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OP THE
Theological Seminary,
PRINCETON, N. J. Case, 'SCC-
-^Z 2, 12.7
SheJf, • ' '
Book,
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THE
RELIGION
O F
NATURE
DELINEATED.
xtif/,evyiv tIu) 'Evaifitia,'/. Plutarch.
Xcii§£LV ^v tddctq TOLg TLfJLoig Toig rcdv ttoXXSv dvS-^c^TrcdV:,
tIw 'AaH'OEIAN ffXOTCCiU, WlipoL<TOI^CLl TO) OVTl CC$ OLV ^UVCOUXi /EcA-
T»<ro5 ay x,a< ^Vy xa.\, isriSlv a7ro9vyiorx6>, k'7tQ^vi]<Ty.i\y. Plato.
The Sixth Edition.
To which is added a PREFACE, containing a General Account of the Life, Charadter, and Writings of the Author.
LONDON:
Piinted for John and Paul Knap ton, at the Crown ia Ludgate^Street, M DCC XXX VIIL
PREFACE
CONTAINING
A General Account of the Life, Charader, and Writings of the Author.
E R H A P S the Perufal of the following Sheets may ex- cite the Curiolity of the Reader to wifli for fome GenC" ral Account concerning the Author of them : And it is not improbable that He may defire to know, in par-- tictdar. Whether the Perfon who compofcd them was a 7nere Speculative Admirer oi Virtue; or whether He was Himself an Example of that Morality which He has fa flrongly recommended to the Pradfice of Others. If fuch a Curiofity {hall happen to be raifed in any One who was quite a Stranger to this Gentleman's Life and CharaSler^ This slight Sketch of Both may chance in fome Me a fare to gratify it.
A 2
Mr. V/lLLIAM
iv AVREFJCE.
Mr. WiLLiAxM WoLLASTON, the Author of the Religion of Nature delineated, was defcended from a Family which ap- pears to have been ancient and confiderable in the County of Stafford. It was, long fmce, divided into T^lvo Branches : The former of whicli continued feated in Ztaffordjlire j But the latter was in procefs of Time tranfplanted into other Counties. The Head of the Second Branch fiouriflied formerly at Oncot in the County oi Stafford ; but, of late Years, at Shenton in the County of Leicefler : and was polleffed of a very con- siderable Eilate in thofe and other Counties. From this Second Branch was our Author defcended : And from a younger Brother of the fame Branch fprung Sir John WoLL ASTON, Lord Mayor oi London^ well known in that City at the Time of the late Civil War.
Mr. WoLL ASTON was born upon the 26th oi March 1659. at Coton- Chmfordiw Staffordfiire. When He was in the loth Year of his Age, a Lati/i School was opened at Shenfton in Staff or dJJjire^ where his Fa- ther, a private Gentleman, of a fmall Fortune, then refided : And Mr. WoLLASTON was immediately fent to the Mafler of it for fuch Inftrudion as He was capable to give Him j and continued near two Years under his Care. Afterwards He was fent to Litchfield School : in which a great Confufion foon after happened, and the Magiftrates of the City turned the Mafter out of the School-Houfe. Many Scho- lars followed the Ejeded Mafter : And Mr. Wollaston amongft the Reft. He remained with Him till He quitted his School, which was about three Years : And then, the Schifm being ended. He returned into the Free-School, and continued there about a Year. This was All the Schooling Mr. Wollaston ever had : And this Time was pafTed, not without Uneafinefs. For, though He was always a great Lover of his Book, and defirous of Improvement^ Yet the Rudenefs of a Great School was particularly difagreeable to his Nature ; and, what was flill worfe. He began to be much infefled with the Head-Ach, which feems to have been confiitutional in Him.
Upon the i8th oi'June 1674. He was admitted a Penfioner in Sidney College in Cambridge ; being then fo much upwards of 1 5 Years of Age as from the 26th of the preceding March, But here He laboured under various Difadvantages : to which a Perfon fo circumflanced as He then
3 waS;,
A T R E F A C E. v
was, could not but be fubjed:. He had ?io Acqiiahitance in the College, nor even in the Univerfity (to which He was come a Country Lad from a Country School ;) few Books or Materials to work with ^ no AJfiftance or Dire^ion from any Body ; nox fiifficient Confideiice to fupply that De- fed: by inquiring from Others. Add to this, That his State of Health was not quite firm : And that his Allowance was by no Means more than fuf- ficient for bare Neceifaries j his then Situation being that of a Second Son of a Third Son of a Second Son of a Second Son. (Tho* indeed, notwith- ilanding this Series of younger Brothers, his Grandfather, who flands in the middle of it, had had a confiderable Efliate both Real and Perfonal. together with an Office of 700 /. per Annum.) However, under All thefe Difadvantages, Mr. Wollaston acquired a great Degree of Re- putation in the Univerfity: perhaps /i?^> much -, For had it been lefs^ it might have efcaped the Tax of E72V)\ which probably was the Caufe of His miffing a Breferment in the College, which a Young Man of his Charader had Reafon to exped:.
Upon the 29th of September 1681 He left the Univerfity : being then Twenty two Years and an Half Old. He had commenced Mafter of Arts the Summer before : And it feems to have been about this Time, that He took Deacon's Orders.
From Cambridge He went to pay his Duty to his Father and Mother, who now lived at Great Bloxwyche: having firil made a Three Weeks Vifit to the then Head of this Branch of the Family, his Coufin Wollaston of Shenton. And He remained at Bloxwyche, with his Father and Mo- ther (whom He Jhaci..not it^n for many Years before) till May or June 1682. About which Time, feeing no Profped of Preferment, He fo far conformed Himfelf to the Circumftances of his Fortune as to become Affiflant to the Head-Mafter of Birmingham School : Who readily em- braced the Opportunity of fuch a Co-Adjutor, and confider'd Mr. Wol- laston as one that prudentially ftooped to an Employment below what He might have reafonably pretended to. And his Coufin of Shenton was far from being difpleafed at this Inftance of his Relation's humble Indujlry, In a fhort Time He got a fmall Ledordiip at a Chappel about two Miles diftaot. But He did the Duty of the }Fhok Sunday : Which, to-
gether
vi A PREFACE.
gether with the Bufinefs of a Great Free-School, for j^bcut four Years began to break his Conflitution j and, if continued, had probably over- come it quite, though the Stamina of it were naturally very ftrong.
During this Space He likewife fuffered many Anxieties and underwent a Deal of Trouble and Uneafinefs, in order to extricate Two of his Bro- thers from fome Inconveniencies to which their own Imprudencies had fubje(5ted them. And in the good Offices which He did them at this Time, He feems to have rather over-aBed his Part : For He indulged his Affedion for them more than was confident with a due Regard to his own Welfare, as He was then circumftanced.
When He had been about four Years at Birminghain^ He was chofen Second Mailer of the School : In which there were three Mafters, two Affiftants, and a Writing-Mafter. It was pretended that He was too Toimg to be Head-Mafter of fo great a School : But in Reality, the Old Mafter was turned out in order to make way for a particular Perjm to fucceed Him. In this Matter fome of the Governors themfelves owned that Mr. Wollaston had Wrong done Him. He kept this new Sta- tion about two Years. It was worth to Him about 70 /. per Annum* Upon this Occafion He took Prieft's Orders : For the Words of the Char- ter were interpreted to require that the Mafters fliould be in Thofe Or- ders, and yet mufl: take no Ecclefiailical Preferment.
The late Chief Mafter, a valuable and good Old Man, and for whom Mr. Wollaston of Shenton had an Efleem, retired after his Expulfion to his Brother's Houfe in the Neighbourhood of Shenton, He once or twice waited upon Mr. Wollaston o£ She?2ton : And undoubtedly in- formed Him of the Charader, Learning, Converfation and Condudt of our Author j which He was very capable of doings becaufe they had lived together till the Time of the Old Gentleman's leaving Birmingham,
Mr. Wollaston oi Shenton having now lately loft his only Sony and never intending (as appears from his whole Condud) to give his Eftate to his Daughter Sy purfued his Father's Defign of continuing it in the Male Line, and refolved to fettle it upon our Author's Uncle and Father (his own Jirjl Coufms and his neareji Male Relations) in the fame Proportions and Manner exadly in which it had been intailed formerly upon them by
A T REFA C E. vii
his Father, And accordingly He made fuch a Settlement : fubjedi: how- ever to a Revocation.
Mr. WoLL ASTON all this While applied Himfelf to his Bufinefs : and never fo much as waited upon his Coufin, or employed any one to fpeak or ad: any thing in his Behalf ^ (tho' many then blamed Kim for not do- ing fo.) Only One Vifit He made Him, in the November before his Death : left a T^otal Abfence fliould be taken for Ingratitude. He went upon a Saturday in the Afternoon ; gave Him a Sermon the next Day 5 received his Hearty Thanks ; and the next Morning told Him that He came only to pay thofe Refpedls which were due from Him, and to thank Him for all his Favors ; and having done that, defired Leave to return to the Duties of his Station : But not one Syllable did He fpeak, or even infinuate, in relation to his Estate. His Coufm difmiffed Him with great Kindnefs : And by his Looh and Marnier feemed to have a par- ticular Regard for him, but difcovered nothing of his Intention by Words.
Mr. WoLLASTON of Shenton was ufed to employ Perfons privately, to obferve our Author's Behaviour : (who litde fufpeded any fuch Mat- ter.) And his Behaviour was found to be fuch, that the ftridter the Ob- fervations were upon it, the more they turned to his Advantage. In Fine, Mr. Wollaston o^ Shenton became fo thoroughly fatisfied of our Author's Merit, that He revoked the before mentioned Settlement, and made a Will in his Favor.
In Auguji following Mr. Wollaston of Shenton fell fick : and fent
fecretly to our Author to come over to Him as of his own Accord with-.
out any Notice of his lUnefs. He complied with the Meflage : and ftaid
fome Days at Shenton. But whilft He was gone Home again, under a
Promife of returning, his Coufin died.
It was the 19th of Jugujl 1688. when this Gentleman died. His Will gave a new and a great Turn to Mr. Wollaston's Affairs: who found Himfelf indtled by it to a very ample Efiate,
'X\i^Circumfiances reladng to the Means whereby Mr. Wollastok came to the Poffcffion of his Efiate, and the Stefs which led to it, have
been
vlii A PREFACE.
been the more minutely particularized here; Becaufe Common Fame has fornehow caught up and forwarded a groundkfi Lnagination^ That our Author was an absolute Stranger to the former PoiTefTor and his Family, and happened to fall into his Company by mere Ac- c I DENT at an Inn. Which is fo far from being /r?^^ or even bearing any Refemhlance to Truth, That they were very 72ear Relations, and this 'Very Eftafe had been twice entailed upon Mr. Wollaston's Uncle and Father.
Such a Sudden and Advantageous Alteration of Affairs would have intox- icated Many a One. But the fame Firmness of Mind which fupport- ed this Gentleman under thePreffures of his more Adverfe Fortune enabled Him to bear his Profperity with Moderation : And his Rel i gion and Ph i- LosopHY taught Him to maintaina^^^£'£ywj;2/W/y under either Extreme.
In November 1688 He came to London : And about a Twelve-month after, upon the 26th of November 1689, He married Mrs. Catharine Charlton, Daughter of Mr. Nicholas Charlton, an eminent Citizen of London, a fine Woman, with a good Fortune and a mofi ex- cellent CharaSler, They lived extremely happy in each other, till her Death left Him a mournful Widower upon the 21/? of July 1720. By Her He had eleven Children : Of whom four died in his Life-time ; the reft furvived Him.
He may moft truly be faid to have fettled in London : For He very feldom went out of it. He took no Delight in unneceflary Journies: And for above Thirty Years before his Death had not been abfent from his Habitation in Charfer-Houfe Square, fo much as One whole Night,
In this his Settlement in London He chofe a Private and Retired Life. His Carriage was neverthelefs Free and Open. He a<Sted like one that aimed 2X jblid2A\di real Content, rather than Shew and Gran- deur: and manifefted his Diflike of Power and Dignity, by refufing one of the highefl Preferments in the Church when it was offered to Him. He endeavoured to £':?<:<:6'// in Sincerity and Usefull Sense, more than in Formalities and Trifles.
He had now Books ^lTyA Leifure : And it was ?jo fmall life Ho, made ©f them. He was perfedlly acquainted with the Elementary Parts of
Learning:
A P R E FJ C E. ix
Learnings And with the learned Language^-, Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, ^c. He thought it necellary to add to Thefe fiich a Degree of Philology and Criticifm as feemed likely to be Ufeful to Him ; Mathe^ matical Sciences^ or at leafl: the Fmidamentah of them j The Gejteral Phi- lojbphy of Nature ; The Hi/lory and Antiquities of the more known and noted States and Kingdoms -, and fuch like Erudition. And in ordei to attain the Knowledge of True Religion and the Discovery of Truth, (the Points which He always \\2A particulai-ly in View, and to which He chiejly direcfted all his Studies,) He diligeittly inquired into the Idolatries of the Heathens: And made Himfelf Master of the Sen- timents^ Rites, ^nd Learni?7g oi the Jews ; the History of the Jirji Settlement of Christianity, and the Opinions a?7d Pra^ices mtvodu.- ced into it fince. In the mean time He exercifed and improved his Mind by throwing o^' Prejudices; ufing Himfelf to clear Images j obferv- ing the Influence and Extent of Axioms, the Nature and Force of Con- sequences, and the Method of inveftigating Truth. In General ^ He accuftomed Himfelf toTniNKMUCH.
By this Method indeed He was rather qualified for private hiftruSfion^ than accomplifhed for public Conversation and Shew. But the latter was not his Point. He looked upon that Specious Sort of Knowledge which often gains a Man the Reputation of a Scholar at a very cheap Rate, to be a False Learning and of no kind of Service to Him who was in Queft of Real Knowledge.
He was of Opinion too That a man might eafily read too ??iuch : And he confidered the Helluo Librorum and the True Scholar as two very different Charaders.
The Love of Truth and Reason made Him love Free Thinking ; and, as far as the World would bear it. Free Speaking too. This tended, He thought, to the Difcovery of Error. Tho' He was not infenfible that This might render Him lefs acceptable to many Perfons : To thofe who perhaps have only jufl fenfe enough to perceive their own Weaknefs ; or judge of Things by the Vogue they bear, or the Refpecfl they have to their own Interell or Par- ty J or can neither bear the Trouble of an honefl Inquiry themfelves,
B nor
X kTREFACE.
nor yet that another fliould know what they do not know ; and, in fhort, to every Prejudiced Perfon whatfoever. But He took all Opportunities to affWt ferioiijly a?id inculcate firenuoiijly the Being and Perfecti- ons of God ; his Providence, \^o'Ci\ General '^v\A Particular , the Ob- ligations we are under to adore Him ; the Reasonableness of all Virtue J the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul ; FUTURE Rewards and Punishments; and other High and ejfen- tial Points of Natural Religion and the Christian Revelati- on. In Fine, To ?-eaJdn impartially, and to know where to Jlop^ was the Mark He always aimed at.
And Pie loved Truth, not in Speculation only, but alfo in Pra^ice: For he loved punctual Honesty.
He hkewile delighted in Method and Regularity: And chofe to have his Labours and Refrelliments Periodical ; and that his Family and Friends fliould obferve the proper Seafons of their Revolutions, The Pcuerfe of this being the prevailing Temper, or at leaft Practice of Man- kind, oftentimes either deprived Him of Converfation or rendered it dif-
agreeahle to Him.
The General Character of his Nature was, That it was Tender and Sensible. This Tenderness difpofed Him to /^t?/ and CompaJjloJiate the Miferies of others : Infomuch that He many times fuffered more perhaps in another man's Cafe than the ?nan did in his own. This Tenderness induced Him always to endeavour to fa- ils fie a?id convince in Cafes where He might have commanded moft def- potically and abfolutely, Tho' it is not improbable that in this He was frequently mifunderjlood as if He meant to chide, when He only intend- ed to explain and convince. To this Tenderness may alfo be afcribed that excejive Modefty atid Dijidence of Himfelf which made Him de- light in Privacy and Retirement ; and incapacitated Him in a great Meafure from appearing in Public at all like what He really was 5 and even occafioned Him fometimes to feem inferior to thofe who exceeded Plim in nothing but Forwardness and Conceit. Some- thing of this might indeed be owing to the Deprefpon of his Spirits
m
A T R E F A C E.\
xi
in his younger Days. From the Jame Caufes might arife his flrong Ap- prehenfion of the Unreasonableness and Injustice of thofe who were defignedly the Beginners of Quarrels or Abufes, or invaded without Provocation Another's Good Name. The fame Tenderness rendered Him in a high Manner fenfible of the Defei^tion^ Unkindnefs or Lidiffer- ence of Friends.
He never indulged his Passions to the Hurt of any One. If in any refpedt He flievved that He was notyS compleat ^ Stoic as to have era- dicated his Passions, ov fo perfe^ a Philosopher 2.'s, jtever to be Jitr^ prized by them^ it was in the Efcape of an hajly Word or ExpreJJio?! now and then, when He was put off of his Guard by Hurries, Indifpofitions, or fuch like Occafions. Yet He was not always angry, when the Ur- gency of Biijinefs, the Strait?iefs of Ti?7ie, the Importunity of impertinent People^ or the like, caufed Him to talk louder or quicker than ordinary j nor often, (if at all) Wwhowifufficient Reafon ; nor everfo angry with any One elfe, as He would be with Himself for having been fo. In fhort. If every One would reflrain their Anger within the fame Bounds as He did, there might be a hafly Word or ExpreJJion dropped fometimes upon Provocation or htdijpoftion : But there would never be Resentment, Wrath or Quarrel more in the World.
He was moft remarkably Chearful and Lively in Private Conver- sation, and by his Inclination ready , as Well as by his Treafures of Learn- ing abundantly qualified to hcferviceable to all forts of Perfons. This render- ed his Company agreeable : and Himfelf worthy to be courted by the Learn- ed and Virtuous. But a General Acquaintance was what He never cultivated : and it grew more and more his Averfion. So that He paffed his Days moftly at Home, with 2ifew Friends : with whom He could enjoy an agreeable Relaxation of Mind, and receive All the Advantages of Tifncere and open Friendship. This Excejjive Retirement was however attended ^\ih fome Inconveniencies. His Intimates were dropping oft, and their Vlaces remained unfiipplied ; His own Infirmities were increafmg -, The Frequent Ret?iiJfion of Study growing more and more necefary 3 and his Solitudes at the fame Time becoming hfs and lefs pleafant and agree-
able,
B 2 ' What
xii A P R E FACE.
What, Decays foever there might be in his Bodily Strength, He neverthekfs retained to the laft the Clearnefs and Perfpicuity of his Thoughts. But perceiving his Defigns fruftrated by the daily Attacks of Nature, and that it would be impoflible io Jlnifl:) and compleat them in the Manner He wilhed, it feems as if He had intended to deftroy with his own Hand the greateji Fart of his Works : And that thofe few Manufcripts which were found after his Death were indebted to the treachery of his Memory for their Prefervation. For He had within the lafl two or three Years of his Life aSlually burnt feveral Treatifes, in the Compofition whereof He had beftowed 710 fmall ^antity of Time and Pains. The following indeed happened to be fpared : But from the Place m which they were depofited, and from Jome other CircumfanceSj 'tis probable that they owed their Efcape to fnere Forgetfidnefs. They were in Number thirteen, (befides about Fourfcore Sermons) viz. i. An Hebrew Grammar. 2 . Tyrocinia Arabica & Syriaca. 3 . Specimen Vocabularii Biblico-Hebrai- ci, Uteris noftratibus quantum fert Linguarum DifTonantia defcripti. 4. For- mulae qusdam Gemarina. 5. De variisgeneribus/^^^z//?/, metrorum, carmt- num, &c. Apud Judcsos, Gracos & Latinos. 6. De Vocum T'onis Monitio ad Tyrones. 7. Rudimenta ad Mathefm & Philofophiam fpedantia. 8. Mifcellanea Philologica. 9. Opinions of the Ancient Philofophers, 10. 'Iou(5^a»)ca : five Religionis & Literature Judaica Synopfis. 11. A Colleaion of fome Antiquities and Particulars in the Hiftory of Mankind : tending to fhew that Men have not been here upon this Earth from Eter- i^iTY, ^c. 12. Some Paffages relating to the Hiftory ^Christ 5 col- leded out of the Primitive Fathers. 1 3 . A Treatife relating to the Jews : of their Antiquities, Language, &c. And what renders it the more pro- bable, or indeed almoft beyond Doubt, That He would have deflroycd thefe ]ikewife if He had remembered them, is That feveral of thefe which remain undefiroyed are only Rudiments or rougher Sketches of what He afterwards reconfidered and carried on much farther : and which even after fach Revifal He neverthelefs committed to the Flames, as being flill (in his Opinion) fiort of that Perfection to which He deftred and had Intended to bring them, _
A T R E F A C E. xiii
It muil be owned indeed that He had formerly publifhed a Para- phrase on part of the Book of Ecclesiastes, which He had not cor- reeled, Bwtfor that 'very Reafon He was afterwards earneftly defirous t-oj'up- prefs it. And He Hkewife compofed and printed a little Latin Gram- mar. But this was only for the Ufe of his Family, The former was printed in the Year 1690 : The latter in 1703.
Not long before his Death, He publiflied the ensuing Treatise, intitled *' The Religion of Nature delineatedj" in which the FiSiure of his Life is mofi fully ^x2^nx\. l^jere you may behold Him in his Real Character: in the humble Submission and Resignation of Himfelf to the unerring Will of the Divine Being; in his TRUE Conjugal and paternal Affection to his Family-, in his kind Regard and Benevolence towards his Felloiv-Creatures, according to their refpedive Stations in Life. For He Himself fieadily praBifed thofe Duties and Obligations which He fo earneftly re- commended to Others. The Public Honors paid to his Memory, and the Great Demand ^ov this Book (of which more than Ten Thoufand were fold in a very few Years) are fufficient Teftimonies of its Value. He had, in the Year 1722, printed off a few Copies of it for private Vfe, And as foon as he had done fo. He began to turn his Thoughts to the Third Question : as appears by a Manufcript intitled Heads and Materials for an Anfwer to ^lefiion 3 . fet down rudely and a?ty how^ in order to be confjdered, Gff. after they are got into fome Order, July 4, 1723. Underneath which He has added. They a7'e writ- ten at Length (not in my Short-hand) that fo if this Anfwer fiould never be finijhed, they may however not be totally lofl. However in this Defgn He had Opportunity to make but a very fmall Progrefs. For it was juft about this Time that, at the Inftances and Perfuafion of his Friends, He fet dhout revifng and publifing the following Work: wherein he had anfwered the two firfi of the propofed Queftions : Re- folving, as foon as that fhould be done, to return to and iinifh his Anfwer to the Third (Question,
But
xiv A V R E F J C E.
But In that He was diiappointed. . For immediately after he had com- pleated the Revillil and Publication of the following Treatife, an acci- dent of breaking his Arm increafed his Diftempers, and accelerated his Death; which happened upon the 2<)th of OBober 1724, and has abfolutely put an End to the Expedation of feeing any wor^of his Works in Pri?U. For it would be equally i?ijurious to the Author and dij'refpcBful to the Public, if his Family fliould expofe his more imperfect Sketches in Print after his Death : when He Him- self had dejiroyed £cvcv^\ more fmjhed Pieces, becaufe He judged them 7iQt fufficiently accurate.
His Body was carried down to Great Fi?iborough in Suffolk, One of his Eftates, and the Principal Refidence of his now Eldefl Son and Suc- ceiTor in his Eftate : who reprefents the neighbouring Burrough of Ipfwych in Parliament.
From all that has been faid concerning Mr. Wollaston, it appears that notwithflanding his Declining to accept of any Public Employment, yet his Studies were defigned tobe of P;/^//f U/^: And his Solitude was far from being employed in "jain and trifling Amufements terminating mHimJelf alone.
His lateft Moments were calm and eafy. Such as might be expeded to clofe a Life fpent like his : And He left the World, as Hefojourned in it, quietly and refignedly. Both the Manner of his Life and that of his Death were well worthy of Jw/Z^/Zo;?.
It is fcarce worth while to take any Notice of an idle or malicious Re- fleaion which has been caft, by fome over-zealous Perfons, upon this Gentleman's Memory, as if He had put a ^S^/^^ upon Christianity by laying fo much Strefs upon the Obligations ef Truth, Reason, and Virtue : Or as if He could not have believed aright, becaufe He »iid not think it necelTary to digrefsfrojn his SubjeSf in Order to insert his Creed. Surely, a ^ui^xcion thus founded C2in Atkivt no Regard. However, it may not be amifs to obferve that it has probably been in- rreafed by a vulgar miftake that Mr. Wollaston, the Author of the
Religion
4
A9REFACE. xv
Religion of Nature delineated, was the fa?ne Per/on with Mr. WooLSTON who wrote feveral Pieces which gro% attacked the Literal Truth of the Miracles of Jesus Christ. And this Miflake, which arofe originally from the Similitude of Names, might happen to be further confirmed by Mr. Woolston's intitling Himfelf " Late Fellow " of Sidney College in Cambridge:' At which College Mr. WoL- L ASTON Himfelf and Four of his Sons were educated.
THE
The Religion 0/ Nature delineated.
To c/^. F. Efqj
WAS much furprifed, S IR^ when (fome time ago) you ioim'^oxxxmxidy dicCircdimy thoughts upon thefequcftions,
I . Is there really any fuch thing as natural xcWgion^ froperiy and truly fo called ?
II. If there is, what is it ?
III. How may a man qualify himfelf^ fo as to be ahk tojudge^ for himfelf, of the other religions profefl in the world j tofettk
his own opini on s in difput able matters; andthentoenjoy tranquillity of mind, neither dijiurbing others, nor being diflurbed at what pajfes among them ?
With what view you did this ; whether in expectation of fome little degree of
fatisfa6tion ^ or merely to try my abilities 5 or (which I rather think) out of k ind-
3 B nefs
6 The Religion of Nature.
nefs to amiife me at a time, when I wanted fometliing to divert melancholy reflexl- onsj I fhall not venture to guefs. I fhall only fay, that could I have forefeen in due tiiT»c, thatfuchataskwastobeimpofeduponme, I might have been better pre- pared for it. I might have marked what was faitablc to my purpofe in thofe books, which I have red, but fhall fcarce ever return to read anymore: many more I might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own convi6tion, I have negleded, and now have neither leifure nor patience to perufe : I might have no- ted what the various occurrences and cafes, that happen in life, fuggefted: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on fuch parts of learning, as would have been diredly ferviceable to me on the prefent occafion.
However, as I have not fpcnt my days without //:?/«^'/»^ and reflecting fe- rioufly within my felf upon the articles and duties of natural religion^ and they are 7ny thoughts which you require, I have attempted, by recolleding old meditati- ons, and confulting a few fcatterd papers, in which I had formerly for my own ufe fct down fome of them (briefly, and almofl folecilHcally), to give an anfwer to the two firji of your quefl:ions, together : tho I muft own, not without trouble in- adjufting and compa6bing loofe fentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the chaos into the fhape of fomething Hke a fyflem.
Notwithftanding what I havefaid, in -xtYt-^t&o^ natural religion^'x fubje6t fa beaten and exhaufled in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which fo ma- ny notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and fo many things require to be proved, which can fcarce be proved by any other but the old ar- guments (or not fo well), you mull not exped to find much that is new. Yet fomething perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, concerning the nature o£ moral good and evil^ and is the prevaihng thought that runs thro them all, I never met with any where. And even as to thofe matters, m which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they ufed to appear to me in my walks and folitudes. So that they are indeed my thoughts^ fuch as have been long mlne^ which I fend you -, without any regard to what others have, or have not faid : as I perfuade my felf you will eafily perceive. It is not hard to difcem, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece -, and to diflinguilli the genuine hand of an author from the fdfe wares and patch-work of a plagiary. Tho after all, it would be madnefs in a man to go out of his right way, only be- caufe it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.
Senfible how unfiniflied this performance is, I call it only a Delineation^ or rude draught. Where I am defcdive, or trip, I hope you will cxcufc a friend,
who
Of Moral Good and Evil. 7
who has now pafled the threfliold of old age ; and is, upon that and other ac- counts, not able to bear much ftudy or application. And thus I commit to your candor what follows : which, for the fake of order and perfpicuity, I have di- vided into fe^iofis^ and propofttions.
Sect. I. Of Moral Good and Evil.
TH E foundation of religion lies in that difference between the ads of men, which diilinguifhes them into good^ evily indifferent. For if there is fuch a difference, there mull be religion j 6? contra. Upon this account it is that fuch a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after fome general idea % or fome rule ^, by comparing the forefaid a6bs with which it might appear, to which kind they refpeftively belong '^. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there mufl be ^. That, which I am going to propofc, has always feemd to me not only evidently true, but withal fo obvious and plain, that per- haps for this very reafon it hath not merited the notice of authors : and the ufe and application of it is fo eafy, that if things are but fairly permitted to fpeak for themfelves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found themfelves to proclaim their own re6litude or obliquity -, that is, whether they are difagreeable to it, or not. I fhall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning.
I. That a£f, which may he denominated morally good or evil, mufl be the aB of a heingcapable of diflinguijhing, chooftng, and aSlingfor himfelf ^ : or more briefly, of an intelligent and free agent. Becaufe in proper fpeaking no a6l at all can be afcribed to that, which is not indued with thefe capacities. For that, which cannot di-
■ So, mPlato, Socrates requires o^Euthyphro not 'hrtt S"uo ^i^'ulftiT ^ro^Sv ia-iu^' d?^' ^/.^o avri
iid(^, a> TToivTce, t» 'o<nc(,'c<rtct,l<Ti, y.rK And again, Tuoii/jj roiviw f/ji ctoTvy ^•.S'cc^cyrvy'l^ia.v t{c ttoti i?-iv
co-tov livcif 0 J[' uv f^i) TCi^rcv, f/j'/iipz. Tofce cxcm^hx honeflf. Luc. '' Olh to y' cii\(io>, kxvw ^ khaS .fAoc6aiy. Eurip. Adjh Reguh, peccatis qu£ pxnas irroget £.qnas, fays Horace. Now by the fame r;;/?, by which puniHiments are juftly proportiond, crimes mufl be diftinguiflid among themfelves ,• and there- fore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good acftions. So tkit it is at bottom a rule which can do this, that is required. = lormuU quAdam confiituenda, efl : quam fi fequemur incompa^ ratime rerum, ai officio nunquamrecedemus. Cic. ^ T-Zc, otoM rs o(.Tiy.fJuo(.sTce. iimt id, hiu^zrce. rd umy- xdiircilic ov uv^^aiTTeii; hiv av [y-nvmnc] Arrian. e ul,i I'irtus, fi nihil fittim ejl in ipjrs uobis ? Cic.
ni:^om nnnn -\my i^in - nmjfl -m'p loyy niion? nyi □!^i n^ins uDn:?* b^b m\yn. Maim.
B 2. Hinguiih,
8 The Religion of Nature. Se(5l. I.
. flinguifh, cannot choofe : and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of choofing for itfelf, and ading accordingly, from an internal principle, a6ts, if it ads at all, under a neceffity incumbent ab extra. But that, which a6ts thus, is in reality only an infirument in the hand of fomething which impofes the necef- lity ; and cannot properly be faid to aSt^ but to be aSied. The a6t muft be the ad of an agent : therefore not of his inftrumcnt.
A being under the above-mentiond inabilities is, as to the morality of its acls, in the flate of inert and pallive matter, and can be but a machine : to which no language or philofophy ever afcribed «^» or mores.
II. Thofe propofitiom are true^ 'which exprefs things as they are : or^ truth is thz conformity of thofe words or figns^ by which things are expreji^ to the things them' felves. Defin.
III. A true proportion may be denied^ or things may be denied to be what they are^ hy deedsy as well as by exprefs words or another propofition. It is certain there is a meaning in many ads and geftures. Every body underflands weeping % laugh- ing, fhrugs, frowns, ^c. thefe are a fort of univerfil language. Apphcations are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by cafts of the eye and motions of the adjacent mufcles K And we read of feet, that fpeak ^; of a philofopher, who anfwerd an argument by only getting up and walking ^ ; and of one, who pretended to exprefs the fame fentence as many ways by gefliculation, as even Cicero himfelf could by all his copia of words and eloquence «. But thefe inllances do not come up to my meaning. There are many ads of other kinds^ fuch as conftitute the charader of a man's condud in life, which have in nature^ and would be taken by any indifferent judge to have a fignification^ and to imply fome propofition^i as plainly to be underilood as if it was declared in words : and therefore if what fuch ads declare to be, is not, they muft contradiB truthy as much as any falfe propofition or affertion can.
If abodyoffoldiers, feeing another body approach, fhould fire upon them,, would not this adion deckre that they were enemies > and if they were not enemies, would not this military language declare what w^s falfe ? No, perhaps it may be faid ; this can only be called amillake, like that which happend to the Athenians
* LacrymA pondem vocis haient. Ov. ^ Oculi, fuper cilia, frons, rultus denique totus, quiCermc quiikm tacitus mentis ep, &c, Cic. Nutu fgnifque loquuntur. Ov. E,( aaio qmfi fermo corporis-
rria-i. Sext. Emp. So Menedemus reproved luxury by eating only olives. Diog. L, And others aif- amentiond by Flmarch, who did uv^ili (p*/m (i ^t7 ff^^iv. f Mdcrob.
in
Of Moral Good md Evil. p
in the attack of EpipoJa % or to the Carthaginians in their lafl: incampment a- gainft Jgathocles in Africa ^. Suppofe then, inllead of this firing, fomc officer to h2iSt [aid they were enemies, when indeed they were friends ; would not that jfentence affirming them to be enemies be filfe, notwithftanding he who fpoke it was miflaken ? The truth or falfhood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance : becaufe there is a certcr^ fenfe affixt to the words, which muft either agree or difigree to that, concerning which the affir- mation is made. The thing is the very fame ftill, if into the place of words be fubftituted actions. The falute here was in nature the filute of an enemy, but fhould have been the falute of a friend : therefore it impHed a falfity. Any fpe6la^ tcrr would have underftood this action as I do > for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be underftood, has a meaning : and what has a meaning, may be either true oxfalfe : which is as much as can be faid of any ver- bal fentence.
When PopiUus Lianas folicited to have Cicero profcribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner ^, would not his carriage have fufficicntlyyJg- mfied to any one, who was ignorant of the Ciife, that I'ully either was fome very bad man, and deferved capital punilhment } or had fome way grievoufly injured this man 5 or at leaft had not faved his life, nor had as much reafon to expect his fervice and good offices upon occafion, as he ever had to cxpe6l I'ully''^ ? And all thefe things being falfe, were not his behaviour and a6tions exprejjive of that which was falfe, or contradictions to truth ? It is certain he a5ted as //thofc things had been true, which were not true, and as if thofe had not been tine which were true (in this confifted the fault of his ingratitude) : and if he in words had faid they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were fo : why then fhould not to a6l as if they were true or not true, when they were o- therwife, contradi6t truth as much as to fay they were fo, when they were not fo''?
A pertinacious objector may perhaps flill fay, it is thebufinefs of foldiers to de- fend themfelves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportu- nity permits j and felf-prefervation requires all men not only barely to defend themfelves againil aggreilors, but many times alfo toprofecute fuch,and only fuch, as are wicked and dangerous : therefore it is natural to conclude, that they are enemies againft whom we fee foldiers defending themfelves, and thofe men wic- ked and dangerous, whom we fee profecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that
' Where we find <p!xnii n <piXoi<i, y^ jroAiVa? ^oA;r«<5 s.5 X>^~i'^i kxtsr.XoK^ sA,9-tVr«5. Thticyit. ^ T»s. oiX£(»5 ffl? TroXifSiiHi Kf^uvcyTo. Dicd.S. ^ Val.Max. ** 'AvS^uTToitrtv chi ':-/^[kv TcTt T 'fxfyijccTUS'T/.t
'^Kwas^a.v i^inn 7r?\.iev, Enrip, ^uaji interjit, nHilian), m zideam, Cic.
thofe
10 The Religion of Nature. Sed:.L
thofe a61:s of defending and ipxo^ccutmgfpeak or fignify fo much : but conjectures are raifed upon the common fenfe-, which mankind has of fuch proceedings. Anf, Ifitbe»^///r^/toconcludeany thing from them, do they not naturally convey the notice offomething to be concluded? And what is conveying the notice of any thing but notifying or fignifying that thing ? And then again, if this fignifi- cation is natural and founded in the common principles and fenfe of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which rcfults only from the ufe of fome particular place or country, as that of language doth ?
If ^fhould enter into a compa6twith ^, by which he promifes iind ingages never to do fome certain thing, and after this he does that thing : in this cafe it mud be granted, that his a6l interferes with his promife, and is contrary to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promife, but it muft alfo interfere with the truth o£ that propoftion^ which fays there was fuch a promife made, or that there is fuch a compa6t fubfifting. If this propofition be true, A made fuch a certain agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement with B. Why ? Becaufe the truth of this latter is inconjijient with the agreement aflerted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a de- nial, is this inconjifience. Ifthen the behaviour of ^ be inconftfient with the a- erecment mentiond in the former propofition, that propofition is as much denied by A's behaviour^ as it can be by the latter, or any other propofition. Or thus, If one propofition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is containd in another, it is faid to contradict this other, and denies the exiftence of what is containd in it. Juil: fo if one a6t imports that which is contrary to the import of another, it contradi^s this otht\-^ ^nd denies its exiflence. In a word, ifyfby his actions denies the ingagements, to which he hath fubje6ted himfelf, his ani- ons deny them > juft as we fay, Ptolomy by his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it ^
When the queftion was asked, Whofefljeep are thefe ? the anfwer was, z/£gon's : for he committed them to my care ^ (he ufes and difpofes of them as his). By this ad Damatas underftood them to be his j and if they had not been his, but M- phondas's or Melibceus's, ty£gon^ by an a£i very intelligible to Damcotas, had ex- prefled what was not true. What is fiid here is the ftronger, becaufe he, who has the ufe and difpofal of any thing, has all that he can have of it j and v. v. he who has the all (or property) of any thing, muft have all the ufe md difpofal of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be his^ than by ufing it, l^c. But of this fomcthing more hereafter.
» 'H/Asr? r mit^oi /3<oPkKt UXurav'^ utii^i, q)u.j^ nxkrum y.X. Vim. ^ Virg. 8c Theocr.
I
In
Of Moral Good and Evil. 1 1
In the Jewijh hiftory we read, that when AVmelek faw Jfaac fporting * with Rebekah^ and taking conjugal hberties '', he prefently knew her to be Ifaac^ wife 5 and if fhe had not been his wife, the cafe had been as in the preceding in- ftance. li\thtobje£ied^ that Ihe might have been his miilrefs or a harlot 5 Ian- fiver^ that fo fhe might have been, tho Ifaac had told him by "jjords that flie was his wife. And it is fufficient for my purpofe, and to make ads capable of contrn- diding truth, if they may be allowd to exprefs things as plainly anddeterminately as words can. Certainly Abimekk gave greater credit to that information which palled through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear ^ > and to what Ifaac did, than to wliat he faid. For Jfaac had told him, that fhe was not his wife, but his filler ^.
A certain author ^ writes to this purpofe, " If a foldier, who had taken the '' oath to C^far, ihould run over to the enemy, and ferve him againil; C^fir^ " and after that be taken > would he not be puniihd as adeferter, and aperjur- " ed villain ? And if he {hould plead for himfelf, that he never denied Cafar j " would it not be anfwerd, ^bat with his tongue he did not deny him, but with " his actions (ox by fadtsj he did ? " And in another pkce, " Let us, faysbe^ " fuppofe fome tyrant command a Chriilian to burn incenfe to Jupiter^ Vv'ithout " adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of Chriji : if the Chriflian fhould '' do this, would it not be manifeft to all, that by that 'very act he denied him j " (and I may add, confequently denied thofepropoftions which affirm him to be the Chriji^ a teacher of true religion, and the like ^) ?
When a man lives, as if he had the eftate which he has not, or was in other regards (all fairly cafl up) what he is not^ what judgment is to be palTed upon him ? Doth not his whole conduct breath untruth ? May we not fay (if the pro- priety of language permits), that he lives a lye 8 ?
In common fpeech we fay fome adions are infignificanl^ which would not be fcnfe, if there were not fome that ^YQfignificant^ that have a tendency and mean- ing. And this is as much as can be laid of aiticulate founds, that they are cither fignificant or injignificant ^.
» iniflD U;o\yo. luy^/. t Only pn^m piU<'3 pay according to Alfliek. "^ 'CiTx r^ Tvfy^K' ti uyB-^uTroKTiv ioP.et, ecTnroTt^ot oipB-xX^Zi). Herod. '^ That inftanceof Mf«f//i«/and hxs^c^ Alexan- der jm Arr'tan, roight befubjoind tothis. Et'r*; air^c, dh (^-.Xoip^orst^iSi ot.yi.y.>.i<c,, >;t.Vjjo-£v av tm M;1>ti ctm, uvai (plxni ccvra^. e Be Dupl. Mart. f Something like this is tliat in one of Greg. Naz.'s orations. When {bme Chriftians, who had been in&ared hy yulitn, asked, ttuc X^irof i^i/Ki^ifix ; they were anfwerd on kxtoc, y a-y^o^ iB-vf/jtoirj-eirs. ^ To. ysyJ^ii TTsu^ujcrx oiclKo;v. Chryf. K«« 7o>.itrufjO^
tii-Jso? y^ yiXcoc,, y^ ^y,i>^c«, ■7:ol\<i uvufyiy^i 'Zih^ uirS, as 2?.t/:/ fpcaks ; and therefore greater things nnift do it more. h As that BAiV^* ap, Diog. L. in v, Zen, It
12 The Religion of Natuhe;! Sedl. L
It may not be improperly obferved by the way, that thcfgnificamyhcrt attri- buted to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but fomctimcs from cuftom and agreement among people % as that of words and founds moftly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary lignifications. The generality of C/;n7?/^«j, v/hen they pray, takeoff ilicir hats : the Jezvs^ wlien they pray ^ or f^iy any of their Berakoth^ put them ■on. The fame thing wliich among Chriftians denotes reverence, imports irre- \ irence among the Jews. The rcafon is, bccaufe covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itfelf an indifferent thing., and peo- vple by uflige or confent may make it interpretable either way. Such acts feem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the ■former kind, fuch as I chiefly here intend, have an unalterable fignification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to exprefs the contraiy toit. z>£gon\ treating the flock, and difpofmg of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to fignify, that it ivas not his. From whence it appears, xhitfatls exprefs more ilrongly, even than words themfelves "^ j or to contradict any propofition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can poflibly be made by words only ^. Words are but arbitrary figns ^ of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes poverty \ in another de- notes riches s) : hut fa^s may be taken as the effects of them, or mther as the thoughts themfelves produced into aU j as the very conceptions of the mind brought
Herod. ^ — nbl.VD vyii-^n— H^Snn 1iDy^ bi*? bbsnnn. Maim. & al. paf = Qicv
itWAoy^c-iv it^tmi, rcT^ ^ 'k^^ ^-f^'5?«'. Epift. ad Tit. And ro s^ye.-; u^^:^ Q^cv Ct^f^ rs Ef^sT- cV roM,«r«. Chryf. d A(J7©-£fy»<r;cr/^ Plut. Res loquitur ipfa : quxfemper valet plurimutn. Cic. ^uid ver-
ba audiafn, cumfaStfivideam? Id. kiirk /3oST««-f4/^flir<», x^y r jj <^»vi< c-iUTrZi^. Baf. « This wc
Jcnow. For they are different to different nations ; we coin them, as we pleafe, &-c. oJW r Ivoi/^urav isHy hiv, u>yt.' or XV yly^cci <rufj^^,oXcy. Arifl. And tho Plato fccms to be of another mind, yet when Cr/i?y/«^ fays 'Ova/Aca©- i^^cr-^.o^. ilvciiiy.^'^u^ cvToov (pua-i TriipfK-jTciv, it is much to bc qucftiond whether any thing, more be meant than this, that fome names of things are m.ore natural or proper than others. For he fays that this reaitude of names is the fame ^r'Ei^jjtr. >-; fia^Qu^ca ; that it is [only] fuch as is fufficient ^y;^?» cjov i>ccc?-oi> £>* T cvrcof j fuch iis m.ay render them kuta to ^ws^iov oi/jota—ToTi n-p^y/^ao-iv. Sec. That lepi-
■Jum & feftivum argnmentum, which. P. Nigidius. efp. A. Cell, makes ufe of to fliew, cur videri pojjint
."jerba ejfe natnrdia magis qimm arbitraria, dcferves only to be laughd at. f ^''^^ Hebr. ^ U;n Arab. So Ab.Ez.ra obferves that nibi iniff-^. is to will, in^r^^. to nill {x.hom Arab, theword is
.written n^^^: and in another place, that theyJ?w? word even in tht fame language fometimes fignifies
l^Sm nm, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words
have different fcnfcs and ufes. HiV in Arabic, according to Ci^geiiu avA Golius, has 70 or So, and
jfome (twoatleaftv contrary the one to the other.
■•forth
Of Moral Good and Evil. 1 3
forth, and grown to maturity v and therefore as the moft natural and exprcfs re- prefentations of them. And, belide this, they bear certain refpe6ts to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any ratio's are in mathematics. For the fa6ls and the things they refped 2iYCJufl what they are, as much as any two given quantities are , and therefore the refpefts interceding between thofe muflbc ^sjjxt, as the ratio is which one of thefe bears to the other : that is, they muft remain the fame, and always fpeak the fame language, till things ceafe to be what they are.
I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim. That whoever acls as if things werefo, or not fo^ doth by his adis declare, that they are fo, or not fo; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwife, his a6ts contradict thofe propofitions, which aflert them to be as they are =>.
IV. No a5i (whether word •' or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true propofition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. For,
1 . If that propofition, which is filfc, be wrong <=, that aft which implies fuch a propofition, or is founded in it, cannot be right : becaufe it is the \-ery propofition itfelf in pra6tice.
2. Thofe propofitions, which are true, and exprefs things as they are, exprefs the relation between the fubjcd and the attribute as it is ; that is, this is either nffimied or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And fur- ther, this relation for, if you will, the nature of this relation^ is determind and fixt by the natures of the things themfclves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any propofition that is true, but it mufi; likewife interfere with nature fthc nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themfelves tooj, and confe- qucntly be unnatural, or wrong in nature. So ^'cry much are thofe gentlemen mif- taken, who by foUowingnature mean only complying with their bodily inclinati- ons, tho in oppofition to truth, or at leafl v/ithout any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature : and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth ^.
» This is TTciiiii-i^iZo Qh- . Apocal. FUto ufes the fame way of fpeaking. -inu^^, fays he, /A,.-Jik-
fX,yj^iv — f/jyiTi Xoyu [x,iiri ieyai TT^aha. The Contrary to this is in Arijlotle eiMd-tvuf cfji^oMi ci Xiye:;
>^ 7r^oili<rtv ; and ov /S/ai ^Mdiuuv. And in S. B. jiOi^l PD^, and flDM "fTI. ^' A€tam ^enerale
■verhum eft, fiije verbis five re auid agatur. luftin. Dig. = As it muft be, becauie O-.ic*
V, ciAi'.B'ii ciSi. Soph. ^ Tu) Pioyt^cJ ^o)* -/i u,vr-/\ TTg^oc^.t, y,nrci!, (puav t-fi k. kc6tc6 >.iyoy (that is, ac-
cording to truth, which it is the ollice ofreafon todifcover). Anton. Nunqtiam almdx\\xiux:L, altud fapientia die it. Juv.
C 3. If
i^ The Religion ^Nature. Secfl. I.
2. If there is a fupreme being, upon whom the exiftence of the world de- pends j and nothing can be in it but what He either caufes, or permits tobej then to own things to be as they are is to own what He caufes, or at leaft permits, to be thus caufed or permitted: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His conftitution of the world, and to fubmit to His will, reveald in the , books of nature =". To do this thereJpore mufl: be agreeable to His will And if fo, the contrary mufl be difagreeable to it j and, {met (as we fhall find in due time) there is a perfed reditude in His will, certainly wrong.
I defire that I may not be mifunderfbood in refpecb to the aftings of wicked men. I do not fay, it is agreeable to the will of God, that w^at is /// done by them, fhouldbe/o donej /. e. that they fhould ufe their liberty ill: but I fliy, when they have done this and committed fome evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we fhould allow it to have been committed : or, it would be difiigreeable j
to His will, that we fhould deny it to have been committed. ^
As the owning of things, in all our condud, to be as they are^is dire£b obedi- ence ^ : fo the contrary, not to own things to be or to have been that are or have been, or not to be what they are, is dired rebellion againfl Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to fay, " God indeed caufes fuch a « thin^T to be, or at leafl permits it, and it is j or the relation, that lies be- " tween this and that, is of fuch a nature, that one may be affirmed of the o^ « ther ^c. this is true : but yet to me it (h^W not be fo : I will not indure it, " or aa as if it were fo : the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I mind « them, or what follows from them: even exiftence fliall be non-exiflence,, " when my pleafures require ". Such an impious declaration as this attends every voluntary infradion of truth.
4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any injiance or manner what- (bever, without contradiding axioms and truths eternal. For fuch are thefe : every thing is what it is 5 that which is done, cannot be undone j and the hke. And then if thofe truths be confiderd as having always fubfifted in the Divine mind, to which, they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himfelf, to do this is to a6b not only in oppofition to His^<?^*^r«»^^«/ ox foveraignty, but to His
» "eJ^«k£v [i ei\(] hr) ^iXra 'r y^-cTfj^c.. Chryf. ^ What Hierocks fays of his ^V-.V^i*. ©£•.
c<\ is true in refpeft of every thing. T J oU^ vcy^c^ KxrxK^Xn&^i^rm Wl rSro kvrU £'"«« r(^-iSK„ 5
vL^v^r.. There is a pafTage fomewhere in S. Iq^ar. much like this: where it is faid (as I remem-. bcr) that he, who worftips an Angel n n''bu; NilH HD nVD (as bims what he is, the mejfenger of eod) is not guilty of idolatry,
?}ature
Of dMoraJ Good and Evil. 1 5
nature " alfo : which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is mod right, muft alfo upon this account be moil wrong.
Pardon thefe inadequate ways of fpeaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning : which perhaps may be better reprefented thus. If there are fuch things as axioms^ which are and always have been immutably true, and confe- quently have been always known to God to be ^o '', the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either diredly or indire6tly, but the truth of the Divine know- ledge muft be denied too.
f . Defignedly to treat things as being what they are not is the ^^■xx.dk.pojjihle abilirdity. It is to put bitter for fweet, darknefs for light, crooked for ftreight, ^c. It is to fubvert all fcience, to renounce all fenfe of truth, and flatly to deny the exiftence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exift, if things are not what they are.
To talk to a/'fi»y?, or otherwife treat it as if it was a man^ would furely be reckond an abfurdity, if not diflra^ion ^. Why ? becaufe this is to treat it as being what it is not. And why fhould not theconverfe be reckond as bad) that is, to treat a man as a poft'^j as if he hadnoienfe, and felt not injuries, which he doth fcelj as if to him pain and forrow were not pain 3 happinefs nothap- pinefs. This is what the cruel and unjuft often do.
Lajlly^ to deny things to be as they are is a tranfgreflion of the great law of our nature^ the law of reafon. For truth cannot be oppofed, but reafon mull be violated. But of this more in the proper place.
Much might be added here concerning the amiable nature ^, and great force ^ of truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my felf, the leaft truth cannot be
» '1D1 n)DlM ^"ip3 n'npn. in Rejh. hhokm. Sc al. And S. Chryfojlom defines truth in the fame words, which philofophers apply to the Deity. 'AAii3-£<;t ro oym^ on- ^ 'aa».9-£<54 yi aVaJ*?
©£5. ph. Jud. ^ Un/jyvxi coi '<xv^^cci 'ix,oJv is in Soph, the chara<£ler of Ajax, when his
head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monflrous and mad extravagances of C. Ca- ligula one is, that he treated his horie Incitntus as a man. Suet. ^ Horace argues after the fame manner. Si quis leciica nit'idam geflare amet agnam; Huic 'vejiem, ut natae, paret,^c. Inter- dicio huic omne adiwat jus Frdtor, &c. ^Hid,J?qHis natam pro r/Jutd devovetagn-1. Integer efl: ani- mi? ne dixeris. If it be againft truth and nature to ufe a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much againft truth to ufe a daughter as a lamb. « Ka^' kvro ?; -i^vjS^ <pccZXoM yu -^ix-ror ro ■^ a-Xn^ic, KdXcy y^ iTroiivirsv. Arifl. Eji quiddam, quod fud 'vi nos dliciat c.d fefe, non emolumento cap- tans aliquo, fed trahens fun dignitate : quod genus, -virtus, fciemia, Veritas ejl. Cic. FXvku ii uXyB-uu. a feflival faying in Flut. ( o magna lis -veritatis, Sec. Cic. A good man HDi^H HU/iy flQN :s^in\y >3aO. Maim.
C i .contradiclcd
i6 The Religion of Nature, Sedl.I.
contmdided without much reludance ; even to fee other men difregard it does fomething more than difpleafe j it is Jhocking.
V. What has been [aid of a6is inconfiflent with truth^ may alfo be faid of many omijfions^ or negk^is to a^ : that is, by thefe aJfo true propofitions may be denied to be true 3 and then thofe omijfions^ by which this is done, mufi be wrong for the fame renfons with thofe affigned under the former propofition.
Nothing can be aflerted or denied by any a6t with regard to thofe things, to which it bears no relation : and here no truth can be affc6i:ed. And when ad:s do bear fuch relations to other things, as to be declaratory of fomething concerning them, this commonly is vifiblej and it is not difficult to determin, whether truth fuffers by them, or not. Some things cannot poffibly be done, but truth mull: be directly and pofitively denied j and the thing will be clear. But the cafes arifing from omaifTions are not always fo welldetermind, and plain: it is not always eafy to know when or how far truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude muil be allowd, and much mud be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.
This may be faid in general, that when any tmth would be denied by a£]:ing, the omitting to a6t can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth \ And there may be omiillons in other cafes, that are filent as to truth. But yet there isxt fome negkSis or refufals to aft, which are manifeftly inconfiftent with it (or, with feme true propofitions).
We before ^ fuppofed J to have engaged not to do fome certain thing, 6?^. if now, on the other fide, he fhouldbyfome folemn promife, oath, or other a6t undertake /£; do fome certain thing before fuch a time, and he voluntarily ^ omits to do it, he would behave himfelf as if there had been no fuch promife or en- gagement j which is equal to denying there was any : and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former infcance.
Again, there are fome ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, nature and truth are denied. If a man does not defire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his oivn nature and the n-ature and definition o£ happinefs to be what they are. And then further, willingly to negleft the means, leading to any fuch end, is the lame as not to propofe that end, and mull fall under the fame cenfure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and
^ P/«m vera (Ufcrepmla ejfe von fojfunt, Cic. ^ f- 10. * Obhv,me volnn-
iarin, Cic. ,
that
Oj Moral Good and Evil. 17
that may be confiderd as an ad, many omiflions of this kind may be turned over to the other fide ^^ and brought under the foregoing propofition.
It mufi: be confeft there is a difficulty as to the means, by which we are to confult our own prefervation and happinefs j to know what thole arc and what they are with rcfpecl to us. For our abihties and opportunities are not equal ; fome labor under difadvantages invincible : and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and efFeas in fuch an irregular dif- temperd world, and of thofe many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our meafures^ deprive us of certainty in thefe matters. But ftiU wc may judge as well as we can, and do what we can ^ 5 and the ncgled to do this will be an omiiTion within the reach of the propofition.
There are omifTions of other kinds, which will dcferve to be annumerated to thefe by being either total^ or notorious^ or upon the fcorc of fome other clrcimllance. It is certain I Ihould not deny the Pbmtifi^ of Euripides to be an excellent drama by not reading it : nor do I deny Chihil-menar to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to fee it. But Ihould I, having leifurcl health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in or- der to improve my mind^ and attain fuch knowledge as may be iifefid to me, I lliould then deny my mind to be what it is^ and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precifely, into what kind of lludies this rc- fpea to truth, will, carry a.man preferably to all others, how fir it will oblige him to continue his purfuit after knowledge, and where the difcontinuance begins to be no offence againil truth, he mull confult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himfelf ^j well as be can^. This is, one of thofe cafes which I faid before were not fo well determind. .
If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no parti- cular obligation, I do not by this deny them loh^poor^ anymore than I lliould deny a man to have a fqualid beard by not fhaving him, to be nally by not wafhing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.
Many things arc here to be taken into confideration (according to the next propofitionj : perhaps I might intrench upon truth hy. doing this^'i and then I cannot by not doing it^. But if I, being of abiUty to afford now and then lomething in charity to the poor, fliould yet ^;t'w;- give them any thing at all,
3 In the Civil Law he is faid to ad, who dees omit, ^ai non facit ^uod facere debet, -videtn, fecere advcrfus ea qu^ non facit. Dig. b ^^ ^^^j^^„ ^^^j-^^ .^^.^^ ^^^^ ^ J
ds.^oles: t^mdiu autem .elle debebu, quoad te, ^u,,nm ,^roJia.., non pcMit, fuys Cicero to bis Iva.. « 2^hUa, virtus virtuti cmtmrin eft. Sen.
lifhoulci;
i8 The Religion of Nature. SecSt. L
1 ilioiild then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is : and thus truth would be injured. So, again,
If I fhould not fay my prayers at fuch a certain hour^ or in fuch a ctix^in place and manner^ tliis would not imply a denial of the exiftence of God, His provi- dence, or my dependence upon Him : nay, there may be reafons perhaps againft that particular time, place, manner. But if I fliould never pray to Him, or worfliip Him at all, fuch a/o^^/omilTion would be equivalent to this affertion, 'There is no God, who governs the world^ to he adored: which, if there is fuch a be- ing, mull be contrary to truth. Alfo generally and notorioujly to negled this du- ty f permit me to call it (o) , tho not quite always, wnWfavor^ if not dire6bly proclaim the fame untruth . For certainly to v/orfhip God after this manner is on- ly to worfliip him accidentally^ which is to declare it a great accident that he is wor- ihipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is poffible to a total negle6t. Be- fide, fuch a fparing and infrequent v/orfhiper of the Deity betrays fuch an ha- bitual difregard of Him, as will render every religious a6b inlignificant and null.
Should I, in the lall place, find a man grievoufly hurt by fome accident, fliln down, alone, and without /-r^y^;?/ help Hke to perifli j or fee his' houfe on fire, no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him my ailiftance immediately, I do not do it at all: and by this refufing to do it accordino- to my ability, I deny his cafe to be what it is j human nature to be what it is j and even thofe defires and expeftations, which I am confcious to my felf I fhould have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.
VI. In order to judge rightly wlMt any thing iSj it mujl be confiderd not only ivhat it is in it felf or in one refpeEl^ but alfo what it may be in any other refpe5l, which is capable of being denied by fa^s or praSlice : and the whole defcription of the thing ought to he taken in.
If a man ftcals a horfe, and rides away upon him, he may be faid indeed by ridincT him to ufc him as a horfe., but not as the horfe of another man^ who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore confidcr him as being what he is, unleis he takes in the refpecSc he bears to his true owner. But it is not ncceflary perhaps to confidcr what he is in rcfpeft to his color, fliapc or age : be- caufc the thief's ridmg away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, is^c. I fay therefore, that thofe, and all thofe proper- ties, refpcfts, and circumflanccs, whicli may be contradicted by pradicc, are to he taken into confidcration. For otherwiic the thing to be confiderd is but -, im-
OfdMoral Good and Evil. 19
imperfe6tly furveyd j and the whole compafs of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is //^ part only, and in other re- fpe6ts perhaps as being luhat it is not.
If a rich man being upon a journey, fliould be robbed and flript, it would be a fecond robbery and injufticc committed upon him to take from him part of his then chara6i:er, and to confider him only as a rich man. His charac- ter completed is a rich man robbed and abufed^ and indeed at that time a poor man ^ and diftreft, tho able to repay afterwards the afliftance lent him.
Moreover a man in giving alTiftance of any kind to another fhould confider what his own circiun fiances are, as well as what the others are ^. If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it : but if he fhould give it, and by that deny his own or his flimily's circumftances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And fince (as I have obferved already) all truths are confident, nor can any rhino- be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true 3 when both parties are placed in a right light, and the c-x^c properly ftatcd for a judg- ment, the latter may indeed be truly fiid to want afliftance, but not the affiflancc of the former : any more than a man, who wants a guide, may bcfaid to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what the latter is with refpect to the former.
The cafe becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under fome promife or compaU to affift another (B), and at the fime time bound to confult his own happinefs, provide for his family, {^c. and he cannot do thefe, if he docs that, effeSlually. For what muft A do? Here are not indeed oppofite truths^ but there are truths on oppoUte ftdes. I anfwer : tho there cannot be two incom- patible duties, or tho two inconfiftent acts cannot be both A's duty at the fame time (for then his duty would be an impoffibility) j yet an obligation, which I will call mixt^ may arife out of thok differing conllderations. A fhould aflill B ; buty^, as not to neglect himfelf and family, ^c. and fo to take cai'e of himfelf and family, as not to forget the other ingagement, as ivell ami ho- nejily as he can. Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other fide fhould be diligently compared : and there mufl in fuch cafes be always, fome exception or limitation underllood. It is not in man's power to promife
» nyvy nm^n >3y .• according to that determination in a cafe fomething like this, which occurs in Talm. Mnjf. The. ^ Uirique Jimul confidendum eft. JOabo t^enti ; fed ut ipfe nonegeumy See.
Sen. Ita te c.Uorum m'lfirefcat, ne ttti alios mifereat. PIaut>
ahfolutely.
20 The Religion of Nature. Se61:. I.
^«#r ahfolutety. He can only promife as one, who may be difahkd by the weight and incumbency of truths not then exifting.
I could here infert many inflances of /^^r/i^/ thinking, which occur in au- thors : but I fhall choofe only to fet down one in the margin ^
In fhort, when things are truly eftimated, perfons concerned, iimes^ places '', ends intended ^^ and effeSls that naturally follow, mull be added to them.
VII. JVhen any a£l would be wrongs the forbearing that aEi muft he right : likewife when the omijjlon of any thing would be wrongs the doing of it (i. e. not emittin"- it) nnift be right, Becaufe contrariorum contraria eji ratio.
VIIL Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. For that cannot be good, which is wrong 5 nor that evil, which is right.
IX. Every ad: therefore of fuch a beings as is before defer ibed., and all thofe omiffions which interfere with truth (;.<?. deny any propofition to be true, which is true 5 or fuppofe any thing not to be what it is, in any regard ^j are morally evil infome degree or other : the forbearing fuch a&s, and the a5ling in oppofition to fuch omiffions are morally good : and when any thing may he either done^ or not done., equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.
I would have it to be minded well, that when I fpeak of acts inconfiftent v/ith truth, I mean any truth j any true propofition whatfoever, whether con- taining matter of fpeculation, or plain foct. I would have every thing taken to be what in fad and truth it is ^
a Sextusl.mp. feems tabe fond of that filthy faying of Zem, in relation to what is ftoried of focetlin and Oedipus : (J^a 'kroTrov wot,t to y^o^lw xiiis f/yir^U r^.'^'e'.f, x.X. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. .Here only r^i-^n is confiderd j as if all was nothing more, hut hardy r^i-^^i ; but this is an incomplete idea of the ad. For r^Z-vJ^j? ^ y.c^i'a is more than 7^/4.^5 by itfclf: and r^r^i? ^ y^c^^a -^ yr:;i^k is ftiH more : and certainly r^.'^sr/ ri^v ^»^* rj? ;t;"f' is a different thing from rj/b^ to ji/.oj/ov rJ jj^oeu-^, &c. He might as well have faid, that to ruha red hot piece of iron with one's bare hand is the fame as to rub one that is cold, or any other innocent piece of matter : for all is but r^A'^'i. Thus men, affefting to appear free-thinkers, fhew themfclves to be but half-thinkers, or lefs : they do not take in the whole of that which is to be confiderd. ^ Sunt res quddam ex tempore, ^ ex confilio, non ex fMnatura conJ!derand&. — ^uidtemporape. tant, mt quul perfonis dignum/it, conftderandum e,7, 8cc. Cic. -" 06 A/ysK tp^XcTtom r 2^^ ^a:-
^io-Apioy ^y^vzyivrci. Arr. Amico Agra alic^nis pffidet: probamus. at hoc fi hdrcditatis causa facit, •vultur ejh cadaver expeciat. Sen. ^ OJ '>^^ ik ^^^<r,k h^ r^o7^<^. Chryf. = Ti k^^t.^c, t
Of Moral Good and Evil it
It may be of ufe alfo to remember, tliat I have added tliofe Avords in fome 4egree or other. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are ecjuai ^ I'hole truths which they refpect, tho they are equally true, may comprife matters of very different importance ^ -, or more truths may be violated one way than another ^ : and then the crimes committed by the violation of rhcm may be c- qually f one as well as the other j fxid to be crimes, but not equal crimes '*, If A Heals a book from B which was pleafing and ufeful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B", who is the proprietor of it, and one whofe happinefs partly depends upon it : but flill if A Ihould deprive B oi ^ good efiate^ of v/hich he v/as the true own- er, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we fuppofe the book to be worth to him one pound, and the ejdate looool. that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated i oooo times by rob- bing him of his eflatc. It is the fame as to repeat the theft of one pound I oooo times over : and therefore if i oooo thefts (^or crimes) are more, and all together greater thim one, one equal to loooo mufl be greater too : greater than that, which is but the looooth part of it, fure. T'be^., tho the conve- nience and innocent pleafure, that B found in the ufe of the bookj was a degree of happinefs ; yet the happinefs accruing to him from the f/?^/(r, by which he was fupplied not only with neceffaries, but alfo with many other comforts and harmlefs injoyments, vaftly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former cafe was, B had a property in that^ which gave him fuch a degree of happinefs : that violated in the latter, B had a property in that^ which gave him ajoappinefs vaftly fuperior to the other. The violation therefore in the latter cafe is upon this account a vaftly gi-eater violation than in the former. Lafly^ the truths violated in the former cafe might end in B, thofe in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his fmiily, who fubfift alfo by the e fate., and
^ Notwithflanding that paradox of the Stoics, "Ori I'a-x t«s kujciiTy.u^ciTci, ^^ rli KciTe^B-af/jes.Tci, Ap. Cic.Vltit. Biog. L. 0> al. which might eafily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. . For if finning belike paffing ah'ne, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, /o/?? being equal to going beyond thcit line, to go more (or farther) beyond that line mufl be to lin more. Who £cci
not the falfity of that, nee bono -viro meliorem, 7i-ec forti fortiorem, nee fcpieiite fapientiorem pojfg
fieri? And fo on. Nullum inter fcelus ^ erratum difcrimen facere (as S. Hier. exprefTes their opi- nion: if thatepiftle to Celantia be his) is to alter ordeftroy the natures of things. ^ Sure that V/iie- man was but a bad accountant, whoreckond, rv* itjiyl^Lu ia-wj 'hcziQo!.>.av, ^^-c.^^^^yXy fAUvQr/.^^Qx7)xivsii. Ap. Vint. c This is confcft in Cic. Illud intereft, quod infcrvo necando, fi adft injuria, fe-
msl peccatur : in patris zita lioLmdci mu'ta, peccantur. Sec. Multitudin? peccatorum pnfiat, &c. '^ This may ferve for an anfwer to Chryfpfus, and them who fay, h aXo^U UM^Si fju'^x\ov chc sVjx, ioi ysyJ^i^ •vf^JJa?- liTUi iih k-!>o(,~n ei7r<»ry)i i^l uiAioi^ryii/jcs. ci[Ji/cifTKiJitx,T<S>^, 'aX, Ap.Diog.L.
D are
22 The Religion of Nature.' Se6l.L
are to be provided for out of it. And thefe truths are very many in refpect of every one of them, and all their defcendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the importance and number of truths violated ■'. I fhall only add, on the other fide, that the value of good actions will rife at lealt in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omifHon of them : and that therefore they cannot be e^uaJ^ any more than the oppofitc evil omiffions.
But let us return to that, which is our main fubjecb, the diflindfion between moral good and evil. Some have been fo wild as to deny there is any fuch thing : but from what has been faid here, it is manifefl:, that there is as cer- tainly moral good and evil as there is true and falfe -, and that there is as natural and immutable a difference between thofe as between thefe^ the difference at the bottom being indeed the llime ^. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil 5 but they want fome criterion^ or mark, by the help of which they might know them afunder. And others there are, who pretend to have found that rule, by which our actions ought to be fquared, and may be difcriminated ; or that ultimate endj to which they ought all to be refer- red'^: but what they have advanced is either filfe, or not fufHciently guarded, or not comprehenflve enough, or not clear and firm \ or (^o far as it is juft) re- ducible to my rule. For
They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call honejium ^, may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the caufe^or ends of them : but then what is honejium^? Something is flill wanting to meaflire things by, and to feparate the honefla from the inhonefta.
They who place all in following nature ', if they mean by that phrafe acting according to the natures of things (that is^ treating things as being what they
» ^ueis tar in ejfe fere placuit peccata, lttbora7it Cum vent urn advernm ejl : fenfus tnorefque repug- nant, Atque ipfii utilitas.HoT. ^ Therefore they, who denied there was either good or evil {<puiri kytc'^^v % Kcxov), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to fay there was nothing in na- ture either rr«e or /^//e. V. Scxt. Emp. 8c Diog.L. <^ ^/W [extremum, J. ultimum fconorum] omnium philofophorumfententid tale debet ejfe, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat : ipfiim autem nufquam . Cic. ^ There was among the old philofophers fuch an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the fnes bonorum & maloru^, that if F^rro computes rightly, the number might be raifed to iSS. S.Aiig. « ^uod honejium eft, id bonnm folum habendum eft. Cato ap. Cic. ^ ^ui [omnes'] permulta ob
tl^,imam caufam/}?fw«? quia honeftum eft. Cic. § It is commonly placed among cK</i : and
is confiderd as fuch in thofe ways of fpcaking } honeftum ejfe propter fe expetendum, Cic. Finem bono- rum ejfe honefte vi-vere, ib. and the like. '• To fay, ^uodlaudabile eft, omne honeftum e(l. or any
thing like that, is to fay nothing. For how fhall one know what is truly laudabile; ^ ^ ' T£A(^ il;rt [Znvav'] to o,w,oAoyx^V*'5 (^L «'C9>-S'^wO r jj (puiri ^v, i'.TSf sVi' iistr' U^ir^v 0"- "A'/i ^ ^rpW t»ut1>m iiUjoci y, (2>j(rii. Di02. L.
4 ^"
0/ Moral Good and Evil. 23
in nature are, or according to truth j fay what is right. But this does not feem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man muft follow his own nature % lince his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will miflead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational parr. At beft this talk is loofe.
They who make right reafon ^ to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them lawful or unlawful^ good or bad, lay fomething more particular and precife. And indeed it is tme, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reafon, is right j and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reafon ismeautthat which is found by the right ufe of our rationalfaculties, this is the fame with truth : and what is faid by them, will be comprehended in what I have faid. But the manner in which they have deliverd themfelves, is not yet explicit enough «=. It leaves room for fo many difputes and oppoftte right-reafons^ that nothing can be fettled, while every one pretends that his reafon is right. And befide, what I have faid, extends ferther : for we are not only to refpeit thofe truths, which we difcover by reafoning, but even fuch matters offa6l, as are fairly difcoverd to us by our fenfes. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way foever we come to the knowledge of them.
They, who contenting themfelves with fuperficial and tranfient views, de- duce the difference between good and evil from the common fenfe of mankind \ and cciXiiin principles ^ that are born with us ^, put the matter upon a very ififirm foot. For it is much to be fufpc6ted there are no fuch innate maxims as they pretend, but that the impreflions of education are miftaken for them: andbe- lide that, the fentiments of mankind are not fo uniform and conjiant^ as that we may fifely truil fuch an important diftindion upon them §.
• Vizere ex hominis natura. Cic. It is true he adds, undique perfecia ;^ nihil requirente: but thofe words have either no meaning, or fuch as will not much mend the matter. For what is natura un- iiique perfeSla ^ nihil requirens ? Befide, moral religion doth not confift in following nature already per- feft, but by the pradice of religion v/e aim at the perfeding of our natures. ^ Celebrated
every V/here. '^ Tap^ kn htm ^ie^iTax,^ la-c, ctyu^^'xi 7r«c«|^5, ra^ Kccra. T e'*S-ov ytvor^cc^ Xoyov,
^ Tas? recij^ac? rivot'JTiov, u.Xri^ic,'p:, cvy, W* '•;)iKcmv TX.<;z^cizic, (nyixvxi. Andr.Rh. ^ Necfolum
jus ^ injuria a natura dijudicatur, fed omnino omnia honefia ^■> turpia. Na?n communis jntelligenti.% nobis not as res efficit, eafque in anifnis no/Iris inchoavit, ut honejia in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Cic. V^^iT^ici'^ (pi',tnv [ o Xf :''(r<ir;T©- ] wen cuSjwtv ^^ 7r^o>,ri-^tv. Diog. L. * They are ufiially
Called principia nature, lex (or leges) natur&, TreoXyf^ii, x-otvui, or (pva-iKni sv^oicst, v'tfjj^ (poTtxi;, &c. f The fet of theie pradical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is, what, I think, goes liy tlx name of Synterefis. f Unzquxque gens hoc legem natura putat, quod didicit. Hieron.
D z They,
24 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. I.
They, who own nothing to be good hut pleafure, or what they cxWjucundumy nothing evil but pain % and diftinguifh things by their tendencies to this or that ^y do not agree in what this pleafure is to be placed ^, or by what methods and act- ings the moflofitmaybeobtaind. Thefe are left to be queftions ftill. As men have different tafis, different degrees of fenfe and philofophy, the fame thing cannot be pleafant to all : and if particular anions are to be proved by this teft, the morality of them will be veiy uncertain 5 the fame a6t may be of oi^e nature to one man, and of another to another. Befide, unlefs there be fome ilrong limitation added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to fink into grofs voluptuoufnefs, as in fad the generality of Epicurush herd have done ^ ( notwithlknding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, ^c.) \ and the bridle will be ufurped by thofe appetites which it is a principal part of all religion, natural as well as any other, to curb and reflrain. So thefe men fay what is intelligible indeed : but what they f^iy is falfe. For not all pleafures, but only fuch pleafure as is ?r^;/^, orhappinefs (of which afterwards) ^ may be reckond among the fineSy or ultima honor um.
He % who, having confiderd the two extremes in mens pra6tice-, in condemn- ing both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the middky^nd feems to raife an idea of it from its fituation at an equal diftance from the oppofite extremes ^,
» Under which word thefe delicate men comprehend Uior. When Epicurus, in Lucian, is asked, Ka-
rcv v^y^r TTovovi heanfwers, N«i'. And Mindyrides (S/Atvi^v^tJij?, a^. Herod, 'oc, IxiTtXu'ro)! ^i x.>'i^hik^- ' np I'.Tiiy.iTc ) proceeded fo far in his averfion to labor, that ejus latus alieno labore condoluit— : qui cum lidijfet fodientem, & a hi us rajirtm allevantem, lajfumfe fieri (^^yfi>ec,XxQiT», in Athen.) que/tus vetuit iUurti opHS in cofifpeSu fnofacere. Sen. ^ Adh^c [voluptatem, & dolorem] ^ qu&fequamur,
t^ qudfugiamus, refert omnia [Arifiippus]. Cic. <= Velim definias, quid fit -voluptAs: de quo
emnis hAc qu^ftio eft. Cic. Thedifputes about pleafure between t)^cCyrenaics, Epicurus, Hieronymus« Sec. are well known : whether the end was pleafure of body or mind : whether it was -volnptas in mo- tu, or inftatu (ftabilitate); qu£ fuaviiate cJiquanaturam ipfam mcvet, or quA percipitur, omnidolo- re detrafio; '< <^ >^iy^H, or i KocTwr^f^^oinyJ^, Sec. Cic. Diog. L. 8c al. ** Negat Epicurus ju-
tunde -vivi pojfe, mfi cum -virtute vivntur. Cic. But for all that their pleafures have not continued to be always like thofe in the little gardens of Gargettus. Nor indeed do they feem to be very vir- tuous even there. For Epicurus not only had his Leontium (or, as he amorouQy called her, Aiovtx- fio:;) a famous harlot; but llie ■s-Sr/rsror^'Ea-j^ca^f/ei? trwYiv ci Tclc, jcij^rs*?. Atben. And in bis book «fS* Ts^ia? he is faidto have written thus, Oo^V/oifi i^wri voy.a-iKi rkyuSlv, k<^xi^m p: rue, 2^ x^^^' (Ai»- >,Sy, Athen.) v^omc,, iicpcctgojv ^ y^ t«? ^' u<p^oh(!-(&>v, r.X. See this and more in Diog.L. * St
Jerom ufes the pliiral number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. Thilofephor^m fentenM-
kffiio-cv iTi-cciVu'^ .■ ^'E^iv u^oc y.k^irv) 'ihe, TTPncn^iriicyi, cv fJjiTor^i, itru,, xtA. M£r«T'/}5 y ouo xxjciat' 'f
fH^ xssfl' iWj^^o^.n'y 4--^Kct,r 6»^-^iv. Arift. Perliaps Tythagoras (and after him Tlato, and others), when he faid (a^. Disg. L.) rnv U{iTY,v Ufii^mei^ ilnti might have fome fuch thought as this.
eouM;
Of Moral Good and Evil. 25
could only defign to be underftood of fuch virtues, as have extremes. It muft be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward either extreme, muft be fo far wrong or evil j and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) di- vides the diflance, and declines »^i/>[Yr way, muji be right: alfo, that this not io-a fupplies us with a good diredfion for common ufe in many cafes. But then there are feveral obhgations, that can by no means be derived from it : fcarce more than fuch, as refpeft the virtues couched under the word moderation. And even as to thefe, it is many times difficult to difcern, which is the middle point \ This the author himfclfwasfenfibleof f*.
And when his mailer Plato makes virtue to confiil in fuch a likenefs to God % as we are capable of (and God to be the great exemplar)^ he fiys what I fliall not difpute. But fince he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likenefs, we are little the wifer in point of pradice : unlefs by it we un- derftand the pradice of truth,God being truth^and doing nothing contrary to it =*.
Whether any of thofe other foundations, upon which morality has been built will hold better than thefe mentiond, I much queftion. But if the formal ratio of moral good and evil be made to coniill in a conformity of mens acts to the trutb of the cafe or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the diftinmon feems to be fettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, praaicablc. For as what is meant by a true propofit ion and matter of fa£t is perfedly underftood by every body j fo will it be eafy for any one, fo far as he knows any fuch propofitions and fads, to compare not only words^hut alfo anions with them. A very little skill and attention will ferve to interpret even thefe, and difcover whether they^^^^y^ truth, or not ^
X. If there he moral good and e'vil, dijiinguifjd as before, there is religion -y and fuch as may mofi properly hefiyled natural By religion I mean nothing elfe but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend ads both of body and mind. 1 fay, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to for bear what ought not to be
* When he iays, it muft be taken kVw? m «!- o o§3-c? Asy©- !rfor«|j?, it is not by that afcertaind. See before. b OJ ^ p'^j^ev ^locja-at to ttZc, y^ ri<r:, kX. Therefore R. Albo might havefparcd
that cenfure, where he blames him for expreiTing himfelf too generally, when he fays, ii>i~)U/ IDD, ^1&<"^n Cmpom ""l^in ny:ai without telling him what that manner, time, place is. = That
man, fays he, cannot benegleded, who endeavours ^<x«j©- y/j^joS^, y^ hirnh'Sun It^irlyj, in ca-ov JW» Toy uv^^^~c!> cff^oii^ 5-sJ, And in another place, our <ptyi c^j^iA is ifj^olaxrKi S-^? y-ora to ^wuctroi Zt.Auguffmiccms to agree with him, in that fentence of his, Religionisfnmma ejlimitari quem colis[ d Uvirayo^ca i^UTriB-iU, tI 7roiH(nv uvB-(6)zci ^i) ofjijowj, 'i(p/i, lav kX/iivjua-i. Stob. e 1 here is
«crtainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which Cicero feems to fuppole, v^hen he fays, CmfttetHdo exerc'ttatioque cuftenda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiornm ejfe p^mns.
1 done^
2^ The Religion of Nature. Sec?). I.
done. So that there muftbe religion, if there are things, of which fome ought not to be done, fome not to be omitted. But that there are fuch, appears from what has been faid concerning moral good and evil : becaufe that, which to omit would be evil,and which therefore being done would be good or well done,ought certainly by the terms to be done j and fo that, which being done would be evil,and implies fuch abfurdities and rebellion againft the fupreme being, as are mentiond under propofition the IVth. ought moil undoubtedly not to be done. And then fince there is religion^ which follows from the diftinftion between moral good and evil i fmce this diftindion is founded in the refpecl,which mens ads bear to truth 5 and fince no propofition can be true, which exprefles things otherwife than as they are in nature : fmce things are fo, there mull be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be moll properly and truly called the religion of nature or natural religion ; the great la'W of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we fliall afterwards find reafon to call it) of the Author of nature is,
XI. that every intelligent^ aSlive^ and free being jJoould fo behave himfelf^ as by no a£l to contradict truth 3 or, thathefiould treat everything as being what it is''.
Obje6lions I am fenfible may be made to almoll any thing •'' j but I believe none
to what has been here advanced but fuch as may be anfwerd. For to confider a
thing as hdng fomething elfe than what it is, or (which is theflime) not to confider
it as being what it is, is an abfurdity indefenfible. However, ior ^fpcimen^ I will
fet down a few. Let us fuppofc fome gentleman, who has not fufficiently confiderd
thefe matters, amidfl his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after fome
fuch manner as this. " If every thing mufl be treated as being what it is, what
'' rare work will follow ? For, i . to treat my enemy as fuch is to kill him, or re-
" venge my felf foundly upon him. 2. To ufe a creditor^ who is a fpend- thrift, or
" one that knows not the ufe of money, or has no occafion for it, as /s^f^, is not to
" pay him. Nay further, 3. If I ijoant money ^ don't I a6t according to truth, if I
" take it from fome body elfe to fupply my own wants ? And more, do not I a6l
" contrary lo truth^ if I do not ? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a deftgn
" of killing another, or doing him fome great mifchief, if he can find him, fliould
" ask mc where he is, and I know where he is -, may not I, to fwe life, fay I do
" not know, tho that be £ilfe? f . At this rate I may not, in zfroUck^ break a
'^ glafs, or burn a book : becaufe forfooth to ufe thefe things as being what they
* what it is in nature, ^i)^xy HD ^3^, to ufe Maim.'s words. And thus that in Arriar.us is true^ No|t*®-/34WT(x.o? sViv 8Tf^, TO ctM^isB-o* Tj? (ptfV^ TTpxTiiv. Ownt tit TB quid ft VBr't, v'tdere ^ tueri de- cet. Cic. This is indeed the way of truth. *> Becaufe there is fcarce any thing, which one
or other will not fay. ^uid mm poteji did de illo, cnu nigrum dixit ejfe nivem, ^c, l.ad.
r-. arc*
Of Moral Good and Evil. 27
^« are, is to drink out of the one, not to break it j and to read the other, not " burn it. Laftly^ how Ihall a man know what is true : and if he can find out " truth, may he not want the power of a6bing agreeably to it ? '*
To the firj} objedion it is eafy to reply from what has been already faid. For if the objedor's enemy, whom we will call E, w^s mtbif?g more thm his ene- my, there might be feme force in the objc6tion -, but fmce he may be con- iidcrd as fomething elfe belide that, he muil be ufed according to what he is in other refpeds, as well as in that from whicH he is denominated the ob- jcdor's (or O'sj enemy. For E in thefirft place is Timanj andasfuchmay claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is : and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very fenfible part. And then if O and E arc fellow-citizens, living under the fame government, and fubjed to laws, which are fo many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, eftatc, i^c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unlefs he treats him alfo as one, who by common confent is under fuch a protcdion. If he does otherwife, he denies the exigence of the forcfaid laws and public compads : contraiy to truth. And befide, O fhould act with refpect to himfelf^s being what he is -, a man himfelf, in fuch or fuch circumftances, and one who has given up all right X.O private revenge (for that is the thing meant herej. If truth there- fore be obferved, the refult will be this. O muft treat E as fomething com- pounded of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three : that is, he mufl only profecutc him in fuch a way, as is agreeable to the ftatutes and methods, which the fociety have obliged themfelves to obfene. And even as to legal profecutions, there may be many things flill to be confiderd. For E may fhew himfelf an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are fuch things, as really affect the fafety or happinefs of O or his nimily, then he will find him- felf obliged, in duty and fubmifiion to truth, to take refuge in the laws 3 and to puniih E, or obtain fatisfiction, and at leafl fecurity for the future, bv the means there prcfcribed. Becaufe if he does not, he denies the nature ^i\d fenfe of happinefs to be what they are 5 the obligations, which perhaps we iTiall fhew hereafter he is under to his family % to be what they are j a dangerous and wicked enemy to be dangerous and wicked j the end of laws,.and fociety itfclf, to be the fafety and good of itsmembers,by preventing injurieSjpunifiiing offenders, C^^-.
* Conveniet cum in dzndo munifictim ejjfe, turn in exigerjJo Kon acerhum • a litibus I'erb quan- tum Itceat, 1^ nefcio an paulo plus etiam c^uam Itceat, abhorremem. Habenda eft autem ratio rci
fiimiliaris, qimn qnidem dilabi fnere fiagiticfum eft. Cic.
which
28 The Religion of Nature^ Sed. L
which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity ofE rifes not beyond trifling, or more tokrabk inilances. then O might a6l againll truth, if he iliould be at more charge or hazard in profecuting E than he can afford, or the thing loft or in danger is worth 5 fhould treat one that is an enemy in lit- tle things, or a little enemy, as a great one ; or fliould deny to make fome al- lowances, and forgive fuch peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it necefiary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. Laflljy in cafes, of which the laws of the place take no notice^ truth and nature would be fufliciently obferved, ifO fliould keep a vigilant eye upon the fleps of his adverfiry, and take the moft pudent meafures, that are compatible with the character of a private perfon, cither to afTwage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it i or perhaps, if he fhould only tiot ufe him as a friend ^ For this if he iliould do, notwithftanding the rants of fome men, he would cancel the na- tural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.
The debtor in the fecond objedion, if he acts as he fiys there, does, in the firft place, make himfclf the judge of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy fentence, an incapacity in effc<5t of having any eftate, or any more eflate. In the next place, he arrogates to himfelf more than can be true : that he perfectly knows, not only what his creditor and his circumftances are^ but alfo what they ever will be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwife. yind, which is to be confiderd above all, he dire6tly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it \sfuppofed to be owing or due to him (otherwife he is no creditor) : and if it be due to him, he has a right to it : and if he has a right to it, of right it is his (or, it xshis). But the debtor by detaining it ufes it, as if iL was his own, and therefore not the other's j contrary to truth. To pay a man what is due to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him ex- travagant, ^c. or any other tmth 3 that act has no fuch ligniiication. It only iignifics, that he who pays thinks it due to the other, or that it is his : and this it naturally doth fignify. For he might pay the creditor v/ithout having any other thought relating to him, but would not without this.
Anf. to objection the 3d. A6ting according to truth, as that phrafe is ufed in the obieftion, is not the thing required by my rule > but,fo ro act that no truth may be denied by any ad. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbe-arancc, which does not fignify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it denies that to be his, which fby the fuppofition)
is
Of ijMoral Good and Evil. 29
If; his. The former is only as it were filence, which denies nothing : the lat- ter a dirc6t and loud aflertion of a flilfity j the former what can contradi<Sb no truth, becaufe the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extra- vagance and vice, there can be no pretence for making another man to pay io^ his wickednefs or folly. We will fuppofe therefore the man, who v/ants mo- ney, to want it for necejfaries^ and to have incurred this wantthroughfome?»n" fortune^ which he could not prevent. In this cafe, which is put as ftrong as can be for the objc<Stor, there are ways of exprefling this want, or afting ac- cording to it, without trefpafTing upon truth. The man may by honeft labor and induftiy feek to fupply his wants j or he may apply as a fupplicant ^, not as •an enemy or robber, to fuch as can afford to relieve him j or if his want is very prefiing, to the firft perfons he meets, whom truth will oblige to aiTift him ac- cording to their abilities : or he may do any thing hut violate truth ^ ; which is a privilege of a vaft fcope, and leaves him many rcfources. And fuch a beha- viour as this is not only agreeable to his cafe, and expreflive of it in a way that is natural i but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not idi thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himfelf without the vio- lation of truth (which can fcarce be fuppofed. If there is no other way) he mull e'en take it as his fate ^. Truth will be truth, and mud retain its charac- ter and force, let his cafe be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved Iccl. vi. to have a right to defend himfelf and his, and not fuffer it to be taken from him j per- haps he may ftand as much in need of it, as the other, i^c.
Anf. to obj. the 4th. It is certain, in the firfi place, that nothing may wil- lingly be done, v/hich in any manner promotes murder : whoever is acceflary to that, offends againft many truths oi great weight. 2. You are not obliged to anfwer the furiofo\ queflion. Silence here would contradi6l no truth. 3. No one can tell, in ftri6t fpeaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may truly deny, that you know where the man is. Lajlly^ if by not difcovering him you fhould indanger your life (and this is the hardell circumllance, that can be taken into the obje6lion), the cafe then would be the lame, as if the inquirer fliould fay, " If you do not murder fuch a one, I will murder you. " And then be fure you muil not commit murder j but mufl defend your felf againft this, as againfl other dangers, againfl Banditi, ^c. as li-ell as you can. Tho' merely to deny truth by "ijuords (I mean, when they
* To 7!ir^o:^ one oi/jo>^oyiui thI ctiV^ov, li^as M»>i :^a.(p£i'y<iv i^'/t;; xl'^uv. Thucyd. ^ For s^yof
y isS'it lyi^^. Hef. ^ Skum cuique huomfnodura fere-ndum e/ potius, quam de a Iter ins com'
mgdis detmhendum, Cic. According to ilato, a iiun liiould cJioofe to die /rg 0 ? ka\i.i7v.
E are
go The Religion of Nature. Se(5l. L
are not produ6i:ive of fa6ls to follow -, as in judicial tranfactions, bearing wit- tiefs, or pairing fcntence) is not equal to a denial by /^^^j tho an abufe of lan- guage is allowable in this cafe, if ever in any j tho all fins againfl tmth are not equal, and certainly a little trefpaillng upon it in the prefent cafe, for the .good of all parties % as little a one as any j and tho one might look on a manr jn fuch a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a man but a mad wan: yet truth \s facred^^ and there are other ways of coming off with inno- cence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in afliftance, or taking the advantage of fome feafonable incident '^.
The f th objeSiion ieems to refpe6t inanimate things, which if we muft treat ac- cording to what they are, it is infinuated we fiiall become obnoxious to many tri- fling obligations > fuch as are there mentiond. To this I anpwer thus. If the glafs be nothing elfe but an ufeful drinking-glafs, and thefe words fully exprels what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is oc- cafion and it is truly ufeful, and to break it defignedly is to do what is wrong '^o For that is to handle it, as if it neither was ufeful to the objedor himfelf, nor could be fo to any one elfe j contrary to the defcriptionof it. But if there be any Teafon for breaking the glafs, then fomething is wanting to declare fully what it is. ks^ if the glafs be poifond : for then it becomes ^ pi fond drinking-glafs^ and to break or deftroy it is to ufe it according to this true defcription of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the lofs of it, it becomes a glafs with that circimflance : and then for the objedor to break It, if it be his own, is to ufe it according to what it is. And if it fhould become by fome circumlfance ufelefs only, tho there fiiould be noreafon for breaking it, yet if there be none againft it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. , This anfwer, mutatis mutandis^ may be adapted to other things of this kind j looks J or any thing cifc. As the ufefulnets or excellence of fome books renders them worthy of immortafity, and of all our care tofccurethem to pofterity^j fo fome may be ufcd more like wliat they are, by tearing or bimiing them,
a Our« -^ ieclfc^ voo-^tu, llocTixru., ;^ J'ai/jv ^AV Mitx. Tyr. ^ To that queftion, Si
quis ad te confugiat^ qui mendacio tuo pjjh a morte Itberar'i., non es raenttturus ? S. Aupn anfwera in the negative, and concludes, Ke"iat nt wtnquanJ bommentiantur.—. — Quanta fortius, quanta excel- lentth dices, necprodam, necmentinr. " In fuch prefllng c:x{es, under immment danger, the
v/orld is wont to make great allowances. Cue Ui%^oii liyji ^2ru, ru i\/y^^n A/y^ j oJx, £4 70 c-»>e^-
mi yt ri ^iU^®^ (pi^^. Soph. Even they, who fay nU;yQ3 "imy nblflD nn^'j; nWH, and '^^2'^b y 'O
«rjby-i ^b^on ^b'^^ii nnN, and ;"y "imy i^rj^:^ npvirQn, fay alfo imD oibu; a^wb bn^ji.
S. Hhared (& aL pajf.). And AL Ezra f.ys of Ahraha?n, T]y^r] -J-.W ^S2 anmn ibc^D^J nm. In (hort, fome have permitted, in defperatSr cafes, mendacio tanqmm veneno uti. Sext. Pythag. ** 1:31 inDnn vbD ^:2\vb-—-^'D^. S. HL%f. f who doth aot dctell th^t thought of Cali-
gula de Hoineri canniniiHs abolendis, 8cc ? Suet, ^"^^^
Of tjMoral Good and Evil. gt
than by prefei-ving or reading them; the number of which, large enough ah-ea- dy, I wifh you may not think to be increafcd by this, which I here fend you.
Here /wo things ought to be regarded, i . That tho to a6t againll: truth in any cafe is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in fome cafes the importance one way or t'other may be lo Httle as to render the crime cjanefcent or almofl nothing ^ And, 2. that inanimate beings cannot be con- fiderd as capable of wrong treatment, if the refped they bear to living bein^rs is- feparated from them. The drinking-glafs before mentiond could not be confiderd as fuch, or be what it now is, if there was no drinking animal to ow^n and ufc it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it felf, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what fuch thino-s are we muft' take them as being what they are in reference to things that have life.
The lail and moft material ohjetiion^QX quejiion rather, {hall be anfiverdhy and by. In the mean time I fliall only fiy, that if in any particular cafe truth is inacceffible and after due inquiry it doth not appear w/;^/, oyIjow things are, then this will be true, that the cafe or thing under confideration is doubtful : and to ad ao-reeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor bbftinate, but modell, cautious do- cile, and to endeavour to be on the fafer fide. Such behaviour fliews the cafe to be as it is. And as to the want of power to ad agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made : and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour he may take to himfelf the fatisftdion, which he will find in kd:. IV.
S E c T. 11. Of Happinefs.
■^HAT, which demands to be next confiderd, is happinefs ; as being in it felf moll: confiderable j as abetting the caufe of truth 3 and as being indeed fo nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the refpeds due to one, unlefs we regard the other. Happinefs mufi: noc be denied to be what it is : and it is by the pradice of truth that we aim at that happinefs, which is true. In the few following propofitions I fiiallnot only give you my idea of it, but alfo fubjoin fome obfervations^ which tho perhaps not neceffaiy here, we may fome- time hereafter think no lofs of time or labor to have made en pafjant : fuch as
» The Sto'scs muft certainly therefore be much too fcrupulous, when they affirm (if they were fa carneft), that i-A r ^k%T^Xf>v 'w, 'iTvx.i o-aXiviv ?» (ro<P'^ i A^y©- i7rir^i;ri. Clem. Alex. EipeciaJJy iince tliis is, at leafl ordinarily, a thing perfcdly indifferent by pr. ix.
E i men
g2 The Religion of Nature. Sed. II.
men of fcience would call, fome of them porifmata^ or corollaries, and fome fchoUa^ I {hall take them as they fall in my way promifcuoufly.
I. Pleafure is a confcioufnefs offomethtng agreeable^ pain of the contrary : 6c v. v, the confcioufnefs of any thing agreeable is pleafure^ of the contrary pain. For as no- thing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the fame time, andasfuch^ nor a- ny thing difagreeable pleafant, by the terms j fo neither can any thing agreeable be for ihat reafon (^becaufe it is agreeable j not pleafant, nor any thing difagree- able not painful, in fome meafure or other.
Obf I. Pkafures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions andfenfe of their Jubjc5is^ or the per fons affected with them. For confcioufnefs and perception cannot be feparated • becaufe as I do not perceive what I am not confcious to my felf I do perceive, fo neither can I be confcious of what I do not perceive, or of more or lefs than what I do perceive. And therefore, fince the degrees of plea- fure or pain mufl be anfvverable to the confcioufnefs, which the party affeded has of them, they muft likewife be as the degrees of perception are.
Obf. 2. IVhatever increafes the power of perceivings^ renders the percipient more fuf" reptive of pleafure or pain. This is an immediate confequence ; and to add more is needlefs : unlefs, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward fenfe of things may in many cafes be heightend and increafed^ the principal are reflexion^ and the pra6tice of thinking. As I cannot be confcious of what I do not perceive: fo Ido not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every inflance therefore of con- fcioufnefs and perception is attended with an a6t of advertence : and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions -, fo v, v, the more frequent or intenfe thea6ts of advertence and reflexion are, the more confcioufnefs there is, and the flrongeris the perception. Further^aW perceptions are produced in time : time pafles by moments : there can be but one moment pre- fent at once : and therefore allprefent perception confiderd without any relation to what is palt, or future, may belookd upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a re- petition of what is paft, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come ; there is a connexion of pail and future, which by this are brought into iht fum,and fuperadded to the prefent or momentaneous perceptions, ^gain^ by reflefting we pradife our capacity of apprehending : and this pradiling will in- creafe, and as it were et^tend that capacity, to a certain degree, Lajlh'y reflexion
doth
Of Happinefs. ^^
doth not only accumulate moments pad and future to thofe that are prefent but even in their paflageit Teems to multiply them. For time, as well as fpace is capable of indetermmate divifion : and the finer or nicer the advertence or reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided j which, whilft the mind confiders thofe parts as fo many feveral moments, is /« effecl renderd by this Co much the longer. And to this experience agrees.
Obf 3. The caufes of plea fur e and pain are relative things : and in order toefli* mate truly their effeU upon any particular fuhjetl they ought to he drawn into the degrees of perception in tbatfubjeSl. When the caufe is of the fame kind, and ads with an equal force, if the perception of one perfon be equal to that of another, what they perceive mud needs be equal And fo it will be likcwife, when the forces in the producing caufes and the degrees of perception in the fentients are reciprocal. For (which doth not feem to be confiderd by the world, and there- fore ought the more particularly to be noted; if the caufe of pleafure or pain fhould aft but half as much upon A, as it does upon B j yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the fum of their pleafures or pains will be equal In other cafes they will be unequal As, if the caufa dolorifica fhould aft with the fame impetus on C with which it afts upon D j yet if C had only two de- grees of perception, and D had three, the pain fuftaind by D would be half as much more as that of C : becaufe he would perceive or feel the afts and im- preiTions of the caufe more by fo much. If it lliould aft with twice the force upon D which it acts wi^th upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D as 1 to 6 : /. e. as one degree of force muitipUed by two degrees of perception to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And fo on.
Obf 4. Mens refpeElive happineffes or pleafures ought to be valued as they are to the perfons themfelvcs, whofe they are j or according to the thoughts and fenfe^ 'which they have of them : not according to the eftimate put upon th^m by o- ther people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor can laiow what they are j may compute by different rules 3 have lefs fenfe ; be in different circum- ftances =» j or fuch as guilt has renderd partial to thcmfelves. If that prince, who having plenty and flocks many, yet ravifhd the ^oox man's fingle ewe- lamb out of his bofom, reckond the poor man's lofs to be not greater, than the lofs of one of his lambs would have been to him, he mufl be very defective in moral arithmetic, and httle underflood the doctrine of proportion. Every
f Th f hie fis, dliterfenttas. Ter,
man's
oA The Religion of Nature. Se61:. II.
man's happinefs is his happinefs, what it is to him j and the lofsof it is an- fwerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his wants and circumftances *.
Obf.f . How judicious and wary ought prinres^Jawgivers-^judges^urics^and e^uejt ma- fiers to be ! They ought not to confider fo much what a llout,refolutc,obftinate, •hardend criminal may bear, as Vv'hat the weaker fort, or at lead (if that can be known j the perfons immediately concernd can bear: that is ^ what any puniih- jnent would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind} and therefore fliould not be ufed as if they were. Some are drawn into ^crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public juftice, they fcarce know how thcmfelves: fome fall into them through necelTity, ftrength of temptation, ...defpair, elafticity offpiritsand a fuddcn eruption ofpailion, ignorance of laws, -want of good education, or fomc natural infirmity or propenfion, and fome who , are really innocent, are oppreft by the iniquity or miilakes of judges, witnelTcs, ju- ries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a fadion, with which their fenfe or their honefty has not permitted them to join. What a difference mull there be be- tween the fufferings of a poor wretch fenfible of his crime or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and thofe of a fturdy i?^/^- ran in roguery: between the apprehenfions, tears, fliintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other j in Ihort, between a tender nature and a brickbat !
Obf <5. In q^encralj all ■i)erfons ought to be very careful and tender^ inhere any other is concernd. Othcrv/ife they may do they know not what. For no man can tell, by himfclf, or any other way, how another may be affccled.
Obf 7. Inhere cannot be an equal dijiribution of rewards and punijijments by any fiated human Jazvs^. Bccaufe f among other reafonsj the fame thing is rarely either the fime gratification, or the fame punifiiment to different perfons.
Obf 8. 'The fiijferings of brutes are not like the fufferings of men. They perceive
by moments,without reflexion upon pail: or future,upon caufes,circumftances,C^(r.
Time and life without thinking arenext neighbours to «o//;/«^, to no-time and
no-life^. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remain-
» Felidt/is cui prxcipux fuerit homini, mn ejihumml judkii : cum profperitate7nipfn7n alius alio modo, j^fiicpte ingehio qui/que term'met. Fliny. ^ It is not poffible (in Albo's words) U^^^i^ nn7
'1D1 ^pll/om mon G'U;3iyn -^yu/bl m\!;n mw rDin^. = :nter hom'mem & belluam
hoc maxir/ie interefi, quod b&c ad id fclum quod ade(i, quodque prAfens efl, fe accommodat, paululum
udmodum [entiins prxtcritum ant futurum, Sec. Cic. Nos &venturotorqnemur &fr£terito. Timorts enim tormaitum msmoria, reJucii, procidentia ant'-.cipat. Nemo tantum pr£fcntil'Hs fnifer efi. Sen- * fr&fens tcrnpus brevijjimum eft, adeo quidem, tit quibu/dam nullum 'videatur, &c. Sen. Or-iv -p
der
Of Happinefs. 5^
der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing : tho this may perhaps be more applicable to fome animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to bg taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unneceflarily i when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain ;\s may be ^ > and that. no young be left to languifli. So much by the way here.
II. Pain confiderd in it [elf is a real evil^ pleafure a real good. I take this as a fojlulatum^ that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,
III. By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleafure] is in it felf deftrahle^ the other [pain] to be avoided. What is here faid, refpects mere pleafure and pain, ab- ftracted from all circumftances, confequences, ^c. But becaufe there are fome of thefe generally adhering to them, and fuch as enter fo deep into their nature, that unlefs thefe be taken in, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what happinefs is, I muft proceed to fome other propo- rtions relating to this fubject.
IV. Pleafure compared with pain may either he equal, or more, orlefs : alfo plea'- furesmay be compared with other pleafure s '', and pains with pains. Becaufe all the moments of the pleafure muft bear fome refpect or be in fome ratio to all the mo- ments of pain : as alfo all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other : and fo muft thofe of one pleafure, or one pain, be to thofe of another. And if the degrees of intenfenefs be multiplied by the moments of duration, there muft ftill be lome ratio oi the one product to the other.
That this propofition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind 3: tho in fome particulars they may err, and wrong thernfelvcs, fome more, fome left. For what doth all this hurry of bufinefs, what do all the labors and tra- vels of men tend to, but to gain fuch advantages, as they think do exceed all their trouble? What are all their abftinencesand felf denials for, if they do not think fome pleafures lefs than the pain, that v/ouldfucceedthem ? Do not the various methods of Hfe ftiew, that men prefer one fort of pleafure to another, andfub- mit to one fort of pain rather than to have another ? And within our felves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the
a '131 Dan rxor}'^ mrDnu? van a'i;n j^^j. Ab. zz. '1:21 in^^^^— ciisn nDnnb -lyj: nuny,
S. Hhas. *> The rants- of thofe men, v/ho aflert, im ^i.<Pb^Jv '^^ov^v ith^yit;, fjcual i-^tTov n iTvca:
nay, (poa-i i^iv v<J~u. It c<.y,o\c, ap. Diog. L. can furdy afFcft no body, who has fenfe, or is aJive. Nor that of the Stoics in Tlut. ot- ctyaaov 6 x.[<>v(^ crx, eJSii %-^c<ryiV}f^/j®^, ktX. As if an age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age's happinefs more than a momeat's,
I- pain.
9(5 The Religion of Nature. Secft.II.
pain with the pleafure obtaind by it, or mifs the pleafure, being excufcd from the pain.
V. When pleafure s and pains are equal, they mutually dejlroy each other : when the one exceeds, the excefs gives the true quantity of pleafure or pain. For nine degrees of pleafure, lefsby nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing : but nine degrees of one, lefs by three degrees of the other, give fix of the former «^/ and true.
VI. y^s therefore there may he true pleafure and fain : fo there may he fome plea- fares, which compared -with what attends or follows them, not only may vaniflo into nothing, hut may even degenerate into pain, and ought to he reckond as pains ^\ and V. V. fome pains, that may he annumerated to pleafure s. For the true quantity of pleafure differs not from that quantity of true pleafure -, or it is fo much of that kind of pleafure, which is true (clear of all difcounts and future payments) : nor can the true quantity of pain not be the fame with that quantity of true or mere pain. Then, the man who enjoys three degrees of fuch pleafure as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are fet off to balance and fink the three of pleafure, can have remaining to him only fix degrees of pain : and in- to thefe therefore is his pleafure finally refolved. And fo the three degrees of pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleafure, end in fix of the latter. By the fame manner of computing fome pleafures will be found to be the lofs of .pleafure, compared with greater : and fome pains the alleviation of pain j becaufe 'by undergoing them greater are evaded*'. Thus the natures of pleafures and pains are varied, and Ibmetimes tranfmuted : which ought never to be forgot.
Nor this neither. As in the fenfe of moft men, I believe, a little pain will weigh againft -^ great deal of pleafure '^ : fo perhaps there may be fome pains, which exceed all pleafures ; that is, fuch pains as no man would choofe to fuffcr for any pleafure whatever, or at leafb any that we know of in this world. So that it is pofliblc the difference, or excefs of pain, may rife fo high as to become im- menfe : and then the pleafure to be fet againfb that pain will be but a point, or .cypher 5 a quantity of no value.
VII. Happinefs differ snot from the true quantity of pleafure, iinhappinefs of pain. Or ^any heing may hefaid to hefo far happy, as his pleafures are true, Sec. That cannot
» Nocet (fit noxa) empta dolore voluptcts. Hor. And— multo corrupta ilolore -voluptai. Id. '' As when that Pompey mentiond by Val. Max. by burning his finger efcaped the torture. « Bona
mdis parin nonjunt, etiam parinumero: nee Utitia ulU minimo moerore penfand;^. Plin.
be
Of Happinefs. 37
be the happinefs of any being, which is bad for him : nor can happinefs be dififfrecable. It mull be fomething therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the poflefTor. Now prefent plcafure is for the prefent indeed agreeable j but if it be not true, and he who injoys it muft pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his happinefs. Nor, again, can that pleafure bereckond happinefs, for which one pays the full price in pain : becaufe thefe are quantities which mutually deftroy each other. But yet fincc happinefs is fomething, which, by the ge- neral idea of it, mull be defirable, and therefore agreeable, it mufl be fome kind of plcafure =• : and this, from what has been faid, can only be fuch plea- fure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happinefs will be as his true quantity of pleafure.
One, that loves to make obje^iom^ may demand here, whether there may not be happinefs without plcafure: whether a man may not be faid to be happy in re- fpea to thofe evils, which he efcapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be fuch a thing as negative happinefs. I anfwer^ an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho wefhould not befenfible what thofe misfortunes or dangers are, from which we aredeHverd, and in the larger ufe of the word may be llyled a happinefs. Alfo, theabfcnce of pain or unhap- pinefs may perhaps be called negative happinefs, fmce the meaning of that phralc is known. But in proper fpcaking happinefs always includes fomething pofitive. Yovmere indolence refulting from infenfibihty, or joind with it, if it be happi- nefs, is a happinefs infinitely diminifhd : that ts, it is no more a happinefs, thanic is an unhappinefs j upon the confine of both, but neither. At bell it is but the happinefs of Hocks and flones ^ : and to thefe I think happinefs can hardly be in llrianefs allovv'd. 'Tis the privilege of a flock to be what it is, rather than to be amiferablebeing: this we are fenfible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with our own fenfc of it, we call it happinefs j but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the flock it felf. A fenfe indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happinefs : but then the happinefs flows from the fenfe of the cafe, and is a po/iti-je happinefs. Whilft a man reflcds up- on his negative happinefs, as it is called, and injoys it, he makes it pofitive: and perhaps a fenfe of immunity from the affliaions and miferies everywhere fo obvious to our obfervation is one of the greateft plcafurcs in this world.
38 7"/^^ Religion o/' Nature. Sedt.IL
VIII. That being may he [aid to he ultimately happy ^ in fome degree or other^ the fiim total of ivhofe pleafures exceeds the fum of all his pains : or, ultimate happinefs is the fum of happincfs^ or true pleafure^ at the foot of the account. And To on the other fide, that being way be [aid to be ultimately unhappy^ the fum of all ivbcfe pains exceeds that of all his pleafures.
IX. 'To make itfelf happy is a duty^ which every beings in proportion to its ca^ pacity.^ owes to itfelf ', and that .^ which every intelligent being may be fuppofed to aim at^ in general ^ For happinefs is feme quantity of true pleafure : and that pleafure, which I call true, may be conliderd by itfelf, and fo will be jultly defirable /^according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappincfs is certainly to be avoided : becaufe being a quantity of mere pain, it may be conliderd by it felf, as a real, mere evil, ^c. and becaufe if I am obliged to purfue happinefs, I am at the fame time obliged to recede, as far as I can> from its contrary. All this is felf-evident. And hence it follows, that,
X. We cannot a5l with refpedl to either our felves^ or other men, as being what we and they are, unlefs both are confiderdas beings fufccptive of happinefs andunhappinefs, and naturally defirous of the one and aver fe to the other. Other animals may be con- fiderd after the fame manner in proportion to their feveral degrees of appreheniion.
But that the nature of happinefs, aud the road to it, which is fo very apt to be miftaken, may be better underftood j and true pleafures more certainly diftinguiihd from falfe> the following propofitions mull Hill be added.
XL yf; the true and ultimate happinefs of no beingcan be produced by any thingj that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things : fo neither can thepraUice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature and truth, oppofes the will ofthe Author of nature fv/hofe exigence, ^^. liliall prove afterwards) ) and to fuppofe, that an inferior being may in oppofition to His will break through the conllitution of things, and by fo doing make himfelF happy, is to fuppofe that being more potent than the Author of nature, and con- fequently more potent than the author ofthe nature and power of that very be- ing himfelf, which is abfurd. And as to the other part of the propolition, it is alfo abfurd to think, that, by the conllitution of nature and will of its author,
" This is truly Bonum fummum, quo tendimus onrnet. Lucr. "Axxnoi, y^ wc, umTv, hifii^ y^x^iv tcL
any
Of Happinefs, 39
any being fhould be finally miferable only for conforming himfelf to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the fame as to fay, God has made it natural to contradid nature > or un- natural, and therefore punifhable, to a6t according to nature and reality. If fuch ablunder(excufethe boldnefs of the word)could be, it muft come either through a defeft of power in Him to caufc a better and more equitable fcheme, or from fome delight^ which he finds in the mifery of his dependents. The former can- not be afcribed to the Firfl caufc, who is the fountain of power : nor the lat- ter to Him, who gives fo many proofs of his goodnefs and beneficence. Many beinf^s maybe faid to be happy i and there are none of us all, who have not ma- ny injoyments ^ : whereas did he delight in the infelicity of thofe beings, which depend upon Him, it mull be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one ofthem would be otherwifein any refpea. The world in that cafe inftead of being fuch a beautiful, admirable fyftem, in which there is only a mixture of e\dls, could have been only a fcenc of mere mifery, horror, and torment.
That either the enemies of truth {wicked men) fiiould be ultimately happy, or the religious obfervers of it (good mm) ultimately unhappy, is fuch injuftice, and an evil fo great, that fureno Manichean will allow fuch ^fuperiority of his evil principle over the good, as is requifite to produce and maintam it.
XII. The genuine happinefs of every king mujl befomething, that is not incompatible ^vith ordefiru5iiveofits nature^ or the Juperior or better part of it^ if it bc^ mixt. For inftancc, nothing can be the true happinefs of a rational being, that is mcon- fiilcnt with reafon. For all pleafure, and therefore be fure all clear pleafure and true happinefs mull be fomething agreeable (pr. I.) : and nothing can be agreeable to a reafoning nature, or (which is the fime) to the reafon of that nature, which is repugnant and difigreeable to reafon. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reafon, it is plain his reafon is lofl, his nature deprell, and that he now lifts himfelf among irrationals^ at leaftasto that particular. If a being finds pleafure in any thing unreafonabIe^hch-:i%^nunrea' Imable pleafure j but a rational nature can Hke nothing of that kind without a contradiction to itfclf For to do this would be to aa, as if it was the contrary towliat it is. Laftly, if v.-e find hereafter, that whatever interferes witli rea fon, interferes with 'truth, and to contradia either of them is the fame thing j then what has been laid under the former propofition, does alfo confirm this • as what has been laid in proof of this, does alfo confirm the former.
' Kon dat Detiibcnejicit. Uncle ergo aju fcJJIdes ? qiu— Sea. ^ Uuvrl to ^«.k (p:<riv
^ Y 2. XII 1. Tho'e
4-0 The Religion of Nature. Sed. II.
XIII. thofe pleafures are true^ and to he reckond into our happpinefs^ againft ivhich there lies no reafon. For when there is no reafon againft any pleafure, there is always one for it ^5 included in the term. So when there is no reafon for un- dergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one againft it.
Ohf. There is therefore no neceffity for men to torture their inventions in find- ing out arguments to juftify themfelves in the purfuits after worldly advantages and injoyments, provided that neither thefeinjoyments, nor the means by which they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjuft, immode- rate, or the Hke*'. For in this cafe there is no reafon why we ftiould not delire them, and a direct one, why we ihouldj I'iz. becaufethey are injoyments.
XIV. To conclude this fe6tion, The way to happinefs and the practice of truth incur the one into the other ^. For no being can be ftyled happy, that is not ulti- mately fo: becaufe if all his pains exceed all his pleafures, he is fofar from be- ing happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miferable, in proportion to that ex- cefs. Now by prop. XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happinefs of any being, which interferes with truth : and therefore whatever doth produce that) muft befomething which is confiftent and coincident with this.
Two things then (but fuch as are met together, and embrace each other),which are to be religioufly regarded in all our conduct, are truth (of which in the pre- ceding fe6t.) and happinefs (that is, fuch pleafures, as accompany, or follow the praflice of truth, or are not inconiiftent with it ; of which I have been treat- ing in this). And as that religion, which arifes from the diftindion between mo- ral good and evil, was called natural, becaufe grounded upon truth and the na- tures of things : fo perhaps may that too, which propofes happinefs for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that diiference, which there is berv/ecn true pleafure and pain, which are phylical (or »^//^r<^/j good and evil. And fince both thefe unite fo amicably, and are at laft- the fame, here is one religion which may be called natural upon two accounts.
* Tiveov v.^cvZo }^ y.cru Xcyov o^^ov fjijiraXxfji/^civefO/l Simpl. Recle fucit, finimo quctndo obfeqtiltur fuC quod omnci homines facer e opcrtet, dum id modo fiat bono. Pbur, ^ Habeblt philo/ophus am^
plas opes 5 fed nulli detrailas, &c. Sen. Here he feems to confefs the folly Oi the Stoics, who denied themfelves msny pleafures, that were honeft and almoft neceflary j living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a fordid garment, with a rough beard, flaff and iatcbel, &c. ^ ^■^i'd reBum fit, apparet : quid expediat, obfcurum ejl: if a tamen, fit dhbitare non poffimus, qtun en
naximt' coudticam, Pjtt& ftmt re^iffima, Cic.
If-
Sect,
Of Reafon, and the ways, ^c. 41
Sect. III. Of Reafon, and the ways of difcovering truth.
MY manner of thinking, and an ohjeElion formerly ^ made, oblige me in the next place to fay fomething concerning the means of knowing, what is true: whether there are any, that are /«rf, and which one may fafely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amufement to no purpofe. Be- iides, as this will lead me to fpeak o^ reafon ^^c. fome truths may here (as fome did in the former fcdion) f^ill in our way, which may be profitable upon many occafionsj and what has been already allerted, will aUb be further confirmed.
I. ^n intelligent beings fuch as is mentiond before ^, jnufl have fome immediate ob' jeBs of his under [landing j or at leaf a capacity of having fuch. For if there be no ob-
ie£t of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all : becaufe every obje61; muft be fuch (an obje<5y either in itfelf immediately) or by the inteiTcntion of another, which is immediate; or of feveral, one of which mull at leaftbe immediate
II. An intelligent being among the immediate obje^s of his mind may have fome, that are abjira6l and general. I fhall not at prefent inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not how)^ fince this mufl be true, if there is any fuch thing as a rational being. For that reafon is fomething different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence > becaufe it is not confined to particular things or cafes. What is reafon in one mftancc, is fo in another. What is reafonable with refpe(5t to ^in5lius<y is fo inrcipcfl: o^N^vius <=. Realon is performed in y/'^f/Vj. A ratio- nal being therefore mull have fome of thc{e /pedes (I mean fpecificandabftraft ideas) to work with > or fome fupcrior method, fuch as perhaps fome higher order of rcafoncrs may have, but we have not.
The knowled^;e of a particular idea is only the particular knowledge of that idea or thing; th:re it ends. But reafon is fomething univerfil, a kind of ge- neral inftrumcnt, applicable to particul.ir things and cafes as they occur. We reafon about particulars, or from them j but not by them.
» The laft objeaion, p.ij. ^ Sed. I. prop. I. ' ®«/i hoc Jlfftftit, qtml Aiiimm
ft in ^imciium, id inic^HHtn ejfe in NAiinm ? Cic.
In
^2 The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. IIL
In fad we find within our felves many logical^ metaphyftcal^ mathematical ideas^ no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing : but they com- prehend whole chjfes and kinds. And it is by the help of thefe that we reafon, and demonllrate. So that we know from within our felves, that intelligent beings not only may have fuch abftract ideas^ as are mentiond in the propofition, but th2X(omQa5lually have them; which is enough for my purpofe.
Vil.l'hofe ideas orohjetls^ that are immediate^ will be adequately and truly known to that mind^ whofe ideas they are. For ideas can be no further the ideas of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them : and therefore that mind mull perceive the whole of them 3 which is to know them adequately.
jjgain^ thefe /^e-^i being immediate, nothing (l^y the termj can intervene to in- creafe, diminifli, or any way alter them. And to fay the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradidion : becaufc it is the fame as to f ly, that they are mif- reprefented j that is^ that there are intervening and mifreprefcnting ideas.
And /^y?/)', there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not> nor therefore of any immediate obje6t othcrwife, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions,and mifperceptions of things : but then thefe things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and f«^^/^, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defedive at beftand incapable of tranfn,itting things as they are in themfelves, and therefore occafion im.perfc6t and falfe images. But then, even in this cafe, thofe images and ideas that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the very reafon, why the originals, which they fiiould exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as they are. In fliort, I only fay the mind mull know its own immediate ideas.
IV. IVhat has ken faid of the/e ideas, 'which are immediate, may be faid alfo of thofe relations or refpe5ls, which any of thofe ideas bear ifnmediately each to other : they raufl be known immediately and truly. For if the relation be immediate, the ideas can- not fubfiil without it j it is of their nature: and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this muft be known too. They are in this refpcd like the ideas of whole and part. The one cannot be without the other: nor either of them not difcover that relation, by which the one muff be always bigger and the other Icfs.
To fay no more, we may fatisfy our felves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propofitions,from the experiences of our own minds; where we find ma-
4 "/
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c. 4.3
ny relations, that are immediately feen, and of which it is not in our power to doubt ^ Wc are confcious of a knowledge, that confiftsin the;»/«/V/()«of thcfe relations. Such is the evidence of thofe truths, which are ufually called axi- oms^ and perhaps of fome fhort demonftrations.
V. iToofe relations or refpeBs^ which are not immediate^ or apparent at the fir Ji view, may many times he difcoverd by intermediate relations ; andwitb equal certainty. If the ratio of B to D does not inftantly iliew itfelf j yet if the ratio of B to C f' does, and that of C to D S from hence the ratio of B to D '^ is known alfo. And if the mean quantities were ever fo many, the fame thing would follow 5 pro- vided thercafon of every quantity to that, which follows next in the feries, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the mathematicians ^ : as I might all, that know any fcience, for the truth of the propoiition in general. For thus theorems and derivative truths are obtaind.
VI. If apropofitionbe true, it is always fo in alltheinflances and ufes, to which it is applicable. For otherwife it muft be both true and falfe. Therefore
VII. By the help of truths already known more may be difcoverd. For
I . Thofe inferences, which ^LU^Qprefently from the application of general tmths to the particular things and cafes containd under them, muftbejuft. Ex. gr. 77:?^ whole is bigger than a part : therefore A ((omt^^niculzr thing) is more than half A. For it is plain that A is containd in the idea of whole, as half y/ is in that of part- So that if the antecedent proportion be true, the confequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and muft alfo be true. The former cannot be true un- lefs the other be fo too. What agrees to the gentis, fpecies, definitio-n, whole, muft agree to ihiif pedes, individuals, thing defined, the part. Theexiftenceof an^/><J2 infers dire£l:ly that of a caufe > of one correlate that of the other 5 and fo on. Antl what is iiud here holds true (l^y the preceding propofition) not only in refped of axioms and firft truths, but alfo and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. Thefemay be capable of the Hke applications : and the truth of fuch confcquences, as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evidcL. as that of thofe theorems themfelves.
» That qucdion in P/^/o, T/ 'k.^ tk 'ix.,, rw/„>,v ^^.V|^,,, ^ ric, 'Ullo v^V »'r«/? ci re! 7rc^^!,yr,, ^l, . Ticoy y.x'hiuS'oibp^ -.i. -r. :^, t ct, u ^vc-^,a.cScc ivi^ir\Sp, xtA., may have place among the veliiationsof phi- lofophers : but a man can fcarce propofe it ferioufly to himfelf. If he doth, the anfWer will attend ^^- '^ r= a. ^ - e. " - ^^ e y. T^r^. El. Geom. 1. ^. p. 3. n. XII.
But the thing appears from the bare infpedtion of thefe quantities : b, ab, aeb, aeib, aeiob, &c.
z. All
44. The Religion of Nature. Seifl. III.
2. All thofe condufions^ which are derived through mean propofitions, that are true, and by juft inferences, will be as true as thofe, from which they are derived. My meaning is this : every juft confequence is founded infome known truths by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of fteps in an algebraic operation : and if inferences are fo founded, and juft, the things inferred muft be true, if they are made from true premifTes.
Let this be the form of an argument. M = P : S = M : ergo S = P. Here if S =s M be falfe, nothing is concluded at all : becaufe the middle propofition is in truth not S = M, but perhaps S = iVk, which is foreign to the purpofe. If S=M be true, but M = P ialie, then the conclufion will indeed be a right conclufion from thofe premifles : but they cannot fhew, that S = P, becaufe the firft pro- pofttion if it was expreft according to truth would be Mf = P, which is ano- ther thing, and has no place in the argument. But if thefe two propofitions are both true, M = P, S = M, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but alfo true, that S = P. For the fecond or middle propofition does fo conned the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (ox tofpeak with the logicians^ by feparately comparing the predicate or major term of the conclufion with the medium in the firft propofition, and the fubjeft or minor term with it in the fecondj, that if the firft and fecond are true, the third muft be fo likewife : all being indeed no more than this, P = M = S. For here the infe- rence is juft by what goes before, being founded in fome fuch truth as this, and refulting immedi...Lely from the application of it, ^u£ eidem aq^ualiafunt^ £5? in- icr fe funt a^q^iialia-^ ox ^i<e conveniunt in eodem tertio^ etiam inter fe conveniunt -, or the like^ Now if an inference thus made is juftifiable, another made af- ter the fame manner, when the truth difcoverd by it is made one of the premif- fes, muft be fo too j and fo muft another after that ; and (o on. And if the laft, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the firft is fuppofed to be, it is no mat- ter to what length the procefs is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the laft refult is derived through fuch a fuccefiion of mean propofitions, as render its title to our aflent not worfe by being long.
Since all the forms of x.x\xtfyUogif?ns may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the /57/(3^//?/V method toward the difcovcry or confirmation of truth, are fomany inftanccs and proofs of what is hereaflertcd. So alfo are the performances of the mathematicians. From fome felf-evident truths, and a few eafic
* If men in their illations, or in comparing their ideas, do many times not a£lually make ufe of fuch maxims j yet the thing is really the fame. For what theie maxims exprefs, the mind ices without taking notice of the words.
theorems.
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c1 45
tlieorems, which they fet out with at firft, to what immcnfe lengths, and through what a ti-ain of propofitions have they propagated knowledge ! How numerous lire their theorems and difcovcries now, fo far once out of human ken !
I do not enter fo far into the province of the logicians as to take notice of the difference there is between the analytic and fynthetic methods of coming at truth, or proving it j whether it is better to begin the difquifition from the fubjedt, or from the attribute. If by the ule of proper media any thing can be fliewd to be, or not to be, I cai'e not from what term the demonflration or argument takes its rife. Either way propofitions may beget their like, and more truth be brought into the world.
VIII. Thatpo'wer^ iiuhich any intelligent beinghas of fur'veyinghis own ideas ^ and comparing them; of forming to himfelf out of thofe^ that are immediate and ahjlradt fuch general and fundamental truths^ as he can he fur e of ^ j and of makin<^ fuch in- ferences and conclufions as are agreeable to them^ or to any other truth^ after it comes to be known j in order to find cut more truthy prove or difprove fome ajfertion^ re- fohe fome quefiion^ determin what is fit to be done upon occafion^ &c. the cafe or thing under confiderationbeingfirfi fairly fated and prepared^ is what I mean by the faculty of rcafon^ or what intitles him to the epithet rational^ Or in fnort, Reafon is a faculty of making fuch inferences and conclufions^ as are mentiond under the preceding propofition^ from any thing known^ or given.
The Supreme being has no doubt a dire6t and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye : or at leafl we may fafely fay, that He is not obliged to make ufe of our operofe metliods by ideas and inferences j but knows things in a man- ner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to fuperior finite natures, v/hat other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me ; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumllances. Reafon mufl be itnderflood, when it is afcribed to God, to be the Divine reafon 5 when to o- ther beings above us, to be their reafon j and in all of them to tranfccnd ours^ as much as their natures refpedively do our nature ''.
G It
a Under the word reafon I comprehend the intuition of the truth of axioms. For certainly to difcern the refpedl, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the propofition nneffarily true, h an a£t oi reafon, the performed quick, or perhaps all at once. •> If many
believed, according to Socratei n^. Lhc. that '<}<ri))i iyj to [jjiyi^^ ^ loiryjis ri}» t/;Tiso^vif z^ot, ro 2«-
^6 The Religion of Nature. Sed. IIL
It cannot be amifs to note further^ that tho a man, who truly ufes his ratio- nal powers, has abftra6t and univerfal ideas, obtaind by reflexion j out of thefe frames to him felf general truths, or apprehends the ftrength of fuch, and ad- mits them, when they occur to him > by thefe, as by fo many flandards, mea- fures and judges of things } and takes care to have the materials, which he makes ufe of in reafoning, to be rivetted and compared together by them : yet by a habit of reafoning he may come to ferve himfelf of them, and apply them fo quick, that he himfelf fliall fcarce obfcrve it. Nay, moll men feem to reaforr bvvirrue of a habit acquired by converfation, pra6tice in bulinefs, and exam- ples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the folidity even to their ewn juft reafonings : iuft as mai ufually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the ufe of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the demonjiration of any one of them. But 11:111 tho this be (oy and men reafon without advert- ino- upon general ideas and abilraft truths, or even being aware that there are any fuch, as it were by i-ule or a kind of rote > yet fuch there are, and upoa them refls the weight of reafon as its foundation.
This, by the ivay^ helps us to dete6t the caufe, why the generality of people are fo- little under the dominion of reafon : why they facrifice it to their interells and pafli- ons fo eafily i are fo obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party } fo apt to change, tho the cafe remains the very fame ; fo unable Co judge of things, that are ever fo little out of the way j and fo conceited and po- iitive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to difcerning perfons manifeilly filfe. Their reafoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one ftep, but all is to them Terra incognita ; be- ing ignorant of the fcientific part, and thofe univerfal, unalterable principles, up- on which true reafoning depends, and to find which and the true ufe of them are required cc?o/ hours and tinhonejl application, heCidem^inY preparatives.
in the next place itmuftbe noted, that one may reafon truly from that, which is only probable, or even falfe ^ Becaufe jufl inferences may be made from propo- fitions of thefe kinds : that /';, fuch inferences may be made as are founded in cer- tain truths, tho thofe propofitions themfelvcs are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or falfe, according to-
xmra^ '^ ;j(^«:w!<f).vvT®- sT.^, rtiXix-^rov y^ t'hv ^Jvoifjutv uvr^, i^ rlv (^fmav, »$ 2^mxv uvx>.6'/ov 2^(pL ^iv -^ T^- ip^-? 2J^^i(riUi, what may we think of the God of the worU ? Therefore Tidly fcems to
exprefs himfclF too boldly where he writes, Eft htnini cum Deo mtioms focietas. Inter quos au-
am ratio, inter eo/dem et'mm recia ratio communis eff.
a Upon this account it is, that I add the word given at the end of my defcriptioa of reafon.
* T the
0/^ Reafon^ and the ways, &cl 47
the quality of that propofition, orthofepropofitions, from which the inference
IS m^-dc
Jgain-, it{houldbc obferved, that what I havcfaid of reafoning, chiefly belongs
to it as it' is an internal operation. When wc are to prefent our rcafonings to o- thers' we muil transfer our thoughts to them by fuchways as we can. The cafe is to be'flated in a manner fuitable to their capacities j a fair narration of matters of fad, and their circumftances, to be made j many times perfons and things to be de- fcribedby ^^xo^cv diatypofes, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in difcourfes and books, and are performed by difterent authors, upon different fubjcclrs, and in different kinds of wrkmg, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities > and many times not without a neceffity of fome condefcenfions, afcititious advantages, and e- ven applications to the pafhons. But notwithflandmg this, in flrid reafoning no- thing is required, but to lay ff eps in a due order, firmly conneaed, and exprefl pro-, perly, without flourifli ^ > and to arrive at truth by the/jcr/^/ and ckarejl gra- dation we are able. ^ ^ , ., , . ^. . ^ Once more-, perhaps difputacious men may fay I afcribe the mvefligation of truth to one ficulty, when it is in reality the joint bufmefs of feveral. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make ufeof fubordinate powers, and e- ven external helps j to draw diagrams, and put cafes in our own imagination ; to correa the images there, compound them, divide them, abflraa from them ; to turn over our memoiy, and fee what has been enterd and remains in that regifler > even to confult books, and ufe pen and ink. In fliort, we affemble all fuch axioms, theorems, experiments and obfervations, as are already known, and appear capa- ble of ferving us, or prefent themfelves upon the opening and ^;?^/)'/?i of thequef- tion, or cafe before us. And when the mind has thus made its /^«;', fetched inir.a- terials from every quarter,and fet them in its own view 3 then it contemplates, com- pares, and methodizes them 5 gives the firfl place to this, the fecond to that, and fo on i and when trials do not fucceed rightly, rejcas fome, adopts others, fliitts their order, ^c. till at lail xhcferies is fo difpofed, that the thing required comes up reiblved, proved, or difproved by yuji conclufion from proper premifles. Now in this procefs there feem to be many fliculties concerned > in thcfc aas of circumfpec- tion, recoUeaion, invention, reflexion, comparing, methodizing, judging. But what if all this be lb ? 1 do not exclude the ufe of fuch fubfervient powers, or other helps, as are neceflary to the exerting this faculty of rcafon 3 nor deny the mmd
« Simplex & nucU Veritas eft hmdentior; a,uia fatis ornata per fe eft: aJcoque ormmentis extrin^. (ecus additis JHcau corrumpitur : merJacitim verl fpecie placet al,en,i, &c. Laftant. ^^^^^^
4.8 The Religion of Nature. SecSl. IlL
matter to work upon. I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offi- ces and yet make reafon to be what I have defcribed it to be.
IX. ^here isfuch a thing as right reafon: or, Truth may be difcoverd hy reafon- ing^. The word reafon has feveral acceptations. Sometimes it is ufcd for that pow- er mentiond in thclaft propofition 3 as when we fay, Man is a being indued with reafon. i\.nd then the fenfe of this prop ofition mull be thisj that there is fuch a ufe to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifeft truth. Sometimes it feems to be taken for thofe general truths, of which the mind polTelTes it felf from, the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illati- ons and conclufions 3 as when we fay. Such a thing is agreeable to reafon : for that is as much as to lay, it is agreeable to the faid general truths, and that authen- tic way of making dcdu6tions, which is founded in them. And then the fenfe of this proportion is, that there are fuch general truths, and fuch a right way of infeninfy. Again j fmetimes it feems to ftand only for fome particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with the caufes of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth : that iSy it differs not from truth except in this one refpe6t, that It is confiderd not barely in itfelf, but as the effed and refult ofaprocefsofreafon- ine ; or it is truth with the arguments for our aflcnt, and its evidences about it j as when it is faid, that fuch or fuch an ajjertion is reafon. And then the fenfe of the propofitionis, that there ;ire truths fo to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at laff j truth (or there are truths, which) may be difcoverd, or found to be fuch, by reafoning.
If it were notfo, our rational faculties, the nobleft we have, would be vain. Befdey that it is fo, appears from the foregoing propofitions and what we know within our felves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abftrad ideas : the relations of thefe are adequately known to the mind, whofe ideas they are : the propofitions expreffing thefe relations are evidently known to be true: and thefe truths muft have the "common privilege and property of alltmths, to be true in all the parti- culars and ufcs, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our fenfes, or prefent themfelves by any other way or means, to
» That way, which fome Sceptics take to prove the inexiftence of truth, has nothing in it, unlefs k be a contradiaion. If any thing, fay they, is demonftrated to be true, how fliaH it be known-, that that dcmonftra'aon is true? E<' i| a^^»'|£^?, C^jrij^^Vs^) ^^A.v, zZi i'r. ;^ riro «A>,^/6 hi ; ^ i'T«5 ur, 'A^if^. Sext. Emp. Nor do I well comprehend St. Chryfo/lom's meaning, when he fays, tI Aoy.(r;/.lr? ^l^^uz^m 4^ ^M^k ^= i^^^^ ^M^o<pc^ix^ rj? -^v^yi Trccp^yj, >^ ;t<V.» Ucco'^k For as no man truly believes any thing, unlefs he has a reafon for believing it : fo no reafon can be ftrongcr than (temonfiration. . . ,
which
Of ReafoHj and the ways, ^c. 49
which thefe truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may be made after the forementiond manner, new truths maybe thus coUefted. And fince thefe new truths, and the numerous defccndents, that may fpring from their loins,may be ufed flill in the fime manner, and be as it were the feed of more truth, who can tell at what undefcried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At leafl no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is moil: nfeful to us in our condu6t here, is difcoverable by this method.
They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reafon, and treat right reafon as a Cbimara^ muft argue againil: reafon cither with reafon, or without reafon. In the latter, way they do nothing : and in the former they betray their own caufc, and eflablifli that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no fuch thing as right reafon by iuiy good argument, is indeed impoffiblc : becaufc that would be tofliew there is fuch a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.
And. further^ ifthis propofitionbe nottrue, there is no right reafoning m Eu- clid ; nor can we be fure, that what is there demonftrated, is true. But to fay this I am fure is abfurd. Nor do I defire, that this propofition, which I here main- tain, fhould be efteemd more certain than thofe demonflrated by him : and fo cer- tain it muft be 3 becaufe there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.
The great o^yV^;o» againft all this is taken from the many inftances of falfe rea- foning and ignorance, with which the pra6lices, difcourfes, writings of mankind are too juftly taxed. But,in anfwer to it, I would have it minded, that I do not fay, men may not by virtue of their freedom break offtheir meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a fufficient furvcy of things j that they may notbeprepoflefledwithinveterate errors, biafled by intereft, or carried violently down with the ftream of a fe6t or f ilhion, or dazled by fome darling notion or bright name ^ 5 that they may not be unprovided of a competent ftock ofpr^cognita and preparative knowledge 5 that (among other thingsj they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reafoning, and what it is that gives finews to an inference, and makes it juftj that they may not want philofophy, hiftoiy, or other learning requifite to the underftanding and ilating of the queftion truly 3 that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not 3 that they may not be impotent in their elocution,and mifreprefent their own thoughts, by exprefling themfelves ill, even when within themfelves they reafon v/ell 3 that many under- ftandings may not be naturally grofs, good heads often indifpofed, and the ableft judges fometimes overfeen, through inadvertence or hafte : I fay none of theic
3 Haud nUo filei ^ron'wn la^u, qH^.m ubi fdfA rei gravis ftutor exijiit. Plicy,
things.
^o The Religion of Nature, ^tdi. III.
things. The contrary I confefs is manifcfl: : and it is in oppofition to thofe er- rors, which appeal- in thefe cafes under the name of reafon, that \vc are forced to add the epithet right^ and to fay right reafon inftead o^ reafon only ; to dillin- guifh it from that, which wrongfully afllimes that appellation. Nor, more- over, do I fay, that by reafoning the truth is to be difcoverd in every cafe : thaC would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only fay, that there is fuch a thing as right reafon, and truth difcoverable by it.
I might add, that he, whole faculties areintire and found, and who by a proper exercife of his mind in fcientific lludies fuil opens andenlai-ges its capacity, and renders his intelleduals adiveaild penetrating) takes care to furnifhhimfelf with fuch leading truths, as may be ufeful to him, and of which he is afTured in hig own breft 5 and in treating any fubjecl keeps them ftill in his eye, fo that his difcourfe may be agreeable to them : I fay, fuqh a one is not in much danger of concluding falfely. He muil either determin rightly, or foon find, that the fub- jca lies out of his reach. However he will befenfible, that there are many things within his fphere, concerning which he may reafon 3 and that there are truths to .be found by this ufeof his faculties, in which he may fecurely acquiefce.
Thus that quellion fuppofed to be asked p. 27. How fjalla man know^ what is true ? is in part anfwerd. More fhallbe added by and by : only a propofition or two, which ought not to be omitted, mull be firftinferted.
X. To acl according to right reafon^ and to a5i accordingto truth are in effect the fame thing. For in which fenfe foever the word reafon is taken, it will fland either for truth itfelf, or for that, which is inftrumental in difcovering and proving it to be fuch: and then, with refped to this latter fenle, whoever is guided by that faculty, whofe office confiib in diilinguifhing and pointing out truth, miiftbe a follower of truth, and ad agreeably to it. For to be governed by any fliculty or power is to ad; according to the genuin dccifions and dictates of it.
That reafon, which is right (by the meaning of the words) muft conclude rightly : but this it cannot do, 'if the conclufion is not true, or truth.
That is ("for fo I v/ould be underflood), if the principles and premiiles from whence it refults arc true% and certainly known to be fo, the conclufion may be taken as certain and abfolute truth : but othcrwife the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that fuch a thing is fo, if fuch another, or fuch others are (b or fo.
a That manner of demonftration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced direftly from that which is falfe, is only a way of ihewing, that an allertion is true, becaufc its contradiaory is iklfe; founded in that known rule, Contradtcioru necj-wul <uerA, necJimiilfdjA ejfe popnt, &c.
XL To
Of Reafon^ and the ways, &c. 5 1;
XI 'to be governed by reafon is the general law impofedby the Author of nature » mon them^ 'whofe uppermoft faculty is reafon : as the dilates of it in particular cafes are the particular laws^ to -which they arefubjeSl. As there are beings, which have notfo much as fenfe, and others that have no faculty above it ; fo there may be fome, who are indued with reafon, but have nothing higher than that. It isfuf- ficientat prefent to fuppofe there may be fuch. And then if reafon be the upper- mofi fliculty, it has a right to controll the reft by being fuch. As in fenfitive ani- mals fenfe commands gravitation and mechanical motions in thofe inftances, for which their fenfes are given, and carries them out into fpontaneous ads : fo in ra- tional animals the gradation requires, that reafon fhould command fenfe.
It is plain, that reafon is of a commanding nature '' : it injoinsthis, condemns that, only allows fome other things, and will be paramount (in an old word r'c ^ys- j,.c:..\. 0 if it is at all. Now a being, who has fuch a determining and governing power fo placed in his nature, as to be effential to him, is a being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It feems to be as much dcfigncd by na= ture or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals iliould ufe their rea- fon,'and fteer by it; as it is by the fhipwright, that the pilot fhould dired the velfel by the ufe of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be ufed : nor would reafon be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and negkaed. And it is certain, it cannot be ufed5 but it muft command : fuch is its nature.
It is not in one's power deliberately to refolve not to be governed by reafon. For (here the fame way of arguing may be ufed, that was lately) if he could do this, he muft either have fome reafon for making that refolution, or nonc> If he has none, it is a refolution, that ftands upon no foundation, and there- fore in courfeMs: and if he has fome reafon for it, he is governed by reafon,. This demonflrates that reafon muft govern.
Xll. If a rational being, as fuch, is under an obligation to obey reafon, and this obedience, or prance of reafon, coincides with the obfervation of truth, thefe things plainly follow.
'Cuius [fumrni recioris ^ domini] ad mturam ^pt.t r^tlo verx il'a & fumma lex a phUofiphis
More to this purpofe might be eafily ^ p •
f^on.\. ^ Kv^ifuo. -t ^v^'^'; y^k'^. M. Anton. Or as it is inrlHUmh, t^ -^^Z^i ^'^rUl^' /^^^^- ^^'""^ cipatus in Tully, Summus in mitm^ gradtu^ Tert. ^ ThaCr'
^2 The Religion- of Nature. Se6t. III.
I . That what is ^-Mfecf. I . prop. W. mufl be true with refpeft to fuch a being br this further caufe > becaufe to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reafon, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it muil interfere with reafon. Such a har- mony there is between them . For whatever is known to be true, reafon either finds it, or allows it to be fuch. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being,if he has a reafon to the contrary, z. That there is to a rational being fuch a thing-x^ religion which may alfo upon this further account properly be called natural For certain- ly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion : and to obey the law, which He has given or reveald to him by making it to refult from the right ufc of his own natural faculties, mud: be to him his natural religion. 3 . A careful obfervation of truth, the v/ay tohappinefs, and the pra£lice of reafon arc in the ifllie the fime thing. For, of the two laft, each falls in with the firft, and therefore each with other. And {oj at laft, natural religion is grounded upon this triple and ll;ri6t alliance or union o^truth, happinejs^ and reafon ; all in the fame in- tercil and confpiring by the fame methods,to advance and perfe6t human nature : and its trueft definition is, T'hepurfuit ofhappincfs by thepratlice of reafon and truth. Permit me here again to infert an obfervation obiter.
Ohf The >'-f'-'''p"»' of right reafon and truth, or that which is to be regarded in ]udging of right and truth is private : that iSj every one mull judge for himfelf. For fince all reafoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own pri- vate ideas., by virtue of which he becomes confcious of fome firft truths, that are imdeniable 5 by which he governs his fteps in his purfuits after more truths, (^c. the criterion^ or that by which he tries his own reafonings, and knows them to be right, muft be the internal evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agreeablcnefs of his inferences to them. One man can no more difcern the objects of his own underftanding, and their relations, by the faculties of a- noiher, than he can fee with another man's eyes, or one fbip can be guided by the helm of another. They muft be his own faculties and confcience, that muft determin him. Therefore to demand another man's aflent to any thing without conveying into his mind fuch reafons, as may produce a fcnfe of the truth of it, is to ere6b a tyranny over his underftanding, and to demand a tri- bute which it is not pojjible for him to pay ^ It is tnie indeed, tho I cannot (^t with another man's eyes,yet I may be aflifted by another, vv/ho has better eyes, in finding an objeft and the circumftances of it -, and fo men may be afftfted in making their judgments of things. They maybe informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among thofe that are to be
* Relish cogi non pteji ,verbis potih qukm 'verberibus res agend.^ ejl, Ht Jit 'voluntas. La£l.
confiderd i
Of KcaCon^ and the \N^ys^ &c. 53
confiderd : and they may be direded what to advert principally upon > how to ftate the queftion -, how to methodize their thoughts,and in general how to rcafon : efpe- daily if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little converfant in clofe reflexions, and doth not teach them to reafon, or (as the cafe too often is) teaches them not to rcafon. But Hill this is all in order to produce fuch a light i-n them, that by it they may fee and judge for themfelvcs. An opinion, tho ever fo true and certain to one man, cannot be transfufed into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his underftanding, and affifting him fo to order his conceptions, that he may find the reafonablcnefs of it within himfelf.
To prevent miftakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I fiy men muft judge for themfelves, I do not iay they muft in all cafes a5i according to their private and fin- gle judgments. In rcfpe6t of fuch things, as are private, and concern themfelves only^ or fuch as are left open and fubjeft to every man's ownfenfe, they may and ought i only preferving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occafions to have more knowledge and hterature than them- felves: but when a fociety is concerned, and hath determind any thing, it may be confiderd as one perfon, of which he, who diffents from the reft, is only perhaps a fmall particle J and then his judgment will be in a manner abforbedand drowndin that of the majority, or ofthem to whom the power of judging is intrufled. But I mufl not digrefs too fiu" from the main bufinefs, the ways of coming at truth.
XIII. The reports of fen fe are not of equal authority ivith the dear demonf rations of reafon, when they happen to differ. It is true, the ideas caufed by the imprcflion of fenfible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they arc in themfelves > and the mind may ufe them, and reafon truly upon them : that ts, the mind may make a right ufe of the ideas, which it finds in itfelf But then whe- ther thefe are the true e6typcs of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a quelHon-; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, muft be acknowled- ged. They are conveyd through media and by initruments fufceptive of different difpofitions and alterations, and may confequently produce different reprefentati- ons : and thefe cannot all be right. But fuppofe thofe initruments and media. to be as intire and pure, as when intireit and pureft j yet ftill there may be in ■ many rcfpcds an incapacity in the faculty to notify things juft as they are. How mightily are thelliapeand fizeof a vifible object varied upon us according to its diitance, and the htuation of the place, from whence the profpc(5t is taken ? Now thefe things cannot be f lid of the reports, or rather determinations of rea- fon. For in purc reafoning wc ufe our own ideas for themfelves, and fuch as the mind knows them to be, not as rcprefentatives of things, that may be filfcly
H exhibited.
54- The Religion of Nature, Se61:. III.
exhibited. This internal reafoning may indeed be wrongly applied to external ihings, if we reafon about them as being what they are not : but then this is the fault not of reafon, but of fenfe, which reports the cafe wrong j or per- haps of the perfon, who has not been fufficiently induftriousto inform himfelf.
That fame fmiiliar infbance of vilion proves further, that reafon may be appH- ed to over-rule and correci fenfe. For when the pi6tures of obje6ts are pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the retina of the eye, and do not give the true figure of thofe objects (as they not always do, being divcrfly projeded, as the lines proceeding from the feveral points happen to fall upon that concave furfacej j this, tho it might impofe upon a being, that has no faculty fuperior to fenfe, doth not impofe upon our reafon, which knows how the appearance is alterdj and uuby. To think the fun => is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be ^5 feems to be the laft degree of ftupidity. He muft be a brute ({o far from being a philofopher), who does not know, that the fame line (v. g. the diameter of the fun) at different diftances fubtends different angles at the eye. A fmall mat- ter of reafon may ferveto confute fenfe in this and the like cafes.
Obj. How can reafon be more certain than^«?/f , fmce reafon is founded in ab- flradions, which are originally taken from fenfible objefts ? Jnf. Perhaps the mind may by being exercifed at firil about particular objeds by degrees find in itfelf this capacity of confidering things by their fpecies^ making abftradions, ^c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of thefe particulars. But then after it has found^this capacity in itfelf, and attaind to the knowledge of abib-a6l- and general ideas^ I do not fee why this capacity of reafoning by the help of them may notbeufed, upon this proficience, to cenfure and cor- rea the advices of fenfe concerning even fuch particulars, as firft gave occafion to the n:5ind to exert this capacity and raife it felf. Is it a new thing for a fcho- lar to make fuch a progrefs in learning, as to be able afterward to teach the maffer, from whom he received his firir rudiments ? May not the modern phi- lofopherscorrea the ancients, becaufe thefe firil Ihewd them the way, and led them into the ftudy of nature ? If we look impartially into the hiftory of learning, and even of religion, we Ihall find that truth has generally advanced by de- crees, and many times (vcxj many 5 as if that was the method of introducing knowled2;e among men) rifen out oi fable and error, which gave occafion 10 thofe- inquiries, by which themfehes were detcaed. Thus blind ignorance was fucceedcd by a twilight of fenfe : this biightend by degrees : at lad; the fun as
• TantulHS iUs fol. Lucr. Tooc creature ! ^ Nee nimio foils major rota Ejfe potcfi^
nojlris quamfirftbH:- effe -vulemr. Lucr. EpuurHs mtem p# fntat emm mmorem ejfe c^nkm vidci^- tar, 8cc. Cic, ^j.
Of Reafoiip and the ways, &c. 5 5
it were rofe upon fome paits of the commonwealth of learning, and cleard up many things: andlbeUeve many more will in time be cleard, which, whatever men think are yet in their dark and uncultivated ftarc. The underftanding, tho it ftarts h'om particulars^ in time makes a further progrefs, taking in ge;?erals^ and fuch notions logical, metaphyrical,^<:. as never could poffibly come in by the fen- fes ^ Befide, further, the capacity itfelf of admitting and confidering general ideas was originally in the mmd, and is not derived from without. The intelligences communicated by fcnie are only an occafion of ufmg what it had before ''. Juft as a mafter may, by the cxercifcs he fets, excite the fupcrior capacity of his fcholar. In a word^ no man doth, or can pretend to believe his fenfes, when he has a reafon againft it : which is an irrefragable proof, that reafonis above fenfc and controlls it. But,
XIV. 'The reports of fenfe fnay be taken for true^ when there is no reafon againjl it ^. Becaufe when there is no reafon not to believe, that alone is a reafon for beheving them. And therefore,
XV. In this cafe to a5l according to them (i. e. as taking the informations of fenfe to be true) is to a5i according to reafon and the great law of our nature.
Thus it appears that there are two ways, by which we may alTure our felvcs of the truth o^many things ^ > or at leaft may attain fuch a degree of certainty, as will be fufficient to determin om pra^ice : by reafon, and by fenfe under the government of reafon-, that is, when reafon fupports it, or at leaft doth notop- pofe it. By the former we difcover fpeculative truths ; by the latter, or both together matters of fii6t.
XVI. JVhere certainty is not to he had^, prohahility mufi he fuhjlituted into the place of it : that is, it mufi be confderd, which fide of the qiiefiion is the more probable.
Probability, or that, which in this cafe may inchne one to believe any propofl- tion to be true rather than falfc, or any thing to be rather than not to be, or the
« Natura etiam nullo cloccnte profecia ab us, quorum, ex prima ©^ inchoata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confinnat ipfa per fe rationcm, (y> perficit. Cic. ^ Semina, nobis fcienti.i dedit [tmtu-
ra] fcientiam non dedit. Sen. <^ Sifanifunt [fen/US'], ^valentes, Qr> o>;maremoventHr, qu*
obftant & i:npediiint. Cic. <* Socrates's laying, ap. Cic. nihil fe fcire, nifi id ipfiim, favours
of an afteded humility, and muft not be underftcod ftriftly. But they, whofollowd, went further
( omnes pAne veteres : qui nihil cognofci. nihil percipi, nihil fciri pojfe dixcrunt) : and particularly
Arceiilas negabat ejfe quidquam quod fciri pojjei, ne illud quidem ipfum, quod Socrates fibi reliquipt. And ,thus the a'jfurdity grew to a lize, that was monflrous. For no man can aft, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Befide, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradidtion : and not to know, that l:c knows even that, is not to know, whciiicr ht knows any thing or not 5 and that i5 to knovv for ought he knows. "^ Nee fcire fas eft omnia. Hor.
H 2, contrary.
^6 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. III.
contrary, will generally fhewitfelf upon the application of thefe andfuch like rules. I . That may be reckond probable, which, in the eftimation of reafon, appears to be more agreeable to the conjiitution of nature. No body can certain- ly foretell ihmt ftcc-acewW\. come up upon two dies fairly thrown before ambs- ace : yet any one would choofe to lay the former, becaufe in nature there are twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a ftrolling wolf fliould light upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb : but there is fuch a natural propenfion in that kind to do it, that no body would much queftionthe event. ('This inftance might have been taken from amongft men, who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent caufes his child to be inftru6led in the foundations of uleful learning, educates him virtuoufly, and gives him his firft impulfe and diredion in the way to true happinefs, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he Was left to himfclf to be carried away by his own palllons, or the influence of thofe people, into whofe hands he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, andmifery in the end, and the plurality of the l^atter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So that the advantage in point of probability is on the fide of good education \ When Herodotus writes, that the Egyptian prieils reported the fun had within the compafs of 1 1 340 years twice rifen where it now fets, and fet where it rifes ^^ what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation fas of many others;, is eafily difcernable by this rule. Herodotus^ poffibly delighting in tcratical ftories, might tell what he never heard : or the paflage may be an interpolati- on i or it may be alterd in tranfcribing : or the priefts, who pretended much to a knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to fhev/ what chil- dren the Greeks were in refped of them, invent fuch a monftrous relation, and im- pofe it upon them, whom they thought to have not muchfcience among them: or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to He- rodotus, and fopafsuponpofterity, as many other fictions and legends have done. Thefe are fuch things, as are well known to have happend often. But that the diurnal rotation of the earth about her axis {liould be inverted, is :i pheno- menon^ that has never been known to happen by any body elfe, either before or fmce ; that is favourdby no obfervationj and that cannot be without great
. This was the opinion of a wife man. H^DD -.10^ ^b I^pT> O QA mi ^3 ^V nV^^ inn.
Prov. For ^'inn by ninsD napin ^D^n mD^Sii — pvin by ninsD &ji.-i nnyan ^d^ -iiD^bn.
alteration
Of Reafori;, and the ways, &"€. 57
alteration in the mundane fyllem, or thofe laws by which the motions of the planets, and of our earth among the reft, are governd. That this account then maybefalfeis very confiftent with the humor and circumftances of mankind : but that it Hiould be true is very inconfiftent with thofe laws, by which the mo- tions of the celeftial bodies feem to be regulated, and tend to perfevere in their prefent courfes anddiredions. It is therefore in nature much more probable that this account is fUfe. The odds are on that fide. 2. When any obfervation hath h'lihci'to conjlantly held true, or mofi commonly proved to be fo, it has by this ac- quired an cftablifiid credit i the caufe may be prefumed to retain its former force j and the effed may be taken as probable, if in the cafe before us there doth not appear fomething particular, fome reafon for exception. No man can demon- ftratc, that the fun will rife again, yet every one doth, and muft ad, as if that was certain « : becaufe we apprehend no decay in the caufes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reafon to miitruft the event, or think it will be otherwife afew hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodidli- cal argument to prove, that any particular man will die : but yet he muft be more than mad, who can prefume upon immortality here, when he finds fo many generations all gone to a man, and the fame enemies, that have laid them proftrate, ftill purfuing ihdrvi^lories. Thcfeand fuch Hke, thoin ftri6bnefs per- liaps not certainties, are juftly current for fuch. So great is their probability. There are other obfervations, which, tho not fo infillible as thofe, deferve yet to be thought of, and to have a ihare in the direction of our judgments. Ex.gr, There have been men in the world and no doubt ftill are, who, having had op- portunities of impofing falfities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing o- ther wickednefs, have yet in fpite of temptation prefervcd their integrity and virtue : but, fince opportunity has fo feldom faild to corrupt them who have been in pofiefilon of her, and men's interefts and pafiions continue in general the fame, it is more^probable her charms will ftill have the fime power and ef- feft, which they ufc to have j which whoever doth not mind, will be wofuUy obnoxious to be abufed by frauds pious and impious ^ Briefly, when there is no particular reafon for the contrary, what has oftneft happend, may from experi« ence moft reafonably be expeded to happen again. 3 . When neither nature nor other obfervations point out the probable conjefture to us, we muft be deter- mind (if it be ncceffiiry for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and fenfe of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the beft skill we
* ibin i.-^njKJD Cnbiy. t -^m b±> pOii> ^ns. Prov. (which fure one may convert thus,
2>iin ins -^m b^b pDiiion-)
T have
58 The Religion of Nature. Sedl.IIL
have % to be moil knoiving ^ and honefi '^. Of all thefe rules thtfirfl is that which deferves tlie principal regard : the other two are of ufe, when nature fo utterly ex- eludes us from her bofom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgment. X^y?/)', when nature, the frequent repetition of the fame event, and the opinion of the befl judges concurr to make any thing probable, it is fo in the higheft degree.
It appears from what has been faid concerning the nature and foundations ofpro^ bahility^ that the force of it refults from obfei-vation and reafon together. For here the one is not fufficient without the other. Reafon without obfewation wants matter to work upon : and obfervations are neither to be made juilly by our felves, nor to be rightly chofen out of thofe made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the afliifance of reafon. Both together may fupport opinion and pra6ticc in the abfenceof knowledge and certainty. For thofe obfervations upon the na- ture of men and things, which we have made our felves, we know> and our own reafoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know : and from hence there cannot but arife in many cafes an internal obligation to give our aflent , to this, rather than that 3 or to a61: one way, rather than another. And as to the obfervations of others, they may be fo cautioufly and skilfully fele61:ed, as to be- come almoft our own ; fince our own reafon and experience may dire6l us in the choice and ufe of them. The remarks and advice of old men\ who have gone through variety of fcenes, lived long enough to fee the confcquences of their own and other peoples a6tings, and can now with freedom ^ look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily fure to be preferred to thofe of young and raw a6lors. The ^^o;//^, apologues, i^c. o^ wife men^ and fuch as have made it their bufinefs to be ufeful fpies upon nature and mankind, national /r^^i'f^r*^^, and the like*, may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their feveral profellions and arts, in which they have been educated, and exercifed thcmfelves all their days, mull be fuppofed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can ufually
* Statuere enlm, qui fit fa pi ens, 'vel maximevhletur cjfe fapientis. Cic. ^ Non ntimero hAC
mdkantur, fed pondere, as Tully fpcaks upon another occafion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a fort of writers pleafing themfelves with having difcovcrd fome uncivilized na- tions, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, ^c. and then applying their obfervations to the fervice of atheifm. As if ignorajice could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general!
<^ jiriflotle's known rule is 'Evao^as rx Jox-Svt-cc ttuo-iv, yi toT^ ti'Ah^oic,, v\ to\'^ a-oCpcTi' iu tutok;, « roi5
Troiriy, n roTq o-AsiVot?, ») 70*5 (jjocXi^a yvu^iujoi^ >^ cv^ilot^. But it is not applicable to all cafes. ^ Aox.i7 Uioi VfKi'ott Ticio uvrav V7rpifrZvTai\ Ttwj^cvi'i^y ^ ixTTn^ nva ooa TiftiAv.yMhaTuv^ ii> ;^ lijiz/S? »(rw5 oii^a-i tto- PiuiS^ . xcla, rr, £>(. Fluto. ^ When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, UZ^ 't^i'^ jrp?
t' u,(pi>oS'!g-icc, he an{\verd, I.u(py,^ii, a av^^azr occri/Jjji?a,\ct. f^j tci Uvro <z7iipi'yev, «r-f^ >\V'r\cnTci nvce,
ic, oiypiav oitTTTOTltM ^^!pyy»ii. viavTciTrenri f^p T ys rct^rav e'l* ra ytf^:'. TTn^'/t ti^'^v/t yytj y^ IXt^j-
Q-ipi'd. TldtOy C^ at. i 'El' /0^«;%;u o-<pyp»;P.aTov vap <Zib<iX,'>^rii . Phit.
have :
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c. 59
have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honefly they do not either lofe, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in refpe6t of thofe things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to bcrehedupon. And, laftly, hiftoriei written by credible and induftrious authors, and red with judg- ment, may fupply us with examples, parallel cafes, and general remarks, profit- able in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perufiil of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cafes is ac- quired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their counfels, much of the courfe of Divine providence is vifiblc in them.
To conclude 5 that we ought to ^o\\o\y probability^ when certainty leaves us is plain: becaufe then it becomes the only light and guide we have. For unlefs it is better to wander and fluctuate in abfolute uncertainty than to follow fuch a guide i unlefs it be reafonable to put out our candle^ becaufe we have not the light of the fully it mull be reafonable to dire6t our fleps by probabihty, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reafonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XL When there is nothing above probability, it doth govern : when there is nothing in the oppofite fcale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the courfe of nature mull turn the beam. Tho a man, to refume the inllance be- fore, cannot demonllrate that Jice-ace will come up before ambs-ace, he would find himfelf obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that fide : nor could he not choofe to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which lide it lay.
Here then is another way of difcovering, if not truth, yet what in practice may be fuppofed to be truth. T'hat is, we may by this way difcover, whether fuch propolitions as thefe be tme, / ought to do this, rather than that j or, to think fo, rather than the contrary.
Obf. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almoll from the premifles colleft,
Firjl, the principal caufes oi error, which I take to be fuch as thele. i . Want o^ faculties > when men pretend to judge of things above them. As fome (llray» ing out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no ideas but their own dreams, come toj aficrt what they have no reafon to aflert : fo others deny what there is the higheil reafon to believe, only becaufe they can- not comprehend it. i. Want of due reflexion upon thofe ideas we have, or may have : by which it comes to pafs, that men arc dcllitute of that knowledge* which is gaind by the contemplation of them, and their relations > mifapply names, confufedly : and fometimes deal in a fet of words and phrafes, to which
do The Religion of Nature. Sedl. III.
no ideas at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 2. Want of proper qualifications and '^?»^'«'<^e'^>'*^«- As, when illiterate peo- ple invade the provinces of fcholars > the half-letterd are forward, and arro- gate to themfelves what a modefi^ ftudious man dares not =» , tho he knows more > and fcholars, that have confined themfelves to one fort of literature, lanch out into another : unfuccefsfully all. 4. Not underftanding in what the nature and force of ajull confequence confifts. Nothing more common than to hear people aflert, that fuch a thing follows from fuch a thing j when it doth not follow : i- s- when fuch a confequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. f. Defcfts of memory and imagination- For men in reafoning make much ufe of thefe : memory is upon many occa- fions confulted, andfometimes draughts made upon the /'/r^^^/^yj. If then they depend upon thefe, and thefe happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be mifreprefented, and men led out of the way by mif-fhapen ap- paritions. There ought to be therefore a little dijirujl of thefe faculties, and fuch proper helps ought tobeufed, as perhaps the he ji judgments want themoft. 6. Attributing too much to fenfe. For as neceflary as our fenfes are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice ; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of fenfible objcds, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but juft faluted the mathematics and philofophy, muft be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which feem abfurd to fenle, and yet muft be admitted. 7. Want of retirement^ and the pradice of thinking and reafoning by our felves ^ A rambling and irregular life mull be attended with a loofe and irregular head, ill-connefted notions, and fortuitous conclufions. Truth is the offspring o^ filence^ unbroken medi- tations, and thoughts often revifed and corrected. 8. The flrength of appetites, pafiions, prejudices. For by thefe the underftanding may be corraptcd, or over- born : or at leaft the operations of the mind muft be much obftructed by the in- trufion of fuch folicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet ftrong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which you muft have obferved to be one of the greatcji caufcs of modern irreligion. Whilft fome opinions and rites are carried to fuch an immoderate height, as ex- pofes the abfurdity of them to the view of almoft every body but them who raife them,not only gentlemen of the belles letireSy but even men of common fcnfc, many
• Sicut kyjoi^'ot, "p: B-(ot(r©^, Aoyto-jW/os ■j ox.vov (^i^i (e Thucyd.) kit recin ingenia deb'tlitat verecundia^ perverfa confirmat audacia. Plin. jun. ^ 'Otw n, /SisAa^jS-a; km^it, voyttrca, £»5 i^yi'^Mv ~£<m,^\-
times
Of ReafonJ and the ways, &c. 6i
times fee through them -, and then out of indignation and an cxcciHve renitence, not feparating that which is true from that which is flilfe, they come to deny both, and fallback into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general ^ p. Ill itating of a quellion j when men either put it wrong themfclvcs, or accept it fo put from others. A fmall addition or Eilfity flipped into the cafe will ferment, and fpread itfclf ; an artificial color may deceive one : an incumberd manner may perplex one. The queftion ought to be prefented before its judge clean, and in its natural flate, without difguife or dillortion. To this lail: may be fubjoind another caufe, nearly allied toit j not fixing the fenfe of /^r;;?;, and fwhich muft often fol- low) not rightly underftanding what it is, that is to be examind and refolved.
Secondly J the reafon why the many are commonly in the wrong and fo wretch- edly misjudge things. The generality of people are not fufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by rcafcning. And of them, who have liberal education, fome are foon immerfed and loft in pleafures, or at leaft in faihionable methods of living, rolling from one vifit or company to another ^, and flying from nothing fomuch as from themfelves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reafoning : others become involved in buiinefs and the intri- cate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingrofs their time : others fill into a flothful negleft of their ftudies and difufc of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only dcfign to deceive life and gratify themfelves with the amufements and fenfual parts of learning : and others there are, whofc misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the concluilon j taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their fituationin the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by vv^hich they are to get their bread, before they have ever confiderd them j and then making the fubfequent bufinefs of their lives to difpute for them, and maintam them, right or wrong. If fuch men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the eflr6l of their improvements : and ifthcy happen to be in the wrong, the more they ftudy,and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors 3 and having fct out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, fomuchworfe or lefs than no knowledge. Of this fort there are many : and very few indeed ('with refpc6l to the bulk of mankind^, wliofe de- terminations and tcncnts were ever in the form of queflions : there could not other- wife be fo many feels and different denominations of men, as there are, upon
* Aliis ntilltci ejl clear urn refpectus., al'iis fudendus. Plin. Sen. The former part of this obfcrvation is in truth theeffcd of the latter, ^ Vnd<:t dicere frequeniiam falut/indi, Sec. Hieron.
I the
62 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. IV.
the liicc of the earth. The fum of all in a few words is this: many qualificati- ons arerequifite in order to judge of fome truths, and particularly thofe which are of greatejl importance : proper learning and penetration, vacancy from bufi- nefs, a detachment from the intereft of all parties, much fincerity and a perfe6fc refignation to the government of reafon and force of truth ; which are things not to be reconciled with the ufual ignorance, pafHons, tumultuary lives, and other circumftances which carry moH men tranfverfe.
Sed:. IV. Of the Obligations ofimperjecl Beings 'with refpeci to their power of adling.
THere remains yet another queflion, fuppofed alfo to be propofed by an objedtor, which mull: not be forgot ; and upon vvhich I fhall beftow this very fhort fefbion. The queftion was this, Jf a man can find out truths may he not want the power of ailing agreeably to tt ?
I. Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the lame as not to oblige.
II. So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing.^ fo far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it : or, no being is capable of any obligation to do that., which it has not power or opportunity to do. For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity neceflary to the doing of any thing, is inre- ipeft of that thing a being utterly unadive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that ad nothing at all.
To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power fuperiorto therefiftcnce to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply fuch a power is the fame as to require that his pov/er of fucha kind and degree be >applied. But if he has no fuch power, then his power of that kind and degree IS nothing: and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is juft the fame, as if a man was commanded to do fomething with his third hand, when he has but two : which would be the iame as to bid him to do it with no hand, or not bid him do it.
Without more ado, it is a truth confellby everybody, that nobody isobh- ged to impofTibiliticFo
From hence will follow, after the manner of corollaries, the two following propofitions. HI- Inani-
Of the Obligations, ^c. 6%
III. Inanimate and um^dlCve beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely fen- fitive of any obligation to a£l upon principles^ or motives above fenfe.
IV. The obligations of beings intelligent and active muji be proportionable to their faculties^ powers^ opportunities-, and not more.
V. To endeavour may fitly exprefs the ufe of all the opportunities and powers^ that any intelligent and a6live, but imperfe6l^ being hath to act. For to endeavour is to do what one can : and this as every fuch being may do, where ever he Hands in the fcale of imperfeds, fo none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or fucccfs, than another j yet ftill they are but endeavours.
VI. The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of underflandingand aSiing mufi be in proportion to their endeavours : or, their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may-. This follows again from what has been faid : and fo does this>
VII. andlaftly. They who are capable of difcerning truth, iho not all truths, and of atling conformably to it, tho not always or in all cafes, are neverthelefs obliged to do thefe, as far as they are able : or, it is the duty of fuch a being fincerely to en- deavour to pradlire reafon > not to contradidl any truth, by word or deed j and in port, to treat every thing as being what it is.
Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentiond in or refulting from the preceding fedions, are brought together, and finally fixt under the correElion or limitation in this lall: propofition. This is the fum of their religion, from which no exemption or excufe lies. Every one can endeavour : every one can do what he can. But in order to that evciy one ought to be in carnefr., ^iud to ex- evthim{d£ heartily -, not ftifling his own confcience, not diffembling, fupprefs- ing, or negle6ting his own powers.
And now needlefs to me feem thofe difputcs about human liberty, with which men have tired themfelves and the vv^orld. The cafe is much the fame, as if a man fhould have fome great reward or advantage offerd to him, ifhe would get up and go to fuch a place to accept it, or do fome certain thing for it, and he, inllead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious difquifition about his own freedom > whether he has the power to llir, or whether he is not chaind to his feat, and neceffitared to fit flill. The fhort way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be loflj but if he is capable of a<5ting, and doth not a6b, the confcquences and blame mull be juftly chargeable upon
1 i himlelf
64. The Religion of Nature. Sed. IV.
himfclf. Aiid I am perfuaded, if men would be ferious, and put forth them- ielves % they would find by experience, that their wills are not fo univerfally and peremptorily determind by what occurs, nor predcftination and fate fo ri- gid ^ but xhitmuch is left to their own condud ^ Up and try ^.
Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth : if it is, it is alfo in his power to forbear excefs in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, fo as to go either tliis way or that or no whither, as fure he has, it is in his power to abflain from ill company and vicious places. And fo on ^
This fuggefts a veiy material thought : that forbearances^ at leaft in all ordinary cafes, arc within our power ^ fo that a man may if he will, forbear to do that, which contradids truth : but where ading is required, that veiy often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities j and fo may feem to contradid truth by hisomilTion, which, if his infirmities and diladvantages were taken into the account, and the cafe was rightly flated, he would be fotmd not to do.
ir^ Arabic is to dhe : and from hence the word fatum feems to come (as many Latin words do from that and other Eajlern languages), death, if any thing, being fatal and neceffary. Yet it doth not fol- low, that therefore the time or manner of dying isunmoveably fixt. Oi ^k.ru. ««.9-«fS? i^i 2^pp^. ^,y i L/^x^l^:, ^'.lyX «»' '^'^"^ '^^^^^^^ P^«^- ChfiPP''' ""P- ^•^'^^- ^^^"'' ^° ^""P'^'" himfelf much after the fame manner. The ancients moreover feem many times to make fate conditional. Stmiln n cur a Met, Nee pater omnipotens Trojam, nee fata -vetabant Stare, &c. Virg. c what
the Shartfees fay, according to Jofephus, feems to be right, o; fH^ «v cP«f .o-«?<=/ r.v« ^^ « ^^vr« r?« ufA^ccMi ^Ixi A^V^o-*" H'V^^> '•''^ ^' '4'' ''''^'•«^« <:^kzi', <rv^.^ccH^ te ^ « y.n^. R. Albo, in rela- tion to human aftions (and the confequent events), explains this opinion thus, rnin.nn |nvpO 1D1 nn^nnm niDnn XO nnmyo ^nyp?3l mniDTD (ni^poi. But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old praftice: l^iXo.<..^^u.rc.,-i:r\ r.v .o.n^ c^^M ^^Xc:.... y.cru(pvyiXn r.A. Luc. " BmuUumfaai, c^ui co^pit, habet. fapere aude. Hor. A/iJlotle goes
further than that old adagial faying {k^z^ i>>.c-" -^vr.',). His words are Ao.aT^A.uv ) -<> y--- ji
m//V, is a little poctie fally. l '^Oa., ^^^ ■n'k.x c^r/'* ^ ^ -'^r^^-'^^ H-^>^^ '^" ^v^.a.^^^.i,<.■ 0..,
Sect.
Truths relating to the Deity, 6c.
Sect. V. Truths relating to the Deity. Of his exijience^ perfe^ionj providence ^ 8cc.
IHavefhewn in what then^tuveo?moraIgocchndevilconCi{{s; viz. a confor- mity or dilagreement to fruth, and thofe things that arc coincident with it, rea- [on ^ndihappinefs : alfo, how truth is diicoverd ; hy fen fe^ or reafon^ ox both. I {liall nowfpecify fome of thofe /ra/Z^j,. which arc of greatcft importance and influence, and require more reafoning to difeoverthem j leaving the reft (common matters of fa6y to the common ways of finding them. They refped principally either the Be- ■ ify, or ourfelvesy or the reji of mankind. The firft fort are the fubjed of //;;j fcdion.
* r. Where there is afubordination of caufes and effed:s^ there muji necejjarily be a. caufe in nature prior to the reft^ uncaufed. Gr thus, Where there is a feries^ in which, the exijlence of one thing depends upon another.^ the exigence of this again upon fome other, and fo upwards, as the cafe pall be, there muJi be fome independent beinv upon whom it doth originally depend.
If Z (fome bodyj be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are firft moved, X by W and Y by X : that Z, Y, X are moveds, or rather Z more Y more X, taken to- gether % are one moved: that W ftands here as the firft mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other : that therefore without W there would be a moved without a mover, which is abfurd '' : and laftly, that of what .length foever the feries may be^ the cafe will be ever the ilime 5 . /. e. if there be no Fir^ mover = unmoved, there muft' be a moved without a mover.
Further, if W,. whom we will fuppofe to be an intelligent being, and to have • a., power o'i beginning motion, hath this power originally in himfelfand independent h, of all others, then here not only the firft mover in this y^nVj, but a Fiyflbeino and-> original caufc is found. Becaufe that, which has a power of beginning motion /w. dependent of any other, is a mover independent-, and therefore is independent, or has- an independent exiftence, fince nothing can be a mover without ^a^^.. But if W
' /-t M A. •= One might with the 'ZTo.inanu.t, {^^o railed by Arifioth, ap. s. Emp.) as wcJf
dery, that there is any fuch thing as motion, as fay there is motion w/'thout a mover \ or, which h the fame, a frfl wover> f UfZ-cv pr«c«^?.e;'. Plc.to, 'Ajv!) Kty^,(rioji «T««(r!j5. Id.. neaTevKiviy. uirijU
66 The Religion of Nature. Secl-.V.
bas not this power independently in himfelf, then he rauft receive it from fome o- ther, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of conferringa faculty of producing motion originally and independently in himfelf, here will be a Firji^ independent c.i..je. And if it can be fappofed, that he has it not thus, and that the /fr;>i lliould rife too high for us to follow it j yet however we cannot but conclude, that there is fome fuch caufe^ upon whom this train ofbeings and powers muft dep.nd, if wereafonas in the former paragraph. For,
Unii-er filly ^ if Z be any effeEl wlatfoei-er^ proceeding from or depending upon Y as the caufe of its exiftence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifeftthat the ex- igence of all, 2, Y, X does originally come from W, which ftands here as the Supreme caufe, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and confequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects ;or dependents^ or rather Z more Y more X one effect^ without W there would be an effect without a caufe. Laillv, let this retrogrelTion from effecrs to theh caufes be continued ever fo far,the fime thing will IHU recur, and without fuch a caufe as is before mentiond the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon ; /'. e. dependent.^ and not dependent.
Ol^J.Thcfenes mzy^cend infinitely ^, and for that reafon have no/r/ mover or caufe. u^nf. If a feries of bodies moved can be fuppofed to be infinite^ then taken together it will be equal to an infinite body moved : and this niQ'uedyK'^ not lefsr.^- ^ire a mover than a finite bodv, but inf.niiely more. If I may not be permitted to place a firfl mover at the top o£xhc feries^ becaufeit is fuppofed to be infinite, and to have no beginning; yet flill there mull of neceflity he fome caufe or author
' The greareft men among the ancients denied the poffibility of fuch an afcent. C-jn -/^ Tis\' l'x tSc* ouffitrey titxi ug itTieoj. Ariji. If there could be fuch a procefs, then all the parts of it but the kit would be u>--<ree, : and then f~;^ lo^jsV tVt r: TJ*-e7, s>.i:6»T»c» sffasr*. *>.. To fjppofe one thing moved by anothg-, this by another, and fo ^-t' ^drt*:', is to fuppofe stw sW? a.sjyxrsr iss, .^ irr»; ih-E r.ij^ £?»* k-£ xi»s.4°"j /A~i if5-?5 kcyric 'f xmsTc. Simpl. Not only thofe Ar.ibian philofophers •aEed Hebr. CUnn-R:, ^ab. (lObrr^^b^, but many of the elder ^^i have agreed vrith the Greek, ^ m this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former fee 3/flr. mbok-o^al. particuirly 5. Kox.ri : where their iirfr argument fecrr.s to be ftrong Cand mjjch the fame with the fourth in i\ £?>::'. .
mth). r^ rnMT.-i i^yn ny ^7-\nr\ join u*^ix:n G'U^itn ry-j' r^'i-^i^ ip p^? ^i^m H'h cz-^
byian h>i» iCr» 64b n^b'zn ^b pij-i; n):i cnb r"'brr'. For tho, as Mh/cMus obferves, thefe rea- fonings of the Medabbersm iTni^^n] r:2? 1-n \VJ~b ^iOi yet mofi: certainly let the /mw of caufes *nd eficfts be what it wii', it is juft as long aoTctiwxrJ as upvcard i and it they are infinite and inex- fcuiftible one way, they muil be ib the other too: and then what S.zad.Ga. fays, takes place Nb DiJ 131 .Tin: bi? 13'?5{ HMm y'-:P. There is another argumait of this kind in fu/iin M. which de- leryes notice, what ftrefs foe%'er may be laid upcn it. Et re u,t».ei ftAe^ i ;^''^> ^7' t^» *^^ -^"' i?» I) ;^ Ts '/s.st:; ."•-;^ ?/;f=»s -=\ i '/six^ u/:^»' 17 xix on TVX ki rt yzyot^i "'^j^ ^ XV^^'
<- of
Truths relating to the Deity. 67
of the motion % different from all thefe bodies, bccaufe their being {by the ftippofition) no one body in the feries^ that moves the next, but only in confe- quence of its being moved firft itfelt^ there is no one of them that is not moved, and the whole con be confiderd together but as an infinite body moved, and which muft therefore be moved by fumething.
The fime kind of arifwer holds good in relped of all effects and their caufes in general. An infimta fuccefHon of effects will require an infinite efficient, or acaufe infinitely effdciive. So far is it from requiring no^ie.
Suppofe a chairj ^ hung down out of the heavens from an unknown height, and tho eveiy link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not vifiblc, yet it did not defcend, but kept its fituation j anduponthisaquclli- on ihould arile, fVhat fupporied or kept up this chain : would it be a fufficientan- fwer to fay, that the firfi (or loweflj Imk himg upon the fecond (or that next above it), the fecond or rather the fjfi and fecond together upon the third, and fo on ad tnfiniitrm ? For what holds up the ivhole ? A chain of ten links would fall down, unlefs fomething able to bear it hinderd : one of twenty, if not ftaid by fomething of a yet greater ll:rength, in proportion to the increafe of weight: and therefore one of infinite links certainly, if not iuftaind by fomething infi- nitely il;rong,and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a chain of caufes and effects ^ tending, or as it were gravitating, towards fome end. The lafl: (or lowefl) depends, or (as one may fayj is fufpended upon the caufe a- bove it : this again, if it be not the firft caufe, is fufpended as an effect upon fomething above it, ^c. ^. And if they fhould be infinite, unlefs (agreeably
* Ariflotle himfelf, who afTerts the eterniry of motion, aflerts alfo the neceflity of a firft and eternal mover. ** 2£<r?,» ;vj^j(riJ-4' s| »j:/y3.5-£v . Horn. Aurea. de coelo — •/«»;/ is mentiond
too by Lucr. ^ rn^bm "Tibij Sn h'lbyi mbyo i^sy b\y'?ry;'\i; niysit i^^. s. iqqar.
Where more may be feen of this i~1lb\L'bn'i?n out of Jbn Sinai, Maim. ^c. d The
chain muft be faftend •^^ pVsv O-jX-ju^-o^o. Inver.ietnr, fays Macrobius, prejjitis inttients k fmnmo
Dec ufque ad Hltimum re, urn ficem cenmxio: & hAc efi Homert catena aurea, quam pendere de
coelo in terms Deum jujpjfe commemorat. This matter might be iUuftrated by other iimilitudes (even ,"~lb^pn i — \b'V'?-'ii might ferve for one) : but I Ihall fet down but one more : and in that in- deed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the fame taken either way. It occurs in Hhob. halleb. and afterward in Rejh. hhokm. Sjppofe a rov/ of blind men, of which the Jaft laid his hand upon the fhoulder of the man ne::t before him, he on the fhoulder of the next before him, and fo on ti]] the foremoftgrew to be quite out of light , and fome body asking, what guide this ftring of blind men had at the head of them, it fhould be anfvvcrd, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and fb went on, adinfin. would any rational creature accept this for ajufl anfwer? Is it not to £y, that infinite bikidaefs (or blindnefs, if it be infinite) fuppiies the place of light, or of a guide ?
to
68 The ReligiOiNt of Nature. Sedl. V.
to what has been faidj there is fome caufe upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effed without an efficient : and to aficrt there is any fuch thing, would be as great an abfurdity^ as to fay, that a finite or Utile weight wants ibmething to fuftain it, but an infinite one or the greateft does not-
II. A Caufe or Beings that has in nature no fuperior caufe ^ and therefore {'by the termsj isalfo unproduced^ and independent^ mufl be felf-exijient : i. e. exiflence mufi he ejfential to him; ox^fuch is his nature^ that he cannot but be^. For every bc-
■ ing muft either cxift of itfelf^ oi* not of itfelf : that which exifts not of itfelf muft derive its exifbence from fome other, and fo be dependent : but the Being mentiond in the propofition is fuppofcd to be independent^ and uncaufed. There- fore He muft exill, not this way, but the other. The root of His exiftence can be fought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where elfe is to make a c-xxx^o. fuperior to the Supreme.
III. TIjere muft be fuch a Being. For ('befide what has been Hiid already^ if there was not at leaft one fuch Being, nothing could be at all ''. For the uni- 'verfe could not produce itfelf ^ j nor could any part of it produce itfelf, and then produce xhtreft : becaufe this is fuppofing a thing to a5l before // is.
* So Arijiotle fays of the Firft mover, Ovk cv^i^rrui ^»vw; \x>v' 1% u-vufic-^^ £>;, kA. And af- ter him the Arabic philofophers, Maimonides, Alio, ^ al. pajf. teach all that God exifls necejpirily. myn npU'n JD: to fuppofe him not to be implies a falfityi or. He cannot be fuppofed not to be. This feems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himfelf in Mofes's hillory j 1\y^ rpHii rrriii ; or in one word, n^P^^i which in the mouth of one who fpeaks of Him in the third perfbn is n^H"" or nin\ So Fhilo explains it; Elvxt xi(pvy.x. So Abarhanel; ""^ rT'n^^iU; inyn nrilJi ^3i4 ■^DJ^yn N>5< ^nblTn •'ibn "mJsi-'yO |^N; adding moreover, that it fiiewd God to be not, like other beings, niii'iycn ny;3''N, but lOyy n^O ni^i^ynn la^-iinn, a^NeceJfary being. And fo2?. L. b.GerJf}, iniLryn jJiyD"" nw^* ^4yD3^ ^iiniy a\i;n DT n-W, I omit others, who write after the fame man- ner. There have been even Heathens, who feemd to think, that fome fuch name as this bclongd to the Deity, and for the fame reafon. For as mn>i and thaice HIH^ are ufed above, fo Plutarch lays, that in addreffin^ to Him the fecond perfon eT (n'^nP, or mnnj is iurorsA;;? ^ QiS rr^ocrccyo- ^Jjiri', t^ 7r^o<r<pair/)(rii : and that by this compellation we give Him mAn^n ^ a^^j^'/) x^ fA,ru'M y^oyu TT^oa-yix-va-tc tkv ^ iLxi TT^oa-uyo^dliTiy. 'HfjijTv fdfi y^ cyraf ^ iivxi (juiTi-^i') i^i^ It IS r» atotov x^ ocyir/irc^ 3^ a<p^x^roy that is cvrc^^ a. ' ^ Something muft be niN^l^DH ^^''inT, othcrwife .T-H^ !s^b
b"?D >iV?j3 -im : every thing cannot be mii>l^y»D 1U;3>< . &c. Mor. neb. & al. ' This
needs no demonftration. But' there is a very old one in 5. Emm. and after in Hhob.halleb. nwiy
'^ifiun^vvi in-'in nn^i ^:^< m^n amp ^my ni^ nvyyu; anm >jvl?d nni^Ts tobD^ ^'^ ^r^^iy n^
IV. Such
Truths relating to the Deity. 6g
IV. Such a Beings as is before defer ibed^ mufl not only be eternal^ but infinite. Eternal He mud be, becaule there is no way, by which fuch a Being can cither begin or ceafe to be, exiftence being of His eflence. And infinite He muft be, be- caule He can be limitedby no other as to his exiitence. For if there was any being able to limit Him, He muft be inferior to that being. He muft alfo in that cafe be dependent : becaufe he muft be beholden to that being for his being what He is, and that He is not confined within narrower limits. Befide, i£ His prefe nee (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded. He would not he there : and if not there. He might be fuppoied to be not elfezvhere : and thus he might be fuppoied not to be at all. But fuch a Being, as is defcribedin the II. prop, cannot fo much as hcfuppofed not to be.
V. Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance : and there- fore his manner of exijlence is above all our conceptions. For He is a necejfary ex- iftent: but nothing within our comprehenfion is of this kind. We know no being, but what we can imagine not to be without any contradi6tion or repug- nance to nature : nor do we know of any befide this Supreme being himfelf. For with refpect to Him indeed we know, by reafoning, that there mufi be One be- ing who cannot be fuppofed not to be 3 juft as certainly as we know there is any thing at all : tho we cannot know Him, and how he exifts. Adequate ideas of eternity ^ and infinity are above us, us finites ''.
» what relation or analogy there is between time (a flux of moments) and eternal (unchangeable) exiftence ; how any being fliould be not older new, than he was fooo years ago, ^c. are fpccuia- tions attended with infupcrable diificulties. Nor are they at all cleard by that of Tim&Hs ap. Plat.
PC^av<3^ xrvv yJcrf/jiJ i^ctuinsfiyii^ij ; or that in Fhilo, 'A(&'» o!.vctyfu(pircn 'S voj^tS /S/©- Kta-fXia, «? ««c9-j}tS
Zf^*(^. Many philofophers therefore have thought themfelves obliged to deny, that God exills /;; time. To, T 'w, TO, r ffcn, Xf^*^ 'yiyovcr©^ itoij, (pifiovrti Xxv^oivcfOf IttI tuv uthov ia-tctv, erne efSZ^, kA. Plato. ' Eri' o 0£O5, ;(j»ii (pxvxi, ^ £r« icxt' ihvx Xf""">^ <iMa4 Kxra T citZvx T «t;cii/jT(;v, <c' a^^cvov ^ ect'fK?. ' Tcvy !^ » TTpoTi^oi, isJVf Wiv, ii<^ l<rifoy ioi viaiTifiov <x,^' if, aiv ci( ru vuv to dii TrsTXyi^aiKS, y.>^, Tlut. 1D1 (Orn pm 13^3 On^ r&4 nbyn^ CDU;n. Maim. IOT:^ -"lyD la^jsj. id. Alh has a whole Chap- ter to fliew |DTn mnn h>313 iri^ """nW. But then he owns, that their Rabbi's do not mean
nibu/n {>Din, or tzjno {dt, or that r—iiiiiyD cznip .'-T''n\i; "jiiron 5>i'm -lyiiyoi "isdj ■•nba 'm '7:t>:in; but oi mbu/n {tdt ^b a''3DT mo i^np: b±>yn nynnn -iyrvt;)2n inn. Jnfliort,
they reckon (to ufe R. GedaVs words) (OT '>nD 13"'!>i "|\ynm fri-in3 J^i^^ TDDNn {DTy;. And fo what they fay, doth not include all the preient difficulty, time in their ufe of the word being confi- ned to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet fee b. x. c. 19. fi*^'N ^"U'n
tzabiyn Minu^D ib n^n\i; nnm *i>n"io''n ^b n\iu; nno cum |)3T inr ib vi/iu; vby "ynvc^v
u-'^i^j olS'n. TO J iToic STO eiJst. So Chryfojiom.
K In
yo The Religion ^Nature! Sed.V.
In inquiring after the caufes of things, when we find (or fuppofe) this to be the caufe of that, another thing to be the caufe of this again, and fo on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with refpefb to the laft caufe that we can comprehend, M^hat is the caufe of that ? So that it is not pojfible for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in fomething, which is to us incompre- henfibk. And therefore the Supreme caufe muft certainly be fuch^ But tho it is impofTible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of exigence, yet we may be fure that,
Yl.Heexiftsinamanner^ ivhich is perfect-. For He, who exifls of himfelf, de- pends in no regard upon any other, and (i\s being a Supreme caufe) is the fountain of exiftence to other beings, muft exill in xhtuppermoft and beft manner of ex- ifting. And not only fo, but (fmce He is infinite and illimited) He mull: exiit in the beft manner illimitedly and infinitely. Now to exift thus is infinite good- nefs of exiftencej and to exift in a manner infinitely goed is to be perfe^.
VII. There can he but One fuch Being b. That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there muft be at leafto^^ independent Being, fuch as is mentiondinprop.I. fo now, that in reality there is but One <". Becaufe his manner of exiftence being perfect and illimted, that mannei' of being ("if I may fpeak fo) is exhaufi- ed by Him, or belongs folely to Him ^. If any other could partake with Him in it. He muft want what that other had ; be deficient and limited. Infinite
and iUimited inclofe all ^.
If there could be /wo Beings each by himfd? abfolutely perfect, they muft be either of the fame, or of different natures. Of the fame they cannot be 3 becaufe thus, both being infinite, their exiftences would be coincident : that is, they would be hwtxhc fame or one. Norcan they ht oUiff event ratrnxs: becaufe if their na- tures were oppofite or contrary the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and eyery where meeting the one with the other), the one would ]u(tdefiroy or be
a simonUes had good reafon dill to double upon Hiero the number of days allovvd for anfvvering ttat queftion, 6)«,V/, aut quale Jit Deus ? Ap. Cic. " Nee viget quhlquam fimile mt fecun-
dum Hot. '^ = In Mor. neb. Mamonides having proved, that there muft be fome Being, who drifts necejfarily, or whofe exiftence is mceff^ary ^my n^^roi, proceeds from this neccffity ot exi- ftence to derive /W^.r/^ore/Vy, aUolnte fimplicity, perfeBion, and particularly «»/ry, miJi^^^xn n^MHOT >D1 isn i^bi HDn 5>ib hbo nPSWn n -l\t;2>3 ^«- '^ Therefore by Plato He is called
'O ill, the One. * Beus, ft perfecius efi, tit ejfe debet, non potcjl ejfe nifi tmts, ut in
to fin t omnia. If there could be more Gods than one, tanttm fingulis decrit, qimnitm in ceteris
•' the
Truths relating to the Delty.^ yi
the negation of the other ^ ; and if they are fuppofed to be only different, not op- pofite, then if they differ as difparates^ there muft be fome genus above them j which cannot be : and however they differ, they can only be faid at moft to be beings perfed in their refpe^he kinds. But this is not to be abfolutely perfed 5 it is only to be perfect in this or that refpcct : and to be only thus imphes im- perfection in other refpects.
What has been here fliid is methinks fufficient to ruin the Manichean caufe and exclude the independent principle of e'uil For if we cannot account for the exigence of that evil^ which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one inlhnce out of many of our ignorance. There may be reafons for it, tho we do not know them. And certainly no fuch experience mull; make us deny axioms or truths equally certain ^. There are, befide, fome things relating to this fub- je6t, which deferveour attention. For as to moral goodi and evil, they feem to depend upon ourfelves'^. If we do but endeavour, the mofl we can, to do what we ought, we fhall not be guilty of not doing it (fed. IV.) : and therefore it is our fliult, and not to be charged upon any other being ^^ if guilt and^i?// be in- troduced by our negled, or abufe of our own liberty and powers ^ Then as to /j/^j/f^/ evil J without it much phyfical^oc^ would be loft,the one ncceffarily infer- ring the other ^. Some thingsy?m to be evil, which would not appear to be fuch, if we could fee through the whole contexture of things §. There are not more e- vilthan good things in the world, butfurely more of the latter"^. Many evils of this kind, a5 well as oii\\Q former^ come by our own fault > fome perhaps by way o^punijlment j fome oiphyfic ' j and fome as the means to happinefs, not otherwife to be obtaind. And if there is a future ftate, that which feems to be wrong now may be redified hereafter. To all which more may yet be added. As, that matter is not capable of perfection j and therefore where that is concernd, there mufi he imperfections, and confequently evils '^ So that to ask, why God permits evil, is
As light and darknefs arc. AJo yj £|t(rtr^svTot «i»viiA5(? >cj4j' cvavTiwo-iv <pB-x^riy-ci sVat tc^vtiw? t?; i.>:^y,X6i-^ o-yj-ao-w?. Baf. There can be no fuch law between them, as is faid to be among the Hea- then deities. &ic7(rt ^ io^ t^i yi,y.<^. Ou^m i^ravrSv /3aAl;«« tt^dBi'iaU T^ ^ .S-eAovt©-, k'a. Euxip.
^ A.7:oXo>Xa v, kX^?^ii , tVst cro ^•j?vyj:c: Id. c ■ii'^y.y %'^{^ tk-jTiU(rio>- si -^ Ksurli yma-i*
(i[/>'x,§ru.mi, Hrt y-ura tu^.I'm xo^'niit^, xA. Cyr. Hier. ^ "iiv kvToq u xt/f*S>-, Tisrav raj? ci'^oi^
l^y) l^iT^.a-fi hi^uBiv. S. Ba/. e 2^:tJ God ext'mgmjl} fun, moon, and fiars, bscaufe fome peo-
jple worfl}ip them? Mifl;;n. Aut£ ri iXoi^n aIt'm, &io<; axa/r*©-. Max. T. ^ "H ^i^'ii 'f^ <r^-
fA,a,ri 7rx^<4,(rK<iUu^u it^on-.v t^otS, «a. Max. T. This obfervation might be extended a great way. It there was, v. g. no fuch thing as poverty, there could be no riches, or no great benefit by them_ there would be fcarce any arts or fciences, <!^c. 'A* rp UnXy, t\'» ^vUy^ 'S /3<» Tiji/ c-wVao-'^ etvijAf? oj;r£«o-«i', k\. Chryf ^ Tec yji^/j zecc, k'Jro ro «Aov ^ii tTKOTTiTv^ ii (rt/i/tipuytt' ^ Uef-tjo-PiovTct,
c^i'w (with more to this purpofc). Vlot. '' V. Mor. nebok. 3.12. \ U^Xvu^c, ^
"S ©fS iV-rpi>i^. Simpl. k K«y.('<4 .3A«r:i,W'« -t vXiji, Tint.
K 2. to
72 The Religion 0/ Nature. Sed. V.
to nsk, why he permits a material world, or (lich a being as man is ^ j indowd in- deed with fome noble fliculties, but incumberd at the fame time with bodily paf- fions and propenfions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfed being ; and that is, any being at all : which is a bold de- mand, and the anfwer to it hes perhaps too deep for us. If this world be de- iignd for a/'^/^/r^, where men ^ are loexercife their faculties and their virtues, and by that prepare themfelves for a fuperior ftate ^ (^indwho can fay it is not?) there mu^ht difficulties and temptations^ occafions and opportunities for this ex- ercife. Laftly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true origin j yet if they would but ferioufly refle6t upon the many marks of reafon^ ivifdom and gtiodnefs every where to be obferved in inftances, which they do or may under- ftand, they could fcarce doubt but the fime things prevaild in thofe, which they do not underftand. If I fliould meet with a book^ the author of which I found had difpofed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his fubjeds with reafonand exadnefsi but at laft, as I red on, came to a/^w leaves written in a language which I did not know : in this cafe I Ihould clofe the book with a full pertuafion, that the fame vein of good fenfe, which iliewd itfelf in the former and much greater part of it, ran thro the other alfo ; efpecially having argu. ments a priori^ which obhged me to believe, that the author of it all was the fame perfon. This I fliould certainly do, rather than deny the force of thofe arguments, in order to affert t%vo authors of they^w^ book. But the evil prin- ciple has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return.
VIII. Jll other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propoft^ tions for their esijience. For fmce there can be but one perfe6t and independent being, the reft muft be imperfed and dependent : and fince there is nothing elfe, upon which they can, ultimately^ depend befide Him, upon Him they 7nu(i and^o depend.
IX. He is therefore the Author of nature : nor can any thing be ^ or be done^ but what He either caufes (immediately^ or mediately)^ or permits. All beings (by the laft) depend upon Him for their exiftence: upon whom depends their exiftence,upon him alfo muft depend the intrinfic manner of their exiftence, or the natures of thefe
3 To that queftion. Why are we not fo made, <aVs y^n^): ^ay^of^oic, iiyJ^v vzjJi^x^tv tI U^jx^ravm^ S.Bafil anfwers, Becaufe ci^ir/> ok Tr^aai^icnui >^ cm il kvcc[x.-/i', ymrtcu And he who blames theDc, ty becaufe we are not impeccable, s^sv 'in^^ov « th» «Aoyov (pJcriv v Aey*x.si? TT^onfj-ju, >c, rnv ccy-vr/iTO)! >c, kvo^fAnrov 'f ^foxi^irtK'Hc, <£" ifAjTr^ux-TH. ^ 'aB-XhtxI u^iT^i, as Thilo. '= In C.hryfo,1om's
ftyle, u^iTKc, i7niMXi7i3(„ (c^ KccB-xTn^ ov TrotXatrpci sVt J' ^rctpovrC^ /3i'» uyuviX^'S^' "'« .«-? ■^'' •^'-'^'i'*"** '""
beings :
Truths relating to the Deity. 75
beings : and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the necejfary effe^s and confequences of their being, and being fuch as they are in themfeh^cs. Then, as to the atls of fuch of them as may htfree agents^ and the ef- fects of them, He is indeed not the Author of thofe •, becaufe by the terms and fuppofition they proceed from agents, who have no neceflity impoied upon them by Him to a6l either this or that way. But yet however xht(t free agents muft depend upon Him as fuch : from Him they derive their power of a6ting : and it is He, who permits them to ufe their Uberty j tho many times, through their own fault, they ufe itamifs. And, lallly, as to the nature of thofe relations^ which he between ideas or things really ex//? ^>/^, or which arife from fa6l:s already done andpafty thefe refult from the natures of the things themfelves : all which the Supreme being either caufes, or permits (lis before). For fince things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, diiagree- ments, 6?^- are nothing but their manners of being with refped to each other the natures of thefe relations will be determind by the natures of the things.
From hence now it appears, that whatever exprefTes the exiftences or non-ex- iftences of things, and their mutual relations ^jj they are, is tYUchy the con fiitution of nature : and if fo, it muft alfobe agreeable to His perfe6t comprehenfton of all truth, and to His icv//, who is at the head of it. Tho the a6t of A (fome free a- gent) is the eifccl of his liberty, and can only be faid to be permittedhy the Su- preme being j yet when it is once done, the relation between the doer ^nd the deed, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one w^ho has committed fuch a fad, is ^fjxt relation. From thenceforward it will ^/w^j; be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it : and if any oncfhould deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whofe exiftence is now proved. And thus thofe arguments in fe£t. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon z/up- pofttion that there was fuch a Being, are here confirmed and made ahfolute.
X- '^he onefupreme and perfect Being, upon whom the exifience of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the word GOD.
There are other truths iliil remaining in relation to the Deity, which we may know, and which are necejjary to be known by us, if we would endeavour to de- mean our felves toward Him according to truth and what He is. And they are fuch, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attri- butes j but alfo may ferve at the fame time -xs further proofs of His exiftence, aivi an ampliftcaticn of fome things touched perhaps too hghtly. As,
XL GOD
74 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. V.
XI. GOD cannot be corporeal : or, there can be no corporeity in God. There are many things in matter utterly inconfiftent with the nature of llich a Beings 5is it has been demonftrated God muft be.
Matter exiils in parts , every one of which, by the term, is imperfe^'' : but ip a Being abfolutcly perfe6t there can be nothing that is imperfect.
Thefe parts, tho they are many times kept clofely united by fome occult in- fluence, are in truth fo many diftin^i bodies, which may, at leaft in our ima- gination, be disjoind or placed otherwife: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural difcerpibility and fufceptivity of various fhapes and modifications : /'. e. mutability feems to be ejfcntial to it. But God, cxilt- ing in a manner that is perfect, exiils in a manner that mull be uniform, always one and the fame, and in nature unchangeable.
Matter is incapable of acting, pajjive only, and flupid : which are defects, that can never be afcribed to him who is the Firft caufe or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.
Then, if He is corporeal, where ever there is a •vacuum. He muil: be excluded^ and fo becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chafms.
Laftly, there is no matter or body, which may not be fuppofed not to be j whereas the idea of God or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves in it cxiftence.
XII. Neither infinite [pace, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally exifling, nor any, nor all of thefe taken together, can be God. For,
Space taken feparately from the things, which poflefs and fill it, is but an empty fcene or vacuum : and to fay, that infinite fpacc is God, or that God is infinite fpace, is to fay that He is an infinite vacuum : than which nothing can be more abfurd, orblafphemous. How c^n fpace, which is but a vail void, ra- ther the negation of all things, than pofitively any thing, a kind of diffufed no-
oAa, fays Flotinus even of the Soul. *> AihiHTca i) y^ ot< [j^syiS^ aJiv cv^iX'O '-/C^^ tc.utIw
^(Tieif ayhci ccyji^f.c, iC^ <iJjt;i'gsT05 sV*)'' Arijl.
thing j
Truths relating to the DeityJ 75
ihing 5 how can this, I %, be the Firft caufe, ^c. or indeed any caufe ? What attributes befide penetrabiHty and cxtenfion, what excellencies, what perfedions is it capable of ^ ?
As infinite [pace cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or fpace ; fo tho He is eternal, yet eternity or infinite duration itfelf is not God ''. For duration, abftra61:ed from all durables, is nothing actually exifting by itfelf: it is the duration of a beings not a being.
Infinite fpace and duration^ taken together, cannot be God : becaufean inter- minable fpace of infinite duration is ftill nothing but eternal fpace j and that is at moft but an eternal vacuum.
Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconfiflent with Divine perfedion, tho»^(3;//^rlhould be infinitely extended^ or there fhouldbe an infinite quantity of it, yet ftill, where ever it is, it carries this inconfiftence along with it.
If to matter be added infinite duration.^ neither does this alter the nature of it. This only fuppofes it to be eternally what it is, /. e. eternally incapable of Di- vine perfe6lion.
And if to it you add the ideas of both infinite extenfion (ox fpace) and dura- tion too ; yet Hill, fo long as matter is matter, it muft always and every where be incapable of Divinity,
Laftly, not the univerfe^ or fum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then every thing is divine, every thing God, or of God ; and fo all things together muft make but one being ^. But the contrary to this we fee, there be- ing evidently many beings diftin6t, and feparable one from another, and inde- pendent each of other. Nay, this diftin6tion and feparation of exiftence, be- fide what we fee without us, we may even feel within our felves. We arey^- verally confcious to our felves of the individuation and diftinction of our own
a They, who call God CZlip):., do it lOlprs bDH r&)1 b^H CZllpn ><inu; ^ob. Thijhbi. Or, as Thil. Ac^u'm. from the ancients, irjipD mb^V pjsil Ubw ^^ CZnpD n'npn. 06 ^ ^z^iyjTse.^ \o ©w?3' "'^•'^ '^ijci '"« "^^v. Th.Jud. By which ways of {peaking (tho there is a Cabbaliftic reafon ailigned too) they intend chiefly to exprefs his omniprefence and immenfity. That in Aci. Ap. leems to be of the lame kind, 'Ev uvrZ yi ^ZfJ^, ;^ mviyji^x,, Kcct ia-fS^. t Such things as
thcfe, how incongruous and wild foever they are, have bin affirmed ; that God is infinite du- ration, fpace, ^c. What can be meant by that, i^xXu^ kv XiyoiTo o cciav 3-so?, in FlotJnus f c Were not they, who converge with books, accuftomd to fiich trials, it would be fhocking to find Bdlbus in Cicero aflerting, ejfe mundum demn : and yet in another place, that it is qu^fi communis de~ orum, atque homi/ium domus, aut urbs utrorumque ; and deorum, homiriHmque caufa, fa£tus: in ano- ther, proviJentia dccriim mundnm, f^' omms ?nHndi partes ^ initio conjlitutas eJfe, ^ omni tempore adminifirari : in another, fnuiuhint ipfnm rtatnrd fiidminijlrari ; with ether like incorJiflences.
z minds
7(5 The Religion of Nature. Sedt. V.
minds from all other : nor is there any thing, oi which we can be more cer- tain. Were we all the fame being, and had one mind, as in that cafe we muft have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one perfon } but they muft be common acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one confcience common to us thW''. Befide, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of fuch things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable inftance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we fliould not know even our felves, and whap we are "^ ? In fhort, no colleUion of beings can be one being ; and therefore not God. And the univerfe itfelf is but a collection of diftinct beings *=.
XIII. // is fo far from being true that God is corporeal^ that there could he no fuch thing as either matter or motion^ if there was not fome Superior beings upon whom they depended. Or, God is fuch a beings that without Htm there could be nei- ther matter nor motion. This muft be true oi matter : becaufe it has been proved already, that there can be but one independent being j that he is incorporeal j and that the exiftence of all other beings muft depend upon Him. But the lame thing may be proved otherwife. If matter (I mean the exiftence of it) does not depend upon fomething above it, it muft be an independent being 5 and if an independent being, a neceflaiy being > and then there could bene fuch thing ^s^ vacuum: but all bodies muft be perfectly folid-, and, more than that, the whole world could be but one fuch body, five times as firm as brals, and incapa- ble of all motion. For that being which exifis neceffarily does necejfarily exifi : that is, it cannot not exiji. But in avacuum matter does not exift.
Moreover, i£ matter be an independent, necefiary being, and exifts of itfelf, this muft be true of every particle of it : and if fo, there could not only be no vacuum
* ^'Atottov h itjCce, vi l^jij'fi \f^v)(/i\ r^ ii oriiv kXi^ii' i^f'yiv Y^ iutjS oiiS'a.vo^S/JH, J^ xPi^oy u.tS-cin(3^, >o o-
Aw$ oi/j67:x6hv li^S? ts Tifo^ a^n'A^?, >^ 5rpo? to ttuv. Plot. Here this author is clear, tho at fome other times very dark. ^ Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, ft ejfet Bens? Cic. '^ The
fyftem of Spinofa is fo apparently falfe, and full of impieties and contradiftions, that more needs not be faid againft it : tho much might be. What Velleius fays in Cicero, is not only true. Si yrmndm cji
dem, dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerate dicenda funt : but, if there is but one fub-
ftance, one nature, one being, and this being is God, then all the follies, madneffes, wickedneiles that are in the world, are in Godj then all things done and fiifferd are both done and fufferd by Him^ He is both caufe and effedt; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the fame things at the fame time, i^c. That fuch grofs Atheifm as this fhould ever be fafhionable! Atheifm: for certainly when we inquire, whether there is a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourfelves and all other things which are vifible about us do exifl : fomething different from them muft be in- tenjied. Therefore to fay, there is no God different from them, is to fay, there is no God at all. f but
Truths relating to the Deity. 77
but every particle muft be every 'where. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of fuch certain dimenfions by its own nature 5 fince this confinement o^ cxiftence within certain bounds implies non-exiftence in other places beyond thofe bounds, and is equal to a negation of exiftence ; and when exiJienceiseiTcir tial to any being, a negation of exiftence cannot be fo. Nor, in the next place could its exiftence be Hmited by any thing elfe^ becaufe it is liippofed to have its exiftence only of itfelfj /. e. to have d. principle of exiftence in itfelf, or to have an exiftence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.
And I may add ftill, if matter be felf-exiftent, I do not fee, not only how it comes to bereftraind to a place of fome certain capacity, but alfo how it comes to be limited in other refpe^ls j or why it Ihould not exift in a manner that is in all refpe^s perfed. So that thus it appears, matter muft derive its exiftence from fome other being, who caufes it to bejuft what it is. And the being, who can do this, muft be God.
It is tonopurpofe to obje6t here, that one cmnot conceiz^e, how the exiftence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being ahve our conceptions the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, muft alfo be unconceivable. Reafon difcovers, that this vifible world muft owe its ex- iftence to fomeinvifible Almighty being > /. e. it difcovers this to be fad, and we muft not deny fads becaufe we know not how they are effeded. It is far from being new, that our faculties fliould difclofe to us the exiftence of things, and then drop us in our inquiiy hotv they are. Thus much for matter.
As for motion 5 without a Firft caufe, fuch as has been defcribed, there could be none : and much Ms fuch motions as we fee in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if matter itfelf could not be without fuch a caufe, it is certain «?(?//o;?, which is an afFedion of matter, could never be.
But further,there could be no mot ion, \m\ds either there be in matter itfelf a pow- er oibeginning it j or it is communicated from body to body in an infinite fucceffi on, ox in a <r/r^/f, and fo has no beginnings or elfe \s produccdhy fome incorporeal being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices tho never fo repugnant to reafon, I can hardly believe any one will afTert, that a par- cel Q?mere matter (let it be great or fmall, of any figure whatfoever, ^c.) left alto- gether to itfelf, could everof itfelf %•« to move. If there is any fuch bold aftertor, let him fix his eyes upon fome lump of matter, ex. gr. ^Jlone, piece oUiniber, or a clod (cleard of all animals), and perufe it well j and then ask himfclf ferioufly, whe- therit is poflible for him in earneft to believe, that thmtftone, log, ox clod, tho no- thing corporeal or incorporeal ihould excite or meddle with it, might fome time or other of itfelf begin to creep. However, to be fhort, a power of beginning motion
J-* ic
78 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. V.
is not in the idea of matter. It is paflive, as we fee, to the impreffions of mo- tion, and fufceptive of it j but cannot produce it. On the contrary, it will al- ways perfift uniformly in its prefent fiate^ either of reft or motion, if nothing ftirs, diverts, accelerates, or ftops it. Nor is there any thing in all phyfics bet- ter fettled than that, which is called 'vis ineYt'ne^ or the inertia of matter.
The propagation of motion from body to body, without any Firfi mover, or immaterial caufe of motion, has been proved impoffible, prop. I.
The fuppofition of a perpetual motion in a circle is begging the queftion. For if A moves B, B moves C, and fo on to Z, and then Z moves A 3 this is the fame
as to fay, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, Z; that is,
A moves itfelf^ or can begin motion ^
It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from fome mover incorporeal : which muft be either that Supreme and felf-exifting fpirit himfelf, who is God 5 or fuch, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is fuch a Being. Turn back to p. 6f .
If we confider our/elves, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there fee the thing exemphfied. We move our bodies or fome members of them, and by thefe move other things, as they again do others j and know thefe motions tofpring from the operations of our minds : but then we know alfo,that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could not be fo limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to fmall quan- tities and certain circumftances only : we fhould have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are neceffitated to look up and acknowledge fome Higher being, who is able notonlytoj^rc?^/^;^^ motion, but to impart ^faculty of producing it.
And if the petty motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may thoiJc greater motions we fee in the world, and thepb^no- mena attending them : I mean the motions of the planets and heavenly bodies. . For thefe muft be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, a6l- ing upon them immediately, or by caufes and laws of His appointment -, or by their refpedive movers, who, for reafons to which you can by this time be no ftranger, muft depend upon fome Superior, that furnifhd them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done either of thefe ways, we can be at. no great diftance from a demonftration of the exifience of a Deity.
» \Vh:it Cenfor in us charges upon many great men (but upon fome of them furely unjufjy) is to me unintelligible. He fays, they helkved femper hsmines fuip, ^c. and then, Itaque & omnium, e^ud in fempiteriso ifio rr.undo femper fuerunt, futuraque funt , aiunt principium fuijfe mdlum-, fed orbcm cjfe muemdam (^emr^ntimn, ndfcenmmqtie, in (im minfcti.jtfoitie geniti inittHmfmul & finis ejfe vidcatur.
4 it
Truths relating to the Deity. ■ ^p
It may perhaps be faid, that tho matter has not the power of moving itfelf, yet it hath an attradiive force, by which it can move other parts of matter: fo that all matter equally moves and is moved. But, allowing thofe things which are now ufually afcribed to attra£lion^ we Ihall ftill be necellitated to own fome Superior being, whofe influence mixes itfelf with matter, and operates upon it i or at leaft who, fome way or other, imparts this force. For attraction^ accord- ing to the true fenfe of the word, fuppofes one body to aft upon another at a diflance, or where it is not ; but nothing can be an agent, where it is not at all. Matter can ad only by contaEi^ impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by fomething elfe, or refiiling thofe which ftrike againft it, when it is at reft. And this it docs as ^natter-, i. e. by being impenetrable to other matter : but attradion is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called attra£lion^ is fo called only becaufe the fame things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attra6t : but in truth this can only be an eifed of fome- thing, which a6ts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter feem not only to gravitate towards each other, but many of them to fly each other. Now thefe two contrary motions and feeming qualities cannot both proceed from matter qua matter ; cannot both be of the nature of it : and therefore they muft be owing to fome external caufe, or to fome other being, which exites in them this, as it were love and difcord ".
Befide, as to the revolution of a planet about the fun, mere gravitation is not fufficient to produce that effe6t. It muft be compounded with a motion of />ro- je^ion, to keep the planet from filling diredly into the fun, and bring it about : and from what hand, I defire to know, comes this other motion (or direction) ? Who imprefled it?
What a ^'aft field for contemplation is here opend ! Such regions of matter a- bout us, in which there is not the kafl particle that does not carry with it an ar- gument of God's cxiftencej not the kafl ftick or ftraw, or other trifle th^t falls to the ground, but fhews it j not the flighteft motion produced, the leaft whif- per of the air, but tells it.
XIV. The frame and conflitution of the world, the afloniflnng magnificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity obferved in the pro- duciiuns of things, the ufesand ends for which they ferve^ ^c. do allflocw that there is fome Almighty deflgner, an infinite wifdom and fower at the top of all thefe thin^
ds :
» So what we call attra£tion and averfion (cetitripetal and centrifugal forces) feem to have been called by Lmpdocles: <p4Ai«s jj (rvyx.:^n.e.i\j^(ii '^ciXMi]^ (^n?«:(^ u aiu.y.^in\cii. Diog.L.(-v,Em^.)V.Arifi' Cic. ^ al.
L z. fuch
So T'^e' Religion o/' Nature, Seel. V.
fucb marks there are of both ^. Or, God is that Beings without whom fuch a frame or conflitution of the worlds fuch a magnificence in it, i^c. could not he. In order to prove to any one the grandnefs of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him confider the fun with that inflipportable glory and luftre that furrounds it ; to demonftrate the vaft diflance^ magnitude, and heat of it : to re- prefent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their feveral orbits about it > affording a regular variety of afpeds j guarded Ibmc of them by fecondary planets, and as it were emulating the flate of the fun ; and probably all pofleft by proper inhabitants : to remind him of thofe furprifing vifits the comets make us 5 the large trains, or uncommon fplen- dor, which attends them 5 the far country they come from 5 and the curiofity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who alfo may be up to fee the entry and progrefs of thefe minifters of fate '' ; to dire6b his eye and contemplation, through thofe azure fields and vail regions above him, up to the fixt ftars^ that radiant numberlefs hofl of heaven > and to make him underftand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they fhould be placed there only to adorn and befpangle a canopy over our heads ft ho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much lefs to fupply the places of fo many glow-worm5, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets : to convince him, that they are rather fo many other funs, with their feveral regions and fets of planets about them: to fiiew him, by the help of glafii^s, ftill more and more of thefe fixt lights, and to be- get in him an apprehenfion of their unaccountable numbers, and of thofe im- wenfefpaces^ that lie retired beyond our utmofi reach and even imagination : I fay, one needs but to do this, and explain to him fuch things as are now known almoft to every body j and by it to Ihew that if the world be not infinite, it is infimtofimilis *^ j and therefore fure a magnificent ftrufture, and the work of an infinite Architc£t. But if we could take a view of all the particulars contaiad within that aftonilhing compafs, which we have thus haftily run over, how would wonders multiply upon us ? Every corner, every part of the world is as it were made up of other worlds. If we look upon this our feat (I mean this
* So far is that from being true, Nequaquam — dlv'mitus ejfe creatam Naturam mundi, qu£ tanta. ejl
fr&dtta. ctilpA-Lucret. Men raflily (impioufly) cenfure what they do not underftand. Like that king
oiCC'ft'de, who fancied himfelf able to have contrived a better fyftern of the world ; becaufe he knew
not what the true fyftemis, but took it to be as afcribed to him by R. If. ao.Sid, and other aftronc-
mers of thofe times. ^ Since they have, or may have great effefts upon the feveral parts of
the folar fyftem , one may fpeak thus without falling into the fupcrftition of the multitude, or meaning
what is intended by that, Nunqmrn uloffs^fttum immune comet en (in ClatuL), or the like. <= I's-
mnth ^in^nitojitmlh-flin.
earth?3
Truths relating to the Deity^ 81
carthj, what fcope is here for admiration ? The great variety of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, feas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different animals^ with which it is flocked ! The multifarious inventions and works of one of thefe j that is, of us men^ 6<:c. And yet when all thefe (heaven and earth) are furveyd as nicely ^s they can be by the help of our unailifted fenfes, and even of telefcopical glaHes, by the afhftance of good microfcopes in very fmall parts of matter as ma- ny new wonders * may perhaps be difcoverd, as thofc already obferved 5 new kingdoms o^ ^mm-^\s; nf^ architeSlure and curiofity of work. So that as before our fenfcs and even conception fainted in thofe vaft journeys we were obliged to take in confidering the expanfe of the univerfe > fo here again they fail us in our refearches into the /)r;««/'/^i and conilituent parts of it. Both the beginnings and the ends of things, the leafl and the greatefi, all confpire to baffle us ; and which way ever we profecute our inquiries, we ftill fall in with frejh fubje£bs of amaze- ment, and freJJj reafons to believe that there are indefinitely flill more and more behind, that will for ever efcape our cagerefl purfuits and deepefl penetration.
This mighty building is not only thus grand, and the appearances ftupendous in it, but the manner in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their caufes too profound for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know j and fome, of which we feem to know the caufes : but, alas ! how /f ware thefe with refped to the whole fum .^ And the caufes which we af- fign, what are they ? Commonly fuch, as can only be exprefTed in general terms, whilft the bottoms oi things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been collcded from experience^ but could fcarcely be known beforehand, by any ar- guments a priori J to be capable of rendering fuch effeds : and yet till caufes are known after that manner, they are not thoroughly underftood. Such, as feem difproportionate and too little^ and are fo infufficient and unfatisfadory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that fomething immaterial and in-viji- ble muft be immediately concerned. In fhort, we know many times, that fuch a thing will have fuch an effed, or perhaps that fuch an effe6t is produced by fuch a caufe, but the manner how we know not 5 or but grofly, and if fuch an hypothefis be true. It is impoflible for us to come at the true prin- ciples of things, or to fee into the oeconomy of the fineft part of nature and workings of the firji fprings. The caufes that appear to us, are but efe^s of other caufes : the vejfels^ of which the bodies of plants and ani- mals confiil, are made up of otber^ [mailer veflels : the fubt Heft parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal fpirits, or particles of hght), h2^7e their parts, and may for ought we know be compound hodks : and as to the fubftances
* UoiKi^r, S-avf/^dTii^yM. Plot,
f them-
82 The Religion of Nature.' Se6t. V,
themfelves of all thefe things, and their internal conftitution^ they are hid from our eyes. Our philofophy dwells in the furface of nature.
However, in the next place, we ourfelvcs cannot but be witnefles, that there 'Aveflated methods^ as fo many fet forms of proceeding, which things pun6lu- ally and religioufly keep to. The fame caufes^ circumftanced in the fame man- ner, have always the fame fuccefs : all the /pedes of animals, among us, are made according to one general idea j and fo are thofe of plants alfo, and even minerals : no new ones are brought forth or arifen any where : and the old are prefervcd and continued by the old ways.
Lafblyjit appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world,that there is a contrivance and a refpe<5t to certain reafons and ends. How the fun is po- Htcdnear the middle of our fyftemforthe more fo«i;^w>;2/difpenfing of his benign influences to the planets moving about him j how the plain of the earth's aqua- tor interfe£bs that of her orbit, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to ,diverfify the year, and create a ufeful variety of feafens, and many other things of this kind, tho a thoufand times repeated, v/ill airways be pleaiing m.editati- ons to good men and true fcholars. Who can obferve the 'vapors to afcend, efpecially from the fea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condenfation, and not underftand this to be a kind of difiillation in order to clear the water of its groffer filts, and then by rains and dews to fupply the fountains and rivers with ft-elli and wholfom liquor ^ to nouriili the vegetables below by fliowers, which defcend in drops as from a watering-pot upon a garden, ^c. who can view the ftru^ure of a plant or animal > the indefinite number of their fibres and fine vefTels, the formation of larger veflels and the feveral members out of them, and the apt difpofttion of all thefe j the way laid out for the reception and diilribution of nutriment -, ihtefeSl this nutriment has in extending the vefiels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expanfion, continuing the motion of the feveral fluids, repairing the decays of the body, and prefcrving life : who can take notice of the feveral faculties of animals, their arts offaving and providing for themfelves, or the ways in which they are provided for 3 the ufes of plants to animals, and of fome animals to others, particularly to man- kind 3 the care taken that the feveral fpecies fhouid be propagated out of their proper feeds (without confuflon^j, the llrong inclinations implanted m animals for that purpofe, their love of their young, and the like : I la)-, v/ho .^an do this, and not fee a defgn, in fuch regular pieces, fo nicely wrought, and fo prcferved? If there was but one animal, and in that cafe it could not bedoubt-
a If anyone, fitting upon mount Ida, had feen the Greek army coming on in proper order [/ast;* we^.5 K«5-p» ^ Txhoj<irot\ 7i'J\ci<i ;rs8{ri5(r«v], he ought mofl: certainly, notwithlranding what Sext. ^Hr.ikys, to have concluded, that there was feme coiT.mander, under whofe condud they moved.
" ed
Truths relating to the Deity, 83
cd but that his eyes were made that he might fee with them, his ears that he might hear with them and fo on, through at leafl the mofl confiderable parts of him 5 if it can much lefs be doubted, when the fame things arc repeted'm the individuals of all the tribes of animals j if the like obfervations may be made with refpe(5t to "jegetables^ and other things : and if all thefe kinds of things, and therefore* much more their particulars^ upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceiv- ably numerous fas moft evidently they arej, one cannot but be convinced from that, which is fo 'very obvious to every underftanding, and plainly runs through the nobler parts of the vifible world, that not only they, but other things, even thofe that feem to be lefs nohle^ have lYicix ends too, tho not fo well underftood.
And now lince we cannot fuppofe \ht parts of matter to have contrived this won- derful form of a world among themfelves, and then by agreement to have taken their refpedive pofts, and purfued conftant ends by certain methods and mea- fures concerted (becaufe thefe areads, of which they are not capable), there muft be fome other Being, whofe wifdom and power are equal to fuch a mighty work, as is the Jiru6lure and prefervation of the world. There mull be fome almighty Mind, who models and adorns it ) lays the caufes of things fo deep j prefcribes them fuch uniform and fteady laws -, defines and adapts them to certain purpo- ies 5 and makes one thing to fit and anfwer to another ^
Th^it fticb a beautiful khcme,fucb a juft and geometrical arrangement of things, Gompofed, of innumerable parts, and placed as the offices and ufes and wants of the feveral beings require, through fuch an immenfe extent, ihould be the effed of chance only, is a conceit fo prodigioufly abfurd, that certainly no one can efpoufe it heartily, who underftands the meaning of that word. Chance kems to be only a term, by which w-^ exprefs our ignorance of the caufe of any thing. For when we fay any thing comes by chance, we do not mean, that it had no other caufe ; but only, that we do not know the true caufe, which produced it, or interpofed in fuch a manner, as to make that fall out which was not ex- pe6ted. Nor can I think, that any body has fuch an idea of chance, as to make it an agent or really exifting and afting caufe of any thing, and much lefs furc of all things. Whatever events or effects there arc, they muil pro- ceed from fome agent or caufe, which is dihcrfree or not free (1:hatis, ncccda- ryj. If it be free, it wills what it produces : and therefore that which is pro- duced is produced with defgn, not by chance. If it ads neceflarily, the event muft necefjarily be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been 3 or it is an accident only, that
thing as this doth not come by accident.
84 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. V.
it is There can be therefore »(;>^^ caufe as chance. And to omit a great dealthii might yet be faid, matter is indefinitely divirible,and the firft particles (ox atomsj of which it confifts muft be fmall beyond all our apprehenfion j and the chances, that muft all hit to produce one individual of any fpecies of material beings (if only chance was concerned), muft confcquently be indefinitely many: and if rpaceht^\(o indefinitely extended, and the number of thofe individuals Cnot to fay of xhc fpecies themfelves; which lie difperfcd in it indefimte, the chances re- quired to the produaion of them all, or of the univerfe, will be the redangle of one indefinite quantity drawn into another. We may well call them infinite. And then to fay, that any thing cannot happen, unlefs infinite chances coincide, is the f^imeas to fay, there are infimite chances againft the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen : and this again is the (lime as to %, it is impofilbk to happenj fince if there be apoffibility that it;^^^ happen, the hazaixl is not in- finite Vhe world therefore cannot be the child of chance \ He muft be lit- tle acquainted with the works of nature, who is not fenfible how delicate and fine they are : and tht finer tliey are, the grofer were thofe of Epicurus K
If it ftiould be objeaed, that many things lecm to be ufclefs, many births ^rt monfirous, or the like, fuch anfwers as thefe may be made. The ufes ot fome things are known to Jome men, and not to others : the ufes of fome are known now, that were not known to any ho^y fiormerly : the ufes of many may be difcoverd hereafter : and thofe of fome other things may for ever re- main unknown to all men, and yet be innature, as much as thole difcoverd were before their difcovery, or are now in refped of them who know them not. Thinas have not therefore no ufes,becaufe they are concealdfrom us. Nor is na- ture in-egular, or without method, becaufe there are fome/..;^/;.^ deviations from the common rule. Thefe are generally the effeas of that influence, which free agents and various circumftances have upon natural produaionsi which may be deformed, or hurt by external imprejjions, heterogeneous «/^//^r introduced, or difagreeable and unnatural motions excited : and if the cafe could be truly put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as regularly (or the laws of na- ture have as regular an eftea),when a monfier is produced, as when the ufual iffue m common cafes. Under thefe circumftances the monfter is the genuine ifllie : that is,
^Hocaulexinmat fieri potuip, nonintelligo cur non ,dem futet, fi innumerabiles mius & ri^int. fornuuLJ,--al.,uo ccn^a^ntur, pojfe e. hu ,n terram e.a^u annates Enn.j, -^^-"^P^J^' polfint, effia: c^uoi nefao anne m uno c^uUem rerfu p.p tantum .alere forlum.Crc^ But alas, what ie BnZs's annals to fuch a work as the world is ! ^ He was ..;.v,.^..«x(^, --^. -.^^A-
l^.<^ ..^.^u ^./3./... D. L„ But thatpart of his phyfics is hcremeant m wh.ch Retreated of the orfgin of the worlds or rather ormfinite worlds; which makes his thought the grofler ft,U. Eor m- finite worlds require infinite chances inf.nitely repeted, _ .^
Truths relating to the DeityJ 8$
in the fame circumftances there would always be the fame kind of produflion. And therefore if things are now and then mif-fhapcd, this infers no unfteadinefs or miftake in nature. Befide, the magnificence of the world admits of fome ferturbations j not to fay, requires fome variety. The queftion is, Gould all thofe things, which we do know to have ufes and ends, and to the produ6bion of which fuch wonderful contrivance and the combinations of fo many things are required, be produced,and method and regularity be preferved/o/^r ^j it is^ if nothing but hlind chance prefided over all ? Are not the innumerable inftances of things, which are undeniably made with reference to certain ends, and of tliofe which are propagated and repeted by the fame conftant methods, enough to convince us, that there are ends propofed, and rules obferved, even where wc do not fee them. And, laft ly, if wc ihould defcend to particulars, what are thofe feemingly ufelefs or monftrous produdions in refped of the r^/, th-xt plainly de- clare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the ufualwd.ys, with the ^(/^^/ perfe6tion of their feveral kinds? If the com- parifon could be made, I verily believe thefe would be found to be almoft infi- nituple of the other j which ought therefore to be reputed as nothing.
They, who content themfelves with words, may afcribe the formation of the world to fate or nature^ as well as to chance^ or better. And yet fate^ in the firfb place, is nothing but a y^r/Vj of events, confiderd as neceflarily following in fome certain order 5 or, of which it has always been true, that they 'would be in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed a feries ofcaufes ' : but then they are fuch caufesas are alfo efc£is^ all of them, if there is no Firflcaufe^ and may be taken for fuch. So that in this dcfcription is nothing like fuch a eaufe^ as is capable of giving this form to the world. A feries of events is the fame with events hzTp^cning feriatim : which words declare nothing concerning the caufe of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, ne- cefTity are but circumfiances of things that come to pafs ; not caufes of their ex- iftence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, fome external and fupe- rior caufe mull: be fuppofed to put the feries in motion, to projed the order, to conned the caufes and effeds, and to impofe the neceffity ''.
• Series implexa caufarum. Sen. ^ Sereca. fays himfelf, that in this feries God is frimn
omnium cauft, ex qua, cAter& petident. Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the an- eients meant hy fate. Sometimes it ieems to follow the motions of the henzenly bodies and their afpedts. Of this kind of fate is that paflage in Suetonius to beunderftood, where he fays that Tibe- rius was addlciiis 7nathematic£, perfuajionifque plenus cun6tn fato agi. Sometimes it is confounded With fortune. So in Lucii^n we find Ty,v tvx^i ~^(x.\H(rv.v rk f/^ijjju^^cifii/^ci, x^ k f| asfr^^)^ t>ccci-a> itts- itXu&ri. And fometimes it is the fame with God : as when the Stoics fay, s'v tj siW* b-<.ov y^ v5v }^ t>;Ai/.«^/-'jjv >^ A,«t, mp. Biog.L. and the like elfevvherc.
M Then-
86 The Religion (pf Nature^ Se6l. V.
Then for nature^ i . If it be ufed for the Intrinfic manner of exifling % that con- ititution, make, or difpofition, with which any thing is produced or born^ and from which refult thofe properties, powers, inclinations, pailions, quaHties, and manners, which are called natural (and fometimes «^/«r^), in oppofition to fuch as are acquired^ adventitious, or forced ('which ufe is common^ : then to fay, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of exiflencc, is to fay, that it formed itfelf, or that the efecl is the efficient ^ Befide, how can manner (^man- ner of exifting) be the caufc of exifting, or properly do any thing. An agent is an ading being, fome fub fiance, not a manner of being. 2. If it be ufed in that other fenfe, by which it flands for the ideas of things, what they arc in themfelves, and what in their circumftances, caufes, confequences, refpe6bs 5 or, in fhort, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (las when we fay, the nature of juflice ^ requires this or that j /. e. the idea of juftice requires or fup- pofes it : a crime is of fuch a nature j that is, bears fuch a refpe6b to the law, and is attended with fuch circumftances, or the like) : then none of the fe lenfes can do an atheift any fervice. 3. If it be ufed for the world <= (as, the laws of nature may be underftood to be the laws of the world, by which it is goverr;- ed, and the phanomena in it produced 5 after the fame manner of fpeaking as when we fiy, the laws of England^ France^ Scc.j then it Hands for that very things the former and archite6t of which is the object of our inquiry j and there- fore cannot be that archite6t itfelf. Under this fenfe may be comprehended that, when it denotes reality of exifence, as when it is fliid that fuch a thing is T^olisi/fiature (liot to be found in the world). 4. If it fignifies the forementiond laws themfelves 3 or that courfe, in which things by virtue of thefelaws pro- ceed (as when the effects of thefe laws are ftyled the works of nature) : then,, laws fuppofe fome legiflator, and are pofterior to that of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that nation confifts. f . If it be ufed after the fame manner as the word habit fre- quently is ; to which many things are afcribed (juft as they are to nature), though it be nothing exifting diftin6l from the habits^ which particular men or beings contract : then nature is a kind of abftra6l notion, which can do nothing. Per- haps nature may be put for natures^ all natures, after the manner of a collective noun J or it may be mentiond as an agent^ only as we perfonify virtues and at-- tributes, cither for variety, or the fhorter and more convenient exprefting of
a As when Stretto Lamps, according to Tiilly, docet omnia ejfe cjfccla natura. *> Vis ^
natufa jtifiitiA. Cic. = Almoft ss if it flood for nata, or res 7jat& ; -all things, that are pro-
duced. {So fitura feems to be put fometimes for fitas.) Sunt, ^ui omnia natur* naming ffpfel- lei^t J -^^ (or^or/ii (^ inane, ^uA^ue hit accident, Cic,
\ things
Truths relating to the Deity.' 87
things. Laftly, if it denotes the Author of nature^ or God ^ (the efe6t feeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this cafe, to be put for the efficient) : then, to Him it is that I afcribe the formation of the world, (^c. To all which I muft fub- join, that there is an unaccountable liherty taken in the ufe of this word : and that frequently it is ufed merely as a word^ and nothing more, they who ufe it not knowing themfelves, what they mean by it ''. However, in no fenfe can it fuperfede the being of a Deity.
XV. Life, fenfe^ cogitation^ and the faculties of our own minds fhew the exijlems effome fuperior Beings from whom they are derived. Or, God is that Being, with- cut whom neither could thefe be, any more than the things before mentiond. That they cannot flow from the nature of any matter about us as matter, or from any modification, fize, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our fouls themfelves are not felf- exillent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, followg from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we muft neccflarily be indebted for what we have of this kind to fome great Benefador, who is t\\Q fountain of them. For fince we are confcious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our felves, we muft have them £rom fome other.
A man has little reafon, God knows, to fancy the fuppofitum of his life, fenfe and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he confiders how tranfttory and uncertain at beft his life and all his injoyments are j what he is whencehc came, and whither he is going <=. The mind a€ts not, or in the mod imperceptible manner in animalculo, or the feminal ftatc of a man 5 only as a principle of vegetation in the ftate of an embryon -, and as a fenfitive foul in the ftate of infancy, at leaft for fome time, in which we are rather below, than a- bove, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and cxcrcife and pro- per opportunities, it feems to open itfeh^ find its own talents^ and ripen into a rational being. But then it reafons not without labor, and is forced to take ma- ny tedious fteps in thepurfuit of truth , finds all its powers fubjed to great eclip-
' Natura, mquit, h&c mihi pr&ftat. Non intelligls te, cum hoc dscis, tnutare nomtn Deo ? ^uid enim aliud efi Natura, quam Deus, f^ dlvina ratio. Sec. ? Sen. When it is faid, Necejfe efimundum iffum natura adtninijlrari, ap. Cic. what fenfe are thofe words capable of, if by nature be not leally meant Cod ? For it muft be fomething different from the world, and fomething able to go- vern it. ^ Alii naturam cenfent ejfe lim qitandam fine ratioije, cientem motus in corportbus necejfarios. Sec. lays Balbus in Cic. What can this vis be : vis by itfclf, without the mention of any fubjcdl, in which it inheres; or of any caufe, from whence it proceeds ? Afoul of the world, plaflic nature, hylarchic principle, by 13 h'D^, and the like, are more intelligible than that. <: yi
M 2, fes
88 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. V,
fes and diminutions, in the time of fleep, indifpofition, ficknefs, ^c. and at bell reaching but a few objeds in refpeft of all, that are in the immenlity of the univerfe j and, lailly, is obnoxious to many painful fenfations and reflexions. Had the foul of man the principle of its own exiftence and faculties within it- felf clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all thefe limitations and de- fe£ls<i to all thefe alterations and removes from one ftate to another : it muft cer- tainly be conftant to itfelf, and perfiil in an uniform manner of being.
There may be perhaps who will fay, that the foul^ together with life, fenfe, (^c. are propagated by traduElion from parents to children, from them to their children again, and fo from eternity =» : and that therefore nothing can be colled- cd from the nature of them as to the exiftence of a Deity. Jnf. If there could be fuch a tradu6tion, yet to fuppofe one traduced to come from another traduced^ ^ndioab aterno^ without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this tradu6live power, is the fame as to fuppofe an in- finite feries of moveds without a mover ^ or of effects without a caufe : the abfur- dityof which is ihewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by tradux anima ought to be clearly explaind : for it is not eafy to conceive how thought, or thinking fubftances, can be propagated after the manner of branches^ or in any manner that can be analogous to it, or even warrant a metaphorical ufe of that phrafe •'. It fhould alfo be told, whether this tradudion be made from one or from both the parents. If from one, from which of them is it } And if from both, then the fAvnetradux or branch muft always proceed from two ftocks : which is a thing, I prefume, that can no where elfe be found, nor has any parallel in na- ture. And yet fuch a thing may much better be fuppofed of vines, or plants, than o£ thinking beings, who are fimple and uncompoundcd fubftances ^.
» For I cannot think that any body will now ftand by that way of introducing men fird: into the world, which is mentiond by DioJorus Sic. but aflerted by Lucretius. Ubi qu^que Iocs regio spportunA dabatur, Crefcebant uteri terrA radtcibus apt, &c. What by Tertalltan in one
place is called animA ex Adatn tradux, in another is "vdut fur cuius quidam ex matrice Ad.tm in pro- fuginem deducia, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himfclf better, when he confeflcs there to he duas /pedes feminis, corporalem & animnkm ("al. corporis femen e^ anim&): or more fully femm animttle ex animx difltllatione, ficut & -virus illiid, corporale femen, ex carnis defxcatione- • According to the fore-cited author the foul is derived from the father only, (^ genitalibus f&mi' nAfoieis commendat/i: and all fouls from that of Adcim. Definimus dnimam, fays he, Dei fl^tu na- tfttn, ex unit redundeintem : and in another place, ex uno homine totd h^e animarum redundantia agi- lur- But this dotJi not well confift with his principal argument for traduction, that children takt after their parents. For befide what will here be faid by and by, if there ie a tradudion of all men from one man, and traduction caufes iikenefs j then every man muft be like the firftj and (coolc- ^uently) every oiher.
This
Truths relating to the Deity. 89
This opinion of the iradu^ion of fouls feems to me to fland upon an unfound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on thefe two things : the fimiUtude there is between the features, humors, and abihties of children and thofe of their parents ^ > and the difficulty men find in forming the notion of afpirit ^. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other fubftance but matter : and that the foul refulting from fome difpofition of the body, or fome part of it, or being fome merely material appendix to it, mud attend it, and come along with it from the parent or parents j and as there is a derivation of the one^ fo there mull be alfo of the other at the fame time.
Now the former of thefe is not always true -, as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to fee children differ from their parents, in their undcrftandings, inclinations, fliapes, complexions, ^^nd (I am fure) one from another. And this diffimilitude has as much force to prove there is not a tradu6):ion, ^sfimilitude^ whenever that happens, can have to prove there is. Beddes, it feems to me not hard to account for fome likenefs without the help of tradu6tion. It is vifible the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the obje6ts they fee, the founds they hear, the company they keep,£5f^. will create changes in them, fometimes with refpe^l to their intellectuals, fome- "times to their paffions and humors, and fometimes to their health and other cir- cumftances of their bodies ; and yet the original ft amina and fundamental parts of the man remain ftill the fame. If then the femina, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) animakula already formed *= -, which being dif- tributed about, efpecially in fome opportune places, are taken in with aliment, or perhaps the very air j being feparated in the bodies of the males by flrainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in their feminal vefTels, do there receive fome kind of addition and influence j and being thence transferred into the •wombs of the /<?^^/^i, are //;fr^ nouriihd more plentifully, and grow, till triey be- come too big to be longer confined'^: I fay, if this be the cafe, why may not
the
• Unde, oro te, fays the fame author, fimilitudlne animA quoque purentibm de ingeniis reffonde-
mus, finon ex (tnlmA femine educimur? Then to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus:
in illo ipfo voluptatis nltimo aJIu quo genitale 'virus expelUtur, nonne aliquid de anlma quoque fentimus exire ? I am afhamed to tranfcribe more. ^ Therefore the faid father makes the foul to
be corporeal. '^ This might feem to be favord by them'Vho hold, that all fouls were crea-
ted in the beginning (an opinion mentiond in Nuhh. ab. ^ al. often) , did not the fame authors de- rive the body nnnD nQL;D : as may be feen in P. Abb. ^ pnjf. Particularly R. D. &imhhi fay&
of man, inTb* lO^Hvy^u; -\y oyrj ^?•^:n■^ D'v^o^ wiy -]3nn "Wtn yiin ns^wo 5<m3 isn-
^ This account deftroys that argument, upon which Cenforinus fays many of the old philofophers aflevted the eternity of the world ; quod negent omn'mt pop reperiri, avefne Ante, m eva genenttA
fin*
pd The Religion of Nature, Sedt V.
the nutriment received from the parents, being prepared by their vefTels, and of the fame kind with that with which they themfelves are nouriHid, be the fame in great meafure to the ammakulaiind embrya that it is to iherr.^ and confequent- ly very much affimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing elfe from them ? Many impreflions may be made upon the/^/^j, and many tin61:ures given to tht fluids communicated to it from the parents j and yet it, the animal itfelf^ may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothefis (which has long been mine) fuggells a rcafon, why the child is fometimes more like the father^ fometimes the mother : viz. becaufe the vefiels of the animalculum are difpofed to receive a greater proportion of aliment fometimes from the one^ fometimes from the other : or the fluids and fpirits in one may ferment and ope- rate more (irongly than in the other, and fo have a greater and more fignal effect. (Here it ought to be obfei ved, that tho what the animalculum receives from the father, is in quantity little in refped of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mothers yet the former, being the firfl accretion to the original /^wi«^, ad- hering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affed it more.)
Since there cannot be a proper tyadu5lion of the child {one mind, and one bo- dy) from both the two parents, all the fimilitude it bears to one of them muft proceed from fome fuch caufe as I have afligned, or at leaft not from tradu6lion. For the child being fometimes like the fither, and fometimes the mother, and the tradudion either always from the father, or always from the mother, there mull fometimes be fimilitude^ where there is no traduction : and then if the child may refemble one of them without it, why not the other too ? The ac- count I have given, appears, many times at Icall, to be true in plants^ which raifed from xhc fame kzd, but in different beds and foil, will differ. The dif- ferent nutriment introduces fome diverfity into the feed or original plant, and allimilates it in fome meafure to the reft raifed in the fame place.
The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal fupports to this doc- trine of /r^^at7/o« (a fuppofition, that the /o/// is merely material, or but the refult of fome difpofition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may prcmife this here : tho we can have no image o£-xfpirit (becaufe no being can be portraid or reprefented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reafon to affert the cxiftence o? fuch a fubftance =». Mitter is a thing, which we converfe with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and pro-
fnt ; cum ^. ovum fins tive, & avis fine ovo figni non fofjlt. This queflion was once much agitated in the world, as may be fcen by Macrobins and Vhttarch j who calls it, ri ^xo^os' ^ jt*^^ 7r^uyy.x[<K.
» 1 his is as much as ^IcHrui had to fay for his atoms : for they were only o-<^/x,«t« a«V? ^^»'
4 perties >
Truths relating to the Deity. pi
perties j and fince we cannot find among them any that are cogitative^ or fuch a thing as lih, but feveral things inconfiftcnt with them, we are under a neceflity of confeffing that there is feme other fpecics of fubftance bcfidc that which is corporeal, and that our fouls are of that kind (or rather of one of thofe kinds, which arc not merely corporeal : for there muft be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all furprifing, that wefhould not be able to do this : for how can the mind be the objed of itfelf ^ ? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be confcious of its own a6ls, and refle6t upon the ideas it finds : but of its ownfubilance it can have no adequate notion, unlefs it could be as it were obje6t and fpe5iator both. Only that per- fect Being, whofe knowledge is infinite, can thus intimately know himfelf.
They, who found the tradu5lion of the foul upon this prcfumption, that it is material J and attends the body as fome part or affedion of it, feem further to be moftwofuUy miflaken upon this account: becaufe the body itfelf is not propa- gated by tradu6tion. It paiTes indeed through the bodies of the parents, who af- ford a tranfitory habitation and fubfiftence to it : but it cannot ht formed hy the parents, qx grow out of any part of them. For all the '■cital and ejfential parts of it muft be one coeval fylkm, and formed at onct in the firll article of thenafcent animalculum j fince no one of thefe could be nourifljd^ or ever come to any thing without the reft: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be be- fore the reft, it would foon wither and decay again for lack of nourifiiment re- ceived by proper veftels 5 as we fee the limbs and organs of animals do, when the fupply due from the animal oeconomy is anyway intercepted or obftru£ted,. And fince an organized body, which requires to be thus ftmultaneoufly made (fa- Ihiond as it were at one ftroke j cannot be the effc61: of any natural and gradual procefs, I cannot but conclude, that there wtYcanlmakula of every tribe origi- nally fomied by the almighty Parent, to be xhc feed o'^wW future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would belike that, which is ufual- ly called equivocal or fpontaneous generation, and with great reafon now gene- rally exploded. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other inftancesj and microfcopical obfervations do abet what I have faid flrongly.
Laftly, if there is no r^f^ of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man . who is notdefcended from t^o flrfl parents : and then the fouls of thofe two firft parents could be traduced from no other. And that there is no fuch race fnone that has been upon this earth from eternity^, is apparent from the face of earth- ly things, and the hifory of mankind'', arts, and fciences. What is objected
* Ou -p ou ra 9-£<y^y/.4oai to S-t^-i^fjv. J>lot. b ^7 nulla fuh genitalis origo Terrai c^ caU -
Cur/Hprabellnin TbelffinHm O'fmnn TroJ4 Non cliaj ^iit ^noque res cecinere pet a, Lucr.
againil ,
p2 The Religion of Nature. Sed, V.
againfl this argument from fancied inundations^ conflagrations^ 13 c ^ has no weight with me. Let us fuppofe fome fuch great calamity to happen now. It mull be either univerfal, or not. 1^ univerfalj fo that no body at all could be faved, then ei- ther there muft never be any more men, or they muft begin again in fomc Jirfi pa' rents. If it was only topical, affefting fomc-onetra6t of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unafiFe6led, or if there were^;^^ natural means left by which men might efcape, confiderable numbers muft ccYtzinly furvive : and then it cannot be imagined, that they fhould all be ahfolutely fo ignorant of every thing, that no one Ihould be able to give an ac- count of fuch things as were common 5 no one able to write, or read, or even to recolle61: that there were fuch things as letters 3 none, that underftood any trade j none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they ufed to be clothed, how their meat dreft, or even what their food was : not can it be thought, that all books, arms, manufaflures of every kind, fhips, buildings, and all the produ6l of human skill and induftry now extant in the world fhould ht^ouni- *uerfally and utterly abolifhd, that no part, no 'vejligium of them Hiould remain j not fo much, as to give a hint toward the fpeedy reftoration of neceflary arts at leaft. The people efcaping muft fure have clothes on, and many neceftaries a- bout them, without which they could not efcape, nor outlive fuch a dreadful fcenc. In iliort, no conflagration, no flood, no de fir u^ ion cin^ti'wt the oh\cQto\s purpofe, to reduce mankind to that ftate, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable fymptoms we find them to have been in not many thoufands of years fince 5 I fiy, no deftru6lion can ferve his purpofe, but fuch an one as makes thorough work, only fparing two or three couples, ftript of every thing, and the •moft ftupid and verieft blocks ^ to be picked out of the whole number : natural fools, or mere homines fylvefires would retain habits, and fall to their old way of liv- ing, as foon as they had the opportunity to do it. And fuppofe they never fhould have fuch an opportunity > yet neither would this ferve him effectually : fince with- out [omcfitpernatural'Power interpofing fuch a revolution could not be brought a- bout, nor the naked creatures prcferved, nor the earth reformed out of its afties and ruins after fuch a calcination, or diflblution, fuch a total demolition of every thing. To this give mc leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes vul- cano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries j yet there is no memo- ry or teftimony of any fuch thing, that has ever been univerfal ^, except per-
*^c^^es» }^ y-etToi wo^es (pB-o^ca yiyivctriv ivB-fia-fJ)/, >o 'ia-evrcci, ttv^i f^ ^> "^^■'^^ fAiyiTcci. P'ate. * T»5 uyfccy^i/jurisi ;^ 6ifAism<;, as PWofpeaks. « For what has been faid only in general,
and presumptively, to ferve a caufe, fignifies nothing : no more than that eftlmony in Ar):obiu.'^ where he feems to allow, tha' there have been univerial conflagrations, ^u/indo, fays he, mmidus incmfus in favillas ^ cimres dijfolutus eft f Non ante nos /
I haps
Truths relating to the Deity, pc^
liaps of one deluge : and as to that, if the genius of the language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing hiftory in it were well under- ftoodj fome labord and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And belide that, the fime record^ which tells the thing was, tells alfo how immediately God was concernd in it > that fome perfons adually were faved } and that the people who then perifhd, as well as they who furvived, all defcended from t\YQ firjl parents : and if that authority be a fufficient proof of one part of the relation, it mufl be fo of the refi.
We may conclude then, that the human foul with its faculties of cogitation, 6cc. depends upon a Superior being. And who can this be but xhcSupremehQ- ing, or God ? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,
XVI. Though His ejfence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehenji- hle^ yet ive may fay with ajjurance^ that He is free from all defers : or One^ from whom all defeats mufl be removed.
This proportion hath in efFe6l been proved already =>. However I will take the libeity to inlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are^wVf, they cannot without a contradi6tion comprehend what is infinite. And if they were inlarged to ever fo great a capacity, yet fo long as they retain their ge- neral nature, and continue to be of l\\cfame kind^ they would by that be only renderd able to apprehend more and more finite ideas j out of which, howfoever increafed or exalted, no pofitive idea o^xhtperfeSiiono? God can ever be form- ed. For a Perfe£i being muft be infinite^ and perfe6lly One : and in fuch a nature there can be nothing /«/7^, nor ixny co-mpofition of finites.
How fhould we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He exifts, when we comprehend not the nature of the moft inferior fpiritSj nor have any conception even of matter itfelf divefted of its acci- dents ? How fliould we attain to an adequate knowledge of the Supreme au- thor of the world, wdicnweare utterly incapable of knowing the extent of the world itfelf, and the numberlcfs undefcried regions, wnth their feveral Hates and circumilances, containd in it, never to be frequented or vifited bv our phi- lofophy i nor can turn our felves any way, but we are Hill accoftcd with fome- thing above our undcrilanding ? If we cannot penetrate fo far into effects^ as to difcover them and their nature throughly, it is not to be expe61:ed5 that we lliould, that we can ever be admitted to fee through the myfteriesof His nature,
• Prop. V, VI.
N who
94- The Religion of Nature. Sect.V.
who is the Caufe^ fo far abo've them all. The Divine perfection then, and man- ner of being mufl be of a kind different from and above all that we can conceive-
Hovv^ever, notwithftanding our own defeats, we may pofitively affirm there can be none in God : fince He is perfe^^ as we have kcn^ He cannot be defe£ilve or imper/etl. This needs no further proof But what follows from it, I would have to be well underftood and rememberd : viz. that from Him mull be re- moved want of life and a^ivity^ ignorance^ impotence^ a^ing inconjijiently with reafon and truth ^ and the like. Becaufe thefe are defers-, defe61: of knowledge, power, l^c. Thefe are defeCIs and blemifhes even in 7is. And tho his perfeClion is above all our ideas, and of a different kind from the perfections of men or any finite beings -, yet what would be a defeat in them^ would be much more fuch in ///>;, and can by no means be afcribed to Him ^.
Though we underftand not His manner of knowing things -, yet ignorance being uniform and the far/ie in every fubjeCt, we under fl and what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly dsny that to belong to Him. The like may be faid with refpeCt to His power, or manner of operating, 6cc. And when we fpeak of the internal ejjential attributes of God pofitively, as that He is omnifcient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the intent is only to fay, that there is no objeCt of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do. He exifls without beginning and end, 6cc. and thus we keep ftill within the limits allowd by the propofition ''. That is, we may fpeak thus without pre- tending to comprehend His nature. And fo,
XVII. JVe may confider God as operating in the produElion and government of the world^ and may draw conclufions from His works^ as they are called^ notwith- ftanding any thing which has been faid '^. Becaufe this we can do without com- prehending the manner of His exiftence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into a neceffity of owning, that there muft be an incomprehen- fible Being at the head of them.
Though I do not comprehend the modey in which the world depends upon Him and He influences and difpofes things, becaufe this enters into His -nature^ and the one cannot be underitood without the othei* : yet if I fee things, which I know cannot h^ felf-exiftent^ and obfeiTC plainly 2inoeconomy 2X\di defign'mihc difpofitioi of them, I may conclude that there is fome Beings upon whom their exiftence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld > may call this
3 If that in Terence had been (not a queftion, as it is there, but) an affirmation, Ego homuncio hoc non facerem, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity ? ^ Aiyo^^ o
{A>f, :V»y 0 ^i tfff, « Aiyo^. flotm, i V^vynu >i>N U^U^H? T^l j^S*. Maim.
Being
Truths relating to the Deity. 95
Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, (^c. without con- tradi^iing my felf or truth : as I hope it will appear from what has been faid, and is going to be faid in the next propoiition.
XVIII. God^ who gives exijfcnce to the ivorld, does alfo go'-jern it by His pro- 'uidence. Concerning this grand queftion, Whether there is a Divine providence^ or not^ I ufe to think, for my felf^ after the following manner.
Firfi^ The world may be faid to be governed fat leaffc cannot be faid to be a.y.v^U'^nr<^^ orlcft to fluftuatc fortuitouflyj, if there are laws^ by which natural caufes 2id:^ the CevevA phenomena in it fucceed regularly, and, in general, the conlHtution of things is preferved : if there are rules obferved in the produ6]:ioii o£ herbSj trees, and the like* if the feveral kinds o£ animals are, in proportion to their feveral degrees and ftations in the animal kingdom, furniflid with fa- culties proper to dire£i and determin their anions j and when they a£b accord- ing to them, they may be faid to follow the law of their nature : if they are placed and provided for fuitably to their refpeftive natures and wants * , or /which amounts to the fame thing^ if their natures are adapted to their cir- cumftances ^ : if, lallly, particular cafes relating to rational beings are taken care of in fuch a manner, as will at lad agree beft with reafon.
Secondly, If there are fuch laws and provifions, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the Juthor of nature. For thofe laws, which refult from the natures of things, their properties, and the ufe of their faculties, and may be fiid to be written upon the things themfelves, can be the laws of no other : nor can thofe things, whofe very being depends upon God, exifl: under any condition repugnant to His will 5 and therefore can be fubje6l to no laws or difpofitions, which He would not have them be fubje6t to 5 that is, which are not His. Beiide, there is no ether being capable of impoling laws, or any fcheme of government upon the world j becaufe there is no other, who is not himfelf part of the world, and whofe own exiftence doth not depend upon Him.
Thirdly, By the providence of God I mean His governing the world by fuch laws, and making fuch provifions, as are mentiond above. So that if there -xxtfuch, there is a Divine providence.
• a"'3D •'y^n ny a"')DN'^ ■'^"tp'^, as the Jetes fpeak. '' I fliall not pretend here to meddle
with particular cafts relating to inanimate or irrational beings ; fuch as are mentiond mMo.nebok. (a leaf's falling from a tree, a fpider's catching a flie, ^c.) and which are there faid to be "*»1DI> n~ip03. Tho it is hard to feparate thefe many times from the cafes of rational beings i as alfo to compre- hend what m>3:\ niDQj perfeH accident, is.
' N 2 Lajlly,
pd The Religion of Nature."' Se6l. V.
Laflly^ It is not impojfibk^ that there fhould hcfuch : on the contrary, we have juft rcafons to beheve there are. It would be an abfurd aflertion to fay, that any thing is impojjtble to a being whofe nature is infinitely above our compre- henfion, if the terms do not imply a contradi5lion : but we may with confidence aflert, that it is impoJJihU for any thing, whofe exiflence flows from fuch a being, ever to grow fo far out of His reach, or be fo emancipated from under Him, that the manner of its exiflence fhould not be regulated and determind by Him.
As to inanimate fuh fiances^ we fee the cafe to be really jufbas it was fuppofed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their ftations, or perfevere to go the fame circuits over and over by a certain law. Little bodies or particles, of the fame kind, obferve continually the fame rules of attrading, repelling, ^c. When there are any feeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumflances and combinations of things, a6ting all the while under their ancient laws. We are fo far acquainted with the laws of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their efFe6ts, and ferve ourfclves of them, fupplying upon many occafions the defect of power in our felves by mechani- cal powers, which never fail to anfwer according to the ejiablijljment. Briefly, we fee it fo far from being impojfible^ that the inanimate world fhould be go- vemd by laws^ that all the parts of it are obnoxious to laws by them inviolable.
As to vegetables^ we fee alfo how they are determind by certain methods pre- fcribed them. Each fort is produced from its proper feed> hath the fame tex- ture of fibres 5 is nourifhd by the fame kind of juices out of the earth, digcll- cd and prepared by the fame kind of veffels, ^c. Trees receive annually their peculiar liveries, and bear their proper fruits : flowers are drell, each fa- mily, in the. fame colors, or diverfify their failiions after a certain manner /ro- per to the kind, and breath the fame effences : and both thefe and ail other kinds obferve their feafons 5 and feem to have their feveral profeflions and trades appointed them^ by which they produce fuch food and manufactures fpardon the catachrefis)^ as miy fatisfy the wants of animals. Being fo very neceffary, they, or at leafl the moll ufeful, grow eafdy : being fixt in the earth, infen- fible, and not made for fociety,they are generally ^??i*oB-^>^icc ; being liable to a sreat confumption both of them and their feeds, they yield great qiianiities of thefc in order to repair and multiply their race, ^c. So that here is evi- dently a regulation^ by which the feveral orders are preferved, and the ends of them anfwerd according to their firfb e(iablifment too.
Then as to animals^ there are laws^ which mut. mutand. are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables,or at leaft fuch as refemble ^ their laws. The
I Fliny in his chapter JDe mVme rmtmA infath, Sec. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.
individuals
Truths relating to the Ddty- 97
individuals of the fcveral kinds of thofc, as of thcfe, have the fams (general) fhape and members, to be managed after t\\c fame manner : have the fame veflels repleniflid with the fame kinds of fluids, and furniilid with the fame glands for the feparation and diilribution of fuch parts of them, as anfwer the fume inten- tions in them all : are flimulated by the fame appetites and uneafinclTes to take in their food, continue their breed, (5?^. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in a manner fo like to that of vegetables, according to Jixf methods, and keeps in theilimc general track as they do, may be fiid to obferve and be under fome like rule or law, which either operates upon and limits it^^ extra, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations refulting from the feveral degrees ofreafon and fenfc, orfenfeonly, of which we cannot butbecon- fcious in our felvcs, and obferve fome faint indications in the kinds belows us, and which can be lookt upon as nothmg Icfs than laws, by which animals are to move and manage themfclves : that is, otherwife exprell, by which the Author of their n7LtuYesgoverf?s them. 'Tis true thefe laws may not im^pofe an abfolute neceiiity, nor be of the fame rigor with thofe of inanimate and merely paflive beings, becaufe the beings which are fubje(^to thefe (men at Icail) may be fuppofed in fome meafure free,and to a6t upon fome kind of principles or motives : yet IHII they may have the nature of laws, tho they may be broken j and may make a part of that providence by which God adminiflers the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right ufe of thofe faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effeds of God's providence and government, as if they were given me immediately by Him, without my a6bing ; fince all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon Hi?n, and are as it were inflruntents of His providence to me in refpe<5t of fuch things as may be procured by them^
To finilTi this head : it is fo far from being impoffible, that the feveral tribes of ^- nimals ihould be fo made and placed, as to And proper ways of fupporting and defending themfclves (I mean, fo far as it is confillent with the general oeconomy of the world : for fome cannot well fubilfl: without the deftruclion of fome others), that, on the contrary, we fee men, beads, birds, fillies, iniects all have organs and faculties adapted to their refpective circumllances and opportunities of finding their proper food or prey,^^. even to the aftoniiliment of them who attend to the hiltory of nature. If men, who fcem to have more wants than any other kind, meet with difticultics in maintaining life, it is becaufe they themfclves, not contented wath what is decent and convenient ox\\^, have by their luxuries and fcandalous neglect of their reafon made life expenfive.
» Therefore if thofe 'E^enes in Jofe^hus, who are £id *V» 'p: ©if K«r«Aj,Tirv t«« HMTtty excluded human endeavours, they muft be much in the wrone.
The
5)8 The Relmion c/^ Nature, Sec^l". V.
The "jjcrld then bemg not left in a ftate of confufion or as a chr^os, but reduced in- to order -.xn^ methodized for ages to come j the fcveral fpecies of beings having thei v offices and provinces ^#^;^^ them 3 plants and animals fubfiftcncey?/ out for them^ and as they r^ooff, fucceilbrs ^/'/'o/V//^^ to relieve them, and carry on xhzfcheme^ 6:c. that thopoJfibiUty only of a^^w^r^// providence fliould be allowd, is certainly too modefl a demand. \Ve fee, or may fee, that in fatl there is fuch a providcr.cc ^ .
The ereat difficulty is, how to account for xh-^t providence* which is called /Jt^/'- ticukr y or that, which refpects ("principally) particular men. For rational being? and free agents are capable of doing and deferving well^ or ill. Some will make a right ufe of their fliculties and opportunities, fome ivill not : the vicious may, or may not repent^ or repent and rclapfe : fome fall into evil habits through inadver- tence, bad examples, and the Uke, rather than any defign : and thefe want to be re- claimd: fome may be fuppofed to worfhip God and to crave His protection and bleHing,^^. and then a proper anfwer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence many and great differences will arife, which will require from a governor put able incouragements, rewards, correptions, punilhments j and that fome fhould be protefted and fortunate, others not, or lefs. Now l\\t good or /// Ifate of a man here, his fafety or danger, happinefs or unhappinefs depend upon many things, which feem to be fcarce all capable of being determind by providence. They depend upon what he does himfelf^ and what naturally follows from his own behaviour : upon what is done by others^ and may either touch him at the lame time, or reach him afterward : upon the courfe of nature, which muft affe6t him : and, in fine, upon many incidents., of which no account is to be given ^ As to what be does himfelf^ it is impofliblc for him, as things are in this maze of Hfe, to know always what tends to happinefs, and what not : or if he could know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compafs of his powers. Then, if the aflions of other men are /r^^, how can they be determind to be onlyy^^i', as may be either good or bad (as the cafe requires) for fome other particular man 5 fmce fuch a determination feems inconfiftent with liberty ? Befide, numbers of men afting every one upon the foot of their own private freedom, and the feveral degrees of fenfe and ability which they refpe^ively have, their acts, as they either confpire, or crofs and obliquely impede, or perhaps diredly meet
' Ut fiquis ht dotnum aliquatn, aut in gymnajium, aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, tnoJum, difciplmam, non pojjit en jine can/a fieri judicare, fed ejfe aliijuem intelligat, qui pro- fit, & cut pareatur, 8cc. Cic. *> Little things have many times unforefeen and great efFcdls: f^ contra. The bare fight of a fig, fhewn in the fenate-houfe at Rome, occafiond Carthage to be deftroyd: quod non Trebia, aut Trafymenus, n'^nCanriA bufioinfgnes Romnni nominisperficere potuerf. ncn cfijira Fknicn ad tertium lapidem vallata, port^ue Collin* adequitans ipfe Hannibal. Plin.
and
Truths relating to the Deity. pp
and oppofe each other, and have different effcfts upon men of different w^^^'-f, or in diffx^rent circumflanccs^ muftcaufe a ftrangc embarras, and intangle the plot-'- And as to the courfc of nature^ if a ^^o J man be paffingby an infirm building, juft in the articfe of falHng, can it be expected, that God ffiould fufpend the force of gravitation till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance j or can we think it would be incrcafed, and the fall haftend, if a had man was there, only that he might be caught, cruihd, and made an example ? If a man's iafcty orprofpe- rity ffiould depend upon winds or rains, muff nemo motions be impreff upon the atmofphere, and new directions given to the floating parts of it, by fome ex^ traordinary and new influence from God ? Muft clouds be fo precipitated, or kept in fufpencC^, as the cafe of a particular man or two requires? To w^hich add, that the difi^ering and many times contrary interefts of men are fcarce to hz reconciled. The wind, which carries one into the /'or/, drives another back to fea } and the rains, that are but juft fuflicient upon the hilh^ may drown the inhabitants of the 'valleys ^. In fliort, may we expe6fc miracles^ : or can there be a particular providence, a providence that fuits the feveral cafes and prayers of individuals, without a continual repetition of them, and force frequently com- mitted upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents ? For my part, I verily believe there may. For,
I . It feems to me not impoffihle^ that God fliould know nsohat is to come : on the contrary, it is highly reafonable to think, that He does and muft know things /^//^r<?. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come imme- diately from Him, muft cither be the effisct of mechanical caufes, or of the motions of living beings and/r^^ agents. For chance we have feen already is no caufe. Now as to the former, it cannot be impoffible for Him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore muft intimate- ly know all their powers and what eff^e6ls they will have, to fee through the whole train of caufes and eff'ecls, and whatever will come to pais in that
» While every one puflics his own deligns, they mufl interfere, and hinder one another. Adfum' mum fuccedere honor em Certztites, iter infejiumfecere viai. Lucr. •= Or is it not more like
ly, EJTi8(r>)5 (;i>iofl6y,w?, T Vz^c-itrovroc 'h^n^ ccv ilv^ 6 TTOicc, tict av y, (in FlofiliUs'S words) ? ^ Some.
thing more than this we meet with in OnqJs psraphrafe, v/here it is faid, that uf on Mofes's prayer £<iyn>i Vy ><atD >ib n^n: rrim :^-i:irD. which fame place 2^/Z>i explains after the fame manner >
V^i^b •iyyr\ &^b n^ii^n vnw Jm^i qijii. [ ny-i^j y^xi i<b [rw^yzl ^ j^ zucmn, tZ»
TtXiovruv 0 fifj Gceiciv tjj^iTo iTXiTSviZa-xf o ^, v^to'/' o 'j yia/ffyci y,TU lirov o '-) Kioi,<Pivc,^ 'vjXiov. * Some
have talked to this purpose. So R. Albo fays ot fbme prophets and hhajidim, 1^ yilton IDV^vy tZl~)i:iyii rnsntt'"'. So R. if. Abuh. that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world by way of reward or punifhmcnf, .—F^nn n nVvyn-" ins: D3 5<im DJH riU^yDn pi HT p!^
dbiy ^\u un3D t^inu;. So Abarb. oi inn:\u;nn D^ync^n .—idu/o nih ^nbisin nbo^"^. And accordingly in Sed. te^h. we find this thankfgiving : IDGy CDl^ *7D3\i; "^03 Vy -—l^nsbi amo.
loo The Religion of Nature. Se^St. V,
way ^ : nay, it is mpojjlbk^ that He fhoiild not do it. We our felvcs, if we are fatisfied of the goodnefs of the materials of which a machine is made, and iinderftand the force and determination of thofe powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effed of it. And as to thofe things which depend upon the 'voluntary motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the reil) can only be free with refpecc to fuch things as are within thciv Jpbere ; not great, God knows : and their free- dom with refpect to thefe can only confiil in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent neceflity, as their ow« r^^/^;? and judgment fhall determin them ^ or to negk^thdr rational faculties, and not ufethem at all, but fufFer themfelves to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itfelf acts in a manner mechanically. Now He, who knows what is in mens power, what not 3 knows the make of their bodies, ^^n^i -AX tht me chanifm and propenfions of them j knows the nature and cedent of their underftandings, and what will determin them this or that way > knows all the procefs of natu- ral for fecondj caufes, and confequently how thefe may work upon them ^ : He, I fiiy, who Icnows all this, may know what men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, viz. whether they will ufe their rational fliculties or not. And fince even we our felves, mean and defective as we are, can in fome meafure conceive, how fo much as this may be done, and feem to want but one flep to finifli the account, can we with any fliew of reafondeny to a Perfe5l being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too > efpecially if we call to Tnind, that this very power of ufmg our own fliculties is held of Him '^ ?
Obferve what a iagacity there ism^omcmcn^ not only in refpect of phyfi- cal caufes and effects, but alfo of the future actings of mankind > and how very eafie it is many times, if the perfons concernd, their characters, and cir- cum fiances are given, to forefee what they will do : as alfo to foretel many general events, tho the intermediate tranfictions upon which they depend are not known ^. Conflder how much more remarkable this penetration is in fome men, than in others : conflder further, that if there be any minds more perfect than the human, (and who can befo conceited of himfelf as to quelfi- on this ?) they mull: have it in a flill more eminent degree, proportiona- hie to the excellence of their natures : in the lall place, do but allow
a "What Seneca fays of the Gods (in the heathen flyle), may be faid of the trueCotl, NotJieJltllf cperis fui feries : omniumq^He illi rerum per manns fuas iturarum fcientia, in aperto femper eft ; nobis ex abdito fubit, ^c. ^ "O '/j (^<yo57A«s-/3? ij^is? sTiV street Tct iccvrS KX>i.Zi ^nfAm^yyiiA/XTx. '^h.fud^
«^ 1^P& nojlrd volimtates in caAfarum online funt, qui ccrtus ejl Deo, ejnfque pr<i.fcie?nia continetur, ^c. S. Auft. ^ Etfi quern exitum acies habitura Jit, divinare nemo potefi ; tamen belli exiinm
Tjideo, ^c. and after, quern e^o turn video animo, quam e^, quA octiiis cernimns. Cic.
/ fas
Truths relating to the Deity. loF
(as you muftj this power of difcerning to be in God proportionable to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to theirs^ and then it becomes infinite i and then again, the future adions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and expofed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to thino-s /'.'?/ ov prefent or which come to pafs necej/arily.
After all, what has been faid is only a feeble attempt to fhew, how far even lus can go toward a conception of the manner^ in which future things may be known : but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His power of knozving, mufl infinitely pafs all ourun- derftanding. It mufl be fomething different from and infinitely tranfcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of*.
We know matters of fa£t by the help o^ourfenfesy the flrength of memory^ impreffions m^ideu^on phanfy, or the report of others (tho that indeed is compre- hended under y?;?/^j. For that, whichweknowonly by report, in proper fpeak- ing we only know the report of, or we have heard it) ; and all thefe ways do fup- pofe thofe matters either to be prefent^ or once to have been : but is it therefore impojjible^ that there fhould be any other ways of knowing? This is fo far from being true, that, fince God has no organs of fenfation, nor fuch mean faculties as the bell of ours are, and confequently cannot know things in the v/ay which we know them in, if He doth not know them by fome other way, He cannot know them at all^ even tho they were prefent : and therefore there mufl be o- ther ways, or at leaft another w^y of knowing even matters of fa6t. And fince the difHculty we find in determining, whether future matters of fa<5l may be known, arifes chiefly from this, that Ave in reality confider, without minding it, whether they may be known in our way of knowing > it vaniflies, when wc recollect, that they are and mull be known to God by fome other way : and not only fo, but this mufl be fome way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. Future^ or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, -xs prefent is of ours : nor can we'' tell, what refpccc pafi^ prefent^ to come^ have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no fuch thing ^sfi)Und^ to blind no fuch thing as light or color : nor, when thefe things are defined and ex- plaind to theminthebefl manner, which their circumflances admit, are theyca^ pable of knowing how they are apprehended. So here, we cannon tell hozv future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what founds or co- lors are, and how they are perceived 3 but yet there may be a way of knowing //j(?/f,
» i3nyn^ T^^ ^y^' '"it i'-n. Maim. It differs not Hi^'-rDn ^03 bni< "Xi^ icyQai. '-2^-2. idl
5 Jgmr'h qnid c[tieeit ejfe, ^uid nequeat ; to u&Lucretiffs's words more properly.
O as
I02 The Religion of Nature. Sedl.Vo
as well as there is of perceiving thefe. As they want % fifth fenfe to perceive founds or colors, of which they have no notion : fo perhaps we may want ^fixtb fenfe, ox fome faculty^ of which future events may be the proper objcds. Nor have we any more reafon to deny, that there is in nature fuch a fenfe or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is fuch a fenfe as that of hearing
or feeing.
We can never conclude, tliat it is hnpojjihh for an infinitely perfc6t Being to know what a free agent will ^ri^o^T^ to do, till we can comprehend all the powers of fuch a Being, and that is till we our felves are infinite and perfed ». So far are we from being able to pronounce with anyfhew of reafon, that it isimpojjible there ihould be fuch knowledge in God.
In the lall place, this knowledge is not only not impojfible^ but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfedion doth neceflarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if ignorance be an imperfedi- on, the ignorance of future a6bs and events muft be fo : and then if all imper- fections are to be denied of Him, this muji.
There is indeed a common prejudice againll: the prefcience (as it is ufually call- ed) of God i which fuggeib, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or certainly : and if fo, then they are certain ; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of freedom. And thus prefcience and freedom are inconfiftent. But fur e the nature of a thing is not changedhy being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is ; an(5 therefore is not alterd by this. The truth is, God forcfees, or rather kcs the adions of free agents, becaufe they w/7/ be; not that they will be, becaufe He fore fees them''. If I fee an obje6t in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties fup- pofed, it is certain that objed is there : but yet it cannot be faid, it is there becaufe I fee it there, or that my feeing it there is the caufeo^ its being there: but be- caufe it is there^ therefore I fee it there. It is the objed, that determins my kTi- fation : and fo in the other cafe, it is a future choice of the free agent, that deter- mins the prefcience, which yet may be infallibly true ^.
Let us put thefe two contradidory proportions, B (fome particular manj will go to church next Sunday^ and B will not go to church next Sunday 3 and let us fup-
» To attempt fo comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the fame as to endeavour nM5\I?
Kin i3n3N. Malm. ^ iy:i!flO nwQNn -imn t<^yv i>i> n^n>u; hd^ inyn\ Maim. Much
might be inferted upon this fubjed (out of Abarb. particularly) which I fhall omit. ^ Shut
enim tH memoria tnA mn cc^gh faHa e^e qua ^r At trier Wit ; fie Deus fr^fcientid fu4 r.en co^it faaenda ^m ftitnra fmt. S . Auft. p.
Truths relating to the Deity. 103
pofewlthall, xh^tB is free^ and that his going or not going depends merely upon his own will. In this cafe he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but one oF thefetwo things, either ^<7, or not go -y and one he muftdo. One of thefe pro- poiitions therefore is now true -, but yet it is not the truth of that propofition, which forces him ?o ^^ what is containd in it : on the contrary, the/r/^/i'of the proportion arifes from what he fhall choofe to do. And i£ that truth doth not force him, the foreknowledge of that truth will not. We may fure fuppofe B himfelf to know certainly before hand, which of the two he will clioofe to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean fo far as it depends upon his choice on- ly^ ; and if fo, then here is B's ovfn f or eknozvledge confident with his freedom : and if we can but, further, fuppofe God to know as much in this refped as B does, there will be God's foreknowledge confiftent with ^'s freedom.
In a word, it involves no contradiSlion to aflert, that God certainly knows what any man will choofe 5 and therefore that he fhould do this cannot be faid to be impojjible.
z. It is not impoj/iblr, that fuch /<«w J of nature, and fuch a y^r/W of caufes and effe61:s may be originally defignd, that not only general proviiions may be made for the feveral fpecies of beings, hut even particular cafes, at leail many of them, may alfo be provided for without innovations or alterations in the courfe of na- ture ». It is true this amounts to a prodigious fchemc, in which all thinc^s to come are as it were comprehended under one view, eftimated, and laid together : but when I confider, what a mafs of wonders the univerfe is in other regards j what a Being God is, incomprchenfibly great and perfect j that He cannot be igno- rant of any thing, no not of the future wants and deportments o^ particular men ; and that all things, which derive from Him as the Firlf caufe, mufldo this fo as to be confiftent one with another, and in fuch a manner, as to make one compact fy- ftem, befitting fo great an Author : I fay, when I confid.er this, I cannot deny fuch an adjufiment of things to be within His power ^ The order of events, pro- ceeding from the fettlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and rea- fonable fuccefs of my endeavours and prayers (as inconfiderablc apart of the world as I am'^), as with any other thingor phenomenon how great foever.
' Things comctopafs (c^ y-aru (puc-ty^i k^fiXa^Uc, <t xutk >l>yc..' aiideven ret ir<jji)tj.'oTi^x h^trwJTi- Tux^oci <B <nyj.v<pci\'^!n vot^l^uy. Plot. That in SenecA looks fomething like this ; Hoc dico, fhlmin/f, non mini a Jove, fed fie omnia di/pofita, at eel etiam, qus, nb Hie non fiimt, t amen fine rattone non
fiant: quA illius efi. Narn etfi Jupiter ilia nnnc non facit, fecit utfierertt. *> Ihisfceins
to be what EufebiHi means, when he fays, that Divine providence does (among other things) nT; tMTOi o-ti^^scivsj-* T^v ^ma-xv ruhv 'ihrin-zjut , ' T«v ^ i^ftviiKv Tr.f lyjeiVTv >MreiTv 'if/jxB-cr, in Vhilo's
words.
O i Perh;ms
104 The Religion of Nature. Sed:. V.
Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppofe M (fome man) certainly to foreknoiv fome Vv^ay or other that, when he ih.ouki come to be upon his death-bed, L would petition £oy i^ome particular legacy > in a manner fo earneft and humble, and with fuch a good difpofition, as would render it pro- per to grant his requefl : and upon this M makes his la/l will^ by which he devifes to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the will-, and all this many years before the death of M, and whilil L had yet no expedation or thought of any fuch thing. When the time comes, i\\q petition is m^dt^ ■^i^'^'d granted-, not by making any new will, but by the old one already made, and without altera- tion : which legacy had, notwithftanding that, never been left had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an cffe6t of a future ad, and depends as much upon it, as if it liad been made aftei- the a6t. So if it had been forefcen, that L would not fo much as ask^ and had therefore been left out of the will 5 this preterition would have been caufed by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowd to foreknow the cafe ^. And thus the prayers^ which good men offer to the Jll-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting eflFe^ls already forecalled in the courfe of nature. Which pojjihility may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general.
It is obvious to every one's obfervation, that in/^^7 particular men are very com- monly (at lead in fome meafurej rewarded orpunifhdbythe^(?«^r^/ laws and me- thods of nature. The natural ('tho not conilant) attendents and confequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity > of vice, lofs of philofophical pleafures, a difeafed body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be virtuous and happy ^ C vi- tious and at laft miferable^ laboring under a late and fruitlefs remorfc j tho this comes to pafs through the natural tendence of things, yet thefe two cafes, being fuppofed fuch as require, the one that B fliould be favord, the other that C fhould fuffer fo-r his wickednefs, are as effectually /'roi';.^^^ /(?r, as if God ex- erted his power in fome peculiar way on this occafion.
3 . It is not impojjible^ that men, whofe natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in fuch times^ places^ and other circumjiances^ as that their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with iht general plan of things, but alfo anfwer mzny private cafes too ^. The planets and bigger parts of the world
* The cafe here put may perhaps fupply an anfwer to that, which is faid in Mi/Im. majf. Berak. '1D1 bilU/nbsn it "'~n~iny\l;b pyil^. '' if Vlato had not been born in the time of Socrates, in
all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with LaBantius's favor, he might have reafon to thank God, quod Athenkn/is \_n&tiis ej[ei], & quid temj^oribus SocrMts. Jull as M. Ariioni- nns afcribes, gratefully, to the Goi^ t<i yimon' AT^o^unmj 'fsrixev, M<»|./*w.
A we
Truths relating to the Deity. 105
we cannot but fee are difpofed into fuch places and order^ that they together make a noble/y/?^/?/, without having their natural powers ofattradtion (or the force of that which is equivalent to attradionj or any of the lav/s of motion re- fir aindov alterd. On the cowivxry ^beingrightly placed^ they by the obfervation of thefe become fubfervient to the main defign. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind fomething like a projcclion of the future hificry of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aipects of the greater bodies of the world ? And then why fliould it not be thought pojjible for men^ as well as for them^ by fome fecret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the preii- dence and guidance of an unfeen governing power, to be brought into their places in fuch a manner as that by the free ufe of their ficulties, the conjun6lions and oppofitions of their interefls and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their feveral magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, ^c. they may confpire to make out the fcheme ? And then again, fince generals confift of par- ticulars, and in this fcheme are comprehended the actions and cafes o? particular men, they cannot be fo fituated refpe£tively among the rellof their fpeciesasto be Serviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the general dia- gram of affairs, unlefs they and their feveral adtings and cafes do in the main cor=^ refpond one to another, and fit among themfelves, or atleaft -xxcnol inconftjfent.
Here is no implication of any contradiction or ahfurdity in all this ; and therefore it may at leaft be fairly fuppofcd. And if fo, it will follow, that a particular pro'uidence may be compatible with the n-MwrA freedom of mens adions. Such a fuppofition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty^ per fed: Being : it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon thofe words, and take their import, mufl believe.
The ancients I am perfuaded had fome fuch thoughts as thefe. For they were generally /^/^///?j-, and yet do not feem to have thought, that they were ?iot maflers of their own actions ^
4. It is nolimpojjible (for this i^all that I contend for herej, that many thingSj fuitable to feveral cafes, may be brought to pafs by means oi fecret and fome- times fudden influefices on our minds '', or the minds of other men, whofe ads may.afFedus. For inflancci if the cafe fliould require, that N fliould be de-
• Tlato and the Stoics, ap.Tlut. imke fate to be o-vfA/TtXo^/y Ktnm Tirayf^Iw, cv -^ crui/jTrAoxy, }^ rl 3«f' lijw/S^' <yf-£ ras fB/} iif/jx^B-xt, ra j kyuyjus'^cn. ^ The Heathen were of this opinion: other-
wife Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing tlieir Deities as he doth. Tf 4' «f «^« 4>ffo-* Sws 3-sot yXcivr.aTctti 'A^m' 'A>hu t(5 k^avoiTm r^i-<^t (p^i'w?- and the like often. F lut arch exphins thefe paflages thus. Ouk civxic^nTu, ttokH: [''Ouajj*®-] t ^tov, a-yKv. ym'^itc/, i\t Ti^ocf^pi^ir i'^C o^iy^oic, le- yu,'Cpy}j^ov, l(.7)s(je, (pmza^Ut, cewm et'/aysc* and afterwards the Gods are faid to help men, r -^v'/^a'-, to
liverd .
io6 The Rfxigion of Nature. Seel. V.
liverd from fome threatening ruiv^ or from fome misfortune^ which would cer- tainly befall him, if he Ihoiild go fuch a way at fuch a time, as he intended : upon this occalion fome new rcafons may be prefented to his mind, why he fhould not go at all, or not then, or not i^y that road; or he may forget to go. Or, if he is to be deliverd from fome dangerous enemy, either fome new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the enemy will be, or the enemy may be after the fume manner diverted from coming where he fliall be, or his [the enemy's] rcfentment may be qualified, or fome proper method oi defence may be fuggefted, or degree of refolution and vigor excited. After the feme manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advanta- ges and fuccciles may be conferred ; or on the other fide, men may, by way of puniihment for crimes committed, incurr mifchiefs and calamities. I lay, theie things and fuch like may be. For lincc the motions and adions of men, which depend upon their wills, do alfo depend upon their judgments, as thcfe again do upon the prefent appearances or non-appearances o'i things in their minds j if a 7ie%v profpea of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are fcen eilterd, new forces and diredions impreil: upon the fpirits, paifions exalted or abated, the power of judging inli'uend ox debilitated, or the attention taken off, without any fufpcnfion or alteration of the (landing laws of nature, then with- out that new volitions, defigns, meafures, or a cellation of thinking may alfo be produced, and thus many things prevented, that othcrwife would ^f, and many brought about, that would not. But that this is far from being impojjibk, fecms clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great meafure the pre^ fent difpofition of the body, fome thoughts and defigns, or abfences of mind, may proceed ^vom corporeal CAuks, ading according to the common laws of matter and motion themfelves j and fo the cafe may fall in with n. 2. or they may be oc- cafioivi by fomcthing fiid or done by other men j and then the cafe may be brought under n. 3. or they maybecaufed by thefuggeftion, andimpulfe, or other filent communications oi hmcfpintualbemg 5 perhaps the Deity himfelf For that fuch imperceptible influences and ilill whifpersmay be, none of us all can pofitively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no fuch things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them w^ho have made obfcrvations upon themfelves and their affairs, but mufl-, when they rcfled on life paft and the various adventiu'es and events in it, find many inlbnces, in which their ufuid judgment and fcnfe of things cannot but feem to themfelves to have been over- Vuled, they knew not by what, nor how \ novwhy (i.e. they have done things,
s^i^^Ki, fays CaUidmidas, who dellgud the poifon for Vtoeodoruh in Lucwn.
Truths relating to the Deity. 107
which afterwards they wonder how they came to do) j and that thefe adions have had confequences very r^»;jr/^^^/^ in their hiftory^ I fpeak not here of men dementated with wine, or inchanted with fome temptation : the thing holds trtieof men even in their fober and more confidering feafons.
That there may be fojjibly fuch infpirations of new thoughts and counfels may perhaps further appear from this j that we fo frequently find thoughts Or riling in our heads, into which we are led by no difcourfe, nothing we read, n9 clue of realbning j but they fuiprife and come upon us from we know not what quarter '^. If they proceeded from the mobility of fpirits, ilraggling out of or- der, and fortuitous affeftions of the brain, or were of the nature of ^rr^^j, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are ? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore feems to have experien- ced fome ailillance and diredions given to good men by the Deity ; that men have been many times infituated, and loft to themfelves, ^c. If any one fhould objed, that if men are thus over-ruled in their adings, then they are deprived of their //^^r/j, &c. the anfwer is, that tho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to every thing. His freedom may be reftraind, and he only ac- countable for thofe a61s, in refpe6l of which he is free.
If this then be the cafe, as it feems to be, that men's minds are fufceptive of fuch infinuations and imprejftons^ as frequently by ways unknown do afFe6t them, and give them an inchnation toward this or that, how many things may be brought to pafs by thefe means without fixing and refixing the laws of nature : any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpofe, in his way ? I %, how many things may be brought about thus , not only in regard of ourfelves., but other people who may be concerned in our actions, either immediately •=, or in time through perhaps many intermediate events ? For the profperity or improfperity of a man, or his fate here, does not intirely depend upon liis <?•:£;« prudence or imprudence, but in great meafure upon his fttuation among the reft of mankind, and what they do. The natural effed: of his management meeting with fuch things, as are the natural efFc6ls of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the refult may be fomething not intended or forefeen.
y. There poJ/iHy may be, and moft probably are beings invifible^ and fupe^ rior in nature to us, who may by other means be in many refpeds minifiers of
' When Hannibul was in fight of Rome, mn aufus eft obfidere. S. titer. Sei religione quadam
abfiinuit, quotl iliceret, capiendo urbis modo non dart lohmtatem, tnodo non dari facHltatetn, ut teftatUT (^ Orofius. Schol. *> Non enim cHiquam in pote(}ate eft quid veniat in mentem. S. Auft.
c They who call'd Simonides out from Sc(ifa$ and his company, as if it were to fpeak with him, iaved his life. The ftory known. God's
io8 The Religion of Nature. Sed:.V.
God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without altering the laws of nature. For it implies no contradi^ion or abfurdi" ty to fay there are fuch beings : on the contrary we have the greateit reafon to think what has been intimated already -y that fuch imperfed beings, as we are are far below the top of the fcale. Tho pictures of fpiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal j yet to the upper and reafonin*^ part of the mind the idea oi jpir it ual fub fiance may perhaps be as clear, as that of corporeit'j''. For wh-^t penetrability is, mull be known jull as well as \yhax im- penetrability is : and fo on.
Andlince it has been proved (p- 77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from (omQ.t\\u\gincorporeal^ it mufl be ascertam, that there are incor- poreal fubftances, as that there is motion, Befide, how can we tell but that there maybe above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capa- ble of mighty things, which yet may have corporeal vehicles as we have, but/z- ner and tnvifible ? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of thefe many orders, riling in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above ano- ther ? It is no way below thepbilo/opby of thefe times, which feems to delight in inlarging the capacities of matter, to aflert the poj^bility of this. But how- ever, my own defects fufficiently convince me, that I have no pretcnlion to be one of the firfi rank, or that which is i:ext under the All-perfect.
Now then, as we our felves by the ufe of our powers do many times interpofe and alter the courfe of things within our fphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being faidto alter thofe/c^wjj fo may thtfc fuperior beings like wife in refpect of things with- in their fpheres, much larger be lure, the lead of them ail, than ours is : only with this diiFerence, that as their knowledge is more extenfive, their intellects purer, their reafon better, they may be much propever inllruments of Divine providence with refpect to us, than we can be with refpect one to another, or to \\it animalshda^ us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of thefe beings is fo large, . as to alter or fufpend the general laws of the world ; or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft fet backward or forward by them ; or that they can at pleafure change their condition to ape us,or inferior beings J and conlequcntly am not apt hatlily to credit llories oi portents, &c.fuch as cannot be true,unlefs the natures of things and their manner of being be
» They, who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or iee (»« »^£v «»^o oiofZ/Jn wen i) ir Kf. o'-ju.ij £^^7^(1 rcuv ^iBo7)i Xctti^, %m -^ to cio^scrcv ano "if^h^cof^ot »? C4/ icrten; f^i^it) are by
Thto rcckond to be void of all philofophy, (i/^c'jjro*, vkM^oI, Unlrvwot, y^«^' sv o^iiiisTn.
quite
Truths relating to the Deity. 109
quite renverfed : yet (I will repeat it again) as men maybe fo placed as to become, even by the free exercife of their own powers, injlruments of God's particular providence to other men (or animals^ j fo may we well fuppofe, that thefe higher beings may befo dijlributed through, the univerfc, and fubje6b to fuch an ceco- nomy(tho I pretend not to tell what that is),as may render them alfo inftruments of the fime providence ; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abi' lities, be capable, confifiently 'with the laws of nature^ fome way or other, the not in our way, of influencing human affliirs in proper places.
Lajlly\ what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be foun- derftood, as if I peremptorily ajferted things to be jufl: in this manner, or pre- tended to impofe my thoughts upon any body elfe : my defign is only to fhew» how I endeavour to help my own narrow conceptions. There mull be other ways above my undcrftanding % by which fuch a Being as God is may take care of private cafes without interrupting the order of the univerfe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be fure He regards ever^" thing as being what it is ; and that therefore His laws muft be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of thofe things, which are affeded by them. Tht purely material part of the world is governd by fuch, as are fuitedto the ftate of a being, which is infenfihle^ paffive only^ and every where and always the fame : and thefe feem to be fimple and few, and to carry natural agents into one conftant road. But intelligent a5live, fr eebemgs muft be under a govern" ment of another form. They muft, truth requiring it, be confiderd as beingsy who may behave themfclves as they ought, or not ; as beings fufceptive of plea- fure and pain i as beings, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are for may bej fenfibleof this, and to whom therefore it muft be natural wpoiv many occafions to fupplicate Him for mercy, defence, diredion, afliftance 3 laftly, as beings, whofe cafes admit great variety : and therefore that influence, by which He is prefent to them, muft be different from that, by which gravitation and common pb<enomena are produced in matter. This feems to be as it were a pub- lic influence, the other private, anfwering private cafes, and prayers j this to o- perate dircdly upon the body, the other moreefpccially upon the mind, and up- on the body by it, ^c. But I forbear, left I iliould go too far out of my depth : on- ly adding in general, that God cannot put things fo far out of His own pow- er, as that He fliould not for ever govern tranfidions and events in His own world i nor can/^r/^(^ knowledge and power ever want proper means to atchieve
* 'Ot.xo/*si«5«)'3-fa3-^ UyuunrKi ^ ©£55, '^h.Jiul.
P what
1 1 o The Religion of Nature. Se6l. V.
what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced fhould ftand for nothing, there may flill h^-x particular providence notwithftanding the foremen- tiond difficulty. And then, if there w^;' ^f one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one: bccaufe in the defcription of providence, p. i)f, nothing is fuppo- fed with rerpe6l to particular cajes^ but that they fhould be provided for in fuch a manner as will at laft agree beji with reafon j and to allow, that this may be done, and yet fay, that it is not done, implies a blafphemy that creates horror j it is to charge the Perfect being with one of the greatell imperfections^ and to make Him not fo much as a reafonable being.
I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a particular providence^ as that God is a Being of perfect reafon. For if men are treated according to reafon, they mull be treated according to what they are : the virtuous, the juft, the com- pafTionate, ^c. as fuch ^ and the vitious, unjufl, cruel, ^c. according to what they are : and their fcveral cafes muft be taken and confiderd as they are : which cannot be done without /^^Z:; a providence.
Againft all this it has been, as one might well expe6t, objected of old, that things do not feem to be dealt according to reafon^ virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adverfity, pains, perfecutions, whilft vitious,wicked, cruel men prevail and flourifh *. But to this an anfwer (m which I fhall a little further ex- plain my felf) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the Manichean objeftion under prop. VII. But I fhall here give one more dired : and let that and this be mutually alTifting and fupplements each to the other. I. We are not always certain, who are good^ who wicked^. Ifwetrufl to fame and reports, thefe may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendfhip, or flattery > on the other, from ill-natured furmifes and conftru6tions of things, envy, or malice ; and on either, from fmall matters aggrandized, from mif- take or from the unskilful relation even of truth itfelf Oppofite parties make a merit of blackening their adverfaries % and brightening their friends,
« Sicurent [Dy] homines, bene bonis fit, male malts: qtml nunc abejl. Ap.Cic. ThtJeTOs, who call this cafe iblVdJl y\y~\lb y^l p''"!-', have written many things about it, to he feen in their books: Monebok. S. Iqquar. Men. hamma. Nahh. ai.&c. So have the Heathen philofophers too, Seneca, Flutarch, Flotimis, Simplicius, al. But the anfwers of neither are always juft. God forbid that fliould be thought true, which is aiTerted by Glauco, ap. Plat, that the juft, if they had Gy^es's ring, woulddoastheunjuft, andonii^.k iica» ^i>i!it(^ , ^».ci uvayKx^of^iv®-, x-^. Or that mS.Hhafd. and Men. hamma. yw^ P p'''^^ '•'^ V^'' P''"'^- The reafon afllgned for this cafe in another place is foraethin^^ better : p'l^ r\-T\ ^b nman n\-| bib OJSJ nDJii^ feibw HD. But the way of falving it in Ni'^.im. hhaiy. by n^Diy^n bub-'', or what the Cabbalifts call in^y, is worft of all. ^ Cadit 0>Riphms, juitiftimus unus ^i fwt in Teucris, ^ fervantiffimns dc^ui. DzV aliter I'tfum. Virg. ' Virtutes ipfis invertirJH.'. Hor.
undefervedly
Truths relating to the Deity.
Ill
mdefervedly and unmeafurahly : and to idle companions and goffips it is diverfi- on, and what makes the principal part of their converfation % to rehearfe the charafbers of men, dreft up out of their own dreams and invcmions. And befide all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great meafure upon mean people, who carry their ftories from family to family, and propao-atc them very fall: like little infe6ts, which lay apace, and the lefs x\\&f after. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to repre- fent things truly ''. Befide the matters of fa6t themfelves there are many cir- cumftances which, before fentence is paflcd, ought to be known and weighed, and yet fcarce ever can be known, but to the perfon himfelf who is concernd. He may have other views, and another fenfeof things, than his judges have: and what he underftands, what he feels, what he intends, m-xy ht ^ fecret confined to his own breft. A man may through bodily indifpofitions and faults in his conflitution, which it is not in his power to corred, be fubje6t to ft arts and inadvertencies J or obnoxious to fnares^ which he cannot be aware of 3 or through want of information or proper helps he may labor under invincible errors, and a6t as in the dark : in which cafes he may do things, which ai-e in themfelves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at leafl: rather to be pitied, than cenfured with feverity. Or perhaps the cenfurer^ notwithflanding this kind of men talk as if they were infillible, may be milkken himfelf in his opinion, and judge that to be wrongy which in truth is right ^. Nothing more common than this. Igno- rant and fuperflitious wretches meafure the anions of ktterd -^n^i philofophical men by the tattle of their nurfes or illiterate parents and companions, or by the fafhion of the country : and people of differing religions judge and con- demn each other by their own tenents 5 when both of them cannot be in the
» 'Ot-Jii' ^ iiruq ii^u To7c, xtB-paTToii, Ijc, to XuM7v rat ««^oTf«cc- (^ fAxXira i)tv rup/uns 'v7r' iuvnxi; rtvo^ K jM.i'(r»? iXico[/jiv6t, i<p' m <t (^iAE? xAsVtsc^ a^ ret 7ro?^)i ii uM^asi,. Greg. Naz. ^ Therefore, with Socrates in Flato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [o< TroXt.U'] fay of us, <i;^' 'J, t* i iTTcciaiv '^ T ^ix-oiiuv, <^ ioV-fcy, o il^, (c" avryi ij iAii3-£<«, <^ Or, v.v.he may judge that to be right, which is vDrong. This feems to be pretty much the cafe in that enumeration of good men, who fufFerd, af. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortijjimos Qr> optimos viros, in Hifania Vceniis opprejjlt f Cur Maximus ex- tulit filium conftilarcm ? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit,^-c. For here they are reckond Sofii, only becaufe they were/or/e^ 5 that is, becaufe they had been zealous and fuccefsful inftruments in conquer, ing and deftroying them, who happend to be io unfortunate as to be neighbours to the Romans, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to inlarge their own territories. Is this t&he goo^? Doth it deferve iuch a particular obfervation, that F. Maximus buried a fon, after he had been Conful too ? How doth it appear, that Marcellus was a better m.an than Hannibal? Is it fuch a wonder, if they, who fpend their lives in flaughter, fhould at length be flain themfelves.' If the margin permit- ted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue : as alfo fome upon that, which follows in the fame place, of others, qutbus improbis optime e%enit,
P 2- right,
112 The Religion 0/ Nature. Sed:. V.
right, and it is well if either of them are. To which may be added, that the true characters of menmuft chiefly depend upon the unfeen part of their lives j lince the trueft and bed religion is mod private, and the greateft wickednefs endeavours to be fo ^ Some are modeft, and hide their virtues : others hypo- critical, and conceal their vices under fhews of fanctity, good nature, or fome- thing that is fpecious. So that it is many times hard to difcern, to which of the two forts, the good or the bad^ a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It rarely happens, that wc are competent judges of the good or bad fortune of o- ther people ''. That, which is difagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or difigreeable in a lefs degree. The mifery accruing from any in- iliction or bad circumftancc of life is to be computed as in p. 32, 33 : or ac- cording to the refiftence and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another can the weight of one hundred, by thefe different weights they will be equally loaded. And fo the fime poverty or difgrace, the fame wounds, l^c. do not give the fame pain to all men. The apprehenfion of but a 'vein to be opend is worfe to fome, than the apparatus to an execution is to others : and a wordm^y be more terrible and fenfible to tender natures, xh^nwfword is to the fenfelefs, or intrepid breed. The fame may be faid with refpect to injoyments : men have different tafts, andtheufe of the fame things does not beget equal pkafure in all. Beride,we fcarce ever know the whole cafe. We do not fee the inuard ftings and fecret pain?, which many of thofe men carry about them, whofe external fplendor and flourifhing eftate is fo much admired by beholders ^i nor perhaps fuffi- ciently confider the /?/?«/ pleafurcs of a lower fortune, ariiingfrom temperanccj. moderate defires, eafy reflexions, a confcioufnefs of knowledge and truth 5 with o- ther pleafures of the mind^uch. greater many times than thofe of the body ^. Before one can pronounce another happy orotherwife, hefhould know all the other's
* Viupqftfcen'ta ceUnt (mLttcr.) may be aptly applied to the wicked. Mttlti famam, confdentiam ffiHci 'verentur. Plin. jun. ^ Neq; maU. veL bona, qu£ vulgus putat : muki, qui confli£iari
adverjisvidentur, beati ; ac pleriqi quatiquam meignas per opes, mi/errimi, &c. Tacit. '■' Feli-
ciorem tu Mec&natem putas, cut fitvoribm anxio, ZT PJorofA uxoris qhotidiana npudia dejler.t'i, fomnus
per fytnphoniarmn cantum, ex long'mquo bene refonnntium, qu^ritur ? Mero fe licet fopiat, ; tarn
vigiUbit in plu7na, quamille [^Regulus^ in entce. ut dtibium\non'\jlt, anekciione fati data, plures
Tkeguli najci, quam Mec&nates "velint. Sen. Ifii, quos pro felicibus afpicitis, fi non qua occurrunt , fed qua latent, iiideritis, miferi funt. Id. ^ Archimedes having found the way of folvinga problem
(examinandi, an corona aurea prorfus ejfet), ran in an ccftafy out of the bath, crying \Lu^r,xi~ : but who evCi heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoyment of a woman, ran cut thus, cry- ing Bt)Sp«x«, or nt<f{X})K(ii tluU
iiijoy-
Truths relating to the Deity. 1 1 o
injoyments and all his fufferings ». Many misfortunes are compenfated ^ by fome larger indowments, or extraordinary felicities in other refpeds. But fup- pofe the pleafures of fome, and the fufferings of fome others, to be juft as thev appear: ftill we know not the <:o»/^^^^;?(r^j of them ^. The pleafures of thofe m.en may lead to miferies greater than thofe of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune : and, again, the fufferings of thefe may be preludes to fucceeding advantages '^. So that indeed we know not how to name thefe outward appea- rances of particular men, nor which to c?Mhappinefs^ which the contrary^ un- lefs we knew the inward fenfe of the perfons themfelvcs, all their true circum- llances, and what will be hereafter confequent upon their prefent fuccefs or adverfity. 3. Men ought to be confiderd as members of families, nations, man- kind, the univerfe, from which they cannot be feparated : and then from the very condition of their being it will appear, that there muft be great inequali- ties « } that the innocent cannot but be fometimes involved in general calamities or puniihments, nor the guilty but iharc in public profperitics ^> and that thegood o^x.\iQ whole fociety or kind is to be regarded preferably to the prefent pleafureof any individual^ if they happen to clafh g. Lajlly^ if the virtuous man has under- gone more in this life, than it would be reafonable he fhould fuffer, if there was mother; yet thofe fufferings may not be unrealbnable, if there is another. For they may be made up to him by fuch injoyments, as it would be reafonable for him to prefer, even with thofe previous mortifications, before the pleafures of this life with the lo/s of them. And moreover, fometimes the only way to the felicities of a better ffate may lie through dark and difficult paffes, difci- pline to fome men being neceffary, to bring them to refled, and to force them into fuch methods as may produce in them proper improvements • fuch as otherwife and of themfelves they would never have fain into. On the o- ther fide, if viiious and wicked men do profper and make a figure > yet it is poffible their fufferings hereafter may be fuch, as that the excefs of
» ¥atis contraria fata rependens. Virg, See what VUny writes of Agrlppa, the other great favorite and minifter of Auguftus, whom he reckons to be the only inftance of felicity among them who were called Agripp&. Is quoq^ adverfa pedum valetudine, mifera JHventct, exercito ^vo inter armn
mortefque, infelici terris Jlirpe cmni,~pr^terea &re-jitate avi,~m tormenth adulter, or urn conium
foceriqi pr^grav, fervitio, Iw/Je atigurmm prapojlerinatalisexif.maiur. " ■0<p^uA^cv y%: i^,J,
^i^>i r yA'uv JccJ'n-^. Horn. e zeno reckond he made a good voyage, when he was fliip'
wracked. £>%.I.^ ^ Mf a good man labors under poverty, ficknefs, or the like, i^Uyx'^o, rl 7tX,vT;.^u, l^Zyr, ^ i ^rr,^cvi,r>, for how can he be negle(fted of God, who ftudies accordincr to hi^ poor abilities to be like Him ? Plato. e ^ho blames a drama, becaufe all the perfonslirc not
heroes ? Plot. ^ ^ nn ->n^* pTD Q^iyn. ^M, Sc paf 8- m.'/ ,^/ iW. ^'.„
t ax o>^oy (^tfrniinnd a7>t^yxQT»i, ktX- Plato.
thenj
114 The Religion of Nature.' Se6t. V.
them above their pafl in joyments maybe eqiia4 lothtjufl mul6i of their villanies and wickednefs. And further, their worldly pleafures ("which mufl; be fuppofed to befuch as are not philofophical, or moderated and governed byreafon and ha- bits of virtue^ being apt to fill the mind, and ingrofs the whole man, and by that means to exclude almoft all right reflexions, with the proper applications of them, may be the very caufes of their ruin j whilll they leave them under fuch defeds at the end of their day s^ as we fhall fee afterward tend to unhappinefs.
If what is objeded be in many inftances true, this only infers xhcnecejfity of a future ftate : that is, if good and bad men are not refpe6tively treated ac- cording; to reafon in this life^ they may yet be fo treated, if this and another to follow be taken together into the account =■. And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future Ilate, that inftances of that kind have been fo numerous. For he muft not only be guilty of blafphemy, but reduced to the greateft abfurdity, who, rather than he will own there is fuch a ftate, is forced to make God an unreajonable Be- ing ^ : which I think amounts to a ftrong demonftration, that there is one. But of that more hereafter.
XIX. If we would behave ourfehes as being what we cannot but be fenfible we fire^ towards GO D as being what He is according to the foregoing proportions j or, if we would endeavour to behave our felves towards him according to truth ^ we tnufi obferve thefe following and the like particulars.
1 . fVe muft not pretend to reprefent Him by any picture or image whatfoever ^. Becaufe this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehenfible nature, (^c'^.
z. We ought to be fo far from doing this^ that even the language we ufe^ when we fpeak of Him^ and efpecially of His pofitlve nature and effmtial properties^ ought not only to be chofen with the utmoft care^ but alfo to be underftood in the fubli- meft fenfe : and the fame is true with refpe5i to our thoughts^ mut. mutand ^ Or thus :
» Divine providence and immortality of the foul muft ftand and fall together. Q^n^ov ix. 'Utv
^jiXiTTitv ec.icttfi&yTX B-aiTi^ov. Flut. ^ TsTo rxvrov sVi to (/ja oiiarB-M hvcii ©soV Ij ivra y^y, ^TfovatTr »
TT^ovoivTu fJUYi ^ya-^-of uvea (c" ^Ikci'-ok Hierocl. <= Sure no body ever diJ in reality pretend to do this. According to Diog. L. the Egyptians fet up ee.yuXf/.c(.rc<. in their temples rZ /^n uhvcci T/tJ S* 0i» foo^- 4);i'v : for that very reafon, becaufe they did not know his Ihape; or, how to reprefent Him. Their images feem to have been fymbols or hieroglyphics, exprefling fomething of their fenfe or opinion concerning Him. For, as Maimonides obfervcs, no man ever did or ever will worfhip an idol, made jof metal, ftone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth «* Non efi dubium, quin
reltgio nulla /it, uiicunqi JimttUchrKm eft. Lad. ^ '"5 -y^ 'i^yo* (ra>fA,xT(^ to a-uy^x-iy-Zi n j^t-
T£Af(r<4<, Uru >^ 4^v'/,'^<; t^yov to retXi ovvoixic, txc, ei^itntia-Xi <px'/TXirix^ T£A>)(rt»fyw(r«« »« BiM, 0,0 t^ rai Evvolx cufAX^Ti'xi fJi/yi (Di (pxyrxiTiXi «S'/VS?, iiX^' Ixi i^yoi ov "^t^X^ "/tvof^^x &iKXtov x-^m^, S. Baf.
we
Truths relating to the Deity. 1 1 5
we muft: endeavour to think ^nd /peak of Him in the moll reverent terms and moft proper manner we are able ^ 5 keeping withal this general conclufion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the bell: we can. He is ftill fomething above all our conceptions j and defiring, that our faint ex- preflions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more p>oportionabIe meaning. To do otherwife implies not only, that Hs mode of exiftcnce and elTcntial at- tributes arecomprehenfible by us, but alfo (which is morej that our words and phrafes, taken from among our felves ^ and theobjeds of our faculties, are ad- equate exprefHons of them : contrary to truth.
To explain myfelf by a few inilances. When we afcribe mercy to God, or im- plore His mercy^ it muft not be underftood to be mercy like that, which is called compajfion in us. For tho this be a very diftinguifhing afte£lion in human nature "^^ to which we are made fubjc6l for good reafons, the conftitution of the world and circumftances of our prefent ftate making it neceflary for us to compajfio- nate each the fufferings of another j yet it is accompanied with uneafmefs^ and muft therefore not be afcribed ftri6tly to God in thaty^^/^, in which it is ufed when afcribed to our felves. It perhaps may not be amifs to call it Divine mer^ cy, or the like j to diftinguifh it; and to fhew, that we mean fomething, which, tho in our low way of fpeaking and by way of analogy we call it by the fame name, is yet in the perfe6t nature of God very different. Or we may confider it in general as the manner, in which God refpe^ls poor fuppliants and proper obje6bs for their good. For certainly the refpe6i or relation, which lies between God, confiderd as -An unchangeable Being, and one that is humble and fupplicates and endeavours to qualify himfelf for mercy, cannot be the fame with that, which lies between the fame unchangeable God and one that is obftinate, and wall not fupplicate, or endeavour to qualify himfelf'^: that is, the lame thing, or Being, cannot refpe6t oppofite and contradi^ory characters in the fame man- ner j him who does behave himfelf as before, and him who does not. Therefore whenweapply tothemercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and wants, thedelign is not to move His j^^^/ow, as good fpeakcrs move their audi- tors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tearsi but to exprefs our own fenfe of our felves and circumftances in fuch a manner, as may render us more capable oi the emanations of Divine goodncfs, and/^
* ©£«T^£^&)? «c«i/rcc voavT-t?. S. Cbryf. ^ We ufe them (and fpeak, as the Jews every where
inculcate, □"!!>< ''3I11 |1\I7^^) only kzo^M oiK-uui ^^otr-ziyo^ixi' ru 6K5M«r« z-5<«' v.u.Tvu'/XTrafA!-
id i/^irci<pipcvri<;.' Plot. « MolUJpma corda Humano generi dare fe natnra fatetur, ^u^ la-
chrymas dedit, hue 7J0j}ri pars optima fenfi'u. fefarat hocnos a gregerxwitorwrn^ ^c. Juv. ** 'i he
ratio of G to M f q is different from that of G to M— q : and yet G remains unaltcrd,
I 6€>
1 1 6 The Religion of Nature* Se6l. V*
to receive fuch inftances of His beneficence, as to us may feem to be the effects of compajjion^ tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reafon always and without alteration, that he, who labors under a fenfe of his own defeats, honeftly ufes his bell endeavours to mend what is amils, and (among other things^ flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, fliould have many things granted Z?m, which are not given to the carelefs, obdurate, unasking * part of mankind 5 tho his expreilions and manner of addrefs, with all his care, are ftill inadequate, and below the Divine nature. In Ihort, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our felves we may al- ter the relation or refpe6t lying between him and us.
As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of mercy, juftice, 6cc. cannot be as we conceive them : becaufe in him they are one. Perhaps they may more properly be called together Divine reafon : which, as it exerts itfelf upon this or that occafion, is by us varioujly denominated.
Here itmuftnotbe forgot, that mercy or mercies are many times taken for ad- vantages or benefits injoyd by us : and then they are properly afcribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effefts of His beneficence and providence.
When we fpeak of the knowledge of God, we muft not mean, that He knows things in the way that we do : that any intention or operation of His mind is re- quifiteto produce it: that He apprehends things by any imprefiions made upon Him: that He reafonsby the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is moft intuitive and immediate, does in any degree come up to the mode in which He knov^s things. We muft rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be ignorant : which has been laid already j and is, I am afraid, as much as we c-xn Jafely fay.
When^^ry, honor, praife ^ are given to God j or He is fiid to do any thing for His ownglory, or we to propofe theglojj of His name in what we do 5 thofe words iliould not be taken as ftanding for that kind of glory and applaufe,which is fo induf- trioufly fought, and capricioully *^ diftributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more Iargely,m order to give here a fpecimcn of the world, and fave that trouble in another place. Among us fome are celebrated
* nZc 'ct,v hU rJ ■!Teor, roic of'^Cxc. kvri%is<r(u jU/ij «»tSi't» o i\^3vxi srt^^ww? 0£os j Hierocl. Tm
ke^km cvy, Uiv £-K»v@^, ^,;ifcW /Asr^^i' T* rC; /SiXTtov. Therefore 0 0m? y^ rxyxSlv are above praife. Arifi. Oi rhi B-ih £-«<yav7£? yfAoroj'nc-jv, iiAw ^uriic. iliaSvTii. Andron. Rh. = Clean, only a fongfter
r^-it?], had a ftatue at Theks, kept as facred, when Findar himfelf had none. See the ftory in
2 for
Truths relating to the Ddtj. nj
for fmall matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a flidion, the advantage of great friendHiips, the ufual deference paid to men in eminent Nations, or mere good luck ' j and others for atchievingy?^^/:; tbings, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not impofed upon by fal/e nofiom, iirft introduced in barbarous times, and fince polifhd and brought into falhion by hif- torians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a difgrace to favages than any recommendation of rational and a-u/Y/sf^ natures. Strength, and courage and beauty, and parts, and birth are foUowd with encomiums md honors, which tho they may be the felicities and privileges of the poflcflbrs, cannot be their merit, who received them gratis, and contributed nothing ^ themfelves toward the acquifition of them: whilllreal virtue and induftry ("which, even when unfuccefsful,orop- preft by ill health or unkind fortune, give the truefi title to praifej lie difregarded. Thirft after glory, when that is defncd merely for its own fake, is founded in ambition and -vanity *^ ; the thing itfelf is but a dream, and imagination 3 'fmce, ac- cording to the differing humors and fentiments of nations and ages, the fame thing may beeither^/om«i or inglorious: the effe6loiit, confiderd flill by itfelf, is nei- ther more health, nor eftate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it j or if that be any thing, it is but what mufi ceafe when the man ^ dies : and, after all as it lives but in the breath of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguiflies it % or perhaps it goes quite out of itfelf ^. Men pleafe them- felves with notions of immortality, and fancy a perpetuity of fame fecured to themfelves by books and teftimonies of hiflorians: but, alas ! it is a llupiddelu- fion, when tliey imagin themfelves pefent, and injoying that fame at the read- ing of their flory after their death. And, bcfide, in reality the man is not known ever the more to poiterity, becaufe his name is tranfmitted to them: hs doth not live, becaufe his name does. When it is faid, J. C<^far fubducd Gaul^ beat Pompey, changed the Roman commonwealth into a monarchy, ^c. it is the fame thing, as to fay, the conqueror of Pompey, &c. was C^far : that is Cafar and the conqueror of Pompey are the fame thing j and Ccefar is as much known by the one dcfignation as by the other. The amount then is only this : that the conqueror of Pompey conquerd Pompey 5 or fome body conquerd Pom-
• what Se^icca, iays of Alexander, is true of many an other heroe : pro -virtute erat felix temeri- '^•»- '' THVies alto Brufor urn f anguine, tanqmm Feceris ipfe aliquU, O'c. Juv. <= Glo.
rm c[uantAlibet auid erit, fi gloria tantmn eft? Juv. <* ^n am inpn inoi JiiD uDVn
riDn "^HDI. S.Hhaf. « Kr^Jpc* a-<pc.Xi^wrccrov. Fh. Jud. ^ Even the great pyramid
in Fgypt, tho it ftiil remains, hath not been able to pre&rve the true name of its builder j which is loft, one may juflly wonder how.
I i 8 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. V.
pey ; or rather, fince Pompey is as little known now as C^far^ fome body con- o^QxAfome body^. Such ipoor bu^nefs is this boafted immortality ^ : and fuch^ as has been here defcribed, is the thing called glory among us ! The notion of it may fcrvc to excite them, who having abilities to ferve their country in time of real danger, or want, or to do fome other good, have yet not philofophy enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to fee through the glories of the w^orld (juil as we excite children by praifing them ; and as we fee many good inventions and impro^'cments proceed from emulation and vanity) : but to dif- eerning men this /^;»^ is mere air, and the next remove from nothing % what they defpife, if not lliun. I think there are two confiderations, which may juftify a dclire oi fome glory or honor : and fcarce more. When men have per- formed any 'virtuous actions, or fuch as fit cafy upon their memories, it is a reafotiabk pleafure to have the teftimony of the world added to that of their own confciences, that they have done well '^ : and more than that, if the repU' tation acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any real com- fort or advantage (if it be only protc6tion from the infolencies and injuftice of mankind j or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege muft be a great fatisfa6tion, and what a wife and ^oo^ man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propofe to himfelf. But then he pro- pofes it no farther than it may be ufeful: and it can be no farther ufeful than he "iVams it. So that, upon the whole, glory ^ praife, and the like, are either mere 'vanity^ or only valuable in proportion to our defeSis and wants. If then thofc words are underftood according to the import and value they have among meUy how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propofe fuch a mean end to Himfelf as our praifes ? He can neither want^ nor value them. Jlexan- der^ according to his tafte of things, it may well be fuppofed would have been proud to have heard that he fhould be the liibjeft of fome fecond Homer ^^ in whofe fiicets his nam.e might be imbalmed for ages to come ; or to have been celebrated at Athens^ the mother of fo many wits and captains : but furc even he^ with all his vanity, could not propofe to himielf as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praifed by children.^ or rather by worms and inficls^ if they were capable of fhewing fome faint fenfe of his great-
» Tfi« ovo^jjicra T •HiK.XvA zrcXvutJjvt^TX'i vZv rfioTTov riva yX/uoTyifAiicrx t^i. 3/. uijiton. * Mtx^cv
'»ri yi Tov'7:co7:u.Ai/A ri^.vijicorx. Id. <= Expende Hcinmbalem : qaot Itlfras in ducefummo Inveniei ?
^ MiX^iT^^ioi \z-xtvoi uviKTCi iia-tv, lic, oG-ov liv 6 iTTccivisf/jiv®^ V^yf^Jl s'"«?"6i' T AjycjU/iWv T^oerflK iu.vrZ' TO jIti)^ tSto, oi».or^ic)i,K>.. Luc. « Mi^wpt^iW? iivrlv ^' A^t'^i^,"] en y< Zxo-) (piAs ^*f », y^ ti>m-
Truths relating to the Deity. 1 1 9
mfs '. And yet how far ihort is this comparifon ! In conclufion therefore, tho men have been accuftomd to fpeak of the Deity in terms taken from princes^ and fuch things as they have, in their weakness, admired j tho thefe are now- incorporated into the language of Divines j and tho, confidering what defe6ts there are in our ways of thinking and fpeaking, we cannot well part with them all : yet we muft remember to esaJt the fcnfe of them, or annex fome mental qualification to the ufe of them. As, if God be faid to do things for His own glory, the meaning I humbly conceive muft be, that the tranfcendent excellence of His nature may be coUeded from the form of the world and adminiftra- tion of things in it j where there occurr fuch marks of inexpreiTible wifdom and power, that He needed not to have given us greater^ had He only intend- ed His own glory : or fomething to this purpofe. Or if the glory of whatw^ do, be afcribed to Him-, by this muft be fignified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him ; and that we defire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is laudable in us ''.
When we thank God for any deliverance or injoyment, this muft not be fo underftood, as if He could value Himfelf upon our ceremonious acknowledgments^ or wanted complements, or any return from us. // is rather a profeftion of the fenfe we have of our wants and defeds, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatnefs or feafonablenefs of the mercies received : an efibrt of a poor dependent being, who defires to own things, as hv as he is able, to be what they are '' 5 and efpecially to beget in himfelf fuch a difpofition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty benefactor.
When we are fiid to he fervants of God, or to fer'ue Him, or do Him fervice, thefc phrafes are not to be taken as when one man is liiid to be fcrvant of ano- ther, or to do him fervice. For here it implies the doing of fomething, which is ufcful and beneficial to the man who is ferved, and what he wants, or fancies he wants : but nothing o£want can be fuppofed in God, nor can we any way he pro- fitable orfcrviceable to Him. To fer'ue Him therefore muft rather be to -worflnp or adore Him fbf which fomething by andbyj. And thus that word in another language, of which our ferve is but the tranflation, is frequently ufcd : as tofer^^e
* As Tfaphon was celebrated by the birds, fmging Miyac, B-iU •i^i,<puv. M. Tyr, b Honon-
hvi auiii —————cum dtls gratia,: agimus, turn nihil noftrA laudi aptmptum arbitratnur. Cic.
Ot< «v ^.yciB-cy 7:^ut\v,c, he, BioM kmTriiAjTn. A faying of Bias ap. Biog. L. <= Ei f> y^ f/y<
ouveifAji^u, x«ct' U^iccv Tson r^TO 7ro*!icr«Hj— — — i^' cfxci', ry^v KciTH ouv(/,imv (Cfnyiy/.iiv iv^x^t^-utt ^.'y.fnoi (ty «-}. Chryf,
I20 The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. V.
a graven image ^ is to worpip the image j but cannot fignify the doing of any thing, which may be ferviceable or ufeful to the dead Hone. Or to fewe God may be un- derftood in a fenfe fomcthing Uke that : Serve the king of Babylon^. For they were faid to ferve the king o^ Babylon, who ownd his authority, and hved according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be parti- cularly/^ri'/V^^^/e to him : and fo they may he dud to ferve God, or to be His y^r- vants, who live in a continual fenfe of His foveraign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themfelves to the laws which He has impofed upon thcm*^. In thefe fenfes we pray, that we may live to ferve Him : that is, we pray that we may live to worfhip Him, and pradice thofe laws of reafon and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him fubjeded ^.
Many more reflexions might be made upon epithets and ways of fpeaking, intro- duced by cuflom, from rude antiquity, or by neceflity following from the nar- rownefs cither of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that love, anger, hands, eyes, &;c. when afcribed to God, cannot import fuch bodily parts or pallions as are found in us. Even the pronouns my, thy, his fas His people. His houfe, ^c.) require much temper in the ufe of them ^.
3 .• Wefhallfind ourfelves bound to worJJnp Him, in the bcfi manner we can. For by worfhipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be what He is, and ourfelves to be what we are, by forae more foiemn and proper a6t : that is, by ad- dreffing our felves as His dependents to Him as the Supreme caufe, and Governor of the world, with acknowledgments of what we injoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us ^, and the like. As if, ex. gr. I fliould in fome humble and compofed manner 8 pray to that Almighty being, upon whom depends the exiftSce of the world, and by whofe providence Hoave beenprefervedto this moment, and injoyd many undeferved advantages, that He would gracioufly accept my rr at eful fenfe and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that he would deliver me from the evil confequences of all my tranfgreffions and follies : that He would indue me with fuch difpofitions and powers, as may carry me innocently and fafely
* Dn^iy vn Lnrrib^DS nit ; h'DS ^"l^my bD, ^ fm. pajp. Dcut. 12. mention is made of the places, 'U1 a^Un QU? l"12y "^l^i^ : in Qhald. par. "IH^S, Seft.^ ix^rfivtruv (in the ccclefiaftical fenfe), Yulg.'-v. coJuerunt. ^ ^^2 I^JS riM nny. c 'piato applies the word ferve even to
the laws themfelves in that phrafe, ^4>Jvii!> 7c7c, ycf/.aq. ^ '£«£(*« aJsv £|« (^.AcAo-t^tk yvaf^^;
3i»ei)c<>tTii. Th.Jud. « r^^ b"»D\y>D. ^ Care mufl be taken how we pray, left we fhould
ask what may be hurtful to us. Ovao-jw ^oki! ^-o^^w? ■^^oyj-^^nni ys y^^oa-h'i^, o^ruc, ixj'^ M<yyi t<? uuto^ k>xifjuiv<^ /^.£V«A« >cxx.)i, c'okZv ^^ kyx!^u. Pla'o. Evert ere domos totds, optantibus ipfis, Di faciles. C^c. is a poet's obfervation. The author of S. Hhaf. adds, that we iliould not pray for tlut
mu;yb niysN ^N\y, or yn^n ^s^jnu^y: vm}, or ^i&iijri<y;, or abiy ^D\y:i dj n"npn T\^y^^'
through
Truths relating to the Deity. 121
through all future trials -f and may inabk me upon all occafions to behave my Jelf con* formally to the laws ofreafon^ ploiijly^ and wifely : that He would fuffer no being to in- jure me^ no misfortune to befall me^ nor me to hurt myfelf by any error or mifconduEl of my own : that He would "jouchfafe me clear and difindi perceptions of things -, with fo much health andprofperity^ as may be good for me : that I may at leafipafs my tin^e in peace^with contentment^ and tranquillity of mind : and t hat ^ having faithfully dif- charged my duty to my family and friends^ and endeavour d to improve myfelf in vir- tuous habits and ufeful knowledge^ I may at laji make a decent and happy exit^ and then find my felf m fome better Jiate. Not to do this, or fomething like it, will certainly fall among thofe criminal omijjions mentiond fed. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the injoymcnts and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in efFed to deny that we receive them from Him j not to apply to Him for what we want is to deny^ either our wants, or His pow(;r of helping us j and fo on : all contrary to truth *.
It mull ever be ownd, that no worfhip can be proportionable to the Divine na- ture and perfedions ; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can : therefore I added thofe words in the beji manner we can. And it mull be acknowledged further, that thofe words do not oblige us to be always at our devotions neither ''. For as in the worfhip of God we own Him to be -what He isj fo mufl we do this as not denying our felves to be what we are : beings not capable of bearing continual intention of mind 5 beings, that arc incompalled with many wantSy which by the conflitution of our nature require to be fupplied, not without care and a£liviiy joind to our prayers j beings, that are made for many harmlefs injoy- ments \ beings, that have many offices to perform one for another j and beings in whom, all things coniiderd, it would be /<?/} refpeEl to be conflantly in the for- mal a6l of devotion, than it is to addrefs our felves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occafions. To be always thus ingaged, if it could be, would be 10 make God what He is not : fince it feems to fuppofe that He wants it and we merit af Him by it j or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavouring j or, at lead, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teafing. For thefe reafons I have alfo in the explication o^' my meaning inferted that limitation, by fome Jolemn and proper aU.
Tho every man knows beil his own opportunities and circumllances, and there- fore may be moil able to judge for himfclf, how he may beft perform this duty 3
Id. ^ Likethofc' Axoiyjyjrxt ax Cofijimthiople particularly, who continued divine fervice night acd
iij rvithout intermijjicn. Or the Me0iluns perhaps Cpb^^D, 'Ev^lrxi), who placed (or pretended to place) all religion in prayer, jU/sy.; ^oXn^uv rvj ^fji-f^'/vi 5r()«o-,Tff(»,'//£i'9«, V. Siiie.
122 The Religion o/' Nature.^ Se6l. V.
yet in general it may be (aid, that to the doing of it/o/m/^/yand in the beft man- ner we can thefe things are required : an intent mind % proper times and place^ a proper form of words, and a proper pofiure. For if the mind be abfent, or attends not to what is faid, it is not the man that prays : this is only as it were the noife of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any con- fcioufnefs of its own a6b. To repeat one's prayers with moving Ups^ but 2]:v' Qn-AX.t<\ thoughts^ is not to pray in the heji manner we can: becaufe it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to truth. For this is to do it only :is /peak- ing., and not as thinking beings.
Upon this account it will be certain, that ^// times and places cannot be equal- ly proper ^ Some times are ingrofTed by the bufmefs of life, and fome places lie expofed to interruptions. Thofe of retreat znd filence ought to be fo^ight, .and, as far as £^irly it may be, contrived. And for this further reafon, becaufe the'farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we ftand of all oftentation : that is, the more we do it upon the fcore oUruth and duty^md. this is again, the more truely and dutifully we do it.
Our next care is a proper >m of words. All prayer muft either be vocal, or mental. Now even that which is called w;^«/^/canfcarcebe made without words ^^ or fomething equivalent ^. (I believe, that even the deafmd. dumb form to them- fclves fome kind of language : I mean fomething, which fupplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked ftate, devefted of all words, and taken •merely by themfelves, are fuch fubtle and fleeting things, as are fcarce capable of making any ^/>;?^^r^«r^ in the mind i at Icaft of being detaind, compared toge- ther, and ranged iwlo fentences. If a fentcnce may be fo made up of fenfible ideas astoVubfilHnthemindby the hclpof thofe images which remain in thephantafy, after the manner of a fcntence exprcil in pictures., or by hieroglyphics : yet fuch a fentcnce mull be very impcrfed, through the v^ant of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions ncceflary to modify and conned the ideas, of which
,_,^3P;-,3,^;^3^1^2 ^:^^i'J; n'73n'7D.M^;w.n^3nn!:'n nbsnn. 5. H/^a/ and the like every where. b This in general is true: notwithftanding which I do not deny but there may beoccafions, when «J£»
~ "•" ' ..-»l T^r hv-^^- i'^if* <2' yvviiKoi ^iXxy.oiTny KuUr.^B-xv 'i 'ViifvSerctv Uyx/^M^'cn uc, rev i^xm rjj
J?l~c' 'vy>.' ^^'sJi^S ^''^^^^'^S, ''A. S. Chryf. ^ "O y:iy^oy<^ tci^-^nvc, J^.«v3(«5 rt^cc, uy^f^7i'j<,- ,i ^^ ^^i-
>=1 y;LrJ. 'ro,Xcy.r'u^ek re. ^.o.. H. Jid. '^ Cogitation itfclf. according to Plato, is a kind
.of fpecch of the mind. For he calls ro i\^.vcC^ (cogitation) Xo^/cy,J, i-.r« t^^'c^ kvrvy y. ^vyj, U}^x^-
Truths relating to the Deity. 123
(particles, ^c) there can be no images ^ i and indeed little more than a fet of dis- '' jointed conceptions^ fcarce exhibiting ^/z}; y^;?/^ without the affi fiance of langua'^e to fill up the blanks : and befide that, 2. prayer cannot be made out of fuch fenten- ces as thofe. It is by the help of words, at Icaffc in great mcafure, that we even rea- fon and difcourfe within our fclves, as well as communicate our thou<^hts and dif- courfe with others: and if any one obferves himfelf well, he will find, that he thinks,'^ well ^s /peaks in fome language, and that in thinking he fuppofes and runs over filently and habitually thofe founds, which in fpeaking he adlually makes. This is the caufe, why men can fcarce write well in any language but tbeir own : for whilft they think in their own, their ftyle and fpeech, which is but the portraiture of their thoughts, muft have the /«r« and ^^«/«j of their own langua^-e, to what language foever the particular words belong. In fliort, words feem to Idc as it were bodies or 'vehicles to the fenfe or meaning, which is the fpiritual part •', and which without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuouf- ly, whether he can think over but that fhort prayer in Plato, t« fj,\v sc&Ak, Y.rK c abftra<5led quite from thofe and all other "^ords. One may apply his mind to the words of a prayer pronounced by another, and by taking them in make them his own -J or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them /;/»;79//i or he may lay before him a prayer in writing, and fo carry his eyes and his mind toge- ther through it 5 or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his memory j or he may put words together in his mind ex tempore : but IHII in all thefe ways - words and language are ufed. And fince to think over a fet of words cannot be a more adequate manner of addrefiing to God (who neither fpeaks, nor thinks like us/ than to /peak it over and think tooj and moreover, fince the \ cry found of the words affeds us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of compofing, doth really help attention^: I fay, fince this is the cafe, it mufl be better, when we have opportunity, lo pronounce a pray- - er % than only to think it over. But then it fhould be fpoken no louder (I mean ; when we pray privatelyj, than jull to make it audible to ourfehes^. It is not upon God's account that we fpcak, fince he would know even our thouo^hts.
" Multafunt 'verba, qu£, quajiarticu/i, connecJimt membra orationh, quA formari fmiUtiuUne nu!li>-
pojfmt.Cic. tncwa j>ibn ^uj r\i-\-D^b:iT\bBry.Nahh.ab. ^Aldb. 2. d i3in2iD3^5ina"i^i-^i3-i
Abar b.Hh^t in S.Hh(ired.C[uo\iediOutoi\i''OD explains this thus: na^D ib^JD nboi HPO h'Dn pnpT' n-imnT. « Ut ees Ideos, in the flyla of the Heathens] Temper pura meme & -voce veneremur. Cic-
mon in his prayer dp, Jof. ^ This we find often among the Dinim of theje-ws. "jnJZ (blD n 0-s:3n •1>31&J fciinii; HD VOTJJibF^DW^iy.M^/w. AndR. ihz.Axquari Javinj^ cited this paffage, -Ms^y2^^Dn '01^iy^Jt5!?r3T>iby^CU;nN.?a!SiU;a>pDl2nni-i. Mamm.ides in 'another place cxpreflb himfelv
thus; wnbn V3t^j!? y^)D'^)^^ rnavyn aninn "inno ?>ibi4 [i^b] ^±>1 bbsn^ i>5X (That nnb
I inferted from Shulhh. aruk.) The fame occurs in Qr hhad:*!%, ^ pafs.
4 ' " but ■
124- Th^ Religion of Nature. Se6l. V.
hut it is upon our own account, and to make our adorations^thoim^^ox'tQdi at the bell, as compleat as we are able, f Which, by the way, is an anfwer to them» whoobjc6t againft prayer the impertinence of talking to God.J This being pre- mitcd, and it being found that we muft make ufe o£ words, it cannot be denied tJiat we ought to ufe the befl and properefl we can. This cannot be done in extern' poraneous effufions : and therefore there muft be forms premeditated j the kfi, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worfhip God to the beft of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of ferioufnefs and being in earnell, it ought to be the plainefl, and at the fame time is perhaps the bar deft of all compolitions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have injoyd, what we vdant, what we have done, Sec. and every thing ought to be cxpreft with method, in phrafes that are grave and pointing, and with fuch a /r«^ eloquence, as ingages all our attention,and reprefents our deep3Jl fenfe, without affeBation or need' lefs repetitions. Thefe confiderations have caufed me many times to wonder at thofc men, who difpute againft pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk k> much of the fpirit of prayer, fccm to know but little of it.
As to thepofture, that is beft, which beft exprejps our humility, reverence % and earneftnefs, and affe6bs us molt. Tho perhaps fome regard is to be paid to the cu- ftomsofthe;>/^^ffwhcrewearei ov o£ om own country, to which we have been moft ufcd. Several nations may denote the lame thing by different geftures : and we may take thefe, as we do their words 3 i. e. as having that fignification which they put upon them.
Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be alfo a public worJJjip of the Deity. For a man may be confiderd as a member of a fociety, and as fuch he ou^ht to worfhip God (if he has the opportunity of doing it : if there are proper prayers ufed publicly, which he may refort to 5 and his health, l^c. per- mit). Or the y^w/;' may be confiderd as o»^ /'^^j, that has common intere lis and concerns, and as fuch is obliged to worfhip the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Belide, there are many, who know not of themfelves, bow to pray 5 perhaps cannot fo much as read. Thefe too muft be taken as they are, and con- fequently fome time and place appoi?tted, where they may have fuitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keep- in" mankind in order, it is neceff'ary there ftiould be fome religion profell, and even eftablifhd 3 which cannot be without fome public worfhip. And were it not for that fenfe of virtue, which \s principally preferved (fo far as it is prefervedj by national /or?«j and habits of religion, men would foon lofeit all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what eife the worft of favages do.
»i:3'' -1.^33 nrDW i'?^i*D nu^rr'— ''r^sn^n. or hhaiy.
But
Truths relating to the Deity. 125
But how does this pidlic worfliip, it maybe demanded, compoit with that re- treat and privacy recommended above? ^uf.l Ipoke there of prayer /;2 general^ to which thofe circumftances give a great advantage : but then they are recommend- ed no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. Excufe a fliort reflexion here, which if it be not diredly for the purpofc, is not al- together foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to all at the fame time, that all may unite in one common a6b, which otherwife they could not do: yet ftili every />(7r//(r/^/^rperfon, who minds the prayers at all, has a feparate perception of the words in his mind^ and there he offers them, or the fenfe containd under them, with more or Icfs application and ardor. And lince no man can be fiid to pray any further than he docs this -, and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beilde himfelf, how^fu- he doth do it 5 his prayer is in reality as private^ as if he was inclofed within a thoufund walls. So that, though f here are reafons for a pubhc worfhip, yet I will venture to affirm, that all true prayer is private : and the true feat of it being in the mind^ toward the interelHng of whofe powers all the circumftances of worfhip are mainly defigned to con- tribute, it may be fiid upon that account to be always made in the moll retired and undifcerned of all retreats " : nor can more be faid in refpe6t of a worfhip, which by the terms is in other refpe6ls public. A man may be prefent in a congrega- tion, and either pray the func prayer in which others feem U) join, or fomeo- ther, or none at all ^, for ought any body there cm tell belides himfelf
I am not infenlible how much I may cxpofe myfelf by thefe things to the laugh- ter of fome, who are utter flrangers to all this language. What a ilir is here, fay they^ "^out praying ? Who ever obferved, that they who pray are more fuccefsful or happy, than they are who do not? j^n/. All obfervations of this kind mull be very lubricous and uncertain. We neither kf^ozu what other men are inv/ardly and really S nor how they pray^, nor what to call fuccefs ^. That, which is good for one, may be bad for another : and that, which feems good at prefent, may at length be evil, or introduce fomething which is fb \ x'^nd as to the profperity of themj
» 'El* tS ua-u eloy nZ. Tlot'm. S.Chryfcftom lays fome are fo unmindful of what they are
about, that they know not fbmuch as what they fay themlelves. 'E»s-£|i;^o>t«4 -onsci c^ rvj sK/cAjjo-isa,
y^ f^if^enTXi, )^ sxoiJ'c4tr« Ti ii7:or roi ^tiXij y,iviiru,i, i Js UKcyi ix. ky-^>sii- "^ The very
Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bi^s happening to be with fome fuch in the fame fliip, when a great florm arofe and they (being now frighted) began to invoke theirdeiries, cries out, StySrs, ^^ij uiAmrni u.toS; iv?^xh 7t>.iovra.c,. d. L, «* C. Ceftius
(tp. Tac. fays, principes c^uidejn inflar deorum ej[e : fed nfqiie a, dtis 7iifi ju' as fupplicum preces audiri- * Sometimes %>.it'j 'w/Ji(rv t^cmtcc : that is, as Flato paraphrales thofe words of Hefiod, To lipio-f g^
-.TKVTO? TtoXt-KKi^ sV* 57>£6y, CTTOTt/.V VJ TO fJL,tf oAfK ACif/AoC'/iU Q/lffJiU^t^,, X.X. f &Hid qUOtl tfle Citl.
suit candore laudatus dies originem malt habnit ? ^tAmmidtos aiccpta fiffiixcre i«77peria ? qttam mtdtos hcna perdidere, cj> tiltimis mer/ere fuppliciis! Plin.
R who
126 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. V.
who endeavour to worfhip God in a proper and reafonable manner, whatever it /;, perhaps it might be lefs^ if they did not j or their misfortunes might be greater : who can be certain of the contrary ? If thcfe gentlemen have any way of difco- verino-jt, I willi they would impart their y?(rrf/. In the mean tim.e fare they cannot expe6l:, that even in the moft imperfect sketch of natural religion the worJJjip of the Deity Ihould be omitted : that very thing, which hath been, principally intended by the word religion \
4. And laflly, to deliver what remains, fummarily -, Rational beings^ or theyy to u'hom reafon is the great law of their nature.^ if they luould behave themfehes as above^ fhould confider in earnefi^ what a mighty being He is, who by the confiitu- tion of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and. whofe laws the di5lates of right reafon may be f aid to be. They ought to keep it well impreft upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very ex~ ilience dfotnds: that it is He who fuperintends and adminifters the affairs of the the \vox\dihy Irlis providence : that the ei?e<5ls of His power ^nd influence ikxcYiCihlQ before their faces, and round about them, in all the phenomena of nature, not one of which could be without Him : that they are always in Wi^prefence : that He is a being of perfeU reafon : that, if it be reafonable, that the tranfgreflbrs of reafon fhould be punifl^id, they will moft certainly, one time or othey, be punifhd, 13 c. And then, if they do this, it is eafy to fee what efFe<5l it muft have upon all their thoughts^ words ^y, -^.ndariions.
By what is fliid liere, no fuperf it ion is intended to be introduced,: it. is only the pra6tice of reafon and truth, which is required : and any thing, that is ncf inconfiftent with them, may be freely done, though under the infpe61:ion of our great Lawgiver himfelf.
• Keligio deorum eultu po continetur. Cic. ^n't omnia, qus. ad cultim deemm fertinerent, dili- gemer retra^arsnt, & tmc^mm reUgercvt, fur.t dtcl'i rehgiofi, &c. Id. *> Parncnlarly with
refpea to cu(lomary [wearing i which, befide the ill confequences it has in making oaths cheap, e^-r. is a great inftance of "dtfregard and irreverence. For they, who ufc themfclv. s to it do, iit k^fi, make the t'remendous name of God to fervefor an expletive only 5 and commonly to rude, paffionate, or de- bauched difcourfe (Aoya^v ^va^A^pfcz/xsi 7SCi»^i}ioi to «yu<i:e^^T«v >Cj ^imov^^a,. Vh.Jud)
ECT.
Truths r ef piling Mu\]sxr\diy S^c. 127
Sect. VI. Truths refpefting Mankind in ge- neral^ antecedent to all human laws.
I
N this and the following feiScions I fhall proceed as in the forcffoino
I. Every man hath in himfelf a principle of indi'utduation^vihichdiflingmjhes and feparates him from all other men in fiich a manner^ as may render him and them capa-
Jlble of dijlin6l properties in things {ox dijlin^fubjccfs of property). That is, B and C arc fodillinguifhd, or exiftfo diftin^ly^ that if there be any thing which B can call his^ it will be for that reafon 7iot Cs : and n). v. what is C's will for that reafon not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own confcience. Let us fee then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.
II. There are fome things^ to 'which (at leaf before the cafe is alterdby voluntary fubje^ion^ compa^^ or the like) every individual man has^ or may have^ fuch a na^ tural and immediate relation^ that he only of all mankind can call them his.
The ///>, limbs ^ &c. of B are as much his^ as B is himfelf \ It is impoilible
_ for C, or any other to fee with the eyes of B : therefore they are eyes only to B :
and when they ceafe to be his eyes^ they ccafe to be eyes at all. He then has the
(ole property in them, it being impoiUblc in nature, that the eyes of B fhould
ever be the eyes of C.
Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C : becaufe it is the application ofthe organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of fomething j and there- fore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs wnd faculties made ufeof are his.
Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effed of the labor of C : and therefore this efFe6b or produce is B's, not C's j as much B's, as the labor was B's, and not C's ^. Becaulc,what the labor ofB caufes or produces, B produces
a 'Ov^iv iroi', y.i/.iTif^o> i^iv, i.^ y.wui ■^■jm uvrou. Xtn. ^ And therefore the produce of a
man's labor is often ftill called his la6or. So lyw D'>'^^] ID"' : and h'l^^in "J'SD j;U"', in Tfahn. ^ al. pajjitn^ lliajiiinpjie l.Uor zejfcs, Virp-.
R 2 by
128 The Religion (/ Nature, Sedl. VI.
by his hborj or it is theprodu6t of B by his labor: that i?, it is B's produ6V, riot C's, or any other's. And if C fnould pretend to any profcrty in that, which B only can truly call his^ he would a6t contrary to truth ^.
Lalily, there may be many things, which B may truly call bis in fome (nchfenfe^ or upon fome fuch account, as no other canj and to which C has no more right tTian D, norD thanF, ^c. the property oi which, will therefore be inB. Becaufe C lias no more title than D, nor D than F, i^c. and that, to which everv one befides B has an equal i\x.\c^ no one befides B can have any title to at all'', their pretences mutually balancing and dejlroying each other, whilil his only remains. And in thiscafeafmall matter, being oppofed to nothing, will be llrong enough to maintain the claim of B.
in. IFhatever is inconfiflent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of man- kind^ is inconfifent with the laws of human nature^ wrongs intolerable. Thofe max- ims may be eileemd the natural and true laws of any particular fociety, which; are moft proper to procure the happinefs of it. Becaufe happinefs is the end of fo- ciety and laws : otherwife we might fuppofe unhappinefs to be propofed as the right end of them > that is, unhappinefs to be dcfirable, contrary to «^///r^ and truth. And what is fiiid of a particular fociety is not lefs true, when applied to the univerfal fociety of mankind . Now thofe things are mof apt to produce hap- pinefs, which make the mojl men happy. And therefore thofe maxims or princi- ples, which promote the general tranquillity TCcAwell being of mankind, if thole words exprefs the /:?^/i/)/;7f/} of mankind, mud be the /r»^ laws of humanity, or thcbafis ot them : and all fuch pradices, as interfere with thefe, mult alfo in- terfere with thofe. It is contradictory to fay, that any thing can be a general law of human nature, which tends only to favor the pleafures of fome particulars to the prejudice of the relf, who partake of the fame common nature > and ef- peciallyif thcfe pleafures are of the lower and brutal kind. As a million of men- arc more than one y fo in fixing the public laws of human nature,, and what ought to be,, or not to be, they muft in reafon be more regarded by a million of times : for here we confider men only as men.
It willbecafy nowtofliew, that the /r^;?/^''^_^^;^ of thefe laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is wrong and morally evil. For if m.ankind may be £iid in general to be a rational animal, the general welfare of it muft be the wcl- faie of a rational nature : and therefore that, and the laws which advance it,
* If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the cafe. He iway commute them for money, becaufe they are his. ^ Tanciuum Sparti illi poeturum, fc fg
mv'mm jugnlmt} M nemo ex omnibm rejiet, as Luclmttus fays in another cafe,
muft
Truths refpe&ing Mankind, &c. 1 29
nuifl: be founded in reafon y nor can be oppoftd by any thing, but what is op- pofitc to reafon, and confcqucntly to truth'.
Let us fuppofcy^w^ rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern thcmfelvcs, it would be in general good for the world: that is, fuchapradice would be agreeable to the nature -And drcumfiamei of mankind. If(^//menfhould traiifgrefs this rule,, v.' hat would be the confequence of fuch an unrcerfal revolt ? A general evily or fomething difigreeable to our nature and the trut/j of our circumftances : for of contrary practice? there muft be con- trary effects ', and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the fime thing. This tlien would be wrong by the terms. And as wrong it w-ould be in any one man : becaufe all the individuals have equal right to do it, one as much as ano- ther > and therefore all as much as uny o?ie. At leafl it is certain, that whoever fhould violate that;«/f, would contribute his fliare towards the introduction of univerfal diforder and mifcry ; and would for his part deny human circumftanccs to be what they are, public happinefs to be what it is, and the rule to be what itreal- ly is, asmuchasif all others confpired with him in this iniquity and madnels.
With what ftce can any particular man put his own humor or unreafonable pleafure into the fcale againft fuch a.weight of happinefs as that of all the world ? Does not he, who thus centers mhimfelf^ difregards the good o'tei'ery body elfe^ and intirely feparates his injoyments and intereits from thofe of the public j does, not he, I fay, ftrike himfelf out of the roll of mankind ^ ? Ought he to be ownd as one of thern ? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an alien and e- nemy to the common happinefs and tranquillity of our [pedes ?
IV. Whatever is either reajonable or unreafonable in B with refpe^ to C, would le juft the fame in C with refpe^ toB, if the cafe was inverted ^. Becaufe reafon is univerfal, and refpeCts cafes % not perfons. (^See fe6t. III. pr. II.j
Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in re- lation to other men^ is to confider what we ihould take tilings to be were we in their circumilances ^.
V. In a fate of nature men are equal in refpeU of dominion^. I except for the pre- fent the cafe o^ parents and their children ^Xind^ perhaps of fome few other near relati=
» 'AtS-puTrif^c^cpcv .9^»«iey. Th.Jud. ^ Nee enim Aquus judex ^diam de fad, allam de
uliinA causa, fent entiar/7fert. Sen. « 'AvTuvroi 'z^ yiT avrm yiwa-ici. Ificr. ^ p-jf^ ViS?
lOipDb yunu; iy I'lnn. p. Aboth. lo loco nos conftituamus, qu* Hie ejl, cui ira/cimur. Sen, * He was a mere flatterer, who told Cyrus, BxriMui f/^tv ty^oi yt ^oy.iC^ v<i ^m* Tri^vnimt ti^iy >)r\oy ^
Gns»-
1 30 The Religion of Nature. Sed. VL
ons. Here let me be underllood to mean only thole, between whom there is no tamily relation (ox between whom all family relation is vaniflid).
In :i llatc, where no laws of fociety make any fubordination or diftinclion, men fe-an only be conliderd as men^ or only as individuals of the famey/?f^/>j, and equal- ly lliaring inonc common definition ^ And fince by virtue of xWi^ fame definiti- on B is \\\(ifame to C, that C is to B 5 B has no more dominion over C than C reciprocally has over B : that is, they are in this regard equal.
Perfonal excellencies or defeats can malvC no difference here : becaufe, i . W ho mw'^ljudge^ on w hich ^\C\^ the advantage lies ? To % B for D, or any body elfe) has a right to judge to the diladvantage of C, is to fuppofi what isinqucftion, a dominion over him j not to prc^oe it. 2. Great natural or acquired indoivmcnts may be privileges to them who have them : but this does not deprive thofe, who have lefs, of their title to what they h-xxt; or, which is the fame, give any one, who has greater abihties, a right to take it, or the ufe of it from them. If B has better eyes than C, it is well for him : but it does not follow from this, that C fhouldniot therefore fee for himfelf, and ufe hiseyes^ as freely asB m^yhis, C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his ufe, and fo are B's to his 3 and each has the fole property in his own : (o their refpective properties are equal. The cafe would be parallel to this, if B fliould happen to have hciicr inteUe^lual faculties than C. And further, if B fliould be jlrongcr than C, he would not yet for that reafon have any right to be his lord. For C's lefs degree of Ifrength is as much his, as B's greater is his : therefore C has as much right to his, and (which is the natural confequence) to ufe his, as B has to ufe his : that IS, C has as much right to re/tji, as B has to impofe or command, by virtue of his ftrength : and where the right ("tho not the power) of refilling is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding ov do- 7/iinion is nothing. 3. Since ilrength and power are moll apt to pretend a title to dominion ''j it m;iy be added further, that pozver and right, or a power of doing any thing, and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they maybefeparated, nor does one inferr the other. Lajily, ii^ power, qua power, gives a right to dominion, it gives a Y\^\t to every thing, that is obnoxious to it ; and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For no body can do any thing which he has not the power to do.j But this is not only contrary to what has been pro- ved in fed. I. buttoaffcrtitwouldbe to advance a plain abfurdityox cmtradiHion
« K'.h'd e) tmura uni tarn fimile, tarn p.^r, quam omnes inter nofinet ipfos fumtis. SUi^cur.a^i
■ejl homims dc<hmt\o, una m omnes valet. Cic. ^ When the Romans, in Lhy, asked the Ga/Is,
^uodnam id jus cpt, agrum a poJfejToribiis pet ere, aut minari armc, they anfwerd,ye in armis jit^
ferre, 0> ormm fortium virorum ejfe. Like barbarians indeed !
ratner.
Truths ref^eciing Mankind, &c. 1 21;
rather. For then to oppofc the man who has ih\s poii-er^ as far as one can, or (which is the (iime/ as far as one has the pov:er to do It, vrould not be wrong : and yet fo it mull; be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not oppofed. Moreover, that p, man Hioiild have ■aright to anything, merely becaufc he has the power to take it, is a doclrine indeed, which may ferve a few tyrants, or fome handiti and' rogues, but dircclly oppofitc to the peace and general good of mankind • and' therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is alfo what the powerful themfelves could not allow, if they would but imagine themfelves to be in the liate of the lueak-dxAviioxQ. defcnceUfs ; and therefore unreafonable, by prop. I \^ =".
VI. No man ean have a right to begin to interrupt the happinefs of another. Be- caufe, inthefiril place, thisfuppofes a dominion over him, and the moft ahjulute too that can be. In the next, for B to begin todillmb the peace- and happinefj of C is what B Vv^ould think unreafonable^ if he was in C's cafe. Inthelaft iince it is fuppolcd, that C has never invaded the happinefs of B, nor taken any thin,"- from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the whole tranfaclionXicgms origi- nally from B (for all this is couchd in the word begin\ C can have nothing that is B's5 and therefore nothing, to which C has not at lead: as good a ////^ as B has 3 or, inotherwords, nothing, which C has not as much right to /(t<?/> as B to claim. Thefe two rights being then at leafi equal, and counterpoifing each other no al-^ teration in the pref^nt ftate of things can follow from any fuperiority of rieht in B : and therefore it muil of right remain as it is ; and what C has mult, for any right that B h^is to oppofe this fettlement, remain with C in his undiffurbed^Doh' felfion. But the argument is Hill flronger on the fide of C : becaufe he feems to have fuch a property in his ov/n happinefs, as is mentiond in prop. II. fuch. a one as no other can have ''.
Vir. Tho no man can haz'e a right to begin to interrupt another mayis happinefs or to hurt him ; yet every man has a right to defend himfelf and his againfi violence to re- cover vjhat is taken by force from him^ and even to make reprifals^ by all the means that truth and prudence permit ^. We have iccn already- that there are fome things which ■
■ « Jofcphas when he fliy?^, v'o^.ov ys ,(Ay,v l)p(^, ^ Trufli. .'^*;fcnV i^v^iruroy, ^ ii-«f^ uy^^.^zt>Ki, ukuv
■7c7i Suvarxri^oic, can only mean, tha: neccffity, or perhaps prudence, oi>liges to do this, not any Jaw- in the ftrifter fenfe of that word. b Socictatis [inter homme:'] ar£l'ijji'mum -vinculHrn eflmmgis ■■ arbitrart ejfe contn-i naturawy hom'mem Imnini detrahere,/m commodi cmifi, qnam omnia incommoAa
fubire_. See. Cic. . « All this is fuppofed to be in a Hate of nature and the abfence of human
laws..
a -mans
1^1 The Religion ojT Nature.' Se6t. VL
a man may truly call his -, and let us for the prefent only fuppofe, that there may be more. This premifed, I proceed to make good the propofition.
To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to afTert, contrary to truth, either that he has not the facultie.^ and powers, which he has 5 or that the Author of na- ture has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not u/e them ? And how may he ufe them, if not for his own prefervation, when he is attacked, and Hke to be abufed, or perhaps deftroyd.
AW amrnals have a principle oi felf-prefervation, which exerts itfclf many times withanuncontroulableimpetuofity. Nature is uniform in this, and every where conlhmt to itfelf ^vcn inanimate hofXics, when they ai'ea<5ted upon, read. And one may be fure, that no pofition can have any foundation in nature, or becon- iiilent with it :md truth (thofe infeparablecompanionsj, which turns upon nature itfelf, and tends to its dejirii^ion.
Great part of the general hap pinefs of mankind depends upon thoCe means, by which the innocent may be fived from their cruel invaders : among which the op- portunities they have of defending themfclvcsmay be reckond the chief There- fore to debar men of the ufe of thefe opportunities, and the right of defending themfelves againft injurious treatment and violence mufl be inconfiilent with the laws of nature by prop. III.
If amanhasno right to ^^/^^^himfelf andwhatishis, he can have no right to anythiri'y (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved^ i fincethat cannot be his right, which he may not maintain to be his right.
If a man has no right to defend himfelf againft infults, i^c. it muil: be becaufe the a^Tgreflbr has a right to affail the other, and ufurp what is his ; but this pretenfion has been prevented in the foregoing propofition. And, more than that, it includes agreatabfurdity, to commence 1^nm]\x\•y, or to ^^^/» the violence, being in nature more than only to repell it. He, who begins, is the true caufe of all that follows : and whatever tails upon him from the oppofitionmade by the defending party, is bur the eifecc or his own ad : or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, re- fletled back upon hi)nfclf. It is as when a man fpits at heaven, and the fpittle falls back upon his own face.
Sincj he, who begins to violate the happinefs of another, does what is vjrong, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a Hop to that violence, does in that rcfped what isright, by the terms.
LaiHy, fmcc every man is obhged to confult his own happinefs, there can be no doubt but that he not on\y may, but even ought to defend it (fed. II. prop. IX.) i
in
Truths refpefii^g Mankind, &c. 153
infuchamannerl mean, as does not interfere with truths or his own dcfignof being happy. He ought indeed not to Tidirafily^ or do more than the end propof- ed requires : that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wife forecafl to Ihut up, if he can, the avenues by which he may be invaded ; and when that cannot be doncy to ufe arguments and perfuafives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm : but when thefe meafures are ine{Fe6lual or imprafticable, he mull take fuch other as he can, and confront/orci? with force. Otherwife he will fiil in his duty to himfelf, and deny happinefs to be happinefs.
By the fame means, that a man may defend wh^iishisj he may certainly endea- vour to r^^oz'^r what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been fhewn already, that the power to take any thing from another giyes no right to it. The right then to that, which has been taken from its owner againft his will, remains Hill where it was : he may ftill truly call it his : and if it be /;/;, he may ufe it as his : which if he who took it away, or any other, {hall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggrefibr, and the owner does but defend himfelf and what is his. Befides, he, Vv'ho ufes any thing as bts, when it is his, a6i:s on the fide of truth : but that man, who oppofes him in this, and confequently afTerts a right to that, which is not his, acls contrary to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amifs : but what the latter does, is wrong by that fundamental propolition, fc6b. I. prop. IV.
Then further, if a man hath Hill a right to what is forceably or without his con- fent taken from him, he muft: have a right to the 'value of it. For the thing is to him what it is in value to him : and the right he has to it, may be confiderd as a right to a thing o£ fuch a value. So that if the very thing which was taken be deftroyd, oi' cannot be retrieved, the proprietor neverthclefs retains his right to a thing of fuch a value to him j and fomething muft be had in lieu of it : that is, he has a right to make reprifals. Since every thing is to every man what it is in value to him, things of the fame value to any one may be reckond as to him the fame, and to recover the ^^//i^'^/^;?/ the fame as to recover the //:7/^/^ ^^felf- for otherwife it is not an equiva- lent. If the thing'taken by way of reprifal ftiould be to the v.an, from whom it is taken, of^r^^/^r value than what he wrong fully took from the recoverer, he muft charge himfdf with that lofs. Ifinjufticcbe donehim, it is done by himfelf^ the other has no more than what he has a right to. To whichadd, that as a man has a right to xccoYcr what is his, or the equivalent, from an invader j folfefecms for the fame reafons to have a right to an eqiiivalent for the e:^penfe he is at in recovering his own, forthelofs oi time 2iXid quiet, a.nd £ov the trouble, hazards, znd dangers under"
* For ho k^iKuv KKKcoi TironT, o Umrroim y.siy.^i i^m ^yflov yr^jt^.v.,- ,•':, zctv K-f/'Vi/fircA. Max. T.
S ' p-one:
1 34 The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. VI.
gone ; becaufe all thefe are the efFe6ls of the invafion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.
"VIW. 'The firft pojfejjion of ^ thing gives the pojjejfor a greater right to it^ than any other man has^ or can have^ till he and all^ that claim under him^ are extinSI, For, I . till then no other man can be xhQJirJipoJJeJfor again : which is more than nothing ; fince he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were donation, z. That, which no man has yet any title to % the finder may take without the violation of any truth. He doth not deny that to be another man's, which is another man's : he doth not begin to interrupt the happinefs of any body, ^c. Therefore to pofTefs him- felf of it is not wrong. So far from it, that, fince every man is obliged to confult his own happinefs (that is, his own intereft and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to a6l confonantly to this obligation is an omif- lion that would be wrong. What he does therefore is right. And then if he does right in taking pofleilion of it, he muft from thence be the rightful pojfejjor j or, it becomes his. 3 . There are many things, which cannot be poflefl; without culti'va- tion and the contrivance and labor of the firft poflefTor. This has generally been the cafe of lands : and thefe are indeed more eminently meant by the word pojfejfi- ons. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of his own cares and fweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the intruder's pains and travel, is a moll mani- feft violation of truth. It is aflerting in fad that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary dodrine, viz. t\\'M prime occupancy giwts no right, interferes with prop. III. for it muft certainly be inconfiftcnt with the peace and happinefs of mankind in general to be left in endlefs wars and ftruggles for that, which no man can ever have any right to. And yet thus it muft be, if thatdo6trinewas true: becaufe it has been demonftrated, ih^t power confers no right 5 and therefore thcfirjl right to many things can only accrue from the firft poflefTionof them, f . If B fliould endeavour by force (or fraud) to ejed C out of the poffeflion of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind without expelling or clifturbing any body, he would certainly do that, which he himfelf would judge unreafonable., were he in C's place. Therefore he ads, ag if that was not reafon with refped to C, which would be reafon in refped of B j contrary to the nature oi reafon., and to prop. IV. 6 . To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his poflciTions is the fame as to command him to leave them, upon pain of fufFering for non-obedience. But this is ufurping a dominion^ which he has no right to j and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his
» l^am proprtA tdlnrii herum mtura neq; ilUtm, Nee me, nee qneneimm Jlatuit, Hor.
^ ^ pofleflion
Truths refpe fling Mankind, &^c. 135
pofleflion without beginning to interrupt his happinefs : nor can any one do this without contravening the truth containd in prop. VI. This therefore fecures the pofleflbr in his pofleffion for ever : that is, it confirms his right to the thing pofTell. Lajily., \\\cfirji pojfcjjor^ of whom I have been fpeaking, has undoubt- edly a right to defend his perfoHy and fuch other things as can only be his, againft the attempts of any aggreflbr (fee prop. II.): therefore thefe no one can have a right to violate . And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably difpofTcll without violence offerd to thefe, no one has any right to difpoilefs him. But this muft be the cafe, where the pofleflbr does not quit his pofleflion 'willing- ly. The right confequently muft remain folely in him, unlefs he confents to quit it.
N. The fticceffors of an invader, got into pofleflion wrongfully, may acquire a ri^ht in time^, by the failure of fuch, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in pofTeflion, when all thefe are extin6t, is in the place of a prime occupant.
IX. A title to many thi'ngs may be transferred by compact or donation ^. If B has the fole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the difpofal of them befides B : and he has a right. For difpoling of them is but ufing them as his. Therefore thea6t of B in eschangingxhtm forfbme thing elfe, or bejiowing them upon C, interferes not with /r«//:7 ; and fo B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing againft truth, or that is wrong, in taking them : becauie he treats them as being what they are > as things, which come to him by the act of that perfon, in whom is lodged the fole power of difpofing of them. Thus C gets the title innocently.
But in the cafe o^compaSl the reafon,on which this tranfa6tion ftands, is more evi- dent ftill. For the contra6lors are fuppofed to receive each from othcv the equiva- lent of that which they part with, or at leaft what is equivalent to them refpe^ively, or perhaps by each party preferable. Thus neither of them is hurt : perhaps both advantaged. And fo each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being nsohat it is : better for him, and promoting his con- venience and happinefs. Indeed he, who receives the value of any f^;~2; ^"<^ what he likes as well, in eflFe6l has it ftill. His property is not diminiflid : the fituation and matter of it is only alterd.
/w<('^s(rn'. Ifocr. ^ To this may be reduced that title to things, which Tully mentions as con.
ferred by feme law (lege); and even thofe, which accrue conditione, ox forte. For I fuppofe the go- . vg:nment to liave a right of giving them thus.
S z Mankind
I3<5 The Religion of Nature. Sedt.VI.
Mankind could not well fubfift without bartering one thing for another : therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourfe, is incon- iillent with the general good of mankind, i^c. If a man could find ihznecejja' ries of life without it, and by himfelf, he mufl at leafl want many of the com- forts of it.
X. 7'here is then fuch a thing as property^ founded in nature and truth « ; or, there are things^ 'which one man only can^ confidently with nature and truth^ call lis: by prop. II, VIII, IX. ^
'Xl.'Thofe things^ which only one man can truly and properly call his, mufl remain his, till he agrees to part ivith them [if they are uh, as he may part with) by com- ;paU or donation 'y or (Vhich muft be underftood) till they fail, or death extin- guifhes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Becaufe no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the de- liver mufl ufe them as his, when they are not his, in contradi6bion to truth. For,
XII. ^0 have the property of any thing and to have the fole right of ufing anddif" w poftng of it are the fame thing : they are equipollent expreffions. For when it is iiiid, that P has the property, or that fuch a thing is proper to P, itisnotfaid, that P and Qor P and others have the property {proprium Hmits the thing toPonlyj : and when any thing is faid to be his, it is not faid that part of it only is his. P has therefore the^// or all-hood "= of it, and confequently all the ufe of it. And then, fince the all of it to him, or all thatP can have of it, is but the ^y^and difpofal of it ^, he who has this has the thing itfelf, and it is his ^
Laws
« Which muft not give way to opinions of fitne[s. Sec. The mafter was in the right, who cor- Tedtcd Cyrus for adjudging the great coat to ihe great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not t5 -i^i'/v^rlovr®- jc*;-.*;?, but of property. Omnium, o[U& mhom'mum doclorum difputaticne verfan- inr, nihil efl profecio pr&ftabilms, quam plane intelligi rjos ad jufiitiam efe natos, neque opinione, re./'natura conftitutum ejfe jus. Cic. ^ There is another way of acquiring a title
mentiond : which is, by the right of war, as it is called. Sunt privata nulla natura: fed autve- teri occHpatiom, ut qui quondam in •vacua -venerunt ; atit viaoria, ut qui bello potiti fmt, &c. Cic. And fo in Xcnophon it is fliid to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's} and they may poflefs them as their own, not ^^A;^p..'«. But furethis wants limitations. « Allodium. ^ Uoi^uKKi iyiXc^a-x.
X»^<roihii hipciij TK> ximv Kc.^7tM<r^ihini: {f^'om. S. Chryf. Tsrft'v f*s^ <^<^<rn is^tm ia-i^ii' ^o^^oi, vUm S\
C
Truths refpe^ing Mankind, fe^c. 137
Laws indeed have introduced a way of fpeaking, by which iht property md
the ufufru6l are diflinguiihd > but in truth the ufufructuary has a temporary^ or
Umited property j and the proprietary has a perpetual ufufruft, either at prefenr,
^r'in reverfion. Propriety without the ufe (if the ufe is never to come to the
proprietary) is an empty found.
I have before upon fome occafions taken it as granted, that he, who ufes any thing as his^ when it is not his, a6ls againft/r«^//^,6cc. but now I fiy fur- ther, that,
XIII. He J who ufes or difpofes of any things does hy that declare it to he his. Be- •cai^e this is all, that he, whofe it really is, can do. Borrowing and hiring af- ford ncObjedionto this. When the borrower or hirer ufes the thin^^ borrowd or hired, he ufes what is his own for the time allowd : and his doing fo is only one of thofe wnys, in which the true proprietary difpofes of it.
XIV. To ufurfcr invade the property of another man is injuftice: or, more ful- ly, to take^ detain^ ufe^ defroy^ hurt^ or meddle ^ with any thing that is his without his allowance^ either hy force or fraud or any other way^ or even to attempt any of thefe, or affift them^ who do, are a5is of injufice. The contrary > to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is juftice, Tiz^.
XV. He that would not violate truth, muft avoid all injuftice : or, all injufiice is -wrong and evil. It interferes with the truths ^ here before laid down, and per- haps more. It deaies men to hcfubjeSls capable of dillinct properties: in fome cafes it denies them to have a property even in their own bodies, life, fame, and the hke : the pradice of it is incompatible with xhQ peace and happinefs of man- kind : it is what every man thinks unreafonable in his own cafe, when the inju- ry is done to himfelf : to take any thing from another only becaufe I think I want it, or becaufe I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title
TT^i^iJt/jM 7r«p£A3-t} rr.nyJxvra. '^XfXAcc^liv ci^(^ 'i<mXcJii rS cvofA,y,T(^. LuC. ^ 3ui te pafcit
ager, tuns efl. Sec. Horace, alluding to this truth. Ut^l xavrcc, fays Tbto, Iv h^^&6) Ttmh ^iri viiAi- f^ov iStxtm TTi^i' tSv uXi^oT^Lv (aj-^civcc ^j5(^£v (p£^£jv fATi^l «y£«v and then proceeds, yj-n^' uv ^^»^ fJ^^^^^ rZv ^ 7ri?,xc, tciv y^A ttuctvi tIv y.s:cT7,f/Jvcy, y.rX. In Tlutarch the thing is carried farther : where it h faid, that a man pafllng by another man's door ought j«/>, /3A2>tjj» '/«o-*., kX. according to a faying of Xmocrates, y^'piv ^laipi^nv « ra? 570^^5 ^ T85 o(^9-aApas Ui a«^oi|r«» iirJav riB-ii/xi.
* Turtum fit, cum quis aliemm rem invito domino contre'(9:at. _7«/?. infi. ^ On the contrary
r^M nvyyj -\n nu;y3. A faying of b'nn. And Ciaro more than once ufes ^■erHm forjujlum, and Veritas for bonit^i or probitas,
to
1 38 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. VI.
to it, is the higheft pretence to dominion^ and denial of our natural equality : it is fettino- up a right t '^egin to difturb the happinefs of others : and laftly, it is to deny there is any lach thing as property^ contrary to truth.
Briefly, if there be anv thing which P can truly and properly call bis^ thenj if T takes or ufes it without the confent of P, he declares it to hthis (for if it was his he could do no morej when it is nothis^ and fo ads alie => : in which confifts the idea and formal ratio of moral evil.
The very attempting any inftanceof injuftice, or ajfijling others in fuch an at- tempt, fince it is attempting and promoting what is lijrong^ is being in the wrong as much as one is able to be 5 or doing what one can to achieve that^ which is evil: and to do this, by the terms ^ muft be wrong and evil.
Even the defire of obtaining any thing unjuftly is evil : becaufe to defire to do evil^ by the terms again, is an evil or criminal deftre. If the ad follows fuch a defire, it is the child and produd of it : and the defire, if any thing render* the fulfilling of it impradicable, is the ad obftruded^i the beginning, and ftifled in the womb.
Let it be obferved here by way offcbolion concerning the thing called covs- toufne/s, that there feem to be three forts of it. One is this here mentiond : a defire of getting from others, tho it be unjuflly. This is wrong and wicked. Another is animmenfe defire of heaping up what one can byjufl; methods, but without any reafonable end propofed '', and only in order to keep '=, and as it were bury it^ : and the more he accumulates, the more he craves^. This alfo in- trenches upon truth, and feems to be a vice. But to covet to obtain what is znothzr min'shy jujimeans^ and with his confent, when it may contribute to the happinefs of our felves or families, and perhaps of the other perfon too, has nothino- furely that looks unfriendly u^on truth, oris blameable, in it. This, if it may be called covetoufnefs, is a virtuous covetoufnefs.
* Account TO <ro^ y^ovm (Tov hmi, ro ^i kn^oT^m, oxttts^ eViV, u».or^icv. IplB's WOrds. fuJlitU pr'i- mum mmus efi, ut ne cut quis noceat, nlfi lacejjitus injuria, 5 deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatii ut fuis. Cic. This is to ufe things as being what they are. ^ Bkpfias i ^u-
KBs-li?, in Lucian, dies of hunger (Aj/>(,2 «3->n©- i>.iyiTo u'ria-x-XuKivxi). Ridiculous enough. e Or
only 7.V'« '"'" ^ffS-zASii-, as Anacharfis faid of fome Greeks. Athen. ^ As that man, inAthe-
n&us, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he fwallowd as much of it as he could (xfitT«.Tio>T« ix. ix'.ya^ pci^r^i ^•'^^vslv) . '^ Of fuch it is, that Diogenes ufed to fay, 'QfJ^oiis^ rta <pi?ix^yvci^c, roTq o^^uTriK^m, xA, Stob. The MitmJJjtlim, mentiond in mhb. Ab, compare them nnvi/^U/ my ^D >d a^mbon a^DHQ nnur^'^ i-^cj^'b
I XVI. men
Truths refpe£iing Mankind, &c. 1 39
XVI. H'^hen a man cares not what fufferings he caufes 1o others^ and efpecially if he delights in other men's jufferings and makes them his fport^ this is ivhat I call cruelty. And not to be affected with the fufferings of other people^ tho they proceed
^ not from us^ but from others^ or from caufes in which we are not concerned^ is un- mercifulnefs. Mercy and humanity are the reverfe of thefe.
XVII. He^ who religioufly regards truth and nature^ will not only he not unjufl^ hut (more) not unmerciful^ and much lefs cruel. Not to be affe6ted with the affli^l- ons of others, fo far as we know them, and in proportion to the feveral degrees and circumftances of them, tho we are not the caufes of them, is tlic fame as to conlider the afflicted as perfons not in afflidion j that is, as being not what they are, or (^which is the famej as being what they arc not : and this contra- dids matter of fa6l.
One can fcarce know thefufferings of another without having at leaft fome image of them in his mind : nor can one have thefe images without being confcious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to fuffering itfelf is to carry the reprefen- tation of it about with one. So that he, who is not afFedted with the calamities of others, fo far as they fall within his knowledge, may befaidto know and not to know i or at leallto cancel his knowledge, and contradi6t his ownconfcience.
There is fomething in human nature ^ refulting from our very make and conftitu- tion, while it retains its genuin form, and is not ^^//^T^byvitious habits j notper- wr/^^/ by tranfports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or falfe philofo- phy ^ } nor oppref by ftupidity and neglecting to obferve what happens to others : I fay, there is fomething^ which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, caufes us to fympathize with them, and almoft comprehends us in their cafe. It is grievous to fee or hear (and almoft to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in tor' went. "Yhis compaffon appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are juftly reckond amongft the beft of men ^; in fome degree it appears in almofl all 5 nay,
» Properly called humanity i becaufe nothing of it appears in brutes. nvI/U/im mSpD n3>i4 HDnst
nfTlUn "\y2^:2. S.Hhaf. ^ VfhenSeneea fays, Clementiam omnes bon'i pr&Jiabunt, mife-
ricordiam autem vltuhunt, he feems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this i'ub- jedi. Thdit,fuccMrretlfap:ens'}aUenij lachrymis, nonaccedet, owns one ufe of tears: they obtain fuc- coureven from a Stoic. « 'Ay«3-oi u.^i^ciK^vi^ «vJfs?. They, who of all writers undertake to imi-
tate nature moft, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer repreients UlyjfesOd.i.
1^1, 2, 7, — 8.) The tears of men are in truth very diferent from the cries and ejulations
of children. They arejilent Jlr earns, and flow from other caufts i commonly fome tender, or perhaps philofophical, reflexion. It is eafy to fee how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fafhionable. Buf for all that, it is certain the glandnh lacrymales are not made for nothing.
even
140 The Religion- of Nature. Se61:. VL
even fomctimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in thofe hardend and ex- ecrable monflers of cruelty tliemfelves, who feem juft to retain only the leaft tinc- ture of humanity that can be. The Pheraean tyrant, who had never wept over any of thofe murders he had caufed among his own citizens, iioept when he faw a trage- dy but a61:ed in the theatre ^ : the reafon was, his attention was caught here, and he more obferved the fuflFerings of Hecuha and Andrcmache^ than ever he had thofe of the Pherceayis 5 and more impartiiilly, being no otherwife concerned in them but as a common fpedator. Upon this occalion the principle o{ compajjion^ implanted in human nature, appeardjovcrcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrifaction, and would fhew that it couid not be totally eradicated. It is there- fore according to nature to be affected with the fufferings of other people : and the contrary is inhuman and unnatural.
Such are the circumftances of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knowsj make our way through this world without encountering dangers and fufFering many evils : and therefore fnice it is for the good of fuch, as are fo expofed or a6tuallyfmarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and alTillance from others, without which they muft commonly continue to be miferable, or perifh, it is for the common good and welfare of the majority at leaft of mankind, that they fhould compajfionate and help each other ^. To do the contrary mufl therefore be contrary to nature and zvrong by prop . III. And befide, it is by one's behaviour and adions to affirm, that the circumftances of men in this world are not what they are > or that peace, and health, and happinefs, and the like, are not w^hat they are.
Let a m?.n fubftitute bimjelf into iheroom of fome poor creature dejeded with invincible poverty, diftracled with difficulties,or groaning under the pangs of fome difeafe, or the anguiHi of fome hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want and pain. In this diftrefs what reflexions can he imagine heftoould have^ if he found that every body negleded him, no body fo much as pitying him, or vouchfafing to take notice of his calamitous and fad condition ? It is certain, that what it would be reafonable or unreafonable for others to do in refpeft o£ him, he mufl allow to be reafonable or unreafonable for him to do in refped of ther/^, or deny a manifell truth in prop. IV.
If immercifulnefs, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be fpent in pro- ving that cruelty is fo. For all that is culpable in unmercifulneis is containd in cruel- ty, with additions and aggravations. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the fufFer-
' Thtt. ^ A generous nature pities even an enemy in diftrefs. 'BTToiKTHfu ci nv Z^i-Vr^v*^
ings
Truths refpe£iing Mankind, &c. 14.1
ings of others, but caufes them ; or perhaps delights in them, and (which is ths moft infolent and cruel of all cruelties^ makes them -xjefi and fubjcd of raillery. If the one be a defe5l of humanity, the other is diametrically oppofite to it ^ If the one does NO good J the other does much evil. And no man, how cruel foever in rea- lity he was, has ever liked to be reckond a cruel man : fuch a confefHon of guilt does nature extort 5 fo univerfally doth it rejed, condemn, abhor this chara£len
XVIII. The praSlice of jujlice and mercy is juji as rights as injujiice^ unmerd- fulnefs^ and cruelty are wrong. This follows from the nature of contraries. B.> iide, not ta be juil: to a man is to be notjuft, or unjuft to him : and fo not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.
Here I might end this fe6lion : but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,
XIX. From the foregoing propofttions may be deduced the heinoufnefs of all fuch crimes^ as murder^ or even hurting the perfon of another any how^ when our own necejjary defence does not require it (it being not poflible, that any thing ihould be more his^ than his own perfon, life and limbs) j robbing., Jlealing.^ cheating., be^ fraying', defamation., detraction ; defiling the bed of another man., et cat. luith all the approaches and tendencies to them. For thefe are not only comprifed within the definition of injufticc, and are therefore violations of thofe truths, which are violated by that ; but commonly, and fome of them always, come within the defcription of cruelty too. All which is evident at firll fight with refpect to murder, robbery, cheating, flandcring, ^c. efpecially if a man brings him- felf into the cafe, and views himfelf in his own imagination as renderd fcanda- lous by calumniators and liers ; ftript by thieves ; ruind in his fortunes and un- done by knaves j llruggling to no purpofe, convulfed and agonizing under the knife of fome truculent rutlian ; or the like.
The fame is altogether as plain in the cafe of adultery '', when any one *= infnares, and corrupts the wife of another i notwithftanding the protection it gains from falfe notions, great examples '^j and the commonnefs of the crime ^. For (the na- ture o'tmatrimonyhemg for tJie prefenc fuppofed to be fuch, as it will appear by and by to bej the adulterer denies the property a husband has in his wife by compact, the moft exprefs and facrcd that can pofiibly be made : he does that, which
* Eft hominum nv'HYA, qua7n fecpti debemus, maxime inimicacmdelitas. Cic. ^ Luv\v fjuiv
h jiAs»-T)j?, c4^' isy^ nTu ac, 0 fjjci.x'xi- Chryf. '^ One of the Sub[eJ]ores allenortim matrimoni-
orujn, as they are called in Val. Max. ^ Palam apparet, adhitc Atate Divi Hieronymi adttl-
ter'mm capte folere pHniri: nunc magnatmn Ih/us eft. Schol.in S. Hier. e For hence follovifs
impunity, O'f. QnoH Q^D ipDS a>SN3D niurn. Miflm.
T " tends
1^2 The Religion ojT Nature. Se6l.VL
tends to fubvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether in- confiflent with the order and tranquillity of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature : he does what no man in his wits could think reafonabkj or even tolerable^ were he the perfon wrongd ^ : briefly, he impudently treats a woman as his own woman (or wife ^), who is not his, but another's, contrary to jujiice^ truth ^nd fa£l <=. Nor is this fimple injuftice only, butinjuftice, for which fio reparation can be made if the injured man thinks fo j as he generally does (fee fe6t. II. prop. I. obf. 4.) injuftice accompanied with thegreateft cruelty, fo complicated, as fcarce any other can be. The husband is for ever robbed of all that pleafure and fatisfa6bion, which arifcs from the wife's fidelity and af- fection to him ^ -y prefuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and fharer in all his fortunes = : and into the room of them fucceed painful and deftru6tive pafHons. The poor woman *" herfelf, tho fhe may be deluded 8, and not fee at prefent her guilt, or the con- fequences of it, ufually pays dear for her fecurity and want of guard, the hus- band becoming cold^ andaverfe to her, and fhe full of apprehenfions and fears ', with a particular dread of his further refentment. And their affairs, in this disjointed and diftraded condition, are negle6tedj innocent children iYighted, d.nd left unp-o- vided for,without fo much as the comfort of any certain relations to pity them'^,^^. The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by fuch impertinent Jimile\ and rakifh talk, as are commonly ufed for that purpofe I When any one wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of what it is to him, the proprie- tor : and the value mult be fet according to what he efteems it to be, not what
* Is, qui nullius non uxorem concuftfcit, — — idem uxor em fuam afpici non vuh : ^ fide't acerrimus exaBor, e(l perfidus: Sx. mcndacia perfeqititur, ipfe perjur us. Sen. *> fD^^, Ty,v icivrS ywxiKx.
< What amonfter in nature muft he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to aft againft allthefe, (to uCe Seneca's words again) fatis juftam caufam putat amandi, quod aliena eft [uxor}? ^'Ov^i r^ tSt' 'inTiv ii^iiVy 6'5 ■J'o (rayjci fjuovcv ^KX.<f)^ii^iroi,t ry,<, fjiioi^ivoyjivya •yunu.tx.oi, uX^' a' oiV r«A>j9"£; ii7:uv, ij •i/tjyy, TTpo tS (rmyjocT^^ £('? ot,^6r^Coia-iv iB-ti^irxt, ^i^aa-Koyjiyy) wavroe, r^oncv "^r^ttpi^ *^ //^KTitv t av^^a, ti yitIov U.V nv hivov, u ro (M!r(^ iTTS^itJcvvro lyj(pxvi(i, ktX. Vh-ftid. e Marriage is Koivunx Ticcvro^ ^
jg/j. oix-iioTipcn tc" jMit^ojv T u^m [jcoivuviZt'j- Jfocr. ^ 'AttxXov ^coov. S. Bdf. ' E7nt<rxiy
iii^ui]/xc, fays the penitent woman in Soph.ap. Plut, ^ '^v^.^'ov Trx^xyKxXKri/tx Twi xxk»
iuviv)!®^. Soph. ^ ^uid enim falvi eft mulieri, amijjk pudicitia ! Livy. ^ Ol f/>rMy ^^iKn-
x'oTlC, xB-XtOi TTUt^ii y>yi^' iTi^M yi]/U TT^OO-VlfJljIild'iivXl O'vVXf^iVOl , [Aji) T£ TU t5 y/ifJiiXVT©^ , y4 Ti rZ rS
«-6(v5. Th. J. ' Such as Ar'tftippus ufes to Diogenes, ap. Athen. ''a^x ys y^ii n c-o* xro^6>
i'cKiTuvxi Aioymi oix.tX9 oi)tity, ov -^ tt^oti^ov ^tc/jTuv x>^oi ; i yi i(p-/j. ti' -j vxvv^ ov i ^roX^ot Trs^/MVKxe-ty ;
iJJs tSto fcp's. iirui . Senfelefs fluff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman jn Frov. S. better:
where HObv:! '^'2> *°}"»1 is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of aferpent upon a rock, and of aihip in the fea. nyu; "iH^i "iDP Cl]\i;n nn nwy^ ^ibu/j and therefore fhe b'i; H'S nn^pD T]^)2, and then thinks that llfcl ^nbyS i*b "iDlb ^7\r\ HT infei. See ^^6 veufiqi,
4 ^^^
* Truths refpeBing Mankind, ^c 14.5
the injurer, who perhaps has no tafteof virtuous pleafures, may think it to be. (See p. 3 3 . obf. 3,4.) Nor may thefe thefts be excufed from their fecrecy. For i . the injuftice of the fad is the fame in itfelf^ whether known, or not. In either cafe /r«/i; is denied : and a lie is as much a lie, when it is whifperd, as when it is proclaimd at the market-crofs. 2. It has been fhewd (fc6t. II.) that the reditude of our adions and way to happinefs are coincident 5 and that fuch ads, as are difa- greeable to truth^ and wrong in themfelves, tend to make men ultimately unhappy *. Things are fo orderd and difpofed by the Author of nature, or fuch a conftitution of things flows from him, that it mufi be fo. And fince no retreat can be impervi- ous to his eye, no corner fo much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and vitious ad a fuitable degree of unhappineft and punijhment "xrmfKX^ which the criminal will befure to meet with /o/i^^ time or other ^. For his own (like therefore he ought not to depend upon thedarknefs of the deed. But lajily^ it can hardly be, but that it mull be difcoverd'^. People ge- nerally rife in vice, grow impudent and vain and carelefs, and difcover themfelves ^i the opportunities contrived for it mufl be liable to obfervation : fome confidents muft be truiled, who may betray the fecret, and upon any little diftafte probably will do it : and befide, love is quick of apprehenfion ^.
It will be eafily perceived from what has been faid, that if to murder^ roby 6cc. are unjuft and crimes of a heinous nature, all thofe things which have any tendency toward them, or affinity with them, or any way countenance them, muft be in their degree criminal <": becaufe they are of the fame complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the fame growth, nor matured into thegrofs ad, or perhaps do not operate fo prcfently, apparently, or certainly. Envy^ malice^ and the hke, are conatus's toward the deftrudion or ruin of the perfon, who is the objcd of thefe unhappy paffions. To throw duji % upon a man's reputation by innunend£s^ ironies, (^c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when dirt is thrown, ov grofs calumnies} yet it infeds the air, and may deftroy it by a hn- gring poifon. To expofe another by the llrength of a jeiling talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, though it be in an inv'ifihle
a "^cmo malusfellx: minime corruptor, &c. Juv. ^ 'Avei,?ri^^cc<r®^ ^ h h-a^ »9/a©-, p/o^"
£^»?. Lfic. <^ 'H^o^y> fxdv r^ kTrxvTm xXx^^ovi^xroK Tlato. « ^nid non /emit amor .? Ov,
^ 'Ay«3^ox i TO fjjYi u.^i:ciiv, k^^x ro f/,!,^£ iB-iAny. A gnome of Democrates. f yiH \wb p3&>i.
T i place'.
144- The Religion ^/^ Nature. Se6l:. VI.
placed Many freedoms and reputed civilities of barbarian exn'a6t5 and efpcci- ally gallantries '', that proceed not to confummate wickednefs, nor perhaps are intended to be carried fo far, may yet divert peoples affe6tions from their proper objciSt, and debauch the mind <^. By Jlor'ies or tnfmuations tofow the feeds of dif- cord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to intermeddle in other peoples affiiirs, as bufy bodies and »»-oT^io- iTsrla-KOTvoi do, is to afllimc aprovince, which is ?iot theirs -, to concern themfelves with things, in which they are not concernd j to make that public^ which in iik\^ is private -y and perhaps to rob theperfon, into whofe bufinefs they intrude themfelves, of his qaict^ if of nothing elfe. For indeed this intermeddling looks hke fetting up a pretence to fomething further 3 like an unjull attack be- gun at a diftance. AH which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable to truths this pragmatical humor is. And fo on.
If thefe things are fo, how guilty muft they be, who are defignedly tht pro- moters or infruments of injuftice and wickednefs -, fuch as mercenary fwearers^ and falfe witneiles 5 traders in fcandal 3 folicitors in vice j they who intend by their converfation to relax mens principles too much, and (as it feems) prepare them for knavery, lewdnefs, or any flagitious enterprize ^.
There are other crimes, fuch as infidelity to friends or them who intruft us with any thing, ingratitude^ all kinds of wilful /^^r/V/r;/, and the like, which might have been ^^^w^ic'^^^inthepropofition, being great inilances of injuflice : but becaufe they are vifHy fuch, and their nature cannot be miftaken, I comprife them in the et c^t. there. Any one may fee, that he, who ads unfaithfully^ afts againft his pro- mifes and ingagemcnts, and therefore denies and fins againfl truth -, does what it can never be for ihegoodof the xvorld fhould become an univerfal practice 5 does what he would not have done to himfelf; and -wrongs the man, who depends upon him, of what hejuftly might exped. So the ungrateful m-m treats his be» nefa^tor as not being zohat he is^ ^c. And the falfe-fwearer refpefts neither things, nor himfelf, nor the perfons affected, nor mankiiul in general, nor God himielf as hdngvuhat they are. All this is obvious ^
t 3i"ny!? rbr\ lb pN CH^n^^n n-'nn 133 ^'-n^J^n. Mahr..^ Jim. pajf. For, according tc the
}ewil"h(ioaors, he who does this breaks thefixth commandment. ^6aro. ^ See how chaft the
Romans were once. _^uo matronale ilecus 'verecmd'u mm'mento tut'ius ejfit, in jus vocantl matro-
nam corpus ejus att'mgere non fermijermt, tit inviolata mantis aliens tailu JiolarelinqueretHr, Val. M.
And it is told of V.M&riius, thsxtrijli exe?nplo pr&ccpit \_fili&fu&]., ut non [oium'virgi-nitatem illibntam,
fed emm ofcsiUaJ inrumfncem perferret. Id. ^- ^tianto autetn prapntior eft animHs cor-
' ^c, tmto fcekrp.Uus corrumpitHr. S.Auft. '' 'ovroi nu-^ o* Aci.o^it it ro la^v yccy^cj l-.l ^uvrxi
«;yj(v (p(Acy£*)c5vr!;5, xA. S. Baf. « Omnes enim immemorem beneficii odmmt. Cic. And the fame
jEay be faid of the unfaithful, perjured, ^c,
Z. b E C T*^
Truths ref peeling particular Societies, &c. 145
Sect. VII. Truths refjpecling particular Sockties of^jMeUj or Governments.
r. "\ /T JN is a focial creature: that is, afingle man, or family, cannot fuhfifl^ . j Vl^ or not well, alone out of all Jociety. More things are necefTary to fuf- tain life, or at Icaft to make it in any degree pleafant anddefirable, than it is pof- (ible for any one man to make and provide for himfelf merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothin g, and houfe, and that frugal furniture which is abfolutely requifite, with a little necefTary phy fic, fuppofe many arts and trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a ihift in time of health to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon fuch fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth fhould afford, and happen to ^ prefent to him j yet what could he do in Jicknefs, or old age, when he would noC be able to ftir out, or receive her beneficence.
If he fhould take from the other fex fuch a help, as the common appetite might prompt him to feek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks > yet ftill if ■ the ^<3»(^5 are doubled, the tf^w/j are doubled too ; nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the bearing and education of children.
If we could fuppofe all thefe difficulties furmounted, and a family grownup and doing what afingle flimily is capable of doing by it felf^ fupporting them- felves by gardening, a little agriculture, ox a few cattle, which they have fome how got, and tamed ftho even this would be hard for them to do, having no mar- kets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things 5 no {hops to repair to for tools ; no fer- vant, or laborer to affift ; nor any public invention, of which they might ferve therafelvcs in the preparation of their grain, drefling their meat, manuficturing their wool, and the like) 3 yet flillit is only the cortex of theman^ which is pro- vided for : what muil become of the interior part, the minds of thefe people ? How would thofe be fed, and improved ' ? jirts and fciences, fo much of them as is necefTary to teach men the ufe of their faculties, and unfold their reafon, are not the growth of fingle families fo imployd. And yet for men to lay ouu
*^«i</ ergo, animii nulUne habet alimenta p-otria ? an i'.Hs tfca fcient'a nob'u videtur ? S. AuH.
alii:
146 The Religion of Nature. SecSfc. VIL
nil their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in circulation^ without any further views, or any regard to the nobler part of themfelves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being form- ed for rational exercifes.
If all the exceptions againft this feparate way of living could be removed 5 yet as mankind increafes, the little plot s^ which the feveral families poflefs, and cul- tivate, mufl be inlarged, or multiplied : by degrees they would find themfelves ftraitend : and there would foon be a collijion of interelb, from whence difputes and quarrels would enfue. Other things too might minifter matter for thefe. Andbefide all this, fomemen ^rc naturally troublefome, vitious, thieviih, pug- nacious, rabid j and thefe would always be difturbing and flying upon the next to them ; as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or fuperiority in power, would not fail to make themfelves yet greater or ftronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to hz formidable \
Under fo many ivants^ and fuch apprehenjions, or prefent dangers^ neceflity would bring fome families into terms o? friendJJjip with others for mutual com- fort and defence; and this, asthereafonofit increafed, would become ftronger, introduce ftrifter ingagements, and at lajl bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to flielter themfelves under the protection and condu6t of the more able, and fo naturally giving way for thefe to afcend, the feveral forts would at lengthy?///^ into their places, according to their feveral weights and capacities with refpecl to the common concern. And thus fome form of zfociety muft arife : men cannot fubfift otherwife.
But if it was poflible for a man to preferve life by himfelf^ or with his petit company about him : yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely better for him, and them, to live in a fociety, where men are ferviceable to them- felves and their neighbours at the fame time, by exchanging their money, or goods, for fuch other things as they want more j where they are capable of do. mggood offices each for other in time of necd> where they have xho. protection of laws, and a public fecurity againft cheats, robbers, afiafiines, and all enemies to property j where a common force or army is ready to interpofe between them and foreign invaders ; and where they may injoy thofe difcoveries which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by converfa- tion and innocent conflids of reafon, and (to fpeak out^ may be made men.
? Mur in alferiHi exiiittm levi compendia dncitur. Sen.
Truths refpe^ing particular Societies, &"€. 1 4.7
If, when we have the privilege of fociety and laws, we can fcarce preferve our own, or be fafe, what a woful condition fhould we be in -without them j ex- pofed to the infults, rapines, and violence of unjull and mercilefs men, not having 2ir\y Jan5luary^ any thing to take refuge in ? So again, if notwithftand- ing the help of friends and thofe about us, and fuch conveniences as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melan- choly hours, how irkfome would hfe be, if in ficknefs or other trouble there was no body to adminifler either remedy or confolation ?
Laftly, fociety is what men generally defire. And tho much company may be attended with much vanity, and occafion many evils ^ j yet it is certain, that ab- folute and perpetualyo/////^^ has fomething in it very irkfome and hideous ''. Thus> the focial life is natural to man j or, what his nature and circumftances require.
\\. The end of fociety is the common welfare and good of the -people ajfociated. This> is but the confequencc of what has been juft faid. For becaufe men cannot fubfift. *well^ or not fo ivelly feparately, therefore they unite into greater bodies : that is,, the ^»^of their uniting is their better fubfiflence) and by how much their manner- of living becomes better, by fo much the more effedually is this end anfwerd,
III. A fociety^ into which men enter for this end^fuppofes fome rules or lawSy ac- cording to which they agree all to be governed^ with a power of altering or adding to them as occafion fhall req^uire. A number of men met together without any j-ules^ by which they fubmit to be governed, can be nothing but an irregular multi- tude. Every one being {kill fuijuris^ and left intirely to his own private choice^ by whatever kind of judgment or pafTion or caprice that happens to be de= termind, they mull needs interfere one with another : nor can fuch a concourfe of people be any thing different from an indigefted chaos of dilfenting parts, which by their confufed motions would damnify, and deftroy each other. This muft be true, if men differ in the fize of their under Handings, in their man- ner of thinking, and the ieveral turns their minds take from their education^ way of living, and other circumftanccs} if the greateft part of them are un- der the diredion of bodily affeSiions ; and if thefe differ as much as their ihape5j< their complexions, their conllitutions do ^. Here then we find nothing but confufion and unhappinefs.
« Arii'otle fays a good man would be neither ^<?iA©-, nor 7toXu(pix<^. This is juft. Therefore Seneca feems to go a little too far, when he writes, Omnes amicos habere operofum ejfe, frtis ejfe inmicos won habere. ^ Zmv trwJsi.'yiXx'^iKov o ciy@fu7i<^, S.Baf, « Mail is, inCre^. HdZ.J's
words, TO TroXvr^ozuTXToy T ^auv, yc^TroiKiXuTdTov,,
Such
iaB The Religion of Nature. Se6l. VJf,
Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their common good and happinefs^ mult be fuch a one as in the firft place, may render them compatible one with another: which cannot be without rules^ that may direct and adjuft their feveral motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to fome de- gree of uniformity^ or at leaft reflrain fuch excurfions and enormities^ as would render their living together inconfiftent.
Then, there muft be fome exprefs declarations and fcita to afcertain properties and titles to things by common confent : that fo, when any altercations or difputes ihall happen concerning them fiis be fure many mufl: in a world fo unreafonable and prone to iniquity^, the appeal may be made to their oivnfettkments; and by the application of ^ general undifputed rule to the particular c^Cc before them it may appear, on which fide the obliquity lies, the controverfy may be /<«/V/)^ decided, and all mouths eternally flopped. And then again, that they may be proteded and perfevere in this agreeable life, and the injoymcnt of their refpedive properties he fecured to them, feveral things muft be forecafled by way of precaution a- gainll foreign inva/ions ; puninimentsmuft be appointed ior offences committed amongfl themfelves, which being known may deter men from committing them, ^c. Thefe rules, methods, and appointments of puniihments, being in- telligibly and honeilly drawn up, agreed to, and publilhd, are the mutual corn- pads ^ under which the fociety is confederated, and the laws of it.
If then to have the members of a fociety capable of fubfifting together^ if to have their refpective properties afcertaind^ if to hefafe and quiet in the polTellion of ihemhefov the general good of the fociety, and thefe things cannot be had without laws; then a fociety, whofe foundation and cement is the pubHc good, muft have fuch laws^ or be fuppofed at leaft to defign fuch.
As to the making of any /«r//.;^r laws, when the public intereft and welfare re- quire themjthat is but repeating the fame power in other inftances,which they made ufe of before in making their firft laws : and as to altering or repealing^ it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are equal. Bcfide, when men are incorpo- rated and live together for their mutual good, this end is to be confiderd at one tune as much as at another ; not only in their firft conftitution and fettlement.
yV .Thefe laws and determinations muft be fuch^ as are not inconfiftent with natural juftice. For i. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the fame as to or- dain, that what is true fhall he falfe; or i;. ^' ''. which is abfurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to he jufj which before and in itfclf was unjuft, is the fame as to ordain that which interferes with truth : becaufe juftice is founded in
truth
' Truths refpeBing particular Societies, ^c. 149
truth (as before), and every where the fame «. Thcrcfoic, 3 . by a law to enaa any thing which'is nattivally unjuft is to enad that which is abfurd j that which by fed. I. is morally cvilj and that which is oppofite to thofe laws, by which it is manifeftly the will of our Creator we (hould be governed''. And to enad what is thus evil muft be evil indeed. Laflly, to eitablifh injufticc mull be utterly inconfifient with the general good and happinefs of any fociety j unlcfs to be unjuftly treated, pilled, and abufed cm be happinefs ^ And if fo, it is utterly inconfiftcnt with the end of ibciety j or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.
V. J fociety limited by la'ms fuppofes magifl rates, and a fub ordination of powers : that is, itfuppofes a government of feme form or other. Bccaufe, where men are to adby rules or laws for the public weal, fome muft of ncceflity be appointed to judge, when thofe laws are tranfgreft, and how far; to decide doubtful cafes, and the like : there muft be fome armed with authority to execute thofe judg- ments, and to punifj offenders : there muft be perfons chofcn not only to punilh ^ndi prevent public evils, but alfo to do many other things, which will be re- quired in advancement of the public good : and then the power of making nevj laws, and abrogating or mending old ones, as experience may dired or the cafe at any time require, as alfo of providing prefcntly and legally for the fafety of the public in time oi fudden danger, muft be lodged fomewhere.
If there are no executors of the laws, the laws cannot be executed : and if fo, they are but a dead letter, and equal to none : and if the fociety has none, it is in- deed no fociety, or not fuch a one as isthefubjed of this propofition. Guardi- ans and executors of laws are therefore the vitals of a fociety, without which there can benoaVf«/^//(?«of juftice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it conti- nue. And fincc men can be but in one place at once, there muft be numbers of thefe proportionable to the bignefs and extent of it.
Y.kiu. Ariji. b Even the Heathens believed, that above all human Kyi>6yy.xTc<. there were
^kyfJ-T^Tcc y.ci<T(\ci>,XA ^iZi vcf.oiu,x, which mortals ought not to tranfgrefs : ji v^f t« y'^ 7« x^p^irs^ <i:A' kil ^'--on (,; rx-jTU. Soph. Nee ft regnant e Tarquinio nulla erat RomA fcript>i lex de fiupris, ul-
circonon contra legem fempiternam Sex. Tarquinms T.hn LucretU — attulit. ErAt enim ratio pro.
(i-aa k mum natura, & ad rtdie faciendum impeUens, ^ a delichra^ocans : qu£ ncn tarn dr.iqi
i-lapit lex cjfe, chm [crlptA eft, fed turn chm orta eft. Orta autem fimul eft cum mente divina. Cic.
/i, t:^r.ta fcteftas eft fultorumfentcntih atq; jtiftis, nt eorum ffragiis rertm natura vertatur -, cur
noi^fAncimt, itt, qui mala perniciofqifimt, habeanlHr pro lc?m,ac faltaaril>ui? am cur, amps ex
v.uiTia Ux f,icerc top, bcnnm ead' m facere non pcjjk eK malo ? Gq.
^ Y And
I 50 The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. VII.
And further, fince the concerns of a whole fociety, and fuch things as may fall within the compafs of a ftatute book, are i;^m«J,requiring feveral forts and fizes of abilities J and lying one above another in nature j fince not only private men want to be infpediecl^ but even magillrates and officers themfelves, who (tho they oft for- get it) are ftill but men j and Uncc the whole fociety is to be one^ one compad bo- dy : I fay, fince the cafe is thus, there muft be men to a£t in feveral elevations and qualities as well ^s places^ of which the inferior fort in their feveral quarters mufl; ad immediately under their re(iped:ivc fuperiors ; and fo this clafs of fuperiors in their feveral provinces under others above them 5 till at lall; the afcent is terminated in fome head^ where the legiflative power is depofited, and from whence fpirits and motion are communicated through the whole body .An army may as well be fuppo- led to be well difciplined,well provided, and well conduced without either general or officers^ as a fociety without governors ^nd theirfubalterns, or fvvhich is the fmic) \Yithout fome form of government, toanfwer the end of its being.
VI. ^ man may part with fome of his natural right s.^ and put himfelf under the government of laws^ and tho fe^ who in their feveral fiations are intrufied with the execution of them^ in order to gain the prote^ion of them^ and the privileges of a re- gular fociety. Becaufe by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons equivalent^ or indeed preferable by much : and this he may do without ading againft any truth. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are his own^ and therefore no other man's property is denied by this : nor is the nature of happinefs denied to be what it is, fince it is happinefs which he aims at in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend a- gainft truths and deny happinefs to be what it is, if he did not do it j efpecial- ly feeing, that here his own happinefs coincides with the general happinefs and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his lot falls, or his choice determins him to live.
If the queftion Ihould be asked, what natural rights a man may part with, or how far he may pai't with them ; the generaUri'iwcr^ I think, may be this. Some things are effential to our being, and fome it is not in our power to part with. As to the r^/, he may depart from them fo far as it is confiftent with the end^ for which he does this: not further, becaufe beyond that lies a contradidion. A man cannot give away the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order x.o pre ferve or retain that property : but he may confent to contribute /^r/ of his ellatc, in order to preferve the refi.^ when other wife it might all be loft 5 to take his flmre of danger in defence of his country, rather than certainly periih, be inllaved, .1 iuind by the conqucft or opprefiion of itj and the hkc.
Wl.Mn
Truths ref peeing particular Societies, 8^c. 1 5 1
VII. Men may bscome members of a fociety (/. e. do what ismentiondinthe f&re- going propofition) by giving their confent^ either e^cpUcitly^ or implicitly. That a man may fubjea: himfelf to laws, wc have feen. If he does this, he muft do it cither in his own perfon; or he muft do it by (omc proxy, whom he fubftitutes in his room to agree to pubHc laws i or his confent muft be colleSled only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the fociety, accepting the be- nefits of its conftitution, and acquiefcing in the eftabliftid methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the twofirfi ways he declares himfelf ^Ar/»//V/V/y, and directly : nor can he after that behave himfelf as if he was no member of the fociety, without a6bing as if he had not done what he has done. And this is the cafe not only of them, who have been concerned in xht firfl formation of any government, but alfo of them, who have in the faid manners » given their confent to ^ny fubfe que nt a6ls, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came into what their anceftors had done, or who have by oaths put themfelves under obligations to the pubhc. By the lafi of the three ways mentiond a man's confent is given indeed implicitly^ and lefs diredly j but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For fuppofe him to be born in fome certain kingdom or com- monwealth, but never to have hctn party to any law, never to have taken any oath to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himfelf by any other a6i. In this cafe he cannot methinks but have fome love and fympathy for that place, which afforded him the firft air he drew 5 fome gratitude towards that conftitution, which proteded his parents, while they educated and provided for him ; fome regard to thofe obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyd to him his very life.
If he inherits or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeafiblc right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to get^ or keep^ without the aid of laws and advantage of fociety i then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it \^ ijoith it he takes and owns the laix^s which give it him.
Indeed fince xhcfecurity he has from the laws of the country in refpecVof his perfon, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happcji to be hereafter, is the general equivalent for \\\sfubmifjion to them, he cannot accept //:^^/ with- out being obliged in equity to pay this.
a In perfon, or by proxy.
V 2 Na-r
i$i The Religion of Nature. Se6l. VIF.
Nay, laftly, his very continuing and fettliug in any place {hews, that either he likes the conilitution, or Hkes it better than any other, or at leall thinks it bet- ter in his circumflances to confonn to it than to feek any other: that is, he con- fents to be comprehended in it *.
VIII. nijen a man is become a member of afociety^ if he would behave bim/elf Mccording to truth, he ought to do thefe things: viz. to conMtr property as founded not only in nature, but alfo in lava j and men's titles to what they have, as ilrengthend by that, and even by his ouin concejjion and covenants > and therefore by fo much the more inviolable and facred : inllead of taking fuch meafures to do him- felf right, when he is molefted, or injured, as his own prudence might fuggeft in a flate of nature, to confine himfelf to fuch ways as are with his own confent marks out for him: and, in a word, to behave himfelf according to his fubordination or place in the community, and to obferve the laws of it. For it is containdinthe idea of a law, that it is intended to be obferved : and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or profeflcs himfelf member of a focicty formed upon laws, cannot willingly tranfgrefs thofelaws without denying laws xohtvchat they are, or him- felf to be what he is fuppofed or profefles himfelf /o ^^ ; and indeed without con- tradicting all or molt of thofc truths containd in the foregoing propofitions.
IX. In refpeil of thofe things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, »r when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of thufe laws cannot be had (lor fo it may fometiines happen. I fay, in refpe6b of fuch things), he who is a member of afhciety in other refpeUs retains his natural liberty, is fiill as it were in aflate of nature, and mufi endeavour to a6t according to truth and his befl prudence. For in the former cafe there is nothing to limit him, by the fuppofition, but truth and nature. And in the other it is the fame as if there was nothings (ince in effedl there is no law, where noeffeSf or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man lliould be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no op^ port unity or power to call the proper magi Urate or officer to his afiMance.
There is a third caCq, which perhaps may demand admillion here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to truth znd natural juf ice. For tho they may pafs the ufual forms, and be ftyled laws j yet, fince no fuch law can abro- gate that law of nature and reafon> to which the Author of our being hath iubjecled us, or make fallhood to be truth 3 and two inconfillent laws c^mnot
a Flato fays, when any man has feen our i'orm of government, ^e. and lemains nnckr it, n^n (^x-
I both
Truths refpe^ing particular Societies, &c. 1 53
both oblige, or fubfifl: together} one of them mull give way : and it is eafy to difcern, ivhich ought to do it ».
There remains one truth more to be annexed here, which may be conti'a- di6bed by the pradices and pretences of Enthiiiiafts ''.
X. I'he focieties intended in this fe^ion^ fuch as kingdoms and commonivcalthsy may defend themfehesagainji other nations : or, war may lawfully be waged in de- fence and for the fecurity of afociety^ its members and territories^ or for reparation of injuries. For if one man may inaftate of nature have a right to defend himfclf, (fee fc£t. VI. prop. VII. j, tvjo may, or three j and fo on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, (^e. At leafl, if the right be not greater, the concern is greater : and there will be more reafon, that two, or three, or more Ihould be faved, than one only i and therefore that two, or three, or more ihould defend themfelves, than that one fhould. And if this may be done by men in a Hate of nature, it may be done by them when con- federated among themfelves : becaufe with refpe(St to other nations they are IHII in that Jiate. I mean, fo far as they have not limited themfelves by leagues and alliances.
Befide, if a man may defend himfclf, he may defend himfelf by what methods he thinks moll proper, provided he trcfpafTes againft no truth j and therefore, by getting the aid and aiUftance of others. Now when \uar is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be confiderd as if every particular man was defending himfelf with the afhftance of all the refl, and fo be turned into the fame cafe with that of ifingle man.
In truth the condition of a nation feemsto be much the fame with that of a Jingle perfon when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had : and what one man may do to another in that poftion^mxy he done by one nation or pohtic body with refpedb to another : and perhaps by this rule, regard being bad to what has been deliverd in fe^t. VI. thejufice of foreign wars may be not untruly eftimated.
Mutual defence is one of the great ends of focicty, if not the greateii, and in a particular and eminent manner involves iiiit defence ^g^miH foreign enemies. And whoever fignahzes himfelf, when there is occafion for his fervice, merits the grate- ful acknowledgements and celebrations of his countiy-men : fo far at lead as he ads gcneroufly and with a public fpir it, and not in purfuance only oi private views.
• lllud ftuitijjimum, exiftimare omnia jn/ta ejfe, qtufcitafnt in populcrum inftitutis, (tHtlegibus. — Si poptilorum jitjfs, ft principum decretis, fifententiisjudicMm, jura conftitiierentur, jus effet latrocinari z jus., atlulterare : jus, teftamenta falfafupponere, ft fuc f/ijfr.igiis aut fcita multitudinis probarentHr. Cic. *" Manicheans of old, and feme modernsv
As
1 54- The Religion of Nature. Sedl. VIIL'
As to thofe zvarsy which arc undertaken by men out of ambition % merely to inlargc empire, or to fliew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to (lay, how many flaves to make ^, how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in fhort, how much mifchief and mifery they are able to bring upon mankind j thefe are founded upon falfe notions of glory : imbellifid indeed by fervile wits and mifplaced eloquence, but condemned by all true philofophy and religion.
Sect, VIIL Truths concerning Families and
Relations.
T
HIS fcction fhall begin as relation itfelf does, with marriage.
I. ^he end of marriage is the propagation of mankind ^ and joint happinefs of the couple intermarrying^ taken together -y or the latter by itfelf^. The difference of the fexes^ with the ftrong inclination they have each to the injoymcnt of the o- ther^, is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the continuance of the fpe- cies^ which without that mufl be foon cxtinguifhd. And tho people, when they marry, may have many times not fo much the increafe of their family in their dcfign or wifhes, as the gratification of an importunate appetite j yet llnce nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, nature (or rather its great Author^ may be laid to make this an end of the marriage, tho the kridegroom and bride themfelvcs do not.
* Like thofe particularly of y. C&far: of whom it is reported, that, animadversA apud Her cults templum magni Alexeindri imagine, ingerauit ; quaji pertifus ignaziam fuam, quod nihil dum a ft me- inorabik actum ejfet in dUte qu4 jam Alexander orbem terrarumfui>egijfet. Suet. ^ Some
o-o to war axTTTif) iTTi B-K^M ^ xyMr,yi(yieiy oc'j^^uTruv. Plut. Not out of nece/Tity, and in order to peace •■, which is the true end of war. UoXifjj^iAiv, lixsipmf «'/»/*£>'. Arifl. ha bellum fufcipi^tur, ut nihil aliud quam pax quxfita videatur. Cic. ' Ol mB-^uttci » y^cvtv r nKvczoi'mc^ x,'^^'" irvvoi-
tfcSo-p, a.')^« <£" ^ ih ?■«* /St'o^ 'i>i- Arift. '^ 'Av^jjj' >^ '/vvaikI QiXU oox-u x-xroc (puirty uttu^-
y^iiv. 'cc'i^Ptar.©^ ^p ryj (fxjiTH (rvvov»'^tK'o)i fjuuxt^oy h TToXirtKov. Id. "H; yJ « y/ccyvvirii AjS-^— — — — —
TT^li s«t/Ti5ii r (n'<^(jf6> fAxsi" jiTU TO ^ ^ijAii*^ (T^tyjci — TO S' «5p:v©- iraiAsi Tps; t-^v /^'I" ^-^^e'-
5. Baf.
And
Truths concerning Families, 6^c. 155
And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforefaid end of marriage, or is (^is in many cafes it can only be) the end itfelf^^ the joint happinefs of the conjuges, no body can be fuppofed to marry in order' and on fet purpofe to make him or herfelf unhappy : no nor without a pre- fumption of being more happy. For without an apprehenfion of fome degree of happinefs to accrue, or what prefents itfelf to the imagination as fuch, and is taken for fuch, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there muft be, by which (however things prove upon trialj they think to better it. And indeed if their cir cum fiances are fuch, as may inablethem to maintain a fa- mily, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares,, and if they in good earnefl refolve to behave themfelves as they ought, and recipro- cally to be helpful and loving each to other, much comfort and happinefs ^ may juftly be expected from this intimate union c, the interchange of affections, and a- confpiration of all their counfels and meafures '', the qualities and abilities of the- one fex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pafsoverin filence thofejoys, which are truefl when moflconceald % many things there are, which may be ufeful, perhaps neceflary to the man^ and yet require the delicater hand or nicer management and genius of the woman *"; and fo, vicijfm ,
a That furt is a hard law in Vlato^ which injoins o-tt'i'/^iS::^ i.^^^cci B-nXuai ttuo-t,:;, c^lifj^^ iSivXotro «k trci (jbc/'so^ TO o-^x^iv. That mentiond in S. Hhared. fays otherwife: ^IMI IDDiy Cmii C3"»^nb y'Q 1D1 nnniyo invi/^iU;::. Many opinions are taken up upon flight rcafons. When Ocellus Lucams
fays, 'AvTk<i rui ^uv^fAu:, (^ ra opyuva, f^ rocc, i^il^c, tcc<; tt^U r;y jM//|jv IttI B-iS h^ofjtjiycic, i.,^^^^oii, »;^^ i(lAi'i«5 tviicec, d'i^o^ frvi/j^iiQ-/ix.iv, x.».'oi7>i^^u\rcv uil ^ci^""^ ^''"'l^o'^'^'i »"S v"^?. how doth he know that they were not given for both thefe ends, in a regular way ? And fo when Clemens Alex, ihews his zeal
againft t^5 <i»«f;r»5 g-tto^ui;, rly tt^U rem lyy.visc, if^i>,ix'j, (^c. adding, ■^t?^>, -^ ^i^bvIi, )tu» c* yi.ujo> t^c,-
|i«A»(p3-5i, ■!Tu^u.-jof/.c(, sV», %>,. he does this becaufe o Mt'o-^? u-zuyn reiv lyx-vuv t»? 'ocv^cct.^; and then cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpofe, nor I believe any where to be found • OuK 'ih(roti r >«7&v, sJs rviv uxtvuv. {^Hetn interpretem fecutus Jit Clemens nefcio. Gent.Herv.) Cer tainly the Jews underftand their lawgiver otherwife. See how that n3iy mentiond in the law is cx- plaind hy Maim, in hilk. ijlj. Nor are the fuffrages of Chriilians wanting. Bens, cum atcrc.s nni-
mantes, fufcefto fcetu, maribus reptignare xoliiijjet , folam omnium mulierem putieniem firi fecit ■ ne
feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret liros aliud appetere, See. that is, that the man and wifemi^ht be kept infeparably together. La^. ^ Ki« to X'^y.a-tfAov hvcci ^okiT, >^ to ii^u cv tuvt-.j rij (piXU. Arifl.
anno nrDvi; ^ii<-i3 czi->:in^D nu-'^- \I;^^iu;D. Refj.hhekm. c "e^^^ '-y^x^ru^.lhl,;^/,'^
^iTlu Tf/j^t/jctrx — £<5 Tccvrlv k^f/jorliTo:.!. Th. J. ** True love is to be found in marriao-e, or no
where. TXo^vti ^ (p^Xw »« hiTXTui, u>h' hiQaXvju. yjiioy. S. Chryf. .""iDIDD ^bril nbuo nniiy a homely, but true faying of a Je-wijl} commentator. ^ ^iod facere turpe non eft modi occulta^
id dicere objc&nwn eft. Cic. * Ewk ^f> jj xocrji/z/ot >^ t^iii>cy,i, » fjuoyov r/y iin 7)55 x-oivuviur, ■zuext/jv-
^ixv TTx^i^ii TO) civa^h ei)i^li J^ ov roTc ««.«(? iixccc"* >ve;i^»^i' T?? ixvTni /if^'ft' l-ihihTxiy kX. S. Chryf.
3 the
1 55 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. VIII.
the woman c-mwoihwt want many things, which require the more robuft and ac- tive powers or greater capacity of the man*. Thus, in lower life, whilll the wheel, the needle, (Jc. imploy ker, the plough or feme trade perhaps demands the mufclcs and hardincfsof^/^; and, more generally, if Jlje infpccts domeftic tiflpairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, fpent frugally, tmd injoyd with neatnefs and advantage, be is buded in that profeflion, or the overfi^htand improvement of that eftate, which muft fuftain the charge of all thisi he prefides, and directs in matters of greater moment j preferves order in the family by a gentle and prudent government, i^c ^.
As then I founded the greater focietia of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together 5 fo may I found this lefs^ hmftr ic- ier alliance between the man and the woman in their joint -hapfimfs^. Nature has a further aim^ the prefervation of the kind.
II, 'That marriages, arc made by fvrne fclcmn contra6f^ vow^cr oath (andihefe perhaps attended vjitbfome pledgf" J or nuptial rite ^)^, by which the parties muYiially ingage t»
live
Arif. ^ Sec the convcrfation between Jfchomaclus and his vvite in Xtnophon. ^ Tho
Flrto (like «7^ of the old Greeks and Rciytans) among many 'very fine things hath now and thenfomc that are weak, and even abfurd ; yet I cannot think, that by his community of women he meant any thine like that, which is faid, ap. Athcn. to have beey pra£liled ^rctfas Tv'fo-4voi<, i»T07r&)<; rf'j<pK<ret<rtv i or that his thought could be fo grofs, as La^anlius rcprefents it : Sci icet nt ad eandem muli^rcm tnulti ziri, t/tnqnam cariss, confinerera. For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is cxtinguiflid, and all induftry and improvements are at an end. And befide that, many of the moft fubftantial comforts and innocent delights of thisj^Ife are deftroyd at once. Slomnes om-
r.iam fuerlnt O* muriti, ^ pc.tres, ^- tixcres, (y- liberi, qii£ ifta confu_fo generis hvmani eft ? JS^uis
aut lir midierem, itut mtilur I'trum dili^it, niji habitaverlnt femper una ? nifi dezot/t mens, ^ f-r- %ata inviccm fides inditiduam fecerit curitatcm, &c. id. Mowever it muft be confcft, that flato ha.s advanced more than was cbnfifcfnt with his own gravity, or with nature. The beft cxcufe to be made for 1 im, that 1 know of, is that in Athenstts, ''tonar 6 UXccmv uj-a to?? i^o-ti/ u-j^cd<7: i; yfs:v«< 7 »? vouj:^',, ci>^^ TiT; y/T «vrS o.cizXa.Tiot/ji:ct<; : or perhaps to fay, that he was To intent upon fircngtliening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men muil live after his manner, there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not pcrfcftly clear. ^ Everv one knows how marriages were maJe among the Roman J, confarreatione, coemptione, ufu : ct which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies : and the legithfis. t^nbelU cr at Icafl: confent of friends (which could not be given without lome folemnity) preceded all, au'p.'iia were uiualiy taken, public notaries and witneffes allilfcd, err. Among the Greeks men and v/onion wi.re elpcuicd by mutual fromiPjs of fidelity : L elide v/hich there wei e witncflcs, and dotal writings
Truths concerning Families, &c. 1 57
Iheicgether in kve, and to he faithful^ ^ffi flings and the like^ each to other ^ in all circumjlances of health and fortune^ till death parts them ''^ I take for granted. For all nations have fome form or other upon thefe occafions : and even pri- vate contrads cannot be made without fome words in which they are containd, nor perhaps without fome kind of fignificant, tho private, ceremony between the lovei"s ; which lofe nothing of force with refpe6t to them by their being both parties and witnejfes themfelves. Something mull pafs between them that is declarative of their intentions, exprejfes their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of man and in'ife upon any other foot.
III. 27.7^/ intimate union, by which the conjuges become pojfeji each of the other^s per/on '', the mixture of their fortunes ^, and the joint-relation they have to their chil" dren ^, all Jirengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every a6i done in purfuance of a covenant, fuchas the matrimonial is, that covenant is ownd, ratified, and as it were made de integro, and repeted.
PoJJ'cJfion is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title muil needs be corroborated.
When two perfons throw their all into one flock "x?, joint-traders for life^ nei- ther of tliem can confidently with truth and honefly take his fhare out and be gone (i. e. dilTolve the partnerfhip) without the concurrence of the other j and Ibmetimes it may not be eafy, perhaps pofTible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.
And as to theprefent cafe, if the marriage to be not altogether unfruitful, fince both the parents are immediately related to the 7^;;^^ child, that child is the medium of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the fame blood with
(a-fejxft:); atthe wedding, facrificcs to Diana and other deities, and the ya/^n'Ao; iv^xl ; and after that, perhaps the being fliut up together, eating the Kv^amov, a formal A£/V<? ^^v/j?, ^c. The ^■'\yi"lp of the jfews have been performed ^01313, or "1JDWD, or nM'':n2; the ceremonies accompanying which may be feen particularly in Shulhh. ctr. with the additions ofR. Mo. Jferles {Eben ez.) And (to pafs by other nations) the torm of folemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which perfons mar- ried give their troth each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may be feen by fuch, as feem to have forgot what they are. » Co7inubio ftabili. Virg.
b 01 v^^n -in-1 bin> ^b^ — -iu;n nmpn NnpiDi •^•y^ ^J^^" n'i^ riDm'pn nns^ ->u/3brn7.
In Rejh. hhokm. c Autjj ^^i^yjUTuv Koiv&ivia 7r^Ba-^,x.i fj!jsi>.iTcc rc7i "/df/j^Tiv, ii^ u.Uv
^iii, y^ yy^hy u.».c7ficv. fha. d 2j;vA(3-^(^- tI-. rUm, ^cku ilvxi. Arif?,
X the
1^8 The Religion ojT Nature.^ Se6l. VIII.
the child S they themfelves come to be of the fame Mood : tind fo that relation which at firfl was only moral and legal, becomes natural-, a relation in nature, which can never ceafe, or be difannuUed. It follows now that,
IV. Marry'wg^ when there is little or noprofpeSl of true happinefs from the match ^, and efpe dally if there are plain prefages of unhappinefs 5 after marriage adultery j nil kinds of inHdelity , transferring that affeUion^ which even under the decays of nature ouvht to preferve its vigor ^ and never to degenerate (at luorfi) but intoafriend- fjip of a fuperior kind ^ and the like^ are all wrong ^. Bccaufe the firfl of thefe is bely inff ones own fenfe of things, and has an air ofdiflra^ion ; or however it is to a6l as if that was the leaf and moll trifling of all tranfa6tions in life, which is certainly one of the greateft and moft delicate. And to offend in any of the o~ ther ways is to behave, as if the end of marriage was not what it is > as if no ^wchleague had been made between the perfons married, as has been made,^^^- ally^2xAfolemnlyy and is M\fubfifling between themj as if they were not pof- fefi each of the other j their fortunes not interwoven j nor their children fo e- qually related to them, as they are 5 and therefore the misbehaviour, being re- pugnant to truths is a finagainfL it, and the mighty Patron of it.
If the moll esprefs ^nd foiemn contra6ls, upon which perfons, when they mar- ry, do fo far depend, as in confidence of their being religioufiy obferved to alter quite their condition, begin a new thredoi life, and rifque all their fortune and happi- nefs : I fay, if fuch facred compads as thefe are allowd to be broken, there is an end oi^W faith; the obligation of oaths (not more binding than marriage vows) ceafes J no jufiice can be adminiflerd j and then what a direful influence mud this have upon the affairs of mankind upon that., and other accounts ^ ?
» In rtfpeft of which that in Plutarch particularly is true, 'H tpua-n ^(yvi/ir; ^ t tTK^Aruv «/*2$,
.y' s'l iKxnpm fjiji^®-' /c4c£o-««, y^ ■rvf;^ici(j-x, koivov UfJi^cpoTi^oti 'ihndZ to ymiBfov. ^ Socrates ab
ndolefcentulo quodam confultus, tixorem duceret, an fe omni matrimonio ab(l'tnr.ret, refpondir, Utrum torttm fecijfet, aclurum poenhentiam. Hie te, inquit, folitudo, hie orbit as, hie generis inter itus, hiehA- res alientis excipiet : illic perpetuafolicitudo contextusquerelarum—incertusliberorumeventus. Val.M^ c X^om (TVVY,^ila,<, ODTiy-k^v,^ 7:i'J^®- ui<rB-<znrcii rui Xeynryjui to (pt^Miv }^ rl kyaz'^i i?r:ruvofBiJOV. Flut. ^ It is vifible that polygamy, pellicate. See. mufl: be included here. They arc not only inconfiftent with our forms and the very letter of the marriage-contra6t, but with xheejfence of marriage, which lies in fuch a union and love as can only be between tvco. Arijiotle doth not allow there can be even perfeft friend/hip between more than two : much lefs therefore, perfea: love. Uo»,ori I'.fat 0'.-
Mv, Kdr'oi TAt rtXilxv (pO.Uv, cirA (^Si}CK), '^'^^H ^'^ 'V?' '^°^^^'' "'-■''■'*'" ^^^- "■^^' "^^ ^'^^ '^^'^ ""i^'
'-a?. Ibid. e Tacunda culp<£ frenla nuptias Primkm inqninavere, & gemts, & domos. Hoc
fonte derivata eludes In patriam, popHlnrnque fluxit. Hor.
y^IJowance^
Truths concerning Families^^c. 159
Alloirance^ by feft. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary fail- ings. A perfon's age, health, eftate, or other circum fiances may be fuch, and with- out any /^«//, that he or flie cannot do what they would j or perhaps inftead of that one of them may come to want the pity and ajjlfiance of the other. In this calc (which requires the philofophy and fubmiilion proper in affli61:ionsj it is the duty of the one not only to hear inith^ but alfo to comfort^ and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happinefs propofed^ which confifts not only m pofitive pleafures, but alfo in leffening pains and wants j whilft the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.
N. I have delignedly forborn to mention that authority of a husband over his wife, which is ufually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws i becaufe I think it has been carried much too high. I would have tliem live fo far upon the kvel^ as (liccordingto myconllant leflbnj to be govtmilboth by reafon ^ If the man's reafon be flronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly fuppofed to bej, the woman will be obliged upon that fcore to pay a deference^ and fubmit to him ^.
Having now confiderd the man and woman between themfelves, I proceed in the order of nature to confider them as parents -, and to fee (in a few propofiti- ons following) how things will be carried between them zndxhdr children^ as alfo between other relations^ coming at firft from the fime bed, i? truth and matters of fa£l (to benamed,where the argument fhall call for them) are not denied,
V. Parents ought to educate their children^ take the befi care of them they can^ indeavour to provide for them^ and be always ready to affi[i them. Becaufe other- wife they do not carry themfelves towards their children as being what they are, children and theirs : they do not do what they would dcfire to have done to themfeheSj were they again to pafs through that feeble and tender ftate 3 or perhaps what has been done to them <= : and beiide, they tranfgrefs the law efta- blilhd by nature for the prefervation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued j a law^ which is in force among all the other tribes of animals^ fo far as there is occafion for it.
(c <rvfA7:i<pvKCT(c, Tij luvciu. Ttut. (A fentencc, which deferves to be written in letters of gold.) "Ojth e-o rui<^, iyo) Tuicf — otth <ru Kuri^r, y^ oi^oJstrTorj;?, ^ iyl) kvcm (c' oiKo^io-TToivu.. At. eund- ^ Kxili
(fva-iv cl ciffiyii i fiiovcv cv tc7<; dvB-faTrotg, c'^as t^ c* toT^ 'u>Z.ct<; ^aoti uf^^cn. Plato ap. Diog. L.
c Tio>,v7rXiB-^iiq oi a-ct yviu^ Aayw. ^tccrpo? yi toZt IhiJif^L'j ^k5«, Eur. Varentes voi alendo ncpO' turn nutriendorum debito (fi qtiis ejl pudor) alUgavirnnt. V. M.
X i Not
i6o The Religion o/' Nature, Sedl. VIIL
Not to do what is here required, is not barely to a6t ngainfb truth and nature, not only fuch an omiflion as is mcntiond infeft. I. pr. V. but a heinous inllancc of cruelty. If any one can deny this, let him better coniider the cafe of an infanh negle6led, helplefs, and having nothing fo much as tofoHcitc for him, but his mirj and (that which will do but little in this world} his innocence : let him think what it would be to turn a childy tho a little grown up, out of doors, deilitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly % or what to do j and whether it is not the i^me thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body elfe hereafter^ or (in general^ to conflid with "joant and mifery : let him reflc6l a while upon the circumftances of poor orphans ^ left unprovided for, to be abufed by every body ^^5 (s'c. and then let him fay, whether it is pojjible for a parent to be fo void of bowels, as not to be moved with thefe confiderations j or what epithet he deferves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have done well, thofe inllances ought to be placed among parti- cular providences : as when a vellel at fea, without pilot or failor, happens to be blown into the port.
Not only the care^ but the early care of parents is required, left death fhould prevent them > death, which skips none, and furprifcs many. Not to remem- ber this, and a6t accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the moft cer* tain and obvious of all truths.
VI. In order to the good of children^ their education^ See. there muji be fome. authority over them lodged by nature in the parents : I mean, the nature of the cafe is fuch ^ as neceffarily req^uires there fhould be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good. At firfl if fome body did not nurfe, feed, clothe, and take care of children^ the intei"val between their firft and laft breath would be very fhort. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their parents : to do this is their duty by the foregoing propofition. But then they muft do it as they can, and according to their judgment : and this is plain- ly an a6t o^ authority^ to order and difpofe of another according to one's judg- ment, tho it be done according to the befl of one's judgment.
As the child grows up^ the cafe is ftill the fame in fome degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond mature j and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himfelf, but what/'^//^ to choofe he knows not 3 cannot.
a Incertus quo fata ferant, ubi (iftere detur, in the poet's language. '' See that moving
ilefcription of the 'Hf/jxe of<p«y;xov in Homer. ' I could never think of that Arabic faying
without pity, The barber iCJ^^lipiA^ learns to flmve upo» the head of an orphan.
4 diftinguifli
Truths concerning Families/ €^^. i6i
diilinguiih his fafety and his danger, his advantages and difadvantages j nor, in general , good and evil : he muil be warned, and dire6ted, and watched flill by his parents^ or fome body intruded by them, or elfe it niight have been poffi- bly much better for him to have expired under the midwife's hands, and pre- vented the effecls of his own ignorance.
When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himfelf capable of go- 'verning himfelf^ by how much the more he thinks himfclf capable, by fo much, the lefs capable may he be, and the more may he want to be governed. The avenues of fenfe arc opcnd : but x\\q: judgment y and intelle^iual faculties are not ripend but with time and much pradice. The world is not eafily known by per- fons of adult abilities 5 and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it,, yet they find things in it fo intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for them to rcfolve, what meafures arc fitted to be taken : but they, Vv'ho. are not, or but lately, pafl their nuts^ cannot be fuppofed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themfclves, any thing elfe but a prey to. the villain who firfl feizes upon them. Inllead of Judgment and experience we find, commonly in youth fuch things as areremotefl from them, chiidiili ap- petites, irregular paffions, peevifh and obftinate humors j which require to be fubdued^ and taught to give way to wholfom counfels. Young people are not. only-obnoxious to their own humors and follies, but alfo to thofe of their compa- nions. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers mif, condu6t : and thus folly mingles with folly, and increafes prodigioufly. The judgment therefore of the parents mull; ftill interpofe, and prefide, and guide through all thefe Jlages of infancy, childhood, and yotithj according to their power improving the minds of their children, breaking the flrength of their in- ordinate paffions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and fhewing them the way which they ought to be found in.
Thefe things are fo infaii, and a parent cannot acquit himfelf of theduty impo- fed upon him in the preceding propofition, if he a6bs fo as to deny them : but then he cannot ad fo as not to deny them {that is^ fo as to fubdue the paffions of the child, break his ftomach, and caufe him to mind his inftrudionsj witlt- out fome fort of difcipUne^ and a proper feverity j at leaft very rarelv ^.
To all this, and much more that might be urged, muft be fuperadded, that the fortunes of children, and their manner of fetting out in the world
» For cerrainly, when it can be, Hoc patrinm eft, fotius confuffacere filium fm J^onte reiie facere, . cjuam aiseno metu. Ter.
depending
i6z The Religioin- (9/^ Nature. Sedt.VIII.
depending ('commonlyj upon their parents, their parents muft upon this account be their director Sj and govern their affiiirs.
N.I. It appears now from the premifles, that even /^.'^r^;?/; have not properly a dominion over their children^ fuch as is intended fed VI. prop. V. from which thi 3 parental authority is a very different thing. This only refpefts the good of the chil- dren, and reaches not beyond the means, which t^nQ parents^ a61:ing according to the befh of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find mofl conducive to that end: but dominion only refpeds the w/7/of the lord, and is of the fame extent with his pkafure. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itfelf m/; and if they do, the chil- dren ought not to obey ^. Nor may they do any things what they pleafe, to them. They may not kill, or miim, or expofe them ^ : and when they come tohc men ov women, and are poflefl ofelfates, which either their parents for any body clfe) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the hmc properties in thefe with refpe£t to their parents, which they have with rcfpe6t toother people : the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the reH of the world have=. So that what occurs in the place abovementiond remains ^zr;^, notv/ithftanding any thing that may be objeded from the cafe of parents and children. And moreover,
N. 2. They, who found monarchy in paternal authority, gain little advantage with refped to defpotic or ahfolute power. A power to be exercifed for the^£'<?^of fiibjecSts (hkethat of parents for the ^00^ of their children), and that principally, where they are incapable o^ \\^ypm% themfelves, can only be derived from hence. The father of his countrey cannot by this way of reafoning be dcmonftrated to be the ahfolute lord ^ of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to difpofe of them as he pleafes ^ The authority of parents goes not this length. Befide, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the eldefl [on lliould have the fame authority, be it what it will, over his brothers
^ The barbarity of the thing at length put a flop to the cudom ot" expofing children : but it hid been praftifed by the Perjiaas, Greeks, 6cc. Romnlus's law only reftraind it, but did not abolifii ir.
For it inioind his citizens only, 'cc?!U.iro(,v uf,fivx yivikv CMr^i<piv, >^ B-vyctn^av -.c^c, z-^oiToyivac- ^^iKliy ^tj'cti ^ i/y/ii'iv Tuv yivoiBjCaJV yiari^ov rptsrS?, ttXkv UTi yivoiro z'HidiC]/ civu,Tr,roy, x.A. Dion. HAltCtrn, *Vnd
bciide, OiTrciTKV, Ui iH-.TiiV, i^£<-'X£» i\iSa-i!i(.V TTdTsl Kub' ViS, it, TTCt^O. TTUVTCt, T is" (i.ii Xi^^'"^'^' ^•■^' ^'^*
= 'r»i/ya(o*5 i^'iv Ictov l^i jctki/jX ^ofjn.v in "T Tmnf&iv, dyis'a. }^ Ty- pf^fajf/jecra ?i ret o-a'iMxrci T 7ru.koi-n d 7-i /3iAev1 3jLrj3^n«< To?5 7iu.7'^kv>i 'i^i'iocMi.. Id. Thcfe are inftances of fuch laws, as fliouldnotbe, by prop. IV. fed. VI!. * Romd patrem patrU Ciceromm libera dixit. Ju- ^ 'f^-5 Acy«iS»
y.i'jm ci^\(iv. Arr.
and
Truths concerning Families, &c. 163
and JlJ^ers : and much Icfs, that the heir of the Jirji parent ihould in fiiccceding ge- nerations have it over all the collaterals. The very relation between them foonva' nilhes, and comes at lail incffc6t to nothing, and this notion mth it.
VII. yfs parents are obliged to educate their children^ Sec. fo children ought to conftder parents as the immediate authors {authors under the firji and great Caufe^) of their being; or to [peak more properly^ of their being born. I know children are apt (not very rerpe61:fully, or prudentlyj to fay > that their parents did not beget them iox their fakes ^ whom they could not know before they were born, but for their cwnpleafure. But they, ^^'ho make this a pretext for their difobedience, or dif- regard, have not fufficiently thought, what /'i^/;/, what trouble .y how mii\y frights and cares^^ what charges^ ^nd wh^it felf-denials parents undergo upon the fcore of their children : and that all thefe, if parents only rufhd into pleafure, and confulted nothing elfe^ might eafily be avoided, by negle^ing them and their wel- fare ^ For as to thofe parents, who do this, let them fpeak for themfelves : I fhall not be their advocate.
VIII, A great fubmiffion and many grateful acknowledgements^ much refpeEl and piety are due from children to their parents. For if there is an authority in parents (asbefore)thismuflbeanfwerdbya proportionable fubmiffion on the other fide: fince an authority, to which no obedience is due, is equal to no authority.
If the thought of annihilation be generally difagreeable, as it feems to be, then merely to be confcious oiexifience muft have in it fomething defireable '^. And if fo, our parents muft be confiderd as the authors, or at leaft the inftruments oUhat good to us, whatever it is : which cannot be done, unlefs they are treated with dijiin^ion and great regard, being to us what no other /V, or e%er can be,
Godi as the firfc caufe of all beings, is often ftyled metaphorically, or in a large fenfe of the word, the Father of the world, or of us all : and, if we behave our felves towards Him as being fuch^ we cannot ^according to fe6t. V. pr. XIX. n. 3 .) but adore Him. Something analogous^ tho in a lov/ degree, to the cafe between God and his offspring there feems to be in the cafe htiv^ZGw parents and their children. If that requires divine ivorfjjip^ this will demand a great refpeci and reverence ^.
» an-^^y^n psniu; inU?bu;. s. nhared. t Uunam oculos in peffora popnt Inferere, ^
patriae intus deprerukre curas. « I confefs, in Seneca's words, minimum ejfe beneficium pa,-
ti-is matrifque concubitum, nifi aceejjerint alia, qux. profequerentur hoc initiftm muneris, ^ aliis ojfi- I'.is hoc ratum facerent. ^ To aii&avst^ iV* ^yj t v.^iuv kuB-' uvro- <pu(ri -fi ««'/«.'tsk ij Cwij.
^nji. The fcnfe of life (of being alive) Icems to be (bmething more than what Seneca calls mufca- rum ac verinium bonum. ^ Ol TruXatot t 'P^JiAxiat voyjoi^ xA." > ■•el \ tn 7r»?iXioTi'oi -ror^ro
TSf5 yo!£«? i<ri<pB-i;(rxv, ac, y^ ^i]ic jtor^?? c^tM)TXi r.xM?/. Siwpl.
z ' Nor
164 The Religion 6/^ Nature. Sed. VIII.
Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor hx^ parent^ can have any dif- palition to worfhipliis Creator^. The precept of honoring pareiiis^ to be found inalraoil all nations and religions, feems to proceed from fom; ' ich fentnuent : for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rathe i ; .dhering to that (^i ,'worfiipping the Deity ^. in laying children under this obligation they have all confpircd, tho fcarcc in any thing eife ^
Thz admonitions of a parent mull be of the greateft weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occallons to conjider things^ and obferve e-vents ; hath cooler pajjions^ as he advances in years, and lees things more truly as they arej is able in a manner to predi6t what they tbemfehes will defire to hav-e done, when they fhail arrive at his age > may upon thefe accounts, ordinarily, be prefumed to be a more competent ^W^^ thanthem- felves'^i and lailly from his relation to them mufl be mort fmcerely inclined to tell them truth, than any other perfon in the world can be fuppofed to be^. I fay, if young people refled well upon thefe things, they cannot m prudenceyOV even kindnefs to themfelves^ but pay the utmoft deference to the advertifements and dire6lions of a parent.
And to conclude, i£ parents want theafliftance of their children, efpecially in the dcclenfion of their age, and when they verge towards ^helplefs condition again tliey cannot deny or withhold it, but they muft at the fame time deny to requite the care and tendernefs fhewd by their parents towards them in ?/:;^;> helplcfs and dan- gerous years j that is, without being ungrateful -, and that is, without being //;2>/?5 if there be injuftice in ingratitude ^. Nor (which is more ftiiy can they do this with-
^ MeoyuUclo pietas fundamentum eft mmium -virtutum. Cic. The fame author reckons among fhofe things, that are laudable, parentem -venri «? deum {neqi enim multo fecus parens Uber'u). Ou^
cio^mv'oiJ^®-u7ri^ux.i?lut. Vonu.Tif^^y,^ ffjirkzv^v ^^05 Q iov ^ivri^ ci, iV^r [Ms^W^^- >/• We indeed ufuall/ divide the two tables of Mofes's lawfo, that the fifth commandment (Honor thy father and thy mother) falls in the fecond: but the jews themfelves divide them otherwife i i)^ «^«i -? T- w'S; yp^t?)^? tw u.^-/j^:'
0/.. k; 7;^^cc 'Sr.^.no^, t\ 3 f.A(^ yw»?, k,A. Vh. Jud. Agreeably to this, Jofephus fays that
d ^ku, xiyo^ were written upon two tables, iv^ ^^W. ^i h^ Uurifccv [_7:Xukc.-] : Abarhmel reckons the fifth commandment the laft of the firft table ; and fays their Hhakamim do fo : and in the offices of diat nation thefe commandments cirementiond as written nWDH nvi/QH mnVH .^y- ^ Pn-
ma igitnr ^ ottima rerum natura pietatis e^l mapjiJra, £cc. Val. Max. ^ O X,^-^^, '■^^='
^l..- k<pcc.^., T^vk- ^,-^'-5->'" --'^ i-^^^V^-^ Vl^-'t. '^ T\y^ -V-y:^ ^^^<y : ^^\ thy father.
md he toWl (J:e^ thee. Deut. ' A4^'^ 4' ^v ^^.c?;?? y«.c^a-; J^.r. ^uX^^ l-^H^^^^' *-« *^.a.yr«,,
y-1 ■ro7, c:rU„ ^sf.*.. - ;<- t,u,;,v j ^o',^^,7t,P ^io:,.. Arift. Among the ancients .^,.£^1.;'i« and r^.o'^r.cc
were reckond dm. And he, who doth not requite to his parents imbO.-iU; nailflH. is called y.«.r ^o^if^v yiJI in S. Hhar.
out
Truths concerning Families, &c] 1 6^
out denyino- what they may in their turn require of their children '. In effect they do thus by their actions deny that to have been, which has been j and thofe things to be pofTible, which may be hereafter.
Not only ^o^/7>' infirmities of parents, but fuch decays of their w/Wj as may happen, ought to be pitied, their httle haftinefles and miftakes diflembled, and their dcfeds fupplied, decently ^.
IX. That «"''?y*' or affe^ion onboth fides^ which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children^ and viciilim '^^ ought to be obferved and follcwd^ when there is no reafon to the contrary.
We have feen before, audit is evident from the terms, thditfenfe ought to govern, when reafon does not interpofe j i. e. when there is no reafon^ why it fhouid not. If then this ^'t/*' or mutual afiFe6tionbe an inward fenfc of the cafe between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, i^ felt by them, and fits upon their natures \ it may be comprifed in prop. XIV^, and XV. of fed. III. But whether it is or not, the fame may be faid (which mud be repeted in another placej of every affeUion^ pafiion, inclination in ge- neral. For when there is no reafon, why we fhould not comply with them, their own very follicitation, and the agreeablenefs we apprehend to be in com- plying, 2cct preponderating arguments. This muft be true, '\i fomething is more than nothing > or that ought to be granted, which there is no reafon to deny. So that if this «'<'?'/'' be only taken as a kind o£ attrailion^ or tendence, in the mere matter of parents and children j yet flill this phyfical motion or fympathy ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a geod reafon for it. On the contrary, it ought to be ta- ken as afuggeftion of nature, which fhould always be regarded, when it is not fuperfeded by fomething y///^r;5r J that is, by reafon. But further, here reafon doth not only not gainfay, by its filence confent, and fo barely lea^e its right o£ commanding to this bodily inclination ; but it comes in llrongly to abet and inforce it, as defignd for a reafonable end : and therefore not to a6t according to it is not to a6l according to reafon, and to deny that to be which is,
X. the fame is true of that affe^iion^ 'wbich other relations naturally have, infome proportion or other ^ each for other. To this they ought to accommodate themfelves
* TmSr©- yoa Tse* Tii<i yotiic, »*J*5 «" sf|«sto ts^cixvroy yii-scSj r»i e-£i54^T» rroudx^. Ifocr. ^ That epithet pus (plus JEntas) fliines in Virgil. ' Vofitci eft inter pf.rentes ac liberos honefta con-
tentio, dederint majora^ An receperint. Sen. '^ That is, methinks, a moving defcription in
S. Bctfd (Hsfi TrXioni.) of a conflict ^^hich a poor man had within himfclt, when he had no ether way left to preferve life but by felling one of his chi-ldren.
Y wlicre
i66 r/?^ Religion o/' Nature. Sed.VlIL
where reafon does not prohibit. The proof of this aflertion is much the fiime with that of the foregoing mut. mutand.
The foundation of all natural relation is laid in marriage ^ For the husband and ivife having folemnly attachd themfelves each to other, having the fame children, interells, l^c. become fo intimately related as to be reckond united, oneflejh^ and in the laws of nations many times one perfon ^. Certainly they are fuch with refpe^t to the poflerity, who proceed from them jointly ^. The children of this couple are related between themfelves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the fame blood with their common parents, they are all of the fame blood (truly confanguinei)^ the relations, which they refpedively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their center. This is the neareji relation that can be'^, next to thofe of man and wife, parents and their children, who are immediately related by contad or rather continuity of blood, if one may fpeak fo. The relation between the children of thefe chil- dren grovv's more remote and dilute., and in time wears out. For at every remo^cg the natural tindureor fympathy may befuppofed to be weakendj if for no o- ther reafon, yet for this. Y^wcvy remove takes off half the common blood deri- ved from the grand parents. For let C be the fon of A and B, D the fon of C EofD, F of E: andjet the relation of C to A and B be as i : then the relation of D to A and'B will be but \ j becaufe C is but one of the parents of D and fo the relation of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. Bv proceeding after the fime manner it will be found, that the rela- tion of E to A and B is ; (or half of the half}, of F f : and fo on. So that the relation., which dependents in a direct line have by blood to their grand pa- vents decreafing thus in geometrical proportion ^, the relation between them of collateral lines, which paiTcs and is made out through the grand parents, muil foon be reduced to an inconfiderable matter f.
^r'mx focietns in ipfo conjugio eft: proximo in libcris, c^r. Cic. '^ Mulier conjmcfa vir&
concejpt in unum. Lucr. '•n^U/n ^JSmnD. Ap. R. Elaz. Azq. (^ pajf. ^ ' 'H o-vyCinKVi
\d>i>Mi\ (pJuviTcct 7toXvi{.i^y,<, %')icf,i, >^ h^i'cc^ 7:'oi.<Tif. c^c -l' 3-ct7-ftx«5- Of yovC'c, y. ^ fl^yi-o-t r<x. rUvx, aii
r auTm 7n<pvyAVX,t.- 'Xvi-\'icn ^ ^ ej Xoi-^rol (rvyfiviTc, — ■ — tS ^^ t ccvrZv ihccf yiivevrai 4' o«
(/%! hiKuirt^a, ol 4' U^oT^t&>T<eoi, x.r>,. Arifi. ^ ^uhn copiofi fuavitatis ilia reconlatio eftl
In codem elomicilio, anteqtiam nafcerer, hal/itavi : in iifJem incnnnbulis infantiA fetnpora peregi : eofdem gtf^iliax-i f^rentes, ^c. Val. Max. ' There is no name for any defcendcnt, who is more
than trimpos. I It becomes Uy^vhl'.. Andr. Khod.
If
Truths concernhig Families, &c, \6y
If then we fuppofc this affeWon or fyinpathy, when it is pennitted to act re." guUrly and according to nature, no reafon intervening to exalt or abate it, to ope- rate with a Itrength nearly proportionable to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly difcern the degrees of that obliga- tion, which perfons related lie under, to ailid: each other, from this motive.
But there arc many circumftanccsand incidents in life capable ofaffecting this obligation^ and altering the degrees ot it. A man mud weigh the wants of him/elf ^nd his own family again ft thofe of his relations: he muil confider their fexy their age^ their abilities and opportunities, how cap.ible they are of good offices, how they will take them, what ufe they will make of them, and the like. He, who defigns to act agreeably to truth.^ may find many fuch things demanding his regard j fome juftly moving him to companion, others holding back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, th-xtnext after our parents and own offspring ^ nature directs us to be helpful, in the fyf} place to brothers and fifters, and then to other relations according to their re- fpective diilances in the genealogy of the fiimily, preferably to all foreigners ''. And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants Hiould be but httlej yet we ought to preferveour affection towards them, and a difpofi- tion to ferve them, as far as we honeflly and prudently can, and whenever the proper opportunity Ihall prcfent itfelf. This nature and truth require.
Sect. IX. Truths helonging to a Private Man, and refpeciing (dire^ly) only himfelf.
I. J^y^ R R ^ ^^» knozvs {or may ^ know) beft^ what his own faculties^ and per-^ fonal circumftances are, and confequently what powers he has of aUing.^ and governing himfelf. Becaufe he only of all mankind has the internal knowledge of himfelf, and what he is j and has the only opportunity by reflexion and ex- periments of himfelf to find, what hi? own abilities, paffions, ^c. truly are ^.
* Mr.n and Wfe are fuppofed to be one, and therefore have no place here 5 any more than a man and his felf. Otherwife conlidcrd diftinftly, the one of them ought always to be the JJrf} care of the other. '' Mjjvs xucyv/.r^ la-sv '^c{.v.i)\ iTciT^av. Hef. ^ For many I acknowledge
there are, who fcem to be without reflexion, and almofl: though*- T.5 iy";?^ rl'.y otr.i.xv c- -A- A.'4' luy^ct. ^ ^«>r£5 57A11V oX'^kv. S. Chryf. <^ Nee fe t^nd/izerit extra,
Y z
1 68 The Religion of Nature. Se6l:. IX.
II. He^ that well examines himfelf^ ^ f^Ppofi-> 'will find thefe things to he true^.
1 . That there are fome things common to him not only inithfenfitive animals and vegetable^ but alio with inanimate matter : as, that his body is fubject to the general law of gravitation j that its parts are capable of being feparated, oil diflocatedj and that therefore he is in danger from f-iUs, and ail impreffions of violence.
2. That there zxcother things common to him -with vegetables nndfemfitive ani-- mats : as, that he comes from a feed (fuch the origin^xl animalculum may be taken tobc)> grows, and is preferved by proper matter, taken in and dillribiited through a fet of veflels j ripens, flouriflies, withers, decays, dies 5 is fubject to ^^ifeafes, may be hurt, or killed j and therefore wants, as they do,, nourifh.- ment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.
3. That he has other properties common only to him and x.\\q fenfiti've tribe .'nsy that he receives by his fenfes the notice of many external objects, and things 5 perceives many affections of his body 5 finds pleafure from fome, and pain from others i and has certain powers of moving himfelf, and acting; that is, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, difeafes, and the caufes of death, but alfo feels them I' > is not only capable of nourifhment, and many other provifions made for him, but alfo injoys them > and, befide, may contribute much himfelf to ei- ther his injoyments, or his fufferings.
4. That befide thefe he has other faculties, which he doth not apprehend to be either in the inert mafs of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the fenlitive kind, atleaft in any confiderable degree j by the help of which he inveftigate.s truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, ornot, after the manner fet down in feet. III. or, in a word, that he is animal rationale "=.
5-. That he is confcious of a liberty in himfelf to act or not to act j and that therefore he hfuch a being as is defcribed feet. I. prop. I. a being, whofe acts may be morally good or evil. Further,
6. That there are in him xmny inclinations tind averfions -, from whence flow fuch affections, as defire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, forrow, pity, anger, 6?^. all svhich prompt him to act this or that way.
7. That he is fcnfible of great defers and limitations in the ufe of his mtional faculties, and powers of action, upon many occ^fions : as alfo, that his pafHons
a Uluct '/»S3-« o-£«vTov noli put are cj arrogantiam m'muendam folum ejfe diBum, 'verum etiam ut b«- na neflra norimus. Cic. ad Qu. fr. ^ Non [entire mala, fua. non eft hotninis: (^ nonferrenon
eft viri. Sen. who condefcends here to be fomething like other men. As alfo when he fays, Alia i^nt, t^HA fapientem feriunt, etiamfi non pervert nnt i ut dolor capitis, O'C. Hic nen nego fentsre fapi^ mtim, &c. f ^iti fi ipfe »orit, alic[tii(lfemict fe habere divinum, 8vC. Cic.
are
Truth belonging to a Private Man, ^c. 1 69
are many times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, exceflivc \ In other words, that he is in many refpe6l:s fallible, and infirm ''.
Laftly, that he dcfires to be happy : as every thing muft, which undcrilands what is meant by that word.
III. // he doth find thefe things to hefo^ then if he will a5i as he ought to do (thai> is^ agreeably to truth and fii6l) he mufl do fuch things as thefe.
I. He mufifuhjeU his fenfual inclinations^ his bodily pa ft ons^ and the motions of all his members "" to reafon j and try everything by it. For in the climax fetdown he cannot but obferve, that as the principle of -u'^^^/^/io^ is fomething above the /Wr- tia of mere matter, and/f;?/"^ fomething above that again ; fo r^^yo^ mull be fome- thing above all thefe ^ : or, that his uppermoll faculty is reafon ^ And from hence it follows, that he is. one of thofe beings- mentiond feet III. prop. XI. and that the great law impofed upon him is to be governed by reafon.
Any man may prove this to himfelf by experiment, if he pleafes. Becaufe he cannot fat leaft without great violence to his naturej do any thing, if he has a greater reafon. againft the doing of it than for it. When men do err againft reafon, it is either becaufe they do not (perhaps will not) advert, and ufe their reafon, or not enough y or becaufe their fiiculties are defective.
And further, by fed. III. prop. X. to endeavour to a£t according to right rea- fon, and to endeavour to aft according to truth are in eflfea the fame thing. We cannot do the one, but we muft do the other. We cannot ad according to truth, or fo as not to deny any truth., and that is we cannot act n^^/,^unlefs we endeavour to act according to right reafon^ and are led by it.
Therefore not to fubject one's fenfttive inclinations and pitlTions to reafon is to deny either that he is rational, or that reafon is the fupreme and ruling faculty in
• ynn •^::^1 -\Dmn yniO are (in Jewilh language) nD>y3 m>iiy. " 'AfA^^x^^cv sfv:*; ^v-
Bf^^^ rivcc k.x^u^-^oy. Chryf. c The author ofS.HhareJ. reckons eight, the right ufe oi
which comprehends all praftical religion : the heart, the eye, the mouth, nofe, ear, hand, toot, and HMiH \yii"^. The duties refpefting thefe are the fubjea of that (not bad) book. •* Chm
trinfint hAc, effe, -vivere, intelligere : ^ lapis eft, &pecusvivit, nee tamen lapiikm pirn vivere, auf pecui inteUigere : qui amem intetligit, emn & ejfe & vivere certi^mfn eft. £hmre non dubito id txcelkntius jndicare, eui omnia tria inftmi, quam id cui duo vel imum defit. S. Aug. Thus reafon fets man above the other vifible orders of beings, 6'C- ' ^rAjio eft domim omnium & regim
rasio . Hac fit imperet ilU pmi animi, qtu obedire debet, id videndHrn eft vire. Cic,
1 hk'
lyo The Religion of ^ATVRE. Sed:. IX,
his nature: and that is todsfert mankind*, and to deny hirafelf to be what he knows himfelf by experience and in his own confcience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry iF any body iliould fay he was not.
If a k^ajl could be fuppofed to give up his fe^tfe and activity j neglect the calls of hunger, and thofe appetites by which he (according to bis nature) is to be guided 5 and refufing to ufe the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preferve his life, lie ftill in fome place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a plant ; this would be much the fame cafe, only not fo bad, as when a man cancels his reafon^ and as it were ftrives to metamorphize himfelf into a brute. And yet this he does, who purfues only fenfual objects, and leaves him- felf to the impulfes of appetite and paffion. For as in that cafe the /^rw/*? neglects the law of hh nature^ and affects that of the order beh'UJ him : fo doth the man dilobey the law of his nature^ and put himfelf under that of the lower animals 5 to whom he thus makes a defection ''.
If this be fo, how wretchedly do they violate the order of nature, and tranfgrefs againit truth^ who not only rejeEl the condu6t of reafon to follow fenfe and paflion, but even make ix.fubfer'vient to them ^ ; who ufe it only in finding out means to effed their wicked ends '^, but never apply it to the confideration of thofe ends, or the nature of thofe means, whether they are jull or unjufl:, right ox -wrong ? This is not only to deviate from the path of nature, but to invert it, and to become fomethin'T more than brutilli ; brutes with reafon^ which muft be the mofh enormous and worft of all brutes. When the brute is governed by fcnfe and bodily appetites, he obfcrves his proper rule -, w^hen a man is governed after that manner in defiance of reafon, he violates his 3 but w^hen he makes his rational powers to ferve the bru- tifli part, to affiuand promote it, he heightens and increafes the brutality^ inlarges its field, makes it to aft v/ith greater force and effc6c S and becomes a monfler.
His duty then, who is confcious to him.felf of the truth of thofe things recounted up.dcr the foregoing propofition, is to examine eveiy thing carefully, and to fee
» AbjeBo hom'ine in fyhefire anbnal tr^^nfi-e . 'E^ rai Ao'/j»fi riWy x,'^'siZ,'^(/^ij-u, ; rm .9-:;f.«.T.
'C^r4 av jjt^i t; -ai a)i iTn^iov ^reiwf.i. Arr. Pertinet ad omnem o^.c'ii quAfiionem femper in promptu ha- bere, quantHTn natara hominis pscudibm reliquifque belluis ar.tecedat. Cic. ^ Hfc; tkv ram .S-.;p/&v iAov/itv c^;rs(r^. Chryf. «-" A thing too often done. ^u£ enim libido, ^ma aTjaritsay quod facirais ant fufclpitHrniJl conj:Uo capto, ant fine — raticnc p:rf.citur ? Cotta ap.Cic. ^ Son-e- thing like him, v/ho in Ch^yfojhjn^ words, .^V r- oii-x-uv y.xTcci-uu ro T>c(..{p3>-. e This makes Cclta fay, Satius fuit nullam otnnino nobis a diis irmmr tali jus datam effe rationem, quhn tanta cuyn bernicie datam: with other bitter things. Tho an anfwer ,o this may be given in the words which follow afterward: A deo tanthn rationem habejnus, fi modi babsmus: bonarn atitem rationem, ant non bonarn, a nobis.
T that
Truths helonging to a Private Man, 6^1:. 1 7 1
that he complies with no corporeal inclination at the expenfe of his reafon •, but that all his affe^ions^ concupifcible and irafcible, be direded towards fuch ob- je5ls^ and in Rich msafure^ time^ :indplacc, as that allows. Every word " and ac- tion, eveiy motion and Hep in life fhould be conduced by reafon^. This is the foundation and indeed the fum of all virtue.
z. He miift take care not to bring upon himfelf <= -k;^;?/, difeafes^ trouble \ buf^ on the contrary^ endeavour to pre'vent them^ and to provide for bis ozvn comfortable fubftftence^ as far as he can ivithout contradi6iing any truth ^ (zhzx. is, without denying matters of faEf^ and fuch propofitions, as have been already or will in the fequel here be fhewn to be true, concerning God^ property^ the fuperiority of reafon^ Scc.j To explain this Umination: if a man fhould confidcr himielf as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, difeafcs, and the re(i ; then, to fun- ply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property 3 and at laft, in vindica- tion of himfelf, fay, " I acb according to what I am, a being obnoxious to « hunger, (^c. and to a6l otherwife would be incompliance with truth " 5 this would not be fufficient to juiliify him. T he ^r^W r^/^ requires, that what he does, fnould interfere with no truth : but what he does interferes ^^ith. feveral. For by taking that, which (by the fuppofition) is his neighbour's^ he ads as if
a This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off thofe reflraints which men have from nature or a modeft education, and is &> utterly deflructive of virtue, that Ariftotle banifiies it outof rhe commonwealth. "OXuK^lii Ui%^oXayiix,v ci« 4 TroMui, aa-Tnf) ujiso n, ^iTr uujt-
B-iriw ly.-iC^i-i' ck ^ Y^ ^v^i^a^ As'yjtv cn^v ? ui^^^Zv y^ ro ttoiw c-t/^y.'y?. b True manl
reafon: which is a very different thing from that fuperfticious precifenefs, which carries things too far. As v. g. when the Jews not contented to condemn np^j -^12"! or nSH nib:i3, and every where to exprefs ~ilDi:«n b"ll*, go fo far as to comprehend under ir W^'O ^TViX^ rbr^ nrriy; 'iSi^ invi/ii ay ; and to add, '121 r-tiiD^) y-iT !>i^yiDD n^^^nb .— rbo ISi^yiD. There are other fay- ings of this kind to be Teen, m:.ny of them, among thofe, which R. El. de Vidas has collefted : as that particularly, 'Ql n:>iDn? Isi'^inb 5>ibu; ^nY niti'i pDiT p. What ^lian reports of Anaxa- goras and others, belongs to this place j that they never laughed : with many other unneceffary au- fterities, which might be added. c ""b ^O ^b ^3i4 |^i« CDS*. P. AS. d n^eir^Vr** r*--
ruv [tS/ oscri? iiy«.v-£;] o av^ceoTTi^®- ^i(^- yjftsu /l' iKrlt lit HXT k^iTyy d-jiey^xt -t iv^ciii/jcvixi;. Arifi,
They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely ^\\5t^<«, diftinguiihincr between Tfls v.fAiTiix and Tec i (T&'pc-^©-, making theft latter to be ii^v tt^I^ vi-'^Zi, and leaving the body as it were to itfelf (iyra [THJu.Ano} u^i^iu^mru, — s/'ti 77u%i): they, I fay, might injoy their own philo- fophy ; but they would fcarce gain many profelytes now a days, or ever perfuade people, that the pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to thefn. Nor indeed do I much credit many (lories th^t are told of fome old philofophers : as tlrit of An.ixarchns, when he was put to a mo ft cruel death
by Nicocreon; i ^JpiVTiWvxc v rty.u:Mc, L-^ritv nr/oys r ' AyxlJifX,^ ^uXakov, ' AyU%v,i^'^vi ^ » 7T>.nT.t:c,
See I.ftci. Arr, SimpL Anton. D. Laert. and others.
172 The Religion of Nature. Se6t. IX.
it was noi his neighbour's^ but his own^ and therefore plainly contradi£ts/(:?(??, and tljofe truths in k6b. VI, VII. rclpeeling property : when by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradidno truth, he would not deny dimfelf to be obnoxious to hunger, ^c. There are other ways of furnifhing himfelf with conveniences, or at leall neceflaries, which are confident with property and all truth : and he can only be faid to deny himfelf to be what he is by omitting to provide againft his wants, when he omits to provide againft them by fome of thofe -waysi and then indeed he doth do it. (See p. 28. AnC to Obj. 3.)
So again, when a man does any thing to anjoid prefent fuffering or dangers rd?»- /r<^;7 to theexprefsdi6tatesofreafon, and the tenor of forementiond truths, he a6ts as 2l fenfiti've being only, not as being what he really is^ fenfitivo-ratiomlis. But when there is no good argument againji his doing of any thing, that may gain him protedion from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look upon himfelf only as a being, who needs that which is to be obtaind by doing it : and in that cafe^ if he Ihould not do it, he would be falfc to himfelf-^ and deny the circum fiances of his own nature.
Certainly when a man may without tranfgrejjing thehmitsprefcribed confulthis own fafety, fupport, and reafonablc fiitisfadion, and does not> and efpecially when he takes a counter- courfc, and expofes himfelf % he forgets many of the foregoing /r«/^.f, and treats himfelf as not being what he is. This is true with refped to futurity^ as well as the prefent time : and indeed by how much future time is more than the prefent, by fo much the more perhaps ought that to be regarded. At leaft injoymcnts ought to be taken and adjufted in fuch a manner, that no onefhould preclude, or fpoil more^ or greater to come.
It may eafily be underftood here,that thofe evils^-^Ydch. it is not in a man's power to prevent, he mufl endeavour to bear patiently and decently^ i. e. as fuch ; and moreover, fuch as are mr.dc by this means lighter ^ : for when they cannot be to- tally prevented, as much of the effeSl muil be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks 3 efpecially ihtlaft^ great one<^.
^ . He mitft confder even bodily andfenfual affe^ions^pajfions^ and inclinations as in- timations^ which many times he not only may^ but ought to hearken to. What is fiid be- fore of the fubjedion of pafllons and appetites to reafon mufl always be rememberd. They are not to proceed from unjulliiiable caufcs, or terminate in wrong objeds -,
« Ne oferamis nos pcricnlis fiie caufa : quo nihil potejl epjlultius. In tranquillo tempep.mn ad-
'varfain of tare dementis eft. Cic. ^ Levitts fit patientia, ^uicquid corrigere eft nefas. Hor.
c MiXim ^xvxTH was a 2reat man's definition of" philofophy.
not
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &"€. lyo
not be unfeafonable or immoderate. Being thus regulated, fet to a true biafs, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they hccomtfuch as are here intended j gentle ferments working in our breads, without which we fhould fettle in ina<5t'ivity =« • and what I think may be taken for juft motives and good arguments to a6b upon
For if a man fiwds^ that hehaswo/ only a fuperior faculty of realbn, but alfo an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propenfions and aver- fions, tbefe cannot be denied to be any more than that ; tho they mud be taken in- deed for what they really are^ and not more. When they arc checked by reafon and truth, or there lies a reafon againji them fas there always will, when they are not within the forefaid reftridionsj, they mud: be taken ^j clogdwixh. thiscircum- ftance, as things overruled and difabled : but when they are under no prohibition from the fuperior powers and trutb^ then they are to be confiderd as unfettcrdand free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been obferved upon a par- ticular occafion before p. i6f.) when there is no reafon again ji the complying with our fenfes, there is always onefQr\\.hy prop. XIV. fed. III. the inclinati- on itfelf, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this cafe uppermojl, and in courfe takes the commanding poll : and then a man muft ad as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this fedion.
The7^r/»^j of all human anions are in fad, either a fenfe of ^«/j, oraprofped of fome plea/ure or profit to be obtaind, fome evil or danger to be avoided -, that is, either the reafonablenefsof what is done, or the manner, in which fomethino- doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded cither in reafon^ or pajfion Tmd inclination. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being fo, what fhould hinder, when reafon does not work, but that the inferior fprings fhould retain their nature, and act.
Bodily inclinations and paffions, when they obferve their due fubordination to reafon, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were alTefTors to it upon the throne, are of admirable ufe in life, and tend tna- ny times to noble ends. This is applicable to the irafcible, as well as the concu- pifcible affections and the whole animal fyftem. Love of that which is amiable compaffion ^ toward the miferable and helplefs, a natural abhorrence and rcieiitment «^
a 'H o>y», «ry«A9» .J/a«. ^lyUoi^. Chryf: b When the Stoics fay, that ■x wife man may
relieve one, who wants his help, without fity'mg him; I own indeed he may, but I very much doubt whether he vould. If he had not fome compaflion, and in fome meafure felt the ails or wants of the ©thcr, I fcarce know how he fliould come to take him for an objed of his charity. e 'o i>w. e>*
LihX, >^e;?^ire>yt^<;^«v®-, iT»3^ Ix, h\ ^0T(, ^ c<rovzi°'oy, fTTXimru,. Arlji. To bc an'^ry under thcfe conditions is a different thing from rage, and t\iok tranfportsVfhKh perhaps fcarce corap'/ with any one of them: iuchzitkaxoi Alexander, who, bccaufc his ^^^a(^ died, commandcii thc'A<ricAi!- ^H$(. to be all burnt. Jbrr.
Z of
174 ^^^ Religion c/ Nature. Se6t. IX.
of that which is villainous or vitious orbafe% fear ^ of evils, are things, which ^uly temperd have laudable" effects : and without them mankind could not well iubiifb. By Vv^hich it appears, that the Author of nature has placed thefe cona- tus's^ thefe tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to difpofe us for action, when there are no arguments of a higher nature to move us. So far are they, rightly managQd^ from being mere infirmities. And certainly the philofopher^ who pre- tends to abfolute apathy^ maims nature, and fets up for a half-man, or I don'i
know what '^.
I mufl confefs however, that our pajjions are (oi'ery apt to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an exaSl difcipline^ that by way of prevention or caution it is advifable rather to affect ai<?^r^^ofapathy, or to recede more from the worfe extreme ^. This very propofition itfelf, which, when reafon isabfent, places y^»/^ and inclination in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our paflions, or give them their full carreer 5 becaufe if we do, they may (and will) carry us into fuch excejes^ fuch dangers and mifchiefs^ as may fadly affect the fenfitive part of us : that part itfelf, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well cxamindj i? reafon is on their fide, or flands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I fay) : in other cafes we mufl be deaf to their appli- cations, flrongly guard againft their emotions, and in due time prevent their rebel- ling againil the fovereign faculty.
I cannot forbear to add, tho I fearlfball tire you with repetitions, that from what is fiiid here and jufl before, not only the liberty men take in preferring what theylilce beft, among prefent in joyments, meats, drinks, i^c. fo far as they are innocent ; but all thofe prudential and lawful methods, by which they endea- vour to fecure to themfelves a comfortable and pleafant being, may be juftified, and that obf. under prop. XIII. in feet. II. flrengthend.
» There is, according to Tully, Civile odium, quoomnes improbos odimus. *> €>ooij|W/t,9-« dV
XovoTi rk ^o^ipoc.- • <po'^ifjbt^cc IvM Ttotvrx rk y-XKU- enov khl^Uv, Tnvixv, votrov, et<PiXntv, B-uvxrcv.-
"inoi -^ '^ ^ii <Po<Sii^, ^ KcuXor TO ^6 iM,, uiarxicy, kX. Arijl. When one called Xenophanes coward, becaufe he would not play at dice with hina, ii^oXoyiT ^icw ha^ic, Uvui, ^^05 rk aitrx^x j^ «roA^©-. Tint. ' A wife man is not ciTrxB-lii;, but fjuirfieva^ii.AriJi. ap, Diog. L, ^ Ah r
^BX,»^6jMivov "S fJi^iora ^i<7n'/,a>^w V [jJknso^ ivxYTtH. ^ -^ enc^uv^ to f/jiv i^lv ufA,u^ru>ioripov ro ^e '^t-
Tov. Arift. la the tame chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but fet down
here. Sx-o^rtii h'i ttpo^ ac uvrcl £t;x«T«(p«pe/ ia-fjinr- ■ Ui tom/ccvticv d'' ictvTm cc<piXy.nr — oTCt^ c( roc, ^.i'fdyjfjoim T iyM'v o^BSyrfc, ^eiijnii. And after, 'Ey TTavrl 3 fAU^hfit (^aXxr.Tiov re ij^v, ^ r\v v.S'em-
4 < If
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &"€. ij^
If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible\vithr^^/6';f and truth^ to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to dctiy it : but if it is not, to iifc it as it is, is to confidcr it as an appetite clear of all objedion^, and this muft be to comply with it. The humoring of fuch appetites^ as lie not under the inter- di6t of truth and reafon, feems to be the very means^ by which the Author of nature intended to fweeten the journey of life : and a man may upon the road as well muffle himfelf up againft fun-lhine and blue sky, and expofe himfelf bare to rains and llorms and cold, as debar himfelf of the innocent delights of his na- ture tor affected melancholy, want, and pain. Y'et,
4. He muft ufe what means he can to cure his own defe5ls^ or at kajl to prevent the effe^s of them ; learn to deny temptations^ or keep them at a proper difiance^ 5 even mortify .^ where mortification is necejfary ^ -, and always carry about him the fenfe of his being but a man. He who doth not do this, doth not conform himfelf to thzfeventh particular under the preceding prop, ('doth not own that to be trucy which he is fuppofed to have found true in himfelf j ; denies a de* fe£l to be what it is, to be fomething which requires to be fupplied, or amend- ed} and is guilty of an omijjion^ that will fall under fe£t. I. prop. V.
I might here mention fome precautions^ with fome kinds and degrees o£ mor- tification OY felf' denial^ which men will commonly find to be necelTary. But I fliall not prefcribe 5 leaving them, who beft know their own weak places and difcafes, to fele6t for themfelves the proper remedies.
I fhall only take notice, that fince the felf-denial here recommended can only refped things in themfelves lawful and not unrcafonablc, and in favor of fuch our bare inclinations have been allowd to be taken for arguments and dire6bions, it looks as if this advice to deny ones felf or inclinations inferred a contradidion. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow thofe inclinations might otherwife be right -, yet in tbefe circumflances and under this view there a- rifes a good itafon againft it, and they, according to the efiablijhd rule, muft- therefore giveaway : which is all that is intended ^,
* 'AyiTt^^ceo! f^-'ixi^ ^ o<pBccXujZv ^^co-:A3-&)v o ss»5, ivruvB-a 'Uij ss"* S^^xn; r '4^:';c5c. Max. Tyr.
To appoint things, as the fewiflj Doftors have done, to be niinb :i^"'D, or rii^ p"'n~)nb nD n-T-nyn jn tzn^tn, would be right, if they were judicioufi^ chofen, and not fo very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly juft : as that nM\i;ni U-'^M nU/'i^n CZII^ S^DD'' i>i:7 CDn U/pP 13 nmy. Paffim. ^ IVhatJJwuU a man do to live ? "i^'Jy r-l^O\ Mijlm. = No
/jionkcry no fuperftitious or phantaflical mortifications are here recommended.
Z i ^^ The
i 75 The Religion of Nature. Sedl. IX.
The lall: claufe of the propofition takes in a great compafs. It will oblige men, if they do bat think well what they are, and confcquently what others of the fame kind with themfelves alfo arc, not to be proud, conceited, vain 5 but modeft, and humble, and rather diffident of themfelves : not to cenfure the failings of otherg too hardly, not to be over-fevere in punifhing or exa6tingjuftice% and partir cularly not to be revengeful j but candid, placable, manfuete : and fo forth.
f . He ought to examine "^ his own anions and condudl^ and where he finds he has iranfgrcjfed '^, to repent. That is, if the tranfgreflion be againft his neighbour^ and the nature of it admits, to make reparation^ or at leaft as far as he can : in other cafes, when that which is done cannot be recalled^ or repaird, or termi- nates in himfelf only, to live however under a fenfe of his fault, and to prove by fuch a6ts as are proper, that he dcCncs forgivenefs^ and heartily wifhes it un- done j which is as it were an eflay towards the undoing of it'', and all that now can be ^ : and laftly, to ufe all pofUble care not to relapfe. All this is involved in the idea of a fault, or aftion that is wrong, as it prefents itlelf to a rational mind. For fuch a mind cannot approve what is unreafonablc, and repugnant to truth i that is, what is wrongs or a fault : nay more, it cannot but difapprove it, deteft it. No rational animal therefore can a6b according to truth, the true nature of himfelf and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it ; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at leaft fhew himfelf to be penitent ^.
If when a man is criminal, he doth not behave him fc\£ as fuch y or, which is the fame, behaves himfelf as being not fuch, he oppofes truth confidently.
And further, to aft agreeably to what he is fuppofed to find himfelf to hy is to aft as one who is in danger of reJapfmg : which is to be upon his guard for the future.
6. He mufi labor to improve his rational faculties %y fuch means, as are (fairly) praUicahle by him, and confiflent with his circumftances. If it be a difadvantage to be obnoxious to error, and aft in the dark, it is an advantage to know fuch truths as may prevent this : if fo^ it is a greater advantage to know, or be capa- ble of knowing, more fuch truths 8 : and then again, not to endeavour to improve
» \''\r\ m'^IU/D D^ab nmioriWiy TiDD (which words I Ufiderftand in the fenfe, that Bjtjhi fecms to put upon them, Gen.xWw. 10.) >> n^ 3-«p/3^i-^ -n y i^i^xi t(>o. ^»ey ^y- £TfA«e&;j i
^»r. carm. c T/^ <]^ u\ r otyu,yx ^ fii'a Trccf^iX^uv ocvtut®^ 'ifjuitn ; ric, ^' iy^ uxcrici^^t^Ui ;
rj^a.i{Ajuy h ^y> ?7cXK«»(?. ih Jud. «* &Hem fATiitet peccajftj, ftne efiinnocens. Sen. 'Even
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c, 177
thofe faculties, by which thefc truths are apprehended, is to fhut them out, as being not what they are ^
And moreover, by the inlargement of our rational faculties we become more rational', that is, we advance our natures ^, and become more attentive to rati- onal injoymcnts.
The ordinary means indeed of improving our minds are the infl:ru6bion of able men, reading, obfcrvation, meditation : but every man has not proper opportuni- ties^ ov capacity for thefe, or but in ibme low degree j and no man is obliged be- yond his abilities, and opportunities (by fe6t. IV. prop. II J Therefore that mol- lification is added, by fuch means^ &:c.
Bcfide healthy a comfortable and fuitable provifion of externals is fo necefliiiy to the well-being of the whole man^ that without it the rational part cannot dwell eafy, all purfuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improve- ments (commonly^ imperfe6i; *=. And fo- reafon itfelf (which cannot betray ^x.^ own intereft) mud for its own fake concurr in feeking and promoting that,, which tends to the prefervation and happi-nefs of the whole. But the doing of this ingrofles time and induftry j and before that which is fought can be obtaind (if it is ever obtaind), probably the ufeo? it is loft: except where men live by the profeflion of fome part of learning.
And asto them who are more free from worldly cares, or whofe bufinefs and imployment brings them into a ftri(5ler acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (fuch is the great variety of human circumftances in other refpe6is) they muft be contented with feveral degrees and portions of knowledge. Some are bleil; with clean and ftrong conftitutions, early inll:ru<ftions and other helps, fucceeding incouragements, ufeful acquaintance, and freedom from difturbance : whilft others, under an ill ftate of body, or other disadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can-.
But notwithftanding all this, every man may in fome degree £>r or/j'f r- endeavour^ to cultivate his nature, and poflefs himlelf of ufeful truths. And not to do this is (again) to call off reafon fwhich never can be reafonahle\ apoftatize from humanity, and recoil into the beftial life ^.
» And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For ttmvtk; otv^^uTret ^ u^lnxi l^t, yevT64* (fve-et, Arijl. *> Arijlotle being asked, vahat he got byphilofophy, anfwerd, To knittTccx^
Tw? To;t(v u Ttvii ^la. T ^^ 'T fofjjur <f)oocv 5r£42o-<». And another time, how th» lenrned differ d from ■ the unlearned, laid, ' Oa-co oi ZJa-m^ t t>!.5-;))>c«twii- T%t Trcci^iiu* iMym cv fOfi iv7vx'ct,t^ "'«" KocjAev, ci j Tdii iiTv^iciti ■/.XTa.<pvyyi:J. D.Laert. ^ 'A^JvuToy if), « a fx^iov^ roe x9t>,o« jr^arUfv k^ef'/iytiTC*
eyTof :ro?i.u f/S/j yi z^i^rlirici xxS-uztf <Ji' oeyUvuv, y.rX- Arift. ^ ii(im fait Cjjioddum tempHS',
cum in a^ris homines pajpm beftinrurrt mode vagab^,ntHr, ^c. Ci<",
o 7. Hs
178 The Religion of Nature. Sed. IX:
7. He mujl attend to injiru^ion ■*, and even ask advice -y efpecially in matters of confequence. Not to do this is to deny^ that his faculties are limited and defec- tive, or that he is fiillible (which is contrary to that, which he is prefumed to be confcious of j ; and perhaps, that it is poiTible for another to know what he doth not.
Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improve- ments are, the more doth truth prefs him to fubmit to the counfel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only capable^ but every one wants upon fome occafions to be informed. In how many countrey affairs muft the /cholar take the rujiic for his mafter ? In how many other men of bulinefs, traders and mechanics ? And ■on the other fide, in refped of how many things doesthegenerality of the world want to be taught by them, who are learned and honeft ?
There is or ihould be a commerce or interchange of counfel and knowledge, as well as of other things : and where men have not thefc of their own growth^ they fhould thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters.
I do not mean, that a man ought implicitly and blindly to follow the opinion ofanother^ ("this otherbeing/^////'/^ too, as well as himfelf), unlefs he has /« /.?/w- y^Z/agoodreafonfo to do, which many times happens > but by the affiftance of -another, and hearing what he has to fay, to find out more certainly on which fide reafon^ truth^ and happinefs (which always keep clofe together^ do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's own reafon at lafl, which governs.
He, who is governed by what another fays (^or does) without underftanding it and making the reafon of it his own, is not governed by his own reafon^ and that is, by no reafon that he has. To fay one is led by the nofe (as we com- monly fpeak ") gives immediately the idea of a brute ^.
« The effect, which Xenocrates's lefture had upon Tolemo, is remarkable : unins orationis faluber- rimn medicine fanntus, ex infamt ganeone maximus philofophus evajit. Val. M. ^ Like them,
who fubmit to their Hhakamim, m ^6*^3^ t^l^U; ^O^ '7y nO^i^ ib^SN. In S. Jqqar. Many more inOances might ealily be given. "= Not only we. T?5 pvo? i>.y.ioX was ufed in the
fame fenfe by the Greeh. ^ Nihil magis pr^ftanJum eft, quam ne, pecorum ritu, fequamur
anteeedenttum gregem, pergenics non quz eundum eft, fed qua itur. Sen.. Something may perhaps be cxpefted in this place concerning logHe and fafhion, which fecm to be public declarations of fome general opinion i fhewing how far they ought to fway with us. I think, fo far as to keep us irom being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done ; efpecially in refpedt of trifling and little matters. Bat further a wife man will fcarce mind them. That is a,good[cTittnceiaDe/f!cphilus, nan » »f»£»4 i»v«» y-a^'i, y-a-^ Trum iA,i}}sy,r, k^V^-.Tur (p^.vX'^ '{^
Lailly,
Truths hehnging to a Private Man, 8^^. i yp
Laftly, He miiji labor to dear his mind of thofe preoccupations and incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him from reafoning freely^ and judging impartially. We fet out iu life from fuch poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under fuch remains of fuperflition and ignorance, fuch influences of company and fkfliion, fuch infinuations of pleafure, l^c. that it is no wonder, if men get ha- bits of thinidng only ino;;^ ijoayy that thefe habits in time grow confirmed and obftinate j and fo their minds come to be overcafl with thick prejudices, fcarc* penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reafon. He therefore, who would ufc his rational faculties, mull in the firfl place difentangle them, and render them// to be ufed : and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not intend to ufe themj that is, he proclaims himfelf />r^//(7ff^/, con- traiy to truth, if fuppofition the fourth be true.
The fum of all is this : it is the duty of every man, if that word cxpre/Tes fuch a being as is before defcribed, to behave himfelf in all refpeds (^^'hich I cannot pretend to enumerate^ as far as he is able according to reafon. And from hence- it will follow, further, that,
IV. Everyman is obliged to Uie virtuoujly and pioufly. Becaufe to practice reafon % and truth ^ is to Hve after that manner. For from the contents of the^ foregoing feftions it is apparent, that one cannot pradice reafon (or a6t accor- ding to truthj without behaving himfelf reverently and dutifully toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends} nor without_;«/?/V^ and a tender regard to the properties of other men : that is, unlefs his injoyments be free from im- piety, virtuous and harmlcfs. And as to thofe virtues, which refpe6t a mans felf the fame thing " will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by fome of the principal ones.
Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but choofing (after things ^ have been duly weighd) and uiing the mod reafonable means to obtain fome end, that is reafonable. This is therefore dirc5lly the exercife of reafon.
Temperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as phy lie for hunger and: thirfl:,but alfo as an innocent cordial and fortifier againft the evils of life,or even fome- times, reafon not refufing that liberty, merely as matter o^ pleafure. It only con- fines us to fuch ^/Wj, quantities, and /(^o-^/ow;, as may bell confift with our health *
» Ipfa virtus bre-vijjime reBA ratio did poteft. Cic. ^u^ nen Alittd eft quam recla ratio. Sen. •> Idem ejfe dtcebat Socrates veritatem ^ virtiitem. Id, "= Viz. "That a man cannot praftiie rea-
fon without praftiling them. ^ tU t' Iovtu, to. t iask^ivA,, tt^o t iovtx. « That /ayin<y
oi Timet hens to Tlato, with whom hehadfupped the night before in the Academy, /l^ould beremem-
the
;8o The Religion &/" Nature. Se6l.IX.
the life ofour faculties % our fortune, ^c. and iliew, that we do not thhik our felvcs made only to cat and drink here ^ i that is, fuch as fpeak us to be what we are.
Chafiity docs not pretend to extinguij}} our tender paflions, or cancel one part of our nature : it only bids us not to indulge them againft reafon and truth <= > not give upthc man to humor the brute ^ ; nor hurt others to pleafe our fehes s to divert our inclinations by buiinels, or fome honell: amufement, till we can gratify them lawfully, conveniently, regularly'' j and even then to participate of the myftei-iesoflovc withw^c^^f/j, as within a veil or facred inclofure, not with a canine impudence ^.
Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about i not only confiders the man bimfelf, but com piilTio nates his family ; knows, that, when the cxaileft com- putation is made that can be beforehand, there will Hill be found many unforc- fcen defiderata in the calendar of his expenccs j is apprehenftve of the world, and accidents, and new occafions, that may arife, tho they arc not yet in be- ing %'y and therefore endeavours wifely to lay in as much, as may give him fome kind of fecurity againft future wants and cafualties, without which provifion no man, whofe fenfe is not quite loft, or cii-cumfcribed within the prefent mi- nute, can be very eafy '\ To this end it not only cuts oft' all profujion and ex- travagance, but even deducts fomething from that, which according to the prefent appearance might be ajforded ' > and choofes rather that he ftiould live upon half allowance now, than be cxpofed (or expofe any body elfej to the danger of ftarving hereafter ^, wiicn full meals and former plenty ihall make poverty ^udfajiing more infup portable. But ftill it forbids no inftance of gene- roftty^ or even magnificence, which is agreeable to the man's ftation and circum- ftances, or fwhich is tantamount) to the truth of his cafe ^
» Corpus oyitiftiiin Hefiemis vit'tls animum quoq; pr££ravat una, (^c. Hor. '' ^uibus
in folo 'Vivendi caufafalato eft. Juv, Sic prandete commilitcnes tanquam Apud inferos anAturi {Leonid. ap.Val M.) may be turned to a general r»ement«, no inan knowing, how near his death may be. <^Tiiidi!ii — —K(x,>.iij; " Ex-ay f T xxtnei. jirr. ^ Venerem incertam rapientes, more femrum
Hot. e In which words are compreheaded naturally (To juii 7«; ^«f« ^unv ifi^o^ui ^»«-
KSij). ' Kot as Crates and Hipparchia (of whom fee Dio^. L. Sext. Emp. (^ al.), and iudecd
the Cynics in general are faid to have done : qtiibus in propatnlo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit- Laftanr. Of whom therefore Cictro fays with good reafon, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio'] tota eft eji- ilenda. Eft enim inimica verecundtA, fine qua nihil reilttm ejfepoteft, nihil honeftum. Sin"* IflU/i* ^il ^y322 ru;''N'. i\ Hhas. That in Herodotus, "a-uiix, x.i3-Zvi (^/.^veiAi*ai a-vnxhiToci (t t» oti^a yvi^* ought not to be true. Verecnnd A narurali habint provifutn lupanaria ipfz fecretum. Aug. * £<*•; TO T^? T-jy.A', KT.K/AXfTu kiposafet,- ph. J. i' Simonides was wont to fay, BuMtf^iit u» 'hen-
.">ctiki/ ToT? *%-^.p«'? ///«».<;* ^JTiAiriTr, it ^a» ^tt^Z T <pUuy. Stob. » Non intelligunt homines quAm
^Agnutn "jecitgal fit pArJimonia- Cic. * Like them, who c* t^ viirnTt ric if y^eu^ i<fii^,x7rfo-
xarct^xXicrKtss- y, as in Arhen. J Ea li&erslitate Htamurt qu£ profit armcis, neceat nemini.
After
I Truths hehnging to a Private Man, &c. 1 8 1
After the fame manner I might proceed upon other/>^r//V»/i?r virtues. But my notion of- them muft by this time be fufficicntly underflood: and therefore I Ihall only give this general advice. That you may take the truer profpe6t of any a6t, place your felf in your imagination beyond it (beyond it in time), and ^u^^ok ix. already done^ and then fee how it looks 5 always remcmbring, that a long repentance is a difproportionate price for -xjhort injoyment. Or, fancy it done by fome other man^ and then view it in xhTil fpeculum : we are commonly {har- per-fighted in difcerning the faults of others, than of our felves ". And further, as to thofe virtues, which are faid to confift in the mean, it may be fomctimes fafer to incline a little more to one of the extremes^ than to the other: as, rather to ftinginefs, than prodigality 5 rather to inflexibiUty, and even a degree of ill nature, than to dangerous complaifance, or eafinefs in refpe£b of vice, andfuch things as may be hurtful ^ and fo on^.
Since then to live virtHouJly is to pra6life reafon and a6t conformably to truth^ he, who lives fo, muft be ultimately happy^ by fe6b. II. prop. XIV". and therefore not only the commands of reafon, but even the defire of happinefs (a motive, that can- not but work ftrongly upon all who think) will oblige a man to live fo.
It may be collected even from experience^ that the virtuous life compared with the contrary^ if one looks no further than the prefent ftate, is the happier life <^ ^ or, that the virtuous pleafures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer '^. Who kcs not, that the vitious life is full of dangers and folicitudes, and ufually ends ill J perhaps in rottenncfs and rags, or at leaftin a peeviih and delpicable difcon- tent ^ ?
I am not of opinion, that virtue can make a man happy upon a rack ^,under avid- lent fit of the ftone, or the like § -, or th^t virtue Und prudence can always exempt him from wants andfufferings, mend a ftrait fortune, or re6bify an ill conftitu-
' Non ejl incommodum, quelle quodqi fit, ex aliis judicare : ut fi quid dedeceat in aliis, -w-
temtis ^ ipji. Fit enim nefcio quo modo, at mugis in aliis cernamus, qukm in nobifmet ipfis, fi quid delinqtiitur. Cic. ^'Oton, cai cL-^vm rrs^Timt 7i<> 'a^Av'iZ^yn; fx^'y, ^va-uTrtiB^tii, fjutiS"] Tfotr/Biua-^i a-iuv-
rev, ^».'ci xxTud-n re jtotd'^jov, y.A T!»t. <^ Even Epicurus himfelf kz^^i'ro)! <P)j<rt ■/ if JovJ? th»
upiT-/iv u,mr and 2^ mv id'av»v t«? kciru'-. oiii kifu^. Diog. L. •* Ifocrates eives pne reafon'
for this, where he compares vitious pleafures with virtue. 'Emu fi^ tt^Zthv Y^tivri^^ v-^vov h.vz-'air,-
yjtr iV7Uu^cc 3 /4? r'xi XuTrcti rac, it^eveii 'i;^oy,iv. e Whereas virtUC is iiptsi^tav sr^e? ywei^.
Bias ap. S. Baf. f For who can bear fuch rants as that, Epicurus ait, fapientem, fi in Pha~
laruits tauro peruratur, excUmaturum, Dulce eft, j^ ad me riiJ?il pertmet ? Sen. Ttilly reports the fcrne. ^ It is in the power of very few toad like him, qui durs varices exficandas pnberet,
legere librum perfeveravit : or him, qui non defiit r'uhre, cum cb hoc ipfum in-iti tortores omnia inftru^ menta crudtUtatis experirentur. Sen,
A a tion :
1 82 r^^ Rfligion o/' Nature. Se(a:. IX.
tion : araidil fo many enemies to virtue, fo many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but be fometimes affeEled. But I have faid, and fay again, that the natu^ ral and ufual cffc6fc of virtue is happinefs ; and if a virtuous man ihould in fomerefpefts be unhappy, yet ftill his virtue will make him lefs unhappy : for at lead he injoys inward tranquillity, and a breaft confcious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer : that, which naturally tends to happinefs^ tho it may be diflurbed j or that, which naturally tends to unhappimfs ? In bricf^ 'uirtue will make a man here^ in any given circumftances, as happy as a man can be in thofe circum fiances : or however it will make him happy hereafter in fome other ftate : for ultimately^ all taken together, happy he muft be.
Some may poilibly wonder, why among virtues I have notfo much as once named one of the cardinal^ and the only one perhaps which they pretend to : I mean fortitude. That that^ by which fo many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greateft, death it f elf > that^ which diftinguilhes nations, raifes empires, has been the grand theme of almoft all wits, attradls all eyesj opens all mouths, and aflumes the name of liirtue by way of excellence 3 that thii fhould be forgot !
To attone for this omiflion I will make this appendix to the foregoing brief account. Vi fortitude be taken for natural courage (/. e. ftrength, a6bivity, plen- ty of fpirits, and a contempt of dangers refulting from thefe), this is conftitu- tion and the gift of God % not any virtue in us : becaufe if it be our virtue, it muft confill in fomething, which lue produce, or do our felves K The cafe is the fame with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or itrong walls, which may indeed be great ad'uantages^ but were never called -:;;>- tues *=. To haiis thefe is not virtue > but to ufe them rightly^ or according to reafon, if we have them.
That this is juilly laid, may perhaps appear from what is to be faid on the o- t her fide. It may be a man's misfortune.^ that he has not more courage, a grea- ter ftock of fpirits, firmer health, and ftronger limbs, if he has a juft oc- cafion to ufethem j but it never can be reckond a vice or fault not to ufe what [\Qbas not : for otherwife it might be a crime not to be able to Carry ten thoufmd pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.
« "Ei wuXoi. icx^Ti^k ioTi, 3-to? TTn a-oi Toy ih/x%v. Hsm. ^ Propter lirttUemJHre laudamur, ^
ffi virtute reHe gbriamur, ^uoJ non contmgeret., ft id donum a deo, noil a nobis haberemHs. Cic ^ As that v/ord is ufed here. For when it is ufedasinthat af, Luc, 'ApsTii ,4" vuiuaj'^ t%W, and the like paflijges, it has another meaning,
.1 Fortituds^
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 183
Fortitude confiderd as a virtue confifts in (landing and endeavouring to overcame dangers and oppofitions,\vhen they cannot be avoided without the violation o^rea- fort and truth. Here it is, that he, who is endowd with natural braveiy, a healthful conflitution, good bones and mufclcs, ought to uje them, and be thankful to the Doner : and he who is not {o favord, muft yet do what he can : if he cannot con- quer, he mull endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is natural- ly timorous, or weak, or otherwife infirm, may have as much, or more ot the wV- tue of fortitude, than the hero himfelf ; who apprehends Httle, and feels little, com- pared with the other, ovpojjibly may find pleafure in a fcene of dangerous a6tion.
If a man can prevent, or efcape any peril or trouble, falvd veritate^ he ought to do it : otherwife he neither confiders himfelf, nor them as being what they are 5 them not as unnecejfary, himfelf not as capable of being hurt by them 5 and fo daihes againll truth on the woife fide ^ But where that cannot be done, he muft exert himfelf according to his abilities, whether great or little, and refer the fuccefs to the Divine providence. This is the true virtue o^ fortitude, which is nothing but endeavouring firmly and honeflly to ad: as truth requires j and therefore is dire£lly dcducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of hmuan afts.
It has for its obje6l not only adveifaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the evils of life ^ -, which a man mud labor by pmdence to ward off, and where this cannot be done to bear with refignation, decency, and an hum- ble expe6lation of an adjuftmcnt of all events in a future ft ate : the belief of which I am now going to prove, in my manner^ to be no vain nor groundlefs conceit.
V. Every one, that finds himfelf as before in prop. I. finds in himfelf at thefa^ne time a confcioufnefs of his own exijience and a^s (which is life), with a power of apprehending, thinking, reafoning, willing, beginning and flopping many kinds and de- grees of motion in his own members, 6cc. *^. He, who has not thefe powers, has no power to difpute this with me : therefore I can perceive no room for any difpute here, unlefs it be concerning the power of beginning motion. For they> who fay there is always the fame quantity of motion in the world, mud not allow the produ6bion ofany «ew} and therefore mullfuppofe the animal ipirits not to
• K«Tn< >^ KUfJuctt©^ ly.Te^ «fye NiJ«. Hom. *' E»V< ^' a* ti cv tutlce. <?.aTgioovT£?, t ruujccraj
u^reTi » fX/cc»fani »ofl'o*$, >i t?r«To»j) ynfct, nxTurKiXinviJUivut, tIau iAtiS-Ji ^tajrevKir** «»«*!*>, eca-Kr,Teil tro-
4)t«5 iWt?. Th. J. Non in viriSus corf em (^ Ucertis tantummodofertitudlnts gloria ejl, fed tnagss in •virtute animi. — Jure en fortitudo -vocmht, qUMndo Hnufqut/que feipfum 'vincit, iram continet, nullss tl- Itcebris emollitur atqut infleiiitur, non adverfu ferturbatur, non extollitttr fecmdis, 8cc. S. Ambr. ' M**'/' 'Pf' »orit, primnm Aliquid ftmier fe habere divinum, {cc. Cic.
A a i be
184- The Religion of Nature. StdiAX.
be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive from it their diredions into thefe or thofe canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be anfwerd, that, if the mind can give thefe mw dire^tons and turns to the fpirits, this ferves my purpofe as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it. And befides, it could not do this, if it could not excite thofe fpirits being at reft.
It is plain I can move my hand upward or downward or horizontally, fafter or flower or not at all, or flop it when it is in motion, juji as I will. Now if my hand and thofe parts and fpirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already impreft upon them> the effeds would be determind by rules of mechanifm, and be ne- eejfary : the motion or reft of my hand would not attend upon my iinll^ and be alterable upon a thought at my pleafare. If then I have fas I am fenfible I have) a power of moving my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by thofe laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitati- on would obferve, this motion depends folely upon my willy and begins there ^
VI. Thaty which in man is the fuhje5l or fuppofitum of felf-confcioufnefs^ ihinksy and has the forefaid facultiei^ muji be fomething different from his body or earcafs.
For, firft, he doth not I fuppofe find himfelf to think, fee, hear, I3c. all over^ in any part of his body : but the feat of cogitation and reflexion he finds. in his head •> ; and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objeds are conveyd to him, all tend to the fame place. It is plainly fomething, which refidcs there <^5. in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of thefe nersxs governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by fo many reins, or wiresj \ feels what is done to it, fees through the eyes, hears through the ears, i^c".
' ¥a fjUHTi ii^S-fv MViiTXi \_To (rZfAcc'] CO', Ttfj c!.-\'vx», jW/>)rs (pva-iKbXi an, ro «ry^, ^yiXoi> '<iti vTto "^v^^vic, xinXTcity aX, Greg. Thaum. ^ Which, ft)? uwrn, cmo^ sV» t ki<r^it<ri6>v. Artem. « "Otth i
Uiipn 3^ ff&'rtar©- uXor/oe, ii^iy.^ et.^' orav o^fjun ymrxi, (ritirccvr(^ ug-ri^ viVM^ ^ Xoytiri/i5, jrejvret nruKTUt )i G-wnKTcn ^ iTtditovu. Flur. ^ Nqs ne nunc qniilem ochUs cernlmus ea, qua videmus : neque
enim eft hUhs fenfiis in corpore, fed'. tjU qunfi quddam funt c.d oculps, ad aurej, ftd nares a fede
anmi perforata, Jtaque fipe (tut cogitathne, ant aliqun it morbi impedlti, apertts at que integris (^ scuiu e?* ciitribm, nee 'videmus, nee audtmus : ut facile mtelligi pojjit, mimum (^ lidere, ^ audire, nm etis parti}, qm qnafi feneftr* funt mimi : qHtbus t amen f entire nihil qtieat mem, nifi id agar, &■_ »dfit. CiC.
Upon
Truths hehnging to a Private Man, 6^c. 1 85
Upon amputation of a limb * this thing (^vhatever it is) is not found to.be diminifjjd '', nor any of its faculties loji. hsfphere of a6ting, while it is con- fined to the body, is only contraded, and part of its injlrument loft. It can* not make ufe of that which is not, or which it has not.
If the eyes be fhut, or the ears ftopt, it cannot then fee, or hear : but remove the obftrudion, and it inftantly appears that the faculty, by which it apprehends the impreflions made upon the organs of fenfation, remaind all that while intirej and that fo it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had never been opend again j or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite difibled. This fhews in general that, when any fenfe ov faculty feems to be impaird or loft by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pafs, becaufe it is the body that perceives and has thefe faculties in itfelf j but becaufe the body lofes its in- Jlrumentality, and gives that which is thctruefubjeSl of thefe faculties no opportu- nity of exerting them, or of exerting them well : tho it retains them as much as in the cafe before, when the eyes or ears were only fliut "^ . Thus diftinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the foul
Again, as a man perufes and confiders his own body, doth it not undeniably appear to be fomething different from the confiderer ? And when he ufes this e;5cpreflion my body, or the body of me, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by me, pr what my relates to ? It cannot be the body itfelf : that can- not fay of itfelf, it is my body, or the body of me. And yet this way of fpeak- ing we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual fenfe of our felves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.
What I mean is this. A man being fuppofed ^perfon confifting of two parts, foul and body, the whole pcrfon may fay of this or that part of him, the foul of we^ or the body of me : but if he was either all foul, or all body, and nothing elfe, he could not then fpeak in this manner; becaufe it would be the fame as to fay the foul of the foul, or the body of the body, or the I of me. The pronoun there- fore (in that faying my body, or the body of me) mu ft ft and for fomething elfe, to which the body belongs ^ ; or at leaft for fomething, of which it is only a parr, ^iz. the perfon of the whole man ^. And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not body.
» Oxtv^ndetradlo corpore multo, as Lucretius fpeaks. ^ n^^^i^;? y^ ^ ^u^Zv ^ ^ iro^Z, Usi-
xofA^fx^i.^y, ixU>.>,f<^ Uiiv, [i -^vx^} i^im. Chryf. = Therefore Arlftotle fays, if an old man had
ayoung man's eye, &hko, uv Htzz^ ^ i »'©». ''a^c r)> v^^«?, i ro> -rlu? ,J.,;^;,v ^.^ro.^/v:*. r<, io^: ci * K«S-i^£f cJ^^^iS-^,? ^ ^^o-oi?, y,-rx. d Hlirochi (with others) accounts the foul to be the true
man. X« ^ u k -i^vyi,' ro A o-S^« o-iy. e So VUto ufes "Avt^s for the tthole of the man j by
which the foul; as one part of it, is called xr?///««.
It-
1 85 The Religion of Nature. Se6l. IX.
It is plain there are two different interejis in men % on the one fide reafon, on the other paflion : which, being many times dircftly oppoftte^ mud belong to dif' ferent fubje^s. There are upon many occafions contefts, and as it were wars be- tween the mhid and the hdy : fo far are they from being xhtfume thing.
Laflly, there is we may ^CYccivtfometbifig -withm us^ which fupports the body (keeps it upj, dire6ls its motion for the better prefervation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like ; without? which It would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The^o- dy therefore mull be confidcrd as being under the dire6iion and tuition of fomc other thing, which is (or fhouldbe) the governor of it, and confcquently upon this account muft be concluded to be different from it.
VII. tl'je foul cannot be mere matter. For if it is, then either all matter muft think i or the difference muft arife from the different modification^ magnitudes figure^ or motion ^ of fome parcels of matter in refpe6b of others > or a faculty of thinking muft be fuper added to fome fyftems of it, which is not fuperadded to others. But,
In the firft place, that pofition, which makes all matter to be cogitative, is con- trary to all the apprehenfions and knowledge we have of the nature of it> nor can it be true, unlefs our fenfes and faculties be contrived only to deceive us. We per- f eive not the leaft fymptom of cogitation^ oxfenfe in our tables, chairs, £5?^ .
Why doth the fcene of thinking lie in our heads^ and all the minifters of fenfa* tion make their reports to fomething there ^ if <?// matter be apprehenfive, and co- gitative ? For in that cafe there would be as much thought and undcrftanding in our heeh^ and every were elfc, as in our beads.
Hall matter be cogitative, then it muft be fo quatenus matter ^'xndi thinking muft be of the efTence and definition of it : whereas by matter no more is meant but a fubftance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And fince, for this reafon, it cannot be neceffary for matter to think (becaufe it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as matter only.
If it did, we ftiould not only continue to think always, till the matter of which wcconfiftis annihilated, and fo the aflertor ofthisdodrine would ftumbleupon
^ Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human foul, feems to be muchfuch another queftion as that in one of ^f»fc/j's epifllcs, Anji*ftitia, anfortitHdo, prutlemi^i cettraqHC vh' tuteSi animalin fint.
immor'
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 1 87
immortality unvf^^rcs ', but wemuft alfo have thought always /« time pap ^ ever lince that matter was in being j nor could there be any the lead intermiffion oF uSiual thinking : which does not appear to be our cafe.
If thinking, felf-confcioufnefs, (^c. were ejfential to matter, every part of it muft have them : and then no fy ft em could have them. For a fyftem of mate- rial parts would be a fyftem of things confcious every one by itfelf of its own ex- iftence and individuality, and confequently thinking by itfelf: but there could be no one aSi of felf-confcioufnefs or thought common to the whole. Jaxta- podtion in this cafe could fignify nothing: the diftin6tion and individuation of the feverai particles would be as much retaind in their vicinity, as if they were feparated by miles.
In the next place, the faculties of thinking, i^c. cannot arife from xhtjize^figurey texture^ or motion of it : becaufe bodies by the alteration of thefe only become grea- ter or lefs y round or fquare, (^c. rare, or denfe 5 tranflated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity > or the like : all which ideas are quite different from that o£ thinking; there can be no relation hefwccn them^. Thefe modifications and affedlions of matter are fo far from being principles or caufes- of thinking and a<5ting, that they are themfelves but ^Z"^^;, proceeding from the adion of fome other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its pafHvity^ deadnefs, and utter incapacity of becoming cogitative. This is evident to fenfe.
They, who place the efTence of the foul in a certain motion given to fome matter (if any fuch men there really bcj fnould conlidcr, among many other things, that to move the body fpontaneoufly is one of the faculties of the foul ^ > and that this, which is the fame with the power of beginning motion, cannot come from motion already begun, and impreil ab estra.
Let the materiahft examine well, whether he does not feel fomething within himfelf, that ads from an internal principle : whether he doth not experience fome Mfr/j' fome power of^oi;?r«/«^ himfelf, znd ckoofng: whether he does not injoy a k'mdodnvifble empire, in which he commands his own thoughts, fends them to this or that place, imploys them about this or that bufinefs % forms fuch and fucb
» Koutf ihi (ra>fXj» yinS.' ■auc, yi «» rk u.)3r,7(n vettw yivynVo*. SalluJ}, ^ That the fbul is th€
principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no teftimony) often faid by the ancients. 4>«;(r» -j^ mo«, v^ ^aA(fc<, <? Tr^urui ■sj'^*!' £»■«* ro Kmvf- A'ift. 'H ^v;^*) to 'tt^o^t, y.mvvTot vufA,xTce, Kj kvT6x.'vnrov. Simpl. 'A^zi ><'>yWit>%, ?k(in, ^ 'n■\'vxyi.^rt;:ua■^ 7«<r«p y'^v, z^a 7^5
ST H^ccnv, xA. Max. T.
deflmis
1 88 The Religion of Nature. X Se6t. IX.
defigns and fchemes : and whether there is any thing like this in hare matter ', how- ever fafhiond, or proportiond j which, if nothing ihould protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, ane- ternal monument, ofi its own being dead. Can fuch an adlhe being as the foul is ■', the fubject of/tf many powers^ be itfelf nothing but an accident ? i
When I begin to move my felf, I do it for fome reafon^ and with refpe6l to fome md^ the means to effect which I have, if there be occafion for it, concerted within my felf: and this doth not at all look like motion merely material (or, in which. matter is only concernd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine matter lo be moved by arguments^ or ever phcsd fyllogifms and demonfirations among levers andpuUies?
We not ojily move our felvcs upon reafons, which we find in our felves, but up- on reafons imparted by words or writing from others, or perhaps merely at their defireorbarefUggeftion. In which cafe, again, no body fure can imagine, that the words fpokcn pr written (the found in the air, or the llrokes on the paperj can by any natural or mechanical efficience caufe the reader or hearer to move in any determinate manner (or at all). The reafon, requeft, or friendly admonition, which is the true motive^ can make no impreflion upon matter. It mull be fome other kind of being, that apprehends the force and lenfe of them.
Do not we fee in converfation, how a pleafmt thing faid makes people break out into laughter^ a rude thing into/><3^e», and fo on ? Thefe affections cannot be the phyfical effe6ls of the words fpoken : becaufe then they would have the lame elfed, whether they were imderltood, or not. And this is further demonflrable from hence, that tho the words do really contain nothings which is either plea- fant, or rude j or perhaps words are thought to be fpoken, which are not fpoken j yet if they are apprehended to do that, or the found to be otherwife than it was, the effed will be the fame. It is therefore the fenfe of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by palling through the underji anding and caufing that, v/hich is the fubjed of the intelledual faculties, to influence the body, produces thefe motions in the fpirits, blood, mufcles.
a V/hat a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the foul is that in Lucretius ? Vi>i propellere rietnbra, Conripere ex fcmtw corpus, crc. -vuletur (Qjiornm nil fieri fine tjcin pojfe videmus. Nee tacium porrofine corpore); nonne fatendurrt efi Corporea natura animum confiare, arnmamq, ? If nothing can inove the body, but another body, what moves this .' iht body might as well move iticlf; as be moved by one that does. '' T«;^trov v»s- :4^ T^xnic, ^ reix,^i. Thai. at. Diog. L.
4
They,
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 1 89
They, who can fimcy, that matter m-^y come to live, think, and a6t fpontanc- oufly, by being reduced to a certain magnitude^ or having its pares placed after a certain manner^ or being invelled with fuch -^ figure^ or excited by fuch a particular motion: they, I fay, would do well todifcoverto us that^f^r^^? of finenefs, that alteration in the Htuation of its parts, i^c. at which matter may begin to find itfclf alive and cogitative j and which is the critical tninute^ that introduces thefe impor- tant properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon 2.ny particular cri- fis^ it is a fign they have no good reafon for what they fay. For if they have no rea- fon to charge this change upon ^ny particular degree or difference^ont more than an- other, they have no reafon to charge it upon any degree or difference at all; and then they have no reafon, by which they can prove that fuch a change is made at all. Bciides all which, fince magnitude, figure, motion are but accidents of matter, not matter^ and only the fuhftance is truly matter j and fince the fubjiance o^ any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, i^any matter can be by nature cogitative, all mull be fo. But this we have feen cannot be.
So then in conclufion, if there is any fuch thing as matter that thinks.^ Sec. this muft be a particular /jr/wV^^^ granted to it : that is, ^faculty of thinking muilbc/uperadded to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, mufc infer the exiilence of fome Being able to confer this faculty 5 who, when the ineptnefs of matter has been well confiderd, cannot appear to be lefs than cmm- ^otent, or God. But the truth is, matter feems not to be capable of fuch im- provement, of being made to think. For fince it is not of the ejcfice of mat- ter, it cannot be made to befo without making matter ^^t^z/^^^-r /^/Woffubllance from what it is. Nor can it he made to arife from any of the modifications or accidents of mattery and in refpe£tof what elfe can any matter be made to dif- fer from other matter.
The accidents of matter are fb far from being made by any power to produce cogitation, that [ome even of them {hew it incapable of having a faculty of think- ing fuperadded. The very divifibility of it does this. For that which is made to think muft either be one part, or more parts joind together. But we know no fuch thing as a part of matter purely one (or indivifiblcy. It may indeed have pleafed the Author of nature, that there fiiould be atoms, whofe parts are a&ually indifcerpible, and which may be the principles of other bodies ; but ftill they confift o^ parts, tho firmly adhering together. And if the feat of cogi- tation be in more parts than one (Vhether they lie clofe together, or are loofe, or in a ftate of fluidity, it is the fame thing), how can it be avoided, but that cither there muft be fo many feveral minds, or thinking fubjlances, as there ^xc parts (and then the confequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon ua again) ;
B b oi
ipo The Religion 6/ Nature. Se6l. IX.
or cjfc, that there muxihe. fomething elfe fuperadded for them to center in, to unite their a6ls, and make their thoughts to be one? And then what can this be, but fome oihcr fub/l an ce^ which is purely one ?
Matter by itfelf can never intertain abjlra6ted and general ideas^ fuchas many in our minds are ^ For could it reflecl upon what pafies within itfelf, it could poflibly find there nothing but material and particular impreflionsj abilraftions and metaphyiical ideas could not be printed upon it''. How could one abflrad from matter who is himfelf nothing hut matter? And then as to material images themfelves, which are ufually fuppofed to be impreft upon the brain (or fome part of itj, andilock thcphantafy and memory^ that which peruies the impref- lions and traces there (or anywhere) muft be fomething dillin6t from the brain^ or that upon which thefe impreilions are made: otherwife it muft contemplate itfelf, and be both reader and book. And this other diftin^l contemplating being cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without afoul. Forfuch a corporeal being mull require y^w^'^', and fuitable (?r- p,?«j, to perceive and read thefe chai*a6ters and i;^7?/gM of things j 1x116.(0 another organized body w^ould be introduced, and the fame queftions and difficulties re- doubled, concerning the foul of that body and its faculties ^.
Ifmy/o^//was mere matter, external vifible obje6ts could only be perceived within me according to the imprejjions they make upon matter, and not other- wife. Ex.gr. the image of a cube in my mind (or my idea of a cube) muil be always under fome particular />r<?//?f^, and conform to the rules of per/pe^ive -, nor could I otherwife reprefent it to my felf : whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is in itfelf ^ and almoft view all its hedr^ at once, as it were incom- paffing it with my mind.
I can within my{df correct the external appearances and impreffions of obje<51;Si and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my fenfes, to form ideas of things that are fiot extant in matter. By feeing a material circle I may learn to form the idea of a circle ., or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its cen- ter : but then recoUeding what I know of matter upon other occafions, I can con- clude there Is no cxacl material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raifed from the hints I received/r^w; without^ but is not truly to be foimd there. If I feea/{?-u;fratagreatdiftance, which according to the impreffions made upon my
• Diogenes, tho he could fee the table, and the pot^ could not by his eyes fee VUto's. T=a.7:i^o7'^z-> 5c xv«S-or>jc. Biog. L. *> Flato, £c c* fro<p'oi (more generally) fay, that the foul indeed perceives
objeds of kiife by the mediation of the body ; but there are ymTct^ which it doth m^' ^vtI^v c-jB-v pi7^. Id. c Such a foul mufl be indeed as Greg. Tha^m. has it, irS///* tfA-'l'vpcov. ''Atctov 3
■tf;^?5 '^••^X"-'' •^'■y^"''
material
Truths helonging to a Private Man, &c, ipi
material organs feems little and round ^ I do not therefore conclude it tohe either ■: there is fomething within, that reafons upon the circumftances of the appearance and as it were commands my fenfe, and corredts the imprcfTion : and this muft be fomething fuperior to matter, fince a material/oul is no otherwife impreflible itfelf but as material organs are. Inflances of this kind are endlcfs. (v.v>. r2, r.)
If we know any thing oi matter^ we know, that ^>' ///r// it is a lifelefs thinly inert, and pafsive only j and ads necejfarily (or rather is adedj according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This pafsivenefs feems'to be ^^«//,3/ to it. And if we know any thing oUurfclves^ we know, that we are confcious of our own exiftencc and ads (i.e. that we live) , that we have a degree of freedojn ; that -we can move our {elves fpontaneoujly; and infhort, that we can, in many inllances, take off the effed of gravitation, and imprefs new motions upon ourfpirits (or o-ive them new directions), only by a thought. Therefore to make mere matter do all this is to chanee the nature of it j to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into coeitativity necefsity into liberty. And to fay, that God m-Ayfuperadd a faculty of thinking, moving itfelf, £5? <^. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the fuppofitum of thefe faculties (that fubftance, in which they inhere), is the fame in efFed as to fay, that God may fuperadd a faculty of thinking to incogitativity^ of a6ting freely to necejjity^ and fo on. What fenfe is there in this ? And yet fo it muft be, while matter continues to be matter.
Th.'kt faculty of thinkings fo much talked of by fomeas fuperadded to certain fyfiemsoivci-xxxer^ fitly difpofed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be fo called, mull in reality amount to the fame thing as -xrxo^er fuh fiance with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking alone will not make up the idci of a human /(?«/, which is indued with many faculties -, apprehending, reficd- ing, comparing, judging, making deductions and reafoning, willing, puttino- the body in motion, continuing the animal fun£tions by its prefencc, and gi- ving life J and therefore, 'whatever it is that is fuperadded, it muft he fomething which is indued with all thofe other faculties. And v.'hether that can be a fa- culty of thinkings and fo thefe other faculties be only faculties of a facul- ty^ i or whether they muit not all be rather the faculties of {ome fuh-
• This is worfe than ■^•■jx'^ 4"'Jx'^i in Max. Tyr. and the place jufl: before cited. The author of the I.ffay cone. Hum. UrJerJl. has himfelf exploded it, or what is very like it. To ask, fays he, rehether the tpHI has freedom, is to ask, irhether one power has another power, one ability another abi- lity; a queflion at firfi fight too grojly abfurdto-make a difpiite, or need an anfwer. For who is it that fees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of fubftayues, and not of powers them- pl-vesl There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another paflage feme where in the lame book as much (or more) to my purpofe : but at prcfent I cannot find it.
B b i fiance %
ipi The RELiGioisr ^Nature. Se6l. IX.
fiance % which, being (by their own concefsionj Superadded to matter, muft be different from ir, I do leave the unprejudiced to dctermJn.
If men would but fcrioully look into thcmfclves, T am perfuaded the /o/// would not appear to them 3.sd. faculty of the body, or kind o£ appurtenance to it j but ra' ther iis fome fuhftance^ properly placed in it, not only to ufc it as an inftrumcnt, and act by it, but alfo to govern it (or the parts of it 5 as the tongue, hands, feet, ^c.) according to its ov/n reafon. For I think it is plain enough, that the mind^ tho it acls under great limitations, doth however in many infl:ances^(jwr;?the body^^r- hitrarily : and it is monftrous tofuppofe this governor to be nothing but fome fit difpofitioH or accident (fuperaddedj of that matter which is governed. A flnpix. is true would not befit for navigation^ if it was not built and provided in a proper manner : but then, when it has its proper form, and is become ^fyjlem of materials fitly difpofed, it is not this difpojition that governs it. It is the man^ that other fub- ilancc, who fits at the helm, and they, who manage tlie fliils and tackle,that do this. So our veljels without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be cap<ibieofbdnga<5ledasthey arej butftillit is not the fhapc, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The capacity of being governed or ulcd can never be the governor^ applying and ufing ^ that capacity. No there muft be at the helm fvmething diftinSi^ that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather fink.
For the foregoing reafons it fcems to me, that matter c^innol think, cannot ^e wade to think. But if ^faculty of thinking can be fuperadded to a fyftem of matter, without uniting an immaterial fubftance to it «= 3 I fay, if this can be, yetzhumafi body is not fuch afyfi:em, being plainly void of thought, and organized in fuch a manner as to tranfmit the imprefiions of fenfible obje6bs up to the brain, where the percipient, and that which reJleSfs upon them, certainly refides : and therefore that which //r'^r^ apprehends, thinks, and wills, muft he that fyfiem of matter to which a faculty of thinking is fuperadded. All the prcmifTes then w^ell con- Jiderd, iudge I befeech you, whether inftead of faying, that this inhabitant of our heads (the fouJ) is a fyftem of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is fuperadded, it might not be more rcafonable to fay, it is a thinking fubfiance in- timately united to feme fine material vehicle, which has its refiidence in the brain,
* If the foul is only an accident (or attribute) of the boJy, how comes this accident to have (or he the fupportof) other accidents, contrary ones too ? As when we fay, "131 nb:)D WQil nODD WS3 -S". Haemitn. ^ "Et^cv (^» rori x^'^f^^'^^' '^ ^ Z^^'^'^^- Tlato. ' Or, if to a thinking fub-
Cra»ce can befuperatldedthe modification of folidity. Which way of fpeaking, tho I do not remember o have met with it any v;here, nor doth it feeni to differ much from the other, yet would pleafe rp.t better.
Tho
Truths hehnging to a Private Man^ &c. 193
Tho I underftand not perfectly the manner, how a cogitative and fpiritnaHuh- llance can be thus clofely united to fuch a ^/^^/fri^/ vehicle ; yet I can underftand this union as well, iis how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itfelf cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be fuperadded to matter: and befidc, (Qvtv;i[ phenomena may more eafily be folved by this hypothefis j which (tho I jfliall not pertinacioufly maintain it) in fhort is this. Fiz. that the human fouVis a cogitative Tub fiance, clo- thed in a »7^/m^/ vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were infeparably mixt (\ had almoft faid incorporated) with it ' : that thefe aft in conjun5iion^ that, which af- feds the one, affefting the other : that the foul is detaind in the body f the head or brainj by ^omQfympathy or attradfion between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is fpoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an averfion, that makes it fly off), by fome hurt, or difeafe, or by the de- cays and mins of old age, or the like, happening to the body : and that in the /«?g- rim by means of this vehicle motions and imprefsions are communicated to and fro. But of this perhaps fomething more by and by.
VIII. Thefoulofmanfubfijis after the diffolution of his body : or, is immortal. For^
1. If it is immaterial^ it is indifcerpible^ and therefore incapable of being dif- folved or demoliflid, as bodies are ''. Such a being can only perifli by annihila- tion: that is, it will continue to fubfift and live, if fome other being, able to do this, doth not by a particular a6t annihilate it. And if there is any reafon to- believe, that at the death of every man there is always fuch a particular anni- hilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any fiibfiance into nothing requires juft the fame power as to convert nothing into fomething : and I fancy they, who deny the immortaUty of the foul, will be cautious how they^ admit any fuch power.
2. If the foul could be material 5 that is, if there could be any matter^ that might- be the fubjefb of thofe faculties of thinking, wiUing, i^c. yet (till, (Ince we cannoD but be fenfible, that all thefe are ficulties o^ihcfelf-fime thing j and that all the fe\'e_ ral ad:s of the mind area6ts oithtfame thingyCich of them individual -^nd truly one .- I fay, fince it is fo, this matter muft be fo perfectly united in itfelf, fo abfo-
• It is worth our confideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of fpirit, and pa/pie. fower of matter. Hence may be conjeciured, that created fpirits are not totally feparate from matter, iecaufe they are both active and pajjive. Ture fpirit, viz. God, is only aclive ; pure matter s onty puf- five; thofe Beings, that are both active and pajji've, we may judge to partake cf both. Hum. Under fl,
'' This is Socrates's argument in Plato. The foul is altogether «Jl;«/.i/7-©-, and therefore !iy^AE.7|.<3^.
Which Cicerc interprets thus: nee difcerpi, nee diftrahi potsft ; nee interire igititr,
3 lutely
194 ^^^^ Religion of Nature. Se6l. IX.
lately ond as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the ka(l that can be allowd is that it fiiould be truly foHd, and not aSiually divifibls 5 that is, fuch as no natural caufe could deftroy.
To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a thinking matter^ is to in- troduce matter with a new and oppofite property -, and that is to introduce a new fpecies of matter % which will differ as eflcntially from the other common unthink- ing kind, as any fpecies whatfoever doth from its oppofite iny?^/^ pr medicamentally even as body doth from fpirit. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if fo, this thinking matter mufl always continue to think, till either it is annihilated^ or there is a tranfmutation of one fpecies into ano- ther: and to take refuge in either of thcfe expectations is at leafl to exped om- nipotence fliould interpofe to help out a bad caufe.
If any one fliould fay, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence fuperadd to certain parcels of matter a fourth dimenfion^ I fhould not perhaps dilpute the Divine power : but I might fay, that fuch matter, exiiling under four dimenfi- ons, would eJ/eNtially differ from that, which cannot exift under four, or which can exiflbut only under three-, and that this four-dimenfiond matter m\iW. always remain fuch, becaufe no fubflance can be changed into or become another, ef- fentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the courfe of nature ceafes totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.
3 . The next argument fhall proceed by way ofobjeSlion and anfwer. Becaufe a removal of the principal objcdion againjl any thing is a good argument /(^r //. Obj. It feems as ii thinking was not effential to the foul, but rather a capacity of think- ing under certain circumftances. For it doth not think, when it lies conceald in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infan- cy, in fleep, in a fwoon : and the reafon of this feems to lie in the circumftances of the body J which either is not fuflicientiy extended, and prepared > or for a while im- ploys the fpirits wholly in the digcftion of its aliment,and other offices in the animal oeconomy ; orbyfome external attack, or the working offomeenemygot into it, hath its parts diforderd, and the paflages io poffeft, that the blood and other fluids can fcarcc break through j or after fbme fuch manner is preter naturally affe6ted. And therefore the queflion to be refolved is not, whether the foul is material or im-^ material ; and much lefs, whether it will be annihilated at death j bur, whether that foul (be it what it willj, which ceafes to think, when the body is not fitly difpofed,
■ Lucrcuus fccms to be aware of this- Jam triplex animi f ? natura reperta : Nee tamea h^cfat funt adfer.fmn cuncla. crearJum ^c. ^larta qaoq^; his igitnr quxdam natura necejje eft AttribtiA' ttir : ea c/t ownino nominis cxpers.
can
Truths helonging to a Private Man, &c. ig^
can think at all, Vv'hen the body is quite dijolnjed^ and leaves the foul no opporui- nity of aduating it any more, or operating by it -''. Anf. If this objection can- not be lully anfwerd, till we know more of the nature oi fpiritual beings, and of that 'vinculum^ by which the foul and body are connefted, tl^ian we doat prefent, it mud not therefore be lookd upon as certainly unatifwcrable in it felf 3 and much lefs, if only it cannot be anfwerd by me. It may perhaps be pofiible to turn it even into an argument /(?r //j^ immortality of the foul.
The foul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts uyidcr li- mitations : thcfe limitations :it different XAxnts^a'c different^ its a£Livity and faculties being more obil:ru61:ed or clogd at one time than another.^ andmoftof allinlleep, oY-^deliquium : as thefe obflru6tions are removed, it acts move clearly and freely ; and therefore if the ftateof the foul in the body fits confinement thercj may be confiderd as one general ^nd great limitation^ ^^'hy, when this limitation iliall be taken off (1:his great obftruction removed j, may it ^ not be allowd to act with iiiW greater freedom and clearnefs > thegreatejl it is capable of? Whilft it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a/<?iy apertures 5 that is, receive the no- tices of many things by thofe nerves and organs, which are the inflruments of fenfation : but if any of thofe avenues to it be flopt, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If thofe tracks in the brain, or thofe marks^ whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our memory and images of things feem to depend, are filled up or overcafi; by any vapor, or otherwifc dar- kend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is difperfed. (For it cannot ;'^<2^ what is not legible^ and indeed for the prefent not there.) And fince even in ahjlracled reflexions the mind is obliged to make ufe of words '^, or fome kind of figns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and flable enough to be peru- fed, compared, ^(f. and this kind of /^;?^/^t7^^ depends upon memory, whilftthis is intermitted, the ufe of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is iht prefent fiat e of the foul : and from hence the reafon appears in fome meafure, why we do not think in found fieep.^ 8cc. but it does not follow from hence, that the foul cannot fubfift and act under more inlarged circitmfiances. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the op-
* If Lucan by fenfus means all manner of apprehenfion and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunftion: Ant nihil eft fens us animis a morte reliclum, Aut mors ipfa nihil. For if the former part be true, the other will follow. fc Velut e cliutino carcere emijjus \_F.nimns']. Sen.
« Thofe kinds of animals, which do not fpeak, do not reafon ; but thofe, which do the one, do the other. Therefore -inHD T\ (or Arab. pa>^3) is a rationd animal: and ?^'oy'^ fignifies holh fpeech snd reafon, as going together.
I portunities
1^6 The Religion o/* Nature. Se6t, IX.
portiinities this affords, can now perceive vifible objects only with two eyes fat two windows ^), becaufc there are no more^ might doubtlefs ;|ee w'lxh four^ it there were fo many properly placed and difpofed j or if its habitation were all eye (window all round), might fee all round. And fo, in general, that, which now can know many things by the imprcilions made at thejends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our prefcnt organs, and in this /ituatioK and inclofurecxn know them no other way, may for all ciiat, whf^n it comes to be loofed out of thatprifon ^, know them immediately^ or bv fome other medium. That, which is now forced to make ihift with words ana ; «x of things in its reafonings, may, "when itfhall be fet at liberty andcancomeatthem, reafon upon the intuition of things themfehes^ or ufe a language more fpiritual or ideal. I fay, it is not impoJJiUc'i that this fhould be the cafe i and therefore no one can (iiy, with reafon^ that it is not: efpecially, fince we find by experience, that the foul is limited j that the limitations are variable j that we know not enough of the nature of fpiritto de- termin, how thefe limitations are effc6ted : and therefore cannot tell, how far they ■may be carried on, or taken off. This fufficesto remove the force oi the objec- tion. But further,
A man, when he wakes, or romes to himfelf (which phrafe implies what I am go- ing to fiyj, immediately knows this, and knows himfelf to be the fame foul that he ^as before his ileep, or fainting away. I will fuppofe, that he is alfo confcious to himfelf, that in thofe intervals he thought not at all (which is the fame the obje6lor mull; fuppofej : that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or moulderd to duff, he could not have tho^aght lefs : for there is no thinking lefs than thinking mt at all. From hence then I gather, that the foul preferves a capacity of thinking, i^c. under thofe circumftances and indifpofitions of the body, in which it thinks m more, than if the body was deflroyd j and that therefore it may, and will preferve it, when the body is deliroyd. And if fo, what can this capacity be preferved for ? Certainly »o/, that it may w^-uiT be exerted. The Author of nature doth not ufe to act after that manner. So that here is this dilemma to be oppofed to the objec- tion . In fleep and fwoonings the foul doth either think, or not. If it does, the objec- tion has no foundation : and if ii doth not, then all that will follow, which! have jull now faid.
If we fhould fuppofe xht foul to be a being by nature made to inform fome body, and that it cannot exift and act in a ftate o£ total feparaiion from all body } it would not follow from hence, that what we calldeadi, muff therefore reduce it
to
* Truths hehnging to a Private Man, &c. i^j
to a flate of abfolute infcnftbility and inaElhity^ which to it would be equal to fiQYi'Ociflence. ^or that body^ which is fo necefTaiy to it, may be ^omtfine 've- hicle^ that dwells with it in the brain (^according to that hypothefis p. 193.) and goes off with it at death. Neither the anfwers to the obje6tion, nor the cafe after death will he much alterd by fuch ^ifuppofitton. And fmce I confefslfee no abfurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are fenfible of many material impreflions (imprefTions made upon us by material caufes, or bo- dies) : that there are fuch we arc fure. Therefore there muft he/ome matter within us, which being moved orprefled upon, the foul apprehends \i immedi- ately. And therefore, again, there muft htfome matter to which it is immediate- ly and intimately united^ and related in fuch a manner, as it is not related to any other- Let us now fuppofe this faid matter to be fome refined and fpirituous vehicle *, which the foul doth immediately inform j with which it fympathizes 5 by which it a6ls, and is a61:ed upon > and to which it is vitally and infeparably united : and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the brain.^ among the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppofe we alfo, that when any impreffions are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effe6ls of them are carried by the nervesw^ to their fountain, and the place, where the foul in its vehicle is • and there they communicate their feveral motions or tremors to this material -u^- hicle ('or by their motions, or tendency to motion, prefs upon it) > fo that the foul^ which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly poffefl of it, fhall be nppreheniive of thefe motions or preflures : and moreover, that this vehicle fo guarded and incompajjed by the body as it is, can be come at or moved by exter- nal objeds no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves > nor the foul, by confequenccj have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correfpondence with them, any other way. And as we fuppofe the foul to receive notiees of things from without in this manner, fo let us fuppofe, on the other fide, that by mo- ving its own vehicle it may produce motion in the contiguous T^^'/'m.^ and nerves^
* So Hierocles diftinguiilies ro u,'jyoii,a\c, iifjt,Zv (rZjjtjci, o li. ■^vy^'; XiTtTo-i tyj^^a.^ from that, which he calls ro ^^tatcv v.^Zv u-ay^ct, and to which the former communicates Hfe. TZ u.tjyoii^iT ijoj^v a-a- f/MTi 7rfc(n<pv (Tu^u. .^wjrov ov. Jd. This fine body he calls alfo i|^j>;^«>ior trZwa, znAmivy^uTtKav cvriujx. In Nijlim, hhaiy. there is much concerning that /«^ body, in which the foul is clothed, and from which it is never to be feparated, according to an old tradition Men. b, Ifr. gives us the fum of it in fuch words as thefe. Cbiyb H^i-in ailD rTDW^n iLObfiD n "li^D ny pn rjU W : and af- terward, yi'Sinid a^^ann a^pi qiou;:^ ay nnu;p3 njiu/Nin ariNnrnn .—ion r-nrDi^Dn t3''pin cz)^nu;,'(n an1^^D nnsn^ i^ib mn\i;3m .r-n^i-in wnb u3>:(u;irD >nbn ^d^dwh Dn-isn nn^j D>^ my anvnn 0:^1 qub o^n airp d^ ab^y ^d^ bo a^-'Dnnn "I3>jD- Saadias long before him joins to the foul pi OiTj which he fays is p 11? "irirj 7)1 "
C c and
ipS The Religion of Nature.^ Se^H:. IX.
andfo move the body : I menn, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved. Let us fuppofe further, that the foul by means of this %'ehicle feels or finds thofe prints and portraits, or thofe effe5is and remains left by objects on the mind in fome manner or other, which caufe the remembrance of words and things : I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obfcured by any thing j or,v^^hen there are any fuch to be felt. And laftly, let us fuppofe, that if the foul in its more ahfra^led^nd purer reafonings, or more fpiritual afts, has any occafion for matter to ferve it, the matter of this "jshicle is that which is always with it, and ferves it. All which it is eafy to underfland, and perhaps not very difficult to fup- pofe. On the contrary, by many fymptoms it appears moft probable, that that matter, to which the mind is />i;^^<r/Ai/^/>'prefent, and in which is its iymq fljekinah^ is not the whole grofs body, but Come fult He body, placed fas I have faid) in the region of the brain. For there all the conveyances of fenfible fpecies confpire to meet, and there in reflexion we find our felves : when a limb is loft, the foul, 'tis true, lofes an opportunity of receiving intelligence from or by it, andofufing it, but perceives nolofs m itfelf: and thothe^^^j', many parts ofitatleaft, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the fubftance, which thinks wilhin me now (ox rather, which is Ij, is, notwithftanding all the changes my body has undergone, the very fame which thought above fifty years ago, and ever fince j when I playd in fuch a field, went to fuch a fchool, was of fuch a univerfity, performed fuch and fuch exercifes, ^c \ If you would permit me to ufe a fchool term, I would fay the egoity ^ remains. Now to anfwer the objefti- on, and apply all this to our purpofe. Why do we not perceive external objects in our Jlcep, or afwoon? Becaufe the pajages are become impra6licable, the win- dows fhut, and the nerves, being obftruded, or fome how renderd for the time ufelefs, can tranfmit no information to it. Why however does it not reafonand think ^houtfomething or other ? Becaufe, all the marks by which things are remem- berd being for the prefent choked up or diforderd, the remembrance of thofe c^- je5ls,^hout which it is wont to imploy itfelf, and even of the words (or other figns), in which it ufes to reafon, and to preferve the deductions and conclufions it makes, is all fufpended and loft for the time j and fo its tables being coverd, its books clofed, and Its tools locked up, the requifites for reafoning are wanting, and no fubjed of- fers itfelf, to exercife its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to
* Cum corpora quetidie vofira fluant, ^ aut crefcant aut decrefcant, ergo tot er'mm homines, quot euottdie commutamur ? aut alius fui, cum decern amorum effem ; alius, cum triginta j alins cum quinqua- gmtn, alius, cum jam tot a cano capite fum ? S. Hier. So it mult be, if our fouls are nothingdifferent from cnr bodies. ^ Tully has LentttUtm and applet as -, in the fame form, tho not juft the like fenfe.
3 take
Truths helonging to a Private Man, €fc. 199
take in higher objects and more refined matter for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any onefhould imagin, that the/()«/ may think, perceiye, a6t after death^ when it doth not do this injleep^ &c. the anfwer is j becaufe thofe indofiires and impediments^ which occafiond the formentiond intermiiTions, and thofc great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be removed with its inlargement out of the body. When it fliall in its proper vehicle be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the immediate imprel- fions of objeds : and why fhould not thofe impreffions, which affeded the ne? ves that moved and affeded the vehicle arid foul in itjaffe^ the vehicle immediaiely,when. they are immediately made upon it, without the interpofition of the nerves ? The hand, which feels an obje6t at the end of a/^/", may certainly be allowd to feel the fame much better by immediate contact, without the ftafF. Nay, why fhould wc not think, that it may admit oimore objeds and the knowledge of more things,than it can now > fince being expofed all round to the influences of them,it may be moved not only by vifible objedbsjuft at the extremities of the optic nerves, by founds at the ends of the auditory, Sec. but become as it were all eye to vifible objects, all ear to audible, and fo on ? And why fhould we not think this the rather, becaufe then the foul may be alfo perceptive of finer impreflions and ethereal commas, and con- fequently of more kinds of objects, fuch as we are now incapable of knowing ? And then, this being fo, why fhould we not prefage, that other indowments, as faculties of reafoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be proportionable to fuch noble opportunities of knowledge ? There feems to be nothing in this account impoffible ; and therefore nothing, but what may be.
If we do but attend, we mufl fee every where, that many things are by ways, which we do not, nor <r^» underfland > and therefore we mull be convinced, even from hence, th^t more mzy be j and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could notfal\^ethe^(^^^///>jinit, and what isfuppofed here ihould be all rejected 2i5 chimerical, yet ought to be no prejudice againfl the belief of the immortality of the foul, ii there is any (but one) goodreafon for it.
But if we can in any tolerable manner (which in our prefent circumflances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difKculties objected, and thofe the^r^^j- /?/ belonging to this matter, andfhew how it is/'^j^^/^ that they may confift with immortaUty, this will greatly corroborate the arguments for it, if not be one it- felf. This I hope is done : or if I have not fpoke directly to every part of the ob- jection, from what has been done that defect may eafily be fuppiied.
4. We may conclude the fouls of men to be immortal from the nature of God. For if he is (which fure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as fuch, can do no-
C c 2 t\\\ng
200 The Religion of Nature. Se61;. IX.
thing inconfiftent with perfect or right reafon. And then no beings nor circum' fiance of any being, can come from Him as its caufe, which it is not agreeable to fuch reafon ihould be : or fwhich is the fame^, He cannot but deal reafonably with all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of thefe, and the mortality of the human foul docs not confill with reafon, we may be fureit is immortal : as fure as wc can be of any thing by the ufe of our faculties j and that is, as fure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth confiji with reafon, or»o/, is to be inquired.
To produce a being into a (late of clear happinefs^ in any degi-ee, can be no in- iury to it J or into a Itateof ;;^/x/ happinefs^ provided thehappinefs certainly over- balances the contrary, and the unhappy or fufferingpartbe not greater than what that being would choofs in order to obtain the happinefs, or rather than lofe it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being fubje^ to more mifery than happinefs, if that being hath it in bis oim power to avoid the mifery-, orfo much of it, as may leave the remainder of mifery not greater, than what he would rather fuftain than mifs the proportion of happinefs. The only cafe then, by which wrong can be done in the produ6lion of any being, is, when it is neceffarily and irremediably to be miferable^ without any recompenfe, or ba- lance of that mifery => : and this indeed is a cafe fo grievous, fo utterly irrecon- cilable to all reafon^ that the heart of a rcafoning and confidering mancanfcarce bear the thought of it. So much every one mull: underlland of the nature of reafon and jultice as to allow thefe things for truths inconteflable.
Now then he, who fays the/o^^/of man is mortal^ muft lay one of thefe two things : either that God is an unreafonable, unjuft, cruel Being > or that no man in refped of this life (which according to him is all)^ has a greater fhare of mifery, una'voidable^ than of happinefs. To fay the former is to contradid that, which I prefume has been proved beyond contradidtion. To which I may add here, that this is to avow fuch an unworthy, impious notion of the Supreme beings as one would not entertain without caution even of the worft of men > fuch a one, as even the perfon himfelf, who fays this, muft know to hefalfe. For he cannot but fee, and mufl own many inftances of the reafonablenefs and beneficence of the Deity : not one of which could be, if cruelty and unrcafonablenefs were His inclination ; fmce He has power to ex- ecute His own inclinations thoroughly^ and is a Being uniform in his nature. Then to fay the latter is to contradid the whole ftory of mankind, and even ones ownfenfes.
a That pafTige in S. Jqqar. imports much the fame thing, that has been faid here : ^^1■^
'^•"ii -im:»n tviin y~\T\ am nho''\i; ^i&^i nDun j^^in men D!5< y~ini nijcn (Dn^iyo iniii^iZDu; 1 Conii-
Truths belonging to a Private Man, £^c. 20 1
Confider well the dreadful effe6l:s of many wars^ and all thofe barbarous defoh- tions, which we read of : what cruel tyrants there are, and have been in the world, who fat lead: in their fits) divert themfehes with the pangs and convulfi- ons of their fellow- creatures "" : what Jlavery is b, and how men have been brought into that lamentable ftate : how many have been ruind by accidents unforefeen : how many have fufferd or been undone by unjujl laws, judges, witnefles i^c •=. how many have brought incurable difeafes^ or the caufes of them, and of f^rcac torments, into the world with them : how many more, fuch bodily infirmities and difad vantages, as have renderd their whole lives uneafy : how many arc born to no other inheritance but invincible poverty and trouble ? Inftances are endlefs; but, for a little iafle of the condition of mankind here, refled upon that llory related by Strabo (from Polybius) and Plutarch^ where, even by or- der of the Roman fenate, P. <!^myliiis^ one of the beft of them too, at one prefixt hour facked and deftroyd y^'z;^«/); cities, unawares, and drove fifteen my- riads of innocent perfons into captivity j to be fold, only to raifc pay for the mercilefs foldicrs and their own executioners. Perule that account of the gold- works in the confines o^ Egypt given by Diodorus: and think over thecircum- llances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even fuch as calumny^ or unjuji power had doomd ('perhaps for being too good) to that place of torment 5 many times with all their relations
a C.CAfar Senator es ^ Equites — cecidit, torfit, non qu^ftionis, fed mimi causa. Be'nde quof-
dam ex Hits ad lucernam decollabat. Torferat per omnia, quA in rerum natura trifiijjima, fmty
fidiculisy^c.Sen. Homo, facra res, jam per luCum i^ jocum orciditur. Id. ^ Slaves were rec-
kond among hearts of old. OwVs y^ y^v,, 7ri(pvKx<i, cvr' ci uv^gxa-i <ruy' h. Eurip. And fometimes as mere inflruments and tools, "o r ^^Ae? 'iy.-i^v/,oy c^yxvor 70 a"' c^yxvev a-\vy^oc, J-sAo?. Arift. Their fad condition I will fet down in Vlato'z words. Qvy. k^^c^ rSro y hi to -4-uB-^y.u, rl u^.y.u^ i,»,)c
UV^^XTTch nice, i> xpJr'ie.^TsWv^.t £>*► « 0V iV.5 k^i^i(X.im ^ ^^;crT:^XK4y.ivc<;^ f^iy, 1^^ i^iv UvtU ic'jru, ,8cn^uy, f,.^^. 'Jc?^^ « ^, k^o^txi. c Thofe x^p^.To, ^ 'U^^,, ^vr^xlxi, which the r,A<?,«, had
brought upon the cities of ^y7^, are too many to be tranfcribed : but fome account of them is to be feen in Plut. v. Luc. which may ferve for one inllance out of thoufands. It may be reckond madnefs 'MAttA,maximasvirtutes,quajlgraviJJima delscia, punire ^ as Fii/. M. fays, fpeaking of P^onow's cafe: but fuch madnefs has been very common, and men have fuffcred even for their virtue. Ot^/o cruelly put to death,^ Ochamfororem—, o> patruum cum centum amplnis filiis ac nepotibus—, nulla injuria Uceffitus, fedquodinhis maximam apud Per/as ipTohitatiso>fortitudinis laudem confifttre videbat. Id. And Senec'a. having reco-.r.mended the example oi Gr Acinus Julius {Julius Gr Acinus, ap. Tacit, the father of 7«- Ixus Agricola), adds, quern C. CAfar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior z'ir erat, qu^m e/e quewquam tyranno expediret.
and
202 r/j^ Religion o/' Nature. Se6l. IX.
and ^oor children''. Or, once for all, take a view o^ fervitude^ as it is defcribedby P'lgnorius. To pafs over the Sicilian tyrants, him of Phene^ Apollo dor us ^, and the like, of which hiilory fupplies plenty; confidcr thofe terrible profcriptions among the Romans '^■^ with the reigns of moil of their emperors^ more bloody than Lpic lion, or Hyrcanian tiger, even fome of the Chriftian emperors not excepted. Read the direful and unjuft executions reported by Amm. MarceUi- nus : among hundreds of others that of Eufebius ^. Every ivhifper in thofe times or light fufpicion brought upon men the queftion and tortures inconceivable. Men's very dreams were once interpreted to be treafon j and they durft fcarce own, that they had ever flept ^. What inhuman puniidiments were ufed a- mong the Perfians *, in an arbitrary manner too j and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concerned § ? But inftead of enume- rating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, <^x-«'' 4"<^/*»«, i^c. I choofe to refer you to thofe authors, who have defignedly treated oi: the torments and quejlions of the ancients. Look into the hiftory of the C-6r//?/- an Churchy and her martyrologies : examin the prifons of the inquifition^ the groans of which thofe walls are confcious, and upon whztfJght occafions men are racked and tortured by the tormentors there : and, to finifh this detail (hide- ous indeed, but too true) as faft as I can, confider the many maflacres, perfecu- tions, and miferies confequent upon them, which falfe religion has caufed, au- thorized, fan£lified. Indeed the hiflory of mankind is little elfe but the hiilo- ry of uncomfortable, dreadful pallagcs : and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is fcarcely to be red by zgood natured man without amazement, horror, tears. One can fcarce look into ^ news-paper^ or out at his ivindow^ but hardfliips and fufferings prefent themfelves, in one fhape or other. Now among all thofe millions^ who have fufferd eminently^ can it be imagind, that there have not been multitudes^ whofe griefs andpaiags have far outweighd all their •injoyments 5 and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their
fjttiTec ff«o->j? a-vyfiviicti. , *> Mcntiond by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of Cajprndria, and is reprelented (out of Polyaaus) as <pevi«»rc4|®- ^ ciii/jotu.t(^ ttxvtuv, cg-oi ttx^' ' E^z^-iifrtv » ttx^u'&x^^u,- poi? iTV^tiw^tfav . Yet ^lianfzys, 'Lie's oivahnc.vciCpM'yoffjiv^ <^ hTuhi^rlofjijiv^^, tytnTo ^oyiKar£fo<;,x,^. c It is faid of SylU's peace, after Marius's party were broken, Fax cum hello de crudelitate certavit, ^ I'icit. S. Auft. " ^Ht Ha evifceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deejfer.t, tmplorans cdojuftitiam,
iorvum remdens fundato peclore man/it immabilis. Sec. In the reign of Conftanttus. * MArebant-
c^m doEl'i quidam, quod apud Atlanteos natinon effent, ubi metmrantur /omnia non videri. ^ V.Flm. tn V. Artox. £ Ob noxam unim omriis propinquitas perit. Amm. Marc.
prudence.
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 203
prudence, or any power in them, toefcape that bitter draughty which they have drunk ? And then, how can we acquit the ju,^ ice and reafonabknefs of that Being, upon whom thefe poor creatures depend, and who leaves them llich great lofers by their exiftence, if there be no future Jiau^ where the proper amends maybe made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable ifTuej i£tht foulo£ man is not immortal^ either there is no God, upon whom we depend j or He is an unreafonable Being ; or there never has been any man, whofe fufFeringsin this world have exceeded his injoyments, without his being the caufe of it himfelf. But furcly no one of thefe three things can be laid. Eygo — .
That, which aggravates the hard cafe of the poor fufferersmentiond above, if there be no future ft ate, m\7\\\c\iX.]\tiv Y^.i\ fuiferings may be brought into the ac- count, and recompenfed, is, that many times their perfecutors and tormentors pafs their Hves in plenty and grandeur : that is, the innocent have not only the portionj that properly belongs to the criminal and unreafonable part of mankind but the guilty have that, which belongs rather to tlie innocent ^ Such a tranfpo- fttion of rewards and punifhments, ending in itfelf, without any refpedto fome- thing which is to follow hereafter, can never confift with the nature of a Go- vernor, who is not very mxxchbelow rational : a thought, which God forbid ^.ny one fhould dare to admit of Him, To fuppofe the ^virtuous and ivije left ultimate- ly but in the fame ftate with the unjuft and profligate is to fuppofe fuch a confti- tution of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reafon, a God of truth ^nd equity : and therefore fuch a conftitution, as leaves the former in a we?r/9conT dition than the other, can much lefs be fuppofed.
Obj. It hath been faid, that virtue tends to make men's lives happy even here, ^c, and how then can the virtuous be fuppofed ever to be lb very miferable ? Anf. In or- dinary cafes virtue doth produce happinefs : at leaft it has indeed a natural tendency to it i is the mean,by which it is moil likely to be attaind ; and is therefore the way, which a wife man would choofe for his own fake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are wo perturbations in human affairs j no cafes, in which the ufual cfFed of virtue may be overpower d by difeafes, violence, dyfiilers. It doth not ren- der men invulnerable 5 cannot command ihQ feafons j nor prevent many great cala- mities, under which virtue and vice muil Ml undiflinguifid. fThere may be a direB road to a place, and fuch a one, as he, who fets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is poflible he may meet with robbers or accidents in it, that may incom- mode, or hurt him in his journey .) On the other fide, vice and wickednefs may be io
» Dies deficiet, fi velifn numerare, qnibus bonis mde evenertt : nee mjnus, fi commemorem, qtiiku improiis optime. Cic. This isjuftlyfaidj tho I account hisinftances not the moft appoiTte.
cir-
204. The Religion of Nature. Se6l. IX.
circumftantiated as to be attended with mwchgxfxitr pkafure tXwnpain^ contrary to the tendency of its nature : that is, a wicked man may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining themj and from the advantage of a ftrong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive /j/^^y^r^J, which fhall exceed the ipYcknt iuconvemences ^ndfufferings naturally following from his vices ^
Men's circumjiances have a natural influence with refpe6i: to the prefent pleafures or fufferings, as well as their w///^ or vice. No body fure ever faid, that ^// de- pends c»/}' upon thefe : nor, when the natural tendence of //^^ ;?/ is aflerted, is the natural tendence or effe6b of the other denied. Therefore indeed, when it is faid that virtue naturally tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in proportion to their circuni fiances j and vice does the contrary. It is naturally productive of that part of happinefs, which is in our own power ^ and depends upon our [elves j makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumllances are, than they could be without it.^ and commonly tends to mend their worldly circumflances too : but it is not aflcned, that vir- tue can ^/w^^j intirely corre6l them, or make men fo completely happy in this life, as that their injoyments fhall exceed their mortifications j no more than the vices of fome particular men, tho they bereave them of many folid pleafures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from be- ing greater than their prefent fufferings. Not only our being.^ but our place^ with the time^ and manner of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the fcheme the manner o^ behaving our/elves in our ftation (according to our in- dowments, and the talents we havej only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has fo orderd things on purpofe, thatfromthe i.'mo«J compofitions of men's circumflances with the natural efFefls of their virtues and vi- ces, and the many inequalities arifing thence, they might fee the necejjity andr^r- tainty of another flate ; and that for this reafon there fhould always be fom.e re- markable inflances of opprejl innocence znd Jl our i/ljing wickednefs.
The uplliot is, that upon comparing thofe pleafures^ which, are the natural ef- fe61:s of virtue with thofe fufferings, which are the natural effefts of ill conflitu- aion or other calamity, thefe are many, very many times found to exceed : and c con- trario, upon balancing thofe evils, which are the genuin efrc6ls of vice, againfl the
• Yet according to Ariftotle he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion Diog. L. represents
thus : T^-*^ kfiTAV (Mi iivxi eivraifx-yj %^oq suJectjx/oviwv' TT^oaii^^ 'f^ T' 7i 'zfe^ (jrZfj.ci <c' ^ ixroi a.yci.
ad'
Truths belonging to a Private Man, ^c. 205
advantages refulting from a fortunate eftate, thefe may often be found to outdo the other. Both contrary to reafon^ if all ends with this Hfe, and after death be nothing. F or my part, if there were only fome few^ nay but one inftance of each kind in the world ^unfortunate virtue, and profperous wickednefs), it would be to me a fuffici- ent argument for a future ft ate : becaufe God cannot be unjuft or unreafonable in any one inftance. It muft not be forgot here, that many times men o? great vices have alfo great virtues, and the natural effe6t of thefe may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumftances may help to turn thefcale.
If there is no other befide the prefent being, the _^^;7fr^/ and /^y^^^/ftate of man- kind is fcarce confiftent with the idea of a reafonabk Caufe. Let us confider it a Ht. tie *. Not to mention what we muft fuffer from the very fettkment and condition of this world by hunger, thirft, heat, cold, and indifpolitions 5 like /^^'z;^; one gene- ration drops, and another fprings up, to fall again, and be forgotten ■». As we come into the world with the labor of our mothers, we foon go out of it with our own. Childhood and youth are much of them loft in infenfibility or trifling, vanity and rudenefs j obnoxious to many pains and accidents j and, when they are fpent in thebeft manner, are attended with labor and difcipUne. When we reach that ftage of life, which ufually takes us from our neareft relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper imployments and ftations found for us ? When we -x^tgot out, and left to fcramble for ourfelves, how many hardJJjips and tricks are put upon us, before we get the fagacity and dexterity to fave ourfelves ? How many chances do we ftand ? How troublefome is hufinefs made by unreafonablenefs, ill nature, or trifling and want of pun6tuality in the per- fons with whom we deal ? How do we find ourfelves inftantly furroundedwith fnares from defigning men, knaves, enemies fof which thebeft men have fomej, oppofite interefts, fa6tions, and many times from a mifchievous breed, whole chil- di(h or diabolical humor feeks pleafure in the unealincfs of other people? Even in many of thofe injoyments, which men principally propofe to themfelves, they arc greatly difappointed, and experience ftiews, how unlike they are to the an- tecedent images of them. They are commonly mixf^ : the apparatus to moft of them is too operofe : the completion of them feldom depends upon ourfelves
» Et valet annates noftrorum audiri laborum. For, as Seneci fays, Nidii contigit impune nafci,
^"Oojxep <pu?^uv ymK, reiy.h (? u^^cZv. y fBfi <pusi, K J" ^Ar/£<. Hom. This is true not only ot
lingle men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may fay the fame concern- ing many of them, that Floras fays of Veii : Laborat anndlum fides, ut Veios fuijje credamm- <= Labor vcluptafq; dijjimdlma natHrA, ficiefgte quadam inter fe natitrali funtjm^a. Liv.
D d alone^
2o6 The Religion of Nature. Se<5t. IX,
(ikne^ but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit all right".- they arc. crenerally not only lefs in pradice, than in theory, but die almoil as foon as they are : and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To go on with the hillory of human life : tho aftairs go profjTeroully, yet ftill per- haps -J. family is increafing, and with it new occafions of folicifude are introdu- ced, accompanied with many fears and tender apprebenfions. At length, if a man, throuc^h many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at old age^ then he feels moll commonly his frefjures rather increafed, than diminifhd, and himfelf lefs able to fupport them ^ The bufinefs he has to do grows urgent upon him, and calls iovdifpatcb: moft of his faculties and adive powers begin now to fail him apace : relations and friends, who might be helpful to him fand amono- them perhaps the dear Confort of all his joys, and all his cares <>) leave him never to return more : wants and pains all the while are multiplying upon him : and under this additional load he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bendin^ toward the earth -, till he either Humbles upon fomething which throws him into the grave \ or £iinting falls of himfelf. And mull he end here ? Is this xht period of his being? Is this all? Did he come into the world only to make his w^;/ through the prefs, amidft many julllings and hard llruggles, with at bed only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleafures interfperfed, andfo^oo^^ of it again? Can thisbeanendworthy afirllCaufe/)^r/f^/)' reafonahle? Would Gvcn any man, of common fenfe and good nature, fend another upon a difficult journey, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with ahttlcfmooth way, get an interval for reft and contemplation, or be flatterd with fome ver- dures and the fmiles of a few daifics on the banks of the road > yet upon the whole he muft travel through much dirt, take many wearifom ftcps, be conti- nually inquiring after fome clew ordire6lions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent viaticum and pay his reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being loft in deep waters, aiid befide forced all the while to fence againft weather, accidents, and ci-uel robbers, who ai-c every where lying in wait for him : I fay, would any one fend a man upon fueh a journey ^s this, only that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts perifh > that is, either for no end ^X. all, or for xhc puniflmteyJ of one, whom Ifuppofe never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable
3 SenfiWe of this, Socrates ufed to fay, <^«rv txc, ii^ov)x.<„ ^^i ttx^ M»><yv, k)isu.7eccf i/^Sr ^n(u^. Stob. b Smex, o- levipnii quocii cur is mpar: as Seneca, of himfelf, in Tac. f ^egtis affuieiidtis
umatA Conjugis, O'C. Juv* * S/A/i^a ■m^xi'd <rui/,«,T' km^u fozi Soph,
4 ^^
Truths helonging to a Private Man, &"€. 207
of hurting him ? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common fize of men ^ ?
I am apt to think, that even among thofe, whofe flate is beheld with envy, there are m^ny^ who, if at the end of their courfc they were put to their option^ whe- ther, without any refpe6t to a future ftate^ they would repeat all the pleafures they have had in life, upon condition to go over again alfo all the fame difappoint- rnenrs, the flime vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the fame fe- cret pangs and tedious hours, the fame laboi s of body and mind, the fame pains and fickncfles, would he far from accepting them at that price ^.
But here the cafe, as I have put it, only refpects them, who may be reckond among the more fortunate paflengers : and for one^ that makes his voyage fo well, thoufands are toft intempefts, and loft '^. How many never attain any comforta- ble^ettlcment in the world ? How many fail, after they have attaind it, by various misfortunes ? What melancholy, what diftradions are caufed in families by inhu- mane or vitious husbands, falfe or peevifh wives, refra6tory or unhappy chil- drenj and, if they are otherwife, if they arc good,what forrow by the lofs of them ? How many are forced by necellity upon drudging and very Ihocking imploy- ments for a poor livelihood ? How many fubfift upon begging, borrowing, and o- ther fliifts, nor can do otherwife ? How many meet with fad accidents, or fall into deplorable difeafes ? Are not all companies, and the very ftreets filled with com- plaints, and grievances, and doleful ftories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may afcribe their deaths to want and dejection. Serioufly, the/r^?- fent jlate of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not fome connexion with ano^ tber^ and be not as it were the porch or entry to it ^.
There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully perufes the ftory and face of the world, what appears to prevail in it ? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at leaft ? Are not debauching ^, getting per fas aut nefas^ defaming one another, ere6bing tyrannies of one kind or other,
B-y/^icic, kX. ToiSrS^ o /2i(^. Baf. ^ Non mehercule qiafquam accepijjet [zitam], ni/t da-
retur infciis. Sen. « TanUfper te cretie fuhduci in 7nontis ardiii verticem celjiorem j fpecu-
lare inde rerum infrdte jacentium fftcies ; Cr- oculis in dlverfa porreclis, flucfuantis mundi [urhmes in- tuere. Jamfeculi ^ ipfe mtferzberis, ^rc. Cypr. <^ ""JSn "ininsb mon ,*— fTH tzb^y^\
t^nn abiyn. ^.Abeth. « O fi pojjis in ilia fublimi fpectik, conjlitutus oculoi tnos infe-
rercfecretis, re cinder e ctibicHlorttm obductas fores, (y ad confcienti^m luminum psnetrnlia occulta re- ferare, (^c. Cypr.
Dd 2 pro-
2o8; The Religion of Nature. Se<a. IX.
propagating empty and fenfelefs opinions with bawling and fuiy the great bufi- Titkoi this world? And are notallthefe contrary to reafon? Can any one then with reafon imagine, that reafon lliould be given, tho it vvere but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then extinguifljd? May we not rather conclude, that there muft htfome worlds where reafon will have its turn, and prevail and triumph ? Some kingdom of reafon to come ^ ?
f . In the laft place, thxt great expectation, which men have, of continuing to live in another ftate, beyond the grave, has I fuppofe been commonly admitted as one proof, that they pall live-, and does feem indeed to me to add fome weight to what has been faid. That they generally have had fuch an rA;j5^(??^//o;?, canfcarcc be denied. The hillories of mankind, their deifications, rites, ftories of appari- tions, the frequent mention 0^2. hades, with rewards and punilhments hereafter, ^c. all teftify, that even the Heathen world believed, xh-Mi\\tfouls ofmenfarvi' ^^^ their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the feats and circumftances of the de- parted has begot many errors TLndfuperJIitions j and thefe have been multiplied by licentious /^^/ J and idle vifonairs : but this, being no more than what is ufual in the like cafes, ought to be no prejudice againft the fundamental opinion itfelf.
Cicero ^, tho he owns there were different opinions among the Greek philo-- fophers about this matter j that, q^uod Uteris extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum effe fempiternos > that Pythagoras and his fchool confirmed this opinion j that Plato was the man, who brought a reafon for it, ^c. yet tells us' plainly, naturam ipfam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare-, that nefcio quomodo inharet in mentihus quafi f^eculorum quoddam augurium; that permanere animos arbitramur confenju nationum omnium 5 and more to this purpofe. Now if this confent was only the effect of fome tradition, handed from parents to their children > yet fince we meet with it in all the quarters of the world (where there is any civility or fenfe), and in all ages, it feems to be coeval to mankind itfelf,, and born with it. And this is fufiicient to give a great authority to this opinion of the foul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is fupported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reafonings and fymptoms which we may find within ourfelves. All which, put together, may at lead /V^y?//)' an cxpe6tation of a future ftate : that is, render it a juft or reafonable expedation :. and then this reafonable expeUation grows, by being fuch, into a further ar- gument, that there isjill be fuch a ftate.
* Befide, there being no latiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunitic5> when our faculties fliall be exalted, ^c. T«? lt.Xn^uai.<, <k ^Ui ^ on<^ »<^s(\ cW«v5-«« ^^ if&ivruj,.
Fancy;
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 209
Fancy a man walking in fome retired field^ far from noife, and free from pre- judice, to debate this matter with himfelf : and then judge, whether fuch me- ditations as thefe would not be juft. " I think I maybe fure, that neither Ufekfs '* matter^ nor the vegetative trik^ that flone, that flower, that tree have any " reflex thoughts : nor do the fenjitive animals, that fheep, that ox, feem to have *' any fuch thing, or but in the loweft degree, and in refpe£t of prefent obje6i:s *' only. They do not reafon, nor difcour/e. I may therefore certainly pretend to " be fomething ?;^^^<r^ ^^01;^ all thefe things ^ I not only apprehend and confl- " der thefe external obje^s afting at prelent upon my nerves, but have ideas " railed within my felf of a higher order, and many : I can, not only reprefenc «' to my felf things, that are, or have been, but deduce many other from them, " make excurlions into futurity, and forefee much of what will be, or at leaft " may bcj by fl;ri6t thinking I had almofl: fiid, get into another luorld before- " hand : and, whether I fliall live in fome other Hate after death, or not, I am " certainly a being capable of fuch an expectation, and cannot but be folicitous a- " bout it : none of which things can be faid of thefe clods, or tho^e brutes ^. Can " I then be defignd for nothing further, than juil: to eat, drink, fleep, walk about, " and ad upon this earth*-' j that is, to have no further being, than what thefe " bmtes have, fo farbeneath me ? Can I be made capable of fuch great expeUati- " ons, which thofe animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I " am, if we muft die alike), only to be dif appointed at lafi ? Thus placed, jufl: upon " the confines of another better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, " and injoying it, only tom-xke^Jhort appearance heve\ and then to hefiutout " and totally Junk ? Muft I then, when I bid my laft farewell to thefe walks, when " I clofe thefe lids, and yonder blue regions and all this fcene darken upon me and " go out, muft I then only ferve to furnifh duft to be mingled with the aflies of '' thefe herds ^nd plants, or with this dirt under my feet ? Have I been ^etfo far ^- " bove them in life, only to be leveld with them at death ?
This argument grows Jlronger in the apprehenfion of one, who is confcious of a= bilities and intellectual improvements, which he has had no opportunity here of ihewing andufing, through want of health, want of confidence % wantofpro^
» Metlunks thofe philofophers make but an odd appearance in fl-ory, who, looking big and faftu« ©usv at the fame time profefled, that their own fouls were not fuperior to thofe of gnats 0'c. o*
J9 (T-Soi 'i^vyjii -rluJ" a-(paiv xvrZv ^^Xoiro(puTUTedv -^v^nv, as Eufe6. ^ Alexander after
death might be in the fame flate with his muktler (M. Anton.), but fure not with his mule. '■ Brevis eft hie fruclm komullis, may be juflly faid for all Lucretius, ^ 'O x-ia-y^O- <rK>)ni,
per.
21 o The Religion of Nature. Sedl.IX.
per place, want ot liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge confequent upon them, cannot ultimately refpecl tbisftate : they can be only an inlargement, and preparation for another. That is all they can be : and if they are not that, they 2xcnotbing. And therefore he may be fuppofcd thug, further, to argue within himfclf. " Can the Author of my reafoning faculties be Himfelf fo unreafonahk " as to give me them, cither not to imploy them, or only to weary my fclf with " ufelefs purfuits, and then drop me ? Can He, who is privy to all my circum- " fiances^ and to thefe very thoughts of mine, be fo infenfible of my cafe, as to ^' have no regard to it, and not provide for it ?
It grows Jhonger Jim upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little caufe he has given for it, the pains and fecret uncafinefs he has felt upon that fcore, together with many other fufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a filent, humble appeal to that Being, who is his lajl and true refuge^ and who he muft believe will not defert him thus.
h'xilly J it is Jlrongeft of a II to one ^ who, befidesall this, endeavours in the con- dud of his life to obfervc the laws of reafon ('that is, of his nature > and that is, of the Author of nature^ upon whom he depcndsj j laments, and labors againft his own infirmities-, implores the Divine ;;z^r(r;' j prays for fome ^^//rr /,^/^ hereafter j ads and lives in the hopes of one j and denies himfelf many things upon that view : one, who by the exaltation of his reafon ^nd upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effed of real and ufeful philcfophy, the pradice of virtue, is ftill approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already tafbe fomething fpiritual and above this world. To fuch a one there mufl be a flrong expeda- ' tion indeed^ and the argument built upon it muft be proportionable. For can he be indowd with fuch capacities, and have as it were overtures of immortality made him, if after all there is no fuch thing ? Muft his private ads and conceald cxercifes of religion be ail loft =» ? Can a perfcd Being have fo little regard to one, who however inferior and nothing to Him, yet regards Him according to his befi abilities in the government of himfelf ?
Are fuch meditations and reflexions as thefe well founded, or not ? If they are, it muft be reafonablc to think, that God will flitisfy a reafonable espeBation.
There are ether arguments for the immortality of the foul, /wo of which I will leave with you, to be at your leifure ponderd well. The one is, that, iithe fouls of men are W6;r/^/ (cxtinguiflid at death), the cafe of ^r«/^j is by much preferable to that of 7nen. The pkafures of brutes, tho but fcnfual, are more finceie, being
* Hie fietAtii hones !
palled
Truths helonging to a Private Man, ^c. 2 r i
palled or diminiflid by no diverting confideration : they go •ixiholly into them ^ and when they have them not, they Teem lefs to want them, not thinking of them Their /«/m»^; arc attended with no reflexion % hutarefuch as they are f-iidto be p. 34. obf. 8. They arc void oUares; are under no apprehenfion for famihes and pofterityj never fatigue themfelves with vain inquiries, hunting after /^«ow- ledge which muft perifh with them j are not anxious about ihcir future /lately nor can be difappointed of any hopes or cxpedations j and at laft fome fudden blow (or a few minutes oi un fore fee n pain) linillies them, having never /o much as kno-Mt that they were mortal.
The other \s^ th^it the ^ou\ is :i principle of life : that, which brings vitality to the body. Forhowfhould that, which has been proved to be a fubftancc and at the fame time is alfo a principle of life, and as fuch (as being what it is) is alive; Ifiy, how can that die <^, unlefs it is annihilated ?
Here I begin to be very fenfible how much I want a guide. But as the religion Denature is my theme, I muft at prefent content my felf with that light which nature affords 3 my bufmefs being, as it feems, only to Ihew, what a Heathen philofophcrj without any other help, and almoll ^'^^o^V^^'ctc^'^ niay be fuppofed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elfe containd in this Delineation^ can be the leaft prejudice to any other true religion. Whatever is immediately revealdfrom God, mull, as well as any thing elfe, be treated as be- ing 'what It is : which cannot be, if it is not treated with the higheft regard, beUeved and obeyd. That therefore, which has been fo much infilled on by me, and is as it were the burden of my fong, is fo far from undermining txnereveal'd religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this oppor- tunity to remark to you once for all. Andfo returning to my philofopher, I can- not imagin but that even he would have at lead fome fuch general thoughts as thefe, which make up almofl the remainder of this laft fedion.
• TerA pericula, qu^ zUent, fugiunt : cum effugere, fecura funt. Sec. Sen b j^^^
'iDi an^i^ miDb qdidu; anyu;^ anrnn ^-^ym^ s. iq^^ar. c sic mihi perf»ajl, fie
fentw, cum femper agttetur animus, nee principium motm habeat, quia fe ipfe movenn m
finem qnidem habiturum ejfe motus, qui:t nmquam fe ipfe fit reltSHTiis. Cic. That in Greg. ThLm is like this thought of r«//y: *H -^v-^^, kvrcy.i^nrc, i^x, i^iyror, §" i..«, ^^ocXu'tth- ukO^^^u'^ rZ kv Ta,.,v,r^ t'-o kd K^^nrc, Uvx^- rl ^ kii x.y.riv .ir«.f :', ,V/, xA. But that 'n S . Auftin comcs fomething
nearer to my meaning ; Ifi mtmns vita, qiudamy unde omne quod animatum ejl vivit. Ncn ergo
fotejl animus mori. mm fi car ere poterit vita, non ssixxmsfed animatum aliquid efi.
IX. Tbt
2 1 2 The Religion of Nature. Sed:. IX,
IX. the foul^ when it parts from this grofs body^ luill pafs by fome law into fom€ new feat ^ or fiat e^ agreeable to the ?jature of it\ Every fpecies of beings miifl: belong to fome region, or ftate. Bccaufe nothing can be, but it muft be fome where^ and fome how : and there being different kinds of abodes and man- ners of fubfiiting in the univerfe, and the natures of the things, that are to exift in them, being alfo different, there will be a greater congruity between thefe feveral natures refpe6lively and fome particular places^ ovfiates^ than there is between them and otliers ; and indeed fuch a one, that out of thofe per- haps they cannot fubfift, or not naturally. To thofe therefore muftbe their re- fpe(51:ive tendences : to thofe they are adjudged by the courfe of nature, and con- ftitution of things, or rather by the Author of them ^
While the foul is in the body, it has fome powers and opportunities of moving it fpontaneoufly, or otherwife than it would be moved by the meer laws of gi-a- vitation and mechanifm. This is evident. But yet, notwithftanding this, the weight of that body., to which atprefent it is limited (^among other caufes) con- ftrains it to ad for a while upon this flage. That general law, to which bodies are fubjeded, miikes it fmk in this fluid of air, fo much lighter than itfelf j keeps it down j and fo determines the feat of it, and of the foul in it, to be upon the furfice of this earthy where, or in whofe neighbourhood it was firft produced. But then, when the foul fhall be difengaged from the grofs matter, which now inclofes and incumbers it, and either become naked fpir it, or be on- ly veild in its own fine and obfequious 'vehicle, it muft at the fame time be ei- ther freed from the laivs of bodies, and fill under fome other, which will carry it to (ome proper manfion, or ftate^.3 or at leaft by the old ones he capable of mounting upwards ^ in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of e- merging out of thefe regions into fome medium more fuitable, and (ifthephi- lofopher may lay fo) equilibrious. Thus much as to the general fate o^ fouh after death. But then,
, The trmfmigration of fouls has been much talked of: but ea fer2tenua,—quoniam ridicuLi, & mmo d\gn\or quam fchoU, ne refelli quidem fer 10 debet i qued qui facit, lulemr -vtreri, ne qtmtdcre- dat. So LaBmtiHs. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucim of Homer's having been a camel in Bacirta.^c. b Xwp«v ^^ «.«.'V^ ro o/*e.»^ ^|«; ^o '^f^o.ov. Hierocl. ' Ex hnmli
A^que deprejfo tn eum emicabit locum, quifquis ille eft, qui folutas -vinculis ammiis beato reci^it finu. Sen 'H '^ :-tnr-i>, srpca-^^^/.^? ^ZoM, <^ 'i r k^^rm, Uo, yrr-.^Z, r..«y, i'x^t;a-<? ^^o, r ^ ycc^.Xm ;c«. S^cci.. ro^^K h^-, ^/ ^«'«v .'<«i^. 'm^-ic, kmln, Hierod. ^ De^ofita f^nina, levior volabu nd
coelMn. S. Hier.
X. In
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 2 1 3
X. /« this new ftate, or place of nbode^ there may be different Jlatiom befitting the differences of particular fouls among themfelves^ as they are more or lefs perfedl in their kind. We fee even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, figures, impulfes, i^c. fettle into fome order among themfclves, agreeable to thefe differences. And fo by the fame univerfal rule in nature [viz, that diffe- rences in things are attended with anfwerable relations and effe6ts) fouls mull alfo take their fituation 'mfome kind of order according lo their differences.
XI. T'he great difference of human fouls^ with refpeEl to perfe&ion and mperfediion, lies in their different degrees and habits ^ of reafonablenefs or unreafon- ahlenefs ''. That is to fay, not only in men's different improvements^ or negleds and abufe of their rational faculties > but alfo in the greater or lefs influence of thefe upon their a6lions, and by confequence in their different degrees of virtue or vice. For a man is accounted a reafonable man, when he reafons rightly, and follows his reafon : in which exprefllon virtue mufl be included, being (as p- iJPj y ^l) nothing but the praSlice of reafon and truth.
That men are reafonable, or the contrary, in different degrees is plain. Some reafon well upon fome fubje£bs, but in refped of others^ to which they have not been accuftomd, are dim and confufed : or they are partial to their vices and pafHons, their old impreffions and parties > and fo their reafon is not gene- ral, nor has its due extent, or influence. Others, whofe reafon is uncultivated and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into fuperfiition and abfurdities -, mifled by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes of fpeaking, ^n^ grave non-fenfe. Many, if not the mo ft, feem to have fcarcc any notion of reafon or virtue at all., but ad fortuitouily, or as they fee other folks ad i moved either by bodily propenfions, or by example. ' Some few there are, who endeavour to improve their underftandings, to difcover what is agreeable to reafon, and to fix their opinions j and conduct their lives accord- ingly. And in all thefe feveral kinds there are various degi^es of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immerfion in vice and ignorance, and new diffe- rences arifing endlefly. All this is vifiblc.
• The Jews, who generally fay, that by the praftice of religion the foul acquires perfeaion and life eternal, lay fuch a flrefs upon ^^^»>j of piety, that R.^/^o makes the eflfed of giving looo zuzinia charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one zuz, and repeating it looo times mDnn
r^nNOya js>inn byan n^wyo nby-^^ nnr r\y-\--\rz n:ip'' lovyn inN bys ni^\i;y. b ho
lyb a^p ir.rm h'yisn h'2^2 ipmrn n^^n mbn -in^ y,'33n. //. Lev.
E e Now
214- The Religion ojT Nature. Sed.IX.
Now the foul, refleding, finds in \tk\Uivo general faculties, one^ by which it underftands, and judges, and reafons fall which I comprehend under the term r^- tional faculties^ OYreafon); Tindi another^ by which it wills, or determins to a6t, according to the judgments and conclufions made in the upper part of it. And the more perfedfiy it performs thefe operations (i.e. the more fruly it rcafons, and the more readily it wills and executes the decifions of reafonj, the more perfect certainly it muftbein its kindj and the more imperfe6tly, the more imperfect. The accomplifhments therefore and perfe6lions of human fouls, and the contra^ fj, muit be in proportion to the forementiond differences.
XII. According to thefe differences then it is reafonahle to think the fouls of men will find their fat ions in the future world ^. This is but a corollary from what goes before.
Obj. Why fiiould we think, that God caufes things to be in fuch a manner, as that in the future fate men fhall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progrefs they have made in reafon and virtue, when we fee the cafe to be widely different in this ? Anf It muft be rememberd, that this is one of thofe very rcafons on which the belief of the foul's immortality is found- ed. Now, if it be reafonable to believe there is a future ftatc, becaufe things are dealt unequally now, upon that very fcore it will be reafonable to think, that they are dealt equally ^ in that other ftate.
Here bodily wants and affedions, and fuch things as proceed from them, do inter- mix with human affairs, and do confoimd »2m^ with demerit^ knowledge with igno- rance : and hence it comes to pafs many times, that bad men injoy much, and good men fuffcr, and both are, if there is no other flate, in their wrong places. But, when the corporeal caufes of mifplacing fhall be Yemoved,Jpirits for fpirits and their frafA,xrx TrnvajdriKci) may bc fuppofcd morc regularly to take their ^^^ pofls and privileges : the impudent and vitious will have no fuch opportunities of getting into circum- (lances, of which they arc unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find fuch nhftr unions to keep them down in circumftances unworthy of them. Be fure the more advanced and pure any ftate is, the more properly will the inhabitants be rank- ed, and the jufer and more natural will the fubordination of its members be.
Even here we commonly find men in that kind of bufinefs, for which they are educated d.ndpreparedj men of the fame profeilions generally keeping together j the virtuous and reafonable defiring to be ftho they not always can be) with their like ^ j
» ToTTnq 55-^ ocr.iKsvref? tj] ei^iry. Flate. ^ With an eqiial or impartial regard to every man's
defcrts: equitably. < 'Ayet^t^f h) ^ettrec^ /fSff-tv 'AvTi'//«T6j xycc^ti. E.Plaf,
' I ~ and
Truths helonging to a Private Man, 8^^. 2 1 5
and the vitious (as they fcarccly ctmnot he) with theirs. And why iliould we not think, xh'\t 'majfociation^n^ commimkn of fouls with thofe of their own fize, difpofition, and habits maybe movQunherfal ^ndi compkat^ when chofe things, which in great meafure hinder it here, fhall be no more? If we may think this, certainly thofe fields or ftates, in which the 'virtuous and wife^ {hall meet, mull; be different from thofe in which the foolip and wicked fhall herd together ^. The very difference of the company will itfelf create a vaft difference in the manner of their living.
XIII. The manfions^ and conditions of the virtuous and reafoning part mufi be proportionably better than thofe of the fooltfh and vitious. The propofition can- not be inverted, or the cafe be otherwife, if the conftitution of things de- pends upon a reafonable caufe : as I have endeavourd to fhew it does.
Cor. Hence it follows, that the practice of reafon (in its juft extent) is the great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happinefs throuzh all our fubfequent duration. But moreover,
XIV. In the future fl ate refpeSl will be had not only to men's reafoning, and virtues, or the contrary, but aJfo to their injoyments and fufferings here "". Becaufe the forementiond inequalities of this world can by no means be redreft, unlefs men's injoyments and fufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I fay, taken together : becaufe no reafon can be aflignd, why a vitious man fhould be recompenfed for the pains and mifchiefs and troubles, which he brings upon himfelf by his vices, as the natural confequen- ces of them j nor, on the other fide, why any dedudions fhould be made from the future happinefs of a good man upon the fcore of thofe innocent injoyments which arc the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and found reafoning.
Cor. IVicked men will not only be lefs happy than the wife and virtuous, but be really unhappy in that fate to come. For when all the happinefs, that anfwers to thofe degrees of virtue, w^hich they had, and thofe fufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effe6t of their wickedncls 5 I fay, when
•« 01 7ri(piXo(rc(p>ixiric, i^B-Z^, or e/ uXnB-Zi (pi\o<ro<poi, in Tluo's frylc. '' TiMvTwuvrxc, u-v
s'hia-i, KxySci xciicoii trwovTi^. Plato. « Ej' jt/sov t- a;//vi*^r5;M,.«r»» koXx^ztxi [o ^UK,i<^'\ z-fiocB^a-,]
Ee 2 that
2i6 The Religion o/^ Nature. Sed. IX.
that is fubtrafted, what remains upon the account will be fomcthing below no- ^ .j
happinefs : which muft be fome quantity of pofitive imhappinefs^ or mifery. S
Thus there will be rewards y and funijlrments hereafter : and men will be hap' pyy or unhappy^ according to their behaviour, injoyments, and fuiferings in this prefent life. But,
XV. If the immortality of the foul cannot he demonjirated^ yet it is certain the contrary cannot \ To fay, when a houfe is ruinous and fain, that it once had lui inhabitant^ and that he is efcaped out of it, and lives in fome other place, can involve no contradidion,. or abfurdity ^. And,
XVI. If the immortality of the foul fliould he confiderd only as a probability ^ or even as a chance poffihle^ yet fl ill a virtuous life is to he preferred before its contra- ry. For if the foul be mortal^ and all perception perifhes for ever at our death, what in. this cafe does a good man lofe by his virtue ? Very rarely more than fome a6ts of devotion^ and inftances of mortification^ which too by cuftom grow habitual and eafy % and it may hepleafant by being (or feeming at leaft to be) reafonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man gain ? Only fuch in- joyments, as a virtuous man leaves : and thofe are fuch, as moft commonly owe their being to a vitiated taftej grow infipid in time 3 require more troublfc and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth > go off difagreeably j
« Sure thofe arguments in Lucretius can convince no body. Nunc quontam, qunjjatis undique VH' fis, Diffluere humorem, e^ laticem difcedere cernii; Crede animam quoque diffitndi, &c. And TntersJi g'tgni f writer cum corpore ^ una- Crefcere fentimus, pariterque fenefcere mentem, Sec. ^uare animum quoque dijfolvi fateare neceffe ejl ; ^uandoquidem penetrant in eum contagiu morbi. Nor thofe in Tliny (N.H. 7. fj".): if there really are any at all. For to plead the ant egenitale experimentuvt is to beg the queflion ; which may be put thus, Whether we fhall after death be more confcious of our exiftence, than we were before we were born. And if Didnarchus's Lesbinci were extant, I be- lieve we (hould find nothing flrongerin them. The truth feems to be, Ov fiisXtTcci 6 kkkoc, k^eivuTav ilvd-i tIim kvr'i -^vxh : but he comforts himfelf with this thought, that « /a,iro£ 3-«v«ro>i ti^iiiKt, IccurZ will prevent future fufferings. This is nk to jooij iJvxi Kxrci<pvy^. Hierocl. ^ Nor that the
foul ftill exifts £f )5|U,6v x^raAi^rJa-a ^&J;5 r iifj^inetv oikov. fh f. Bomus ab hubitatore deferta, dilabitur ;
■ c^ corpus, rellBurrt fib ani/na, defluit. La£l. c Muk^o^ 3 ^ o^B-iOi ej/*e5 sV xvryif [ifJ^VJ
JLrtj r^nx^'i TO Tr^tirey. ixnv #' ih «xfo» ixjjet*, "PjjiiJii'ij ^' »)5T»jt» TTiMi. He/.
are
Truths hdonging to a Private Man, &c. 2 1 7
are followd many times by fliarp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear > and at beft afterafhort time end in nothing, asif they had fiever been. This isall'. But then if the foul prove to be immortal (iis we have all the reafon in the world to think it will;, what does the virtuous man gain ? His prefent pleafures (if not fo many) are move fincere ^ and natural '; and the efFed of his felf-denials and fubmiffion to reafon, in order to prepare himfelf for a future ftate, is the happi- nefsof thatftate: which, without pretending to defcribe it, may be prefumed to be immortal, becaufe the foul is fo j and to be purer and of a more exalted na- tiu-e (i. e. truer, and greater:) than any of thefe low injoyments here, becaufe that ftate is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man lofe ? That happinefs, which the virtuous gain as fiich ; and he finks, be- fide, into fome degree of the unhappinefs of that future ilate : of which one may fay in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappinefs or fuf-- ferings of this world, as the happinefs and joys of that are above thofe of this.
In a ftate that is fpiritual and clear every thing will be purer, and operate- more direaiy and ftrongly, and (if the expreffion may be tolerated) with more fpirit : there will be fewer obftrudions to either happinefs or unhappinefs : the foul will lie more open, and have more immediate and acute perceptions of ei- ther : fo that each of them in their kind will be more intenfe, the one nearer to pure or mere happinefs, the other to the contrary ^. But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an un- dertaking for my philofopher,
I ihall only add, that the reafoning and virtuous man has at leaft this advan-- tage over the foolijh and profligate, that, tho his wifdom and virtue cannot al- ways redify that which is amifs in himfelf or his circumftances, they will find means to alleviate his preflures and difadvantages, and fjpport him under all the anomalies of life, with comforts of which the other knows nothing : par- ticularly this, the injoyment of an humble, but well grounded expeftation of felicity hereafter, fincere and durable ^.
« CaIo prdifertur Monh. ^ 'O k^ir^ ^Kta-^iTtm t ii^ovki ut/jiTtCf/jiXiiTiii KU^jr^rxi, HkrocL
« If the foul was mortal, yet the virtuous man tIw iuvi^ nXuiTKrn ^?^ccfAQuvm, tI itxmt x«/!tj<-
ftiivoi liytx^or, iv^ottf/jtiv ovtui; i^l ^ fAaaet^tci. <^ if* ^ to a-uiA/», xtA. SimpL ^?i ."'►>
ip^jXoi iTTxvi^. Hier. 5 0< '^ ^i'xxm r k^W, u j^>ioiy «^e 7rXi9mT^<ri>, k».' oiw s;.r.'V*
y» s-Tfts^wm vTt^ijc^triy. Ifbcr. WTT TT
2i8 rZ?^ Religion (j/* Nature. Se6l. IX
XVII. He therefore^ ivbo ivouhl a^ according to truth, tnitP, in the lafl: place,
not only confider what he is, and how circumficintiated in this prefent fiat e, and pro- vide accordingly ; but, further, mufl confider himfelf alfo as one whofe exifience pro- ceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How I think this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.
For a conclufiion of the whole matter ; let our converfation in this world, fo far as we are concernd, and able, be fuch as acknowledges every thing to be iDhat it is (what it is in itfclf, and what with regai'd to us, to othtv beings, t© caufes, circumfiances, confequences) : that is, let Lo by no a6t deny any thing to be true, which is true : that is, let us acl according to reafcn : and that is, let us n£b according to the law of our nature. By bmefily endeavouring to do this we , fliall exprefs our duty * to Him, who is the Author of it, and of that law • and at the fame time profecute our own/?r£?/)i?r.happinefs fthe happinefs o£ ra- tional beings) : we fliall do what tends to make us eafy here, and be qualifying our felves and preparing for our removal hence to our long homes that great revolution, which, at the farthefl, cannot be very fiu" off.
And now, Sir, the trouble isalmoll over for the prefent, not properly which 1 give you, but which you have brought upon yourfelf, thefe being the Thoughts, which you deftred : unlefs I have any where mifreprefented myfelf through inadvertence ', which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in fome places fubjoind a few little llri6tures principally of antiquity, after the manner of annotations : fuch as, when I came to revife thefe fheets, I could re- collect upon the fudden ^ 5 having no common-place book to help me, nor thought of any fuch thing before that time. They may ferve perhaps fometimcs a little to explain the text 3 and fometimes to add weight j but chiefly to dir •vert you, who knov/ very well how to improve any the kafi hint out of the Ancients, and I fear will -want to be diverted. I have alfo printed a few copies of this Sketch, not with any defign to make it pubHc, but merely to fave the trouble of tranfcribing '^ 5 being minded, fince I have made it, to lea\ e it not only with you, but perhaps alfo with two or three other friends :
* TpaTt®^ -p ©£» 5-igci7rnoci iiTci^ iqriMTciTcq [k<ncuv a.^iry,)i]. Jof. ^ Some more were
added in the fecond impreflion, t Nothing more was intended at firft. See the advertlfe ■
rntnt.
or
Truths hehnging to a Private Man, ^c. 2 19
or however, with my Family^ as a private monument of one that meant well. Tho, as to the difpofal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment and manner of acceptance.
William Wollastonc
.S"ni N'otg
.tA»5s^
A Compleat INDEX /'^/^<? Religion ^N a t ur e T>elineated.
A.
CriONS, morally good or evil, in what crea- tures to be found p. 7, S -their Ipring 173 ' — are expreifive as well as words 8--13
— may be fignificant or infignjfi- canc 1 1
— the fame, when indiflFerent, may have contrary fignificati- ons II
— fome have an unalterable mean-
ing ibid.
— what conftitutes their depra- vity 1 3
— what makes them unnatural ib.
— morally good or evil, which lo
— good, not equal 22
— fuppofe the agent fufcepti-
ble of happinefs or mifery
33
— according to right reafon, and according to truth the fame ^o
— public not to be dttermin'd by private judgment ^5
Adultery, its heinous nature laid
open 141, 141
AfFeftlon, natural, its diftates to
be followed 16)
Agent, its difference from inftru-
ment 8
Agents, neceflary have no''«9« ib. Animals, the wifdom exprefled
in their ftrufture S2, 83
— the laws by which they are go- verned 96, 97
Aflronomy affords noble proofs
of a deity 78-80
Attraftion, what 79
— how lodged in matter ibid.
B.
BEings, different orders there- of ^ 108 Brutes, their fufferings and death notlike to thofe of men 34, 35"
— cautions co beobferved in kil- ling them for ufe 35
— their difference from men 110,
Chance, what 83
— no caufe 83, 84 Chaftity, what 180 Children, whence like their pa- rents 89, 90
—-their duty to parents i6y-i6^ Coniets, their motions and phse-
nomena 80
Common-fenfe, no proper judge
of aftions 23
Compaflion, a natural principle
in man 139, 140
— mort vifible in the beft men ibid. Conflagrations, whether any have
been univerfal 91—93
Confequences, when juft 44 Cnvetoufnefs,its feveral kinds 138
— may be virtuous ibid. Crimes may be evanefcent 31
— fo many afts of in;uftice 141
— of a lefs heinous nature repre- fented 144
Criminals, their difference 34 Cruelty, what 139, 140, 141
— inconfiftent with truth and na- ture 139, 140
D
DEath may enlarge the facul- ties of the foul i9<) Defence, mutual, one end of fo-
ciety 1 53
Deluges, whether any have been
univerfal 9i"93
Defpotic power not founded in
paternal authority 162^ 163 Dominion not given, or loft, by
perfonal excellencies, or de-
fe<^s 130
Doubtful cafes, how to proceed
in them 31, 58, f9
Duration, what 7^
Duties of rational agents, what
6?
— of parents to their children
159-1^3 ——of children to their parents
153-165
— - owing to remote relations i^^
—167
Evil, no independent principle of it 71
— whence it may proceed yr, 71 — — its formal ratio 1 38
F.
FA£ls more expreffive than words II, I ;
— help us to judge of good and evil 13
Faculties remain in the body, tho
their inltruments are loit 1 8 j,
196, 198
Falfehoods expreffible by adtions
II
Fame, what 117, uS
Fate, wliat ibid.
Freedom, whether in man 63,64
Forbearance from aftion in the
power of man 64
Fortitude, what i8i, 183
Frugality, what 180
Future-ftate, the neceflity thereof
— the expeftation of itjuft and reafonable 193—211
CAufes, when fatisfaftorily known 81
— the fame with eftefts ibid,.
EDucation of children incum- bent on their parents 160, _ , 161
Endeavour, what it means 61 Enjoyments, when lawful 40 Error, its caufes f 9— 6i
Evil, its degrees how to be rated
2Z
GEneration of animals how performed 89-91
Glory, what 116-119
— thedfcfireofir, whenjuftifia- ble 1x8
God, feeks not the unhappinefs of his creatures 39
— how he conceives of things
45'j lOi
— his exiftence proved by the chain of caufcs 65^—68
— his exiftence proved by the
faculties of the mind 87-93
— neceffarily exiftent ,^8 produced every thing ibid.
— fhewn to be infinite 69 - — his manner of exiftence incon- ceivable 69, 70
— exifts in a perfeft manner 70
— is but one 70,71
— fuports all other beings 72 — — is the Author of nature 71,73 — • not the immediate Author of
the afts of free agents 74
— not fpace, duration or matter
. . 74-76
' — not the univerfe 75, 76
• — the caufe of matter and mori- on 76-79
— the Author of the univerfe 79
F f God
INDEX
G od is free from defers 9 3? 94
— .s incomprehenfible «»!«•
— operates in the government of
the world 94, 9)
— governs the world by iiis pro- vidence 9^:"4
— his foreknowledge reconcuea- ble with human liberty ^T-
105
— the duty whicli men fhould have towards him ii4--ii6
—-how to be conceived of by man '^'«-
— his attributes, how to be un-
deiltood '^'f-
Gooi *nd eyil, coincident with
pleafureand pain 35
— how imputable to intelligent beings ^3
Government, its origin 1 49, 1 5©
Gravitation not alone fufficitnt to
produce tlie motions of the
heavenly bodies 79
Guilt, its degrees vary with the
importance of things 31
H.
HAppinefs, nearly allied w truth 31
— how to be eftimated 33
— coincident v-ith thetrue quan- tity of pleafure 36,37
— whether capable of cxifting without pleafure 37
— ultimate, what 3^ — the duty of every intelligent
being to procure 38
— ultimate, not procurable but
by the praftice of truth 58, 39
— never deftruftive of the nature
of the creature 39
— wherein it confifls 40
— coincident with truth tbid- - — the end of rtligion J^'«-
— hard to judge of it in others
110--114
— every man's property 131 -—ought to be defended i^^,
'33 ——• how obtainable 218
Heavens, figns of providence
therein !04> ?05
Honour, how to be given to God
ii6--i,i9
Honour?, what 118, 119
when the defire of them ju-
ftifiable 118
Humanity, what 139
Human life, its hiflory lOi-ioS
I.
De?.s, immediate, adequately
known to the mind ^ 41
— thtir immediP-te relations
known to the mind 4^, 43
Identity, in men, what 117, 198
Inanimate beings capable of no
obligation ^ °3
— — govern'd by certain laws 96
Individuation, a principle in man
127
Indolence, a happinefs infinitely
diminifli'd 37
Iniuftice, a violation of truth i37,
138
Innate maxims no proper judges
of right and wrong 23
Intelligent beings have immediate
objeds ot their underlland-
ings 4-1
. have general ideas 41
are under obligations in
proportion to their facul- ties 63 Irregularities in nature, whence 84, 8^ Irreligion, its principal caufe <5o, 61 Judgment, how to be form'd in dubious cafes 58, 59 Juftice, what 1^7 the praftice of it right 141
I
K
K.
Indred, to find the degrees
of obligation between
them 1 67
the di£Vates of natural affe-
ftion for them to be regarded 165—167 L.
LA VV of nature, wliat ~6 Laws obtaining in the uni- verfe $6, 97 ^— offuciety, natural 128, 148 muft confift with natural ju- ftice 148, 149 — — muft be ohferved 1 51
where they fail, thofe of
nature take place ibid.
'—— what to be done when they
oppofe the laws of nature
^i^i, 153 Liberty, wherein it connfts 63,64 Life, human, itshiftory 201-208 Loveof our country, whence 151
M
M.
A N not abfolutely free 107 —— his duty towards God 114
a focial creature i45
. the heft judge of himfelf 167
- has fome things in common with inferior creatures 168
■ is endowed with various fa- culties ibid,
- is confcious of liberty 183,
184 pofleffed of many inclinati- ons and averfions idS
Man, fenfibleofdefeas i^h
defirous of happinefs ^ 69
muft be fubjeft to reafon 169
---171
muft provide for himfelf
17', 172
muft hearken to his afi'cfti-
ons 172-175
muft ^remember he is but
man . i75, ^76
— — muft examine himlelt ana repent ^7y
muft labor to improve his
faculties 176, ^77
muft be advifed i 7^
muft lay afide his prejudi- ces ^79
muft live virtuoufty 1 79 —
185
. is compounded of foul and
body 184-184
fummary of his duty in lite
•218
Marriage, its foundation and
ends 154
_ — its advantages 1 5 fj 1 5 6
- — - — the nature of the compaft i5<^, 157
.. — its obligations how
ftrengthcn'd 157
, how made a natural re- lation 1 58 . how beft to be underta- ken ibid. m the contraft to be religi- oufly obferved ibid.
the behaviour it requires
under affliftion 159 " whether it gives autho- rity to the man ibid, ——— the foundation of all na- tural relations t66
makes a ftrift union ibtd.
Mathematicians, their way of rea-
foning 44, 45
Matter, what 74, 7?
its manner of exiftence 77,
78 • • •- not felf-exiftent 76, 77 whether capable of think- ing 186,19? Men, whether they have exifted from eternity 91—93 Mercy, what i t^ ■ the praftice of it riglic 141
Mind, its operation in reafonin
47
its progrefs in knowledge
— ■ — how it gradually mcreafes its faculties 87
■ may be afFefted by fudden
influences
iO'f~io7
Monarchy, not founded in pater- nal autliority 162, i<s^ Monfters, whence S4, 85
Moral
INDEX.
Moral good and evil, what?, 8, 20
coincident with right and
wrong io, 21
the vulgay rules for di-
ftinguiihing between
them faulty ii
Morality, its jult foundation 2?
Motion, what, and how caufed
77» 78, 185, 18+
Murder, its heinous nature 29,
141
N.
NAtions to be confider'd. as fingle perfons 153 Natural religion, its foundation
• why fo called 40
' is the purluit of happi-
nefs by the practice of
reafon and truth 52
Nature, what 86
— various lignifications of
the word 87 ■ how rightly foUow'd 1 5
—-3
■ — - that of man not purely
rational 13
■ thelaw of its Author 26
Neglefts may be inconfiftent with truth i6-~}'S
O.
OBjefts, why notpercaiv'd in fleep _ 198
Obligations of a mixed kind 19 Occupancy, prime, gives right ^ 134
Omiflions may be finful i^--i8
P.
PAIN may infinitely exceed pleafure 56
when true and real 40
Pain and pleafure, no criterions of good and evil 24
— proportionable to the
perceptions of the per- fons 32 "" increafed with the facul- ty of perceiving them
their caufes relative ^5
— how to be eftimated 33,
34
' - not to be judged of in
others by wliat we feel
ourfelves 34, 112--114
— — tlie fame with good and
evil 35
" maybear 'different pro- portions to each other ibid. • when equal they deftroy
each other 35
"— — — may change their nature, and runj into each other ibid.
Parents, their duties to their cliil- dren 159, 160
their authority over their
children i6o-'i6-^
— their authority not do- minion 161 Particles, their mental ufe 113 Paffions of the mind, exprelTible by gefture 8
• no infirmities 174
Perception always produced in
time 32
Planets Iiabitable 80
Pleafure, what y-
wlien true and real 40
only the true kind good
14 Poffeflion, original, gives the greateft right 134,13^ Power gives no dominion or right 130-133 Praife, what 117, 118 how to be given to God 11 ti
— liO
Prayer, a negleft of it a denial of God 18, 121
how to be ofl^ered up to
God no— i2o
requifites to tiie folemn kind
111
the proper times and places
for it ibid.
-in what words to be put up
122—124
the mental alfo verbal 122
' to be made audible 123, 124
• • not to be made exempore
.114
in what poftureto be offered
jbtd. public, of the nature of pri- vate iZ5
true prayer .always private
_. _ ibid.
Its efFeas 125,116
Principles of things, unfearchable
81 Probability, the fubftituteforccr-
rules tor finding it 56-58
its hi" iieft degree 8 5
its force the refult of rea -
fon and obfervation 58 • the only light wlien cer- tainty leaves us 59 Property, upon what ir depends 107 • equal in a ftare of nature
founded in nature and
truth 1 3^
gives abfolute {right of
difpofal 156,137
not juftly diftinguifh'd
from ufufruft ' i^y
Propofitions once true remain fo in all cafes 45
Providence, what 9?
• whetlier tliere be a di- vine providence 9^—114
inftances thereof in the
world 9&
particidar, its exiftencs
proved 9S~ii4
its phasnomena accoun- ted for ilnd.
invifible minifters there- of 107, loS
Punifhmentsto be diflFerently fui- ted 34
• naturally annexed to
crimes 143
"■ whether they can be eter- nal 200
R.
RAtional, what denominates 2 creature fo 45
Kcattion in matter 132
Reafon the judge of anions r 23
. differs from particular
knowledge 41, 42
a fix'd and general thing
41
the faculty, what 4?
relative to the being wlio
is poffeffed of it ibid.
— how improveablc 46
-why it influences men fo
little ^ ibid.
• defign'd as thegoverning
principle in man 5 1
its criterion 51
of greater authority than
fenfe 54
whether things are go-
vern'd by it 110-114
the great preparative for
death 215 whence different in dif- ferent men 113 Reafoning, a method to improve in it 46,50-53
may be rightly exercifed
on falfe propofitions 46, 47
the requifites to ftrift-
foning f 47
'to wiiat lengths it may
reach 49
•■^ -right reafoning no chi-
ma?ra ibid.
— ■ falfe rrafoning, whence
Reflexion, its difference from per- ception 3-, 33
Relation, ]:ow weakened by remo- val from the parents 1,56 Relations, determine the nature of things, and are the guideofouraftionsiS,
T- r ^9, 27, 28
^ » 2 Re! a ions,
INDEX.
Relations, not immcJute, difco-
vciable by fudi as arc
intermediate 4;
Religion, what 25, 69, ^16
- — ■ its foundation 7, 15, ^26
itsfum andfubliance 125
Reprifals lawful 151-133
Repiilfion in matter 79 '
Revelation, how to be treated 211 Rewards and punifhments une- qually diftributed by hu- man laws ^ ^4 - their unequaldiftribution in this life argues the being of another 201— ;;c5, 215, 2i(5 brought about by the laws of nature 104 Right, n.itural, what 127, 12!} — — ftrong in the firft occupier iH Right and wron^, what 14, 20
. how to be judged of 129
Rigius, natural, how far a Man may part witli them i j o
S.
SEafons, how wifely contrived
Secrecy no excufefor injuftice 143 Self, wherein it confifts 127 Self-defence, lawful 131, 132 Se!f-denial-neceflary 175 Self-prefervation, a ftrong princi- ple in animals 132 Senfation, how performed f77 Senfes may givefalfereprefentati- ons of things _ ??» 54 , II I- when to be credited 55 Sentimenrs,exprenible bygefture S Sins, not excufed by fecrecy 143 . tendencies towards them cri- minal 1435 J44 ——their heinous Jiature manife- fted 14J--144 Society, tlie laws thereof 128 1 — laws neceffary therein 145, 147 its bafis 128, 129
• reafons for it 145
— its end r28> 129, i47i ^4^
• fuppofes government
149, 150 ■ ■ fuppofes rules agreed to 147 — — — maybejuftlyform'd ifo • may be form'd by impli- cit or explicit confent 151
• dunts required in it 1 52
Soul, what TQi, T93
its dependent manner of ex-
iftence 8S'
its exi'^ence proved 184-- 186
■ not ex traduce 88-93
Soul, not a faculty 191,192
• iaimiterial 186—143
• -its feat, where 184, 192, 198
proved immortal 193—211
may think after death, tho'
not in found fleep 199
- — -may have its faculties en- larged after death 1 99, 2 1 7
■ pafles into a new ftate after
deatli, agreeable to its na- ture 212
■ will af'-er death have a feat
afiignea it fuitable to its per-
feftion ZI3--2I5
— its difference, whence in dif-
frient perfons 115,214
——its two principal faculties 2 14
• 'i'-S mortality not demoniira-
ble _ zi6y 217
Sound?,elther fignificant or not 1 1 Space, what 74, 75
Spiri[,proofs of its exiftence 90,91 Spirit, whether the notion of it be clear to the mind loS
Stars, their phaenomena 80
State of nature, gives equal do- minion_ 119, s^o
2T0f ^» , its diftates to be followed
Succeffion may give right 135
Sun, demonftrates the grandeur
of the fyftem . 80
Emperance, what 179, 180 Things, to judge rightly of them 18-2C
indifferent, what 20
Thinking, whether efTential to the
foul 104, 19^
——why not obferved in
found fleep 195, 198
Thoughts,their fleeting nature 122
Time,prefented by moments 32',35
Titles, transferable by compaft or
donation 135
Trade, the neceflity and lawful-
nefs thereof 135,135
Truth, what 8
— — its different acceptations 48
never contradifted without
'impiety \\—i6
• how dilcoverable 49, f o
• its criterion 52
how convey'd to the mind of
another ^ 53
— —the way of coming at it 5 i-6z
' difcoverable by reafon and
fenfe 55
Truths,allofthemconl!ftent i(<r,i9
— T^ lead to the difcovery of
truths 43
Truths, by wliat faculty invefii- gated 47
difcoverable by reafon-
ing 48,49
may nlefrom error 54,53
'many qualifications rt-
quifite to judge ot them ^r, 6z
• whether men can afl
agreeably to them when difcovered 62-64
U.
UNhappinefs, coincident with the true quantity of pain 36, 37
—ultimate, what 38
Unmercifulnefs, what 139
inconfiftent with truth
and nature ibid.
Ufage, proves pofleflion 10, 157
Ufprpation of property, injuftice
137
V.
VApors, the wifdom and good- nefs f xpreffed in tlicir formation 82
Vegetables, the wifdom expreffed in their ftrufture- ibid. • the laws by whicli they
are regulated 9^
Vice, tha caufe of unhappinefs
IIJ, 21(5
its effefls and confequences
216, 217 Virtue, whether feated between extremes 24, 25
— the praflice of it recom- mended I79~l83
produftive of happinefs
182, 203-zoS, 217
W.
A R fliewn to be lawful
Writing, why beft praftifedin our mother-tongue 123
Words, what 12, 123
• • their ufein thinking ri2,
123
lefs expreffive than fafls
12
World, a furvey thereof and its
furniture 87
■ ■" laws of nature obferved
therein 76-98
Worfhip, how to be given to God
120 — 126.
■ ■■ publick, why neceffary
124, lif
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