


38-2-

38-2
1



THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
Princeton, N. J.

BS 413 .B58 v.1
Ernesti, Johann August, 1707
-1781.

Principles of Biblical
interpretation

BS
413
.B58

self

4
THE
BIBLICAL CABINET;


OR
HERMENEUTICAL, EXEGETICAL,
AND
PHILOLOGICAL LIBRARY.

VOL. I.

ERNESTI'S INSTITUTES.

EDINBURGH:
THOMAS CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET;
J. G. & F. RIVINGTON, LONDON;
AND W. CURRY, JUN. & CO., DUBLIN.

MDCCCXXXII.



PRINCIPLES
OF
BIBLICAL
INTERPRETATION,

TRANSLATED FROM THE
INSTITUTIO INTERPRETIS

OF
J. A. ERNESTI,

BY

CHARLES H. TERROT, A. M.

LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

VOL. I.

EDINBURGH:
THOMAS CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.

MDCCCXXXII.

J. THOMSON, PRINTER, MILNE SQUARE.

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND

CHARLES-JAMES,

LORD BISHOP OF LONDON,

THE FOLLOWING PAGES

ARE,

WITH PERMISSION,

RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY THE

TRANSLATOR.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

EVERY man who attaches a meaning to a text of Scripture, so far acts as an interpreter of Scripture. And in an age when almost all can read, and when, it may be hoped, many more than at any former period, are seriously occupied with the study of the Word of God, it cannot be considered as a useless undertaking, to endeavour to fix some Principles of Biblical Interpretation. And when the character of the times is such, that every sober Christian must daily come in contact with schemes of doctrine which to him are perfectly new, and hear them supported by texts of Scripture which he has been accustomed to understand in a very different sense; under such circumstances, he must be desirous of obtaining some

rules, whereby he may account, not merely to an opponent, but still more to his own conscience, for believing that these texts mean one thing rather than another.

Among ourselves, sound general learning and native talent have enabled many men to become good expositors of Scripture : but Biblical Interpretation has not, among us, been formed into a science ; nor have any very memorable attempts been made to reduce its principles into a system. In Germany, on the contrary, *Hermeneutics*, as distinguished from *Exegesis* ; that is to say, the Principles of Interpretation, as distinguished from Actual Interpretation, have long occupied the attention of scholars. Among these, Morus, Keil, Beck, Seiler, and Jahn, are eminent ; but, by the concurrent testimony, both of Protestant and Romish critics, the *Institutio* of Ernesti still retains the same rank in Hermeneutics that the Elements of Euclid do in Geometry.

John Augustus Ernesti, born in 1707, was educated at the Universities of Leipzig and Wittenberg ; and became, successively, Master of the School of St. Thomas at Leipzig, Pro-

fessor of ancient Literature, of Eloquence, and of Philosophy, in the University there; and died in 1781. His name, as an accomplished Editor of the Latin and Greek Classics, is well known to many who are not acquainted with him as a theologian. His theological works, however, are numerous and valuable, consisting of Sermons in German, 1728. *Neue Theologische Bibliothek*, 1760—68. *Opuscula Theologica*, 1773. And *Institutio Interpretis Nov. Test.* 1761.

Of the last named work, a translation is now offered to the British Student. The edition used is the 5th edited by Dr. Ammon of Gotha, 1809. All the notes of that editor are translated; in some cases, the Translator has given his reasons for dissenting from the conclusions of Ammon, and, in others, has appended additional notes of his own. It is possible, that the whole may be thought an unnecessary labour, after the publication of "*Elements of Biblical Criticism*," &c. &c. by M. Stuart of Andover, U. S. and its republication by Dr. Henderson of the Mission College, Hoxton. But the following translation is intended to form

the commencement of a series of translations from the works of the most approved Continental Theologians,—a series which, it was thought, could not commence more properly, than by a work on the general principles of Interpretation, by a scholar so celebrated as Ernesti. This purpose could not be served by the publication just mentioned, which is a very useful compilation from various authors, with Ernesti's work as its basis; but not a translation, at least not a faithful and complete translation, of that work.

Doubts may also exist as to the expediency of translating Ammon's notes, especially in the minds of those who are aware of the Neological bent of his opinions. Ammon's, however, is the standard edition; and Ammon himself stands high, as to rank and influence, among the Theologians of Germany. It might, therefore, appear almost contemptuous, to pass over, in silence, what he has done, or attempted to do, for the elucidation of his subject. Nor is Ammon a person to be treated with contempt: his extensive learning must render him always respectable, and often useful, even where the

weakness of his conclusions is strangely at variance with the laborious and polyglot premises on which they are founded. Nor is the Translator alarmed at the idea of introducing to British students a portion of the Neological or semi-infidel theology of modern Germany. He verily believes, that it might have been safely trusted, without note or comment, to the practical good sense of the public, in the firm conviction, that German *Rationalism* is not a system by which honest minds have been, or can be, misled. To those, indeed, who desire to reconcile real Infidelity with a public profession of Christianity, it affords a convenient medium between the humiliating reception of genuine Christianity, and the daring and unpopular avowal of absolute unbelief. In such cases, the effect of the system is good, rather than evil: for it is with infidelity as with vice; if we cannot prevail upon their adherents to reject them altogether, something is still gained when they are led to assume the decency of a veil.

In some cases, however, where the Rational System is strongly brought out in Ammon's

* *Nothing is gained to the cause of religion
ness. And but little, to the "adherents"*

notes, the Translator has thought it proper to subjoin his reasons of dissent. The Preface of that editor he has entirely omitted, because the spirit of it must be offensive to all serious students of the word of God, and because it contains no information to repay the trouble of translating, or even of reading.

The Translator has taken for granted, that all who think upon the subject at all, will allow the importance of Hermeneutics; but it may be worth while to consider more particularly what is their use, and to what extent we may expect them to aid us in the investigation of truth. As to the few, if, indeed, there be any such in the present day, who, in the study of Scripture, contemn human learning, and look to supernatural assistance, as the sole and sufficient guide; it may be enough to say, that they do not act upon their own principles. He who reads the Scripture in the vernacular translation, uses the aid of human learning, and relies upon human authority; and differs from the most laborious critic, not in the principle of his conduct, but only in the extent of his apparatus.

But, supposing it granted, that it is our duty to use all the natural means which God has afforded us, for the elucidation of Scripture, we recur to the question, to what extent may we expect to be aided, by systematic rules of Interpretation?

I. The most cursory inspection of these rules, will shew that they presume the possession of considerable learning, and of natural clearness of intellect. In fact they are little more than a systematized account of the way in which learned and acute men have proceeded towards the investigation of biblical truth. It does not, however, follow that men of good sense and sincere piety, are totally disqualified for the examination of Scripture difficulties, by the want of a critical knowledge of the original languages. They may on good and reasonable grounds assume that the authorized English version is, in all important matters, a fair and faithful copy of the meaning of the original; and, upon this assumption, they may apply the same rules to determine the meaning of the Translator, that the more

learned interpreter applies to determine the sense of the original author.

II. Though rules of interpretation can no more make a good interpreter, than rules of poetry can make a good poet, yet are they highly serviceable in teaching us how to apply the requisites of learning and natural talent to the best advantage. Many interpreters of considerable learning and talent, have failed through the want of what is commonly called *judgment*; and it is to the cultivation of the judgment that these rules are especially addressed.

III. Though the study of Hermeneutics may fail to render the student a very good interpreter, it can hardly fail to prevent him from becoming a very bad one. By shewing what an interpreter ought to be and to know, what ought to be his natural and acquired qualifications, it will prevent unqualified men from unwarily disseminating error, and from dishonouring the Scriptures by their rash and unfounded interpretations.

IV. The study of Hermeneutics is requisite,

not only for those who would become interpreters, but also for those who would judge of the interpretations of others; and this is by far their most extensive application. In any one generation, there can be but few qualified to extend the limits of biblical knowledge; but in every country there must be many thousands professionally bound to study the Scriptures, with all the aids which circumstances will admit of their obtaining. Of these aids, none are more frequently referred to than the writings of commentators, and of commentaries few are in more general use among us than the Synopsis of Poole. And whoever has bewildered himself among the various and contradictory interpretations there given of every difficult passage, must have felt his want of some general rules, by which he might judge of their comparative probability.

But, granting the importance of the science, and the excellence of Ernesti's treatise, some may still be disposed to doubt the necessity of a translation. It may seem that all who are capable of applying the rules of Ernesti to the

interpretation of Scripture, must be equal to the easier task of comprehending those rules in their original Latin. But the Translator has observed, that in many cases where there is the ability to read Latin, there exists great unwillingness to exert that ability for any continued time. Nor does it follow, that because a student can construe classical Latin with fluency, he must therefore be able to interpret *Ernesti* with ease and accuracy. The *Institutio* abounds with technical expressions of grammar and logic, the sense of which can be derived neither from classical authors, nor from the ordinary dictionaries. In some such cases, the Translator suspects that those who have gone before him, have not caught the exact meaning of the original; and, in some cases, he has been obliged to confess his doubts as to the accuracy of his own translation. In short, most students employed upon the Latin of *Ernesti*, must occasionally wish for assistance. The Translator, therefore, is not conscious of any presumption in hoping that the labour and time which he has employ-

ed upon this work, may be useful in sparing the labour and time of those to whom a translation was not absolutely necessary.

The reader will observe that, in the following pages, all the Translator's additions are included within brackets, thus [].



AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

TO THE LEARNED AND STUDIOUS READER,

J. AUGUSTUS ERNESTI,

GREETING.

MANY years ago, when, in my academical lectures, I had interpreted the Apostolic Epistles, I was requested, by many, who had found those lectures useful, to deliver also some rules of Interpretation, by applying which, to practice, they might be directed in the investigation of the sense, and supplied with reasons for establishing it. When I observed to them, that interpretation was one of that class of

things which rest almost entirely upon practice and observation, and admitted but of a few heads of advice, which might more efficaciously be propounded in the very act of interpreting: that there existed no peculiar method for interpreting Greek and Latin authors, which could be embodied in a system of rules; and that, in interpreting them, everything must be referred to use and practice, while yet, in every age, there had been excellent interpreters: that men, and especially young men, were prone to deceive themselves, by supposing, that they could do anything as soon as they possessed a rule for doing it; and were thereby led to relax their efforts, in practice and application: I was still importuned to reduce these heads of advice into some regular system, on the plea, that it was scarcely possible I should find opportunity to notice and illustrate them all, while lecturing upon, and interpreting, a few books.

I assented then, to their request, and began to collect whatever I remembered to have been useful to myself, and whatever I had observed

to have been impediments to others, in the investigation of Biblical truth. These I first formed into short Theses, and afterwards gradually enlarged, as ideas were suggested to me, in the course of reading and interpretation. For, all that we would wish, does not occur to the mind at once; nor is it easy to draw together a variety of principles widely scattered, so that none shall be omitted or escape; especially in a Hermeneutical work, which must consist of so great a number of separate observations, many of which, when taken separately, must appear of trifling importance. Thus, a short system of rules was gradually formed, which, in order to save the time that would be wasted in dictating and copying, I now, after careful arrangement and revision, commit to the press.

Since the whole work is so short, that the order of subjects, and the method of treating them, may readily be determined by any one, it seems superfluous to say anything on that head. Nor do I admire a practice, very common among authors, of mixing vain boasts of

the novelty or importance of their matter with strong professions of humility, in the hope of imposing upon the credulity of their readers. But this I may say, with perfect truth, that, in the first place, I have avoided the assertion of all such absolute rules as generally go under the name of Canons; and that, in the next place, I have laboured to deduce precepts from accurate observation, and to insert such only as contain some clear and distinct mark for the discovery of truth, and which admit of a clear and easy application. Whether I have attained my object, must be determined by the judgment of others, who possess an accurate knowledge of languages, experience in interpretation; but, above all, experience in usage itself, which, in such matters, is the best guide to judgment, quotation, and correction.^a In

^a The Latin is, "Sed eorum, qui justam scientiam linguarum, et usum interpretandi habent, maximeque ipsius usus, qui est in talibus rebus, judex, laudator et corrector optimus." The difficulty lies in the two words, *ipsius usus*. The Translator understand^s Ernesti to refer to the *usus loquendi*, which forms so prominent a subject in the *Institutio*.

the whole work, I have principally had regard to the younger students, whose minds have not yet been imbued with false opinions. For, it would be a vain task to attempt the conviction of those who have been habituated to the use of their Canons; and it would be utter folly to hope, that any one will unlearn that which he learned long ago, and which, perhaps, he has often taught. It is a piece of rare good fortune to meet with one who is willing to give up his preconceived notions, and who has the will, or even the courage, to admit the opinions of others. I, therefore, do not hope for such a result in many cases, and should wonder extremely were it to happen to me, any more than it has to others.

I have carefully laboured to describe, with clearness and precision, the method of discovering the sense from the usage of language, the method of determining tropical and emphatical language, the criticism of the New Testament, and the use of the Septuagint version: on which subjects, I ought certainly to be able to offer some useful practical hints, since I

have spent a great portion of my life in the investigation of them, and of similar topics. In the last Chapter of the Second Part, and in that portion of the work which relates to history and antiquities, I have been somewhat more prolix, than suited either my plan or my intention. But when I found that, from my unceasing attention to brevity, the work was likely to prove even shorter than I had anticipated, I thought that I might render a service to students, by inserting the principal heads of these subjects; and by putting it in the power of those who should use this work in their lectures, to explain this province of learning, as far as it is serviceable to interpretation, at the same time and place. I have interspersed throughout, observations on the proper method of learning in each division of the subject; observations which, I hope, will not be found useless, by those students who are willing to pay attention to them. I have judged it necessary, for the sake of brevity, to insert no examples, except in cases where there existed some peculiar necessity or advantage

in inserting them. For I myself, in my lectures upon this book, shall be able to produce examples; and others who may choose to use it, will have an opportunity of producing the results of their own reading. In those chapters, however, whose subject is principally historical, I have myself supplied much of what is requisite: but, upon the whole, I consider it unbecoming for an author, in works intended for schools, to force every thing upon the reader, like a nurse feeding an infant.

Respecting interpretation in general, I had some observations to offer for the use of students, and some complaints to make of those who, through a pretended reverence for the word of God, attempt to introduce a fanatical barbarism, and a sort of dreaming over, and trifling with, the Scriptures; but my time would not permit me to pursue the subject, which I hope hereafter to treat of under more favourable circumstances. I conclude, then, this Preface, with a hearty prayer, that this little Work may be the instrument of exciting many to a right and systematic study of the

Scriptures; and may be of some service in directing them to a correct knowledge of its meaning.—Written at Leipzig, during the Autumnal Fair, A. D. 1761.

CONTENTS.

	Page
PROLEGOMENA ON INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL	1
§ 1. Importance and Difficulty of Biblical Interpretation.	
2. Ditto.	
3. Interpretation defined.	
4. Qualities requisite in an Interpreter.	
5. Clearness of Comprehension defined.	
6. ————— how shewn, and how acquired.	
7. Knowledge of Languages.	
8. Clearness of Explanation defined.	
9. ————— how acquired.	
10. Hermeneutics defined.	
11. Division of the Subject into Contemplative and Practical.	
12. The Hermeneutical Apparatus.	
13. Sketch of the Plan to be followed in the whole Work.	

PART FIRST.

SECTION I.—CHAPTER I.

	Page
ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS . . .	15
§ 1. The Sense or Signification of a Word defined.	
2. The Literal Signification.	
3. ——— was arbitrarily imposed.	
4. ——— but by usage has become necessary.	
5. Sources of <i>Ambiguity</i> in the Signification of Words.	
6. The <i>Necessity</i> of the Signification the only Ground of <i>Certainty</i> in Interpretation.	
7. Error of Augustine as to a Multiplicity of Senses.	
8. Error of the Jewish Expositors.	
9. Allegorical Interpretations.	
10. The Typical Sense.	
11. Error of supposing that some Texts have no Literal Sense.	
12. Signification of Words depends on the <i>Usage of Language</i> .	
13. Usage of Language affected by Certain Causes.	
14. Of the Literal, Grammatical, or Historical Sense.	
15. False Distinction between the Grammatical and the Logical Sense.	
16. The Scriptures are to be Interpreted according to the same general principles, as other Ancient Books.	
17. Error of Interpreting from Preconceived Notions of the Subject.	
18. ————— further exposed.	

- § 19. Limits of the Application of Dogmatic Opinions to the Interpretation of Scripture.
20. Absurdity of submitting the Interpretation of Scripture to Human Authority.
21. Apparent Discrepancies or Errors in Scripture.
22. Grammatical Reasons ought to have greater Weight than Dogmatic Reasons in determining the Sense.
23. No Real Discrepancies or Errors exist in Scripture.
24. The Context a safe Guide to the Sense of Particular Passages.

CHAPTER II.

	Page
ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF WORDS, AND	
THEIR VARIOUS USES	40

- § 1. Importance of Attention to these Differences.
2. Distinction between the Proper and the Tropical Sense.
3. All Words originally Proper.
4. Origin of an Extension in the Sense of Words.
5. Of Words in which the Tropical Sense has become Proper.
6. Of Words in which the Tropical Sense has become more Familiar than the Proper.
7. Of Words transferred by Necessity.
8. Of Words transferred for the sake of Ornament.
9. Metaphors naturally pleasing.
10. Most abundant in the Works of Poets and Orators.
11. Their frequency determined by the Genius of the Author, and the Nature of the Subject.

- § 12. Importance of keeping in view the difference between transference by Necessity, and transference for Ornament.
13. Interpretation of Tropical as well as of Proper Words to be determined by the Usage of the Language.
14. Of Synonymes.
15. Of Words *ἔυφημα*, *δύσφημα*, and Emphatic.
16. Emphasis not inherent in any Words.
17. Distinction between *Temporary* and *Constant* Emphasis.
18. Method of discovering these severally.
19. Erroneous Division of Emphasis into *Verbal* and *Real*.
20. Error of supposing all Tropical Words Emphatic.
21. Every Language has Untranslatable Words.
22. Of *Contrasted* Words.
23. Of the Permutation of *Abstracts* and *Concretes*,
24. ——— and of its Causes.
25. It tends to Perspicuity and Ornament.
26. Of the *General* and *Particular* Signification of Words.

SECTION II.

	Page
ON THE PROPER INVESTIGATION OF THE SENSE, OR ON THE RULES OF INTER- PRETATION	62

- § 1. Rules of Interpretation defined.
2. ————— whence deduced.
3. Various uses to which they may be applied.
4. Of the Usage of Language,
5. Which is either general of the Language, or particular of the Author.

CHAPTER I.

	Page
ON THE METHOD OF DISCOVERING THE USAGE IN ANCIENT LANGUAGES, AND IN PAR- TICULAR AUTHORS	65
§ 1. Usage determined by Testimony, either Direct or Indirect.	
2. Of the Sources of Direct Testimony.	
3. Of the Testimony of the Author Interpreted.	
4. Of the Testimony derived from <i>Definitions, Ex-</i> <i>amples, and Parallel Passages.</i>	
5. Of Parallelism in Words.	
6. Of Parallelism in Sense.	
7. Of the best Method of Discovering Parallels.	
8. Caution to be used in the Application of Appa- rent Parallels.	
9. Practice and Observation of the Methods pur- sued by able Expositions, also requisite.	
10. Expediency of collecting several Parallels.	
11. Of the Testimony of Scholiasts.	
12. Of the Testimony of Glossarists.	
13. Of the Difference between Glossaries and Lexi- cons.	
14. Of the Testimony of Versions.	
15. Of Casual Testimony.	
16. Of Individual peculiarities in an Author.	
17. Of the <i>Age</i> and <i>Class</i> of an Author.	

CHAPTER II.

	Page
ON THE SUBSIDIARY MEANS OF DISCOVERING THE SENSE	80
§ 1. Of the Cases in which these Subsidiary Means are to be used.	
2. Of the general Context or Scope.	
3. Caution to be used in its Application.	
4. Of the immediate Context.	
5. Of the Comparison of Subject with Predicate, &c.	
6. Of Antithesis.	
7. Of the Analogy of Language.	
8. Cases in which it may be usefully applied.	
9. Of the Analogy of kindred Languages.	
10. ——— and its Application.	
11. Danger of pressing Etymologies too far.	
12. Use of Comparing similar forms in different Lan- guages.	
13. Origin of this similarity in the general uniformi- ty of the Human Mind.	
14. Purposes to which it may be applied.	
15. Allowance to be made for Figurative and Popular Language.	
16. Inaccuracies not always Errors.	
17. The Popular signification of Words not to be too closely adhered to.	
18. These principles to be applied specifically to the New Testament in the next Chapter.	

CHAPTER III.

Page

ON THE METHOD OF DISCOVERING THE USAGE
OF LANGUAGE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 99

- § 1. The question, as to the general nature of the Language used by the Writers of the New Testament proposed.
2. Different Opinions as to its Purity.
3. Impurity of Style not to be inferred from occasional Hebraisms.
4. Purity not to be inferred from the fact that all the words in the New Testament may be found in good Greek Writers.
5. Impurity not to be inferred from the use of Technical Words in peculiar senses.
6. The real question is, whether Words and Phrases in the New Testament, are generally applied according to the usage of good Greek Writers.
7. The Purity of the Writers with whom we compare the Style of the New Testament, to be carefully ascertained.
8. The Style of the New Testament determined to be impure.
9. Expressions may be Hebraisms, and at the same time pure Greek.
10. The New Testament in many places cannot be satisfactorily explained, without a reference to Hebrew idioms.
11. Interpreters who have consulted only the Greek idioms have fallen into great Errors.
12. Impurity of Style does not detract from the Dignity of the Sacred Books.

- § 13. Purity in this case impossible,
 14. ——— and undesirable.
 15. The Impurities of the Style of the New Testament do not diminish its perspicuity.
 16. The Language of the New Testament may properly be called Hebrew-Greek.
 17. Other Variations from pure Greek to be found in the New Testament besides Hebraisms.
 18. The foregoing Truths facilitate the Interpretation of the New Testament.
 19. An Interpreter ought to be well skilled in Greek and Hebrew.
 20. Hebraisms to be interpreted by the aid of such authors as Philo and Josephus.
 21. The Style of the Septuagint to be diligently studied.
 22. Also that of the Versions of Aquila and Symmachus.
 23. When a word or phrase may be either Pure or Hebraistic Greek, the Hebraistic interpretation is to be preferred,
 24. ——— especially when the subject is Dogmatic.
 25. Even the peculiarities of the Hebrew Grammar are sometimes to be applied to the Greek of the New Testament.
 26. Recourse is sometimes to be had to the kindred dialects of the Hebrew, as Chaldee, &c.
 27. Cases in which the *general usage* cannot be applied.
 28. In such Cases parallel passages to be consulted,
 29. ——— and the Writings of the early Fathers,
 30. Whose *Expressions* may probably be of Apostolic origin.
 31. Use of Glossaries.
 32. Of Glosses which have crept into the Text.

- § 33. Where other helps fail, the Context and Analogy to be consulted,
34. Equally in Profane and Sacred Books.
35. Analogy of Doctrine explained.
36. Analogy to be applied to Passages, where a doctrine is stated Vaguely or in a Popular form.
37. Of Principles to be applied in the Interpretation of anomalous Phrases of Scripture.
38. Similar Anomalies in Profane Authors to be noted.
39. Subject of the next Chapter announced.

CHAPTER IV.

	Page
ON THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF TROPICAL LANGUAGE	135

- § 1. An Interpreter ought to be able both to *distinguish* and to *interpret* Tropes.
2. The ordinary Maxim on this subject faulty.
3. Tropes very frequent in Scripture.
4. The rule given by Danhauer and others not precise.
5. Tropical Expressions to be determined by a reference to our own perceptions.
6. Reasons why this reference cannot always be made in Scripture.
7. Words transferred from a Popular to a Theological sense, and used uniformly in that sense, are to be considered *proper*.
8. Propositions, whose Subject and Predicate are Heterogeneous, to be interpreted Tropically.
9. But if the Subject be Complex, Heterogeneous Predicates may be used in their *proper* sense.

- § 10. In Laws, Dogmas, and Plain Narratives, Words are generally to be taken in their proper sense.
11. Usage alone can determine, whether, in Scripture, a Word is used Tropically or Properly.
12. The usage to be determined by a comparison of Parallel Texts.
13. The Judgment in this matter often to be determined by Epithets, Adverbs, and other Determinatives.
14. Assistance may sometimes be derived from the Context.
15. Of the Interpretation of Tropes.
16. Tropes not to be Interpreted from Etymology.
17. Tropes to be Interpreted by excluding the Idea and retaining the Notion.
18. Allegories to be considered as Tropical, and to be Interpreted by the *scope of the Context*.
19. Next the Signification of the Primary Term to be fixed, and all the rest to be interpreted in conformity with it.
20. The same principles to be applied to *Parables*.

CHAPTER V.

	Page
ON EMPHASIS	158

- § 1. Errors respecting Emphasis are common,
2. And arise commonly from Ignorance of the Language.
3. Necessity of Canons on this subject.
4. The Common Canon inadequate.
5. Emphasis scarcely admissible in the enunciation of a Law or Dogma.

- § 6. No word is Emphatic in itself.
7. Emphasis not to be sought for in the Etymology of Words.
8. Prepositions in Composition do not render a Word Emphatic.
9. Plurals used for Singulars are not Emphatic.
10. Abstracts for Concretes are not Emphatic.
11. The existence of Emphasis or of Hyperbole not to be rashly concluded from peculiarities of Idiom.
12. Constant Emphasis to be inferred only from *Usage*.
13. Temporary Emphasis to be allowed when the ordinary signification of the word gives an *insufficient* sense,
14. And also when it gives an *inappropriate* sense.
15. In these cases, also, the Usage of Language is not to be neglected.

CHAPTER VI.

	Page
ON THE METHOD OF RECONCILING APPARENT	
DISCREPANCIES	170

- § 1. When Texts are manifestly irreconcilable, we must look for an Emendation of the Text.
2. When the integrity of the Text is indisputable, we must seek to harmonize the Texts by suitable Interpretation.
3. Of various Classes of Apparent Discrepancies.
4. Of Apparent Discrepancies in Doctrinal Passages.
5. Of the same in Historical Passages.
6. Discrepancies are in general only *Verbal*.

- § 7. Examples of such Verbal Discrepancies to be studied in Profane Authors, and in the Commentators on them.
8. Obscure Doctrinal Texts to be explained by such as are plain.
9. Absolute Assertions to be qualified by a reference to Fundamental Principles.
10. In the Narratives of Historical Facts, we must not rashly assume either *Identity* or *Difference*.
11. In Harmonizing them, the more obscure Passage is to be interpreted by the plainer.
12. A perfect Harmony of the Gospels is scarcely to be looked for.

PART SECOND.

CHAPTER I.

	Page
ON THE PROPER METHOD OF WRITING, AND JUDGING OF VERSIONS AND COMMENTARIES	185

- § 1. Necessity of Rules on this subject.
2. Of the object and purpose of a Version.
3. Versions ought to be as *Literal* as the usage of the two Languages permits.
4. But *Literal* exactness ought never to be preserved in opposition to that usage.
5. A Translator of the New Testament must be thoroughly acquainted with Hebrew, Greek, and the Language into which he translates.

- § 6. When the form of the Words in the Original has a close connexion with the Subject, we must sometimes translate Literally, even in opposition to the usage of the Language.
7. The same must be done in Cases of Antithesis, &c.
8. And in Words which have no exact counterpart.
9. Obscure Passages must be translated Literally.
10. In general, Perspicuity rather than Literal Exactness is to be studied.
11. These Rules, though undeniably true, often neglected in practice.
12. Nature and use of Paraphrases.
13. Of Scholia.
14. Of Commentaries.
15. Of the Explanation of Words.
16. Of the Explanation of the Subject.
17. The Commentator ought to state the various opinions that have been advanced, and to give his own judgment.
18. Prolixity to be avoided.
19. All Ostentation of Learning to be avoided.
20. Dialectic Analysis of the Books of Scripture unadvisable.
21. Interpretation ought not to be affected by preconceived theories.
22. Simplicity to be studied.
23. Brevity to be studied.
24. Utility of Practice in Composition.
25. Consistency to be observed in the application of Hermeneutical Rules.
26. ————— particularly in reference to the authority of the Primitive Fathers.
27. Marks of Qualification in an Interpreter.

APPENDIX.

	Page
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY .	213
§ 1. Purpose of the Chapter.	
2. Definition of Prophecy.	
3. Of the Prophecies existing in the New Testament.	
4. Grammatical Interpretation to be used in the first place.	
5. Of the Figurative Language of Prophecy.	
6. Interpretations given by Christ or his Apostles, a Key to the Ancient Prophecies.	
7. Qualification of this Rule.	
8. Deduction from this Rule.	
9. The Power of Predicting Future Events not to be expected from the Interpretation of Prophecy.	
10. Passing Events not to be fixed upon as completions of Complex Prophecies.	
11. Propriety of Dividing extended Prophecies into Periods.	
12. The Language of the Apocalypse to be compared with that of Daniel.	
13. Its Predictions to be referred to the Church of Christ.	
14. The Kingdom therein spoken of is a Spiritual Kingdom.	
15. No explanation of Unfulfilled Prophecies is to be attempted.	
16. The Historico-Dogmatic Method of Interpretation does not apply to Prophecy.	
17. Reasons for this Distinction.	
18. Error of the Millenarians.	
19. Of the Double or Mixed Sense.	
20. Conclusion.	

JAHN'S LIST OF HERMENEUTICAL AUTHORS.

OF THE ROMISH CHURCH.

- Santis Pagnini, *Isagogae ad Sacras Literas; et Isagogae d Mysticos S. Scripturae Sensus.* Lugd. 1536, fol.
- Ambrosii Catharini, *Claves duae ad aperiendas intelligendasque Sacras Scripturas.* Ludg. Bat. 1548, 8vo.
- Gulielmus Lindanus, *de Optimo Sacras Scripturas Interpretandi genere.* Coloniae, 1558, 8vo.
- Sexti Senensis, *Ars Interpretandi Scripturas Sacras absolutissima.* Venetiis, 1566, fol. ; a Work which, from its excellence, has often been reprinted. See Rosenmüller's *Handbuch*. P. I. See 93—96 ; and R. Simon's *Histoire Critique du V. T. L.* iii. cap. 17.
- Hofmeisteri, *Canones ad interpretandas sacras literas.* Paris, 1573, 8vo.
- Jos. Acosta, *de vera Scripturas Interpretandi ratione, in opere de Christo revelato.* Romae, 1590, 4to.
- Martini Ant. del Rio, *Pharus sacrae sapientiae.* London, 1603, 4to.
- Basillii Ponce de Leon, *Quaestiones quatuor Expositivae.* Salamanticae, 1611.
- Hen. Marcelli, *Canones Explicandae Scripturae.* Herbipoli, 1653, 12mo.
- Joh. Neercassel, *Tractatus de Læctione Sacrarum Scripturarum.* Emmerici, 1677.
- Jos. Metzgeri, *Institutiones Sacrae Scripturae.* Salisburgi, 1680.
- Dom. J. Martianay. *Traité methodique, ou maniere d'expliquer l'Ecriture par le secours de trois syntaxes, la propre, la figurée, l'harmonique : et Methode sacrée pour apprendre et expliquer l'Ecriture sainte par l'Ecriture même.* Paris, 1704, 12mo. ; and 1716, 8vo.

xlii LIST OF HERMENEUTICAL AUTHORS.

- Sebast. Seemiller, *Institutiones ad Interpretationem, S. Scripturae.* Augustae Vind. 1779.
- J. J. Monsperger, *Institutiones Hermeneuticae V. T.* Vindobonae, 1776; recus 1784, 8vo.
- Steph. Hayd, *Introductio Hermeneutica in Sacros N. T. Libros.* Viennae, 1777, 8vo.
- Ad. Vizer, *Praenotationes Hermeneuticae N. Foederis.* Tyrnaviae, 1777, 4to.
- Christoph. Fischer, *Institutiones Hermeneuticae N. T.* Pragae, 1788, 8vo.
- G. Mayer *Institutio Interpretis sacri.* Vindobonae, 1789, 8vo.
- [Johann. Jahn, *Enchiridion Hermeneuticae generalis tabularum V. et N. Foederis.* Viennae, 1812, 8vo.]

PROTESTANTS.

- Math. Flaci, *Clavis Scripturae Sacrae.* Basiliae, 1567, fol.
- Joh. Gerhardi, *Tractatus de Legitima S. Scripturae Interpretatione.* Jenae, 1610 and 1663, 4to.
- Wolfg. Franzii, *Tractatus Theologicus novus et perspicuus de Interpretatione Scripturarum S. S. maxime legitima.* Vitenbergae, 1610, 4to.
- Sal. Glassii *Philologia Sacra.* Jenae 1623, 1643. Francof. et Hamb. 1653, and since then frequently reprinted. Edited by Dathe 1776, and with Emendations by Bauer, Lips. 1795-97. This work still retains its value.
- Conr. Danhaueri, *Hermeneutica Sacra*, 1654, 4to. and *Idea boni Interpretis et malitiosi Calumniatoris*, 1670, 8vo. Argentorati. At the same time appeared, *Sixtini Amamae Antibarbarus Biblicus*, in which the erroneous style of interpretation prevalent in that age, is reprehended.
- Theod. Hacspani, *Interpres errabundus, h. e. brevis disquisitio de causis errandi interpretum et commentatorum S. Scripturae*, 1645, 8vo.

- Joh. Olearii, *Theologia Exegetica*, 1674, 8vo. ; et *Elementa Hermeneuticae Sacrae*, 1699, Lips.
- J. J. Rambachii, *Institutiones Hermeneuticae Sacrae*, Jenae, 1723 ; and eight times reprinted. It is praised for its fulness of matter, but does not appear adapted to practice.
- J. A. Turretinus, de *S. Scripturae Interpretatione*, Traj. 1728 ; republished by Teller, Frank. ad Viadrum, 1776, 8vo. This work has received unmerited praises.
- Baumgarten's *Unterricht von der Auslegung des H. Schrift.* Halle, 1742, 1745, 1751.
- Dan. Wittenbachii, *Elementa Hermeneuticae Sacrae*, eo, quo in scientiis fieri solet, modo proposita. Marburg, 1760, 8vo.
- J. A. Ernesti, *Institutio Interpretis N. T.* 1761, 8vo ; reprinted in 1792. [The 5th edition, edited with Notes, by Ammon, Lips. 1809.] An excellent work.
- Toelner's, *Grundriss einer erwiesenen Hermeneutik der H. Schrift.* Zulichau, 1765, 8vo. The author shews acuteness in this as in his other works.
- Gottl. Traugott Zachariae, *Einleitung in die Auslegungskunst der H. Skrift.* Gottingen, 8vo. A posthumous work.
- J. E. Pfeifferi, *Institutiones Hermeneuticae Sacrae, veterum et recentiorum, et propria quaedam praecepta complexae.* Erlangae, 1771.
- J. S. Semleri, *Apparatus ad liberalem V. T. et N. T. interpretationem.* Halae, 1767 and 1777, 8vo.
- G. L. Baueri, *Hermeneutica Sacra V. T.* Lipsiae, 1797.
- G. W. Mayer's *Versuch einer Hermeneutik des A. T.* 2 Th. in 8vo. 1779-1780 ; a useful work, principally collected from other works, and containing much that belongs rather to an introduction.
- S. F. N. Mori, *Super Hermeneutica N. T. Acroases Academicæ.* Editioni aptavit H. C. A. Eichstädt. Lips. 1797 [and 1802.] Not praised in the Journals.

- G. L. Bauer's Entwurf einer Hermeneutik des A. and N. Test. Leipz. 1799.
- G. F. Seiler's Biblische Hermeneutik des A. and N. Test. Erlang. 1800, 8vo.
- C. D. Beckii, Monogrammata Hermeneutices librorum nov. Foederis. P. i. 1803, 8vo. Lipz.
- K. G. Bretschneider's Historisch-Dogmatische Auslegung des N. T. Leipz. 1806, 8vo. A work admirably suited to the present times.

[To these we may add the following Works by British Authors.]

- Institutes of Biblical Criticism, by Alexander Gerard, D.D. Edinburgh, 1808, 8vo.
- An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture Interpretation, &c. by W. Van Mildert, D. D. (now Bishop of Durham). Oxford, 1815, 8vo.
- Lectures on the Criticism and Interpretation of the Bible, by Herbert Marsh, D. D. Bishop of Peterborough, Part II. Camb. 1828.
- An Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, by T. H. Horne, M. A. Vol. II. Lond. 1823.
- The Four Gospels, Translated from the Greek, &c. by G. Campbell, D. D. Fourth Preliminary Dissertation. London.]

PROLEGOMENA

ON

INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL.

I. THAT the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures is the highest, and, at the same time, the most difficult task of the theologian, both the nature of the thing itself, and experience, and the consent of the most enlightened ages, agree in declaring. For all sure knowledge, and all effective defence of divine truth, must be derived from a clear understanding and accurate interpretation of the sacred records: ^a the purity of Christian doctrine fell, and was restored, with the decline and restoration of exegetical studies; and, finally, those have always been reckoned the first among theologians, who have excelled in the science of biblical interpretation. ^b

^a In every system the fundamental truths ought to be known. Jesus himself left no written records. And since

his doctrine has been propounded in very various manners by different writers, it is clear that we must recur to the fountain head ; that is, to the books of the New Testament. See *Doederlein's Christlicher Religionsunterricht*, Instruction in the Christian Religion, ed. 2. t. ii. p. 1. sq. *Morus' Epitome Theologiae Christianae*, sect. 30, on the Sacred Scriptures ; and my [Ammon's] work, *Ausführlicher Unterricht in der Christlichen Glaubenslehre*, Full Instruction in the System of Christian Faith, Nuremberg 1807, t. i. p. 232, sq.

^b Add this also, The increased liberty of our own times, both as to thinking and writing, has introduced a certain license, not only of doubting but even of deciding. We shall scarcely be able to impose limits upon this license, to lead others into a better course, or to remove or repress our own doubts, unless we arm ourselves with sound principles of interpretation. See Noesselts, *Anleitung zur Bildung angehender Theologen*, p. 295, Guide to the Formation of Theological Students.

So much concerning the necessity of the interpretation of the New Testament. We shall also be convinced of its utility, if we consider,

1. That the divine truth of Christianity, based upon the doctrine of Christ himself, can be defended against the insults of its enemies only by arguments drawn from the writings of his disciples. A theologian unskilled in the interpretation of Scripture, and pressed by the vehemence and assaults of opponents, can repel them only by arms drawn from dogmatic and symbolical books, [that is the creeds and formularies of his church,] to the assertions of which he is satisfied with rendering an implicit belief.

2. It is certain that the belief of the Christian church maintained comparative purity down to the 6th century, when it became contaminated with the perverse opinions of philosophers, owing to the neglect of the study of biblical interpretation. When, at the period of the Reformation,

sacred literature began to revive, the true doctrine began also to emerge from its obscurity, and to shine again in its original lustre. In the same way the civil law revived through the study of Greek and Roman literature, and medicine from the study of Celsus. Concerning the merits of Reuchlin, Erasmus, Melancthon, and Luther, it is unnecessary to speak. See Ernesti Opusc. Theol. p. 583, sq. And, in the same way, among more recent theologians, those have always been accounted in the first class, who have applied themselves successfully to the interpretation of Scripture. [Of these names, Reuchlin is the only one with which any of our readers can be supposed unacquainted. He was born at Pfortsheim in Baden, A. D. 1455, became celebrated for his acquirements in Greek and Hebrew, and was much employed in diplomacy by Eberhard I. and II. Counts of Wirtemberg. In 1510 Pfefferkorn, a converted Jew at Cologne, obtained an order from the emperor, that all Jewish books, excepting the Scriptures, should be burned. Reuchlin, who was much devoted to Rabbinical studies, opposed the execution of this order by a memorial to the emperor, and afterwards by his *Speculum Oculare*, in answer to Pfefferkorn's *Speculum Manuale*. In consequence of this he underwent a long and harassing persecution from the Scholastic Theologians, headed by Arnold of Tongres, Ortuinus Gratius, and J. Hoogstraten, Grand Inquisitor of Mayence. Though Reuchlin contributed much to the cause of the reformation, he never left the communion of the church of Rome. His principal works, in addition to the *Speculum*, are,

Liber de Verbo Mirifico, on the Cabala.

Rudiments of Hebrew, *Hebrew Lexicon*, *Three Books on the Cabalistic Art*.

His controversy with Pfefferkorn was the occasion of that admirable satire, *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*, a good edition of which, with explanatory notes, has long been a desideratum in literature.]

II. But as all interpretation is difficult, requiring much learning, judgment, and diligence, and often a certain natural sagacity, so the interpretation of the Scriptures is, on many accounts, particularly difficult. This has been acknowledged by the most learned men, and is sufficiently proved by the wonderful scarceness of good interpreters. See Huetiana, p. 181. ^c

^c Although the difficulties of exegetical study are such, that a clear view of them may possibly deter a student from all attempts to overcome them, yet they ought not to be concealed or denied; for known difficulties are the most easy to overcome. Let it then be observed,

1. That in addition to natural powers of intellect, assiduity and diligence are also requisite, without which, however irksome they may be to quick and delicate minds, no considerable effects in exegesis can possibly be produced.

2. That in this pursuit an extensive acquaintance with literature is required, especially in our days, when the number of books is somewhat unnecessarily multiplied.

3. That many difficulties arise from the antiquity of the books of the New Testament, which were written many ages ago, in a very peculiar language, and by men of a nation, whose manners, customs, and language, differed most widely from our own. Among the ancients, Origen has pointed out this in his *τομοι*, Jerome in his book *de Principiis*, and also Chrysostom and Theodoret. Among the moderns, Luther in the preface to his Commentary on the Psalms, and after many other learned men, the immortal Ernesti, in his dissertation *on the Difficulty of rightly Interpreting the New Testament*, in his *Opuscula Phil. and Crit.* p. 198, in which

he rehandles the subject, and gives it its last finish and perfection.

4. That many prejudices in certain quarters oppose the exegetical study of the New Testament, as for example, that the Scriptures cannot be properly explained without prayer, and a pious simplicity of mind: That all profane learning is to be utterly shunned and contemned, (on which point a humorous story occurs in the life of Jerome): that the text of the New Testament is utterly uncorrupted, and that its books are composed in a pure Greek idiom. For the complete subversion of these and similar fancies, the reader may consult Herder's, *Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffende*, Letters on the Study of Theology.

[The translator having undertaken to give the notes of Ammon generally, has not thought himself entitled to reject those from which he dissents. But when *prayer and pious simplicity* are spoken of as totally useless in the investigation of Scriptural truth, he might quote the aphorism of the great Luther, "Bene precari est bene studere," had he not the declaration of a greater than Luther,—“I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes: even so Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.” Luke xi. 25, 26.]

5. That it is necessary the mind should be formed to habits of interpretation, by the study of the Greek and Roman classics.

6. That it is difficult to form just and certain laws of interpretation, and the difficulty lies in this, that the subject is entirely one of probabilities. See Le Clerc's *Ars Critica*, and Beck's *Commentatio de Interpretatione Veterum Scriptorum*, sect. 2, 3. The critical knowledge of the New Testament labours under still greater difficulties, which even in our times, does not rise above the limits of probability. [By *scientia critica*, Ammon means the determination of the genuine text.]

7. That there still remain many obscurities in the history of the times, the authors, and the books of the New Testament: many things, also, in its geography and natural history, require a fuller elucidation than they have yet received, even from the enlightened researches of modern travellers.

8. That in the interpretation of the New Testament, besides the mere words of the text, the character of the author should also be taken into account, without a due attention to which, the interpreter cannot see far into his subject. In Paul we may remark Rabbinical learning, and Jewish philosophy, together with an ingenuous candour and warmth. In John a richness and depth of feeling, with a tender simplicity of mind. Some information on this head may be drawn from Niemeyer's work, *Characteristic der Bibel*. Lives of Jesus Christ, of John, and of Paul, acutely and ingeniously written, are still desiderata, even after the labours of *Langius, Witsius, Paley and others*.

All these difficulties attending the art of interpretation will deter only those minds which are, *nil magnae laudis egent*; they will serve to excite more elevated minds to greater exertion. See Doederlein's *Institutiones Theol. Christ. t. i. p. 174, ed. 5.*

III. Interpretation is the art of teaching the real sentiment contained in any form of words, or of effecting that another may derive from them the same idea that the writer intended to convey. ^d

^d Interpretation is either cursory or precise; universal or historical. The last is of most value in reference to the New Testament. See Storr *on the Historical Sense*. Tübingen, 1783. Keil *on the Historical Interpretation of the Sacred Books*. Lips. 1788. Bretschneider's, *Historisch-*

Dogmatische Auslegung des N. T. nach ihren Principien, Quellen und Hülfsmitteln. Lips. 1806. Principles, Sources, and Aids, of the Historical and Dogmatical Interpretation of the New Testament.

For the other species of interpretation, see Beck's *Comm. de Interpretatione Vet. Script.* p. 40. [The translator has been unable to meet with a copy of Beck. Ammons' terms for the different kinds of interpretation are, *cursoria, stataria, universalis, historica.* Interpretatio cursoria is probably what we call a running commentary. For *Interpretatio Historica*, see note vv. § xiii. p. i. s. i. cap. ii.]

IV. All interpretation, therefore, depends upon two things; the perception of the sense contained in certain words, and the explanation of that sense in proper terms. A good interpreter ought, therefore, to possess clearness of comprehension, and clearness of explanation.

V. Clearness of comprehension is shewn in two points: the *first* is, clearly to be aware how much you understand, and how much you do not; and to perceive clearly what are the difficulties, and wherein they originate; the *second* is, by a right system of inquiry, to discover the sense of those parts which are difficult. ^e

^e An interpreter ought, therefore, to possess two species of acuteness, *dialectic* and *grammatical.* That faculty which critics and interpreters call *sagacity*, was particularly conspicuous in Salmasius, Hemsterhuis, Valkenaer, Bentley, Ruhnken, Eichhorn, and others.

VI. The *first* part arises partly from natural acuteness of intellect; for in proportion as the intellect of any one is naturally dull, the more unthinkingly does he assent to propositions, and the more readily does he persuade himself that he understands that which he does not understand: it arises, also, in part, from diligence, and the habit of distinguishing between the ideas of things, and the ideas of sounds; ^f that is, of considering in every case, whether we are really thinking of anything beyond the mere word or combination of letters. The *second* is attainable, first by an accurate knowledge of the language to be interpreted, and of literature in general; and then by an acquaintance with the principles of interpretation. Not that the faculty of interpretation is absolutely unattainable without these; but they strengthen weaker minds, lead them into the right path, direct them to rely rather on reason, than on chance; and supply a common rule of judging in controverted cases. Finally, it is attained by practice, without which all the other requisites can be of little avail.^s

^f Although it be a common error in all literature, to imagine we understand that which we do not, yet has it produced the greatest mischief in the interpretation of the New Testament, by the ideas of sounds, in which men contem-

plate, not the subject itself, but merely the external letter. As examples, we may quote, 'Αδάμ ἀρχαῖος, ἁμαρτίαν λούσασθαι αἵματι, δαιμονιζόμενος, &c. *The old Adam, To wash away sin by blood, possessed of a devil, &c.* [The two first are tropical expressions; and an indolent reader will generally be satisfied with a very vague notion of the real subject denoted by the figure. Indeed, all men are apt to treat words as algebraical symbols, that is, to work with them according to the rules of logic and grammar, without attending to the subjects they denote.]

^ε [Ernesti appears to rate the importance of his art too low, when he limits its efficacy to minds of inferior quality, *mediocria ingenia*. Rules for interpretation are still more useful in curbing the irregularities of powerful minds, than in strengthening the efforts of weak minds. See the Translator's Preface.]

VII. What is meant by a just and accurate knowledge of languages will be more conveniently treated of in another place: The practice tending to sharpen the mind to a perception of the true sense consists, first, in listening to good interpreters;^h next, in reading and meditating upon their works; by which means the mind is insensibly formed to imitation, and follows the traces of their footsteps; and, lastly, by an assiduous and habitual perusal of those books, the faculty of interpreting which we desire to obtain.ⁱ

^h [The author here refers to *Academical Lectures on the Interpretation of Scripture.*]

ⁱ Among the best critical editors of ancient authors, we may enumerate Valkenaer, Ruhnken, Brunck, Schütz, Wolf, &c. : among the best interpreters, Gesner, Heyne, Morus, and Beck. In the science of Biblical Criticism, the student may take as his guides Wetstein, Semler, Griesbach, Matthai, Hug; in Interpretation, Grotius, Noesselt, Morus, Koppe, Eichhorn, Gabler, and others. Before he forms any judgment on works of interpretation, I request him to peruse Gesner's Prefaces to Livy, and the *Scriptores Rustici*, Burmann's preface to Phaedrus, and Ernesti's dedication prefixed to his edition of Cicero. Upon the whole, we may remark, that a work which we desire to understand, ought first to be read cursorily, and then studied slowly and carefully; this is a most important arrangement.

VIII. *Clearness of explanation* consists in the faculty of expressing the sense of an author's words, by converting them into easier terms in the same language, or in any other; or in demonstrating and illustrating the sense by expansion.^k From this interpreters properly take their name.

^k This may be done, 1, by illustrating the sense of words from the *usus loquendi*, and from the context, as when the predicate is explained by the subject, or the subject by the predicate; for example, *σάρξ ἐστὶν ἀπώλεια*. 2, by interpreting the sense of formularies and propositions; which may be done either by adducing examples, or collecting parallel passages, or by resolving the whole context of the discourse, as has been done by Koppe in his annotations on the Epistles of St. Paul; or, finally, by illustrating the subject itself.

IX. This is founded upon a thorough command of the language *which we use in interpreting*, and is discernible in translation from the purity of the style which we use, together with the preservation of the character of the original, as far as that is possible, lest the force of the argument, which often depends upon the force and figure of particular words, should be impaired: in expanding it manifests itself by purity and brevity. These points, however, we shall consider more fully, when we come to treat of commentaries and versions.

X. Hermeneutics are the science of attaining clearness, both in comprehending and explaining the sense of any author; or, of discovering and explaining clearly what is the meaning of any sentence.¹

¹ They err, therefore, who imagine, that hermeneutics consist in single precepts, or in canons collected from all sides, and amassed together, of which he will be able to judge who has inspected the Tables of Opicius.

With respect to the history of hermeneutics, as distinct from that of interpretation, we find, that the first lines of it were traced by Pfeiffer (*Instit. Hermeneut. Sacrae*, Erlangen, 1771.) He who wishes to pursue the subject, besides the works of Töllner, *Grundriss der Hermeneutik*, Principles of Hermeneutics, and of Zacharias, *Kurze Einleitung in die Auslegungskunst der heiligen Schrift*, Short Introduction to the Science of Biblical Interpretation, will especially study the following works of the celebrated Semler. *Vor-*

bereitung zur theologischen Hermeneutik, Preparation for theological Hermeneutics, Halle, 1760: *Apparatum ad liberalem, N. T. Interpretationem*, Halle, 1767. *Neuen Versuch die gemeinnützige Auslegung des N. T. zu befördern*, New attempt to further the useful Interpretation of the N. T. Halle, 1786, &c. Add to these the *Acroases Academicæ* of Morus on Hermeneutics, Leipzig, 1797: and the excellent works of Meyer of Altorf, *Versuch einer Hermeneutik des A. T.* Attempt at a System of Hermeneutics for the Old Test. Lübeck, 1799. *Geschichte der Schrifterklärung seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften*, History of the Interpretation of Scripture since the revival of letters, Göttingen, 1802. [The English student, if unacquainted with German, may consult Bishop Marsh's 11th and 12th Lectures.

After this formidable array of authors, whose works the English reader may find it difficult to meet with, he may still have some difficulty in determining what hermeneutics, as distinguished from interpretation, or exegesis, really mean. Hermeneutics differ from Exegesis, as algebra from arithmetic: the former consists in general principles of interpretation, the latter in the application of those general principles to the interpretation of particular passages. A full catalogue of the most celebrated hermeneutical works will be found at the commencement.]

XI. The discovery of the sense, so far as it can be made the subject of rules, will be considered in two parts, of which the one is *contemplative*, the other *preceptive*. The former contains general observations concerning the signification and the classes of words, from which either the rules of interpretation themselves, or the reasons for them are deduced:

the latter contains precepts as to the method of interpreting. For neither do all these observations concerning the classes, the signification and the nature of words, suffice to enable us to discover their proper application in any particular case; nor, on the other hand, can precepts respecting the proper method of investigating the sense, be certain or perspicuous, unless the nature and signification of words be previously ascertained.

XII. There is also to be considered the material, as it were, on which the interpreter exercises his ingenuity, or which he uses in investigating the sense of his author. This consists in the books themselves which he interprets, and in the literary apparatus bearing any relation to them. These must therefore be treated of in a system of interpretation.^m

^m After the laws of hermeneutics, there are still many things requiring our attention, before we attempt the Interpretation of the N. T. as, 1, disquisitions concerning the authors and compilation of the N. T.; 2, concerning the canon; 3, concerning the copies, whether manuscript or printed; 4, concerning the versions. These inquiries have, in our age, acquired such an extent, as to form a separate branch, that of *Introductions to the N. T.* of which a brief account will be found in this work.

XIII. This work, then, on the Principles of Interpretation, will be divided into three great

divisions: of which the *first* part, as before noticed, will be divided into *the contemplative* and *the preceptive*: the *second* will treat of versions and commentaries: and the *third*, of the whole hermeneutical apparatus, and its legitimate application to the exegesis of Scripture.

PART FIRST.

SECTION I.

CONTEMPLATIVE.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.

I. To every word there ought to answer, and, in the inspired books, there always does answer, a certain idea or notion of a thing, which we call the *Sense*,ⁿ because the sensations or feelings originally excited by the thing, ought to be recalled to the mind by the hearing of the word which represents it.

ⁿ Words are the signs of our thoughts. But in a sign there are two things; the sign itself, and the object denoted by the sign. Therefore, in every word there ought to be the sound or form of the word, and the notion signified by

the word. See Federi Instit. Log. sec. 28. [Morus rightly distinguishes between signification and sense: the former is the meaning of a word; the latter, of a proposition.]

II. This sense scholars denominate the *literal* sense; because it is by custom so united to the word, as, that when the word is heard, this sense is immediately recalled to the mind. This sense is the same as that which, among good and ancient authors, was called *sensus literæ*, the sense of the letter, to which the ignorance of some moderns has given a different meaning;° though Erasmus and his cotemporaries use the two terms promiscuously. For the *letter* means exactly that which the Greeks called τὸ γεγραμμένον, or τὸ γράμμα, and which Cicero and other Latin authors properly render by *scriptum*; whence the phrases *scriptum sequi*, and *scripti interpretatio*.

° The distinction which has been drawn between the *sense of the letter* and the *literal sense*, is, that the former comprehends all the senses which the word can possibly have; the latter, only that which is intended in the passage. But that this distinction is to be entirely rejected, has been shewn by *Morus* in his *Epistola de Ratione*, S. S. interpretandæ, p. 60. Compare also his dissertation on the difference of the *sense* and the *signification*, in his *Opusc. Theol.* t. i. p. 61. Either sense is nothing more than the primitive signification of the word, which immediately strikes the mind as soon as the word is pronounced.

[It is not true that the *primitive* signification is that

which necessarily enters the mind of the hearer. The primitive sense of such words, as *sincere, precise, right, wrong*, that is, the ideas of, *without wax, cut off at the end, ruled, twisted*, never enter the mind of a hearer when they are pronounced. Ammon ought rather to have said, that the *literal* sense is the sense in which the word is, or was ordinarily used at the time of writing.]

III. Words have not this sense from nature or necessity, but only from human institution and custom, by which a connexion has been formed between words and ideas.^P

^P The full investigation of this point is to be looked for in disquisitions on the origin of language. For which, see Rousseau sur l'Orgine des langues. Opp. t. xvi. p. 153. Ed. Bipont. Herder's *Preischrift über den Ursprung der Sprache*. Prize Essay on the Origin of Language. Berlin, 1789; and his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*. Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Human Nature, t. ii. p. 269. Dorsch, *Philosophische Geschichte der Sprache und Schrift*. Philosophical History of Language and Writing, Mayence, 1791. The connexion between a word and its sense, is arbitrary; but so that the first race of men aimed at the expression and imitation of nature. The more ancient therefore a nation, the more simple is its language, and the more abounding in imitative sounds, as is peculiarly the case with the early language of the Jews. This, however, only holds good with respect to sensible objects; for more abstruse objects may, in various ways, be compared with natural objects, and, in consequence, the signs for them are more arbitrary and various: such are the words אלהים θεος, God. [Whatever may be thought of the origin of language, and that, to a certain extent at least, it was of Divine communication, seems by

far the most probable opinion ; yet, as the words of any existing language cannot be traced up to this original communication, their sense must be considered as fixed only by human institution and custom.]

IV. Though this connexion was in its commencement and institution arbitrary, yet, being once established by custom, it has become necessary. Not that one word has, or can have only one meaning; for the fact is manifestly otherwise; but that we are not at liberty to give what sense we please to a word, either in writing or in interpreting; nor, at the same time and place, nor in the same style of speaking, can the sense be various.

V. Therefore, though custom has by degrees attached more than one meaning to a term, in order that the difficulty of learning languages might not be increased by the infinite multiplication of words; yet, in practice, while the subject, the mode, and the place of speaking, remain unchanged, it only attaches one meaning to each word; and, upon the whole, arranges so, that whatever addition is made to the ordinary sense, may be understood from the whole style of speaking, or from the accompanying words.⁹ In this, however, we must confess, there occasionally exists a certain degree of ambiguity, sometimes arising from the fault of writers,^r who do not guard suffi-

ciently by the construction of the words, or by those necessary adjuncts, which philosophers call *determinations*, against the possibility of doubt and error on the part of the reader; and sometimes arising from the fault of custom itself,^q which, not being under the control of philosophers, does not, in all cases, possess complete accuracy. Whence, also, it may be understood what ambiguity is innocent, and what faulty.

^q Words which are *πολυσήμαντα* or of many meanings, may generally be interpreted from the context. Thus *λόγος* has the different meanings *reason, reckoning, speech, Christ*. The proper sense of this word must be determined by the construction, as in the cases *λόγον ὑπέχειν, λόγον ποιῆσθαι, ὁ λόγος σαρκὶ ἐγένετο*. As examples, we may also refer to Matt. xiv. 25. *περιπατῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης*, and 1 Cor. xv. 29. *βαπτιζομενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*. The ambiguous sense of the prepositions *ὑπὲρ* and *ἐπὶ*, must be determined from the context on which they stand. [In every language the prepositions have each many meanings, all however referable, in a greater or less degree, to some one primary sense. On the text Matt. xiv. 25. Ammon has given some very wild criticism in the Preface to his edition of Ernesti. He holds that *περιπατῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης*, means merely *wadeing* and *swimming*, because it answers to the Hebrew **הַלֵךְ עַל פְּנֵי הַמַּיִם** Gen. vii. 18. spoken of the ark, whose motion it is to be supposed was alternately *wadeing* and *swimming*. A denial of the miraculous powers of Christ puts an interpreter to great difficulties, and will never be supported by the legitimate use of any sound principle of Exegesis.]

^r Such an ambiguity arises, for example, when two accu-

satives are joined to one infinitive: as *Ἰησοῦν εἶναι ἀνθρώπον*, *patrem esse filium*. In Eph. v. 26. *τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι*, the repetition of the dative case darkens the sense of the passage, unless ἐν ῥήματι be resolved as a Hebraism into *διὰ τοῦ ῥήματος*. In the writings of St. Paul, whom, on that account, Jerome has ventured to charge with ignorance of grammar, (Hier. ad Coloss, ii. 23.) similar *δυσνοητα* (2 Pet. iii. 16.) often occur.

^s Custom originates not with philosophers, but with ignorant men; and whatever springs from such a source must have some taint of error. Of such custom, the faithful mother of error, some traces may be found even in the New Testament, and in such ambiguities, even the best interpreters are at a loss. Such are Heb. iv. 12. *ζῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος Θεοῦ*. Rom. viii. 19. *ἀποκαρδοκία τῆς κτίσεως*. Acts viii. 23. *σύνδεσμος ἀδικίας*, which expressions cannot be illustrated, except from the custom of the Jews, as will be shown hereafter. [In these texts, that from Romans is the only one containing a real difficulty; but, supposing they all require illustration from Jewish custom, it surely does not follow of necessity, either that the custom is unphilosophical, or that the resulting interpretation must be uncertain.]

VI. On these considerations rests all the certainty which can exist in interpretation. For there could be no certainty of interpretation, did there not exist some *necessity*^t for attaching a peculiar meaning to each word; and were not the literal meaning of the same word in the same passage one and the same.

^t Not absolute, but merely hypothetical necessity; which is commonly the only foundation of systems. For the nature of truth itself is freed from the necessity of thinking, which must be one thing in the creature, and another in the

Creator. [The translator subjoins the Latin of Ammon, which, he confesses, that he does not understand, “*ipsa enim veri natura absolvitur necessitate cogitandi, quae, alia in creaturis, alia esse debet in Creatore.*”]

VII. Their mistake is therefore to be the more reprehended, who, on the authority of Augustine, (Confess xii. 30, 31,) hold that there can be many senses, and those all literal, of one passage of Scripture; an error which has sprung from the variety of interpretations upon ambiguous passages, of which several may possess a shew of probability, or be recommended by the respectability of their authors. Such a notion renders interpretation uncertain, and therefore is in the highest degree pernicious.^u

^u They offend against this rule, who maintain a double sense in the prophecies of the Old Testament, especially in the Psalms. We would not, however, be understood to mean, that the same passage cannot refer to David and to Christ: for that such is the case we are fully persuaded: but only that a distinction must be drawn between the primitive sense and the sense as determined by a later age. See Ernesti De Interp. Prophet. Messiae in Opusc. Theol. p. 495. It is agreed upon by the best critics, that the passages quoted from the Old Testament, in the New, generally afford a double sense; the one in the Hebrew, the other in the Greek; which observation is of the highest importance in the doctrine of Prophecy. [It is to be remarked, however, that no later age could rightly give any sense to a passage, which sense was not intended by the author. The author may intend part of his sense to be understood by his cotemporaries, and part by a later age: part to refer to David as the type, and part to Christ

as the antetype. But, as Dr. J. P. Smith well observes, "I do not perceive that the application of this principle is the admission of a double sense. It is one sense; it is one predicate or collection of predicates; but by original design and construction, formed so as to be applied to two subjects; to the first by anticipation, and partially; and to the second in complete perfection; the former being the temporary representative and introduction to the latter. Perhaps the phrase *double application* might be suitable for the expression of this fact; or Lord Bacon's springing and germinant accomplishment." See Principles of Interpretation, &c. by J. P. Smith, D. D. p. 53. See also Lowth's Praellect. xi.]

VIII. Nor can that opinion, originating among the Jews,^x and afterwards propagated among the Christians, be more approved of, which holds that the words of Scripture mean whatever they can mean. From this it is an easy transition to fill everything with allegories, prophecies, and mysteries; as experience shews to have been the case with the Jews, the Doctors of the early Church, the Scholastic Divines, and the Cocceians.^y

^x The Jews hold, "that on every point of Scripture hang mountains of wisdom." In the Talmud, (Sanhedrim, fol. 34, c. i.) it is remarked on Jeremiah xxiii. 29, "As a hammer separates into many particles, so each text of Scripture has many senses." And in Sopherin, c. 16. fol. 13. col. 3. "God so gave the law to Moses, as that a thing may be pronounced clean or unclean in forty-nine different ways." This is proved from Cantic. ii. 4. וְרַגְלֵי the letters of which, numerically computed, amount to 49. Another author has assumed this silly fancy as a hermeneutical law. See Psik-

tha rabbtha, fol. 23, col. 1. Eisenmenger has reviewed many of these follies of the Jews as to the multiplication of the sense, in his work, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, Exposure of Judaism, t. i. p. 454. From the Jews, this absurd method of interpretation, which they call *מדרש*, was borrowed by Origen and Augustine. In modern times, it is defended with feeble hands, by a few adherents of Cocceius. See Deyling in his *Observ. Sacr.* t. iii. p. 140, and Turretin, who has treated the subject more fully in his *De Interpretatione*, S. S.

‡ Add to these the disciples of Kant and Fichte, (see *Anweisung zum Seligen Leben*, Exhortation to a Pious Life, Berlin, 1806, p. 157,) whose opinions, after the complete refutation given by Rosenmüller, Eichhorn, *Ἐπιδαίμων*, &c. it is unnecessary again to open up. For it is one thing to *interpret* an author, and another to *philosophize* upon his meaning. Lest, however, as is common with grammarians, we should insist upon this too strictly, we may remark, that ignorance and superstition have often imagined a new and secret sense in writings remarkable for their antiquity: this appears in the interpretations of Plutarch, and in the Homeric allegories of Heraclides. Besides, the books esteemed divine, sometimes afford a sense so jejune, that, on account of the divine impulse by which we suppose the author to have been actuated, we are easily led to suppose, that one thing is simply stated, while another is figuratively implied. Thus, we find Paul after Philo, openly supporting the allegorical interpretation in Gal. iv. 24. See the Commentary of Koppe on this text. Besides, we have experience and history as witnesses, that, from the time of Origen, down to our own, the allegorical interpretation of Scripture has been more effective in stirring up pious and moral feelings in the people, than the simple and grammatical interpretation. See Noesselt's *Dissertatio de Sensu Morali*, improved and completed in his last exertions. But all this belongs to the history of popular interpretation, as treated of in Schuler's

work, rather than to the interpretation of the New Testament, strictly speaking. [This note is written throughout in Ammon's most offensive style. That Scripture may be properly interpreted, in a sense which we are well assured was never in the writer's mind, and that it has thus been interpreted by St. Paul *after Philo*, are fancies too revolting to common sense, and too directly opposed to all reverence for the word of God, to be readily received among us. The reader will find no such unholy rashness in the note of the judicious Koppe, to which he refers. Koppe says, and with perfect truth, that the words of the text may mean, either that Moses really meant to shadow out the Christian and Jewish Churches by the story of Hagar; or that the story may serve as an apt illustration of the relative position of the two churches. He then at once decides, that the latter is the true interpretation, because no clear instance can be brought of a prophetic allegory interrupting the course of a plain narrative, like that of Moses. He then proceeds to shew, that the allegorical interpretations of Philo, and other great Jewish Doctors, were not intended for interpretations, but for illustrations only; and that there existed no reason why St. Paul, writing to Jews, or to persons acquainted with Jewish literature, might not use this method of illustrating, to which their minds were familiar. Ammon, in fact, has not profited by the lessons of his master Ernesti, and has fallen into the error blamed in the text: with this difference, however, that the persons there mentioned acted *bona fide*, and believed the allegorical to be the real sense; he maintains, that a popular interpreter may give any sense to Scripture which he thinks likely to produce pious feelings in the minds of the vulgar. And, indeed, this species of falsehood is perpetually attributed by the Neologists to our Lord and his apostles.]

IX. Nor are *allegorical interpretations* to be reckoned as forming part of the sense. They

are rather accommodations of the sense, properly so called, and of facts, to the illustration of some point of doctrine ;^z which, if they be apt and moderate, have some use, and that no mean one : but if they be handled by unlearned men, whose minds are undisciplined by literature, they usually degenerate into useless, and sometimes into ridiculous trifling.

^z Allegory rests upon similitude ; and as this cannot be perfect, it is evident that there cannot be room for a perfect comparison. For investigating allegories well, there is needed a mind well disciplined in literature, especially in rhetoric, without which the transition is easy from allegories to childish trifles and follies. This discipline is peculiarly necessary in an interpreter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. For excellent observations on this subject see Mori *Dissertationes*, i. p. 370. *Ziegler's Einleitung in den Brief an die Hebräer*, Introduction to the Epistle to the Hebrews, sect. 16 ; and Eichhorn in the *Allgemeiner Bibliothek der Biblischen Litteratur*, General Library of Biblical Literature, iii. p. 470.

X. Neither is a *typical sense*, the sense in the strict use of that term. For it is a sense or meaning, not of words, but of things which God intended to be signs of future events. Nor, in searching for this typical sense, is there need of the care and talents of an interpreter. For it is revealed by the information and testimony of the Holy Spirit, beyond whose shewing we should not in this matter attempt to advance. Those who look to the

counsel, or intention, as they call it, of the Holy Spirit, act irrationally, and open the road to the unlimited introduction of types. The intention of the Holy Spirit can be made known to us only by his own shewing. On this head the reader may consult Luther de Papatu, t. i. Altenberg, p. 461.

^a Allegory differs from type, in that the former exhibits the comparison of a universal, the latter of a particular. Types, therefore, afford not a sense, but an image. Three things are to be observed :

1. Types are comparisons drawn from persons or ceremonies in the Old Testament, remarkable for their antiquity, their learning, their fate, or their sanctity, and were very much used by the Jews. The more, therefore, any writers of the New Testament use the Jewish style of composition, as Matthew and Paul, the more frequently do they introduce types : the farther they recede from this style, the more sparing are they in the use of types, as appears from the writings of John.

2. Types are not to be multiplied, nor are any to be allowed, except such as are expressly named in the New Testament. As, for example, *Adam*, Rom. v. 14. *Jonas*, Mat. xii. 39. *Melchisedec*, Heb. v. 7.

3. Types are not to be extended beyond the proper limits of comparison ; but are so to be explained, as that it may appear they are not of the essence, but only of the external form of Christianity. See *Rau, Freimüthige Untersuchung über der Typologie*, Free Inquiry respecting the Doctrine of Types, Erlangen, 1784.

XI. There is also an error unspeakably dangerous, into which some doctors of the ancient church have fallen, (Augustin, Civ. Dei xv. 27;)

and which has been approved of by some doctors of the Romish Church; that, namely, of asserting that some passages of Scripture, those of course which they cannot interpret, have no literal sense.^b This one Wittius has lately dared to assert respecting the Proverbs of Solomon; and hence has arisen the madness of Woolston, who degrades the narratives of Christ's miracles into mere allegories.

^b It is to be remarked, however, that the books of the Old Testament, especially the more ancient ones, contain passages which are manifestly allegorical; the cause of which is to be looked for in the simplicity of ancient language, which could not yet admit an historical plainness of style. See note y, sect. viii. [The translator has already offered his remarks on the neology of note y. Here he has only to remark, that the simplicity of a language seems a strange cause of unfitness for plain narrative; and that the language which served for narrating the history of Joseph, as it is narrated by Moses, could admit what Ammon calls *historicam decendi exilitatem, planumque scribendi genus.*]

XII. Since the connexion subsisting between words and ideas sprung from human institution, and is maintained by custom; it is evident that the signification of words depends upon the *usage of language*; and that the latter being known, the former is known also.

XIII. The *usage of language* is affected by many things, by the time, the religion, the sect or party, the habits of ordinary life, and

the political institutions, all of which tend to form the character of the style. For the sense in which words are used, either originates from, or is modified by all these : and thus the same word may mean one thing in ordinary life, another in religion ; it may have a third sense in the schools of the philosophers, and even this philosophical sense may vary in different sects.^c

^c This will best be illustrated by examples. *Καθαρισμὸς* (*purification*) has one meaning in ordinary life, another in Pagan religion, another in Judaism, another in Christianity ; in Christianity, again, it has different senses, according as it occurs in dogmatic or in moral treatises ; and, finally, we find it used with a meaning different from all these in the philosophy of Pythagoras. We may also instance the Hebrew words *כְּהֵן*, *נְבִיא*, *בְּרִיָּה* ; the Greek *πίστις*, *δαίμων* ; and the Latin *auctoritas*, (See Ernesti, *Clav. Cic. ad. voc.*) *Libertas*, *Sacramentum*.

XIV. This is the proper province of grammarians, the highest exercise of whose art, consists in discovering what is the exact meaning of each word, at different times in different authors, and in different styles.^d Whence the *literal* sense is the *grammatical* sense, and indeed the two terms are derivatively the same : it is also called the *historical* sense,^e which, like other matters of fact, rests upon testimony and authority.

^d As the *usage of language* is a matter of fact, grammarians ought to attend carefully to the history of significations. They must distinguish between the primitive and the derivative, the poetical and the prosaic use, as the ancients did in their Homeric, Platonic, and Tragic glosses. The difficulty of effecting this, in a dead language, may be inferred from the fact, of our having so long wanted a Lexicon of the New Testament, satisfactory to the wishes of all. See Fischer, *Prolusiones de Vitiis Lexicorum*, N. T. Lips. 1791, prolus. 16, 31. Schleusner's *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, N. T. has at length, in our days, satisfied the wishes of the learned. [The merits of Schleusner are admitted wherever the New Testament is critically studied. Other Lexicons of the New Testament are, however, beginning to rival his, especially those of Wahl and Bretschneider.]

^e [Though, it is true, that there being but one sense of each passage, the historical sense must be the same as the grammatical: yet historical and grammatical exposition are different things. Thus *αἰών*, grammatically considered, is simply *time, age*; but, if we consult the history of Jewish dogmas, we find that *αἰὼν οὐτός*, and *αἰὼν ὁ μέλλων* mean the *time previous*, and *the time subsequent to the advent of Messias*. See Lightfoot's *Hor. Hebr. ad Matt. xii. 35*. So, again, with respect to *λόγος*, John i. 1. grammarians refer it, some to *ὁ λέγων*, others to *ὁ λεγόμενος*. The historical interpreter, on the other hand, examines whether the Jews had not attached some peculiar dogmatic sense to the word, as expressing a *divine substance*. Ernesti was well aware of the necessity of historical investigation, but considers it as part of the grammarian's office. For a full examination of the difference between these two methods, see K. G. Bretschneider's *Historisch-Dogmatische Auslegung des N. T.* p. 16, sq. Mr. Horne, in his useful Introduction, vol. ii. p. 575. classes the interpretation of chronological difficulties

under the head of Historical Interpretation. But this is to confound things essentially different.]

XV. There is therefore no sense but the grammatical. Those who draw a distinction between the *grammatical* and the *logical* sense, do not apprehend the real meaning of the term *grammatical*: nor can this sense be varied by the use of any particular method or system of rules in the investigation of the sense.^f For, in that case, the meanings would be as various as the methods may be.

† [Ernesti's words are, *nec sensus ab usu aliquo qualicunque alicujus disciplinae aut rerum in indagando sensu variatur*. The meaning seems to be, that though an interpreter may consider a text in many different lights, and treat of it first *dogmatically* and then *practically*, we are not to suppose that the text has two senses, a *dogmatic* and a *practical*; nor does the application of *rhetorical* or *logical* rules bring out a *logical* or a *rhetorical* sense. See Morus, i. 68, 69.]

XVI. And since all these principles are true, with respect both to sacred and profane writings; it is evident, that as far as human efforts are concerned, the meaning of the sacred books can be discovered by no other means than those which are employed upon other books; nor are those fanatics to be listened to, who, neglecting the study of languages and other learning, refer everything to the imme-

ciate assistance of the Holy Spirit.^g On the other hand, however, it cannot be doubted, but that pious men, sincerely desirous of discovering the true sense of Scripture, are assisted by the Holy Spirit in matters relating to belief and practice.^h

^g The Waldenses attributed everything to the Spirit, and despised the study of languages. In the same way fanatics, obeying the impulse of a heated imagination, which is always dangerous in religion, rely, as their sole aid in interpretation, upon the promise, "Seek and ye shall find."

^h They who seek to discover truth in an honest spirit are certainly assisted by the Holy Ghost, who is the Spirit of truth, John xv. 26. There is therefore no need of examining the question, whether the divine instruction of an interpreter ought to be counted among the acts of grace.

XVII. Not very dissimilar, and perhaps still more pernicious, is the error of those who, through ignorance of languages, and contempt originating in ignorance, depend in interpretation upon matter rather than words. For thus the sense is rendered uncertain, and the truth is referred to human judgment, as soon as men forsake the written word, and look for the determination of the sense from any other quarter. Nor can this system of interpreting have any force in refuting opponents, who boast that they also interpret by matter; that is, by preconceived dogmas and opinions, or by phi-

losophical principles. From all this arises the abuse of reason in the interpretation of Scripture.ⁱ

ⁱ [Neither the Latin word *rebus*, nor the English *things*, seem fully to express the idea of Ernesti in this rule. From the conclusion and the following rules, it is clear that he means *preconceived opinions* as to what the text must mean. They therefore err against this rule, who, when a text refers, or appears to refer, to some doctrine respecting which they have a decided opinion, interpret the text not *verbis*; that is, not according to its literal, grammatical, historical sense; but *rebus*, that is, according to the opinion on the subject which they previously held. Few books abound more with instances of this error than the improved (Unitarian) version of the New Testament, London, 1808. For example, John i. 2. *This word was in the beginning with God*, is thus rendered in the note, *Before he entered upon his ministry, he was fully instructed by intercourse with God in the nature and extent of his commission*. And again at v. 14, *Καὶ ὁ λόγος σαρκὸς ἐγένετο*. *Nevertheless the Word was flesh, i. e. a mere mortal man*. And still more to the purpose, John vi. 62. *What then if ye shall see the Son of Man going up where he was before*; that is, says the note, “What would ye then do, if I should still farther advance into the subject of my mission, and reveal truths which would be still more remote from your apprehension, and more offensive to your prejudices.” This is interpreting *non verbis sed rebus*, and this is the abuse of reason in the interpretation of Scripture.]

XVIII. The system of deducing the sense of words from the matter is altogether fallacious; matter ought rather to be deduced from

the words, and from their sense rightly investigated.^k For a sense may be true which does not exist in the words under consideration; and it is clear that our decisions respecting things, ought to be grounded on the words of the Holy Spirit. With perfect truth has Melancthon remarked, “that Scripture cannot be understood theologically, unless it be first understood grammatically:” and Luther truly observes, “that the knowledge of the sense can be derived from nothing but the knowledge of the words.” See his *Epistola ad Magistratus Germ. de Scholis constituendis*. T. ii. Altenb. p. 804.

^k History shews that when the use of language is thrown into confusion, the effect extends to opinions and to systems. Plutarch well observes, *τοὺς μὴ μανθάνοντας ὀρθῶς ἀκούειν ὀνομάτων, κακῶς χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι*: *That those who have not learned the right use of words, blunder also in the use of things*. See Tarnovius, *Exercit. Bibl.* p. 258. Vitringa on Isaiah, p. 5. Ernesti, *Programma de Interp. lib. sac. in Opusc. Phil.* p. 219.

XIX. Opinion then, and the analogy of doctrine, as it is called, can be applied to interpretation only thus far, that in words which are ambiguous, either from the variety of significations, or from the structure, or from some other cause, it may lead us to the choice of a signification.^l But even then we must be

careful that the opinions which we use for defining the sense, be drawn from plain, perspicuous, and well known words in other passages; and that they do not oppose the words whose sense we are investigating. When this caution is not used, and when opinion and analogy alone are used, without any attention to grammatical principles, nothing more is effected than that a sense is determined, which, though it may not be absurd in itself, does not exist in the words, and was not in the mind of the author.

¹ The analogy of *doctrine* is to be applied, 1. In ambiguous constructions, as in John iii. 15. 2. In words which must be illustrated from the whole scope of Christianity, such as σωτηρία *salvation*, ἀπώλεια *destruction*, βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν *the kingdom of heaven*. See Morus on Universal Notions in Theology, Opp. t. i. p. 248. The analogy of *matter* assists in interpreting those passages of the New Testament which require illustration from the history and manners of the time. As the whole of Acts xxviii. βραβεῖον. 1 Cor. ix. 24. στρατοπεδιάρχης. Acts xxviii. 16. [These two analogies constitute what Bretschneider calls *Historico-dogmatic interpretation*; and the proper application of them forms the subject of his *Historisch-dogmatische Auslegung des N. T.* Leipzig, 1806. He distinguishes, however, with propriety, between *historical* and *personal* opinion; thus, in interpreting *for theirs is the kingdom of heaven*, it is one thing to explain it according to our own belief of the ultimate blessedness conferred on believers; and another to interpret it according to the belief of the Jews respecting Messiah's kingdom, as historically determined. With these

views he lays down as principles, 1. That neither theology nor philosophy, ought to exercise any influence on the operations of an interpreter. 2. That an interpreter is not to consider the logical propriety of the sense, as discovered by the Historico-dogmatic process, but must leave all such considerations for the dogmatic theologian. 3. That he is not to shrink from apparent inconsequence or inconsistency in the sense, which he has satisfactory hermeneutical reasons for giving to the text. Pp. 57, 63.]

XX. Such being the case, it follows, that the determination of the sense of the inspired books, is no more arbitrary than that of other books, but is equally restricted by certain laws drawn from the nature of language. They therefore act absurdly, who subject the interpretation of the sacred books, and the sense of the words of God, to any human authority, as, for instance, to that of the Roman Pontiff.^m

^m Even church formularies cannot restrict the freedom of interpretation. See Doederlein's *Observationes Morales de Libris Sacris*, Jena, 1789, 5. Bossuet, a great luminary of the Gallican Church, takes a very different course in his *Histoire des Variations des Eglises Protestantes*, l. v. c. 23. [Ernesti has here started a question, which neither he nor Ammon appears to have settled in a satisfactory manner. The sense of words, in a dead language, must be, as Ernesti has observed, § xiv., a matter of testimony and authority. But whose testimony and whose authority are we to rely upon? Certainly not upon that of the Pope, of whose attainments, in such matters, we know nothing; nor yet upon the semibarbarous ecclesiastics who constituted the Councils of the middle ages: but upon that of men whom,

we have reason to believe, possessed greater advantages for the discovery of the sense than we do; or who, possessing the same means, have used them to better purpose. Thus we especially rely on the authority of the early Fathers of the Church, not on account of any supernatural aids which we suppose them to have enjoyed, but on account of their natural advantages, such as their familiarity with the language in which the Apostles wrote, and with the customs and opinions to which they refer. We also bow to the authority of learned critics and philologists of our own time, who show that they have carefully investigated the sources from which such knowledge is to be derived.]

XXI. That sense, therefore, which, according to grammatical laws, must necessarily be attached to words, is not to be rejected for reasons drawn from opinions, or opposing facts. In profane literature, if facts and reason oppose the sense of the words; we presume either a fault in the copy, or an error in the author: in the sacred books, if we meet with anything opposed to ordinary opinion, we acknowledge the weakness of human intelligence: but if it be manifestly repugnant to history, we must attempt to reconcile them; nor is a correction rashly to be attempted without consulting good copies. And, in this matter, it is strange that more reverence should be paid to human than to divine writings. When any difficulty occurs in the former, or any correction or reconciliation is required, we talk of the ancients as if they were infallible; in the latter, occasion

is eagerly caught at, of carping at the writers, or even at their doctrine.

XXII. When different reasons for the meaning of a word oppose each other, greater weight ought to be given to grammatical than to dogmatical reasons; because a proposition may be strictly true, which is not contained in the words of the text. There are many such interpretations in the writings of theologians, which accord with the doctrines of Christianity, but cannot be deduced from the words; which are true dogmatically, but are not true grammatically and exegetically.ⁿ

ⁿ Those passages of the New Testament, therefore, which treat not of moral precepts, but of the more subtle dogmas of religion, are so to be interpreted, as that you mingle nothing of your own with them, but follow simply the teaching of the Holy Spirit: this has not hitherto been always done, nor indeed could it be done. Let then every interpreter apply all the force of his intellect to this, and let him see and acknowledge, that his exertions are thus limited. See Ernesti, de Vanitate Philosophantium in N. T. Opp. Phil. p. 233.

[It is not clear what Ammon means by saying that “theologians hitherto could not follow the simple teaching of the Spirit;” that is, the grammatical sense of the words of Scripture. He perhaps refers to the bigoted spirit of the Lutheran church, and the severity with which its influential members punished any variation from their symbolical doctrines. See Pusey on German Theology, 16, 17; and for the effect which this produced on scriptural interpretation, see id. 28, 32.]

XXIII. Since the books of Scripture were written by inspired men, it is clear that no real contradiction can exist in them. For neither can God fail to see what is consistent with, or consequent upon, any proposition; nor can he be forgetful so as not to remember that which he has already said.^o If, therefore, any contradiction should appear to exist, a suitable method of reconciliation is to be investigated; a proper place will hereafter be found for this inquiry.

^o Some may wish that our author had thus expressed himself, "For neither could men elected by the providence of God so err, as not to be mindful of what they had before said." For John differs widely from Luke, Paul from Peter, (Gal. ii. 11; 2 Pet. iii. 16.) and each of them from the original writer. The notion of inspiration ought therefore not to precede a just and firm interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, but rather an admission of the truth of the sense thus elicited. [As Ammon has not condescended to notice wherein John and Luke contradict each other, nothing more can be said than that we disbelieve the assertion. As to Paul and Peter, we find from Gal. ii. 11, that they differed as to a point of expediency, not of doctrine; and lest the recorded difference should produce any doubt, we have the matter finally settled by the college of inspired Apostles. Who the original writer may be I cannot imagine, unless he means St. Luke in Acts xv. He indeed gives a different, but not a contradictory account. In 2 Peter iii. 16. Peter says that many things in St. Paul's writings are hard to be understood. If this be to contradict, *satis longe discedere*, from an author, we must submit to the dictum of Am-

mon. Finally, the translator would observe, how exquisitely must those writings harmonize, in which these, and such as these, are the especial points of discrepancy? We shall have occasionally to consider this matter more fully, when we come to the practical division of this work.]

XXIV. And, for the same reason, all interpretation, both of profane, and still more of the sacred books, ought to harmonize with the spirit of the author, and with the context. For men may, through ignorance or carelessness, insert that which is foreign to their purpose; the Holy Spirit cannot. And on this depends the certainty of interpreting from the design and series of the context. On this point, however, some cautions are to be given, which we shall treat of in their proper place.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF WORDS, AND
THEIR VARIOUS USES.

I. It imports much to the discovery of the sense, that we know those differences of words which affect the sense, and increase or change their force.

II. The first distinction to be noticed, and one of great importance, especially in the New Testament, is that between the *proper* and the *tropical* sense of words.^P

^P In some cases the transition from the proper to the tropical sense can hardly be distinguished. As in רוּחַ *wind, spirit*, אֵשׁ [light. There appears to be no tropical sense of this word except in the plural, when it signifies the Urim, or breastplate of the High Priest. The transition here is sufficiently clear.]

III. There can be no doubt but that originally all words were proper; that is, that they were formed and invented to express certain things.^Q And a small number of words were sufficient, because, in that early age, few things could become the subject of language.

* These primitive words were also for the most part monosyllabic. See Hesse, *Heb. Gram.* t. i. p. 2.

IV. But there soon arose the necessity of using words in various senses, when the number of subjects was increased, respecting which, men wished to speak, partly by their beginning to attend to objects which had not formerly entered either into their thoughts or their conversation, and partly by the invention of new things, for which names were required. This necessity might be met in two ways. Either new words were to be formed, or old words to be applied to new objects. In languages used by ingenious and literary nations, and in such as were naturally flexible, and adapted to the formation of new words; in such languages many new words were invented and brought into use.^r And yet even in these, new words were not introduced on all occasions, lest the number of words should be indefinitely increased. In languages of a different character, the same word was extended to several objects. The poorer, therefore, any language is, either generally, or in particular parts of speech, the more must it abound in words which are applied to different things.^s Cicero, in his *Orat. pro Caecina*, c. 18.; and

also c. 20, deserves to be consulted on this point.

^r As in Greek and Latin, each of which had several forms of the same words, as *φάω, φαίνω, φαίνομαι, φανερόω* : *facio, facesso, factito* ; *edo, esito, esurio*. See Varro de Ling. Lat. l. vi.—viii. ; and Scheidii Prolegomena to Lennep's Etymol. Ling. Graec. Trajecti at Rhen. 1790.

^s The Hebrew language may afford many examples, as **הלך**. See Herder's *Geist der Hebr. Poesie*, Spirit of Hebrew Poetry.

V. But of words thus applied, there are many kinds. In some, the primary, and, to speak with accuracy, the proper signification, has become obsolete, and has ceased to be used. In which it is clear, that the sense which may seem to have been once tropical, has now become the proper sense. Thus there are many words which never have their proper signification ; that is to say, that signification which they had originally, and which, from their derivation, they ought to have : no one then would now hesitate to call that meaning which they have subsequently acquired their proper sense.^t

^t Such are, **ברך** to bend the knees, subsequently to bless. (See Michaelis, Supp. on the word,) **הא**, *διάβολος, ὀρθοτομεῖν, καινοτομεῖν, hostis, refutare*, a word borrowed from the kitchen, and originally meaning, to check the boiling over of

water, by pouring in cold water from a vessel called a *fontum*. See Vossii Etymol. on the word, and Lennep's Etymol. quoted above.

VI. Secondly ; and this case approaches nearly to the last, there are some words in which the tropical sense has become so familiar, as to be better known than the proper sense. This class of words may fairly be called proper, although, if we wish to speak accurately, they must be considered as tropical. Thus, if any one were to bequeath his library, we should not say that he had written tropically, although, strictly speaking, there is a metonymy in the word library.^u

^u [The word *Bibliotheca Library*, seems not to be a well chosen example ; for it is difficult to say which is its most commonly received sense : and in such a bequest, a doubt might arise, whether the testator meant to leave his books, or the building in which they stood, or both together.]

VII. When, also, words are transferred to things, which had not previously any proper name, they may in that application be considered proper, as when we speak of the *luxuri-ousness* of a crop. For though it is only by transference that such a term can be applied to a crop, yet, for the reason stated, it is proper. And the same holds good of the words *perception* and *liberty*, as applied to the human

mind and will, and of other similar applications.^x

^x So praetor, a Roman magistrate, from praeire, to go before, gemma vitis, sitiunt segetes. See Aristotle's Rhetoric, iii. 4, 10. Quintilian Instit. Orat. viii. 6.

[The expression *gemma vitis*, the bud of a vine, will not translate into English as an example. *Sitiunt*, as applied to crops, is strictly tropical, not proper: the proper term is *areo*, *aresco*.]

VIII. But a transference of words is often used, when it is not of necessity required by the novelty of the thing. For in all human operations, gratification is studied even more than necessity; and this in a greater or less degree, according to the varieties of tempers and manners. Tropes, therefore, were invented to produce variety in language, by preventing the too frequent recurrence of a word; of which sort are metonymies, synecdoches, and the weaker metaphors. For in every thing variety is desired, and whatever wants variety, soon becomes tedious; and no one studies elegance and beauty of style, without considering the variation of his terms as an important part of it.^y

^y Even in the Scriptures, tropes are used to give a colour to the style, as כּוֹל, ערלה, for the Gentiles. אכל Mal. iii. 3. for the locust. ἀμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ for the passion and

death of Christ. Numerous examples may be found in Glass, *Philolog. Sac.* l. v.

IX. Tropical words, especially metaphors, were introduced to ornament style. For as in these, which are the most frequent, there exists a simile compressed into a single word, the mind is gratified by them through its natural love for similes and images, especially such as are drawn from objects possessing something of sensible splendour or beauty.

* It is an old precept, that metaphor is to be used, 1. If it be introduced into a vacant place; 2. If it come in the place of another word, and be preferable to that which it displaces. See Dionysius Hal. *de compos. verb.* ed. Schaefer, Leipzig, p. 237.

X. Therefore, in proportion as an author is desirous of adorning his style, the more does he abound in tropes, as appears in the practice of poets and orators: to whom, on this account, the more frequent use of tropes is allowed, because they have the highest effect in ornamenting the style.

XI. In this also, the genius of the writer, and the nature of the subject, have much influence.^a For men of warm and vivid imaginations delight in tropes, even when they are bold, and, as others may think, somewhat harsh,^b because they have a natural facility in

the composition and perception of similitudes, and are naturally led to the comparison of them; and hence they are satisfied, though the similitude be slight and partial. Some subjects, also, by their greatness and elevation, naturally excite the mind of the writer, and lead him to use tropes of suitable dignity and sublimity.

^a Every climate and people has some distinguishing peculiarity in its tropes, especially in its similes. Thus, the Orientals affect the use of visions, parables, proverbs, and common places. Thus, לבש, *to clothe*. פּרש כנף, *to spread the wing*.

^b For examples, see the Arabian Poets, (as Hamasa,) and the Greek Tragedians, especially Aeschylus. Alb. Schultens has observed, that these may usefully be compared with oriental writings. Great care, however, must be taken, not to confound the tropes of one language with the images of a totally different idiom. Thus Michaëlis, in his *Supp. ad Lex. Hebr.* on the word רדס, to which he wishes to affix the sense *to prick*, might justly quote a passage of Hamasa, where sleep is said to prick the eyes. But he ought not to have misapplied this notion, as explanatory of πνεῦμα καταύξιας, Rom. xi. 8. For καταύξιας does not come from ύσσα, *to prick*, but from νυστάζω, *to lull to sleep*, and that again from νόω, *to nod*. See Lennep, *Etymol.* ed Scheid. p. 620.

XII. It is therefore important in all literature, and especially in the sacred books, to keep in view the great distinction between the transference of a word from necessity, and its

transference from any other cause. In the former, the transference is made, that a thing may have a proper name; in the latter, gratification and ornament are the sole object. The former, therefore, is grammatical; the latter, rhetorical. In the former, the ground of transference rests on the analogy of the nature of things; in the latter, on some sensible resemblance. And since every thing ought to have a name, either proper or common, it follows, that a word grammatically transferred does not cease to be proper, while a word rhetorically transferred does.^c

^c This distinction must be considered more accurately. If, between two things, each having already a proper name, there exists some *special* or arbitrary similitude, and the name of the one is, for the sake of ornament, transferred to the other, this is rhetorical transference: as, for example, *generare epistolam, to prune a treatise*. But if, between two things, there exists some *general* similitude of nature, and if, from one of them, which has a proper name, that name be transferred to the other which has not, this is a grammatical transference. Interpreters generally hold, that *ὁ υἱὸς Θεοῦ* et *γεννητὸν*, as expressive of the essential relation between Christ and the Father, and *ἐξέρχεσθαι*, as referred to the procession of the Holy Spirit, are used properly. They ought, however, to be reminded, that the expressions **בני אלהים**, and *τέκνα Θεοῦ* are used of mere men, (1 John iii. 2 :) and that *ἐξέρχεσθαι παρὰ πατρὸς*, (John xvii. 8.) is used to express the readiness of the disciples to receive the truths of the Gospel, and also respecting Christ himself. (See Doederlein, Diss. de vi et usu formulae, *Christum de Coelo Venisse*, in Opusc. Theol. p. 59.) These remarks will serve to show that we

ought to proceed warily in distinguishing between grammatical and rhetorical transference, especially in those doctrines which, from the weakness of human intellect, must necessarily be conveyed by means of allegorical imagery.

[The translator is not sure that Ammon has, in this note, thrown much additional light upon the distinction between grammatical and rhetorical transference. Ernesti's practical distinction will probably be still thought the most intelligible: for most persons are better aware of the distinction between necessity and ornament, than they are of that between *genus* and *species*. As to the phrase $\nu\acute{\iota}\delta\varsigma$ $\Theta\epsilon\iota\sigma\tilde{\omega}\nu$, it may be observed, that its being rhetorically applied, in one case, cannot affect the probability of its being grammatically applied in another very different case. A king of England may call the Prince of Wales his child; and he may call all his subjects his children: but the certainty that he speaks rhetorically in the latter case, can throw no doubt on the certainty, that he speaks grammatically in the former. We may also observe, that almost all the expressions relative to the nature and acts of the blessed Trinity were fully investigated before the modern improvements in Biblical interpretation; and that it would be difficult to add any thing important, on any of the expressions noticed in Ammon's note, to what has been given by Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed. He who has carefully studied that noble work, is competently acquainted with dogmatic theology. The translator cannot affix any intelligible meaning to Ammon's remark on John xvii. 3.]

XIII. Since it appears, from what has been said, that the meaning of tropical as well as of proper words, is derived from the arbitrary will and institution of those who first applied them to certain things, as is also evident from observation; it follows, that the tropical mean-

ing is also literal and grammatical, and that those mistake the matter entirely, who, with Jerome and others, (See Amama, *Anti-Barbarus Biblicus*, p. 161,) have advanced the contrary opinion. Nor does the interpretation of tropical words in any respect differ from that of proper words.^d

^d All tropes ought to be reduced to their literal sense, which is more easily done in those which arise from grammatical transference, as רוח הכמה Is. xi. 2. for *profound wisdom*, μυστήριον, a *sublime or recondite doctrine of religion*. Those are more difficult which arise from rhetorical transference, as διαβολος, אֲכָלָה בָּשָׂר eating flesh.

[Ammon does not specify what meaning of διαβολος he refers to; but this word affords a good example of the proper sense, of the trope by grammatical, and of the trope by rhetorical transference. Thus διαβολος, an *accuser*, is the proper sense: by grammatical transference it means *the chief of evil spirits, Satan*; and, by rhetorical transference, a *wicked man*, John vi. 70. So also υἱος διαβολου, Acts xiii. 10. *Satan* is also used in same sense, Matt. iv. 10; xvi. 23. Mark viii. 33. See Bretschneider's *Lex. N. T.* on the word. Ernesti would in this and many other places have expressed himself more clearly, had he kept in view the difference between grammatical and historical investigation. Philosophical and dogmatic terms are generally tropical; and nothing but an accurate knowledge of the history of opinion at the time, can enable us to judge what notion such terms were originally intended to convey. This study has been too much neglected. How many authors, for instance, have written controversially upon *Regeneration*, without examining whether any particular sense was attached to the expression *born again*, in the technical system

of Jewish theology. Bretschneider, in his *Historisch-Dogmatische Auslegung*, p. 209, lays down an important rule, "Every text must be interpreted in that sense in which it may be shewn by historical proofs, that the original hearers or readers, could and must have understood it."]

XIV. And hence, for the most part, originate *synonymous* words, in which some care is requisite on the part of the interpreter, not to look for a diversity of meanings where it does not exist, as is frequently done. For in the same language, or, at least, in the same dialect of it, among the same people, and at the same time, there are no synonymes of words properly applied.^e If there be synonymes in any language, as there certainly are, especially in Greek, these belong to different dialects, or to different ages. But most of them arise from tropical transference, which, either for ornament or variety, has communicated the same sense to the several words.^f

^e Thus among the Greeks βασιλεύς. The other names for *king*, τύραννος, κοίρανος, κρείων, belong to different dialects: and no Attic writer would use ἀναξ except in poetry. So also πορεύεσθαι and βαδίζειν, λήστης and ποριστής; ῥοδοδάκτυλος, φοινικιδάκτυλος, and ἰσθροδάκτυλος, which last are all tropical, and differ in their force, (Arist. Rhet. iii. 2.) See also the leading grammarians, Ammonius, Pollux, Harpocration, Thomas Magister. Nor ought we to omit the celebrated works of Girard and Eberhard on the synonymes of the French and German languages.

[The translator cannot imagine why Ammon should consider *ληστῆς* and *πορῖστῆς* as synonymes, either real or apparent. Morus (i. 272.) lays down useful rules for the cases in which apparent synonymes ought not to be nicely distinguished from each other. These are, 1. When the interchange of the terms, for the sake of variety, has become habitual, as *λόγος, διδασχῆ, κήρυγμα*, for the Gospel. 2. When the conjunction of two words has become habitual; as in English we say, *Peace or comfort, peace and joy*; here the terms are not to be contrasted. 3. When similar terms are repeated for ornament, as *prostrate and afflicted*. 4. When the same is done to strengthen the assertion. 5. When we know it to be the habit of the author interpreted to repeat his idea in different terms, as is the case with Cicero.]

^f These are used by the best writers, both profane, as Cicero, Off. i. 6. *inquisitio et indagatio veri*: and sacred, as David, Ps. cxix. *מצוה, תורה, עדות, חק*, for *the divine law*: Paul, *ζωή, δόξα, τιμή*, for *happiness*. Synonymy occurring in phrases is called *exergasia*, and in the poetical parts of the New Testament parallelism; the laws of which ought to be known to an interpreter of the hymns of Luke, and the Apocalypse. See Schleusner's Diss. on the Parallelism of Clauses, Lips. 1781, an excellent aid to interpretation.

[It is to be observed that *tropes* often exist which are not *tropical synonymes*, and such are several of those advanced by Ammon. David says that the law is an *ornament*, a *frontlet*, &c. these are tropical expressions, but not synonymes for *the law*; and that they are not is clear, for by themselves they could never convey the idea of *law*. He who first used the expression *Catherine is the Semiramis of the north*, used a rhetorical trope; he who, now that the phrase has become familiar, says *the Semiramis of the north*, instead of *Catherine*, uses a tropical synonyme.]

XV. Occasionally something is added in

the way of augment, so to speak, to the ordinary signification of a word. And this augment is of two kinds. The one affects the dignity of the word itself; the other, the extent and weight of its signification. In the former case, the word receives a sort of honour or dishonour from popular usage, whence some words are considered *εὐφημα*, others *δύσφημα*; concerning which distinction, it is necessary to speak in this book of principles.^g In the other case exists that which we call *emphasis*. Emphasis, then, is something added to the ordinary signification of a word, increasing its force for good or for bad.^h

^g It is to be observed that words *εὐφημα*, *decorous*, are such as are used by persons of credit and delicacy; *δύσφημα* *indecorous*, are those which cannot be heard without offence, though only proper and decorous notions are conveyed by them. No word is in its own nature decorous or indecorous, but takes its character in that respect from popular opinion. That therefore in Scripture which may seem coarse, (as Ezek. xvi.; 1 Cor. vii. 13, *ἰπισπᾶσθαι*,) was not accounted so in those times. The more cultivated a language becomes, the more does it abound in such ambiguities. Cicero complains of this, Ep. ix. 22. [On this note we may remark, that *ideas* only are conveyed by words, *notions* by propositions or sentences. Words are indecorous when, being used in a sentence conveying a decorous notion, they convey along with it an indecorous idea. The ambiguitates, *doubles entendres*, whereof Cicero treats, have nothing in common with the passages of Scripture referred to. These passages only shew that ideas may without of-

fence be presented to the mind in one age, which cannot at another. The English version of the Bible, and the dramatic poetry of the Elizabethan age prove this. A more refined age would convey, without offence, by a periphrasis, those ideas which offend when conveyed by a single term.]

^h Emphasis, from ἐμφαίνειν, is that by which something more is signified than is actually expressed, as, *you ought to be a man.*

XVI. From hence it may be inferred, and this is to be particularly attended to here, that no word contains any thing emphatic in itself. For every word has a certain fixed meaning, and conveys the idea of some certain thing, in itself either great or small, in which there can be no emphasis. Nor because a word denotes a thing either very great, or very small, is it on that account emphatic, nor does any one suppose it to be so.ⁱ For in that case the words *God, universe, sun, king,* would be highly emphatic; a notion which never entered, or could enter, into the mind of any one.

ⁱ So in Matt. vi. 31. μετρημῶν can scarcely be explained as expressive of the magnitude of the case, which some have supposed.

XVII. Emphasis is either *temporary* or *constant*. Temporary emphasis is that which is given to a word at some particular time and place, and generally arises, either from the feelings of the speaker, or from the magnitude

of the subject requiring that the word used should be understood with some addition to its usual force. Constant emphasis is when a word receives from usage a certain increase of force, and always retains that increase in particular modes of speaking.^k

^k Strictly speaking, all emphasis is temporary, though in different degrees. That which is more temporary arises either from the feelings of the speaker, as when Medea, being asked what remains to her in her difficulties, answers, *I*; and Sulpicius, Ep. ad Diu. iv. *Noli oblivisci te Ciceronem esse*: or, from the magnitude of the subject and occasion, as in John ii. 11, *πιστευειν* indicates the firmness of faith. That which is less temporary arises from the usage of language, as *לָשׁוּב*, *ἄδης*, *incedere*, *βαδίζειν*, used of a god or goddess, to *slumber*, to *stare*.

[On this section Ernesti has not received justice from his commentators. The learned and acute Mr. Stuart omits in his translation the expression *in certis modis loquendi*. It is one thing to say that certain words are always emphatic, (as Ammon, in opposition to Ernesti, § xvi. thinks is the case with *schlumern*, *schauen*, to *slumber*, to *stare*,) and another to say, that they are always emphatic in *particular modes of speaking*. The verb *drink* is not constantly emphatic, but usage has rendered it so in the form, *That man drinks*.]

XVIII. The method of discovering these is clear from the definitions above given. The context and the nature of the subject point out temporary emphasis: the usage of language determines that which is constant.

XIX. Rhetoricians have invented another division of emphasis into *real* and *verbal*. *Real* emphasis, they say, consists in the magnitude and sublimity of the subject, as in Gen. i. 3. quoted by Longinus : *verbal* emphasis in words suited to express the magnitude of the object. This division is futile and erroneous. Emphasis relates to words only, not to things, which may possess sublimity or power, but not emphasis ; nor is a word emphatic because it expresses, or is suited to express, a great idea : for then the expression of C. Nepos, *militēs flagrabant cupiditate pugnandi*, would be emphatic ; a notion which never occurred to any man acquainted with grammar.

See Dion. Halicarnas. de Verborum Compos. § xvi. Schaefer's ed. p. 191.

XX. They also err, and shew their ignorance of grammar, who consider every tropical word, especially if it be metaphorical, as emphatic.¹ For in necessary tropes, and in those introduced for the sake of variety, there can evidently be no emphasis. In those which are introduced for the sake of ornament, there is merely a simile, tending to render the style more agreeable : and thus *flagrare cupiditate*, means nothing more than *vehementer cupere*, and no one attaches any other idea to it. If

then there be no emphasis in the latter expression, there can be none in the former. The error lies here, that they suppose *flagrare cupiditate* is put for *cupere* simply. Hence we may conclude that the emphasis of tropical words is to be judged of exactly on the same principle as that of proper words.

¹ Emphasis then, is not the same as trope, (though perhaps we may find an instance of an emphatic trope in Matt. xxiv. 18. where the reference may be to the Roman Eagles,) but a figure. The confounding of tropes with emphasis, has enriched the systems of dogmatic theology, while it has done much injury to sound interpretation, as in the words *prophet*, *priest*, and *king*, referred to Christ. See Ernesti de Off. Christi triplici, in Opp. Theol. p. 413; and also Fischer, Prolus. de Vitiis Lex. N. T. v. ix.

[It is not clear whether Ammon takes these appellations as *tropical* or *emphatic*. It would not be difficult to shew that they are used *properly* and *literally*: that Christ did or does execute those functions which are proper to prophets, priests, and kings; and that as he executes these offices in a higher degree, and to a greater extent, than any other, these terms are applied to him emphatically.]

XXI. It is a familiar, but at the same time a weighty and important observation, that every language has some words or forms of expression, to which there exists nothing equivalent in other languages, or at least in that language into which we are translating :^m of which peculiarities many are found in Hebrew, in

Greek, and in the dialect of the New Testament.ⁿ The cause of this lies not only in the difference of the things to be expressed, every nation possessing something peculiar in its system of religion, laws, and ordinary life; but also in the varieties of the human mind, which are differently affected by the same thing, and finally, in the arbitrary formation of ideas not relating to the essence or substance of things. See Locke on the Human Understanding, iii. 5, 6. Le Clerc's *Ars. Crit.* P. ii. s. i. c. 2.

^m Cicero, de Orat. lib. ii. at the beginning, says that the Greeks could not express by one word the Latin *ineptus*, to which *απειροκαλος*, suggested by Casaubon, does not fully answer. In his *De Leg.* he says also that the Greeks could not express the Latin *vultus*, to which *πρόσωπον* is not equivalent. To these we may add, ערב, יהוה, מטה, לחם, ὀδηγεῖν, John xiv. 13. οἱ περὶ Παῦλον, Acts xiii. 15, φεύγειν, διώκειν.

ⁿ [The original is, "cujus generis plura sunt in hebraico et graeco, etiam proprio Novi Testamenti sermone." Stuart renders this, "of this nature are many words and phrases, both in the Greek and Hebrew Testament."]

XXII. Finally, since we form our notions of things as being either contradistinguished, or else as agreeing in genus or species; so there is a corresponding distinction of words. Therefore as in contradistinguished notions,

when the one is known, the other can be inferred from it, since what the one affirms the other denies: so also in words expressive of contradistinguished ideas, we ought to take care that the sense of the one rightly determined by the usage of language, or where that is various, by the context, be accurately applied to determining the sense of the other.^o If, for instance, the words *many* and *few* occur in the same sentence, and it be evident from the context and subject, that *many* means *all*, it will follow that *few* is not used in its ordinary sense, but merely expresses *not all*, without any reference to absolute *fewness*.^p Of this sort also are *σὰρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, *γράμμα* and *πνεῦμα*, in which the interpretation of the one must be directed by the sense of the other.

^o Opposites are illustrated by juxtaposition: such are, *יה* and *מות*, *Χριστός* and *Βελιαλ*, *σῶζεσθαι* and *κατακρίνεσθαι*.

^p It is a common opinion among interpreters, that *many* is in the New Testament often used for *all*, as in Matt. xx. 16, 26, and xxvi. 28. Consider, however, whether there be not too much license in this rule, and compare Rom. v. 15, 16, 19, with v. 18.

[The comparison of Rom. v. 15, 16, 19, with v. 18, clearly shews that, in this case at least, not *πολλοί* simply, but *οἱ πολλοί* is used for *all*. And this is its ordinary use. In politics *οἱ πολλοί* means *all* the citizens, excepting a privileged *few*; here it means *all* the human race except *ένος*, *one*, that is, Adam in the one case, and Christ in the other.

Stuart observes, however, that if *multi* means *all*, *pau-
ci*, the opposite to it, must mean *none*. In Hebrew כל and
לא כל mean *all* and *none*: and לא כל is equivalent to
non omnes in such a case. The difficulty is to determine
whether we ought to take the mere negative, or the oppo-
site idea, which often differ from one another; and this
can be determined only from the context.]

XXIII. Nor is the distinction of words into
abstract and *concrete* to be neglected.^a For all
languages, especially the ancient, use abstracts
for concretes, but not all, or in all cases, from
the same cause.

^a According to the system of the ancients, concrete words
are those which denote a subject with its attributes; ab-
stract are those which denote that which must necessarily
be found in the subject. See Glassii Philol. l. v.

[Glasse does not consider the difference in this metaphy-
sical point of view. By *abstracts* he merely means substan-
tives, by *concretes* the corresponding adjectives or partici-
ples. Thus, as examples of *abstract* for *concrete*, we have
Eph. v. 8. σκοτος and φῶς, for ἠσσκοτισμένοι and πεφωτισμένοι.
So also we say, *Spes altera Trojæ*, *The pride of his country*.

Sometimes the concrete or adjective is put for the abstract
or substantive, as Rom. i. 18. τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ for ἡ
γνωσις, ii. 4. τὸ χρηστὸν for ἡ χρηστότης.

XXIV. This is done either from necessity,
or for the sake of perspicuity and ornament.
The *necessity* exists in those languages, which
are defective in concretes, especially in adjec-
tives, as the Hebrew and its cognate dialects;

in which it is therefore necessary to supply the want of concretes by the use of abstracts. And the practice having once begun, is often continued where there is no absolute necessity.

XXV. This conversion tends to *perspicuity*, when abstracts are put for the subject with the pronoun, or even for the subject itself, because they direct the mind to that, on account of which the predicate is asserted: in which all allow that there is additional energy. (See Init. Rhetor. sect. 299.) It conduces also to *ornament*, not only by this perspicuity, but also by the dignity and elevation it confers on the style.^r

^r [Neither Ammon, Stuart, nor Henderson, give any note on this sect. The translator feels himself bound to confess that he does not understand it.]

XXVI. Finally, some words have a *general* and a *particular* sense; that is, they are differently used by the people in ordinary life, and by philosophers in treating of their systems. Not that actually different senses are attached to the word; but that, in ordinary life, it is used more indeterminately, in the works of the learned, with greater precision. Interpreters who confound these two uses, confound the sense of their author. See P. II. c. 10. sect. 31.^s

* In this undefined and popular sense, we must interpret ἀδύνατον, *scarcely*, Heb. vi. 4. πάντα, *many*, John iv. 29. δαίμων, δαιμονιζόμενος. On the other hand, πίστις is used in a peculiar and technical sense for Christianity generally, (See Koppe, Exc. vi. in Ep. ad Gal.) Percipere, *to take*, means, in Cicero, *to represent to oneself*, and in the Stoic Philosophy, *to be certain of a truth*.

κλήσις also in Paul's writings

SECTION II.

ON THE PROPER INVESTIGATION OF THE SENSE,
OR ON THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION.

I. HAVING in the preceding Section examined the classes and nature of *words*, we now proceed to the consideration of rules for interpretation. *Rules of interpretation* are formularies expressing and defining the mode, of rightly discovering, and clearly explaining the meaning of words, in any author, or in any context.

II. These are to be deduced from fixed principles, respecting the nature of *meaning*, *words*, and *interpretation*, principles not deduced from logical subtleties, but from observation.

III. Such rules are serviceable, not only for discovering the sense; but also for determining whether a meaning advanced by another, be true or false: by them also we may discover not only that a wrong sense has been elicited,

but also why it is impossible to discover the true one.

IV. Since the meaning of words, as we have already shewn, depends upon the usage of language ;^t rules for discovering or judging of the sense, ought, in the first place, to point out the proper method of discovering the usage of language, and of applying the knowledge so discovered to each particular passage.

^t [The phrase *usus loquendi*, which is here rendered the *usage of language*, is commonly left by translators in its original Latin form. This usage consists of two parts, 1. in the use of particular words in a particular sense: and, 2. in the effect produced upon words by their combination with other words in a sentence. In determining the first class of usage we are assisted by good lexicons, in the second by good grammars.]

V. The usage of language may be considered, either generally of a certain tongue, or particularly of some certain writer. For, in addition to the peculiarities of a language, the genius of each individual writer adds some peculiarities of his own, which we call the idioms of that author.^u We have, therefore, first to consider the method of discovering the usage of language in a dead tongue generally; and then the idioms of particular authors in such a language, especially those of the New Testa-

ment, the interpretation of which forms the proper subject of this treatise.

^u That is to say, ways of using words and phrases peculiar to the author : thus Dion. Halicarn. wrote on the idioms of Thucydides. Similar philological characteristics of the New Testament are a desideratum.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE METHOD OF DISCOVERING THE USAGE
IN ANCIENT LANGUAGES, AND IN PARTICULAR
AUTHORS.

I. SINCE the usage of language is arbitrary, and a matter of fact, it must be determined in dead languages by the testimony of those who lived when those languages were in ordinary use, and who were in circumstances to be sufficiently conversant with them.* These testimonies are either *direct* or *indirect*; of the latter we shall here make no use.

* The meaning of words is therefore to be determined, not by theological reasonings, as, strange to say, has sometimes been attempted, but simply by testimony.

II. Direct testimony is derived, first, from writers to whom the language was vernacular, especially from the writer we are interpreting, or his cotemporaries :^y next from writers to whom the language was not vernacular, but who lived while it was a spoken language, and

were well acquainted with it:^z and, lastly, from Scholia, Glossaries, and Versions composed by learned men during the existence of the language as a spoken tongue.^a Of each of these we shall speak briefly.

^y Thus the language of St. Paul may be explained, by referring to the writings of the Evangelists, or of St. Peter.

^z In difficulties respecting Latin words, we may use Polybius, Dionsys. Halic. and others, who, though not Romans, were thoroughly acquainted with Latin. So, in reference to Greek, we may use Cicero and Varro, in whose works many Greek words, especially terms of philosophy, are explained.

^a Such as Hesychius on the New Testament, Didymus and Eustathius on Homer; for these had learned the language carefully, and in a scholar-like manner.

III. Of these three classes, the first is the most valuable, and their testimony is of the highest weight. It may be given in three ways: 1, by the definition of words; 2, by examples and the context; 3, by parallel passages.

IV. In definitions, and in examples illustrative of the meaning of the word, there is no difficulty;^b except that in examples some sagacity and practice are requisite to distinguish in particular cases, the notions of genus and species.^c But in the use of parallel passages, much caution is requisite, both in judging of

the passages separately, and in comparing them for the elucidation of the more obscure passage. Wherefore the principles of such collation ought to be diligently studied; especially since all who have made any proficiency in the science of interpretation, agree that this method of investigation is of all the most effectual, not only in the interpretation of Scripture, of which Danhauer (*Hermen. Sac.* p. 342,) says, that collation of texts is the key, but equally in the interpretation of other books.

^b Of *definition*, we have an instance, Heb. xi. 1. where faith is defined. So Livy defines the words *interregnum*, *formula*, *patres*, *auctores*, &c. Cicero defines *majestas*. Tacitus, *tribunicia potestas*. Of *examples*, we have Rom. iv. 1-8, where the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη justification*, is illustrated by the example of Abraham. John xiv. 6. where the word *παράκλητος* is illustrated. So, in Cicero, pro Muraena, a question arises, What is meant by *notae*? From what follows, it appears they were forms of law used in the conduct of a suit. See Ernesti Cl. Cic. ad v.

^c [The Latin is, “nisi quod in exemplis, quaedam facultas requiritur in singularibus videndi notiones generum et formarum, quae exercitationem aliquam desiderat.” The translator is obliged to confess his doubts as to the meaning. Stuart and Henderson omit the clause. Morus, i. 82. has a long dissertation on the subject, in which, however, he only shows that many words, as *χάρις*, *σωτηρία*, &c. have both a *general* and a *specific* sense. It would appear, that an illustrative example must almost of necessity, show whether such words are used generally or specifically. Thus, in Heb. xi. 1. *πίστις* must be interpreted in its *general* sense,

for the examples allude to belief in God's promises generally, not *specifically*, in the promise of Messiah.]

V. Of parallel passages, there are two classes. The first is, when some word of ambiguous meaning, to determine the sense of which the context affords no help, is found also, either itself, or one of its conjugates,^d in another passage in a similar context, with adjuncts, from which its meaning may be deduced, or else accompanied by some synonyme or explanation.^e As *συνείδησις*, 1 Cor. x. 20. Compare v. 29, and 2 Cor. iv. 11; Acts ix. 31. Compare xx. 12.

^d [*Conjugata*. Stuart renders this by *synonymes*. It means *words of connected formation*; for how can we know what is the synonyme of a word whose meaning we are ignorant of. Thus, *βάπτισμα* and *βαπτίζειν* are conjugate words, of which it is evident that the meaning of the one being explained, the meaning of the other follows of course, (See Morus, i. 89.) The translator has carefully copied the reference to texts: but there appears to be some error. *Συνείδησις* does not occur, nor any word-like it, in 1 Cor. x. 20; yet the subject there does perhaps throw light on the meaning of *συνείδησις* in v. 29. In this case, the explanation is rather by the context, *ex rebus*, than by parallelism.]

^e If, then, a word of various significations occurs without any thing to determine its sense, it must be explained by the context of parallel passages. Thus, *ἐν γνώσει*, 2 Cor. vi. 6, is explained by another passage, 2 Pet. i. 6, where *γνώσις* means moderation of desires. So, Acts ix. 31, *παράκλησις ἁγίου πνεύματος* is illustrated by Acts xx. 12, where it means

confirmation in the faith. In Cicero, de Orat. i. 7. we meet with *enucleate et eleganter.* Compare with this, De Finibus, iv. 3, qui grandia ornate velint, *enucleate* minora dicere. By such testimonies, false significations attributed to a word may be disproved. See Ernesti Diss. de Negotiatoribus in Opp. Phil. p. 3. [*Gerard*, in his Institutes of Biblical Criticism, divides parallels into the following classes: 1, Passages in which, either with or without a quotation, the same thing is said in the same or nearly the same words, as Exod. xx. 2-17 is parallel to Deut. v. 6-18. The comparison of such texts often serves to correct a false reading.

2. Passages which relate the same *facts* in different terms.

3. Passages in which the same terms or expressions are used in speaking of different things.

4. Passages which treat of the same subject in different expressions. See *Gerard*, p. 148, sq. It may be useful to the reader to classify, according to this scheme, the parallelisms adduced in the following canons and notes.]

VI. The other class of parallels is when the same fact or sentiment is elsewhere expressed in fuller and more perspicuous terms,^f of which the most ordinary instance, is the repetition of a proposition, with some variation in the terms after a parenthesis; as Rom. i. 17. compared with iii. 22.^g

^f Thus, 2 Cor. v. 21, illustrates the signification of *δικαιοῦσθαι* in the New Testament, (See Koppe Excur. iv. Ep. ad Gal.) ἐπιψηφίζειν in Xen. Mem. i. 1. has not its ordinary meaning, but must be compared with L. iv. 4. where *ψηφίσασθαι*, in a similar context, gives the more apt meaning to *put the vote.* See Ernesti and Zeunius on the passage.

[*Stuart* here refers, as an example, to the books of Sa-

muel and Kings, compared with Chronicles. But, though parallelisms of fact and doctrine be highly important, it does not appear to come under the subject here treated of by Ernesti: which is, not the full settlement of historical doubts or doctrinal points, but only of the *usus loquendi*, by comparison of words and phrases.

There is also a third kind of parallelism, which Stuart here notices, that, namely, which runs through the poetical part of the Old Testament, and which consists in the correspondence of two parts of a verse to each other, so that words answer to words, and sentiment to sentiment; the latter clause being a repetition, an explanation, or an antithesis of the former. This parallelism is also found in the New Testament, as in Luke i. 35 and 46; xi. 27; and in many parts of the Apocalypse. On this subject the student will do well to study Lowth *on Heb. Poetry*, and *Preface to Isaiah*, Herder, *Geist der Hebr. Poesie*, L. i. c. 22, De Wette, *Ueber die Psalmen, Einleitung*. Meyer, *Hermeneutik*, L. ii. and our own Jebb's *Sacred Literature*.]

[⁵ As an additional example, we may take, after Morus, 1 Cor. vii. 1, where St. Paul says, *it is not good*, καλὸν, to marry. Here the sense of καλὸν cannot be determined till we arrive, after a long digression, at v. 26. There we find that it was *not good*, only διὰ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἀνάγκην.]

VII. A good interpreter, therefore, in reading a book which he wishes to interpret, ought to pay particular attention to those passages which bear a resemblance to others, the determination of whose sense he has found impossible. His success will be the more likely if he reads his author continuously, or with short intervals;^h for he will thus more easily remember preceding difficulties, which may be ex-

plained by passages of clearer meaning that now occur; or texts of distinct meaning, which throw light on the difficulties he now meets with.ⁱ

^h A good interpreter ought to have accurate observation; a sound judgment as to similarities; and diligence in comparing them. [We may add, also, a retentive memory, which is of no small weight in this branch of interpretation, especially where the author interpreted is voluminous.]

ⁱ The sense of 1 Cor. xiii. 3 ἵνα καθήσωμαι, may appear difficult. But it is cleared up, Gal. vi. 17, στίγματα Ἰησοῦ βαστάζειν ἐν σώματι, which shows, that the apostle is, in both cases, speaking of the Thracian stigmata with which slaves were branded. See Wetstein ad loc.

[Rom. viii. 24. is a difficult text. The Apostle, in speaking of the resurrection of the body, ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, says, that *we are saved in hope*; and goes on to urge, as a truth, which had been, or might be denied, that the resurrection is a matter of hope, and not of experience. With this compare 2 Tim. ii. 18. *Of whom are Hymenaeus and Philetus, who have erred from the truth, saying, that the resurrection is past already, ἀνάστασιν ἤδη γεγονέναι.* See Terrot on Rom. ad loc.]

VIII. When any apparent parallelism strikes the mind, the next point is to consider whether the similitude be real and sufficient; that is, whether there is in both, not merely the same word, but also the same subject; and next it must be settled, which is the clearer of the two, that the interpretation of the other may be ac-

commodated to it; this frequently strikes the mind at once.^k

^k Parallelism consists not in the words (merely,) but in the subject. So *λόγος*, John i. 1, cannot be properly compared with 1 Pet. i. 19. Secondly, the more obscure is to be interpreted by the plainer. So, in Mark xv. 16, occurs *πραιτώριον*, concerning which there was a long dispute between Huber and Perizonius. It is useless to compare with this, Phil. i. 13, because the Roman Praetorium, in which Paul was, differs from the Provincial Praetorium. It may more aptly be compared with Cic. in Verr. v. 24, where it appears, that the Sicilian Praetorium was the house of the Praetor. As at Syracuse, the Praetorium was the house of Hiero, so, at Jerusalem, it was the house of Pilate. In the same way, James ii. 24, may be illustrated by comparison with Gal. v. 5.

[Stuart considers this rule as containing a *ὑστέρων πρότερον*, as, in fact, supposing that you know the sense of the obscure passage, which you wish to discover: for, if it be unknown, how can you decide whether it be the same with that of the plainer. It may be answered, that we frequently perceive what a passage refers to, without being able to define its meaning precisely. If the subject referred to in the obscure passage be the same as that referred to in the plain one, we may usefully apply the parallelism. But, if a passage be so obscure, that we have no notion what it refers to, then the rule does not hold. It may further be observed, that as *verbal* parallelism is useless, unless there be also a *real* parallelism; so *real* parallelism seldom throws much light, unless there be also something of *verbal* parallelism; that is, unless the same words, their conjugates or synonymes, be used in both of the parallels: for, without the recurrence of these, the *real* parallelism of an obscure passage is very unlikely to be detected.

The discovery of verbal parallelisms must evidently be much assisted by Concordances. The most celebrated of these are,

1. For the Hebrew Scriptures.

M. de Calasio *Concordantiae*, 4 vols. fol. Rome, 1621, and London, 1747.

The Hebrew Concordance, by J. Taylor, 2 vols. fol. London, 1754.

2. For the Septuagint Version.

A. Trommii *Concordantiae*, Amsterdam, 1718, 2 vols. fol.

3. For the Greek Testament.

Novi Testamenti Graeci, J. C. Tameion, &c. operâ Erasmi Schmidii, Lips. 1717, and London, 1819.]

IX. After all these points have been attended to, there is still required practice in detecting similitudes, and in comparing them properly together. In this respect it will be serviceable to the future interpreter to consult good expositors, not only of the sacred, but also of profane books.¹ And when he finds them use this aid of parallels, especially when they use it in such a way, as manifestly to lead to a right conclusion, to mark the steps by which they proceed; and, by careful and frequent attention, to form himself gradually to an imitation of their system of interpretation.

¹ As Gesner, Ernesti, Heyne. In the New Testament Kypke, Krebsius, and Loesner, may be recommended for their diligent collection of parallel passages: Wetstein and Koppe as commentators. [The merit of our own Lightfoot principally consists in the collation of parallelisms from the

Old Testament, and the writings of the Rabbins, applied to the New Testament.

Stuart justly observes, that the inducement to use this method of illustration is stronger in the case of the Scriptures than in that of any other book. For, as we believe it to be divinely inspired, there must be a harmony in it far beyond what other writings possess.]

X. It is not sufficient to compare an obscurity with one text alone, either in this case, or when we are attempting to determine the sense of a word from examples and context, (§ iv.) especially when we are seeking the sense of a complex term:^m but several texts are to be examined and compared, until we find that our inquiry is brought to a clear and satisfactory decision.

^m As, for example, the phrase *πνεῦμα αἰώνιον*. Noesselt has given a fine instance of diligence and judgment in collecting illustrative passages in his *Opusc. Fas. i. p. 333*. Ordinary interpreters are too much in the habit of heaping up passages, little to the purpose, and of thus obscuring, instead of illustrating their author. See Ammon's *Praef. ad Hecubam*, and Beck's *Comm. de Interpr. p. 24*.

XI. The testimony of Scholiasts is either original or derived; and is valuable in proportion, as either they, or those from whom they borrow, are nearer in point of time to the author whom they interpret, and appear, by sufficient marks, to be acquainted with the lan-

guage in which he writes. To determine this requires learning and practice; yet it is not very difficult.ⁿ

ⁿ Of Greek Scholiasts, those on Homer, Aristophanes, Appollonius Rhodius, Thucydides, and Sophocles, are reckoned the best. The principal scholiasts on the New Testament are Origen, Damascenus, and Theodoret, of whom hereafter.

XII. The testimony of Glossarists is to be estimated on the same principles; for its value also depends, in some degree, upon their age, and much more upon their learning, and that of the authors whom they quote.^o

^o Glosses, or explanations of unusual words, first began to be formed upon particular authors, as the Platonic glosses of Timaeus, and then upon the language generally; as those of Hesychius, Cyril, Philoxenus, Pollux, Photius, and Suidas, whose work holds a middle place between scholia and glosses. The glosses of Hesychius, Suidas, and Phavorinus, as far as they relate to Scripture, have been published separately, with prefixed dissertations, by J. C. G. Ernesti, Leipzig, 1785. Add to these, the glossaries compiled by Albertius and Matthaeus, with the treasures of Photius and Zonaræ, lately (1809) published. It is much to be desired that the other scattered glosses on the sacred books may soon be collected in a similar manner.

XIII. The student must, however, be careful not to suppose that glossaries are similar to our Greek lexicons. In interpreting words,

they look only to certain words of certain authors, especially where the nouns are not in the N. C. nor the verbs in the first person of the present tense, nor in the infinitive. Ignorance or forgetfulness of this, has led into very absurd errors. See my (Ernesti's) prolusion, de *Usu Gloss. in interpretatione*.^P

^P Written previous to the edition of Hesychius by Albertius, which regulates the use of glossaries by excellent canons. As, for example, glossaries on the sacred books often refer to one text only, as *πετραχηλίσμινα, φανερά*. Hes. see Heb. iv. 13. They illustrate the noun by its attribute, the genus by the species, and *vice versa*, as *ἄμητος, καιρός*.

XIV. *Versions*, and the value of their testimony, are to be estimated by the same measures. The skill of the versionists in each language may be judged of, by comparing the version and the original, in passages of whose meaning there is no doubt. We must be careful, however, not to err through ignorance of the language used by the versionist, as it is clear many have done in their criticisms upon the Septuagint and Vulgate versions; and not to take words *nicely* chosen in a *vulgar* sense. Even learned men may err in this respect, as Boyse^q has proved in the cases of Beza and Erasmus, not to mention others.

^q In his book, *Collatio versionis antiquae Latinae N. T. cum versione Bezae, et aliorum recentiorum*. Compare Rein-

hard's Opusc. Acad. Lips. 1808, I. 1. De *Vers. Alex. auctoritate*.

[In estimating the authority of Scholia, Glossaries, and Versions, Stuart undervalues the question of time. He remarks, "the simple question always is, Is the author interpreted well and skilfully? not when or where the commentator lived." This seems as if we should say in law, that the evidence of a witness is not to be estimated by his character, circumstances, or opportunities of knowing the fact, but simply by its truth or falsehood. The age of the scholiast, &c. ought to have no weight in matters which can be proved without his testimony; but in cases where his testimony is the only evidence, it ought to have great weight.]

XV. By similar principles must we estimate the evidence of those who have casually explained in their writings obscure words or phrases from another language, as Cicero has explained many Greek,^r and Dionysius Halicar., many Latin words: or of those who have assumed words from another language, as the Latin poets and historians from the Greek, and the writers of the New Testament from the Hebrew text of the Old Testament.

^r [Thus in De Off. L. i. 40, "Tempus autem actionis opportunum Graece *Ἐκαιρία*, Latine appellatur occasio." And again, "Illa est *Ἐνταξία*, in qua intelligitur ordinis conservatio."]

XVI. The foregoing rules are universal. There are, however, peculiarities of the individual writer,^s of his age and nation, and of the

sect to which he was attached.^t The peculiarities of the author can be explained only from his own evidence, either express or implied: those of the sect, whether religious or philosophical, from the practice of other writers of the same sect: and those of the age and nation, from the rites and customs of the age and nation, as recorded by contemporaneous authors.

^s So Plato made many innovations in words which are used indeed by other writers, but in a different sense. See Plutarch, Quaest. Platon. Opp. Ed. Reiske, x. 159.

^t The Stoics are said by Cicero to have been innovators upon words, because they used words in their philosophy in a sense very different from their ordinary acceptation; and that often inaptly, as was the case with the Epicureans. Such were *ὁρθὸς λόγος, κατόρθωμα, καθῆκον, μέσον*, which words yield one sense in the precepts of Zeno, as given by Diog. Laert., and another in Stobaeus, Antoninus, and Plutarch, De Stoic. Repugn.

[Attention to this point is very necessary in reading theological works. The important terms, *Grace, New-birth, or Regeneration, Faith, &c.* are used in very different senses, and thus a book of Romish devotion is unintelligible to a Methodist, and *vice versa*. In the New Testament also, it is to be remembered that the writers were all of the Jewish sect and nation: much light may therefore be thrown upon them by an accurate knowledge of Jewish opinions and phraseology, not only as exhibited in the Old Testament, but also in the Rabbinical writings.]

XVII. There is usually no difficulty in determining the *age* in which an author wrote.

As to his *class*, that is determined by his subject, as poetry, history, or oratory; and still more from the character of his style, which is either that common to his age and nation,^u or else formed upon that of some other author, as was frequent among the Greeks and Romans.^x

^u Thus the Ionic and Macedonian writers use a very different style from the Attics and other Greeks.

^x So Ælian in V. H. has successfully imitated the ancient historians; Chrysostom, Xenophon; Philo, Demosthenes and Plato. But all these observations relate rather to profane authors than to the writers of the New Testament.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE SUBSIDIARY MEANS OF DISCOVERING
THE SENSE.

I. THE usage of language cannot always be determined, at least with sufficient accuracy, by the means proposed in the last chapter. For there may be a deficiency of evidence as to the usage of language, in the particular age and author; ^y there may be inconstancy, variety, ^z and ambiguity, in the use of words and phrases; obscurity or novelty in the subject; and, finally, neglect of the usage of language, which sometimes occurs even in the most careful writers. ^a Other principles are therefore to be used, by which the true sense may be elicited, even where the usage of language is not known by testimony. These constitute the subject of the present chapter.

^y Especially in *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα*, that is, words or phrases which occur nowhere but in the passage under consideration, as, for example, *επιούσιος*. How many works must have perished in the destruction of the Alexandrine Libra-

ry, from which the defects in our knowledge of the Greek idiom might have been supplied? See Herder, *Ideen zur Philos. der Geschichte der Menschen*. T. iii. p. 244.

^z As in *ἀνάπιστος, ἄζυλος, infucatus*.

^a Especially among the Hellenists. For example John, who frequently indulges a pleasing laxity of style, uses *ς* for *δ*. See Ernesti, *de Grata Negligentia Orationis*. Lips. 1743.

II. The first of these is to apply the *context* to the discovery of the meaning of particular words; and this may be done in many ways. First, by considering the whole design of the passage, or, as it is commonly called, the *scope*; since it is improbable that a good writer would insert any word or phrase inconsistent with his general purpose. The evidence from such comparison does not, however, always amount to certainty, because there may be several interpretations, each of which will sufficiently agree with the context. Hence by this method we can only attain a certain degree of probability, and sometimes not even that.^b

^b By this application of the context, we may explain John v. 39; i. 1, and Rom. viii. 1, in which text we must consider the scope of the writer, who, in the seven preceding chapters, has been treating of justification. Add to these, Gal. vi. 11, where the context shows, that *πηλίκους γράμμασιν* does not refer to the size of the characters, but to the length of the Epistle, written with the Apostle's own hand. We must remark, however, that it is only the general, not the special and determinate sense, that can thus be discovered; as Matt.

xvi. 19, where, it appears, that Jesus had conferred power upon Peter, but not of what sort it was, whether of coercing, teaching, or chastising.

[Ammon's examples do not appear very striking illustrations of the rule: those from John seem, to the translator, so foreign to the purpose, that he suspects some error of the press. Nor is it true that the special sense can never be determined in this way. For example, in the passage quoted Rom. viii. 1, it may be doubted who are ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Now, those who *are in Christ*, were not so naturally, and must therefore, at some time, have come into, εἰς, Christ. Now, the context, vi. 3, shows, that they came *into Christ*, when ἔβαπτίσθησαν εἰς Χριστόν, at their baptism. But lest they should rely on their baptism with an antinomian confidence, there is immediately added, "who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." It makes no difference, though, with some copies, we suppose this clause not to occur till the end of v. 4. Here, then, we derive the *special* meaning of the phrase from the context.

Stuart here inserts a useful caution. "All parts of a discourse have not invariably a strict connexion with its general scope. Many things are often said which are wholly irrelevant to it, and which are mere *obiter dicta*. These are to be interpreted, not by the general scope of the discourse, but agreeably to *the subject that is treated of in the place where they occur*;" that is, not by the *general*, but by the *immediate context*.]

III. In applying this rule, then, we must be cautious not to trust to it too much, or to it alone; and not to be contented with every degree of congruity with the general scope. This is frequently done by those who are not sufficiently skilled in the languages, and hence they

often derive mere empty conjectures.^c Our object ought rather to be, the discovery of an evident and necessary connexion with the general scope. The next point is, when we have fixed upon a sense from the general scope, to examine carefully whether this sense be conformable to the usage of language; either so that the words may by usage have this meaning, or, at least, that the usage does not oppose it.^d Sometimes the sense, as derived from the general context, leads to the method of determining its conformity to the usage: but to interpret solely from the context or general design, without any regard to the proper force of the words, and in opposition to the usage of language, is the part rather of a rash conjecturer, than of a reasonable interpreter. We must therefore use that rule only in ambiguous cases, or in ἀπαξ λεγόμενα; that is to say, in those cases where the usage is not fixed by sufficient testimony, or where it is not sufficient for the determination of the sense.^e

^c Interpreters are often driven from the right course by the vain desire of philosophizing, (see Ernesti's Diss. de Vanitate Philos. p. 241): as Theophylact on 1 Cor. vii. 31, who explains σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου, *the empty show of this world*, whereas it is merely a periphrasis for the world. (See Schulz ad loc.) So also many of the ancient commentators have idly refined on the phrase καταβολὴ σπέρματος, Heb. xi. 2.

^d A passage in Cic. de N. D. i. 1. has puzzled interpreters,

where the question is, What is meant by *inscientia*? The scope of the treatise shows, that the reference is to a philosophical principle. The Academicians held, that all things were uncertain. This tenet of theirs Cicero calls *Inscientia*. See Ernesti's *Clav. Cic. ad v. inscientia*.

^e *πλεονεξία*, Ephes. iv. 19, has puzzled the commentators. Even the great J. D. Michaelis, who takes it to mean *Venerem immoderatam*, comparing 2 Pet. ii. 14. Nor can it be denied, that the preceding *ἀκαθαρσία* favours this opinion. But Ephes. v. 3, 5, and Coloss. iii. 5, show clearly, that the allusion is not to the lust, but to the avarice and rapacity of prostitutes, &c.

IV. Less extensive,^f but of clearer application, is the rule which directs us to consult the antecedents and consequents; that is, *the immediate context* in which a passage stands, in order to determine its meaning. This comparison may be applied to two objects; either to the choosing out of many meanings, all conformable to usage, that which is most suitable;^g or to the discovering the meaning of an unusual and unknown word.^h This rule, however, does not always lead beyond a probability, and its use must be guarded by the same cautions as the preceding.ⁱ

^f [*Angustius*. It is not clear what idea Ernesti intended to convey by this word. In frequency of application, comparison of *context* far exceeds comparison of *scope*.]

^g As in Acts iii. 21, to determine between the two senses, *whom the heavens ought to receive, or who ought to receive the heavens*.

^h Rom. vi. 5. It may be doubted what is meant by *σύμφυτος*, rendered in the vulgate *complantandus*. Here, by comparing what goes before, we find the meaning to be, that, since we have been united to Christ, by a certain imitation of his death, we ought also to be joined to him in a resemblance to his resurrection. This sense is not only necessary from analogy, but may also be proved by usage. Aristotle calls those animals *σύμφυτα*, which possess any similitude or community of nature.

ⁱ Matt. xvi. 13, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, these words are, by construction, joined to the preceding *μι*. Both the antecedents and consequents show, that the conversation refers to a prophet or divine messenger, but the exact meaning of the phrase cannot be determined from the context alone.

V. A similar aid towards defining the sense of words which are ambiguous, and discovering the sense of those which are obscure, may be derived from the comparison of subject and predicate;^k of adjective and substantive; of the nominative case and the oblique;^l of the verb and its determining adjuncts,^m whether adverbs, or nouns used periphrastically for adverbs; and, finally, by the comparison of disjunct, or antithetical terms.

^k Thus 2 Peter i. 10, Κλησις καὶ εκλογή, means the happiness to which we are invited by Christianity, and from which we may fall. See Pott ad loc. in N. T. Koppian. [Though Ammon be substantially right, yet neither the *usus loquendi* nor analogy warrant the exact rendering he has given. Κλησις καὶ εκλογή, may properly mean *the state* to which you are called and elected; that is, the *state of grace* which they enjoyed as believing and baptized Christ-

ians, a state which we know may be lost. Κλῆσις. Dor. Κλᾱσις. Lat. *classis*. Eng. *a vocation or calling*. A more apposite illustration is given by Morus (i. 164.) In Exodus iv. 16, Moses is said to be a god to Aaron. Now this cannot be said properly, for Moses was a mere man. But from the context we find, that God had given commands to Moses, and Moses was to communicate these to Aaron: hence in this respect God stood in the same relation to Moses that Moses did to Aaron, and thus Moses was a God, or as God, to Aaron.]

¹ As in Eph. i. 23, where πλήρωμα illustrates the succeeding πληρουμένου.

^m As in 2 Pet. i. 19, λόγῳ προφητικῷ. [Such is Ammons' reference; but the translator cannot see how the text illustrates the rule, or how the rule can be brought to explain the passage. John vii. 24, κρίνειν κατὰ ὄψιν, is an example of a noun used adverbially. Rom. xii. 8, gives good scope for the application of the rule.]

VI. Among these, the comparison of *Antitheses* has this peculiarity, that it always affords a certain interpretation as soon as either of the opposed terms is understood.ⁿ In the other cases, the evidence is occasionally as strong; but, on the other hand, their comparison affords sometimes only the semblance of truth. And this is the case, because the connexion of subject and predicate, substantive and adjective, verb and adverb, is not so necessary as to afford an absolute determination of the sense. In the use of all these the interpreter must attend to the caution given in § III. respecting

6. [It seems doubtful which of the two kinds of analogy Ammon means in this note. There is, no doubt, such a thing as universal grammar,—principles of construction common to all languages. But this is not either the analogy of one particular language here referred to, nor yet that of which Ernesti is about to treat.]

†

VIII. There are cases, however, where this particular analogy sheds light on dubious and obscure words;^p as in the case of any word whose general sense is known, by comparing other words of the same class, and the mode of treating such subjects, peculiar to the language, we may judge of the special force of the word. Thus in 1 Pet. v. 5, the question may be, what is the proper meaning of ἐγκομῶσασθαι, in which interpreters in general conceive there lies a strong emphasis? Here we must compare other forms of the Greek language which relate to clothing. In these we find that the prepositions περι, ἀμφι, ἐν are affixed, without adding any thing to the simple idea of clothing: and consequently that ἐγκομῶσασθαι, means nothing more than ἐνδύσασθαι, by which word Clem. Rom. renders it, Ep. i. p. m. 39. Such analogies a good interpreter ought to be well aware of, and to have them ready for use.

^p [It may seem strange that Ernesti should say there are cases where the *particular analogy*, that is, the grammar of a language, is useful, after he has devoted a whole chap-

ter to proving its utility. But it must be observed that he here speaks of the light it throws on dubious and obscure words, by which he means words whose sense cannot directly be defined by the *usus loquendi*; cases, in short, which do not come under the rules given in the last chapter. Other analogies of the same kind determine the specific meaning of the prepositions in composition; of verbals in *της, τικος, τειος, &c.*]

IX. There is another analogy subsisting between similar languages; that is, between those which are sprung from a common origin, as the Hebrew, the Chaldee, the Syriac, and the Arabian; or between those which stand in the relation of parent and derivative, as the Greek and the Latin. The first of these Schultens has explained, and frequently used in his *Origines Hebraicae*, and in his *Commentaries*.⁹

⁹ On Job and Proverbs, the prefaces to which may be consulted. See also Reiske's Discourse on the Study of Arabic, affixed to his *Conjectures on Job*. Lips. 1779.

X. This analogy is useful, not only in that it enables the interpreter to discover in one language or dialect, the roots of difficult words in another, and thereby to determine their signification; but also that it enables him often to illustrate by similar forms that sense which he is forced by the context to adopt.^r

^r Analogy may be applied to the illustrating of entire forms of expression in the New Testament. As this aid has been too much neglected by interpreters, (see Schultz, *Erinnerungen und Zweifel gegen Michaelis' Uebersetzung des N. T.* Enquiries and Doubts respecting Michaelis' Version of the New Testament,) it may be expedient to produce some examples drawn from the Arabic and Syriac. In Elmacin's *Saracenic History*, Ed. Erpenii. Lugd. Bat. 1625, p. 277.

جدي ببنی وانا فابی, *avus meus in filio est, et ego in patre.* Hufnagel, in his *Handbuch der Bibl. Theologie*, p. ii. pag. 77, has used this to illustrate John xiv. 11. Chalfifa, p. 109, urges a perfidious friend to take an oath, in these words, احلف براسي, *swear by my head*; which throws light on Matt. v. 36. At page 193, Muctadir salutes his brother Cahir قبل جبهته, *kissing his forehead*; which explains καταφιλιῶν, Matt. xxvi. 49, and ἀσπάζεσθαι in the New Testament. At p. 135, we may read, with advantage, the discourse of Almamon upon *repentance*. At p. 236 and 256, we have examples of a decollated head brought in a dish, as in Matt. xiv. 11. We may close the list with two passages from Barhebraeus, for which I am obliged to the diligence of Kirsch. In Matt. viii. 20, we read, οὐκ ἔχει, ποῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν κλίνῃ. The note of Rosenmüller is, "Christ shows himself to have been so far from possessing wealth, that he had not even a house of his own." A clearer light may be thrown upon the text by a passage from Barhebraeus, p. 406, where Saladin, exciting his soldiers to the storming of Tyre, says,

ولا مكان على الساحل باقى لفرسنا انما بسطحة زينا
 صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه صحنه

That no place on the coast now remained to the Franks, where they might lay their heads, except Tyre. And again, at p. 591, it is related, that the Arabs stormed the city of Acre,

וְלֹא מָצָאנוּ לְבָנֵיהֶם מְשֻׁבְּטִים אֶתְּמַר ; וְלֹא מָצָאנוּ
 מְשֻׁבְּטִים : זֵלָּה :

and left not to the Franks, on the coasts of this sea, where they might lay their heads. From both these passages, it is clear, that the meaning in Matthew is, that Jesus had no where a safe and settled abode.

XI. The inconstancy of usage which prevails in every language, causes an easy and frequent mutation in the signification of words; and, in all languages there are but few derivative words which retain the primary force of their roots. We must therefore be careful not to press the analogy mentioned in the last rule too far, nor rashly to build upon such etymologies, than which nothing can be more fallacious. In fact they are serviceable, rather for tracing the history of the word, than for determining its actual sense in any passage; and in interpretation they seldom afford more than a slight probability of truth.^s

^s See Ernesti Antimuratorius, p. 25, sq. In Valkenaer's Opusc. Ed Lips. 1308, vol. i. p. 103, sq. is a dissertation on Byrsa, the Phoenician name of the citadel of Carthage; with which word, βάρβις and בִּירָה are rather unhappily compared. [Etymology gives us, with greater or less degrees of probability, the original sense of the word. If there is no evidence that the usage has been changed, and if that original sense gives a good meaning to the passage, we may then reasonably adopt it with something more than a slight probability of

truth. But, to set up etymology as having any authority in opposition to usage, is quite irrational.]

XII. That analogy is the most useful, which consists in the comparison, not merely of similar words and phrases, but even of modes of speech, which are dissimilar as far as regards the etymology; but which manifestly relate to the same subject, and which, therefore, may throw mutual light upon one another. As examples of the former sort of analogy, we may compare *πεπραμμένος ὑπὸ τῆν ἀμαρτιαν*, Rom. vii. 14, with the use of the Latin *addictus*, or *venditus*: and *ὡς διὰ πυρός*, with that of *ambustus* used tropically.^t As an example of the latter, we may compare the Hebrew *מִבְּנֵי רִגְלִים* with the Greek *ἐκποδῶν*. For, since it is clear that where the Greeks use *ἐκποδῶν*, there the Latins use, in the same sense, *e medio*; and that *ἐκποδῶν* and *מִבְּנֵי רִגְלִים* are so similar, that the Greek seems derived from the Hebrew; it follows that we must conclude *מִבְּנֵי רִגְלִים* means nothing more than *e medio*.^u

^t *πεπραμμένος*. Cic. *vino vendita fides*. Ὠς διὰ πυρός, Livy xxxii. 36 and 40. *Ambustus*, *Semiustus* Evasit. i. e. he escaped with the greatest difficulty and danger.

^u Ernesti has followed out this more fully in his Op. Phil. 173 and 277. The contrary suggestion of Teller, (Ernesti's Verdienste, p. 53.) that, in Gen. xlix. 10, we should read with the Samaritan *מִדְּרָגְלִי*, from his standards, appears to be still undetermined.

[The difference between the Samaritan and Hebrew texts is, that the former has ד, the latter ר. דגל is a *standard*, רגל a *foot*. Ammon, by a typical error, has used the ר in both cases, and thereby rendered his note unintelligible. Ernesti's argument in the *Opp. Philol.* as repeated by Rosenmüller, in his *Scholium* on the verse, is, that the different parts of the body are often put in Hebrew redundantly for the person, and that the same is true of the Greek *πους*, and the Latin *pes*; and, in this view, מבן רגלים would simply mean *from him*. As to the expression *ὡς διὰ πυρός*, it appears exactly to tally with that of a *brand plucked out of the fire*; and with the *prope ambustus evasisse*, and *incendium semiustum evasisse*, of Livy.]

XIII. It cannot be doubted, but that men are generally affected in the same ways by the same objects, especially if the objects be sensible. Hence it arises, that those who speak of the same objects, considered or perceived in the same point of view, although they may use forms of speaking etymologically different, must still be supposed to have meant the same thing; and, consequently, the one may be properly interpreted by the other.

XIV. This principle has a wide range of application, and is highly useful in rightly interpreting, in judging of the sense of tropes, and in guarding against imaginary emphasis: we therefore shall find it to have been used with advantage by the most learned critics. It requires, however, an accurate knowledge of

many languages, and therefore we need not wonder if it has not been generally applied by interpreters.*

* The student may consult the writings of Casaubon, Scalliger, Salmasius, Celsius, and Dorvilliers, for examples of what Ernesti here means. To these we may add the inquiries of Schultens and Menage, into the origin of the Arabian, Italian, and French languages, which can never be too carefully studied.

XV. It is sometimes necessary to consult the general nature of things,^y and the analogy of the doctrine which the author treats of,^z in order to discover the true sense of the words, and to see neither more nor less than he himself intended to convey. For since the writer, either spontaneously or from education, might suppose that the sense of his expressions was so familiar to all, as that no error could occur; the consequence was, that he used words which must be considered as inaccurate, if judged by the strict rules of grammar and logic. Among such inaccuracies we may class all instances of Catachresis, Hyperbole, Hypallage, and those passages which appear to assert universally and simply that which is true, only of some, and under certain limitations. All these forms are so frequent, even in ordinary discourse, especially among the Orientals, and in all poe-

tical and oratorical composition, that there exists no reason why they should have been avoided.

^y The nature of things teaches us, that we are not to understand every passage according to the letter: as, for example, in the formulae, *God is born, God hardened Pharaoh's heart*. And when Cicero asserts, *Romanis insitam fuisse fortitudinem*, that courage was instinctive to the Romans, we must not suppose they were never timorous, for this even Marius would refute. [The translator knows not where the form *Deum nasci* occurs, either in Scripture or elsewhere, or what it would mean if it did occur. For the sense of *σκληρύνειν* in the second, see his Notes on Romans, ad loc.]

^z For example, in Col. i. 15, *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως* cannot be explained as signifying *the origin of created things*; but rather as speaking *περὶ τοῦ πρώτου κτισθέντος, the first created*, agreeably to 1 Cor. iii. 23, xi. 3; Phil. ii. 6. Again, *ἐξουσίαι, δυνάμεις, and κυριότητες*, Ephes. i. 21, cannot be interpreted of political magistrates: for, it is clear, that these, and such terms in St. Paul's Epistles, have always the signification of angelic dignities, which we shall prove elsewhere. [There appears to be a defect in each of the examples here produced by Ammon: for, if it be consistent with Christian doctrine to speak of Christ as *the first created*, which the translator is far from allowing, it is also consistent to speak of him as the origin of created things, John i. 3. The translation of the Nicene Fathers is the best, *begotten before the worlds*. The other cases illustrate the analogy of language, rather than that of doctrine, and their interpretation rests upon the *usus loquendi*. The reader will probably find the following note from Stuart, on this point, more to the purpose. "As to the various figures of speech mentioned in the section above, can it be doubted, whether

they occur in Scripture? *Catachresis* is the use of a word, so as to attribute to a thing what cannot be really and actually predicated of it. When the heavens, then, are said to *listen*, the floods to clap their *hands*, the hills to *skip*, the trees of the forest to *exult*, what is this but Catachresis of the boldest kind? Hyperbole magnifies a thing beyond its real greatness. When our Saviour says, *It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven*; which is afterwards explained, as simply meaning, How hardly shall they that have riches be saved; was not his language Hyperbole? Hypallage means the change of appropriate language for unappropriate. Thus, Luke i. 54, His mouth and his tongue *ανεωχθη* were opened. The student, however, must not be content with a meagre note on this great subject. Let him peruse and reperuse Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew Poetry, where the nature, extent, and design of figurative language in the Scripture, is better unfolded than in any other book of which I have any knowledge. Compare also Glass, Phil. Sac. ed. Dathii, vol. ii. and Morus, p. 185-194."

"In regard to the usage, by which the whole is put for a part, and a part for the whole, it is by no means unfrequent in the Scriptures. How often do we meet with *πας* or *παντας*, when only a large or considerable number is intended. On the other hand, a part is put as the representative of the whole, in very many passages; *e. g.* Ps. viii. 7, 8, Rom. viii. 38, 39. Surely, in the last example here, the Apostle does not mean to say, that the things which he particularizes are the only things which are unable to separate us from the love of Christ. He means to say, that *nothing* whatever can effect the separation. In all such cases, the extent, the nature of the subject, and scope of the discourse, must determine the latitude in which the words are to be taken."

"Especially must *common sense*, as Ernesti says, be appealed to in the interpretation of parables, allegories, and all

kinds of figurative language; proverbial expressions, &c. Every writer addresses himself to the common sense of his fellow-men.”]

XVI. In such cases, then, we must refer the interpretation to the nature of things, to original notions, to common sense, and to the plain principles of knowledge. We must also avoid a too strict adherence to the proper meaning of terms in their etymological sense; and never imagine, that because this sense is departed from, therefore the style is faulty. For languages are founded upon use and custom; nor can that be considered as faulty in language, which is sanctioned by the usage even of skilful writers. Therefore, even grammatical anomalies; that is, forms opposed to the general laws of language, are so far from being faults, that, when sanctioned by custom, they must be complied with; and it would be a grammatical error to avoid them.^a

^a [Among such anomalies we may class, the use in Greek of the neuter plural with a singular verb; in French and English, of the plural pronoun of the second person instead of the singular.]

XVII. This error of pressing etymologies too closely, extends farther than is commonly supposed. Nor are they alone faulty, who accommodate the sense to the primary origin of

the word, than which nothing is more common, (See § xi. :) but those also who adhere too tenaciously, even to the ordinary and popular use of words ;^b whence have arisen many false interpretations, and especially imaginary emphasis. But on this head we shall speak more fully, and with more particular reference to the interpretation of the New Testament, in the following chapter.

^b As in ἐπισκιάζειν, Luc. i. 35, σπείρειν εἰς τὴν σάρκα, Gal. vi. 8, which passage Morus has illustrated in his Op. Theol. i. 150. [Morus, who has made several improvements on the arrangement of Ernesti, classes the four last paragraphs under the general head of *Sensus Communis*. His editor Eichstädt adds, p. 191, a long and judicious inquiry into the application of common sense to the interpretation of the discourses of our Saviour. The same subject has been treated by Turretin, *De Interpret. S. S.* 249, and by his editor Teller, p. 105, and also by J. C. T. Ernesti, in his dissertation *de Usu Vitae Communis ad Interpret. N. T.*]

XVIII. Having thus laid down the principles of discovering the meaning of words generally, it remains that we should speak of their particular application to the exegesis of the New Testament.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE METHOD OF DISCOVERING THE USAGE
OF LANGUAGE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I. THE first point to be considered, is the general nature of the language used by the writers of the New Testament; for on this much depends, both in discovering and judging the sense, as experience sufficiently shews.^c

^c [*Inveniendum et judicandum.* Ernesti had too much judgment and piety to suppose, that, when the sense of Scripture is once determined, man has any business to judge of the reasonableness or truth of that sense. By *inveniendum* he means the discovering the sense for ourselves; by *judicandum* the weighing the conflicting interpretations of other interpreters.]

II. And this inquiry turns upon the question so frequently agitated, whether that language be in its words and phrases pure classical Greek, or whether it be tinctured with an admixture of Hebraisms. The former opinion has been supported by Pfochen, Stolberg, Erasmus Schmidt, Blackwall, George,^d and a few

others, of no great name for Greek learning; the latter, by Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Camerarius, Beza, Drusius, Casaubon, Glasse, Gataker, Solanus, Olearius, Vorst,^e and many others, of high attainments, both in Greek and Hebrew literature. Of the fathers, we may name on the same side, Origen, Philoc. i. 4, 15; and Chrysostom on 1 Cor. i. 17.

^d In his *Hierocriticus* N. T. Vitemb. 1733. Compare *Rhenferd's* *Syntagma Disput. Theolog. Philol. de Stilo* N. T. Lewarden, 1702, and *Honert's* *Syntagma Diss. de Stilo* N. T. Amsterdam, 1703.

^e Add to these *Leusden* on the Hebraisms of the New Testament, *Maldonatus* in his *Commentary on the Gospels*, and *Hemsterhuis* on *Lucian*, ii. 361. Ed. Bipont, who says "the opinion of those who hold, that the style of the New Testament is pure Greek, has to me always appeared most absurd." After Solanus and Vorst, Gataker stands the highest in this list, and has refuted Pfochen in every point.

III. For the right understanding and determination of this question, we must observe that the inquiry is not, whether some phrases may not have been considered as Hebraisms, which are really pure Greek; for this we readily concede. On this point there may have been, and certainly have been, errors; and some forms of speech are common to all languages.

IV. Nor is the inquiry, whether the words and phrases of the New Testament do not oc-

cur in good Greek authors; for this is conceded by all: nor whether some phrases of Hebrew character may not be found in the same sense in the writings of some poet of a tragic and sublime cast, as Aeschylus and Sophocles; such as ξηρὰ for a continent of land.^f For poets, especially tragic and lyric poets, frequently use remarkable expressions, which are not to be considered as examples of the general language; they are allowed also to borrow expressions from foreign languages, and to introduce obsolete idioms. Stanley has remarked many such forms in Aeschylus, and Zwinglius in Pindar; we may also find them in Sophocles.

^f Such singular forms prove nothing for the purity of the New Testament style. Thus מבור רגלים, is in Plato ἐκ τῶν ποδῶν διαχωρεῖν, and in Cicero *e medio discedere*. Upon the whole, it is lost labour to derive arguments for similitude of style from the poets. [Ammon's own illustrations require, that he should have added, or from orators or sophists. The general idioms of a language can never be learned from those who systematically laboured after originality of expression, and carefully avoided all the ordinary forms of popular discourse. As to the peculiarities of Plato, see Plutarch's *Quaest. Platon. Opp.* Ed. Reiske, x. p. 159. For a fuller examination of the expression מבור רגלים, see Cap. 11, § 12, Note.]

V. Nor do we charge it as a want of purity on the style of the New Testament, that some

words are found in it, such as *πίστις μετάνοια*, &c. which, as they express ideas unknown to the Greeks, are used in a sense different from that which they have in other Greek writings, and in a manner more conformable to the Hebrew usage. §

§ The barbarism of single words, therefore, does not prove that the style of the New Testament is Hebraistic. Nor from the occurrence of Latin words, such as *μάκισλλον, κουστωδία*, would we think of asserting, that the style is Latinized. D.C.C.

[There is, however, an essential difference between the cases adduced by Ernesti, and those by Ammon: in the former, ordinary words are used in a scientific, and consequently in a restricted sense; and as the science, that is to say, revealed religion, was previously known to the Hebrews alone, the restriction is made in conformity with Hebrew usage. In the latter case, foreign terms are ingrafted without any change of the sense, as we every day see done from French into English, as a *levee*, a *boudoir*, a *surtout*.]

VI. But the real question is respecting words and phrases expressive of ideas and notions, with which the Greeks were conversant: and whether, in the first place, the words are used in the same sense in which they were used by the Greeks; and, secondly, whether the phrases are not merely arranged according to the rules of Greek syntax, but also, whether they really have the sense which Greek usage would attribute to them: for these two points are necessary to purity of style. And this in-

quiry may fairly be instituted respecting such words and phrases, as *δικαιοσύνη* used for *liberality*, *εὐλογίαι* for *plenty*, *κοινὸν* for *profane*, and *δίκαιος ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, *ἄρτον φαγεῖν*, *παρὰσστήναι ἐνώπιόν τινος*, etc.^m

^h [*δικαιοσύνη*, Heb. **הקדש**, *Liberality*. See 2 Cor. ix. 9, 10; 1 Sam. xii. 7. *Εὐλογίαι*, Heb. **ברכה**, *Plenty*. Heb. vi. 7; Gen. xxvii. 27.]

VII. We must be careful also that the authors, by whose authority the purity of the New Testament is defended, be themselves pure; that is, that they be prose writers of an early date; and that they have derived nothing from the Greek version of the Old Testament itself. Besides, we must compare historical writings with historical, doctrinal with doctrinal. The comic authors may also be used, with the exception of the chorus.ⁱ

ⁱ The purity of the New Testament would therefore require to be defended, by comparing single words and phrases with corresponding words and phrases in Greek authors anterior to the date of the New Testament; by comparing, for instance, Matthew with Xenophon, Paul with Plato, the Apocalypse with Pindar and Aeschylus, and the Hymns of the New Testament with the Tragic Choruses.

VIII. Such being the real nature of the question, we unhesitatingly deny that the style of the New Testament is pure Greek: on the

contrary, we maintain that it imitates the Hebrew, not merely in single words, phrases, and figures of speech, but also in the general texture of the style. This may be proved by the clearest examples, whose number is greater even than is suspected by many who agree with us, as Werenfels well observes in his treatise *de Stilo N. T.* Even Luke, who is generally considered more pure in his style than the others, has innumerable Hebraisms; and the commencement of his Gospel, after a short preface in pure Greek, becomes, in verses 5, 6, 7, so completely Hebraistic, that it might be rendered, word for word, into good Hebrew.^k

^k Even the more learned among the Jews, as Philo and Josephus, could not, without much labour, attain a moderate command of the pure Greek idiom. The writers of the New Testament naturally used a Hebraizing style, 1. because they quoted frequently from the LXX version of the Old Testament; 2. because the Jews, who persecuted Josephus on account of his attachment to a pure Greek style, would scarcely have received or understood a purer idiom; and, 3. because the New Testament was to take the place of the Greek version of the Old. [This is but a poor statement of the reasons for the impurities of the New Testament style, which are much better explained by Ernesti himself, in the following sections. These reasons were of two classes; the 1st, arising from the mental condition of the writers themselves; the 2d, from the purpose to which their writings were to be applied. The Apostles generally knew no literature except the Hebrew Scriptures. They could have acquired a pure Greek idiom, therefore, only by miracle. But, if we may

judge from the general dealings of God's Providence, this miracle would not be wrought, unless it were necessary. Now, a consideration of the primary purpose of the several books of the New Testament will serve to show, that such a miracle, instead of being necessary, or even useful, would have been actually injurious. For a great portion of the primitive church, and probably all its earliest ministers, were Jews, not indeed by country, but by descent. These, then, having learned Greek, by necessary intercourse with the surrounding heathens, but having learned scholastically, nothing but the Jewish Scriptures, and Commentaries on them, would themselves have written in a style similar to that used by the Apostles, and could not so well have understood any other. As to the heathen converts, they being totally unacquainted with the Old Testament, could not fully have understood the New Testament, in whatever style it might have been written, without receiving assistance from their better informed brethren of Jewish origin. Ammon says, that the Jews hated Josephus with a *Vatinian hatred*. The expression may not be familiar to all his readers. Vatinus, says Seneca, (de Const. Sap.) assiduo convitio depudere didicerat. He was so hated by the Roman people, on the discovery of his crimes, that *odium Vatinianum* became a proverb. So Catullus at Calvum, Epig. 14.

Ni te plus oculis meis amarem
 Jucundissime Calve, munere isto
 Odissem te odio Vatiniano.

See Hoffman ad v. Vatinus.]

IX. To prove these assertions, by adducing examples, is needless. Teachers may find a profusion of such examples in Olearius, Leusden, Vorst, Glass, and others. We may remark, however, that some phrases which may

be found in the same sense in good Greek authors, may yet be Hebraisms,¹ just as a literal translator from the vernacular into some other language, may unknowingly fall into some proper idioms of that language. This sensible observation has been made by Gataker, (Cont. Pfochen, p. 61,) Hemsterhuis, Raphelius, and other approved critics.

¹ So *χαρὰν χαίρειν* is both a Greek and Latin idiom. But, in Matt. ii. 10, it must be considered as a Hebraism.

X. No slight argument rests upon the fact, not only that much of the Greek of the New Testament can be translated literally into no language with so much facility as into the Hebrew; which is confessed (in reference to Matt. iv. 4; xxi. 42, &c.) even by E. Schmidt, in other respects, a warm defender of the purity; but also that much of it can scarcely be explained without referring to the Hebrew. So decidedly is this the case, that in many passages an attempt to interpret the New Testament according to the usages of pure Greek writers, would produce a meaning utterly false and ridiculous, as appears from the instances adduced by Werenfels de Stilo N. T. p. 358; and by myself, in my *Treatise de Difficult. Interpr. Gramm.* N. T. sect. 12. To which much might be added: consult, for example, the

Apology of Eunomius, c. 24. Theology, at all times, and many books of our own time, owe a great portion of their errors to the practice of explaining Hebraisms according to the Greek: ^m this has frequently been remarked by Melancthon in his Commentaries.

^m Thus the formula ἀδελφὴ γυνή, 1 Cor. ix. 5, if explained according to the Greek idiom, as it is used by Plutarch in Alexandro, c. 30, ἀδελφὴν καὶ γυναῖκα, *the wife and sister of Darius*, would give a sense utterly false. According to the Hebrew, however, it simply means *a Christian wife*. The Greeks, however, following the idiom of their own language, abused the word ἀδελφὴ for the concealment of their lusts in the use *συνεισάκτων*: a practice which Chrysostom severely blames, and which repeated acts of councils could scarcely remedy. See Clem. Alex. Strom. iii. p. 448, and Ernesti Opp. Phil. 171. [*Συνείσακτος*, in its peculiar ecclesiastical sense, meant a male or female companion in celibacy, that is, either a vowed virgin who lived in the house of a man, or a monk who resided with a woman.]

XI. It is also no slight proof of our assertion, that the Greek and Latin interpreters, who, in ignorance of the Hebrew idiom, have interpreted according to the Greek, have in many cases been puzzled and led into trifling follies, as in *συνδέσμῳ τελειότητος*, Col. iii. 14. (See Melancthon, iv. 330.) The same still happens to modern interpreters, who are ignorant of Hebrew; while to those familiar with the Hebrew idiom, the same passages are perfectly

clear.ⁿ Now this could not have happened had the Apostles written pure Greek.

ⁿ How many errors have arisen in the church from ignorance of Hebrew ! The doctrines of Purgatory, Penance, Faith, Good Works, and others, may perhaps be proved from the Vulgate and Augustine, but they cannot be maintained against an interpreter well acquainted with Hebrew. [It would have been well had Ammon either omitted *Faith and Good Works*, or specified what doctrine respecting them he meant to condemn. From the connexion, we may presume he refers to the ordinary Romish doctrines on these heads.]

XII. This fact detracts, however, in no degree from the dignity of the sacred books. For truth can never injure religion ; and sufficient reasons may be adduced why the use of such a style was appropriate and necessary.

XIII. For, in the first place, the writers of the New Testament could not, by their own natural powers, write pure Greek, having been born and educated among Jews ; having never learned Greek scholastically, nor been accustomed to the reading of Greek books, ° all of which may be affirmed of St. Paul, even though he was born at Tarsus. For it does not follow, because he was born at Tarsus, where there existed schools of rhetoric and philosophy, that therefore he must have been educated in them, nor that he had read certain authors, because

he occasionally quotes a verse from them. All approximation to Greek arts and custom was, we know, an abomination to the sect of the Pharisees.

° They rather viewed all such studies with abhorrence, as Paul himself does, 1 Cor. i. 17. [This is putting the matter too strongly as relates to St. Paul. It does not follow that he *abhorred* or even undervalued Greek science, because he asserted that *the world by wisdom knew not God*. There is nothing in this but the assertion, that human reason had no share in the discovery of those truths which Paul preached, and which were purely matter of revelation. It is strange that our own enthusiasts and the Neologian Ammon should agree in considering Christian Faith as something opposed to the full and fair exercise of the reasoning powers.]

XIV. Nor was it desirable that the Holy Spirit should inspire the Apostles with the faculty of writing in a pure Greek style. For, not to mention that in that case no one would have believed them the authors of their own writings, they themselves could not have understood them without an additional inspiration.^p Much less would they have been intelligible to the ordinary Jews, who hated both the Greeks and their eloquence; but who, on the other hand, were familiar with the Hebraistic style, from their constant perusal, either of the Hebrew Scriptures or the Alexandrine

version of them.⁹ Finally, since the doctrines of the New Testament were founded upon those of the Old, it was evidently useful that a similarity of phrase and style should be maintained between them.

^p When Paul preached at Athens, before the Stoics and Epicureans, (Acts xvii. 17,) they called him *σπερμολόγον*, on account of the peculiarity of his style; for as to the substance of his discourse, it was altogether excellent and divine. [It may be doubted whether *σπερμολόγος*, a *scatterer of words*, a *babbler*, had any reference to the style. They mocked, not at the style, but at the subject matter of the discourse, the resurrection of the dead.]

^q Add also this consideration, that they wrote not for Greek grammarians and philosophers, but principally for the Jews. Those writings which are addressed to the Gentile Christians are in a purer style. [This hardly tallies with Ammon's last note: for if St. Paul had the power of employing a pure style, he would surely have used it, when he spoke before an audience of Athenian philosophers.]

XV. Nor does the peculiar style of the New Testament offend against that perspicuity which is requisite in an author. For every author ought to regard his own times, and those whom he primarily addresses, not future ages, to the neglect of his contemporaries. And the obscurity which has since grown upon it is not necessary, but the accidental result of the change of times and circumstances: such obscurity belongs to all ancient writings, how-

ever pure, and the cause of it rests not with the writers, but with the readers.

XVI. Upon the whole, then, the language of the New Testament may properly be called *Hebrew-Greek*. If any, with Scaliger and Drusius, who, according to Salmasius, invented the term, choose to call it Hellenistic, let them beware of supposing, with Heinsius, that it is a peculiar dialect, which error Salmasius has completely refuted.^r Nor would I call it with some, the *Alexandrine dialect*, since this style was used by the Jews in other places as well as in Alexandria.^s As to that Alexandrine dialect, respecting which a treatise was written by Irenæus, an Alexandrine grammarian, it consisted in those peculiarities in which the language of the Alexandrines, though pure Greek, differed from that of the other Greeks, such peculiarities as existed also among the Athenians, Ionians, &c. Some, again, speak of it as the Macedonian dialect, because they conceive that the style of the New Testament approaches nearer to that of Polybius,^t Diodorus, &c. than to that of any other of the ancients.

^r In the first place, the concurrent voice of antiquity (see Gregorius, p. 3, Ed. Koen,) admits only the five dialects, Attic, Ionic, Doric, Æolic, and Common: and, secondly,

Dialect affects the inflexion of declinable words, [and the change of one letter for another,] not the phraseology. [For a full examination of the meaning of the term Hellenist, see Eichstadt in Morus, i. 224.]

* As at Antioch, Cæsarea, and elsewhere. But on this and the subject of the following note, see Sturtz de Dialecto Alexandrina. Lips. 1786, and Ed. 2d, 1809.

† Ernesti points out the nature of this similitude in his Opp. Phil. 212. As to the Macedonian dialect, it is well known to have prevailed throughout Asia. On this subject, the student may consult Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. Vol. III. L. iv. § 22; Michaelis' Introduction to N. T. § 18; and Leusden on the Dialects of the N. T.

XVII. Every variation from pure Greek in the New Testament is not a Hebraism. For there may be found in it some Latin words, introduced by the intercourse of the Romans with the Jews, which may easily be detected by any one: There are also others of Syriac, Chaldee, and Rabbinical origin. Examples of these may be found in Olearius de Stilo N. T. Sect. didact. ii. iii. and Wetstein on N. T. Acts xiii. 48. ^u

^u [Besides Latinisms, (rather Latin words,) as σπεικουλάτωρ κουσταδιά, and such phrases as λαμβάνειν συμβούλιον *consilium capere*, εργασίαν δούναι *operam dare*, &c. there are Persian words to be found in the New Testament, as γάζα μάγοι, ἀγγαρεύειν: Syriasms as ἄββά, μαρνανθά; also Chaldaisms and Rabbinisms. See Marsh's Michaelis on the N. T. idioms. Stuart.]

XVIII. Having settled these points respecting the general style of the New Testament, we shall find it easier to lay down rules for determining the usage of the language, for investigating it in particular passages, and applying it to the purposes of interpretation.

XIX. In the first place, then, an interpreter of the New Testament ought to be well skilled both in the Greek and Hebrew languages, so that he may be able to distinguish between the idioms of each language, and rightly to interpret both.^x And in order to acquire this knowledge of Greek, he ought to study not merely those authors who have written in the popular style, but also those who, in a later age, have written without a close imitation of the earlier Attics. In this class I would place Polybius first, and then Diodorus Siculus and Artemidorus.^y These contain many forms, in common with the New Testament, which are either unknown to, or used in a different sense by, the purer and more ancient authors.

^x The excellence of these precepts has been illustrated by Ernesti himself, especially in his *Prelections on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, lately published by Dindorf, in which the pure Greek forms are generally well explained, the Hebraisms not so well. Nor do we fear to pronounce the same opinion respecting the *Commentaries of Morus*, a man of

deathless fame, and peculiarly dear to us; which have in some instances been corrupted by the inattention of his auditors, but generally betray a want of sound Hebrew scholarship. We mention this only that students may be led to make the most of their time, and may learn from the example of the most distinguished men, what a mass of learning is required to form a complete and accomplished interpreter of the New Testament.

¹ Together with Arrian. The words *βασιλίσσα, γενέσια*, are not pure Greek; yet they both occur in Polybius.

XX. In every case a judicious interpreter will use all diligence to distinguish that which is pure Greek from that which is not: in which the difficulty is greater than may be supposed.² (See my Treatise de Diff. Interpr. Gr. N. T. § 13.) When he perceives that the idiom is not pure Greek, the next point will be to look for assistance from the Hebrew; and to do this with full effect, he ought to know, not only its genius as to the inflexion of words, and the composition of sentences, which may be sufficient in some cases; but also by what Greek words the Jews, as Philo and Josephus, were in the habit of expressing Hebrew notions, when writing upon sacred subjects in Greek, but not with purity and elegance; so that, by comparing the corresponding Hebrew forms, he may discover the real sense.³

² As in the words *κόσμος, ειρήνη, φόβος, σὰρξ, πνεῦμα, ἐκλογή*.

[These are, in fact, technical words. See the Translator's Add. to Note (g) § v.]

^a Suppose it be inquired what is the meaning of ἰξουσία ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, 1 Cor. xi. 10. It is evident that ἰξουσία cannot have its ordinary sense of dominion or power. Τριχώματος ἰξουσία, occurs, indeed, in a prose author. (*Callistrati, Expos. Stat. in Opp. Philostrati. Paris, 1608. t. i. p. 871.*) signifying a *covering for the hair*: and in the Digests (l. xxiii. tit. 10.) *imperium* conveys the idea of dress, and specifically of a *head-dress*. Some copies, however, read *impilia*, and Callistratus may perhaps be speaking of a luxurious growth of hair. Being thus left in doubt, we must have recourse to the Hebrew usage. At Ps. lx. 9. מַעוֹן, is rendered by the LXX κραταίωσις. The words כִסוֹת and רָדַד, which have radically the sense of *protecting* and *ruling*, are rendered by the same translators in the sense of περιβολαίου. Gen. xx. 6. and Cant. v. 2. The word ἰξουσία, therefore, may have the sense, not merely of *power*, but also of a *covering* or *head-dress*. The decree of the Council of Gangra, (A. D. 324.) *si qua mulier tondeat comam anathema esto*, rests upon this precept of St. Paul's.

XXI. In some cases therefore, nothing is more advisable than to translate the Greek, word for word, into Hebrew; which is often easy, both in single words and in phrases, even for those who are but imperfectly acquainted with Hebrew. Sometimes, however, this is not so easily effected, on account of the rarity of the words, the harshness of the construction, or the disparity of the etymology. In such cases the LXX Version is to be consulted; which ought to be so familiar to the interpreter,

as that he may always be ready to give the Septuagint Greek for any given Hebrew expression. For, since the truths of revealed religion were first expressed in Greek by that version, it is manifest *that the Septuagint must form the basis of all sound knowledge of the Hebrew-Greek idiom.* On this subject, however, we shall speak more fully, when we treat of the use of Greek versions of the Old Testament. It will be useful also to be acquainted with writers upon Hebraisms in general, and those of the New Testament in particular, especially *Vorst, Leusden,*^b and, one who in learning excelled them all, *Gataker.*

^b Both edited by Fischer, whose Supplements have been lately published. To these may be added Sturtz's work on the Alexandrine Dialect, before referred to, in which there are many excellent hints on the proper use to be made of the LXX Version.

XXII. Nor will it be without its use to study the fragments of Aquila, who pursued a similar style of translation, as he was not far removed from the apostolic age, and contains many things suited to our purpose. The remains of the version of Symmachus are also valuable; who, by translating into pure Greek, has thrown light upon the sense of the Hebrew.^c But of these, and of their proper use, we shall speak more fully in another place.

° From all the Greek versions of the Old Testament, especially those which adhere most closely to the original, an interpreter may derive much assistance in determining how propositions conceived in Hebrew are wont to be expressed in Greek. For this purpose we may also recommend, *Nova Versio Graeca V. T. Veneta*, edited by Villoison and me (Ammon) at Strasburg and Erlangen 1784, 1791. [The same reasons may serve to recommend the study of the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament. See G. J. Henke, *de Usu Librorum Apocryphorum V. T. in N. T.* Hallae, 1711, and Kuinoel, *Obs. ad N. T. ex libris Apocryphis V. T.* Lips. 1794. Semler, Frisch, Flügge and Straeudlein, have used them to illustrate, not the idioms, but the matter of the New Testament. Brunn has applied the Apocryphal gospel of Nicodemus to the illustration of St. Matthew. The *Nova Versio Veneta* was discovered by Villoison in the Library of St. Mark at Venice, and part of it was published by him at Strasburgh, under the title, *Nova Versio Graeca, Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastis, Cantici Criticorum, Ruthae, Threnorum, Danielis, et Selectorum Pentateuchi locorum*. The remainder was published by Ammon. Its author and age are unknown, but it appears to have been written by a Greek, and between the 6th and 10th centuries. See Eichhorn, *Einleitung ins. A. T.* p. 397.

XXIII. We may also usefully apply the following principle. When the same word or phrase is both Hebraistic and pure Greek, and either will give an admissible sense, we ought, in translating, rather to follow the Hebrew sense. For it is more probable that Jews would use it, especially if the expression, considered as pure Greek, be rare or refined. Thus, Hebrews xi. 11. *καταβολὴν σπέρματος*. I

would rather render according to the Hebrew sense, Gen. iv. 25, than according to the Greek; as also ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν ἁμαρτίαις. John viii. 24.^d

^d This expression, rendered in conformity with the Greek usage, would signify, *to persevere in sin to the end of life*; according to the Hebrew, *to be condemned finally on account of sin*. To these we may add ἁμαρτίαν πρὸς θάνατον, 1 John v. 16, which can only be explained by reference to the Jewish classification of sins.

XXIV. An interpreter of the New Testament ought always to refer the Greek, especially when it treats of doctrines, and, above all, of Christian doctrines, to the Hebrew; because in such cases the words must necessarily have been taken according to their use in the Old Testament.^e In this he may also be usefully guided by the *analogy of doctrine*, which he ought to have ready for application, lest the words be forced into a sense different from the intention of the author, and adverse to the essential doctrines of religion.

^e They, for instance, are in error, who imagine, that προφήτης always means a *foreteller of future events*. The corresponding Hebrew מורה shows, that προφήτης means a *teacher or master*. See Koppe, Excursus iii. in Ep. at Ephes. [Hence appears the great utility of a good dictionary of the LXX to a student of the New Testament. Such a dictionary we possess in *Biel's Thes.* edited by *Schleusner*. The connexion between the two sentences of this § is not very

apparent. Every method of determining the sense of the words must be used, so as not to offend against the *analogy of doctrine*. See P. I. Sect. I. c. i. § xix. though there Ernesti appears to attach less importance to it than he does here. But why should its application be particularly enforced in connexion with the adoption of the Hebrew sense? To the translator it appears, that Ernesti saw there might be danger in construing the technical words of the New Testament in *exactly* the sense in which they had been used in the Old. By doing this, Christian doctrine might run a risk of being represented rather as a republication, than an extension, of the Mosaic. The reader may consider whether Taylor, in his celebrated Key to the Romans, has not fallen into this error; that is to say, whether he has not forgotten the *analogy of doctrine*, in adhering too closely to the Hebrew sense. No one, however, can read Taylor's Notes, without being satisfied of the great use of Hebrew scholarship in the interpretation of the New Testament.]

XXV. Nor is this principle to be applied exclusively to the signification of single words and phrases, but also to the forms and tenses of verbs, and to the number of verbs and nouns, in which points, the language of the New Testament often departs from the usage of pure Greek, and adopts the Hebrew style.^f Interpreters have often fallen into difficulties and absurdities through the neglect of this fact.

^f Thus the *futures* of the New Testament are in meaning frequently *aorists*, according to Hebrew usage. So also *ὄψωνοι* from **וַיִּשְׂמַח**, **וַיִּשְׂמַח**, **וַיִּשְׂמַח**, **וַיִּשְׂמַח** to *cause to triumph*, from the Hebrew Hiphil, or causative voice. See Ernesti's Opp. Phil. p. 175.

XXVI. Where the Hebrew fails us in discovering the sense, we must have recourse to other dialects, especially the Syriac,^g the Chaldee, and the Rabbinical. As to the Syriac and Chaldee, all allow their utility, though all do not understand it aright, as appears from the nature of the attempts that have been made to illustrate the Greek from the Syriac version of the New Testament:^h of which we shall speak in their proper place. The principle upon which we ought to proceed is, as we have just said, to have recourse to these dialects, only when we cannot derive a satisfactory sense, either from the Greek or the Hebrew. If, in such a case, we find that the phrase is borrowed from the Syriac, then, by discovering what meaning it conveyed in Syriac,ⁱ we may also determine what is the sense of the Greek. This operation will be the more easy, if the Syriac be still a living language, since in them the usages are most easily determined: but this I find to be a disputed point. With the same limitations we may use the Chaldee Paraphrase, and Rabbinical writings. He who seeks and hopes for more, seeks and hopes in vain; he labours uselessly in heaping up unprofitable matter, and throws away an assistance, which, under proper management, is not to be despis-

ed. The utmost he is likely to discover, is, whether the Syriac versionist has translated correctly or not. These, however, are subjects which will be more fully treated of in their proper place.

^g 'Paxà. Matt. v. 22. Μαργὰν ἀβά. 1 Cor. xvi. 22, are Syriac words, [𐤀] 𐤍 and must be illustrated according to the idiom of that language.

^h As *L. De Dieu* and *Boysen*. It is desirable, however, that some one would collect observations on the New Testament, not only from the Syriac versions, but also from other Syriac authors, as Barhebraeus.

ⁱ Albert Schultens decidedly classes it among dead languages. Perhaps it may still be spoken in the Maronite Convents, while the mass of the people speak Arabic. See Michaelis' *Bibl. Orient.* t. xv. p. 130. [The Aramean language, spoken in Palestine in the time of Christ, consisted of two dialects; the Syriac, spoken in Galilee; the Chaldee, in Judea. See J. D. Michaelis, *Abhandlung von der Syrischen Sprache und ihren Gebrauch*, Treatise on the Syriac Language, &c. § 111. For Rabbinisms, see Lightfoot's *Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae*, and Schoettgen's work of same title, 1733-42, Dresden.]

XXVII. Thus have we laid down the legitimate method of investigating and determining in each instance, the usages of language in the New Testament, by those testimonies which we have denominated direct. But though this principle is of very wide application, yet it neither is, nor can be sufficient of itself. For, in the sacred books, there occur many new forms of expression required by the novelty of the

ideas to be expressed. Not that an entirely new religion was to be revealed, but that old truths were to be declared more openly and distinctly than they had yet been, without the intervention of figures and allegories. And, for this purpose, new words and phrases were required, many of which are, by some similitude, accommodated to the ideas to be expressed by them. These new terms, we may remark in passing, neither were, nor could be invented by the Apostles themselves; for such an operation would require much more of talent and scholarship than they possessed, but were supernaturally communicated to them by the Holy Spirit. Hence arises a strong argument for the verbal inspiration of Scripture. Of this class of words are *τέρασις, δαιμονίζεσθαι, τάρταρος, ἄδης, ἀναγεννᾶν, &c.*^k

^k Few, it may be presumed, will agree in the opinions here expressed by Ernesti. With respect to the word *δαιμονίζεσθαι*, it is well known that the Jews, after the captivity, admitted many Chaldee notions into their creed, and among others the belief, that all evils, and especially the more severe diseases, were the work of malignant spirits or demons. As to *τάρταρος* and *ἄδης*, they are merely renderings of the Hebrew *לשן*. The propensity of the age to a belief in miracles produced, and caught at the words *σημεῖον*, and the purer Greek *τέρασις*. The whole question, however, resolves itself into a fuller explanation of the nature of *θεοπνευστία*. This has been done, tolerably well, by Ernesti, in another place, but better by Morus, in his *Epitome and dogmatic prelections*, edited by Hempel. [The question,

as it appears to the translator, lies in a much narrower compass. How can words be called *nove dicta*, which were familiar to the Greeks many hundred years before the writing of the New Testament? Stuart, though he gives no note of this §, appears to have had this in his mind; for he omits the two most common words in Ernesti's list, *τίεας* and *ἄδης*. Ammon, with his neological fancies, renders the matter still worse. It requires an incredible degree of credulity to believe, that the credulity of the apostolic age invented (*peperit*) words as old as the Greek language: or that the Jews, who received 1 Sam. xvi. 14-23, as a true history, had no notion of demoniac possession, till they learned it from the Chaldeans. Ernesti may, perhaps, mean only, that the *application* of these words was new. If so, it was nothing more than had been done, and is still daily done, by the promoters of any new system of doctrine. See S. ii. C. i. § 16, and the notes there. But, in that case, he might have enlarged his list indefinitely. For instance, *Θεός* in the LXX may be called a *nove dictum*, for it conveyed a different idea there from its ordinary Greek sense.]

XXVIII. Such words and phrases, then, cannot be understood and explained from the previous usage of language, but have an interpretation of their own, not less definite and sure than the original meaning, founded upon the testimonies of the authors themselves. These may be collected principally from the comparison of parallel passages, the proper methods and limitations of which have been already explained. S. ii. C. i. § 4.

XXIX. Nor is the testimony of the Greek Fathers, respecting such forms, to be overlook-

ed, whether they have given it in the way of interpretation, or casually. With respect to interpreters, their choice and use, we shall treat in the Third Part. Here we need only observe, that in the writings of Greek fathers, not expressly treating of the interpretation of Scripture, expressions from the New Testament are introduced in such a context, and with such adjuncts, as shew clearly in what sense they were understood at that period. Many such elucidations are to be found in the writings of Clem. Romanus, Ignatius, Hippolytus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others.¹ Examples will hereafter be given, P. III. C. v. § 23. Interpreters ought carefully to read such authors, and attend to such elucidations.

¹ The writers of the New Testament had many disciples, whom they would imbue with their phraseology as well as with their doctrine. These, again, would transmit the knowledge to their disciples, whose writings we still possess. So Cyril, in his Catech. xxx, explains ἐρευνᾶν, 1 Cor. ii. 10, on which commentators have refined strangely, by γινώσκειν.

XXX. Among such elucidations, there may be opinions derived from the Apostles themselves; and when they agree with the context, and with the analogy of doctrine, they are not lightly to be rejected. Those especially deserve attention, which bear the stamp of Apos-

tolic diction, and are formed upon the model of the Hebrew idiom.^m

^m Ἐν εἶναι μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, John xvii. 21. Compare Clem. Rom. Ep. ii. p. 27. Ed. Syr. after Wetstein's New Testament, Lugd. Batav. 1752.

XXXI. For the same purpose, we may use the ancient Glosses of Hesychius, many of which, it is clear, refer to passages in the New Testament, drawn from the most early interpreters; of Suidas, fewer of which are to our purpose; and of Photius, from the unedited Onomasticon,ⁿ usually attributed to him. In the use of these, however, we must be careful to judge from the form of the word, whether the accompanying remarks refer to the passage we wish to interpret. Upon the whole, there is great need of judgment in this matter, to distinguish that which is to the purpose, from that which is useless or false; and it must be exercised on the Glossarists, much in the same way as on the Fathers.

ⁿ *Albertius* had introduced portions of *Photius* into his edition of *Hesychius*: but we now possess the complete work, edited by *Tittman* and *Herman*. See *Johannis Zonarae et Photii Lexica, ex Codd. Manuscriptis nunc primum edita, observationibus et indicibus instructa*, iii. tom. Lips. 1808. Nor are the glosses of the Scholiasts upon the classical Greek authors to be neglected. Ἐξέυσθεν, John v. 13, is well illustrated by the Scholiast on the *Phoenissae* of *Euripidis*,

who explains *ἐκνεύει* by *ἀναχωρεῖ*. The Venetian translator renders פנה, Deut. xxxi. 18, by *ἐξένευσεν*.

XXXII. Those Glosses which, in some manuscripts, have crept into the text, and displaced the true reading, may occasionally serve to suggest, to illustrate, or to confirm, the right interpretation. Thus Chrysostom, Hom. 51, on John vii. 52, for *ἐρεύνησον* reads *ἐρώτησον*,^o and adds *μάθε, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐρώτησον*. These may have been derived from the ancient Scholia, of which Origen's were the earliest;^p or, perhaps, from other Commentators, even from the Latins.

^o Chrysostom, in his glosses, is more guided by the supposed subject, than by the words, and, on that account, is a much less careful interpreter than Jerome. Take, as an instance, *τὸ σῶμά μου, ἵνα καυθήσωμαι*, 1 Cor. xiii. 3, where Chrysostom adds, *τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ζῶντα κατακαῆναι*, which is far from the meaning of the Apostle. [For a more complete and more favourable opinion of Chrysostom, see Jahn's *Enchiridion*, p. 165.]

^p [The Latin is, "eae possunt e Scholiis antiquis in N. T. ab Origine ortis fluxisse." This may mean, that the ancient Scholia, of which he speaks, were *borrowed* from those of Origen. Stuart, and his English editor Dr. Henderson, appear to have read *Scholis*, and speak of "ancient schools instructed by Origen."]

XXXIII. In cases where we can avail ourselves of none of the above-mentioned aids, we must have recourse to the context, and to the na-

ture of the subject previously ascertained. We ought also to keep habitually in view the analogy of Scripture, and of the doctrine therein revealed; so that no interpretation be approved of, which produces a sense contrary to that doctrine; and, that in difficult passages which appear to oppose it, the interpretation be accommodated to it.

⁹ A remarkable example appears in Matt. xii. 32, *εἰπὼν κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου*, where, the words literally taken, seem to designate a crime, for which there is no forgiveness. This, however, is directly opposed to the doctrine of Scripture respecting the remission of sins, especially to Acts xiii. 38, and 1 John ii. 2. Our Saviour then appears to mean nothing more, than that the consequences of a sin, by which the very notion of God is driven from the mind, will accompany the sinner into another world. The same sentiment appears in Maimonides Tract. de Poenitentiá, Oxon. 1705, p. 93.

XXXIV. Nor ought this theological precept to appear strange to any, even though it be not expressly laid down in Scripture: (for the *ἀναλογία πίστεως* in Rom. xii. 6. refers to quite another thing, as I have elsewhere shewn,)* since common sense sanctions it, and it is equally applicable to the interpretation of profane books, which must be interpreted, not only generally, but also in particular passages, according to the *analogy* of the doctrine whereof they treat.

† Not according to the system of faith, but according to the measure or magnitude of your faith. See Koppe or Rosenmüller on the passage, and my (Ammon's) Summa Theol. Christ. ed. 2. Erlangen, 1808, § 26, de *regulâ fidei*. [By this analogy we distinguish *ironical* from *serious* assertions. Thus, if Cicero, in the Philippics, praises the wit, courtesy, or humanity of Antony, we know either by the *context*, or by *analogy*, that his expressions are intended to convey a sense directly the reverse of that which is their literal meaning.]

XXXV. *Analogy of doctrine or of faith*, which is rarely defined with sufficient accuracy, depends not upon the system received by any sect of Christians, as unfair and ignorant men falsely assert; for in that case the rule would be variable; nor on the mutual relation of its parts: just as legal analogy does not consist in the body of laws, nor in the mutual dependence and connexion of single laws; nor grammatical analogy in the words themselves. But as grammatical analogy is the law and form of language established by usage, to which is opposed *anomaly*; that is, departure from the established laws and forms of speech: so the analogy of doctrine or faith rests upon the main points of Christian doctrine evidently declared in Scripture, and thence denominated by the Latin Doctors, the *Regula fidei*. To these every thing is to be referred, so that no interpretation be received which is inconsistent with

them.⁵ Nor as far as relates to matters of faith and practice, is the analogy of *Scripture* anything different from the analogy of doctrine. Examples of analogy, and of doctrine according to analogy, may be found in Gal. vi. 15, 16; and 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4–11, sq., where the Apostle, in conformity with Greek usage, calls these main points τὰ πρῶτα, *principles*; which principles have in every system the force of a law, both in judging and in interpreting.

⁵ Neither the truth itself, nor the relation of dogmas, as Baumgarten has maintained, constitutes the analogy of faith. As the analogy of jurisprudence is the spirit of the laws, so the analogy of faith is the spirit of revealed religion. This analogy often serves to relieve the interpreter. Thus, if it be inquired, whether the heathen [who have not heard of Christ] necessarily perish, we answer in the negative, on the analogy of the doctrine delivered in John iii. 16. See Diss. on this question, by J. G. Gurlitt, Lips. 1775. It must be allowed, that the analogy of faith is twofold; the one exegetic, the other dogmatic. The former is variable, according to the different tempers and tastes of the different authors, who illustrate the doctrines respecting Christ, Justification, and the Resurrection, in different modes. The latter ought to be always one and the same, being based upon the universal notions of the Gospel, which are but slightly removed from ideas. There can, however, be little doubt but that exegetic analogy, if once rightly established by interpreters, would pave the way to an analogy really dogmatic, of which but a shadow is yet to be found in our theological systems.

[The last sentence but one of Ammon's note stands thus,

“ Haec una eaque firma esse *debet*, notionibus evangeliiis universis, quae ab ideis proxime absunt, insistens.” The translator has taken for granted, that *evangeliiis* is an error of the press for *evangelii* or *evangelicis*: and has rendered the sentence, as well as he could, without clearly understanding how *universal notions* approximate to *ideas*. Ernesti has before touched upon the Analogy of Doctrine, S. i. c. i. § 19, but, after all, the subject does not seem placed in a very clear light. What is intended is, perhaps, little more than this, *that Scripture, in common with all other books, ought to be interpreted consistently*: and that consistency is to be maintained, not only between different passages professedly relating to the same subject, but between any passage of doubtful interpretation, and the *fundamental truths* of Christianity. If it be asked, how are we to determine which are these fundamental truths, the translator knows no better guide than the well known passage of Vincentius Lerinensis: “ We must be careful to hold that which has been believed *everywhere, always, and by all*; for this is really the Catholic doctrine, as the very term implies. And this we shall do, if we follow *universality, antiquity, and common consent*. We follow *universality*, when we admit that faith to be true, which is professed by the church of Christ throughout the world: *antiquity*, when we maintain those doctrines which we find to have been maintained by our predecessors in the church: and *consent*, when, among ancient dogmas, we hold those which have been maintained by all, at least by all the clergy, and accredited teachers.” See also Jahn’s Enchiridion, p. 96, sq. who, though a Romanist, is wonderfully free from the trammels of his church, in this and all other matters of Biblical interpretation. We may usefully apply the analogy of doctrine to Rom. xii. 20, where some interpreters of note maintain, that to *heap coals of fire* on the head of an enemy, means *to increase his eternal condemnation*. But, is such a diabolical motive for cherishing an enemy, in analogy with the great principle of Christian morality, which teaches

us to love our neighbour as ourself? Gerard, p. 161, gives the following sensible rules for determining the Analogy of Faith. "All the plain texts relating to one subject or article ought to be taken together, impartially considered, the expressions of one of them restricted by those of another, and explained in mutual consistency, and that article deduced from them, all in conjunction; not as has been most commonly the practice, one set of texts selected, which have the same aspect, explained in their greatest possible rigour, and all others which look another way, neglected or explained away, and tortured into a compatibility with the opinion, in that manner partially deduced."]

XXXVI. Above all must we recur to analogy, in passages which, at first sight, express a sentiment abhorrent from the truth, as elsewhere clearly expressed; or from common sense, as regards either human or divine things. For it is common to all authors, even the most eloquent and acute, when they are not delivering a compendium of doctrine, nor professedly treating of any particular doctrinal subject, to assume the common notions and elements of knowledge, as known by previous education; and, neglecting the accuracy and subtlety which would be required in an elementary and scholastic treatise, to use forms of language more gross and popular.^t And the same must be granted to the writers of the inspired books, who, in all respects, wished to speak, and must have spoken *more humano*; the Holy Spirit so

directing their thoughts, as that they should depart as little as possible from the innocent weakness of humanity. We need not, therefore, wonder if such vulgarisms, or even harsher forms occur in their writings, since this is the characteristic of the Orientals, both in thought and style.

¹ So, ἀπελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀγέλην τῶν χοίρων, Matt. viii. 31. See Doederlein, de Redemptione a potestate Diaboli, in Opusc. Theol. p. 96.

XXXVII. A student who aims at acquiring skill in interpretation, ought to note and study the peculiar forms of expression in the Scriptures; those especially which are foreign to the idioms of his own language, and from the precision and simplicity of didactic writing. He ought to acquire principles for their interpretation, so as not to be delayed and puzzled by them, when they occur in the course of his reading. As examples of such principles, we may observe, that many assertions are made *universally* and *abstractedly*, which are true only *particularly* and *relatively*, especially on moral subjects,^u that active verbs do not always denote a proper action and efficacy, and the like; some of these may be found in Glasse's Gramm. S. in Calovius de Personâ Christi, p. 527, in Turretin de Interp. S. liter.^x and others.

^u For example, πάντα, John i. 9, 1 Cor. x. 23. The same principle must be observed, in interpreting the Sermon on the Mount. See Pott's *Diss. de Natura et indole Orationis Montanae*, Helmst. 1788, and Rau's *Tract, Ueber die Bergpredigt*, on the Sermon on the Mount.

* Edited by Teller, Frankfort, 1776.

XXXVIII. It will also be useful to attend to similar forms in profane authors: and, indeed scarcely any such cases occur in Scripture, to which parallels may not be found in profane authors. Nor can it be doubted but that such obscurities in Scripture will present the least difficulty to those interpreters, who come to the interpretation of Scripture most familiar with the interpretation of other books. He, for instance, who is familiar with the difficulties that occur in Thucydides, will not be startled when he meets with forms of similar obscurity in the sacred writings, especially in those of St. Paul: nor will he be likely to consider instances of transposition, ἀνακολουθίαν, or inconsistency of construction, enallage, and the like, as faults inconsistent with the dignity and sanctity of the sacred writings; an error into which many good, but ignorant men, have fallen, shewing thereby rather an uninstructed superstition, than an enlightened reverence for the Word of God. This has been judiciously

noted by Melancthon in his Dedication prefixed to the Epistle to the Romans.

XXXIX. Having thus explained the general methods of discovering the sense, by the usage of language and other subsidiary means, we shall proceed to treat separately of certain forms, to which these methods do not directly apply, either in theory or in practice. The principal of these are, 1. *tropes*; 2. *emphasis*; 3. *apparent contradictions*.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF TROPICAL
LANGUAGE.

I. WITH respect to *tropes*, two points must be attended to by the interpreter. In the first place, he must be able to distinguish between *tropical* and *proper* language, so as neither to mistake tropical for literal, as was sometimes done by the Jews, and even by the disciples in their interpretations of our Lord's discourses;^y nor, on the other hand, to pervert *literal* forms, by forcing upon them a tropical sense. In the second place, when an expression is determined to be *tropical*, he ought to be able to interpret it aright, and to give its proper sense. For men often think that they have reached the *tropical* sense, because they know the *proper* sense of the word, and deceive themselves by a vain shadow, or pervert the trope by an etymological interpretation.^z That these errors may be avoided, rules for both purposes must be deduced from the nature of tropical language, as already explained from usage and observation, by which the interpre-

ter may be directed, both in distinguishing and in interpreting.

¹ It is well known, that the disciples misunderstood, in a literal sense, our Lord's expressions respecting the *kingdom of God*, or of *heaven*: and, in John iii. Nicodemus himself, a Jewish theologian, mistook the tropical assertions of our Saviour respecting *Regeneration*. Many interpreters fall into similar errors, as in the phrase *Χριστὸν ἐνδύσασθαι*, and others. [Nicodemus did not suppose our Lord to speak *literally*: for, the form *to be born anew*, was a familiar *trope* among the Jews, expressive of the change which took place in a proselyte from Heathenism to Judaism. His wonder was excited by the announcement, that he who had been a child of grace from his infancy, could require, or be capable of a second spiritual birth. See Christian Remembrancer, vol. xii. p. 510.]

² [The Latin of Ernesti is, "Saepe enim accidit, ut homines putent, se tropicum sensum tenere, quia sensum verbi proprium tenent, ludanturque inani imagine, aut tropum etymologicâ interpretatione pervertant."]

II. With respect to judging whether an expression be *tropical* or *literal*, the common maxim is, *not readily to depart from the literal signification*. But this rule fails in simplicity, applicability, and perspicuity.^a

^a Upon the whole, this can hardly be fixed by rules. The following, however, would come nearer the truth; *not to depart from the literal sense, unless in cases where the literal sense is tame, ridiculous, or contradictory*. So, 1 Cor. xv. 29, *ὕπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* is *εἰς χάριν νεκρῶν*; as in Rom. v. 8, *ὕπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανε*, *he died for our sakes*. We must not then depart from this sense of *ὕπὲρ* for any dogmatic or individual rea-

sons ; for we see, that the Apostle does not dwell upon this argument, probably, lest he should seem to confirm superstition by his authority. [*ὁπίε*, with a genitive, has other senses besides *εἰς χάριν*. Among the many guesses which have been made as to the meaning of this text, the reader must choose for himself, or be satisfied that it is one of the few texts which have not yet been sufficiently elucidated.]

III. For the phrase *non facile*, understood in its proper Latin sense, of *almost never*, or *very rarely*, is here falsely applied. Tropes are so common in the Scriptures,^b that Glass has been able to fill a large volume with them. Besides, the rule is ambiguous, and affords no certain mark or character, by which *tropical* can be distinguished from *proper* diction, or by which we may judge when a transition is to be made from the one to the other. Such ambiguity is a fatal error in a rule.

^b Since the Hebrew style is full of images, ornaments, allegories, proverbs, and similes, on account of which many tropes are found, both in the historical and dogmatic books of the New Testament.

IV. They teach somewhat more distinctly, who, with Danhauer, Tarnoff, Calovius, and others, recommend that the *proper* sense should never be given up *without some evident cause or necessity* : still they do not define this necessity, nor explain what they consider as an evident cause. No one certainly will deny, that when

a necessary and evident cause requires, we ought to desert the proper sense. But that necessity which Danhauer explains in his *Idea boni Interpretis*, p. 91, as consisting in a manifest incongruity of subjects or facts, is not always necessary, as in the word *πυγὸς*, 1 Cor. iii. 13.^c Besides, it is clear, that in the statement of this rule, the *proper* sense which is opposed to the *tropical*, is confounded with the *literal* or *historical*, which is opposed to the *allegorical*, and which, from the older writers, received also the name of the *proper* sense. Respecting this, as well as respecting the ordinary meaning of words, it is a just and well known rule which teaches, that it is not to be deserted without a weighty and sufficient cause. Yet, that it may be departed from is clear, since we find that the sacred writers themselves do sometimes depart from it. Besides, in some words and phrases the tropical sense is usual, and may even be called *the* usual sense.

^c [Ammon, who gives no note upon this §, must either have thought it perfectly clear, or despaired of fathoming its meaning. This sentence, “*Nec necessitas ea, quam Danhauerus explicat, quae sit in manifestâ vel verum vel factorum repugnantîâ, semper necessaria est,*” is rendered by Stuart, “But some apparent repugnance of things or facts, is not hastily to lead us to desert the literal sense.” This may be the general meaning, but the translator cannot imagine what Ernesti meant by a “*necessitas non semper*”

necessaria." For the meaning of the last sentence in the §, see Sec. i. Chap. ii. § 5, 6, 7. Upon the whole, the purpose of the § is to refute the rule of Danhauer, and the others: and this is sufficiently effected by the first sentence.]

V. Whether a word is used tropically or not, may generally be determined by referring the thing spoken of to our external or internal senses; that is, by recalling its external or internal perception;^d and when this can be done, the decision may easily be made. And this is the reason why, in the interpretation of profane authors, doubts seldom or never exist, as to whether a word is to be taken tropically or properly. For the subjects of which they treat being temporal, are the proper subjects of our external and internal senses, and may be referred to them.

^d Thus we may compare the external and internal perception of the subject and predicate (or adjunct,) and observe, whether each perception can be admitted in the interpretation. For example, in the phrases, *Θώραξ δικαιοσύνης, florere ingenio*, we easily see that the proper sense of *Θώραξ* and *florere* is inadmissible. [Ernesti has here wrapped up his meaning in metaphysical terms. Jahn, in his *Enchiridion*, p. 108, gives the following rule, which strictly applies to such examples as those produced by Ammon. "If the subject and predicate (or adjunct) be such, that, in their proper sense, they are inconsistent, we must conclude, that one or other is tropical, provided that both be clearly known, and the repugnance be manifest." And this is, perhaps, all that Ernesti meant to convey."]

VI. But in the sacred books, where the subjects treated of are such as cannot be subjected to the human senses; as, for instance, the divine nature and operations, difficulties often occur as to whether an expression is to be understood in its proper or tropical sense. Hence have arisen, and still exist, bitter controversies, in which much has been advanced on both sides with more of metaphysical and dialectic subtlety, than of truth.^e Something of this kind may, I conceive, be found in *Calovius de Personâ Christi*, p. 547; and in *Pet. Martyr's Loci, de Sacr. Euchar.*

^e Man's knowledge of the *internal* nature of God can be attained only through tropical terms, as 'Ἰησοῦς Θεοῦ υἱός, ἀργὴ Θεοῦ, *the Son of God, the anger of God.* And thus God can be known properly and directly only by himself. But his external nature or operations being subject to the senses, are properly known by them, [and can therefore be expressed by the *proper* use of human language.]

VII. We have already shewn, (Sect. I. Chap. ii. 5, 6, 7,) that those words are not to be considered as *tropically* used which have altogether lost their *proper* sense; or which have become so connected with the objects to which they have been transferred, as to be their only usual designation. Therefore, though the word *beget*, for example, has been transferred from human to divine things, yet, since it alone is

used for expressing one particular divine act; like other words, as *love*, *pity*, *decree*, and even the appellation, *son*, all of which have been transferred from human to divine things; it is used in its *proper* sense in reference to the *Son* of God. And such words have been transferred to a theological sense, not from such external and remote similitude as constitutes rhetorical metaphor, but from some real analogy in the nature of things. For instance, though the act of communicating a similar nature be *specifically* different, as referred to God and man; yet, as it is *generally* the same, it is in both cases properly expressed by the same word. The word *beget* is therefore as *properly* used in theology, as in human affairs; a truth which ought to be distinctly stated in dogmatic treatises. ^f

^f In the doctrine respecting the Son of God, long since agitated by Arius and Aetius, the question as to the proper or tropical sense of terms will always labour under some degree of obscurity: See my (Ammon's) *Summa Theol. Christ.* Ed. 2. § 52. For, it can hardly be denied, that the words קנה, חלל, ילד, κτίζειν, γεννᾶν, as used in Scripture with reference to the divine nature of Christ, have something of an allegorical sense. Compare John iii. 3, sq. and 1 John v. 1. The settlement of such disputes is, however, the province, not so much of the interpreter, as of the theologian, whose business is, to use the words of Justin Martyr, φιλοσοφεῖν περὶ τοῦ Θείου.

[קנה *to possess*, and חול, not ללח, *to beget*, are used in Proverbs viii. 22, 24, in reference to the divine wisdom. קנה is rendered by the LXX ἔκτισσι, but by Aquila and Symmachus more properly ἐκτεσάτω. The application of these texts to the divine nature of Christ, hardly tallies with the general tone of Ammon's theology.]

VIII. We must, however, without hesitation allow, that the tropical sense is to be taken in all propositions, whose subject and predicate are heterogeneous; for instance, where the one is material, the other immaterial; the one rational, the other irrational; the one animated, the other inanimate; as, also, when they are different species of the same genus.⁸ For things which, from a natural incongruity, cannot co-exist in the same subject, and such are those just mentioned, cannot logically, and therefore cannot *properly* be predicated the one of the other; for logical truth is the foundation of propriety of expression. If, then, they be predicated at all, it must be tropically.

⁸ For example, ἀπειλούσαθε ἐν πνεύματι τοῦ Θεοῦ, 1 Cor. vi. 11. which Griesbach has explained with his usual felicity in his Program on the passage, Jena, 1783. So also κίρας σωτηρίας, Luke i. 69. which Noesselt has attempted to illustrate in his Opusc. i. 31. but in a manner which I cannot approve of. Here it may be enough to remark, that κίρας σωτηρίας means just the same as κραταιὸν σωτήρα. [The translator has not met with the program of Griesbach. The close connexion of *water* and the *Spirit*, the outward

and visible sign with the inward and spiritual grace, seems sufficiently to account for the expression, *to be washed in the Spirit.*]

IX. From this rule we must except those texts in which divine and infinite attributes are predicated of Jesus, equally with those in which spiritual attributes are ascribed to man. For, as both corporeal and spiritual qualities may be predicated of man, who is a being compounded of soul and body; so both divine and human attributes may properly be predicated of Christ, on account of the union of the two natures in his person. ^h

^h The reader must not confound the ideas here promiscuously presented: for we are taught one thing in the New Testament, and another in theological treatises. See my *Summa Theol. Christ.* § 96. [This, if true, would be a melancholy fact: but Ammon probably means, that the treatises inculcate that implicit submission to Scripture, as the word of God, which he, as a rationalist, is not prepared to yield.]

X. And as the usage of all languages proves that complex subjects may have heterogeneous predicates; so, also, it proves, that *legislators* in their edicts, *historians* in their narratives, where the sole object is to convey information, (for there do exist ornate narrations, in which the pleasure of the reader, and the reputation of a

fine style are studied;) and, finally, the *teachers* of any system, when their object is simply and directly to convey their dogmas, not touching upon them casually, or for some other purpose; that all these are in the habit of using proper diction, and of avoiding tropes, except those which, from usage, have acquired a *proper* sense. In such compositions, therefore, we must not admit a tropical sense, unless it can be clearly shewn that such a sense has become almost proper, by the usage of all writers, or, at least, of the particular writer under examination: and that there are such tropical words in Scripture, as *illuminate*, *regenerate*, &c. cannot be doubted.ⁱ To the truth of this observation, we have the assent even of those, who, in particular instances, are in the habit of opposing its application, as Bochart. Hieroz. ii. 56; Placaeus, T. ii. Opp. p. 255; Periz. Orig. B. 300. Therefore, as in Matt. xxviii. 19, we understand βαπτίζειν properly, though it is sometimes used tropically; so, by parity of reason in xxvi. 27, 28, *To eat the flesh of Christ, and to drink his blood*, must be understood in its *proper* sense, though in John vi. it be used tropically.^k

ⁱ These observations hold good in a polished and correct language; but, in the Hellenistic style of the New Testament, they must be taken with many exceptions, even in

the historical books ; as in the narrative of our Lord's temptation, (See Eichhorn's *Bibl. Lit. Bibl. Univ.* t. iii. 283,) and in the history of the private life of Christ. In the dogmatic books, whose authors were imbued with the spirit and imagery of the Jewish philosophy, as, for example, the anonymous author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the case is still stronger.

[Ammon here confounds *tropes* with *allegory*, which is a subject to be hereafter treated of. As to the *anonymous* author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we may observe, that, in modern German theology, there are as many candidates for the authorship of this Epistle as there are in England for the Letters of Junius. For a full exposition of the different theories on this subject, and for a satisfactory proof that the Apostle Paul was the real author, see *M. Stuart*, *Prolegomena to the Hebrews.*]

^k This interpretation rests upon grounds rather dogmatic than hermeneutical. For, what Matthew calls *σῶμα* and *αἷμα*, Paul calls *ἄρτον* and *ποτήριον*, 1 Cor. xi. 26, sq. Nor can it be proved, that Matthew advances a different doctrine respecting the body and blood of Christ from that of John. [As this is one of the most important points to which the doctrine of tropes can be applied, it will be fully examined in the note on § xii.]

XI. Hence, in divine things, which are known by revelation alone, and which cannot be subjected to the senses; it is only by the *usage* of the sacred writers that we can clearly determine whether an expression be proper or tropical.

XII. And this *usage* can be determined only by a comparison of similar texts, which may be done in many ways. For when the same

subject is elsewhere treated of in other words, the distinction between what is proper and what is tropical is easy. Thus in John iii. 5, it is clear that *to be born anew of water and of the spirit*, must be understood tropically; because the same subject is expressed in proper terms, Mark xvi. 16. When the same word is always used for the same thing, as *ὕδωρ* and *γεννηᾶν*, to express the mode of relation between Christ and the Father, we must admit such terms to be used in a proper sense. Finally, when the same phraseology is used of things which, though different, are yet similar, or possessing some mutual relation, we must admit that is used properly. Thus if we compare Matt. xxvi. 28, with Heb. ix. 20, it follows from this principle, that *τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης*, is in both texts to be interpreted in a proper sense. For no one doubts but that in Hebrews the sense is proper; much more then must this be the case in the antitype, Matt. xxvi. 28. Nor could that expression convey any other than its proper sense to the minds of the disciples, who were accustomed to understand Christ's declarations in their proper sense.¹

¹ I fear the passages quoted are not exactly parallel. That Christ ratified the new covenant by his own blood,

and that in a proper sense, is certain ; but that bread is flesh, *σκληρός ἐστι λόγος*. Nor must we fail to observe, that the copula *ἐστι*, on which the proper sense ought to depend, was not used by our Saviour in the institution of the Eucharist.

[What Ammon means by saying that the copula *ἐστι* was not used is quite incomprehensible. It stands in Matt. xxvi. 28, and it must have been either expressed or implied in the original Syriac expression, for otherwise there could have been no proposition either proper or tropical. The reader may be surprised at finding the protestant Ernesti so anxious to maintain the *proper* sense of the form of Eucharistic institution. But it must be remembered that he was a Lutheran, and as such, bound to support the doctrine of consubstantiation, which he does by the same arguments and texts as Jahn, a Romanist, uses for the support of transubstantiation. Since *we* deny both the one and the other, it may be worth while to shew here, upon exegetical principles common to the Lutheran, the Romanist, and ourselves, why we do so, and why we hold that the expression *this is my blood*, is to be interpreted not in a proper, but in a tropical sense.

First then, let us apply § xi. which teaches, that it is by the usage of the sacred writers alone we can determine whether any expression is to be rendered properly or tropically. Now this usage we can easily ascertain, nothing being more common in the New Testament than the occurrence of two subjects apparently heterogeneous, united by the copula *εἶναι*. Such are, John x. 9, *I am the door*. 11, *I am the good shepherd*. xiv. 6, *I am the way*. xv. 1, *I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman*. 5, *I am the vine, ye are the branches*. Eph. i. 23, *The church, which is his body*. 1 Cor. x. 4, *And that rock was Christ*. In these texts there occur *nine* examples of the form under consideration, and the list might easily be extended. In not one of these examples has it ever been held by any critic of any

church, that the subjects so conjoined are identified either by consubstantiation or transubstantiation; or that any thing more is asserted than similarity. The usage then of the Sacred writers, and particularly of our Lord himself, is decidedly, and, may we not add, uniformly, in favour of the tropical sense.

Let us also apply Ernesti's 8th §. He there says, that if of the subject and predicate, one be *animated* and the other *inanimate*, we must interpret tropically. Now such is the case here: the body of Christ is animated, the bread in the Eucharist is inanimate. Therefore, by § 8, we ought to take not the literal but the tropical sense.

Next let us examine the parallelisms adduced by Ernesti, and first, that of Matt. xxvi. 28, with Heb. ix. 20. In Hebrews there is no doubt but that the word *blood* is to be taken in its proper sense, for it refers to that which the Jews, by all their bodily senses knew to be *blood*, and nothing else; but it does not follow that, when the same word was applied to that which the disciples by all their senses, knew to be *wine* and nothing but *wine*, they must have understood it in its *proper* sense. The rock which Moses smote, was a rock, and in speaking of it he used the word *rock* in its proper sense; but when St. Paul (I Cor. x. 4.) applies the same word to the antitype Christ, neither Ernesti nor the Pope himself would assert that any thing more is asserted than typical similarity. Perhaps the Apostles, till the day of Pentecost, were too much in the habit of construing their Master's declarations in a literal sense; how far they were right in doing so, may be seen from the texts above quoted.

Lastly, we have to examine the justice of the parallelism drawn by Ernesti, § x. between the baptismal form of institution, Matt. xxviii. 19, and the Eucharistic, xxvi. 27, 28. Here that great critic seems to have forgotten a most important principle in the interpretation of parallels, namely, that we must compare their *homologous* parts. If they be

simple propositions, we must compare subject with subject, copula with copula, predicate with predicate ; if syllogisms, antecedents with antecedents, and consequents with consequents. Now the homologous terms are, *baptizing in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost*, in the one, and *drink ye all of this*, in the other. Then in the Eucharistic form we have a reason, *for this is my blood, &c.* to which there is no parallel in the Baptismal. By the legitimate use of the parallelism, therefore, we conclude, that as the baptismal *water* is still water, so the eucharistic *wine* is still wine ; and the wine is no more consubstantiated with, or transubstantiated into the blood of Christ, than the baptismal water is consubstantiated with, or transubstantiated into, the Holy Spirit.]

XIII. The judgment may frequently be determined by epithets, adverbs, and other determinatives, expressing the mode or nature of the subject. Thus when *Son* is coupled with ἴδιος or μονογενής denoting Christ, since these epithets can have only a proper sense, we conclude that *Son* is also used properly ;^m but that believers are called the *Sons of God* only tropically, appears from this, that they are said to be begotten *by the word of truth*, Gal. iii. 36 ; that is, made sons by the Son : and elsewhere it is said that they are *adopted*.

^m We have already seen that the texts quoted in this and the foregoing §, may easily be rendered in a tropical sense. David often uses μονογενής, יְהוָה of himself and his life, and יְהוָה, answering to the φίλον ἦτορ of Homer.

XIV. Sometimes also the context may assist us. For when the whole is allegorical, we must acknowledge a tropical sense in each part which bears a relation to the whole allegory; as 1 Cor. iii. 13, we render *πυρός* tropically, because it is connected with the tropical terms *ξύλον* and *χόρτον*. As also when the same subject has previously been treated in proper terms, and a transition has manifestly been made into the allegorical style, as John vi. 27, 33, 35, 51; and the contrary is the case when nothing proper has preceded. Zuinglius himself allowed this, nor could he extricate himself from the difficulty. See Chemnitius in *Annotat. Hist. ad Fundamenta S. Coenae*, § 14. And so far respecting the methods of distinguishing between proper and tropical language. ⁿ

ⁿ [It is true that Christ often borrowed tropes from some sensible matter previously under consideration, and this was probably the case more frequently than is specified in the Gospels. But that there can be no trope where the subject has not been previously treated in proper terms, is true neither in Scripture nor in any other composition. Stuart and Henderson have entirely omitted all Ernesti's pleadings for the proper sense of the eucharistic form, which is hardly dealing fairly either with the author or with the subject.]

XV. The *interpretation of tropes*, is derived from two sources, the subject itself, and the

usage of language. We interpret by the subject, when there exists a clear similitude between it and the word actually used, as in φωτισμός. In order to interpret from *usage*, we must be acquainted with the usage both of the Hebrew and Greek in tropical words; such as ζωή, θάνατος, ο τιμή, δόξα. We must also apply the comparison of texts, in which the same subject is spoken of by its proper appellation, or in which the same term is used in such a context as that its sense is evident.^p Here also we may use the analogy of language in conjugate and similar words, of which we shall presently give an example.

° Θάνατος *death, calamity*, hence ἀποθνήσκειν to threaten punishment. [The translator cannot see that ἀποθνήσκειν has either this, or any other active sense.]

^p Compare Gal. iii. 27, with Rom. xiii. 14, and it will appear that Χριστὸν ἐνδύσασθαι means, *to be by our virtues worthy of Christ*. [Rather, to mould our character and conduct to a conformity with that of Christ. Thus to be clothed with humility, means simply to be humble.]

XVI. There is, however, nothing against which we must be more upon our guard, than the attempt to interpret tropes by etymology, on which no reliance ought to be placed. Thus in interpreting ὀρθοτομεῖν, 2 Tim. ii. 15, the favourers of etymology have imagined that a distinction is here drawn between the law

and the Gospel,⁹ which is mere trifling; for *λόγος ἀληθείας* is the gospel, and there is no reference whatever to the law. The analogy of language might have taught them that *ὀρθοτομεῖν* means to hold and communicate to others the true sense of the gospel. The earlier critics, and among the later Gerhard, held that the conjugate *ὀρθοτομία* was used by the ancients for *ὀρθοδοξία*, as by Clemens Alex., Eusebius and others; (see Valesius ad Euseb. H. E. iv. 3,) and that *καινοτομεῖν* meant to disseminate novelties in religion.

⁹ [They supposed *ὀρθοτομεῖν* to be opposed to *περιτομεῖν*. Unless the translator has misunderstood Ernesti in § xiii. he there gives another sense to the expression *λόγος ἀληθείας*, and understands it to mean the Eternal Word.]

XVII. It proves that we in some degree understand a tropical expression, if we can substitute proper words for those which are tropical. It does not follow that he who can do this, immediately and fully understands the trope; but certainly he who cannot do this, does not understand it. The sacred writers themselves sometimes subjoin proper terms explanatory of tropical ones, as in Coll. ii. 7; and the same practice is common with the best Greek and Roman authors. It may also be

useful to consider, whether, upon setting aside the image which the tropical word properly conveys, and excluding it as it were from the attention, there remains any notion in the mind different from that image, which you can express by a proper term. And this must especially be attempted when the proper terms for sensible objects are tropically transferred to express ideas simply intellectual, as *θάνατος*, *ζωή*, *διαθήκη*, &c. in which class of words we are very apt to fall into error.^r

^r Thus in interpreting *αἷμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, 1 John i. 7, he who, having excluded the image of blood, has no notion whatever remaining, does not understand the passage. He who wishes to discover the sense, must substitute the proper term, the *death* of Jesus Christ. [This metaphysical rule, which is given by Jahn in nearly the same words, may best be explained by examples. God is frequently styled a King and a Shepherd. If we exclude the images conveyed by these terms, there still remain the notions of *guiding*, *feeding*, *protecting*, *ruling*; and consequently the proper terms to be supplied are, *governor*, *guide*, or *protector*. St. Paul, Rom. xi. 1, exhorts the Roman Christians to present their body a *living* sacrifice to God; here the epithet, the context, and common sense, shew that he is not speaking of self-immolation. We must therefore exclude the *image* of a sacrifice, and retain the *notion* of dedication and presentation to God.]

XVIII. Since *allegories* abound in Scripture, whose language is also tropical, princi-

ples for the interpretation of these must, in the next place, be laid down.^s First then, we must investigate the scope of the whole allegory, which may often be discovered from the context, and is sometimes expressly declared.

^s See above, Sect. I. c. i. § 9. note, and Morus, Diss. on the Causes on which the Interpretation of Allegories depends, in Opp. i. 370. [To the translator it appears that there is an important difference between a tropical expression, or at least such tropical expressions as we have hitherto been considering, and an allegory. In tropical expressions, the words taken in their *proper* meaning afford no sense, or a false one; for example, *the shield of faith, the armour of righteousness*. In an allegory, the words must all be taken in their *proper* meaning; and so taken they afford a consistent sense. But then, from the context, or occasion, it appears that the author wished to convey some higher meaning than this, and that higher meaning it is the object of the interpreter to discover. Thus the parable of the Prodigal Son, interpreted *properly*, is an interesting narrative, with a consistent intelligible meaning. But as we cannot conceive our Saviour would occupy his time with narrating a tale of mere fictitious interest, we are led to examine what moral and general truths he wished his auditors to deduce from the imagery so employed. Allegory is defined by Morus as being *a method of expressing an entire sentiment, in such a way as that instead of the thing meant, something resembling it is expressed*; and it is in this entireness that an allegory differs from a simple trope or metaphor.]

XIX. The *scope* being determined, we must next consider what is the primary word, and by what *proper* term it may be expressed. To

the meaning given to it all the other tropical words in the allegory are to be referred, and interpreted in consistency with it. We shall thus find it more easy to explain the whole and to avoid errors. If we take for example 1 Cor. v. 6. sq. it is clear from the context that the design of the allegory is to exhort the Corinthians to purify themselves from evil dispositions, and from the sins to which these led; ζῦμη then means *evil dispositions*, and ἀζυμος *free from evil dispositions*, such as a consistent Christian ought to be. Ἐορτάζειν therefore cannot have its proper meaning of *celebrating a festival*, but must have a tropical meaning, as to serve and worship God, to be a true Christian, pure from former vices, and worshipping with real holiness; unless, indeed, we prefer taking the simple notion of *living*. We must also observe that it is by no means allowable to interpret some portions of an allegory *properly* and others *tropically*, like those who, in 1 Cor. iii. 15, take the word πύδος alone in a *proper* sense, while all the rest is evidently metaphorical (See § 14); and this is the more inexcusable in this case, because ὡς clearly marks the expression as tropical. †

† The whole passage 1 Cor. iii. 9-16, may be taken as an example, for the proper application of these rules to the

interpretation of an allegory. [If the view taken by the translator in the last note be correct, Ernesti is now speaking of *tropes* or *metaphors* at the utmost, not of *allegories*; for when it is said that Christians are to be *a new lump*, that they are *unleavened*, there is a manifest inconsistency between the subject and the predicate; and the same is true in the passage referred to by Ammon; whereas congruity of parts is essential to an allegory. 'Εορτάζειν coupled as it is with the Jewish passover and the sacrifice of Christ, must mean to feed upon him, either in the ordinary exercise of faith, or in the Eucharist. Upon the whole, the proper definition of allegory, as used by Ernesti, seems to be, *a sequence of connected tropes*: what we should consider allegory, he treats under the name of parables. The view taken in this and the preceding note of the real nature of metaphor and allegory, is much the same as that advanced by *Bishop Marsh*. Lectures, p. 342, sq.]

XX. Similar to this is the method of interpreting *parables*, which are generally nothing more than *allegory*.^u We must be careful, however, not to press too closely all the points of the parabolical narrative, nor to interpret them too minutely with a reference to the general purpose; this is a great and very common error. In Luke xv. 11, sq. therefore, we need not inquire what is meant by the *robe*, the *calf*, and the *ring*. For such adjuncts are necessarily assumed, and each particular one, according to the taste or judgment of the author, in order to complete the narrative, and adapt it to the customs of human life; and the

same takes place in profane stories or apologies of the same nature.

^a For a parable is nothing else than a historical allegory, in which, after determining the moral purpose of the author, we must be careful not to strain the several images beyond the proper point of comparison. On this head compare Storr's *Commentatio Hermeneutica de Parabolis Christi*. Tubingen 1788, with the German tracts of *Ewald* and *Krummacher* on the same subject. [Also *Jahn's Enchiridion*, p. 124, and *Lowth's Lectures*, x. xi. xii. It will not, in general, be difficult to distinguish the mere complementary parts, which admit of no interpretation, from the essentials. Thus in the parable of the Prodigal Son, it was necessary to represent the father as receiving his son with kindness, and this could be done vividly, only by enumerating such marks of kindness and distinction; had this story been a mere narrative of a real event, they would have been introduced merely to *illustrate* the kindness of the reception. But, on the other hand, the existence of an elder brother and his envy, are *substantial* facts, not illustrative of any other, and for such we must seek an interpretation.]

CHAPTER V.

ON EMPHASIS.

I. THERE is no province of interpretation in which interpreters err more frequently, or more laboriously, than in the judgment of emphasis; most of them being prone to fill every passage with emphasis, under the notion that they are thereby acting consistently with the dignity of the sacred books; forgetting that there can be no dignity where truth is wanting.^x

^x Compare Glass's *Phil. Sac. ed. Dathe*, i. 1327. *Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Criticism on the Power of Judgment; and Graeffe's *Vollst. Lehrbuch der Katechetik*, Complete Instruction in the Catechetical Method of Teaching.

[For a definition of emphasis, see Sect. I. cap. ii. § 15.]

II. This error arises principally from ignorance of the language to be interpreted; for many being destitute of sufficient practice in it, and ignorant of its analogy,^y are obliged to depend entirely upon lexicons. Hence they

strain too far the etymology, especially of tropical words, from whence but little advantage can be derived, and imagine meanings which never entered into the minds of the authors. They form also canons of emphasis, grounded neither on the nature of the subject, the word, nor the usage of the language. This occurs principally in the Hebrew, and in the Hebraisms of the New Testament, on account of their unlikeness to the western languages, and especially from the vernacular language of each interpreter.

³ This refers particularly to the Greek and Latin fathers, who, from their ignorance of Hebrew, often fell into error. But, it is true also, of later authors, as Lütken in his *Collegium Emphasiologium*, and others.

III. There is, therefore, the more need of fixed precepts, drawn from the nature of things and of language, by which we may judge rightly respecting *emphasis*; so as neither to overlook real emphasis, nor pursue imaginary ones. Erasmus on 1 Cor. vii. 1, holds that this pursuit of imaginary emphasis is allowable in preaching, for purposes of encouragement or exhortation. Yet, even here, I would wish every thing to be real, nothing fictitious: in a serious argument it is plainly inadmissible, and is neither more nor less than to sport with sacred subjects.²

² In pulpit discourses, no one would seriously object to an *emphatic* interpretation of Job xix. 25, and Dan. xii. 2, as referring to the resurrection of the dead. But such passages cannot justly be reckoned among the proofs of the doctrine. [The proper question is, Do these texts refer to the resurrection, or do they not? if, as Warburton thinks, they do not, then reason, and a respect for Scripture, ought to prevent a preacher from interpreting them in any other sense than their true sense. The business of a preacher is to *explain* the word of God. But, after all, it may be questioned, whether *emphasis* has any thing to do here. Those who interpret these passages of the resurrection, hold that such is their literal *proper* meaning.]

IV. The common canons, which warn us not to admit false emphasis, nor to reject true ones, however just, do not merit the name of canons, and are of no force in directing the judgment: for no one ever admitted what he considered to be false emphasis. There are also other defective rules respecting emphasis, which it is unnecessary to examine in this place.

V. In the first place, it is clear, that when the object is to explain a subject accurately, to lay down perspicuous precepts of doctrine, to enunciate a law, or simply to narrate a fact, in such cases emphasis is scarcely admissible. For emphasis is a sort of *figure*; and we have already shewn (Chap. iv. § 10.) that all figures are foreign to the style required for such purposes.³

^a The proper place for emphasis is an oration, and it is there used for the purposes of admonishing, exhorting, reproving, &c. An oration without emphasis is jejune, and scarcely tolerable. [Emphasis is fitter for spoken than for written language, because the tones of the speaker can mark the emphatic words, and thus lead the hearers to a right interpretation. We must not, however, suppose, that all those words on which a good speaker would lay particular stress, are, grammatically speaking, emphatic words. Thus, in reading aloud, "God willeth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should turn from his iniquity and live," a stress is laid upon the words *death* and *live*, not because they are emphatical, but because they are contrasted.]

VI. We must beware of looking for emphasis in any word itself, either in its proper or tropical sense:^b for we have already shewn, (Sec. I. Chap. ii. § 16.) that no word contains emphasis in itself, but that emphasis is an extrinsic accession to its ordinary signification.

^b Beza has fallen into this error, in commenting on Matt. v. 5, where he takes *κληρονομηῖν* to mean, *to receive blessing or inheritance*: but the Hebrew *ירשה* denotes only secure possession. [It does seem highly probable, that our Saviour, on the beatitudes, spoke Hebraistically, and that by *inheriting the land*, and *entering the kingdom of heaven*, he meant, and was understood to mean, a participation in the triumphs and blessings which Messiah should procure for his faithful people.]

VII. Nor is emphasis to be sought for from the etymology of the word, which seldom teaches us even its proper sense, as has already

been observed; nor in tropical words are we to look for it from their proper sense. Thus, with respect to the verb ἐρευνᾶν^c in its tropical sense, it is clear that there is no emphasis marking the intensity and earnestness of the search, since the Holy Spirit is said ἐρευνᾶν τὰ βάθη τῆς θεότητος, in which case the emphatic sense is utterly inadmissible. Hence the Fathers in this very passage render ἐρευνᾶν by γινώσκειν. In both of these points errors are frequently committed.

^c Thus, Chrysostom explains σχολάζειν τῇ νηστείᾳ, 1 Cor. vii. 5, *so to fast, as to be free from all engagements of business.* But σχολή does not always mean *rest from business* absolutely, but only from such business as is attended with care and labour. See Ammonius, p. 255. Σχολάζειν, therefore, in this passage, means, *to give careful attention.* [The drift of this note is not clear; but the fact is, that νηστεία does not occur in the best copies; and that Chrysostom, though he quotes it, makes no mention of it in his comment on the text. His words are, τὴν μετὰ πλείονος σπουδῆς προσευχὴν λέγων, ὅτι γὰρ ἀπλῶς, ἵνα προσεύχησθε, ἀλλ' ἵνα σχολάζητε, ὡς ἀσχολίαν ἐμποιοῦντος τοῦ πράγματος.]

VIII. In Greek words we must be careful not to suppose, that any accession of meaning is given to the simple word by the prefixing of prepositions, especially of ἀνά, ἀπό, πρό, σύν, ἐκ, περί, as in ἀνασταυροῦν, ἀνανήφειν, συμμαρτυρεῖν, προγιγνώσκειν, etc. Many interpreters refine upon

the meaning of such compounds unnecessarily; since it is clear from usage and observation, that these propositions do not always change the sense of the simple word, but are, in fact, commonly redundant:^d especially in Polybius. Therefore in such words, the usage of language is to be consulted.

^d Thus *ἀνασταυροῦν*, Heb. vi. 6, is simply *to crucify*; 2 Tim. ii. 26, *ἀνανῆφειν*, *to watch*. It were desirable that the same had been observed in the verbs *προσσίζειν*, *προσγινώσκειν*, Eph. i. 5. See Ernesti ad Hom. Il. i. 3. [This, however, appears to be a matter quite distinct from emphasis. Prepositions may, or may not, *modify* the sense of verbs to which they are prefixed, but they can never render them emphatic. To *know before* is no more emphatic than to *know* simply, or to *know after*.]

IX. We must be careful not to suppose that the *plural*, when used for the *singular*, contains any thing emphatic. This supposition has no good grounds in the usage, either of the Greek or Hebrew. Melancthon (T. ii. Opp. 130,) well observes, “Origen absurdly distinguishes between *οὐρανόν* and *οὐρανοῦς*.” The same Father makes a similar mistake in *οἰκτιρισμῶς*, Rom. xii. 1. Many in the present day follow his example, as Bengelius does in reference to the first mentioned case.^e

^e [M. Stuart observes here, “This is so far from being

correct, that the *pluralis excellentiae*, as in אֱלֹהִים, אֲדָנִים, בְּעֵלִים, &c. is formed on the very basis, that the plural is emphatic in such cases." This principle extends to many cases of the Hebrew; *e. g.* their inward part is הוֹוֶה *depravities, i. e.* very depraved. It is a principle, however, which no grammarian has yet sufficiently defined and established." Jahn qualifies his assertion in a manner that shows he agrees with Stuart. "Plurals, in certain words, *which have no singular* in Hebrew, as *ἀγαθὸν, ὑδάτα, שְׁמַיִם, מַיִם*, are not emphatic." From this we may conclude, that, where the Hebrew has the singular, he admits the plural to be emphatic.]

X. No less care must be taken, not to suppose there is any emphasis in the use of abstracts for concretes: a supposition which has been supported by learned men, as Glass, and many others after him. They have, however, produced no reasons, nor shewn any probable cause or origin of the emphasis. Abstracts are used, either from necessity, or for perspicuity, not for emphasis. (See Sec. I. Chap. ii. § 24, 25.) In the sacred books they are generally used from necessity, owing to the want of concretes in Hebrew: and the error arises from the infrequency of such a practice in the Latin and vernacular languages. But dissimilarity of idioms does not necessarily produce emphasis. The real state of the case is clear from this, that in corresponding passages, abstracts

and concretes are used interchangeably, as in Col. i. 13, compared with Matt. iii. 17; and Eph. v. 8, with iv. 18.^f

^f[For definitions of *abstracts* and *concretes*, see Sec. I. cap. ii. § 23. note.]

XI. In the sacred books, and in the Hebraisms of the New Testament, we must be careful not to be led into the supposition of emphasis, merely by the difference between their idiom and our own; this is an error to which many, and good Hebrew scholars, have been prone. But nothing can be more fallacious. In the eastern tongues, many things appear also hyperbolic, when rendered literally, that is according to the ordinary lexicons, and etymologically, when, in reality, they contain no hyperbole whatever. Thus, when in Lamentations it is said, “*My tribulation is great as the sea,*” the author meant nothing more than a Latin writer would express by *mala mea sunt maxima.*^g

^gAdd **הר אלהים**, ἄβυσσος Θεοῦ, and other Hebrew forms, which are rather hyperbolic than emphatical. [Ernesti’s argument is here self-contradictory. If the expression, *my temptation is great as the sea*, really means nothing more than that it is *very great*; in that case, more is expressed than is meant, and this is hyperbole. See Sec. II. Chap. ii. § 15, note.]

XII. If it cannot be proved by any conclusive evidence, that any particular word or phrase has a constant emphasis, (See Sect. I. Chap. ii. § 17,) usage is to be consulted, so as to determine, first, whether in all places where it occurs, an emphasis can be given to it; and, secondly, whether in the same or in a similar context, other words are used for it, joined to adjuncts, expressive of particular greatness or intensity. If neither of these be the case: if we find that it is used interchangeably with other words, clearly not emphatical; or, if in other passages, some adjunct expressive of magnitude is expressly joined to it, in that case we cannot consider it as emphatic. Thus, in the word ἀποκαραδοκία, Rom. viii. 19, we cannot admit the existence of a constant emphasis; because we know there is no such emphasis in ἐλπίς, which, in Philip. i. 20, is conjoined with it as a synonyme, and which, both in the LXX, and in this very context, v. 21, is used interchangeably with it.^h Nor can the existence of emphasis be allowed in phrases composed of conjugate words, such as χαρὰν χαίρειν, because we find them used with a direct adjunct of magnitude, Matt. ii. 10, which would be superfluous, if there were any emphasis expressive of magnitude inherent in the phrases themselves.

^b Ἀποκαρδοκίῳν, means to hold the head in an attitude of attention, and is used of sailors, who, with the head turned aside, look for the signal of the pilot. But that there is no emphasis in the word, is clear, 1st, from the Hebrew תִּקֵּה, which the LXX render by ἐλπίς, ἐυδοκῆ, and ἀποκαρδοκία; 2d, from the context, since, in v. 21, its synonyme is ἐπ' ἐλπίδι. See Noesselt, Opp. Fasc. i. 115, and Koppe on Romans ad loc.

XIII. Temporary emphasis, arising from the feeling of the speaker, or from any other cause, must be admitted to exist, when the ordinary sense of the word is manifestly insufficient to express the intensity of the feeling, or the greatness of the object.ⁱ For in such cases, without the supposition of emphasis, the style would be tame and frigid, which is very far from the style of the inspired writers.

ⁱ We have an example of this in Matt. ix. 24, where καθεύδει means, *he sleeps in death*, as appears from the context. [This is not an example of what Ernesti means; for, καθεύδει, taken in its proper sense, render the sense not *frigid*, but *false*. The expression is *tropical*, and of frequent recurrence, both in the Old and New Testament: as, *He slept with his fathers, Those that sleep will God bring with him*. Better examples are produced by Jahn, *Enchiridion*, p. 134, 135. As Eph. vi. 13, 14, and Col. iv. 12, where, *to stand*, means to stand firmly and boldly, like a Roman soldier, without shifting his ground, or retiring.]

XIV. In other cases, also, we must believe the existence of emphasis, when the usual

meaning of the word or phrase gives a frigid or inappropriate sense; whereas the sense becomes appropriate to the general subject of the discourse, by the addition of some qualification. For, in such passages, the necessity for emphasis, is the best proof of its real existence. As in 1 Cor. iv. 3, 4, ἀνακρίνειν is thrice used, and always with emphasis. For, in the first place, ἀνακρίνεσθαι means to be approved of by the judgment of others; next, ἀνακρίνειν, means to assume the right of judging and approving; and, lastly, v. 4, it means to have the right of judging, or to be able to judge rightly.^k If, therefore, in all these cases we render it simply *to judge*, the sense would be frigid and unsuitable to the whole context. So also the subject and context shew, that, in Col. i. 4, πίστις is used with an emphasis of constancy, greatness, and fruitfulness. For there was no need that St. Paul should hear by report of the faith simply of the Colossians, since he had known that personally when he founded their church. The same holds good in Rom. i. 8, where the greatness of the Apostle's joy would seem unreasonable, unless we adjoin some emphasis of greatness to the simple idea of faith. So also in Matt. iv. 2, ἐπείνασε means he was vehemently and intolerably hungry.

* [Stuart renders this passage, "So, in Cor. iv. 3, 4, ἀνακρίνειν is constantly emphatic; meaning either *to be tried by the judgment of another, or to take to oneself the right of trying and judging, or to have the right of judging, or to be able rightly to judge.*" This appears as if, in rendering the passage, we might, in each case, choose any of these meanings indifferently, which is far from being the meaning of Ernesti.]

XV. In thus judging of the presence of emphasis, the usage of language must not be neglected. It is, however, to be consulted only so far, as that nothing in the presumed emphasis shall be inconsistent with it. Thus the analogy of all languages admits, that *judgment* or *opinion* simply, may be taken in either sense for good or bad. For the Latins use the phrase *judicium facere de aliquo*, to express both honour and contempt.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE METHOD OF RECONCILING APPARENT
DISCREPANCIES.

I. IF it can be evidently shewn, that two passages of Scripture are so contradictory, as that there is no possibility of reconciling them, we must of necessity allow that one of the passages has been corrupted, and must attempt to discover some legitimate emendation.¹ See Sec. I. Chap. i. § 23. Of this class, perhaps, is John xix. 14, compared with Mark xv. 25, and Matt. xxvii. 45; and also, as many think, Luke iii. 36, compared with Gen. x. 24; but of this I am not convinced.

¹ A critic may be allowed to doubt of the truth of this rule. Discrepancies, in number and name, are not incompatible with the divine origin of the sacred books, whose authors were human beings, and might make an error of memory. Compare Mark ii. 26, ἐπὶ Ἀχιάβαρ, with Sam. xxi. 2, where the Priest is called Achimelec. Nor can open and more important discrepancies, as, for example, the double genealogy in Matthew and Luke, be always legitimately emend-

ed, but must be compared by suitable interpretation. See Michaelis, ad loc.

[If, by the *divine origin* of the sacred books, we understand their general *inspiration*, a belief in this is certainly inconsistent with a belief in the fallibility of their authors in the act of writing. In nothing have ancient books suffered more than in names and numbers, and the cause of this is self-evident. Even in modern books, errata are most frequent in these: and, in this very rule, Ammon, in his edition of Ernesti, 1809, has printed Matt. xxix. 9, instead of xxvii. 45. With respect to John xix. 14, for *ώρα δὲ ὡσεὶ ἕκτη*, some MSS. and fathers read *τρίτη*, but this looks much like an arbitrary emendation. But what if John, wishing to define the time which was between the *third* hour and the *sixth*, but nearer to the *sixth*, wrote *about the sixth hour*. See Jahn, Enchiridion, p. 138. Morus inclines to the opinion, that *τρίτη*, or the numeral Γ, is the proper reading, and defends it by plausible arguments.]

II. If, however, the integrity of the text cannot be called in question, we must then conclude that there exists merely an appearance of discrepancy, which must be removed, and the passages brought into harmony, by the application of suitable interpretation.^m

^m It can now no longer be doubted, that, in the books of the New Testament, there are many discrepancies, some chronological and historical, others dogmatic and didactic. In the first class, we may place Matt. i. 18-25, compared with Luke ii. 1-7; Mat. ii. 13-23, compared with Luke ii. 21-40; Matt. iv. 1-8, compared with John i. 35, and ii. 11; Matt. xxiii. 35, compared with my (Ammon's) dissertation on the passage in the *Nova Opusc. Theol., Göttingen, 1803*,

and Matt. xxviii. 16, sq. compared with Acts i. 1-8. We pass over, in silence, the vii. of Acts, which is full of anachronisms, and many passages in the Epistles of St. Paul, which can scarcely be reconciled with the Acts of the Apostles. To the second class, we may refer John i. 1, compared with Col. i. 15. (See the judgment of the Emperor Julian on this subject, reported by Cyril of Alexandria, ed. Auberti, vi. p. 327.) and Rom. iv. 9, compared with James ii. 21. Those interpreters, therefore, are in a wretched mistake, who labour to remedy such discrepancies by grammatical observations, or rather by exegetical fallacies, in order that they may uphold their own hypothesis of the inspiration of Scripture. For, what confidence can be bestowed upon that interpreter, who fears to investigate the true sense of Scripture, and offends against truth, that he may sustain and defend a fiction? A system of hermeneutics, suited to our times, ought to treat not merely of apparent discrepancies, but of discrepancies simply.

[This note is written in Ammon's very worst spirit of rashness and scepticism. Of the passages he has referred to as historical discrepancies, the four first pairs are not *discrepancies* at all, they are merely *differences*, such as always exist in the different accounts of the same period of history, where, as it is impossible that every event should be recorded, different historians select different circumstances. The reader will do well, however, to examine and compare the passages for himself, with the aid of some judicious interpreter, for example Kuinoel. As to Acts vii. that is not *directly* the word of God, but a reported speech of St. Stephen; and whether Stephen was, or was not, inspired in that instance, may perhaps be questioned. But, setting aside this consideration, we have no reason to expect, even in the direct word of God, any greater accuracy than the nature of the occasion requires. And who would think of expecting chronological accuracy, in a sketch of all the more important events that had happened to the Jewish nation,

from the time of Abraham, condensed into a speech that would not occupy half an hour? Just as untenable is Ammon's list of doctrinal discrepancies. *πρωτότοκος*, in Coloss. i. 15, as far as the analogy of doctrine, or the immediate context are concerned, may mean the *origin of created things*: and if the usage requires us to take it passively, the best rendering, which is that of the Nicene fathers, *begotten before the worlds*, is quite in harmony with the doctrine of St. John. See Sec. II. Chap. iii. § 15, Note. Finally, as to the discrepancy between St. Paul and St. James, respecting the ground of justification, if ever a question was settled, that question was settled a century and a half ago, when Bull published his *Harmonia Apostolica*. The translator ventures to express a hope, that he has thrown some additional light on the subject, in his Introduction to the Epistle to the Romans, Chap. iv. § 11, sq.]

III. Apparent discrepancies exist in dogmatical and in historical passages. Sometimes the writers of the New Testament appear to contradict themselves, and sometimes other writers of the Old or New Testament.ⁿ Hence a numerous class of authors have arisen, who have occupied themselves in harmonizing such texts; some taking a particular class, and others embracing the whole. Le Long, Pfaffius, and Fabricius, have given lists of such authors. We, in conformity with our proposed plan, will keep within the limits of the New Testament.

ⁿ Sometimes, also, they contradict profane authors, as Luke ii. 2, plainly opposes Josephus, and other historians.

For it is certain that, at the time of Christ's birth, Cyrenius, *i. e.* Quirinus, was not governor of Syria. Sentius Saturninus held the office at that time, and then in succession Quinctilius Varus, and Sulpitius Quirinus. The Census under Quirinus occurred in the year 51 or 52 of the Julian period, of which distinct mention is made in Acts v. 37. See Rosenmüller *ad loc.* and Papst, who attempts an explanation of the difficulty in his *Hist. Eccles.* i. p. 104, note. A similar error is found in Luke iii. 1, and Acts xvi. 12. [Though there is great difficulty in this passage, it seems clear, from the insertion of *πρώτη*, that Luke did not confound the two occurrences. May we not construe *ἐγένετο*, *was carried into effect?* The enrolment was made under Herod the Great; the actual taxation did not take place till the banishment of Archelaus, and the reduction of Judea into a Roman province, A. U. 759. What Ammon means by the year 51 or 52 of the Julian period is quite inexplicable.]

IV. In doctrinal passages, the apparent discrepancy to be removed, is commonly caused by the want of dogmatic accuracy in the one or the other, or by the wide difference that exists between the idioms of the eastern and western languages.^o For a discrepancy between doctrines distinctly revealed, which has been objected to Christianity by impious and profane men, as by Julian in the case of the Unity and Trinity, must be removed rather by an explanation of the subject, than by the interpretation of the words.

^o Or, by the mistakes of interpreters, as in Heb. xii. 17, where *μετάνοια* is the irrevocable blessing of Jacob. [Am-

mon, as usual, quotes the verse incorrectly, putting 2 for 17 : where he discovered such a sense for *μετάνοια*, as *irrevocable blessing*, the translator cannot imagine. *Μετάνοια* may probably refer, not to Esau, but to Jacob : *He found no means of changing his father's mind, or of inducing him to alter the blessing.* The apparent discrepancy here is the supposed assertion, that hearty repentance was not accepted by God.]

V. In historical passages, it arises principally from a difference of object and method in the narrative, as is often the case with the evangelists. For a difference of object causes a difference in the choice of circumstances ; and some circumstances have no particular force in expressing the general idea, and, consequently, may either be changed for others, or entirely omitted : sometimes, also, it is immaterial whether they be expressed in a generic or specific form.^p From all of these, apparent discrepancies may easily arise.

^p Thus, for example, Matthew, in order to show that Jesus was the true Messiah promised by God, employs, as evidence, the narrative of frequent miracles : John, on the other hand, inserts many things omitted by the other Evangelists, and is particularly careful to record the discourses of our Saviour. Sometimes, also, he corrects those who wrote before him. Thus, Luke says, that Simon the Cyrenean bore the cross of Christ ; whereas John, who was an eye-witness, says that Jesus bore it himself. See Morus' *Defence of the Narratives of the New Testament*, Opp. p. 23. [John certainly says, that Jesus bore his own cross ;

Matthew, that, as they came out, *i. e.* on the road, Simon was compelled to bear it : Jesus, therefore, bore it for the first part of the way, and Simon for the latter.]

VI. But the most common source of apparent discrepancy, is the mode of speech, causing that to seem a diversity in facts, which is in reality only a difference in words. For it is clear, that even the best and most careful writers do not always use the same system or accuracy in the names of persons, things, and places, in the limitation of numbers or times, nor generally in the attributes of things : and in using this license, they neither are nor can be thought blameable.⁹ Therefore, when the same subject has many names, they choose sometimes one, sometimes another ; they denominate times, places, and numbers, with various degrees of accuracy ; they sometimes express the genus by the species, and sometimes *vice versâ*, the species by the genus. Of all these, examples may be found in the evangelists, as well as in other historians.

⁹ A remarkable example of discrepancy, from this cause, appears, by comparing Ernesti on the Mem. Socr. l. iii. c. v. § 1, with Drakenborch's Note on Livy, l. xxxix. c. 49. See another discrepancy in Michaelis' Annotations on John vii. 8-10, and in Acts ix. 26 ; xi. 30 ; and xv. 2, compared with Gal. ii. 1, sq. For, Gal. i. 9. seems to shew, that the Apostle, in the Epistle, is speaking of his last journey to

Jerusalem, which is usually considered his third. It is possible, however, that the discrepancy in this narrative, is rather of words than of things; for, Acts xi. 30, treats of the journey of St. Paul only into Palestine, not to Jerusalem. I state this, not to excite controversy, but in order freely to state my opinion, that the Epistles of St. Paul cannot be fully reconciled with the Acts of the Apostles, unless the sources of this book be laid open. [There seems here some error in the reference to texts, which the translator cannot correct: nor can he explain what Ammon means by "nisi fontes hujus libri aperiantur." The following examples, from Jahn, may serve to illustrate the meaning of Ernesti. "If, in the narrative of Saul's death, 1 Sam. xxxi. 10, we find no notice of the Amalekite mentioned in 2 Sam. i. 1-5, there is here no discrepancy; but only in the latter text the narrative is more ample; or, what is probable, the Amalekite invented the story, in order to gain the favour of David. If the king, who, in 2 Chron. xxvi. 3, &c. is called Uzzias, is called Azarias in 2 Kings xv. 1-6; and if the father of that Zacharias, who was slain between the temple and the altar, is called Barachias in Matt. xxiii. 25, and Jehoiada in 2 Chron. xxiv. 20-27; in such cases, there is no necessary discrepancy, we have only to suppose that these persons were known by both names. If, in Matt. xx. 30, two blind men are mentioned, and in Mark x. 46, Luke xviii. 35, only one; it can only be inferred, that Matthew gives a fuller account than the others, not that there is a discrepancy. See the whole of § 53, Jahn's Enchiridion. The translator may here mention, though it does not strictly apply to the subject of discrepancies, that many readers of the English version are misled by the use of the name *Jesus* for *Joshua*, in Heb. iv. 8.]

VII. This manner of narrating and speaking is to be carefully learned, either from our

own study of the Greek and Latin historians,^r or from the observations of judicious critics, such as Perizonius in his *Animadv. Hist.*, and his other works; Duker on Livy; Wesseling on Herodotus and Diodorus. We must have this knowledge familiar to us, and ready for use, to be applied whenever passages occur that appear contradictory. For it cannot be doubted, that the difficulty of harmonizing apparent discrepancies, arises in a great degree from ignorance of this manner.

^r Especially Xenophon, Polybius, Livy, Tacitus. [We may here notice how different is the course pursued by the most celebrated critics in interpreting profane authors, and by the Neological school in interpreting Scripture. The former never presume their author to be ignorant of the occurrences of his own time, and the history of his own country, and admit any possible supposition, rather than charge him with ignorance or falsehood: the latter represent every difference as a discrepancy, and pass over in silence the most ordinary and probable reconciliations. In fact, were the Gospels as full of blunders as Ammon represents them, we ought to conclude, not merely that they are not inspired, but that they are the work of some ignorant forger, written long after the period of which they profess to give the history.]

VIII. The method to be employed in attempting to harmonize apparent discrepancies in *doctrinal* passages, is, that the more obscure text, which may be interpreted in different

ways, or which contains any unusual expression, be interpreted in conformity with the clearer, in which there is neither ambiguity nor difficulty:^s and, also, that texts in which a subject is only *incidentally* treated, be explained by those in which it is properly discussed. We must endeavour, also, to lay open and remove the causes of apparent discrepancy, by explaining the usage of language, that all plea for cavil or doubt may be excluded; for it may fairly be required of us to shew that the words of the more difficult passage may have, and that by usage, they really had, that sense which we have given to them, and which we deduced from the clearer and more express passage.

^s Rom. ix. 18, *ὃν Θέλει σκληρύνει*, appears to be an obscure passage relating to the absolute decrees of God. Light may be thrown upon this by 1 Sam. vi. 6, where Pharaoh is said to have hardened his own heart. John iii. 16, and Rom. iii. are express, and what we may call *standard* passages, as to the means of attaining salvation, because in them the dogma is professedly explained.

IX. It will be useful to keep in mind, that many doctrinal assertions are made simply and absolutely, in conformity with the usage of all languages, which, in order to be properly interpreted, must be referred to certain princi-

ples; and these being supposed familiar to all Christians, required not to be expressly mentioned in every instance. For instance, it was one of these elementary principles, that salvation was by faith, and that by it man was justified before God; the Apostles, therefore, did not think it necessary to mention this in every enforcement of duty, but supposed it would always be understood and remembered.^t Therefore, when they say that charity or other virtues render men acceptable to God, they must be understood to mean, when performed by those in whom the essential quality of faith existed. These considerations will render the harmonizing of such apparent doctrinal discrepancies more easy and more probable. On this head the student may peruse with profit, the commencement and first examples of answers to the objections of the Romanists in the *Apology for the Augsburg Confession*. Art. iv.

^t If, therefore, St. James asserts that justification is to be attained by good works, we are not to understand that faith is excluded; for all virtues without it are vain, since faith is the essence of Christianity. [The reader will do well not to give the German theologians the same credit for dogmatic, that he does for exegetic theology. St. Paul asserts, that works done with a view of purchasing heaven by their merit, are totally unavailing to justification; St. James asserts that Christian holiness is indispensable. St.

Paul asserts that we are justified by faith ; St. James, that faith justifies, not by its mere existence, but by its action. But, for dogmatic theology, the student must go to our own older divines, and in this matter especially, to Bishop Bull. The remarks of Jahn, *Enchiridion*, 141, sq. are also sound and judicious.]

X. In historical texts we must beware not to assume the identity of facts from some slight resemblance, and thus to create imaginary discrepancies : this is an error into which interpreters of profane authors have often fallen. On the other hand, we must be equally careful, not to multiply facts on account of some slight diversity.^u The perusal of other historical works, and of the annotations upon them, will assist us much in this matter.

^u So Matthew xxvii. 44, says, that the thieves reviled Jesus, while Luke xxiii. 39, asserts it of one only. Matthew, therefore, employed the species for the individual ; and we must not suppose that two different acts are alluded to. Compare Matt. xxi. 12-27, with John ii. 12-22, and Michaelis' Annotations on the latter passage.

XI. In attempting to harmonize two passages, we must, before all things, determine which of the two is, in its interpretation, to be accommodated to the other ; and for this there ought to be some determined law, lest we wander about at random. The principle then, upon which the apparent discrepancy is to be

reconciled, must be looked for in that passage, the words of which are free from all ambiguity, and are so plain and accurately defined, as that in no way can they be accommodated to the other.* Accommodation then should be applied to that which contains an ambiguity, or whose sense is not strictly defined. Thus in Acts vii. 14, the number of the family of Jacob who came into Egypt is stated at *seventy-five*, whereas Moses calls them *seventy*. In the former passage there is no ambiguity; in the latter there is, because we know that in popular language the nearest round number is frequently used for one which either exceeds or falls short of it. We must therefore accommodate the statement of Moses to that of Luke, by supposing that Moses wrote popularly and vaguely, while Luke accurately defined the exact number. Perizonius acknowledges the propriety of this rule in his *Orig. Ægypt.* p. 410.^y

* [Plato, in the *Menexenus*, (Ed. Bipont, t. v. p. 283,) represents Aspasia as saying that the government of Athens was, and always had been, an *Aristocracy*; Thucydides, reporting the same speech as spoken by Pericles, (B. ii. c. 37,) says that it was a *Democracy*. But in the *Menexenus* the meaning of the term is strictly defined: it was *μὲτ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία*; and might therefore with equal propriety be called a Democracy. Perhaps Thucydides might

prefer the term Democracy, to mark the change which the policy of Pericles had effected in the constitution of Athens; while Aspasia, as a partisan of Pericles, might wish to make it appear that no change whatever had been made.]

^y In Acts vii. 6, God himself says, that the Israelites were to serve in Egypt *four hundred* years, whereas it appears from Exod. xii. 17, and Gal. iii. 17, that they remained there *four hundred and thirty* years, counting from the date of the promise to Abraham. It must not, however, be denied, that other difficulties arise from this interpretation, as *Koppe* has shewn in his Program, and *Dindorf* in *Morus'* Commentary on the passage. It would be better to confess at once, that the chronology of that age is not as yet settled upon satisfactory grounds.

XII. I would not, however, deny that Pfaff (Hist. Lit. Theol. t. i. p. 140,) was right in thinking that it is scarcely possible to form a Harmony of the Gospels absolutely perfect. We must sometimes have recourse to conjecture, both in forming harmonic canons, and in applying them to each particular example. In such cases we may be thankful, that the doubt relates only to historical narrative, in which we may be ignorant of some points, without any injury to the integrity of our belief; and in which we had better submit to partial ignorance, than vainly torture our ingenuity for a solution.^z

^z To this we may add, 1. That many things might not be discrepant in the view of the sacred writers, and of the

age in which they lived, which appear so to us. 2. That differences and varieties, especially in historical narratives, could hardly be avoided, since the writers were men, and not mere machines. 3. That hence a perfect harmony of the Old and New Testaments can hardly be expected after so many fruitless endeavours have been made. See Michaelis' Introduction, ed. 4. t. ii. p. 877; and Marsh's Notes and Additions, translated into German by Rosenmüller, Gött. 1803, t. ii. p. 5, sq.

PART SECOND.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE PROPER METHOD OF WRITING AND
ESTIMATING COMMENTARIES AND VERSIONS.

I. SINCE an interpreter of Scripture ought to possess not only acuteness in comprehending, but also the ability to explain clearly that which he comprehends, either in the way of version or commentary; on this subject, also, it will be requisite to lay down rules.

II. Since the object of a version from one language into another, is to express the sense of the author, without diminution, addition, or alteration; and since a version ought to be, as it were, a perfect image or reflection of the original, without any alteration for greater or

less, for better or worse;^a it follows, that a version ought to use all those words, by which all the meanings of the author may be expressed in his own way. But this requires fuller explanation.

^a In translation, therefore, the patavinity of Livy, the simplicity and brevity of John, the involution of Paul, ought, as much as possible, to be preserved. This virtue is still a desideratum in all the authorised ecclesiastical versions. See Morus, t. i. Opp. p. 83, sq. [This is surely demanding too much. Simplicity and involution are imitable qualities, but patavinity, and all other provincial peculiarities, can never be transferred.]

III. In the first place, then, in order that the sense may be fully preserved, words must be chosen, which, in their power, exactly correspond to those of the original; and which are not ambiguous, but possess a fixed and clear signification among those for whom the version is prepared.^b When words can be found which agree with those of the author in etymology, trope, figure, and construction, they are certainly to be preferred. In this, however, we must be careful that the usage of the language into which we translate be also consulted; without which, we produce a version unintelligible to those who are unacquainted with the original; and darken, and sometimes pervert the real sense. For the reader interprets a Latin

version according to the usages of the Latin language, or a German one according to the German usage, whereas they require, in this case, to be interpreted according to the idioms of the Greek or Hebrew; or he really attaches no sense to what he reads, though from the habit of frequently reading and hearing, he imagines that he understands. No error is more common than this, not only among the people, but even among the instructors of the people.^c

^b We must not, therefore, translate with such scrupulous accuracy, as Valla has done in the case of Homer, and Reisk in Demosthenes. It is an error in the New Testament to render βίβλος γενέσεως, *the book of the generation*, instead of *the genealogy*. Πατήρ ἡμῶν, *Vater unser*, instead of *Du, unser Vater, Our Father*, instead of *O thou our Father*: and thus, in Homer, μέτρον θαλάσσης is ill rendered by *the measure of the sea*. [A translation absolutely literal must, in many instances, give a sense foreign to the original: thus κακῶς ἔχειν in Greek, and *se porter mal* in French, if literally translated, would never convey to the English reader the real sense, *to be sick*. Idioms of this kind must be rendered by corresponding idioms.]

^c We may take, as an example, Bolten's Version of Matt. viii. 20, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔχει, ποῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν κλίνει, which he renders *ein Anderer hat keine Stelle, wo sein Haupt ruhen könnte*. [Literally, in English, *an other man has no place where he may rest his head*.] For he had compared the expression υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου with the Syriac ܘܝܘܢܐܘܪܐܘܬܐ, and held that this was synonymous with ܘܝܘܢܐܘܪܐܘܬܐ in which, though a good Syriac scholar, (see his notes on Matt. v. 19,) he was

widely mistaken. Many instances of similar folly occur in Bolten's version. [The translator has not seen Bolten's version, and cannot imagine what sense he intended to give to the passage thus strangely rendered.]

IV. But if we cannot proceed thus literally, which is often impossible, from the different genius of different languages, expressing the same thing in different terms, which do not correspond each to each, either in etymology, or in proper signification; a difference, which especially exists between the eastern and western languages, to such an extent, that if we were to translate into English, word for word, according to the ordinary lexicons, we should present a composition, which, understood according to the English usage, would vary widely from the original sense: we must, then, abandon this literal exactness, and consider it enough to express the sense of the original in any words, provided that, according to the usage of the language into which we translate, they mean the same thing.^d

^d Idioms must, therefore, be rendered by idioms meaning the same thing; thus, Rom. i. 4, *ἀρισθέντος υἱοῦ Θεοῦ*, declared the Son of God. *τίκνα ἁγνῆς*, men worthy of punishment, *τίκνα σοφίας*, cultivators of wisdom. The reader may find another example on which he may exercise his judgment, in Stoltz' German Version of the New Testament at Coloss. i. 15.

V. But since none can translate thus, unless they be accurately acquainted with both languages; it follows, that none ought to attempt this method of translating the New Testament but those who are acquainted with three languages,—the Hebrew, the Greek, and that into which they translate. And their acquaintance with them must not be of a puerile and ordinary cast, but deep and accurate;^e so that they may not only understand every thing rightly, but also be able to judge what is proper to each language, and to express it according to the genius of their own.

^e That is to say, the translator ought to have acquired a familiarity with the genius of the language, which is a difficult attainment without great acuteness. Students of ardent mind often err in this matter, when, through their dislike to settled reading, they run through authors, and satisfy themselves with acquiring the general sense. In this there is generally an agreeable self deceit. See Bahrdt's Version of the New Testament.

VI. We are often obliged, by necessity, to depart from the rule laid down in § 4; and that in many ways. The first is, when the form and mode of the Greek words has such a connexion with the subjects treated of, and with the style of argument, that neither can the former be understood, nor the latter proceed con-

sistently, unless we abandon that rule, and translate the words etymologically, without regarding the usage of the language into which we translate. This is requisite in the arguments of St. Paul, as for instance, 2 Cor. iii. in the words *γράμματος* and *πνεύματος*, and *δόξης*: as also in Gal. iii. 16; and in allegories, as John x. ^f

^f So the words *λόγος*, *φῶς*, *ζωή*, *κόσμος*, which St. John uses in combating the doctrine, if not of the Sabians, at least of the Gnostics, must be preserved in the translation. Bahrtdt and others have erred, by rejecting these words in their versions. Compare Ziegler's new version of the Proverbs of Solomon. Lips. 1791. Preface, p. 6. [It has been doubted, whether St. John had any view to the Gnostic heresy. See Tittman's Proleg. in Johann. Ammon's language might seem to mean, that we should keep these words without any alteration, as has sometimes been done in the case of *λόγος*: he means, however, that we should translate them etymologically, as *the word*, *the life*, &c. These, in fact, are *technical* words; the meaning of which is to be derived, not from the general usage of the language, but either from the definition of the author, or from the context.]

VII. The second case of necessity is caused by antithesis, *πλοκῆ*, Matt. viii. 22; John i. 10. Paronomasia, Philip. iii. 2, 3, and like figures;^g the omission of which, would destroy all the grace and elegance of the passage. St. Paul has many cases of the same kind. But

even such figures cannot always be retained; for the language into which the translation is made, will not always admit them.^h

^s We have an example of ἀντανάκλασις in Rom. iii. 27. In all these the words must be kept to maintain the force of the opposition. [The translator is not aware of any term, by which he could properly render πλοκή. It means a figure of speech, by which the same word is used, both properly and improperly, in the same sentence, as in, Let the *dead* bury their *dead*.]

^h As, for instance, John iii. 6, 8, where πνεῦμα is, first *the wind*, then *the Spirit*. Add also Matt. xvi. 18, πέτρος and πέτρα, in which the paronomasia, derived from the Eastern dialects, might be retained in the Greek and Latin, but cannot in the Teutonic dialects. [In John iii. 6, 8, it is highly probable that πνεῦμα, throughout, means *Spirit*, and not *wind*. For, 1st, Spirit is the ordinary sense; and no instance occurs in the New Testament of πνεῦμα used for ἄνεμος, *wind*. 2d, *Spirit* will give a consistent sense in both cases; and certainly nothing short of absolute necessity should lead us to translate the same word in the same passage in different senses. The Vulgate renders πνεῦμα by Spiritus throughout. The translator has more fully treated of this text in the Christian Remembrancer, vol. xii. p. 510.]

VIII. A *third* case of necessity exists in those words to which there are no corresponding terms in the other language capable of fully representing them. Such is sometimes the word ζωή, used Hebraistically, and others;ⁱ as Simon well observes in his Hist. Crit. Vers. p. 280.

ⁱ Especially doctrinal words, as πίστις, μετάνοια. Erasmus was aware of this, and for *verbum* in John i. substituted *sermonem*; and Castellio, in the second edition of his Latin version of the New Testament, changed *lotio* into *baptismus*, *genius* into *angelus*, *respublica* into *ecclesia*. It is well known what troubles they excited by this, and what torrents of abuse Beza alone poured upon them. [There is a distinction, which Ammon does not observe, between doctrinal or technical terms, which have no terms in our language *exactly* corresponding to them; and words expressing things which have no counterpart among ourselves, and for which our language has no name *whatever*. The former class are best rendered by choosing the term generally corresponding, and leaving the specific limitation to be determined by the context; thus, though ζωή may mean *eternal blessedness*, it is better to render it simply *life*. The other class, such as *consul*, τετραρχεῖν, πεντηκωστή, cannot be construed at all, and must be simply retained.]

IX. A *fourth* case of such necessity occurs in obscure^k passages, where we can scarcely affix a sense, but where there are several interpretations possessing some, and nearly an equal, appearance of probability. To translate such passages into good Latin or English, we must, in the first place, assume the right of determining their sense; a right which we might assume in a commentary, but not in a translation. Castellio, with great propriety, remarks on 1 Pet. iv. 6, *I do not understand this, and therefore I render it word for word.*

^k That is, in passages utterly obscure and inexplicable, the number of which is daily diminishing, by the diligence

and sagacity of interpreters, as may be seen in the lists of Wolfius, Bonitzius, and Zeunius. Luther certainly has not hit the sense in translating *μεσίτης*, by *ein Mittler*: for Paul, however obscurely and parenthetically, seems to have meant nothing more, than that the messenger was not of one *law* only, but many, (Acts vii. 25, 35,) but that God was one and the same. [The Latin is, “ Paulus enim obscure licet et per parenthesin, nil nisi hoc voluisse videtur, internuntium unius *legis* non esse, sed *plures*, (Act. vii. 25, 35 :) Deum autem esse unum et unicum.” Unless *plures* be altered into *plurium*, and some more appropriate text be inserted, the translator must say with Castello, Haec non intelligo, itaque ad verbum verti.]

X. Any one who has previously been trained to translation under a good master, may, by the observance of these rules, both translate rightly, and be enabled to judge of versions, whether they go to excess in studying purity of style; or whether, on the other hand, they adhere too closely to the forms of the original. With respect to these points, the right of judgment is sometimes assumed by men who are not sufficiently acquainted with the idioms of either language. But since versions are principally intended, not for the learned, who can read the original, but for others, and especially for the common people; it is always safest to err on the side of perspicuity, even in cases where it is not absolutely necessary to desert the phraseology of the original. Jerome well

observes, in his Epistle to Pammachius, on the best method of interpreting, p. 994; *Let others hunt after syllables and letters : do thou look for the sense.* The whole passage is well worthy of attention.¹

¹ A right perception of the goodness of a version is best formed by practice, and by the use of good versions of profane authors, such as the translations of Lucian and Homer, by Wieland and Voss. See Luther's Works Ed. Halle, t. xxii. p. 5, sq. [These, of course, are into German. One of the best English translations is that of Thucydides, by *Hobbes*; in which the forms of the original are never deserted, except when it is absolutely necessary. The same translator has failed ludicrously in his attempts upon Homer; whence we may conclude, that different powers are required for the translation of poetry and prose. As examples of versions going to excess, we may take those of Homer, into English by Pope, and into Latin in the margin of Clarke's edition. The former will never assist in construing a difficult passage, because the peculiarities of the original are almost always neglected, and nothing but the general notion of the sentence retained. The latter being perfectly literal, throws no light upon difficult idioms, and can be of no further use, than to save the reader from the trouble of looking into his Lexicon for the vulgar sense of the words.]

XI. Though these rules are so clearly just, that they neither are nor can be denied by any person of information; yet, as often happens with universally admitted truths, they are practically denied, both in writing and judging of

versions; in this way chiefly, that when purity of style may, and ought to be retained, it is rejected by translators, and blamed by critics. The purity of Castellio, though he sometimes erred through his zeal for purity, was ill received, even on many occasions where it conveyed the true sense, especially by Beza, his rival and enemy. And the real ground of this opposition was, that, in his pure Latin version, the Zuinglian doctrine of predestination and its accompaniments, which had been founded upon a literal version, were not to be found: this Beza himself has pretty clearly shewn. Upon the whole, it is difficult, or rather impossible, in a version of the Scriptures to please all men, because the religious opinions of men, and the arguments for those opinions, often depend upon a literal version, and are destroyed by a fair translation. Hence arose the clamours of Emser against Luther, and of Stunica and Lee against Erasmus; to omit other examples. On this subject, it will be worth while to read the books written on Erasmus's translation, by Stunica and Lee, and Erasmus himself; Luther's Defence of his own version against Emser; and, finally, Castellio's Defence of his versions, especially of his New Testament.^m

^m See *Panzer's Entwurf einer vollständigen Geschichte der Deutschen Bibelübersetzung Martin Luthers von 1517-1581*,

mit Zusätzen. Nürnberg, 1791. Plan of a complete History of M. Luther's German translation of the Bible, &c. *Meyer's Geschichte der Schrifterklärung seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften. Götting. 1803, t. ii. p. 262, sq.* History of the Interpretation of Scripture since the revival of Letters. He who wishes to form a judgment of the various versions, especially German ones, must not fail to read Griesbach's excellent treatise *on the different kinds of German translations of the Scripture*, in *Eichhorn's Repertorium, Lit. Bibl. et Orient.* t. vi. p. 262, sq. Amidst an abundance of private versions, we still want a version of the New Testament, suited to public use, and to our own times: nay, if my judgment be correct, we still want a good and faithful version of the New Testament, preserving the characteristics of the several writers. Indeed, we can hardly hope that our literature will be enriched with such a version, unless several learned men shall combine, and each undertake a separate book. Indeed, it is wonderful, that, among all the learned men of Germany, not one has undertaken to give a new edition of Luther's German version, with notes, correcting his errors, both in style and sense, which are very numerous. But, the work which we require, would need the labours of more than one man. [Much of what is here said by Ammon, in reference to Luther's version, is applicable to our own authorised version. It was an admirable work for the age in which it was written: but, since that time, emendations have been made, in every department of biblical criticism. A new edition, with the errors corrected, with a revised punctuation, and omitting the pernicious divisions of chapters and verses, might be of the highest utility. As an instance of a passage requiring correction, we may notice Rom. viii. 21, which, from the false punctuation, and the erroneous rendering of $\sigma\tau\iota$, is quite unintelligible.]

XII. *Paraphrases* are similar to versions: but they are less difficult, because they aim

only at expressing the sense, and are, for the same reason, more suited to popular use.ⁿ The main point, then, in composing a paraphrase, is by circumlocution, to explain what is difficult and ambiguous, by the insertion of definitions and reasons, to explain the subjects and propositions; and, finally, to express clearly the connexion of the whole composition. In all this, however, brevity is to be consulted, lest the paraphrase should extend into a commentary; an error which has often been committed. Nor, finally, must we abuse this license of departing from the words of the original, by synonymes, paraphrases, definitions, &c. so as to use it unnecessarily, or insert our notions and opinions for those of the Apostles.

ⁿ See Herder, *Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffende*. Letters on the Study of Theology, ii. p. 350. A good paraphrast ought, 1st, to supply intermediate notions. 2d, to proportion this to the peculiarities of his author; for instance, to insert much in John and Paul, little in Matthew and Luke. For the example, even of Erasmus, teaches us, that paraphrases and periphrases are apt to degenerate into superfluities and tautologies, which had better have been omitted. We value highly the commentaries of Semler on the New Testament, on account of the mass of learning collected in the notes; but we do not equally value his paraphrases, because they often present the opinions, rather of the interpreter, than of the author. [The business of an interpreter or translator is, to express what the author *says*; of a paraphrast, what he conceives to be the *intention* of the

author. For this purpose, it is often requisite that he should restrict or qualify the sense of words, and that he should expand the connexion between different parts of a discourse, expressed in the original by such particles as *οὐν, γὰρ, δὲ*. If we take, as an example, Rom. xi. 1, a translator can make nothing of *οὖν*, but, *therefore*, nor of *απώσατο*, but *rejected*. A paraphrast may, and ought, to show what *οὖν* refers to, and in what sense God had not rejected the Jews. These points he may determine from the context, and paraphrase thus: "Seeing, then, that the great body of the Jews have rejected the mercy of God offered to them through Christ, has God, on that, account, *universally* and *finally* rejected them?"]

XIII. That branch of interpretation which consists in the explanation of the author's meaning, is of two sorts; for it is either brief, in the style of *Scholia*, of which sort were the *σημειώσεις* of Origen, or more extended in the form of a *commentary*. The rules for writing *Scholia* are short and easy. For since they ought to aim at nothing more, than briefly to explain the sense of words; it is evident, that in them, rare words ought to be explained by ordinary words, difficult words by easy ones, tropical words by proper ones; and all this must be done with purity of style, that no ambiguity may exist. Moreover, the less familiar names of persons and things must be briefly illustrated, to save the reader the trouble of inquiry. The various readings ought also to be noticed, when they affect the sense; and

also the various interpretations, when the sense of the passage has been disputed. This style of interpretation, from its brevity and simplicity, is, without doubt, the most useful in conveying a right understanding of the text.^o

^o And most agreeable to the present age. Rosenmüller's Scholia on the New Testament have reached their fifth edition, which will not be the last, provided sound literature continues to flourish in connexion with the study of the sacred books. German Scholia are contained in the *Exegetisches Handbuch des N. T. Lips. 1788*. Exegetic Manual of the New Testament, a work not contemptible twenty years ago; but far surpassed by Paulus's Commentary on the New Testament. Lübeck, 1800, of which a second edition has been published. [The reader, who has seen something of the nature of Ammon's own opinions, will understand, that his testimony in favour of Paulus is to be received only as far as scholarship is concerned. Paulus is Neological in the extreme.]

XIV. A *commentary*, which ought to embrace the explanation both of the *matter* and the *words*, is a work of greater labour, and requires more exact rules and caution. With respect to the words, the attention of the commentator ought first to be directed to the reading, that its truth may be established, and that it be cleared from corruptions, either of oversight or conjecture: those varieties in the reading, which are of any importance, ought also to be mentioned and examined. Nor is con-

jectural criticism to be entirely neglected, (See P. I. Sect. ii. Chap. vi. § 1,) which the most learned and right thinking theologians have not scrupled occasionally to use :^P but rashness must be avoided, and a modest diligence must be exerted. The rules and aids applicable to this subject in general, will more conveniently be treated of in a future part of this work.

^P See G. A. Teller's Epistle to Kennicott, on Conjectural Criticism, applied to the Hebrew books of the Old Testament. Lips. 1765. Also Bowyer's Conjectures on the New Testament, translated into German by Schultz, the Supplements to which may now be given from the London edition of 1782. See Michaelis' Introduction, Ed. 4. Göttingen, 1788, p. 722, sq. [Eruesti's distinction between *Scholia*, as explaining only words, and *Commentaries*, as explaining both words and subjects, is sufficiently precise. But it would be difficult and needless for an interpreter to confine himself by the strictness of this definition. The *Scholia* of Rosenmüller, so highly praised by Ammon, often proceed beyond the mere explanation of words. In our own Biblical literature, there is an intelligible practical distinction between *Notes* and *Commentaries*. Notes may contain whatever is necessary for the full understanding of the text. Commentaries consist of pious and moral reflections deduced from the text. And these ought, as much as possible, to be kept distinct.]

XV. The next object must be to explain the more difficult words, and to prove and illustrate the explanation from the usage of language, according to the mode laid down in

P. I. Sect. ii. Chap. iii. It is allowable, also, sometimes to illustrate passages in which there is no great doubt or difficulty, by suitable observations, which may throw light on other passages of Scripture, or on the writings of the fathers. It may also be serviceable to compare the old Latin version,⁹ both that it may be rightly understood, and that hence the meaning of terms, as used by the church in the earlier ages, may be learned.

⁹ With the glosses of Jerome interwoven with the context. Thus, Gal. v. 12, ἀποκόψονται is rendered in the old version *abscindantur*. Jerome adds, “Si enim exspoliatio membrorum proficit, quanto magis abscissio.” [For information respecting this old Latin version, commonly called the *Vetus Itala*, or *Ante-Hieronymiana*. See Part iii. Cap. iv. § 12, sq.]

XVI. After having explained the words, the commentator must next engage with the subject matter, whether it be historical or dogmatical; but so that, omitting what needs no explanation, or may be found in ordinary books, he grapple with real difficulties, and especially with those points which have been attacked or misrepresented by the enemies of religion. It is also allowable to subjoin more extended dissertations on difficult passages;† but these ought to contain something new, or

at least, to support what was known before by new and improved arguments.

^r Heyne, in his editions of Virgil, Tibullus, and Homer, calls such dissertations *Excursus*; and has been followed by Koppe, in his edition of the New Testament. [Every one, who has been in the habit of consulting commentators, must be aware, that it is a great and common fault, to pass over, *sub silentio*, important difficulties: and equally so, to give solutions which cannot be supposed to have been satisfactory to the mind of the commentator himself. In such cases, it is more honest, and more useful, to state the difficulty, and to confess our inability to solve it. By the more common method, the boundaries of knowledge are confounded.]

XVII. Whether explaining words or matter, the interpreter having stated and weighed the various opinions which have any shew of probability,^s must then state his own opinion, confirm it by suitable arguments; and, finally, clear away any doubts which may attach to it.

^s It is a fault, however, to heap up a vast variety of opinions, by which the reader is bewildered, while the true sense of the author remains as obscure as ever. For, however we may grant, that, in extricating the sense of a difficult passage, a review of various opinions may properly enough be made in an excursus or supplement, yet the meaning of the author can be but one: a good interpreter ought diligently to seek for this, and express it in distinct terms, without troubling himself about the opinions of others.

XVIII. In doing this, he must avoid lengthened discussions respecting the sense of words,

which are more suited to the completion of lexicons, than to clearing up the sense of the author; and all doctrinal common-places, which are more adapted for a scholastic lecture or sermon, than for a commentary.^t For, as in commentaries upon the Greek and Latin classics, we do not approve of those which are swelled with ordinary matter, which may be found in books of history and antiquities; so neither can we approve of this method of commenting on the sacred writings: and on this ground the earlier commentaries, especially those of Melancthon, Luther, P. Martyr, and others, have been blamed by the moderns, particularly by Simon. The times in which they lived form their excuse; and also of those who, immediately after the revival of letters, filled their commentaries on the Greek and Latin classics with matter which no one now would think of inserting.

^t The commentaries of many of the fathers abound with useless learning; as also those of the Scholastic divines, who introduced metaphysical trifling into their interpretations; and those of the Grammatical school, who were too much given to etymological digressions. Examples of these errors are to be found even in the English critics. Nor must we omit to notice the error of those, who, when they stumble on an obscure passage, heap together titles of books, and send the reader to seek for information from them. To such annotators Heyne says well in his preface to Homer, “but

do thou produce what may be necessary to illustrate the passage; for, had I wished to seek it elsewhere, I would not have asked thine assistance." We approve of this method of reference in compendiums, as in Wolf's *Curae*, and Thies's valuable work, *Neuer Kritischer Kommentar über das N. T.* New Critical Commentary on the New Testament. Halle, 1804. But, in commentaries, properly so called, it is deservedly to be blamed. [By the *Critici Anglicani*, Ammon probably means, not the English critics in general, but the great English work of the *Critici Sacri*; the principal fault of which is its endless repetitions. Besides this, in common with Pole's Synopsis, it has the error noticed by Ammon in the last note.]

XIX. A commentator ought carefully to avoid all affected display of learning, and an abuse of profane learning; into which those are most apt to fall, who having but a small stock, wish to set it out to the best advantage. This was done by many in the beginning of the eighteenth century, from the novelty of the application of literature to this purpose.^u

^u Even Wetstein is not clear from this fault. The charge of a vain display of learning has been brought against many interpreters of the New Testament, from their fondness for quotations from Arabic and Syriac authors. [The reader may, perhaps, have thought that Ammon himself has exhibited his familiarity with these languages on very slight temptation, and to very little purpose.]

XX. It must also be kept in mind, that the books of the New Testament are not written

with the precision of dialectic method. We must neither look for dialectic connexion between all their parts, nor must the words be restricted to philosophic accuracy of meaning. Arrangements, therefore, and dialectic analysis, are not adviseable, nor can they be of much service.^x

^x [The books of the New Testament have this in common with almost all narratives and epistles, that they are not written with studied precision. But, it does not follow, as Ernesti would seem to imply, that they are without a plan; or, that it is impertinent and useless to attempt an analysis of them. In the Epistles of St. Paul, particularly, amidst much inaccuracy of form, there is a substantial sequence and connexion between the parts; and he who has not formed for himself some analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, is far from perceiving the full scope of that important book. This analysis ought to be formed after the whole Epistle has been read, carefully and frequently, but before the commentator proceeds to a grammatical investigation of words and clauses.]

XXI. We must carefully avoid the great error into which those fall, who, by mere possibilities drawn from the nature of things, or their own philosophical notions, interpret historical propositions, without having any grammatical or historical grounds for their interpretations.^y

^y So Hammond reduces everything to the Gnostics, Heinsius to the Septuagint, Schultens to Arabisms. A similar

error exists in Lampe, and the Cocceian school. . This propensity is more excuseable in historical matters, where, though we often cannot proceed beyond a learned ignorance, yet it often advances literature in no small degree, as we may see in the recent controversy respecting the author and purpose of the Epistle to the Hebrews. See Storr's useful work, *Notitiae Historicae Epistolarum ad Corinthios Interpretationi Servientes*. Tubingen, 1788.

XXII. Similar to this, is the tendency to refine unnecessarily, and to create difficulties for the sake of explaining them; a fault into which men of good talents are apt to fall, when their minds have been accustomed to philosophical disputations, but untrained to the elegancies of polite learning. This fault, however, sometimes arises from a natural perversity, even in men of great learning, especially when they have devoted themselves to some particular opinions or course of study, and direct the whole of their interpretation with reference to these. The excellence of an interpreter consists much in simplicity; and the more any interpretation bears the mark of facility, and appears as if it ought to have struck the reader before, the more likely is it to be true.² *Ἠρόδιον τὸ ἀληθές*, says Lyeurgus: and Schultens, in his preface to Job, well remarks, that the seal of truth is simple and eternal.

² The Epistles of St. Paul form an exception to this rule: in them the more difficult explanation is often to be prefer-

red to the more simple. Generally, however, we must confess, that involved interpretations are proofs of but humble talent. See Fromman, de Facilitate bonae Interpretationis, in Opusc. Philol. 268. Ἀπλᾷ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔπη. Æschyli Frag. [By an easy or simple interpretation, we must understand, not one that is easily found, but one that is easily understood and acquiesced in. And such an interpretation is generally easily found by him who has the proper requisites. The translator cannot grant that St. Paul's epistles form an exception to the rule. Their great difficulty consists in the frequency of allusions to the circumstances either of the Apostle or of those to whom he wrote, and to the opinions and habits of Jews and Gentiles at the time. In many cases it is impossible to interpret the Apostle till these circumstances and opinions are known; but, when they are known, then, as in other writings, the simplest interpretation is the most probable.]

XXIII. In every thing brevity is to be studied, as far as the subject and perspicuity will permit. For by extended and prolix discussions, like those of Vitringa on Isaiah, and Lampe on John, the subject is obscured rather than illustrated; and the mind of the reader is confused, or at least fatigued.^a

^a [*Koppe* in his annotations on Romans and Galatians, affords a fine example of perspicuous brevity; in this, though not in all his other excellencies, he has been successfully imitated by his continuators *Heinrichs* and *Pott*.]

XXIV. The practice of composition will be serviceable here. For the less any one is accustomed to writing, the more verbose is he

apt to be, even when he imagines that he is writing with brevity. Such practice will also be serviceable in producing purity of style, which is likewise necessary for perspicuity; and from the neglect of which we may generally infer ignorance. Upon the whole, he can hardly interpret well, who has not learned to write well.

XXV. A good interpreter must act consistently in his use of hermeneutic rules and apparatus. He must not approve generally of that which he rejects in particular cases; nor must he admit and reject an authority according as it coincides with, or opposes his own sentiments. This is a fault very common among interpreters.^b

^b Especially among dogmatic interpreters, on the words *πίστις*, *πνεῦμα*, *υἱὸς Θεοῦ*, *δικαιοσύνη*, and others. Teller and Lang teach a better practice in the *Wörterbuch des N. T.* Lexicon of the New Testament, with its Supplements.

[Yet an authority may be good for one purpose, and not for another. A commentator may fairly lay great stress on the authority of the early fathers, as witnesses to the current belief of Christians at the period when they wrote: while he treats with little respect their private interpretation of texts.]

XXVI. This inconsistency is apparent, when men extol antiquity too highly, and reject every new opinion in interpretation, espe-

cially when antiquity is on their side. On the other hand, when they themselves have produced any thing new, they depress the authority of antiquity too low.^c We ought not to adhere with a blind respect to antiquity, nor ought it to be rashly despised; for though it is not easy in interpreting to produce anything useful which is not derived from antiquity; yet, on the other hand, the Fathers were not infallible, nor were they very skilful in interpretation, especially where a knowledge of Hebrew was required.

^c So Calovius contended that no interpretation could be true which was not drawn from the Fathers. On the other hand, a contempt for the ancient interpreters has begun to prevail in our own times; of whom the same holds good as is asserted of the ancient theologians by Morus, in his preface to the *Epit. Rel. Christ.* p. 18.

[The study of the Fathers, and, we may presume, a higher opinion of their value, has revived in Germany. Numerous republications of their works are issuing from the press, and in a form which shews that the publishers calculate upon an extensive sale. We may particularly notice the *Bibliotheca Sacra Patrum Ecclesiae Graecorum*, Lipsiae, in 12mo, of which Philo and Josephus are completed, and Clemens Alexandrinus is in course of publication.]

XXVII. From the principles which have been laid down, it will be easy to judge of the faults of commentators; and to discriminate

between the good and the bad or trifling. But there are also external marks, by which a tolerably sure conjecture may be formed. We may hope well then of an interpreter of the New Testament, if we know, 1. that he possesses an accurate knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek languages, not derived from lexicons, but from constant practice and reading; 2. that he possesses distinguished attainments, in antiquities, history, chronology, in short, in all liberal knowledge and critical art; and, 3. that he has had much and careful practice in interpretation.

APPENDIX.

ON THE

INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY,

BY

THE TRANSLATOR.

APPENDIX.

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY.

I. THE translator, conceiving that there are certain useful principles respecting the interpretation of prophecy, which have not been touched upon in the preceding treatise, has been induced to collect a few of the most important.

II. “ A prophecy is a declaration made by a creature, whether human or of a superior order, under the inspiration and commission of the omniscient God, relating to an event, or series of events, which have not taken place at the time the prophecy is uttered, which could

not have been certainly foreseen by any science or wisdom of man, but which will take place in the visible dispensations of the divine government, in the present state." See Dr. J. P. Smith, on the Principles of Interpretation, as applied to the Prophecies of the Holy Scriptures, p. 9. There seems, however, no good reason why we should thus exclude from the definition of prophecy, previous declarations of future events, made immediately by God himself, without the intervention of any inferior agent, as in the declarations to Abraham respecting his seed. ^a

^a So Vitringa, *Typus Doctrinae Propheticae*, § 1, "Prophetia est Scientia, declaratio, interpretatio ejus quod sciri nequit nisi ex revelatione Dei."

III. Though there is no book in the New Testament generally prophetic, except the Apocalypse, yet there are few in which some prophetic declarations are not to be found. Thus in the Gospels we meet with prophecies respecting the death and resurrection of Christ, the descent of the Holy Ghost, the destruction of Jerusalem, and the day of judgment. In the Epistles, we find prophecies respecting the restoration of the Jews to the divine favour, and the rise and extension of heresies in the Christian church.

IV. Before attempting to fix the fulfilment of a prophecy, we must use all the means that are proper for securing the just interpretation of the words and sentences, in which the prophetic declarations are conveyed. If we do this effectually, we shall then have brought ourselves into the condition of those to whom the prophecy was first declared; and any good effect which it could produce upon their minds, may still be produced upon ours, independent of any *particular* knowledge of the events by which the prophecy shall be accomplished. Thus a belief that an inspired Apostle has prophesied that the great body of the Gentiles shall ultimately embrace Christianity, and the great body of the Jews be readmitted into covenant with God through Christ, will always excite to endeavours for the conversion of both, though we may be quite ignorant of the time when, and of the means by which the great result will be produced. This just interpretation of the words of prophecy, must be effected by the application of the grammatical rules laid down in the foregoing treatise; and, in the passage just alluded to, Rom. xi. 25, 26, we may usefully apply them to the interpretation of the important term *πλήρωμα*.

V. " We must be particularly attentive to

the fact, that the real prophecies are generally written in the highest style of poetry; with the most vivid imagery, the boldest figures, excursive descriptions, large digressions and episodes, and all the peculiarities of poetical composition." *Smith*, p. 57. This is true of the Old Testament prophecies, and of those contained in the Apocalypse; but not of those scattered through the Gospels and Epistles, which usually retain the ordinary tenor of the style. Much of the light which has been thrown by Lowth, in his *Prelections*, and others, on the figurative style of the ancient prophets, may properly and usefully be applied to the Apocalypse.

VI. The interpretation of the word of prophecy made by Jesus Christ himself, and by his inspired Apostles, is a rule and key by which to interpret correctly the prophecies cited, or alluded to by them. *Horne*, vol. ii. p. 646.

VII. This rule must be taken with a qualification. For general facts or sentiments from the Old Testament are often applied to particular facts in the New, which naturally fall under them; and frequently nothing more is meant by the expression, *it was fulfilled*; than that there existed such a similitude between

the fact spoken of the Prophet, and that narrated by the Evangelist, as that both might properly be expressed by the same terms. *Smith*, p. 51, and *Terrot* on Romans, p. 277.^b But if the passage in the prophetic writing be not a general fact or sentiment, but a particular prediction, then we must allow that a declaration by our Lord or by an inspired Apostle, that it was fulfilled on a particular occasion, is a full and satisfactory guide to the meaning of the prophecy; and this is true even though the prophecy had previously received a partial and typical fulfilment.

^b *Dathe* in his notes to his Latin translation of the Hebrew Bible, makes a distinction between quotations from the ancient Scriptures introduced with the formula, *Then was fulfilled*, and quotations introduced with the formula, *This was done that it might be fulfilled*. He considers the latter as quotations of prophecies really fulfilled, the former as mere accommodations. *Surrenhusius*, in his 3d Thesis *De Formulæ Allegandi*, has also noticed the same difference between these two expressions as used by the Rabbinical writers. See *Marsh's Lectures*, p. 452.

VIII. From the same rule, we may deduce another analogical rule for interpreting the prophecies of the New Testament. When we meet with an historical fact bearing the same relation to a prophecy of the New Testament, which any fulfilment of prophecy, as

fixed by our Lord or his Apostles, bears to its prediction, we may then conclude that the fact is an accomplishment of the prophecy. We must not require a closer coincidence in the one case than in the other; nor, on the other hand, ought we to be satisfied with an inferior degree of correspondence.

IX. "We must not expect to derive from the study of prophecy an ability to predict future events;" *Smith*, p. 53. No prophecies, respecting events still future, contained in the New Testament, can be more clear and precise than many in the Old Testament, respecting the person, life, and death, of Christ; and yet, the best and wisest of the uninspired Jews, at the time of our Saviour's birth, were only *generally* looking for salvation in Israel. Nor do we find that our Saviour ever reproved them for not understanding the prophecies.^c

^c "God gave these, (the Apocalyptic Prophecies,) and the Prophecies of the Old Testament, not to gratify men's curiosity, by enabling them to foreknow things, but that, after they were fulfilled, they might be interpreted by the event, and his own Providence, not the interpreter's, be then manifested thereby to the world." *Newton on Apocalypse*, p. 251.

X. We must not fix upon any series of passing events, as the certain completion of any complex series of prophetic declarations.

For the series of events, however it may hitherto have coincided with the prediction, may suddenly change its character, and become totally inconsistent with the remaining portion of the prophetic series.

XI. Hence appears the propriety of dividing every extensive prophecy into proper periods. It is not difficult to make this division of the Apocalypse ; the interpreters, however, are much at variance, as to the synchronism or sequence of the several portions. See *Horne's Introd.* vol. iv. p. 484.^d

^d The distinguished periods of Ecclesiastical history, to which we must refer, in an attempt to interpret the *Seals* and *Trumpets* of the Apocalypse, are, as fixed by Vitringa,

1. The Apostolic Age.
2. The times of Pagan Persecution till Constantine.
3. The period of the peaceable establishment of Christianity, though mixed with heresy, from Constantine to the end of the 7th century.
4. The period of the Church's decay under the influence of Mahomedanism without, and idolatry within, from the reign of Leo the Isaurian, to the rise of the Waldenses, in the 12th century.
5. The period of a corrupt Church, and of a purer portion endeavouring to extricate itself from prevailing corruption, and suffering under persecution, from the 12th to the 16th century.
6. The age of Reformed religion, gradually relapsing into religious indifference.
7. The final re-establishment and extension of pure religion, both among Jews and Gentiles.

XII. "We must compare the language, the symbols, and the predictions of the Apocalypse, with those of former prophecies, especially with Daniel; and admit only such interpretations as shall appear to have the sanction of this divine authority." This canon is given by Horne, as from Woodhouse. The sense of the last clause is not very clear; but it probably means much the same, as is more fully expressed in Rule IX.

XIII. "Unless the language and symbols of the Apocalypse should, in particular passages, direct, or evidently require another mode of application, the predictions are to be applied to the progressive states of the Church of Christ."

XIV. "The kingdom, which is the subject of the Apocalypse, is not a temporal, but a spiritual kingdom. Wars, conquests, and revolutions, are not the objects of the Apocalyptic prophecies, unless they appear to have promoted or retarded in a considerable degree, the real progress of the religion of Jesus Christ; whose proper reign is in the hearts and consciences of his subjects."^e

^e "In Prophetiis, quae de Christo et regno suo agunt, sensus ille est optimus, qui quam maxime est spiritualis." Vitranga Typ. Doct. Proph. Can. xvi.

XV. "We are not to attempt the *particular* explanation of those prophecies which remain to be fulfilled." See Rule X. The three last rules are from Woodhouse, as quoted by Horne, vol. iv. p. 486.

XVI. We must not expect to interpret prophecy by applying the Historico-Dogmatical method of interpretation. (P. I. Sect. i. Chap. i. § 14. Note e). For as prophecies can be interpreted fully only by their events, and those events were generally distant; it follows, that the cotemporaries of the prophet, were really in a worse situation for determining the sense of their predictions than we are. Nor can we suppose that they received any oral explanations from the prophet which have not been recorded in Scripture; for, it is highly improbable the prophets themselves possessed any such additional knowledge. (Dan. viii. 27; vii. 28; and 1 Pet. i. 11.)

XVII. The reason for this important difference between the interpretation of doctrinal and prophetic passages may easily be found. We have seen, (§ x.) that prophecies were not given with a view of communicating a particular foreknowledge of future events, for this would have been totally inconsistent with the system of the moral government of the world:

but with the view, *primarily*, of alarming the wicked, and comforting the pious; and, *ultimately*, of manifesting the absolute foreknowledge and omnipotence of God. On the other hand, doctrinal and moral precepts were given with the *primary* intention of influencing the hearts and the conduct of those to whom they were first addressed, in one certain definite manner. A distinct understanding of *prophecies* would therefore have been unnecessary and hurtful, while a distinct understanding of *dogmas and precepts* was essentially requisite. It follows, then, that any interpretation put upon a prophecy by those cotemporary with the prophet, or living shortly after, can be of no assistance to us; while, on the contrary, it is of the highest importance to ascertain the sense in which doctrines or precepts were understood by the earliest Christians. The reader may find much that is useful on this subject in Seiler's Dissertation, *De Divinis Notionibus ab Humanis in interpretandis Vaticiniis caute discernendis*.

XVIII. As it is satisfactorily established, in spite of the arguments of Eckermann, Rosenmüller, and other moderns, that the prophecies of the Old Testament do, under the images of temporal dominion and conquest, foretell the

spiritual triumphs of Messiah; it is reasonable to conclude, that the prophecies of the Apocalypse, which are formed much upon their model, use similar imagery for the same purpose. Those Millenarians, therefore, who expect any reign of Christ upon earth further than by his Spirit in the hearts of believers, appear to have fallen into the same error with the Jews.

XIX. As we find it to have been the practice of the Old Testament prophets, so closely to interweave prophecies respecting the type and antitype, as to lead many to suppose the existence of a double sense, (See Warburton Div. Leg. b. vi. sec. vi.) ; we are not to be surprised at the occurrence of the same form in the prophecies of the New Testament. Thus, in Luke xxi. 20, 24, we have an explicit prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem. After this, from v. 25 to 36, the subject is the destruction of the material universe, and the coming of Christ to judgment. Here we ought not to labour in endeavouring to refer both parts of the prophecy to the same subject; for, the one subject being typical of the other, it is according to prophetic usage, that they should both be comprehended under one continuous prophecy. See Part I. S. i. C. i. § 7, Translator's Note.

XX. Most of these rules, the reader may observe, are rather negative than positive; and their application will serve rather to prevent rash and erroneous interpretations, than to conduct to such as are true and satisfactory. Those, however, who know anything of the successive dreams of visionary interpreters, will allow, that

Virtus est vitium effugere, et sapientia prima
Stultitiâ caruisse.

END OF VOL. I.







b. 32

after 17

7-19-9

