1

;<**"

LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF

NORTH CAROLINA

A/03

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

http://www.archive.org/details/princeormaximsofOOrale

S-X j£)<^ W^ Uue£ tytrrtraiiusv

A^«pA(m^AAAAA®«*A<&wwAAAc^A •u?«k^>A^^w®»®-<s>4p$,ss,w s&

^ ^ ^

THE

PRINCE

MAXIMS

O F

STATE

3 By Sir W a l t e r Ravvley,

and prefcntcd to Prince Henry; S

iS^r? e> Si/ere.

'tM*

x^o«, Printed, M D C X L 1 1. £ ¥

The Contents. of caufes prefirving a State or Common-wealth,

of My flerks or Sophi fines.

of Axioms or rules of preferring a State.

Mies fir frefer<ving of a Kingdome. ^Conquered;

Kirtgdomes hereditary are preferred at home hy the or * dtrhgofa Prince.

Kingdomes new gotten^ or purchafedby force, are prefer* \jvedby 10. Rules*

Rules politique of Tyrants.

Sophi fines ofabarbarous and prof effed tyranny*

Sophifmes of the fbphifticall, orfubtill tyrant to hould up his State.

of preservation of an Jriftocraty.

ofprefervation of an oligarchy, hy -f |°^f mCS#

ofconverfion of States in general!.

Caufes of converfions of States are of two forts : Cent* rAHand Particular.

Particular caufes of Converjton of State ', are oftm forts.

effeditm.

* Caufis

The Contents. Caufes of (edition are of two forts,

of alteration without violence'

A Method t how to make ufeofthe booke before } in the reading of pry.

old age is not ever unfit for pttblique Govern* mtnt.

Example of the like prattife in Charles the fife*

ofobfervation for the Affirmative and the Wga* five,

of defence for David in marrying Abifhag.

Politicall Nobility, 9fc\donhhaJpiring to the Kingdom*, Obfervations,

Ofwayes offuchas afpireto the Kingdwer&nd markes iodifternethem.

OF

to

GOVERNMENT.

Overnmetttte oftwo forts* I. Private of him*

felfe. Sobriety. Of his Family ; called Oec§*

nomy,

2. Tubliqw of the Common-wealth I

called Policy. A man muft firft governc himlclfe, ere he be fit to governc a Family 5 And his Fa- mily , ere hec bee fit to bcare the Governement in the Common-wealthy

Of Policy*

Policy is an Art of Government of a Gomm&n- wealth,' and feme part of it according to that State, or forms of Government wherein it is fetled for the publiqu* good.

State, is the frame or let order of a Common-wealth,

or of the Governours that rule the fame, fpccially of the

chicfe and Soveraigne Governour that commands the

teft.

The State or Soveraignty confifteth in 5 . points.

1. Making or annulling of Lawes. 2. Creating an*

difpofing of Magiftratcs. 3. Power over life and death,

4. Making of Warre, or Peace. 5, Higheft orlaft appeale.

""' B Whetc

Where thefe 5. afe, either in one or in more, there fa the State.

Thefe $e points of State reft either in; t. One Mo- narchy or Kingdome. 1. Some few chicfe of men for vertue and wifedome, called an Arijlocraty. 3. Many, cal- led a Free State or a Popular State. Thefe three iorts of Government have, refpecl: to the Common good, and therefore are Iuft and Lawfull States,

1. Tyravy. I. Monarchy. I z. Oligarchy, or.Go-

vernmenc of a Yew, rich or able.

Thefe5.de-

generate in-

?o 3. others >• *V«r*7. \ Intc< £^™o?^.

Governe

ments

J. Popular Eft at*.

the common & bafer

fore , and therefore

called a Common

, wealth , by an Vfur-

J" '^pcii Nickname.

Thefe all refpeft there owne, and not the publiquc goods and therefore are called Baftard Governments.

I. Monarchy.

A Monarchy, or Kingdome, is the Government of a State by one head, or Chiefe, tending to the Common benefit pf all.

Monarchies or Kingdomes are of 3* forts touching the right or poffeffion of them; viz.. ' 1. Hereditary, bydifcent, as the Englijh, French, &*. a. Ekffivc, by fu&rage oftheother0r^r//orfbmeof %bem,& the Polenian.

5. Mi**, or of both kinds; viz, by Difccnt yet not tyed to the next of bloud,as the ancient Jemjb State.

Monarchies are of 3* forts touching their power or authority; viz.

tl 1. Imier, Where the whole power of ordering all State matters, both in peace and warrc, doth by law and

cuftomc appertainc to the Prince, as in the Etegtijb Kihg^ dome, where the Prince hath power to make Lawes, League and Warrc, to create Magillrates; To pardon life: Of appeale, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a TurTerage in making Lawes ; yet ever fiibjecl: to the Princes pleaiure , nor negative will,

t. Limited, ox re ftr tuned that hath no full power in all the points or matters of State, as the Military King that hath not the Soveraignty in time of peac«, as the ma« king of Lawes &c. But in Warre onely as the Pelonkn. Kings.

.2. Ariftocraty or Semory State,

AN Ariftoeraty is the Government of a Common- wealth by fome competent number of the better fort,, preferred for wifedome and other vertucs for the publique , good.

Ariftocraties arc of 3 . forts, viz.* where the Senators are chofen, for 1 . fbrtue, Riches&nd the Common good,as the Venetian,

2. Vertue and the publique good without refpeft of wealth, as fometimes the Roman when fome of the Sent* tours , were fetched from the plough, and fome from the Schooles.

3. Vertue and Wealth, more refpe&ing their private, then the publique good which inclineth towards an Oli~ $Achj, or the Government of the Richer or Nobler fort^ as in Rome towards the end,

3 . Tret State or Popular State*

THe Popular State is the Government of a State by the Choiier fort of people, tending to the publique goodofall forts; viz. with due refpeel of the better, no» Jbler, and richer iort, |£ B * In

(4)

In every Iuft State, feme part of the Government fe^ or ought to bee imparted to the people; As in a Kingdome, a voice or foflferage in making Lawesj and iomctimes alfo, in levying of Armes (if the charge bee great,and the Prince forced to borrow helpe of his Subjects) the matter right- ly may bee propounded to a Parliament, that the taxe may fceme to have proceeded from themfelves* So confuta- tions, and fome proceedings in Judicial! matters may in part bee referred to them. The reafon,leaft feeing them- felvesto be in no number,nor ofreckoning,they miflike the ftate or kind of Government : And where the Multitude is difcontented , there muft needs bee many Enemies to the prefent ftate. For which caufe,Tyrants (which allow the people, no manner of dealing in State matters^ are for* ced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other meanes, whereby they may refift, or amend them- feives3as in RtiJheUnd^THrkey^c.

4. Tyranny,

ATjrmny is thefwarving, or distorting of a Monarchyl or the Uovernmcnt of one tending not to the publique good, but the private benefit of himfclfe, and his followers. Asinthe/tejfeand Turhjjb Government, where the State and Wealth of other orders- are employed onely to the wphoulding of the greatndfe of the King, or Emperour. This is the worft of all the Baltard States, became itis the perverting of the beft Regiment, to wit, of a Monarchy ^ which refcmbleth the Soveraignc Government of God Mmfelfe,

5. Obligarchyjrthe Government of a few.

/AN Oligarchy is the fwarving,or the corruption of an cLJ^Arifteiratyi or the Government of fbme few that are ©f the Wealthier or Nobler fort, without any refpedt of the pujlique good. The chiefc end of tbeicGovcrn©urs

is their bwne greatneffc and enriching. And therefore there manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their Eftates. This State is not wholly fo bad, as is the Ty4nmj% and yet worfe then the Common- wealth, becaufe it refpe* ctcth the good of a few.

6. Comnm-wedtk*

'A ^ommen-lffea^ IS tne fwarving or depravation ofg '£jLFtte or Popular State, or the Government of the whole Multitude of the bafe and poorer fort, without re- ipccT: of the other orders.

Thefc two States, to wit j The Oligarchy and Common- wealth, are very adverfe the one to the other, and have ma- ny bickerings and difTentions betwecne them. For that the Richer or Nober fort fuppofe a right of fupcriority to) appertaine unto them in every refpccl, becaufe they arc fuperiour, but in fome refpccls onely, to wit,in riches,birthtf parentage,&c. On the other fide, the Common people fup- pofe, there ought to bee an equality in all other things,' and fome State matters j becaufe they are equall with the rich or noble, touching their Liberty t whereas indeed nei- therthe one nor the other are limply equall oriuperiour as touching Government and fitnes thereunto , becaufe they arefuch^to wit, becaufe they are Rich,Noble,Frce,&c.' But becaufe they are wife, vertuous valiant &c. and fo have fit parts to governe a State.

Thefe feverall States are fometimes mixed and inter- wrought one with the other, yet ever fo, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and completions of the body. So in the Roman State, the people had their yUbifcita, and gave the fufferage in the election of Magiftrates : , Yet the Se- nate fas the State flood J for the moft part fwayed the State, and bare the chide rule. So in the Venetian State , the Duke fcemeth to reprefent a Monarch, and, the Senate to Jtohi&Counccll: Yet the Duke hath no power in State

? I """ matters*

(<0

matters, bat is like a head fet on by art that bearemna braine. Arid fo that State is Senatoricall or Ariftocrati*

xltY'' •»'**.:•'.'. . ^

* *

Cmfisof y states and Cmmon-wdths in generaU. \ r

Caufes of 1 I. Founding or fctlingS i. LMeafitre] State* or off a State where to bee Y2. Parts and

Cofetoon« I confidercd. v their Qualities.

wealths are ot* preferving a Statc.

3. forts, m, I ■.■£?? -7 & ? ,. • c-fcl

I 3. Changing and altering a Stlte.

I!

Founding a State*

In founding a State are to bee con- J* 1. Proportion, fidered 2. things. \ 2. Tarts.

PRoportion is a Juft Meafure or Mediocrity of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that order, as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in his kind ; to wit, fo that a Monarch bee not to Monarchicall, nor ftrisft, or abfblute, as the Rajfe Kings; nor Ariftocraticall,that is over- rated or ecclipfed by the Nobility, as the Scottijh King- dome ; but ever refpe&ive to the other degrees. That an Ariftocraty bee not to magnificent nor intier to it fclfe, but communicate with the people fome commodities of State or Government as the Venetian, and fometimes she Rmtan allowed the people to elect certaine Magiftrates out of themfelveSjto have a Tribune,to make PUbifcka &c. So a free St Ate or Common-wealth that it bee not over po- pular, viz. That it depreffe not to much the richer, wifer, norlearnedcr fort ; but admit them to offices with a Can* tlon out of the rules and miseries of that State. That they feeke no alteration of the prefent State. The reafon, be- caufethe moderate States in their fsverall kindes fas all

other

other things that obferve themeane/are beft framed for their continuance, becaufe they give leffc caufe of grudge* envy, and aHecling the wealth, honour, and liberty which they fee in others, that goverjne the Sta,te ; And foareleffe fob/set to ftirres, and commotions, and eafieft kept in their

1

pfefejat State wherein they aifciet.

Parts*

THe Parts of the State, or thole Magifirates that bcare place or fway in thepubiique Government. Tarts or Pamirs of publique Government, are $. Counfell or Senate, which cbnfuiteth of all matters pertaining to Warre and Peace, Magiftirates, &c. in admit- ting of whom there ought to bee a more fpeciall care that they bee men expecl in matter of Policy, becaufe it is their trade and vocation? as men tife to chobfe Pilots and Matters of {hippes iuch as know' the Art of Naviga- tion, and not Husbandmen &c. And fo the contra- ry.

2. Magiftrates a.nd Officers which are to bee execu* tioners ot that which is confultcd and found tojbec expe- dient for the Common-wealth, wherein are to be| obferved the kinds- of Magifttatres, that they bee fuch as fit that kin& of Government; The time of their continuance, and the manner of" their eje&isn or appointing, by whom,, out of whom,and in what manner they be choofsn^

3, 7«^x - To determirie in civill and criminall mat- ters, where aretobeepbferivea, out $f whom they are to beechofenj wha^ kinds arf ncceflarjj, and the manner of i|mJgement arid J«^icfellr|ioceeding; "; [ '" "

■ J

I

f rates are to be ob* ferved,

of Aftfj-e-

firates, as

.

* r. Supirmrl which arc ta bee fueh and of that kind as agree with the State ; as Confuls for a yeare, and not perpetual! Ui&atours in a Senatory State. Praters and Cenfors that overfce man- ners and orders ofthepoo^ pie.

For a Kingdome Lieute- nants of Shires , Marjbalst Mafters of Horfe, extfi&w-

tours of Peace , Conftahlcs, &c.

Qverfecrs of Youth, that take care of their education for civill and warlike cxer- cife.

Clarkes oF the Market that provide for the quai> tity and prize of vicluall .

Ediles for Buildings^ Streets,Bounds.

Quafiours or Treafu* rours to keepe and defpencc thepublique treafury.

AUuarks or Ttecorderfj which keepe the publiqae records.^-

GaolersJdk&pQ Ptifons; and Prifbners* i Survey ours of Woods and Fields, &c I As Bijbops, or PafioHYsl

2t Tim:

i

i.Eecle- fiafikdl*

} 2] Tim of Magijlrsth] wherebf fdmi are perpetuall, feme for a time, WK-.Tor more y cares - ay care, halfeayeare, according to the neceffity of tne Common- wealth, and not perpetuallj or at lead not hereditary in a Kingdome. Yearcly in an <ufrijtecraej , or halfe ycareiy in a free State,

3. M*n*tr 6f choife , by whom and how t«

_ bee chofen , where cfpccially they are to bee

i^chofen by fufferage, and not bj Lot,

Cmfis frefervittg a State or Commm-wulth.

r 1. Generall td aft

1: Mfieries or Sophifm€sJSum- . , ' - - f. J ~/% 2. FarttcaUf for ci

fevery feyerall Stite^

In preferring of States, two things fegui-^j red, .I]

\\i. Rules QtUftiems.

■*Vf generall ict al \ States.

i 2- Particular for t» . very Stat*.

Myfttries or Sophifmtsl

MYfleriet or Softyfmes of State, arc ccrtainc fccfet pra&izes, either for the avoiding of danger^ ora- vcrtingfuch cfte&s as tend to the prefcrvationofthepre^ fent Stated it is fet or founded.

State Myjttrks are of z. forts, x. GeneraUi That per- tainc to aWStates; as firft, to provide by all meanes, that the fame degree or part of the Common- wealth doe not ex- ceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity as that the number of the Nobility, or of great perfons, be not mote then the State or Common- wealth can beare. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more then that is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights beare, downe theSkale: SomCommon-

C " ~ wealthy

do;

wealths, that |>art or degree that exceUeth the reft m Qua- lity and Quantity ,overfwayeth the reft after it, whereof follow alterations and conversions of State. Secondly, to provide by all meanes, that the middle fort of people exceed both the extreames (via.) of Nobility and Gentry y and the Bafe,Rafcall and beggerly fort. For thlsmaketh the State conftant and firme, when both the Extreames are tied together by a middle fort, as it were with a band, as for any confpiracy of the rich and beggcrly fort together, it is not to bee feared. To thefe two points, the Particular Rules or Sopkifmes of every Common-wealth ate to bee applied.

2. Particular: That ferve for prefcrvation of every Common- wealth in that forme of State, wherein it is fetledas in a Kingdome. That the Nobility may bee ac~ cuftomed to beare the Government ofthe Prince , efpe- ciaUy fuch as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye, it is expedient to call them up at certains times to the Princes Court under pretence of doing them honour , or being defirous "to fee and en/oy their prefencej and to have their children, efpecially their efdeft, to bee attendant upon the Prince, as of fpcciall favour towards them and theirs, that fo they may bee trained up in duty- and obedience towards the Prince , and bee as Hefiag* for the good behaviour and faithfull '.dealing- of their Pa- rents, efpecially if they bee of any fufpeded note. To that cmd, fetvesthe Perfiau praclize in having a band or traine of the Satrapas children, and other Nobles to attend the Cpurt; which was well imitgd by our traine of Hen-ek- «**,tf they were ofthe Nobler fort. Againe, fometimes to borrow fmale fummes of his Subjects, and to pay thent. againe, that hee may after borrow greater fummes and ne- ver pay : So mm Oligarchy, leaft it decline to a Popular State t they deceive the people with this and the like $a- yhtfmts '(«**. ) They compcll their owne fort, to wit, the rich men by great penalties to frequent their aflemblies lor chooftng of Magftmesjox provifton of Armour, war-

-(ix)

ikcExcrdfcjmakingan Execution of lawes, &c, By that meanes fecming tobearea hard hand over the richer ; but to fuffer the poorer and meaner fort to bee abfent, and to ncglccl thole afTemblies under pretence, that they will not 4raw them from their bufirieffe and private earnings: Yet withail to cite thither fome few of them -{vfr. ) fomany as are cafily over-matched by the richer fort, to make a fiiew, that they would have the pcople,or poorer fort par- takers likewife of thofc matters , yet terrifying thofe that come to their Aflembiies with the tedioufneffe of con- sultations, greatneffe of fines, ifthcy fhouid mifdoe. To the end to -nake them unwilling to come againe, or t© have to doe with thofe confutations; by which meanes the Richer fort doc ftiil go verne the Sute with the peoples liking and §oqd contentment. " """ " " "~*r

"Aximsi.

■jbtms or | *• ff**™//, that few Tot all Gommo^

Rules of pre-l Wealths.

fcrviag the j *• Particular, that ferve fqr every fcverali

Smti are | State* ""'.— ' ■ - — -'

'■' ■

General Rales *

*"' THp.firft ■* ,nd pf incipall Rule of Policy to bee obferi A ved m ail States is to profefle, and praftize, ahtf maintaine the true worfhip and religion of Almfchty God, prefcnbed unto us in his word, which is the chiefs end bf all Government. The Axiom, that God bee obeyed fimpl* without exception, thou-h hce command that which fce- methunreaionablc, and abfurd tohumahePdi<iyvasin*c /^Commonwealth, That all the-men ftiould repair* yearely to one place to worihip God foure times, leaving none to defend tbeir coaft; though being befet with many

£ * En*,

(IV

£nemic£ Not 6 fow the feventhy«are,buttofufFcrthe ground to reft untilled without refpeft or feare of fi^ jninc, &c.

'*. To avoid the caufes of convcrfions, whereby States *rc ovcrthrowne that are fet downe in the title of con- vcrSbns; For that Common- wealths (as naturall bodies/ are prefcrved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof, and are fo cured by contrary Medi- cines.

\ 3. Totakeheedy that no Magiftrate bee created or con- tinued contrary to the Lawes and Policy of that State. As that in a Sehatc,there bee not created a perpctuall Ditto* nr, as Ctfur in Rome. In a Kingdome,that there bee no Se* nate or convention of equalL power with the Prince, in State mattersjas in Poland.

4. To create fuch Magiftrates as love the State as it is letled, and take heed of the contrary praftize, as to ad- vance Popular perfons in a Kingdome, or Ariftocraty. And fecondly, to advance fuch as have skill to difcerne ■what doth preferve,and what hurteth or ^lterctjh the pre- sent State.

5. To that end to have certaine Officers to pry a- broad , and to obferve fuch as doe not live and behave themfelves in fit fort, agreeable to the preferit State; but defire rather to bee under fome other forme or kind of Go- yernment,

€, To take heed that Magiftraeies bee not faldfor mo- nevv nor bribe in their Offices, which is fpccially to bee

trved in, that Common- wealth which is governed by v of the Richer fort : For if tfaeMagifkate gainc no- thing bat his Common Fees^ the Common fort and fuch as want honour take in good part, that they bee not pre- ferred,; aryl are glajd rather that thcmfclves are fuffered to intend private- bufineffc. But if the Magiftrate buy and £11 Blatters, the£ommon<peopleare doubly grieved, both because they are debarred of thofe preferments and of ^h*t gair^ which they fee to grow by them, whieh is the

U3)

caufe that the Germaine Olygarchies continue fo firme, for both they fuffer the poorer fort to grow into wealth, and the Richer fort are by that raearies freed, and fecurcd from being under the poore.

7. To take heed that the State as it is fetled and main- tained bee not overftridt, nor exceed in his kind; (viz..) That a Kingdome be nottooMonarchicalljNor a Popular State bee too Popular : For which caufe it is good, that the Magift rates fometimes yeeld of his right touching honour, and behave themfelves familiarly with thofe that are equall unto them in other parts, though inferiour for place and office; And fometimes popularly with the Common peo- ple, which is the caufe that fome Common- wcalths,though they bee very (imply and unskilfully fet; yet continue flrme, becaufe the Magiftrates behave themfelves wifely, and with due refpecl towards the reft that are without honour; And therefore, fome kind of Moderate popularity, is to bee ufed in every Common-wealth.

8. To take heed of fmall beginnings, and to meet with them even atthefirft, as well touching the breaking and altering of La wes, as of other Rules which concerne the continuance of every fever all State. For the diieafe and alteration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at •once but growes by degrees , which every Common wit cannot difcerne, but men expert in Policy.

$>. To provide^ that that part bee ever the greater in number and power which favours the State, as now it ftands. This is to bee obferved as a very Oracle in all Common- wealths.

30. To obfervc amcane in ail the degrees, andtofurTcr no part to exceed, or decay overmuch. As firft for pre- ferments, to provide that they bee rather fmall and ftiort, then great and long; 1 And if any bee growne to overmuch greatntfle, to withdraw or diminish tome part of hi$ ho- nour. Where the Sopbifmej are to bee practized (vtz,) to doe it by parts and degrees-, to doe it by occafionor coiourofiaw? and not all at once. And if that way Jerve

&©t, to advance fome other, of whofe vertue and faithful- netfe, wee are fully affured , to as high a degree, or to grea- ter honour : and to bee the friends and followers of hita that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that thoie of the middle fort fas before was (aid ) bee more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to ufe the Sopbifmes of a Popu- lar State; (viz.) to fendhimonEmbaflages,and forrame ^Negotiations, or employ him in fbme office that hath great charges and litle honour, &c. To which end the Edilejhip ferved in fome Common- wealths.

ii. To fuppreffe the fadUons and quarrels of the No- bles, and to kcepe other that are yet free from joyning With them in their partakings and factions.

12. To encrcafe or remit the Common taxesand con- tributions, according to the wealth, or want of the people and Common-wealth. If the people bee increafed in -wealth, the taxes and fubfidies may bee increafed. If they bee poore, and their wealth diminiCh, fpecially by dearth, wantoftraffiquc, &c. to fbrbeare taxes and impofitions, or to take litle. Other wife grudge and discontentments tnuft needs follow* The Sophifmcs that fcrve for impo- fitions are thefe, and other of like fort, to pretend bufineffe of great charge, as Warre, building of Ships, making of Ha- vens,Caftles,Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; fometimes by Lotteries and like devifes , wherein fome part may bee bellowed, the reft referved for other ex- pences; but Princely dealing needs no pretences.

13. To provide that the Difcipline ;and training of youth of the better fort beefuchas agreeth- with that Com- mon-wealth: As that inaKtngdome, the Sonncs of No- ble-men to bee attendant at the Court, that they may bee accuftomed to obedience towards the Prince : lathe'' Se- oaiiosy State, that the Son'nes ofthe Senatours bee not idly* morovefrdaintiiy brought up, but well inftrufted and trai- ned up in learning tongues and Martiall exercife ; that they may bee able to bcare that place in the Common- wealth

(15) wealth,which their Father held,and contrary wife in a Po- pular State.

14. To take heed, lead their Sefhiftnes, or fecret pra- ftizesforthe continuance and maintenance of that State bee not discovered, leaft by that meanes they rcfufe and difappoint themfclves, but wifely uled and with great fc- crecie.

Articular RttUs,

Rules and ^xionwforpreferving of a Kingdome; < -, 1°

Kingdome? Hereditary are preferred at home by the ordering.

i.T'Xlmfc/fei (viz.) By the tempering and moderations J[jLof the Princes power, and prerogative. For the leflb and more temperate , their power and ftate is the more firme, and (table is their Kingdome and Government; be- caufc they feeme to be further offhom a Mafter-likc and Tyrannicall Empire; and lefle unequall in condition to the next degree; to wit, the Nobility , and foleffc fub/ecTto grudge and envy.

1, Nobility $ (viz,.) By keeping that degree and due proportion, that neither they exceed not in number more then the Realme or State can beare, as the Scottijb King- dome, and fometime the JEngliJht when the Realme was overcharged with the numbers of Dukes, Earles,and other Nobles; whereby the Authority of the Prince was ec- clipfed, and the Realme troubled with their factions and ambiiions. Nor that any one excell in honour, power or wealth, as that hee refemble another King within the Kingdome,- as the Houie of Lancafttr within this Realme* To that end not to load any with too much honour or pre- ferrcment,becaufe it is hard even for the beft and worthieft

~ ~ Men

(i6)

Men 'to bears their greatneffe and high fortune tempe- rately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all States. The Sopklfmss for preventing or reforming this inconvenience,- are to bee ufed with great caution and wifedome. If an£ great pcrfon bee to bee abated, not to deaie with him by calumniation, or forged matter, and fo to cut him off with- out defert, especially if hee bee gratious among the people after the Macfuvilian policy, which befides the Injuftice, is an occafion many times of greater danger towards die Prince. Nor to withdraw their honour all at once, which maketh a defperate difcontentment in the party , and a commiferation in the people, and fo greater love, if hee bee gratious for his vertueandpubliquefervice. Nortobantfh him into forraine Countries, where heef may have opor* tunity of practizing with forraine States, whereof great danger may enfue, as in the Examples of CorioUnu$% Henry the fourth, and fuch like. But to ufe thefe, and the like Sophifmes : (vfc. ) To abate thcir_greatneflc by degrees, as Davidyloabs, lufitma^ Bellifftrius, ape. To advance fomc other Men to as great or greater honour, to {hadow or over-mate the greatneffe of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers, by preferments, rewards, and other good and lawful! mcanes; efpecially, to bee provided that thefe great men bee not employed in great or powerfull affaires of the Common-wealth, whereby they may have more oportunity , to fway the State.

3. People 1 (t/kjfoto order and behave himfelfe, that hee bee loved and reverenced of the people. For that the Prince need not greatly feare home-conipiracies, or for- raine invafion, if hee bee firmely loved of his owne peo- ple. Thereafon, for that the Rebell can neither hope for any forces for fo great enterprise; nor any refuge being discovered and pur to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince : But the Common people being once offended hath caufe to feare every moving, both at home and abroad. Bus. !W beq effefted by the Prince, if hee ufe meancs and

ait

{17) art of getting the favour of the people ; and avoid fhofe things that breed hatred and contempt; (viz,.) if hee feeme as a Tutor, or a Father to love the people and toprotccl them, if hee maintaine the Peace of his Kingdomej For that nothing is more Popular, nor more plca(jng to the people then is peace.

4. If hee thew himfelfi oftentimes gratioufly, yet with State, and Ma/efty to his people, and receive com- plaints of his fuppliants,and fuch like.

5. If hee fit himfelfe fometimes in open Courts and place of JulUce, that hee may feeme to have a care of Ju- Itice among his people. If hee beftow many benefits and graces upon that City which hee maketh the feat of his Empire, and fb make it fure and faithfuil unto him, which is fit to bee in the middle of his Kingdome, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the Sunnein the middle of Heaven, both to divide himfelfe more eafily into all the parts of his Dominions; and iealtthe fartheft parts atone end move, whileft the Prince is in the other* If hee goe inprogreffe many times to lee his Provinces, efpecially thofe that are remote.

6. If hee gratifie his Courtiers and Attendants in that fort, and by fuch meanes as that hee may feeme not to plea- sure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with Monopolies> and fuch like.

7. If hee commit the handling of fuch things as pro- cure envy , or feeme grievous to his Minifters, but refervc thofe things which are gratefull and well pleafing to him- felfe, as the French Kings, who for that purpofe, as may feeme,haveere&ed their Court at Parity which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the Nobles and the people.

8. It hee borrowes fometimes fummes of money of his people,though hee have no need, and pay the fame juftly without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officers.

9. If hee avoid all fuch things as may breed hatred

D or

(i8)

<ot contempt of his perfbn, which may bee done, if hee (hew himfelfe not too light ,inconflant^ hard, cruell, effc* minate , fearefull, and daUardly, &c. But contranwife. Religious grave, juft, valiant, &c. Whereby appeareth the falfe Doctrine of the Machivilian Policy; with fcare, the better meanes, to kecpe the people in obedience, then love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince*

p. If the Prince bee well furnifhed with Warlike Pro- vifion, which is to bee rumored and made knowne abroad s If it bee knowne, that hce is reverenced and obeyed by his people at home.

10. If hee provide fo much as lieth in him, that his Neighbour Kingdomcs grow not overmuch in power and Dominion; which if it happen, hee is to joynefpee- dily with other Princes, which are in like danger to abate that greatnefle, and to ftrengthen himfelfe and the reft a- gainuVir. An overfight of the Chriftian Princes towards the King of Spake.

Xi. If hee get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other 'meanes* to detect or hinder the defignes of that Prince, with whom hee hath differences, if any thing bee intended agalnft his Sta'te. Or at leaft have fomc of his oWne lydging abroad about that Princes Court, under colour of Em- halTage, or fome other pretence; which muft bee Men of skill and Dexterity to ferve for that turne.

12. To obferve the Lawes of hisConntrey and not to encounter them with his Prerogative, nor to ufe it at all where there is a Law, for that it makcth a fecret and jufi: grudge in the peoples hearts, efpecialiy jf it tender to take from them their- commodities, and to beftow them upon ©ther of his, Courticrsand Minifters.

13. To provide efpecialiy that that part which favou- reththe Statcas itftandethbee more potent, then theo- sher that favoureth it not, or defiretb a change.

14. To makefpecially choyce of good and found men to bear e the place of Magiftrates, efpeciall.of fuch asaififi: thePrince in hisCounccfe, and Policies, and not to leane

(IP)

overmuch to his owns advife , contrary to the rule of Machivill, who teachcth that a Prince can have no good Councell except it bee in himfelfe; his reafon, becaufe if hee ufe the Councell of 'fome one; hee is in danger to bee overwrought and fupplanted by him : And if hee Councell with more , then hee {"hall bee diftracted with the diffe- rences in opinion. As if a Prince of great, or meane wife- dome could not take the judgement of all his Counfellours in any point of Policy, or of fo many as himfelfe thinketh good, and to take it either by word or in writing jand him- felfe then in private peruie them all, and fo after good arid mature deliberation make choice of the beft, without any deftraction or binding himfelfe to the direction of one* For the Proverbeis true, that two eyes fee more then ohe5 and therefore, the advifes and consultations of a Senatory State is compared by fome to a feaft, or dinner, where ma- ny contribute towards the Shot, by which meanes they iiavemore variety of dimes, and {o better fare : And yet every man may make choice of that dim that fervethhiai beft for his healthand appetite.

15. The Prince himielfe is to fit fometimes in place of publique /ufticc, and to give an experiment of his wife- dome and equity , whereby great reverence and eftirna* tion is gotten, as in the example of Solomon*, which may feeme'the reafon, why our Kings of England had their Kings bench in place of publique Iuftice, after the mamier of the ancient Kings that fate in the Gate; where for bet- ter performing of this Princely duty, fome fpeciall caufes may beefelected, which may throughly bee debated and confidered upon by the Prince in private, with the helpe and advife of his learned Counfell, andio bee decided pub- liqucly,as before is faid, by the Prince himfelfe; At lead the Prince is to take accompt#f every Minifter of publique Iuftice, that it may bee knowne, that hee hath a care of Iuftice, and doing right to his people, which makes the J ufticers alio to bee more carefull in performing of their du- ties. -*.::.

D 2 16. Ta

do)

16. To bee moderate in his taxes, and impofitions; and when need doth require to ufe the Sub/efts purfe, to doe it by Parliaments, and with their confents , making the caufe apparant unto them, and ftiewing his unwilling- neficin charging them. Finally, fo to ufe it, that it may feeme rather an offer from his Subjects, then an exaclion by him

17. To ftop ftnall beginnings, unto this end to com- pound the diffentious that arifeamongft the Nobles, with Caution that iuehas are free, bee not drawne into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole Common- wealth fet in a combuft ion ; as in the example of the Barons Warres, and the late Warres of Trance^ which grew from a quarreil betwixt the Cnifton faclion and the other Nobility.

1 8. To ftirre up the people, if they grow fecure and negligent of armour and other provision for the Commonr wealth, by foroe rumour or feare of danger at home, to make them more ready when occafion required But this feldome to bee ufed leaft it bee fuppofed a f alfe Alarme, when there is need indeed.

1 p. To have fpcciall care, that his children, efpecially the heire apparent, have iuch bringing up as Is meet for a I£ing {viz..) in learning, fpecially of matters pertaining to State, and in Mar/hall exercife, contrary to the practize of many Princes, who lufter their children to bee brought up in pkafure^ind to fpend their time in hunting. &c. which by reafonof their defects afterwards is a caufcofmif-gc^ vernment and alteration of State*

a. Kingdomes new gotten, or purchafed ty force, are preferred by theft mctwes,

% "Cfrft' if they baveteene Subjects before to his Ance-

JT ftours5 oc have the fame tengue, manners, or fafhions

:. - _ _ .. ... ... ..... ^

Ui) as have his ownc Countrey, it is an eafa matter to retain* iuch Countries within their obedience, in cafe the Princes bloudof the faid Countrey bee wholly extinct. P or men of the farae quality ,tongue, and condition, doe eafily fhole and combine themfelves together, fo much the rather if the people of that Countrey have ferved before and were not accuilomed to their owne liberty, wherein fpecially is to bee obferved, that the lawes and cuftomes of that purchafed Countrey bee not altered nor innovated , or at leaftitbee done by litle and litle. So thzBurgmdiansand Acquitaines were annexed to Trance. The reafon, becaufe partly they have bin accuftomed to ferve^and partly ,for that they will net eafily agree about any other to bee their: Prince, if the blond Royall bee once extinguifhed. As for the invafion of a fbrraine Countrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living; It is not the part of a /uft Civill Prince, much leffe a Prince Chriitian to enforce luch a Countrey; and therefore, the Iviachivilian practizes in this cafe to make lure worke by extinguilhing wholly the bloud Royall is leud , and im- pertinent : The like is to bee iaid,of murthering the natives, or the greateft part of them, to the end hee may hold the reft in fure pofleflion. A thing not:onely againft Chri-r ftian Religion : but inhumane luftice , cruell, and barba- rous.

a.. Thefefeft way is, f fuppofing a rightjthat forne good part ofthe Natives bee tranfplanfed into iome other place, and our Colonies confifting of- fo many as (hall bee thought mc-et be planted therein fomc part ofthe Province, Catties, Forts, and Havens, feifed upon, and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch which tranfplanted 10. tribes of the lewes : And of the ifo- maris in France* Germany, Britany, and other places. The realon : i . For that other wife forces ofhorfeand foote,are> to bee maintained within the Province which cannot bee done without great charge. 2. For that the whole Pro- vince is troubled and grieved, with removing andfuppty-

ingthe Army with vi&uils, carriages, Sec." f. For that Collonies are mare furs and faithful! then the reft. As for the Natives that arc removed from their former feates, thsyhave no meaties to hurt, and the reft of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that them- felves may bee fo lerved, if they attempt anything rafhly, are content to bee quiet. The Turkes practize m Afiat where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are poflefled by the Souldiours, whom they call Timariot*. That the Prince have his ieat and his refidence in his new purchafe, cfpe- cially for a time, till things bee well fetled; cfpecially if the Province bee great and large, as the Turke in Greece. The rcaibns : i. Becaufe the preience of the Prince availeth much to keepe things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects. 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes prefence, if they bee opprefled by the Lieu- tenants and inferiour Governours : Where it will bee con- venient for the winning the peoples hearts , that fome examples bee made of punching of fuch as have commit- ted any violence or oppreflfion. 3. Becaufe being prefent hee fceth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and fo may quickly give remedy to it, which being abfent, hee cannot doe, or not doe in time.

$. If the Prince himfelfc cannot bee prefent to refide, then , to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new purchafes bee committed to fuch as bee fure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Princes favour; And no^to Natives, or other of their owne Sub- jects, that are gratious there for their Nobility, or vertue; cfpecially if the Province bee great, and fomewhat farrc diltant, which may foone f:duce the unfetled affections of thofs new Subjects. As for fuch Governours as depend wholly upon the Princes favour being not borne, but crea- ted Noble, they will not fo eafily fuffer themfelves to bee wonne from their duty ,• and in cale they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great ftrength , for that the people obey them but as Inltruments and Mini-

fters

ftersidkecpe them in fubjection, and not for any good will-

_4» To have the children of the chicfe Noble men, and of greatcft authority, Hoftages with them in fafe keeping. the more the better: For that no Bound is ftronger,then that of Nature to containe the Parents and Allies in obedience, and they the rcfh

5. 1 o alter the Lawes, but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behovefull for the cfta- bliftiing of the prefent Government.

6. To kecpe the people quiet and peaceable and well affected fo much as may bee, that they may feemc, by being conquered, to have gotten a Protectour, rather then a Ty- rant; For the Common-people if they enjoy pence, and bee not diftracted, nor drawne from their bufinefle,nor exacted upon beyond mcafure areeafily contained under obedience; Yet notwithiranding , they are to beedif ufed from the praftife of Armes, and other Exercifes which encreafe con* rage, and bee weakened of Armour, that they have neither Spirit nor will to rcbelh

7. If there bee any faction in the Countrey, to take to him the defence ofthc better, and ftronger part, and to combine with it,as Ceefar in F> ance.

8. To looke well to the Borders and confining Pro- vinces , and if any rule there of great, or equall power to himfelfe, to joyne league with fome other Borderers, though of leffe ftrengtfa to hinder the attempts ( if any {hould beej by fuch Neighbour Prince. For it happenctti often, that a Countrey infefted by one Neighbour Prince calleth in another of. as great or greater power to affifl:, and refcue it from the other that invadethif; Sothe/fc?- moms were called into Greece by the *sEulians\ The Saxons by the Britainesfhe Danes by the Saxons.

9. To leave their Titles and Dignities to the Na- tives , but the command and authority wholly to his ownc.

!«. Not to put much truft? nor to practife to often the

S&phifmi

V*4)

Sophifimx of Policy , efpscially chofi that appertaine to a Tyrannicall State, which arc fcone dete&^d by m:n of Judgement, and fo bring difcredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wifer and better fjrt of his Subjects, whereof muft needs follow very evill effects.

The Sopblfimss of Tyrants, are rather to bee knowne, then pra&ized, ( which are for the fupporting of their Ty- rannicall States, ) by wife and good Princes,and are thefe, andfuchlikeas follow.

Rules Politique of Ty rams,

RVles praftifed by Tyrants are of 2. forts ivix.. 1. Bar- barous* and Profeffed, which is proper to thofe that have got head, and have power fuflficient of thSmfelves without others heipes,as in d\sTurki[b and Ruffe Govern- ment.

2. Sophifticall and Diffembled-t As infome States, that are reputed for good and lawfull Monarchies, but incli- ning to Tyrannies, proper to thofe which arc not yet fetled nor have power iurhcient of thetnfeives; but mutt ufethe power and hclpe of others, and fo are forced to bee Poli- tique Sopbijters.

!• Sophifimes of a Barbarous andProfeffed Tyranny*

x.'TpO expell andbanifo out of his Countrey allhoneft X meanes,whercby his people may attaine to learning, wifedome, valour, and other vermes, that they might bee fit for that eftate and iervile condition. For that in thefe two, learning, and Martiall exercife,effc& two things mod dangerous to a Tyranny: (viz.) Wifedome and Valour. For that men of Spirit and undemanding can hardly endure a fervile State. To this end to forbid learning of liberall Arts, and Martiall exertifc : As in the Ruffe Governcment,

'46 Julian the Apoftaia dealt with the Chriftians. Contrary- wife, to ufe his people to bafe occupations, and Mechanical! Arts, to keepe them from Idlenefle, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunke, and of other bafe and lewdconditions that they may bee fotted, and fo made unfit for great enterprizes. So the lALgyptian Kings dealt with the Hebrewes; So the Ruffe Emperour with his Ruffe

Eeople: And Charles the fifth with the Netherlanders^hQn ee pur po fed to enclofe their Priviledges , and to bring them under his abfolute Government.

2. To make fare to him and his State, his Military men by reward, liberty, and other meanes, efpecially his Guard, or Praetorian band ; That being Partakers of the fpoile and benefit, they make like that State, and continue firmc to it ; as the Turks his lavfcaries , the Ruffe his Boy ■*. rensy &c.

5. Tounarmehis people of weapons, money, and all meanesjwhereby they may refill his power; And to end, to have his fet & ordinary exadtions,ws.onee in t wo,threc, or foure yearesj and fometimes yearely,astbc2~#r^,and Ruffei who is wont to fay, that his people muft bee ufed as his flock of /hecp : viz. Their fleece taken from them, leaftifi oyerlade them, and grow too heavy jthat they are like to his Beard, that the more it was fhaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there bee any i of Extraordinary- wealth to borrow of them in the meanc while, till the taxe come about , or upon fome deviled matter to cohfifcate their goods, as the Common pradife is of the Ruffe and Turks,

4. To bee ftill in Warres, to the end, his people may, need a Captaine«and that his forces may be kept in pradi&j as the J?**/,? doth ycarely againftthe Tartar, Polomart, ani Sveedeni&c.

5* To cut offfuchas excell the reft in wealth, favour^ or nobility, or bee of a pregnant, or fpiring wit, and fo arefcarefuUtoaTyrant, and to fuffer. none to holdofhce;

(26)

ft any honour, but dnelyofhim; istheTrtrkehisBaJbafs; and the Ruffe his Rftexxes, h

6. To forbid Guilds,Brotherhoods, Feaftings,and other Aflcmblies among the people, that they have no meanes or oportunity to confpircor conferre together of publiquc matters, or to maintaine love amongftthemfclves, which is very dangerous to a ryrant,the/teJ7« praftife.

7. To have their Beagles, or Littners in every corner,1 and parts of the Realme, efpeciaily in places that are more fufped, to learne what every man faith, orthinketh, that they may prevent all attempts,and takeaway fuch as miflike their State.

8. To make Schifme and Divifion among his Subjects, (viz.) To fet one Noble man againft another , and one Rich man againft another , that through fa&ion and dis- agreement among themfclvcs, they may bee weakened, and attempt nothing againft him; and by this meanes en- tertaining whifperings and complaints , hee may know the fecrets of both parts, and have matter againft them both; when need requireth. So the Ruffe made the faclionof the Zemsky and the Ofprejfinit*

9 To have Strangers for his Guard, and to entertaine Jarafitcs, and other bafe and fervile fellowes, not too wife, fcut yet fubtill, that will bee ready for reward to doe and execute what hee commandeth, though never fo wicked and anjutt. for thai good men cannot flatter, and wiie ancB cannot ferve a Tyrant.

Allthcfe pradiiesand fuch like, may bee contracted m to one or two, (vi&) To bereave his Subjects €i w»U and power to doe him hurt, or to alter the 5 fwfent State. The tufe tsCaution, not imitation*.

a. Sff* ■ ' ■

a, Sophtfmcs of the Sephifticait, orfubtitt Tj- rmtto foidup his State.

si mTi0 make a (Hew of a good King by obferving a tem- 1 per and mediocrity in his Government, and whole courfeoflitc; to which end it is neceffary, that this fubtill Tyrant bee a cunning Polititian, or a Machivilian at the leaft, and that hee bee taken (o to bee, for that it maketh him more to bee feared and regarded, and is thought there- by not unworthy for to governe others.

2. To make (hew not of icverity, but of gravity, bj£ feeming reverent,and not terrible in his fpcech,and gefture, Eiabite,and other demeanour.

5 . To pretend care of the Common- wealth; and to that end to leeme loath to exact Tributes and other charges; and yet to make neccifity of it, where none is * To that end to procure fuchWarre as can bring no danger towards his State, and that might eafily bee compounded, or fome other chargeable bufineflc; and to continue it on, that hee may continue his exaction and contribution to long as hee lift.' And thereof 'to employ fome part in his publique fervice8 the reft to hoord up in his Treafury, which is fometimes praftifed even by iawfull Princes ; as Edward the fourth inhisWarresagainftfrvwe*, when having levied a great fumme of money throughout his Realme, efpecially of the Londoners , hee went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an accompt by open fpeech and publique writing of the expenfe of fuch taxes and imposi- tions as hee hath received of his Su/e&s, that hee may fo fceme to bee a good Husband, and frugall, and not a Robber of the Common-wealth.

5 . To that end, to befto w fome coft upon publique Buil- dings, or fome other worke for the common good, efpe- ckily upon the Ports, Forts, and chiefs Cities of his

E 2 Realme,

Realms, that fo hee may feemc a Benefa&dur, and to have: a delight in the adorning of hisCountrey, or doing fome good for it.

6*. To forbid" Feaftings and other meetings, which in- creafe love, and give oportunity to conferre together of publique matters, under pretence of f paring coft for better ufes. To that end , the Curfieu bell was rirft ordained by William the Conquerottr to give men warning to repairc home at a cerraine houre.

7. To take heed, that no one grow to bee over great, but rather many-equall great, that they may envy and contend one with another; and if hee refolve to weaken any of this fort, to doe it watily and by degrees; If quite to wrack him and to have his life, yet to give him a Law- full triall after the manner of his Countrey • And if hee proceed fb farrewith any of great power and eftimation as to doe him contumely- or difgrace, not to fuffer him to efcape, becaufe contumely anddifgrace are things contrary unto Honour, which great Spirits doe moft dejire, and fo ace moved rather to a revenge for their difgrace', then to any thankfulneffe, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or difmifiion -3 True in Athieftst but not in true Chriftian Nobility.

8. To unarme his people, and (lore up their weapons Under pretence of keeping them fa fe, and having them rea- dy when fervice.requireth, and then to arme with them,. fuch and fo many aslhee (hall thinke meet, and to commit them to fuch as are fure men.

5?. To make fcifmeor divifion under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the People, and to fct one Rich man againft another, that they combine not together, and that i himfelfe by hearing the griefes and complaints, may know the fecrets of both parts,and fo hava matter againft them both, When it lifteth him to call them toanaccompt.

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, Ipecial-

ly . about Womens matters, by attempting the chaftity of

""""'■ " ", ' ' theit

C i9)

their Wives or Daughters, which hath beene the mine "of many Tyrants, and converlion of their States* As of7*r- quinius, by Brutus >Appiust by Virginiu4%(PiJiJ}ratuS) by Har- modiiis, Alexander - Me dices Duke of Tloreme, Aloifus of PUcentta, RodericutKing of Spaina &c.

ii; To that end to bee moderate in his- pleafures, or to ufe them clofely that hce bee not feene; For that men fbber or watchfull, or fuch as-fecmc fo, are not lightly Subject to contempt , or confpiracies of their owne.

12. To reward fuch as achieve fome great or commen- dable enterprise, or doe anyfpeciall action for the Gom- mon-wealth in that manner as it may feeme, they could not bee better regarded, in cafe they lived in a free State.

13. All Rewards and things grateful! to come from himfelfe but all. punifaments , exactions, and things un- grateful! to come from his Officers and publique Miniftersj And whenhee hath' effected what hec would by them, if heefee his people difcontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacitie his Subi' ects.

14. To pretend great cure^ of Religion andofferving ofGodi (which hath beene the manner of the wicked eft Tyrants ) for that people doelefTe feare any hurt from thofe, whom they thinkc vertuous and religious, nor attempt ligbtely to doe them hurt, for that they thinkc that God protects them.

15. To have a ftrong and fare Guard of forraine Soul- diours,and to bind them by good turnes, that they ha- ving at leaft, profit, may depend upon him, and the prefent State; As CaliguU,th& German-ljuard, where the Nobility are many. and mighty. The like is practifed by lawfull Kings, as by the FretchKing.

» 6. To procure that other great perfons bee in the fame fault, or cafe with them, that for that caufe, they bee forced to defend the Tyrant , for their owne fafe-

17. To take part, and to Joyne himfelfe with the ftr on- ger part; if the Common people, and means degree bee the

(3°)

(kongerto joyne with then; if the Rich and NoM4, to /oync with them. For fo that part with his owae ttrength will bee ever able to overmuch the other;.

t8. Soto frame his manners and whole behaviour, as that hee may {seme, if not p~rfc.tly good , yet toUctabiy evill,or fomewhat good,fomewhat bad.

Thefe Rales of Hip xriticall Tyrants are to be known, that they may bee avoided and meet withall , and no draWne into imitation.

Prefewasiw of an Arifiocratf.

RVles to prefervc a Senatory State, are partly takett from the Common Axioms, and partly from thofc that prefervc a Kingdome.

Pccfcmtion of an 0^ar% by £ &$*"*'*

1. |N Confaltations and Affemblics about publique afc lfairesfo to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Aflcmblics and Couneels : But to impofca fine upon the richer fort if they omit that duty. On the other (idc,to pardon the pcopiejf they abfent them* Selves, and to beare with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations, and not bee hun- dred in their trades and earnings.

2. In election of Magiftrates and Officers : To fuflkr the poarcr fort to vow and abjure the bearing of office un- der colour of fparing them ; or to enjoy ne foms great charge as incident to the office, which the poorc cannot beare. Buc to impofe forae great fine upon thofe that bee rich, if they refufe to beare oificc , being elect unto it.

3. In Judiciall matters : In like manner to order that the people may be abfent from publique Trials, under pretence of following their bufinefte. gut the richer

"V~3 ~~ ""'^ " " to

(Si)

to bee prefcnt, and to compell them by fines to frequent the

" 4. In Warlike Exerciie and Armes, that the poorebec not forced to have Armour, Horfe, &c. uuder pretence of fparing their coft, nor to bee drawne from their trades by Martiall Exercifes; but to compell the richer fort to keepe their proportion of Armour , Horfe, &c. By cx- ceflivc fines, and to exercife themfelves in Warlike mat-

ters &c

f. To have fpeciall care of inftruaing their Children in liberall Arts, Policy, and Warlike Exercife, and to ob- fervegood order and difcipline. For as Popular States arc preferved by the frequency and liberty of the people, fo this Government of the richer is preierved by difcipline and good order of Governours.

6. To provide good ftoreof Warlike furniture,efpecially of Horfe, and Horfemenjand of Armed men, v.*. Pike,&c,' which are proper to the Gentry 5 as ihot and light furniture are for a popular Company.

6. To put in practiie fome points of a Popular State, viz. To lade no one man with too much preterrement; to makeyearelyor halfeyeares Magiftrates &c. For that the people are pleated with fuch things, and they are better iecured by this meanes from the rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatneffe, to abate him by the Sophifmes

fit for this State. .

7. To commit the Offices and MagiftracieSj to thofe that are belt aMe to beare the grcateft charges for publi que matters, which both tendeth to the conicrvation of this State, and plealeth the people, for that they reapc fome re- leifeand benefit by it»

8. To the fame end to 'contract marriages among them- ielvcs,the rich wiih the rich,&c.

«. In fome things which concerne not the points and matters of Statc.-as electing Magiftrates making Lawcs,&c. to give an cquality,or iometimes a prefcrmen to the Ce*m- snon-pcople, and not to doe, as in fome Oijimhuf they

•W2M wiittj viz.* To (Weare againd the people, to fu'p- preflfe and bridle tbsm; but rather contrary, to miniflerari oathatth:ir admiilion, that they ihalidoe no wrong to .any of the people; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to (he w iomc example of fervere pu-' . nifhment.

JFor other Axioms that preferve this State, they are to

beeborrowed, from thufe other Rules that tend to

the preferring of a Popular and Tyrannicall State;

.for the ftricl kind oiOtygarchj is kinne to aTyranny.

'Prefu-vationofaPopalarStatei 3 ^M^s* .

L Ttgbs or jixMOFf.

;i. TN publique AfTemblics and confultations, about mat- iters of State, creating d£ Magiftrates,publique Juftice, and Exercifc of armes, to pra&ile the contrary to the for- mer kind of Government, to wit, an Oligarchy. For in Po- pular States, the Commons and meaner fort are to bee drawne to thofe Affemblies, Magiftracies, Offices, Warlike lixercifes, &c. By mulcls and rewards, andthe richer 4brt arc to bee fpared, and not to be forced,by fine,or otherwife, to frequent thefeExercifes.

^ s,. To make {hew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to f weare againft them, as the manner hath becne in fame Papular States; but rather topreferre them in all other matters, that concerne not the State and publique Government.

3 . To elecY Magiftrates from among the Commons, by Lot, orBallating, and not tochoofe any for their wealths lake.

4. To take heed, that no man beare office twice, es£ cept it bee Military, where the pay, and falery, &c. is to bee referved in their owne bands, to bee difpofed of by a Common Councelk&c. And to fee that do man bee to high- ly preferred.

, & ffiat no Magiftracy bee -perpetually but as fhortj

(33) a§ may bee, to wit, for a yearc, halfe yeare, &c?

6. To eompell Magiftrates, when their time expireth to give an accompt of their behaviour and Government, and that publiquely before the Commons.

7. To have publique Saleries and allowance for their Magistrates , Judges , &c. And yearely dividence for the Common- people, and fuch as have moft need among

them.

8 . To make Iudges of all matters,out of all forts, io they have fome aptnes to pcrforme that duty.

9. To provide that publique Iudgements and Trials,bee not frequent; and to that end to infl ift great fines and other punifhments upon Pettifoggers and Dilatours, as the hw of requitali; &c. Becaufe for the moft part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indited and accuipd in this Common-wealth,which caufeth the rich to conipire againft the State,- whereby, many times, the Popular State is turned into an Oligarchy, or fome other Governmcnt., Hereto tendeth that Art of Civiil law, made againft Accu- fers and,Calumniatours:;& JV»**w Confultum Tftrpilianum, lib, I. dt Calttmnidtoribus,

io. In fuch free States as are Popular, and have no re- venue, to provide that publique Aflemblies bee not after: becaufe they want faiery for Pleaders and Oratours; And if they bee rich; yet to bee wary, that all the revenew bee not divided amongft the Commons. For, that this diltri- bution of the Common revenue among the Multitude is likeapurfe orbarrell without a bottom. But to provide, that a furfceient part of the revenue bee ftored up for the publique affaires.

1 1 . If the number of the pooreencreafe too much in thi§

kind of State, to fend fome abroad out of the Cities into

the next Country places>and to provide,above all, that none

doe live idly, but bee fet to their trades. To this end, to

provide that the richer men place in their Farmes and

Coppiholds, fuch decayed Citizens.

1 a . To bee well ad vifed what is good for this State, and

F -j- not

S3t to Tuppofe that to r, bee fit for a Popular State \ thai fecmeth moft popular; but that which is beft for the con- tinuance thereof; And to that end, not to lay into the ^Exchequer j or Common Treafury, fuch goods as are con- ftfeate, but to ft ore them upasholyandcqnfecrate things, which except it bee praftifed, confifcations, and fines of the Common people would bee frequent, and fo this State. ^puW decay by weakening the people.

Converfo» ef States in General.

'Onverjion of a State, is the declining of the Com- _;mon-wealth , either to fome other fbrme of Go- vernment, or to his full and laft period appointed by.

Caufis rf Cower pons of states, are of two forts : Cenerall and. Particular. ,

G Ever all >( viz.) i. Want of Religion : viz. of the true knowledge and worfhip of God, prefcribed in his word; and notable finnes that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in. the examples of Saul, Vz&i.abf the Icwifli State; the foure Monarchies, and all other. a. Want of wifeduuic , and good Councell to keepe the State, the Prince, Nobles, and People in good temper, and due proportion, according to their feverall orders and degrees.

3. Want of Iuftice, either in adminiftration fas ill Lawes,orillMagiftratesJ or in the execution, as re wards, not given where they Ihould bee, or there beftowed where they ftiould not be,or punifhments not inflicted where they fhould be.

4. Want of power and furficiency to maintaine and defend it felfe; yfc,. Of provifion, as Armour, Money ,Cap- taines,Souldiours,&c. Execution when themeanes or pro-, Xiuon is not ujfedj or iU tiled, " a. Par-

(J5)

£ f*rtle»l#rs To bee noted and collected ©tit b? the . contraries ofthofe rules that are prescribed for the prefer- Ration of the Common-wealths.

fmicuhr caufesofConverfmofSwt, are

tftwofirtt.

' »

% T^OrrAwe: By the overgreatnefe of invafion of fame JLtorraine Kingdome, or other State of meane pow- er, having apart within ourowne, which are to bee pre- vented by the providence ofthechiefe, and rules of policy for the preferving of every State. This falleth out ve- ry feldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forraine State.

* Sedition or open violence*by the ftroj^ a. Vomefil%He:j gerpart.

^Alteration without violence;

Sedition*

S Edition is a power of inferiours oppofing it fclfe with' force of Armcs againft thefuperiour power? Qntfititk

Gemrall. «

Cmfes of S editimarcvftWQjdrtsZ

\ ■

f -.liberty. fC 7t 7Hen they, that are of equall

V V quality in a Common-wealth,

or doe take themfelves fotobee, are

♦not regarded equally in all, Or in any

tofthelej.

Riehes. 1 °r when they are fa unequall in

quality^or take themfelves fo to be, are

regarded but equally , or with lefle

refpeA , then thoic that bee of leffe de-

feft in thefe 3. things, or in any of

npmu lthe,m. ":f § '- ■, ~-%,Xn

p tNtfo Chtefc: Covetuoufneffe ot opprefliori; by the lMagiftrateor higher Power, (viz. ) when the Magi- ftrates, efpecially the Chief© encreafeth his fubftance and revenue beyond meafure, either with the publiqueor (pri» vate calamity, whereby the Governours grow toquarrejl among themfelves as in Oligarchies) or tHe other degrees confpire together, and make quarrellagainftthechiefe,as inKingdomes : The examples oiWrt Tyler* larks Strgw, &c.

i. In the Chief e ;In/ury>when great Spirits,and of great power are greatly wronged and difhonoured,or take them- felves fo to bee, as Coriolanus, Cyrus minor, Earle of Jf4r- TUfhkz In \$hich cafes the beft way is to decide the [Wrong.

3, Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein fome have overmuch, and fo wax proud and afpire higher j or have more or ieffe, they deferve as they fuppofe; and fo in envy, and difdaine feeke Innovation by open faction, fo Cs- ftri&c.

4. Some great neceflity or calamity; So Xerxes after thefoileofhis great Army. And. Semcheris after thelpfle ®fi85.inonenight.

,'fi. X^Nvy, when the chiefe exceed themedlo- t jC/crity before mentioned, and fo provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to confpire a- „ gainfthim; as Brutus Caffiu6,i&c. agaipft Cafar, j 2. Feare, viz,. Of danger, when one or more \ difpateh the Prince, by fecretpra&ife^or force ' to prevent his owne danger,! as *Artalfynu$ did

ai • \ Xerxes. TtirtmlarJ 3 . Lufi or Lechery, as Tor qui™** Sujkrbns, by

Brutus yPififiratinda, by Afmodms\ esfppius by Virgtnlus.

4. Contemp\ For vile quality andbafebeha- | viour, as Sardanapalfts ,by At faces- Dionifim the ibounger by Pw.

' t : 5. Cm-,

Other de- grees.

Other de- grees,

(.37)

5 ] Contumely 5 W hen fome great difgrace is done to fome or great Spirit who ftandethupon his honour and reputation, as Caligula, by Cka- reas.

6. Hope of Advancement, or fome great pro- jfit,as Mithidrates,Anobarfanes,

Alteration without violence.

CAufes of alteration without violence are; 1. Excejfe of the State; when by degrecs,the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity, wherein it was,or fhould have beefetlcd, and exceedcth in power, riches and abfolutncs in his kind, by the ambition & covetoufneffeoftheChiefes, immoderate taxes, and impofitions, &c. applying all to hisowne benefit without refpect of other degrees, and fo in the end changeth it felfe into another State or forme of Government, as a Kingdomeinto a Tyranny, an Olygarchy into an Ariftocratj,

2. Excejfe9 of fome one or more in the Common- wealth^*.. When fome one,or more,in a Common- wealth grow to an excellency or excefTe above the reft, either in honour,wcalth,or vertuc; and fo by permilfion and popular favour ,are advanced to the Soveraignty : By which meanes, Popular States grow into Oligarchies; and Oligarchies, and Arifiocraties into Monarchies, For which caufe, the zAthe- mans and fome other free States made their Lawes of Oftrocifmos to banifli any for a time that ftiould exeell, though it were in vertue, to prevent the alteration of their . State; which becaufe itisanemjuft law, t'is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the meanes, that none ftiould grow to that hight and excellency, then to ufe io {harp and unjuft a remedy.

FIN IS,

St5 rAMZ

■ . '

/ k i :.. . " , in ■■

lo 9 el i ■ ' '

• . ■

• . • ■■ .■-..•

♦s

mmmm^m

!

ii METHOfD, hoy» tomake ufe

of the Booke before^ in the reading of Story.

[Avid being feventy yearesof age^ wasofwife^ J dome , memory , &c. {efficient to governe 'Hs Kingdomcj I, Reg. foah *•

Old age is not ever unfit for pnblique

Government. "Ant

DAvid being of great yeares , and fo having a cold J dry, and impotent body, married with Abijhtig&hits Maideofthe beft completion through his whole Realme9 to. revive his body and prolong his life, i . Re&fchtq. i» Verfe 3.

Example of the like pratfife in Charles the fifth.

.. •

DAvid being old and impotent of body by the advice of his Not^s and Phifitions, married a young Maide called %Afcfhag% to ywax and prefcryp his ol§

!*?ciy.

w*

WHether David did well in marrying a Maidejand whether it bee lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman; or on the other fide, for an ©Id- wome, and decrepite woman to marry a young and lufty man.

J For the Affirmative*

/A R. g . The end of marriage is Society and mutuall com- XXfort; bat there may bee Society and mutuall comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young party. Ergo *tit lawfull.

Anfw. Society and comfort isanufeand effecT; of mar- riage; but none of the principall end is of marriage, which are:

~ is _ Procreation of Children, and fo, the continuance of 5 mankind, a. ^ The Avoiding of fornication.

As for comfort and fociety , they may bee betwixt man and man, women and women where no marriage is, And therefore no proper ends of marriage.

The Negative.

'■

Arg^ u That conjunction which hath norefpectto the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God , is no la w full marriage. But the conjun- ction betwixt an old impotent, and young party hath no refpe&tothe right end, For which marriage, was ordai- ned by God. Therefore it is no lawfull marriage.

2. No contract, wherein the party contracT:ing,bindeth himfelfetoanimpoflible condition, or to doe that which hee cannot doe,is good,or lawfull. But the contract of mar-

riagc by an impotent perfon with a young party bindetK ftiia to an impoffible condition to doe, that which hee can- not doe (viz, ) to performe the duties of marriage; There* fore it it unlaw full*

For the fame eaufc, triecivilllawdeterminctha nullity in thefe marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity 'of the man, in w hich cafe fhe can have no wrong, being a thing done with her owne knowledge and cop- fcnt,becaufe Volenti nefit injuria:-— In legem lulian. de adul- term leg. Si uxor &c.

..It provideth further, for the more certainty of the infir- mity, that three yeares bee expired before the d involution of the marriage, becaule that men, that have beene infirme at.thefirft, by reafonof fickneffe, or fome other accident, afterwards proved to bee fufficieut : z>e r^fuim ieg% in ban*

. Defence for D4vid in marrying Abijhtg.

1 i . tT was rather a Medicine then a marriage, without any *evill or dif ordered affection. 2. It was bytheperfwafionof his Nobles and Phifl- tians.

3* It was for the publiqae good to prolong the life of a worthy Prince.

4. It was with the knowledge and confent of the young Maid, who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmity, and to what end fhee was married unto him; who if (hee did it for the Common good, and for duties fake, having withall theguift ofcontinency,fhee is to bee commended; if for ambitioa, or fome vajne refpeft, it is te owne,and not Vdvtds fault ,

G Poll-

Political! NoMitjri

Adoniah afpirfag U the Kingdom?.

FIrft, tooke the advantage ofpavids affection and kind-; neffe towards him, and made him fecure of any ill dea- ling.

Secondly^of his age and infirmities, difablkigliis father as unfit for Government.

Thirdly, blazed his title, and right to the Crowne.

Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horfemen, and Footemeni and a guard to make (hew of State.

Fiftly, being a comly and goodly pcrfon,made.a Popular {hew of himlelfe, and his qualities.

Sixtly, joyned to himfelfe in fa&ion /*/«£, the GeneralF of the army, who was in difpleafurefor murdering olAbnw and Amafa, and feared that David would fupply Benajah into his place, and Co was difcontented. And Abiatber the highPrieft, that was likewife difcontented^ yfith David, for the preferrement of Ztdoch*

Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his con- federates, under a pretence of a vow and offering at the Fountaineof Ragnelljn. the confines oiltidta,

Eightly, macle afhewof Religion by Sacrificing; &c. \ Ninthly, made himfelfe familiar with the Nobles and people, and entertained' them with feafting.

Tenthly, drew into his part the chiere officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by Rewards, Familiari- ty, &c.

Elevently, diigraced and abafed the Competitour, and fuch as hee knew, would take part with him, andconcea- 3cth his ambition^and purpofe from them.

Twelftly, had Jonathan a favorite of the Court, and neere about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing twere difcovered, and moved at the Court, whileft himlelfe was in hand about his practise. r7 OK

F

Obfcrvatiorisi

WW tf fab ** *fpre ** *ke KiHgdome^ni UArhstedifcerm tkw.

Irft, they wind into the Princes favour ,by fervice,offi- *. cioufneffe, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulnefle, thereby to make him ie- cure of their pra&ifes, >#

3. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities, age, impotency, negligence, fexe, &c. And worke upon that by difabling the Prince, and fecret detrafting of his per- fon and Government. _

3. They blaze their Title, andclaime to theCrowne, (if they have any ) with their friends,and favourers.

4. They provide them in fecret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the warres>make much of good fouldiours, and have- a pretence (ifitbeeefpied,) of fome- other end; as for the Kings honour, or fer vice, and to bee in readines againft forraine enemies , &c. " „

5. They make open fhew of their beft qualities and corn- lines of their pcrfon (which though it bee vaine as a dumbe {hew, it is very cffeduall to wirme the liking of the po- pular fort, which according tQ the rule of the election of Kings, in the Bees Cemmon-wealth ; thinke that Forma eft dignamperare) Aclivity, Nobility ,Anceftry;&c.

6. To have their blazers, abrpsd to;fet out their vertues, and to prepare their friends irteyery Province.

7. To' draw into their part, and make fure unto them, of the chiefs Peeres, & men of beft quality ,{uch as are migh- tieft , and moft gratious with the Souldiours, and the Mili- tary men, and moft fubtill and politique, efpecially fach as bee ambitious, and difcontent with the State.

8. To have meetings for conference under fome pre- tence of fome ordinary matter in fome convenient place,

nol to5 ricere,* nor too farre of, hut where friends miy bel refort and affemble unto them without fufpition.

p. To take up a fhew and pretence of Religion more then before, and beyond the praftife of their former life.

10. They ufe popular curtefic ("which in a great perfon is very effeauall)feafting,liberalicy, gaming, &c.

ii. To. bee over liberal 1, andwinne to them byguifts, familiarity, &c. the chiefc Officers of the Court, and Go* vernours of Shires.

12. To havefome neere about the Prince, to keeps them in credite, and remove fufpition, if any rife.

13. To difgrace fuch as they know to beefure and faith- full to the Prince, and prefent State, ©r to the Competitour,. and to bring them into contempt by (lander, detraction,, arid all meanest they, can , and to conceate the defines from: ihemjleaft they'oee difcovered before they bee ripe.

14. To have fomefpie neere about the Prince, toad ver- tlfe them if any sickling of fufpition arife whfteltthem- felves are practicing.

Note the praflifes of tAbfofon : 2. Sam. Cl-jap, 16. and ot Cyrm minor ^m. Xetfophdn : VLtfia.ya.ga. '$•$$ cap. 1,

Political! Prince.

David being' a moft worthy and excellent Prince for mfedome, valpur^ religion ,andjujlice, andfo highly deferring of the Common- wealth, yet ghwne into Age, grew withaUjtrto contempt, and bMWany jbtth if his Nobles and Common-peofie ^ that fell from bim^ fr fl with hbfolonjhen with Adoj)iahrwkhe affecJedthe Kwgd&me mdrebettedAgainfi fcw: l(Qfc remedy whereof hee /lined up himfelfowffibliqtie. Actions which might fhew his vigour and fuffkiemy u mwn&gc the affaires ofhk Kingdoms,

I; Af-

<45>

i7 "X -TF!erth©vi(ftwyflgainft Abfotm\ tee forced fife /TLfelfe to forbeare mourning, and flawed himfeftg to his difcontentcd Army, when all were like to fall from him. for his unreafonable forrow and lamentation for his Sonne

2. After the victory, hee catjfed a generall convention to bee affembled of the whole nation, to bring him hom« with honour to Iernfatem% which was a renewing and rc- eftablifhing of him j 2. Sam, 19*12.

3. Hee gave an experiment of his power and authority, by depofingaperfon of great authority and eftimation, to wit,/0tf£, Generall Captain of the Army, and advancing Amafa to his place.

4. Hee fent kind MefTengers to lerufahm, and to other dhicfe and head Townes,and ipeciall men of Judca^his con- tributes,.putting them of their alliance with him, with thefs Words, thatjhey were ofhisowne flefh and bloud, with proteftation of his fpeciall love and affection towards them, to provoke them with like kindneflfe and affection towards him .

5. Hee affembled a Parliament of his whole Realme," andtooke occasion upon the designing of his Succeflbur, to commend unto them the fuccefiion of his Houfe, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worfhip and religion, then eftablifhed, and gave a grave and pub- lique charge to his Succeflbur, now defigned, touching the manner of his government, and maintaining cf Re- ligion,!. C/?m*. 12.13.

6. Hee- (hewed his bounty : and magnificence in con- gefting matter for the building of the Temple, as gold, iilver, braffe, &c. And caufed it to bee published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation, i.Chron, 22.15.

7. Hee revived the Church Government, andfetitin aright order, afligning to every Church Officers his place and function.

• 8. Kec fupprefTed th e faction of Adoniah, and ordained

G 3 Solomon

V "-V

SakMUKbisSahottotiXt i.Re& i. %i\ By thefe meaneS hce retained his Ma/efty an^ authority in his old age, as appearcth by ttfeffeft . for that being bedred , hec fup- preffed die faction or Adonith, (which was growne " mighty, and was fet on footej with his bare con> raandemen^and fignification of his plea- furea and fo hee died in peace.

g~ ."-JL

T INI s;

' ll'l ■■■

■Wr^^— '-i ■ , ■fa*"

vf