



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
**THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY**



THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Nikolai Nikolaevich
By GENERAL N. GOLOVIN

IN COLLABORATION WITH ADMIRAL A. D. BUBNOV
TRANSLATED BY C. NABOKOFF
INTRODUCTION BY HAROLD WILLIAMS



NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1922

THE PROBLEM OF
THE PACIFIC IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
A GENERAL ANALYSIS
IN COLLABORATION WITH ADMIRAL A. V. KARNOV
TRADUCED BY C. NASHORE
TRANSLATED BY HARRISON MURRAY

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CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
NEW YORK
1900

FOREWORD

THE object of this book is to disclose to the reader the essence of the problem of the Pacific. In no other sphere of human activities are people as prone to nourish illusions as in the domain of phenomena affecting the commonwealth as a whole. To nourish such illusions is, however, as dangerous an error as to approach a precipice blindfolded. For this reason the author has aimed chiefly at restricting himself to the realm of realities in dealing with the problem of the Pacific. One of these realities is the necessity of all international agreements being backed by actual force. We may deplore this fact the more bitterly that mankind has but recently suffered such heavy losses in blood and treasure ; but such is the present condition of the world, and it must be taken into account, more especially in a treatise, for such is the primary principal of positive science in search of the truth. The realities of so vast a problem as that of the Pacific can only be understood if the investigator embraces the entire field of social, economic, political and military conditions appertaining to the problem. The view has

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recently become prevalent that he who speaks of military power is a "militarist." This, however, is as great a fallacy as the reverse assertion that he who talks of nothing but peace is a "pacifist."

- Truth, even bitter truth, is better than the most high-minded fallacy.

The author has visited Japan, Siberia, China, the Philippines, the Malay States, and Hawaii in 1919 and 1920, and his personal impressions and investigations form the basis of the present book. The list of works which he has perused in the course of his investigation of the problem of the Pacific is hereto appended.

The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to Admiral A. D. Bubnov, who has contributed Chapters VII—X. Admiral Bubnov took part in the Russo-Japanese War, was Professor of the Naval Staff College at Petrograd, and Chief of the Naval Section of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the Great War. The Admiral is an authoritative student of the questions of naval strategy discussed in the chapters that belong to his pen.

The author also has to thank Mr. C. Nabokoff, the late Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London, for undertaking the translation of his book.

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INTRODUCTION

THE author of the following work, General Nikolai Nikolaievich Golovin, is one of the most distinguished Russian officers of the new school who did so much to increase the efficiency of the Russian Army during the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War. As professor of tactics for many years in the Military Academy, or Staff College in St. Petersburg, he maintained a consistent struggle against the old deadening spirit of routine, brought into the work of the school modern methods and broad and progressive ideas and insisted on a thoroughly scientific outlook on military problems. A brilliant pupil of Marshal Foch's, he profited in all his work by the lessons of his master.

At the beginning of the Great War, General Golovin commanded the regiment of Grodno Hussars. In the course of the fighting he received shell-shock. Later he was transferred to the staff of General Lechitsky's Army as Quartermaster-General (Director of Operations), and in 1916, as Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army, he was largely responsible for the success of General Brusilov's

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
advance against the Austro-Hungarian Army. During the latter period of the war General Golovin was Chief of Staff on the Rumanian Front, and after the break-up of the Army and the Bolshevik Revolution he retired to Odessa, where he lived in obscurity until the victory of the Allies and the opening up of the Black Sea enabled him to come to Western Europe.

In 1919 General Golovin acted for some time in Paris as Assistant Military Representative of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin for Europe, and later in the year went to Siberia to assume the post of Chief of Staff in Admiral Kolchak's Army. He had hardly entered upon his duties, however, when he was laid low by a serious illness, and had to go to Japan to recruit. While he lay ill, Kolchak's Army broke up and the Bolsheviks overran Siberia.

The present work is based on the results of General Golovin's close observation of the Pacific situation in the period immediately following on the war. His observation has a quality of freshness and objectivity. A trained scientific mind, after being immersed for several years in the strategic problems of the war and the tangled and harassing problems of the Russian Revolution, with all its startling revelations of the inner structure of the State and society, was directed upon that new and remarkable situation

in the Pacific which recently attracted the anxious attention of the Powers assembled in the Washington Conference. The decisions of the Conference have thrown some light on the problem of the Pacific, and have somewhat diminished its complexity and its dangers. None the less, the problem presents a new and highly interesting phase in the world's development, and General Golovin's objective account of the factors involved is of particular interest at the present moment. Some readers may not agree with all the author's conclusions, but they will at least recognise the value of his first-hand observations and of his skilful marshalling of the facts on the basis of which the situation may be judged. The Washington Conference, beneficial as many of its decisions are, has done little more than mark and fix in certain general political agreements the main outlines of the problem. It has by no means laid to rest those swiftly growing forces, political and economic, which are thrusting this problem more and more urgently upon the attention of the world. General Golovin's work may be recommended to the reader as an important contribution to the study of the rapid changes in national values and the confused clash of national ambitions on the Asiatic shores of the Pacific.

HAROLD WILLIAMS.



THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

CHAPTER I

THE ROUTES OF JAPANESE SETTLERS

THE great Russian Professor of Chemistry, Mendeleiev, wrote, not long before his death, a remarkable book entitled *Towards the Understanding of Russia*. His conclusions are based entirely upon the data of the first All-Russian census of 1897. Discussing the density of the population of the greater part of European Russia (except the North—the provinces of Archangel, Vologda and Olonetzk), he writes : “The vast majority of the population of European Russia is in the same position as that which obtained three or four centuries ago in most European countries. That position caused certain historical events—religious wars, rebellions, revolutions, the advent of Napoleon, etc.—and such an impetus for emigration that America and the African shores rapidly became colonised by European settlers. Some of the events which

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are taking place in Russia are undoubtedly occasioned by the position in which we are now placed." These lines were written in 1906, immediately after the disastrous Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905.

Only fifteen years have elapsed, and Russia found herself involved in a fresh war, and later in civil war provoked by the Bolsheviks. At present the country is faced with the prospect of the slow death of tens of millions of her people.

Mendeleiev's powerful scientific brain struck the basic cause which determines all events, irrespective of the outward diversity of their manifestations. There is no other means of foretelling the future. If you wish to acquire knowledge of the general character of a locality, you must rise to a certain height. The outward appearance of events, as a rule, completely absorbs the attention of the contemporaries and prevents them from perceiving the true cause which underlies these events. And yet the movements that occur in the arena of history are but waves rolling on the surface, driven into motion by unseen forces. Individual leaders, party programmes, the ideological foundations of political aspirations and the national conflicts which they engender are but different combinations of the component parts of social life. Thus the pictures in the kaleidoscope change rapidly at the slightest touch of the hand that moves it. The diversity and mobility of the social phenomena which we witness prevent us

from seeing the fundamental causes that produce these combinations.

The complex international problem which has now arisen in the Pacific is due primarily to the excess of the population in Japan. According to the census of 1920 the islands of Japan (of which the main are Nippon, Shikoku, Kiushiu and Jesso)—a total area of 148,756 square miles—have a population of 55,961,140. In other words, 375 per square mile, a density almost equal to that of the British Isles and almost double that of France. One must of course bear in mind that an acre of rice can feed a greater number of people than an acre of Russian rye, and that a mere comparison of figures is not therefore convincing. There are, however, other indications of the density of the population of Japan. Although she is essentially an agricultural country she is compelled to import foodstuffs. Thus in 1919 Japan imported food to the value of 250,000,000 yen. The masses of the population are dependent upon the rice crop, because the area under cultivation cannot be increased. A rise in the prices of rice provokes popular risings (rice-riots).

Nippon is the most densely populated island. In the region of Kioto and Osaka there are over 1,000 inhabitants to the square mile. In the region of Yokohama and Nogaia over 750. On the remainder of Nippon and on the other islands except Jesso, there are about 500 to the square mile.


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
The territory of the Northern island, Jesso, is more than one-tenth of the total area of Japan and it has only sixty-five people per square mile. Here we are confronted with a fact which affords an important clue for the solution of the problem of the routes which Japanese settlers are endeavouring to follow.

In the course of thousands of years the Japanese people has grown in a kind of enclosure formed by three islands: Nippon, Shikoku, and Kiu-shiu. It is only during the last fifty years that Japan began to colonise Jesso, where about 1,500,000 people have been sent. Competent authorities have long since noticed that Japanese emigration towards the North has been very slow, and have come to the conclusion that extensive Japanese emigration is possible only to countries South of the forty-fifth parallel.

The experience of the colonisation of Southern Sakhalien is another striking proof of the difficulties encountered by Japan in her endeavours to colonise the North. This territory was ceded to Japan by Russia in 1905. In fifteen years, in spite of many efforts, the population there has reached the insignificant figure of 75,000, of whom only 17,000 actually inhabit the island, while the rest only come to Sakhalien for the summer. It is to be noted that Jesso and Sakhalien offer another fundamental condition which the Japanese people cannot renounce. The Japanese is essentially an islander; he is organically bound to the sea, to its industries and climate.

MAP N^o 1 of the Pacific Ocean.
Distribution of the Population in the Countries of the Pacific Ocean.





For this reason the argument which is to be found in some American and English papers concerning the possibility of Japanese settlements in Siberia is based upon a total misconception of the realities of the situation. As long as Japan is sufficiently strong to safeguard her expansion as a fully developed Power, she will never accept such a solution. The Far Eastern possessions of Russia may prove useful to Japan in many ways, but we repeat: the colonisation of Siberia is not the goal towards which Japan is striving. The emigration of the Japanese to North America began in 1900. The majority of these immigrants settle on the shores of the Pacific, and chiefly in California. The waves of the Yellow race that have washed the American shores of the Pacific have caused the United States to ponder. The Yellow people, efficient and laborious agriculturists with an infinitely lower standard of life than the natives, and consequently ready to accept a lower wage, proved dangerous competitors on the general labour market. Since the spring of 1905 the *San Francisco Chronicle* started a campaign against Japanese immigration, an "Asiatics' Exclusion League" was formed which demanded the repatriation of the Japanese, or at least the prohibition of any further influx. Public opinion compelled the State of California to enact local laws directed against the Japanese. In 1908 the children of Japanese immigrants were excluded from public schools. The Anti-Japanese attitude of the

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State of California was to a certain extent mitigated by the conciliatory influence of President Roosevelt. At the same time, the Federal Government insisted at Tokio that Japanese emigration to the United States should cease. During the negotiations for the Trade Agreement of 1908 with the United States, Japan undertook to restrict her emigration. The significance of this pledge, which has become widely known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement," was so explained by a Japanese authority (*The Japan Year Book*, Tokio, 1919-1920) :—

"In 1908 the School Board of San Francisco decided to segregate Japanese children. This action the Japanese residing in America, the Japanese Government, and the people resented. In connection with this, strong opposition to Japanese immigration manifested itself on the Pacific coast. So threatening was the agitation that legislation prohibiting Japanese labour immigration was imminent. To avert the enactment of these laws, which the Japanese considered humiliating, they, in the 'Gentlemen's Agreement,' undertook to satisfy America by regulating immigration. It may be asked why America should think of excluding the Japanese or what right she had to do so. When the treaties were revised in 1894 America expressly reserved the right to legislate on questions relating to immigration. At that time comparatively few Japanese had crossed over to America, but the Chinese question had in its adjustment caused much trouble, and America carefully guarded her rights

against the day when the Japanese might begin to crowd the Pacific States. The Japanese may have imagined the time would never come when that clause would be called into service, but it was a powerful weapon in the hands of American legislators, and the ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ could not be most welcome to Japan. Three years later (1911), when the treaty between Japan and America expired, this question, of course, had to be confronted, and was disposed of in the following way : the objectionable clause in the treaty of 1894 reserving the right to legislate on immigration restriction does not appear in the new treaty, nor is mention made of it in the body of the treaty. It was, however, appended to the treaty as a protocol. When the treaty came before the Senate for ratification, the following declaration by the Japanese Ambassador was read : ‘In proceeding this day to the signature of a treaty of commerce and navigation, the undersigned has the honour to declare that the Imperial Japanese Government are fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in respect of labour emigration to the United States.’ Without this declaration, or its equivalent, the Senate would have rejected the treaty.”

In spite of this “Gentlemen’s Agreement” the Anti-Japanese movement in the States bordering upon the Pacific acquired a new impetus in 1909. In January, 1913, over forty Anti-Japanese laws were passed by the State

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of California (E. Hovelaque, *Le Japon*, Paris, 1921, p. 326). In February, 1921, the "Gentlemen's Agreement" was confirmed, and yet the restrictions imposed upon Japanese emigrants grew. And the Japanese are only admitted to the United States as students or tourists. Australia followed the lead of the United States and prohibits Japanese immigration into sparsely inhabited territories.

The Japanese strongly resent these restrictions. At the Versailles Congress, under the pressure of public opinion in Japan, her representatives endeavoured to raise the question of the equality of races. Many references were made at that Congress to high humanitarian ideals, but the Congress, nevertheless, refrained from discussing this question. The matter of the equality of the Yellow and White races thus became one of those principles deeply affecting national sentiment which have always been solved in history only by the force of arms. The present-day discussions are but the rumblings of the distant thunder of the coming storm—the impending struggle between the Yellow and the White races. The Pacific and the countries bordering upon the ocean will be the arena of this gigantic struggle.

Japanese Westward immigration meets obstacles of a different kind.

After the Russian War of 1904–1905 Japan became the mistress in Korea. In 1910 she openly annexed that country. Japan, however, found in Korea a normal density of the popula-

tion—about 200 to the square mile. At the same time the Koreans, who are loth to renounce their national independence, are strongly opposed to the newcomers. In spite of the Draconian régime established by the Japanese Government, Japanese settlers dare not live outside the towns.

China presents still greater difficulties to Japanese immigration. Here the population is still more dense than in Korea, and is still more hostile towards the intrusion of the Japanese. Of all the regions of China the most favourable conditions obtain in Southern Manchuria. Mongolia, although thinly populated, is as unsuitable for Japanese immigration as Siberia.

The average increase of the population of Japan varies from 15·99 (in 1913) to 12·79 (in 1920) per thousand per annum. In other words, the average increase amounts to 700,000 a year; in seventy years the population would thus be doubled. At the close of the twentieth century Japan will have a population of 130,000,000. Even if immigration into Korea and Manchuria were greatly intensified, these countries could not make room for more than a few millions. Where, then, are the tens of millions to be diverted as they swell the population of the Japanese Archipelago? There is one direction—southwards, to the long string of islands along the Pacific coast of Asia, stretching towards Australia and throwing out detached groups into the ocean.

Although the island of Formosa, captured by

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Japan in 1895, proved rather a narrow field for immigration owing to the density of the population (about 280 to the square mile) further in that direction there are ample opportunities.

This route leads towards the Philippines Archipelago—over 7,000 islands with a territory of about 114,000 square miles (three-fourths of Japan). The population of the Philippines is 10,000,000—about eighty-seven to the square mile. There are likewise thousands of islands in the East Indian Archipelago, the territory of which is 714,000 square miles (five times the size of Japan), with a scarcer population than the Philippines. Counting without the thickly populated island of Java, the average is twenty to the square mile in the East Indies. New Guinea and the surrounding islands have just over one million people on a territory of 311,000 square miles (less than thirty-five per square mile). The innumerable small islands of the Pacific—totalling 75,000 miles, have also just over a million. Lastly, the southern extremity of the Asiatic continent is more thinly populated than China, Korea and Japan. In French Indo China there are sixty people to the square mile, thirty-four in Siam and seventy-five in the Malay Peninsula.

Japanese writers and diplomatists are wont to dwell upon the necessity for Japan to struggle in order to find a place under the sun. They are, however, reticent on the point that Japan will of course choose the place that suits her best. The southern route leads to these best

places. Here the Japanese agricultural labourer will remain in the country of rice—a condition which is absolutely necessary for Japanese immigration *en masse*. Also, Japan would find here political advantages of paramount importance. Over 90 per cent of the population of the Philippines and of the East Indian Archipelago belong to the Malay race. Like the negroes, the Malay people have not as yet shown any ability to create stable national commonwealths, and the many tribes into which the race is divided offer an infinitely more pliable material for "Japanisation" than the races which Japan would encounter in other directions. To a certain degree, they may meet with opposition to absorption from the natives of the Philippines. But even in these islands there is no solid national organism. The "Filipinos" also consist of several tribes which speak different dialects. Of these tribes the most numerous are the following: The Visayans (42 per cent) inhabiting the Visayan Islands in the centre of the Archipelago; the Tagalogs (19 per cent) inhabiting the central part of Luzon with Manilla as the capital. The Tagalogs are the most advanced and politically influential tribe; the Ilocanos (10 per cent) occupying the northwest of Luzon; the Bicols (7 per cent); the Pangasinans (5 per cent); the Sagayans (2 per cent) who also inhabit Luzon. Apart from these main tribes, there are the Zambalans, the Negritos, the Moros, the Igorots, the Ifugaos, the Kalingas, etc. Some of them are still

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primitive savages. The influence of the United States may perhaps contribute to the growth of culture and to the creation of a "Philippine people," but this would require a very lengthy period of penetration—at least several decades. At present the Philippine tribes are utterly unable to withstand the armed aggression of Japan, much less to resist, as the Koreans are doing, the Japanisation that would follow upon their conquest by Japan. Their fate in such an emergency is not open to doubt. They would be completely absorbed by their victors.

These conditions allow the Empire of the Rising Sun to cast its glances southwards, not only in search of convenient space for peaceful emigration, but also as a ground for further expansion of its power.

The Philippines are the first obstacle on the path of a "Great Japan" extending from the Behring Sea to the Indian Ocean. Should the power of Japan extend uninterruptedly across the Pacific, she would cut off Eastern Asia from the ocean and would thus dominate all the Yellow races. No one will be able to compel Japan to make such agreements as the "Gentlemen's Agreement." Japan would be in the position not only to guarantee the full freedom of Yellow emigration, but to open new routes for mass emigration.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF PRESENT-DAY JAPAN

IMPRESSED by the power of European technique, Japan emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century from her cultural isolation. Her leaders and their followers began, with tremendous energy, to emulate the strongest aspects of the civilisation of the White race hitherto strange to her.

Upon entering this new path, Japan was compelled to devote her serious attention to the task of solving the economic difficulty caused by the narrow limits of her territory. The Government of regenerated Japan applied all its energies to the promotion of industry and maritime trade. In 1877, her exports and imports totalled 50,000,000 yen. Within ten years, this figure was doubled (97,000,000).

The end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries constitute a period of clearly defined Imperialism in the history of the White race. All the strong Powers of Europe were striving towards the rapid political seizure of markets. Quite naturally, Japan followed the example of her teachers, and as early

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as in 1894 she attacked China. Her victory gave her Formosa and marked the beginning of her invasion of Korea and Southern Manchuria. Japan, however, encountered the opposition of Russia, and the latter deprived her of the fruits of victory in Southern Manchuria and occupied Port Arthur. Yet the gates to the Asiatic continent were thus opened, and Japan stood in China on the same footing as the "White" Powers, while the Korean markets practically passed into her possession. In 1897, Japan's foreign trade was trebled and reached the amount of 328,000,000 yen.

By defeating Russia in the war of 1904-5, Japan removed her opponent from the path of her Imperialism and became the sole mistress in Korea and in Southern Manchuria. Her foreign trade was trebled once again, and in 1907 amounted to 927,000,000 yen.

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 suddenly placed Japan in an exceptional position. All the resources and efforts of the Great European Powers and of America were directed towards the struggle against Germany. Not only did Japan acquire a free hand in the Far East, but the belligerents required her exports. In the year 1915 alone Japan supplied Russia with arms and munitions to the value of 200,000,000 yen. The total of the orders placed in Japan by the Allies exceeded 1,000,000,000 yen. The requirements of the belligerents obviously were not limited to military supplies. Japanese industries worked for increased demands in

every direction. The excess of exports over imports in Japan during the war can be counted in milliards of yen. These tremendous demands caused the rapid establishment of new industrial concerns and the hurried development of the existing ones. The Bank of Japan (*Nippon Ginko*) reckoned that in the first quarter of 1916 the total investment in new enterprises amounted to 660,000,000 yen, and in the first quarter of 1917 870,000,000 yen were spent on the development of existing concerns. On December 5, 1918, the paper *Jiji* stated that from 1914 till November, 1919, the capital invested in industrial development amounted to 3,000,000,000 yen.

The tonnage of the mercantile fleet also grew rapidly. In 1908 it was 1,500,000 tons, and in 1918 it exceeded 3,000,000 tons.

These exceptionally favourable circumstances do not, however, constitute a healthy condition for the conversion of the country to industrialism, especially as the growth of industry and commerce had been stimulated by the success of Japan's policy of conquest.

Gold flowed in an interrupted stream into the chests of Japan. From 300,000,000 yen in 1914 the Japanese gold reserve grew to 1,600,000,000 yen in 1918. Speculation assumed gigantic proportions. The profits of joint-stock companies were colossal. The yearly dividends of most shipping and transport companies reached 60 per cent. Other business concerns also made similar profits. Japanese millionaires,

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who before the war were but a handful, can now be counted by the thousand.

In a word, the war has enriched the Exchequer and the Capitalists.

On the other hand, the welfare of the masses has not improved. The Japanese Liberal Party (Sei-yu-kai) which advocated the extension of suffrage, succeeded in reducing the value of property entitling to a vote from fifteen yen—yearly tax on landed property—to three yen. As a result, 2,860,000 voters gained access to the polls.

Instead of increasing their wealth, the masses of the people were impoverished during the war.

The influx of gold into the country resulted in a rise in the cost of living. The prices of rice, fish, clothing, fuel rose 250–300 per cent. The Government published in August, 1921, the following interesting figures :—

THE MONTHLY COST OF LIVING—IN YEN.

	1914.	1920.
Rent.....	13·64	20·93
Rice	11·46	50·17
Other goods	16·09	48·47
Fuel	5·61	16·74
Clothing.....	16·10	75·54
Travelling	2·46	3·94
Other expenses	4·82	11·20
	63·08	208·99

Meanwhile, wages did not increase considerably for the same period. In 1920, the average pay of an ordinary workman varied from 2·50 to 3·00 yen a day.

Thus Japan has tasted alongside with the sweetness of rapidly growing industrialism the bitter fruits of capitalism. Labour troubles, hitherto unknown in Japan, compelled the employers to agree to increased wages. In the first nine months of 1921 there have been sixty-three strikes affecting over 2,000 men each. The biggest strike occurred in Kobe, where tens of thousands of workmen went on strike. It lasted over a month, whereas all previous strikes hardly survived ten days. Another novel feature of the strike was the procession of over 30,000 workmen which marched through the streets of Kobe in perfect order, thus displaying their solid organisation. One of the leaders of the Labour movement in Japan, Sudzuki, thus comments upon that strike: "A strike similar to the Kobe one would have been smashed by the Government a few years ago. I consider that the Government has been wise in refraining from such action, as it would only have embittered the conflict between the workmen and the capitalists."

The Japanese Government will have to acknowledge the justice of the workmen's demands and to insist upon a considerable increase of the standing wage.

A rise in wages will, of course, increase the cost of production, and this will have an ill

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effect upon the Japanese industries. The abnormal conditions of the development of these industries in the last few years have exercised an unhealthy influence upon production, favoured by the temporary absence of all competition; the Japanese merchants, in their pursuit of easy profits, did not hesitate to lower the quality of their goods to a level which was hardly tolerable. When goods manufactured in Europe and in America re-appear on the market, the Japanese goods cannot compete with them. This is clearly illustrated by the following fact: In 1918, 52 per cent of the total imports into China came from Japan. In 1919, Japan's share fell to 40 per cent, and in 1920 to 30 per cent.

With the end of the European War, the general conditions suddenly underwent a drastic change which was all to the detriment of Japan. The gates of Europe and America, which had been open wide for Japanese industries, began to close. France prohibited the imports of Japanese silks. Other Powers—and especially the United States, who is also suffering from economic depression as a result of the war—are trying to protect their own industries by raising import duties. A striking example is provided by the following figures: In 1919, Japanese exports to the United States amounted to 828,000,000 yen. In 1920, they fell to 565,000,000.

The general balance of trade undergoes a change unfavourable to Japan.

IN TENS OF MILLIONS OF YEN.

Years.	Exports.	Imports.	Total.	Balance.
	In £.			
1916	113	76	189	37
1917	160	104	264	56
1918	196	167	363	29
1919	210	217	428	7
1920	195	234	329	39

The economic conditions did not improve in 1921. The balance is higher on account of the fall in imports as well as in exports, in other words, of a general depression.

This industrial depression has led to several bankruptcies. The economic crisis affects the working masses in that they lose the only advantage they had enjoyed during the war, namely—the increased demand for labour. Now that many factories have been closed, the numbers of workmen required for the maintenance of industry have fallen 40 per cent since 1919.

The depression in the economic life which followed after the war is an evil from which the whole world is suffering. The Powers of Europe and of America are likewise affected. But the industries of these countries have grown in conditions more healthy than those of Japan : the latter, like a hot-house plant grown in artificial surroundings, is less capable of withstanding acute atmospheric changes.

The Japanese Government is therefore tempted to give further impetus to its Imperialistic policy.

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This consideration should be borne in mind in examining the realities of the situation which has now arisen in the Pacific.

In the next chapters the question will be discussed whether Japan can be expected to renounce her tendencies in spite of the economic crisis with which she is now confronted and will continue to face for some time to come, and whether she will really enter upon the new path leading to the stabilisation of peaceful intercourse between nations on the basis of complete abandonment of the method of exploitation of one nation by another.

Suffice it to indicate here that the temptation is strong indeed. To the west of Japan, two of her neighbours, Russia and China, are for the time being in a state of utter prostration, devastated by civil war.

The Russian lands east of Lake Baikal are not, perhaps, a very tempting market, owing to the scarcity of the population.¹ China, on the

¹ According to the investigations of the Russian Central Statistical Committee recorded in 1915, the figures were as follows :—

<i>Provinces.</i>	<i>Population.</i>
Yakutsk	76,000
Transbaikalia	971,700
Amur	264,500
Maritime	631,600
Kamtchatka	41,400
Sakhalien	15,000

Assuming that in the last six years owing to natural growth and to immigration from Russia and Western Siberia under Bolshevik pressure the population cannot have increased beyond one and a half millions, the total in 1921 would not exceed 3·5 millions.

other hand, affords a rich field for the Imperialistic policy of Japan. Mr. Rockhill, formerly United States Minister in Peking, and a great student of China, estimates the population of China in 1912, without Tibet and Mongolia, at 325,000,000.

The importance of China to Japan from the economic point of view is enhanced by the following significant fact:—

Japan needs raw material. Apart from foodstuffs,¹ she requires cotton,² oil and coal, and the greatest handicap to her industries is that they depend upon foreign iron and steel.

Japan's output of ores, including that of Korea, amounts to some 329,000 tons, equivalent to 160,000 tons of pig iron. As against this small output, Japan consumed in 1917, 1,300,000 tons of steel and pig iron. In the next few years Japan's requirements will rise to 2,000,000 tons per annum.

Before the European War, iron and steel were imported from Great Britain and Belgium. Since 1914, the United States became the chief importer. In 1914–17, Japanese shipbuilding

¹ IMPORTS IN MILLIONS OF YEN.

	1919.	1920.
Rice	162	18
Beans	35	48
Sugar	358	60

In 1920 there was in Japan an exceptionally good harvest of rice.

² Imports of cotton occupy the first place in the total amount of imports. In 1919 cotton was imported to the value of 668 million yen, and in 1920, 721 million.

lived on these American supplies. But in June, 1917, the United States placed an embargo upon steel, and Japanese shipbuilding and other industries found themselves in a critical position. At that moment Japan was building ships totalling 300,000 tons. The American embargo put a check upon this industry.

Kawakami, a Japanese writer, says in his work *Japan and the World Peace*: "The American embargo on steel has given strength to the national desire, already understood by the leaders of industry, to acquire independence from the metallurgic factories abroad for Japanese industries. This desire has been changed into a national watchword."

Japan's dependence on the imports of iron is the Achilles tendon of her military power. Having created a first-class Army and Navy, Japan can confidently challenge any Great Power in Europe or America on sea and on land. Her tactical strength is very great. And yet she cannot embark upon a war without ensuring her supplies of iron, as the struggle would otherwise be hopeless.

Given the general Imperialistic tendency of Japan's policy, the lack of iron and coal of the quality required for metallurgic works is in itself an incentive sufficiently powerful to induce Japan to seize territory on the Asiatic continent.

The present-day condition of Japan is complex, because to further her Imperialistic policy she would have to come into an open conflict with other Powers, and especially with the United

States. A vicious circle appears to arise. In order to promote her Imperialistic aims, Japan requires iron. And in order to seize iron, she must needs follow an Imperialistic policy.

This vicious circle can only be broken in the near future by the following means :—

As economic conditions in Japan preclude the possibility of successfully competing in armaments with the United States, Japan must arrest the tempo of these armaments at all costs. This would give Japan a breathing space in which to complete her economic, and more especially her metallurgic, preparations for the war, while masking these preparations by the clever moves of her diplomacy. When these preparations are completed, she will start a "preventive" war without giving her more powerful and rich neighbours the chance of bringing their armaments to the necessary proportions.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF MODERN JAPAN

THE Japanese Revolution of the middle of the nineteenth century which opened a new era for regenerated Japan was prompted by the desire of the popular masses for the restoration of Imperial Power. This peculiar trait of the Japanese Revolution is often overlooked by Europeans who are inclined to apply their own European standards to the social life of the East.

Every political revolution entails social changes. So it was in Japan, where the Revolution affected class distinctions. It completely destroyed the old feudal system in the country. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fundamental process which provoked the Revolution differed from that which brought about the French Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century, and the Russian Revolution of 1917.

I would venture to describe the process which took place in Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century as the desire of the people to break through the boundaries of the islands into which it had been driven from time imme-

morial and which had become too narrow. The feeling of national self-preservation inspired the nation, with ever-growing intensity, to create a strong and united commonwealth. Even a superficial study of history cannot fail to prove that whenever a strong nation comes into conflict with its neighbours, such struggles produce internal changes aiming at the establishment of a strong and centralised Power. Thus the Roman Republic proclaimed a dictatorship in times of war. Thus the Moscovite State, which fought for deliverance from the Tartar yoke, evolved the autocracy of the Russian Czars. When the German nation found itself in straitened bonds in Central Europe, it created a strong Imperial Power. And so it was in Japan. It is the same social process, and only from that point of view can the inner meaning of the events that are taking place in that country be fully understood.

The penetration of Europeans into Japan was the spark that lit the fire of national energy and provoked the process described above.

The forcible opening of several Japanese ports for European trade disturbed the quietude of the country of the Rising Sun, and disclosed the importance which was the direct result of its long cultural isolation. The people, slighted in their national pride, assassinated Shiogun-li-Kamon, who signed in 1858, under pressure from Europeans and against the will of the Mikado, the pact which opened the Japanese ports to Europeans. That was the beginning

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of the casting off of the Shiogunate. When you study the history of Japan, you are confronted with an apparent paradox; the downfall of the Shiogunate is effected according to the watchwords: "Respect the Emperor" and "Down with the White barbarians," while at the same time the leaders of the Revolution preach persistent adaptation of the material culture of these very barbarians.

The paradox, however, is only an apparent one. The inner logic of the movement is clear to those who would understand the psychology of the Japanese people.

On my last journey across the Pacific, I heard the following explanation of the national Japanese boxing jiu-jitsu from an old professor of the sport:

"When Europeans fight, they always endeavour to set their own strength against that of their opponent. The Japanese jiu-jitsu teaches first of all to endeavour to use the opponent's strength against him." He illustrated the idea by the following example: "Two boxers are trying to bring one another down. Their efforts are made in opposite directions. The boxer who applies the jiu-jitsu method will at first offer some resistance to his opponent, in order to induce him to put all his strength into the task of mastering the forthcoming obstacle. If the boxer then suddenly swerves from the direction taken by his opponent and hits him in the back, he will inevitable force him to fall. By this method you add your

opponent's strength to your own and may therefore win in spite of being the weaker of the two." This fervent adept of jiu-jitsu eloquently expounded the idea that the Japanese sport was not only a method of physical fighting, but a whole system of philosophy. He is, of course, perfectly right. That is the doctrine of the Japanese struggle in all its manifestations. That is why those who made a revolution in the name of the deliverance from White barbarians were the first to apply all their energies to the task of adopting all the powerful traits these barbarians had shown. In studying the foreign policy of Japan, her strategy and tactics, one detects the application of the methods of jiu-jitsu.

In 1889, a Constitutional Government was formed in Japan. Marquess Ito was its founder. In selecting a model for his work, he did not look to the truly democratic Constitutions of Great Britain, the United States, or France, but chose the German Constitution. There was so much in common between the strivings of Japan and of Germany for the creation of a strongly centralised Power.

Ito's Constitution presupposes the Divine origin of the Mikado's power. The Emperor, of his own free will, summons the representatives of the people to take part in the legislation, but he remains the sole source of power.¹ The

¹ Article 4 from the Japanese Constitution.—"The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of Sovereignty and exercising them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."

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Ministers are responsible to the Emperor, not to Parliament. In times of war or civil strife the Emperor may suspend the laws embodied in the second chapter of the Constitution which determine the civic rights of his subjects. The Emperor has the right to declare war and to make peace. Characteristically enough, the strength of the Army and Navy in peace time and the expenditure for the maintenance of these forces are determined by the Emperor.¹

The following lines give an idea of the autocratic and unrepresentative character of the Japanese Government, and disclose the manner in which the power is concentrated in the hands of a military and civil bureaucracy without any parliamentary checks:

Article 7 of the Constitution reads: "When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year." Thus the control of the public purse is placed outside the scope of the powers of the Diet.

The reforms which were carried out in 1919 by the Hara Cabinet did not materially alter the situation. The land tax, the payment of which gave the suffrage, was reduced to three

¹ Article 12.—"The Emperor determines the organisation and peace standing of the Army and Navy."

Article 67.—"Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the Government."

yen, and this caused the number of voters to increase from 1,460,000 to 2,860,000. Universal suffrage would have given the vote to about 13,000,000 men. Hara's liberal reforms have thus left more than 10,000,000 men without suffrage.

The Marquess Ito's *Comments upon the Constitution* offer a key to the understanding of the spirit of the Japanese Constitution. The *Comments* are the political Bible of all leading circles in Japanese politics. Based as it is upon the regenerated Shintoist religion, Ito's doctrine reaffirms the religious attitude towards the sacred person of the Mikado, the Son of the Sun, who embodies in himself and his ancestor the soul of Japan herself.

The spreading of the main principles of Ito's *Comments* forms the basis of all school teaching in Japan, towards which the main energy of the Government of regenerated Japan is directed. In the Japanese schools, religious worship of the Mikado is coupled with the intense fostering of national militarism. In 1873, the number of children educated in schools was 40 per cent.; in 1900, 90 per cent.; and in 1915, 99½ per cent. Naturally, in these circumstances religion and education work hand-in-hand for the spreading of an influence which no Japanese can escape.

In that respect a great effort is required for the European to understand the psychology of the Japanese people. Not merely prejudices, but our European logic have to be discarded.

The strength of the spirit described above

was manifested in the following incident. The Emperor Mutzuhito died on July 20, 1912. Marshal Nogi, who was in command of the Army besieging Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, decided to accompany his sovereign to the abode of the everlasting Sun. At the sound of the first salvo of guns that announced to the subjects of the Mikado the beginning of the funeral ceremony, Nogi committed *hara-kiri*. His aged wife followed his example. It is significant that Marshal Nogi, who had espoused all the intricacies of the German military doctrine, had preserved intact all the sentiments of a Japanese Samurai.

Another striking fact.

Owing to the enormous losses Japan had suffered in the siege of Port Arthur, Marshal Nogi failed to acquire popularity which would have otherwise been enjoyed by the conqueror of the stronghold that had been for decades the object of the ambition of the Japanese people. When Nogi landed in Japan, the crowds at the pier met him in dead silence. After his suicide, Nogi became the most popular hero of the war of 1904-5. Admiral Togo and Marshal Oyama, who were the victors over the Northern Colossus, receded to the background before the shade of the Samurai who had remained faithful to the traditions of the people. The small house where the tragedy was enacted is a place of constant worship in the same degree as the most revered shrines.

The process which led to the establishment

of a strong central Power likewise created in Japan an elemental movement for the increase of territory. Japanese Imperialism is not an invention of a handful of politicians, or of chauvinistic political parties. It is the expression of the spirit of modern Japan. It has led to the creation of an original Government organ. Alongside with the Cabinet and the Parliamentary machine which attract the attention of Europeans, there is the "Privy Council," the so-called "Genro." Its members are drawn from the same aristocratic clans which had been leaders in the Revolution : Satsuma, Cochū, Kizen, Tosa. As a matter of fact, foreign policy is directed by the "Genro." Even now, no Cabinet can free itself from the tutelage of the "Genro." This body has many means, besides its intimate connection with the Mikado, for maintaining its influence. For example, only Lieutenant-Generals and Vice-Admirals can be Ministers of War and of the Navy, and these ranks are bestowed chiefly upon the clans Satsuma and Cochū. When members of the "Genro" come to the conclusion that the policy of the Cabinet is not conducted upon the lines which they favour, and when other methods fail, the "Genro" secretly instructs the Ministers of War and of the Navy to resign from the Cabinet : at the same time, all other possible candidates are also secretly forbidden to enter the Cabinet. In these circumstances, foreign policy must needs be in the hands of the military party, whether avowedly or covertly. No Govern-

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ment can recede from the Imperialistic path ; it can only change its façade.

From 1873 till 1894, the Government was in the hands of the statesmen who were engaged in the internal reorganisation of the country, and were also preparing the annexation of Korea and of China. From 1894, when the new era began of victorious wars with China and Russia, the military party was in power almost uninterruptedly and openly. This lasted till the fall of the Terauchi Cabinet in 1918. The victory of the Allies over Germany exercised the world over the effect of strengthening democratic tendencies. Japan did not escape this influence, and the Hara Cabinet came into power. Hara was one of the leaders of the Liberal Party Seiyukai which fought for the extension of suffrage. Hara, nicknamed "the first Commoner," did not belong to the Japanese aristocracy or to the military party. But he was unable to cast off the yoke of that party. As a matter of fact, Hara, although he did not profess the rabid chauvinism of the military party, was also an Imperialist with regard to China and Korea. As a journalist he always preached the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics," which meant, of course, a free hand for Japan in Korea and China. Against the European cries of "The Yellow Peril" he launched the watchword of "The White Peril." Hara has now perished from the assassin's dagger. We shall never know the real cause of that murder.

The masses of the Japanese people are warlike. The brilliant victories which they achieved over the Chinese and the Russians have but stimulated these natural sentiments. In that respect, the attitude of the Japanese people can be likened to the spirit of Germany before the war of 1914.

The Japanese are extremely fond of all manifestations of external power. In 1905, the Japanese Government consented to send representatives to the Peace Conference at Portsmouth. Although Admiral Togo's naval victories had removed every possible menace to the Japanese islands, the fine achievements of the Japanese Army had failed to produce decisive results on land. Manchuria was too remote from the vital centres of Russia, but the gradual strengthening of the Russian Army was threatening to upset the strategical balance in favour of Russia. The Peace of Portsmouth gave Japan a free hand in Manchuria and delivered Korea and Southern Sakhalien into her hands. Apart from the economic advantages of such a peace, the strategical results were far-reaching. By the occupation of Korea and of Southern Sakhalien, Japan made a large step forward towards the conversion of the Japanese Sea into an inland sea.

This result, however obvious to specialists, was not fully perceived by the masses. The latter wanted to have a striking acknowledgment of Russia's defeat in her acceptance of the demand for an indemnity. They knew that Japan

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was unable to compel Russia to accept these terms, and they therefore accused their representatives of treason. Baron Komura, the chief Plenipotentiary who signed the Portsmouth Treaty, had to conceal the date of his return to Japan. The Mikado had to cover the treaty by his own sacred personal authority and to declare in a manifesto that he considered the terms of peace as "honourable and adequate."

It would be a mistake to deny that continued close intercourse with European culture may affect the spiritual development of Japan. European scepticism will sooner or later serve to destroy the mystic halo which now surrounds the person of the Japanese Ruler. Also, conditions may arise which will threaten the present-day structure of the central Power. The negative aspects of capitalism have already given rise to an opposition movement among the workmen. The governing circles will presumably make the necessary concessions in due time, but one thing is certain—in spite of all their wisdom, they will not surrender power without a fight. They have an excellent expedient for retaining their authority with the masses: successful foreign policy which always flatters the conceit of the masses, and an improvement of the economic prosperity of the people at the expense of its weaker neighbours. Thus, the social movements which may be anticipated in the near future will also at first strengthen the Imperialism of Japan.

One is tempted to recall the comparison

between present-day Japan and the Germany of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. In both instances a psychology arises which results in "might" being stronger than "right." Given such a psychology, any agreement signed by Japanese diplomats can but be a "scrap of paper" if there is not such power behind it as would suffice to compel Japan to carry out the agreement.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN'S POLICY IN KOREA

It is the misfortune of the Korean people that they should have been the first nation that stood in the path of Japanese penetration into the Asiatic continent. Not even forty-three centuries of historical existence could save the Korean people from the endeavour of its powerful neighbour to absorb their national entity.

The methods applied by Japan in pursuing that end are highly instructive, as they disclose the future that is in store for other peoples who may lie across the path of Japanese expansion.

In the first place, Japan having defeated China in 1894–95, compelled her to renounce the protectorate of Korea and to recognise the latter's independence. In the second stage, which began after Japan's victory in the Russian war of 1904–05, Japan proclaimed her own protectorate of Korea. The third stage was reached in 1910 when Japan annexed Korea.

These are the three acts of the drama through which the Korean nation has lived. All the political and administrative steps taken by Japan in Korea represent the methodical realisation of the plan of the absorption of the weaker nation by the stronger one.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth which gave Japan a free hand in Korea, the Korean Army was reduced to ten battalions, then to 1,500 men, and finally completely disbanded. Civil administration, railways, postal services, telegraphs, customs—were seized by Japan. After the annexation the process of "Japanisation" of Korea was started and conducted with the utmost energy. The Korean flag is prohibited.¹ All that might remind the Korean people of their national existence is carefully eliminated. Education is strictly controlled by Japan. The Japanese language is declared the dominant and official language. Even religion is interfered with. Japan implants Shintoism and the Japanese interpretations of Confucius and Buddha, and grants privileges to those Koreans who accept such doctrines.

In justice to the Japanese it must be admitted that they have done a great deal in Korea in respect of material culture. Since the annexation, 400 miles of railway have been built, and 16,000 miles of telegraph wire; the harvest of rice and of other cereals has been doubled, sanitation in the towns has greatly improved, tramways introduced, etc. The traveller in Korea cannot fail to be impressed by these changes.

The Korean people, however, are groaning under the Japanese yoke. The Press is under

¹ The very name of the country, "Korea," is replaced by "Chosen."

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severe censorship. The country is covered with a network of secret police which is watching every slightest manifestation of the Korean national spirit. The Koreans, always a weak people, are hopelessly crushed under the chains by which they are fettered. All revolts are put down by the Japanese with implacable severity. The Koreans retaliate for oppression by terroristic crimes, which lead, of course, to renewed repression and to the system of government terrorism.

The Korean political leaders endeavoured to appeal to the European Powers, but their pleadings addressed to the Hague Tribunal were of no avail. In 1919, under the impression of President Wilson's fourteen points, in which the principle of self-determination was proclaimed, representatives of the Korean people sent a new appeal to the nations of Europe and America. But the victors who sat at Versailles and promised to make a just peace, remained deaf to this cry of despair.

How modest the wishes of the Korean people are can be gauged from the appeal to the world which we quote below. This appeal was signed in 1919 by the leaders of all religious and cultural groups in Korea. This document is most interesting and is probably unique. It bears the signatures of representatives of three different religions, namely :

- (1) The leaders of the so-called "Tien Tao Hui," or "Heaven-Worshippers";

- (2) The representatives of the Y.M.C.A. and of the Methodist and Protestant Churches in Korea;
- (3) The representatives of the Buddhist priesthood in Korea.

Manifesto of the Korean People issued to the World on March 1, 1919.

“ We, the Korean Nation, hereby declare the independence of Korea before all nations, assuming that this will be generously recognized by them.

“ We declare this with the united voice of twenty million people in the name of Justice and Humanity. We are no mean people, having a long history as a distinctive, integrative, self-governing nation through the course of forty-three centuries. It is a most solemn duty for us to secure the right of free and perpetual development of our own national character and ability, adapting ourselves to the principles of the reconstruction of the world.

“ It is nearly ten years since we were for the first time in our history put under the yoke of another nation, and made a victim of the cursed militaristic Imperialism of the old world. Since then, how much our spiritual development has been hampered, our national dignity injured! And how many opportunities have been lost to make a contribution to the civilisation of the world!

“ Oh, fellow-citizens! The most urgent and

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the greatest duty for us is to secure our national independence, in order to wipe out the past resentment, to get rid of the present sufferings, to remove the future threatenings, to stir up the national spirit and vitality so long suppressed under the unjust régimé of Japan, and to leave our children eternal freedom and perfect happiness instead of the bitter and shameful inheritance of to-day. We shall fight to the last drop of blood in the great cause of liberty.

“We do not blame Japan for breaking treaties in which so often and so solemnly she promised to guarantee the independence of Korea. Nor do we complain of her for calling our land a colony and treating us as slaves. It is unnecessary for us to find faults in others. We do not mean to take such a measure as to avenge ourselves upon Japan. All we desire to do is to right wrongs done to us, not by the Japanese nation, but by a few of her statesmen who were led by the ‘old’ aggressive policy.

“See the actual outcome of the annexation which was made in 1910 without the free consent of the peoples concerned. A bitter and irreconcilable animosity is growing deeper and deeper between these two peoples, though it has been glossed over with a tranquil appearance caused only by heavy pressure, and by a series of so-called statistics, most of which have nothing to do with our welfare. It is clear that the two nations must and ought to enter into a new relation for good friendship in order to enjoy permanent happiness and to avoid further perils

on both sides. Moreover, in the matter of maintaining the peace of the Far East the independence of Korea is not without deep significance. It is not only because the injustice which subdued twenty million people of Korea must prove a source of incessant alarm, but because any further occupation by Japan of Korea is likely to provoke more suspicion and fear against Japan in the minds of four hundred million people of China ; whereas true friendly relations between the two peoples are the only basis upon which any eternal peace of the East can possibly be established. Could any international peace be expected without the perfect harmony of the Eastern Nations ? Hence we are assured that the independence of Korea is worthy of universal consideration and approval.

“ Ah ! a new epoch is opening before us. The age of Might is gone, and the age of Right has come. The history of mankind will henceforth shine with the glorious light of the new civilisation led by the spirit of humanity which has been fostered through all ages past. We have no hesitation and no fear in marching on towards our goal, as we are now at a new turn of the world and a fresh start of the universe. We shall live. We shall be free. We shall enjoy the Heaven-given happiness. We shall do our best as a member of the family of the nations in rendering any service called for to promote the peace and civilisation of the world.

“ We have arisen now ! Justice is with us. Righteousness is leading us ! All citizens, male

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and female, young and old, have risen up from the gloomy dungeon to push their way into the bright Freedom. Our forefathers inspire us, and the world supports us. Go on, fellow-citizens !

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KOREAN
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE UNION."

CHAPTER V

JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA

THE idea of domination over China has long since been deep-rooted in Japan. As the weakness of China was revealed, and the consciousness of Japan's own strength grew, this idea was transformed into one of those popular yearnings which have always led to long periods of stubborn struggle.

It is quite obvious that 300,000,000 Chinese people cannot be "annexed" with their ancient and profound culture by so elementary a process as mere conquest. As we have demonstrated in the preceding chapter, even the 17,000,000 of Koreans are not being so easily absorbed by Japan. In order to reach her goal, Japan follows the methods borrowed from her "White" masters, and which they had conceived in the days of Imperialistic policy.

The seizure of China's outlets to the sea is the first step towards the economic subjugation of China. It leads to the capture of the maritime transport and to the control of China's foreign trade.

In Tientsin, Shanghai and Hong-Kong, the Europeans form a barrier to the intercourse between

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the outward world and the three main regions of Central China with their capitals, Peking, Hankow, Nanking, Wu-chang, Nan-iang and Canton. In the beginning of the twentieth century the Europeans likewise seized Kiao Tchao (Germany), Wei-hai-wei (Great Britain), and Kwang-chow-wan (France). Since 1900, the "concert" of foreign Powers controlling the foreign trade of China was joined on equal terms by Japan.

This, however, did not satisfy the latter's secret aspirations. In accordance with the principles of *jiu-jitsu*, she marches alongside her White competitors while carefully preparing such a condition of affairs as would allow her to reap the harvest of the "White" endeavour at the most convenient time.

Japan's strategical manœuvre consists in placing herself between the points seized by the Europeans and the ocean, thus cutting them off from the outer world. The entire policy of Japan towards China is a methodical, logical fulfilment of this plan.

In 1874, under the excuse of obtaining compensation of the murder of a few Japanese in the islands of Riu-Kiu, Japan forced China to cede these islands. As a result of the war of 1894-5 Japan obtained Formosa and the Pescador islands, and penetrated into Korea. After the Russian War of 1904-5 she gained a firm footing in Korea and in the Liaodun peninsula. The seizure of the latter was dictated not only by the desire to dominate in Southern Man-

churia, but also to control the outlets into the Yellow Sea of the Northern part of Central China. Taking advantage of the Great War, Japan seized Shantung in 1914. At the same time, she took every possible step in order to gain exclusive influence in the Chinese province of Fu-Kien. When all this is accomplished, it may be taken for granted that the Northern and Central parts of Central China will be strategically blocked. Liaodun and Shantung are the first line which ensures such domination. Korea, the Riu-Kiu islands, Formosa and the Pescador islands are the second line.

The consequences of such a contingency are self-evident: All maritime routes will be in the hands of Japan. The application to these routes and to the ports of the principle of the "open door" will depend upon the goodwill of Japan. When Japan chooses openly to denounce that principle and to defend her hegemony in China by the force of arms, she will find herself placed in exceptionally favourable conditions with regard to strategical bases against the competitors whom she will be ousting, as well as against China in the event of the latter trying independently to oppose the aggressive policy of Japan.

The tenacity with which the Japanese are pursuing this plan of blocking the northern and central parts of Central China is further illustrated by their conduct during the Great War.

The Japanese diplomats never fail to assert

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that Japan's participation on the side of the Entente was dictated by idealistic motives. They declare that the Country of the Rising Sun opposed German militarism and remained true to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The facts, however, point in a different direction. On August 14, 1914, Japan sent an ultimatum to Berlin in which the aims of the war are clearly indicated: Germany must cede to Japan her rights in Shantung. Had Germany yielded, there would have been no excuse for going to war.

In November, 1914, Tsing-Tao, the fortified centre of the German colony of Kiao-Tchao, capitulated to the Japanese troops.

The ruler of China, Yuanshikai, offered to Japan the assistance of Chinese troops for the purpose of expelling the Germans from the territory of the Celestial Empire. The Chinese troops, with the aid of the British and the Japanese, might have blockaded Tsing-Tao, and the fate of the stronghold would have been sealed. No sacrifice would have been made by Japan. But she declined the offer, effected a landing, not near Tsing-Tao, but at a distance of 250 miles in Lungkhou. Under the pretence of military operations, Japan seized not only the German colony of Kiao-Tchao, but the entire railway Tsinanfu-Tsing-Tao.

Having declined the participation of China in the military operations, Japan thus gave her own diplomats an excuse for going back on their

previous declarations that Germany was being driven out of Tsing-Tao in order to restore the sovereign rights of China. The Japanese ultimatum to China of May 7, 1915, states:—

“From the military and economic point of view the importance of Kiao-Tchao is so great that Japan has made tremendous sacrifices in blood and money for its conquest. Japan therefore acknowledges no obligation to restore Kiao-Tchao to China.”

The casualties of Japan in the occupation of Kiao-Tchao were 336 killed and 1,180 wounded, apart from the 280 men who went down in a small cruiser sunk by the Germans. Suffice it to compare these figures with the millions of Russian, French and British killed in the war in order to answer the question whether Japan can seriously claim that her rights have been bought at the price of her sons' blood.

We have already alluded to the strategic interests of Japan in Shantung. “Economic” interests mean nothing else than the seizure of the fruits of all the previous work of Germany in that region. “Economically” it is a rich booty. The Germans had invested enormous sums of money in the exploitation of Chinese concessions. They built the harbour, the Tsinanfu-Tsing-Tao railway, and began to explore the coal mines of Fantze and Hungchan and the iron ore of King-lin Chen. They forced China to grant a series of other concessions which

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practically gave them full possession of the rich province of Shantung.

Another method which is applied nowadays by strong nations with a view to subjugating weak ones is to obtain the monopoly of building and exploiting railways. The railway policy which is based upon that secret aim is a kind of "peace-time strategy."


Victory over Russia in 1904-5 gave Japan the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern railway. Immediately after the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan began to develop the railways in Southern Manchuria, and linked them up with the railway system of Korea. Southern Manchuria was thus secured for Japan.

The Tsinanfu-Tsing-Tao railway seized by Japan on the excuse of military operations against Kiao-Tchao not only ensures Japanese domination in Shantung, but affords Japan the possibility of approaching at Tsing-tau one of the two railway lines connecting Peking with the valley of the Yantze-Kiang.

In September 1918 Japan hastened to compel China to grant fresh railway concessions in order that the Peace Conference be faced with accomplished facts. Although they did not quite succeed, still the secret Chino-Japanese agreements on railway concessions in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shantung, signed on September 24 and 28, 1918, are very interesting. They are a vivid illustration of the motives which underlie the Japanese policy and strategy in China.

MAP No. 2.

The Eastern Parts of China and Asiatic Russia.



By these agreements Japan obtains the right to build and exploit what she calls the "four railways in Manchuria and Mongolia":—

1. Kaiyan-Ghirin.
2. Chan-Chung-Taonan.
3. Taonan-Jehol.
4. Jehol to one of the ports in the Yellow Sea beyond the Chinese wall.

When the reader glances at these lines on the affixed map, he will immediately see that the possession of these lines not only gives Japan new territories in Manchuria, Mongolia and Chihli, but constitutes a stepping stone towards the strategic encircling of Peking from the north.

In Shantung Japan obtained concessions for the building of the lines Tsinanfu-Shunth and Kao-mi-Hsu-tchao. A new glance at the map will show that Peking is cut off from the south. These lines, like two outstretched arms, embrace the two lines connecting Peking with the valley of the Yantzkiang. At the same time Japan approaches through Shunth the province of Shensi, which is the richest of all the Chinese provinces in iron and coal.

There was a significant detail: the agreement was signed by the Chinese Minister at Tokyo, not on behalf of the Peking Government, but in the name of the Minister of Railways.

The following is the list of iron, coal and

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copper mines with up-to-date technical equipment in various provinces of Central China¹:—

<i>Provinces.</i>	<i>Iron.</i>	<i>Coal.</i>	<i>Copper.</i>
Shensi	9	34	3
Shantung.....	8	29	—
Hupeh	2	10	7
Chihli	1	48	2
Ho-Han	—	28	—
Kiang-si.....	—	14	—
Anh-wei	—	8	—
Hunan	—	3	—
Kiang-su	—	2	—
Sze-chwan	—	1	3
Kweichow	—	—	2
Yunnan	—	—	44
	—	—	—
	<u>20</u>	<u>177</u>	<u>61</u>

It has been mentioned in one of the preceding chapters that Japanese industries needed iron. The desire to obtain the necessary supplies of iron is thus perfectly legitimate. Japan's endeavour to acquire concessions for the production of iron and coal is not, therefore, a proof of the Imperialism of her policy. But, as the French saying goes, *Le ton fait la chanson*. Japan is trying to get hold of the entire iron industry of China. She is doing so by the veiled seizure of political and administrative control of the respective provinces of China. To Europe and America this is presented under the guise of the nebulous formula of "special interests in the regions of China adjacent to Japan." Manchuria and Shantung are first in that list. When Japan succeeds, she will have deprived China

¹ These data relate to 1915.

of one half of the latter's iron mines. With that end in view Japanese diplomacy will soon begin to argue as convincingly as ever that the provinces of China further east, Shensi, Hupeh, Chihli, etc., are likewise "adjacent." The Celestial Empire will then be deprived of all its iron and of the greater part of its coal. Not only would Japan be strengthened strategically for the coming struggle against the "white barbarians," but China would be entirely in her hands.

In 1911 a revolution broke out in China which put an end to the Imperial power, but has failed so far to establish a stable and united Government. Civil war, with all its consequences, has completely ruined China. A favourable atmosphere has thus been created for secret intrigues of any foreign power intent upon exploiting the internal weakness of China. Japan has taken full advantage of this situation. By bribing the adventurers who rise to power in China, Japan obtains economic concessions and influences the policy and administration of that country. At a very low price, in the shape of securities for loans granted by her banks, she obtains exclusive rights on railways and other concessions. In grasping the natural riches of China she has recourse to the methods of an usurer. This can be illustrated by the following fact: in 1918 Japan acquired from China as a security for a loan of 30,000,000 yen the right to exploit all the mineral riches and forests in the provinces of Ghirin and Heilungchiang. The

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territory of these two Manchurian provinces is one and a half times the size of France. Japan does not shrink from concluding such deals behind the back of the Peking Government and signs agreements with individual Ministers and Governors. This paves the way to bribery of corrupt Chinese officials on a large scale. In his book *Russia as an American Problem*, Mr. J. Spargo says (pp. 155-56) :—

“ Agents of the Japanese Government prepared elaborate lists of Chinese officials, civil and military, their habits, debts, financial interests, and so on. If a Chinese official needed money for any purpose he was almost certain to be approached by a Japanese agent, or some Chinese intermediary, suggesting how the necessary money could be readily obtained. Sometimes this took the form of a bribe disguised as a personal ‘loan.’ Sometimes a contract would be let in such a manner that the impecunious official was made a nominal partner and enabled to draw big dividends. In other cases the contractor had to pay rich commissions to the official acting as ‘agent’ for the Japanese corporation in whose name the contract was made. One of the most common methods was to induce public officials to raise large loans in Japan for public works, giving local revenues or concessions as security, and to appropriate large sums for themselves. In this way, not only was China undermined through the corruption of her officials, but, at the same time, Japan secured control of immense economic

interests in China, a veritable mortgage upon her future."

Japan applies the same methods in dealing with the middle and lower grades of the Chinese administration. Her firms always manage to have at their disposal wagons and ships which they refuse to lend, on the plea of these wagons and ships being engaged for the transport of the goods of other Powers. A great many goods of Japanese manufacture escape the Chinese customs. A position is thus created, which was described by a passing observer in the following sentence: "My investigations entitle me to assert that there is a secret system which gives Japanese goods special privileges denied to those of all other countries" (*Christian Science Monitor*, August 30, 1918).

In spite of China's energetic protests, Japan organises on an extensive scale the contraband supply of opium. This traffic is extremely profitable to the Japanese farmers, who cultivate the plant.

In granting loans and armaments to various Chinese generals who have grown like fungi on the unhealthy soil of protracted civil war, Japan is preventing the establishment of a stable and united Chinese Government. Japan fans the enmity which has developed ever since the beginning of the revolution between the North and the South of China. A glance at the map will show that by this manœuvre Japan is separating from Peking the provinces (of which Canton is the political centre) that are at present

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outside the sphere of her influence. By this strategical *coup* Japan reduces the part of China which she is intent upon exploiting as a beginning.

We give below a list of the loans granted by Japan to China in 1918. This list discloses with sufficient clearness the real nature and aims of Japanese policy in China.¹

¹ JAPANESE SECRET LOANS TO CHINA IN 1918.

	Yen.
1. Jan. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to the Central Government on the Bureau of Engraving and Printing	2,000,000
2. „ Yokohama Specie Bank's share of Group Bank advance for flood relief	200,000
3. „ Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Military Governor of Chili for military purposes	1,000,000
4. „ Second advance on Second Reorganisation Loan by the Yokohama Specie Bank....	10,000,000
5. „ Japanese Syndicate to Rebel Government of the Province of Hunan	20,000,000
6. „ Yokohama Specie Bank to the Central Government for suppression of plague	1,000,000
7. „ Loan to the Province of Fukien for general purposes	1,000,000
8. „ Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Chihli Province for purchase of yarn for spinners for flood relief	1,000,000
9. „ Tai-hei Kumei Syndicate to Central Government for purchase of arms	14,000,000
10. „ Second loan to Bank of Communication made by Bank of Chosen, Bank of Taiwan and Industrial Bank	20,000,000
11 Apr. Chosen Group of Banks to Telegraph Administration for extension of lines	20,000,000
12. „ Loan to Fengtien Province made by the Bank of Chosen	3,000,000
13. Feb. Loan to Shihpingkai-Chengchiatun Railway made by Specie Bank.....	2,600,000
14. „ Nanjin Railway Loan between Nanchang and Kiukiang	100,000
15. Apr. Wireless Loan	3,000,000

The campaign of 1914 on the European theatre of war showed that the struggle against Germany would be long-drawn, and would require an effort such as none of the Powers had anticipated. This was taken into account by the Japanese strategists and politicians. On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister at Peking, without any preliminary negotiations, presented to the Chinese Government "twenty-one demands,"¹ which in reality were but an extensive scheme of Japanese penetration into Shantung, Fukien and the valley of the Yantzkiang, as well as the extension of the rights of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia. The so-called "fifth group" of demands, which was kept secret,

	Yen.
16. May Loan to Chihli Province by the Chosen Bank	1,000,000
17. June Kinin-Huaining Railway Loan by Banks of Chosen, Taiwan and Industrial Bank of Japan	20,000,000
18. ,, Loan to Shensi Province	2,000,000
19. ,, Yokohama Specie Bank of Hupeh Province	1,000,000
20. ,, Okura Forestry Loan made by Industrial Bank of Japan and the Chosen Group of Banks	30,000,000
21. July Kirin Forestry Loan made by Industrial Bank of Japan and the Chosen Group of Banks	30,000,000
22. ,, Second Re-organisation Loan—third advance.....	10,000,000
23. ,, Loan on Yu Kan Iron Mines, Kiangsi Province	3,000,000
24. Sept. Loan to Shantung Province	1,500,000
25. Oct. Peking Telephone Loan	5,000,000
26. ,, Manchurian and Mongolian Railway Loan	40,000,000
27. Nov. Shantung Railway Loan.....	26,000,000
28. ,, Military Agreement Loan	20,000,000
29. Dec. Peking-Suiyan Loan	4,000,000

¹ The twenty-one demands are given in Appendix III.

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was nothing else than an infringement upon the sovereignty of China.

On May 7th, Japan presented another ultimatum, and China acceded to most of the claims included in the first part of the January "demands" (those that were made public). In her refusal to agree to the secret demands China was supported by the European Governments and by the United States, who brought pressure to bear upon the Government at Tokyo.

The secret clauses of the "twenty-one demands" were the following:—

1. The Chinese Government shall employ influential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.
2. Japanese hospitals, temples and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.
3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police, the settlement of which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places in China shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the police departments of such places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to make plans for improvement of the Chinese police service.
4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or

(more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government, or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly operated arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed, and Japanese material is to be purchased.

5. China agrees to grant Japan the right of constructing

- (a) A railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang.
- (b) A railway between Nanchang and Han-chow.¹
- (c) A railway between Nanchang and Chao-chou.

6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour-works (including dockyards) in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.²

7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China.

Had China accepted these conditions she would practically cease to exist as an independent State. Japan would have acquired sovereign control over China. By seizing the armaments of China, Japan would have deprived her of the possibility of ever defending her interests against any future aggressive designs of her neighbour.

¹ These railways are indicated on Map, No. 2.

² It is interesting to compare this point with the point in the demands that were made public "that the Chinese Government should pledge itself not to cede or lease to a Third Power any harbour or bay along the coast of China."

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Mr. Putnam Weale, in his book, *The Fight for the Republic in China*, is right when he considers that these terms were designed to administer the *coup de grâce* to the independence and integrity of China. “Not only is a new sphere—the Fukien Province—indicated; not only is the mid-Yangtse, from the vicinity of Kiukiang, to serve as the terminus for a system of Japanese railways, radiating from the great river to the coasts of South China; but the gleaming knife of the Japanese surgeon is to aid the Japanese teacher in the great work of propaganda; the Japanese monk and the Japanese policeman are to be dispersed like skirmishers throughout the land . . . ; Japanese advisers are to give their necessary advice in finance, in politics, in every department—foreshadowing a complete and all-embracing political control. Never was a more sweeping programme of supervision presented, and small wonder if the Chinese when they learned of this climax, exclaimed that the fate of Korea was to be their own.” These demands were, indeed, “a more vicious assault on Chinese sovereignty than the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia of July 1914.”

Japanese do not care to recall these points. Pamphlets edited in Japan in defence of her policy in China and Korea make but a passing mention of these points, and state that these were included as a diplomatic ruse in order to induce China to accept the first section of the “twenty-one demands” which dealt with Japan’s “special interests in China.” The impartial

student will hardly agree with this naïve excuse. Logic will compel him to come to the conclusion that the "twenty-one demands" embody all the Japanese scheme for domination over China which Japan has been pursuing and will pursue in the future.

Less than three years after this decisive but abortive effort Japan had succeeded in inducing China to enter into an agreement for common military and naval defence. Like the famous "twenty-one demands," this treaty attracted but little notice in Europe and America—outside diplomatic circles—owing to the preoccupations of war; but it affords evidence not to be neglected by those who wish to form an accurate conception of Japanese political aims. The agreement was ostensibly concluded, according to the preamble, "in view of the daily spread of enemy influence in Russian territory and the threatened danger to the peace and weal of the whole Far East." It provided for Sino-Japanese military co-operation, standardisation of their plans, transport, communications, and military codes, and therefore placed Japan virtually in control of the entire land forces of China. The naval agreement was in similar terms, the following extracts being particularly illuminating:

"In order to ensure the rapidity and accuracy of naval operations and transports, the naval authorities of Japan and China shall exchange officials who will keep the two departments in mutual communication and touch. With regard to the repair of warships, arms, naval machinery,

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etc., and materials necessary for such repairs, assistance shall be reciprocally afforded as far as possible. This stipulation holds good with regard to munitions of war. The Japanese and Chinese Navies shall establish information bureaux at such points as may be considered necessary, and shall exchange the charts and information necessary for operations. A naval code for mutual use shall be agreed upon. The present agreement and the detailed stipulations pertaining thereto shall not be published either in Japan or China, but shall be treated as naval secrets."

Both the military and naval agreements were to lose their validity on the termination of state of war between Japan and China, on the one side, and Germany and Austria on the other. That condition has since been fulfilled, but it is evident from the notes addressed to Japan by the Peking Government during the autumn of 1920 that the former had not up to then withdrawn the troops which it had sent to occupy military posts in China by virtue of the defence agreement.

Japan's policy in China is the policy of a double-faced Janus. One face is astutely hidden from Europe and America, but that is the face which represents the real policy pursued by Japan for the attainment of hegemony over China. The other face is shown to the foreign Powers with the sole object of concealing the true aims of Japanese aspirations as long as Japan does not consider herself strong enough

openly to declare her supremacy.¹ "Shantung will be restored to China. Japan has not the slightest intention of infringing upon the sovereign rights of China, upon the integrity of her territory and upon the principle of the 'open door.'" Such are the official declarations of Japanese diplomats. The late Prime Minister, Mr. Hara, and Admiral Kato, Japan's representative at the Washington Conference, declared that Japan thought of nothing else than peaceful intercourse with her neighbour, but that constant internal strife in China compelled Japan to take temporary measures in order to safeguard the interests of her subjects, to maintain trade and to get from China the necessary raw materials.

In justice to Japan it must be admitted that the Europeans themselves gave Japan an example of duplicity in their Far Eastern policy. When the strong figure of the Japanese warrior appeared on the threshold of the peacefully slumbering Chinese dragon, the European Powers protested against the Treaty of Simonoseki, which gave the Liaodun peninsula to Japan. Immediately afterwards, however, Germany, Russia, Great Britain and later France seized Kiao-Tchao, Liaodun, Wei-hai-wei and Kwang-chow-wan. Such was the example of the defence of the principle of Chinese sovereignty and of the inviolability of her territory.

This unscrupulous policy was immediately reflected in China. In 1900, the Boxer rising

¹ H. C. Bywater, *Sea Power in the Pacific*, pp. 50-51.

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took place, and the combined expeditionary forces of the United States, Japan, Russia, Great Britain and Germany soon mastered China.

During that joint campaign the European Powers had the opportunity of gauging the strength of the new Japanese Army.

Having embarked upon the policy of "spheres of exclusive influence" and "territorial concessions," the European Powers naturally took the next step in seeking to arrive at an agreement for sharing the hegemony in China with the strongest Power in the Far East—Japan. Great Britain was the first to enter upon that path, and concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902, which has been renewed several times since.

Russia having lost the war of 1904–5, made treaties with Japan in 1907, 1910 and 1916. France made an agreement with Japan in 1907.

On the whole, the situation that had thus arisen can be described as follows: Seeing that a strong plunderer was coveting China, the European Powers, fearful of losing their share of the booty, have tried to win over the plunderer and to agree with him upon the spoils. Such a situation proved full of significance. Japan was indeed a very capable disciple.

We have already alluded to the manner in which Japan took advantage of the situation arising out of the World War. Japan succeeded in making in 1917 a special agreement even with the United States, the only Power that had pursued a straightforward policy in China.

On November 2, 1917, Mr. Lansing and Vis-

count Ishii signed an agreement in which the special interests of Japan in China were recognised, especially in the regions adjacent to Japan. This agreement is the consequence of the United States becoming a member of the Entente struggling against Germany, of which Japan was likewise a member, and of the critical condition of Russia.

It is true that the principle of the integrity of China's sovereignty is confirmed in the agreement, as well as the inviolability of her territory and the principle of the "open door." But the idea of "special interests" is in obvious contradiction with these principles.

Japan interpreted this agreement as definitely giving her a free hand in China. Several days after the agreement was signed, the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. V. Kroupensky, reported to the Russian Government that "Japan is manifesting with increasing clearness that she intends to interpret the recognition of her special interests in China in the sense that other Powers are not entitled to any action in that country without previous consultation with Japan. Such a state of affairs is tantamount to the establishment of Japanese control over China's foreign relations. At the same time, the Japanese Government attaches no importance to its recognition of the principles of the open door and of the integrity of China." A few days later the same Ambassador reported having had an interview with the Foreign Minister, Baron Motono, and having gained the

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impression that this statesman was fully aware of the possibility of future misunderstandings in respect of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. "Nevertheless," wrote Mr. Kroupensky, "Motono thinks that by that time Japan *will have at her disposal more efficacious means than the United States of enforcing the interpretation given by Japan.*"

Japanese diplomacy lost no time in impressing upon China that henceforward the latter was entirely in the hands of Japan. With that end in view the words "special interests" were translated into Chinese "specially acquired advantages, i.e. predominance" in the copy of the Lansing-Ishii agreement presented by the Japanese Government to the Peking Government for information.

The great European War has had one important moral consequence. The European Powers have come to the conclusion that their former Imperialistic policy inevitably resulted in wars. The new ideas which tend to bring mankind nearer to the ideals of peaceful intercourse are beginning to be perceived, however dimly. There can be no doubt that Europe and America will be diverted more than once from that path. They have already done so at Versailles when they departed with the connivance of President Wilson from the Fourteen Points which the American statesman had been striving to establish as the foundation of future international intercourse. It is likewise certain that this was only a deviation from the right path, not its abandonment. Mankind is weak and will wander

in the darkness for a long while before it finds the truth. At the dawn of these new international relations, for which humanity has suffered and shed rivers of blood such as the world has never seen, Europe should renounce her Imperialistic policy with regard to China and protect, together with the United States, this peace-loving people from the plundering appetites of its warlike neighbour. It should be remembered that Japan did not make the same sacrifice in the Great War as the European Powers. The cleansing fire of war never touched Japan. The situation that was so favourable to her aspirations had only intensified them.

It was with this hope that the Chinese representatives came to Washington. On November 16th, the chief Chinese representative presented a memorandum to the Conference, in which the desiderata of China were somewhat vaguely formulated.¹

¹ 1. (a) The Powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and the policy of the administrative independence of the Chinese Republic.

(b) China, upon her part, is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate nor lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power.

2. China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-called "open door,"² or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept it and to apply it to all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception.

3. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these

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In presenting the wishes of China in this abstract form, the Delegation evidently did not wish to dot the "i's" and cross the "t's," as the principles of the integrity of China, of the "open door," and of the inviolability of China's sovereignty had more than once been violated.

In order to put these principles into practice, all the territorial concessions already obtained from China in Liaodun, Shantung, Hong Kong, Kuang-che-wan and other agreements contrary

regions without previously notifying China and giving her an opportunity to participate.

4. All special rights, privileges, immunities, or commitments, whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities, and commitments now known or to be declared are then to be examined with a view to determining their scope and validity, and if valid to harmonise them with one another and with the principles declared by this Conference.

5. Immediately, or as soon as circumstances permit, the existing limitations on China's political, jurisdictional and administrative freedom of action are to be removed.

6. Reasonable and definite terms of duration are to be attached to China's present commitments, which are without time limits.

7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights or privileges, the well-established principle of construction that such grants shall be strictly construed in favour of the grantors is to be observed.

8. China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in any future wars to which she is not a party.

9. Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East.

10. Provision is to be made for future conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and Far East as a basis for the determination of common policies by the signatory Powers in relation thereto.

to the sovereign and administrative rights of China will have to be revised.

The demand for the abandonment of secret diplomacy in respect of China and of agreements between other Powers concerning China is one of the instruments of defence against the policy of extortion and of violence. Closely scrutinised, this demand means : (1) To publish all secret agreements concluded by Japan with different governing Chinese authorities in Peking and in the provinces during the period of unrest and civil war in China of which Japan took advantage; (2) to put an end to, or at least to render more difficult, the policy of intrigue and bribery; (3) to denounce such treaties as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1916 which represent in reality agreements between strong Powers for the exploitation of the weak Power—China.

China, at present in a state of utter debility, is trying to find a champion in the United States against powerful Japan, which is watching on her threshold.

The wishes of China are irreconcilable with the entire policy of Japan. And yet the representative of Japan issued in the first days of the Conference a short and extremely cleverly worded communique, the meaning of which is that the internal affairs of China are China's own concern, and that the Conference is only called upon to place her foreign relations on a proper footing. Japan is anxious to maintain the happiest relations with China. Japan fully

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endorses the principle of the "open door," and accepts just and honest competition with all other nations. Japan will endeavour to come to an agreement for the cancellation of extraterritorial rights.

By such declarations Japan is trying once more to lull the attention of America and Europe, because as long as China is not cured of its social strife and has not recovered strength, she can offer no resistance to Japan's Imperialism. In order that the just demands of China may be satisfied, other forces must be brought into being.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUTURE CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC

THE masses of the German people were convinced in 1914 that right and justice were on their side. Germany had to offer millions of her sons on the altar of war before renouncing the idea of basing her history upon the principle of world hegemony.

In order to lift the veil over the impending events in the Pacific, we should understand the viewpoint of the Japanese people. That viewpoint has very much in common with the mental attitude of the German people in the last few decades preceding the Great War. If we penetrate that viewpoint, we shall find that Japan stands on the eve of a long period of stubborn struggle which can only be stopped by real, material forces, not by diplomatic negotiations alone.

The motives which will prompt Japan to engage in the struggle are so deep and so vast that not one but several wars will have to be waged before a solution is reached. Let us illustrate this view by another example from recent history. The wars of 1864, 1866, 1870–71 and 1914–18 are but links of the chain of events

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in the struggle of the German people for expansion in Central Europe.

We find the first links of the same chain in the East of Asia: the Sino-Japanese Wars of 1874, 1894 and 1900, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and the war against Germany in 1914-18. What is the next link? To answer that question we must define the Power that stands first and foremost across the path of Japanese expansion. Russia, ruined by the Bolsheviks, will not be in a position for some time to come to be a serious opponent. Russia's temporary weakness, moreover, tends to make her Far Eastern possessions an easy prey to Japan. The other two possible adversaries are Great Britain and the United States.

The interests of Great Britain and Japan in the Far East are related chiefly to trade with China. Japan and Great Britain headed the list of countries trading with China. The British are mainly interested in dealing with Southern China and Tibet. An amicable agreement with Japan as to spheres of influence was therefore possible, and Great Britain was the first of the European Powers to enter upon that path in 1902.

Great Britain would have followed that course even now had the menace to her maritime routes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific and to her Dominions in the Pacific not begun to loom in the dim distance. Japan, with her ever-increasing population, is akin to a vessel which, owing to growing internal pressure, will

needs begin to disgorge its contents. As we have pointed out in Chapter I, these contents will flow in the direction of the islands forming a chain around the Eastern shores of the Asiatic Continent, linking it up with Australia. The latter foreshadows the impending menace, and realises that with her population of six millions she will be unable to stem the tide of that influx.

Moving in that direction, Japan will come against the United States in the Philippines.

It is the traditional feature of British foreign policy skilfully to weaken Britain's rivals by means of setting other Powers against them, and to join in the struggle when the forces of these other Powers prove inadequate.

Thus in the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain was the most stubborn opponent of the growing might of France. Great Britain organised and supported a coalition of European Powers against Napoleon. Russia, Austria and Prussia drowned Europe in blood. Great Britain took a minor part in secondary theatres of war—in Spain and in Portugal—until fate compelled her to join in the momentous battle of Waterloo. That, however, was merely dealing the final blow to Napoleon.

In the same way, when Germany grew at the close of the nineteenth century into a serious competitor, Great Britain did not bind herself by an alliance with France and Russia, but joined in an *entente cordiale* which left her free to refrain from becoming a partner in an

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active struggle between these two countries and Germany. We all remember that Great Britain's decision to join France and Russia in August 1914 was not taken till the eleventh hour. Great Britain declared war when the neutrality of Belgium was violated, and that was a direct menace to the British Isles.

The lessons of the past seem to justify the belief that Great Britain will take advantage of the fact that the United States stands first in the path of the Japanese expansion, and will endeavour to hold back as long as possible. For this reason the conflicting interests of Japan and the United States in the Pacific, and the conditions in which the struggle is likely to be waged, must first be dealt with in this chapter, in order that we may form an idea of the probable outcome of the conflict.

The United States needs the Chinese market. In 1918, out of the total imports into China the share of the United States was only 13 per cent., but in the following year it rose to 16 per cent, and in 1920 amounted to 20 per cent.

For the future, the need of the United States for the Chinese market is bound to grow. All the markets of North and South America cannot suffice for the industries of the United States, which are developing so rapidly. Suffice it to recall that the population of all the States of North and South America, excluding the United States, is only 80,000,000. The European market was closed to American goods after the war owing to the high exchange, and will in

future be flooded with goods manufactured by European industries, as European countries will defend their markets by the same protectionist system which the United States has heretofore so rigorously applied. China, with her 325,000,000, offers such alluring possibilities as a market that the United States is not likely to renounce it easily. China, owing to cheap labour, is also a splendid field for capital accumulated in the United States after the war.

Quite apart, therefore, from idealistic motives, and out of mere practical commonsense, the United States is compelled to defend the principles of Chinese independence, of the integrity of Chinese territory, and of the "open door." As long as these principles are professed only in words and ambiguous diplomatic notes, Japan will not oppose the United States. Japan, moreover, is interested for strategical and economic reasons in gaining time and not showing her cards. The moment the United States begin to insist upon the strict application of these principles, she will have to stand face to face with the country of the Rising Sun.

Emigration is another question in which the interests of Japan and the United States clash. Justice in this matter is on the Japanese side. Another glance at the map affixed to the first chapter will convince the impartial reader that in the east of Asia and in the Japanese islands there is a dense population of many dozens of millions, whereas the shores of the Pacific are but thinly populated by peoples of the "White

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race," who will not "make room" and forego the advantages which they possess. Are we to trust the sincerity of those who talk about the horrors of war and describe it as a relic of the barbaric past, but who will not surrender of their own free will any of the privileges they have acquired by force? The surplus of the Japanese population must find room, and Japan will be fully justified in claiming "a place under the sun" and demanding the recognition of the principle of racial equality. It is no longer an economic question for Japan, but a matter of national and even racial self-esteem. On these grounds the Japanese Imperialists hope to recapture the goodwill of China, who is at present deeply irritated. After imposing her yoke upon China, Japan will endeavour to overcome the instinctive opposition of China by fanning the flames of racial hatred. It should be borne in mind that the ground is extremely favourable, and by working in that direction Japan will represent her domination as being a holy war for the rights of the Yellow races.

The United States, whose example will be followed by Australia and Canada, will not give in to Japan in the matter of free emigration. The question of the freedom of Yellow emigration will not be solved substantially at the Washington Conference, or at any other subsequent Conference. In this matter the United States will follow the example of Japanese diplomacy in the Chinese question. Resolutions and agreements will be full of ambiguities and

omissions, and every effort will be made to create a façade that will not shock the Japanese and yet will "keep the door shut." The question of the freedom of emigration is pregnant with excuses for conflicts in the near future. It contains the inflammable material which may blaze up from the slightest spark. The more remote future, however, is even more menacing. The longer Japan is prevented from sending out settlers to suitable countries, the stronger will the explosion be. The boiler is bound to explode sooner or later if internal pressure is not relieved and safety valves remain closed. The Government circles in Japan will have to face a dilemma. Either they will have to devise measures to prevent the increase of the population, or they will have forcibly to open the channels for Japanese emigration. Can there be any doubt the decision that victorious Japan will arrive at? Japan is thus bound to come into contact with the United States in the Philippines.

The conflict between the interests of Japan and of the United States is therefore much more serious than it may appear to the casual observer.

The only means of averting war with Japan in the twentieth century would be for the United States to evacuate the Philippines and to renounce her interests in Eastern Asia. Is that possible? The United States might camouflage her retreat before the power of the country of the Rising Sun by granting to the Philippines

the promised independence, and by afterwards refusing to defend the islands against their absorption by Japan. Such a retreat, after all the sacrifices and expenditure already incurred would be a heavy blow to the national pride of the Americans. There has never been a case in history of such a reversion of policy without any attempt to solve the question by fighting. Another circumstance renders the free withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines still more improbable: by gaining possession of the islands, Japan would become the sole mistress in Eastern Asia.

The policy of "Great Japan" will not alter its aggressive course, as that would also be against all historical precedents. Japan will continue to strive for supremacy in the Pacific. Step by step she will drive her rivals out of all the Pacific islands. The United States will be forced to bid farewell to the Monroe doctrine. "Great Japan" will be strong enough to make her voice heard in all matters concerning the Panama Canal and the Pacific coast of America. That is, of course, a matter of the remote future. It is, however, the object of the present book to examine the Pacific problem in its entirety.

The United States will not withdraw from the Philippines. She will have to throw down the glove. The limitation of naval armaments does not offer a concrete solution of the problem. It will not even delay the war, because it is to the advantage of Japan. We shall discuss this statement at full length in the next chapter,

and confine ourselves here to considerations of general strategy.

Japan cannot compete with the United States in peace-time armaments. The difference in economic and technical possibilities is so great that comparison would be futile. The only weapon at the disposal of Japan is "preventive war." And even this weapon Japan is not in a position to apply for economic reasons mentioned above, as well as for strategical reasons to which we will now turn.

War is the continuation of peace-time policy by force of arms. Policy will impose the following tasks upon the Japanese strategists in the event of an armed conflict with the United States :—

1. To ensure Japan a free hand in Northern China, Korea, and in the Far Eastern Dominions of Russia.
2. To afford the opportunity of the complete absorption of China, thus opening the way for Japanese penetration in the southern direction.

The first series of tasks is that which Japan has been and will continue to carry out in the near future. From the military viewpoint, these aims can be attained by a mere strategical defence in the Japanese, the Yellow and the Okhotsk Seas. The second series constitutes the next step in Japanese policy, and may become apparent in a future somewhat more remote. From the military point of view it differs from

the first series in that it requires a strategical advance of which the Philippines would be the objective. The seizure of the Philippines would be the crowning act of the policy which bends towards the isolation of China ; all lines connecting China by sea with the outer world would fall under the control of Japan, and the Chinese Sea would be encircled. The importance of the seizure of the Philippines for the opening of lines of emigration southwards has already been mentioned.

The problem with which the United States General Staff will be confronted when politicians will recognise the impossibility of gaining their ends will be :

1. To compel Japan to reverse not in words, but in deeds, her aggressive policy in China.
2. To defend the Philippines, or reconquer them if Japan succeeds in seizing the islands in the first stage of the war.

The defence alone of the Philippines can be accomplished by strategical defensive. All other aims can be attained through a strategical offensive.

This correlation of policy and strategy places Japan in a more advantageous position than the United States. It allows Japan to assume the outward appearance of the "Power that is attacked" in the event of an armed conflict. Such is at present the psychology of the popular masses that they will always be against the Power

that appears to be the aggressor. In 1870 Bismarck forged the Ems telegram when he was determined to go to war with France, in order that the formal declaration of war should come from that country. He needed this political blackmail in order to enlist the sympathy of the masses unable to understand the inner meaning of events. War can only begin if one of the Powers is compelled by its policy to start the offensive. In order to form an idea of the general strategy of the contemplated struggle, it is therefore necessary to analyse the probable strategical offensive plans.

It would seem futile to draw fantastic pictures worthy of the pen of Mr. H. G. Wells, of millions of an expeditionary army landing in Japan or in the United States. Military history knows of two cases only in which huge armies crossed the ocean: the British in the Boer War, and the United States in the Great War. The first took place in a war with a small nation deprived of a fleet, and was but an operation for the transport of reinforcements and complements. The United States Army was sent across the Atlantic in the Great War in similar circumstances, with the difference that the operation was carried out on a larger scale and under the menace of German submarines. But the main difficulty characteristic of such expeditions did not exist. The American troops landed in the rear of the French and British Armies. Also, in order that the United States Army might cross the Atlantic Ocean, an ocean of Russian, French and British

blood had to be shed. In the future conflict between the United States and Japan neither of these States will be in a position to undertake the objectives which were inherent in European wars, namely, the destruction of the entire armed forces of the enemy and the capture of his capital.

Should Japanese strategy deem it necessary to adopt an offensive plan, the Philippines would provide a convenient and easy objective. Irrespective of the demands of Japanese policy for the final conquest of the Philippines, an attack upon these islands would be prompted by the purely strategical aim of destroying the only American base in the Western Pacific.

American strategy is not quite so simple. All possible objectives for an offensive are far remote from the United States. It might even appear at first sight that Japan is unassailable. And so she would and will be if measures are not taken to remedy one of the most sensitive spots in her armour.

In the present circumstances a blockade would be a great danger in Japan.

Japan, as we have already said, has to import large quantities of raw material for her industries as well as for feeding her population. Japan is not alone in that position, but the want of iron ore places her in conditions of exceptional difficulty. It is truly the Achilles tendon of Japan's military might. In war time the demand for iron and steel naturally becomes much greater than in peace time. Also, the evolution of

military science is proceeding in the direction of a further increase of the armies' need for metals. We are loth to quote extensively from the statistics of the last war, but we venture to mention one typical instance. In the wars of the nineteenth century it was reckoned that in order to destroy or permanently disable one combatant, an amount of shells and cartridges equal to the average human weight had to be expended—in other words, about ten stone. In the last year of the campaign on the Western front about one ton of ammunition was spent to every German. In other words, the proportion increased tenfold.

It would be impossible to give in these pages a complete estimate of all the raw material, the imports of which would have to be guaranteed to Japan in the event of going to war. That vast and intricate task is now being performed by the Japanese General Staff, and forms an important part of the general war scheme. The General Staff will present to the political leaders of the country a series of demands, the fulfilment of which will constitute the economic preparation for the war. These demands will be formulated in accordance with the exact data concerning the strength of the Army and Navy mobilised for the war, with the data concerning the requirements of the country in respect of all kinds of raw material and of its home production: the probable length of the war will also be taken into account. It is not, however, necessary to go into the minute details

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of these elaborate calculations in order confidently to assert that Japan will require a REAR OF THE ASIATIC CONTINENT in the war with the United States.

Even in the Russo-Japanese War, when Great Britain and the United States maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality and there was no naval blockade, Japan, in spite of continued victories on land and sea, had to seek peace after eighteen months, because the territory of the Japanese Islands proved AN INADEQUATE ECONOMIC BASE.

The following conclusions seem, therefore, obvious :

1. The blockade is a war measure which is likely to produce decisive results against Japan, but with that end in view, Japan must be cut off from the Asiatic continent.
2. Japan cannot engage in an armed struggle against the United States without organising a solid base on the Asiatic continent.

The sea will be the main arena on which these strategical offensive designs will be carried out by both belligerents. In the last war, naval operations supplemented, as it were, the conduct of the war on land. In the coming conflict between the United States and Japan the operations of the armies on land will likewise supplement the naval operations. For this reason, in our analysis of what the relative strength

of the belligerents would be, we shall deal chiefly with the relative power of the navies.

The only active method of warfare against Japan which is at the disposal of the United States—the blockade—is in itself a slow method. It should also be remembered that the United States will not realise her shortcomings in respect of military preparedness until the war is actually upon her. Such is the law of history that every nation has to pay a price in the blood of its sons for a real understanding of the science of war. It is quite possible that the United States may lose the Philippines in the first days of the war. That will not induce the country to stop fighting. With redoubled energy, the United States will develop her economic and technical might. The country will make a far greater effort than that which we witnessed in the Great War. That will require time, and it is more than likely that the United States will not be in a position to blockade Japan effectively till an arduous and intense preliminary work, begun after the declaration of war, is completed. Japan will thus be compelled to prepare for a protracted struggle.

CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC

THE sea power of Japan is ever in existence, and ever present in the Pacific. That ocean has been its cradle for centuries past, and the Japanese Fleet is as much at home in the waters of the Western Pacific as the British Fleet in the waters of the Eastern Atlantic.

The entire Fleet of Japan has been and always is a Home Fleet which has but one object—to keep a firm hold over the strategic keys of the waters over which the rays of the “Rising Sun” are spreading.

What is the strength of the United States Navy which could be despatched to the waters of the Western Pacific?

The nearest base of the American Fleet—Pearl Harbour, in Honolulu—is 5,000 miles distant from the axis of the Western Pacific—the line connecting Nagasaki with the Philippines.

When the American Fleet starts from its base on a long journey of 5,000 miles into the waters of the Western Pacific, the big battleships whose scope of action after a voyage of 5,000 miles would deprive them of the amount of fuel

necessary for battle, cannot form part of the fleet. The older the ships, the greater the chances that their worn-out mechanism would prove inadequate for immediate battle after a long cruise. In order not to impair so important a tactical asset as the speed of the squadron, the fleet would not include ships of old construction. Destroyers and submarines incapable of long cruises would likewise stay behind. Otherwise, the American Fleet would run the risk of sacrificing quality to quantity, and would repeat the mistake made by the Russian Government in sending Admiral Rojestvensky's squadron to the Pacific during the Russo-Japanese War. Owing to the inclusion in that squadron of obsolete ships, its speed was reduced to 10 knots in the Battle of Tsushima, whereas the best divisions of the squadron could have developed a speed of 16 knots. Considering that the average speed of the American Fleet is two knots lower than the Japanese, it would hardly be wise to risk further loss of speed. It seems, therefore, doubtful that ships of a class inferior to the *Wyoming*, light cruisers of under 30 knots, destroyers under 1,000 tons and submarines other than of the ocean-going type, will be seen in the Western Pacific.

Bearing in mind these facts which determine the strength of the American Fleet capable of operating in the waters of the Western Pacific under normal tactical conditions, let us examine the relative strength of the American and

Japanese Fleets, such as it was in the beginning of 1922.

In the Battle of Jutland five German battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought type fought for over three hours with six British cruisers of the same type. The latter were supported in action by four British super-Dreadnoughts and three battle-cruisers. The numerical superiority was obviously on the British side, as well as the strength in armament. And yet the battle resulted in the loss of three British battle-cruisers while the Germans lost only one (on the following day).

After the war and the surrender of the German Fleet the Allies investigated the construction of the German ships. They found that although in peace time the German ships appeared to be weaker than the British, there were certain details of construction and peculiarities in the armour which made those ships not only no weaker than their rivals in battle, but even stronger. This shows that the actual strength of the present-day structure of battleships cannot be accurately gauged, as many details which are kept secret escape the attention even of specialists who do not get access to these secrets.

It is particularly difficult to estimate the material strength of the Japanese Fleet because published information is very scanty, and details are concealed under the cover of rigidly observed secrecy characteristic of the Japanese people. We may therefore expect many surprises from the Japanese Fleet in action, such as were dis-

closed in the German Fleet in the battle of Jutland.

Technical progress in naval construction is, of course, a matter of common knowledge, and details alone are kept secret. It would, therefore, be a mistake to assume, for example, that five battleships of a certain type would be equal in strength to ten ships of the same type and of approximately the same period of construction. But it would not be safe to assume that the same ten ships would be stronger than seven or eight corresponding enemy ships, especially after the experience of the Jutland battle.

Until now, in estimating the comparative strength of fleets, a simple method was applied : the sum total of ships of a given type was taken for each fleet and the difference in numbers was accepted as indicating the relative strength. This method was quite rational in the days of sailing ships, as well as during the period of the so-called "line tactics" of the steamship fleets. In those days the tactical ideas of the combatants were limited to the "line ahead" formation, and their chief concern was to maintain the line unbroken at all costs.

After the Russo-Japanese War, and especially after the Great War, naval tacticians have definitely abandoned this narrow and out-of-date conception, and have adopted the so-called "manceuvring tactics," which give ample scope for carrying out the plans of the commander-in-chief, and consist in the manœuvring in battle

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of several autonomous tactical units (divisions) composed of a limited number of sister ships. In this connection the speed of the ships acquires greater importance, as it is the main feature of the manœuvre.

Those who have witnessed the birth and development of these tactics in the Japanese Fleet during the Russo-Japanese War, and have followed the evolution of the tactical conceptions of the Japanese Fleet clearly manifested in Japan's programmes of naval construction, know that in future battles the Japanese Fleet will apply the newest methods of manœuvring tactics. That which we could only dimly perceive in the British tactics of the battle of Jutland—the free movements of independent divisions—will undoubtedly be fully and clearly manifested in the tactics of the Japanese Fleet in future naval battles.

In forming a comparative estimate of the strength of the American and Japanese Navies one should bear in mind the present-day tactics, and not only compare the numbers of individual ships, but also of tactical units (divisions) which these fleets contain. The Japanese Fleet was formed and continues to be formed into divisions of four battleships of the same type. This number is considered in present-day tactics as the best for manœuvring and for the concentration of fire in battle. For this reason Japan has been building her ships in pairs and combining these pairs into divisions. The American Navy had no definite system in that respect. At

first the scheme of building ships in pairs seemed to have been adopted, but it was subsequently altered when three battleships were built of the *New Mexico* type. After building two ships of the *Tennessee* type, the United States began the construction of four ships of the *Maryland* type, and has now adopted the system of six ships.

In the first months of 1922 the first line Japanese Battleship Fleet will consist of two and a-half divisions: half-division of the *Nagato* type, a division of the *Fuso* type, and a division of the *Kon-go* type.

In accordance with the types of battleships and the requirements of modern tactics, two and a-half divisions could also be formed of first line American battleships, a half division of three battleships—*Maryland*, *California*, and *Tennessee*, a division of five battleships: *New Mexico*, *Mississippi*, *Idaho*, *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*, and a division of four ships: *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, *New York* and *Texas*. These divisions would be superior in gunfire strength to the corresponding Japanese divisions, but would have inferior speed, as is shown in the table on page 102.

In the table the first line comprises battleships armed with 15 and 14-in. guns, and the second line battleships armed with 12-in. guns and more than ten years old. Considering that the 16-in. gun is nearly 75 per cent stronger than the 12-in., and that the second line battleships are not supposed to resist the fire of 16-in. guns, it must be admitted that in

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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE FLEETS AT THE END OF 1921.

First-Line Battleships. Capital Forces.

AMERICAN FLEET.

JAPANESE FLEET.

I. Half-Division.

<i>Maryland</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 8 \text{ 16-in. guns} \\ 2 \text{ torpedo tubes} \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Nagato</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 8 \text{ 16-in. guns} \\ 8 \text{ torpedo tubes} \end{array} \right.$
<i>California</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 12 \text{ 14-in. guns} \\ 2 \text{ torpedo tubes} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Mutsu</i>	Speed, 23 knots
<i>Tennessee</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots} \end{array} \right.$		

II. Division.

<i>New Mexico</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right.$	<i>Ise</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 12 \text{ 14-in. guns} \\ 6 \text{ torpedo tubes} \end{array} \right.$
<i>Mississippi</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 12 \text{ 14-in. guns} \\ 2 \text{ torpedo tubes} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Hiuga</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right.$
<i>Idaho</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right.$	<i>Fuso</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right.$
<i>Pennsylvania</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Yamashiro</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \text{Speed, 23 knots} \end{array} \right.$
<i>Arizona</i>			

III. Division.

<i>Nevada</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 10 \text{ 14-in. guns} \\ 3 \text{ torpedo tubes} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Kon-go</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 8 \text{ 14-in. guns} \\ 8 \text{ torpedo tubes} \end{array} \right.$
<i>Oklahoma</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Hi-yei</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right.$
<i>New-York</i>		<i>Hazuma</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right.$
<i>Texas</i>		<i>Kirishima</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \text{Speed, 27\frac{1}{2} knots} \end{array} \right.$

Second Line Battleships.

I. Half Division.

<i>Wyoming</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 12 \text{ 12-in. guns} \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots} \end{array} \right.$	<i>Setsu</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 12 \text{ 12-in. guns.} \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots.} \end{array} \right.$
<i>Arkansas</i>			

II. Division.

<i>Florida</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 10 \text{ 12-in. guns} \\ \text{Old model} \end{array} \right.$
<i>Utah</i>	
<i>Delaware</i>	
<i>North Dakota</i>	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \text{Speed, 21 knots} \end{array} \right.$

a general battle against ships of the first line the ships of the second line can be of no use. On the contrary, should they come under the fire

of the 16-in. guns, they may turn an easy prey to the enemy.

The second line division of the American ships of the *Florida* type, moreover, cannot operate in the waters of the Western Pacific because the radius of action of these ships does not exceed 6,000 miles, not to mention the fact that they have 12-in. guns of the old pattern and are inadequately armoured.

The experience of all naval battles of the last years tends to show that the battle is decided by the newest battleships, whereas the old ones do not affect the issue. The relative strength of the contending fleets, and more especially in the Western Pacific, depends therefore upon the power of the battleships of the first line.

On the whole, therefore, the relative strength of the two fleets would be the following :—

<i>American Fleet.</i>	<i>Japanese Fleet.</i>
$2\frac{1}{2}$ Divisions of 12 battleships, 132 heavy guns, 28 torpedo tubes, 21 knots speed.	$2\frac{1}{2}$ Divisions of 10 battleships, 100 heavy guns, ¹ 72 torpedo tubes, 23 knots speed.

In other words, the first line American Fleet will have the same strength of divisions, two battleships and approximately one-third of heavy guns more than the Japanese, but will be weaker in respect of speed and torpedo tubes. Does that mean that the American Fleet will be stronger than the Japanese, and the victory of the former is assured ? We doubt it. Experience in the Jutland battle teaches us that a

¹ Superiority in 16-in. guns is taken into consideration, the 16-in. guns being estimated 50 per cent stronger than the 14-in.

certain advantage in ships and guns is not a decisive factor in battle.

We are not inclined to attribute excessive importance to the advantage which the Japanese Fleet possesses owing to its threefold predominance in torpedo tubes. It should be noted that the modern torpedo has about the same range as gunfire, and it is quite likely that it will be used in battle to the same extent as the guns. In the Jutland battle both sides made use of torpedoes, and there is reason to believe that they were not altogether unsuccessful. The growing importance of the torpedo for battleships in modern battles has already been recognised by the British Navy, which has given it the same place of honour as the Japanese Navy.

In discussing the relative strength of the American and Japanese Fleets, we have deliberately omitted to mention the question of armour. The fact is that these navies have different systems of armour. The American system is to protect with very heavy armour the vitals of the ship, leaving a considerable portion of her surface unprotected. The Japanese system is to protect the vitals of the ship with thinner armour in order to cover the remainder of the ship with light armour. The United States adopted her system in accordance with the experience of peace time (experimenting on the old battleship *San Marcos*). The Japanese system was devised after the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved that the extent of armoured surface was more important

than the weight of the armour. As the Great War did not provide in that respect any reasons for altering the conclusions arrived at in the Russo-Japanese War, the relative merits of both systems are open to doubt. Coupled, however, with the higher speed of the Japanese Fleet, the Japanese system of armour is not unlikely to give Japan an ascendancy over the American Fleet, because higher speed will give the Japanese the opportunity of keeping in battle such distances as will reduce the importance of the weight of the armour, whereas the difference in the extent of armoured surface will remain, and will influence the result of the battle. Generally speaking, the advantage in speed is in itself a strong asset in favour of Japan. The speed of the main forces of the American Fleet does not exceed 21 knots, whereas the speed of the Japanese Fleet reaches 23 knots, and that of the Third Cruiser Division is as high as 27·5 knots. This advantage enables the Japanese Fleet not only to keep suitable distances in battle, but to concentrate its forces against a given part of the American Fleet, upsetting thereby the unfavourable balance in ships and guns.

At the same time, the presence in the Japanese Fleet of a cruiser division with a speed $6\frac{1}{2}$ knots higher than that of the American ensures the possibility of the Japanese Fleet carrying out with impunity all kinds of tactical manœuvres in action which the American Fleet will be unable to parry, as it does not possess a single division with a speed of over 21 knots.

This question, however, requires special consideration, and will be discussed below. We would only remind the reader of the important part played by the division of battle-cruisers in the battles of Tsushima and of Jutland.

We now come to the relative strength of the secondary forces of both Fleets in their present stage.

Light cruisers who do the reconnoitring and are "the eyes of the fleet" before the battle, and during the battle cover the battleships by repelling the attacks of the enemy destroyers, play a very important part. The practice of the last wars and modern tactics show that normally there should be in a present-day Fleet no less than one light cruiser to every battleship. The British and Japanese Navies maintain that standard. The latter has now ten light cruisers with a speed of from 26 to 33 knots.

The American Navy is at present very badly off in regard to light cruisers. As the Japanese Fleet has divisions of battle-cruisers of 27·5 knots, only such American light cruisers can operate against the Japanese as have a speed of at least 28 knots. There are no such cruisers in the American Navy, because the fastest cruisers of the type of the *Chester* do not attain 27 knots. This defect will be remedied in 1922, when five light cruisers will be commissioned of the *Omaha* class of 33 knots. Five cruisers to twelve battleships of the first line is obviously an inadequate number.

The opinion prevails in the American Navy that the deficiency in light cruisers can be counterbalanced by destroyers. It is true that in the Great War destroyers sometimes filled the part of light cruisers. But this produced favourable results only on limited theatres of war such as the North Sea, the Baltic and the Black Sea. In the waters of the Western Pacific, destroyers cannot replace light cruisers, because there, speed, a long radius, and a solid gun platform are of paramount importance.

In the beginning of 1922 the American Navy has about 300 ocean-going destroyers which answer the needs of modern battle. The Japanese Navy has only fifty such destroyers. It is, of course, impossible to estimate the numbers of destroyers that will be in a position to join in the long cruise of the American Fleet, and will be capable, with their delicate construction, of taking part in battle after such a cruise. It may, therefore, be assumed that the Americans will have a stronger preponderance in destroyers, which are also better armed than the Japanese. The effect of destroyers' action in battle depends, however, not so much on their quantity as on the pluck and endurance of their commanders. The record of the Japanese destroyers in the Russo-Japanese War is such as has hardly been equalled in naval history. At any rate, the superiority in the numbers of destroyers gives the American Fleet a good weapon of defence against the attacks of Japanese destroyers and submarines. These

attacks will be conducted with great vigour and complete disregard of human life.

The American Navy has over fifty ocean-going submarines. It is very difficult definitely to ascertain the number of submarines in the Japanese Navy capable of operating in the Western Pacific, because here again we are confronted with the impenetrable Japanese secrecy.

Whatever their number may be, it will not materially affect the relative strength of battleships in action. Submarines have not as yet reached such perfection in fighting capacity as would render them useful in a naval action conducted at a speed of 20 knots. In that respect they are no great improvement on the submarines that proved their utter incapacity in the battle of Jutland.¹

The same applies to aircraft—a weapon which has now become the craze and the fashion. One cannot help entertaining the fear that this fashion has many disappointments in store for those who have exaggerated hopes, when confronted with realities. Aeroplanes are not as yet capable of action in all climes and weather and of hitting fast moving ships with their bombs. It would, therefore, be premature to look upon aeroplanes as a decisive weapon in naval action.

The preceding argument refers chiefly to the

¹ The number of submarines will have an important bearing upon the development of strategical operations on the entire theatre of war.

“striking power” of the two fleets. As is well known, the full effective strength of a fleet consists not only in its striking power (gunfire, torpedoes, etc.), but in an equal measure in its manœuvring capacity. The latter must also be examined in detail in order that an accurate estimate be formed of the relative strength of the fleets.

The experience of the immortal battle of Trafalgar has taught us the immense value of manœuvre in action. The names of the greatest naval commanders are coupled with the term “manœuvre.” “Nelson’s Manœuvre” has been and will always remain the gospel of naval men all the world over. “Togo’s Manœuvre,” inadequately perceptible in the Battle of Tsushima, was until recently the object of study on the part of naval experts, and has been superseded by the brilliant and strong “Beatty Manœuvre” of the Jutland battle.

It would, however, be a mistake to assume that a manœuvre is the expression of the commander’s inspiration only. The history of naval warfare teaches that famous manœuvres have always been preceded by a period of intense development and crystallisation of tactical ideas. The entire commanding personnel of the fleet took part in this development of ideas, and afterwards produced the gifted Flag Officers and Captains who surrounded the Commander-in-Chief as indispensable satellites. Such were, for example, Nelson’s famous and immortal “Captains.”

Even a Commander-in Chief of exceptional genius would be helpless without such captains trained in independent action, because the manœuvres of a fleet, in their boldest conception, imply the free movements in action of several autonomous divisions. If the Commander-in-Chief is not assisted by officers in command of these divisions who are fully conversant with up-to-date tactical ideas, his plans, however audacious and inspired, are doomed to failure.

War is naturally the best school for the development of tactical ideas and for the training of capable commanders, and the Wars of Japan against China and Russia provided this inestimable training for the Japanese Navy. The Chino-Japanese War produced Togo and the admirals who covered themselves with well-deserved glory in the Russo-Japanese War. The latter war produced the admirals who will lead the Japanese Fleet in future battles. These admirals are now conducting the development of the Japanese Navy along the path which will make it the ideal weapon for the full application of the strength of the "manœuvre."

From the experience of the recent wars the Japanese admirals have learnt the idea to which they now adhere that higher speed and strong cruiser divisions for co-operation with battleships represent the goal which their Navy should strive to attain. At present, as we have already shown, the Japanese Fleet has an advantage in speed of two knots over the American Fleet, whilst there is one division of battle-cruisers

to every one and a half division of battleships. Such an advantage in speed, and such numbers of battle-cruisers in proportion to battleships, are considered in modern tactics as sufficient for the broadest and strongest manœuvres in action. The Japanese, however, are not satisfied. Their "8-8-8" shipbuilding programme contemplates equalising the numbers of divisions of battleships and of battle-cruisers in the Japanese Fleet. This shows the intensity of tactical thought in the Japanese Navy, and the degree to which its commanders are inspired by modern methods of naval action.

The same impulses are not noticeable in the American Navy. The advantage in speed has been freely conceded to the Japanese Navy, and the proportion of battleship and cruiser divisions is zero. Should one division of battle-cruisers of the *Constellation* type enter the line of the American Fleet, the above-mentioned proportion would be one-fourth : in other words, half the proportion existing in the Japanese Navy. This tends to show that in the American Navy no great importance was attributed to the "manœuvre" as a factor in battle, and that the development of tactical ideas had until recently been completely neglected.¹

The Spanish-American War afforded no opportunities for naval operations. It is, therefore, natural that no impetus was given for the creation

¹ This is likewise confirmed by the vacillating methods of battleship construction and by the scarcity of light cruisers in the American Navy.

of a school of admirals and for the development of tactical ideas in the United States Navy.

Should, however, brilliant commanders appear in the United States Navy, even in the absence of such a school, they will be unable to apply their knowledge of modern tactics and their genius to the conduct of battle. For the fact would remain that the United States Fleet would have to face the Japanese Fleet, in regard to manoeuvre, with the same handicap as if, in regard to "striking power," it were armed with obsolete and short-range guns.

The Japanese Navy developed in full harmony all the factors that constitute the power of the fleet in action, whereas in the United States Navy one factor only was developed at the expense of others. For this reason the United States Navy may be under a disability in action which may prove fatal if a clever opponent in forming his plan of action takes full advantage of this disability.

Taking into consideration all these facts, based not upon guess-work but upon the experience of recent wars, the estimate of the relative strength of the Japanese and United States Navies tends to show that should they meet in the Western Pacific, their chances would be even, not to speak of the strategical conditions under which a conflict would be waged in these waters.¹

¹ Mr. Bywater says (p. 128): "From the foregoing summary it will be seen that the modern United States Navy is exceptionally strong in heavy armoured ships and exceptionally weak

Let us now examine the shipbuilding programmes of the United States and of Japan, without touching for the present upon the changes which the Washington Conference may bring about in that respect. We will endeavour to derive a few conclusions from such an examination.

We have before us at present two shipbuilding programmes: the United States programme of 1916 and the so-called "8-8-8" Japanese programme.

The United States programme is intended to be completed in 1925, the Japanese in 1928. Both these programmes contemplate the construction of battleships of the "post-Jutland" type.

Both programmes were alike in that the battleships were to be armed with 16-in. and bigger guns and have special protection against torpedoes.

The battleships, according to both programmes, were to form the first line in both fleets.

Towards 1925 the following changes were to take place in both navies: three additional battleships of the *Maryland* type, six battleships of the *Indiana* type, all with twelve 16-in.

in fast cruising ships. It has a large but not excessive complement of destroyers, a limited number of ocean-going submarines, and a reserve of auxiliary vessels sufficient to cope with its requirements in home waters, but wholly inadequate to supply the bare needs of a fleet operating at a great distance from its bases. It would appear, therefore, that American naval policy up to the present has been guided mainly by considerations of Atlantic and Caribbean strategy; and that very little attempt has been made to forestall the contingency of war in the Pacific, where the conditions would be fundamentally different."

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guns, and six battle-cruisers of the *Constellation* type with seven 16-in. guns and a speed of 33 knots were to be commissioned in the United States Navy. Four battleships and four battle-cruisers were to be added to the Japanese Navy. In other words, the relative strength of the two fleets in 1925 would be as follows:—

UNITED STATES NAVY.	JAPANESE NAVY.
<i>First Line.</i>	<i>First Line.</i>
3 Divisions, 16 ships, 152 heavy guns.	2½ Divisions, 10 ships, 84 heavy guns.
<i>Second Line.</i>	<i>Second Line.</i>
2½ Divisions, 11 ships, 124 heavy guns.	2 Divisions, 8 ships, 80 heavy guns.
Total : 5½ Divisions, 27 ships, 276 heavy guns.	Total : 4½ Divisions, 18 ships, 164 heavy guns.

The United States Navy would be stronger by one whole division, 9 ships and 112 heavy guns.

In these circumstances, even taking into account all the considerations mentioned above, the United States Navy would have better chances of victory.

Should the United States, however, carry out her programme of 1916 and build no more ships after 1925, the relative strength in 1928, when the Japanese would have completed their programme, would be entirely different.

The figures would be as follows:—

UNITED STATES NAVY.	JAPANESE NAVY.
<i>First Line.</i>	<i>First Line.</i>
3 Divisions, 16 ships, 152 heavy guns.	4 Divisions, 16 ships, 148 heavy guns.

UNITED STATES NAVY.

Second Line.

$2\frac{1}{2}$ Divisions, 11 ships, 114 heavy guns.

Total : $5\frac{1}{2}$ Divisions, 27 ships, 276 heavy guns.

JAPANESE NAVY.

Second Line.

2 Divisions, 8 ships, 80 heavy guns.

Total : 6 Divisions, 24 ships, 228 heavy guns.

In view of the fact that in 1928 the ships of the second line in both fleets will be over ten to twelve years old, that having 14-in. guns as against the 16-in. and 18-in. guns of the first line ships, they would not be able to play a decisive part in action, we might assume that in 1928 both fleets would be materially of equal strength.

Such an assumption would, however, be unwarranted.

Half of the first line Japanese battleships would have 18-in. guns, which are much more powerful than the 16-in. guns with which all the first line battleships of the United States Navy are armed.

The squadron speed of the Japanese Fleet would still be two knots higher than that of the United States Fleet, as the latter would have to fall into line with the divisions of the *Maryland* type, which has a speed of 21 knots. In both lines of the Japanese Fleet the relative numbers of battleships and battle-cruisers would be 1×1 , in the United States Fleet— 1×3 in the first line and none in the second line. This seems to justify the contention that unless the United States succeeds in the

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next seven years in launching new battleships with 18-in. guns in excess of the programme of 1916, the Japanese Fleet will be stronger than the American.

The United States programme of 1916 was intended to remedy the capital deficiency in battle-cruisers, thus restoring to a certain degree the manœuvring capacity of the United States Navy.

The Japanese programme is permeated in every detail with all modern tactical ideas, and presents in that respect a model of which the Japanese naval men are justly proud.

We shall now examine the changes which the "Five Power Agreement" on the limitation of armaments has brought about in the respective strength of the United States and Japanese Navies such as it was in the beginning of 1922.¹

As compared with the table quoted above,² the United States has introduced into the first line two battleships of the *West Virginia* class (*Maryland*) instead of the second line battleships the *North Dakota* and the *Delaware*. The first line is thus strengthened by sixteen 16-in. guns. Japan has retained in her first line the battleship *Mutzu*, and has sacrificed the second line battleship *Setzu*.

¹ Extracts from the "Five Power Agreement" are given in Appendix No. 102.

² See page 102 of the present chapter.

The comparative strength of the fleets of the first line will, therefore, be the following:

THE UNITED STATES FLEET

3 divisions.

14 big battleships.

152 heavy guns.¹

32 torpedo tubes.

21 knots.

THE JAPANESE FLEET

$2\frac{1}{2}$ divisions.

10 big battleships.

96 heavy guns.

72 torpedo tubes.

23 knots.

The United States Fleet of the first line will be stronger by one half division (ratio 6 to 5), will have four battleships in excess of the Japanese (ratio 7 to 5), and an advantage of fifty-four heavy guns (ratio 3 to 2). The Japanese Fleet will have twice the number of torpedo tubes, and what is more important will maintain the signal advantage of 2 knots in squadron speed. The paramount feature from the tactical viewpoint is that the United States Fleet *remains without battle-cruisers*.

According to the "Five Power Agreement," four ships are maintained in the second line of the United States Fleet, whilst there are none in the Japanese Fleet.

¹ The advantage in 16-in. guns is taken into account, and 16-in. guns are estimated 50 per cent stronger than 14-in.

As we have already mentioned, battleships armed with 12-in. guns, and whose armour is not intended to withstand the 14-in. and 16-in. enemy guns, cannot play a decisive part in action against battleships armed with these calibres. Such obsolete ships as the *Utah* and the *Florida*, with limited supplies of fuel cannot at all be taken into account in estimating the relative strength of the fleets in the Western Pacific. The advantage of four second line battleships which the United States possesses is, therefore, problematical.

Yet the "Five Power Agreement" on the limitation of armaments is based entirely upon the tonnage ratio. According to the idea of the initiators of the Washington Conference, this ratio was 5 for the United States and 3 for Japan.

On the strength of the above comparison, we consider it correct to assert that *the actual relative fighting power of the United States and the Japanese Fleets is not accurately described by this ratio*. In the Western Pacific this relative strength approaches the ratio of 4 to 3.

The Japanese representatives at the Washington Conference requested that the 5 to 3 ratio be not mentioned in the text of the Agreement. They did so presumably not so much for considerations of national pride, but because the tonnage ratio does not express the real relative strength of naval forces. The Washington Conference began by solemnly proclaiming the 5-5-3 ratio, and ended in shyly eliminating

this ratio from the text of the Agreement, after the figures had been skilfully manipulated by experienced Japanese military and naval specialists.

The Five Power Agreement also takes tonnage as a basis for the relative strength of light cruisers, destroyers and avio-ships. Such a basis is still less correct in regard to the light forces of the fleet, because the operation of the latter depends in a greater degree than the operations of big battleships upon their bases, owing to the insignificance of the quantities of fuel they can carry, as well as to the fragility of their mechanisms. In the Western Pacific the United States has very few weak *points d'appui*. Her fleet, therefore, must have a much greater superiority in light forces than that which she has secured by the Agreement in order to counter-balance the activities of the Japanese light forces which may have many bases and *points d'appui* in those waters.

The ratio of submarine craft has not been established at the Washington Conference. At the plenary sitting of the Conference on February 1st, Mr. Hughes, the Chairman of the Conference, said that the question of the limitation of submarine construction should be dealt with by the "public opinion of the world," which, he trusted, would not allow any strengthening of submarine fleets. We will endeavour to show in the next chapter that the many well-equipped Japanese bases in the Far East afford excellent opportunities to Japan for intensive

submarine warfare, and that her submarine fleet will needs be a very powerful weapon. The endeavour to impose restrictions upon the activities of submarines which was made by the Conference in prohibiting attacks upon commercial ships belongs to the realm of platonic desiderata which every nation will disregard while defending its existence by armed force.

The above considerations seem to justify our general conclusion that the main aim of the Washington Conference of establishing a balance of power in the Pacific has not been attained by the Five Power Agreement on the Limitation of Naval Armaments. It is to be hoped that the great sacrifices which have been made by the representatives of the United States with a view to securing peace in the Pacific will not lead to the opposite results.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF NAVAL WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

IN the days of sailing ships, when there was no question of coaling stations, and when wooden vessels, if damaged, were easily repaired without going into dry docks, the strategical conditions of warfare did not influence the development of naval operations or the striking power of the fleets in the same degree as in our time. Sailing ships, therefore, had no difficulty in conducting operations thousands of miles away from their base. On the other hand, the complex and delicate mechanism of present-day battleships, and the enormous amount of fuel needed for their cruises¹ render modern battle

¹ In his book, *Sea Power in the Pacific*, Mr. Bywater quotes the estimate drawn by an officer of the United States Navy of the amount of fuel required for the transfer of the United States Navy (when it has the displacement contemplated in 1925) through the Panama Canal to the Philippines. This estimate shows that 249,000 tons of coal and 45,000 tons of oil would be necessary. Of these 129,000 tons of coal and 16,000 tons of oil could be carried in the ships' bunkers. The remaining 120,000 tons of coal and 28,000 tons of oil would have to be carried in twenty transport ships. According to this calculation, the fleet would have stores of fuel for ten days' anchorage after its arrival in the Philippines.

Taking these data into account, and bearing in mind that

fleets closely dependent upon their bases and deprive them to a great extent of their liberty of action.

Submarines, mine-fields, aircraft and long-range guns of the coastal defences hamper the operations of the fleet, and the movements of its squadrons depend to a greater extent than ever before upon the geographical conditions of the theatre of war which facilitate or hinder, as the case may be, the use of these new weapons of naval warfare.

If the fleet can give battle close to its shores, its action will be more resolute and free because of the certainty of the damaged battleships reaching the docks. If the fleet is engaged soon after leaving its base, the crews will not be tired by long cruises, the mechanism of the fleet will be used to the fullest extent, and the question of fuel will not be a matter of constant anxiety in action. If geographical conditions are such that a region of the theatre of war may be selected in which submarines, mine-fields, aircraft and shore batteries can be brought into action, the striking power of the fleet will be

according to the experience of war the Fleet, in order to have perfect freedom of action, must have stores sufficient for twenty days' full speed and ten days' anchorage per month—we find that for six months' operations the United States Fleet would require in the Philippines (or any other point in the Western Pacific) about 1,000,000 tons of coal and 200,000 tons of oil. These quantities can be lifted in about 200 ships. If, therefore, the United States Fleet does not possess sufficient stores of fuel in the Western Pacific, a large fleet of transports will have to accompany the fleet, severely handicapping its liberty of action.

greatly increased. Naturally a fleet placed in such strategical conditions would be stronger than the enemy fleet in which these conditions would be lacking. In order, therefore, to form a correct estimate of the fighting sea-power of any State, one should consider not only the relative strength of the fleet itself, but also the strategical conditions in which that fleet is likely to conduct its operations.

Apart from the Russo-Japanese War, the bearing of strategical conditions upon the relative power of the fleet was clearly reflected in Sir John (now Lord) Jellicoe's well-known report to the British Admiralty of October 16, 1914. Discussing in this report the strategical conditions of the North Sea, Sir John Jellicoe comes to the conclusion that it would be rash to give battle in the southern part of that sea, because it is so remote from the British bases that damaged ships would run the risk of failing to reach them, while the German Fleet would have, in the southern part of the North Sea, good chances of making use of submarines and mine-fields in action. The British bases are about 500 miles away from the southern part of the North Sea. When the report was drafted the British Fleet was nearly one-third stronger than the German. Thus Sir John Jellicoe considered that the strategical conditions obtaining in the southern part of the North Sea deprived the British Fleet of its advantage over the German Fleet.

The distinguished Admiral's views were, of

course, thoroughly justified, and the Lords of the Admiralty approved his report.¹

Strategical conditions of the theatre of war which influence the action of the fleets can be divided into two categories—natural and artificial.

The natural conditions or the so-called "conditions of military geography," are: the extent of the theatre of war, the outline of the coast, the situation and nature of the islands, straits, narrows and bays, the depth and currents of the seas, climatic conditions, the presence in adjacent territories of minerals useful to the fleet, such as coal, oil, metals, etc. The extent of the theatre of war affords a basis for calculating the amount of fuel required by the fleet. Upon the characteristics of the straits and narrows depends the possibility of forcing them in war time. Depths and currents indicate the degree to which mine-fields may be laid. Climatic conditions are an essential factor in determining the scope of aerial operations. The outline and situation of bays determine the extent to which the fleet may count upon anchorage on the theatre of war far from its bases.

The artificial conditions, or the so-called strategical preparation of the theatre of war are: the naval bases, the coast defences, the stores,

¹ Sir John Jellicoe's apprehensions were not confirmed in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 because the British Fleet was then nearly twice as strong as the German, and the action was fought not in the Southern, but in the Central part of the North Sea, where strategical conditions were different.

arsenals and dry-docks, observation points and other military requisites.

Naval bases as a rule are divided into three categories :

1. Arsenal bases provided with ample means for repairs ; docks for the big battleships ; large stores ; safe anchorage for the entire fleet, and strong coastal and naval defences.

2. Operating bases supplied with sufficient means for repairing the ships after the battle so as to enable them to reach the arsenals ; docks for medium and small craft, medium stores, safe anchorage and sufficient fortifications to protect the fleet from bombardment without any co-operation on its part.

3. *Points d'appui*, strongly fortified, covering the fleet from the attacks of destroyers, submarines and aircraft, and docks, stores and arsenals sufficient only for small craft.

Any bay in the theatre of war can be made a *point d'appui* by the fleet, provided the natural conditions of the bay are convenient. For this purpose repair-ships, floating docks and transports with stores are stationed in the bay, and the entrances to the bay are protected by nets and batteries of light guns taken from the fleet in supply ships.¹


Whereas the maintenance and defence of the

¹ In the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese Fleet had two *points d'appui* in the Korean fiords. In the Great War, France had such bases in Corfu and at the entrance of the Adriatic. The British Fleet had a base in Mudros and at the entrance of the Dardanelles.

bases of the first two categories are not directly dependent upon the fleet which, when anchored at these bases, is itself resting under protection, the *points d'appui* have to rely always upon the fleet, which, whether present or not, is bound to take every precaution against an enemy attack upon these *points d'appui*. In order to capture the bases of the first two categories, combined operations on a large scale on sea and on land are necessary (the siege of Sebastopol, of Port Arthur, etc.). For the capture of a *point d'appui* the landing of a small expeditionary force, supported by a cruiser squadron, is sufficient.

Bases and *points d'appui* as a rule are created at such points of the theatre of war from which the fleet can command important strategical objectives such as straits, maritime routes, main commercial ports, etc. The greater the number of bases and important strategical points at the disposal of the fleet, the more intense and decisive will be its operations, and the greater the pressure of its forces on the entire theatre of war.

The experience of the last war teaches us that the favourable influence of the base upon the development of naval action ceases when the fleet is removed to a distance exceeding 500 miles from that base. At such a distance one can hardly count upon the damaged ships reaching their base, and the lack of fuel, especially in regard to destroyers, severely handicaps the operations. A theatre of war can, therefore, be considered as being *adequately prepared*



from the strategical point of view when it is surrounded by a network of bases less than 500 miles distant from one another. Coastal defences, apart from covering the bases, may prevent access to straits or narrows on the theatres of war. Coastal batteries, combined with mine-fields, constitute naval positions which cannot easily be forced by fleets.¹

Bearing in mind the aforesaid theoretical considerations, let us now examine the strategical conditions of naval warfare in the Western Pacific (see Map No. 3).

The waters of the Western Pacific—from the Behring Sea to the East Indies—can be divided in respect of the outline of the Asiatic coast, the situation of the archipelagos and of separate islands into four regions, four geographical entities called the Okhotsk, the Japanese, the Yellow and the Chinese Seas.

The strategical region between the archipelagos—Japanese, the Riu Kiu, the Philippines, the Marian and the Bonin—forms an approach to these waters from the East. All the shortest and easiest maritime routes from the Pacific—from the coast of distant America—cut across that region into the central part of these waters, which are of the greatest value from the general strategical and economic point of view in the Far East.

¹ Such, for example, was the famous German “wet triangle” in the southern part of the North Sea formed by the fortified islands Borkum-Heligoland-Silt, or the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The strategical significance of these regions (theatres of war) is determined by the value of the political, economic and military conditions obtaining in these waters and in the countries washed by them. The Sea of Okhotsk, washing the rough and uncultivated shores of Siberia, has a certain economic value owing to its fisheries and the unexplored mineral riches of Kamtchatka, as well as a certain strategical importance owing to its proximity to the shores of rich Alaska. But the importance of that sea, and its influence upon the economic and political life of the Far East, is insignificant in comparison with that of the other three seas.

The Japanese Sea is of *vital importance* to Japan. The heart of the country is in that sea, and a blow dealt to that region may be a death blow to Japan. The main maritime routes connecting the central region of Japanese industries with its external markets on the Asiatic continent lead through that sea and the Korean Straits. The routes connecting Japan with the two main Asiatic railways, of which Fusan and Vladivostock are the termini, likewise cross the Japanese Sea. A menace to the connection of Japan with these main lines would endanger the communications of Japan with her strategical rear in China, Korea and Siberia. Without that rear, Japan cannot fight or even live. As long as these communications are safe, Japan has nothing to fear from a naval blockade. She cannot receive a mortal blow by means of cutting her maritime routes in the Yellow Sea.

and in the Pacific as long as her connection with the Asiatic continent via the Japanese Sea is not broken. Japan, therefore, has always endeavoured to convert the Japanese Sea into an inland sea to prevent the appearance and establishment in these waters of a foreign fleet.

Quite recently, before the Russo-Japanese War and the annexation of Korea, the position of Japan in that sea was entirely different from what it is now. In the centre of that sea, close to the heart of Japan, there was a strongly fortified base of the Russian Fleet—Vladivostock. Based upon that fortress, the Russian Fleet was in a position to challenge the supremacy of the Japanese Fleet, and to threaten the communications of Japan with the continent. The Russo-Japanese War was waged under that disturbing menace until the Battle of Tsushima. Two entrances to that sea most convenient for battle fleets—the Korean and the Laperouse Straits—were not in the hands of Japan, because only one of the shores of these straits was in her possession. After the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Fleet was driven out of that sea, and both shores of these two routes came under the grip of Japan through her occupation of Southern Sakhalien and of Korea. The Russian collapse after the last war contributed to the establishment of Japanese influence over the remainder of the shores of that sea belonging to Russia. More than half the shores of that sea now belong to Japan, and the remainder, owing to the present weakness of Russia, is in such a state

that all the important points on the Russian coast could be occupied by Japan at any moment without resistance. Vladivostock can therefore be regarded as a Japanese base, even in the absence of Japanese forces of occupation.

Access to the Japanese Sea from the north—the Tartar Straits—geographically inconvenient for big battleships, is under the complete control of Japan, especially since the occupation of Sakhalien. These straits, owing to the exceptional narrowness of the channel, can easily be made impassable even to submarines and destroyers. Nicolaievsk, on the Amur, an important strategical point dominating the entrance to the Siberian main line of communication—the Amur River—lies on the coast of these straits. The important strategical point will be an easy potential prey to Japan so long as Russia's impotence lasts. Of the three Eastern accesses to the Japanese Sea, the Tzugar Straits and the so-called canals of the Mediterranean, owing to their narrowness, are even more difficult to force than the Dardanelles proved in the last war, because up-to-date methods and means have been applied to their defence. The Laperouse Straits, broad and more convenient for the passage of big ships, have the special advantage in respect of the defence of the Japanese Sea, of being adaptable to mine-laying. These mine-fields, protected by the fire of Japanese batteries on both shores, would make these straits a strong naval position, behind which the Japanese Fleet could easily

repel the attacks of a superior enemy. The same favourable conditions for defence exist in the Korean Straits. The batteries on the island of Tsushima and on the shores of Japan and Korea constitute a naval position no less powerful than that of the Straits of Laperouse. Also, owing to the fact that Japan has two naval bases in the Korean Straits—Sassebo and Shinkai—submarines and aircraft can take an active part in the defence of the straits. In that respect, both these straits strongly resemble the famous German fortified area in the southern part of the North Sea, which it was considered dangerous to approach in the Great War.

Any enemy who would endeavour to force the entrance to the Japanese Sea would have to risk heavy losses from the coast batteries, mines, submarines and aircraft. Whatever his superiority over the Japanese Fleet, he can never rely upon maintaining this superiority after forcing the straits. The Japanese Sea is surrounded by a network of Japanese bases. There are three first-class bases in the sea itself: Sassebo, Kure and Maitsuru. Every one of these bases is perfectly equipped for repairs and supplies for the entire fleet, as well as with docks for the big battleships. Of these docks there are two (dry docks) at Sassebo, and one floating dock is being built for ships of 50,000 tons displacement. In Kure there are two dry docks and one in Maitsuru. In addition to these three main bases, there is a first-class base on the eastern shores of Japan—Yokosuka,

with two dry docks for big battleships. Ships damaged in the Japanese Sea can easily be brought to the dry docks of Yokosuka through the channels of the Mediterranean. Thus, after battle eight Japanese battleships (three-fourths of the present-day Japanese Battle Fleet) could be put into dry docks simultaneously, and repairs could be started simultaneously at four different points. Such an abundance of docks, repairing stations and private shipbuilding docks with ample means and working at full strength, ensures the possibility of the Japanese Fleet recovering its strength after action very much quicker than any enemy in the Western Pacific could ever hope to do. Apart from large docks, these first-rate bases have plenty of medium and small docks for light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. These four main Japanese bases are strongly fortified, and supplied with all necessary defences against bombardment from sea or air. Apart from these four main bases there are in the Japanese Sea two second-class bases—Shinkai and Ominato. The chief object of these fortified bases is to provide a base for the naval forces guarding the Korean and Eastern entrances to the Japanese Sea. There are at Ominato floating docks for small craft, and repairing facilities intended for repairs of battleships prior to their arrival at the main bases. There are also in the area of the Japanese Sea a series of *points d'appui* for destroyers and submarines. The following four points are of special strategical importance:

on the island of Tsushima, the skerries of the Korean coast, the skerries of Nagasaki, Sakhalien and the Kuriles which cover the accesses to the Laperouse Straits. The network of these bases and fortifications embracing the entire region of the Japanese Sea creates particularly favourable strategical conditions for the defence of the Japanese Sea by the fleet. It affords the chance of the fleet maintaining a central position and at the same time easily diverting its forces to the menaced points of access. The Japanese Sea is thus in the true sense of the word an inland sea.

The Yellow Sea plays an exceptionally important part in the economic life of the Empire of the Rising Sun. Two of the three main points giving access to the Chinese markets lie on that sea : the ports Shanghai and Tien-tsin. The former is the key to the valley of the Yantsekiang, while the latter leads straight to the capital of China—Peking. Not so very long ago—fifty years—nearly all the shores of that sea and the Riu Kiu archipelago which lies at the entrance to that sea from the east belonged to the Celestial Empire or to Korea, then under China's protectorate. From the east, the rocky island of Kiu Siu, the country of the Rising Sun stretched out feeble feelers into that sea.

The last fifty years have brought about many changes. The rays of the “Rising Sun” rose higher and higher over that sea, and painted red its “Yellow” shores. At present two-thirds of the coastal line of the Yellow Sea belong to

Japan. She holds the southern, eastern and northern borders formed by Formosa, the Riu Kiu group and the Korean coast, including Liaodun. The important strategical regions of Fukien and Shantung are beginning to assume the colours of the "Rising Sun." Here Japan is trying to gain a solid footing on the opposite bank of the Gulf of Formosa, the main entrance to the Yellow Sea from the south, and on the opposite bank of the entrance to the Gulf of Petchili.

Apart from the main base of the Japanese Fleet in the Korean Straits—Sassebo—which spreads its strategical influence as far as Formosa, Japan possesses a secondary base at Port Arthur and four fortified *points d'appui*: in Dalny, Formosa, the Pescadores, and in Tsin-Tao, not yet evacuated by the Japanese troops.

These fortified bases are equipped with all the necessary means for giving shelter to ships damaged in action, and for repairs which would allow them to reach the main bases. There are floating docks and all necessary supplies for destroyers and submarines. In the Riu Kiu archipelago and in the Korean skerries the Japanese submarines and destroyers have many excellent shelters which would allow them to develop their operation in that area with great intensity and resolve. The Japanese bases and *points d'appui* in the Yellow Sea are situated in the points of paramount strategical importance for that theatre of war. Formosa, with her fortifications, and the group of the Pescadores,

with a *point d'appui* and mining stations on the Isle of Bako, command the entrance to the Yellow Sea, which is of the greatest commercial importance. Access to the Yellow Sea from the East is barred by the Japanese Islands, Riu Kiu and Shikishima. The Japanese submarines and destroyers, for which many well-equipped shelters and observation points are to be found on these islands, can effectively prevent any attempts at cruising in that neighbourhood. By virtue of the "Five Power Pact for the Limitation of Naval Armaments," Japan renounced the right further to fortify Formosa, the Pescadores, Riu Kiu and Bonin Islands. This "sacrifice" of Japan has, however, no great strategical importance in connection with the strategical plans which may be drawn up by that country in the event of war breaking out within the next ten years, because Formosa and the Pescadores are already sufficiently fortified. The principal base of the Japanese Fleet—Sassebo—dominates Shanghai, while Port Arthur dominates the entrance to the Gulf of Petchili.

The skerries of the Korean coast, with their many shelters for submarines, destroyers and aircraft, dominate the longitudinal routes leading from Shanghai to the Gulf of Petchili. Also, the coastal waters of China, especially in the region of Shanghai and of the Gulf of Petchili, are so deep that minefields can easily be laid. These minefields may render access to Shanghai and Tientzin extremely dangerous and difficult, especially as these minefields can be constantly

and easily renewed by Japanese mine-layers based upon the skerries of the Korean coast.

The chief strategical feature of the Yellow Sea, however, is that no fleet other than the Japanese can have even a temporary base in those waters. All the ports, bays and shelters of any strategical importance whatsoever are at present on Japanese territory. The enemy fleet that would attempt to seize or occupy these ports or bays for its own purposes would inevitably have to reckon not only with the Japanese Fleet, but with the Japanese Army guarding Japanese territory. The ports remaining in the hands of China have practically no rear. As long as the communications between Japan and Korea in the Japanese Sea are not interrupted, nothing can prevent the Japanese Army—as long as Russia and China remain in their present state of weakness—from appearing at any given point of the Chinese coast.

At whatever point of the Chinese coast the enemy fleet might anchor it will have to anticipate a bombardment from the batteries of the Japanese Army approaching from the mainland. British Wei-hai-wei would not be spared that fate. Is it not for this reason that Great Britain declared at the Washington Conference that she was going to restore that part to China?

If the Yellow Sea cannot be described as an inland sea in the same sense as the Japanese Sea, it is only due to the fact that the Almighty in creating the firmament in the midst of the waters, and in dividing the waters from the

waters, did not make the Riu Kiu group more compact and more impassable for big battleships. Nevertheless, the strategical conditions created in the Yellow Sea by Japan in the last fifty years facilitate her naval supremacy in these waters.

The network of important strategical points and bases held by Japan in that Sea enables her submarines and aircraft, assisted by mine-fields and coastal defences, to develop their striking power in these waters, whereas the potential enemy, deprived of any shelter or anchorage, would have to operate from distant bases. The importance, from a military viewpoint, of the strategical conditions created by Japan in the Yellow Sea is further enhanced by the fact that the Korean Straits and the Korean mainland closely connect that theatre of war with the main impregnable stronghold of Japan—the Japanese Sea—upon which the entire strategical preparation of the Yellow Sea is thus based. The coast of China may, therefore, be attacked not only by the entire Japanese Fleet, but also by units of the Japanese Army reaching that theatre of war by routes independent of the freedom of the maritime routes of the Yellow Sea.

As a result of this strategical position, Japan actually stands “on China’s doorstep,” as was said at the Washington Conference. She stands on that doorstep with both feet, and holds in her iron hand the handle of the “open door.”

The Chinese Sea is the “Sea of the Future.” As, fifty years ago, Japan looked towards the

Yellow Sea from the shores of Kiu Siu, so now she is casting penetrating and rapacious glances in the direction of this "Sea of the Future" from her island of Formosa. From there she sees that powerful Britain commands from Hong Kong the outlet of Southern China to the sea and from Singapore the main routes connecting that sea and the entire Far East with the markets of the West. In Hong Kong Great Britain has created a first-class strongly fortified base for her fleet, possessing large stores, shops and three dry docks for the largest Dreadnoughts of the British Fleet. Britain also has a first-class base at Singapore, with one dry dock for big battleships.

Hong Kong and Singapore are of enormous strategical importance to the Chinese Sea, because they command both main outlets from the north and from the south. All maritime routes are therefore at present under the control of Great Britain. It would appear that in these circumstances the British Fleet unquestionably dominates in that sea.

Japan, however, does not fail to notice that Hong Kong, the mainstay of British power in that sea, has a highly vulnerable feature. It is Chinese territory, towards which lies the immediate rear of Hong Kong. The realisation of this inherent strategical weakness of Hong Kong is presumably the reason which prompted Great Britain to make her "sacrifice" at the Washington Conference and to renounce further fortifications in that harbour.

From Formosa Japan sees the French fortified base at Saigon, with its workshops and docks for small craft. She sees the excellent bays on the coast of Annam-Kamran and Van Fong which may serve as anchorages for big fleets, and which have already attracted the attention of Japan when Admiral Rojdestvensky's Fleet anchored there in the Russo-Japanese War.

Finally, from Formosa Japan sees the weak base, Cavite, which points to the truly pitiable and insignificant power of the great trans-Pacific Power, the owner of the Philippines, in the Chinese Sea.

As a matter of fact, Cavite cannot even be considered as a base in the strategical sense of the word. It is rather a mere anchorage, because its fortifications date from the Spanish domination, and have now lost their military significance. In the port itself, with the exception of a floating dock for small craft, there are no stores or shops of any importance. Two other points in the Philippines, Olongapo and Polloc, are weaker still in respect of fortifications and equipment.

That the Philippines are badly equipped as a base for the fleet is obvious from the fact that when the United States Fleet visits the islands it has to be accompanied by transports carrying fuel and other stores, as well as repair-ships. This condition of the bases in the Philippines has several times attracted the attention of the United States Government. The question of their equipment and fortification has been re-

peatedly raised in the course of the last few years, but has never been solved.

This is, of course, due not so much to financial difficulties as to the position of strategical disadvantage in which the Philippines are placed in the western waters of the Pacific. Owing to their remoteness from the United States, the islands would easily be occupied by an expeditionary Japanese force before any reinforcements reach them. There could, of course, be no question of serious resistance being made by the small contingent of 6,000 American troops supported by 9,000 natives to the well-trained Japanese Army, and no fortifications could be of any use. The question of the defence of the Philippines can only be solved by maintaining adequate naval forces in the Chinese sea. Taking into consideration the present strength of the Japanese Fleet, it may be said that with this end in view the entire American Fleet would have to be sent into these waters and the shores of the United States left bare; also, several first-class bases should be erected in the Philippines—which would cost a great deal of money and take much time. This is confirmed by the opinion of a prominent American naval officer, quoted in Bywater's book, *Sea Power in the Pacific*. This officer wrote:—

“The Philippines are there for Japan whenever she likes to take them, and nothing can prevent her from seizing them when she feels disposed to do so. As at present circumstanced, we could do nothing whatever to protect them

in time of war. If we were foolish enough to locate a fleet at Manilla, the history of Port Arthur would repeat itself, with us in the rôle of the Russians. An expeditionary force, consisting of 18-knot transports, guarded by a squadron of reasonable strength, could from the southern ports of Japan reach Manilla in three days, and make itself absolute master of Luzon before succour could arrive from Hawaii, our nearest naval base, which is some 5,000 miles away. Consequently, when the 'rescuing fleet' did turn up, it would find the Japanese flag waving over Manilla, and itself with depleted bunkers, forced to fight under the most disadvantageous conditions or to beat an ignominious retreat without standing upon the order of its going. That is not merely a picture of what might happen, but of what most assuredly will happen if war breaks out within the next five years."

The five years mentioned by the American officer obviously correspond with the completion of the vast American shipbuilding programme of 1916, because the letter was written in 1920.

It would be a mistake to imagine that such opinions publicly expressed by American naval authorities are apt to restrain the ambitions and hopes of Japan in respect of the Chinese Sea. At the Washington Conference the United States renounced the right to fortify the Philippines and Guam. Thus the "Five Power Pact" has definitely established the defencelessness of the Philippines. (The opinion of the American

naval officer quoted above undoubtedly reflects one of the main reasons of the calling of the Washington Conference at which the United States aimed at finding a diplomatic solution of the strategically insoluble problem of the Philippines.)

The strategical position which Japan now occupies in the Chinese Sea cannot, however, be considered sufficiently secure to enable her to conduct in that sea naval operations on a large scale in normal strategical conditions devoid of serious risks.

In the northern part of that sea, Japan possesses Formosa and the Pescadores. If Hong Kong dominates the northern outlet from the Chinese Sea, Formosa and the Pescadores actually close that outlet, as they are situated in the Gulf of Formosa.

Although there are several fortified bays on the island of Formosa, and a base on the island of Bako in the Pescadores, the Japanese Fleet cannot be based upon them, because these bays and bases are mainly suitable for destroyers and submarines. In Formosa and in the Pescadores there is no dock for big battleships, nor anchorages affording a safe refuge for the Japanese Battle Fleet. The strategical region—Formosa and the Pescadores—is well equipped as a base for submarines and destroyers which would be in a position to conduct operations in the Gulf of Formosa, as well as in the northern part of the Chinese Sea, on an extensive scale as far as Manilla.

Should the political situation compel Japan to reckon with the possibility of the enemy Fleet being based on Hong Kong in the event of naval operations in the northern waters of the Chinese Sea, the strategical conditions of warfare would be of much greater advantage to her enemy, because Hong Kong is in the extreme north of the Sea, and the nearest base of the Japanese Fleet—Sassebo—is 1,000 miles distant. Such is the strategical condition of Japan in the Chinese Sea to-day, as far as we can understand it. This, however, does not mean that it may not be different to-morrow.

Should the Japanese Fleet not be satisfied with its anchorages in Formosa and in the Pescadores, it would have excellent bays at its disposal on the coast of the province of Fukien. If the Japanese forces may land in Manilla on the fourth day after their departure in rapid Japanese transports, these troops may land in Fukien sooner than that. The Japanese gunners have learnt in Port Arthur and Tsin Tao quickly to bring the heaviest guns into position, and there are special units in Japan fully trained and equipped for that purpose. Special attention has been given to the training of these units, and they have really attained perfection in every detail. It may be taken for granted that the Japanese heavy artillery may appear within a fortnight on the coast of any given bay in the province of Fukien.

On the fifth day after the huge Japanese repair ship will have sailed from Japan, accom-

panied by auxiliary craft and transports with fuel for the Fleet, she may reach the Fukien region. We shall then understand the reason why a floating dock is now being completed at Sassebo for battleships of 50,000 tons displacement, when there are in the bases of the Japanese mainland seven dry docks already. That dock can be towed to any given spot in the region of Formosa and kept there on the eighth day after its departure from Japan.

Thus the Japanese Battle Fleet has no base in the northern part of the Chinese Sea to-day, but may easily have one within a fortnight. In that base it would have a large dock, all necessary supplies and shops on transports, coastal defences, and a secure rear guarded by Japanese troops on the territory of impotent China. The landing of a Japanese expeditionary force on the coast of Fukien would be of importance if only for the organisation and security of the rear of the naval base. In the event of the occupation of the Fukien coast, the Straits of Formosa would be converted into a strong naval position closing the main outlet into the Yellow Sea and providing a strategical base for the operations of the Battle Fleet in the northern waters of the Chinese Sea, and in particular against the Philippines.

That is not all. The Japanese troops in the Fukien province would threaten the only real base in the northern waters of the Chinese Sea—Hong Kong—and would thus render questionable the sole stronghold of British sea power

in that region and the sole base of the potential allies of Britain. The Chinese Sea, from the strategical point of view, is the "Sea of the Future." The rays of the Rising Sun which are at present but faintly touching the shores of the Fukien province, may unexpectedly penetrate the mist of this future, and light an entirely different strategical picture than that which we are at present contemplating.

In order to have finished with the strategical conditions of naval warfare in the Western Pacific, we must make a passing reference to the strategical region, the eastern border of which is formed by an almost uninterrupted chain of islands beginning near the shores of Japan in the region of Yokohama and extending southwards through the Bonin and Nariana Islands to the Pelew Islands in the immediate vicinity of the Philippines.

The strategical region is the advanced theatre of war, the doorstep towards the main theatre, the Western Pacific, because it is traversed by all the maritime routes leading from the East to the Japanese, Yellow and Chinese Seas. All these islands, except Guam, which form the eastern border of this region, and follow the meridian on a distance of 2,000 miles, belong to Japan or are under her immediate control (the islands formerly belonged to Germany, but Japan received a mandate over them by virtue of the Versailles Treaty). These islands and the coral atolls abound in innumerable small bays in which the Japanese submarines and small craft

reconnoitring and privateering can find safe refuge.

The very presence of an enormous quantity of bays and places of refuge in this chain of islands provides a perfectly safe and invulnerable base for the Japanese submarines and small craft, because the enemy cannot occupy all these bays simultaneously and permanently maintain his forces therein. This region is, therefore, of great strategical value to Japan, and nature has served Japan well in creating this chain of islands. As the Japanese Fleet occupies in the Western Pacific the so-called "central position" it must know beforehand, in order to draw up and carry out strategical operations, what portion of these waters the enemy fleet will be heading for, and when it is likely to reach them. Only then can the Japanese Fleet successfully conduct the strategical defence of the Western Pacific and compel the enemy fleet to accept battle immediately after a long cruise, giving it no chance to rest and replenish its supplies. As the maritime routes from the East are hampered by this chain of islands, the reconnoitring craft and observation posts in the islands, together with the submarines which, with the aircraft, would be posted in the channels, would form so formidable a system of reconnaissance that the enemy fleet could not pass unnoticed even at night time. Taking into consideration, therefore, the distance between these islands and the axis of the Western Pacific, it can be taken for granted that the Japanese Fleet will be informed

three days in advance of the approach of the enemy fleet to the Western Pacific from the east, and the fast Japanese battle-cruisers which would immediately follow that fleet would uninterruptedly give information to the main forces about the direction of the cruise of the enemy ships. In three days the Japanese Fleet can easily be moved from its bases in the Japanese Sea as far as Manilla—in other words, perform a strategical “castling.” Obviously the strategical importance of these islands does not escape the attention of Japan. In order to give greater stability to the reconnoitring system, to which the chain of islands is so favourable, Japan is now doing careful work in preparing *points d'appui* in every one of the three strategical sectors which form that system. This work is being done on the Bonin Islands belonging to Japan, on the group Saipan in the centre of the Marian archipelago, and in the Bay of Angaur in the middle of the Pelew Islands which lie on the route of the United States Fleet to the Philippines. This work is favoured by the fact that during the German domination of the Marian and Pelew Islands similar work was already done, and the Japanese have only to complete it. This work has, however, created a certain uneasiness in Europe and in America, which was reflected in the so-called Yap controversy. Japan is energetically protesting against “unfounded” accusations.

Japan argues that the wireless station serves commercial purposes only, and the stores of

fuel and convenient harbours are destined only for commercial fleets. To-day, Japan is right. But to-morrow, should the thunder of war sound in the distant neighbourhood of that region, the Japanese cruisers and submarines would find a safe refuge in these harbours, and the wireless stations would work at high pressure, transmitting to each other and to the Japanese Fleet valuable intelligence. On the shores of these harbours batteries would appear of quick-firing Japanese guns. Thus the peaceful commercial harbours and wireless stations would soon be converted into *points d'appui* for a powerful intelligence system for that region, and the enemy cruisers that would try to destroy these wasps' nests would be met by the fire of the coast batteries.

We do not intend to enter into a detailed examination of other strategical features of this region, as these details which would help specialists to form a conclusion in respect of the thoroughness and exceptional perfection of the intelligence system based upon these details would be outside the scope of this chapter. We cannot but emphasise, however, with reference to this region, the strategical importance of battle-cruisers for the development of naval operations on a large scale.

No sooner will the danger of war become imminent than Japanese battle-cruisers will appear in these waters and will constitute the mainstay of the entire intelligence system. Should the United States Fleet endeavour to destroy this

system beforehand, in order to conceal the approach of its main forces to the Western Pacific, the American cruisers would inevitably come into collision with the Japanese battle-cruisers and would be either sunk or chased away, because there are no cruisers in the United States Navy capable of coping with the Japanese cruisers. If the reconnaissance system is supported by battle-cruisers, it can only be destroyed by the United States Battle Fleet, which would thus be compelled to reveal itself, whereby the object of the reconnoitring system would be attained. The importance of this region is not, however, limited to reconnoitring purposes. If the Japanese submarines based upon the islands of this region do not inflict great losses upon the Battle Fleet (because the latter in traversing this region would be strongly protected) they would remain in the rear of the enemy fleet, and would be the masters on the main lines of communication, and would sink the ships carrying fuel and supplies.

The chain of the Caroline and Marshall Islands, which are also in Japanese possession, joins the southern part of this strategical region in a perpendicular line along the parallels. There are also favourable conditions on these islands for submarine bases and for reconnoitring, similar to the conditions described above. Here as well, Japan is carrying on the work initiated by Germany for the establishment of "peaceful harbours." These "peaceful" harbours on the island of Ponape in the Garloines and on Jaluit

in the Marshall group have already served as *points d'appui* in the recent war for German cruisers in the Pacific.

This chain of islands which extends eastwards along the parallel into the Pacific is of great strategical importance, because it commands the flank of the American lines of communication along about 2,000 miles. All transports heading for the Western Pacific will have to be menaced by Japanese submarines based upon these islands on a line 2,000 miles long. This chain, moreover, would be most important for reconnoitring purposes were the United States Fleet to attempt a long outflanking movement in order to avoid the advanced theatre of war and to appear suddenly in the southern waters of the Chinese Sea, where it could rest before going into action and replenish its supplies in friendly waters. Thanks to this chain, the United States Fleet cannot carry out this outflanking manœuvre without being detected, because these islands would lie in the immediate vicinity of its course. Japanese diplomacy has succeeded in obtaining for Japan possession of these perpendicular chains of islands which seem to be specially assigned by nature itself for intense submarine warfare and for reconnoitring in the approaches to the Western Pacific. President Wilson has marked the communication lines and operation lines of the American Navy with a heavy strategical "cross" in ceding these islands to Japan at the Versailles Conference.

Let us now examine the position occupied

in this complex strategical cobweb of Japanese islands by the isolated American island of Guam, lost in their midst.


Owing to its geographical position in the Pacific, this island might have been of paramount strategical importance to the United States Navy. If the latter could count upon this island as upon a solid base, the strategical operations of that Navy in the Western Pacific would have been possible, because the Island of Guam lies at an equal distance (of 1,500 miles) from the most important strategical centres of these waters—the Korean Straits and the Philippines. It is true that 1,500 miles is too long a distance, as we know, for a base at Guam to be of real assistance to the operations of the American Fleet in the Western Pacific. But it is better to have a base 1,500 miles distant than to have it at a distance of 5,000 miles, which is tantamount to its complete absence. We have already mentioned that the United States Fleet cannot count upon the Philippines as a base, and have quoted the views of a distinguished naval officer. If the United States Fleet were not in a position to count upon Guam as a base, the only base left would be Pearl Harbour, in the Hawaii, which lies at a distance of 5,000 miles from the Western Pacific. In its present condition, Guam is not a base for a battle fleet, but only a weak *point d'appui*. It has neither docks nor shops of any importance, nor coastal defences. Owing to the great strategical importance of this island, the question of converting it into a solid base


for the fleet has been repeatedly raised in the United States, and corresponding schemes have been drawn up, but these schemes have remained on paper. Since the United States has undertaken not to fortify the island, the question cannot be raised.

We do not share the view that this island—only from four to ten miles wide, and not exceeding the insignificant dimensions of 200 square miles—can be converted into a well fortified base. Owing to its narrowness, however powerful its artillery, the island can be “shot through,” as specialists say, and all the fortifications and the fleet anchored in its harbours could be subjected to a severe bombardment from both sides. Much less could this island constitute a base and a rallying point for the American Army in its endeavour to reconquer the Philippines, as some writers appear to think, by reason of the insignificance of its area and lack of protection against a heavy bombardment.

Guam is 1,500 miles distant from the centre of the might of the Japanese Fleet, and 3,300 miles distant from Hawaii, whence assistance may come. At the same time, it is situated in the centre of the advanced theatre of war, in which, as we have already shown, all the Japanese cruiser strength will be deployed at the first signal of war, including the battle-cruisers, as well as the main complement of the Japanese ocean-going submarine fleet.

In these circumstances, if the island of Guam is not seized it will be destroyed by a bombard-





ment long before anyone comes to its rescue, and the entrances to the harbours will be blocked by loaded steamers—as the Japanese did in Port Arthur, but with better results because narrow channels and coral reefs form the entrance to the harbours of Guam. That is not all. As Guam is at the top of the angle formed by the crossing of two chains of islands, all the routes leading to Guam from the east will be flanked on both sides by submarines based upon these islands. Owing to the position of Guam, it seems understandable why the United States is loth to “throw into the sea” huge sums of money—the cost of converting this island into a first-class base.

If we now summarise all the foundations described above of the strategical might of Japan in the Western Pacific, we shall have a complete and harmonious idea of the structure of her “strategical castle.”

That strategical castle of the Japanese Fleet stands on the firm foundations of the Japanese bases in the central and most important strategical region embracing the Japanese and the Yellow Seas. Entrances to that strategical castle from the north and from the south are in the firm grip of Japan. At these entrances—in the north in the region of Nikolaievsk and in Sakhalien, and in the south in the Fukien province—Japan is preparing an outpost for strategic operations into the seas of Okhotsk and the Chinese. From the East, entrance to the strategical castle is guarded by the vast

advanced theatre of war which stretches its tentacles deep into the Pacific, and from the West it is safeguarded by the temporary impotence of Russia and of China.

In the centre of that castle in the region of the Korean Straits a strong Japanese Fleet is stationed in impregnable bases, whence it can rapidly move along the vast strategical network of its bases and *points d'appui* towards the threatened area. There also is the powerful Japanese Army. Owing to the network of railways on the continent and the enormous tonnage of the Japanese Mercantile Fleet, it can support the operations of the fleet at any given point of the theatre of war.

Let us now examine the accesses to this castle available to the prospective enemies of Japan. The United States may conduct operations from two weak *points d'appui*—Guam and Cavite—which are about 1,500 miles distant from the centre of Japan's might. (These points, as the Americans themselves recognise, are inevitably destined to fall into the hands of Japan in the first days of the war.) Great Britain can base her operations upon her first-class harbour, Hong Kong, which, however, has no rear. Further, there is the American base, Pearl Harbour, 5,000 miles away, and the British base, Singapore, 2,000 miles distant. Everything that is situated nearer is in the hands of Japan.

The strategical conditions described above will determine the special features of naval

warfare in the Western Pacific. These features may be thus formulated :—

1. All the fleets of the potential enemies of Japan are far remote from the theatre of war ; the initiative will inevitably rest with Japan as long as these conditions will prevail, and as long as these fleets are not transferred to a permanent base in the Western Pacific. Owing to this initiative Japan will be in a position to carry out all preparatory operations after the outbreak of war, i.e. mine-laying, the creation of naval positions and additional bases, the destruction of the enemy's *points d'appui*, and landings of expeditionary forces in the important points of the theatre of war, etc., before the enemy has time to prevent these operations from being accomplished.

2. Even in the event of the enemy bases in the Western Pacific not being destroyed, for some reason or other, by Japan, or not occupied by her in the preliminary stage of the war, the remoteness of these points and bases from the centre of Japan's naval power would compel her enemies to bring into action much greater forces than Japan would be in a position to deploy. The following example will serve as an illustration of our assertion :—

Let us suppose that two submarines of the same type and with the same amount of fuel—one American and the other Japanese—were to be assigned for the same purpose during the war of blocking Shanghai. The nearest American base—the Philippines—is about 1,000 miles dis-

tant ; two of the nearest Japanese bases for the submarine—Tsin Tao and the Korean skerries—are about 250 miles distant from Shanghai. In order to reach the area of the proposed operations and to return to her base for fuel, the American submarine would require about nine days. If we deduct from the total of the fuel of the American submarine the quantities needed for a cruise from and to the base, we get the amount of fuel she will have at her disposal for the operation proper. Let us admit that she will have sufficient fuel to remain in position for three weeks (as the submarine maintains her position at low speed, she needs much less fuel for that purpose than for a long cruise). As we have taken for granted that the supplies of fuel in both submarines are identical, the Japanese submarine would maintain herself in position for another fortnight, as she would spend in that fortnight the fuel which the American submarine would require for the to-and-fro cruise to her distant base.

In other words, three Japanese submarines, owing to the proximity of their base, can accomplish the same war work as five American.

The same relative strength applies to the operations of the surface fleets of equal strength, and especially of cruisers, destroyers and small craft. Should the Philippines and Guam be destroyed or fall into the hands of Japan, the farther the other bases and *points d'appui* of the American Fleet from the main theatre of war, the greater number will be required in

order to balance the work of the Japanese Battle Fleet.

3. Owing to the fact that all the convenient harbours and anchorages in that theatre of war are in the hands of Japan, or threatened with seizure in the preliminary stage of the war (as, for example, the Fukien coast), the enemy fleet would be unable to improve its strategical position, as far as bases are concerned, by seizing the anchorages nearest to the theatre of war, because it would inevitably come against the Japanese Army. With the fall, therefore, of Guam and the Philippines, the enemy fleet—considering the insecure position of Hong Kong—would have to move its base, circumstances permitting, to the extreme southern corner of the Western Pacific—to the region of Singapore-Saigon. That region is 2,000 miles distant from the centre of naval operations, i.e., even farther distant than the Philippines or Guam.

4. The vast network of Japanese bases and *points d'appui* affords the possibility of the Japanese High Command developing to the greatest possible intensity the operations of the Japanese submarines, aircraft and mine-layers. Of this possibility the enemies of Japan will be deprived because the main chance of success of these auxiliary operations depends upon their bases, and that question cannot be satisfactorily solved by the enemies of Japan.

The principal object of these auxiliary forces would be to weaken the main forces of the enemy before the decisive battle. The enemy fleet

would, therefore, run the risk of not going into action with all its forces intact. At the same time, the operations of the Japanese Battle Fleet may be conducted with the greatest possible determination and stubbornness because the many docks and shops on the theatre of war would guarantee to Japan the opportunity of repairing her ships after battle more speedily than her enemy could ever hope to do.

5. Specially favourable conditions for reconnoitring and large quantities of cruisers would give the Japanese High Naval Command the certainty that the Japanese Fleet would stand in no danger of strategical manœuvres on the enemy's part, and that the fleet would be kept informed of the movements of the enemy in time to allow it to calculate the time required for carrying out its designs.

The main strategical features of the Far Eastern theatre of war described above refer to the entire circle of strategical operations of the future contest.

We have dealt with the questions of intelligence and initiative, the alpha and omega of military genius—the questions of main and auxiliary strategical operations, and of bases. We have thus gained an idea of the conditions of the probable decisive battle which crowns the war. In all those elements of which the phenomenon of war is composed, Japan has undisputable and important strategical advantages. Undisputable because these advantages are created by nature itself in the shape of

enormous distances and of the situation of islands and continents. And Japan has taken clever advantage of these natural conditions. She has assured the possession of these natural advantages by clever strategical preparation which now allows her formidable Army and Navy rightly to consider themselves the masters of the Far East.

CHAPTER IX

THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

WE have discussed in the preceding chapter the general strategical conditions of naval warfare in the Pacific. We shall now turn to the strategical conditions which would obtain in the event of war between the United States and Japan, other Powers remaining neutral. We shall endeavour to base our argument on strictly scientific foundations and to refrain from entering into the region of vague assumptions—an error which some writers on this subject are occasionally inclined to commit.

It has been pointed out in Chapter VI that American statesmanship may entrust the General Staff of the United States Army with the following objects :—

1. To compel Japan by force to alter her aggressive policy in China and in Siberia.
2. To defend the Philippines or to recapture them in the event of their seizure by Japan at the outbreak of war.

It has likewise been indicated in the same chapter that the most effective method of attaining these objects, namely, the capture of the Japanese mainland by the United States Army—belongs to the realm of strategical phantasy.

There are but two means of compelling the enemy to capitulate—the capture of his mainland and the strangling of his people through a blockade. The United States General Staff would thus have but the last of these two means at its disposal. A full blockade which would separate Japan from the Asiatic continent which Japan needs for her supplies and without which the country could not live, would sooner or later force Japan to capitulate.

As the Japanese mainland, however, and the centre of her power are situated on the islands of the Japanese Archipelago, it would be necessary first of all to defeat the Japanese Fleet or to force it to shelter in its base in order to achieve a full blockade.

The question therefore arises whether the United States Fleet may hope to defeat the Japanese Fleet or to compel it to retire to its bases, taking into account the relative strength of the two navies as established at the Washington Conference, as well as the strategical conditions which would obtain in the Western Pacific in war time.

The United States Fleet can only reach the waters of the Western Pacific about a month after the outbreak of war; the Japanese Fleet

would have plenty of time for occupying or destroying all the American *points d'appui* and for establishing an extensive system of intelligence and of submarine warfare along the routes followed by the United States Fleet. The latter may thus be compelled to accept battle at the end of a long cruise, when its supplies will be exhausted, its crews weary, its machinery not altogether reliable, and when it will have no hope of being within easy reach of a secure base to which it might send its damaged ships or retire for a rest. In action, the fleet would also feel uneasy about the fate of the many transport ships carrying the supplies which the fleet would require after battle in order to recuperate, because these transports would have to sail for many hundreds of miles under the direct threat of Japanese cruisers and submarines. The heaviest handicap would be, however, the necessity of accepting battle in the conditions and within the regions which would be most advantageous to the Japanese Fleet, which would also enjoy the advantage of higher speed.

Should the Japanese Fleet choose, for some reason or other, to refrain from availing itself of these strategical advantages, in order to compel the United States Fleet to accept battle in unfavourable circumstances, and should prefer to take up an attitude of expectation—even then the strategical preparedness of the theatre of war would be exceptionally favourable to Japan. Should the Japanese Fleet decide to adopt this attitude, the United States Fleet

would be even more seriously handicapped than it would have been in open battle.

In order to defeat the Japanese Fleet, or to compel it to retire to its bases, the United States Fleet would then have to force the naval positions barring the access to the Japanese Sea. The United States Fleet would not be strong enough to undertake such a task. In the attempt to force these positions the United States Fleet would inevitably suffer such heavy losses that it might be deprived of the material superiority over the enemy fleet which, as we know (Chapter VII), is four to three for the Western Pacific.

A full blockade of Japan, implying a break through into the Japanese Sea, cannot therefore form the basis of the American plan of campaign against Japan. Unable to break through into the Japanese Sea, the United States Fleet might perhaps attempt to cut off the direct communications between Japan and China in the Yellow Sea. A base, however, would be required for the purpose, and we know that the United States Fleet cannot secure such a base. Should the United States Fleet appear at intervals in the Yellow Sea, such action would only temporarily interrupt these communications, and Japan would still be in a position to avail herself of the sheltered route for small transports along the skerries of the Korean coast.

As the entire coast of the Yellow Sea would be within the sphere of the activities of the

Japanese Army, the United States Fleet would be unable to establish a base in that sea, and would have to confine itself to the Chinese Sea, in which case the blockade of Japan would only be a distant and ineffective one.

In what measure can a distance blockade contribute to the solution of the problems which the policy of the United States may impose upon her General Staff ?

The strategical conditions with which the United States Fleet would be confronted in the Chinese Sea must first be taken into account. Upon its arrival in these waters, the United States Fleet may find the Philippines occupied by the Japanese Army. Guam, the *point d'appui*, may likewise be destroyed or disabled as a base. The United States Fleet may thus be compelled to reckon with the necessity, in drawing up strategical plans, of creating a new base on the theatre of war. Such a base can only be secured, without the assistance of a large expeditionary force, in the islands of the Pacific where there is no Japanese garrison, or where the strength of that garrison is insignificant. These islands are about 1,000 miles distant from the Japanese mainland, and the creation of a base in any of them would not therefore widen the strategical scope of action of the United States Fleet or render the blockade of Japan more stringent or more efficacious.

We are thus confronted with an insoluble strategical problem. In order that the blockade of Japan be rendered effective even in a small

degree, the base of the United States Fleet must be brought nearer to Japan. For this purpose American troops would be required. They would be required in greater numbers for the recapture of the Philippines. The United States would thus be compelled to dispatch vast forces simultaneously. How is this to be done?

There is in the Japanese Fleet a powerful division of four fast battle-cruisers with which only the big American battleships can contend. Transports conveying troops would therefore be necessarily escorted by no less than half of the American Battle Fleet, in order to ensure the safety of the transports against the attacks of Japanese battle-cruisers. Should the United States Fleet detach part of its forces as convoys, the Japanese Fleet—always fully informed owing to the efficiency of its intelligence service—would not send the battle-cruisers anywhere else, but would attack with all its might the United States naval forces remaining in the waters of the Far East, and would in all likelihood defeat them, as numerical superiority would in such a case be on the side of Japan.

The United States would thus have no other choice than to send the battle-fleet in its entirety to escort the transports. No sooner, however, will the United States leave the waters of the Far East, than the Japanese cruisers will destroy their bases and all the supplies which will have been brought to these bases from the United States. The American Fleet has no base in

the Far East capable of defending itself on its own account; at the same time, the tasks of defending a temporary base and escorting transports with troops cannot be performed simultaneously. The United States Fleet has therefore no other choice than to remove, in its course from the shores of the United States to the Far Eastern theatre of war, both the transports carrying troops and the transports constituting its floating base—a total of several hundreds of ships. The Japanese Fleet could not hope for any better opportunity of attacking the United States Fleet conveying hundreds of transports laden with troops. These transports must be escorted at a short distance and cannot be left behind inadequately protected, as for instance, transports carrying fuel. The movements of the United States Fleet would be handicapped by this armada to such a degree that it would be in a hopeless condition, if attacked by the Japanese Fleet, should the former be numerically stronger than it is now. One need not be a specialist in order to understand that military science is justified in considering that to escort transports with considerable land forces across a sea that is not in possession of the convoying power is a strategical adventure.

The strategical conditions of the theatre of war thus compel the United States Fleet to limit its action to a distant blockade which it will have to carry out while availing itself of the bases it may secure somewhere in the

islands of the Pacific. How would such a blockade affect the Japanese troops occupying the Philippines?

Owing to ample local supplies, the Japanese troops would be able to get everything on the spot. With regard to war material—this would be brought from Japan in large quantities before the arrival of the United States Fleet in the Chinese Sea. Japan, however, would not require much war material for action in the Philippines owing to the scarcity of the United States forces in these islands. The Japanese troops would easily therefore be maintained in the Philippines for many months, even in the event of the islands being cut off from the Japanese mainland.

Japan herself would not be seriously menaced by a distant blockade. She would only be cut off from all intercourse with the American continent, and her communications with China across the Yellow Sea would be somewhat hampered. So long are the distances of the Pacific and so insignificant the number of American cruisers that Japan's naval communications would suffer no greater inconvenience.

A distant blockade is not, therefore, likely to afford a solution of the problems which the policy of the United States may impose upon her armed forces. On the contrary—the war may serve as an excuse for the occupation of China by Japan.

The United States Fleet cannot blockade Japan at a long distance for any length of time.

Not to speak of the Japanese submarines which would apply all their strength to the blockade of the harbours in which the United States would be anchored—a natural cause will inevitably compel this or the other United States ship to be put into dock. And there would be no docks available. As the superiority of the United States Fleet over the Japanese, as established by the Washington Conference, is not so very great, the position of the former in the Chinese Sea would be imperilled in the event of two or three ships being out of action owing to the absence of docks. The Japanese Fleet would naturally await this propitious moment with impatience, and would then strive to engage the United States Fleet in a decisive battle.

The strength of the United States Fleet, as established by the "Five Power Pact on the Limitation of Naval Armaments" is insufficient for the conduct of a war in the Western Pacific aiming at decisive results. At the outbreak of war, the United States would have therefore to proceed immediately to increase the power of her Navy. For this the United States has ample possibilities, owing to the immense shipbuilding resources of the country. Japan is well aware of this, and has been recently developing her shipbuilding concerns, both private and State-owned, with great energy, and they have reached at present large dimensions. Until recently, the weak point of the Japanese shipbuilding has been its dependence upon foreign markets, and especially upon the American,

for metals and machinery. Japan is anxious to free herself from this dependence and is devoting her energies to the formation of a solid base for her shipbuilding industry. By establishing a "shipbuilding holiday," the Five Power Pact on the limitation of armaments enables Japan to divert considerable financial resources and technical means to the furtherance of this object. When it is attained, the shipbuilding resources of Japan will allow of such development in war time as to enable her to maintain a relative strength necessary for opposing the United States in the Western Pacific.

All the above considerations appear to us to show that the strategical conditions now obtaining in the Pacific preclude the possibility of the United States defending her possessions in the Far East and her interests in China *by the force of arms alone*. There can hardly be any doubt that this is well understood by the United States' leading statesmen and military authorities. And it would seem that the Washington Conference was called with the object of devising a diplomatic solution of the national problems which the United States is conscious of being unable to solve by force of arms. The United States hoped that the prestige and influence she had gained in the world after the Great War would enable her to ensure the co-operation of the mighty British Navy and the hospitality of the British and French naval bases in the Western Pacific in war time. The United States thus hoped to alter the strategical conditions

of that theatre of war in such a manner as to render impossible a challenge on the part of Japan, and thus to establish peace in the waters of the Pacific. In the following chapter we shall endeavour to appraise the strategical value to these hopes of American statesmanship.

CHAPTER X

THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL GROUPINGS IN THE PACIFIC

BEFORE the Washington Conference, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the only international agreement that determined the military and political conditions in the Western Pacific. This Alliance was, in fact, nothing else than a diplomatic sanction of the Anglo-Japanese hegemony in the Far East. The military importance of this Alliance can be gauged from the following considerations :—

Let us assume that the United States is compelled to resort to arms in order to solve the political problems we have discussed in Chapter VI. What strategical conditions would she be confronted with in view of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ?

Before the United States Fleet could reach the Far East, the Japanese Fleet could easily transfer its bases to the Allied British harbours in the Chinese Sea. This would preclude all possibility of recapturing the Philippines or continuing to blockade Japan. That, however, is not all. From the moment the United States

Fleet would set forth for the Western Pacific, the entire coast of the United States and the maritime routes in the Atlantic would be defenceless, and the very presence in these waters of the fleet of Japan's Ally, Great Britain, would inevitably compel the United States to keep part of her fleet within a short distance of her shores. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance would thus give Japan a free hand in the Far East because the United States Navy would be unable to combine the task of fighting in the Western Pacific with the defence of the coast, and of the maritime routes in the Atlantic. For these purposes the United States would require a fleet stronger than the combined fleets of Great Britain and of Japan. In other words, the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would compel the United States to adopt the "Two Power Standard" programme for the development of her Navy. At the present moment there are forty capital ships in the Navies of Great Britain and of Japan as against twenty of the same ships in the United States Navy. If the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remains, the United States will have immediately to start building at least twenty of these ships.

The peculiar feature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is that it exercises its influence from the military point of view, even without any direct interference on Great Britain's part in a war between the United States and Japan. There is no need for Great Britain to send her fleet into the Pacific. Owing to the strategical

conditions secured by Japan in the Far East and which are supplemented by British bases, Japan is perfectly capable of dealing alone with the United States Fleet in the Pacific. At the same time, should the United States send her fleet to the Pacific, she could not run the risk of Great Britain joining in the war on the side of Japan. The United States would therefore be compelled to choose between three alternatives : Either she must renounce once and for ever her position in the Far East, or succeed in bringing about the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ; the third alternative would be immediately to embark upon the ruinous policy of the "Two Power Standard." The Anglo-Japanese Alliance afforded Great Britain an excellent and convenient opportunity of counterbalancing the influence of a new competitor on the international stage, without shedding his kindred blood or moving the British Fleet from the Atlantic. The motives must have been serious indeed that have prompted Great Britain to renounce this simple and powerful weapon of international policy.

Had there been no British Dominions in the Pacific, it is doubtful whether Great Britain would have denounced her Alliance with Japan, but the anxiety of these Dominions has caused the British statesmen seriously to ponder. To the British Dominions in the Pacific the gigantic growth of Japan is obvious. They understand that "movement South-Westwards" is the watchword of the national Imperialistic policy

of the Rising Sun. British politicians, in spite of being fully absorbed in finding a solution of the vexed questions relating to the late World War, could not but be perturbed by the voices that came from the Dominions.

Very soon after the war had ended, Admiral Lord Jellicoe, one of the shrewdest British students of naval strategy, was appointed Governor-General of New Zealand, and was entrusted with the task of investigating from the military viewpoint the degree in which the fears of the Dominions were justified. Lord Jellicoe gave a summary of his investigations in a report addressed to the British Admiralty in 1920.

Lord Jellicoe points out in this report that "the interests of Great Britain may require the presence of important naval forces in the Pacific in the nearest future."

A full list is further given in the report of battleships of all classes which will be needed to "defend the interests of the British Empire." These numbers of battleships and the percentage of battleships and battle-cruisers equal the strength of the Japanese Fleet. The report indicates the amount of large credits required for further equipment of the British basis in the Southern Pacific. The point of paramount interest in the report, however, is that Lord Jellicoe emphasises the necessity of converting Singapore into the centre of British power, and does not mention Hong Kong (at least not in the part of the report which has been

published). Lord Jellicoe, presumably, realises the position in which Hong Kong would be placed in the event of war with Japan.

British statesmanship is thus faced with the alternative: to strengthen the position of the British Dominions in the Pacific by entering into an alliance with the United States, in which case Great Britain would have to share with that country its naval supremacy which has been for centuries the bulwark of British prosperity and power. At the same time, an alliance with the United States would have the drawback of weakening Great Britain's position in the Atlantic and in Europe at the moment when such a contingency would be the least desirable. For an open alliance would create for Great Britain the obligation and the necessity of despatching to the Far East, in the event of war between Japan and the United States, part of her fleet; Japan would naturally take advantage of this contingency and would begin open hostilities at a moment which would be the most inopportune for Great Britain. In the present condition of European affairs, such a possibility might occur at any moment. The other alternative would be to maintain the Alliance with Japan, which would allow Japan to seize the Philippines and to get ready for the next stage in her advance towards the South-West.

There can be no doubt that common sense and the traditional policy of Great Britain indicate the middle course which she has already

followed so often and so successfully : not to commit herself and to have a free hand in case of war to act in a manner most beneficial to the interests of Great Britain. The "Four Power Pact" which Great Britain has signed at the Washington Conference is drafted in such a way that it does not impose upon her any obligation automatically to take part in the war in the Pacific. This Pact stipulates that in the event of a conflict in the Pacific a mediation conference be held, and Great Britain is thus placed more or less in the position of a mediator between the United States and Japan. The former may only hope to receive armed assistance from Great Britain in the event of the Conference deciding in favour of the United States. On the other hand, Great Britain may maintain friendly relations with Japan which are so important, especially in regard to British influence in China. Meanwhile, the Pact does not preclude Japan from hoping that her late Ally and future mediator will still remain friendly. The only practical factor of the "Four Power Pact" is that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has not been renewed.

From the military point of view, this merely means that the United States may count in the future upon Great Britain remaining neutral. But mere hopes for neutrality do not suffice, as war is in itself too stringent a reality. In order to fight successfully against Japan the United States cannot rest content with hopes alone ; she must be certain of the possibility of using British bases in the Far East and to

count upon the assistance of British battle-cruisers and light cruisers of which there is a deficiency in the United States Navy. For this reason the mere neutrality of Great Britain does not present a solution of the problem of the Pacific favourable to the United States, and marks no improvement in the latter's strategical position, because it does not guarantee the use of British bases in the Far East. France well understands this, and before the Washington Conference offered to the United States her base—Saigon—(the well-known Admiral Fournier wrote a significant article on the subject in the *Matin*). Saigon, however, is not a sufficient base for the United States Navy, as there are no docks for big battleships, and the harbour itself is too small.

The question thus arises whether the United States is justified in assuming that the "Four Power Pact" affords a key to the solution of the problem of the Pacific and gives the United States "a powerful military and political weapon" against Japan. Also whether the United States is justified in considering that the strategical position in the Far East which she cannot solve alone, can be decided through Great Britain and France joining in an eventual war against Japan. The American statesmen who have summoned the Washington Conference and directed its deliberations would presumably answer these questions in the affirmative. It is difficult to imagine that these statesmen should have made such heavy sacrifices in sea power

and should have paid so heavy a price for the "Four Power Pact," prompted by illusions only. The entire agenda of the Conference, which began with disarmament, indicate that the main object of the Conference was to induce Great Britain to denounce the Alliance with Japan and to replace it by the "Four Power Pact." The programme of the Conference aimed at impressing public opinion with America's sacrifice in the cause of world peace. The bombshell which Mr. Hughes threw upon the Conference table on the opening day did actually blow up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and did create a world-wide movement of public opinion in favour of the United States being given guarantees as a reward of her magnanimous sacrifice. This movement has found expression in the "Four Power Pact."

There are, however, many politicians in the United States at present who question the practical value of the guarantees contained in the "Four Power Pact." These doubts have already been reflected in the American Senate and Japan's peculiarly complacent and amiable attitude towards that Pact is undoubtedly an ominous sign which tends to confirm American apprehension. In order to answer the above-mentioned questions as to whether the promoters of the Washington Conference were justified in their hopes, the "Four Power Pact" should first of all be examined from the military point of view. The following is the text of the Pact :—

The United States of America, the British Empire, the French Republic and the Empire of Japan, having in view the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights regarding their insular possessions as well as their insular Dominions in the zone of the Pacific Ocean, have decided to conclude a treaty. Towards this end they have appointed plenipotentiaries, who have agreed to the following articles :—

1. The High Contracting Parties agree, in so far as they are concerned, to respect their rights regarding their insular possessions, as well as their insular Dominions in the zone of the Pacific Ocean. If there should arise between any of the High Contracting Parties any difference on any question whatever concerning the Pacific, and putting in question their rights hereafter set out, which cannot be settled satisfactorily through diplomatic channels and which might threaten to endanger the happy harmony now existing between them, such Powers are to invite the other Contracting Parties to meet in a Conference, to which the whole question shall be submitted with a view to its consideration and arrangement.

2. Should the rights hereafter set out be threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties are to communicate with one another, fully and frankly, in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly

or severally, to meet the exigencies of the situation.

3. The present agreement shall remain in force for ten years from the time it takes effect, and after the expiration of the said period it shall continue in force subject to the right of each of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it after giving notice twelve months in advance.

4. The present agreement shall be ratified at the earliest possible date in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties. It will come into force upon the exchange of ratifications which will take place at Washington. Whereupon the conventions between Great Britain and Japan, signed at London on July 13, 1911, will come to an end.

What, then, is the military significance of the Pact, as a means of maintaining the balance of power in the Pacific? We know that the fundamental reason for the conclusion of the Pact is that the balance of power in the Pacific is menaced by the growth of Japan's military power and by the exceptionally strong position which she has created for herself in the Western Pacific. The ultimate, albeit covert aim of the Pact is therefore to counterbalance the might of Japan by the combined forces of the other three parties to the Pact. On the whole, this covert aim is identical with the aims pursued by the political understandings between the European Powers that were striving to counterbalance the military power of Germany before

the Great War. From the military viewpoint, however, the difference between the pre-war political groupings of Powers in Europe and the "Four Power Pact" is so great that comparison is almost impossible.

Political groupings directed against Germany—first and foremost the Franco-Russian Alliance—had a practical and tangible military bearing. Military conventions and other definite stipulations formed the basis of all the calculations of the respective General Staffs.

The diplomatic agreements upon which the Alliances were based took into account cases of automatic combined military action of the Allied Powers, and were supplemented by military conventions.

Powers were grouped together whose armed forces were contiguous and were also bordering upon the forces of Germany. In other words, these groupings combined Powers already on the main theatre of war.

Simultaneous action by the combined groups of Powers was guaranteed not so much by diplomatic agreements as by the fact that for every one of these powers the German menace was in any event a matter of paramount importance overshadowing all other national problems.

For all these reasons the political groupings into which European Powers were divided in order to counterbalance the military might of Germany had a definite military meaning which played a decisive part in the last war.

What is the military substance of the grouping of three Powers, Great Britain, France and the United States, which is concealed in the "Four Power Pact"?

1. The United States is the only one of these three Powers for which the problem of the Pacific is likely to become in the near future a matter of paramount and vital interest as a national question. For Great Britain, this problem cannot assume the shape of an urgent and vital national issue for some time to come. The problem of the Pacific will always be of lesser importance to her than the problems of the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and of the Mediterranean, of the waters that wash her own shores and in which the centre of her political might is situated. Should a menace to the interests of Great Britain arise in the Pacific simultaneously with trouble in Europe, or even in India, it is to these latter problems that her attention will be riveted, and she will prefer to compromise in the Far East pending the advent of a more favourable moment. Should the United States be menaced in the Philippines by Japan whilst India would be threatened by the foe, Great Britain's choice can easily be foreseen.

The problem of the Pacific is not of paramount importance to Great Britain or to France. A conflict in the Pacific may arise or may be provoked by Japan at a moment when Great Britain and France, or any one of these Powers, are occupied in the Atlantic. For this reason

the grouping of the United States with Great Britain and France is not *in itself* a guarantee of combined military action in the Pacific. The United States cannot, therefore, have the assurance that military co-operation will be forthcoming.

2. The main armed forces and bases of the United States, Great Britain and France are not situated on the theatre of war to which the "Four Power Pact" refers. The main forces of the United States are at a distance of from 5-7,000 miles, whereas the British and French are about 10,000 miles distant. At the sudden outbreak of war, the main forces of the United States cannot reach the theatre of war under one month, and the British and French under two months after the opening of hostilities. That is the weakest point of the grouping from the military point of view. The United States Fleet may reach the Western Pacific in a month's time. But in order not to allow the enemy to attack the naval forces of the three Powers piecemeal, the American Navy must wait until it can combine with the British. Japan would thus have nearly two months at her disposal for the completion of all strategical preparations.

All students of the late war remember that every day, nay, every hour that could be spared for the rapid preparation of the preliminaries of war, such as mobilisation, distribution of troops, the seizure of important strategical points, etc., added enormously to the strength of the

respective armies, whereas every moment of delay, especially in the present days of highly developed technique, was fraught with the most dangerous consequences. The advantage that any Power would possess which would have a whole month at its disposal for these preparations is self-evident. Taking into consideration Japan's opportunities with regard to transport, bases, etc., we may well surmise that by the time the combined fleets of Great Britain, France and the United States will have reached the theatre of war—they might find that China has been occupied, the Philippines seized, Cavite, Guam and Hong Kong disabled. Nature itself and the long distances weaken the above-mentioned political grouping strategically, while adding to the natural military power of their opponent, and placing into the hands of Japan one of the strongest weapons of war time.

3. Point 1 of the "Four Power Pact" stipulates for a diplomatic conference of the Four Signatory Powers to be convened when a conflict in the Pacific arises and before the opening of hostilities. Thus the Pact which, as we have already said, contains no guarantees of their simultaneous action, pre-supposes no spontaneous action, or military sanctions to which there is no allusion in the Pact. It pre-supposes only a diplomatic sanction, a conference. It is useless to speculate on the military bearing of such a sanction. Military specialists and students of the military history of all peoples are rather sceptical, however, in regard to the practical military effect of

diplomatic conferences, and are doubtful as to the possibility of these conferences bearing fruit. In the present case such scepticism seems particularly apt.

As we have already mentioned, two of the four Powers concerned, Great Britain and France, would be discussing the conflict in the Pacific, whilst their paramount interests would lie 10,000 miles away, and those interests might be at that moment jeopardised. Ample indeed would be the scope for Japanese diplomacy at the conference. Even if Japan should fail to secure the neutrality of Great Britain and France, or of one of them, at any price, she might easily induce them to waver and not to render the United States simultaneous assistance. The mere fact that the Allies would not come in at the same time would place a trump card into the hands of Japan for the obvious reason that complete harmony of action constitutes the bulwark of every military coalition.

The three fundamental points described above appear to us fully to illustrate the military significance of the "Four Power Pact." The very nature of the political groupings intended to counterbalance Germany's might precluded the possibility of any one of these Powers having to oppose Germany single-handed. But the nature of the "Four Power Pact" is by no means such as to preclude the chance of the United States being isolated in a conflict with Japan. The chances of such a conflict have increased after the debate in the United States

Senate at the end of February, 1922, during the discussion of the "Four Power Agreement." As a result of this debate the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate voted the so-called Senator Brandegee's substitute reservation to the Four Power Treaty reading.

"The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or under the terms of the treaty there is no commitment to armed forces, no alliance and no obligation to join in any defence." Reluctance to become tied by any obligations towards other Powers has considerably weakened the pledges, already somewhat conditional, of Great Britain and France to come to the assistance of the United States in the event of the latter being attacked by Japan in the Western Pacific. It is the immutable rule of life that he who fears to come to the rescue of others cannot count upon others helping him. The policy of "splendid isolation" may be the outcome of broad-minded statesmanship, as well as of narrow-minded egoistical provincialism.

The foregoing lines appear to us to give an exhaustive answer to the question as to the soundness of the views of American statesmen in respect of guarantees offered by the "Four Power Pact" of balance of power in the Pacific. We shall now revert to the examination of the strategical possibilities inherent in the Pact. In other words, we will endeavour to estimate the practical value of the participation of Great Britain and France in a war against Japan.

To what extent would France's participation in the war affect the issue?

Generally speaking the French Fleet is technically equipped for action in the restricted area of the Mediterranean, but not for wide oceanic regions. In equipment, armour, gunnery, etc., France's newest battleships are inferior to Japanese battleships of the first line. As in the United States Navy, there are no battle-cruisers in France, nor has she any light cruisers of the latest type. There are very few destroyers and submarines. In other words, the French Fleet could only reinforce in a small measure the second line of the United States Fleet, and could not materially affect the relative strength of the contending Fleets of Japan and the United States in the Western Pacific. The participation of France would somewhat improve the strategical position of the United States Fleet in respect of bases, as the deserted harbours of Indo-China and Saigon would then be available. But, as we have already said, there are no docks in Saigon. Should the United States Fleet be able to shelter in the harbours of Indo-China, it would be nearer to the Japanese naval centre than if it had only to count upon the islands of the Pacific for bases. On the whole, however, the participation of France would not widen the scope of naval action of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, and that action would still be limited to a partial long-distance blockade of Japan.

In comparison with France, Great Britain

would be of greater practical strategical value as an ally of the United States. In the first place, part of the naval forces of Great Britain might take part in the war in the Far East. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the entire British Fleet could be sent to the Pacific. Were the conflict in the Pacific to arise at a time of peace and quiet in European politics, yet Great Britain could not send her fleet to a distance of 10,000 miles away from the shores of the United Kingdom, not only by reason of her insular position, but because the very absence of the British Fleet from European waters might provoke conflicts in Europe. The British Fleet could no more be sent in its entirety to the Pacific than could the French Army be sent to fight outside Europe, for example, in Morocco. The presence on the Continent of Europe of a strong French Army and of important British naval forces in European waters is necessary for the strategical balance of the world.

Taking the above considerations into account and bearing in mind the conclusions of Lord Jellicoe's Report, we may assume that Great Britain is in a position to send to the Pacific naval forces equal to those of Japan. As the strength of the British Fleet has been determined at the Washington Conference by the figure 5, and that of Japan by the figure 3, it follows that Great Britain would have to send the main part of her fleet to the Pacific. Should these British forces be added to the United States

Fleet, the Japanese Fleet would have no chance of success in open battle.

Should Great Britain join the war on the side of the United States, all the British bases in the Pacific would be available for the American ships. This would improve the strategical position of the United States, as she would have docks for big battleships at her disposal.

What would be the effect of British participation upon the operations of the United States Fleet? Great Britain's participation would not suffice for a successful application of the most decisive method of winning the war, namely, the capture of the Japanese mainland. The next most drastic method would be, as we have already shown, a complete blockade by which Japan would be cut off from her communications with the Continent of Asia. The first step which would have to be taken to that end would be the destruction of the Japanese Fleet. It seems obvious that should Great Britain join in the war on the side of the United States and should the British battleships arrive in the waters of the Far East *simultaneously* with the American Fleet, Japan would not run the risk of giving open battle and would take up an attitude of watchful expectation under cover of her powerful naval positions. Should the Allied Fleets concentrate upon a thorough blockade of Japan, they would have to force these fortified positions and to challenge the Japanese Fleet in an open battle.

This extensive action of the Allied Fleets

against Japan would take place approximately on the following lines :—

The Japanese Fleet whose strength, as we know, is represented by the figure 3, would be defending strong naval positions barring the access to the Japanese Sea, and the bases of that fleet would be in the close neighbourhood. The Allied Fleets whose strength would be represented by the figures $4 + 3$, would have to attack these strong positions and would have a secure base (Singapore) 2,000 miles away in the rear, for the nearest base, Hong Kong, cannot, as we know, be considered secure.

In the Great War, the Allied Fleets did not venture to force the naval position behind which the German Fleet was sheltered, although the Allied Fleets were about three times stronger than the German, and their numerous bases were only a few miles distant from these positions. At the same time, the Allies risked forcing the Dardanelles simply because apart from the one German cruiser, the *Goeben*, there were no other enemy battleships in the Sea of Marmora. Had they failed to force the Straits, no danger awaited them. In fact, while the operation was in progress the Allies noticed that their losses exceeded their expectations. They therefore merely stopped the operations and retired to their bases in the immediate neighbourhood.

In trying to force the entrance to the Japanese Sea, the Allied Fleets would find themselves in an altogether different position. Should Japan's

opponents notice, as it happened in the Dardennes, in the course of their operations, that their losses are excessive—a great misfortune might befall them. For should they stop the operation they would have to retire to their distant base under the threat of the Japanese Fleet. The latter might easily pursue them and compel them to accept battle in conditions of unexampled difficulty.

In the event of the Allied Fleets deciding not to complete the operations after their first losses, when their main forces would still be strong enough to prevent Japan from risking an open battle, the disabled ships might still fail to reach their base, as they would have to be subjected on their way to the base to the intensive operations of Japanese submarines and destroyers. It may be taken for granted that should the first attempt to force the entrances to the Japanese Sea fail, it will not be repeated, as the abortive attempt at forcing the Dardennes also was not repeated. The risk of heavy losses would be too great, and the Allied Anglo-American Fleet might even lose its numerical superiority over the Japanese Fleet. The idea of forcing the German positions in the Southern waters of the North Sea was not carried out in the last war, for analogous reasons, in spite of the fact that the success of such an operation would have entailed complete cessation of submarine warfare and the destruction of Germany's sea power by one stroke. As a rule, the risk of such operations is so great that they are described

in naval strategy as something akin to strategical adventure. Operations may be undertaken on land entailing the risk of heavy losses simply because these losses can be made good in the Army with much greater ease than losses in battleships, and because the issue of modern war on land is never decided by any battle. On sea matters are different. If, for example, the Allies failed to force the Japanese positions in the Japanese Sea, and suffered such losses as would allow Japan to challenge them in open battle, they would stand in great peril, because should the Japanese Fleet defeat the Anglo-American, it would mean the establishment of Japanese supremacy in the Pacific for some time to come. We venture to think that no British admiral with experience of the late war, and realising the vital importance for Great Britain of maintaining the constant and unbroken hegemony of the British Fleet would agree to such an operation. We know how careful Great Britain was to preserve her naval forces in the Great War; we know that although submarine warfare was a deadly menace to her very existence, Great Britain would not venture to force the German "wet triangle." We cannot therefore imagine that Great Britain would ever undertake the forcing of the Japanese Sea in order to solve the Far Eastern question.

We can therefore take it for granted that a complete blockade of Japan, coupled with the necessity of breaking through into the Japanese

Sea, cannot form a reasonable basis of the war plans of the Allied Anglo-American Fleets against Japan.

There are those who think that a method of warfare may be applied against Japan which is commonly described as "fleet in being." We will touch upon this question because certain writers, not altogether amateurs in matters of naval strategy, seem to entertain groundless hopes with regard to this method and are misleading public opinion, ignorant of the intricacies of naval strategy, by this would-be scientific expression. "Fleet in being" is nothing else than the constant presence of a fleet in a given theatre of war, alongside with the enemy fleet, but avoiding battle and hiding in its bases and behind its fortified positions. "Fleet in being" gives conditional mastery at sea to the fleet which may apply this method. In order, however, to apply it, the fleet must have a secure base in the theatre of war, and the strategical influence of the method is, strictly speaking, confined to the scope of assistance which a solid base renders to a fleet in action. In the late war, the British Fleet was in a position to apply this method against the German Fleet in the North Sea only because the main and numerous bases of the British Fleet were situated in that sea.

When the "fleet in being" method is successfully applied and conditional mastery of the sea thus attained, the enemy is deprived of his surface communications until it defeats

its opponent. That is why the mastery of the sea is described as conditional.

In order to apply this method in the Japanese Sea, the enemies of Japan would have to first of all break through into the Japanese Sea. Supposing the operation is successful, and the Japanese Fleet, battered and weakened, shelters in its many bases and is being repaired. How will Japan's enemies carry out the "fleet in being" in the Japanese Sea? They cannot acquire bases on the coasts of Japan and of Korea because these coasts are defended by the Japanese Army. There remain Vladivostok and other harbours on the Russian coast. These harbours, however, owing to the present condition of Russia, would obviously have fallen into the hands of Japan and would be occupied by Japanese troops long before the arrival of the Allied Fleets in the Far East. The enemies of Japan would find themselves in the same position in the Yellow Sea if they desired to establish conditional mastery on those waters in order to interrupt Japan's communications with China. Bases in the Japanese and in the Yellow Sea being thus beyond reach of the Allied Fleets, they would have to make a bid for the Chinese Sea, where they have a first-rate base—Singapore—and anchorages on the coast of Indo-China.

The participation of Great Britain in a war against Japan would not, therefore, tend to broaden the scope of strategical methods of warfare which would remain the same as in

the event of a single-handed struggle against Japan. A long-distance naval blockade would still remain the only weapon. With the assistance of Great Britain, this blockade might be more effective. In the event of war between the United States and Japan, the former, owing to the lack of docks and bases in the Chinese Sea, would have to leave these waters sooner or later for repairs. The Japanese troops occupying the Philippines would thus have the certainty that their communications with Japan would sooner or later be re-established. If, however, the British Fleet is in the Chinese Sea as Japan's enemy, it can always remain in that sea, and the blockade of the Philippines may continue for ever. For this reason it may be anticipated that should Great Britain join the United States, Japan would not risk the occupation of the Philippines.

An Anglo-American alliance would not open new possibilities of decisive and powerful strategy against Japan, and the severance of the latter's communications with the Asiatic Continent would still remain an unattainable task for her enemies.

On the other hand, Great Britain's participation in the war would give Japan a free hand in China. The mere instinct of self-preservation in the face of a protracted war would compel Japan to strengthen her rear on the Continent, and she would have to occupy China in order to secure food supplies and minerals. The occupation of China would signify the lasting supremacy of Japan over that country. The

participation of Great Britain would be a guarantee against the seizure of the Philippines, but in the long run would result in the loss for Great Britain of rich markets in Southern China, and in the appearance on the Asiatic Continent, in the immediate vicinity of British Asiatic possessions, of energetic and active Japan instead of "sleepy China."

We have already mentioned that fifty years ago Japan entered upon a cycle of wars, of which the coming war will be one of the stages of the development of the Rising Sun according to the watchword "Asia for the Asiatics." Strategically, this next stage is so prepared that even the combined forces of Great Britain and of the United States cannot prevent Japan's occupation of China at the outbreak of war in the Far East. As Great Britain's participation in the war would not deal Japan a decisive blow and could not prevent the occupation of China by the latter, we venture to think that American statesmanship at the Washington Conference was not justified in assuming that the "Four Power Pact" is capable of restoring the strategical balance in the Pacific.

The "Four Power Pact" had the narrow aim of defending the islands of the Pacific, and it thus indicates to Japan the access to the next stage of her progress—to the Continent of Asia.

CHAPTER XI

THE BEARING OF RUSSIA AND OF HER FAR EASTERN DOMINIONS UPON THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

WE have already stated in Chapter I that in spite of the scarcity of the population of the Far Eastern Russian dominions, their seizure by Japan would not solve the problem of finding room for the surplus population of the Yellow Empire. We have indicated that many authoritative scholars who have studied the customs and requirements of the Japanese people have come to the conclusion that the Japanese surplus population can only settle in countries lying south of the forty-fifth parallel. But geographical parallels do not afford sufficient ground for judging of the climate, and it is necessary to study the outline of isotherms.

The isotherms of the average annual zero temperature begin in European Russia north of Uleaborg, and follow the line of Archangel and the north of the province of Perm, cross the Ural mountains towards Tobolsk, Krasnoyarsk, Habarovsk, and then rise northwards, crossing the centre of Sakhalien and the Kamt-

chatka peninsula. Alaska, the north-western territories of Canada and Greenland lie to the north of that isotherm. The population of these countries is as follows:—


Alaska	1 to 9 square miles
North Western Canada	1 to 60 ,, ,,
Greenland	1 to 60 ,, ,,

All these countries are destined to be thinly populated. The capacity of these countries for immigration might be described as amounting to decimal fractions of one per cent. of the capacity of Japan, China, Java, and other rice-growing countries. The capacity of the above-named northern territories is not, however, the same everywhere. It is larger as the country is nearer to the sea. In this respect the Russian Far Eastern dominion is most unfavourably situated. Three winter isotherms are indicated on map No. 5—the isotherms of the average temperature for January of 16°, 20°, and 24° of frost. The second isotherm is the most interesting. It begins in the north of the Petchora region, descends along the Ural chain, separating Europe from Asia, continues towards Tobolsk, Krasnoyarsk, runs along the southern coast of Lake Baikal, crosses Manchuria south of the fiftieth parallel, and the Sikota Alin chain, and, encountering the moderating influence of the ocean, rises abruptly to the north along the coast. This isotherm embraces almost all Russian Far Eastern dominions, which are therefore bound to remain

MAP No. 5.

Showing the Annual Isotherm of 0° Cent., and the January Isotherms of: -16° , -20° and -24° Cent.

- Annual Isotherm 0° Cent.
- January Isotherms.



thinly populated. It should not be forgotten that the province of Yakutsk is the region of the heaviest polar frost.

In the twentieth century Japan will stand in need of finding room for tens of millions of emigrants. In the Russian Far Eastern dominions only a small stretch of territory round Vladivostok and a narrow coastal line are fit for Japanese emigration. The coastal line, moreover, has even greater disadvantages than Southern Sakhalien, to which, as we have already mentioned, Japan has only sent a few thousands of settlers in fifteen years.

A thorough study of the question compels us to repeat what we have said in Chapter I: Japan will not find room for her surplus population in Far Eastern Russia.

In Chapter II we have shown that as a market for exports of manufactured goods the Russian Far East likewise does not answer the requirements of Japanese industry, because the total population of the entire territory east of Baikal does not exceed 3,500,000. But that restricted market will always remain open to Japanese goods, because the Far Eastern territory is too remote from the centres of Russian industry, and Russia cannot introduce protective tariffs, as they would produce a rise in the cost of living and would practically put an end to the economic development of the country. Japan, therefore, does not need to exercise political domination over the Russian Far East in order to capture the markets.

The Russian coast of the Japanese and Okhotsk Seas and of the Behring Straits abounds in fisheries and furs. Japan requires their exploitation. Fish is one of the items of staple food for the Japanese islanders. In the endeavour to exploit these industries Japan is not likely to encounter any resistance on the part of Russia, because the fisheries have long since been practically in the hands of Japan. Russia only protested against destructive methods in the fur seal fisheries, and the offenders, in this case, were not so much the Japanese as the Americans. It may be confidently asserted that Russia's measures of protection of the fur seals were advantageous to Japan, because, in the absence of Russian supervision, Japan is defraying the costs of that supervision. With regard, therefore, to the exploitation of the fisheries and furs of the Russian Far East, the interests of Russia and of Japan do not clash.

The situation is somewhat different in respect of the exploitation of the rich soil of that region. The map No. 6 indicates the regions in which various mines are located. No exhaustive survey of the mineral riches of the Far East has ever been made, so that we must needs be satisfied with the available data.

East of Lake Baikal, near the Myssovaia station, the existence of a rich bed of iron ore has been ascertained, which is the more important because there is coal in the immediate neighbourhood. Beds of iron ore have also been

discovered along the River Baleg, the tributary of the Shilka, in the Nerchinsk district, and at a distance of about twelve miles from the Bay of St. Olga, in the Maritime province. Iron ore is to be found also in some regions of the Yakutsch province (along the Rivers Anga and Batash, the tributary of the Lena, the Valui, etc.) in the Amur province.

Coal has been discovered in Transbaikalia, Amur, the Maritime province, and in Sakhalien. Of these the richest are the Sutchansk and the Sakhalien mines.¹

Near Lake Baikal there are oil wells and burning gas. Although the country has not been as yet properly surveyed, there can be no doubt that there are plenty of oil beds. They would be of paramount importance, and their exploitation would prove highly profitable on account of the scarcity of oil in Asia.

¹ The Sutchansk mines are in the Maritime province, to the north of the Nakhodka Bay, near Vladivostok. The Sutchansk coal may prove necessary for the development of the metallurgical industry within the Sikota-Alin chain, which abounds in iron ore and other metals—even in the event of the Olguinsk and other coastal mines being dependent upon the Sakhalien coal.

The south-western part of Russian Sakhalien is the region in which the coal industry of the island is most likely to develop rapidly. The coal mines of Russian Sakhalien are supposed to be of several hundred million tons. The diversity in the quality of coal in Sakhalien would allow it to be used for various purposes. Hard coal would be used in gas factories and furnaces, whilst soft coal and coke would help to develop the iron industry in the Far East. The mixture, in certain proportions, of these kinds of coal makes excellent coal for shipping purposes. In spite of the primitive nature of the industry, the Sakhalien coal is known as the best fuel throughout the Far East.

There is oil also in Sakhalien. In the mountains of Transbaikalia there is copper, silver, and manganese ore. The first two metals are to be found in the Maritime province as well.

The Russian Far Eastern dominions abound in gold mines.¹

The economic exploitation of the mineral riches of these regions by Japan does not involve political supremacy over the territory. Owing to the scarcity of the population, the local needs of coal and iron cannot be great, while the

¹ The richest of these mines are in the Olekminsk district of the Yakutsk province, which is situated north of the Tablonov chain, between the rivers Vitim, Lena and Olekma. The valley of the rivers Bodaido (a tributary of the Vitim), of Great and Small Patomo (tributary of the Lena), and of Juia, Bogolnak, Batoiho and Vatch (tributaries of the Olekma) are particularly rich in gold mines. Gold is here to be found in two or three layers and in big lumps. But the gold mining industry is especially arduous on account of the rigorous climate, and frozen soil, and the high cost of labour and of supplies. In Transbaikalia there is gold almost everywhere; the richest mines are in the Bargusinsk district along the rivers Vatimkan, Vitim, Amanat, Zipa (and their tributaries) and in the Nertchinsk district. In the latter they are situated along the systems of the rivers Shilka, Kara, Nerch, Great and Small Urum, Ingoda, Onon, Unda, Gazimur, Urlungal, etc. The gold mines of the Amur and Maritime Provinces are in the valleys of the left tributaries of the Amur. The extreme western group of mines in the Amur Province lies between the Amur and the Zea in the neighbourhood of the town of Albasin. The second group is along the rivers Gilui and Brianta, right tributaries of the Zea. These mines are particularly rich. The third group is situated along the river Selendja (left tributary of the Zea) and the fourth group in the upper Niman (right tributary of the Burea). The mines of the Amur provinces are rich and not very deep beneath the surface. There are gold mines in the Maritime province along the Amun river in the Oud district and elsewhere. Gold has also been found further north, along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk.


remoteness of the region from the industrial centres of Russia and high freights caused mining surveys to be limited almost exclusively to gold. The iron and coal industries can only be developed on a large scale to satisfy the requirements of Japanese industry. Thus this branch of industry can only be conducted in close economic connection with Japan. It is in the direct interest of Russia to work hand in hand with Japan, because such an economic policy would be the best means of economically developing the Russian Far Eastern dominions. It may be confidently stated that a strong Russia would see no danger in giving concessions to Japan for the exploitation of coal and iron, which are necessary for her peaceful progress, and that such concessions, provided they are purely economic and not political, would not be detrimental to the interests of Russia in these regions. If we revert, however, from the economic standpoint in discussing this question (of the coal and iron mining industries) to the strategical standpoint, we will arrive at entirely different conclusions.

From the economic viewpoint, the exploitation of the coal and iron mines of China would offer greater advantages to Japan than that of the riches of Far Eastern Russia. In the latter region a start would have to be made, and first of all a survey. There would be a scarcity of labour, while in China this question is simplified by the abundance of available labour and by its very low cost. But from

the strategical viewpoint a metallurgical base in the Russian Maritime region and in Sakhalien would be much more advantageous. The establishment of a metallurgical base in the region of the Sikota-Alin chain would be a lengthy undertaking. Japan will therefore endeavour to exploit the iron and coal of Manchuria and of Central China. But the strategical preparations will only be completed when Japan will ensure the supplies of coal and iron for her war factories from the metallurgical bases situated in Manchuria and in the Maritime region. In other words, Japan is making every effort to use Siberia and China as a general metallurgical base for her industries, and is also organising a *military metallurgical* base in Manchuria and in the Russian Far East.

In examining the condition of the iron and coal industries, we are once more confronted with the question already discussed in the preceding chapters—the necessity for Japan of having a base on the Asiatic continent in the event of hostilities against the United States and her Allies.

Apart from iron, Japan must import all kinds of raw materials and food. Rice is first and foremost among these, because it is the staple food of the people. Taking into account that the war with the United States would be a protracted one, Japan must provide for the continued activities of her industrial concerns in war time, and must therefore obtain all necessary raw material from her base in Asia. All



MAP № 6
Situation of Mineral Riches
in The Eastern Siberia.

- Coal ●
- Iron ore ●
- Gold ●
- Oil □
- Copper □
- Silver & lead *
- Manganese ▲
- Tin ▲
- Mercury ▲

the circumstances have compelled Japan to widen her base southwards, and to include in it the portion of Central China that touches the Yellow Sea.

We have pointed out in Chapter VIII that in order to dominate the Yellow Sea, the Japanese Fleet must be strongly supported by the army. The latter would have to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of any given point on the Yellow Sea as a temporary base. With this end in view, the Japanese troops would have to occupy the respective provinces of Central China. This objective can only be reached if all the railways are seized. The Fusan-Mukden-Tientsin-Tsinanfu-Nankin-Shanghai line will be the main line upon which the operations of the Japanese Army in China will be based. If Japan is in possession of the Russian coastal region, she will have another line of communication with the Japanese Sea—Vladivostok-Nikolsk—Ussuriisk—Pogranichnaia-Harbin-Mukden-Port Arthur. That line would allow the Fusan-Mukden line to be quite free of cargoes for and from Manchuria, and to serve entirely for the purpose of communications with Central China.

In Chapter V we have mentioned the Japanese scheme of the so-called "four railways of Manchuria and Mongolia." If the reader will draw an imaginary railway line connecting Yehol with Peking (see map No. 2), he will discover a new railway main line starting from Vladivostok, through Pogranichnaia, Harbin, Shan-

tung, Taonan, Yehol, Peking, Shunch, Hangkow—encircling the Yellow Sea from the coast. It should here be noted that the Japanese have not as yet raised the question of a concession for the Yehol-Peking railway. They have drawn their “four railways of Manchuria and Mongolia” in the shape of a quadrangle, one corner of which is at Yehol. But strategical preparations, as a rule, are carefully masked in peace time, and remind one of a “puzzle” in which the most amusing bit of the picture is cut in such a manner as to conceal the true aspect of the picture as long as possible from the solver of the puzzle. The Japanese are past-masters in cutting diplomatic puzzles. Of this the Washington Conference is another striking proof.

The strategical value of the second railway line, running along the coast of the Yellow Sea, is very great. It allows an encircling movement to be carried out, and the province of Central China to be occupied. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War teaches us that Russia was able to base in Manchuria simultaneously about 750,000 troops upon the only available line—the Trans-Siberian railway. That line served for purposes of reinforcing and completing the army, of supplying it with arms and ammunition, and of special technical means. The Russian Armies could get other supplies on the spot. The Japanese Army thrown across Manchuria into China would be in a similar position, and the use of the two railway lines

connected with the Japanese Sea would ensure an impregnable base for about 1,500,000 Japanese soldiers against the United States and Great Britain.

The Japanese General Staff must needs foresee the necessity of occupying China with considerable forces, owing to the present acute animosity of that country towards the "Rising Sun." Maritime transport will, of course, play an important part in the operations of the Japanese Army in China, especially in the opening stages of the war, when the enemy fleets will still be far distant. But wise strategists should foresee unfavourable contingencies —namely, the possibility of the Japanese Army in China having to depend solely upon railways for supplies.

Both the above-mentioned lines will serve for shipments in both directions. They will carry from Manchuria and China the raw materials which Japan, blockaded from the ocean, may require. The second line crossing the provinces of Central China remote from the sea will be of paramount economic importance. South of Peking it crosses the agricultural region of China, and approaches the valley of the Yantse-kiang. The three towns Hang-kow, Haniang, and Wu-chang, the industrial and commercial centres of this, the richest and most thickly populated part of China, are situated in close proximity to the tail of that branch. The metallurgical factories of Haniang (Haniang-Ping Company) that obtained from Japan a

loan of 40,000,000 dollars, and are in covert possession of Japan, are here situated. (This loan was granted on condition of the supply of 8,000,000 tons of pig-iron and 15,000,000 tons of iron ore in forty years, beginning in 1914.) Here also are the Chinese arsenal and gunpowder factory—also in the hands of Japan. Cotton is grown in that region. The branches of that line—leading westward (the Japanese Shunch-Tsinanfu concession) and eastward, will connect it with the Chinese provinces of Shantung and Shensi—the richest in iron ore. Should this line be pushed to Canton, Japan would be able to deal a rapid and decisive blow at Hong Kong in the event of war against Great Britain.

The conditions described above seem clearly to demonstrate how dangerously any menace to the communications between the Yellow Sea and China and Manchuria would affect Japan. We have already alluded to the fact that Japan would have to reckon with the enmity of China. Japan, however, has spread over China such a network of intrigue in order to prolong the internal chaos and strife, that China would be unable to act *independently*. China can only rise against Japan if supported by a dozen European army corps. Where could these troops come from?

At the outbreak of war two routes would remain open for a short time: from the south, across the Chinese Sea, with Hong Kong for a base. As soon as Japan is aware that a consider-

able British or American expeditionary force has been earmarked, she can deal a blow at Hong Kong in order to capture either the island itself, or at least Kao-Lun—the opposite coast. Thus, before the American or the British expeditionary force is in a position to use Hong Kong as a base, the base would be lost to that force. Only then would the United States, or Europe, be in a position to render armed assistance to impotent China, when the Japanese armies are drawn towards the north. And this explains once more the exceptional strategical importance of the presence of Russia north of Manchuria.

The concentration of Russian troops must be carried out far away on the continent. That was the decision of the Russian General Staff after 1905 in regard to the deployment of Russian forces in the event of another war with Japan. The remoteness of the Transbaikalian *place d'armes* enables Russia to complete the concentration of her troops before advancing through Manchuria. Should a Russian army of a million men (in the Japanese War Russia transported 1,200,000 men along the Siberian railway) appear in Manchuria, there would be a chance of a rising in China. A new war with Japan would be conducted in conditions infinitely more favourable for Russia than the previous war of 1904-5. In the event of a Russian victory Japan would be cut off from China and would have to evacuate Manchuria. *This would deprive Japan of the main portion of her base on the*

Asiatic Continent, and, if coupled with a maritime blockade, would result in a complete blockade, in other words, in the loss of the war.

That is why we arrive at the general strategical conclusion that

THE UNITED STATES CAN DEFEAT JAPAN ONLY IN ALLIANCE WITH A STRONG RUSSIA.

Russia is now incapacitated by a grave internal disease. But the Pacific problem will not be solved in its entirety in a moment. As we have already said, it will require a protracted struggle. Within ten years the position on the Russian front may undergo a radical change, because the economic restoration of Russia, when she has shaken off the yoke of the Third International, will proceed at a much quicker pace than is generally anticipated. The very presence of a strong, albeit peaceful, Russia on the shores of the Pacific would seriously handicap the aggressive designs of Japan.

Strategy therefore dictates to Japan the following measures :—

- (1) A strong army.
- (2) In the event of an armed conflict with Russia, the Japanese Army must advance as far as Lake Baikal in order to block the *defile* south of that lake.

At present Japan can mobilise 3,000,000 men. According to the scheme for the re-organisation of the Army, Japan will have raised that figure to 5,000,000 in 1930. Such important forces would only be required in the event of the renaissance of a strong Russia. Otherwise Japan

would not have to place more than 2,500,000 men in the field at the outbreak of war.

In order to forestall Russia in Transbaikalia, Japan must seize the existing Russian railways—the Oussouriisk, Chinese Eastern Amur, and Transbaikalian—the Amur shipping, and must acquire a concession for the linking up of the Amur railway with the coast of the Japanese Sea (Habarovsk—the gulf De-Castri). This would allow her not only to despatch troops to Transbaikalia more rapidly, but to form a base for these troops without straining the Vladivostok-Nikolsk-Oussouriisk-Pogranitchnaia-Harbin line, reserving it entirely for communications between the Japanese Sea and Manchuria and China.

These strategical preparations for a rear in the Russian Far Eastern dominions open a wide field for the activities of Japanese policy.

In spite of the state of utter impotence in which Russia now remains, the political atmosphere is rather complex. This complexity arises from the fact that while a strong Russia would be a menace to Japan, an alliance with a *weak* Russia is a welcome contingency. The Trans-Siberian is the only pathway to Europe which would remain open to Japan in the event of a successful blockade of the Japanese islands by the United States and her Allies. As Japan borrows her entire material culture from Europe, she must preserve a link with that continent. Even in peace time she cannot do away with imports of machinery, and that item is first in the list of imports of manufactured goods.

In 1919 the imports of machinery and instruments amounted to 90,000,000 yen, and in 1920 reached 111,000,000 yen, while exports of similar goods in these years amounted to 17,000,000 yen.

At the same time the fact must not be overlooked that in the conduct of modern war a great effort of technical and scientific thought is indispensable. War creates new means of applying technique; new methods are being devised and new weapons invented. Japan cannot afford to lose the assistance of European specialists. The Trans-Siberian would form a link between Japan and Germany and other European countries, which would not join in the struggle in the Pacific. For this reason it would be to the advantage of Japan that Russia be weakened by influences not emanating from the "Rising Sun."

The protracted war against Germany proved extremely advantageous to the country of the "Rising Sun." Bolshevism in Russia was another force working to the same end. Here, however, two complications have arisen:—

(1) Japan does not want Bolshevism to spread east of Lake Baikal.

(2) Japan does not believe that Bolshevism can endure in Russia, and does not wish therefore to deal with that Power in order not to estrange the patriotic elements in Russia.

The formation of a buffer state east of Lake Baikal is the contingency that suits Japan best. That buffer state would have but 3,500,000

inhabitants. Apart from other reasons by which this buffer state is doomed to impotence—the mere fact of its population being very scarce suffices to show that such a buffer state would be entirely dependent upon Japan.

What, then, are the forces capable of arresting the strategical penetration of Japan into Siberia, a penetration which Japanese diplomacy was careful to describe at the Washington Conference as "peaceful penetration."

The United States and her Allies have only diplomatic means at their disposal. The portent of international agreements cannot, of course, be denied. But it should be remembered that, as history shows, the voice of diplomacy is only efficacious when it is backed up by real force. In the question of the Russian Far East, such a real force can only be provided by REGENERATED RUSSIA.

CHAPTER XII

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

WE began the study of the Pacific problem by examining the question of the increasing congestion of the population in Japan. We compared Japan to a boiler, in which the inner pressure is constantly increasing and an explosion is inevitable unless the safety valves are opened in time. Such an opening of the safety valves is the discovery of methods of peaceful Japanese emigration.

The Washington Conference evaded the discussion of this cardinal point in the Pacific problem. The programme was as follows:—

- (1) Reduction of naval armaments, the basis of such reductions and their limits to be discussed.
- (2) Regulations for controlling new methods of warfare.
- (3) Reduction of land armaments.
- (4) The Pacific and Far East problems, including questions affecting China, such as: Territorial integrity, administrative integrity, the "open door" or equal trading and industrial facilities, the development of railways (including schemes for the Eastern-Chinese

railway), preferential railway rates, and the position of acquisitions already made.

(5) Siberia : the same questions.

(6) Islands under mandates (provided the question has not been already settled).

The unwillingness of the leaders of the Washington Conference to touch the sore spot in the mutual relations of the White and Yellow races is to be explained by reasons of a general character. Mankind has not yet attained to the actual realisation of "objective justice." We use the word "objective justice" deliberately, although quite naturally the reader will think that there can be only one kind of justice. If we look at the long way which the nations of the world have passed in the arena of history, we must confess that each nation is defending its own "subjective justice," its own "subjective conception" of law. It is true that one cannot help observing that the civilised nations have come nearer to the conception of objective justice than the uncivilised nations have done. Let us hope that continued progress will bring mankind nearer and nearer to the ideal of truth, moral righteousness and equality . . . and then wars will disappear from the pages of history. This Golden Age of the future at present exists only in the mind of mankind ; the White nations, in spite of the fine words about the horrors of war uttered by their representatives, will not give up their predominant position in the world without a struggle. The Yellow race, the most energetic branch of which—the

Japanese—came to the front during the second half of the nineteenth century, is preparing for a titanic struggle for "a place in the sun," which it really requires.

Of course it would be naïve to expect that the Washington Conference could solve the problem of the Pacific finally. For this purpose it would be necessary to educate the whole of mankind all over again. It might, however, have been expected that the Washington Conference would avoid imitating the ostrich and hiding its head at the sight of approaching danger.

If the Washington Conference were to begin to open discussion on the question of removing the obstacles placed by the Pacific States to Yellow immigration, it would find the right way to peace in the Pacific.

Listen to what one of the Japanese writers says, and you will have to acknowledge that there is a fair amount of truth in his words:¹

"When Socialists in Europe and America pledge themselves to internationalism, they are thinking only of Europe and America, forgetting that across the oceans teeming millions are crying for larger fields of activity. When the trade unionists of Europe and America speak of the brotherhood of workers, they are thinking only of their own race. They complain that Japanese working men work for low wages, ignoring that, if the teeming masses of England or America were bottled in a small archipelago

¹ Kawakami, *Japan and World Peace*, pp. 50, 51.

as are the Japanese, their wage scale would not have risen as rapidly as it has. When the pacifists of Europe and America advocate world-peace, they seem to mean maintenance of peace by sustaining the *status quo* of the relations of the East and West—by permitting the West not only to continue its occupation in all parts of the world of more territory than it is justly entitled to possess, but also to exclude from such territory all dark-skinned races, whose overcrowded home lands afford not only scant opportunity to their natives, but are themselves often subject to ruthless exploitation at the hands of the West."

The evasion of the direct discussion of the race problem threatens to increase the race hatred. Already the obstacles placed by America and Australia to "Yellow immigration" have removed the controversy from the sphere of ordinary international disputes to that of world principles. Japan insists on the White races acknowledging "the principle of race equality," while, as regards the "Yellow races," she acts the part of protector against enslavement by the Whites. It is the secret dream of all Japanese Imperialists to play that part, and it must be admitted that they are not mistaken, and the cry of "Down with the White barbarians" may drown the anti-Japanese feeling now prevalent in China.

If Japanese immigration were facilitated, the relations between the races would gradually improve, while every year the departure of

emigrants would relieve the congestion in the land of the Rising Sun.

Owing to the Washington Conference having evaded the examination of the above-mentioned fundamental psychological and economic question of the Pacific, the Conference could not accomplish anything decisive and lay the terrible spectre of the approaching deadly conflict in the Pacific.

Having evaded the discussion of the fundamental point of the Pacific problem, the initiators of the Washington Conference have thought fit to give prominence to another no less important idea, namely, the limitation of armaments.

Disarmament is an old and vexed question in international relations, the solution of which has always been doomed to failure.

Without going into the question of the failure of the Hague Conference in 1898 and the subsequent more feeble and less sincere attempts, we shall only call to mind Wilson's "Fourteen Points," in which the President of the United States formulated the conditions under which the Entente Powers would agree to negotiate with the Central Powers. Point IV of these "Fourteen Points" says :—

"Adequate guarantees, given and taken, that national armaments be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic security."

The author of this point crossed the Atlantic in order that, at the Versailles Peace Conference, he might personally take part in the practical realisation of the reconstruction of the world

on the principles he had expounded. On examination of the results of the Versailles Conference, however, the historian will find pitiful traces of the realisation of this Fourth Point. In the peace negotiations it found expression in the preamble to the compulsory disarmament of the defeated Powers: "In order to make it possible to begin the limitation of armaments of all nations, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey¹ undertake to observe the following military, naval, and air regulations strictly . . ."

The Covenant of the League of Nations contains as a sort of memento of Wilson's Fourth Point the very hazy Eighth Clause: "The members of the League of Nations acknowledge that the preservation of peace requires a reduction of the armaments of nations to the lowest degree compatible with national security and the protection of international obligations by means of common action. The Council, taking into consideration the geographical position and the conditions of each State, will draw up a scheme for such a reduction to be examined and approved by individual Governments. Such schemes will be examined and revised again at least every ten years."

The actual results were even more pitiful. The League of Nations itself was still-born, and the American Senate was the first to

¹ Professor Baron Nolde's article, "The Washington Conference," published in the *Sovremennye Zapiski* (Contemporary Notes), viii. 240.

repudiate the infant. For the Signatory Powers of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Clause 8 was merely an "international" obligation to carry on a correspondence on the subject of the "limitations of armaments to the lowest degree."

Thus all the previous experience of history, both ancient and recent, precludes any optimism on the subject of disarmament. The problem is in itself insoluble, as it requires the preliminary solution of another more difficult question—it requires what the French President of the Council of Ministers, in his declaration at the Washington Conference, called "moral disarmament." At the same time, this "moral disarmament" of individual nations is possible only when all nations will be prepared, not only in word, but in deed also, for immediate armed intervention on behalf of the injured party, even in cases when such action entails material disadvantage to the intervening party. At the Washington Conference a very characteristic episode occurred. Mr. Briand concluded his speech on the difficulty France would experience in reducing her Army, by declaring that he saw only one way of carrying out the fervent desire of the French people for a reduction of the burden of armaments, namely, that the United States of America should conclude a Treaty with France, undertaking to render her armed assistance in case of an attack on her by restored Germany. The American representatives replied in general

terms, but evaded a direct answer. Thus at the very beginning of the Conference they buried, with their own hands, the question of the limitation of land armaments, which was the third point of the programme.

Another problem, the solution of which presents difficulties as grave as that of the limitation of armaments, is the problem of the control over new war-weapons.

Mankind has tried several times to arrest the development of new weapons of warfare, but these efforts have invariably failed. Thus, for example, the Hague Conference forbade bomb-throwing from the air. Since then, technical science has made to civilisation the precious gift of the aeroplane, and in the Great War the belligerents made extensive use of that engine of destruction for inflicting injury upon the foe.

In order actually to put into practice the "control over the application of new war-weapons" the fundamental condition has to be fulfilled of the neutral Powers being prepared to compel the belligerent who infringes upon the "rules and regulations of war" to stop these infringements.

Is it possible to anticipate such a consummation in the present condition of international intercourse, based almost entirely upon "Economic egoism"? Recent experience does not encourage such a belief. The United States joined the Entente after the Germans had begun the submarine war and had sunk the *Lusitania*.

By so doing, the Germans had directly challenged the United States. Till then the Central Powers had been openly breaking all the "rules and regulations of war." Apart from the moral principle proclaimed by the United States, there was a covert motive: from July 1914 till June 1917 the United States had supplied to the enemies of Germany armaments to the value of 53,000,000 francs, and the submarine blockade instituted by Germany was hitting the American capitalists very hard.

Real observance of the "rules and regulations of war" will only be secured when public opinion the world over will reach the consciousness of the obligation for every signatory of an international agreement to take up arms for the defence of the injured party "on principle," and not only when such intercession is advantageous.

The path is a thorny one indeed. In all justice it must be admitted that the advent, after the Treaty of Versailles, of the League of Nations is a step in the right direction. In spite of all the shortcomings of this institution, which owes its birth to the inspiration of President Wilson, it undoubtedly constitutes a new era in international relations. Yet the United States has repudiated it when the United States Senate refused to recognise it. In so doing, the United States was actuated by the reluctance to assume any obligations towards Europe, by a kind of egoistical "insularity." As long as such egoism prevails, no improvement in inter-

national intercourse is possible, because a moral ideal is only attainable when those who profess it are prepared to fight for its realisation, and not merely indulge in speech-making. This is the inherent fallacy that permeates all the labours of the Washington Conference, and which will result in all its decisions concerning the limitation of submarine warfare and the prohibition of poison gas belonging to the domain of pious intentions, with which, as Dante has said, the way to Hell is paved. In presenting the seven agreements concluded at the Conference to the Senate, President Harding said in his address that the Conference has given rise to a new diplomacy. Verily, the methods of Europe and of the United States proved entirely different.

History has given European nations a hard training in strenuous international competition, and has caused them to evolve traditions and methods entirely foreign to the distant Trans-Atlantic Republic. Surrounded by the seas, and having for neighbours the weak and sparsely populated States of Central and South America, the United States developed in perfect freedom from the menace of outward aggression. Being the one and only truly "insular" Power, the United States have created on their island-continent a diplomatic tradition and diplomatic methods of their own, which Europe cannot fathom.

This isolation and lack of understanding became apparent when the United States appeared in the ranks of the enemies of Germany

at the end of the World War. They came, helped to win the war, became entangled—in the person of President Wilson—in the complex net of European politics. They soon got tired of trying to disentangle that net ; they withdrew, with a sigh of relief, and passed the sponge over Europe, over the victors and the vanquished. They misunderstood Europe, and Europe misunderstood them. This was indeed a colossal and fateful misunderstanding.

The Washington Conference was intimately connected with that misunderstanding. The Republicans who replaced President Wilson's administration realised, as early as during the Versailles negotiations, and later during the election, that all that was done in Paris during the period of liquidation of the Great War had been badly done, that President Wilson had acted in a manner distasteful to the United States, that he had failed to grasp the American ideal, and had become enmeshed in the tangle of European diplomacy. Having repudiated the methods by which Europe was striving to achieve universal peace and disarmament, the opponents of the Versailles Treaty in the United States endeavoured to arrive at the same goal by different, typically American, ends. They convened the Washington Conference, which was conducted in a truly American fashion, without secret diplomacy, and in the light of a colossal American publicity.

President Harding and Secretary Hughes intended the Conference to be a counterpart

of Versailles and of the League of Nations, a conference of "disarmament" and of the "establishment of lasting peace."

Has the Conference achieved that purpose?

We have endeavoured to show that in that respect the Conference has failed. The comedy and drama of the world's history have not changed through the shifting of the stage.

Has the Conference been successful in the limited sphere of securing peace in the Pacific?

The leaders of the policy of the United States began by making certain suggestions which were subsequently embodied in the "Five Power Agreement for the Limitation of Armaments."

Has this agreement rendered war in the Pacific impossible? Wars were fought before Dreadnoughts came into being. Wars will not cease when the numbers of Dreadnoughts will be reduced.

Has the "Five Power Agreement" rendered the pursuance of the aggressive policy of Japan more difficult?

For the next few years Great Britain, and still less Japan, cannot compete with the United States in peace time naval armaments. By this proposal, the United States are indeed making a great sacrifice of their only military advantage over Japan. The nobility and boldness of this "gesture" is undoubted, and is perhaps unique in the history of mankind. But will this bring the era of peace any nearer, if not in the whole world, at least in the Pacific?

Public opinion would appear to us to make

one great mistake with regard to the military power of modern States. It has a firmly rooted idea that militarism is measured exclusively by the number of Army corps and Dreadnoughts kept in times of peace. Now war has become a struggle in which all the forces of a nation take part. Together with the preparation of armies and navies—the external manifestations of a nation's fighting strength—the question of the preparation of the whole State has come to the fore. Therefore the military strength of a State is now measured not by the peace strength of the army and navy, but also by the following factors: the possibility of utilising the maximum living and material forces of the whole nation during the war, and the possibility, in case of a prolongation of the armed struggle, of counter-acting the economic disorganisation of the country most effectively. In the case of Japan—for reasons which we have examined in detail in the preceding chapters, this side of strategical preparations assumes a greater importance than even purely military problems. Therefore the practical solution of the problem of the limitation of Japan's armaments must consist, not in the limitations of her naval forces, but in the limitation of the possibility of penetration into the continent of Asia.

By a voluntary limitation of naval construction for ten years, the United States have deprived their diplomacy of real power in Far Eastern questions.

In return for such a gift, the political leaders

of Japan have found it possible to make a number of concessions at the Washington Conference. They have agreed to cancel their alliance with Great Britain, substituting the "Four Power Pact." They have also agreed to make a number of concessions with regard to the continent of Asia.

Public opinion in the United States will be greatly mistaken if it sees any actual value in these concessions. The fact of the matter is that from the moment the "Five Power Pact" on the limitation of naval forces was signed, it was no longer possible to influence what is now Japan's practical policy in China and Siberia. Japanese diplomats will now be faced only with the problem of maintaining the outward appearance which will serve best to conceal the real objects of their policy. In this respect they have already had plenty of experience in the past, and they observed the same tactics in their negotiations at the Washington Conference.

The fundamental resolutions of the Conference concerning China are based on the proposal made by the United States' representative, Mr. Hughes. Here is the complete text of his proposal.

"(1) With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the 'open door,' or equality of opportunity in China, for the trade and industry of all nations, the Powers, other than China, represented at this Conference agree:—

"(a) Not to seek, or support their nationals

in seeking, any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic developments in any designated region of China.

“(b) Not to seek, or support their nationals in seeking, any such monopoly or preference as would deprive other nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participation with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent, is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

“It is understood that this agreement is not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of any particular commercial, industrial, or financial undertaking, or to the encouragement of invention and research.

“(2) The Chinese Government takes note of the above agreement, and declares its intention of being guided by the same principles in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether they are parties to the agreement or not.

“(3) The Powers, including China, represented at this Conference, agree in principle to the establishment in China of a Board of Reference, to which any question arising on the above agreement and declaration may be

referred for investigation and report. (A detailed scheme for the constitution of the Board shall be framed by the special Conference referred to in Article 1 of the Convention on Chinese Customs Duties).

"(4) The Powers, including China, represented at this Conference agree that any provisions regarding an existing concession which appear to be inconsistent with those of another concession, or with the principles of the above agreement or declaration, may be submitted by the parties concerned to the Board of Reference, when established, for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain a satisfactory adjustment on equitable terms."

Clause IV of Mr. Hughes' proposal admits the possibility of revising existing agreements by means of a Commission which is to be formed. The French, followed by the Japanese, protested against this Clause, and the latter was rejected by the Far Eastern Commission. And yet, if the policy as regards China is to be really guided by the principle of her sovereignty, her territorial integrity and the "open door," then it is impossible to avoid revising the former political treatise which practically introduced principles of a directly opposite nature.

This was particularly necessary in regard to the "twenty-one demands" presented to China by Japan in January 1915, and which we have discussed in Chapter V.

The Chinese delegates insisted upon the revision of these "twenty-one demands," a suggestion

which the Japanese resisted with equal vigour. The latter went so far as to hint that the agreement between China and Japan of May 1915, which followed upon the presentation of the demands, was an agreement between sovereign States, and that there was as much ground for discussing that agreement at the Washington Conference as there would have been for the examination of the agreement between the United States and Cuba. Finally, Mr. Shidehara, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, declared that any discussion of the "twenty-one demands" at the Washington Conference would be a breach of international law, and would lead to no practical results, because Japan had already receded in 1915 from the "fifth group" of these demands (the right of appointing political financial, and military "advisers" in China). At the same time Mr. Shidehara read the official declaration of the Japanese Government to the effect that it intended to respect the sovereignty of China, the inviolability of her territory, and would not interfere in the internal affairs of that country.

The Chinese representatives, who are well aware of the value of such declarations, did not consider themselves satisfied, and quite rightly remarked that the entire spirit of the "twenty-one demands" was in direct contradiction with the principles which had always been officially recognised, and had been once more proclaimed at the Washington Conference. Yet after the Japanese representative had made his declara-

tion, the matter of the "twenty-one demands" was dropped.

According to the agreements signed by nine Powers (Great Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Italy, China, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal), these Powers pledge themselves to respect the sovereign rights of China and the integrity of her territory, the "open door," the equality of all nations in matters of railway policy, and the neutrality of China in the event of war between them. The Powers have also agreed upon certain alterations in their customs policy, have settled the question of wireless stations in Chinese territory, and have raised the question of renouncing ex-territorial rights of foreigners in China. Inasmuch as the "Nine Power Agreements" do but confirm the principles of policy in the Far East that had been previously formally recognised, these agreements can only serve to ensure a "lasting peace in the Pacific" if they are capable of bringing about a change in the policy *practised* by these Powers in China.

It is difficult not to be pessimistic in this respect. Suffice it to dwell upon one of the problems of practical policy discussed at the Washington Conference at great length, namely, the Shantung question, in order to be confirmed in a pessimistic view.

The United States representatives failed to secure a discussion of this question by the Conference as a whole, because the European Powers that had fought against Germany were already bound by a promise to support the

Japanese claims in Shantung. The question was therefore relegated to direct negotiations between China and Japan. The Japanese delegates understood perfectly well that in spite of all the outward independence of their negotiations with China, in regard to Shantung, the solution of the difficulty was closely linked up with the general labours of the Conference. The United States Senate and the Press gave plainly to understand that if Japan failed to make concessions, the "Five Power" and "Four Power" agreements would not be ratified. The Japanese representatives delayed the solution of the question till the last moment, in order to reduce their concessions to a minimum. At the same time they very ably endeavoured to confine themselves to purely formal concessions.

The main point in the actual solution of the Shantung difficulty was the question of the evacuation of the Japanese troops and the possession of the Tsinanfu-Tsintao railway. Japan was bargaining over every opportunity for delaying the evacuation, and of maintaining her representatives in the administration of that line. At the last sitting but one of the Conference, Mr. Hughes solemnly declared that Japan and China had arrived at a settlement of the Shantung question.

"This Shantung agreement provides for the return of Kiao Tchao and restoration of all properties to China with some exceptions, and the removal of Japanese troops as soon as China is able to take over their duties, but in any

case they must be removed in six months. By the railway settlement China pays 53,500,000 gold marks plus the Japanese improvements, this payment to be made in Treasury notes over a period of fifteen years, but with a redemption privilege in five years. There will be a Chinese managing director, with a Japanese traffic manager, both Chinese and Japanese accountants operating jointly."

What is the actual value of the Shantung settlement?

Let us remember that when Japan began operations against the German colony in China she declared that she was not pursuing any selfish aims of conquest, and that after the eviction of the Germans Shantung would be restored to China. This did not prevent Japan soon afterwards taking advantage of the propitious international situation and presenting her claims to the inheritance of German rights in Shantung. It is true that the evacuation of the Japanese troops is mentioned in the agreement, but we should bear in mind that Japan has many excuses in store for delaying the withdrawal of her troops from Shantung, or for landing once more soon after the evacuation.

The Japanese diplomats were well aware of the necessity of finding such an outward form for the solution of the Shantung controversy as would place their hosts at the Washington Conference in a favourable position in respect of public opinion in the country, and especially of the Senate. As we have already said, the

Republican party had made the Conference a weapon in its contest with the Democratic party. Thus from the hands of the Republican party Japan received a valuable gift—the “Five Power Agreement” . . . and yet another one.

In refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, the United States Senate rendered doubtful the consent of the United States to the mandate over the former German possessions in the Pacific—the Marian, Marshall, and Caroline Islands—granted to Japan at Versailles. We have examined in detail the immense strategical importance of these islands in the future struggle in the Pacific. As a reward for her “concessions,” and after the question of Yap was settled, Japan has now secured the consent of the United States to this mandate.

Having received two such valuable gifts, which greatly enhance the strength of Japan in the Western Pacific, the Japanese diplomats have been at pains to paint their Asiatic policy in such colours as might make it easier for the Republican party to get the Washington agreements ratified by the Senate. Japan may have no fear of her concessions preventing her from pursuing her traditional policy. The continued disturbances in China and the external impotence of that country leave many secret weapons, which never fail, in the hands of the leaders of the Rising Sun. But the main point is that from the moment of the signing of the “Five Power Agreement” the position of Japan will grow stronger for the next ten years.

At the Washington Conference the United States renounced the possibility of compelling Japan to alter in the next few years her practical policy in China. After the Washington Conference the United States can but entertain the pious hope that the politicians of the Empire of the Rising Sun, who will be the masters of the situation in the Far East, will display a spirit of peaceful conciliation.

Would such an expectation be likely to be fulfilled?

History teaches us that the political appetites of nations grow as their faith is strengthened in their own power. The conversion of President Wilson's Fourteen Points into the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty afford the latest illustration of this truth.

We now turn to the result of the Washington Conference in respect of the Siberian problem (point six of the programme).

The Japanese troops first appeared in Siberia in 1918, under the plea of supporting the Czechoslovaks, who had been stranded along the Siberian railway, and on the excuse of guarding the stores of war material in Vladivostok. The armed forces of all the Allies took part in this intervention. Before they went to Siberia, the United States Government insisted that all the Powers should proclaim the integrity of the sovereign rights of Russia. Japan immediately (August 2, 1918) confirmed her "open policy of respect of the territorial integrity of Russia." Japan promised to withdraw her troops from

Russian territory as soon as the aims that had been declared would be achieved, and pledged herself to leave the sovereignty of Russia intact in all its aspects, political and military.

In 1920 all the Allied contingents were evacuated from Siberia with the removal of the Czecho-Slovaks. But the Japanese stayed, and in 1921 they occupied the Russian port of Sakhalien, where they proceeded barefacedly and rapidly to "Japanise." By a series of regulations issued by the forces of occupation, the Russians were practically deprived of all rights of citizenship. Among these regulations the most striking is the order No. 24 (1921), which is a blatant infringement upon the elementary rights of the Russians, reducing them to the status of "white slaves" to the new masters of the Far East.

In 1921 the United States protested against the policy of Japan towards the Far Eastern Russian territories. In the note of May 31st the United States declared that the "continued occupation of strategical centres in Eastern Siberia, resulting in the doubtful possession of the port of Vladivostok, the distribution of troops in Khavarovsk, Nicolaievsk, de Castri, Mago, Sofisk, and other important points, the seizure of Russian Sakhalien and the establishment of a civil administration inevitably resulting in misconceptions and antagonism, tended to foster, instead of calming, unrest and disturbances in that region. Military occupation as reprisals for the disorders of Nicolaievsk,

are not a rightful procedure according to the accepted canons of international law. Recalling the definite engagements given by Japan at the time of the dispatch of expeditionary forces, the United States declared that "neither now, nor in the future, will the Government recognise the validity of any claims resulting from the present occupation, and that the United States could not sanction any action on the part of the Japanese Government capable of infringing upon the existing treaty rights or the political and territorial sovereignty of Russia."

Japan answered by the usual professions of the purity of her intentions and allegations of circumstances which compelled her to continue the occupation.

These conditions endured until the Washington Conference began to loom in the distance, and the "Siberian question," with the same reservations as in regard to China, was placed on the agenda.

Shortly before the meeting of the Conference, on September 19, 1921, the United States Government officially declared that the absence of a single recognised government in Russia imposed upon all the Powers partaking in the Conference the duty of "moral trusteeship" of the interests of Russia. This announcement, however noble, did not alter the fundamental fact that the Russian Far Eastern possessions were made an object of discussion in the absence of their rightful owner—the Russian people.

Once again Japanese diplomacy took clever advantage of the situation. On November 16th, at the Conference, Japan launched a *ballon d'essai* in proclaiming her "peaceful penetration" into Siberia. The true meaning of this "peaceful penetration" could not be disclosed at the Conference owing to the absence of suffering Russia. On November 19th a group of Russian politicians in Washington issued a statement to the effect that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia and Sakhalien could not be made conditional upon the restoration of a rightful Russian authority, because the very presence of the Japanese, who were supporting such men as Semenov and Kalmykov, undermined the efforts of the Russians at standing on their feet again, and hindered the establishment of a constitutional Government. On December 8th the Japanese delegate, Mr. Hanihara, made a statement on the Siberian question, in which he reiterated the previous conditions for the evacuation. He pointed out that the Japanese intended to retain Sakhalien and Nicolaievsk as a guarantee against the events in Nicolaievsk in 1920 (he mentioned the connection between these two points under Russian rule). The remainder of the Russian territory was to be evacuated as soon as the Republic of Chita would offer safeguards for the immunity of the Japanese colony.

It is interesting to note that these promises of evacuation were made in complete disregard of the Provisional anti-Bolshevik Government of

Vladivostok, headed by Mr. Merkulov, which had been supported by Japan at the time of its formation. It was obvious that Japan needed that Government only as a rival to Chita, a rival which would have been immediately surrendered to the Bolsheviks as soon as the latter would accept the conditions offered by Japan.

The Siberian problem was at the bottom of the programme. It came to the fore at the Conference in the end of January 1922. Japan skilfully made this discussion to coincide with a declaration made in the Japanese Diet by the Foreign Minister, Count Uchida, who repeated once more the stale declarations of Japan. The occupation of the Maritime province was due to "the necessity of self-protection pure and simple." Against all evidence, interference in the internal affairs of Siberia was denied, and it was alleged that negotiations were in progress with Chita. This speech was immediately circulated all over the United States, and on January 23rd Mr Shidehara made the corresponding solemn declaration at the Conference to the effect that occupation must continue. "I am empowered to state that Japan is determined to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-interference in her internal affairs, as well as the principle of equal opportunities for all nations in matters of trade and industry in all Russian possessions." The Conference was thus placed before an accomplished fact.

What did the other Powers say to this ?

In British circles the argument was whispered that Japan cannot be denied the right of deciding whether or not there was a threat to her national safety.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, declared on behalf of his Government that he took note of Mr. Shidehara's statement, which he repeated in a very concise form. It must be admitted that a certain ambiguity was here manifested. Japan was not to "absorb" the fisheries, or indulge in "exclusive exploitation" of the riches of Sakhalien and of the Maritime Province. The portion of Mr. Hughes's speech that presents a particular value was the historical outline of the negotiations between the United States and Japan, emphasising the mutual engagements of these two countries entered upon at the beginning of the Allied expedition into Siberia. In spite of the Japanese declarations, Mr. Hughes was bound to admit that there was a continued "divergence of opinion," and to express the hope that it may soon disappear upon the withdrawal of Japan from Siberia and Sakhalien within the near future. Failing to reach an unanimous conclusion, the United States merely placed the Japanese and American declarations on record.

We have dwelt upon this subject merely with a view to showing the inability of the United States delegates to find a satisfactory solution of the problem. We now come to another vital problem upon the solution of which peace in the Pacific largely depends.

The surest means of preventing war is, certainly, to remove the causes of war.

Should such a radical solution prove impossible, another method, though not so effective, promises a temporary respite.

This is the method of compromise, preserving the strategic balance of power. Modern warfare is such a calamity to the vanquished nation that no government would risk commencing a war without overwhelming chances of success. Would Germany have risked a war with both France and Russia if Great Britain had from the first stated her intention of joining them? There are many reasons for supposing that Germany would have abstained from war, and agreed to Russia's proposal for the Austro-Servian conflict to be settled at a Hague Conference.

Russia's disappearance from the ranks of the Great Powers not only shook the economic stability of the world, the restoration of which is now the recognised aim of politicians and economists the world over, but her fall also destroyed the strategic balance.

In Europe this has had the effect of maintaining France's "watch on the Rhine," though Germany lies crushed in defeat.

The effects have also been felt in the Pacific. Japan, freed from the menace of Northern Manchuria, has been at liberty to pursue her Imperialist policy. She has the possibility of extensively preparing a base of operations for future wars on the continent of Asia, and

heavily inclining the balance of power in her favour.

The Washington Conference has not found a permanent solution of the Pacific problem ; it has not even rendered effective the compromises to which it confined itself.

That is why the Conference, which gave rise to great hopes, ended in general disappointment.

The Washington Conference is a piece of political fireworks engineered by the Republican Party with the object of influencing public opinion in the States in their favour. As such, it is but an illusion. It has burnt itself out, and darkness is thicker still. Thus in the life of the individual vanished illusions are followed by moments of despair.

"But," says the reader, "is there no solution of the Pacific problem ?"

Our answer is :

"Yes and no!"

The future struggle in the Pacific will be of an elemental nature, in the face of which individuals are powerless. Does this, however, justify the assumption that humanity may not strive to mitigate the evil ? Has not mankind achieved notable victories over the forces of nature ?

If the Washington Conference has not only not prevented the possibility of war in the Pacific, but has not even interrupted the preparations for war, even greater efforts on the part of all peace-loving nations are needed. Prevention of a bitter struggle in the Pacific is only

possible if the United States work consistently, and earnestly strive for the regeneration of China and Russia. However strange it may seem, especially to the latter, the best guarantee for the preservation of the present compromises lies in the restoration of the strategical balance of power in the Pacific.

Should the Washington Conference induce public opinion to believe that peace in the Pacific is now assured, it would assuredly have the contrary result. Instead of postponing war, the Conference would serve to bring it nearer.

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APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATY FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA- MENT.

THE United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan;

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament;

Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes, to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval armaments.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.

ARTICLE I.—The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty.

ARTICLE II.—The Contracting Powers may retain respectively the capital ships which are specified in Chapter II, Part 1. On the coming into force of the present Treaty, but subject to the following provisions of this Article, all other capital ships, built or building, of the United States, the British Empire and Japan shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

In addition to the capital ships specified in Chapter II, Part 1, the United States may complete and retain two ships of the *West Virginia* class now under construction. On the completion of these two ships the *North Dakota* and *Delaware* shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

The British Empire may, in accordance with the replacement table in Chapter II, Part 3, construct two new capital ships not exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement each. On the completion of the said two ships the *Thunderer*, *King George V*, *Ajax* and *Centurion* shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

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ARTICLE III.—Subject to the provisions of Article II, the Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital ship building programmes, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the Contracting Powers except replacement tonnage which may be constructed or acquired as specified in Chapter II, Part 3.

Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, Part 3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that Chapter.

ARTICLE IV.—The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States, 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for the British Empire, 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for France, 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Italy, 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Japan, 315,000 tons (320,040 metric tons).

ARTICLE V.—No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE VI.—No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 16 inches (406 millimetres).

ARTICLE VII.—The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States, 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire, 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France, 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy, 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan, 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

ARTICLE VIII.—The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on the 12th November, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age.

ARTICLE IX.—No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any two of their

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ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a calibre exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed eight.

ARTICLE X.—No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Article IX, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres) is not limited.

ARTICLE XI.—No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this Article.

ARTICLE XII.—No vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers, hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres).

ARTICLE XIII.—Except as provided in Article IX, no ship designated in the present Treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

ARTICLE XIV.—No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimetres) calibre.

ARTICLE XV.—No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers for a non-Contracting Power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and

armament prescribed by the present Treaty for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the Contracting Powers ; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a non-Contracting Power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

ARTICLE XVI.—If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-Contracting Power is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers, such Power shall promptly inform the other Contracting Powers of the date of the signing of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid : and shall also communicate to them the particulars relating to the ship prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I (b), (4) and (5).

ARTICLE XVII.—In the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in war, such Power shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

ARTICLE XVIII.—Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE XIX.—The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the *status quo* at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder :—

1. The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands.

2. Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand.

3. The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit : the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the *status quo* under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified ; that no

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measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

ARTICLE XX.—The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the Contracting Powers.

CHAPTER II.

RULES RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY—DEFINITION OF TERMS.

PART I.—CAPITAL SHIPS WHICH MAY BE RETAINED BY THE CONTRACTING POWERS.

In accordance with Article II ships may be retained by each of the Contracting Powers as specified in this Part.

Ships which may be retained by the United States.

Name.	Tonnage.
Maryland	32,600
California	32,300
Tennessee	32,300
Idaho	32,000
New Mexico	32,000
Mississippi	32,000
Arizona	31,400
Pennsylvania	31,400
Oklahoma	27,500
Nevada	27,500
New York	27,000
Texas	27,000
Arkansas	26,000
Wyoming	26,000
Florida	21,825
Utah	21,825
North Dakota	20,000
Delaware	20,000
<hr/>	
Total tonnage	500,650

On the completion of the two ships of the *West Virginia* class and the scrapping of the *North Dakota* and *Delaware*, as provided in Article II, the total tonnage to be retained by the United States will be 525,850 tons.

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Ships which may be retained by the British Empire.

Name.				Tonnage.
Royal Sovereign	25,750
Royal Oak	25,750
Revenge	25,750
Resolution	25,750
Ramillies	25,750
Malaya	27,500
Valiant	27,500
Barham	27,500
Queen Elizabeth	27,500
Warspite	27,500
Benbow	25,000
Emperor of India	25,000
Iron Duke	25,000
Marlborough	25,000
Hood	41,200
Renown	26,500
Repulse	26,500
Tiger	28,500
Thunderer	22,500
King George V	23,000
Ajax	23,000
Centurion	23,000
<hr/>				
Total tonnage	580,450

On the completion of the two new ships to be constructed and the scrapping of the *Thunderer*, *King George V*, *Ajax*, and *Centurion*, as provided in Article II, the total tonnage to be retained by the British Empire will be 558,950 tons.

Ships which may be retained by France.

Name.				Tonnage (metric tons).
Bretagne	23,500
Lorraine	23,500
Provence	23,500
Paris	23,500
France	23,500
Jean Bart	23,500
Courbet	23,500
Condorcet	18,890
Diderot	18,890
Voltaire	18,890
<hr/>				
Total tonnage	221,170

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France may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929, and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section II.

Ships which may be retained by Italy.

Name.					Tonnage (metric tons).
Andrea Doria	22,700
Caio Duilio	22,700
Conte Di Cavour	22,500
Giulio Cesare	22,500
Leonardo da Vinci	22,500
Dante Alighieri	19,500
Roma	12,600
Napoli	12,600
Vittorio Emanuele	12,600
Regina Elena	12,600
<hr/>				Total tonnage ..	182,800

Italy may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929 and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section II.

Ships which may be retained by Japan.

Name.					Tonnage.
Mutsu	33,800
Nagato	33,800
Hiuga	31,260
Ise	31,260
Yamashiro	30,600
Fu-So	30,600
Kirishima	27,500
Haruna	27,500
Hiyei	27,500
Kon-go	27,500
<hr/>				Total tonnage ..	301,320

PART 2.—RULES FOR SCRAPPING VESSELS OF WAR.

The following rules shall be observed for the scrapping of vessels of war which are to be disposed of in accordance with Articles II and III.

I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such condition that it cannot be put to combative use.

II. This result must be finally effected in any one of the following ways :

- (a) Permanent sinking of the vessel ;
- (b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom plating ;

- (c) Converting the vessel to target use exclusively. In such case all the provisions of paragraph III of this Part, except sub-paragraph (6), in so far as may be necessary to enable the ship to be used as a mobile target, and except sub-paragraph (7), must be previously complied with. Not more than one capital ship may be retained for this purpose at one time by any of the Contracting Powers.
- (d) Of the capital ships which would otherwise be scrapped under the present Treaty in or after the year 1931, France and Italy may each retain two sea-going vessels for training purposes exclusively, that is, as gunnery or torpedo schools. The two vessels retained by France shall be of the *Jean Bart* class, and of those retained by Italy one shall be the *Dante Alighieri*, the other of the *Giulio Cesare* class. On retaining these ships for the purpose above stated, France and Italy respectively undertake to remove and destroy their conning-towers and not to use the said ships as vessels of war.

CHAPTER III.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

ARTICLE XXI.—If during the term of the present Treaty the requirements of the national security of any Contracting Power in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that Power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at the request of such Power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the Treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other Contracting Powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting Powers which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the present Treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the Treaty may be necessary to meet such developments.

ARTICLE XXII.—Whenever any Contracting Power shall become engaged in a war which in its opinion affects the naval defence of its national security, such Power may after notice to the other Contracting Powers suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty other than those under Articles XIII and XVII, provided that such Power shall notify the other Contracting Powers that the emergency is of such a character as to require such suspension.

The remaining Contracting Powers shall in such case consult together with a view to agreement as to what temporary modifi-

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cations, if any, should be made in the Treaty as between themselves. Should such consultation not produce agreement, duly made in accordance with the constitutional methods of the respective Powers, any one of the said Contracting Powers may, by giving notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present Treaty, other than those under Articles XIII and XVII.

On the cessation of hostilities the Contracting Powers will meet in conference to consider what modifications, if any, should be made in the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XXIII.—The present Treaty shall remain in force until the 31st December, 1936, and in case none of the Contracting Powers shall have given notice two years before that date of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the Contracting Powers, whereupon the Treaty shall terminate as regards all the Contracting Powers. Such notice shall be communicated in writing to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notification to the other Powers and inform them of the date on which it was received. The notice shall be deemed to have been given and shall take effect on that date. In the event of notice of termination being given by the Government of the United States, such notice shall be given to the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the other Contracting Powers, and the notice shall be deemed to have been given and shall take effect on the date of the communication made to the said diplomatic representatives.

Within one year of the date on which a notice of termination by any Power has taken effect, all the Contracting Powers shall meet in conference.

ARTICLE XXIV.—The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other Contracting Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington the day of 1922.

APPENDIX III

THE 21 DEMANDS

GROUP 1.—SHANTUNG.

I.—China to assent to any arrangement Japan may make with Germany relating to the latter's rights and privileges in Shantung.

II.—China not to cede to a third Power any territory in Shantung or island on the coast.

III.—China to consent to Japan building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway.

IV.—China to open certain new treaty ports.

GROUP 2.—SOUTH MANCHURIA AND EASTERN MONGOLIA.

V.—China to agree to extend the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the lease of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden Railways to 99 years.

VI.—Japanese subjects to have the right to lease or own land for building, trade, manufacture, or farming.

VII.—Japanese subjects to be free to reside and travel and to engage in business or manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

VIII.—China to agree to grant Japanese subjects the right of opening mines.

IX.—Japan's assent to be obtained before China

(1) Gives permission to subjects of a third Power to build railways or make loans ;

(2) Or pledges local revenue for a loan from a third Power.

X.—If China employs political, financial, or military advisers or instructors, Japan shall first be consulted.

XI.—Control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to be ceded to Japan for 99 years.

GROUP 3.—HANYEHPING COMPANY.

XII.—China to agree to make the Hanyehping Company a joint Sino-Japanese concern, and China not to dispose of her share without reference to Japan.

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XIII.—Mines in the neighbourhood of the Hanyehping Company's properties not to be worked by outside parties without consent of the Company.

GROUP 4.

XIV.—China to engage not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour, bay, or island on the coast of China.

GROUP 5.—MISCELLANEOUS.

XV.—China to employ influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers.

XVI.—Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools to be granted the right to own land in the interior of China.

XVII.—Police in certain important places in China to be jointly administered, or China to employ in such places numerous Japanese to improve her organization.

XVIII.—China to purchase from Japan a fixed amount—say, 50 per cent.—of the munitions she requires, or to establish a joint arsenal employing Japanese material and technical experts.


XIX.—China to agree to grant Japan the right to construct railways connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, Nanchang and Hangchow, Nanchang and Chaochow.

XX.—If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways, or construct harbours or docks in Fukien, Japan to be first consulted.

XXI.—Japanese subjects to have the right of missionary propaganda in China.

Printed in Great Britain by

UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, THE GRESHAM PRESS, LONDON AND WOKING



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