ave Pan ¢ < 7 h eae lego i f mt y Ay a ne ; me ba yi owe - ae A es . 7 r i] y Mi at ti : 7 N ] Ail} : - a pear G Report of AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION to Europe Observations Made by American Agriculturists in Great Britain, France, and Italy for the United States Department of Agriculture WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 17, 1919 CONTENTS. OuUtstandiie MACls, serees a ecclesia seveie seus ace tiaos eds Gr pieie einer diese aya) eisns lal etetehene Sk eee eporiol We Os Lbompsonki@hairmam rey clei is oilers erie in) ol is) hele eee Individual Reports: RCA: (Pears ONia. exert BRA! Ch: eo fy a eR Whe PRE RRS GIS! oS cnc) ATi 00 wae J. Need BE a1 (0) aR aaa Ae chat ee Oo rien ree Pn ae 6 tic oc Georszer Mey VomMicli me vecaaciiiers \uevouc eer scceiets. «6. 8 sd ielerd ls alte oee. oes SMG 4 5.150 TMA OMTAS oH ELUM tia eeeceas ee oie euaniouk sa Memey ele teeter ai silo Tossa. s dst vay ak ateea sey Rapa Re RN CEEES David we COKCI) os sa ceeecortie cadus b= CORTON «sitchin kus ddl ale diateconenanegateyee koeiaee GeOre ws HATO ies cree rer Me Geeta oa: SHOPPED Sore belien ov curensts.tarps) ctehs ketene vale SugceshionsHand mm ECOMIMENGALIONS Mac yer. « - li teen 1 Estimated. bo bo REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. In normal times Italy imports 12 to 15 million quintals annually. Last year the importations amounted to about 32 millions of quintals. This year the quantity of wheat needed through imports probably will amount to as much as 25 million quintals. The Italians depend greatly on their bread supply. COE ree 633,840 507,990 434,949 MM otailitevs cee teraatee dow Aaa ses 7,602,970 6,145,080 5,729,235 The cereals show an increase of 23.8 per cent over 1917, and 32 per cent over the 10-year pre-war average. This is the largest acreage of cereals since 1879. Potatoes show an increase of 25 per cent over 1917 and of 45 per cent over the 10-year pre-war average. This is said to be much the largest | acreage of potatoes on record. The acreage of peas and beans, which to a large extent are raised for stock feed, shows a decrease of 0.034 per cent below that of 1917 and of 0.041 per cent below the 10-year pre-war average, while the acreage of grass, including both hay and pasture, shows a decrease of 0.079 per cent below 1917 and of 0.083 per cent below the 10-year pre-war average. While the wisdom of this enlargement of human food and horse crops at the expense of cattle, pig, and poultry forage, in view of the war emergency, is not to be doubted, when taken in connection with the adverse season for roots it explains in large part the acute situa- tion now existing with respect to shortage of stock feed. This has been accentuated by the necessity for taking unexpectedly large ton- nage for troop transport from America which might .otherwise have been available for importation of concentrates. In view of the prolonged and extreme depletion of manpower due to withdrawals for military service, the 10.2 per cent increase of land under cultivation, amounting to 1,152,620 acres in England and Wales, is evidence of the energy and effectiveness with which the farmers 36 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. under the leadership and with the assistance of national and local authorities have met the urgent need for larger home production of staple food crops. While in the main this has been accomplished through persuasion, drastic action even to the extent of dispossessing inefficient tenants and of taking, clearing, and operating idle land at the expense of the owner and regardless of his desire, was in some cases taken. Authority for this was found under the Defense of the Realm Act, maximum production of essential crops being considered a public necessity in the face of which adverse private and individual interest must give way. In like fashion the planting of certain very profitable cash crops such as mustard was restricted by local authori- ties in favor of staple food crops and reduction of acreage of such crops as strawberries and hops was accomplished through persuasion and the influence of public sentiment. SEED SUPPLIES. This vital essential to crop production received much attention in both France and England. In the former country, which under normal conditions exports both field-crop and vegetable seeds much more largely than she imports them, little special governmental ac- tion was taken other than restraint of exports through requiring the securing of permits for export shipments of seeds. The most notable exceptions appear to have been winter wheat, spring wheat, and sugar-beet seed. To make possible the largest production of breadstuffs considerable importations of Canadian spring wheat were made both in 1917 and 1918. Though this grain is commonly but little grown in France, 10 per cent of the total wheat acreage in 1917 and 6 per cent of that of 1918 consisted of spring wheat. While not yielding as well as the winter wheat it appears to have answered a very useful purpose in the food emergency. For sugar-beet seed France had for many years relied on imports from Germany and Austria. These were cut off when the war started, simultaneously with the taking of approximately 80 per cent of the beet-sugar factories and beet-growing territory. Some progress in sugar-beet seed production in France has been made during the past two years but imports of considerable magnitude will be necessary if the French beet-sugar industry is to be reconstituted to any large extent during 1919, which at this date appears doubtful. In England it was found necessary for the Government to purchase considerable quantities of seed wheat and oats of approved varieties, for sale to farmers. To supplement the forage production several thousand bushels of South African maize was imported. This is a comparatively unknown crop in England, where the seasons are too REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 3 short for corn to ripen, but the fields observed were yielding fair crops of forage. Most of this was fed green to cattle, silos being practically unknown. The apparent certainty that the reconstitution of agriculture in France and Belgium will be well under way by planting time in the spring of 1919 renders the question of effective distribution of the existing world stocks of staple-crop forage and vegetable seeds one of the most vitally important to the food supply of western Europe and America at this time. Clover, lucerne (alfalfa), cabbage, rutabaga, turnip, mangel, and sugar beet are some of the important crops of which the yield for 1918 appear to have been relatively light in most countries. Demands from the farmers in liberated Belgium and France, in addition to those likely to arise in certain of the northern neutrals and probably from Germany and Austria also, render the conditions peculiarly favorable for speculative manipulation at the expense of the farmers who must have seed promptly if they are to produce crops next year and therefore to endanger production in 1ST9: Unless through prompt international action the approximate stocks and requirements of the vitally important seeds for each country can be determined as a basis for the administration of the existing export restricting regulations in force in the several countries with respect to seeds, the prospect for prompt restoration of normal pro- duction in several of the countries will be seriously impaired. The existing conditions tend to favor the forcing of seed prices to destruc- tively high points and thus to endanger the welfare of our own farmers as well as of those of the allied countries. Prompt consideration of the matter by an International Council on Agricultural Production with vigorous and effective action by the proper agencies in the respective governments would seem the most practical way to handle the matter. In Great Britain one of the distinct agricultural advances made which appears likely to endure is that accomplished through the so- called “Testing of Seeds Order” of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries under which sellers of agricultural seeds are required to declare the purity and germination of seeds offered for sale. This is applicable to seeds of all the more important cereals when sold for seed, as well as to the leading grass and forage-crop seeds and the leading vegetable seeds when sold in quantities in excess of from 6 ounces to 2 pounds. Its operation will insure to the purchaser of seed intended for plant- ing, authoritative information as to the name and address of the seller of the seed, the purity, the germination within six months of sale, and 38 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. in the case of many specified seeds the name of the country where grown as well as the name of the variety. If more than 1 per cent by weight of injurious weed seeds be present the total percentage of such weed seeds must also be stated. The law is applicable to farmers who sell seed, except that farmers may sell seeds “as grown” to a merchant, without having a test made, in such case merely stating the name of the variety. Packages of vegetable seeds below a certain weight must reach a prescribed standard of germination. If the seed falls below this standard the fact must be declared at time of purchase. This step to protect farmers and gardeners and reduce the produc- tion risk resulting from the unknowing use of impure seed or seed of low vitality is regarded as a reform of very great importance. It is said to have met with the hearty cooperation of the British seed trade and to have yielded distinctly beneficial results in 1918, the first year of its operation. SEED POTATOES. The importance of the potato as the crop most capable of quick enlargement under British conditions to supplement the deficient supply of bread grains was early appreciated in Great Britain. Vari- ous methods of stabilizing prices and stimulating production were tried during the early years of the war. As was true in North America, however, the crop of 1916, due chiefly to adverse climatic condi- tions, fell short of the consuming requirements at a time when the submarine menace to the importation of foodstuffs was distinctly ominous to the national welfare. This brought about unprecedentedly high prices for potatoes for both food and seed at a time when every effort was being made to stimulate maximum production both by com- mercial growers and allotment holders who were aiming to produce their family supplies. In addition to the control of prices of pota- toes for food use, the Ministry of Food accordingly established maxi- mum prices for seed potatoes, by varieties and classes, applicable to~ the seed required for planting the crop of 1917. In addition to recog- nizing the difference in value of different varieties of potatoes, the relative values of stock one year removed and two years removed from Scotland and Ireland were recognized by price differences ranging from 25 to 38314 per cent. This was accomplished by establishing three qualities of seed potatoes of each important variety as follows: Class I. Seed potatoes grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1916. II. Seed potatoes grown in England or Wales in 1916 from seed grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1916. III. Seed potatoes grown in England or Wales in 1916 from seed grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1915. REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 39 In accordance with a fixed schedule of maximum prices to the grower the price of seed potatoes of each class of each important variety was established. For example, in the spring of 1917 the maximum price to growers of seed potatoes of the 1916 crop of Early Puritan variety in Scotland and Ireland was £12 per ton. At the same time the price of Early Puritan grown in England or Wales from seed grown in Scotland or Ireland in 1915 was £11 per tun, while the stock grown in 1916 from seed of the same variety grown in England or Wales in 1915 was but £9. The prices of seed of some thirty of the leading varieties were fixed in this way, the effort being to maintain the differences of seed value that are more or less generally recognized by British potato growers. Standard sizes for seed potatoes expressed in terms of mesh of riddle were also set. Apprehensive lest the supply of seed should prove insufficient for the planting requirements, the prices were soon raised considerably above the initial schedule, the government pur- chasing for sale to commercial planters and allotment holders, seed potatoes to a total value of £200,000. The exigent conditions of the prospective food supply continuing to some extent when preparation for the planting of the crop of 1918 needed to be made, three lines of government provision of seed were decided upon. The first, when completed, involved the purchase for sale to growers of 11,000 tons of seed potatoes of varieties immune to the wart disease, for use in districts where the soils are infected with that destructive trouble. The required quantities were found in Scotland, England, ind Ireland at an average cost of £8 10s. per ton for the seed. In this way the inevitable losses to be expected from the planting of ordinary sorts on infected soils were protected against. The provision of adequate supplies of seed of varieties immune to the wart disease is recognized as one of the most vital necessities of the British potato production for the near future. To meet this the Government contracted for the growing in Scotland and Ireland of 1,000 acres of the most promising of the newer resistant varieties in 1918 for seed for 1919, at a cost estimated at £44,000. Availability of immune seed is more necessary because the planting of infected land with susceptible varieties is prohibited by the Wart Disease Orders. The second line involved the provision of seed potatoes of desirable non-immune sorts to small growers in order to encourage production of home supplies for village and suburban families. This undertaking attained a magnitude of 11,000 tons at a cost of £8 per ton and assisted materially in the carrying through of the allotment holders’ movement which marks the English landscape everywhere this year. 40 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. The third potato effort was instituted and carried forward until blocked. by the German drive in March, 1918. This contemplated the planting of some 13,000 tons of seed potatoes, worth approximately £100,000, in the regions of France behind the British Army lines where both soil and climatic conditions were considered favorable for potato growing. Some 9,000 tons of this seed reached France, but because of the German drive the larger part could not be planted. t POTATO CROP OF 1918. The securing of the largest possible acreage of potatoes in 1918, | being considered a matter of urgent national importance, the Food Controller in January, 1918, announced a policy of contracting with farmers to grow potatoes for the Government on substantially the following conditions: 1. The total acreage grown on each farm or holding in question must not be less in 1918 than in 1917. 2. Cultural, spraying, and harvesting and storing directions of the Board of Agriculture must be followed out. It was announced at the same time that as from November 1, 1918, the Food Controller would purchase the entire potato crop of Great Britain grown in lots of one acre or more, except where grown for consumption on the grower’s farm or for experimental purposes or for seed potatoes. : Basis prices for England and Wales and for Scotland were announced at the same time. These were established on an increasing scale from November 1, 1918, to May 1, 1919, and as will be noted from the following table were higher for England and Wales than for Scotland. It was also announced that the purchase price would event- ually be assessed with due regard to the size and quality of the crop, but in no case less for sound potatoes than the following scale: Potato prices. Price per ton. Time of delivery. sue: | ngian and Wales. Scotland. November and December, 1918.......... 0... scene cece eee e eee eens £5 SA 10s. ears FT Gln ao prone Tete Seene ab BAAatar Osetodocourn out se. £5 10s 5 March and April, 1919... ..,..2.00.-0. cs esses nee sce ceesececeeemens £6 £5 10s. May, 1919, to end of season ........- LaeMiprose o Gialdwlawies cle secleeitan te £6 10s. ie The prices for seed and undersized potatoes will be announced in due course, but every grower will have the right to retain any seed he may require for his own use. The higher price basis for England and Wales was expressly stated to be for the purpose of stimulating production in the territory near- est the principal consuming areas and in recognition of the fact that REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 4} Scottish farmers obtain their seed cheaper than English farmers and secure higher prices for it when sold. GOVERNMENT PURCHASE PRICES FOR POTATOES AS DETERMINED IN THE AUTUMN OF 1918. During hearings in fifteen potato-growing sections of England and Wales, which extended through the month of September, 1918, effort was made to ascertain the approximate cost of production in each district and to some extent the difference in cost of production of different varieties or types of potatoes. The prices announced late in October were as follows: In accordance with an announcement made at the beginning of this year, the Food Controller on November 1 will take control of the whole potato crop of England and Wales. The arrangements in respect of the Scottish and Irish crops will be announced later. The prices to be paid to the growers have been fixed by a Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Rigby Smith, K. C., M. P., appointed by the Food Con- troller and the President of the Board of Agriculture jointly. The report of this Commission has just been issued. It prescribes different growers’ prices for different areas, according to the size of the crop and the quality of the potatoes. The prices per ton, free on rail, during November and December for Grade 1 potatoes (King Edward, Golden Wonder, Langworthy, What’s Wanted, and Main Crop varieties) are as follows: Sussex, £8; Wilts, Hants, Berks, Bucks, and Oxford, £7 10s; Kent, Surrey, Herts, Neds, Middlesex, Dorset, Somerset, Gloucester, Devon, Cornwall, Suffolk, Lancaster, Cheshire, Monmouth, Wales, £7; Hereford, Worcester, Warwick, Shropshire, Stafford, Derby, Leicester, North Hants, Rutland, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Durham, £6 15s.; Nottingham, Yorkshire, and other than blacklands in Lincolnshire, Soke of Peterborough, Norfolk, Cambridge, and Hunts, £6 10s.; blacklands in Soke of Peterborough, Lincolnshire and Norfolk, £6; blacklands in Cambridge and Hunts, £5 15s. Prices for Grade 2 potatoes (which include all other varieties than those mentioned above) are in all cases 10s. less. While the prices to producers will thus vary in different areas, the price to the public for the same grade of potato will be uniform throughout England and Wales. Until the end of December Grade 1 potatoes will be retailed at a uni- form price of 114d. per lb. and Grade 2 at a uniform price of 1d. per lb. Lower prices will be fixed for large retail sales. In January the retail prices will be raised to 114d. per lb. for Grade 2 and 114d. per lb. for Grade 1 potatoes. The potatoes will be supplied to retailers at a uniform price fixed condition- ally at £9 per ton for Grade 1 potatoes and at £7 per ton for Grade 2 potatoes, the price being reckoned in each case to the retailer’s nearest railway station. The wholesalers will thus buy from the growers at varying prices, and sell in all cases to retailers at a flat price. In doing so they will act as agents of the Ministry of Food, at a commission which has been fixed, provisionally, at 7s. 6d. per ton, and they will account to the Ministry for the difference between the price paid to the grower and the price obtainable from the retailer after deducting their commission and necessary charges. Both the retailer’s buying 42 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. price and the wholesaler’s commission are subject to revision when further in- formation as to actual cost has been obtained. DEFICIT AND SURPLUS ZONES. For purposes of administration England and Wales have been divided into 11 deficit zones, which will need at some time or other during the year to im- port potatoes from elsewhere, and 12 surplus zones, which will export potatoes (particularly to London and the other large industrial centers). In each sur- plus zone is a Zonal Committee, under a zonal chairman, responsible for organiz- ing the collection of potatoes for export to other areas. In each deficit zone is a Potato Control Committee, under the chairmanship of the Food Commissioner. These committees will be empowered to. issue directions relating to the collec- tion and disposal of potatoes. For example, they may require potatoes of good keeping qualities to be held back until later in the year, so that those which will not keep may be absorbed first. Subject to any restrictions imposed by the Potato Control Committee or the Zonal Committee, growers will be permitted to sell potatoes to any registered wholesale dealer in their zone but may not sell to anyone else, except under license to be obtained from the Food Commissioner of their area. Sales under such licenses will be made at the appropriate price for the class of sale author- ized, but growers of more than five acres will be required, as a condition of obtaining such a license, to pay a fee so adjusted as to secure that their net receipts are equivalent to the growers’ price fixed for their district, together with any sum required to cover the cost of additional cartage and a commission of 2s. 6d. per ton. Growers of less than five acres of potatoes will not, as a rule, be required to pay this fee. The outcome of this effort to stimulate the production of an essen- tial perishable crop through recognition of regional and varietal differ- ences in cost of production and with a view to securing the larger in- creases in the sections where the article is most needed for con- sumption is a matter of distinct public interest to the United States. In view of the possibility of the occurrence of similar emergencies in the future its practical workings should be carefully studied as they develop. FLAX. At one time considerable fiber flax was grown in England, but as the result of a general decline in special crop production and of competi- tion with the increasing production of Russia the industry had prac- tically ceased to exist many years ago. In 1913, however, experiments looking toward the revival of flax production were begun at a Flax Experiment Station established by the University of Leeds at Selby in Yorkshire, where the conditions were considered favorable for such a test. At that point a considerable number of farmers had had experience in the growing of flax in their earlier years. Thorough test of the practicability of standardizing the retting process and the REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 43 practicability of central retting stations for groups of farmers were in mind. This work began with plantings of 117 acres in 1913, and con- tinued on about the same scale of operation through 1914, 1915 and 1916. At points in Somersetshire and elsewhere experimental pro- duction of flax was also under way. Under the impetus of rapid in- crease of prices for fibre and the urgent need of it for airplane con- struction, the acreage of this crop in England rose in 1918 to 18,400 acres, more than seven times that of 1917, and said to be the largest but two in the past fifty years. Those in charge of tlie very active government campaign for flax production appeared confident that the quantity and quality of the crop would be found to justify the effort put forth and the large expenditure made. While much had been expected of pulling machines recently developed in America for the harvesting of this crop, we were informed that in England recourse to hand pulling had been necessary. This necessitated the employ- ment of English soldiers, women, boy scouts and all other available labor and also the bringing in at heavy expense of a considerable number of men from Ireland experienced in flax pulling. Farmers who planted flax were guaranteed a return of at least £10 per acre through a price of £8 10s. per ton for the flax in the seed, the Government securing and paying for the labor required for pulling the crop. Where the crop did well yields of 2 to 21% tons per acre were secured. Deseeding and scutching were to be done with improved labor-saving machinery and canal and tank retting was to be prac- ticed. While Ireland was not visited, we were informed that the flax acreage there showed an increase of about 25 per cent over last year and is much in excess of pre-war production of this crop. As all information indicates that world stocks of flax fiber and linen fabric are unprecedentedly low as the result of the disorganiza- tion of production in Russia, Belgium and Northern France, it would appear advisable that steps be taken to ascertain somewhat in detail through expert investigation, the nature and extent of the progress now being made in Canada, England and Ireland in the development of special methods and machinery for the growth and preparation of this crop. Some progress has been made with it in the northern United States, especially in Michigan and Wisconsin. It is understood that the chief retarding factors have been variable weather, adversely affecting uni- formity of quality and yield of fiber from year to year, and the heavy labor cost of preparing the crop. WAR GARDENS. In both France and England the garden is a more universal feature of the suburban as well as the farm home than in most parts of 44 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. America. Apparently the possibility of food shortage was realized very soon after the war began and steps taken to stimulate war gardening. In France little more than suggestion appears to have been necessary to bring the full available human power to bear effectively. In Britain local food production societies were organized and local town and District Councils were authorized to take possession of any . suitable unoccupied land and allot it to the towns people for planting. The total number of “allotments” thus cultivated in 1918 in England and Wales is estimated at 1,400,000. As the climatic conditions make possible the continued growth of many vegetable crops throughout the winter, as well as during the summer, the addition to the food supply thus accomplished was very considerable. The psychological effect of such activity upon the home forces was also excellent and effective in maintaining morale at home when the military conditions were not encouraging. ARMY GARDENS. Early in the war the French made provision for the systematic pro- duction of vegetables by their soldiers wherever a sufficient force was quartered for a long enough time to justify such plantings. During 1918 some 7,000 separate military gardens, totaling some 40,000 acres, were thus maintained. These varied in size from a few square yards to several acres and furnished a large part of the fresh food supply for the French troops. The central feature of the general plan was a 65 acre vegetable plant nursery at Versailles, where seedlings of such crops as cabbage, cauliflower, onions, leeks, and various salads were grown under inten- sive conditions to a size suitable for transplantation. These were then shipped by motor or rail transport to the places where they were needed for planting out. Between April, 1917, and October, 1918, some 70,000,000 vegetable plants were shipped from this garden in this way, shipments during the month of October, 1918, being approxi- mately 20,000,000 plants. Fifty-six other seedling nurseries were also maintained at different points. This activity, though under the direc- tion of a Lieutenant of the French Army as Chief Garden Officer, was chiefly supported by funds contributed for the purpose by persons inter- ested. In cooperation with this a beginning was made in 1918 in the estab- lishment of army gardens for the American troops in France through which 146 such gardens were established at various points. Greatly enlarged operations were contemplated for 1919. The British Army agricultural activities comprised gardens ‘at camps in the home countries where the principal crops grown were REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. 45 vegetables, including potatoes. In these some six or seven thousand acres were utilized in 1918. A project for the production of crops on some 50,000 acres in the zone of British occupation in France was inaugurated early in 1918 with a view to producing cereals and potatoes on a large scale. Funds, tractors, implements, and seeds were provided but the operation as a whole was seriously interfered with by the German advance in March. Notwithstanding this, several thousand acres of grain were ultimately harvested by the British forces as a result of the plantings made. | Extensive crop production work was also undertaken by the British in connection with the Salonica Expeditionary Force and in Mesopo- tamia. The whole agricultural work of the British Army was under the advisory direction of an Army Agricultural Committee, of which Viscount Harcourt was chairman. - AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION. The advance of cooperative organization in agriculture in England does not appear to have been materially affected by the war. The advantage of consolidated selling of produce and purchase of feed- stuffs and fertilizers appears to have been rather less conspicuous than in normal times. This was doubtless to a considerable extent due to the fact that the prices of so large a proportion of what the farmer had to sell and needed to buy were fixed by regulation, leaving little to be determined through competitive buying and selling. The prevailing type of cooperative marketing organization differs from that which is most familiar in this country in that the English association actually buys the produce of its members in competition with other buyers, and having done so sells it for the association account. Any profit on the transaction thus- goes to the association for ultimate division among the entire membership rather than directly to the farmers whose produce was sold or through pooling of proceeds of like sales, as is the case in most such organizations in the United States. The membership and volume of business of existing organizations has increased considerably and the members appear to have turned a larger portion of their individual business through their association channels but not many additional such organizations appear to have been formed. The general and unusual wartime prosperity of the British farmer has not specially encouraged him to cooperate. Adversity, not prosper- ity, is the mother of effective agricultural cooperation. 46 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. The thoughtful observer of agricultural conditions in these countries can hardly fail to be impressed with the radically different situation that exists in them. France, with her long-maintained policy of self-feeding, must in every way exert herself to restore her crop and live-stock production to the pre-war normal at the earliest practicable date. In view of her depleted manpower and of the peasant type of farm operation which is to a considerable extent inherent in the long-prevailing system of land ownership and inheritance, this is certain to be a slow and difficult process. Apparently it will involve largely increased supplies of fertilizer, implements, and the provision of additional agricultural labor to that of the French people. Prior to the war, agricultural production in France appears to have reached the approximate maxi- mum likely to be attained with the available supply of labor, until consolidation of holdings into farm units of more effective operating size makes possible the larger application of machinery in the ordinary operations of the farm. There is every indication that France will need to import cereals, meat, and sugar for a number of years to come in larger proportion than before the war. In the portions of Britain visited, the maintenance of the enlarged war production of food crops or even a material further enlargement will apparently be determined chiefly by whether it will pay to raise more at home rather than to exchange manufactured goods for the foodstuffs of her colonies and other countries. The undeveloped potential food resources of England are obvious in the large acreage devoted to parks, estates, and game preserves, as well as in the extrava- gantly numerous and wasteful hedges that characterize the farms. The manpower, notwithstanding the losses during the war, is appar- ently ample, provided the man and the land are brought into effective combination. : Leaving aside the possibility of future war interference with trans- portation, the agronomically sound policy would appear to be to con- centrate even more largely on live stock and perishables than hereto- fore and continue to rely in large part on other countries for cereals - which, notwithstanding lighter yields per acre, can in many countries be grown and delivered to Britain at distinctly less cost than she can produce them. For the immediate future, especially the crop year 1919, the pro- duction of staple crops in both England and France will depend more upon the character of the weather than is usually the case. This is especially true of winter wheat which has gone into the ground with less fertilizer and with less thorough preparation than is common. REPORT OF WM. A. TAYLOR. AT Apparently, too, the crop was being sown later than usual because of the adverse weather for preparation of the land. In France this was due to prolonged drouth; in England to prolonged rainy weather during August, September and October. Under these conditions it appears probable that the production of wheat in both England and France will show material decline in 1919 below 1918, even if the acreage of those years is maintained. 4§ REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. LIVE STOCK CONDITIONS IN EUROPE. THE UNITED KINGDOM. Farming and live stock raising are very closely associated in the United Kingdom. Soil and climatic conditions and the innate con- servatism of British character are largely responsible for this condi- tion. The British farmer, however, unlike his neighbors in Holland and Denmark, has usually been an individualist. Cooperative effort has had very little support, but it is now a matter of serious discus- sion among leaders in agricultural affairs. In a general way we may say that live stock farming in the United Kingdom in normal times has been directed with three general pur- poses in mind: a. To furnish manure for the maintenance of soil fertility. The British farmer who merely breaks even in direct profits on his feeding has a profit in the manure. This fact explains the dependence of the farmer on high-protein feeds, such as the various oil cakes. Circum- stances and centuries of experience have thoroughly ground into the British farmer’s mind that the maintenance of soil fertility is the first and most fundamental problem of farming. It is not surprising, therefore, that grain yields are maintained in Great Britain at much higher averages per acre than in America. b. To make a direct profit in commercial feeding for meat and milk production. Great Britain has always been the world’s most dis- criminating market for choice meats of all kinds. The home meat products have been famous as the best the world produces. Prime Scotch beef, Southdown mutton, Yorkshire ham, and Wiltshire bacon are conceded to be the world’s standards in choice and appetizing meats. Beef and mutton are produced in normal times on pastures in summer and by straw and roots in winter. Oil cakes form the chief supplements to the ration. Since the war the supply of oil cakes has declined so that meat production has suffered somewhat. Dairying in England is unique. The dairy cow of England, and to a considerable extent of Scotland also, is a Shorthorn, bred to furnish abundant milk on the rich pastures and to drop a calf which can be fattened for beef. Guernseys and Jerseys have never made much beadway commercially, but Holsteins are just now having quite a run in popular favor, the descendants of an importation made trom Hol- land just before the war selling at very good prices. REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 49 c. To produce high-class pedigree breeding stock. A greater number of useful breeds of cattle, sheep, pigs, and horses has been developed in Great Britain than anywhere else in the world. Probably half of the world’s meat, as well as a large part of the world’s wool, comes from animals which trace directly to parent stocks in Britain. The condition of British herds during the war: LIVE STOCK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. MEAT ANIMALS. Country and Class of iNaiiala! 1909 1914 1917 1918 United Kingdom: Cowstandwheifers:. | %sdeeccscevnccceee 4,360,982 4,595,128 4,514,803 (a) PAU Patt... 1<:cperes ais spoke sisters dazass Saisie ss 11,761,830 12,184,505 12,382,236 (a) SHEED ecidiicetee manne ne cleo ebeee see 31,839,799 27,963,977 27,867,244 (a) RUSS yee ste yosarchibsicle ciate che totete vo See ts oarcjey overs 3,543,331 3,952,615 3,007,916 (a) Scotland : Wowsrand Jheifers: se j..5 ct oc reinie.s.8055°5 435,110 453,703 441,802 451,949 PANN CATUIOL ro vcacsit se ceieve Saleientetecie.ss c/s 1,176,165 1,214,974 | 1,209,859 1,208,696 SHES os oreo wisi Bo sire bis topo te et slarayazovese wags 7,328,265 7,025,820 6,873,234 6,863,168 PPR Sse are cn ire race craraiere Oeaye ares nielivern, auyare's 129,819 152,768 182,945 127,615 Ireland : Cowsandwheifiers.:... cadens atts cons 1,566,806 1,657,205 1,608,207 (a) JNA TUE a Seo R Rg Dc a eciten BeeerEe 4,740,848 5,091,587 4,945,229 (a) STAG aro MB nase eco Eas ere 4,221,380 3,678,463 3,824,153 (a) I eTECMGOVOLDMG Ec BC OnE SCR ORRR Gr Ic ati ware 1,162,444 1,318,366 956,430 (a) England and Wales: - PC Ow sand WNCITErB's,,.).cjesclocctits ces osc 2,359,066 2,484,220 2,464,794 2,577,970 PA CALELOSE castro eh ero ies yctaeicigneare 5,844,817 5,877,944 6,227, 148 6,200,490 REO te oiote raticse cielo vittelsie/sieltietevarele eraiete 20,290, 154 17,259,694 17,169,857 16,475,180 PPE eecitree safes are aio ieaniee rian eaices see 2,251,068 2,481,481 1,918,541 1,697,070 Horses on Farms: : Wnited! Kinedom:.i1..%. 0c 0c0neendss 2,091,743 2,237,783 2,190,318 (a) SCOLANG ate aie Saleraies z accasiacia sie iase. 6 204,490 209,360 210,048 209,883 Mrelandhn eae ationer ss cos seco meee 528,806 619,028 597,692 (a) England and Wales.................. 1,348,503 1,399,547 1,372,822 1,375,830 a Figures for Ireland not available. a, Cattle in Great Britain are more numerous now than they were ten years ago, and there has been a steady increase in their numbers during the war. They are not, maintained in as high condition as formerly, except on grass. Store cattle are very high in price, and this, with the shortage of concentrates, will cause a decreased amount of feeding during the coming winter. A shortage of native beef in Great Britain may, therefore, be expected from January to May, in- clusive. ey S REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. The beef cattle situation would have been in better shape had farmers early in the war begun to adopt the practice of marketing at earlier ages. As a means to meet the existing feed emergency this is now impossible, as it requires several years’ time to put such a change into effect. b. From the standpoint of numbers alone, dairy cows are holding their own in Great Britain. ‘Thus far the milk supply has been suffi- ciently well maintained for essential purposes. At the time we left Great Britain, however, there was much concern whether there were sufficient supplies of concentrated feed to keep up milk supplies during the coming winter. In view of the peculiar system of live stock production possible and usually followed in Great Britain, namely, many -wenths’ dependence on grass with a winter maintenance on straw or hay and roots, clover and other leguminous hays are not so common as in most parts of te United States. In fact, they are exceptional. Hay is usually tz cutting from a grass crop which has not been pastured. Of the 1% million acres of grass land in Great Britain, in 1918 less than two million acres were grown in a rotation as a hay crop. Alfalfa is un- important. The protein in the dairy cow’s ration is therefore obtained from the concentrated feed. Milling by-products and oil cakes are thus absolutely essential for this purpose. In the rationing of farm ani- mals which the Government expects to put into effect this month (November) preference in all cases is given dairy cows in milk. The ration, however, is under the normal requirement, being 2.4 pounds per head daily of grain offals and 2.4 pounds per head daily of oil cakes. : Those dairymen who have foreseen the winter shortage of cake withheld it during the summer while the cows were on pasture. With the best of conditions and careful economy in the use of home supplies, and with such additional amounts as are made available by importa- tions, the maintenance of the milk supply in England will still be a difficult problem during the coming winter. It will be made possible if the 153,000 tons of oileake recommended by the Inter-Allied Food Conference to be exported from the United States is approved. c. Sheep were declining in Great Britain before the war for the same reasons as existed in the United States. They have increased in numbers since the beginning of the war on account of the increase in the prices of wool and' meat. The last year saw a decline in numbers owing to the blizzard of April 17, 1917. This storm was the worst in many years. It occurred in the midst of the lambing season and swept over Scotland and northern England with disastrous effect. The present prices for fat ewes are the same as for fat wethers of equal weight. This has sent many ewes to market, especially in the fall of REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 51 / 1917. The labor shortage has also tended to cause the marketing of tlocks, especially in those parts of England where lambs and sheep are handled on forage crops. Pastured or “grass” sheep do not seem to have been affected by the labor shortage. These are the three prin- cipal causes for the falling off in the numbers of sheep during the year. Considerable criticism is indulged in of the Government’s policy in handling the woo! clip, but it does not seem to be causing any farmers to dispose of their flocks. The Government price on wool in Great Britain is much less than in the United States, but it is quite a little more than pre-war prices. d. Pigs were increasing in the United Kingdom before the war. Since then they have declined sharply owing to the shortage of con- centrates. The decline during the past year has been marked and the great shortage of concentrated feed expected during the next winter has caused the Government to announce that there will be no concen- trated pig feed available for commercial pigs after January 1. Farmers have been given notice to dispose of their feeding pigs by that date. e. Horses are worth in Great Britain at least twice what they were worth before the war. Farm horses worth $250 to $350 each before the war now bring $500 to $750. Fine heavy geldings for city trade bring higher prices, sales from $1,000 to $1,650 each having been reported. The military demands have made heavy inroads on the supply of British farm horses, and the increase in the acreage of tillable land has augmented the farm demand. It is said that the war has caused a great increase in the use of ponies and donkeys for light work in cities and towns. f. Poultry, especially chickens, have fallen off. Like pigs, poultry are largely maintained on purchased feed (grain). Wherever the system of ranging in fields from colony houses is followed the flocks seem to be maintained. This practice, however, is not common. Poultry are not often seen in the stubble fields. g. Pedigree stocks of all classes are being maintained at or above the pre-war numbers. It is believed that this will continue unless the shortage of concentrates causes the slaughter of some pure-bred herds of pigs, which is unlikely. The physical condition of breeding animals seems to be healthy, although the animals are usually rather thin. Prices for all kinds of pure-bred animals are high—at least double pre-war quotations. Prices for pure-bred beef cattle and horses are higher than in the United States. It is an important indication of the confidence which British breeders have in the future of the pure-bred live stock business that by far the larger number of the pure-bred ani- mals in Great Britain are bought by British breeders for British herds and flocks. 52 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO ASSIST THE BRITISH LIVE STOCK FARMER. Concentrates are today the greatest need of the British farmer. Manure being such an important necessity in his farming operations, the farmer who has no stock to feed or who has an insufficient supply of concentrates is in a very serious situation. The United States should furnish to Great Britain during the coming winter all the con- centrates, especially cottonseed cake, which shipping facilities will permit. Not only does a considerable part of the 1919 British grain production depend on this, but a much more vital necessity, the milk supply, depends for its maintenance to a great extent on an adequate supply of cottonseed cake. REQUIREMENTS AFTER THE WAR. The British farmer will continue to require large quantities of high protein cakes after the war and will be in the market for them. The British consuming public will be in our markets for as much beef and pork products as we can spare. ; The coming of peace will probably cause considerable demands for American horses, both for farm and city use, but this will be offset to some extent by the release of transport horses from the British army. It is an interesting fact to American farmers that the experience of the British army with grade Percheron horses from the United States las been extremely satisfactory, especially for transport and artillery purposes. It is believed that these horses have proved to be more hardy, more active and more courageous than the grades of other draft breeds. This fact is largely responsible for the growing interest in Percheron horses in England. Already some purchases have been made in France, and Percheron horses are found here and there throughout England. Just before the Commission left Great Britain a shipment of 26 mares and 1 stallion landed from Canada and are now in Norwich. A British Percheron Society has been organized, and I am confiden- tially informed that they propose to send a commission to the United States in 1919 to make purchases of Percherons in the United States for English breeders. The demand for commercial horses will probably develop as soon as it is known how many will be available by demobi- lization from the British army, as soon as shipping conditions become more normal, and as soon as feed supplies are available in Europe. In other words, we may look for this trade to manifest itself about July 1, 1919. On account of the sharp reduction in stocks of chickens there may le trade with American breeders. It may also be possible to arrange for the importation of pure-bred Holstein cattle from America, but it REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 38 will not be easy to bring about on account of the long-standing objec- tion to the importation of live cattle. With the foregoing possible exceptions, no restocking of British farms with live stock will be necessary, except perhaps in the case of pigs, which British breeders will be able to take care of without assistance. On the whole, British breeders will be competitors with American breeders in the world’s markets for purebred live stock. They are already looking forward to the demand from continental Europe for animals to restock the devastated areas and to replenish herds else- where which have been depleted on account of the necessities of war. LIVE STOCK IN FRANCE. Purpose.—The French farmer is a consistent utilitarian. He grows live stock for certain very definite and practical purposes, the most primary motive being the money he can make out of them—either directly in sales or indirectly through the maintenance and increase in soil fertility. The breeds of live stock found in France are unquestionably useful and practical and on their native pastures they not only fit in admirably with farm practice, but they are extremely attractive as well. Few more beautiful sights can be offered the traveler interested in live-stock subjects than a group of Normandy cattle in a river-bound pasture, with a few choice Percheron colts grazing with them, or ' several teams of four or six white Charolais oxen in each, plowing in a field at sunset. However, one does not get the impression of personal attachment between the man and his animal which is so strongly evi- dent in the case of the British farmer. The French peasant’s great passion is the land, and four--fifths of them own the land they operate. Although there are many distinct breeds of live stock in France, which are bred to a type in rather well-defined areas, we do not find the extraordinary development of systematic breeding with elaborate pedigree records which is such a feature of animal breeding in Great Britain and also in the United States. Specifically we may assign two general purposes for live-stock raising in France: a, To consume roughage and supply a sufficient quantity of manure to keep up soil fertility. An American soldier remarked that in the French farming villages the social status of the farmer was indicated by the size of the compost heap at his front door. Be that as it may, the compost heap is one of the most conspicuous features of a French rural home. The French farmer is nothing if not practical. For example, he has mitigated requisitioning of farm horses for military _ purposes largely by the substitution of oxen, and has been financially ‘ 54 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. the gainer in many cases. Oxen are slow, it is true, but they consume rough feed, they do not become so easily blemished as horses, the manure is more valuable from them, and when worn out they will bring more money for meat than will horses. b. To produce meat and milk for home and city consumption. Meat does not form nearly so large a proportion of the diet in France as in Great Britain, and meat production is therefore not so highly special- ized. With the skillful cooking which is a national trait, wonderful things can be done with an unpromising piece of meat. For this reason careful feeding is not so necessary when a French cook prepares. the meat. More veal is used and meat animals generally are fed out at much younger ages than across the channel. This is particularly true with cattle. Big calves, which are neither veals nor baby beef, are common. Breeding stock is kept at the highest possible maximum and young animals are sent to market early, with their weight obtained from the dam’s milk and green forage. Highly specialized dairy breeds do not seem to be common in France. Even the red Flemish cattle of the northeast are praised for their meat as well as for their milk. Cows apparently must be capable of fattening when closed out of the dairy and a calf not wanted for breeding must go to the block as veal or into the fields for work. Except for Percheron horses, the purebred live-stock business is a relatively unimportant feature of French farming and has not figured extensively in the foreign trade. The Condition of French Herds During the War (Numoers). Class. 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 Dee. 31. Dec. 81. June 30. June 30. June 30. Cattle 12471 ES eee roe ro ater 284,190 231,053 211,343 221,300 214,764 SLCEES ioc pci sorties 1,848,160 1,394,384 1,262,315 1,321,887 1,295,120 Cows tae 7,794,270 6,663,355 6,346,496 J 6,337,799 6,238,690 “Breeders” (over 1 | ’ VERT) A Rts eet tees 2,853,650 2,549,417 2,581,870 2,678,837 2,677,870 ‘Breeders’ (under 1 ViEAT) tS ieaicatdeehe cone 2,012,440 1,829,434 1,884,825 2,032,102 2,016,860 Potalicattle.......0+- 14,787,710 12,668, 243 12,286,849 12,723,946 12,443,304 Sheep: Rams over 1 year...... 293,640 258,447 239,832 209,760 188,204 - Ewes over 1 year...... 9,288,460 8,390,863 8,033.886 7,143,685 6,463,720 Wethers over 1 year... 2,580,810 1,881,295 1,572,236 1,288,250 1,129,320 ambsnsenetnesmenee ace 3,968,480 3,507,756 8,637,235 2,654,630 2,795,350 Total sheep s.siea00 26 16,131,390 14,038,361 13,483,189 10,845,280 10,586,594 Pigs: , FOALS i a tde as bei cie viens 38,560 » 36,179 31,501 27,631 26,090 SONU ci acabsla aphasia 906,790 802,858 785,989 660,631 628,040 Pores a L’Engrais a... 2,800,760 2,226.456 1,632,252 1,317,432 1,300,840 Pigs under 6 months... 3,289,740 2,859,994 8,041,054 2,442,404 2,245,310 Motalipiss en asec dees 7,035,850 5,925,487 5,490,796 4,448,366 4,200,280 1 3 Po) aS ct= A tt) Oe 8,231,000 2,105,000 62,156,000 b2,246,000 2,283,000 a Pigs for fattening. b For December 31. oy co REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. Ten departments in France have been occupied by the enemy more or less completely since the invasion of 1914. The French authorities estimate that the decline in animals in those districts has been, of cattle 935,954, and of sheep 824,652. The period is from December, 1913, to December, 1914. Some of the animals were moved into other sections of the country and presumably appear in statistics for those departments. The French assume that the live stock in territory wholly and continually occupied by the Germans are entirely lost to France. In departments only partially occupied no increase can be expected so long as the war is in progress. The figures given above show that the most serious losses have oc- curred among sheep; that pigs have suffered less seriously, and that, under the circumstances, cattle are holding their own surprisingly well. a. Cattle have declined in numbers about two and one-third millions since December 31, 1913. However, since the first shock of the invasion there has not been an alarming decrease in numbers—only 1.8 per cent. Furthermore, there are now reported more young cattle under one year of age than before the war. We were told that in certain sections of central France cattle were increasing in numbers. These facts are very encouraging, and if the slaughter of young stock can be prevented during next winter and spring a rather serious crisis will have been passed. During the summer and early fall the demands of the military opera- tions made it impossible to obtain cars to ship cattle to Paris. Many were therefore driven to market on foot for long distances. At the time of our departure from France the transportation problem was somewhat easier and cattle were coming in freely both by the roads and by rail. The relief of the rail congestion had the usual effect. In addition, France faces a feed situation more serious than exists in Great Britain. Not only has a considerable proportion of her pro- ducing area been occupied by the contending armies, but the horses for these armies required relatively larger quantities of French feed stuffs, especially roughage. The number of cattle being received at the Villette market in Paris in mid-October was said to be larger than before the war. There were a few bulls, the rest being cows and steers in equal proportion. The market could not absorb them at the fixed official prices, and the absence of sufficient coldstorage accom- modations made the situation difficult. The opinion was freely ex- pressed that after the supply now going to market is exhausted there will be a growing scarcity of native veal and beef, which will become acute during the winter and spring months. The inevitable high prices for live animals which will result will tempt farmers to sell their young stock, and in the opinion of leading agricultural authori- ties this can only be averted by the importation of frozen beef. 56 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. The dairy situation in France has been fairly well maintained, although dairy products are high in price, butter and cheese especially. Like Great Britain, France will need concentrates, especially oil cakes, during the winter. Her own supplies of oil cakes have been seriously reduced on account of her not receiving oil seeds in the usual quantity for manufacture. France grows much more alfalfa and other legumes. than Great Britain, but the reduction in her home manufactured oil cakes largely tends to offset this. b. The decline in sheep production in France has been serious. The invasion, the labor shortage and the high prices for live animals: have all combined to cause a reduction in the flocks of approximately 30 per cent. A still further reduction was taking place when we left. The receipts of sheep at the Villette market in Paris were said to be as large as before the war. c. Pigs in France, while reduced in numbers, are not causing the authorities serious concern. Sufficient supplies of breeding stock will probably remain in any event to permit fairly rapid replacement after the war. d. The horse supply on farms is below present requirements, but farmers have replaced horses with oxen, so that there has not been @ material decline in production on this account. It must be remembered that oxen have always been used for farm work in France. When need arises, therefore, the farmer is able to supplant his horses by oxen without having to familiarize himself with a form of motive power of which he is ignorant. The relatively large number of oxen in the country made it possible for French farmers to meet the heavy demands of the war for horses in a fairly satisfactory manner. In some cases both the supply of horses and of oxen is reduced to the minimum. One farmer, operating north of Paris, said that in normal times he used 25 horses on his farm. The army had taken five this year and if further requisitions were made he would have to cut down his tillage area. On the other hand, in the Gironde, where the replacement of horses on farms by oxen was general, we were told that there were still some horses to be spared. The French Government requisitioned 135,000 horses last spring, mainly for the American army, and that army needs still more horses. The supply of horses for the American army, however, is a military question which is not directly germane to this report. / So far as this question affects the maintenance of production on French farms, it may be said that further heavy requisitions on French farmers are not possible without causing a decrease in the agricul- tural output and therefore indirectly tending to reduce the morale of the French people. Looking to the future, we may expect that large. numbers of the horses now in both the French and American armies REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 57 will be made available for the French farmers. It must be said, however, that the horses of neither army are maintained so well as in the British army. There will therefore probably be a smaller propor- tion of fit horses available when demobilization begins. Horses in civilian duty in France show the effects of the shortened feed supply and will have a rather rough time of it next winter. The price of horses in France is about the same as in England, and the increase since the war has been in about the same ratio. Good geldings are worth $1,000 to $1,200. The horses bought in France for the American army are said to have cost around $700 each. Ata Percheron stud which we visited stallions were priced at $2,000 to $3,000. Weanling Percherons are worth $600 to $800 each. e. Poultry are scarce in France and very high priced. Of all classes of poultry on the markets, geese seemed cheapest. Chickens sell in Paris at about $1.00 per pound, geese at 60 to 70 cents per pound. Flocks of poultry are seen around the barn yards but rarely in fields. Colony houses on range are seldom seen. High prices and strong de- mand have combined to bring about what appears to be a considerable decline in the number of poultry. WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO ASSIST THE FRENCH FARMER IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION. a. The greatest problem of the French farmer for the immediate future is to prevent the slaughter of the large supplies of young cattle which are now on hand. Not only does the meat and milk production for the next two years depend to a great extent on the successful solution of this problem, but an even larger problem, the restoration of the cattle industry in the devastated areas, is linked up with it. Some authorities believe that if the slaughter of young cattle can be prevented, France will have in ten years more cattle than ever before. An ample supply of chilled or frozen beef will probably prevent this slaughter. Reference is made above to the expected shortage of beef during, the winter and spring of 1918-19. If this shortage can be made up by importations from America, the solution of the problem may be found. There is a possibility of failure in the fact that French people do not like refrigerated beef. They usually eat meat quite fresh, often with some of the animal heat still remaining in it at the time of cooking. Experimental shipments at reasonable prices should soon establish whether this measure of relief could be made a success. b. Feed supplies are low in France and importations in large quantity will be urgently needed during next winter and spring. It has been pointed out by another member of the Commission that France has been deprived of considerable quantities of cottonseed 58 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. and other oil cakes which were formerly manufactured at Mediter- ranean ports, but which have not been available during recent years of the war. c. In regard to live stock, the needs of France after the war are best indicated by the losses which she has sustained, particularly in the devastated area. Roughly, there has been a loss of 900,000 cattle and 800,000 sheep in the departments which have been invaded. Officials of the Government estimate that of these numbers 400,000 were dairy cows and 400,000 were breeding ewes. What losses there were in pigs no official figures indicate. The loss in horses is repre- sented mainly by the numbers which went into the army and were lost in warfare. An estimate that there are 30 per cent less horses on French farms to-day than before the war is probably not far wrong. Authorities differ as to the relative importance in which animal re- construction should be taken up. Some place dairy cows first, others horses; some believe that the stocks now on hand will enable the reconstruction work to be carried on without supplies from elsewhere; others believe that tractors will fill the need caused by the shortage of horses. All agree that sheep are badly needed. So far as dairy cattle are concerned, the Government has already in contemplation making an experimental shipment from the United States, as has been already reported by cable and letter. It is proposed to buy 100 cows and place 10 in each one of the ten departments which have been invaded. Wherever Holsteins have been tried in France they are said to have given satisfaction. Certainly they should be given a trial in Flanders. The results of this shipment will be valu- able as indicating how far the United States will be called on for assistance in this regard. In view of the rather strong indications of the development of a demand for considerable numbers of dairy cattle from the United States, I took the liberty while in Paris, with the approval of the Chairman of the Commission, to exchange notes with the head of the French Live Stock Sanitary Service, suggesting an informal under- standing with the Bureau of Animal Industry on the subject ef cattle importations. This correspondence is being forwarded direct to the Chief of the Bureau. The attitude of the French official is encouraging and the correspondence can be made the basis of more formal negotia- tions if desired. With horses and mules it is to be expected that one of the first sources of supply will be those now in the French and American armies. Naturally the British horses first relieved will go to British farmers. The American armies can do French farmers a service if they are allowed to buy horses and mules, especially the heavier ones, as rapidly as demobilization will permit. There will be no object REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 59 whatever in bringing all the American army animals home. If the American army does not need them in France, the French and Belgian farmers should be allowed to have them. Arrangements should and no doubt can be made to insure equitable prices for such animals. They should not be “condemned” and sold at auction. I am unable to see that the United States can offer French farmers any assistance in rebuilding the sheep industry. Possibly Argentina would be a more promising source of supply. d. There will in all probability be a considerable demand for poultry for the farmers of the invaded districts. The “Agricultural Relief of Allies Committee,” an organization fostered by the Royal Agricul- tural Society of England, which has been donating live stock, poultry, seeds, and other agricultural materials to these people, finds a very large demand for poultry and has sent large numbers to France. A French official interested in reconstruction work stated that the first animals the returning farmer wanted was some chickens, a rabbit, and then a cow. The introduction of American breeds of chickens would probably have less prejudice to contend with than those of dairy cattle. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. In the agricultural reconstruction work at the close of the war the farmer of Continental Europe should neither be given charity nor should he be made the victim of exploitation. Neither should the farmers of any other countries be allowed to suffer from the conse- quences of unbalanced production, from inadequate distribution, or from unwise financial organization. This general statement leads to the suggestion that agricultural matters in the future will receive much larger consideration in inter- national councils than has heretofore been the rule. American busi- ness men on war duty in London and Paris, almost without exception, recognize the importance of agricultural matters in world affairs and at the same time admit their inability to handle them on account of their lack of technical knowledge. An officer of the United States Food Administration in London stated that he had declined invitations to confer with officers of the British Ministry of Agriculture on certain subjects because he felt himself lacking in technical knowledge and there were no representatives of the Department of Agriculture in London on whom he could call. After the first need is met, after starving, shivering peoples are fed and clothed, crop growing is restored, and live stock herds are replen- ished, the great problem to be considered is the development of the world’s agriculture in order to prevent unbalanced production. No one will predict at this time how the American farmer should prepare 60 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. for the 1920 wheat harvest, because no one knows what the consuming nations of the world are likely to need or what other producing nations are likely to do. Neither can anyone offer any predictions as to the American program for meat or wool production in 1925. Why should farmers everywhere rush into the production of such a staple as wheat if on investigation a conservative planting program will satisfy all reasonable demands and provide for unforeseen contingencies? The United States suffered from unbalanced production for thirty years after the Civil War. The rapid development of farming in the upper Mississippi Valley and westward is a splendid theme for a platform orator to use to thrill his audience. Practically, however, it wrecked for a generation the agriculture of the North Atlantic States; it stopped the growing of wheat in England and in the very land where this development took place “a farmer” in the nineties was a by-word for an unwise, short--sighted individual. In Iowa at this time the vright boys in the: farm family were the favored ones and, if the father could afford it, received an education to fit them for a profes- sion or for business. The dullards, who were not worth an education in the father’s opinion, were left to manage the farm. In those days corn was burned for fuel in Nebraska and Iowa farmers welcomed an epidemic of hog cholera because the ravages of the disease sent the market up. The land was not to blame, nor the weather, nor the Government. This calamitous condition was the result of unbalanced agricultural production; more grain and meat were produced than the world’s markets could absorb. For the protection of the American farmer and in justice to the farmers of other countries, nothing should be left undone which humanly can be done to prevent such an unwise development as a sequel to the present war. Fortunately, in the Agricultural Extension Act, and the various services organized under it, American farmers have functions at their command which may fairly be expected to protect them in any probable developments of world-wide agricultural condi- tions, provided full and accurate information is at the command of the United States Department of Agriculture. This information can not be forthcoming unless the United States Government can an- swer two questions: (1) What are the prospective food, feed and fiber demands of the world? (2) What are the prospective produc- tion possibilities of the agricultural countries? If the Department of Agriculture can forecast the answer to these questions with reason- able accuracy sufficiently in advance of the production of a given crop, the county agents can furnish our farmers with information which will enable them to expand or contract their operations to conform to world requirements. The success of the production campaigns of the Department undertaken during the war in the light of fairly accurate REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. GHliay knowledge of world conditions is suggestive of what may be done under peace conditions with the more accurate information which peace will make available. I therefore venture the opinion that production pro- grams will be desirable in the United States after the war. They will be necessary for the protection of the American farmer and they will have to be based on information which can only be obtained through agents of the Department in European capitals such as London and Paris. Thereby will the American farmer’s interests be safeguarded. Will this be all? Already the American papers are running accounts of the food distress among the people of Austria-Hungary and Bul- garia, and the statement is made that the food shipment program may have to be increased 5,000,000 tons over the first arrangement in order to meet the unexpected food developments caused by the Austrian collapse. Hints are even thrown out that Americans may even be _called upon to meet one of the supreme tests of a true Christian— to share their food with those who have heretofore been enemies. One of the young Americans just out of Russia says that Bolshevism is spreading throughout the Austrian territories and Turkey and that _ the best cure for it is food. A leather expert in touch with Russian conditions says that next to food the Russian people will need shoes next winter more than anything else. What an appeal these facts will make to the generosity of the American farmer! How they could be used to fire him to sturdy efforts to grow more than America needs! But what of the wheat and wool in Australia, the production possibili- lies of Russia herself, of Roumania and France? Suppose the Aus- tralian wheat were a surplus. What could such a surplus not do to the price of American*wheat if suddenly thrown on the market? Let us answer these questions by saying that the American farmer should not be permitted to let generous motives get the better of his sound busi- ness judgment. However, Russia may have to be the world’s ward for some time to come. If so, the rest of the world has to supply her with food for a year or two, and to supply Austria and possibly Germany even, common sense and foresight seem to urge that as soon as possible the associated nations draw plans accordingly to meet the world emergency. It is not too much to believe that the nations now asso- ciated as belligerents will be compelled to have some sort of under- standing as to their agricultural production, not only for self-protec- tion, but to fulfill the obligations which they will have towards the people of the defeated nations, and which, for humanity’s sake, they can not evade. Let us pass over the question of the distribution of food, feed, and fibers with the assumption that both on sea and land means will be found to move those products from the producer to the consumer. 62 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. There is another aspect of this subject which compels attention to agricultural production as an international world-wide problem. The financial problems after the war will be enormous. True, we Americans do not have to fear the consequences of a bad banking system which caused such havoc in the United States after the Civil War. The United States has a safeguard in a banking system which has stood the strain of the war splendidly. The war as a whole may not have been scientifically financed, but, in the light of the information avail- able, the work has been wonderfully well done. When peace comes and the ledger is cast up, the world will learn where it stands. It will know what interest charges must be met, what sinking funds must be created, what retrenchments made—in fact, the world will then find out that it is financially poor but sound in mind and heart. The job then will be to get to work, meet the interest, create the sinking funds, make the retrenchments, and strive with might and main to . create wealth to replace as far as possible that which has been destroyed. It is inconceivable in the first place that such a stupendous financial task can be performed without cooperation among the leaders of the nations now associated as belligerents, and in the second place . it is equally inconceivable that the possibilities of agriculture as a source for the rapid creation of wealth could by any chance be over- looked. Let us consider the relationship of agriculture to war finance in the light of a famous national experiment. As a war measure Great Britain has made a great effort.to increase wheat production. As such it is justifiable and the British farmers as a class have loyally cooper- ated with the government to make the plan succeed. Under the stimu- lus of a high market price as a guarantee to farmers, the compulsion of law as to plantings and an elaborate organization for administra- tion several million acres of grass land were plowed up and possibly half of Great Britain’s wheat requirement was this year grown at home. I believe it was Disraeli who once referred to the British as the most emotional nation in Europe. The success of their wheat campaign has fired many leading British agriculturists with the idea that it is possible to grow all the wheat needed in the United King- dom. If wheat, why not all necessary staples, and the fetish “agricul- tural self-sufficiency” comes into being. The Government, through the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Prothero, and one of his chief assistants, Sir Daniel Hall, are committed to this policy even if (in Sir Daniel’s opinion) state ownership of land becomes necessary. Aside from the natural preference of British farmers for grass farming and live stock production and the economy of wheat production in the British colonial dominions, the expense tothe British taxpayer for the subsidies the British farmer now receives for wheat growing is somewhere around a REPORT OF GEORGE M. ROMMEL. 63 million dollars a day. In France, even, where wheat growing was always important and supplied in peace times most of the nation’s requirements, a member of this Commission has estimated the cost * of the bread subsidy at two hundred and forty million dollars annu- ally. With the cheaper wheat of Canada, Australia, India, and South America available, such a condition becomes intolerable, because it subjects the non-agricultural classes to a burden of taxation which they will be the first to resent. After-the-war financing will not stand such an expense item and sound economy will demand its elimination. This subject and others like it (wool supplies, for example) should not be handled without expert agricultural advice and participation at the council table. The subject of agriculture can not escape con- ‘sideration in business management of inter-allied affairs after peace is declared, and it should be handled by qualified authorities and not by men who, well meaning though they may be, are frequently amateurs. 64 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. THE AGRICULTURAL NEEDS OF THE ALLIES DURING 1920. FRENCH REQUIREMENTS. War or no war, it seems probable that France will need in 1920, and perhaps for one or two years thereafter, to import wheat, frozen meat, wool, farm machinery, and commercial fertilizers in greater quantity than before the war. This is the general consensus of opinion among French authorities themselves. There follows, in brief summary, some of the evidence collected in support of this statement. WHEAT. The estimated wheat production for 1918 is 614 million metric tons. For reasons stated elsewhere there may be not more than 5 million tons raised in 1919. The requirement for 1918 has been placed at 7,175,000 metric tons, including 900,000 tons for seed. This is based upon bread made by the substitution of 20 per cent of other cereals. If the requirement for 1920 is based on white bread, 7.8 million metric tons of wheat will be required for human consumption. To this must be added the seed requirement, 900,000 metric tons, making a total of 8.7 million tons, of which France may be expected to produce 5 million. This leaves 3.7 million metric tons, or 187 million bushels, to be imported in 1920. BARLEY. Wheat, says the French expert, should be favored in place of barley. From an importation standpoint barley is chiefly interesting as a wheat substitute. Last year it was necessary to use barley as a diluent of wheat flour. Hence there was not enough home-grown barley for brewing. Furthermore, there had been but little carry-over the previous year. In case of peace, France will go back to wheat bread, and will be less interested in barley, since then its own pro- duction of barley will more nearly supply its demand. From the standpoint of importation wheat is important also because it takes less space than an equal value of barley and because it has a higher milling quality. FROZEN MEAT. The total number of cattle in France has decreased considerably, perhaps 15 to 20 per cent. About half of this decrease was due to loss of occupied territory. The number of calves, however, is normal, REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 65 or even above that of pre-war times. Hence the percentage of loss of mature animals is much greater. In order that the cattle supply of France recuperate quickly, the farmers should hold back from market their young stock, and frozen meat should be imported while these young animals are becoming mature. Whether this will occur depends, of course, on relative prices. It would seem probable that the demand among the farmers themselves, for live animals, in order to consume the pastures and forage, would help to keep their animals from coming to market, and thus induce the importation of beef if prices do not rule too high. WOOL. The reasons for it will be discussed elsewhere, but the fact is that there has been a marked decrease—it may almost be said an extraor- dinary as well as unwise decrease—in the number of sheep during the war. By 1915 the number had decreased 40 per cent. Since then there have probably been further decreases. This not only lessens the meat supply, but also lowers the future output of wool. There is a general consensus of opinion that it will take fibers, especially wool and cotton, longer to catch up with the world’s needs than it will the food supplies. France, England, and Germany are all likely to be in the world’s market for some years to come, with insistent demands for fibers, which may have an important bearing upon the agriculture of the United States during the next decade. The signi- ficance of this remark will be discussed later. FARM MACHINERY. It is more or less short lived. Hence there has been not only a considerable loss in the damaged area, but there has been a decrease through normal use in the free portions of France. The shortage of manpower has also caused a greater interest in labor-saving machin- ery. These and other factors seem to make it certain that there will be an increased demand for farm machinery, using the term in a broad way. For example, there is a marked deficiency at the present time of carts and wagons. Ammunition factories, it is believed by some, will later turn their attention to the production of farm machin- ery, including tractors, thus making extensive importations unneces- sary. Others say that the French do not show a genius for the con- struction of farm machinery and will not be able to compete with American firms who already more or less fully occupy the field. How- ever that may be, it seems that there will be a considerable demand for American farm machinery, at least during the transition or the attempted transition stage, as the case may be, provided American 66 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. factories are themselves in a position to supply the orders. Since the manufacturers of farm machinery are competently represented in Europe it may be doubted whether any suggestions by this Com- mission can be serviceable. COMMERCIAL FERTILIZERS. The one requirement of French agriculture upon which the French authorities are agreed is the need of commercial fertilizers. So em- phatic is this feeling that they say one boat bringing phosphates from Africa will be as effective as fifteen boats in bringing food from America. France is also short of nitrogenous feeding stuffs, through the breakdown of her oil factories during the war. It has been neces- sary for Great Britain to allot sulphate of ammonia to France which she very much needed on her own farms. ; TRANSPORTATION. Over and above these direct agricultural requirements France needs. freight cars. Lack of transportation helps to aggravate the shortage of food. Thus, for example, while there is a general shortage of pota- toes in France, the situation is made much more difficult because in. some places there is an over-Supply while in others there is a great shortage. The greater demand for freight cars for moving soldiers. and munitions makes it impossible to move potatoes from one point to the other. This applies more or less to all classes of staple foods.. The shortage of wheat is made greater by the lack of transportation. between Algiers and France. Hay is selling in Paris at $80 per ton retail, while within fifty miles there are farmers who are having: difficulty in making satisfactory disposition of their product. BRITISH REQUIREMENTS. A study of the 1920 and future needs of the United Kingdom is: made somewhat difficult by the attitude of mind of the British men. of affairs. It is to be the settled policy of the United Kingdom to get its raw materials from its outlying possessions, and in return to. insist upon these colonies buying their manufactured materials from the home country. It is a part of the policy to keep London the great financial center of the world. Of course, even in pre-war times, there: has always been the assumption, more or less fully understood, that this would be done. - Now it is a definite and avowed policy, which Premier Hughes of Australia states as “trade first with our overseas: dominion, next with our allies, next with the neutrals, and next or not at all with our enemies.” When, therefore, one talks to a REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 67 Britisher about the future needs of the United Kingdom, his mind instinctively considers not so much the needs of the United Kingdom as the supplies which their own possessions may be able to furnish. The primary object of the Commission was to determine the probable future needs of our allies without reference to the source of supply, and then secondly, how much of this need the United States should undertake to supply, and particularly, whether there was any obliga- tion upon the farmers of the United States to change their agricul- tural policy to meet these future demands. SEVEN STAPLE REQUIREMENTS. Various authorities discussed the following as probably needed by the United Kingdom in 1920 in greater quantity than in pre-war times, namely, (1) wheat, (2) meat, particularly frozen beef, (3) sugar, (4) coffee, (5) feeding stuffs, (6) wool, and (7) cotton. WHEAT. All observers insist upon wheat as the cheapest and most concen- trated import food. It has a higher nutritive value for the money required. It contains a large amount of food for the shipping space occupied. It has a high milling quality, and the offal has high feeding value. These milling offals are and will be much in demand. Some authorities state the rate of extraction as 85 per cent, while other equally good authorities say that 88 per cent is taken in domestic wheat and 91 per cent in the best imported hard wheat. The best extraction of barley is 68 per cent, while the present Government re- quirement is 50 per cent. The lower the extraction the better the flour and the more offal obtained for domestic animals, which just at the moment is a consideration of considerable importance. For the best grades of patent white wheat flour the extraction it was agreed should be 72 per cent. GRASS. There is a rather general but not unanimous agreement that the increased acreage of plowed land will not obtain permanently. The climate is better adapted to grass than to cereals. The British are willing to pay a higher price for their own meat products than for the imported article. Imported beef, however, is sometimes sold as prime British beef. Our American mutton is, confessedly, below the British quality. The bacon, with its excessive fat and its hard salt cure, which is now being shipped from the United States is distinctly inferior to the American bacon used for home consumption. It is also 68 REPORT OF AGRICULTURAL COMMISSION TO EUROPE. pointed out that most of the flour milling is now done at seaports, hence these mills can buy to advantage imported wheat. It is the interior mills which grind the domestic wheat chiefly. They are generally decreasing, both in number and size, because of this seaport competition. The factor that does most to keep them going is the bran, which in addition to being nearer the point of consumption is claimed to be of better quality for feeding purposes. How much of this claim was justified was not determined. LATE SEASON. According to observations, as well as statements made, the season has been late. The large crop of wheat has been rather badly damaged by persistent rains. The loss has been variously estimated at from 5 to 25 per cent, the first figure probably being nearer the truth. A ‘representative of the leading milling company which is now grinding the present domestic crop, says that it is the poorest in quality in the history of the country. Since little wheat is yet sown, it seems not improbable that there might be a decrease in the acreage of the 1919 crop. It is claimed, however, by more than one British commen- tator that there is still plenty of time (October 29th) to plow and seed wheat. If it is sown by December first, say these observers, all will be well, although it is admitted that October seeding is preferred. It is stated also that last year a considerable portion of the newly broken sod was sown to oats. This year that land will go into wheat. Hence the acreage of the latter may be further increased. At least one member of the Commission believes that the acreage of wheat will be less in 1918-19 than in 1917-18 in the United Kingdom. SUBMARINES. On account of the submarine warfare, drastic measures were taken to cause the plowing up of grass land and the seeding to cereals and other food crops. In 1917 the total area in England and Wales in grass, including clover and rotation grasses, was 18,334,370 acres. The preliminary statement for 1918 shows a decrease of grass land of 1,650,690 acres, or 9 per cent. Likewise in 1917 the area in cereals was 5,693,200 acres, and in 1918, 7,080,380 acres, or an increase of 1,387,180 acres, which is an increase of 24 per cent. Beans increased 19 per cent and peas 15 per cent. Potatoes increased from 507,990 to 633,840 acres, or 25 per cent. Flax increased from 2,510 to 18,400 acres, or more than six times. The acreage in wheat increased 33 per cent; oats, which exceed wheat in total acreage, 23 per cent, and barley 3 per cent. The acreage of all human foods increased, while the acreage of all crops for domestic animals remained about station- m REPORT OF THOMAS F. HUNT. 69 ary or decreased in the United Kingdom, with the exception of oats, ‘which are now extensively used for human food. The requisitioning of food ordinarily used for live stock has produced a marked domestic shortage of concentrates and of hay. Pigs and chickens are being sacrificed because of this situation, and a marked increase in the price of milk has been allowed. Thus the winter wholesale price of milk has been set at $5.40 per cwt. f. o. b. farmer’s railway station. This price is between three and four times any pre-war prices existing since at least 1880. The estimated yield of wheat in the whole United Kingdom is the largest since 1878. The average pre-war yield for the two years prior to the war, together with the production for each of the following years, is shown below: Average. Million Bushels. TPIS Syo:d SOO OS IC IOI CRC nee ra 57.04 OS IAT eetetetale fetes aie ois Si nie ae ease s.cisiseysale sielecsh 0s Sn eies 62.52 NG A cepemereneen taretererc ia aiet cy cis "ajo Or eveVa\/s' ates toleieteie stereos 73.12 LG THEFE Tl fpmedereneteys aie level 1 c/alai'cfeyeiclcrs’siais stave) less vss eis: 6 svete 59.77 MG UG ale trererets aot. = ais) oe aver sie ohavicys oeeneleie yt ial shad areis ase 64.32 MG eal Sian cave edayenstctni ar) syevcueieseve Gia ehalavevere aie eis accents 193.20 1 Estimated. Not since 1885 has the yield of wheat exceeded 80 million bushels until this year. RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE WAR UPON THE AGRICULTURE OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. It is interesting to note the comparative trend of wheat production in the United Kingdom and France, not alone because of its bearing upon the supply of wheat, but because it indicates in a considerable degree the relative vicissitudes of agriculture in the two countries. Remembering that the average production of wheat for the two years 1912 and 1913 was, in the United Kingdom, less than 60 million bushels, and in France, about 330 millions, and taking these yields at 100, the percentage production during the war period compared to the pre-war production stands as follows: United Kingdom. France. OB yaya cy uctetareke ties ayeiarans oleae 100 100 BO ies iT Flee ta Sit : , ‘ f AY A ‘can ; * ath et tr 4 a ; “4 : ia Pia y ae as a Py at LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Il a J ——————————— a | —s—