chris-
tianity, 308.

Judgments, idea of, abandoned,
327-

K.

Kidd, on Human adjustments to

the environment, 336 ff.
Kingsley, on Humour in Creation,

255.
Kirby, on Instincts, 179.
Knowledge, Gorham and others on,

221 ff. (See Induction.)

L.

Language, origin of, 149, 150.
Lankester, on Albuminoids, 41.
Laughter, Incongruities, cause of,

255, 256.
Law, of Substance, 19 ; man

answerable to, 280 ; of Contrasts,

320; Natural, meaning of, 321.
Least Action, Principle of, 87 ff. ;

in plants, 93.
Life, Origin of, 38 ff. ; Definitions

of, 67 ; Psychical, beginning of,

361-
Linnaeus, on plant/actVs, 196.
Literalism, misleading, 312 ff.
Locke, on Abstract Ideas, 220.
Logos, or Directivity, 238.
Long, " Christ or Diana ? " 325.

M.

McCullum, experiment on sub-
merged leaves, 199.

Mallock, on " Religion as a Credible
Doctrine," 282.

Malthus' theory, misapplied by Dar-
win, 151, 152.

INDEX

375

Man, a Revealer, 102 ; Origin of,
207 ff. ; Biblical origins of, 208
ff. ; Descent of, explained, 209 ff. ;
contrasted with Animals, 277,
27S, 321 ; answerable to Law, 280;
bodily Evolution ceased, 361.

Matter, as Vortex-Rings, 33 ; v.
Mind, 260.

Mechanical Principles in Nature,
87 ft'., 102.

Memory, inherited, as instinct, 239 ff.

Mental Physiology, by Dr. W. B.
Carpenter, 274.

Metamorphoses, similar, from differ-
ent Organs, 105.

Metaphysics and the Senses, 251 ff. ;
Mr. Rix on, 256.

Mind, Origin of, 211; and Matter,
260.

Molecular Motion, Croll on, 75 ff.

Molecules, Origin of, 33.

Monera, require organised food, 44,
45 ; as degradations, 44.

Monism, Haeckel's description of,
18, 19 ; criticised, 22 ; why based
on Darwinism, 174.

Monist compared with Socrates,

15-

Monistic Religion, 311, 314.

Monsters and Chaos, 132.

Moral, and Natural Law, compared,
III; man, alone, 143; maxims
and living principles contrasted,
301 ; Ecce Homo, on, 301 ; Evil,
Origin of, 317 ff.

Morality and Religion, contrasted,
322.

Musicians and Automatism, 141.

Mutantes, 192.

N.

Natural, and Moral Law, compared,
hi; Law, Whewell on, iii ;
Law, Interaction of, 113 ; Man,
the only Moral Being on Earth,
143 ; facies, among plants, 168 ;
Religion, Seeley on, 256.

Natural Selection, defined, 146 ; only
concerned with Distribution, 147 ;
and definite action, mutually ex-
clusive, 148 ; Darwin's descrip-

tion of, 152 ff. ; true application
of the term, 152 ; true basis of,
156 ; contrasted with Artificial
Selection, 166 ; true function of,
172 ; misuse of term, 173 ; Dar-
win's illustration of, 175 ; con-
trasted with Adaptation, 177 ; and
with Design, 178 ; its assumed
omnipotence, 179 ; teleological
descriptions of, 180; has no in-
fluences, 189; a deiis ex macliind,
229.

New Secularism, Gould on, 11 ff . ;
deficiency of, 12.

Nucleus, function and origin of, 43.

o.

CEcology, 146.

CEnothera, variations of, 192.

Organic world contrasted with in-
organic, 51, 52, 67.

Organised Products made artifi-
cially, 47.

Organs, rudimentary, 137.

Origin, of the Universe, 33 ; of Life,
38, 107, 108, hi; of Form by
Directivity, 61 ff. ; of Man, 208 ff. ;
and possible date of, 210 ; of gods,
as human ancestors, 216 ff. ; of
Emotions in Man, 218 ff. ; of
Senses, 253 ff. ; of Sin, 325, 326.

Parsnip, proof of Heredity of ac-
quired characters, 200.

Paul and Christ, Haeckel on, 313.

Paul's demand for Proofs of Belief,
268.

Pearson, Karl, on Science, 26.

Phyllotaxis, 158, 159.

Physical evils. Rationalists on, 327 ;
quotations on, 329 ; interpretation

of, 334 ff-

Physico-chemical forces, only recog-
nised by Rationalists, 25.

Pithecanthropus, 211.

Plasmodium, Analysis of, 40.

Prisoner, a, on Automatism, 278,

Prodynamics, 19, 22.

Proof of God, 355 ff.

376

INDEX

Protoplasm, Haeckel's, Origin of,
28 ff. ; imitation of, 42 ; Dolbear
on, 65 ; Responsive Power of, 129 ;
practically omnipotent, 178.

Pseudo-philosophy, 107.

Psychology and Rationalism, 232.

Psychometry, 346.

R.

Race, false ideas of, 307.

Radish, Carriere's origin of, 164.

Rationalism, based on Darwinism,
17 ; Definition of, 17 ; and
Science, 221 ; criticisms on, 223 ;
and Psychology, 232 ff. ; and
Ethics, 294 ff. ; and views of
Knowledge, 222 ; and idea of God,
criticisms on, 350 ff.

Rationalist Press Association, ob-
jects of, 17.

Reason, Prof. Jones on, 226 ; in
Animals, illustrations of, 232 ff. ;
and Adaptation, 237 ; and Faith,
Prof. Jones on, 265 ; in Structures
of Plants, 237 ; in Animals,
Romanes on, 232 ff. ; and Auto-
matism, 248.

Regeneration, 268.

Religion, Origin of. Smith and Sayce
on, 208 ; experimentally proved,
268 ; Defined by St. James, 268 ; as
a Credible Doctrine, by Mallock,
282 ff. ; and Rationalism, 311.

Representative Plants, 196, 202.

Responsive power of Protoplasm,
129 ff.

Revealer, Man as a, 102.

Ritualism and Credulity, 271,

Rix, Mr., on Metaphysics, 256 ff. ;
criticisms on, 257 ff.

Romanes, on Darwinism, 51 ; falla-
cies in his Argument, 51, 52; on
Mental Evolution, 218; on Ani-
mal Reasoning, 232 ff.

Rudimentary Organs, 137.

St. James, identification of Religion

and Practice, 268.
Salmon on Erysipha, 46.

Sayce on Origins of Religion, 208.

Schimper, Botanical Geography on
a Physiological Basis, 171.

Schizomycetes, Schyzophycce and
Schizophyta, 45.

Science, and Rationalism, 221 ff. ;
Haeckel's views of, 225.

Secularism, the Old, defined, 3, 8 ;
Bradlaugh, Foote and Holyoake
on, 3 ; Utilitarian, 4 ; Happiness,
sole end of, 4 ; Morality, and God,

4 ; belief in God and Immortality,

5 ; its Motive Power insufficient,
5 ; Atheism and Theism, 5, 8 ;
contrasted with Christianity, 6 ;
the New, Gould on, 11 ff . ; its
defects and requirements, 11.

Sedgwick, Prof. A., and Automatism,

281.
Sedgwick, Mr. A., views on He-
redity, etc., criticisms on, 184, 185.
Seeley, on Religious Motives, 14 ;

on Natural Religion, 256 ; on

Christ's temptation, 284.
Selection, Artificial, 164 ; Natural

{see Natural Selection).
Senses, Origin of, 253 ff. ; infallibility

of, a fallacy, 251 ; Metaphysical

view of, 251 ff.
Shame, Origin of the sense of, 324,

325-
Sickenberger, Prof., on Weismann's

views, 193.
Sin, Origin of, 213 ; unknown to

ancients, 322.
Slime-mould, 40.
Smith, G., on Origin of Religion,

208.
Socrates compared with Rational-
ists, 16.
Soles, instinct of, 241.
Soul, Origin of, 23 ; as Vibrations,

358 ; its various capacities, 361.
Sound, Laws of, their Origin, 254.
Species, Definition of, 163.
Spectrum Analysis of Sun, 195.
Spencer, on Origin of Life, iii ; on

Adaptation, 198.
Stoicism and Christianity, Seeley

on, 14.
Structure, not caused by struggle,

154; preceded by Function, 179.

INDEX

377

Struggle for existence, chief period
of life for, 154; and constitution,
156.

Submerged leaves, Origin of dis-
sected form of, 199 ; experiments
on, 199.

Substance, Law of, 19 ff., 29.

Systematist's requirements for Va-
rieties, 157.

T.

Tact, 275.

Teleology, Darwinian, 180.

Textbook on Botany (Strasburger,
etc.), Darwinism changed to
Adaptation in and ed., 181.

Thanatism, 362.

Thought, Revealing, Experiments
in, 343 ff. ; Transference, 346 ;
Myers on, 348.

Trap-door Spiders and Retreats, 244,
245.

"True" Darwinism, 145, 161; ex-
plained, 147.

True, The, Prof. Jones on, 269.

Tylor V. Haeckel on Belief in Gods,

253-
Tyndall, on Origin of Life, 107 ff.

U.

Universe, Origin of, 33 ; The Un-
seen, Quotation on Life from, 69
ff. ; and Spiritual Body, 346.

Use and Disuse, effects of, 54, 55.

V.

Variation, Cause of, 163 ff., 167, 168.

Vernon on Definite Action, 148.

Verworn, Max, on Origin of Life, 38.

Vines on Yeast, 41.

Virginia Creeper, a proof of the he-
redity of acquired characters, 201.

" Virtue " of Ancients, 302 ; Eccc
Homo on, 302.

Vis Medicatrix, 136.

Vital Force, 60 ; Huxley on, 72, 73.

Volition, and Automatism, 135, 214,
232 ; lapse of, in abnormal cases,
276.

Vortex-Rings, 30 ff. ; Motion of, 30 ;
Lord Kelvin's view of, 32 ; Origin
of Matter, 33.

Vries, Hugo de, on Mutantes, 192.

W.

Wagner, Darwin's letter to, 162.

Wallace, in disagreement with Dar-
win, 153, 154, 170, 171.

Wasps paralysing spiders, 244.

Water Crowfoot, 200.

Watts, Mr. Charles, description of
Christ, 312.

Weismann, on Adaptation, 124 ;
his theory refuted, 193, 200.

Whewell, on Natural Laws, iii.

Will requires Attention, 274.

World, Origin of, Charnock on, 34 ff.

Y.

Yeast, Analysis of, 41.

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