



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

D 1,192,978





PROBLEMS IN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

*A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND SUGGESTED FORMULATIONS*

BY

JOHN T. MACCURDY, M.D.

Assistant, The Psychiatric Institute of the New York State Hospitals;
Lecturer on Medical Psychology, Cornell University
Medical College, New York

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1922

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COPYRIGHT, 1922,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Set up and printed. Published December, 1922.

Wahr

8649

Psychology (For Gen. Lit.)

5-15-1925

Press of
J. J. Little & Ives Company
New York, U. S. A.

To
W. M.

424685

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	ix
PART I. FREUDIAN FORMULATIONS	
I. INTRODUCTION	3
II. THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE "WISH"	8
III. INSTINCTS	15
IV. SEX	21
V. REPRESSION AND EGO-LIBIDO	27
VI. DEMENTIA PRÆCOX AND PARANOIA	50
VII. DEPRESSION	58
VIII. THE ACTUAL NEUROSES	65
IX. EMOTIONS	71
X. DREAMS	90
PART II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SUGGESTION	
XI. DIFFERENCES OF TECHNIC	119
XII. COMPARISON OF MATERIAL GATHERED BY HYPNOSIS, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND OBSERVATION OF THE PSYCHOSES	134
PART III. THE PRECONSCIOUS PHASE	
XIII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF REALITY ACCORDING TO FERENCZI	153
XIV. THE ORIGIN OF SYMBOLS	161

	PAGE
XV. THE MEANING OF AUTO-EROTISM	169
XVI. THE PRELIMINARY SUBJECTIVE PHASE OF BURROW	188
PART IV. INSTINCTS AND THEIR MANIFESTATIONS	
XVII. THE THEORIES OF RIVERS	209
XVIII. PRAGMATIC CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCTS AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION	253
XIX. THE EGO INSTINCTS	271
XX. THE SEX INSTINCTS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS	288
XXI. THE HERD INSTINCTS	322
XXII. THE CO-OPERATIONS AND CONFLICTS OF INSTINCTS	346
INDEX	379

PREFACE

It is only fair to warn the prospective reader of what is before him. This book is not a systematic treatise on psychopathology or psychoanalysis but, rather, a discussion of some of the fundamental problems which must be solved before our knowledge in this field may be accurately systematized. Limitations of space have forced me to omit description of phenomena and to confine myself to exposition of the hypotheses put forward to correlate these phenomena. Some knowledge of psychopathology is therefore necessary for proper understanding of the text, particularly of Part I, which (with the exception of some pages in the chapter on dreams) is purely critical. This knowledge, however, is already possessed by many laymen who have read the current popular literature in this field.

Dynamic psychology is a useful term which covers the study of instincts, motives, emotions and imaginative (or "autistic") thinking as opposed to the more static functions of attention, perception, memory and similar conscious, logical processes. A rough analogy may make this discrimination clearer. One could observe the various mechanisms in an automobile, see how the pistons turn the crank shaft, how the transmission acts, what the differential does and so on. But all this would throw no light on what makes the engine go. This is a prob-

lem in thermodynamics. The static, intellectual functions of the mind are like the mechanisms of the automobile; the emotional or instinctive functions are like its thermodynamics.

Dynamic psychology is a relatively new science which has grown up from the observations and speculations of sociologists, anthropologists, criminologists, neurologists and psychiatrists (to a less extent from the work of the psychologist with normal man). Naturally each of them is apt to see the problems from an angle where only some aspects of human behavior are strongly illuminated. Not until work is complete in all these fields and the results collated, can anything like finality be reached in formulation. In the meantime in order to criticize such tentative hypotheses as may be put forward it is well for a reader to know what the professional standpoint of a writer is. A word as to the history of this book is therefore in order.

For ten years I have been interested in the study of those graver mental aberrations which we call psychoses in contradistinction to the milder disturbances known as psychoneuroses. For eight years I have been treating the latter conditions in private practice, largely by psychoanalytic procedures. With the late Dr. August Hoch I began in 1913 a systematic study of the psychology of manic-depressive insanity—those conditions where pathological emotional reactions are the most prominent symptoms. Years before it had been demonstrated by Jung and many other psychiatrists in both Europe and America that the false ideas present in

the functional psychoses, particularly dementia præcox, were not haphazard and lawless products of a diseased brain but that they were closely analogous to the unconscious ideas discovered by Freud in the dreams of his psychoneurotic patients and available for systematic study. The task in investigation of manic-depressive insanity was to examine the form which delusions took and see if they could be correlated with the other symptoms. The results of this work are not yet published except for one clinical group.¹ The present book represents a by-product of these researches.

The study had not proceeded far before rather definite laws began to appear. Naturally curiosity was aroused as to how close these laws were to those which Freud had expounded, so a careful examination of his theoretic writings was made. In 1913 and 1914 Dr. Hoch and I spent some hundreds of hours together in reading critically what Freud had written. To our surprise it was found that his fundamental principles were not internally consistent. It seemed possible that this was due to the haphazard appearance of his articles, which extended over a period of years, and that he would sometime put all his discoveries together and formulate his views in a systematic way. No published criticism of his theories was therefore undertaken at that time. During these years I was also becoming interested in the psychology of epilepsy and, later, of the war neuroses. These conditions would have been totally incomprehensible had it not been

¹ Hoch, "Benign Stupors," Macmillan Co., New York, 1921.

for the light which psychoanalysis had thrown on morbid mental processes, yet these studies seemed to demonstrate that instincts other than the sexual could be responsible not merely for isolated symptoms but for the very core of the abnormal reaction. This naturally excited an interest in the interplay of different instinct groups—a broader field than that of psychoanalysis as it is exposed by Freud and his immediate followers.

The purpose of this book is, therefore, twofold. On the one hand it is an attempt to show from demonstration of the limitations and inconsistencies of Freudian formulations that a broader system is needed, while, on the other, an attempt is made to outline some tentative hypotheses to make good this need. Apology for both parts of the work is in order. The critical portion of the book (mainly in Part I) is unquestionably hard reading. The only excuse I can plead is that I labored long in the attempt to find what Freud really means and discovered such complicated formulations that I could not express nor discuss them more simply than I have done. As for the more constructive portion, it would be folly to claim for this anything more than a temporary and suggestive value. Our science is new and its "laws" must be only working hypotheses. New observations—most likely to come from anthropologists—may upset any theory overnight. The only defence for publication is that the generalizations now appearing are not, in the main, new, but have been tested by applicability to clinical problems for a number of years.

No attempt has been made to consider the theories of Jung because, quite frankly, I cannot understand them. In so far as I have caught any glimmering of Jung's meaning it has seemed as if his "psychoanalysis" is mystical rather than scientific in its tendency. Science begins with objectively observable phenomena; its theories have to do with the correlation of these phenomena and must be altered whenever observations are made that conflict with the existing formulations. Mysticism, on the other hand, begins in subjective feelings or convictions which are elaborated into theory with the same type of logic as is used in science. But the primary observation always carries with it a feeling of reality superior to that engendered by objective phenomena. Consequently new observations are invariably interpreted in the light proceeding from the original subjective experience. It may well be that there are, and always will be, truths capable of none but mystical treatment but this method should not masquerade as science.

The situation with Freud is quite different. His original discoveries are truly objective phenomena; his observations can, in the main, be confirmed by any one who takes the necessary pains. It is his reasoning about these phenomena which is at times faulty. The author greatly regrets that it has been impossible within the narrow limits of a small book to expose that which Freud has contributed to dynamic psychology; the iteration of adverse criticism must inevitably give the impression of hostility. As a matter of fact the criticisms would never have been

attempted except as an effort to modify the hypotheses deduced from his observations into a form compatible with general biological theory. It is better for his admirers to put the psychoanalytic house in order spontaneously than for Freud's enemies to force revision. So far, the hostile critics have been too ignorant and too blinded by prejudice to deal with the problem intelligently. It is my belief that the greatest service which can be done to psychoanalysis to-day and the most practical form for tribute of gratitude to Freud to take is the dispassionate criticism of his work. His theories cannot endure as they stand and the sooner they assume scientific and logical form the more certain is their immortality.

If the objections taken to Freud's formulations be sound, the deduction is inevitable that his capacity as a logician is relatively weak as compared with his scientific imagination—that necessary precursor to original observation. But only a handful of supreme geniuses have ever combined the two. (Many *savants* have critical ability to the full but imagination—and the courage to see it through—is a gift of the gods. Columbus had it, yet he died in the belief that he had only landed on the outskirts of Asia.) The very names of those who showed his error and demonstrated the separate existence of the continent of America, are forgotten to most educated people. And so they should be. We honor Columbus for his imagination and courage, not for any mean skill as a critical geographer. One ventures to predict that the generations to come will forget

Freud's errors and immortalize him as the founder of true dynamic psychology.

In conclusion reference should be made to another scientist, a little less original but more learned, whose essay into the field of psychopathology is treated with more sympathy than agreement by the author. I was privileged to know the friendship of W. H. R. Rivers, whose sudden death cut short a career of unique achievement. Had his strength continued he would probably have lived to see himself recognized as the first man to utilize some of the discoveries of Freud in the solution of fundamental anthropological problems. It is unfortunate that his most popular book, "Instinct and the Unconscious," should bring his name to the attention of many psychopathologists as an *amateur* in this field. If one would know his real capacity and the potentiality of his method, let him read "Conservation and Plasticity" (*Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1).

Of his relative unfamiliarity with clinical phenomena he was well aware; he welcomed criticisms from this standpoint and had promised me to read over prior to publication the chapter on his work, which was finished only the day before his death.

I wish to record my thanks to Dr. Morton Prince, the editor, for his courtesy in allowing reproduction in the last chapter of large portions of an article published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*.

J. T. M.

o

o

c

c

PART I
FREUDIAN FORMULATIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Modern psychopathology may be said to have originated with the appearance of the hypothesis of unconscious mentation. This hypothesis was necessary to account for the phenomena observed by workers in two schools, the hypnotic and psychoanalytic. The work of the former group has never received the attention it deserved either from scientific speculators or intelligent laymen. This is possibly to be accounted for by the limited therapeutic results of such hypnotic measures as demonstrated unconscious phenomena. Psychoanalysis, however, has become highly popular as a result of its therapeutic achievements on the one hand and also, probably, because its insistence on one dominating and specific unconscious tendency, namely the sexual, has made a wide and often morbid appeal. It is a peculiarity of psychoanalytic technique that it cannot be used for therapeutic ends without a constant demonstration of the "unconscious." The popularity of psychoanalysis, therefore, has led inevitably to a wide consideration or acceptance of the doctrine of an unconscious mind. During the war the experience was repeated in different countries of finding that those trained in psycho-

o

o

—

PART I
FREUDIAN FORMULATIONS

ical theory. Two books¹ appeared recently in which solution of these problems is attempted and since their purpose is to illuminate the same fundamental question from these two angles, it may be well to use them as starting points for discussion.

The followers of Freud who are interested in psychoanalysis have been eagerly waiting for a summary from him of his views. His previous publications have been mainly topical and, as time went on and his theories broadened and were modified, earlier generalizations were contradicted in later writings. His readers felt curious as to how much these alterations modified his general theory and, being unable themselves to synthesize his scattered formulations into one unified structure, have looked to him for a statement of this new system of psychology. During the winters of 1915-16 and 1916-17 he delivered 28 lectures to lay audiences in Vienna, which were designed to cover, superficially, the field of psychoanalysis. Owing to war conditions these lectures have only recently become available in translation to English readers. Unfortunately the translation (anonymous) seems to have been made by some one ignorant of psychiatry and more familiar with German than English. In places the text is completely incomprehensible and necessitates reference to the original. Typographical errors are frequent and gross.

To add to these difficulties of the English reader

¹“A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis,” by Sigmund Freud, New York, Boni & Liveright, 1920.

“Instinct and the Unconscious,” by W. H. R. Rivers, The Cambridge Press, 1920.

the arrangement of the lectures seems unfortunate. They begin with a discussion of errors (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life), proceed with dream analysis, while it is only in the last half of the book that Freud's theories of the neuroses appear. It would seem that either from the standpoint of logical development or from the standpoint of tact it would have been wiser to reverse the order of presentation. Moreover no topic seems to be exhaustively discussed in any one place, important additions to the exposition appearing in later chapters. Considerable labor is therefore necessary if one is to discover just what his views are. In the following pages an attempt will be made to digest and criticize the material thus gathered. During the years when Freud was delivering these lectures he published five papers¹ which also contain important generalizations. When these amplify or amend the formulations arrived at in his book, special reference will be made to them.

¹ These papers with the titles "Triebe und Triebchicksale," "Die Verdrängung," "Das Unbewusste," "Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre" and "Trauer und Melancholie" have all been reprinted in *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Vierte Folge*, 1918. Hugo Heller, Leipzig and Vienna.

CHAPTER II

THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE "WISH"

The basis of psychoanalysis is the doctrine of the *unconscious*, so it may be best to begin with examination of Freud's present opinions about it. On pages 255 and 256 he gives his general formulations to the effect that practically all mental processes originate beyond the range of awareness. Some have not the force ever to intrude into consciousness, others tend to do so. The latter are met at the threshold by a "censorship"¹ which repels them, thus keeping them unconscious. To clarify this conception Freud uses an analogy, which he insists is only an analogy, although submitting that it gives an accurate representation of his views. The unconscious is like a large anteroom crowded with people. Off it leads a smaller reception room. At the threshold of the door between stands a watchman who prevents the passage of undesirables. When a visitor is allowed past the host may recognize him or not as he chooses. The optional character of this awareness is emphasized by the term "fore-conscious" (or "preconscious") to describe this reception-room or that collection of mental processes which are available for inspection if attention is

¹ Usually, as in this book, mistranslated as "censor."

directed to them. The unconscious, however (the anteroom), contains mental processes toward which no mere effort of will can force the individual attention.

If Freud used the term "unconscious" in this broad sense consistently many critics would have more intellectual sympathy with his formulations than they are capable of achieving. Practically he confines the term to those mental processes which struggle for admission to consciousness and are thrown back. In fact he goes even further and, in effect, limits the "unconscious" to those mental processes which are sexual. An example of this is shown on page 377 where he is speaking of the conflict between unconscious sex impulses and "resistance." ". . . resistance is not part of the unconscious but of the ego which is our fellow-worker [in psychoanalytic treatment]. This holds true even if resistance is not conscious. . . . We expect resistance to be relinquished . . . when our interpretation has enabled the ego to recognize it." A component of the ego, therefore, of which consciousness is not aware, which operates unconsciously and can only be recognized by the technic of psychoanalysis—this is not part of the "unconscious." Unfortunately this example is not isolated.

In his essay on "Das Unbewusste," Freud describes the characteristics of unconscious mental processes as opposed to those of the fore-consciousness. The former are out of touch with reality and logic, directly antagonistic ideas can coexist (their

10 PROBLEMS OF DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

conscious, or fore-conscious, products being compromises) and they are regulated by the pleasure-pain principle. Fore-conscious thoughts, however, may be fully logical and influenced by a recognition of reality. As a corollary (although derived from his speculations about schizophrenia), he thinks that unconscious thoughts are concerned with the idea of an object or process alone, while in the fore-conscious the thoughts are composed not merely of the objects as such but also of the words denoting them. Anyone with even a superficial experience in psychopathology knows that there are many thoughts which meet too strong resistance to enter consciousness and which yet are closely connected with reality and are formulated (or capable of being formulated) in words. Freud recognizes this and to meet the difficulty changes his definitions of the fore-conscious, or, rather, says that it has two subdivisions. One of them is the fore-conscious as earlier defined, the realm of mental processes that pass censorship and are out of awareness simply owing to inattention. The other and new fore-consciousness is composed of fantasies of unconscious origin, that have the characteristics of fore-conscious ideas (contact with reality, verbalization, etc.), but still suffer some repression. This second type of fore-consciousness is analogous to the "co-consciousness" of Morton Prince, if not essentially identical with it. Freud, however, does not seem to recognize this. By defining fore-consciousness first in terms of repression and later characterizing it descriptively he has arrived at a category which is

unconscious by one system of classification and fore-conscious by another.

It seems to the writer that it would be safer to abolish the "fore-conscious" as a strictly delimited neutral zone of mental process and say simply that as unconscious processes (with the characteristics Freud gives them) approach nearer the threshold of consciousness they take on more and more the qualities and attributes of conscious processes. This development would be accompanied by a progressive weakening of repression. Such complexes of ideas as had gained definite formulation and some stability could then be termed fore-conscious or co-conscious as one preferred. Personally I prefer to retain both these terms. The fore-conscious would then include ideas on the fringe of awareness, a category of no great importance in psychopathology. Co-consciousness on the other hand would be a special subdivision of the unconscious containing impulses not latent but formulated in definite concepts. These would be derived from the vaguer tendencies of the general unconscious which may not be active at all. The co-conscious thoughts would be the actively functioning ones, the ones determining conduct and symptoms, but never in awareness. The moment they become even potentially capable of coming with awareness they would be fore-conscious. Naturally the boundary lines between these subdivisions must constantly be shifting within a relatively narrow range—that is in normal mental health. A characteristic of disease

is a wide excursion and irregularity of these boundary lines.

(We see, then, that although Freud admits a wider content to the unconscious on purely theoretic grounds, practically the unconscious he works with represents repressed mental processes usually sexual.) These mental processes he further characterizes as *wishes* or connected with wishes. As Holt has pointed out, this is one of the most original of Freud's contributions since it introduces a new dynamic unit or element into psychology. It is, therefore, important to know what he has to say about the wish. It may be something either conscious or unconscious for he speaks (p. 107) of hunger, thirst and sex desires appearing directly in dreams. These are cravings of which the dreamer becomes conscious if he wakes and which would waken him if they did not receive a hallucinatory fulfillment in the dream. They belong, therefore, to a conscious rather than an unconscious order. Similarly symptoms—and elaborate symptoms—may be motivated by efforts to prevent the expression of criminal unconscious wishes or to nullify their effects as in the elaborate rituals of compulsive neurotics (p. 261). He speaks of them as positive and negative objects of sex wishes. If negative, so far as the antisocial impulse is concerned, the same impulse is a positive expression of the ego, or, in other words, of something quite capable of becoming conscious. So Freud does not insist on all dynamic wishes being unconscious. However, dreams in which marked distortion occurs

he holds to be invariably stimulated by unconscious, licentious, sex wishes (p. 169). But he goes on to say, "It can be shown that at one time they were known and conscious." Although this time is often fairly recent, these wishes were preponderantly conscious in infancy and the factor which he finds to be invariably most important in any neurosis is the unconscious infantile sex wish. From this one might deduce that Freud considers all wishes to be either now or at some time conscious affairs. Unfortunately, as we shall soon see, he admits that the Oedipus complex is developed largely in the unconscious. But since Freud does not try to draw this line it must be admitted that he uses the term consistently. The question remains, however, is "wish" the right word for his concept?

The question of the present or historic consciousness of a wish is of importance since so many critics have inveighed against the introduction of a volitional coloring to impulses of which the subject is unaware. Volition, they say, must be the expression of a personality, conscious or submerged, before it can be volition. Freud is apparently aware of this implication of the term "wish" for he explains the presence of painful wishes (pp. 185, 186) by the operation of conflicting elements in the personality, analogous to the conflict of two persons. Thus is introduced an anthropomorphic tendency which detracts from the scientific value of his formulations. This anthropomorphism will be found to be constantly cropping up. It is unfortunate that Freud picked on the word "wish" as a label for

14 PROBLEMS OF DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

something which he uses consistently in the sense of psychic craving, innate tendency, dynamic mental processes, or some such concept. A totally new term would have been more useful but it is unlikely that any substitute will ever be generally employed in psychoanalytic literature. Nevertheless, accuracy in terminology is such an aid to clarity of thought that I shall (in Chapter 18) suggest a term which might be applicable as a substitute for "wish."

CHAPTER III

INSTINCTS

Instincts stand in close dynamic relationship to "wishes" although Freud unfortunately does not state the nature of the connection. In his essay on "Triebe und Triebchicksale," however, he presents some novel ideas about instincts. Ernest Jones¹ has summarized these formulations so well as to justify quotations from his paper.

"He begins with an attempt to clarify our psychological conceptions of instinct, and, starting with the physiological concept of the nervous system as a reflex apparatus the function of which is to avoid stimuli or abolish their effects, he points out the differences between stimuli of instinctive origin and those emanating from without. Because the former cannot be dealt with by any form of motor flight, as the latter can, but only by complicated ways of altering the outer world so as to bring about suitable changes in the internal source of stimulation known as satisfaction, he considers that it is instincts, and not external stimulation, which are the true cause of progress and have led to the present complexity of the nervous system. As the mind seems to be regulated throughout by the pleasure-pain principle, he thinks that this must mirror the way in which stimuli are dealt with in general, and he correlates pleasure with a relief of excitation and pain with an increase of it."

¹ Ernest Jones, "Recent Advances in Psychoanalysis," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. I, Part 2.

These extraordinary conclusions are based on reasoning so glaringly false that the errors need only be indicated. His fundamental postulate is that "the mind seems to be regulated throughout by the pleasure-pain principle." This is expressed as an observation, yet only Freud and his immediate followers have been able to find such a wholesale application of the principle of hedonism, which they have accomplished, as we have seen above, by distorting the meaning of the term "wish." This postulate in mind, Freud has fabricated a physiology of reflexes on which he may base his instinct theory. No physiologist has been so bold as to state that the function of a reflex apparatus is to avoid stimuli or abolish their effects. This is anthropomorphism again. When the gall-bladder contracts during the process of digestion—a typical reflex—it is difficult to imagine that organ (or all the organs involved) shunning a stimulus. Another error shows an equally gross fault in logic. All instincts are supposed fundamentally to be set off by external stimuli. When Freud speaks of stimuli of instinctive, inner origin, he means stimuli which release the conative expressions of the instinct, not the stimuli responsible for the initiation of the instinctive reaction as a whole. This mistake is the result of his terminology. He uses throughout the word "Trieb," a lay term, which means in German either "impulse" or "instinct." An impulse may be immediately actuated by an inner stimulus, although the instinctive reaction of which it is a component is a response to something in the environment. As

to the growth of the nervous system being a product of instinct, he again argues falsely. He presents external stimulus and internal instinctive stimulus as the only possible factors in evolution. Most biologists would like to consider at least one other possibility, namely intelligence, that which controls and modifies instinct, as an important function developing with human specialization. If Freud were right, there would be many insects with a larger nervous system than man.

Jones proceeds with his digest:

"After a number of considerations on the nature and characteristics of instincts in general, and the fate they undergo in development, he illustrates his views by taking the example of the sexual instinct, the one which the nature of their material has compelled psychoanalysts to study most fully. The destiny of such an instinct would seem to lie in one of four possible directions: reversal into its opposite; turning against the subject; repression; and sublimation. It essentially depends on the instincts being subjected to the influence of the three great polarities that govern mental life, namely, the *biological* one of activity-passivity, the *real* one of self-outer world, and the *economical* one of pleasure-pain. The interrelationships of these three great polarities, which sometimes coincide and sometimes cross one another, are distinctly complex, and are discussed by Freud at some length. For instance, the contrast of active and passive cannot be identified with subject and object (self and outer world); the subject is passive towards the object in so far as it receives stimuli from it, active when it reacts to these, and especially active towards the outer world when stimulated by an instinct. Again subject and object can only be identified with pleasure and pain (or indifference) respectively in the beginning of life; soon the subject is separated into a pleasurable part and a painful part which is projected into the outer world, while at the same time the outer world is divided into a pleasure-giving part which is incorporated

(introjected) into the self and the opposite of this which remains distasteful or indifferent, the stage being thus attained which Freud refers to as that of the 'purified pleasure-self.'"

Is Freud really talking about *instincts* here? Let us consider his items one by one. An instinct cannot be reversed into its opposite although it may be replaced by it. For instance, flight may be abandoned and attack take its place; but flight cannot be turned into attack. His examples, however (e.g. sadism-masochism) are taken from the sex instincts—not from the sex instinct in the proper sense of the term, for if there were only one it would be for copulation pure and simple, a reaction which would or would not take place and could have only one form. Sexual activities may vary in their nature, may in fact be mutually opposed in tendency, and still serve as releases for the energy of sexual instincts. These, then, are either impulses belonging to as many different sex instincts or else they may be looked on as alternative conative reactions for one vast, vague and undifferentiated sex instinct. In the former case these differing instincts would replace one another as with flight and attack. In the latter the impulses would alternate while the instinct would remain fundamentally unaltered. In short, it is inconceivable that any pure instinct can be changed into another, unless one first establishes some totally new definition for an instinct.

As to the "turning against the subject," a man may first desire to injure somebody else and then substitute for that action self-injury. This change must either be a replacement of one instinct by an-

other or else, if only one instinct be involved, we must have an expression of the same fundamental drive in different *ideas*. This introduces a new factor—the intellectual—which may serve as a directing influence for the conative aspect of the instinct. Intelligence, of course, is capable of great variation, but, if it be the idea which is changed the underlying instinct has remained unaltered.

There need be no discussion of repression. A pure instinct or, rather, a pure instinctive reaction can certainly be repressed. It is a question, however, whether an instinct can be sublimated. According to the Freudian definition, sublimation is a process whereby energy derived from sex is utilized in a non-sexual outlet. Here again we deal, probably, with an ideational modification. But the process is still more complicated, for it seems likely that in sublimation another instinctive factor enters in and combines with the sexual in supplying the energy for the activity in question. This new instinct would be one connected, biologically, with social specialization. (See Chapter 22.)

It is striking that the most natural fate of sex instinct, free expression in copulation, is omitted entirely from Freud's list. The omission is significant. His viewpoint is not biological but psychopathological. He is dealing so constantly with the perverse and aberrant in sex that its ultimate, normal goal is lost sight of in his generalizations.

Doubt may be cast on the value of Freud's three "polarities that govern mental life." Examination of them seems to show that they are new terms

rather than new ideas. The "*biological* one of activity-passivity" looks like stimulation or non-stimulation, which is certainly not novel. When Freud speaks of passivity in reception of stimuli and activity in reaction to the stimuli, he seems to forget the time-honored division of instincts into cognitive, emotional and conative parts, which imply of necessity passive and active phases. The "*real* one of self-outer world" is the intellectual factor mentioned above and so confused does he become in mixing ideas with instincts that when he discusses his third polarity, the "*economical* one of pleasure-pain," he represents as instinctive most refined metaphysical concepts of self and environment, both being divided into pleasurable and painful aspects, reacting mutually.

CHAPTER IV

SEX

The most dynamic element in Freud's psychology is the *sexual or libido*. The latter he defines as ". . . the force through which the . . . sex instinct expresses itself." It is analogous to hunger which is the force through which the instinct of nutrition is expressed.) It is presumed that the reader is familiar with the outline of sexual development which Freud gave in his "Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie" and, therefore, comment will only be made on the elaborations or emendations to that theory, which appear in these lectures.

He gives the conventional, psychoanalytic picture of "infantile sexuality" and in this connection there is a discussion as to terminology which has broader significance than that of mere pedantic accuracy. The meaning which Freud has always given to the term "sex" is wider than that accorded to it by most psychologists. His defense of this is typified in his argument in favor of calling the various infantile practices such as finger sucking, and the child's interest in excretory sensations, sexual. He admits that this behavior has not all the qualities nor the intensity of adult manifestations of the sex instinct but insists that what everybody calls "sex" grows

out of this undifferentiated matrix. He insists upon calling this sexual rather than "organic pleasure," as some have proposed, because it is impossible to say when plainly sexual pleasure begins. In the latter he is correct, and as a practical matter in the practice of psychoanalysis the use of the term is justified because the sexual potentiality of "organic pleasure" is the important thing for the patient to realize. This, however, is a different problem from the academic one of correct formulation. As a matter of fact, it seems to the writer that Freud's use of the term sexual is exactly that of the man on the street with the proviso that he uses the word consistently while the average citizen calls a thing sexual when it is comfortable for him to do so but denies its sexuality when that would be embarrassing. (But this loose usage is not scientific.) Popular expressions and scientific terminology differ just in the point of the latter showing discrimination. The nemesis following such inexactness is that unsympathetic critics are furnished with good weapons for attack although the motive for attack may not itself be at all scientific.

While clinging to the term "infantile sexuality," Freud has become more conservative and guarded in accounting for it. That doctrine of the Stone Age in psychoanalysis, the allocation of neuroses to definite sex traumata, is abandoned. He now says that these experiences are often only imaginary, although of course they may have the importance of real events psychologically. (In this sense it might be fair to call them the initial neurotic symptoms.)

Actual experience, he notes, may have little importance at the time but become pathogenic in virtue of repression and unconscious perpetuation with elaboration. In fact he says that observation of the child may fail to reveal the presence of many infantile sex fantasies and practices or their development may be rapid. It is by the analysis of neurotics that the material is gained from which these "constructions" are fabricated, constructions which he believes to be necessary and valuable. Many a friend to psychoanalysis who has felt that the riot of perverse fancies unearthed in an analysis was more of an unconscious product than an unconscious memory will be cheered by this assertion. If only he would leave it at that! Unfortunately he describes the child as it were a monster devoid of all interest save in the lewd and unclean. How the critic will gloat over such a statement as that children (not some children) value their feces highly and make of them the first presents to those they love!

The Œdipus complex receives a less literal treatment. Apparently Freud's present view as to this matter is that the mother is an object of "love" to the boy and that the definite and literal incest ideas are of gradual, unconscious growth, receiving considerable impetus at puberty. Quotations may elucidate this.

"We call the mother the first *object of love*. For we speak of love when we emphasize the psychic side of sex impulses, and disregard or for a moment wish to forget the fundamental physical or "sensual" demands of the instincts. At the time when the

mother becomes the object of love, the psychic work of suppression which withdraws the knowledge of a part of his sexual goal from his consciousness has already begun in the child. The selection of the mother as the object of love involves everything we understand by the Œdipus complex. . . . (P. 285.)

"To be sure, the analytic representation of the Œdipus-complex enlarges upon and is a coarser edition of the infantile sketch. The hatred of the father, the death wish in regard to him, are no longer timidly suggested, the affection for the mother recognizes the goal of possessing her for a wife. Dare we really accredit these horrible and extreme feelings to those tender childhood years, or does analysis deceive us by bringing in some new element? It is not difficult to discover this. Whenever an account of past events is given, be it written even by a historian, we must take into account the fact that inadvertently something has been interpolated from the present and from intervening times into the past; so that the entire picture is falsified. In the case of the neurotic it is questionable whether this interpolation is entirely unintentional or not: we shall later come to learn its motives and must justify the fact of "imagining back" into the remote past. We also easily discover that hatred of the father is fortified by numerous motives which originate in later times and circumstances, since the sexual wishes for the mother are cast in forms which are necessarily foreign to the child." (P. 291.)

In the development of object libido, Freud now defines two types, the *narcissistic* and the *dependent*. In the former a personality, similar to that of the subject, is loved, while in the latter one who has become valuable in virtue of filling non-sexual needs becomes the object of the libido. In either of these cases the passion is held to be selfish, although Freud speaks only of the love capacity of the individual being initiated or directed unconsciously by egocentric ideals. In one place, however, he does introduce the term *altruism* in connection with love.

This (pp. 360, 361) is when he contrasts egoism and narcissism. In the completest love altruism enters, which united with sexual attachment makes the object so powerful that it "sucks up the ego as it were." A factor is thus admitted which may be more potent than egoism or narcissism. Yet this factor is mentioned only once and then rather incidentally. He has nothing to say about its origin, its development or its influence on other factors in dynamic psychology. It is inconceivable that altruism springs suddenly into being in connection with one life situation alone. We therefore feel justified in concluding that Freud's admission of altruism in this instance is accidental so far as his general psychology is concerned. As a matter of fact, with this exception, Freud now describes love only in terms of narcissism of different types.

A refreshing broadening of view about sadism and masochism appears in this book, for they are now regarded as active and passive forerunners of the later masculine and feminine traits. "Hate stands throughout in closest connection with the instinct of self-preservation." (Jones.) Sadism is an "instinct to mastery which may border on cruelty." A less critical statement is concerned with the physical expression of masochism: "Impulses with passive goals attach themselves to the erogenous zones of the rectal opening." It is difficult to see why anything but coincidence of development should ally this particular type of object libido with this specific goal. The experience of a critical analyst would probably be found to vary a good deal with

different patients in this regard and the experience of different analysts would probably vary still more. In the subdivision of the prepuberty period, Freud now makes two stages. The first is one when oral erotism dominates while the second is this sadistico-anal phase. We shall return to the question of the relationship of libido and object to specific impulse and goal, when discussing Freud's theory of depression.

Probably the most important point in his outline of sex development is the reason he assigns for the importance of sex. He says the libido escapes the education given other impulses very largely because it does not need outward expression and persists with auto-erotic outlet for quite a time. Sex impulses are governed by the pleasure principle and fall under the influence of fact later, with difficulty, or not at all. It is contact with reality, with fact, that gives education and control.

After hearing a good deal about the individual origin of sex anomalies we read (p. 323) that primal sex fantasies are inherited! If psychoanalysis has any value, either as a method of treatment or a system of psychopathology, it derives that value from the emphasis it places on purely auto-genetic factors. If Freud regards this principle as too narrow, he should say so and place some limits to what he thinks are the boundaries of congenital and acquired influences. This baldly stated inconsistency simply throws matters into confusion. If it means anything it could be easily elaborated to undermine the most basic principle of psychoanalysis.

CHAPTER V

REPRESSION AND EGO-LIBIDO

In regard to *repression* the writings now under consideration present a considerable advance and elaboration of Freud's earlier views. In his "Zwei Principien des psychischen Geschehens",¹ he spoke of it as a reaction of withdrawal or flight from something painful. The phenomena subsumed under the heading of repression are, however, so often expressive of active aggression that Freud has had to modify the first formulation with the introduction of this latter element of condemnation and expurgation. Now it stands that repression partakes of the nature of both processes. Since they are antitheses, it would have been more logical to confine the term to the aggressive reactions. Freud introduces repression in his lectures as follows: "That pathogenic process which is made evident to us through the resistance (appearing in the course of psychoanalytic treatment) we will name repression." It occurs beyond the vision of consciousness. He further identifies it with another process, namely that of censorship. The watcher at the threshold, who prevents the entrance of unwelcome visitors from the unconscious or who extrudes them from

¹ Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse, Bd. III, S. 1.

fore-consciousness, is also the repressing agency. Anthropomorphism is running rife here again. Freud says the essential function of repression is to keep painful ideas or impulses out of consciousness. The suspicions, distortion of judgment, accentuation of symptoms or invalidism that are called "resistance" present quite different phenomena, which might be related to, but could not possibly be identical with, repression. If, however, the "censor" were a real person, he might be enraged at the threat to his authority made by the psychoanalyst and retaliate with such behavior.

One cannot escape the feeling, at times, that psychoanalysts failing in their therapy, find comfort in talking diffusely about "transference" (which is flattering) and about "resistance," which somehow puts responsibility on to the patient and lightens the load of the physician. Resistance can be explained more readily as a failure of repression than as an evidence of its power and its symptoms can thereby be correlated with clinical facts. The process of psychoanalysis tends to arouse unconscious tendencies. In studying psychotic reactions we learn that they are not aroused singly but that stimulation of one unconscious idea tends towards a general autonomy of the unconscious. When this takes place repression automatically begins. If the latter were entirely efficient the gate would be locked and barred and the analysis would cease. Successful analysis occurs only when repression is gradually lifted and the personality so educated that repression becomes discriminative. In an unsuccess-

ful analysis the inflated unconscious processes are attached to the existing situation and appear as symptoms—hatred of the analyst, delusion-like interpretations of what the analyst has said and so on. The conditions are analogous to those at the outbreak of a neurosis or psychosis and the mechanisms are identical. A given situation—the precipitating cause—stimulates the unconscious and unconscious fantasies are woven around the elements of this situation which then appear as symptoms. So far as the experience of the writer goes this view is justified by the frequent recognition of definite paranoid tendencies in patients incapable of profiting by analysis and the observation that the most tragic failures laid at the door of psychoanalysis have invariably occurred in the practice of physicians who were ignorant of psychiatry. Violent resistance may be looked on as a psychosis precipitated by stimulating the unconscious of a psychotic patient.

As has been stated, repression is held to be a process whereby painful ideas or impulses are prevented from entry into consciousness or fore-consciousness. In his essay on the "Unconscious," Freud narrows down the mechanism of repression in the psychoneuroses to a highly specific task. In the unconscious there are only ideas of things untranslated into words. The process of becoming-conscious involves such a translation. So the specific task of repression is confined to prevention of any attachment of words to ideas. The untranslated ideas then remain unconscious. The original re-

pressions take place in infancy and have to do with the formation of the unconscious. The repressions of later life are concerned with derivatives of these primordial unconscious elements. These secondary repressions are maintained by what Freud terms *Gegenbesetzung*.¹ The *Gegenbesetzung* forces a modification of the unconscious fantasies into a form acceptable to the censorship. An essential feature of repression is this formation of substitutes. Successful repression results in freeing consciousness from anything painful and Freud regards the apathy of many hysterics as an example of this. Less successful repression restrains the libido from direct expression but allows its transformation into anxiety. (See below under the discussion of emotions.) He admits that an affect cannot be recognized nor detected till it reaches awareness, so that any talk of unconscious affects must be speculative in the extreme. He thinks, however, that there are various affects attached to ideas in the unconscious and that the invariable fate of these is transformation into anxiety as the result of repression.

Various methods of handling the fear thus produced are responsible for the symptoms of different neuroses, as will be discussed later. It may be remarked now that "anxiety hysteria" with "free-floating anxiety" represents a simple unsuccessful handling of this fear production. In phobias the

¹Jones has translated this by "countercharge," using the analogy of electrical charge. But several of Freud's contexts show this not to be Freud's meaning invariably. No single English word seems to give the varied meanings of "Besetzung" so I have left it untranslated.

fear is attached to a limited number of real external objects so that the patient is free from mental pain so long as he avoids contact with these objects or the repressed libido produces no more fear than can be attached to these objects. In other neuroses entirely different symptoms such as obsessions and compulsions are substituted for the anxiety.

The speculations as to the origin of repression lead Freud into a complicated problem. He speaks of repression corresponding to a flight of the ego away from the libido which it regards as dangerous. Repressed material is held in check, however, by a pressure exerted from the direction of consciousness. Resistance and repression both come from forces of the ego, that is "from obvious and latent traits of character." The ego, therefore, is represented as something which both flees and repels at the same time and by the same process—an impossible view; or else it must be a complex affair composed of divergently operating elements. This leads us to a discussion of the most difficult part of Freud's psychology.

In the earlier years of psychoanalysis the dynamic elements of personality were held to be sexual, comprising auto-erotism and object libido, and non-sexual, or the ego impulses, which had to do with the instincts of self-preservation. In his later work the concept of narcissism has brought in a third factor with the introduction of "ego-libido." At the same time there has been a tendency to accentuate the aspects of the ego that are antipathetic to sex, giving the impression that the *raison d'être* of the ego, so

to speak, is repression rather than self-preservation primarily. For instance, the nearest approach to a definition of the ego, which Freud attains in these lectures is the following: "What powers are these which interpose objections to libidinous desires, who are the other parties to the pathological conflict? They are, in the widest sense, the non-sexual impulses. We call them comprehensively the ego impulses." Apparently in justification of this neglect of the self-preservation aspects, Freud claims that the latter are not pathogenic. For instance he says that the non-satisfaction of hunger and thirst never result in their reversal into anxiety as frustrated sex libido is held to do. On the other hand he admits (p. 355) as an inconsistency in his theories that normal fear in the presence of real danger is an expression of the ego's instinct of self-preservation. The rôle he allows to the primitive ego impulses in pathological conditions is a contributory one. On page 331 he says that a "selfish ego impulse which seeks protection and personal advantage," although not a sufficient cause for illness, favors its beginning and feeds its needs once it has been established.

This is the case in the traumatic neuroses, particularly in war. The evidence of the war neuroses would seem to argue strongly for the instincts of self-preservation taking a leading part in pathogenic conflicts, but Jones, Abraham, Ferenczi and Simmel have all interpreted their evidence as meaning that repressed "ego-libido" is the responsible agency. As we shall see the pragmatic value of

“ego-libido” in Freudian psychology resides largely in the fact that it allows one to pan-sexualize human psychology. In one other instance Freud retains the ego in its original sense, again as a contributory factor. As we have seen he describes the development of the Oedipus complex as determined in part by selfish impulses. In another place he speaks of egoism teaching the child to love. So far, then, we see that the ego directs self-preservation, causes repression and is an accessory agency in the formation of the Oedipus complex and in the establishment of certain neuroses.

How can a primarily selfish agency be responsible for repression? Although he does not explicitly say so this is probably due to the “education of the ego.” The development of ego and sex, he thinks, are probably both innate, but they are also influenced by individual necessity (education). The education of the ego is direct and simple because the self can be preserved only in a limited number of ways. It is also, therefore, an effective education. The libido on the other hand remains governed by the pleasure-pain principle, very largely because of its capacity of expression in fantasy, with consequent divorce from reality and perpetuation in the unconscious. The ego is guided by the pleasure principle only indirectly and ultimately, but immediately by the principle of fact (reasonableness). American psychoanalysts would, probably, express this idea in the more biological terms of adaptation: the self can be preserved only by learning to adapt itself to the environment, while the libido can per-

sist without adaptation to reality. There is no doubt that this argument is, on broad lines, thoroughly sound and can be taken as a good reason for sex, in ordinary civilian life, playing the dominant rôle in the causation of psychopathological reactions. Elsewhere¹ Freud describes the development of an "ego-ideal" as a result of education of the individual. (Since libidinous factors enter into this latter education it cannot be held to be the "education of the ego" referred to above but as it would make a consistent argument we will assume that the two educations are essentially one. Self-interest certainly could actuate such an ideal.) As a result of precept and example the developing child and youth builds up an ideal of what he would like to be and this standard becomes the criterion for censorship. A special faculty in the ego—conscience—sits in judgment on libidinous impulses and conscience, Freud says, is the same thing as the censorship in dreams.

If Freud used the term "ego" as an equivalent for instincts of self-preservation operating via the ego ideal his formulations would be clear. Unfortunately he frequently employs the term as an equivalent for "personality," an inclusive label for all characteristics, no matter how acquired or developed. Quotations should make this criticism clear: "It is obvious that this ego [of the nervous person] is neither a reliable nor an impartial authority. For this very ego is the force that denies and suppresses

¹Zur Einführung des Narzissmus, *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, VI, S. 1.

the unconscious. . . . If one is to believe the evidence of the ego it would appear to have been active all along, all its symptoms would have been actively willed and formed. Yet we know that it has passively allowed a great deal to occur, a fact which it subsequently attempts to conceal or palliate." ["Ego" is here used in the senses of interlocutor, personality and ego in the narrow sense.] Such instances could be repeated indefinitely. Perhaps the plainest example of an unequivocal use of ego in the sense of personality occurs when he is speaking of the function of conscience, ". . . there is really an agent which continually watches, criticizes and compares the other part of the *ego* and thus opposes it. . . . [The patient] feels the dominance of a factor in his ego, which compares his *actual ego* and all of its activities to an ideal ego that has been created in the course of development." The words which I have italicized can only refer to personality. Freud states (Lecture 22) that in neuroses a pathological struggle is waged between ego impulses and sex impulses. If, on the other hand, the ego adapts itself to the libido development, there is no conflict but sexual perversion. On the face of it, this seems quite consistent with his general views but a little scrutiny shows the logical implications of the statement to be embarrassing. If the libido triumphs in this manner a new ego ideal must be established, one which countenances perversion. If this be so, libido has contributed to the formation of the ideal, which is therefore not an expression of ego impulses alone. Like personality itself the ideal is a composite thing

backed by self-interest, sex libido and, probably, social instincts as well. But if this were admitted repression could no longer be held to be actuated by ego impulses alone.

There is another occasion for obscurity in Freud's discussion of the ego, which concerns the question of consciousness or unconsciousness. Ego in the sense of personality is mainly conscious, the ego ideal is purely conscious, as we have seen, while conscience is usually conscious but may (as the censorship) operate fore- or un-consciously. These discriminations are rarely made in the text, hence such confusions as the following (p. 377): "Resistance is not part of the unconscious but of the ego, which is our fellow-worker [speaking of psychoanalytic treatment]. This holds true even if resistance is not conscious. . . . We expect resistance to be relinquished . . . whenever interpretation has enabled the ego to recognize it." If resistance be unconscious, how can it cooperate in psychoanalytic treatment? The answer might be by way of transference, but Freud says distinctly that transference is an expression of object- not of ego-libido. So we are left in this dilemma.

After all this we find ourselves little nearer solution of the original question, what part of the ego flees from the libido in repression and what part repels? The second question is answered. The ego-ideal as operated by conscience does the repelling, but what of the fleeing? Freud says that in infancy the ego is weak and therefore regards the libido as dangerous and denounces it. If he said that it fled,

the answer might be that weakened ego causes the repression by flight, which could then be portrayed as a turning of the individual's attention from libidinous to other interests. But, unfortunately, the libidinous strivings which Freud writes most about are expressed with great freedom in infancy. In fact it is the period of life when repression in any sense is least effective. The only conclusion one can reach is that "flight from the libido" is a mere phrase prompted by anthropomorphism. It is a natural reaction when two individuals are in conflict.

By far the most important addition which Freud has made to his psychology in recent years has to do with *ego-libido*. This is based on *narcissism*, so the latter had best be discussed first. This perversion was named from the myth of Narcissus, who was insensitive to the charms of women but fell in love with his own image.

As I understand it, the narcissist is one whose libido derives no satisfaction from attachment to other persons but is occupied with his own personality. This introduces the two types of libido—object-libido and ego-libido. Narcissism represents an important stage in psychosexual development. The first phase is auto-erotism, where satisfaction is gained by irritation of parts of the subject's body without any concept of the personality entering in. Auto-erotism can exist without self-consciousness being present. (Freud does not make this discrimination clear.) The next step in development occurs when the subject builds up an idea of himself for which he has a feeling of love. Self-love is nar-

cissism. Physically this may be expressed in auto-erotic practices but can exist without auto-erotism, in fantasy alone. From narcissism the libido goes on to homosexuality (love of another like oneself) and to heterosexuality, where objectivity may be completely developed. Very frequently the alleged object of love is merely a lay figure; the subject is in love with his ideal of what the loved one should be. In such a case the union is happy just in so far as the object of attachment is capable of identifying himself or herself with the ideal. This type of love is narcissistic because what is loved is not another person at all but an autochthonous ideal. True objectivity occurs only when another person is loved as another personality and not only in so far as the object duplicates a fantasy of the lover. When a sexual object is credited with undue virtue (sexual overestimation), this is a product of narcissism, because the qualities in question do not reside in the object (or not in the degree represented) but are fantasies of the lover, things he would like to see and, therefore, does observe. Such an attachment may pass for true love, thanks to its loud protestations, but it is unstable. A puff of reality will blow it away. Reality holds no terror for genuine affection since the true lover is interested in a real person, not an imaginary one. From such considerations it is evident that narcissism is of fundamental importance.

Freud has said little or nothing about the development of narcissism. This problem has, however, re-

ceived most enlightening treatment from Burrow,¹ who traces the steps by which self-consciousness and self-love grow out of the "primary subjective state" and a primary identification of self with mother. It is peculiarly significant that this, the most original and important contribution to psychoanalysis of recent years, has received no attention from Freud and his immediate followers. (It is discussed in Chapter 16.)

Before proceeding with the discussion of ego-libido certain implications of narcissism and of narcissistic libido should be considered. Deductions drawn from narcissism should be based on the phenomena that are peculiar to this perversion or complex. For instance, coexisting auto-erotic characteristics should not be brought into discussion since they can have independent existence. Similarly all the details of a homosexual or heterosexual attachment, which is founded on narcissism, cannot be utilized as evidence, since such unions, in so far as they are homosexual or heterosexual, contain elements of true objectivity. Again, the demonstration of solicitude for personal safety or aggrandisement is not *ipso facto* evidence of narcissism for the instincts of self-preservation can produce such solicitude and this interest can coexist with well-developed object love.

It is when the libido that normally goes to others is fixed on an "Imago" of one's self that the situation is narcissistic. If narcissistic libido has any

¹Trigant Burrow, "The Genesis and Meaning of Homosexuality," *Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3.

peculiarities differentiating it from other types of libido, these characteristics must be determined by the objective of the libido. Towards what is this libido directed? Not to the body of the subject alone, for if that were the limit of its application, narcissism would be synonymous with auto-erotism. The libido becomes distinctively narcissistic when it is occupied with worship and affection of the subject's own personality. The qualities of narcissistic libido must therefore be derived from the characteristics of this personality as it is viewed by the subject.

Personality is never a completely objective reality but varies with the subjective bias of the observer. The John Doe known to himself is a different man from that known to his wife, his child, his servant or his business acquaintance. The personality to which a narcissist is attached is, probably, his ego-ideal regarded in unconscious fantasy not as a standard of conduct but as a real person. Narcissism implies, therefore, unconscious delusions of grandeur, power or capacity. But its implications go further. The ego-ideal is not the product of an isolated individual but of an individual whose standards are determined very largely by the precept and example of parents, teachers and, later, society as a whole. In other words the ego-ideal is not an egocentric monster but an adaptive socialized human being. Even its most selfish component—its delusion of greatness—implies social approbation and, therefore, socialized activity.

These ideas are inherent in the following sen-

tences, although Freud does not express them in this form.

"... how are the concepts of narcissism and egoism to be differentiated? I think we can put it that narcissism is a libidinous inflation of egoism. When we speak of egoism, we have in mind only the needs of the individual; if we use the term narcissism, his libidinous satisfaction is also brought into consideration. As practical motifs the two can be separately traced for quite a way. One can be absolutely egoistic and still maintain strong interest in libido-objects, in so far as libidinous satisfaction in an object is one of the needs of the ego. Egoism is then on the guard to see that the striving for the object brings no harm to the ego. One can be egoistic and, at the same time, preponderantly narcissistic, that is, have a very slight need of an object. This need, again, may be for direct sexual satisfaction or even for those higher desires, derived from sexual striving, which we are accustomed to speak of as 'love' in opposition to 'sensuality.' In all these aspects egoism is the self-evident and constant element, while the narcissism is variable."¹ (P. 360.)

The last sentence is most important. The psychological characteristics of any situation cannot logically be described in terms of a variable element in that situation. Yet this, as we shall see immediately, is precisely what Freud does. Knowledge of "ego-libido" is derived from a study of narcissism according to his argument and is supposed to be synonymous with "narcissistic-libido," yet once the term ego-libido is adopted the characteristics of egoism are assumed to reside in this particular type of sexual striving.

Freud admits that the mechanisms of the transference neuroses can be studied adequately on the assumption that there is antithesis and conflict between object *libido* and ego *interest*. The concept of *ego-libido* he finds to be necessary, however, for an understanding of the constitution of the ego, of

¹ Translation emended by the Writer.

the fundamental mechanisms of sleep and dreaming, of the pathogenesis of dementia præcox, paranoia, hypochondria, the mental state in organic disease and of manic-depressive insanity.

He begins his argument with an acceptance of Abraham's theory of dementia præcox, namely, that in this disease the capacity for attachment of libido to external objects is lost and that it is lost because the libido is withdrawn and applied to the patient's own ego. Proof of this is held to be found in the "delusion of grandeur" observed in dementia præcox. There is a similar withdrawal of interest from the environment in sleep, this interest being temporarily turned in on self. Libido thus directed to the ego is called the ego-libido. Object libido and ego-libido are reciprocally convertible one into the other. He uses the physiological analogy of an amœba, which when active protrudes its pseudopodia but retracts them again while in a resting phase.

This analogy is certainly an apt one to describe the disposition of energy in dementia præcox or sleep; but is this narcissism? If so, dementia præcox and sleep should be regularly accompanied and dominated by delusions or dreams of grandeur. Every psychiatrist knows that prominent delusions of grandeur are rarities in dementia præcox. Probably less than half the cases give even casual expression to such beliefs, whereas megalomania as a dominant symptom is extremely unusual. Similarly, it is a matter of common knowledge that expansive dreams are not universal accompaniments of sleep. Although it is conceivable that Freud and his disci-

ples are as ignorant of psychiatry as their statements imply, it is not conceivable that they believe dreams of grandeur to be regularly present in sleep. It is therefore probable that what they mean is that narcissism, with its egocentric and self-magnification tendency, is a regular component of dementia præcox delusions. This, however, is not scientific reasoning. One proves a theory by appeal to indisputable facts, not by *interpretations* of facts made *ad hoc*. It is true that the delusional world of a schizophrenic has the patient for its center and this might be interpreted as inherently expansive, even though the patient may not represent himself as the God of this universe. But by exactly the same reasoning it could be shown that all the vital interests of the most normal man are essentially subjective and not truly objective and that such a man is therefore a pure narcissist. This, however, would be equivalent to saying that all instincts flow from narcissism, and this, in turn, would give such a wide meaning to the perversion as to rob it of any specific significance. We would conclude, therefore, that the symptoms of dementia præcox cannot be used to establish ego-libido as an outgrowth of narcissism.

A second difficulty appears when one considers the nature of the process which Freud describes as a transformation of object- into ego-libido. Interest normally applied to objects is withdrawn and applied, he says, to the self. This results in the emotional isolation and idleness of dementia præcox or in the unconsciousness of sleep. As we have seen above narcissism implies a contact with the world,

hence a process which breaks that contact cannot be narcissism. Then what is it? It is a change from activity to inactivity, one of the most universal phenomena of nature, an event which is usually normal but may be pathological and one having its special characteristics, physiological and psychological. Physiologically it is the assumption of a resting phase in an organism whose metabolism cannot keep pace with its activity. To speak anthropomorphically for the moment, the amœba who withdraws its pseudopodia is not lost in admiration of his greatness, he is simply taking a nap.¹ Psychologically the process is identical with introversion. This Freud describes as a turning aside of the libido from the possibilities of actual satisfaction with a consequent inflation of preëxisting fantasies. Thinking is substituted for doing. This is what happens in dreams and introversion can account equally well for the symptoms of dementia præcox which Freud describes as evidences of ego-libido. Biologically considered, this resting phase is an adaptation related to self-preservation. It should, therefore, in Freud's nomenclature, be classified as a reaction of egoism rather than narcissism.

It might well be objected that calling this highly important psychological phenomenon introversion does not explain it, even though the term narcissism

¹I am leaving out of consideration the case of withdrawal of pseudopodia in the presence of noxious stimuli. This could, if one wished, be regarded as a fear reaction of immobility. The argument could be carried to a greater extremity than Rivers (*vide infra*) does to prove that sleep and dementia præcox are danger reactions. This conclusion would be as logical as Freud's suppositions about the withdrawal of ego-libido and equally unwarranted.

be utterly inapplicable. This is quite true. But might not any attempt at real explanation be premature? A thoroughgoing solution of the problem of introversion would demand final knowledge of the physical causes in insanity as well as an infinitely greater psychological insight than we now enjoy.

If the foregoing arguments are sound the idea of object-libido being transformed into ego-libido and vice versa seems to be untenable. One is, therefore, constrained to seek for some explanation of Freud's enthusiasm over this formulation, which, he says, may lead to such extension of our knowledge as to make previous psychoanalysis seem a small matter. There are probably two reasons which give the hypothesis pragmatic value for him. In the first place it provides a dynamic source for the process of repression. The most potent principle in Freud's psychology is sexual libido. If this be repressed, it stands to reason that the repressing force must be at least as strong as the libidinous one. Up to the time of this ego-libido scheme, there was no psychic element invoked to account for this process that Freud would admit to have dynamic value. But since "libido" is *the* driving force in the psychoanalytic system, ego-libido can be held adequate to cause repression without admitting the existence of dynamic principles other than the sexual—provided one does not follow out the relentless implications of such a theory. In the second place it seems to meet a still greater need, the solution of the problem of the disposal of energy in psychopathological conditions. The conclusion is inevitable to any observer

of neuroses and psychoses, no matter what his prepossessions, that morbid states are characterized by a deficiency of normal objective interest in the environment. Jung formulates this by calling the fundamental energy supply "libido" and making this libido a general vital force, an *élan vital*, not necessarily sexual. As a matter of fact Freud's views, in so far as they are tenable, amount to just this. There does seem to be a transformation into a non-productive self-centeredness of the energy expressed in the normal man sexually and objectively; introversion is the initiation of this process. The latter type of interest we have shown not to be libidinous in Freud's sense of the term. Therefore, that which is workable in his theory is identical with Jung's fundamental principle.

The founder of psychoanalysis has considered this possible interpretation for he specifically eliminates it as valueless. He says (pp. 357, 358) that an understanding of the "transference neuroses" is rendered possible by conceiving the underlying conflict to be between ego and sex tendencies which are separate and antithetic. These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. There is no theoretic reason why fundamental energy should not be expressed in forms which would conflict with each other. In fact the metamorphosis of sadism, according to Freud, shows developments of mutually antagonistic love and hate.

He goes on to say that ordinary psychoanalytic experience would never have led to the notion of object-libido turning into ego-libido. This concept

has become necessary to him to account for dementia præcox, where the capacity for placing object-libido in the outer world is lost. The return of libido to the ego is, he admits, a normal process during such conditions as sleep, but when pursued beyond a certain point it becomes pathogenic. He concludes that libidinous interest in objects is maintained in order to prevent mental illness. When so much libido has flowed back to the ego that the narcissistic libido is dominant, then return of it to objects is impossible. This process (pp. 363, 364) is closely related to the process of repression and must be considered as its counterpart,—the conditions of these processes are identical as far as we can see now, with those of repression. "The conflict seems to be the same and to take place between the same forces."

At last we seem to get some hint of what Freud means by speaking occasionally of repression as flight. He has an end condition in view, one where libido is separated from objects, or, in other words, a condition where the ego (in the sense of the individual) is not in libidinous contact with objects. Naturally this can be brought about in several ways: by repression of libidinous fantasies into the unconscious; by introversion, i.e., the application of libido to pure fantasy divorced from reality; or by withdrawing the libido from objects and placing it on the ego. Only one element is common to these three otherwise different processes; in all of them an end is made of actual, objective, libidinous outlet.

But just as the nature of the processes is different so the end conditions differ. Repression, in the

sense given to it as a rule by Freud himself and also by other psychopathologists such as Morton Prince, means an exclusion from consciousness of definite ideas or fantasies associated with dynamic or instinctive impulses (the *sentiments* of Shand and McDougall). Introversion is the substitution of imaginary for actual outlet. The "conversion into ego-libido" is really two processes, not necessarily successive or related. Withdrawal of libido seems to occur as a pure reaction in such states of apathy as are encountered in stupor or epileptic dementia. The application of libido to the ego is really a substitution of reactions actuated by self-preservation for those actuated by sex. A banal example of this is the interruption of love-making by some physical danger. Attention is withdrawn from the sexual stimuli and applied to the peril at hand. Similar events in the psychopathological field are seen in epilepsy where ego reactions are common. These are not narcissistic as we have seen.

To return to repression,—it is evident that the confusion is occasioned by Freud giving one definition to the term and then using the same word for analogous states. The ensuing difficulties are in no place more flagrant than in his remarks about dementia præcox. He has several times made the statement that repression is strong in that disease. Now, according to the accepted (and Freud's own) definition of repression as an exclusion from consciousness of libidinous ideas of a kind repulsive to the ego-ideal, there is no condition in which repression is so weak as in dementia præcox, when sexual and

even infantile sexual delusions are so common as almost to be universal. Apparently this inconsistency results from a confusion of repression with resistance. Since dementia præcox patients do not profit by psychoanalysis, and exhibit no "transference," a process involving object-libido, they are held to have a great deal of resistance. Then, as resistance and repression are the same there must be great repression in dementia præcox.

Of course a faithful Freudian might object to these criticisms that Freud never intended to give such a narrow meaning to repression as is here insisted upon. This is possible. But if terminology is to have any value it must be exact. A process that can have as many variations as the three cited above cannot be labeled by one term. Again, if only one, but another, of the possible meanings be the correct one for what Freud calls repression, that is, if I have mistaken his meaning and assign the wrong original significance to the term,—then, starting with any other single meaning, as great a confusion is encountered as that just indicated.

CHAPTER VI

DEMENTIA PRÆCOX AND PARANOIA

So far we have considered the main generalizations at which Freud has arrived. There remains for discussion the application of these principles to specific problems in psychopathology. The most important problems have, naturally, to do with the origin and structure of morbid psychological symptoms.

Since our attention has just been directed to dementia præcox it may be simplest to complete the résumé of Freud's views as to this disease. As we have seen, he regards its essential pathology as a withdrawal of libido from the outer world and its transmutation into ego-libido. In his essay on the "Unconscious" he gives three bits of evidence for this: (1) the incapacity of the patients to "transfer"; (2) the weaning of their interest from the outer world; (3) the signs of excessive interest in their own egos; (4) the end stage of complete apathy. The second is a generalization of which the first is a special instance. Loss of interest in the real world and people in it is certainly present but does not necessitate the conclusion that it is placed on the ego. Clinical experience shows that the attention of the patients is focused on fantasies. The

nature of these thoughts can give us the only reliable evidence as to the goal and type of the libido. There are ideas which collation shows to be related with adult sexuality; with these are often connected delusions of persecution; there are infantile sexual ideas, variations of the Œdipus drama, which tend to increase in importance with the gravity of the disease process; then there are elaborate fancies of activity and theories of philosophy, discovery, etc., which are frequently tinged with expansiveness. Pure delusions of grandeur are rare and it is of extreme importance to note that the elaborate notions of a philosophical order which have a boastful coloring are the ones which bring the patient most in contact with reality and are associated with milder types of the disorder.¹ Such ideas can properly be called narcissistic and have that element of contact with the world which the ego-ideal, the object of narcissistic libido, must have. The behavior of the dementia præcox patient should also be mentioned here. So far as it is abnormal, it is determined by the delusions mentioned above or is an expression of auto-erotism in a pure, not narcissistic form. (I am speaking of course of usual cases. Sometimes one sees striking examples of pure narcissism, such as one man who spent hours every day exercising nude in front of a mirror. But such cases are rare.)

In general, then, one can say that the tendency for dementia præcox is to show in severe cases autistic thoughts of a crude Œdipus order and auto-erotic

¹ MacCurdy and Treadway, "Constructive Delusions," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August, 1915.

behavior. The milder cases often express ideas which are narcissistic (and sometimes expansive) but these are to be looked on as arrested cases, so that narcissism can only be regarded as an initial phase, not an end product. The third bit of evidence, therefore, the excessive interest in their own egos, is based on insufficient clinical knowledge. Freud gives only two instances of this, delusions of grandeur and hypochondriacal ideas. The latter are not so rare as is expansiveness but are far from universal. It is a question for speculation as to whether hypochondria does not represent a deterioration of narcissism due to a preponderance of the auto-erotic element which, of necessity, is implied by self-love. The last point of evidence, the apathy, can be briefly dismissed. If narcissism be self-love, there must be emotion in it. It is only the self divorced from love that can be apathetic.

It is significant of the disregard for the symptomatology of the psychoses which Freud exhibits, that he has nothing to say about dissociation of affect. This, or more specifically, the acceptance with pleasurable emotion of ideas essentially painful, is the one symptom which is pathognomonic of dementia præcox. All the others—divorce from reality, delusions and hallucinations, apathy—can occur in recoverable psychoses.

Freud proceeds by recalling the fact that in dementia præcox many thoughts seem to be conscious, which in normal and neurotic conditions are unconscious. He hopes to elucidate the relationship of conscious to unconscious, and ego to object, by con-

sideration of certain symptoms in schizophrenia. The first is that in their apparently senseless talk these patients often complain of bodily disturbances of which there is no physical cause. They themselves will, however, explain the origin of the alleged symptoms. His first example is an excellent one, being highly typical. A girl complained of her eyes being twisted and explained this by saying that her lover was a hypocrite, he had made her see things differently, he had twisted her eyes. Freud calls this "organ speech" because changes in organs express ideas, and he regards such complaints as hypochondriacal. But is this hypochondria? In this disease, as ordinarily described, the patient's attention is focused on part of his body which he believes to be diseased because of what he feels there. Any elaboration has to do with the exploitation of possible causes for the disability. This is the hypochondria of which Freud speaks when he uses it as an example of narcissistic interest. But the "twisted eyes" are something else. The patient's attention is here not focused on the physical complaint but on the perfidy of the lover. The disordered eyes are a proof of this and only one of a number of proofs. True hypochondria does occur in patients suffering from dementia præcox but it is probably a coincidence and has no more to do with the essential psychopathology of that disease than symptoms of compulsion neuroses, which may be prominent in some cases.

His second point is that in this "organ speech," as in the formation of other ideas, words undergo

the "primary process" of condensation and displacement, which Freud discovered in dreams and regards as highly significant of unconscious mentation. In schizophrenia the process is applied particularly to words, which are used as symbols. Symbolization in the psychoneuroses depends on the resemblances existing in actual objects or processes. In dementia præcox it may depend much more on words. For instance, Freud gives another typical example. A patient had a sexual interest in stockings which he explained by comparison of the openings between the threads of the fabric and the female genital openings. As Freud says, the resemblance here is not nearly so much of the physical characteristics of the holes as in the fact that the same word may be used for either. He is forgetful, however, when he says that such a process is characteristic only of schizophrenia. He has given countless examples of similar events in his "Psychopathology of Everyday Life"; it is fairly frequent as a symptom determinant in compulsion neurosis and a not unknown basis for a phobia. His deduction from this observation is that given above in discussion of the unconscious: that the elements of unconsciousness thoughts are ideas not clothed in words; it is only in the fore-conscious that they are translated into words, or, more correctly, that words are added to the ideas. Applying these conclusions to dementia præcox he has to admit that the original concept of repression, as something standing between the fore-conscious and unconscious, should be modified to cover the material of

schizophrenia and allied psychoses. But he does not say what this emendation should be.

He does, however, make an effort to get away from the paradox of word-formations bulking so large in dementia præcox where unconscious phenomena are supposed to preponderate. He escapes by the claim that following the narcissistic regression, an attempt is made to reëstablish contact with reality. This cannot be fully successful and only a faulty grasp of word-concept is achieved. These constitute the delusions. Freud offers not one shred of clinical evidence in support of this view that an early, enduring and fundamental symptom is a secondary manifestation of the disease. It seems to be a purely arbitrary construction that can serve no purpose except his extrication from a logical dilemma.

Freud's theories of dementia præcox may be summed up in the classification he gives of manifestations in this disease. First there is such normal mentation as persists; second the symptoms of the disease process proper, namely withdrawal from the outer world, megalomania, hypochondria and "regressions" (not otherwise specified); and third the attempts at recovery which include delusions, hallucinations and changes in conduct. It seems strange that one of his insight could fail to observe, even in the material he briefly presents, that "organ speech," word distortions and delusions about the environment are all examples of the same type of thinking. The patient seems to begin with a central idea—or, more accurately, perhaps, a dominant

theme—which is substantiated in his mind by perversions: of bodily sensations (“organ speech”), of memory (delusional thinking), of perceptions (illusions and hallucinations). In so far as this theme is dominant all cognitive functions are perverted. When this theme is latent his mind can function normally. Of course these phenomena are duplicated in slighter degree in everyday life. The fundamental problem is to discover how such a theme (or themes) can gain this ascendancy. Narcissism does not give the answer. When this question is solved it will be time enough to enter into such refinements as the relationship of words and bodily sensations to normal or abnormal thinking.

Closely related to schizophrenia is *paranoia*, an extremely rare psychosis in a pure form but, when modified, common enough as the “paranoid” type of dementia præcox. In his recent publications Freud offers nothing new concerning this disease but repeats the theory he expounded years ago. The delusions of grandeur are, of course, explained as narcissistic exhibitions against which no criticism is apparent. The delusions of persecution are held to be the outcome of homosexuality, unconscious or, sometimes, conscious. The patient has an attachment to one of the same sex, which is repressed. This repressed libido is then transformed in fear and hate of the object or a surrogate of the object. Freud claims that the enemy of the delusional system was always the most loved person in his life. This theory has been repeatedly published by psychoanalysts, each time accompanied by the his-

tories of one or of very few selected cases. No one has, to my knowledge, ever confirmed the validity of this hypothesis by careful examination of a large series of unselected cases. Since the material is copious and available in any hospital for mental cases this neglect seems suspicious. In my experience, cases like those of the authors mentioned are not uncommon but more usually the clinical facts refuse to fit the theory. If this observation be correct, there must either be more than one type of paranoid mechanism or else a new formula must be discovered to cover all types.

CHAPTER VII

DEPRESSION

Another psychosis that shows a family resemblance to the schizophrenic group is *depression*. Freud has new light¹ on this reaction, which unfortunately he calls "melancholia," a term usually reserved by psychiatrists for a form of insanity characterized more by anxiety than sadness and occurring mainly in the involution period. His argument is as follows:

Grief and depression have in common a painful mood and a discontinuance of interest in the outer world. The latter comes from a loss of capacity to love and a secondary inhibition of effort. In addition to these features, depression shows a lowering of self-esteem, and self-reproaches even to the extent of imaginary punishment. In grief the loss is felt to be outside the sufferer but the depressed patient feels himself to be depleted. In grief there is love of a real object and efforts are made (mourning) to recall it in memory and fantasy. The precipitating cause of depression, on the other hand, is the loss of an object not necessarily by death but more often by disillusionment (e.g., abandonment by a lover). While the deprivation is invariably a conscious

¹ In his paper, "Trauer und Melancholie."

matter in grief, it may be wholly unconscious in the analogous psychosis. The self-reproaches, too, which are so prominent in this morbid condition are not occasioned by a feeling of shame as they would be were they consciously determined. The patients show neither shame nor contrition before others, so that the judgment is entirely subjective. Further, the disgrace they feel is not the product of any change in their nature that they can record, for they say that they have always been that way. (Freud claims too much here. A complaint of both moral and physical change is quite common in depression.)

If this problem is to be solved by analogy some adequate internal loss must be discovered, resembling the real occasion for grief. His theory is that there is a change and loss in the ego. Careful observations show, he says, that reproaches do not always fit the patient but that they frequently do (with slight modifications) apply to some one who is, or was, or ought to be, loved by the patient. The complaints appropriate to another are directed against the ego. Justified self-reproaches are mixed in, in order to hide the real nature and origin of the accusations. Their behavior confirms this view for these patients are irritable and talk as if they had grievances, etc. (Not always, by any means!)

The mechanism he then outlines. A real loss or disillusionment breaks up an object attachment. The libido thus freed is not applied to another object but withdrawn from the outer world. In the meantime there has been an unconscious identification effected between the ego and the object. The

withdrawn libido is attached to this new identification and becomes the target for criticism, hence the self-blame. The loss of object is thus transmitted into loss of ego and the conflict between the ego and the love object is changed into a split between the ego-critic (conscience) and that part of the ego modified by identification. The self-reproach is further explained. The loss of a loved one is a frequent cause for liberation of the ambivalent, love-hate, tendency (e.g., in compulsion neuroses). This ambivalence is now directed towards the identification ego. This also explains suicide in depressions. Freud says that such ideas are a common reflection of murderous, unconscious thoughts but they are normally inhibited by the tremendous self-love which most of us enjoy. In depression, however, the impulse may succeed because the object of hate is identified with self, so that what is consciously suicide is murder unconsciously.

This narcissism is a regression to a stage where there is a wish for identification by physical incorporation. This may be expressed by eating. Hence Freud suggests that depression may represent a regression to the oral phase of libido development. He admits there is insufficient evidence for this and offers none except the citation of Abraham's hypothesis that refusal of food in depression may be a reaction to this. Another symptom, the fear of poverty, is dismissed without argument as an outcome of a regression to anal erotism.¹

¹See Chapter 15 for discussion of the relationship between anal erotism and poverty ideas.

The depression complex draws energy to it from all sides and so impoverishes the ego. (What component of the ego does he mean?) The patients cannot even sleep, for a primary part of this process according to Freud is a withdrawal of energy in service of the ego's wish to sleep (*vide infra*). A problem, he admits, is raised by the phenomenon of improvement of symptoms toward evening. He thinks this cannot be psychogenic and must be caused by somatic factors.

This introduces another question. It might be possible to view the symptoms of depression as an outcome of physical disease which depleted the ego-libido. But many cases switch over into mania. These very cases have often been cured by psychoanalysis, so that they must be psychogenic reactions. This leads to a discussion of the psychology of mania as an extension of his depression theory. Great happiness and activity in real life come when obstacles are suddenly overcome. In alcoholic excitement there seems to be a toxic overthrowing of resistance. Therefore, he thinks, there may be a freedom in mania from an object that is intolerable. The energy, that in depression is turned back on the ego, is now free for expression.

This is a most ingenious theory of depression and a creditable bit of speculation, just as speculation pure and simple. Unfortunately it does not fit the facts. In the first place loss, real or unconscious, is not the invariable precipitating cause of depression. This statement may be too strong, for one cannot deny that unconscious loss of an object might be

present, although there is no reason to suppose that it is. But, at best, such an unconscious factor is an inference and one cannot find a theory on inferences made *ad hoc*. Secondly this work (like that of Abraham's which preceded it) is based on a small number of cases of a type, which extra-mural physicians are apt to see frequently, but which is clinically impure. These are what psychiatrists term "reactive depressions" to signify that they occur as reactions to definite situations. Clinically, they seem to be mixtures of normal grief (exaggerated) and the symptoms of pure, retarded depression. Such a mixed psychosis should not be taken for an initial study unless it be first analyzed into its elements. Freud also uses symptoms, such as irritability and airing of grievances, as a basis for arguments that would be valid if these symptoms were invariable. They are not.

One wonders why it is necessary to introduce the "oral complex." It is not needed and it explains nothing. Refusal of food is not a more striking symptom than countless other failures to respond to stimuli normally pleasurable. It would be just as logical to say that the inactivity was a reaction against regression to muscle erotism, etc. There is here, however, another criticism to be made. As Freud pointed out at the very beginning of his "Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie," libido and object are one thing and specific impulse (*Trieb*) and goal are another. Libido is directed towards an object as a generality. This may be expressed in a number of ways any one of which is a specific im-

pulse (oral, anal, genital, etc.) to a specific physical goal. Since his whole argument is based on libido and its choice of object, the introduction of a specific impulse is merely confusing and gives a false impression of the analysis being carried to minutiae of universal application. It is interesting that extensive experience with manic-depressive insanity seems to indicate that the specific impulse is a matter of no pathogenic consequence, being in this respect in marked contrast to such neuroses as hysteria when its influence seems to be supreme in direct determination of symptoms.

The remarks about sleep are unfortunate. Insomnia is not an essential symptom of depression. On the other hand a frequent event is the aggravation of symptoms following a good night's sleep, which would argue directly against Freud's claim. A still more unfortunate remark concerns the improvement towards night, which he thinks must have some somatic cause. It is strange that Freud does not know that this is a diagnostic point of some importance in the discrimination of organic and functional disease, for it is of much wider application than in depressions alone. When somatic disease is a prominent factor in the production of subjective, "nervous" symptoms, these invariably grow worse as fatigue increases during the day. The reverse is true in functional states. The latter is, probably, an exquisitely psychogenic reaction, for it seems to be a lifting of the introversion tendency as reality repeats and reiterates its demands for attention to it on the part of the patient.

The failure of this theory is most acute in respect to the correlation of psychopathological principles with the facts of prognosis. Any analysis is meaningless which cannot explain the outcome of a psychosis or, at least, be correlated with it. Dementia præcox, Freud says, has a bad prognosis because it is a narcissistic regression. His depression mechanism is a more perfect narcissism. Yet the patients always recover. Although he does not give utterance to this dilemma the problem of prognosis worries him. Recovery from normal grief he finds to be due to an ameliorating process inherent in its symptoms. Each thought of the lost loved one brings to mind the fact that the subject is still alive; gradually the satisfaction of continued existence compensates the ego for its loss and grief is ended. In depression he thinks there may be a similar outcome. He sees two possibilities. First, rage at the original object may wear itself out. This seems to be a fairly tautological explanation. Secondly, the object may be abandoned as worthless. If this second possibility be not also tautological it involves us in further difficulty. Since the struggle is all in the unconscious, when judgment does not operate, it is hard to see how this conclusion could be reached. If the object and the ego are identified in the unconscious, what influence is there, in that part of the mind, which could separate them again?

As to his theory of mania, Freud puts this out as a mere suggestion and says it introduces doubtful points and questions which can't be answered. Under the circumstances, it seems unfair to criticize it.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ACTUAL NEUROSIS

These psychoses comprise what Freud terms the narcissistic psychoneuroses. His psychopathology includes two other groups, the transference psychoneuroses (conversion hysteria, anxiety hysteria and compulsion neurosis) and the "actual" neuroses ("neurasthenia," anxiety neurosis and hypochondria).

In his recent publications Freud has brought forward nothing that is essentially new about the specific determination of symptoms in the "transference" neuroses. This is his special field, his clinical experience is enormous therein, and it is, therefore, unlikely that he has made any significant errors in his discussion of the immediate pathogenesis of these conditions. The problem of the underlying conflict is a more general one, one to be solved by inference and by observation in other fields. This second problem provides the subject matter for his generalizations as a whole, and hence has already been treated rather fully. Only one important field remains untreated, namely the psychology of emotions, which will be taken up presently. We need not tarry longer, therefore, with the transference neuroses, except to remind the reader that this is

the group of cases which are most available for psychoanalytic treatment because the symptoms seem to be determined essentially by psychic mechanisms and the diseases occur in individuals of a certain mental elasticity which is exemplified in their capacity to transfer libido to the physician—the medium, it is held, of cure.

The problem with the “actual” neuroses is claimed by Freud to be of a different nature. The symptoms, after exclusion of unessential, subjective phenomena, are physical and the result of toxins. One might, therefore, be surprised at their being considered at all. There are, however, two reasons for their inclusion in his classification and discussion. The first is historical: these diseases were formerly always grouped with those pathological states which Freud and other psychopathologists have now isolated as psychogenic. The second is theoretical: just as there are parallels between the symptomatology of these organic and functional conditions, so Freud finds a parallel between the physiological pathology of the actual neuroses and the psychological pathology of the psychoneuroses.

True neurasthenia is characterized by fatigue, a feeling of pressure in the head, “weakness” and “sensations” in the back, “indigestion” and constipation. It is supposed to result from undue loss of semen in masturbation or emissions. In the anxiety neurosis there is an overwhelming fear, which is to be psychically explained, while the physical symptoms of dizziness, palpitation, precordial pain,

sweating, dilation of the pupils, etc., are claimed by Freud to be the work of toxins sexual in origin which were produced as the result of sexual stimulation without sufficient sexual outlet. They are all related to the physical manifestations of fear. That physical factors participate in the production of these symptoms is certain, but whether they are primary or not (as they should be if Freud's classification stands) is another matter. Something physical happens when we blush, yet blushing may be a psychoneurotic symptom. The practical criterion for Freudians as to whether a condition be somatic or psychic in origin is its behavior under analysis. In this respect it is interesting to note that Freud and his followers have, during the course of the last twelve or fifteen years, steadily narrowed the boundaries of these two groups. In other words, with increased skill in treatment, fewer cases have been thought to be true neurasthenia or anxiety neurosis. There is not one of the symptoms held to be classical, that frequent experience does not demonstrate as psychogenic—that is, if removal by psychic treatment is to be taken as proof.

Originally true neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis were the only "actual" neuroses. More recently Freud has added hypochondria. He thinks, apparently, that some kind of physical disease is present in these cases which occasions the painful feelings of which the patient complains. In the dyspeptic group there can be no doubt but that enteroptosis, disorders of gastric secretion and changes in motility are objectively demonstrable. Of course the

latter two, at least, can result from purely mental influences but Freud, presumably, makes hypochondria an actual neurosis because specific ideas or impulses are not demonstrated to be translated directly into the physical symptoms as in conversion hysteria. The most noteworthy thing clinically is the mental attitude of the hypochondriac. This is held to be a narcissistic regression. Libido is withdrawn from the outer world and placed on the organ affected. (As suggested above, this is more like auto-erotism than narcissism so far as the specific location of the libido to part of the body rather than to the personality is concerned.)

Freud suggests that functional changes in the organs involved may be the direct result of this focusing of the libido. He compares the change to that of erection in the genitals and assumes that other organs may have erectile capacity, so that viscera might become swollen and tender as a result of local, libidinous excitation. It is probable that few physiologists will have much sympathy with this bizarre hypothesis. There is no problem in all medicine that is of greater importance or that presents greater theoretic difficulty. The mental attitude of the hypochondriac is unquestionably the most important feature of the disease. The question is, does this attitude lead to a recognition of physical anomalies that would otherwise be ignored (certainly this is sometimes true); does the attitude increase the abnormality; or does it actually produce it? Quite possibly all three may operate in different cases or in different stages in the same patient.

In view of the absence of any really thoroughgoing analysis of a large amount of this material both from the mental and physical angles, it is premature to place these cases in any one definite group as Freud has done. Some symptoms, which seem typically hypochondriacal, are found to have specific psychogenic determination, e. g., constipation. Again, we find all kinds of wild physiological perversities disappear after a psychoanalysis apparently because there is an endocrine readjustment consequent on the establishment of mental poise. As an example of this I might mention one of my patients in whom menstrual difficulties ceased following analysis, although they were never even mentioned during the course of treatment. It is not at all impossible that in a few years this "hypochondria" group of Freud will shrink as have the other conditions which he terms actual neuroses.

The suspicion cannot be escaped in viewing the "actual" neuroses as a whole that a certain wish-fulfillment lies back of this classification. The first responsibility of every physician—particularly if he be a psychoanalyst—is cure. All these cases are extremely difficult to treat. In so far as they have physical symptoms, resistance raised during psychoanalysis, hides behind these symptoms immune from attack. May not the analyst also use them as a defense against the charge of failure? Whether this suspicion be justified or not, it seems certain, at least, that this classification, in making which Freud confessedly turns the problem over to the biochemists, will not result in any stimulus to more thorough

knowledge of whatever mental factors may operate in the production of these conditions.

Before leaving the psychoneuroses one problem should be mentioned. Freud brings to our attention a most interesting point. He shows that although all kinds of mental complexes and traumata may be found to have produced symptoms in such a disease as conversion hysteria, the range of symptoms is small and stereotyped. He admits that he has no explanation to offer. It may be that Rivers' work, which we shall soon discuss, may throw some light on this. Freud is willing to consider the possibility of inheritance of primal, unconscious fantasies. Is it not more possible that the hysterical symptoms may be racial, as patterns of reaction, so to speak? If so, River's theories would go a long way towards clearing up this mystery.

CHAPTER IX

EMOTIONS

Our next problem is that of *emotions*. All psychologists agree as to there being some relationship between instincts and emotions, although they may differ as to the closeness and the mechanism of that relation. Since psychoanalysis deals with instincts so intimately, one would expect that Freud might throw some light on the nature of emotions in general and the ontogeny of some of them in particular.

He gives us only one general statement about the structure of emotions. They are complex affairs, he says. First there are "indefinite motor innervations or discharges"; secondly perceptions of two orders, of the efferent impulses just mentioned and pleasurable or painful sensations which supply the "feeling-tone" of the emotion, the *affect*. We are certainly in agreement with him as to the necessity of considering the feeling-tone as an entity separate from the perception of bodily changes, in other words, we agree with his judgment of the James-Lange theory as inadequate. Quite properly Freud is dissatisfied with this analysis as a solution of the problem for it says nothing about the origin of these reactions. Hysteria, however, he says, shows us

similar phenomena and the study of hysterical attacks demonstrates them to be reminiscences, that is, memories of some original event activated to the point of dramatic reproduction. He therefore concludes that their mechanisms are the same; in one case (that of the emotions) the original experience is a universal one, which may belong to the antecedent history of the species rather than to the individual (hysteria). This seems to be a contribution to the pathology of hysteria rather than to the psychology of emotions, for this is precisely the theory of emotions usually known by the names of Shand and McDougall. A recurrent reaction which originally had a biological significance and represented response to a definite typical situation is an instinct. Freud arrives then (in effect) at the not too novel conclusion that emotions are parts of instinctive reactions. These are his only generalizations.

As to the analysis or origin of the different emotions or emotional reactions, Freud at no place attempts any catalogue of them. One must pick out his observations as they occur. In an early "Liebesleben" paper¹ he differentiated the components of *love* into what may be termed passion and tenderness. The former is associated with genital sexuality, the latter with the innumerable impulses for extra-genital physical contact which Freud calls the infantile sexual impulses. If one regards this as representing the union of the mating

¹ Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens, *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, Bd. IV,

impulse with the type of attachment existing between parent and child, we are supplied with an excellent biological standpoint for the understanding of one of the most important problems in psychology or psychopathology. In this contribution Freud showed a marvelous breadth of view and it must be regretted that he never continued his researches and speculations along this most fruitful line.

His analysis of *grief* has been discussed above in reference to the psychology of *depression*. Only one comment need, therefore, be made at this point. The comparison of "normal" and "abnormal" reactions is an excellent method for the study of either, provided it is properly employed. That is the phenomena explicable in one condition should be utilized to illuminate obscurities in the other, but mere familiarity with the features of one reaction should not be taken as equivalent to complete understanding of all its details, else false assumptions may be made or the method fail of its potential usefulness. Freud notes that in grief there is no attention given to the outer world and no activities indulged which are not connected with memories of the lost loved one. This, he says, is a restriction of the ego to an exclusive devotion to mourning. It is "not pathological, because we know well how to explain it." But do we? It may be familiar but it is not explained by anything Freud says as his remarks on this point are merely descriptive. Why should the object engross so much more attention when consciousness recognizes that it has left

the real world? Study of the analogous pathological state might reveal the reason. He shows that in depression there is regression and identification. May not the same process occur in normal grief? The steps then would be: first the loss which transforms the loved one from a real object to one of fantasy, then unconscious identification of the fantastic object with earlier and more fundamental objects. The loss would thus result in a transference of the libido from the real object to those earlier relationships from which object love originated and which continue throughout life to furnish the unconscious energy for all objectivity. In other words object libido would return to its source. No matter whether Freud be correct or not in his formulation of this particular type of regression and identification in depression, the demonstration of *any* regression would make the above argument valid. Failure to use this comparative method thoroughly has led Freud into difficulties. His hypotheses account for self-reproach, suicide and irritability but leave the retardation (a cardinal symptom) unexplained. Regarding the inhibition of grief as normal, he is forced to say that the analogous, and much severer, symptom in depression is part of the grief reaction and he cannot understand why it should be so much more intense. The greater thoroughness of the psychotic reaction would explain this.

We have refrained from any discussion of *mania* for the reasons stated above. As Freud makes no discrimination between the various moods found in

such states, no claim could be made of his having elucidated the psychology of these affects.

It is an interesting thing that all psychologists and psychopathologists seem to discuss emotions in general from the standpoint of their study of *fear*. It is taken as a paradigm and any phenomenon of the fear reaction is presumed to have its analogue in any other emotion. Hence we find that, in practice, all generalizations in affect psychology are a mere translation of the observations or speculations concerning fear. For instance, would the James-Lange theory ever have arisen without knowledge of the physical manifestations of terror? Freud is no exception to this rule, in fact the analogy between hysteria and emotions cited above is confessedly an analogy between hysterical and anxiety attacks. This is, of course, a most dangerous method and is practiced perhaps only because it is so tempting. Fear is certainly more available for subjective or objective examination than any other emotion. Its evidences are usually manifest and can be observed even in the physiological laboratory. In time of war, at least, it has great social importance. We all know it, it comes dramatically to interrupt the even tenor of our way; we even know neurotic fear, be it only in the form of nightmares; most important of all we can recognize and name it when it comes. There is nothing subtle or intangible in a fright, we know we are frightened. Finally it is the commonest of all morbid emotions. It is important to bear in mind these reasons for its prominence for they throw light occasionally on the true origin and mean-

ing of what is said about fear. If other writers have used it as a paradigm in studying emotions in general, Freud makes it, in a certain sense, the center of all his psychopathology. A careful scrutiny of his writings on this subject would therefore be justified.

As has been mentioned above, Freud regards emotions in general as representing dramatized memories, the subject living through old experiences. This view, he says, is based on our knowledge of anxiety. When we look to find what initial experience is reproduced in fear, a surprise awaits us. He offers us not clinical observations but a wild speculation, to which he was led, he tells us, by the words of an ignorant midwife! The initial experience is birth. It were best to quote his own words: "It is the act of birth by which that grouping of unpleasant feelings, discharges and body-sensations comes about, which has become the prototype for the operation of a danger to life and since then has been repeated by us as a state of anxiety. The enormous increase in irritability through the interruption of internal respiration was then the cause of the experience of anxiety. The first anxiety was, therefore, toxic. The name anxiety—*angustiae*, constriction—accentuates the characteristic of constriction in breathing, which was then present as the result of the real situation and today is reproduced almost regularly in the affect. We also recognize the significance of this first anxiety state originating in a separation from the mother."

Preposterous as this notion is, it should, perhaps,

be criticized. The last remark refers, presumably, to the psychic trauma of the act of birth. As Freud says himself, one cannot speak of emotions except in consciousness. No child either during or immediately after birth has a kind of consciousness that could gauge the meaning of this separation or feel emotionally about it. If the newborn infant has any consciousness at all, it must be of an entirely different order from that of adult life and of which Freud speaks in all other instances. On the physiological side the analogy is quite as faulty. There is no contraction of the chest during birth—it never has been expanded. If there were any chest sensations to be repeated they would be of expansion, for after birth the lungs are inflated for the first time. On the other hand, if perceptions there be, the most prominent one would certainly be that of constriction of the head. This is a rare feature of anxiety.

It may be well to comment, parenthetically, on the type of error of which this speculation is an example. An idea may have dynamic force although it may have no foundation in fact. It then has a certain psychic reality. Unquestionably mythology, delusions and dreams are replete with examples of birth experiences, many of them cast in terrifying form, but this does not imply actual memory of the event. For various reasons birth fascinates people; its actual repetition would fill the mind of any sentient being with terror. From these two elements, unconscious ideas of painful birth are produced and these may have psychic reality without being memories at all. Fear of the devil has seemed very real

to many people but the modern man of science does not regard this as proof of the existence of an actual devil. Freud has gotten away from much of this tendency to confuse psychic and objective reality, in his recognition of the frequency with which infantile sex traumata are pure fantasies. This uncritical habit still persists, however, in psychoanalytic literature and gives some show of justification to those critics who assail psychoanalysis as mysticism.

With the exception of this unfortunate speculation, Freud's arguments about fear are based on actual observations or deductions from observations. He uses three sources: fear in the presence of real danger, fear as observed in nervous patients and the fears of children.

He deals briefly with what he calls *real fear* as opposed to *neurotic fear*. He says that in the presence of actual peril fear appears before flight and is, probably, a preparation for the latter. When action is taken fear disappears. He thinks this real fear must be regarded as an exhibition of the self-preservation instinct, i. e., as an ego reaction. Later, as we shall see, he modifies this view. It is important to note, as Freud does, that with real fear something occasions it. There is fear of *something*. He thinks there must always be some object for this emotion.

One of Freud's earliest contributions to psychopathology was his separation of the anxiety neuroses. Conditions where fear was represented directly as nameless terror or in physical symptoms,

he claimed to find as a sequel to sexual abstinence or frustrated attempts at relief of sexual excitement. His views as to the all-importance of inadequate outlet in the direct physiological sense have undergone modification so that he now sees the problem much more in the light of disposal of psychic energy. Nevertheless his original view of the origin of the fear is still maintained: frustrated libido is turned into fear. He does not mean libido in the sense of an unconscious source of energy but conscious libidinous desire. He points out that many people achieve continence without anxiety but that those who have most desire are most apt to develop anxiety and that then the desire disappears. Further, anxiety is most likely to occur at those periods of life when sex is physiologically accentuated, such as at puberty and at the menopause. A characteristic of the fear thus produced is that it is vague, not focused on any given object or idea. There is a general dread which leads the patient to be anxious about everything. For this form of anxiety, Freud uses the term "free-floating fear."

The notion of libido turning into fear is, of course, one that jars one's prepossessions about emotions. It is difficult if not impossible to think of an emotion existing except as a reaction to some situation. It is like trying to think of heat as a substance rather than as a result of chemical or physical action. One would therefore be chary of accepting such a theory unless it were supported by much direct and contributory evidence. The idea of libido providing the fundamental energy for an emotional reaction

is, of course, another matter. It is not theoretically unlikely. Perchance it might be possible to explain the relationship of libido to fear in another than the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* one. In such cases as I have had an opportunity of examining when this sequence was to be observed, the libido was always pathological and already or soon felt to be such by the patient. After analysis they experienced no more than a normal sex desire. In such cases one could regard the marked libido and anxiety as consecutive phases in the development of the neurosis. One should note in passing that free-floating anxiety assumes an absence of any object or idea towards which the patient reacts specifically with fear. Other psychopathologists cannot confirm the experience of psychoanalysts in this respect for they always find the fear attached to some conscious or unconscious object. It is inconsistent, too, with Freud's own view that there is always something to be afraid of.

He proceeds by describing the phobias which occur in a clinically entirely different condition, namely anxiety hysteria. Here there may be no unfocused fear, no mental discomfort whatever except when the patient is confronted with some object or situation which invariably arouses a violent reaction of terror. This is known as a phobia. The reaction may sometimes have some shadow of reasonableness, as when the fear is of something which might be dangerous but the general character of the phobia is that the stimulation is either quite innocuous in reality—for instance a fear of open

places—or that the response is quite disproportionate to the chances of accident, as in a fear that a bridge will give way while crossing it. But in hysteria vague fear may also appear, usually attached to any chance object. This latter fear Freud has analyzed and finds it to originate from the repression of an idea united with an emotion (of any kind). The emotion reappears as anxiety. Somehow or other, then, if any kind of an emotion is repressed, it can only reappear as fear. His next point is that in compulsion neurosis the patients are singularly devoid of fear except when the carrying out of their compulsive acts is interfered with. From this he makes an important deduction, that the symptoms in this disease (and, presumably, in hysteria as well) are developed in order to prevent the appearance of fear, for which they are substitutes. This makes anxiety occupy the center of the stage in psychoneuroses.

The next point is to correlate neurotic fear with real fear where some truly fearful object is the stimulus to the reaction. This may be done, he thinks by falling back on the old conception of ego versus libido. The ego may be afraid of the libido, may have good grounds for regarding it as dangerous. The various psychoneurotic symptoms may then be looked on as measures of defense. Apparently he feels the insecurity of this anthropomorphic formulation, for he admits that the libido belongs to the individual and therefore cannot confront him as an external force. How the mechanism of what he describes in these terms is carried out, he thinks

may be found in the observation of childish fears and the analysis of phobias.

So he describes the fears of childhood or, rather, interprets them. He says they occur when the child longs for the presence of the loved mother (reminiscence of birth separation!), in the presence of strangers who are not the mother, etc. In these situations the unsatisfied libido is turned into fear for it cannot be held suspended as in adult life. On the other hand children do not seem to be as apprehensive of really dangerous situations as they should be. Consequently the terrors of children are of the neurotic type rather than examples of real fear. He discusses the Adler theories of inferiority and denies flatly that children fear strangers, strange situations, etc., because of a feeling of inadequacy but insists that they fear them because being adjusted to those they love, they cannot apply their libido to new objects. He says that he substitutes observations for mere hypotheses. As a matter of fact both the inferiority and libido constructions are hypotheses to account for observations. (The only observations are, that many children are frightened in the presence of the strange, the unknown, the dark, etc. One cannot "observe" libido, either in operation or in abeyance. Further, one should add, these terms are not alternatives. One may be more suitable to account for one fear phenomenon, another in another, and, often, they might both operate, supplementing one another.)

The analysis of phobias shows that they are, fundamentally, repetitions of the infantile phobias,

the difference being that there is not a direct and immediate transmutation of libido into fear in the adult. Unemployed libido produces emotional complexes of various kinds, these are repressed and in the unconscious the infantile phobias are reawakened and return to consciousness. At this point Freud elaborates again his statement about any emotion attached to a repressed idea reappearing as anxiety. In this instance, however, the fear appears because the repressed emotional complex has led to a regression to an infantile phobia, rather than the emotion having changed directly into fear as a result of repression, which is the mechanism of production of free-floating anxiety.

There is an incompleteness about this outline. Freud says the adult has learned to maintain unemployed libido in suspension, so that it is not converted into fear directly as in infancy. Repression first affects emotional complexes of which this libido is a part. Now this implies that the unemployed libido did turn immediately into some kind of emotion, although not fear. Since Freud uses fear as the paradigm for the understanding of all emotions, he has no right to take for granted a direct transmutation of libido into emotion, even though the emotion be not fear. This transmutation is the very problem he has just set himself to study. A second point is this: Freud describes precisely the same etiology and initial mechanism for free-floating anxiety as it occurs in hysteria and for the phobias. Unemployed libido produces various emotionally toned ideas which are repressed and the emotions

then turn into fear. In the case of the phobias there is a resurrection of infantile phobia. One naturally asks why the regression goes to the infantile phobias in one case and not in the other. The answer might be that in the former condition there have been phobias in childhood which have facilitated that reaction. But we know as a matter of experience that neurotics give a history of infantile phobias almost universally. This may be too refined a criticism, since it is beyond our present knowledge to state with definiteness the reason for one form of morbid reaction appearing rather than another. But the point is that Freud uses the analysis of adult phobias to explain how libido can be an object of fear for the ego and adduces therefrom nothing that is really new. In fact immediately after this discussion he says, as it were a conclusion of the argument: "I said that the transformation into fear, or rather a discharge in the form of fear, is the immediate fate of the repressed libido." This is precisely what he started out with. This gives no explanation of why the ego should be afraid of libido as of something objective. This could occur only if the patient were analyzed and knew the mechanisms involved and hence recognized that the misused or unused libido were responsible for the final appearance of the fear.

To recapitulate Freud's generalizations: *In anxiety neurosis there is a physiological transformation of libido into fear; in infancy the same thing takes place on the psychological level. In hysteria either free-floating anxiety or specific phobias result*

from the repression of emotions which reappear as fear. In real fear the ego reacts to real danger; in neurotic fear the ego fears the libido. The transformation of libido into fear is "explained" only in one instance (the case of phobias, where the assumption is made of libido being already changed into emotions) in other cases it is stated as a fact, which we have seen is open to dispute. The statement, that any repressed idea accompanied by an affect leads invariably to a reappearance of the affect in the form of fear, may also be questioned. We are constantly repressing such emotionally toned ideas. The normal fate is the reappearance of their affects in not unpleasant form, else every civilized person would be subject to anxiety. Every analyst has seen numerous examples of this reappearance of complexes in tolerable emotions. That is, so to speak, what psychoanalytic cure consists in.

The final conclusions are: the ego is afraid of the libido and the libido turns into fear. This inconsistency, making fear originate now from the libido, again from the ego, Freud leaves unexplained in his lecture on anxiety. Later, however, in his discussion of ego-libido he returns to this difficulty. He points out that real fear does not seem to be a libido activity as do neurotic fears. This dilemma might be escaped by assuming that ego interests (self-preservation instinct) may lead in actual danger only to adaptive action, while the ego libido may supply the fear. In support of this view he claims that we do not fly because we fear but that danger leads first to fear and then to flight.

Before accepting this hypothesis we should see how it would apply to the two conditions of real and neurotic fear. First as to real fear: Freud claims that libido manufactures fear when it is denied outlet but he does not explain how this happens in the presence of actual danger. We might assume, perhaps, that he thinks the ego sees the narcissistic object threatened, but even this comes back to a fundamental ego fear reaction. It seems impossible to get away from the otherwise universally admitted view that the emotion of fear is a reaction connected with the instinct of self-preservation. The problem becomes more intricate if an attempt be made to apply the hypothesis to neurotic fear. Freud has already said that the relationship to real fear is established by assuming that the ego regards the libido (object libido) as a danger. The ego-libido would then supply the fear—how? The narcissistic object cannot be threatened because the offending object libido is regressive and weakened rather than aggressive. If, however, we imagine (which Freud never suggests) that this cutting off of object libido from real application leads it to attack the ego-libido (a terribly anthropomorphic formulation), then we are confronted with the old dilemma of libido being antagonistic to libido. For ego-libido to be inimical to object libido it must have changed its essential nature when it was derived from the latter (the view of libido being merely "energy" being repudiated by Freud). If it be different the difference must lie in its combination with ego interests. If it be not different (the difference being inherent only in the

object, i. e., self or outer world) then libido is not specific in its nature but a general source of energy as assumed by Jung. So again we return to the same conclusion that to get fear, the instinct of self-preservation must operate. Freud's attempt to pan-sexualize emotions fails.

Yet it is probably unfair to make this ambition the sole determinant of the futile intricacies of Freud's argument. His immediate task is the solution of clinical problems. The phenomena which are assembled under the interpretative heading of "cutting-off of the libido" do lead to the "fear," which he attempts to explain. But is it fear? No attempt is made to analyze and accurately describe the emotion. Frequently real fear may be present but in general, it were more accurate to say that an unpleasant affect is present. As has been stated above, fear is an easily comprehended and universally experienced emotion and, in consequence, is often used carelessly to designate any unpleasant affective state in which there is a prospective unpleasantness. Examples from common speech may illustrate this. If I say "I'm afraid it will rain today," I do not mean that I shall be terrorized by the rain when it comes. I am using the analogy of a strong, painful emotion to express the idea of rain making me unhappy. Freudians have made a good deal of the popular expression "I am anxious to do something" as an example of the relationship of libido to fear. It would be more accurate to say that this is an example of the relationship of unapplied libido to a painful emotion. "I am anxious

to" is equivalent to saying "I'll be disappointed if I don't." It is easier to recognize the poignant state of fear than the vague one of disappointment. Everyday speech is full of such hyperboles. If a girl says "I just love chocolates," would one take this as an instance of love being derived from nutritional impulses? The psychopathology of emotions will never be understood until accurate discriminations are made between the different affects and the phenomena studied which accompany each specific reaction.¹

Although unapplied libido leads directly to a peculiar and unpleasant state of tenseness from which varied distressful emotions are apt to emerge, it cannot be denied that a reaction of anxiety is peculiarly apt to appear. This is perhaps to be accounted for on the basis of the projection mechanism, which is the commonest unconscious escape from the *impasse*. Libidinous satisfaction not being gained by the direct efforts of the subject, the lack is made good by fantasies of others taking the initiative. These aggressions are readily symbolized by general bodily, in place of frankly sexual, attacks and the fear develops as a response to these active unconscious (or co-conscious?) fantasies of what would be actual dangers if enacted in real life.

¹ Freud is not the only psychopathologist who is guilty of this carelessness. In fact, it is rather universal. A good example of such looseness occurs in Prince's discussion of his famous "churchbell phobia." The description shows that a complicated emotional state was present in these attacks, in which depression probably outweighed true fear.

There is ample objective evidence of this to be found in the psychoses and inferences (in my experience) from the analysis of neurotic patients support the same view.

CHAPTER X

DREAMS

The next problem is that of *dreams*. Freud has summed up his latest views on this subject in his paper on "Metapsychological Additions to Dream-Science." *Metapsychology* is a new term he has coined for the viewing of mental phenomena from three standpoints. The first is the *topical*, i. e., whether the phenomenon is conscious, fore-conscious, unconscious or one that takes place in transition from one of these divisions to another. The second is the *dynamic*, under which heading he considers the source of the energy (*Besetzung* or libido) which actuates the phenomenon. The third is the *economic*, which is an attempt to gauge the relative strengths of the interacting forces. The first two standpoints have been represented in the abstract of Freud's present views on consciousness, fore-consciousness and the unconscious given above. At no place does he seem to elaborate or make any particular use of his third principle. This is perhaps natural, since it is difficult to see how any "dynamic" study can be made which does not of necessity include all the considerations of quantitative adjustment or balance that he puts into a separate compartment in his metapsychology. These

divisions do not seem to be happy ones but at least they serve one useful service. It is an attempt to clear up the confusion (particularly in the minds of those whose experience with psychoanalysis is purely literary) as to how such a word as "unconscious" can be used at different times to mean something out of awareness, something tabu, something primitive, infantile or instinctive, something that produces symptoms, and so on. When Freud discusses dreams metapsychologically, it means that he will consider both the localization and dynamics of the elements which enter into dream construction.

It may be said in introducing a digest of this work that Freud seems to have elaborated a most intricate structure in his dream theory, the complications of which are due more to the necessity of anastomosing this with other branches of his psychological system than to the urgency of unexplained phenomena. In other words he is not merely engaged in accounting for the details of actual dreams but finds himself obliged to hypothesize a development in the dream structure that can be described in terms of the psychic elements he has utilized in the study of the psychoneuroses.

We have noted above that Freud regards sleep as a regressive process consisting essentially in a withdrawal of object libido from the outer world and its conversion into pure narcissistic libido. This view has already been criticized. He begins his essay with a statement of the developmental regressions in sleep: (the ego, which during waking life

has learned to recognize reality falls back to the stage where hallucinations are acceptable, while the libido returns to the narcissistic phase. In connection with the latter he cites the so-called "diagnostic dreams" in which bodily disturbances are represented, which have not yet sufficiently developed to obtrude themselves on the waking consciousness. This he regards as a hypochondriacal tendency, an evidence of libido being withdrawn from the environment and placed on the body. This hypothesis will be criticized later. This regression is not a permanent reaction as in dementia præcox and so any stimulus which tends to produce a reaction of the waking type (motor response) is apt to waken the sleeper. Dreams exist to dispose of these stimuli, which may be either external (sensory impressions) or internal (thoughts which would incite to action).

In the dream appropriate actions to abolish the stimuli are hallucinated and so the dream is a guardian of sleep. When dreams are so vivid as to disturb sleep Freud says this is like the action of a watchman who wakes the inhabitants of a house to meet a band of marauders too powerful for him to cope with alone. The more important of the stimuli are the internal psychic ones. In his lectures Freud says, "These are unfulfilled wishes. The dreamer does not wish to withdraw interest from the world and therefore does not sleep. The dream disposes of the wish and is, therefore, a guardian of sleep." This argument rests on the unnecessary

assumption that sleep to be perfect must be free of mental content, free from all psychic activity.

An alternative view ought also to be considered, namely that we sleep in order to indulge in dreams, or rather, that we may enjoy another type of psychic activity. A good deal of evidence could be presented in favor of this hypothesis. On this basis we would accept such dreams as show plainly a response to external stimuli at their face value. For instance, if the telephone bell rings and I dream that I get up and answer it, we could say that I would rather dream of this action than actually perform it. Such a formulation as this is so close to Freud's as to be almost identical, yet its literal meaning when elaborated leads to an opposite viewpoint. As a matter of fact one hypothesis explains the known phenomena as well as the other; we have not sufficient evidence in this field on which to base conclusions. For instance sleep may consist in a raising of the threshold for sensory stimuli so that only supraliminal stimuli affect dreams, or, it may be that dreams (as Freud says) dispose of all stimuli except very strong ones in which case the threshold might be the same essentially as in the waking state. When such alternate hypotheses are at our disposal, choice is best made pragmatically. Let us see how workable is Freud's theory of dream construction.

He says that the most interesting and least transparent case of reaction to stimuli is that initiated by the "day-remnants" and from it he builds up the whole development of the dream. The day-remnants are experiences of the day before the sleep,

or of a slightly longer period of the recent past, which set up fore-conscious mental processes. These do not fall in with the general withdrawal of libido and are recognized during the procedure of psychoanalysis as the latent dream thoughts. The first problem is to discover the reason for their resistance to the general libido withdrawal. Freud thinks that this must be due to unconscious reinforcement, which may be effected in virtue of the weakened censorship between the fore-conscious and unconscious during sleep. But the unconscious is supposed to suffer from narcissistic regression like the conscious and fore-conscious. Freud therefore assumes that part of the unconscious has become independent of the ego, just as there is a corresponding modification of the censorship. The latter although weakened still operates to prevent too free expression of unconscious impulses. His formula therefore is: "The wish to sleep tries to draw back all the interests of the ego which have been externally expressed and establish an absolute narcissism. This can succeed only in part because the repressed material of the unconscious does not follow the wish to sleep. A part of the *Gegenbesetzung* must therefore be maintained and the censorship between unconscious and fore-conscious must remain although not in full strength. So far as the power of the ego extends, all its activities are deflated. The greater the amount of energy placed in the unconscious, the more easily is sleep disturbed." In extreme cases, dreams may be so terrific as to make

the subject afraid to go to sleep, i. e., abandon the wish to sleep.

One may remark parenthetically that this seems to be a complicated way of saying: The sleep process affects only consciously directed thinking; unconscious processes have relative freedom in sleep and may even disturb sleep. What this simpler statement omits is a nomenclature that adds nothing—so far—to an understanding of the dream problem as such.

In addition to the unconscious processes which do not fall under the sway of the ego's wish to sleep are the fore-conscious thoughts which Freud labels "day-remnants." Their resistance may be due to contact established during the day with the unconscious, or, before sleep withdrawal is complete these fragments may make contact in virtue of a weakened censorship. In either case the unconscious activities are expressed through the material of the fore-conscious day-remnants and thus the *dream wish* (wish-fulfillment fantasy) is formed. This last is not to be confused with the day-remnants; it did not exist before sleep and has the irrational character distinctive of unconscious processes. It should also not be confused with other wishes (Freud evidently means of the diurnal type) which may also be discovered in the fore-conscious dream thoughts. The fore-conscious wishes, when present, are merely overdeterminants of dream wishes.

Here again we believe the essential phenomena may be stated more simply: analysis shows that un-

conscious forces may utilize for their expression ideas or words remembered from the dream-day; these day-remnants may make contact with the unconscious before or during sleep; the wish-fulfillment fantasy thus formed is not a diurnal wish (although it may parallel one), nor yet is it a logical repetition of the day experiences. Two elements are here omitted, censorship and any mention of the fore-conscious. How can one speak of fore-consciousness during sleep? In terms of its definition in relation to its capacity of becoming conscious it should mean such thoughts as are present in the dreamer's mind and of which he could become aware if he willed. But direct examination of mental operations either subjectively or objectively is impossible during sleep. All we have to go on is the subject's *memory* of dreams. Freud might, conceivably, be referring to such parts of a dream as can be recalled only with effort. But there is nothing in the context to indicate this, which would involve most radical changes in his theories. Of course Freud might be referring to mental processes which have the qualities of fore-conscious thought. The futility of this discrimination has been discussed earlier in this criticism (p. 10). "Fore-consciousness" in dreams seems, therefore, to be an artificiality not related to dream phenomenology.

The inclusion of censorship seems also to be redundant. Elsewhere Freud makes censorship work like a one-way valve—it prevents the unconscious material from becoming conscious, but he gives no other indications (that I am aware of) of it working

in the other direction. The phenomena, too, with which he works do not suggest that movement in the other direction is hampered. It seems quite likely, on the contrary, that conscious thoughts are always available, either in diurnal or dream life, for unconscious elaboration. The unconscious seems always to be in contact with out conscious life. It is the reciprocal knowledge which is banned by the censorship. Consequently, it is not necessary to presume any abeyance of the censorship, when the day-remnants make contact with unconscious processes.

To proceed with Freud's argument. There are three possible fates for this dream wish (wish-fulfillment fantasy). 1. It may be expressed in consciousness as such, that is as delusions of wish-fulfillment, which never occurs in dreams. 2. It may reach direct motor expression. This is rare but does occur in somnambulisms. 3. Regression. This last is the usual process and involves the "dream-work," the discovery of which is probably one of Freud's most original and profoundly important discoveries.

The regression consists in the transformation of the fore-conscious representation of the dream wish into images (mainly visual) which are unconscious in type. This is regressive both as to type of thinking, verbal into hallucinatory, and as to development of thinking, for the hallucinatory is a primitive and original form of mentation. The end result of the regression is a dramatization of the dream wish. But this is not a simple matter. The first phase of

regression results in an activation of unconscious memories (infantile wishes). These suffer the "primary processes"¹ of condensation and displacement and thus the manifest content is produced. The manifest content becomes conscious in the form of hallucinations. The wish is fulfilled in the belief of the dreamer in its reality.

The mechanism by which hallucinations of dreams give a feeling of reality presents to Freud an important problem, which he attempts to solve by

¹Symbolism of which Freud does not write in this essay is a product of the "primary processes." He devoted one of his lectures to it, however. He there makes some disquieting statements. For instance, he says that symbols can often not be analyzed as they occur in patients' dreams but must be translated directly. He assumes the existence of a fundamental symbolic language which is inherited and unconscious. That this involves an acquiescence with one of Jung's fundamental claims will interest only those of polemical spirit. A much more important point should be considered. Is such an assumption justified? From a practical standpoint it is dangerous for it facilitates superficial "wild psychoanalysis." It also departs from the basic psychoanalytic principle of individual determinism of thoughts and symptoms. On page 161 he cites a dream of a peasant woman ignorant of psychoanalysis as an example of sexual symbols. The writer, after ten years' work at analysis, would hazard only one guess on reading it over, namely that each detail of the dream was an echo of some actual experience of the woman and that a significant interpretation could be secured only after hearing the dreamer's free associations to the various elements. This conclusion is the result of frequent disillusionment with the "translation" method. Many a dream has seemed transparent when first recited but its meaning turned out to be quite different as soon as the patient began his free associations. From a theoretic standpoint the validity of the universal-symbolic-language hypothesis should be regarded as premature and unsafe. The school of ethnologists headed by Rivers and Elliot Smith have, of recent years, directed serious arguments against it, backed by weighty evidence.

analogies from the psychoses. In Meynert's "Amentia" (frequently called "Toxic-Exhaustive Psychosis" in this country) he says that one gets simple daydream-like hallucinatory wish-fulfillments. Hallucinations probably constitute a primitive form of thinking but a highly unpractical one. Hence a method of proving reality develops in order to discriminate between inner and outer impressions. This is accomplished by muscular action. When a perception can be dissipated by motor activity it is recognized as real. This is a function of consciousness. In amentia the ego finds reality intolerable and withdraws from consciousness that activation (*Besetzung*) which has to do with the proving of reality. (Freud seems to treat amentia as a functional, psychogenic psychosis, although it is regarded by all schools of psychiatry as fundamentally organic in origin.) This is a psychotic "regression." In dreams it is performed voluntarily as part of the sleeping process. In dementia præcox hallucinations occur when the ego is so disintegrated that the faculty of proving reality is lost.

This is a most curious argument designed to prove that there is a disturbance of consciousness in dreams and amentia, although this can be demonstrated with facility by a wealth of clinical symptoms such as disorientation. This demonstration is so easy that it is taken for granted by all dreamers and by psychiatrists in so far as amentia is concerned. The argument is, therefore, superfluous. It is also tautological. In effect it is this: In these

conditions that which normally inhibits hallucination has disappeared. We know that it has gone because hallucinations occur. That the feeling of reality is tested purely by motor activity is a matter open to dispute. How could muscular action discriminate between memories of real and unreal events? Both are inner perceptions in Freud's terminology. I may recall that I was in a train yesterday, and feel that to be a real memory, and I can recall that I was in a submarine last night and feel that to be false, that I only dreamed it. Conversely, I can *know* that I have been on a train yet have the feeling of something unreal about the experience or I can *know* that I have been dreaming and yet dispel with difficulty the feeling of reality I have about the dream events. Muscular activity is unquestionably a factor in the testing of reality but the process is not so simple as that. At least one other factor (probably more) has to be considered, namely memory.

We may conclude discussion of Freud's dream psychology with a few general criticisms. His notion of narcissistic withdrawal of libido in sleep has been dealt with already. One other point may be added now. Hypochondria, he says, is a form of narcissistic satisfaction (*vide* "diagnostic" dreams above); in hypochondria this satisfaction is gained by perception of visceral stimuli. If the libido formulation held true, organic disturbances would increase the narcissistic tendency and hence favor sleep. Visceral pain would deepen sleep instead of abolishing it.

The most important general consideration is that of the nature of the material with which one deals. Freud seems to regard the manifest form of the dream as if it were a fixed and definite structure, the construction of which can be analyzed out into sharply definable elements. He looks on it as if it were a finished house; he can see the ambition of the owner, the taste of the architect, the craft of the contractor all working with so much lumber, nails, stone, mortar, and so on. But it must be borne in mind that the dream only takes on this aspect of immutability when it has been committed to writing or to memory. If one, during the waking-up period, forces his attention back to the experiences he has just been through, he finds that the memory of one image or set of images calls up another and another, some clear, some vague and elusive. When one is clearly focused in attention the others seem to slip out of consciousness in a most baffling way. The dreamer seems to be in a maze of moving-pictures, he feels that he has dreamed of thousands of things but to bring them all into his waking consciousness is an impossible task and that the effort is inexplicably difficult. Some items are chosen for concentrated attention, he holds them in mind as he achieves full waking consciousness. After some hours of diurnal activity, this memory may become clear and distinct; there is no longer that penumbra of elastic elaboration which it had when he first began to think of it. All this suggests that the final remembered dream is only a highly selected frag-

ment and that it attains definiteness only when this selection is complete.

Those who have practiced themselves in the art of introspection and retrospection during the period of morning drowsiness are aware of the fact that a richness of detail can often be secured which betrays the significance of the central data of the dream. Not infrequently free associations during analysis will resuscitate these details, which when secured may complete the analysis, up to a certain point.

An example may make this clearer. A patient dreamed of a house with an ash can in front of it—at least that was all that he could remember in the afternoon. He felt rather depressed and knew that his mood was connected somehow with the dream, “as if my hopes were buried in that ash can.” When asked to describe the house he said it was an ordinary New York brownstone front but his associations led quickly to a particular house in Boston. This was the home of an elderly friend of his to whom he had written only the day before. Then he recalled more of the dream. His friend had come out of the house carrying a piece of paper, which he crumpled up and threw into the ash can. The analysis was plain. The patient had counted much on the friendly reception by his friend of some proposals set forth in the letter. In the dream his plans were laid to rest with the garbage. Here we have condensation of the ideas with two meager images and displacement of the affect on to the ash can. But these mechanisms were not present in the dream but occurred in the repression of its memory.

This, however, was not the whole story. The patient then interjected (what the analyst had failed to observe) that ash cans do not stand in front of houses in the part of Boston where his friend lived. This location of refuse made the patient think of his boyhood's home and of an incident there. As a very small boy he found in an ash can, exactly so situated, a broken toy, covered with filth, of which he had been deprived as a matter of discipline some weeks before. Elaboration of memories connected with this period gave the dream a deeper and more tragic meaning. He had looked to his father for sympathy he had never been shown and from this had developed a yearning for friendship with men combined with hostility towards them which had gravely complicated his social and business life. Now no dream of that night was recalled which dramatized the infantile foundation of the finally remembered dream but that does not prove that it did not occur. In fact sufficiently rigorous effort during the period between deep sleep and fully awakened consciousness will usually reveal a number of dreams with pure infantile content. From this we may infer that the incomprehensibility of dreams is largely a matter of the selectivity of memory process by which continuity is established between the imaginary experiences of the night and the real ones of the day. It is more a matter of dream destruction than of "dream-work."

What, then, is the nature of the thinking in dreams as they actually occur? By direct observation we can study types of thought in the psychoses and in

analogous states artificially produced by hypnosis. These methods are truly objective. But mentation in normal sleep is never open to direct inspection and hence its laws must forever remain a matter of inference. Psychoanalysis may lead to invaluable and practical speculations but it can *prove* nothing. Our inferences may proceed from data derived at the two extremes of the period of sleep and they seem to lead to the same conclusion. When we compose ourselves for sleep we continue as a rule to think about the events or problems which have been occupying our attention throughout the day. Soon the connections between our thoughts begin to lose the logical sequence that is characteristic of diurnal, directed thinking. One may have a house in mind, then its bricks, their red color, a red flag, a bull, bull in a china shop, and so on. These are *free associations*.

It seems that this is a natural way to think which we normally inhibit in the waking state because it distracts our attention away from consideration of the immediate problem before us. When our minds "wander," we indulge in free associations. Freud and Jung have studied this process and have concluded that the random sequence, which is so obvious, is random only so far as it is obvious, that is, that each element in the train of thought is the conscious representation of an underlying thought or a series of thoughts which actuate the process although the subject may be unaware of this at the time. For instance the associations given above would become explicable if one more were added—

equally fortuitous from the standpoint of conscious logic. If the series ended with "social revolution" one can see the sequence as representing the fancies of an anarchist. The house is the home of the capitalist, which should be destroyed, then by gradual transitions come the ideas of the revolutionary flag and destruction of property.

This is *undirected thinking* and has two further characteristics of importance for our present problem. First, it occurs whenever one's supply of energy is low or its application is withdrawn from conscious effort (hence the "wandering" of thought in toxic delirium and idleness); second, it is closely associated with one's innate desires and interests (hence the intrusion of thoughts irrelevant to the immediate situation at times of emotional stress.) Since what we call the "unconscious" exhibits itself in mental disease and provides an explanation for mental operations of the emotional rather than of the intellectual order, it is surely safe to assume that unconscious thinking is of the free association type. It occurs as the first step in the change from diurnal to nocturnal thinking.

The next stage is that of hypnagogic hallucinations. In this the ideas—house, bricks, flag, etc.—are not thought of as abstractions but are actually visualized. This phase is, normally, brief or at least seems to be. Soon we are fast asleep. Naturally it is not easy to detect this kind of mental process without abolishing it. We can hallucinate easily enough (as in dreams) but to know that we are hallucinating requires a coincident recognition

of reality. When attention is turned from the visions to reality, the former are apt to cease. Hypnagogic hallucinations lead immediately over, therefore, into dreams. So soon as attention is given exclusively to the hallucinations, the environment excites no interest in the dreamer unless it applies an unusually strong stimulus. We can presume therefore that in dreams there is a continuation and enhancement of the free association process, each item of which is hallucinated.

We have already discussed the final product of nocturnal activity as it is presented to us in remembered dreams and concluded that these were only distorted selections of an almost endless riot of hallucinations. In the period of half-waking of which we have spoken, when it is possible with effort to recall many dreams, it may be observed that one dream or dream event calls up another or merges into it. The process seems to be the same essentially as that of free association and sometimes the associated memories become vivid, they turn to visions and the observer becomes a dreamer once more. He has gone asleep. But there is a great difference between the content of the hypnagogic associations or hallucinations and the remembered dream visions. The former are more or less like ordinary conscious thoughts having to do with commonplace objects and events and, moreover, the superficial sense connection between any two is more or less obvious. The latter, however, may be fantastic in extreme and the pictures succeed one another in an apparently lawless manner. This dif-

ference may give us some suggestion as to what had been happening during sleep.

The study of free associations as practiced during psychoanalytic treatment may throw some light on this inquiry. We find that latent unconscious ideas are nearest to open expression when the transition from one association to another is superficially senseless. So long as the connection is logically sound the critique of rationality which we normally impose on our thinking is operating to inhibit emotionally urgent but irrelevant thought. Examples may clarify this. If John Doe associates to the word "yellow" by the words "ochre, paint, linseed oil, flax, spinning, weaving, tapestry," etc., etc., any one can see the connection between the ideas expressed and they are not necessarily bound together by any emotional complex. But if he jumped from "yellow" to "Mary," he alone can explain the connection, which turns out to be that there were intermediate associations of "yellow dress and yellow dress of Mary," which passed so quickly through his mind that he gave no attention to them. If numerous other words lead to similar short-circuiting to "Mary," we presume that he has a "Mary complex" (or more correctly a "Mary sentiment" since his interest in and knowledge of her is conscious), i. e., a group of ideas about Mary that are cemented together by his interest in her. The mention of any word which represents one of her characteristics or an event with which she was connected will serve to recall Mary to John Doe's conscious attention. But he may also give a third type of association. The

word "yellow" may lead abruptly to Philadelphia, a jump which neither he nor his auditor can explain. The analyst presumes some connection, unconscious if not conscious, between these two ideas. His interest in Philadelphia is inquired into. After a few perfectly reasonable opinions about that city are uttered, he begins to think of the Philadelphia dog show. He is not interested in dogs except negatively; he dislikes them. Asked to visualize the show, he thinks of a big mastiff. Then comes a memory long absent from consciousness. When a little boy, visiting in Philadelphia, he was terrified by a big yellow mastiff, the origin, apparently, of his hatred for dogs. This important discovery might never have been made had it not been for the psychoanalyst's attention being directed to an extremely illogical association.

Similar conclusions may be reached more easily and directly by examining the speech of many cases of dementia præcox. When their speech is "scattered," there are many illogical jumps, which the patients themselves will often explain on request, for it is an essential peculiarity of this disease that, both as to content and type of thinking, unconscious mental processes are allowed relatively free expression. For instance a patient may say "He stuck his knife into the door and she had a baby." Ask him what knife is and he will say without hesitation "penis" and as unreservedly explain the door as "vagina." For him the unconscious interest in "penis" is as well expressed by the symbol as by the real word for it. The illogicality disappears so

soon as a translation can be made into the ideas which are symbolized.

From such studies we assume that sequential ideas, logically unconnected, are the conscious representations of unconscious ideas, which they symbolize. The underlying ideas may be progressing in a perfectly orderly way. Ideas are united then in three ways—consciously (logically), unconsciously (illogically), or both. The more potent is the unconscious connection, the less logical does the sequence appear.

Applying this principle to what is gathered by retrospection of nocturnal experience, we can see that the series of visions we call dreams are hallucinated free associations that differ from those occurring during the induction of sleep merely in that unconscious links bind them more exclusively than in the hypnagogic state. When the thoughts symbolized in these visions are dragged into the critical light of common day, we find that they are usually of a type which is unfit for conscious entertainment, they are adaptable neither to real life nor to the moral code of the dreamer. They are the kind of ideas which are repressed into the unconscious. We thus have a second reason for presuming that the basic elements of dreams are unconscious: not only are the mental processes of an unconscious type but the ideas thus elaborated are also of the unconscious order.

Now how does this view correspond to, or differ from, Freud's? Our formula—during sleep we think in hallucinated and symbolic free associations

of ideas unconscious during the day refers to *dreaming* rather than to the remembered dream. This dreaming process is covered in Freud's description only by the "primary processes of displacement and condensation" (the mechanism of symbol formation) which he regards as the fundamental characteristics of the unconscious type of thinking.¹ We separate off from this "dreaming" the process by which specific dreams are perpetuated into waking consciousness. It is to this process, which begins before the dreamer is fully awake, that we would allocate the distortions of the original dream thoughts, distortions which make the dreams appear more reasonable (secondary elaboration) and which result from the elision of details painful to waking consciousness. The reason we confine "repression" or "censorship" to this phase only is that, with sufficient effort, a dreamer can often recall so much material, with so many telltale details, that the unconscious thoughts are easily discerned in these "free associations." According to this outline, then, we need not consider such hypotheses as the formation of "fore-conscious" dream wishes, their "repression" and consequent activation of unconscious ideas, and so on. Dreaming, then, is simply unconscious thinking, the remembered dream a synopated, distorted fragment thereof.

¹It is probably more accurate to say that condensation and displacement are results of the selectivity of the memory process by which fragments of dreams are perpetuated into waking consciousness. The ideas of the night are represented in the conscious memory only by a fragment (condensation), while the feeling tone of an elaborate dream is attached to the fragment (displacement of affect).

It will be noted that nothing has been said about the "day-remnants." It is questionable whether they have anything to do with dreaming as such. That experiences of the day are reflected in dreams we remember the next day is probably the most universally known phenomenon of dreams. Every one who has given the most fleeting attention to them knows that. If our view that dreaming is simply unconscious thinking be a sound one, the content of the remembered dreams is dependent on the nature of the current unconscious thoughts. As was remarked above it seems that the path from consciousness to unconsciousness is always open: to use an anthropomorphic figure of speech, it seems that the unconscious knows everything that consciousness does while the reverse is far from true. Consequently any experience during the day may have enough latent significance to divert unconscious thoughts into some specific channel. When sleep comes this train of thought is continued and is expressed in countless symbols. On waking, as we have said, there is an effort to adjust the remembered dream with reality, so the formulation which contains elements repeating the day experiences is selected.

For example let us take the case of the John Doe above. He goes to a circus and recalls next morning that he dreamed, *inter alia*, of being in the Sahara Desert, chased by a lion. At the circus he saw, literally, thousands of things but he tells us that he was particularly impressed by the intrepidity of the lion-tamer. Why did this affect him

more than the work of the trained seals, the trapeze artists or the giants and dwarfs? Inquiry proceeding along the line of free associations reveals the fact that the lions were yellow, the sand in the desert was very yellow, the sunlight was yellow. In the dream he was as much afraid of being sunstruck as he was of the lion. Then comes the "yellow-Philadelphia-dog show" associations. The nocturnal events begin to assume a new importance. We learn of an unconscious memory of a terrifying yellow beast. Both the dream and the interest in the lion-tamer, we may presume, were evidences of this memory being activated. The patient has vague memories of other dream experiences than with lions: a man was attacking him at one time, his father was criticizing a politician at another. All these clues when followed up (which may take days) show that the attack by the mastiff received its significance in turn from the lively fear of his father from which the patient suffered at this period of his childhood. The conclusion is finally reached that the lion was a mere incident in the long drama of the night's experiences. The circus stimulated the infantile complexes of filial inferiority; during the night one (of many) expressions for this pursuit by a lion and this was the only one to be sufficiently linked up with reality on waking to be clearly remembered. During the night, then, the circus experience had nothing whatever to do with the construction of any fore-conscious, or other, dream wish. Its only immediate connection is with the form in which *one* dream was recalled. Freud's

views might be sustained if the only activities of the night were those which were remembered next day.

Theoretically, then, there is no *a priori* reason to expect an invariable appearance of day remnants in dreams. The unconscious may be working away at some train of thought started many days or even weeks before. And, indeed, experience shows this to be true. We not infrequently are given dreams by our patients from whom it is impossible to elicit any evidence of the day's experience having entered into the themes of the night's unconscious performances. When I say "any evidence," I mean any direct and compelling evidence. During analysis the patient may refer to thoughts symbolically related to the themes in question but it seems simpler and more logical to relate these to the undercurrent of unconscious thought than to regard them as building blocks in the subsequent dream.

Another factor which may swerve the unconscious thinking in a new direction is a stimulus received in the night. This may be a loud sound or one for which the dreamer is instinctively attuned (e. g., a mother for a baby's cry), a fly settling on the face, or a visceral disturbance, and so on. Any one of such stimuli may act in precisely the same way as a day experience in starting a train of unconscious thought and hence appear in some form in the remembered dream. Some authors (the most recent is Lydiard Horton) have laboriously "proved" that dreams are simply expressions of bodily sensations. The experience, even of the layman, is so much at

variance with this view that it seems unnecessary to discuss it.

The problem of "diagnostic dreams" deserves comment at this point, however. How is it that one can dream of a somatic disturbance when it is too slight to be recognized consciously? Nicoll and Riddoch¹ have observed, for instance, that the patient with a complete lesion of the spinal cord does not dream of being paralyzed, which the man with a partial lesion does. This difference is noticeable before there is any return of conscious sensibility in the legs. It should be noted that the afferent impulse in all such cases does not appear in the dream as it would if it were consciously recognized. It is not registered in accurate terms but symbolically as a rule. This supports the view that the threshold for definite sensations and perceptions is higher than for indefinite ones; that a stimulus may be strong enough to be registered unconsciously and appear improperly described in consciousness but cannot be specifically recognized by consciousness until it becomes stronger. This is, of course, nothing new. Twenty years ago hypnotists did a great deal of work on this subject—Boris Sidis probably performed the most exhaustive experiments—and showed that the range of sensibility (like that of memory and efferent impulses as well) was much wider unconsciously than consciously. It is to this that suggestion owes its effectiveness in therapy.

The repeated failure in psychoanalytic treatment to resuscitate infantile memories the existence of

¹ Personal communication.

which is repeatedly indicated in dreams may be explained by this principle. The memory is present unconsciously and may be potent there, but it does not exist in such an exact and detailed form as will enable it to enter consciousness. (It should be remembered that children are several years old before they are capable of recalling voluntarily and in detail what happened even the day before. Yet their experiences obviously make impressions and produce specific reactions. Consequently it is only to be expected that events from this period of life would be recalled as reactions rather than specific memories.)

Another corollary has to do with waking stimuli. The threshold for external sensory stimuli is certainly raised during sleep. It is possible that stimuli which would be well over the threshold in the waking state may give direction to unconscious mental processes until the strength of the stimulus is such as to be *accurately* registered by the sleeper. It then crosses the threshold and becomes a waking stimulus. In this sense waking is simply the accurate recognition of external stimuli. The reverse would be true of falling asleep, which could be said to take place at that point where the impinging stimuli are not recognized clearly but distorted or neglected.

PART II
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PSYCHOAN-
ALYSIS AND SUGGESTION

PART II

**THE RELATIONSHIP OF PSYCHOAN-
ALYSIS AND SUGGESTION**

CHAPTER XI

DIFFERENCES OF TECHNIQUE

If under the heading of suggestion one includes hypnotism, it is probably safe to affirm that only two fruitful methods have ever been devised either for the investigation or treatment of the psycho-neuroses. These are suggestion and psychoanalysis. The practice of hypnotism was regarded as charlatanism for close on to a century. It is now respectable, however, and perhaps owes this reputation in part to psychoanalysis, since the latter has recently been the target for reactionary abuse and has, by contrast, forced the former on to the pedestal of conservatism. Both those who practice suggestion and those who are completely ignorant of its first principles unite in stating that psychoanalysts simply use suggestion. One group imply by this that the matter need no longer be discussed and the other that Freud has stolen other folk's thunder and denied the crime. Curiously enough psychoanalysts have always resented this imputation as if it were an accusation and usually have disputed any relationship of their art and science to the earlier one. Freud is an exception because he has always frankly admitted his debt to the hypnotic school and in his lectures admits suggestion as a definite factor in

psychoanalytic treatment. Nevertheless he restricts the relationship to this one point of contact and does so with emphasis. When there is so much smoke there must be fire. In most disputes the disputants talk about different things although they use the same terms. It may therefore be well to see just what suggestion is and what the theory of hypnotism involves.

In the simplest form of suggestion the subject accepts uncritically some thought from the operator and reacts to this idea automatically and consistently just as if it were a spontaneous mental process. Psychogenic symptoms may thus be abolished or unusual conduct initiated. Hypnosis is simply an exaggeration of this condition and frequently is so effective as to confine the subject's voluntary reactions to those directed by the hypnotist with a complete ignorance consciously of external stimuli or of spontaneous thoughts.

A prerequisite for suggestion is the establishment of a type of emotional relationship between the operator and subject, which is often spoken of as *rapport*. In an excellent discussion of this subject Jones¹ has demonstrated with a wealth of quotation from the writings of hypnotists that the characteristics of this *rapport* are identical with those of love (before the latter has become conscious). From this he deduces, quite logically I think, that suggestion is based dynamically on unconscious sexual attraction between the patient and physician.

¹"The Action of Suggestion in Psychotherapy," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, December, 1910.

An identical relationship, called "transference," exists during the course of psychoanalytic treatment and, in fact, is regarded by Freud as a *sine qua non* of cure. He says quite frankly (p. 286): "We . . . must realize that we have excluded hypnosis . . . only to rediscover suggestion in the shape of transference." From a dynamic standpoint, therefore, psychoanalysis and suggestion would seem to be the same. But this dynamic principle operates in many other situations: a salesman or politician may make use of it, so may a missionary or a lover. In fact it is nearly universal as the *modus operandi* of personal influence. On this account no one would claim that these various types of human contact were identical. The method whereby the unconscious sexual *rapprochement* is manipulated must determine the differences between politics and proselytizing or suggestion and psychoanalysis. The hypnotist uses it unwittingly, the psychoanalyst, according to theory, works with it consciously. Freud claims that the patient during analysis transfers to the person of the physician interests both friendly and inimical originating earlier in life and closely related with the conflicts underlying the symptoms; that these conflicts can thereby be brought into the light of full consciousness; and that, if this "transference" can be so handled as to exclude hostile elements, the positive attachment to the analyst will lead to a rearrangement of unconscious forces abolishing symptoms for which constructive substitutes are added (Lectures, pp. 383-5). Manipulation of *rapprochement* is thus made

the core of psychoanalytic treatment. Its utilization without manipulation is the essence of suggestion.

The critics urge, however, that the actual conditions of a psychoanalysis favor suggestion in the narrow and accurate sense of the term. They say the patient is convinced that if he recalls enough of his past and talks enough about sexuality, he will lose his symptoms and that this belief actually does cause such a result. An issue of fact is thus raised. What are the phenomena? Unquestionably patients do find relief, particularly at the beginning of an analysis, simply from the conviction that the treatment is potent to charm away their symptoms. This should rightly be termed suggestive influence and psychoanalysts have no hesitancy in so naming it. But permanent cure, they claim, does not consist in loss of symptoms alone but in such a reorganization of the patient's mental life as to make the unconscious forces, which motivated the symptoms, actually productive of happiness and efficiency. In other words, cure rests not on an abolition of symptoms such as suggestion may affect, but on a redirection of unconscious strivings which suggestion does not attempt to produce and which, in fact, occurs spontaneously. This is the ideal. In practice it is probable that with the host of incompetents who advertise "psychoanalysis" as their mode of treatment there are many patients who receive under this title nothing but suggestion—and clumsy suggestion at that.

So much for the dynamics of suggestion and psy-

choanalysis. The two technics are used, however, as methods of investigation. How are the two methods related as to efficacy and the psychological mechanisms involved? The general conclusions as to the mechanism of suggestion worked out by the hypnotic school years ago may be stated roughly as follows. The higher functions of the nervous system (including "mental" operations) are more extensive than realized by the subject. At the same time his behavior at any given moment is determined by the thoughts of which he is conscious. Consciousness brings into focus, with functioning activity, certain reactions of the nervous system. These reactions extend all the way from the afferent and efferent impulses of the visceral nerves which are only partially under psychic control, up to the highest discriminative capacities of intelligence and memory. The function of consciousness may be likened to that of a spot-light. The attention of the audience is directed mainly to what is seen under the glare of this light and the observers react chiefly to the action there depicted. They are dimly aware of other actors on the stage but are relatively indifferent to them, whereas they are in total ignorance of what is occurring off the stage in the wings and dressing rooms. They know the actors appear from somewhere off the stage but that is all. The spot-light corresponds to full consciousness, its dim reflected light over the rest of the stage to "fringes of consciousness" or Freud's "fore-consciousness." The "unconscious" is the place where the actors come from. The "co-conscious" of Prince is the

prompter or director just off the stage, unseen but actively at work. Under normal conditions the spotlight is shifted by the subject himself; under hypnosis the operator takes control of it. He brings into functional activity bodily reactions, memories and ideas according to his will rather than the will of the subject.

If this view be correct—and there is a wealth of evidence in favor of it—suggestion does not manufacture anything but simply brings material into consciousness that might normally never appear there. For instance, no hypnotist can make the subject have an hallucination of an animal he has never seen and knows nothing of. He may hallucinate a lion but not an amphioxus. Supposing a command is given for the subject to see an amphioxus; no hallucination appears. The hypnotist must say “It looks something like an earthworm and something like a fish.” The subject may then see a long, cylindrical, yellowish body with small fins. This is not an amphioxus, but a combination of fish and worm features present in the memory of the subject. By no chance could an hallucination appear of what an amphioxus looks like unless the subject be so minutely instructed as to the anatomy of this animal as to have an independent knowledge of it just like his knowledge of the lion. How then are we to characterize the vision of the worm-fish which he does have? It is merely a visualization of two ideas neither of which originates from the suggestion. Let us suppose the subject reacts with disgust to this hallucination. It will be found that he has nor-

mally a disgust for worms or for fish and the affective reaction is a response to the worm or fish idea. In other words, no new entity has been produced; reactions latent in the individual have simply been stimulated.

The situation with memories is more complicated. So far as single, simple concepts are concerned, no memory of such can be manufactured out of nothing. The hypnotist cannot make the subject remember seeing an amphioxus any more than he can call forth an hallucination of it. But most of our memories are of complicated situations, the elements of which are, individually, well known to us. For instance, I have been to Washington and know well the details of the journey thither and of the buildings there. But I was not there yesterday. Similarly I know Mr. X well and dislike him. Under hypnosis I might be told that I had just been to Washington, had met X there and had quarreled with him. I might believe all this and feel upset about the whole incident, which had in reality never occurred. It would probably be difficult to make this false memory persist after the séance, for it would conflict too directly with my actual memories of what I did yesterday. The greatest permanent effect the suggestion might have would be to change my emotional attitude towards Washington. Although I had previously liked the city I might now feel disinclined to visit it again.

What has happened in this case? Under hypnosis definite memories have not been manufactured out of whole cloth but merely combined and the most

important element (from a psychopathological standpoint), the emotional reaction, has also not been created but simply evoked in a false association. During the séance, when consciousness is altered, this false association is in awareness and the emotional reaction is correctly attached to X not to Washington. Thereafter, however, the false memory is perpetuated unconsciously, while consciously a displaced affect appears, i.e., a symptom. The hypnotist did not manufacture memory of either Washington or Mr. X, he merely combined them, caused repression of the memory of what I actually did yesterday and left me with a symptom. From a practical standpoint this may be a serious matter, as for instance when a witness with manifest sincerity gives false testimony in court. But from a theoretic standpoint the work of the hypnotist is superficial, since he has not produced any new emotional reaction in the unconscious. He has only devised a new way of eliciting a reaction already present. Composite memories may therefore be distorted by suggested amnesia and false elaboration of details, which as elements remain unaltered. Fundamentally nothing has been manufactured.

As a method of research, therefore, hypnotism is a method of selection of ideas and reactions already present, although perhaps latent, in the mind of the subject. If he could do more than this the power of the hypnotist would be colossal. He would be able to produce or cure insanity (not to mention psychoneurosis), manufacture criminals or raise the subject to his own level of intelligence. But he can only

work with the mental machine as it already exists. He cannot fundamentally alter it. The spot-light is turned by the hypnotist not merely on the stage but off into the wings.

How does this compare with the procedure of psychoanalysis? The patient is urged to abrogate all conscious guidance of his thoughts, to indulge in "free" associations. According to theory, when this is done, the spot-light does not wander lawlessly over the stage but fore-conscious and unconscious thoughts are spontaneously illuminated as it were. A memory, wish or impulse that can be expressed in various disguises, presents itself with less and less disguise until it is finally revealed in its nakedness. In practice we see many examples of this; but we also find that there is a resistance creeping in, the train of thought does not go on relentlessly, the patient begins to operate the spot-light himself as he does in his normal waking life. The analyst brings him back to the point where he thinks the divergence occurred, and insists on his letting his thoughts wander from that point again.

For instance one incident in a dream may be that the dreamer strikes a man with a stick. The patient's associations may be initiated into two quite different channels. If I ask him what the striking makes him think of and keep him associating to the idea of injury, he will think of antagonisms and murderous impulses. Then when we examine the appearance of the victim, details of his costume, etc., lead to associating thoughts of some enemy. But I might have started him off on the stick, the charac-

teristics of which induce thoughts of a penis. The dream incident may therefore be interpreted as a sadistic homosexual symbolization or as an expression of a homicidal impulse or as an ambivalent combination of the two. As a matter of fact the context of this incident in an elaborated dream will usually suggest to me that the striking or the stick is the important element. This guidance occurs constantly during every psychoanalytic séance and every time it is done the analyst is directing the spot-light be it only for a moment to light up a path which the patient himself follows. This selection is analogous to, if not identical with, that of the suggestion technique. It differs only in its extent. The hypnotist never relinquishes control, whereas the analyst aims constantly at doing so.

But whenever the patient is given a specific stimulus for free association some selection is exercised. With some patients such guidance is constantly necessary and with them the analyst is apt to feel (if he have a scientific conscience) that he is practicing an art rather than a science or that at best he is forcing the patient to prove a preconceived theory rather than making independent discoveries. From a scientific standpoint, therefore, there is great danger of the free association method being used in the service of a theory rather than as a means of research. Nor does this guidance of the patient's thoughts end with control of allegedly free associations. Probably every psychoanalyst has noticed how the patient may night after night dream of the same theme, constantly elaborating it. The way in

which this may occur is discussed in the previous chapter. An experience of the day stimulates an unconscious train of thought which continues on into the night and is then elaborated in varying settings of dream imagery. The original day thought may be selected by the analyst from a number of themes presented in an earlier dream. The analyst picks out one part of a dream for intensive examination. He interprets it to the patient, thus stimulating the unconscious complexes appertaining to this theme. The next night the theme is elaborated, the analysis again is directed to this topic and so on. An example of this guidance may make the point clearer.

A young man was being analyzed for severe stuttering. On a Monday he brought a dream with a number of acts. First there is a battleship coming to dock, the sailors are met by friends, one of them is much troubled on meeting his fiancée by thoughts of his sexual irregularities. Next the patient wants to telephone to his chum but cannot on account of his speech. Then a girl accuses the patient of being effeminate and of speaking effeminately. He welcomes the criticism. The girl changes into his chum and they buy candy together. This is followed by a scene in which the patient's brother undertakes the direction of the patient's fiancée in an offensive way. Finally the patient buys a cigarette out of which most of the tobacco falls before he can light it. Asked to associate to the idea of sexual irregularity in a sailor, the patient soon began to talk about homosexuality. Communication with his chum led

to homosexuality also. The logical connections of these dreams with the charge of effeminacy were pointed out and the suggestion made that the embarrassment which was an integral feature of his stammering might be connected with unconscious homosexuality. The other acts of the dream were not analyzed. But we can imagine that a jealousy complex might have been ventilated, if the scene where his brother directed his fiancée had been discussed or masturbation ideas might have emerged from analysis of the cigarette episode. Both of these, it happened, were important problems for the patient but they were deliberately neglected by the analyst, who selected one theme for exclusive consideration.

Tuesday's dream was not analyzed, but it looked like a portrayal symbolically of homosexual relationships. Some experiments were attempted that day in getting the patient to whisper. It was found that he could whisper without hesitation so long as his attention was directed to the whispering but that when he attended to the ideas expressed he at once began to use his vocal cords again with consequent stuttering. He was told that this phenomenon probably explained his inability to profit by any method of speech reëducation. A definite symptom was a stubborn tendency to speak in only one way—a way which always was accompanied with embarrassment.

Wednesday's dream began with a scene in which a young man is making a speech and gets stuck. The audience thinks he is contemplating some nefa-

rious scheme and nearly mobs him. This dream brought out an idea of guilt and fear of punishment in connection with the speech trouble. Other dreams of the night were neglected.

Thursday's dream came as a climax to the homosexual series. First he is talking to his chum and hesitating a great deal; his chum suggests words to him and this only makes his speech worse. After some irrelevant scenes he and a friend are trying to light their pipes, his pulls badly and it is difficult to light it. Then suddenly, "I had a penis in my mouth. It was all so disgusting. My whole mouth sort of closed on it half involuntarily" (precisely the behavior of his mouth when stuttering).

This last dream gives first indirectly, then directly, a most specific explanation of the speech trouble in terms of a particular perversion. This detail was not suggested to the patient by the analyst we may be reasonably sure, because it was never in the latter's mind, consciously at least. The mechanism of suggestion was employed, however, in focusing the patient's attention consciously on to the theme of homosexuality and this led to an unconscious pre-occupation with, and a nocturnal elaboration of, this theme. Nothing was put into the patient's mind but a definite selection was made.

How does this affect the reliability of psycho-analytic procedure as a method of investigation? If the patient had recovered after this analysis the conclusion would be that his stuttering was fellatistic in origin. Yet there is much evidence in the case to show that shame about masturbation and

sexual curiosity in childhood (symptoms began at the age of four) also contributed. When sufficient unconscious energy is deflected from outlet via symptoms to outlet in constructive activities recovery takes place. It is just conceivable that analysis of this patient simply as an unconscious homosexual with a ferreting out of all the factors behind the inversion would result in cure. But another analyst might have a preconception in favor of masturbation as the essential cause. He then would analyze the onanistic features of his patient's dreams and the latter would promptly begin to dream preponderantly along this line. Neither puts anything into the patient's mind and each finds only one dominant theme.

Freud makes this admission: "Any one who has himself performed a psychoanalysis has been able to convince himself innumerable times that it is impossible thus to suggest anything to the patient. There is no difficulty, of course, in making the patient a disciple of any one theory, and thus causing him to share the possible error of the physician." Every one knows that preconceptions determine observations very largely in all scientific work. We see what we are on the look-out for and are blind to the unexpected. In psychoanalysis, however, this danger is augmented by the plasticity of the material which is so largely produced in accordance with the theory of the analyst. This is the reason why one analyst can say: "Every neurosis has in it a big penis" and have his dictum disputed by another who finds identification with the mother back of

everything.¹ Both are probably right in their inclusions and wrong in their exclusions. With this condition of affairs it seems extraordinary that Freud should, during the years when he was making his discoveries, have kept his eyes so vigilantly open for new factors and new unconscious phenomena and that his general conclusions as to the content of the unconscious should be so accurately confirmed by examination of the insane who do not talk or dream to order.

¹I can cite from my own practice a striking example of how material often considered to be fundamental may be neglected without affecting the success of the treatment. I once analyzed a man who had led a homosexual career for over ten years and wished to cure himself of it. During the analysis I never asked him nor did he have occasion to tell me whether he was an active or passive homosexual or what the nature of his actual practices had been. Throughout attention was directed to his homosexuality as a relationship not as an act. The analysis was speedy and effectual. He has been married for some years, is happy, more efficient than ever before, and is aware of homosexuality only as a vague unreal dream of the past.

CHAPTER XII

COMPARISON OF MATERIAL GATHERED BY HYPNOSIS, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND OBSERVATION OF THE PSYCHOSES

One of the most signal triumphs of hypnotism was its demonstration of the recoverability of memories long absent from consciousness. When many symptoms (as in hysteria) were found to be dramatizations of some element in these memories, hypnotism became a method of investigating the psychogenesis of symptoms that offered much promise for the development of psychological medicine. Since then two other methods have come into use: the psychoanalytic method of free association and the painstaking observation and correlation of the utterances and behavior of the insane. It may be well to discuss the relative merits of these three methods.

Under hypnosis an artificial state is produced in which the patient is relatively unaware of the environment in general but is extremely sensitive to the dictates of the hypnotist. With the loss of attention to the environment there is a proportionate weakening of resistance to appearance in consciousness of ideas which are unconscious. Perhaps it would be better to say that an altered consciousness appears into which the normally repressed ideas may come.

In this state the "spot-light" is operated by the hypnotist and its range depends on the depth of the hypnosis induced. An exception occurs where a secondary personality makes its appearance under hypnosis. This personality then has its own system of acceptable and tabooed thoughts; but this exception need not be considered now. Theoretically, the determination of all psychoneurotic symptoms should be discoverable, provided only sufficient depth of hypnosis be secured. Practically, however, these results are attained, as a rule, only in patients with a natural tendency to dissociation of consciousness such as is observed in hysteria and allied states. Nevertheless an enormous amount has been learned in this way. A patient, for instance, explains under hypnosis that at the time a certain symptom occurs a definite thought is present. A banal example would be some retraction or twisting of the head, which is an accompaniment of a thought of being struck, the patient at the time being unaware of this thought. Such ideas that are active, although not conscious, Morton Prince has aptly termed "co-conscious." When co-conscious thoughts are demonstrated by hypnosis the evidence is so direct and compelling that there seems little doubt that hypnotism offers the best method of studying the immediate mechanism of such discrete and episodic symptoms as may be investigated separately. In no other field of psychopathology do we meet with such satisfying exactness and precision as in these investigations. The recent work of Morton Prince belongs to this order.

Many hypnotists have published invaluable material of this order but only one, Morton Prince, has seriously attempted a broadening of the field of investigation. Forel and Janet, for instance, are content to explain the symptoms of such a disease as hysteria and admit that the disease itself, that is the tendency to develop such symptoms, is the product of some constitutional defect which cannot be further elucidated. Prince has tried to answer the question, Why the co-conscious thought? He finds that specific ideas have emotional and dynamic value in virtue of their "settings." That is, experiences dating often from childhood give certain ideas or impulses peculiar power. For instance a religious education may endow the ideas "priest" or "church" with great affective power or devotional exercises may become compelling. If two ideas, similarly powerful as a result of important settings conflict, one of them is repressed, becomes unconscious, may be activated as a co-conscious thought and thus produce a symptom. He finally concludes that all the conflicts are conflicts of instincts, the more powerful ones being dominant as a result of individual experience.

It will be seen that, although the terms used are quite different, these conclusions are generalizations which include Freud's fundamental claims. For instance, let us consider the psychoanalytic theory of a compulsive idea. In childhood an individual develops as a result of various circumstances (the setting) a strong cruelty impulse which tends to be directed towards loved ones—sadism in other words.

At the same time, or shortly thereafter, ethical standards and feelings of sympathy are developed. These come into conflict and the sadistic impulses are repressed becoming unconscious. In later life when some disturbance occurs in the emotional life of the patient, the sadism is activated and co-conscious sadistic thoughts develop. These appear partially or symbolically in consciousness as the compulsive thoughts. Fundamentally, therefore, Freud's and Prince's theories are alike but with one great difference. Prince finds no specific instincts always at work and Freud does. The latter admits many factors as contributory but insists that sexual instincts are always dominant. The former does not deny that sex is often potent but denies its universality. Which is right?

So far as the psychoneuroses are concerned the question cannot be answered empirically. So far as I know no well trained psychoanalyst has ever taken up hypnotic researches as thoroughly as Prince has done, nor has he nor has any of his colleagues used the psychoanalytic approach with understanding, sincerity and zeal. Comparative results have not then been secured. The therapeutic proof is futile. Too many factors enter into cure to make statistics of any value whatever. If this test were to be allowed, we should also have to discuss the theories of Christian Science and the maunderings of many quacks as scientific hypotheses. We are consequently forced to argue *a priori*.

It by no means holds that, because under hypnosis a patient may be able to account for a symptom

directly and adequately, he can answer a question cogently as to the background or history of the idea which the symptom represents. In the first instance a level of consciousness is tapped that has knowledge of the existence at a given moment of a certain thought. But this consciousness would have to have a great knowledge of psychology to answer the second question, which is not a demand for a specific fact but for an interpretation of facts. The various levels of consciousness made accessible by hypnosis can produce memories of definite events but they are no more capable of interpreting those facts than is normal waking consciousness—perhaps less. One may ask a carpenter why he cuts a board a certain length and he can give a satisfactory answer without hesitation. It is a shelf for a cupboard he is making for his wife. But ask him why he married this woman and he can only tell you of certain events that seem to him to have shaped his career. His choice of memories and his interpretation of them might fail to satisfy a student of human motives. The latter will ask more questions, elicit more facts, and put them all together in making up his judgment as to what were the really important influences in attracting him to one particular woman. Now this carpenter knows many things, the price of lumber, the strength of oak and what team won the World Series in 1905. But his psychological inquisitor does not ask him such questions; he asks only for such information as he expects may throw light on the marriage problem. In other words he has some hypotheses, to prove or disprove which he

seeks facts. When he exhausts the supply of information bearing on these hypotheses he ceases to ask questions.

And so it is with the psychopathologist who seeks to gain information about the fundamentals of the life of a hypnotized patient. The examiner's questions are dictated by a hypothesis. If he thinks one instinct is at work he will exhaust that line of investigation; if he turns his attention to another instinct he will gain evidence of the power of that instinct, and so on. One can therefore see that an important instinct might be eliminated from the list without its absence being betrayed by a paucity of material. The only control on complete diffuseness is some knowledge of the nature of the patient's difficulties, which is gained from the patient's conscious history. For instance, if a patient has no anxiety and gives no history of it in the past, the hypnotist will not be much interested in all the incidents, which might be brought to light under hypnosis, that concern situations of danger. But this control comes from knowledge derived outside the séance. The patient may show emotional reactions while hypnotized that suggest some importance to the memories excited at the moment. But it is characteristic of the hypnotic state that when older, deeper memories—the ones important for the final settings and fundamental conflicts—are elicited the dissociation of consciousness is apt to be more profound and emotional reactions weak or absent. The results of hypnotic investigation are therefore apt to lead to diffuseness or to have only

such specificity as exists in the mind of the inquirer before hypnotic examination begins.

The conditions under which psychoanalytic investigations are made present a contrast to those of the hypnotic séance. In the latter a modification of consciousness is deliberately induced while in the former this is avoided. In fact the free association technique aims at the extension of full consciousness, i.e., of awareness, to cover mental operations previously unconscious. The maintenance or modification of consciousness involves two differences in the nature and value of the material recovered: when normal consciousness is preserved the search for pathogenic ideas is tedious and follows a tortuous path, normal emotional reactions being maintained, while with the altered consciousness of hypnosis the route is direct and the emotional reaction is reduced. A patient, let us say, has an hysterical ptosis. Under hypnosis this symptom is specifically explained as an effort to shut out the memory of some particular sight. The psychoanalyst asks the patient what he would rather not see and a good many unpleasant visual memories are produced by free association. Among these—probably as the last association—the patient recalls the incident which would be recounted at once under hypnosis. If this memory appears accompanied by a marked emotional reaction and if the ptosis then disappears, the analyst feels sure that the symptom was the expression in consciousness of the painful memory. This situation is, then, analogous to the hypnotic one because in both some specific relationship between un-

conscious idea and symptom is indicated. But, more often, the emotional reaction is not marked and the symptom does not disappear so dramatically. It disappears only when other abnormal reactions—of mood and behavior—show signs of alteration, in other words when the neurosis as a whole is beginning to yield. Usually we find that analysis removes a symptom suddenly only when the symptom is of recent origin. As has been explained, a symptom of long standing has become the vehicle for expression of a number of complexes. In this case the psychoanalyst, when cure is complete, cannot state with definiteness just what the specific determination of the symptom was. The hypnotist, on the other hand, can always do this, theoretically at least. He can do so because the patient, during a condition of altered consciousness, has explained it directly.

I once had an opportunity of comparing the material recovered during hypnosis and by free association. The patient was an unmarried woman thirty-eight years old with complicated symptoms, which eventually were found to have hysteric mechanisms. From her normal conscious life were dissociated all the ordinary pleasures, she dressed with excessive plainness, had a severe, unsympathetic expression and seemed to have no interest in anything æsthetic or "human." After demonstrating spontaneously a capacity for development of somnambulism when free associations led to memories of her early childhood, she was hypnotized at times and states of deep somnambulism were thus artificially induced. In

these she accounted for her symptoms directly and without the slightest hesitation by telling of her co-conscious thoughts. She also explained her abnormality by reference to another person, "Helen Gray," who had the thoughts which were expressed in symptoms. This Helen Gray was fond of beautiful things, loved social activities, was herself beautiful and had six children. But she hated routine and conventionality. The name she explained, without hesitation, was derived from Helen of Troy and a gray shawl belonging to her mother, which she greatly coveted as a child. But as to the origin of this submerged, secondary personality she could tell nothing in hypnosis. She just "was." When awakened the patient was amnesic for these revelations.

The day after one of these séances, she was examined by the free association method. She told of playing, when a little girl, that she was a maiden with beautiful hair, whom a fairy prince would rescue and marry and that these fantasies persisted on into her dreams. The following questions and answers show how the examination proceeded.

Q. What name did you give the girl?

A. I didn't name her; she was myself.

Q. What name comes to your mind when you think of her?

A. (*Long pause.*) She was me—I didn't name her.

Q. Try hard to remember!

A. (*With a whining voice.*) I didn't name her. She was myself. I had another name only once when I ran away from home—so they wouldn't find me. (At the age of twenty-one.)

Q. Do you remember that name?

A. I wrote it on a hotel register. My uncle came for me and

he knew my writing. They told me they would put me in prison for doing that.

Q. Guess at the name!

A. Helen Gray but I'm not sure. I may not be right at all.

Q. Where did you get the name?

A. I don't know.

Q. What does "Helen" make you think of?

A. I don't know. Anybody named Helen—Helen of Troy—a beautiful woman, wasn't she? Did they take her prisoner?

Q. What does "Gray" make you think of?

A. Thomas Grey—the "Elegy." But that is G-r-e-y and this is G-r-a-y, gray hair—a color—my grandmother has gray hair—gray dress—I wear gray dresses, I thought my mother had a gray shawl, I asked my grandmother but she didn't know. (The patient's mother died when the patient was three years of age.)

Q. Was Helen Gray the name of the play child?

A. I think it was me but it may not have been, I mean it may have had another name—I like my name all right.

Q. Did Helen Gray have any children?

A. I don't remember about her children.

Q. See if you can remember!

A. No, I don't think she did. That's all I remember about Helen Gray. That's all there was. You see I just had that name because I went away from home.

In these consciously produced remarks one finds nearly all the data recovered under hypnosis, but without any evidence of relationship to symptoms being given directly and everything is expressed dubiously. On the other hand the free associations give room for conjecture as to the origin of "Helen Gray" in the maiden of childish daydreams, whereas the material recovered under hypnosis gives no clue to this at all. Conjecture is necessary for the interpretation of this free association material but the material extends over a wider field.

It is when the hypnotist begins to investigate the background of the symptom that his technique is apt to fail. This is something that the patient does not know, enquiries are diffuse and the investigator is forced to choose from the data recovered those which he thinks are most likely to have furnished the "setting." This selection, it is true, is also exercised by the psychoanalyst, but he is aided tremendously by the emotional reaction of the patient, which has remained normal. The more deeply-lying is any unconscious complex, the greater is the resistance to its appearance in consciousness. This resistance is expressed by illogical blocking in the patient's free associations and by the emotional reaction accompanying the recital of recovered memories. The patient is, then, constantly telling the psychoanalyst in an indirect manner what is important and what is not. We can therefore conclude that where one method is weak the other is strong. Hypnotism gives us the most direct approach to the study of the immediate determination of symptoms, while psychoanalysis reveals the important elements in the patient's past, which have rendered his emotional life abnormal and led to the establishment of a neurotic reaction.

At the same time the psychoanalyst is using material which does not interest the hypnotist so keenly. A different order of psychic material is investigated when dreams are studied. From the standpoint of research this material presents both advantages and dangers. No one who has given any degree of attention to dreams from the psycho-

analytic standpoint remains unconvinced that from them may be learned a great deal about current unconscious thoughts. The unconscious significance of the events of the day is revealed by the elaboration of what they suggest in the drama of the night. Associations from data presented in the dreams almost always hark back at once to experiences and fantasies of the far past. The existence of actively functioning thoughts different from those of the waking hours is thus indicated, but, since there is often a large element of selection in the analytic process, one can never say that the resuscitated memories are the only ones of importance. All that is explicitly demonstrated is the importance of certain unconscious processes during the period when the dream occurs. It is not unthinkable that there is a retroactive emphasis laid on the experiences or thoughts which are recalled during analysis. Very often, too, the latent content of the remembered dream is so complicated by its distortion into a setting assimilable with waking consciousness that selection on a large scale is inevitable and this selection can only be justified by repeated confirmation from many analyses. Under these last circumstances the evidential value of the material gathered from the analysis of any single dream is slight.

These criticisms have little weight when directed against the third method of investigating psychopathological phenomena, namely the study of the abnormal mental processes of the insane as revealed in delusions, hallucinations and anomalies of behavior. A convenient term under which these data

may be subsumed is the word "trend." This is a contraction for "trend of false ideas," a term originating, I believe, at the Psychiatric Institute, New York, and now becoming popular in America among psychopathologists engaged in institutional work. When we speak of a patient's "trend," we refer to the general story that runs through and logically connects and correlates his utterances and conduct. With the exception of paranoics and some cases of paranoid states, the patients are not able to give any connected account of their delusions, they are usually like dreamers who know what the dream of the moment is but not that which has gone before. In most cases of dementia præcox and manic-depressive insanity false ideas and perceptions occur haphazard, often kaleidoscopically. If careful record be taken of consecutive verbal productions, manic flight of ideas and the "scattered" speech of dementia præcox can both be seen really to be free associations. In scattered speech a succession of symbolizations of the same latent idea may occur without the patient making any effort to connect the consecutive statements logically and the actual meaning of the statements may be widely at variance, which is what makes the speech "scattered" and senseless. A psychoneurotic giving a series of free associations to the word "stick" may produce a series of ideas between which a logical connection is discernible. The dementia præcox patient, however, is apt to go directly to the latent phallic idea, in fact he is apt to make such a statement as "stick is a penis." His regard for reality is so slight that he can use the

words "stick" or "penis" or "sword" interchangeably. In this way delusions appear or, if the thoughts be sufficiently vivid they are hallucinated. Such a patient may be said to be living in a purely fantastic world. More often this type of thinking occurs episodically but delusions appearing in the episode persist into the intervals of saner thought, like dreams which still have an aura of reality on awakening. The false ideas of manic-depressive insanity are produced, apparently, in the same manner, but are often even more evanescent than the delusions of dementia præcox.

If one is to understand the rationale of the trend, record must be made with full detail of as much of the psychotic productions as possible. We then have a disconnected mass of fantastic thoughts much like the separate pieces of a puzzle picture. They can be similarly pieced together and then an extraordinary result is obtained. Not only is a connected story built up but each piece provides a pertinent detail. The central theme, or plot, of this story seems to be universal; it is the *Œdipus* complex in one of its many adaptations, often crudely expressed with literal exactness, more often modified by substituting for the parents more adult objects of interest. In the latter case, however, these surrogates are shown by the patient's speech, sooner or later, to be only substitutes. In many cases of dementia præcox the primitive incest ideas may occur in simple, direct terms and these are apt to be deteriorating cases. Roughly speaking the prognosis seems to correspond with the crudity or refined elaboration

of this fundamental theme. In manic-depressive insanity, although attachment to, and intimacy with, the parent of the opposite sex may be the essence of the trend, this relationship is not represented literally as a sexual one. This definitely sexual element only appears in the more chronic forms.

Observations can also be made in the psychoses of the ideas which accompany abnormal emotions and these observations are useful if not essential to the understanding of pathological affects. It is true that by hypnotic investigation it is often possible to find co-conscious thoughts which seem to explain fears, etc., that are otherwise inexplicable, but these thoughts are apt to represent preoccupation with complicated life situations or, if simple, usually have to do with such primitive reactions as fear. With the tendency that psychotic ideas have to be developments of one fundamental theme it is possible to catalogue them, and hence reach relatively simple formulations.¹ Ordinary psychoanalytic technique gives us practically no assistance in the understanding of emotions because, as explained above, it has little exactness in dealing with the immediate determination of symptoms.

Study of the psychoses, then, furnishes us with valuable material for the fabrication of fundamental psychopathological theories. But what are its defects? They are a natural corollary to its virtues. The material—in so far as it is purely psychotic—is apt to be too simple for us to get a proper picture

¹See a forthcoming book by the author on "Morbid and Normal Emotions."

of the personal drama. So universal are its exposed themes that the insane person seems to be enacting a human rather than a personal tragedy. It is only so far as he is normal, only so far as he is capable of responding to hypnotic—or better—psychoanalytic investigation, that we can hope to learn from him these individual factors the knowledge of which is essential for treatment.



PART III
THE PRECONSCIOUS PHASE

CHAPTER XIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF REALITY ACCORDING TO FERENCZI

Although there is general agreement among psychoanalysts that the forces in the unconscious which operate to produce psychoneurotic symptoms are essentially sexual, there have still been many who do not feel that this tells the whole story. Particularly they suspect the existence of a stage early in infancy which is essentially presexual in its nature and they are inclined to regard the type of mentation then existing as having great importance for the establishment of a tendency to abnormal thinking in general. Those who have contributed most to the elucidation of this phase are Ferenczi and Burrow. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this work, for their speculations are probably the only truly original, rather than elaborative, productions of those who follow Freud strictly. They have even served as stimuli for the psychological investigation of clinical types previously neglected by psychoanalysts.¹

Ferenczi's theories are presented mainly in his classical paper on "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality" and to a less extent in his

¹ Witness the studies of Epilepsy by Pierce Clark and by the writer.

“Introjection and Transference.”¹ He begins by recalling the two stages of child life which Freud had described; the first that of pleasure-pain with hallucinatory satisfaction of desire, and the second that of recognition of external reality. Ferenczi sets himself to the task of determining how one phase passes over into the other. He finds a clue in the symptom of “omnipotence of thought” or “magical thoughts” in the compulsive neuroses. The patients are prone to feel that their thoughts about other people will really cause injury to the latter, although their judgment regards such ideas as absurd. Fundamentally, he thinks, this feeling is based on a recognition of something all-powerful within themselves, namely their instincts. The patients suffer, presumably, from a fixation at some point where actual experience was had of omnipotence or of what could be interpreted subjectively as that.

While still *in utero*, the child has no needs which are not satisfied without effort on his part, even the fundamental demands of warmth, nutrition and oxygen are met. So the fetus . . . “gets the impression that he is omnipotent.” Whether this statement be justified or not at least one must admit that if an adult man could have his necessities so supplied he would indeed be magically powerful. It is like Mother Carey in “The Water Babies” who “made things make themselves” so wise and great was she. Such psychic processes as exist before

¹Both of these have been translated by Jones in the book: “Contributions to Psycho-Analysis,” Boston, Richard G. Badger.

birth go on after it and so the infant longs to regain this situation. He dislikes the world and wishes he were back whence he came. Nurses have an instinctive recognition of this for they duplicate the womb environment as perfectly as possible, whenever he expresses his dissatisfaction by crying and struggling. He is wrapped up warmly in coverings that exclude the light; they duplicate the rhythmic movements and sounds of the mother's body by rocking him and with crooning lullabies. Ferenczi presumes (following Freud) that the child actually incorporates his wish to return in an hallucination. Since the nurses are largely successful in creating an illusion of return, the babe believes that the hallucination has made the actuality. This establishes Ferenczi's first stage—that of "magical hallucinatory omnipotence." The result of this treatment is that the infant goes to sleep and in this first sleep as in all later ones Ferenczi sees a return to the mother's body—"a reproduction of the womb situation."

Such movements as the suckling makes at this stage are incoördinate and explosive. As coördination develops he finds that objects "come" to him when he stretches out his hands for them. This constitutes the second stage, that of "magic movements."

But he soon learns that such commands are not always obeyed. He has been living in a world where he has simply had to wish, to hallucinate, in a word to *feel* anything to enjoy it in actuality. But he now begins to realize that, apart from this feeling

world, there is another harsh external world, that of reality. The feeling world is "ego," the external, or world of sensation is "non-ego." The two stages are the same, Ferenczi says, as his *Introjection Phase* and *Projection Phase*. Animism appears in the transition between the two. In this outer world which he is beginning to perceive, the child finds similarities to his own organs and activities, so he interprets one in terms of the other. This is the fundamental basis of symbolism. The most important symbolic activity is the representation of objects by vocal sounds. This is slowly developed into speech. When once mental images are clothed in definite and specific sounds, i. e., in words, *thoughts* are possible. At first these are used, as gestures were, for the purpose of issuing commands, they too are interpreted by nurses and obeyed and so we come finally to the stage of "magic words and thoughts." From this point the gradation is easily seen to "normal" mentality, although the transition is incomplete in the psychoneurotic or psychotic individual who has been "fixed" more or less in these earlier stages.

In his paper on "Introjection and Transference," Ferenczi makes it clear that introjection is concerned with mental images of outer-world things, which are incorporated into the ego by means of fantasy. The child (or patient) identifies himself with them. Projection is the earlier process, corresponding to the recognition of the world as something definitely external and inimical. Introjection on the other hand is tendency which develops with the beginning

of emotional objectivity. "The first 'object-love' and the first 'object-hate' are, so to speak, the primordial transference, the roots of every future introjection." Practically, then, introjection is the same thing as positive and negative transference, but the latter term is usually restricted in psychoanalysis as a term for the emotional relationship of patient to physician.

This account of Ferenczi's views has been given with a brevity that is hardly fair to their importance although his argument has been followed literally. There are, of course, certain weaknesses in his claims that are immediately apparent. The mental processes of the fœtus cannot be of the same order as our adult ones; they must be primitive and inchoate. Yet Ferenczi represents the unborn and newly born babe as indulging in perceptions, hallucinations and arguments such as we would have every reason to believe could not exist. In fact he himself ascribes sensational life only to the animistic stage and thoughts to the speech stage. It is difficult to imagine how with the extreme monotony of life *in utero* such impressions as are received from without could be correlated to form perceptions. Without perceptions there could be no memory in any exact sense nor any hallucinations. Yet psychic processes must have some beginning and probably they do begin before birth although not in a form which we are accustomed to recognize. We cannot envisage with accuracy the neutral experiences of creatures without consciousness such as we enjoy; the best we can do is to describe them in

metaphors. This is one of the functions of poetry; in fact large parts of Ferenczi's essay read like a paraphrase into academic language of what Wordsworth has written in his "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality." From the latter one gets a feeling of truth without the shock to scientific sensibility which Ferenczi administers with his ascription of consciousness to the fœtus.

Another difficulty appears when one examines his alliance of the omnipotence stage with his "introjection." He uses Freud's conception of the ego in the same puzzling way that has been discussed in an earlier chapter.¹ The omnipotence phase means nothing if it is not a purely selfish state; in so far as emotional objectivity appears—altruism—just to that extent is the self-centered imperiousness weakened. But introjection involves true sympathy and objectivation. Therefore it cannot have an integral connection with the original, purely selfish, omnipotence stage of development.

On the other hand Ferenczi performed great service in drawing psychological attention to a period of life that must have great importance in psychic development and in attempting to give some characteristics of this nascent mind which may well appear echoed in later life. Indeed, if one is to admit the principle of regression, it is difficult to eliminate this earliest phase as the goal of most complete regression. If reality is difficult to endure, and if acute consciousness is developmentally connected with the recognition of external reality, and

¹ Chapter V.

if contact with the environment is essentially a function of consciousness—all of which any psychopathologist would admit—then a most natural regression would appear with a dissolution of consciousness associated with some expression of return to the earlier type of existence. One would expect the latter to be formulated as ideas of death and, in fact, this is a universal phenomenon. Suicide is common, death is frequently portrayed as a release from life, while, whenever we are wearied, we lie down and sleep. Even in common speech sleep is compared with death, so it is safe to assume that sleep represents (from the psychological aspect only, of course) a normal and partial regression of this type. The psychological element in the loss of consciousness in epilepsy seems to be similarly determined.

This is the regression from the negative standpoint, the blotting out of reality by the lapse of consciousness. Less universally, however, but still with considerable frequency we find this return made more attractive by ascribing positive allurements to it. Death is figured not merely as a release from burdensome life but as a translation to realms of bliss. Furthermore in many psychoses there are allied with these ideas fairly transparent symbolic references to return to the mother's body such as being buried alive, living under water, living underground or being swallowed by a monster and existing inside it. Occasionally one even meets with literal expression of rebirth. For instance a psychotic epileptic used to declare that in each attack he was

born again and once, after a seizure I heard him say that he had just been born, was covered with blood and that it ought to be washed off. Again one may find in myths, tales of imagination and the psychoses an apparently illogical association of mother-body ideas with imaginations of omnipotence.¹ Such phenomena present a real problem. Is it to be solved by accepting Ferenczi's naïve view that the child actually remembers his physical surroundings and thinks about them *in utero* or may there be some other explanation less destructive of our present notions of the development of consciousness and memory? An answer to this question goes right to the bottom of the problem of individual symbolism, which must now be discussed.

¹For examples of such observations see: Hoch, "Benign Stupors," New York, Macmillan Co., 1921; MacCurdy, "Productions in a Manic-Like State, etc.," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. 8, p. 361; and, "Allmacht der Gedanken in den Mythen von Hephaistos," *Imago*, Bd. III, S. 332.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ORIGIN OF SYMBOLS

The problem of symbolism is too wide a one to be solved by research or speculation in one field alone. It is a fundamentally primitive type of thinking which can be studied wherever thought is primitive. That is to say among savages, in childhood, in dreams, in abnormal mental states and even in a good deal of our adult mentation, which we think is conscious and rational but really is not. The discussion of this chapter is one from one angle only, that of psychopathology. The assumption is made that symbol formation is not congenital but acquired and an effort is made to reconstruct the processes by which this illogical form of thought is created. This assumption may not be valid as an exclusive hypothesis but pragmatically it has value and should not be abandoned until research in other fields demonstrates the range of its applicability. Even then its usefulness will not vanish for a great deal, if not all, symbolism must be established while consciousness is developing.

We may begin by examining these most puzzling phenomena, the mother-body fancies. A clue as to their meaning may perhaps be found by examining the actual form in which these ideas occur in the

psychoses. Vivid reliving of uterine or birth experiences with literal exactness is an extreme rarity. The epileptic patient quoted above produced quite exceptional material. The rule is for this trend to be expressed in symbols, metaphorically. In other words the insane person adopts the same method of expression as does the poet, each describing what he feels rather than what he knows. Now, if there be a latent urge to return to the beginning of life again, we would phrase that metaphorically as re-birth—and so we do and have done in countless religious rites. Then, if we further wished to dramatize this process we could do so accurately by utilizing our adult knowledge of anatomy and physiology or we could put into metaphor that which we *feel* it would be like. That adult knowledge contributes to the structure of such delusions and hallucinations can frequently be observed. For instance I once studied the psychosis of a drug addict who passed from a delirium into a dementia præcox deterioration. Spontaneously or in response to the stimulus of one question he would launch into an interminable series of pseudo-reminiscences. Many of these were concerned with his prowess while still *in utero* (thus emulating and outdoing Hercules). He manifestly was trying to describe this early lair of his in anatomical terms but having little education the best he could often accomplish was to say, "When I was in my mother's ovulade, etc." This example is important. He meant, of course, ovary. There was no question as to his firm belief in the experience he was retailing, but he

could hardly have had any memory of the time when he was an unfertilized ovum! His is one of the cases which proves too much and thus destroys the contention for which proof is sought. It is probable that all literal details, with which the mother-body situation is elaborated in works of the imagination, dreams and delusions, are the product of knowledge gained after the stage of development to which they are assigned in the final production.

To explain this process we may recapitulate Ferenczi's argument with modifications. The fœtus experiencing only the most monotonous afferent stimuli can recognize neither comfort nor discomfort, either of which demands contrast for its perception. After birth, an ordeal which probably no sentient human nervous system could endure, the infant finds himself in a blinding, cold world. He has then the first experience which is later to be repeated with sufficient frequency for him to learn it as a definite perception. He is "uncomfortable," or rather let us say, a set of reflexes are set up by these new stimuli which he later learns to recognize as discomfort. The nurse duplicates so far as possible the situation *in utero*. He thus begins to learn different environmental conditions, some comfortable, some not. The former are always associated with an assortment of stimuli which we, as adults, realize that he enjoyed before birth. If we can imagine his being conscious and able to formulate his desires at this stage, we would hear him say, "I want to be warm, to feel something all around me, to have no light in my eyes, to hear nothing but

rhythmic sounds. I don't even want to be bothered with the weight of my own body and limbs." But, of course, he does not think this. The best he can do is to learn gradually different experiences or situations that constitute one or more of the elements of the general desire formulated above. As he gains coördination he can assist in the realization of these wishes for peace. He can snuggle up against his mother's warm body, pull the bedding over himself, shut his eyes or cover them, cover his ears or enjoy the delightful levitation of being carried or of floating and bobbing in a bath. All of this may occur without definite apperception.

Each one of these experiences or situations thus gains a pleasurable, an emotional value for him. The child no less than the man likes or dislikes a new sensation in accordance with the pleasure or pain he has known with something similar. As consciousness, in our adult sense of the term, is being developed the child is having more experiences, is living in a larger world. Anything in this enlarged universe, that reminds him emotionally of these earlier delights, attracts him. He dreams of them. In short, they become symbols to him of peace and security. This is, perhaps, the history of the womb—or, better term, the mother-body—symbols. We have imagined the infant making certain demands for comfort. If an intelligent man be asked what these suggest to him he may come to the conclusion that there is only one situation that fulfills all the needs, namely life *in utero*. A psychoanalyst putting such a question may get this reply and assume

therefrom that the patient unconsciously yearns to be back in his mother's body. But this deduction is not justified. The patient may merely want just those things which we represented the infant as demanding. Of course it seems probable that many people unconsciously put this question to themselves as it were. They answer it similarly and, in the unconscious, the composite desire may well be expressed in a single word, the womb. This would explain the definite references to such a return in the delusions of insane patients to whom no suggestive questions have been put. In such patients any knowledge that may be gained in adult life may be utilized unconsciously in the elaboration of just what is desired. The epileptic, for instance, who asked to have the blood washed off him, had had an opportunity to know what a sanguinary affair parturition may be. He had a child of his own.

There remains the problem of accounting for the coincidence of ideas of power and of return to the mother's body or to the early suckling stage, the "nest" place as Burrow appropriately terms it. This is probably a simple matter. The younger the child the more he gets his own way, the more is his comfort looked after. Ferenczi is quite right in all that he says about the solicitude of the environment for the infant. There are probably two reasons for this. Those in charge of the baby know he will perish without their care and secondly his needs are simple. As he develops, however, he gains greater capacity for self-help and at the same time his ambitions become broader and less easily

satisfied. He finds that he can gain happiness only by his own efforts. As a matter of fact he now enjoys more actual power than he did before, he can change the environment more according to *his* notions than he could before when very little ego in the proper sense of the term was in existence. But he can recall, or more exactly he can retrospectively feel, that there was a time when more was done for him. When his volition was weak he got all he wanted, now that he has more definite will he gets much less than he wants. What more natural than that he should allocate to the past an enjoyment of power to get what he wanted, which he no longer experiences? The "nest" then becomes in his mind a palace where he was emperor. When thwarted in attaining his ambitions or wearied in the struggle the man wishes he were a boy again, when he had so much vigor that he ran for the sheer joy of using his muscles, forgetting the innumerable restrictions with which parents and teachers enslaved him. Similarly the child with budding consciousness probably wishes himself in a vague way back in the cradle and does this with no realization that the peace he enjoyed and the homage he secured were the privileges of a hothouse plant, not of a sentient individuality.

These dreams of a Golden Age—for they are pure dreams—are expressed in symbols as we have seen. Why? The answer goes right to the root of psychoanalytic theory.¹ It is not merely because the real

¹ Whether the symbolism that interests ethnologists is similarly determined may be quite another matter.

underlying wish is repugnant to some adult moral sense—that is only a frequent overdetermining factor—but because the ideas are expressible only in symbols. In the stage of mental development to which return is desired no accurate perceptions of the environment is possible, even feelings cannot be formulated consciously; they can only be felt. Perception, consciousness, verbal thoughts come later and when they come, certain experiences that can be registered are dowered with an attractiveness and a feeling of similarity which they owe to resemblance to the experiences of the preceding stage when consciousness was larval. It is only these later experiences that can be remembered, they stand symbolically for the enjoyment of the past. But—a most important point—since the valuation of the past is a retrospective falsification, the wish did not develop till the symbols appeared and hence that wish can be expressed only in symbols. Reduce the symbols to their latent terms, that is to a concrete expression of the “wish” and you get something hopelessly vague or else something utterly ridiculous.¹ An example of the latter is the wish to be back in the mother’s womb.

Poetry and imaginative literature are full of examples of concepts too vague to be put into anything but symbols. Many dreams are also of this

¹This is probably as important a factor in psychoanalytic treatment as is the recognition by the patient of his inner sexual anomalies. When a patient has been living in a world of symbols he can learn to adapt himself to reality only when the baselessness of his symbols is patent to him. They can then no longer function as they did when they were “reality” for him.

order representing ideas too shadowy to be clearly formulated or remembered. A good example of this is to be found in the last dream recorded by De Quincey in his "Confessions." If I understand it aright it can only refer to the subjective experiences of an infant being born. Immediately after its recital the author goes on to say that it is probably more painful to be born than to die and discusses his rebirth with the cessation of laudanum drinking. These remarks seem as like interpretive free associations as anything in literature. He was struggling to express the tumult and agony of transition from one life to another. In the unconscious this is envisaged as literal birth. There can be no definite or real memory of the event but what "it must be like" may be expressed in metaphor and this is what De Quincey seems to have done in his dream. These are of course pure speculations. But, until some baby is born speaking and familiar with abstract terms, we shall be forced to content ourselves with pure speculation. If we refuse to speculate we must leave a most important field of psychology and psychopathology totally incomprehensible.

CHAPTER XV

THE MEANING OF AUTO-EROTISM

These general remarks about symbolism are probably quite applicable to the understanding of the infantile sexuality which Freud first described, which is always found by psychoanalysts and which may be objectively observed in the psychoses. The stress laid by the Freudians on infantile sexuality is repugnant to our moral and æsthetic sense, but science should not tolerate any such opposition. What is of real importance is that it seems biologically unnatural for the most powerful instinctive drive to be something useless and futile from the standpoint of any kind of adaptation past or future.

Moreover actual observation of the child fails to confirm the psychoanalytic theory. It is true that one whose eyes have been opened by modern psychological literature observes innumerable evidences of infantile sexuality in act and speech to which he was previously blind or deaf. But forced interpretation is necessary to give the erotic anything like the exclusive importance in the life of the child (beyond the actual suckling period), which is demanded by zealous Freudians. For example, little interpretation is necessary to convince one that puppies play almost exclusively at fighting and

copulating. But children's games are inexhaustible: they imitate almost any activity they see in their elders and in addition run, swing and climb with an apparently instinctive delight. It is true that any one of their actions may be given a symbolic activity by interpretation (for which during analysis in later life there may be evidential justification) but according to Freudian dogma these children have not yet begun to repress their infantile sexuality and as a matter of fact we see them indulge in autoerotic practices quite shamelessly and exhibit no embarrassment about their sexual curiosity. Without repression there is no necessity for symbolization. The deduction is therefore justifiable that the larger part of their activities is non-sexual. If Freud had claimed that sexuality—as it is ordinarily understood—were all-important, he would only be echoing the opinion of many novelists and other observers of human behavior. On the other hand no one who has adequately and sincerely studied the matter has failed to convince himself not merely of the importance of aberrant sexuality in psychopathic states but also of its unconscious influence in normal people. Are we to conclude that man is dowered with useless, even harmful, instincts? Another view is possible. It may be that his instincts are sound and work constructively except where abnormality is present; that infantile sexuality is an unreal thing, like the "nest" symbols discussed above, and becomes of importance only when that which is symbolic attains a value independent of what is symbolized.

The argument concerning mother-body symbols dealt with the reception or rejection of stimuli proceeding from the environment not clearly perceived but only "felt." But these are not the only afferent impulses. The reflex and semi-reflex movements in feeding and excreting must give some sensation just as tactile stimuli do. Particularly when coördination is developing and the infant is able to produce or control the stimuli and movements, the sensations experienced would be the most important elements in his psychic functioning. But it must not be thought that he is acutely conscious and discriminative of these sensations.¹ For a number of weeks, with the exception of sucking movements the infant is incoördinate. The first coördination is usually observed in the continually improving efforts to get the thumb into the mouth. (The pleasure of sucking has thus a biological advantage, it is an educative impulse.) At this stage sensations are probably similarly "incoördinate," i. e., not yet true perceptions. What pleasure the infant is able to produce is by stimulation of his body and this delight is likely to be commensurate with his success in achieving just the perception he most wants. Apart from nutrition his interest in the environment is mainly negative. One's mentality—child or man—is as wide as his range of interest. Granted a creature whose positive interest is confined to bodily sensations and you have a creature who thinks only in terms of the body.

We interpret new experiences in terms of the al-

¹ They are probably of a "protopathic" order. See Chapter XVII.

ready known. This makes it inevitable that, as interest is spontaneously advancing with natural development, whatever is observed outside the body must be interpreted as analogous to bodily perceptions. This is the animistic phase of which Ferenczi speaks so plausibly:

"Everything points to the conclusion that the child passes through an *animistic period* in the apprehension of reality, in which every object appears to him to be endowed with life, and in which he seeks to find again in every object his own organs and their activities. . . . The child's mind (and the tendency of the unconscious in adults that survives from it) is at first concerned exclusively with his own body, and later on chiefly with the satisfying of his instincts, and with the pleasurable satisfactions that sucking, eating, contact with the genital regions, and the functions of excretion procure for him, what wonder, then, if also his attention is arrested above all by those objects and processes of the outer world that on the ground of ever so distant a resemblance remind him of his dearest experiences."

Since the world around is interpreted in terms of the body, somatic perceptions constitute the child's first "language" or "thoughts." This is for two reasons: he is interested only in what can remind him of his body and his comprehension is developed to the point of understanding only his body. One would expect, however, that with his further development both of interest and intelligence this body language would pass away. He would learn much more discriminative labels for the objects around him and let the others totally lapse just as the umbilical vein shrivels up and ceases to carry a single drop of blood once independent respiration and nutrition are established. But the situation is not so

simple in the psychic sphere. The umbilical vein is tied, the placenta gone, no return to that form of respiration or nutrition is possible. And the transition is abrupt as well as final. The development of interest in, and comprehension of, the outer world is, however, a gradual matter. New powers are quickly tired and it is always easy to slip back into the old habits. When the world ceases to repay the budding interest taken in it, regression to bodily stimulation and preoccupation is natural. This does not mean that the body is really more pleasure-giving. Child or man, we seem always to have greatest delight in the exercise of new faculties. It simply is easier. With this growth there comes also a demand for adaptation, partly internal, partly external in origin. Pleasure can no longer be obtained without great and greater effort. The past must then seem to have been heavenly—complete happiness securable by such simple means as sucking one's thumb! Thus a retrospective falsification appears, which glorifies past pleasures, just at the same time as they are being expressed in terms of objective reality. Bodily sensations therefore gain a symbolic value that is analogous to that of the "nest" symbols. They are based on a belief, so to speak, of the body once having been able to give pleasures such as are now enjoyed. Yet it would be a great mistake to assume that this is conscious reasoning.

Observations confirm the opinion that when the range of interest widens, auto-erotism no longer gives obvious pleasure. The suckling who succeeds

in getting his thumb into his mouth certainly looks pleased and contented. Similarly much older children (and many adults) put themselves to sleep by some auto-erotic practice or attitude. In both these situations we have a practical non-existence of the environment. In one case it cannot be mentally grasped, in the other attention to the environment and normal interest in it are deliberately abandoned. But children who are beginning to run about and play exhibit little satisfaction with the auto-erotism in which they may be observed to be indulging. It is apt to occur when they are reproved or prevented from following some whim. Then the picking of the nose, boring the ear or even actual masturbation may appear, seemingly without much awareness of what the hand is doing. No expression of joy or contentment is seen, the face may even be sullen. In fact the act seems to be rather compulsive and not initiated with any idea of gaining pleasure. Conscious pleasure is now associated with externalized activities.

It must not be thought that the argument of retrospective falsification implies any conscious or exact animadversion of the infant. If he were capable of reasoning as adults are and if he still showed the same sequence of behavior and interest, we would be justified in ascribing such a train of thought to him. As a matter of fact it is probably incorrect to think of the mentation of the child at this age as either conscious or unconscious. He has only a larval consciousness and imagination. He reacts instinctively in various situations, has only

a beginning awareness of what he has been doing and only the faintest knowledge of how he would behave in any future situation.¹ "Retrospective falsification" is just a grown-up way of saying he turns instinctively to auto-erotism expecting satisfaction from it commensurate with the pleasure he derives from his more mature activities.

The first function of auto-erotism is educative—a stimulus to control of movement and establishment of true perceptions. The next is also a step in education. The phenomena to be observed in the external world make too big a mass to be grasped all at once. The process is gradual and something must guide the interest of the child to one thing rather than another. The nutritional impulse perhaps directs the attention to one important part, the breast and nipple of the mother? (Whatever auto-erotic, animistic tendency is probably responsible for the guidance of all externalized interests.) Seeking contact with the outer world he is first attracted to things that remind him of his own body and bodily activities. But it cannot yet be thought

¹ Even when speech is fairly well established children can report what they have been doing only during the past few days. When asked they can remember the content of their experiences in true but they cannot account for unusual experiences. The first light which a baby shows when he says "No!" is "No!" if something has been done which he does not like or if something has been done which he does not want to do. They are not aware of having a memory for things done at a distance and in the past, but only things done just now.

² The mother does not know what she is doing and she does not know how to be guided in her behavior and she does not know what she is doing. She is not aware of having a memory for things done at a distance and in the past, but only things done just now.

that at this stage, auto-erotism supplies the energy for this interest, for in this case there would be no recourse to the environment. If it were a matter of an increasing auto-erotism there would simply be a frenzied stimulation of the body produced. The driving force is that x within all specialized animals that leads them on to the development of higher and higher functions. It is growth—whatever that may be.

In the larval consciousness of the child there is probably very little discrimination made between the concept of the thumb, for instance, and that of the rattle which he puts into his mouth. One "word," so to speak, will cover both. Since this body-language is to become the language of the unconscious, as we shall see, it is most important to bear this in mind. A dream for instance which may be found to contain such symbols is probably just as correctly described as a "rattle" dream as an auto-erotic dream. It refers to this period of life, that is the all important thing, and may represent budding interest in the world around just as well as auto-erotism, for the very good reason that an infant of this age is interested neither in one nor the other but in a kind of mixture of both.

The next stage is one of great importance and presents new problems. It is that of the disappearance from consciousness of auto-erotism and its animistic "language" and its perpetuation in the unconscious. The first part is easily understood. As we have said the first somatic sensations must be vague, and accurate perceptions develop gradually.

As the psyche expands sensations become sharply defined and organized into definite perceptions. The need for animistic labels no longer exists and as far as peripheral somatic sensations are concerned auto-erotism has played its rôle in that development and is finished. At the same time interest has been transferred to the outer world which can give so much more return to a truly sentient being. Everything conspires then, for the destruction of auto-erotism and all connected therewith. The organism has advanced to the development of a definite consciousness that has no need of such childish things.

A comparison with the fate of other bodily sensations may make this clearer. The kind of vagueness, lack of discrimination and localization, which we have posited for early peripheral sensations, exists even in adult life with visceral, afferent impulses. If sensations and even pains could be described and localized within the body as they are on its surface, medical and surgical diagnosis would be extraordinarily simplified. And what of the "language" of visceral impressions? We find it has not disappeared from consciousness like that of auto-erotism, it is still used but only to denominate those vague, subjectively experienced perceptions which we call emotions. We have not evolved to the point of making accurate discriminations and measurements either of visceral stimuli or of affective experience, hence one group is used metaphorically to describe the other. We have courage, i. e., we have heart; we have—or lack—"guts"; we are inspired, dispirited or exhausted; when sad we

are, etymologically, full, an idea which returns literally in the modern expression "fed-up"; we are hot-or cold-blooded. These metaphors have affected science and theories have held ground for centuries that would probably never have come into being, were it not for this visceral language. One thinks at once of the various "humors," of "melancholy," of the ascription of mental processes to the heart or diaphragm (witness all the psychological terms containing the root "phren") that culminates in the doctrine of the "abdominal brain." A modern example, with slightly greater objective foundation, it is true, is to be found in the James-Lange theory of emotions. Until we free ourselves of this truly infantile habit of treating metaphors as though they were identities, important branches of psychology are bound to remain mere animism.

Advance of interest in the outer world and the development of a sense of objective reality have eliminated from adult consciousness what we have termed auto-erotic language. There remains the other aspect of this problem, its persistence in the unconscious. Has auto-erotism other functions besides those already described? If we define it as preoccupation with bodily sensations, one obvious necessity of the organism can be seen to be closely connected with it. If absolute indifference to physical well-being developed, neglect of the body would appear. In fact this is a daily phenomenon. Men are constantly becoming too engrossed in external interests to attend to the simplest rules of hygiene. Think to what a green old age the hypo-

chondriac so often attains! In milder grades the connection of hypochondria and auto-erotism is a matter of analysis and interpretation but in some of the psychoses, particularly in involution melancholia, the interrelation of the two is patent. Since it is advisable, then, for some interest in the body to be maintained, its abolition with the passing of the auto-erotic language would be a serious detriment biologically. But this would, or should not, involve a definite dissociation from consciousness. It should be simply a part of the *mens sana in corpore sano*.

The all important complication appears in the connection that auto-erotism establishes with sexuality. This is a topic that must be discussed later under the heading of the development of the sex instincts, so only the salient points need be mentioned now. Breeding is a function which involves great sacrifice for the individual and were it not dowered with an immediate and powerful pleasure would tend to lapse, particularly among self-conscious animals. The pleasure is, fundamentally, a physical one, in other words satisfaction is gained by stimulation of specific parts of the body. If the infant in passing from his early phase of auto-erotic interest were to abandon utterly his capacity for physical pleasure, the sex instinct awakened at physiological puberty would have no tools to work with, so to speak. On the other hand, if auto-erotism were therefore allowed to persist in its native form, self stimulation would become fixed as the only possible form of gratification. This, I believe, is the

reason why the spark has to be kept glowing, but not allowed to burst into flame, a process best accomplished by maintenance in the unconscious of the desire for bodily pleasure. The mechanism of the repression is a matter for later discussion.

At this point, however, the function of the auto-erotic symbol should be considered. The conclusion was reached above that things in the outer world which resemble the child's organs or activities are held by him to be equivalents but that this new interest is not due to auto-erotism but merely directed by it. These outer things become the auto-erotic symbols, of course. Freudian literature is full of statements about the determination of normal characteristics and interests as well as symptoms by unconscious auto-erotism. All these things are symbols or symbolically determined. The question is, how far are we justified in accepting the proposition that the energy which activates this behavior is auto-erotic? When may we say that auto-erotism has simply given a direction to energy derived elsewhere and when is it the motive power? The answer must be that the motivation is truly auto-erotic when the activity has auto-erotic qualities. For instance, let us take some simple instances. The habits of smoking or gum-chewing are surely auto-erotic of their very nature. The acts would be meaningless if it were possible to perform them without sensation in the mouth and throat. But suppose a man manufactures one of these articles. The psychoanalyst will trace out the history of his interest in the practice, will find that as child he was a great

finger sucker, later was always sucking or chewing his pencil, was very fond of kissing, etc. The conclusion is justifiably reached that the mouth area of his body was an important zone in childhood. In his adult life he is constantly dreaming of the mouth in one way or another, he may even dream of business operations as swallowing, spitting up capital, machinery, etc. From this evidence the Freudian concludes that his business is an outlet for an auto-erotic urge. But we must remember that he has to manufacture something and nothing he is likely to choose as a commodity will be immune from similar analysis. No line of interest comes out of the blue, each has its specific history. Further we must bear in mind that he is *manufacturing*. He is creating, gaining wealth for the support of his family and so on. These activities are not characteristic of anything auto-erotic. Instinctively and behavioristically, they are related to the later forms of sex which are constructive and involve an external object.

But how about the dreams in which his business is represented in terms of mouth activities? This brings up the whole question of how ideas are expressed in dreams. Freud has shown that during sleep we think in images, that abstractions are depicted symbolically as concrete objects and actions. The primitive language of the unconscious is a body language as we have said above. Each person has his own unconscious predilection for symbols. This manufacturer dreams of his business in terms of mouth activities—another man would put the same ideas in terms of another organ or of other activi-

ties. It is the ideas which are of importance. They can be expressive of quite other interests than the auto-erotic and still be put in those terms. To interpret such dreams as fundamentally auto-erotic is to commit the error of the child or savage in confusing the name with the thing.

This is, indeed, what happens when symptoms develop. Regression takes place; the language is interpreted literally in conduct. Our hypothetical manufacturer, for instance, may develop after business (and other) troubles a difficulty in swallowing. The dream which normally is only a *façon de parler*, is being dramatized. At once the character of the mental processes is changed. He is now indulging in something that is definitely auto-erotic. That which was in infancy frank auto-erotism, then a direction of energy for other interests and a language for the expression of those interests, has returned to the original form. In fact one is probably safe in making the generalization that symptoms only appear when unconsciously used symbols are expressed in behavior at their face value. Otherwise the dreams of all normal people would convict them of mental abnormality.

A number of emotional characteristics of an antisocial kind have been claimed by Freud and his followers to be developments of anal erotism. Such are stinginess, animosity, stubbornness, conceit, bad temper, willfulness and so on. Jones¹ gives a long catalogue of these. His description sounds like that

¹“Anal Erotism,” Chapter XL, Papers on Psychoanalysis, New York, Wood & Co., 1918.

of a spoiled child with tantrums or like what is frequently observed in involution melancholia. Many cases of dementia præcox and some of manic-depressive insanity also show these features but it is in the whining depressions of the involution period that the reaction assumes its most consistent form and becomes a definite part of the clinical picture.

One can understand how an emotional habit that might symbolize the impulse of such a specific activity as anal erotism might be a direct representative of it in later life, a conscious expression of what is still present in the unconscious. For instance, according to Freud's hypothesis, a child may have a keen desire to retain his feces longer than the nurse wishes and so develop a habit of hoarding and of stinginess. When thrift becomes meanness it is not difficult to imagine that anal symbolism is invading consciousness. If the child had no contests with the adults who try to rear him other than those arising from his habits of defecation one could also understand stubbornness developing in a similar way. But it would be a rare nursery that staged conflicts over just this one difference. The child is willful and wants his own way over many things and consequently there is little *a priori* ground for expecting a rigid correlation between anal erotism and stubbornness and so it is with the other characteristics which make up the general picture of egotism.

In an earlier chapter objection was taken to the argument of psychoanalysts that coincidence of unconscious ideas necessarily implies an immediate and causal relationship between them. This is a case

in point. Most people with strong auto-erotic survivals will show considerable evidence of unconscious anal erotism. Unless one can prove by observation of the child or a clear history the development of these general antisocial characteristics with an isolated anal erotism, it is just as logical to assign the determination to the auto-erotism in general or to a regression to the emotional attitude of the infant at the auto-erotic period.

Actual observation of children shows that they may have no real irregularity, and no greater interest, in bowel function than in any other region of the body and yet show the general spoiled-child characteristics in marked degree. Such children are, of course, not free from other auto-erotic inclinations.

Or we may turn to the psychoses. For light on this point I have looked over material recently published for other purposes¹ In involution melancholia, auto-erotism either as observable habit or expressed rather frankly in some hypochondriacal idea is so common as almost to be the rule, except in that group that shows a pure fear reaction. Many cases also show peevishness, petulance, tantrums, etc. In sixty-seven cases I find that in fourteen these characteristics were associated with anal erotism, in three with other forms of auto-erotism but not with anal erotism and in six with no record of anything auto-erotic whatever. The existence of this last group, might lead one to suggest that the

¹ Hoch and MacCurdy, "The Prognosis of Involution Melancholia." *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, Vol. VII, No. 1.

auto-erotism was repressed more deeply than the bad behavior. But unfortunately for this view the tendency in this psychosis seems to be in the other direction for there were fifteen cases where observation was made of plain auto-erotic practices or ideas in which no antisocial conduct was recorded. From the occurrence of six cases where irritability was present with no indication of auto-erotism one might therefore conclude that the tantrum reaction can exist independent of any strong auto-erotic tendency. At the first blush the fourteen cases of coincidence of refractory conduct and anal erotism look like a tendency for specific relationship. But in eleven of these other forms of auto-erotism existed as well, so that the behavior anomaly appeared three times with pure anal erotism and three times with other forms of body interest, excluding the anal region. There is certainly no evidence for specificity in this form of mental disease.

Freud has stated that gold is a fecal symbol and that interest in money and property is an exhibition of unconscious anal erotism. He does not say that this is the sole root of greed but some of his followers seem to think so. It may be interesting, therefore, to see what the behavior of property ideas is in involution melancholia since delusions of poverty are also quite frequent. In the same sixty-seven cases such delusions were coincident with anal erotism eleven times, with other forms of auto-erotism three times, but with no auto-erotism fourteen times. This would certainly indicate that other types of unconscious interest may determine

the love of property. In two cases these delusions existed with an isolated anal erotism and in one of them the evidence was strong for a causal relationship. Complaints of poverty disappeared as soon as the anal erotism appeared.

This evidence would seem to justify a less rigid formulation than that of the zealous Freudians who derive antisocial behavior and attitudes directly from anal erotism and incline one to look rather for some looser association with auto-erotism in general. It has been pointed out above that at an early stage auto-erotism is a natural preoccupation. At this time the attitude of the child is neither social, nor antisocial. It is indifferent. But with retrospective falsification the motivation of the practices changes somewhat. There is a reversion to auto-erotism because more social interests fail to give pleasure or are actually provocative of pain. Rebellion is apt to be an accompaniment. An active and willful regression is therefore apt to be expressed both in an antisocial attitude and in auto-erotism. This principle probably holds true during after-life. The individual who cannot get on equably with his fellows displays his maladaptability in his emotional conduct and at the same time regresses unconsciously by preoccupation in dreams with auto-erotic fantasies. If the latter tendency be pronounced actual symptoms may appear. The relation of the two is not cause and effect but each is an effect of a common cause, regression to a period of life and of erotic interest that has nothing social in it.

There remains to be discussed but one other

detail in connection with this topic and it may be disposed of briefly. Freudians claim that excessive neatness, cleanliness, sense of propriety and so on that may develop to the point of foppishness and foolish punctiliousness are products of anal erotism as reaction formations.¹ That is, the unconscious love of filth develops into its opposite, a passion for order and purity. Action and reaction are equal and opposite in psychology as well as physics and therefore one would expect exaggerations of these qualities to represent some protection which the psychic organism is building up in order to guard itself against the opposite tendency. But to claim that these characteristics originate in anal erotism is preposterous and to imply it is to indulge in great carelessness of expression. These qualities can exist by themselves alone or as derivatives of other instinctive tendencies—they do in many animals.² They are simply utilized as protective measures. Some children also seem to be born neat, others careless and slovenly, quite independently of anal erotism and they seem to exhibit these characteristics before those secondary developments appear that are plainly the result of environment and the conflicts which emerge from contact with the environment.

¹ For instance Jones, *vide supra*.

² Cats, for instance, are neat and clean, yet no Freudian has had the temerity to account for this as a revolt against anal erotism.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PRIMARY SUBJECTIVE PHASE OF BURROW

As we have seen, Ferenczi describes a mental state in the infant existing before recognition of the outer world is accurate, in which body sensations predominate and in which thoughts are omnipotent. Burrow¹ treats of the same period in a different way. He is interested in the nature of the consciousness which then obtains and finds it to be intensely subjective. Out of this subjectivity grows a tendency for identification with the environment that leads specifically to the development of unconscious homosexuality, underlies all true love, is the basic factor in repression and so is responsible for all psychoneuroses.

We may conveniently begin consideration of Burrow's arguments with his theories concerning homosexuality. His problem there is wider than that of mere overt inversion, for he writes of the unconscious homosexuality found so universally in

¹His argument is found chiefly in two papers: "The Genesis and Meaning of Homosexuality and its Relation to the Problem of Introverted Mental States," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3; and "The Origin of the Incest-Awe," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3. Reference is also made to it in "Notes with Reference to Freud, Jung and Adler," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August, 1917, and in "Psychoanalysis in Theory and in Life," *Proceedings of the International Conference of Women Physicians*, Vol. IV.

the analysis of psychoneurotics as to seem an essential factor in neurotic reactions. He is dissatisfied with the conventional psychoanalytic hypothesis of homosexuality being an enlargement of narcissism, which in turn results from the repression of the Œdipus, mother-image with substitution of the subject himself as love object—an identification with the mother. This mechanism may obtain in males, although not in females, but dynamically—or “genetically” as he says—it cannot account for the highly important, unconscious homosexuality. The fundamental cause and one which can be seen still to be operating in the psychoneuroses is “primary identification.”

While still *in utero*, the infant’s “organic consciousness is so harmoniously adapted to its environment as to constitute a perfect continuum with it.” The foetus has no knowledge of where he begins and the maternal envelope ends. He has no personality, no individuality, because these are the sum of consistent reactions to the environment which give the organism its psychic individuality or personality. Even for some months after birth the child is still without true individuality and, so far as consciousness is concerned is still an extension of the mother so to speak, for all his experience is gained through or with the mother.

“Now during these early months of the infant’s exclusive relationship with the mother, organic associations begin to be formed which mark the beginning of the awakening of consciousness. Let it be remembered though that since the child is still in the subjective, undifferentiated phase of consciousness, the associations

of the first months of infantile life are entirely primary, subjective and unconscious, and that therefore its early associations, being subjective, non-conscious and undifferentiated, tend always toward the closer consolidation of the mother with itself, that is to say, they tend to the indissoluble welding together of the infantile ego and the mother-image. Thus is strengthened from day to day the mental union—the psychic amalgamation between the mother and infant which establishes for him an organic bond in respect to feeling or consciousness subsequent to birth that is correlative with the organic correspondence prior to their separation at birth. It is this subjective continuity—this organic mental bond which I call the *principle of primary identification*.”

A close, even sensual, connection with the mother exists with suckling. Burrow accepts the general psychoanalytic doctrine of this act giving pleasure which is sexual in its nature but he makes, with this compliance, a most important discrimination. Since the infant has so far no grasp of the external world, no real comprehension of anything outside of the mother-self complex, he cannot have any true objectivation and so, in suckling, he does not make his mother a sexual object.

Such consciousness as he does enjoy is the subjective unity with his mother, hence his first efforts at objectivation follow the line of his mother's solicitation, namely, himself. So he regards his own body as a love-object, just as does his mother. With weaning he is thrown more back upon himself and his body becomes the constant and insistent object of his interest. Thus auto-erotism. “*Now auto-erotism or the love of one's own body is the love of that sex to which one's own body belongs and this, in psychological interpretation is precisely homosexuality.*”

By this argument unconscious homosexuality is merely an extension into adult life of the primary identification and a psychoneurosis a state of heightened subjectivity correlated with the unconscious homosexuality which is simply one expression of it.

His next point is an important one. Biologically sex has one aim, propagation, which forces a relation that must exist between those of the opposite sexes. But in man it has a psychological development, in love, which does not necessitate a pairing of the sexes. So he proceeds to examine the "sentiment of love" and finds that it consists in identification with the love-object. It is not hard to find evidence of the existence of this factor and Burrow adduces many examples from the vocabulary of love to prove it. Normally the biological sex urge leads the individual to direct his love capacity, his identification tendency to one of the opposite sex but the neurotic is so dominated by the primary identification that he cannot do this and so tends to identify himself, unconsciously at least, with one like himself, i.e., he is homosexual.

Unconscious homosexuality is thus merely incidental to the psychoneurosis. A much more fundamental problem is the origin of repression, without which one would not get all the distortions and evasions which constitute symptoms. Repression in general is typified in the horror, the revolt, against incest, so Burrow sets himself to the task of relating this to his principle of primary identification.

He begins by considering the inherent antagonism

between identification and objectivation, between the pre-conscious mode of relationship which is based on feeling and the conscious mode which is based on knowledge.

“Now the demands of the world of outer objectivity or of consciousness proper entail increasing outrage to this state of primary quiescence. . . . Thus our primary nature shrinks from the intrusion of those outer impressions which disturb its elemental sleep. And so it may be said that *nature abhors consciousness*. But with the increasing importunities of reality there begins the gradual increase of outer objective consciousness. Slowly there is the establishment of that *rapport* between the organism and the external world, which constitutes individual adaptation. Observe that the process of adaptation is essentially outward-tending, away from the ego, that it is inherently a process of objectivation.”

With the advance of objectivation consciousness is widened so as to include even the self. One becomes self-conscious. The relationship with one's self should be purely subjective; with self-consciousness there is a clash, a conflict develops which is the essence of the neurosis.

Subjective feeling and objective consciousness are mutually opposed. We feel things by identifying ourselves with them, i.e., by “loving” them. Knowledge and reasoning are always objective. By knowledge we gain possession over things emotionally foreign to us and ordinary sex desire for possession is of this order. Subjective and objective do not mix but always are in conflict. Hence sex as possession and “love” are mutually incompatible. Repression is an inevitable result of this conflict and since the greatest conflict is over incest—the desire to have carnal knowledge of one with whom

subjective feeling should be, and used to be, complete—the very idea of incest produces an impulse of revolt. It is rebellion against making objective what should be purely subjective.

The feeling of repugnance is not against the act itself but against the process of making conscious what should be unthinking and preconscious in type. "Sin," he thinks, is awareness of our nakedness, not the nakedness itself. It is knowledge of what should be felt only. To buttress this view he gives a long list of words showing an etymological relationship between the ideas of knowing and sinning and many mythological parallels.

From this point Burrow branches off into arguments that seem, clearly, to be of a mystical order. This unfortunate tendency colors much of his writing and is probably the reason why his truly scientific views have met with so little acceptance. In the minds of most readers his science has been obscured by his mysticism. This elaboration may be briefly outlined in quotations.

The general theory of psychoanalysis rests on the conception of psychoneurotic symptoms being substitutive manifestations of repressed sexuality. Burrow claims that these replacements are not primarily but secondarily representations of the sexual.

"Sexuality, in my view, being itself a replacement for the complete unification of personality, that is, the primarily ordered state of the psyche as represented in the full acceptance of life in its deepest organic as well as conscious sense. The whole meaning of sexuality as of unconsciousness is repression, indirection, substitution. In a word, sexuality is identical with the unconscious and a unification of personality is alone to be found

through eliminating the recourses of substitution and so reuniting the elements of the conscious and the organic that are now kept asunder through the interposition of the unconscious."

". . . this organic denial and the restless compensations and substitutions comprising the unconscious are in essence the psychology of the mental reaction-average known as normality. . . . an analysis of the social unconscious shows that the collective reaction embodied in normality betrays a tendency to repression and displacement that is no less an indication of disease process than is the individual reaction presented in the neurosis. Indeed . . . so-called normality is of the two the less progressive type of reaction because normality, in evading the issues of the unconscious, envisages less the processes of growth and a larger consciousness than the neurotic type of reaction.

"Thus man's 'morality'—the code of behavior that represents psychologically the zealously courted standard of conduct he designates as 'normality'—is, in my view, nothing else than an expression of the neurosis of the race. It is a complex of symptoms representing the hysterical compensations of society that are precisely analogous to the compensative reactions manifested in the hysteria of the individual. As morality is essentially the pain of the neurotic due to an instinctive sense of his inadequacy to the demands of his own individual code of behavior, so morality expresses equally the pain of the social organism because of its inaptitude to the requirements of the generic social code.

". . . Human life is subjective. It is something experienced, something felt. It is not theoretical, it is actual. It is not descriptive; it is dynamic. Human life *is*, it is not a *theory* of what is. Life as it is felt is our ultimate subjective actuality. Subjectivity or feeling is the very basis of life.

"It is a lesson which parents have yet to learn that the child is closer to the inherency of things than the grown-up—that the consciousness of childhood stands in a far more truthful relationship to the actuality of life as it is than the consciousness of the conventionalized and sophisticated adult. For years it has been my feeling that beneath the conflict of the neurotic personality there is presented an urge toward the expression of this primal inherency of consciousness."

[The psychoanalyst should] “. . . take his stand for a mode of consciousness that flings away every habitual protection and accepts only the truth of life as it unfolds itself in the communication of his own personality as well as that of others.”

We may begin our criticism of Burrow by first clearing away these speculations that I have called mystical. The essence of mysticism I believe to rest on the acceptance of a subjective feeling as an objective reality and its treatment in argument as if it were objective reality. The primary subjective state that he describes with its larval mentality is hardly a model for adult life. But from it grows a passion for unity that Burrow assumes to be the essence of life. He feels it to be and neglects all other possible components. He therefore exalts the subjective and arrives at the final conclusion that society or the individual can attain its greatest development only by following the advice “To thyself be true.” But the only “self” which he describes is that of the newborn infant with its nascent mind. Of course he does not claim any virtue for this primary subjective phase as such; it is only in its promotion of unity in later life that he can ascribe virtue to it. He forgets that the primary relationship of child to mother is a passive one and that it can become active only in so far as the subjective mode is abandoned. The doctrine of being true to one’s self is capable of unbridled use as a rationalization.

It is all very well to attack conventional morality and inveigh against the imperfections of society—and contentment with it would result in stagnation—but the psychopathologist can use nothing less

concrete and objective than the mental behavior of the average man as his standard of normality. If one were to accept Burrow's subjective standard each psychiatrist would stand on a pedestal and judge the rest of the world to be insane.

We may next examine his theory of the fundamental basis for incest-horror. It is that the soul revolts from making conscious and objective what should be pre-conscious and subjective. He assumes in this that the mother, with whom the first identity is established is the mother of the Oedipus situation. But we cannot follow him here. In the first place he himself has given us a good description of the extreme vagueness of the concept of the other person in the primary identification. At this time there are not two people according to the child's conception but only one. When objectivation does begin, it appears as worship of himself, the first thing to precipitate out of this mother-child solution. Any further objectivation must be an extension of this narcissism. Incest would therefore be a development like homosexuality and the revolt would be as much against the one as the other. In fact they are both much alike in the quality which Burrow makes the essence of love, namely identification. Unity of thought and ideals is more easily obtained in either of these situations than in any ordinary heterosexual situation. The Greeks lauded "Platonic love" (which was a homosexual relationship) because it gave opportunity for mental communion and mutual inspiration. With the advent of Christianity and the development of chivalry this

type of devotion was transferred to the irreproachable, untouchable "mother" person. Hence we quite properly call the latter kind of relationship "Platonic" at the present time.¹ Burrow would be right if he made revolt against objectivation in general the product of the identification tendency. Further, although we can imagine the early mother-child union extending into objectivated love with the boy, it is quite unthinkable for the girl. She has known no pristine bond of unity with the father.

Some light is thrown on this subject by clinical observation, particularly of the psychoses. The commonest cause of nervous or mental breakdown is lack of adaptation to the adult sex situation of marriage or to something definitely analogous thereto. In the resultant pathological states we see varying degrees of regression, whether viewed from the standpoint of alteration of consciousness and contact with the environment or of the ideational content, which, with the severity of the process, proceeds to earlier and earlier types of erotic interest. With the deepening of regression goes a proportionate lifting of repression. In the neuroses, interpretation and analysis is necessary to demonstrate the return of interest to the parent of the opposite sex. In the psychoses less and less interpretation and no analysis is needed for this demonstration. Finally in certain delusional states of epilepsy we reach a crude expression in frankly physical terms of incest that often gives no trace of any resistance whatever

¹See J. A. Symonds, "A Problem in Greek Ethics," privately printed.

to this thought for which the normal person has such a feeling of horror. Now the epileptic shows in his whole life poor capacity for objectivating his emotions and clinically the most fundamental symptom is a clouding or loss of consciousness. Plainly, then, his life and his regression point to a relative purity of the "primary subjective state." He has never developed away from this phase with any completeness and he returns to it with alarming facility. According to Burrow's thesis, such an individual should have the greatest repugnance to incest and show the greatest capacity for "love." Yet he can entertain delusions of incest without evidence of any horror at the thought and is less capable of love, as that term is usually understood than any other clinical type we know about. Such considerations make the identification principle an impossible foundation for repression of the Oedipus fancy.

There can be no doubt that the association of "knowledge" and "sin" in language and folklore must mean something. But words and myths, of their very nature, are social rather than individual in nature. Although there may be other explanations for the association this one seems plausible: social unity depends to a considerable degree on unanimity of thought and belief. New knowledge cannot be acquired except by the development of independent observation and thought. This upsets group traditions, hence "knowledge" as opposed to conventional belief is tabooed. This universal attitude is quite possibly reflected in the language and myths which Burrow quotes.

An inconsistency in his argument appears in his confusion of narcissism and auto-erotism. This mistake, so frequently made, has been discussed in a previous chapter, so need not be ventilated again. But in Burrow's case the error is the more serious as he succeeds in making the discrimination between the sexuality of suckling and the making of the mother at this stage into a sexual object. By exactly the same argument auto-erotism at this period is bound to be sexual in its nature without the self having such an existence as to make it a possible object.

But in spite of all these defects Burrow must be given credit for adding to our psychological schemes two most fundamental principles—that of the primary subjective state and that of primary identification, together with the corollary that they occur together. His analysis of the type of consciousness that must exist at this early period shows us why with loss of objectivity there must be a lessening of acuity of consciousness. This enables us to understand such phenomena as sleep and epilepsy much more clearly.

The principle of identification is practically, therapeutically, of wide application. Its meaning we are only beginning to grasp. It may explain, for instance, peculiar phenomena such as those of paranoia, when the patient has an uncanny faculty for reading the unconscious thought of his wife or friend, which he makes into a delusion by assuming it to be conscious. Any one who has worked intimately with paranoid conditions will be familiar with

this peculiar gift—or curse. *Folie à deux* is, probably, a phenomenon to be similarly explained. These are merely suggestions. We may find in this principle a potent psychiatric weapon.

For instance there is one wide spread phenomenon for which Burrow's work may furnish a dynamic explanation. Suggestibility is apt to be associated with a clouding or loss of normal consciousness. We see this in hypnosis, in sleep (more often in half-sleep, dozing states), occasionally in epilepsy and, perhaps, in the cataleptic symptoms of stupor. The mechanism of this is easily explained. Normal, conscious, critical regard of the environment being lost or reduced, the flux of free associational thought may be guided or focused, as it were, by the dictate of another person. But the dynamic problem remains. Why should the voice or hand of another mean more to the subject than any other chance environmental stimulus without this stimulus awakening the subject to a realization of all the environment? If, as Burrow says, subjectivity is associated with identification, we would expect a tendency for identification of thought to take place when objectivity (consciousness) was abandoned. The same process would then, at the same time, weaken interest in the environment and produce a longing for community of thinking. The goal of regression is reached; it is no longer necessary to think for one's self.

But it is in the sphere of more normal human relationships that it probably has its widest application. Although love is a more complex matter than

Burrow seems to think, the striving for unity is certainly a vital component in it. It has both good and bad implications and potentialities. Its favorable aspect is the only one he sees and, indeed, he allies it with the social tendency in general. This last suggestion he makes only once in these words:

"It is but natural that having come suddenly into the franchise of consciousness, man should employ his liberty of action in the wanton aims of personal satisfaction, or in the tedious propitiations of vicarious conformities. But there is something deeper still, more native to man, than all this. It is expressed in the social merging of personalities into each other in the pursuit of the common good. It is that quality in man that ever goads him to search and strive to the utmost benefit of the race. It is this quality of harmoniousness and unity inherent in the social aims of man that is, it seems to me, the strongest principle of man's consciousness. This it is that men have called love. This, it seems to me, is the true affirmation of life and its prototype is the harmonious principle of the preconscious."

Of course in all this he is totally forgetting the existence of herd instinct.

On the other hand the desire for unity has its malignant influences. It probably leads to more disharmony and conflict in marriage than is generally realized. This is not the open conflict where avowed antagonism exists but a struggle that is rationalized in the name of love. In a hypothetical condition of perfect unity, two people would think and act as one. This involves loss of individuality on one or both sides and in either event there is an internal rebellion against the sacrifice demanded, a rebellion that often crystallizes out into a neurosis or, at least, neurotic reactions. Many "successful" marriages

are permanently happy as a result of one partner or the other making the sacrifice, an arrangement that leads to a fixation of domineering characteristics on the one hand and the development of a colorless personality on the other. Usually in the struggle that precedes this solution the first one to develop neurotic manifestations gains the upper hand. In spite of the effort Burrow and others make to exalt the neurotic as the victim of too high ideals, the neurosis is usually a weapon forged and used for selfish ends. During the period of conflict sympathy for the partner appears only when the latter capitulates to pressure. Proof of love is held to be this identification of interest or thought and when this proof is absent the difference of opinion is looked on as a sign of indifference or hostility. To extort sympathy the neurosis is fabricated. When this recourse is not had, through pride or inherent stability, misunderstandings are frequent and separations imminent or advisable. Yet all this is folly. The conflict is due to basic unconscious revolt against real objective love—or to a false philosophy of what love is. The former type is found in people who are inherently neurotic clinging to a subjective viewpoint, while the latter factor may operate among quite "normal" people. In this case the tendency to withdraw from objectivation, that is unconsciously present in all of us, may gain an outlet through this rationalization, this pseudo-philosophy which makes unity rather than reciprocity and partnership the essential of love. Particularly when the friction is largely a matter of false ideals, a little analysis and

explanation of the "unity" as really a narcissistic affair may accomplish much to reestablish a tottering marriage. So this theory has a practical side.

A dramatic example of how this tendency may produce complications may be briefly cited. A young woman had been throughout childhood highly imaginative, a habit that persisted with such intensity that, when she was old enough to know better, her tales of adventure were safely to be characterized as lies. In her teens, however, she learned to control her lust for story-telling. Striking dreams—she recalled them in detail even back to the age of seven—always were concerned with going to Heaven, up in pink clouds and so on, the description of which scenes were full of details belonging to the symbols of earliest life. "Love" to her was a melting of two individuals into a common spirit. Shortly after meeting her future husband she dreamed several times of floating with him up through the sky each reading and *thinking* the other's thoughts. It was ecstatic. Almost immediately after marriage, she felt compelled to confess to her husband some isolated erotic irregularities in the past. He was rather shocked but forgave her. He questioned her further however, and in response she regressed at once to her old tendency for romance and began to elaborate her story with completely untrue details. His suspicions were aroused, he fancied he had not heard all that might have happened. More questions and more fabrications. Very soon the poor wife was entangled in a web of damning deceit, compulsively manufacturing lurid tales about what had

been a nearly spotless past. At the same time the husband (of rather unstable family stock) was developing a definitely paranoid system of ideas. At first incredulous, he began to believe all the stories and to imagine other scandalous affairs in which she might have participated. He grew brutal in his interrogations. She became frightened at what she had done, tried to recant but with each effort only succeeded in evolving more horrible inventions. Like a true pathological liar when once started on a story she could not stop and for the time being believed all she said. The ensuing tangle can readily be imagined. Neither was capable of independent judgment of the other. Each thought and felt that a difference of opinion or a shadow of reticence was indicative of indifference or distrust. They had to think as one. As a result when he suspected her, she felt compelled to agree with him and did so with pathological thoroughness. And whatever she said he found himself believing. Yet with a little analytic assistance their difficulties were straightened out. She learned to discriminate between fact and fancy and maintain her position, while he soon followed with complete trust in her and belief in the rarity of her past derelictions.

Unfortunately the "unity complex" does not confine its malign influence to husband and wife relations. Parents are terribly prone to regard their children not as separate individuals with a right to independent opinions, principles and choice but as mere echoes of themselves. Compliance with the parents' viewpoint is then held to exemplify pious

PRIMARY SUBJECTIVE PHASE OF BURROW 205

love, while difference of outlook is resented and rationalized as wickedness. So common is this tendency that it is a rare adolescent who can escape from home to live his own life without his departure taking the form of rebellion. The weaker child, of course, goes to the wall and remains throughout life incapable of independent expression either intellectually or emotionally. Many a soul is sacrificed on the altar of "family life."

PART IV
INSTINCTS AND THEIR CLASSIFICA-
TION

1

CHAPTER XVII

THE THEORIES OF RIVERS

Urged probably by the materialistic drift of modern philosophy, psychologists have, for a generation, been attempting to bridge over the gap between body and mind, abandoning the older methods of metaphysics and introspection. Conceiving mental processes as the physiology of the brain they have been unwilling to accept psychic phenomena as definite entities but have endeavored to reduce them to terms of such physical processes as can be weighed and measured. Wundt, an unsuccessful physiologist, was largely responsible for this new line of attack and he left a legacy to psychologists (particularly in America) which has been expended in tireless research into the physiology of the special senses. Although much valuable material has been the return on this investment, it has not brought us nearer to an understanding of man as a unit organism, which is psychology. In fact one leader of "experimental psychology" has been honest enough to declare that the object of the science of psychology is to eliminate "mind."

Another attempt at "physiologizing" psychology has been the invocation of the involuntary nervous system to account for instinctive and emotional re-

actions. The James-Lange hypothesis is one of the early examples. Cannon and his school have done most excellent critical work in this field, yet Cannon is forced to admit that, although he can demonstrate bodily effects of several emotions, he can find nothing specific in these effects. The differentiation remains psychological. So far as his work goes, the discovery of the physical basis of the emotions is rendered more remote. The findings which it had been hoped would show the physiology of the emotions have added to physiological lore and left psychology where it was. The recent publications of Kempf represent the most strenuous efforts to bridge the gap. It seems, however, that he has merely translated psychological terms into those of conditioned reflexes, a type of exercise which Adolf Meyer stigmatized once and for all as "neurologizing tautology."¹

A third group, the behaviorists, have attempted to prove that thought is an illusion, that we are simply aware of muscular movements and that the laws of psychology are the laws of reflexes. Their experiments with animals and children have greatly advanced our knowledge but their theories are shot through with grave logical fallacies. It is impossible to discuss psychological phenomena in other than psychological terms; the mind is in a separate category from that of the body. It is as idle to seek for

¹Since Kempf has added little to psychoanalytic theory as such, no criticism of his work will be attempted in this book. The physiological aspects have been well discussed by Thatcher in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. II, p. 237.

the specific origin of mental phenomena in specific physiological processes as it is to look for the origin of the electro-conductivity of a salt solution in the properties of water or salt. When they combine in solution new properties arise that can be discussed only in terms of a special science, physical chemistry. Similarly when the organism functions as a whole we get "mind" and mental phenomena can be discussed only in terms of what is mental, not in terms of the functions of isolated organs or groups of organs of the body.¹

On the other hand mental processes unquestionably depend on the integrity of the nervous system and somehow or other they have developed with the evolution of the central nervous system. Fundamentally some parallelism must exist. Psychology is a biological science and, therefore, must be subject to biological laws. Consequently any system of psychology must rest at bottom on certain laws analogous to those of biology or else the system is wrong or the biology wrong. Biology being an older, more tested, science it is safe to assume reliability for its more fundamental tenets. It is natural, therefore, to test the validity of any new psychological theory by looking to see if it be biologically sound. Psychoanalysis has escaped the pitfalls described above by treating objectively, but as purely mental, the most dynamic factors in mental life. But are its hypotheses biologically sound?

Any book which makes anything like a serious at-

¹ For further discussion of this problem see MacCurdy, "Psychiatry and 'Scientific Psychology,'" *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. V, No. 2.

tempt to answer this question is an important contribution. Rivers' work¹ is, however, doubly important in that he not only raises this problem and in part answers it but also opens for discussion a series of most stimulating problems. He does not call his book a discussion of psychoanalysis but in effect it is, since his central theme is an unconscious distinctly of the kind which Freud describes and with which the latter's name will always be associated. One should bear in mind that Rivers has established his position as a scientist by important work in physiology, neurology, psychology and, particularly, ethnology. When, during the war, his attention was drawn to the war neuroses he approached their study not with a background of psychopathological training but with a wide experience in the biological sciences and extensive familiarity with scientific method.

Discussion and criticism of his work is difficult. It is too important to pass over with a mere statement of his general conclusions, while it is impossible to present his arguments adequately and criticize them fully in one chapter. It is therefore hoped that the reader will refer to the original text, which justifies close study. Perhaps it may be best to digest and criticize each chapter separately. Incidental, unimportant comments will occasionally be inserted in square brackets.

His first chapter is introductory. His aim is to consider the mechanism of neuroses in their relation

¹ "Instinct and the Unconscious," by W. H. R. Rivers, Cambridge University Press, 1920.

to biological reactions with an attempt to show that psychoneuroses represent a solution of conflict between opposed and incompatible principles of mental activity.

In Chapters II and III he deals with definitions. If he had written nothing but these chapters it would make his publication worth while, not because his definitions are necessarily final in their accuracy but because he attempts to do what has never been done in psychoanalysis, the lack of which has brought such confusion into the writings of Freud and his followers. The *unconscious* he defines as a deep level of mental activity which is brought into consciousness only in dreams, abnormal states and by special psychological technique. He definitely eliminates mental experience which is not in consciousness but may be brought there by focusing the attention. He also excludes from this category material which appears in consciousness without one knowing why he has thought of it. He prefers not to say that the subject is unconscious of the mode of its appearance but rather that such phenomena are *unwitting*. For instance, one person may unwittingly suggest one thing to another. *Suppression* is a process by which experience becomes unconscious. It is never the result of conscious volition. When one excludes anything from consciousness by an effort of will the process is one of *repression*. Repression leads over into suppression only when conditions favorable for the latter are present.

His choice of the term "suppression" is unfortunate because general usage has given it a flavor of

annihilation rather than of keeping in abeyance. It would have been better if Rivers had kept the term "repression" for this and found another for what he calls "repression." His concept of "repression" is open to criticism but this will be postponed till later when the topic is more fully discussed. Although I do not accept these terms, Rivers' usage will be adopted throughout this chapter to avoid confusion.

In Chapter IV he considers the analogies existing between the psychological principle of suppression and what is known as inhibition in biology. The first comparison is with the inhibition of elements of protopathic sensibility when epicritic sensibility is restored. When the former type exists alone localization is massive, the sensation may radiate over a large field or be referred by the subject to quite a distant area. This radiation and reference disappear when the discriminative, epicritic, sensibility is developed. He thinks there is a similar inhibition occurring when, in a protopathic area, the presence of temperature sensation may prevent a pain stimulus from being appreciated.¹ The central cortex exercises epicritic-like inhibition over thalamic sensibility, for the affective aspects of the latter appear in exaggerated form when the former is removed. On the efferent side he cites similar phenomena in the mass reflexes which are liberated in man and animals when the spinal cord is isolated from the brain. These are racial inhibitions or suppressions presumably recapitulated in individual development.

¹ His description of the phenomenon will be quoted later.

Only those entities are suppressed that are elements of experience (psychological) or of behavior (physiological) incompatible with later, more refined and discriminatory developments. Other elements fuse with what is compatible in the later specializations to form higher functions. Rivers uses the term "unconscious" to include material only of the first order, that is, whatever is incompatible.

This comparison of neurological with psychological function is probably the most important single contribution in Rivers' book. It not only enables us to understand suppression but makes it seem inevitable that suppression should occur in the psychological as in the neurological field. At the same time it is unfortunate that Rivers should have chosen for one of his first examples of suppression in the physiological field a phenomenon not only unconfirmed by other observers but also one that can better be interpreted as a psychic than as a neurological affair. This is his claim that the presence of a temperature stimulus may inhibit a pain impulse. The experiment was this, in Rivers' words:

"On the normal skin stimulation by a temperature of 40°C.-44°C. produces a pleasant sensation of heat free from any element of pain, and this effect was present on the dorsum of Head's thumb after epicritic sensibility had returned. The index knuckle lingered in its recovery behind the thumb, so that at one stage of the experiment when epicritic sensibility was present on the thumb, it was still absent on the index knuckle. At this time stimulation of the knuckle by cold produced a referred sensation of cold on the dorsum of the thumb. When the two regions were stimulated simultaneously, the thumb by a stimulus of 40°C.-44°C. and the index knuckle by cold, the two temperature sensations on

the thumb neutralized one another and a third mode of sensation, one of pain, appeared. The observation is most naturally interpreted by the supposition that when a temperature sensation is present, any painful element is suppressed. Though the pain was localized on the thumb, it may have belonged either to the heat sensation due to direct stimulation of this region or to the referred cold."

The type of "pain" is not described. Now pain, particularly in its minor grades is an intensely subjective phenomenon. Some authors think that "hot" which cannot be distinguished from intense cold is due to simultaneous stimulation by heat- and cold-spots. If this view were sound one might imagine that the perception here experienced was merely this composite "thermal pain" feeling. In this case the product would be one of fusion, not of suppression. Or the subjective realization may have been one of discomfort due to incapacity to focus attention either on warmth or coolness. The painful quality of tickling probably has this, purely psychological origin. In either event it is difficult to see how there is any "suppression" here for pain is not produced by the ranges of temperature stimuli employed in this experiment, either when they are applied to the normal skin or to a regenerating area. It is unlikely, therefore, that either the cold or warmth had been inhibiting a painful response. The latter was a new creation. But even if we assume that the warmth, for example, was a quality which kept a latent pain stimulus from being perceived (it is impossible to express these ideas except in psychological terms) is this an example of "sup-

pression" as Rivers defines that term? If so the temperature sensation would be a later, more discriminative development incompatible with a primitive pain sense, which is nowhere claimed. Moreover by defining the unconscious as that which manifests itself only in dreams, abnormal states or under special technique, he is stressing the *permanent* nature of the suppression. When protopathic elements are inhibited by epicritic the former reappear only under pathological circumstances. The disappearance of protopathic pain sensation when a temperature stimulus is given means merely that under protopathic conditions both pain and heat stimuli below 45° C. may not be registered at the same time. This is an example of inhibition, if you will, but not of the kind of inhibition of which Rivers is writing. It would be better to speak of this as an alternation of function. There are many examples of this. For instance we do not chew and swallow at the same time except with great effort. When we begin to swallow we cease chewing. But we have not lost the power to chew, that function is momentarily in abeyance while the muscles involved are engaged in another series of coördinated movements. Riddoch¹ found that this occurs even with the isolated spinal cord. The coitus reflex "inhibited" the urination reflex. In neither case has chewing nor urination become "unconscious." It is simply the impossibility of using the same organs at the same time for two different purposes.

¹"The Reflex Functions of the Completely Divided Spinal Cord in Man." *Brain*, Vol. 40, 1917.

In the psychological field this alternation of function is determined by an *alternation of attention*. We react to whatever in the environment we are giving our attention but to other stimuli we are inert. If I am looking for a taxi I scrutinize each motor that comes down the street and finally signal one of them. But if I intend to walk I am indifferent to all motors and could not say after one had passed whether it had been there or not. This difference of behavior in the latter instance involves no loss of my capacity to see or recognize a taxi. I have not suppressed the capacity. I simply have given no attention to motors of any kind. Similarly the chauffeur, while driving, sees many things in the traffic which modify his behavior but when walking he may be quite unaware of them and remain unaffected by them. If, on the other hand, his capacity for watching traffic were truly suppressed he would become incapable of driving. We shall see that Rivers has largely vitiated his work by frequently confusing true suppression with alternation of attention.

In Chapter V he begins an inquiry as to what the unconscious mind contains. From analogy with the neurological parallels and from clinical examples (which mainly or entirely have to do with fear) he concludes that suppression is directed against affective experience or intellectual experience which has a strong emotional coloring. The affect is a painful one. With these experiences others connected with them by association may also be suppressed, so that the unconscious may contain neutral as well as affective experience.

The next question is the biological nature of the suppressed material. He rejects Freud's concept of the wish because it is derived from consciousness and prefers to follow the scheme of Shand and McDougall, which allies affect and instinct. If the content of the unconscious be affective, it should by the same token be instinctive. "It is thus suggested that there is the closest relation between the unconscious and instinct, that the unconscious is a storehouse of experience associated with instinctive reactions. Moreover, I have shown that suppression, the process by which the conscious becomes unconscious, itself takes place unwittingly. The question arises how far the unwitting character of a process is a mark of instinct and is associated with instinctive reactions." This leads him naturally to discussion of the nature of instincts.

But before following him in this it may be well to pause and examine the nature of the argument he is making. In the first place his examples of suppressed material have to do with fear. His only clinical experience has been with the war neuroses in which that was naturally the most prominent emotion. He eliminated Freud's term of "wish" as being too conscious, forgetting that, except for its unfortunately voluntary coloring it has no theoretic, biological implications. It is merely a label. By adopting the Shand-McDougall hypothesis, however, he has involved himself in the acceptance of something it is very hard to prove—the specific association of certain affects with certain instincts. This uncritical acceptance does not do any serious damage

to his thesis so long as he confines his attention to such primitive reactions as those of danger where an association with fear is easy to demonstrate. But the finer shades of emotion that are the most important for us in our daily lives (outside dramatic emergencies) are not associated so obviously with instincts that can be easily demonstrated. In other words Rivers is gently preparing the way for a psychology of danger reactions which may appear to be a psychology of all emotional reactions. He has fallen into the error of practically all psychologists, who when they wish to study emotions, confined their research to fear and then assume their findings to have universal application.

In Chapter VI he takes up first the discriminations that have been attempted between instinct and intelligence. The term is used so loosely by many psychopathologists that it is refreshing to read something really critical on this subject. The differentiation cannot be made, he says, on the basis of human as opposed to animal behavior, because men show unreasoning reactions and many animals have been demonstrated to be capable of just that mental behavior which we are accustomed to look on as intellectual. Similarly, a physiological discrimination on the basis of cortical and subcortical localization of their functions does not hold, or at least remains unproved. Further, even if it could not be demonstrated, it is plain that this differentiation would not be practicable in psychology. The best biological comparison is between what is innate and what is acquired, but this does not help us

where we need greatest assistance, namely, in considering the behavior of higher animals and men where it is often impossible to distinguish between the innate and the acquired. He therefore concludes that it is necessary to analyze instincts, in an effort to determine their psychological characteristics. This may be done by comparing the mentality of man as opposed to that of animals, and of adults as opposed to infants.

He finds three characteristics to appear when this comparison is made. Instinctive reactions tend to follow the *all-or-none* law; the reaction is unreflective and, finally, the nature of the response is immediate or uncontrolled. The *all-or-none* law is best demonstrated in a nerve impulse, which is the same no matter what the strength of the stimulus may be, provided this latter be adequate. Protopathic phenomena also tend to follow this law. For instance the sensation of cold is "roughly the same" for stimuli ranging from 0° C. to 20° C. Heart muscle and the mass reflex have similar behavior. Fechner's formula (sensation is proportional to the logarithm of this stimulus) does not hold strictly for affective phenomena. It is only when instinctive reactions are overlaid with experience (intellectual or "epicritic" development) that proportional response appears at all.

These three characteristics hold for the instinctive behavior of man but not for many invertebrates (ants, bees, etc.) when what seems to be instinctive behavior is characterized by discrimination and graduation of response.

In Chapter VII he divides instincts into three groups, those of self-preservation (appetites and danger instincts); of preservation of the race (sex and parental instincts with the tender emotions); and the herd instinct (suggestion, sympathy, intuition and imitation). No definite lines, however, form the boundaries between these three groups.

It may be remarked at this point that this is a convenient, workable classification. But to make proper use of it one should assign all instinctive processes to one or another group or to the combined action of different groups. This Rivers does only in part and leaves discussion of the sex instincts quite untouched! The value of the classification for psychopathological purposes therefore remains undemonstrated.

He proceeds with a discussion of the danger instincts. There are five types of reaction to danger: flight, aggression, what he calls "manipulative activity," immobility and collapse. Manipulative activity is a complex response to a complex situation such as the manœvering and discharge of his weapon by the hunter, the unreflective operations of the aviator, etc. The simians also have this instinctive reaction, he thinks. Collapse is usually accompanied by coarse tremors or convulsive jerks that would nullify the effect of concealment obtained by perfect immobility. Rivers thinks it particularly likely to occur when one of the other instinctive reactions is frustrated of completion.

The emotional states accompanying these reactions furnish Rivers with the central data of his

theories. He says that fear accompanies flight, although admitting that the evidence is inconclusive and that fear is most likely to develop with impeded flight. Anger is the affect with aggression. On the other hand there is absence of affect with manipulative activity. The fear which one would expect has been suppressed, he claims, because it may reappear later in a dream of the same dangerous incident. Further the absence of pain from stimuli acting during the crisis which would normally cause pain is further proof of the suppression. Pain and fear are also not found with immobility, another example of suppression. Finally terror is the regular accompaniment of collapse, being a product of frustrated activity.

With the last statement one can agree unqualifiedly but each of the others is open to question. It is customary, of course, to associate fear and flight although we have no evidence to prove it. As to its existence in animals we can naturally have neither proof nor disproof. They cannot tell us and we can observe these actions closely only when their flight is prevented or retarded so that the frustration reaction appears. In man whenever fear appears flight or the thought of flight is invariably unsuccessful. Whenever a man fears he is invariably thinking of failure in his efforts to escape the danger or abolish it. On the other hand, if he directs his *whole* attention to the circumvention of the danger—in other words, if he indulges in what Rivers calls manipulative activity, he feels no fear. This is a phenomenon of attention; our reactions, both sen-

sory and motor, depend on that to which we give attention. As to the reappearance of the "suppressed fear" in a dream, I would take issue here on a point of fact. It is my opinion that when an individual relives with accuracy in a dream an exciting adventure in which no fear was felt, there is again no fear in the dream. What we do find is that a different outcome is dramatized in the dream. For instance an aviator after a successful combat may dream of encounter under similar circumstances of the same opponent. But now it is he, the dreamer, who is, or is going to be shot down. In the dream attention is given to the immanence or possibility of destruction. In the actual encounter there is no thought given to the chance of failure but only to what should be done. In other words the situation is not looked on as one of danger but as an emergency. The absence of pain is similarly a phenomenon of attention. The individual is thinking solely of how he shall meet the emergency, or, in some cases, his attention is wholly given to the novelty of the situation. When a man does not feel the nail in his shoe as he runs to catch a train, he has not suppressed the pain, he simply does not think of it. Similarly if two noxious stimuli are applied to the same region of the body, we can feel pain only from that which is more intense. We can only attend to one pain at a time. The second, greater stimulus, has not suppressed the first, it simply has engrossed the attention. If it suppressed it, according to Rivers' original definition, the first pain could only reappear under abnormal circumstances, but instead

of that it reappears so soon as the second stimulus is withdrawn.¹

The absence of fear and pain with immobility is a most important link in Rivers' argument since he later bases his theory of hysteria on this, alleged, suppression. It is important for animals who adopt immobility to do it perfectly hence absence of fear and pain (which might lead to movement) are necessary. But so far as fear is concerned, is it not just as simple to assume that they practice indifference as that they develop an emotion and then suppress it? If immobility be a fundamental reaction, as Rivers assumes, why should it have any affect attached to it? Why should it not be an essentially negative reaction throughout? In fact one might assume that it is so fundamental that it goes back to an evolutionary period preceding that when affect appeared at all. But these are pure speculations. Animals cannot tell us what they are feeling or thinking. Men can. In the pathological state known as stupor we find the closest analogue to the immobility reaction of animals. In it the central symptoms are inactivity and apathy. A large amount of evidence² leaves little reason to doubt that interest and attention are withdrawn from the environment

¹ Although not an essential part of the argument one cannot let go unchallenged the statement that manipulative activity is an instinctive reaction in the ordinary sense of the term. It is definitely an acquired thing, it is no more unreflective than is any rapid activity, it is highly discriminative and response is far from uncontrolled. It does not live up to a single one of Rivers' characteristics of instinct. That self-preservation motivates manipulative activity is self-evident; but that is quite another matter.

² Hoch, "Benign Stupors."

—totally so when the reaction is complete. There is then complete inactivity, complete absence of evidence of pain and both objectively and subjectively in retrospect, no affect of any kind. On the other hand in another psychopathic reaction, depression, there is good evidence for repression producing such inactivity as exists and accompanying this there is intense affect. The reaction of immobility may therefore be looked on more satisfactorily as a phenomenon of attention than of suppression.

At this point Rivers suggests that suppression is basically an immobility reaction and later assumes it to be so. It is therefore worth while to examine the claim carefully. Even if the argument alleging attention in place of suppression be unsound, there is a more fundamental objection to this hypothesis. Suppression produces the content of the unconscious. This remains in the unconscious except under abnormal circumstances. But as Rivers points out a number of times the immobility reaction is only one of a number of possible reactions to danger. The animal may suddenly alternate inactivity with flight. If it had "suppressed" muscular movements how could they appear again so easily? This is an example of alternate function (alternate attention psychologically) not of suppression.

As a matter of fact alternating function is the exact analogue of what Rivers calls "repression," i.e., a conscious process of excluding one reaction or one thought in order to take up another. This point is discussed again in the criticism of the "Repression Neurosis." The kind of suppression which

Rivers' definition of the unconscious demands must be permanent, a continuing, rather than a temporary, process. To me, at least, this seems possible only as result of a conflict that persists between permanent incompatibilities. We should therefore look for the origin of suppression in the coincident operation of opposing instincts—that is if we assume suppression to be instinctive, as we well may. Trotter¹ long ago made the fundamental claim that sex and self preservation did not tend to operate concurrently but alternately so that no serious conflict could arise between them. But, as he pointed out, the herd instincts do operate (or motivate) concurrently with either of the other two. We should therefore look to herd instinct for the origin of suppression. As to conflicts between instincts of different orders Rivers has very little to say.

Whether anger is a necessary accompaniment of aggression or whether it may be an affect appearing only with ineffective aggression is a question to answer which we have not so much evidence as in the case of fear and flight. One slaps at a fly quite equably and remains calm if the fly is killed. But if the fly eludes destruction and continues to buzz around irritability appears. Again a frustrated activity. But this anger reaction is not essential to Rivers' argument so we need not tarry longer with it.

In the next chapter he considers how far the all-or-none principle is found in the instinctive reac-

¹“Instincts of the Herd in Peace and in War,” London, Fisher Unwin Co., 1919.

tions just discussed. Flight and anger reactions follow it or tend to do so. Immobility must be an all-or-none affair while manipulative activity is largely so. [This last seems a strange statement. Manipulative activity that ceased for a moment to be discriminative and controlled would at once become flight, aggression or immobility.] When forgetting is an active process (i.e., suppression) memory is either present or absent, but there are gradations in the difficulty of recall. Hence suppression does not follow the all-or-none principle completely except, perhaps in childhood. It may therefore be presumed that in the course of development suppression has become capable of gradation, just as certain elements of protopathic sensibility have been shown by Head to fuse with the developing epicritic and so attain discriminative function.

The ninth chapter deals with biological analogies to the process of suppression. Man probably inherited his most normal reaction to danger—manipulative activity—from his arboreal ancestors. If the early simians had not already had the capacity for suppression developed, if they had not been able to suppress with ease their terrestrial reactions when they took to the trees, this change in mode of life would have been disastrous. But the more primitive reactions to danger must have already demanded a suppression capacity for the alternative behavior of flight and immobility found in much less specialized animals. In fact the most fundamental and far-reaching suppressions must be present in animals which undergo metamorphoses in the course

of their development. For instance the moth must suppress reactions appropriate to the caterpillar, the frog must breathe and move himself in a totally different way from the tadpole. Reappearance of the habits peculiar to the earlier phase would be fatal in the second. Suppression in man involves perpetuation in the unconscious. As an example of something similar in a lower form of life, he cites the case of a butterfly returning to a special plant to lay its egg, presuming that it carries latently an attraction to the plant on which it developed as a caterpillar.

This chapter is highly important. The examples from the changing reactions of animals are not valid, as we have seen; but the analogy with metamorphosis is suggestive. It tempts one to the generalization that suppression is a process whereby earlier thoughts, or modes of thought, are eliminated from consciousness when development leads to adaptations, or the preponderance of instincts, that are incompatible with the former mental activity.

In the following chapters Rivers applies his principles to a study of separate psychological and psychopathological phenomena.

The first of them is *dissociation*, which he points out is not used in the neurological sense of one function isolated or eliminated by disease but in its psychological meaning of a process by which experience is separated from normal consciousness and remains active. An example of this is the fugue. Morton Prince has coined the term of "co-consciousness" as a label for such mental processes as have

independent existence during the fugue and presumably are latent during the normal periods; similarly the normal consciousness is presumed to be co-conscious during the fugue. Rivers rejects this terminology because he thinks these presumptions are not backed by sufficient evidence in these cases to justify the inevitable implication of a separate consciousness, of which the subject is at the moment unaware. He admits this to be proved only in such cases of multiple personality as Morton Prince has described with Miss Beauchamp. So he limits the term "dissociation" to experience separated and having independent consciousness, which he terms "alternate consciousness."

Suppression can exist without dissociation. As an example of this the activity known as night terrors or nightmares may show no evidence of diurnal operation, even when the subject is exposed to grave danger. The fear reaction keeps recurring in dreams alone. [This sounds like the uncritical acceptance of a patient's statement. Others' experience would not confirm it. Nevertheless the discrepancy between diurnal and nocturnal fear is striking. It is to be accounted for, as above, by a change of attention.] Another example of suppression not leading to dissociation is the disappearance from consciousness of experience of early childhood which reappears in character formation. This is brought about by a process of fusion, analogous to that of certain elements of protopathic sensibility which may fuse with the super-added epicritic.

Again, a suppressed memory of a fearful experi-

ence which produces phobias is not dissociated, because we have no evidence of a separate consciousness. When fear does occur, the suppression is incomplete, the idea tending to appear but the affect only doing so. The affect boils over, as it were.

For the psychological process of dissociation, he finds biological analogies in the dissociation of life in water and on land of the amphibians. These two environments demand kinds of behavior so different that the mental processes while on land must imply a complete dissociation by the water reactions and *vice versa*. There must be alternate consciousness. Man probably went through such a stage in his phylogenetic development and then acquired the capacity for dissociation. Later he changed from land to arboreal life gradually with *integration* of the two types of reaction. The ability to switch from one line of interest or activity to another is an epicritic-like modification of this primitive dissociation tendency. The keeping of ideas in logic-tight compartments (e.g., science and religion) is more related to true dissociation. This imperfect integration is characteristic of many delusional states. [Quite true.]

Serious objection may be made to Rivers' interpretation of what dissociation means. Criticism centers around his elimination of Prince's term of "co-consciousness." In his desire to be cautious he has been entrapped in loose thinking. If he is to deny consciousness to dissociated mental processes, he should define what he means by consciousness, but curiously enough he nowhere at-

tempts this definition in his book. By analogy one might presume that he considers consciousness to be an epicritic-like development. If so, there is more evidence of this in the behavior of many "complexes," than there is in that of most amphibia, whose lives, he claims, show perfect dissociation and alternate consciousness. If the amphibian has consciousness, the latent "complex" must have it too. It must therefore be "co-conscious."

Another definition which would suit his general argument is that consciousness exists when the body of experience or mental processes in question shows a capacity for recognition of a stimulus to which it responds. For instance the land reactions of the frog have consciousness in this sense when they respond to an appropriate stimulus. This amounts to a capacity for independent reaction. Now if we accept this definition—and, if Rivers should not, his entire system would fall to pieces—alternate consciousness implies co-consciousness. If, for instance, there is not some kind of consciousness uniting the reactions of the fugue state while the subject is still normal, the fugue could never be called into being. If the only consciousness in existence were the normal one, nothing but normal reactions would ever occur. Similarly, let us consider the case of the suppressed memory of a fearful event which produces a phobia. In the presence of a suitable stimulus the memory is stimulated and the organism as a whole responds with an exhibition of fear. The actual memory does not come into awareness, it is true, but objectively, there is as much evidence of con-

sciousness attaching to the memory as there is in any reaction of an amphibian. The fact of the matter is that psychologists and psychopathologists have for years been using the term consciousness in two senses, one of subjective awareness and the other of stimulability. Until Morton Prince produced his term of co-consciousness, we had no discrimination in our terminology for these difficult concepts. Now we have: consciousness is subjective awareness; co-consciousness is capacity for specific reaction without subjective awareness. These terms are purely human. We still need a third to cover the "consciousness" of the animals who cannot tell us of what they are thinking. Will the students of animal psychology give us one? Until they do, we shall probably have to be content with "consciousness," remembering that it implies neither the existence nor the absence of subjective awareness.

Of course Rivers is too logical to make such mistakes as these, were they not connected with other details of his theory. We shall see that his antagonism to "co-consciousness" is justified. If he adapted this term and concept, if he assigned any form of consciousness to "complexes" in general his interpretation of hysteria would explode.

Chapter XI deals with the "complex" which he defines as affective experience or body of experience unconscious but capable of influencing behavior. [As we have just seen the latter characteristic implies co-consciousness.] He objects to Bernard Hart's wider use of the term including conscious constellations of ideas. These, he says, correspond more

closely to the "sentiments" of the academic psychologists.

His criticism of loose usage of the term "complex" is warranted and Hart is not the only culprit. On the other hand there is a certain pragmatic justification for this looseness, since in most cases analysis reveals a true complex (i.e., something not in subjective awareness) underlying the purely conscious "sentiment." But, as the latter may be a distorted expression of the former, it is not right to label the complex until it has been demonstrated. For instance a political antipathy may be based ultimately on antagonism to the father which is unconscious. The former is a sentiment, the latter a complex. That does not justify calling the hatred for some politician a complex.

In Chapter XII he analyzes *suggestion* and relates it to herd instinct. These are important elements in his general argument. McDougall has classified the elements of herd instinct as follows: on the cognitive side there is suggestion, on the affective sympathy and on the conative imitation. "If I were to use suggestion as a term for the cognitive aspect of the gregarious instinct, I should prefer to define it as the process which makes every member of the group aware of what is passing in the minds of the other members of the group." He prefers, however, not to use suggestion as a cognitive aspect of herd instinct but in a broader sense as the process by which one mind acts on another unwittingly. It is its unwitting character which allies it with the unconsciousness and hence with instinct. Imitation

may be purely a conscious process, so he uses *mimesis* for the unwitting form of imitation. *Sympathy* is generally recognized as unwitting, so no new term is needed for this, but he thinks *intuition* is the best term for unwitting recognition of cognitive activities in the mind of another person. *Mimesis* sympathy and intuition would then make up suggestion. He thus makes suggestion equivalent to herd instinct and says its function is to produce harmony of action in the group. This harmony is more complete than that attained by intellectual methods. Of this he gives some excellent examples from personal observation of Melanesians. What we call "tact" is an example in our own civilization. Another example he thinks is the ability we all possess to guide ourselves or our vehicles through traffic, always recognizing without conscious efforts what the movements of others will be. [This last is probably more of an habitual intellectual operation. Cats have it to a far higher degree than dogs, though cats are solitary animals.]

Before discussing his views as to the interaction of suggestion and other instincts, we should pause to consider what Rivers has done so far. In the first place is he justified, biologically, in allying suggestion exclusively with the herd instinct? From an evolutionary standpoint it seems probable that long before herd life existed a high degree of coöperation between individuals must have been developed in connection with sex activities. This coöperation is essential for mating even quite low in the animal scale, while with any kind of family life the mother

and offspring must show a good deal of harmony, else the latter will perish. The evidence of sex operating in human suggestion need not be discussed here. Neither determination excludes the other, nor should it be made to do so even by implication.

What warrant is there for making suggestion equivalent to herd instinct or its only manifestation? This makes the instinct operate only in the presence of others and thus eliminates from consideration its motivating power—the desire to think and behave as others do, which acts through imagination, when there are no companions. This, of course, is one of Trotter's great contributions—the individual operation of the herd instinct. It is this makes internal conflict not merely an incident but a permanency.

He proceeds to discuss the interaction of suggestion and the danger instincts. He finds suggestion of particular value in connection with immobility because with this reaction there cannot be readiness for an instant change to other behavior on the part of every member of the group. If they are suddenly to flee, for instance, all must flee at once. He therefore thinks that suggestion is connected with the potential activity of suppressed tendencies. A sudden change of activity is like dissociation. Suggestion by its very nature implies a gradation of individual response to various stimuli. Hence it is different from the all-or-none, or protopathic type of instinct. He suggests that herd life may have caused a different type of modification of primary protopathic instinct in addition to that of intelligence (the

epicritic type). Insect development may have been along this line. [An excellent suggestion.]

There are two statements in this last paragraph that should be challenged. First as to the relationship of suggestion to the potential activity of suppressed tendencies. Suggestion, in this connection, is just one method of directing attention to a stimulus appropriate for the new reaction. This new reaction has not been suppressed in the proper sense of the term as we have seen. Secondly, he speaks of "the suppression of the instinct of immobility." Earlier he has derived suppression from immobility. Now suppression is suppressing itself. A suppression cannot be suppressed; it can only be abolished. Throughout this section he treats immobility as if it were an active process.

Chapter XII deals with *hypnotism* in which he notes four essential phenomena or groups of phenomena: (1) heightened suggestibility, (2) wider range of sensibility, (3) anesthesia and amnesia, which he regards as suppression and (4) dissociation. Naturally he attempts to ally these phenomena with the instincts he has been discussing. Although usually an individual rather than a group phenomenon, hypnotism shows intuition (wider range of sensibility) and the heightened suggestibility characteristic of herd suggestion. The analogy of suppression is not so clear, but the immobility of this group and cataleptic phenomena of animals and of hypnotized man are analogous and he points out further that unwitting suggestions in hypnotism are particularly apt to lead to anesthetics and

paralyses. This makes it seem possible that hypnotism is connected with the instinct of immobility. Dissociation has already been shown to be connected with herd suggestion. He therefore thinks that suggestion utilizes the primary principles of suppression and dissociation: "Hypnotism is an artificial process in which man has wittingly utilized a process, or group of processes, which normally takes place unwittingly." Suggestion and intelligence ("epicritic" factor) are the two agencies by which the cruder "protopathic" instincts are usually contrasted. "From this point of view we may regard hypnotism as a process in which Man has discovered that he can direct the instinctive process of suggestion and annul the activity of intelligence, thus giving the mastery to suggestion with its three aspects of mimesis, sympathy and intuition."

Finally he is forced to consider post-hypnotic phenomena in which activities so plainly "co-conscious" are present. With his antagonism to "co-consciousness," these phenomena are awkward. He admits that if one grants co-consciousness in multiple personalities, it is probable that co-consciousness is a good explanation for post-hypnotic phenomena and that in this case the natural extension of the argument is to include fugue activities as similarly determined. Having admitted this much, he gets out of his dilemma with this naïve statement:

"Though I regard this hypothesis as possible and even legitimate, I do not propose to adopt it, but to continue to speak of the fugue as an example of alternate consciousness and to reserve 'co-consciousness' for cases of double or multiple personality.

When speaking of post-hypnotic suggestion, I shall regard it as an example of the independent activity of suppressed experience, and leave it an open question whether this experience is or is not co-conscious."

In criticism of these views I can only say that if one were prepared to accept his previous arguments about suppression and immobility, change of activity being dissociation and suggestion being purely a herd phenomenon, these applications of his hypotheses might be acceptable. It is, however, a little difficult to follow him when he speaks of the abolition of the "epieritic" factor in hypnosis. One cannot read any of the literature of experimental hypnotism without being struck by the exquisite discrimination revealed not only in perception of stimuli but also in response. So far as the *mechanism* of hypnotic phenomena goes, it is a comparatively simple matter to subsume them under the heading of anomalies of attention—but this has been discussed in an earlier chapter. As to its dynamic interpretation it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the sex instinct has something to do with it, when one considers its emotional concomitants and the attitude of the subject towards the hypnotist often existent before and after the séance.

His treatment of *sleep* in the next chapter follows similar lines. He finds processes of "suppression" and "dissociation" and evidence of suggestive mechanisms in waking stimuli. As one would expect, he allies sleep with suppression and immobility, although admitting that it is more universal than immobility—"instead of coming into action

only in the presence of danger, is normally of daily occurrence." This seems queer biology or psychology, to explain the universal and fundamental in terms of the more occasional phenomenon! But, of course, if he began with sleep, he would have to admit a withdrawal reaction; immobility would then become just one example of this and there would then be no analogies for "suppression" as he conceives it.

In Chapter XV Rivers finally reaches the problem of the psychoneuroses, gives an excellent general statement and discusses specifically what he terms the "Repression Neurosis." Psychoneuroses, he says, are due to failures in the maintenance of equilibrium between instincts and the forces controlling them. There are two general factors concerned in the loss of balance, increased strength of the instincts on the one hand and weakening of the inhibiting forces on the other. Often these two factors are both in operation. As examples of the former type he cites the greater forces of the sex instincts at puberty or the stimulus applied to the danger instincts in war. Loss of control may be occasioned by fatigue, intercurrent physical disease and the like. Again there are two influences which produce different types of neurotic reaction. The instincts involved may differ (for instance the war neuroses are simple because the danger instincts are simple) or, a more important matter, the methods chosen to restore equilibrium may differ.

An attempt is always made, he thinks, to suppress the disturbing instinct, for example the soldier tries

to repress his danger reactions and fear. If this attempt be successful, the incipient neurosis disappears. In what is usually called the "Anxiety Neurosis" the unbalance is focused around a particularly unpleasant or dangerous experience with an accompanying effect of shame, horror or fear. The patient tries to repress this and exhausts himself in the process, so that the experience becomes more dominant in his mind. Finally it gains complete control and then there is established what Rivers calls the "Repression Neurosis." Integration of the experience or its suppression have not taken place and the effort to repress it has only magnified the conflict. Suppression, as he has pointed out, is instinctive, while repression is an epicritic function, an intellectual affair. Therefore the patient who represses ". . . is not merely aware of the conflict, but both the factors in the original conflict and the various symptoms which the conflict produces tend to become the subject of rationalizations, and to act as the nuclei of morbid intellectual processes, of the nature of delusions but differing therefrom in their being open to criticism and capable of being removed by knowledge and appeals to the intelligence." In this state there is always a painful mental condition, but this is also amenable to cure by the patient's own understanding of the factors involved. The anxiety or repression neurosis is, therefore, the result of trying to use wittingly an instinctive and unwitting process which acts with facility in childhood but not so readily in the adult.

Such a theory is tenable only by one with limited

clinical experience. The description is applicable to many cases of war anxiety but is not relevant to the anxiety states of civilian life where concern with the memory of a particular, painful incident is the exception rather than the rule and where conflicts are not conscious. In fact if Rivers had not had this theory in mind he would probably have recalled a good many cases of war anxiety states when this phenomenon was absent or unimportant. A fair number of patients gave a history of becoming more and more "fed-up," more and more fearful and finally broke down completely as a result of the gradual increase of their symptoms or as the result of concussion of which they had no memory. That painful memories were always operating in these cases is probably indisputable—they often appeared in dreams, for instance—but not infrequently they were quite unconscious. In such cases the anxiety persisted in the absence of "repression" and the presence of "suppression."

But even if we narrow down the discussion to those cases which Rivers' description fits we still encounter difficulties. It is questionable whether any one can ever put anything out of his mind by direct effort, no matter how he try. When "repression" is apparently successful, attention has been distracted to something else. In fact a little analysis shows that direct exclusion of a thought from consciousness is impossible. If I say to myself "I will not think of *A*," I am, *ipso facto*, thinking of *A*. I adopt rather the custom of ridding my mind of *A* by thinking of *B*. I change the di-

rection of my attention and so long as I succeed in this *A* remains out of consciousness. If there be no reason for *A* again attracting my attention, the idea of *A* is gone permanently. Rivers' process of "repression" is really a change of attention, like the alternate reactions, immobility and flight, which he regards as the basis of suppression. On the other hand, I may not succeed in diverting my attention to *B*; the thought of *A* keeps coming back to my mind again and again. It has some peculiar fascination for me. In other words it "obsesses" me. The symptom which Rivers discusses is really that of obsession. It is characteristic of the obsessional thought that the patient cannot account logically for its persistence. There is something unconscious here. It represents some other idea or tendency in the unconscious. When that is brought to light the obsession may disappear. These obsessions so frequent in war anxiety states, are important only in so far as they prevent adequate conscious examination of the preëxisting thoughts, now no longer conscious, which determines both the anxiety and the obsession. This *Anlage* is the essential thing. In Rivers' cases (given in Appendix III) when this *Anlage* was sufficiently powerful discussion of the painful thoughts (i. e., the cessation of "repression") brought no relief.

The relationship of attention to pathological fear is of prime importance. In any situation that is potentially dangerous, if attention be given to its dangerous aspects fear is present. For instance the soldier who hears a shell coming and immedi-

ately thinks of its hitting him is invariably afraid. The "courageous" soldier, on the other hand, thinks of what must be done about it and gives no attention, no thought, to its death dealing power. This does not imply any suppression of knowledge, merely an indifference which he has developed. Many situations of civilian life are potentially dangerous, but those of us who are normal pay no attention to such potentialities. For instance, I am not afraid of street traffic, although the man who is driving a car towards me might put his foot on the accelerator instead of the brake. It is characteristic of neurotic fear and phobias that attention is always focused exclusively on these dangerous potentialities.

This association of fear with attention introduces a definitely intellectual element into the problem. This is frequently illustrated in the phobias of children, which may occur before there is much evidence of there being a definite splitting off of the unconscious. For instance a small child unfamiliar with dogs may be frightened by one. The concept of "dog" is then something which includes only notions of barking, biting, etc. Consequently whenever a dog is seen fear appears. If, however, the child is given some opportunity of familiarizing himself with other attributes of dogs, their friendliness, playfulness and so on, the phobia disappears. So attention is no longer directed merely to the potentially dangerous characteristics of the dog, it is turned rather to those features which make him a companion. This is the reason why children, other-

wise apparently normal, develop and lose phobias with such facility. Most adults have similar reactions towards large wild animals, but lion-tamers see much more in a lion than his teeth and claws.

The fear of the child for the dog or of ourselves for a lion is not neurotic because all we know about the animal in question is dangerous. Truly neurotic fear begins when the nature of the object exciting fear is properly grasped by the patient, is recognized not to be dangerous and yet does produce terror. For instance the sufferer from claustrophobia knows as well as his normal companions that the dugout or tunnel or mine shaft is not likely to collapse but he is unable to think of anything but this possibility. We have good reason to believe that previous experience (actual or imaginary) has fixed in the patient's unconscious mind a vision of himself being buried alive or shut up in some small space from which escape is impossible. When he is placed in a situation where this *might* occur, the unconscious memory is activated to a point of dramatic intensity; fear develops and is attached consciously to a remote possibility of the present environment producing the catastrophe. Without some such unconscious factor it is inconceivable that any one would ever fail to react logically to the true nature of the environment. In other words, since something unconscious is present, something must be suppressed. The pathology of what Rivers terms the "repression" neurosis does not lie, then, in the memory which the patient is trying to exclude from

his mind, but in some other, and unconcious, memory or tendency, which is forcing the obsessing thought into the attention of the patient.

In Chapter XVI Rivers goes on to discuss what he terms "Hysteria or the Substitution Neurosis." In this condition the conflict is solved by a physical symptom (usually a loss of function) which disables the patient and thus removes him from the occasion for conflict. Paralysis and anesthasias are crude protective reactions and in war they do protect except in the rare instances when they occur on the actual field of battle. The latter cases require explanation showing their relationship to suppression, dissociation and suggestion. The loss of sensation, paralysis, amnesia and absence of painful effect are all evidences of suppression. They show a definite relationship to the immobility reaction. Paralysis may be fundamentally an attempt at "playing 'possum," in the pathological case incomplete, and hence non-adaptive.

We may pause at this point to consider these last statements. Suppression cannot be derived from immobility, as we have seen, hence amnesia and absence of painful effect cannot be regarded as immobility reactions. But how about paralysis, anesthesia and loss of localized function? Immobility, as Rivers takes occasion many times to point out, is a reaction of the whole body, it must be complete or it fails entirely of its purpose. He seems to have forgotten that there is another widespread protective reaction, immobilization of part of the body when use of that part is painful. Foster Ken-

nedy¹ has shown how after a wound of one of the extremities there is an automatic (and perfectly healthy) tendency to immobilize the part. When conflict may be solved by perpetuation of disability this immobilization continues as an hysterical symptom. Biologically, this localized loss of function represents nothing more unusual than a dog running on three legs when the fourth is hurt. It is true that Kennedy's cases were hysterias consequent on wounds but I² found that when a war "conversion hysteria" developed without a wound that the patient had always harked back to some previous physical disease, one or more symptoms of which were reënacted. Immobilization rather than immobility is therefore the probable biological reaction represented in hysterical loss of localized function.

As to the relationship with suggestion, Rivers points out that military training enhances suggestibility and that hysteria is highly mimetic. As an example of the mechanism, he cites mutism: this is a loss of speech and the cry is a signal for flight which must be inhibited if the group decide on immobility as the mode of protection to be adopted. If one animal cried out the whole group would be endangered. [The cry, or its inhibition, is just as much—or more—a function of the solitary animal. Consider the cry of a young animal to its mother or the call of the mother to her young.] His general formulation for hysteria is like that for hypnotism:

¹"The Nature of Nervousness in Soldiers," *Journal of American Medical Association*, 1918, LXXI, 17.

²"War Neuroses," Cambridge University Press, 1918.

It is due to a breaking down of one modifying factor—intelligence—allowing fuller scope to the other modifying factor—suggestion.

On reading this one is struck at once with the implication of some sort of an antagonism existing between intelligence and suggestion. This is, of course, the kernel of Trotter's work but it is a conflict not otherwise hinted at by Rivers.

He proceeds with the statement that there is no reason for considering dissociation (in his sense of the term) as present in hysteria, for there is no evidence of independent consciousness. He calls hysteria the "substitution neurosis" because there is a substitution of a primitive type of danger reaction for a fully adaptive and discriminative reaction to the danger situation. He thinks that in civilian hysteria there may be a utilization of mental processes originally developed with the danger instincts now used in the service of the sex instinct. [This is like Darwin's derivation of speech from sex.] In this connection he remarks, quite correctly, that the sex life of women has much real or imaginary danger in it and that hysteria is commoner with women than with men. He admits that some hysterical symptoms, such as convulsions and various emotional states, cannot be related to immobility and therefore suggests that there may be two kinds of hysteria, one primarily related with the danger instincts and the other with the sexual.

On perusing this chapter critically it seems that Rivers has succeeded in reducing the field of his inquiry to *some* symptoms of *one* kind of hysteria

that appeared under abnormal conditions. Why does he not discuss the tremors, coarse muscular movements and tics that occurred in war hysteria? If he admits there are other kinds (or one other kind) of hysteria, why does he not analyze them? Instead of this he gives a forced interpretation to one group of symptoms and leaves us to conclude that "hysteria" is to be understood in the light of this interpretation. It cannot account for innumerable symptoms—exaggerations or perversions of bodily function, fugues, amnesias, etc.—that occur in war as well as civilian hysteria. Janet has shown in an exquisite way how all hysterical symptoms may be psychologically interrelated but, of course, this demonstration involves such concepts as dissociation, co-consciousness, etc. Rivers would be more logical if he separated out the symptoms he writes about as belonging to a clinical group separate from hysteria in general, explicable without the invocation of dissociation and so on. But then the climax of his book would be an explanation for a small sub-group of psychopathological phenomena bearing little relation to the problems of psychopathology in general.

But his program is open to another and more serious criticism. He is speaking all the time of the immediate determination of specific and simple symptoms and not of the conflicts which are the fundamental causes of the diseases in question. From a practical, therapeutic, standpoint such discussions are of little value. Rivers has thrown no light on the inherent incompatibility of instinct

derivations, their motivations, as Trotter has done. He deals merely with the crude and primitive instinct reactions which are of relatively little importance. It is like confining a discussion of carpentry to the anatomy and physiology of the hand.

On the other hand in this chapter Rivers has perhaps initiated discussion of what may prove to be a most important principle in psychology, namely the possibility that one instinct may adopt in its expression mechanisms established in the service of another instinct. Darwin, in effect, made this suggestion when he derived speech from sex,—speech which can serve for the expression of almost any one of our instincts. But as Darwin did not write on psychology, the psychological implications of his suggestion have remained unnoted.

The remainder of the book may be mentioned briefly. After his discussion of hysteria he devotes a chapter to "Other Modes of Solution." Here he follows Freud, roughly, in formulation of the mechanisms in other psychopathological reactions. These have little direct bearing on his previous thesis. The next chapter on "Regression" serves mainly as a review of what has gone before. It is interesting to note that, as Rivers points out, the principle of regression as developed in psychoanalytic theory is practically identical with Hughlings Jackson's principle of "Devolution." A last, brief chapter is devoted to "Sublimation," which he regards as the normal solution of conflicts. "In this process . . . the energy arising out of conflict is diverted from some channel which leads in a social or anti-

social direction, and turned into one leading to an end connected with the higher ideals of society." [At last reference is made to mental forces derived from instinct!] He makes an interesting suggestion to the effect that psychic energy may, perhaps, be increased by conflict. In this connection one thinks at once of how almost universal is the story of neurotic, or even psychotic, difficulties in the youth, sometimes in the adult life, of great men.

An estimate of this book as a whole is difficult because it is such a mixture of error and inspiration. Many of his generalizations are attractive and may prove to be of great value. Unfortunately he attempts to apply these generalizations as explanations of the mechanism of specific reactions without first making certain that all the general principles involved have been considered. It is like trying to explain the mechanism of a pump by reference to the laws of gravity alone. One has to take into account friction and atmospheric pressure as well. The immobility reaction is unquestionably an important thing in psychology but at best it is only one factor out of many in the causation of phenomena which Rivers tries to explain on the basis of immobility alone. Again, as has been pointed out, he deals exclusively with the mechanics, so to speak, of instinctive reactions and leaves out of consideration their dynamic aspects. That is he neglects to discuss the relative strengths of different instincts, their inherent conflict or natural coöperation and so on. A most serious omission is his failure to discuss symbolism in terms of his instinctive reactions,

—unless one could take his remark about childhood's experiences fusing in the formation of character to be a reference to symbolism.

From these criticisms which have been almost wholly adverse, the reader might easily gain a wrong impression of the book. It is too full of error both clinically and logically to be instructive but is extremely valuable in its suggestiveness. One reads the separate arguments and rejects them one by one and yet keeps reverting in his thoughts to the type of argument which Rivers has initiated. It is extremely stimulating. In the immediate task to which Rivers set himself he has failed but he has written a book that may prove to be a landmark in the evolution of psychopathology.

CHAPTER XVIII

PRAGMATIC CONCEPTIONS OF INSTINCTS AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION

The first task of any science is the discovery and description of the phenomena with which it concerns itself. Then comes the problem of formulating the data secured into such order as will make the whole collection have some order, some inherent consistency. Although these two procedures may progress more or less hand-in-hand—and, indeed, neither is apt to be effectual alone—there may be rather definite stages in the development of the science marked by the preponderance of one or the other type of work. Psychoanalysis has, apparently, rather run its course as a purely investigative method, for in recent years few data of first-class importance have been added to its literature. This may be taken as an indication either that all possible discoveries have been made or that newer formulations are needed which may act as fruitful working hypotheses. So far criticism in this book has been mainly destructive. The remaining chapters will be devoted to more constructive argument. I am keenly aware of the magnitude of this task and realize that to promise either accuracy, completeness or finality in such an undertaking is equivalent to an assump-

tion of omniscience. What is offered is therefore put forward as tentative suggestion. Whatever value it may have is bound to be temporary. New discoveries may demonstrate it to be not only inaccurate in detail but false in principle.

For close on to a decade I have been dissatisfied with the exclusive importance placed by Freud on the sexual as an explanation of practically all psychopathological phenomena. This dissatisfaction was not a matter of incredulity as to alleged findings but with the interpretation of the data. In studying the trend of false ideas in the constitutional psychoses I found it almost exclusively sexual in type and yet I found evidence of another factor combining with the sexual, namely egoism. At the same time I could not account for such phenomena as repression without invoking the coöperation of some social force more potent than intellectual recognition of convention and expedient compliance with its dictates. I therefore concluded that any general formulations must include the factors of ego instincts and social instincts as well as the sexual. These views were presented to a small group of psychopathologists in Boston in the autumn of 1914 and repeated at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in the spring of 1915. They were, however, never published. Investigations of Epilepsy seemed to emphasize the pathogenic possibilities of egoism. Then came the War and the study of the war neuroses. In these the importance of ego and herd reactions seemed so manifest that I felt confirmed in these

views. They were again repeated in the symposium of the American Psychopathological Association in June, 1921. In what follows I have drawn freely from the contributions of the other participants in that symposium.¹

Scientific formulation necessitates the fabrication or adoption of classificatory terms that are as simple as possible and yet, as headings, may include all the phenomena discussed. Psychoanalysis is a psychological method and theory that has concerned itself almost exclusively with dynamic principles and not with intellectual mechanisms, except only as the latter must be understood incidentally in the observation of the former. We are now, therefore, interested in the forces that move the machine, so to speak, rather than with the mechanism of it. Our formulations must be in dynamic units. Where shall we turn to get evidence as to the existence and mode of operation of these dynamic units?

The environment of civilized man is extremely complex and calls for a high degree of discrimination in his behavior if he is to adapt himself successfully to it. This discrimination is derived from, or might be said actually to be, his intelligence, so intelligence is an essential equipment for adaptation. On the other hand this varied environment furnishes a large variety of opportunities for the support of life and its enjoyment. If choice between these dif-

¹ Bernard Glueck, "The Ego Instinct"; Sanger Brown II, "The Herd Instinct"; C. MacFie Campbell, "The Sex Instinct"; John T. MacCurdy, "Synthetic View of Ego, Herd and Sex Instincts." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, October, 1921.

ferent possible activities were to be settled by mere intelligence, man would be in a paralysis of indecision such as that of the metaphysician's ass, precisely halfway between carrots and hay which he wants equally. As a matter of fact either the carrots or the hay is really preferred and the preference makes itself felt before intelligence operates to measure the distance to each. This choice-function—this motivation—is derived from the instinctive part of the human psyche and intelligence is merely the instrument of instinct. If man had such a relatively simple phylogenetic history as a fish only a limited number of occupations would attract him. But, leaving aside his marine and amphibian forebears, man has lived on the surface of the ground, in caves, in trees and at times almost in the water. He has fed on animals and been a hunter, or fisher; or depended, sometimes, on vegetables which he found or cultivated. He has gathered his food or fought with his hands and also with tools or weapons. He has been a solitary animal and lived in a herd, a nomad and a dweller in cities. He has seized his sexual mate and abandoned her; he has also won her with servile courting and placed himself in bondage to family institutions.

These are all more or less positive in their nature. The forebears of civilized man had also dangers to meet and obstacles to overcome. Even if they had the necessary intelligence to form definite judgments as to the best way of solving these problems, they usually occurred as emergencies and called for immediate unreflective action. Even today with our

much vaunted intelligence we do not use it in sudden emergencies. We do not summon to consciousness our knowledge of the kinetic energy of an automobile that is bearing down upon us and reflect on the damage that it might do to us. We jump aside and then think. Instincts therefore developed as rules for conduct in general situations and those instincts are still with us.

In this study the first problem is concerned with what we shall call an instinct and what we shall exclude from that category. As Rivers has pointed out, the attempts to delimit instincts on the basis of what is inherited rather than acquired, or what is animal not human, or what is (anatomically) sub-cortical rather than cortical—all these discriminations fail in actual practice. We have to fall back on characteristics derived from such comparisons. It is an exemplification of the principle enunciated by Adolf Meyer that definitions in psychology must express direction rather than delimitation. Rivers has defined instinct in terms of certain qualities: its unreflective nature, its lack of discrimination and its tendency for immediate and uncontrolled response. To these I would add two other characteristics. First the irrational persistence of instinctive behavior long after its futility is demonstrable. One thinks at once of a man's pursuit of some woman continuing so long after her indifference is proved that, were the conduct not so frequent, the man would be regarded as insane. The second is the emotional factor that is added to many or all instinctive reactions. This factor makes a given

situation pleasurable or painful, desirable or repulsive beyond all the bounds of reasonableness. For instance a man may desire to possess a woman with such intensity that he is willing to sacrifice for this one brief moment all the joys that the rest of life might yield. Our working definition of instinct would then be that it is a type of phenomenon which is unreflective, non-discriminative, immediate and uncontrolled in operation, ineradicable and affective.

The second problem is, how are instincts exhibited? In most animals the question is easily answered, for their behavior is simple. The animal fights, runs, feeds or protects its young, mates and so on. But these simple instinctive reactions in man occur only in emergencies. A man who suddenly strikes a blow or flinches, a woman who becomes enraged when her child is threatened, or the lover who suddenly seizes his mistress is plainly indulging in an instinctive reaction. Such conduct is simple and direct, immediate, uncontrolled, etc. Strip man of all the accouterments of civilization and of his education and he can still perform such acts perfectly. This is the obviously animal side of his nature. But if a man goes into a shop and buys a book, no direct observation of that act alone teaches us anything about any possible instinct being involved in the purchase. Yet he may be seeking knowledge for self-aggrandisement or self-protection, or he may be securing a present for his sweetheart. And so far as any one of these *programs* is concerned the action (although in itself rational

enough) is unreflective, impulsive, persistently repeated and has a high emotional value. But it may be quite understandable from an instinctive standpoint.

The lower animals use, mainly, the different external organs of their bodies for the expression of their instincts. The simians, however, may strike with sticks or stones in place of their paws. The equipment for expression of instinct has been enlarged. In man this equipment has grown to an enormous extent and entailed modifications of the type of expression. Man's chief weapon for offence or defence, for acquisition or mating is not his body or any part of it, nor yet a weapon he takes in his hand, but is his intelligence. Abstract thought—ideas—are his tools, and these are used by his instincts as his arboreal ancestors first used sticks. But ideas are of little use to be picked up and thrown, they are utilized in programs of activity. Hence with the development of his capacity for abstract thought man has modified the exhibitions of instinct and transformed them very largely into what we call motives. A motive is not obvious to any observer, it is not immediate in its exhibition, but if one knows the motive the underlying instinct may not be hard to see. An animal lives a life of emergencies, so his instincts are manifested in simple reactions. Man, on the other hand, sees his problems ahead of him in imagination, so he substitutes for instinctive reactions, motivations. But when he does meet an emergency, then the instinctive reaction appears. The study of man's

emergency behavior would be an extremely simple problem. The real task of psychology is the discovery and analysis of instinct-motivation, the form of instinct expression peculiar to man.

There is a rather inevitable corollary to this proposition. The structure of the motivation requires memory and ideation with instinct to supply the driving force. It is generally agreed that emotions are—somehow—connected with instinct and not intelligence, the latter being cold and dispassionate. Is it not then reasonable to assume that the existence of emotionally charged ideas implies the existence of underlying instincts embodied in an instinct-motivation? This new unit, at the formulation of which we have arrived, is nothing more nor less than the Freudian "wish." I have chosen the term "instinct-motivation" rather than the simpler word "motive" because the latter, like "wish," has a distinctly conscious connotation.

Instinctive reactions being unreflective are unwitting, to use Rivers' excellent term. Consciousness of what the organism does is apt to occur after, rather than during, the act itself. Similarly instinctive motivations tend to be unwitting and even unconscious, because when consciousness is intimately concerned with any motive, the instinctive element is apt to wane in favor of expedience, which is purely intellectual. True (and powerful) instinct-motivations therefore tend to be incorporated in unconscious ideas. An instinct operating consciously is apt to be weak because it is then vulnerable to the attack of expediency. On the other

hand an instinct not expressed in a motivation is formless and impotent except in emergencies. Consequently we can see that the all important dynamic elements are unconscious ideas charged with instinctive energy, i. e., unconscious instinct-motivations. But it must not be assumed that the unconscious is purely instinctive. Intellectual operations proceed there as in consciousness; in fact memory and ideational processes are intellectual. But, in the unconscious they are wholly under the sway of the instincts; expedience, sense of reality, does not check their use nor evolution. Unconscious intellectual operations are therefore wild and erratic, they may be brilliant or ridiculous. They are like the flight of ideas in a manic patient.

Unconscious ideas are unquestionably acquired. Therefore instinct-motivations must be too. Can one go so far as to say that instincts may also be? It is probable that analysis will show every motivation of any power to be founded on instincts that are at least mammalian in distribution. On the other hand habit behavior may in emergencies have all the characteristics of instinctive reaction. Should we therefore class habit with instinct? On this point psychoanalysis throws some light. Fixed habits that persist in spite of conscious effort to eradicate them are found to be expressions of unconscious motivations, that incorporate instincts in the narrow sense. Probably the safest formulation is that habits are either indirect expressions of true inherited instincts or are weak and unstable acquired instinctive reactions.

Biologically there is no ground for revolt at such a conception. Reactions held to be physiological may be definitely acquired, for instance the conditioned reflex. Of course a psychic element enters into the formation of conditioned reflexes, this phenomenon holding an intermediate position between physiological and psychological activities. Schematically one can arrange a kind of hierarchy in the evolution of instinct. First there is the simple primitive reflex in which no mental elements are discernible, such as the secretion of bile at a certain phase of digestion. All the phenomena in this case can be expressed in purely physiological terms. Next comes the conditioned reflex in which the description of the afferent component necessitates the use of psychological concepts. The third stage in this development is the appearance of true instinctive reactions which are best described both on the afferent and efferent sides by the employment of psychological terminology, although with some of them the old reflex character persists in demonstrable visceral effects that can only be described as physiological processes. Finally we reach the fourth stage of instinct-motivations in the construction of which appear ideation and in fact the highest type of intellectual operations. And, so long as the instinct-motivation remains a motivation and does not become (as it may in emergencies) an instinct reaction, there is no physiological element discernible. In this hierarchy we have, then, running side by side the elimination of the purely physiological and the inclusion of the mental, cul-

minating in the utilization of the most complicated and elaborate intellectual faculties.¹

The relationship of instinct to mental energy should now be considered. It is often assumed, I think erroneously, that instincts have energy in themselves. But they are simply modes of behavior in the presence of generic situations. Faced with a certain type of emergency, the organism responds in accordance with its instinct pattern. A pattern has no energy; the latter comes from the organism. An instinct directs energy; it does not create it. The allocation of energy to its wrong source is a mistake that is easy to make. Let us take an analogy. Let us imagine a savage to be investigating the water system of one of our cities. He visits our houses and sees small quantities of water emerging from taps when they are turned on. Then a fire occurs: the firemen arrive, street hydrants are opened and huge streams of water appear. He never sees these large streams except when there is a fire. What more natural than that he should conclude that a fire reaction produces the big supply of water? Yet we know the firemen have merely liberated it.

In this connection we should also examine the relationship of this energy to conscious and uncon-

¹ The adoption of this classification of instinctive phenomena might reduce the number of problems which perplex the more philosophic of writers in this field. For instance if one takes Hocking's recent and interesting paper on "The Dilemma in the Conception of Instinct" (*Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, June-September, 1921) and substitutes the terminology now proposed, many of the inconsistencies he points out will disappear.

scious mentation. The function of consciousness does not seem to be so much creative as selective and inhibitive. I cannot voluntarily create a wish to do something in my mind. I can only eliminate those wishes (or their expression in conduct) that seem to me inexpedient. Energy must then be directed unconsciously rather than consciously. Since instincts are the great directors of energy, it follows that unconscious, instinct motivations must control most of the human organism's mental energy, and that the most important of these will be the permanently unconscious motivations. These will regulate the dominant streams of energy of the man's life.

Now it is a fundamental principle that energy to be demonstrable must act against resistance, some "work" must be done. For instance water evaporating in an open space gives no hint of the energy expended; when it evaporates in a closed boiler it does. A stick of dynamite may be held in the hand and burned innocuously. If wires running to an electric motor are short circuited, the motor does not turn, the electricity goes, apparently, nowhere. But if resistance be introduced into the circuit heat or motion or chemical action may be observed. We have ample evidence from clinical experience that the same principle applies psychologically. When the unconscious instinct-motivation becomes conscious in its original form, i. e., when regression takes place, the subject shows less energy. (Hence the apathetic deterioration in dementia præcox, for instance.) It is therefore essential for demonstra-

tion of psychic energy directed by unconscious instinct-motivations that the motivations should not appear in consciousness as such, but, working against resistance, assume the form of some substituted, symbolic outlet. This is the relationship of sublimation to activity and normality. It also explains why physical disease is apt to cause psychological regression. The total available energy of the organism is reduced, the energy supply is not sufficient to move against the existing resistance and so it can only appear in a more primitive form.

The next point is one of prime importance. The instinct-motivation being the culmination of a long evolutionary process in a highly complicated organism it is only natural that a number of instincts should coöperate in directing the motive power of the constellation. Instinct reactions are elicited by simple stimuli which affect only one instinct, but man's conduct, as a whole, is determined by both his phylogenetic and individual history. A man whose life was dominated by only one instinct would be a highly pathological monstrosity. The emergency reaction is, relative to the customary behavior of man, an abnormal exhibition. It is like the knee kick which is brought out by a simple stimulus but teaches us little about the coördinate functions of the lower extremity. If a physical instructor tried to reduce the science of running to elements as simple as knee kicks his teachings would not be effective. Similarly we cannot discuss man's conduct in terms of simple instincts acting separately,

for he has long since passed the point in evolution when his motives were of such a primitive order.¹

On the other hand, if we admit great complication to exist in the construction of instinct-motivation, how are we going to be able to analyze our phenomena into elements of sufficient simplicity for practical classificatory purposes? In the prosecution of all the activities through which man and his forebears have passed, instincts have grown up, and, as they all survive in varying strengths, their combinations tend to produce an infinite variety of personalities. Were it not that certain instincts or groups of them usually predominate over all others and that some work powerfully to produce uniformity of character, there would be no consistency to human behavior and psychology would be doomed to a Sisyphus task of description. But, simplify as we may, we have to admit in normal man the existence of a number of dominant instincts which interact to produce what we call normality.

Since, biologically speaking, disease consists in the destruction of more recent evolutionary developments with a consequent lawless accentuation of more primitive processes, one would expect the symptomatology of mental disease to show a wider range of atavistic instincts in operation than one meets with in normal people. It would therefore be unthinkable that one group of instincts could be responsible for all psychopathological reactions

¹The complicated instinct determination of motivation is facilitated by the complicated nature of many ideas. The same idea may act as the vehicle of expression for different instincts.

unless it could be shown that the human mind is resistive to all strains, except those of one class, or that only one strong primitive instinct survived since barbarous times to spring into prominence when the instincts peculiar to civilization were dissipated. Such conditions are conceivable but improbable of universal demonstration. We should, therefore, not expect to find one formula covering all abnormal reactions any more than one instinct would be expected to guide the life of normal man.

Few of us, moreover, are capable of searching for many unknowns at once; singleness of purpose seems essential as a stimulus to scientific inquiry. Freud's theories which center around the sex group of instincts have provided the necessary impetus for initial investigations in dynamic psychopathology but the time has come to consider more catholic views. Other theories such as those of Shand, McDougall and Prince have been less productive of enthusiastic research because their readers have not been able to see the woods for the trees. The long catalogues of instincts postulated or inferred by these authors are too diffuse. None have been granted sufficient dominance over others to give the student any sense of direction. From a dynamic standpoint their analyses become rather tautological, new instincts being easily hypothesized to account for new reactions. The cataloguing of long lists of instincts, and disputes as to the existence, or non-existence, of separate minor instincts degenerate into sterile academic discussions and squabbles about nomenclature. Such unfocused formulations

have, practically, a tendency quite opposite to Freud's. Dogmatism is so far avoided as to make an invertebrate system.

A tentative solution may be found in adopting some middle ground. If instinctive reactions could be separated into groups which could be shown *a priori* to be inherently antagonistic and if clinical experience demonstrated certain abnormal reactions to be definitely related to the preponderance of one group over the others, then this grouping would have high pragmatic value. The interaction of three factors is difficult to study but is not impossible. No one short of a supreme genius could formulate a dynamic system where a score of factors operated and, if he did, few could understand it. Some simplification is therefore made necessary by the limitation of the human mind. If such a system sufficiently approximated the truth it might stimulate another forward move in psychopathological research similar to that initiated by Freud's theories but productive of greater accuracy.

Writers on dynamic psychology have recently been prone to classify instincts into ego, herd and sex groups. It is now our task to see if this classification is applicable to psychopathological phenomena and, particularly, if it be useful in the interpretation of the data established by psychoanalysis.

But at the very outset we must bear in mind the fact that any classification is necessarily artificial. The function of any complicated organism is not a simple addition or mixture of the functions of its

hypothetical elements. In the fields of physiology and psychology analysis is almost always a study of disintegration. The experimental physiologist almost always disturbs function in order to study it. He is really an experimental pathologist and is working with pathological not normal phenomena. Similarly the clinician works with disintegrated functions and is always in danger of assuming that disintegrated elements have, in combination, the functions exhibited when they are isolated by disease or that in the evolutionary past they had such functions. But this is a mistake. Any element when it combines with others to form a more complicated functional structure is, *ipso facto*, altered.¹ A neurological example may make this clearer. It is often assumed that the functions of the human spinal cord are those revealed when the spinal cord is isolated from the brain by accident or disease. But there never was or could be an animal having just the collection of mass reflexes so demonstrated. Such an animal would have an extremely simple morphology and a much simpler spinal cord than has man or any of the mammalia. The spinal cord when isolated shows only a degeneration of the complicated functions in which it participates, which

¹“But it would be wrong to suppose that removal of a dominant mechanism reveals the reactions of a phylogenetically older organ in all their primitive simplicity. The integrative activity of the higher centers has profoundly modified the functions of those below them in neural hierarchy; some have been caught up to take part in the new complex, whilst others are held in check or inhibited.” Henry Head, Croonian Lecture, *Proceedings of the Royal Society*, B, Vol. 92, 1921.

functions are predominantly located in the spinal cord. Yet we can learn much about spinal cord functions by studying the isolated cord, and much that is essential to the understanding of disease. The spinal cord has no functions that are totally independent of the functions of the nervous system as a whole but we assume that it has for the necessary purposes of classification.

Similarly we shall assume that the ego, herd and sex instincts have separate existence. The first task will be to see how they act when they are relatively independent or dominant and then to trace, if possible, their workings in combination. It will only be when this is done that we can judge as to whether the classification has pragmatic value or not.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EGO INSTINCTS

Self-preservation is a term often used for labeling the ego instincts but this has too much the flavor of defense against danger. It does not suggest those activities in animals or men that are connected with the indulgence of appetites, the furtherance of purely personal ambition. The essence of any ego impulses is that it is self-centered; it is self that is to be saved, to be pleased or to be exalted. Both animals and men are either episodically or chronically subject to other impulses which direct their interest of actions to the preservation of the race or the security and aggrandisement of the group. None of the higher animals is a purely egoistic animal and we are consequently assuming the existence of a hypothetical individual when we speak of ego instincts as though they had an isolated function. I would suggest these definitions: The "ego" is that about which the ego reactions center and the latter constitute the behavior of an organism placed in a purely hostile or indifferent environment. This environment as viewed by the hypothetical ego animal has no claim on his service, and exists only to be subjugated, outwitted and utilized for the indulgence of his appetites. Such an animal may be moved to coöperation with others through realization of

expedience but this coöperation will not entail the development of any *feeling* of responsibility towards his partners. He will coöperate merely to serve his own ends, and any show of friendliness he may make will be a *quid pro quo*, vanishing so soon as the relationship no longer pays. These reactions are all simple, hence we would expect to find their emotional accompaniments to be the simple affects of fear, anger, apathy or the pure joy that comes with lust of power. None of the finer emotions, that have an element of sympathy in them, can have any place here.

The suckling child closely approximates this picture. The environment interests him only so far as it may minister to his comfort. He is happy when it indulges his appetites, angry when it does not, shrinks from discomfort but is otherwise apathetic. One might imagine that the process of suckling would entail something like affection for the mother but we find that if he can get milk more easily from a bottle than from the breast the former is preferred and the latter repelled. The appetites during this period are primitively self-indulgent—feeding, excreting and bodily stimulation all involve purely personal satisfactions that do not include any element of companionship. These appetites may also be satisfied without the mediation of definitely conscious ideas, in other words these reactions are purely instinctive. In later life, as we shall see, similarly pure instinctive ego reaction may appear in emergencies when the ego as such is directly stimulated.

The development of consciousness, however, inevitably extends and elaborates the structure of these reactions. With consciousness comes the concept of the self which these instincts serve. A child refers to himself by his proper name very soon after the acquisition of speech and probably has self consciousness long before this.¹ The concept of the ego having appeared, the instincts previously serving the interests of the individual's body become the servants of the ego. This ego has a mental rather than a physiological existence. It is not what the individual is but what he thinks he is. The ego impulses are now engaged in providing or preventing consciously conceived pleasures and pains. The transition has been gradual and the next stage is also slow in its establishment. The child begins to look forward, has ambitions, he builds up an ideal of what he would like to be, and how he would like to be regarded by others. This is the "ego-ideal" around which are centered the activities that may now safely be called instinct-motivations.

There are five general directions which these motivations may take. (1) As a survival of the original body pleasure phase there is a desire for food and drink, creature comforts and bodily sensations that may take the form of caresses. (Since we are speaking of the hypothetical individual who

¹The long delay in adopting the use of the first personal pronoun probably shows the slowness of development of objectivation. A child can learn "I" only by analogy from its use by others in referring to themselves. So a child has to recognize the individuality of others and their consciousness of it before he sees the need for "I."

has no sex or herd instincts, this pleasure in bodily contact exists without love.) (2) Intellectual curiosity and the desire for new experience. This is evidenced early in the life of the child and may become a potent principle of action. There can be little question as to its instinctive quality, for monkeys and other animals show it. (3) Lust for power and for exhibiting it is a highly important form of ego impulse. In its crude developments it assumes a physical expression; later it becomes intellectualized. There is no such perfect way of demonstrating power as by exciting fear: hence brutality or cruelty is the simplest and commonest behavior actuated by this impulse. One can't help feeling power, if he makes his opponent cry for mercy and one may accomplish this with his fists, with words or with a cunningly laid plan. (4) Allied with this last is the lust for recognition. This is seen most primitively in the child who makes himself conspicuous by fair means or foul. The adult may win attention with distinguished conduct, outlandish clothes or martyrdom. (5) Opposed to all these others is the desire for security. It is the negative aspect of ego reactions and may, if strongly developed, inhibit the full development of any or all of the other four. On the other hand, since it is negative in quality, it tends to appear only when the security of the ego—or ego-ideal—is threatened. It is therefore likely to be episodic in its manifestations, to be exhibited only in emergencies.

The individual who would fulfill all these ambitions would have to be omniscient and omnipotent,

were he not to adapt himself to the hostile and indifferent world, adopt the world's means of establishing power and eminence, take the opportunities the world offers for gaining a livelihood and seeking adventure. In short the ego ideal that is not cast in terms of expedience would soon die of inanition. Consequently the ego-ideal quickly incorporates standards of conduct which are approved by the group. Our hypothetical egoist is full of "moral principles" without having a grain of moral feeling. He serves his fellows for pay, not for love of man (or woman.)

Certain reactions of such a creature can be predicted. The personality we are depicting is a simple one. The more complex any structure is the more unstable is it, or rather, the more modifiable it is. Consequently the egoist will have a simple, rigid character. This would be revealed positively in great persistence—he has only one goal to reach and cannot be distracted—or negatively in stubbornness. His emotions would always be of a simple order, anger, fear, joy, apathy. If expediency did not work his "ideal" would quickly break down and he would regress to more primitive forms of satisfaction. With this loss of extroversion of interest his energy (so far as could be objectively discerned) would diminish. Finally, since his instincts are concerned solely with his own welfare, he would feel no repugnance to antisocial conduct or the harboring of antisocial ideas.

There is considerable clinical support for the belief that ego instincts operate as outlined above

because in certain situations and in certain pathological states these reactions tend to appear in a relatively pure form and in others it is not hard to discern the ego element having large influence.

In the first place we may anticipate the discussion of a later chapter by stating that unconscious sex motivations which are exclusively unconscious in normal life and most potent in the production of pathological mental states all have a larger ego element than is present in conscious sexuality. Sexual functions have two main aspects, their pleasure-giving capacity and their potential altruistic developments. The former make of sex a means for gratification of the primitive ego striving for physical satisfaction. This, however, is a conclusion reached by analysis and interpretation.

But there are some clinical conditions that illustrate our theme much more directly. The most universal of these is epilepsy. In order to avoid polemical misconceptions, it must be clearly understood that, for our present purposes, it is a matter of indifference whether the etiology of epilepsy is physical or psychological, whether the characteristics to be mentioned are produced by bodily disease or as a functional development. Further it must be borne in mind that epilepsy is a disease that may exist in all gradations and that the epileptic personality is not to be understood so much as the average reaction of all epileptics but as the character which distinguishes the epileptic from his more normal fellows, so far as the discrimination can be made. It is only in the severer forms of the malady

that these traits may be seen in anything like pure culture.

The epileptic is definitely self-centered, the events which move him emotionally are those that affect his personal comfort or ambitions rather than the sorrows or joys of other people. For instance the same patient who received the news of his mother's death (for whom he protested great affection) with equanimity became morbidly disturbed when refused a second piece of pie at dinner. The epileptic is never a devoted friend although often a sentimental one. He is secretive and does not make confidants of his companions. When succeeding in his program of activity he is energetic and persistent but when thwarted becomes stubborn, sullen and finally apathetic. He is usually held to be conceited and many have ideas of their importance amounting to definite delusions but more widespread is an attitude, a feeling of self-importance, an assertive conviction of infallibility and an indifference to the opinions of others. The epileptic's morality is proverbial. He is full of moral sentimentality but can be ruthless, cruel and indulge in antisocial acts without a twinge of conscience apparently. Allied with this is an extraordinary lack of repression observable in epileptic delusional states. In no case of dementia præcox have I ever seen such complete absence of reserve in speaking of sexual ideas nor such crudity in their formulations. Epileptics may not only have literal incest fantasies but hallucinate them in terms of frank perversions. Their emotions are simple and vio-

lent—the epileptic rage is proverbial—and these affective states are invariably called up when the ego, as we have defined it, is directly involved. Sympathy is absent, which perhaps accounts for no epileptic ever having been a great interpretative artist although many have been endowed with high intelligence and have won distinction. They cannot adopt other people's ideas with enthusiasm but can only forward their own plans. Finally, when blocked in the pursuit of their egocentric ambitions, they have not the resilient capacity to turn to other outlets for their energy such as is enjoyed by normal persons of the same intellectual vigor; they respond with apathy and deterioration.¹ A most important point is that the type of circumstances which excite pathological reactions in the epileptic is rarely some disturbance in human relations, as with most neurotic or psychotic people, but is some untoward event which cramps his egoistic ambitions.²

The relation of the epileptic's egoism to his energy display is important theoretically. Since only his ego instincts are well developed, his ego-motivations tap the bulk of his energy and his personal ambitions are driven by the concentrated force of his whole being. He thus may show more intense pre-occupation with his vocation than does his more normal fellow, for the latter is rendered less

¹ MacCurdy, "A Clinical Study of Epileptic Deterioration," *Psychiatric Bulletin*, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1916.

² Clark, L. Pierce, "Clinical Studies in Epilepsy," Utica, N. Y., State Hospital Press, 1917.

effective by the distraction of calls from other instincts. On the other hand since his motivations are determined by only one group of instincts, they are rigid and not variable in form. When some activity is thwarted it is not easy for him to modify his ambitions as can the normal person with capacity for a varied instinctive satisfaction. Hence disappointment is apt to lead to regression, even so profound a regression as unconsciousness. The epileptic is constantly giving exquisite examples of the all-or-none type of reaction in his energy output.

We must bear in mind that the kind of situation which disturbs the epileptic may excite ego reactions in more normal people. The best example of this was during the war when the desire for personal safety came into inevitable conflict with duty to the army and the state. No situation could be imagined where sexual conflict was less likely to arise. It is true that a few psychoanalysts have fabricated labored and complicated hypotheses to demonstrate how the symptoms of war neuroses could arise from unconscious sex factors but one feels, on reading their articles, that a primary assumption was made of the truth of the hypothesis and that the clinical material was not approached with an open mind. Certainly the great majority of those with psychoanalytic experience who saw *fresh* cases were convinced very quickly that they were dealing with ego reactions—with the instinct of self-preservation specifically. Of course there were cases, called war neuroses, who did have symptoms that were due to sexual conflicts but these symptoms invariably orig-

inated in civilian life prior to duty at the front or else were acquired after invalidism, when emotional contacts of a civilian order were resumed. This is not the place for a discussion of the symptomatology of the war neuroses which is after all too well known to justify repetition. It is sufficient to note that the symptoms were simple in structure and exhibition being, for the most part, either functional physical disabilities, which like battle casualties or physical disease served as occasions for removal from the danger zone, or else they were states of fear.

Another situation that has produced simple ego reactions is imprisonment. Prison psychoses have long been known for their comparatively simple symptomatology and their good prognosis. Delusions usually take the form of fulfillments of the wish for liberty. The prisoner imagines himself indulging freely in the pleasures denied him during incarceration. Emotional reactions take the form of outbursts of rage and destructiveness, fear or apathy. The latter frequently is so complete as to produce stupor. Hysterical disabilities not unlike the conversion hysterias of war are not uncommon.

Analogous to the prison psychoses were many of the army psychoses. Unfortunately these have never been adequately described. I saw a number however that were much like prison psychoses in their simplicity of symptomatology and in their good prognosis. Some of them looked quite like dementia præcox at first sight but astonished one by rapid recovery. These conditions were usually char-

acterized by paranoid ideas in which the patient fancied he was regarded as a spy. It is not difficult to interpret such ideas as projections of inner unfaithfulness—i. e., revolt against the organization that forced absence from normal life and exposure to danger.¹

One must not forget that a definite threat to the ego has so frequently the result of producing infractions of the law that we are accustomed to consider the circumstances in passing judgment as to the heinousness of the crime committed. If the threat be so violent as immediately to endanger life one may kill the aggressor and successfully plead self-defense when charged with murder. If the threat be more remote, the criminal is held to be guilty but is lightly sentenced. For instance the attitude of a court is quite different towards a man who steals food when he is starving than towards a man who steals money simply for the sake of acquiring wealth. On the whole, however, it may safely be said that ego reactions are frowned upon by society. Hence the tendency for their direct expression leads to conflict. These conflicts would normally produce symptoms (as in war, prison, etc.) were it not for the opportunities that society allows us for personal expression provided we play by the rules of the game. If we consider the five ego-motivations outlined above we can see how little modification is required of the crude impulses to give them social sanction—in some cases, approval. One can indulge

¹In the cases I examined this mechanism was easily demonstrated.

the nutritional appetites and all bodily pleasures provided the latter do not assume certain sexual forms. Intellectual curiosity is usually considered a virtue, while the correlated love of adventure can be followed in many socialized forms. Ambition for power is not frowned upon unless it take the form of cruelty or the illegal subjugation of others. It is only in its most primitive expressions that desire for recognition is censured. Finally considerations of personal safety are held to be mere common sense, unless the subject happen to be a soldier, policeman, fireman or some other public servant whose duties include exposure to danger. So the ego reactions, as such, are not tabu.

In consequence of this it is only natural that special circumstances must exist before the ego reactions become pathological. These may be classed under two heads: situations which involve a direct threat to the individual, these producing only temporary reactions; and the operation of external or internal factors which lead to an unwonted and disproportionate prominence of the ego-motivations. Epilepsy is an example of the latter type. How far the cause is to be assigned to external and how far to environmental influences no one knows. At all events the epileptic is a constitutional egoist.

Another egoist is the habitual criminal. Concerning him, as in the case of the epileptic, there is room for much difference of opinion as to the ultimate pathology of the condition. This, however, is not our present problem. All that need concern us now is the fact that the criminal, as a constitutional type,

does exist. Recent psychological investigations in the field of delinquency have shown that frequently there is a definite etiology demonstrable from the history of childhood. In one way or another the future criminal has been thrown on his own resources—he has been placed in the situation of a creature moving in a hostile world. Sometimes the child has been ostracized on account of some physical defect, sometimes his natural protectors, his parents, have neglected or ill-treated him. At all events, early in life, he has adopted a career of crime and with this has developed a philosophy fitted to his occupation. He believes society to be inimical, he is convinced that he must play a lone hand. Such a man does not stir up internal conflict when he consummates a burglary, hold-up or murder. He is not inhibited by “conscience,” nor betrayed by appearance of guilt. On the contrary he feels a professional pride in his achievements and often escapes detection and apprehension permanently. Although the purest type of egoist we know (for the epileptic may develop a pretty, socialized ego-ideal and approximate it), one of the directions that egotism takes may be his undoing. He may desire recognition and, often under the influence of alcohol, boast of his crime.

There is one other, and a pathological, form of ego reaction that remains to be discussed. This is the feeling of inferiority or “inferiority complex” that renders so many, otherwise effective people miserably unhappy. Unlike most of the egoistic exhibitions we have been considering its psychology

is rather complicated and this may be related to its etiology which is, probably, sexually overdetermined in many cases. Yet its mechanism seems to be a rather purely ego affair. In my experience the symptom has this history as revealed by analysis. Early in life the child finds himself relatively or actually inferior. It may be that he is physically handicapped, overshadowed by an older child, overawed by his father, backward in development—for some reason he is unable to give expression to his personality as he would like to. It may be that the desire for security is stronger than his desire for experience, recognition and so on. He feels this inferiority and compensates with fantasies of might and of wisdom. This relieves him from actual test of his capacity on the one hand and gives him pleasure on the other. So he indulges it. But a time comes when the realities of the world cannot be gainsaid and fantasy must be consciously abandoned. The imaginary power then takes up its abode in the unconscious. Unfortunately the energy that has gone with the fantasies has been lost to adaptation, so the child or youth is handicapped in the struggle for eminence among his mates. Each disappointment is reacted to as in the past with a compensatory imagination of success but now this regal image exists only in the unconscious. The less successful he is in actual life, the wider grows the gulf between unconscious hero and the conscious toiler. Finally in the unconscious he is a Napoleon, a Mahomet, a Shakespeare or a Sandow. Actually he is just John Doe.

Three cardinal phenomena of the inferiority feeling can be traced from this splitting of conscious and unconscious judgment. Unwittingly he is constantly measuring himself up with the unconscious heroes and, naturally, he cuts a mean figure in comparison. He looks upon himself and sees a stupid, cowardly, flat-chested, spindle-legged animal. In practice the contrast is projected on to those he meets. He sees Richard Roe and endows him with the wit and powers of his unconscious self. If he were only Richard Roe! He feels mean and puny. Yet he may really be the better man.

But unconscious trends rarely seek only one form of expression. Compensations crop up from time to time. He is occasionally strangely egoistic, even egotistic: he has quite set opinions and holds to them stubbornly, apologizing profusely the while. There are outbursts of temper quite inconsistent with his usual meekness. Episodically he dramatizes his unconscious hero; he speaks from Sinai to the astonishment of those who thought they knew him. Naturally these compensatory flare-ups exhibit as little relation to his real capacity as do his habitual judgments.

Thirdly his social relationships are distinctive. Richard Roe is not immune to flattery and he likes to be looked on with envy. So Richard Roe likes poor John Doe, a man of unquestioned ability who thinks that he, Roe, is a very fine fellow! So Richard Roe will do things for John Doe, which he might not take the trouble to do for another with more real claim on him. Without wittingly seeking it, John

Doe is popular with whatever companions his lot is thrown, although his timidity may keep him from seeking a wide social circle. On the other hand, our unconscious tricks are usually played on our intimates. If you know John Doe intimately you are probably aware of his latent egoism and his intimate society may pall. Particularly, of course, does his wife suffer at the hands of the hero he is not and that he would be were. In marriage unconscious is apt to speak to unconscious, while the two conscious parties are mutually shocked.

Sometimes the compensation may become a rather permanent reaction, the last development of this complicated series, and an aggressive pose of superiority is assumed. The unconscious ideas may take the form of grandiose delusions in paranoid states or be projected in ideas of persecution. The "spy" delusions during the war usually developed in men with definite "inferiority" histories. These psychotic manifestations are, perhaps, not to be regarded so much as compensations as the sequel of regression to unconscious motivations that have not been able to gain or maintain adequate indirect expression in sane and permissible form. In the true compensations there is a double determination for the egoistic behavior. The unconscious is reaching an almost direct expression while, at the same time, there is a revolt against the playing of an inferior rôle.

In summary we may say that ego-motivations appear in chronic form almost exclusively in behavior reactions (the exception being definite symp-

toms in epilepsy and paranoid developments with inferiority) and that acute psychotic or psychoneurotic manifestations are seen usually, if not always, in response to situations where the ego or ego-ideal is directly threatened.

CHAPTER XX

THE SEX INSTINCTS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS

The ego instincts are practically universal in their distribution. The other group of instincts that is present in all the higher vertebrates (and in many invertebrates as well) is the sexual. These two groups are the most fundamental because together they often include the entire instinctive equipment of highly organized animals. It is possible to define sexual instincts only in broad terms as those which have to do with propagation and the seeking for pleasures associated with the functions of breeding. If one eliminates this latter element, there are then left for consideration a large group of phenomena of unquestioned dynamic importance, which, analyze as one may, remain without any possible biological significance. "Sexual" pleasure, the gaining of which involves no breeding act, is observed in many animals and is extremely common in man. If one allies it solely with the ego instincts, it remains inexplicable as a biological phenomenon. If, on the other hand, one tries to make it a procreative impulse, its frequent sterility belies that classification. From this dilemma one can escape only by admitting that sex is not a pure function but subserves both ego pleasure and racial propa-

gation. In other words sex is not a single pure instinct but is compound and might just as well be frankly treated as such.

In Chapter XVIII we have seen that, on *a priori* grounds, one would expect most mental energy to be directed by instinct-motivations that are unconscious, and, acting against repression, reach expression in indirect forms. From the standpoint of dynamic psychology, therefore, we are now interested in seeing how the development of the sex instincts, the motivations they assume, may become unconscious and so energize the conduct of man. We are not interested in the open conscious exhibition of sex impulses which do not occasion conflict; their occurrence is apt to be episodic, their nature to be that of simple instinct reactions and their aim and function are too obvious to demand further attention. It is the motivations that arouse conflict and are repressed that we must study. This involves a recapitulation of sexual development, something, I believe it is safe to say, that could never be done today were it not for the researches of Freud. Our task lies with the interpretation of phenomena unearthed by psychoanalysis. Of course, if one were to trace out all the ramifications of sex anomalies, a separate book would be required for their description. We can now merely follow the general tendency of psychosexual development, the phenomena presumably occurring in every individual.

In an earlier chapter we have traced the origin and development of auto-erotism into unconscious, symbolic "language." Its function in establishing

the pleasure element essential to sex has been mentioned but not the fact that this is done, very largely, by a concentration of interest, previously diffuse, on the genitalia and that this interest becomes *conscious*. This consciousness may appear in infancy, be repressed and reappear at physiological puberty or (pathologically) it may never be well developed consciously at any time. remaining rather an unconscious elaboration.

Another problem left untouched was why auto-erotism should be repressed. When it has served its purpose in first directing the budding powers of perception and coördination it is natural that it should lapse. But this is not repression, it is disappearance. Its persistence is probably owing to its sexual potentiality which supplies a biological reason for preserving the body-pleasure function. Its connection with sex may also account for its repression. A good deal has been made in psychoanalytic literature of the effect of education and discipline in causing repression of auto-erotism but the importance of the factor has probably been overestimated. Such influence alone would tend simply to make it disappear. The child's habits are very plastic, he is continually being trained to change his way of doing things and abandon certain tastes without the adaptation involving repression and a relegation of the early habit or taste to the unconscious. For instance, he is trained not to drink his food but to chew and swallow it. Does he retain in the unconscious a lust for drinking food? He is taught to abandon a spoon and adopt a knife and fork. Does

he continue to yearn unconsciously for a spoon as his only means of taking food? So it is with clothes and games, in fact with nearly all his occupations. Nor is it the severity of the attitude of the nurse towards auto-erotism that accounts for the repressions. Many a child is spoken to more severely for spilling food or soiling a dress than for anything plainly auto-erotic. We are forced to the conclusion that it is the sexual potentiality of auto-erotism which is somehow associated with the repression of the former. Whence comes the tabu on sex? This brings us to the examination of the beginnings of *sex consciousness*.

As the child begins to take interest in the outer world he naturally is interested in the people in it. Almost at the beginning there is a difference between the child's attitude toward human and inanimate objects. With the former he gets and gives a kind of sympathetic interest. Naturally experiment by trial and error will soon teach him that he can get more from people than from "things." But there is another element in the situation, there is some subtle, definitely human bond. Even a fairly young child will withdraw from one who is not kindly disposed although gentle and generous in act. Whether this is the working of sexual, or of social instinct is immaterial; it is, at any rate, a larval form of affection—larval because it is still a highly selfish kind of interest.

This affection tends to become concentrated on the parent of the opposite sex. Two factors probably coöperate in this first direction of interest. One

is the attitude of the parents themselves. Try as she may to be impartial a mother tends to pet her son more than her daughter and the father does the reverse. When unsophisticated and unthinking this difference of attitude may be grotesquely and cruelly marked. The second factor seems to be some kind of instinctive choice which the child makes. The evidence of this is that when, owing to the constitution of the family or the peculiarities of the parents, the reverse of the usual parental attitude exists, the child responds with greater apparent affection for the parent of the same sex but the relationship is not normal. The child does not thrive emotionally in this situation, becomes exacting, demands attention with tantrums and so on. In other words there seems to be something natural in the pairing of the opposite sexes in the family, something pathological when the reverse holds true.

Children are selfish and want all they can get or imagine out of any situation. The adult lover wants complete possession of the woman of his choice and he translates this into terms of sexual embrace. (As a matter of fact he wants much more than that and that alone does not satisfy him. He wants a vague, general possession as well.) The child does not know what a sexual embrace is, nor, if he were told with ever so complete detail could he understand it fully, because he is physiologically incapable of the act and therefore of its true perception or imagination. So he formulates his desire in terms of what he can understand and what he sees or knows about. He yearns for complete intimacy with his

mother, soon he finds that his father enjoys some kind of intimacy which is denied to him. So he begins to say that he wants to put his father out of the bed and sleep with his mother, if his sophistication has advanced to the point of his knowing they sleep together. Otherwise he may say that when he grows up he will marry his mother and so on.

Then, as a rule rather abruptly, such remarks cease, repression has occurred. It cannot be too strongly urged that this process is essentially spontaneous. No direct influence is, as a rule, used to inhibit such talk. When little Willie says he will marry his mother, the family circle are not horrified, they do not credit him with any sexual ambition, in fact they usually think it a joke, they laugh, he is made to feel that he has said something smart. Nor do the parents themselves (so far as I have been able to learn by observation and questioning) suddenly become sex-conscious with their offspring. Children may be, and often are, taught to feel shame about excretion and exposure of their genitalia—often a difficult reaction to inculcate and one that comes later than the repression we are speaking of—but the cessation of this “Œdipus” talk is a spontaneous phenomenon.

We judge that there has been repression and not a simple lapse or change of interest because all that disappears is the open reference to a potentially sexual attachment while the relationship to the parent becomes stronger rather than weaker. The child continues to behave as though still moved by the same ambitions although he does not speak of

them. He is apt to be even more demonstrative, is more influenced by his mother, likes to be with her constantly and frequently shows signs of jealousy of his father. The last is particularly important because it indicates the existence somewhere of a sexual desire. The average mother shows more affection, publicly at least, to her son than to her husband. If the child had lost, and not repressed, his wish for extreme intimacy he would be indifferent to what his father might enjoy in this regard, since he apparently wins more attention than the latter. There is, then, no possible ground for jealousy except it be based on the maintenance of a sexual ambition. It cannot be too often repeated, however, that "sexual" is too strong a word to use because the child at this time does not and cannot know what the term means in the way an adult does. Two other attendant phenomena are presumably related to this repression. The child exhibits much sexual curiosity and wants to be "grown-up." He wants to do what big boys and men do, have their peculiar, masculine possessions such as knives. A final point should be mentioned. The result of the repression may be to produce conscious antagonism to the parent or insensate oscillations between affection and repulsion—never indifference. How can repression result in such varying consequences? What is repressed and what happens to it?

It is obvious that the mother herself cannot be repressed but only the boy's idea of her. If the child were an accurate observer this repressed image—this "Imago"—would correspond closely to what

the mother really was and the repressed desire would be for complete possession in all possible and in quite knowable ways. But once repressed and in the unconscious (which is probably being created now for the first time by this and similar processes) the object of attainment is no longer formulated in terms of the known but of the desirable. In other words the Imago becomes an ideal and does not remain the picture of a real person. This discrimination is most important. Without it the Œdipus complex becomes in many cases inexplicable or ridiculous. For instance, the girl, whose father is and always has been a brutal ruffian, gives voice in delusions to an unconscious striving for union with him. It cannot be her real father, it must be an ideal parent. It is failure to recognize that the unconscious Imago is established as an imaginary and not a real figure that has led Jung to formulate his doctrine of the collective unconscious, that this Imago is inherited. Yet we can see how it is easily and naturally acquired.

Viewed from this angle one can see that the Œdipus complex is not only inevitable but essential. Psychosexuality has to begin sometime. If it appeared only at physiological puberty, the individual would suddenly be confronted with a new instinct, a new impulse, utterly meaningless to him. He would have not the slightest means of knowing what to do with it either consciously or unconsciously. On the other hand, we know by universal experience that in later years sexual selection, for mating purposes, does not rest on an immediate and conscious sex

attraction but rather begins with admiration, tenderness and so on. If a friendship thus established flourishes, the closer intimacy which develops produces sooner or later conscious sex feelings. Now the young child enjoys a higher degree of such affection and tenderness than will ever come his way until he has reached the age of definite courtship in adult years. Consequently—if we admit the existence of sex interest in childhood, which we have seen to be biologically necessary and the existence of which is demonstrated by much evidence—it is inevitable that sex feelings will tend to flow towards those with whom greatest intimacy is enjoyed. This is usually, as we have seen, the parent of the opposite sex but it may be a nurse, an aunt, an older sister and so on. Practically we often find that the mother of a small boy fills a secondary place in his life, that rôle being taken by a nurse or older sister. The same repression takes place because sexual feeling for a *mother person* is tabu.

The development of a father Imago by a little girl, was nicely illustrated in the observations of the parents both of whom had previously been my patients. The father was forced by business to be away from home a good deal, which threw the child more into the mother's society and also made her reactions more definite when she did see her father on his returns home. Objectively she showed as a rule much more interest in her mother than in her father, but was invariably more easily influenced by the latter. Her reactions with her mother were sometimes ambivalent, almost never with her father.

When approaching the age of two, she was quite shy and coquettish when her father came home after an absence of two weeks. This lasted only a few hours but he now seemed to have a strange, almost hypnotic power over her. She disliked her midday nap and often would lie awake obstinately for a couple of hours. But at a word from her father the child would go placidly to sleep. At my suggestion this convenient solution of the household problem was abandoned as I thought the reaction verged on the pathological and such suggestibility should not be crystallized into a habit. Some six months later, the father was away from home for several months. She anticipated his return with much excitement but was more than ever shy when he actually arrived. After a day or so this shyness disappeared and she abandoned herself to enthusiastic enjoyment of his society. But now a curious reaction appeared that can surely only be interpreted as sex consciousness. She showed signs of painful embarrassment if her father appeared while she was taking a bath, a behavior not noted in the presence of any other person. My informants insisted that not a word had been said to suggest any impropriety in his inspection of her toilet and that an invariable rule had been to treat the questions of excretion and so on in a perfectly matter-of-fact way. The only rule was that these matters were not to be discussed in public because this was "bad manners," like using a fork in the wrong hand. Coincident with this modesty reaction, however, there was at all other times more display of affection than there had ever been before.

Then came the war. The father entered the navy and was absent for over a year. Her mother went to the seashore shortly after the departure of her husband, near which was a naval officers' training station. A cadet who was a friend of the family came to visit one day in his uniform. The little girl followed him around like a dog with idolatrous admiration. A week later he returned in civilian clothes, when she would have nothing to do with him. While at this place, for the first time the little girl, now three and a half years of age, exhibited imagination such as had been very slightly developed before. Whenever she saw a ship on the horizon she would begin a story about how that was a battleship on which her father was an officer. He would jump overboard and swim ashore to see her. He would arrive on the beach, "without any clothes on" (!), light a fire by which they would play games and so on. When the fall came she was very anxious to return to her home and on arriving spent two days wandering around disconsolately as if looking for something she could not find. But she did not say what she wanted (perhaps she did not know consciously) and was not asked. Then she cheered up and became her normal care-free self.

When her father finally did come home she could talk of nothing else for days beforehand. She was overheard telling her little playmates that her father was the greatest sailor in the world. When he actually arrived she showed not an instant's shyness and was elated as only children, manic patients and those under the influence of alcohol can be. Another

change was soon manifest. She not only had lost her feeling of embarrassment but actually asked to have her father come and see her bathed. When he did so, she evinced no more sex consciousness than a puppy. A few weeks later the secret of this change was discovered. She was found playing with several dolls whom she had named after the younger children in the family and who were her children, so she said. The rule of not asking leading questions was, for once, broken and she was asked who the father was. Without an instant's hesitation she replied, "Oh, their father's in the navy!" Two months later an uncle of whom the child was fond, but not inordinately so, appeared also in naval uniform. Again she went through the same kind of elation but not in so exaggerated a form.

It is not difficult to reconstruct the mechanisms at work in this case. When embarrassment over nakedness appeared her attachment for her father was assuming sexual form consciously and she was working unwittingly to repress it. As soon as her father left home she succeeded in this repression by means of transferring the sexual impulse to the Imago, which she could now easily build up. The sexualized object was now no longer her real father but a *father person* who was in the navy. So, when her real father reappeared, she was emotionally excited, but had no sex consciousness with him whatever. The Imago was a perfectly permissible father for her children and when another man appeared wearing the Imago's clothes, she was again stirred up emotionally.

This case shows very prettily the function of repression and of the Imago. She disposed of embarrassment and, at the same time established a mechanism whereby her psychosexual development could go on. That which was originally repressed was probably not a definitely sexual desire that an adult would recognize as such but only a desire for possession that had some kind of sexual coloring. With added sophistication, each increment of knowledge is being added to the unconscious motivation (now no longer to be called a wish because it is not conscious) until finally, when at physiological puberty adult sex sensation is possible, a full blown incest motivation will develop deep in the unconscious. According to this scheme of development, we see that there never is a conscious incest fantasy; it cannot exist in infancy owing to ignorance and it does not (normally) exist in adult life because any thought of sex in association with blood relations is long since relegated to the unconscious.

The Imago begins as an ideal of the parent as we have seen. The parent is more important for the development of the child after repression than before. Freud has wisely said that it is the boy's mother who first teaches him to love. If the mother is wise and affectionate she can serve as a conscious outlet for the unconscious impulses centered on the Imago. In other words the child does not dam up libido but learns to apply it to a real person. The application of libido to real persons and real activities is its achievement of adaptation. Making

the ideal actual is the object of our lives. But what happens if the mother is not wise and affectionate? The child must love some one, the instinct is developing within him. If he cannot apply this interest to some one who is actual he must give it to a fantasy figure. If his mother repels him he turns to the Imago, the latter is exalted. If his mother does not kiss him, the Imago is all kisses. If his mother kisses him too much, the Imago is full of dignity and treats him with respect. In short if his mother is unsatisfactory the Imago becomes her very opposite. We are all seeking to find our Imagos in the real world. The man whose Imago is a pure ideal, compounded of virtues not known but only desired, will never find her. This is, very often, the problem of the neurotic. This also accounts for most men marrying women who either resemble their mothers or are their very opposites. The man who has never learned to get emotional outlet with his mother is apt to regard her as physically repulsive and naturally feels the same way towards all women of a similar physical habit. The same is true of mental traits. Faithfulness to the Imago implies revulsion of feeling for those who have not her form or character. This also accounts for the otherwise anomalous existence of unconscious Œdipus complexes coupled with conscious dislike. The fate of people in this predicament is sad, particularly when they are young. Not only have they little opportunity in conscious outlet for their affection but they are often strangely under the domination of those they despise. The real parent is the representation on

earth, so to speak, of the Imago and hence enjoys the authority of a vicegerent.

From all this argument we may conclude that repression—of an effectual, unwitting order—first begins with the establishment of the Œdipus trend. This—as Burrow has said—is the foundation for all repression. We certainly see in studying the psychoses ample reason for indulging this opinion. There the last thing to appear is the frank incest fancy, the first that which resembles it least. The more repression is psychotically lifted the nearer do we come to conscious appearance of literal Œdipus ideas. Probably all true repression (as opposed to voluntary inhibition which may become habitual) is really at bottom a repression of incest.

A narrow literal interpretation of this statement might make it ridiculous for there certainly is repression in the normal person of auto-erotism and infantile sexual impulses in general. Yet one does not have to receive many confessions from fairly normal people to realize that much of this “repression” is more of a conventional inhibition than a thoroughgoing exclusion of such impulses to the deeper levels of the unconscious. Most people, when honest with themselves will admit an interest in their excretory processes, probably few people in the heat of erotic excitement have never felt a temptation—be it only a fleeting one—to perform some perversion. The fact that this indulgence would involve another person and doubt as to the attitude of the other probably bulk largely in the speedy inhibition of the tendency.

On the other hand some repression does exist and this, I think, is a repression of all infantile erotism that is associated with the Œdipus complex. One must remember that the child does not know what adult sex activities really are. He can only interpret them in terms of practices which he himself can enjoy. In the delusions and hallucinations of the insane when there is literal reference to sex union with a parent it almost always takes the form of a perversion, i.e., of an infantile impulse. It must be remembered, too, that infantile attachments are selfish—the child gets much and gives little—while the erotism of the period is of its nature sterile. The libido outlets of this time are all non-adaptive and must therefore suffer repression. The Œdipus complex comes to act as a kernel or focus for all these activities that must be made unconscious. But no matter whether all repression comes from the “incest-horror” or not, it certainly seems to be the earliest true repression. The little girl described above, for instance, continued at increasingly long intervals to indulge in auto-erotic acts for over two years after the Œdipus repression was definitely established. She, of course, had never been violently scolded for such indulgence. Her parents merely reproved her for babyishness and bad manners, wishing to avoid the development of unreasoning shame about sex.

Auto-erotism and the establishment of the Œdipus complex mark the first stage in the development of the sex instinct-motivations. Next to this Freud has posited a latent period that lasts until

puberty. With this I am not in sympathy as it implies a cessation of sex activity and this does not take place. Sex curiosity flourishes at all ages and the child who has reached the school age does not confine his interest to the subjects of the curriculum. Moreover auto-erotism, although not so openly practiced, still persists in some form or other in the majority of children and definite masturbation is common particularly in boys. Finally interest in the opposite sex, although normally not violent shows all the characteristics of sex attraction. I would define puberty as the period during which the individual becomes conscious of his or her sex and sexual destiny. Normally, I think, this begins gradually as the infantile period, characterized by doubtful consciousness of sex, is tapering off. It comes normally to a climax at physiological puberty, the next stage being adolescence, when new types of adaptation are being tried out.

It is important to make the discrimination between physiological and psychological puberty for they may be far from coincident in their development. Many young people, particularly girls, may have physiological puberty established without any sex consciousness appearing for years. The same situation is sometimes found among men. I have had one patient who until in his twenties regarded his penis as a rather awkward appendage and the physical complications of puberty as a nuisance. In his late teens he had erotic fancies but they were of a definitely infantile order. He began to masturbate at twenty-eight. Psychological puberty did not

reach its full development until he had passed physiological puberty by ten years.

The developments of psychological puberty are as follows. In the directly sexual sphere there is a gradual sophistication about the facts of birth and procreation with a coincident realization of what the individual's sex goal must be. This process must be a gradual one for the simple reason that accuracy of knowledge, in what remains for the child an abstract matter, cannot be acquired in early years no matter how accurate the statements of instructors may be. A child for instance, who today is told in answer to questions, the exact facts of generation may to-morrow publish a fantastic theory of his own creation. Except where observation of the concrete and palpable is possible, the child is incapable of grasping correctly statements of processes beyond the sphere of his experience. Consequently the first phase of sophistication is one of fantasy. Many of these hypotheses are repressed and become part of the "language" of the unconscious. Insatiable curiosity driving him on, he begins to learn for himself the phenomena of generation in the lower animals, which he may have opportunity to observe or he may hear older children repeat the same story with sufficient consistency to give it a flavor of authenticity. Naturally so far as all this concerns his own sexual potentiality, he cannot know it in anything like a real way till he has experienced an orgasm, or some more or less equivalent genital sensation. This is apt to lead to experimentation, sometimes practiced with other boys or girls. At

this time there is apt to be a guilty delight in "smutty stories." All this education culminates in the actual experience of orgasm when it occurs as a result of appropriate stimulation after physiological puberty has been established. Sex consciousness is then established and all that remains to be accomplished is its application, a fruition not to be reached till marriage or some equivalent relationship is established.

As has been said before, this conscious sophistication is paralleled by an unconscious growth of the Œdipus fancy, which ever becomes, more and more literally, incest. Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that unconscious knowledge frequently outstrips the conscious. One may (at any age) take cognizance of words or sights, which one is unaware of having perceived. For instance one of my patients remembered a vivid dream at the age of thirteen of seeing coitus between a man and woman. It was accurate in detail. The next day she told her mother, who then, for the first time told the girl of facts of which she was consciously in complete ignorance.

From the standpoint of adaptation in later life other events of this period are probably more important than actual and accurate sex instruction. The normal child during this time is gradually weaning himself from the nursery and its hothouse influence and learning to adapt himself to strangers who demand a *quid pro quo* for their friendship. In the home the child has care and love given him, whether he works for it or not. When he goes to school or

plays with strange boys elsewhere he gets, roughly, just as much as he gives. He cannot be self-centered or selfish and thrive in this new environment. Consequently he learns to objectivate his interest. At the same time he is acquiring interests other than the purely human ones. Ideas of occupations come to him. At first he is going to be a fireman or a locomotive engineer; later he begins to dream of vocations more in keeping with his social status. Wittingly or unwittingly he is preparing himself for the business aspect of his adult life. He may even develop a taste for his studies! Such thoughts are important from our present standpoint because these new interests are all outlets for energy. They may or may not at this stage be vicarious outlets for sex energy but they are available as such against the period of adolescence when there is a great increment of sexual energy that has to be taken care of somehow. We believe that these general adaptations are more important than sophistication in the narrow sense because many children have most defective sex education and still attain to success in after life. On the other hand practically every neurotic and psychic patient gives a history of insufficient objectivation of interest at this time. He has not learned to sublimate while the technique is easily acquired. The mind of a child is plastic; he can learn new mental habits which involve great effort for the adolescent or adult, or may, indeed, be impossible for the latter.

We learn as much about the normal development of psychological puberty from its irregularities as

we do by direct observation of the mentally healthy boy and girl. The anomalies are of two kinds: precocious appearance of sex consciousness and slowness in development of all the characteristic acquisitions of this period. The first is quickly disposed of. The child who is prematurely sex conscious has not the intellectual equipment (nor opportunity) to sublimate; he is not physically endowed, even if he were socially permitted, to gain a "normal" sexual outlet. Consequently he is thrown back on himself and masturbates. This does give him an outlet and so facile a one that it is easily established as a life habit. This may be fixed as his kind of sexual pleasure. To others he cannot attain.

Unfortunate or disastrous results may follow on the appearance of physiological puberty before its psychological correlate is complete. This may occur as a result of precocious physical, or of delayed psychic, development. In either case he has "strength without hands to smite." There is a great influx of energy before the individual has become a socialized animal. Very often this energy is expressed in antisocial ways. It begins with adventure and ends with crime. Healy¹, for instance, found that precocious physical puberty was not infrequently associated with delinquency in girls. A somewhat analogous occasion for trouble is the sudden acquisition of sophistication (before physical development is complete) in a child who has been "sheltered" from such knowledge. The informant

¹ William Healy, "The Individual Delinquent," Little, Brown & Co., 1915.

in such cases is an older child, who sets himself up as a guardian of the mysteries and so gains a pathological power over the initiate. If the former be—as he so often is—a bad boy, he may lead an unwilling but unprotesting accomplice into crime. Many children are thus forced against inclination and judgment into thieving; they are under a spell which they cannot break. Neither they nor their distracted parents realize that the conduct is an aberrant exhibition of a sex impulse.

But most important of all is the fructification of the unconscious Oedipus development unaccompanied by capacity to sublimate. The unconscious impulse for erotic satisfaction with the parent has become a definitely copulative one and is backed by a strong physical pressure. It is characteristic of all unconscious motivations that they are capable of fulfillment in indirect and substitutive form. Therefore, if the boy has learned to make friends, play games and study, such activities can carry off this surplus energy. He can make his friendships warmer, he can blow off a lot of sexual steam in dancing and in comradely affection for those of the other sex. But if he has never learned to do this kind of thing, if he is of the seclusive bashful type who prefers to go home after school rather than mix with his fellows, he is now caught in a dilemma. The unconscious motivation is there, it is inflated with a new access of energy and, consciously, there is no channel for expression of the impulse except that which the unconscious demands! Some outlet must be found. It usually is pathological. A psy-

chosis or neurosis ensues in which there is represented a weak attempt to socialize the Œdipus idea that succeeds only in representing the attempt in fantasy, not in actuality. Sometimes the unconscious breaks through in literal, or almost literal, form and dementia præcox results. This is the central mechanism of the psychopathic reactions of the period of physical puberty.

Adolescence is the period during which people of either sex are apt to become keenly aware of their sexual and other problems. For this reason most patients date their "nervousness" from this time but any one who goes beneath the surface of such phenomena sees that adolescence is merely the time when faulty preparation for life becomes dramatically evident, the causative factors lying far behind.

We have just seen how the inflation of the Œdipus complex at physical puberty inevitably leads to conflict. The first solution of this is pathological in kind but is so frequent in occurrence that, provided its duration be brief, it must really be regarded as a normal phase. Consciousness of sex is acute and leads to onanism, which is usually accompanied by fantasies. In boys this is practically universal. With girls—it is harder to get reliable information here—some kind of masturbation is practiced provided the subject be conscious of sex. So frequently in our form of civilization are girls brought up to know nothing in this sphere, even of simple hygienic matters, that menstruation may be established without there being any knowledge of the meaning of

the phenomenon. In such cases sex information is apt to be unconscious and, naturally a mixture of fact and infantile theory. These girls, however, often indulge in auto-erotism at this period although the erogenous zone may not be the genitalia. Frequently they irritate the breasts. Such acts are usually half compulsive and accompanied with an ill-defined feeling of shame.

Fantasies may accompany such acts or simply occur in the absent-mindedness that so often is a symptom of physical puberty. With boys masturbation is apt to be a physical outlet for a fanciful experience of coitus. With girls sentimental sex fantasies may produce a condition of excitement that culminates in definite onanism. Then both sexes indulge freely in daydreams appropriate to their sex. The boys see themselves as cowboys, pirates, aviators, etc. The girls lose themselves in scenes of social and domestic triumph.

These imaginations prefigure normal destiny and if the individual have the requisite adaptability, the necessary capacity for objectivation, sex energy is deflected into activities preparatory to the assumption of their life work. More direct outlet for sex is obtained in social intercourse. Young people usually show a sudden increase in sociability at this time, and, unless it be compulsive in character it is a healthy activity. Adolescents can gain much diluted sex pleasure in a socially permissible form in dancing and "puppy love" affairs. In fact there is nothing more surely indicative of psychopathic taint than the failure to have such love affairs in

one's teens. They form the natural transitions to the serious attachments of later life.

Coincident with the socializing of the sex impulse in friendship is its sublimation in play and work. Fantasy is gradually made achievement. Sex rivalry probably has a good deal to do unconsciously with the lust for athletic achievement among boys, and in addition there is definite pleasure, allied to autoerotism but healthy in form, to be derived from the use of one's muscles. The essence of sex biologically is creation, consequently doing or making almost anything can become a sexual sublimation. But the psychological mechanisms of sublimation are too well known to require further exposition.

The fate of puberty masturbation varies. In normal, well adapted individuals the excessive energy first directed towards sex is deflected into other channels, genital consciousness therefore diminishes and masturbation dies a natural death. But in many cases—some of them not at all psychopathic in constitution—it does not depart without first stirring up a good deal of trouble. Misinformation as to the prevalence of masturbation and its alleged disastrous effects (impotence, sterility, insanity, etc.) causes the onanist to think himself (or herself) a secret criminal doomed to inevitable and awful punishment. He does not realize that in brooding over his iniquity he is continually thinking of his genital organs or functions and is so only increasing the sex consciousness that is the occasion for his trouble. Inevitably this consciousness reaches a climax in another compulsive indulgence and so the vicious

circle goes on. Without psychological advice the habit may gradually lapse owing to the intercurrent of a stimulus which forces distraction of attention to some healthier preoccupation. These unfortunates, however, usually carry with them throughout life a psychic scar. Frequently male masturbators are advised to seek relief in "normal" intercourse and often this recourse is effective because they think it is normal and so lose the vicious circle of worry. But in severer cases this expedient does not work; either no satisfaction is gained (perhaps there may be psychic impotence) or heterosexual promiscuity becomes itself compulsive. Physically masturbation is self-stimulation of orgasm. Psychologically it is incitement of genital sensations without the psychic accompaniment of love. When, therefore, a man has intercourse with a woman for whom he has no affection he is indulging in a practice that is, for all intents and purposes, onanistic. The only difference is that in one case he regards the practice as abnormal and in the other thinks it normal. But from the standpoint of psychosexual development the whoremonger is no nearer the goal of intercourse as an expression of love than is the masturbator. This is the reason why the neurotic who cannot attain this development, who cannot combine mental and sexual regard for the same person is apt to make intercourse with prostitutes a compulsive affair. Often, poor fellow, he regards himself as a prodigy of potency. His real trouble is that for him womankind is divided into two classes—"mother" people and prostitutes. Having never learned adequately to

objectivate his unconscious sexual motivations, any woman for whom he has respect is so direct a representative of his mother that a sex tabu hangs over her. If he tries to marry, there is a domestic tragedy.

The girl who masturbates and loses herself in sex fantasies, if she does not succeed in distracting herself to more normal interests, is apt to develop a prudish attitude towards life. Socially she is forever being shocked by any frank statement or reference, while in the seclusion of her chamber she indulges in endless erotic ruminations. Since such thoughts are, for her, the essence of sin, she sincerely regards all sex as wicked and, when she marries is anesthetic or actively frigid. Very commonly she develops a monstrous fear of childbirth that may lead to hysterical vomiting during pregnancy or other unconscious protests against the responsibilities she has assumed. Her baby (if he is so unfortunate as to survive) is treated for years as part of her own body and fondled with auto-erotic zeal.

There are three stages in direction of objectivation through which one passes during adolescent development. They are of importance psychopathologically because the subject may not be able to pass beyond either of the first two and is then incapable of fulfilling his sexual destiny adequately. During the period of psychological puberty the child's objectivation is essentially of the *Œdipus* type. There may be latently a great deal of self-love but this is more noticeable objectively in his behavior than subjectively. With physical puberty and the begin-

ning of adolescence come the three stages of narcissism, homosexuality and heterosexuality. The first and last of these represent in sexual labels adaptations that are essential for normal development.

The narcissist is one who loves himself. This does not necessarily mean his body, although masturbation is frequently a physical expression of the love. The affection is for himself as a personality. He has an ego-ideal and he knows it. The child may be self-centered and selfish without the consciousness of self which is the core of narcissism. If a child is to break away from nursery attachments and nursery habits of thought and emotion, he must attach his libido to some one other than his mother. Also, before he can take his place in the world as an individual, he must self-consciously see himself acting in it as an independent agent. He is visualizing himself in the world's arena in his fantasies of adventure and achievement, which, as we have seen, prefigure his actual accomplishments. Because his libido is all (or almost all) going to this object he exaggerates his importance outrageously. But without some self glorification he probably could not succeed in declaring his independence of parental influence. As noted in an earlier chapter the "unity" complex drives parents to the domination of children, who must rebel sooner or later if the world is to advance. Without adolescent conceit few boys or girls could stand out against the manifestly greater wisdom and experience of their parents and declare their independent views on

social and religious matters. The youth who has not this inflated ego is apt with difference of opinion to be thrown into most painful conflict. Naturally fixation at this point embarrasses success in later life or makes it impossible.

The homosexual phase is of less importance but is still useful. With the accession of sex consciousness the other sex cease to be merely other young of the same species. Before this time, "He unabashed her garter saw," now the boy is painfully aware of it even though it be not visible. This embarrassment does not extend to others of the same sex, however, so it is easier to mix with the latter. But this *rapprochement* is not entirely a negative matter. The adolescent is drawn to those who have the same problems to face as he, the "unity" complex drives him to consort with those who think as he does. A dominant topic of interest being sex, erotic discussion and initiation is common. Both boys and girls lead each other to masturbate and actual homosexual practices are much commoner in the early teens than are usually supposed. But no label of "degeneracy" is placed on these acts and in the ordinary course of events they soon are discontinued. Many an adult can recall without much effort experiences of this time of life, which, had they come ten or fifteen years later would have filled him (or her) with horror. This is the period when boys have "chums" and girls have "crushes." Provided these attachments are temporary or moderate, they not only do no harm but are positively useful, for they teach the practice of self-abnegation, service and coöperation

that is essential for objective love. Unfortunately circumstances often combine to exaggerate and prolong this period unduly so that the subject becomes fixed in merely homosexual adaptations and is indifferent or antagonistic to the other sex. Such circumstances are the too exclusive and persistent segregation of the sexes at this age, coupled with lack of opportunity for expressions of energy in other ways, or, most important of all, the definite seduction of a younger person by one whose greater age and experience gives an authority, and a sanction to the relationship that dignify it permanently.

The group of boys who are playing at this homosexual level take delight in vaunting manliness and despising girls who have not their physical capacities. (There is much symbolization of anatomic differences here.) Similarly the group of girls regard boys as rough and rude. But soon there are defaulters from the brotherhood, who, followed by the jeers of the rather jealous faithful, sneak away for some mild flirtation with one of the other sex. One by one the band is broken up as instinct calls imperiously for its normal fruition. Heterosexual adaptation has begun.

The distinctive characteristic of this last and adult development is that the demands, created by the series of sex instinct motivations we have been discussing, are fully met by emotional outlets gained in adult relations and vocations. The mother—unconscious mate—can be represented by the wife, the pristine rival, the father, can be defeated in the per-

sons of business or professional rivals. The lust for creation is satisfied with the procreation of children and accomplishment in one's vocation. These represent ideal achievements; most of us fail of complete or consistent consummation of this adaptation. To write in detail of the way in which failure occurs would require a whole treatise on psychopathology. We must be content with mere mention of the general ways in which regression to earlier types of interest is initiated. There are three of them.

First, a personal recipient of affection such as a wife or close friend may die or be estranged; or—what is psychologically equivalent—some business or professional outlet may be blocked by untoward accident. If the subject is dowered with the proper degree of elasticity some new outlet is found or the interest bound up in the relationship or project that has lapsed is added to other existing outlets. Otherwise regression, often to complete infantility may take place.

Second, the responsibilities of the existing situation may be increased beyond the emotional capacity of the individual. A good example of this comes with the birth of another child to a woman (more rarely a man) whose resources are already taxed in maintenance of the *status quo*. It must be borne in mind that marriage makes a more exorbitant demand for adaptation than any other class of situation we know about. Not only must affection be focused on the partner and children but independence of movement and opinion are inevitably cur-

tailed. The man or woman who gets married abandons personal liberty in its most intimate aspects and enters into an agreement, which would be regarded as purest servitude, were it not voluntarily espoused and presumed to offer supreme compensation in emotional delight. Unless this consolation is adequate, the married man or woman is constantly liable to regress psychologically. When a child is born not only are responsibilities increased but the bond is forged more tightly. The task is too great and unconscious motivations seek directer expression.

Third, complexes may be specifically inflated by some environmental event that represents the achievement of some unconscious ambition. For instance a harried wife may yearn for some lightening of her load that is unconsciously translated in terms of diminution of the family. She responds with pathological worry over the health of her children. Then comes the illness or death of one of them. The unconscious "wish" is fulfilled, which acts as a stimulus to all allied motivations. Or, again, the original rival in the *Œdipus* setting of the infantile love story may die. To the unconscious this means that the way is open for possession of the mother, so that tendency surges up, or tends to do so.

The argument concerning sex instinct motivations may be epitomized as follows:

The sexual proclivities of man do not represent the workings of a simple instinct. They have at least two directions, a lust for peculiar bodily sensa-

tion and an urge for propagation. The first (allied with ego instincts) begins with auto-erotism, a blind, protopathic-like stimulation and response of the body which exists without consciousness in the ordinary sense of that term. Contrasted with this is object attachment, an essential component of the procreative tendency which appears with the development of consciousness and is expressed in the Oedipus fantasy. Sex consciousness is associated with this attachment and also repression. The three phenomena of consciousness, objectivation and repression are correlated and together make up an epicritic-like development. As psychosexual life proceeds the struggle between the primitive impulse for sterile physical satisfaction and the biological urge for mating and procreation results in the repression of some elements of body pleasure and the utilization of others. Acuity of sensibility is focused in the genitalia and, in appropriate situations, is available for display of typical "protopathic" intensity and affective quality. Affection for parents represents merely a passing and unsatisfactory compromise between these two factors, because it is an almost wholly selfish relationship without the element of equal coöperation that is necessary in mating and also because it is biologically false, involving as it does in-breeding. Its crudely sexual potentialities are repressed and from the most central and powerful of the unconscious sex motivations. When first repressed the sexual implications of the relationship are vague but it becomes more and more

literally incest as the sophistication of the child advances. The great problem of life is the adaptation of such unconscious motivations to socially useful outlets in indirect and symbolic form.

CHAPTER XXI

THE HERD INSTINCTS

The third group of instincts which we have to discuss differs from the ego and the sex instincts in two general respects. The instincts so far considered are more fundamental, biologically, because self-preservation and reproduction are necessary functions of practically all animals, while herd life is an adaptation found only in certain species or genera. (On the other hand the distribution is diversified for communality is found in quite unrelated phyla.) Secondly, since the herd instinct has no meaning unless associated with herd life, it is necessarily highly modifiable in reaction type, by stimuli from the society in which the individual lives. That is, one's herd reactions are essentially connected with the reactions of the group, while the motivations by which the other instincts are expressed are much more fixed and rigid. Of course one's sex reactions vary with environmental change. In the presence of one woman the conduct of a man is different from that in his association with another. But still he follows in the main pattern reactions resulting from repressions and unconscious elaborations of years gone by. Herd instinct motivations are not personally elaborated by the indi-

vidual but by the group and then adopted by the individual. Hence a change in national standards of conduct—as for instance with a change from peace to war—may lead a man to take keen pleasure in killing which previously would have filled him with horror.

Although many psychologists and sociologists have spoken vaguely about the herd instinct (or instincts)—Trotter was the first, so far as I know, to undertake any helpful analysis of its mode of operation. He points out that man is a herd animal apart from his behavior when acting in immediate concert with other people. In other words that the instinct is acting when a man is thinking or living alone as well as when he is one of a mob. The chief exhibition of this action he finds in tendencies to derive comfort from thinking as other people do and discomfort in thinking differently. Hence we are prone to adopt the opinions and beliefs in business life, philosophy, religion or science, of our neighbors. We do not do this after dispassionate weighing of evidence but accept their views uncritically and unwittingly. Having once taken over such thoughts, we usually regard them as our own independent conclusions and offer allegedly logical argument in their support, by which logic we are convinced of their originality. This secondary process Trotter called “rationalization.” It was popularized in psychoanalytic literature by Ernest Jones, but it is to Trotter that we owe the original conception. His contribution to the study of conflict we shall come to later.

This rationalization tendency points to the fact that we dislike the thought of not forming our own opinions and that there is some antagonism between individual, intellectual activity and acceptance of "group thinking." There is considerable evidence as to this contrast in functions. Those of highest intelligence are as a rule most independent in their views, while egoism (necessarily correlated with relative weakness of herd instinct) unquestionably facilitates independent intelligence. On the other hand the feeble-minded show an exaggerated docility to group opinion. Hence the feeble-minded boy may be a criminal if placed in a bad environment but within a short time after transference to a good home or institution be a docile, altruistic person. We see no such rapid changes in the intellectually normal with purely environmental treatment. Also we find a rough parallelism between refinement of civilization with its greater latitude for individual intelligence and a weakening of herd instinct. The savage never questions the theories or practices of his people while the European does, although the latter compromises by formation of small groups in which opinions different from those of the masses may be comfortably held.

If contrast and relative incompatibility between intelligence and conformity exist it would only be reasonable to infer that the latter is an instinctive phenomenon. And, indeed, these manifestations do show in a fairly complete way the three characteristics which Rivers posits for instincts. They tend to follow the "all-or-none" law. A middle ground

is hard to hold. One cannot agree with a solid group of people (i.e., a real "herd") and preserve independent judgment. "He who is not for us is against us" sums up this state of affairs. The individual feels this and either enters or stays out of the group.¹ The second criterion is certainly present. These phenomena are unreflective or they are nothing. The third that of the reaction being immediate and uncontrolled, holds true when the instinct is expressed in a reaction rather than a motivation. There are few kinds of conduct less immediate and controlled than the pillaging of a mob. During a war all our enemies are inhuman monsters. At the height of a political campaign all opponents are

¹The present day decay of the Church is probably thus to be explained. Right to individual opinion and interpretation is being granted more and more. If faith becomes individual, there is no need for communal exercise of the rites that go with faith. Religious organization is and must be founded on dogma and intolerance. As the latter are no longer popular, social caste has largely been substituted for community of faith as the cement of church organizations. Since castes have other means of expressing their cohesion the churches have not gained by this exchange of motifs.

If the religious spirit or attitude be ingrained in man (as I believe it is) this must tend with the dissolution of church power to be expressed in mundane affairs. In more primitive societies practically nothing can be done which has not some religious significance. For generations we have been dissociating worldly and sanctified activities. Now we may be reassociating them. Certainly much of the psychology of religion can be seen in trade-unions, socialism, political groups, etc., schools of thought and sometimes in business. The religious component is now, however, unconscious and discoverable only by analysis. One hope of civilization may be a further evolution which makes this "religion" conscious, controllable and not a component introducing irrationality along with enthusiasm and devotion.

grafters and traitors. Finally we should note that herd reactions, like other instinctive phenomena are apt to be emotional. The affect of comfort that goes with uniformity of thought and action is hard to describe but is nevertheless definite. Further they tend to show irrational persistence.

Herd instincts operate both positively and negatively. We shall discuss the former exhibitions first. These are of two types: like the other instincts showing reactions in emergencies and motivations of longer duration.

Herd instinct reactions appear most plainly when the group as such is on the offensive or defensive. A mob in full career gives an excellent example, the individual forgets himself and follows the "voice of the herd," as Trotter calls it, with extraordinary obedience. Similarly there is a sudden cohesiveness in a country launched into war. Trotter gives excellent examples of this. Election phenomena are instructive in this connection. If an issue be raised that represents (or is made to represent) a threat to the nation's integrity a landslide may occur at the polls that is utterly unpredictable by those best in touch with the political situation. An excellent example of this was the election by which the Laurier Government was ejected from power in Canada. The big issue of the campaign was a proposed trade reciprocity with the United States. The slogan was raised that this would jeopardize the independence of Canada. As the polls were closing political workers, who should have known the conscious temper of the electorate, were offering even money on the

result. Yet in a few hours it was seen that a landslide had "saved" Canada from reciprocity and that old members of the Laurier Government who before had been practically unopposed in their solid constituencies had received only a handful of votes. Unwittingly the word had been passed from voter to voter that reciprocity was not to be. This is of course a striking example as it shows how individuals may respond to a group decision without that decision being previously voiced in a conscious way. Yet every election shows similar phenomena in a smaller way. The political parties gain a cohesiveness they never enjoy between elections and personal independence (as in all herd reactions) is lost or largely lost for the period of the emergency. But the great example of herd activity is war. When "morale" is properly developed the military unit acts with concert not achievable by mere obedience to command and the individual loses his individuality to such an extent that he ceases to have any regard whatever for his personal safety. And an army in panic shows the unwitting spread of the herd decision for flight in an exquisite manner.

Among savages whose lives are much more communal than ours, less dramatic occasions are needed for the display of these phenomena. Rivers gives some excellent examples,¹ which are worthy of quotation *in extenso*.

"When in the Solomon Islands in 1908 with Mr. A. M. Hocart we spent some time in a schooner visiting different parts of the island of Vella Lavella. Whenever we were going ashore five of

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 94 seq.

the crew would row us in the whale-boat, four rowing and the fifth taking the steer-oar. As soon as we announced our intention to go ashore, five of the crew would at once separate from the rest and man the boat; one would go to the steer-oar and the others to the four thwarts. Never once was there any sign of disagreement or doubt which of the ship's company should man the boat, nor was there ever any hesitation who should take the steer-oar, though, at any rate according to our ideas, the coxswain had a far easier and more interesting task than the rest. It is possible that there was some understanding by which the members of the crew arranged who should undertake the different kinds of work, but we could discover no evidence whatever of any such arrangement. The harmony seems to have been due to such delicacy of social adjustment that the intention of five of the members of the crew to man the boat and of one to take the steer-oar was at once intuited by the rest. Such an explanation of the harmony is in agreement with many other aspects of the social behaviour of Melanesian or other lowly peoples. When studying the warfare of the people of the Western Solomons I was unable to discover any evidence of definite leadership. When a boat reached the scene of a head-hunting foray, there was no regulation who should lead the way. It seemed as if the first man who got out of the boat or chose to lead the way was followed without question. Again, in the councils of such people there is no voting or other means of taking the opinion of the body. The people seem to recognize instinctively, using this much misused word in the strict sense, that some definite line of action shall be taken. Those who have lived among savage or barbarous peoples in several parts of the world have related how they have attended native councils where matters in which they were interested were being discussed. When after a time the English observer has found that the people were discussing some wholly different topic, and has inquired when they were going to decide the question in which he was interested, he has been told that it had already been decided and that they had passed to other business. The decision had been made with none of the processes by which our councils or committees decide disputed points. The

members of the council have become aware at a certain point that they are in agreement, and it was not necessary to bring the agreement explicitly to notice."

Children sometimes show coöperation in their play that is strikingly like the behavior described by Rivers. They will play "house" or "school" or "railway," each child playing a separate rôle and fitting it in with the actions of the others, when the verbal agreement preceding the game is much less extensive than that which adults would need. Of course this unity is often disturbed by the insistence of several children on playing the leading rôle. A phenomenon of extraordinary interest and one that should be investigated psychologically is that of the seasonal rotation of purely childish games, games for which there are no printed rules. Why do boys bring out their marbles at one season, tops at another and kites at a third? They seem to follow some powerful influence the nature of which they do not know nor question. This is quite like many savage customs.

The motivations of the herd instincts are different from those of the ego and sex instincts in one most important particular. The energy directed by the herd instinct is not incorporated in an internally evolved motivation but adopts a formulation supplied by the group. The most obvious of these are codified laws and consciously recognized traditions and conventions. Of course one element of obedience to these institutions is intellectual. We recognize the consequence of disobedience. But our compliance goes further than that. Most people will not

steal although immune from discovery. When any but a professional criminal commits a serious crime his guilt may betray him. Why should he feel guilt, if his objection to crime is purely a conscious recognition of consequences? To take a glaring example, how hungry a man must be before he will eat human flesh and what a revulsion of feeling it then causes! Again we all know how necessary for the enforcement of any law is the "moral sentiment" of the community. In fact the unwritten law binds people much more than that which is codified and therefore enforceable by the police. Conformity with convention, whether that be formulated or not, is not merely a matter of habit. When society lifts any ban our emotional reactions are apt to alter quickly, habit only serves to retard the change slightly. For instance we have horror of shedding blood or killing fellow men. Yet a declaration of war is enough to change the revulsion of feeling into a pleasurable lust.

These motivations are wittingly recognized. Society also issues its mandates in a form recognizable by intuition alone. Ostracism can be commanded without a word being spoken. A room full of people can show interest in or disapproval of one guest's conversation or actions in ways which no novelist could adequately describe. The mechanisms by which agreements of a mass of people are reached are nevertheless worthy objects of psychological study. So far as I know Martin ¹ is the only one who has contributed liberally to this type of enquiry.

¹ Everett Dean Martin, "The Behavior of Crowds," New York, Harper Bros., 1920.

With the exception of some conventions that are not put into words most of our herd motivations are codified. As we descend, however, in the scale of civilization we find less law (in the lawyer's sense) and more custom. The savage has few definite crimes against which he must legislate although his life is hedged about with restrictions so (to him) self-evident that they need not be taught by precept. One difficulty in the researches of anthropologists is that they have to ask savages about laws and rules of which they are not accustomed to think as legislative enactments but in terms of behavior. Place the savage in a certain situation and something tells him what he should or should not do. His obedience to this uncodified dictate is unquestioned and complete. Here again we see the unwritten law as the powerful one. In fact when we make conformity a legislative matter, that is, more intellectual and less instinctive, it at once begins to lose its power. A lawyer would starve in Melanesia! On the other hand conventions and customs that are not reduced to words have not been made fully conscious and hence are not subject to logical criticism. Only the codified law can be rational. Our mental evolution has proceeded to the point where legal rationality seems inevitably to be associated with proportionate indifference to it.

We have covered, roughly and schematically, the positive manifestations of the herd instincts. They contribute specific phenomena in our mental lives. Do they inhibit as well? Or do these instincts alternate with the ego and sex? The answer is that both

types of reaction occur. Just as direct threat to the ego will cause a pure ego-instinct reaction, so direct threat to the group will cause the individual to abandon ego and sex activities and surcharge his consciousness with exclusively herd ideals. For instance at the outbreak of war many men feel compelled to leave business, wives and friends to join the colors. That this behavior is instinctive is indicated by the fact that this compulsion may occur without any further stimulus than the declaration of war and before any social or legislative pressure is brought to bear. As to the inhibiting functions, we would expect these to exist because, as Trotter pointed out, man is a chronically herd animal and the inner motivation of uniformity must come into conflict with the automatic tendencies for direct expression of such ego and sex impulses as are banned by society. "Conscience" may be regarded as the affectively colored recognition of what the group demands, or prohibits in conduct. Hence the conscience of a European may be different from that of a Chinese or Hindu. The affective coloring, which distinguishes conscience from the purely intellectual judgment of expediency, is derived from herd instinct.

Many crude exhibitions of ego tendencies are of necessity inimical to the interests of society so the occasion for conflict in this connection is obvious. The sex inhibitions are more complicated. In historical times social attitudes towards different forms of sex indulgence have varied a great deal. -In Greece of the classical period homosexuality was not

only tolerated but certain aspects of the relationship were actually honored. Now a suggestion of "degeneracy" horrifies the average man. Similarly in civilizations of European origin the attitude towards promiscuous heterosexuality shows considerable variation. Conflicts that rage over unconscious (or conscious) temptations in these directions are manifestly connected with herd standards, to which we feel an inner compulsion of obedience, presumably founded on gregarious instinct. On the other hand repression of incest is a much more widely spread phenomenon and acts more consistently and thoroughly. So effectual is it that even warm embraces between blood relations can occur without any consciousness of sex appearing although the subjects may not have much inhibition of ordinary sex thoughts. In fact this repression de-sexes a woman for most men if she be a mother or sister. There are laws concerning incest, it is true, but, taking the population of our civilized countries as a whole it is safe to assume that these laws are known only to the sophisticated and the term "incest" itself is unknown to many if not most people. Moreover the thing itself is rarely discussed. Manifestly, then, this repression cannot be due to the absorption of current opinion. Then, too, it begins to operate at a time of life when conventions have comparatively little power and are only vaguely realized and, as has been noted, it may appear in the absence of any specific disapprobation on the part of the child's elders. These latter details indicate its instinctive quality, the former its fundamental and well-nigh

universal character. How and whence is this particular repression derived?

In the first place one notes that it seems to have certain biological analogies. Nature seems to try to prevent in-breeding. The phenomena are well known with plants. The pistils of the flowers in one plant ripen before or after the stamens. In others where insects are the agents of fertilizations there may be most elaborate anatomical specializations which seem to have no function unless it be to prevent the insect which is reaching for honey carrying pollen from stamens to pistil of the same plant. Among most animals scattering of the family group occurs when the young reach sexual maturity. This may be instinctive. A custom reported of beavers, who live a communal life, is plainly so. When the young are mature they are driven from the parental house and have to build new houses for themselves. What with scattering or active separation the chances of in-breeding are slight among the animals.

Now man is not only a herd animal but the family group is maintained long after the time of sex maturity is reached, at least among civilized peoples. Under these circumstances,—to which should be added the fact that parents give children just the kind of intimate attention which is sexually exciting outside the home,—incest would be both inevitable and universal were there not some inhibition in operation. Since instincts work blindly against incest in animals and repression operates against it specifically among civilized people, one naturally would like to know what intermediate phases there

may be. The custom known as exogamy among savages is highly suggestive on this point.

Tribes are divided into exogamous groups which means that, after puberty initiation rites are complete, any woman of group A is tabu for a man of that group and the latter must marry one of group B. The interpretation of this widespread custom is a matter of much dispute among anthropologists but the following seems a reasonable explanation from a psychological standpoint. When exogamy prevails matrilineal institutions also exist as a rule, i.e., children belong to the mother, or rather the mother's family, the father having no jurisdiction over them. This institution is not only understandable but seems inevitable if one considers that knowledge of the physiology of conception is still quite vague among many savage peoples and is inevitably a recent acquisition in primitive society.¹ The tracing of connection between copulation to-day and childbirth ten lunar months hence is no small feat of scientific observation and inference. If a woman becomes pregnant of eating rice, bathing in a certain stream, being exposed to a full moon, etc., the child naturally belongs exclusively to her or her family. We can therefore conclude that matrilineal descent and exogamy are (or were) correlated with ignorance of paternity. The fact that they may only rarely coëxist now proves nothing because human institutions are notoriously tenacious of life long after the occasion for their establishment has passed

¹ E. S. Hartland, "Primitive Paternity," David Nutt, London, 1909.

away. Outside of such restrictions as exogamy, sexual promiscuity is apt to be free among these peoples. Granted herd life, promiscuity and ignorance of paternity what could prevent in-breeding except such an institution as exogamy? Incest, so far as these people know the conception, which with them is a matter of marrying with a "father" group man or a "mother" group woman, is taken care of effectually by exogamy. But they did not arrive at this conclusion as a result of logical argument; had they done so, incest only in the specific sense of the term would have been tabu. It must be a custom which gives an expression to instinct. This custom may be looked on as something intermediate between pure instinct and codified law such as we enjoy. But as children our repressions were like the savage exogamy, being directed against sexual ideas in connection with "mother" people rather than the individual mother, who stood as a representative of the group which was tabu.

The next problem is, whence comes the instinct? Is it sexual or herd or neither? If it be sexual then we must assume that in addition to the pleasure aspects and the propagation aspects, sex instincts must also contain a highly discriminative element looking towards a peculiarly fitting kind of propagation. Were this so, we would expect sexual activities that were not directed towards propagation at all to be as universally banned. But homosexuality is not, nor is masturbation. In fact many an adolescent practices masturbation with practically no revulsion of feeling until he is instructed as to its

perniciousness. On the other hand incest horror has grown up with social development. In fact it is the advance of material comfort which makes possible the continuance of the youth in the home after sexual maturity has been reached. Of course the coincidence does not establish identity of origin. We may be dealing with an instinct different from sex or herd as ordinarily described. But since the other repressions are rather plainly associated with herd instincts it is expedient to class this one here too. If we speak of herd instincts rather than herd instinct we can make no grave error. This group of instincts has, then, as one of its functions chronic repressions and one of them—we cannot further specify which one—motivates an antagonism to the idea of incest.

We should not leave this topic without mentioning the phenomenon of actual incest. Unfortunately we know nothing about this psychiatrically. Extensive research into the nature of the other mental processes in the perpetrators of this crime might enlarge our knowledge of the *Œdipus* repression. Occasionally incest occurs in plainly psychopathic individuals, when it may be regarded as a sudden surging up of the unconscious motivation, analogous to the delusions so frequently observed in dementia præcox. These cases do not necessarily present any great problem. Most frequently, however, it is met with in the definitely and unquestionably lower classes. What is the psychology of these people? We must remember that what is repressed is not the real mother but an *Imago*. Yet with most

people the real mother stands for the Imago in many ways. Do these "degenerates" lack this identification? In their other reactions do they fail to behave differently towards mothers, sisters or daughters than towards other women? An investigator who studied a large group of these cases carefully might find that alcoholic intoxication was often or always present. Under its influence the unconscious often is liberated and, at the same time, recognition of the environment is difficult. The perpetrator of the crime might recognize his victim only as a female. Again one might find that this disordered state of consciousness was manufactured *ad hoc*, as is so often the case in hysteria and epilepsy. Dogmatism as to the repression of incest will not be justifiable until such researches are carried out. Yet they will be difficult for it is no easy matter to get accurate histories from patients and relatives who have no education and no experience of introspection; at the same time only nice psychological discrimination will be of any value.

Sanger Brown in his contribution to the symposium on instincts mentioned above, makes an interesting claim. He thinks that "collective thinking," an expression of herd instinct, and defective sense of individual personality are correlated tendencies and that similar phenomena are present in the psychoses, in dreams and in childhood. All these would then be expressions of herd instinct.

It may be well to enumerate these phenomena. Many examples (such as those quoted from Rivers

above) show that many savages have not individuality of thought such as we enjoy but that they rather tend to think collectively, not only in the construction of their myths and customs but also in their daily occupations. This has been called "group thought" or "group consciousness."¹ Some anthropologists ally with this the habit of ascribing life and influence to inanimate objects, that is, the general principle of animism. To quote Sanger Brown:

"For example, a savage felt that anything which was near and dear to him, such as his weapons or his trinkets, actually became a part of his own individuality. He thought that if any one destroyed these possessions or weapons they could thereby do injury to him. This belief worked out in curious ways. He believed that an enemy, by gaining possession of bits of his hair or his clothing or other possessions, could make him ill by magical performances upon these things. It is stated that one effect which this belief had, was to make members of one group or moiety of the tribe always suspicious of members of the other group. Individuals of different groups were never quite at ease in each other's company. They feared domination from an enemy by means of this outside influence, somewhat as a paranoid patient feels domination from an influence from without."

He then follows one school of anthropology in the argument that the primitive savage before evolving anthropomorphic gods has nature deities, de-

¹It should of course be borne clearly in mind that this is a different phenomenon from that alleged by Jung to exist in the "collective unconscious." Jung's conception is of inherited ideas belonging to all mankind. "Group consciousness" refers definitely to acquired mental processes. It is a term for the phenomenon of a group of people unwittingly acting and reacting on each other to produce ideas which are common to all when they become conscious.

icted in representations of clouds, mountains, seas, etc., and that these images were like what he conceived his own personality to be.

An analogous psychology exists in the animistic stage of childhood. It is a question whether the symbolic thinking and the vague feelings of influence observed in dementia præcox and other psychoses may not be an atavistic return to this evolutionary phase of mental development. They may represent a lack of integration of personality and individual consciousness. Dreams often show similar phenomena, personal and even bodily individuality may be lost and the dreamer feel he is in several places at once or that his dismembered parts are floating through space.

In his argument Sanger Brown makes use of a book "Themis" which Miss Jane Harrison has written on the methods of thinking in savages. She, in turn, has followed the French school of anthropology, who seek to explain the fundamental differences between our own and savage thinking by the assumption that the more primitive men enjoy a "prelogical" type of thinking that is characterized by what this school calls "collective representations." Lévy-Bruhl¹ has attempted a definite analysis of this type of mentation and finds that the differences from civilized thought can be classified under two headings. One is positive and the other negative. The former he calls the "law of participation," while the latter is that the savage

¹"Les Fonctions mentales dans les Sociétés inférieures," Paris, 1910.

can hold beliefs which to our minds are flatly contradictory. It is the law of participation that enables a savage to believe that a part of his body, such as his hair, which may be removed from the rest of his body, still remains part of it and that action on the detached portion can affect him. Rivers¹ has attacked this school from an anthropological standpoint, directing his criticism particularly against the alleged lack of recognition of contradiction. He shows that before one can properly evaluate the beliefs of a savage one must know the details and history of his standpoint. As he points out, a savage visiting our civilization might easily conclude that we were backward, because we have no names for concepts he enjoys and because there are contradictions in our beliefs. In the same way one may say that we do not believe our shorn locks have life in them or are still parts of ourselves, because we are dominated by materialistic knowledge and philosophy that excludes such a notion. The savage may have theories of individuality, as internally logical as our own, but which strike us as illogical because we hold a different philosophy of life. Such criticisms weaken the force of the arguments of the French anthropologist school and make it unwise for psychologists to take as proven the claims of only one section of those who are interested in human culture.

But this does not mean their material is valueless. On the contrary, if the same tendencies, present in

¹ W. H. R. Rivers, "The Primitive Conception of Death," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. X, No. 2, January, 1912.

the savage mind, can be demonstrated amongst ourselves, the study of primitive peoples serves to light our way to the observation of rather universal human traits. For instance, the law of participation is not unknown amongst ourselves. Would not a savage observing us say that when we pay a large sum for an autograph, that we hope to gain possession, thereby, of some of the life or power of the signer? Would any one like to see his love-letter torn in pieces and stamped upon? There certainly are traces amongst ourselves of beliefs (not operating wittingly) in a wider kind of personality than we are accustomed to avow.

On the other hand it is questionable whether this extension of personality is, strictly speaking, the same as animism. If I think a tree has its own spirit, I ascribe a personality to it of its own nature. But if I think my knife has part of my personality, it has not its own spirit but merely part of mine. The tree having a spirit is animism. The knife's spirit is an example of the principle of participation. Symbolism may be derived from either source. Herd instinct may have an influence on each, although as we have seen in Chapter XIV both diffuse consciousness, and animism can arise naturally in early life before social influence plays any rôle whatever. This influence differs somewhat in the two cases, but before discussing this we must consider the relationship of herd instinct to the sense of reality.

We are accustomed to think that we observe the phenomena of nature dispassionately and object-

ively and that the sense of what is real comes to us as a result of these individual and independent observations. Yet everyone who has tried to teach science in any form knows what a rare gift that really is. As a matter of fact we see what we are told to see and are blind to practically all else unless its exhibitions be seismic. Similarly we accept theories of natural processes as if we had ourselves fabricated them. In fact we go so far, in this latter direction, as to deny the evidence of our senses. An example may make this plainer. We all believe that the earth goes around the sun, although probably not more than one in every hundred thousand of us could either prove it, nor knows the method of observation and argument which originally promulgated this view. At the same time, in holding this theory as a fact, we disbelieve the evidence of our senses. Every day the sun plainly goes around the earth—or (because that statement implies a round world) everyday we see the sun come up on one side of a flat earth and disappear at night on the other. The first man who said the earth moved was not treated kindly by his neighbors; now the man who denies its motion is called insane. From the standpoint of individual observation and logical deduction therefrom, the first persecutors were in a safer position. As an example of failure to observe an obvious phenomenon I may mention the case of a biologist who had done good research work; at the age of thirty he had his attention drawn for the first time to the fact that a new moon appears in the West and that a moon seen in the East is a

waning moon. Thereafter, he told me, he saw this so regularly that anyone who failed to observe it seemed like an imbecile to him. Our fondness for acceptance of group ideas goes to quite absurd lengths when we maintain beliefs concerning phenomena of which nobody knows anything—or much. For instance we hold strong opinions about the reality or unreality of ghosts, yet no one has ever investigated occult phenomena with sufficient thoroughness to justify him in holding dogmatic views one way or the other.¹

We have stultified individual intelligence in gaining the unanimity essential to herd life. A solitary animal possessed of man's intellectual equipment would soon abandon animism and the principle of participation. Having no group to fall back upon for protection, he would have to develop an inde-

¹The whole question of insight in the psychoses is, of course, bound up with this matter of accepting the current interpretation of reality. An abnormal person holds different views from his fellows. They may be progressive, in which case they are a nearer approximation to objective reality than his contemporaries have reached and the man is a genius, or they may be regressive and the holder of them is insane. In either case society treats the person as if he were antisocial, it hates or fears him. When we say that a man holds false ideas or that he has no insight, we would be more correct if we said he thinks differently from most of us. Insight is applying the current sense of reality to one's own mental processes. When people say that genius and insanity are allied, they usually are thinking of the fact that both types of thinking are extraordinary. A more fundamental connection may sometimes exist. Either the genius or the lunatic may have an inner urge towards non-conformity. If this can utilize a large intelligence, genius may be the product rather than insanity. For examples of regressive false ideas see: MacCurdy and Treadway, "Constructive Delusions," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August, 1915.

THE HERD INSTINCTS

pendent sense of reality. Naturally the tribes men who have greatest communality in their li must show the least development of individual cr ical judgment. This tends to prolong the childi types of thinking represented in the principle participation and in animism. But there is an im portant difference between the two in the streng th of the effect, for group thought overdetermines participation. The more one sees with the eyes of the herd, the less he sees with his own and the less, therefore, are his eyes his own. That is he has a loose and uncertain sense of his own individuality. Group consciousness and personal consciousness are mutually antagonistic, when one is strong the other is weak. The savage may have a weak sense when he begins and ends, on the other hand, we show more than traces of collective consciousness. There is, therefore, a correlation between herd instinct and the range and acuity of consciousness.

CHAPTER XXII

THE COÖPERATION AND CONFLICTS OF INSTINCTS

So far we have considered the ego, sex and herd instinct groups as though they operated separately, as indeed they often do. But all these reside in the same organism and one situation may tend to stimulate reactions of quite different orders. Conflicts must inevitably arise in consequence of this, conflicts which are solved either by the inhibition of one kind of reaction or by the appearance of behavior which represents instinctive tendencies of more than one order. Mention has been made of these conflicts and coöperations several times, but now the point is reached when we can take up these problems systematically. Anything like a detailed discussion of this topic, applying the conclusions reached to the solution of clinical problems would involve an exhaustive treatise on psychopathology. We must be content with a merely schematic treatment of the subject.

The first problem is to see what relative importance of different groups of instincts could be predicted from the biological history and present status of civilized man. We have earlier reached the conclusion (Chapter XVIII) that abnormal mental states (in so-called functional disease) result from the

operation of unconscious forces, which, in turn, are unconscious as a result of conflict. This conflict is, we assume, something that takes place between instincts or instinctive derivatives within the individual himself. We are therefore interested in the discovery of causes for inner, instinctive conflicts.

In the lowest forms of life the individual is pitted against all environmental forces and there can therefore be no inner conflict of any moment. He eats when hungry, rests when tired, fights or flees—according to his nature—when in the presence of his prey or enemy. If he is faced with danger when hungry he attends to the stronger stimulus. This contention of stimuli might be said to constitute conflict of a mild sort but it is not of the dynamic order in which we are interested as psychopathologists. The recognition of one stimulus and disregard of another is essentially an intellectual operation, a phenomenon of attention. With true conflict the struggle is not between the stimuli but between instincts or instinct groups which *seek* different stimuli, and the solution is reached by the subjugation of one of the instincts. When one stimulus, however, becomes stronger than another and dominates the field of consciousness previous reactions are not subjected or weakened, they simply are in abeyance. Examples may make this clearer. I may be working and begin to feel hunger. When the latter stimulus becomes strong enough I cease work and eat, then I return to my work. My permanent interest in work has not suffered, nor, when I work, do I weaken my potential appetite for food.

On the other hand, if I am hungry and have no money to pay for food an instinctive conflict arises. I want to eat but I also want to be honest, that is I instinctively tend to adopt a herd standard of conduct. This conflict can only be solved by the repression of one desire to the other. The repression results in the exclusion from consciousness of aversion to stealing or desire to eat. If the conflict were prolonged and repeated sufficiently I would become a criminal or insensitive to hunger stimuli, either being an abnormal mental state for civilized man. The primitive solitary animal, however, can experience no such conflict. His duty, so to speak, is to himself alone; his struggles cannot be internal but only between himself and the environment. This is, I believe, a most important differentiation and our literature is full of logical errors resulting from a failure to discriminate between alternation of attention and true instinctive conflict.

As we have seen the simple instinct reactions are confined to emergency situations more or less, while programs of activity are the product of instinct-motivations, largely unconscious. The latter are not simply constructed but have the life history of the individual back of them. Consequently more than one instinct group is apt to be concerned in their growth. If every motivation represented only one instinct group, all our behavior would probably be of the alternation of attention type because in any given situation the motivation aroused would elicit the force directed by only one instinct group and there would be no chance for instinctive conflict.

The earliest conflict is probably related to sex because reproduction involves great sacrifice for prolonged period to the parent of one sex or the other, or to both. Perhaps to offset this sacrifice nature has placed a high premium of pleasure on the sex act. This pleasure aspect of sex activity which satisfies the ego, relates sex as definitely to ego appetites, on the one hand, as to reproduction and service of the species on the other. (It would be an interesting problem in animal psychology to determine whether the strength of the sex impulse which, presumably, measures the degree of pleasure in copulation is correlated generally with the degree of responsibility assumed by one or both parents for the welfare of the offspring.) In so far as ego and sex instincts are concerned there does not seem to be much permanent conflict for there is an alternation of attention to one type of stimulation or another, at least in so far as the pleasure aspects of the sex instincts may conflict with other pleasures of the ego. It must be admitted that parental instincts might lead to more protracted and real conflict with ego tendencies, and in this connection one should note that the more selfish a man or woman is the more do the pleasure aspects of sex life predominate.

In general, however, alternation of attention is apt to be the form assumed by ego-sex conflict, since breeding is a seasonal function in most animals, and even care of the young endures for a relatively short period of time. Indifference to offspring appears so soon as the progeny develops a certain degree of

maturity. When danger or hunger interferes with mating the latter is temporarily discontinued but is renewed when danger is past or hunger appeased. There is no repression (which would lead to sexual incapacity) but merely alternation of attention. The probability is that important pathogenic conflicts would not result from the interaction of sex and ego instincts alone.

But development of herd life introduces another type of conflict. Self perpetuation and group safety are concurrent needs and when one is threatened the other is apt to be. Individual comfort is then best secured by suppression (and annihilation) of purely ego tendencies, a phenomenon well demonstrated by bees. The group is much more permanent, powerful and effective than the individual. If the individual flings ambition away, he can enjoy the triumph of his group untroubled by considerations of his own welfare. His comfort is thus assured. Man has never developed or has lost this type of evolution (in perfect form.) Under certain circumstances, however, a tendency in this direction appears. For instance, in war perfect morale involves individual unconsciousness of danger and indifference to personal deprivation.

Though a well developed reaction of this order is episodic, civilization entails a constant restriction of ego impulses. This inhibition acts through laws and conventions, which as Trotter has shown, derive their power not from an intellectual recognition of their wisdom but because the voice of the herd speaks through them. The herd instincts, therefore,

force the individual to obey conventions. When these conventions cramp individual ambition, the ego accepts the restriction because it gets a *quid pro quo*. This compensation takes the form of protection from danger, a share in material prosperity not achievable by the individual alone and, above all, a feeling of comfort derived from unity with the group that is a direct emotional expression of herd instinct.

If these compensations are not procurable conflict arrives. But it is largely a conscious affair because the struggle is between conscious desire and "conscience." The latter seems to be largely a growth of experience of what the herd wants, that is, a motivation derived from herd standards. In so far as unconscious factors may enter into the construction of conscience, the conflict has unconscious elements but these seem to be slight. For instance, in the situation in which war neuroses develop there is a conflict between a desire to be loyal and a desire to save one's own skin. The loyalty is mainly a conscious matter and that the conflict takes place at a level near to consciousness is, presumably, proved by the facility of treatment of uncomplicated cases of war neuroses. Another important factor to bear in mind is that civilization does not deprive man of all right to self-defense or self-aggrandisement. Society does not censure a man for jumping out of the way of an automobile; he can actually win social approval by building up a fortune. Normally, therefore, some outlet to ego tendencies is always allowed by the herd and the pressure of such ego

impulses, as may be repressed, is continually being reduced, which prevents the accumulation and damping up of unconscious ego energy.

In consequence of this adjustment of ego and herd instincts pathological ego expressions should not be expected to occur except under two possible conditions. One is where there is a constitutional predominance of ego tendencies such as seems to exist in epilepsy; the other is under exceptional circumstances when the ego is denied normal expression as with imprisonment or ostracism. These circumstances would be episodic and therefore produce episodic abnormalities enduring only for the period of the emergency. A repetition of such influence could, of course, lead to a new standard of behavior, the rather artificial production of a dominant ego analogous to that of epilepsy. These special situations lead to an unnatural severance between the individual and the group. When repeated the individual may assume a conscious attitude of hostility to the group and permanently regress to that phylogenetic level where the individual exists in a purely hostile environment. The clinical facts confirm this view. Psychopathic reactions of ego origin appear in epilepsy rather chronically, episodically in crime and in the situation neuroses and psychoses; or, a conscious adoption of exclusively ego ambitions may lead to crime as a vocation.

The conflict between sex instincts and herd instincts is more complicated. Society allows only one form of entirely free sex outlet, namely in legalized

marriage. This possibility is open to adults only and even when legal maturity has been reached marriage is subject to many vicissitudes. One inevitable result is that sex impulses are liable to conflict in all people for years and in some permanently. It is now important to bear in mind that sex has two aspects: a fundamental biological urge for propagation, with which is probably to be related the parental instincts; and a secondary development of great importance, the pleasure-giving capacity. The first of these may be correlated in action with the herd instincts. It is, however, more fundamental than the latter since sex subserves the maintenance of the whole species, while herd instincts cement and maintain only a group within the species. Another contrast has to do with the factor of intelligence. An animal has sensational contact with the group, whereas, the "species" is an abstraction which can be intellectually grasped by educated man alone. Sex instinct therefore operates more directly in purely instinctive reactions whereas herd reactions may be immediately determined by intellectual factors behind which lie the instinctive forces. The contrast is discernible in conscious attitude: when actuated by herd instinct a man is apt to be aware of the social implications of his conduct, but when his behavior is sexual his only conscious motive is likely to be the attainment of sensual pleasure.

Between propagation impulses and herd standards of conduct the conflict is mainly conscious and does not approach in severity the struggle between

society and the secondarily developed pleasure components of sex. The latter are viewed as purely ego tendencies and treated as inimical to the welfare of the group. The degrees of sympathy or disgust felt for the sex delinquent vary largely with the extent to which the practice definitely assails marriage, renders it impossible, is a substitute for it, is of its nature sterile or would involve in-breeding. Adultery is aimed against marriage, hence legal action is severe but some sympathy may be shown the culprits; prostitution does not prevent marriage hence it is condoned pretty widely; the relationship of man to mistress, which is without the legal guarantee of permanence that marriage enjoys but is otherwise largely identical, is in many countries an open and approved practice. On the other hand inversion and perversion are fairly universally held in disgust, while incest is abhorred. As we have seen in the last chapter, there is good biological reason for believing that there are instinctive forces directed against incest and since these operate in connection with social institutions, they are, presumably, related to the herd instincts. The gist of our conclusions would then be that neither ego nor sex tendencies in pure form are necessarily subject to repression but that it is the combination of the two which is tabu.

Although discrimination between propagation and pleasure aspects of sex may be made in theory it is impossible in the light of our present knowledge to draw a sharp line between the two in practice. Hence the value of discussing instinct groups rather

than separate instincts. The question as to whether so-called "infantile sexuality" is truly sexual or not is thus avoided. The pleasure aspects of a sex activity have much in common with the erotism of infancy; the latter has biological significance only as a forerunner of sex in the narrow sense, yet sex consciousness is absent in the infant sucking his thumb or actually masturbating. One can argue indefinitely about the nomenclature to be applied to these phenomena and never escape this dilemma. But if a group of sex instincts is postulated, that group will then combine all impulses which are historically or potentially related to sex practices. The only condition for the presence of any impulse exclusively in this group is that some connection with sex can be demonstrated and that this impulse is not explicable as an exhibition of some other instinct.

Discussion is thus confined to the question of the classification of such impulses as may express instincts of different groups. For instance, the infantile sucking tendency certainly has to do with nutrition and the maintenance of life. It can, therefore, be classed as an ego instinct expression. But it may be present in the absence of hunger, or special forms of it may actually interfere with the taking of food. In the latter instances the practice is indulged for the pleasurable sensation it gives and for this alone. We can trace this pleasure sensation in its development to a point where it unites with practices indisputably sexual. Hence, we are safe in saying that sucking, which does not subserve the

function of nutrition, is an instinctive practice which belongs in the sex group. Exactly the same argument may be employed in discriminating between different phenomena connected with excretion. In fact this duplication of function must exist in the absence of a large group of organs specialized for the recognition of a sex object alone, and for the stimulation of sex desire and for the satisfaction of sex-sensation cravings.

We have noted that the types of sex activity which are pathogenic have, all of them, components of pleasure which predominate over the propagation elements. As just stated society frowns on non-productive sex indulgence and it seems that this inhibition becomes incorporated in the individual's instinctive life, by way of the herd instincts. Psychoanalysts find that repression operates with progressive strength as it is directed against impulses in which the pleasure aspect gains relatively greater importance. The stronger the repression the deeper in the unconscious does this repressed tendency go. Finally a point is reached in uncovering unconscious sex cravings where they are found to be purely selfish and totally unrelated, or actually inimical, to propagation.

An important cause for continuous conflict between the sex and herd instincts is that sex is not a periodic function in the races of man we know about. A study of the psychology of those tribes of Eskimos, which are said to have seasonal sex-impulses, would probably be most illuminating. A second and all-important point is that the channels for sex

stimulation are, many of them, identical with the channels of social contact. This is an inevitable result of the lack of anatomical specializations of organs by which sex stimulation is effected. The community of interest, the moral and physical propinquity which draw people into groups may draw two individuals into a sex relationship. It is therefore difficult for one to receive a social stimulus without at the same time being subject to a sex stimulus. The latter falls almost invariably, under social tabu, hence a constant conflict between the synchronously stimulated herd and sex instincts is inevitable. On the other hand this same situation makes sublimation possible and relatively simple. Since unconscious tendencies can be expressed indirectly and symbolically, social activities of all kinds are capable of giving an outlet to unconscious sexuality.¹ The importance of this conjunction of

¹This is, of course, a sublimation, a process which it may be well to describe in our present terminology. When an ego or ego-sex impulse is so formulated as to be antisocial in tendency it is repressed. That is, the energy incorporated in this crude motivation meets with the stronger opposing force of an antagonistic herd instinct motivation. So long as this process is going on there is more or less of a deadlock and little energy remains for expression in manifest activity. The normal solution of this conflict is the reformulation of the "complex"; a new motivation is compounded. An idea appears which can represent the ego or ego-sex impulse symbolically and at the same time represents a socially useful activity. This new motivation therefore incorporates the energy directed both by the ego or sex instincts and by the herd instincts. Forces previously in opposition now coöperate and the subject exhibits great energy. This definition is broader than Freud's but fits clinical facts better, I believe. For instance, it enables us to understand the blood lust of war as a sublimation. See MacCurdy, "Psychology of War," London, Wm. Heinemann, 1917.

sex and social outlets will be apparent when we come to consider some of the phenomena of development of dementia præcox.

A third factor in the development of unconscious sexuality must be briefly considered. Anatomical and physiological restriction of actual sex expression has an essential influence on psychosexual development. In childhood sex instincts are incapable of any outlet which fulfills their biological purpose. In consequence budding sex tendencies are restricted to pleasure impulses that are, at first, auto-erotic in nature. As soon as they begin to be objectivated they tend to be expressed in relation to those in the immediate environment. Even at this early stage the identity of the channels of stimulus for sex and social activity begins to complicate matters. Were the infant's environment a wide one no untoward results would ensue, but, not only are his companions in the main relatives, but by all his associates he is treated with that affection and that personal attention which is sexually exciting in adult life. That his larval sex impulses should therefore be directed towards relatives is only natural. The Œdipus complex is thus initiated. In so far as these objectivated sex impulses tend to assume an adult form their expression is possible only in fantasy. So soon as the herd instincts begin to operate, and through them the child senses the attitude of society towards sex in general and towards anything sexual of which he is capable in particular, at this point these fantasies become specific objects for repression and form the founda-

tion of unconscious sex ambitions. Until puberty reached literal translation of these thoughts into action is a physical impossibility. Consequently, for many years there must exist unconscious ideas capable of no expression except that of symbolic outlet.

This is probably the reason for the universal presence of potent unconscious sex tendencies, more potent (as unconscious factors) than any ego impulses. The fate of the latter is much less harsh. From the earliest days the child, although curbed in many directions of ego expression is still allowed some chance to assert his individuality and to protect his personal interests. It is therefore only under unusual circumstances that his ego instincts are so thwarted of expression as to lead to the construction and maintenance of a large system of repressed, unconscious ambitions. The same type of process does occur here, however, in the formation of what appears clinically as a feeling of inferiority. But one finds both from analysis of individuals and from theoretic considerations such as are here outlined, little reason to believe that this feeling of inferiority when uncomplicated by sex factors is a common cause of psychopathic reactions.

As a general rule the inferiority feeling is not so simple in its history as might be gathered from the outline given in the chapter on ego motivations. Unconscious masochism is apt to take this outlet in consciousness. With this there are often associated castration ideas in the male and homosexual tendencies in the female. The woman who unconsciously likens herself to a man is, naturally, in-

ferior in actuality by the lack of the genital equipment necessary for realization of this fantasy. So fancied sexual inferiority overdetermines this symptom and, probably, accounts for its persistence.

In addition to the conflicts of ego with sex, ego with herd and sex with herd, one other possible type of conflict must be considered. It is conceivable that, with the highly complex development of psychosexuality, one kind of sex ambition might clash with another. Freud makes a great deal of this possibility in his discussion of narcissism and ego-libido. His system becomes so complicated, however, that Freud himself has never been able to explain it without inconsistencies and the use of anthropomorphic argument. On the other hand if one assumes that it is the herd instincts which supply the repressive energy one can formulate a much simpler and apparently adequate psychological system. Narcissism, although an important type of psychosexual aberration is probably only an overdetermining factor in relation to repression. One can account for repression proceeding from the individual's ideal of himself by assuming that herd instincts are an essential factor in the composition of that ideal. Freudians frequently attempt to account for the obviously dynamic character of social influence by claiming that the individual transfers to society the awe originally felt for the father in early childhood, so that fear of the law is fear of the father unconsciously. There can be little doubt that this often occurs. The actors of the nursery drama are met again in the persons of the policeman

or judge. On the other hand Rivers¹ has recently shown that the ambivalent reaction towards the father (alternate respect or love and hate or fear such as we know them in our civilization are found among savages towards groups of people—this with savages who have not our family institutions and who may come into little or no contact with their fathers. From this we would be justified in concluding that awe of the father is merely an over-determining factor in repression. Moreover a posthumous child may develop a "father-complex." I have analyzed one such: in this case the patient had been brought up entirely by women and conjured up a father-image in order to personify, apparently, the repressive motivations which he spontaneously developed.

In concluding these remarks about conflicts in general one point must be added. Serious conflicts are apt to occur only when the opposing forces are approximately evenly matched. Rivers reports an extraordinary harmony and smoothness in the life of Melanesians among whom herd reactions predominate and the phenomena of group consciousness are striking. It is, therefore, not surprising that he found only one type of psychopathic reaction among these savages (excluding feeble-mindedness, of course). This is a very simple kind of insanity in which the victims seem simply to run off and exclude themselves from the group.²

¹ Rivers, Presidential Address, "Conservatism and Plasticity," *Folk-lore*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1.

² Personal communication.

The matching of strength of two instinct groups is shown in the development of dementia præcox. The two main types of personality antedating this psychosis are the seclusive and antisocial. These betray weak herd instincts in positive and negative expression. When the psychosis emerges, delusions and hallucinations appear which represent an acceptance of the unconscious type of sex fantasies. As the disorder proceeds in intensity, these fantasies assume, roughly, the form of unconscious thoughts proceeding from lower and lower levels. The situation may therefore be looked on as one where sex is not essentially overdeveloped, for it does not take the form of procreative or creative tendencies, but rather, where the herd instincts are weak. When the latter are disproportionately powerful no psychosis appears but, rather, too great an absorption of current ideas. Independence of thought is lost and intellectual stultification takes place. The individual is, so to speak, too normal.

These generalizations about instinct conflicts may be summed up in a few words. The most important conflict is between the sex and herd groups of instincts and this results in the formation of unconscious cravings for the pleasure-giving aspects of sex. This "unconscious" is present in all people, potentially capable of producing psychopathological reactions. The next most important conflict is between the ego and herd groups. The former usually does not suffer complete repression and hence does not tend to build up any elaborate unconscious system. Abnormal mental reactions are produced by

this conflict only when the ego is constitutionally preponderant or when special circumstances call forth an ego response. The manifestations of these disorders are in behavior or in temporary neuroses and psychoses.

Our next problem is to determine what forces operate in the precipitation of morbid psychological conditions. Normality is achieved and maintained by the balance of an intricate system of instincts. In the terminology of psychoanalysis this balance is the product of sublimations, forms of activity which allow outlet to the various instinct groups at once. These outlets are indirect since direct expression produces instant conflict. The maintenance of indirect outlets demands a greater expenditure of energy than does direct expression of instinct. Any factor such as physical illness, therefore, which reduces the individual's supply of energy endangers the stability of the normal system. It is more or less of a truism of general pathology that disease breaks down the most recent evolutionary structures of functions, while more primitive ones survive. In psychopathology we see something similar. When the energy supply is low sublimations are weakened and instincts of the sex or ego group express themselves more directly. This is the principle of regression.

We have already considered the different types of environmental accident that may lead to the abandonment of sublimations. Attention should be drawn however to one feature of these reactions.

When conscious activities fail to give satisfaction or cannot be maintained, the process of regression leads to an attempt at unconscious satisfaction. Since the unconscious is constituted largely of egoistic sex cravings the immediate determinants of the ensuing symptoms may be sexual, without the general cause of the disease having much to do with sex.

The last portion of our problem is the most difficult, being the operation of these instinct groups in the production of different symptoms, which is an intricate matter. Few symptoms seem to have a simple relationship to one group of instincts alone.

This may be shown by considering first a fundamental psychopathic symptom—unreal thinking. Sanger Brown's claim as to the herd type of thinking being present in the child and repeated in the psychosis seems worthy of adoption. If further evidence were required one could point to the fact that the clearest thinkers are, as a rule, egoists. We may assume, therefore, that delusional thought processes represent an atavism to the evolutionary period when individual consciousness was not sufficiently developed for accuracy of observation and recall to exist except in larval form. So much for this type of thinking process. But when we turn to the content of delusions the reverse seems to be true. What we call fantastic thoughts are beliefs maintained in spite of the opinion of the immediate herd. The urge to unreal thinking does not come then from those herd instincts which lead us to unify ourselves with our actual fellows but rather from the attrac-

COÖPERATION AND CONFLICTS OF INSTINCTS

tiveness of the imagination itself. We must probably look to the sex instincts for the immediate production of most autistic thought for the reason that imagery is for years the main outlet for impulses, which establishes fantasy as an expression for these motivations. If regression leads to awakening of unconscious sex impulses, these tend naturally to expression in fantasy. If the lure of these images is stronger than one's desire to accept the herd standards of reality a delusion results. Only in most complete regression does the thought represent a crude unconscious desire. The herd instinct is not abolished but forces, as a rule, some modification or transformation of the idea that is less repellent to the socialized personality.¹

Ego ambitions may also lead to imaginations but these are more readily translatable into terms of

¹ The psychological mechanisms of paranoia and paranoid states probably illustrate this point. It is not difficult to demonstrate ego-sex motivations as the dynamic factors underlying the abnormal state. But the form false ideas take seems to be associated with a peculiar perversion of the herd instinct. The patients feel influences from without, like the savage with group consciousness and, at the same time, are extraordinarily sensitive to the unconscious attitudes of their intimates. They interpret little evidences of unconscious infidelity in their partners, for instance, and exaggerate these into delusions of infidelity. That is, they allege something to be conscious which is really unconscious. (This is one of the difficulties of treating such patients psychoanalytically. They say, "You tell me this shows infidelity in me; but that is just the way my wife behaves, of course she is unfaithful.") It would seem that these phenomena are explicable by assuming that the paranoic builds up an imaginary group which he alleges to hold views similar to his. When real people are in this group it is their unconscious minds with which the patient is in contact. But this is a problem the solution of which demands much further observation and elaboration.

action and hence do not involve the same degree of divorce from reality. (This holds true no matter whether "reality" is taken in an absolute sense or as the herd formulation as to what is real.) Another stimulus to fantasy is, probably, the curiosity impulse. Whether this is a purely instinctive thing or not, it seems to be related both to the ego and sex instincts. But the fates of curiosity as to sex and other matters are different. The former falls under a social tabu and cannot be satisfied except through imaginations. The ego-determined curiosity—a hypothetical interest in objective facts for the sake of knowledge itself, so called "intellectual curiosity"—can proceed from fancy to actual experience. So an examination of curiosity leads us to the same conclusions: the urge to think vividly of something alluring and unreal is probably, a product of the sex instincts in the main, although a less potent tendency in the same direction may come from the ego group.

If unreal thinking is an atavism to the period when herd thinking was dominant but the regression is determined by a sex urge, we have here an example of the principle first enunciated by Rivers, I believe, which may prove to be of great value in dynamic psychology. He points out that civilian hysteria based on sex conflicts exhibits the same symptoms as war hysteria based on danger reactions, the latter symptoms representing primitive reactions to danger. He suggests that reactions first elaborated in the service of what he calls the danger instincts may be utilized by the sex instincts. If this principle holds, we could invoke it to account for

delusions repeating a type of thought developed as a phenomenon of group consciousness, but now directed dynamically by sex instincts.

The evidence in favor of there being a "collective consciousness" among many primitive peoples is strong enough to make us presume that this may be a fundamental kind of human mental process, which civilized man has outgrown but still maintains in vestigial form. At the same time the "primary subjective state" which Burrow has described carries with it a good deal of the same sort of dependent, rather than independent thinking. The infant, who identifies his own with his mother's body and fails to discriminate between this flesh and the surrounding material objects, is repeating more fully perhaps in this period than at any other in his life this psychological feature of herd specialization. Of course it is not impossible that the primary subjective state is much more fundamental matter than herd development; if this were so communal society would be a specialization of a type of emotional relationship first appearing with maternal care. The two factors seem frequently to coöperate in the production of symptoms or characteristics. People who are unusually sensitive to difference of opinion in those they love, who exaggerate the importance of "unity" are apt to be morbidly uncomfortable (even fearful) when they feel urged to conduct different from that of their business, social or political associates. In the first situation the mother identification (in this sense largely an ego instinct phenomenon) preponderates. In the second instance the

reaction is mainly a herd instinct exhibition. Yet both factors probably operate together.

On the other hand there are differences of tendency in these two principles. The unity motivation is apt to lead to a demand for others to agree with the subject—a natural result of the ego impulse on which it is historically founded—while the collective consciousness principle is likely to produce more of a passive attitude, an adoption of the opinions and attitudes of others.

The principle of one instinct borrowing the reaction elaborated with another may explain the relation of many pathological emotions to the various instinct groups. As we have seen, the ego emotions seemed to be confined to fear, anger and apathy and we certainly see them in purest form in the war neuroses and in epilepsy. It may be remarked parenthetically that apathy is a good example of the all-or-none type of reaction which Rivers claims to be characteristic of simple, primitive emotions. An epileptic, for instance, shows much energy in following successful enterprises, but when assailed with misfortune is apt to lose interest altogether. Perhaps elation, as the emotion occurring with free expression of personal power or prowess should also be included with the ego emotions. Now we also see fear, anger and apathy and elation in situations precipitated by sex. For instance, in the psychoses we find sex aggression represented by an idea of physical attack. That this notion is fundamentally a sex fantasy is shown by the fact that physical assault occurs as a variant in the same indi-

vidual for a delusion of being an object of sex interest on the part of the aggressor. In these psychoses, when the idea once appears in a form implying bodily injury, anxiety appears. That is, a sex desire is transformed into a delusion or hallucination of some threat to the ego and, promptly, an ego emotion appears. The emotion, then, is an ego instinct reaction but the motive power comes from the latent sex impulse. Similar events can be shown to produce anger, elation and apathy.

If we turn from the psychoses to other fields we find similar evidence. In dreams the principle is usually demonstrated exquisitely. In most anxiety dreams for instance, the fear is a direct response to the mental image of bodily harm. But when one analyzes this manifest content it is found to be the product of latent sex impulses. In anxiety neuroses there is much evidence (which space prevents our repeating) that the fear is a reaction to a co-conscious hallucination of attack. The mechanism is the same as that seen in psychoses with the exception of the fantasy not having penetrated into full consciousness.

The broader aspects of the anxiety neurosis problems become more complicated. Freud claims that anxiety represents a transformation of libido into fear and points to the fact of common clinical experience that this neurosis develops in situations where sex outlet is denied or greatly hampered. The direct transformation of an unformulated instinctive urge into an emotion is as foreign to our notions of psychology as is alchemy to modern chemistry.

We should therefore be chary of accepting such a hypothesis and another view is conceivable. The heightened libido is probably always pathological. Freud furnishes much presumptive evidence of this when he tries to prove that the incapacity for sex expression is abnormal. The exaggerated libido may easily represent an instinctive attempt at cure. Stekel says all fears have in them an element of dread of death or of the unknown. We certainly see the most dramatic exhibitions of psychotic fear in involution melancholia when the delusion of imminent death is obsessive. This may be regarded as the situation of the herd animal separated from the group.¹ In every psychopathic situation there is evidence presented of weakened herd instincts. We might therefore assume that the excessive libido represents an attempt to force a reestablishment of emotional contact with one's fellows. Such an attempt may be a natural corollary of the identity of sex and social contacts. A feeling of social isolation would lead to a desire for close contact with others and the emotional value of this contact can be immensely heightened by its sexualization. In my experience the pathological libido of these cases disappears on analysis and the patients have little difficulty in leading continent lives thereafter. One advantage of this hypothesis is that it covers the

¹ There are two types of fear seen in anxiety states. The first is a vague, unformulated dread that something is going to happen. The second is acute panic. The former may, perhaps, represent the affect of the herd animal separated from his group, while the latter is the appreciation of the danger depicted in the co-conscious fantasy.

COÖPERATION AND CONFLICTS OF INSTINCTS

phenomena of anxiety in children much more adequately than do the theories of Freud.

Anger in the psychoses can easily be shown to be a meeting of aggression with aggression, the instincts involved being exactly the same as those in anxiety states.

Elation in manic-depressive insanity is found to be associated with ideas of exercise of great power in business, discovery, religion or love. The general construction of these ideas is that of sublimations. Their energy seems to come from unconscious sex sources, as with anxiety, but the emotions are of ego expression, a feeling of free expression of power.

Ecstasy is similarly found with religious ideas that are a vehicle of sex impulses of the unconscious type but the feeling seems to be that of union of the individual consciousness with a larger consciousness. This is presumably a direct utilization of the old group consciousness capacity. If this view be justified it may explain the coincidence of erotic and religious phenomena, which one meets constantly in the biographies of mystics. The religious idea becomes a vehicle for liberation of unconscious sex energy and the expression of a herd emotion.

The feeling of tenderness associated with the parental aspects of sex occurs in manic states but is rarely a prominent emotion. It is probably rare for the reason that pathogenic sexuality is of the pleasure giving rather than of the altruistic order. Another directly sexual emotion, a lustful excitement, occurs most infrequently, if at all, in the

ordinary psychoses. It does appear, however, in epilepsy. Since it is directly related with the pleasure aspects of sex, this emotion too is probably to be placed in the ego group. Its occurrence in epilepsy justifies such a view, for the sex life of the typical epileptic is almost devoid of anything suggesting altruism and is intensely selfish. So much is this the case that normal copulation seems to appeal to him no more than auto-erotic practices or perversions.

The situation with depression is complicated by the fact that this is not a simple emotional state but a clinical condition. In this mood there are elements of sadness which on analysis seems to be a subjective recognition of blocked energy. There is no reason to exclude any one of the instinct groups as the source of this energy. The sadness also has another component, a feeling of wickedness. The emotion is different from guilt in which an idea of social censure is prominent. The depressive feeling of wickedness is an intensely subjective and self-contained reaction, which bears no relation to other people. It probably represents somehow the conflict between sex and herd instincts since these are the ones we find struggling against one another in manic-depressive insanity. There is a good deal of evidence which points to the occurrence in depression of highly antisocial ideas, sexually determined, which neither reach consciousness nor are successfully repressed to the deep unconscious. They remain co-conscious and give the patient a poignant although unfocused feeling of unworthiness. Ref-

erence will shortly be made to other indefinite affective components of depression.¹

We must next turn to other symptoms. Freud's comments on the fact that most heterogeneous conscious ideas find expression in a small number of stereotyped hysterical symptoms such as anorexia, paralysis, anesthesia, aphonia, etc. He admits that his theories do not account for stereotyped symptoms. Rivers' hypothesis may, however, as has been stated the latter suggests that most hysterical symptoms are danger reactions. We might elaborate his view by assuming that only such unconscious sex ideas reach expression in symptoms as are capable of exciting an ego reaction. An example may make this clearer. Anorexia may be the only physical expression for complicated unconscious sex ideas in a woman. One of these may be unconsciously formulated after the infantile habit, as pregnancy in the stomach. This again is transformed into a notion of something noxious there. At this point the ego reactions of disgust may give symptomatic expression of this last formulation. Some conscious outlet having been achieved the energy of all other unconscious ideas is drained off by this route. This hypothesis would also explain the necessity for prolonged and elaborate analysis before such a symptom disappears; the symptom, originally simple in origin, has become multiply overdetermined.

According to this assumption we are consciously

¹ For full discussion of these problems see a forthcoming book by the author on "Morbid and Normal Emotions."

capable of experiencing only a relatively small number of instinctive reactions, only those with such a long biological history as that of the ego group. Evolution then has not proceeded far enough to give us the power of expressing externally the more finely differentiated feelings which have developed with sex and herd life, and which therefore remain simply "feelings." On the other hand it may not be a failure of evolution. The gift of speech may be a substitute for instinctive expression. The greatest literary artist is certainly he who can stir in us the most subtle instinctive response, a reaction which we feel within but cannot describe or exhibit to our companions in any way. This may have a bearing on the indefinable emotional components that appear in such conditions as depression and in some mystical experiences, for example. They may be larval emotional responses to instinctive impulses which have not found expression in the easily definable and recognizable ego emotional reactions.

Suggestibility is perhaps determined compositely as well. For our present purposes we might define suggestion very broadly as a process by which one individual influences another's conduct or transmits ideas to another (taking "idea" in a broad sense) without utilization of the ordinary, civilized intellectual channels of communication. This phenomenon is probably met with first in connection with reproduction, both in respect to the mating behavior and in the relations of parent to offspring. Dispassionately viewed the act of copulation between the male and female of many familiar species of mam-

imals represents a coördination of effort, that strikingly disproportionate to their ability for operation in other enterprises. Fundamental therefore, suggestion is probably sexual in origin. We are probably right in thinking that the most effective suggestion seen in normal lives occurs in connection with love. One has only to recall how sensitive lovers are to each other's moods to realize the truth of this statement. On the other hand, suggestion bulks largely among herd phenomena. Perhaps the only safe view to take of the matter is to assume that group suggestion is a utilization and overdetermining of an earlier sex mechanism. In psychopathological experience suggestion, when individual, seems to be largely an exhibition of an unconscious sex relationship. The question of herd suggestion playing a rôle in the war neuroses has been mooted by Rivers. He claims that military training inflates suggestibility and that, since mimesis is one of the phenomena of suggestion, it is an important factor in the production of hysterical symptoms. The argument is specious, but the evidence is insufficient, either for its proof or disproof. If true, symptoms of one type or another would have shown an epidemiological occurrence. If there were such epidemics of specific symptoms, I have not seen reports of them. On the other hand group suggestion certainly played an important part in the spread of neurotic reactions in general, although it could be argued that one had to do here with conscious knowledge rather than with unwitting imitation.

A word should be spoken about the symptoms of compulsion neuroses. There are different types but one may be taken as a paradigm, namely, the case we all know where there are ideas of injury to others offset by an elaborate ritual for undoing the effect of the primary imagined evil. Here all three groups of instincts cooperate. First there is the impulse to harm a loved one which is usually called sadistic. Freud, quite wisely, now regards sadism as an accentuation of the masculine tendency to dominate. With our present notion of combined instincts we would certainly view this as a sexualization of an ego impulse. Such a view receives support from the observation of children, savages and epileptics. The belief in the power of thought to produce harm is, surely, a survival of the magic which is an exquisite example of herd thinking. The desire to make good the damage is a direct expression of the social aspect of the patient's character; back of it lies the whole history of "conscience" which as has been stated above is largely constructed by the herd instincts. The ritual again harks back to the psychological level of group thinking and group practice. There is probably no clinical condition in which these three instinct groups participate so equally or where their identification is so easy.

The brief analyses of symptoms thus attempted are not supposed to be either exhaustive or profound. A proper analysis of each symptom would call for a monograph by itself. The attempt has been merely to indicate superficially how the

principle of coöperating instincts may be applied to clinical problems.

In conclusion an answer must be given to the question "what of predominant herd instincts?" This does occur, but, sad to say, the product is not considered pathological. Herd conduct is the standard of normality. Hence one who conforms more than his neighbors is held to be the worthiest and most normal of citizens. Yet rampant herd instinct is the greatest enemy to human evolution. Ego and sex instincts, when in the ascendant, lead to the destruction or ineffectiveness of the individual. Herd solidarity, however, which should merely act as a balance-wheel, in practice is a locked brake. The genius who is ahead of his time is subject to the same distrust or persecution as is the lunatic or criminal who lags in evolution. It is herd instinct which stones the prophets, persecutes Galileo, puts convention above abstract justice, cements the uncritical electorate, rushes wildly into war. The world of men suffers and has suffered more from such insensate devotion to the herd than from all crime, insanity or nervousness.

THE END

INDEX

- Abraham 42
 activation 99
 adaptation 306
 Adler 82
 adolescence 310 seq
 affect, dissociation of 52
 aggression 222
 all-or-none law 221, 227
 altruism 24
 amentia 99
 amnesia 237
 amphioxus 124
 anæsthesia 234
 anal erotism 182
 anger 223, 227, 371
 animism 156, 172, 340, 342
 animistic phase 172
 Anlage 243
 anthropomorphism 13, 16, 28, 37,
 86
 anxiety neurosis 66, 241
 anxiety hysteria 80
 apathy 225
 army psychoses 280
 attention 223
 alternation of 218
 and fear 243
 autistic thinking IX
 auto-erotic symbols 180
 auto-erotism and coordination 171
 and character 182 seq
 hygiene 178
 narcissism 37
 sexuality 179
 sleep 174
 repression of 290, 302
 unconscious 177
 awareness 8

 behaviorism 210
 "Besetzung" 90, 99

 biological reactions 213
 birth dream 168
 experience 76
 blocking 144
 blood lust 357
 bodily sensations 113
 body language 172
 Brown, Sanger 338
 Burrow, Trigant 39, 188, 367

 cannibalism 60
 Cannon 210
 castration 359
 categories 210
 censorship 94, 96, 110
 and repression 8, 27
 Clark, Pierce 153, 278
 claustrophobia 245
 co-conscious 10, 11, 123, 135, 229,
 231, 238
 coitus reflex 217
 collapse 222
 collective unconscious 339
 compensation 286
 complex 233
 compulsion neurosis 376
 compulsive ideas 136
 condensation 98, 110
 conformity 324
 conscience 34, 283, 332, 351
 consciousness, collective 339, 367
 communal 324, 326 seq
 definition of 232
 function of 123
 constructive delusions 51
 conversion hysteria 247
 coördination and auto-erotism 171
 eriminal, habitual 282
 curiosity 282

 Darwin 248
 day remnants 95, 110

- death 159
 definitions in psychology 257
 delinquency 283
 delusions 147
 constructive 51
 of grandeur 42
 of poverty 185
 dementia præcox 42, 48, 108, 264,
 280, 362
 depression 73, 372
 De Quincey 168
 devolution 250
 diagnostic dreams 92
 displacement 98, 110
 dissociation 229, 236
 of affect 52
 dogma 325
 dramatization 97
 dream wish 95
 work 97, 103, 110
 dreams diagnostic 113
 memory of 96
 dynamic psychology IX
- ecstasy 371
 ego 156
 conscious or unconscious 36
 critic 60
 definition of 31 seq, 271
 emotions 272
 energy 278
 ideal 34
 interest 41
 libido 31 seq
 and sleep 43
 and personality 34
 egoism 25
 elation 368, 371
 emotions 368 seq
 emotions, visceral language of 177
 energy 263
 epicritic 214, 239
 epilepsy XI, 197, 276
 epileptic deterioration 278
 Eskimos 356
 exogamy 335
 expansive ideas 284
 expedience 260
- fantasy 311, 365
 fear 75 seq, 220, 223, 369
 fear, childish 82
 free-floating 79
 and attention 243
 libido 79 seq
 repression 30
 of poverty 60
 Ferenczi 153
 flight 222
 flight of ideas 146
 folie à deux 200
 food refusal of 62
 fore-conscious 8, 9, 11, 94, 96,
 110, 123
 Forel 136
 free associations 104, 127
 fugue 229
- games, rotation of 329
 "Gegenbesetzung" 30, 94
 Golden Age 166
 grief 58, 73
 group thinking 324, 339
- habit and instinct 261
 hallucinations 147
 hypnogenic 105
 Harrison, Jane 340
 Hartland, E. S. 335
 Head, Henry 269
 herd instinct 234
 voice 326
 Hoch, August X, 184
 Hocking, W. E. 263
 homosexual phase 316
 homosexuality 188
 in Greece 332
 Horton, Lydiard 113
 hygiene and auto-erotism 178
 hypnogenic hallucinations 105
 hypnotism 237
 hypochondria 67
 and narcissism 52
 hysteria 246
 hysterical symptoms 373
- ideas and instincts 19, 259
 identification 192
 in marriage 201
 imago 39, 294 seq, 337
 imitation 234
 immobility 222
 and suppression 225

