



SCHLEY SAMPSON AND CERVERA

JAMES PARKER



REAR-ADMIRALS SCHLEY,
SAMPSON AND CERVERA





James Parker

REAR-ADMIRALS SCHLEY SAMPSON AND CERVERA

*A Review of the Naval Campaign of 1898, in Pursuit
and Destruction of the Spanish Fleet
Commanded by Rear-Admiral
Pascual Cervera*

By
JAMES PARKER
Formerly Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy

With Portraits



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TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE
SOCIETY OF THE
SACRAMENTO VALLEY

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PREFACE

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THE feeling displayed by the Navy Department of the United States; between the officers of the navy, and throughout the country, that resulted from the events of the naval campaign of 1898 in the West Indies, in the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, would seem to justify a review of those events; and some reference to the career and experience of the author hereof may not be without interest in determining his fitness to undertake such review.

I was born in the town of Newark, Licking County, Ohio, of New Jersey parentage and lineage, in the year 1832; was appointed midshipman in the navy of the United States November 14, 1846, and sent to the then newly established "Naval School," as it was then called, at Annapolis, Md., for a few months. It is proper here to state that when the Hon. George Bancroft, then Secretary of the Navy, established that institution the intention was that when a lad was appointed midshipman his first two years of service were to be passed there; he was then to be sent to sea for a three years' cruise; then brought back to the Naval School for one year; and at the end of the year be examined by a board of captains of the navy, and, if passed, be warranted as passed midshipman.

The Mexican War broke out in May, 1846, and a great need of young officers having developed, I was soon ordered away for service on board ship,

and on March 26, 1847, sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, for Vera Cruz, on board the sloop-of-war *Saratoga*, under command of the late Admiral David G. Farragut, then a commander in rank. It was his first command.

Farragut hoped to get to Vera Cruz before the capture of the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, and on the way down the crew of the ship were assiduously practiced in all sorts of apparently useless drills, such as boarding from yard-arms, dropping hand grenades upon the decks of imaginary ships, etc. It was long years afterwards that we learned that his plan and purpose were to dress the ship up as an old merchantman, run the blockade into the harbor, tie up alongside the castle, and "board" from our yard-arms and attempt to capture it; but his plan was frustrated by the fact that the castle surrendered the very day the ship sailed from Norfolk.

Although there were no naval enemies to fight, yet almost as soon as we arrived the dreaded "Yellow Jack" broke out and continued its ravages until December. We had 105 cases, and 26 deaths, out of a complement of 159 officers and men. This was a lesson of patient performance of duty in the face of death that has not been without its effect upon my subsequent life.

After the usual midshipman's experience of five years, two of which were on the coast of Africa, where I suffered shipwreck, I again came to the Naval School—which had meanwhile been recognized by Congress and dignified by the title of "Academy." After a year's study and preparation, in June, 1852, I was graduated as passed midshipman, second of a class of which the late Rear-Admirals Lewis A. Kimberly, Bancroft Gherardi, Daniel L. Braine, Lieutenant George U. Morris, who fought the *Cumberland* against the *Merrimac*; Captain Kidder R. Breese, who was Rear Admiral

David G. Porter's fleet captain during nearly the whole of that distinguished officer's Civil War service; Lieutenant John G. Sproston, the first regular officer of the navy to give his life in the Union cause, and others of like character were members.

I then served as passed midshipman for nearly three years on the Mediterranean Station, on board the U. S. sloop-of-war *St. Louis*, under command of Commander Duncan N. Ingraham; and was an officer of that vessel when Ingraham rescued Martin Kozta (one of Kossuth's patriotic band of revolutionists) from the Austrian brig-of-war *Huzzar*, whose officers had kidnaped him from shore at Smyrna in 1853.

That incident has long been practically forgotten, but it then set the world of diplomacy on fire, and established the principle that one who comes to the United States, renounces allegiance to the ruler of the land of his birth, and, under our naturalization laws declares his intention to become a citizen of the United States, becomes, *ipso facto*, entitled to, and will receive, the protection of our flag and power.

In September, 1855, I was promoted to be lieutenant, but having in the meanwhile become engaged to be married, in November, 1856, I resigned my commission. Having read law in Cincinnati, in the office of Hon. Salmon P. Chase,¹ I graduated LL. B. from the Cincinnati Law School.²

I was admitted to the bar of Ohio April 14, 1857, and on June 3 married my Virginia sweetheart (Miss Kate McLean, of Norfolk). I practiced law until the Civil War broke out.

On April 13, 1861 (though at that time an ardent

¹Then Governor of Ohio, subsequently Secretary of the Treasury under President Lincoln, and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

²President William H. Taft was graduated from and for several years was dean of that school.

Democrat), I volunteered to resume my former place in the navy, to aid in the maintenance of the Union, and was the first officer who had formerly resigned from the regular navy to be reappointed (on May 8th, 1861). I was subsequently reinstated, and commissioned Lieutenant-commander (July 22, 1862), in my former place on the regular navy list.

I served through the Civil War with credit and some distinction; was the executive officer of the frigate *Minnesota* in the five days' bombardment of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and the senior officer in the naval assault on that fortress January 15, 1865, concerning which assault Rear Admiral Porter, in his report, said: "Nowhere in the annals of war have officers and sailors undertaken so desperate a service. The work, as I said before, is really stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied so long the combined power of France and England. The courage of these officers deserves the highest reward." And Rear Admiral Porter recommended the author and five others (viz: Lieutenant Commanders K. R. Breese, Charles H. Cushman, and Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., and Lieutenants George M. Bache and Roswell H. Lamson) for promotion for personal gallantry displayed in that deadly assault.

When hostilities were entirely over I again resigned my commission and retired to private life. Had I remained in the navy I would now be a rear admiral on the Retired List.

I am a counsellor-at-law of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the highest courts of Ohio, New Jersey, and New York.

As one of the counsel for Rear Admiral Schley before the Court of Inquiry held in 1903, I had every opportunity to acquire full and accurate knowledge of all the facts and reports of the campaign.

While it will be evident to the reader of this review that my professional, legal, naval, and personal judg-

ments are favorable to Admiral Schley, I yet trust to be believed when I say that I would not willingly do the slightest injustice to any other officer, because I regard them generally as still my professional brethren.

This book has been written without any consultation with Rear Admiral Schley, who has never seen a line of it, and does not know that it has been written; and it is proper to say that Schley's book, "Forty-five Years under the Flag," was also written by him without consultation with the writer of this book, who never saw a line of it until after this book was entirely written.

For all facts stated in this review proof is given. Opinions based on, and inferences drawn from, those facts are, of course, my own.

The author feels confident that a careful reading of this review will dispel all misunderstanding of that campaign, a misunderstanding which has pertinaciously been promulgated in the effort to convey false impressions in respect to the principal actors in it.

JAMES PARKER.

PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY,
September 1, 1907.

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY.

THE Admiral of the Navy, George Dewey, well says, in his Introduction to the book "James Lawrence," which he most fitly styles "the admirable work of Lieutenant Commander Albert Gleaves, U. S. N":

"It is by the close and careful weighing of the causes which produced the wonderful results of our sea battles of the past, that we equip ourselves for the warfare of the future."

The complete success and far-reaching results of the United States naval campaign of 1898, in the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, are without a parallel in the naval histories of the world; and are fruitful of lessons for the future, of warning against the mistakes and errors of judgment, departmental or individual, that may have occurred, and of example that may serve as inspiration and guide to the navy that is to carry on the record of excellence; and of brave deeds well and effectively done, in the past, under and for the flag and honor of our country.

CHAPTER II

CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN

It is common to attribute that war to a particular cause; but the truth is that the sentiment which brought it about had been growing for centuries; certainly since the days when the Spanish Armada was sent against England in Queen Elizabeth's time.

There is no doubt that there has been transmitted to us from our English ancestry a feeling of contempt for what English-speaking sailors from that day to this have called the "Dagoes"; and that the Spaniard has always been regarded by English-speaking peoples as a pompous, exaggerated, rapacious, blood-thirsty and tyrannical type of man. The record of the crimes of Spain against the peoples of Holland, Peru, Chili, Mexico, and the Philippines is a black one, truthfully told in the pages of Prescott and other historians, and is well known and indubitable.

It may well be doubted if any other nation (not of Spanish blood or teaching, and professing to be Christian and civilized) can be truthfully charged with such a deliberate murder of defenseless prisoners as that of Captain Joseph Fry and his fellow-martyrs at Santiago de Cuba in 1874; and it is the highest retributive justice that the power of Spain on this hemisphere should have been brought to an end there by Fry's countrymen; and that the last of Spain's naval vessels in American waters—the *Cristobal Colon*, named after him who by his discoveries gave to Spain her first power over the people of the Antilles—lies a submerged wreck at the mouth of the Rio Tarquino, near which Fry and his ill-fated companions were captured and taken to their murder at Santiago de Cuba.

Another remarkable coincidence is that the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, Admiral Cervera's flagship (which was the only vessel of his fleet saved from the beach after the Battle of Santiago), was, while on her way to the United States, driven ashore by a violent gale at nearly the exact spot where Columbus landed in 1492 and planted the standard of Spain; and lies there a wreck.

Since we became a nation every effort that has been made by Spain's colonies in America to throw off her tyrannical yoke has had the earnest and active sympathy of the people of the United States. Our adventurous young men have freely risked their lives in that behalf. Numerous "filibustering expeditions," so called, have gone from our shores to aid, with arms and men, the Cubans in their efforts for independence; and from the walls of all the military prisons in the "ever faithful isle"—as the Spaniards persisted, notwithstanding, in calling Cuba—thousands of bullets can be dug, ghastly proofs of the fate of those patriots or their associates who unsuccessfully had attempted to overthrow the Spanish domination. All such efforts, and they were many, came to defeat until the United States government and people took an active part in the movement in the year 1898.

"It was in the air," at the beginning of that year, that war between the United States and Spain was imminent; and it needed only an incident to make that war a reality.

CHAPTER III

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLE-SHIP "MAINE"

THAT incident came when our battle-ship *Maine*, while lying peacefully moored to a buoy where she had been placed by Spanish pilots, in what was then the friendly harbor of Havana, was on February 17, 1898, blown up. By this disaster 270 of her officers and men were hurled, unexpectedly and instantly, to death.

No more dastardly act was ever perpetrated. Those who did it waited until most of the victims were asleep for the night—when, of course, they had least chance of escape.

The whole world stood amazed, and our entire nation, though blazing with indignation, waited until a most patient and careful investigation could be had. A naval court of inquiry, of which Captain William T. Sampson was president, made it certain that a submarine mine or other instrumentality had been exploded under the ship; but how so exploded has never yet been discovered. There are some significant facts, however, that demonstrate but too clearly that, while privity on the part of the Spanish authorities in the atrocity has not been shown, those authorities must have known whether the *Maine* was located over or in dangerous proximity to such instrumentality, because they knew exactly where every such—if there were such in that harbor—was located; and they have never given up that knowledge to us.

If such mine was located near that buoy to which the *Maine* was moored, it seems evident that it must have been done for the purpose of exploding it under

a friendly vessel, because none others were ever moored there; and the *Maine* was so moored by direction of the Spanish port officers.

The explosion must have been caused by someone entirely familiar with the location of the mine, because it could have been effectively exploded only when the *Maine* was directly over it, as the winds and tides would change her position in respect to it. It must therefore have been exploded by some Spanish official who had the means of determining with precision when she was over it; and who had access to the batteries by which alone the explosion could be effected.

The Spanish authorities could easily have located all who had such knowledge and access; and this they have never done, so far as we know.

Admiral Dewey, in the Introduction to Gleaves' book before referred to, says: "Out of the accounts of great battles, by sea and land, we seize as watch-words the phrases of the commanders."

Thus the words "Remember the *Maine!*" (like those other words, "Remember the Alamo!"; Lawrence's dying cry, "Don't give up the ship!"; Farragut's, "Damn the torpedoes, go ahead!"; and Dewey's quiet command, "You may fire when you're ready, Gridley," which sounded the death-knell of Spain's dominion over the Philippines) became an inspiration to the country at large, and the navy in particular.

CHAPTER IV

EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR

EVENTS moved very rapidly in the early part of 1898. Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard commanded the North Atlantic Station at the time the *Maine* was destroyed, and on March 1, 1898, appointed a court of inquiry to be held on board the steamer *Mangrove*, at Havana. The members of the court were Captain William T. Sampson, president; Captain French E. Chadwick, and Lieutenant Commander William P. Potter, members; and Lieutenant Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate.

After a most thorough investigation the court reported that, in its judgment, the ship had been blown up from without; but did not, except by inference, implicate the Spanish authorities; and that it was "unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons."

On March 5, by recommendation of President McKinley, Congress voted fifty millions of dollars then lying idle in the Treasury, to be used by the President, in his discretion, for national defense. This great mark of confidence and purpose was displayed without distinction of party, and almost unanimously.

Warlike preparations immediately began, and were continued with zeal. New vessels then building in England were purchased, examinations of vessels suitable for auxiliary purposes were made in our various ports, and warlike spirit and activity everywhere prevailed.

On March 17 Senator Proctor, of Vermont, who had been an officer of distinction in the Civil War, had been Secretary of War, and had just returned from an inspection of the "reconcentrado camps" in the island of Cuba, made an address in the Senate of

the United States that created a profound impression, not only in the United States, but abroad. His descriptions of the horrors he had seen in those camps, of the slowly starving old men, women, and little children, (whose only fault was that they were suspected of being in sympathy with their husbands, fathers, brothers, or sons who were in the patriot army of Cuba,) declared in clarion tones to the country and the world, that to relieve the suffering people of that island from the cruel domination of Spain was not only a national, but a moral, duty on our part. It removed all lingering doubts.

Two names will go down to history in a common infamy: The Austrian Field Marshal Haynau, whose atrocious treatment of the Hungarian and Austrian patriots of 1848-9 aroused the indignation of the world; and the Spaniard, Captain-General Weyler, by whose orders the atrocities that Senator Protor described were committed.

The President's call for volunteers for army and naval service was responded to by a vast multitude of men. North and South, East and West, vied with each other in display of patriotic zeal. Veterans of the Blue and veterans of the Gray stepped out with their sons and grandsons, in patriotic emulation, to march and suffer and, if necessary, to die under the Old Flag, when and wherever they might be called upon to go.

Into the navy, as parts of the naval militia, went the yachtsmen that owned and ran expensive yachts, who left their business to become enlisted men and, with dainty hands that had never known labor, indulge in the pleasant tasks of coaling ships and scrubbing decks.

There was only one rivalry—who should do and dare and suffer most in the great good cause and duty of the hour, and for the honor and glory of the United States and the Stars and Stripes.

CHAPTER V

THE "FLYING SQUADRON" IS FORMED

To form the squadron that will go down to history as "The Flying Squadron" several ships were taken out of the North Atlantic fleet and sent to rendezvous at Hampton Roads. These were the armored cruiser *Brooklyn* (Captain Francis A. Cook); battleships *Texas* (Captain John W. Philip; *Massachusetts* (Captain Francis J. Higginson); and armored cruisers *Minneapolis* (Captain F. M. Wise); and *Columbia* (Captain James H. Sands). The last two were soon sent to the New England coasts, and some smaller vessels and a collier (*Sterling*) were sent to Hampton Roads in their stead.

On March 24 Rear Admiral Sicard broke down under the strain of his greatly increased official labors and anxieties and was relieved from his command.

Sicard was a distinguished officer who had served faithfully and with distinction during the Civil War. In command of the gunboat *Seneca* he took part in the battles of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and voluntarily—for he was under no obligation of duty to do so—headed the officers and men from his vessel in the naval assault on that fort, January 15, 1865, where he behaved with much gallantry. He had served as chief of bureau in the Navy Department, had commanded the monitor *Miantonomoh* in the North Atlantic fleet when it was under command of Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce, and succeeded that able officer in command of that fleet.

His detachment left Captain William T. Sampson the senior officer of that station; and on March 27 Captain Sampson published an order in which he announced: "By order of the Honorable Secretary

of the Navy I have assumed command of the United States naval force on the North Atlantic Station; and hoisted my pennant on board the armored cruiser *New York*, at 3.30 P. M. this day." And then after announcing his staff as follows: Chief of staff, Captain French E. Chadwick (who was also the captain of the flagship *New York*); assistant chief of staff, Lieutenant Sydney A. Staunton; flag lieutenant, Charles C. Marsh; secretary ensign, E. L. Bennett; he signed himself, "William T. Sampson, *Captain, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.*"

The above named continued to be his staff during the Spanish War. Up to this time Sampson had been the captain of the battle-ship *Iowa*. Captain Robley D. Evans was on March 28 ordered to the command of that ship, and thus became next in rank to Sampson. In the opinion of the author that appointment of Evans was a most significant move; for, that Sampson was a frail man and therefore liable to break down at any moment was a fact that was not unknown (certainly should not have been) to the officials of the Navy Department; and if he did break down, Evans, as senior captain, would have become Sampson's successor, just as Sampson did when Sicard broke down. It would never have done to detach Sampson and put Evans in his place—the whole navy would have cried out in condemnation of that; but if Evans could succeed to the command in the way indicated the scheme might have gone through with much less comment.

If this was the scheme, one very important individual was "left out of the count." That was Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, who apparently made up his mind that Sampson should not break down.

Evans, who bears the sobriquet of "Fighting Bob," has always been a lucky character, "reaping where he had not sown, and gathering where he had not strewn;" but his luck seems to have failed him

in this matter. Where he got his sobriquet of "Fighting Bob" neither he (as he says) nor anyone knows. He was an acting ensign in the Fort Fisher assault, but although he was painfully wounded in the legs, none of the official reports mentioned him for bravery; and in fact he was not conspicuous.

Several months after the assault I learned that he had been placed on the retired list because of his wounds, and, for the purpose of remedying the injustice of retiring a young officer because he had been wounded in battle, I wrote the letter praising him which Evans quotes on page 108 of his book, "A Sailor's Log." If I had known what effect the letter was later to have, it would not have been so strongly worded.

When in 1866 selections were made to fill up the increase in the grades authorized by Congress in that year, Evans was advanced thirty-four numbers—over the heads of the present rear admirals, Glass, Sands, Sigsbee, and many others who had a much better fighting and professional record than he. When those over whom he had been promoted complained of injustice, a naval board of distinguished officers, of which the late vice admiral Stephen C. Rowan was president, reported that his advancement, to the extent to which it had been made, was an injustice to those over whom he had been promoted, and that an advance of ten numbers was all that Evans' conduct merited. A second board of rear admirals recommended that Sands, Glass, and Sigsbee should be restored to their places above him. Notwithstanding that Sands had stooped over Evans, at his request, and bound up his wounds under the furious fire at Fort Fisher, and had then gone further into the fight and *had* been mentioned in the reports for gallantry displayed, yet Evans in Congress had the bills defeated that were introduced to effectuate the recommendation of the boards of admirals.

He was a good "Fighting Bob" to prevent justice being done to his brother officers.

After the battle of Fort Fisher Evans had no opportunity for fighting (except with his tongue) until the Spanish War occurred.

The foregoing incidents of his history are given because he, in his "Sailor's Log," "points with pride" to my praise of him in that letter from which he quotes, and it is but just that the whole truth about the matter should be told.



H. A. Schley

CHAPTER VI

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY IS PLACED IN COMMAND OF "THE FLYING SQUADRON"

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY had been promoted to that rank in regular order, on February 6, 1898. On March 28 he was assigned to the command of the Flying Squadron, and hoisted his broad pennant on board the *Brooklyn* on that day. It was a high compliment, and it may be presumed that it would not have been paid him but for the conviction that he was the man to fill the part which that squadron was expected to play. As its name implies, it was intended that the squadron should be in continual readiness to fly to meet the Spanish ships should they appear on our coasts. On April 6 the Navy Department, in a confidential circular to Captain Sampson, commanding, etc., said: "Should the department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Porto Rico, it is possible that the *Flying Squadron may be sent thither; in which case some of your vessels may be needed to reinforce that squadron.*"¹ Therefore at that date it seems to have been intended to take away from Sampson a part of the vessels of his command to add to Schley's command. Schley in command of the augmented Flying Squadron was then to find and fight the Spanish fleet, which was the important duty of the war, while to Sampson was left the performance of the other duties pertaining to his position as "captain commanding the North Atlantic Station," such as blockading the Cuban ports, etc.

Commodore Schley's statement of his doings as soon as he assumed command, made to the Court of

¹ Italics are mine.—J. P.

Inquiry, is so clear that it is deemed proper to give it in detail.

He said: "During the time that we lay at Hampton Roads the squadron was organized. Its commanding officers were brought together, and the general plan of campaign was thrashed out. I put the squadron on a war basis, established the matter of pickets and patrols, and also the masking of lights. During the time we were there I explained to the commanding officers that as it would be impossible to construct a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen contingencies, the general plan of the squadron would be to cruise in line of battle; and its general principle would be to attack the head of the leading vessels, concentrating fire upon them, in order, first, to obtain the moral effect; and, second, to throw them into confusion, making victory over them very much more successful and complete.

"I did this for the reason that the older plans had all been to attack center and rear, resulting in the escape, usually, of a part of each squadron. I thought that the attack on the head of a squadron, which was, to some extent, new, would involve the destruction of the whole, and this was to be the general plan of action as explained on that occasion.

"These preliminaries arranged, target practice was taken up with sub-caliber guns. It resulted in an accuracy of fire which, I think, was fully demonstrated in the action that occurred some months later.

"There was a good deal of restlessness, naturally, among the squadron at being held from what they thought was the scene of action; which was, happily, relieved when orders were received from the Secretary of the Navy to proceed off Charleston, where orders would await us."

Schley's "Squadron General Order No. 9," which was issued at Hampton Roads April 22, 1898, elaborately provides directions for the efficiency of the

squadron in minute particulars. It will be found in full in the Record of the Court of Inquiry, I.¹ 1216, and it is commended to those who are not, and wish to be, informed as to the commodore's preparedness for emergencies.

In thus discussing with his captains the general plans to be pursued in attacking and otherwise dealing with the enemy, should he be met, Schley was but following the plan Nelson had pursued in that memorable chase after the French fleet after its escape from Toulon, culminating in its destruction in the Battle of the Nile.

Concerning this, Fitchett (an English writer of merit) says: "Throughout that memorable cruise, whenever the weather permitted he (Nelson) summoned his captains on board the flagship, where he would fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of attack, and such plans as he proposed to execute upon falling in with the enemy."

¹ Report of Court of Inquiry.

CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL WAR BOARD

AN anomalous body with this pretentious title sprang, like Minerva from the brain of Jove, into existence at the outbreak of the war with Spain; but who was Jove, and how he came to give being to such a Minerva, has not yet been explained.

"History repeats itself." So long a time had elapsed that it had been forgotten how, during the Civil War, the efforts of our generals in the field had been rendered abortive by interference from Washington, whose "Organizers of Victory" and "Committee on the Conduct of the War" had come to be more dangerous to our armies than all the foes that confronted them.

There was no such body in the Navy Department before the war with Spain. It was organized May 21, 1898, which, fortunately for the country, was one day after Dewey had destroyed or captured all naval enemies in the Philippines; and was composed of Rear Admiral Sicard, president (who had recovered from his disability to command the North Atlantic fleet, and was now able to command it and its new commander, Commodore Dewey and his fleet, Schley and the Flying Squadron, and Clark and the *Oregon*, as well); Captain A. S. Barker, and Captain A. S. Crowninshield (titular rear admiral), Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which bureau controlled the whole personnel of the navy.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan was then in Europe, under summons to join the board. The nation waited with bated breath while he was returning (it has been said, under an assumed name and in disguise) to

make sure that in spite of Spanish spies, assassins, or other evil agencies he might safely reach his expectant country, and be able to shed the light of his great strategic wisdom and undoubted professional skill and ability on the naval conduct of the war; and breathed with assured confidence of success when, on May 9, he arrived safely in Washington and took his seat as an additional member of the board. Never since Mr. Lincoln flitted through Maryland disguised in Scotch cap and long cloak has so important a journey been accomplished.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt was for a time a member of the board; but on May 7 (probably attracted more by the "Rough Rider" scheme, or perhaps unequal to the mysterious character of the board's methods) he "severed his connection" with it.

A great air of mystery as to the proceedings of the board at once pervaded the department. Its sessions were held in the topmost attic, so that "far from the madd'ing crowd's ignoble strife" its meditations could not easily be disturbed. No one could get near it without special permission from the Bureau of Navigation. The elevator men, who seemed to be very dubious as to the exact location of the board, scanned with suspicious eye everyone who mentioned it and asked to be let out at its floor, and a double line of messengers or guardians carefully scrutinized any individual, as well as his credentials, who desired admission . . . one of the guardians then disappeared into the room, and, if so directed, ushered the visitor into "the presence."


A friend who once got into the board room, said that he found Admiral Sicard writing a private letter; Barker with his feet on the table reading a newspaper, while Mahan's polished crown looked as if it was struggling to keep him from giving forth a new book on the "Influence of Sea Power," which

the strategy about to be developed by the board was soon to exert through the navy of the United States. Cold indifference pervaded the room; but it was all assumed, for henceforth naval strategy ruled the hour.

Luckily Dewey had taken the precaution to cut the cable from Manila that might otherwise have connected him with the board, and so his operations could not be interfered with, and from start to finish were conducted without error. He had used his own method of learning the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet in those waters, and he made no mistakes from the time he left Hong Kong, through the episode with von Diederichs, the German admiral, down to the time of his departure for the United States, to be received by his admiring countrymen in a manner which would have caused the splendors of the Roman triumphs to pale into insignificance. In one respect Dewey had a great advantage over Schley and Sampson. Before leaving Mirs Bay for Manila he waited until he knew where the Spanish fleet would be found, and was never troubled by any of the uncertainties which the Navy Department (inspired as the Secretary of the Navy undoubtedly was by the wisdom and strategic insight and foresight of the Naval Board) succeeded in enveloping Schley and Sampson with respect to the whereabouts of Cervera.

It was a great body, that War Board, and, whether correctly or not, felt itself big with the fate of our naval operations.

Captain Clark, upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro, on his wonderful voyage in the *Oregon*, no sooner came in communication with the board than he felt himself impelled to voice his opinion of it by his famous despatch: "Don't hamper me with instructions. I am not afraid, with this ship, of the whole Spanish fleet."



W. F. Sampson.

CHAPTER VIII

SAMPSON ASSIGNED TO COMMAND, WITH RANK OF REAR ADMIRAL

SAMPSON continued in command of the North Atlantic Station as captain until, at midnight of April 21, 1898, he received from the Secretary of the Navy a telegram in the following words, viz :

“WASHINGTON, April 21, 1898.

“SAMPSON, Key West, Fla.

“You are assigned to command of the United States naval force on the North Atlantic Station, with the rank of rear admiral. Hoist the flag of rear admiral immediately.

“LONG.”

This he did on the morning of the 22d.

No more remarkable act has ever occurred in the navy of the United States than this. It was plainly contrary to all naval precedent and rule, and it is quite easy to show that it was not only *without warrant of custom or law, or of the Constitution of the United States, but was also against one positive prohibition of statute law, and contrary to the Constitution.*

The only attempt at justification that the department has ever made is found in the statement made by Mr. Long, in his letter addressed confidentially to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. p. 6.)¹ that “Sampson had been second in command of that fleet, been with it in its evolutions and practice during the previous year, and was familiar with its workings.”

If that was a good reason, then it may be said that

¹ Senate Executive Document, 1899.

Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce (to whom the eyes of many officers of the navy turned when Sicard gave up) had commanded that fleet for more than two years; and Schley had been his "chief of staff" (the same position Sampson held under Sicard), and both were more "familiar with its workings" than Sampson. The fact that Bunce was to retire on Christmas Day of that year need not have stood in the way of his assignment to command, because a law authorized the President to assign any officer on the Retired List to active duty. And when that Retired List is looked over the names of the following officers, available and fully competent to discharge such duties, could be found:

Jouett, the most conspicuous figure of the battle of Mobile Bay, next to Farragut.

Glorious old Kimberly, the executive officer of the *Hartford*, the hero of nearly all Farragut's battles, and whose conduct in the Samoan hurricane won for him the praise of the civilized world.

Walker, one of the most accomplished of our officers, conspicuous as a fighter on the Mississippi River during the many months of almost daily battle during the Civil War; who had been Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for eight years; had commanded the "White Squadron" for three years with great ability and success; and since his retirement for age had been president of the Inter-oceanic Canal Commission.

Selfridge (just retired for age), than whom no better officer ever trod a deck, who had served with great credit and ability and conspicuous bravery during the Civil War, and was one of the lieutenants of the *Cumberland* when she was sunk by the *Merrimac*, standing to his guns until the water covered them as she sank. Lieutenant George U. Morris, who was in command of the ship, said of him: "He did all that a noble and gallant officer could do." He was,

immediately after the sinking of the *Cumberland*, ordered to the command of the victorious *Monitor*; but held the command only a short time, because of his junior rank. He had commanded one of Porter's Mississippi fleet, in the Vicksburg campaign, took part in the Fort Fisher battles, both afloat and in the naval assault, and was one of the six officers before mentioned who were recommended by Admiral Porter for promotion for conspicuous gallantry displayed on the last occasion. Up to his retirement (only six weeks before) he had commanded the European Squadron.

There were Belknap, who had been the executive officer of the *New Ironsides* off Charleston in many fights with the formidable batteries by which that stronghold had been defended; had commanded a double-turreted monitor with great efficiency in the Fort Fisher battles; and Phythian, who was the executive officer of the *New Ironsides* in the same battles, both accomplished and distinguished fighters of the Civil War.

Also Howell, Watson, Remy, and Schley, whose records will be referred to hereinafter.

The Secretary of the Navy in his confidential letter to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. 1) said that "when Commodore Schley was given command of the Flying Squadron he was informed verbally that if his command and that of Sampson came together the latter would command the whole."

The Secretary is probably in error as to this, because, as has already been shown Sampson was still only a captain; and it was at that time contemplated that Sampson's fleet should be further depleted by sending more of his vessels to Schley's command. And it is most highly improbable that the Secretary would say to a commodore that he was to be put under command of a captain, for, as every naval

officer knows, if at any time the commodore had come into the presence of a captain, the commodore would have commanded and the latter obeyed his orders.

The Secretary has also stated that when Schley was informed as stated above, he "expressed ready acquiescence in the proposed arrangement." It will be remembered that Schley assumed command of the Flying Squadron on March 28, and Sampson's appointment as a rear admiral was April 21, three weeks later.

It is not improbable that if the commodore had been so informed, after Sampson had been appointed rear admiral, he would have acquiesced, as in fact he afterwards did; because apparently the only hope any of the Sampson's illustrious seniors seems to have had left to him of being permitted to serve his country afloat in the West Indies in the war with Spain was based upon his willingness to waive his rank and "acquiesce in the arrangement made" to put his junior over him.

Four commodores, viz., John A. Howell, George C. Remey, John Crittenden Watson, and Winfield Scott Schley—all of whom had served with much greater distinction, ability, and experience in the Civil War, and afterwards, than had Sampson—were given the opportunity to serve under their junior, or not at all. They were all men of unblemished personal character, and of distinguished professional ability and standing.

Howell had served faithfully and almost continuously on the blockade; took part in the Battle of Mobile Bay, as the executive officer of the *Ossipee*, and was highly commended by his captain (the late Rear Admiral William E. Leroy) for efficient performance of duty in that great contest. He was recalled from command of the European Squadron at the beginning of the Spanish War, having relieved Selfridge, on the latter's retirement.

Remey was in many fights with Confederate batteries at Charleston, S. C.; was taken prisoner in the gallant naval attempt to recapture Fort Sumter, September 8, 1863, and suffered a long and harassing imprisonment.

Watson had stood by Farragut's side as his flag lieutenant in nearly all of the great admiral's battles and many minor engagements, constituting an almost continuous fight for many months on the Mississippi River; and had been wounded by an exploding shell.

In Farragut's report of the battle of Mobile Bay (wherein the best and most formidable forts, commanded by officers who were the most skillful of our countrymen, were fought, torpedoes run, and iron-clads encountered and rammed by wooden ships) the great admiral said: "My flag lieutenant, J. Crittenden Watson, has been brought to your notice in former despatches. During the action he was on the poop, attending to the signals, and performed his duties, as might have been expected, thoroughly. He is a scion worthy the stock from which he sprang, and I commend him to your attention."

This from Farragut, who notoriously was not prodigal with compliments to his subordinates, was high praise.

Hardly had the sound of the Battle of Santiago ceased, when the Department placed Watson in command of the "Eastern Squadron," to be sent to the coast of Spain to encounter and finish up what Dewey and Schley had left of the Spanish navy; which, under Admiral Camara, was steaming aimlessly about in the Mediterranean or Red Sea. When Dewey gave up his command at Manila, Watson was sent to take and fill his place, which for about two years he very ably did. Watson was succeeded in turn by Remey, whose conduct of our naval operations in the trying situations and complications of the Chinese (Boxer) War contributed so much to give us our leading position among the allies there.

CHAPTER IX

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY

COMMODORE WINFIELD S. SCHLEY comes of eminent Maryland stock. His family has furnished great lawyers, a Governor of Georgia, and many men distinguished in every walk of life. His maternal grandfather was captain of the crack military company of riflemen that Maryland contributed to the defense of the State in the War of 1812-15, ranking then as the Fifth Maryland Regiment does at the present time.

That is the State which produced both the poet and the occasion that called forth our anthem, "The Star Spangled Banner," which to-day brings all Americans who hear it to their feet with bared heads, almost realizing for them Webster's description as applied to England's drum-beat: "Whose morning reveille, following the sun, circles the whole earth with one continuous and melodious strain of the martial airs of England." And who can tell what patriotic impulses they may have stirred in that old ancestor's heart, to be transmitted from him to the grandson?

Winfield S. Schley was born October 9, 1839, near the city of Frederick, Md., where the family had lived for several generations, honorable, and honored by all their contemporaries. He was appointed midshipman and sent to the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis in September, 1856, and was graduated thence in June, 1860.

When the Civil War broke out he was serving abroad in the frigate *Niagara*, and when she arrived in the United States he promptly continued his allegiance to the Union, in which course he had the approval and support of his family.

During the war he faithfully and zealously performed all his duties. As early as May 12, 1861, when Schley was not yet twenty-two years of age, so highly was he regarded by his captain (McKean) that the latter appointed him prize-master of a ship that the *Niagara* had captured. A few months later he behaved with gallantry in the attack upon and capture of a vessel attempting to run the blockade at Mobile, and was highly commended for such gallantry by Commander Francis Winslow. He was in many of the engagements on the Mississippi River, part of the time in command of U. S. S. *Monongehela* (a command far above his rank as lieutenant), in the almost daily fights which preceded and resulted in the fall of Port Hudson; and during the whole struggle he merited and received the commendation of his superior officers, notably of Admiral Farragut. During the whole Civil War he, continuously afloat, creditably performed all his duties during that conflict.

CHAPTER X

SCHLEY IN AN ASSAULT ON A KOREAN FORT

IN June, 1871, Schley took part in an assault upon a fort in Korea, one of the most dangerous and desperate ever made by officers and men, sailors and marines of any navy. He was the second person to scale the parapet and enter the fort, Lieutenant W. W. McKee being first by a few feet. McKee was mortally wounded, and the Korean who struck him down sprang with the same spear upon Schley, and made a thrust at him that ran between his arm and left side, pinning his coat sleeve to his coat, whereupon Schley shot him dead.

The late Rear Admiral Lewis A. Kimberley, then a commander, commanded the whole of the forces engaged, and of Schley's conduct on that occasion Kimberley's report says:

"The gallant and brave McKee, the first to enter over the parapet, fell mortally wounded with two wounds. He has since died, and the navy has lost one of its bravest and noblest sons. Lieutenant Commander W. S. Schley was the next officer in the fort, and killed the Korean who wounded McKee.

"To Lieutenant Commander Schley belongs the credit of organizing the expedition and carrying out the several details which went far to prevent confusion and induce success. His arrangements of the boats, his superintendence of the various labors on shore, in destroying the guns and forts, encouraging the men, and setting them a brave example in being second in the fort at its storming, and being in position to render assistance where most needed, render praise unnecessary. The facts of his labors, judgment, and system speak for themselves."

Kimberly evidently did not think it any part of his duty to withhold from his subordinate the praise and commendation that were the due of that subordinate.

Of that assault Schley (signing himself "Acting Adjutant General") in his report said:

"The assault was made through a deep ravine, full eighty feet deep, with 350 sailors and marines. The approach was without any covering, and the fire of the enemy most terrific and severe. Nothing could withstand the men. The impetuosity of the charge was met by brave men in the fort, who contested inch by inch, and fought hand to hand.

"The honor of gaining the first foothold inside fell to Lieutenant McKee, who was at once charged by the enemy. But a moment had elapsed until I gained the inside, and went to his aid in his desperate fight with the enemy. In a moment he fell, mortally wounded by a musket ball in the groin and a spear stab in the side.

"The same brave one who had wounded McKee rushed upon me, but the spear passed between my left arm and the body; and before he could withdraw it he was shot dead and fell lifeless at my feet."

Schley does not say who shot him. That's his usual way of telling of his own exploits.

He adds: "I should not do proper justice if I failed to mention those men (sailors) whom I recognized as the first to gain the inside of the fort." He then mentions several of them by name, and continues: "The officers of the whole battalion behaved with great gallantry and decision. It would require a better pen to praise properly, or do justice to their dash and courage."

Rear Admiral John Rodgers, the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Squadron, who was himself one of the most gallant and efficient and distinguished commanders of the Civil War,—who commanded

the *Galena* in the battle with Drewry's Bluff, on the James River (or Fort Darling, as we called it),—said in his report of the assault on the Korean fort: "The fighting inside the fort was desperate; the courage of the Koreans was unyielding; they expected no quarter; and probably would have given none; they fought to the death; and only when the last man fell did the conflict cease. It gives me the greatest satisfaction to say that our officers and men defeated a determined enemy in a desperate fight, with a patience and courage most admirable. A victory was won of which the navy may well feel proud."

Such praise and commendation from John Rodgers mean more than that of most other officers, for no man ever displayed more courage in the most dangerous and trying circumstances than he, and he was a good judge of that characteristic which we call bravery.

CHAPTER XI

THE GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION OF 1884

SCHLEY'S next important service was rendered as commander of what is known as "The Greely Relief Expedition of 1884."

In that service all the characteristics of the fully equipped naval officer were required—ability for organization; judgment in selection of ships, officers, and men; skill, self-reliance, and ability in execution. Schley displayed in the highest degree the qualifications necessary in fitting out, and accomplishing with complete success and remarkable promptness, the object of the expedition, which was to seek and rescue Lieutenant Greely and his surviving men lost in the Arctic regions.

Two previous expeditions had failed to accomplish that purpose.

The full nature and extent of the responsibilities imposed upon Schley were lucidly set forth in the following letter from the Honorable Secretary of the Navy:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,

February 18, 1884.

"SIR.—Having been selected for the command of the Greely Relief Expedition of 1884, you will make immediate and full preparations for the performance of your duties. You will investigate the circumstances of Lieutenant Greely's voyage to Lady Franklin Sound, in 1881; and of the attempts to relieve him in 1882 and 1883; incidentally familiarizing yourself with the whole subject of Arctic exploring and relief expeditions.

"You will examine the *Thetis* and *Bear*, and all other ships which may be designed for the expedition, and co-operate with the chiefs of bureaus in strengthening and equipping them; giving particular attention to all the special articles of outfit necessary in Arctic voyaging, including boats, sledges, dogs, houses, clothing, navigation instruments, and the whole material of the expedition.

"You will also consider and assist in the selection of the subordinate officers and enlistment of the crews; and on all points indicated, and concerning any steps which might be taken to give success to the expedition, you will from time to time make to the Department all suggestions and recommendations which may occur to you as useful or important.

"Very respectfully,

"W. E. CHANDLER,

"Secretary of the Navy.

"COMMANDER W. S. SCHLEY,
"Washington."

By the above letter Schley was clothed with full responsibility for the fitting out and conduct of the expedition. That responsibility was fully met. In about two months and a half the expedition was ready, and the first ship sailed May 1, 1884.

In his final letter, dated April 21, the Secretary of the Navy said: "No detailed instructions will be given to you. Full confidence is felt that you have both the capacity and courage, guided by discretion, necessary to do all that can be required of you, by Department or the nation, for the rescue of our imperiled countrymen."

That "full confidence" was not misplaced; but was entirely warranted by results. Fifty-three days after the expedition sailed from New York Lieutenant Greely and the survivors of his party were found and rescued.

The Secretary of the Navy, when he received Schley's despatch from St. John's, Newfoundland, announcing the successful result of the expedition, replied in words that found an echo in all hearts:

“COMMANDER W. S. SCHLEY:

“Receive my congratulations and thanks for your prudence, perseverance, and courage in reaching our dead and dying countrymen. The hearts of the American people go out with great affection to Lieutenant Greely and the few survivors of his deadly peril. Care for them unremittingly, and bid them be cheerful and hopeful on account of what life has yet in store for them. Preserve tenderly the heroic dead; prepare them according to your judgment, and bring them home.

“W. E. CHANDLER,
“*Secretary of the Navy.*”

The living and dead were “tenderly cared for, and brought back home,” the ships arriving at Portsmouth, N. H., August 2, 1884, where they were received by the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the ships of which were dressed out as for a joyful holiday; and with three cheers for Schley's ships, they passed to their anchorage.

On the 4th, through the streets of Portsmouth, there was a grand parade of the naval brigade from Luce's fleet. A public reception of Schley and his officers and men, by the citizens of Portsmouth, followed, and the whole world resounded with justly earned praise of Schley, his officers, and men. That a new and brilliant page of our naval history had been written by him and them was a feeling universal in our country.

Congratulations and commendations poured in upon him from representative bodies and distin-

guished citizens throughout the land. The legislature of Maryland, by a joint resolution of thanks, and the present of a gold chronometer-watch, marked its appreciation of her son.

In his official report Schley gives unstinted praise to all his subordinates, saying in a general order that was read to the assembled officers and men of each ship:

“Greely’s relief was made possible, *First*, by the promptest activity and unwearied energy of the Honorable Secretary of the Navy and Honorable Secretary of War. *Secondly*, by the unceasing vigilance and readiness of officers and men; their alacrity in responding to orders; their cheerfulness at all times, day or night, in the performance of their duties, which demanded promptness, endurance, and courage. My confidence grew daily, in noting that the spirit of those who fitted this expedition had been caught up by the officers and men who were to use it to accomplish its purpose.”

There is not a word in that order or report of claim of credit for himself. He had not learned, apparently, how to exalt himself by disparaging, belittling or ignoring the efforts of those under him, or by magnifying his own.

Rear Admiral George W. Melville, who had been a most conspicuous figure in the ill-fated *Jeanette* expedition, as chief engineer of that vessel under Lieutenant George W. De Long, and was also Schley’s chief engineer of his flagship *Thetis*, said to the writer, concerning Schley’s vigilance and work in the expedition: “How the man found time for his meals and sleep was a marvel to me, for it seemed to me that every time I looked at that crow’s nest he was in it.”

Inasmuch as the laws gave no promotion for such services, the President of the United States (Mr. Arthur), as a mark of his appreciation and approval,

personally tendered to Commander Schley the appointment of Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting of the Navy Department, a position that had generally been given only to captains in rank.

Schley served in this capacity for four years, introducing many reforms and improvements in those departments of the service. He did much to perfect the apprentice system, then in its infancy, also in establishing in the navy the principle that promotion for merit to the highest rank should be open to anyone who deserves and is fitted for it, as it was and is in the army. It certainly is anomalous that (as in the case of Lieutenant General Chaffee) one in the army can attain the highest rank, even though enlisted as a drummer boy or private, while in the navy one who does not come in through the Naval Academy cannot hope for any such advance, no matter how high his merit or attainments or distinguished his conduct.

Schley's next most conspicuous conduct was when, in command of the cruiser *Baltimore*, he carried to Sweden the body of John Ericsson, the great inventor, to be buried in his native land. This duty was performed with the approbation of the people of both countries. In the ceremonies and receptions tendered to him and the officers and men of his ship by the Swedish authorities and people, he exhibited a facility of speech, and readiness and felicity of manner, that made his visit memorable to all who took part in those ceremonies.

CHAPTER XII

RECORD OF SAMPSON'S SERVICES

WILLIAM T. SAMPSON entered the Naval Academy as midshipman in September, 1857, and was graduated first of his class in June, 1861.

During the Civil War nearly all of his service was performed at the Naval Academy, then located at Newport, R. I. Probably he chafed under his detention at that warlike spot, and would gladly have been sent, sooner than he was, to the seat of war at the front, where there were greater dangers to be encountered than the fire of the eyes of the young ladies who congregated in that charming New England resort.

But it was not until October, 1864, that he was sent to the front, as executive officer of the monitor *Patapsco*, on board of which vessel he served until January 15, 1865, on the night of which day she was sunk by an enemy's torpedo while on picket duty in Charleston harbor, when his commanding officer commended him for "coolness and intrepidity." In that great struggle this was all the mention that was made of him that I have been able to find by a diligent search through the twenty-odd volumes of reports which the Navy Department has published.

Subsequent to the war he had been chief of the Bureau of Ordnance in the Navy Department for eight years. He was undoubtedly among the leaders in that branch of professional knowledge, but that did not necessarily make him an officer to be chosen over all the commodores and rear admirals of the navy for the important position that subsequently was assigned to him.

The foregoing records of fighting and other ser-

vices have been given to show that all those commodores and other officers named were at least the equals, personally and professionally, of Sampson. And their services and experiences as fighters were all vastly superior to his, because they had had better opportunities than he.

As a matter of fact Sampson had never been in any fight whatever, and he died without any such experience, except "firing a few shells at one of the Spanish torpedo boats at Santiago de Cuba," and at San Juan, Porto Rico.

The best illustration of the impropriety of the action of the department in placing him over his seniors will be found in the mere statement of the fact that if George Dewey had not, fortunately for himself and the country, been already in command of the Asiatic Squadron he would in all probability have had the same opportunity given him that his brother commodores had, of "expressing ready acquiescence in the arrangement made."

CHAPTER XIII

SAMPSON'S APPOINTMENT WITHOUT WARRANT OF LAW, AND CONTRARY THERETO

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY in his letter to the Senate of the United States (Ex. Doc. D. 6.) refers to the selection of Sampson as being in the "exercise of discretion in the assignment of officers, which is authorized by law"; but he failed to cite the law which gives such authority.

It is quite correct to say that the department has a discretion to choose, for the performance of particular duties, from among its officers of the requisite rank, those deemed best fitted for such performance. It might have selected any of the rear admirals or commodores of the navy to command the North Atlantic Station; and while there might have been difference of opinion as to the wisdom of the particular choice, there could have been none as to the right of choice. Having made such choice, the department, with entire propriety, might have detailed those four commodores to service under the officer of its selection, even though not lineally outranked by the new appointee.

As has been already said, it is quite easy to show that the appointment of Captain Sampson to be rear admiral and commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Station was not only without warrant of law or the Constitution of the United States, but was also a violation of one positive prohibition of law, and against the provisions of the Constitution.

Prior to December 21, 1861, the highest rank in the navy of the United States had been that of captain. A captain might be assigned to duty as commander-in-chief of a squadron, and while so commanding was—by courtesy only—styled "commo-

dore," and hoisted a commodore's broad pennant; but it gave him no command over his seniors on the list of captains. If any chance brought into his company one of those seniors—in command of a single ship even—down would come his broad pennant, and he obeyed for the time being that senior's orders.

On December 21, 1861, Congress enacted: Sec. 1454, Revised Statutes: "The President may select any officer not below the rank of commander on the Active List of the Navy and assign him to the command of a squadron with the rank and title of *flag officer*," etc.

Under this section many officers were assigned to command squadrons with that rank and title; and this continued to be the case until July 16, 1862, when Congress enacted "An act for the reorganization of the navy," which for the first time established the grades of admiral, vice admiral, rear admiral, and commodore. These were all flag officers.

While the Act of December 21, 1861, was not, in terms, repealed by the Act of July 22, 1862, there is no court in the land that would not apply to it the maxim of Lord Coke: "*Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.*"

No "flag officer" was ever appointed after the passage of the Act of July 22, 1862. During the rest of the war acting rear admirals were appointed, and the practice was continued for a time subsequent. It had been given up later, because of its illegality, and when Dewey and Howell were assigned to command of their respective squadrons it was in their lineal rank as commodores. Dewey was only a commodore when he fought the Battle of Manila.

It cannot be claimed with any show of propriety that anyone could be assigned to command as rear admiral under an act which authorized only the title of "flag officer."

Sampson was not assigned with the title of "flag officer" or "acting rear admiral," but as rear admiral; and he never signed his name as acting rear admiral.

Sec. 1366 of the Rev. Stat. (which was part of the Act of July 22, 1862) is as follows:

*"During war, rear admirals shall be selected from those officers on the Active List not below the grade of commander who shall have eminently distinguished themselves for courage, skill, and genius in their profession; but no officer shall be promoted under this provision unless, upon recommendation of the President by name, he has received the thanks of Congress for distinguished service."*¹

No language could be clearer; and that section is conclusive against the legality of Sampson's appointment, because:

First. He had *not* "eminently distinguished himself by courage, skill, and genius in his profession."

Second. He had *not* "been recommended to Congress by the President by name," for its thanks; and,

Third. He had *not* "received the thanks of Congress for distinguished service," or any service.

It is undoubtedly true that the President has unrestricted power, under the Constitution, to "nominate" all officers; but he cannot "appoint" any officer without "the advice and consent of the Senate."

Sampson was not nominated to the Senate; and its advice and consent to his appointment were never asked for or given, as required by Art. II, Sec. 2, par. 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

The *ad interim* (so-called) clause does not help the matter out, because that applies only to "vacancies that may *happen* during the recess of the Senate." There was no vacancy in the list of rear admirals, and the Senate was in session, when the appointment was made.

¹ The italics are, of course, mine.—J. P.

It is a further fact that war had not been declared (although it was subsequently, on the 25th, declared as of the 21st). And Sec. 1366 provides that "during peace, vacancies in the grade of rear admiral shall be filled by regular promotion from the list of commodores, subject to examination according to law." So that by that section, Sampson, being only a captain, was not eligible for promotion to the grade of rear admiral.

This matter has been dwelt on at such length, not from any desire to disparage Sampson, who, through no effort of his own, was placed in that position by the Navy Department, to the exclusion of many of his seniors (notably the four commodores above named) who *had* "distinguished themselves by courage, skill, and genius in their profession"; but because his promotion was a fundamental wrong that was sure to revenge itself, as it did, by results.

If attention shall thereby be called to the consideration that the fundamental rules of naval subordination, precedence, and command cannot be violated with impunity, or without evil consequences, the author's purposes will have been accomplished.

Having been placed in such humiliating position, it is greatly to the credit of those four commodores who have been named that they preferred to serve their country, under the flag that had "braved for many years the battle and the breeze" over them, even while they felt the humiliation of the situation, rather than to stand for their own right and dignity under the well established rules of the navy; and thus deprive the country of their services. They should be honored for preferring performance of duty to any considerations of self or official pride; and there has been no pretense they did not as loyally support Sampson as they would have done had he been their lineal superior officer.

CHAPTER XIV

SAMPSON'S FIRST DAY AS REAR ADMIRAL, COM- MANDER-IN-CHIEF

THE same despatch boat that brought to Captain Sampson his assignment to command as rear admiral brought him also the following telegraphic order:

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 21, 1898.

“SAMPSON, Key West:

“Blockade immediately coast of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda. Blockade Cienfuegos, if it is considered desirable. Issue a proclamation of blockade, covering blockaded ports. Do not bombard, according to my letter of April 6.

“LONG.”

Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, at page 410 of his book, “A Sailor’s Log,” describes the meeting of the captains that was held in the cabin of the flagship *New York*, at which these telegrams were read; and most fitly states the feeling that was inspired in them all by the situation: “Then, with serious and thoughtful faces, we said ‘Good-night’ to the admiral and each other, and returned to our ships.”

It was an occasion for serious thoughtfulness.

In obedience to the last order the fleet with great promptness sailed next morning (22d) at 6.30 A. M. for the coast of Cuba, shaping course for Havana.

At the hour for hoisting colors, Sampson broke out his rear admiral’s flag at the mast-head of his flagship *New York*; and with the inspiring strains of the “Star Spangled Banner” sounding over the sparkling waves of the Gulf Stream, and the roaring

of the guns in salute to his flag, he began the first day of the war with Spain.

The situation was most remarkable and anomalous. Here was a captain in the navy of the United States, lifted over the heads of all the distinguished veterans of the Civil War, rear admirals and commodores put in command of the finest fleet that ever flew the flag of our country, and sailing at the head of that fleet under orders from the President to inaugurate war with Spain.

One would think that he would have been so impressed by the importance and solemnity of the responsibility thus laid upon him, that nothing could or would divert or deter him from the full performance of the duty involved.

Rear Admiral Evans, in his book already referred to, at pages 412 *et seq.* has given such a graphic and full account of the events of that day that I venture to quote from it, and refer the reader to the whole of it. He says:

"In the late afternoon the land about Havana was made out in the distance, and every preparation was made for battle in case the enemy fired at us. Shortly after we sighted the land a vessel was seen, well inshore, attempting to escape to the eastward, and the *New York* left her place in the column, and gave chase, at the same time flying the signal: '*Disregard movements of commander-in-chief.*'"

"I, as next in rank to Sampson, hoisted the guard flag; and, *as* senior officer present, held the fleet to its course, direct for the Morro Castle at the entrance of the harbor of Havana.

"The *New York* soon ran out of sight, and I saw no more of her until about two o'clock the next morning, when she rejoined, having in the meanwhile captured the Spanish steamer *Pedro*, and sent her into Key West as a prize."

Thus that great fleet was in effect abandoned by

its newly made rear admiral commander-in-chief, and the inauguration of the war with Spain was left, by him, to Captain Evans. The latter, as in duty bound, and in accordance with the regulations of the navy, at once assumed the command, and its responsibilities, by virtue of being "the senior officer on the spot."

Captain Evans continues the relation of the methods he pursued, and tells how, like the man who exclaimed, "My soul's in arms and eager for the fray," he "hoped that the Spaniards would fire upon our ships; how some guns were fired, but he saw no splash of the shot, for, unfortunately, none came. They were only signal guns to announce our arrival." And, finally, he says: "I continued on my way and established the blockade, and night settled down. General Blanco and the City of Havana were in a grip that was to make them very tired and hungry before it relaxed."

Evans seems to have been greatly and very properly impressed by the responsibility that rested upon him. He tells of his anxieties while he was on the bridge during the entire night; of having made up his mind that the Spaniards would attempt something in the way of a torpedo attack, and how every breaking sea was, to his imagination, a torpedo boat.

"Shadows that night did strike more terrors
To the soul of Richard than could the substance
Of ten thousand soldiers."

He tells of the signals he made to the fleet during the night, of its prompt maneuvering in obedience thereto, and he winds up his interesting account, by saying:

"Between two or three o'clock in the morning of the 23d the *New York* rejoined, and the responsibilities of command shifted to the able shoulders where it belonged."

That responsibility must therefore have been upon

Evans' shoulders until it shifted back to the "able shoulders" of Sampson.

That Evans had no doubt as to who was in command that day and night is shown by the number of pronouns "I" and "my" which adorn his narrative, there being no less than fourteen of these in a little more than a page of his story.

An interesting question here obtrudes itself. Suppose that during the time that the commander-in-chief was out of sight and signal distance a Spanish fleet or those apprehended torpedo boats could have emerged from Havana and made an attack upon our fleet; suppose that, with Evans in command as "senior line officer on the spot," a great victory—as complete as that secured at Santiago de Cuba on July 3, 1898—had been secured by our fleet: would the honor of such victory have belonged to Sampson, the commander-in-chief, who in his flagship had gone off chasing possible prizes, or would it not have been properly given to Evans, "the senior line officer on the spot," in actual command?

There can be no doubt as to the answer to that question; and those who know "Fighting Bob" know that from his well-known disposition to "claim everything" in sight he would have been prompt and vociferous in claiming, and properly claiming, all the credit and honor that belonged to the commanding officer of the victorious fleet.

When one reads such a statement as that of Evans, one instinctively wonders if there is not some mistake about it.

There is no mistake, however. The story has been carefully verified by myself as to the movements of the *New York*, by examination of her log-book, which tells of her hoisting that signal: "*Disregard movements of commander-in-chief*," and what she did after making that signal, and confirms and verifies Evans' statement.

A digression by way of anticipation may be pardoned at this point of the narrative. That signal, "*Disregard movements of commander-in-chief,*" is the same that was made by Admiral Sampson on the morning of July 3, 1898, when he went away to the eastward to make an official visit to General Shafter at his headquarters up in the country back of Siboney (leaving Commodore Schley in command as "senior line officer on the spot").

Diagram 1

4. To 6. p.m. At 5.05 sighted Spanish Merchantman Pedro,
Left squadron, overhauled and hove to Spanish steamer
Pedro. Sent boarding party in command of Lieutenant
Capehart, who seized her as a prize.
Sighted German Merchantman Remus.

at 6.10 hove herto, and sent boarding party, Miss

Mundy in charge. He was directed to record in this

vessel's log, that the port of Havana was in a state of blockade
very ^{with the appearance of} Diagon

None of the vessels of the fleet were Collegan
at the time of the Capture of Spanish Steamer Pedro. Lieutenant
1572

DIAGRAM I.—“It has not been possible to procure a fac-simile copy, but the appearance of that part of the log-book of the New York for that day is, as nearly as possible, as shown by Diagram I.”

CHAPTER XV

WHAT THE FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK" DID WHILE ABSENT FROM THE FLEET

IT has not been possible to procure a fac-simile copy, but the appearance of that part of the log-book of the *New York* for that day is, as nearly as possible, as shown by Diagram I.

As the log was originally written and signed by Lieutenant Mulligan, it ended with the words "state of blockade," which were at the end of the last line above the line on which his signature was written. The words, "None of the vessels of the fleet were within signal distance at the time of the capture of Spanish steamer *Pedro*," while they are in the same handwriting as that of the rest of the log-book, were evidently written in (as they appear) some time after he signed the log-book, because the ink and pen used were different from those used in writing the body of the remarks. The ink is much darker, the words are not consecutive with the other remarks relating to the capture of the *Pedro*, and, inasmuch as there was no room to write them in between the top of those capitals and the last line above, they had to be run through the top of those capitals as they appear in the log.

It will be natural and proper to ask:

Why did Admiral Sampson, charged as he was with the inauguration of the war with Spain, leave the command of his fleet and the performance of that duty on so important an occasion to one of his subordinates, while he in his flagship went off in chase of a peaceful merchant steamer, to make a prize of her?

He had several light vessels that he might just as well have sent after the *Pedro*.

The suggestion might arise that he was after prize money but for the fact that it made not a cent's difference to him whether the *New York* or some other vessel of his fleet made the capture, because the prize law provided that "the commanding officer of a fleet or squadron shall receive one-twentieth part of all prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his immediate command," and so self-interest could not have been his motive.

But there was another officer on board the *New York* who had a large pecuniary interest at stake, and that was the fleet captain (chief of staff) and also captain of the ship, Captain French E. Chadwick.

The prize law contained a further provision: "The fleet captain shall receive one one-hundredth part of all prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels of the fleet or squadron in which he is serving." Under this provision, if the *New York* had remained with the fleet to do her duty as flagship, and some other of the light cruisers had been sent to make the capture, a beggarly one per cent. would have been all that Chadwick would have been entitled to.

But the prize law contained two other provisions that were of great import to Captain Chadwick. One of these was as follows: "To the commander of a single vessel shall be awarded two-twentieths part of all the prize money awarded to the vessel under his command," etc. The other provision was: "All vessels of the navy within signal distance of the vessel or vessels making the capture shall share in the prize."

Manifestly it was therefore to the interest of Captain Chadwick, first, that the *New York* should chase and capture that prize; and, second, that no other vessel of the fleet should be "within signal distance" at the time of the capture.

The last consideration nicely accounts for that interlineation in the log-book. As a matter of fact the proceeding made a cash difference to Captain Chadwick of more than ten thousand dollars, because the *Pedro* was subsequently condemned and sold as a prize, and the *New York* got all the prize money to the exclusion of the rest of the fleet. They were left to do the duty and reap the glory of inaugurating the Spanish War. The cash profits were the *New York's* alone; and the biggest share went to Captain Chadwick.

Whose was probably the dominant mind on this occasion?

Before leaving this subject, I wish to express my admiration for that most remarkable book, "A Sailor's Log," written by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans. No such entertaining work of "fiction founded on fact" has appeared since the "Tales by the Baron Munchausen" were given to a wondering world. I advise everybody to read it. It will no doubt become a nautical classic for the same reason that the Baron's adventures are so famous, viz., because of the marvelous imagination displayed by its author.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SEARCH FOR CERVERA'S FLEET

THE Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera had rendezvoused at Puerto Grande, in the Island of St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Group, and consisted of the cruisers *Infanta María Teresa* (flagship), *Viscaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and *Cristóbal Colón*, and destroyers *Plutón*, *Furor*, and *Terror*.

This squadron sailed from St. Vincent on April 28, 1898, but its destination not having been given out by Admiral Cervera, the Naval Board set its wits to work to find out where it had gone, but without much success. All that could be learned was that it had "gone to sea," so there was nothing to be done but await its appearance from the "deep bosom of the ocean."

There were several minor engagements between our small ships and batteries on the north side of Cuba, in one of which Ensign Worth Bagley and three enlisted men were killed and several others wounded—the first victims of the war. At other points there was some cable cutting. In all these engagements officers and men displayed great gallantry and skill, as was to be expected from them.

The first operation of any magnitude occurred on May 12, when Admiral Sampson, in his flagship, together with several of the fighting vessels of his fleet under his immediate command, made an attack upon the defenses of San Juan, Porto Rico, lasting about three hours. Concerning this attack, Sampson's report (A. 368)¹ says:

"Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels was in the harbor. I was therefore considerably in doubt whether they had

¹ Appendix to Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1898-9.

reached San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination, or whether they had not arrived. As their capture was the object of the expedition, and it was essential that they should not pass to the westward, I determined to attack the batteries defending the port, in order to develop their positions and strength. Then, without waiting to reduce the city or subject it to a regular bombardment—which would require due notice—turn to the westward. The attack was without result, except that one of our men was killed and seven were wounded.”

How the capture of Cervera's ships was furthered by this attack is difficult to see because it could be seen from Sampson's flagship that Cervera's fleet was not in that port.

On that very day Cervera's squadron arrived off Martinique, sent one of the destroyers (*Terror*) into port for repairs, and passed on towards Curacao, where it arrived on the 14th, on which day Sampson, then on his way back towards Key West, sent from Puerto Plata, San Domingo, to the consul of the United States at Curacao, a cablegram of inquiry as to Cervera's whereabouts. On the 16th, at noon, he received a reply as follows: "*Maria Teresa* and *Viscaya* in harbor coaling. *Oquendo*, *Crisóbal Colón*, *Furor* and *Plutón* outside. Only two admitted at time. Short of coal and provisions; dirty bottoms; and leave 15th at 6 P. M. Destination unknown.”

Sampson also received a cable from the department confirming this news, and also informing him that Schley, with the Flying Squadron, had been ordered south. Schley at the same time received orders to proceed to Key West, but nothing was said to him about Cervera's arrival at either Martinique or Curacao.

In his article published over his own signature in the *Century Magazine* for April, 1899, at page 894, Sampson says: "It now seemed probable that

Cervera's objective was either Santiago or San Juan." On same page he adds: "It is possible that he (Cervera) had learned of our bombardment at San Juan almost at the same time it was taking place, and, if so, that he decided to give up any thought of going to San Juan."

A very probable supposition.

Sampson further says (same page): "This news confirmed in me my previous determination to return to Key West, it seeming to me to be the proper thing to fill up our bunkers, and not to permit Cervera to get between me and Cuba."

This last expression does not appear very lucid. It is quite clear that Sampson could, in thirteen hours, have placed his fleet between Cervera and Cuba, because all he had to do was to run down off Santiago de Cuba, and thence send out his scouts, who would have found Cervera on the 18th without much doubt. But how Cervera could come some 650 miles, pass around the east end of Cuba and get between Sampson and Cuba passes common understanding.

There was absolutely no reason why Sampson, immediately on receipt of the news that Cervera had left Curacao two days previously, should not have gone down off Santiago. His force, consisting of the *New York* (armored cruiser), *Iowa*, and *Indiana* (battleships), *Amphitrite* and *Terror* (monitors), *Detroit*, *Montgomery*, and *Wampatuck* (light cruisers), and torpedo boat *Porter*, was greatly superior in numbers and fighting power to that of Cervera, or even to the Flying Squadron as it was then constituted. And as for coal, his ships had enough in their bunkers to steam back to Key West (a distance of about five hundred miles), which it took nearly three days to do, at a speed of 9.3 an hour. With care they had enough for a week's blockade off Santiago, and within that time colliers could have reached them.

No imputation against Admiral Sampson is intended when I contend that he lost the opportunity of his life when he failed to go down off Santiago, instead of taking his whole force back to Key West, leaving Cervera's way into Santiago clear and unobstructed.

Cervera evidently thought it probable that he would encounter some of our ships on the voyage between Curacao and Santiago, because in the captured log-book of the *Cristóbal Colón* appears the following: "May 17-18—Flagship signaled, 'Admiral intends to make port of Santiago; be prepared for action to-night, in case the enemy appears.'"

We don't know how much Cervera knew of our naval movements, but he knew that, with all the fast vessels we had at command, it was probable that scouting vessels were on the lookout for him.

As soon as Cervera appeared in the West Indies, and the Flying Squadron had been ordered south, Sampson, on May 17, at 6 P. M., received while on his way back to Key West one of its misleading dispatches from the Navy Department, as follows:

"Department has just heard that the Spanish fleet have munitions of war essential to the defense of Havana, and the order of the Spanish fleet is imperative to reach Havana, Cuba, Cienfuegos, or a railroad port connected with Havana, at all hazards; and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, Schley, with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts* and *Texas*, to arrive at Key West morning of 18th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as soon as possible. So Admiral Sampson take or send his most suitable armored ship to join Schley, and hurry with remainder of his heavy ships to Havana blockade."

So strongly was the department impressed with the idea that Cienfuegos was the port Cervera was aiming

to reach, that on the 14th it sent the following order to Sampson (A. 462) :

“On account of presence of Spanish fleet near Curacao, send with all possible dispatch swift vessel to direct all except smallest blockading vessel off Cienfuegos to return to Key West.”

This was done, and Captain McCalla, with his division, promptly abandoned the blockade of Cienfuegos, on May 16, and started for Key West.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FLYING SQUADRON AND SAMPSON ARRIVE AT KEY WEST

THE Flying Squadron arrived at Key West during the night of May 17, some hours in advance of the Navy Department's expectation; and on the morning of the 18th, after saluting the flag of Commodore Remy (who was Schley's senior officer), Schley went on shore to make him an official visit.

While on shore he was informed by several resident Cubans that the province of Cienfuegos was most thoroughly occupied by Spanish troops (I. 1348), and therefore he had best be careful about attempting intercourse with the shore there.

Sampson, in his flagship *New York*, arrived about 4 P. M. of the 18th, and after saluting Sampson's flag Schley went on board to report to him. While there, as would naturally be the case, the two officers discussed the situation, and Sampson showed, or stated to Schley, the contents of a number of despatches or other communications from the Navy Department, including the one last above quoted.

Sampson had that day received the following:

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 17, 1898.

“Flying Squadron, after being increased by the armored vessels commander-in-chief North Atlantic Station considers most suitable, proceed with despatch [utmost] off Cienfuegos. The remainder of the fleet to blockade Havana closely. Sampson to have choice the command of Havana or at Cienfuegos. Schley, in either case, to remain with his own squadron. The commander-in-chief is authorized to make

such change of detail in this plan as he may think proper.

"In general, the object is to engage and capture the enemy off Cienfuegos, if possible; or otherwise blockade him in that port."

Sampson informed Schley that he (Sampson) had chosen the blockade of Havana. He also verbally delivered to Schley the confidential instructions found in the Department's Confidential Circular of April 6 (A. 171), "that our ships were not to be risked against the fortified places on the coast of Cuba until after the Spanish squadron had been disposed of." They looked over charts together, and agreed that Cienfuegos came most directly in accord with Cervera's supposed instructions.

A most remarkable circumstance is that, although Sampson had been informed on the 16th that Cervera's fleet had arrived at Curacao, whence Sampson believed he would make for Santiago de Cuba, he never said a word to Schley about that fact.

Of course, the fact that Sampson was Schley's lineal subordinate officer could not but be in the minds of both of them. Sampson could not very well have asked Schley whether he accepted their new relation. Indeed, there was no occasion to do so, because Schley's salute had done that; but Schley voluntarily said to Sampson that he wanted to assure him "at the outset that he would be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause they were both representing" (I. 1344).

Chadwick, the chief of staff, testified (I. 540): "My only distinct recollection is Commodore Schley's statement to the admiral that he would be perfectly loyal; and that he was very pleased to be under his command; that the admiral could be sure he would be perfectly loyal in all his conduct." But we may doubt whether Schley said he was "very pleased to

be under his junior's command." Schley was not called upon to give any assurances of the kind; and we may be certain that if he had not meant what he said, he would not have said it; and if he had felt pleased to be under Sampson's command he would have said that.

Schley testified before the Court of Inquiry (I. 1344) that at this interview he asked Sampson if any means of communicating with the insurgent Cubans had been established, to which Sampson replied that he did not know; but when he got the situation better in hand he would write him.

Captain Chadwick, before the Court of Inquiry, endeavored to deny much of Schley's statements relative to that interview between Sampson and himself, but most of his denials are of the *non mi ricordo* character. There is every probability that Sampson would do and say what it was his plain duty to do and say in order to give Schley all the information he had, and communicate all instructions he had received from the department which might affect or control the blockade about to be established at Cienfuegos, by the Flying Squadron. It would manifestly have been highly improper for Sampson to send Schley in command of the Flying Squadron on the important duty assigned to it, and leave the commodore in ignorance of anything essential, or which might contribute to the successful performance of that duty. It is not possible to believe that he intentionally did so.

The matter of communication with the friendly insurgent Cubans might become, at any time, of great moment, and what more natural than that Schley should inquire whether any means of such communication had been arranged; and, inasmuch as no such arrangement had been made, that Sampson should reply that he did not know, but would write the commodore when he "got the situation better in hand"?

There was absolutely no reason for anything but the most perfect confidence and frankness between the two officers, and there is no evidence whatever of any lack of such frankness and confidence.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FLYING SQUADRON SAILS FOR CIENFUEGOS

SCHLEY'S SAILING ORDERS

AFTER coaling with prompt rapidity, the Flying Squadron sailed the next day, May 19, between 7 and 8 o'clock A. M., under the following order from Admiral Sampson:

"No. 5. "U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,
KEY WEST, May 19, 1898.

"SIR:—I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from Secretary Long, concerning a vessel which was to sail on the 15th, and carrying a large amount of specie; and is supposed to be going to land it at Trinidad, or to the east of Cienfuegos or even Havana.

"The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with the two torpedo boats following them. As soon as the *Iowa* is coaled, she will follow you.

"It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible.

"Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and finding you on the lookout attempt to come around the island, either east or west, please send me word by the best vessel you have for that purpose as to their direction, that I may be prepared for them at Havana. I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that you may have them to send with messages to me, should you desire to do so. After I have the situa-

tion in hand, I will write you, and give you any information that suggests itself.

“Yours respectfully,

“WILLIAM T. SAMPSON,

“*Rear Admiral,*

“*Commander-in-Chief, N. A. Station.*”

“COMMANDING OFFICER,
“Flying Squadron.”

The important part of the foregoing letter is the sentence: “It is unnecessary for me to state that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible.”

It was a remarkable coincidence that Cervera's squadron entered the harbor of Santiago de Cuba almost at the same hour the same morning that Schley sailed from Key West; and Sampson received the news from the department at 12.30 A. M., of the 20th. He could not therefore have given Schley that information before that time, because he did not have it to give. But as soon as he learned it he should have sent a fast vessel to overtake Schley and give him the information; and, by the same vessel, Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, could have sent the signal system (to be spoken of hereafter) of communication with friendly Cubans about Cienfuegos, which would have enabled Schley to learn, four days before he did, that Cervera's fleet was not at Cienfuegos.

CHAPTER XIX

SCHLEY MEETS M'CALLA'S DIVISION

ON the morning of May 19, a few hours after leaving Key West, the Flying Squadron met the Division of vessels commanded by Captain Bowman H. McCalla, in the *Marblehead*, returning from the blockade of Cienfuegos.

It does not appear that Schley had any knowledge, before this meeting, that McCalla had been at Cienfuegos. McCalla signaled, as is usual on such occasions, for permission to proceed, but he sent one of his vessels (the *Eagle*, commanded by Lieutenant Southerland) to communicate with Commodore Schley "and give him such information as they had." The *Scorpion* (Lieutenant Marix) was sent by Schley to meet the *Eagle*. There was a difference of recollection between these two commanding officers as to what passed between them by means of the megaphone, but Marix, at that time, caused an entry of what Southerland had said, to be made in his log-book. This entry is of course the best evidence. All that was communicated to Schley was that the "message communicated by the commanding officer of the *Eagle*, from Captain McCalla to Commodore Schley, was to the effect that Captain McCalla had left Cienfuegos with his ships, and did not believe that Cervera's fleet had arrived there when the *Marblehead* had left" (I. 500).

An effort was made to show that Schley should have gone after McCalla, to find out if he had communicated all he knew through Southerland; but it is plainly preposterous to claim that a commodore in command of a squadron, or any other superior officer, must himself run after his subordinates for any purpose whatever. He has the right to assume that they,

as is their duty, will give him all the information they have; and they, and not he, will be blamed for any consequences resulting from failure so to do.

There was some peculiar practice by the Judge Advocate of the Court of Inquiry (Captain Samuel C. Lemly) relative to the testimony of Lieutenant Commander Marix, who had commanded the *Scorpion* on the occasion last referred to. The record shows (I. pp. 799-600) that on August 11, 1901, a month before the court convened, the Navy Department, no doubt at the instance of Lemly, had cabled to Rear Admiral Remey, then commanding the Asiatic Fleet, to take the statement of Marix as to the meeting between the *Scorpion* and *Eagle* on May 19, 1898, and cable it to the Department. On August 18 this was done, and Marix's deposition was on that day put into the hands of Lemly. He kept it in his possession, and said nothing about it until October 10—which was the nineteenth day of the sessions of the court. He had put in the testimony of Lieutenant Southerland, to the effect that the latter had told Marix about having communicated with insurgent Cubans near Cienfuegos, and, having Marix' statement to the contrary in his possession, he deliberately suppressed it until Schley's counsel placed him in such a situation that he could no longer withhold it. Then he produced it.

Inasmuch as a court of inquiry is convened only for the purpose of bringing out the whole truth, there can be no justification for keeping back from the court anything bearing upon the subject of inquiry; but if, on the contrary, concealment or perversion of the truth is the object, then holding back evidence is in order; and one of the most efficacious methods that can be employed to that end. Who can doubt that that was the intention of Lemly; or that he would have promptly produced Marix's deposition if it had sustained Southerland? The man who steps into the

open with a false statement is entitled to the credit of manliness; but he who suppresses the truth adds cowardice to his wrongdoing.

After this communication with McCalla's division the latter continued on to Key West, where it arrived about three hours later.

The Flying Squadron continued its voyage towards Cienfuegos, and in the neighborhood of Cape San Antonio fell in with the *Cincinnati*, Captain Colby M. Chester. The latter came on board the *Brooklyn*, and in the interview between him and Commodore Schley, which lasted about an hour, they discussed coaling facilities and possibilities in the waters near Cienfuegos and on the south side of Cuba.

Captain Chester asked that his ship be ordered to continue on with the Flying Squadron, but Schley did not feel authorized to grant Chester's request. The Flying Squadron then continued its way, and at 4.20 P. M., of the 21st, as is recorded in the log-book of the *Brooklyn*, "heard the report of two great guns to Sd & Ed," which was in the direction of Cienfuegos.

Commodore Schley happened to be on deck at the time, and also heard the reports, as he testified (I. 1347), "six or seven, fired with the cadence of a salute." Of course, every indication of that sort suggested the possible presence of the Spanish fleet, since none of our vessels was known to be in that neighborhood.

The squadron arrived as near the port as in the commodore's opinion, prudent navigation at night permitted, at midnight of the 21st, and stopped to await daybreak of the 22d, when it steamed in as near to the entrance of the harbor as was thought proper by the commodore. It certainly would have been very imprudent, with such a fleet, to approach at night an unlighted port with which no one in the fleet was familiar. Any landsman knows that.

CHAPTER XX

THE ALLEGED DELAY IN THE VOYAGE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON FROM KEY WEST TO CIENFUEGOS

It will be remembered that Schley's "sailing orders" from Key West, on May 19, signed by Admiral Sampson, contained the following: "It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible."

Before the Court of Inquiry was organized no official or public criticism of Schley in reference to the speed maintained by the Flying Squadron on its passage from Key West to Cienfuegos had ever been made, and the *Precept under which the court was organized contains no reference to that subject*. But the majority of the court seems to have been so anxious to find something to censure, that they in effect added another count to the Precept; and in order to condemn it was *necessary that the order under which Schley sailed should be misstated*.

In the majority's first "Finding of Fact" they say "Flying Squadron sailed with orders from the Navy Department, and from the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Station, to proceed with despatch [utmost] off Cienfuegos."

Now, the only order that Commodore Schley received before sailing for Cienfuegos was that No. 5, quoted in full on page 69, *and that word "utmost" is not to be found in it*. Indeed, there was not a word of evidence, written or oral, before that court that Schley had *any* order from the Department about going to Cienfuegos; and in fact he had no such order. He testified (I. 1417) that he had never seen the despatch to Sampson containing the word "utmost."

The majority of the court therefore interpolated into Schley's "sailing orders" the important word "utmost" and then proceeded to find fault with him because of it—and this without giving the commodore any opportunity to be heard about it. Nothing could be more unfair and unjust, and that opinion, being without foundation of fact, is mere "*brutum fulmen.*"

Commodore Schley had absolutely no reason or purpose of delay on that passage. On the contrary, he had every motive for all proper haste, and there can be no reasonable doubt that he made all speed consistent with the best results as to keeping his command in the highest condition of efficiency.

An examination of the log-books will show that the speed (ten knots) he maintained on that passage was the same as that subsequently made by the *Iowa* (with the exception of three hours, during which the latter made one knot an hour more), and "perish the thought" that the valiant Captain Robley Dunglison Evans ("Fighting Bob"), who commanded the *Iowa*, did not do *his* utmost to get into the presence of the enemy in the least possible time.

Higher speed, as everybody knows, means greatly increased consumption of coal. The opinion, therefore, of Admiral Dewey, that "the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible despatch, Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers," will stand as the only justifiable opinion. It is common sense as well as good judgment.

CHAPTER XXI

THE BLOCKADE OF CIENFUEGOS BY THE FLYING SQUADRON

ON the forenoon of the 22d the torpedo boat *Dupont*, Lieutenant Wood commanding, arrived from Key West, whence she had sailed May 20, at 11.45 A. M. She brought despatches from Admiral Sampson, but what, Lieutenant Wood didn't know. The lieutenant was worn out by the "great fatigue of commanding officer's service in torpedo boats," saying he was almost exhausted; and hoped that the commodore would give him an opportunity to get four or five hours sleep" (I. 977). Some of his men were temporarily transferred for rest on board the *Brooklyn*, where they remained until the *Dupont* sailed back to Key West on the 24th. Notwithstanding his fatigue and sleepiness, the gallant lieutenant seems to have kept at least one sharp eye on the commodore, and was able, three years later, to give a minute description of what had appeared to him to be the state of the commodore's nerves.

The *Iowa*, Captain Evans, arrived at 1.30 P. M., on the 22d, having left Key West May 20 at 11 A. M. She also brought despatches. None of the testimony makes it clear what despatches these two vessels respectively brought.

As soon as night came on, the commodore arranged his ships in column, with the *Dupont* on picket close to the entrance, and so blockaded the port. Lights on shore were seen that night, but they did not seem to be in the nature of signals, and no one on board the flagship so understood them.

On the morning of the 23d, at 8.15, the torpedo boat *Hawk*, Lieutenant Hood, arrived from Havana,

bringing further despatches from Admiral Sampson; and on the same day the *Castine* and collier *Merrimac* joined. On this day, also, the British steamship *Adula* arrived from Jamaica, and brought report that the Spanish squadron had left Santiago de Cuba on May 20, which was before the Flying Squadron had arrived off Cienfuegos; and, if it had been the fact, Cervera's ships had had time to arrive at Cienfuegos before Schley did.

The *Adula* also reported that on the night of May 18, after she had left Santiago de Cuba bound for Jamaica, she had met seven ships, seventy miles south of Santiago, bound to the northward.

All this tended to convince Schley that Cervera was in the port of Cienfuegos, and he permitted the *Adula* to enter the port upon promise that she would come out next day, when Schley could learn from her passengers whether Cervera was or was not in the port.

Admiral Dewey approved the action of the commodore in permitting the *Adula* to enter, by his finding that "Commodore Schley in permitting the steamer *Adula* to enter the port of Cienfuegos expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish Squadron from her when she came out."

CHAPTER XXII

THE SIGNALS AT CIENFUEGOS ARRANGED BETWEEN CAPTAIN M'CALLA AND INSURGENTS

ON the night of the 23d lights on shore were seen, which were apparently signal lights; but no one on board the flagship knew their significance. So much has been said about these signal lights, in the effort to find fault with Schley for not having understood them, and for not having immediately opened communication with the Cuban friendly insurgents, that a full statement concerning them, when, how, and by whom they were established, and what had been done about them by the various officers who had knowledge of them, is advisable. It furnishes a remarkable illustration of what was a series of blunders that ought never to have been permitted to occur.

It will be remembered that Commodore Schley, while at Key West, had been warned by friendly Cubans that the country around Cienfuegos was most amply supplied by Spanish troops, and that therefore to him every person, certainly every military person thereabout, was presumably a Spaniard.

Captain Bowman H. McCalla, as everyone who knows him is aware, was an officer who, without being in the least foolhardy, was disposed to take rather more than ordinary risks in the performance of any duty laid upon him, or which he thought it incumbent upon him to undertake. He had been blockading Cienfuegos from the 7th to the 16th of May, with a few days interval, and, as he testified before the Court of Inquiry (I. 303), did not make any effort to communicate with people on shore, except one on the east of the port, which failed because there were no Cubans there. In fact he had no such communication until the afternoon of May 15, when a boat was

descried at some distance to the westward of the entrance. The *Eagle* was sent to capture it, which she did. It was found to contain five Cubans of the patriot army, who, as Lieutenant Southerland (A. 350) stated, had "been forty (40) hours in the boat," and they were sent on board the *Marblehead* to Captain McCalla.

The log-book of the latter vessel tells of the sighting of the boat, the sending of the *Eagle* after it, and gives the names and rank of the Cubans who were in it, "bearing a letter from Colonel Rodriguez, commanding (insurgents), requesting arms and ammunition. They had been in the small batteau for 30 hours without food or water."

The *Eagle* was then sent with four of the Cubans to a Cuban camp located thirteen miles to the westward of the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos, and after landing them and six thousand rounds of ammunition, and communicating with Colonel Rodriguez, the Cuban officer in command, she returned.

What further resulted from this visit of the Cubans was stated by Captain McCalla before the Court of Inquiry (I. 277), as follows:

"On the 15th and 16th of May, 1898, I had been in communication with three Cuban officers and two privates, on board the *Marblehead*; and I had arranged with Lieutenant Alvarez, who spoke English very well, a system of signals. In case they wished to communicate with the *Marblehead* there were to be three lights horizontally by night or three horses in line on the beach by day."

Captain McCalla regarded this system of signals, thus arranged, as of such transcendent importance that he locked the knowledge of it up in his own mind, and never made any of his officers acquainted with it; never made any report of it, and never made it known to anyone until after he arrived at Key West, on May 19, when he told Captain Chadwick, the chief

of staff; but he was certain he did not intrust the immense secret to the commander-in-chief. McCalla said before the court: "It was a secret code, arranged by myself, and I did not wish any publicity to be given to this code, in order that the Cubans might not be betrayed." He seems to have had a fear that there might be such betrayal by some of our own people, if the code had been made known to any of them, which, he said, "was a possible feature of the case that was in my [his] own mind at the time."

He testified (I. 305) that when he sent the *Eagle* to communicate with Commodore Schley, on the morning of May 19, he did not give her commanding officer any orders to give the commodore information about the signals, for the reason that he did not wish to communicate it in writing; and he did not know that Commodore Schley was going to Cienfuegos; but that, if he had thought that the commodore was going there, he certainly would have gone alongside the *Brooklyn* and secretly have given Commodore Schley the information about this signal arrangement."

What a pity it was that McCalla, instead of being so suspicious even of his own officers, did not, seeing that the Flying Squadron was on its way towards the locality whence McCalla's division had just been withdrawn, assume that communication with the friendly Cubans might at any time become useful, and therefore give the commodore the means of establishing such communication.

McCalla testified (I. 303) that when he gave the signal code to Chadwick, it was his (McCalla's) purpose that it should go to the commander-in-chief through his chief of staff. Captain Chadwick in his testimony (I. 839) said: "My recollection, of course, is not particularly definite, because I laid no stress upon the matter at all. I did not communicate the signals to anyone, not even to Admiral Sampson."

If he had done so, it is scarcely conceivable that the admiral (who only the day before had been asked by Schley if any means of communication with the friendly Cubans had been arranged, and had replied that "he did not know of any such, but when he got the situation in hand would write to him") would have failed to send off that code, and all the information McCalla possessed, to Schley, by the *Dupont*, when she sailed with other despatches for Schley on the morning of the 20th; or by the *Iowa* (Captain Evans), which sailed the same day. If that had been done, the code would have reached Schley at 8.15 in the forenoon of the 22d, and communication with the Cubans could have been had more than two days before it was, enabling Schley to learn nearly two days and a half earlier than he did, that Cervera was not in the port of Cienfuegos.

It is a curious fact that McCalla, in his communication with the Cubans, should not have learned positively whether or not Cervera was there. But if he acquired such knowledge, he locked that up with the knowledge of the code, and kept such knowledge a secret. If he had told the admiral that fact, Sampson would certainly have told the fact to Schley, and not have left the latter to find it out for himself. And Lieutenant Southerland, though he testified that he had learned it from those Cubans, failed to say anything about it to Marix, when he (Southerland) was sent to tell Commodore Schley all they knew.

As above stated, Captain Chadwick testified that he did not communicate the signals to anyone—in which statement he was wrong. Captain Evans testified that Chadwick told him about them on the 19th or 20th, but gave him no directions to inform Schley about them.

Evans further testified (I. 367) that he did not tell Schley about them: "It never entered my head

that he did not know it. If I had for a moment supposed that Commodore Schley did not have those signals, I would, of course, have given them to him the first thing, instantly on my arrival.¹ I supposed every captain in the fleet had them."

This last supposition was a very natural one, for Evans had the right to suppose that, inasmuch as the chief of staff had given him the knowledge of the code, he had also sent it to Schley.

It seems peculiar that, knowing through the signals that the insurgents wished to communicate with the squadron, and seeing that Commodore Schley paid no attention to the signals, Evans should have rested tranquilly, without venturing to inquire whether the commodore knew or not. It was another act in the "comedy of errors" in which they were all playing parts.

From all the foregoing it is quite evident that Commodore Schley cannot possibly be faulted for not knowing what had been imparted only to McCalla, Chadwick, and Evans. No reason can be found why McCalla should have been so suspicious of his own officers, for the whole signal system of the navy is accessible to at least the commanding and signal officers of every ship. There was no reason why McCalla should not have assumed that the Flying Squadron was going where the knowledge of the signals might be useful, and have informed Schley about them. It was right that McCalla should have given the code to Chadwick, and it was plainly culpable in Chadwick not to inform Sampson, as it was his clear duty to do.

Even when McCalla came on board the *Brooklyn* at Cienfuegos, on the 24th, he seems to have been still so oppressed by his self-imposed burden of secrecy that he forgot to mention the signals to the commodore.

¹ Which would have been exactly proper.

Captain Cook (I. 884) in his testimony said: "I was present during a portion of the interview between Captain McCalla and the commodore. They talked on various subjects at first. I think Captain McCalla told him that he had brought mining material for the insurgents, and he was going to communicate with the insurgent camp. That brought up the conversation about the camp, and where it was. Then the commodore said to him: 'We have had three lights, one ahead of the other here, that we cannot make out; and I believe it is something in connection with the Spanish fleet.' Captain McCalla gave a start, threw up his hands, and said: 'Why, Commodore, that is the signal from the insurgent camp. They want to communicate with you. I can go and find out at once.' So the commodore told him to go. He said: 'Get off as soon as possible, and if you can send a party across, send them; and let me know as soon as possible.'"

McCalla went off at once, communicated with the insurgents, and returned at 4 P. M., with information that Cervera's fleet was not in the port.

If they had all intended not to do anything that would help the commodore to the knowledge of those signals, they could not have more effectually accomplished their purpose than was done apparently by accident.

The chief of staff (Chadwick) was strangely derelict in the matter. It was of the greatest importance that Schley should be able to communicate with those friendly insurgents, and, when Chadwick learned about them, he should have sent them as soon as possible to Schley. If they had gone by the *Dupont* they would have reached the commodore at 8.15 A. M. of the 22d; and if she had been sent off with the signals on the afternoon of the 19th she would have overtaken Schley before he reached Cienfuegos, and he

could have known on the 21st that Cervera was not in that port.

There is one thing made apparent by the action of the chief of staff, viz., that in that early stage of the campaign he had become accustomed to determine for himself what information should be given to the commander-in-chief, and what should be imparted to the commanders of squadrons, divisions, and single ships of the fleet.

CHAPTER XXIII

DESPATCHES RECEIVED BY SCHLEY AT CIENFUEGOS

OF the despatches received by Commodore Schley while at Cienfuegos, the first, in numerical order was:

"No. 6.

"U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

"KEY WEST, May 19, 1898.

"SIR:—I enclose copy of a memorandum from Commander McCalla.

"2. You will take steps to prevent the enemy from continuing work on the new fortifications mentioned therein.

"3. There is a rumor, by way of Havana, that the Spanish squadron has put into Santiago.

"Very respectfully,

"W. T. SAMPSON,

"*Rear Admiral.*"

An indorsement, made at the time by a receiving stamp, shows that No. 6 was received on board the *Brooklyn* at 8.15 A. M., May 23, 1898, which was the time at which the *Hawk* arrived.

The memorandum enclosed was as follows:

"A good landing place for troops has been found 13½ miles West of Savanilla Point. The Spanish force about Cienfuegos is reported, on good authority, to be between 4,000 and 5,000 men. The Cuban force, only part of which is armed, is between 2,000 and 3,000 men. The Cubans need arms for 2,000 men; and munitions for the whole number. I was informed that the Cubans have perfect knowledge of what was going on in Cienfuegos, and that a force

of our men could be taken to Cienfuegos without the knowledge of the Spanish force within that city. About 1,500 men are said to be kept within the vicinity of the castle. The only battery which fired on the ships at all was made of the old guns in the castle.

"They have modern guns, 6 in. and 8 in., I am told, but not mounted five days ago.

"An emplacement is being built on the hill above the castle. A line passing through the new emplacement and the castle leads down the middle of the river to the sea. There was working a force of men on the ground immediately below the castle, and I was told that a water battery was being erected there. It is possible that since the attempt to cut the cables a masked battery of small calibre is being erected on Colorados Point. The insurgents want dynamite to destroy the railway. I asked them to devote their efforts to cutting telegraph communication between Havana and Cienfuegos. They report that the wires are repaired as fast as destroyed; while the railroad is intact. The Cuban forces in the San Juan mountains control the highway between Cienfuegos and Trinidad, so that provisions cannot be sent between those places. Troops must be prepared for rain every day. No resources in the country; all destroyed. Fair road leading from landing point to Cienfuegos."

It is quite certain, though McCalla does not say so, that all the information contained in this memorandum was given to him by those five Cubans who came off in that boat on the 16th of May; but the memorandum is marked by indefiniteness, where it might as well have been definite. If, at the end of the first sentence, McCalla had inserted the words "where the insurgents can be communicated with," Schley could have had communication with them forty-eight hours sooner than he did.

“If,” most pregnant of words!

It will be considered that all this business was a new experience to the actors, and that no one could foresee the importance of little matters, or words left out of or inserted in despatches, which had a significance not then apparent, but which we now know were afterwards to be held, as against the commodore, to be of the greatest possible import.

CHAPTER XXIV

DESPATCH NO. 7

DESPATCH NO. 7 is of so great importance that its consideration deserves a chapter to itself. It is as follows, viz :

“No. 7. “U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,
 “KEY WEST, May 20, 1898.

“DEAR SCHLEY :

“The *Iowa* leaves this morning at 11 o'clock, bound for Cienfuegos. The collier *Merrimac*, in company with the *Castine*, is also bound for Cienfuegos. The *Marblehead* and *Eagle* will both be ready to depart to-night to join you.

“Enclosed is a copy of a telegram received at Key West dated May 19, marked *A*.¹

“A. The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct; so the department strongly advises that you send word immediately by the *Iowa*, to Schley, to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the department will send the *Minneapolis*, now at St. Thomas, Auxiliary No. 461, to proceed at once off Santiago, to join Schley, who should keep up communication *via* Mole, Haiti, or Cape Haitien, Haiti. If the *Iowa* has gone, send order Schley, by your fastest despatch vessel.” “LONG.”

“*After considering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plan; that is, that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos.*”² If the

¹ This telegram is here inserted for convenience.—J. P.

² The italics throughout are, of course, mine.—J. P.

Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must come either to Habana or Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba.

"I therefore am of the opinion that our best chance of success in capturing these ships will be to *hold the two points—Cienfuegos and Habana*—with all the force we can muster. *If* later it should develop that these vessels *are* at Santiago, we can *then* assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose, and completely blockade it.

"*Until we then receive more positive information, we shall continue to hold Habana and Santiago*³ [*sic*].

"I enclose a copy of a telegram received at Key West May 19, marked B. With regard to this second telegram, in which the consul at Cape Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix, on May 17, reports two ships, etc., it is probably of no importance, and the vessels referred to may have been our own ships. The statement made by the United States minister at Venezuela, contained in telegram of same date, is probably not true, because these ships are reported to have left Curacao at 6 P. M. on the 16th. If they were seen on the 17th, apparently heading for the French West Indies, *they could not possibly be at Santiago de Cuba as early as the 18th, as reported.*

"From the first cablegram, marked 'A' it will be seen that the department has ordered the cruiser *Minneapolis* and Auxiliary No. 461 to proceed for Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please send the *Scorpion* to communicate with those vessels at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to the department from Nicholas Mole or Cape Haitien the change I have made in the plan 'strongly advised' by the department. As soon as this vessel has communicated with the Department, let her return to

³This word "Santiago" evidently should be "Cienfuegos."

Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs, and report immediately at Habana or Cienfuegos, as he may think most advantageous.

“Very respectfully,

“W. T. SAMPSON,

“*Rear Admiral, etc.*”

“COMMODORE W. S. SCHLEY,

“*Commanding Flying Squadron.*”

Enclosure B. “The United States consul at Cape Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix, Haiti, on May 17, reports two Spanish ships cruising off Mole every night two weeks. The United States minister to Venezuela says that cable employee reports, confidentially, Spanish ships of war seen May 17, apparently heading for West Indies, French.

“LONG.”

Duplicates of No. 7, with enclosures, were sent to Schley by different vessels, and were probably received the one on the 22d and the other on the 23d.

No. 7 is an almost personal letter, beginning “Dear Schley,” instead of with the formal “Sir” usual in official communications. This beginning shows that up to that time only the most kindly feeling and confidence animated both officers. The only positive thing that the letter contains is the statement, thrice made, that notwithstanding the Department “strongly advised that Schley be sent with his whole squadron off Santiago de Cuba,” Sampson would adhere to the plan already adopted, viz., that Schley should continue the blockade of Cienfuegos, while Sampson continued that of Havana.

And, as for the uncertainties that pervaded the despatch: “*If the Spaniards have put into Santiago.*” “*If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago,*” etc. “*Until we then receive more positive*

information." "They could not possibly be at Santiago de Cuba as early as the 18th, as reported."⁴

One of these two copies of No. 7 had been copied into a letter-press copying book, and contained an interlined word in ink, over an erasure. When they came to be made up, sheets of the two were mixed up and the interlined word was left out of the one copy, showing that the business methods of the staff were none too carefully conducted.

Another peculiarity of No. 7 is that it directs Schley to send the *Scorpion* off Santiago de Cuba, with instructions to direct the captain of another vessel, which the department had ordered to join Schley there, to go to Mole St. Nicholas, and thence inform the department of the change that he (Sampson) had made in the plan "strongly advised" by the department.

Why Sampson should have taken this roundabout and expensive and slow way to do this, when he was at Key West, in telegraphic communication with the department, is one of the things "that no fellow can find out," as Lord Dundreary expresses it. Perhaps, as he couldn't cut the connection with that famous "War Board," he took that method of keeping it in the dark as long as possible.

There must have been some divided counsel about it, because, oddly enough, that very evening, after sending off No. 7 to Schley, the Navy Department was telegraphed to, as follows (A. 465):

"Replying to department's telegram of the 20th: After duly considering the information contained, I have decided to follow the plans already adopted, to hold position Cienfuegos with *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, and the *Iowa*, *Marblehead*, *Castine*, and *Dupont*, and two auxiliaries. There remain *New York*, *Indiana*, and monitors for Havana. The latter

⁴ All italics are mine.—J. P.

very inefficient, and should not be sent from base. Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliaries at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to department from Mole or Cape Haitien; then to return to Santiago and report further at Cienfuegos or Havana, as he thinks best. Plan may be *changed when it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago.*"

Comparing this telegram with No. 7 an important difference will be observed. In No. 7 Schley was directed to "send the *Scorpion* to communicate with those auxiliaries at Santiago, and direct one of them to 'report to the department the *change I have made in the plan*' '*strongly advised*' by the department." The important words in italics are omitted.

Someone of the staff, in his testimony, called this a "paraphrase" of No. 7. Paraphrase is a new definition of omission; and why publish a paraphrase when the original is to be had, unless it is desired to conceal the original which may be part of No. 7?

CHAPTER XXV

THE REMARKABLE ELUSIVENESS FROM PUBLICITY OF DESPATCH NO. 7.

A VERY remarkable characteristic of that Despatch No. 7, and its predecessor No. 6, has been their elusiveness from publicity.

Rear Admiral Sampson made up a long "Report of Operations of North Atlantic Fleet," dated from Guantanamo, August 3, 1898 (just one month after the Battle of Santiago), which covers forty-seven pages of the Appendix (A. 458-505). This report gives a copy of every letter and telegram sent and received by him relative to those operations, no matter how long or short or apparently unimportant, up to July 3, 1898, *except those important two, Nos. 6 and 7, which managed to get omitted*; but the memorandum enclosed in No. 6 was put into the report.

It is not suggested that Sampson was knowingly privy to those omissions. Such reports are generally compiled by the staff of the commander-in-chief, who must trust them to make a correct compilation. He could not be expected to keep in mind all the despatches he had sent and received, or personally make the compilation.

The reason for omission of those two despatches is apparent enough, for *they are a complete justification of Schley's remaining at Cienfuegos as long as he did*. And a reason for publishing the memorandum taken out of No. 6 is just as apparent, *for it could be used, as it subsequently was, against Schley*.

By the time (August 3) that report came to be made by Sampson, the Sampson-Schley controversy was raging, and every possible effort was being made to throw odium upon Schley. To this end the "*sup-*

pressio veri" was more efficacious than the "*suggestio falsi*," because harder to detect and expose.

The letter-press copybook of the commander-in-chief (as already stated) contains a copy of No. 7, and the latter is too long and important to have been accidentally overlooked. It shows upon its face that it was copied into such book, and *that letter-book was in possession of and kept by the staff*. The commander-in-chief would never see it except as he might call for it to clear up some doubt as to the contents of some letter that had been sent off.

To say that such an important despatch in the interest of a truthful account of Schley's conduct of the Flying Squadron was accidentally omitted by those who made up the report of the commander-in-chief, is an excuse rather more culpable and reprehensible than intentional concealment, and it requires rather more credulity than the average man possesses to believe that it was innocently done.

Schley brought No. 7 out for the first time by his letter to the Senate of the United States (Ex. Doc. D. p. 62), but the Department seized it and put it back in its secret files, whence, so far as the Department could control, it has never since been allowed to escape into the light of day, except when brought out by Schley's counsel's demand, before the Court of Inquiry.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE NOMINATIONS OF SCHLEY AND SAMPSON FOR PROMOTION

MORE, however, remains to be told of the elusiveness of No. 7 from publicity. On August 11, 1898, President McKinley advanced Schley six numbers and Sampson eight, and gave them each an *ad interim* commission as rear admiral. This placed Sampson one number above Schley on the Navy List, whereas he had theretofore been two numbers below Schley.

Schley's commission, among other formal things, contained the following:

WILLIAM MCKINLEY

President of the United States of America

To All to Whom These Presents May Come:

Know ye, That, reposing special Trust and Confidence in the Patriotism, Fidelity and Abilities of

WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY,

I do advance him Six numbers, and appoint him a Rear Admiral in the Navy, for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle, from the 10th day of August, 1898, in the service of the United States.

* * * * *

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President,
JOHN D. LONG,
Secretary of the Navy.

In addition to this promotion, President McKinley had appointed Rear Admiral Schley as one of the commissioners to receive from the Spanish authorities in Porto Rico the surrender of that island and all governmental property therein. Schley most efficiently performed the duties thus imposed.

Admiral Sampson was advanced by the President eight numbers and nominated to be rear admiral. The writer has never seen a copy of Sampson's *ad interim* commission, but the President could hardly have promoted him for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle," because he had never been in any battle. He was also honored by appointment as one of the commissioners to receive the surrender of Cuba.

On December 7, 1898, Schley and Sampson were both nominated to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent to their advancement and promotion, Sampson's proposed promotion being such as to place him one number on the Navy List ahead of Schley, whereas up to that time Sampson had been two numbers below Schley, as already stated.

By these several appointments and proposed promotions President McKinley set the seal of his approval upon Schley's conduct up to that time.

When the Senate came to consider the promotions, the absurdity of promoting Sampson over Schley was so apparent that the Senate, on January 23, 1899, in executive session (Ex. Doc. C. 1)

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is, hereby directed to furnish the Senate with the facts and military records in the possession of his department affecting the proposal that, under Section 1506 of the Revised Statutes, Commodore Sampson be advanced eight numbers; and Commodore Schley six numbers; and the same information with respect to other nominations for promotion under the same section, and Section 1905, which were sent to the

Senate with the above nominations, on December 7, 1898."

Secretary Long thereupon appointed a board of officers to make up such "facts and military records"; but instead of appointing on that board impartial members senior to both Schley and Sampson, he appointed Captains Robley D. Evans and Henry C. Taylor (Evans's brother-in-law), who, as was well known, were two of Schley's most pronounced critics. To assist them he named Ensign Henry H. Ward, another of the same sort, and then, to give an appearance of fairness, placed on the board Lieutenant James H. Sears, Schley's former flag lieutenant and devoted friend.

No more unseemly, not to say scandalous (in a military sense) act was ever done than the appointment of that board, and for the two following reasons:

First—It is a universal rule of the military and naval services that no inferior shall ever, except in case of absolute necessity, be allowed to sit in judgment upon a superior officer, or express any opinion upon the conduct of such superior.

Admiral Dewey, as president of the Court of Inquiry, speaking for the court, stated the rule (I. 291): "We have twice ruled that questions calling for the opinions of a junior on the actions of a senior ought not to be asked."

Second—Not one of those officers should have been appointed: Evans and Taylor because of their well-known antagonism to Schley, and their inferiority in rank to him, and also because the record they were to make up was to affect their own promotions then pending before the Senate; Sears because he was an ardent friend of Schley, and Ward because he was the superserviceable servant of Schley's enemies.

There were plenty of officers from whom the mem-

bers of the board could and should have been selected—all senior to those who were to be affected by the report.

That board made up the record as unfavorably to Schley as they possibly could, and the Secretary of the Navy sent it to the Senate to be considered by that body, in secret session (as he supposed it would be), with the statement that “the board report that the facts as therein stated correspond with the facts and military records in the possession of the Department.”

But the Secretary failed to inform the Senate that Lieutenant Sears had made up an additional, and, in some particulars, contradictory report, and upon asking if he might send it to the department, was informed that he might so send it, but that it would not be sent to the Senate as part of the board’s report.

What could a mere lieutenant do against three others, two of whom were captains, whose nominations were also to be affected by the military records upon which they themselves were reporting?

The board had unlimited access to every record of the department, every paper that had been sent it by Schley or Sampson, and at Sampson’s letter-books. But of course they accidentally or purposely failed to send, as part of the record, Dispatches Nos. 6 and 7, although copies of these were in Sampson’s letter-books. Schley’s report of May 30 (A. 402) also contains reference to Despatch No. 7, as follows: “That day (May 22) the *Dupont* joined me with despatches from Admiral Sampson, directing that the blockade of Cienfuegos be preserved, and that the *Scorpion* be sent to communicate with the *Minneapolis* and *Harvard*, off Santiago.”

When this precious report reached the Senate, the overwhelming majority of that body considered it so unjust to permit an honorable officer thus to be, as it were, stabbed in the back and in the dark, that the injunction of secrecy was removed and a copy of the

report, and of Secretary Long's letter which accompanied it, was sent to Schley by the Committee on Naval Affairs, with the request that he would make such communication to the Senate as he might desire.

In Schley's reply (I. pp. 1661-1663) sent to the Senate under date of February 18, 1899, No. 7 was for the first time made public.

It would have slept in some unapproachable stow-hole of the Department until the present hour but for its production by the commodore, for *the department has never yet published it among the other records of the Spanish War.*

Its production by the commodore was what in old times was called a "shot betwixt wind and water." A blunderbuss fired at a flock of wild ducks would not have produced a greater sensation among the ducks than did Despatch No. 7 among Schley's enemies in the Navy Department.

The Secretary made haste to deny that the department had suppressed the despatch. Well, nobody had charged that it had suppressed it. Schley stated that it had not been published, which was a fact, but charged nobody with suppressing it. "*Qui s'excuse, s'accuse*" seems not inapplicable. The Secretary should have been above any such suppression, but there were plenty of malicious ones surrounding him who were none too scrupulous about use of means to discredit Schley.

In this connection, however, it is a noticeable fact, which compels some doubt of the accuracy of Mr. Long's disclaimer, to find that in his book, since printed, he makes no reference to Despatch No. 7, and thus virtually suppresses it, although he makes effort to show that Schley's delay off Cienfuegos was unwarranted.

Ought one who intends to be fair, to suppress or keep back any of the orders under which the commodore acted? Only one answer can properly be given—Certainly not.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BLOCKADE OFF CIENFUEGOS CONTINUED

IT would seem, from the indorsements made on them at the time by the commodore's secretary (Lieutenant Wells), that the same vessel that brought the second copy of No. 7 also brought No. 8, which was as follows:

"No. 8 (Received May 23, 8.15 A. M.).

"U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

"KEY WEST, May 21, 1898.

"SIR:—1. Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba—four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers. *If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos¹*, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and *if the enemy is there*, blockade him in port.

"You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—fishermen and others—to learn definitely that the ships are in that port, it being impossible to see into it from outside.

"2. When the instructions sent by the *Iowa* and *Dupont* (duplicates) were written, I supposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since learned that they have been ordered by the department to get in touch with the Spanish fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicholas Mole.

¹The italics are all mine.—J. P.

"3. Report from Nicholas Mole.

"Very respectfully,

"W. T. SAMPSON,

"*Rear Admiral*

"*Commander-in-Chief.*

"THE COMMODORE,
"Flying Squadron."

The fact that the department had sent scouts to get in "touch with the Spaniards on the north coast of Venezuela" was another exhibition of its uncertainty of the whereabouts of Cervera.

The commodore received at the same time with No. 8, the Memorandum following, viz :

"It is thought that the enclosed instructions will reach you by 2 A. M., May 23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago, A. M., May 24. It is thought the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make, and coal to take.

"The *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis* have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes westward, one is to keep in touch, and one is to go west and meet you.

"If the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep in touch, and the other will go into Nicholas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cay Francis, two hundred miles east of Habana. If you arrive off Santiago, and no scout meets you, send a vessel to call at Nicholas Mole, and get information to be left there by scout as to direction taken by Spanish in case they have left Santiago de Cuba.

"The *Yale* has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel, until May 24. It is thought possible that the squadron, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there. If this word

does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real direction as much as possible.

"Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they may take.

"W. T. SAMPSON, *Rear Admiral*.

"THE COMMODORE,
"Flying Squadron."

In manuscript on the margin of the above memorandum is the following:

"Our experience has been that ships may be traced by their smoke from twenty to thirty miles, and it is suggested in case you leave in the daytime to stand a good distance to the westward before turning to the eastward."

As has already been shown by endorsements on them, these two papers came together, and were received at 8.15 A. M., several hours after daylight of the 23d. The manuscript suggestion on the memorandum was childlike. No one of any sense whatever would have left that blockade in the daytime.

In addition to the direction contained in No. 7 to Schley, to "Hold his squadron off Cienfuegos," another condition was now imposed by No. 8, requiring him to leave for Santiago de Cuba, only when he was "*satisfied that the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos.*"

Suppose he had gone away without satisfying himself, and that the Spaniards had been left in that port; and, after Schley's departure, had come out and run the blockade into Havana, which, with Sampson two hundred miles to the east, at Cay Francis, there would have been no difficulty in doing, what a howl of criticism would have been raised about it!

On that same day the British steamer *Adula* appeared with her budget of conflicting reports, and Schley, who up to that moment had nothing but un-

certainties from Sampson and the department about Cervera's whereabouts, was not satisfied that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos.

Availing himself of the *Adula*, he permitted her to go into the port under promise to come out next day, so that he could get from her passengers information as to whether Cervera was there or not.

Admiral Dewey commended Schley for this action (I. 1830), saying, "Commodore Schley, in permitting the British steamer *Adula* to enter the port of Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish squadron from her when she came out."

It will be remembered that up to this time knowledge of the code of signals that Captain McCalla had arranged with the Cubans near Cienfuegos was still slumbering peacefully in the mind of Captain Robley D. Evans, who, when informed that the signals had been made, knew that the Cubans were asking to be allowed to communicate with the commodore, and who, although he saw that no attention was paid to the request by the commodore, let the knowledge slumber on.

On the 23d the commodore sent to Admiral Sampson the following despatches:

"M. 43.

"U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,

"OFF CIENFUEGOS, May 23, 1898.

"SIR:—In reply to your letter No. 8 I would state that I am by no means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported *via* Havana, no doubt as a ruse.

"I shall therefore remain off this port with this

squadron, availing myself of every opportunity for coaling, and keeping it ready for any emergency.

"Regarding the enclosed information from Commander McCalla, I would state that I went twice yesterday close to the mouth of the harbor, the first time about two thousand yards, and the second time about fourteen hundred yards, but saw no evidence of any masked batteries near the entrance.

"Well up the river, across their torpedo mine fields, now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a new battery constructed, hardly within range from the mouth of the river.

"The *Castine*, *Merrimac*, and *Hawk* arrived this morning, and I send the *Hawk* back with these despatches.

"Last night I sent the *Scorpion* East to Santiago de Cuba, to communicate with the scouts off that port, with instructions if they were not there, to return to me at once here, and I expect her back day after to-morrow. I am further satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos or Havana.

"This point, being in communication with Havana, would be better for their purposes, if it were left exposed; and I think that we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana, which is, no doubt, sent out for the purpose of misleading us.

"*Iowa* is coaling to-day, having reached this station with only about half of her coal supply.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore, &c.

"TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF."

The commodore also sent to Admiral Sampson the following:

"M. 44.

"U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,

"OFF CIENFUEGOS, May 23, 1898.

"SIR:—Steamer *Adula*, chartered by Consul Dent, with proper papers from U. S. State Department, to carry neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped off this port this morning. She had no cargo, and was permitted to enter. She reports that she left Santiago de Cuba at 4.30 P. M., May 18, and that night she saw the lights of seven vessels, seventy miles to the southward of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, May 19, at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at Santiago. Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to have left Santiago. Now, on Saturday, May 21, when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard from the bridge of this vessel firing of guns towards Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet; and the news this morning by the *Adula* convinces me that the fleet is here.

"Latest war bulletin from Jamaica, received this morning, asserts that the fleet has left Santiago. I think them here, almost to a certainty.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore, &c.

"TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF."

One who reads the foregoing despatches from Commodore Schley to Admiral Sampson cannot but be struck with the doubtfulness and uncertainty that pervade them. There is nothing positive in any of Schley's expressions, but, on the contrary, many expressions of doubt whether the Spaniards were at Santiago de Cuba.

Remembering that the only information received through Sampson as to the whereabouts of Cervera had come through Spanish sources, and what Schley knew in addition was what the *Adula* had brought

him, can there be any doubt that he was correct in saying in No. 43, to Sampson, "It would be extremely unwise to chase a probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse"; and "I think we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana, which is, no doubt, sent out for the purpose of misleading us"?

If Admiral Sampson had thought it advisable to change the "plan strongly advised by the department," all he had to do was to give Schley a positive order to leave Cienfuegos and go off to Santiago de Cuba. He was wise not to do this, leaving to Schley, who was on the spot, the responsibility of finding out whether Cervera was at Cienfuegos.

The Navy Department's despatch said, "The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct." Yes, so it might; and it might just as well be incorrect.

On May 22 Sampson issued to that part of his fleet on the north coast of Cuba, then off Havana, an "Order of Battle" (A. 469), which he began as follows:

"It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now off Havana will meet the Spanish ships [naming them].

"These vessels are *supposed* to be now in Santiago de Cuba, where they are taking coal and provisions. The squadron of Commodore Schley will probably leave Cienfuegos to-morrow, bound east in pursuit of the Spanish ships; and it is anticipated that they will leave Santiago de Cuba on the same day that Commodore Schley leaves Cienfuegos, to reach Havana by north coast of Cuba; in which case the blockading squadron off Havana will attempt to intercept them, by going east about two hundred miles beyond the junction of the Santaren and Nicholas channels. The object in view (A. 470) is to occupy the Nicholas

Channel in such manner as to prevent the approach of the Spanish squadron from the east towards Havana."

On the morning of the 24th he received from the Navy Department the despatch following:

"WASHINGTON, May 23.

"The information of the department all *goes to indicate* that the principal aim of the Spanish fleet and government is to introduce a supply of munitions of war and food to Blanco by Havana and Cienfuegos. This is for your information.

"ALLEN, *Assist. Secy.*"

"Cienfuegos!" "Cienfuegos!" "Cienfuegos!" was always the cry.

Schley's despatches, M. 43 and M. 44, above given in full, were sent to Admiral Sampson by the *Hawk*, delivered by her commander to the *Dolphin*, and by the latter vessel were delivered on board the flagship *New York*, at some distance to the eastward of Havana, on the 26th of May. When these despatches were received the situation was naturally and properly discussed in the cabin of the flagship *New York* between the admiral and other officers of rank.

From an officer of high rank (whose declarations import, in the navy, absolute verity) the following statement has been received:

"There were present, besides myself, Admiral Sampson, Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, and perhaps others. Chadwick was animadverting upon Schley's proposed delay at Cienfuegos. I said: 'Let us see the orders that have been sent to him.' These were brought in, and as they were read aloud I saw a surprised look come into Chadwick's face, and he said to the admiral, 'I didn't know that you had sent such

orders to Commodore Schley.' 'Yes,' replied the admiral, 'he is only obeying his orders.' "

Captain Chadwick testified before the Court of Inquiry (I. 854) relative to that Order No. 8,—which, it will be remembered, contained the instruction: "If you are satisfied that they [the Spanish fleet] are not at Cienfuegos, then proceed, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba"—"I did not read the original despatch until the answer was brought by the *Hawk*. That was on May 26, when the ship [*New York*] was at a point between Havana and Cay Francis, and in the vicinity of Cay Pedros."

Chadwick thus partly confirms the statement above.

The impartial mind, in view of the foregoing, will be satisfied that Commodore Schley was right in doing just what he did—to obey in letter and spirit the orders he had received from Rear Admiral Sampson with regard to remaining off Cienfuegos, until he (Schley) was "satisfied that the Spanish ships were *not* there, and then proceed, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba."

Having finally learned from Captain McCalla the significance of the signals that he had noted along shore for some time, Schley promptly sent the *Marblehead* and *Eagle* to communicate with the Cubans, from whom it was definitely learned that Cervera's fleet was not in that port. The vessels did not get back until about 4 o'clock P. M. Commodore Schley then wrote to Commodore Remey, at Key West, that he would leave for Santiago de Cuba next day (25th); but instead, as soon as night set in, having meanwhile arranged his squadron for the purpose, he started at about 8 o'clock P. M. of the 24th, for that port. That he had a right to change his mind about the time he would leave Cienfuegos cannot be questioned, and particularly when the change was for an earlier departure.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CHARACTER OF SCHLEY'S BLOCKADE OF CIENFUEGOS

THE majority of the Court of Inquiry expressed the opinion that "Commodore Schley should have maintained a close blockade of that port" (Cienfuegos). They do not say that the blockade was not effective. All authorities agree, however, that if a blockade is "effective," it is a "close blockade."

What constitutes an effective or "close blockade" has been much discussed by writers on international law, but the following from the work of Rear Admiral Henry Glass, of the Navy, is as clear a statement of the requisites of a "close" (in the sense of effective) "blockade" as can be found:

"The doctrine of the Paris Conference of 1856, that blockades, to be obligatory, are to be effective; that is to say, maintained by a sufficient force to shut out the access of the enemy's ships and other vessels in reality, is now a recognized principle of international law."

Mr. Madison, Secretary of State under Thomas Jefferson, stated to our minister to England, Mr. Charles Pinckney that "the law requires that to constitute a blockade there should be the presence and position of a force rendering access to the prohibited place manifestly difficult and dangerous."

The Navy Department instructed the flag officer commanding the United States naval force in the Pacific in 1846 that "a lawful maritime blockade requires the actual presence of a sufficient force situated at the entrance of the ports sufficiently near to prevent communication."

Admiral Glass further says: "The doctrine that

has been laid down by the English and American courts, which is approved by English and American writers, and which is embodied in the policy of both countries, requires that the place shall be watched by a force sufficient to render the egress or ingress dangerous; or, in other words, sufficient to render the capture of vessels attempting to go in or come out most probable."

Admiral Sampson himself issued to his fleet "Squadron General Order No. 10," in which he says (A. 168): "A blockade, to be effective and binding, must be maintained by a force sufficient to render ingress to, or egress from, the port dangerous."

Tested by these principles and definitions, the opinion expressed by Admiral Dewey, that "the blockade of Cienfuegos was effective," has common sense as well as international law to back it, while the opinion of Admirals Benham and Ramsay is without warrant of either.

During his three days there Commodore Schley, in the daytime, let his vessels "loll about" in positions near the entrance where they could be seen, so as to give the impression of a want of preparation for battle, in hopes that the enemy might thereby be tempted to come out. When night came they were formed in line of battle, in complete readiness, with the lighter vessels that he had available, on picket duty, much nearer to the entrance.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE VOYAGE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON FROM CIENFUEGOS TO SANTIAGO

IT will be remembered that Order No. 8 of the commander-in-chief to Commodore Schley was (A. 466): "Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba. If you are satisfied they are not in Cienfuegos proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in port."

And in his memorandum he added: "Follow the Spanish squadron, whichever direction they take."

It is a fact of some significance that up to this time the Flying Squadron had never been formally placed under the command of Sampson; but on May 24, 1898, this telegram was sent to Sampson, by the Navy Department: "Until further orders the Flying Squadron is under your orders, and Schley will be so informed.—LONG."

And to Schley: "Till further orders the Flying Squadron is under the orders of Sampson, Commander-in-Chief North Atlantic Station.—LONG."

Schley did not receive this order until after his arrival off Santiago de Cuba, but he had already, on the 18th of May, and since, recognized Sampson as his commanding officer.

The evidence and log-books of the vessels show that on the voyage towards Santiago de Cuba the commodore proceeded as fast as he could and yet maintain the integrity of his squadron; that is to say, without abandoning his smaller vessels and the collier *Merrimac*. The distance was about 340 nautical miles.

Admiral Sampson, in his *Century* article, says, "It

was a day's run." To have run it in a day would have required an average speed of more than fourteen knots an hour, and none of the vessels except the *Brooklyn* could make that speed except upon a spurt of an hour or so.

The log-books of the ships show that on the 25th the weather and sea were rough, with stiff to fresh breezes from the east (these were head winds).

Rear Admiral Higginson testified (I. 36): "The weather was rough; not rough for a battle-ship, but it was rough for small vessels." Rear Admiral Evans (I. 361): "The weather on the evening of the 24th was squally, raining and squally. On the 25th the weather changed, and we had a long swell from the southeast. On the 25th the weather got worse. In the afternoon the squalls were fresh; there was a good deal of rain, and a long swell from the southeast."

The log-book of the *Marblehead*: "May 25th, commences overcast, cloudy, drizzling and squally. Fresh breeze from E. S. E. Rough sea from S'd and Sd. & Eastward. The port lower boom was unshipped and carried away. Stiff to fresh breezes from E. N. E., rough sea."

Log-book of the *Vixen*: "Fresh breezes from E. S. E.; overcast and cloudy with frequent and heavy rain, and moderate gale in squalls. Moderate to heavy sea, breaking over fore-castle occasionally. About 7.05 A. M. an unusually heavy sea was taken on board, and washed C. Buehler (Ch. G. M.) from the fore-castle to the main deck, inflicting thereby a severe flesh wound in his thigh."

All through that day this log-book shows "stiff to fresh breezes, heavy head sea; ship pitching and rolling uncomfortably."

The log-books record slowing to allow the *Eagle*, which had dropped astern, to come up. That of the

Texas: "Stopped to allow the *Eagle* to rejoin squadron." The collier *Merrimac* also fell behind.

Enough has been quoted from those log-books to show that while the weather and sea were not such as to interfere very much with the large vessels of the squadron, they did interfere very greatly with the speed of the smaller vessels.

The testimony of Captain Francis S. Cook, with respect to the weather on that voyage, should be accepted without question. He commanded the flagship *Brooklyn*, and was acting as chief of staff to the commodore, and, as such, it was his duty to keep an eye over all the other ships of the squadron and regulate the speed of his ship so as best to keep the squadron together. He testified (I. 887): "We had a fair run the night of the 24th. The weather gathered during the night, and the next day it was squally, stormy; and there was from a moderate to a rough sea. The 25th was a bad day. On the 26th the weather had moderated so far as the wind was concerned, but there was a long, nasty sort of a sea, and the ships rolled a good deal."

While on the subject of the weather, it may be said for the benefit of the non-professional reader that it is quite true that there may be a heavy sea running while there is little or no wind; and when steaming against such a sea a small vessel would have a very rough time of it. Even so large a vessel as the *Marblehead* lost one of her swinging booms by it. The *Vixen* was being boarded by heavy "green seas," one of which swept one of her petty officers from the forecastle and severely injured him, and the *Eagle* fell so far behind that she was lost sight of by the rest of the fleet.

The majority of the court expressed the opinion that Commodore Schley "should not have permitted the *Eagle* to delay the progress of the squadron,"

but they ignore the fact that it was not the *Eagle* alone that had to be considered. The *Vixen* and the collier *Merrimac*, and to some extent the *Marblehead* also, were a cause of delay.

It is a mere opinion, after all, about which there is room for difference, and it may well be doubted if either Benham or Ramsay, or any other of Schley's critics would have done very differently if any of them had been there in command.

That Commodore Schley would not have been justified in abandoning those smaller vessels and his collier seems really not open to dispute. They were a necessary part of his force, and he required them for scouting, for picket duty. Like Lord Nelson's frigates, they were the "eyes of his fleet." Nelson said that when he died they would find the word "frigate" engraved on his heart. If perchance, and that was one of the possibilities, Schley had met Cervera's fleet, the smaller vessels might have been a great protection against the torpedo-boat destroyers of the enemy.

Of course, as the commodore said in his letter to the Senate, if he had known with any certainty that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago harbor, no consideration of the *Eagle* or any other vessel would have prevented him from getting off that port, with his heavier ships, at the earliest possible moment."

Admiral Dewey's opinion, expressed in the finding of the Court of Inquiry (I. 1830), that "the passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago was made with as much despatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a unit," is abundantly justified by the facts above shown.

CHAPTER XXX

THE EVENTS OF MAY 26, 27, AND 28

THESE embrace what has been called the "Retrograde Movement"; and will be treated, not apologetically, for rightly considered they need no apology, but candidly and fairly, with a view to their explanation in the interests of truth and justice.

Admiral Schley, in his letter to the Secretary of the Navy asking for the Court of Inquiry, said (I. 4): "I admit the right of fair criticism of every public officer."

On the evening of May 26, at about five o'clock, the Flying Squadron had arrived at a point about twenty-two miles S. S. E. from the entrance to the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.

The scouts *Yale* (Captain William C. Wise), *Minneapolis* (Captain Theodore F. Jewell), and *St. Paul* (Captain Charles D. Sigsbee) had been cruising off the harbor and in the vicinity for several days prior to that time.

Captain Jewell testified before the court (I. 351) that on the 23d the captains of all those vessels were on board a fourth (the *Harvard*, Captain Charles W. Cotton), and "had some talk."

Here were four vessels commanded by extremely capable officers, whose duty it was to find the Spanish fleet, if possible, and they had been diligent, but entirely unsuccessful.

Captain Wise testified (I. 212): "My ship and the *St. Paul* were off Santiago all day of the 22d. Together we reconnoitered Santiago very carefully and closely. Could see nothing. I saw nothing, except around the corner of Cay Smith, where some small vessel was anchored, either a torpedo boat or

a small gunboat; I could not determine which it was. There was nothing in sight whatever. So the *St. Paul* and my vessel cruised all that day and that night, the *St. Paul* to the eastward, while I took to the westward.

"On the 23d the *Harvard* joined us, and she took the course to the westward, the *St. Paul* to the eastward, and I took to the southward. We observed carefully and reconnoitered, going in as closely as we could, but we could see nothing."

Captain Sigsbee testified (I. 406): "I proceeded for Santiago, where I arrived early in the morning of the 21st. Within a few days the *Yale*, *Harvard*, and *Minneapolis* arrived. On the 25th captured the British steamer *Restorval*, coal laden, bound into Santiago de Cuba."

Now the testimony of all these officers (except Cotton of the *Harvard*) is to the effect that, although they all believed at the time that the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, none of them expressed that belief to anyone outside of themselves, or, so far as the testimony given shows, even to each other; and they left the commodore in ignorance of their belief, and of whatever reason for such belief any of them had.

There is a remarkable fact about these scouts. As stated by Captain Sigsbee, his vessel (*St. Paul*) captured the British steamer *Restorval* on the 25th. Now the log-book of the *Cristóbal Colón* (of Cervera's fleet) shows that on the morning of the 25th she came down from the inner harbor and took position in plain sight from outside the harbor entrance. I quote from her log-book as follows: "Anchored at 7 A. M. At this time the vessels of the enemy were discovered off the mouth of the harbor. Morro made signal to begin firing; but in a short time it was seen that it would be obstructed, as an English steamer was about to enter the harbor." That was the

Restorval. The *Colón* could see our ships and the *Restorval*; but our ships could not see the *Colón*.

As soon as those scouts were discovered by the Flying Squadron the latter "went to quarters" (which is the nautical expression for made ready for battle), but it was soon discovered that they were not enemies. At 6.20 P. M., in obedience to signal, Captain Sigbee went on board the *Brooklyn*, to make report to the commodore.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN SCHLEY AND SIGSBEE

WHAT occurred between those two officers at that meeting was of the greatest importance, because Schley immediately acted upon what Sigsbee had said.

Sigsbee testified (I. 458): "I knew nothing positively about the Spanish fleet at that time. I reported the situation generally to Commodore Schley. I did not say I believed the Spanish fleet was not there. I said I had not seen it." Sigsbee did not claim to have expressed the belief that it was there.

Commodore Schley testified (I. 1356): "The first thing that I asked Captain Sigsbee when he came over the side"—and I want to say before I make this statement, that I do not believe that Captain Sigsbee would misstate anything for his commission. I do not believe he is capable of stating what is not true; I think that in this instance his recollection is in fault, and not his veracity—"I said to him, 'Captain, have you got the Dons here,' or 'in here'? He stated to me: 'They are not in here. I have been in very close.' He said, 'They are not here, they are only reported here.' I said to him, 'Have any of the other vessels seen them, the *Yale* or *Minneapolis*?' He said, 'No; they have not; they have assured me so.' I assumed from the communication with Captain Sigsbee that he was bearing to me the assurance of all of them.

After this conversation Captain Sigsbee went on board his ship.

Ensign Ralph N. Marble testified (I. 1902): "I heard a conversation between Captain Sigsbee and Commodore Schley, on board the *Brooklyn*, on the afternoon of the 26th of May, 1898, when we met

the three scouts off Santiago. Captain Sigsbee came on board and reported to the commodore. As Captain Sigsbee came aft Commodore Schley asked him: 'Have we got them?' (or something to that effect), meaning the Spanish ships as I took it. Captain Sigsbee answered: 'No, they are not here. I have been here for about a week, and they could not be here unless I knew it.' [I. 1094.] I do not say those are the exact words. That is the text of what I heard. I think they are almost the exact words. The incident was recalled to my mind less than a year later, by some article that was printed in a newspaper, with Captain Sigsbee's signature. I was not more than seven or eight feet from them."

The judge advocate asked Marble if Captain Sigsbee may not have said: "I have been here about a week, and have not seen any of them; or words to that effect?" to which Marble replied, "No, sir. As I remember, he said, 'They could not be here unless I knew it.'"

The commodore's orderly (Cronin) testified (I. 1235): "I heard the commodore ask something of Captain Sigsbee. I could not tell exactly what it was. I couldn't quite understand. But I heard Captain Sigsbee answer, 'They are not in there; the Spanish fleet are not in there.'"

Mr. George E. Graham, a correspondent of the Associated Press (who had been on board the *Brooklyn* since March 29, 1898), testified (I. 1223): "I saw Captain Sigsbee on board the *Brooklyn* on May 26. Heard him in conversation with Commodore Schley. After he had reached the quarterdeck by the gangway, he stopped, and Commodore Schley said to him: 'Have we got them, Sigsbee?' He said: 'No, they are not here. I have been here for a week, and they are not here.' He went from there back on the quarterdeck, and he continued the conversation. Commodore Schley said: 'Are you sure they are not

in there?' He said: 'I have been very close to the harbor entrance two or three times; and Cotton has been in and cut the cable; and they are not there.' I heard Captain Sigsbee say that. I took some sort of a part in the conversation; I can't tell exactly what. There were several officers near the gangway when he made his first statement, I believe; and when we went aft there were simply the commodore, Captain Sigsbee, and myself.

"I made a report of our conversation at the time. Captain Sigsbee knew I was a newspaper man and was there looking for information, and Captain Sigsbee later took a despatch written by me, and viséd by Commodore Schley. I described the fact that the fleet was not there, I think; it was open and unsealed."

Three days later (on the 29th) Sigsbee wrote to the department (A. 411):

"This morning, while in towards the coast, after chasing, I saw the smoke of a number of vessels to the westward; and at once made for the Santiago entrance, *believing it possible that the strangers were the Spanish squadron approaching that port.*"

Now, it is pertinent to inquire, how, if eight days after the Spanish were reported to have entered Santiago harbor Captain Sigsbee believed (as he now says he did) that the Spaniards were in there, he could three days later have believed it possible that they were outside and "approaching the port"? Such a dilemma "puzzles the will."

While there is not the slightest intention of suggesting any purposed change of statement on the part of Captain Sigsbee, it must be said that the foregoing testimony shows "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Captain Sigsbee's memory was in fault; and that he did say, in substance, to Commodore Schley what Schley says he did; and that he stated to the commodore that the Spaniards were not in Santiago

harbor at that time. And, whatever his language, he certainly conveyed that impression to the commodore.

In addition to what Sigsbee said, he had brought with him a Santiago pilot, Eduardo Nunez, who testified (I. 914): "I was asked by the commodore if I knew the Spanish vessels were then at Santiago? I replied that I doubted if they were in yet, because they were very large vessels, and the water was not deep enough, and the channel was too narrow."

Captain Sigsbee, in a letter written to the department on February 24, 1899, said: "In my position as commanding officer as a scout it would have been a great mistake to have stated to Admiral Schley that I did not believe Admiral Cervera's fleet was in Santiago harbor."

It is difficult to accept that proposition. A scout is defined by Webster, as "One employed to gain information of the movements of an enemy," and Milton says:

"Scouts each coast light-armed scour,
Each quarter to descry the distant foe."

According to Captain Sigsbee, when they have "descried," or failed, or have acquired such information as gives them an opinion as to the whereabouts of the foe, they must keep silent until particularly asked by the commander-in-chief before it would be proper to impart to him the tidings they may have gained of the movements of an enemy, or the opinions they have formed of his whereabouts.

Such a conception of the duty of a scout seems preposterous to the common mind. The idea that a scout should stand dumb and require the senior officer to worm out of him by adroit questionings such information and opinions as he may have acquired and formed, is original with Captain Sigsbee. It would, on the contrary, seem to be the duty of a scout to give

to the commanding officer present all the information he may have obtained, and to express any opinion he may have formed.

If his opinion was that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago Bay, it was his clear duty to say so; and if he had said so, no one could have supposed that he had expressed to Schley the opinion that it was not there.

But whatever was or was not said, the result was not to remove from the commodore's mind the uncertainty and doubt indicated by the telegram from the department to Sampson, which had been sent him by the admiral in that Despatch No. 7, which up to that time was all that Schley had concerning the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE COALING PROBLEM

IT should be remembered that prior to the war with Spain coaling in the open sea was a problem that had not been solved. To the sailor nothing seemed more dangerous than to attempt to bring two heavy ships close enough alongside of each other at sea to enable one to coal from the other. As soon as the collier, *Merrimac* arrived off Cienfuegos coaling efforts were begun, but without much success.

Admiral Sampson, in the article printed over his own signature in the *Century Magazine* for April, 1899 (at page 898), well says: "Schley had become greatly disquieted by the difficulty he experienced in coaling his ships, and by the fear that, with a continuance of bad weather, he might become short of coal, although he had the *Merrimac* in company, with about four thousand tons aboard. Only those who have experienced the anxiety caused by such a doubt can appreciate its wearing effects."¹

Having the coal on board the *Merrimac* was well; but to get it out of her holds into the bunkers of the fighting ships was the problem to be solved.

Captain Cook's testimony (I. 892-3) states the exact conditions: "Until dark of the 27th, when the weather indications decidedly moderated, we [himself and the commodore] were both watching the weather pretty closely. I did say at that time that they could coal, as it had moderated, and he evidently thought so himself, as he made signal to them to coal. The weather overhead had been good, as I recollect it, for twenty-four hours, and the sea was moderating. At that time the sea was getting quite moderate; and,

¹The italics are mine.—J. P.

as I knew that the commodore wanted to coal as soon as he could, I spoke to him at that time. The signals were made, and the *Marblehead* commenced coaling at once, first with boats,² and then they got the ship alongside to coal. Signal was made to the *Texas*³; that was the only ship I thought he was particularly anxious about, and I knew that on board the *Texas* they were very anxious, and I presumed they were watching the weather, too. But they had not asked; and he signaled—wigwagged. They did try; and they succeeded and got coal.

Captain Philip, commanding the *Texas*, was certainly as anxious to fill up his ship's bunkers as anyone else could possibly be. A modern battleship without coal is like a sailing ship with her masts and sails gone, and if he had not been doubtful, Philip would undoubtedly have answered "Yes," and not, "We can try."

The judge advocate of the court of inquiry (Lemly) made persistent effort to show, by Captain Cook, that Schley did not order the coaling until after Cook suggested it to him; but Cook testified further (I. 893):

"I really couldn't say whether the order was given after that conversation. I wouldn't like to say that he was controlled by anything I said, because I knew that his anxiety was mine. He had the responsibility, and I did not. I don't say the sea was smooth. I say the sea was better. There was always a long swell there. It was a new experience entirely."

The judge advocate put the following question: "This matter of coaling at sea is not a very easy matter, under any conditions, Captain, so far as you know?" To which Cook replied: "No, I think after

² This would not have been done if it had been thought safe to go alongside the collier.—J. P.

³ The signal record is as follows: "7 P. M. Do you think you could coal to-night? Ans. 7.01. We can try. 7.02. *Brooklyn* to *Texas*, Try."

experience, perhaps, changed our opinions a good deal; but I must say that in coaling down there, I never did see as bad a sea as we had at that time.

"We never had anything like it afterwards, according to my recollection—a sea that made it so troublesome to go alongside a collier. The 25th was a very bad day; I don't think it was practicable at all, to coal. The next day (26th) was a bad day, and up to the 27th. I think that, possibly, if the *Texas* had made the trial a little before on the 27th, she could have done so. They coaled all night of 27th, and part of next morning, the 28th; and at noon we started for Santiago."

Lieutenant Harlow, of the *Vixen* (I. 1320), clearly stated the coaling problem thus: "I should say that, in the light of all the experience we had during the war, no one would have attempted to coal ship on the 26th. In the early part of the 26th no amount of experience would have warranted in coaling ship. In the after part of the 26th, with the experience we had at that time, it is doubtful whether they would have tried it. But with experience we learned a good many things." A most pregnant remark which the ancients expressed by the two words: *Experientia docet*.

It is worthy of notice that, in a report made by Admiral Cervera (published by the Navy Department), that officer states that the weather ("storm," he calls it) on the 26th was such as to prevent the Spanish squadron from putting to sea, as had been resolved upon for the day.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE EVENTS OF MAY 26, 27, AND 28 CONTINUED

The interview with Captain Sigsbee had not relieved the uncertainty of the situation, and the coaling problem was pressing for solution. Therefore, acting in accordance with his best judgment; without any certain knowledge of the whereabouts of that Spanish fleet; after having been informed by the scouts that, although they had all been off Santiago for a week, they had seen nothing of it, and knew nothing of its movements or whereabouts since it had left Curacao; after having been assured by Captain Sigsbee that he did not believe it was in Santiago; and knowing that as the sea and weather then were it would be impossible to coal his squadron off the port, Commodore Schley deemed it best to return, via the south side of Cuba and the Yucatan Channel, to Key West, to fill up his ships bunkers with coal and be ready for any emergency. And so on the night of the 26th, at 9.50, he started to the westward with his whole squadron.

The collier *Merrimac* had broken down and had to be towed, and but little progress could be made; and so after standing west for two hours and a half, and for a distance at the most of 16.5 knots, the fleet was stopped by signal from the flagship, at 11.30, to enable the collier to make repairs. Great difficulty was experienced by the *Yale* in towing her, and the log-book of the latter shows that all that night, and next day up to 11 o'clock A. M., was passed in various efforts to get the *Merrimac* in tow; also that the sea was "rough and confused." Meanwhile the fleet drifted.

At 9.30 A. M. of the 27th the *Harvard* (scout)

arrived from St. Nicholas Mole. She brought a despatch from the Navy Department, which was in the following words:

“WASHINGTON, May 25, 1898.

“HARVARD, St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti:

“Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also the senior officer off Santiago, as follows: All department’s information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action.

“Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say there are landing places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of the harbor; and that there insurgents probably will be found, and not the Spanish.

“From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron, and also *Harvard*, coal from *Merrimac* leeward of Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel, or Mole Haiti? Report, without delay, situation at Santiago de Cuba.”

The above despatch is the one upon which the charge of “Disobedience of Orders by the Commadore” was based.

The Secretary of the Navy, in his letter of February 6, 1899 (Ex. Doc. 3, p. 3), to the Senate, gives to the despatch a significance which it does not import. He reads into it a word which it does not contain, and speaks of it as “directing Schley to remain at Santiago and ascertain whether the enemy is there or not.” This may have been in the mind of the Secretary, but it is certainly not in the despatch.

In the first place, it is not addressed to Schley, but to the *Harvard*. There is no order in it, except to the *Harvard* “to proceed immediately and inform

Schley," and also the commanding officer off Santiago, who—as the despatch shows—was thought to be some other than Schley, what the department's information "indicated" as to Cervera's fleet. There is no order to Schley to "proceed" to, or remain off, Santiago de Cuba, or anywhere else. The word "remain" is not in the despatch. It will be observed that the despatch was dated and sent on May 25. It therefore was not sent because Schley had started back towards Key West, inasmuch as he did not so start until May 26, at 9.50 P. M. As a matter of fact, the department did not learn of the start back until it received Schley's despatch announcing it, which was dated the 27th, and was sent by the *Harvard* to Jamaica, to be cabled thence to the department, as it was on the 28th, after 9 A. M. (A. 406), and received same day.

It must have been received by the department about the time Schley started back to Santiago, after the coaling problem had been solved.

That despatch which the *Harvard* had delivered to Schley on the 27th was characterized by the same uncertainty that up to that time was manifested by all the department's despatches with respect to Cervera's whereabouts. Its language was: "All the department's information indicates." "The department looks to you to ascertain the facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action." "As soon as ascertained, notify Department whether enemy is there." Everybody knows now that the enemy was there; but the question that must be faced in forming any judgment upon Schley's action is, "What did Schley know or believe then"? Nobody can have the slightest belief that, if he had then known or believed that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago harbor, he would have turned his fleet away towards Key West or anywhere else.

In truth the despatch suggests that "under Cape

Cruz," or in "Gonaives Channel," or at "Mole, Haiti," the squadron might go to coal; but to go to any of those places would leave Santiago harbor as open as it had been left since Cervera had arrived there.

The despatch delivered by the *Harvard*, on the 27th, gave no new information as to Cervera's whereabouts. The coaling difficulty still continuing, Schley did not then change his plan of procedure, but sent the despatch (A. 397) to Jamaica by the *Harvard* to be cabled thence to the department. The despatch, as shown by the commodore's letter-press book, was as follows:

"OFF SANTIAGO, May 17, 1898.

"SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington.

"Received despatch of May 25th, delivered by *Harvard* off Santiago de Cuba. *Merrimac's* engine is disabled, and she is helpless. Am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, and *Brooklyn* from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. *Brooklyn* is the only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago, in present state of coal in the squadron. It is not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer, owing to southwest winds. *Harvard* just reports to me she has only sufficient coal to proceed to Port Royal. Also reports that only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti.

"*Minneapolis* has only enough coal to reach Key West, and same of *Yale*, which will tow *Merrimac*.

"It is to be regretted that department's orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am obliged to return to Key West, via Yuca-

tan Passage for coal. Can ascertain nothing concerning enemy. Was obliged to send *Eagle* to Port Antonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty-seven tons of coal on board. Will leave *St. Paul* here. Will require 9,500 tons at Key West.

“SCHLEY.”

As to the charge of “disobedience of orders” growing out of this despatch and the one to which it is a reply, it is to be said that disobedience is an act of commission or omission done with disobedient intent. That the commodore had any intent to be disobedient will not be pretended. The state of facts, as they appeared to him (just as on the 16th they had appeared to Sampson), seemed to require a return to Key West for coal; and, so after stating the necessity, he expressed his regret for it. There is no disobedience in that, absolutely none.

Not a word of suggestion of disobedience was ever made by the Navy Department until after Schley’s request for a court of inquiry, when the department came to frame the Precept, and then it required the court to “Report the reasons for the disobedience of the orders of the Department contained in its despatch dated May 25, 1898.”

The commodore (I. 5), wrote to the department asking that “Par. No. 5 be modified so as to omit the department’s expression of opinion, and thus leave the court free to express its own opinion on that matter”; but the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Hackett) declined the request, saying: “The Precept treats certain matters as established, among which is the fact that you disobeyed orders.” But the department further said: “Inasmuch, however, as it is the Department’s purpose that the court shall be absolutely free to report, if such shall be found to be the case, that you [Schley] did not wilfully disobey the orders, or that you were justified

in disobeying them," the two letters would be sent to the court.

It is a fact that the majority of the court did not find that the commodore had disobeyed, but merely expressed the opinion that he "should have promptly obeyed the Department's order of May 25."

Well, there is room for difference of opinion; but common sense teaches that "the man on the spot" is probably the best judge as to what should be done.

After the *Harvard's* departure the same condition as to coaling, of the *Merrimac's* disability, and of inability, owing to rough seas, to take her in tow, continued until about 4 P. M. of the 27th, when the *Yale* at last got the collier in tow. The squadron then started to the westward, but after proceeding about twenty-three knots the sea had so calmed down that coaling seemed possible. The commodore made signal to the *Texas* at 7 o'clock: "If collier is cast off do you think you could coal to-night?" *Texas* replied: "We can try." *Brooklyn* at 7.02 replied: "Try." At 7.20 commodore signaled to *Texas*: "Go alongside *Merrimac*."

The *Texas* and *Marblehead* continued all night to take coal, and up to 1.20 P. M. of the 28th.

The coal problem having been solved, the commodore had made up his mind as early at 8.05 A. M. of the 28th to return to and remain off Santiago de Cuba, because at that hour he signaled to the *Minneapolis* (which vessel had the collier in tow): "We are going to hold on here as long as coal lasts." One of the engines of the *Massachusetts* had become disabled, but it was repaired at 12.25; and at 1.20 P. M. the signal was made to the squadron, "Form column in regular order, course E. $\frac{1}{2}$ N., speed 6 knots."

The squadron proceeded on that course until about 6.30 P. M., when it stopped for the night, with the works at entrance of Santiago de Cuba in plain sight.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE RETURN TO SANTIAGO

THIS return movement was made by the commodore entirely of his own motion, without any communication from the Navy Department or Rear Admiral Sampson, or influence or suggestion from any officer or man in the squadron.


A strong effort was made by the judge advocate of the court of inquiry to show otherwise; but the effort was unsuccessful.

Captain Cook was asked (I. 893): "Did you have any conference with the commodore before starting back for Santiago de Cuba, with respect to that?" and he replied: "None whatever. I don't recollect anything at all, until I knew that the order was given. I saw him on deck afterwards, and asked him if that was his intention? That was all. After he started for Santiago we had a little talk. He started as soon as he found that the *Texas* had enough coal; and my impressions—I can only state them as impressions—are that he said he should go to Santiago, and if he found it practicable to coal from colliers, there he should stay; and if he got short of coal he would go to Gonaives Bay and try there, or elsewhere."

Effort was also made to show by the testimony of Commander Mason, who had been the executive officer of the *Brooklyn*, of Lieutenant-Commander Sears (then flag lieutenant) and Lieutenant Wells (flag secretary) that they had exerted some influence over the commodore towards beginning the coaling and returning to Santiago, but without success. They all said that the commodore had acted entirely of his own motion, without influence from anybody, in all the movements of those two days.

Harsh criticisms of the so-called "retrograde move-

Diagram II



Gurwico and the coast to the westward is reported to be charted about 6 miles too far south.

Chart showing positions of Flying Squadron on May 26-27-28.

ment" are utterly unwarranted. It is absolutely impossible to place one's self in the commodore's place; to invest one's self with the sense of responsibility that he then felt; to divest one's self of the after acquired knowledge that we have, but he did not have; to feel the effect of the "serious doubts" in relation to coal and coaling mentioned by Admiral Sampson in his *Century* article (before quoted), that, as he says, "can only be felt and appreciated by those who have experienced them in command."

We think that we have already shown "beyond a reasonable doubt" that there was no purpose on the commodore's part to disobey any order; that the despatch brought by the *Harvard* on the 27th was no order to Schley to return or remain at Santiago de Cuba, because it was issued on the 25th, before the retrograde movement was begun, and merely stated that he or the senior officer off Santiago was expected to find Cervera; and to "see that he did not escape without a decisive action."

Both of these things Schley unquestionably did. He found Cervera, and as to escaping without a decisive action—all of Cervera's ships were destroyed; nearly all his officers and men were killed, drowned, or captured; the poor old admiral came on board of our ships clad in a pair of drawers and an undershirt, without hat to his head or shoes to his feet. "Decisive action." Could any action have been more so?

Granting, however, for argument's sake, that there was a disobedience of orders, the ethics of the situation were settled by the Savior of Mankind, in His parable of the man who had two sons, to the elder of whom he said: "Son, go to work to-day in my vineyard," who answered and said: "I will not," but afterwards he repented and went; and to the second son he said: "Son, go work to-day in my vineyard"; and the second son said: "I go, sir," and went not.

Even the chief priests and elders, unfriendly as they were, could see that the first, though nominally disobedient, so far as expression went, did the will of his father, and was entitled to praise. But the chief priests and elders of the Navy Department (including Rear Admirals Benham and Ramsay) were not willing to concede the same praise to Schley.

A disobedience of orders from which no evil results flow is of no consequence whatever, especially where the alleged disobedience is a mere exercise of judgment. A disobedience from which good results flow is to be commended. Earl Jervis acted upon that principle with Nelson, after the Battle of St. Vincent, to be alluded to hereafter.

Neither the Navy Department nor Admiral Sampson, up to July 10 (a week after the Battle of Santiago), wrote or expressed verbally, so far as appears, a word of criticism of Schley's conduct of the Flying Squadron; and there can be no doubt that but for the fact that when the battle took place Sampson, through no fault of his own, was "not in it," such criticism would never have been made. It is a further fact that neither has ever done so, officially or otherwise, to Schley to the present time.

President Roosevelt, on Schley's appeal, said: "Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in an official letter to the Department, alluded for the first time, to Admiral Schley's 'reprehensible conduct' six weeks previously." And there is great force in what the President adds: "If Admiral Schley was guilty of reprehensible conduct of a kind that called for such notice from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral Sampson ought not to have left him as senior officer on the blockading squadron on the 3d of July, when he (Sampson) steamed away, on his proper errand of communication with General Shafter."

Diagram II shows the whole movement of the Flying Squadron during these three days, May 26, 27 and 28.

CHAPTER XXXV

SCHLEY DISCOVERS CERVERA'S FLEET IN HARBOR OF SANTIAGO

DURING the night of the 28th the ships lay off the harbor, with the *Marblehead* and *Vixen* on the flanks of the battle-ships. On the morning of the 29th the whole squadron steamed in about six miles towards the Morro at the mouth of the harbor, and at 5.30 discovered two or three of Cervera's ships lying at anchor near Smith Cay. The *Cristóbal Colón* was recognized because of the fact that her military mast was between her two smoke-stacks.

The chart opposite shows her position as given by her log-book. The positions of the other vessels are as given by Lieutenant José Miller y Terjiero, of the Spanish service.

Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, in his volunteered letter of February 24, 1899, to the department (Ex. Doc. D. 175) says: "It is possible that the admiral saw the Spanish vessels a short time before they were sighted by the *St. Paul* [Sigsbee's ship]. I had not before seen them, or any sign of them." The *Colón's* log-book contains this entry: "At 7.30 enemy's squadron coming from eastward, and steaming in column past the mouth of the harbor."

Thus the long agony of doubt was ended. Schley had discovered the enemy; and had them safely blockaded in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.

Well might the commodore have exultingly said, as it is reported he did say, "I have got them now; and they will never get home."

The *St. Paul* was at once sent to St. Nicholas Mole, to cable the good news to the Navy Department, and to Sampson, by the following despatch.

“OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 29, 10 A. M.

“Enemy in port. Recognized *Cristóbal Colón*, *Infanta Maria Teresa*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, moored inside of Morro behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have not sufficient coal. Making every effort to get coal in. *Vixen* has blown out man-hole gasket. I have sent boiler-makers on board to repair. Collier repaired, machinery being put together. Have about three thousand tons of coal in collier; but not easy to get aboard here. If there is no engagement in next two or three days, Sampson’s squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or Port au Prince. Hasten me despatch vessels for picket work. The *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Vixen*, and *Marblehead* compose squadron here. I am sending *St. Paul* to communicate with Sampson.”

“SCHLEY.”

Between the 25th and 29th the department’s information that Cervera’s fleet was at Santiago de Cuba received almost hourly confirmation, and its nervous anxiety, when on the 28th it received Schley’s despatch of the 27th (sent by *Harvard*, via Jamaica), announcing his purpose to return to Key West, was very natural; and the cables in every direction were kept hot in frantic efforts to reach him. The department sent a cable on the 28th as follows (A. 397) :

“HARVARD, Kingston, Jamaica :

“Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possible. Utmost urgency. Unless unsafe for your squadron, Department wishes you to remain off Santiago. So cannot you take possession of Guantamo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in mouth of harbor; but if not so used, and if necessary to you, it would be desirable to leave her Nicholas Mole, or vicinity. You

must not leave the vicinity of Santiago unless it is unsafe your squadron; or unless Spanish squadron is not there.” “LONG.”

The department, in getting up the charge of disobedience of orders, evidently confused the two despatches of 25th and this one of 28th. It has already been shown that the word “remain” is not in the despatch of 25th. It appears, for the first time, in that of 28th.

The *Harvard* did not leave Jamaica until 3.15 P. M. of 30th, and arrived off Santiago on 31st at 7 A. M. This was Schley’s first despatch from the department, and none of the others reached him until later.

Without knowledge of Schley’s change of purpose, or of his return to Santiago, or of the fact that Schley had discovered Cervera, the department on the 28th cabled Sampson as follows, viz (A. 398) :

“Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba he must go to Key West with his squadron for coal, though he has four thousand tons coal with him in a broken-down collier. How soon after arrival of Schley at Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba with *New York*, and *Oregon*, the *Indiana*, and some lighter vessels; and how long could you blockade there, sending your vessels singly to coal from our colliers at Gonaives Channel, Mole, Haiti, Porto Nipe, Cuba, or where? Schley has not ascertained whether the Spanish division is at Santiago de Cuba. All information seems to show that it is there. “LONG.”

“Seems to show.” Doubting, still doubting! But not a word of criticism of Schley’s proposed movement.

As soon as he received Schley’s despatch announcing his discovery of the Spanish ships, Sampson, on 29th, sent to Schley the following :

“Congratulate you on success. Maintain a close blockade at all hazards, especially at night. Very little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in open sea, whenever conditions permit. Send a ship to Guantanamo, with a view of occupying it as a base, coaling one ship at a time.”

Captain French E. Chadwick, the chief of staff, testified (I. 842): “I protested [to Sampson] against his congratulations. He persisted in putting it that way; and when I asked him why, he said, ‘Oh, I want to encourage him.’”

This picture, which Chadwick volunteered, of the subordinate “protesting” against his admiral’s proposed action shows the assumption which that subordinate had accustomed himself to display; but on this occasion the chief of staff does not appear to have been “the dominant mind.”

Why shouldn’t Sampson have congratulated Schley? The latter had “discovered Cervera,” and whatever credit belonged to anyone for that service unquestionably belonged to Schley.

The writer hereof doubted, at the time Captain Chadwick volunteered that statement to the court, and still doubts, the correctness of what Sampson was stated to have said. Sampson was, unfortunately, so impaired in mind that he could not be brought before the court.

CHAPTER XXXVI

SCHLEY'S PLAN OF BATTLE AND BLOCKADE OF SAN- TIAGO DE CUBA

HAVING found Cervera's fleet in that port, Schley at once took measures to prevent them from "leaving without a decisive action."

Accordingly, at 8.50 A. M. (less than two hours after their discovery) the commanding officers of all ships were summoned, by signal, on board the flagship *Brooklyn*, to a conference with the commodore.

What occurred there is best told by the following statement of Captain McCalla, of the *Marblehead*, which he caused to be entered, immediately after the conference, in the log-book of that vessel (A. 426) :

"Commodore Schley explained to the commanding officers that, in case the Spanish ships came out, he wished to concentrate the batteries of all our ships on a portion of those of the enemy. This was not explained as a tactical concentration of our whole force on a part of the enemy, but as a division of our whole fire on several of the enemy's ships.

"During the time the commanding officer was on board the flagship Captain Evans asked if it was his intention to steam at the enemy's ships in case they should start to come out? Commodore Schley answered, 'Certainly,' and added words *indicative of his intention to attack them as they came out of the narrow defile.*"¹

Captain McCalla testified (I. 299) : "The conference was with regard to the work of the blockade. I can only remember one specific thing, and that was that Captain Evans asked Commodore Schley if the Spanish ships came out, was he going for them? He said: 'Certainly,' and then arranged for a subdivision

¹ Italics are mine.—J. P.

of fire from the ships under his command, on the Spanish ships, should they come out."

Before the Court of Inquiry Rear Admiral Evans testified, relative to that conference (I. 385): "Commodore Schley was in the cabin when we assembled, and there was a general talk about the Spanish fleet having been located, at last, in Santiago. I do not recall any special conference. I do not think it was in the nature of a conference.² I do not recall now that the officers were asked to express any opinion.³ I remember having a conversation with Commodore Schley about the effect of fighting batteries with the ships, in which I told him of the experience that we had at San Juan; and expressed the opinion to him that it was not worth while to risk ships for fighting shore batteries alone, as there was nothing to be gained by it. But in the case under consideration, as the Spanish ships were present in the harbor, the conditions were changed; and we would have to take the risk of fire from the batteries, in order to get at them."⁴

"I remember Commodore Schley remarking further, before we left, that he felt that the country would hold him responsible; that the ships should not be risked under the fire of shore batteries until the Spanish fleet was destroyed."

This was exactly the rule laid down for Sampson's guidance by the Confidential Circular of April 6, before referred to; and confirmed in Sampson's sailing order from department, of April 21, 1898.

The extract from Captain McCalla's log-book, above given, was then read to Evans, who pronounced it "quite correct."

The foregoing is substantially the same as the

² This is a mere play upon words.—J. P.

³ That did not deter Evans from so doing, as may be noted from the sentences immediately following.

⁴ All this is not mentioned by anyone else who was present.

“Order of Battle” (so-called) afterwards issued by Admiral Sampson on June 2, to be referred to hereafter. It was the natural, obvious, and indeed the only plan of battle that could be pursued under the circumstances; and it was pursued on July 3, when the enemy tried to escape.

If that statement by Schley was not an “Order of Battle,” it would be difficult to say what was. It was in several respects more explicit than the one—so-called—given out by Sampson two days later, as will hereafter be shown.

Having only four ships (besides the *Marblehead* and *Vixen*, which two he was compelled to use as picket boats at night) Schley kept his fleet moving in column, backward and forward, before the entrance to the harbor, at a distance of about four miles from the Morro, with the picket boats some two miles further inshore.

His force was thus kept compact, with the ships in proper supporting distance from one another, and so well in hand that, if the Spaniards had attempted to escape, a simple right or left wheel would have enabled him to pursue to the best immediate advantage.

If he had made the semi-circular disposition afterwards adopted by Admiral Sampson, the distance between his most easterly and westerly ships would have been nearly, if not quite, ten miles, with the two intermediate ships nearly four miles apart. One does not need a nautical eye to see that this last method of blockade was out of the question with only four ships. And in the judgment of the writer, the circular formation made collision between the blockaders not only possible, but probable. Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, told before the court of a narrow escape from collision, owing to smoke, between that ship and the *Texas* and *Iowa*, which occurred during the battle of July 3. If that danger could come in the daylight, what might have happened if the darkness of night

had been added to the smoke! In the daytime the vessels were permitted to lie about in seeming disorder, coaling as opportunity permitted.

Captain Cook testified in relation to this blockade (I. 894): "I recall that the commodore's general idea was that the vessels were to be kept full of coal, and steaming, moving all the time. His idea was to keep the vessels at night, in column, at distance, moving all the time—because his idea was to get that fleet to come out. I think he wanted more to have the fleet come out than to keep it in, and his idea was that, in moving that way, the squadron was always ready for action, and he was sure of that fact. So we steamed in a circle. That is the way he expressed himself to me."

Commodore Schley's methods in that instance were much like those of Nelson, pursued by that great commander in the blockade of the French fleet at Toulon in 1803-05. Concerning this, Captain Alfred T. Mahan (our great naval historian) in his admirable "Life of Nelson" (p. 577), says: "His [Nelson's] dispositions were taken rather with a view to encourage the enemy to *come out*." "My system," Nelson wrote to Admiral Pole, "is the very contrary to blockading. Every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea, for it is there we hope to realize the hopes and expectations of our country."

CHAPTER XXXVII

SAMPSON'S UNOFFICIAL STATEMENT ABOUT SCHLEY'S BLOCKADE

NO official criticism of Schley's blockade of Santiago de Cuba has ever been made by anyone, so far as appears; certainly none has ever been made public by the Navy Department. But Admiral Sampson, in his article printed over his own signature in the April number of the *Century Magazine* for the year 1899, undertook to make such criticism (of course unofficially), saying:

"The log of the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship, for the five days from May 26 to June 1, indicates that, whatever might have been the disadvantages under which the blockade had been maintained, it can hardly be described as a close one, of the sort desired and expected by both the department and myself.

"During this period it had been the custom to retire from the coast at night for a distance of twenty-five miles."

"The day service had been maintained at a distance of about six miles off the coast, the ships moving at very slow speed, in column, first to the eastward and then to the westward, about four or five hundred yards apart, or three times the length of a ship, the total length of column being about a mile and a half, and the total distance traversed probably about seven miles."

The whole of that statement is grossly inaccurate, and the part italicized (by the writer) is absolutely untrue, as will now be shown.

Admiral Sampson could never have seen the log-book of the *Brooklyn*, for, if he had, he would have

known that it indicated nothing of the sort; but precisely the contrary. Her log-book and those of all the other ships of the Flying Squadron are printed as Appendices to the Report of the Court of Inquiry, and may be consulted if desired; and *there is not a word in any of them about going off twenty-five miles. It would certainly be in all of them if it had occurred.*

On the strength of this assertion in the *Century Magazine* (for there had been no such statement made by anyone else), the judge advocate put into the Precept for the court as Art. 8: "The necessity, if any, and the advisability of withdrawing at night, the Flying Squadron from the entrance to Santiago harbor, to a distance at sea."

He didn't dare to put in the twenty-five-mile statement, because he had (or could and should have) examined those log-books; and he knew that the statement about withdrawing twenty-five miles at night was absolutely untrue. If it had been true, we can imagine the comfort it would have given to Schley's detractors to be able to show that the commodore had done such an absolutely foolish thing.

Before the Court of Inquiry, Admiral Higginson (who had been the captain of the *Massachusetts* off Santiago) testified (I. 38): "We kept our vessels there in sight of the port, and *at night* we cruised up and down in front of the harbor. I think we cruised nearer during the night.

"The vessels were in column, the flagship leading, and we would cruise up to the eastward and then countermarch and cruise to the westward. We kept going round in an elliptical track. I suppose we went on perhaps a mile or a mile and a half past the harbor, and then turned around and went back. They generally turned with a port helm, as nearly as I can remember.

"The extreme blockading distance was six miles in daytime, and 'closer in at night.'"

Q. Was there ever a time when that fleet went off twenty-five miles at night? Ans. No; I can say perfectly clearly, that I have no memory that that fleet ever went off further than six miles at night.

Captain McCalla testified (I. 307): "To the best of my recollection, the fleet at night kept closer to shore than it did during the day. The blockade at night was maintained four miles off shore, to the best of my recollection."

Q. Did you ever go off at night to any distance of twenty-five miles? Ans. Never.

Captain McCalla further testified (I. 635): "I understood that we [referring to the picket boats] were always to keep two miles inside of the larger vessels. I estimated that we were about two miles from shore at night."

This would make the distance of the larger ships from shore at night four miles.

The log-book of the *Cristóbal Colón* (Spanish) contains the entry: "May 29, 4 P. M. to midnight. American vessels continue to pass by mouth of the harbor with their searchlights thrown on the coast." And "May 31, at 9.30 P. M. Six of the enemy's vessels passed E. to W., across the mouth of the harbor, returning at 11.30 the other way." So that they were so close as to make them visible to the Spaniards in the harbor.

Captain Folger (of the *New Orleans*) testified (I. 635): "During the nights of 30th and 31st of May and 1st of June¹ the fleet was generally in a more regular and uniform position at night than it was in the daytime. It was also somewhat closer, in my opinion, to the shore at night than it was in the daytime. When we passed the entrance at night we were nearer than we generally were in the daytime."

The mention of that twenty-five-mile story served

¹ This last being after Sampson's arrival.

to make the judge advocate very anxious, for when the question, "Then the story, by whomsoever told, that the fleet was in the habit of withdrawing twenty-five miles at night, is not true?" was put to Captain McCalla, he viciously objected, and the witness was not permitted to answer. It was a sore subject.

The majority of the court utterly ignored the testimony given by Higginson, Folger, and McCalla, besides the statements of the log-books, and found that "the Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea. The blockade was maintained at an average distance of about six or seven miles from the harbor entrance during the day; and probably somewhat nearer during the night. Two vessels performed picket duty at night, two miles inside the line of vessels." That majority was skillful in "damning with faint praise." There was nothing in the testimony of those gallant and capable officers that rested on mere "probability." They stated, not probabilities, but facts.

The majority of the court expressed no opinion as to the "propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises" (that is, in that blockade), as the Precept required them to do. They could not condemn, without condemning Sampson, because he continued Schley's disposition for one night; but it was written that nothing that Schley had done was to be praised.

However, by their finding the court *condemned as untrue in fact* the statement made by Admiral Sampson, over his own signature, in the *Century* article, that "it had been the custom of our vessels during that period to retire from the coast at night to a distance of twenty-five miles."

It is not intended to make any reflection upon Admiral Sampson's personal veracity in this matter. Somebody in whom he trusted deliberately deceived him by false statements of the contents of those log-books. But, considering the delicate relations then

existing between him and Schley, he should have been scrupulously careful not to accept and publish statements of others as the basis for such a charge. He never could have seen the log-books himself. If he had, he would never have made such a statement.

Admiral Dewey's opinion, expressed in his Special Findings of the Court, that "the blockade of Santiago de Cuba was effective," is supported by all the evidence given before the court, and will stand, the opinion of the critics to the contrary notwithstanding.

On May 30 the *New Orleans* (cruiser), Captain Folger, and the collier *Sterling* arrived, and became part of the squadron. Captain Folger brought an order from Sampson to Schley, about sinking the collier in the entrance to the harbor, which will be considered hereafter.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE RECONNAISSANCE OF MAY 31, 1898

THE Spanish cruiser *Cristóbal Colón* had remained in the position (near Smith Cay) in the harbor which she had occupied when first discovered on the morning of May 29.

On May 31 (the *Brooklyn* being engaged in coal-ing), shortly before noon, Commodore Schley shifted his flag to the *Massachusetts*, Captain Higginson. When he arrived on board the last named vessel and communicated his purpose, it was suggested that he defer the movement he was about to make until after dinner by the crew. Accordingly, shortly after dinner, accompanied by the *Iowa* and *New Orleans*, he steamed in towards the entrance of the harbor to make a reconnaissance.

Before discussing this movement, it will be well to go back a little.

The Confidential Circular (before referred to) sent to Captain Sampson (as he was then) by the Navy Department on April 6, 1898 (A. 171), contained the following:

“Second—The department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in that case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz.: the destruction of the enemy’s vessels without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. The lack of docking

facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels."

Admiral Schley testified that Sampson, during their interview at Key West, on May 18, either showed, or told him of, this circular.

On May 26 the department again wrote Sampson: "While the department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect vessels you may desire to attack, if you can do so without exposure to heavy guns." It is claimed, by Schley's critics, that the last quoted direction was a modification of Circular No. 6; but it is, on the contrary, a renewed caution against attacking "forts protected by heavy cannon" and "exposure to heavy guns," and a permission to attack "light batteries" only. Schley never heard of, much less saw, that so-called modification of Circular No. 6 until several days after June 1, 1898; so that, so far as he is concerned, it "cuts no ice," in the matter.

Commenting on the above extract from Circular No. 6, the then Secretary of the Navy, in his book published two or three years later, at page 232, says: "It would have been the height of recklessness to have risked the destruction of one or more of our battle-ships while the Spanish fleet was afloat intact."

Very good sense that, in the mind of the Ex-Secretary; but in the same mind it was very bad sense when applied by Schley to the situation that confronted him.

The purpose of the reconnaissance was so clearly stated by Flag-Lieutenant Sears (I. 972) that his statement is here given in full:

"The commodore said to me that he wanted to know what the batteries were; that he was going to take the ships available, not coaling, and that he had fixed upon a distance to pass in front of the fortifica-

tions, which was seven thousand yards. We went on board the *Massachusetts*, and the commodore, on arriving on the quarterdeck, directed Captain Higginson to make his preparations to pass in front of their fire at once."

Incidentally, it may here be stated that, as the commodore greeted Captain Higginson, he jocularly said that he "hoped to pot," or "expected to pot," or "might pot," the *Colón*. This joke would not have been mentioned here but for the fact that it was made use of to build an insinuation against the commodore.

Continuing the narrative of Lieutenant Sears: "Captain Higginson, I think, after consulting with his executive officer, Mr. Schroeder, demurred, and asked the commodore to wait until after the men had dinner. The commodore assented, and during the wait I consulted with the navigator (Lieutenant Potts), by instructions from the commodore, as to ascertain that distance. We looked up the height of the Morro. He made a table of sextant angles, and made his preparations to make that reconnaissance at seven thousand yards. After the men's dinner the squadron was formed with the *Massachusetts* leading, the *New Orleans* following, and the *Iowa* third. The navigator told Captain Higginson about the time we were [supposed to be] on the range; and the course was changed from the oblique course we had been pursuing to a course parallel with the coast; and the moment the *Colón* opened [to view], one of the thirteen-inch guns of the forward turret of the *Massachusetts* opened fire. We passed up and back once, and then stopped for a time, before turning out. The commodore seemed to be satisfied with the reconnaissance, and gave the order to resume the blockade."

The forts at the entrance and on the hills, and the *Colón* inside, returned the fire of the ships.

There was some conflict of testimony about the

ranges at which the firing was done. The commodore had ordered a range of 7,000 yards, and it was the duty of the navigator (Lieutenant Templin M. Potts) to inform his captain as soon as that range had been reached. It was not the business of the commodore to do anything more than give the order to the captain.

Captain Evans, of the *Iowa*, testified: "I saw the first shot from the *Massachusetts* fall a long way short, and, supposing that she was firing at 7,000 yards, I gave the range of my guns at 8,000 yards; and, when I saw the shots falling short, increased it to 9,000 yards, as we stood across the harbor."

Captain Folger, of the *New Orleans*, testified: "We fired at ranges varying from 8,000 to 11,000 yards."

From all this it would seem that Lieutenant Potts was not a very successful range-finder on that occasion. He testified that the first shot was fired at 7,800 yards, and "after that he was unable to determine any accurate range with the sextant, because it was completely covered with powder-smoke." In his testimony the gallant lieutenant condemned to a "state of innocuous desuetude" and general worthlessness the stadimeter, the sextant, and all the other instruments which were given to our navy for use in determining ranges.

It is possible that on the occasion in question he was so busy watching the personal conduct of the commodore that he could not give proper attention to his duty with reference to the range. However, the lieutenant, very shortly after he had given his testimony before the Court of Inquiry, was able to find the exact range of the second best position in the gift of the Navy Department for officers of his rank, viz., that of naval attaché to our embassy at Berlin, where he luxuriated for about two and one-half years.

Inasmuch as the ranges for the other two ships were

set by the *Massachusetts*, Mr. Potts got them all wrong.

Several shots from the enemy passed over and beyond our ships, but none of them struck, and the log-book of the *Colón* states that "an enemy's shell exploded near the stern, making dents in the side, and cracking some bowls in the round-house."

As usual, the *Iowa* did this damage to the enemy. At least Captain Evans claimed that that shell was from his ship.

Commodore Schley on the next day made official report of this reconnaissance to the Navy Department and Admiral Sampson, and has never had a word of official criticism from either concerning it. Later non-official criticism has been made in the light of later acquired knowledge of the defenses of Santiago entrance, and is manifestly unfair. What was then known and believed is plainly the only proper criterion.

It is said that the *Colón* could and should then have been destroyed. That is matter of opinion, and it is not probable that if her safety had been seriously menaced she would have remained in an exposed position, but would have shifted to a safer one, as she did next day.

All she had to do was to let go the hawsers from her stern to the shore, and the tide in a very few minutes would have carried her behind Smith Cay into perfect safety.

CHAPTER XXXIX

ADMIRAL SAMPSON ARRIVES AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND ASSUMES COMMAND

It has been stated, *ante*, that when the department received Schley's announcement of his purposed return to Key West, but before Schley had discovered Cervera, it cabled Sampson to know when he could go to Santiago. He left Key West on the 30th, with the *Oregon*, *Mayflower*, and *Porter*, and arrived off Santiago de Cuba on the morning of June 1, at 6 o'clock. Commodore Schley, of course, went immediately on board the flagship *New York* to make report of the situation to Admiral Sampson.

Schley testified (I. 1383): "On the first of June Admiral Sampson arrived. He brought with him the *New York*, *Oregon*, and *Mayflower*, and steamed down to the westward, a little inside of the line of blockade.

"He found us, at that time, just making the turn, and I went on board. He was very cordial, very glad to see me; and I explained to him the situation, and the facts of the reconnaissance. He seemed very glad to find out the situation that was there, and *I pointed out the Colón to him in the entrance.*"

At this point in Admiral Schley's narrative the judge advocate endeavored to stop him, and the following colloquy occurred:

The Judge Advocate: If the Court please, I think we are getting beyond the Court's construction of the scope of the Precept.

Admiral Dewey: As I understand, he is turning the command over to the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral Schley: Yes, sir.

Admiral Dewey: I want to hear it: I should like to hear that part.

That little colloquy illustrates the general spirit of unfairness displayed by Judge Advocate Lemly throughout the whole inquiry. As soon as anything was suggested that might bear upon Sampson, his objections became fervent.

Admiral Schley, continuing his narrative, said: "I handed him a number of despatches, explained to him the situation and told him the form of blockade I had maintained, and I heard no word of complaint from him. In fact, in view of the telegram of congratulation, I supposed, naturally, that everything was approved. Admiral Sampson's relations and mine were always very cordial. I never had any difference with him.

"So I turned over the command to him, and my squadron was not broken up until the 19th or 20th of June. I was still in command of the Flying Squadron, and it composed the left half of the blockading line at Santiago."

The log-book of the *New York* for June 1, 1898, contains the following entries:

"At 6.30 A. M. stopped; the harbor entrance bearing north. Commodore Schley came on board. In passing the harbor entrance sighted two Spanish men-of-war inside; one of the *Viscaya* class close to the westward, and the *Cristóbal Colón* opposite the mouth of the harbor, bearing north.

"The fort fired a shell alongshore; and the *Cristóbal Colón* fired one toward us, which fell short about two miles."

The log-book of the *Colón* for June 1 (A. 433), contains the following: "4 to 8 A. M.—The enemy's squadron in sight, passing the mouth of the harbor from E. to W., afterwards from W. to E. at a great distance, and beyond the reach of our guns. They appear to have been reinforced by several vessels."

In the report that was prepared by Admiral Sampson's staff for his signature on August 3, 1898, the

admiral says (A. 479): "June 1. Immediately on arrival I steamed down past the entrance to Santiago harbor, and saw, lying close within, the *Cristóbal Colón*, and one of the *Viscaya* class."

So that there can be no doubt whatever that these two Spanish vessels were distinctly visible to Admiral Sampson.

In his report last mentioned he adds to what is quoted above: "Both of these got up steam and moved up into the harbor out of sight."

The time at which they so "got up steam and moved up into the harbor out of sight" is not given, but the inference manifestly intended to be drawn from the statement is that they did so at once.

But the log-book of the *Colón* contains the statement: "At 10.35 got under way, and passed at slow speed between Punta Gorda and the bow of the *Oquendo*. Directed our course into the inner harbor, until 11.30 A. M., at which time we came to anchor."

So that, from all the above, it appears that Admiral Sampson, as soon as he arrived, at 6 A. M. June 1, saw the *Colón* and another of the Spanish fleet lying in plain sight just inside the entrance; that the *Colón* fired a shot at the flagship, which was a direct challenge to battle, as much as to say, "Come on, you Yankees, if you dare"; that Schley pointed her out to Sampson, as they sat on the *New York's* quarterdeck; that the *Colón* remained in plain sight for four hours and a half before she "got under way and moved up into the harbor," instead of going at once, as Sampson's report suggests.

The ships of the Flying Squadron, and the *Oregon*, were as ready for battle that morning as they proved to be on the morning of July 3. Sampson had a better chance to destroy the *Colón* than Schley had had the previous day, because he had a larger force, and had the benefit of the knowledge of the shore batteries Schley had gained by the reconnaissance. But he

seems to have been of the same mind as Schley relative to risking his ships by attacking unknown batteries, even for the chance of destroying the *Colón*, and notwithstanding the fact that he had just been challenged by her shot fired at his passing flagship.

The majority of the Court of Inquiry gave its opinion that Schley "should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29 and 30; and did not do his utmost with the force under his command, to capture or destroy the *Colón* and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31."

Part of that opinion is an absurdity on its face. Only in one way could either of those vessels have been captured, and that was by going into the harbor of Santiago after them, and nobody can pretend to believe that it was Schley's duty to attempt that.

Sampson for the whole month of June and part of July, with the full approval of the Navy Department, refused the importunate demands made by General Shafter, backed by the War Department, that he should make an effort to force an entrance into that harbor. The Spanish vessels were in there. The fact that they could not be seen was of no consequence.

As for the effort to destroy the Spaniards on the 31st, there is room for diversity of opinion as to what more, if anything, Schley should have attempted to do to that end. It was a matter of judgment, and the "man on the spot," upon whom the burden of responsibility rested, was the best judge.

If that criticism of the court is just, as applied to Schley, it applies to Sampson with greater force. The fair-minded man will be unable to see any reason why one should be faulted and not the other.

The truth is that neither should be so faulted, and so far as the Navy Department or Sampson is concerned, neither ever wrote a word of criticism. Sampson could not criticise Schley for the obvious

reason that he had done just what Schley had done, and the Navy Department could not criticise the one without criticising the other.

I said that the Navy Department had never done so. I beg Mr. John D. Long's pardon. When on February 6, 1899, he sent the report of Captains Evans and Taylor to the Senate *to be considered in secret session* (as he expected), he for the first time did undertake to fault Schley about it; but the Senate regarded the whole report as "a blow in the dark."

CHAPTER XL

THE SINKING OF COLLIERS IN THE ENTRANCE TO SANTIAGO BAY

THE sinking of colliers in the narrow entrance to the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, to keep Cervera's fleet *in*, seems early to have commended itself to the Navy Department, and also to Admiral Sampson. Both had forgotten our experience in the Civil War, when it was attempted to close up the main ship channel into the harbor of Charleston (the scene of Sampson's only war service of a few months), by sinking a fleet of old New Bedford whalers, laden with stone; which attempt was a complete failure. The commerce of that port now enters through the same channel, drawing more water than was ever possible before the stone fleet was sunk.

In its despatch to Schley of the 28th, the department used the language: "If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in mouth of harbor."

As has been stated, the *New Orleans* (Captain Folger) arrived off Santiago de Cuba on the 30th of May. She came under the following orders:

"U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

ST. NICHOLAS CHANNEL, May 27, 1898...

"SIR: You will proceed to Santiago de Cuba, to convoy the collier *Sterling*. You will communicate with Commodore Schley, and direct him to remain on the blockade of Santiago de Cuba at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are now in that port. Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier *Sterling* to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe

that it would be perfectly practicable to steam this vessel into position, and then drop all her anchors, allow her to swing across the channel; then sink her, either by opening the valves or whatever means may be best in his judgment. Inform Commodore Schley that the details of this plan are left to his judgment. In the meantime he must exercise the utmost care that none of the vessels already in the port are allowed to escape; and say to the Commodore that I have the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wish him good luck.

“W. T. SAMPSON,

“*Rear Admiral, etc., etc.*

“Commanding Officer,

“U. S. S. NEW ORLEANS.”

Schley does not seem to have entered very enthusiastically into this project. We have already seen that, following the example of the illustrious Nelson, he was of the opinion that the thing most to be desired was to persuade the enemy to come out, and not to keep him in.

Schley, in his testimony given before the Court of Inquiry (I. 1382), said: “Captain Folger brought with him a direction to sink the collier *Sterling* in the fairway leading into Santiago. He brought also some verbal explanations of the admiral’s desire to leave the matter to me. We had, of course, quite a lot of conversation in relation to that matter, and I did not understand, at that time, in view of the despatches from the Secretary, that it was intended that that passage should be blocked, unless we were obliged to abandon the port. In that event I rather suspected, rather thought, that that was the intention.”

No neater explanation of a failure to obey an order than that has been made since Nelson, at the battle of Copenhagen, with his blind eye to the glass, remarked: “I can’t see the signal to discontinue the

action." And we can almost hear Schley mentally repeat Nelson's further remark: "Damn the order; I'll not obey it."

At any rate, Schley didn't obey the order; and didn't sink the collier.

CHAPTER XLI

THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC"

As soon as Sampson arrived, on June 1, as he says (A. 481):

"Preparations were at once made for sinking the collier *Merrimac* in the entrance. The night of this day was particularly favorable for the enterprise—the tide, the setting of the moon—all conjoining most favorably.

"In consulting Naval Constructor Hobson as to the best means of sinking the vessel, he showed himself so interested, worked to such a degree in the preparation, and entreated so strongly to be allowed to take the ship in, that I consented, though several hundred officers and men had volunteered; and many begged hard to be allowed to go."

The crew finally selected were as follows: Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson; D. Montague, chief master-at-arms of the *New York*; Mate, Third Class, Charette, of the *New York*; Coxswain R. Clausen, of the *New York*; Machinist, First Class, G. F. Phillips, of the *Merrimac*; Coxswain O. Deignan, of the *Merrimac*; and Coxswain J. F. Murphy, of the *Iowa*.

In the *Century* article (pp. 898-9), Sampson gives the details of the organization and attempted execution of the project. They are, in some respects, very dramatic. One can imagine the intensity of the interview, on board the flagship, between the admiral and Captain Miller, of the *Merrimac*, when Miller learned that it was proposed to deprive him of the only chance for distinction that was likely to come to him; and to supplant him by a young naval constructor who was not even a line officer.

The admiral tells us of Miller's most urgent protest against being deprived of his command, even questioning the admiral's authority "to remove him from a ship where he had been placed in command by the Navy Department; and of his positive refusal to give up his command to anyone in the circumstances." But the admiral does not tell of the entreaties, the arguments, almost (if not quite) the prayers of Miller, that this, his one possible opportunity, should not be taken from him.

The admiral was inexorable. He says: "He (Miller) had my sympathy, but I succeeded in convincing him that, in the short time, it would be most unwise to make a change in the plans."

Hobson, in his *Century* article for December, 1898, "The Sinking of the *Merrimac*," puts this matter rather differently, and says (p. 247):

"Captain Miller had given directions to the officers and crew of the *Merrimac* to prepare to leave the ship, and was himself leaving to go and see the admiral."

Again (p. 278): "Captain Miller, who expected to go in, had spoken in high terms of his quartermaster and coxswain, young Deignan.

Hobson and Miller then both went on board the flagship, and saw the admiral. We have not Miller's statement of this interview, but he returned to his ship, evidently believing that he would not be deprived of his command.

Hobson continues the narrative (p. 278): "When I was about to leave, the admiral sent for me and said that Captain Miller claimed it as his right to go in with the *Merrimac*; and that he did not see how his claim could be disregarded. My answer was, in effect, that I should be happy to serve in any capacity, but that it must be evident to all that Captain Miller could not be anything but a passenger, even if nominally in command." And he used other arguments

(all this in Miller's absence), and finally Hobson said to Sampson that "when the situation was clear to the captain, he surely would not insist on going, however great his desire, as he could not really consider it right, or his duty to go."

The result of his argument was that "the admiral concluded that he would not allow the captain to go."

Hobson then followed Miller back to the *Merrimac*, and the preparations were continued far into the night. Hobson continues the story:

"Captain Miller was sitting on the bridge; Deignan was at the wheel. The ship replied well to the helm, and the gallant captain told about her steering and maneuvering qualities and other virtues, still expecting to go in with his ship. He had let me take complete charge, and I had not thought it necessary to tell him of the admiral's final decision."

When Admiral Sampson came on board, at nearly three o'clock in the morning, to make a final inspection, Miller was still in ignorance of his coming fate, and remained on the bridge, managing his ship, and still expecting to go. Hobson continues the story (p. 283):

"On coming on board, the admiral had gone up on the bridge,¹ and as he spoke to Captain Miller I heard an exclamation of disappointment from the latter. The admiral was the last to leave. Though bitterly disappointed, the generous captain came up to say a kind word, and wish us success."

Miller, from Hobson's account, does not seem to have been very strongly "convinced" by Admiral Sampson. He obeyed his order to leave the ship,—he had to do that,—but as for the admiral's "sympathy," he will no doubt to his dying day regard his treatment as the refinement of cruelty.

Hobson, in that *Century* article, relates an incident

¹ As a matter of fact, this occurred just before the admiral was about to leave.

that is not mentioned in any of Admiral Sampson's reports, but it will bear repeating here. After a day of anxious preparation and a sleepless night, Hobson started in to sink the *Merrimac*; but he was recalled by command of the admiral, and early in the morning he brought the *Merrimac* out near the flagship *New York*. He and his crew were worn out by want of sleep and want of food (which in the excitement of the hour had been forgotten), and the reaction of the excitement had set in.

Hobson, in the January number of the *Century* (p. 427) continues the narrative: "We stood over near the *New York*, and stopped. The executive officer hailed, and said a relief crew would soon be over; but asked if we would take care of her until the relief crew could get breakfast. We replied that we would take care of her as long as might be desired. The headway having carried us forward some distance, we put the helm a-starboard to steer across and circle back, when suddenly the *New York* started up, her propellor race began to seethe, and she shot by us at full speed. We looked ahead, and on the horizon, to the southwest, discovered a craft standing towards the harbor. Soon the smoke began to pour out of the *New York's* funnels. The craft stopped, turned about, and took to her heels, and a chase was on. The quarry was fleet, and had ten or twelve miles start. She drew hull down, and then disappeared. The *New York* stood straight on, and gradually disappeared; and for a long time the two columns of smoke told of hot pursuit. The *Porter* stood out at full speed to join in, and we saw her cut over the horizon.

"There would be hours of chase; and hours for return.

"A scorching sun rose high in a cloudless sky; not a breath of air stirred; a blinding glare came out of a

glassy sea; and a day of waiting lay before us. We remained there until late in the afternoon."

What a picture is thus presented!

Without food, until late in the forenoon (when by accident Ensign Gherardi learned of their condition and brought relief), and without relief, those brave fellows were left, and compelled to wait, until the commander-in-chief in his flagship could get back from chasing a possible prize again out of sight and signal distance of the rest of the fleet. It was nearly two o'clock in the afternoon when she got back.

That story is but a repetition of the one already given of the chase of the Spanish steamer *Pedro* on April 22, and it seems almost incredible. But the following extracts from the log-book of the *New York* completely verify the statements of Hobson.

"June 2. Midnight to 4 A. M.—The commander-in-chief visited the *Merrimac* from 2.25 until 3.20, when he returned with working party from the vessel, and Commander J. M. Miller.

"4 to 8 A. M.—About 4.30 the *Merrimac* started in for harbor under command of Naval Constructor R. P. Hobson, U. S. N., to be sunk in the channel; but was recalled by order of the admiral.

"At 5.55 sighted smoke of a steamer hull down to the Wd. Set out in pursuit, added another boiler, and increased speed to 17 knots.

"8 A. M. to Merid.—Standing to Wd in chase of a steamer, until 8.50, when we overhauled her. At 9.20 set course; and stood back to rejoin squadron, until 1.50; when stopped near the *Brooklyn*."

The log-book also shows that the *New York* steamed thirty-one miles from her station before she caught up with the steamer.

A further and very significant extract from that log-book on that same day is the following: "At 2.30 P. M. Commodore Schley came on board from the *Brooklyn*, and was received with the honor due his

rank, viz., full guard of marines, and band." This is the officer whose conduct up to that time Admiral Sampson subsequently characterized as reprehensible! What absurdity!

Suppose that, while the commander-in-chief was off chasing that possible prize, with Schley left as "senior officer on the spot," present in front of Santiago, Cervera had taken the opportunity to try and escape; and that his destruction had been as complete as it was on July 3, whose would and ought to have been the glory and credit of that destruction? There can only be one name given in reply, and it would not be "Sampson."

Cervera had a better chance to escape that morning than he ever had again, for by some misunderstanding the *Oregon* went off chasing, during the absence of the *New York*, and the *Marblehead* was sent after her, and they did not get back until 7 P. M.

The *Merrimac* went in on the night of June 2, and was sunk, but the attempt to block the channel was a complete failure.

The writer may be pardoned the expression of his opinion that it was very fortunate for the country that Captain Miller was not allowed to take the ship in. Miller was a good sailor, while Hobson, brave and able as he otherwise undoubtedly was, was not a sailor, and was therefore lacking in that readiness of resource in emergencies that comes only from long experience in handling vessels as a sailor.

So long as everything went according to the pre-arranged plan, all was well; but when the plan was broken there was none of the ability that was needed to adapt itself to the unexpected situation. The writer does not mean to disparage Hobson, in asserting the belief that Captain Miller would probably have made more successful the effort to block the channel.

The sinking of the *Merrimac* has furnished occa-

sion for the thanks of Congress to Hobson and his men who undertook it. Their bravery was not exceptional. When volunteers were called for, pretty much all the young officers and men of the fleet responded; but there should be and is no wish or purpose to detract in the least from the praise their bravery has rightfully received.

But one cannot help the feeling that it was a new procedure on the part of an admiral in the Navy of the United States, to put any obstruction whatever between his ships and the ships of an enemy.

Imagine, if one can, Admiral Farragut, when the progress of his wooden ships up the Mississippi below New Orleans was obstructed by Forts St. Philip and Jackson, by two or three ironclads, by fire-ships and rafts, by booms and chains, all commanded by officers who had been brought up in the navy of the United States, deliberately sinking a vessel in the narrow channel left open by the enemy, and through which only he could get at that enemy. Or at Mobile endeavoring to block up the narrow channel for the same purpose. Imagine, if possible, Admiral Dewey endeavoring to block up the entrance to Manila Bay, to keep Montojo's fleet in, and necessarily, to keep his own fleet out. Imagine Nelson endeavoring to block up the channel leading into Toulon, to keep the French fleet in there! Imagine any of these things! Impossible!

If Admiral Sampson could thereby have persuaded Admiral Cervera to come out, he should have sent a message to him that he would do as the French colonel did, when he exclaimed to the English regiment confronting his own in a battle: "*Apres vous, Messieurs!*" And have allowed Cervera to fire the first broadside.

The attempt to obstruct the channel, fortunately, proved utterly futile. Its best success was its complete failure.

CHAPTER XLII

SAMPSON'S ORDER OF BLOCKADE

SCHLEY'S method of blockade was continued by Sampson until the night of June 2. On that day he issued the following (A. 481), which was styled,

"ORDER OF BATTLE

"The fleet off Santiago will be organized during operations against that port, and the Spanish squadron, as follows:

"First Squadron (under the personal command of the commander-in-chief), New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.

"Second Squadron (Commodore Schley), Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.

"Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the commander-in-chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well inside.

"The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port; and the second squadron on the west side.

"If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close, and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them to run ashore in the channel.

"It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

"In smooth water, the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant."

[To accompany order of battle, dated June 2, 1898.]
Diagram III. U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, 1ST RATE,
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898.




DIAGRAM III.—“Accompanying this Order of Blockade was a diagram showing the position each vessel was expected to maintain.”

Accompanying this Order of Blockade was a diagram showing the position each vessel was expected to maintain. It is here reproduced, Diagram III opposite. The ships were placed in a semicircle, the radius of which was six nautical miles, with the Morro, at the entrance of the harbor as the center.

The distance in a straight line between the *Mayflower*, on the extreme right, and the *Vixen*, on the extreme left, was nearly twelve miles; and between Commodore Schley's flagship *Brooklyn* and Admiral Sampson's flagship *New York* was nearly seven miles.

These distances evidently were found embarrassing, in the matter of reading signals, because, on June 15 (A. 514) the admiral directed:

"If, at any time, the flagship makes a signal which is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flagship, or repeating vessel, to a point where she can read the signal."

The blockade was thenceforth maintained in this order, but the distance from the Morro was subsequently decreased in daytime, to about four miles. No hungry cats could have watched a hole out of which a rat was expected to come with a more sleepless and persistent vigilance than was displayed by that whole blockading force during the whole period before the day of the battle on July 3, and when the Spaniards did come out, "There they come"! was an almost simultaneous cry from the lookouts of those ships whose station permitted them to look into the entrance. It was expected that this should be, and it was most efficiently done; and there should be nothing but praise about it.

Commodore Schley's flagship *Brooklyn* faithfully performed her share of the arduous duty. Others of the ships went to Guantanamo to coal, but she remained and did her coaling on her blockading station, ever alert and ready for any emergency, as the event proved.

The only order that Admiral Sampson ever gave, after his assumption of command at Santiago de Cuba, which bears any semblance of an "Order of Battle" with Cervera's fleet, is found in the last preceding order. It is here reprinted in parallel columns with the order, or direction, that had been given by Admiral Schley to his captains on the morning of May 29, within two hours after Cervera had been discovered.

COMMODORE SCHLEY'S
ORDER.

Commodore Schley explained to the commanding officers that, in case the Spanish ships came out, he wished to concentrate the batteries of all our ships on a portion of those of the enemy. This was not explained as a tactical concentration of our whole force on a part of the enemy, but as a division of our whole fire on several of the enemy's ships.

During the time that the commanding officer was on board the flagship, Captain Evans asked Commodore Schley if it was his intention to steam at the enemy's ships in case they came out?

Commodore Schley answered "certainly," and added words indicative of his intention to attack them as they came out of the narrow defile.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S
ORDER.

If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close, and engage as soon as possible; and endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them ashore in the channel.

The above statement of Schley's "order," "directions," or "views" (whichever it may be called), is the statement made by Captain McCalla in the log-book of his vessel (the *Marblehead*) within a few hours after Commodore Schley gave them. They are in accord with what the commodore had said to his officers while at Hampton Roads, in April previous.

If Sampson had summoned his officers on board of

his flagship, on the morning of June 1, and there discussed with and explained to them his views, instead of writing that order, he would have done what Nelson did before the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar; and just what Schley did on the morning of the 29th, as soon as he had discovered Cervera.

Aside from verbal difference, the orders of both Schley and Sampson were: "If the enemy tries to escape, we will attack and try to sink them in the narrow channel." That was the natural, and in fact the only general direction that could have been given, for neither officer expected that our ships would do anything else than attack the enemy as soon as he appeared; and the giving of any formal order was about as necessary as it would have been to say to the cats watching the rat-hole: "Now, if that rat attempts to escape, you must go for him." That was cat nature; and it is the nature and education of the officers of the navy of the United States to "go" for the enemy as soon as he appears.

Nelson's rule of battle: "No captain can go very far wrong if he puts his ship alongside that of an enemy," has always been the rule of our navy.

CHAPTER XLIII

EVENTS DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE

THE month of June was not entirely uneventful. On the 6th a part of the fleet bombarded the batteries at the entrance to the harbor of Santiago de Cuba for about two hours and a half. The admiral then cabled the Navy Department (A. 485): "Have silenced the works quickly, without injury of any kind. If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movements. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly, by guns taken from the fleet."

General Shafter had on that very day embarked his army at Tampa Bay, Fla.

Ex-Secretary of War General Alger, in his book, "The Spanish-American War," at page 72, says: "During all night of the 7th the transports moved down the bay towards the gulf, on their way to Santiago; but just at that moment the phantom Spanish fleet revealed itself a second time."

The first revelation of this phantom had been during the month of April, or first part of May, when the whole New England coast got frantic with apprehension about it; and the then Secretary of the Navy (being from Massachusetts) sent Schley's two cruisers (*Minneapolis*, and *Columbia*) away from the Flying Squadron to "search for and descry" the imaginary foe.

Shafter's transports were stopped until the "phantom" could be laid, but finally (as General Alger facetiously says, "When the navy thought it safe to furnish an escort") sailed on June 14 for the seat of war, and, in due time, with the assistance of the boats

and steam launches of the navy, and under the management of Captain Caspar F. Goodrich of the navy, the troops were all safely landed (except two or three soldiers drowned) at Daiquiri and Siboney, two small villages to the east of the entrance of Santiago Bay.

The ten thousand men (it was fifteen thousand) were there, but the city was not "ours," for several periods of forty-eight hours, because then began a series of misunderstandings and bickerings between Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, of which the least said the better. The views and strictures of each upon the other are set forth on pages 86-89 of General Alger's book.

To sum it up, Shafter insisted that Sampson should force the fleet into the harbor of Santiago, which Sampson, with full approbation of the Navy Department, refused to try to do. He declined to risk his battle-ships, and insisted that Shafter should first capture the Morro and other batteries at the entrance, so that the channel might be cleared of torpedoes, mines, and other obstructions before attempting an entrance.

The fact is, however undeniable, that no effort whatever was made by Admiral Sampson to destroy the connections between the Spanish submarine mines and the electrical batteries by which they were to be exploded; or to do anything whatever looking towards the forcing an entrance.

The admiral had had one very frightful experience with torpedoes, during the Civil War, when the *Patapsco* was blown up under him at Charleston harbor in 1865. He was wise in his wariness to subject his battle-ships to any such risk.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE OCCUPATION OF GUANTANAMO

ON June 10 a battalion of marines that had been organized at, and sent from New York, under command of Colonel Robert W. Huntington, arrived; and under convoy of the *Marblehead* (Captain McCalla) and *Suwanee* (Lieutenant Delahanty) and other small vessels, landed at Guantanamo, and took possession of that excellent harbor. The marines were attacked vigorously, on several occasions, by Spanish troops, but, with their accustomed gallantry, the marines maintained their hold, and thenceforth that important harbor was occupied by our vessels as a coaling station.¹

On June 12, during a very severe attack by the Spaniards on the camp, Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs, of the navy, was killed.

On June 15 the *Texas* (Captain John W. Philip), *Marblehead*, and *Suwanee* attacked and demolished the forts guarding the channel at the head of the bay. In this attack the *Texas* and *Marblehead* each picked up, by their propellor screws, a submarine contact mine, containing about one hundred pounds of gun-cotton. The screws whirled them over and over several times before they were discovered. Philip naively says: "Owing to Divine care, neither of them exploded." A better explanation is that the incident demonstrated that in a short time after they were put down the contact mines became useless from corrosion, and were little to be feared. These had been planted only about a month.²

On June 16 another bombardment of the batteries

¹ Under our treaty with Cuba it has become permanently such station.

² One of them can be seen at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

at the entrance to Santiago took place. The admiral reported that "the batteries were quickly silenced, and after firing with great deliberation for some forty minutes, the fleet returned to its blockading position, without any shot from the batteries following this movement. This fact undoubtedly shows the efficiency of our fire."

There can be no doubt of the efficiency of our fire, but the failure of the Spaniards to return it is probably better explained by lack of ammunition to waste. These bombardments were an undoubtedly useless waste of our ammunition and straining of our guns.

The weary blockade continued all through the month of June, and until July 3.

CHAPTER XLV

THE BRAVERY OF LIEUTENANT VICTOR BLUE, UNITED STATES NAVY

THERE is a personal incident of that blockade that deserves especial mention, and certainly deserves especial commendation.

Up to June 10 Admiral Sampson seems to have continued uncertain as to whether all of Cervera's ships were in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and so he directed Lieutenant Commander Delehanty (commanding the *Suwanee*) to "communicate with the insurgent forces and obtain, through them, positive information concerning the presence of the enemy's ships in the harbor."

Delehanty subsequently reported (A. 444) that, in order to furnish absolutely reliable information, he had sent Lieutenant Victor Blue, that he might proceed to the hills north of Santiago, to make the desired observations. Lieutenant Blue returned and reported, on June 13, how, "after going through the Spanish lines, he proceeded to a hill top, from which he had an almost unobstructed view of the entire bay," and "in the bay he counted five large vessels that were unmistakably men-of-war. Three of these answered the descriptions of Cervera's vessels." "I was fully satisfied from my own knowledge that the vessels I saw were those of Cervera's squadron."

Not satisfied with this, Sampson again gave verbal directions to Delehanty "to procure further information of the location of the enemy's vessels in the harbor," and a second time Lieutenant Blue was sent within the Spanish lines for the purpose.

Delehanty, in forwarding Lieutenant Blue's report of this second venture, says (A. 445): "While it is

a simple and modest statement of his trip and its results, I beg to invite your attention to the perilous nature of the trip, and the prompt and satisfactory manner in which it was performed. This is the second time that Lieutenant Blue has successfully undertaken this hazardous duty, and while he has only done that which is expected of every officer, a due recognition of such valuable services is a great stimulation to the best efforts of officers and men."

Admiral Sampson, on June 27, wrote the department:

"I desire to recommend to your consideration the excellent conduct of Lieutenant Victor Blue, U. S. N., who has, on two occasions, at my request, undertaken to locate the positions of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. To accomplish this, it has been necessary to travel on one occasion over a distance of seventy-five miles, and on another a distance of sixty miles, mostly through territory occupied by the intrenchments of the Spanish Army.

"I think the manner in which he has accomplished these tasks is deserving of promotion, and I respectfully recommend that he be advanced ten numbers."

On these occasions Lieutenant Blue "wore his uniform and side arms."

It was chivalrous for the lieutenant to do this, but if he had been captured within the Spanish lines it is to be feared that "his uniform and side arms" would not have saved him from the fate of Major André or Nathan Hale.

"Promoted ten numbers!" He should have been promoted immediately to be lieutenant commander, for if he had been taken by the Spaniards, his reward would probably have been the erection, a hundred years after his death, of a statue to his memory, such as that which stands in the City Hall Park, at New York, to the memory of Nathan Hale; for we may be

quite sure that those Spaniards would have been prompt to take his life away.

More than a year later the gallant lieutenant was advanced for those deeds—*five numbers only*. The statute authorizes such promotions for “extraordinary heroism.” If that was not “extraordinary heroism,” it would be difficult to say what falls within that definition.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE MORNING OF JULY 3, 1898, SAMPSON, IN HIS FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," LEAVES FOR SIBONEY

THE signal-book of the flagship *New York* records on the morning of July 3 that the following signals were made:

"8.15 A. M.—*New York* to *Indiana*. To Captain Taylor. The admiral wishes to know if you will join him this morning, in going to see General Shafter?

"8.37 A. M.—*Indiana* to *New York*. Captain Chadwick. Work aboard ship previously going on prevents me from going with you to-day. Taylor."

The log-book of the *New York* contains the following entries:

"At 8.50 A. M. started at full speed under three boilers, for Altares (Siboney), accompanied by the *Hist* and *Ericsson*, after making signal to the rest of the fleet: 'Disregard movements of the commander-in-chief.'"

The signal-book shows that this last signal was made at 9.10, so that the flagship had been on her way towards Siboney for twenty minutes, at full speed, when it was made.

It is a very significant and important fact that neither Admiral Sampson nor Captain French E. Chadwick, the chief of staff and captain of the flagship *New York*, has ever, in the official reports of the events of that day, made any mention of those signals, particularly of the last and most important one, while *other unimportant signals are mentioned*.

The failure to mention it was not accidental in both. Captain Chadwick probably prepared both reports. Why, except upon the principle of "*Suppressio veri*," mention of it should have been omitted passes common understanding.

The log-book continues: "Mustered at quarters at 9.30. The admiral, captain, and assistant chief of staff prepared to land at Altares, to visit the headquarters of the army."

In his article printed in the *Century Magazine*, Captain Chadwick says: "The admiral, having made the engagement to consult that morning with General Shafter, and expecting to ride to headquarters on landing, had put on leggings and spurs (as had also the assistant chief of staff, Lieutenant Staunton), and did not remove them until after the battle; a costume that would have surprised the uninformed observer."

Certainly it would; but it as certainly shows the completeness of the preparation that had been made for landing.

The story of the succeeding events of that day has been told, not only in the cold official reports, but in the pages of the magazines and in the newspapers by their respective correspondents who were on board the ships in the action.

These correspondents shared all the dangers of the occasion, and displayed a bravery unexcelled by that of any of the trained and disciplined officers and crews of the respective ships that took part in the battle that ensued on that day.

Mr. George E. Graham, who was on board the *Brooklyn*, and Mr. Thomas E. Dieuwaide, who was on board the *Texas*, deserve particular mention and commendation.

The stories told by these gentlemen, *at the time*, were carefully viséd by the commanding officers of the respective ships, and are therefore as reliable in every particular as the official statements. There was no occasion for controversy, at the time they wrote, about *what they had seen in the fight*.

Mr. Dieuwaide, constrained no doubt by his relations to the *New York Sun*, afterwards undertook, before the Court of Inquiry, to qualify somewhat

some of the statements that he had made on the very day of the battle, while its roar had hardly ceased; but such qualifications, made more than three years afterwards, are of little worth, especially in view of the fact that Mr. Dieuwade had become involved in the Hodgson dispute, to be treated of hereafter.

CHAPTER XLVII

THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898.

IN the *Century Magazine* for May, 1899, the captains of all the fighting ships that took part in the battle (except Clark of the *Oregon*) have told the story of the battle as they saw it. Lieutenant Eberle, of the *Oregon*, told his vessel's story. Most graphic descriptions they all are.

Admiral Sampson also gave his version in the April number, 1899, of the same magazine.

Admiral Schley, up to the time when he told it before the Court of Inquiry, had resisted all inducements (and they were many, pecuniary and other) to tell that story, except in his official reports.

It is now purposed to give it in his own words, as testified to before that court, and to supplement it by the testimony of other officers of the *Brooklyn*, of the *Oregon* and the *Vixen*, given under oath before that court.

Before doing this, however, the following from the book of the Spanish Lieutenant José Muller y Terjiero (reprinted by the Navy Department), will not fail to be interesting. The lieutenant says:

"If I were to live a thousand years, and a thousand centuries, never would I forget that 3d day of July, 1898; nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it.

"The day dawned beautifully—one of those summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves of the trees; when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was wonderfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a great distance.

"Nothing was to be noticed among the ships of our



REAR-ADMIRAL, PASCUAL, CERVERA

fleet, motionless on the waters of the bay, which reflected their hulls, though inverted, with wonderful accuracy. They looked as though they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could remain in such perfect safety.

“To my mind the going out from Santiago harbor under the circumstances Cervera did, and as confirmed by the commanders of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with fearlessness, but with a clear head; for a man must be completely master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming excited or losing his head.”

CHAPTER XLVIII

ADMIRAL SCHLEY'S STORY OF THE BATTLE¹

SUNDAY, July 3, broke a perfectly beautiful day. The skies were flecked with white clouds, and the breeze continued a little longer, off the land that morning, than usual; light, it is true.

After I had gotten my breakfast, I came up to take a survey of the situation; to look about, and see what could be observed with the glasses.

We were lying, at that time, possibly three miles, or a little bit over, from the land; and I remember to have wondered very much why they had permitted us to lie so close to the shore—for we were constantly in range—and it was a matter of constant inquiry and discussion, on board the ship, why the batteries did not fire on us.

At a quarter of nine o'clock my orderly reported to me that a signal had been made from the flagship (*New York*) to "Disregard movements of commander-in-chief," and that she had gone eastward.

I looked over the ground and situation. I did not, of course, know where she had gone.

I sat under an awning that we usually had put into position each day as the sun rose, in order that the officers might collect there. I think we also had one forward for the men.

After having gone below for a little while, I came back on deck, with my glasses; and while I was sitting in this position, abaft on a hatchway, I heard a call from the forward bridge:

*"Tell the commodore that the fleet are coming out."*²

¹ As told to the Court of Inquiry, I. 1336 *et seq.*

² Throughout the course of Schley's own story the italics are all mine.—J. P.

That was some time after the men had been called to quarters; how many minutes I do not now remember; but in the vicinity of 9.35, according to our time.

The ship was at that moment lying with her head in toward the land, in the direction of Cabanas; which was a little cove to the westward; one of the marking points which we used in maintaining our position.

I looked over the starboard side and saw the enemy coming out of the entrance; and, realizing that there was very little time, I looked eastward to see the order of the ships, as they were arranged. I saw the *Texas*, apparently, I should say, a point or more abaft the starboard beam. My recollection now, as nearly as I can state it, is that the ship's head (*Brooklyn*), was pretty nearly north-northwest, having drifted around. The *Texas* appeared to me to be heading on some one of the easterly courses. I saw just ahead of her, to the left, the *Iowa*. She was, of course, to the eastward of the *Texas*. The *Oregon* was to the eastward of the *Iowa*; the *Indiana* was to the eastward of that position; and the *Gloucester* was lying in under the land, I thought, in the neighborhood of Aguadores.

The *New York* (Admiral Sampson's flagship) was out of sight, and out of signal distance, with glasses.

I looked at that, in order to determine what my position in the action was to be. Of course, if she had not been, I should not have given, or made, a signal!

In the meantime I had gone forward to a little platform that I had had constructed around the conning tower, as my position in battle;—the position I would take in order to be very close in with Captain Cook. I had only been there a moment or two when Cook joined me.

In the meantime Mr. Hodgson (the navigator), who was on the bridge sang out something to the captain about being "connected up," and all ready; and he (Hodgson) said to me about the same time:

"Commodore, they are coming right at us." "Well," I said, "go right for them."³

The helm was put a-port; the ship was started ahead; at first at, perhaps, half-speed; I don't recollect that. She took her way very quickly; and when we headed around, of course I said to Captain Cook, "Go ahead, full speed," and hoisted the signal "Clear ship for action." We generally made that signal, because there was around the quarterdeck and fore-castle of those ships a little temporary railing, composed generally of oars and rope, to keep the people from getting overboard; and generally an awning of some sort or other.

That signal was followed up by, "Close up," or "Close action."

The *Brooklyn*, as well as the other vessels of the squadron, charged immediately in to the entrance, in accordance with the original plan of sinking them in the entrance, or driving them ashore there.

We continued directly for the head of the enemy's column, the idea uppermost in my mind being that, if we could arrest them long enough for the battle-ships to close in and knock them to pieces, that would be our best point of attack.

We continued on this course, porting and starboard-ing, to meet the movement of the leading ship, which I assumed to be the flagship, from a flag at her mast-head; and I suppose that, from the start, as nearly as I can recall, we were ten to twelve minutes turning; first with port helm, and then advancing directly towards the enemy. I saw the ships to the eastward and westward (of the entrance) closing in.

I said to Captain Cook: "Close action," or "Close up" has been hoisted; and it means to keep about a

³ Mr. Hodgson confirmed this statement, and testified (I. 571): "I told him (the commodore) that they were evidently making for us; and he said, 'Well, go for them.' I rang full speed, and put the helm a-port."




DIAGRAM IV.—“He replied that it was either ‘a-port,’ or ‘hard-a-port’; I think he said ‘hard-a-port.’”

thousand yards away, so as to be out of their effective torpedo range."

"Much will depend upon this ship this day."

Captain Cook was standing close alongside of me. He said: "Yes, we will soon be within the cross-fire of these ships." I said: "Yes." We had advanced and were firing.

The first gun, I think, was fired (from the port forward turret) by Lieutenant Simpson, almost directly over the forecastle of the ship. I saw the leading [Spanish] ship, which apparently had started with the intention of ramming, take a most decided sheer to the westward, leaving a gap between her and the ship following, which subsequently proved to be the *Viscaya*. We were standing in the direction of the *Viscaya*, when she also, if she had been minded to ram, seemed to have given up the intention; and turned also to the westward, following the direction of the leading ship.

It then became apparent, as we were steering on diametrically opposite courses, that the original plan had failed; and that the Spanish fleet in order, and apparently at distance,⁴ had succeeded in passing the battle-ship line.

The new feature of the fight became immediately apparent, the first having failed.

The disposition was to be made then that was to control the subsequent battle.

THE LOOP (SO-CALLED) IS MADE

Immediately Cook gave the order to port the helm. I did not. I should have done it in a second. I saw the ship's head swinging very rapidly, and I asked him if the helm was hard-a-port. He replied that it was either "a-port," or "hard-a-port"; I think he said "hard-a-port." (Diagram IV shows situations at the time.)

⁴This means about four hundred yards apart.—J. P.

I have never seen a ship turn more rapidly than she did; and her turn was absolutely continuous; there was no easing of her helm.

I never saw the starboard side of the *Texas* at all. I only saw her port side, and she never approached any position that was within six hundred yards of the *Brooklyn*. She was so distant that she never entered my head as a menace or danger. We passed completely around the circle.

The last range [of the Spanish ships] was 1100 yards, and a feature of the nearness of that ship which has impressed itself on my mind, and will never be forgotten, was that I could see, with the naked eye, men running from her turret to her superstructure deck; and I observed the daylight between their legs, as they ran. It was the second ship upon which I saw this. We turned immediately about, and I was for a long time under the impression that our starboard engine was backed; but I found out subsequently that it was not.

During the turn Mr. Hodgson (the navigator) very properly made some allusion to look out, perhaps, for the *Texas*; I do not recollect what it was; but there was never any colloquy of any character between Mr. Hodgson and myself. First, he was too good an officer to have transgressed one of the plainest duties of an officer at that time; and, second, if he had undertaken it, I would not have permitted it for a second. As I say, that is fiction. There was no colloquy.

Before we turned, the leading [Spanish] ship was abeam, or a little abaft the beam. When we had turned about she was ahead of us,—that is, on the starboard bow,—*and all four of the Spanish ships and the fort were firing at the same time.* I looked over and saw the forts firing. From that moment, the next ten or fifteen minutes was the most furious part of the entire combat. I remember very distinctly seeing,

from time to time, as my attention was attracted for the moment, the jets of water ahead and astern; and over and short; and the roar of the projectiles was one of the things that can be heard once in a lifetime, and never forgotten.

It appeared to me, at that moment, that all four of those ships were at work on the *Brooklyn*; and up to that moment, up to the moment of turning, so far as we could perceive, there was not the slightest evidence that they had been even injured.⁵

The thought passed through my mind that after all our precautions and waiting, those fellows would get away.

At that moment I felt, and I think I remarked to Captain Cook, that we were alone; and would perhaps have the most of that fight upon ourselves, because I did not know then that the battle-ships could possibly keep up with their speed; but I said to him: "We must stay with this crowd." I had no idea we would escape. I thought, of course, that if they could have shot as well as we did, they certainly would have gotten us.

When we had turned around, when we had got completely turned around, and on a westerly course,—the Spanish ships appeared to have been broken up a little, although still in some semblance of formation,—just at that moment I saw the *Oregon* breaking through the cloud-envelope. She broke through on to the starboard quarter of the [*Brooklyn*] flagship. I had hoisted the signals of "Close up" and "Follow the flag," believing that a new disposition was necessary; and that signal was replied to, and I saw it repeated to our other ships.

Captain Clark knew very well that it was not in-

⁵ This same idea impressed itself upon Captain Clark's mind, who said (I. 1335): "The *Oregon* ran between the *Iowa* and *Texas*, and soon after we sighted the four Spanish ships ahead, apparently uninjured at the time."

tended for him, because he *was* "following the flag," so he repeated it to the other ships.

In a very few minutes after the *Oregon* broke through the cloud of smoke—she was, at that time, perhaps four hundred or five hundred yards distant, not much farther—the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were a sheet of flame. I never saw such a fire; and never realized what rapid gun firing really meant before, because both ships were, at that time, a sheet of flame; and in a very few minutes after that I saw that the leading [Spanish] ship was very badly hurt, for she lagged astern. I saw the smoke coming out of her hatches, and the fact that impressed itself upon me was that the columns were going almost straight into the air.

I said to Captain Cook, who was constantly at my side, and always in my confidence: "We have got one. Keep the boys below informed of all the movements. They can't see; and they want to know"; and he did throughout the action. Every few moments messages were sent below to the men; and they were answered oftentimes with cheers that we could hear through the ventilators.

It appeared a very short interval after that that I saw a second one on fire, which proved later to be the *Oquendo*. She had evidently suffered very severely, and she started, of course, immediately inshore, leaving the *Viscaya* and the *Colón*. The *Viscaya* immediately took a leading position on the bow, and I thought for a while that perhaps she would outfoot us. The *Colón* worked inshore, and from the dropping out of those two ships, until the *Viscaya* turned inward, was a period of perhaps thirty minutes, during which she was abreast of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*.

I looked to the eastward just before these ships turned in, and I got occasional glimpses of the *Indiana* and *Gloucester*. I could not see very well, for the

smoke, what they were doing; though I knew that they were doing admirable work. I felt that the moment those vessels ran on the beach the commanding officers of our ships who could not keep up the pace with the leaders would take care of the prisoners, and save them from the insurgents as well as from the fire that had been started by our gun fire.

I should say that, as nearly as I can remember the time, about thirty minutes elapsed from the time of the turning in, or wounding of those two vessels, until the *Viscaya* followed their example.

The *Viscaya* was a little forward of the beam of the Brooklyn, and I do not think over about 2300 or 2400 yards distant, at any time.

She was in most excellent target range, and I remember, on the way out, inquiring from a man in the top [one of the marines] who was under this heavy fire of the two Spanish ships; and he reported that he did not see any of our shots hitting the water; and so I imagined that he meant they were striking the ships.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YEOMAN GEORGE H. ELLIS

YEOMAN ELLIS was the only man killed in the battle, and Schley, continuing the narrative, said:

On the trip outward, after the turn, I was very anxious about the ranges, because I did not want the *Viscaya* and the *Colón* to get out of good fighting range.

Ellis, who was an expert man with the stadimeter, constantly kept the stadimeter on those vessels; and, knowing exactly their heights, he reported to me that they were maintaining the same range. I thought, however, that my eye was a little bit more sensitive, and I said to him, "No, they are evidently gaining." He went from me a second time, and that was the last I saw of him.

In performing this magnificent duty, he lost his life.

I don't think he was distant from where I was standing over eight or ten feet. His brains and blood were thrown over a great many people, and some of it reached me. He immediately fell to the deck, of course, and it was a shocking sight, to men who had never seen such things. Lieutenant McCauley and Doctor Du Valin were standing between me and the tower, and they picked up the body and carried it to the side. I just happened to see them through this opening, and called out to them, "No, don't throw that body overboard." I thought that one who had fallen so gallantly deserved to be buried like a Christian, and his body was laid under the lee of the forward turret, covered with a blanket, and kept there until the battle was over.¹

¹ Lieutenant Ryan gave the following account of Ellis' death. "Ellis was forward of the forward turret, perhaps about three

He was buried at Guantanamo.

Just before the *Viscaya* turned to run ashore she put her helm a-starboard, apparently starting out for the *Brooklyn* or the *Oregon*, I don't know which. At that moment she evidently got a severe wound, for I saw quite an explosion under her port bow. In a moment afterwards she put her helm hard-a-port, turning inshore, with smoke coming from all of her hatches, and I thought she was going to capsize, as she had such a tremendous list to port.

At that moment I saw a shell strike her,² which appeared to me to rake her fore and aft, and I thought she would sink in deep water. So I told the signal officer to signal to the *Texas* to look out for her people, and save them.

The *Texas* was, however, too far astern to receive the message, and I made the remark at the time, "Well, Philip is always sensible; he needs no instructions about such things."

In the tremendous part of the fight to the eastward, all of the signal halyards of my ship were cut, with, I think, probably one exception. One of the speed cones, that we had hoisted to indicate speed, was cut, and came very near striking me on the bridge. It came down in front of me and went overboard.

After the *Viscaya* had turned in, on fire, her colors down, the *Colón* had edged inshore, and appeared to

feet, taking ranges; and, while he had the stadimeter in his hand, a shell, from what I thought was the *Colón*, struck him in the face and took his head off instantly. Blood spouted out of his neck, and went over all the people about there. We attempted first to drop his body overboard, on account of the blood that was around the deck, but the commodore said not to throw him overboard, and he could be buried on shore."

² Concerning this shell, Schley was too modest to claim that it was from his own ship, but Lieutenant Harlow (I. 1330) says: "I have a very good reason for believing that the projectiles which set on fire the *Viscaya*, and compelled her to turn inshore, came entirely from the *Brooklyn*; and that there was, at that time, no other ship within range of the *Viscaya*."

be following the contour of the coast. I thought at the time that, looking astern, and seeing what had happened to her consorts, she was looking for the best place she could find in order to end the matter at once.

But from Asseraderos, which is a point some fifteen or sixteen miles west of the harbor of Santiago, to the Rio Tarquino, is about thirty miles perhaps; and I saw she was out of range. So I made the signal to "cease firing," and told Captain Cook to let his men come out of the turrets into the cooler air and get something to eat; and to hurry up his men from below.

I think I went into the tower myself at that time, and sang out to the men below that we had got all hands of them [the Spaniards] except one; and I thought they could be relied upon to catch that other vessel. I heard a good deal of merriment and rejoicing.

I went back to the bridge, and soon realized that they were doing their best. There was a jingle to the rails and a vibration of the vessel, but I perceived, at that time, that the motions of the ship were very sluggish. It developed that one of the after compartments was filled with water, which we thought at the time was due to the fact that we had received some injury below the water line.

The ship's speed, of course, came up with some rapidity. I think the *Viscaya* had run ashore somewhere in the neighborhood of eleven o'clock, and towards twelve it became very apparent that we were gaining on the chase. I said to Captain Cook several times during the action, that it would be a good idea to edge in a little closer, so that we could finish those fellows quicker. He replied that we had them in most excellent range, and that the guns were doing most admirable work.³

³ Captain Cook confirmed this statement (I. 991) saying: "He [the commodore] spoke to me a number of times, asking me if I

We were pointing at that time for Tarquino Point—not Cape Cruz. It was Tarquino Point, a point extending to the southwest.

My idea was that, in steering that course, if this ship [*Brooklyn*] kept up her speed, the *Colón* would be obliged to come out; and at that time I said to Cook, "I would get up a lot of extra ammunition, so that when we come to close quarters it will be a very few minutes to knock her out."

As we were going out, of course there were various signals between the *Oregon* and myself, some of a pleasant character and some official.

I gave the order (which Captain Clark has testified he did not receive) to open fire with her thirteen-inch guns.⁴

However, we continued to advance,—the *Oregon* and the *Brooklyn*. I do not think the *Oregon* was ever farther astern than eight hundred yards, and at times she worked up on our quarter. We continued in this position until about 12.50 P. M., when we realized that we were within range of the vessel, and we tried the thirteen-inch and eight-inch guns on her. Several of the shots fell short, but I recollect that a shot from one of the *Oregon's* thirteen inch guns passed entirely over the *Colón*; and one from the *Brooklyn's* eight-inch guns passed over her. I saw with my own eyes the jet of water beyond, and thought it had gone through her; but it appears that it did not strike her.

couldn't edge in on them a little. I recollect this distinctly, because I was anxious to keep a straight course, believing that we gained by that; and we had them at all times under our range. We had their range ocpletely; and our shots were landing, while theirs were not."

⁴ Concerning this Lieutenant McCauley, who was Schley's signal officer, testified (I. 1038): "We ceased firing shortly after the *Viscaya* went ashore, and the *Brooklyn* chased the *Colón*; and finally, when the signal was made to the *Oregon* to try the thirteen inch guns—or whatever the words were,—I don't remember the words exactly,—she opened fire with her thirteen inch guns. I remember that signal distinctly, and particularly (I. 1041); because I made it myself."

CHAPTER L

THE "COLON" HAULS DOWN HER FLAG

SCHLEY continues the story: At that time the *Colón* being directly under the fire of the two ships (*Brooklyn* and *Oregon*), there was no question, apparently, in the mind of her captain that it would be fatal to continue the attempt to escape; and I think he did exactly right. The sacrifice of life would have been unnecessary. So at 1.15 he fired a gun to leeward, and hauled down his flag, and ran in on to the bar at Rio Tarquino.

I signaled at once that the enemy had surrendered, and gave the order to cease firing.

At the time she hauled her colors down I do not think she was over four miles from us. We were then running in the neighborhood of fifteen knots.

We hauled up and immediately passed into a position, I should say, of one thousand yards from the *Colón*; and I should say that we arrived in the vicinity of the *Colón* certainly at 1.30 o'clock P. M.

When this surrender took place I naturally felt interested in the vessels that were following. I was then on the bridge, and with glasses saw three vessels astern. I could see the masts of two, but only the smoke of the third one.

We lowered out boat, and Captain Cook went on board the *Colón*.

He asked me, "What were the terms of surrender?" I replied, "Unconditional. Those are matters that the commander-in-chief must arrange. We can only receive unconditional surrender."¹

¹The captain of the *Colón* seems to have had peculiar ideas of his duty as one who has surrendered. It goes without saying that when an enemy hauls down his flag and fires a gun to leeward, it

"About 2.23 the *New York* came up. We had distinguished her. I made signals to her, and one of the signals I made she was quite half an hour in answering. When she came up I also made signal to her that it "*was a glorious day for our country,*" to which the reply was: "*Report your casualties.*"

As soon as I could, I went on board the flagship to pay my respects to Admiral Sampson. In the meantime Captain Cook, who had been detained some little time on board the *Colón*, started back to make his report, and went on board the flagship to make his report to Admiral Sampson; and did so. When he returned to the *Brooklyn* I took the boat and went on board the flagship myself.

There I reported to the admiral substantially what had occurred, narrating the features of the battle in a hurried way. After making this statement to the commander-in-chief, a group of the officers who were standing on the opposite side came up to me and asked me about the details of the battle, everybody, of course, being interested in them; and I rehearsed them again, in a hurried way.²

means that his ship belongs to the victor; and the defeated party has no right to injure or destroy or imperil her. And yet the Spanish captain had, after surrendering, run his vessel ashore, opened her sea-cocks in such a manner as to fill her with water, and had caused all the breech-blocks of her guns to be broken off and thrown overboard, so as entirely to disable her battery.

²The Battle of Santiago was then over, and a complete victory won, and with total destruction of the Spanish fleet had been secured with Schley as the "senior officer on the spot."

CHAPTER LI

THE "BROOKLYN" IS SENT TO FIGHT A NEW FOE

SCHLEY's story then continues as follows: At that time Chaplain Royce, of the *New York*, came up to me and said: "Commodore, your work is not over yet. The *Resolute* has just arrived. Captain Eaton reports that there is a Spanish battle-ship on the coast, and the admiral wishes to see you."

I went over, and there I found Captain Clark in the presence of the commander-in-chief. I made some suggestion to the commander-in-chief about hoisting the flag on the *Colón*, and said to him that, if he had not come, I was prepared to have a force of fifty or sixty men mechanics and marines on board, to avoid anything like "monkeying with her."

He stated to me that he wished me to take the *Oregon* and go eastward to meet this ship.

I must say that I felt some little delight as soon as he said that, because I thought that, after the admirable work of the squadron on that day, and the part the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* had had in it, there was not anything that carried the Spanish colors that we should have hesitated to meet.¹

¹ Captain Clark gave the following statement of this episode (I. 1336):

"It was reported by Captain Eaton of the *Resolute* that a Spanish battle-ship had arrived off Santiago, and I think he said he had been pursued by her. He was positive he had seen a Spanish battle-ship.

"The admiral did not seem to be much impressed by that; he seemed incredulous. I remarked that it must be Camara's fleet, but that they had arrived too late. The admiral did not dissent; he did not say anything to that. Presently he said: 'Well, Clark, you will have to go after that ship!'

"Believing, as I did, that there really was a Spanish ship there, I said: 'Well, Admiral, in war we want to overpower the enemy, if possible. Why should not the *Brooklyn* go along? He turned, and said, 'Certainly; Schley, you go also!'

I immediately went on board my ship, stopping on the way to get the chaplain of the *Texas*, in order to bury the man who had been killed.

I made signal to the *Oregon* to "Follow the flag," and started eastward at pretty high speed. After I had gone some little time I saw that the *Oregon* did not follow. After I had gotten about an hour away,—perhaps a little less,—I saw, coming from the eastward, what proved to be the *Vixen*, with the flag-lieutenant [Staunton] on board. He came up alongside of the *Brooklyn*, hailed me, and said that the smoke that I saw on the eastern horizon was that of the *Pelayo*; that he had gone close enough to distinguish her, and make out her colors; and that he was sure it was the *Pelayo*. I told him to go west and inform the commander-in-chief, and that the *Brooklyn* would go east and meet the *Pelayo*.

As we approached what was supposed to be the *Pelayo* I must confess that I was a good deal confused in attempting to distinguish her two colors."²

"Then, feeling that I had perhaps assumed too much in speaking, and suggesting that a commodore also accompany me, I turned to the commodore, and said: 'Commodore, we have knocked out several vessels this morning; and we can knock out another, can't we?'"

"He [Schley] said, 'Certainly we can; come on.' And started over the side. I started for my boat too—I think on the other side of the vessel.

"What I was impressed with was his cheerful, cheery manner of approving of my having mentioned his going; that, as a senior, he had no feeling against me for suggesting it; but was approving, rather, and cheerful in his manner."

To the ordinary mind, the question will suggest itself:

Why didn't Admiral Sampson himself go in his flag-ship *New York* to meet the new foe?

He had not been able to take any part in the battle, and one would think that he would have hailed with delight the approach of the new enemy, and gone promptly east with the *Oregon*, to meet her, leaving to Schley the duty of taking care of his prize, the *Colón*. But, no; he preferred the caring for the prize, and sent Schley to fight the new enemy.

² The Spanish flag consisting of horizontal stripes, red, yellow, and red; and the Austrian, red, white, and red.

She had flags at both mastheads, and that only impressed me with the idea that she was cleared for action and in battle array.

We kept our battery trained upon the ship, and had reached a position about eighteen hundred yards from her, and I had just given Captain Cook the order to "stand by" [to fire]. Perceiving, however, that we were a little too close inshore to maneuver, and that our starboard battery was almost entirely disabled, I ported the helm to get a little more room, and to engage her on the port side, the battery of which was almost complete and entire. As I ported the helm she did the same, and that only convinced me that she was looking for us, as we were looking for her. In a few moments my signal officer, Mr. McCauley, said to me: "She is making a signal." It was towards dusk, and she had turned her searchlight upon her flags, in order to call our attention to them, and that signal was interpreted by the code to mean that she was an Austrian.

Of course we immediately trained our guns off of her, passed under her stern, and stopped. Her commanding officer came on board. She proved to be the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, of the Austrian navy, the second ship of that name that we had encountered that day.

When the *Colón* surrendered, the battle, of course, ended, and there were no other operations. The commander-in-chief signaled to me that he would remain and transfer the crew from the *Colón* to the vessels there, and I went on to the eastward, feeling that, under the circumstances, the proper position for the second in command would be off Santiago. To that place I went, reaching the position of the squadron off the harbor somewhere near midnight.

At ten or half past, in passing down the coast, just when we were abreast of the *Viscaya*, an explosion of

one of her magazines occurred. We all said, as we passed, "Well, that is the final salute."

As I approached the *Indiana*, of course all on board of her were very anxious to know what had become of the *Colón*. I announced her surrender, and there was great cheering.

CHAPTER LII

SCHLEY MEETS ADMIRAL CERVERA—NO CHEERS ALLOWED

SCHLEY continues: As I passed on, Captain Evans (of the *Iowa*) hailed me, and said that Admiral Cervera was on board, and would like very much to see me.

I went over to see him, and found him on the after part of the ship. But before approaching him I directed that there should be no cheering, as I did not think it proper to exult over a foe who had fought and behaved so gallantly, and that we ought to omit that,—which was done.¹

I went over to see the admiral, whom I found, of course, very greatly dejected. I said to him that I knew he had lost everything, clothing as well as

¹ Much praise has been properly given to Captain Philip of the *Texas*, for his order given to his crew: "Don't cheer, boys; those poor devils are dying." But Philip was not alone in his kindly expressions towards the beaten foe.

Major Paul Saint Clair Murphy, of the Marine Corps, who was on board the *Brooklyn* that day, testified before the Court of Inquiry (I. 1319):

"I remember distinctly, because it made a very great impression on me at the time. The *Colón* had hauled down her flag, and was ashore.

"We were preparing a cutter to take Captain Cook to the *Colón*, to receive the surrender of that ship. The officers and men were gathered forward, in the neighborhood of the forecastle, and Commodore Schley addressed the men, cautioning them not to cheer when the Spanish captain came on board. He spoke of their gallantry, saying they had made a good fight, and they should not be humiliated; that we should treat them chivalrously; and not humiliate them with cheers.

"It was a gallant speech, and we all felt it very deeply. The commodore made the same speech about midnight of the same day, when we were ranging up alongside the *Iowa*. We had learned that Admiral Cervera and his officers were on board the *Iowa*."

It is quite evident that *vae victis* had no place in the commodore's heart.

money, and that I wanted to say that the object of my visit was to inform him that my wardrobe, as well as my purse, were at his service. He replied that he thanked me very much, and that he had never met a sailor who was not a gentleman; that he was very much obliged, but that all he wanted was to send a despatch to his government, or to the captain general, announcing what had happened to his squadron. I told him, of course, that there could be no objection to that, and the despatch which he sent practically announced the destruction of the Spanish squadron, and what he had done. I informed him of the fate of the *Colón*, and that telegram was sent to the Captain General.²

That ended the battle of Santiago, on the 3d day of July, 1898.

Admiral Schley, closed his story, thus:

I would like to say, before concluding, that I was very much impressed that day with the fact that the officers and men who were engaged in that struggle fulfilled, in the highest and very noblest degree, the traditions of the American Navy.

Is there any wonder that the close of such a story as that, by that sentiment, caused the listeners to break out into hearty, vehement, and prolonged applause?

Not even Dewey's gavel, and command, could prevent.

² It was as follows (A. 505): "I went out at 9.30, and sustained a very hot battle with the enemy. The defense was brilliant, but it was impossible to fight against the hostile forces, which were three times as large as ours. The *Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Viscaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore and were then blown up. The destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor* were sunk by shots from the hostile guns. The *Colón*, the Americans say, surrendered after running aground. I estimate our losses at six hundred killed and wounded. The rest of the crews have been taken prisoners, Villamil was killed in the battle, I believe also Lazaga. Among the wounded are Concas and Eulate. The Americans have allowed the latter to retain his sword, because of his brilliant conduct. I must state that the American sailors are treating us with all possible consideration.

"CERVERA."

CHAPTER LIII

CAPTAIN FRANCIS A. COOK'S STORY OF THE BATTLE

THE testimony of Captain Francis A. Cook, the captain of the *Brooklyn*, given before the Court of Inquiry (I. 895) is of very great interest, and importance, and is as follows:

We were to the westward. The bearing of the entrance from us was about N. E. by N.

The Spanish fleet came out south; and turned, as they left the entrance, about four points southwest; so that they turned in our direction.

As soon as I saw this fleet, and saw that they were heading southwest, they seemed to be coming straight for the interval between the *Texas* and *Brooklyn*, we being headed for the fleet, about northeast. I went into the conning tower and directed the helmsman, told him what I wanted to do—to keep straight for the head of the fleet.

They wavered a little, sometimes turned one way, and sometimes another. We shifted the helm once or twice, but a very little indeed; and, finally, when we were getting up fairly close—between 2,000 yards and 1,500 yards, I should judge—it seemed to me clear that they wanted to pass between the *Texas* and the *Brooklyn*.

The *Texas* was well on our starboard, and she was heading to the northward and eastward (how much I do not know); but all the ships were carrying out the instructions of the commander-in-chief, which were to head for the entrance.

The Spanish ships were well to the westward. We held to the northeast. When I saw that, I ported the helm, perhaps halfway over. The fleet was still com-

ing for this interval. I stepped out of the tower, and on to the port hand side, to get a good look at the Spanish fleet; to see just what they were going to do, and as to our relative positions.

When I saw that they [the Spanish] had evidently put their helms apart, and were turning to the westward,—we were then turning rapidly to starboard with port helm, and had turned through, I think, almost to eastward; had ported the helm from about northeast—as I saw the enemy turn westward, I gave the order “Hard-a-port” to the helmsman; ran through the opening between the shield and the conning tower, to the other [starboard] side, on purpose to see our own fleet, and the relative positions of our own fleet. The *Texas* was well on our starboard hand.

Instantly, quicker than I can tell it, the commodore called to me: “Cook, hard-a-port,” or “Is your helm hard-aport?” My answer was, “It is hard-a-port; she is turning as rapidly as possible.”

As I saw the *Texas*, I saw her port bow. I never saw her starboard side; and changing her bearing very rapidly, the *Brooklyn* turned very rapidly along the port side of the *Texas*, until there was a clear opening between the [bow of] the *Brooklyn* and the stern of the *Texas*.

We made a complete turn, and a very rapid turn, with the helm hard-a-port, from previously “port,” until we came around, and paralleled the Spanish fleet on the other side; and then we had the *Viscaya* on our starboard bow; and abaft beam was the *Oquendo*, and then the *Colón*. At the time I thought it was the *Teresa*; but I soon discovered this vessel dropping out, and heading to the beach. Then we passed on.

That [referring to the turn] was about the hottest time in the action. There was no time for indecision,

and I don't think there was any. It was a critical point, at a critical time.

I have always felt, in my own mind, from a study of the position, that the chances would have been of disaster, had we shifted the helm at such a time.

However, we got around there, and we had those three vessels [Spanish] there; and I looked, and could see nothing but smoke astern. Our vessels seemed enveloped in this smoke.

We certainly were alone then. They were all firing on the Brooklyn, when, almost immediately,—faster than I can tell it,—I saw a large “white bone” in the water,—that is the bow wave,—and through the smoke I saw the bows of a vessel. I exclaimed, “What’s that?” and the navigator [Hodgson] who was near me said: “That’s the *Massachusetts*.” There was some question about the *Massachusetts*; and I said, “That’s the *Oregon*.” I was perfectly assured from that moment. She came up very rapidly. She was making more speed than we were at that time.

She passed in between the *Texas* and the *Iowa*, shot into that opening. She came to the northward of the *Texas*, and came out on our starboard quarter, and about eight hundred yards from us. I mean a perpendicular distance between our courses. There was never anything between the *Brooklyn* and the Spanish ships.

I gave that order, “Hard-a-port,” on my own order; there is no question about that. It was not after having heard the commodore.

There was a perfect understanding between us, and never a question of any kind during the action.

CHAPTER LIV

CAPTAIN CLARK'S STORY OF THE BATTLE¹

ONE would think that a judge advocate, whose duty it was to place before the Court of Inquiry the true facts of that eventful day, would, at the very outset, have called upon Captain Clark and his officers to tell what they knew about the battle of July 3, 1898.

The eyes of the whole naval world had been fixed upon that gallant officer during his great voyage around from the Pacific, and his ship, the *Oregon*, had been most conspicuously efficient in that fight.

Captain Clark's statements imported absolute verity, and no one could or would pretend to doubt them in any particular. He had been "in it" from start to finish, and knew all about it, and his absolute impartiality could not be doubted.

And yet the truth seeking judge advocate left Clark and the other officers of the *Oregon* out of the telling, and left it to Admiral Schley to produce them as witnesses.

Up to the time of the inquiry, Clark had resisted all efforts to persuade him to tell the great story, except in the official reports; and one who consults his report of that battle will find it very meager and unsatisfactory, so far as details go.

Before the Court of Inquiry he testified as follows (I. 1334):

When we discovered the Spanish ships coming out, our fleet closed in at once to attack, each ship having been ordered to keep her head directly towards the harbor entrance. The Spaniards turned to the westward, breaking through our line, or crossing it, and our ships swung off to the westward in pursuit. Both

¹ Captain of the *Oregon*.

sides opened fire promptly, and a dense smoke soon obscured the vessels, making it difficult to distinguish them. The *Oregon*, however, ran between the *Iowa* and *Texas* (the next ships to the westward in our line), and soon afterwards we sighted the four Spanish ships ahead, *apparently uninjured at the time*. They had gained so much that I believed they had been successful in their attempt to escape. It was very soon evident, though, that we were gaining a little, at least on one of them, which proved to be the *Maria Teresa*, the flagship; and I thought we should bring her to close action, might be exposed to the concentrated fire of all the ships.

Just then the smoke lifted, or broke away to our left, and I discovered the *Brooklyn*. She was well forward of our port beam, and broadside to the enemy's fleet. Her course was a little divergent from ours, because the *Oregon* was attempting to draw up on the *Maria Teresa*. But the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* maintained this relative position, bow and quarter, to the end of the battle, the *Brooklyn* steaming straight ahead, as nearly as I could judge, and *engaging all the Spanish ships*; the *Oregon* endeavoring to come to close action with the sternmost one; and when she was driven out of action, and pointed to the beach, pushing on for the next ahead; and so on, until the entire fleet was driven ashore, burning or sinking (I. 1336).

When the smoke lifted and I saw the Brooklyn on her westerly course, she must have been engaged with all four of the enemy's ships (I. 1338). *I do not know that they were all firing at her, but they could have fired at her, they were all within range; and she was alongside of them—that is, broadside to them.*

I never saw the Brooklyn until I came out of the smoke and discovered her ahead. It made a deep impression on me to find her there. I felt that we should mutually support and sustain each other; and I felt

that she needed a battle-ship; and that we were to be there together at the battle.

The *Iowa*, when I first saw her, during the earlier part of the engagement, was steaming in towards the entrance to the harbor. Her position was a little to the westward of the *Oregon*, and at first she seemed to be advancing faster than the *Oregon*. It seemed to me that she was gaining ground more towards the entrance than we were, and I thought she would get in there considerably ahead of the *Oregon*.

The smoke became very dense, and I lost sight of her, but I could see the Spanish ships as they came out, and turned to the westward. I knew that they were turning sharply that way, and that I would not get to the entrance in time to strike any of them, and that therefore I must immediately haul to the westward. I put my helm a-starboard, and sheered off; and then I saw the *Iowa* again. She had evidently changed her course to the westward very sharply at almost the same time [with me]; and I was fearful that she would collide with us,—that she would swing too far. I therefore put my helm hard-a-starboard, to clear her, and we went by her; and *I saw no more of her during the entire action.*

I saw the *Texas* just after I passed the *Iowa* (I. 1338). Whether she was moving rapidly, or lying in the water without any movement, or how she was moving, I cannot recall, I was so concerned about striking her. I was just clearing the *Iowa* when the *Texas* was reported on the port bow, and I had no time except to give one glance at her; and then give the order "Hard-a-port." Then I had to jump over to the other side to see if I was going to clear the *Iowa*. I was afraid my speed would not be sufficient to carry me by; and yet *I had to get past*; and I really cannot tell whether I saw the bow or stern of the *Texas*. I just saw that large, great object loom up out of the

smoke, and I knew I had to give the order instantly, to clear her. I knew, or thought I would swing enough to clear her, but it might carry me into the *Iowa*, which I had on my starboard beam, only about a ship's length off."²

Captain Clark further testified (I. 1339, 1340): None of the Spanish vessels was run ashore or destroyed in the channel, as provided in the standing squadron orders to close in and destroy the enemy in the channel. The battle of July 3 was *not completed in accordance with any squadron orders previously issued*.³

I remember a signal, made by Commodore Schley from the *Brooklyn*, "Follow flag," because I ordered it repeated. We did close up. I thought it was "Follow flag." It may have been "Close up." My memory is distinct in this,—that it was made immediately after we came out of the smoke and discovered the Spanish fleet ahead of us. On our first discovery of the *Brooklyn* this signal was flying, or it was reported to me immediately after that time.

Lieutenant Eberle's (of the *Oregon*) picture of the end of the battle, will bear repetition here. He said:

The bugle had sounded "Cease firing," and the last shot of July 3 had been fired. That was a moment to die for. Suddenly the sound of heavy guns was re-

² The *Iowa's* navigator (Lieutenant Commander Scheutze) testified (I. 778): "She [the *Oregon*] passed, I should say, about 150 to 200 feet [from the *Iowa*]" (I. 779).

From this description of the situation it is evident that it was only by the most consummate seamanship and coolest judgment displayed by Captain Clark that a collision between those ships was avoided. The calm skill and judgment that Clark displayed in bringing the *Oregon* safely through the perils of her voyage from the Pacific to the Atlantic coast were most signally displayed in extricating her from this new danger.

³ This statement of Captain Clark explodes the theory that Sampson prescribed the plan of battle, and that he was therefore entitled to the credit of it,

placed by the strains of "The Star Spangled Banner" from the band. On our forward deck 550 men, mostly bare to the waist, and begrimed with powder and coal dust, were embracing each other and cheering with the fervor and joy which mark the out-pouring of the hearts of men who knew how to look into the face of death.

There were rousing cheers for our beloved captain, and the tender words he spoke to the crew caused many a heart to soften.

Amid ringing cheers the *Brooklyn* signaled: "Congratulations upon the glorious victory," and her cheers were returned with enthusiasm. The *Oregon's* Fourth of July reception by the fleet off Santiago and Commodore Schley's signal, "Welcome back, brave *Oregon*," were something to be cherished.

CHAPTER LV

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HODGSON'S STORY OF THE BATTLE

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ALBON C. HODGSON, the navigator of the *Brooklyn*, was a star witness produced by the judge advocate. He was smarting under a feeling into which he had worked himself, prompted, no doubt, by the officials of the Navy Department, that Commodore Schley had done him an injustice. He got dreadfully mixed up about that matter, (as will hereafter be shown), but he was an honorable officer, and loyal to the truth as he saw it.

It will be well, for the better understanding of the non-professional reader, to explain in a general way the position and duties of the navigator in battle and on other occasions when any general function is going on.

Up to a very late period the officer who is now styled "Navigator," was called the "Master." Among his other duties he is charged with the task of taking the observations and finding the ship's position on the chart, and, under direction of the captain, to navigate her from port to port.

When all hands are called, he proceeds—on board a modern ship of war, which is nowadays always a steamer—to the bridge and relieves the "Officer of the Deck," who, up to that moment, has had charge.

On the first Sunday of each month it is the custom to hold what is called "General Muster," at which all the officers and crew are assembled on the quarterdeck. "The Articles for the Government of the Navy" are read, after which all the names of the men are called; and each passes in review before the captain and officers.

This general muster is commonly, and was on that 3d of July, held at 9.30 A. M.; and this explains why Mr. Hodgson happened to be on the bridge that morning when Cervera's fleet was seen to be coming out of Santiago Bay at 9.35.

From this station on the bridge he could see every move of all the ships, whether friends or foes, and his ringing battle cry: "Tell the commodore the Spanish ships are coming out," transformed the solemn "muster" instantly into a seeming chaos, with officers and men rushing to their respective stations. The seeming chaos soon resolved itself into the most perfect battle order and array, with every officer and man at his proper station, with a solemn silence reigning supreme, only to be broken by the captain's order to fire the first gun at the foe, whose report turned that silence into pandemonium.

When Mr. Hodgson was asked, on cross-examination, to "give the work that the *Brooklyn* did in that battle from its commencement until the surrender of the *Colón*," he testified (I. 617):

The *Brooklyn* did all that she could do. She got into action as soon as speed could carry her, and we began firing as soon as the first gun on port bow would bear; and we kept firing the port battery until we turned around with port helm. During the arc the guns of the after turret were fired until we brought all the starboard battery to bear. We got around as quickly as we could, with the port helm, and we almost paralleled the course of the leading Spanish vessel.

When we got around the smoke was very dense, and nothing could be seen in the rear of us.

The three Spanish vessels that were engaged [by the *Brooklyn*] were the *Viscaya*, the *Colón*, and the *Oquendo*. The *Viscaya* was 2500 yards on our starboard bow, the *Colón* perhaps a little forward of our

starboard beam, and the *Oquendo* was abaft the starboard beam.

We continued in that direction, and I remarked to Captain Cook that it seemed rather lonely for us out there. He was inside the conning tower, and asked, "Why?" And I replied, "We were alone after the three Spanish vessels, and it seemed that it would devolve upon us to knock them out." At that time, as I said, the smoke was so dense that I could see nothing to the rear, and I supposed that the *Brooklyn* was steaming ahead of the slower battle-ships. Captain Cook stepped out of the conning tower, and as he stepped out he exclaimed to me, "Why, what's that off our starboard quarter?" I looked in that direction and saw the heavy bow wave formed by a ship, and next the bow looming up, and said immediately: "That must be the *Massachusetts*."¹

Captain Cook said, "It cannot be the *Massachusetts*, for she has gone to Guantanamo for coal." Then I said, "It must be the *Oregon*," and he said, "God bless the *Oregon*." And I said, "Yes, I'm very glad to see her." The *Oregon* was at that time, I should say, about four hundred or five hundred yards off our starboard quarter, and we continued in that relative position until the *Brooklyn's* speed began to increase as we gradually got up more steam; and probably during the battle we drew further ahead. She never was that close to us again, that I remember.

The *Oquendo* very shortly fell out and went ashore, and the *Colón* drew ahead and went inshore of the *Viscaya*. I remember very well the time that the *Viscaya* blanketed her from our fire, and the chase

¹ It is proper to explain here that the *Massachusetts* had been next in line between the *Texas* and *Iowa*, but had gone away to Guantanamo, at 4 o'clock that morning, for coal; and Mr. Hodgson had not observed her absence from her usual place in the blockade.

was continued in that direction. Off Asseradores the *Viscaya* ported her helm and ran ashore.

The *Colón* at that time had gained speed, and was inshore, I suppose, ahead about seven miles.

After passing the *Viscaya* the men were allowed to come out of the turrets a few at a time, to get a breath of fresh air and something to eat, although the guns were kept manned, and everything ready.

The gaining on the *Colón* was very slow; in fact, she gained on us, apparently, at first. We began gradually to gain. My recollection is that the commodore told someone to signal over to the *Oregon*, to "try one of his railroad trains." At any rate, shortly afterwards the *Oregon* fired one of her thirteen-inch shells, which fell short. Then we tried with an eight-inch shell, and that fell short. We were signaling to the *Oregon*, and she to us, the fall of the shots. Both continued occasionally feeling for the range, until I remember seeing one of the thirteen-inch shells from the *Oregon* fall ahead of her, from our view of the *Colón*, and one of our eight-inch shells apparently fell inshore of her.

At that time the *Colón* put her helm hard-a-port. Previously, during the chase, she was porting her helm once or twice, apparently seeking for a soft spot; but at this time she made a rank sheer, with the port helm, fired her lee gun, and hauled down her flag.

I pulled out my watch and looked at it, and it was exactly 1.15.

We then ceased firing, slowed down, and Captain Cook was ordered to go on board to make terms, or tell the terms to the commanding officer of the *Colón*.

The *Oregon* of course came up, and other ships gradually drew up off the Rio Tarquino, about fifty miles to the westward of the entrance to Santiago de Cuba.

The fight was then over.

The *Colón's* captain had run her high and dry on the shore. She had not been injured by our shot or shell, and she was safe on the shore, where she should have been suffered to remain until it was found that she was uninjured. It will be remembered that the commander-in-chief, after sending Schley in the *Brooklyn* to fight the new foe that had been reported as coming from the eastward, had remained behind to secure the prize.

Whose was the fault or bad judgment, cannot be known, under which the *Colón* was prematurely hauled off the shore into deep water, where it was soon discovered that she was sinking. An effort was made to push her back, but it was too late, and she turned over, sank in deep water, and was lost. All subsequent efforts to raise her were vain. There she lies, where she met her doom.

CHAPTER LVI

SCHLEY'S AND SAMPSON'S ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE VICTORY

AFTER parting from the Austrian ship of war while on his way to the entrance of the harbor Commodore Schley prepared and, as soon as possible, sent to the cable office at Siboney, by his flag lieutenant, James H. Sears, a despatch to the Secretary of the Navy, announcing the victory.

When Sears reached Siboney he found there Sampson's flag lieutenant, Sidney A. Staunton, sending, in Sampson's name, an announcement of the victory.

For convenience of reference and contrast, these two despatches are here printed in parallel columns:

SCHLEY'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898.

Spanish squadron came out of Santiago harbor this morning, and were all destroyed in a running fight to the westward of about three and one-half hours. Very few casualties in our fleet. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed, and one man wounded on the *Brooklyn*. Reports from other ships not in yet. The commander-in-chief superintending transfer of prisoners from *Cristobal Colón*, which surrendered to *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* at 1.15. Victory complete. Details later.

SCHLEY.

SAMPSON'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898.

The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present, the whole of Cervera's fleet.

It attempted to escape at 9.30 this morning. At 2 last ship, the *Cristobal Colón*, had run ashore seventy-five miles west of Santiago, and hauled down her colors. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Viscaya* were forced ashore, burned and blown up, within twenty miles of Santiago. The *Furor* and *Plutón* were destroyed within four miles of the port.

SAMPSON.

The contrast between these two despatches is remarkable.

One reading that of Schley will be struck with the

entire absence of any self-exaltation, or even reference to himself. Neither of the personal pronouns "I," or "My" is to be found in it, and he would fail, in reading it, to learn more than the fact that the Spaniards had come out of Santiago that morning and had all been destroyed in the running fight that ensued.

One would certainly suppose, from reading Sampson's despatch, that he had been leading in the battle, and had actually commanded in the fight; and be left in entire ignorance of the fact that he had not been in the battle at all; or of the other fact that Schley had, as the "senior officer on the spot," been actually in command.

The late Secretary of the Navy (John D. Long), in his book lately published, entitled, "The New American Navy" (Vol. ii. p. 42), says: "Sampson has been criticised for this despatch. He did not write it. It was written by the officer he sent to telegraph the news; but he assumed it, for he shirked no responsibility. The personal pronoun "I" is not in it.

This last statement is true. The personal pronoun "I" is not in it, but the equally, and in this case more, personal pronoun "My," *is* in it; and, whether so intended or not, the despatch conveys the false impression that Sampson had been in actual command in the battle.

That assistant chief of staff (Staunton) who wrote it (as alleged by Mr. Long) no doubt had in his mind and memory Caesar's famous triplet, "*Veni, Vedi, Vici*," and Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry's announcement of his victory on Lake Erie: "We have met the enemy, and they are ours," and thought, no doubt, that he was framing a despatch that would ring down the ages with equal brilliancy. But he only succeeded in placing his chief in a false position, from which there has been no escape. Secretary Long further says: "It [the despatch] is exceedingly like

General Sherman's telegram on the capture of Savannah."

It is exceedingly unlikely that Lieutenant Staunton had ever read Sherman's despatch, for, if he had, it is not probable that he would have repeated it in this instance. As well might he have repeated Perry's famous couplet. He might have tried to frame something that was quite as original, for it cannot be doubted that Staunton thought himself quite as competent as the heroes named, to startle the world with a brilliant announcement of the great victory that had been that day achieved,—but in which his chief and he had borne no part!

The despatches of Caesar, Perry, and Sherman expressed the exact truth; and if Sampson's despatch had been similarly based, while there might have been differences of opinion as to the good taste of the language employed, it would have created no false impression.

All that it was necessary to do was to announce the plain truth about the matter, and there could have been no adverse criticism.

Sampson's despatch is never mentioned by, or in the presence of, his friends without explanations or apologies; but there can be nothing of the sort necessary for that of Schley.

Staunton, being Sears' senior, would not allow the latter to send Schley's announcement. *The Navy Department has never published it*, and when it was offered to the Court of Inquiry the majority would not permit it to go upon the record of the court's proceedings.

As a part of the *res gestae*, it was clearly admissible and proper.

CHAPTER LVII

SCHLEY'S PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE BATTLE

DURING the night of July 3 Schley wrote, and on the morning of the 4th sent to the commander-in-chief a report of the events of the day as follows:

“FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN, OFF SANTIAGO
DE CUBA, July 3d, 1898.

“SIR:—I have the honor to make the following preliminary report of the engagement this morning.

“1. At 9.30 o'clock Admiral Cervera, with the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Viscaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and *Cristóbal Colón*, with two torpedo-boat destroyers, attempted to escape from Santiago harbor.

“Signal was at once made for ‘close action,’ which was promptly responded to by the *Brooklyn*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Gloucester*, and *Vixen*.

“The squadron, after leaving the harbor, stood to the westward, but engaged at close range (from 1100 to 3000 yards); and in about twenty minutes the *Oquendo*, and *Viscaya*¹ were set on fire by the shells of our squadron, and were forced to run ashore, where they burned and blew up later in the night.

“Of the destroyers, one was sunk, and the other was set on fire by our shells, and burned on the beach.

“2. The flagship *Infanta Maria Teresa*, with Admiral Cervera, and the *Colón* were engaged in a running fight with the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Iowa* for some twenty-five minutes, when the Spanish flagship was set on fire, the Spanish being obliged to beach her.²

“The *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* continued the chase

¹ This last should be the *Infanta Maria Teresa*.—J. P.

² This paragraph is all wrong; it was the *Viscaya*, not the flagship.

and fight, gradually drawing away from the other ships, until 1.15 P. M., when the *Colón* was beached, and struck her colors to the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*.

"3. The *Brooklyn* was exposed for some twenty minutes to the fire of the four Spanish ships, until the other vessels of our squadron could get into good range.

"I cannot speak with too much praise of the conduct of the officers and crews of the vessels engaged; their spirit and enthusiasm were such as I have rarely before seen in action.

"4. I would especially mention Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Taylor, Captain Cook, and Captain Clark, for exceedingly meritorious conduct on the occasion. Their ships were handled superbly, and their officers and men responded nobly.

"Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, commanding the *Gloucester*, and Lieutenant Sharp commanding the *Vixen*, acted with conspicuous gallantry, and although not able to engage the heavier ships, they were close in on the battle line.

"5. Admiral Cervera and his officers, with about 1200 men, were captured, and he informed me that his loss in killed was about 450.

"Our casualties were one killed and one wounded, (both) on board the *Brooklyn*. No one else was hurt in the squadron, although this ship was struck twenty times.

"6. In order to make a complete and detailed report, I would suggest that you direct that the commanding officers of vessels of the First Squadron send copies of their reports on the engagement to me.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore U. S. Navy,

"Commander Second Squadron.

"THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

"U. S. Naval Forces,

"North Atlantic Station."

It is noteworthy that the pronoun "I" only appears thrice in the foregoing report, and then in connection with others than himself. The pronoun "My" does not appear at all.

Schley testified (I. 1529): "I carried that report to the commander-in-chief, and went back on board of my ship. He signaled for me to come on board again, which I did. He then handed the report back to me. There was nobody in the cabin but him and myself at the time.

"He handed it back to me, with the statement that he was the commander-in-chief, and that I had omitted a very important detail, which was that the *New York* was present."

Schley on July 6 made a second report (A. 517), concerning which he further testified: "I felt at that time that the victory, as I said, was big enough for all. I made this last 'out of generosity'; and because I knew that if the *New York* had been present they would have done as good work as everybody else, I referred all throughout this to 'your command,' and his appearance, and so on, in complimentary terms."

There can be no doubt that Commodore Schley made a mistake when he consented to receive back that preliminary report. It stated exactly the truth, gave full credit to every ship, officer, and man that had been in the battle, and assumed no credit to himself. The facts spoke for him with a forceful eloquence that any claim he could have made would have only weakened.

Receiving it back and writing the other in the terms he employed was a most amiable display of generosity, which, when occasion required, was sure to be—and was—quoted against him.

Sampson did all he could for himself and his flagship *New York* when he said in his official report of the battle (A. 507): "She [the *New York*] was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish

ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the fort in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the *Gloucester*."

That preliminary report of Commodore Schley has never been printed by the Navy Department, and the majority of the Court of Inquiry refused to permit it to be made part of its record. In the judgment of lawyers, it was clearly admissible as part of the *res gestae* (attending circumstances).

Lieutenant Sears also, in the judgment of the writer, made a mistake in not sending Schley's announcement of the victory, notwithstanding Stanton's objections. Sears was but obeying Schley's orders, and with Sampson "forty miles away" Schley was undoubtedly, as "senior officer on the spot," in command off Santiago. Stanton had no right to countermand Schley's order at any time.

Commodore Watson sent a similar announcement (A. 505), and no fault was found with him. How could there be?

CHAPTER LVIII

THE NOTES OF THE BATTLE TAKEN ON BOARD THE "VIXEN"

IN addition to the accounts of the battle of Santiago given in the official reports made by the commanding officers of the ships engaged, and in the already quoted testimony of Admiral Schley, Captains Cook and Clark, and Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, there was one account written during the progress of the fight that has never been given to the public by the Navy Department, to which attention will now be called.

The *Vixen*, commanded by Lieutenant Alexander Sharp, Jr., occupied, when that morning the Spanish fleet was discovered to be coming out, the extreme westerly end of the semicircle of the blockade. She was about two miles from the shore and about three miles from the entrance. The *Vixen*, like the *Gloucester*, which occupied the extreme easterly end of the semicircle, was a frail craft—a converted yacht—and when the Spaniards came out that morning and turned to the westward Lieutenant Sharp saw that she had no place among those thunderers, just as Wainwright did in the *Gloucester*. So knowing that it was his plain duty, as Wainwright said, to "look after the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers," that at that time it was thought would be found running along the starboard side of the fighting ships, ready to dash out against our vessels when opportunity offered—Sharp very properly put the helm of his little craft "hard-a-port," and ran down to the southward, out of the line of battle, but still under fire; and then, turning to the westward, steered a parallel course to that of the combatants, ready for any duty he might be called upon to perform.

There can be no doubt in the minds of those who know Sharp that, if those Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers had ever got that far to the westward, the *Vixen's* commander would have shown that he and she well deserved their names—*Sharp* and *Vixen*.

Having no fighting to do, Sharp thought that the next best service he could perform would be to have notes taken of what the fighting vessels did as the battle progressed, and accordingly such notes "were written by Paymaster Doherty, and the times and incidents given by Lieutenant Harlow, the executive officer."

Lieutenant Harlow, before the court, described the method pursued:

"Mr. Doherty sat with pad before him and the watch in his hand. I, with glasses, carefully watched the fighting ships. Whenever I saw anything worth noting I called to Doherty, 'Mark time,' which he would do; and then wrote what I told him to write."

It may be doubted if there ever was a more truthful and impartial account of a battle written than that. There was no dream of controversy about any of the incidents related, and no possible inducement to relate anything but "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

Within a few hours after the battle ended Sharp caused manifold typewritten copies of the notes to be made, and the "ribbon copy" was attached to the log-book of the *Vixen*, where it still remains. The notes thus became an official statement of the facts to which they relate.

On July 5, at Guantanamo, Sharp took one of these manifold copies on board the *Brooklyn* to Commodore Schley, who was so pleased with the notes that he sent them to the ship's printer and caused numerous copies to be printed and distributed to his officers and men as a faithful and accurate pen-picture of the battle.

Those notes are the only impartial account written by officers at the exact instant of the events; they are a record made by unbiased eye-witnesses who were under no temptation or influence to color or conceal facts, either in their own interest or for their self-exaltation, or that of any other officer or vessel.

Every vessel engaged, as long as she was in sight from the *Vixen*, has full mention of the parts taken by such vessel; and what these officers thus set down would be accepted by any tribunal as the nearest possible approach to the exact truth.

On July 6 Lieutenant Sharp wrote his official report, addressed to Admiral Sampson, of the part taken in the battle by the *Vixen*. His report is typewritten, and in it he says: "I enclose a copy of notes taken during the chase, by my orders, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Harlow. The times taken after 10.30 are accurate; those taken before that time were estimated, and may be in error a few minutes."

Now, when Sharp wrote that report to Admiral Sampson he had still in his possession several of the manifold typewritten copies that had been made; and one would think he would have enclosed one of those, but the purported copy that appears to have been enclosed is in long hand, written on the stiff official paper used in the navy. It was written by a man named Wainwright, who was the yeoman of the *Vixen*, and it differs in very many and important particulars from the copy attached to the log-book.

When the Court of Inquiry was about to begin its sessions Wainwright was serving on board the surveying steamer *Ranger*, which was at Panama. Admiral Schley's counsel made request, in the usual form, that Wainwright should be subpoenaed before the court, which request was made in ample time to secure his attendance. But whether by accident (which the writer very much doubts) or design

(which the writer may be pardoned for believing) Wainwright was not brought before the court. He was the only person who could have fully explained how the notes came to be so changed.

When the character of these changes is considered—that every one of them which relates to the *Brooklyn's* doings is made less favorable to her, and not one more favorable; the unsailor-like expressions that are absent in the original, but contained in the purported copy; the suppression of all that occurred between 1.15 P. M. (the time of the *Colón's* surrender) and 2.23 (the time the *New York* arrived near her, off Rio Tarquino), made evidently in the interest of the flagship *New York*, and which corresponds to a similar suppression in the notes taken on board the latter vessel, and attached to her log-book; the alteration in the log-book of the *New York*, made at the request of Lieutenant Marble nearly two years after the battle (to be hereinafter more particularly referred to), which last alteration was made apparently at the instance and request of Sampson's chief of staff, Captain French E. Chadwick, and certainly with his approval—the paternity and purpose of all is evidently the same, and is sufficiently well indicated.

In all these changes and suppressions one palpable purpose is to place the *New York* nearer to that battle than she really was. The other was to belittle the part taken by the *Brooklyn*.

For convenience of comparison, those notes and the purported copy that was sent to Admiral Sampson in Sharp's official report are printed in parallel columns; and some comments will be made in passing. It may be noted that both Sharp and Harlow testified before the court that the notes attached to the *Vixen's* log-book are exactly correct.

NOTES TAKEN ON ABOARD THE U. S. S. VIXEN,
JULY 3, 1898.

(From copy attached to the
"Vixen's" log-book.)

What follows is a copy of notes taken during the engagement with Admiral Cervera's fleet, and is an accurate statement of such incidents as appeared important, as viewed from the *Vixen*. Bearings and distances are approximate, and are generally relative to the positions of the *Vixen*. The coast pilot, Eduardo Nunez, was frequently consulted; and where there was an uncertainty as to the correctness of his estimates, the opinion of several officers was taken, and as nearly as possible a fair estimate was arrived at.

At 9.45—Quartermaster reported a tug coming out of the harbor. Upon examination it was discovered to be a Spanish cruiser, flying a large Spanish flag, with a smaller flag at the masthead, which was taken to be an admiral's flag, as it was on the leading ship.

(The *Vixen* at this time was lying about two miles off shore, and four miles to westward of Morro Castle; and from this time to the end was never out of sight of the chase, and was a close witness to the destruction of the three armored cruisers.)¹

Word was immediately sent to the commanding officer; all hands were called to quarters; full speed ahead was ordered; and the helm put to port, to stand further off shore and leave the line of fire of the *Brooklyn* unobstructed.²

(As sent by Lieutenant Sharp to
Admiral Sampson.)

These notes were written about 11 A. M., and were drawn from the recollection of events transpiring prior to 10.30.

At 9.45 A. M.—Reported tug coming out of harbor. Mr. Harlow examined it through glass, and discovered it to be a Spanish cruiser, flying what was probably an admiral's flag.

Notified commanding officer; called all hands to quarters; and stood to southward.

¹ The omission from the other notes of the part here put in parenthesis is very significant.

² Why leave out of the other account this about leaving the line of "fire of the *Brooklyn* unobstructed"?

The *Brooklyn* had hoisted a signal that the enemy were attempting to escape; and the *Vixen*, noticing that the leading ship was turning to the westward, hoisted signal that the enemy was attempting to escape to the westward.

(The fleet, which at that time had resumed their day blockading stations, began rapidly to close in towards the Morro, concentrating a terrific fire upon the escaping fleet, though at long range. There was no doubt at all to the fact that the enemy was coming out; but there were several anxious moments as to his intentions. Whether he would disperse and attempt to break through the lines, or keep his vessels together.)³

The leading vessel had about changed course to the west, when the second vessel appeared, followed shortly by the *Cristóbal Colón*.

It was easy to identify this ship from the fact that her mast is placed between the two smoke-stacks. The first two were not so easy to identify, as the *Viscaya*, *Oquendo* and *Maria Teresa* are practically identical in appearance. The fleet, meanwhile, were closing in towards the Morro, and when the fourth vessel appeared and turned to the westward, it became apparent that Admiral Cervera had carefully reconnoitered the field, and selected the west as the weakest part of the blockade, as the strong easterly current had drifted the heaviest ships considerably to the eastward of their customary positions.⁴

Brooklyn hoisted signal 250.

The leading vessel had about changed course to west, when the second vessel appeared, followed shortly afterwards by the *Colón*.

The first two vessels were evidently the *Viscaya* and *Oquendo*, or *Maria Teresa*. Fleet closing in, and opening fire.

³ Why omit this in parentheses?

⁴ What is here said about Cervera having reconnoitered is important and probable. It is not surprising that the revisers left that out.

The western arm of the blockading circle chanced to be defended by the *Vixen* and *Brooklyn*. The *Brooklyn* headed to the northward, apparently intending to intercept the head of the enemy's column. Simultaneously with the appearance of the leading ship of the enemy's column, the western battery opened fire, apparently directing it upon the eastern and central ships of the blockading squadron.

At 10 A. M.—The *Brooklyn* was the nearest vessel to, and was engaging, the two leading ships.

These two ships were quite close together, with an interval of perhaps three-quarters of a mile between the second ship and the *Colón*.

At 10.05—The *Brooklyn* began to turn up with the port helm, and made a complete turn to the eastward, continuing around so that, when again heading the west, the two leading enemy's ships bore well on her starboard bow, and the *Colón* on her starboard quarter, with the fourth vessel coming up rapidly astern.

The *Vixen* at this time was well to the westward of the leading ship, and was steering a parallel course.

For the next fifteen minutes the *Brooklyn* received and returned the fire of the two leading enemy's ships, with an occasional shot from the *Colón*.

The first two shots from the enemy's leading ship were evi-

About 10 A. M. leading enemy's vessel had headed to west, full speed, followed by the others. *Brooklyn* at 10 was nearest vessel, and standing to north, engaged two leading ships.

At this time two leading ships were quite close together, with an interval of perhaps three-fourths of a mile between second ship and *Colón*.

About 10.05 the *Brooklyn* began to turn with port helm, and made a complete turn to eastward, coming around so that when again heading west the two leading enemy's ships bore well on her starboard bow, and the *Colón* on her starboard quarter.⁵

For the next fifteen minutes, the *Brooklyn* sustained and returned the fire of the two leading ships with an occasional shot from the *Colón*.

The *Vixen* steered courses of various time intervals of south,

⁵ The substitution of the word "coming" for "continuing" is significant. It was subsequently charged that the *Brooklyn* had stood to the southward two thousand yards or more before turning west.

dently aimed at the *Vixen*, as they passed directly over her, striking the water a hundred yards or so beyond.

At 10.30 the chase was well formed, with the positions as follows: Enemy's ships were in column between Cabanas and Guayacabon, with the *Brooklyn* steering a parallel course about a mile distant from them; and the *Oregon* southeast of them about two miles distant. The other vessels of the squadron were obscured by smoke.⁶

NOTES TAKEN BY LIEUTENANT HARLOW DURING THE ENGAGEMENT WITH ADMIRAL CERVERA'S FLEET ON JULY 3, 1898.⁸

At 10.32 the *Colón* and leading enemy's ships were close together, just clear of the *Brooklyn's* bow, as viewed from the *Vixen*; the *Colón* evidently gaining in speed, and closing up.

At this time it was apparent that the vessel that had been leading was disabled and on fire,

southwest-by-south, and about 10.15 was going, full speed, W. $\frac{1}{2}$ S. (steering compass). The shells that went over the *Brooklyn* struck close ahead, astern, and on starboard beam of *Vixen*; and several passed directly over, a piece of bursting shell going through the flag at the mainmast-head.

10.30—Entirely omitted.⁷

10.32—*Colón* and first boat close together, just clear of *Brooklyn's* bow. *Colón* evidently passing ahead.

The first ship that came out of harbor stopped off Juan Gonzales, undoubtedly on fire.

⁶ Up to this time the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon* and *Vixen* were the only ships of our squadron mentioned.

⁷ The omission of the whole paragraph 10.30 was made for obvious reasons:

It is the only statement given of the positions of the whole fleet at that instant. It contains the statement that (after the loop was complete) the *Brooklyn* was "steering a parallel course, about a mile distant from" the Spaniards. And it shows that only the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were visible; the other of our vessels were obscured by smoke.

⁸ These notes are accurate, as viewed from the *Vixen*. The watch used was at practically the same reading as the deck clock of the *Brooklyn*.

Accuracy of position is not claimed for any vessel. Position and bearings are relative only.

Incidents recounted are accurate.

as she dropped rapidly astern. She apparently was headed for the shore off Juan Gonzales. The *Oregon* was forging rapidly ahead, engaging the fourth ship as she passed.

Two smaller vessels, probably the torpedo-boat destroyers—the *Furor* and *Plutón*—were to the westward of Cabanas, engaged by the *Iowa* and *Texas*, and apparently on fire; but the leading vessels had gone too far to the westward to be able to distinguish either of them accurately.

The *Indiana* was in sight a little to the westward of Morro.

At 10.34—The *Colón* was still gaining and reserving her fire.

At this moment the only United States vessels in sight from the *Vixen* were the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*; the *Texas* in the rear of the *Oregon*, followed closely by the *Iowa*, about five or six miles distant. The *Indiana* was apparently about four miles astern of the *Iowa*.

At 10.37—The *Colón* and other enemy's vessels opened fire again.

The second vessel was just clear of the *Brooklyn*, and about five miles distant from the *Vixen*. The *Oregon* was gaining rapidly. The *Colón* was apparently using nothing but smokeless powder.

The firing of the enemy was very high, many of their shots falling close ahead, astern, and around the *Vixen*, one piece of shell going through the flag at the mainmast.

At 10.46—The *Brooklyn* forged ahead, and the *Oregon* fired her 13-inch forward gun at the leading vessels of the chase.

At 10.47—The *Texas* was in

Oregon forging ahead, and firing ahead.

Enemy's destroyers to westward of Cabanas, evidently engaged by *Iowa* and *Texas*, and apparently on fire.

Indiana a little to the westward of Morro.

At 10.34—*Colón* still gaining. Ship which led before, rapidly falling behind; and two on fire near Juan Gonzales. *Colón* reserving fire.

Colón commenced firing again at 10.37. No other United States vessels in sight. *Texas* and *Iowa* in rear of *Oregon*, five or six miles. Distance between *Iowa* and *Indiana* about four. *Colón* slacking up.

At 10.40—Second vessel just clear of stern of *Brooklyn*. *Vixen* distant about five miles. *Oregon* gaining rapidly. *Colón* using only smokeless powder.

At 10.46—*Brooklyn* forged ahead from our point of view, *Oregon* fired 13-inch from forward gun.

10.47 *Texas* considerably

lead of the *Iowa* and gaining rapidly.

The firing of the *Brooklyn* at this time was both steady and deadly, shells from her guns apparently striking or bursting alongside or striking the enemy.

At 10.49—The *Texas* passed Juan Gonzales, and what was apparently the *Indiana* was off Cabanas at the same time.

At 10.50—The *Vixen* veered in close, heading about N. N. W.

The *Texas* was gaining rapidly. The *Iowa* appeared off Juan Gonzales.

A small vessel, evidently a yacht, appeared off Guayacabon, hotly engaging some of the enemy's ships.

At 10.54—It was apparent that another of the enemy's vessels was on fire, and headed for the beach, with a heavy list to port. This vessel proved to be the *Viscaya*; and she was evidently making for the reef at Asserederos.

At 11.01—She ported, evidently heading east, as if seeking for the entrance to Asserederos.

The *Texas* and *Vixen* directed their fire on this vessel until 11.07, when, as her colors were evidently down, the order was given to cease firing.

ahead of *Iowa* and gaining rapidly.⁹

10.48—Shell from *Brooklyn* burst apparently alongside of second vessel.

Texas passed Juan Gonzales at 10.49; *Indiana* off Cabanas at 10.49.

Vixen at 10.50 veered inshore, heading about north-northwest.

At 10.53—*Texas* gaining. Yacht and *Indiana* off Guayacabon.

At 10.54 *Viscaya* (?) evidently on fire and heading for the beach, with a heavy list to port quarter (*sic*).¹⁰

At 10.56—*Viscaya* heading for Asserederos. *Texas* coming up five miles distant. *Viscaya* at 11, with colors flying, nearly ashore at Asserederos.

At 11.01—*Viscaya* ported helm, and headed about east. *Texas* firing forward gun. *Iowa* and *New York* close off shore, and torpedo boat astern of *New York*, about one mile.¹¹

⁹ Leaving out the statement about the firing of the *Brooklyn* is very significant.

¹⁰ No sailor wrote that sentence. "Heavy list to port quarter" is absurd. The proper expression, "heavy list to port," is as used in the original.

¹¹ In this revised 11.01, first mention is made of the *New York*. But she "fades away suddenly, like the grass," and appears no more in either of the notes, until 11.42, in the revised, and 11.45 in the original, in which last mention is first made of her.

At 11.09—There was a sudden burst of smoke from her after end, and she apparently was sinking, and all ships reserved their fire on passing the doomed vessel, now hard and fast ashore on Asserederos reef.

At 11.16—The vessels in sight from the *Vixen* were the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, *Iowa* and *Indiana*. The *Indiana* at least ten (10) miles from the *Colón*.

The impression on board the *Vixen* was that the vessel ashore at Asserederos was the admiral's flagship.

At 11.25—The *Iowa* evidently had stopped. The after end of the vessel ashore at Asserederos was a sheet of flame.

From 11.20 to 11.42 there was a series of explosions on board of her, which were apparently from the ignition of loose charges about the guns. They resembled huge chrysanthemums with ribbons of smoke, as the burning powder grains fell from the end of the petals.

At 11.45—The chase had resolved itself into the *Colón*, close inshore, distant about seven miles from the *Vixen*; the *Oregon*, about one point on the starboard bow, distant about one mile and a half; the *Brooklyn*, one point on the port bow, distant about three miles; and the *Texas*, on the starboard quarter, distant

At 11.04 — *Viscaya* starboarded, and stood close inshore.

At 11.05—*Vixen* opened fire on *Viscaya*, and at 11.07 her colors came down, and orders were given on board *Vixen* to cease firing.

At 11.09—Sudden burst of fire from her, and probably sinking.

At 11.15—*Texas* and other ships reserved their fire.

Iowa gaining on *Massachusetts*.¹²

Vessels in sight at 11.16, *Iowa* and *Indiana*. *Indiana* at least ten miles from *Colón*. Vessel ashore at Asserederos probably flagship.

At 11.20—*Iowa* evidently had stopped.

At 11.24—Flames were seen bursting from the *Viscaya*.

At 11.26—The *Viscaya* exploded, followed by another explosion, probably magazine, with large sheet of flame.

Other explosions at 11.33.30; 11.35.15; 11.36.15; and 11.41.

At 11.42—The position of the ships as seen from the *Vixen* was as follows: The *Colón* close inshore, distant about seven miles from the *Vixen*; the *Oregon*, about one point on starboard bow, distant about 1½ miles; the *Brooklyn*, one point on starboard bow, distant about 3 miles; the *Texas*, on starboard quarter, distant about 1 mile; *Iowa*, two points on starboard quarter, distant about

¹² The *Massachusetts* had gone to Guantanamo that morning, and was not in the battle. She was "forty miles away."

about one mile; the *Iowa* was two points on the starboard quarter, distant about eight miles; and the *New York*, one point on starboard quarter, distant about ten miles. These last two vessels were apparently off Boca del Rio, but they were too far off to identify either of them with certainty, in thin haze of smoke that was left behind the leading ships.

No other vessels were in sight. The smoke from the ships destroyed at Juan Gonzales and to the eastward could be seen, but their hulls could not.

At 12 M.—Their positions were practically the same, except that each had changed positions relative to the *Vixen*. When the *Vixen* was abreast of Cevilla, thirty miles west of Santiago, the *Texas* bore three points on the starboard quarter, a little less than a mile distant. The *Oregon* and *Brooklyn*, one point on the starboard and port bows, respectively, distant about four and five miles, respectively; while the *Colón* bore two points to starboard box, distant fully ten miles.

According to the official pilot on board the *Vixen*, the latter vessel was off a point called Bayamita. It might be said here that all localities and estimates of distances were referred to him in connection with the opinions of four or five officers of the *Vixen*.

At 12.05—The *New York* was in line with the burning ship

8 miles. *New York*, one point on starboard quarter, distant about 10 miles; the two latter apparently off Boca del Rio. No other vessels in sight.

Smoke of vessels destroyed off Juan Gonzales in sight; but hulls invisible.¹³

At 11.52—Another explosion occurred on board the *Viscaya*.¹⁴

Position at noon practically the same, except *Texas* gaining rapidly. *Vixen* abreast of Cevilla, 30 miles west of Santiago. *Texas* bearing three points on starboard quarter, distant 1 mile. *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* one point on starboard and port bows respectively, distant 4 and 5 miles. *Colón*, two points on starboard bow, distant about 10 miles, close under fourth hill (see sketch), Bayamita.

Vixen shifted Nos. 2 and 1 pounder guns upon their mounts at 12.03, No. 3 1 pounder being disabled.

[No mention of consulting pilot and officers.]¹⁵

At 12.05—*New York* was in line with the burning ship at

¹³ In the original the *New York* and *Iowa* were "too far off to be identified with certainty." The revision leaves out the uncertainty.

¹⁴ This helps out the certainty.

¹⁵ Why leave out this about consulting the pilot and officers as to distances and localities?

(*Viscaya*) at Asserederos, distant about ten miles.

At 12.25—The *Texas* was on the starboard quarter; *New York* two points on the starboard quarter and evidently gaining. The *Oregon* was a half point on starboard bow; the *Brooklyn* one point on the port bow; the *Colón* one point on the starboard bow, still distant about ten miles.

The *Oregon* fired a shot at 12.20, which fell short. The *Colón* at this time was about hull down from the *Vixen*.

During the next half hour there were occasional shots fired from the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn*, many of which apparently struck near the chase.

At 12.50—The *Texas* was one point forward of the starboard beam, and gaining steadily.

At 1.15—The *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* headed in shore about four points.¹⁶

Asserederos, about 9 miles distant.

At 12.15—*Texas* was on starboard quarter; *Vixen* heading west by south, (p. c); *New York* two points on starboard quarter, and evidently gaining. *Oregon* one-half point on starboard bow; (*Brooklyn*, one point on port bow, distant 9 miles; *Colón*, one point on starboard bow distant 10 miles),¹⁶ half way between third and fourth hills. *Oregon* started firing at 12.20, her shot falling short. Fired only one shell from 13-inch gun.

At 12.23—*Oregon* fired again; shot struck a little ahead of *Colón*, and appeared to pass over her. *Colón* is almost hull down from the *Vixen*. *Brooklyn* started firing at 12.26; struck very short; about two-thirds the distance to *Colón*. Second shot at 12.26.30, about three-fourths distance to *Colón*; third shot at 12.27.15, about four-fifths distance to *Colón*; fourth shot about five-sixths of distance.¹⁷

At 12.29.30—*Oregon* fired again; shot went over. There were thirteen seconds between the flash of the *Brooklyn's* shot and the time the shell struck the water.

At 12.50—The *Texas* bore one point forward of the starboard beam.

At 1.15—The *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* headed in about four points.

¹⁶ These distances are absurd. The *Brooklyn* never was within one mile of the *Colón*.

¹⁷ The precision of the above 12.30 is remarkable.

¹⁸ This was the time that at which the *Colón* hauled down her flag and, like her consorts, "put for the shore."

At 1.23—The *Texas* hoisted the signal "Enemy has surrendered."

This signal was repeated to the *New York*, but not acknowledged. The *Colón* was distinguished by the aid of glasses, lying close in shore, and, according to the pilot, lying off a point called Rio Tarquino. Opinion was divided on the *Vixen* as to whether a white flag was displayed on the *Colón* or whether it was steam escaping from the steam pipe forward. This subsequently proved to be steam.

At 2—A boat from the *Brooklyn*, or the *Oregon*, was seen to go alongside the *Colón*.

At 2.25—The *Vixen* stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*. The *New York* arrived from three to five minutes later, and intercepted the boat returning from the *Colón*.

In all these observations the time was accurately noted, but the watch used was five minutes slow of the deck clock, which agreed very nearly with the times indicated by the bells on other vessels.

At 1.23—The *Texas* hoisted signal, "Enemy has surrendered."¹⁹

The *Colón* lying at Rio Tarquino.

Boat from *Brooklyn* went alongside *Colón's* starboard side at 2 o'clock.²⁰

As a matter of fact, allowing for difference of time, the *New York* arrived at 2.23, or an hour and eight minutes after the surrender. Inasmuch as Admiral Sampson in his report insists (A. 507) that the *New*

¹⁹ The *New York* was evidently too far away to read the signal. Therefore, why, thought the reviser, make any mention of the repeating of the signal? It might be embarrassing later on.

²⁰ The revised notes end here. It will be observed that no mention of events occurring after 1.15 is made in the revised notes. That clause showing that "the *Vixen* stopped off Rio Torquino, in the vicinity of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, and that the *New York* arrived from three to five minutes later," at 2.25, was a most embarrassing one. If allowed to remain it settled the fact, beyond dispute or cavil, that the *New York* did not arrive near the *Colón* for an hour and twelve minutes after the latter surrendered.

York "toward the end of the chase was making 16½ knots," and Captain Chadwick wrote a second report (A. 522) to show that she was going "not less than 17 knots," by giving her the latter speed she must have been 19.26 knots (or 22.2 miles) away at the time the *Colón* surrendered. As the facts were incontrovertible, *suppressio veri* was the only escape from them.

CHAPTER LIX

REAR ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE

THE report of the commander-in-chief (A. 505) dated July 15, 1898, is a remarkable document, and the most significant of its features is the evident purpose of whoever wrote it to belittle the part played in the combat by the *Brooklyn*.

The commander-in-chief says (A. 507): "The initial speed of the Spanish vessels carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase, in which the *Brooklyn* and the *Texas* had, at the start, the advantage of position. The *Brooklyn* maintained this lead. The *Oregon*, steaming with amazing speed from the beginning of the action, took first place." Again (A. 510): "The fine speed of the *Oregon* enabled her to take a front position in the chase."

It was so easy for the commander-in-chief to state the facts exactly as they were, because he knew from the report of Captain Clark that the latter had said (A. 526): "We soon passed all our ships, *except* the *Brooklyn*, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Schley."

Captain Clark's report is so significant that I venture to make a larger quotation from it. He says (A. 526): "As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through and escape to the westward, we went ahead at full speed, with the determination of carrying out to the utmost your order; 'If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible; and endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them to run ashore.'

"We soon passed all of our ships *except* the *Brooklyn*, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore

Schley. At first we used only our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were following their ships we used our rapid fire guns, as well as the 6-inch, upon them with telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships, she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she too was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots, and our fire, added to that of the *Brooklyn*, soon sent another, the *Viscaya*, to the shore in flames.

"The *Brooklyn* signaled, '*Oregon, well done.*' Only the *Cristóbal Colón* was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened with our forward turret guns, and the *Brooklyn* followed, she began to edge in towards the coast, and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came down, and the *Brooklyn* signalled, 'Cease firing,' following it with: '*Congratulations for the grand victory; thanks for your splendid assistance.*'"

A large part of the report of the commander-in-chief is devoted to laudation of the method of blockade that had been pursued during the month before the battle, and he claims that "this complete and most important victory was the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade."

This is "*non sequitur.*" It is difficult to see what the effort to keep an enemy *in port* has to do with beating him to absolute destruction after he has come *out*. If Cervera's fleet had escaped when they came out that Sunday morning, could either Schley or Sampson have pleaded that closeness of the blockade in justification? Manifestly not.

It may well be doubted whether it was good judg-

ment on the part of the commander-in-chief, after having sent the *Massachusetts* away to Guantanamo for coal that morning, to withdraw the fast cruiser *New York* and two other vessels (the *Hist* and *Ericsson*, the latter being his only torpedo-boat destroyer) to enable him to go "*en grande tenue*" to Altares, where he was to land with his staff, and go up to General Shafter's headquarters. This especially in view of the fact that the movements of columns of smoke in the harbor on July 2 (the previous day) had been so marked as to excite Schley's attention to such a degree as made him think it proper to send word (as he did) to the commander-in-chief, calling his attention to the matter (Schley, I. 1385; Sears, I. 972; Harlow, I. 1362).

It was a mere accident that the battle-ship *Indiana* was not left without her captain (Taylor) in that day's battle.

It has already been stated that, before starting for Siboney, Captain Chadwick, the chief of staff, signaled Captain Taylor, saying that the admiral wished to know if he (Taylor) would not go with him to General Shafter's headquarters, and that Taylor declined, because of something that was going on on board the *Indiana* that required his presence.

Suppose that Taylor had gone, and that the Spaniards had deferred their exit for two short hours. In that event Sampson and his party would have been on shore, astride of horses or mules, part way up to Shafter's headquarters, and when Cervera came out the *New York* and *Indiana* would each have been left in command of their respective executive officers.

The roar of the battle would have put upon Lieutenant Commander Potter, the executive officer of the *New York*, the decision of the question whether to remain at Altares until he could get his admiral and captain back on board, or, leaving them behind, go at once to the assistance of his brethren in the fight.

There can be no doubt that Potter would have promptly chosen the latter course, as would have been his plain duty, and have done his best to speed the *New York* into the fight.

In that case, could she have reached the scene, both the *New York* and *Indiana* would have been fought under command of their respective executive officers, instead of their absent captains.

And then of course it would have been in order for Captains Taylor and Chadwick to claim the credit for fighting them, and to criticise and find fault with everything that those executive officers had done—without any criticism—during the past month or more before the battle; and even to make insinuations as to their courage, in order to deprive them of the credit of fighting their ships successfully.

If this would not have been proper in Taylor and Chadwick, with respect to their respective seconds in command, why not?

Anyone can see the absurdity of the question, and the proper answer to be given.

In the famous battle between the Confederate iron-clad *Virginia* (as the Confederates called her) or *Merrimac* (as we called her) and our wooden ships, the *Cumberland* and *Congress*, the captains of both the latter ships were ten miles away, sitting as members of a court of inquiry at the time the fight began.

Their absence left their respective executive officers—Lieutenant George U. Morris in the *Cumberland* and Lieutenant Joseph Smith in the *Congress*—in command of those ships respectively.

Every naval officer knows the names and deeds of Morris and Smith on that day, and the whole world rang in praise of their gallantry; and history records it. But who knows who their captains were? The latter were very gallant and capable officers, and as soon as the *Merrimac* was seen to be about to make the attack they took horse, galloping at full speed to

Newport News, off which their ships were lying. If they could have gotten there in time we know that they would have done their full duty in command, but as it was, through no fault of theirs, they were not able to be in it. They therefore claimed no part of the credit due to "Joe Smith" (as his brethren have always affectionately remembered him), of the *Congress*, and George U. Morris, of the *Cumberland*.

Captain (afterwards Rear Admiral) William Radford commanded the *Cumberland*, and in his report said: "I was on board the *Roanoke*, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, as member of a court of inquiry when the *Merrimac* came out. I immediately procured a horse and proceeded with all despatch to Newport News, where I arrived only in time to see the *Cumberland* sunk.¹

"Though I could not reach the *Cumberland* before the action was over, I have the satisfaction of reporting that she was fought as long as her guns were above water. Everyone on board must have done his duty nobly.

"I send, with this, the report of Lieutenant George U. Morris of the action, he being, in my absence, the commanding officer."

When old Commodore Smith, the father of Lieutenant "Joe" Smith, heard that the *Congress* had been surrendered, he exclaimed: "Then Joe's dead." And so he was.

¹This was exactly Sampson's experience and course.

CHAPTER LX

THE LOOP (SO-CALLED) MADE BY THE "BROOKLYN"

THAT incident of the battle has been the subject of much inquiry and unfavorable criticism and comment on the part of Schley's detractors. Even a President of the United States joined in this, and, in his memorandum on Schley's appeal to him, says of the "loop"; "It seriously marred the *Brooklyn's* otherwise excellent record; being, in fact, the one grave mistake made by any American ship that day."

The author is not going to make any apologies or excuses for the "loop," but on the contrary will explain and show clearly that, in the situation that confronted the *Brooklyn* at that moment when Captain Cook—without direction from Schley—ordered the helm of the ship "hard-a-port," to make the turn, it was not only the right thing to do, but the *only* proper thing; and that to have turned the other way, under starboard helm, would have been "the one grave mistake"; not only an act of folly, but might, and probably would, have exerted a disastrous effect upon the fortune of the day; and would probably have resulted, not only in the destruction of the *Brooklyn*, but in the escape of the *Colón* and *Viscaya*.

It was merely a tactical move, and must be rightly judged solely by its results.

When in a battle between two prize-fighters one "knocks the other out," it makes no difference whether the victor struck the decisive blow with his right fist or his left; or whether at a critical moment he turned to the right (starboard) or left (port), or towards or from his adversary, the better to deliver the knock-out blow.

The on-lookers who were not in the fight may have

and may express their opinions about it—that's easy enough; but the man who knocked the other out gets, because he deserves, the credit of the victory. In this case Cook and Schley get no credit for the result, but only criticism of the method by which that result was accomplished.

The *Brooklyn* and the Spanish ships were approaching each other on practically opposite courses, each steaming at the rate of twelve knots an hour; which, for both, was twenty-four knots, or a knot in two and one-half minutes, and the *Teresa* (Cervera's flagship), was only eleven hundred yards away, or, in time, one minute, forty seconds.

The other Spanish ships were following her at distance (about four hundred yards) from each other, except the *Colón*, which was pursuing a course much inside the others, in the hope to escape—that being the plan agreed upon.

That the *Brooklyn* must promptly turn about and pursue an opposite course admits of no doubt, because in another two minutes the two leading Spanish ships would pass her, and she would be between them and our other ships, thus, as it is termed, "blanketing their fire."

Turn, therefore, she must, and the only question was whether the turn should be under port helm, to starboard (right), or under starboard helm, to port (left).

The credit (or blame) of beginning the turn under port helm undoubtedly belongs to Captain Cook. He first gave the order to his helmsman (Anderson) "Port." The commodore, Captain Cook, and the navigator (Hodgson) all agree about that. Captain Cook testified before the Court of Inquiry: "I gave the order; it was not after having heard the commodore."

That it met with the approval of Commodore Schley is also a fact that nobody denies, or wishes to

deny. He could have given the order "starboard" instead of "port," if he had thought proper; but he approved and confirmed Cook's order, and assumed responsibility for it, and any results that might have followed.

No one has as yet even suggested that Captain Cook committed any impropriety, either of action or motive, in so doing, or insinuated that he was afraid of getting into too close proximity "to the enemy" in giving the order "Port." It was done in the exercise of his best judgment. All who were there approved of it then, and approve of it now.

To ask from either Cook or Schley reasons influencing his mind at the instant it was done would be futile. "A situation, and not a theory" confronted them, and there was no time for theorizing, reasoning, or calculation of chances. They were both professional men of the highest ability, skill, and judgment and long experience in dealing with the emergencies of the sea-life and in the handling of ships, and particularly of the *Brooklyn*. They both seemed to reach the same conclusion as to the proper way in which to turn almost at the same instant, because, as Captain Cook testified: "I gave the order 'Hard-a-port,' to the helmsman instantly, quicker than I can tell it. The commodore called to me, 'Cook, hard-a-port,' or 'Is your helm hard-a-port?' My answer was, 'It is hard-a-port; she is turning as rapidly as possible.'" The nautical instinct of self-preservation (by which is meant preservation of their ship) asserted itself in the mind of both at the same moment.

It was quite certain that one or the other of the Spanish ships would ram the *Brooklyn*, if possible to do so, and their movements had only a few moments previously caused Schley to say to Cook: "Look out; they're going to ram."

Another thing was probably in the mind of both. Each knew that the enemy's ships were provided with

self-acting torpedoes that were effective within a radius of about six hundred yards, and that in about another minute and a half the *Brooklyn* would be within that radius.

In the judgment of both the turn under port helm meant immunity from torpedo attack, or danger of being rammed, for, as Cook testified (I. 898): "If she had turned with starboard, instead of port helm, and the Spaniards had continued on their course southwest, straight for us [the *Brooklyn*], it would have made ramming possible; yes, certainly." (At the point F in last diagram.)

Cervera's chief of staff (Captain Concas y Palau), in Chapter IX. p. 68, of his book, reprinted by the Navy Department says: "The admiral [Cervera] proceeded to give us instructions for the battle. When we came out, the *Teresa* was to engage her [the *Brooklyn*] in battle, endeavoring to ram her while the rest of the ships, headed by the *Viscaya*, without delaying to succor the *Teresa*, were to pass in column, between her and the coast and endeavor to escape."

It would have been fatuous, and of the highest degree of foolhardiness, to have run the risk of either under the circumstances.

The following diagram illustrates the turn as it was actually made, the positions after it was completed, and the *Brooklyn* and the four Spanish ships running on parallel courses to the westward. It also shows the movements of the Spanish ships before they ran ashore.

The testimony about this turn or "loop" is as follows:

Captain Cook (I. 895): "When I saw the enemy turn westward I gave the order, 'Hard-a-port.' Quicker than I can tell it, the commodore called to me: 'Cook, hard-a-port,' or 'Is your helm hard-a-port?' My answer was, 'It is hard-a-port; she is turning as rapidly as possible.' "

"We made a complete turn, and a very quick turn, until we came around and paralleled the Spanish fleet on the other side; and then we had the *Viscaya* on our starboard bow, and about a-beam was the *Oquendo*; and then the *Colón*."

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson testified (I. 571): "The *Teresa* falling off, she got abaft our port beam, and the helm of the *Brooklyn* was ported immediately after that; and we were swinging with a port helm [to right]; I heard the commodore sing out, 'Hard-a-port,' or words to that effect, and Captain Cook sang out to him, 'The helm is a-port.'"

Lieutenant Harlow, in the notes taken by him on board the *Vixen*, said: "The *Brooklyn* at 10 A. M. was the nearest to, and engaging, the two leading ships. The two ships were quite close together, with an interval of perhaps three-fourths of a mile between the second ship and the *Colón*."

"At 10.05 the *Brooklyn* began to turn with the port helm, and made a complete turn to the eastward, continuing around so that when again heading west the enemy's two leading ships bore well on her starboard bow and the *Colón* on her starboard quarter, with the fourth vessel coming up rapidly astern. For the next fifteen minutes the *Brooklyn* received and returned the fire of the enemy's two leading ships, with an occasional shot from the *Colón*."

Intimations have been made that the *Brooklyn* was run off on a southerly course two thousand yards (a nautical mile) before she was brought on a course parallel to that of the Spaniards.

Captain Taylor (of the *Indiana*) and his marine officer (Captain Dawson) were the only two officers who made that statement before the Court of Inquiry. Inasmuch as their ship was not less than six miles away from the *Brooklyn* at the time the turn was made, and Taylor's attention was probably engrossed (certainly ought to have been) by the movements of

the Spanish ships, his testimony as to what the *Brooklyn* was doing would not be very reliable.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson testified (I. 620): "Any witness who made the statement that the *Brooklyn* ran two thousand yards to the south from the Spanish line of battle, though he might have been stating what he thought was true, was absolutely mistaken."

Captain Cook, in reply to a question by the court, testified (I. 904), in answer to the question, was the helm of the *Brooklyn* steadied or eased, at any time during the turn: "No, no, no, not until she was around and parallel with the Spanish ships; it was not even eased."

And the helmsman Anderson, who was produced by the judge advocate, in reply to the question by the court, Was the *Brooklyn's* helm eased or righted from the time it was first put a-port until she was put on her westerly course? replied: "No, sir." And Anderson also testified (I. 1604): "I understand it has been stated that she went to the southward and stood on a southerly course, which is incorrect."

And the finding of the court (I. 1829) put a quietus on that untruth, which finding was: "The *Brooklyn* turned to starboard, with her helm hard-a-port, and continued to turn until she headed to the westward, parallel to the course of the Spanish ships."

In the face of such testimony and that finding of the court, Mr. John D. Long, formerly Secretary of the Navy (at p. 36, Vol. ii. of his book lately published) has had the hardihood to say: "The *Brooklyn* began to turn away from the battle line until her stern was presented to the hostile cruisers. Having gone to the southward a distance not fully established, but ranging between eight hundred and two thousand yards, the *Brooklyn* turned and ran parallel with the Spanish ships." And again (at p. 41) he says: "Far out to sea, the *Brooklyn*, which had been doing mag-


nificent work with her battery, after the loop was made . . .”

For making just such untruthful insinuations in his (so-called) “Naval History,” one Edgar Stanton Maclay was dismissed in disgrace, by order of President Roosevelt, from the service of the United States. His book was condemned by the Congress of the United States, and its use in the naval or military academies was prohibited.

Mr. Maclay did not have the above testimony and finding to show him his error, and he was undoubtedly deceived by just such statements as that of Captain Taylor. Long reviewed all this testimony, and approved the finding of the court.

If Maclay was justly treated, what treatment does Long deserve?

Diagram V. Battle between U.S.S. U.S. and Macedonian



Wind S, S E

DIAGRAM V.—“The plan of the battle, as given by Captain Mahan, is here reproduced.”

CHAPTER LXI

THE LOOP (CONTINUED)—ITS PROPRIETY ILLUSTRATED IN THE BATTLE BETWEEN UNITED STATES FRIGATE "UNITED STATES" AND THE BRITISH FRIGATE "MACEDONIAN"

IT was clearly the duty of Commodore Schley and Captain Cook not to take unnecessary risks in performing the duty of that moment.

If a ship has guns that will enable her captain to keep out of the range of the enemy's guns and torpedoes, and knock that enemy to pieces without "getting her into dangerous proximity" to that enemy, it would be the worst sort of foolhardiness if, for mere purposes of individual display, he should go within range of the guns and torpedoes of that enemy. He would simply be a vainglorious fool to do so.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, United States Navy (who is one of the best authorities on such subjects), in the May, 1904, number of *Scribner's Magazine*, in an article, "The War of 1812," well illustrates the truth of the last statements in a critical description of the battle between the United States Frigate *United States*, commanded by Captain Stephen Decatur (*who was, as Gleaves says, "the most brilliant sailor officer the navy of the United States has ever produced"*), and the British frigate *Macedonian*, commanded by Captain Carden, resulting in the capture of the latter ship with very little loss to the former.

The plan of the battle, as given by Captain Mahan, is here reproduced, Diagram V.

At 8.30 A. M. the two ships were approaching each other exactly as the *Brooklyn* and the Spanish ships were just before the "loop"—that is to say, each had the other on the port bow.

Mahan says (p. 604): "The *United States* was fully fifty per cent. stronger than the *Macedonian* in artillery power."

The *United States* at that time put her helm "hard-a-port" (just as the *Brooklyn* did), thus turning away from instead of towards her enemy (just as the *Brooklyn* did). Or to use the elegantly expressed insinuation of Ex-Secretary Long regarding the *Brooklyn's* actions at the Battle of Santiago (Vol. ii, p. 36 of his book), "Thus began to turn away from the battle line, until her stern was presented to the hostile cruiser." After a little time she a second time turned "away from her foe," again "presenting her stern to the hostile cruiser"; and she, a third time, ran further away from her foe.

Mahan of this maneuvering, says (p. 608) that "the action of the *United States* puzzled the British extremely. Her first wearing [turning away from the *Macedonian*] was interpreted as running away."¹

Three cheers were given [by the British], as though victorious in repelling an attack.²

"The handling of the *United States* was thoroughly skillful. Though he probably knew himself superior in force, Captain Decatur's object necessarily should be to take his opponent at the least possible injury to his own ship.

"In general principle the great French Admiral Courville correctly said: 'The best victories are those which cost least in blood, timber, and iron.'

"Captain Carden, of the *Macedonian*, had no hesitation as to the need of getting near [the *United States*]. To avoid this was therefore not only fitting, but the bounden duty of the American captain.

"His business was not merely to make a brilliant display of courage and efficiency, but to do the utmost

¹ That is what Schley's critics have insinuated and professed to believe.

² We have no report of any cheers by the Spanish on July 3.

injury to the opponent at the least harm to his own ship and men."

This battle is also described by Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, in his book entitled _____ and he therein gives a diagram which shows these turnings from the English ship, but not to so marked a degree. And thus these two great naval authorities agree in commending the course pursued by Decatur.

Tested by these sound and sensible principles, thus stated by our most able critic, Mahan, and Roosevelt, Cook and Schley, in making that turn as they did, did exactly what was right to be done—what Captain Decatur twice did in one battle, and what Mahan says "was thoroughly skillful."

Decatur brought the captured *Macedonian* into New York, where he was received by his fellow-countrymen (just as Schley has been) with universal and hearty praise.

What a pity it was that there was not some Maclay or Long to make insinuations against him for turning three times away from his foe!

The criticism of the "loop" has been indulged in by a President of the United States, who said: "Had the *Brooklyn* turned to the westward, that is, in the same direction that the Spanish ships were going, instead of the contrary direction, she would undoubtedly have been in a more dangerous proximity to them. But it would have been more dangerous to them as well as for her. This kind of danger must not be too nicely weighed by those whose duty it is to do and dare for the honor of the flag. Moreover, the danger certainly was not as great as that which, in that self-same moment, menaced Wainwright's fragile craft as he drove forward against the foe."

The innuendo of the last statements and the comparison with Wainwright were not necessary to a judicial determination.

Comparisons are always odious, and one who makes them should be sure of his parallelism.

The President says that he had examined all the official reports of every kind in reference to the Santiago campaign. He could not have examined with any great care or comprehension the reports made by Captain Wainwright and his executive officer, Lieutenant Huse (A. 540-1), wherein Wainwright said: "It was the plain duty of the *Gloucester* to look after the destroyers, and she was held back, gaining steam, until they appeared in the entrance. The *Indiana* poured in a hot fire upon the destroyers from all her secondary batteries, but Captain Taylor's signal, 'Gunboats close in,' gave security that we would not be fired upon by our own ships."

Lieutenant Huse says (A. 541): "In the belief that the two torpedo destroyers known to be in the harbor would come out, you directed me to slow down and wait for them, keeping up a deliberate fire on the cruisers from the port battery.

"Presently signal was made from the *Indiana*, 'Gunboats will advance.' After this signal it appeared that the fight between this ship and the apparently uninjured destroyers was a thing apart from the battle in which the larger ships were engaged." In this he was mistaken.

Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, says (A. 530, 531): "Our secondary battery guns were directed principally on the destroyers, as were the six-inch guns. The destroyers were sunk through the agency of our guns and those of the *Gloucester*, which vessel came up and engaged them close aboard. At about 10.15 we devoted our especial attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, which appeared to be more than a match for the *Gloucester*, she being the only small vessel near, to engage them. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently struck by *our* six-inch and six-ponders."

Captain Evans, of the *Iowa*, in his report of the battle (A. 537) says: "About ten o'clock the enemy's torpedo boat destroyers *Furor* and *Plutón* were observed to leave the harbor and to be following the Spanish squadron. At the time they were discovered (and, in fact, most of the time they were under fire) they were at a distance varying from 4500 to 4000 yards. As soon as they were discovered the secondary battery of this ship was turned upon them. About 10.25 the fire of this vessel, together with that of the *Gloucester* and another small vessel, proved so disastrous that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (*Plutón*) was so damaged that she was run upon the rocks." After his characteristic fashion, Evans ignores the fire of the other battle-ships.

The log-book of the *Texas* contains the following: "Four ships came out; besides these there were two torpedo-boat destroyers. These two were compelled to run ashore by *this* ship and the *Gloucester*."

From the log-book of the *Oregon* the following is taken: "Shortly after the beginning of the engagement one torpedo destroyer was seen to steam in towards the beach, and the other was blown up by a shot from the after six-inch gun of *this* ship."

In his report (A. 526) Captain Clark says: "When it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo-boats were following their ships, we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the six-inch, upon them with telling effect."

In the notes taken on board the *Vixen* appears the following: "10.32,—Two small vessels, probably the torpedo-boat destroyers, the *Plutón* and *Furor*, were to the westward of Cabanas, engaged by the *Iowa* and *Texas*;" and "10.50.—A small vessel, evidently a yacht, appeared off Guyacabon, hotly engaging some of the enemy's ships."

Now, the author does not wish or purpose to detract in the slightest degree from the gallantry, ability,

and skill displayed by Captain Wainwright of the *Gloucester*, and his officers and crew, on that occasion. But Wainwright was not the foolhardy man that the President seems to think Cook and Schley ought to have been. Wainwright knew that he might have a highly important duty to perform,—which was to protect the battle-ships against the attacks of those torpedo boats,—and he therefore, as in their official reports he and Huse say he did, “held his ship back, gaining steam,” and waiting for the proper time when the signal from the *Indiana* and the support of the powerful batteries of the *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Oregon* warranted his advance. Then, and not till then, he went in with a dashing gallantry never excelled in any naval battle except perhaps that of Nelson in the *Captain* in the Battle of St. Vincent. There is, however, this difference between the two cases: Wainwright’s gallantry was displayed in obedience to signal; Nelson’s was without—in fact contrary to,—orders.

Any comparison between the situation of the *Gloucester*, supported, as she was, by four battle-ships and another small vessel, and directed to go in by the signal of his superior officer, and the situation of the *Brooklyn* at the time of making that turn, fighting, as Captain Clark says, those four Spanish ships alone, is far-fetched and absurd, no matter who makes the comparison.

If Wainwright had been foolhardy enough to attack the Spanish cruisers, and the *Gloucester* had been sunk, as she certainly would have been, it would have been no appreciable consequence to the result; but the loss of the *Brooklyn* at that time would have been a most serious and probably fatal calamity, so far as the capture or destruction of the *Viscaya* and *Colón* was concerned.

One more quotation and we will have done with this subject.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, the navigator of the *Brooklyn*, wrote to Admiral Schley concerning that turn (I. 592): "It proved to be a strategical move of the greatest importance, and the result of the battle proved its wisdom. And the successful issue of the turn, the gallant closing in of the *Brooklyn* upon the fleeing enemy, the bulldog tenacity with which she held on, her magnificent fighting and glorious scars, will always attest your leadership and bravery."

Captain Cook was promoted five numbers for his conduct in the battle of Santiago (as were all the other captains of ships engaged).

Cook began the "loop." Schley merely approved of it. If there was anything wrong about it, why should Cook be promoted, and Schley not only not promoted, but condemned?

In this connection let me add my approval of the praise so gallantly and justly earned by Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright, commander of the *Gloucester* in that battle. He comes of fighting naval stock, and he proved himself worthy his lineage.

And I deem it but just to quote what he said of his executive officer, Lieutenant Harry McL. P. Huse, in his report (A. 40), which is as follows: "The escape of the *Gloucester* was due mainly to the accuracy and rapidity of her fire. The efficiency of this fire, as well as that of the ships generally, was largely due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the executive officer, lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The result is more to his credit, when it is considered that a large proportion of the officers and men were untrained when the *Gloucester* was commissioned. Throughout the action he was on the bridge and carried out my orders with great coolness."

Such praise is worthy all the publicity that can be given to it.

The majority of the Court of Inquiry expressed the

opinion that "by commencing the engagement on July 3 with the port battery, and turning the *Brooklyn* around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the *Viscaya* and *Colón*."

Let us see about that. This is the situation after the turn, as told by an absolutely impartial witness:

Lieutenant Harlow, of the *Vixen*, testified (I. 1330): "It was not until after the *Viscaya* had gone on shore at Asserederos that it was apparent to anybody on board the *Vixen* that there had been any fighting by any ship except the *Brooklyn*, a little by the *Oregon*, and a little by the *Texas*, except that fire which was concentrated on the Morro as the ships came out. From my positive knowledge, I saw the *Brooklyn* receiving and returning the fire, almost the entire fire, of the two leading ships, with an occasional shot from the *Colón*. I was in a position to see the flash, and immediately afterwards, or shortly afterwards, the fall of the projectiles; and the proportion between the flash and the fall showed that a large proportion fell about the *Brooklyn*. I made a note at the time, and remember distinctly that it was evident that the *Colón* was using smokeless powder; so I was not able to detect the fall of as many shells from the *Colón* as I was from the two leading ships. I have very good reason for believing that the projectiles which set on fire the *Viscaya*, and compelled her to turn inshore, came entirely from the *Brooklyn*; and that there was at that time no other ship within range of the *Viscaya*.

"As I have said before, I repeat now, from my point of view (calmly, and carefully watching), the *Brooklyn* was receiving the bulk of the fire from the two leading ships, with occasional shots from the third."

Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, testified (I. 1336): "I never saw the *Brooklyn* until I came out of the

smoke and saw her ahead. She must have been engaged with all four of the enemy's ships."

"Lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels!"

Those poor Spaniards, with her shells bursting all about them, burning, sinking, and fleeing to the shore, didn't think the *Brooklyn* had lost any distance or position, and it was preposterous for the majority of the court to make that finding.

CHAPTER LXII

THE ALLEGED DANGER OF COLLISION BETWEEN THE "BROOKLYN" AND "TEXAS"

LET us now consider the matter of the alleged danger of collision between the *Brooklyn* and the *Texas*. There was no reference in any of the official or newspaper reports of the battle as to the possibility or danger of such a collision.

Strong effort has, however, been made by Schley's detractors to make it appear that in turning about ("making the loop") the *Brooklyn* ran into great danger of such collision with the *Texas*.

The sole foundation for this story was an article printed in the *Century Magazine* for May, 1899, by Captain John W. Philip, who commanded the *Texas* in the battle.

He described this incident of the battle thus: "The smoke from our guns began to hang so heavily and densely over the ships that, for a few minutes, we could see nothing. We might as well have had a blanket over our heads. Suddenly, a whiff of breeze and a lull in the firing lifted the pall, and there, bearing towards us and across our bows, turning on her port helm, with big waves curling over her bows and great clouds of black smoke pouring from her funnels, was the *Brooklyn*. She looked as big as half a dozen *Great Easterns*, and seemed so near that it took my breath away. 'Back both engines hard!' went down the tube to the astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the old ship was racing against herself. The collision which seemed imminent, even if it was not, was averted, and, as the big cruiser glided past, all of us on the bridge gave a sigh of relief."

Philip had died before the Court of Inquiry was

held, and when that magazine article was mentioned by Schley's counsel before the court, the judge advocate promptly objected to all reference to it, and it was ruled out by the court.

But the President and Ex-Secretary Long (in his book) having both cited it to support a conclusion adverse to Schley, in having endangered the *Texas*, it is thought proper to insert the foregoing citation from the article.

It will be observed that Philip does not say that there *was* danger of a collision, but merely that "it seemed imminent, even if it was not." The statement regarding the menace to the *Texas*' safety was never made until this magazine article appeared, and Captain Cook testified (I. 896): "I didn't hear anything about it until long afterwards." That is, long after the battle. The testimony to support the statement that the *Texas* had been endangered, was as follows:

Thomas M. Dieuwaide, a newspaper correspondent,—produced as a witness by the judge advocate,—was on the bridge of the *Texas*, at the time, and testified (I. 398):

"I saw the *Brooklyn* ten or fifteen minutes after the battle began. When I first saw her she was off the port bow of the *Texas*. I would not like to make any estimate of the distance,—how far away; she seemed very close to me. She was going seaward, and it was her stern that I saw."

From Dieuwaide's statement there was absolutely no possibility of collision, unless the *Brooklyn* should stop, reverse, get a sternway on, and back into the *Texas*.

Dieuwaide continued: "I have an entry in my notes, 'Stop both engines; helm hard-a-starboard,' and another, 'It was the *Brooklyn*; close shave.'"

It seems incredible that Philip, who was a fine seaman and had had a large experience in the management of the large steamships of the Pacific Mail

Steamship Company for several years, should have done anything so unseamanlike as to put the helm of the *Texas* hard-a-starboard to avoid a collision with the *Brooklyn*, if the latter was crossing the bows of the *Texas* from starboard to port. If he did so, he must have been "rattled," and that I cannot believe.

Dieuwaide must have got that order "starboard" wrong as to the time when it was given. It would have been necessary, shortly before that, for Captain Philip to give that order "starboard"; but not with reference to the *Brooklyn*.

It is worthy of note that Dieuwaide, as soon as possible that afternoon of July 3, cabled to his news agency an account of the battle (which was printed in the *New York Sun*), in which he said not a word about the turn of the *Brooklyn* or of danger of collision with the *Texas*.

Commander Heilner (navigator of the *Texas* during the battle) testified (I. 127): "When the second of the enemy's ships followed the first to the westward, he [Captain Philip] put our helm a-starboard. I had made several reports to him about the *Brooklyn*,—that is, about her signals,—of which he said: 'Never mind'; and also the way I thought the *Brooklyn* was standing up to the fight, as I said, very nicely. The captain said: 'Oh, cracky! never mind the *Brooklyn*. You look out for this ship.' The *Brooklyn* was then about on our port beam. I said: 'All right, Captain; I will look at the *Brooklyn* no more'; and I turned my back and looked over on the starboard beam at those ships coming out. After we slewed [turned] around and got to the westward, I suggested to give her a little port helm, to get closer in; and he did."

This conflicts with Dieuwaide, and the next sentence more so.

"Right after he gave her this port helm, he sang out through sight holes, to the men at the engine room

indicators, to 'slow'; then 'stop.' I said, 'Captain, they will all get away from us.' He did not answer me, but immediately said, 'Back.' I then said: 'My Lord, Captain, we are out of the fight.' He then said: 'Look at the *Brooklyn*.'

"I turned around, and right ahead of us this big gray ship loomed out of the smoke. For a second, I think, my heart was in my mouth; but I saw at once that she had a heavy sheer,—or, rather, that she was steaming with a heavy helm, and she sheered by us. When I saw her she was practically ahead of us,—that is, the first I saw of her. As soon as the *Brooklyn* cleared us we rang to go ahead. Just before this turn of the *Brooklyn*, the *Iowa* and the *Oregon* were both close to us on our starboard beam."

The testimony given by others than those on board the *Texas*, was, on the other hand, as follows:

Captain Francis A. Cook (of the *Brooklyn*) said (I. 895): "We ported our helm from about north-east. The *Texas* was well on our *starboard* [right] hand. As I saw her, I saw her port bow. I never saw the starboard bow of the *Texas*. And, changing her bearing very rapidly, the *Brooklyn* turned [her bow] along the port side of the *Texas* until there was a clear space between the *Brooklyn*'s bow and the stern of the *Texas*."

At this point of the testimony Admiral Dewey interposed with the following question:

Q. May I interrupt you there? How near did you pass to the *Texas*?

A. *In my estimate, at the time, the thought of collision never entered my head. I never for a moment had any idea of solicitude in that respect. We passed, I should judge, about four hundred yards. I had handled that ship under all circumstances, and had gotten so that I could judge distances pretty correctly; and my impression was, at the time, that we were about our distance that we sailed in squadron; but*

collision never entered my head, and I didn't hear anything about it until long afterwards. *She turned perfectly clear of the Texas.*"

If Cook had seen the starboard side of the *Texas* he could not but have known that there was danger of collision, and would immediately have whistled to the *Texas* his purpose to cross her bow.

The "Rules of the Road" enacted by Congress, as adopted by all maritime nations for the prevention of collisions at sea, provide:

Art. 16. If two ships under steam are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the ship that has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other. And

Art. 20. Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course.

The *Texas*, in the situation, would have had the *Brooklyn* on her (*Texas*) starboard side; and thus the *Brooklyn* (apart from the fact that she was the flagship, and could go where she pleased) would have clearly had the right of way, and it was the duty of the *Texas* to keep out of the way.

Lieutenant Sears (I. 1007) when asked by the court: "At the time the *Brooklyn* turned to starboard, was her distance more or less than what is known as 'distance,' when ships are in column?" replied: "It was not far from that distance." And on page 974 he said: "When the order was given, 'Hard-a-port,' I looked to the next vessel in our fleet, the *Texas*; and in my judgment we were completely clear of her. As we turned, we passed well clear of her."

And on page 1008 he was questioned and answered as follows:

Q. Do you know whether the *Brooklyn* crossed the bows of the *Texas*?

A. *She did not.*

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who called the attention of both the commodore and Captain Cook, to the *Texas*, testified (I. 572): "The *Brooklyn* swung *well clear* of the *Texas*, and came around with helm 'hard-a-port.'

Q. (By the judge advocate): I want to ask you how near was the *Texas* to the *Brooklyn* when she crossed the bow of the *Texas*, and you spoke to Commodore Schley about it? How near were the two vessels?

A. Well, I suppose, sir, about 250 to 300 yards.

The witness then read from notes: "We quickly put our helm a-port, and wore round to starboard, passing *well inside* the *Texas*," and added: "This was the account written by me the day after the battle."

Lieutenant Harlow, who was on the bridge of the *Vixen* taking notes, in reply to the court's question (I. 1333): "If you saw the *Texas* while the *Brooklyn* was turning to starboard on July 3, how near were those two ships?" answered: "At no time were they sufficiently near to give me any idea of collision." And (I. 1331): "I saw the *Texas* at the time of the 'loop.' She was to the eastward. The *Brooklyn* made the 'loop' and started to the westward, and I don't think the other vessels had started in to the westward."

Lieutenant Commander Nicholson (who as navigator of the *Oregon* had been on her magnificent voyage 'round from the Pacific) was asked: Q. When you passed under the stern of the *Texas* can you estimate the distance between the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* about that time? and replied (I. 1111): "Well, I thought she was a mile, or mile and a half, away, I never saw her [the *Texas*] when she was any closer than then to the *Brooklyn*. I never saw the *Brooklyn*

anywhere near the *Texas*." And (I. 1115): "I did not see them come anywheres near each other."

Admiral Schley testified (I. 1338): "I never saw the starboard side of the *Texas* at all. We were never across her bow. I saw only her port side, and she never approached any position that was within six hundred yards of the *Brooklyn*. She was so distant that it never entered my head at all as a menace or danger."

It would seem quite clear from all this testimony that the turn (or "loop") of the *Brooklyn* did not in any way, or to any degree, menace the *Texas* with collision; and that the two vessels were never nearer each other than four hundred yards,—if so near.

That the captain of the *Texas*, for an instant only, thought a collision possible, there is no doubt. Whence his apprehension?

In his book "James Lawrence," Lieutenant Commander Gleaves says:

"The affair with the *Leopard* had effectually condemned the *Chesapeake* and sealed her untoward reputation, for, as is well known, to seamen a ship becomes endowed with human virtues or human thoughts. To them she ceases to be a mere inanimate thing of wood or iron, for in their eyes she is a living organism, and as such acquires a reputation for good or evil; and in a short time establishes a permanent reputation.

"The *Chesapeake* was considered the most unlucky ship in the navy, and from the time she was launched until Barron's bullet, at Bladensburg twenty years later, slew the most brilliant sailor officer the navy of the United States has ever produced, she seemed to exercise a baleful influence upon everyone connected with her.

"Like Oedipus in the fable, she was pursued by a malignant fate from which it seemed impossible to escape."

Captain Philip was personally as brave a man as ever trod a deck, but affected possibly by the feeling Gleaves has so well stated, he might have regarded the *Texas* as "a hoodooed" ship. She had been unfortunate from the start. She was built from plans brought from England, had some trouble at her launching, and had mysteriously sunk while lying at the wharf at the Navy Yard, Brooklyn.

Philip, in that *Century* article, tells of an interview he had had with a woman in the Navy Yard, just before he sailed. She, in bidding him good-by, said that she was the last person who had shaken hands with the captain of the ill-fated *Huron*, which was wrecked on the coast of North Carolina a few hours after leaving port.

Speaking (in the magazine) of the turning of the *Brooklyn*, he says: "It was the one time in the battle when I thought for a second that I should have to give in to that woman in Brooklyn who shook hands with me just before the *Texas* sailed." And he adds: "I always did want to fool that woman."

Philip, a short time before his death, said to the author, when asked if there really was danger of collision, "No; not at all. But when I saw that great ship coming out through that pall of smoke with her batteries a sheet of flame, belching fire from her three great smokestacks and all her guns, she looked as big as a mountain; and for an instant my heart was in my mouth, and I gave the order to back immediately; but countermanded it."

Captain Cook has told the author that Philip made the same statement, in substance, to him.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE PERSONAL CONDUCT OF COMMODORE SCHLEY DURING THE BATTLE

IN taking up the matter of the personal conduct of Commodore Schley at the Battle of Santiago, it seems almost an insult to the gallant commodore even to allude to that subject; but there have been so many insinuations and suggestions made, even by those in high places, that it will be well to give the testimony of those who saw him during the progress of the battle; and who, consequently, know whereof they speak.

Lieutenant Templin M. Potts (suggestive name), who was the officer who for some reason was unable to get the ranges right on the day of the reconnoissance (May 31) while navigator of the *Massachusetts* (as hereinbefore stated), having intimated that during that reconnoissance the commodore had betrayed some nervousness or excitement, Potts' captain (now Rear Admiral) Higginson was requested to "describe definitely the bearing of Commodore Schley at the time."

He replied: "His bearing was that of a commander-in-chief. I don't know what you mean."

Of the commodore's conduct during the battle with Cervera's fleet, July 3, the subjoined testimony calls for little or no comment.

Captain Cook (I. 899) testified:

Q. (By judge advocate): What was the conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley while under fire on such occasions as you have had opportunity of observing?

A. I have always regarded him as an enthusiastically brave and patriotic officer; never in any other light.

Q. (By the Court): Please state what was the conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley during the battle of July 3d. The answer to the question previously given by you does not refer specifically to this date.

A. I cannot imagine any conduct in battle more admirable. He was cool, brave, and enthusiastic, from the beginning to the end of the battle."

Q. (I. 992): Was Commodore Schley's position upon the *Brooklyn* on the day of the battle one of danger?

A. Yes. As much so as that of anyone's on board the *Brooklyn*. He was in the open all the time.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who was laboring under a feeling that Commodore Schley had not been just to him, and was close to the commodore all through the action, testified (I. 619): "The bearing and manner of Commodore Schley during the engagement of July 3 were the bearing and manner that you would expect an officer of his rank and station in the service to have. That is all I should say. It was the natural manner of a commander-in-chief of the naval forces on that occasion. His position was a point of danger. He was always in full view of the enemy's ships."

Lieutenant Edward Simpson (I. 1255) testified: "I very often heard the commodore's voice, cheering us on to fire rapidly. 'Give it to them, boys,' and expressions of that sort. As the *Viscaya's* fire slackened, I heard the commodore's voice giving the order, 'Fire deliberately, boys.' As the *Viscaya* turned and headed inshore, the *Oregon* fired one of her big bow guns. I heard the commodore say: 'He has raked her, and she is on fire. Signal to the *Oregon* to cease firing.' I saw Ensign McCauley climbing up on top of my turret with a wig-wag flag, and I could hear the flapping of the flag.

"I saw the commodore (I. 1256) several times dur-

ing the action. The principal time I recall seeing him was just when the *Viscaya* was about two points forward of our starboard beam. I then saw the commodore standing leaning against the turret, in the most natural position, with his glasses on his arm and his hand up to his chin. I was about ten feet from him. His bearing was that of a brave man, self-possessed, alert to his duties, and encouraging his officers and men in their duties."

Major Paul St. Clair Murphy, of the Marines (I. 1301): "I saw Commodore Schley on three or four occasions during the battle. His manner and conduct impressed me, as they seemed to impress everyone on board the *Brooklyn*—it was that of a brave and resolute officer. It inspired the utmost enthusiasm throughout the ship."

Captain T. S. Borden, of the Marines (I. 1541): "I saw the commodore during the battle; once immediately after the 'loop' was made; twenty minutes been destroyed, except the *Viscaya* and the *Colón*. His bearing was everything that the crew expected, and the officers; and everything that could be expected."

Lieutenant Edward McCauley (I. 1037): "The conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley on the day of the battle were perfectly cool and steady. He made encouraging remarks to the officers and crew. 'Give them hell, bullies.' Said that several times."

Lieutenant J. P. J. Ryan (I. 1139): "I saw Commodore Schley all the time. His manner and bearing were admirable, I think. He was on the fighting side of the ship all the time; was exposed all the time."

Carpenter George H. Warford (I. 1134): "I saw Commodore Schley several times during the battle. His bearing was that of a brave and fearless officer. I heard him encourage the men. Heard him say: 'Give them hell, bullies.' 'Well done, bullies.'"

Passed Assistant Surgeon C. M. De Valin (I.

1117): "I saw Commodore Schley during the whole time of the battle, and his manner and bearing were all that could be desired or expected. He seemed to know what he was about, and doing what he wished to do, in complete command of the situation."

Gunner F. T. Applegate (I. 1391): "Saw Commodore Schley several times during the battle, and spoke to him. He seemed to be cool, calm, and collected, and wanted to inspire confidence."

Orderly Lennis J. Cronin (I. 1237): "His manner was such that it inspired the men under him with confidence."

Chief-Boatswain William L. Hill (I. 1276): "The *Viscaya* was putting up the best fight of any of them Spanish ships there. She fought well; and them big shells were going over us, and a great many people ducked. The shells sounded like half a dozen railroad trains under way; made the same kind of a 'Chuck, chuck, chuck,' and down would go a head; but Commodore Schley's head never bent." [Loud applause broke out from the spectators in the courtroom.] "He was as calm and collected as he is at this moment. He called me to him constantly, as the different events occurred, and said, 'Do the bullies below know this?' Do they know this or that ship has gone ashore? and his whole idea seemed to be that he wanted the people below to know as much about it as those of us who were on deck."

In the face of such testimony as was given by these officers and men before the Court of Inquiry, its finding on this subject was tame and cold. That finding was as follows, viz.:

"His [Commodore Schley's] conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed; and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously."

The majority of that court was not going to display any enthusiasm in praising the commodore.

That finding, however, disposes of and refutes all the base insinuations, by whomsoever made, that any of Schley's actions or orders during that battle, including the turn or "loop," were prompted by any feeling, influence, or motive other than a purpose to do the best possible thing in the performance of the duties of the hour.

With that finding, and the unanimous testimony of all who knew (from Captain Cook down to a plain marine orderly), given before the Court of Inquiry, it was criminally ridiculous for any of the officials to pretend or believe otherwise. No one has had the manliness to make any charge directly or in the open. It has only been base insinuation—from the highest to the lowest of those in official station who have dealt with the matter.

CHAPTER LXIV

UNDER WHOSE COMMAND WAS THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO FOUGHT AND WON?

INASMUCH as much time and effort have been made to place the honor of command at the battle of July 3 where it does not belong—obviously denying it to its proper officer—a summary of evidence touching upon this point will determine the matter.

As has been already stated, on the morning of July 3, 1908, the log-book of the *New York*, Admiral Sampson's Flagship, records (I. Ex. A. 107) :

"At 8.50 started at full speed under three boilers, for Altares (Siboney), accompanied by the *Hist* and *Ericsson*, after making signal¹ to the rest of the fleet, to disregard movements of the commander-in-chief."

Mr. John D. Long, then Secretary of the Navy, in his letter of February 6, 1899, to the Senate, in response to the resolution of the Senate of January 23d, before cited (p.——), failed to make any reference to, or mention of, that signal as having been made by Admiral Sampson that morning.

This failure may have been through ignorance on the part of the secretary. But Captains Evans and Taylor were not ignorant that that signal had been made, and it was clearly their duty, as members of the board of compilers of the despatches and reports referring to the events of that day, to make mention of that signal. Evans and Taylor were clearly, and should have so felt themselves, bound in honor to in-

¹ This was the same signal that the commander-in-chief had made "to the rest of the fleet" on April 22, 1898, as told by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans in his book, "A Sailor's Log," p. 412; and referred to hereinbefore.

form the secretary, and, through him, the Senate about it.

The secretary's letter mentions several other unimportant signals, and it requires considerable credulity to believe that he was innocently kept in ignorance of that particularly important one, and innocently failed to make mention of it.

It is also a most significant fact that neither Admiral Sampson nor his chief of staff (Captain French E. Chadwick) and captain of his flagship *New York*, made any mention in their respective reports of the making of that signal.

It is difficult to see how any fair report can be made of the events of that day if the making of that signal is omitted therefrom.

But Admiral Schley, in his letter to the Senate of February 18 (Ex. Doc. D. 171), having mentioned it, of course it had to be explained away, if possible. Therefore Mr. Secretary Long, in his letter to the Senate of March 8, undertook to do so thus (Ex. Doc. D. 174): "Admiral Schley's mention of the signal made by Admiral Sampson, at 8.45 A. M., July 3, 'Disregard movement of the commander-in-chief' and his mention of the movement of the commander-in-chief towards Siboney, is followed by an incorrect inference, to wit, 'This left me senior officer present, and necessarily clothed me with the responsibilities of command.' "

It is proper to give the secretary's reasoning, which is as follows: "The signal mentioned is one which is frequently made in squadron" (which is true), "and is never held in any sense a relinquishment of command" (which may or may not be true, according to circumstances).

"It is made where, for any reason, the flagship leaves its assigned position in formation, as was the case when the *New York* left her habitual blockading station that morning of July 3. At such times it is

made to avoid confusion, which would result if other vessels, fixing their positions by reference to the flagship, were to move with her. Without further signal the responsibility of command would not be shifted until the senior officer had gone out of signal distance."

This last statement is correct, for it is undoubtedly true that the senior officer cannot relieve himself of the responsibility of the command that rests upon him and impose that responsibility upon his junior merely by making that signal. But if he goes beyond signal distance, the senior left behind becomes, with or without the signal, *ipso facto* clothed with that responsibility.

To the secretary, reply may be made that the flagship might have on that morning moved all about the blockade without disturbing the formation of the blockading fleet, since every vessel had her assigned position, fixed not at all by any reference to the position of the flagship, but with reference to the Morro at the entrance to the harbor. And Sampson's order of blockade provides that, if any vessel is "withdrawn for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant."

The source of the secretary's inspiration will be apparent to anyone who reads the comments on that signal submitted by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, to the President (I. 1931) in the President's memorandum on Schley's appeal to him. But Evans in practice differed from Evans in theory. On the afternoon of April 22, 1898, Admiral Sampson, as Evans states ("A Sailor's Log," p. 412) "left his place in column, flying the signal, 'Disregard movements of the commander-in-chief.' I, as *next in rank to Sampson*, hoisted the guard flag; and, as *senior officer present*, held the fleet to its course direct for the Morro Castle at the entrance of the harbor of Havana."

But all theories and opinions are vain in the face of the Naval Regulations on the subject. These are as follows and are quoted from "Regulations for the Government of the Navy" (in force July 3, 1898).

"Art. 53. By the force of naval law and regulations made in conformity therewith, the following principles are established, and exist as essentials of all military service, without which there can be neither command, discipline, nor responsibility.

"1. Officers entrusted with the command of war or naval vessels, or with the command or direction of any military duty, whatever their rank, while properly in such command or direction have full command authority and precedence over all persons of whatever rank serving in such vessel, station or expedition; or in the execution of such duty. This authority and precedence will descend to the officer or person on whom such command or direction may devolve by reason of the death, disability or *absence of the person otherwise in command or direction.*

"2. In case of the death, disability or *absence of an officer in military command or direction, this command and direction, with all its authority and precedence, devolves and rests upon the line officer next in rank who may be present and on duty with such command.*"

Art. 18, par. 4, prescribes that "at all times and places not specifically provided for in these regulations, where the exercise of military authority for the purpose of co-operation or otherwise is a necessity, of which the responsible officer must be the judge, *the senior line officer on the spot shall assume command, and direct the movements and efforts of all persons in the navy present.*"

Art. 325.—*The senior officer present shall discharge the duties of the flag officer in chief command, as laid down in paragraphs [enumerating them, of which Arts. 268, 270, and 271 refer to battle], and*

authority for that purpose is hereby conferred upon him.

It is a question how far the flagship *New York* went to the eastward that morning. As to this the only positive and impartial evidence must be the log entries made at the time, before any controversy had arisen.

It is a significant fact that neither Sampson nor Chadwick claims that the *New York* was within signal distance of the ships actually engaged in the battle. Sampson does say (A. 507): "The *New York* turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal 'Close in towards harbor entrance, attach vessels.' 'However, none of the reports or entries made that day in any of the log-books mentions having seen that signal, or of any action taken with circumstances. The expression means 'distance within which signals can be read at the time they are made.' "

Captain Taylor's idea of the extreme distance within which signals can be read is shown by his sworn testimony given in the prize case of the *Panama*. The captain was endeavoring to show that his vessel (the *Indiana*) was within "signal distance," in order that she might share in the prize. Self-interest, then, would prompt him not in *understate* the distance within which signals can be read.

The captain was asked the question, "What would you call the distance at which, *under most favorable* circumstances, signals could be read?" His answer was: "Under most favorable conditions of light, clearness of atmosphere, and everything possible, up to eight miles—under favorable circumstances."

Admiral Sampson, in his report, written July 15, (A. 506), said: "The *New York* was about four miles east of her blockading station, and seven miles from the harbor entrance." If that statement were

correct, then her "full speed under three boilers" that morning was only a trifle over five knots an hour.

But the log-book tells a different tale.

From that log-book it appears that, instead of going four miles only, the *New York* actually went 9.5 miles east from her blockading station, or more than twice as far as the admiral states, and, adopting the rest of the admiral's statement, the *New York* was $12\frac{1}{2}$ (nautical, or nearly 14.5 statute) miles from the mouth of the harbor when Cervera came out, or twice as far as the admiral estimated.

That log-book of the *New York* for the forenoon of July 3 was most carefully written. There were no alterations or interlineations in it. It was duly signed by Lieutenant Frank Marble, the officer of the watch, and the regulations (Art. 568) required that it should be examined and signed by the navigator, and submitted to the captain before 1 P. M. daily. Whether that was done with the log-book of July 3 does not appear, although that of the previous day bears the endorsement: "Examined and found correct—John E. Roller, Lieutenant and Navigator."

Naturally, and probably, in writing the log for that day they made the best case they truthfully could for their ship.

That log shows that "at 8.50 the *New York* started at full speed, under three boilers, for Altares (Siboney), after making signal to the rest of the fleet 'to disregard movements of the commander-in-chief'; that she steamed ["at full speed"] 9.5 knots [not 4]; that the admiral, captain, and assistant chief of staff prepared to land at Altares, to visit the headquarters of the army; that, about 9.45, just before reaching Altares, heard heavy firing off Santiago, and observed smoke in the entrance. Immediately turned and stood back, at full speed."

That log-book remained (for two years less seven days) as it was then written, or until June 20, 1900.

On the last mentioned day Lieutenant Marble found himself on board U. S. S. *Baltimore* (then on her way to the United States, bearing the flag of Rear Admiral John C. Watson, who was returning at the end of his two years' command of the Asiatic Fleet), which vessel had arrived at Port Suez. On that day Lieutenant Marble wrote to the Navy Department a letter, of which a copy is as follows (I. Ap. A. 108):

"U. S. S. 'BALTIMORE,
"SUEZ, June 20, 1900.

"Sir:—I have the honor to request that the following correction be made in the log of the U. S. S. *New York*, for the forenoon watch of the 3d of July, 1898, which was signed by me, viz: The time at which the *New York* turned to the westward in pursuit of the Spanish fleet, then emerging from the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, ought to be 9.37 A. M. instead of 9.45 A. M., as written in the log.

"My attention has only now been called to this error, which I believe was wholly due to an oversight in the first place. The time 9.37, as I now state it, accords with my remembrance of the event, and with the time at which we went to quarters for Sunday inspection—9.30 A. M., and the time—9.35 A. M.—at which, by general consensus of reports, the Spanish fleet began to make their exit; and with the fact that the *New York* turned immediately upon sighting the first Spanish ship, which she did the instant the latter was clear of the entrance. No one on board the *New York*, so far as I have heard, noticed, in the excitement of the moment, the precise time by the clock when her helm was first put over; and in writing the log three or four hours later, I had to be guided by the time of going to quarters, etc., as here stated.

"The difference of eight minutes may seem small, but it is, of course, of considerable importance when events are moving rapidly.

"I make this correction now, after nearly two years, but merely because my attention has been called to what I regard as an obvious (*sic*) error.

"I think it right to forward this letter through Captain Chadwick, who commanded the *New York* at that time, rather than through my present immediate superiors.

"Very respectfully,

"FRANK MARBLE,
"Lieutenant U. S. Navy.

"THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
"Washington, D. C."

(Endorsed) "Respectfully forwarded, requesting that the change mentioned may be made. F. E. CHADWICK, *Captain U. S. Navy.*"

The department, on receipt of this letter, caused the change to be made by a Mr. Taylor, by endorsing on a copy of this letter the following: "Memorandum, for Mr. Taylor. 'Make the correction herein requested; and paste this sheet in the log-book to indicate authority.' "

Mr. Taylor then made the alteration by striking a red line across the 45 in the figures 9.45, and inserting, in red, the figures 37, alongside.

It is not surprising that the young officer who wrote the foregoing letter should have adopted the apologetic tone displayed therein. He must have felt himself to be standing on very doubtful ground indeed, when he undertook to impeach the accuracy of his own solemn statement, made over his own signature, two years before, and, as he says, made only "three or four hours after the events occurred."

How he could venture to call the alleged error an "*obvious error*" rather puzzles one.

The lieutenant does not say who had called his attention to this "obvious error," but the fact that he sent the letter "through Captain Chadwick, rather

than through my immediate superiors" (which naval regulations required), unmistakably points to the source of the lieutenant's inspiration.

Lieutenant Marble, in the letter, says: "No one on the *New York*, so far as I ever heard, noticed the precise time by the clock, when her helm was put over."

Nevertheless, attached to the log-book of that day is a typewritten paper purporting to be a copy of "Official Notes, taken on the Bridge of the U. S. Flagship *New York*, on July 3, 1898, by Chief Yeoman Fred J. Buenzle, U. S. Navy [admiral's writer]. *Time by clock.*"

In the judgment of the writer these purported "Notes" in several particulars bear internal evidence that they probably do not correspond with the originals.

A copy of the notes is as follows:

"9.50 A. M.—Reported to the admiral on the bridge by the chief quartermaster, that the *Cristobal Colón* was coming around Morro Point. Without glasses could not distinguish what sort of a vessel she was, being enshrouded in her own smoke, and that of the guns of the west battery. The *New York* had turned, and was speeding in the direction of the Morro."

None of that sounds sailor-like. The words used are too big. A sailor would say "Make out," and not "distinguish," and "surrounded" instead of "enshrouded." Mention is made of the *Cristobal Colón*, and nothing is said about the other three vessels that had come out before her. If those notes had been properly taken, they should have stated the time when the order to turn was given, just as the log-book entry does, or, rather, *did* before it was changed.

These notes purport to make mention of events as they occurred, and the last entry is as follows:

"At 1.15 P. M.—The *Oregon* fired a 13-in. shell

which fell very close to the *Colón*; and it was thought that the latter had been struck, as thick black smoke arose. This was a few moments before it was reported that she was heading for the beach."

With this last statement Buenzle's notes end. He was interviewed by the author hereof, and he stated that in his notes he had made mention of the time when the *New York* arrived, and stopped near the *Colón*, which, as he remembered, was 2.15 P. M.

Here, then, is a second instance of the *suppressio veri*.

Connect with this the same suppression in the notes taken on board the *Vixen* and the alteration in the log-book of the *New York* by Lieutenant Marble. All these omissions, alterations, and proposed corrections *may* have been accidental, but as they all have apparently a common purpose, the suspicion will arise that some one person must have inspired them all; and that some one must have been acting with intent to bring the *New York*, if possible, "within signal distance" of the fighting ships. That is plainly apparent.

Having shown (as *we* think) that Lieutenant Marble's alteration was suggested by Captain Chadwick, the fatherhood of all these alterations and omissions seems sufficiently well indicated.

Exactly where the *New York* was located at the time that battle began is settled by the following affidavit. It may be premised that, inasmuch as the statements, under oath, of a newspaper correspondent (Mr. Thomas M. Dieuwaide) were, by the judge advocate of the Court of Inquiry and apparently by the majority of the court, considered sufficient to fix the fact that the *Brooklyn's* turn endangered the *Texas*, the statements made in this affidavit by another, and, so far as appears, equally reliable newspaper correspondent, ought to have equal effect. The affidavit is as follows:

STATE OF ILLINOIS, }
 COUNTY OF COOK, }^{ss:}

I, James O'Shaughnessy, being duly sworn, do depose and say, that I am a citizen of the United States, and of Chicago, in the County and State aforesaid; and that, in the year of 1898, I was employed as a reporter and correspondent of the *Chicago Chronicle*. In that capacity I went to Cuba with the military expedition that left Tampa, Florida, June 14, 1898. I landed at Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898, and remained in Cuba, watching the operations of the army about Santiago until after the capitulation of that city, July 17, 1898. On July 2d I was informed that Admiral Sampson was to come on shore to confer with General Shafter.

On the following day, July 3d, I was at the beach at Siboney, Cuba. While waiting there that morning, I saw the U. S. Cruiser *New York* approach from the direction of Morro Castle. It came directly into the bight of Siboney, and approached nearer to the shore that I had ever before observed approach a large war ship in that bight. A launch was let down into the water from the *New York* when it stopped; and three officers from the *New York* entered the launch. While the launch was still alongside the *New York*, I heard the report of a heavy gun coming from the direction of Morro Castle. Immediately there seemed to be a commotion among those on the decks of the *New York*. The ladder was quickly drawn up on the side of the *New York*. The officers in the launch were gesticulating to somebody on the cruiser. The firing towards the mouth of Santiago Harbor increased; and I could hear the heavy guns booming at close intervals. The distance was too great to hear any but the heavier guns. I was afterwards informed it was the reports of the twelve-inch and thirteen-inch guns only which were

audible at Siboney. After the ladder was drawn up the *New York* began to move. It began to swing round, moving slowly, as it had to turn around in the bight, in which were a number of army transport ships. On the western horizon the smoke of the ships, which was plain enough at first, was becoming less distinct, and the sound of the guns was fast becoming fainter. A torpedo boat which had accompanied the *New York* got around first, and was steaming away to the west. The *New York* was slower in its movements as it brought its bow around to the west, but when it was headed towards Morro Castle it went away at a fast pace. The launch with the three officers in it came to the temporary dock at Siboney. I waited at the dock for their coming, and talked with them for some time. Those officers who were left in the launch seemed greatly chagrined when they came on shore, and appeared as if they were at a loss to know what to do. I questioned them about the meaning of the fire, and the precipitate departure of the *New York*; but they were reticent, although at that time those thereabouts were evidently in no doubt that a considerable sea fight was going on then somewhere below the western sky-line; and later in the day I learned of the destruction of the ships of the Spanish fleet by those of the United States Navy. That was, then, the explanation of the failure of Admiral Sampson to visit General Shafter after having come to Siboney.

My reason for noticing this much was that it was my intention and desire to talk with Admiral Sampson when he came ashore, to obtain some statement from him for the benefit of the paper I represented.

JAMES O'SHAUGHNESSY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th July,

1899,

[SEAL]

FRANCIS J. HOULIHAN,

Notary Public.

The above affidavit carries conviction on its face. The occurrences stated are just what probably took place. No more intelligent statement of the exact facts could be made, and the *New York* must have been pretty close to shore to enable him to see what he says he saw going on alongside of her. And the ship must have been stopped, or very nearly so, before that boat would be lowered except as a matter of great haste or emergency, of which there was none at that time. The booming of those guns creating commotion, furnished the occasion for haste.

The facts set forth in this chapter in conjunction with the citations from the "Regulations for the Government of the Navy" show plainly the correctness of the opinion given to the President, by Admiral Clark, of the *Oregon* (I. 1929): "I considered Commodore Schley in responsible command during this running fight and chase, so far as I was concerned."

And also of the finding of Admiral Dewey, who, as President of the Court of Inquiry, said (I. 1830):

"Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. He was in absolute command, and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer, for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish fleet."

In which all impartial and unprejudiced people will concur.

CHAPTER LXV

THE PART IN THE BATTLE TAKEN BY THE FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK"

For the purpose of determining what part the *New York* took in the Battle of Santiago, the subjoined extracts from reports and other sources are subjoined.

Admiral Sampson, in his report (A. 507) says: "She [the *New York*] was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, though at the moment to be attempting to escape from the *Gloucester*."

"The mills of the gods grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small."

Of course, as soon as the admiral discovered by the firing off Santiago that the Spaniards were attempting to escape, he, and every officer and man of the *New York*, did everything possible to get into the battle. He well described the feelings of himself, his officers and crew, when, in his *Century* article, he said: "The first thought was, Oh, that we had wings, not those of the dove, but of the eagle, swooping down upon its prey."

One can imagine the galling bitterness of the thoughts that must have possessed him, as (like Miller of the *Merrimac*) he saw himself deprived of the opportunity for which he had so long waited and watched; and that opportunity given to another.

When the *New York* started back from Siboney she hoisted the signal, "Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels," but none of the squadron seem to have seen it, because they were too far away

to the westward and surrounded with the smoke and roar of battle, engaged in obeying the same signal, and another, "Follow the flag," that had been hoisted by Schley when the Spaniards turned to the westward. In fact, all signals were superfluous that morning. The cats had been watching the rat-hole too long not to know exactly what to do without any signal.

Admiral Sampson says, as quoted above, that the *New York* "was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish ships." It is capable of mathematical demonstration that she was never within 19.26 nautical miles of any one of them until they were driven successively to the beach.

That part of the notes taken on board the *Vixen* which was suppressed states that "the *Vixen* at 2.25 stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the neighborhood of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*. The *New York* arrived from three to five minutes later," or at 2.28 to 2.30.

As a matter of fact it was 2.23. And thus it is shown, by entirely impartial testimony, that the *New York* did not arrive for an hour and eight minutes after the *Colón* surrendered. The suppression from Buenzle's notes—taken on board the *New York*—of all mention of events after 1.15 (the time of the *Colón's* surrender) tends to corroborate the *Vixen* notes.

Admiral Sampson in his report (A. 507) says: "The *New York* gradually increased her speed, until towards the end of the chase she was making 16½ knots."

Captain Chadwick in his official report (A. 521) says: "The speed had rapidly increased, so that we were going 16 knots at the end." But on July 29, after nearly a month's consideration, he wrote (A. 522): "As supplementary to my report dated July 4, of the action of the 3d, I beg to say that, at the close of the chase of the *Colón*, our speed had in-

creased to not less than 17 knots, instead of 16, as mentioned in my ninth paragraph.”

So that, accepting Captain Chadwick's statement of her speed, she must have been 1.13×17 k. = 9.21 knots = 22.1 statute miles away from the *Colón* when she hauled down her flag.

And that is as near as she got to any of the “heavy ships” during the battle.

CHAPTER LXVI

WAS THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO A CAPTAIN'S FIGHT?

IN considering another phase of the great controversy arising from the events of that memorable July 3, it will be recalled that the President of the United States himself has said that neither Sampson nor Schley was in actual command on that day (against which assertion we place the opinion of Commodore Dewey and Rear Admiral Clark) and that it was "a captains' fight."

The claim that the credit of a great victory is not to be given to the admiral commanding, or other "senior officer on the spot," but may be taken from him and divided among two or more of the captains commanding single ships, is no new thing in naval history.

It is commonly supposed that Nelson was what is ordinarily styled "the hero of the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar"; but J. Fennimore Cooper, the novelist and naval historian, in the preface to "The Tale of Two Admirals," writing by the authority of the late Commodore Charles Morris of the United States Navy, says:

"It is now known that all the early accounts of the maneuvering at the Nile, and of Nelson's reasoning on the subject of anchoring inside and doubling on his enemies, is pure fiction.

"Since that time naval officers of rank have written on the subject, and stripped the Nile, Trafalgar, etc., of their poetry, and given the world plain, nautical, and probable accounts of both those great achievements. The truth was just as little like the previously published accounts as well could be."

It was doubling on the French line that gave Nelson so high a reputation as a tactician.

The merit of the maneuver belonged exclusively to one of his captains. As the fleet went without any order, keeping as much to windward as the shoals would permit, Nelson ordered the *Vanguard* hove to, to take a pilot out of a fisherman.

"This enabled Foley, Hood, and one or two more to pass that fast ship. It was at this critical moment that the thought occurred to Foley (we think this was the officer) to pass the head of the French line, keep dead away, and anchor inside. Others followed, completely placing their enemies between two fires."

Nelson's tactics are discussed by Fitchett (an eminent English writer) in his book, "Nelson and his Captains." What he says is as follows:

"Nelson's tactics were merely perfect common sense applied to the business of war. The official 'Fighting Instructions' of the Admiralty directed an admiral, when engaging an enemy's fleet, to arrange his line exactly parallel to the enemy's line, and to pit ship against ship; so that a sea battle resolved itself into so many sea duels. The essential idea was to distribute the attacking force along the whole of the enemy's line, not to combine it in overwhelming preponderance against a portion of that line.

"Nelson inverted that process. The essential principle of all his battles was to double on part of the enemy's line and crush it, leaving the surviving fragments to be destroyed in detail.

"All the traditions of the navy were against these tactics, and, it may be added, the natural pride of the British seaman was against it. 'One Englishman was equal to two Frenchmen. Why invert these odds and expend two Englishmen on one Frenchman?' This was, in substance, the criticism of Saumarez, on Nelson's tactics at the Nile.

"The terrible quality of Nelson's fighting was

found in the deadly skill with which he threw his whole force on part only of his enemy's force, and thus satisfied the first condition of victory—that of being overwhelmingly superior in strength at the point of attack. Nelson applied this new principle to naval warfare on a scale and with a certainty and swiftness that made his battles like thunderbolts, and as destructive as thunderbolts."

All the critics of Nelson's tactics in those battles have long been forgotten, but Nelson is still the "Hero of the Nile," and he and that "noble fellow, Collingwood" (as Nelson called him, as he carried his ship into action at Trafalgar), are still the heroes of that battle, and will always continue to be.

Nelson and his deeds are, however, now a part of history, so let us pass back to the matter under discussion.

The Court of Inquiry refused to allow any testimony to be given as to the position of the *New York* at the time the battle began.

The President of the United States therefore violated all the rules of proper procedure in respect to appeals when, upon Admiral Schley's appeal to him from the findings of the court, and of their approval by the Secretary of the Navy, he called in all the captains in that fight except Cook (who was the only one who knew whether the *New York* was within signal distance of the *Brooklyn*) and took their statements and opinions upon that matter.

These officers were all Schley's subordinates; they had all been witnesses before the court, and not one of them was allowed to give any testimony as to the position of the *New York*. If the court had permitted any such testimony the admiral's counsel were prepared to show exactly where the *New York* was when she started back towards the battle that morning.

The affidavit of Mr. James O'Shaughnessy (here-

inbefore given) and other testimony of a like character were ready.

The President also quoted from Philip's article in the *Century Magazine*, giving statements from it which were expressly excluded by the court, and he also referred to a letter written by Philip to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 27, 1899, which has never been published—a letter which Schley has never seen, and which no tribunal having regard for the plain practice and principles of legal proceedings on appeal would have permitted to be used.

It was grossly unfair to receive statements, opinions and documents outside the record, without giving Schley opportunity to introduce evidence in reply.

Rear Admirals Evans and Taylor, in their statements quoted by the President, take the extraordinary position that if Commodore Schley had made any signals to them, they would not have heeded them, inasmuch as they considered Admiral Sampson "to be present and in command." And yet Captain Taylor (as he then was), with his admiral present (as he says), did not hesitate to make signal to the *Gloucester*, "Gunboats advance," a signal which Captain Wainwright promptly obeyed, because made by the "senior officer present." But if Admiral Sampson *was* present, within signal distance, Captain Taylor had no right whatever to make any signal to Wainwright, and according to his statement above, Wainwright should not have heeded it.

Notwithstanding these *ex post facto* assertions, there can be no doubt that if Schley had made a signal to any ship that day to do some particular thing, that signal would have been promptly obeyed.

There was none of this ill feeling going at that time, and Taylor was not the kind of officer to defy or neglect a command from his superior officer during the progress of a battle, on any such flimsy theory

as he advanced to the President. And the writer is of the opinion that "Fighting Bob" would not have done so either.

CHAPTER LXVII

PAUL JONES AND THE BATTLE OF THE LIMAN

EFFORTS to deprive the commanding officer who was actually in the battle of the credit due the victor and give it to another who was "not in it" have occurred before.

Buell, in his book "Paul Jones, the Founder of the American Navy," gives the following instructive instance, in his account of the "Battle of the Liman," between the Russians and the Turks, June 17, 1788.

Paul Jones, who had been appointed by the Empress Catharine a rear admiral in the Russian Navy, was in actual command of the Russian fleet on that occasion. Field Marshal Potemkin (a military officer and one of Catharine's personal favorites) was Jones' superior officer, and as such was in titular command, though not actually present. A great victory was secured by Jones, for which Potemkin at first endeavored to claim the credit. He suppressed Jones' report, and endeavored to take the credit to himself.

Buell (Vol. i. p. 196) in a note says: "Kolnitz, a harsh critic, but in the main well sustained by his authorities, says of this incident:

"Potemkin was at first thought captivated by the idea Paul Jones had offered him, that of figuring as the vicarious hero of a great naval battle and victory. But on a second thought the Prince Marshal reconsidered this ambition. It occurred to him *that the hero of a naval battle must be on board a ship actually engaged in it.*

"On land battles could be won by a pseudo-commander, who might choose the distance of his person from the enemy. There is no limit to the rear of an army in battle, *but there is no rear whatever on board a ship in battle.*"

Mr. Ex-Secretary Long, in his book already referred to, undertakes to settle this question of command in Santiago affair, by saying: "Sampson was as much in command as Grant was at Chattanooga, although Grant's generals were doing the actual fighting at Lookout Mountain, and Missionary [*sic*] Ridge, where he could not possibly be."

Let us see about that. The perpetrator of such a parallel should be sure of the facts; and an examination—which Mr. Long evidently did not make—of the facts of that battle will show that there is no parallel whatever between the two cases. General Grant had not gone off, out of controlling and communicating distance of those generals, leaving them in their ordinary encampments and positions, after directing them to "disregard [his] movements," as Sampson had.

General Grant planned out the battle in all its main details, assigning all the parts to be played by each corps commander, and he then assumed a central position where he was in constant communication with the center and both flanks of his army.

In Chapters XLIII. and XLIV. of his "Memoirs," the whole story of that battle is told by General Grant himself; and one who reads that story will not fail to see that, from the beginning to the end of that three days' contest, he had, and personally exercised, complete control of all the forces engaged. He tells how he prearranged the battle, and began it. Sherman, Thomas, Gordon Granger, Thomas J. Woods, Hooker, Howard, and a host of other generals were all assigned to their respective parts, and performed them under Grant's eye; and he tells how he was there through the whole of it, directing modifications of his orders as emergencies arose.

Of his own positions during the battle he says (Vol. ii. p. 72): "Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our

line [of battle] a continuous one. *It was in full view*, extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the Ridge, to the Chattanooga Valley; then along, parallel to the Ridge, a mile or more across the Valley, to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek; thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the palisade."

Again (p. 77): "From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith, from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce him." Again (p. 80), speaking of Thomas J. Wood's charge, he said: "I watched their progress with intense interest." And (p. 81). "While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas, with staff, General Gordon Granger, commanding the corps making the assault, and *myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed*. The moment the troops were *seen going over the last line of rebel defenses* I ordered General Granger to his command, and, mounting my horse, I rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time." And, at the close, General Grant says: "*The battle was fought as ordered.*"

The above extracts show that if ever a general was "in it," Grant, on that occasion, was the man. But if he had gone off for any purpose out of possible communication with his army, without any expectation of a battle, and Bragg had made an attack; or—as Cervera did—had attempted a retreat from his positions, the senior general left behind on the spot (it was Sherman) would have been in command, and entitled to the credit of whatever success had been secured; and held responsible for defeat or failure.

CHAPTER LXVIII

SCHLEY'S GENEROSITY TOWARDS SAMPSON

SCHLEY'S preliminary report, which Sampson returned to him, has already been given in full (*ante* pp. —).

A few days later Schley sent to Sampson a second report (A. 517), in which, in several places, expressions are used such as: "The great victory of the squadron under your command."

Among other things, Schley in that report said: "I congratulate you sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command [this is a very equivocal sentence]; and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us."

Concerning this report, Admiral Schley testified (I. 1529): "I felt that the victory, at that time, as I have said, was big enough for all; and I made this [report] out of generosity, and because I knew that if the *New York* had been present they would have done as good work as anybody else. I referred throughout this, to 'your command' and his appearance, and so on, in complimentary terms. That was the reason."

The writer may be pardoned in saying that, in his opinion, the commodore made a mistake in couching his second report in the equivocal language employed, which may be so read as to convey the impression that Admiral Schley therein states, that Admiral Sampson was in command. Sampson in his report says that he was "not in range of any of the heavier fighting ships,"—that is, he was not in the fight. Assertions that are contrary to the facts, however complimentary they may have been intended to be, carry no weight.

A few days after the battle the newspapers from the United States containing the accounts of it reached the fleet. Many of these accounts, written by correspondents who had been "in it," and had seen the whole of it, almost without exception printed Schley's name in large head-lines, as the "Hero of the Battle."

Further influenced by his generous feelings, without suggestion or any other motive, Schley cabled (without Sampson's knowledge) to the Navy Department the following:

"OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,
July 10, 1898.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington, D. C.:

"I feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of July 6 have attributed the victory on July 3 almost entirely to me. The victory was secured by the force under the command of the commander-in-chief of naval force on N. A. Station, and to him the honor is due. The end of the line held by the *Brooklyn* and *Vixen* was heavily assailed, and had the honor, with the *Oregon*, being in the battle from the beginning to the end; and I do not for a moment doubt that proper credit will be given all persons and all ships in the official report of the combat.

"SCHLEY."

The commodore then wrote the following letter to Sampson:

"U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,
OFF SANTIAGO, July 10, 1898.

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL:

"I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a cipher telegram which I sent to-day to the Secretary of the Navy, with a view to correcting the accounts in the newspapers of July 6, which attribute the victory of July 3 to me.

"2. My official report indicates very clearly what my views are upon the subject, and I beg to say that, so long as I am serving under your orders, I shall do my duty loyally, fully, and without reserve.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore U. S. N.

"COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
"North Atlantic Fleet."

Concerning these two papers, Admiral Schley testified (I. 1533): "I took that letter, and that despatch, on board the *New York* to Admiral Sampson. The admiral accepted it, and stated to me that he thought it was very generous on my part."

"Very generous," it certainly was; and anyone familiar with the parts played by the two officers in that battle will agree with Admiral Sampson's statement. It may well be doubted if there ever was such self-abnegation displayed, for the benefit of another, by any navy or military officer before that time. All Sampson's supporters, from Secretary Long down, should have united in so accepting Schley's action. But instead, the despatch was divorced from the letter (which was what the majority of the Court of Inquiry professed to think "unfair," in the Hodgson matter), and was sent, by the Secretary of the Navy, to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. p. 135), to be considered "as a pertinent fact." by that body, in secret session.

CHAPTER LXIX

SAMPSON'S CONDUCT TOWARDS SCHLEY

ON that same tenth day of July Admiral Sampson received from the Secretary of the Navy a despatch asking "if he had any recommendations regarding promotions of officers to make."

To this Sampson replied by cable (Ex. Doc. C. p. 13. No. 36), making many such recommendations.

Concerning Commodore Schley, he said: "I prefer leaving any question of reward for Commodore Schley to the department. Think his conduct during the time when Schley commanded the east [*sic*] side of Cuba, which I assume is well known to the department, should be considered."

This last clause, beginning "Think his conduct." etc., is geographically absurd, in so far as it speaks of Schley's having commanded the "east side of Cuba." If there is any east side of Cuba, it has not yet been discovered or placed on any map or chart. There is a little sneering insinuation in that last clause, that one would think Sampson, with his thanks given to Schley so shortly before, for the despatch and letter set forth in the last chapter, would not have made. He had never before criticised Schley's conduct, either to him or to the Navy Department.

On that same tenth of July Sampson signed and sent to the Secretary of the Navy a letter which was evidently intended (though not so worded) to be regarded as confidential, (Ex. Doc. C. p. 135, No. 35): It begins, "My dear Mr. Secretary."

In this letter, after recommending promotion for many other officers, he says (p. 136): "With regard to Commodore Schley, I much prefer that the department should decide his case. I am unwilling to fully

express my own opinion. His conduct when he first assumed command on the south coast [he gets his geography correct] of Cuba, I assume to be as well known to the department as to myself. If he had left his station off Santiago de Cuba at that time, he would probably have been court-martialed, so plain was his duty.

"Were I alone in this opinion, I would certainly doubt my judgment; but, so far as I know, this opinion is confirmed by that of other commanding officers here, acquainted with the circumstances.

"This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from his other conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion."

The picture here presented, of the commander-in-chief listening to the opinions expressed by Commodore Schley's subordinates in order to fortify, or perhaps form, his own, is most extraordinary, and is contrary to all naval ideas of propriety and custom.

It was a well-established rule of the service that a junior is never allowed to express opinions upon the conduct of his senior in the service. Thus, opinions that no naval court would have permitted appear to have been solicited (or at least permitted) by the commander-in-chief, and made use of by him to prejudice the question of Schley's promotion.

On that same tenth of July a prominent officer of that squadron (whose statement imports absolute verity among his brother officers) went on board the flagship *New York*, and was ushered into the cabin of the admiral without formality. He found there Admiral Sampson and Captain Chadwick, the chief of staff; and he heard Admiral Sampson say to Chadwick: "There's no use talking, Chadwick, I can't, and I won't, send any such letter as that about Commodore Schley to the department. I would never be able to justify myself before my brother officers if I did." Or words to that effect.

What letter they were discussing the officer did not know, but the letter of which the above quotations form a part was the only letter relating to Commodore Schley that was sent that day; and the letter, whatever it was, must have been one prepared by the staff, without previous direction by the admiral, because, *if he had ordered it he would not have objected to it.*

In the judgment of the writer hereof, the letter bears internal evidence that Sampson never wrote the body of it. He was a very clear-headed writer, knew exactly what he meant, and how to express himself clearly.

CHAPTER LXX

THE NAVIGATORS' CHART OF THE BATTLE

Two months after the battle, on September 2, 1898, Admiral Sampson convened a board of officers, composed of the navigators of the different ships that had participated, "to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States' fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago de Cuba."

The board took more than two months to perform the duty imposed upon it, and on October 8 made a report, which report, and accompanying chart, will be found in A. 593.

The report says: "The board submits this report, with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the engagement."

Before the Court of Inquiry this chart came early under review in the cross-examination of one of its makers, Commander Heilner. He testified (I. 141): "I never signed that chart as correct." Thereupon the assistant judge advocate said: "If the purpose of these inquiries is to show the incorrectness of that chart, we will save time by conceding it at once. We never supposed it to be correct."

Lieutenant Commander Wainwright (who was the senior member of board of navigators) testified (I. 672-3): "So far as I know, none of the members of the board was satisfied with all the positions. We did not consider them accurate positions. We were not satisfied with the positions as they were; but, in order to get all the navigators to sign, we took those as the probable positions. It was not the best we could do to satisfy any of us, it was the best we could

do, under the circumstances, to get all the navigators to sign the report. I think none of the seven was satisfied, except the navigator of the *Brooklyn*, and I don't know that he was. None of the navigators was satisfied; nevertheless, all of them signed that report."

He was asked the question :

Q. Then all signed a report putting the *Brooklyn* at a certain position, and the *Texas* at a certain position on that chart; and yet there was not a man of them who was satisfied with the position they plotted?

A. That is correct as far as I know. I doubt very much if Mr. Schuetze, the navigator of the *Iowa*, was satisfied with any of the positions of the *Iowa* (I. 676).

Lieutenant Scheutze testified (I. 778): "I protested against signing the report, as being inaccurate; but I was finally persuaded, principally by Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, the senior member of the board, that that was the best we could do, even if we stayed there until doomsday, and that I had better sign it; and I signed it under protest. Measured with reference to the time stated in the report, she [*Iowa*] is making there 16 or 18 knots. In my opinion she made about 9½ to 10 knots."¹

Every officer signing that report, whose evidence could be had, stigmatized that chart as incorrect and unsatisfactory to all the signers. It well merited what Mr. Rayner said of it, in his argument:

"Now, this navigators' chart is a most wonderful thing. It is a thing of joy forever. It is like the obliterated epitaph on an antiquated tombstone. Here are half a dozen navigators, who meet together for the purpose of giving to the country a chart of the Battle of Santiago; and, after two months of unceasing toil and unremitting labor, they compose a chart which might as well be a chart of the Battle of Salamis

¹ Her captain, Evans, stated her speed as 9½ knots. (I. 384.)

or the Battle of Thermopylae, or of the field of Waterloo. It appears that every navigator was trying to put his ship in a different position from where his ship really was.

“They were all trying to compose a chart that did not represent the situation at all; and, as a disgraceful failure, this chart is undoubtedly a magnificent success.”

The Navy Department has never withdrawn that chart,—which it knows to be a chart that has been pronounced by its makers to be totally inaccurate and wrong,—and the ex-Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John D. Long, knowing its false character, and that it had been repudiated by the officers who made it *as false*, has since reprinted it in his book; and, so far as he thereby can, has sent it down to the future as correct and true.

Mr. Long may think it to be in the interest of truth and fair history to send down to posterity a false chart of that great battle, but honorable minds will not so regard it. If anyone were to put before a club as true, a plan or statement that he knew to be false, there can be no doubt that the club would promptly and properly expel him, as having been guilty of a dishonorable act.

CHAPTER LXXI

THE ALLEGED CONTROVERSY WITH LIEUTENANT HODGSON DURING THE BATTLE

IN its effort to find something which might throw discredit upon Admiral Schley, the judge advocate, under instructions of the Navy Department, formulated the Tenth Article of the Precept, as follows:

“10th.—The circumstances leading to, and the incidents and results of, a controversy with Lieutenant Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. Navy, who, on July 3d, 1898, during the Battle of Santiago, was Navigator of the *Brooklyn*; also the colloquy at that time between Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson; and the ensuing correspondence between them on the subject; and the propriety of the conduct of Commodore Schley in the premises.”

In this article, as in all others, the Precept assumes that there had been a controversy and a colloquy; and does not leave it to the court to find as to the fact.

The basis of that Article 10 was the following: The New York *Sun* having printed an offensive editorial relative to a colloquy alleged (on the authority of Lieutenant Hodgson, as it asserted) to have occurred between the two officers during the height of the battle, about or immediately before the turn of the *Brooklyn* was made, Admiral Schley wrote to Lieutenant Hodgson as follows (I. 589):

“WASHINGTON, June 6, 1899.

“DEAR HODGSON:

“I enclose you an editorial of the New York *Sun*, and would ask you to write me your denial of this oft-repeated calumny.

“I know full well that you never made any such

authorization of this grotesque lie, but I desire to place you in a proper position before the country, as well as myself. This vicious and malignant vituperation ought to cease, and, in justice to you and myself, I think something authoritative ought to be said.

“Very sincerely yours,

“W. S. SCHLEY.”

It is not worth while copying the *Sun's* editorial. After reading it, Lieutenant Hodgson replied to Commodore Schley, on June 8, 1899, by a long letter full of vituperation of persons not named, concerning certain statements relative to the turn of the *Brooklyn*, in the battle of July 3, 1898, alleged to have been made or insinuated. As to the statement, Hodgson said: “You can imagine that no one would acknowledge the paternity of such a bastard.”

He further said: “Mr. Dieuwaide [the *Sun's* reporter] came to visit me some days ago, about the conversation quoted as having taken place, and he wished to know from me if it was correct. I told him that to the best of my recollection it was substantially correct, though garbled and incomplete; but that the inference the *Sun* wished to have drawn from it, and the stand his paper had taken, was damnably and infamously false.

“I do not believe that anyone whose opinion is at all worth considering, will be at all influenced by the scurrilous and infamous lies that appear from time to time in the *Sun*; but I am willing to do anything in my power, that may be agreeable to you, that will cause the editor of this paper to be shown up as an unprincipled blackguard.”

This was pretty strong language, and the admiral thought that letter hardly the thing to publish; and so, on June 10, wrote again to Hodgson, saying, among other things (I. 594): “The *Sun's* effort has been to promote the notion that you and I had a con-

troversy at a critical moment; and this is unjust to you, and to me. What I desire is simply your denial to me that any such colloquy occurred.

"There is much in your letter that I should not like to use, as it would provoke an assault upon you, which I am unwilling should happen; and what I want to show is simply that this dialogue did not occur; and that shown, the whole flimsy canard falls to the ground. Make your letter as short as possible."

To this Hodgson replied (I. 595) :

"JUNE 11, 1899.

"DEAR ADMIRAL SCHLEY :

"The colloquy published in the *Sun*, and alleged to have taken place between you and me on the day of the battle of Santiago de Cuba, never occurred. I return, herewith, the newspaper clipping containing the colloquy referred to.

"Very respectfully,

"A. C. HODGSON,

"*Lieut. Comm'd'r.*"

The reported colloquy, alleged to have taken place between the commodore and his navigator in the heat of the battle, set forth in the clipping returned, as stated by Hodgson, was as follows (I. 594) :

SCHLEY. Hard-a-port.

HODGSON. You mean starboard.

SCHLEY. No, I don't. We are near enough to them [the Spaniards] already.

HODGSON. But we will cut down the *Texas*.

SCHLEY. Damn the *Texas*! Let her look out for herself.

Hodgson enclosed that letter and clipping in the same envelope with another, of which follows a copy (I. 595) :

“JUNE 11, 1899.

“DEAR ADMIRAL SCHLEY :

“I send you, herewith, a categorical denial of the colloquy published in the *New York Sun*, for such use as you may desire.

“From my last letter you will gather my recollection of what occurred the day of the battle regarding the turn. I wish you to have a clear idea of what I told the *Sun* reporter the day he came to see me; and what grounds the *Sun* had for publishing the editorial of June 1st. The reporter asked me if there was any foundation for the article as published in the *Sun*. I told him that I could not recollect exactly what was said, but that he had published a very garbled and misleading account of whatever might have happened; for, of course, I had never answered you in any such manner as had appeared in print; nor had there been any argument or difference between us, the very idea of which was absurd.

“I told him that, when the turn was to be made, I had suggested the proximity of the *Texas*; and the probable danger of getting mixed up with her, if we turned to starboard; and you said the *Texas* would have to look out for herself. This is all the grounds the *Sun* has for saying that I am authority for that printed colloquy as being absolutely correct. I write you this, so that you may know just what I have said to anyone connected with a paper. As I wrote in my last letter, I have frequently explained on other grounds than interfering with the fire of our fleet; but not since I knew that you had given that reason. I trust this will be satisfactory, but still hold myself in readiness to do anything in my power that you may desire.

“Very respectfully and sincerely,
“A. C. HODGSON.”

To this Admiral Schley replied:

“JUNE 12, 1899.

“DEAR HODGSON:

“Thank you for your prompt answer, relating to the colloquy. Your statement that it never occurred is absolutely true, for you are too good an officer and too gallant a man to have committed the impropriety charged in the *New York Sun*.”

Schley then published the categorical denial, as was evidently intended, and permitted by that clause of the last letter from Hodgson, which says: “I send you a categorical denial, for such use as you may desire.” Publication of the denial was what it was asked for and given, and it is plain that Hodgson did not expect, or intend, and certainly did not ask, that both letters should be published. That was clearly an afterthought.

On the very day on which Admiral Schley’s acknowledgment of the categorical denial was sent to Hodgson (July 12), the Navy Department ordered Hodgson to appear before Captain French E. Chadwick, at Boston (I. 627), in relation to this matter. He so appeared, and made a statement, which he and Chadwick signed, as follows:

“U. S. S. ‘NEW YORK,’

“BOSTON, June 17, 1899.

“SIR: I have to report the following as the statement of Lieutenant Commander Hodgson of the conversation between Rear Admiral Schley and himself during the action of July 3, 1898.

“He states as follows: ‘As we were approaching the Spanish ships I heard Admiral Schley say “Port,” or “Starboard,” several times to Captain Cook in the conning tower. I had been on the bridge above, and was just coming down to report the positions of the ships, when I heard the admiral say, “Hard-a-port.”’

The *Maria Teresa* was then hauling abaft our port beam. The *Brooklyn* was heading about northeast.

“I told the admiral, or at least suggested to him, that the *Texas* was very close on our starboard hand, and that turning to starboard would bring us too close to her. I don’t know that I used the word “collision.” I did not say: “You mean starboard.” I intended him to understand there was danger of running into the *Texas*. He said: “All right; the *Texas* must look out for that,” or words to that effect; I cannot repeat verbatim.

“When I knew he was going to turn to starboard, I suggested backing the starboard engine, in order to make a smaller circle, and give the *Texas* a wider berth; but he decided against that as decreasing the speed of the turn.

“He did not say, that I know of, “We are near enough to them [the Spaniards] already.” The only thing I gathered from what he said was that, if he turned to port, we should get so close that we would expose ourselves to torpedo attack. I supposed he meant torpedo boats, and replied to him that I had not seen them.’

“Lieutenant Commander Hodgson states that he did not intend to convey, in his note of denial sent at request of Admiral Schley, and published in the *Washington Post*, the idea that no such colloquy took place.

“He states, regarding this, as follows: ‘Admiral Schley wrote me, enclosing an article from the *New York Sun* (of June 1) asking me to write a denial of what he phrased as “an oft-repeated calumny.” He said he had no recollection of any such conversation. I wrote a lengthy letter of explanation, giving my recollection of the conversation as nearly as possible.

“‘Admiral Schley wrote me saying, “There is much in your letter that I should not like to use, as it would provoke assault upon you, which I would not

like to happen. What I want to show is that the dialogue did not occur."

"I then wrote a denial of the colloquy, certainly not intending to say [but that is exactly what he did say] that no such colloquy occurred; but that it did not occur as printed. I at the same time sent with this an explanatory letter, explaining to Admiral Schley that the letter of denial was a denial of the dialogue as it appeared in the *Sun*; and that I had told the *Sun* correspondent that the substance of the conversation was correct. In writing the letter I wished to refute the fact of any controversy existing at a critical stage of the battle. It (the letter) was a denial of the words as they stood in the published article; a denial of their literal correctness, and not a denial of the substantial correctness of the statement.'

"Lieutenant Commander Hodgson appends his signature as a voucher for the accuracy with which the foregoing is given.

"Very respectfully,

"F. E. CHADWICK,

"*Captain U. S. Navy.*

"A. C. HODGSON,

"*Lieut. Comdr., U. S. N.*

"TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY."

The alleged Colloquy, and what Hodgson has said about it at different times, will now be stated in parallel columns.

THE ALLEGED COLLOQUY

HODGSON'S STATEMENT

1. SCHLEY. Hard-a-port.
2. HODGSON. You mean star-board.
3. SCHLEY. No, I don't. We are too near them already.

1. Before the court: "He either said 'Hard-a-port,' or 'Is your helm hard-a-port?'"
2. Before Chadwick (I. 625): "I did not say 'You mean starboard.'"
2. Before the court (I. 625): "I did not say, 'You mean starboard.'"
3. Before Chadwick (I. 626): "He did not say, that I

- know of: 'We are near enough to them already.'"
- Before the court (I. 624): "I never said that he said: 'We are near enough to them already.' I did not tell the *Sun* man that Admiral Schley had ever said: 'We are too close to the Spaniards.' I never told him that. That's not true either. We never had such a colloquy as that."
4. HODGSON. But we will cut down the *Texas*. 4. Before the court (I. 624): "I never said, 'We will cut down the *Texas*.' I never said that."
- Before Chadwick (I. 627): "I don't know that I used the word 'collision.'"
5. SCHLEY. Damn the *Texas*! let her look out for herself. 5. Before Chadwick (I. 627): "I intended him to understand that there was danger of running into the *Texas*. He said: 'All right; the *Texas* must lookout for herself,' or words to that effect. I cannot repeat verbatim."
- Before the court (I. 626): "I did not tell the *Sun* man that the admiral had said 'Damn the *Texas*.' Probably I never mentioned 'Damn the *Texas*,' in any of my letters."
- To Schley (I. 626): "I told Dieuwaide [the *Sun's* reporter] (I. 595) that I could not recollect exactly what was said. That you [Schley] had said, 'The *Texas* would have to look out for herself.'"

That interview between the *Sun's* reporter and Hodgson was in June, 1899, at which time he said, to Dieuwaide, that he "couldn't recollect exactly what was said"; and to Chadwick: "I cannot repeat verbatim." And yet, more than two years later, and

three years and more after the battle, he could come before the court and repeat "verbatim" (I. 571) the language alleged to have been used by Schley, as: "Damn the *Texas!* She must look out for herself," or words to that effect. "He [the *Texas*] will take care of that," and he said, "I don't propose to go in any closer and subject myself to torpedo attack."

Fair-minded people will be, as they ought to be, very doubtful as to placing reliance upon such a memory as that.

Hodgson's alleged grievance was that the admiral did not publish both of those letters of June 11, 1899. If Hodgson had intended that, he should have written the "categorical denial," and the explanation of it, in the same letter; or have written Schley that both letters (or neither) must be published.

And if the "categorical denial" was not true, he should not have written it. There can be no doubt about that, for no man has any right to put his name to an untruthful statement.

Hodgson well said to the court, concerning his admissions and denials, and of the part he took in this whole business (I. 625): "It was a little hair-splitting that I [he] indulged in at this time"; or, as he also luminously said: "Admiral Schley understood me as denying the verbal accuracy of a dialogue which was a fictitious concoction of the imagination of the editor of the *Sun*, 'or some of his reporters.'"

This "fictitious concoction of the imagination of the editor of the *Sun* or of some of his reporters," he, then to the court affirmed to be "a substantially correct statement."

The ordinary mind will be puzzled to understand how "a fictitious concoction of the editor's imagination" (and for which "concoction" he desired that the editor should be shown up "as an unprincipled black-guard") could possibly be "substantially correct."

The majority of the court found, as a fact, that:

“About the time the *Brooklyn* began her turn to starboard a conversation regarding the proximity of the *Texas* took place between Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson.” But the court does not say what the alleged conversation was, nor does it state that the alleged colloquy occurred.

If Mr. Hodgson had thought that either Commodore Schley or Captain Cook did not see the *Texas*, or any other vessel whose proximity seemed to him (Hodgson) an element of possible danger, it was clearly his duty, as the navigator, to call their attention to it. But there his duty ended. Captain Cook testified (I. 900): “After the helm was put hard-a-port, he [Hodgson] came across to me, and said, ‘Captain, do you see the *Texas*?’ As she was the nearest ship at that time, I was looking directly at her. Just about then, we were pretty well clear of her—I mean opening out her stern. I said, ‘Oh, yes’ and he told me that entirely satisfied him, and walked away.”

Admiral Schley testified (I. 1388): “During the turn Mr. Hodgson very properly made some allusion to ‘look out,’ perhaps for the *Texas*; I do not recollect what it was; but there was never any colloquy between us. First, He was too good an officer to have transgressed one of the plainest duties of an officer at that time; second, if he had undertaken it I would not have permitted it for a second. As I say, that is fiction; there was no colloquy.”

To have done more than Captain Cook says he did would have been an impertinence on the part of Mr. Hodgson. He would never have ventured to instruct either the commodore or captain. And if he had said to either what the alleged colloquy states, he would have got back a reply containing language more forcible and unforgettable than the impatient remark which he asserted that the commodore used in reference to the *Texas*.

As to the question of whether there was a colloquy

or not, we have only the evidence of Lieutenant Commander Hodgson that it occurred. There is not a word of evidence to corroborate him, and he denied twice,—once in his letter to Schley, and again in the statement made, over his own signature, before Captain Chadwick,—that it occurred. Admiral Schley says there never was any colloquy. So, without impeaching the truthfulness of either, the proof that it occurred fails. Why should Hodgson—self-contradicting—be believed rather than Schley? There can be no pretense that Admiral Schley had any purpose to be unfair to Lieutenant Commander Hodgson.

The author wishes to say that he believes Lieutenant Commander Hodgson to be an honorable man, but that his mind, from one cause or another, seems to have become (as a marine witness once, before a court martial, expressed it) “so obfuscated” as to that supposititious colloquy that, as is shown, his various statements were all contradictory.

The most appropriate comment upon the whole matter is: “*Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.*”

CHAPTER LXXII

THE COURT OF INQUIRY

NO such court of inquiry as that which passed upon this notable controversy was ever before held. As the author, in opening his argument before it, said: "I doubt if the naval history of the world presents, or ever has presented, a case of the important character of that in which we have so long been engaged. I doubt if a tribunal more exalted in the character of the officers who composed it has ever sat in judgment upon a brother officer's acts.

"I doubt if any man, with the lifelong character and standing and conduct of Admiral Schley, was ever before called upon to ask an investigation of his conduct as the victorious commander of a fleet. There never has been a case, so far as my knowledge and search into naval history has shown me, wherein the man who, without controversy, was completely victorious, and did his whole duty, has felt himself compelled to ask an inquiry as to that conduct, before his brother officers. I say 'compelled'; not by the Navy Department; not by any charge made by any officer against him,—for no officer has had the temerity to say, over his own signature, a word against the conduct of Admiral Schley in the Battle of Santiago; or in the conduct of the Flying Squadron. So, I say that the situation is exceptional, without a parallel in all naval history, in all its aspects.

"There are no accusers here. There is nobody on trial. No charges have been preferred. And yet we cannot have failed to see, as we have progressed, that the case has been conducted as though Commodore Schley *were* on trial. We are compelled to consider the case in that aspect—as a trial."

A large room in one of the buildings at the Navy Yard in the City of Washington was fitted for the sessions of the court. Ample accommodations for several hundred people were provided, and hardly a day passed that there were present fewer than three hundred well-dressed, intelligent ladies and gentlemen from all parts of the country. Fully fifty, if not more, correspondents of the principal newspapers in all parts of the land were in attendance, and their reports were, with a few exceptions, fair and as full as could be expected; and the great dailies printed almost verbatim report of the proceedings.

The military clubs, not only in the United States and Canada, but in Europe, were kept fully informed of the progress of the inquiry; and the foreign clubmen (accustomed, as they had been, to see their victorious commanders rewarded with the highest honors) looked on with "sad and wondering eyes" at the spectacle of the victor practically on trial for having secured that victory. It was "a spectacle to make the gods weep."

The acoustics were perfect; every word spoken by the Court, witnesses, and counsel could be distinctly heard by all, and the order among the spectators (which was most courteously maintained by Captain Henry W. Carpenter, of the Marine Corps, as sergeant-at-arms, and his subordinates,) secured to everyone the greatest comfort attainable on such occasions.

The audiences were largely drawn from Washington and Baltimore, and almost entirely in sympathy with Admiral Schley, who was, from first to last, "the observed of all observers." He, before the morning sessions began, at recess, and after the adjournments for the day, was compelled to hold a sort of levee, with scores of lovely women of all ages from "sweet sixteen" to old age, and distinguished men

pressing to shake his hand and speak words of sympathetic kindness and respectful admiration.

To maintain the solemn decorum of such a court was almost an impossibility. The feeling was too intense, and applause was frequent, in spite of Dewey's gavel, and warning against it.

The court, as originally composed, consisted of the Admiral of the Navy, as president; and Rear Admirals Lewis A. Kimberly and Andrew E. K. Benham, members. Before it met, Rear Admiral Kimberly asked to be excused, on account of ill-health, and Rear Admiral Henry L. Howison was appointed in his place. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Captain Samuel C. Lemly, was appointed judge advocate, with Edwin P. Hanna, Esq., as his assistant.

When the court met, on September 12, 1901, Admiral Schley introduced, as his counsel, Hon. Jeremiah M. Wilson, of Washington, D. C.; Hon. Isador Rayner, the Attorney General of the State of Maryland; and Captain James Parker (the author) of Perth Amboy, New Jersey.

Admiral Schley, having objected to Rear Admiral Howison as a member, that officer was excused; and Rear Admiral Francis M. Ramsay was appointed in his stead. Admiral Schley had been serving abroad as commander-in-chief of the South Atlantic Squadron, and neither he nor either of his counsel knew that Rear Admiral Benham, as a member of a board, had already decided the important question of who was in actual command in the Battle of Santiago. If we had known that, Admiral Benham would have been objected to as a member of the court, and would probably have been excused.

In the opinion of the writer, Benham, knowing that he had made up and officially stated his opinion as to that question, ought not to have served as a member of that court—without, at least, informing Schley of that fact.

There was a semi-tragical interruption of the course of proceedings, when, on the sixth day, the senior counsel, Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson, suddenly died, at his hotel. He was a lawyer of wide renown, and of the highest professional and personal character, and his death was a great shock and a great loss. In respect to his memory the court adjourned over the day of his funeral, and all attended in a body; the counsel being among the pall-bearers.

For the information of non-professional readers, an explanation of the functions and methods of naval courts will not be inappropriate.

A court of inquiry (as its name implies), is a tribunal of three officers, whose duty it is to examine into all the facts and circumstances connected with the matters referred to it; to bring out the whole truth without regard to the result as to anyone; to express its opinions upon the facts, if required by the Precept; and to recommend what, if anything, further should be done in the premises.

Elicitation of the truth, and the whole truth, is its fundamental duty.

Its findings are authenticated by the signature of the president and the judge advocate, but such signatures do not show that the president or any particular member concurs in such finding. A majority of the court determines all preliminary matters, such as questions of evidence and proceedings, arising during the investigation; and the findings.

Any of the members may dissent in writing, but it does not follow that such member concurs merely because he does not formally dissent; and no one has the right to assume that a finding is unanimous (as has been done in this case) merely because there is no such dissent.

It is clearly the duty of the judge advocate to summon before the court all who know, and can testify to, any of the facts bearing upon the matters to be in-

quired into; and he has no right whatever to keep back anything pertinent to such inquiry; or fail to present any witness having knowledge of those facts.

The judge advocate early announced (I. 25): "The conduct of Rear Admiral Schley is in question, not only at the Battle of Santiago, but in the whole Santiago campaign; but I might as well say here that the question of Admiral Sampson's conduct on those occasions is not before the court in any way."

A court martial, on the other hand, is a tribunal composed of not more than thirteen, or fewer than five officers, organized to try an officer or enlisted man, upon charges that have been preferred against him by proper authority; and to determine his guilt or innocence of those charges. All the members of the court are sworn to secrecy, and must sign the findings, whether they concur in them or not; and so it may happen that seven members out of the thirteen (except in cases involving the punishment of death, in which cases three-fourths must concur) may find a judgment, and the other six may not concur; but the finding will appear to have been unanimous.

It soon became evident, from the methods of procedure adopted by the judge advocate, that the court, so far as he could control, was not to be a court of inquiry, but, in fact, a court martial. Instead of summoning all the witnesses who knew, or were supposed to know anything about the matters to be inquired into, in order that all the facts might be presented to the court, as it was his duty to do, only those witnesses, with a few exceptions, were summoned by the judge advocate who were known or believed to be unfavorable to Admiral Schley, and who could be relied upon to discolor or conceal such facts as might be favorable to him.

Such important and impartial officers and eye-witnesses as Captain Clark of the *Oregon*, his navigator,

Lieutenant (now Captain) Nicholson, Lieutenants Eberle and Ackerman, of that ship; and Lieutenant Harlow, of the *Vixen*, who had taken, from the bridge of that vessel, notes of all the incidents of the battle; and all the officers of the *Brooklyn*, except Captain Cook, and Lieutenants Hodgson, her navigator, and Lieutenant Doyle, were left to be summoned by Admiral Schley. Lieutenant Doyle was subpoenaed only because the judge advocate hoped to be able to give a sinister appearance to an alteration which Doyle had made in the log-book of the *Brooklyn*, but which hope proved vain, for Doyle explained and showed it to be entirely innocent and proper. And it was not pretended that Admiral Schley had any knowledge of or connection with it.

That log-book had been written by a man named Mason, who, having served out his enlistment as an apprentice, had gone into business in Pittsburg. Lemly had him brought on from Pittsburg, and had carefully examined him with respect to that alteration. Mason produced to him a copy of the log as he had at first written it; and made such explanations as showed its exact character, and how the alteration came about; and, with full knowledge that the alteration was proper, Lemly sent Mason back to Pittsburg, with instructions to say nothing to anyone about the matter. Mason was, however, loyal to his old commander, and came over to Schley's counsel, and told them what had occurred. We sent him back to Pittsburg, with the statement that he would be called if we should need him. We afterwards found it proper to summon him.

This conduct on the part of the judge advocate was a plain effort to suppress evidence in the case, and, as everybody knows, the "*supressio veri*" is more culpable, than the "*suggestio falsi*," and both are an effort to work a fraud. The former is manly and

works in the light, the latter is cowardly and works in the dark.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson was no doubt expected by his testimony to give a sinister character to the "loop" or turn of the *Brooklyn*; but, if that was the hope, he proved a most undesirable witness to that end. After his testimony had been given, the judge advocate must have understood, better than he had ever done before, the disappointment of Balak, the son of Zipper, which brought forth his reproach to Balaam the son of Beor: "What hast thou done unto me? I took thee to curse mine enemies; and, behold, thou hast blessed them altogether."

As to that turn, Hodgson proved to be a first-class witness for Schley.

CHAPTER LXXIII

WHY DID SCHLEY ASK FOR A COURT OF INQUIRY?

FOR more than three years Admiral Schley had been subjected to all sorts of malicious misrepresentation and insinuation and had been viciously attacked by certain newspapers. But to all this he gave no heed until when, about July 1, 1901, a highly respectable publishing house issued a third volume of a book (the first two volumes of which had been published some years before) entitled, "The History of the Navy," by Edgar Stanton Maclay.¹

The statements made in this third volume which extended the scope of the history so as to include the war with Spain were of so defamatory a character, that the admiral felt impelled to address to the Navy Department a letter in which, after characterizing the statements of the book as they deserved, he said:

"I have refrained heretofore from all comments upon the innuendoes of enemies muttered or murmured in secret, and therefore with safety to themselves. I think the time has now come to take such action as *may bring this entire matter* under discussion under the clearer and calmer review of my brothers in arms; and, to this end, I ask such action at the hands of the department as it may deem best to accomplish this purpose."

Maclay was an employee of the Government of the United States, and in the preface to this third volume

¹ It is proper to state that as soon as the publishers learned of the false character of Maclay's book, it was withdrawn from sale and suppressed as far as possible; and Maclay was, by order of the President of the United States, dismissed from the service of the Government, and the use of his third volume in the naval and military academies was prohibited by the Congress of the United States.

he stated, in effect, that he had submitted the volume to several of the higher officers of the navy, and also to the Secretary of the Navy, and that what he had written met with their approbation.

It will be observed that Admiral Schley asked that the department should "*take such action as may bring this entire matter under clearer and calmer review of [his] brothers in arms.*"

This certainly, as the admiral intended and expected, involved all who were connected with Schley in any way during the time that elapsed between May 18, when the Flying Squadron, under Schley's command, came under the orders of Admiral Sampson, and the end of the Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898.

The Navy Department, by its Precept of July 26, 1901, ordered a court of inquiry; but instead of directing an investigation "of the whole matter," confined the court to an investigation of the "conduct of said Schley during the recent war with Spain, and in connection with the events thereof"; and set forth ten specifications of matters to be investigated.

One who reads that Precept cannot fail to see that the object which Judge Advocate Lemly, who drew it, had in view, was an indictment of Admiral Schley, to prove and sustain which every possible effort was to be directed. And this purpose was relentlessly pursued.

When Schley, on July 27, wrote to the department, suggesting that Paragraph 5 of the Precept be modified so as to omit the department's expression of opinion, and thus leave the court free to express its own opinion in that matter, he was informed that the "Precept treats certain matters as established, such as the fact that you disobeyed orders."

The paragraph which Admiral Schley wished omitted was as follows:

"The circumstances attending and the reasons for the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the or-

ders of the Department contained in its dispatch dated May 25, 1898; and the propriety of his conduct in the premises."

Here was a proposed inquiry in which the question whether there had been a disobedience of orders was as much a matter of inquiry as any other fact alleged or not. Whether there had been such disobedience of orders was not left to the court to say; it could only express opinion whether or not the commodore had "willfully disobeyed the orders, or was justified in disobeying them."

There were other assumptions of fact, just as flagrantly wrong, in a matter of inquiry.

CHAPTER LXXIV

CONCLUSION—A CONTRAST

IN the foregoing pages I have endeavored to bear in mind the maxim: "Nothing extenuate, nor set down ought in malice."

I have given authority and document for every statement made, except those about what occurred in the cabin of the flagship *New York*, May 26 (about Schley's remaining off Cienfuegos), and again on July 10, in the interview between Sampson and his chief of staff (Chadwick), relative to the letter of Sampson about Commodore Schley. Authority for these, which will be indubitable, can be produced if circumstances require.

The signal book of the flagship *New York* (printed as an exhibit to the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry) shows that the following signals were made on the afternoon of July 3 by Commodore Schley to Admiral Sampson:

"2 P. M.—We have gained a great victory. Details will be communicated."

To this the only reply was: "Report your casualties."

2.43 P. M.—"This is a great day for our country."

To this there was no reply.

In the great Battle of St. Vincent (between the British fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jervis, and the Spanish fleet, under Admiral Don José de Cordova), Nelson, who was only a commodore, violated and disregarded the order of battle that had been given by the admiral and was being executed by him, in plain view of the enemy.

Nelson's action resulted in a great success, in which he and Collingwood and others of the captains of Nelson's division displayed great ability.

Nelson, instead of tacking, wore ship, and thus "turned her stern towards the enemy, and increased her distance from the enemy by at least her tactical diameter," whatever that was. But once about, Nelson and his supporters attacked the head of the Spanish fleet and destroyed it. Exactly as was done by the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*.

If someone in high station had been criticising Nelson's action on that day, he would no doubt have said of the "loop" made by Nelson's ship: "It seriously marred the *Captain's* otherwise excellent record; being in fact the one grave mistake made by any British ship that day."

But grim old Sir John Jervis took a different view, and acted differently.

Mahan (p. 335) says: "He signalled to the *Excellent* [Collingsworth's ship] to tack and follow Nelson; and the *Victory*, Jervis' flagship passed the *Captain*, Nelson's flagship, and cheered, as did every ship in the fleet."

Brenton, the naval historian of the combat (Vol. 1, p. 313) says:

"When the firing ceased, Nelson went on board the flagship *Victory*." (He carried with him the sword of the Spanish rear admiral, which had been surrendered to him personally.) "He was received on the quarterdeck by the fine old admiral," (a most unusual compliment, because admirals do not come out of their cabins to receive subordinates), "who took him in his arms, and said he could not sufficiently thank him; and insisted that Nelson should keep the sword of the Spanish rear admiral which he had so bravely won."

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, our great naval historian writer and critic, in his "Life of Nelson" (p. 340) says: "The commander-in-chief had come out to greet him upon the quarterdeck of the flagship—a compliment naval officers will appreciate—had there

embraced him, saying he could not sufficiently thank him; and used every kind expression which could not fail to make me (he was quoting Nelson) happy." Brenton further says: "That evening the captain of the *Victory*, Sir Robert Calder (Admiral Jervis' chief of staff), suggested to the admiral that Nelson had rendered himself liable to a court martial by his disobedience of the order of battle that day." Concerning this incident Mahan says (p. 341):

"In the evening, while talking over the events of the day, Calder spoke of Nelson's wearing out of the line as an authorized departure from the mode of attack prescribed by the admiral."

"'It certainly was so,' replied Jervis; 'and if ever you commit such a breach of your orders, I will forgive you also.'"

It is said that "comparisons are odious"; but contrasts are instructive.

All generous hearts will regret that the incident of Jervis' treatment of Commodore Nelson was not—even in small measure—repeated between Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley when the victorious commodore went on board the flagship *New York* after the Battle of Santiago with Cervera. No cheers from the *New York* were granted to him, as were given to Nelson and his gallant officers and men of the *Captain* by the *Victory* and the whole British fleet.

The *dramatis personae* were all present: An admiral commanding; a gallant, victorious commodore; a Spanish fleet destroyed; a Spanish rear admiral's sword; (even an envious chief of staff). Alas, that there should only have been lacking the generous spirit that swelled out of the heart of the "fine old British admiral" as he embraced and thanked Nelson that day, more than a hundred years ago, on the quarterdeck of the *Victory*, on board of which Nelson was to die at Trafalgar some years later!

It is a curious fact that Sir Robert Calder, who (as above related) undertook to criticise Nelson to Admiral Jervis, and had meanwhile been promoted to be vice admiral, should have been court-martialed, and deprived of his command of nineteen sail of the line, for a failure to avail himself, on June 22, 1905, of a fine opportunity to destroy the combined French and Spanish fleets under Admiral Villeneuve, which Nelson destroyed at Trafalgar four months later.

If anyone wishes to read a touching story, let him read the "Calder incident," as told by Captain Mahan, on pages 704-07, of the "Life of Nelson." In reading the last mentioned book the writer has been much impressed by the similarity between Nelson's experiences, while in pursuit of the French fleet before the Battle of the Nile, and Schley's experiences while in pursuit of Cervera's fleet. Both were greatly hampered by lack of information as to the whereabouts of the enemy. Nelson sailed eastward to Alexandria, as Schley did to the neighborhood of Santiago de Cuba. Nelson learned at Alexandria that nothing had been seen or was known of the French, and Schley was similarly informed by the scouts off Santiago, as to Cervera's fleet.

Nelson, embarrassed by want of water and other supplies, sailed back to Syracuse, and then—after procuring them, still without knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy—sailed away again to the east in pursuit; and, having found them in Aboukir Bay, destroyed them in the Battle of the Nile.

Schley, troubled on account of his coal supply and lack of reliable information as to Cervera, started back to the westward; but, as soon as opportunity to coal his vessels offered, he availed himself of it, and promptly returned to Santiago de Cuba, and found Cervera's fleet there. But before he could lay any plan to get at them, he received Sampson's order to sink the collier *Stirling* in the narrow channel, but

before he could do that (if he had wished to do so) Admiral Sampson arrived, assumed command, and sent Hobson to sink the *Merrimac*.

I do not read that Nelson or Schley caused any ship to be sunk anywhere to keep the French (or Spaniards) in any port. Both were anxious only to get their enemy out. When he came out the same result followed, to wit, total destruction in both cases.

It may be said that Schley is not a Nelson. He never had the opportunity to be; but the writer may be pardoned the opinion that he makes a very close second.

Nelson never won a victory more complete and decisive than that won by Schley and his subordinate brother officers and men on that 3d day of July, 1898, over the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Cervera. Every ship of the enemy and man and officer was captured or destroyed; and through it crumbled into dust and destruction the power of Spain, which, for more than four hundred years, had dominated and oppressed so much of this hemisphere.

The personal attacks upon Commodore Schley began by the publication of a letter in *Harper's Weekly*, about ten days after the great victory had been won. This letter was without signature—anonymous—but the *Weekly* vouched for the high character of the writer. ("High character" of a man who sneaks behind an alias! Ugh!) That writer, like all others who have made insinuations against the admiral, has remained in the darkness, has never stepped into the light, and probably never will.

The author hereof had been the personal friend of Commodore Schley ever since during the Civil War, and wrote to him, congratulating him upon the part he had been able to play in the great battle, and assuring him that he need have no fear that his countrymen would fail to give him the credit that was his just due.

In reply the Commodore wrote the letter which follows, and by which this review can, most appropriately, be closed.

“FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,
“OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,

“July 20, 1898.

“DEAR PARKER:

“Thank you for your letter. I have felt that the marvelous victory of July 3d was the joint product of all who were engaged; and I felt no wish to appropriate the congratulations to myself. The *Brooklyn's* luck was to be in that part of the line where the assault was first felt; and, afterwards, by her speed and direction to continue in the scrap for some three hours and a half to the finish. The victory was so unique in completeness, and so marvelous in its glory, as to be large enough for all who participated. I feel no sympathy with the wish expressed to exclude anyone; and if I had announced the victory, I should carefully have noted all whose prominence of action had helped. I think that omission was a mistake which has created some thoughtless expressions; and I hope no friend of mine will keep this matter alive, while the facts, coldly recited, are sufficient. Thanking you again, my dear friend

“I am, very sincerely yours,

“W. S. SCHLEY.”

The letter shows no erasures or interlineations. It evidently was not written and copied, because it lacks capitals, and is somewhat tautological, in the repetition of the word “victory,” instead of using the pronoun.

The envelope was marked “Personal,” and the letter was not written for publication, but solely for my own eye. The sentiments expressed are just what

flowed spontaneously out of the commodore's heart, through the nib of his pen, on to the white page; his words exactly expressed his feelings and convictions only twenty days after the battle; and that, too, after the anonymous and venomous attacks upon him had begun.

From the spirit of that letter Commodore Schley has never deviated, and never will deviate, so long as he lives to be the frank-hearted and generous sailor he has always been.

JAMES PARKER.

Perth Amboy, New Jersey,
November 1, 1909.



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