COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy

An extended study of the interactions of science
and technology with United States foreign policy

Volume III

COMMITTEE PRINT

U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy

An extended study of the interactions of science
and technology with United States foreign policy

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COMMITTEE PRINT

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, B.C. 20402 (3-part set ; sold in sets only)

Stock Number 052-070-04350-4

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia
E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CaUfornia
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, lUinois
PAUL FINDLEY, IlUnois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California

John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff
George R. Berdes, Staff Contultant

Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas

Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director

William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant

Forrest R. Frank, Subcommittee Staff AnocicUe

La Verne Still, Staff Atsittant

(II)

Contents — Volume III

Organization of the Study v

Introduction to the Analysis and Findings:

Chapter 15 — Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Meth-

odolog}^ of the Study 1505

Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues:

Chapter 16 — Anal3^sis of the Cases 1517

Chapter 17 — Analysis of the Issues 1595

Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications:

About the Essays to Follow 1705

Chapter 18 — Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy . 1713
Chapter 19 — Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Re-
lationships 1737

Chapter 20 — High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-
Technology Diplomacy . " 1757

Chapter 21 — Roles and Interactions of Public and Private

Institutions in International Technology 1783

Chapter 22 — Independence Versus Interdependence . . . 1805

Chapter 23 — Long-Range and Short-Range Planning . . 1847

Chapter 24 — Concluding Observations 1885

Bibliography 1909

(III)

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Volume I
Introduction to the Study as a Whole

Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age

The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy

Part 1 — Six Cases

The Baruch Plan

Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe

The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year

The Mekong Project

Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed

United States-Soviet Commercial Relations

Volume II
Part 2 — Six Issues

The Evolution of International Technology

The Politics of Global Health

Beyond Malthus

U.S. Scientists Abroad

Brain Drain

Science and Technology in the Department of State

Volume III
Introduction to the Analysis and Findings

Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study

Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues

Analysis of the Cases
Analysis of the Issues

Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications

About the Essays to Follow

Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy

Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships

High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy

Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International
Technology

Independence Versus Interdependence

Long-Range and Short-Range Planning

Concluding Observations

Bibliography

(V)

INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS

AND FINDINGS

Chapter 15 — Recapitulation of Purpose,
Scope, and Methodology of the Study

CONTENTS

Page

Scope of the Study 1510

Methodology of the Study 1511

Organization of Parts 3 and 4 1512

An Anticipation of the Findings 1512

Opportunities for Institutional Reform 1512

Importance of Science and Technology for Diplomacy 1514

Problems and Opportunities Facing the Congress 1515

(1507)

CHAPTER 15— RECAPITULATION OF PURPOSE, SCOPE,
AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Parts 3 and 4 present an analytical summary of the findings of a
7-year study by the Congressional Research Service of the problems
and functional interactions of science, technology, and American
diplomacy. The study had its origins in congressional concern with
science and technology that had been steadily mounting since World
War II. The prospectus for the study, attributing to science and
technology "an ever-increasing influence on domestic public policy,"
added that they "also appear to have a growing effect on the content
and conduct of American foreign policy." ^

The general purposes of the study, as stated in the prospectus, was
"to provide Congress with background material useful in strengthening
the resources that support the conduct of American diplomacy." For
this purpose it would "describe and analyze the formulation and
administration of American diplomatic policies having significant
science and technology components."

More specifically, the study was designed to examine six "cases" and
six "issues" in recent diplomatic history in order to —

1. characterize processes and problems involving the interac-
tion of science and technology with diplomacy;

2. define organizational requirements for the effective formula-
tion of important policies to direct and control activities involving
this interaction;

3. identify ways in which the capabilities of agencies serving at
this interface can be strengthened legislatively or administra-
tively ;

4. discover ways in which science and technology can better
support foreign policy objectives of the United States; and

5. discover ways in which the conduct of diplomatic activities
can better support the healthy growth of national and interna-
tional science and technology.^

As noted in chapter 1, Lloyd V. Berkner posed two questions in
his 1950 report for the Department of State on "Science and Foreign
Relations":

1. How can the potentialities of scientific progress be
integrated into the formulation of foreign policy, and the
administration of foreign relations, so that the maximum
advantages of scientific progress and development be ac-
quired by all peoples?

2. How can foreign relations be conducted in such a manner
as to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective
progress of science and technology? ^

1 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in
a Scientifio Age," In the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P.
Huddle, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Con-
gress, Washington, D.C.. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, 28 p. (Committee print.) Chapter 1
is a current version of tliis prospectus, updated to .luly 1977. See vol. I. pp. 1-.35 ; see p. .5
for the specific reference.

^ Ibid., p. 8.

^Ibid., p. 10.

(1509)

1510

The 12 completed studies in the series, and the analysis that follows,
are intended to suggest answers to Berkner's two questions. However,
much has happened in the 27 years since the questions were posed. It
is unlikely that the participants in the Berkner report had in mind the
vast scope of the impacts that science and technology would impose
on the world of diplomacy. Space exploration, the use of satellites for
communications and remote sensing, the ballistic missile deterrent
impasse, the Green Revolution, the technological dedication to
petroleum that made the oil embargo effective, supertankers, nuclear
proliferation, and the technology transfer activities of multinational
corporations have emerged as important diplomatic concerns since the
publication of the Berkner report. Even the International Geo-
physical Year, in which Berkner was a leading participant, postdates
by some years his scheme to bring science and technology into the
Department of State.

The purpose of part 3 of the extended study is to sift through the
12 chapters in which the 6 cases and 6 issues are analyzed, in order to
present a summarization of the entire project. However, unlike most
summaries, this publication contains new material ■ further thoughts
by the authors of the 12 individual studies, and by the present authors
(the project codirectors) , and assessment of the performance of the
governmental decisionmaking apparatus in relation to the outcomes of
these studies. The extended study ends with a comprehensive an-
notated bibliography prepared in January 1976 with a supplement
updating it to August 1977.*

Scope of the Study

The supporting studies of six cases and six issues summarized in
part 3 are as follows:

CASES ISSUES

1. The Baruch Plan for international- 1. International impact of technology

ization of atomic energy. on diplomacy.

2. The Eisenhower proposal for peaceful 2. The politics of global health.

use of the atom.

3. The International Geophysical Year. 3. Food and population.

4. The Mekong regional development 4. Temporary placement of U.S. scien-

proposal. tists abroad.

5. Efforts to reach international agree- 5. The "brain drain" of technically

ment on exploiting the resources of trained people,

the seabed.

G. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade treaty and 6. Bringing science and technology into
technology transfer. the Department of State.

A decision was made at the outset of the project to exclude considera-
tion of all subject matter that involved security-classified information.
Accordingly, no military or intelligence topics were considered, and
arms control was dealt with only to a limited extent in two of the
papers which examined unclassified aspects of atomic energy cases.
Several studies were abandoned with regret: those tentatively pro-
jected on the use of the social sciences in the U.S. Information Agency,
the computer and information management, scientific research in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Treaty on Outer Space.

* Both were prepared by Genevieve Johanna Knezo, analyst in science and technology of
the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service.

1511

The project director and associate director also regret that it was
not possible to extend the study series to cover some other important
areas: for example, research and development in the U.S. foreign aid
program, global allocation of material and fuel resources, and science
and technology activities in the complex of United Nations
organizations.

Indeed, one of the difficulties in undertaking a broad policy study
in the field of diplomacy is the richness of the subject and the attrac-
tiveness of the issues it presents. What was attempted, therefore, was
the selection of a representative and manageable list of topics that
were judged to yield instructive guidance to the Congress and to
policy analysts in the executive branch. Perhaps it will be possible
for the academic community to extend the analyses begun with the
present series in 1970 into the topics neglected.

It was a part of the plan for the project that each of the 12 separate
studies should perform 2 functions: It should stand alone as a useful
account and analysis of an issue containing important policy questions
and legislative values; and it should be an integral part of the total
project on the managing of the interface of science and technology
with diplomacy. As observed in chapter 1, there is evidence that the
first purpose has already been served. The analysis that follows
represents the effort to achieve the second purpose.

Methodology of the Study

The six cases and six issues examined in the total study necessarily
bear some substantive relationship to each other. However, there
is no intention of presenting them as a time sequence. This is not
in any sense a chronology of science, technology, and American
diplomacy since 1945, when the atomic bomb gave the subject a
permanent urgency, or since 1950, when an early effort at serious
appraisal was made in the Berkner report. Each separate case or
issue is presented in its own time frame. The focus of the study as a
whole is on the nature of the problem of relating technical problems
and opportunities to diplomatic methods, processes, and philosophy.
Each case or issue is presented as a study complete in itself, but the
series of these studies taken together provides a longitudinal report
on the subject prepared during the years 1970 to 1975, inclusive, and
covering selected events over a much longer timespan. The order of
the summaries is determined by the topics and substantive matters
rather than by the chronological order of theix original issuance.

To eliminate some of the awkwardness that this methodology
introduces, each author reviewed his or her contribution to the
study to bring it — more or less — up to date.' Questions that have
emerged since first issuance are indicated and comments on the
original studies are responded to.

But to repeat: The purpose of the entire project is not historical
but analytical; it is intended that the project as a whole will provide a
coherent and reasonably comprehensive set of observations for use
by the Congress in surveying the broad canvas of science, technology,
and American diplomacy. Is the subject as crucial to the welfare of

'• The reassessments by authors were made In 1975 or early 1976 ; some of them, as noted
In each instance, have been updated to mld-1977.

1512

humanity as it is sometimes allep:ed to be? If so, why, and in what
ways? What are its major areas of concern? What are its institutional
and procedural problems? W^hat possibilities are offered for leo^islative
strengthening of the institutions and the processes involved?

In imposing some degree of uniformity on the separate cases and
issues it was hoped that from each separate study it would be possible
to draw insights and evidence that could be presented in a coherent
fashion in this summary report bearing on the outstanding policy
aspects of the science-technology-diplomacy interrelationship. These
policy aspects would also be identified, and confirmed or qualified, by
the cases and issues themselves.

Options for congressional consideration to strengthen the U.S.
diplomatic apparatus, and possible ways to strengthen congressional
participation in the foreign policy process, are identified from an exam-
ination of all the cases and issues, taken together. In the concluding
chapter of the overall study, these findings are offered and discussed,
as are a number of questions of fundamental policy.

Organization of Parts S and 4

Following this introduction, in part 3, the six cases and the six
issues are recapitulated, subjected to further analysis by both in-
dividual authors and project codirectors, and, where appropriate,
brought up to date. In part 4 the report offers 6 essays of a more
extended nature on policy alternatives that have emerged out of the
12 studies as important questions governing future direction of the
diplomatic aspects of science and technology, and of the technical
aspects of diplomacy. Whereas the recapitulations — which might be
termed abstracts to which have been added observations from a
broadened and more current perspective — involve focusing on the
circumstances of the 12 studies, taken individually, and their im-
plications for the general theme, each of the essays examines all 12
of the studies from the perspective of one major aspect or dimension
of the general theme.

An Anticipation of the Findings

In the concluding chapter, a number of separate products ought to
emerge, properly documented and defined. One is a set of general
conclusions as to the need for reform of the institutional arrangements
for dealing with the broad scope of the subject. Another is a better
appreciation of the importance of the relationship between diplomacy
and both science and technology — but especially the latter. A third
is the particular set of problems and opportunities that challenge the
Congress to provide for their legislative solution or exploitation.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Many illustrations appear, in the individual studies of the project'
of the need to eliminate institutional gaps and deficiencies in the U.S.
diplomatic machinery that result from the emergence of technology as
a major force, if not the primary force, compelling diplomatic change
and adaptation to change. Among these illustrations are the following:
— The United States is preeminent in technology and admin-
istrative management but neither of these great attributes has
been effectively mobilized by the Department of State for pur-
poses of U.S. diplomacy.

1513

— ^Virtually all the great problems facing the United States
today have a large technological content. Yet those most knowl-
edgeable about the generation, management, and utilization of
new technology are not being inducted into the U.S. diplomatic
machinery; conversely, too few of those who are part of the
machinery of diplomacy are equipped by education, training, and
experience to communicate effectively with the technologists or
even to recognize when a technological/diplomatic problem exists.
• — Multinational corporations are recognized as the primary
mechanism for international transfer of technology, yet the United
States has no policy for enlistment and coordination of this
great organizational resource to advance the purposes of U.S.
diplomacy.

— In its development of large technological systems, American
engineering has led the world in its ability to deal with an in-
finity of variables, design options, and interfaces. Apart from
mainly military initiatives of the Department of Defense, systems
approaches congenial to technologists have not been exploited
to develop technological initiatives beneficial to U.S. diplomacy.
— In the murky field of national security the emphasis has
been on the design of nuclear weaponry and high-precision sub-
nuclear weapons, to the neglect of the broader aspects of national
security such as: vulnerability of external sources of materials
essential to the U.S. economy, vulnerability of U.S. transport
indispensable to heavy industry, and the economic health and
innovativeness of basic materials industries.

— In the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, preference is given to
bilateral agreements and programs. Science and technology are
major ingredients in these activities but the resources of people
with both diplomatic and technical expertise to serve these
agreements — numbering 28 as of early 1976 — are seriously
deficient. Moreover, resort to multilateral programs — which,
though difficult, might be a more efficient and diplomatically
more acceptable way to use these resources — is largely neglected
or downgraded. Engineering support for the United Nations and
its family of associated agencies is feeble.

— The style of American diplomacy contrasts sharply with
that of American industry, in that engineering moves from the
establishment of goals to the design of programs to achieve them
while diplomacy waits for crises to appear and then attempts to
cope with them.
Thus, the study reveals the need for a greater emphasis on long-
range planning of diplomacy, with particular emphasis on its tech-
nological aspects. There needs to be a sustained and systematic search
for future trends in the world outlook, a sustained effort to formulate
U.S. goals, and a broad-gauge effort to discover organizing principles
to bring a greater coherence to U.S. foreign policy.

Better and more accessible information is needed about all aspects
of the global diplomatic scene and about the forces that technology
brings to bear on it.

All signs seem to ])oint to the need for a mobilization and coordina-
tion of the enormous intellectual resources of the United States in
academic institutions and other nongovernmental centers of intel-

1/514

lectual analysis whose contributions are insufficiently available to
diplomatic decisionmakers today. At the same time, in the formu-
lation and furtherance of diplomatic goals, every effort would be
worth consideration to bring technological skills into closer con-
junction with those of political and economic policy.

Finally, the role of technology could usefully be studied for op-
portunities to design international institutions to reverse the all-too-
evident trend toward disaffection of the "Third World" toward the
United States.

IMPORTANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DIPLOMACY

Studies of war and diplomacy up to 1945 assumed that either of
these two modes of international relationship was the extension of
the other. The further assumption was implicit that no technology
of warfare could ever dissolve or destroy the necessary interrelation-
ship of war and diplomacy. At one stroke the atomic bomb transformed
the relationship and made the avoidance of total war the prime goal
of diplomacy; subsequent refinements and delivery systems confirmed
the new order. At the same time, the nations of the world came to
recognize technology itself as a principal foundation of national power
and diplomatic influence.

The achievements of technology since World War II have done
nothing to contradict this assessment. Technology has moved to center
stage in the world diplomatic scene. The United States, as the principal
national exponent in technological achievement, ought therefore to be
recognized as diplomatically preeminent, but ought also to accept the
responsibility for leading the way in the application of technology to
the achievement of goals shared with the other nations of the world.

Thus, the theses emerge from the study of Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy that —

(1) In a rapidly changing world, the business of the Federal Govern-
ment is increasingly the governance of relations with other States,
working with them in rational and controlled ways toward global
development and the betterment of the human condition.

(2) The historical role of violence or the threat of violence as the
measure of diplomatic effectiveness has been considerably superseded
by competitive excellence in technology.

(3) Domestically, the United States is foremost among world powers
in technological excellence.

(4) Exercise of this preeminence for purposes of achieving world
progress and harmony is both a moral imperative and a requirement of
national security. As technology brings peoples closer together, these
two motivations — national interest and international morality — tend
more and rnore to reinforce each other. To the extent that they do not,
the result may be chaos and, ultimately, failure of the human race, or
at least of the present great civilizations of the world, to survive.

(5) There are difficulties, not yet susceptible of evaluation as to
their relative importance, but certainly including —

(a) The sheer numbers of contacts and agencies concerned with
technology on the international level, for multiple purposes having
an infinite variety of sponsorship, affiliation, and structure;

151.5

(b) The grossly inadequate resources allocated by the United
States to the analysis of its technological resources, with particular
reference to their applicability toward global objectives of the
United States;

(c) Diffusion of effort, both because of the number of interna-
tional claimants for attention and because of the absence of clearly
defined foreign policy in technology — in particular, policy as to the
proper relationship of U.S. efforts to those of other countries and
of international organizations;

(d) The tendency of less-developed nations to identify the
U.S. mix of moral purpose and technological superiority with
colonialism;

(e) The fact that too much has been expected of American
mone}^ and skills to 3'ield quick results through sheer volume and
technical virtuosity, and that too little has been said of the need
for patience, perseverance, and acquired insights to accommodate
to the psychologies of other cultures and to solve large problems
of development by tackling the innumerable small, everyday
problems.

PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE CONGRESS

In the 12th study in the series, the importance was stressed of the
diplomatic role of tlie Congress: "In the last analysis the Constitution
vests in the Congress of the United States a large share of decision-
making power on foreign as well as domestic affairs. Senatorial assent
is the sine qua non of treatymaking. The power of the purse defines
congressional control over all positive actions and programs of the
Federal Government, foreign as well as domestic. The control of
foreign trade and international transfers of persons, no less than the
regulation of Armed Forces and the right to declare war, rests in the
Congress." '^

Also, the congressional need was suggested for strengthened insti-
titional means to provide assistance in the following ways:

— Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with
congressional intent in the area of scientific and technological
impacts on foreign policy and international relations — and vice
versa ;

— ^ Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic
environment as changes occur in response to the global spread of
technological innovation;

— ^Assessing the secondary impacts and interrelationships of
"international" technological issues;

— Examining the adequacy of U.S. "international" institutions
in the face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting
from the global spread of technological innovation;

— Structuring and making coherent the array of foreign policy
interactions with science and technology; and

" U.S. CoiiRress. House. Committee on International Relations. Science and Technology
in the Department of State, in the series Science. Technolojiy. and American Diplomacy,
prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin
P. Huddle, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, 1073. See vol. II, p. 1500.

— Maintaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an
extended institutional memor}^ and an assistance cadre for
major studies for "international" committees concerned with
S. & T, questions, S. & T. committees concerned with foreign
policy questions, and committees monitoring major technological
missions with significant international implications/
The interest of the Congress is inevitably — and more and more
demonstrably — drawn to the importance of technology in its influence
on the U.S. world posture, both directly through the diplomatic
process and indirectly through the contributions of technology to U.S.
economic health and vitality. Other congressional interests include
the development of specific diplomatic initiatives employing tech-
nology for national and international benefit; and the evolution of
sound policies for the sharing of U.S. technology abroad and for the
mutually beneficial exchange of technology with other countries.

From these preoccupations, it would seem to follow that the Con-
gress has a strong justification for considered action to supply
(a) the best possible mechanism for long-range diplomatic planning
in the Executive Office of the President; (b) means to strengthen orga-
nizational resources of the Department of State at home and abroad
relative to science and technology; (c) positive guidance to the
Department of State in the use of nongovernmental intellectual
resources and institutions bearing on the relationship of diplomacy
with science and technology; and (d) means to strengthen the
resources supporting the Congress itself in making its own independent
decisions on all these matters.

7 Ibid., p. 1467.

PART 3 — ANALYSIS OF THE CASES

AND ISSUES

Chapter 16 — Six Cases Illustrating the

Interaction of Science, Technology,

and American Diplomacy

CONTENTS

Case One — The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age: Pag«

Statement of the Case 1521

Importance of the Case 1522

How the Case Developed 1522

U.S. Involvement 1523

Role of Congress 1524

Outcome 1524

Assessment 1524

General Lessons From the Study 1526

Author's Reassessment 1528

Need for Congressional Involvement 1528

Some Illustrative Questions 1529

Case Two — Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of
Diplomacy With a New Technology:

Statement of the Case 1529

Importance of the Case 1529

How the Case Developed 1530

Purposes of the IAEA 1531

European Regional Organizations 1531

Non- Proliferation Treaty 1532

U.S. Involvement "1 1533

U.S. Support of IAEA 1533

U.S. Relationship to Euratom and NEA 1534

U.S. Position on Safeguards 1535

Role of Congress 1536

The Congress and Agreements on Nonmilitary Uses 1536

Outcome 1537

Assessment 1537

Author's Reassessment 1540

Relevance of Study Themes Today 1541

Some Lessons From the Study of Commercial Nuclear Power 1542

Legislative Implications 1542

Some Illustrative Questions 1543

Channeling of U.S. Technical Assistance in Nuclear Power 1543

The International Atomic Energy Agency 1544

The IAEA as a "Testbed" 1544

Euratom 1545

Joint Euratom-U.S. Research 1545

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 1545

U.S. Nuclear Fuel Services 1545

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Safeguards 1546

Case Three — The Political Legacy of the International Geophysiaal Year:

Statement of the Case 1546

Importance of the Case 1547

How the Case Developed 1547

IGY Concept Replaces That of TPY 1548

Scientific Results of IGY 1549

U.S. Involvement ; 1550

Role of Congress 1550

Outcome 1551

The Space Program 1551

Congressional Responses 1553

Other Domestic and General EflFects of IGY 1553

International Impacts 1554

(1519)

l!520

Case Three — The Political Legacy of the International Geophj^sical Year —

Continued Page

Assessment 1555

Author's Reassessment 1557

Global Scientific Cooperation 1557

Improved Transfer of Knowledge 1557

Remaining Obstacles 1558

The Emigration Problem 1 558

A Summing Up 1558

Some Illustrative Questions __ 1558

Case Four — The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of
Regionalism :

Statement of the Case 1559

Importance of the Case 1560

How the Case Developed 1560

U.S. Involvement 1561

The Wheeler and Ford Foundation Reports 1562

The Mekong Project's Broad Base of Support 1563

Role of Congress 1564

Outcome 1565

Assessment 1566

The Momentum of Nonpoliticized Regionalism 1566

Geography as the Binding Force 1567

Advantages of Multilateral Regionalism 1567

Author's Reassessment 1568

The Mekong Project in Perspective 1568

Some Observations and Conclusions 1569

Some Illustrative Questions 1571

Case Five — Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed :

Statement of the Case 1572

Importance of the Case 1572

How the Case Developed 1573

U.S. Involvement in the Case 1574

Role of Congress 1574

Outcome 1575

Assessment 1576

Author's Reassessment 1576

Policy Proposal by Secretary Kissinger 1578

Some Illustrative Questions 1579

Case Six — U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics,
Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy:

Statement of the Case 1579

Importance of the Case 1580

How the Case Developed 1581

Accelerated Movement Toward Detente 1582

U.S. Involvement 1582

Barriers to Trade Expansion 1583

Role of Congress 1584

Outcome 1 585

Assessment 1585

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Prospects 1586

Political Consequences 1587

Risks*Versus Potential Gains 1588

Author's Reassessment 1 588

East- West Trade in Perspective 1588

Expansion of Trade as Element of Detente 1589

Past U.S. Legal Restrictions 1589

Recent Moves Toward Liberalization of Trade 1590

Carter Administration Policy 1591

Some Illustrative Questions 1592

CHAPTER 16— SIX CASES ILLUSTRATING THE INTER-
ACTION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY

In chaptere 1 and 15, reference was made to the original plan
to present a number of cases and issues to illustrate the interaction of
science, technolo^', and American diplomacy, and in doing so to adopt
a conmion format. Despite the widely differing circumstances of the 12
separate studies which followed, it did prove possible to achieve sub-
stantial structural parallelism in treating them. This parallelism is
evident in the fact that virtually all of the studies contribute illustra-
tions and insights to each of the 6 major operational issues presented
below in chapters 18 through 23 even though the topics of the 12
studies were not selected with these operational issues in mind. On
the contrary, the operational issues were suggested by the independent
analyses of studies as the series progressed., -- - -

The parallelism "is also evident in the ease with which the com-
mentaries on the various studies fit the somewhat arbitrary formats
circumscribing all of them — one format for the six cases and a varia-
tion of it for the six substantive issues.

The format for the six cases is given herewith, followed by the
commentaries on the cases themselves:

Statement of the case

Importance of the case

How the case developed

U.S. involvement

Role of Congress

Outcome

Assessment

Author's reassessment

Some illustrative questions

CASE ONE— THE BARUCH PLAN: U.S. DIPLOMACY ENTERS THE

NUCLEAR AGE «

Statement of the Case

The proposal to internationalize the control of atomic energy
presented by U.S. negotiator Bernard M. Baruch on June 14, 1946,
at the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Com-
mission, was the first major postwar step toward coping -w-ith a
foremost technological threat to future world security. Despite wide-
spread recognition of the dimensions of the threat,^ the negotiations

8 U. S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nu-
clear Age. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Le-
neicc N. Wu, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. See vol. I, pp. 53-122.

» Two Americans whose reaction to the threat when it first became known was essentially optimistic may
have been representative of many others. One, a military officer who was present at the Alamagordo test of
the first atom bomb, was heard to remark, with pardonable rhetoric: "At last war has devoured itself."
The other, the associate director of this study— then a U.S. Navy Japanese Language Officer assigned to
military government duties on Tinian, near the airfield from, which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima
(August 6, 194,5) was flown— wrote to his wife on August 8, 1945, that the development of "this terrifying new
weapon" could be seen as strengthening the prospects for world peace, because of the strong possibiUty that
"when a certain point was reached in the degree of devastation that war is capable of causing, that knowledge
would act as a deterrent to war and would do so increasingly as modern weapons increased in power. The
debut of [the atomic bomb] seems to me to mark that tiuning point."

To tlie extent that this reaction of characteristic American optimism may have been shared by those mak-
ing policv, however, it seems clear in retrospect that it was a hazardous one which took for granted the dif-
ficult negotiations, spurred by a supreme sense of urgency, upon which the achievement of a reliable state of
deterrence would have to depend. Thirty years later it is by no means certain whether "that turning point"
has actually been reached.

(1521)

1522

on the Baruch proposal ended in failure and the threat continues to
grow.

Importance of the Case

The arrival of atomic power was a technoloo;ical event of unparal-
leled significance for international affairs. It raised the cost of all-out
v>\arfare to an intolerable level and substantially altered the basis for
the positions of diplomats at the bargaining table. The problem of how
to establish control over both military and peaceful uses of atomic
energy posed an unprecedented challenge to world diplomacy. At
the outset, the technological necessities of effective international
control were politically unacceptable, especially to the Soviet Union.
For U.S. diplomacy the problem, seen in retrospect, was a test of
ability first to establish an atmosphere of confidence despite differing
political goals, then to fashion a step-by-step control program, keved
to common interests, which could serve as a basis for productive
negotiation. From the perspective of the Science, Technolog}^, and
American Diplomacystudy series, it was a major test of the capacity
of the United States to use its scientific, technological, and diplomatic
expertise in concert to solve a crucial world problem.

How the Case Developed

Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been
demonstrated to the world, the Truman Administration acted to
create public understanding of the bomb and its significance for the
United States. The Smyth report, containing a great deal of previously
classified, basic scientific information, Avas released in August 1945;
the President took initial steps toward enunciation of U.S. atomic
energy policy in two major addresses in October. On November 15
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom laid a foundation
for international action to control atomic energy in the Three Nation
Agreed Declaration.

In December the Soviet Union was made a party to the endeavor
in the signing of the Moscow Declaration. Earlier that month Assist-
ant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been appointed to liead a
committee to report to the Secretary on U.S. policy for international
control. In January 1946, the United Nations Atomic Eneigy Com-
mission (UNAEC) was created, and a Board of Consultants headed
by TVA Chairman David Lilienthal was formed to assemble technical
advice for the Acheson committee. The findings of the Acheson com-
mittee and the Board of Consultants (which came to be known as the
Acheson-Lilienthal report) were released in March 1946. In the same
month, Baruch vcas appointed to represent the United States in the
UNAEC.

The plan which Baruch presented to the UNAEC on June 14, 1946,
was a combination of his own ideas on international control of atomic
energy and the proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal report. A central
feature of the plan was an international organization to which would
be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy.
The plan also called for inspection and for making violations of the
control agreement subject to punishment, and a proposal that the
veto power in the Security Council would not apply in voting on
sanctions, in a counterproposal on June 19, the Soviet Union rejected
the idea of waiving the veto and urged a total prohibition of atomic
weapons, promotion of peaceful development of atomic energy, and
agreement on international control but with retention of full sovereign

1523

freedom of action. Ilowevei-, Soviet neo;otiators stopped short of
suggesting an actual procedure. There was thus from the outset a wide
gulf between the U.S. plan and the Soviet approach, a gulf that never
appreciably narrowed.

The work of the UNAEC proceeded for less than 4 years; a majonty
plan based on the U.S. proposals was accepted, 40-6-4, in a nonbincl-
ing U.N. General Assembly resolution, but rejected (by Soviet veto)
in the Security Council; by November 1949, the work of the UNAEC
had waned to the point where the General Assembly agreed to suspend
its activities.

U.S. Involvement

As suggested above, President Truman sought at the outset to
develop a broad base of understanding and participation in the process
of achieving international control of atomic energy. Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, asked by Truman to appoint a group to consider
both domestic and international control needs, brought leading
scientists together with key Government officials in the Secretary of
War's Interim Committee in May 1945. Vannevar Bush, eminent
scientist-engineer-administrator, and General Leslie Groves, head of
the Manhattan project which had developed the atom bomb, were
members of the Acheson committee formed in December 1945, along
with Har\'ard President James B. Conant and former Assistant Secre-
tary of War John McClo3^ The Board of Consultants appointed to
advise the committee consisted of TVA Chairman David Lilienthal,
New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. president Chester Barnard, Manhattan
project participant Harry A. Winne (an engineer and a vice president
of the General Electric Co.), and physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer,
who had directed the Manhattan Project weaponry installation at Los
Alamos. The Acheson-Lilienthal report which resulted from meetings
of these two groups identified the basic technological factors that
would affect the development of an international control system antl
outlined a control plan governed by those factors.

The delegation named to present the U.S. position to the United
Nations was of a different character. With financier Baruch were three
leading bankers, the head of the New York State Racing Commission,
and a scientific adviser who had served in that role with General
Groves. Baruch contributed a reputation for political acumen: it was
apparently hoped that he could help enlarge the administration's
freedom of action in international negotiations because he had the
confidence of Congress, which was concerned about giving away
secrets and thereby undermining the U.S. strategic position.

There appear to have been significant diflferences in perspective
between those who developed the recommendations for a policy of
international control of atomic energy, representing mainly a technical
approach, and those who were responsible for conducting the diplo-
matic negotiations to implement the emerging policy. In any case, con-
tact between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups
ended after a few meetings. There was fault on both sides: Baruch
resented open pubhcation of the Acheson-Lilienthal report; he asserted
that he would introduce his own ideas into the negotiations and con-
duct them in his own way; the members of the Acheson committee and
the Board of Consultants declined to serve under Baruch, partly on the
grounds that they wanted to retain the right to speak out in opposition
if Baruch pursued policies with which they disagreed.

1524

Role of Congress

Congress played no direct role in the negotiations but exercised a
restraining influence. At the time of the December 1945 conference
which resulted in the Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Vanden-
berg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other
Members of Congress repeatedly sought and received assurances from
the President that the United States would not release atomic energy
information before adequate safeguards were established. This pro-
tective attitude was heightened by the revelation in early 1946 of
evidence of espionage activities in Canada involving the transmission
of atomic energy information to the Soviet Union.

Outcome

The collapse of the Baruch plan negotiations was a costly diplomatic
failure. It would be idle to speculate on the consequent diversion of
resources from peaceful uses to armament expenditures. More con-
sequential still is the question of how the pattern of cooperation
established through a diplomatic success in this critical problem area
might have altered the course of postwar political developments.
Decisive agreement on an international control system might have
put an end to the uncertainty which has prevailed ever since: the
paradoxical uncertainty of escalating military power in conjunction
with waning security.^" Further, an early agreement might have
laid the groundwork for the development of peaceful applications of
nuclear energy almost a decade earlier than it in fact occurred, and
on a wider scale — thereby, among other things, possibly heading off
or making more manageable the present complex economic, energy,
and diplomatic situation with respect to oil. But apart from the uses
of nuclear power itself, a successful conclusion to the Baruch plan
negotiations could have provided an influential precedent — somewhat
as the IGY did a decade later, but in a more direct iatergovernniental
context — for the acceleration of international cooperative activity of
many kinds. It is conceivable, in short, that it might have averted or
mitigated the course of the Cold War,

Assessment

What were the reasons for the failure? One way of summmg them
up is to concede that the American political leaders and scientists
involved did not bring to bear the vision and persistent effort de-
manded by a problem of this extraordinary nature and magnitude.
In more specific terms, some of the elements of the failure were the
following:

— There was a basic contradiction in the U.S. negotiating
position. The United States had demihtarized in haste after World
War II, whereas the Soviet Union had maintained very sub-
stantial forces in combat readiness. This factor argued for
retention of the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons as long as

ID Various oljservers have commented on this paradox. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on August 26, 1973, Dr. Herbert York— Chancellor of the University of California at San Diego,
and previously Director of Defense Research and Engineering— noted that "ever since shortly after World
War II, the military power of the United States has been steadily increasing; over the same period the
national security of the United States has been rapidly and inexorably diminishing." (Technical Information
for Congress, p. 220.) On May 14, 1968, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown declared: "There can be no
successful aggression Ijy means of strategic war today." (Thf Kvolutinn nf Inlinmlional Tcchnolngti, \ ol. II,
p 630) Earlier, in lO'i", Dr. Henry Kissinger liad written in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policji: Ihc
destructiveness of modern weapons dei)rives victory in an all-out war of its historical meaning. {Iliid.,
p. 629.)

1525

]:)Ossible — a consideration that was as much in tlio minds of t]io
Soviet leaders as it was a concern of the administration and
the Congress. Yet the American leadership realized, and stated
])ublicly, that the secret could not be kept for long. Therefore, it
was necessary to move quickly and comprehensively to estab-
lish international controls. Paradoxically, the U.S. approach —
in particular, the fact that the United States repeatedly asserted
its intention of relinquishing atomic weapons but never reached
the point of defining the conditions and timing of what it would
consider acceptable controls — apj^ears to have underlined the
U.S.S.R.'s suspicion that it was the American purpose to retain
essential control while giving the appearance of vesting it in an
international body.

— There was calculated ambiguity in the Soviet position. Gen-
uinely suspicious of the United States, the U.S.S.R. substituted
statements of principle for concrete plans while it continued its
own atomic weaponry i)rogram which was to prove much further
advanced than most American scientists and diplomats sus-
pected at the time. In retrospect, the fact of understandable —
and at least partly justified — Soviet suspicions may argue that
the United States should have adopted a more conciliatory,
patient, and persistent negotiating posture.

— Certain features of the U.S. proposals which some considered
essential to an effective control system — notably those concern-
ing limitation of national sovereignty, inspection, and waiver
of veto in the Security Council in matters of punishment for
violations of a control agreement — were totally imacceptable
to the Soviet Union. The question arises as to whether these
points were in fact essential to a control plan and as to the extent
to which they prevented meaningful negotiation. A i)ossible
alternative approach in the U.S. poHcymaking process might
have been first to determine what among the basic technological
and political requirements of an effective control system each
side would accept, and then try to estabhsh some common ground
between the two positions. A willingness to proceed on this basis
might at least have emphasized good faith and signaled an under-
standing that each side had its special political problems to
resolve.'^

— There were conflicts in the relationships and respective roles
of the American scientists and diplomats. Although the diplomats
carried the action, with the scientists in a limited advisory role,
it was the technology of atomic energy which set the scope and
tone of the negotiations. Disagreements were couched in tech-
nological terms. Actually, they reflected political differences, but
the diplomats failed to deal with them accordingly. At the same
time, scientists who were in a position to influence policymakers in
the United States and in the UNAEC failed to recognize the
problems of feasibility of control in the context of emerging
post-war political relationshiDS.

" On the other hand, it is of course possible to speculate that nothing could have induced the Sd viet leaders
to compromise on what they considered key issues, as long as (a) the U.S.S.R. lacked atomic weapons
and therefore remained in a weak bargaining position, and (b) the leadership believed it either certain or
strongly possible that the U.S.S.R. would soon develop its own atomic bomb.

1526

One of the factors which set the stage for faihire was the over-
estimation by U.S. leaders of the tactical advantage which monopoly
possession of atomic weapons gave the United States. ^^ As the author,
Leneice N. Wii, observes:

While pxclusive possession of a new technology stemming from a scientific
discovery may give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage
is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear energy, the principal disadvan-
taged country was able to duplicate the discovery of fission and to create a
rudimentary initial technology sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device
while the negotiations were still in progress. Yet during this time U.S. negotiators
apparently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a comfortably
long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus [one] lesson from this study is
that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once the application of a new technology
has been forcefully demonstrated before the world as in the case of the atomic
bombs, to prevent other nations from acquiring or recreating this technology. i'

Whatever the reasons for failure of the Baruch plan negotiations,
they were characterized by insufficient teamwork and discontinuous
involvement of technologists in the diplomatic process. Possibly
Presidential and congressional encouragement of a continuing dialog
between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups
could have helped to shape a U.S. position capable of contributing
to a successful conclusion of the negotiations. But existing procedures
and impetus were inadequate for dealing with the impact of a tech-
nological development of this size and complexity.

GENERAL LESSONS FROM THE STUDY

This study of the Baruch plan negotiations suggests some general
observations about the interrelationships of Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy. Among those noted by the author are the
following: ^*

— The creation and application of new technologies may so
change relations among nations that a system of international
control becomes desirable. Although probably the most dramatic
example to date, nuclear energy is neither the first nor the last
example of a technological innovation which suggests the need of
international machinery and procedures for controlling it. (Some
others are aviation, warships, supertankers, and communications
satellites.)

— Intense riv^ahies among different national interests may
nevertheless tend to prevent the achievement of an appropriate
international control system. ''Not even an awareness of the
awesome destructive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient
incentive to nations to agree on a secure form of control over
atomic energy."

'2 Anothfir contributing factor was the pervasive lack of understanding of the facts of atomic technology
which prevailed at the time. The project director of this study series observes that after 30 years of exposure
to atomic technology it is hard to recall how little was generally known about the subject in 1915. For even
aliterateobserver of the political, military, and technical developments of that time, it took several readings
of the Smyth Report to get the full import of the technology. It is unlikely that many Washington bureau-
crats gave it as muoh as a single thorough reading. An informal random poll of 30 Washington professionals —
mainly government— taken a few weeks after the Smyth report had been released and at a time when it
had been much in the news, yielded only one person— a chemist— who had read it. This same source remarks
that in a conversation he had at this time with General Groves, the director of the Manhattan District
expressed complete confidence that the Soviets could not possibly produce an atomic weapon for at least 20
years.

" Wu, Thv Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomaci/ Kritirs the Nuclear .Xgc. \o\. T, p. W'h

i< Ibid., pp. 118-122.

1527

" — While exclusive possession of a new technology . . . may
give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage
is likely to shrink quickly."

Once a new technology has been demonstrated it is unrealistic
to sup])ose that the secrets of how it is created can be kept for
more than a very short time.

— For scientists and technologists to work effectively with
di})lomats toward the solution of complex political problems \vith
important technical components, "the members of each field
must express their respective j)oints of view fully and in terms
which can be understood and api)lied by members of the other
field. At the same time, there must be a special receptivity by
members of each field and a special willingness to accommodate
to the outlook of the other, in order to attain the ultimate goal."

— Where the technological and political reahties which must be
harmonized are in sharp conflict, a special effort is required of
negotiators to see that all of the requirements to be reconciled
are fully anal3'zed and taken into account. In the Baruch Plan
negotiations, the dominant political reality was that an assurance
of the end of the serious threat to Soviet military security posed
by U.S. possession of the atomic bomb would have been necessary
in exchange for renunciation by the U.S.S.R. of its own efforts to
develop a nuclear weapon and accept international control. The
dominant technological reality was that the processes associated
with the ])eaceful and military uses of atomic energy were ap-
l)roximately the same. "And it appeared from the outset that the
security of a control system would have to be maintained through
inspections of an exceedingly intrusive character. The Soviet
Union was faced with this peculiar attribute of the technology of
atomic energy which weighed heavily on the choices of a control
system and which seriously challenged the closely guarded society
of that country. To the United States, a major consideration . . .
was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in
order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control
system . . . The negotiations neglected to reconcile [the respec-
tive national security requirements of the two countries] with
these dominant technological and political factors of atomic
energy in order to attain adequate and acceptable international
control."

■ — ^Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and
negotiators alike was that the technological necessities of effective
control would force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the
drive to devise effectiveness in the control system seems to have
ignored, if not to have defied, the need for special diplomatic
efforts to achieve acceptability. "The area of acceptability re-
ceived little if any consideration in U.S. policy discussion."
Underpinning the U.S. approach were "a moralistic attitude
which characterized the U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance
generated by the notion of U.S. leverage, or prejudice toward
Soviet science and technology. . . ."

— In summary: "It is clear that while science and technology
alone could devise a control system which would be efficient in its
task, and diplomacy could provide the fundamentals for an
effective system to protect national securit}^, only a combination

1528

of tlie elements from science, teclmology, and diplomacy could be
expected to devise a workable system for control which would
be acceptable to the leading nations of the world."

Anthor^s Reassessment

The author of the study made the followins: comments 3 years
after the study was completed (summer 1972) :

There appears to have been a general acceptance b}^ Congress of
Baruch as a competent negotiator in this area, an acceptance which
might not be as forthcoming today. The question is still relevant: to
what extent does Congress have a voice in, or can it effectively raise
questions regarding, the selection of a chief arms control negotiator?
In retrospect, and in light of developments since 1946, it would seem
appropriate for Congress to intensify its efforts to insure that persons
nominated for such critical diplomatic assignments as the negotiation
of arms control agreements were not unduly subject to a particular
professional, bureaucratic, special-interest, or other bias.

NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Although Congress had expressed an anxious determination to
retain the "secret" of the atomic weapon — a goal which has since
proven impossible — there was little congressional involvement in the
Baruch plan negotiations. Was the reluctance in Congress during
1974 ^* to transfer peaceful nuclear technology similarly based on the
notion that blocking this action would prevent the spread of weapons
technology? There is a greater need now than ever for Congress to
become intimately familiar with facts of nuclear technology, its
military and peaceful uses, and the vital question of accelerating
proliferation versus international controls.

However, the issue of controlling nuclear energy presents a much
more complex set of circumstances now than it did in 1946. Congress
is called on to understand defense needs in the field of increasingly
complex and costly strategic weapons. Current arms control negotia-
tions, especially SALT, require congressional decisions to support or
reject a specific arms control program. In the face of growing demands
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to overcome the energy shortfall in
many parts of the world, and with the offers of U.S. nuclear assistance
to Egypt and Israel last year and the addition of India to the nuclear
club, Congress has seen the need for, and sought, solutions to the
problems of nuclear proliferation.

Further, in relation to such developments as the Vladivostok
accords,^® Congress will increasingly be called on to make timely

" As Wu states in a chapter on Arms Control and Disarmament in Congress and Foreign Policy: 197^
(prepared for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign
Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service; Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 15,
1975, p. 23): "A major issue in the Congress [in 1074] arose over the offer of U.S. assistance in the field of
nuclear technology to both Eygpt and Israel, during President Nixon's visits there in Jime. The primary
concern in Congress was the arms control implications: whether safeguards were adequate to prevent diver-
sion to weapons use, and whether such moves might contribute ultimately to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. These fears were reinforced by the peaceful explosion of a nuclear device m May by India, using
nuclear material provided through an agreement with Canada for cooperation in peaceful uses." The author
adds that congressional concern for control was eventually translated into a number of different pieces of
legislation.

'• I.e., the agreement in principle signed by President Ford and Soviet party leader Brezhnev at Vladi-
vostok in December 1974. The two leaders agreed to numerical ceilings on the offensive weapons systems
of each country. The S A LT teams of negotiators of both countries were to attempt to translate the statement
into a treaty by late 1975, when Brezhnev was scheduled to visit the United States, an event which had b^n
postponed several times. (As of niid-lOTV neither the treaty nor (he visit had materialized, but the negotia-
tions were still in progress.]

1529

political and technical judgments contributing to U.S. decisions to
accept or reject successive international arms control agreements.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether Congress is doing
all it could and should do to come to grips with this greatest of con-
temporary problems of the interface of science, technology, and
diplomacy.

Some IlhiMrative Questions

Cases One and Two of the Science, Technolog}^, and American Diplo-
macy study series both deal with the question of control of nuclear
energy. The foregoing anal^'sis of Case One poses important questions
for Congress. However, because The Baruch Plan deals with an early
stage in American diplomatic experience with nuclear technology, and
because the basic issues and their implications were more fully ex-
plored in the decade between the Baruch Plan negotiations of 1946 and
President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative and related legis-
lation of the mid-1950s, the questions suggested by this study are
combined with those following the analysis of Case Two, (See Vol. I,
pp. 536-539.)

CASE TWO— COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER IN EUROPE : THE INTER-
ACTION OF DIPLOMACY WITH A NEW TECHNOLOGY "

Statement of the Case

A second major U.S. diplomatic initiative in the post-World War II
effort involving foreign policy and atomic energy was President
Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal, conveyed in a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953.'^ This time
the emphasis was on nonmilitar}^ applications, but the underlying goal
remained the same: to avert atomic military buildup by diverting
nuclear materials to peaceful uses, and to provide a forum for some
cooperation between the United States and Soviet spheres of influence.

The new initiative was successful in furthering the development of
peaceful uses of atomic energy, thereby serving a secondary U.S.
policy objective. Whether, on balance, it contributed to the primary
aim is less evident, for the nuclear arms race continued at a frightening
pace. At best, it ma}' be said to have helped establish patterns of
international cooperation and formal agreement on controls and safe-
guards which might some day carry over into the area of military
applications. At worst, it may be judged to have encouraged nuclear
technology transfer, without first achieving reliable international
safeguards, to the point at which responsible nations adhering to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may one day — perhaps soon — be
subject to pressures to withdraw and make their own bombs as
defense against nonadhering nations. Proliferation of nuclear power
technology and industry also increases the possibility that outlaw
groups will come to possess nuclear arsenals.

Importance of the Case

The Baruch Plan of 1946 had failed to achieve agreement to
arrest the development of a nuclear arms race before it could get
started. By the time of the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" message the

" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Inter-
action of American Diplomacy With a New Technology, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-
ments by Warren H. Donnelly, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service,
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. See Vol. I, pp. 123-292.

"8 Ibid., pp. 150-151.

1530

Soviet Union had assembled its own stockpile of Hiroshima-type
atom bombs and had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Meanwhile,
several "People's Republics" had been established in Eastern Europe
and China, South Korea had been invaded, attempts to form a
European Defense Community had not worked out, and international
disarmament negotiations were deadlocked. ^^ Moreover, the Kremlin
had pressed a vigorous and considerably successful diplomatic and
propaganda offensive to persuade the world that nuclear weapons were
not decisive, that they nevertheless were especially horrible and
should be banned, and that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take the
lead in developing nonmilitary applications of atomic energy. ^^ The
principal U.S. reaction to the frustrations of this period of strategic
setbacks and declining nuclear advantage was to threaten massive
retaliation with nuclear weapons against Communist aggression.

Another reactive policy was the "Atoms for Peace" proposal. "With-
in the United Nations, the response . . . was instantaneous and favor-
able. The speech was scored as a victory for the United States in
international affairs by undercutting a persuasive Communist propa-
ganda offensive. . . ." ^^

Historically, the proposal represented a unique and constructive
attempt to shift the emphasis in utilizing a significant new technology
away from its military potential and toward its peaceful applications:

It signaled the start of U.S. diplomatic efforts to create an international atomic
energy agency; American encouragement to two European regional, multinational
agencies for nuclear energy; establishment of a network of bilateral agreements
between the United States and individual nations for technical assistance in
nuclear energy; and a treaty to establish international safeguards over nuclear
fuel materials. These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of nuclear
energy abroad, ranging from applications of radioisotopes for research and for
diagnosis and treatment in medicine to the demonstration of nuclear power for the
generation of electricity. Underlying the publicized, idealistic purpose of sharing
U.S. nuclear science and technology were pragmatic, practical considerations of
advantages to the United States.22

"o'-

In the most consequential way, probably, of any of the 12 studies
in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy series, this
case (together with the preceding one on the Baruch plan) raises
questions as to what diplomatic courses of action in fact are, in the
long run, most advantageous to the U.S. national interest in dealing
with a potent new technology.

How the Case Developed

The international activity most directly associated with atoms for
peace is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was
established July 29, 1957, as an international organization within the
framework of the United Nations. It continues to report annually to
the U.N. General Assembl}^ and, on occasion, to the Security Council
and the Economic and Social Council.

i« Ibid., p. 150.

20 Henry A. Kissinger, Nudiar Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York, published for the Council on
Foreign Relations by Harper & Bros., 1957: pp. 363-364.

21 Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

22 Ibid, p. 150.

1531

PURPOSES OF THE IAEA

In his December 1953 message, President Eisenhower had proposed
an international body with four main purposes: encouraging worldwide
investigation into peaceful uses of fissionable materials; cutting back
on atomic weapons stockpiles; advertising to all nations the desire of
the great powers to satisf}^ human aspirations rather than build up
armaments; and opening up a new channel for peaceful discussion of
the many difficult problems facing the world. What resulted after
more than 3 years of negotiations was an international statute which
specified the following qualified goal for the IAEA:

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic
energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall insure, so
far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its super-
vision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

Dr. Donnelly comments: "As 'military purpose' is nowhere defined
m the statute, the mission of the International Agency is general
enough to accomplish as little or as much as the member nations might
desire ".^^

The IAEA was expected to develop a system of international safe-
guards for nuclear materials. This most difficult issue posed the
dilemma of satisfying the general demand for a credible system of
inspection and control in the face of the reluctance of the nonnuclear
nations to surrender any sovereign rights to permit inspection by an
international agency. The Soviet Union took the side of sovereign
rights and has since continually opposed international inspection.^*
The final compromise reached was to restrict safeguards to IAEA
projects and projects voluntarily placed under the IAEA safeguards
system,

EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The two European regional organizations directly and indirectly
influenced in their origins by the Atoms for Peace initiative were the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). (The latter, originally known as the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation or OECC, includes
in its membership the United States, Canada, and Japan.)

Euratom was established by the Treaty of Rome, signed on
March 25, 1957, to further development of nuclear power in the
European Economic Community — France, Italy, West Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. An underlying broader
goal was economic integration of Europe. Setting out ambitiously
to create a European nuclear technology and power industry, the
Community sought the advice of outstanding European technologists.
The result was a report, "A Target for Euratom," which "combined
the factors of energy and economic policy into a compelling argument
for European atomic integration."

23 Ibid., p. 178.

2< Departing from this position only briefly in 1963 at one stage of the negotiation of the I<imited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty. How far the U.S.S.R. proposes to depart from this principle with respect to the ongoing
negotiations on extending the scope of the test ban, while also providing for peaceful uses of nuclear explo-
sions, remains to be seen.

96-243 O - 77

1532

With the Suez Crisis still fresh in mind, [the authors] observed that a future
stoppage of oil could be an economic calamity for Europe, and that excessive
dependence upon an oil supply from an unstable region might lead to serious
political trouble throughout the world. Estimating that future energy require-
ments of the economic community would increase by 83 percent between 1955
and 1975, they advised that the economic growth of the six countries was in danger
of being seriously hampered by lack of another source of energy.^s

Euratom quickly ran into diplomatic difficulties. The Soviet Union
opposed both it and the European Economic Community, labeling
Euratom a scheme for the rearmament of Germany with atomic
weanons and charging that both organizations were instruments of
NATO. The six European nations disregarded Soviet threats and an
accompanying Soviet plan for Pan-European economic and atomic
energy integration. However, there were other problems; for example,
Euratom failed to win necessary support for building facilities to
manufacture enriched uranium — considered by European proponents
a top-priority feature of an independent program — but was obliged
instead to buy enriched uranium from the United States. Further, of
the 5-year research programs provided for by the Treaty of Rome,
the first (1958-62) was largely limited to building an organization;
the second (1963-67) was characterized by dissension and budget
troubles; and the third (proposed for 1968-72) was not even
approved — Euratom's research program has since been funded
annually. Euratom did not produce a nuclear industry for the Com-
munity, but rather faces competition from the national industries of
its members.

The Nuclear Energy Agency of the then OECC was, like Euratom,
a response to European fears of a fuel shortage. The NEA was estab-
lished by an international statute effective February 1, 1958, with the
assigned objective of furthering "the development of the production
and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by the participating
countries." Like its parent OECD, the NEA is a forum rather than
an operational agency. As Dr. Donnelly puts it, ". . . its strong point
has been coordination and program [review] rather than direct
operation. The Agency has led its members into agreements on
radiation health and safety standards, and on nuclear insurance. By
contrast, Euratom is an operating organization as well as an agency
involved in establishing an industrial structure for nuclear power in
Europe." ^^

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The most recent major diplomatic consequence of the scientific
discovery of fission was the negotiating of the Treaty on Non-Prolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force March 5,
1970. The concept of the treaty was a radical one: it divided nations
into two classes, those which had the atom bomb and those which
did not; and it committed the non-nuclear-weapons parties to relin-
quishing their sovereignty to the extent of permitting inspections on
their territories by international inspection. In return, the nonweapons

23 It)id., p. 204.
26 Ibid., p. 240.

1533

parties received a-^isiirances through a separate U.N. resohition^" of
certain protective measures by the parties possessing nuclear weapons.
The treaty also provided for a system of bilateral safeguards agree-
ments between the nonweapons countries and the IAEA. At the same
time, it obliged nuclear weapons parties not to transfer nuclear
weapons to other countries, to share the benefits of nuclear energy
with the other parties, and to support the efforts of the IAEA to
develop an effective safeguards S3^stem.

U.S. Involvement

As the first country to tap nuclear energ}^, and for a time the sole
possessor of the atom bomb, the United States was the principal force
behind virtuallv all of the early efforts to control and harness the
atom. It was the source of some constraints, however, as well as
positive support for the pursuit of these goals.

U.S. SUPPORT OF IAEA

U.S. officials worked hard to achieve the establishment of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and, initiall}", to endow it with
real powers. Despite the limited goals finally agreed upon for it, the
ofl^icial U.S. position heralding it was optimistic. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles assured the wSenate Foreign Relations Committee
that the United States had achieved its diplomatic objective and
gained the widest possible international support for the new agency,
which would (among other things) provide a forum for the exchange
of information about nuclear energy discoveries, provide an effective
system of safeguards, enhance nuclear health and safet}^ strengthen
control of nuclear weapons, reduce pressure for proliferation, and im-
prove the climate of international relations. At the same time, Secre-
tarA^ Dulles, promised that the Agency would not be a "giveaway
organization" for U.wS. atomic secrets or nuclear fuel materials, and
that U.S. assistance to and through the Agency would not constitute
a subsidy to commercial nuclear power in Europe.

When the Congress authorized U.S. participation in the IAEA, the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had had almost 3 years of experi-
ence with bilateral agreements to foster the civil use of nuclear energj'.
These agreements involved assistance to some 40 countries ; most were
for nuclear research, a few for nuclear power. The State Department
at first advocated channeling such assistance through the IAEA as a
step toward achieving international agreement on common standards
for safeguards and gaining acceptance of inspection — in the belief that
nations would more readily accede to supervision by inspectors from
an international agency in which they participated than b}' those of
another nation. However, the insistence of AEC Chairman Lewis
Strauss that the United States should not abandon its bilateral agree-
ments deprived the new agency of an important source of strength.

■'' Thesp as«nrancps wprp rot rmhorlipcl in the tpxt of the treaty itself. "Non-n'iclear-wrppons strtps soii.?ht
guarantppes that renunciation of nuclear arms would not placp ihem at a permanent military disadvantage
and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. But, it was argued, the .security in+erests of the various
states, and proups of states, were not identical; an effort to frame provisions within the treaty that would
meet this diversity of requirements — for xmforeseeable future contingencies — would create inordinate
complexities. To resolve the issue, the T'nited States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom sub-
mitted ... a trinartite proposal that security assurnncps takp the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution,
supported by declarations of the three powers. [The declarations were duly made and the resolution was
passed, with France abstaining.] The resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression,
created a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially its permanent members."
V.P-. AiTns Control and Disarmament Ageiii v. Arms Control and Disarmament Arreements: Texts and
History of Neijotiations. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. OfT., February 1975, p. 83.

1534

The IAEA's first Director General, W. Strrlins; Cole — who had
resigned the chairmanship of the Joint Conmattce on Atomic Energy
to take the post — tried to structure the Agency as a channel for atomic
energ}" aid and as a proponent of international safety standaids and
international controls for nuclear fuel materials. The United States did
not respond to his Ansion of a strong international agency. In 1961 the
State Department, in agreement with the AEG, established an Ad-
visory Committee chaired by Dr. Henry D. Sm^-th — author of the
postwar "Smyth Report" — to conduct a general review of the IAEA.
The Advisory Committee urged tliat the IAEA be strengthened under
U.S. leadership and that more U.S. nuclear energy aid be clianneled
through the Agency i-ather than bilaterally. The State Department and
the AEC rejected the Advisory Committee's recommendations, pre-
ferring that the IAEA limit itself to such technical service functions as
international safeguards and inspection.

U.S. RELATIOXSHIP TO EURATOM AND XEA

U.S. backing of Euratom, as of the IAEA, was mixed. Secretary
Dulles made clear "that the United States wanted Euratom to con-
centrate exclusively on development of nuclear power and not aspire
to such greater goals as the economic welfare of the European Com-
whether it should manufacture enriched uranium, whether member
states. While some European proponents of Eiu'atom looked to it to
restore the influence of the six nations in world affairs, the Washington
view was the opposite." -^

Three major issues central to the establishment of Em'atom were
whether it should manufacture enriched uranium, whether member
states should be precluded from military use of atomic energy, and
whether Euratom should have a monopoly over nuclear materials.

For security reasons, the United States opposed foreign production
of enriched uranium, and retained its monopol}^ by guaranteeing an
adequate supply to Euratom at reasonable prices. The idea — derived
from the Atoms for Peace concept — that Euratom could serve to pre-
vent nuclear armament in Europe was stillborn because of French
insistence on the right to produce and use atomic weapons for national
security. Yet the French pressed successfully for a Euratom monopoly
of nuclear supplies for commercial purposes. By pointing to tlie U.S.
example in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, v.hich took title to all
nuclear materials in the Nation and forbade private ownership, the
French prevailed over West German opposition to nuclear monopoly
as incompatible with the principles of a free-market economy.

The United States did participate with Euratom in a joint power
program, using U.S. nuclear technology, v.diich resulted in the con-
struction of three operating nuclear powerplants with a combined out-
put of about 600 megawatts. The goal had been six plants and 1,000
megawatts. In the negotiations leading to the bilateral agreement
covering this program, the only significant issues were over U.S.
inspection i^ights and safeguards with respect to nuclear materials
supplied by the United States. The U.S. negotiators wanted to send
inspectors into nuclear facilities of European member states; the
Euratom negotiators refused. A resulting compromise provided for

28 Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

1535

Eiimtoin to establish, for U.S. -supplied materials, a safeguard systeiu
meeting U.S. standards, developed with U.S. tccdinical assistance, and
indirectly monitored through frecpient consultations and visits.
Euratom also agreed to consult with the IAEA to assure that its safe-
guard and control system would be compatible with lAEAs.

The bilateral agreement further ])rovided that if the IAEA should
establish an international safeguard and control system, the United
States and Euratom would explore its assvnnption of the safeguard
function for all Euratom activities.

The U.vS. relationship with Euratom has been a joint operational one,
however cautious; that with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency,
despite U.S. membership in it, has followed more conventional lines
of international cooperation and exchange. Dr. Donnelly comments
on this apparent inconsistency as follows:

Since both the NEA and Euratom were created to fester commercial use of
nuclear energy in Europe, and since the membership of NEA represented until
recently a larger potential market for the U.S. nuclear power industry than the
six Euratom members, it seems curious that U.S. support to Euratom has so
exceeded that for NEA. For the latter there are no joint undertakings with U.S.
funding. One significant difference between the two multinational organizations
may explain the difference in U.S. support. This, in the opinion of the writer,
was the presence of the United Kingdom in NEA but not in Euratom. During
the mid-1950s the U.S. nuclear industry was concerned that the United Kingdom
with its strongly backed government program for development and application of
nuclear power would be able to capture much of the world's nuclear power
market. For the United States to have funded NEA projects may well have seemed
to give a principal competitor in the international nuclear market still greater
advantage. In these circumstances, U.S. support could not appear to benefit
nuclear power research and development of interest to the United Kingdom.-^

U.S. POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS

The U.S. relationship to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ques-
tion of safeguards presents problems too complex and thorny to be
identified briefly without distortion; the reader is referred to the more
detailed treatment in pages 136-154 of the basic study. In general:
the United States has consistently supported the principle of inter-
national safeguards administered by the IAEA; on signing the NPT
on July 1, 1968, President Johnson offered to put commercial nuclear
power in the United States under IAEA safeguards, even though the
United States was exempt from them as a nuclear-weapons state.
Presidents Nixon and Ford reiterated this offer, but it has never been
carried out ; U.S. negotiations with IAEA over details were still in
j)rogress as of micl-1977. The ITnited States has also consistently sup-
|)orted the work of the IAEA Safeguards Committee. One of the most
important actions of the Committee — created in April 1970 to draft
safeguards agreements between the IAEA and individual nonnuclear
weapons states signatory to the NPT — was to specify the use of
national systems of accounting and control for nuclear materials.
Another important result of the Committee's work was to assure
that the legitimate commercial interests of states subject to inspection
would be protected. Most recently, the IAEA has begun to show lead-
ership in drafting international guidelines for physical security of
nuclear materials and facilities.

=9 Ibid., p. 244.

1536

Bole of Congress

Presidents Truman and Eisenhower established a pattern of close
cooperation with the Congress in what was recognized as a matter of
highest concern to U.S. security and other national concerns. There
was active participation by the Congress in many of the developments
attending the sharing of nuclear energy information and materials:
numerous hearings were held, important legislation was passed, and
advice and consent was given to treaty provisions.

To preserve nuclear secrecy as a national security measure, the
Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 terminated nuclear
collaboration with the wartime allies of the United States. As the Cold
War intensified, the act was amended in 1951 to authorize the Atomic
Energy Commission to enter into certain limited arrangements with
allies, as in NATO, to give them nuclear information. The amendment
was intended to strengthen militarj^ alliances, not to foster commercial
uses of nuclear energy.

THE CONGRESS AND AGREEMENTS ON NONMILITARY USES

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held extensive hearings in
May and June 1954 on revisions of the act proposed b}^ President
Eisenhower, calling for international cooperation in nonmilitary uses
of nuclear energy. The resulting changes in basic atomic energy legis-
lation greatly expanded U.S. encouragement of the commercial use
of nuclear energy abroad. As before, international nuclear cooperation
was to be effected through bilateral agreements with individual
nations or with regional defense organizations. Not required to take
the form of treaties, the agreements were to be negotiated by the AEC
subject to congressional veto.

This legislative framework is the basis for U.S. cooperation with
other nations in commercial nuclear energy matters; it made possible
the IAEA, Euratom, the NEA, the network of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements negotiated by the United States, and the Non-
proliferation Treaty.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations expressed a keen interest in the question of
safeguards when the proposal to establish the IAEA was undergoing
congressional examination in 1957. In favorably reporting the pro-
posed Euratom Cooperation Act, the joint committee expressed its
belief that a vigorous program of cooperation in nuclear power by the
United States with foreign nations was desirable. The committee was
more critical of the proposed bilateral agreement with Euratom and
insisted on changes, particularly in connection with the safeguarding
of nuclear materials furnished by the United States.

Mainly through the joint committee. Members of the Congress
closely followed proposals to sell U.S. technology' for manufactur-
ing enriched uranium. On several occasions the joint committee
expressed concern over possible moves to provide this technology to
foreign countries not only from the "giveway" standpoint but also
from that of effects on national security and U.S. obligations under the
Xonproliferation Treaty.

1537

On the whole, tlie Cong:ress has shown awareness of both the dangers
and the constructive potential of nuclear energy. However, it might
have been appropriate — ^and still might be — for the Congress to
demand more vigorous efforts on the part of the executive branch to
resolve longstanding problems of control in view of their vital bearing
on national and international security.

Outcome

The Atoms for Peace initiative seems certain to be judged among
history's significant instances of the diplomatic response to a new
science and technology. This initiative set forces in motion which have
already changed the world. Propelled by some of those forces — the
move to meet a growing shortfall in tlie world's oil supply through
nuclear energy production; continued trends toward the proliferation
of nuclear weapons and the potential for producing them — ^the future
course of civil nuclear power is approaching a point of no return.

To epitomize all that Atoms for Peace set in motion is to oversim-
plify. Yet oversimplification may be necessary to highlight certain
urgent realities and keep them from being obscured by a welter of
detail. The two essential realities illuminated and acted upon by Atoms
for Peace are (1) the growing potentialities of nuclear energy to help
fill urgent world energy needs and, (2) the concomitant growing po-
tential threat to the world's safety through the increase of national
capabilities to make nuclear weapons, the potential risk of theft of
nuclear materials by subnational groups, and possible insults to the
global environment from escaped radiation. Constructive steps taken
to meet the energy needs have not yet caught up with it but are on
the way: the consensus in 1977 is that much of the world's electricity
supply' by the year 2000 can be provided by nuclear power if places
can be found for nuclear power station sites and the fears of environ-
mentalists can be allayed.

The outlook with respect to proliferation remains ominous. As
Dr. Donnelly points out, European experience with international safe-
guards offers a working demonstration of inspection for future arms
control and disarmament."'*' On the other hand, what many observers
have characterized as the disappointing record of the May 1975 NPT
Review Conference in Geneva reinforces doubts as to whether the
momentum of progress toward an effective universal system of con-
trols is equal to the overwhelming importance of the goal.'^

Assessment

vSome of the more pertinent observations of the 1972 study not
already cited are listed below, with page number:

— Safeguards systems do not extend to physical protection
against theft or diversion, but only to detection of it. Assuring
the physical security of nuclear materials is a separate respon-
sibility of the possessing nation. (Vol. I, ]). 140)

30 IIM.. p. 28.').

31 So». for rxamplf : (1) Tlip n>r>ort of flip Pro'^iflpnt of tlie Conferoncp, Swpdi=h TTnrior Spprntary of State
Tnia Thoi-sson, as inserted by Senator Edward Kennedy in the Congressional Record for July 30, 1975, p.
Sl44*)2- "Wl^.at vas a failure was not tliP conferenee. but the way in which the superpowers proved them-
spIvps unable to show the world not only their genuine will but also their capacity for disarmament. They
did notmakeacontributionof slrenKtheningtheNPTreginie." (2) Letterfrom Colgate University Professor
of Peace Studies Alan Geyer to Senator Hnliert H. Humphrey as inserted by the latter in the Congrrssinnal
Tlrcord for Jnup 3, 197.5. p. S93S3: ". . . it is painfully clear that the ioint United States-Soviet line here (in
Ceneva, May 10, li)7.'i] is to downgrade the conference and to stonewall any pressures to reverse their own
mutual escalation of the nuclear arms race." (3) Arms control and disarmament specialist Thomas A.
HalstPd's "Rpport from Geneva" in .4r)».<: Control Todnri, June 1975. p. 1-3 ". . . the Gonfereni-e undpr-
scored the fact that for the most part the Treaty has been an effective instrument for facilitating access to
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Where the Treaty— and the R^'view Conference— continue to fall short
remains in the harder questions of security. . . ."

1538

— Despite the importance of a nuclear safety function for the
IAEA, radiation safety guides are confused and apparently over-
lapping. In Europe there are standards issued by both the IAEA
and Euratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation rather than
transfer the committee's functions to the IAEA. Meanwhile, the
latter's role in setting standards for the construction and opera-
tion of nuclear ])ower])lants is dormant. (Vol. 1, ]>. 194)

■ — Euratom's nuclear supply function has not grown as origi-
nally expected. The safeguards function, in contrast, has been per-
formed effectively and has demonstrated the practicability of
international inspection. (Vol. T, p. 216)

—The Safeguards Committee which the IAEA created in 1970
was open to all member states of the Agency, in recognition of the
general interest in safeguards and the desire of nonweapons mem-
ber nations to participate directly in developing safeguards
agreements. The committee met intensively over many months
and issued three reports covering all aspects of the proposed
agreements. Nearly 50 delegations, very different in character,
were involved. A British member of the IAEA Board of Gover-
nors who participated commented on the moderate, compromising
spirit and friendly atmosphere which prevailed: "Informal con-
sultation came to count for more and more in our work; and when
we got back to the Board room even the intractable problems
had been [more or less worked out]." (Vol. I, p. 272)

— ^Atoms for Peace has been unique as an example of inter-
national cooperation in scientific helds, in that international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy came about
as the result of deliberate decision of governments rather than
of scientific communities. Among its other accomplishments, it
has provided mechanisms for working on health, safety, and en-
vironmental j)roblems which cross national boundaries. (Vol. I,
pp. 156-157)

— Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States
and of world peace to see the Nonproliferation Treaty operate
at full effectiveness, and granting that the bilateral agreements
have provided the United States with certain benefits, it may
be time to reexamine the respective roles of bilateral agreements
and the IAEA with a view to possibly channeling more aid
through the latter as a means of strengthening it. (Vol. I, p. 175)

— Altliough the IAEA evolved out of the discovery of fission
by scientists, the scientific community had relatively little part
in the negotiations. An eminent European nuclear scientist
complained in 1960 that "Scientists do not generally know what
an enormous effort lies behind the creation of a full-fledged in-
ternational agency. They also do not know what an irresistible
momentum lies in international organizations ... it is practi-
cally impossible to terminate one [and it i^^] therefore onl}' a
question of the degree of usefulness of these indestructible giants
which can be influenced . . . the scientists and technologists of
the world . . . have not as a group realized the potential power
of the instrument created, and have failed to follow up with
. . . speaking or writing about the duty of scientists . . . we
have not even tried to influence the selection of representatives
of our countries for' important j)ositions in the Agencv organs."
(Vol. I, p. 179)

1539

— If the IAEA had evolved in tlie direction indicated by the
Atoms for Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence
on development of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a
channel for technical assistance and nuclear materials. However,
because of cold war tensions, the United States chose not to
promote the Agency as a distributor, or custodian of a pool, of
nuclear materials; neither did it support an international regula-
tory role for the Agency in the design and operation of nuclear
powerplants. On the other hand, the Agency provided a forum
in which United States and Soviet representatives could meet in
a relatively friendly atmosphere at a time when most contacts
between the two countries were strained and formal, if not
hostile. (Vol. 1, pp. 201-202)

— The experience of Euratom illustrated a diplomatic reality:
the poUtical cohesion of members of an international technologi-
cal undertaking is a prerequisite to its success, not simply a
desirable byproduct. As a corollary, the troubles of Euratom's
R. & D. programs illustrate also how the cohesive force of inter-
nationalism in science may not be strong enough to withstand
the divisive forces of national commercial interests. (Vol. I, p. 214)

— A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an
organization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that
seek to create and apply new technologies. (Vol. I, p. 214)

— The Treaty of Kome is silent on the issue of environmental
protection. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining
and controlling the environmental effects of nuclear power and
fuel reprocessing plants. (Vol. I, p. 221)

— Euratom and the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency overlap
in many of their interests and activities. Euratom's usefulness
appears to be handicapped by the dispersion of human and
financial resources of its member states between its own pro-
grams and those of the NEA and IAEA. (Vol. I, p. 222)

— Moves toward European unity such as the establishment of
Euratom have been eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism.
Euratom's successes have come in activities which were linked
to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of
France, Italy, and West Germany. Inability to form a common
European approach to nuclear technology has proved advan-
tageous to the U.S. nuclear industry [but perhaps at the expense
of long-range U.S. national goals and interests]. (Vol. I, p. 224)

— The lessons of the diplomatic effort of organizing joint U.S.-
Euratom programs for nuclear power production could point
the way toward future joint ventures to develop other new power
sources, such as large-scale use of solar energ}^ (Vol. I, p. 2.38)

— From World War II to Sputnik, U.S. world technological
leadership went unchallenged and was sustained in large part by
advances in nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek
to monopolize this leadership, the United States offered and
supplied technological assistance to many countries, especially
in Europe, to develop their own use of nuclear power. During
the late 1960s, U.S. world leadership was challenged by other
nations. Looking to the 1970s and to an era of greater peaceful
rather than military competition, there are several fundamental

1540

issues involving nuclear energy: To what extent should U.S.
foreign policy and diplomacy continue to foster commercial use
of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with
future U.S. technological leadership to be worth the effort, or
would the required financial and other resources be more profit-
ably dedicated to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S.
technological leadership be more than offset by economic losses
through competition from other countries receiving U.S. tech-
nological assistance? Most important of all, are there any sig-
nificant risks and dangers from the standpoint of U.S. national
security in continued U.S. support of foreign nuclear power
development? (Vol. I, p. 286)
Diversity of outlook and experimental approach can lead to weak-
ness or vulnerability when the danger is either unclear or not imminent.
The potential for extreme danger in nuclear proliferation has been
clear enough to American diplomatic and congressional leaders from
the outset, but not the imminence of that danger. Reaction to this
threat has been slow in coming.

Although man}^ voices compete in the formulation of U.S. foreign
policy, there is relatively free play for influential expression of the
views of strong individuals (as Secretary of State or Secretary of
Defense, for example) unchecked by sustained and sober analysis of the
technological miplications of any given proposal regarding nuclear
energ3^ There is, in short, no central governmental machinery for
technology assessment in the nuclear field comparable to the Office
of Technology Assessment with its mandate in other areas, Further-
more, OTA is a mechanism of the Congress. There would appear to
be a compelling need for centralized institutional machinery and
procedures in the executive branch to provide impartial, measured,
and long-rang-e assessments of all nuclear energy developments or
proposals (or needed initiatives) affecting U.S. national interests and
international security.^'^ It would follow that development of counter-
part oversight machinery, possibly involving in part an extension of
the OTA mandate, should be considered by the Congress.
Author's Reassessment

Author Warren H. Donnelly comments retrospectively as follows:
Beginning with the explosion of the atom bomb over Hiroshima in
August 1945 U.S. diplomac}^ was doubly affected b}^ the discover}^ of
nuclear fission. The military use of atomic energy became a mainstay
of U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. By the mid-
1950s the civil uses of nuclear power appeared promising enough for
U.S. diplomacy to back efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear
energy to create international and regional atomic organizations for
this purpose. With the late 1960s and early 1970s the imperatives of
nuclear weapons led to international treaties and agreements and to
the strategic arms limitations talks. During these years, U.S. diplo-
macy also assisted the domestic development of nuclear power by
helping to open markets for the infant U.S. nuclear industry and to
provide opportunities to demonstrate nuclear power abroad before

^''^ Dr. DonneUy comments (July 1977) that executive branch machinery for policy and
management relating to civil uses of nuclear energy remains fragmented. The Department
of State negotiates agreements for cooperation but the Energy Research and Development
Adinlnstratlon (ERDA) administers the arrangements under them; the Nuclear Reguatory
Commission regulates safety and some environmental aspects of nuclear energy, as well as
exports of nuclear materials and equipment. ERDA regulates exports of some, but not all,
nuclear technology. ERDA Is also developing new or Improved nuclear technologies but Is
not supposed to promote them. The Environmental Protection Administration is expanding
its regulatory role for nuclear power, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Is
trying to promote development of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles.

1541

its introduction in tlie United States. On the whole, the discovery and
use of atomic energy has afforded the United States new sources of
leverage for its diplomacy, complicated the conduct of that diplomacy^,
and in many ways fmidamentally changed relations between major
world powers. By mid- 1977, however, foreign progress in nuclear
technology and the inability of the United States to sign new contracts
for enrichment service had begun to erode U.S. influence.

RELEVANCE OF STUDY THEMES TODAY

The main themes of the study of this case appear to be as relevant
in mid-1977, or more so, than at the time of writing in the latter half
of 1972. Events and factors influencing today's themes include:

— The oil embargo of 1973-74, followed b}^ the enormous price
rise in Middle East oil, which reawakened foreign interest in nu-
clear power, particularly in the United Kingdom, Europe, and
Japan. Conventional wisdom (which a healthy skepticism may
temper) now assumes that by the year 2000 as much as half of the
electricity used by these countries will come from nuclear power-
plants. Their development of strong nuclear industries will have
implications for future U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy.

— The detonation of a nuclear explosive device by the Gov-
ernment of India on May 18. 1974, which provided a strong
reminder that countries other than the leading industrial ones
can, if they wish, acquire a capability to make a few nuclear
weapons. There is some concern, for example, that South Korea
may try to make nuclear weapons if the United States withdraws
its ground forces.

— The congressional concern expressed in 1974 over the ade-
quacy of nonproliferation conditions for then proposed bilateral
agreements between the United States and Iran, Israel, and Egypt
to help them acquire and use the technology for nuclear power .
production ; over arrangements between AVest Germany and Brazil
for the former to supply the latter with nuclear powerplants and
a factory to recover plutonium from used fuels ; and over a French
contract to supply fuel reprocessing plants to South Korea and
Pakistan.

— The May 1975 NPT review conference in Geneva, which stim-
ulated interest in many of the subjects covered in the study.

— The 1974 cutoiT of new enrichment supply contracts by the
Atomic Energy Commission (functions now assumed by ERDA),
which revived foreign interest in nuclear enrichment plants and
damaged the credibility of the United States as a reliable source
of enrichment services.

— President Carter's early nonproliferation initiatives to dis-
courage world use of plutonium as a fuel and to provide terminal
storage of spent fuel without reprocessing.
With the benefit of 5 years of hindsight, Dr. Donnelly says that if
he were to rewrite this report he would give more attention to :

— The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
international nuclear safeguards under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and U.S. support of that role.

— The interaction between the IAEA and Euratom in the
carrying out of nuclear safeguards, because of the anticipated
importance of regional international organizations in the future.

1542

^—Extension of the concept of safeguards from simply detecting
and announcing diversion or theft of nuclear materials to in-
clude the prevention of theft and recovery of stolen materials.

— Whether the influence gained by the United States' long-
standing but now diminished role as the principal free-world
supplier of enriched uranium has justified the cost, and whether
it is in the U.S. interest to expand the Nation's capacity to make
enriched uranium sufficiently to maintain a free world monopoly.

— The effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic efforts to persuade nu-
clear supplier countries to limit their exports of dangerous nu-
clear products and technology.

— International or multinational organization and operation of
nuclear fuel service facilities.

— Whether commercial use of plutonium is inevitable and, if
so, the implications of a plutonium economy for national and
international safeguards.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE STUDY OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER

The subject of commercial nuclear power in Europe continues to be
particularly illustrative of the interaction of science, technology, and
diplomacy. This interaction is highlighted by such matters as the
further favorable development of the gas centrifuge, the new prospects
of laser enrichment of uranium, the possibility of transfrontier pollu-
tion from nuclear powerplants, demands that international nuclear
safeguards be strengthened, and prospects for more vigorous inter-
national cooperation to develop the breeder reactor. Further prolifera-
tion of weapons-making ability, as well as attempts to halt such
proliferation, will place great strains upon American diplomats and
their diplomacy. Another complication is the congressional quest for a
greater influence in the negotiation of international agreements for
cooperation.

American experience suggests that international cooperation in
energy production and similar high-technology enterprises should give
less attention to technologies approaching commercial application and
emphasize longer-term ventures in their early stages — as nuclear
energy was until recently and as solar energy, fusion, or ocean heat
research are now.

The author also states that he would now give much more attention
to the impact of nuclear safeguards upon diplomacy, in anticipation
of commercial use of the breeder reactor. The long-term future of
nuclear power may depend upon success of the breeder reactor. If the
breeder succeeds, it will greatly increase the amount of energy re-
coverable from world uranium and thorium resources. But it will also
introduce great quantities of plutonium and uranium-233 into inter-
national commerce; the control of which will pose many new problems
for diplomacy. Indeed, some analysts view these problems as so un-
solvable that they favor barring use of the breeder both in the United
States and elsewhere.

Legislative Implications

The study identified a number of issues for congressional considera-
tion, most of which have legislative implications. Slightly updated,
these include:

1543

— Sustaining U.S. international leadership in nuclear tech-
nology in the 1970s.

— Reducing United States, European, and Japanese depend-
ence upon imported oil.

— Controlling the possibilities for nuclear proliferation.
— Demonstrating the practicability of international inspection
for arms control.

— Improving the U.S. position in world trade.
— Assessing the implications of domestic opposition to nuclear
energy upon U.S. diplomacy.

— Maintaining a competitive position for the United States in
the world market for nuclear goods and services.

— Cooperating in international efforts to control environmental
effects of nuclear power.

— Developing international safety and environmental protec-
tion standards for nuclear powerplants.

— Protecting the U.S. position in uranium enrichment and
fuel reprocessing.

— Establishing criteria for export of U.S. nuclear products and
technology.

— Establishing sanctions for violation of non-proliferation
commitments.

— Establishing multinational or international organizations to
enrich uranium and to store spent fuel.
Finally, the study identified two main lines of thought that the Con-
gress might wish to pursue: the use of nuclear technology in U.S.
diplomacy; and the use of diplomacy to advance nuclear technology.
While separate, these lines do interact and that interaction should be
systematically taken into account. The study also indicated a close
interaction of U.S. domestic and foreign interests in commercial nu-
clear power, which suggests that if recent efforts by Mr. Nader, the
Union of Concerned Scientists, and others, to persuade the Congress
to enact a moratorium on nuclear power reach the stage of legislation,
the implications of such an act upon U.S. diplomacy would require
analysis.

Further, the study sought to highlight present and coming issues of
international safeguards for nuclear power. To strengthen interna-
tional safeguards would necessitate treaty changes, with attendant
Senate advice and consent; both Houses would be involved with legis-
lation to authorize and fund new or 'expanded U.S. agency activities
to this end.

Some Illustrative Questions

Cases One and Two suggest an extensive catalog of questions which
appear to warrant congressional concern. Because of the special ur-
geny of the problems of nuclear energy utilization and control, they
are given in some detail.

CHANNELING OF U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR POWER

In the light of current concern over risks of theft of nuclear materials, should
the United States seek renegotiation of the NPT to deemphasize this commitment
and deliberately slow down technical assistance for nuclear power?

If U.S. technical assistance should continue, would U.S. interests be best served
by channeling this assistance through bilateral agreements with recipient countries,
by supplying it through the IAEA? Conversely, which approach would seem most
favored by the recipient nations?

1544

To what extent should U.S. technical assistance be limited to installation and
operation of nuclear powerplants, with assistance for other parts of the nuclear
power cycle to be avoided or withheld?

To what extent should the United States unilaterally proceed to reserve exports
of nuclear materials, products, information, and assistance to those nonweapons
nations that agree to place all of their nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA
safeguards?

What should be the i)articipotion of the private U.S. nuclear industry in
negotiating and carrjing out bilateral arrangements — in particular, extension of
present agreements on commercial u^e of nuclear power?

How satisfactory is the present interworking of the Energy Research and
Development Agency (ERDA). the State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Administration in nego-
tiating and carrying out bilateral agreements? How consonant with national
foreign policy have past bilateral agreements been?

What shou'd be the I\S. jjosition in offering technical aid and assistance to
Arab nations for nuclear power?

To what extent should commercial exports of nuclear products, services, and
technology by private organizations be required to conform to U.S. foreign
policy, and how should this be done?

What sht)uld be the role of Congress in review and appraisal of major ventures
in nuclear cooperation or in export of nuclear powerplants and associated goods
and services?

THK INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

What should be the U.S. diplomatic position on proposals to establish and
enforce international standards for the design, construction, and operation of
nuclear i)owerpl:ints and other facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle that may present
risks to the environment, to public health and safety, and to national and inter-
national security?

To what extent would channeling U.S. assistance exclusively through the
IAEA strengthen that agency in general, and in its capabilities to provide effec-
tive safeguards for nuclear materials?

What should be the U.S. position on establishing and enforcing international
regulations for transportation of fissionable and radioactive materials?

What should be the U.S. position on extending international control of atomic
energy to include location, design, construction, and operation of facilities that
could cause transfrontier pollution in normal operations or in case of an accident?

What would be the implications of U.S. participation in such arrangements
for domestic regulation of nuclear energy? What would be the expected roles of
the State Department, EIRDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and ADC A?

If the United States abandons its position as the sole supplier of enriched
uranium to the free world nuclear i)owerplants, would U.S. self-interest be served
better by establishing additional production facilities in the IAEA or by encourag-
ing national or regional ventures?

To what extent would U.S. interests be served by having the IAEA locate,
build and operate facilities to reprocess spent fuel, recover plutonium and
depleted uranium, and store or manage long-term disposal of radioactive wastes?

Considering questions about safeguards being raised by domestic critics of
nuclear power, what would be the comparative benefits and drawliacks of U.S.
diplomatic efforts to revive the Baruch-Lilienthal plan in part and make the
IAEA the sole proprietor of fuel reprocessing plants and all facilities for making
plutonium into nuclear fuel elements for use in domestic nuclear powerplants?

The United States has offered voluntarily to place its domestic nuclear power
industry under IAEA safeguards once hold-out nations have ratified the NPT.
What would be the advantages and disadvantages of fulfilling that offer now
without waiting Icmger for nations such as France, India, Israel, and mainland
China to ratify?

What would be the pros and cons of a U.S. policy to promote consolidation of
various regional nuclear organizations into the IAEA?

THE IAEA AS A

To what extent is the idea of tlie IAEA as a testln-d for arms control inhiliited
by tiie presence in tlie Agency of the Soviet Union V

To what extent and in what ways eonld diplomacy protect IAEA operations
from ideological contests? Is this a realistic goal to postulate?

1545

What has been learned from U.S. experience with the IAEA that could apply
to other fields such as aviation, transfrontier pollution control, communications,
or disease control?

EURATOM

To what extent should the United States seek to discourage Euratom and its
member states from reprocessing spent fuel and recycling plutonium?

To what extent should the United States encourage Euratom to build and oper-
ate a uranium enrichment plant in Europe?

To what extent should the United States attempt to recoup some of the national
investment in nuclear energy through licensing fees, royalties or other charges,
or exports of nuclear products and technologies?

How long should the United States continue its commitment to supply nuclear
power in Europe with enriched uranium? What would be the effects on U.S. foreign
policv of a decision to end this commitment?

What participation should the United States seek in the setting of standards
by Euratom governing nuclear power plants and related facilities? How much of
such participation should be assigned to the Department of State and ERDA?
How much should be left to voluntary efforts of the U.S. nuclear industry?

Should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand Euratom work in radioactive waste
disposal and broaden U.S. participation in such work?

To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to influence the Euratom breeder
program, particularly towards developments that could provide a fallback if the
U.S. breeder demonstration program should fail?

How should available U.S. resources be divided among Euratom, the OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and the IAEA?

What benetits would" accrue from U.S. diplomatic efforts to expand Euratom's
programs and laboratories from nuclear energy to fuels and energy in general?

JOINT ErRATOM-U.S. RESEARCH

What did the United States learn from the Atomic Energy Commission's
participation in the joint U.S. -Euratom research program? What were the strengths
and weaknesses of the joint venture?

What are the implications of these lessons for other joint ventures : for
example, in fusion, solar energy, or synthetic fuels from coal?

To what extent should and could joint ventures with Euratom be revived for
radioactive waste management and disposal, development and demonstration of
nuclear safeguards technologies, and development of new and improved ways of
finding and enriching uranium?

THE OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY

Should U.S. diplomacy seek to combine Euratom with the NEA?
What conclusions can be drawn from the comparative success of NEA relative
to Euratom?

U.S. NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES

Should the United States seek to preserve its position as the sole supplier of
enriched uranium to the free world? If so, what are the financial and other implica-
tions of such a decision?

What would such a decision imply as to demands on U.S. fuels to supply
electricity for enrichment, and as to the environmental consequences of supplying
such fuels?

If the United States is prepared to relinquish its monopoly position, what al-
ternatives would best suit U.S. interests:

— National construction of enrichment facilities?

— Regional organization to build and operate enrichment facilities?

— International (IAEA) construction and operation?

— Encouragement to the Soviet Union to expand its enrichment services?

In retrospect, how useful and effective were U.S. efforts to hold back develop-
ment of the centrifuge method of enrichment? To what extent are new enrichment
technologies — for example, centrifuge, laser, nozzle, and other methods — likely to
present a technological surprise and open the way to easy proliferation of foreign
enrichment capabilities?

What diplomatic options are open to the United States should the Soviet Union
seriously enter the world market for supply of enriched uranium and reprocessing
of spent fuels?

1546

THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND SAFEGUARDS

How close is the point of no return in the worldwide use of nuclear power bej'ond
which it will not be possible to halt, slow down, or contain further growth?

What are the potential implications for U.S. diploinacj- of:
— A substantial theft or diversion of nuclear materials?
— The successful use of stolen materials for purposes of terrorism, extortion,
or foreign policy?

What, if any, preparations should the United States be making now to respond
to the situations of question (2)?

What arc the potential implications for U.S. diplomacy' of:

— An accident in a nuclear facility at home or abroad that causes large
offsite injur}^ and contamination?

ilffective safeguards will require extraordinary measures to learn about, pre-
vent, or intercept thefts of nuclear materials, or to recover stolen materials. What
is the U.S. assessment of the need for a world protective or police force with j^or-
haps supranational powers to give safeguards credibility? Are safeguards important
enough to the United States to induce it to accept the problems and risks of such a
force — especially if its members incli;ded nationals from the Soviet Union, its
satellites, and mainland China?

To what extent should the United States in its bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments extend safeguards terms and conditions beyond those expected of the
IAEA under the NPT?

W ithin the United States what are the respective safeguards fimctions, respon-
sibilities, and authorities of the Department of State, the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, ERDA, the National Research Council (NRC), and the De-
partments of Defense and Commerce? Who is responsible for coordination of these
P'edcral activities? How are these activities coordinated with U.S. foreign policy?

What level of international effort would be needed to assure reasonably effective
safeguards in an international plutonium economy? How should this be financed?
What should be the nature and extent of U.S. participation?

Should the IAEA be transformed into a world nuclear safeguards agency V
Should the safeguards function be transferred to a new, separate international
agency with no other functions?

To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand international safeguards
to include phj^sical protection of nuclear materials, interception of attempts to steal
materials, and recovery of stolen materials?

Man}' developing countries appear to be less concerned with safeguards thnn
with acquiring the benefits of nuclear power. How are the}' to be persuaded that
the need for safeguards is not a "put-on" designed to serve the convenience of the
nations which already have nuclear power?

To what extent would placing U.S. nuclear fuel facilities for civil nuclear power
under IAEA safeguards by voluntary action reduce or neutralize expressed fears
and concerns of nonweapons nations that IAEA safeguards maj' violate their
sovereignty, or put their nuclear industries at a disadvantage?

CASE THREE— THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR^"

Statement of the Case

The Intenialional Geophj'sical Year or IGY (July 1, 1957-Decem-
ber 31, 195S) was the most ambitious venture in international scientific
cooperation in history-. Broadly speakin";, it had as its purpo-e the
observation of phenomena relating to the entire Earth and evei'ylhing
in and around it. It enlisted the services of tens of thousands of
scientists and volunteer observei's from 07 nations, working at ^ome
8,000 observation stations around the wo.'ki. It yielded much scientific
data, was attended by significant technological achievements, and
stimulated other major international coopei alive efforts invohing
science and technology in the years to follow.

"' U.S. Congre.s.s, Uouse, Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs, The PoUficul legacy of ttu Intrrnntional Oin-
pfiysical Year, a sttidy in the series on Science, Technolcpy, an<l Aiiu'rican Diplomacy pretiared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis, Scieiue Policy

Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Coi'.gicss, Washington, U.S. Government

Printing Ollicc, November 1973. See vol. I, pp. 294-360.

1547

Impoiiance of tiie Case

The IGY's feats of science ami technology v.eie impi-e.-sivc iiiu! in
some instances spectacular; its accompli>hments in llie area of })(/iitics
anil diplomacy weie al^o important.

Among the latter: (1) the IGY, while generously supported by
national governments, was successfully run by s(;ientists — for scien-
tific and not for political purposes; (2) it nevertheless contributed to
the diplomatic framework for later negotiations leading to such
developments as the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty,
and the 1967 Space Treaty; and (3) at least one IGY event did liave a
powerful political impact, especially in the United States: The Soviet
launching of Sputnik I.

The iG Y's scientKic achievements included the acf|uisition and pub-
lication of valuable data relating, among other things, to cosmic rays,
geomagnetism, ionospheric ph3"sics, meteorology, oceanography, solar
activity, and the upper atomosphere. The Antarctic was opened up to
scientific exploration on a substantial scale.

The outstanding technological development of the IGY — a develop-
nrent which has been widely characterized as marking the world's
entrance into the Space Age — was the launching of aitificial Earth
satellites. Beyond making possible such important IGY scientific
achievements as discovery of the Van Allen radiation belts, the use of
satellites for scientific space probes opened "a new era of exploration
and discovery which has progressed much more rapidly than could
possibly have been foreseen during the IGY."^^ Progress has been
so rapid and so extensive, indeed, as to raise the question of whether
a second International Geoph^^sical Year might be appropriate for
1982-83.

How the Case Developed ^^

A certain amount of intercountry and interregional scientific
cooperation has long taken place in such activities as navigation and
mapmaking. Not until the 18th century, however, did coordinated
efforts by many observers at different locations begin to become
common. These eft'orts were intensified during the 19th centiuy; for
example, an international conference was held at Brussels in 1853 to
facilitate coordinated weather observations at sea. Increased coopera-
tion led to the formation of international scientific organizations in
various fields, and then to the First International Polar Year (FPY)
of 1882-83.

During the FPY, scientists from 20 nations conducted studies in
the high northern latitudes, with emphasis on surface meteorology,
geomagnetism, and the aurora borealis. The success of their efforts led
to the much larger undertaking, 50 years later, of the Second Inter-
national Polar Year or SPY (1932-33). Scientists from 40 countries
participated in the SPY; they concentrated on the same subjects
that had occupied tlie FPY plus Earth-Sun relationships and atmos-
pheric electricity. An important result of the SPY was increased
knowledge of the ionosphere, which facilitated the development of
radio communications.

3< Bullis, The Political Legacy nj the International deophysical Year. Vol. I, p. 327.

'5 For a more detailed account of I he origins and development of the IGY, see: IT.S. Congress, Senate,
International Cooperation and Organization for Outer Space, staff report prepared by Mrs. Eilene (Jalloway,
Legislative Reference Service specialist and special consultant to the committee, for the Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Senate Document No. 56. Washington, U.S. Government Printing OfHce,
August 12, 1965: 353-373.

96-243 O - 77

1548

IGY CONCEPT REPLACES THAT OF TPY

The success of the First and Second Polar Years, at intervals of 50
years, led to expectations that a Third International Polar Year
(TPY) would be held in 1982-83. However, before even half of another
50-year period could elapse, it became apparent to some observers
that the accelerating pace of technology and the fact that available
basic data in the Earth sciences had been largel}^ exploited were
making further international observation efforts desirable. Early in
1950 Lloyd V. Berkner ^e proposed that the TPY be held in 1957-58,
25 years after the SPY, and coinciden tally a period for which unusual
solar activity was predicted.

The idea was widely discussed among scientists and scientific
organizations, and in May 1952 the International Council of Scientific
Unions (ICSU) established a special committee to take charge of
planning for a Third Polar Year. Invitations to participate were sent
to ICSU member nations and to the U.S.S.R. The response was only
moderate, however, and included the suggestion from several scientific
groups that the scope should be broadened to encompass worldwide
phenomena rather than concentrating on the polar regions. ICSU
considered the suggestion, and in October 1952 its general assembly
approved the enlarged scope, which was reflected in a change of name
from Third Polar Year to International Geophysical Year.

The IGY concept gained quick acceptance throughout the world
scientific community. The ICSU special committee was enlarged and
designated as CSAGI (initials of the French version of Special Com-
mittee for the International Geophysical Year) ; the Englisli scientist
Dr. Sydney Chapman was named president and Berkner vice presi-
dent. The number of countries represented at CSAGI meetings grew
from 26 in 1953 to 67 in 1958.

Enthusiasm for the IGY idea was not limited to scientists, but was,

. . . shared by tho various gnvornmcnts concernrd, by heads of state, and by
the public at large. This interest was aroused by the strong appeal of the ICiY as
a cooperative venture representing many nations working together for the benefit
of all mankind. Consequently, the collective response of the many legislative
bodies and governments whose approval was necessary to make the program a
success was on a far more generous scale than that prompted by any previous
scientific enterprise.

Governmental support consisted not onlj' of unprecedented financial contribu-
tions, but also of equally valuable and necessary logistic support. Governments
cooperated by facilitating the movement of participating scientists from one
country to another, and in assuring prompt movement through customs of
scientific equipment on which the various programs de]jended.

. . . Wides])read interest in the IGY was aroused in the general public by
numerous articles in the daily press and in popular magazines. Consequentlj',
more was imdoubtedly known concerning the IGY than had been the case for
any previous international scientific effort, and expectations were correspondingly
raised. 3^

'* Author of thr 1050 Bcrknpr report on Riatr Dppartmcnt oreanization and stafTme for science and tech-
nology. For a description of the report and its consequences, see: U.S. Congress, House. Committee on
International Relations. Science and Technoloqy in the Department of State: Bringinq Technical Content Into
DipUnnnlic Pniicy niid OpeTationn, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy,
prepared for the SubconiTnittee on International Sectirity and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Iluddle,
senior specialist in science and leclmology, Coiiere<;sioiial Research Service, Library of Congress, Wash-
ington, U.S. Government Printing Ullicc, June I'JT.'i. Vol. \l, pp. 1342-1317.

■" Bullls, The Political I.cgacj of the International Geophysical Year. Vol. I, p. 30.3.

1549

IG^' programs wore selected mainly to assist in solving specific
planetary- problems of the Earth, with emphasis on problems requiring
concurrent observations at many points around the globe and coopera-
tive efforts by many nations. These problems fell generally into three
broad areas: tlie Earth as a structure, atmospheric and oceanic circula-
tion, and upper atmosphere physics and solar-terrestrial relationships.
The broad areas were divided into thirteen scientific areas — for exam-
ple: oceanography, ionospheric physics, nuclear radiation — in which
research would be concentrated.

SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OF IGY

The scientific results were unprecedented:

Tremendous masses of data were obtained during the IGY. For example, 17 tons
of records were generated by American Antarctic stations alone. Triis dramatic out-
pouring of information posed more questions than were answered. Borkner likened
the situation to that of coming from outer space and finding a new planet. ^^

One commentator wrote that cosmic ray physics had emerged from
the IGY as "the broadest ranging of all man's intellectual endeavors,"
encompassing not only the vast concepts of galaxies and intergalactic
space but also the microcosm of atomic particles and forces. ^^ IGY
investigations in the Antarctic showed that ice depths may extend to
more than 14,000 feet. Much was learned concerning the elasticity of
the Earth and its crust, and concerning the distribution of the Earth's
mass. Additional valuable information affecting radio communications
was acquired. Meteorological findings provided the ba.sis for better
weather predictions and for long-range efforts to exercise some degree
of control over weather.

Experiments involving the explosion of small nuclear devices be-
tween the Van Allen radiation belts represented the first time in history
that worldwide measurements of a completely controlled geophysical
phenomenon had been made simultaneously. Studies of ocean currents
showed that ocean depths are very much in motion, and not stagnant;
one related finding was that deep ocean trenches are unsuitable for the
dumping of radioactive wastes, another that life — including fish and
crustaceans — exists even in the ocean trenches of the Pacific at depths
of almost 40,000 feet. Studies of solar activity raised the possibility
that much thermal energy might be transferred to the Earth's atmos-
phere through direct contact with the hot gases of the Sun's corona.
Further, IGY research established that there is no definite end to the
Earth's atmosphere —

As far distant as 10 Earth diameters a substantial hydrogen atmosphere was
found to exist, fading into the atmosphere of outer space itself, dominated by the
effects of untold meteors, X-rays, ultraviolet light, protons, electrons, cosmic rays,
and electric and magnetic fields. Thus, the upper atmosphere was found to be a
place of considerable activity, affecting many phenomena on the Earth itself. Of
tremendous interest was the discovery of the two Van Allen radiation belts, exist-
ing as annular shrouds about the Earth, shaped by terrestrial magnetic fields.
These belts of intense radiation were seen as important factors in determining and
perhaps limiting man's future exploration of space.*"

i> Ibid, p. 324.
33 Ibid, p. 324.
<o Ibid, p. 327.

1550

U.S. Involvement

The connection of the U.S. Government with the IGY, like that of
other national governments, was unofficial. Nevertheless, about a
third of the initial U.S. financial support — more than $43 million —
consisted of appropriated funds. An equivalent amount was contrib-
uted by private institutions — mainly universities — with the remain-
ing third provided througli existing programs in both public and private
research laboratories. Of the $43 million of appropriated money,
nearly $20 million was for the U.S. Earth Satellite program." Ulti-
mately, logistical and operational support for IGY activities brought
the total cost of the U.S. contribution to about $500 million.

Many different approaches to the administration of funds for the
IGY were taken by the 67 participating countries. In the United
States, a National Committee for the IGY — the USNC — was estab-
lished by the National Academy of Sciences, a member of ICSU. The
USNC served as a focus for all U.S. technical panels, geographical
committees, and special groups, as well as for a broad cross-section
of American geophysicists. It provided technical guidance for the
National Science Foundation, which was responsible for preparation
of budget estimates and for obtainino; congressional appropriations.
Among the U.S. Government agencies which assisted the UwSNC
were the Departments of State, Defense, and Coxiimorce, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Role of Congress

The original budget for the IGY presented to Congress by
Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Directorof the National Science Foundation, was
for $13 milhon. Dr. Waterman emphasized that this budget was not
to be confused with the separate amount of about the same magnitude
needed for the NwSF's regular programs. Altogether a considerably
greater amount was requested, and more than $43 million was
approved.

With only minor qualifications, congressional reaction to the IGY
was positive, both in the early stages and after the event. As author
Harold BuUis comments:

Although both Houses of Congress supported IGY requests enthusiastically,
the House frequently reduced the amounts requested whereas the Senate usually
voted for the full amounts. The final figures arrived at represented a compromise
between the two bodies. Action in the House reflected a belief that the budget
estimates arrived at by the scientists were necessarily rough and could be reduced
without damage to the U.S. IGY program, whereas the scientists insisted that
the budget estimates were conservative and that any reductions would indeed
severely damage the program. Irritation was also expressed in the House that the
scientists were making use of administration prestige to "sell" the IGY program,
thereby relegating the Congress to a back seat in the endeavor. These difficulties
were relatively minor, however, and for the most part the Congress granted the
scientists what they requested.''^

♦1 In the lieht of tho magnitude of U.S. spending for space exploration in the yeans following the IGY,
$20 million seems a modest enough investment. However, even that amount was not arrived at without
dissension. The associate director of this study series, Warren R. Johnston, recalls attending meetings
of the NSC Planning Board in 19.56 at which Presidential advisers debated the (juestion of how much— or
how little— money it would take to assure a minimally successful Earth satelUte e.xperiment. With the
shock of Sputnik I, th.-^ empliasis suddenly changed from minimal to maximal.

« BuUis, op. cit. p. 312.

1551

Major elements in persuading Congress to provide the needed funds
were the desirabihty of simultaneous observations and on carrying out
measurements throughout the entire globe, the evident exi)ense of
doing so, and the assurance that the program was finite and of definitely
limited duration. Later, when Dr. Berkner, speaking for the USNC
and responding to a Soviet proposal to extend the IGY formula beyond
the IS-month period earlier decided u})on, raised the possibility of
further development of IGY activities, the congressional reaction was
mildly favorable. However, the position of the American scientists
themselves — who had repeatcdl}^ emphasized to Congress that the
IGY was to be a specific, time-limited undertaking — had by then
become hardened so that support for the Soviet direct continuation
proposal was impractical.

The separate question of the impact of the IGY — or Sputnik — on
the Congress is discussed below.*^

Outcome

Some of the scientific results of the IGY have already been touched
on. The main concern of this study is with its domestic ])olitical
impact and its effect on U.S. diplomacy. These impacts were many
and substantial. As quoted in the basic study, Walt W. Rostow sums
up American reaction to the most spectacular of the IGY events:

There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by the
launching of the Soviet Earth satellite on October 4, 1957. This intrinsically
harmless act of science and engineering was also, of course, both a demonstration
of foreseeable Soviet capability to launch an ICBI\I and a powerful act of
psychological warfare. It immediately set in motion forces in American political
life which radically reversed the Nation's ruling conception of its military problem,
of the appropriate level of the budget, and of the role of science in its affairs.
The reaction reached even deeper, opening a fundamental reconsideration not
only of the organization of the Department of Defense but also of the values and
content of the American educational system and of the balance of values and
objectives in contemporary American society as a whole. ^^

The effect of Sputnik I in particular and the IGY in general on
Government support for basic science in the United States was
unprecedented. Federal funds were restored for scientific facilities
previously closed down; the Federal Government's in-house research
efforts were increased; Federal scientists and engineers received
ingrade promotions and other preferential treatment. The budget of
the National Science Foundation shot up from its pre-IGY ceiling of
$15 million to about $159 milhon in 1960 and $416 milhon in 1965; by
1975 it had reached approximately $690 million.

THE SPACE PROGRAM

The most dramatic development sparked by Sputnik I — and
probably the most significant, at least in the short run — was the
"Space Race":

« For a compact summary of the "vigorous and sustained role [of the Coneress] in the adoption and
implementation of U.S. polfcv for international space cooperation," see also the account by Mrs. Eilene
Galloway, CRS Senior Specialist in International Relations, of "Congress and International Space Coop-
eration"'in Senate Document No. 92-57 (International Cooprration in Outer Space: A Symposium), prepared
for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1971: 3-12. (Mrs. Galloway wa.s appointed by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson in March 1958 to
serve as Special Consultant to t!ie Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, and later to the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.)

" Bullis, op. cit., p. 334.

1552

The Soviet achievement carried the implication that the Soviet Union had
mastered the primary technology required for an intercontinental ballistic missile.
At one stroke, this achievement erased the issue of the "Bomber Gap," created a
"Missile Gap," rendered obsolete the elaborate earl}^ warning system of the United
States against bomber attack, reduced the warning time of an attack from hours
to minutes, and raised the issue as to whether manned strategic bombers would
not soon be obsolete. It gave a practical demonstration of the possibility and ad-
vantages of technological surprise. And, finally, it raised the prestige of the Soviet
Union as a technological power of the foremost rank.

The U.S. response was enactment of Public Law 85-568, the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Act, approved July 29, 1958. From this point on, the American
space program was launched on an arduous and costly technological course for
more than a decade of competition with the Soviet Union; it was to embrace a
tremendous range of scientific investigations, technological concepts, and practical
applications. Most importantly, for the purposes of this study, it was a form of
activity of inherent importance in international relations: its achievements were
prestigious and enabled the United States to recover and even raise its diplomatic
stature; its operations were obviously global in nature and required the cooperation
of many nations; and the exploitation of its technological capabilities offered
attractive rewards to many nations, developed and undeveloped alike.

While space was later to be formally abjured as a military combat regime,
satellites obviously offered great advantages for surveillance (which would con-
tribute to the stabihty of the mutual deterrence evolving between the United States
and the Soviet Union). Surveillance from space also offered a way out of the
awkward impasse presented by Soviet reluctance to admit any form of external
inspection as an adjunct of arms control agreements. ^^

The new space program made heavy demands on the Federal budget
and caused some reshaping of both executive and legislative branch
machinery. In addition to the establishment of NASA, there were
radical changes in the Federal structure for national and international
science policy and programs, including the appointment of a Science
Adviser to the President and the location of the President's Science
Advisory Committee directly within the White House — ^a step which,
according to Berkner, had profound implications for making the needs
of science, scientific research, and science education discussed and
understood at top governmental levels. ^^ The expanded science
advisory apparatus within the Executive Office led in turn to creation
of the post of Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, or
equivalent, in most old-line departments.

Within the State Department, which had created an Office of
Science Adviser in 1950 and assigned science attaches to several West
European countries but had curtailed these activities in 1955, the
science function was revived. Science attaches were appointed to serve
at U.S. Embassies in London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, Tokyo,
Moscow, New Delhi, and some South American countries.

To promote military applications of space research, the position of
Director of Research and Engineering was established within the
Department of Defense, ranking above the Assistant Secretaries of
Defense and possessing the authority to manage interservice projects
without following the normal military chain of command. This senior
officer was supported by an Office of the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering and by the [Defense] Advanced Research Projects
Agency.

45 Huddle, The Ki'ohition of Iiilrrriatinnal Technology, vol. II, [i. 6.3-4.
<» Bullis, op. cit., p. Xi~.

1553

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES

There were corresponding responses in Congress. A House Select
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration was created on
March 5, 1958, and replaced on July 21 of the same year by the
Committee on Science and Astronautics (now styled the Committtee
on Science and TechnologjO- In the Senate a Special Committee on
Space and Astronautics was created on February 6, 1958, and was super-
seded on January 14, 1959, by the Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences. Appropriations were passed funding NASA and the
National Aeronautics and Space Council, which had also been estab-
lished by passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

OTHER DOMESTIC AND GENERAL EFFECTS OF IGY

Still other important effects are attributable to the IGY and
Sputnik I:

— In the words of Walter Sullivan, a perceptive observer of the
IGY as it progressed, they "precipitated an examination of the
educational system and in fact, of the entire American scale of
values." ^' Parents, school boards, and legislators became more
aware of the importance of science training for the Nation's
youth; curricula were revised, and mathematics and science
courses which had been dropped reappeared; efforts were made to
bring textbooks and teaching methods up to date: the National
Defense Education Act of 1958 was passed, making substantial
Federal appropriations available for these and related purposes.

— Sputnik 1 and its attendant publicity convinced Americans
that they no longer possessed an undisputed lead over the rest of
the world in science and technology. The universal concern which
followed this jolt to American complacency helped focus public
attitudes upon the necessity for basic research.

— 'An important outcome of the IGY earth satellite program
was the development, under U.S. leadership, of international com-
munications satellites. Less than two decades later, worldwide
television broadcasts as events take place, from tennis matches
and the Olympics to actual combat or meetings of heads of state,
are taken for granted. The increasing interdependence of peoples
around the world is accented by the growing network of facilities
for instant TV, as well as radio, communications between distant
points.

— 'Apart from their obvious advantages in arms inspections and
military operations, satellites are proving to have many surveil-
lance uses. A NASA stud}^ in 1967 listed these, among others:
flood warnings; tracking of migrating birds, fish, and animals;
iceberg reconnaissance; mapping of land areas and ocean bottoms;
earthquake prediction; air pollution monitoring and forecasting;
weather forecasting; and earth resources surve^^s (agricultural
and mineral).^*

— Good progress has been made in the use of satellites for
weather forecasting. Of increasingl}' significant potential is their

<' Ibid. p. 338.

^'Iluddlo, The Kiolution of International Tcchnologu, vol. II, pp. 637-638.

1554

use for surveys of global resources of agricultural and niirerul
wealth and for the management of these resources."

INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS

The international impacts of the IGY and. the Soviet Sputniks
"were every bit as spectacular as were the impacts upon the United
States and would be difficult to exaggerate."

Foremost was the impact upon the cold war. Tensions heightened in East-
West relations as the Soviet leadership sought to use its success in space to further
its goals in foreign and military policy and as the United States countered Soviet
thrusts with crash programs in space and missile development. Sputnik I catalyzed
the cold war and not until the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis 6 years later
were Soviet- American leaders able to take the first steps decelerating the spiralling
pressures of the arms race. Additional impacts were the effect upon the international
politics of science, the use of science as a vital element in foreign affairs, and the
generation of a remarkable degree of international cooperation and good will
in politically nonsensitive pursuits. *°

Noteworthy effects on international science included the strengthen-
ing of the ICSU and its affiliates; the bringing together of Western
scientists wdth Soviets and others previously cut off from the Western
world; the stimulation, on a worhlwide basis, of the interdisciplinary
approach to problem solving; and encouragement of the revival
of science in underdeveloped countries newly experiencing their
independence.

The IGY and the manner in which it was conducted served also,
in various ways, as a model for other programs involving iiiternational
collaboration in scientific activity. These new programs, govern-
mentally sponsored, included the International Years of the Quiet
Sun from January 1, 1964, through December 31, 1965; the Upper
Mantle Program held in 1966-70; a Global Atmospheric Research
Program; an International Geodynamics Project; an International
Magnetosphere Survey; the World Weather Watch; Indian Ocean
Research; and the International Biological Program.

Apart from organized developments and institutional impacts,
the IGY was effective in helping to meld the top scientific talent of
the various participating countiies into an international scientific
leadership element. The pervasive influence of this element has not
been confined, over the years since the IGY, to purely scientific
matters, but has moved into the realms of politics and ethics. The
Pugwash Conferences are a manifestation of this trend; others
include numerous conferences and movements of recent years in
such areas as population control, food production and distribution,
and conservation of the Earth's resources. While many other influences
have combined to bring about these movements, the IGY appears
to have played an important part in helping to set the stage for them.

" Huddle, The Krolution of International Tcctinnloqii. vol. II, pp. 6.38-639. (For further treatment of this
latter subject see: (1) U.S. CoiiRrcss. Senate. Earth Resources Satellites. Hearings lipfoie the Senate Com-
mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences pursuant to S. 23.''i0 and R. .'5484. August 6, 8, and 9 and Sept. 18,
1974. Washington. U.S. (iovt. Print. Off., 1074, .■^36 p. (-') U.S. Congress. Senate. Earth Resources Survey
System Uearin-js biiorj th3 Sub-onrnitt" > o'l Spwe Scic'ico and Applications, House Science and Astro-
nautics Committee, pursuant to H.R. 14978 and H.R. i:w81, Oct. 3, 4, and 9, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1974, 283 p.

M Bullis, op. cit., pp. 341-342.

1555

Finally, there is highh^ suggestive evidonco that the new communications
•channels, the tremendous cooperative spirit, and the increased understanding
among participants of the 67 nations which took part in the IGY led directly
to the Antarctic Treaty. Whether or nut the IGY can be credited in such strong
terms, it clearly played an important part in helping shape that treaty, which
in turn reinforced the cooperative pattern for the other treaties and agreements
which v,'ere to follow. Just as scientists approach their objectives through a
step-by-step process, so did politicians appear to approach these international
objectives in similar fashion, with similar success. 5'

Assessment

How can the full significance of an undertaking as far-reaching in
its ramifications as tlie IGY be measured?

Perhaps, by way of caution — especially because, as Bullis notes,
the record of the IGY as written by contemporary observers is full of
exuberant praise but apparently lacking in significant critical reac-
tion— the way to begin is with some negative considerations. He
observes that it seems tmfortiniate in retrospect that the occasion of
the IGY and its achievements was not systematically exploited in the
United States to influence lasting ptiblic attitudes toward basic
research :

Unlike many of the activities of the K'.Y, which took place dramaticall.y in
remote and exciting areas of the globe, basic research was a difficult area of
scientific activitj' for the general public to understand and appreciate, and still
remains so. Although the IGY was, to scientists, primarily an exercise in basic
research, to the public it appeared largely a matter of polar adventures and space
satellites. Thus, were such an effort proposed today, it would appear doubtful
that it would receive widespread puljlic support unless the activities involved were
sufficientlj' broadened so as to appeal to a wide variety of interests. ^^

Again in retrospect, the new emphasis in education on science and
mathematics and on related curricuhun, test, and teaching reforms was
not entirel}" beneficial:

Science careers may have been made attractive to some students who lacked
either the necessary qualifications or the sustained motivation required for such
careers. Furthermore, as Dean Harvey Brooks has pointed out, curriculum reform
was largely undertaken for the wrong reason, namely, ". . . on the grounds that
it was needed to make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counter-
parts," rather than because of a fundamental desire to improve the way in which
science was being taught. Thus, while the Sputnik motivation increased interest in
science and made changes easier, the danger also existed that both interest and
programs might collapse once the motivation subsided. ^^

In the context of the issue of the nuclear threat, possibly more sus-
tained and serious attention should have been given to the Soviet pro-
posal for a continuation of the IGY oiganization and procedures.
The spirit of cooperation engendered b}' the IGY itself, reaching not
only scientists but also the world's ])eoples and their political leaders
at a time when the prevaiUng atmosphere was one of cokl war hostility,
could perhaps have been captured and institutionalized in this way to
bring lasting benefits of a still higher order of magnitude than those
conferred by the IGY. Would the good will and flexibihty implicit in
such a response to the Soviet initiative have eased Soviet suspicions
of U.S. intentions in other areas, such as arms buildup, and made for
earlier and more certain solutions to pressing cold war problems? Or,
on the other hand, would tlie Soviet Union have attempted to convert

51 Ihid.. p. .358..

5= Iliid., p. .33."..

53 Ihid., pp. 338-339.

1556

the extended IG\ msiehinery into a front organization serving its own
version of peace and progress? The answers to these questions are
beyond the reach of the present study, but they would seem worthwhile
for historians and long-range ])olicy planners to ponder.

In any case, it is clear that what the IGY and its sponsors failed to
to do was far outweighed by its accomplishments. Its outstanding
achievements in science have been mentioned. On the organizational
level, a formula was invented which mside possible the smooth and in-
dependent functioning of a complex enterprise, under the lendership of
scientists, with generous sup»port from many governments but a mini-
mum of interference by them.''^ On the substantive side, although the
IGY was primarily an exercise in pure science, it made brilliant use of
contemporary technology; the scientific space prohes which opened a
new era of exploration were only the most visible of many such uses.
In the area of international cooperation, to cite one category of results,
the same technology employed in the Eai'th satellite program required
agreements among nations which subsequently smoothed the way for
other agreements in related areas.

There is, perhaps, a danger attending the euphoria generated by a
great and successful enterprise in international cooperation like the
IGY. Especially among scientists, for whom good will is an accus-
tomed accompaniment to cooperation in scientific and techno-
logical problem solving, there may be a tendency to underestimate the
problems inherent in the political setting. On this theme, Bullis
comments:

One of the difficulties in attempting to transfer scientific methodology into
political reality is suggested by Sullivan's observation that "science, in treating
our planet as indivisible, is far ahead of politics, which treats it as two worlds."
In view of today's multiple ideologies, "multiple worlds" might be a more appro-
priate political designation. During the IGY, as a result of their common participa-
tion in efforts which opened up to man not only Antarctica but outer space, scien-
tists were said to have experienced unusually strong feelings of humility and
brotherhood. These feelings served to reinforce the traditional attitudes most
natural scientists develop as a result of sharing with others the common objective
of unveiling nature's secrets. There is but one universe for scientists to study, and
its singularity unites all scientific minds.

Thus scientists tend to have fewer social problems since their research is generally
focused upon common, well-defined objectives offering "a natural point of con-
vergence, namely, the correct result." Unlike politicians, they are not engaged
in conflict resolution as a profession and are not charged with responsibility for
the protection of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the existence
of a common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency toward social
cooperation despite all obstacles, a tendency which has become a characteristic
of the international scientific community. ...

■ ■•«•••

In view of the substantial differences between the scientific and politicnl
communities in the kinds of problems they are respectivelj^ called upon to solve,
prudence would suggest caution in looking for too bold a transfer of techniques
from one comnumity to another. The IGY itself was apttlitical and closed ended
whereas the political process is, a priori, political and open ended. Yet, politicians
and scientists do share some important human characteristics. Politicians and
governments, no less than scientists and scientific organizations, are capable of
and motivated toward uniting to achieve common ol)jectives. A major difficulty
is that th(^ i3roc(dures for finding solutions to problems facing politicians and
goverinnents are less clearly defined than are the procedures for finding solutions
to the specific types of problems commonly faced by scientists and engineers.
Scientific and engineering problems are t3'pically more specificall.y defined than

54 Sro //)/(/. pp. 30."i-:({)',), for a (li'scripUon of how this was done.

1557

are political problems, which tend to be overburdened with value systems in which
rational and irrational factors are intermixed.

Nevertheless, the author concludes,

... if men can unite to solve problems under cne set of circumstances (the
scientific), there presumably is room for hope that they can learn to do so under
another (the pohtical). Scientists, as already indicated, tend to share this hope.^s

Author's Reassessment

The International Geophysical Year was an episode, with a begin-
ning and an end. The interval since the basic study was written has
viclded no important new revelations about it or interpretations of its
sio-nificance. Nevertheless, its influence continues to be exerted, as
Bullis points out in the following observations of September 1975:

GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

The IGY study represented a detailed examination of a specific
example of how the world scientific community worked together in
cooperation and good will toward resolving international problems.
In particular, it analyzed the contributions this massive scientific
undertaking made in overcoming ideological' differences to bridge
science and diplomacy. In so doing, the study attempted to identify
and explain the attitudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed
during the IGY as a step toward detente.

These themes are as relevant today as when the study was written
in 1973. However, international cooperation appears to have been a
mixed affair. On the positive side, international exchange undoubtedly
experienced sharp growth immediately following the IGY. Precise
figures are not available, partly because of what is meant by an
"international" meeting, partly because so many meetings have been
held that it is difficult to keep track of them, and partly because
interest in compiling relevant statistics does not appear to warrant
the expense of collection. Such data as are available, however, indicate
that the number of international meetings remained fairly constant
throughout the early 1950s and through 1957, when the IGY began,
and then increased by about 25 percent during 1958 and almost
doubled during the next decade. (Yearbook oj International Organi-
zations data.) It would seem reasonable to infer that much of this
growth resulted from activities initiated during the IGY,

IMPROVED TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE

Also on the positive side was the signing by the Soviets of the
Universal Copyright Convention in May 1973. Prior to this time,
the Soviets had reproduced about 70,000 pages annually from U.S.
scientific journals published by the American Institute of Physics,
and had been in frequent communication with the Institute regarding
copyright permission and payment of royalties.''^

It would appear to be a fair assumption that these scientific com-
munications had a positive effect upon the Soviet decision to sign the
Copyright Convention.

55 76/rf., pp. 348-3o0.

5t Physics Today, vol. 28, Jan. 197,'). p. HO.

1558

REMAINING OBSTACLES

On the negative side, the Soviets have not always honored tentative
agreements for exchange of scientific information and research.
Typical of this faihire is lack of cooperation in mental health research,
first proposed in mid-1971 and discussed in subsequent years as part
of an overall health package, but not agreed upon until 1975.^^

Much of the delay has been due to Soviet unwillingness to discuss
details of the proposed research and possible exchange of scientists
between the two countries. More recently, U.S. scientists have devel-
oped doubts as to the advisability of such cooperation as a result of
the possibility that some Soviet' psychiatrists may be deliberately
misdiagnosing political dissidents as schizophrenic to silence them by
confinement in mental hospitals.

THE EMIGRATION PROBLEM

Another problem which has continued is friction between United
States and Soviet scientists over alleged Soviet persecution of Soviet
scientists who wish to emigrate to Israel. The head of the Foreign
Relations Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has expressed
the view that such emigration represents a capitalistic brain drain to
the disadvantage of the Soviets,^^ whereas U.S. scientists have ex-
pressed their strong support for the Soviet scientists who wish to
move-. Correspondence between United States and Soviet scientists on
this subject has at times been abrasive. As a result of these and other
incidents, communication and travel by scientists between the United
States and the Soviet Union have been characterized as recently as
July 1977 as being a difficult problem.^^

A SUMMING UP

In summary, while it is clear that the "IGY spirit" is by no means
in universal evidence throughout toda^^'s international scientific
community, international scientific cooperation continues at a higher
level of activity than it had reached in pre-IGY days. To the extent
of the difference, there is perhaps justification for greater hope that
bridges built by this cooperation will increasingly serve constructive
purposes of science and diplomacy.

Some Illustrative Questions

The IGY yielded far more new data for scientists to assimilate
than did the SPY 1932-33. On the other hand, data assimilation and
technological application are growing progressively more rapid with
every passing decade. The following questions are posed in the light
of this latter consideration:

In what scientific areas covered by the IGY, and to what extent, is
there already a need for fresh data? Are there other geophysical areas
not covered by the IGY which should now be studied, from a purely
scientific stand[)oint, through a similar international cooperative
effort?

57 Science, vol. 183, Mar. 8, 1974, pp. 932-935, and communication from the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH).

^Physics Today, vol. 27, Aug. 1974, p. 64.

=» Communications from various services, Including the American Institute of Physics,
the American Psychiatric Association, and NIMH.

1559

Besides the international conferences leading up to major treaties
(Antarctic, Test Ban, and so on) and the governmentally sponsored
scientific efforts like the lYQS, World Weather Watch, and Interna-
tional Biological Program — two categories of developments influenced
by the IGY — the past two decades have witnessed a number of other
major international and regional conferences in which science and tech-
nology have played important roles. These conferences, sponsored by
governments to help solve tough political problems, have dealt with such
matters as food (see Issue Three), population (also Issue Three),
health (Issue Two), the exploitation of ocean resources (Case Five), and
environmental programs (for citations see bibliography following this
final chapter).

Have these, too, been influenced, in their organization and proce-
dures, by the successful patterns established in the IGY? Has a con-
scious effort been made, in planning and conducting them, to build on
the best experience of the IGY, other mainly scientific conferences,
and the mainly political treaty conferences? Would a systematic,
comparative studj^ highlighting the goals, methods, procedures, and
results of all these major conferences, beginning with the IGY,
conducted by a university or a private research foundation, be likely
to make a significant contribution in the interests both of scholarship
and of improved governmental policy formulation and planning?

Much has happened to change the world in the short time since the
IGY. Whether or not most of the scientific knowledge gained in
1957-58 has been assimflated, would it be useful to "stop the clock"
and take fresh readings at IGY-plus-25, or 1982-83; i.e., hold a
second IGY?

Should some new IGY follow the pattern of the first one in terms of
scientific leadership mth government support (but with minimal
interference)? Would it be desirable this time for governments to take
the initiative? Would this be feasible in today's world, with its increas-
ing trend toward independent behavior by nationalist states and by
regional or economic blocs pursuing special interests rather than global
cooperation?

If governments take the initiative — or even if scientists retain it —
would it be feasible and productive to focus a large part of the scientific
effort on fields closely related to current human needs, the conscious-
ness of which has come so much to the fore since the time of the IGY:
e.g., energy, agriculture, exploitation of ocean resources, mineral
discovery, and preservation of the natural environment?

CASE FOUR— THE MEKONG PROJECT: OPPORTUNITIES AND
PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM

Statement of the Case

On April 7, 1965, in a nationally broadcast and telecast speech at
Johns Hopkins University, President Lyndon B. Johnson asserted
U.S. willingness to negotiate an end to the then-expanding conflict
in Vietnam, defended the U.S. policy of bombing North Vietnam, and
offered U.S. support for an extensive program of regional development
in Southeast Asia, including rehabilitation of Vietnam.

The President singled out for particular attention the Lower Mekong
River Basin project, a major development enterprise undertaken in
the 1950s jointly by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam with
the support of the United Nations Commission for Asia and the Far

1560

East (ECAFE) and the cooperation of a large number of U.N. agencies,
foundations, and individual countries.

As a peace initiative the President's offer failed; Hanoi and Peking
emphatically rejected it. In retrospect it is seen as merely a brief
episode of the eventful period, characterized b}^ mounting opposition
to the Vietnam War that culminated in the Pr-esident's decision not to
seek reelection in 1968. Nevertheless, it called attention to the poten-
tialities of the Mekong project, both in itself and as a model, and of
regionalism as an approach to development.

Importance of the Case

What emerges from this study as significant is not the President's
proposal, dramatic though it was at the time, but the hardiness of the
Mekong project and the regional approach:

". . . throughout the 7 years from the time of the speech to the present (May
1972), the international effort to apply technology to the systematic development
of the Lower Mekong Basin has grown considerably. . . . Despite many strains,
cooperation among the four countries of the Basin held steadfast. . . . As a multi-
national development effort it has demonstrated 14 years of continuity, stability,
and growth." »"

How the Case Developed

In a 1946 study of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), Herman Finer wrote that—

"The Council will encourage or institute regional conferences on economic,
social, and humanitarian problems. . . . Some countries by reason of their prox-
imity and certain common characteristics of geography and climate and location
or the chance of history, have some problems in common.

Under its charter, ECOSOC on March 28, 1947, created an Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), with head-
quarters in Bangkok, Thailand. ECAFE's scope extended to trade,
agriculture, transportation, industrial and technological development,
education, and data gathering. Its membership included all members of
the United Nations in Asia plus Australia, New Zealand, France, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and the Soviet
Union. (Other regional commissions have been established bv
ECOSOC: for Europe— ECE; Latin America— ECLA; and Africa—
ECA.) «i

In 1957 the four Riparian Nations (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam), in association with ECAFE, established a permanent Com-
mittee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong. The
four members of the coordination committee representing the Riparian
Nations had full powers of decision; an executive agent, heading a
permanent advisory board of professional engineers created in 1958,
had authority for making day-to-day decisions in preparing requests
for technical and financial assistance, program planning and super-
vision, and staff support of the coordination committee.

M U.S. Congres<5, IIoiiso, rnmniittpp on Foreign Affairs, The M(kmig Project: Opportitnilkf and Prohhm.i
of Reqionalism, a sliidy in the series on Science, Teclinolopy, and American Diplomacy, prerared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Frai'klin P. Ihiddle. Science
Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Wasliinglon, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Oflice, May 1972. See vol. I, pp. 361-4.S4. The quotation is from page ,371. For a men-
tion of how the Meliong project has survived the turl)ulent years since, the above lines were written, see
below undn' Antlior's lieassissincnt.

«' Huddle, The Mekong Project, vol. I, p. 380.

1561

On this rather unusual and extemporized foundation was erected the organiza-
tion to plan and administer a, regional program covering three-quarters of the
drainage ba-^in of the tenth largest river in the world, a region larger than France,
with a population of perhaps 30 million. ^^

By the time of President Johnson's proposal for a bilhon-dollar aid
program featuring the Mekong regional plan, a complex of 21 countries,
12 U.N. agencies, and 7 private institutions were contributing support
to the project — donations and pledges were to reach $68 million by the
end of 1965 — and the technical and administrative resources of the
coordination committee's executive agent and staff were expanding.
France, India, and New Zealand were collaborating on preliminary
plans for a major dam at Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia; a Japanese
team was at work on the Sambor Dam, also in Cambodia; the United
States was taking the lead ($2.5 million in feasibility studies) in con-
nection with a third great dam at Pa Mong in Thailand. Australia
had a half-million-dohar program of geologic studies underway at both
Sambor and Pa Mong Dam sites. In addition, construction was in
progress on dams, channel markers, and other engineering or pre-
paratory projects on tributary streams feeding the Mekong.*"^

In short, the enterprise to which the President proposed to extend
massive support was no mere flight of fancy but a major project in
being, backed by a strong and broadly based multinational commit-
ment to see it through. At the same time, it could be considered a
grossly underfinanced enterprise, proceeding at a pace which would
require many years for completion of most of its elements and even
decades for some. Was it not appropriate, then, for the nation which
had fathered "the first regional development project to command
worldwide attention — the Tennessee Valley Authority" ^* to offer
assistance in accelerating the progress of this enterprise, as a construc-
tive contribution to a negotiated peace?

The U.S. and world press in general found it appropriate, though
recognizing the offer as part of a ''carrot and stick" approach.

The timing of the speech coincided with stepped-up bombing of strategic targets
in North Vietnam by U.S. military aircraft, beginning with isolated strikes in mid-
February, and broadening into a more sustained air offensive in early March. It
followed by a week the President's decision, to be disclosed later on, to deploy U.S.
troops and undertake ground combat operations in South Vietnam (to an extent
that would number 184,314 military personnel in the area by the end of 1^65).^^

But Hanoi was not in a bargaining mood:

The determined nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict . . . re-
mained obdurately aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a
prospective ultimate victory. ^^

U.S. Involvement

A succession of three studies was undertaken between 1951 and
1958 to explore the potential for a regional development program for
the Lower Basin of the Mekong. The first of these was carried out by
the Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Development of
ECAFE. The second, made at the request of the Riparian States

6-' Ibid., p. 381.

•^^ Iliid..\i.'A'M). (Talilr 1 of the study, pages 301-394. prosonts an imprrssive list of ipsourccs, including ongi-
nt'oring and other toclinical services, contril)uled or ph^dgod l)y the various countries, agencies, and institu-
tions support ingt lie project as of January lOe.'i.)

6* Ihid., pp. 36;3-366.

65 Iliid., p. 366.

66 Ibid., p. 430.

1562

when the poUtical situation in the area had stabiUzed briefly after
the signing of the Geneva Accords of 1954, was a reconnaissance by
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under the sponsorship of the U.S.
International Cooperation Administration (later U.S. AID). According
to the study,

Although the interest of the States themselves was undeniable, it seems likely
that the initiative for this effort traces ultimately to France and the United
States. It may well have been thought that stimulating a general interest in
technological and economic development of the region might help to stabilize the
political regimes there. At any event, a Special Project Agreement was signed
between the Riparian States and the United States in November 195.5. There-
after, the representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation ranged the area, held
several meetings with representatives of the four countries, and returned to the
United States, where their "Reconnaissance Report — Lower Mekong River
Basin" was issued in March 1956."

This .36-page report and its detailed appendices received close
attention in Indochina, the study continued, perhaps because it was
issued by representatives of the nation that had most to offer in
support of the project as well as the broadest experience with sys-
tematic river development. In any case it was a collection of the best
data available about the region, and it specified what further data
would be needed to get on with the project:

Specifically, it called for hydrographic and sediment surveys of the main
river; surveys of such features of the entire basin as topography, geology, trans-
portation, communications, and agriculture; establishment of water flow meas-
uring stations on the main stem and tributaries, weather stations, and a systematic
search for preferred dam sites; studies of such special problems as the control of
the water level of the great lake (Tonle Sap) in central Cambodia, the salty soil
in the great Plaine des Jones of Vietnam, the technology of double-cropping to
increase agriculture production, and improved fish capture and processing; and
such action programs as improved sanitation in water supply, and the training of
local personnel in the technical skills that would be required later on. The study
emphasized the need for cooperation among the four Riparian States in collecting,
maintaining, and disseminating data on a uniform, integrated basis. ^*

The Bureau of Reclamation report was enthusiastically endorsed
when it was presented at the annual meeting of ECAFE in Bangkok
in March 1957. Meetings of experts from the Riparian States were
held in May and September to implement the recommendations of
the report, and resulted in agreement on a charter for the aforemen-
tioned Coordination Committee. ^^

THE WHEELER AND FORD FOUNDATION REPORTS

When a Preparatory Committee met to adopt this Charter, it also
asked the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration to
help recruit a visiting team of water resources experts to review and
amplify the previous studies. By mid-November 1957 a U.N. team
had been assembled in Bangkok under the leadership of Lt. Gen.
Raymond Wheeler (Ret.) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The
Wheeler Report, completed January 2.3, 1958, reinforced and went
beyond the recommendations of the Bureau of Reclamation study,
proposing a 5-vear program of data collection at a total estimated
cost of $9,200,000.

6^ Ihid., p. 386.

M/ftirf.

•' Renamed in 1967 the "Mekong Development Committee."

1563

In 1961 the Ford Foundation, at the request of the Coordination
Committee, sent a mission lieaded by Gilbert F. White to examine
the economic and social implications of the proposed development.
The report of this mission was made in Bangkok in Juh^ 1962:

It recommended substantial strengthening of the staff of the Coordination
Committee in social science fields for the purpose of generating and collecting
social statistics. It called for joint studies with intergovernmental agencies on
problems of wide interest in the ECAFE region. It proposed that the Bank for
International Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) be invited to
participate in a study of methods for determining economic feasibility, and pointed
out that the primitive economy of the Riparian States imposed inexorable limits
on the rate of investment in regional development.'"

The report emphasized the need for a systematic compilation of
available data concerning resources, resource use, and social charac-
teristics. It called for a power market survey, a land use inventorj^,
and a study of ways to optimize agricultural use of water. The require-
ment for training of technicians was again emphasized. Further:

The report suggested that flood control benefits might be overstated and the
institution of a flood warning system could reduce losses at moderate cost. It
suggested that a large demonstration area be set up where the potential impacts
of the Mekong project upon rural life could be observed. It proposed an elaborate
program of demonstration projects in forest planting. In the introduction to the
report, the authors warned that heavy investment in engineering works would
not automatically lead to solid growth in social structure and economic gains.''

Instead of "monolithic concrete structures whose most immediate
return is inflation of the national ego," the report urged a more n^odest
start and suggested that ". . . the first construction be initiated
on one or more of the tributaries: They can provide essential experience
with ways of reaping an adequate harvest of benefits from investment
in water management." This recommendation, the stud}' notes,
directly conflicted with the views of the Coordination Committee,
which Jiad given priority to three ver}'' large engineering projects at
Pa Mong, Tonle Sap, and Sambor.

The committee's views prevailed for a time over the Ford Foinida-
tion Report's concept of a small-scale beginning. On the other hand,
the Foundation Report suggested a list of investigations and research
projects which would require more extensive and close supervision
than the Coordination Committee could manage. Nevertheless, the
period of the Foundation study and the years immediatel.v following
was marked by an increased tempo of activity on the Mekong project.
The number of participating countries increased, as did donations
and pledges of contributions to support the planning studies, which
rose from $20 milhon in March 1962 to $42 million by the end of
1963 and $68 million a year later.

THE MEKONG PROJECT'S BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT

Two things stand out in a review of the events associated with the
Mekong project from its beginnings until the time of President
Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech in April 1965. One is the broad base

'0 Huddle, Tlu Mckoiiq I'rojict, vol. I, p. 388.
■I Ibid., pp. 388-389.

96-243 O - 77 - 5

1564

of support for the project, with no nation monopoHzing the leader-
ship; the other, the major contributions made by the United States,
both officially and unofficially. A sampling of activities of the years
f 962-64 will'illustrate:

In 1964, a first geological map of the basin was completed. In France, work was
proceeding on a mathematical model of the river while representatives from the
Columbia River headquarters of the U.S. Corps of Engineers were undertaking
a system study of the Mekong. Studies were underway by the World Health
Organization of the problems of malaria and schistosomiasis in the basin. Scores
of hydrologic and meteorologic stations had been set up and a radio network
linked them to headquarters in Bangkok, where their reports were collected and
tabulated. The Bureau of Reclamation was beginning work on a feasibility study
of the Fa Mong Dam. Stream gradient measurements on the main stem had been
completed in 1961 and measurement of the capacity of possible reservoirs was
actively proceeding. In 1964, ECAFE completed an agricultural market analysis.
Resources for the Future, Inc., had begun a study of world demand for products
of electro-processing industries. A study of manpower needs and resources was
begun in 1962, with the International Labor Office as lead agency. The Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and Israel, were studying
agricultural improvement methods; plans were underway for farm and timber
demonstration projects. ''^

With a broad base of support and stepped-up pace, the character
of the investigations changed markedl}' as the project proceeded:

Not onh^ w^as the scope of the pertinent data recognized as far wider than it
had been in the 1950s, but primary emphasis was shifting to the economic and
social consequences of proposed constructions and development. In the United
States, river basin development had followed this trend, but the conversion to
total system planning had taken more than a century; benefiting from U.S.
experience, the Mekong planning activity had achieved it in less than a decade."

Role of Congress

Congressional reaction to the President's speech of April 7, 1965,
was mixed. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield saw the speech
as a U.S. commitment to help make the peace, once obtained, "a
dynamic peace, a peace of constructive benefit, not only to the
people of Vietnam, North and South, but to Southeast Asia as a
whole." Congressman Zablocki asserted that the "principal object"
of the speech had been insufficiently recognized: "That is the bold
move to stabilize Southeast Asia and assist the peaceful progress of
the people in that area through a multi-national program of economic
assistance, directed b}^ the United Nations, in which Communist
nations would be invited to participate." Senator McGovern declared
that peace in Asia "... means precisel}^ the kind of imaginative
effort the President proposed . . ., including regional develop-
ment . . . and experienced assistance from the best people available
in the field of international development." Senator Moss added that
the speech "represents a major breakthrough in international posture."
On the other hand. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen ques-
tioned the feasibilit}^ of an attempt to "buy peace with an American
aid program," and Congressman Gerald R. Ford declared that
. . . friendship, security, and solid international relationships cannot
be bought with dollars." ^*

Despite forebodings. Congress supported the proposal advanced in
the Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, 1965. When the President in a

'2 Ibid., pp. 389-390.

'3 Ibid., p. 390.

7< Ibid.. Di). .368-.36n.

1565

special message of June 1, 1965, asked for a supplemental $89 million
in foreign aid funds for the Mekong River Basin project, Congress
acted promptly to grant the request. On March 16, 1966, it authorized
a $200 million subscription to the capital of the new Asian Develop-
ment Bank." Had the President's initiative succeeded in hastening
an end to the Avar, there is little doubt that Congress would have
given strong support to a postwar reconstruction program in South-
east Asia with the Mekong project as a major feature.

Outcome

President Johnson's initiative ended in failure. It seems clear that
the main reason it failed w^as its timing: it was too late, probably by
several years. The North Vietnamese were dug in and were apparently
convinced that they held the long-run advantage. There is evidence,
however, that the proposal Avas taken seriously at the time, even in
North Vietnam, and that it had considerable influence on long-range
thinking about regional development. Presidential emissary Eugene K.
Black has commented as follows on the political impact of the speech
in Southeast Asia :

. . . there is little doubt in my mind that the political impact of President
Johnson's offer of large-scale post-war assistance to South Asia was substantial. I
say Southeast Asia rather than the "Riparian States" because the offer of assist-
ance was not confined to them. I believe the President intended and I acted as
though Southeast Asia covered the five Mekong coimtries — Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos and both Vietnams — and Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. And I considered the $1 billion of^er to be more symbolic than mathe-
matically precise. My visits and contacts included all of these countries except
North Vietnam. Both an immediate and shortrange political impact of our offer
was its positive role as a catalyst in stimulating the interest in and moves toward
regional cooperation. While nationalism is, of course, the dominant political
force in the region, this is now tempered by a fairly widely accepted view that
the states of Southeast Asia have a common interest in working together for
political, economic and even cultural reasons. Many of the regional organizations
and groupings in Southeast Asia owe their origin cr vitality to the boost for
regional cooperation given by the United States in the period 1905-09. Best
known is the formation in late 1965 of the Asian Development Bank.'*!

Less recognized but no less real. Black continued, was "the large
increase in interregional personal contacts which occurred in South-
east Asia over these years at various levels and in various forums":

I have in mind such developments as the initiation of plans for a regionwide
study of transportation infrastructure (the study was completed in 1971 with
help of the ADB) ; the coming together of ministers of education of the region to
plan development of training institutions of regional significance and the mush-
rooming of specialized regional groups to consider one topic or another of economic,
social or political significance. As for the Mekong "Riparian States," they have
participated in most of this regionwide activitj^ plus, of course, made progress iri
further developing plans for harnessing the resources from the river itseli. The
Johns Hopkins speech and the stepped-up interest in the development potential of
the Mekong which it generated certainly had a healthy political impact in the non-
Communist Riparian States by focusing attention on the future. I know this

" Eupene R. Black, former— 1949-62— president of the World Bark and in 1965 a special emissary of Trc;!-
dent Johnson in connection with the Mekone project, commented in his response of March 14, 197'.', to soiii''
questions by the author of the Mekong project study that while the idea for the Asian Devolopiuciit Ba'ik
"had been around for several years and ECAFE circles favored it, its formation in 196.5 resulted directly
from President Johnson's April 7 general offer to Southeast Asia and his July offer to propose the linifed
States join such a bank, if formed, which I was able to convey to a special meeting of Asian bankers in Bang-
kok." [See Appendix to The Mekong Project, vol. 1, p. 433.]

''• Appendix to The Mekong Project, p. 433.

1566

from my four trips to the area for President Johnson and siiljscquent visits. Whih;
I did not visit North Vietnam, I understand from C. L. Sulzberger's trip to Hanoi
and other accounts that some poHtical figures there were quite interested in the
possibihty of sharing in the proposed major develo])ment effort. At the same time
it was as xmreaUstic in 1965 as it is today [March 1972] to believe that leaders in
North Vietnam [bent] on conquest of the South would abandon their goals simply
in response to offers of aid."

Assessment

Stiul}^ of the Mekong projecit as a particular undertaking, a model
venture in regionalism, and as the subject of a major wartime political
initiative affords a number of significant insights.

One is that "as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of co-
operation in a regional development scheme does not present a con-
vincing opportunity." " Or, to put it in more specific terms, "The
response of the Hanoi authorities . . . appears to have demon-
strated . . . that 'dollar diplomacy' does not convince an adversary
as long as there is any reasonable prospect that he can outlast the
United vStates without some form of capitulation." '^

THE MOMENTU.M OF NONPOLITICIZED REGIONALISM

Another is that a regional enterprise which is essentially apolitical
and at the same time promises tangible economic benefits throughout
the region may develop a momentum powerful enough to keep it going
despite traditional animosities between groups \\ithin the region, and
even under complex conditions of war. "Perhaps the most notable
events to be chronicled about the Mekong scheme from its inception
to early 1965, a period of more than a decade, were the events that did
not happen":

The rather improvised Coordination Committee was able to maintain coherence
and control, as well as forward movement. The four Riparian States, despite
several .serious diplomatic contretemps, continued their active participation and
cooperation in the conunittee. Communist factions in all four states did not
impede the field studies or construction, and a minimum of guerrilla incidents
were reported, even as the conflict in Vietnam worsened.""

Underpinning this phenomenon is a range of attractive character-
istics shared by development enterprises ^vhich involve multinational
regions and multilateral relationships:

Emphasis is on local participation in development and planning;

Subregions in greatest need and offering greatest opportunity for advancement
tend to receive priority by local consent;

Nati<malistic preoccupations appear to be moderated;

Self-help is encouraged and stimulated by being made more effective in com-
bined actions with mutual support;

National .sensitivities that bilateral aid would exacerbate are less abraded by
multinational arrangements;

Regional cohesiveness — the tendency for people of different countries working
together on a shared problem to lay aside their national differences — can result
from attention to geographic regional goals rather than formal national boundaries;

Burdens of foreign aid tend to be more widely distributed; and

The process of applying technological means to social and economic objectives
can be made coherent and understandable to those who expect to enjoy the
benefits.**'

" Ihid.

"S The MikoiKl Project, vol. I. p. lliO.

7» Ibid., I). 424.

8" Ibid., p. :v.iA.

81 Ibid., p. 4:il.

1567

GEOGRAPHY AS THE BINDING FORCE

But the binding force which may be the indispensable condition of
the success of a regional enterprise is not man-made; it is the unity
supplied by nature, a matter of geography:

The ramifications of the Mekong project are beginning to appear almost Hmit-
Icss — encompassing river navigation and channel marking; flood warning and
control; weather stations; hydroelectric power production-distriV)ution-use;
irrigation; mineral resource exploitation; primary manufacturing; fertilizer
I)roduction and use; power market surveys; agricultural experiment and demon-
stration; ]iublic health, education, and training; bridges; roads; resettlement
problems; and even archcological considerations. Were it not for the coherence
inherent in the i)!an for a river basin in its entirety, the diffusion of effort would
almost certainly be unmanageable. ^^

Regionalism — or more precisely, regional development — introduces
the iclea of a system within which technology is applied more co-
herently to a geographic unit than to a political unit. The technological
system requires, first of all, an intensive application of science:

The scientific base of a regional development "scheme, of which the Mekong
Lower Ba^in project is here the prototype, involves an enormous range of research
disciplines: meteorology, soil chemistry, biomedicine, forestry, plant genetics,
sociology, anthropology, marine biology, entomology, and geology, to mention
only a few. The technology and engineering base of .such a regional development
scheme is similarly broad. It encompasses hydraulics, electric power, flood con-
trol, electronic communications, computer modeling, electrical industries, large
demonstration farms, highway and bridge construction, fish and agricultural food
processing, and many more fields of technological applications.^^

ADVANTAGES OF MULTILATERAL REGIONALISM

One of the advantages of the multinational and multilateral regional
approach is that it provides better guarantee? than a unilateral or
bilateral approach is likely to do that the social and environmental
impacts of development v.ill be fairly addressed and effectively dealt
with. The long-range gains of this approach in assuring the purposeful-
ness and benefits, in human and environmental ternis, of a develop-
ment enterprise, and also the stability of the enterprise, may greatly
outweigh the short-term costs in inconvenience and (as the principal
donor nations might see it) lack of control. Patience is required, among
other things:

What makes plausible the management of so large a program Cas the Mekong
project) with so miscellaneous an array of resources and authorities is that the
project has shown an adaptive capability for 1.5 years, has not committed itself
to an unmanageably large effort, has concentrated on lajing a solid data base for
each effort, and appears willing to accept a deliberate pace for the future.*^

The question of adverse ecological consequences received little
attention during the first decade of planning and development in the
Lower Mekong Basin. Then rising anxieties in the United States over
environmental consequences of applied technology spilled over into the
Mekong project and compelled similar consideration of consequences
for the inhabitants of the Mekong Basin. For example, the report of a
field study of the Pa Mong Dam, financed by U.S. AID, predicted ex-
tensive disadvantages along with the benefits of the dam: bilharzia
and malaria from the penned-up slack water, the negative conse-
cjuences of heavy but seemingly necessary reliance on chemical

82 Ibid., p. 418.

83 Ibid., p. 36.i.
81 Ibid., p. 381.

1568

pesticides, resettlement of hundreds of thousands of famihes from the
reservoir area, need for large amounts of chemical fertilizer as farmers
were displaced from fertile floor plains to less fertile uplands, flooding of
prime timberlands, and diminished fish population. Nevertheless, as
Claire Sterling put it in a series of newspaper articles on the Mekong
project in 1971: "For once, developers and planners are giving some
study to this sort of thing before the event." *^

In general, observes the author of the present stud>^ the policies
of the Coordination Committee and its stafT have appeared to be
progressively more adaptive to both the sociological and the environ-
mental impacts of the Mekong project. Mohamed Shoaib, a World
Bank official, has summed up the adaptive process as one involving
(a) deliberateness and incrementalism, (b) increasing pragmatism —
learning by doing, and (c) attention to the problems created by
intervening in depth in the subtle equilibria of established eco-
systems. Shoaib observes that it can always be shown that the effects
of any development will be in part adverse, but that the consequences
of economic stagnation too are demonstrably adverse. He calls for a
meaningful balance between the urgency of development and the
demands for conservation . . . through a timely interdisciplinary
approach to development planning.*^

Author's Reassessment

Five years after the study was completed in the late spring of 1972,
the author of The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of
Regionalism sees it in the following light :

THE MEKONG PROJECT IN PERSPECTIVE

The theme of this study is that a regional approach to develop-
ment affords a focus for peaceful economic progress, serves as an
educational process, and establishes a base for wider cooperation
among participating nations. It offers a possibility for realignment of
nations and international structures toward diplomatic goals: regional
stability, international cooperation, tension reduction, a peaceful
alternative to insurgency, and bridges across ideological and ethnic
differences. The study does not assert that these are certain con-
sequences of the regional approach, but suggests that the approach
warrants further study as a possible way to improve the world system
to exploit economic and technological resources in a more balanced
and rational manner.

The Mekong project was a natural outcome of the application of
U.N. values and purposes in Southeast Asia. The effort to expand it
greatly as a means of damping a nationalistic and ideological conflict
in Vietnam failed. However, the project itself showed remarkable
durability, even under the stress of conflict and insurgency in the
region. A possible lesson is that a constructive regional approach can
help to evolve conditions and relationships favorable to international
cooperation, but it is not a useful instrument for damping conflict
already in progress.

With the withdrawal of the U.S. presence in Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam, a complete takeover of governmental authority by

85 7Wd., p. 41'J.
88 Ibid., p. 420.

1569

Communist-oriented groups followed. The most recent meeting of
representatives of the four Riparian States in the Coordinating Com-
mittee was in March 1975. A subsequent meeting held in Bangkok in
April 1977 was attended by delegates from Vietnam, Laos, and
Thailand, but not Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia). The delegates
of the three countries announced tentative agreement on establishing
an interim tripartite commission to proceed (pending resumption of
participation by Kampuchea) with development of Mekong Basin
water resources. Meanwhile, the Mekong Committee's operating budget
through 1977 has been assured by support from various sources, and
Vietnam and Laos have officially asked for L^nited Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) support of the Committee through 1978. A
phase-out of U.S. support of the project, begun in 1975, has been com-
pleted. While there is uncertainty as to the future scope of the Mekong
project, and as to w^hether it will maintain its previous practices of
extensive multilateral coordination and consultation, the remarkable
fact is that the project is still alive and appears to be in the process of
institutional rebuilding.^^

The study traced the change in emphasis of the Mekong project
from large civil works and capital-intensive development to socio-
economic programs appropriate to the local culture. Concurrently,
an increased concern is evident for the environmental consequences — •
principally adverse consequences — of large public works. Taken
together these two trends accentuate the human importance of
technological impacts. An understanding of the cultures and economic
systems of parts of a region undergoing development planning is now
perceived as of foremost importance. The implication of these cir-
cumstances is that development under local leadership, w^ith local
participation, may yield slower and less substantial physical results
but may tend to create institutions and social organization that are
more stable and compatible with local culture and social forces. The
study gave some, but perhaps not enough, attention to this require-
ment. Moreover, the role of regional development as a vehicle for
cooperation, tension reduction, and social integration seems to be
furthered by this sliift of emphasis.

SOME OBSERVATIOXS AND CONCLUSIONS

Among the conclusions and observations suggested by the study are
these :

— Habits of cooperative relationship may be more important
than formal organization in the mounting of a complex inter-
national development.'

— A regional development program must harmonize differing
national objectives rather than overriding them. In particular,
a regional program cannot win acceptance if it aims explicitly
to diminish nationalistic aspirations and contravene national-
istic values.

— The logical appeal of large civil works that enrich the
energy, transportation, and resource development of a region,
while reducing flood hazards, provides a powerful motivation for
cooperative effort. It also justifies large capital investment. The
risks of such large civil works are less obvious, but still real.

87 Source: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development,
July 1977.

1570

There is a tendency for local leadership to concentrate on the
piins and io;nore tlie risks. However, unless gains are balanced
a2;ainst risks, the long-range consequences — both regional and
diplomatic — may be unfavorable.

— Political acceptability of a multination regional development
proje(;t requires that benefits be evident to all participants, and
that costs and benefits to each nation be in reasonable balance.

A large midtination project can attract contributions from many
nations outside the region; these can aggregate to an impressive
total investment even though no one contribution is much of a
burden to the donor.

— An important benefit of a large project in a developing region
is the necessarv education and training of local participants, and
tlie experience gained in lo(;al leadership and planning.

— The subject of regional application of technology for social
purposes contains many of the elements that make the interaction
of science and technology with diplomacy important politically. In
addition to the potential contributions of the subject to diplomatic
goals, it challenges the ability of the executive and legislative
branches to exploit opportunities that may require years of
evolution.

— When tlie Pi-esident presents the Congress with a specific
regional program, with the costs and benefits adequately defined,
the Congress tends to respond favorably and promptly.

— The combining of U.S. interests in international regional
development as an approach to national security and as an ap-
proach to economic advancement tends to detract from the effec-
tiveness of such development for either purpose. A "low profile"
of external supporting nations tends to yield most fruitful results.

— For a variety of reasons attention to international regional
development b}' the Congress has diminished. Domestic economic
concerns have attracted attention away from foreign develop-
ment. Tensions in the Middle East have replaced Southeast Asian
troubles as the focus of effort in conflict reduction. Confidence in
the practical utility of social science for pubhc policy has been
shaken. Finally, there is a tendency for the Congress to give
principal attention to short-term problems, at the expense of
longer-range considerations — especially when the opportunities of
diplomatic gain ofl'ered b}' the latter are at a low confidence level.

— To conclude with a quotation from the study itself: "It is
slieer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development
of the Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus
for peaceful economic progress, served as an educational process,
and established a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted
legion. However, the question seems legitimate as to whether
the consequences of a slowly and deliberately encouraged regional
development — region by region — in lagging parts of the world
might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run." *^

Some Ilhistrafive Qiiestio7is

What U.S. institution might best take the lead in planning for th^
application of regional development principles to advance U.S. diplo-
matic objectives?

Might the role of U.N. agencies be usefully expanded for this
purpose?

8S Huddle, The Mekomi Project vnl. I, p. 43!

1571

Would the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) in Vienna, Austria, be a possible locus for international plan-
ning of multination regional development?

What regions of the world offer the best opportunities for technical
development, and which of these might yield the greatest diplomatic
benefits — e.g., the Middle East, the Sahel, the Amazon Basin, the
Iberian Peninsula, etc.?

In December 1973 Congressman Clement J. Zablocki spoke on the
House floor in support of the formation of a Mideast Regional De-
velopment Bank. Such a Bank, Mr. Zablocki asserted, would "repre-
sent a positive, reasonable, and promising approach to promoting
the social and economic development of the entire area, thereby
creating a climate for true and lasting peace." ^^ Is there still merit
in this proposal as a practical possibilit}', considering present economic
conditions in the Middle East and the world at large which reflect
recent Arab oil price manipulations and revenue accumulations?
Could it perhaps put some of the new oil wealth to work in ways
beneficial to the entire Middle Eastern region?

What constructive roles might be played by multinational corpora-
tions in supporting multinational regional development projects?

What geographic features other than river basins might suppl}' the
central coherence for regional development?

Does the Tennessee Valle}^ Authority offer any useful lessons, that
is, in the relationships among States in the TVA area, on how best
to exploit the diplomatic advantages of regional development?

Could TVA personnel serve usefully in educating local leadership
in developing countries in the principles and methods of regional
development?

What interactions would be A^aluable and should be provided
between subnational and supranational regional institutions and
activities? W^hat kinds of clearinghouses are needed for the sharing
of basic data in this field?

A stronger role is required of political and social scientists in tlie
field of regional development; how is it to be defined and given scope?

How can political and social scientists best go about structuring an
approach to defining the normative objectives of a region, as a frame-
work within which economic objectives would be determined — and
do so in a manner acceptable to the various political leadership
elements involved?

Apart from economic factors, are there generalizations about
regionalism — having to do, for instance, with social patterns reflecting
adaptation to geographical environment — that need to be incorporated
into the body of thought and planning doctrine on regionalism?

An invention is needed that can do for regional programs what the
systems approach has done for missile and space systems development.
The thrust of sj'^stems development is that all values must be quanti-
tatively defined and subjected to cost-effectiveness analysis. What is
the normative counterpart?

A critical factor to be dealt with in multination regional under-
takings is the social tensions set up by bringing representatives ol
different cultures — however similar — together in working relation-
ships. What standards and methods can be devised for measuring

" Congressional Record, December 11, 1973, nil0~6.

1572

levels of intensity of these social tensions? How can changes in these
levels (a) be brought about, and (b) measured? To what extent is it
feasible to attempt to ascertain the ideal level of tension— that which
would result in the best blend of harmony and accomplishment — for
any given regional enterprise?

CASE FIVE: EXPLOITING THE RESOURCES OF THE SEABED"^

Statement oj the Case

The matter of who owns the ocean floor came into prominence as
a consequence of technology. Historically, the seabed was an inter-
national commons of neghgible utility. International law afforded no
substantial provision for its governance or possession because there
was no need for it. Man's invasion of the ocean deeps came gradually,
beginning v,dth exploration by deep-submergence vehicles, mapping
expeditions using the military technolog}' of ultrasonics, systematic
collection of samples from the ocean floor, and ultimately core drilling
of the seabed at progressively deeper submergences. Offshore drilling
for oil by the United States,' begun during World War II, led to the
evolution of a large and complex technology that extended from its
early application in the Gulf of Mexico to Asiatic waters, and most
receiitly to the North Sea. Early discovery of manganese nodules,
occurring in great profusion on the deep ocean floor, received little
notice until world consumption of such materials as copper, nickel,
cobalt, as well as manganese, contained in these nodules began to
press on world capacity to extract them from sources on the continents.
As the winning of these resources, as well as petroleum, from the
seabed neared practicality, the question of who owns the ocean floor
came to international attention.

Importance oj the Case

Questions of national sovereignty traditionall}^ rank liigh among
the concerns of nations. Determination of seaward jurisdiction of
coastal States remains an unresolved question with proponents of
different interests adducing conflicting principles: major maritime
powers seeking boundaries close in, some smaller states reaching
out as far as possible, and some states pursuing a mixed strategy
based on the principle of submarine geography.

The potential for conflict is inherent in a resource-rich region over
which no authority of law extends. As on land, the riches of the seabed
are unevenly distributed and the right of first capture can always be
challenged by a stronger power. States lacking the technological means
of exploiting the regime adopt the position that they should be able to
share the harvest of seabed wealth from the international commons.
Landlocked states contend that the accident of geography should not
deprive them of a share in the new source of mineral wealth. Poor
and less developed states base their claims for some preference in the
matter on the fact of their relatively greater need.

The technology of extracting petroleum from the ocean floor is
already being applied, with eyer-increasing expertise. In the face of
the energy crisis growing out of the OPEC oil embargo and price
increases, seabed petroleum operations are growing in importance.

6" U.S. C'onpross, House, Committee on Foreign Aff;iirs, Exploiting the Rcsourcs of the Seabed, in the
series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments by George A. Doumani, Science Policy Research Division, Congres-
sional Kesearcli Service, Lil)raiy of Congress, I'.iTl. See vol. I, pp. i:{0-.i24.

1573

As a practical matter, the resolution of the seabed issue in oil-ricli
areas is an early necessity.

Although the recovery of soUd minerals from the deep ocean floor
is less immediately in prospect, there is little question that the tech-
nology will eventually be perfected. The resources sought are enormous
in their occurrence; indeed, it is estimated that they are accumulating
by natural processes more rapidly than they could ever be mined. As
a matter of quantitative perspective, it is reported that maukinri will
never be able to use as much magnesium metal as is contained in a
single cubic mile of seawater. On the problem of resolving the rights
of capture of these solid minerals, the diplomats of the world have
some indeterminate period of advance w^arning before the issue re-
quires operational solution. However, if the solution is not reached
before it is needed, the prospect is that the technology of ocean uuning
will be put to use regardless, leading to many foreseeable (and doubt-
less some unforeseeable) international complications.

How the Case Developed

The study by George A. Doumani approaches the seabed case from

two perspectives: the technological and the diplomatic. The focus of

the case, however, is political. As the author notes, "It is conceded

that development will be confined, for some time to come, to the

Continental Shelf areas, and that progress into the deep sea is not

imminent."

However [Doumani continues], the confusion created b)" the Geneva Conven-
tions, particularly the exploitability clause, invites review; definitive political
boundaries are needed for the seaward limit of national jurisdictions. Beyond
this limit, the deep sea areas would then be confirmed as the common domain
of the community of nations. Whatever regime is suggested for this international
deep sea domain is subject to legal considerations and international approval,
but the issue is not as urgent as is the delineation of national jurisdictions at this
time.si

After presenting in some detail the technological state of the art in
exploiting seabed resources, the author recounts the political and
diplomatic institutions that were endeavoring to deal with these "inter-
national legal considerations." A specific proposition was advanced,
August 17, 1967, by the Permanent Mission of Malta to tlie United
Nations that called, among other things, for the reservation of the
seabed (outside of the limits of present national jurisdictions) from
appropriation by nations, and the use of its resources primarily to
promote the development of poor countries. In response, a U.X. ad
hoc committee was formed to study the Malta proposal. Its report,
in February 1968, was referred to a U.N. standing connnittee in-
structed to continue the work of developing a rationale for legal
control of the seabed. As Doumani was completing his report, the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction — and especially its
legal subcommittee — was engaged in an extensive series of studies in
preparation for a "Law of the Sea Conference."

The first tangible result of the U.N. effort was the signing, Febru-
ary 12, 1971, of a "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and Ocean Floor and Subsoil Thereof." As the report went

" Doumani: Exploiting the Resources of the Scalxd, vol. I, p. 481.

1574

to press the treaty was awaiting approval by the U.S. Senate of its
ratification. (Tlie treaty was subsequently ratified.)

U.S. Involvement in the Case

Tiie Doumani analysis included a statement of the problem, a
description of the U.S. and U.N. institutions created to deal with it,
an account of problems up to July 1971, and an assessment of pros-
pects for resolution of the problem thereafter.

Thus, in June 1966 the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment Act, Public Law 89-454, was passed by the C^ongress. It es-
tablished ". . . policies and objectives for the U.S. effort to develop
the Nation's marine resources" and ". . . for the establishment of
a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment. . . ." that ". . . represented a wide-ranging mandate over the
total national program in oceanography." "^ This Council was to make
a comprehensive investigation and study of all aspects of marine
science in order to recommend an overall plan for an adecpiate national
oceanographic program that will meet the present and future national
needs. One panel of the Marine Council was the Committee on Inter-
national Folic}' in the Marine Environment. Another action by the
Council was to recommend creation of an operating agency in the
field. The policy conmiittee lapsed in 1971, and was replaced by an
Interagency Law-of-the-Sea Task Force, imder the chairmanship of
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. The agency, as created
by the Congress in October 1970, took the form of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).^^

A U.S. policy was proposed May 23, 1970, by Frcsident Ni.xon,
who called for two types of "international machinery":

First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the international com-
munity in an international trusteeship zone consisting of the continental margins
hej'ond a depth of 200 meters off their coasts. In return, each coastal State would
receive a share of the international revenues from the zone in which it acts as
trustee and could impose additional taxes if these were deemed desirable.

As a second stop, agreed international machinery would authorize and regulate
exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins. ^^

As the study concluded, it was ''too early to predict what success
the U.S. proposal will achieve". It was likely to encounter opposition
not onl}' abroad but at home as well. Moi-eover, the proposal left
untouched the thorny question of where the seabed began and the
coastal shelf terminated. The U.S. position favored a 12-mile limit.
Latin American nations clung to their 200-mile limits. Agreement
would not come eas}-.

Role of Congress

Numerous committees and subcommittees of the Congress had
interested themselves in the seabed problem.^'' An early congressional
action was the creation of the Marine Council. Following the Malta
proposal to the United Nations,

Al)out 3 dozen resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate,
mostly in opposition to vesting control over the deep ocean resources in the
United Nations. House resolutions were for the most part identical, expressing

tz Jbid., pp. 4!l6-l(t7
sa Ibid., p. 498.

M lbid.\ p. 510.

«5 These are enumerated on p. 4% of tlic study.

1575

the sense of Congress that any action at that time to vest control of deep ocean
resources in an international body was hasty and ill advised . . . .^^

In hearings before several congressional committees, witnesses
favoring the principle of the Malta Proposal cited as among its
advantages the following:

. . . regulation of the depletion of mineral resources, avoidance of an anarchic
rush to claim and exploit subsea resources, reduced danger of marine pollu-
tion . . ., reduced threat of a military race to exploit strategic advantages of
submarine weapons placement, provision of an independent income for the United
Nations, and a general strengthening and maturity in the U.N. itself, through the
experience of administering the vast area of the ocean floor."

Objections to any U.N. action "stemmed primarily from fears that
the United States might be giving away some valuable assets and
rights the extent of which were not yet known". The qualifications of
the United Nations to accept the responsibihty were questioned.
Scientific exploration might be hampered by a premature definition of
political jurisdiction. National security interests might be compro-
mised.

An executive branch proposal, August 3, 1970, became the focus of
a series of hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcomnriittee on Ooean Space chaired by S3nator Chiiborne Pell.
Hearings on the proposal were also held by the Senate Committee on
Commerce, through its Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic
Lands Policy, chaired by Senator Ernest F. Rollings, and before a
Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, chaired by Senator
Lee Metcalf. These sought answers to such questions as:
— What were the limits of the Continental Shelf?
— Should the limit be geological or legal?

— Should it be based on considerations of equity, security, or
economic advantage?

— How much did the United States stand to lose by the creation
of an international regime?

— Was a new Law of the Sea Conference necessary?
— Should the States have a narrow or wide Continental Shelf?
— For areas beyond the Continental Shelf, what sort of an
international regime would be best?

— What kind of international machiner}^ should be established?

— How did all these aspects affect the economy and national

security of the United States?

The hearings made evident that two differing sets of policies were

taking shape, one favoring substantial transfer of jurisdiction bej^ond

a narrow Continental Shelf to an international body and the other

urging extension of the Continental Shelf to the limit of exploitability.

Outcome

The case was unresolved by the time the Doimiani report went to
press. In fact, it continues unresolved in mid-1977, 6 years thereafter.
As an interim measure, a policy was proposed by the LTnited StatCvS
to the United Nations that "all nations join the United States to in-
sure that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabed
beyond the 200-meter limit be issued subject to an international au-
thbritv".'^

sii Ibid., p. 4'.(i».
" Ibid., p. .5(K).
« Ibid., p. 523.

1576

Writing in 1971, Doumani concluded his study with the observation
that evohition of TJ.S. seabed policy "had been relatively slow".

I'ndoubtedly the marine scientists and technologists would have preferred a
brisker pace than the diplomats were jirepared to take. For its part, the Congres
was ready to move faster than was the Department of State, although in wha
direction is still not evident.^*

■ss
t

Assessment

The United States and the other interested countries of the world
have long had the opportiniity to resolve the question of who owns
the seabed before the beginning of a rush of entrepreneurs to exploit
the seabed mineral wealth, using technology certain to be perfected
sooner or later. The problem is not a technological one, although it is
cieated by technology and without the prospect of a technological
opportunity the problem would be a tiivial one. Only when the
technology is perfected to enable profitable exploitation of seabed
resources will the problem require urgent solution.

The advantage of advance resolution of the problem is evident.
One can imagine the chaos of an international-gold rush into a territory
without law or property rights. The prospect of anarchy in a difficult
and perilous environment, with many claimants and costly equipment,
is disturbing to contemplate. For the United States to assert a policy
of "right of capture," based on this country's technological superi-
ority, affords no answer if the right should be challenged by another
nation using officially sanctioned force based on territorial claims.
Either the seas will be apportioned among national sovereignties,
perhaps by force, or some device for shared sovereignty in the hands
of a jointly established regidatory body must be created to regulate
the international commons. One way or the other, an agreed decision
must be made among nations as to jurisdiction over every part of the
ocean floor. Sovereignty, like nature, abhors a vacuum.

In 1971 the U.S. Department of State had not formulated any
clear policy on how to resolve the dilemma. The Congress was divided
between a national and an international solution. There was un-
certainty over the competence and even the political stability of the
United Nations. The problem of extent of seaward boundaries re-
mained unresolved. There were emerging differences in goals between
the developed and the developing nations. And uncertainty over the
timing of technological advance permitted the problem to linger in
controversy until technology itself would eventually compel a crash
solution under crisis conditions. It is interesting to note that in this
case the essential facts of the situation are not in question; the case
is political and diplomatic rather than technological, even though it is
technology that makes it important.

Author's Reassessment

The study defined the legal and phj'sical boundaries of the seabed
and presented an inventory of its resources. The value of these re-
sources was then related to economics and the present and future
technological capabilities for exploring and exploiting them. The
study discussed potential technological breakthroughs, particularly
in the areas of offshore oil and hard minerals on the ocean floor.

95 Ibid., p. 524.

1577

Political aspects were also considered, with particular attention to
the U.S. policymaking apparatus. From the national scene, the
study moved into the international arena and concentrated on the
concern of the whole world over ocean space. It also explored the
effect of science and technology in shaping national and international
policies, as well as the effects of man's activities on the environment.

Underlying these various discussions was a call for a new sense of
world community and a new breed of scientist-diplomat to meet the
pressing need for fair and proper conduct in the international diplo-
matic process.

These themes are as relevant today as they were when the study
was written. The study stopped chronologically at the time when
the world community of nations was preparing for the Conference on
the Law of the Sea; it served as a reference tool for those participat-
ing in the Conference. The first session of the Third U.N. Law of the
Sea Conference was held in 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela. Progress has
been slow ; by the conclusion of the sixth session in New York on July
15, 1977, a Law of the Sea Treaty had not been adopted and there was a
particular deadlock over the critical issue of seabed mining.

If the study were to be altered, alteration would be in the form of
updating the chronology of events rather than alteration in the scope
of the study. However, since the problems of the seabed have not yet
been resolved, any alteration to the study at this time would be pre-
mature. The subject remains relevant to congressional concerns, and
both Houses have been active in related legislation since the publica-
tion of the study. As far as the project series is concerned, the study is
much more relevant today than when it was wi'itten. This relevance is
particularly evident in the executive branch, where the State Depart-
ment, pursuant to statute, has created the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, headed by an
Assistant Secretary of State (as of July 1977, this position was held
by a former Member of Congress, Patsy T. Mink.)

Throughout the text the study showed the interaction of science and
technological development with the diplomatic process and with the
process of decisionmaking on the national level toward exploring and
exploiting the seabed resources. The conclusions reached can be main-
tained with the same emphasis today.

Legislative action was initiated or completed in some areas directly
related to the contents of the study, such as the bills introduced in
the 92d through the 95th Congresses for the exploitation of hard min-
erals on the ocean floor, the resolutions in both Houses regarding the
Law of the Sea Conference, and the measure introduced in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for the creation of the above-mentioned
bureau in the Department of State.

The significance of the issues raised by this study has not been
difficult to communicate to the Congress and the American people.
The subject has been the focus of attention throughout the world
since 1967, and recognition of its significance has been spreading into
a wide spectrum of the academic, industrial, economic, and political
sectors of the Nation. This significance is also reflected in govern-
mental reorganization in both the legislative and executive branches,
particularly in the former where several committees and subcommit-

1578

tees have established jurisdiction over ocean matters.'^" The Senate
Commerce Committee also initiated the National Ocean Policy" Study
in 1974, aimed at focusing Federal attention on, and national recogni-
tion of, the issues of offshore resources.

In evaluating the study and its effects, it can summarily be said
that the study was needed, was timely, and will remain a useful
reference for the period ending with the Conference on the Law of
the Sea. It has been useful to Congress in particular, and has had
wide use by many different people, governments, and organizations.

POLICY PROPOSAL BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Secretaiy of State Henry Kissinger in a speech given on August 1 1,
1975, before the American Bar Association annual convention ad-
vanced the following set of proposals for seabed policy :

— An international organization t-hould be created to set rules
for deep seabed mining.

— This international organization must preserve the rights of
all countries and their citizens directly to exploit deep seabed
resources.

— It should also insure fair adjudication of conflicting interests
and security of investment.

— Countries and their enterprises mining deep seabed resources
should pay an agreed portion of their revenues to the interna-
tional organization, to be used for the benefit of developing
countries.

— The management of the organization and its voting proce-
dures must reflect and balance the interests of the participating
states. The organization should not have the power to control
prices or production rates.

— If these essent'al U.S. interests are guaranteed, we can agree
that this organization \\'ill also have the right to conduct mining
operations on behalf of the international community primarily
for the benefit of developing countries.

— The new organization should serve as a vehicle for coopera-
tion between the technologically advanced and the developing
countries. The United States is prepared to explore ways of
sharing deep seabed technology vitli other nations.

— A balanced conmiission of consumers, seabed producers, and
land-based producers could monitor the possible adverse effects
of deep seabed mining on the economies of those developing
countries which are substantially dependent on the export of
minerals also produced from the deep seabed.'"^

too During the 92d Congress the determination to protect U.S. investment in deep seabed mining opera-
tions crystallized into legislative iiroposals. Legislation revised as a result of hearings held in 1972 and i;i73
was introduced during the 93d Congress. S. 1134, as amended, and II. R. 12233— the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Act — would require U.S. nationals to obtain a license from the Secretary of the Interior before
engaging in the exploration and commercial recovery of manganese nodules on the deep seabed. S. 1134, as
amended, was favorably reported to the Senate on August 21, 1974 and referred to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on September 4, 1974.

During the 94th Congress the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act as reported out of the Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee during the 93d Congress was reintroduced as II. R. 1270/3. 713.

i"' Henry A. Kissinger, "International Law, World Order, and Human Progress," speech before the
American Bar Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, August 11, 1975, pp. 4-0. These points
were reafUrmed or amplified by Secretary Kissinger on several subsecjuent occasions throughout 1976.

1579

At this time the Secretary also took note of several other issues to
be faced when the Law of the Sea Conference reconvened in Xew
York in 1976 :

Wa,ys must be found to oncounigo marine scientific research for the benefit of
all mankind while safeguarding the legitimate interests of coastal states in their
economic zones.

Steps must be taken to protect the oceans from pollution. We must establish
uniform international controls on pollution from ships and insist upon universal
respect for environmental standards for Continental Shelf and deep seabed
exploitation.

Access to the sea for landlocked countries must be assured.

There must be provisions for compulsory and impartial third-party settlement
of disputes. The United States cannot accept unilater;^! interpretation of a treaty
of such scope b}" individual States or by an international seabed organization. '"^

Some Illustrative Questions

What are the implications for U.S. policy at the continuing Law of
the Sea Conference of Third World pressures for a more influential
role in the development and operation of international institutions?
Is the trend toward politicization that marks current U.X. activities
spilling over into the deliberations of the Law of the Sea Conference
to the extent that it endangers the progress of the Conference? What
possible new U.S. diplomatic initiatives might help improve the nego-
tiating climate and the prospects of the Conference ?

What is the likely timing of technological exploitation of seabed
minerals today, and what are the implications of this timing for the
urgency of reaching a resolution of the seabed problem in the 1976
conference?

What factors and trends in the world diplomatic situation have
tended to obstruct the reaching of agreement on a Law of the Sea, and
what other emerging diplomatic/technological problems might also be
obstructed by these factors and trends? What constructive measures
might be taken by the United States to reverse them?

Might U.S. technological capabilities provide a leverage to promote
international agreement in the seabed problem?

Are there other U.S. -developed technologies having broad geo-
graphic implications that could provide leverage to promote agree-
ment on a Law of the Sea?

Would a regional approach — one which took account of the needs of
landlocked countries — be useful in working out a svstem of benefits
from exploitation of seabed resources?

CASE SIX— U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: THE INTERPLAY OF
ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND DIPLOMACY^*

Statement of the Case

"The estabhshment of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Com-
mission at the May 1972 Summit Conference and the signing of a
comprehensive set of trading agreements on October 18, 1972, opened a
promising new period of economic relations between the two nations."
(p. 529) li initiated what Secretary of State Kissinger called the process
of creating a "vested interest in-mutual restraint". Although the scope

i<» Ibid., p. 5.

'»' U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Sovkt Commercial Relations: The Interplay
of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy, in the series. Science, Technology, and American Diplo-
macy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by John P.
Hardt and Cieorge D. Holliday, Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, l!tT3. See vol. I
pp. .i26-60(j.

Throughoul tliis commentary all citations are from lliis source. Page numbers are given in the text imme-
iliatcly after the citation.

96-243 O - 77 - 6

1580

of the agreements is limited to economics, trade, and technology trans-
fer, its political significance is judged by U.S. leaders to be high; costs
and benefits of both the economic and political consequences need to
be assessed. The Hardt-IIolliday study sought to provide a pre-
liminary assessment, and in particular to identify the imponderable
questions that need to be monitored in the futuie as the process of
building the relationship unfolds.

Importance of the Case

Any bilateral undertaking or transaction involving the United
States and the Soviet Union is of inherent importance to the extent
that it reflects change in the relationship of the two superpowers.
This relationship between two nations which are joint custodians
of ultimate military power can determine the well-being of the rest of
the world, as well as their own. Any agreement that promotes accom-
modation or reduces tension, that promotes peaceful dealings or
reduces competition in military technology, has importance _ for
world peace and security and accordingly for the security of the United
States, which is the Nation's ultimate (liplomatic goal. Trade, accord-
ing to the hypothesis favoring the 1972 detente, influences internal
policy as well as external dealings of nations; and, "in the long run,
selected trade, intelligently negotiated and wisely administered, may
turn out to have been one of our most powei-ful tools of national
policy", (p. 585)

The importance for the United States of the series of 1972 trade
agreements is only moderately in the field of economics. U.S. exports
are limited by Soviet willingness to accept trade deficits, U.S. willing-
ness to extend trade credits, and U.S. acceptance of Soviet expoi-ts.
Totals allowed by these constraints on Soviet dollar earnings and
credit are not impressive.

However, the policy implications of Soviet adjustment to the
changed U.S. -Soviet trade relationship are seen to be of potentially
high importance. They affect such factors as the military arms race,
Soviet allocation of resources as between military weapons develop-
ment and civil goods production, long-term trade commitments, and
long-term commitments to technological development programs
incompatible with a vigorous military posture.

It would seem beneficial to U.S. diplomatic goals that Soviet
interest in improved economic relations with the United States should
be expressed in terms of a reordering of Soviet priorities favoring
"technological change and improvement in the availability of desirable
consumer goods to the Soviet workers and ])easants". (p. 603) It does
not appear likeh^ that the Soviets can pursue vigorousl}^ both the
arms race and expanded productivity to sustain exports and pay for
imports in connection with programs to modernize their economy and
to increase the availability of consmner goods.

From the Soviet ])oint of view, the ti'ade pact might be ex])ected to
yield such selected benefits as: The closing of the technological gap
in Soviet production of civilian goods (p. 54o), ex])an(le(l production
of Soviet oil and gas based on U.S. technology (p. 544), increased
production of nonfcrrous metals (p. 546), and improved quality of
consumer goods (i.e., better diet, clothing, ])ei'sonal transportation,
and housing) (p. 547). But the overall aim is to raise the level of their
civilian economy to the technical level of the other industrial nations.

1581

It is also possible that tlie internal organization of the Soviet Union
in response to the pressures generated by expanded trade with the
West may include such reforms as indicators of "profitability," de-
centralized decisionmaking by cnteiprise managers, and wage and
profit "incentives". Thus, "New planning technicpies, a more flexible
piice system, and increased reliance on market forces are key aspects
of the reforms". (]). 550)

As the report pointed out :

While Soviet reformers have not emphasized the international implications of the
reforms, it is clear that a more rational economic decisionmaking structure would
facilitate the integration of the Soviet economy into the international economic
system. Rationalization of Soviet prices would encourage the importation of goods
produced inefRcientlj' by domestic industries. At the same time, by fostering effi-
ciency in domestic enterprises the Soviet Union may be able to expand its e.\))orts
to Western markets. Moreover, economic reform would remove many of the
features of Soviet central planning which inhibit Western businessmen from
dealing with Soviet foreign trade ()rganizations. (]>]). 5i)l-~>k>2)

How the Case Developed

The Hardt-Holliday study traced the uneven course of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. trade relations from the 1920s through diplomatic relations
and a trade agreement of 1933; at that time the U.S. Export-Import
Bank was created to finance trade with the Soviet Union. Then, during
Workl War II, U.S. military and civilian goods were delivered to
the U.S.S.R. through the Lend-Lease Program. After 1945 efforts to
normalize peacetime trade relations between the two countries and
to bring the Soviets into the world economic community were largely
abortive. There were several reasons for this failure. As the report
observed :

To a large extent, Soviet foreign economic policy in the late 1940s and early
19o0s was a continuation of its j^rewar strategy of minimizing its economic ties
to the industrial West. During the 1930s, Soviet foreign economic relations had
been characterized by a policy of self-sufficiency or autarky. Although the im-
portation of high-technology products and, for a time, the services of foreign
engineers were permitted to meet high-priority, short-run needs, minimum
reliance on the non-Communist world economy was a primary indicator of
econouiie .success, (pp. 53^^-534)

Other factors on the Soviet side were the leadership's ideological
hostility toward the United States, unresolved questions of pre-
1920 indebtedness of Russia to the United States, and more generally
the suspicion of "capitalist" countries and the "Soviet predilec-
tion for comprehensive planning and control of the domestic
economy. ..."

"Cold war" attitudes began to harden soon after the close of World
War II, with trade declining to a low point in the early 1950s. Soviet
moves to relax from an extreme position of autarky in the late 1950s
and the 1960s were again set back by the Cuban crisis, the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, and the Vietnam War.

On the United States side, "The central feature of U.S. foreign trade
polic}^ toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War period was an
attempt to deny the Soviet Union the benefits of trade with the more
advanced industrial West." There were also allegations of unethical
Soviet trade practices such as dumping, pirating of inventions, de-
liberate disruption of markets, and use of slave labor.

However, during the 1960s, several small steps were taken to expand
U.S. -U.S.S.R. trade. U.S. export controls were eased and agricultural

1582

credits were extended. By 1966, President Lyndon Johnson was
urging increased economic exchanges to "build bridges" to East
European countries, (pp. 534-535)

ACCELERATED MOVEMENT TOWARD DETENTE

With the advent of the Nixon Presidency, the exploration of means
toward detente accelerated. One means of correcting recurring balance-
of-payments deficits was expanded trade with the Communist coun-
tries to increase exports, production, and employment. A Presidential
Commission in 1971 proposed that: "Within the bounds set by stra-
tegic considerations, the United States should attempt to expand its
trade with Communist countries." Export restrictions and tariffs
should be eased and multilateral trade arrangements explored for
this i)urpose. (p. 535)

B}^ the close of 1971 the pace of events quickened. The Peterson
Report in December noted that the countries of the Communist
world were trading more extensively with the West and urged a new
U.S. approach to Communist tracle in order to improve the trade
prospects of the United States and to open the way for Communist
countries to join the world trading and monetar}^ community, (p. 536)
In November 1971 Secretary of Commerce Stans went to Moscow
to discuss trade matters; he was followed in April 1972 by Secretary
of Agriculture Butz. These missions encouraged expectations of a
substantial increase in U.S. -Soviet trade. Then in May 1972 came
the Summit Meeting at which a Joint Commercial Commission was
created to negotiate an overall trade agreement (including reciprocal
most-favored-nation or MFN provision), arrangements for reciprocal
availability of credit and facilities to promote trade, and an arbitra-
tion arrangement to resolve trade disputes. By this time also, the
Soviet authorities appeared disposed to press for early resolution of
the issues that had obstructed trade between the two countries. Thus:

On July 8, 1972, an agreement was reached providing credit through the
Commodity Credit Corporation for Soviet purchases of American grain. A mari-
time agreement was conchided on October 14, 1972, which removed several
barriers to commercial shipping between the two countries. On October 18, 1972,
a commercial agreement and a settlement of the Soviet Lend-Lease debt were
signed. The commercial agreement projected a tripling of U.S.-Soviet trade
within a 3-year period and provided a number of regulatory measures. The
lend-lease settlement arranged a repavmcnt schedule for the Soviet World War II
debt to the United States, (p. 538)

Although the discussions of the series of agreements projected
optimistic consequences for future trade between the two countries,
the significant technological lag of the U.S.S.R. in other areas than
mihtary and space offered less reason for these expectations. Soviet
economic relations with the West rested mainly on technology trans-
fers to the relatively backward Soviet industries, paid for by exports
of raw materials. This structure of trade was unlikely to be quickly
altered by the new agreements.

U.S. Involvement

Assessment of the implications for the United States of the trade
agreements \v\i\\ the Soviet Union must consider both costs and
benefits, problems as well as opportunities, and arrangements to
fulfill the expectations raised by the agreements.

1583

It is generally assumed that trade is a means of encouraging more
amicable and stable relations among nations. U.S. interest in Soviet
trade has tended to reach beyond this generality:

Although somewhat inconsistent in application, a policy of reward-penalty
appeared to be followed by the United States, apparently with three objectives:

(1) To encourage detente by reducing weapons development, lowering
force levels, and moderating crisis management;

(2) To encourage detente through moderation and reform of the Soviet
regime's domestic policies, including religious tolerance, economic reform,
freedom of expression, and the right to emigrate;

(3) To encourage polycentrism in the Commimist world, detente in the
foreign policies of the individual Communist countries other than the U.S.S.R.,
and moderation in their domestic policies, (p. 040)

U.S. interest in the effects of expanded trade and detente with the
Soviets raises ambiguities in at least four areas: As to wlietlier the
U.S.S.R. exerts a moderating influence on world tensions or helps
foment dissensions; as to whether Soviet priorities need to shift to
meeting consumer requirements or to remain fixed on strategic mili-
tary weapons; as to whether Soviet internal controls are easing to
encourage modernization and professionalism or tightening over civil
liberties, emigration, and access to foreign media; and as to increased
or decreased independence of satellite countries.

On the commercial side, the question persists as to how good a
customer the U.S.S.R. can be. One view, ofi'ered in the study, is that
"increasing U.S. sales in agribusiness facilities, petroleum and natural
gas equipment, computer systems, and a variety of other high-
technology lines may be an effective wedge into the wSoviet market;
once begun, these sales tend to accelerate over time", (p. 572) This
principle was extended in the discussion to apply generally to advanced
industrial systems, management-control-communications systems,
mass production machinery building, agribusiness as both a system
and a series of technologies, and tourist systems. The hypothesis is
offered that requirements for imports in these areas "appear to
represent a pattern of technical and managerial relatedness that
would limit the ability of Soviet leaders to take short-term advantages,
borrow technology, and then withdraw from continued U.S. -Soviet
economic relations in ])articular lines." (pp. 578-574)

BARRIERS TO TR.A.DE EXPANSION

Again from the U.S. point of view, there are major barriers to the
proposed trade expansion. One is the unfamiliarity of U.S. business-
men with Soviet foreign trade techniques. Corporate rights are some-
what imprecisely defined. "One feature of Soviet state trading to
which Western businessmen object is the necessity of dealing with
Soviet foreign trade enterprises." There is no direct contact with
Soviet producers, consumers, and (hstributors. (p. 591) There is also
a tendency for Soviet traders to "insist on barter trade, tied trans-
actions, and other clumsy arrangements." Other barriers are the
limited Soviet export capability, the doubtful adaptability of Soviet
trade institutions to large-scale economic cooperation, and U.S.
resistance to exports with possible "national security" implications,
(p. 593)

The report concluded that further trade negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, to ease the indicated barriers,

1584

called for a considerable mobilization of U.S. talent. "In order to link
the broadest security and diplomatic interests with the commercial
arrangements, the involvement of high-level polic3rmakers is es-
sential." Also indispensable are "specialists on the Soviet Union,
foreign trade specialists, and private businessmen" to provide technical
advice. In short:

The long-term process of negotiation, its specialized character, and the broad
national interests inherent in U.S. -Soviet relations require a permanent working
blend of experienced people with the following characteristics :

a. Top politicians from both executive and legislative branches, authorized
to speak for the White House and Congress as a whole ;

b. Government trade specialists from the Departments of Commerce,
Treasury, State, and other agencies ;

c. Specialists on Soviet political-economic affairs from governmental or
academic positions; and

(1. Repivseiitatives of private business and hankiuR. (p. (')05)

Bole oj Congress

The Hardt-Holliday report pointed out that, "Congress neces-
sarily will be involved in certain aspects of U.S.-Soviet economic re-
lations in the future." For example, "Congressional approval is re-
quired for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union". (]). 5:^9)
Congressional action would also be rcciuired to e.\|)an(l the credit
resources of the Plxpoi-t-Iinpoi-t liank (p. 5S6) and would be desirable
to monitor the various easements in legulation by the administration
to facilitate the enlarging ])attern of U.S.-Soviet trade.

Although seveial reports (|). 5.'^<S) urged the necessity of a "major
and direct role of (/ongiess in (Soviet) trade negotiations," no effort
was made to involve the Congress in the trade discussions with the
Soviets and no enabling legislation was enacted to facilitate the
trade agreement. Only after the fact was the Congress asked to extend
MFN status to the U.S.S.R. (see es|)ecially |)p. 576-587).

It appears that a considerably expanded congressional role will be
necessary in the future to enable the exercise of constitutional re-
sponsibilities of the legislative branch in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet
commercial relations. In addition to the actions indicated above, the
Congress will presumably be asked for other pieces of implementing
legislation, including appropriations; it will have the continuing re-
sponsibility for legislative oversight; it will be continuously concerned
with the impact on U.S. programs, interests, and economic conditions
of trade with the Soviets (grain transactions being an example of this
concern) ; and it will be concerned with the broader impact of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade and technology transactions and agreements on
U.S. foreign policy in general.

Accordingly, the Hardt-Holliday report suggested that, "it would
be particularly beneficial to include Members of Congress in the
commercial negotiations"; and that "very careful official and public
scrutiny of each step in the progress of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com-
mercial Commission discussions would appear to be in order for both
the executive and legislative branches."

Congressional involvement [said the report] would permit a broader representa-
tion of U.S. public opinion and facilitate passage of legislative measures needed
to improve U.S.-Soviet commercial relations. Without continuous involvement
of the Congress and private interests, it could be difficult to have an informed
debate on important issues. The establishment of a special congressional committee
or subcommittee to deal with East- West trade, roughly paralleling the Jackson

1585

subcommittee on SALT, might be appropriate. The creation of the Jackson siiVv
committee gave evidence of congressional interest, involvement, and authority.
Direct congressional involvement would seem especially desirable in view of
the complex, significant, and long-term nature of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial
Commission deliberations. Such involvement on a continuing basis could facilitate
effective treatment of issues concerning statutory authoritj', such as most-
favored-nation agreements, and in general those in which congressional interest
is high, for example, (^x])ort-iini)ort credits. (Ilnrdt-Holliday Ileport, i)p. (lOo-OOli)

Outcome

The legislative consequences that flo\ved from the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
trade agreements are summarized by the authors in mid-1977 as fol-
lows: Congress passed tlie Trade Act of 197-1: (Public Law 9;^-618) and
the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-646)
at the close of the 93d Congress. The Jackson- Vanik Amendment to the
Trade Act conditioned the extension of MFX and U.S. Government
credits to the Soviet Union on liberalization of Soviet emigration pol-
icy. The Export-Import Bank Amendments placed several special
restrictions on Eximbank financing of LLS.-Soviet trade. L^.S. export
control policy toward the Soviet Union has been influenced l)y two
amendments to the Export Administration Act — the Export Admin-
istration Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-500), enacted on Octo-
ber 29, 1974, and the Export Administration Amendments of 1977
(Public Law 95-52), enacted on June 22, 1977. The former Act clari-
fied and strengthened somewhat the authority of the Secretary of
Defense to review applications for exports of types and categories of
goods or technology which he considers to have potential military
applications. The latter Act changed the basis for determining which
countries should be subject to national security export controls. It
.stipulates that U.S. export control policy toward individual countries
is not to be determined exclusively on the basis of the country's Com-
munist or non-Conununist status, but by its general relationship with

the United States.

Assessment

The Hardt-Holliday study concludes that: "The policies followed
by the United States and the Soviet Union will greatly influence the
probabilities of alternative outcomes." More specifically, adoption
by the Soviets of a consumer-oriented policy wx)uld divert lesources
and policy emphasis from a military buildup. On the U.S. side, the
Soviet policy of grain purchases would encom-age extension of the
interdependent relationship between the two superpowers into other
economic linkages. Inasmuch as Soviet policy objectives are "especially
crucial to such a projection," certainty is lacking as to which of dift'erent
alternate courses — or what compromise among them — the Soviet
leadershij) will adopt. (]). 600)

As the report observed:

The changes that have already been made seem likely to strengthen trade ties
between the United States and the Soviet Union, but many obstacles to com-
pletely normalized economic relations remain. The long-run growth of Soviet-
American economic relations will depend in large part on the continuation of the
liberalization process, (p. 593)

A matrix might be drawm up of possible outcomes and their effects,

for the United States and the Soviet Union, of; (a) exports from the

•United States to the Soviet Union; (b) exports from the U.S.S.R. to

the United States; (c) technology transfers from the United States to

the Soviets; (d) economic changes in the United States as a conse-

1586

quence of the trade pacts; (e) economic changes in the U.S.S.K.;
(f) political consequences for the United States; and (g) political
consequences for the U.S.S.R. For some cells in the matrix there are
fairly high probabilities; for others the forecasts are contingent on
political developments and policy decisions. However, a few con-
jectures on parts of the matrix are offered as follows:

U.S. -U.S.S.R. TRADE PROSPECTS

Although starting at a low level, with the exception of imports of
grain, the U.S. -Soviet trade prospects are judged likely to grow at a
substantial rate.

Current projections indicate a substantial increase in U.S. -Soviet economic
exchanges. Improved economic relations are officially considered to be part of a
pattern of changing U.S. -Soviet relations in many areas. The trade agree-
ment, along with the summit agreements on strategic arms limitations and
other matters, linlcs national security considerations, economic relations, tech-
nology policy, and the conduct of diplomacy between the two major powers.
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
both postulate that the changes occurring in U.S. -Soviet relations will influence
the stability of the int-eniational community for some years to come. (p. 531)

Traditional Soviet exports have included fur skins, nickel, palla-
dium, platinum, chrome ore, crude oil and petroleum products, coal
and coke, cotton, wood and wood products, diamonds, inorganic
chemicals, and nonferrous metals. Expansion of U.S. imports of
Soviet products subject to tariffs are dependent on MFN status for
the U.S.S.R. While the structure of Soviet exports is heavily biased
toward raw materials, foodstuff, and semimanufactures, Soviet
officials have indicated a desire to expand their export portfolio into
machinery and equipment, more intensively technological in char-
acter. These include:

Machinery and mechanical equipment. — Forging and pressing equipment;
rolling equipment; mining machinery; power equipment — hydraulic and steam
turbines; machinery for food preparation; textile machines; printing equipment;
road-building machinery; and parts of machines — antifriction bearings.

Electrical machinery and equipment. — Generators; transformers; radio receivers
and components; and electronics components.

Transportation equipment. — Aircraft — supersonic airplanes, helicopters; motor-
cycles; seagoing freighters — tankers, dry cargo; seagoing passenger ships —
hydrofoils; and tractors.

Miscellaneous equipment. — Measuring instruments — optical, meteorological,
et cetera; medical equipment; tools, watches and components; cameras, photo-
graphic accessories; and movie projectors and accessories, (p. 564)

j\iore broadly, Soviet dollar earnings were considered in the report
as likely to come from the following sources :

(1) Increased Soviet exports of raw materials, such as energy sources and
metals, and industrial goods;

(2) Gold sales;

i'i) Nontrade income, such as tourism and shipping;

(4) Multilateral relations, such as balancing a trade deficit with the United
States by a trade surplus with Japan;
(.5) Cooperative ventures ; and
(fi) Credits (only a short-term consideration, as eventual repayment is required,

plus interest), (p. .Idl)

In assessing the prospects for Soviet export trade to the United
States the report noted a number of significant variables: (a) Soviet
willingness to shift exports of oil and gas ifrom other markets, including
domestic and Comecon, to the United States, (b) trade credits avail-
able to the U.S.S.R. from the Export-Import Bank, the Commodity

1587

Credit Corporation, and private sources, (c) U.S. willingness to extend
most-favored-nation status to the U.S.S.R,., and (d) So\-iet ability
to mobilize production of items for Western markets, (p. 569)

Apart from emergency demands for grain to make good the short-
fall of Soviet harvests, Soviet representativ^es appear most interested
in imports in which the United States has a degree of technological
leadership, such as:

(1) Large-scale petroleum and natural gas extraction, transmission, and dis-
tribution systems, including special permafrost problems and oil recovery sys-
tems;

(2) Management control systems utilizing computer facilities;

(3) Mass production machinery output, such as of trucks and cars;

(4) Animal husbandry as characterized by U.S. agricultural business; and

(5) Tourist systems including hotels, packaged tours, and transport.

Each of these technological areas requires large-scale financing, consortium
■operations, and marketing systems. The experience of U.S. multinational cor-
porations might lend itself to industrial coojioration with the Soviet Union, (p. r)59)

However, the report concluded that the volume of Soviet exports
to the United States is unlikely to reach a large share of either U.S.
trade or GNP. The U.S. advantages as likely to center on such specifics
as imports of oil and gas and exports of feed, cereal grains, and com-
puters and other high technology products.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

The report strongly suggested that the thawing of the Soviets
toward trade relations with the United States is attributable to an
"apparent reordering of Soviet priorities," in favor of "technological
change and an improvement in the availability of desirable consumer
goods to the Soviet workers and peasants." The extent of this re-
ordering "turns in large part on how much of the ^Soviet output
goes to defense and on the volume of Soviet trade with other nations."
The question is whether military priorities will be sustained along
with the increased emphasis in other areas, or be superseded by
nonmilitar}^ economic activity. Even the prospect of a change in
priorities gives rise to some hope of a relaxation of the arms race.
Thus:

... if the Soviet Union should reorder its priorities and permit more foreign
decisionmaking involvement in domestic cooperative ventures, significant long-run
benefits of a predominantly political nature might accrue to the United States
such as: (a) the potential reduction of the Soviet threat to our security from
reordered Soviet priorities; (b) a degree of Soviet acceptance of the international
system, implied by the U.S.S.R.'s permitting domestic involvement of foreign
corporations as partners; and (c) political advantages inherent in increasing
international commercial and financial intercourse. Overall, such political gains
might far outweigh the relatively modest economic returns, (pp. 602-603)

The report identified three political costs to the United States
that warrant attention:

1. The risks involved in the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a supplier of
important raw materials. Reliance on the Soviet Union as a source for vitally
needed energy resources appears to be a particularly risky undertaking.

2. Contributions to the Soviet fund of technical knowledge that could be
translated into security programs or which could result in the release of resources
for military programs.

3. Potential leverage to the Soviet Union that could result from Soviet control
over U.S. investments and personnel — a possible source of economic blackmail,
or an economic hostage system.

There were also three possible political benefits:

1588

1. Soviet reliance on the United States as a source of supply and expertise.
Soviet dependence on U.S. agricultural products and advanced technology, for
example, is a potential source of U.S. political leverage.

2. Encouragement to the Soviet Union to reorder priorities between military
and civihan programs. Expanded commercial relations may serve as an economic
reinforcement of the arms control and other agreements between the two countries.

3. Encouragement of domestic change in the Soviet Union. The presence of
many American citizens in the Soviet Union with some decisionmaking power
and a wider exchange of ideas may in the long run contribute to a moderation of
the Soviet political control system and command economy, (p. GOl)

RISKS VERSUS POTENTIAL GAINS

On balance, the political risks to the United States were larger and
longer range; the economic gains to the Soviet Union were surer and
earher. In particular, the transfers of U.S. technology to the U.S.S.R.
might 3^ield only long-term political and diplomatic benefits to the
United States.

Still, the report offered two summary assessments of a hopeful
character for U.S. -U.S.S.R. diplomatic relations. The first involved
internal Soviet policy.

Three options for economic change open to the Soviet leadership are, in order
of probability: (1) a reduction of the priority for new strategic weapons systems;
(2) a cutback in military manpower; and (3) a withdrawal of party control and
involvement in the economy so as to permit ijnproved efficiency through economic
reform. All are issues which will be influenced by both the international situation
and domestic political considerations. A downward revision in the priority for
further military weapons buildup, for example, is likely only if the economic
rationale is persuasive and the domestic political and international climate are
favorable, (p. 557)

The second assessment, while warning of the hazards of the situa-
tion, suggested that there could be important benefits in the promotion
of closer Soviet economic relations with the United States and the
rest of the non-Communist world. •

In summar}'-, expanded economic relations which facilitate massive technology
transfer from the United States to the U.S.S.R. may create new, potentially
dangerous dimensions in U.S. diplomacy. On the other hand there is at least a
possibility that the process of integrating the centrally planned Soviet economy
into the market economy of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist
world might unleash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in
turn, contribute to international interdependence and stabihty. (p. 601)

Author's Reassessment

This case was revisited by the authors in mid-1977 to ascertain what
relevant changes in outlook had occurred in the intervening 4 years.
Their reappraisal, and a list of questions posed in the original study
and in the 1977 review, conclude this abstract.

EAST-WEST TRADE IN PERSPECTIVE

U.S. trade with the Communist world has grown rapidly in the 1970s.
While it is still small in comparison with overall U.S. foreign trade,
considerable significance has been attached to East-West trade because
of the prospects for future growth and, more importantly, because of
the linkage of commercial ties with East-West political relations.
Congressional consideration of important legislation relating to East-
West trade has been influenced by increased interest in tlie U.S.
business community in trade with the East, continued efforts to achieve
detente with the Soviet Union and China, and controversy about cer-
tain aspects of Soviet foreign domestic policies.

1589

Following the passage of important new legislation in 1974-75,
it is clear that the Congress has reassigned itself a continuing role in
trade, Government finance, and export control. The executive depart-
ment must now make detailed reports to the Congress on the bases
for its actions and, in many specific instances, receive explicit con-
gressional approval. In other cases, prenotification of Congress permits
nullification of executive action by Congress.

EXPANSION OF TRADE AS ELEMENT OF DETENTE

One of the major aims of the policy of East-West detente pursued by
the Nixon-Ford administration was a rapid expansion of commer-
cial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, People's
Republic of China, and the countries of Eastern Europe. East-West
commercial ties have been deliberately promoted by the past and cur-
rent administrations and the governments of the non-Communist
world as a means of easing international tensions. Trade promotion
in the East has been more related to perceived economic need. The
linkage of commercial relations to political goals in U.S. policy toward
the East is not new: precedents were set by President Kennedy's
approval of large-scale sales of wheat to the Soviet Union in 1963 and
later by President Johnson's policy of building bridges to the Com-
munist world. However, neither of the earlier more limited attempts
succeeded either in achieving a major expansion of U.S. trade with
the East or attaining significant political gains.

In 1970, U.S. trade with Communist countries was at a very low
level: trade turnover (exports plus imports) totaled $579 million
($388.4 million with the East European countries, $191 million with
the Soviet Union, and practically no trade with the People's Republic
of China). From 1971-1976, trade turnover expanded rapidly and in
1976 was $4.7 billion. The Soviet Union has accounted for the largest
share of U.S. trade turnover with the East ($2,527 million in 1976),
while the Eastern European countries collectively accounted for $1,836
million and the P.R.C., $337 million. Despite the rapid increase, the
total impact of trade with the East on U.S. balance of trade and do-
mestic employment and income has been modest. In 1976, East-West
trade accounted for only about 2 percent of total trade turnover and
about 31/2 percent of total U.S. exports.

PAST U.S. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

Various U.S. legal restrictions have constituted an important reason
for the past low level of U.S. trade with Communist countries. Three
of the most important restrictions — denial of most-favored-nation
status (MFN), restrictions on U.S. Government credits, and export
controls — were reviewed by the 93d Congress. The importance of
MFN and Government credits (particularly Export-Import Bank
credit) lies in the difficulty that Communist countries have in paying
for their imports from the West. For example, the United States had
a balance-of-trade surplus in its trade with the Soviet Union of $1.6
billion in 1975 and $2.1 billion in 1976. Denial of MFN contributes to
this imbalance because higher tariffs tend to drive up the prices of
Communist countries' exports and thus reduce their ability to sell in
the U.S. market. Restrictions on Government credits have denied

1590

some Communist countries access to a facility which continues to play
an important role in financing U.S. foreign trade — 'the U.S. Export-
Import Bank. The impact of denial of MFN and credits on trade varies-
from country to country. Some suggest the major impact on the
U.S.S.R. currently is political. Export controls prevent the export of
certain kinds of goods and technology which are considered to have
military applications. In the past, such controls have been applied
particularly to the kinds of goods which Communist countries are
most interested in importing from the West.

RECENT MOVES TOWARD LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE

In connection with its detente policy, the Nixon administration took
important initiatives in each of the three areas — ^^Grovernment credits,
most-favored-nation treatment, and export controls. With respect to
export financing, President Nixon issued determinations in 1971-72
that Eximbank financing of trade with Romania, Poland, and the So-
viet Union was in the national interest. (Such determinations were
required by law in order to make Communist countries eligible for
Export-Import Bank credits.) In addition, the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration began to play a major role in financing agricultural exports
to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In October 1972, a comprehensive trade agreement was signed be-
tween the United States and Soviet governments, under which the
President agreed to seek MFN status for the Soviet Union. The agree-
ment included a variety of other provisions designed to facilitate and
promote a IT.S. -Soviet trade. Among the provisions were : Special safe-
guards against disruptive imports; a declaration of intent to place
large orders for U.S. machinery and agricultural and industrial goods;
the right of third-country commercial arbitration ; and improved facil-
ities for U.S. business in Moscow. This agreement could not, however,
be brought into force until Congress passed authorizing legislation.
The necessary authority was included in the Trade Act of 1974 (Pub-
lic Law 93-618), enacted on January 3, 1975. The Trade Act provided
that MFN status and U.S. Government credits could be extended to
the Soviet Union and other "non-market economy countries" only if
they adhere' to certain standards of free emigration. This provision can
be waived by the President, subject to Congressional approval by con-
current resolution, if he finds that such action will further the pur-
poses of the Act. In January 1975, the Soviet Government notified the
State Department that it refused to accept the conditions on emigra-
tion. Even if the Soviet Union should comply with the Trade Act con-
ditions, its eligibility for Eximbank credits would be limited by provi-
sions of the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 (Public Law
93-646) , passed on January 4, 1975. Total new authorizations for loans
and guarantees for the Soviet Union could not exceed $300 million
without a Presidential national interest determination and congres-
sional approval. In addition, special limitations are put on Eximbank
financing of energy-related projects in the Soviet Union.

The Trade Act provision did not apply to two Communist coun-
tries, Yugoslavia and Poland, which already enjoyed MFN treatment.
Another country, Romania, subsequently moved toward trade normal-
ization and acceptance of the conditions for MFN treatment. On

1591

April 2, 1975, the United States and Romania signed a trade a^ee-
ment which inchided a i-eciprocal f^rant of MFN status. On April 24,
1975, the President issued a waiver of the statutory restriction. Both
Houses of Congress subsequently passed concurrent resolutions ap-
proving MFN status for Romania. Thus, three Communist countries,
Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, currently have MFN status and
access to official U.S. credits.

The administration of controls on exports to Communist countries
has been characterized by continued lil>eralization in recent years. The
Expoi-t Administration Act of 1969 effected a major reorientation in
U.S. export control policy. It maintained the controls that had been in
effect since World War II, but called for a removal of controls on
goods and technology that are readily available to Communist coun-
tries from non-U.S. sources and on items that are only marginally of
military value. The 1969 legislation rej^resented a new mandate for
exi)ort controls. Whereas the thrust of previous laws had been to limit
East -West trade, the new Act was designed to foster such trade. The
Nixon administration initially resisted the changes in the law but
subsequently accepted them and used the new mandate to reduce sub-
stantially the amount of goods and technologies that were prohibited
for export to Communist countries. The Export Administration
Amendments of 1977 (Public Law 95-52), signed by President Carter
on June 22, 1977, made further significant changes in the law. They
include a requirement to expedite the export licensing process and
language which shifts the emphasis of national security controls from
exports to Communist countries as such to exports to any country
which poses a threat to the United States.

Carter Administration Policy

The Carter Administration has not enunciated a comprehensive
policy on U.S. East-West trade. However, the initial steps taken in
this area and statements by administration spokesmen suggest an
intention to follow cautiously the lead of previous administrations in
normalizing commercial relations with the East. Thus, President
Carter has recommended an extension of the waiver authority enabling
Romania to maintain its MFN status and eligibility for government
credits. His administration has opened negotiations with the People's
Republic of China on settlement of financial claims between the two
countries — an important step toward expanding trade. The President
has also signed the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, which
appear to call for a less restrictive policy on export controls toward
Communist countiies. At the same time, the Carter administration's
denial of an export license for the sale of a sophisticated Cyber-76
computer to the Soviet Union seemingly established a precedent for
limiting the kinds of technology eligible for export to the East.

Statements by administration spokesmen have confirmed a general
inclination toward normalization of U.S. trade with Communist
countries.

In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee, John L. Moore, President Carter's
nominee as President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, ex-
pressed his support for Eximbank financing of trade with the Soviet
Union.^**^* Later, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that he hoped

!*»» U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urt>an Affairs. Nomina-
tion of John L. Moore, Jr. Hearings, 95th Congress, Ist session, April 20, 1977. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1977; p 7.

1592

that Congress would repeal the Trade Act restrictions of MFX and
ofovernment credits for non-market economy countries. Secretary
Vance described U.S. -Soviet trade as "an important underpinninor of
our relationship." ^"^^ Secretary Vance made his comments after
repeated expressions by Soviet officials of dissatisfaction with the
status quo in U.S.-Soviet trade. Soviet representatives officially con-
ve3-ed tlieir dissatisfaction to the Carter administration in a June
1977 meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission,^"^'' The
Soviet delegation informed U.S. representatives that imports from
the United States would drop sharply in 1977 and 1978 as a result of
the continuing trade and credit restrictions. A reduction of U.S. ex-
ports to the Soviet Union had been anticipated because of a reduced
Soviet need for U.S. grain, Soviet hard currency payments problems,
and the end of Soviet orders for several large industrial projects which
had made extensive use of U.S. machinery and equipment. However,
Soviet officials have asserted that they would shift future import
orders from U.S. firms to other Western firms if the U.S. restrictions
remain.

Some Illustrative Questions

Should the United States grant trade benefits to governments
which pursue hostile foreign policies and repressive domestic policies?

Will increased U.S. trade with Communist countries help to bring
favorable change in their policies?

Will exports of U.S. technology, often assisted by low-cost Govern-
ment credits, assist the economic and military development of Com-
munist countries?

Will the United States receive significant economic benefits from
East-West trade?

Should the United States make exceptions to its general long-run
policy of advocating unrestricted international trade?

Is there a danger that the United States might become dependent
on Communist countries for important raw material supplies?

What effects are increased economic exchanges, especially in tech-
nology-intensive products, likely to have on U.S. foreign policy goals
and on U.S. national security?

What technological contributions will U.S.-Soviet commercial
exchanges make to American industry?

What risks will these exchanges pose to specific U.S. industries
and industrial corporations?

Does the Soviet leadership perceive as yet the need for serious
changes in internal planning and management to rationalize produc-
tion to satisfy market needs? At what point will the leadership see
the cost of not changing as grea,ter than the cost of change?

Does the sale of U.S. high technology products to the Soviet Union
encourage or discourage Soviet military preparedness?

Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods
of commitment than w^as the case in the past?

Does the trade agreement represent a part of a new pattern of
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States?

io.-!b Wttshliigton I'ost. .Tune 17. 1977. p. A22.

103c 'x-he U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission wa.s established in 1972 to find ways to
facilitate and promote commercial ties between the two countries. The June 1977 meeting
was the first of the Carter Administration. See Washington Post, June 11, 1977, p. D8.

1593

Does the agreement presage a new relationship between the Soviet
economy and the non-Communist world economic system?

How can economic exchanges with the Soviet Union, particularly
those involving technology transfers, be used to further U.S. foreign
policy?

What changes are needed in negotiating procedures and commercial
institutions to insure that the United States maximizes its political
and economic benefits?

In light of past grain sales, the question is important as to how
good a market the Soviet Union really is for U.S. exports and how
the United States may have to change its marketing procedures to
deal effectively with the East.

And also: how good an investment for the United States is Soviet
exploitation of petroleum, natural gas, or other raw materials?

Chapter 17 — Six Substantive Issues Which
Further Illustrate the Interaction

CONTENTS

Page

Issue One — The Evolution of International Technology:

Statement of the Issue 1601

Importance of the Issue 1602

How the Issue Developed 1602

Technology as a Primary Source of National Power 1603

Dimensions of the Impact of Technology on Society and on

Diplomacy 1604

U.S. Involvement 1606

Elements of U.S. Technological Structure 1607

Role of Congress 1608

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 1609

Author's Reassessment 1611

Some Illustrative Questions 1013

Issue Two— The Politics of Global Health :

Statement of the Issue 1014

Importance of the Issue 1614

How the Issue Developed 1615

Beginning of Preventive Medicine 1615

Early International Efforts To Control Disease 1616

Establishment of World Health Organization 1617

Status and Potential of WHO Today 1618

U.S. Involvement 1619

Possible Reasons for Early U.S. Delay in Supporting WHO 1620

U.S. Government Organization for International Health Affairs- . 1620

The Role of DHEW 1621

The DOD Role in International Health 1621

Role of Congress 1622

Inadequate Budget Justification for U.S. Share of WHO Funding

Support 1623

Lack of Understanding of Multilateral Health Programs 1023

Status of the Issue 1624

Prospects and Options 1625

Seeming Need of Stronger U.S. Support of International Health

Programs 1625

Reasons for Possible Shift of Budget Defense Role From State

to DHEW 1626

Author's Reassessment 1627

Implications of Global Health Planning 1628

Some Illustrative Questions 1629

Issue Three — Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation 1629

Statement of the Issue 1630

Importance of the Issue 1631

How the Issue Developed 1632

U.S. Involvement 1633

U.S. Policy Need of Facts About Food and Populations 1634

Role of Congress 1634

Status of the Issue in 1971 1635

Food/People Equation as Index of Development 1636

Prospects and Options Suggested by the Study 1636

Bilateral Versus Multilateral Approach 1630

Problems of the Green Revolution 1638

Problems of Stabilizing Populations 1638

Author's Reassessment 1639

Relevance of the Study 6 Years Later 1639

Food/Population Problem Inseparable From Development

Process 1640

Early Congressional Recognition of Problem 1641

Some Illustrative Questions 1641

(1597)

Ii598

Issue Four — U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs Page

for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange 1642

Statement of the Issue 1643

Importance of the Issue 1644

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 1645

Agencies Involved in U.S. Exchange Programs 1646

The Fulbright-Hays (State Department) Program 1647

Lack of Evaluation Procedures a Program Weakness 1648

National Science Foundation Programs 1649

The NAS-NRC Inter-Academy Exchasnges 1651

Role of Congress 1653

Fulbright-Hays Program 1653

NSF Programs 1654

NAS-NRC Programs 1654

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 1655

FCST Efforts To Improve Management of U.S. Exchange

Programs 1656

Author's Reassessment 1658

Continuing Need for Better Direction and Coordination 1658

Some Illustrative Questions 1659

Issue Five — Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International
Scientific Mobility:

Statement of the Issue 1661

Importance of the Issue 1661

How the Issue Developed 1662

The Heightened Human Mobility of Modern Times 1663

Impact of Decolonization on Brain Drain 1664

Effects of Changes in Immigration Priorities 1664

U.S. Involvement 1665

Main Trends in Immigration 1666

The Growing Influx of Foreign Medical Graduates 1666

The Foreign Medical Graduates as a U.S. Domestic Problem 1667

The Brain Drain as an International Issue 1668

The Complexity of the Brain Drain Problem 1669

Role of Congress 1670

Status of the Issue 1671

Prospects and Options 1673

The Problem of Losing Track of Problems 1673

Remedies for the Brain Drain Problem 1674

Some U.S. Options in Coping With Brain Drain 1675

Author's Reassessment 1676

Some Illustrative Questions 1677

Issue Six — Science and Technology in the Department of State 1678

Statement of the Issue 1679

Importance of the Issue 1680

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 1681

Official U.S. Concern With Science and Technology 1681

The Berkner Report 1682

Establishment of Post of Science Adviser 1 682

The Ups and Downs of Science at State 1683

Functions and Limitations of SCI 1684

Shift of Presidential Science Advisory Functions to NSF and

State; Creation of OES 1685

Role of Congress. 1686

Earlier Congressional Studies of Science, Technology, and

Foreign Policy 1686

Studies and Hearings by House Foreign Affairs Committee 1687

Studies and Hearings by House Science and Astronautics Com-
mittee ■_ 1688

Introduction of National Science Policy Bill 1689

The Murphy Commission Report 1690

Need of Added Congressional Resources 1690

1^9

Issue Six — Science and Technology in the Department of State — Con. Page

Status of the Issue 1691

Diplomatic Personnel Are Discouraged From Acquiring Tech-
nical Expertise 1691

The Department Is Not Organized To Conduct Technical

Planning 1692

Presidential Leadership Has Not Motivated the Necessary

Technical Modernization of the Department 1692

Prospects and Options 1693

Author's Reassessment 1693

Kissinger's 19 Proposals to U.N. General Assembly 1694

Implications of Kissinger Initiatives for State Department and

Congressional Backstopping 1 695

New Study of State Department's Management of Diplomacy-
Technology Interface 1696

Some Illustrative Questions 1698

Appendix: Letter of Resignation to Secretary Kissinger From Assist-
ant Secretary Dixy Lee Ray and Her Letter to the President 1701

CHAPTER 17— SIX SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH
FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THE INTERACTION

The remarks introducin*:: chaptoi- Ki apply to this cha]:)ter as well.
The foi'niat ti-overnino; the commentaries to follow did'ers only slightly
from that used in summarizing' the six cases just presented:

Statement of the issue

Importance of the issue

How the issue developed

U.S. involvement

Role of Congress

Status of the issue

Prospects and options

Author's reassessment

Some illustrative questions

ISSUE ONE— THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY

Statement of the Issue

This initial study ^°* was designed to provide an overview of the
subject, and at the same time to express a common theme for the
series. Thus:

The focus of this chapter is on technology. It is intended: To delineate the
important ways in which technology influences diplomacy; to show technological
change as a process producing effects that diplomats must deal with ; and to raise
questions as to whether and how governments can make purposeful, constructive
use of these processes to further diplomatic objectives. '"^

The theme was stated in universal terms, but an assumption of the
study series was — and remains — that the United States could further
its interests and its position in the world by systematically and
judiciously exploiting its technological skills ancl resources. Seven
years and 12 studies later, however, the project director and associate
director find themselves impressed not so much by the opportunities
(though these are many and great) as by the dimensions of the
obstacles to their realization, and by the lack of appreciation even in
the United States itself of both the opportunities and the obstacles.
In the world at large, irresponsible expressions of nationalism and
independence oppose the working out of acceptable accommodation
w^th the imperatives of technology-induced interdependence. There
is evidently a dearth of national and world leadership that sufficiently
comprehends and takes determined steps to direct the dynamics of
technological change. Also largely lacking are concepts and machinery
of mid-range and long-range planning for both U.S. and global growth
and development which take appropriate account of the likely im-

'M U.S. Congress, House, Committpe on Foreign Affairs, The Evolution of International Teclinology, a
study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Re-
search Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Olhce, December 1070. See vol. 11, pp. (;()7-(i80.

iM Ibid., p. (in.

(1601)

1602

pacts of further technological advances. The rising dangers of drift,
drag, and decay threaten everywhere.

But times of uncertainty and flux are not new in history, and despair
has never been an answer to human problems. An important part of
the answer to the problems of civilization today lies in better under-
standing of the changes being wrought in the world by technology and
in efforts to direct these changes. The present study, and the Science,
Technology, and American Diplomacy series as a whole, represent
an attempt to contribute to such understanding.

Importance of the Issue

The influence of technology in human affairs is pervasive and
profound. As Vietnam reminds us, technology may not be the decisive
force in resolving a given issue in some particular situation, but its
cumulative impact on people's lives all over the world is nonetheless
powerful, and growing. Its growth is so dynamic, indeed, that some
critics would arrest it altogether if they could, professedly to save
the world from mind-boggling excesses of human inventiveness.
Other more optimistic analysts, noting that for the first time in history
it is technically possible — given the will, and effective planning and
organization — to eradicate famine, epidemic disease, and other
impediments to the physical well-being of the world's peoples, argue
for actively controlling and directing technology to make it serve
the greatest good of the greatest number.

Whatever the point of view, technology mil increasingly be a force
to reckon with. The responsibihty for reckoning with it, while in part
diffused among such extranational instrumentalities as multinational
corporations and agencies of the United Nations, is mainly vested in
sovereign nations, which may or may not rise to the challenge. Diplo-
macy is the instrument in deahngs among sovereign nations. It is
therefore important that the association between technology and
diplomacy, which in the past has tended to be formal, hmited, and
contrived, become increasingly close, continuous, and comfortable.

Hoiv the Issue Developed

' This study has for its subject the full range of applications of
technology to human affairs. It explores the history of how these
applications have proliferated since the beginning of the industrial
revolution and in a more intensive way since World War II.

Technology, as used in the study series, is a comprehensive term
"covering a wide variety of scientific and technical activities and
products. In its simplest usage, it merely signifies 'tools.' At the other
extreme, it conveys the broad meaning of 'how man works.' " ^"^ In
the context of planned activity it "signifies the systematic, purposeful
application of knowledge to modify an environment toward pre-
determined goals." '"

Foreshadowing the more detailed treatment of the interrelationships
of technology and diplomacy 4^2 years later in the last of the 12 studies,
Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical
Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations, this early study spoke
of "Technology as the Underpinning of Diplomacy":

'"6 l\)\d., I). (il2.

"" Huddle,' Th( M(konij I'Tojict. vol. 1. p. »i-'i (footnolc). •'^I'l' :il«i IHiddlc. ScUiia and 'J'lchiiolwjy in llic
De part iiK lit of Slate, Introduction, vol. 1!, pp- 132.")-133t.

1603

The profound influence that technological change has had in the past, and
promises to have for the future, implies the need for a strong corps of diplomats
trained to anticipate and prepare for the direct and indirect impacts of technology
on diplomatic concerns . . . " '°^

Diplomacy, the study continued, deals with problems between
sovereign nations and with the common concerns of members of the
world community of nations. "The objective of diplomacy is to re-
concile or resolve issues and establish agreements to advance the
national interest in a constantly changing world. Changes within the
jurisdiction of each member of the world community alter its relations
with others. No source of change is more potent than an alteration
in a nation's technological condition."

It produces changes of many kinds at many levels of impacts and interactions:
military, commercial, cultural, political, and scientific; these changes involve
many agencies of government, the academic world, private business, and the
public at large. Familiarity with technology, and with the nature of its impacts,
is thus an indispensable tool of the diplomat. Moreover, the skill with which a
nation manages and advances its own technology contributes to the status of its
diplomats, and to the options with which they can negotiate. In both senses,
national technology confers diplomatic power.^"'

TECHNOLOGY AS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF NATIONAL POWER

But the point can be made even more strongly: ". . . technology
is a 'primary source of national power and diplomatic influence." "°
(Emphasis added.)

The story of how technology has progressively aflfected human
civilization is too long, and too familiar, to be retold here. The reader
interested in detail is referred to The Evolution of International Tech-
nology or — since even this is a highly abbreviated account — to the
definitive treatment contained in the five-volume work, A History of
Technology }^^ The following account is limited to a few reminders of
the history of the past century:

"Early in the industrial revolution, a race began for both overseas markets
for manufactured goods and supplies of needed raw materiaLs. In this race the
process was one of commercial penetration, followed by military enforcement
of commercial rights." "'

From the close of the Napoleonic Wars to the latter part of the 19th
century, England was technologically and industrially the dominant
nation of the world. Between 1870 and 1895, Germany surpassed
England and assumed world technological leadership. "On the eve of
World War I, Germany's energy showed itself in many ways: in
ambitious plans for a railroad line to the Middle East, construction
of a modern war fleet, development of African colonies, and the
prospect of hegemony over the European continent. When the war
broke out, Germany's superior technology very nearly enabled her to
overmatch the combination of England, France, Italy, and Russia." "^

So strong was the emphasis in German education on technological
skills and innovation that even after defeat in 1918, followed by two
decades of social upheavals, inflation, political instability, and finally
"a dictatorship too erratic in its concepts to exploit systematically the

m* Huddle, The J-Joliilion of Intirnalional T<ckiH)lo<m. vol. il, p. lill.
■09 Ibid., p. t)12.
im Hiid.. J). (il!i.

"1 Chaiifs SiiiRcr, E. .7. Ilolmyard, A. U. Hall, and Trevor J. Williams, eds., A History of T(Chnolo(jij,
Now York, Oxford I'nivcrsity Press. I'.i.'iS, 1011 i)apes, L'lO plalcs.
"-'Huddle, 'I'ht l-joliilion ol luUnintioiinl 'l'(cliiiolo(nj. vol. II, p. (i2().
"3 /(yid., pp. (■,20-(i21.

1604

undoubted talents of its people in science and technology," ^^^ German
technological prowess was still evident in the V-2 ballistic rockets, one
of the major achievements in World War II.

In the main, though, the United States assumed world technological
leadership from the close of World War I. From then on, and especially
after World War II, the development of international technology
centered so heavily on the United States that it seems appropriate to
consider its further progress in the section on U.S. Involvement, below.
However, some general observations about the growing impact of
technology on human affairs, gleaned from the study, may be noted
first:

DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON SOCIETY AND ON

DIPLOMACY

Five of the dimensions which characterize the role of technology
today are especially noteworthy: its accelerated pace, the size to which
its applications may attain, the formidable complexity of some of its
more advanced systems, its flourishing variety, and the range and
j)ervasiveness of its impacts.

The pace is everywhere evident in technologically advanced coun-
tries: witness, for example, in the United States today, the use by
school children of the pocket computer, a device which did not even
exist (at least in marketable form) a decade ago. The accelerated
pace of technological innovation and change poses problems for
diplomacy. It "increases the rate at which international issues,
problems, and opportunities arise. It confronts the diplomat with an
ever-lengthening agenda, the need for a deeper understanding of the
processes of change, and the requirement for a great increase in the
orderly flow of exact information concerning its ingredients." "^

As to size. "Although historical achievements in technology have
sometimes approached heroic proportions (the Pyramids, Roman
roads, the Great Wall of China, and the Panama Canal, for example),
the size and cost of some of the modern technological systems is quite
unprecedented. Most notable are those in the field of military hard-
ware, such as . . . the Polaris system, and nuclear test detection sys-
tems. Others include spacecraft like the Apollo series, global com-
munications networks, air traffic control systems, a global weather
forecasting network, the Interstate Highway System, electric power
grids, and the complexes of multipurpose dams on the Tennessee and
other major rivers." "" Large technological projects of an inherently
international character, observes the study, impose added burdens on
the diplomat. Problems and benefits must be shared among many
nations; acceptance of roles of participation must be negotiated; new
mechanisms of diplomacy are required. An illustration from the mid-
nineteenth century — one which may seem small-scale today, but which
was ambitious enough for the time — is found in the difficult and
frustrating, though ultimately successful, efforts of diplomats and
scientists from 12 nations to work out an international quarantine
convention, as described in The Politics of Global Health.^" Numerous

in IIihI., p. (;21.
"5 ihid., p. (;i:i.

"6 Ibid., pp. 1113-till.

"' U.S. f'ongrrsp, Tlonso, ComiTiittop on Forrign Affairs, The Pnlilic/i of Olnhal Health, a study in the
snips nn Soionco, TpchnoIoRy, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National
Security T'olicy and Scientific Developments by Freeman TI. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division,
Conpressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Olllc'c, .May I'lTl. See vol. II, pp. r,(»l-(i',)2. "

1605

current examples involving problems of larger scale (both tech-
nologically and diplomatically) could be cited: e.g., in the area of
international agreements on the use of earth satellites for television
broadcasting or for earth resources surveys.

The most recent step in the centuries-old, but rapidly accelerating,
progression from simple manual tools to systems of great complexity
has been the introduction of computers into large systems to automate
the making of routine decisions in their management. "These systems
have now become so complicated in design and function that even to
build them has come to require elaborate systems of planning and con-
trol, and these have also required the assistance of computers." "^
This complexity too adds to the problems and opportunities of
diplomacy :

On the one hand, complexities of systems design present formidable obstacles to
quick understanding of these large enterprises. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that the disciplines and orderly methodologies they require can make a
direct contribution to the processes of diplomatic analysis and problem solving.'"

By way of example, complex systems like air transportation and
satellite communications "can serve both to help and hinder the work
of the diplomat: While information can now be transmitted virtually
instantaneously, to facilitate long-range bargaining, the time available
for decisionmaking has decreased. The traditional conduct of secret,
official diplomacy tends to be frustrated by radio and television
propaganda and by educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges.
Swift transit of trouble-shooting negotiators to points of tension by
air transport or for consultation with national leaders is counteracted
by the ability of troublemakers and dissident groups to use these
same means of travel." '-"

The variety of technological innovations to which the individual
citizen is now exposed "seems to have increased by orders of magni-
tude in the past quarter-century. . . . The innovative trentl is
indicated by the automation and productivity of agriculture and
industry; the great variety of consumer goods in the home; . . . the
introduction of computers into banks, brokerage houses, ticket
offices, the management of credit cards, and other services; . . . and
the great range of different vehicles in service in the air, on the high-
ways, and in shops, airports, hea\y construction projects, and urban
areas." And here again there is an added burden on diplomacy:
"Assigning priorities among a growing array of salient developments
becomes increasingly difficult as a problem of formulating and imple-
menting foreign policy." ^^^

The range and pervasiveness of impacts of onrushing technology
are evidenced in many ways. Historical concepts of war, including the
Von Clausewitz doctrine of war as a continuation of diplomacy by
other means, have been overtaken b}^ atomic weapons and their long-
range delivery systems. "Industrial productivity, supported by tech-
nological innovations, has risen so greatly in relation to hours of work
that a 'postindustrial' condition can be foreseen in which standards of
living will no longer be limited by the length of the workweek." The
future adequacy of mineral and fuel supplies is increasingly threatened
as production and consumption continue to rise. Impacts of escalating
generation of power on environmental quality are a source of growling

"» Huddle, The luvlution of Intirnational Technology, p. (ill.

1" lljid.

^■0 Ibid., p. 052.

>-i Ibid., p. 015.

1606

public and professional anxiety. Imperfections in technology are more
and more coming under attack, as in the cases of air and water pollu-
tion, noise, radiation, thermal effects, solid waste, and accumulations
of toxic materials. Problems of information overload confront tech-
nologists in fields of medicine, of properties of materials, and of scientific
discoveries generally. With continued global growth in both the uses
and the adverse side effects of technology in prospect, the leading
technological nations — of which the United States is the foremost —
are increasingly confronted with awkward diplomatic problems.

U.S. Involvement

Many factors — geographic, historical, sociological, and economic —
contributed to the emergence of the United States as the technologi-
cally most d^aiamic Nation of the world :

An unpeopled continent with rich natural resources and temperate climate was
settled by immigrants who tended to be self-selected for initiative [and] inde-
pendence. ... A chronic labor shortage automatically placed value on labor-
saving devices and machinery. These combined to sustain rapid progress in
technological innovation toward high manpower productivity and swift economic
growth.

Foremost among the new Nation's needs were roads, canals, and a postal
system, all of which the early Government undertook to provide. Later, the
railroad and telegraph were eagerly seized upon to link up throughout all parts
of the Nation the flow of goods and information.

The American Civil War had a profound effect on technology. For the first
time, ". . . the technological resources of a whole Nation were ultimately mobil-
ized to overwhelm an opponent. There was mass production of weapons and
ammunition, of uniforms and boots; canned food was .supphed to armies trans-
ported for the first time by rail."'22

Thereafter came great industrial growth, characterized by the
expansion of the railroad network throughout the United States,
heavy output of steel, the mass production of lighter engineering
products (agricultural equipment, the typewriter, the sewing machine,
and the bicycle), and radical improvements in the metalworking
machine tool — wdiich (to quote Walt W. Rostow) :

. . . comes as close to being a correct symbol for the second phase of industrial
growth as the railway is for the first. And, by the 1890s, electricity, chemical, and
automobile industries, which were to play an extremely important part in the third
phase, were commercially in being, the first two rooted in new and expanding
fields of science and technology. '^^

The opening of the 20th century was marked by two important
new trends which heightened the intensity of U.S. exploitation of
industrial technology. One was the appearance of the large industrial
laboratory; the other was the rapid spread, by the Taylor Societies,
of the doctrine of "scientific management." The great industrial
laboratories made products better and scientific management made
them lower in cost.

"World War II dramatized the importance of science for military
power, but as a practical matter it was technology that proved itself
of importance":

Trained American scientists, with an impressive supi)lement of refugee and
British scientists, were able to turn themselves into technologists to serve a
great national and international purpose. In 194.'i, when the scientists called
attention to the opportunities of the "endless frontier" of science, and urged its
public support, they based their claim on the proposition that investment in

'" Ibid., p. (322.
■23 Jhid., p. 022.

1607

research and education in the sciences would automatically reward society — •
would .stimulate innovation, and develop opportunities for an expanding econ-
omy— in addition to its having military implications. When their a{)peal was
heeded, beginning about 1950, a veritable explosion, scientific and technological,
took place. '2*

ELEMENTS OF U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

By 1970 the United States, combining a higli-consumption economy
with a heavy emphasis on scientific innovation, had built a techno-
logical structure that included the following principal elements:

A large number of very large, efficient, highly productive, geographically
extended business enterprises with families of satellite suppliers of materials,
components, and specialized services, comprising complex, interconnected,
production-distribution-service enterprises; separation of business ownership
from business management; and a great increase in policy, planning, and admin-
istrative staff in the management of enterprises of all kinds. ^^^

The two decades foUowing the outbreak of the Korean War were a
period of great ferment, with intensive U.S. efforts in both military
and nonmilitary research and development. In his book about Amer-
ican technological dominance, The American Challenge (1968), French
writer J. J. Servan-Schreiber observes that from the launching of the
first Sputnik (October 1957):

American power has made an unprecedented leap forward. It has undergone a
violent and productive internal revolution. Technological innovation has now
become the basic objective of economic policy. In America today the government
official, the industrial manager, the economics professor, the engineer, and the
scientist have joined forces to develop coordinated techniques for integrating
factors of production. These techniques have stimulated what amounts to a
permanent industrial revolution.'-"

But accompanying the "leap forward" were some fumbling back-
ward and sideways steps, at least in the area of technological inputs
into American diplomacy. With the outstanding e.xceptions of the
highly successful Marshall Plan to restore European industry after
World War II and the U.S. role in the emergence of a new Japan,
and except also for the technological coup of the Berlin airlift, U.S.
employment of technology as an instrument of foreign policy enjoyed
limited success. The Korean War, and the Vietnamese conflict later
on, demonstrated "the serious, painful, and frustrating limitations of
technology in waging a limited war against a highly organized and
resourceful, if technologically unsophisticated, adversary." ^" The
Soviet Union achieved brilliant if temporary diplomatic advantages
with its unexpectedly fast development of fission and then fusion
weapons, and with the launching of Sputnik I. Subsequent world
admiration for U.S. space achievements "was tempered by reserva-
tions over U.S. inability to solve such domestic problems as pollution,
crime, and highway accidents . . ." i^s gome constructive interna-
tional applications of U.S. technology proved to have awkward side
effects: for example, the insecticide DDT pla^^ed an important part
in malarial control but came to be recognized as ecologically un-
desirable. Various nations, both developed and developing, became
concerned over the "brain drain" to the United States. (See Issue

1-' Ibid., p. 023.
1" Ibid.

'26 Ibid., p. (i2-l.
'■-' Ibid., p. (i2().
12S Ibid., p. 027.

1608

Five for an analysis of this problem.) The territorial sovereign t}' con-
cept in international law and the issue of ownership of the ocean
floor came increasingly into question; the United States often did not
succeed in developing diplomatic solutions to protect its own interests
and that of its nationals in this critical sphere, or alternatively to
reach harmonious international understandings in the interests of all.
(See Case Five.)

The rise of the multinational corporation, gaining impetus from
"the opportunity seized by American entrepreneurs to exploit U.S.
computer and electronic technologies in European markets," ^^^
created complex policy problems for the U.S. Government and raised
questions as to proper relationships and degrees of control. Even the
innovative "Green Revolution," which seemed to buy time for the
search for solutions to the ultimate human problem of balancing
food and population (see Issue Three), proved to have its special
technological problems and political dangers. "Thus, by the close of
1970, it was evident that U.S. technology had not been an unqualified
success in furthering either U.S. foreign policy objectives or the
aspirations of the world at large":

The undoubted promise of technology had not achieved fulfillment. It was
not clear why. AVas it because technologists were unable to produce imflawed
innovations? Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies
for global effects? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplo-
mats to achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product? Where did — •
and do — the weaknesses lie? '^^

The outstanding development in technologically based diplomacy
since the above words were written has been the setback suffered by
the oil-dependent nations at the hands of the oil producers — a setback
which compounded a major world economic recession already under-
way. As of mid-1977, the foregoing questions seem more insistent than
ever.

Role of Congress

As a broad tour d 'horizon, the study of Tke Evolution of Inter-
national Technology does not address the legislative aspect in the
United States, except to acknowledge in passing that, "The political
role of the farmer and the response of the Congress to the needs of
the farmer appear to have been affected by the technological revolu-
tion in agriculture. . . . Much of the legislation between 1800 and
1900 had a rural or agricultural bias, including the Northwest Ordi-
nance, creation of the Department of Agriculture, the land grant
colleges, the Homestead Act, railroad land grants and subsidies, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and sustained support for agri-
cultural research." ^^^

For the sake of perspective, however, it should be noted that Con-
gress has played a significant part in giving shape and direction to
the technological leadership exercised by the United States since
World War II. The Marshall Plan, technical assistance to developing
nations, establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and subse-
quent support of European nuclear power activities, the space pro-
gram (including the creation of related organizational structures in
the executive branch and in the Congress itself) in response to the
challenge of Sputnik I, the development of the Polaris system — these

129 Ibid.
■30 Ibid.
131 Ibid., P.G42.

1609

are only a few of the American undertakings combining technology
and diplomacy in which Congress has been involved, and in some of
which it has at times played the leading U.S. role. It is not the purpose
here to catalog such congressional involvements; a number of them
are explored in some detail in the other studies of the Science, Tech-
nology, and American Diplomacy series.

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options

Some of the main points made in the study, as of December 1970,
under the heading of "The Emerging Policy Issues of International
Technology," deal with effects of technology as the dominant factor
of change that has shaped the modern world; these are shown to be
both beneficial and injurious. The point has been made that tech-
nology is the most obvious avenue to national strength and inter-
national influence. "Technology has also been shown to be a potent
force, linking the world together by many threads. Technolog}^ itself
has an evident propensity to 'go global'." ^^^

The United States, by virtue of tremendous vigor and public
expenditure in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, enjoys a com-
manding technological lead among the nations of the world. As
Herman Pollack has said: "The attraction generated by this pre-
eminence among the nations of the world, especially those in the
process of development, is perhaps one of the lesser understood but
more pervasively powerful forces at work in international relation-
ships today." ^^^

But will the United States adopt wise and imaginative policies
to turn its technological tour de force into permanent gains for
humanity?— "The emerging question posed by the onrush of tech-
nology, and its effect on the relations among the countries of the world,
is whether this potent factor of change and national power is to operate
in a random way, or whether it is possible, and desirable, to devise
a national strategy to guide and direct it, to stimulate innovation in
some directions, and possibly to slow and inhibit innovation in
others." '^'

In the July 1970 issue of Science, Prof. Robert Gilpin of Princeton
identified three major interrelated economic consequences of modern
technology: increased interdependence among national economies,
the growing role of technological innovation in economic growth and
competition, and the rapid spread of multinational corporations,
primarily dominated by American capital. He suggested that a "new
international economy" was developing under the stimulus of tech-
nology, and that there were three alternative national strategies in
response to the development: (1) "to support scientific and tech-
nological development across the broadest front possible"; (2) scien-
tific and technological specialization; and (3) the importation of
foreign technology.

The United States and the Soviet Union [wrote Gilyiin] have followed the
first strategy; Sweden, Great Britain, and a number of other countries have
followed the second; while Japan and West Germany have, in general, followed
the third. Although the U.S. strategy has been relatively successful, particularly

133 Ibid., p. 675.
1" Ihid.
i3< Ihid.

1610

in fields of high technology like space and the computer, it has begun to show
defects, and, in Gilpin's opinion, "the direction of America's technological strategy
will become an increasingly important political issue." '^^

Gilpin argued that, first of all, "even America does not have the
economic and technical resources to support all projects of impor-
tance; it too must choose. Second, a high proportion of the limited
resources has gone into militar}' and military-related projects, while
pressing social and economic ideas of the society have been neglected.
Third, the devastating consequence of technological advance for
the environment has suddenly emerged as a major national
concern. . . ." ^^^

Accordingly, the study suggests, "thought might be given . . . 'to
the formulation of a more explicit technological strategy designed to
increase the social return of its immense investment in science and
technology and to minimize its negative environmental effects.' Gilpin
concludes with a prediction that" :

. . . To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological
considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek
their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry
has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands
play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's
technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international
pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems."'

The study observes that the great efforts of the United States in
science and technology — since 1940, at least — were inspired by external
events. The Manhattan Project was initiated out of fear that Nazi
Germany might achieve nuclear weapons first. Work on the H-bomb
was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the
Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic-missile submarine was a response
to the Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race
was an effort to catch up with and pass the Soviets in a strategically
and psychologically important area in which they had assumed a lead.
"The great technological programs supported by the United States
are still in military, atomic, and space developments, and all are
motivated by events outside the United States or else support for
them wanes." '^*

Indeed, it is no secret that man}^ U.S. domestic programs owe a
substantial measure of their support to the circumstance that they
can be tied to the coattails of programs related to military security.
Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard declares that national defense
is too often used as justification for doing what is needed simply for
the good of American society. For example:

We backed into Federal support of higher education while stoutly insisting
that we were only buying necessary military research results. We entered upon
school curriculum reform, long ov^erdue, on the grounds that it was needed to
make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts. We
launched a gigantic interstate highway program on the grounds that it was needed
for national defense. We fostered the study of international affairs and the
development of foreign area research on the grounds that a great power needed
this knowledge to maintain its power position.'^'

135 Ibid., p. G7G.

13' Itj:a.

133 HM.. pp. 070-077.
139 Ibicl., p. 077.

1611

It seems paradoxical, concludes the study, that the United States —
best equipped to apply science and technology to the solution of the
world's problems, and credited with the highest development of
managerial skills — "has been reluctant to devise and implement a
positive technological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no
lack of opportunities: earth resources satellites, ocean and ocean floor
development, urban improvement, recovery of resources from all
forms of waste, the Oak Kidge proposal for large agricultural-industrial-
nuclear complexes, and man}^ more." '^°

Author's Reassessment

Technology is perhaps the most powerful of all forces for change
in the modern world. It' measures the qualification of nations for
leadership in the community of nations. It affords a nieans for the
achievement of a nation's domestic and foreign goals. It is a principal
substance of modern diplomacy. A nation's diplomatic voice is often
heard in proportion to the nation's excellence in science and tech-
nology, and in its competence to use these for national and inter-
national purposes.

In this chronologically first substantive study of the Science, Tech-
nology, and American Diplomacy series, the research drew mainly on
historical sources. Most of the eleven studies that followed it provided
evidence that the theme and findings of this study were altogether
valid. The impact of the energy crisis, the demands by developing
countries for technical assistance, and the directions recently taken by
bilateral and multilateral programs, are some additional contemporary
evidences of their validity.

The emphasis of the study was on the roles and impacts of tech-
nology on the world scene. Attention might usefully have been given
also to the ranges of problems created by these developments for
U.S. and foreign diplomats and for the U.S. Congress. The study
demonstrated beyond cavil the diplomatic significance of technology.
But the relevance of the study would have been more incisive if the
diplomatic issues related to main technological trends had been ex-
plicitly stated. This was done in later studies in the series with nar-
rower scope, and most strongly of all in the concluding substantive
stud}'. Science and Technology in the Departjnent of State. (See vol. 11,
pp. 1319-1504.) ' _

There are two aspects to the question of legislative relevance :
the actual relevance of the subject of international technology for the
Congress, and its perceived relevance as demonstrated by congressional
action. The variety of problems of diplomacy with substantial tech-
nological content is large, and growing. Accordingly, the subject is
increasingly more relevant for the Congress. However, the complexity
of the problems presented, and the want of means for rendering them
coherent and manageable, stand in the way of congressional action.

At the oXitset of the project the decision was made, as to its scope,
to encompass both science and technology in their relation to diplo-
macy. It soon became evident that science and technology had different
kinds of impacts on diplomacy. In starting out with an examination
of the technological impacts on diplomacy, we saw that these were
direct and powerful; moreover, we observed also that the main im-
pacts of science on diplomacy tended to be indirect — through the

"0 Ibid.

96-243 O - 77 -

1612

medium of technology that grew out of the science. It also became
evident that in the early etiorts to relate science and technology
programatically to diplomacy the emphasis was on science and the
leadership was provided by the scientific community. Science had the
prestige and the intellectual attractions. However, with the passage
of time it has become apparent that functionally technology has the
greater direct impact and requires more attention of diplomatic
analysts. Now there are some persons who even contend that science
should not be separated from technology in the diplomatic environ-
ment lest science drop out of the orbit.

The study emphasized the changes in the effects of technology on
U.S. diplomacy over the past several decades. These changes were in
terms of pace, size, complexity, variety or scope, and range and per-
vasiveness of impacts. In more general terms :

A nation that consciously and dynamically lays the groundwork for tech-
nological advance, encourages technological skills, rewards innovation, and
systematically increases the variety, depth, sophistication, and universality of
its technology, is in a stronger bargaining position than a nation that does not.
Technology increases the range of [diplomatic] options. . . .

Technology was seen to be a "primary source of national power
and diplomatic influence," but at the same time the quest for such
power and influence led to the internationalization of technology.
Thus:

... As each technology evolved it became internationalized, its substance
became the subject of international conversations, its effects extended beyond
national boundaries, and [the study foresaw as an ultimate outcome] the evolution
of a global system incorporating or resolving the technology.

Recent examples of this process are to be found in the production,
distribution, and use of energy fuels and industrial materials. At the
third Henniker Conference on National Materials Policy a major
theme to emerge was that modern nations are "condemned to
interdependence."

Three trends were observed in the global sweep of technology:
(1) The important wa^'s in which evolving technologies added to the
problems and issues confronting the diplomat (as was made abundantly
evident later in the study Science and Technology in the Department of
State) ; (2) the wa3^s in which technology tended to draw nations
together in international enterprises (as demonstrated in the studies
of world food/population balance, global health, the Mekong project,
and commercial uses of atomic energy, for example) ; and (3) the
emergence of many positive values and serious dangers of technology
that were of concern to many nations (and here the evidence is over-
whelming: SALT talks, the Stockholm conference on the environment,
the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on materials, various
meetings on food and population, energ}'^ and so on). These trends
evidence a growing need for explicit plans to manage technology to
produce global results compatible with U.S. foreign policy. (Although
on this last point the need was abundantly documented throughout
the series, and especially in Science and Technology in the Department
of State, the performance and the institutional provisions to meet the
need were, in general, not considered adequate.)

1613

An interesting contemporary example of both the importance and
the ambivalence of technological impact on diplomacy is the reception
by the "Third World" of the U.S. plan for earth resources satellite
surveys. These were recognized as beneficial in the discovery and
inventorying of resources but denounced as an invasion of sovereignty
and a means by which rich nations would be enabled to plunder the
minerals of the poor countries.

One conclusion of considerable importance was neglected in this
study: that the kinds of impacts of a given technology and the rate
at which they occur are susceptible of analysis leading to prediction.
The study of diplomatic consequences of a technology is accordingly
a vital activity. The impacts are reasonably foreseeable, and the
necessary diplomatic responses can likewise be defined in advance
with careful study. But they seldom are. With the benefit of hindsight,
this neglected area of diplomatic planning was later discussed in
Science and Technology in the Department oj State.

The purpose of this initial study was to define and explore the
universe of technology as related to diplomacy. The principal issue
it raised that might have taken legislative form concerned the relative
utility for U.S. diplomacy of bilateral versus multilateral programs.
This issue runs as a theme throughout many of the subsequent studies.
However, the question persists and the need for its examination as a
policy issue is greater than ever. The space program is the subject of
some 250 bilateral agreements. Bilateral science agreements number
another 50 or so. Atomic energy bilaterals are continuing to pro-
liferate. Precisely how these are coordinated for foreign policy pur-
poses, and how they relate to multilateral objectives and programs,
is a continuing perplexity.

Both for the 1970s and for the rest of the present century, the issue
of global management of technology is likely to remain a foremost
concern of U.S. diplomacy.

Some Illustrative Questions

What are the U.S. diplomatic goals that are served, or contravened,
by the international spread of technology and its impacts?

How do U.S. diplomatic goals that involve technology relate to
those of other nations?

What mechanisms or institutions are there, or might there be, to
reconcile U.S. and foreign diplomatic goals respecting technology?

How is U.S. diplomatic planning conducted with reference to the
uses and concerns of technology?

What is the present balance in the U.S. Government's effort as
between maintenance of deterrent force and emphasis on technological
programs serving constructive peaceful purposes? What balances of
this sort are observable in other nations? Could the uses of peaceful
technology be further extended for diplomatic purposes?

What domestic developments in technology might be encouraged in
support of U.S. diplomatic goals?

How far into the future is it possible to project analyses of tech-
nological change, and with what degree of probability?

How does technological analysis compare with economic analysis
and political analysis as to predictive power?

1614

ISSUE TWO— THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH"'

Statement of the Issue

For more than a century the health of the peoples of the world
has been a subject of international concern and action, enlisting
the combined efforts of diplomacy and science. However, public
awareness and public investment have not been commensurate with
the health benefits of global action. The author. Dr. Freeman H.
Quimb}^, puts the central question in his introduction to the stud}^:
Why has a matter so important to all mankind— human health and
disease prevention — not become a more effective, comprehensive,
and dynamic focus of international cooperation? ^*^

Importance oj the Issue

Disease is international ; it moves freely across political boundaries.
Preventive medicine, also inherently international, requires con-
tinuing vigilance and international cooperation on the part of scien-
tists, diplomats, national and local political leaders, and the public.
Pockets of infectious and communicable disease exist all over the
world, in less developed countries and even in those most advanced.
Under conditions of social disruption, floods, hurricanes, and other
natural disasters, these cells of infection can burst forth as world
epidemics. Conversely, by a relatively modest investment in each
case, they can be eradicated or controlled. Yet, half of the world's
people have no access to health care at all; millions die each year of
readily preventable sicknesses. There is even some retrogression as
the effects of urban blight strike the slum poor in the midst of affluence.
Against this dismal picture of underachievement must be seen a great
and growing array of unused and underused technical capabilities
for controlling disease and building health. The issue is how to,
advance world health through programs utilizing these capabilities
supported by the combined efforts of diplomats, scientists, and the
public.

In the context of the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy
study series, the issue is illustrative in several special ways:

(1) It demonstrates that general acceptance of the importance of an
issue, and of the desirability of taking measures to cope with it, does
not insure full implementation of appropriate measures. The problem
differs in intensity from that of the brain drain,"' in which a persistent
issue that lacked comparable popular appeal and dynamism surfaced
from time to time only to drop out of sight again, still unresolved.
The issue of global health, affecting the lives and well-being of people
everywhere, commands continuing support from the world's govern-
ments. This support, however, does not extend beyond halfway or
palliative measures to stout and forceful programs and toward rational
goals of achievable global health.

'" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Politics of Global Health, a study in the
series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcomjnittee on National
Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Freeman H. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1971. See vol. U, pp. 081-763.

i" Ibid . p. 085.

"3 lor a lull treatment of this subject, see: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain
Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility, in the series Science, Technology,
and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments by Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Foreign Affairs Divi-
sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1974, vol. II, pp. 1037-1318.

1615

(2) The issue also provides instructive examples of progress attribut-
able to the teaming of scientists and diplomats in extended negotia-
tions. When the French Government convened the first international
quarantine congress in 1851, each of the 12 participating nations was
represented by a medical doctor and a diplomatist. Delegates were
left free to vote individually. Although in voting the two groups
tended to cancel each other out, with resultant tensions and frustra-
tions, the diplomats and doctors were at last able to agree to 137
articles on international sanitary regulations. The pattern of one
diplomat and one doctor from each country continued during 10
international sanitary conferences which followed between 1851 and
the end of the century.

(3) The same example illustrates another point: the essentiality of
sustained application of diplomacy among countries as well as in
relations between scientists and diplomats. The pairing arrangement
would probably have been fruitless if not held to doggedly until the
job was done; failure might have discouraged further efforts for years
to follow. Adoption of the first international rules required 48 plenary
sessions and 6 months of work. What is more important, for the first
time diplotnats and doctors from leading nations had met in earnest
to discuss common global disease problems. (It was the diplomats
rather than the scientists in this instance, in contrast to that of the
International Geophysical Year,^" which made the undertaking a
success. The scientific community of the time was divided between the
sanitarians and the quarantinists. Today, both views are recognized
as separately inadequate but complementary elements of a compre-
hensive approach to the problem. Arguments over rival scientific
theories consumed most of the time of the conference, but the French
diplomatic representative who chaired it continued to seek workable
solutions, and the diplomats as a group appeared to have had instruc-
tions not to yield to either of the extreme scientific positions. The
result was successful compromise.)

How the Issue Developed

Historically, cycles of pestilence were accepted as a fact of life.
There was a series of disease invasions of Europe beginning with the
Cliristian era, running on through the fall of Rome, and climaxing
in the black death of the 14th century. (They did not end there: the
influenza epidemic of 1918-19 took 20 million lives.) In time, the
attitude of acceptance yielded to an active search for causes and
remedies.

BEGINNING OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Preventive medicine began, at least in England, with public demand
for corrective measures against recurring epidemics based on the
observed association between polluted water and disease. Its first
phase, including some aspects of sanitary engineering and public
hygiene, was marked by legislative acts like the Great Reform
bill of 1832, the Metropolis Water Act of 1852, and the Public Health
Act of 1875.

'"See: U.S. Con?rpss, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the International
Geophysical Year, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis, Analyst in Science and
Technology, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, 1973, vol. I, pp. 293-300.

1616

The scientific or experimental phase of preventive medicine — the
era of bacteriology — overlapped and followed the sanitation move-
ment. It provided the technical foundation on which sanitary water
and sewage disposal practices are still based, as well as for coping with
those infectious diseases which can be controlled or eradicated by
vaccination.

Though all nations benefit from the health of their own citizens
and those of other nations, and health measures are generally accepted
throughout the world, present levels of international cooperation in
public health were not easily achieved and remain hard to sustain or
extend. In the early deliberations (1850-1900) the paucity and uncer-
tain authority of scientific knowledge left much room for debate
and for the convenient alignment of medical science with national
interest. Thus, the German members of the International Sanitary
Council of Constantinople made decisions of little consequence to
disease but calculated to expand the political dominance of Germany
or to weaken British commercial dominance; British physicians,
even with French scientists ridiculing their logic, supported British
shipping interests by downgrading the importance of quarantine
restrictions ; Turkey reportedly paid little attention to sanitary rules,
holding that the whole system was a tool of imperialist power poKtics
rather than one designed to protect Europe from invasions of
epidemics,^"

EARLY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL DISEASE

It is to the credit of diplomacy that under these circumstances
nations persisted in developing constructive plans and international
rules for controlling the spread of disease. It was a long step forward
when the French Government convened the first International
Quarantine Congress in 1851. Successive congresses were held in
Constantinople in 1866, Vienna in 1874, Washington in 1881, Rome
in 1885, and Venice in 1892. Three other agreements dealing with
cholera which followed in 1893, 1894, and 1897 were later combined
in a single International Sanitary Convention in 1903. In 1909, as a
result of a 1907 meeting in Rome of 12 nations including the United
States, a permanent International Ofiice of Public Hygiene was set
up in Paris. It continued to function through both World War I and
World War II, after which it was absorbed into the World Health
Organization (WHO), created in 1946.

The first full-fledged international health organization, in the
sense of one which carried out sanitary policing action, was the Pan
American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), established in Mexico City in
1902. Further strengthened in 1924 when 24 nations of the Americas
ratified the Pan American Sanitary Code, the Bureau provided for
regional cooperation in public health which went beyond existing
European practices. Now known as the Pan American Health Organi-
zation or PAHO, it still exists as an autonomous international health
organization for the Americas; it serves additionaDy as the WHO
regional office. It brought extensive experience in the control of disease
to the process of designing the new WHO. It also played a strong role
in the adoption of a decentralized structure for WHO, which (with

'*' Many similar examples could be cited. In 1898, for example, German provincial Inspections for trich-
inosis were designed as much to keep out American pork as to protect local populations. (See Huddle,
Science and Technology in the Depannient of State, vol. II, p. 137ti.)

1617

its six regional offices) is unique among the specialized agencies of the
United Nations.

There was another major development in international health
organization before World War 11. The League of Nations set up an
International Epidemic Commission in 1920; this was succeeded by a
health organization in 1923. The latter was a success despite feeble
financial support from member governments (it had substantial
assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation) ; it soon outstripped the
Paris office in both importance and influence.

The League of Nations Health Organization expanded to a new
order of magnitude both the pattern of large-scale cooperative effort
through international organizations in general and the dissemination
of public health knowledge and skills in particular. It stimulated
quarantine reform and quelled numerous epidemics; sought to
standardize serums and vaccines; set up epidemiological centers in
Geneva, Singapore, and Melbourne; established international study-
tours, lectureships, and a public health library; published monographs;
placed its experts at the disposal of governments; and brought together
public health officials from many countries to coordinate their efforts.
Thus, when the World Health Organization was born, it began not
as a revolutionary experiment in public health but as the sophisticated
heir to the work of the League Health Organization and its
predecessors.

ESTABLISHMENT OF WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The World Health Organization was formed in July 1946 within
the terms of the United Nations Charter. (The United States, which
had not belonged to the League of Nations or its Health Organization,
became a member of WHO in June 1948.) The WHO constitution
cites a single objective: "The attainment by all peoples of the highest
possiblelevelof health." Health is defined by WHO as ''. . . a state
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely
the absence of disease or infirmity."

The WHO constitution specifies 22 functions for the organization,
ranging from the broad mandate to "act as the directing and co-
ordinating authority on international health work" through "assist
governments, upon request, in strengthening health services," "estab-
lish and maintain such administrative and technical services as may
be required, including epidemiological and statistical services,'^
"promote and conduct research in the field of health," and "assist in
developing an informed public opinion among all peoples on matters
of health," to "take all necessary action to attain the objective of the
Organization."

These high aims and the need to resume work interrupted by the
war, as well as to deal with conditions caused by it, gave WHO an
early momentum. It has since grown into an international operation
of considerable size and significance. At the time of this study (1971),
its regular budget, funded by assessed contributions from member
governments, had risen from an initial $5 million to $73 million —
that of WHO and PAHO together to above $100 million. (The latter
figure had grown to more than $150 million by 1975.) It had (and
still has) regional offices in Copenhagen, Alexandria, Brazzaville,

1618

Manila, New Delhi, and Washington, in addition to its headquarters
in Geneva. It had a total staff on the order of 4,500 — about a fourth
at headquarters, the remainder at regional and zone offices and in
131 (now 151) member countries. It maintained hundreds of lab-
oratories and reference centers or collaborating institutes all over the
world, had formal working relationships with some 82 major inter-
national government and nongovernment organizations in the health
field, and was supported by numerous advisory panels and expert
committees in virtually every health or health-related subject area.
It initiated annually thousands of research grants and training fellow-
ships. It administered the international health regulations adopted
by the World Health Assembly in 1969, and under the regulations
operated a global intelligence network on the principal epidemic
diseases of the world. Finally, it was a major pubhsher of biomedical
literature: Its monographs and technical reports often represented,
in effect, a world consensus of experts in various health subject areas.

STATUS AND POTENTIAL OF W.H.O. TODAY

Despite this impressive growth, WHO today is far from translating
into global accomplishment such principles, enunciated in its con-
stitution, as "The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attain-
ment of peace and security. ..." and "unequal development in
different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease
... is a common danger." The failure to meet the implications of
these declarations has been generally attributed to budgetary realities.
Even if the major nations fully appreciated the diplomatic potential
of public health and modern medicine as a vehicle of international good
will, it is not likely that they would approve a budget or a philosophy
which would look to the World Health Organization for the solution
of all global health problems. With a budget less than one-tenth
that of the New York City Health Department,*** WHO concentrates
its resources on advisory and coordinating activities and on major
disease control and eradication programs. Undeniably, a greater
degree of U.S. involvement and contribution of funds in excess of
its annual assessment would improve the rate of success in the control
of malaria, cholera, and other infectious diseases, but the monetary
exchange rate is currently a greater problem for WHO than is the
U.S. attitude toward international organizations.

Larger U.S. and other member commitments to WHO would indeed
make it possible for improved followup on its projects and programs;
disease eradication or control programs could be intensified and
studies of health care systems and of health manpower coordination
could be expanded.

But WHO was not intended to be a world medical society to provide
global health services to developed and developing countries. Its
services and technical assistance are rendered in response to specific
requests from member governments. It is the demand and the legiti-
mate need for technical assistance, and the ability of the requesting

14a Kevin Cahill. The Untapped Retource: Medicine and Diplomacy. Orbis Boaka, MaryknoU, New York,
1971: p. 7.

1619

country to use it, which should largely determine the size of WHO'a
budget. Dr. Quimby's study suggested that WHO's budgetary re-
straints necessitated the setting of a few high-priority programs, and
that there would still be numerous countries in desperate need of
advice and assistance because of degrading health conditions.

A further perspective on WHO's failure to realize its fuU potential
may be found in the author's concluding comment:

Public health on a worldwide scale has yet to command the attention of govern-
ments which a global perspective of health would appear to require. The nature
of the work is undramatic; the subject oflFers little in the way of political capital
as do so many other medical topics. Disciplinary development and professional
status for public health and preventive medicine are low compared with those of
modem diagnostic and curative medicine in the United States and other de-
veloped countries. The public and its elected representatives may not be aware of
the miracles which have been achieved in the field of preventive medicine; it was
these, rather than the glamorous surgical and pharmaceutical inventions of
recent vintage, which so dramatically changed the life expectancy of man. The
world was made a relatively safe place in which to live and travel many years ago
by the iippli cation of what now appear to be rather simple biological, medical,
and engineering facts. Indeed, the techniques of preventive medicine have been
80 successful in developed lands that neither crisis nor controversy worthy of
intensive political attention has emerged in recent years.

In the less-developed lands, the power to improve human health at least cost
■still lies in the application of proven technology in the public health and sanitation
field. Curative medicine in the poor countries has as much appeal as it does in
advanced countries with large populations of people with various forms of degen-
erative disease, but there are lacking the medicines, the doctors, and the places
in which to apply the cures. In many of these developing areas, the services of
sanitary engineer, hydrologist, or geologist are more essential to permanent
health gains than is the increased availability of doctors and clinics. Plant geneti-
cists and agrarian reform, together with culturally adapted population policies,
will contribute more at this time to a revolution in the health of some of the
economically depressed countries than will the importation of modem technology."^

U.S. Involvement

The United States has played an active, if not necessarily a leading,
part in many of the international health initiatives of the 19th and 20tn
centuries. U.S. financial support of the World Health Organization
since its inception has been steady, and has far exceeded that of any
other country. (The U.S. assessment ranged from about $6 milHon
or 31.7 percent of the WHO assessed budget of about $20 million in
1961 to roughly $23.65 million or 30.87 percent of the WHO total
assessed budget of more than $73 million in 1971. In 1975 the U.S.
assessment for WHO was $30.15 milhon, or 25.64 percent of the WHO
total assessed budget of $115.4 million.) The United States has a re-
spectable record of faithful payment of its WHO assessments and good
performance in voluntary contributions to international health activi-
ties in general. On the other hand, U.S. support from the beginning has
been less than all-out ; the United States has rarely voted for approval
of the WHO budget, and in recent years has worked to reduce it. This
situation could change : as of July 1977, U.S. policies and actions in
support of international health activities were undergoing a White
House review. According to the office of Dr. Peter Bourne, Special
Assistant to the President for Health and International Human Needs,
an interagency task force headed by Dr. Bourne was to report to Presi-
dent Carter by early fall 1977 on problems, prospects, and policy op-
portunities in the associated areas of international health, nutrition,
and population.

"' yuimby. The Politia of OMxU Health, vol. 11, p. 757.

1620

POSSIBLE REASONS FOR EARLY U.S. DELAY IN SUPPORTING W.H.O.

For example, the 2-year delay of the United States in ratifying the
constitution of WHO seems to have been motivated by both medical-
political and national-poHtical considerations, including fears that
WHO would become involved in such questions as health insurance
and socialized medicine in an international context rather than the
problems of preventive medicine on an international scale. Another
factor making for confusion of goals at the outset may have been
that the American leaders involved in the planning of WHO were
more likely to have been specialists in preventive medicine or public
health than experts in curative medicine with individual patient
orientation. They were supported by diplomats whose thinking was
conditioned by the past dominance of pubhc health (preventive medi-
cine) over private health (curative medicine) philosophies in most of
the countries of the world. It is the curative medicine school of thought
that has dominated the power structure of American medical practice,
and that is the more vocal and organized in exerting pressures on the
decisonmaking processes of the U.S. Government. Another pervasive
factor has been the U.S. preference for bilateral programs, over which
it could exercise more direct control, as against multilateral activities,
which many U.S. leaders have tended to regard as inefficient if not
misdirected.

Since World War II the United States has conducted a wide range
of bilateral programs in the international health field, some with
further multilateral ties and some independent. The major U.S.
Government departments supporting programs of research, technical
assistance, or economic aid in health and related subjects overseas
have been the Departments of State, HEW, and Defense.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AFFAIRS
It

The two principal organizations in the Department of State with
responsibilities for international health affairs are the Bureau of
International Organization Aifairs (10) and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID). The former administers the U.S. con-
tributions to international and Inter-American organizations — mainly
WHO and PAHO — and to certain special programs; they are dis-
cussed further below under Role of Congress. AID administers the
bulk of U.S. bilateral technical and economic assistance, including
health and sanitation projects, and makes voluntary contributions to
multilateral organizations like the United Nations Development
Program. One of the largest health programs supported by AID has
involved community water supply development and management of
sewerage and waste disposal systems to lessen the danger of diseases
caused by pollution. By 1971 AID had established unique guidelines
and machinery for both operations and research in international
health work, such as the control and eradication of epidemic and
endemic diseases. Although funds available for such operations had
been decreasing year by year, there was a turnabout in 1972; by 1975

1621

AID had a budget of about $90 million for international health, of
which nearly a third consisted of funds for capital investments in
sanitary sewerage and water supply. Earlier hmitations of AID as
an organization serving U.S. interests in international health were lack
of staff in the medical field and its practice of concentrating assistance
in relatively few countries. In the fiscal year 1969, 87 percent of AID's
assistance to individual countries went to only 15 nations. Today,
however, AID provides health assistance to about 40 nations and co-
operates actively with WHO — not only with its Geneva headquarters
but with its various regional offices. Indeed, along with the growing
bilateral programs of HEW, the multilateral programs of WHO and
the bilateral programs of AID are the mainstay of global health ac-
tivities involving the United States. Both programs are increasing in
total funds and in scope. Furthermore, coordination between WHO and
AID is today much greater than in the past. Each knows what the
other is doing, and programs are coordinated.

THE ROLE OF DHEW

The Public Health Service (PHS) in the Department of Health;
Education, and Welfare is the primary U.S. Government resource
in both national and international health. It is the official technical
liaison with WHO and PAHO. Its chief medical officer played a major
role in the drafting of the WHO's constitution and has usually served
as head of the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly. PHS
prepares the U.S. technical position papers for the assembly and pro-
vides or assists in providing experts for the WHO advisory committees.

Many of HEW's laboratories and institutes serve as WHO reference
centers or collaborating research institutes. There are many such cen-
ters and institutes in the United States; several of them are located
in the PHS National Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Ga.,
which is part of WHO's worldwide epidemiological intelligence net-
work. Besides playing a prominent role in international health or-
ganizations, HEW participates actively in U.S. bilateral health and
sanitation programs.

The National Institutes of Health of the Public Health Service
(NIH) no longer maintains overseas offices in U.S. Embassies in
Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, or New Delhi. It continues, however,
to support research laboratories in the Panama Canal Zone (the
Middle America Research Unit and the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory)
and Guam (Epidemiology and Genetics Centers). NIH also adminis-
ters the Pakistan Cholera Research Laboratory for SEATO, funded
under a bilateral agreement between AID and the Government of
Bangladesh.

Funds obligated for HEW's international health activities, on a
relatively low plateau in recent years ($38.5 million in fiscal year 1973,
$39.0 million in 1974, $36.5 million in 1975), have risen sharply in fiscal
years 1976 and 1977 ($57.9 million and an estimated $72.2 million), re-
spectively. According to the HEW spokesman who furnished these
figures in July 1977, the increases have been mainly for research.

THE DOD ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL HEALTH

The Department of Defense (DOD) plays a special part in the inter-
national health field. Military medicine has long been the backbone

1622

of tropical and preventive medicine. The improvement in military
medical organization from the Civil War on, the ability of the services
to attract competent researchers and practitioners, and the mobility
of the Armed Forces, have made it possible for mihtary niedicine to
contribute to the remarkable progress of American medicine as a
whole and especially to the solution of global health problems. Ameri-
can military medicine has produced one of the best medical libraries
in the world, and among the medical disciplines it ranks high in the
fields of pathology and epidemiology. DOD supports a substantial
amount of research in foreign countries and maintains four overseas
offices in developed nations, mainly for research and development
liaison purposes. Experienced observers have noted that with the
end of colonial administrations and their health services in many of
the less-developed countries, U.S. military medicine has helped to fill
the gap, especially by providing a pattern for American industry to
follow.

With the decline in teaching of tropical medicine in U.S. medical
schools a physician must look either to military service or to experience
in one of the international health programs to learn how to deal with
malaria and other endemic tropical diseases.

Despite all this U.S. activity in the international health field, what
seems to stand out in overview is a reluctance to become any more
involved than is required by the tacit dictates of conscience, humani-
tarian impulse, and characteristic American pragmatism. Forthright
considerations of moral leadership, on the one hand, or of political
gains to be had in pressing U.S. technical and economic advantages, on
the other, do not appear to have been consequential factors.

Role of Congress

Early congressional actions with respect to WHO were not enthusias-
tic. Congress was slow to ratify the WHO constitution and then
arbitrarily set the annual U.S. contribution at $1.9 million, meanwhile
appropriating tens of millions for short-term bilateral health aid. In
general, extensive hearings records examined during the preparation
of this study showed a strong congressional preference for bilateral
programs. Three major studies of aid and development, available at
the time, were of little use in focusing the attention of Congress on the
extent to which poor health impedes the social and economic progress
of mankind, or in presenting a realistic and balanced picture of both
the problems facing international organizations like WHO and the
great potential of adequately supported health organizations for
providing cost-effective solutions to many of these problems. These
three studies were :

One: The 400-page Pearson Keport of September 15, 1969 (report
of the Commission on International Development set up by World
Bank President Robert S. McNamara), which dismissed international
health problems in two pages but conveyed the impression of sweeping
advances and credited WHO with achievements that that Agency
would not itself claim — prompting the New England Journal oj Medi-
cine to comment: "The cursory and grossly inaccurate treatment
afforded health is representative of current economic thought."

Two: The Jackson Report of September 30, 1969 ("A Study of the
Capacity of the United Nations Development System," published by
the United Nations), which appeared to deemphasize WHO in favor
of a reorganized U.N. development program as the focal point of

1623

funds, coordination, review, and decision in technical assistance for
country-centered liealth programs, and — even though such an ap-
proach could not have been put into practice for several years — sug-
gested to U.N. member governments that they could stabilize the
WHO budget at the level already achieved.

Three: The Peterson Report of March 4, 1970 (Report to the
President from the Task Force on International Development) , which
proposed to rely on multilateral organizations like WHO in place of
AID, but included no specific recommendation that AID funds for
health and sanitation be transferred to WHO. Indeed, it did not even
mention WHO directly, and rarely mentioned health.

INADEQUATE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. SHARE OF W.H.O. FUNDING

SUPPORT "^

Nor does the method by which the executive branch presents its
budget justification for the U.S. share of funding support for WHO and
PAHO provide Congress with a clear and emphatic picture of the
needs of these organizations in relation to potential for accomplish-
ment. This justification is submitted to the House and Senate Appro-
priations Committees (the respective Subcommittees on State, Justice,
Commerce, and the Judiciary) as part of a total package that includes
the United Nations and its nine specialized agencies — of which WHO
is one; the package also includes PAHO and five other inter- American
organizations, NATO and 6 other regional organizations, and 15
miscellaneous bodies. Related hearings records typically do not deal
with the nature and merit of the substantive work of agencies like
WHO and PAHO; attention is largely focused on budgets and balance
of payments. The prevailing view seems to be that the United States
is overassessed and overcommitted to ever-increasing organizational
budgets; assessments for multilateral enterprises are seen as one more
form of foreign aid. Not only has international health not been spared
from rising congressional concern about costs, lack of control over
budgets, and the need to restrict the outflow of American dollars;
on the contrary, international health organizations — as modest as
their demands are in comparison with nuclear power and weapons
donations, and in relation to possible returns — have often been singled
out for budgetary discussion in both Senate and House appropriations
hearings.

LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF MULTILATERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS

Congressional frugality with respect to multilateral health programs
would seem to reflect in large part a commimications gap — that is, a
lack of understanding of how much international health activities
have accomplished and also how much remains to be done that cannot
effectively be done through bilateral measures — and the absence of a
sense of Jurgency. Symptomatic of the latter was the failure of a bill
(H.R. 12453, the International Health Act of 1966) aimed at the
shortage of manpower trained for international health activities and
at raising the low level of U.S. participation in the WHO staff. The
bUl was supported by the HEW Secretary, tlie Surgeon General, the
American PubBc Health Association, the Association of American

1*8 For a recent account of this problem as it relates to U.S. funding support of intemational organisations
generally, see: U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Coveniment Operations, L'.»S. Participation in lutir-
national Organizatiovs, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Oflice. February 1977, 140 p. (Senate
Document No. 95-50), pp. 48-50.

1624

Medical Colleges, and the American Medical Association. During
hearings on the bill in February 1966, there was excellent dialog
among the members of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce and the expert witnesses. WHO and PAHO were mentioned
repeatedly during the hearings, as was the fact that international
health problems require a different kind of instruction from that
available in the typical American medical school. It was pointed out
that there were only three medical schools in the United States with
associated schools of public health. In spite of these endorsements
and the acknowledged need to correct a defect in American medical
education, the legislation was not passed, failing to get out of the
Rules Committee. This inaction may be attributable to the low
priority attached to the measure, inasmuch as no opposition was
recorded. No subsequent legislation has been introduced specifically
for the training of international health specialists. However, because
of demand, several new schools or departments of public health have
been established in American medical schools, without specific Federal
legislation.

Status of the Issue

WHO has accompUshed much in spite of lackluster moral support
and indifferent understanding on the part of the United States as its
major financial contributor. That it has done so must be attributed
in large degree not only to the inherently constructive nature of health
services — ^^although this character may have insured WHO's survival,
it does not account for its signal success — but rather to the sustained
diplomatic skill and perseverance of its leadership.

Able leadership has been evident in WHO from the beginning.
Whereas the drafters of the WHO constitution gave it powers over
functions which governments normally reserve to themselves, the
authority of WHO has never been fully exercised by its administra-
tors. Prudent men have used both commonsense and caution in apply-
ing the constitutional provisions. As a result, WHO has- been able to
function effectively even in the presence of unresolved political
problems. It has refused to deal with some problems because they
were predominantly political, but worked out solutions to others—
where necessary to organizational progress — by avoiding legalistic
debates and pursuing a pragmatic and realistic coursfi,. Thus- U-S.
insistence upon reservations as conditions of acceptance of the WHO
constitution was ignored as an obstacle, even though there was no
provision in the WHO constitution for reservations: the Assembly
accepted the United States with f uH rights and refused to permit such
conditions on membership to become an issu« for the future. Then, in
1949 and 1.950, when nine Communist member countries withdrew
over alleged failure of WHO to execute agreed progpamsy the break
was viewed as temporary. Withdrawing members were asked to re-
consider, and by preparing the way for a settlement of assessments
in arrears, WHO brought about their return after a few yeaxs.

1625

WHO has relied less on regulations and more on the authority of
international biomedical consensus. This course has proven politically
wise in many instances, and an effective strategy: to report conclu-
sions of the world's health experts and to leave implementation to
member governments.

Prospects and Options

who's power resides largely in the high regard in which it is held
among the scientific and public health specialists of the world and its
acceptance as the highest forum of world medical opinion. Its limita-
tions lie mainly in budgetary constraints which reflect lack of priority
standing with governments and the general public. Public health on
a worldwide scale has yet to command the attention which its potential
for further progress would warrant. The nature of the work is undra-
matic; in the United States and other developed countries, disciplinary
development and professional status for public health and preventive
medicine are low compared with those of modem diagnostic and
curative medicine; and the public and its elected representatives are
apparent!}^ not aware of the miracles which have been achieved in
the field of preventive medicine (although the recently publicized
example of the People's Republic of China may be working some
change in this field). However, there has been an interesting recent
development in this area: a 3-day symposium on preventive medicine
held at NIH during the summer of 1975.

SEEMING NEED OF STRONGER U.S. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL

HEALTH PROGRAMS

Recent trends in international health activities reflect a move-
ment from bilateral to multilateral programs such as those of WHO,
PAHO, and UNDP. The Peterson Report, among other studies,
recommended this approach. The United States has the resources,
the systems skills, and the biomedical technology for greatly assisting
WHO to realize its full potential. For this to happen would require
stronger support than is now evident and more visibility at policy
levels of the Departments of State and HEW, in the Congress, and — ■
ultimately — among the U.S. public at large.

The foregoing assessment suggests the desirability of a national
debate on the issue of global health and its interrelationship with
national health. Such a debate, involving medical and other scientific
and technological, political, and economic circles, would have as its
principal aim the education of the American public on a matter of
fundamental human concern. The instrument for leading such a
debate and educational initiative could appropriately be a committee
of the Congress, or perhaps two or three committees in conjunction — •
one concerned primarily with international relations, another with
health, and a third with science and technology.

The study of The Politics of Global Health suggests additional needs.
In the annual congressional scrutiny of proposed budgets for inter-
national health activities, cost-benefit aspects have not been suflB-
ciently examined — probably because of the great range and com-
plexity of the subject matter. A qualified research institution could
be enlisted to make a thorough study of the relationship between the

1626

actual costs and the direct and indirect benefits of international
health programs. Examples are at hand of some successful surveys
in specific connections: e.g., the control of poliomyelitis in the
U.S.S.R., and the reduction of infant mortality in Yugoslavia. Such
a survey should take account not only of past and present experience
but also of potential benefits in relation to costs. For example, arrange-
ments for global medical surveillance and early warning of the danger-
ous spread of disease, together with reliable health statistics, have
hardly scratched the surface. The United States would benefit from
a WHO evaluation of the various systems of health care now in opera-
tion around the world; from a set of WHO standards on electronic
medical diagnostic equipment, water and air pollution, and methods
in the treatment of alcohohcs and heroin addicts; and from such
other internationally established standards as WHO-FAO (Food
and Agriculture Organization) criteria governing the permissible
amounts of heavy metals in foods. Other types of studies for which
the United States does not have sufficient affected population samples,
but from which much of value to U.S. medical research and the
American people could be learned, include studies of the effect of
severe malnutrition on early development and learning and perhaps
of certain types of cancer and heart disease.

REASONS FOR POSSIBLE SHIFT OF BUDGET DEFENSE ROLE FROM STATE

TO DHEW

It might also be appropriate to consider shifting the main burden
of budgetary justification for WHO, PAHO, and other international
health activities from the Department of State to DHEW. With
appropriate State Department coordination but without present
constraints on the presentation of substantive accomplishments and
needs resulting from the simultaneous consideration of funding for all
international organization activities in all fields, DHEW might be
expected to serve as a more effective focal point for the technical
documentation, planning, review, and analysis of issues in connection
with U.S. participation in WHO, PAHO, and certain bilateral bio-
medical programs. Underlying this proposal is the reasoning that the
expansion of national public health interests to global dimensions
requires not only conventional diplomacy: It calls also for worldwide
experience with science, medicine, and public health as political
systems themselves and for experts in the subject matter. To the
increasing extent that a worldwide approach is taken to the problems
of human health, it will be necessary for knowledge to be shared and
exchanged by those who through training and practice are equipped
to work with it.

The problems and potential of the State Department for managing
U.S. relationships with international activities in general are examined
later, in Issue Six. It has been a thesis of the present study that it would
be beneficial for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
to be brought more into the forefront of policy formulation and
review, and budget presentation, with respect to U.S. support of
international health programs. (See, however, the author's postscript
to this comment, immediately following.)

1627

A uthors Reassessment

No changes occurred in the 4 years after preparation of the study in
1971 which would modify its conchisions, except in some matters of
detail. Author Freeman H. Quimby's comments in reviewing the situ-
ation in July 1975 were as follows :

(a) Because science and medicine have an international
character of their own, it seemed to make sense that DHEW
justify before Congress the U.S. fundmg of international health
organizations. However, in recent years domestic problems have
so preoccupied DHEW, NIH, and AMA (American Medical
Association) that their attention to international concerns has
been minimal. Today it would be prudent to consider additional
options for a new organizational spokesman for health concerns,
as suggested in the Peterson Report, or a combination of services
from the National Academy of Sciences Foreign Office and
Institute of Medicine.

(b) The diplomatic potential for the worldwide improvement
of human health lies primarily in preventive medicine and in
related socioeconomic factors. The relatively high level of medical
teclinology in the developed countries is not a primary contributor
to this potential, though it may have its uses as a diplomatic
tool in dealing with the ruling elites of the less developed nations.
Diplomatic efforts should b« aimed at providing technologies
to benefit the health of whole populations, thereby also sub-
stantially promoting development. (As indicated in The Politics
of Glohal Healthy a correlation study of a broad spectrum of social
and economic indicators in 115 countries showed that health
variables tended to be the most highly correlat/cd with all other
measures of progress.) ^*^ There is no doubt as to how this factor
operates, and most international public health experts, sociol-
ogists, and economists understand it. In simple terms, good health
equates with social, economic, and personal development.

(c) The role of WHO in the administration ot programs for
the control and eradication of disease is the same as it was 4
years ago. The importance of that role, however, has been under-
lined by subsequent events: The growing competition for food
and energy resources, heightened perception of environmental
problems and the need for controlling them, and further pressures
for the advances in family planning. The essentially international
character of these problems, along with those of health, becomes
increasingly clear, as does the fact of interaction among many
of them; a global perspective is essential to their management
and ultimate solution.

(d) The 1971 study suggested that the Congress may not have
gi-asped the significant relationship of international health to
national health. Since then, other international problems have
gained priority in Congress over those in the health field ; except
in connection with food reserves, congressional attention is per-
haps even less focused on international health than it was 4
years ago.

n'Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, vol. U,\).7rA.

96-243 O - 77 - 9

1628

IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH PLANNING

(e) It is more effective to think and plan globally for the health
component in the quality of life than it is to make bilateral
agreements with other powers to undertake research of interest
to them in a certain disease, when in fact, large regions if not the
whole world are affected by the disease. Several such bilateral
agreements in effect today will probabl}^ accomplish less than if
the same money were spent on regional centers involving the
participation of many nations, developed and less developed.
The WHO cancer center in Lyons, France, is a highly effective
example ; there is an urgent need for other multinational centers
focusing on specific diseases.

(f) It was pointed out in the study that evidence did not
support the idea that medical assistance should be withheld from
less developed countries on the ground that it will merely exac-
erbate the population problem, but rather — at least in long-range
terms — the reverse. In most explicit terms, the study suggested,
and quoted authorities who contended, that good health facili-
tated population control. However, the theory of the relationship
of the population growth to improvement in public health
measures, combined with rising standards of living, is not well
developed.^'*" This is a subject deserving of intensive investigation
by Congress and additional research efforts in support of such
investigation. (See also Issue Three.)

(g) As a result of politically motivated decisions by UNESCO,
some Western nations are withholding funds and some scholars
are boycotting UNESCO-sponsored meetings. It is too early to
determine whether or not such pro- Arab, Communist, and Third
World trends will continue in UNESCO. The question, of course,
is whether WHO will experience a similar awkwardness and
require adjustments beyond those which it has already satisfac-
torily negotiated in response to similar influences in its Eastern
Mediterranean Region. The answer is, probably not; WHO is
organized in such a way that combinations of bloc votes in its
World Health Assembly have less influence over crucial WHO
decisions than do the decisions of its more powerful 24-man
Executive Board. On the Board, professional representatives of
at least four major powers wield strong technical influence over
who's major assistance programs. It is important to preserve
this arrangement if the United Nations itself should become less
effective and future development should leave WHO to go it alone.

(h) In summary, it seems reasonable today to reach conclusions
similar to those in the original analysis :

That multinational cooperation in ^VHO and PAHO will con-
tinue to contribute effectively to the technical and organizational
health needs of the world, of regions, and of the participating
member countries.

»» Qulmby, The Polilkt of Global Health, pp. 751-752.

1629

That the massive prestige and universal respect commanded
by WHO justifies a greater involvement of the U.S. Government
and American health experts in supporting and shaping the WHO
programs for those global health problems which do not lend
themselves to typical bilateral aid.

That a U.S. role of positive promotion of WHO should be
viewed as beneficial if not, indeed, essential to the success of
that agency's rational attack on world health problems, with
commensurate benefits to U.S. national health.

Some Illustrative Questions

The study of The Politics of Global Health poses a variety of questions
for congressional consideration. The following are some examples:

Would it be desirable, and reahstic, for the United States to assume
a more positive and supportive role in the field of global health as a
means of strengthening its overall diplomatic posture?

If so, what steps should Congress take:

(a) To inform itself more fully about needs and opportunities?

(b) To persuade the American pubUc of the appropriateness of
such a move?

What can be learned from public health/preventive medicine and
health care programs of the People's Republic of China?

Could the United States effectively promote regional health activi-
ties as a low-profile way of contributing to "technological end runs"
in areas of mihtary conflict, such as the Middle East, or of lesser
poU tidal confrontation, as in sections of Africa? Should it seek to do
so?

How should U.S. programs in the international health field be
coordinated? What should be the respective roles of the Department
of State and the mission-oriented agencies?

How ejffective is the monitoring of the World Health Organization
by U.S. agencies? How well do they report on WHO's budgetary needs
and the importance of WHO's activities to the United States? Do
the new Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive
Office of the President, the National Science Foundation's Directorate
of Scientific, Technological, and International Affairs, and/or the
State Department take an active interest and play a constructive role
in this connection? Who should account to Congress and the U.S.
public regarding U.S. support of ongoing and projected WHO activ-
ities? Is a new institutional and mechanism needed ?

Should there be more intensive eflForts to inform the pubHc through
the press of the existence of the World Health Organization and its
objectives and achievements? (One of the few related areas to receive
recent attention is that of WHO's goal of eradicating smallpox in the
near future. This will be the first time in all history that man has suc-
ceeded in eliminating globally a human disease.)

ISSUE THREE— BEYOND MALTHUS: THE FOOD/PEOPLE EQUATION «

In a world shrunk by television, electronic communications, and air
transport, the tragedy of famine is increasingly everyone's concern.
Although technologies of food production and population control are

1" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Beyond Malttius: The Food/People Equationi
in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on Nations'
Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Allan S. Nanes, Foreign Afiairs Division, Congressiona'
Research Service, Library of Congress, 1971. See vol. II, pp. 765-864.

1630

sufficiently advanced that the age-old problem of feeding the world's
people is technically solvable, famine still occurs. Food and people are
unevenly distributed over the globe. The undertaking in the study
by Dr. Allan S. Nanes is to explore the reasons why the technical
balancing of the food/population equation, although feasible, remains
unachieved.

Since about 1950 the United States has maintained a substantial
program of aid to developing countries. Two main elements of this
program have been the strengthening of institutions and measures of
enhancing food production and public health. Although agricultural
productivity has risen, the death rate has declined and populations
have increased so that despite the efforts of the developing countries,
with U.S. aid, to improve their food/population positions, the effect
is that of being on a treadmill — or worse. The impact of inflation and
the raising of petroleum prices by OPEC has intensified the plight of
many developing countries. As the problem is summed up by Robert S.
McNamara, president of the World Bank:

. . . Roughly half the population — in the developing world — are neither con-
tributing significantly to economic growth nor sharing equitably in its benefits.
These are the poor. Within most developing societies, they form a huge group at
the lower end of the income spectrums, receiving only a fraction of what the
middle- and upper-income groups do.

Some 900 million of these individuals subsist on incomes of less than $75 a year
in an environment of squalor, hunger, and hopelessness. They are the absolute
poor, living in situations so deprived as to be below any rational definition of
human decency. Absolute poverty is a condition of life so limited by illiteracy,
malnutrition, disease, high infant-mortality, and low life-expectancy as ^o deny
its victims the very potential of the genes with which they are born. In effect,
it is life at the margin of existence. '^^

As these vast deprived populations struggle for sustenance, the
technology of the developed world has enabled it to produce large
surpluses of food, and to elect by conscious choice the kind of lifestyle
it wdll adopt. The division of the world into rich and poor nations is
increasingly a source of bitter resentment at international forums
where the subjects of environment, energy, materials, food, and popu-
lation are discussed with animus and frustration by spokesmen for a
majority of the world's sovereign states.

It is in this context, in which diplomacy, technology, and human
institutions are closely intertwined, that the study Beyond Malthas
attempts to define the issue of the food/population equation, its
importance, and its significance for future American foreign policy.

Statement of the Issue

The implication of the food/population equation is that mankind
must somehow contrive to produce enough but not too much food
to feed the world's population, while providing incentives and means
for the world's population to hold itself within reasonable bounds.
Beyond this dual task is the further task of assuring the development
of a system of distribution of food to meet human needs, and a political
and economic structure to assure stability of the whole process.

•52 Robert S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Washington, Sept. 1, 1975, p. 13. ' '

1631

The complexity of the task of evening out the global inequities in
food supply and the unbalances in the food/population balance is
described by Dr. Nanes in the following passage :

The problem of achieving a relatively stable balance between food resources
and population in the less developed countries is one of enormous complexity.
It has biological and medical aspects relating to the development and employment
of safe and effective methods of contraception. It involves decisions about basic
economic questions such as the allotment of resources, manpower needs, the
use of incentives, and the establishment of channels of distribution. It calls for
the modification of cultural and social values that have existed, in some cases,
for millennia. It affects the internal politics of the developing countries, and adds
to the strains on their relatively weak administrative machinery. It tests the ef-
fectiveness of communications techniques and training methods. It requires the
development of irrigation systems, intensive use of fertilizers, and in the view of
many experts the development of new crops even more responsive to fertilizers;
this in turn involves research in plant genetics. The depredation of food supplies
by animal and insect pests must be brought under control. Improved food pres-
ervation techniques need to be developed. Disease, which cuts down the caloric
efficiency of ingested foods, must be fought, so that ill health does not diminish
the supply of manpower during a planting season, or cause the loss of a crop.
In many instances a market economy must be developed where none existed
before.

What needs to be done is virtually endless, and it is all interconnected. This
interconnection of very many diverse elements is characteristic of the entire
modernization process in the underdeveloped countries, and the solution of the
food/population equation is simply a specialized model of that process.^*^

Undoubtedly the central problem is the construction of political
and administrative arrangements to bring to bear the available
technologies that can overcome the physical dijSiculties in the global
food/population unbalance. Fortunately, genetic developments in food
grains (the so-called "Green Revolution") and a number of innovative
teclmologies to effect population control have come into being within
the present generation. "As matters now stand there is at least a
chance that development aid, abetted by a skillful and flexible diplo-
macy and working in conjunction with science and technology . . .
could help to bring about a reasonable equilibrium between population
and food resources in the so-called Third World." ^^

Importance of the Issue

The issue should be restated in order to highlight its importance.

As Nanes puts it :

Rapidly advancing technology shows promise of enlarging world supplies of
food to m.eet completely the needs of the w'orld's burgeoning population. Tech-
nology has also demonstrated that it can be used to slow the rate of human
reproduction. On a global basis, mankind need no longer be the inevitable victim
of a postulated Malthusian law that condemns some fraction of the total number
to starvation or semi-starvation. The question now becomes one of skill in human
management: Can man so order liimself and his institutions of government and
administration that he can mate use of the food and population technologies he
has been permitted to discover? "•

The moral aspect of upwards of a billion human beings on the
thresliold of starvation scarcely needs stressing. However, in a de-
veloping country the adverse consequences of an insuflBciency of
proper nutrition constitute a chain reaction that perpetuates the
underdeveloped state of the nation. Calorie deficiencies are measured

153 Xanes, Beyond Malthus, vol. II, pp. 779-780.
'^ Ibid., p. 7S0.
1" /Wd.,p.8.55.

1632

in reduced output of work. Deficiencies of the eight amino acids col-
lectively designated as "protein" cause physical and mental retarda-
tion, a disease called "kwashiorkor," and vulnerability to many
normally minor disorders. Thus, the poorer the diet, the higher the
incidence of disease, and with it the more difficult the developing
country's task in seeking to provide its people with an adequate diet ;
and as diet-deficient children become adults, the fewer of them will
ultimately be qualified to carry out the more sophisticated tasks of
economic development.

The population side of the equation is no less important. The
world's population is increasing faster than at any time in previous
history. Moreover, increases are highest in the underdeveloped coun-
tries. "Thus, while the current rate of population growth in North
America is 1.2 percent, in Western Europe 0.6 percent, and in the
U.S.S.R. 1 percent, in Africa it is 2.7 percent, in Asia 2.3 percent, and
in Latin America 2.9 percent." ^'^ The significance of these rates of
population growth in relation to food supply and economic develop-
ment is of conmianding importance. As the author points out:

There are many reasons to consider the need for national and global eflforts to
stem the rate of population increase. Population density aflfects the ability of
human societies to preserve the quality of life, to make available adequate re-
sources to sustain life, to maintain order, to govern, to insure the security of the
individual from crime, to maintain the security of nations from tension or even
insurrection, I and to reduce the possibility of international conflicts. Population
numbers and rate of increase have a profound bearing on all of these."^

PoUtical unrest is a recurrent theme. Thus:

All phases of development are retarded as long as population eats into economic
growth. Investment is held back or channeled into unproductive areas. Job oppor-
tunities are not created, and unemployment or underemployment spreads. Social
misery continues unchecked, and populations — rural and urban — become increas-
ingly susceptible to appeals to violence."*

And again:

Population pressure in one country (for example East Pakistan) cannot help
exerting pressure on its neighbors (for example India). Population dififerences
make bad neighbors, just as affluence and poverty make bad neighbors. This
dilemma must be resolved cooperatively if it is to be resolved at aJl. It will be
solved either rationally by agreement among nations and an orderly process of
implementation; or it is Kkely to be resolved irrationally by war, disease, and
social disorder within and among nations."'

How the Issue Developed

The seriously disproportionate growth of population in relation
to agricultural productivity iu the developing countries today presents
a different picture from that of 19th century Europe or the United
States in undergoing their transformations into modem industriaUzed
nations. Abundant fertile and weU-watered land m a congenial climate
solved the U.S. food problem, further aided by systematic resort to
advancing farm technology and capital. Western Europe combined
advanced agricultural technology with imports of food, paid for with
exports from industry. Japan combined the European practice with
extensive resort to food from the ocean. In all three cases, the fortunate

^ Ibid., p. 822.
1ST Ibid., p. 860.
^ Ibid., p. 864.
^' Ibid., p. 861.

1633

physical and technological conditions combined with organizational
and educational strengths to assure a self-reliant and well-nourished
population.

It is tempting to attribute the food/population unbalance in develop-
ing countries today to a lag in technology. Unquestionably, Nanes
concedes, it is a factor. However, a more notable deficiencj' —

... is the general deficiency in knowledge of the complex factors involved.
The processes of population growth are not understood. The statistics of food
and population are poor. Even the techniques for disseminating improved tech-
nology are faulty. Under these conditions, the negotiation of positive diplomatic
arrangements and the task of planning programs to achieve the goal of food/
population balance tend to be unsystematic and episodic.'^"

The theme of the inadequacy of data on food and population runs
throughout the paper. Data are needed for diagnosis of the problems,
formulation of policy, design of ameliorative programs, and setting
of practicable long-range goals. Associated with the lack of data for
these purposes are two other deficiencies: (1) insufficient understand-
ing of the cultural dynamics of each individual society, including its
readiness to accept or adapt particular technologies of food production
or population control; and (2) the low level of education.

It would seem to be essential that the base of education be strengthened in
all countries so that their peoples can understand the reality of the problem, and
to assure that the best available technology bearing on the food/people equation
is ever3'where available and in the hands of people competent to use it. "'

U.S. Involvement

Recognition in the United States of the need of the developing
countries for enhanced agricultural technology came early. From
the outset of foreign aid programs after World War II their content
was extensively technological. Their scope encompassed improvements
in fertilizer practice, genetic strains, irrigation, farm mechanization,
food preservation and storage, and marketing systems. However,
defects in the programs were frequent: in the appropriateness of
particular technologies to the cultures of various of the developing
countries, in the willingness and ability of the aided peoples to use
the transplanted technologies, and in the basic data required for
planning and programing to introduce improved practices.

Awareness of the population side of the food/people equation as
an appropriate target for U.S. policy lagged nearly a decade behind
the attention to the factor of food. Thus, in 1959, President Eisen-
hower declared that, "This Government has not, and will not as long
as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that
has to do with this problem of birth control. That is not our business."
At that time, Nanes observes, the "population explosion" had not at-
tracted general awareness. However, by 1965, Mr. Eisenhower had
reversed his stand "when he came out in favor of measures authoriz-
ing the Government to cope effectively with the need to slow down
and then stabilize the world's population growth." ^^^

'6" 76!d., pp. 774-775.

161 /bid., p. 862.

162 /6(d., pp. 777-778.

1634

U.S. POLICY NEED OF FACTS ABOUT FOOD AND POPULATIONS

On both sides of the food/people equation, U.S. diplomacy has a
concern related to world peace and stability. Accordingly, the report
suggests, ". . . It would seem to be advantageous for U.S. long-
range policy to search out and exploit every available opportunitj'^ to
establish a solid and scientific, factual base of information about
this equation for individual nations, for the regions of the world, and
worldwide." ^^^

In relating diplomacy and national policy to the food/people equa-
tion, it is important to recognize that the United States has a profound
long-range interest in the achievement of balance, but has a powerful
influence on only the food side of the equation. As the w^orld's largest
producer of food, and possessing the most advanced technology of
"agribusiness," the United States is in a strong position to export
both food and food technology. Leverage on the other term of the
equation was for long limited to the capability of exporting technology
and managerial skill — without, however, any certainty that either of
these intellectual exports would be compatible with the cultures and
political structures of the nations facing the severest population pres-
sures. The possibility that the United States might use the leverage
of food surpluses in a compelling way to motivate population policy
decisions was not considered. Even the provision of U.S. assistance
to voluntary population control programs was not a factor before the
mid-1960s. Legislation in 1966 authorized the use of U.S.-owned or
U.S. -controlled foreign currencies to assist voluntary family planning
programs in countries requesting such assistance. Then, the "Foreign
Aid Act of 1967 not only put the stamp of approval on U.S. assistance
to family planning programs in the LDCs; it also earmarked funds,
for the first time, for this specific purpose. The amount so designated
in 1967 was $35 million. Thereafter the amount was to increase
annually." In 1968 the legislation renewing Public Lp^w 480 (Public
Law 90-436) also earmarked funds for population-related programs. ^^*

It is possible to foresee a time in the future at which demands for
food exports from the United States will far outstrip the Nation's
capacity to deliver. At such a time, what policies will govern the
allocation of food to the needy? Will relevant priorities include best
effort on the part of claimants to expand their o\vn production of
food, or to stabilize their own populations?

Role of Congress

In 1954 the Congress moved in a major way into the problem of
global food supply with passage of the Agricultural Trade and
Developmental Act of 1954, better known as "Public Law 480."
This act established the policy of Congress "to make maximum effi-
cient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance of the
foreign policy of the United States." Although the main emphasis of
the program established under this act was the liquidation of surpluses,

i«3 Ibid., pp. 861-862.
it*. Ibid., pp. 842-843.

1635

the resultant food aid was massive. Between 1954 and 1967, exports
of Public Law 480 agricultural products amounted to $17.2 billion;
recipients were 116 countries with half the world's population. How-
ever, during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
defects in the program became apparent. In particular, the flow of
of U.S. foodstuffs enabled foreign governments to evade the making of
hard decisions on agricultural development, internal reforms, and
population matters. As recorded by Dr. Nanes, the response of
Congress was to redirect the thrust of the program to motivate
needed reforms:

In 1966, Public Law 480 vinderwent a major overhaul; the program of food
assistance was tied directly to the efforts of the developing coxmtries to limit their
population growth. These changes can be found in the Food for Peace Act, Public
Law 89-808. In the first place, the entire rationale of the law was changed. Instead
of a device to dispose of U.S. agricultural supluses, the new law advances a
program to combat hunger and malnutrition and assist economic development,
particularly in those countries that do the most to help themselves. In line with
this program, the President is directed, in negotiating and carrying out agree-
ments for the sale of agricultural commodities, whether for dollar credits or
foreign currencies, to take account of the eflforts of the other countries to meet
their problems of food production and population growth. In the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1968 one of the purposes for which agreements concerning the use of
foreign currencies can be made is that of ". ; . activities, where participati-on is
voluntary, related to problems of population growth. ; . . Not less than five
(5) percentum of the total sales proceeds received each year shall, if requested
by the foreign country, be used for voluntary programs to control population
growth." (Emphasis added.) That same law also contained a provision stipulating,
as one of the self-help criteria the developing country must meet in order for the
President to agree to the sale of agricultural commodities, the criterion of
"carrying out voluntary programs to control population growth." This is stronger
language than that which would merely take account of LDC efforts at self help.'^^

Concern continues, however, "lest unchecked population growth
lead not only to starvation in the LDCs, but to the wreckage of
international development as well." In Dr. Nanes' opinion, "It seems
likely that the Congress will continue to monitor events in the field
of population with a view to the possible passage of legislation to
make U.S. pohcy in this area more effective." ^^^

Status of the Issue in 1971

The distinction between cases and issues in the separate studies of
Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy is that the cases repre-
sent discrete events with some sort of terminus while issues are by
nature continuing and inconclusive. The summation of the study of
the issue of the food/people equation conforms with this distinction:

The final result of the international campaign to bring food and population into
balance in the LDCs — in such a way that economic development can go forward,
and an acceptable level of human welfare can be achieved and sustained — cannot
be foreseen. Certainly the challenge is as difficult as any ever faced by man ; it
calls for the careful management of a complex interaction of scientific knowledge,
diplomacy, and social engineering. At the beginning of the decade of the 1970s, the
issue is very much in doubt. In the years ahead, the extent and character of the
U.S. effort can have a crucial effect for good or ill. "^

By 1971 it had become evident that the problem of balancing the
food/people equation was not fundamentally a technological one.
It was true that further applications of science were needed, and

»«5 76;d., p. 806.
i«« Ibid., p. 8.52.
^^T Ibid., p. 864.

1636

efforts were underway to provide them. But, with respect to food
supply the genetic developments of the Green Revolution presaged
a large increase in the production of feed grains. More intensive use
of fertiUzers offered opportunities of further major gains. Also of
importance was the apphcation of well-established technologies of
food preservation, storage, and protection against depredations of
pests. With respect to population stabilization, the evidence of the
developed countries suffices to demonstrate that sharp increases in
numbers are not an inevitable consequence of rising affluence but
rather the reverse. However, the primary factor missing in the de-
veloping countries is the complex of institutions and organizational
arrangements to create the social, cultural, economic, educational,
and other modifications in human behavior and relationships that
collectively result in the motivation of a population to relate its
numbers to its resources. In 1971 the rate of population increase was
steepest in the countries least able to sustain it. While the United
States was exerting increasing pressure on these countries to develop
an institutional capability to stabilize the food/people equation, the
traditional emphasis of the United States on freedom of individual
choice, combined with respect for cultural and religious values, tended
to negate official pressures for dealing constructively with the popu-
lation side of the equation. By itself, the encouragement of food
production in the developing countries, supplemented by U.S. exports,-
was no adequate answer.

food/people equation as index of development

The status of the food/people equation is an excellent index of
development. But development must deal with a far larger scope of
programs than food production and population stabiUzation. To
achieve the necessary level of progress, including the equation discussed
here, requires strengthened organization of political forms, improved
educational and pubUc health institutions, more comprehensive and
timely gathering of statistical data, systems of technology transfer
(as for example the highly successful U.S. system of agricultural
county agents), rail and highway transport, and other elements of
technological infrastructure.

Prospects and Options Suggested by the Study

A number of policy issues that might merit congressional attention
can be drawn from the study. Others, coming out of the 4 years of
experience since the study was first issued, amplify but do not alter
the general thrust of the report.

BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL APPROACH

The study divided its attention between two kinds of approaches to
the food/people equation: one was the U.S. bilateral approach in
which food was used directly as aid and indirectly as a motivation for
population control by the aided country; the other was the efforts of
the United Nations and associated U.N. institutions, chiefly the
Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank, to deal with
the problem on a global basis. Neither approach has scored marked
success and even diagnosis of the problem lacks specificity. The fault
appears to lie more in the field of the social sciences and their apphca-
tion than in the field of technology.

1637

It is contended by some analysts that a stronger support of the U.N"^
effort might have been more rewarding than the U.S. practice of
emphasizing bilateral aid. This is possible, of course. Multilateral aid
was shown in the study to have a number of particular advantages in
this field, as also in the field of global health. Some of these advantages
are identified by Dr. Nanes as follows :

The inherent advantage of multilateral over bilateral assistance is that the
diplomatic profile of the donor is lowered. Motives of the donors are under less
suspicion. Another presumed advantage is that recipients may be more likely to
contribute substantively to the planning of general programs. If they are in-
volved in the planning, they are more positively committed to the implementation
of plans. Burdens of cost can be more widely distributed. Results can be better
analyzed on the basis of international comparisons. Contributions to a genuinely
global program can be expected to come earlier from those nations which are
initially recipients. Some forms of assistance practically demand a global
approach, i***

However, Dr. Nanes also warns that the multilateral approach is
not without its present defects:

The asserted advantages of the multilateral approach to world agriculture
should not obscure the evident weaknesses of present institutions to accomplish
purposes generally sought. Some of the weakensses attributed to the U.N. com-
plex have included: Uncertain funding, varied quality of technical personnel,
wavering political support, confused lines of functional organization, want of
firmness in management, and absence of accepted overall authority. The desira-
bility of a clearer mandate for specific global chores to be implemented by this
system, and a general overhaul and strengthening, would appear to warrant early
legislative and diplomatic consideration.'^*

One major example of multilateral aid is the program of the World
Bank under the leadership of President McNamara. This institution
has identified five principal "roadblocks" to enhanced agricultural
productivity in poor regions (paraphrase) :

1. Where poor farmers are struggling to subsist on semiarid
or marginal land, there is a critical need for new agricultural
technologies tailored to these conditions.

2. Another roadblock is government-imposed pricing and sub-
sidy policies to provide cheap food to the cities at the expense
of reduced incentive to rural areas to expand agricultural
productivity.

3. The small farmer is almost always discriminated against by
public institutions, which tend to favor the larger and more
prosperous producers in terms of access to public credit, research,
water allocations, and scarce supplies of petroleum, pesticides,,
and fertilizer.

4. There is a scarcity of trained technicians to implement
complex rural operations.

5. Finally, all of us have a great deal more to learn about the
motivational patterns and behavioral responses of the poor in
shifting from traditional subsistence agriculture to cash-crop
production. ^^^

"s Jbid., p. 8.58.
'^^ Ibid., p. 809.
I'o McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors (op. cit.), pp. 10-18.

1638

PROBLEMS OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION

There is irony in the fact that one of the most successful technologiea
to increase agricultural productivity — the genetic achievements re-
ferred to as the "Green Revolution" — has created many socioeconomic
problems b}^ its very success. As Dr. Nanes explains:

Broadly speaking, the problems set in train by the Green Revolution fall into
two categories: (1) Those appearing within the LDCs themselves, as a result of
the political, social, and economic effects of the new technology; and (2) the
consequences for the developed nations of the world of the appearance of the new
abundance of staple food commodities. The actions taken in response call for three
sets of organizational entities: (1) institutions and organizational arrangements
within the LDC itself to smooth the path and ease the dislocations of the Green
Revolution; (2) bilateral arrangements, such as between the United States and
an LDC; and (3) international or multilateral agreements and systems to provide
global stability, unify international purposes, and ease international conflicts
arising out of the changed patterns of trade.

The prospective abundance threatens to generate several kinds of problems
within the LDCs. Gains in food production may be poorly distributed from one
district to another, as between East and West Pakistan. They may benefit the
wealthier farmers while leaving the poor farmers even less well off. Both of these
effects generate tensions within a country. The already evident flight from the
farms to the cities is likely to intensify, with unemployment increasing in both
poor rural areas and cities. All of these effects call for mediation and corrective
action by the LDC governments, and in some cases for hard decisions on the part
of political leaders. If the alternative is between governmental overthrow and
outside assistance, it would seem to be important for the United States and its
diplomats to know what form such assistance should appropriately take. It
would seem also to be important to know in which countries such outside assistance
would be likely to be effective, and where it would be merely support for a losing
cause. Among the kinds of support that have been mentioned are: Improved
credit resources more widely available at regional and local banking levels; more
widespread and longer education of the population; encouragement of the use of
labor intensive farm equipment; assistance to small farmers in the exploitation
of the new genetic forms of grain; increased opportunities for rural industry;
improved arrangements for storing surplus grains and preventing losses to pests;,
better arrangements and facilities for the marketing o'' agricultural products; and
above all, a strong administration of government, equipped with adequate taxing
power and management skills to distribute equitablj' the costs and gains of the
Green Revolution i^i

PROBLEMS OF STABILIZING POPULATIONS

Applied sociology is certainly important in meeting the challenge
of the food/people equation. Its relevance to the task of raising agri-
cultural productivity is stressed by Mr. McNamara. However, its
importance for the other term of the equation — -the stabilizing of
populations — 'is even greater. On this point Dr. Nanes writes:

If the food/population problem in the developing countries is to be brought
under control, there must be strong motivation for couples to limit the number-
of their children. Mere expressions of general interest in the idea of fertility
control will not suffice. For example, surveys have been made which suggest
that 70 percent of the women interviewed were interested in controlling the size
of their families, but experience indicates that this does not mean that all of
these women wlU use family planning services if they are made available. Pre-
sumably the same applies to men. In any event, there is little information oa.
incentives and inducements for birth control in the LDCs, particularly where,
strong motivation is necessary to overcome cultural barriers to contraception.

1" Nanes, Beyolid Maltlms, vol. H, pp. 85G-8r)

1639

Among other behavioral matters in which additional data would be helpful
are the following: the sociopsychological aspects of male-female interaction;
socioeconomic factors affecting human behavior relative to marriage, fertility, and
migration; and social processes leading to cnltural change. Human behavior is,
after all, the most critical factor in maintaining a balance between population
and available food resources, and indeed in the whole development process.^"

For the United States alone, or under bilateral arrangements, to
embark on studies of tbis sort would seem less appropriate than for
this country to give vigorous encouragement to their pursuit by
agencies of the United Nations. The reasons given above by Dr.
Nanes for the virtues of multilateral programs appear almost uniquely
apphcable to this area. On the other hand, U.S. skills in agricultural
technology might well be suited to transfer under bilateral arrange-
ments. The technology appropriate to the U.S. cUmate, soils, economy,
and other factors might not generally be suited to developing countries.
But U.S. research methods and the remarkably successful U.S.
methods of transfering technology from the research station to the
individual farmer could be widely useful abroad."'

Author\s Reassessment

The main theme of the study is the interrelationships among food
supply, population growth, and the entire process of development.
Subsidiary themes concern food requirements and the technology of
food production, the technology of birth limitation, and the problem
of motivating people in the developing countries to adopt available
birth control techniques. The study is further concerned with the
organizational concepts, plans, programs, and international arrange-
ments designed to operate on these- variables. The enormous human
complexity of the food/population problem — social, cultural, economic,
religious, administrative, political, diplomatic — ia suggested aa an
overlying theme.

RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 6 YEARS LATER

These themes seem unquestionably as relevant today as at the
time the study was written. The importance of the food problem has
been pointed up again in recent months by the famine in the Sahel
and elsewhere, and by the World Food Conference, proposed by the
United States and held in Rome in November 1974. Population
growth continues essentially unabated, while a key effort to control
such growth, namely, the program in India, appears to have failed.
The solution of the food/population dilemma remains crucial if the
poverty of the underdeveloped countries is to be substantially
alleviated.

In this connection it may be noted that there hasr been some change
in the philosophy of development, with a number of experts now con-
tending that first priority should go to the upgrading of agriculture,
not only for the purpose of increasing the indigenous food supply, but
also as a means of providing emplo3rment. It is sug^sted that the
latter objective be achieved by the use of labor-intensive, rather than

1" Ibid., p. 779.

1^ On this point see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, AgrlcultUTe Reitarch
and Derdopment: Background Papers, prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and TechnoK ,iy
and the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. September 1975,
pp. 25-26. (Committee print.)

1640

capital-intensive, methods. (In other words, the most modern tech-
niques may not necessarily be the most applicable, as far as the less
developed countries are concerned.)

If the study were to be rewritten today there would be no change in
its emphasis in any significant way. Few changes appear to have oc-
curred in the subject covered except that, as noted above, the food
problem has become even more critical. Parts of the sections on the
technology of the problem, particularly the technology of birth control,
might need revision in light of the latest research.

The study is as important to congressional concerns as when it was
written, and perhaps even more so. Recent famines, the World Food
Conference, and the earlier World Population Conference in Bucharest
have higlilighted the problems of food and population once again.
U.S. food export policy appears to have become a more important
political issue than it was during the period when the study was in
preparation.

The study seems as relevant now to the project series as at the time
it was written. Certainly the relationship of food supply to population
is one that is markedly affected by the state of technology in each of
these fields. It is equally certain that the food/population problem
is at the forefront of the concerns of world diplomacy. Consequently
the study can still serve as a highly appropriate vehicle for exploring
the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy.

FOOD/POPULATION PROBLEM INSEPARABLE FROM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Among the more significant observations of the study were the
following: (a) The food/population problem cannot be separated
from the total process of development — development is a seamless
web. (b) The growth of world population is outpacing food production,-
and available techniques have not been apphed sufficiently to achieve
increased production and more efl&cient marketing of agricultural
produce on the one hand, or slow down the rate of population increase
on the other, (c) The achievement of a global balance of food and
population will require improvements in political, economic, social,
and diplomatic organization and management, (d) The devising of
programs to deal with both sides of the food/population balance is
a matter of great urgency, (e) If economic development becomes a
kind of treadmill, with gains in development nullified by gains in
population, the United States will have spent many billions of dollars
to no lasting purpose. In such a case U.S. foreign aid is likely to be
terminated, and the task of U.S. diplomacy in the underdeveloped
world is likely to become far more difficult than it aheady is. (f) A
solution of the food/population issue, while not guaranteeing the
success of U.S. and other development assistance programs, will
presumably permit the assignment of additional resources to other
phases of development now receiving less attention, (g) The problem
of the food/people equation is so complex that its solution is bound to
be piecemeal and incremental, and to contain a fair amount of trial
and error, (h) Regardless of the total cost of coping with the rapid
increase in world population, it is important that every success be as
visible as possible. If expenditures for family planning and population
control activities show no results, it is unlikely that support for this
type of activity can be sustained with Congress and the public.

1641

These same points would still be stressed in such a study today.
The emphasis would probably be essentially the same, although
some space might be given to the arguments and counterarguments of
those who say that there is enough arable land to support a far
larger population than now inhabits the globe.

EAKLT CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF PROBLEM

The study pointed out that Congress had recognized the problem
•of controlling population growth as early as 1963, and that Congress
was equally responsible with the executive branch for assigning the
highest priority under the U.S. Foreign Aid Program to family planning
and population activities. Given current conditions, a similar assess-
ment of priorities would appear in order. The study also pointed
out that it would be advantageous for the United States to search
out and exploit every available opportunity to establish a solid,
scientific, factual base of information about the food/population
equation, for individual nations, for the regions of the world, and for
the world as a whole. The study pointed out certain fundamental
"weaknesses in the data on food and population, and since those
weaknesses have not, apparently, been remedied. Congress should
still be interested in ways to strengthen the basic stock of information
about these subjects. In addition, recent shortfalls in production,
combined with natural disasters, have produced several instances of
"famine, thereby thrusting the question of food export policy to the
front rank of congressional concerns.

In general, the study identified problems for the Congress that still
exist. The complexity of the problem area was emphasized, as was
its central position in the entire process of development. The crucial
Tole of technology with respect to both food production and the limita-
tion of family size was highlighted. The study also identified the
problems remaining in agricultural production as a result of the
"Green Revolution, and raised the issue of U.S. foreign agricultural
policy in relation to the less-developed countries. The social and
psychological barriers to the effective use of present technology in
the field of birth control were emphasized, as was the extreme sen-
sitivity of the issue as a matter of bilateral diplomacy. It was sug-
gested that in this field a more hopeful route might lie through
multilateral action.

The foregoing observations could serve to stimulate thinking in
Congress should legislation in the food/population area be under
-consideration. The questions to which they might give rise are as
"valid now as they were when the study was in preparation.

Some Illustrative Questions

What factors are relevant in determining the optimum population
numbers on a global basis? If infinitely continued growth is physically
impossible, should circumstances be allowed to determine the point
At which growth should stop? Or, should the determination be made
as a result of a conscious policy decision? By what criteria should
such a decision be made? Are the criteria the same for all countries
and for all time? Who should decide? How is the decision to be given
practical effect? What are the implications of these questions for
U.S. diplomacy and long-range diplomatic planning?

1642

"What is the comparative cost/benefit advantage of multilateral
versus bilateral programs in dealing with the food/people equation in
•developing countries?

What are the implications for future U.S. diplomacy of the increased
reliance of developing countries on U.S. food supplies? How is this
rehance to be reconciled with U.S. commitments to supply grain to the
U.S.S.R., a large part of which is designed to faciUtate Soviet produc-
tion of meat for internal consumption?

How long will the extensive conversion of grain into meat remain
■an acceptable practice for the United States or any other country,
in view of the emerging necessity for conservation of foodstuffs?

What improvements might be achieved, and to what end, in U.S.
relations with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, the World Bank, the United Nations Fund for Population
Activities, and the United Nations Population Commission?

How can U.S. expertise in agricultural R. & D. methodologies and
technology transfer be effectively made available to developing
countries?

Might food surplus countries act cooperatively to ease food short-
ages elsewhere? Would it be feasible to balance food supply and
demand within geographic regions?

Could a situation arise in which world food needs so exceeded the
available supply that the leading surplus countries, perhaps in con-
junction with the United Nations, were obliged by circumstance to
resort to the triage procedure in allocating food to needy countries?

How long will present maldistribution practices continue, and what
populations are likely to be exposed to widespread starvation mean-
wliile?

Is there currently enough food to feed the world's population?
Are shortages the result of failures in production, or distribution?

If world population continues to increase at the present rate, and
assuming no further technological breakthroughs in agriculture, is
there likely to be a breakdown on a massive scale of the world's
abiUty to feed itself, and if so, when might such a breakdown be
expected to occur?

What is the best general estimate of the impact of the Green Revolu-
tion on the less-developed countries? Should additional inputs of mod-
■ern technology be made available to the agriculture of those countries,
and if so, in what sectors? How should it be disseminated?

Should the United States continue to give priority in its aid pro-
grams to family planning assistance? Would such programs be more
effective if transferred to multilateral sponsorship?

ISSUE FOUR— U.S. SCIENTISTS ABROAD: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR
PROGRAMS FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE"*

U.S. Government arrangements for sending nongovernmental
technical "^ personnel abroad to study, conduct research, attend meet-
ings, or lecture have been initiated at intervals over the past three

"< U.S. ConRress, House, Cominittpe on Foroign Affairs, U.S. ScievtiMs Abroad: An Examination of
Major '^rnqrams for NonqDvernmcntal Scientific Excttange, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and
Americuii Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-
ments hy Genevieve J. Knezo, analyst in science and technology, Science Policy Research Division, Con-
•gressinnal Research Service. Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
April 1974. See vol. U, pp. 865-1035.

"s As used in this commeiitary, the word "technical" generally encompasses science and technology;

1643

decades. A number of these arrangements were made in the immediate
post- World War II period ; some were established as a response to the
launching of Sputnik in October 1957; but most are of more recent
origin "reflecting current trends toward relaxation of mternational
tensions and broader understanding of the benefits to science and
society of cooperative international science." ^^^ Today, the Govern-
ment "maintains a vast array of programs with varying origins and
purposes. Americans are sent abroad for information exchange and
the advancement of scientific knowledge; to meet goals of prestige; to
support the development of a science infrastructure in the developing
countries; and to meet the terms of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments for cooperation — agreements which serve both science and
foreign policy goals. Scientific and technical exchanges are the largest
part of U.S.-sponsored exchange programs." "''

The general assumption of the study is that international scientific
exchanges are beneficial. The emphasis on critical analysis of the
ongoing programs and identification of weaknesses and flaws in their
execution should not obscure their merits. A few examples of these
positive values might include —

Providing a basis for comparison of United States and foreign
science ;

Enabhng the tapping of small pools of high competence in
speciaHzed fields of science abroad, sometimes surpassing the
levels of U.S. achievement;

Supporting the international bridging function of science;
Extending the reach of U.S. science;

Training future candidates for posts as U.S. scientific and
technological attaches;

Familiarizing young scientists with the reality of the world
scientific community;

Providing a future basis for a two-way transfer of technology;
and

More generally, broadening the technical and cultural experi-
ence of the participants.
It is evident that international scientific exchanges contain these
potential benefits. The intent of the study was to suggest ways in which
these benefits might be more positively sought, and to indicate that
program designs require a solid foundation of factual information for
their evaluation and improvement.

Statement of the Issue

Administrative inadequacies in most of these programs make it
difficult to evaluate their effectiveness and accomplishments. In
general, they suffer from inadequate direction, coordination, and
review. Both direction and review are hampered by lack of a clearly
defined U.S. Government set of international science policies. Instead,
the State Department issues detailed, somewhat random lists of
political, security, economic, scientific and technological, and humani-
tarian objectives for U.S. international science and technology pro-
grams. Little attention is given to determining priorities systematically
or even to relating the programs to the objectives outlined by the

"» Knezo, L'.«. ISckntists Abroad, vol. II, p. 873.
"7 Ibid., p. 1022.

96-243 O - 77 - 10

1644

State Department.^^* Review, including congressional oversight, is
further inhibited by a paucity of evaluative data — "most of these
programs do not incorporate effective provisions for continuous
collection, analysis, and dissemination to the public of data required
to evaluate the contributions of the program to the advancement of
the sciences or to promotion of cooperative international scientific
activities." ^^'

A number of factors militate against coordinated program planning. One of
these is that U.S. international science programs and policies have not been fully-
recognized as part of either foreign policy or science policy. A second is that while
each program has a number of overlapping purposes, each is carried out under its
own statutory authority and is reported to different congressional committees.
A third is that some bilateral agreements provide for funding and program com-
mitments which are rarely brought to the attention of Congress until they are a
fait accompli.

A fourth consideration which must minimize expectations of eJective coordi-
nation is the unsuccessful history of actual attempts to provide this function. Two
agencies have had responsibility in the past for coordinating, on a government-
wide basis, international science poUcies and exchange pohcies. These are the
International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology and
the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of
State.is"

An account of the unsuccessful coordination efforts is given later in
this commentary.

But it is the problem of basic policies that should probably warrant
greatest congressional attention. Along with exchange programs serv-
ing the legitimate interests of detente, development, and science for the
sake of science, is the United States placing enough emphasis on
sending abroad persons qualified and alerted to identify and assess
trends in both high and low technology^^^ from which U.S. industry
and research laboratories could benefit? Do the exchange programs
treat technology transfer as a two-way street? Is the ratio of applied
to basic scientists in the programs commensurate with this purpose?
How systematic is the search, in different technical fields, for oppor-
tunities for significant transfers to as well as from the United States?
In reviewing and considering relative priorities for the overall U.S.
program of sending technical personnel abroad, are U.S. policj^makers
giving thought to the appropriate balance among the disciplines, not
for the present day but in terms of what will be needed in the United
States 10 and 20 years in the future? In examining the three principal
U.S. exchange programs and considering problems of direction,
coordination, and review, this study also sets the stage for examining
such broader policy questions as these.

Importance of the Issue

Weaknesses in administration and evaluation of exchange programs
described in this study are symptomatic of a more important problem:
a corresponding gap in U.S. international science policy and policy
machinery. The programs are nominally governed by a collection of
stated goals, but the goals sometimes conflict and do not add up to
a coherent policy (and in any case are not systematically adhered to).
Mechanisms and procedures for coordinated direction are lacking

»'8 Ibid.

1" Ibid., p. 1023.

'80 Ibid., pp. 102.")-1020.

181 See the essay on this subject which follows for an explanation of these terms.

1645

in the executive branch; reporting procedures are inadequate for
review and evaluation; further obstacles to effective review exist in
the complexity and variety of the programs and the manner of their
administration in the executive branch, and in Congress in the fact
that the programs relate to a number of different committee
jurisdictions.

Analysis of any governmental program area calls for attention to
such questions as: What are these programs for? What are they
accomplishing? But what gives the present issue special importance
is that it tends to raise the more fundamental questions: What>
in the large, are (or should be) U.S. purposes in today's world? How
should the U.S. Government organize itself to seek answers to this
question, and to take action accordingly?

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement

As both this study and that on the Brain Drain (Issue Five) bring
out, since antiquity scientists have been traveling to other countries to
study and to teach — often under the sponsorship of governments.
However, the official educational exchange programs of the United
States are of recent origin. Before World War II they were small
and confined largely to Latin America. During the war, educational
and cultural exchange programs were replaced by informational
and propaganda efforts. The immediate postwar period saw U.S.
exchange and assistance activities characterized by mixed educational^
cultural, and informational aims. Such activities on a large scale be-
came part of the 1945 occupation programs in Germany, Austria,
and Japan. Beginning in 1947, technical assistance under the Marshall
Plan had important educational and scientific aspects. The Point
IV Program, initiated in 1950, was designed to provide American
technical expertise to the developing countries.'^^

Since the late 1940s there has been an unprecedented expansion of
activities involving international communication and movement by
U.S. specialists, particularly in technical fields. At the private non-
governmental level, scientists exchange information through the
printed word, through channels increasingly provided by multina-
tional corporations, and through personal visits and correspondence.
Some Government programs send U.S. technical specialists abroad
on official missions designed to obtain or disseminate information in
support of national defense and security objectives or the maintenance-
of U.S. mstallations abroad. Other official programs give substance to
humanitarian objectives of U.S. foreign policy in such areas as de-
velopment aid and disaster relief. Still others promote internationally
sponsored cooperative research efforts. In all, they involve the move-
ment abroad of thousands of U.S. personnel and the expenditure of
hundreds of millions of dollars annually.'^^

Many of those millions, and some hundreds of the persons, are
involved in U.S. Government programs which support the activities
in foreign countries of nongovernmental scientist and technologists.

»" See Chapter Four— "The Point IV Program: Technological Transfer as the Basis of Aid to Developing-
Countries"— in: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautfcs, Technical Information for
Congress, prepared for the Sulicommittee on Science, Research, and Developm.ent by Genevieve J. Knezo,
Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington^
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Apr. 25, 196'J (revised Apr. 15, 1971), pp. 61-96.

'" A survey conducted in 1969 by HEW at the request of Congress found that 31 agencies of the Govern-
ment vi'ere administering 159 programs for tviro-way exchanges of scholars or for other foreign or international
education activities. These programs were authorized by 42 legislative acts and cost "somewhere between
$400 and $800 million annually. "(Knezo, Scientists Abroad, vol. 11, p. 889.)

1646

The question of what role such programs do or should play as instru-
ments of U.S. foreign policy and how they can best be managed
represents a continuing issue. For purposes of manageability, the
study focuses on the programs of three agencies, and mainly on the
time period 1960-70.

AGENCIES INVOLVED IN U.S. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

The three agencies are the Department of State, the National
Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council (NAS-NRC). The State Department is
responsible for the Senior Fulbright-Hays Program. This program
has been funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
(CU) and administered by the Committee on the International
Exchange of Persons (CIEP) of the Conference Board of Associated
Research Councils, National AcademA^ of Sciences, in cooperation with
binational commissions in host countries. It seeks to promote educa-
tional exchange and cultural understanding as objectives of U.S.
foreign policy; the concerns of science are secondary to the objectives
of cooperation.

The National Science Foundation administers four sets of exchange
programs: (1) bilateral science agrocments with the countries of
Europe, Latin America, and Asia; (2) programs supporting interna-
tional travel and meetings of technical personnel; (3) National and
Special Research Programs (major research efforts, often interdis-
ciplinary, of very broad scope or relating to specific geographic areas
and requiring extensive international and U.S. domestic coordination) ;
and (4) awards tenable abroad under NSF's research and educational
support programs. The NSF programs, designed originally to strengthen
the Nation's domestic science base, have been broadened to include
initiation and support of foreign and international science and tech-
nology. They emphasize science for science's sake.

The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
programs implement bilateral inter-Academy agreements for scientific
cooperation which are part of Cultural Relations Agreements signed
by the United States with the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and also support
activities of the NAS-NRC-affiliated Committee on Scholarly Com-
munication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC). The
Soviet and East European exchange programs are funded by the NSF
Office of International Programs and administered by the Section on
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the Commission on Inter-
national Relations, NAS-NRC. These activities represent an attempt
to establish fruitful scientific exchanges between States separated by
wide differences in ideology.

These three major program areas are representative of U.S.
Government-sponsored activities for nongovernmental technical
personnel abroad; they are the largest, oldest, and most publicized
of such program areas, and have wide geographical distribution.
Scientists Abroad describes each of the program areas in some detail.'®*

's< See the following sections of the study: II. The Fulbright-IIays Program for Senior-Level Exchanges
(pp. 88'J-!)15); III. National Science Foundation Programs for Americans Abroad (pp. 91(1-981)); and 1\".
United Stales and Soviet-Eastern European Inter-Academy Scientific Exchanges (pp. 982-1014). The study
also contains a brief section on developing relations with the PRC: V. Scientific Exchanges with the People's
Republic of China (pp. 142-148).

1647

Taking each in turn, this commentary will provide only such further
description as seems essential to a general understanding of program
goals, scope, activities, and management. The main purpose here is
to highlight policy and administrative gaps or problems, as identified
by the author of the study and as they may shed light on the inter-
action of science, technology, and American diplomacy. As indicated
earlier in this commentary, the undeniable advantages of foreign
exchanges of scientific personnel should not be dismissed ; rather the
purpose of the study was to suggest ways in which they could be
maximized. The further point implicit in the study is that U.S.
skills ^ in organization and management have been insuflBciently
exploited in this area, and that a part of the task of U.S. diplomacy
might be to correct this deficiency.

THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS (STATE DEPARTMENT) PROGRAM

'The Nation's first large-scale legislative program for international
educational and cultural exchange began in 1946 when Senator
William Fulbright sponsored an amendment to the Surplus Property
Act of 1944 to authorize a mutual exchange of scholars with 22 coun-
tries, financed by foreign countries derived from the role of surplus
U.S. war materials abroad" :

The Fulbright program differed significantly from previous overseas scholarship
activities. These factors continue to characterize it today.

First: The program was conceived so as to minimize involvement with prop-
agenda and cultural imperialism and to insure bilateral cooperation, by, (a)
requiring that the United States and each participating country sign formal
exchange agreements to authorize the program, and (b) by establishing binational
foundations or commissions, composed equally of U.S. citizens (including the
U.S. Ambassador) and foreign nationals, who would assist in local program selec-
tion and administration.

Second: Architects of the program sought to establish an administrative frame-
work neither too dependent nor too independent of foreign poUcy by, (a) Placing
overall administrative responsibility for the program in the Department of
State; but also by (b) establishing a Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) charged
with selecting all participants and with general supervision of the program.

Responsibility for administration and execution of the program was given to
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) in the Department of
State, which also administers other U.S. exchange-of-persons programs. CU,
acting under broad policy outlines set by the Board provides administrative staff
and secretariat for the program, negotiates agreements covering educational inter-
change with foreign governments, maintains liaison with U.S. embassies and
consulates overseas, and in Washington cooperates with other U.S. Government
and private agencies on particular aspects of the program.'^

According to one historian of this era: "The Fulbright program .' ' ".
fitted perfectly the spirit of the times. International-minded academic
and civic groups saw in it an appeahng and practical means to promote
world understanding." ^^^

The program is not a massive one. The total number of lecturers
and research scholars involved, in all geographic areas, was 1,229 in
1967-68, a peak year. Of the 1,229, 355 were in natural and applied
sciences, 309 in social sciences. The cost of the entire program in
1967-68 was $33,722,523.

1S5 Ibid., p. 892.

'S8 Ibid. The quotation is from The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs,
by Philip }l. Coombs.

1648

After its first few years of operation the Fulbright i)rogram came
under increasing criticism. Some felt that it was too limited — limited
to academic exchanges, to countries where the United States happened
to own "excess foreign currencies," to payment of transportation costs
of foreign students coming to the United States but not the costs of
supporting them here, and so on. Other critics, including Members
of Congress responding to the growing intensity of the cold war, wanted
either to abolish the program or to link it more closely to U.S. informa-
tion and propaganda activities. (Action taken after congressional
debate on the aims of the program is mentioned in the following section
on the Role oj Congress.)

Lack oj Evaluation Procedures a Program Weakness

A weakness of the ])rogram throughout its history has been a lack
of adequate evaluation procedures. As a consequence, not enough
attention has been given to systematic improvement of planning and
programing. The author comments '^^ that the need to assess the effec-
tiveness of the program has been pointed out repeatedly. According
to the program's lirst advisory commission in 1961: "We still know
too little about the processes of communication between cultures,
of attitude formation, of educational development in relation to other
aspects of national development." The successor advisory group,
the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and
Cultural Affairs, has repeatedly called for development of a research
capability in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. For
exam|)le, in its seventh annual report, A Afiilfitude of Counselors (1970),
the Commission reiterated its recommendations: ". . . We believe
that the development of a social science research capability in the
Bureau is a functional and urgent management requirement. . . .
Institutionalizing the evaluation and research function . . . would
give it the staying power which 'contracting out' lacks. It would
also provide the daily evaluation and research continuity which
operators of the program cannot themselves provide." ^'^^

Because of this shortcoming, the scientific exchanges which con-
stitute more than half of the Fulbright-Hays program ^^^ apparently
have not been evaluated in depth by agencies administering the
program :

As a result, there are almost no appropriate measures of the impacts of scientific
exchanges, that is, accomplishments of grantees with respect to both the advance
of science and the promotion of scientific and political cooperation between the
United States and the Fulbright-Hays host country. [The] little information that
is available consists of unpublished reports prepared by the CIEP and annual
reports prepared for the Congress by the Advisory Commission on International
Educational and Cultural Affairs. ^°"

Nevertheless, the Commission has been sufficiently persuaded of the
program's effectiveness to describe it as ". . . tremendously successful
and ... an important and significant element of American foreign
relations" (sixth annual report to the Congress, 1969). The Commis-

"7 Ibid., p. 898, Footnote 59. ■

'88 Ibid.

•88 So known since passage of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (Public Law 87-2o<'))
in September l'.)(;i. Sec further reference to the act in the section b(>low on the Role of Congress.

i'" Knezo, op.cit. p. 89'J. (The CIEP is now called the Council for International Exchange of Scholars and
is part of the NAS Commissiou on Human Resources.)

1649

sion also expressed concern over cuts which the program had suffered
in recent years as part of a general retrenchment occasioned by
budget and balance-of -payments problems.

The author concludes her treatment of the Fulbright-Hays program
with some questions:

Would the quality and effectiveness of scientific participation in the program
be improved if: (1) A science advisory apparatus were established in the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs or in the Committee on the Exchange of
Persons to provide for better coordination between the requirements of scientific
scholarship and diplomatic objectives? (2) the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs undertook more comprehensive information gathering on the program,
and sponsored more research and evaluation to improve program operations,
continuity, and long-range in-country planning? and (3) field responsibilities were
shifted from the cviltural affairs officer to an official more familiar with the require-
ments of educational and scientific exchange, such as an educational officer or
science attache? ^"^

Further, in reference to the related problem of attracting qualified
and needed personnel in certain technical fields to serve overseas,
especially in the less developed countries — she asks :

In view of the difficulties encountered in finding scientific and technical per-
sonnel to serve in the developing countries, would the objectives of the Fulbright-
Hays program in these areas be better served if special inducements were made tc
obtain qualified personnel willing to serve in technical assistance capacities; or if
foreign government expectations for technical assistance were satisfied through
other U.S. Government programs? '^^

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION PROGRAMS "^

Most of the Nation's programs for sending U.S. nongovernmental
scientists abroad are supported by the National Science Foundation
and administered either directly by the Foundation or by the National
Academy of Sciences with NSF funds. These programs have grown
in both number and importance since the Foundation was established
in 1950; they are responsible for sending more senior nongovernmental
scientific and technical personnel abroad than any other U.S. pro-
grams. (In the fiscal year 1970, for example, 886 recipients of NSF
travel awards carried out activities in 75 countries for a total of 3,214
workdays; State Department programs sent 293 nongovernmental
scientists and technicians to 64 countries for a total of 1,781 workdaj^s.)
NSF obligations for international scientific activities totaled about
$118 million in the fiscal year 1974; no cost breakout for programs
which send nongovernmental technical personnel abroad is available
but most NSF international activities involve exchanges.

The purposes of NSF overseas programs are as diverse as their
geographic distribution is widespread.

Some programs support the accumulation of information to advance American
science, or science for its own merits; some promote educational advancement of
American and foreign scholars; some facilitate international cooperative research
programs; and some serve political objectives through bilateral scientific com-
munication. Those programs are increasing in number and importance, with
respect to U.S. commitments for both science and foreign affairs.'"*

»i /bid., p. 915.

'"2 Ibid.

"3 This section focusps mainly on the section entitled: "Conclusions: Some Illustrative Questions of
Policy" at the end of the (iti page treatment of the subject in the basic study. The reader is referred to the
latter (vol . II, pp. 'Jlii-'.i81) for details of the varied NSl' exchange programs themselves.

"< Knezo, op. cit., p. [il'J.

1650

Congress did not give the Foundation explicit authority to carry
out foreign and international scientific activities for their own merits,
until 1968. Therefore most NvSF programs were justified in terms of
their contribution to U.S. domestic science. Foreign exchange activi-
ties are scattered throughout NSF divisions; the Foundation estab-
lished an Ofhce for Foreign and International Science in 1955, but that
office even toda}^ has relatively httle responsibility for overseas
science programs. These circumstances probably account for the-
seeming absence of clear-cut Foundation policies and internal pro-
cedures providing for coordinated administration of the international
programs.

Fragmentation of NSF activities and lack of adequate reporting
procedures make difficult the evaluation of Foundation programs.
Apparently out of deference to scholarly sensitivities, the Foundation
has not required grantees in most programs to report on their inter-
national or foreign activities or to make suggestions for improving the
programs. "Only in fiscal year 1970 did the Foundation begin to attempt
to collect data, and then only in perfunctory fashion, on overseas
activities undertaken with NSF funds." ^^^ These factors have,

. . . kept the Foundation from defining and developing a role as a lead U.S.
agency in support of international science and scientific exchange activities. While
a number of these programs very probably have advanced the cause of inter-
national science and international politics, there is little information on their
achievements or impacts. The absence of both data and a mechanism to plan
programs on a Foundation-wide basis undermines NSF's responsibility for deter-
mining program priorities in both the short- and long-range future. Systematic
determination of priorities, both within and among programs, seems to be reqvured
since the programs are both increasing and becoming more significant as tools of
foreign policy. '"^

An additional problem is that a number of NSF programs suffer'
from poor participation rates by U.S. scientists. U.S. scientific partici-
pation is circumscribed by language barriers and sometimes by
insufficient scientific challenge. "It is conceivable that NSF could
design programs which would satisfy more easily criteria for U.S.
scientific participation and for country planning needed to develop
the science infrastructure for developing countries. For example, the
Foundation might insist on better evaluation of the experiences of
the programs it supports, better reporting, improved in-house evalua-
tion of reports and of program accomplishments and problems, and
more attention to requirements for effective performance." '^^

The author concludes the section on the Foundation's exchange
programs with some comments and questions which have been partly
overtaken by events but appear to remain essentially valid :

. . . the Foundation's responsibilities for foreign and international science
were expanded under terms of President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1,
which took effect on July 1, 1973. This action transfers to NSF some Executive
Office functions for determining of domestic and foreign science policies and for
interagency coordination. It also designates the Foundation's Director as the
President's Science Adviser and personal representative for foreign scientific
afifairs. It is an open question whether the Foundation's organization for foreign
and international science can meet the needs imposed by these expanded re-
sponsibilities.

i»5/6!d., p. 980.
i«« Ibid.
"' Ibid.

1651

Other specific questions might be asked:

Should the Foundation enlarge its overseas science staff?

Should the Foundation evaluate the merits of delegating to the NAS increasing
responsibilities in international science?

Should the Foundation improve in-house reporting requirements and coordina-
tion of foreign and international activities?

Should the Foundation reestablish the International Science Advisory Com-
mittee?

Should the Foundation require more systematic evaluation of it> far-flung
support activities, especially in examining apparent inadequacies of some bilateral
technology-assistance programs?

Should the Foundation provide for more systematic coordination with the
activities of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs,
Department of State (now the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs)? '"*

THE NAS-NRC INTER-ACADEMY EXCHANGES

"The NAS-NRC exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries
of Eastern Europe ilhistrate a unique dimension of programs which
support nongovernmental scientists abroad. . . ." ^^^ These poUti-
cally sensitive programs call for high-caliber nongovernmental
scientific participation in planning and execution.

Before 1959, Americans were not permitted to participate in any
scientific activities in the Soviet Union. Even today all Government-
funded exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union are
conducted under formal, rigidly enforced, official treaties and quid
pro quo exchange agreements. The first of these was signed in 1959
between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States and
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.; it has been renewed every
2 years since and now takes the form of an annex to the biennially
renewed Cultural Relations Treaty between the two countries. The
inter- Academy agreements specify reciprocity in numbers, subjects,
and duration of exchanges.

The inter-Academy agreement of 1959 provided for a sn^.ai! 2-year
program. Subsequent agreements have gradually expanded the
scientific exchange. As the then NAS Foreign Secretary, Dr. Harrison
Brown, described the program in the May 1971 Heatings of the
House Committee on Science and Astronautics (published as^l General
Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space) :

The inter-Academj^ exchange commenced with provision for 44 scientists of
each country to visit the other for a total of 70 months over a period of 2 years,
an extremely modest beginning which .stressed short visits of 1 month. In 1962,
when the program was renegotiated, the NAS took the initiative to adjust the
balance away from the short survey visits in the direction of the longer research
visits, for w'hich Americans at least took their families along to participate in the
new experience. In 1962 a new pattern was established which has continued more
or less up to the present: 30 lecture-survey visits of 1 month; 26 research visits
totalling 160 months for the biennium, with more emphasis placed on the longer
research visits.^""

The 1970-71 inter-Academy agreement made provision for the two
Governments to facilitate exchanges of professors to lecture in the
natural, technical, and social sciences and the humanities. The
1972-73 agreement expanded the permissible volume of exchange

i»8 /6id.,p. 981.
iM Ibid., p. 870.
200 /()id.,p. 991.

1652

to 190 man-months on each side. Terms of the latter agreement may
be summarized as follows:

1. Number and duration of exchanges. — a. Exchanges of 12 prominent scientists,
at least half of them to be members of the respective Academy, for periods up to
1 month to lecture, conduct seminars, or famiUarize themselves with scientific
research;

b. Exchanges of a maximum of 14 scientists from each country, for 1 month
visits for the familiarization with research ;

c. Exchanges of a maximum of 35 scientists, with total visits not to exceed 190
man-months, to conduct scientific research or to pursue advanced study; visits
to last from 3-10 months;

2. Nomination and selection. — Nominees to be approved by both Academies.
Scientists are evahaated on education, professional employment, scientific spe-
cialization, publications, location of proposed visit, knowledge of foreign language,
and title of lectures;

3. Additional exchanges. — Which permit revisions of the agreed upon terms as
well as provision for visits for scientific conferences;

4. Program review. — Both Academies are to exchange small delegations each year
to review the inter- Academy exchange program "at the policy level;"

5. Financing and administrative arrangements. — The sending Academy is to
provide round trip transportation and salaries for its scientists; the receiving
Academy to provide in-country transportation costs, living quarters, medical ex-
penses, special allowances, and reimbursement for research equipment expenses.^oi

As the figures indicate, the inter-Academy program is a modest one.
The total number of American scientists visiting the Soviet Union'
between 1959 and 1970 under the agreements was 224, for a total time
of 666 months; corresponding figures for Soviet scientists visiting the
United States were 234 and 696 months. The average cost of a visit
by a U.S. scientist was $7,300.

Inter-Academy scientific exchange programs with East European
countries are carried out, in general, not through formal intergovern-
mental agreements but under memoranda of understanding between
national academies. This statement applies to agreements with
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia (all concluded in 1966), and
Bulgaria (concluded in 1970). An Academy-to-Academy exchange
agreement with Romania was arranged in 1964 on the basis of an
intergovernmental exchange of notes.

The program of intcr-Academy exchanges with East European
countries has been very small, totaling, for the 5-year period 1966-70,
only 106 East European scientists visiting the United States (33
from Czechoslovakia, 44 from Poland, 45 from Romania, and 19 from
Yugoslavia) and 147 U.S. scientists visiting Eastern Europe.

Despite the need for close attention to the details of arrangements
in the scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union and East European
countries occasioned by the political context, there is lacking in these
programs — as in the Fulbright and NSF exchanges — the kind of
information in depth which would permit assessment of experiences,
problems, and achievements:

Evaluation is . . . hampered by the absence of reliable and public information
on annual activities. The NSF, which funds these programs, is under statutory
ol:)ligation to report annually to the Congress in authorization and appropriations
hearings and also in annual reports of grants awarded. However, the Foundation
gives superficial details of the Soviet and Eastern European exchanges; gross
financial data; and some descriptive material citing especially meritorious activi-
ties. It has not made a systematic attempt to provide the Congress with a detailed
summary of activities and problems culled fron^ materials available from the
National Academy of Sciences.^''^

2«i Ibid., pp. 991-992.
-"■- Ibid., pp. 987-988.

1653

The Academy is a quasi-public scientific advisory group chartered
by Congress to provide advice to the Government on matters involv-
ing science, technology, research, and development. It is not subject
to annual authorization and appropriations oversight. It does prepare
annual reports for Congress, but these are generally published several
years after the fact.

Role of Congress

Post-World War II scientific exchange programs have attracted
sustained congressional interest and frequent legislative activit}^ but
have not been attended by oversight and evaluation efforts of real
depth and persistence.

Some of the important dates in that history are the following:

FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM

19Jf6 — Adoption of the aforementioned Fulbright amendment to the
Surplus Property Act of 1944, authorizing an exchange of scholars to
be financed b}' foreign currencies derived from the sale of surplus war
materials abroad.

19^8 — Passage, after long and heated debate on the relationship
of educational exchange to foreign policy, of the U.S. Information
and Education (Smith -Mundt) Act, Public Law 80-402. ^o* The
provisions of this act reflected a desire to maintain a relative inde-
pendence of educational and cultural affairs from foreign policy. The
foreign policy purpose was served by establishing an information
service separate from educational activities. The latter, under the
Fulbright program, were strengthened by:

(1) authorizing some educational exchange in countries other than those whose
governments had signed educational exchange agreements;

(2) enabling Fulbright scholars to receive some supplementary dollar support;

(3) requiring the State Department to use private organizations wherever
possible in carrying out the operations and objectives of the program;

(4) authorizing the inclusion of technical assistance activities under the concept
of educational interchange of persons, knowledge, and skills authorized by the
program; and

(5) further expanding the concept of educational exchange hy authorizing the
Secretary of State to support the exchange of educational materials, and to extend
grants to American-sponsored schools, libraries, private universities, and other
organizations to further the aims of the educational and cultural exchange pro-
grams.

The act also created the Presidentially appointed U.S. Advisory
Commission on Educational Exchange to appraise the effectiveness of
the exchange program semiannually and recommend legislative
improvement.

195Jf — Adoption of an amendment (Public Law 83-480) to the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, author-
izing U.S.-owTied foreign currencies from any source, including the
sale of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad, to finance educational
exchange. The amendment was proposed by Senator Fulbright when
the earlier source of funds — sales of surplus war materiel — began to
dry up.

1961 — Passage of the Fulbright-Hays act (Mutual Educational and
Cultural Exchange Act, Public Law 87-256). This was the original

203 Ibid., p. 893.

1654

authorizing legislation for present educational and cultural exchange
programs. It had wide support in the Congress and was adopted in the
House 378 to 32, in the Senate 79 to 5. Among other things, the
Fulbright-Hays act :

— made financial arrangements more flexible to support long-range bina-
tional planning and financing by permitting reservation of foreign currencies
in advance, dollar financing, interagency transfer of funds for programs, and
the extension of support to individuals as well as to institutions;

— authorized private sector evaluation research on educational and
cultural exchange;

— expanded the program to include U.S. and foreign participation in
international educational and scientific meetings and created additional
centers of technical and cultural interchange, such as the East- West Center
in Hawaii; and

— refined and strengthened binational program planning and the role of
private advisory groups in administering the program. ^'^^

NSF PROGRAMS

1950 — Establishment of the NSF by the National Science Founda-
tion Act of 1950; NSF given limited authority for international
science activities, but only to support U.S. domestic science.

1958 — NSF authority to foster interchange of information among
U.S. and foreign scientists broadened by passage of the National
Defense Education Act of 1958.

1959 — NSF enabling legislation amended to read "international
science activities" instead of the more limited "international science
research activities."

Mid-1960s — Congress "gave critical attention to further expansion
of the agency's mandate. Three areas received major concern: social
science research, applied research, and international science." ^°^

1968 — Legislation proposed by Science, Research, and Development
Subcommittee Chairman Emilio Q. Daddario enacted, expanding the
Foundation's mandate to "initiate and support specific scientific
activities in connection -with matters relating to international coopera-
tion," on their own merits and not just in relation to domestic science.
The NSF amendments of 1968 also expanded the jurisdiction of the
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development to authorize
appropriations for the NSF.

1971 — NSF requested by House Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics to furnish Congress with a line item budget. In response,
NSF began to use a consistent format for reporting international
science activities,

NAS-NRC PROGRAMS

The area of congressional oversight responsibility includes the
National Science Foundation but only indirectly, through the NSF,
that of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.
Apart from references to the wide-ranging hearings of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics in May 1971 on A General
Beview of International Cooperation in Science and Space, mention
in the study of congressional interest in the inter-Academy exchanges

2(x Jbid., p. 895.
205 Ibid., p. 919.

1655

is limited to references to NSF authorization and appropriations
actions and to a footnote (page 111) on the 1972 accord with the
U.S.S.R. The accord had been reviewed by the Subcommittee on
International Science and Space of the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics in hearings on U.S.-U.S.S.E. Cooperative Agree-
ments and in a subcommittee report on the same subject (August
1972).

It is noted repeatedly throughout the study that the three major
exchange programs are deficient in arrangements for program analysis,
evaluation of effectiveness, and related factual reporting. As the
author observes of one of the three :

Throughout its history the Fulbright-Hays program has lacked both appro-
priate data collection and evaluation procedures; consequently there has been
insufficient attention to systematic improvement of planning and program
operations. Scientific exchanges constituting more than half of the Fulbright-Hays
program, apparently have not received indepth evaluation by agencies administer-
ing the program. 2"*

With the exception of a detailed review that Congress made of
exchange programs when it was considering the Fulbright-Hays
legislation in 1961, congressional consideration of these programs has
been limited essentially to annual Appropriations Committee review
of the State Department's mutual educational and cultural exchange
program. A search of congressional hearings and literature for the
period 1960-70 yielded nothing which focused especially on the
Fulbright-Hays program. ^^^

Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options

A second major problem in the administration of exchange programs,
along with reporting and evaluation, is that of coordinated program
planning. It was noted earlier that two agencies have had some
responsibihty for trying to coordinate the U.S. Government's inter-
national science policies and programs: the International Committee
of the Federal Council for Science and Technology (IC, FCST —
subsequently transferred to the aegis of the Department of State),
and the Bureau of International and Scientific Affairs (SCI), Depart-
ment of State ^°* (now the Bureau of Oceans and International Envi-
ronmental and Scientific Affairs — OES).

The author comments tliat although no in-depth evaluation of
SCI and its work is available, "Several critiques indicate that because
of political and organizational constraints, SCI has been less than
effective in coordinating U.S. science policies abroad." -°^ According

20« Ibid., pp. 898-899.
21" Ibid., p. 898, footnote 58.

2"* The point bein;; made by the author of the present study is reinforced by the observation in a lat?r
(June igV.Tt study in this series, Scienc and Technology in th' Dcpartmrnt of State, that "... pending
action on the Presidential science policy system, the current situation is that aspects of international science
and technolotry policy, in the upper reaches of policymakinf; are spread anion;;:

—The Bureau of Oceans and International Knvironmental and Scientific Affairs;
—The State Department Policy Plaunin? Stall;
— The immediate staff of the Soeretary of State;

— The National Security Council, and the Under Secretaries Committee;
—The Director of NSF and the Science and Teehnolo;;y Planning Office; and
— Council on International Eccnoniic Policy.
Precisely how policy initiatives can evolve out of this rather complex conzeries of hiph level institutions is
not clear." (U.S. Consjress, House, Committee on Internationa! Relations, Srj'icr mji Techndng-i in I h"
£>cpart)iieiil of State, a study in tlie series on Science, Technolosv, and Am-ric:ni Diulcinacy preiiarcd fo'- the
Subcommittee on International S.:>curity ajid .Sci^ntiric .\fiurs" by Frank'iu P. Huddle, seni.ir sp?c;.-iUit in
science and technolosv. Congressional Res<' irch Service, L'bi'ary of Congress. Washington, D.C., U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., June 197.5. See vol. II, p. 1498.
2»» Knezo, op. cit., vol. II, p. 1020.

1656

to one widely traveled U.S. scientist, Roger Revelle, the cause of
this shortcoming is that the Department of State is constrained from
taking the initiative in designing policies for science and technolo^.
RevelTe states that "one reason for this deficiency may be a feeling
among the leaders of the Department that the changes "brought about
by [scientific] developments will be slow to take effect and can be
[managed] as they emerge by conventional diplomatic means." Another
critic, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
"faults the Bureau with concern for minor tasks and deferring respon-
sibility for guiding major international scientific and technological
policies and programs to the White House. . . ." ^*"

FCST EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF U.S. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

FCST, composed of representatives of all relevant Government
agencies, was established in 1959 ". . . to promote closer cooperation
among Federal agencies, ... to irrrfM-ove planning and management in
science and technology, and to advise and assist the President regard-
ing Federal programs affecting more than one agency. The Inter-
national Committee of the FCST was created, also in 1959, to recom-
mend "measures to promote and enhance U.S. participation in and
support for international scientific activities compatible with our
foreign policy." ^" The Committee made several abortive attempts to
improve and coordinate governmental activities relating to foreign and
international exchanges. For example, in 1961, at the request of
Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky, it undertook a
review of the international scientific activities of all Federal agencies
which resulted in a report. International Scientific and Technological
Activities, which called on the NSF to provide better information on
exchange activities. The Foundation never responded to the recom-
mendation. In 1968 the IC, FCST, prepared, in collaboration with
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, a set of guidelines
which contained the recommendation that "each agency concerned
provide the IC, FCST, with an annual report on its exchange programs
and the steps which are consistent with these Guidelines." ''^ The
agencies failed to respond and the effort was dropped.

The IC, FCST, made another attempt beginning in 1970 to catalog
U.S. Government relationships in international science and tech-
nology. The committee requested agencies to supply it with:

(a) Brief description of agency's international scientific programs and projects;

(b) Their relation to past size during the 1960s and to the vigor, need and
demand for programs;

(c) . . . Missed opijortunities which might have been developed under more
favorable circumstances;

(d) Legislative authorities and restrictions within which programs-projects are
carried forward;

(e) The ngency [view of thel programs' utility. Identification of specific instances
in which the cooperative programs with other nations have resulted in savings of
time or money or in other direct benefits to the U.S.; and

(f) Observations which may serve to clarify the data given.*'*

"• Ibid., p. 1020.
2" Ibid., p. 1027.
2" Ibid., p. 1030.
sn Ibid., p. 1031.

1657

The review was never completed. According to the IC, FCST,
"preparation of the report has posed far more difficulties than had
been foreseen. Among the difficulties . . . [was] the lack of compara-
bility between the submissions of various agencies. . . ."

At the beginning of this commentary on Scientists Abroad it was
suggested that an even more important problem than those of the
direction, coordination, and evaluation of technical exchange pro-
grams might be the antecedent problem of providing a coherent policy
context. An example of such a context with respect to U.S. scientific
programs in Europe is provided by Victor Basiuk, writing in 1972:

Present American scientific and technological policy ... is largely ad hoc and
unfocused. There is concentration on individual countries and programs, on tar-
gets of opportunity. But there is no overall view which would take into consider-
ation the nature and requirements of upcoming technologies, especially their
large scale and high cost. As a result, the United States has been drifting in the
direction of bilateral cooperation with European nations. . . . This course is not
adequate. To meet the requirements of the large-scale technology of the future
and of the immense costs associated with it, Western Europe must develop a large
market and cohesive internal institution. Compartmentalized bilateral relation-
ships between the United States and individual Western European nations bypass
this objective.2i*

Basiuk concludes that the absence of multilateral cooperative?
scientific relationships with Europe imperils transatlantic security:

If Washington does not soon develop a concerted science and technology policy,
it is foreclosing options for the late 1970s and early 1980s in a way that almost
guarantees insecurity in Europe. The enormous complexity of the task is no
excuse for not addressing it. Small-scale, bilateral cooperation may postpone
the peril, but it cannot in the end avert it.^'*

In a statement to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
in January 1971, Chairman Daddario of the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development addressed the same theme, but more
broadly :

... It has become evident that the concept of sovereignty and the traditional
means of conducting relations between nations are no longer sufficient. The reason
for this is that technology has largely changed the world, and in doing so it has
rendered the old framework very vulnerable. Today, we are witnessing an in-
creasinglj'^ rapid compression of both time and space. . . . This has led to the con-
temporary paradox whereby the human race is simultaneously becoming more
unified and more fragmented. We now seem to have a dichotomy on our hands — ■
either lasting cooperation or complete political dissolution — the potential for
either being greater than in any previous period in human history.21*

Daddario suggested that the development of individual national
science policies is no longer enough to meet today's foreign policy
and — a consensus must be readied on developing integrated policies
for a technologically interdependent world :

. . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater
consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being
and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational
effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanism?
Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the
priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term locaHzed prob-
lems and long-term global problems? ^^

2i< Ibid., p. 1033.
2'5 Ibid., p. 1034.
216 Ibid.
2" Ibid.

1658

Author^ s Reassessment as of January 1976

In early 1976, 2 years after preparing the Scientists Abroad study,
author Genevieve J. Knezo commented on it as follows:

— That exchange programs are becoming an increasingly impor-
tant tool of U.S. foreign policy is evidenced by the recent prolifera-
tion of bilateral scientific and technical agreements signed by the
United States. Most of these provide almost exclusively for
exchange. These developments foreshadow the future importance
of related considerations: an enhanced desire by other nations to
share in the benefits of U.S. scientific and technical excellence, an
ever-accelerating requirement for the United States to recognize
and share in the technical knowledge and breakthroughs of its
technologically advanced neighbors, and the enlargement of the
scope and objectives of foreign policy to include consideration of
more substantive scientific and technical issues.

CONTINUING NEED FOR BETTER DIRECTION AND COORDINATION

— It seems abundantly clear from the study that if exchange
programs are to meet more eft'ectively the requirements of a
world increasingly dependent upon science and technology, better
direction, review, and coordination of exchange programs will be
needed. Attention is also drawn in the study to the need to
consider the merits of a multilateral alternative for some pro-
grams. It was also noted that complementing agencies do not
always tell the Congress about many of the deficiencies of these
programs.

— The issue of the need for better formulation and coordination
of foreign policy with a scientific and technical content was raised
in the National Academy of Sciences study, Science and Technology
in Presidential Policymaking, pp. 43-45.^^^ The authors of the
report recommended a strong role for the proposed Presidential
Council for Science and Technology in ". . . areas of foreign
policy strongly affected by scientific and technical considerations."

— The number of science and technology agreements with other
nations is increasing. Legislative interest in overseeing these
agreements and their content similarly is increasing. See: "Joint
Commissions with Foreign Countries," statement of the Hon.
Lee H. Hamilton, Congressional Record, January 23, 1975:
E146-E148.

— Rep. Zablocki has proposed creation of a Joint Committee
on National Security to reassert the legislative role and respon-
sibility in the conduct of foreign policy. (Sec Congressional Record,
January 14, 1975: H39-H40.f

— Several issues which were raised in the study are now being
considered by the agencies involved. These include:

— the'pros and cons of USIA field administration and over-
sight, as contrasted with educational affairs officer oversight,

218 National Academv of Sciences, Science and Technnloav in Presidential Policymakim: A Proposal, Rpport
of the Ad Hoc Conoiiittee on Science and Technology, Wiishington, B.C., June 1974, 06 pp. (This study was
prepared in part for use by CoJigress in ils consideration of reestablishing an executive brunch science ad-
visory ollice.)

1659

of field operations of the Fiilbriglit-Iiays program. A study i*
being done by the U.S. Advi.-ory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cuit'.irarAffairs.^i'J

— two separate studies in ureas which warrant review for
scientific and technical educational exchange programs,
commissioned by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs: (1) "An investigation of the consequences of inter-
national educational exchange," and (2) "^.lental Health in
international educational exchanges: a study of coping
behavior in a cultural environment." ^^°

— the merits of team exchanges and multilateral vehicles
for exchange for the Fulbright-Hays program. Efforts are
now underway by the Board of Foreign Scholarships to
examine this issue.
— I believe in retrospect that the report gave a valid and
balanced perspective to the exchanges. However, if time had
permitted, I should have attempted a more detailed analysis of
the impacts of the programs or their contributions to the advance-
ment of science and technology. Also, I should like to have
assessed the quality of technical information transferred in
relation to the level of development of the science and technology
infrastructure of a recipient country. An attempt might also have
been made to assess these programs in light of the origins, pur-
poses, and activities of programs wdiich send governmental staff
scientists abroad under exchange programs or bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements.

— There seems to be little attention in Congress now to review-
ing and improving federally funded nongovernmental scientific
and technical exchange programs. In the course of implementing
new budget review and oversight responsibilities Congress might
give more attention to this topic. The General Accounting Office
and the House Committee on Science and Technology have
recently conducted oversight reviews of the objectives and con-
tent of Soviet-American cooperative agreements, including those
for science and technology.^^^

Some Illustrative Questions

The author has posed many questions in the study itself; some have
been incorporated in the preceding text of this commentar3^ Others
follow :

In the new science policy structure at the national level is adequate
provision being made for coordinated planning and direction of ex-
change programs in relation to foreign policy goals and priorities?
For follow-through of evaluation efforts, with reporting of findings
to the President and Congress ?

"« The sturly was described by W. E. Weld, Jr., staff director, in a letter to the author of Mar. 3, 1075.

"0 These studies are described in "Measuring the impact of academic exchange," FAR Hornons, v. 7,
no. 2, Spring 1974: 5-7.

22' The resulting GAO report is: U.S. General Accounting Office. A Progress Report on United States-Soviet
Union Cooperative Programs. A report to Coneress, Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1975.
98 p. The House Committee review is summarized in: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and
Technology. Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Background
Materials on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agrefments in Science and Technology. Reoort prepared by Claire
Riley Geier, of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress .
94th Co.igress, First session, December 1975. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
93. p.

1660

Is the emphasis in U.S. programs for exchange of technical person-
nel too exclusively bilateral? Should multilateral alternatives be pur-
sued? Through what channels: in existing international and regional
organizations, ad hoc groupings of countries with related interests, or a
new international mechanism established for the purpose?

In its examination of the three major exchange programs the study
frequently touches on the theme that, "If they are to meet more effec-
tively requirements of a world increasingly dependent on science and
technology, and especially if they are to help significantly in recon-
ciling the often incompatible requirements of science and diplomacy,
better direction, coordination and review will be needed." ^^^ What, in
the light of failures to date, will it take to meet this need? How can it
be met without resort to massive bureaucratic methods?

How incompatible, in fact, are the requirements of science and di-
plomacy? Can competent scientists and technologists serve forthright
national purposes — assuming that the}^ do not become involved in the
immediacies of international politics — without compromising scientific
integrity? Is the answer to tliis question partly a matter of the world
view of the President and his key science advisers, and of the profes-
sional qualifications of the latter?

Is it perhaps the diplomats, with their predilection for seat-of-the-
panis deciionmakirig and their traditional aversion to research,
rather than the scientists and technologists, with their disciplined ac-
ceptance of the systems approach and meticulous documentation, who
are responsible for persistent failures in reporting, review, and evalua-
tion? In developing reporting and evaluation s} stems for the various
exchange programs, would it be useful to seek the recommendations
of teams of representative scientists and technologists on ways to
exploit (a) the disciplined habits of scientists and technologists, (b)
the organizational know-how of most technologists, and (c) the sensi-
tivity as to political non-involvement of many scientists?

One observer with outstanding qualifications for judging the success
or failure of scientific exchanges — Dr. Harrison Brown, longtime
Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences who retired
from that post in 1974 — has said of the U.S. -Soviet exchanges:

... As a result of contacts between Soviet scientists and American scientists
there have been some rather extraordinary foreign policy changes. I have seen
attitudes of the scientists of one country change enormously as a result of these
contacts. I have seen people come to the United States who had preconceived
concepts . . . which were dramatically changed during their visit. I would say
that if it had not been for these contacts we would not today have a Test Ban
Treaty . . . nor would we be as far along the path toward the eventual signing
of the Nonproliferation Treaty; nor would we have the SALT talks. . . .^^^

Are broad evaluations like this by knowledgeable persons perhaps
more nformative than elaborate built-in systems of detailed reporting
and analysis? If systematically conducted, could they substitute for
the latter? Would a combination of the two evaluation methods be
preferable to reliance on either one alone?

How important is it that the American public be informed about the
various exchange programs — their purposes, scope, problems, and
accomplishments? Should the executive branch make more of an

-22 Knezo, Scientists Abroad, vol. II, p. 1021.
223 /bid., p. 1011.

1661

effort to disseminate information about them (presumably in the form
of human interest stories as well as statistics)? Should Congress on a
contimious or periodic basis publicize the programs and call attention
to their role in furthering U.o. foreign policy goals?

ISSUE FIVE— BRAIN DRAIN: A STUDY OF THE PERSISTENT ISSUE OF
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC MOBILITY"*

Staiement of the Issue

December 1975 : "The loss of domestic intellectuals and academically
trained individuals is becoming a serious problem for a number of
African governments. Despite the often catastrophic shortage of
skilled personnel in their homelands, a large number of African
students studying at West European and American countries choose
to remain abroad after graduation.

"The number of Nigeiian university graduates who have remained
in the United States, for example, is estimated at 8,000. . . . " 225

Items like this have been common in the world press for more than
a decade. They illustrate a problem which has been critical for many
of the less-developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Latin America,
and — most of all — Asia. Paradoxically, however, that problem has
virtually been dropped from the agenda of the governments of the
developed countries gaining the skilled personnel; in those countries
(though not in the losing countries) it has almost lost official and
political visibility. The issue has both substantive and procedural
importance. The substantive factor may be stated about as follows:
The "have" countries attract educated talent away from the "have-
not" countries, thereby hampering the development process of the
latter and tending to offset the development aid which the latter
receive from them. The procedural might be put in question form:
How is it possible for a problem or issue which exists, and which has
been the subject of emotional debates in major and minor world
forums (the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, the British Parlia-
ment, the parliamentary organs of dozens of other developed and
<leveloping countries), to drop out of sight before any significant
remedial action has been taken? What is missing in the arrangements
by which responsible governments of powerful countries recognize
problems, keep them under, study, and when they are sufficiently
understood, taKe coiTective action? Why do the developed countries
permit problems with important consequences for foreign policy and
international relations to be ignored?

Importance oj the Issue

The brain drain problem "has special relevance for the modern
scientific-technological age . . -. [Situated] at the juncture of science,
technology, and American diplomacy, [it] reveals and is symptomatic
of a deeper and far more serious problem: that of this Nation's rela-
tions with the LDCs and its foreign policy stand respecting the larger

*>* U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Brain Drain. A Study of the PertltUnt Is»ve of
International Scientific Mobility," in the series on Scietic*, Teclinology, and American Diplomacy; prepared
for the Subcommittee on National Security Pohcy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Joseph O. Whelan,
senior specialist in international affairs, Congressional Resenrch Service, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1974. See vol. II, pp. 1037-1318.

«» Peter Seidlitz, "The African Brain Drain," Swiss Review of World Affairs, December 1975, p. 11.

1662

issue of international development as related to U.S. economic health
And national security" : ^^^

Brain drain is a symptom of underdevelopment; solutions lie largely in the
realm of international development; the most essential mechanism is nation-
.building through science and technology. As a foreign policy problem, therefore,
.brain drain raises the basic question of this Nation's stance toward international
■development.

Brain drain is essentially a foreign policy problem of low visibility; but even so,
it is a testing ground for the vitality of a policy of much larger significance, namely,
the Nation's commitment to development. Solutions for brain drain may be the
primary responsibility of the LDCs, particularly the task of institution-building
.and establishing an infrastructure of science and technology as the basis for
modernization, but solutions can neither be devised nor development goals
■achieved without assistance'trom the advanced countries like the United States.-^"

In parallel with the American humanitarian tradition of helping
others to help themselves, it is necessary to comprehend — the author
continues — that political realism alone requires a continuing U.S.
-commitment to development:

It would seem beyond dispute that the LDCs, long the cockpit of international
tension and conflict in which the United States has not been able to stand aside
■uninvolved, hold the potentialities for even deeper and more dangerous involve-
ment. War in South and Southeast Asia, recurring crises in the Middle East,
famine and tribal strife in Africa, are only recent illustrations of the problems that
have been shaking the foundations of this volatile^ troubled Third World. Eco-
nomic development, it is argued, offers perhaps the best prospects for peace and
stability. Thus the increasingly compelling requirements of political interdepend-
ence bind all nations, advanced and underdeveloped, in a common search for
peace through economic development.

American dependence on mineral resources largely under the control of the
LDCs, as development specialists are quick to indicate, points to a new vulner-
rability for the United States. Awareness of this problem comes at the height of the
-current energy crisis and suggests what may be a scenario for things to come with
■growing cartelization of world mineral resources and growing consciousness of in-
creased leverage among the LDCs to be used against the advanced industrial
nations. Reasons of self-interest appear to warrant a reappraisal of the Nation's
f)osture towards the LDCs and the affirmation of a policy of interdependence.^-*

To summarize: ". . . in the judgment of students of development and
brain drain, one of the major challenges to mankind remains the chal-
lenge of finding ways to put the LDCs on a course leading to a self-
reinforcing upward spiral of social and economic progress." The im-
portance of the brain drain issue is that resolving it for any given LDC
or group of LDCs would be one of the critical ways of putting the
■countries concerned on such a course — and to that extent contributing
to the ultimate diplomatic goal of "a world in balance, with social and
economic opportunity within the grasp of all inhabitants and a sense
of hope in all nations." ^^' . /

How the Issue Developed

The international migration of talent is hot a new historical phe-
:nomepon.^^° Of primary concern in the context of the Science, Tech-
nology, and American Diploniacy study series, however, is its current
manifestation as the "brain drain" from countries in need of educated
talent (the less developed countries, or LDCs) to those ' already rich
in such talent^ — especially the United States,

"6 Whelan, Brain Drain, vol. U, p. 1314.

22' Ibid., p. 1316.

228 Ibid., pp. 1316-1317.

■'■^^Ibid., p. 1318.

230 For ail account of the migrations of talent from ancient times until the recent past, including their role
in the spread of science and technology throughout the ages and in the development of Colonial America,
see ibid., "Brain Drain in Historical Perspective," pp. 1064-1076.

1663

As a contemporary international problem, the study observes, the
brain drain phenomenon "has its roots in the profound changes in the
political structure of international relations that have been brought
about as a consequence of World War II. These changes were to have
a marked bearing on patterns of migration in the postwar era." ^^^

THE HEIGHTENED HUMAN MOBILITY OF MODERN TIMES

Human mobility has been a salient characteristic of this new era.
Much of it was in the form of forced migrations. "Programs of repa-
triation or settlement of those dislocated by World War II, and pop-
ulation transfers resulting from the creatioi^ of newly independent
states or the outbreak of wars, involved millions of people":

Migrations on this vast scale tended to overshadow the normal free movement
of peoples. The turbulence of the era is seen in the statistics. After World War
II, 18,000,000 people were uprooted by the partition of India and Pakistan; West
Germany accepted 12,000,000 refugees dislocated during the war; Japan resettled
6,300,000; South Korea absorbed 4,000,000 and Hong Kong 1,300,000. In Israel,
1,000,000 Jews found refuge in a new homeland, while more than 1,000,000
Palestinian Arabs fled the country. Ultimately, the International Refugee Orga-
nization and Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration settled
1,300,000 refugees overseas. These statistics do not include the movement of
people in the Soviet and Chinese areas, but even this limited survey produces a
total of 45,000,000 forced emigrants. Thus in one decade the number of people
compelled to move across frontiers was equal to the entire movement of free
emigrants across the Atlantic in the century ending in 19 IS.^**

These forced migrations were followed by accelerating flows of free
emigrants, smaller in number and different in kind. Conditioning and
characterizing the free emigration were an evolving internationalism,
the process of decolonization, and the reordering of priorities in U.S.
immigration by establishment of the criterion of quality rather than
quantity.

This new internationalism, the author observes, was characterized
in the political sphere partly by the establishment of the United
Nations and its affiliated organizations which gave organizational
structure to world politics, and partly by the growing tendency of
peoples everywhere to think and act in a global context which made
migration less formidable psychologically.

In the economic sphere, the trend toward closer integration of the
world economy has a direct effect on the migration of talent. The
market for educated professional people has become increasingly
international as a result of such developments as the reduction of
barriers to international trade, increasing integration of national
capital markets of the advanced countries into a world capital market,
the growth of direct foreign investment in modern technology from
country to country, and the modernization of traditional class- and
status-oriented societies.

"Contributing to the integration of the world economy which pro-
duced this special eflFect on emigration are two main forces in the mod-
ern world . . . : the worldwide spread of the Industrial Revolution, and
the movement of advanced Western societies into the post-industrial
era. Both forces have created special needs, particularly a need for

231 Ibid., p. 1077.

232 Ibid.

1664

talent." Affecting this need have been such post-World War II
phenomena a>:

— The great upsurge in world education, augmenting substantially the
talent market;

— The movement, internally as well as externallj^, towards urban and
metropolitan centers which industrialization has fed. . . .

— Far-reaching improvements in transportation and communications,
facilitating mobility and making information on job opportunities readily
available;

— The standardization of professional training, easing lateral movement
across national boundaries; and

— Official encouragement of preference provisions, work permits, and other
provisions in state-regulated immigration laws designed to attract talent
from this new world market.^^^

IMPACT OF DECOLONIZATION ON BRAIN DRAIN

The process of decolonization has, by ironic mischance, had nega-
tive consequences for the brain drain problem. In its most serious
manifestations, the problem largely involves emigration from the
former colonial areas of Asia and Africa.

By virtue of the former colonial-imperial link the emigrant moves into what he
believes to be familiar circles. This familiarity eases the burden of transition
between two essentially different cultures. The imperial tradition may also en-
gender a belief that by migrating to the imperial center, the former colonial is
moving up into a superior and more exciting culture. The attraction is often so
alluring that the former colonial remains, to the loss of his developing native
country. ^3*

This form of brain drain arises out of what tend to be self-defeating
contradictions in policies of the erstwhile imperial powers and other
advantaged countries which seek to assist the development process in
the disadvantaged former colonies through programs of foreign aid.
Such efforts, the study notes, are often offset by the movement of
"human capital" in the opposite direction.

Concern for this problem has increased with a growing awareness that develop-
ment cannot be effectively stimulated simply by the flow of money to the LDCs
and that an equally vital role must be played by local Deoole with skills and ex-
pertise to carry out development programs. The United States becomes involved
in this problem in that former colonials immigrate to the United States
through the former imperial centers in Europe ; they come directly from their na-
tive country; and the United States has been a long time advocate and practi-
tioner of foreign aid as a means of development. . . .

What makes this matter particularly important for international relations
today is that the LDCs constitute a vast configuration of political power: they have
a voice; and they make known their complaints. No longer are they willing to
remain silent while their interests are being ignored.^^*

EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES

The effects of the reorder ng of immigration priorities on the brain
drain problem, especially in relation to the LDCs, have been far-
reaching. New criteria of quality and selectivity invited emigration of
the professionals, the intellectuals, and the technically skilled. Along
with the lowering of racial restrictions in the economically advanced
countries, these new criteria had a special appeal for the LDCs.

233 Ibid., pp. 1078-1079.
234/6td.,p. 1079.
23« Ibid., p. 1080.

1665

"Paradox'cally, attempts to right an injustice of discriminatoi\y quota
systems created a new and unintended problem: a powerful incentive
was now given to the professionals in the LDCs to emigrate and thus
deprive their developing countries of much needed professional
manpower":

A survey of professional emigration from Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey showed
that 50 percent of all their scientists trained abroad did not return home. Another
showed that Argentina lost 5,000 engineers through emigration in recent years.
And 58 percent of those emigrating from the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.)
were scientists; 70 percent held Ph. D. degrees.^^^

The most serious professional manpower drain is represented by
nonreturning students:

According to a United Nations manpower report, the number of foreign students
studying in advanced countries has shown a "steep annual increase." In 1967, it
said, 100,262 foreign students were enrolled in American institutions of higher
learning; an estimated 70 percent were from the LDCs. According to estimates by
Prof. Robert Myers of the University of Chicago, described by Dr. John C.
Shearer, Director, Manpower Research and Training Center at Oklahoma State
University, as the "best overall measures of the foreign student brain drain," the
overall nonreturn rate is between 15 and 25 percent rather than the semiofficial 8
to 10 percent frequently quoted. Leakage among nonreturning doctoral students
has ranged from a high of 90 percent for Taiwan to a low of 14 percent
for Pakistan. 2"

Another aspect of the shift in immigration criteria was competition
among the developed countries for professional and skilled manpower.
This competition was especially keen in the medical, engineering, and
scientific professions. As Canada's Minister of Manpower and Im-
migration put it: "The high cost of training professional and skilled
people ... is a measure of the benefit derived [by] Canada. . . .
Other countries are in competition with us for immigrants." ^^^

Still another effect of the change in criteria has been to make skilled
manpower more mobile and unskilled manpower less so.

In the international debates of the mid-1960s, the United States and
its economic policies and practices were singled out as a main cause of
brain drain from the developing countries. However, the author com-
ments, later studies revealed new evidence suggesting what Ambas-
sador Nun Eren of Turkey has called "universal culpability" —

All the great industrial powers of the West were shown to have been acting as
centers of attraction for scientists, engineers, [and] doctors . . . not only the
United States but Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. In
varying degrees these countries were the principal gainers in the brain drain,
while such LDCs as India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Philippine Islands, Taiwan,
Korea, Colombia, and Argentina were prominent losers. Thus the LDCs paid
part of the price for manpower benefits accrued to the expanding industrial
societies of the world.^^*

U.S. Involvement

More than any other country, the United States is a magnet foi
migrating scientists, engineers, physicians, and other professionals.
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University, a student of brain
drain and of the impact of technology on human affairs, has observed
that "America's professional attraction for the global scientific elite
is without historic precedent in, either scale or scope." ^^^

23« Ibid., p. 1081.
23' Ibid.

238 Ibid., p. 1082.

239 Ibid., p. 1083.

i*" Ibid., p. 1095. (In January 1977 Zbigniew Brzezinski was appointed by President Carter to the position
of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.)

1666

MAIN TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION

Two main trends are discernible in the incomplete but still revealing
statistics of post-World War II immigration into the United States: a
large and rapid increase in the immigration of scientists, engineers,
and physicians in general, and an especially steep rise in the immigra-
tion of technical workers in the same categories from the LDCs. In
1947, only about 2,400 natural scientists, engineers, physicians, and
surgeons came as immigrants to the United States: not more than
400 — about a sixth— were from LDCs. By 1968 the numbers were up
t ) about 25,300 and 13,200 — more than half — respectively. According
to data compiled by Gregory Henderson of the United Nations Insti-
tute for Training and Research (UNITAR),^^^ the immigration of
engineers, scientists, and medical personnel from Taiwan rose from
47 in 1956 to 1,321 in 1967; in the case of India, from 100 to 1,415;
and in that of the Philippines, from 90 to 1,066.

A third trend is a relatively greater increase in immigration of per-
sonnel in the same categories from the LDCs of Asia as compared with
those of Africa and Latin America. More than half of the 7,500
immigrant scientists and engineers of 1970 had last resided in Asia —
2,900 of these were from India. Data compiled by the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service and analyzed by the National Science
Foundation ^*^ give the following comparative figures for the fiscal year
1972, by country or region of birth (for each area, the first figure
represents scientists and engineers together, the second physicians
and surgeons) : Europe plus Canada — 1,887 and 757; Latin America —
756 and 523; Middle East— 556 and 683; Africa— 433 and 259; and
Asia— 7,599 and 4,875.

THE GROWING INFLUX OF FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES

A fourth trend is the large and growing percentage of physicians and
surgeons within this group of talented immigrants — with emphasis,
again, on the LDCs as source. While in recent years there has been
some leveling off in immigration of scientists and engineers — partly
because of a decline in the aerqspace industry but largely, it would ap-
pear, from a 1972 revision of regulations by the Department of Labor
to require certification for employment of scientists and engineer im-
migrant candidates — there has been a contrasting steady increase in
the influx of foreign medical graduates (FMGs). According to Foreign
Medkal Graduates of the United States, 1970, a study of the American
Medical Association,^*^ FMGs have played an "important role" in
meetino; the chronically unfilled U.S. demand for doctors. As of Decem-
ber 31, 1970, there were 57,217 FMGs in the AMA's registry of physi-
cians in the United States, representing 17.1 percent of the total physi-
cian population of 334,028. This figure does not include 6,174 gradu-
ates of Canadian medical schools. It does count 5,972 Americans who,
failing to gain admission to the highly competitive medical schools of
the United States, went abroad for training; however, this number is
more than offset by an estimated 10,000 or more FMGs practicing in
the United States but not included in the AMA registry.

2« 76!"d., pp. 109,5-1102. -■. • ,: , ;..:••...:..■..•

2« /bid., p. 1115. , .'.? :^ :; .ii;?i-' ■ ■ r

2« Ibid., pp. 1119-1121.

1667

The LDCs of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are heavily repre-
sented in the AM A statistics on FMGs for 1970. Africa is credited with
1,126 (2 percent), Latin America with 9,929 (17.4 percent), and Asia
with 21,002 (36.7 percent). Altogether the LDCs account for an FMG
population of 32,157 of the total of 57,217, or 56.1 percent, as com-
pared with Europe's 24,756, or 43.3 percent.^" High on the list are the
following LDCs: Philippines, with 7,352 FMGs in the United States;
India, with 3,957; South Korea, 2,095; Mexico, 1,831; Iran, 1,631 ; and
Thailand, 1,098.

Tho growing prominence of FMGs in American medicine is further
illustrated by the fact that, as of 1971-72, one of every six M.D.s
practicing in the United States was an FMG (or one of every five, if
FMGs from Canada are included); more foreign physicians were ad-
mitted to the United States in 1971 (10,540) than were graduated from
American medical schools (8,974); there was one FMG to every two
graduates of American medical schools serving on hospital staffs "in
approved graduate educational positions" ; ^'*^ about one-half of the
candidates for State licensing examinations were FMGs (in some
States, as many as three-quarters). Of almost 20,000 FMGs in gradu-
ate educational positions in American hospitals and universities in
1970-71, about 3,000 were interns, 13,000 we^e residents, and 3,000
were serving in other traditional training positions.

The existence of this situation has led to criticism of the United
States. "Such criticism, much of which comes from within the country,
illustrates both the magnitude and seriousness of the problem for
domestic medical manpower concerns ^^^ and more important, for the
purposes of this study, for its foreign policy implications." ^*^ For
example, in an article on "The Migratory Flow of Doctors to and
from the United States" in Medical Care for January-February 1971,
Dr. Irene Butter of the University of Michigan School of Public
Health wrote: "A permanent loss of doctors from the poorest to the
richest nations is the most disturbing aspect of the medical brain
drain." As reported by the Department of State in Proceedings of
Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October
1966, Dr. G. Halsey Hunt, Executive Director of the Educational
Council for FMGs, stated : "It is a depressing and humbling experience
for an American doctor to visit a medical school in one of the unindus-
trialized countries of Asia, to have his host open the conversation with
a bland statement, 'You people in the United States and your hospitals
couldn't get along without our doctors' — and to realize . . . this is a
fact. ... It ill becomes us to depend indefinitely on other countries
for the production of medical manpower to provide services to Ameri-
can patients." ^"

THE FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES AS A U.S. DOMESTIC PROBLEM

But setting aside questions of equity or the long-term foreign policy
interests of the United States, the influx of FMGs poses a domestic
problem. It does so by threatening U.S. medical standards and limiting
the opportunities for aspiring Americans to study medicine. The

2" Oceani a accounted for 404 (0.7 percent).

2" VVhelan, Brain Drain, vol. II, p. 1125.

2" Concerns over domesti c impact focus mainly on the question of medical standards and on the apparent
effect of a substantial annual influx of FMGs in holding back expansion of U.S. medical schools. (Further
discussion of these aspects follows.)

2<T Whelan, Brain Drain, vol. II, p. 1119.

2" Ibid., p. 1120.

1668

quality of medical education in the LDCs from which most FMGs
have come in recent years is considerably inferior to that of U.S.
medical schools. FMGs as a group achieve much lower scores on
■medical practice qualifying examinations than do graduates of U.S.
schools, and FMGs who pass the examinations tend to do so margin-
ally. Not all FMGs succeed in getting licenses to practice in the
United States, but many thousands do and others find employment
(in mental hospitals, psychiatric wards in prisons, and institutions
for the mentally retarded, for example) without full credentials. By
their sheer numbers they have made it less necessary for American
medical schools, in order to meet the growing demand for doctors in
the United States, to expand their facilities to accommodate more
American premedical students. ^*^ Thus many of the latter who meet
the entrance requirements are turned away each year, while thousands
of FMGs with inferior training enter the medical profession in the
United States.

THE BRAIN DRAIN AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE

The general problem of the brain drain became an international
issue in the mid-1960s. In 1966, Assistant Secretary of State for
Educational and Cultural Affairs Charles Frankel called it "one of the
steady, trying, troublesome diplomatic issues" with which the U.S.
Government was confronted, and added that many countries regularly
raised the brain drain issue with the United States.^^^ Another observer
notes that:

In the United Nations, delegates from the LDCs accused the West of trans-
ferring its exploitative urges from physical to human resources. On one occasion
the representative from Dahomey called it an "odious bleeding" of Africa, a
continuation of the slave trade. The General Assembly, where the presence of the
LDCs is most forcofullj' felt, passed a resolution acknowledging the seriousness
of the problem and expressing grave concern.

In 1966, the Iranian Minister in charge of Cultural Affairs at Iran's Embassy
in Washington complained to American foreign student advisers about the
drainoff of Iranian students (some 60 percent) studying in the United States.
"Our government," he wrote, "is now thoroughly alarmed at the very high
casualty rate of these skilled young people and is pressing us to take effective
countermeasures. "

So concerned has the Indian Government become about the loss of its doctors
that it has taken administrative action to discourage emigration. . . ."'

The volume of complaints about brain drain received by the State
Department from LDC governments ha'^ grown in recent years. In
Sei)tember 1978 an observer commented that a sign that the problem
was becoming increasingly serious was "the pressure put on our
State Department by about SO countries which have asked that we
send students skilled in essential fields back home when their programs
are over,^" and not encourage them to study sophisticated subjects,
such as psychiatry, for which there is not yet a need where they come
from." In February 1974 Deput}^ Assistant Secretary for Education

"9 During the period 1962-1971, the number of FMGs entering the United States was almost as great as
the number of students graduated from American medical s'-hools: 75,639 as compared with 77,867. (For a
detailed discussion of the FMG problem, see ibid., pp. 1219-1247.

2" Ibid., p. 130.5.

251 Jhid.

"2 One of the complications attending the return of students to their native countries, as the study points
■out, is that the LDCs often do not have employment opportunities for educated specialists.

1669

and Cultural Affairs Alan Reich acknowledged publicly that "at times
this problem creates embarrassment for the U.S. Government." '^

It was suggested at the outset of this commentary that the brain
drain problem lacked sufficient visibility in developed countries to
prompt official action by these major beneficiaries of the brain drain.
However, it is evident from what has just been said that, insofar as
the United States is concerned, there is a continuing official awareness
of the problem at the State Department level. ^^ Why, then, is remedial
action not taken? Why, for example, is the United States literally
dependent on foreign medical graduates as a substantial part of its
perennial medical manpower supply?

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE BRAIN DRAIN PROBLEM

It is not enough to say in reply that, as in the case of most foreign
policy problems, the brain drain problem is complex and there are
no easy answers. It would seem reasonable to suppose that options
must be open to the United States for at least ameliorating the
problem and helping to direct the international migration of talent in
more constructive ways.

Some options will be considered later in this commentary. For the
moment, it must be conceded that the problem is indeed complex,
especially for a country like the United States, committed to the
principle of freedom. There is a close linkage between that principle
and human mobility. "One of the salient features of migrations as
a historical phenomenon is the frequency with which exceptional
people . . . possessed of above average talents, strength, and
courage . . . had 'the heart to brave new worlds.' ^^^ . . . Robert C.
Cook, a longtime student of demography, gave this succinct explana-
tion of the historical process of migrating intellectuals : 'Lots of bright
people come from Ozark Junction — and the brighter they are the
faster they come.' "^^^ Is the United States to make agreements with
developing countries which result in repatriation of a promising
mathematician or nuclear physicist because the parent country needs^
sanitary engineers? Moreover, "... a specialist on cancer research
from a small developing country who seeks intellectual contacts and
research facifities available in a larger advanced nation in order to-
satisfy his professional ambitions may be making a greater contribu-
tion to his nation than if he remained home. 'The results of his works,'
wTites Frankel, 'flow outward and benefit his country as well as the
country where he works.' " ^^"^

A further difficulty facing the United States with respect to the
brain drain problem lies in the extent to which principle and advantage
are interwoven. The only massive migration of talent away from the
United States (occurring, ironically, when it was a developing country)
was that of Loyalists at the time of the Revolution — estimates have
placed their number as high as 100,000. Otherwise this Nation has
been the beneficiary. As Assistant Secretary of State Frankel —

2" Ibid., p. 1306.

"^ Especially (the author comments) In AID.

2« The phrase is that of Walter Adams, a student of the subject and editor of a book, The Brain Drain
(New York, Macmillan, 1968, 273 pp.)
2«« Jbid., p. 1075.
2" Ibid., p. 1060.

1670

principal administration spokesman on the brain drain issue when it
was receiving the most attention in the mid-1960s — stated in an
official "Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and
Skills" held in October 1966: "If there had been no brain drain in the
past, we wouldn't be here, and this country wouldn't be what it is
today." ^^^

But there is a difference between enrichment of American scientific
and technical resources in nuclear research as a result of emigration
from a malevolently ascendant Germany under Hitler, or in the aero-
space field due to postwar transfers of talent from a defeated Germany,
and the expansion of resources in private medicine in the United
States at the expense of the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. To cite Frankel once again — this time in testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968 —

. . . the "brain drain" is an important problem because it raises, in the most
dramatic form, the question of the kind of world in which the United States wants
to hve a generation, or even a half generation from now. Over the long run we
cannot stand the burden of a world in which most people and most countries will
have inadequate intellectual resources and leadership of their own, and will have
to lean on us and one or two other giants for their own well-being. This is why
the brain drain is an important matter, and why it behooves us to seek affirmative
measures to alleviate it.^s^

Role of Congress ^^^

Through its constitutional powers to legislate immigration laws,-
Congress is the principal instrumentality for managing the inflow
of manpower into the United States. Congressional interest in the
brain drain issue over the past decade has reflected concern over
international as well as domestic aspects. This concern was relatively
intense in the period 1966-68, and resulted in hearings and studies
by the House Government Operations Committee and the Senate
Judiciary Committee. "Since then. Congressional interest has progres-
sively diminished to the point where today it is largely limited to
isolated concern for the internal aspects of the FMG inflow."

A bill introduced by Senator Mondale in October 1966 (S. 3905, the
"International Brain Drain Act") was referred to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee; apparently no further action was taken. In
1967 the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Nat-
uralization held and published extensive hearings on International
Migration oj Talent and Skills. Concurrently, the House Government
Operations Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs under-
took a study in some depth entitled, The Brain Drain into the United
States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians. In 1968 the House
subcommittee held extensive hearings on The Brain Drain of Scientists,
Engineers, and Physicians from the Developing Countries to the United
States. The House and Senate publications provided valuable insights
into the problems and have been frequently cited in other writings on
the brain drain.

However, nothing came of these congressional efforts. As of the
date of the study (September 1974), overall congressional interest in
the issue of the brain drain would have to be characterized as slight.

2«8 Whelan, Brain Drain, vol. II, p. 1073.

269 Ibid., pp. 1298-1299.

260 Most of this section is a condensation of a section in the basic study entitled "Congressional Involve-
ment in the Brain Drain Issue"— i6td., pp. 1280-1282. The concluding part on foreign medical graduates
(FMGs) is based on a discussion of "Congressional and Administrative Views on FMGs," pp. 1242-1246.

1671

Possibly one reason for the decline in concern is that the United States
has been acquiring rather than losing "brains." "But a more decisive
reason is that the issue itself is set in the context of a paradox: the
Nation is committed to the principle of liberalized immigration
policies and to the principle of international education exchange;
both would conflict with any administrative policies that could be
designed to reverse the flow of emigrating professionals."

In the one brain drain sector which has attracted recent congres-
sional attention — that of the Foreign Medical Graduates — there have
been differences in view between concerned congressional spokesmen
and the Administration. The latter:

. . . sees the utilization of FMGs as an expedient for coping with the Nation's
pressing medical demands. Thus, as Secretary Weinberger told the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Public Health and Environ-
ment in March 1973, "I don't think in and of itself [that] is necessarily a bad
thing."

However, Rep. William R. Roy (D-Kans.), a physician, faculty member of
the Kansas University Medical Center, prominent leader in the Kansas Medical
Society, and member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of
Sciences, disputed this evalution, saying, "May I suggest to you it is a bad
thing," and for these reasons: "No. 1, we have young men and women — probably
twice to three times as many — who cannot get in medical schools, who the medical
schools admit are qualified; and that No. 2, we are stealing these physicians
from other nations around the world who need them desperately." Dr. Roy
asked: "Now will you explain to me why it is not a bad thing when we license
over 12,000 foreign physicians?" 2"

Concern in the House of Representatives over the inadequacies
of the Nation's health services and particularly over the groMdng
prominence of FMGs was expressed in a bill which Congressman
Roy introduced in April 1974: H.R. 14.357, the National Health
Services Manpower Act of 1974. The bill included proposals that
would increase national manpower resources in the health services,
reduce the number of postgraduate trainee positions available to
FMGs and thus limit their inflow, improve the distribution of health
services, and increase Federal Government support for health training
programs. On the Senate side, in June 1974 Senator Jacob Javits
sharply criticized the administration's position on the use of FMGs
to alleviate the doctor shortage. vSenator Javits pointed to the insuf-
ficient number of medical schools and inadequate Federal Govern-
ment support for "desperately needed medical, dental, nursing, and
other health profession schools." '^^ Senator Edward M. Kennedy
followed with a comprehensive critique of the administration's
health manpower policies. The focus of this congressional concern,
however, was on the domestic impact of the FMG problem rather
than its foreign policy implications.

Status of the Issue

The author of the study presents some "tentative generalizations"
on brain drain as a contemporary international problem:

1. A changing world environment occurring over the past three decades has
•created unique political and economic conditions for brain drain to flourish as a

contemporary international phenomenon.

2. The political aspects of the brain drain problem are rooted in this changing
world environment, specifically, in the processes of decolonization that has
produced a "Third World" of independent states in Asia and America.

2" /fijd., p. 1242-1243.
282 Ibid., p. 1244.

1672

3. The economic aspects of the problem derive from the nature of an evolving
and globalizing industrial revolution with parallel developments in the world
of science and technology. This dual phenomenon has created an expanding world
economy, stimulated the universalization of knowledge, and generated a com-
petition of needs and demands, priorities and goals between the advanced in-
dustrial societies and the LDCs: the former seek expanding markets and resources,
human and material, for enlarging their industrial systems ; the latter seek develop-
ment and modernization of their undeveloped or developing countries One of the
primary objects of the competition is to secure trained professional manpower
needed by both.

4. By reordering immigration priorities to stress quality over quantity and by
enlarging incentives, the advanced industrial societies have been able to draw
heavily on the LDCs for their professional manpower requirements, seemingly
to the detriment of the latter.

o. In this competition for trained manpower [the] advanced industrial societies
bear "univenal culpability" for brain drain from the LDCs. The data suggest
that the United States, long the mecca of world immigration, has been a prime
beneficiary; though the number of immigrant scientists and engineers has de-
clined in 1972, the inflow of foreign physicians and surgeons continues on a steady
upward trend.*"

There appears to be little awareness among the Ameiican people —
or even in most quarters of the U.S. Government — of the significance
of a brain drain to the United States from the LDCs. Yet, though
largely hidden, the problem is a durable one that poses the question:
What is the true attitude of the United States toward the developing
countries and the development process? "For brain drain and devel-
opment are principles in contradiction: one cannot have it both
ways — an LDC cannot develop without an educated elite." ^" The
contradiction is heightened by the inability of the United States —
despite the pei-vasive current atmosphere of disenchantment with
foreign commitments other than those with clearly j^crceived benefits
to national security, and specifically despite a declining interest in
foreign aid and international development— to escape involvement
with the LDCs. These countries have the greatest concentration of
the world's population and natural resources; they piovide the indus-
trially advanced states with both materials and markets; and, not
least important in the restless world of 1976, they include most of the
iuceiiiational trouble spots, actual or potential. ^"^

The principal stages in solving or ameliorating a problem are (1)
discovering that it exists; (2) perceiving what impacts it has or is
likely to have, and assessing their significance; (3) analyzing its
causes and deciding on remedial measures that would be feasible and
worth the cost; and (4) carrying out those measures. In these terras,
the brain drain problem as of the time when the study was published
had yet to reach stage (1) for most Government officials and citizens
in the United States; a relatively small number of officials and spe-
cialists had made some partial headway into stage (2), and a few
even into stage (3) ; but virtually no headway at all had been made in
stage (4).

2M Ibid., pp. 1133-1134.

2M Ibid., p. 1287

«K Of the following statement by Russell W. Peterson, chairman of the Council on En-
vironmental Quality, in a Waahington Post article (September 4, 1975), on "World Popula-
tion : A Forgotten Crisis" : "Today, about 70 percent of the world's population lives in the
developing countries. At present rates of growth, that proportion will, within 35 years,
grow to 82 percent. That rate of expansion, if unchecked, threatens unpredictable danget
for all nations. When one considers the growing Interdependence among the nations, the
new policies of inequality in which developing countries charge that our abundance has
been achieved at their expense, and the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry around the
world, it becomes clear that no nation can escape the consequences of failure to moderate the
world s population growth."

1673

In summary:

A mood of withdrawal from extended — possibly overextended — foreign policy
commitments seems to have enveloped the Nation in the post-Vietnam era.
Reinforced by other powerful forces, termed isolationist by some observers, this
mood has had the effect of restricting foreign policy initiatives and inducing a
cautious attitude among lawmakers toward reaffirming traditional but far-reaching
foreign policy commitments. Apathy and indifference toward economic develop-
ment (and also immigration) is reflected in the attitude and posture of the admin-
istration; and thus far in the 1970s the Congress, preoccupied with other pressing
matters such as the energy and constitutional crises, has seemed unaware that a
problem exists. ^'^

Prospects and Options

At the outset of this commentary the question was raised as to how
a problem with important consequences for foreign policy and inter-
national relations — a problem, in this case, involving the interaction
of science, technology, and foreign relations — could drop out of sight
unresolv^ed. The answer to this question is a composite one, and parts
of it are suggested by common sense and common experience.

THE PROBLEM OF LOSING TRACK OF PROBLEMS

There are fashions in policy issues and political or diplomatic prob-
lems, as in virtually all human affairs — ■including village vandalism
and international terrorism. Even the great issues are lost from view
at times as attention is distracted to more urgent and exciting, if less
important, themes or events.^^^ When the issue or problem is of some-
what lesser magnitude than the population explosion, or the nuclear
threat, or any of half a dozen other matters pertaining more or less
directly to the ultimate question of human survival, it has that much
less claim on center stage. Yet it may have an important, if undramatic,
bearing on one of those more vital matters — including the ability of
peoples to live together harmoniously in a world of growing pressures
of interdependence. Taking action to solve or alleviate these under-
lying problems may be a useful and perhaps essential contribution to
the establishment of interdependent relationships that in turn make
the larger and more dangerous issues less intractable. This indirect
approach may, at first sight, appear unsuited to that side of the
American character reflected in the World War II slogan of the U.S.
Army Air Corps: "The difficult we do immediately; the impossible
takes a little longer." But the slogan is ironically at variance with the
disciplined systems approach required to build and operate a fighter
plane (not to mention a space ship). Moreover, for all the alleged
impatience of Americans to get things done yesterday if not sooner,
the American genius in organization and technology — which depends
in both areas on the step-by-step systems approach — suggests that it
is at least a disciplined and sustainable impatience, when problems
are expressed in engineering terms.

Can a diplomatic problem be dealt with in such terms? In many
cases the answer is: Yes — with at least some success, and perhaps
considerable. Human affairs may be comphcated by nonrational fac-
tors, some of them respected and cherished, which would not fit into a

2«6 W helan, BTain Drain, vol. 11, p. 1317.

287 In the article referred to in footnote 265, Russell W. Peterson writes that "... 8 year after the
World Population Conference in Bucharest, population, the world's most pressing problem, is its for-
gotten crisis."

1674

purely rational systems process, but many of the problems confronting
•diplomacy (increasingly many, as technology plays more and more of
a part) are largely amenable to rational management.

Although it concerns the sociology of science and technology, rather
than science and technology as such, the brain drain problem appears
to be one of these. The study presents persuasive evidence that it is
indeed a problem, though largely unperceived, and one worth solving
or at least mitigating. Its causes, which the study describes in some
detail,^®^ may be summarized as a combination of "push" and "pull"
factors. The latter are what attract talented immigrants to one or
another developed countr}^ and especially the United States: eco-
nomic gain, intellectual and cultural stimulus, demand for their
services in challenging work, and so on. The former are all the circum-
stances which make a talented and educated emigrant from an under-
developed country reluctant to return home: lack of adequate pay,
work facilities, and professional challenge; cultural prejudice against
innovation; political repression . . . and many more.

REMEDIES FOR THE BRAIN DRAIN PROBLEM

The study also contains a detailed discussion of remedies,^"^ prefaced
by the observation that:

Virtually every commentary and analysis on brain drain presents a set of
^•emedies, some exceedingly detailed and programmatic, as in the works by
UNITAR, Gregory Henderson, Dr. Adams, Dr. Niland, the authors of the
CIMT study, the various official materials published by the State Department
and the Congress; and others generalized and suggestive. There is an under-
standable sameness about the remedies. The problem is universal; the ingredients
are fairly uniform; and while remedies may vary from case to case, certain prin-
•ciples apply generally.""

These remedies fall broadly into the following categories:

(a) diminishing the "push" factors through economic develop-
ment of the LDCs; creating scientific/ technological infrastructures
within the same countries; building professional manpower
resources; estabUshing an educational base in science and tech-
nology; encouraging basic research as well as technological appli-
cations; improving communications among professionals, and
building linkages among government, academic, and economic
sectors; developing the scientific spirit; establishing regional
■"centers of excellence" — pooled science and technology resources;
and

(b) at the same time, reducing the "pull" factors. The "pull"
factors are less easy to define and generally less central to the
])roblem, but a clear-cut exception exists in the medical brain
drain: "A decade ago when the problem was far less acute than
it is today, American students of brain drain and development
specialists strongly urged the United States to expand its medical
school facilities, and to train a suflicient number of doctors to
meet present and future manpower demands (the shortage is
■generally placed at about 50,000 doctors). These two actions
should go far toward ending American dependence on FMGs from
the LDCs." '''

2«« See Whelan, Brain Drain, Vol. 11, pp. 1135-U72.
289 See ibid., pp. 1254-1266.
2« Ibid., p. 1254.
271 Ibid., p. 1271.

1675

Diminishing the "push" factors through the development procesh
is obviously not a simple matter. The dimensions of the task are such
as to require substantial assistance from the United States and other
developed countries. In this context, the brain drain problem becomes
secondary, though contributing and s}^Ilptomatic; the primary object
is development itself.

SOME U.S. OPTIONS IN COPING WITH BRAIN DRAIN

What assistance can be expected of the United States at a time
when interest in foreign aid and development are at a low ebb? The
study concludes with the thought that:

In the face of many perplexing ambiguities and conflicting trends, perhaps the
most that can be expected at the present juncture in U.S. foreign poHcy is that
brain drain and the larger problem of international development be placed on the
agenda of matters to be attended to when the Nation has recovered its balance,
slowed its retreat from international involvement, and is prepared to resume a
larger, and some would say a more creative, role in world affairs. This course,
requiring a vision of the future and a reassessment of this Nation's place in it,
would seem to be unavoidable, one dictated by self-interest, not a matter of moral
conscience or mere national preference.""

There are some modest options which might be considered, however,
while the Nation is making that reassessment. One which would
involve assisting the United Nations to establish a country-by-
country inventory of trained manpower resources, and a registry of
qualified specialists willing to go where they are needed, is suggested
in the essay on Independence versus Interdependence later in this
volume. Another, for which the groundwork has been parti}" done,
might involve a vigorous attack on the problem of U.S. medical
education resources — primarily for domestic reasons, but also to reduce
the medical brain drain. Again, the National Science Foundation
(which has a continuing interest in the brain drain problem in
particular and international science activities and relationships in
general) might be asked to outline a broad program whereby U.S.
governmental, academic, research laboratory, industrial, and other
institutions and individuals might cooperate in (a) defining country-
by- country needs of LDCs for scientific and technological infrastruc-
ture, (b) exploring the need for regional "centers of excellence";"^
(c) advising at both country antl regional levels in the establishment
of phased short- and long-range development programs; and (d)
advising and assisting in the establishment of related statistical
information systems, data banks, and information exchange pro-
cedures. In shaping and coordinating such a program, the I'ounda-
tion — or perhaps alternatively the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare— might also call on appropriate U.N. agencies to under-
take related initiatives with U.S. funding and collaborative assistance.
In the medical field, as suggested elsewhere in this stud}^ the World
Health Organization would seem an attractive possibility.

272 Ibid., p. 1318.

'"' For a discussion of "centers of excellence" — regional bases in which several countries pool funds and
resources to carry on scientific research and develon research skills suited to the needs of the area, but beyond
the means of any one country— see ibid., pp. 1263-1265.

1676

Author's Reassessment

Following are some retrospective comments made by Dr. Whelan
in early 1976:

The brain drain is as real a diplomatic problem for the United
States today as it was in the mid-1960s, even if less visible. In the past
year or so there has developed a renewed congressional perception of
the reality of the problem. This perception is evidenced in the first
instance in a growing awareness of interdependence and its importance
for U.S. foreign policy. "It took the oil embargo to shake us up and
make us aware of this interdependency." Another aspect is growing
congressional concern over the domestic impact of the medical brain
drain."*

In this new era of interdependence [notes Whelan], international development
holds a central place. International development means modernization ; moderniza-
tion means the application of science and technology. A new requirement is thus
imposed upon the United States and the other advanced nations: To perceive the
interrelationship in coping with the problems of international devekpment.
The brain drain problem enters the picture at this point, since skilled manpower
is one of the many key requirements for development.

It has become especially evident in the past year or tvv^o that
relationships between the developed countries and the LDCs are
undergoing a real and substantial permanent change. "The old
attitudes and assumptions of the West have lost their force; we can
no longer exploit the LDCs as we have done since the beginning of
the expansion of Europe in the 15tli century." "Brain drain" is a
form of exploitation, not perceived as such in the United States, but
resented in most of the LDCs. The remedy may be found in "salvation
by interdependence." Here the United States has the advantage of
the values of its civilization. As never before, Whelan observes, this
country can provide the saving grace for many of the world's problems :
i.e., a saving grace resulting from judicious application of U.S. re-
sources in science and technology.

U.S. interests in the LDCs, apart from purely humanitarian
concern, derive from a need for global stability and for access to
material resources that are important to us and vital to many of our
Western allies. U.S. policy has been to seek peace and stability in the
Third World as a way of heading off great-power confrontations. The
LDCs constitute the most unstable area in the world. They have been
a source of unending conflict, crisis, and tension involving the United
States directly and sometimes indirectly. During the years 1945-67,
80 conflicts occurred in the Third World. Since 1967, major wars
have erupted between India and Pakistan and in Nigeria, the Middle
East, and Southeast Asia. The conflict in Angola threatened U.S.-
Soviet detente. The United States has been deeply involved in LDC
troubles. One reason for instability in the LDCs is underdevelopment

2T* Dr. Whalen points out In July 1977 that there have been significant developments
In both executive and legislative branches since this reassessment was made, and that
together these developments represent a renewed expression of the U.S. official concern
about the brain drain that had been so evident in the 1960s but hardly visible since then.
One development was the forthright position taken by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
at the fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV)
at Nairobi In May 1976 : Kissinger proposed "appropriate Incentives and measures" to
curb the Immigration of highly trained manpower from the developing countries. (U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services. UNCTAD IV:
Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development. Speech by Secretary Henry A.
Kissinger before the fourth ministerial meeting of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development. May 6, 1976. 15 p.) The other development, focusing specifically
on the medical brain drain, was a step toward fulfillment of the U.S. commitment : it was
the enactment by Congress of a revision and extension of the Health Professions Educa-
tional Assistance Act (P.L. 94-^84, October 12, 1976), Title 6 of which amended the
Immigration Act to eliminate special preferences In the entry of forei'rn medical gradu-
ates Into the United States and to establish more rigorous conditions governing exchange
visits.

1677

and poverty, aggravated by crises in energy and food, and the effects
of world inflation. And, to repeat, one reason for underdevelopment
is the brain drain.

Some Illustrative Questions

The C3ntral question which the problem of the brain drain poses
for the United States is: What institutional arrangements will most
effectively insure that significant foreign policy problems involving-
science and technology are not displaced from the agenda of official
concerns but, rather, are actively addressed with the best resources
available to the United States, through timely and proportionate
efforts?

Should these arrangements (i.e., for identifying and tracking
problems or potential problems, assessing both their possible impacts
and the kinds of effort required to cope with them, and alerting the
appropriate action agencies or recommending new ones) focus on the
interface of science, technology, and American diplomacy, or alter-
nativel}^ on the full range of foreign policy issues? If the latter, would
there be a tendency — following traditional patterns of policy issue
identification and decisionmaking — to overlook or slight the tech-
nological component? If the former, would there be a danger of think-
ing too exclusively in technical and rational terms and losing sight of
the larger picture with its blend of rational and nonrational elements?

What implications do the answers to these questions have for
both long- and short-range foreign policy planning mechanisms and
staffing in the executive branch: (a) at the Presidential level, (b) in
the State Department; and (c) in the various mission agencies — all
in relationship to each other? What for the Congress?

To accomplish U.S. foreign policy purposes in an increasingly inter-
dependent (even though sometimes hostile) world, it seems essential
that the good will which America has traditionally projected and
evoked among the peoples of the world be refurbished and built upon.
This good will — whether existing, or lost but recoverable, or poten-
tial— might be regarded as a third resource, along with technological
and managerial skills, that America could summon in unique degree.
Would it be useful to look to some U.S. institution, such as the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare or the National Science
Foundation, to identif3^ areas in which U.S. foreign policy initiatives
building on these three resources might yield a high return in helping
the poor nations of the world solve their development problems, for a
relatively small expenditure of American money and effort? One such
area, as mentioned in discussion of Issue Two {The Politics oj Global
Health) might be that of public health. Would country-by-country or
regional assistance in solving problems of brain drain from the LDCs
represent ar other such area? Would it be constructive for the United
States to make diplomatic representations to regional organizations
such as the Organization of African Unity, expressing willingness to
help in the planning and establishment of regional and national science
and technology infrastructures, w^ith provision for balanced programs
of higher education?

Should the United States assist in setting up regional "centers of
excellence" of in strengthening those already in existence?

How can the United States best help to foster two-way communica-
tion between the developed countries and the LDCs to collect, analyze,
and disseminate information about the migration of talent in relation

1678

to the development process? Is UNITAR the logical center for mforma-
tion collection and exchange on this subject? Should the United States
establish a center for information and research on the subject, inde-
pendently of (or in conjunction with) the United Nations?

To benefit both domestic and foreign policy what steps should
Congress take to deal with the medical brain drain from the LDCs to
the United States?

Are there steps which the Congress might take, for sjTnbolic as well
as practical reasons, to signal its concern over the problems of the
developing countries and its interest in fostering the developnient
process? For instance, might Congress endow an independently ad-
ministered center for the long-range study of development problems,
mth provision for a substantial number of visiting fellowships for
LDC students and administrators concerned with development?

In accordance with the principle that those institutions which will
benefit should help bring about a stable world and the peaceful solution
of problems generated by technology and change, should multinational
corporations be required, induced, or encouraged to contribute to an
international development fund? By what means? What concessions,
if any, should be askod of LDCs in which the corporations operate in
return for substantial contributions to such a fund? How and under
what auspices should the fund be administered?

What, m general, are some of the waj^s in which the U.S. Govern-
ment might form a constructive partnership with U.S. business and
industry in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy goals relating to the
development i)rocess? How can some of the great reservoirs of techno-
logical and managerial resources, skills, and inventiveness of U.S.
private enterprise be tapped for work on development problems,
including the brain drain?

ISSUE SIX: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2"

This is the most recent of the series of 12 studies of the interaction of
Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy which began with pub-
lication in December 1970 of The Ewkition of International Tech-
nology. The latter was designed to bring to the general subject some
historical perspective and a current overview. In each of the interven-
ing 10 studies a particular episode or continuing issue was examined
both for its intrinsic and separate interest and to shed light on the gen-
eral theme.

The present study is similarly intended to perform this dual func-
tion. It differs from the preceding studies, however, in that its subject
is an operational expression of the theme of interaction among Science,
Technology, and American Diplomacy. The preceding studies make
abundantly clear that the interaction must be managed, insofar as it is
within human ability to manage it. Failure to control and direct it in-
volves risk of great damage to the public interest, both national and in-
ternational, as well as loss of substantial positive benefit. In the U.S.
Government, the locus for managing the interaction (apart from the
President and his immediate stafi) is the Department of State. Other

2" U.S. Conpress. House. Committee on tnternational Relations. Sc'ence and Technology in the Departmen'
of State, a study in the series on Science, TechnoloRy, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, Senior Specia ist in
Science and Technology, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, U.S. Govt. Print Off.
Washington, D.C., Juno 1975. See Vol. U, pp. 1319-1504.

1679

agencies have operational responsibilities in the area of diplomacy,
but the State Department is responsible for coordinating their actions
in consonance with U.S. foreign pohcy.

But how clearly is that responsibility defined, and how fully pro-
vided for in terms of competent staffs and appropriate authority? How
broadly and effectively is it exercised? To what extent does the State
Department in fact assume the focal role in this consequential area? To
what extent is the State Department in fact the locus of decisionmaking
and coordinated implementation of the widely varied activities in-
volving Science, Technologj^, and American Diplomac}^ exemplified
by the subjects of the preceding studies? Answers to these and related
questions were sought in this focal study of the series.

Statement of the Issue

The study puts it simply, perhaps understating the case: "... a
succession of Secretaries of State and their subordinates [have periodi-
cally asserted] the importance of science and technology for diplomacy.
The roster of problems, issues, and instances that can be collected from
such statements is impressive. But the effort to marshal the Depart-
ment's resources to deal with this array of business does not seem com-
mensurate with the demand.""^

The State Department, then, has not failed to recognize, and has at
least paid lip service to, its responsibilities for relating science and
technology to diplomacy —

. . . The attempt was made, but circumstances and competing demands on
departmental resources stood in the way. Some specific projects and programs
did peter out, others never got off the ground. Thus the need for a scientific and
technological competence, spread throughout the Department of State, is great
and increasing; what appears to be required is not some vast shake-up but a
carefully managed, gradual, but steady growth in technical sophistication, a
heightened visibility of technological content of diplomacy throughout. This
appreciation should encompass both the positive and negative impacts of technol-
ogy on diplomacy, and be perceived in both the regional and functional bureaus.
There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S. techno-
logical developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the potential
contributions to U.S. diplomacy for foreseeable future technological develop-
ments.2"

The heart of science and technolog}*, the study further notes, is
invention and change. The problem is to make this process serve —
and in a subordinate sense, be served b}^ — the conduct of U.S. di-
plomacy. To do both requires increased creativeness and receptivity
to innovation. More specifically, "the rate of technological change
and its impacts on the diplomatic environment call for a strengthened
ability of the functional bureaus to perceive and interpret these
changes and impacts, around the world, and for an increased alertness
to the predictive power of technology analysis and forecasting." ^'^

But this is more easily said than done. The problem is elusive.
Prof. Edgar S. Robinson points out that it is rooted in a psychological
attitude that is widespread in America, among the general public
as well as among State Department officialdom:

. . . while the public is quite aware of technology's omnipresence, it does not
view technology as the progenitor of insoluble problems. Even as intractable a
menace as thermonuclear weapons appears to have begotten the boon of detente
and precluded the eruptions of a cataclysmic war. Liabilities cease to be dis-
tinguishable from assets.

"6 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1417.
2" Ibid., pp. 1448-1449.
2" Ibid., p. 1449.

1680

Inasmuch as technological problems which resist ready resolution tend to lurk
rather than loom and, as the example of the auto testifies, often make deferred
rather than early debuts, the alarm is seldom sounded before the crisis [reaches a]
climax. There is no evidence that the psychology residing [in the State Depart-
ment] departs the norm. Secondly, where "State" is concerned, there seems to
be a concerted psychology which treats science and technology more as incidental
or adjunctive to diplomacy than as frequently a decisive factor. . . .

Not even the oil situation has overpowered the regnant myth that technological
traumas of international magnitude are basically political. . . . [Diplomats] seem
not as yet to have begun to apprehend the extent to which the techno-tail wags
the diplo-dog.

Robinson concludes that any restructuring of the State Department
to accommodate science and technology will be superficial without a
fundamental change in this entrenched attitude: science and tech-
nology have been, as he expresses it, "ushered into discreet quarantine
in a nursery soothingly tagged 'The Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
national Environmental and Scientific Affairs.' " "^

Importance oj the Issue

It is a matter of stark reality that success in managing the inter-
action among science, technology, and diplomacy may spell the
difference between peace and war. "The conduct of diplomacy involves
a balancing of competition and cooperation, of competing national
aspirations and shared international concerns. To the extent that the
balance tilts toward international cooperation the prospect is one of
peace; a tilt in the other direction leads to the prospect of tension
and conflict." ^*° Although, as the study notes, this statement is an
oversimplification of a complex process — competition in many areas
of human activity, like trade, athletics, and even scientific or other
scholarly achievement, implies a larger context of cooperation and
agreed rules of the game among competitors — it remains essentially
valid.

It is common knowledge today, a generation after the first unleash-
ing of nuclear power, that effective international control of nuclear
technology in its peaceful as well as its military applications may be
central to human survival. But the impacts of science and technology
are not limited to the growing business of avoiding holocaust; they
extend pervasively and often constructively into many areas of every-
day experience. The study lists a few of the functions or fields m
which they have begun to affect people in all parts of the world and
have brought about many changes in relationships among States:

— Instant communication and visual reports at great distances;
— Unlimited recording and rapid manipulation of data;
— Photographic surveys of the total area of the Earth;

" " 9

• • • • • • •

— Global weather prediction;

— Cheap synthetic substitutes for many cash crops;

— Chemicals and drugs with global social and environmental impacts; and

— Massive and rapid air transportation.^"

2" Edgar S. Robinson, Professor of Government, American University, to Franklin P. Huddle, July 25,
1975: "Notes on Science and Technology in the DepaHrnent of State."
2*0 Huddle, SciLjice and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1326.
2" Ibid., p. 1325.

1681

Anyone who is reasonably well informed in public affairs and familiar
with the machinery and processes of government, including specifically
the State Department, will recognize the enormous difficulty of relat-
ing these and other contemporary technological developments to
national interests, both domestic and diplomatic. Nevertheless, failure
to relate national policy to such developments — and where possible
to anticipate where they are tending and to direct them into construc-
tive channels — would represent a surrender to technology as an
uncontrolled force. One result of such surrender could well be the
erosion and ultimate disappearance of social and political democracy
in those countries where they now prevail; another would probabl3^
be a further deterioriation in the quality of life for all peoples every-
where, beyond what may be due to already foreseeable factors, most
of them related to growing population pressures.

In short, there Avould appear to be no more important issue of
foreign policy for governments to cope with than the behavior of
international technology. If this is the case, there is no more important
issue confronting the State Department.

How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement

Preceding studies in this series have dealt with the evolution of
international technology in general, and the circumstances of a variety
of special instances of it, as they affected the United States. This
section will not attempt to tell the story of how U.S. diplomacy has
responded historically to the growing influences of science and tech-
nology, but will give some attention to related developments involving
the State Department since 1950.^*-

OFFICIAL U.S. CONCERN WITH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Under the influence of men like Franklin and Jeffei^on, science and
technology were closely interrelated with American diplomacy in
the early years of the Republic. After the Presidency of John Quincy
Adams, however, "interaction of diplomats— and Government officials
generall}^ — with science and technology appears to have diminished.
In the main, the modern concern of the Department of State with
science and technology dates from the close of World War II. It was
from here in 1946 that the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was drafted,
proposing a diplomatic initiative to bring the newl}'^ developed tech-
nology of atomic energy under international control." ^^

Other positive factors besides atomic energy compelled the atten-
tion of international diplomacy, and in the United States that of the
State Department, to the importance of science and technology.
Among these factors were the ci'eation of such U:N.-affiHated inter-
national institutions as the World Health Organization, the Food
and Agricultural Organization, and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the impulse to
restore the global network of scientific societies, disrupted by war;
early recognition of the need to mobilize technology to repair war
damage, restore the economies of devastated countries of Europe, and
assist m the development of poor countries everywhere ; and the expec-
tation, nourished by awareness of the many important contributions

2*2 Readers seeking a more detailed historical perspective are referred to pages 1335-1395 of Science and
Technology in the Department of State (op. cit.)
2S3 Ibid., p. 1335.

1682

of science and technology to the war effort, of a great impetus in
industrial technology following the close of the war — an expectation
which was to be fulfilled. "Less evident, but still consequential, was
the concept that national excellence in science and technology was a
form of demonstration of national power and world influence." ^^*

THE BERKNER REPORT

The first comprehensive effort to assess the importance of science
and technology to U.S. diplomacy was that of the 1950 Berkner
Report. Apparently in response to ideas generated by the Hoover
Commission's 1948-49 study of the organization of the executive
branch for the conduct of foreign affairs — a study which in itself did
not address the role of the State Department in this field — the Secre-
tary of State in October 1949 appointed Lloyd V. Berkner as Special
Consultant to advise him on responsibilities and functions of the De-
partment in formulating and implementing international aspects of
national science policy, and related organization and staffing. Under
Berkner's guidance, a Departmental Steering Committee on Interna-
national Science Policy conducted a study culminating in a report
which "for more than a decade prescribed the organizational framework
and philosophic concept of science and technology in the Department
of State"—

. . . The durable effect of this report was beneficial in a number of ways:

(1) It emphasized the importance of science for diplomacy.

(2) It identified important functions of a scientific apparatus as a component
of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus.

(3) It prescribed the necessary interaction of overseas scientific attaches with a
strong backstopping unit at home.

(4) It addressed the need for coordination of the State scientific office with other
agencies with scientific functions.

(5) It called attention to the importance of the U.S. nongovernmental scientific
community for the Department of State — and vice versa.

On the other hand, the report had a number of adverse consequences:

(1) The array of proposed functions for science attaches was unrealistically
wide in scope, without establishing priorities of emphasis.

(2) The important distinction between science as somewhat international
and technology as more closely related to national policy and objectives, was
neglected; similarly the heavy emphasis on science and the interchange of scientific
information obscured the larger importance of technology for diplomacy and of
the role of technological analysis as an input to foreign policy formulation.

(3) No assessment was presented of potential scientific and technological
interests of the Department of State in the geographic and economic bureaus, in
State Intelligence and Research, in the in-house educational activities of the
Department, and especially in the Policy Planning Staff.

(4) The relationship of the proposed new scientific organization to the White
House and the National Security Council was not discussed. ^^

ESTABLISHMENT OF POST OF SCIENCE ADVISER

. The Berkner Report resulted in the establishment of the State
Department post of Science Adviser and Special Assistant. This new
office had barely had time to define its role, hire a staff, and begin
to function, however, when it was overtaken by a departmental
retrenchment. By 1956 the State Department science organization
had dwindled to a caretaker Foreip;n Service Officer and two
secretaries.

284 Ibid., p. 1336.
2«« Ibid., p. 1347.

1683

Then, in October 1957, came Sputnik. In January 1958, at the sug-
gestion of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. (Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology), Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
reestablished the departmental post. Naming it "Science Adviser to
the Department of State," he appointed to the post Dr. Wallace R.
Brode, president of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science and a member of the National Academy of Sciences.

THE UPS AND DOWNS OF SCIENCE AT STATE

But the science and technology function in the State Department
•continued to have its ups and downs. It did so partly through initial
lack, at the Secretary of State level, of sufficient interest in or under-
standing of the diplomatic role of science and technology, partly through
lack of leadership skilled in the ways of both science and bureaucracy,
rand partly (or perhaps most of all) because of the great range of subject
matter, complexity of relationships, and unfamiliarity throughout the
rState Department with the concepts and implications of science and
technology as integral to diplomacy. Despite the sympathetic inter-
est of recent Secretaries of State, the function still lacks clear identity,
influence, and prospects. Some of the highlights of the period from 1960
to January 1976 are as follows :

— In a speech delivered in December 1960 and reproduced in
Science January 6, 1961, James R. Killian, Jr., made an appeal for
a strong science program in the Department of State. (This was
one of many representations by eminent scientists, before and
since, on behalf of strengthening the science and technology
component of American diplomacy.)

— In March 1962, in response to an inquiry from Secretary of
State Dean Rusk to Presidential Science Adviser Jerome B.
Wiesner, the report of a "Science and Foreign Affairs Panel" of
the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) was sub-
mitted to the Department of State and essentially implemented.
The thrust of the recommendations was that the status of the
office should be elevated, the scientific functions emphasized,
and the related functions of space and atomic energy consoli-
dated within it. University of Wisconsin Physics Professor
Ragnar RoUefson was named to succeed Dr. Walter G. Whitman,
MIT chemical engineering department head who had followed
Dr. Brode; the title of the position was changed to "Director of
Scientific Affairs." The principal functions of the Director would
be to :

a. Participate actively in general foreign policy development, ensur-
ing that appropriate consideration is given to scientific and technologi-
cal factors.

b. Advise and assist the Secretary of State and other Department
ofllcers in reaching decisions on matters having scientific and tech-
nological implications.

c. Participate in policy planning for and provide guidance to U.S.
international science activities.

d. Work with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, re-
gional bureaus, and other appropriate elements in formulating policy
and planning programs for scientific exchange.

e. Recommend activities to further U.S. foreign policy objectives in
the field of science and technology.

f. Provide guidance to the science attaches developed in collabora-
tion with other Department elements, particularly the regional bureaus.

1684

g. Serve as the point of coordination within the Department and
between the Department and other organizations, governmental and
non-governmental, on matters concerned with science and technology,
including the non-military uses of atomic energy and outer space.

h. Represent the Department on appropriate interdepartmental
committees.***

— EoUefson, who continued the work of his predecessors in
providing a bridge to the scientific community, was succeeded
for a brief period on an acting basis in 1964 by his deputy, Dr.
Edwin M. J. Kretzman, a career Foreign Service Officer who had
been a political science professor at Brown University. Kretzmaa
was credited with several innovations, including the introduction
of a science course at the Foreign Service Institute and the orga-^
nization of a series of "science luncheons" of the Secretary of
State.

— In December 1964 Kretzman retired and was replaced, again
on an acting basis, by another Foreign Service Officer, Herman
Pollack. For several years thereafter the search continued for an
"outstanding" scientist to take the post, but even though the
"Office" was made a "Bureau" in April 1965, and its Director
declared "equivalent" to an Assistant Secretary, there were no
takers.

FUNCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF SCI

Until Pollack, a nonscientist, took charge, the Office of Science
Adviser (under whatever name) had been only marginally effective.
In September 1966 Professor Eugene Skolnikoff of MIT assessed the
effectiveness of the office as one of "poor performance." The func-
tions of the office, he said, were at three levels: participation in
policymaking, handling operational responsibilities, and bridging
from State to the science community. The latter two were inescapable
and time-consuming but easy; the first was "broadest, hardest, and
most important":

... It was the key job. It meant that the office should be not only on call but
prepared to take the initiative "when opportunities are seen for using science
and technology to advance political objectives." It should be highly selective in
the issues it studied. It could tap the reservoir of expertise in the "outside"
science community. The Science Officer needed the ranlc of Assistant Secretary,
more importantly such leadership qualities as "scientific stature," skill in tech-
nology forecasting relative to foreign policy, a competence for representing the
State Department's interest in domestic scientific and technological developments,
and "concern for the general ability of Foreign Service officers to deal with the
day-to-day interactions between science, technology, and foreign policy." ^8'

Pollack proved an imaginative and flexible administrator who was
able to win the respect of the scientific community even while it was
deploring State's inability to recruit a bona fide scientist to the post.
Having served in an acting capacity for two and a half years, he was
confirmed in the position (by this time styled "Director of International
Scientific and Technological Affairs") in July 1967. He held it for
another 7 years until his retirement in August 1974.

During these years the office expanded in personnel, increased in effectiveness
and impact, and somewhat bettered its acceptance by other elements of the
Department. However, while it undertook many experiments in bringing science
understanding into the Department there were few unqualified successes. It was
never adequately manned to perform both operational and staff policy functions.

28« Ibid.., pp. 1352-1353.
28' Ibid., p. 1354.

1685

tt became overloaded with operational chores and tended to neglect other com-
initments. The differing intellectual demands of science policy and technology
policy, and the differing administrative requirements of science programs and
technological programs, made it difficult to allocate effort to deal with these four
functions in a balanced way. StiU, these are criticisms of a dynamically evolving
function in a Department and an administrative environment that tended to
resist change and new directions of growth."'

The office of which Pollack assumed charge as Director (SCI) was
moderately staffed : it consisted of 32 persona m Washington (including
both officer and secretarial personnel), plus 22 scientific attaches or
deputies. By the beginning of 1975 the Washington staff had grown
to 98. The SCI budget had increased from $558,430 in the fiscal year
1965 to $2,439,400 in the fiscal year 1975.

Growth on that scale could hardly be called impressive in light of
the extensive list of tasks for which SCI had become responsible by
1974.^*' The Bureau's performance fell far short of exercising the full
leadership and coordinating potential of the State Department in the
areas of scientific and technological support of U.S. diplomacy and of
international science and technology. Nevertheless, it reflected sub-
stantial gains in recognition and acceptance within the State Depart-
ment and the U.S. Government generally of the science and tech-
nology dimensions of American diplomacy.

shift op presidential science advisory functions to nsf and

state; creation of oes

An added burden was imposed on SCI when the President, early
in 1973, dissolved the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and the
President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and transferred
responsibiUty for the functions of the President's Science Adviser —
including management of the Federal Council for Science and Tech-
nology (FCST) — to Dr. Guyford Stever, Director of the National
Science Foundation. Dr. Stever in turn transferred from FCST to
State the jurisdiction over the FCST International Committee,
which was chaired by Pollack and staffed by SCI. With the termina-
tion of PSAC and its International Panel, and with the move of the
International Committee of FCST to SCI, the committee in effect
inherited both planning and operational coordinating functions, but
without interagency and Executive Office support. This was the
status of the Interagency Committee on International Science and
Technology when, in October 1974, the personnel and function of
SCI and of two other offices *'° were transferred to a new Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES),
headed by an Assistant Secretary.

Chosen to serve as first head of the newly created Bureau was
Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. Upon confirmation, Dr. Ray took office January 30, 1975:

. . . Her appointment was greeted by Science magazine as a challenge to her
"bureaucratic skills" as well as a test of the interest of the Secretary of State
and his senior associates in "upgrading science in the State Department and . . .
making it an effective ingredient in foreign relations."

288 iMd.. p. 1358.

^' See ibid., pp. 1366-1368, for such a list, broken down under the following headings :
Contributions to Policy Planning, Relations with Other Countries, Coordination of U.S.
Technical Mission Agencies, Management and Dissemination of Technical Information,
Facilitating the Work of Scientists, Increasing "Technical Literacy" In the Department of
State, and Administrative Chores.

2*" The Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Coordinator of
Ocean Affairs, and the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population Matters.

1686

There were obvious questions as to the extent of support that the new bureau
would receive from the Secretary of State, the relationships to be established
with other bureaus of the Department, and the rapport with the National Science
Foundation, its National and International Division, and the new Science and
Technology Policy Office, among other interested agencies.

Internally^ the new Assistant Secretary would also have the opportunity to
chart a number of new courses. . . . ^"^

But Dr. Ray was not — at least in her own estimate — given that
opportunity. On June 19, 1975, she submitted her resignation to
Secretary Kissinger, regretting unfulfillment of her hope that her
Bureau would play a significant role in the formation of the De-
partment's science policy and in "the provision of information upon
which to base policy in those areas of technology specifically assigned
to the OES Bureau by Congress." In a letter of the following day tb
President Ford, she asserted that "Under present Departmental pro-
cedures, the Bureau can do little but acquiesce in the policies set by
others, and attempt to implement its broad responsibilities with
little authority and few resources." ^"^

Role of Congress

The observation was made in 1964 that "it was Congress and not
the State Department or the White House that first saw the broad
implications of science's penetration into all segments of foreign
pohcy." 2^^

EARLIER CONGRESSIONAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND

FOREIGN POLICY

This early congressional awareness took the form of a study planned
by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1958
and contracted to Stanford Research Institute in January 1959. The
SRI report, completed in July 1959, was entitled "Possible Non-
military Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on
Foreign Policy Problems of the United States." It presented three
main conclusions: (1) the progress of science and technology will do
more to create or intensify problems that must engage the attention
of foreign policy planners than to solve or ameliorate such problems
"unless deliberate policy measures are taken"; (2) "the security and
well-being of the United States call for a reappraisal of present
allocations of scientific and technological effort with a view to directing
more effort toward nonmilitary foreign policy challenges"; and (3)
foreign policy planning from a broad perspective, making use of the
best scientific assistance, "will be a critical requirement in the years
ahead." ''*

In November 1962 the House Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics(now Science and Technology) , in a brief staff study, proposed
that the committee periodically review the coordination of national
scientific and technological policies and programs with respect to
cost, adequacy, effectiveness, and such questions as:

2" Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1370.

282 The two letters arc reproduced in full below, following the section headed Some Illustrative Questions.

2M Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1450. The quotation is from a book
by Donald W. Cox, America's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power (New York, Chilton Books,
1964), p. 8.

2" Ibid., p. 1450.

1687

How can the United States best incorporate scientific and technological factors
in making its national decisions, including foreign policy?

Under what circumstances does international scientific and technological
cooperation serve the national interest?

What factors favor international cooperation in science and technology?

What factors hinder such cooperation?

How can the United States best use its scientific and technological resources in
support of its national decisions, including its foreign policy? ^»*

Thereafter, the present study notes, congressional interest in the
.scientific and technological aspects of foreign policy "appears to have
followed, in approximate order of emphasis, four sets of considera-
tions, as follows:"

1. The strengthening of the science office and other elements in the Department
of State to deal with aU these matters;

2. Broad reviews of global trends in social, economic, military, and technical
development as background for more specific legislative initiatives;

3. National science and technology policy, with international aspects as an
essential element; and

4. Specific international issues with substantial scientific or technological
content, ^m

The study examines congressional concerns under all of these
headings. It notes that while Congress has followed closely the many
reorganizations of the Department of State since World War II in
related reports and studies, it has chosen in the main not to prescribe
organizational forms and procedures but has relied on the State
Department to accomplish its own modernization. A notable excep-
tion was the congressional action in 1973 to create the new position
of Assistant Secretary of State heading a new Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs: ^^^

. . . This action apparently had the threefold purpose of (a) requiring intensified
attention to the diplomatic importance of the oceans and the environment in a
technological setting, (b) consolidating in one organization a number of diplo-
matic functions with a substantial technical content, and (c) providing statutory
emphasis to the State Department science office as a legitimate copartner with
the ranking regional and functional Assistant Secretaries in the policymaking
hierarchy of the Department. In its new form, OES today presents one organization
that covers oceans, environment, nonmilitary atomic energy, population matters,
bilateral science agreements, technology, and basic science generally. Welding
these elements into a coherent pattern seems to present a formidable as well as
important task. It is hkely to be one that wiU take time and eflfort.^'*

STUDIES AND HEARINGS BT HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Of the many hearings, reports, and staff studies which testify to the
growing congressional interest since World War II in scientific and
technological trends affecting U.S. foreign policy, the study cites
several notable examples. One was an investigation begun in 1969
by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments into the relationships between
national strategy and science. The emphasis of this investigation
was heavily on the technology of weaponry and its diplomatic con-
sequences. However, the concluding witness. Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, broadened the scope of
the discussion with his statement that "Another set of questions
relevant to national security concerns the role technological change

2»5 Ibid., pp. 1452-1453.

2»« Ibid., p. 1453.

2" For details of this move, see ibid., pp. 1369-1372.

2^'> Ibid., p. 1453.

1688

plays in the relationship between ourselves end others. How do
technological developments help to strengthen the ties with others
in the free world? How do these developments divide?" ^^^

A further set of hearijigs by the same subcommittee in 1972 ad-
dressed the broader scope of "National Security Policy and the Chang-
ing World Power Alignment." Although these hearings ranged widely
over strategic, military, economic, foreign aid and development,
sociological, and other considerations, the theme of technological
impacts was never far from center stage.

STUDIES AND HEARINGS BY HOUSE SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS

COMMITTEE

A 10-year sequence of studies on science and technology policy by
the House Committee on Science and Astronautics (now Science and
Technolog}') culminated in 1975 in a legislative proposal for a national
policy — with explicit attention given to the diplomatic aspects of the
polic}^ — and for implementing institutions. The sequence began with
two contract studies by the National Academy of Sciences: Basic
Research and National Goals, completed in March 1965, and Applied
Science and Technological Progress, submitted in May 1967. The sub-
ject of the first study became the theme of the seventh annual meeting
of the committee's Advisory Panel on Science and Technology in
January 1966. Speakers at this 3-day seminar, including Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey and Lord Snow of the United Kingdom
Ministry of Technology, strongly emphasized the international
aspects of science and technology. In January 1967 the Panel took
up the theme of Government, Science, and International Policy. Again
in 1968 the theme of the Panel was international: Applied Science
and the \Vorld Economy. In 1970, when the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development addressed the question of National
Science Policy in an extensive set of hearings at which witnesses
called attention to the international aspects of U.S. science policy,
the strongest statement on the subject was in a letter from Charles A.
Lindbergh, who wrote that "the survival or the breakdown of our
western civilization is likely to depend on how intelligently we apply
its science and technology to our human environment within the
next decade. . . . No previous civilization has had either our knowl-
edge or our tools. It seems to me that in this fact we have remaining
some hope that we can avoid following the path of breakdown that
history suggests is inevitable for every civilization." ^°''

At the 1971 Panel meeting on International Science Policy, former
Congressman (and subsequently Office of Technology Assessment
Executive Director) Emilio Q. Daddario called attention to the co-
herence of the science panels around a "central question" which he
defined as "how science can best be employed for the benefit of all
mankind." He suggested, as a mechanism needed to "integrate more
completely our own national science activities with those of other
nations," a series of regional science policy committees which could
"develop more fully the multilateral approach to scientific coopera-

2" Ibid., p. 1455.

SO" Ibid., pp. 1458-1459.

1689

tion." However, a necessary first step was the formulation of national
science policy .^°^ Another speaker, former NASA Administrator James
E. Webb, cited the committee print which served as the prospectus
for the present study series,^"^ and commented that "just as this
[House Science and Astronautics] committee is reaching out for a
better understanding of the international opportunities inherent in
science, so is the Committee on Foreign Affairs reaching out to better,
understand the implications of science for diplomacy." ^°^

INTRODUCTION OF NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY BILL

The most recent development in the House Science and Technology
Committee's 10-year sequence was a series of hearings in 1973 and
1974 on Federal Policy, Plans, and Organization for Science and
Technology. These hearings led to introduction of a national science
policy bill (H.R. 4461) on March 6, 1975, and to two subsequent
revised versions by the same sponsors: H.R. 9058 (Julv30, 1975) and
H.R. 10230 (October 20, 1975.)^°* Once again, witnesses spoke of the
need for attention to international science and technology. For
example, Dr. Roger Revelle, president of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, maintained that "scientific and
technical information must be one component in the broader context
of policyrnaking in the field of international affairs." ^°^

A significant feature of the resulting Public Law 94-282 (The National
Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of
1976) is the articulation, in title I, of an explicit and detailed con-
ceptual framework for the Nation's pursuit of science and technology.
In essence, the title proposes as the finding of Congress that "the
general welfare, the security, the economic health and stability of the
Nation, the conservation and efficient utilization of its natural and
human resources, and the effective functioning of government and
society require vigorous, perceptive support and employment of science
and technology in achieving natural objectives." Goals of that policy
include "fostering leadership in the quest for international peace and
progress toward human freedom, dignity, and well-being by enlarging
the contributions of American scientists and engineers to the knowledge
of man and his universe, by making discoveries of basic science
widely available at home and abroad, and by utilizing technology in
support of United States national and foreign policy goals." Further,
one of the six policy principles in the bill has direct foreign policy
implications:

(3) The conduct of science and technology operations so as to seTve domestic
needs while promoting foreign policy objectives.

301 Ibid., p. 1459.

302 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age, an
introduction to the study series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: prepared for the Sub-
rflmmittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Huddle. Leeislative
Reference Service. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1970. See vol. I,
pp. 1-35.

203 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1460.

3<x H.R . 10230, "National Science and 'lecnnoiogy jfoucy ana urgamzanon Aci oi lyio,' was mtroaucea
by Committee Chairman Obn E. Teague and cosponsored by Ranliing Minority Member Charles A.
Mosher. The House passed H.R. 10230, as amended, on November 6, 1975, and sent it to the Senate, where
it was jointly referred to the Labor and Public Welfare, Commerce, and Aeronautical and Space Science
Committees. On February 4, 1976, the Senate passed H.R. 10230 after amending it to incorporate the sub-
stance of S. 32, which had meanwhile been jointly reported by the three committees. The bill was sent to
conference on February 26; a conference report was filed April 26 and agreed to shortly thereafter by both
Houses. The measure was sent to the President and signed into law May 11, 1976, as Public Law 94-282, the
National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976.

305 Huddle, Scicrce and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1461.

1690

THE MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT

Space does not permit a recounting here of all the evidences of
conffressional concern with the interactions of science, technology, and
foreign policy that are dealt with in the basic study .^'*^ However,
mention should be made of the Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Created on the initia-
tive of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and representing
both Houses of Congress and the President, the Commission was
charged with undertaking studies that would enable it to ". . . submit
findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for
the formulation and execution of the Nation's foreign policy," ^°^ This
was a very large task, and it is perhaps not surprising that the Report
which the Commission rendered in June 1975 fell short of the clear
and definitive statement of needed reforms sought by its sponsors.
In any case, the Commission did include among its focal subjects of
study the scientific and technological aspects of foreign policy .^°*

NEED OF ADDED CONGRESSIONAL RESOURCES

The section on "Congressional Concern with Science in the Depart-
in the Department of State" in /Scisnce and Technology in the Depart-
ment of State concludes with consideration of a "congressional policy
planning stafi"." The basis for this suggestion is that,

The cultural and organizational situation in the Department of State with
respect to science and technology presents the Congress with two related problems.
One is the need of Congress for information and analysis. The Congress, speaking
broadly, needs to know what is going on in order to decide what to instruct the
executive branch to do about it. The interactions of science and technology with
diplomacy are demonstrably of commanding importance. But the Congress is
faced w^ith difficulties in securing information and analyses in this field because
of the persistent cultural lag in technical literacy and a lack of organizational
coherence and discipline of the Department, which is after all the main source
of diplomatic information for Congress. The second problem is how to strengthen
the resources of the Department of State to collect, analyze, and report to the
Congress on the technical aspects of diplomacy. Recent events suggest that
reform is already underway. But it is also possible that further congressional
encouragement might be found necessary. As time goes on, it is to be hoped, the
departmental deficiencies will be corrected.

But pending such correction and even after, it would seem desirable for the
Congress to strengthen its own arrangements for information analysis and filter,
and option identification and evaluation.'"'

Similarities between the legislative and executive branches in the
approach to foreign policy problems — the study continues — include
(1) the fact that the structure and staffing of congressional committees
has tended to compartmentalize problems in the same way that they
are divided up in the Department of State; (2) both diplomatic and
domestic political realities ". . . compel priority attention to short-
range problems and issues, while tending to defer attention to longer
term trends, problems, and opportunities"; (3) there is a tendency in
both diplomatic and political institutions — and in both legislative and
executive policymaking areas — toward a high degree of personal
mobility and a correspondingly short "institutional memory." Ac-
cordingly, the study concludes,

306 See ibid., pp. 1450-1468 ("Congressional Concern with Science in the Department of State").

307 Ibid., p. 1464. , ,

308 Salient findings of the "Murphy Commission" (so named after its Chairman, former Ambassador
Robert D. Murphy) are discussed in the essay on planning which follows later in this volume. See chapter 23.

30» Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1466.

1691

... it seems reasonable that the many recommendations which have been made
for a strong and technologically sophisticated policy planning staff in the Depart-
ment of State might be allowed to suggest a corresponding need in the congres-
sional environment. Such a mechanism or institution, capable of assessing prospec-
tive future trends at a reasonable confidence level, might help the Congress to
design preyentive actions in advance of crises. Examples of the kinds of services
that might usefully be performed within such an institution might be:

— Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with congressional
intent in the area of scientific and technological impacts on foreign policy
and international relations — and vice versa;

— Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic environ-
ment as changes occur in response to the global spread of technological
innovation;

— Assessing the secondary impacts and interrelationships of "international"
technological issues;

— Examining the adequacy of U.S. "international" institutions in the
face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting from the global
spread of technological innovation;

— Structuring and making coherent the array of foreign policy interactions
with science and technology; and

— Maintaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an extended insti-
tutional memory, and an assistance cadre for major studies for "interna-
tional" committees concerned with S&T questions, S&T committees con-
cerned with foreign policy questions, and committees monitoring major tech-
nological missions with significant international implications.'^"

Status of the Issue

Appraisal of the status of State Department efforts toward effective
integration of science, technology, and diplomacy would appear to
require mention of the following considerations (not all of which have
been dealt with in the foregoing pages, though all are treated in the
study itself or elsewhere in the study series) ;

DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE DISCOURAGED FROM ACQUIRING

TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

Although the importance of science and technology (especially the
latter) to diplomacy has been recognized at top levels of the Depart-
ment, and institutional provision has been made for furthering the
success of integration, that process has not made significant headway
among the various bureaus and in the Foreign Service generally.
The Department of State and the Foreign Service appear to "focus
attention on, and extend preferment to, generalist officers in the polit-
ical officer ranks, and to a lesser extent to those in the administrative,
economic, and consular ranks. Those specializing in technical and
science policy fields receive less encouragement to enter or opportunity
to advance. The cause of this personnel emphasis is suggested by a
study by a panel of the United Nations Association (UNA) [of the
United States] in 1973. In this report, the general problem was
characterized as follows:

The United States Government [like American society as a whole] is increasingly
part of an interdependent world, but its organization and procedures still reflect
earlier, simpler times when nation states could on most matters safely deal with
each other at arms length and through career foreign services. In today's world,
international relations are of necessity pervasive, technical, continuous, and
intimately involved with domestic issues, and this requires new styles and new
systems of governmental organization and process, which rely far more than in
the past on a wide range of professional participation in policymaking.

310 Ibid., p. 1467.

96-243 O - 77 - 13

1692

Compared to the resources lavished on management improvement in a single
large multinational corporation, those being devoted to the far more important
and difficult problems of improving the organization of the government in a
multinational setting are pitiful.'"

THE DEPARTMENT IS NOT ORGANIZED TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL

PLANNING

A generation after the need for long-range foreign policy planning
in relation to national goals was recognized, and provision made for
it within the State Department structure, there are still no effective
mechanisms and procedures whereby State can "anticipate the need
for, and . . . initiate, action — especially future-oriented action — in
these fields [of science and technology], rather than responding to-
foreign pressures." ^^^ In the words of the aforementioned United
Nations Association panel report, "the Department of State, as
currently oriented, organized, staffed, and operated, represents some-
thing of an anachronism in terms of ability to respond to today's
global problems. . . . The new and highly complex demands of a
technologically oriented international society, with its new set of
economic interdependencies and need for shared responsibility in keep-
ing the peace, have simply overtaken the Department's traditional
decisionmaking structure." ^'^

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP HAS NOT MOTIVATED THE NECESSARY
TECHNICAL MODERNIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT

The State Department has never had, and is not yet in striking
distance of having, a substantial capability for putting American
technological and managerial genius to work in the service of American
diplomacy. This lack, however, would appear to be not so much a
failure of the State Department per se as of American political leader-
ship generally, in the legislative branch as well as the executive, and
of American business and industrial leadership as well. There would
appear to be a great untapped potential for beneficial accommoda-
tion between U.S. Government and U.S. business in the interests of
U.S. diplomacy — and also, on an "everybody wins" basis rather than
a "zero-sum" basis, the interests of the world at large. With an
historic tendency for government and academia to be ranged sus-
piciously on one side, and business and industr}^ equally suspiciously
on the other, the impetus, the leadership, and the institutions for
exploring this potential have been not enough in evidence. As the
starting point, a philosophy of accommodation, including appropriate
checks and balances, would seem to be needed; this could be the
product of a national debate involving preparation of executive
branch policy or position papers, holding of congressional hearings,,
and use of the media by academic, corporate, and other private
interests. Such a debate might be launched on the initiative of the
administration, a congressional committee (or two or more commit-
tees acting in concert) , or a public-interest group of citizens.'

311 Ibid., p. 1475.

312 Ibid., p. 1327.

313 Ibid., p. 1475.

1693

Prospects and Options

The last section of the study (XI. Summary and Concluding Obser-
vations) begins with the observation that the years immediately
ahead "look like a time of opportunity in an environment in flux."

New decisions are pending as to the relationship between the science bureau
and other bureaus of the Department, as to the future missions and structure
of overseas science staffs, and as to the design of the President's policymaking
organization in the field of scientific and technological diplomacy.^"

There seems to be a promising climate for teamwork among OES,
the Policy Planning Staff, and the staff of the National Security
Council (the study continues, as of June 1975), and a possibility of
congressional action to establish a new science policy institution in the
Executive Office; such an institution would present the new Science
Bureau in State with further problems, but also further opportunities.
Among the opportunities apart from what might arise out of re-
lationships with a revitalized White House organization for science
and technology could be that involving the improvement of "technical
literacy" in the Foreign Service; "the creation of further science
units in the functional bureaus of the Department, manned and
equipped to cooperate with the science bureau in the formulation of
diplomatic policy and the initiation of new science- and technology-
based programs toward U.S. foreign policy objectives"; ^^^ the estab-
lishment of priorities in dealing with the array of issues already on
hand, while allowing for analysis and evaluation of prospective issues;
most important, perhaps — and certainly most difficult — development
of a comprehensive normative framework of national goals to govern
the setting of priorities. But the redefining of goals in a democratic
society cannot be the work of government alone. Within the United
States this process, involving examination of values and basic assump-
tions and sorting out of the important and lasting from the expendable,
could be initiated by the State Department, or the White House, or
the Congress, and must involve all of these. But it could not be
accomplished by any or all of them without the participation of the
American people. The process would call for a national debate in
which the question of public versus (or in conjunction with) private
enterprise, raised above, would represent one important element. In
such a debate the most important single question to be addressed —
and repeatedly reexamined — would probably be: How can American
leadership best be exerted in a world of growing interdependence
without sacrifice of what Americans hold as fundamental political
and human values?

Author's Reassessment

Although only the 2 years have elapsed since publication of Science
and Technology in the Department of State, many events have con-
firmed the importance of its thesis and suggested the indicated gap in
institutional arrangements in shaping U.S. technological-diplomatic
policy.

The frustrations expressed by Assistant Secretary of State for
OES Dixy Lee Ray upon her resignation may well have been occa-
sioned in part by the low esteem of the subject in the Department.

3'< Ibid., p. 1490.
315 Ibid.

1694

The Murphy Commission's final report tended to confirm the
findings of the CRS study, by proposing that "science" (i.e., tech-
nology) be elevated to concern at the level of Under Secretary of
State. However, by recommending separation of the offices of Assist-
ant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of
State, the Commission may have called for a diminishing of recogni-
tion by the White House of the importance of nonmilitary technology
for diplomacy and (in its broader sense) national security.

In his welcoming speech to the Foreign Service Officer Class, June 27,
1975, Secretary Kissinger spoke of the widening scope of foreign rela-
tions, the need for acceptance by the Congress and the public of the
Nation's course of foreign policy actions, the need for a "more analyti-
cal, more strategic approach to the issues of foreign policy," and the
need to allocate resources to piiority objectives.^^^

Conflicts between executive and legislative foreign polic}^ became
evident in 1975 as the Congress interposed its views on Soviet trade
relationships b}' linking them to Soviet policy on the emigration of
Jews, took a policy stand on the use of U.S. weapons by Turkey in
Cyprus, and forebade U.S. intervention in Angola. Apart from any
question as to the rightness of these positions, they forcefully dram-
atized the importance of Secretary Kissinger's observation that,
"Today the Congress has a decisive role to pla}^ in the formulation
and execution of our foreign policy. . . ." ^'^

Kissinger's 19 proposals to u.n. general assembly

Possibly the most important event in technological diplomacy in
1975 was the address delivered September 1 before the Seventh
Special wSession of the United Nations General Assembly, by Ambas-
sador Moynihan for Secretary Kissinger, on "Global Consensus and
Economic Development." An analysis of that address provides an
excellent recapitulation of the importance of technological diplomacy
in today's world, and the need to develop institutions, policies, and
programs based on the new reality of the world of nations. Said
Kissinger:

The reality is that the world economy is a single global system of trade and
monetary relations on which hinges the development of all our economies. The
advanced nations have an interest in the growth of markets and production in
the developing world; with equal conviction we state that the developing coun-
tries have a stake in the markets, technological innovation, and capital invest-
ment of the industrial countries.

To meet this changed global condition the Secretary proposed a
strategy consisting of five sets of international actions. These might
be summarized as follows:

1. International cooperation to stabilize the global economy of
supply and demand.

2. Accelerated growth through technological innovation and
investment capital.

3. More widely shared trading opportunities.

4. Improved terms of trade in key commodities, especially
food.

3" "Strcngtheninp the Department of State," address by Secretary Kissinger, Department of State
Newsletter, no. 1882 (July 1975), pp. 2-3.
3" Jbid.. p. 2.

1695

5. Concerted efforts to aid the least developed countries.
In furtherance of these five strategic elements the Secretary offered
a long list of proposed initiatives. These included:

1. Creation in the International Monetary Fund of a new
development security fund to stabilize overall export earnings.

2. Expansion of the resources of the World Bank's International
Finance Corporation to support private enterprises in developing
countries.

3. Creation of an International Investment Trust to attract
investment capital for development insured against major losses.

4. Assistance to developing countries to raise investment capital
through direct borrowing in capital markets.

5. Improved access of developing countries to credit resources
in developed countries.

6. Creation of an International Energy Institute to resolve
issues between producers and consumers and advance energy
technologies.

7. Expansion of international agricultural research centers
into a worldwide network for development of agricultural (mainly
food) technology.

8. Creation of an organization to coordinate and finance nonfood
agricultural productivity and competitiveness.

9. Creation of an International Industrialization Institute to
sponsor and conduct research on industrial technology.

10. Creation of an International Center for the Exchange of
Technological Information.

11. Expansion of U.S. bilateral support of industrial technolog}'.

12. Establishment of standards of conduct in the control and
operation of multinational corporations.

13. Elimination of barriers to trade by multilateral trade
agreements including extension of general tariff preferences and
other easements to developing countries.

14. Creation of an international network of buffer stocks in
key commodities with associated institutions to stabilize prices
for these commodities.

15. Funding support for a major new international effort to
expand raw material resources in developing countries.

16. A variet}'' of forms of assistance (emergenc}^ relief funds,
low cost loans, and food aid to least developed countries),

17. Reduction of losses after harvest from inadequate use of
technologies of storage, transport, and pest control.

18. A major expansion in World Health Organization programs
of integrated deliver}- of health services at the community level.

19. Improvement of the United Nations system including
rationalization of assistance programs, leadership in U.N.
Secretariat for developm.ent, streamlining of the Economic and
Social Council, better consultative procedures, and independent
evaluation of program implementation.

IMPLICATIONS OF KISSINGER INITIATIVES FOR STATE DEPARTMENT AND

CONGRESSIONAL BACKSTOPPING

The question presented by this impressive shopping list of initiatives
offered by the Secretary of State to restore rationahty and order to
the "global s^^stem" concerns the abihty of the U.S. diplomatic

1696

apparatus to maintain forward impetus on 19 complex programs^
many of them involving technological as well as economic and in-
stitutional innovations. Can the Department present these programs
effectively to the Congress to obtain the requisite funding support?
Can it obtain public support? Can it coordinate the necessary partici-
pation by the long list of mission departments and agencies? Can it
keep track of all the bilateral programs involved? Can it assure
adequate U.S. voice and staffing in U.N. institutions?

And, from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, can the Congress
equip itself with the staff expertise to maintain oversight of the
prospective array of new responsibihties proposed by the Secretary of
State?

Many, indeed most, of the initiatives presented to the General
Assembly in the September 1 address find echoes in the 12 case and
issue studies of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. How-
ever, the studies also record the shortfalls in past efforts to achieve these
objectives. The Secretary's address has served a useful purpose in
gathering together a comprehensive roster of global strategies for
world betterment. It has also provided a measure of the enormous
future task facing U.S. technological diplomacy.

NEW STUDY OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S MANAGEMENT OF DIPLOMACY-
TECHNOLOGY INTERFACE

There are indications of a deepening concern within the Department
of State both as to its own responsibilities in science and technology
and as to the need for a strengthened organizational structure to
exercise these responsibilities. One important indication of this con-
cern was the commissioning in January 1976 of a special study by
Dr. T. Keith Glennan, formerly Commissioner of AEC and Adminis-
trator of NASA. This study, requested by then Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs (later Deputy Secretary of State)
Charles W. Robinson, required wide consultation among Government,
industry, and academic people concerned with the science-technology-
diplomacy interface and reporting back in the autumn of 1976 on
departmental options for such matters as :

— The extent and nature of the contributions of science and
technology to U.S. diplomatic objectives, and past strengths and
weaknesses in this area;

— The nature, problems, and opportunities, and program
priorities in technological developments of substantial impact on
U.S. foreign affairs; and

— The organization, management responsibilities, internal re-
lations, and external relations of the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. .
Tlie tlirust of the (xlennan study differed substantially from that
performed by Lloyd Berkner in 1950. The experience of the interven-
ing quarter-century has occasioned a shift in emphasis from science
to technology, and fr-om peripheral concern to central programmatic
planning and action.

Among the sources used by Dr. Glennan and others with whom
he consulted in preparing his i-e})ort were studies in the Science, Tech-
nology, and American Diplomacy series, especially Science and Tech-

1697

nology in the Defartiiwnt of State and Science^ Technology^ and
Diplomacy in. the Age of Interdependenee. In discussing the impor-
tance to tiie Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs (OES) of congressional imderstanding and support,
Glennan takes note of a parallel between many of his conclusions and
those of tlie present study :

Congress has demonstrated a great and growing interest during the past few-
years in the role of science and technology in foreign affairs. Reflections of this
interest are indicated by the numerous Congressional inquiries received by OES,
and by Congressional initiative in establishing the presently reconstituted Bureau.
In addition, the Congressional Research Service has recently completed a six-year
study on "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy" which has resulted in
more than a dozen thoughtful reports on this broad theme. These studies are
summarized in "Science, Technology, and Diplomacy in the Age of Interdepend-
ence," published in June 1976 and noted earlier in this Report. The study pre-
pared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of
the parent Committee on International Relations suggests that the Legislative
Branch will involve itself more actively in the future in the conduct of tech-
nological diplomacy. It is interesting that many of the conclusions reached
independently and presented in this Report largely parallel those listed by the
Congressional Study. The similarity of the recommendations in the two reports
offers an opportunity to broaden the base of support for the implementation of
the recommendations of this study.^^""

Dr. Glennan's conclusions and recommendations are given in con-
densed form in his letter of October 20, 1976, forwarding the report
to Deputy Secretary Robinson. Somewhat further condensed, they are
as follows:

(1) The Department needs to reinforce its efforts to interrelate
the conduct of foreign affairs w'ith the current and emerging
realities of applied technology. More effective programs should
be developed to mobilize the cooperation of the private sector in
this task.

(2) OES lacks a long-range technology planning and analysis
capability which the Department badly needs.

(3) OES is seriously understaffed. In addition to pure num-
bers, more top quality people at all levels are required if the
Bureau is to fulfill its responsibilities. At the same time, it is im-
portant that the level of technological "awareness" be raised
throughout the Department and the Foreign Service.

(4) The FSO career system must be augmented by bringing in
outside talent to provide the essential technical competence
which is not available in the regular Foreign Service.

(5) The burden of urgent operational tasks has impeded the
Bureau's fulfillment of its policy responsibilities. Serious effort
should be made to achieve a better balance to ensure coverage of
longer-range policy considerations.

(6) International cooperative programs in science and tech-
nology are frequently handicapped by the absence of "seed
money" to initiate new activities.

(7) Relations need to be strengthened between OES and AID,
the National Academies of Science and Engineering, the newly
established White House Office of Science and Technology Policy,

"i"" U.S. Department of State. Technology and Foreign Affairs: A Report hy Dr. T. Keith
Olennan to Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson. WasWngton, tf.C, December
1076, 70 pp. and 12 appendices, p. 55.

1698

aiid other White House components such as NSC, CEQ, CIEP,
OMB, etc. More productive relationships with professional socie-
ties and academia and industrial groups need to be fostered.

(8) The international aspects of food and agricultural tech-
nology require increased attention from the Department.

(9) A whole new era of oceans management is emerging. OES
must better equip itself to cope with these important problems.

(10) OES needs, and must earn by demonstrated performance,
a clear recognition of its status in the Department hierarchy .^^'''

Some Illustrative Questions

Long-range foreign policy planning is a complex and difficult under-
taking involving infinite arrangements of variables in time (past,
present, and future) and space (today, the world; tomorrow, the uni-
verse?) Many scholars and policymakers nave accordingly concluded
that it cannot be done successfully, especially in a democracy. Others,
though more sympathetic in principle, have urged that not too much
be expected of long-range national planning efforts, and that they be
conducted with flexibility and restraint. As Roger Hilsman observes
in To Move a Nation:

The making of foreign policy is a groping efiFort at understanding the nature of
the evolving world around us. It is a painful sorting out of our own goals and pur-
poses. It is a tentative, incremental experimentation with various means for achiev-
ing these purposes. It is an unremitting argument and debate among various con-
stituencies about all of these questions and an attempt to build a consensus on how
the United States as the United States should decide on these questions and what
action it should take. And none of these several activities is the kind that will yield
to organizational or institutional gimmicks.''*

Why,- then, talk about "long-range planning machinery and proce-
dures," if attempts to institutionalize the complete policy planning
process are likely to fail? What is to be gained by halfway, or perhaps
less than halfway, measures? Hasn't the United States done well
enough, all these years, wdthout a comprehensive national planning
system? And isn't the attempt to establish one likely to lead to greater
trouble and even danger than just meeting developments as they arise?
The answer to this last question is that all the evidence points the
other way. Survival itself may well be at stake — or, after all, has the
danger been exaggerated?

The question is worth repeating in another way. There are two
schools of thought with respect to policy formulation. One emphasizes
experience in problem-solving; not getting cluttered with details; the
attitude that every problem is different: elaborate efforts to project
what may be ahead are unrealistic, and it is better to focus on each
problem or issue ad hoc; the bringing in of experts to explain the
essentials of the problem; and the governing idea that, to begin with,
it is impossible to foresee or even assess all consequences. The other
school emphasizes comprehensive data-gathering; analysis of indica-
tors of trends; forecasting and analysis of emerging issues; preparation
of positive statements; constructing taxonomies of problems; applica-
tion of the systems approach to policy design; and the attempt to
foresee the consequences of alternative courses of actionor reaction —

3i'b Ibid., pages v-xiii.

5" Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of Stale, vol. II, p. 1414.

1699

avoiding surprises by looking ahead. On the surface, the methodical
approach of the second school, which parallels what has long and
effectively been done in American industry, would seem superior — but
is it? Can it be applied successfully on the grand scale, in the governance
of human affairs taken all together?

What kinds of foreign policy issues involve science and technology?
Are there any that do not? What kind of technical expertise would
help improve State Department pohcy planning and decisionmaking?
What are the options as to arrangements for tapping such expertise?
How important is the availability of a multidisciplinary team that is
experienced enough in bureaucratic ways to be effective but brings a
fresh perspective? Should it be built into the system (with periodic
rotation), or called in as needed?

The study, discussing the issue of generalists versus specialists,^^^.
puts this question more specifically. "The issue is many-sided: what
specialties are most needed? Can they be recruited and trained up to
the necessary level? Should promotions be arbitrarily given equally
as between specialists and generalists? Might specialists be brought
into the Service at appropriate levels as needed, on a temporary
basis? Is it fair to specialists to convert them into generalists in
order for them to merit progress up the promotion ladder? Can the
Foreign Service Officer be both?"

It has been observed that foreign policy planning is unlikely to
succeed because those in power do not believe in it. Are human
motivations the main sticking point? Could a dynamic President who
had concluded that systematic long-range foreign policy planning was
necessary gain congressional and public acceptance of it? What safe-
guard against abuses of Executive power might be needed in institu-
tionalizing long-range planning? How might public debate on foreign
policy issues, and public participation in policy formulation regarding
them, best be arranged? Should Congress encourage the institutional-
ization of systematic, long-range foreign policy planning? If not, why
not? If so, what arrangements should Congress make for carrying out
its dual role of supporter and critic of the system? Does the above-
cited suggestion regarding a congressional policy planning staff have
merit in this connection?

The report which followed the 1972 Hearing-Symposium on
National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment
made the following proposals:

. . . that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and other appropriate committees of the Congress should:

(1) Hold annual hearings on the foreign policy reports to the Congress of the
President and the Secretary of State as well as on the foreign policy implications
of the economic report to the President and the President's message on the state
of the world.

(2) Establish machinery and procedures for systematically and periodically
assessing the long-term foreign policy goals and programs of the United States;
for example, by the creation of a high-level advisory panel composed of public
officials and private persons, and/or by systematic and periodic review through
congressional hearings.

(3) Hold hearings and/or establish advisory panels which would:

(a) develop criteria to determine more clearly what constitute the vital
security interests of the United States;

3i» Ibid., pp. 1332-1333.

1700

(b) establish guidelines to determine what commitments must be based
on treaties and what role executive agreements can and should play;

(c) set criteria to guide the conduct of foreign policy in such traditional
fields as the protection of American citizens, property, and investment
abroad; freedom of the seas, and access to markets and sources of raw
materials;

(d) examine the decisionmaking process in foreign affairs, particularly
the roles of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council as
well as the potential roles of the Cabinet and other executive agencies con-
cerned with domestic affairs;

(e) examine the extent to which social science research can be more effec-
tively utilized in guiding the formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward
the other nations and cultures of the world;

(f) conduct periodic reviews of the security, political, and economic impli-
cations of U.S. foreign bases, including the sharing of bases and costs with
our allies.

(4) Request the Office of Management and Budget to prepare foreign expendi-
ture budgets in terms of balance of payment implications.

(5) Enact legislation to require the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelli-
gence staffs of other executive departments and agencies to report their relevant
studies and intelligence assessments to appropriate congres^onal committees in
executive session and to qualified staff members.

(6) Hold hearings on the various efiforts of all government agencies and depart-
ments involved in the development of programs dealing with the protection of
the international environment and natural resources.

(7) Encourage by every means possible public discussion of foreign policy
questions.'^"^

As extensive as these recommendations were, one of the witnesses^
Professor Robert A. Scalapino of the University of CaUfornia at
Berkeley, suggested the need for still further congressional inquiry
and action. In his prepared statement he said:

No current body, however, exists which by virtue of its structure and personnel
can address itself systematically and regularly to the most fundamental issues
concerning foreign policy objectives and strategy in such a fashion as to involve
the Congress and the public as well as the national administration. In my opinion,.
it is time to give this matter the most serious consideration.^^*

Is there indeed a need for new congressional machinery, procedures,
and actions as indicated by these proposals? Would a new Joint Com-
mittee on National Security, as proposed by the Murphy Commission,
be an effective instrument for stimulating, accompUshing, or support-
ing the purposes reflected in the proposals — -or, as some believe, would
it merely "add to the confusion"? If the Joint Committee formula
should be adopted, should the scope of the committee be broadened
to cover long-range foreign policy planning in general? What, for that
matter, do the words "national security" really encompass? Should
there be a special arrangement for long-range assessment support of
such a committee by the Office of Technology Assessment? For policy
analysis support by the Congressional Research Service? Would it
not need at least a modest policy analysis staff of its own?

The study points out ^^^. that a large effort is already being invested
in the congressional review of broad policy matters involving the
interaction of science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. "The value
of these reviews seems compelHng, but the limitations of member time
and staff resources may prevent wider use of them. Among the possi-
bilities to enlarge or increase the scope or frequency of such overviews
might be the following:"

320 Ibid., pp. 1456 and 1457.
32' Ibid., p. 1457.
322 Ibid., p. 1466.

1701

— Enlist the Foreign Service Institute to manage occasional seminars and
prepare reports on them;

— Arrange briefings by selected members of the Policy Planning Staff;

— Contract studies on subjects of continuing interest to the committees,
acting individually or jointly;

— Construct a library of policy studies of enduring value for joint use by
the two committees;

— Publish sets of invited papers with staff or CRS commentary;

— Have CRS conduct an annual seminar series on foreign poUcy issues;
and

— Make more use of the scientific attaches as policy information sources,
aside from home leave, through invited reports and special studies to meet
committee needs .'^^

Viewed as part of an incremental approach and not necessarily as
a substitute for a more comprehensive system of foreign policy plan-
ning, which of these suggestions has merit?

Finally — by way of recapitulation — what are the salient questions
from the standpoint of harmonizing future U.S. purposes and goals

with those of the other peoples of the world? In general terms, the
study sums them up as follows:

Where in the U.S. Government is there an institution charged with responsi-
bility for surveying on a continuing basis the totality of trends and . . . conse-
quences for U.S. diplomacy that grow out of world technological change? Where
are these findings translated into requirements upon U.S. diplomacy? What
kinds of expertise are needed for such surveys and for the definition of the diplo-
matic requirements? How complete is the set of U.S. institutions needed to collect,
assess, analyze, and structure the information to build into a data base for survej'-
ing future technological trends and their consequences for U.S. diplomacy?
Where are innovative strategies to be sought, conceived, and studied? How does
the world system of basic science communities relate to U.S. diplomacy? What
major technological trends and needs of diplomatic consequence are already
evident and how are they interrelated? What congressional options are available
to strengthen the legislative role in this sphere? ^-^

Appendix — Letter of Resignation From Assistant Secretary Dixy Lee

Ray to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger (June 19, 1975), and

Letter of Comment, With Attachment, to the President (June 20^

1975)

Department of State,
Oceans and International ENviRONMENTAii

AND Scientific Affairs,
Washington, D.C., June 19, 1975.
Hon. Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary: After five months as Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, I am hereby sub-
mitting my resignation.

For some time I had hoped that my office and the Bureau I head would play a
significant role in the formulation of the Department's science policy and in the
provision of information upon which to base policy in those areas of technology
specifically assigned to the OES Bureau by Congress.

Unfortunately, that desirable condition has not been fulfilled. Many of the
areas for which OES has statutory responsibility are, in fact, being pursued in
other bureaus and offices.

I sincerely hope that the Department seriously re-examines its administrative
procedures with a view toward pormitting its Bureaus to function efficiently.
Sincerely,

Dixy Lee Ray,

- Assistant Secretary.

323 Ibid., p. 1469.

1702

Department of State,
Oceans and International Environmental

AND Scientific Affairs,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1975.
The President,
The While House.

Dear Mr. President: In my letter of resignation to Secretary Kissinger, I
made brief reference to the circumstances within the Department of State that
thwart those of us who are responsible for information and advice on the i)olicies
that guide United States international programs in science and technology from
exercising our proper role. Public Law 93-126, passed by the Congress in October,
1973, mandates a policy role for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs. Under present Departmental procedures, the
Bureau can do little but acquiesce in the poUcies set by others, and attempt to
implement its broad responsibilities with little authority and few resources.
Similar kinds of problems plague our Nation's domestic science policy.
Although steps may be underway to improve the present situation — e.g., the
establishment of a Science Advisory Office in the White House, as you have
proposed — I am deeply concerned that the imperative to use existing knowledge
and proven technology for vigorous attack on today's problems is not fully
recognized nor appreciated at the highest levels of government.

Of course technology must be used wisely and with proper regard for both'
economic and environmental consequences. An energetic re-'earch and develop-
mental program on problems that are not yet solved must be pursued both by
government directly and by government providing the climate — financial,
intellectual and practical — to marshal the great talent and human resources of
this land. That pitifully little is being done is nowhere so clearly evident as in the
area of energy resources and technology.

On January 16 of this year, thirty-two of our Nation's most outstanding
scientists — including eleven Nobel Laureates — made a public statement on
energy poHcy. It is a significant and disturbing document — significant because
it is a thoughtful and sober expression of concern for the future of our country
made by a group of our most knowledgeable citizens and disturbing because
it has been virtually ignored by the leaders of government. The scientists' state-
ment, a copj'^ of which is attached, says, in part :

"We . . . believe that the Republic is in the most serious situation since World
War II. Today's energy crisis is not a matter of just a few years but of decades.
It is the new and predominant fact of life in industrialized societies.

"The high price of oil which we must now import in order to keep Americans at
their jobs threatens our economic structure ..."

The importance of secure supplies of economically priced energy (fuels and
electricity) cannot be overemphasized. Although energy provides the power for
all manufacturing, business, commerce, transportation, and distribution of
essential goods (all this means jobs and whether there is employment or unem-
ployment), the great energy debate focuses, ironically on gasoline for the family
automobile. Although we are, correctly, dedicated to a clean and healthy environ-
ment, the means to accomplish this laudable purpose requires more, not less,
energy. Our alternatives are severely limited. We have no choice other than to
practice conservation on a scale not yet imagined. This will take dedication and
will require that the leaders of government .set an example in energy saving
measures. But conservation alone cannot recover or maintain the strength of our
economy. Our need for reUance on solid fuels — coal and uranium — is real and
must be recognized.

It is now 18 months since my report to President Nixon, "The Nation s Energy
Future," was submitted. Many of the recommendations, especially the long-term
research and development proposals that are painless and non-controversial are
being implemented at glacial speed. But other programs, aimed at carefully
planned, step-by-stcp conversion to heavier reliance on solid fuels, languish or
are submitted to stultifying and interminable feasibility studies. The innovative
Pioneer Synthetic Fuels Program, proposed in cooperation with private enter-
prise, has yet to receive serious consideration.

Our country is drifting. We seem neither to have the will to conserve energy
nor the courage to map out a national program that will free us from the bondage
of too great a reliance on imported energy whose price and security of supply we
are powerless to influence. Painful decisions are needed for there are no easy
solutions that will please everj'^one.

1703

In the three years I have served in the Federal Government, I have done my
best to face up to whatever problems have emerged and to resolve them in an
open and honest manner. Thank you for your appointment and the opportunity
to serve. I leave with no regrets.
Sincerely,

Dixy Lee Ray.
Attachment: News release by scientists.

scientists' statement on energy policy

Washington, D.C, Jan. 16, 1975. — We, as scientists and citizens of the United
States, beUeve that the Republic is in the most serious situation since World War
II. Today's energy crisis is not a matter of just a few j^ears but of decades. It is the
new and predominant fact of life in industrialized societies.

The high price of oil which we must now import in order to keep Americans at
their jobs threatens our economic structure — indeed, that of the Western world.
Energy is the hfeblood of all modern societies and they are currently held hostage
by a price structure that they are powerless to influence.

In the next three to five years conservation is essentially the only energy option.
We can and we must use energy and existing energy sources more intelligently.
But there must also be long range realistic plans and we deplore the fact that they
are developing so slowly. We also deplore the fact that the public is given unrealis-
tic assurances that there are easy solutions. There are many interesting proposals
for alternative energy sources which deserve vigorous research effort, but none of
them is Ukely to contribute significantly to our energy supply in this century.

Conservation, while urgently necessary and highly desirable, also has its price.
One man's conservation may be another man's loss of job. Conservation, the first
time around, can trim off fat, but the second time will cut deeply.

When we search for domestic energy sources to substitute for imported oil, we
must look at the whole picture. If we look at each possible energy source sepa»
rately, we can easily find fault with each of them, and rule out each one. Clearly,,
this would mean the end of our civilization as we know it.

Our domestic oil reserves are running down and the deficit can only partially be
replaced by the new sources in Alaska; we must, in addition, permit offshore ex-
ploration. Natural gas is in a similar critical condition; in the last seven years new
discoveries have run far below our level of gas consumption. Only with strong
measures could we hope to reverse this trend.

We shall have to make much greater use of solid fuels. Here coal and uranium
are the most important options. This represents a profound change in the character
of the American fuel economy. The nation has truly great reserves of these solid
fuels in the earth. Our economically recoverable coal reserves are estimated to be-
250 billion tons and exceed the energy of the world's total oil reserves. Our known
uranium ores potentially equal the energy of 6,000 billion tons of coal; lower grade
ore promises even more abundance.

The U.S. choice is not coal or uranium; we need both. Coal is irreplaceable as
the basis of new synthetic fuels to replace oil and natural gas.

However, we see the primary use of solid fuels, especially of uranium, as a
source of electricity. Uranium power, the culmination of basic discoveries in
physics, is an engineered reality generating electricity today. Nuclear power has
its critics, but we believe they lack perspective as to the feasibiUty of non-nuclear
power sources and the gravity of the fuel crisis.

All energy release involves risks and nuclear power is certainly no exception.
The safety of civilian nuclear power has been under public surveillance without
parallel in the history of technology. As in any new technology there is a learning
period. Contrary to the scare publicity given to some mistakes that have occurred,
no appreciable amount of radioactive material has escaped from any commercial
U.S. power reactor. We have confidence that technical ingenuity and care in oper-
ation can continue to improve the safety in all phases of the nuclear power pro-
gram, including the difficult areas of transportation and nuclear waste disposal.
The separation of the Atomic Energy Commission into the Energy Research and
Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission provides
added reassurance for realistic management of potential risks and benefits. On any
scale the benefits of a clean, inexpensive, and inexhaustible domestic fuel far
outweigh the possible risks.

We can see no reasonable alternative to an increased use of nuclear power to
satisfy our energy needs.

1704

Many of us have worked for a long time on energy problems and therefore we
feel the responsibility to speak out. The energy famine that threatens will require
many sacrifices on the part of the American people, but these will be reduced if
we marshal the huge scientific. and technical resources of our country to improve
the use of known energj' sources.

Signed by:

Hans Bethe ' — Organizing Chairman; Cornell Universitj' Laboratory of Nuclear
Studies.

Luis Alvarez ' — Lawrence Radiation Laborator.y, Berkeley, Calif.

Peter Auer — Laboratory of Plasma Studies, Cornell Universitj'.

William O. Baker — President, Bell Telephone Laboratories.

John Bardeen ' — Department of Physics, University of Illinois.

Robert F. Bacher — Department of Physics, California Institute of Technologj*.

Felix Bloch ' — Department of Physics, Stanford University.

Norris E. Bradbury — Former Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

Harold Brown — President, California Institute of Technology.

Richard H. Chamberlain — Chairman, Department of Radiology, University
of Pennsylvania.

Cyril L. Comar — Chairman, Department of Physical Biology, Cornell
University.

Arthur Kantrowitz — AVCO-Everett Research Laboratory.

Ralph E. Lapp — Energy Consultant, Alexandria, Va.

Joshua Lederberg ^ — Department of Genetics, Stanford Universitj'.

Willard F. Libby ' — Department of Chemistry, University of Cahfornia, Los
Angeles.

Franklin A. Long — Center for Science, Technology and Society, Cornell
University.

Edwin M. McMillan ' — Director, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Berkeley,
Calif.

Kenneth S. Pitzer — Dept. of Chemistry, University of CaUf ., Berkeley, Cahf.

Edward M. Purcell ' — Dept. of Physics, Harvard University.

1. 1. Rabi ' — Professor of Physics, Emeritus, Columbia University.

Norman Rasmussen — Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, Mass. Institute of Tech-
nology.

Roger Revelle — Director, Harvard Center for Population Studies.

Glenn T; Seaborg ' — Associate Director, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories.

Frederick Seitz — President, Rockefeller University.

Edward Teller — Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Livermore, Calif.

James A. Van Allen — ^Chairman, Department of Physics, University of Iowa.

Warren Weaver — Mathematician, New Milford, Conn.

Alvin Weinberg — Former Director, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

Victor F. Weisskopf — Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology.

Edward Wenk, Jr. — Director, Program in Social Management Technology,
University of Washington.

Eugene Wigner ' — Professor of Theoretical Physics, Princeton University.

Richard Wilson^Department of Physics, Harvard University.

' Nobel Prize in Physics

' Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine

• Nobel Prize In Chemistry

PART 4 — PRINCIPAL POLICY
IMPLICATIONS

OhS>

About the Essays to Follow

PART 4— PRINCIPAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS

About the Essays to Follow

In part 3 of the overall study, each of 12 studies concerned with
major cases or issues was examined to see what light it might indi-
vidually shed on the general theme of the interaction of science,
technology, and American diplomacy. The intent of the next 6
chapters is to look at the 12 studies collectively from the perspectives
of each of 6 particular aspects of the general theme — or what might be
called 6 operational issues, dealing mainly with means, as contrasted
with the broad policy issues (or issue areas), dealing with ends, on
which the 12 studies are focused. The expectation is that this examina-
tion will yield a heightened appreciation of the complexities and sig-
nificance of the general theme as well as sharpened perspectives on
some of its more salient policy, operational, and legislative implica-
tions.

The terms are relative: what is an operational issue in one context
becomes a policy issue in another. The distinction between the 12
studies as centered on policy issues and the 6 particular aspects as
involving operational issues (the latter may also be thought of as
dimensions of the former) is made as a somewhat arbitrary but con-
venient device. The operational issues themselves are also posed
somewhat arbitrarily as either-or alternatives. In reality, most
diplomatic situations are resolved somewhere in the spectrum of
compromise. The six essays which follow deal with real situations and
they confirm that the policymaker is seldom limited to a choice
between the opposing alternatives in their pure forms. That this is so
in itself will be news to no one, but the analysis may perhaps yield
some useful insights as to ways in which it is so.

The operational issues which serve as subjects of the six essays are
these :

Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy
Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships
High-Technology Diplomacy versus Low-Technology Diplo-
macy

Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in
International Technology

Independence Versus Interdependence
Long-Range and Short-Range Planning
Following the essays is a final chapter which sums up the main
findings of the study and offers some possible legislative options for
strengthening governmental structures and procedures for managing
the complex interactions of science, technology, and diplomacy.

The first of the six essays, "Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign
Policy" (ch. 18), addresses the hypothesis that there are advantages
in a foreign policy based on systematic definition of goals and on the

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96-243 O - 77 - 14

1708

short- and long-range planning necessary to achieve them, and dis-
advantages in a foreign policy posture which essentially reacts to
external developments as they occur. Evidence drawn from the 12 cases
and issue studies, reviewed in turn, appears to support the contention
that in the two centuries of its history the United States has tended
away from the intitiative and toward the reactive mode. The choice
is not absolute, since virtually all dipomatic situations involve a
mixture of initiative and reactive behavior; what matters is where the
emphasis is placed. Concentration on reactive rather than initiative
diplomacy — although the accustomed course for most nations at
most periods in their history — appears to risk the greater dangers to a
nation's security in an increasingly dangerous world, as well as to
incur the heavier management demands without compensating
rewards, whereas the initiative mode offers the greater benefits at
lower risk. The main requirements of an initiative diplomatic mode in
a technological age are planning institutions well endowed with
information, policy analysis, and technology assessment capabilities,
and having the respect of and continuous intercommunication with
the makers of policy.

The essay on "Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relation-
ships" (ch. 19) examines a topic which does not seem to have received
enough systematic analysis. The object of such analysis should be to
identify circumstances in which bilateral, multilateral, or variations
on or mixtures of the two kinds of relationship, can best advance
diplomatic goals. The 12 studies illustrate some of the many possi-
bilities ; they also suggest that, whereas both bilateral and multilateral
agreements on scientific and technological subjects have important
diplomatic roles, the growing trend toward interdependence is moving
the United States (along with other nations) in the direction of
increasing reliance on multilateral relationships. Meanwhile, even the
bilateral agreements into which the United States has entered, in-
volving relatively simple and controlled situations, have been reached
more as a result of improvisation than of careful planning; as a result,
less has been learned about their management, and how to evaluate
them, than needs to be known if they are to serve ihe best diplomatic
interests of the United States. As for the U.S. role in the complex
and numerous multilateral arrangements that are coming to govern
much of the world's business, particular study is merited of how to
achieve more effective program management structures and proce-
dures, including procedures whereby Congress can obtain detailed
facts not now available about multilateral program costs and benefits.

"High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy"
(ch. 20) focuses on technology policy as such. The evidence of the 12
studies is that technology is a major and integral component of the
substance of diplomacy; the success of a nation's diplomacy today
will depend in large measure on the understanding of technology that
it brings to policy councils and the skill with which it marshals and
manages its technological resources. Yet the Government of the
nation that, overall, leads the world in technology has not demon-
strated a clear perception of the limitations — from the standpoint of
diplomatic advantage — of high-technology achievements, however
spectacular, or of the benefits to be gained by systematically seeking
to acquire low-technology know-how wherever foreign industries have

1709

led the way or overtaken their U.S. counterparts. Both high and low
technology play important roles in diplomacy, a fact which would
seem to dictate building corresponding structural and staff capabili-
ties in the Department of State. Moreover, Government support for
the development of some elements of both high- and low-technology,
on the basis of their prospective contributions to U.S. foreign policy
goals, would appear to be an appropriate strategy for the United
States.

The thesis of "Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Insti-
tutions in International Technology" (ch. 21) is that the dynamic
growth of technology, especially since World War II, has fostered a
new and more sophisticated relationship between industry and diplo-
macy. Much of the transfer of technology to developing countries in
recent decades has been planned as part of the foreign policy process,
but carried out by private industry. Industry has provided weapons
systems and trained indigenous personnel in their use. Multinational
corporations have been a major and growing force in the spread of
U.S. technology and management skills. The State Department is
inescapably drawn into the picture and must undertake to exert in-
fluence for diplomatic purposes on the foreign and domestic manage-
ment of technology by U.S. private industry. But the Department
is not organized and staffed for this purpose, nor does it appear to
have a ready grasp of the large international problems growing out of
technological change which already confront it. As onerous as it may
be to add the burden of understandmg technology to the many varieties
of political, economic, international law and relations, cultural, linguis-
tic, and other expertise required of the Department, as technology plays
a more and more prominent role in diplomacy the Department must
equip itself to appreciate and react to such matters as the needs of
other countries for U.S. technology, the needs and receptivity of U.S.
industry with respect to foreign technological advances and refine-
ments, and the progress of technology with special significance in in-
ternational relations (e.g., satellite communications, deep seabed
mining) to cite only a few.

Interdependence is an increasingly universal and compelling fact of
life in today's world, closely tied to the processes of technological in-
novation, change, and growth. The essay on "Independence Versus
Interdependence" (ch. 22) seeks to define these opposing forces
in contemporary terms, focusing attention on the role of diplomacy
in reconciling the opposition of the two forces and on the role of tech-
nology in both reconciling and fueling that opposition. In a fundamen-
tal sense it was technology that created interdependence: the Age of
Interdependence, ushered in by a fateful achievement of high tech-
nology— the atom bomb — is a new and explosive phase of the Age of
Technology that began with the Industrial Revolution. (As early as
1948, former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson observed in a letter
to Herbert Hoover that "The progress of science and invention
brought with it a vastly increased interdependence among the nations
of the world.") Among the factors that complicate the process of
working out a constructive balance between the impulses of national
independence and the imperatives of global interdependence are
virulent nationalism, entrenched cultural bias, failures of communi-
cation, and antagonism between the aggressive demands of growth

1710

and the defensive requirements of ecology. A case in point in the last
connection is provided by Japanese efforts to solve the problem of
pollution by relocating dirty industries from Japan to developing
countries with their raw materials, cheap labor, and presumed room
for growth. But environmental pollution cannot indefinitely be
exported nor neatly contained. The problem of pollution in Japan is
thus shaping up as a classic dilemma of interdependence; the ultimate
dilemma it appears to foreshadow — that of limiting growth — will be
an indefinitely more complex and difficult problem of interdependence,
in its time. Meanwhile, the technology -related, increasingly inter-
connected problems of the present are exceeding the capabilities of
governments; the organization of the U.S. Government for the man-
agement of international affairs is based on "assumptions which are
quite inconsistent with the facts of international life . . . there is not
nearly enough room in the foreign policy establishment for strategic
long-range planning, especially on the widening range of 'interde-
pendence issues'." In a broader sense, expanding interdependence —
though not a cause of human problems in the same primary way that
population growth or maldistribution of food and materials are
causes — represents a condition to be dealt with directly with the best
insights and the greatest creativeness in social invention that people
and governments can command.

The need for foreign policy planning is the theme of the last, and in
many ways the most central, of the six essays: "Long-Range and
Short-Range Planning." Despite the difficulties and problems that
governmental planning in a democracy entaUs (in addition to the
characteristically American antiplanning bias, rooted in the pioneer
tradition of self-reliance) , the planning of foreign policy measures on a
long-time scale has many advantages. Among them are the suscepti-
bility of such planning to both congressional and public debate and the
building of a consensus; the allowance of time for the maturing of
technological initiatives that serve diplomatic purposes; and the
opportunity for multilateral collaboration with nations sharing the
same planning goals. Short-range planning, by contrast, tends to be
action-oriented, narrow in scope, closely held and thus not open to
public (and often even congressional) participation, and reactive
rather than initiative. As a further consideration, a new mode of
planning, of wider scope and longer time span, needs to be adopted to
deal with national security as it must be understood today. Many
technologies outside the strictly military sphere now have important
implications for national security — technologies in the fields of trans-
portation, communications, energy, chemicals and drugs, recording
and rapid manipulation of data, and so on. These factors suggest the
necessity of redefining national security in terms of the modern,
independent, technologically oriented system of nations, and of
restating the national goals that are implied by the new definition.

Abundant evidence of need for long-range planning capabilities and
practices in the executive branch is found in the 12 case and issue
studies. Also evident is a parallel need in the Congress. The Murphy
Commission study gave detailed attention to the organizational needs
of the executive branch in equipping itself for more substantial and
longer-range diplomatic planning efforts than have been undertaken

1711

successfully in the past; the Commission study did not, however,
similarly address congressional planning requirements. What, specific-
ally, are the parallel requirements of executive and legislative branches?
Stated in simplest form, they are — as anticipated in the essay on
"Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy" — (1) a strong information
base, accompanied by policy analysis and technology assessment
capabilities of the highest competence ; and (2) institutionalized capa-
bilities for both short- and long-range planning in support of foreign
policy, so arranged as to maintain the integrity of the long-range
planning function while insuring that it performs its role in a dynamic
relationship to the policymaking function and to the real world.

Discussion of these requirements in the essay on Planning, keyed to
analytical review of Issue Six ("Science and Technology in the Depart-
ment of State"), is further developed in chapter 24, "Some Concluding
Observations."

Chapter 18 — Initiative Versus Reactive

Foreign Policy

CONTENTS

Page

Statement of the Hypothesis 1717

Defining the Initiative/Reactive Issue 1717

The Essential Differences 1718

Essentiality of Long-Range Planning 1718

Attention in the Literature to the Initiative and Reactive Modes of

Diplomacy 1719

Discussion of Initiative and Reactive Modes in Earlier Parts of the Study. 1719

Case One: The Baruch Plan 1720

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 1721

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical

Year 1722

Case Four: The Mekong Project 1723

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 1724

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 1725

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 1726

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 1728

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 1729

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 1731

Issue Five: Brain Drain 1731

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of State 1732

Some Concluding Observations 1735

Some Questions for Further Consideration 1736

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CHAPTER 18— INITIATIVE VERSUS REACTIVE FOREIGN

POLICY

The foreign policy of every nation is constructed with reference to
the external world. At one extreme, the policy is designed to respond
to external pressures and events m order to protect the nation's in-
terests and security'. At the other extreme the nation deliberately
forces events and creates situations to motivate other nations into
modes of behavior supportive of its interests and security, or otherwise
designs creative actions to shape the external world conditions in
ways beneficial to the nation's foreign policy. An example of the first
would be President Kennedy's response to the placing of missile
bases on Cuban territory. An example of the second would be Presi-
dent Kennedy's offer to the Soviet Union to join forces in the attempt
to land a man on the moon.

Statement of the Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this essay is that there are inherent advantages to
a nation pursuing an initiative foreign policy, and inherent disadvan-
tages in a policy of reacting to external forces of change. It is contended
that during its history the United States has moved somewhat from
the initiative to the reactive mode. The consequences seem to include
the following generalities:

The diplomatic effort is increased while the progress toward diplo-
matic goals is diminished;

Control of future diplomatic relationships passes from the United
States to other national states;

Elements of U.S. power are spread too thinlj'" over many concurrent
programs ;

Resources are reserved unused in anticipation of the need to react
to external forces of change that do not eventuate;

The pattern of diplomatic stance is made impossibly complex and
incoherent and actions become contradictory and inconsistent; and

Relationships with other national states tend to be alienated in
unintended ways by ad hoc responses.

It is further to be noted that the initiative mode lends itself to
long-range coherent planning and stable relationships while the reac-
tive mode usually involves hasty moving from crisis to crisis with
insufficient attention to ultimate consequences or emerging trends in
world relationships.

Defining the Initiative j Reactive Issue

In the real world the case of a reactive or initiative mode seldom
if ever occurs in the pure form. External changes and forces will always
need to be taken into account, so that the reactive element is almost
always present. Conversely every reaction to external pressures has
elements of initiative — the search for options yielding best resolutions
to external challenges. Sometimes initiative is matched by equally
forceful counter-initiative, as was the case when President Truman
responded to the sealing of Berlin corridors with the dramatic Berlin
airlift.

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1718

THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES

Perhaps the decisive element that distinguishes the initiative from
the reactive mode is that the reactive mode is defensive, and seeks to
reduce the adverse consequences of outside forces; conversely, the
initiative mode seeks to apply a strategy of pressures to create a
faA^orable s-et of external relationships. The reactive mode requires
analysis of the pressures, and ways of responding to them. The
initiative mode requires definition of diplomatic goals in terms of
desired external relationships or conditions and then proceeds to
formulate policies and design actions to produce them at minimum
cost and risk. The line of distinction between initiation and reaction
is often unclear, but in practice the range of diplomatic options is
likely to be wider with the first than with the second. At the same
time the scope and depth of analysis also must be greater. From the
point of view of timing, also, the initiative mode requires longer range
future planning and analysis, while the reactive mode tends to wait
for the event. It is not ])racticable to prejjare in advance to respond
to all possible diplomatic initiatives taken by other nations, nor indeed
to anticipate all the variations and subtleties against which responses
will need to be framed as an}^ one single initiative inifolds. However,
it is possible that the number of responses required will be lessened
if a nation successfully pursues the initiative mode.

The range of events, })olitical developments, institutional evolution,
and massive technological and economic trends that form the matrix
of externalities with which diplomacy must deal is so great that —
according to one bod}^ of o})inion — planning for the long-term future
is unrealistic. But it is also i)os>ible that the quest for short-term
solutions in the reactive mode can lead by degrees to a situation for
which the only outcome is catastrophic. Such a progression is recorded,
for example, in Barbara Tuchman's Guns of August.^'*

ESSENTIALITY OF LONG-RANGE PLANNING

Thus it can be contended that attention to the long-range conse-
quences of national policy for either the initiative or the reactive mode
is essential for security and national well-being. However, the kinds
of questions to be asked in framing a broad national strategy would
seem to include :

— Does the reactive mode characteristically require a larger
use of intellectual resources on a shorter (i.e., more urgent) time
scale than is required to design and execute initiatives?

— Can initiatives be so effectively applied that the nation
applying them retains a commanding and constructive leadership
role in its relations with other nations?

—Does the reactive mode tend to cause a nation's strategic
planners of foreign policy to become bogged down with detail and
the endless shredding out of alternative responses to foreign
initiatives:

— in circumstances of great urgency ("crises")?
— ^in less urgent but equally important questions of national
interest?

— in actions by other nations that require extensive
interpretive analysis?

^* Barbara Tuchnian, Ouns of August, New York, MacniilJan, 19C2: 5U p.

1719

— in the appearance of technologies of clearly global reach
requiring analysis as to their meaning for diplomacy?

— in the assessment of minor shifts in the world power
balance?

Attention in the Literature to the Initiative and Reactive Modes of
Diplomacy

Various assertions have been made, some of them cited later on in
this essay, of the desirability of "taking the initiative" in diplomacy.
It is also frequently observed that the diplomatic mode of the United
States tends to be reactive rather than initiative.

It is observable that nations pass through "activist" periods in
their relations with neighbor states. For example, France under
Louis XI and XIV, and under Napoleon; Germany under Frederick
the Great, under Bismarck's Chancellorship, under Kaiser Wilhelm
and Adolph Hitler; England under Elizabeth I and Victoria; and
the United States at various times, most notably before 1850, and
after 1940.

The factors that impel some nations to be more activist than others,
or to be more diplomatically aggressive at some periods than at
others, do not appear to have been deftnitivel}' identified. Are they a
product of especially dynamic leadership? Popular motivation?
Styles of child-rearing? The educational system? Pohtical structure?
Central organization? Are there differences in one or another of these
factors which create instability that a more (or less) coherent, and
more dynamic, state is tempted to exploit? To what extent do science
and technology motivate national diplcmatic activism and to what
extent do they provide the tools to give force to its directions?

Indeed, measurement of the activist versus the reactive mode of
diplomatic conduct seems virtually impossible except in terms of the
broad canvas of historical perspective. One difficulty in measurement
has already been mentioned : that the two modes in practice overlaj).
That is, an initiative can be reactive in its origin; a reactive mode
can result from a completed initiative, or one which at any stage
has provoked a response; and a reaction can be so positively innovative
and powerful in its impact as to interrupt the continuity of diplomacy
and thus appear to be a fresh initiative.

Discussion of Initiative and Reactive Alodes in Earlier Parts of the Study
Special attention was not addressed to this question in the opening
chapter that provided the prospectus for the entire study of Science,
Technology, and American Diplomacy. It was not recognized at the
outset as a major or significant dimension of diplomatic st3'le. Hew-
ever, as the work progressed, its significance became increasingly
evident. Granting that diplomacy can never be wholly geared to
either mode, the question still needs to be answered as to what propor-
tion of actions in foreign policy are undertaken in response to external
pressures (oil embargo, Sputnik, missiles to Cuba, etc.) and what pro-
portion are seen to have been directly aimed toward achievement of
U.S. foreign policy objectives without previous compelling foreign
pressures (United Nations, establishment of World Bank, President
Kennedy's proposal for joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Moon mission, etc.).

Direct references to this question in the six cases and six issues
making up the study series and recapitulated in this summary are
sparse. Nevertheless, the few which occur are significant. They add

1720

up to a conclusion as to the desirability of increased Icng-range plan-
ning, statements of more explicit and comprehensive diplomatic goals,
and the design of a more coherent and constructive course of initiative
action toward these goals in which various reactions to external forces
can be assessed for long-range consistency.

CASE one: the baruch plan

The case chronicles the failure of a technological-diplomatic initia-
tive undertaken by the United States immediately following World
War II. What was at stake was the long-range security not only of
the United States but of the world at large. The alternative ultimately
•chosen (by default, not by design) was the expenditure of trillions cf
dollars on nuclear arms and delivery systems and an uneasy truce
among the ''superpowers," while one by one other nations— China,
France, and India, with others in the wings — added themselves to
the "Nuclear Club." The effect was an enormously costly and insecure
peace which has been styled the "balance cf terror."

The extreme secrecy in which the Manhattan District carried out
its mission left no opportunity for advance study of the need for the
postwar options to control the new technology. Those engaged in the
project itself were too preoccupied with the technology per se to engage
in profound thought about consequences, beyond reaching agreement
that the weapon must somehow be kept under control — preferably
international. State Department executives charged with formulating
U.S. diplomacy remained in total ignorance of the project.

However, when in the summer of 1945 the secret was out and the
war ended, the confusions of postwar demobilization, upheaval in
China, restoration in Europe, and Soviet reversion to hostility and
aloofness combined to overtax the planning capabilities of U.S. diplo-
macy. Insufficient manpower was spared to think through the problem
of what to do about the atom. It was treated as just one more problem,
rather than as the paramount question of the age. And the Soviet
tendency to minimize its importance was also unhelpful.

Even today it is still not evident exactly what kind of initiative the
United States might have taken to obviate the disastrous consequences
of the new nuclear capability. The vSoviet motivation to delay while
independently developing its own bomb was strong. Still, in view of
the predictably enormous costs and hazards of failure, it is hard to
comprehend in retrospect why the achievement of nuclear control at
this early stage did not motivate a much more vigorous and persistent
effort than it did. Perhaps a key to the puzzle may be found in the
words of a leading scientist, writing in the late 1940s: ". . .we have
done military planning of actual campaigns in time of war exceedingly
well, and we have done military planning of broad nature in time of
peace exceedingly badly." ^" (His solution, in essence, was the adoption
of an interdisciplinary approach in which the Nation's best minds
would be brought continuously to bear in the planning process.)
Many observers of the American character have commented on the
combination of temperamental impatience and ideological distaste
which Americans have traditionally exhibited toward the planning
process at the national level, except under crisis conditions.

«25 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1949, p. 252.

1721

Denied advance knowledge of the new weapon, the Department of
State was in no position to evolve its own diplomatic strategy. Even
had the knowledge been vouchsafed to its leaders, the technical skills
of the Department would scarcely have been equal to the task of
foretelling the directions and rate of change in military technology
that would result. And, indeed, even had they seen these clearly, and
planned well for the arms control negotiations to follow the war, it is
still doubtful that the Department, as constituted, could have led the
United States or other nations into a stable agreement for the control
of the new weapon. It would, it appears, have taken more effective and
purposeful governmental machinery for resolving global security prob-
lems of such high magnitude, charged Math sparing no effort and yield-
ing to no obstacles in working out step-by-step solutions, than then
existed — or than exists today. It can be argued that for lack of such
machinery and such resolve, (1) a crucial early initiative failed, (2)
no decisive action was taken to replace the failed initiative, and (3) a
pattern of escalation was established, and still prevails.

CASE two: COMMERCCAL nuclear power in EUROPE

The effort to bring the atomic technology under practical control
was renewed during President Eisenhower's first term of office. In
his Atoms for Peace address to the U.N. General Assembly, Decem-
ber 8, 1953, the President foresaw nuclear proliferation and its attend-
ant dangers. The alternative he proposed was an initiative to commit
increasing quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful, energy-
producing appUcations. The United States would lead the way.

Success in this endeavor was mixed. The spread of peaceful nuclear
technology was undoubtedly speeded and some fissionable material
was diverted from weaponry. But an abundance of fissionable material
was reserved to trigger the ever-growing stockpiles of thermonuclear
(fusion) warheads. Meanwhile, the plutonium produced as a.byproduct
of fission power reactors grew from a nuisance to a real danger: it
could become a weapon in the hands of a nation with modest technical
capabilities, or conceivably even in the hands of a terrorist
organization.

It is not evident whether the extent of safeguards necessary to
maintain control over byproduct plutonium would have been accept-
able as a concomitant of nuclear sharing. Yet the combination of
policies — each plausible in itself — to share the peaceful atom, en-
courage its exploitation by private enterprise, aid less-advanced
nations in its use, and introduce the theme of healthy competition into
the use of the technology lias produced a mixture of benefits and
hazards that seem likely to grow side by side.

Again, it is not evident that more profound study of this diplomatic
initiative could have held down the costs or enhanced the benefits.
The momentum of Presidential policy might have been too strong for
intervention by any policy planning group. Nor can it be said that the
world would necessarily have been a safer place had the President not
taken the Atoms for Peace initiative.

Nevertheless, it is at least possible that such study, backed by a
combined Presidential and congressional determination inspired by
recognition of the growing magnitude of the problem, could have led
at this second likely moment in history to effective international

1722

agreements for controlling the hazards of proUferation while expanding
the benefits of peaceful uses. Here too, as in the case of the Baruch
Plan initiative, there was lacking appropriate governmental machin-
ery for bringing political leaders and technical experts together for a
sustained dialog and thorough investigation of the problem. ^^^

CASE three: the political legacy of the international

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

This study deals with a nongovernmental science initiative. The
author suggests that this initiative led "substantially" to the success-
ful negotiation of three important treaties, and provided a possible
model for wider cooperation among nations as well as a succession of
follow-on scientific endeavors of a multilateral or global character. He
concludes :

Perhaps an even more persuasive testament to that power is to be found not
in the symbolic, formal language and protocol of treaties but in the quickened
pace and broadened scope of the many international meetings to exchange both
basic knowledge and technological know-how which can trace their origins to
the IGY example. It was 50 years between the First Polar Year and the Second,
and 25 years from that to the IGY. Today hardly a year goes by without one or
more major conferences addressed to phenomena and problems of the environ-
ment, the oceans, energy, or new aspects of mankind's relationships with regard
to outer space. To say that the IGY was responsible for these developments to
advance the human condition would be gross overstatement, since the phe-
nomena and problems themselves are ultimately responsible simply by their
existence. But human perception of them was furthered by the IGY; international
good will in collaborating to explore them was fostered by it; and it seems quite
possible that the IGY conferred on political leaders of most of the world's nations
an enlarged appreciation of the potential of constructive international collabora-
tion for solving political, as well as scientific and technological, problems.'^^

Reference might appropriately be made here to the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, where the IGY had its inception. In a later stud}'^,
Science and Technology in the Department oj State, there were a num-
ber of references to the potentially useful role of the Academy in
support of the Department of State. For example. Dean Harvey
Brooks of Harvard is quoted as suggesting that it w^ould be "desirable
if State could provide the Commission [on International Relations, of
the Academy] with some relatively unencumbered funds in order that
it could explore and develop new initiatives in the international science
and technology area, rather than merely respond to Government re-
quests in a problem-solving mode." ^^^

32« There was, to be sure, the rather elaborate machinery of the National Security Council as developed
under President Eisenhower. However, as a study of that period put it, "there is a . . . serious weakness in
the NSC staff machinery: the absence of any staff element which is concerned exclusively with long-range
planning from a national perspective. The concerns of the immediate future are enough to keep the NSC
Planning Board fully occupied. Board menibers are backstopped by a system of Board Assistants and
departmf^ntal staffs— the State Department's representative, for example, is Director of the Department's
Policy Planning Staff with a strength of ten or eleven personnel— but here again there is a . . . preoccu-
pation with current and pending developments. Though long-range planning was the original function for
which the Policy Planning Sta?'' was established under George Kennan, this apparently came to be re-
garded as an insupportable luxury in terms of the urgency of issues and the scarcity of highly qualified man-
power." ( Warren R. Johnston, A National Plan for the Long Haul, Army War College, 1955, pp. 39^0.) As
noted at the beginning of this essay, the initiative mode requires longer-range planning and analysis than the
reactive.

"'U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the International Geo-
physical Year, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis, Science Policy
Research Division, Congressional Research Science, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1973: vol. I, p. 358.

'28 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Science and Technology in the Department
of State, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Huddle, Senior Specialist in Science
and Technology. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1975: vol. II, p. 1499 (footnote 282).

1723

The interest of the Department of State in the IGY was minimal —
perhaps in recognition of the fact that the scientific community delib-
erately preferred to do its own planning and to avoid any stigma of
nationalistic innovation. Nevertheless, the scientists gratefully ac-
cepted assistance in travel arrangements of U.S. nationals abroad and
foreign visitors to the United States. The question remains as to what
further contributions to U.S. diplomatic goals, and more generally to
global peace and amity, might result from activities of the world's
scientific community, and what encouragement by the Department
would increase such contributions. It would be of interest in the so-
called "Pugwash" conferences of scientists studying global security
and welfare, the "Club of Rome" studies of world resources and popu-
lation problems, and various international conferences of scientists
and technologists in particular disciplines. Some participants, notably
those from Communist countries, have their expenses paid by their
governments. Should possible roles of the Department of State in sup-
porting any of these international private activities of scientists and
technologists be examined? On the other hand, the attitude of the De-
partment toward such nongovernmental study groups of scientists has
tended to be protective and overcautious. What assurance might the
Department require before adopting a more positive and constructive
stance toward these activities?

CASE four: the MEKONG PROJECT

The thrust of this case is an assessment of the failure of an attempted
initiative by President Johnson in a speech of April 7, 1965, offering
to substitute regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin — with
substantial U.S. funding — for continued conflict.

A possible conclusion suggested in the study was that the fatal fault
•in the scheme lay not in its substance but in its timing. Said the study:

Manifestly, the contribution of the Mekong Project to an easing of the Viet-
namese conflict has not been significant or even measurable. The determined
nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict has remained obdurately
aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a prospective ultimate
victory. Notably also, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia adopted a not dissimilar
stance, apparently fearing that any U.S.-led or sponsored regional aid scheme
might entail dangerous compromises and reduced freedom of self-determination.
Accordingly, as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of cooperation in a
regional development scheme does not present a convincing opportunity .^^e

It was interesting to speculate, the study went on to say, "on what
different course events in Southeast Asia might have followed had the
Johnson offer been made at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1954
that partitioned Vietnam."

The uncertainties surrounding this kind of initiative are obvious,
and seem to warrant further investigation. It was, said the study,
""sheer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development of the
Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus for peaceful
economic progress, served as an educational process, and established
a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted region. However, the
question seems legitimate as to whether the consequences of a slowly
and deliberately encouraged regional development — region by region —

329 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problenis
of Regionalism, a studv in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Frankhn P. Huddle, Science
Policy Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972: vol I, p. 430.

1724

in lagging parts of the world might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives
in the long run." ^^^ Accordingly, the possibility that "the concept
might serve as an instrument of long-range diplomacy seems worth
further examination and putting to the test." ^^^

Some of the points made in the study tend to support this concept.
One is the remarkable forbearance, for a long time, of Communist
insurgents in their non-interference with the progress of the Mekong
program. Another is the way in which nationals of the different Ripar-
ian States were able to talk and work together in Bangkok, making
policy and plans even when some of their governments had broken
off diplomatic relations with each other. A third point is the extraor-
dinary durability of the project itself, which survived wave after
wave of political and military upheavals, emerging larger and stronger
each time. A fourth point is a psychological effect that many observers
have remarked: an attitude of cooperation on the part of the partic-
ipants that has been styled the "Spirit of the Mekong."

It is possible that, in an unobtrusive and apohtical way, other such
regional multistate projects could be initiated in troubled areas of the
world like the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, North Africa,
the Sahel, Rhodesia and the neighboring states, and regions of Central
and South America. Investment of capital is an essential ingredient,
but there are others of importance: skill in planning, participation
and cooperation of nationals from states with long histories of suspicion
and dissonance, technological skills, and so on. Nor would it be neces-
sary for the United States in taking such initiatives to assure a domi-
nant role and high profile. The gains could be twofold : in an increased
confidence and willingness to cooperate in the region, and the tangible
rewards of technological development of resources and commerce.

CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed

Perhaps the principal lesson of this case study in reference to the
initiative/reactive question — one which applies both internationally
and domestically — is that there may be severe limitations on initiative
when there are many interested parties with conflicting views. This
study explains the slow progress toward a U.S. position in these words:
"National honor, national security, sovereignty, and territorial claims
all combine to intensify feelings and delay the building of a
consensus." ^^^

Another lesson to be drawn from the study is that the huge stakes
involved require that sooner or later a generally acceptable resolution
of the issue of the rights to the ocean floor must be found. The ques-
tion is whether it will be arrived at by diplomatic processes, by
economic accretion, or by force of arms. It would be fortunate for
the world's nations if a U.S. initiative could be devised to lead the
way to a final resolution by the first of these three options.

It is not hard to understand why an issue of such great moment
should remain so long unresolved. Yet here, surely, is an opportunity
for decisive U.S. initiative, based on long and thoughtful analysis,

330 Huddle, Mekong Project, vol. 1, p. 431.

"1 Ibid., p432.

332 U.S. Congress, House, Comniittee on Foreign Affairs, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, a study in
the scries on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National
Security Policy and Sci^entific Developments by^ George Dounianij^ Sj;ience Pq[icy Research_pivisionj
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971:
vol. I, p. 517.

1725

Planning, and preparation. Unlike the atomic bomb issue that strucl?
J.S. diplomats unawares, the seabed question has evolved slowly;
tapping the oil in the seabed of the Gulf of Mexico and off the Cali-
fornia Coast came in the 1940s. The early 1960s saw the ill-fated
Mohole Project, which demonstrated the feasibility of deep ocean
drilling. Knowledge of the manganese nodules has been with us for
half a century. Much of the substance of the 19th century diplomacy
dealt with fishing rights. In two grei^t wars, 1812 and 1917, issues of
freedom of the seas were at stake. Now, in the context of dwindling
global reserves of petroleum and minerals, and food from the sea, with
many claimants for these valuable resources, the control of the inter-
national commons of the oceans remains unresolved and a continuing
threat to international amity.

CASE six: tj.s.-soviet commercial relations

This study offers two important lessons regarding the formulation
of initiatives — and, conversely, regarding the shaping of reactions — =
of one "superpower" to another. Failure to exploit the expanding
commercial opportunities toward detente between the United States
and the Soviet Union could have unfortunate consequences:

The present period appears to be a critical one in U.S.-Soviet relations.
If the two countries move ahead in developing commercial relations, progress
in political, cultural, and other areas may be facilitated. The failure to do so
may engender disappointments, frustrations, and suspicions which could ulti-
mately result in a return to the pre-Summit atmosphere. In short, an opportunity
is now available to the United States which might conceivably lead to either sub-
stantially expanded relations over a 10- to 20-year period or, if the opportunity
is not seized and U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade is not now expanded, to continued diversion
of the Soviet market to Western European and Japanese suppliers and to a sharp
deterioration in Soviet-U.S. relations.^^^

The other lesson is that initiatives must be built on knowledge,
rather than hopes or expectations:

Because political benefits are the main measure of net gain to the United States
from any pattern of increased U.S.-Soviet trade, careful calibration of the risks
and uncertainties is in order.

If the Soviet Union is indeed in the process of reordering priorities and accepting
greater involvement in the international political and economic system — i.e.,
accepting the rules of behavior of that system — a significant reduction of impedi-
ments to trade may result: this would be much more beneficial to the United States
than would the modest economic gains to be derived from expanding markets.

If, however, Soviet trade overtures do not extend further than a willingness to
settle old accounts, such as Lend Lease, and purchase of more grain and techno-
logically advanced equipment, in exchange for relaxation of trade and credit
restrictions, U.S. policymakers may be well advised to limit concessions and
engage in hard bargaining, with expectation of only modest political and economic
benefits.

The policies followed by the United States and the Soviet Union will greatly
influence the probabilities of alternative outcomes. As the policy objectives of the
Soviet leaders are especially crucial to such a projection, it cannot be known for
some time with any certainty which different alternative courses, or what com-
promise between them, is being followed.

Thus as knowledge of which of the alternatives will prevail may not be evident
for several years, very careful official and public scrutiny of each step in the
progress of the Joint L'.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission discussions would
appear to be in order for both the executive and legislative branches.

?''■ U.S. Congress, Tlouse, Committep on Forpign Affairs, V.S.-Soikt Commercial Relations: The Interplay
of Economics, Technoln(i>/ Transfer, and Diplomacy ,:i study in the series on Science, Teehnolofry, and American
Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by
Jolin P. Hardt and George D. HoUiday, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington^
D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973: vol. I, p. 606.

172G

These two observations can be generalized to the two propositions
that an activist foreign policy can be constructive, but that it must
have a firm foundation of supporting knowledge of the real world.

ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology

This early study in the series develops the theme of the importance
of technology for diplomacy. Thus, "technology has been shown
capable of advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives, but it is neither
infallible nor invariably beneficial."

The question, then, is how to determine what the Federal policy should be
with respect to technology, for purposes of U.S. diplomacy. It is certain, in any
event, that technology will continue to advance. Once set in motion, it has a
momentum of its own. The question is whether and how the dynamics of this
changing feature of the American culture can be guided and directed to serve the
objectives of U.S. international relations. Implicit in this question is the further
issue of whether such diplomatic gains should be pursued or abandoned when they
are found to conflict with domestic or regional programs. What sacrifices are
necessarj'? Are the}^ tolerable? Who should decide? Who should determine the
rules of the game — the criteria and values on which the choice is made? What
organizational resources are available to make these decisions? Are they adequate
for the purpose? What else needs to be done? ^^*

A short section of the study recounts the "Frustration of U.S.
Efforts to Wield Technological Power." During the period 1950-70,
despite many seeming opportunities for the United States to assert a
constructive world leadership by enlisting its technological superi-
ority, "the undoubted promise of technology had not achieved ful-
fillment." The study asked why —

Was it because technologists were unable to produce unflav/ed innovations?
Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies for global
effects? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplomats to
achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product? Where did — and do —
the weaknesses lie? ^^*

This perplexity, expressed in 1970, is altogether as valid today. Why
indeed has superior U.S. technology been so weakly employed as an
instrument of diplomacy?

One answer to this question. was suggested in the study:

It seems evident that modern diplomats and policym.akers require special
training in imdersianding and using technology, and in formulating plans that
involve the new uses or development of new kinds of technology. Parliaments are
called upon to evaluate and approve agreements and treaties with a technological
content. New information is needed for assessing the relationship between tech-
nological information and practical politics.^^^

There were abundant opportunities for the diplomatic exploitation
of technological leadership, and the Nation \\as internationally
active in many of them. The study noted the growth —

... of international participation in Earth satellite systems for global com-
munications, resource surveys, weather prediction, navigation, and other usefui
services derived from the space program. One effect of this activity has been to
advertise globr.lly the technological accomplishments of the United States m ai
difficult and costly field. .Another effect has V)oen to encoiirage a global attitude
toward the Karth itself — perceiving it as itself a "spaceship," whose passenger?*
share its fate, irrespective of country or region. A third effect is tO' tie together

33» U.S. Congress, TIoii'^'\ romir.ittroon Foroiptn AlTair?, The Kiohilinv (if Inlcrnalional 7Vc/i7?o?r)(7j/, astudy
In Ihc .series on Science, Techuoio^'y. and Ameri<'au Diploiaacy preiiiivfd for the Suhcommittcp on National
Security I'olicyiind Sdentific Devolnpnvnts by Frivuklin P. Huddle, Science I'ojicy Research Divisioa,
Congressional Research Service," Library of CorigreVs, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970:
vol. II, p. 619.

335 jbid., p. 627.

336 Ibid., p. 652.

1727

into single systems global communications, transportation systems, resources,
environmental efifects, and weather and climate. International participation in
space projects is demonstrably being stimulated by the opportunities for tangible
benefit as well as by the prestige they afford.^*'

There were both costs and rewards: "Leadership in large international
projects of technology contributes to diplomatic influence at the same
time that diplomatic skills are needed in the design and construction
«of international consortia to execute such projects."

The study quotes the report of a Presidential task force on science
polic}', April 1970, that offered a virtual catalog of opportunities for
initiatives. These were addressed to a formula based on U:S. leadership
in large projects, shared efforts on mutual problems, technical assist-
ance where appropriate, and the building of national capabilities for
self-help. Excerpts from the catalog include the statements that:

— The intrinsic nature of science results in unusual opportunities for
international scientific cooperation and assistance.

- — Some technological enterprises — the space program, for example — offer
unusual opportunities for foreign policy and international initiative.

— Universal human interests crossing aU international boundaries — in
agriculture, health, clean air and water, education, and communications — all
suggest similar though more diffuse opportunities.

— . . . The Federal Government is . . . making insufficient use of our exten-
sive scientific and technological capabilities as instruments of foreign co-
operation and understanding.

— The question of international technology transfer — the delivery and
application of scientific and technological knowledge, methods, and tech-
niques from one nation to another — is one to which the United States should
give very searching consideration in its formulation of a more effective science
policy.

— . . . It is unlikely that indiscriminate efforts to transfer technology will
be effective; technology, to be useful, must be related properly to local en-
vironment and cultural and economic restrictions.

— . . . Much greater emphasis must be placed on the transfer of research
and development capabilities, rather than of technology itself.

— . . . An enlarged program of educational assistance in areas of science
and technology should be made an essential element in our foreign aid
program.

(U.S. President's Task Force on Science Policy. "Science and Technology:
Tools for Progress." The report of the President's Task Force on Science
Policy. April 1970. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970,
page 4042.) 338

The study addressed directly the U.S. tendency toward a reactive
foreign policy:

In Riesman's book, "The Lonely Crowd," he develops a theory of a society
divided into persons characterized as "Inner-Directed" and "Other-Directed."
If nations were so categorized, in aspects of their behavior, it might be said that
in the field of technology the United States to a considerable degree is "Other-
Directed." The great efforts of the United States in science and technology — since
1940, at least — were inspired by external events. The Manhattan Project was
initiated from fear that Nazi Germany might achieve nuclear power first. Work
on the H-bomb was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the
Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic missile submarine was a response to the
Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race was an effort to
catch and pass the Soviets in an area in which they had assumed a lead. The great
technological programs supported by the United States are still in military, atomic,
and space developments, and all are motivated by events outside the United States
or else support for them wancs.33»

337 Ibid., p. 661.

^ Ibid., pp. 669-670.

33« Ibid., pp. 676-677.

1728

In view of the apparent opportunities for such leadership, this
"Other-Directed" syndrome suggests a regrettable failure to grasp
opportunity :

It seems paradoxical that the United States, best equipped to apply science and
technology to the solution of man's global problems, and credited with the highest
development of managerial skills, has been reluctant to devise and implement a
positive technological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no lack of oppor-
tunities : Earth resources satellites, ocean and ocean floor development, urban im-
provement, recovery of resources from all forms of waste, the Oak Ridge proposal
for large agricultural-industrial-nuclear complexes, and many more.""

On the other hand, the reactive mode has apparently been a factor
in encouraging "high" technology to the neglect of bread-and-butter
technologies on which most of the world's economies rely. Thus:

One of the consequences of this "Other-Directed" syndrome in national tech-
nological strategy is that the United States has concentrated its efforts on tech-
nologies characteristically remote from everyday experience. It has supported the
laser but not the science of processing garbage. There are lags in the technological
levels of a number of industries in the United States : such lags may in time impair
the credibility of the U.S. posture of world technological leadership. On this point,
one issue of U.S. technological strategy would seem to be a conscious set of deci-
sions as to the domestic technological gaps to be closed or ignored. What older
technologies might be revitalized by an infusion of fresh technological effort, such
as the railroads, glass and ceramics, coal, lumber, and textiles? What would be the
diplomatic consequences of a vigorous technological effort in one, several, or all of
these fields? 3"

Emphasis on high technology may serve useful purposes. But, ob-
served the study, "in the design of a total national strategy of tech-
nology,"

. . . the effect of their being already on the scene in great numbers is to provide
pressures for the United States to keep on doing. what it has been doing. Where
can objective analysis and innovative policy be found that can examine alterna-
tives or additions to the national program? ^*^

The posture suggested by the President in 1970 seems valid still: "If
our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational
conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the prod-
ucts of rational and deliberate choice." ^''^

ISSUE two: the politics of global health

A general characteristic of the subject of this study is that its broad
objective — world health — does not invite controversy. Controversy
about the management of means of advancing global health such as
health care delivery systems, national declarations about epidemics,
quarantine regulations, and so forth, can be quite lively. But there is
an underlying content of substantial international consensus in the
broad field and general acceptance of the moral essence of efforts
toward health of all peoples. The author suggests the possibility that
initiatives in the field of global health, intrinsically beneficial, can
also yield diplomatic gains because of the universal respect the subject
commands. Moreover, the United States as a highly advanced nation
in the science and technology of medicine and public health is ideally
equipped to exploit the diplomatic advantages of leadership in the
effort toward world health by systematically seeking out ways for
nations of the world to benefit from this resource.

^0 Ibid., p. 677.
3" Ibid.

3*i Ibid., p. 678.
3" Ibid., p. 680.

1729

The study chronicled an interesting initiative in 1851 in the design of
the First International Quarantine Congress in Paris. By arranging
that each of the 12 participating nations be represented by one
diplomat and one doctor, the French government as host ensured
that the primary conflict would center on technical versus political
views, ratner than on political views alone. Essentially, this amounted
to a defusing of nationalistic interests. Moreover, it established a
principle that in the field of global health it was necessary for diplo-
mats and doctors to talk with each other to seek workable political
solutions to technical problems. Significantly, a continuity of progress
in global health has beep, maintained on this basis down to the present
da}^

Since the study was first issued there have been some moves in the
direction suggested. However, the field is far from saturated and the
interrelations between this issue and those in the section to follow
suggest that the opportunity is still open and the urgency of its ex-
ploitation increasing. The author's preference appears to be for the
multilateral approach and he also emphasizes the importance of the
participatory role of the Congress, the executive branch, and the U.S.
public. Thus, he concludes :

It would seem appropriate for the United States to utilize the authority of
WHO and the power of its international voice in the support of national as well
as international programs. This country has the resources, the systems skills, and
the biomedical technology for making WHO a better institution than it now is.
The United States can be the instrumentality for preparing and shaping WHO
to manage the common global health problems of the future.

Yet WHO wiU shape nothing without stronger support than is now evident for
international health institutions, in the Congress or at Secretarial levels in the
Departments of State and of Health, Education, and Welfare. The situation seems
to be a most peculiar one for world health, namely, commitment without involve-
ment. The United States is meeting its fiscal obligations to WHO and PAHO
with very little organizational evidence as yet that it also intends to play a
positive determinant role in an area where American technical competence is at
its best, where its presence is least offensive, and indeed where American leadership
is fully expected by the rest of the world.

Perhaps there is need to mount an educational program so that a larger segment
of the public is included in the discourse surrounding the issues of national and
global public health. The status of the world's health might become a public
issue; and that issue coiild stimulate scientific, medical, and economic debate.
For in the United States, at least, debate is absolutely essential to both clarifica-
tion and political action.'**

ISSUE three: beyond malthus

The theme of this study was that "Finding a solution to the food/
population dilemma is the central problem of international develop-
ment." ^"Initiatives in this complex field encounter deep emotional
conflict and anxiety. Reaction is called for to respond not only to the
political views of other nations but also to the more urgent and dra-
matic needs of their peoples as drought and famine cause food stocks
to run short.

*** U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreipn Affairs, The Politics of Global Health, a study in the series
on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments by Freeman H. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division, Congres-
sional Research Series, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971: vol. II, p. 763.

3<5 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation, a
study in the series on Science, Technology and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Allan S. Nanes, Foreign Affairs Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971: vol. II,
p. 819.

1730

Among the hazards of U.S. initiatives are the personal and political
resistance to external meddling with the population function, and the
prospect of destabilizing a society's political structure by food produc-
tion programs that involve changes in the distribution of incomes. As
the author, Dr. Allan Nanes, puts it:

The job of U.S. diplomacy generally speaking is to advance and illuminate the
goals of U.S. foreign policy. With regard, especially, to a problem as complex and
delicate as that of achieving a food/population balance, it must do so without
offending the sensibilities of the countries concerned. As noted earlier the United
States seeks to promote the Green Revolution and concomitant economic develop-
ment. It is evident from what has been said already that this U.S. posture creates
or exacerbates some difficult diplomatic problems.

U.S. diplomats are faced with the job of urging technological change on the
leaders of the LDCs, even though such changes may have unsettling social and
political consequences. Indeed, it is even possible that the very leaders who take
U.S. advice may find themselves deposed as a consequence of the social instability
introduced by technological innovation. It seems paradoxical for the United
States to encourage the LDCs to adopt the new agricultural technology knowing
that there is a high risk of social turmoil, if a principal aim of U.S. development
assistance is to help bring about stability in those countries. However, it is the
U.S. hope that any destabilizing effects of the Green Revolution can be confined
to the short run, and that eventually the position of the United States vis-a-vis
the LDCs will be stronger, as the role of the Green Revolution in overall economic
development becomes clearer, and its benefits more manifest.^"

An important lesson of Dr. Nine's study is the interconnectedness
of the food/population dilemma with the whole fabric of concerned
nations. Careful study is necessary to lay the groundwork for initia-
tives, and resort to multilateral mechanisms to implement them seems
the most reasonable course. But while progress, however, slow, toward
the resolution of the dilemma is a national and a global goal, urgent
attention to desperate emergencies cannot be neglected. Both
long-range and short-range action have their complications. Writes
Dr. Nanes:

The one conclusion to which the evidence points most insistently is that the
food/people dilemma cannot be considered in isolation. It is, rather, an integral
part of the total development process, and be3^ond that a feature of a maturing
world. Even if the Green Revolution is successful in feeding a vastly increased
population, development will not go forward and living standards will only decline
if population growth is not effectively checked. For population is even more
intractable a problem than food supply. All phases of development are retarded
as long as expanding population eats into economic growth. Investment is held
back or channeled into unproductive areas. Job opportunities are not created,
and unemployment or underemployment spreads. Social misery continues un-
checked, and populations — rural and urban — become increasingly susceptible
to appeals to violence.^*^

The food/population problem will be solved globally in some com-
bination of two ways — by assuring an adequacy of food or by the
limiting of population, whether by design or by starvation. As the
study observes: "There is a regrettable tendency on the part of
mankind to respond eagerly to rewarding opportunities but to ignore
the prospect of misfortune and delay action to avert it until convinced
of its reality by its actual onset." ^"'^ As the primary exporter of
food, the United States has both the opportunity and the necessity
to exercise moral and technical leadership in achieving a global food/
population balance. Here initiative is greatly preferable to the reaction
to endless crises of foreign food shortages. IJnless this country devises

3*<-' Ihid., pp. 820-821.
w md., p. 864.
348 Ibid., p. 861.

1731

and presents to the world community of nations a pattern of successful
initiatives to solve the dilemma, the alternative will be inescapable:
the periodic making of ad hoc responsive decisions as to who eats and
who starves.

ISSUE four: U.S. scientists abroad

There is an obvious relationship between the subject of this study
and that of the IGY case. For purposes of the discussion of the
initiative/reactive mode question, the two studies might be considered
together. Or, at least, the support of foreign activities of U.S. scientists
as a contribution to U.S. diplomacy should be recognized as a benefi-
cial element of more specific scientific projects of an international
character.

While international exchanges of scientists and engineers may not
be considered generally to be an impressive subject for a diplomatic
initiative nor even, perhaps, as a reaction to another country's initia-
tive, there may be special cases where it could assume this nature.
For example, proposals for a major exchange of technical personnel
with the People's Republic of China or North Vietnam, or for a
comprehensive technological survey of regional needs in the Middle
East involving a mixture of American with Loth Arab and Israeli
scientists and engineers on a nongovernmental level, might have
interesting consequences.

What may be more to the point, though, is a suggestion by
Emilio Q. Daddario for a scheme to devise an international consensus
on global science policy. According to this view:

. . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater
consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being
and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational
effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanisms?
Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the
priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term locahzed
problems and long-term global problems? ^"

Ccntinuing along this line of reasoning, one might suggest ways in
which to further such a set of global science and technology goals by
carefully designed initiatives involving large-scale exchange of persons.
It should be noted, however, that Genevieve Knezc,^^^ author of the
stud}^, warns of the necessity for close monitoring and documentation
of such exchanges to maximize their utility and to design means to
increase their efficiency.

ISSUE five: brain drain

The goal of the United States, according to Dr. Joseph Whelan,
author of this study, is "a world in balance, with economic and social
opportunity within the grasp of all inhabitants and a sense of hope
in all nations." ^^^ Dr. Whelan devotes considerable attention to

'" Emilio Q. Daddario. "National Science Policy— Prelude to Global Cooperation." Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (June 1971), p. 22. This statement was presented to the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics at its 12th meeting with the Panel on Science and Technology, January 1971.

s*" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major
Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and Ameri-
can Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments
by Genevieve J. Knezo, Science Policy Research Division, Library of Congress Washington, D.C. U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1974: vol. 11, p. 1034.

M* U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of
Jnternational Scientific Mobility, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy
prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Joseph O.
Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Washington. D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974: vol. If, p. 1318.

1732

cataloging the "push" factors that motivate emigration of trained
people, and the "pull" factors that draw immigrants. Brain drain,
he concludes, is a "symptom of underdevelopment," and its solutions —

... may be the primary responsibility of the LDCs, particularly the task of
institution-building and establishing an infrastructure of science and technology
as the basis for modernization, but solutions can neither be devised nor develop-
ment goals achieved without assistance from the advanced countries like the
United States. Success in diminishing the "push" factors in brain drain and in
resolving the dilemma of development by transforming needs into demands would
seem to rest upon acceptance of the principle of interdependence as a contemporary
fact of life in international aflFairs.^*^

Thus, there is still room for U.S. initiatives in helping less-developed
countries to build the kinds of infrastructure which will offer employ-
ment and challenge to citizens of the country who receive their educa-
tion abroad, and thereby induce them to return. Past U.S. technical
aid efforts have often been criticized for displacing native efforts
instead of developing self-help skills and institutions. The problem,
then, would seem to be one of taking fresh aim.

ISSUE six: science and technology in the department of state

This final study in the series gave considerable attention to the
initiative/reactive dichotomy and in particular to the administrative
and analytical implications of both modes. For example:

. . . urgent operational demands on staff attention can distract attention from
the thinking-through of big problems, the planning of large new initiatives, and
the sorting-out of uncommon subtleties. This unresolved administrative issue
will become increasingly nagging as short-term problems of science and technology
multiply, while at the same time the opportunities for large initiatives tend to be
neglected for want of staff time and attention.^'^

Elsewhere the study notes that "Historically, the Department of
State has not been especially alert to the opportunities for technological
diplomacy." Documentation of this defect is offered from both a former
Secretary of State and the academic community .^^* Defects in the
analytical equipment of the Department are also scored by a senior
member of the Department's science staff.^^^ Elsewhere the study
notes :

A persuasive case could be made that the American diplomatic style has tended
to be reactive rather than initiatory. This hypothesis finds support in the fact
that the ultimate decisions proposed are those of the President; the departmental
role has tended to be to staff initiatives rather than to propose them, and to analyze
the actions and initiatives of other nations to chart the options for U.S. responses.^**

As to the substantive character of initiatives, the study noted that
since World War 11 most U.S. agencies had large foreign missions and
that "the bulk of the foreign contacts of U.S. agencies have a techno-
logical content." ^^^

The study called attention to the conflicting requirements of staffing
for initiatives in foreign policy and for the reactive mode. Both modes
required the same data base, broad knowledge, and analytical capabil-
ities. But while the initiative mode needed unhurried deliberation, the

"2 Ibid., p. 1316.

»^3 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1334.

^ Ibid., p. 1433.

35i Ibid., pp. 1435-1436.

»6 Ibid., p. 1491.

3i7 Ibid., p. 1328.

1733

reactive mode was highly time-dependent. A planning team qualified
to work in either mode was likely to find its energies totally absorbed
by the needs of decisionmakers for policy guidance on immediate
problems. Inherently these would be reactions to external develop-
ments. Accordingly^ the study raised the question as to the desirability
of staffing separately for both modes. Such a scheme was tentatively
suggested for the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.
Also, in view of the large scientific and technological content of both
initiatives and problems of reaction, a similar division in planning was
suggested for the Department's Science Bureau. Moreover, it was
pointed out that there needed to be a close working relationship
between the long-range (i.e., initiatives development) elements of the
Planning Staff and OES, as well as between the reactive element of the
Planning Staff and the operational people in OES.^^^

The requirements of the Department are summed up as follows:

There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S.
technological developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the poten-
tial contributions to U.S. diplomacy of foreseeable futui'e technological
developments.

The heart of science and technology is invention and change. The problem is
to relate this force for change to diplomacy. It implies for the diplomatic process
the encouragement of creativeness and increased receptivity toward innovation.

More particularly, the rate of technological change and its impacts on the
diplomatic environment call for a strengthened abUity of the functional bureaus
to perceive and interpret these changes and impacts, around the world, and for an
increased alertness to the predictive power of technology analysis and f orecasting.*^"

Of course there is no guarantee that even the best organized and
staft'ed teams for planning initiatives and designing responses to
external events can win acceptance of their concepts and expedients.
As the study points out:

One problem that aU institutions concerned with policy analysis encounter is in
being believed by those who make decisions on policy issues. There are repeated
instances of studies that clearly identified a future danger, or the need to prevent
a future crisis, and were neglected until the event occurred. Unfortunately, there
are also repeated instances of forecasts of disaster that didn't happen after all.
It is worth noting, however, that the confidence level of any technology forecast
rises not merely when it is accepted by more critics but when it is subjected to
deeper and more comprehensive analysis. But while the confidence level of a
study may improve with effort, it is less likely that its political acceptability or
credibility will be correspondingly enhanced. Guidance on this problem calls for
much further study .2*°

One entire section (pages 1487-1489) of the study addressed the
question of sources of foreign policy initiatives in science and tech-
nology. It proposed fom* categories of such initiatives:

The technical aspects of diplomacy can be categorized roughly as follows: (1)
policies to encourage the international advance of basic science, e.g., support for
the International Biological Program; (2) policies to advance and exploit the
national posture in technology, e.g., agreements for the sale of enriched uranium
fuel elements; (3) policies to deal with global or international problems calling for
technological resolution, e.g., satellite survej^s of pollution sources and diffusion
patterns; and (4) policies employing science and technology to alter diplomatic
relationship in some beneficial way, e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R. science agreement ta
further detente. ^^i

358 Ibid.: see especially pages 1422-1426.

359 Ibid., p. 1449.

360 Ibid., p. 1468.

361 Ibid., pp. 1487-1488.

1734

Success in exploiting these opportunities has not been impressive or
rewarding. Yet the opportunities seem to exist in abundance.

It is not evident whether the general want of success of this effort to elicit fresh
ideas for diplomatic initiatives has been attributable to the lack of appropriate
organization for creativity, to the uncertainty as to the reception of bold and un-
conventional concepts, or perhaps an asserted tendency of the diplomatic com-
munity toward a reactive rather than innovative style of thought. Certainly there,
exist numerous areas in which opportunity for innovation is offered, and in which
the United States has unique competence. For example, the World Health Organi-
zation, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and various regional organizations
of the United Nations have programs that lag seriously and could be greatly
strengthened at relatively modest cost. The staffing of international organizations
with technical personnel from the United States as a form of training for their
future participation in the technical elements of the Department of State or the
Foreign Service might be considered. Positive action on the U.N. university pro-
posal, or such aspects of it as studies of the multinational corporation, normaliza-
tion of world resources, and seabed management, might warrant exploitation as
mutual interest intiatives. One of the more interesting possibilities is an open
invitation to foreign technologists to identify and help correct technological lags
in the United States as a counterpart to U.S. assistance of this type abroad. ^^^

Various other options were also offered, but the study stressed
the need for balancing creativity with caution. And it concluded this
discussion with a somewhat equivocal observation that —

Perhaps the best that can be said for this problem is that the study of in-
stitutions to promote diplomatic creativity, and encouragement of the U.S.
academic community to generate creative thought in this area, might show the
way to a higher degree of initiative. The importance of the Department of State
in this field, moreover, should not be overlooked.

(Author's footnote:) For example, in discussing the merits of a proposed con-
gressional diplomatic initiative "to facilitate the transfer to certain less developed
countries of United States discoveries, inventions, and research develop-
ments . . . " to be managed by NSF, Dr. H. Guj^ord Stever, director of NSF,
warned: "The close interrelation of science and technologj'^ with other U.S.
policies and initiatives in international affairs would seem to argue for the closest
possible coordination of aU of these efforts." Accordingly, it was necessary to
"take advantage of the capabilities of the Department of State, which I believe
are essential to the success of such an undertaking." (U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Science and Astronautics, International Cooperation in Science
and Space Subcommittee, International Science and Technology Transfer Act of
1974, Hearings, 93d Cong.,_2d sess., May 21-23, 1974, p. 21.).363

A distinction is suggested between science and technology as re-
gards utility for diplomatic initiatives. Thus, science ". . . is basically
an international activity, with a world network of communication
among practitioners of the separate scientific disciplines."

Government funding is generally welcomed but government direction is not.
Science per se has little impact on diplomacy, and that mostly beneficial, while
diplomacy can pave the way for expanded scientific exchanges of persons and
joint or multinational projects. Scientific programs are rarely the subject of serious
diplomatic controversy. They tend mostly to low-cost activities.^"

Thus initiatives in science tend to be long-range in effect, low-key,
and pervasive rather than specific. However —

In contrast with science, the impacts of technology on diplomacy are numerous
and powerful. While many of these impacts are loosely identified as "scientific,"
it is more precise to refer to them as the technological applications of new scientific
principles. The spread of technology is increasingly global, tending in the process
to infringe national sovereignties. The inroads are caused by such technical
effects as satellite overflights and penetration of the deep oceans, and by such
institutional developments as the multinational corporation and multination
cartels/ On the other hand, both the uses of technology and the scarcity of re-
sources consumed in these uses may encourage a more intense nationalism.

362 Ibid., pp. 1488-1489.

363 Ibid., p. 1489.
361 Ibid., p. 1493.

1735

Science may respond beneficially to diplomatic initiatives, but technology de-
termines in major ways the whole environment of diplomacy and national
power. It is therefore a fit subject for broad policy analysis on a major and con-
tinuing basis. It requires extensive information inputs. Quantitative as well as
qualitative factors are involved. Technical knowledge and understanding are
needed in the analysis, but broader social and political understanding are also
essential.^^

An interesting suggestion appears in the study (with particular
reference to technology, it must be asserted) that the resources of the
National Academy of Sciences be more S3^stematically mobilized in
the quest for diplomatic initiatives. A report by the Academj'^ had
found that technical matters of diplomacy ". . . receive little leader-
ship or effective guidance until they reach crisis proportions or cause
major political problems." Thus it called for an advisory council in
the Executive Office of the President, closely coupled with the De-
partment of State and the National Security Council. Said the NAS
report:

That coupling would enable the council to provide in international matters
the early warning and coordinated attention to crisis management and selective
program development that have been suggested here as among the principal
functions of the council. It would enable the council to intervene, side by side
with those within the Department of State responsible for scientific affairs, at
the points where policy is actively determined, particularly where Presidential
initiatives or interests are immediately involved.^^^

Some Concluding Observations

Granting the overlapping nature of the initiative and reactive modes
of diplomacy, there is evidence that the United States tends toward
the latter. There may be reason to believe that concentration on
responsive rather than initiative diplomacy can be more dangerous
for a nation's security in the long run, and conversely, that the initia-
tive mode is both more rewarding and less burdensome.

The United States is still the technological leader of the community
of nations. This advantage offers a potential for diplomatic exploita-
tion, especially since the bulk of modern problems and issues in inter-
national relations have substantial technical content.

It is important also to note that technology has been a major factor
in the gradual development of interdependence among nations.

Accordingly, exploitation of scientific and technological opportuni-
ties for diplomatic purposes and toward diplomatic goals seems an
imperative form of the initiative mode. Then what are its re-
quirements?

Foremost among the requisite elements of an initiative technical-
diplomatic mode are planning institutions with adequate data base,
analytical capabilities and innovative character — and influence in the
policj'making process.

Among the kinds of opportunities that could be explored are the
relative advantages of bilateral and multilateral initiatives, of global
and regional programs of development, and of attention to health,
population, food, the seabed, nuclear safeguards, and global science
projects. Particularl}^ attractive is the relativel}^ noncontroversial and
highly acceptable area of global health.

365 Ibid., pp. 1493-1494.

3«6 National Academy of Sciences, ad hoc Committee on Science and Technology, Science and Technology
iti Presidential Policymaking: a Proposal. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences, June 1974: 45.

1736

Both the initiative and reactive modes of diplomacy in the modern
world require a pooling of the best efforts and skills of technical and
diplomatic manpower. Collaboration needs to extend throughout the
institutions charged with the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign
policy. But the exercise of initiative is the main point of this essay;
it signifies the kind of leadership best calculated to produce movement
toward the diplomatic goals at the heart of U.S. foreign policy.

Some Questions for Further Consideration

How can a democratic political system operate effectively in the
initiative mode?

What planning institutions are most useful for either the reactive
or initiative mode, and particularly for the latter?

What national goals might be adopted as the targets of a diplomac}^-
in the initiative mode?

Is it realistic to fix goals for the reactive mode and if so what might
they be?

Is it practicable for the United States to move more extensively^
into the initiative mode of diplomac}^ without close coordination
between the legislative and executive branches?

What aspects of the external world require particular attention
in the conduct of long-range planning in the initiative mode?

Can any generalizations be made as to whether leading nations
of the world consciously follow either of the two modes?

How are bilateral and multilateral relations related to the initiative
and responsive modes? Do they pair up in any constructive or useful
way?

Is the regional approach to diplomatic goals identified clearly with
the initiative mode or could it be a vehicle for the reactive mode
(as President Johnson attempted to make it)?

How does the reactive/initiative dichotom}^ relate to various
conceptual power structures of the world: bipolar, multipolar, etc?

Chapter 19 — Bilateral Versus Multilateral
Diplomatic Relationships

CONTENTS

Page

Appearance of the Issue in Earlier Parts of the Study 1741

Case One: The Baruch Plan 1742

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 1742

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical

Year 1 1744

Case Four: The Mekong Project 1745

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 1746

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 1747

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 1748

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 1749

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 1750

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 1751

Issue Five: Brain Drain 1752

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of State 1753

Some Concluding Observations 1754

Some Questions for Further Consideration 1755

(1739) •

96-243 O - 77 - 16

CHAPTER 19— BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIPS

In the construction of institutional arrangements of the L^nited
States with other nations for sustained scientific research and tech-
nological development programs of common concern, an important
issue is whether to emplo}^ a separate bilateral, "one-to-one" relation-
ship with each participant, or to bring together all or many interested
nations in one or more multilateral arrangements. Manifestly theie
will be occasions on which one form will be unmistakably superior
to the other, as for example when the subject matter is of interest to
only two nations, or conversel} % when the participation of many
nations is essential to an enterprise.

However, for many programs of international science and technol-
ogy with which the United States is concerned, there are no compel-
ling or obvious reasons for choosing either the bilateral or the multi-
lateral approach. The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss
some of the considerations on which such a choice might be based,
and to suggest the need — and some possible directions — for further
study of this matter.

Historically, multilateral and bilateral treaties, treaty institutions,
formal and tacit agreements, and shared programs have existed
alongside each other. The 12 studies in the wScience, Technology,
and American Diplomacy series contain many references to the simul-
taneous occurrence of both multilateral and bilateral relationships
among nations.

In drawing from the various studies examples of these contrasting
alternatives, the purpose is not to urge the superiority of either form
of relationship, nor even to define comprehensively the kinds of
substantive problem or task for Avhich each is better suited. Rather,
it is to document that some subjects are in fact more compatible ^ith
bilateral associations, and others with multilateral associations. From
this observation, the paper then suggests that extensiA'e further study
of the bilateral/multilateral alternatives could help to chart the future
course of American diplomac3\ Although the present focus is on
scientific and technological nuitters of diplomacy, it is likch' that the
principles adduced would be n>ore widely- applicable.

Appearance of the Issue in Earlier Parts of the Study

The bilateral-versus-multilateral approach to international rela-
tions does not appear to have received sufficiently systematic analysis
aimed at identifying opportunities for the advancement of diplomatic
goals. Repeated reference has been made in many of the 12 studies
to this dimension of U.S. foreign relations. The series demonstrates
a wide variation in form, purpose, scope, organization, degree of
formality, and backstaffing arrangements. As a general proposition,
purposeful standardization of forms aimed at optimizing cost-effective-
ness across the board could be a constructive exercise. Although
organizational forms need to be tailored to the endless varieties of
requirements of particular agreements or relationships, needless and

(1741)

1742

purposeless variations in form increase administrative difficulties
and perhaps unnecessarily raise the costs. Decisions on choices be-
tween bilateral and multilateral forms should be based on hard evi-
dence and reasoning, rather than on a kind of seat-of-the-pants
approach or personal bias.

While the discussions of issues and cases in the present study do not
examine systematically the full array of problems and opportunities
associated with the bilateral-multilateral dimension, enough informa-
tion is developed to show the importance and ramifications of the
subject. The discussions of this operational issue, chapter by chapter,
are presented herebelow under corresponding chapter headings.

CASE one: the bartjch plan

In this study of an early (1946-47) case, the nature of the problem
and the tenor of the times assured that the subject of international
control of atomic energy would be dealt Avith as a multilateral problem
calling for multilateral agreement. Failure of the effort was not neces-
sarily related to the multilateral approach. Basically the Baruch
Plan foundered on the problem of replacing national sovereignty wdth
international (i.e., multilateral) control. It is this same problem that
besets the nations of the world in attempting to resolve the questions
of seabed mineral development, control of direct TV broadcasts from
satellites, and Landsat mineral surveys. However, in the case of the
Baruch Plan, not only national sovereignty but national survival
was at stake. On so momentous a matter it is not evident that a bilat-
eral approach could have offered any more promising option than
did the multilateral approach that failed.

case two: commercial nuclear power in EUROPE

This case presented a large number of different examples of both
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Thus, when the Congress
directed that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission make available to
cooperating nations the "benefits of peaceful applications of atomic
energy," the AEC proceeded to negotiate bilateral agreements with
individual nations or with regional defense organizations.^®^ The ad-
ministrative advantage of this arrangement was that such agreements
were simpler to negotiate and did not require Senate approval. (How-
ever, such agreements did require explicit approval of the President
and were required to "lie before the Joint Committee [on Atomic
Energy] for 30 days while Congress is in session.")

Bilateral atomic agreements were considerably stepped up following
the diplomatic initiative of President Eisenhower, December 8, 1953,
in his Atoms for Peace message.^*^^ Two years later bilateral nuclear
agreements had been completed with 22 countries, and the pace
continued.^®^ These bilateral agreements [concluded Donnelly]
", . . obtained from the United States unusual rights not available

38' U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Commercial Nvdear Power in Europe: The Inter-
action of American Diplomacy with a New Technology , a study in the series on Science, Technology, and
American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-
ments by Warren H. Donnelly, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Besearch Service, Librcry
of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972: vol. I, p. 155. (The initial provision was con-
tained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, P.L. 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 755-75.)

3M See ibid., pp. 1.50-160, for an account of the speech and its aftermath.

309 Ibid. Table I, p. 163, and Table II, p. 175.

1743

through the more traditional and presumably more potent and durable
mstruments of international relations."
On the one hand they were beneficial — -

In retrospect, negotiation and administration of the safeguards provisions of
the U.S. nuclear bilateral agreements has proven to be a unique and extraordinary-
achievement in international relations. The technological promise of nuclear
power, reinforced by incentives and pressures of foreign policy, gave the United
States the unusual right to send its own inspectors into foreign jurisdications to
inspect and verify the use and holding of U.S. -supplied nuclear materials. That
no major confrontation has arisen from the administration of the safeguard pro-
visions of the bilateral agreements gives reasons for some optimism in the future
of international relations. For, despite the arguments and analyses of those who
consider sovereign rights unalterable, there can be pragmatic yieldings and
accommodations when this is sufficiently in a nation's interest.*'"

On the other hand, their existence may serve to obstruct progress in
international control:

The success of the U.S. bilateral agreements, however, worked against one
major goal of Atoms for Peace. Because the agreements provided many ad-
vantages to the other countries, and because this web of agreements obtained for
the United States influence and leverage that it otherwise might not have had,
there has been a reluctance to shift the channel for U.S. technical assistance for
nuclear power in Europe and elsewhere, from country-to-country agreements to
the International Atomic Energy Agency. From a global viewpoint, it might be
seen that the United States and other world leaders in nuclear power are in com-
petition with the International Agency when they deal directly with other coun-
tries in supplying technical assistance. There is an implied balancing of advantages
to goals of individual nations versus the anticipated advantages of a strengthened
International Agency.'"

Accordingly, Dr. Donnelly raises the question as to whether the time
is at hand for a reexamination of the relative roles of bilateral and
multilateral agreements. The bilateral approach lent itself to the
immediate and practical problems of a highly technical transaction
involving patents, safeguards, audit and inspection, and safety.
Nevertheless, said the author:

Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States and world peace
to see the Nonproliferation Treaty operate at full effectiveness, it may now be
time for the United States to reexamine the present roles of bilateral agreements
and of the International Agency as the means for furnishing future technical
assistance and incentives for nuclear power. Channeling more U.S. aid through
the IAEA could be expected to strengthen the agency. However, to deemphasize
the present network of bilateral agreements with individual nations and with
multinational bodies such as Euratom would lose for the United States the
benefits associated with direct dealings."^

One interesting development has been the negotiation of bilateral
agreements with multilateral organizations, viz., the International
Atornic Energy Agency and Euratom. These grew out of a deliberate
decision by the United States not to replace bilateral with muti-
lateral atomic dealings. Secretary Dulles had favored the multilateral
approach for three reasons:

(1) Although the bilateral agreements included adequate provisions for safe-
guards, unless there was an international agreement on common standards,
future competition among supplying nations for the nuclear fuel market would
almost certainly erode the .safeguards of the bilateral agreements;

(2) Nations with bilateral agreements with the United States for development
of nuclear power would not indefinitely accede to U.S. inspection of the nuclear

3'0 Ibid., p. 174.

3" Ibid., pp. 174-175.

"2 Ibid., p. 175.

1744

powerplants. "They will accept international supervision indefinitely, but 'they
will not, I think, indefinitely accept mere inspection by another nation";;
and

(3) The United States lacked adequate technical personnel to meet all potential
needs for inspection. It would be preferable to avoid this drain by sharing the
task with others. ^^^

However, AEC Chairman Strauss "clearly favored use of bilateral
agreements." According to Dr. Donnelly's account:
The United States, [Strauss] testified,

... should not abandon these direct agreements with other countries^when
the Agency came into existence, or at any time in the foreseeable future.liHe-
anticipated that the Agency would stress activities in which many nations had
a direct interest and in which the greatest progress could be made by a multi-
national approach. At the same time, the United States through bilateral agree-
ments would be able to extend to individual countries nuclear cooperation
which . . . conforms more preciselj^ to our traditional and special relationship
with those particular countries." He did acknowledge possibilities of some
resistance to bilateral agreements. Some countries, he said, had not responded
to U.S. overtures to enter into bilateral agreements with them. However, these
nations had shown their willingness to accept from an international agency
limitations on their sovereignty unacceptable from the United States.^^*

CASE three: the political legacy of the international

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

The IGY study dealt with nongovernmental multilateral coopera-
tion among scientists in a very large research enterprise. The coopera-
tive spirit demonstrated by the participants led observers^to suggest
that this spirit might be carried over to the political sphere, and that
political problems "might be amenable to scientific principles properly
applied. Commented Mr. Bullis:

Refreshing as the intent underlying such beliefs may be, it nonetheless under-
estimates the formidable difi'erences existing between the scientific and political
communities.^'^

While the central question of the IGY study was whether scientific
internationalibm encouraged other forms, the study also raises by
inference the possibility that in scientific matters a multilateral
approach is more likely to be fruitful than a bilateral approach.
Mr. Bullis suggests that this possibility is attributable to the nature
of science itself:

Traditionally, cooperation in solving scientific problems has always appeared
immeasurably less complex than cooperation in solving political problems. As
pointed out by Astin, since —

. . . science is concerned with external phenomena which are usually measure-
able and whose manifestations are demonstrable and repeatable, there is less
cause for disagreement, for controversj^, than there is ... in politics. . . .
Furthermore, the preoccupations of . . . scientists are usually less charged with
emotion than are those of . . . politican[s]. . . . The consideration of po-
litical . . . plans or policies tends to arouse . . . passions, whereas delibera-
tions [on scientific matters] tend to proceed more calmly .^'^

Thus scientists tend to have fewer social problems since their research is gener-
ally focused upon common, well-defined objectives offering "a natural point of

373 Ibid., p. 183-184.

3'* Ibid., p. 184.

3'^ U.S. Concre^, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the IntcTnatioval Geophysi-
cal Year, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis, Science Policy Research
Division. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
1973, vol. I, p. 348.

3" Allen v. Astin, "The Scientific Community and International Cooperation," Department of State-
Bulletin 61 (July 14, 1969), p. 33.

1745

convergence, namely, the correct result."^" Unlike politicians, they are not engaged
in conflict resolution as a profession and are not charged with responsibility for
the protection of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the existence
of a common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency toward social
cooperation despite all obstacles, a tendency which has become a characteristic
of the international scientific community .^'^ Scientists tend inherently to recogniz*^?
the interdependence of their efforts and accept that interdependence as one of
the basic conditions of the environment in which they work. It is then relatively
easy for them to accept the extension of this principle to the environment in
which they live.^"

And finally, there is the strongly suggestive evidence that the multi-
lateralism evident in the IGY may have helped to further the multi-
lateralism of the Antarctic Treaty, the Test Ban Treaty, and the
Space Treaty'^" and to establish other patterns of multilateral
cooperation, both governmental and professional. (On this general
point see also Case Three, under Outcome.)

CASE four: the MEKONG PROJECT

The thought behind the selection of this subject was that the same
internationalism manifested by the scientists in the IGY program
might also be found among technologists engaged in a mutual project
of regional development. As with the IGY, the forms of agreement
in the Mekong Project were almost entirely multilateral. They were
also conscientiously technical. Of regionalism, one quoted study of-
fered the opinion that regional cooperation measures "... have the
best chance of success when they achieve a net maximum of two goals:
the maximum of intraregional political neutrality and colorlessness."

Resistance to multilateral development and a preference for bi-
lateralism was expressed by officials of the U.S. program of foreign
assistance. Said the Mekong study (Vol. I, p. 428) :

Bilateral aid problems were thought hard enough to deal with, without the
necessity of becoming involved in multinational plans and programs. However,
the "spirit of the Mekong" has been showr, to have exerted a durable cooperative
influence on the Riparian States for r early two decades. Given a forum for
consultation, and a shared opportunity for economic growth and development
with many donor nations contributing, the nations of a region can demonstrably
work together, despite a long history of conflict and instabilities.

In practice, regionalism appears to open the door to a veritable
catscradle of multilateral associations, institutions and arrangements.
Said the study (Vol. I, 428) :

When a regional development project involves both a plurality of recipient
nations and a plurality of donor nations (and perhaps also an array of United
Nations instrumentalities) the administrative complications may grow but the
political complications seem actually to be reduced. One reason for this is the
doubly "lowered profile" of the individual donors, even though their contribu-
tions may be of commanding importance on an individual program unit in some
one country. The various arrangements for task management by the World
Bank or some other institution, plus the coordinating organization for the total
regional program, tend to insulate the donor from the recipient. In terms of
imposing conditions on the recipient, this insulation may limit the benefits of the
arrangement to the donor, but in terms of its general acceptability to all recipients
and amity among aU participants it is highly beneficial. At the same time, as
President Nixon has said: "I am confident that our role can be kept in consonance
both with our interests and with those of the increasingly self-reliant and inde-
pendent Asian states." ^*'

3" i^enate Document No. 56, Tnfernalional Cooperation and Organization, p. 208.

ara Astin. "The Scientific Conununity," p. 32.

3" Bullis, Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year, vol. I, p. 349.

3S» Ibid., pp. 351-357.

*> U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, House Document 92-53, p. 76.

174G

However, there are also practical reasons for preferring multilateral
to bilateral regional development. Testimony on this point is offered
by Eugene R. Black, who suggests that a "vast program of regional
cooperation" was needed to "counteract the ill-effects of the Vietnam
War." He urged the reduction of the "U.S. presence" and the building
of a "strong multilateral framework." Said the study (Vol. I, pp.
428-429):

As a development banker, Black is "frankly a partisan of multilateral and
regional organizations . . . ," because this arrangement insulates development
■finance from political considerations. ("Or to put it the other way around, it
does not stand to reason that the U.S. Government should undertake in the name
of development to intervene wholesale in the domestic affairs of six dozen or so
poor countries.") It also is able to draw on many sources of capital and skill, and
promotes international cooperation.^*^

The study concluded with the suggestion that a regional approach
to multilateralism might serve as a replacement for the formalism
-of the United Nations: "The concept of dealing with multinational
geographic regions rather than with nations, and extending aid from
fi multinational base instead of bilaterally, has been credited in the
literature with a number of attractive characteristics." (The study
cited eight of these, page 431.) There followed some suggested ques-
tions for policy analysis:

The resultant alignment of nations and international structures from a delib-
erate program of world regionalism acceptable to developed and developing
countries might warrant further study and analysis. What actions could help
to encourage a world system of economically and technologically better balanced
regions? Would there be any effect on the levels of international tensions, either
in the regions or in the relations among the major powers? Might regional voting
in the United Nations General Assembly and the associated U.N. agencies
provide a better or more representative arrangement than the present, admittedly
awkward system of one-country-one-vote? *^

CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed

This case grew out of the evolving technology for offshore drilling
for oil and the emerging technology for recovery of hard minerals from
the deeper ocean floor. International law has traditionally viewed
the oceans as an international commons, with an unresolved issue
as to how far from shore the commons begins. Inherently, then, the
control of the international commons is regarded as a multilateral
matter, while the fixing of offshore boundaries is subject for dispute —
to be resolved by multilateral agreement, by bilateral agreement
between two nations, or by bilateral agreement between individual
■claiming nations and an institution representing all interested nations.

Pending resolution of these two sets of issues, the exploitation
rights to the deep ocean presumably conform with ancient practices
of nationality and freedom of the seas. Right of capture devolves
upon the nation with the best technology until a more orderly marine
jurisprudence can be devised and accepted.

Claims of nations to sovereignty over a 200-mile span of coastal
^'shelf" and claima of landlocked countries to a share of marine
riches complicate the resolution of the problem.

One possibility is to introduce the concept of regionalism into the
marine environment. If, in general, the ease of resolution of issues

3$2 Eupene R. Black: AUernativr in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 166-168.
383 Huddle, Mekong Project, vol. I, p. 431.

1747

ib inversely proportional to the number of interested parties, perhaps
the designation of oceanic subregions and identification of claimants
to each might enable a fairer sharing by all.

It is also likely that the reduction of seabed issues to a network
of bilateral altercations would be fraught with peril, exacerbating
tensions and conflict over sovereignties in question.

On the other hand, shared efforts of a consortium of nations to
discover, and to develop a mutual ability to exploit, mutual wealth
seems as logical for a designated ocean region as for the Lower Mekong
Basin.

CASE six: u.s.-soviet commercial relations

Assessment of the security, political, economic, and technological
implications of the October 1972 commercial agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union is the focus of this study. As
such, it is inherently a study of a single, highly important bilateral
relationship.

As the study points out, this agreement was only one of many
vehicles for progress in relations between the two countries, others
being agreements on science and technology, nuclear weapons, space
cooperation, medical science, and the environment. The emphasis of
the study on the trade part of this series of bilateral agreements
enabled the placing of other bilateral elements in perspective.

The intricate calculus of the slowly evolving detente between the
two "superstates," as presented in the study, shows the importance
as well as convenience of the bilateral approach in application. The
flawed management of the grain negotiations that accompanied the
broader agreement suggests that even when devised in isolation a
major bilateral initiative can overextend the skills of top U.S.
negotiators to achieve a workable diplomatic trade strategy. The
aftermath of the trade agreement, moreover, shows that U.S. diplomacy
can be frustrated if the executive branch assumes sole charge and
neglects the diplomatic role of the Congress.

Undoubtedly the diplomatic problem was usefully simplified by
being managed bilaterally, while ignoring such obviously important
related elements as technological competition from other highly
developed states, the interests of other grain-exporting states, the
special case of the People's Republic of China, the interests of the
emerging "Third World," and the under-lying threat of further
nuclear proliferation.

While the study, steadily bilateral in scope and limited to trade,
was evidently complex and far-ranging in its implications, there are at
least three reasons for enlarging this problem to a multilateral canvas:

First, it became necessary to examine the political, economic, and
technological impacts — actual or potential — of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade
negotiations on many "third countries."

Second, in the background and not taken into account is the ques-
tion of the gradual transition of the political world from a bipolar to a
multipolar character.

Third, as events shice 1972 have shown, U.S. trade policy must
adapt flexibly to multiple markets and sources of suppl}'; it caruiot
safely be shaped too extensively by the special requirements of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. trade. (The rewards of such trade for the United States are

174S

mainly political, and there are both political and economic reasons
for balancing this U.S. policy against the needs for preserving other
•essential political and economic relationships abroad.)

ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology

This paper, written about 2 years after President Nixon took oflBce,
took account of the President's early effort to shift the primary em-
phasis of U.S. foreign policy in technology from bilateral to multilateral
institutions. In his first message to Congress on U.S. foreign policy,
the President emphasized Western Hemisphere programs: "He urged
that bilateral relations be replaced by a multilateral approach, de-
veloped multilaterally." ^^

With respect to more general foreign assistance, the President
"again stressed the importance of multilateral rather than bilateral
relations, and of the need for the developing countries to take the
initiative in charting their own development strategies." ^^^

In his message the President cited two reports, referred to in the
study as the Peterson and the Pearson Reports. The Peterson Report,
March 4, 1970, told the President that:

"For the first time in history, it appears feasible to approach this world prob-
lem [i.e., international development] on a worldwide basis." The report called for a
less prominent and obtrusive role for the United States in extending aid to de-
veloi:)ing countries. It urged greater partnership with developing countries, with
the aided countries carrying out more of the strategic planning. It urged re-
peatedly that bilateral assistance should be reduced and multilateral assistance in-
creased. The goal should be the achievement by the aided countries of a self-
sustaining posture of development. To implement the proposed change in emphasis
of the U.S. aid program, the task force recommended the establishment of four
institutions. These were (1) a U.S. International Development Bank, (2) a U.S.
International Development Institute, (3) the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) which the task force noted had already been authorized by
the Congress, and (4) a U.S. International Development Council.^*^

The Pearson Report, issued in the previous year under U.N. aus-
pices, recognized the deficiencies of multilateral agencies and pro-
grams. There were reasons, it said, why nearly 90 percent of develop-
ment assistance in 1967 was bilateral:

Apart from historical colonial relationships, bilateral aid was often more efl5-
cient. Personnel recruitment was less of a problem. Bilateral programs could be
more flexible and experimental in their procedures. They could encompass a wider
scope of responses to real need.'"

The Pearson Report also identified as political considerations some
asserted weaknesses of multilateral programs:

Most countries will usually feel that at least some multilateral agencies are
unduly dominated by the "wrong" countries, whether aid-givers or recipients; or
that they are following erroneous aid philosophies, either too hard or too soft, too
interventionist, or too lax; or that they are simply badly run and that their pro-
•cedures are slow and expensive, (p. 209)'^*

Nevertheless, the Report continued, there were favorable aspects to
multilateral aid:

It reduced any overtones of charity or interventionism. It helped provide a
framework within which bilateral aid to whole nations could be better integrated

^* Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, vol. II, p. 669.

385 Ibid.

38»7f)id.,p. 670.
387 Ibid., p. 67,3.
318 Ibid.

1749

into a total program. It would reduce unequal geographical preferences in aid'
distribution. It would stimulate regional integration among developing countries.
It would pave the way for international centers of documentation, advice, and
guidance, (pp. 213-214)389

In the study itself, the question was left open as to whether bilateral
or multilateral aid was preferable. The discussion was concluded with
the following passage :

The issue of multilateral versus bilateral aid is complicated by a practical
political consideration. Some of the objectives ascribed to the early Truman pro-
gram, still persuasive for some groups, are largely incompatible with the patterns
of cooperation essential in a multilateral program. A multinational program of
assistance is likely to find few friends and fewer sponsors. It may be easier to win
political support for foreign assistance, no matter how strongly supported by theo-
retical or policy considerations, if the U.S. electorate can identify directly the
relationship with the recipient.

And finally, the problem remains unsolved of how to assess the impacts of pres-
ent and future technology at all these different levels, in relation to the various
sets of national and international objectives. The United States is only beginning
to appreciate the difficulty of assessing technology domestically. The task is
recognized as one of transcendent difficulty. The power of technology to alter the
human condition, so evident in the United States, can be equally potent on the
world scene. EflFects of technology can be favorable or adverse. Combinations of
technological effects can operate synergistically toward good or bad results. The
many nations of the world differ widely in their sophistication, their grasp of these
considerations. How far the United States should go in exercising leadership,
globally, in the international transfer of technology, and in the effort to separate
good from bad technology, in view of all the other elements of this great catscradle
must remain an open question.'^**

ISSUE two: the politics of global health

The essence of the findings of this study is that all nations share
an interest in the health of their peoples, and that this shared interest
strongly motivates a multilateral approach to advance the health of
all. Nevertheless an incredible multiplicity of programs and institu-
tions, public and private, national and international, bilateral and
multilateral, are engaged in efforts to improve the health of mankind.
Along with real accomphshments, these have resulted in confusion,
cross-purposes, and large areas of serious neglect.

The study called particular attention to the utility of the World
Health Organization, a United Nations agency, as the focal center of
global health efforts. Said the author, Dr. Quimby: "Recent trends-
reflect the deliberate movement of international health activities from
bilateral programs to multilateral ones such as the United Nations
Development Program and the World Health Organization." ^^^ He
cited President Nixon's 1970 message to Congress and the Peterson
Report and noted that "The move [toward multilateral programs] has
already started, beginning with the multilateralization of the malaria

389 Ibid.

3»o Ibid., pp. 674-675. The reference to the "early Truman program" includes a passage that reveals the
mixed motives with which the program was undertaken. The passage reads:

One difficulty with the program was that its objectives were seen differently by the various groups
Involved; various of its supporters looked for different outcomes. Was It a humanitarian program to raise
living standards in poor countries? Was it intend°d to effect political stabilization of those regions to halt the
spread of communism, under the containment doctrine of the period? Was it to render the political soil less
fertile for subversion? Was it to strengthen with gratitude U.S. relations with less-favored nations? Was
It to provide assured future sources of essential materials for U.S. industry or possible wartime military re-
quirements? All of these were offered at one time or another during the two years in which the Point IV
Program was debated In Congress.

The point is that irrespective of whether a program is bilateral or multilateral it can hardly succeed if its:
motives and goals are so convoluted and contradictory.

3»i Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, vol. 11, p. 759.

1750

eradication program." '*^ Dr. Quimby observed, however, that the-
Peterson Report's assertion that "a predominantly bilateral U.S,
program is no longer poUtical tenable in our relations with many
developing countries" ran counter to congressional preferences for
bilateral programs.

The rationale for a shift from bilateral to multilateral programs in
the health field, according to Dr. Quimby, is as follows:

The expansion of national public health interests to global dimensions calls
not only for diplomacy or statesmanship of the conventional type; it calls for
worldwide experience with science, medicine, and public health as political
systems themselves and for experts in the subject matter. The more reliance
there is on multilateral organizations for controlling disease and assisting all
the countries of the world in improving their state of health, the less need there
is for a national or bilateral point of view. The. more the health of the State
becomes dependent upon the health of the world, the more the interests and
technology of the State become blended into those of the world. If and when
it appears that the only feasible approach to the problems of human health is
indeed a worldwide approach, it will be necessary for knowledge to be shared
and exchanged by those who are in possession of it and who by tradition and
practice are used to sharing and exchanging it. The multilateral health organiza-
tions are simply institutional devices for encouraging this process in the inter-
national health profession.^'*

The concept of multinational regionalism, developed in the Mekong
study,'^* offers signal opportunities in the field of health. Regions of
endemic disease and regions in which particular disease vectors are
common might warrant cooperative control measures by the nations
in the region, perhaps with the support of WHO. While some success-
ful programs of this sort have been recorded, as for example the work
of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the principle
seems capable of more extensive exploitation as indeed Dr. Quimby
suggests.

ISSUE three: beyond malthus

The two subjects of this study — food and population — both require,
for cornpletely different reasons, a multilateral approach. The global
allocation of food to alleviate starvation and desperate shortage can
scarcely be managed on the basis of a network of bilateral agreements.
The unfortunate experience of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain transaction
(discussed in Case Six above) demonstrates this clearly. To be sure,
the equitable distribution of foods to all populations on the globe is
still a remote goal. But the present scheme of production and distri-
bution has already become too complex an international operation
to be resolved by an intricate series of bilateral arrangements.

The matter of population involves a quite different set of considera-
tions. Long regarded as a personal or familial matter from which all
official intervention was excluded, the right to procreate is increasingly
recognized as posing a general political problem related to the future
well-being of nations and indeed the entire world's people. As this issue
becomes clarified and its policy requirements are defined, perhaps there
will be further adaptations in the approaches to its political and

3»^ Ibid., p. 760.

3»3 Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, vol. II, p. 761.

'M U.S. Congrcs,s. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems
of Regionalism, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Huddle, Science
Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Govt,
Print. Off., 1972. See vol. I, pp. 361-434.

1751

diplomatic management. Logic suggests that this is a necessary
conclusion. But when the study Beyond Malthus was first prepared,
the issue of population control was (as it still is) primarily personal,
familial, and national; its study, however, is increasingly bilateral
and even more multilateral — both regional and global.

The issue of bilateral versus multilateral assistance in food and
population balance was dealt with in the study both generally and in
respect to a specific problem. As the author, Dr. Nanes, expressed it:

The inherent advantage of multilateral over bilateral assistance is that the
diplomatic profile of the donor is lowered. Motives of the donors are under less
suspicion. Another presumed advantage is that recipients may be more likely to
contribute substantively to the planning of general programs. If they are involved
in the planning, they are more positively committed to the implementation of
plans. Burdens of cost can be more widely distributed. Results can be better
analyzed on the basis of international comparisons. Contributions to a genuinely
global program can be expected to come earlier from those nations which are
initially recipients. Some forms of assistance practically demand a global approach.

For example, Herman Pollack, Director of the Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs, Department of State, has suggested the systematic
exchange of germ plasm, a basic ingredient of agricultural development.

Cooperative exchanges developed by the Department of Agriculture [said
Pollack] have been instrumental in providing new germ plasm to widen the
breeding base. For example, a variety of hard red wheat was acquired from
Turkey resistant to various races of stripe rust. In Montana alone, use of this
variety has prevented losses estimated at $2-$3 million annually. Similarly, a
tomato variety acquired from South America provides wilt resistance to about
100 varieties grown in the United States. In Ohio alone, it is estimated that the
wilt resistance gained from this acquisition has saved growers $1 million per
year. A peanut variety acquired from South America was planted on 400,000
acres annually from 1962 to 1968 and is estimated to have increased production
by as much as $9 million annually because of its higher yield. Following an ex-
change developed with the Soviet Union, United States corn breeders received an
early maturing variety having good stalk quality. This germ plasm is now found
in hybrids having an annual value of $500,000 for the seed alone. Many other
similar examples in agricutlure could be cited.''*

Whether it would be more effective to continue the exchange of germ plasm on
a low level, based on bilateral contacts, with countries at different levels of
technical sophistication, or to mount a global program of germ plasm management,
would seem to warrant considerable attention and analysis .^'^

ISSUE four: U.S. scientists abroad "^

Extensive analysis of present arrangements for sending U.S.
scientists aboard on research and educational projects suggests that
the bilateral/multilateral dimension is salient. The study observes
that in the bilateral exchange programs, "Very little attention is
given ... to determining priorities systematically or to relating
programs to the objectives of U.S. foreign science and technology as
outlined by the Department of State." Accordingly, the study
buggested :

Wider and more public scientific/diplomatic and executive/legislative interfaces
seem to be required of all programs to cope with the differences between the means
and ends of science and diplomacy, to determine appropriate program priorities,
and to correct program inadequacies.'^'

Particular attention was addressed to the essentially political
nature of bilateral agreements for science exchanges. To this character

'"5 Testimony before Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space, House Com-
mittee on Science and Astronautics, May 18, 1971. Reproduced in State Department Bulletin (June 28,
1971), pp. 839-840.

3«« Nanes, Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation, vol. 11, p. 8,')8.

3S7 Knezo, U.S. Scientists Abroad, vol. II, p. 1022.

1752

was attributed such weaknesses of the bilateral science agreements as-
"undersubscribed rates of participation by U.S. scientists or lower
quaUty scientific participation. . . ." More generally, the study suggests
that ". . . bilateral scientific and technological links alone may no
longer be sufficient in a world increasingly interdependent in harness-
ing the fruits of science and technology and in solving the problems
they generate." Knezo gives it as the opinion of one author, Victor
Basiuk, that the absence of multilateral cooperative scientific relation-
ships with Europe imperils transatlantic security. On a larger scale,
Emilio Q. Daddario was quoted as urging a broad international con-
sensus on science policy.^**

And the study concludes, mentioning the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, and UNESCO,
with the suggestion that ". . . it may be to the common advantage
of science, U.S. foreign policy, and international cooperative
science policy for policjnnakers to consider incorporating some U.S.
science and technology exchange programs into these same cooperative
international mechanisms." ^^®

ISSUE five: brain drain

It is interesting that the international movement of technically
trained people, although clearly of deep concern to many govern-
ments, does not appear to have been the subject of either bilateral or
multilateral agreement among nations. Perhaps the main reason for
this apparent neglect is that except in totalitarian states where close
control is exercised over emigration, movement of persons is regarded
as a right of individual freedom; and, of course, in the case of the
Soviet Union, the interest of other nations in the emigration of persons
from that country has been disallowed as an "internal" matter.

Dr. Whelan's comprehensive assessment in this study identifies the
many "pull" and "push" factors that motivate movement of scien-
tists from one country to another. Most of these are matters beyond
the reach of international agreements, bilateral or multilateral.
However, as the study makes clear, the analysis of brain drain and
the measurement of its consequences is a legitimate subject for multi-
lateral study, although probably not appropriate for bilateral agree-
ment except in unusual circumstances. It is a conclusion of the author
that a better understanding of the measures and consequences of
brain drain could motivate national action to improve adverse con-
ditions or differences in opportunity for personal advancement that
encourage trained people to move to other countries. At the same
time, multilateral — and in the case of the less developed countries,
regional — action is needed to support certain efforts which are beyond
the means of individual countries, as in the establishment of regional
science and technology centers geared to the low-technology problems
of development.

3»8 Ibid., pp. 1023, 1032-1033.
399 Ibid., p. 975.

1753

5SSUE six: science and technology in the department of state

In this study, which concentrated on the organizational aspects of
science, technology, and American diplomacy, particular attention
was given to the "Emergence of the Bilateral Science Agreement."
Less attention was given to multilateral arrangements.

Advantages of the bilateral agreement were said to include con-
venient evidence of detente, increased interaction in a professional and
noncontroversial field, an impetus toward further cooperation,
increased prestige of local scientists, increased local support for
science, facilitated exchange of personnel and information, and easier
exchange of materials and equipment. A diplomatic advantage of
bOateral agreements is that they can serve as the opening wedge to
begin a dialogue with unrecognized states.

A principal disadvantage of bilaterals is that while easy to make
they are awkward to terminate. Compared with multilateral arrange-
ments they cost the participants more in relation to the benefits
they yield. As they increase in number they impose a substantial
burden of administration and coordination.

One problem posed by the present array of some 28 bilaterals is
that they did not come about as a consequence of a deliberate deter-
mination that these were the best places to have such arrangements,
that aU were meritorious and any others would be less so. Nor was
there a conscious effort to design an optimal plan that could generally
be followed in each case, with only minor modifications. Planning and
priorities appear to have played little role in the&e decisions; instead,
an ad hoc approach wa:? followed, and the designs of the arrangements
evolved out of the cii'cumstances at the time.^°"

This variation was justified ab experimentation. However, observed
the study:

It should also be noted that to justify the experimental nature of the design
variation requires that information be drawn from the experiment. Which de-
signs work best and why? What criteria of effectiveness have been established?
What principles can be adduced? If additional bilateral science programs are
proposed, by what criteria will they be evaluated and how should they be designed
for optimal effect? If there are variations in existing programs, should they be
reviewed and revised to enhance their effectiveness? If there are inactive or unre-
warding programs, should thej'' be rebuilt, renegotiated, or terminated, or allowed
to drag on? "'

And fundamentally, "to be diplomatically as well as scientifically
useful, the science bilateral needs to have a solid technical justification,
and sustained technical and administrative support on both sides."
The analysis further develops this theme as follows :

So numerous have these agreements become, and so diffused the responsibilities
for cooperative overseas programs of U.S. agencies, that the time seems appro-
priate for a general review of the mechanism of bilateral science and technology
cooperation. Agreements are easy to make, costly and time-consuming to imple-
ment, difficult to keep track of, duplicative in effects, and painful to terminate.
Federal agencies find themselves committed to programs abroad for which no
funds can be obtained for support. Expectations are likely to run ahead of per-
formance. In some cases, of course, there are tangible economic benefits in
terms of dollar saving from joint or coUaborative researches, valuable results,
and shared facilities. But only by a vigorous and competent management, supplied
on an overall basis by the executive branch, can these agreements ultimately be

«» Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1403.
«i Ibid., pp. 1403-1404.

1754

•assured of yielding more good than harm. Only if programs are carefully planned,
on a joint basis, toward explicit and useful tasks, with assured leadership, person-
nel, and funding, can the product justify the eSoTt*°^

The study dealt much less extensively with the subject of multi-
lateral agreements and institutions, mainly because these receive less
-close attention of the Department of State. On this matter one opinion
as expressed by Herman Pollack, former chief of the Science Bureau of
the Department of State, was that existing relationships between the
United States and U.N. technical agencies were "fundamentally
sound" but that in "coordination as among U.N. technical programs
and in oversight" U.S. performance was "weak." Manpower was
"entirely insufficient to get on top of the problem." *^^ A similar view,
expressed by a study for the United Nations Association, proposed the
"development of a high-level evaluation and planning unit in [the
State Department's Bureau of International Organizations Aifairsl —

. . . devoted to the evaluation of the effectiveness of international institu-
tions and their programs, to the development of specific initiatives for strengthen-
ing these institutions, and to enhancing U.S. participation in them. This would
include an evaluation of any need for creation or elimination of organizations in
particular problem areas, as well as the formulation of major reforms in existing
institutions and their mandates. It would also involve encouraging international
organizations themselves to perform much of this program evaluation, (pp.
85-86) *«

The study concludes with an observation provided from the Foreign
Service Journal that called attention to the essentially multilateral
character of the large technological problems confronting the world's
nations. Said the statement, in part:

What then does this new proximity of nations, brought about by rapid techno-
logical change, require of diplomacy? It seems to ask for something more than
traditional bilateral ironing out of differences and development of cooperative
arrangements. Technological advance has created problems which affect all of
the world's nations, and require their cooperation for the solution. For example,
arrangements to prevent the pollution of the seas cannot be made bilaterally.
What is necessary is a new innovative multilateralism.^"*

And the statement concluded: "The diplomats of the future will
require all of the tools they can get if they are to succeed in this new
multilateral diplomacy."

Some Concluding Observations

It appears from the evidence of the 12 studies reviewed above
that both bilateral and multilateral agreements on scientific and
technological subjects have a legitimate place in the apparatus of
"diplomacy.

The policy governing bilaterals seems to call for considerable
strengthening and the application of more restraint. Procedures should
be standardized. Criteria of establishment should be more explicit and
less adventitious. Sound technical justification is needed for subjects
of agreement, as is sound technical management of ongoing programs.
Factual reporting of costs, operations, and results is essential not only
for improvement of management but also to facilitate congressional

*<>^ Ibid., the Department of State, p. 1410.
«03 Ibid., p. 1429.
<o< Ibid., p. 1477.
«« Ibid., p. 1504.

1755

oversight. Budgeting of bilaterals requires advance estimate of costs
of proposed programs and assurance that participating U.S. agencies
are properly supported in overseas assignments.

The poHcy governing multilateral warrants much further study.
The politics of the United Nations is taking on a reality separate from
that of the participating nations, and the emergence of large numbers
of new voting states complicates the process of policymaking in
multilateral institutions. Lessons from the World Health Organization
experience are relevant here: the recognition of the need to achieve
solid technical results, to coordinate programs by technical expertise
rather than by political influence, and the general elevation of the
substantive element over the diplomatic relationship. The suggested
principle seems to be that technical advances can help pave the way
to resolution of political differences. In this connection, the adoption
of the regional approach to multilateral organization offers attractive
opportunities for exploitation as well as economy of means.

Probably the most important neglected element of multilateral
program management for the United States is that in neither the
multilateral agencies nor in the Department of State nor even in the
U.S. mission agencies concerned with multilateral programs is there
a clear mandate for accountability to the U.S. Congress. In simplest
terms, the Congress needs to know what the individual programs cost
in total, and the cost to the United States, and also what benefits
accrue generally to the participating nations and particularly to the
United States. It is not now apparent that this kind of information is
available to the Congress, from which funding support is expected.
At present it is not evident whether in the interest of U.S. diplomatic
goals particular programs should be maintained at current levels,
reduced, or expanded.

Some Questions jor Further Consideration

Perhaps to explore further the dimension of bilateral versus multi-
lateral diplomacy, the following questions may be helpful. This
dimension is central to the future management of the interface of
science and technology with diplomacy. And, as has just been ob-
served, the diplomats of the future will need "all of the tools the}' can

get.

QUESTIONS

What are the special advantages and disadvantages of each form of
relationship?

What are the advantages of combining the two forms in various
ways, such as for example: a bilateral agreement between a nation
and a multilateral institution; a bilateral agreement between two
multilateral (e.g. regional) organizations, a bilateral agreem.ent be-
tween two nations to implement program elements of a regional or
global multilateral organization, a multilateral consortium to coor-
dinate a variety of activities developed under a number of different
bilateral agreements, and so on?

What particular characteristics or consequences of agreements,
should be addressed in order to test the relative efficacy of bilateral
versus multilateral forms of agreement?

What differences in sanctions are there as between bilateral and
multilateral agreements? To what extent is either of the two forms,
able to incorporate self-enforcing elements?

1756

With apparent increase in interdependence among nations, is the
bilateral or is the multilateral form of relationship better able to
accept the burdens of expanded coordination?

What adjustments in the structure of the U.S. Government are
likely to be needed as bilateral and multilateral agreements increase
in number and scope?

What planning institution would be useful to analyze the bilateral/
multilateral agreement structure and its domestic U.S. demands, in
order to strengthen the general backstopping organization?

What opportunities are there for diplomatic benefits from opening
bilateral agreements to participation by third, fourth, and more
countries?

What large technological problems are in the offiug that will require
diplomatic attention, and will they be more appropriate for bilateral or
multilateral attention?

What guidance is available to the Congress to assess the manage-
ment of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and to evaluate in
advance the proposals for additional agreem.ents? What data bases
needed for this purpose are now lacking?

Chapter 20 — High-Technology Diplomacy
Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy

CONTENTS

Page

Emergence of High Technology 1761

Need for Attention to Low Technology 17G2

Role of the Department of State 1762

Technology Policy and the Department of State 1763

Obstacles to Diplomatic Planning 1764

The Special Case of Agricultural Technology 1765

Importance of Selectivity in Policymaking 1765

Appearance in the Study of the Question of High-Low Technology and

Diplomacy 1766

Case One: The Baruch Plan 1766

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 1767

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical

Year 1767

Case Four: The Mekong Project 1768

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 1769

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 1770

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 1771

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 1774

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 1775

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 1775

Issue Five: Brain Drain 1776

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of State 1777

Secondary International Aspects of U.S. High and Low Technology 1779

Some Concluding Observations 1780

Some Questions for Further Consideration 1781

(1759)

CHAPTER 20— HIGH-TECHNOLOGY DIPLOMACY VERSUS
LOW-TECHNOLOGY DIPLOMACY

The theme of this essay is the importance of national policy in.
technology for diplomacy. Manifestly, other elements complement
technology in affecting the relations among nations: defense policy,
economic policy, labor policy, and policy on aid to industry for ex-
ample. But the focus here is on technology policy per se. The approach
used is to distinguish two kinds of technology, and to distinguish
their separate relations to diplomacy, in order to define the different
ways in which diplomats need to interest themselves in technology
generally.

The evidence presented in the 12 studies in this series indicates that
technology is a major force in shaping the world of diplomacy. Various
attempts have been made to distinguish different classes of technology
and to formulate distinctive national strategies for each. One form of
classification has been based on size : the concept of "economy of scale,"
by which increases in size of units of capital produced marginal gains
in economic efficiency. Thus, "big industry" was able to outpace
"small industry" in competition for markets and profitability. Another
form of classification was based on the idea of "heavy" versus "light"
industry; in the Soviet Union, for example, great stress was placed
on such heavy industry as steel-making, which was considered the
key to industrial power.

Emergence of High Technology

However, during the Cold War Era, with its emphasis on nuclear
weaponry, electronic systems, computers, and aerospace, another
scheme of classification came into use. This was the concept that the
industry of highly developed countries could be classified according to
the rate of change and degree of "sophistication" in its designs, based
on extensive use of applied science. Research-intensive industries were
described as "high" technology, while more traditional and older —
often less progressive — industries were "low technology." Hoa\ ever, it
is significant that the larger an industry grows as it exploits the ad-
vantages of economy of scale, the less easily can it adapt itself to
technological innovations.

In the late 1960s, concern was expressed — especially in France —
over the asserted superiority of the United States in the industrial
exploitation of new technology.^"^ This alleged superiority was as-
sociated, in the literature, with the heavy U.S. Government invest-
ment in science and technology for atomic energy, weaponry, aero-
space, and supporting technologies, as well as management skills,
high standards of education, technical training, and the existence of a
large and affluent market at home. The role of the U.S. -based multi-
national corporation was also seen as of great importance.

^os See especially J. J. Servan-Schreiber. The American Challenge, translated from the French hy Eonald
Steel. New York, Atheneum, IPfig, p. 27. Alsr. Franklin P. Huddle, Science, Technology, a-nd American Diplo-
macy: The Evolution of International Technology. Prepared for the Suhconimittee on National Socurity
Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, vol. 11, pp. 624, 651, and 662-663.

0761)

1762

Further confirmation of the significance of technology for overseas-.
U.S. trade was offered in a series of studies by Dr. Michael Boretsky
of the Department of Commerce. An aspect of Dr. Boretsky's studies
was the comparison of low and high technolog}^ pioducts as elements
of the U.S. balance of international payments. He offered evidence of a
positive correlation between level of industrial investment in research
and development and economic growth and profitability as well as
ability to exploit export markets. A major reward of high technology
was the cash retiu'n from the sale of patents and licenses. Since one
criterion of the difference between high and low technology is the
intensity of the use of scientific research and development, these
studies led to the conclusion that applied science was a powerful
stimulus to export trade.

Need for Attention to Low Technology

It might be said in addition that high technology, based on extremely
high levels of "value added by manufacture," was science-limited,
while low technolog}^ involving close profit margins and laige
"through-put," was resource-limited. To the extent that this dis-
tinction is valid diplomats must needs give attention to the implica-
tions of the low-technology sector: the increasing reliance of the United
States on imported raAV material at ever-increasing prices imposes cost
penalties and threat of shortages on those industries least able to
tolerate them. Moreover, since the largest part of the Nation's indus-^
try (e.g., steel, wood, paper, glass, and the like) would be classed as
"low technology," the need to strengthen this industrial sector is
apparent. Among the policy alternatives presented b}^ this trend in
analj^sis would seem to be the following:

— Intensification of research and development supportive of
high technology to sustain and perhaps to advance the U.S.
lead in an industrial sector yielding a return both for exports of
hardware and for exports of technology itself;

— Intensification of research and development in technological
advances for use in low technology industries to strengthen their
competitive position vis-a-vis their overseas counterparts, such
R. & D. to be coupled with improved arrangements for dissemi-
nating the technology to industrial users in the United States;
— Development of vigorous programs for the international
commercial exchange of technology — both low and high — to
enable all nations including the United States to benefit fiom the
best technology on a global basis, on the theory that ever}- nation
vail enjo}' some particular form of comparative advantage;

— Selection of a more liiiiited number of specific industries.,
perhaps including sorae from both high and low categories, for
more intensive scientific support, using the criteiion of probable-
U.S. comparative advantage in the selection of candid;itcs.

Iioic oi the Department oj State

It would appear that a number of Governmerit de})artnients and
agencies have roles to play in the formulation and execution of a
strategy to build a strong base for U.S. export industry. Thus, the
Energjv Research and Development Adnnnistration is expected to
generate a portfolio of valua])lc new technolog}' useful at home and
abroad to ease the energy shortage. The Departnu^ut of Agi'iciiUiire

1763

has a similar role in the technology of food, wood, and natural fiber
production. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
has a broad charter for health-related research. The Department of
Commerce has a concern with ocean resources technology, while
NASA and the Department of Defense are concerned with such high
technology areas as aerospace, telecommunications, and computer
hardware. Apart from mission-oriented research, the National Science
Foundation has a general concern for the health and activity of basic
research and a limited amount of applied research. These are illustra-
tive of the specific areas of direct Federal intervention in the appli-
cation of science and technology for public purposes. From the
commercial point of view, apart from the special cases of agriculture
and energy, the role of the Federal Government is both more modest
and less contributor3^ Tax policies, environmental and other regu-
lations, uncertainties over antitrust enforcement, and various require-
ments for forms and documents are widely viewed by industry as
hobbles to progress. Yet it is from the private sector that come the
bulk of the innovations augmenting U.S. exports, as well as the
skills that support the technological aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

What, then, is the role of the Department of State in ensuring
that both high and low technology are so managed as to support
U.S. diplomatic goals, and that a proper groundwork of research and
education is provided for their future support? High technology,
sponsored by the Federal Government, is a major ingredient in this
complex. The Department of State would seem a proper claimant for
some voice in its management for diplomatic purposes, and for the
coordination of aspects of agency missions affecting U.S. diplomacy.
But there could also be a useful role for the Department of State in
assessing ways in which the interests of the United States in low
technology fields could be better served. Thus, the Department is
already concerned (through U.S. AID) in the export to developing
countries of low technology. There is also evidence that lagging
technology in some U.S. industries might be benefited from the im-
port of more advanced technolog}" from abroad; the Department
might conceivably find institutional or procedural arrangements to
secure these benefits. In addition, the Department could perhaps
add its voice to others in this country to urge a stronger national
R. & D. effort to advance these lagging industries through domestic
programs.

Clearly, the scope of this interest of the Department of State
encompasses determination of the influences of high and low tech-
nology on U.S. foreign policy aims and posture, the impacts of U.S.
technology abroad, the ways in which foreign technology aft'ects
or might affect U.S. industry, problems and opportunities in the uses
of technology to support U.S. foreign policy objectives, institutions
that service the transfer of U.S. technology abroad or that bring
foreign technology to the United States, and ways in which action
by the Federal Government could beneficially afiect all these proc-
esses and institutions.

It is a reasonable hypothesis that the application of basic and applied
science to any technological area can enhance its effectiveness. It

1764

would also seem to be a reasonable hypothesis that those areas of
tcchnolo2:y in which apphed science has been least active would offei'
the largest scope for major progress, while those areas in which science
has been most intensively applied would be benefited more marginally
from further investment in related science. Scientists themselves make
a distinction of this kind when they describe a field of research as
being "ripe for exploitation."

Enough has been said here to validate the thesis that the Depart-
ment of State has an interest in both low and high technology as these
relate to foreign policy. It is also apparent that different sets of policies,
programs, and supporting analyses are required to deal with the two
classes of technology in question. However, it may be of interest to
inquire as to what obstacles tend to obstruct the entry of the Depart-
ment into this field.

OBSTACLES TO DIPLOMATIC PLANNING

In tlio field of high technology, individual designs, pieces of hard-
ware, and systems have particularly potent diplomatic significance.
They include such items as desalting plants, nuclear power stations,
large-capacity computers, air defense systems, military aircraft elec-
tronic communication links, and so on. These tend to be costly items,
often one-of-a-kind, and close to the state of the art. They do not
lend themselves readily to economic analysis and are frequently the
subject of controvers}^ as between military and diplomatic policy-
makers.

In the field of low technology the problems tend in general to be
more massive, and the significance of technology more obscure. In
terms of national economic significance, low technology is much more
important than high technology. Moreover, it is in these areas where
U.S. technology often appears to be lagging. It is sometimes pointed
out that in some of these industries (steel, for example), the United
States exports more technology than it imports. But it couid also be
true that this condition is less a measure of technological superiority
than of the alertness of foreign technologists to borrow — and there-
after to improve upon — the best U.S. technology in this field. The
possibility exists that U.S. technologists, corporate or governmental,
have not been equally alert to the opportunities to learn from foreign
technology when it outpaces its U.S. counterpart.

There are historical reasons why U.S. industries tend to invent and
innovate rather than import technology. The early abundance of
industrial materials conferred a comparative advantage on this country
so that the pros~;ure for technologies of materials conservation could
be negl'^cted. Tlie great influx of European migration to the United
States during the 19th century brought with it a rich harvest of
technological expertise from many countries; an important source of
American ingenuity was the interaciiou among American and immi-
grant t'^chnologists so that names like Steinmetz and Tesla rank
along with Edi>on and Kettering. There was more invention in the
United vStates than industry could digest, so that practical interest
in foreign technology was minima!.

The iinport-.mce oi" this issue is that the United States has a problem
of relying on imporls of materials and fuels to support a large indus-
trial system. Volume of imports and prices of the imports arc both

1765

rising. U.S. exports must keep pace. But if — as seems possible— U.S.
"low technology" basic industries are beginning to lag technologically
behind like foreign industries, the United States appears to be con-
fronted with, the need to formidate a new strategy of technology.
The options would seem to include:

— A greatly increased effort to identify and acquire techno-
logical improvements in basic industries from abroad ;

" — A systematic effort to upgrade the technological level of
U.S. basic industries by support for related scientific research,
creation of well-funded applied research institutes in appropriate
fields, a closer coupling of industrial and academic research in
related sciences, and removal of barriers to innovation in the basic
industries.^°'

THE SPECIAL CASE OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

One tangible advantage enjoyed by the United States in world food
and fiber trade is that for more than a century U.S. agriculture has
received governmental support for R. & D. and the dissemination of
research results. Although commonly regarded as belonging in the
"low technology" category, U.S. agriculture has accumulated a vast
reservoir of truly scientific information on all phases of crop produc-
tion, harvesting, preservation, processing, and marketing. In con-
sequence the United States is the leading exporter in the world of
agricultural commodities and is helping to feed both highly industrialized
and overpopulated developing nations abroad. But the allocation of
U.S. foods to those importing nations who need them raises its own
dilemma: man}^ such nations lack the resources to purchase U.S.
foods, and others are seeking to improve their teims of trade by raising
the prices of exports of raw materials. If the United States accepts
these increases in cost without also raising prices of food and other
exported goods, the U.S. trade balance suffers; if it raises the prices,
the U.S. consumer suffers and countries lacking the leverage of material
exports (e.g., petroleum) w^U go short.

IMPORTANCE OF SELECTIVITY IN POLICYMAKING

In general, then, it can^be suggested that different skills and
different analytical approaches are needed to deal with the diplomatic
policy aspects of high and low technology. The former relates more to
strategic weaponry, spectacular achievements and related national
prestige, and such global concerns as space telecommunications,
information storage and retrieval systems, Landsat, and weather
satellites. The latter relates more to the bread-and-butter concerns of
national economies, industrial employment, costs of living, and
international movement of materials and mass-produced products.
Government policy is influential in the development of high technolog}'
and in the international movement oi the injyuts and outimts of low
technology.

«" These barriers are widely regarded in private industry as perliaps the most serious factor retarding U.S.
technological progress. A significant example of lagging U.S. low technology is the belated entry of this
country's auto industry into the small car market, thereby giving small imports a foothold quite unneces-
sarily. However, it is not evident that the principal barriers to this innovative direction were imposed on the
U.S. auto industry from outside its OMn domain. Undoubtedly, such external barriers to innovation do
exist, but whether they are more potent than self-imposed corporate obstacles to innovation is unlikely.
Probably the main barrier to innovation— as distinguished from invention— is shortage of investment capital.

1766

For example, the commercial aircraft industry in the United States,
long dominant in world transportation lines, owes its preeminence to
the very large U.S. Government investment in the development of
military aircraft. On the low-technology side, the steel industry is
affected more by Government policy with respect to sources of
materials in developing countries and tariff policy on imported steels
than by support for research in steelmaking.

The next question to be considered in this essay is the extent to
which the high technology — low technology — diplomacy relationship
siu^faced in the six cases and the six issues dealt with in the present
study.

Appearance in the Study oi the Question of High-Low Technology and
Diplomacy
Some attention was addressed to the question of technological
impacts in The Evolution oi International Technology (Issue One).
The question of organizing to analyze and deal with future impacts
was considered at length in Science and Technology in the Department
of State (Issue Six). In general, the studies tended to emphasize high
technology over low, partly because the most salient cases involved
novel, government- sponsored developments that were readily identi-
fiable. The low-technology area tends to escape notice because its
practice is traditional, unspectacular, and diffused. Moreover, for
different reasons, both kinds of technolog}', as such, tend to resist the
economic analysis on which policy anal3'sis is usually based. Ac-
cordingly, the main contribution of a number of the stvidies to the
question at hand lies in the inferences and interpretations derived from
technology analysis rather than from detailed evidence in the form of
economic data.

CASE one: the baruch plan

The U.S. proposal for international control of atomic energy, the
earliest instance in the series of the impact of high technology on
diplomacy, is a foremost example of an unsuccessful effort to reach
international agreement on a technological issue of transcendent
importance. Atomic weaponry and atomic energy are incontrovertibly
"high technology." It illustrates the principle with which the study
concludes ". . . the creation and application of new technologies
arising from scientific discoveries may so change relations among
nations that a system of international control of that technology
becomes desirable. ..."

. . . Nuclear energy is neither the first nor the last example of a technological
innovation suggesting the desirability of international machinery and procedures
for controlling it. But it is probably the most dramatic example to date.*"*

The lesson of this case is that an innovation in the form of a "high
technology" of tremendous diplomatic significance came into being
without first receiving deep analysis by diplomatists and scientists —
working together — to devise a strategy of control that was both
technically sound and diplomatically acceptable to all parties con-
cerned. In the long run it is possible that the United States, and the
world at large, might find that to have withheld the use of the weapon
in World War II until plans and arrangements for achieving control

«8 Wu, Ttie Baruch Flan, vol. I, p. 118.

1767

were well advanced would have been less injurious than its ur^e to ter-
minate a war already drawing to a close. Certainly the achievement
of effective and acceptable control of this weapon, now in the hands
of six or more countries and threatening to diffuse still further, has
become a foremost task of 20th century diplomacy. The basic point
is that high technology has the potential for vastly disruptive conse-
quences in the relations among nations. If these are not assessed at the
outset, they become progressively more intractable.

CASE two: commercial nuclear power in EUROPE

How intractable the diplomatic complications of atomic applications
have bfconie — even in the peaceful uses of the technology — is demon-
strated by this second case. It records the complex history of a series
of "deliberate policy decisions" by the United States to foster com-
mercial nuclear power in Europe. One reason for this decision was to
divert fissionable material away from weaponry. Another was to lessen
Europe's dependence on imported fossil fuels. A third was to find
markets for U.S. high technology products and services in the field
of atomic power. However, in pursuing this policy, the United States
has magnified the danger of nuclear proliferation, encouraged external
competition with its own exports, accepted a commitment to comply
with multilateral control by the United Nations Atomic Energy
Agency of the domestic U.S. industry, and set in train a series of
actions pointing toward extensive further international controls with-
out assurance that all nations possessing nuclear technology will
equally accept these obligations.

CASE TIfREE: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

The most spectacular event of the IGY, and in terms of long-range
implications one of its most significant achievements, was a high-
technology development : the initiation of the space age through the
launching of artificial earth satellites.

This event, which occurred as an incident in the pursuit of pure
science, illustrates how science and technology (especiall}' high
technology) may sometimes reinforce each other in a symbiotic
relationship. The earth satellite technology was not a result of IGY-
connected scientific activities but of earlier scientific discoveries and
applications; it was brought into play to assist in meeting new scientific
objectives which could not have been reahzed without it; resulting
scientific discoveries and the promise of still further discoveries lent
force to the further development of space technolog3^ (It was diplo-
matic requirements, however, which provided the principal impetus
to this further development.)

Thus, the technological significance of the International Geophysical
Year was mainly its spur to high technology in such fields as space
exploration rocketry, telemetry, weather observation, and communi-
cations satellites. The diplomatic significance of the IGY was mainly
in the new prestige of the Soviet Union, and the spur to U.S. scientific
and technological efforts, in response to the successful orbital flights
of Sputnik satellites. However, Mr. BuUis suggests that additionally
the program "engendered unprecedented international cooperation

1768

and good will, at least on. the part of scientists," and he quotes Dr.
Wallace Atvvood as asserting that it "further demonstrated the signif-
icance of scientific factors in formulating and executing foreign policy."
Furthermore, Bullis provides suggestive evidence that there was some
causal relationship between the IGY and several subsequent treaties
dealing wdth the control or international use of such high technology
artifacts as space vehicles and atomic weaponry.

CASE four: the MEKONG PROJECT

This study is described in a forcM ord by Chairman Zablocki of the
vSubcommittee on National Security' Pohcy and Scientific Develop-
ments as a "case study of how science and technology can be utilized
as an alternative to tlie tragic and bitter conflict which has engulfed
Southeast Asia for so man}^ years." It discusses a "technique for
applying science and technology systematically to a multinational
region." The scope of the technique is uncommonly broad, but as the
following introductory statement of the study clearly shows, the
backbone of systematic development in a lagging (or "developing")
region is mainly but not exclusively basic or "low" technology:

Development of a country is inherently a process of technological application
toward an economic result. Regionalism — or more precisely, regional develop-
ment— introduces the idea of a system within which technology is applied more
coherently to a geographic unit than to a political unit. The technological system
requires, first of all, an intensive application of science. The scientific base of a
regional development scheme, of which the Mekong Lower Basin Project is here
the prototype, involves an enormous range of research disciplines: meteorology,
soil chemistry, biomedicine, forestry, plant genetics, sociolog}^, anthropology,
marine biology, entomology, and geology, to mention only a few. The technology
and engineering base of such a regional development scheme is similarly broad. It
encompasses hydraulics, electric power, flood control, electronic communications,
computer modeling, electrical industries, large demonstration farms, highway and
bridge construction, fish and agricultural food processing, and many more fields of
technological applications.*""

Both high and low technology play a role in the planning for regional
management of a great river watershed. Use of satellite surveys of
land, water, mineral, forest, and crops is one possibility. Computer
and microwave management of flood control and river flow is another.
But the predominant form of technological activity would be areas
classed as "low."

One factor in the preference for low technology in regional develop-
ment is the general desirability of enlisting the active participation of
the inhabitants of the region in both planning and execution of the
project. The rewards to the region from training its people in the use of
nuclear power, aerospace, and other high technologies would be negligible
and would tend to create a technological elite out of touch with the
rest of the population. The cost-eiTectiveness of many expensive items
of high technology would be suspect, and the infrastructure necessary
for its successful employment would require further intervention of
outside specialists.

Indeed, one of the great achievements of the United States in
agricultural technology was the county agent and agricultural experi-
ment station system for transferring technology to using farmers. In
a developing region it is necessary that the technology to be invoked

*'»> Huddle, Mekong Project. Vol. 1, p. 365.

1769

be compatible with the local culture and that it be effectively trans-
mitted to those who are motivated to make best use of it. Ideally, the
leadership in extending the technology to these users should also be
supplied locally rather than from outside.

In short, for the large part of the world where development is more
an aspiration than an accomplished fact, high technology would not
appear to be of major value. On the other hand, there would appear
to be great scope for the adaptation of low technology to the special
needs, circumstances, and cultures of such regions. Even in the more
highly developed regions of the world, there is likely to be more scope
for the introduction of basic technology of agriculture, forestry, mining,
materials processing, manufacturing, and waste recycling, than for
the application of specialized and costly items of high technology.
The principle of multinational regionalism in the diplomatic context of
1976 offers no more attractive target than the energy-rich but water-
deprived region of the Middle East. The potential economic and diplo-
matic gains that might accrue from a shared enterprise involving Israel
with Arab neighbors make this a tempting if immediately, unlikely
prospect.

CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed

It is rather difficult to characterize the evolving technology of
mineral extraction from the surface or subsurface of the deep ocean
floor as either "high" or "low" technology. That it is a demanding
enterprise is beyond question. But the problems involve engineering
more than science, and the products must be quantitative to be
meaningful.

The Mohole Project^'" was a major scientific undertaking. But the
science lay in what was to be discovered by drilling deeply in the ocean
bottom, rather than in the mechanics of the operation. When even-
tually that project was laid aside, it was because less ambitious and
vastly less costly projects were accounted more likely to 3deld valuable
scientific information than would have been secured by a single drilling
to the Earth's mantle.

In essence, the exploitation of the resources of the seabed calls for
elaboration of present engineering practice to a different and more
exacting environment. It will be difficult, and the first rewards are
likely to be marginal, but the technology involved is that of the pe-
troleum and mineral extraction industries, rather than some new tech-
nology evolved out of the scientific laboratory.

If the recovery of resources from the seabed is judged a problem of
low technology, the same is not necessarily true of the problem of
protecting the ocean environment from the consequences. Both high
technology for surveillance and political innovations for control are
a likely further requirement. Satellite monitoring of oceanic pollution
is one obvious implication of seabed mining.

However, the intractable nature of seabed ownership or sovereignty
owes more to the traditional dilemma of an international commons.

*"' U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Technical Informatinn for Congress, a re-
port to the Suhcdmmittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969, pp. 161-192.

1770

Seabed mining technology has merely raised anew this ancient problem
of international law and diplomacy. The monitoring of the oceans may
require high technology, but the stimulus is provided by variants of
technology practised by the Romans.

CASE six: u.s.-soviet commercial relations

The dilemma for U.S. policy explored in this study is that "ex-
panded economic relations which facilitate massive technology trans-
fer from the United States to the U.S.S.R. may create new, potentially
dangerous dimensions in U.S. diplomacy." Yet —

On the other hand [the study goes on to explain] there is at least a possibility
that the process of integrating the centrally planned Soviet economy into the
market economy of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world
might unleash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in turn,
contribute to international interdependence and stability.*"

In the area of food grains and low-technology products the Soviet
Union has been a massive but erratic customer. The questions raised
by the study address this feature of Soviet imports. For example:

(1) Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods of com-
mitment than was the case in the past? (2) Does the trade agreement represent a
part of a new pattern of relationship between the Soviet Union and the United
States? and (3) Does the agreement presage a new relationship between the Soyiet
economy and the non-Communist world economic system? If these questions
can be answered affirmatively, the outlook for political and economic net benefits
to the United States will be favorable. ^'^

In discussing the policy questions of high- technology exports to the
Soviet Union, the study employs a fairly comprehensive definition of
"high" technology that encompasses such industries as "electronics,
agribusiness, petroleum refining, and automotive tooling and forging
equipment." It also cites "Advanced Industrial Systems" and "Man-
agement-Control-Communications Systems." While the particularities
of these are analyzed separately, the general conclusion is offered
that "Current Soviet requirements for high-technology assistance
from the United States appear to represent a pattern of technical
and managerial interrelatedness that would limit the ability of Soviet
leaders to take short-term advantages, borrow technology, and then
withdraw from continued United States-Soviet economic relations in
particular lines." ^^^

Stability of trade relations appears to be a major key to a favorable
and enduring trade partnership of the two countries, and both high
and low technology exports from the United States could be important
elements in this relationship. Soviet exports, on the other hand, appear
likely to be limited for some time to raw materials, petroleum and
liquefied natural gas, and low-technology manufactures, although the
Soviets claim that tariff concessions (MFN) would permit large-scale
sales of their industrial products. Another important factor is the
extent to which the Soviet leadership is prepared to relax its emphasis
on military high-technology development, and how the United States
would be prepared to respond to such a relaxation if it occurred. High
technology in weaponry, like other forms of high technology, takes a
long time to mature and cannot easily be turned off for diplomatic
purposes.

<» Hardt and HoUiday, V.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations, Vo]. I, p. 601.

"2 Ibid., p. 573.

«3 ]bU., pp. 572-584, especially p. 573.

1771

ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology

The issue that emerged from this study was whether the United
States should adopt a poHcy that capitahzed on its admitted lead in
high technology, or whether policy should be addressed instead to
strengthening the science and technology base of older and long-
established industries. One advocate of the second policy pointed
out that the share of the U.S. auto industry of the world market had
declined from more than 75 percent in 1950 to 34 percent in 1970.

If it is true that U.S. leadership in high technology exports is eroding,
despite very large investments in this category, then the implication
appears to be that only progressively larger investments are required to
restore this leadership. In view of the rapid international movement of
high technology, it is easier and much less costly to add minor im-
provements for commercial purposes after the initial high technology
breakthrough has been achieved, than to carry a program all the way
from laboratory to commercial sales. For example, the great scientific
advances in solid state devices by the United States were quickly
followed by the marketing in the United States of efficient and well-
built Japanese pocket radios at low cost.

Here the distinction between low and high technology is drawn as
follows :

The commercially oriented [i.e. "low technology"] part of [the U.S.] technologi-
cal structure achieves high levels of mass production at low cost, based on high
levels of productivity of its labor. There is also a "high technology" part of this
structure (specifically, the aerospace and military systems industry) which
is characterized by low production of items of high quality and performance;
workers in this industry include a high proportion of scientific and technological
professionals, skilled in solving complex ana difficult problems.'"*

To illustrate the range of diplomatic-technological issues in the con-
temporary world the study selected for brief analysis four technological
areas: atomic weapons and delivery systems, space developments,
agriculture, and technological infrastructure. From these it generalized
four trends :

. . . (1) the important ways in which evolving technologies add to the prob-
lems and issues confronting the diplomat, (2) the ways in which technology tends
to draw nations together in international enterprises, (3) the emergence of many
positive values and serious dangers of technology that are of concern to many
nations, and (4) the need generated by technology for explicit governmental
plans and programs to ensure that its consequences over the globe are compatible
with U.S. foreign policy. <•*

Six diplomatic effects of that part of high technology devoted to
nuclear arms were suggested :

... (1) Unlimited general war is an impractical and irrational enterprise and
is not regarded as a realistic alternative to diplomatic agreement as was pre-
atomic warfare; (2) possession of nuclear arms and delivery systems is essential
to preservation of the mutual deterrent posture of the two superpowers and
pursuit of nuclear technology is essential in maintaining the balance of terror, a
form of stability; (3) deployment of new weapons is a competitive activity in
which both sides lose, which inhibits beneficial diplomatic processes, and which
obstructs efforts toward agreement in the control of arms; (4) technological
developments by either party are of intense interest to the other; (5) the dangers
in this relationship are so evident that formal means of direct communication
have been judged necessary to reduce the possibility of a triggering misunder-
standing of intentions ; and (6) the condition of world peace, once only a preferable
alternative, has become a paramount and imperative goal of diplomacy."^

<'< Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, Vol. II, pp. 623-624.
«s Ibid., p. 627.
<'6 Ibid., p. 63.-?.

96-243 O - 77 - 18

1772

"Space" diplomacy was very extensive, in both geographic and
technological scope. It involved, by 1970, 250 project agreements with
some 74 nations. In addition to the exploration of the solar system,
the applications of space technology had been extended to global
telecommunications and television, weather observation, navigation
aids, and earth resources surveys.^^^ The diplomatic impact of the
high technology of space is summed up as follows:

... It afforded a new and relatively non-controversial area of opportunity for
joint US-USSR action. It was inherently global. It offered economic advantages
and opportunities to all countries. It demonstrated U.S. leadership in practical
application of a dramatic new technology. As a communications link it brought
the entire world closer together. It offered promise of solving such grave global
problems as arms inspections, pollution detection, and resource inventory. At the
same time, it raised a host of legal and diplomatic questions as to sovereignty of
near space, content of global television programs, the equities of developing
countries in an activity beyond their limited means, and the rights of nations and
individuals to use information secured by satellite.'"^

In the discussion of agriculture, essentially a "low technology"
field, the study identified four aspects as important for diplomacy:
(1) the problem of feeding a growing world population, and the ques-
tion of agricultural technology transfer' for this purpose; (2) the
policy of overseas disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses ; (3) achieve-
ment of balanced economic growth in developing countries; and (4)
the potentially adverse effects on the global environment of tech-
nologies to increase agricultural production.

In the broad area subsumed under the term "technological infra-
structure" the study briefly touched on education and training, health,
power, transportation, and communications. All of these have some
high-technology elements but in the main they are based on well-
established or low technology. Diplomacy becomes involved with the
low technology of infrastructure through such concerns as aid to
developing countries, the international transfer of technology, inter-
national aspects of education and health, and the inherently interna-
tional character of air and sea transportation and many media of
communications.

Much of the technology cited in support of the 1970 issue of the
"technology gap" between Europe and the United States was of the
high technology category. For example, one student cited, among 12
special advantages possessed by the United States (vis-a-vis Europe),
the folloAving —

U.S. lead in computer technology
U.S. lead in atomic energy, aircraft, and space
U.S. lead in comprehensive communications systems
while most of the other nine items bore a particular relationship to
high technology.*'^

The United States also had its "defenders" during that period of
alleged technological gap. These called attention to the ability of
industry in Western Europe and Japan to sell goods, including mass-
produced items, competitively in the United States. Moreover, said

^'' A more complete listing of possible functions of surveillance satellites appears in ibid., p. 638.

<'s Ihid., p. 640.

*" Ibid., p. 662. Tiie other nine items were: Greater U.S. effort in research and development; greater size
of American firms, with superior profit picture; superior U.S. mnnacerial slnlls; the flow of European scien-
tists to tho United States; higher U.S. expenditures on education (especially technical); mobility of move-
ment e'eosrraphically and institutionally; superior conimunications amons and within institutions; absence
of trade barriers within a large market area; and flexibility and adaptability of social and economic insti-
tutions.

1773

one analyst, "In fields such as power generation, primary metals,
road and rail transportation, consumer durables, and communications,
European companies are among the world leaders." '*^'' The same
could also have been said of Japan.

Another author pointed out that American preoccupation with
such science-based high technologies as "strategic" hardware had
actually worked to the broader economic disadvantage of this country
by diverting attention of U.S. scientists and technologists" . . . from
prosaic problems such as those of improving old processes or dealing
with air pollution and waste disposal." He explained that European
interest concentrated on increasing the efficiency and productivity of
commonplace processes, rather than risking development of "frontier"
technology.^^^ The study offered at this point a table of 18 classes of
items in international trade, showing a considerable correlation
between the ability of U.S. exports to compete in world markets
and "scientists and engineers in R. & D. as percent of employment" in
these 18 classes.

U.S. low-technology industries appear to have a number of dis-
advantages in world trade. Frequently, companies in this category
got an earher start in technological development, but then tended to
rest on their laurels. In some cases foreign companies invested in
U.S. patents and other "intellectual property," and then improved
upon them to outdo the older U.S. competition. Destruction of
industry in Europe and Japan meant that rebuilding was necessary,
so that more modern production facilities were available. Another
advantage enjoyed by industries outside the United States is that
they all adhere to agreed voluntary standards and to the metric
system, with which U.S. products are often incompatible.*^^ Other
disadvantages frequently cited are U.S. antitrust policies, patent
policies, onerous administration of pollution controls, and industrial
and mining health and safety legislation. One comparative advantage
of foreign competition is asserted to be the close and cordial working
relationship between industry and government, whereas this relation-
ship in the United States tends to have an adversarial character.
Clearly, these alleged disadvantages would be generally more charac-
teristic of low-technology industries than those in — for example —
aerospace, military, and nuclear fields associated with high technology
and large Government investment. A useful comparison might be
drawn, in fact, between the policies of foreign governments toward
low technology and the policies of the U.S. Government since 1962
with respect to agricultural technology development and dissemina-
tion. To some degree, perhaps, foreign governments have observed
the extraordinary success of U.S. agricultural development, coupling
the farm to the county agent and experiment stations, and have
applied these lessons to manufacturing industry of their own. As
U.S. workers in the foreign assistance program endeavor to transplant
this uniquely American system to agriculture of developing countries,
it is possible that it might also be transplanted to lagging industries
in the United States.

«° Ibid., p. 663.

«' Ibid.

«2 Ibid., pp. 666-667.

1774

The study then raises the question as to whether technology,
recognized as a potent factor of change and national power,

... is to operate in a random way, or whether it is possible, and desirable,
to devise a national strategy to guide and direct it, to stimulate innovation in some
directions, and possible to slow and inhibit innovation in others.^^s

The study next takes up the question of whether the United States
should opt for a strategy of high or low technology: "It has supported
the laser but not the science of processing garbage." Asserted U.S.
lags in the technology of the commonplace could "impair the credi-
bility of the U.S. posture of world technological leadership":

... On this point, one issue of U.S. technological strategy would seem to be
a conscious set of decisions as to the domestic technological gaps to be closed or
ignored. What older technologies might be revitalized by an infusion of fresh
technological eflFort, such as the railroads, glass and ceramics, coal, lumber, and
textiles? What would be the diplomatic consequences of a vigorous technological
effort in one, several, or all of these fields? *^*

Even in a country as rich in technological resources as the United
States still continues to be, there are evident limits. How best can these
resources be employed, not only for domestic economic health but
also for worldwide economic stability and growth? What are the policy
resources the United States can bring to bear on these issues of national
strategy in materials? Said the study: "U.S. efforts have been con-
centrated in fields of high technology in a reaction against external
threats; the result has been to assemble large organizations in the
fields of military, space, and atomic technologies. That these fields
continue to be important is not questioned. But in the design of a
total national strategy of technology, the effect of their being already
on the scene in great numbers is to provide pressures for the United
States to keep on doing what it has been doing. Where can objective
analysis and innovative policy be found that can examine alternatives
or additions to the national program?" *^^

ISSUE two: the politics of global health

It is hard to apply the high-low technology dichotomy to the field
of global health. One area of high technology in medicine is the use
of the computer for rapid diagnosis and the handling of massive
quantities of pathology laboratory data. Another is the development
of "bio-matenals."

However, another kind of analog might be drawn between the
philosophy of curative medicine in the United States and the em-
phasis of the World Health Organization on preventive medicine
(and public health in particular). While both concepts are science-
based, the expensive equipment, treatment, and operating procedures
of curative medicine preclude its general availability. Medical care
in the United States is expensive and growing more so with each
further innovation of high technology in curative medical practice.
It is inconceivable that this philosophy of medical care could be made
available worldwide; even in the United States itself, the trend ^and
its impUcations raise many questions. On the other hand, the sys-
tematic application of the science, skills, and practical knowledge
of pubhc health yields massive reductions in the incidence of diseases

«3 Ibid., p. 675.
«< Ibid., p. 677.
«5 Ibid., p. 678.

1775

that strike down whole populations. Eradication of communicable
•diseases, correction of dietary deficiencies, and control of disease
■vectors yield larger returns in global health than would an equivalent
monetary effort applied to medical care.

Points like these, developed in Dr. Quimby's study, suggest that a
rough comparabihty may exist between curative versus preventive
medicine and high versus low technology generally. The interest
and intensive use of science tends to center on the high technology
of curative medicine; the opportunity for massive improvement at
modest cost, with moderate further application of new science, tends
to center on the low technology of preventive medicine.

While the analogy is inexact in that both medical philosophies
entail heavy resort to scientific research, the science of^ preventive
medicine — once its discoveries are established and accepted — becomes
widely applicable. It can also make effective use of a higher proportion
of paramedical personnel. Curative medical science, on the other
hand, is costly both because of the individual problems it addresses
and because of the equipment, skills, and effort required in each
individual case.

ISSUE three: beyond malthus

An obviously close relationship exists between this study and the
Global Health study (Issue Two). The food/population equation
deals largely with low technology on both sides of the equation.
Endless modifications of long-estabhshed technologies, and social
institutional innovations to exploit these technologies more fully,
are the focus of the study.

Useful, but for the most part probably only modest, contributions
of high technology are offered in the field of agriculture: for example,
in weather forecasting and modification, in crop surveys and
crop disease detection and assessment, in satellite surveys of soils
and hj^drology, and in computerized management of marketing
information.

The main lines of opportunity for improvement in agricultural
productivity in the United States have historically been in incre-
mental advances in such low technologies as fertilizers, improvement
of genetic strains, pest control, moisture management, product
preservation, and the like. The really major innovation in U.S.
agriculture, lying in the social science area, has been the purposeful
coupling of new discovery witH informed practical application by
trained and skilled farm technicians.

Similarly with the population side of the equation: incremental
innovations in the biology of human reproduction management have
occurred but the primary factors determining the rate of population
increase are sociological. The role of high technology in this area ap-
pears to be negligible to nonexistent, although the possibility remains
that some innovation may emerge from the interaction of biology and
electromagnetics. However, corporations skilled in high technology
do not appear to have attacked this problem.

issue four: u.s. scientists abroad

The focus of this study is on people — and in particular on scientists
rather than technologists. The question of high technology versus low

1776

technology and the implications of both for diplomacy are scarcely
touched upon.

Nevertheless, there is some involvement with what might be called
the "high technology of scientific research," viz., high-energy physics
research ^vith its large accelerators, storage rings, and liquid hydrogen
bubble chambers; large radiotelescope arraj^s; deep seabottom drilling
rigs; and large-capacity digital computers.

Much of scientific research carried on by the visiting scientists who
are the subject of this study requires no elaborate and costly apparatus
(one measure of "high technology"). Yet some of this research might
still be regarded as being in the "high technology" area in the sense that
it is linked to such science-intensive applications as the laser and other
quantum effects, advanced electronics sj^stems, high-temperature
alloys for high-performance gas turbine engines, and radiation-resistant
materials for atomic energy systems. (Probably the most extensively
used piece of scientific equipment in the very "high-technology" Man-
hattan Project was the blackboard.)

Neglect of science explicitly related to low technology, on the otlier
hand, appears to be a characteristic of the entire U.S. program of
supporting U.S. scientists doing research abroad. Many foreign coun-
tries carry on larger programs in such low technologies as wood, glass,
plastics, simple composites, railroad transportation, shipbuilding, and
the like. At a guess, there may well be more visiting U.S. scientists at
the CERN center for research in subatomic particles than in all of these
more mundane research facilities put together. And it should be noted
that the primary means of international technology transfer is by the
movement and intercourse of knowledgeable people.

ISSUE five: brain drain

A distinction between this study and Issue Four (U.S. Scientists
Abroad) is that the focus is shifted to foreign scientists and tech-
nologists in the United States. Also, the movement described in
Issue Four is temporary and that in Issue Five likely to be permanent.
And finally, the gain is more one-sided: the "brains" are drained ex-
tensively from countries that need them and yet do not necessarily
benefit the United States where the competition among resident
"brains" is considerable. In short, the gain to the United States of
the migration to this country of scientists and technologists from
abroad does not appear commensurate overall with the loss- to the
donor countries.

The study did not distinguish explicitly between high and low
technology. Historically, and in the broadest sense, the international
brain drain has involved a wide range of talent and expertise, from
that of the semiskilled Greek or Turkish worker in an industrial
plant in Germany to that of the physicist who has made his wa_y from
the underdeveloped country of his birth into the Western intellectual
community. The emphasis in this study, however, is on the most
talented and highly trained scientists and technologists, the innova-
tors; hence, on high more than on low technology. The appeal of
the United States for persons with high-technology qualifications
is strong because, as Dr. Whelan puts it,

The United States is a "center of excellence," a term used by students of
brain drain to define ideal conditions for scientific development. All components
of these conditions that are lacking in the LDCs and often wanting in many

1777

advanced countries of the West are amply supplied in the United States: eco-
nomic resources and research support; universities and scientific institutions;
laboratories and experimental centers; great teachers; a communication net-
work connecting all professional organizations into a composite grid; a cooperative
spirit among the scientific institutions, industry and government — in brief, the
total infrastructure for the development of science and technology.^^

The severest brain drain into the United States at present is that
of the foreign medical graduates (FMGs), most of whom come from
less developed countries. As pointed out earlier in this essay in
connection with Issue Two, medicine in the United States tends to
be a high- technology field. The essence of the brain drain in this
instance is that less developed countries in desperate need of the low
technology of preventive medicine may be deprived of it by the
transfer of talent to the high-technology practice of curative medicine
in the United States. At the same time, while they fill an actual need
in terms of the existing structure and philosophy of American medicine,
these FMGs by their presence foreclose, for a substantial number of
aspiring and qualified American youth, the possibility of entering
the field of medicine.

In general, if it is true that the United States leads the world in
high technology and lags in low technology (surely a large over-
simplification but necessary to make the point), then logic would
have it that the United States should pursue a policy of attracting
skilled technologists in the low technology area. This was, in fact,
the pohcy advocated by Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treas-
ury in his Report on Manufactures. The rapid evolution of the New
England textile industry after the immigration of Samuel Slater is a
case in point. Most studies of technology transfer include among their
findings an appreciation of the importance of the educated, informed,
and motivated individual as a transfer agent. How much of this kind
of transfer actually occurs is undetermined and the extent to which
it could be systematically and selectively planned to optimize the
consequences for the countries concerned is a subject warranting
further investigation.

ISSUE six: science and technology in the department of state

This study addressed primarily the organizational, institutional,
policy, and management aspects of the science and technology inter-
face with diplomacy. By this point in the overall project it had been
abundantly documented that technology has a decisive impact on
foreign policy. Government decisiomnaking, by its influences on the
rate and direction of technological change and innovation, also pro-
foundly affects the situational factors, the problems, and the processes
of diplomacy. As the principal agency in the field of diplomacy, there-
fore, the Department of State has a broad and pervasive concern with
government decisions affecting technology.

The question to be dealt with at this point is whether the Depart-
ment of State, in treating of high versus low technology, should per-
form on different time scales, should adopt different diplomatic
and analytical modes, or should in any other way behave differently
toward issues of high and low technology.

«6 Whelan, Brain Drain, Vol. 11, p. US?.

1778

The most important point to emerge from the study is the necessity
of studying the long-range future diplomatic aspects of technology. It
is not evident that the kinds of expertise required for analyzing these
aspects as between high and low technology have been well considered.
However, they seem to differ substantially; moreover, within both
high and low technology there is a wide range of technical specialties.

It would appear that some effort should be made by the Department
of State to represent its views on the diplomatic effects of government
policy toward both low and high technology, in both the short- and
long-range future. For low technology, the main concern would prob-
ably be with the long-range future inasmuch as only small incremental
changes are likely to result from short-term technological innovations
in the massive industries characteristic of this category.

It is important also that the Department of State continuously
relate emerging or foreseen innovations of high technology to diplo-
macy, and represent the interests of the Department in Government
plans to advance or employ individual items of high technology. This
requirement implies that the Department become aware at an early
point in the usually protracted evolution of an item of high technology
as to its potential diplomatic significance, that the technology be
understood, that the possible directions of its development be fore-
seen, and that all of these be examined as they relate to U.S. foreign
policy objectives.

World War II signaled the emergence of high technology as a potent
factor of diplomacy. In point of fact, its potency may have exceeded
the capacity of diplomacy to cope with it. As Secretary of State,
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger could well ponder the significance of his 1957
statement that "if recourse to force has in fact become impossible,
diplomacy too may lose its efficacy." *^^ The great variety and power
of electronic-guided, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles and all the rest
of the panoply of modern arms puts an intolerable cost on obduracy.

However, there are many less threatening offshoots of the high
technology of modern deterrent weapons: satellites have been found
capable of performing such peaceful chores as weather studies and
forecasting, aids to navigation, international communications, and
many kinds of surveys of the earth's surface. Each time some new
application becomes practicable the need arises for international
negotiation toward agreement as to what rules shall govern it. At
the same time, the nation achieving this first new use wins a degree
of prestige beneficial in the international marketplace of diplomacy;
in one sense, technological achievement may have become a surrogate
for military strength. During World War II Stalin is reported to have
asked concerning the Pope: "How many divisions does he have?"
Today the question might be: "How many different kinds of working
satellites has he placed in orbit?" Or, from Saudi Arabia, the question
might be: "How many barrels of oil can he export?"

Achievements in high technology, while spectacular, tend to prod
other nations into feats of their own to equal or surpass the first
achievement. If the rewards are great, so will be the effort. Hence
leadership in high technology is a transient as Well as costly achieve-
ment. At best, the exploitation of its diplomatic rewards needs to be
planned well in advance and exploited promptly and with vigor when

«' Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1325.

1779

the time is ripe. Lasting gains for diplomacy from high technology
are few and uncertain. Developed countries see such achievements as
a challenge to be met, and the developing nations of the Third World
see them as arrogant demonstrations of "conspicuous consumption."
On the other hand, the implications of low technology for diplomac}''
are likely to be in the long run of much more significance. Low tech-
nology meets the needs of the developing countries. It pays the taxes
that support the costly ventures into high technology. It provides
the essential base of all industry, and earns the bulk of foreign exchange
through its exports. In short, it determines the economic health,
employment, and solvency of the nation. Technological strength and
adequate scientific support in this category would seem to be of con-
tinuing relevance for U.S. foreign policy goals and as such a matter of
enduring concern for the Department of State. It is not evident,
however, that the Department's organizational scheme provides the
kind of analysis in depth needed as the basis for departmental positions
(and governmental leadership) influencing national policy favorable
to low technolo23^.

Secondary International Aspects oi U.S. High and Low Technology
Germane to this discussion of high and low technology and their
diplomatic significance is a series of studies, hearings, and symposia
by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 1963-72,
addressing the subject of "Science, Technolog}", and the Econom3^"
An interim report in February 1972 by tliis title summarized the
findings at that time.*^* The principal message of the report was the
expression of concern as to whether the concentration of U.S. research
and development under Government sponsorship had drained talent
away from low technology (i.e., the basic staple industries) to achieve
the prodigious accomplishments in high technology (i.e., military and
aerospace industries). There appeared to be a substantial consensus
that technical innovation was the key to productivity, and some
witnesses saw a "close reliance of trade, national and international,
upon S. & T. development." However, one witness suggested that large
defense and aerospace R. & D. outlays had "inadvertently" diverted
engineering education from the civilian economy. This asserted diver-
sion of talent appeared to apply generally, with low-technology in-
dustries less favored than high technology and its specialized, tech-
nically skilled people.

It was pointed out in the report that Government sponsorship of
high technolog}^ involved, first, the outlay for extensive applied science
and technological development and, second, purchase of the product.
Low-technology industries were less favored in both respects. A British
analyst distinguished technological progress from scientific research;
technological advances contributed 3.2 percent of a 4.7 percent rate
in economic growth. He questioned the evidence as to whether
scientific research (as contrasted with technological development)
had any direct or measurable favorable impact on industrial pro-
ductivity. Other witnesses suggested that basic research, while still
an important component to technological development, had been
oversold. Nor was it the sole source of innovation. A summar}- of the
conclusion, offered by the committee staff, suggested that to improve

*2BU.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on Sci-
ence. Research, and Development. Science, Technology, and the Economy, interim report.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972, 40 p. (92nd Cong., 2d sess.)

1780

the international economic position of the Linited States it would
be necessary to "rethink our policies, reorder priorities, set specific
goals." In amplification of this point, the report quoted Prof. ^lurray
Wiedenbaum's statement that it was necessary to "emphasize key
civilian areas to a greater extent."

The inherent interest of the Department of State in the international
implications of the high-versus-low-technology question would appear
to be highlighted by this interim report. But the Department seems
to have played no role in the extended exploration of the matter.
It is possible that the diplomatic role of domestic technology, espe-
cially in the low-technology industries, may have been neglected as
attention has been concentrated on reacting after the fact to the
emergency and spread of more dramatic items of high technology.

Some Concluding Observations

A major issue of national polic}^ may be emerging: the question of
whether Government investment in high technolog}^ should be con-
tinued at past rates — or even expanded; or whether more public
benefit would accrue from a shift of Government funding support
to low technolog3\

Technology influences many aspects of diplomacy. The effects of
high technology tend to be specific and programmatic; those of low
technology more general and economic. High technology produces
the spectaculars, and the applications of low technology pay for
them; they also provide mass-produced manufactures that supply
domestic markets and earn the bulk of foreign exchange.

While high technology demonstrates the sophisticated skill of
American technologists and impresses the developing countries, their
need is for the fundamental knowledge and skills of low technology.

Government investment in applied science and technology in the
United States has been concentrated in the high- technology area.
Except in the longstanding program of agricultural research and
development, Government investment in low technology has been
quite minor.

On the other hand, developed nations in international trade
competition with the United States maintain extensive research
programs in low technology, and — also of importance — encourage
close cooperation within industries and between industry and gov-
ernment on technological programs. The diplomatic consequences
that flow from this difference between United States and foreign
government policy toward low technology warrant examination.
They are reflected in patterns of world trade, usage of miported
materials, balances of payments, economic health, currency stability,
and the prospect of progressive deterioration of the position of the
United States in the world economy.

In view of the important relationship of both high and low tech-
nology for U.S. diplomacy, it seems important for the Department of
State to participate in the formulation of U.S. policy toward both
categories. One kind of activity singularly appropriate for the De-
partment would be the formulation of a policy for achieving a rational
balance between exports and imports of technological information.
The Department is unlikely to be able to mobilize the skills necessary
for managing the substantive aspects of such a two-way transfer of
technology. But the design of institutional arrangements for this

1781

purpose would seem to be well within the scope of its responsibility.
For example, policy toward multinational corporations, a primary
channel for international transfers of technology, has remained
uncertain and inchoate. Overseas scholarships of U.S. students do
not reflect U.S. needs for restoring the balance in low technology
expertise. Scientific missions in U.S. Embassies abroad still appear
to be oriented more toward "science" than technology, and toward
low technology least of all. And the views of the Department toward
domestic policy in high versus low technology needs to be deeply
analyzed and strongly presented in the policy councils of the Executive
Office of the President,

It would be the conclusion of the author of this essay that support
for the development of some elements of both low and high technology
would be an appropriate strategy for the United States, While some
industries based on low technology may be fading out, as was the
case with the 19th century whaling industry and the carriage makers
before 1920, other low-technology industries continue to be basic to
the U.S. economy. Examples are the railroads, the automobile,
housing construction, and various consumer durable goods. To the
extent that technology lags in these "essential" industries, ways
need to be found to encourage more intensive application of science
to support them. The need is to apply support selectively, rather
than to adopt a general principle that all lagging industrial tech-
nologies should be upgraded. Similarly with high technology: the test
should be whether a particular item contributes more, or less, than
others to national goals and public needs. The achievement of tech-
nological spectaculars may have its place, but would need to be
weighed against other high technologies with a more solid utility. It
is not feasible for even the United States to fund every conceivable
technological advance; so choice is necessary. And one important
consideration is the contribution a candidate technology is likely to
make to U.S. foreign policy goals. Determination of the criteria to
resolve this question, and appUcation of the criteria in the choice of
technologies for public support to advance foreign policy goals, could
be a major function of U.S. foreign policy institutions.

Some Questions -for Further Consideration

This essay raises some of the most fundamental issues in the entire
project of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. A par-
ticular advantage of an examination of these issues is that it can
point the way to specific, tangible legislative actions that can influence
both the state of the American economy and the U.S. role in the larger
diplomatic world. Examples of some of these issues that seem to war-
rant examination are presented in the section to follow.

QUESTIONS

What kinds of useful relationships have been established between
the Department of State and (a) the science community and (b) the
technological community of the United States that could provide
guidance in the emphasizing of research and development programs
favoring U.S. diplomacy? What guidance does the Department re-
ceive in return from these communities as to diplomatic efforts to
support their programs?

1782

Has the Department formulated a long-range plan for diplomatic
policy respecting selected items of high technology? Has it identified
low technologies of particular diplomatic significance and designed
courses of action to exploit their significance over the long-range
future?

Have multinational regional patterns of technology been defined
as a basis for constructive diplomacy by the United States?

Has there been a determination of future U.S. needs for technology,
available abroad, that diplomacy might help to meet? Has attention
been given to the design of processes, procedures, and institutions that
diplomacy can help to create to meet these needs? Or have existing
diplomatic processes, procedures, and institutions been examined as to
their possible usefulness for this purpose? What analytical resources
are needed and what plans are afoot to mobilize these resources?

What are the criteria that determine the effectiveness of techno-
logical diplomacy?

What academic and other outside resources has the Department of
State tapped for analyses in these fields?

What institutions are available to implement technological aspects
of U.S. foreign relations and how are they (or how could they be)
enlisted for this purpose?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of international
transfers of high and low technology, and what are the implications of
these advantages and disadvantages for U.S. diplomatic policy?
Might policy deal selectively with the transfers (either export or
import) of high or low technology? Is technology transfer an ap-
propriate subject for international treaties?

What efforts has the Department of State made, or should it make,
to bring to the attention of decisionmakers the diplomatic interest in
public mvestment in R, & D. supportive of high or low technology?

Chapter 21 — Roles and Interactions of

Public and Private Institutions in

International Technology

CONTENTS

Page

Kinds of Technological Diplomacy Since 1950 1787

A Concepetual Model 1788

Problems of Diplomacy Inviting Solution by Private Industry 1788

Support of Diplomatic Goals by Private Enterprise 1790

Lessons for the Public/Private Interface Found in the Study 1790

Case One: The Baruch Plan 1791

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 1792

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical

Year 1794

Case Four: The Mekong Project 1794

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 1795

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 1790

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 1797

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 1798

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 1798

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 1799

Issue Five: Brain Drain 1800

Issue Six : Science and Technology in the Department of State 1 800

Some Concluding Observations 1803

Some Questions for Further Considerations 1803

(1785)

CHAPTER 21— ROLES AND INTERACTIONS OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY

The power and reach of technology have altered the role of private
industry in diplomatic relations. Historically, an important task of
the diplomat was to facilitate private commercial intercourse across
national boundaries. Protection of traders and their property was an
early concern; later, investment and operation abroad of plantations,
mineral extraction, followed by factories to employ both local materials
and local labor, called for the diplomacy of early capitalism — also
term3d by its critics "imperialism" or "colonialism." At best, such
overseas development added wealth and improved living and ed-
ucational standards, and built an infrastructure to support homo-
grown economic activity. At worst, it was indeed exploitive
colonialism. U.S. diplomacy during this period played a relatively
passive role, protecting U.S. investments by appeals to international
law without reference to differences in the normative values of the
activities in question.

However, from about 1950 on the overseas role of U.S. business and
industry has shown a more varied range of characteristics. Both
industry and diplomacy have advanced to a more sophisticated value
system.

Kinds oi Technological Diplomacy Since 1950

A major feature of U.S. diplomacy, sustained from the early 1950s
on, has been the transfer of technology to developing countries.
While the organization and planning of this effort vras in govern-
mental hands, private industry was called upon to provide sub-
stantive elements in the form of knowledge and artifacts. Consultants
loaned by private companies worked in the field. Individual companies
worked under contract to formulate and implement development
plans.

Another major element of diplomacy contributed by private in-
dustry has been the supplying of sophisticated military s\'stems ac-
companied by training of indigenous troops in their operation and
mamtenance.

A third major force has been the spread of the multinational corpora-
ation, generally regarded as the primar^^ path for the transfer abroad
of U.S. technology and management skills.

As these direct contacts of U.S. private industry penetrate further
and deeper into economies of other nations, it becomes of progres-
sively greater interest to U.S. fii^ms to act according to diplomatic
precepts. In this sense, private industry becomes not only a bene-
ficiary of diplomacy but an interested participant in the process of
seeking the mutual benefit of the home countiy and the overseas host.

(1787)

96-243 O - 77 - 19

1788

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

This emergence of private support for diplomacy suggests a possible
model: initially, diplomacy as a means of protecting commercial market
and raw materials interests abroad; then, as development gathers
momentum, a trend toward teamwork of industry and diplomacy
for mutual advantage; and perhaps a third stage in which mature
industrial relations require a minimum of diplomatic intervention, and
even a fourth stage, in which the economic network becomes world-
wide and the relationship of industr}^ and diplomacy reflects a com-
prehensive and amicable interdependence among nations and their
interests.

Whether this idealized process has validity is controversial.
Another view is that initialh^ the interests of the Government and
private industry abroad were in close harmony, but that increasingly
they have become divergent. According to this model, either industry
or Government must alter its objectives in order to restore the pre-
vious harmony or else U.S. foreign economic policy will become
increasingly inefTectual. But in any event, a confluence of fierce
nationalism, effective guerrilla movements, public conscience, and the
nuclear presence has rendered imprudent if not actually perilous the
show of force for commercial advantage, while private industry has
become increasingly international in scope; accordingly, economic
enterprise needs to become the partner of diplomacy rather than its
beneficiary. In prospect is the possibility that the diplomat will learn
how to maximize the contribution of technology in private hands to
support diplomatic goals, and that industrial technologists will be
motivated to perfect their own role in this partnership. It is to be
hoped, for example, that the multinational corporation will come to
serve and to be recognized as a mechanism toward mutually beneficial
interdependence instead of being regarded as the exploitive villain of
the piece and a hostile influence toward developing nations. The U.S.-
U.S.S.R. bilateral agreement has paved the way for a substantial
increase in the role of U.S. -based multinational corporations to transfer
technology to the Soviet Union for mutual benefit. Precisely how, and
by what agency, the further use of these institutions for diplomatic
benefit might be stimulated, guided, and if necessary controlled, is a
livel}^ issue for examination.

Problems oj Diplomacy Inviting Solution by Private Industry

The skill of private industry in the use and transmission of tech-
nology can help solve problems associated with lagging productivity of
foods in developing countries. Food maldistribution, low production,
inefficiencies in supply management, are all amenable to technological
solution. Global food problems present some of the most intractable
and emotion-laden of diplomatic issues. Bilateral and multilateral
arrangements to mobilize private industrial resources have helped
overcome some persistent deficiencies but there remains great oppor-
tunity for further intensification of this effort. Production and dis-
tribution of fertilizers and pesticides, export of standard or adapted
farm machinery, design and local production of food processing and
preservation facilities, and organization of better marketing systems
could all benefit from U.S. expertise.

1789

The role of private enterprise in the extraction of petroleum and
hard minerals from the seabed is another subject of diplomatic con-
cern. Technologists in private companies are pursuing developments
in deep sea drilling, the raising of manganese nodules from the ocean
floor, prospecting for submarine deposits of minerals, extractive
metallurgy of seabed minerals, and operation of submerged oil rigs.
Meanwhile, the diplomatic community is wrestling with a host of
problems like sovereign rights to the ocean floor, protection and
regulation of seabed property rights, and equitable treatment of
claims by landlocked nations to a share of submarine resources. In
this broad area of activity, cooperation is essential between the diplo-
matic community and the technological entrepreneurs. Resolution of
the diplomatic problems must relate in its timing to the development
of technical capabilities to recover seabed resources economically, and
vice versa. This problem of timmg, m fact, is quite characteristic of
modern diplomatic technology generally. The contemporary problems
tend to be long-range and to require long-range planning. Present
decisions will determine the state of diplomatic technology two decades
hence.

One of the most interesting contemporary problems has to do with
constructive ways of "recycling petrodollars." The rising prices of
oil from the Middle East result in an enormous accumulation of
dollar exchange in the possession of the oil-producing countries.
Characteristically, these countries are technologically "undeveloped,"
despite their great wealth. They have the choice of spending this
wealth on consumer goods or on the capital equipment and infra-
structure required for a soundly based, balanced, diversified industrial
economy. The shape of the future global economy to develop out of
this present decision has diplomatic significance for the United
States: should the oil-producing countries be encouraged to become
mutually advantageous trading partners with the United States or to
develop economies in sharp competition with U.S. industry for world
markets? In the special case of the Soviet Union, can U.S. assistance in
the development of Siberian oil and gas reserves encourage a more
modern, possibly consumer- oriented, production system in the
U.S.S.R. or will it permit a continuation of Soviet emphasis on arms
production and military support?

Both developed and developing countries are concerned with their
ability to exercise sovereignty over the foreign-based multinational
corporations that have penetrated their territories and economies.
These concerns extend to such matters as corporate control, use of
foreign management personnel, corporate policy decisions adverse to
national economic or social interest, excessive payments for the use of
foreign patents and technologies, tax evasions, insuflBcient return on
exported raw materials, and technological incompatibility with the
host country's industry. As the leading nation in providing a home
base for multinational corporations, the United States has a strong
diplomatic interest in minimizing adverse impacts of these institutions
on U.S. foreign relations and diplomatic goals. In the long run, the
corporations themselves share this interest. Provisions for cooperative
coordination of overseas activities of U.S. -based multinational
corporations in the interests of U.S. diplomacy would seem to be
generally advantageous to the corporations and to all the countries
involved.

1790

Support of Diplomatic Goals by Private Enterprise

The question is raised as to the ways in which private industry can
perform profitably in overseas transactions \\Ai\\ concurrent benefit to
U.S. diplomacy. Recent revelations of poUtical interventions, "kick-
backs" to influential leaders in forei2;n countries, and like actions for
private profit are readily perceived to be diplomatically d3'sfunc-
tional. A closer relationship between business executives and the U.S.
diplomatic community might help to distinguish courses of business
action favorable to both. In particular, objective assessment of the
future political course of foreign countries can reduce the likelihood
of shaky reliance on leaders or parties about to be deposed. Conversel}',
establishment of relationships that enable participation in corporate
decisions by local community leaders abroad might contribute to
stability even when the national leadership is shaky.

Exercise of national sovereignty by developing countries over
mineral resources in their territories, and over corporate properties
and management policies under their jurisdictions, can impose impos-
sible obstacles to meeting the necessary constraint of private enterprise
that it be profitable. But this is not an absolute consequence; it is
amenable to diplomatic adjustment. Moreover, the task of diplomatic
adjustment is made easier if the resident corporations seek consciously
and overtly to meet the perceived social, technological, and economic
needs of the host country. To the extent that they do this, they
further their own acceptance in the country, as well as furthering the
diplomatic goals of the United States. And finally, the overseas
diplomatic representatives of the United States can reasonably be
expected to give guidance to U.S. corporations abroad on social,
technological, and economic policy. The Department of State can give
this help only if it deploys abroad people knowledgeable in social,
technological, and economic policy.

But there is a great danger in the jdelding to short-term economic
advantage of private industry in the formulation of diplomatic policy.
For example, a foremost national goal of the United States in diplo-
macy is world peace. It is difficult to reconcile this goal with the
vigorous dispensing of sophisticated weaponry to opposing nations in
the Middle East. From the short-range diplomatic point of view,
weapons sales or donations may facilitate negotiations and balance
opposing forces to discourage war as well as providing markets for
U.S. -produced armaments. But it does so at the cost of raising the
potential level of intensity of future conflicts and broadening their
geographic spread. When diplomacy is linked to private industry in
the dangerous world of the 1970s, long-range diplomatic goals neces-
sarily ought to take precedence over short-term goals, either diplomatic
or commercial.

Lessons jor the Public j Private Interface Found in the Study

The 12 topics selected for anal3^sis in the present study were chosen
on the basis of their significance for U.S. diplomacy and their repre-
sentativeness as parts of the universe of diplomacy, focusing always
on science and technology in accordance with the main purpose of the
study. Aspects of the public/private interface were touched on,
sometimes at length and sometimes only implicitly, in all 12 subjects.

1791

The hj^potheses derived from a review of the treatment of the 12
topics can be expressed in the form of a chain of logic that runs as
follows:

1. Science and technology are a large part of the substance of
diplomacy.

2. The cases and issues dealing with the technological part of
the science-technology spectrum have the heaviest consequences
for diplomacy.

3. Technology, more than science, is strongly oriented toward
the private sphere, toward commercial and profit-making
activities.

4. Therefore, the Department of State, in seeking to advance
diplomatic goals in the modern technological world, must address
questions of technology, and in particular must undertake to
exert influence for diplomatic purposes on the management of
technology at home and abroad by profit-seeking private enter-
prise.

5. For this purpose a close functional relationship between the
Department and private industry needs to be established.

Evidence in support of this set of hypotheses is drawn from the 12
individual chapters of the study. While clearly qualitative and
indicative rather than conclusive, the evidence suggests that further
investigation is warranted: both as to the validity of the hypotheses
and as to the actions required if they are confirmed. Selected observa-
tions from the chapters bearing on this matter are presented in the
following subsections.

CASE one: the baruch plan

Perhaps the most salient point to be drawn from this case is one
that received little if any attention at the time it was first made, and
has gone virtualh^ unremarked ever since. It concerns the matter of
inspection of atomic plants as to compliance with nuclear treat}^
provisions. Great stress was placed on the importance of placing
inspectors in the Soviet Union, and it was even suggested by one U.S.
leader that such inspection might be one way "to alter Russia's closed
society." *^^

On the other hand, the Board of Consultants who assisted in the
preparation of the initial U.S. policy report on the international
control of atomic energy warned that the presence of a large number
of foreign inspectors would be "as obnoxious to Americans as to any
others." ^^^ The truth of this cautionary observation is evident when
one considers the probable reaction of any large American industrial
corporation engaged in the production of nuclear hardware — pacific
or otherwdse — when confronted with an asserted right of entry of a
foreign national to inspect the premises and examine the books.
The unqualified insistence of some bodies of U.S. opinion on the
necessity for inspection of Soviet territory in connection with the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*^' raises interesting questions as
to the attitude of U.S. industry toward any such proposed provision.

«9 Wu, The Baruch Plan, Vol. I, p. 86.

«o Ibid. p. 81.

«' See for example, U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Re.search Service. Technical Information for
Congress, a report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science
and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Ofl., pp. 195, 204-205,
and 216.

1792

Would private industry in the United States indeed be willing to
accept the principle of foreign inspectors of its plants and records as
a quid pro quo of U.S. inspection of their foreign counterparts? Was
any effort ever made to obtain the views of U.S. industry on this
matter? Had such an agreement been made, would its inspection
provisions have been legally enforceable and acceptable (or even
Constitutional!) in the United States? Will there be future demands
for mutual inspections under arms treaties?

On the other hand, the Baruch Plan study raised the opposite
question as to whether secrecy could be relied on in any event. It
may be too obvious a point to deserve mention that the only value
a deterrent weapon can possibly have is obtained by its disclosure to
the adversary whom it is intended to deter. And once the disclosure
is made, the detailed technology can be more or less quickly duplicated
by a competent and determined adversary despite efforts to keep it
secret.*^^ Thus, proprietary and secret information can remain so only
if it is of less than major strategic importance. The protection of com-
mercial technology may well be analogous: possible only inversely
in proportion to its commercial value.

In the absence of severe international patent restriction, the trans-
fer of technology may be reduced to a matter of convenience and
utility. Its volume may stand as a greater barrier to its universal
use than does the effort to withhold from disclosure individual pro-
prietary items of value.

Historically, it is recalled that the British Government unsuccess-
fully sought to prevent emigration to the United States of skilled
textile technologists. And the Brazilian Government failed to prevent
the British from obtaining seeds of the rubber tree, native to the
Amazon Valley. All too often a technology emerges simultaneously
in two countries, as was the case with the calculus and the reduction
of aluminum.

CASE two: commercial nuclear power in EUROPE

This case raises the interesting question of the conflict between
national security and private profit. Historically, the role of diplomacy
is to protect the national security. But diplomacy is also expected to
serve the overseas interests of the Nation's business. Granted that
security is paramount, how should private interests respond to this
priority? Are private companies content to leave questions like this
to the bureaucracy?

When, early in the administration of President Eisenhower, the
U.S. Government's monopoly on nuclear materials was somewhat
relaxed, private industry took over as commercial activities the
functions of constructing and operating nuclear power reactors.'*^^
This policy was never fully carried out; enrichment has remained
in Government hands, and there has been a persistent hiatus in the
provision of spent fuel storage and high-level radioactive waste man-
agement. As for reprocessing, although pnvate ventures moved into
the supply of this nuclear service, as of July 1977 there were no com-
mercial facilities in operation, and prospects for the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission to license such operations appeared dim. The new

«2 Wu, The Baruch Plan, Vol. I, p. 119.

"3 Donnelly, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe, Vol. I, p. 246. The only two services retained as Gov-
ernment monopoly were the enrichment of uranium (which the customer supplied) and storage of radioactive
wastes from fuel element reprocessing.

1793

administration appears to have decided that enrichment will remain
a Government monopoly and that additional capacity will be added
by the Federal Government. However, since 1974 the United States
lias lacked the enrichment capacity to take on new foreign orders, a
situation that has accelerated foreign ejirichment ventures and
brought the Soviet Union into the world enrichment market as a sup-
plier. The United States for perhaps the next 5 years will remain the
principal free world source of enricliment, but thereafter will face
competition from European plants. This situation can change over
tlie coming decade if new enrichment technologies, primarily the
centrifuge and laser separation methods, prove substantially supei'ior
to the gaseous diffusion process of the U.S. plants. The policy issues
for uranium enrichment are epitomized in a series of questions pre-
sented in the case study :

Will the United States, for reasons of economic and foreign policy, seek to pre-
serve its position as the world's leading supplier of enriched uranium and enrich-
ment services?

What measures should the United States consider if other nations, singly or in
concert, attempt to^reak the longstanding U.S. enrichment monopoly by building
their own enrichment facility?

Is the further development of gas centrifuge technology in Europe likely to
lead to a technological surprise for the United States, should the economic and
technological feasibility of this technology be demonstrated?

What measures can or should the United States consider to discourage further
development of the gas centrifuge?

What diplomatic options are open to the United States should the Soviet Union
seriously enter the world enriched-uranium market?

Since supplying enrichment services requires the use of large amounts of elec-
tricity which, in the United States, comes from coal-burning powerplants, and
considering present air pollution problems of the United States and the environ-
mental impacts of mining coal, do the foreign policy benefits of supplying enrich-
ment services to foreign customers balance the energy and environmental costs to
America? *^*

Two future questions also involve the public/private interface:
(1) As nuclear power technology moves forward to the breeder reac-
tor— as it may well do — what role will private industry be permitted in
this somewhat controversial technology, both in the United States and
abroad? And, as the world's nuclear industry moves toward the es-
tablishment of international standards for the design, construction,
and operation of nuclear powerplants, how should the U.S. interest
be represented, what standards should be proposed, and what should
be the respective roles of the Government and private industry in this
matter?

In view of the great uncertainties surrounding the formulation and
implementation of U.S. energy policy in recent years, there would
appear to be reason for concern that in the particularly complex and
dangerous area of nuclear power policy, decisive policymaking will not
come easily. Always in the background is the threat that fissionable
plutonium, a byproduct of power reactors, might be surreptitiously
diverted to unfriendly use by a foreign power or even by a gang of
terrorists. The question is whether the separation of control by Gov-
ernment and operation by industry would weaken security against
such diversion. Again, a close working relationship in these matters
would seem to be called for, between the Department of State and the
private sector, supported by a highly competent departmental plan-
ning staff.

«3< Donnelly, op. cit., p. 265.

1794

CASE three: the political legacy of the international

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

This case involved worldwide cooperation of scientists, supported
only in part by governments, with policy on the program largely in the
hands of the scientists themselves. Certain major projects were, of
course, managed by governments: for example, the placing of satel-
lites in orbit, Antarctic expeditions, and the like. But the important
consequences for private industry were largely unplanned and in-
advertent, with little consideration given by either the scientists or the
governments involved in the IGY as to its commercial consequences.
The converse is also true: the industrial community appears not to
have recognized the potential commercial significance of the tech-
nological advances that were to be spurred by the IGY.

An enumeration of some of these advances in technology may be
helpful. The stimulus of the first orbiting satellite led to the creation
of NASA with its multibillion-dollar program of space exploration and
utilization, along As-ith communications satellites and ground ter-
minals, useful spin-off technology in computers and solid state devices,
weather forecasting from space observation, military surveillance
satellites, and a general stimulus to the "military-industrial complex"
in the new field of outer space.

Another consequence of the IGY was the great impetus given to
education in the physical sciences. A little more than a decade later,
Servan-Schreiber *^^ was to attribute in part to this U.S. educational
emphasis a superiority of United States over European economic
advance, the so-called "technology gap."

These were only a few of the more outstanding consequences for
public/private relations with diplomatic significance that grew out
of the IGY. The question to be asked at this point is whether any of
them were foreseeable, and whether the Department of State ought to
have had a voice in guiding the substantive directions of the research
program. This point leads in turn to the question as to whether the
Department of State has resources of its own to study such proposed
scientific initiatives in advance, and also whether communication of
the Department with the scientific community and with technologi-
cally oriented people in private industry is not also a required input
to the study of future scientific initiatives.

CASE four: THE MEKONG PROJECT

Few diplomatic initiatives could match in intensity or scope the
potential impact on private industrial opportunity offered by aggres-
sive support of a regional development program like that of the Lower
jMekong basin. The concept involved a coupling of engineering control
of a major liver with economic development of the watershed and its
resources, along with education and training of indigenous populations
in the best use of these resources to advance their opportunities.

Clearly involved are social planning and civil works planning and
construction. But the project extends to the general betterment of the
condition of populations in the basin: improved agriculture, mineral

"6 J. J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, translated from the French by Ronald Steel, New
York, Atheneum, 1968, 201 p.

1795

discovery and exploitation, development of forest products and af-
forestation, public health and medical service delivery, education,
electric power distribution and use b}^ agriculture and industry,
improved water and land transportation, commercial fishing, and
development of marketing systems to accommodate a growing list of
products. Banking and credit facilities are an early requirement. Map-
ping, surveying, soil sampling, forest inventories, and prospecting,
as well as demograpliic, health, and educational surveys, are needed.
Training is required in both technical and entrepreneurial skills.
Technology transfer, in all its ramifications, is a major feature of such
projects and entails extensive public-private coordination.

The regional development concept as epitomized by the Tennessee
Valley Authority sought to encourage the balanced social, economic,
and technological development of a geographical area, Basic to the
plan was the construction of large civil engineering projects: dams,
roads, port facilities, locks, and powerlines. Production and use of
electric power was a key element. Another was flood control coupled
with water transportation, afforestation, and soil erosion control. But
creation of an infrastructure for development also entailed the im-
provement of schools and health services, libraries, and technological
training of valley people in appropriate skills. New farm equipment
was designed and constructed under contract, and then manufactured
locally for use in the valley. Rvual industries were started up by local
entrepreneurs, using technical processes developed under TVA
sponsorship, with technical consultative assistance supplied by the
Corporation.

As the productivity of the inhabitants and local industry rose, the
Tennessee Valley became a better market for the products from out-
side tho. region, while also contributing its own share to national
development.

This admittedly rosy picture of an American social invention of the
1930s indeed neglects mention of defects, waning enthusiasm and
motivation, and evidences of unbalanced growth. No technological or
social concept can remain long unchanged and still retain its initial
validity. Adaptation to change is an imperative.

Nevertheless, tlie regional development concept offers commanding
logical validity. Whether applied to a subnational or a multinational
river basin or other coherent geographical feature, it can be the basis
for wide-ranging cooperation of industry and the institution that
undertakes the regional development plan. In this sense, the Lower
Mekong Basin appears — still — to be a region in which diplomacy can
lead the way to the participation by the private sector in a construc-
tive interdependence, with a minimum of nationalistic dissonance.

CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed

The ocean floor is a special region in which diplomacy and national
interest, technology, and private enterprise ar6 all closely involved,
both now and prospectively.

For the most part, the role of diplomacy in this field has been more
of the traditional character : an effort to assert and protect the interests
of the private business community under the general rules of equity
based on international law. Similarly, the industrial interest in the
seabed remains narrowly addressed to the possibility of profitable new

1796

ventures. Little attention appears to have been given by the diplo-
matic community as to ways in which new technology for the seabed,
in the hands of the private entrepreneur, could advance the goals of
diplomacy. Nor does the private business community appear to have
given much thought to ways in which it could act profitably in
developing seabed resources so as to further U.S. diplomatic goals.

Clearly, the minerals on the floor of the ocean are an immense
resource for the future. Even so, the unplanned exploitation of this
resource could disrupt industrial patterns, impair the ocean ecology,
provoke international confrontations, and obstruct progress toward
rational resolution of the question of seabed sovereignty. Once private
industry established the technology, the systems, and the commercial
structures for seabed exploitation, there would be resistance to any
change in the rules of ownership, however unsatisfactory these rules
might be.

CASE six: u.s.-soviet commercial relations

The origin of this case lay in the May 1972 summit meeting between
President Nixon and Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet
Union. From this summit meeting there developed a Joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, various trade agreements, bilateral
science pacts, and other agreements.

The theme of the study was that detente, cautiously approached,
might help motivate the Soviet leadership away from the arms race
and toward joining the world economic system, modernization of their
civilian economy, and expanded production of consumer goods.

The role envisioned for U.S. industry in tliis evolving relationship
would be to provide the Soviet Union with a highly selective set of
technologies, coupled with technically oriented management. In re-
turn, the Soviets would provide the United States, initially at least,
with materials deficient in this country and products in which the
Soviet Union enjo^'ed a comparative economic advantage. The case
study enumerated as potential U.S. exports electronics, agribusiness,
petroleum refining, and automotive tooling and forging equipment. ^^'^
Also mentioned were advanced industrial systems for oil and gas
production, improvements in communications systems, and facilities
to encourage tourism. However, these exports were greatl}^ overshad-
owed by the huge grain deliveries to the U.S.S.R. in 1972 and 1973.

Soviet short-term prospects for export to the United States were
also assessed in the study, and included furskins, petroleum and
natural gas, nonferrous metals (nickel, platinum, palladium, and
chrome ore in particular), and possibly wood and wood products, coal
and coke, and other raw materials. If the United States elects to ex-
tend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union and ease tariffs
on Soviet manufactured goods, Soviet exports of some manufactures
might find U.S. markets.

One problem facing U.S; industry in undertaking projects in the
Soviet tlnion, as well as U.S. exporters to the U.S.S.R., is the control
structure of the Soviet economy. As a state-trading monopoly, the
wSoviet Union confronts the U.S. negotiator with a formidable array of
officialdom. U.S. industry will need to feel its way into this relation-
's Ilardt and HoUiday, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations, Vol. I, pp. 572-575.

1797

ship, learning by experience, with the U.S. Departments of State,
Agriculture, Treasur}-, and Commerce standing by as anxious
midwives.

In the background will remain the question of the effect of this
interaction on Soviet militarj- potency and Soviet military intentions.
While the main actors in this drama, insofar as the United States is
concerned, are the American industrialists and businessmen, "polit-
ical benefits are the main measure of net gain to the United States
from any pattern of increased United States-Soviet trade. . , .*^''

Thus, the study documents a clear-cut need for U.S. private enter-
prise to act in U.S. diplomatic and national security interests, in
particular the facilitating of a reorientation of Soviet production away
from armaments to consumption goods with a consequent slowing of
the arms race. It would seem to be a further responsibility of the U.S.
participants in dealings with the Soviets to keep U.S. officialdom
fully informed of all transactions. The Soviet counterparts, them-
selves a part of the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union, presumably
coordinate better. Accordingly, U.S. diplomats may be placed at a
serious disadvantage if they are less well informed than Soviet diplo-
mats. But it is also a responsibility of the Department of State to
provide a central institutional arrangement for the receipt, aggrega-
tion, synthesis, and analysis of this information.

ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology

The theme of this study is that technology has grown from a national
concern to a global force, even as it continues to be the principal source
and measure of national power. On both counts it is of foremost
concern to the field of diplomacy. But the development, use, manage-
ment, and transfer of technology are largely left in private hands.
So the question is posed squarely: what useful functional relation-
ships need to be developed between the U.S. diplomatic community
and the private sector for the purpose of developing, using, managing,
and transfering technology for diplomatic purposes? If the diplomatic
impact of technology depends on private decisions, to what extent and
in what ways can and should these decisions be influenced by diplo-
matic considerations?

Kinds of impacts cited in the study include:

— Whether to support the transfer of simple industrial tech-
nology to developing countries that put U.S. industry using the
same technology at, a comparative disadvantage;

— Whether to export production equipment used by U.S.
industries ;

— Whether to encourage in the United States a high-con-
sumption domestic economy (with a high throughput of materials)
that increases U.S. dependence on overseas sources of materials ;

— Whether the export of U.S. technology unsuited to the re-
cipient, or otherwise flawed, works to the disadvantage of the
U.S. image abroad;

— Whether the trend toward economies of scale invites serious
consequences for the global environment;

«37 Ibid., p. 606.

1798

— Whether exchange of technology would serve diplomatic
goals better than do one-way transfers of technology;

— Whether adoption of voluntary standards (and the metric
system) by the rest of the world works to the disadvantage of
both U.S. industry and U.S. diplomacy; «,nd

— Whether multilateral rather than bilateral diplomacy affords
a more constructive forum for the effective management of tech-
nology to serve U.S. diplomatic interests.

ISSUE TWd: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH

This study, with its emphasis on preventive global medicine ad-
ministered by multilateral institutions, conveys only by inference
the possibility of a role for the technologist in the private sector, or
the need for public-private interaction with respect to health
technology.

It is quickly evident that the philosophy of medical care in the
United States with its stress on personal curative service is economi-
cally out of the reach of most of the world, and indeed is raising
questions in the United States as to the feasibility of its indefinite
further extension. The cost-eflfectiveness of preventive medicine, by
comparison, offers attractions for global application and extension.
The role of the private sector in this field may have lagged quite as
seriously as has U.S. eicploitation of the diplomatic opportunities for
enlargement of its role in furthering global preventive medicine
through association with the World Health Organization, the Pan
American Health Organization, and other multinational health bodies.

One question, not touched on in the study, is whether the multi-
national corporation might serve as a useful instrument for the inter-
national transfer and development of systems of preventive medicine.
Certainly it is of interest to such corporations that health standards
be adequately maintained in all countries in which they operate or
might desire to enter. There are also market opportunities in such
fields as electronic medical diagnostic equipment, for which the study
proposes the establishment of global (WHO) standards. And speaking
more broadly, it is diflScult to conceive of a field in which the com-
petence of management and skill in technological development of the
multinational corporation could be employed with greater social and
diplomatic advantage and with less dissonance than in the global ap-
phcation of the principles and practice 'of preventive medicine.

ISSUE three: BEYOND MALTHUS

An extraordinary array of opportunities for the private sector to
participate in programs beneficial to U.S. diplomatic goals is offered
in this study. The technological and managerial resources appropriate
to the tasks delineated in the study could be available, given the
motivation, the funding support, and the policy guidance.

For example, in the field of food production and distribution, a
serious lack is crop information. Satellite surveys of crops, supple-
mented by local information of a less aggregated character, is well
within the present state of the art. Another lack is in food nutrients
and fertilizers and other agricultural necessities, to be made available
on eafey terms to needy countries. Another possibility is that U.S.

1799

technologists could help the developing countries find ways of reducing
the enormous losses of foods to spoilage and rodents.

In the thorny field of population, the dilemma described in the
study is that scientific knowledge about human reproductive processes
and the development of technologies for their control are concentrated
in the United States and other technically advanced countries. In the
United States in particular, standards of drug and medical equipment
testing are extremely exacting, costly, and time-consuming. Standards
appropriate to the United States are not necessarily as relevant to the
conditions of developing countries. In consequence, the technology
they need may not be provided. The question is suggested as to why
the technologists are not transferred, rather than the technology, to
resolve the dilemma.

A further problem, highlighted by the "Green Revolution," is the
worldwide trend toward urbanization — the movement of rural
populations into the cities. Easement of this problem, which also
afflicts the United States, calls for a total reversal of the U.S. produc-
tion philosophy. Traditionally, the emphasis of ' 'scientific manage-
ment" in the United States called for reducing hours of labor by
intensive use of materials, capital, and electrical energy. However,
in the developing countries — and increasingly in the United States —
shortage of labor has less bearing while shortages of capital and
energy are acute. Thus, the design of small industry in urban areas
needs to produce useful items for consumption or export, based on
high input of labor and low mechanization. Opportunities in this
field, and training in the management of small enterprises, would seem
to be the necessary direction of effort. Whether U.S. skills in
technology, marketing, and entrepreneurship are transferable to this
environment is less evident.

ISSUE four: U.S. scientists abroad

This study was silent on the subject of the private/public dichotomy.
^The scope was restricted entirely to private scientific ventures, publicly
supported. But the question is implicit: if the main impact on
diplomacy comes from the technological part of the science-and-
technology spectrum, why is there no interest in the encouragement
of overseas study (and its reverse counterpart) in such technological
subjects as engineering, design, tool-making, plant layout, production
engineering, quality control, inspection, and so forth? Has the United
States nothing to learn from the rest of the world on these matters?

It is true that most large corporations in the United States and
abroad would not require financial assistailfce to support their own
technical personnel to travel and study abroad. Also, U.S. AID
supports some programs to train technologists from developing
countries in the United States and sends some U.S. technologists
abroad on its own programs. But smaller corporations, and even
large corporations that are not technology-intensive, might benefit
from exposure to foreign training and expertise. Tax incentives and
technological internships in U.S. Embassies abroad might be a means
to this end.

Even in the developing countries, there are local technologies —
including what for the contemporary U.S. culture are forgotten arts
and crafts — that could be useful in the United States. Recognition

1800

of this fact, and acting upon it, might replace the "lady bountiful"
image with one of fair exchange.

ISSUE five: brain drain

The United States has drawn skilled labor and technologists from
abroad over much of its history. Private enterprise provided the
magnet of opportunity. Periodic unsettled conditions in Europe
added a "push" factor, to which were added the ideological stresses'
of the 20th century. By the 1970s, the movement to the United
States of "brains" had shifted somewhat: from the developing
countries came medically trained people and students seeking ad-
vanced degrees (and usually subsequent employment) ; while from
the developed countries came engineers and scientists whose inputs
could find employment in the high-technology fields of aerospace
and atomic energy.

While the international movement of highly trained people —
especially if it goes one way — has considerable diplomatic significance,
no policy seems to have been applied or formulated to deal with it
in the United States. Private industry, as the chief instrument for
employment of imported "brains," is thus an actor in U.S. diplomatic
policy in this area, but without guidance as to its relationship to
broader national diplomatic goals. The study makes clear that freedom
of the individual to move from one country to another to seek oppor-
tunity and amity is a prized value in most countries. However, little
attention is given to the equity — the concept of fair exchange — in
human transfers. The need is apparent, as the study suggests, for new
diplomatic initiatives in the field of "brain drain," but they have not
been forthcoming and neither Government nor private enterprise
has provided an answer.

ISSUE six: science and TECHNOivOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Increasingly during the 1970s, interests and aspirations of the de-
veloped and developing nations have involved materials,' energy, and
environment, and the unifying feature of technology. Management of
diplomacy to reconcile the goals of developed and developing countries
has thus become increasingly concerned with the development and
management of technology.

The purpose of this study was to explore the organizational resources
of the Department of State to manage the diplomatic aspects of science
and technology. It was recognized that science and technology are a
principal item on the diplodnatic agenda, a primary force, and thesub*-
stance of international relations. It was therefore necessary for the
Department of State ". . . to translate the generalized and normative
goals of American foreign policy into operational goals to which
American technological superiority can contribute" and ". . . to
establish a closer functional relationship between [these goals] and
domestic programs of science and technology and to enlist the com-
munities of science and technology in support of these foreign policy
goals. . . .""8

*38 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1327

1801

The study observed that the "community" of technology is less
coherent than that of science. Technologists tend to be mission- or
company-oriented rather than national or international in their
outlook. In particular, and unlike the case of the sciences, "inter-
national associations of engineers are neither very large nor very
active." *^* On both counts, the technological community — mostly
in private industry — is not easily accessible to the diplomatic commu-
nity either to receive diplomatic guidance from, or to give technological
guidance to, the diplomats. Yet it is very evident that many of
diplomacy's problems, goals, and solutions are shaped by technology.
Dr. Leo S. Packer, director of the OES Office of Technology Policy
and Space Affairs, spoke to this point as follows :

For example, how do you balance short-term economic gains against long-term
competitive risks? How do you weigh the anger and possible retahation of a foreign
country? How do you account for intense competition for the business by foreign
industries? How do you consider the capacity of the overseas customer to assimilate
the technology transfer to our later disadvantage? How do you deal with foreign
customers who want an independent R&D capability rather than products?
How should government provide useful guidance and help to U.S. industry?
How do you measure the existing technology gap in a specific technology area?
What are the probable rates of progress in the U.S. and overseas and what will
the future trend be in the technology gap? What should our attitude be toward
exporting management and systems integration skills? How can we encourage
the import of certain commercially valuable technologies developed in Japan,
USSR, Europe and elsewhere? What are the risks of technology diversion to
undesired military use or to third parties? What are the comparative risks of
transferring various embodiments of technology by different modes of transfer?
To what extent does U.S. government action actually control the diffusion of
technology and what is the likely impact of possible actions? ""

One possible bridge to the U.S. industrial, technological, and
business communities is the Department's Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs.**^ The Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific [and technological] Affairs (OES) is another
bridging institution. On the private industry side, the multinational
corporation could be employed as an integrating or bridging element.
Others might be the National Academy of Engineering, technical
societies, and the technical universities.

It may be unrealistic to expect the Department of State, with so
many different categories of expertise demanded of it (languages,
political systems and power structures, national and international law,
flows of persons and values, and negotiations between and among
systems) to add the further burden of required expertise in tech-
nology. Yet, as technology moves to the center of the diplomatic
scene, the planning and conduct of U.S. foreign policy require hard
and mature understanding of such matters as —

— The changing structure of U.S. industry;
— Needs for U.S. technology in developing and developed
countries ;

— ^Vulnerability of U.S. industry to uncertain supply of im-
ported raw materials ;

— Effects of changes in technological levels of developed and
developing countries ;

— Comparative receptivity of industry at home and abroad to
technological innovation ;

«9 Ibid., p. 1331.
«o Ibid., p. 1436.
*« Ibid., see especially pp. 1430-1434.

1802

— Progress of teclinology having special international signifi-
cance, e.g., satellite communications, weather forecasting, re-
source surveys, and mihtary surveillance; strategic weapons;
weather modification; deep seabed mineral mining; and the like;
and

— Transnational and oceanic enAdronmental threats posed by
refineries, irrigation projects, large tankers, supersonic aircraft,
deep sea mining, offshore oil drilling, and the spread of toxic
agricultural and other effluents.
The traditional pattern of diplomacy does not appear to provide the
kind of alert perception and early readiness needed to deal with such
matters as these. Contacts are necessary not only with the diplomats
of other nations but also with technological leadership in the United
States. The diplomatic impacts of technology must be assessed in ad-
vance, and remedial action devised to meet future needs. An important
fact aloout technological — i.e., industrial — change is that it takes time.
Industry may indeed be adaptable to shortages of materials or en-
vironmental regulation, but not without time delays. Diplomatic
resolution of problems arising out of technological change must be
sensitive to this constraint.

It is not evident that the Department of State, and in particular
the science bureau, is structured to collect, analyze, and use tech-
nological information inputs for diplomatic policy guidance. For
example :

— The Advisory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs was
permitted to lapse.**^

— Although the "scientific attaches" were restyled several years
ago as "scientific and technological attaches," and attempt to keep
abreast of technological matters, they are not adequately staffed
to do very much in this direction.

— Technological resources of the Department in the functional
bureaus are modest to nonexistent.

— While the Department's science bureau has recognized the
importance of "technology," the word itself was removed from
its formal title and the heavy load of operational chores makes
difficult any substantial attention to this complex subject.

— The Secretary of State has been generous in his commitment
of the United States to international programs to advance
technology, but the ability to implement these commitments is
in doubt.

— No significant effort appears to have been made to search
out or coalesce the views and advice of the U.S. technological
community on present or future impacts of technology on U.S.
diplomacy.

— Significant technology-based diplomatic initiatives of the

United States have been few and far betweci, despite U.S.

technological preeminence.

The main point of this recital appears to be the need for a closer

coupling of diplomats and technologists, and between private industry

and the formulation of foreign policy.

<« Ibid., p. 1365.

1803

Some Concluding Observations

To a considerable extent the role of private industry has changed
from one of reUance on the Department of State for assistance in
overseas transactions to one productive of major if unguided impacts
on the substance of diplomacy. This change implies the need for the
Department to adjust its relationship towards private industry in
the United States. There is no substantial evidence that it has done
so.

I^arge international problems growing out of technological change
already confront the Department; others are in prospect. These
problems give plenty of advance warning of their impact. But the
Department seoms not to have taken advantage of these forewarnings.
The emergence of problems may be slow but technological adjustments
to change are also slow. Time is thus a resource to be used effectively
if it is not to be wasted. Prompt and earh^ recognition of problems
and the planning of vigorous correctives are required.

Some Questions for Further Consideration

In the further development of the theme of this essay, the following
questions are offered to indicate the scope and possible directions of
the inquiry:

What should be the relationship between the Department of State
and U.S. industry engaged m overseas operations?

In what ways can private companies support and advance U.S.
diplomatic goals?

What areas of technology offer particularly promising opportunities
for private contribution to U.S. diplomatic goals?

How can the motivation of private industry be increased in the
conduct of operations and initiatives beneficial to U.S. diplomacy?

How can the views of other countries best be obtained and trans-
mitted to U.S. -based companies on their constructive participation
in coherent programs abroad?

How can the dilemma be resolved of the wide gap between formal
ethical standards and e\ddences of individual breaches of ethics in
the relations between U.S. businesses and officials of foreign govern-
ments?

Is there a distinction between U.S. diplomatic goals and the U.S.
national interest?

Has the Department of State made available to U.S. businesses
any general guidehnes on the conduct of foreign activities?

Does the Department maintain an awareness of the consequences
for the U.S. economy of overseas commercial and technological
developments?

Conversely, does the Department maintain an awareness of tech-
nological developments in U.S. private industry having a potential
for beneficial or injurious consequences for overseas diplomatic
relations?

B}^ what means and through what channels can the Department
of State communicate to U.S. industry on social, technological, and
economic trends affecting diplomacy, and with reference to U.S.
diplomatic goals?

When major new international scientific programs are proposed
and activated, should the Department of State examine their possible
implications for new industrial technology of diplomatic significance?

96-243 O - 77 - 20

1804

At what point? With what kinds of expertise? Should the private
scientific and technological communities be consulted on these
matters in the course of such an examination?

What multinational regions in the developing parts of the world
might be candidates for the sort of regional development plan
evidenced b}^ the Tennessee Valley Authorit}? Are the opportunities
for constructive participation of the private sector in. such regional
schemes adequately appreciated? Might this same regional concept
be applied to the seabed?

What arrangements can ensure that contracts and negotiations
between U.S. businesses and offices of state-trading (communist)
nations are made known to the U.S. Departments of State and
Commerce for policy planning and coordination purposes? What
polic}^ guidance is available to U.S. companies and how can it be
bettered?

Are there special diplomatic considerations regarding relationships
between the Soviet Union and U.S.-based multinationaicorporations?
How are these to be evaluated?

wShould thought be given "to the formulation of a more explicit
technological strategy designed to increase the social return of its
immense investment in science and technology and to minimize its
negative environmental effects?" What are the policy resources the
United States can bring to bear on issues of national strategy in
technology, and how are these to communicate with the industrial
sector where such a strategj^ must be implemented?

In the field of global health, can the tremendous medical and
industrial technology resources of the United States be mobilized
in support of U.S. diplomatic objectives? What initiatives might best
serve this purpose and how might they be organized and guided?

What technologies might further the general objective of im-
proving global health and where does the responsibility lie for sponsor-
ing their development and use?

Could cooperative arrangements be developed for oil-rich countries
to work with the U.S. chemical industry to provide fertilizers and
pesticides to developing countiies? Might such cooperation be
furthered by assisting the oil-rich countries to develop petrochemical
industries to produce these high-energ^'^ agricultural materials?

Should there be recognition that transfers of value can include
more than finished goods, materials, capital, and credit? (For example:
transfers of teclmology and human expertise.) Might a system of
equity be devised in Avhich exchanges of tangible values and exchanges
of knowledge and knowledgeable people are taken together, so that
all parties benefit from the combined exchange?

Even if it is not possible to maintain a strict accounting of the
value of transferred technology and "brains," should not these be
recognized as important elements in the flow of value from nation
to nation?

What organizational and institutional changes are needed in the
Department of State to improve the coupling of technology and
diplomacy?

How can the Department tap the private industrial community
for technological expertise to make diplomatic pohcymaking more
responsive to technological forces for change?

What actions by private industry, at home or abroad, might
contribute toward tJ.S. diplomatic goals and how can the Department
motivate and coordinate such a private effort?

Chapter 22 — Independence Versus
Interdependence

CONTENTS

Page

Independence as an Historic Force 1809

Technology and Interdependence 1811

Interdependence as a Growing Concern of Political and Other Leaders 1811

Obstacles and Problems Affecting Constructive Interdependence 1813

The Obstacle of Political and Economic Nationalism 1814

U.S. Proposals for Global Economic Cooperation 1814

Cultural Obstacles to Interdependence 1815

Growth Versus Environmental Constraints 1816

Attempts to Cure Pollution by Redistribution 1817

The Obstacle of Imperfect Communication 1818

The Issue of Independence Versus Interdependence as a Theme in This

Study 1819

Case One: The Baruch Plan 1819

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 1820

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical

Year 1822

Case Four: The Mekong Project 1824

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 1826

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 1828

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 1829

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 1831

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 1832

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 1834

Issue Five: Brain Drain 1836

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of State 1838

A Concluding Remark 1842

Some Questions for Further Consideration 1843

(1807)

CHAPTER 22— INDEPENDENCE VERSUS INTER-
DEPENDENCE

A disturbing feature of the world of the mid-1970s is the widespread
and seemingly growing opposition between the forces of independence
and those of interdependence. Both forces appear to have great
potential for helping to solve the world's major problems. But if badly
managed in relation to each other or out of control, they may have
an even greater potential for destruction.

Interdependence has many meanings. As the term is used in this
study, it signifies a dynamic condition in which the forces of growth
and change oblige the nations and peoples of the world to rely
increasingly upon each other for their security and welfare — though
relying no less (but rather more) upon themselves. Self-reliance,
mutual (bilateral) reliance, and common (multilateral) reliance are
all embraced in this usage of interdependence. Also implicit in this
usage is the need to achieve a workable balance between independence
and interdependence. Further implicit is the need for diplomacy to
mediate the growing intercourse among nations — the greater the
degree of interdependence in economic, environmental, security, and
other areas of human affairs, the greater the need for competent
diplomatic personnel, institutions, procedures, and, above all, under-
standing of the forces which are shaping today's and tomorrow's
world. (The last requirement applies beyond the Foreign Service,
the State Department, and the White House to the entire Govern-
ment, including both domestically and internationally oriented
departments.) *"

The purpose of this essay is to draw insights from the 12 Science,
Technology, and American Dii>lomacy studies that bear on the
independence-interdependence dichotom}^ In particular, the role
of technology in fueling and in reconciling the opposition of the two
forces needs to be noted. In a more immediate sense, diplomacy is
the agent of reconciliation: can there be hope that enlightened di-
plomacy will bring about an Hegelian "higher synthesis" in which
the constructive values of independence and interdependence are
merged and their destructive potentials blunted? This question is
one with which the governments of the world's nations must come to
terms.

Independence as an Historic Force

The concept of independence is associated with such ideas as liberty,
self-determination, and self-reliance. A manifestation of independence
which has special relevance to this study is nationalism.

<<2 It should he further nctcd that the terms independence and interdependence are used in this essay mainly
with reference to sovereign nation-states and their interrelationships. It will not escape the reader, however,
that many parallels exist with regard to the independence-interdependence spectrum in the inteiTelation-
ships of states or provinces, cities; a great variety of organizations other than governmental, and just individ-
ual people.

(1809)

1810

"Nationalism," wrote Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson in 1942,
"has developed from the deepest of primitive instincts and emotional
forces in mankind." They continued:

It gathers from a thousand springs of common race with its common language,
religion, folklore, traditions, literature, art, music, beliefs, habits, modes of expres-
sion, hates, fears, ideals, and tribal loyalties. . . .

From all these racial instincts and mores rises the eternal yearning for inde-
pendence from foreign subjection or domination. . . . Nations are eternally
striving for independence. . . .

Who can even recite the repeated wars for independence of the Greeks, the
Germans, the Spanish, the French, the Romans, and their successors, the
Italians? . . .

Nationalism can readily expand into dangerous forms . . . [but] will continue
as long as man inhabits the earth and will have to be embraced in any plan to
preserve the peace."*

The words seem prophetic. Writing early in World War II when the
hope was widespread that victory would bring an end to nationalist
excesses everywhere, the authors were referring to a world of only 60
separate nations. Now there are more than 160. The behavior of many
nations today tends — despite the emergence of new internationalist
forms and vocabulary — to reinforce the skeptical view of human
nature and its selfish motivations which Hoover and Gibson shared
with the Founding Fathers and which is reflected in the system of
checks and balances built into the Government of the United States.

Independence has been a constructive force in the development and
growth of the United States and many other countries. It has not
generally been achieved and maintained by following Marquess of
Queensberry rules. The tactics of nations which are challenging the
Western industrial democracies on both political and economic fronts
today, however distasteful to those challenged, may sometimes effec-
tively advance the independence-related interests of the challengers.
On the other hand, some of the tactics — blindly, or at least not
farsightedly, pursued — may be contrary to those interests in the
long term, and perhaps even in the short term. They may collide with
national interests which would be better served by a posture of inter-
dependence, or by a more carefully adjusted balance between inde-
pendence and interdependence.

No nation in history has been better nourished in its independence
than the United States — nourished by a vast natural endowment of
land and other resources, by the insulation of great oceans and weak
neighbors, and by the imaginative development and application of new
technologies. Understanding the potential of this endowment and
sharing with Washington a keen distrust of foreign entanglements,
Hamilton and Jefferson sought autarky: i.e., economic, as well as
political, independence from the rest of the world. The Jeffersonian
concept was one of self-sufficiency with an agricultural base; the
Hamiltonian, self-sufficiency on a foundation of industry. But not,
for Hamilton, total self-sufficiency: industry, more than agriculture,
implied trade, and Hamilton favored trade. And trade implied the
development of varying degrees of economic interdependence. With
the growth of the Republic and its industry, trade relations also grew,
and the United States moved by gradual stages from a unique position

"< Herbert Hoover and Tlueh Gibson, "The Problems of Lasting Peace," in Prefaces to Peace: A Sympo-
»mm, cooperatively published by Simon and Schuster, Doubleday, Reynal and Hitchcock, and Columbia
University Press. New York, 1943. pp. 160-161.

1811

of substantial independence to one of substantial dependence on
other nations.**^

Technology and Interdependence

Technology, more fundamentally than trade, created interdepend-
ence. The Age of Technology which began with the Industrial Revolu-
tion has now, in a new and explosive phase which began with World
War II, become the Age of Interdependence as well. It was an achieve-
ment of high technology, the atom bomb, which ushered in the Age
of Interdependence and has since served as one of its more ominous
reminders. Writing in 1948 to Herbert Hoover, then heading the
Hoover Commission study of reorganization of the executive branch,
Henry L. Stimson (who had served as President Hoover's Secretary
of State) observed that "The progress of science and invention brought
with it a vastly increased interdependence among the nations of the
world." ««

In 1964 a book by Vincent P. Rock entitled A Strategy of Inter-
dependence outlined an approach for applying technology to the control
of conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. instead of to
the escalation of armaments. Rock quoted from an address in June
1963 by President John F. Kennedy at Frankfurt, Germany: "We
live in an age of interdependence." *"

Interdependznce as a Growing Concern of Political and Other Leaders

In 1975 — the year in which, ironically, celebration of the Bicen-
tennial of American Independence began — public references to
the theme of interdependence assumed epidemic proportions,
prompting one well-informed observer, Richard N, Gardner, to call
it "surely the political catchword of our time." Writing in a special
magazine issue marking the 30th anniversary of the United Nations,
Gardner went on to say: "The crises of energ}^ and food, of infla-
tion and depression, all testify to the increasing interdependence
of our world." "^ In the same special issue. Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger registered regret "that outmoded expressions of rivalry
should be increasingly asserted at the very time when a more elevated
and unified sense of global obligation is required," *^^ and Harlan
Cleveland asserted that "Our problem ... is ... to cope with
interdependence." *^° Particularly noteworthy not only for its per-

**'= One measure of this dependence is the special effort which the administrations of Presidents Nixon
and Ford felt it necessary to give to establishing and publicizing "Project Independence," an expensive
and protracted campaign to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign energy sources.

"* Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1342.

<" X'incent P. Rock. A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict Bettreen the United
States and the Sorict Union. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904, 3W) p. (President Kennedy's statement
is quoted more fully on p. 364: "We live in an age of interdependence as well as independence— an ape of
internationalism as well as nationalism. . . . Today there are no exclusively German problems, Anieric-an
problems, or even European problems. There are world problems.")

"8 UN SO: A Special Issue of The Inter Dependent (Journal of the United Nations Association of the United
States of America, New York), vol. 2, no. 7, August 1975. p. 16. (Cun-ently Professor of Law and Interna-
tional Organization at Columbia University, Gardner served from 1961 to 1965 as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State for International Organization Affairs.)

■"iiWrf., p. 20.

«o Ibid., p. 9. A one-year "National Commission on Coping with Interdependence" was created in Decem-
ber 1974 under the auspices of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. Originating in a suggestion by
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs John Richardson, the Commission sought
answers to four questions: (1) What adjustments in American lifestyles and workways seem indicated in
view of growing U.S. interdependence with other nations? (2) How ready are the American people for the
projected kinds of clianges? (3) To what extent are U.S. institutions capable of perceiving and analyzing
these changes and of reacting to them accordingly? and (4) What new altitudes and arrangements may
be required to enhance the capacity of Americans to cope with interdependence? A major conclusion reached
by the Commission, as set forth in "Coping With Interdependence: A Commission Report," was that the
main obstacles seemed "to arise from the pervasive assuminion that the line between 'domestic' and 'in-
ternational' is still a useful and relevant tool in making institutional policy." (Undated report, Aspen
Institute for Humanistic Studies, Princeton, N.J.)

1812

ceptive analj^sis but also for the fact that (while not an official view)
it resulted from a State Department initiative was Prof. Lincoln R.
Bloomfield's article, "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence,"
published by the State Department Bureau of Public Affairs as a 30-
page Special Report (No. 17, July lOTS).*^^

A wider selection of recent statements on the theme of interdepend-
ence might include such examples as the following:

— President Gerald R. Ford's nationally televised "State of the
World" address of April 10, 1975, in which he characterized
technology as presenting "a vast new agenda of issues in an
interdependent world."

— Numerous references in the press. On September 3, 1975, for
instance, the Washington Post observed editorially that "It is
comforting to think of a world in which all nations recognize that
both necessity and civility commit them to policies of interde-
pendence. But domestic political considerations and national
economic and political interests regularly cut across the impera-
tives of interdependence." *^^ (In another editorial, 4 days
later, the Post referred to "the new interdependence that the IMF
[the International Monetary Fund, meeting. in Washington the
previous weekl convened here to discuss.") **^ On July 3, 1975, the
Grinnell [Iowa] Herald-Register printed a report by its managing
editor on a conference on international problems he had attended
in June, in which a Canadian participant had said that "the U.S.
needs to refresh its views of other countries' views . . . interde-
pendence does not necessarily lead to cooperation." *^*

— The statement by Dr. Edmundo de Alba, Scientific Coun-
selor, Mexican Embass}^ at the August 1974 conference at
Henniker, New Hampshire, on National Materials Policy Re-
quirements: "No country in the complex technological world of
the present day is completely self-sufficient in the raw materials
consumed by its people. Even the so-called 'supplier' countries
in their turn need materials from other countries. This interlinking
of availabilities and necessities is the most profound reason to
mount an effort to resolve the problem of world materials supply
by interdependence within international justice." *^^

<5i The article summarized portions of a 4-volume study. Analyzing Global Interdependence. The study
was the product of a year-long inquiry that the State Department, through its external research program,
had cominissiop.ed the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to conduct. It was prepared by Professors
Ilaj^-ard R. Alker, Jr., Lincoln P. Bloomfield. and Nazli Chbucri. In "Toward a Strategy of Interdepend-
ence" Blooiafield distinguishes among the main kinds of interdependence {environmental, security, and
econoiTiic) and examines interdependence separately as "fact," as "good," as "bad," as determined partly
by how it is perceived, and as balanced or unbalanced. Unbalanced or asymmetrical interdependence, he
emphiisizfis, is dysfunctional — the more so as it is perceived to be unbalanced. Bloomfield goes on to discuss
the requirements and implications of a U.S. "interdepeudence strategy." The first element in an effective
interd'pendence strategy for the United States, he contends, is "a program of modest 'decoupling' of tiiose
interdependent liiiks which threaten to create excessive strain through excessive 'presence' " — economic,
both governmental and commercial, as well as military. A second element is increasing as rapidly as possible
the number and complexity of links between the United States and the principal oil-producing exporters.
A third involves applying to alliance relationships "the insights gained from analyzhig the psychological
aspects of dependencies." Finally, many security, economic, and environmental functions traditionally
man;iged on a national ba.sis can no longer lie confined by national boundaries; collective management is
inescapable. Bloomfield adds that all contemporary governments are inadequately organized to deal effec-
tively with contemporary problems, and that, in the case of the United States, "there should be a strongly
enhanced capacity to perform 'cross-sector' analysis of interdependence issues; this entails . . . fadding] an
improved capabilit\' to the Department of State, and the Executive Branch generally, for anticipating
crises and insurinsr that the foreign i)oli'-v system is better organized for the loug pull."

<« Waslihinton Pout eflitoria', "A World Economic Order." Sept. 3, 197.5.

«i Waf'iUustoi) Po.1t editorial, "A Recession Abroad," Sept. 7, 1075.

«■< Pinrier, A. .1. Report on Wilton Park I\' Conference, sponson d by the American Friends of Wilton
Park and held at.the Wingsiiread conference center, Racine, Wisconsin.

*''■'' U.S. Congress. Oflice of Technology Assessment, ReiiuircmtulH for Fulfilling a National Materials
Policii: Procceiina^ofa Conference OrQani:eihij the Federations of Matcriah Societio' for t tie Oifice of Technology
As.ies.iiiii7}t, Ancust 11-16, l!)7t. Edited bv Franklin I'. Huddle, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress; Foreword by Kmilio Q. Daddario, Director, OlRce of Technology Assessment. Published by
arrangement of the American Society for Metals, 1975, 194 pp. (p. 84.)

1813

— The statement at the same conference by Jean-Pierre Hugon,

Ministere de I'lndustrie et de la Recherche, Repubhc of France:

". . . the most important fact is that we are now entering a new

era of worldwide interdependence. There is not any estimation

to be done: we are condemned to interdependence. Inferences

must be drawn from that new state of things, all over the
world." *^6

— The observation by former diplomat and Japan Times editor
Kazushi^e Hirasawa in an article on "Japan's Emerging Foreign
Policy" m Foreign Affairs: "Because of their economic vulnera-
bilities, and development experience, the Japanese have become
one of the world's most active proponents of global economic
interdependence." *^^

— Congressional hearings and reports, as well as numerous
statements in the Congressional Record. The theme appears, for
example, in the title of the printed record of hearings before the
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy
in May 1974: "Global Scarcities in an Interdependent World." *^*

— The observation of the Murphy Commission Report (which
also states the case, in principle, for a constructive balance be-
tween independence and interdependence): ". . . an inter-
dependent world will intensify relations between states and
peoples and place a premium on international cooperation, [butl
it does not diminish the need to retain that independence neces-
sary to provide leadership, to secure cooperation in satisfactory
terms and to make the contribution to world needs which na-
tional skDls, resources and experience permit." (The Report
further states: "We believe that the interdependence of foreign
and domestic policy will grow.")^^*
Man's perspective on the world has undergone a drastic change
since the Age of Interdependence began, more or less simultaneoulsy
with the founding of the United Nations:

Thirty years ago, the UN's Founding Fathers did not (could not?) foresee the
interlocked conflicts of values and scarcities we now call the "interdependence
issues." On food, we worried about surpluses. Population planning was almost
unmentionable' and certainly untouchable by governments. Energy was cheap,
air was largely unpolluted, water was free and plentiful, the seas were a zone of
liberty, and raw materials were there for the benefit of those with the wealth and
the power to extract them. Trade and investment were "free," which meant they
were often expensive for the poor. And the monetary system was managed by
those with the hardest money.

Today, the international system built on those assumptions is in disarray be-
cause the assumptions are on the cutting room floor. ...*'<'

OhslacLes and Problems Affecting Constructive Interdependence

A word on some of the obstacles to the various forces that appear to
be thrusting interdependence upon the peoples of the world, and on
the complex dimension of growth versus ecological stress, may assist
in rounding out the context for the examination of the six cases and
six issues which follows.

<M Ibid., pp. 84-85.

"'Kazushige Hirasawa. "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, October
1975. p. 170.

** U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy.
Global ScarcUits in an Interdependent World. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., May 1, 8, 9, 15, and 22, 1974. Wash-
ington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 259 p.

"' Report of the Commission on the Oreanization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
(the Murphy Commission), Washington, D.C, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 1975, p. 26.

«•« Harlan Cleveland, "The Pace of Mutation," UN SO (op. cit.), p. 11.

1814

THE OBSTACLE OP POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM ^^

Virulent political nationalism is perhaps the most obtrusive of the
obstacles. It is paradoxical that many of the nations which have
recently achieved political independence, but are economically and
technologically dependent on the rest of the world, are aggressively
asserting their sovereignty. Along with the emergence of ministates
with their collective tendency to create imbalances in the United
Nations and in other international forums or relationships, the trend
toward nationalism is in seeming conflict with the broader and longer-
range imperatives of interdependence.

Sometimes accompanying this political nationalism, or an ingredient
of it, is a tendency toward a limited form of economic nationalism.

One kind of economic nationalism follows Western economic and
industrial models but seeks to bend them to further advantage
through such devices as expropriation and nationalization of extractive
industries or formation of cartels to control the supply and price of
energy and mineral resources. Another rejects Western ideas of
progress and reflects distrust of Western industrial society and its
patterns of technology, development, and growth in general. *^^ A
point of view associated with the latter position was expressed by
Muhbub ul Haq, Director of Policy Planning and Program Review
for the World Bank; he maintained —

. . . that the Third World must return to considering the needs of its land
and peoples first. . . . He said that the real question was not whether the Third
World had a future, but whether the industrialized Western world had a future.
In the next 25 years, he sees the economic, financial and cultural balance of
power shifting to the Third World.^®

Economic nationalism of either kind may sometimes serve the
immediate interests of the country which adopts it. It runs counter,
however, to the purposes associated with proposals for worldwide
economic cooperation advanced by Secretar}^ of State Henry Kissinger
in his message to the United Nations General Assembly of September 1,
1975.

U.S. PROPOSALS FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

In the U.N. address that Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan delivered
for him,^^* Mr. Kissinger said: "It is not enough to insure the minimal
economic security of the developing countries. Development is a
process of growth, of acceleration, of greater productivity, higher
living standards, and social change. This is a process requiring the
infusion of capital, technology, and managerial skills on a massive
scale."

«> Professor Edgar S. Robinson of American University, who reviewed this essay in draft, comments in
a note to the associate project director (November 17, 1975): " 'Quickie nationalism,' as manifested in the
LDCs in the wake of imperialism's withdrawals, is rather doubtfully to be lumped together with
the lengthy, gradual evolution of nationalism in the West. The distinctive, diversified assertions of inde-
pendence characterizing many LDCs, frequently in spite of internal heterogeneity, have properties pecuUar
to them and not necessarily associated with such classic Western attributes as the consolidation of a middle
class [andl a matrix of urbanization. . . . Thus, 'nationalism' seems to be a catch-all caption somewhat
wanly endowed to convey the elements, flavor, and nuances of behavior in lands remote from its origins. . . .
I don't know what can be done to alleviate this conceptual problem . . . other than to stipulate its existence
as an 'alert' to the reader. We seem to be stuck with an emotionally taut, empiricallj slack, word."

"2 It would probably be more accurate to say "seeks to reject." The course of outright rejection is, as a
practical matter, hardly open to any nation today. Nations can, however, resist economic penetration and
slow it down somewhat. This is a point closely related to the factor of cultural and psychological resistance
to interdependence, discussed below.

"3 Thecla R. Fabian. "Does the Third World Have a Future?" (Report on a work session of the Second
General Assembly of the World Future Society, held in Washington, D.C., June 2-5, 1975). TA Update
(Newsletter of the International Society for Technology Assessment), vol. II no. 2, summer 1975.

<M Henry A. Kissinger. "Global Consensus and Economic Development." Department of State, Bureau
of Public Aflairs, Office of Media Services. September 1, 1975.

1815

To this end the Secretary of State proposed the creation of an
International Industrialization Institute and an International Center
for the Exchange of Technological Information; the planning of a
conference on science and technology for development; agreement on
standards of conduct for both governments and transnational enter-
prises (multinational corporations) vdth respect to the operations of
the latter; adjustments in the relationship of the developing countries
to the world trading system; establishment of a consumer-producer
forum for every key commodity; and a "major new international
effort to expand raw material resources in developing countries.
The United States proposes," he added, "that 1976 be dedicated as
a year of review and reform of the entire U.N. development system."

Along with these concrete proposals Secretar}?" Kissinger made a
plea for international consensus and cooperation. He described the
world of 1975 as one of "some 150 nations ... in an environment of
continuing conflicts, proliferating weapons, new ideological divisions,
and economic rivalry." Then he went on to say:

We profoundly believe that neither the poor nor the rich nations can achieve
their purposes in isolation. Neither can extort them from the other — the developing
countries least of all. . . . The reality is that the world economy is a single global
system of trade and monetary relations on which hinges the development of all
our economies.

But it would seem that a more immediate realit}'' in the area of
global economic cooperation and development is the pressing need for
constructive and sustained leadership in the United Nations. The
concrete proposals by Secretary Kissinger move in that direction;
it remains to be seen how seriously the U.S. Government will follow
through. A first step might be to strengthen the U.S. Government's
own institutional arrangements and mobilize its own resources for
supporting his proposals.

CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO INTERDEPENDENCE

Cultural and psychological factors may greatly reinforce political
nationalism. American isolationism in the 19th century was sup-
ported by an outlook shaped largely by the open frontier and the
seeming limitlessness of natural resources: "The nation became a
great farmer-mechanic democracy, its people possessing . . . qualities
of independence, ambition, and individualism quite novel in the history
of the world." *^^ Independence was an important motivating force
in the life and growth of the young nation. Its role in interdependence
among the nations of the world, on the other hand, was almost
neghgible before World War I, and did not become a matter of com-
mitment until after World War II. Another major example of insistent
independence and self-reliance is that of the Chinese Communists
during the past three decades.

Successful North Vietnamese resistance to a series of external
threats over a long period was founded on more than political and
ideological nationalism or skill in tactics of guerrilla warfare. Although

"5 Wa\nie Caldwpll Neely. The Agricultural Fair. (Columbia L niversity Studies in tho History of Ameri-
Cfln Agriculture; edited by Uarry J. Carman and Rexford C. Tugwell.) New York, Columbia University
Press, 1035, p. 72.

1816

the wellsprings of that resistance are still not understocd in this
country,*"^ it is obvious that a fierce spirit of independence was at
work.

Instances of resistance to Western foods, however nutritions and
needed — such resistance constituting an obstacle to both normal trade
practices and extraordinary measures like famine relief- — have oc-
curred in Oriental, Arab, and other non-Western societies. This kind
of cultural barrier to rational interdependence arrangements usually
derives both from taste preferences formed out of deeply rooted
traditional practices and from historic religious beliefs.

Longstanding French resistance to "Americanization" (of language,
TV programs, products, lifestyle in general) might serve as a relatively
sophisticated example of cultural resistance in the developed world.
Recently this posture has been mirrored by French and other
Canadians.*^^

It is not the intention here to denigrate cultural resistance to-
change.^®^ Cultural diversity is important to human civilization.
However, since cultural and psychological factors tend to support
independence and to work against interdependence, thej^ need to be
takeii'into consideration in any attempt to balance the two forces,

■ • ' .,'(■ :-■■■■

V GROWTH VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

There are significant relationships between the two dichotomies of
growth versus environment and independence versus interdependence.

A posture, pf independence may tend at certain stages in national'
development to favor growth. This is likely to be true for nations
relatively self-sufficient in resources, including requisite skilled and
unskilled manpower; the classic case is that of the United States
of the 19th century. It may also be true for nations with unbal-
anced resources but a great wealth of one highly essential commod-
ity— the obvious example is oil — which can command a premium price
in the world market if vigorously exploited. In both cases, the proc-
ess of iactive growth and more sophisticated development tends to
lead in time to a situation of interdependence as rising domestic
standards of living and the need for export markets amplify exchanges
with other nations. "Have-not" countries, however, are limited to
a choice between interdependence and continued poverty.

Perhaps the process of growth leads to an ultimate condition of
global interdependence by three stages: (1) the exchange of materials
and services which nourish growth ; (2) the redistribution of the nega-
tive ecological impacts of growth; and (3) not yet at hand but foresee-
1 — • — ■

«» Margaret Mead testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 20, 1969, that "we
know nothing whatsoever about the North Vietnamese, because no research has ever be<>n done on the
subject . . ., nor do we know anything about the South Vietnamese." On the other hand, she said, "we
knew how the Japanese responded to liombing and how the Oermans responded to bombing. Those were
first-clasi pifeces of social science research done at the end of World War II which we totally disregarded when
we decided to go in and bomb Hanoi." (U.S. Congress, Senate. Psychological Aspects of Forngn Policy,
hearings "before the Committee oh Foreign Relations, June 5, 19, and 20, 1969.' Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1969, pages 96 and 118.)

•" In the article referred to above— "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence"— Lincoln P. Bloomfield
writes; ''It is not simply the onc-si(ledness of U.S. 'investments in Canada that hais produced mounting
strain. Rather,' it is thetotallty of penetration in the social, cultural, and informational sectors. ..."
, «•« Cultural resistance of this kind may also deriye some support from technology-alienated elements in
developed countries who see uncontrolled, too rapid, or misdirected growth as destructive of human values.
Professor Robinson notes: "As John Dewey observed, the multiplication of points of contact may Kkewise
multiply points of friction. Thus, technology's incalculable impact upon the concourse of states may produce
the very opposites of cooperation and community"'

1817

able, a global approach to the complex problem of controlling and
ultimately Umiting growth.

The phenomenon of growth poses a major dilemma for the 21st
century. The economic, political, social, cultural, and psycho-
logical health of Western society, and increasingly that of all of the
world's societies, are tied to growth. The structure and dynamics of
human civiHzation are intimately bound up with the phenomenon of
growth in many complex ways — as an ethic, in habits of production
and consumption, in the spending of time and the flexing of both
physical and intellectual muscles, and in the way society is organized.
It is difficult to conceive of an end to growth (the achievement of a
stable state), much less to predict how it will come about. Yet logic
compels recognition that space-consuming human activities cannot
infinitely expand within finite space.

The world's foremost laboratory for the study of growth as a
complex problem is Japan:

A survey of Japan's experiences with environmental disruption, population
growth, and diminishing resources casts into sharp relief the problems common
to all industrialized and industrializing nations. Moreover, the negative con-
sequences of Japan's rapid growth policies may well foreshadow an advanced
stage of our planetary predicament. . . .

The Japanese environment is so riddled with industrial effluent and agricul-
tural chemicals that in 1973, the entire population panicked before the threat of a
■nationwide epidemic of "pollution diseases," incurable human disorders resulting
from exposure to intense environmental pollution.

But is it fair to extrapolate from Japan's experiences to throw light on future
conditions in other parts of the world? Unfortunately, the answer is yes. For
Japan's environmental problems reflect assumptions underlj-ing modem industrial
society everywhere. . . .

Indeed, the economic effectiveness of Japanese patterns of industrial organiza-
tion have gained increasing recognition. Many developing nations openly aspire to
fashion their own futures after the Japanese blueprint, choosing to cope with
pollution control only after a high economic growth rate is achieved. . . .*•*

ATTEMPTS TO CURE POLLUTION BY REDISTRIBUTION

The authors just quoted cite numerous specific examples and causes
of pollution in Japan and conclude that Japan's political and eco-
nomic leaders have come to recognize the need for changes in the
industrial system. One proposal under serious study would create a
"New New Japan" — "the epitome of an ultramodern post-industrial
society" — by replacing high-resource and high-energy- consuming
activities located in the Japanese islands with knowledge-intensive,
minimal-pollution industries (for example, computers and information
processing, communications, and aircraft). Existing industrial in-
stallations would be redistributed and emphasis would be placed on
developing better parks, playgrounds, sewage and waste-treatment
systems, and medical and social services.

To maintain economic growth and a rising standard of living,

. . . economic planners propose transferring dirtier industrial production to
developing nations eager to emulate Japan's domestic miracle. Thus, the impera-
tive need for restructuring Japan's domestic economy is seen to dovetail with
the rising economic aspirations of developing nations. The key concept underlying
this transformation is the "international division of labor." Over-industrialized,

♦«» Norie Huddle and Michael Reich with Nahum Stiskin. Island of Dreams: Envhonmental Crisis in
■Japan. (Foreword by Dr. Paul R. Ehrlich, afterword by Ralph Nader.) New York and Tokyo, Autumn
iPress, 1975. pp. 22-24.

1818

inflation-plagued and resource-poor Japan would transfer its production facili-
ties— or simply sell its technology — to foreign nations which enjoy rich deposits
of natural resources, offer plentiful, cheap labor, and . . . "have more elbow
room from an environmental viewpoint." . . .*'"'

The concept is an ingenious one, but — the authors conclude — it
has the fundamental weakness that environmental pollution cannot
indefinitely be exported nor neatly contained. What is at issue is
"man's assault on the life-support systems of the earth as a whole." *'^

Clearly, as the Japanese themselves perceive, the problem of
pollution in Japan in the near term is shaping up as a problem in
interdependence.*^^ The ultimate problem which it appears to fore-
shadow— that of limiting growth or of defining appropriate kinds of
growth — will be an infinitely more delicate and complex problem in
interdependence, when its time comes.

THE OBSTACLE OF IMPERFECT COMMUNICATION

Three factors which complicate the process of working out a con-
structive balance between the impulses of national independence and
the imperatives of global interdependence have been noted: nation-
alism, cultural resistance, and antagonism between the aggressive
demands of growth and the defensive requirements of ecology. Another
is communication, in the sense of shared thoughts, values, and think-
ing processes. People of different cultures cannot work together
effectively if they do not understand each other's ways of thinking.
Thus, Americans tend to think inductively, arguing from the particu-
lar to the general; Russians, it has been observed, tend to think and
speak deductively, concluding "what must be" from established prin-
ciples. For example, a Russian factory doctor told a group of American
scientists visiting her textile mill : The Soviet Union cares about worker
safety and welfare ; air polluted by dust and fibers from the materials
used in this factory is dangerous to workers' health ; therefore we have
equipment to purify the air; "and so, gentlemen, look around you —
there is no air pollution!" According to one of the American scientists,
the visitors saw the air filled with clouds of cotton lint.*^^ One wonders
whether a better appreciation of the differences in thought processes
on the part of both the Russians and the Americans involved in the
Baruch Plan negotiations might have influenced their outcome.

<'i) N. Huddle et al., Island of Dream* (op. cit.), p. 322.

*"i Ibid., p. 325.

*" From the Japanese standpoint the problem is one of exporting pollution; from that of many of the less
developed countries (LDCs) it is one of importing growth. At the United Nations Conference on the Envi-
ronment (Stockholm, June 1972) the LDCs objected to U.S. efforts to impose American environmental
quality standards on them. For the past several, years, diplomatic and other representatives of LDCs attend-
ing meetings of the Washington, D.C., chapter of the Society for International Development have made it
clear, whenever the subject came up, that sentiment at home favored tackling the problem of achieving
growth first and worrying about pwUution later.

As a short-term solution to the LDC problem of growth in conjunction with the developed country prob-
lem of pollution, the exchange may prove a popular expedient in the years immediately ahead. This likely
trend was suggested in an inforn.al talk to the staff of the Office of Technology Assessment on October 15,
1975, by Dr. Dieter Altenpohl, director of research for Alusuisse Aluminum Co. Dr. Altenpohl expressed
doubt that future aluminum reduction plants would be built anywhere but in LDCs which had the el ectric
power and could tolerate the fluoride eflBuent.

*" Credit for the epistemological observation about the difference between American and Russian thought
processes belongs to Professor Edgar S. Robinson. The anecdote concerns an actual experience of an Ameri-
can social psychologist during a Soviet visit. (The point is not that American thinking is superior; in most
problem-solving situations — in those which involve human affairs, at any rate — an approach which com-
bines induction and deduction is better than one which leans too heavily on either.)

1819

The Issue oj Independence Versus Interdependence as a Theme in This
Study

An examination of the ways in which the dimension of independence/
interdependence fi^ires in the six cases and six issues presented in the
Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy study series — or any
of the other five dimensions considered in this part of the final
chapter — was not specifically anticipated when the series was originally
planned in 1969, but was decided upon after the 12 studies had been
completed. The common perspective which the authors of the latter
shared with the project directors was essentially limited at the
outset to the broad theme of interaction among science, technology,
and the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The findings
which follow are a reflection, therefore, of the separate mquiries of
different authors.

These findings support the widely held thesis that interdependence
of the world's nations and peoples is a growing reality, with a primary
link to technology. As the applications of technology spread, so does
the condition of interdependence.

Some of the cases and issues are explicit on this theme; others are
illustrative by implication.

CASE one: the baruch plan

The symbolic significance of the atom bomb and its consequences
for interdependence have been noted. The mere existence of this
weapon in large numbers and with sophisticated delivery systems
deters opposing nuclear powers from major belligerency. This tech-
nological development has thus deprived war of its social function.
The function of war in the past has been to help intransigent adversary
states resolve otherwise intractable issues. Or, to put it another way,
war and the capability to wage it was a means of assigning a cost to
intransigence. Issues may still be intractable, and adversaries may
still be intransigent, but total war has lost its social function —
nuclear war, at any rate — because its virtually unthinkable cost is
grossly disproportionate to the value of the service it would perform.
In this sense, war — nuclear war — has priced itself out of the market.

But there is a flaw in that generalization: it applies only to the
rational use (or rather, withholding from use) of nuclear weapons by
responsible powers who understand the consecjuences of massive
nuclear exchanges. Today all other nations are at the mercy of the
United States and the Soviet Union — but one must reach for rather
unlikely scenarios to conceive of rational use of nuclear weapons by
either country. Tomorrow all nations, including the United States
and the Soviet Union, may in fact be at the mercy of some reckless
possessor of atomic bombs — perhaps an unidentified aggressor at
whom it is impossible to strike back in time to affect the outcome.

It may be yielding to fantasy to suppose that if the Baruch Plan
negotiations had led to a control agreement involving the gradual
elimination of nuclear weapons, the possibility of a new balance of
terror would have been forever precluded, and nations would at last
have got down to the serious business of eliminating war itself as a
means of resolving major international differences in the face of
intransigence. There seems little doubt, however, that success in the

1820

negotiations would have helped smooth the world's passage into the
era of interdependence.

Worth special note is the fact that the United States, at that time
the sole possessor of the atomic "secret," and historically committed
to the assertion of sovereign independence, should have taken the lead
in proposing to yield up both the secret and its sovereignty to inter-
national control of this ultimate weapon. It is both ironic and tragic
that the Soviet Union, principal exponent of Marxist internationali-^m
and abnegation of "capitalist wars," should have rebuffed the overture
in a spirit of intransigent nationalism and sovereignty. The failure
to reach agreement lay, perhaps, on both sides: in the inability of the
United States to foresee or communicate the con-^equences of a new
agreement and in the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to forego the
early prospects of its own nuclear arsenal and East European hegemon}^
for the larger but more remote chance of global amity.

Yet, despite the inability of the two leading nations to reconcile
or moderate their differences in the face of the ultimate weapon, the
subsequent spread of the weapon itself creates a global impasse that is
forcing all nations toward interdependence and away from the inde-
pendence that obstructed the first moves to control the weapon. As
the next case shows, bits of sovereignty are being yielded up in the
face of the general need to keep the weapon itself and all its associated
technology from bringing about an inadvertent holocaust.

CASE two: commercial NUCLEAE power in EUROPE

The atom bomb signaled the world's entry into the Age of Inter-
dependence in a context of common defense and security; the context
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is one of development and
growth — though still with a nagging concern over the security prob-
lem posed by reactor byproducts. President Eisenhower's Atoms for
Peace initiative embraced both aspects:

The initial objectives of Atoms for Peace were to help contribute to a more
stable and peaceful world by sharing with other nations the benefits of nuclear
science and technology, to improve" U.S. rehvtions with other nations through
such sharing, and to minimize pressures for independent and potentially hazardous
nuclear programs by cooperating in peaceful uses under conditions which would
discourage diversion of atomic materials and equipment to military purposes.

In recent hearings before the House Subcommittee on International Cooperation
in Science and Space of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission observed that these objectives continue to be
valid. With the passage of years, additional objectives have taken on increased
importance. For example, the Atoms for Peace program has enabled the United
States to take part in the rapidly expanding world market for nuclear goods and
services. The program is also "providing an invaluable mechanism for a world-
wide approach to health, safety, and environmental problems which transcend
national boundaries." *''* •

The President's proposal also established a precedent for intergov-
ernmental action and a partial relinquishing of sovereign t}^ in a major
peacetime scientific and technological endeavor:

Atoms for Peace has been unique as a form of international cooperation. While
cooperation across national boundaries has occurred in many scientific fields,
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy came about as
the result of deliberate decisions and specific actions of governments, rather than
of scientific communities, to share the benefits of an important new science and
technology. "5

<74 Donnelly, Commncial Nuclear Power in Europe, vol. I, p. 156.
<" Donnelly, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe, vol. I, p. 157.

1821

The discovery of nuclear fission as a source of energy occurred on
the threshold of a period in history when the energy needs of heavy
industry and of the population at large in the developed world were
to begin to exceed the commercially available supply. The future need
for nuclear energy as an increasing proportion of the total energy
supply was foreseen at the time of the Atoms for Peace message.
There was then, however, no special sense of urgency in this regard,
and the United States took the practical course of looking to the
European nations — whose more urgent energy requirernents made
necessary for them what was not yet necessary, or politically and
commercially feasible, in America — to work out the problems of
establishing a nuclear energy industry.

Dr. Donnelly describes the situation as it was before the Atoms
for Peace proposal:

. . . prototype nuclear powerplants had to be designed, built, and put into
operation to provide engineering and operating experience for the nuclear indus-
tries and the electric utilities. The AEC wished to get on with this demonstration,
but its nuclear power program became caught up in the controversy of public
versus private generation of electricity. One pragmatic solution was to build
demonstration plants overseas. Arranging such demonstrations became the task
of the diplomats. The AEC supported the idea of building demonstration plants
abroad. In 1952, AEC Commissioner T. Keith Glennan forecast an increasing
demand abroad for nuclear power: "This demand naturally will arise first where
present costs of electrical energy are high and this suggests that such a program
may have an important place in a future Point Four program." Europe was a
likely location because it needed electricity and costs of European electricity
were higher than in the United States, thus setting an easier economic goal for
the designers and engineers. AEC Commissioner Henry D. Smyth endorsed the
idea that the nuclear power stations might be built abroad with U.S. financial
help through Point Four funds. He too pointed out that since power production
in the United States was much cheaper than in other countries, the economic
incentive for nuclear power would be greater abroad.

By the early 19o0s nuclear power had begun to attract the interest of the makers
and executors of foreign policy. Still it remained of limited import as the govern-
ments and diplomatic services of the United States and its aUies struggled to
assure the survival of a free Western Europe. The experience then with a massive
outpouring of U.S. financial and technical aid through multinational organizations
was to point the way for later multinational ventures in nuclear power.*"

A climate of expectation and near-readiness, then, had been estab-
lished; Atoms for Peace provided the stimulus to action. There fol-
lowed the building of new multilateral institutions, the forming of
special bilateral and multilateral relationships, and the developing of
extensive patterns of research, information exchange, and negotiations
on international agreements.

"Interdependence" is an abstraction; patterns, relationships, and
institutions give it concrete meaning.*" Nuclear energy has brought
nations and people together in many ways, in both fear and hope,

"8 /6i(/., pp. 143-144.

<" Professor Robinson adds: "The plain truth is that, today, the peoples of the world and their official
spokesmen have no option but to worship at nationalism's altar. There exist absolutely no alternative
s.vrabols (and these are crucial) toward which they can gravitate and upon which they can firmly fix their
loyalty. . . . The problem is that of creating images, flowing from the realities of interdependence and
transcending the nation-state system, with which the earth's peoples can identify. . . . The medieval
church accomplished a somewhat analogous feat, thereby causing the deferral of nationalism itself. . . . The
framers of the American Constitution undertook a superb attempt to reconcile unity with diversity in a
country then very far from being homogeneous and one which was not wholly unlike a world-into-itself. . . .
I would add that, if we prove too fearful or imimaginaii ve to face up to the question of reconciling . . . ideals
on a global scale, the undirected course of events may cause us to end up, historically, 'either with mince-
meat or monoUth'." . .

Finally: "The psychological problem inheres in the difficulties of making interdependence an inspiring
ideal, so that it wiU cease to be seen as a menacing competitor to patriotic pride and self-determination.
Interdependence has come into its own as a fact, but not as a philosophy."

1822

during the three decades since it was unleashed, but its constructive
potential has barely begun to be realized. If the world's peoples are
spared the military and environmental hazards of fission for another
two or three generations, the foreseen technology of nonrailitary fusion
may follow. Though it is to be recognized that nuclear power has
been, and continues to be, employed by some countries to promote or
safeguard their national independence, it seems likely that by that
time no development in human history will have done more to bring
about global interdependence and the abandonment of outmoded
assertions of sovereign independence than the scientific discovery and
technological application of nuclear energy. But it is not too soon to
chart the implications of further additions to nuclear technology on
the structure and course of interdependence,

CASE three: the political legacy of the ixterxational

GEOPHYSICAL YTiAR

As a study in cooperative interdependence, the International
Geophysical Year was an almost ideal model translated into action.
Most of its scientific achievements and constructive political legacy
resulted from the coordinated efforts of scientists from 67 countries,
stationed in every part of the globe. Their acts of cooperation required
no special orders or persuasion, beyond the dissemination of an idea
and some organizing to carry it out; in the main they posed no insoluble
problems of intercultural communication or accommodation. As
author Harold Bullis observes:

. . . Scientists tend inherently to recognize the interdependence of their efforts
and accept that interdependence as one of the basic conditions of the environment
in which they work. It is then relatively easy for them to accept the extension of
this principle to the environment in which they live.*''*

The author carries this thought a step further to suggest that pos-
sibly a pattern of interdependence in the scientific sphere may carry
over into the diplomatic. He sees a political legacy left by the IGY
in the form of international agreements, treaties, and working rela-
tionships. His assessment of the IGY, given as part of the earlier
commentary on Case Three, ends with that thought, attributed to
the scientists themselves:

Several factors help provide at least some degree of optimism that the scientists
may be justified. One is the great importance of first perceiving and assessing,
and then communicating, technological impacts. Scientists and technologists are
likely to comprehend the possible consequences of new discoveries and applications
in the fields of energy or of ecology, for example, more immediately or fully than
are politicians. Partly because of the IGY, both technological developments and
political (or institutional) developments which significantly affect the human
condition can be more readily appreciated and utilized today. First, they can be
brought to the attention of both political leaders and the public within countries
(it is becoming increasingly difficult for leaders to withhold them even in dictator-
ships) ; secondl}'', they can be shared among the countries of the world far more
readily than was possible just two or three decades ago. Wider public understand-
ing of technological impacts and a stronger institutional framework (governmental,
professional, and the press) for increasing that understanding still further are in
large part responsible in the first instance; technological advances in rapid com-
munications and transportation are among the factors responsible in the second.*^*

"8 Bullis, Tlic Political Legacy of the Interntttional Geophysical Year, vol. T, p. 349.
<7» Ibid., p. 350.

1823

A striking example of what Bullis is referring to is given in an article
by Peter Osnos, in the Washington Post for September 26, 1975,
entitled "Ecology and Pride Save a Soviet Lake." The article relates
how, "In the name of progress, Soviet authorities decided a few decades
ago to empty one of the world's largest and most beautiful mountain
lakes," Lake Sevan in Soviet Armenia. "They reasoned that the
water could be better used to irrigate the valleys nearby and provide
electricity for much of Armenia. But that challenge to nature proved
to be a mistake," seriously disrupting the ecological balance of the
area, "and now, at enormous cost, Lake Sevan is being saved. . . .
Reversing any ambitious [electrification] project ... in the Soviet
Union is hard enough, but doing so on primarily environmental
grounds is a substantial tribute to popular will."

It takes scientists to diagnose a condition of pollution, technologists
to correct it, and political decisionmakers to give the order. Increas-
ingl}^, as the communications process grows technologically more
sophisticated and knowledge is more widely disseminated, the public
may also be involved.

Yet there is irony in the fact that the IGY, as a foremost demon-
stration of scientific interdependence and cooperation, was also the
occasion for a resurgence of technological competition for nationalistic
objectives. The Soviet scientific achievement of an orbiting sattllite,
employing military missile technology for the purpose, galvanized a
U.S. response in both military missile development and the "space
race." While, on both sides, the development of nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles brought about an unusable but terrible threat to
civilization, the huge outlays for technology to penetrate outer space
contributed to the emerging view of the shared planet as "Spaceship
Earth." Both directions of technology, in different ways, added to the
compulsion upon the two superpowers to accept the technological
consequences that continue to force them and the rest of the world
toward some form of rational accommodation — in other words, to
yield up bits of sovereignty toward interdependence.

CASE four: the MEKONG PROJECT

Regionalism — characterized in the Mekong study ^^^ as the applica-
tion of technology on a geographic rather than politically defined
basis — is inherenth^ an expression of interdependence. It acknowl-
edges the need of an area which transcends the boundaries of local
(city and county), subnational (state or province), or national juris-
dictions in pooling its human, material, and financial resources to
share economic, securitj^, environmental, and other benefits. On a
small scale, the numerous regional councils of government and
"Metro" systems which have been established in the United States
in recent years bear witness to both the dependence of geographically
related local jurisdictions upon each other for the successful manage-
ment of problems of common concern (for example, ground and air
traffic control, provision of adequate public transportation, solid and
liquid waste management, air and water pollution reduction, and
crime control) and the difficulty of attacking such problems through
traditional intergovernmental channels.

4S0 Huddle, The Mekong Project, vol. I, p. 434.

1824

An American experiment on a grander scale, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, illustrates the regional approach applied to a multistate
area. Furthermore :

Rpgionalism became almost an ideology in the United States during the depres-
sion years. Its advocates cited the Tennessee Valley Authority as the idealization
of tlie concept. Although admittedly a capital-intensive development of dams,
power plants, transmission lines, flood control works, and navigation improve-
ments, TVA was much more: a complex program of soil improvement, agricultural
processing, farm technology, reforestation, and commercial development of the
entire basin of the Tennessee River and its tributaries.

The TVA concept was characterized by the following features :
Corporate organization

Exercise of the sovereign powers of the Federal Government
Right to hold and sell property, to sue and be sued
Authority to construct and operate power dams and distribution lines — to

sell power wholesale or retail ...

Domain over the entire watershed of the Tennessee River
A policy of contracting with State and local governments and individuals

for cooperative development arrangements
Maintenance of its own civil service and labor relations

Incorporation within its central organization of miniature departments of
commerce, agriculture, labor, health, mining, and engineering technology,
in addition to its more widely publicized power activities.^*'

Thus, a feature of the Government-sponsored TVA experiment was
the employment of centralized regional — rather than national or
subdivided— planning and authority. What made this arrangement
possible in the face of traditional American antipathy toward Federal
Government management and control in the normally private de-
velopment sector was the economic emergency and the need for con-
certed, large-scale action in a severely depressed region. Although it
was both technically and politically successful, and although many of
the lessons learned in the experiment were applied elsewhere in the
United States, the TVA model as such was not repeated.

Aj^plied subnationally, the regional approach requires either the
exercise of strong central authority, or institutional relationships
and procedures for achieving consensus and cooj)eration, or some com-
bination of both. The TVA experiment leaned in the first direction
(though it actively sought cooperation with local authorities); co-
operative joint organizations of States to develop such regions as
Appalachia, Four Corners, and the Great Lakes, coordinated by the
Department of Commerce, illustrate the middle ground; the regional
councils of government depend on consensus, owing their success
mainly to good staff work performed at shared expense and directed at
problems of commonly perceived urgency.

Manifestly, procedures for assuring support and effective manage-
ment of regional enterprises at the subnational level are subject to
varying combinations of control and consensus (other than in coun-
tries where even local development is centrally planned and directed).
However, the requirement for voluntary agreement to accomplish
regional undertakings in the international sphere — where there is no
central authorit}" — is inherent:

. . . the differences between subnational and international regions are vast.
The primary distinction is that of sovereignty, of competing national interests.
The nations comjjrising a region need to reconcile their own interests with their
participation' in a joint enterprise. In addition, the Great Powers have the
problem of reconciling their own national interests with their bilateral relations
with the individual states of the region and with the region as a whole. ^^^

«i Ibid., p. 373.
<82 Ibid., p. 376.

1825

The regional approach comports with the Jeffersonian principle
of fixing governmental responsibility for a given function at the
lowest (or most localized) level at which it can be performed effectively.
Properly carried out it also meets the Hamiltonian requirement for
sufficient centralized direction to accomplish coherently the purposes
in view. It is easier for the members of a regional association to-
identify and act upon their readily identifiable common interests
than it is for United Nations members as a whole to perceive and
respond to their less evident or specific shared goals. Regionalism
is a middle way:

Beyond bilateral deals and specialized multilateral dealings, there is the regional
level of cooperation. Neighbors should first settle their own disputes; that is the
conventional wisdom. It has a long and distinguished lineage.

• ••••••

Several years ago Sir Oliver Franks . . . described regionalism as "a halfway
house at a time when single nations are no longer viable and the world is not
ready to become one." *^^

The Mekong Project offers testimony to the durability of the
regional approach in the face of great obstacles. That it was kept
going in the face of war, insurrection, and nonrecognition of the
participants implies not only that the need for it was recognized by
those responsible within the region but also that they were able to
work together in support of the project despite political differences.
The evidence presented in the basic study indicates thiit in doing so
they relied heavily on reaching agreement by consensus rather than
by more formal means, such as parliamentary procedure.*** To the
e.xtent that they did so they were perhaps showing the developed
world, with its Western habits of parliamentary decisionmaking by
majority rule, what is for most of the world a more natural way to
make progress in regional arrangements, and what may prove to be
a more effective way to proceed in the global forum of the U.N.
General Assembly:

To convert the U.N. system to consensus decision-making will seem visionary
only to Americans and Europeans who have grown up in the belief that parlia-
mentary procedure and Robert's "Rules" are the very stuff of democracy. But
that is a minority view in the modern world, and even in the West is a rather
recent notion, not deeply rooted in classical or Christian thought. "Consensus"
will not seem extraordinary to any one who has participated in a Quaker meeting,
grown up in a modern family, or sat on a British or American jury. It will not
seem strange to a Japanese businessman, a Chinese scholar, an African villager.
Chaidir Anwar Sani, the Indonesian delegate to the U.N., . . . [has] charted
a way out: "Indonesia," he said, "has a tradition of decision making through
musyawarah and mufakat, consultations and consensus. INIost of our countries
have at one stage or another known that method. The process may be lengthy,
cumbersome, sometimes exasperating, but we are much better off than im-
mediately after our independence when we experimented with the "half-plus-onc-
is-right" method.

. . . My delegation would not like to see the United Nations turn into an
arena for confrontation between majority and minority, or a factory to turn out
resolutions, but a forum for the combined and concerted efforts of all the countries
in the world to find concrete solutions." *^^

"3 Harlan Cleveland, The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace, New York,
Harper and Row, 1966, pp. 58 and 62.
*»* Huddle, op. cit. See especially pp. 384-394.
«5 Harlan Cleveland, "The U.S. vs. the U.N.?" New York Times Magazine, May 4, 1975.

1826

Regionalism as a concept is more than a halfway house between
independence and interdependence. It offers a means by which the
separate nations of the world can group themselves into larger multi-
national units, with each participating nation yielding up some portion
of its sovereignty in exchange for the shared benefits enjoyed by the
region as a whole. The earlier study of commercial nuclear power in
Europe demonstrated that nations may be willing to relinquish a
measure of sovereignty in exchange for the greater safety of nuclear
control. The mutual efforts of the Riparian States of the Lower
Mekong basin exemplify another form of interdependence in which
some elements of sovereign independence in economic planning and
technological self-determination are traded for the greater gains
possible through concerted regional development. If it should come
about that 20 or 30 regions of the world, rather than some 150 inde-
pendent and sovereign nations, are represented in the U.N. General
Assembly, it will be because the member states of each region find
the forces that hold the region together stronger than those that
separate the nationalities comprising it.

Each action that tends to strengthen the ties that hold each multi-
nation region together would be a step toward a more coherent and
manageable world of global regions, each interdependent within itself
and each region interdependent in its relations with other regions of
the world. Such a concept, perhaps not altogether beyond human
attainment, seems to be suggested by Cleveland and Franks, and
reinforced to a degree by the "Spirit of the Mekong."

CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed *^

The issue of independence versus interdependence is moving toward
a climactic contest in the impending question of sovereignty of the
seabed. The oceans of the world, from the earliest formulation of inter-
national law, have presented the challenge to seafaring nations: how to
allocate law and responsibility in a global region open to all — an
international commons. In the 1970s, technology has raised anew the
quandary of national versus international control. The increasing
ability to drill for oil and prospect for mineral wealth in the ocean
floor poses problems of sovereignty, property rights, and national
interests in the allocation of rich resources among claimant nations
and their nationals.

The dangers and serious problems which would result from failure
to establish an orderly and equitable international system for exploit-
ing the resources of the seabed were widely recognized at the time
when the seabed study was prepared, 5 years ago. The United Nations
had sponsored conferences m 1958 and 1960 to reconcile conflicting
jurisdictional claims. In 1970 the U.N. General Assembly called for
another conference :

. . . this time to produce a comprehensive treaty settling all the issues that had
been skirted before, and that had arisen in the interim as a result of new tech-
nological progress. The complexity of the problems overwhelmed the 2,000
delegates of 148 governments who met for 10 weeks in the summer of 1974 in
Caracas, Venezuela. The same proved true of the eight-week conference [held in
the spring of 1975] in Geneva. The primary disputes remain.**'

«8 Doumani, Kxploiting the liesourccs of (fie Seabed, vol. 1, pp. 435-524.

"7 Richard A. Frank, "The Law at Sea," New York Times Magazine, May 18, 1975, p. 15.

1827

Mr. Frank (the author just quoted) began his article with a dismal
scenario and commentary —

Geneva. — rit is the year 2000. The coastal powers have extended their sovereignty
to the centers of the oceans. Cargo and miUtary vessels must pay tribute as they
pass from one sovereignty zone to another or as they transit straits through which
passage once was free. Conflict between the "have" and "have-not" countries, as
governments jostle over the resources of the seabed, keeps the world in a state of
tension. Fish are a rarity; the few species that survive taste rather odd, for they
inhabit an element befouled by enormous amounts of pollution. In most coastal
areas, swimming in the sea is forbidden by law. The contamination has killed most
of the sea's phytoplankton, the primary source of the earth's oxygen. The
environment needed to sustain life on earth is wearing away.

Frank commented that this picture of the world 25 years from now
was simply a projection of current trends. "Four major controversies —
over territorial seas and strategic straits, over the fish in the oceans,
over the oil and mineral riches of the seabed and over marine pollu-
tion— have merged into the one overwhelming problem of establishing
new regulations for the water two-thirds of the earth. And while all
governments acknowledge that the peace of the world and mankind's
very future are at stake, the powerful competing interests at work in
each area of controversy have thrown the technicalities of the problem
into the swirl of a multinational political contest."

Today, Frank observed, there are no effective regulations for
sensible conservation of fisheries, nor against unilateral extension of
national controls seaward, nor against use of the oceans as "the
world's great garbage dump." He continued: "There is only a record
of four inconclusive attempts since 1958 to organize for ordeily use
and exploitation of the seas. The last attempt, the International
Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, has just concluded with
no agreement by the delegations on the major issues. . . . About the
only clear decision was to convene yet another conference — in New
York, next March." Meanwhile (he concluded), it is uncertain whether
national appetites and the pressures of technological advance can be
kept in check for another year. "If they can't, the last restraints
may be abandoned, and with them any chance of an international
solution averting the kind of situation described above." ***

It has been said before: technology is outpacing the means of
controlling it. The case of the ocean, however, is especially consequen-
tial. World peace, security, and economic and environmental well-being
all urgently require the establishment of some kind of effective
international regime governing exploitation of all ocean resources
and the uses of the ocean.

One possibility, frequently voiced, is to vest in the United Nations
the sovereignty of the oceans beyond some generally accepted offshore
territorial limit. Exploitation of resources of the vast ocean commons
would be by U.N.-licensed operations, with fees and a share of profits
going into a fund to assist in the development process or otherwise to
benefit the world community. Another possibility, raised by Harlan
Cleveland among others, is to partition the oceans to adjacent states
in a form of marine regionalism, with the member states of each region
resolving for that oceanic region the rules and equities to apply within
it. The most controversial alternative would be for those nations
possessing the technology to exploit the seabed to proceed to do so,
with all the complications that such a technological version of

«s Ibid.

1828

"manifest destiny" would imply. The outcome of the problem remains
in doubt, although some progi-ess toward a comprehensive treaty has
been made in the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. What-
ever it proves to be, it will have great significance for the supreme
global issue of striking a workable balance between independence and
interdependence.

CASE six: U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Much has happened in United States-Soviet commercial and politi-
cal relations in the 4 years since the Hardt-Holliday study *^® was pre-
pared. However, in tlie context of interdependence the study seems
more relevant and timely than ever.

A basic question raised in the study is whether the Soviet Union
is prepared to operate as a participant in the international economy.
Another question of more direct and immediate significance for the
United States is whether the Soviet Union is ready to shift resources
from a continuation of the arms race in order to use its role in the
international economic system to benefit consumers within the U.S.S.R.
A third question that has emerged since the study was published in
1973 is whether the United States is prepared to facilitate such changes
of direction by the Soviet leadership.

A significant statement was made in the study regarding the possi-
bility that closer United States-Soviet economic relations might
"unleash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in
turn, contribute to international interdependence and stabihty."
Moreover, transactions resulting from relationships established by
U.S. agribusinesses and by the U.S. oil and gas industry with their
Soviet counterparts might prove substantial, but "political gains
might far outweigh the relativeh^ modest economic returns."

The statement was preceded by caveats and a balancing of political
costs and risks against foreseeable or likely political benefits. These
were then summarized in relation to likely economic gains to the United
States :

The volume of Soviet trade with the United States by any projection is not
likely to represent a large share of U.S. trade or GNP. Economic advantages to
the United States are likely to be centered on such specific sectors as imports of
petroleum and natural gas, and exports of soybeans, feed and cereal grain, and
comjbuters, and other high-technology products. The balance of payments deficit
of the United States and our program for expanding the export of high technology
may receive benefits which are, at best, only marginal compared to those which
may derive from potential changes in economic relations with non-Communist
countries.

At the same time, if the Soviet Union should reorder its priorities and permit
more foreign decisionmaking involvement in domestic cooperative ventures,
significant long-run benefits of a predominantly political nature might accrue to
the United States such as: (a) the potenticil reduction of the Soviet threat to our
securitj' from reordered Soviet priorities; (b) a degree of Soviet acceptance of the
international system, implied by the U.S.S.R.'s permitting domestic involvement
of foreign corporations as partners; and (c) political advantages inherent in in-
creasing international commercial and financial intercourse. Overall, such political
gains might far outweigh the relatively modest economic returns.^*"

The concept of interdependence is given concrete meaning by the
estabhshment and growth of institutions, relationships, and procedures
for coping with it. The eventual development of United States-Soviet

«» Hardt and HoUiday, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations, vol. I, pp. 526-606.
"o Ibid., pp. 601-602.

1829

commercial relations as both engine and expression of detente was fore-
seen as a possibility a quarter century or more ago by some of the same
political leaders who were responsible for charting the U.S. course in
the cold war.*^^ The prospect was then largely speculative and hedged
about with many qualifications. Vincent P. Rock's analysis and pre-
scription of 1964 in A Strategy qf Interdependence was reasoned and
constructive, but it too was ahead of its time. Events have since
caught up, and U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations could address some
real, if hesitant, developments toward the establishment of United
States-Soviet ties with constructive implications for global inter-
dependence. The management of these ties in such a way as to fulfill
their constructive potential, however, presents many unresolved
problems in the organization of the U.S. Government (including the
question of executive-legislative relations), and the formulation of
appropriate U.S. policies, for carrying out a global "strateg^'^ of
interdependence. ' '

402

ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology'-'^

Technology is "a powerful force — perhaps the most powerful of all
forces" *^^ — for growth and change in the world. A principal aim of
The Evolution of International Technology was to document the inter-
relationship of technology and diplomacy. Technology was seen as
both an ingredient of the conditions which call upon diplomacy and a
source of diplomatic strength:

The objective of diplomacy is to reconcile or resolve issues and establish
agreements to advance the national interest in a constantly changing world.
Changes within the jurisdiction of each member of the world community alter
its relations with others. No source of change is more potent than an alteration
in a nation's technological condition. It produces changes of many kinds of many
levels of impacts and interactions: military, commercial, cultural, political, and
scientific; these changes involve many agencies of government, the academic
world, private business, and the pubUc at large. Famiharity with technology, and
with the nature of its impacts, is thus an indispensable tool of the diplomat.
Moreover, the skill with which a nation manages and advances its own technology
contributes to the status of its diplomats, and to the options with which they can
negotiate. In both senses, national technology confers diplomatic power."*

Developments in U.S. technology bear on the attainment of such
national and international objectives as peace, reduced tension, in-
creased trade, and improvements in the lot of the developing countries:

Accordingly, the Department of State has a cause for concern with the health
and vigor of U.S. technology, both generally and with specific reference to tech-
nological fields that can be identified as contributing most directly to diplomatic
objectives of the United States. The future direction of U.S. technological ad-
vances, no less than the Nation's general level of technological competence, has
far-reaching consequences beyond its borders. Of great importance also are the
uses made of this burgeoning technology, and the organizational arrangements — •
domestic and international — for overseeing these uses. In these senses, technology
is an important basis for national power.^^^

"I The director and associate director of this study series recall discussions in the executive branch in
the late 1940s and early 1950s, involving interpretations by consulting scholars and Government analysts
of the likelv tendencies of the Soviet Union as the aging leaders of the revolutionary period were replaced
by a generation of managers and engineers. In some of the discussions the present trend toward detente
and economic relationships was predicted— though always with the proviso; "Assuming a nuclear staud-
on . . . ."

<92 Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, vol. II, pp. 60/-680.

"3 Ibid., p. 680.

«4 Ibid., p. 366.

«5 Ibid.

1830

The study is concerned throughout with the uses of technology to
advance the national interest. As it progresses, however, the theme of
interdependence commands increasing attention, both implicitly and
explicitly. Nuclear weapons and atomic power, it is pointed out, have
profoundly influenced the international scene in many subtle and
unexpected ways. They have created the need for a deeper mutual
security, opportunities for large multipurpose projects to open desert
regions of the world to habitation, and a host of international agencies
and activities to control and exploit this still new product of science.
Space exploration has led to a similar need for closer understanding
and cooperation among nations, as well as conferring prestige and
power upon the leaders in this technology. The securing of various
new benefits by all nations from space technology requires cooperative
agreement and joint action. "Planet Earth has been shown visibly
and coherently as a single unit whose artificial divisions by mankind
can be ignored in the global study of weather, resources of land and
ocean, and even the superficial changes brought about by industry,
agriculture, and human settlement." "^

Programs in technical assistance, international activities in edu-
cation and health, exchange of technical information about transporta-
tion, communications, and power, all provide a basis for closer relations
among governments and individuals. Even primarily domestic tech-
nological programs are found to have significant international aspects.
Some aspects of domestic infrastructure are themselves taking on an
international character, such as air transportation and satellite
communications. ''These can serve both to help and hinder the work
of the diplomat: While information can now be transmitted virtually
instantaneously, to facilitate long-range bargaining, the time available
for decisionmaking has decreased. The traditional conduct of secret,
official diplomacy tends to be nullified by radio and television propa-
ganda and by educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges. Swift
transit of trouble-shooting negotiators to points of tension by air
transport or for consultation with national leaders is counteracted by
the ability of trouble-makers and dissident groups to use these same
means of travel." *"

Although particular technologies are not international in the rela-
tively uninhibited and nonpolitical way that scientific developments
are international, and although in the short run they may often play
the role of powerful servant of nationalism, in the longer run they
tend to affect all nations:

Examination of the history of a number of fields of technology has demonstrated
the tendency for technology to cross national boundaries, to generate problems
involving many nations, to offer opportunities for general global benefit, and to
effect profound changes in the world scene for better or worse. Perhaps the most
significant fact about technology is this force for interdependence among nations.

The philosopher, Kant, proposed the "Categorical Imperative," an ethical
principle to govern human behavior. It postulated that man should "Act as if
the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal
law." In other words, one should inquire of his actions as to what the effect would
be if everybody did them. Perhaps the same principle warrants examination as
applied to nations. Are there some general principles governing the development,
application, and sharing of technology that should be incorporated in a Tech-
nology Treaty? "**

<«« Ibid., p. 651.

<« Ibid., pp. 651-652.

"9 Ibid., p. 678.

1831

Finally, there is the vastly complex problem of how to accommodate
the national interest to the growing demands of interdependence:

Excellence in technology serves to establish a new measure of a nation's leader-
ship within the community of nations. At the same time, it affords a means by
which all nations can progress toward their own internal goals of reducing human
hardship and enlarging human opportunity. How are these two effects of tech-
nology to be reconciled? What policies and what compromises are suggested for
the United States, to optimize the benefits and minimize the adverse effects of
technology within the United States and globally? "»

It is difficult to escajie the conclusion that part of the answer must
lie in new institutional approaches providing for more thorough
policy analysis, technological assessment, and long-range planning
efforts at both national government (including legislative branch)
and international organization levels.

ISSUE two: the politics of global health

Public health is among the least controversial and most acceptable
of activities in which modern nations cooperatively engage. Even in
the earliest stages in the development of international programs to
control the spread of infectious disease, national interests tended to
be subordinated to the general good of all peoples. A tradition of
interdependence, established early, has been reinforced by modern
technologies of intercontinental travel and communications. Although
it is still not uncommon for the more backward nations to assert their
independence by concealing e\'idences of diseases like cholera for
reasons of national pride or trade advantage, most nations today
promptly share experiences with disease control methods and diagnos-
tic technologies. Global health is a universally accepted goal, and
bits of national sovereignty are yielded up to advance it.

"As our consciousness of the world as a 'global village' intensifies,"
wrote Congressman Clement J. Zablocki in the Foreword to the
study,^"" "we are increasingly aware of the dangers and opportunities
involved when traditional values of time and space are no longer
relevant. The field of global health exemplifies both dangers and
opportunities." To this note the author of the study. Dr. Freeman H.
Quimby, added in his Introduction : "The degree of freedom enjoyed
by Americans from epidemic disease is the result of many steps taken
by physicians and statesmen [in all parts of the world] over many
decades, toward improving global health conditions." He continued:

Nothing is more international than disease. It recognizes no political boundaries
and few natural ones. It moves freely across national frontiers and spreads as
conditions permit from one area to another. The picture usually drawn is that of
great pestilences moving from backward regions to the more modern countries.
But disease can also go the other way, as shown in numerous accounts of aboriginal
populations' becoming infected by the customary diseases of the missionary,
trader, explorer, and traveler. If one extends the problem to include the diseases
of plants and animals, there is little doubt today that pathogenic organisms them-
selves are either already globally distributed or can rather rapidly become so.
However, large numbers of these organisms, and the diseases which they cause,
remain largely .sequestered in regions where unsanitary conditions and certain
insect vectors prevail. These conditions are the reasons for the generally endemic

"9 Ibid., p. 680.

5«i Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, vol. H, pp. 681-763.

1832

nature of such diseases as cholera, ' malaria, and plague in the less developed

countries. *"'

and further,

Preventive medicine, like disease, is inherently international. Had there not
been the problem of preventing the entrance of disease from one country to another
and of controlling the spread of di.sease within countries, preventive medicine
would not have developed as early as it did. Public outcry demanded that cor-
rective measures be taken against recurring epidemics based upon the observed
association between polluted water and disease. Thus was born the first pha-se of
preventive medicine — sanitary engineering and public hygiene. ^"2

The study calls attention to an opportunity for the United States
to exercise a leadership fole in an exceptionable cause — strengthened
support of the programs of the World Health Organization. The idea
suggests the further thought that there are other subject areas in
which the United States could contribute in a concrete way, yiet with
relatively little cost and effort, to the emergence of a more manageable
global interdependence. It would also share in the ultimate benefits —
as in this case, the benefits of improved health conditions ^"^ — and
would be taking a modest step toward establishing a new kind of
leadership.

ISSUE three: beyond malthus

The food/ population balance encompasses probably the most
extensive and difficult complex of issues with which present-day
diplomacy has toi contend. National sensitivities are deeply involved
in it. Many countries which have an excess of people over food and
therefore an inherent need of interdependence cling to an independent
jjosture with respect to both aspects of the issue. They seek aid without
strings from countries with food surpluses, at the same time resisting
external pressures to adopt population control measures. In these
respects, an attitude of independence predominated over that of
interdependence at both the World Population Conference (Bucharest,
August 1974) and the World Food Conference (Rome, Novetnber
1974).

Meanwhile, the global imbalance between population growth and
lagging food production is worsening. The study by Dr. Nanes^*'^
concludes (and it is in general widely accepted) that the growth
of world population is outpacing food production, while available
techniques are not being applied in such a way as to improve agricul-
tural production and marketing efficiency enough on the one hand,
or to slow the rate of population increase on the other.

"Achievement of a global balance of food and population calls for
many explicit improvements in political, economic, social, and diplo-
matic organization and management to achieve stronger human
motivation, to improve the acquisition and dissemination of pertinent
information, and to design and implement coordinated social programs
which can apply existing technology more effectively. Without all of
these, the goal of balance will continue to recede with results that
seem Hkely to be tragic." 503 .

501 Ibid., p. 687.

«•-' Ibid.

^ Acrordinp fo an ailidc in the Washivglon Star for Septpmber 29, 1975, WHO officials are now predicting,
(lip total, worldwide eradication of smallpox by early 1976. When assured, this development— besides
signifying the end to one of histoi-y's most dreaded scourges— will eliminate in the United States and else-
where the necessity for the familiar smallpox vaccination.

SIX Nanes, Beyond Malthus: Tlie Food/People Equation, vol. II, pp. 765-864.

w/fiid., p. 769.

1833

Dr. Nanes also points out that as important as the relationship
between food and population is, and whatever solutions may be found
to the many-sided problem of the food-population imbalance, this
problem cannot be separated from the total process of development.
Development is a "seamless web." ^"^

FindiBg a solution to the food/population dilemma is the central problem of
international development. It is interwoven with every other aspect of develop-
ment. . . . for the new agricultural revolution to make its most forceful impact,
there must be ... a market economy.

. . . domestic production helps establish sufficient purchasing power ... so
that the additional food produced by the new methods can be bought at prices
high enough to make it worthwhile for the farmer to utilize the new technology.
This process requires economic growth on a broad scale; "The tremendous inter-
action and interdependency which exists between agriculture and other sectors on
both the demand and supply sides makes it impossible to separate the problem of
food production as such from that of overall economic development." [Quoted
from the summary report of the National Academy of Engineering's "Symposium
on the Food-People Balance," Panel on Interactions between World Food and
World Population, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1970, p. 4.]"^

Among the factors which complicate the process of achieving overall
economic development are the dangers of ecological overstress on
food-producing systems ^"^ and limitations or imbalances in the supply
of energy for motive power and fertilizer production. Recognition of
the importance and pervasiveness of these factors has increased
markedly in the 6 years since the study was prepared. They call
attention to another meaning of interdependence: the interrelation-
ship and interaction among global problem areas as such. Population
growth is dependent on food production ; that is dependent on market
forces which include an adequate supply of fertihzer, which in turn
requires energy; food production is also subject to growing ecological
constraints. The population explosion in turn multipUes and aggra-
vates the other problems upon whose solution it depends, and in the
process adds further complexities and uncertainties to the manage-
ment of interdependence amon^ peoples.

Reference was made earlier in this essay to the growth-no growth
dilemma of the future. Of all the factors which might combine to
speed the day when that dilemma must be faced, expanding popula-
tion is the most potent. The study is expHcit on the growth-no growth
problem :

Rationally, men can already perceive the adverse human consequences of over-
population. But there is a countervailing recognition that there are also adverse
consequences of a stable population. Population growth in some instances is a
powerful engine of economic growth and expansion. The developed countries have
not yet accepted the consequences of a steady state either in the numbers of
their population or in their industrial productivity. The alternatives that face
mankind today are growth or no growth, and either one presents its problems.
The logic of the situation is that soon or late mankind must accept the limits of
the physical world. In a finite world, infinitely continued expansion is an impossi-
bility. The next question is whether there is at any given time an optimum size of
global population. (And indeed, also, an optimum level of affluence!) If growth in
numbers must stop, then when would be the best time to stop it? By what criteria
is this decision to be made? Is it the same decision for all countries? Is the final
result the same for aU time? And, how is the decision to be reached and then
given practical effect? s"*

s* Ibid., p. 770.
5W Ibid., pp. 819-820.

5* For a discussion of this subject see: Lester R. Brown, By Bread Alone, published for the Overseas
Development Council, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974, pp. 45-57.
5M Nanes, Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation, p. 861.

1834

It would be difficult, the study implies, to exaggerate the importance
of the interrelated problems of food and population, and the challenge
which they present to diplomacy — or the difficulty of seizing the
problem :

Clearly, the two global tasks of producing enough but not too much food to
feed the world's population, and providing incentives and means for the world's
population to hold itself within reasonable bounds, are a tremendous challenge
for modern diplomacy. The rewards of success are less impressive than the terrible
consequences of failure. There is a regrettable tendency on the part of mankind
to respond eagerly to rewarding opportunities, but to ignore the prospect of
misfortune and delay action to avert it until convinced of its reality by its actual
onset."'"

Is the food/population balance receiving the kind of attention on
the part of the U.S. Government, the United Nations, and the
other individual nations of the world which a problem of this
magnitude demands? Certainly concern is more widespread than at
any previous period in history, and it is a key consideration in current
U.S. aid to developing countries. Although two world conferences,
one on population and the other on food, were held under United
Nations auspices in 1974, measures undertaken to date have barely
touched the edge of the problem. New approaches may be called for.
How can individual countries be persuaded to accept the need for
worldwide, interdependent action in setting population and food
production and distribution goals in such a way as to benefit all?
What additional data and analyses of future demographic problems
in different areas could be furnished to all countries as a United
Nations service?

How far might it be feasible to go toward estabUshing U.N. food/
population planning and advisory facilities? Would a regional ap-
proach to population planning, in conjunction with food production
and distribution measures, help avoid some of the pitfalls of either
bilateral assistance or U.N. planning on a worldwide scale? Are there
bold and farsighted initiatives which the United States could take
now in addressmg this paramount problem?

ISSUE four: U.S. scientists abroad

The relationship of scientific exchange to global interdependence is
implicit throughout this study,^'^ and occasionally explicit in particular
connections: e.g., in mention of bilateral agreements with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe as serving both science
and diplomacy "by forging continuing working relationships and a
degree of interdependence between the citizens of ideologically
disparate states." *'^

In hearings before the House Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics, Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and
Space, in May 1971, Herman Pollack (speaking as director of what
was then the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological
Affairs of the Department of State) cited the following as among the

»i« Ibid.

•" Knezo, U.S. Scientitti Abroad: An Examination of Major Programt for Nongovernmental Scientific

Exchange, vol. II, pp. 865-1035.
512 Ibid., p. 873.

1835

objectives of U.S. foreign and international scientific and techno-
logical programs:

a. To advance the world's store of knowledge by free exchange of ideas and data
(e.g., International Decade of Ocean Exploration) ;

b. To create a "critical mass" of intellect andjor instrumentation in attacking
common problems (e.g., Global Atmospheric Research Program) ;

c. To speed the solution of critical problems by task appointment or complementary
research (e.g., .safety vehicle development, U.S., Italy, Germany (CCMS));

d. To meet the need in many studies of simultaneous or coordinated observatio?is for
many sites (e.g.. World Weather Watch) ;

6. To compare the effects of geographic, climatic, cultural, etc. variables on a target
system under study (e.g., International Biological Program) ;

f. To avoid unnecessary duplicatory research by information and personnel ex-
change (e.g., Medlars Information Exchange) ;

g. To make available to scientists everywhere unique resources or experimental
conditions otherwise available to only a few (e.g., SEATO Cholera Research Labora-
tory, Pakistan) ;

h. To develop international "banks" of scarce materials (germ plasma, micro-
organisms, geological samples, etc.) for the use of all scientists (e.g., Lunar rock
study program) ; and

i. To concentrate the talents of many nations on a transitory phenomenon (eclipse,
volcanic eruptions, etc.) to provide maximum scientific benefit (e.g., International
Task Force at Mexico solar eclipse.) ^is

Besides these scientific and technological objectives, Pollack sep-
arately enumerated political, national securit}^, economic, and humani-
tarian objectives. Virtually all of these have imjilications for inter-
dependence, many of them quite directly — such as "To reduce tensions
and rivalries between countries by utilizing science and technology
for common goals and mutual benefit (e.g., U.S.-Mexico Desalination
Cooperation)"; "To provide for mutual security by devising reliable
methods for ensuring compliance with treaty obligations (e.g., inter-
national nuclear safeguards)"; and "To provide networks for early
warning systems (hurricanes, tidal waves, etc.) (e.g., Tsunami warning
system)." ^^*

The study brings out an interesting point about the relationship
between government and science. Although (as noted in the IGY
study) scientists tend to be international and nonpolitical in their
orientation, there are in fact varying degrees of interdependence — to
use the word in a more limited sense — between them and their govern-
ments :

U.S. scientists, like their counterparts in other fields and in other countries,
play pivotal roles in determining both the content and mechanics of foreign and
international scientific programs. In a similar manner, the objectives of these
activities — the scientific goal of systematically accumulating knowledge about
man and his world, and the political goal of forging closer relationships among
states — necessarily vary with the way the diplomat uses science and the way the
scientist views his diplomatic role.^s

Ejiezo further suggests that scientists participating in ostensibly
nonpolitical international scientific activities may often, in effect, be
given political missions. She cites an observation by Jean-Jacques
Salomon with regard to the scientists who attend the privately spon-
sored Pug wash Conferences that "the compliance of governments
toward them is in no way absent from the calculation. In fact a reading
of the lists of participants in the Pugwash Conferences is enough to
pick out the names of the scientists or political observers who are

513 Ibid., p. 886.

51* Ibid., pp. 884-886.

iis Ibid., p. 886.

1836

officially or unofficially linked with political decision-making bodies,
whether in the East or West." "«

Carried too far, this symbiotic relationship between science and
government may be seK-defeating. The author quotes Dr. T. O. Jones,
director of National and International Programs, National Science
Foundation: "It has been my experience in dealing with international
science activities over the years, that whenever one contrives a
scientiJEic program purely for the purpose of political advantage or
motivation it frequently fails, because the science is contrived and not
genuine, and is not really of interest to the scientific community." "'

Although scientific exchanges tend in general to have the effect of
promoting interdependence, they result from mainly nationahst
motivations. Thus, although the administration in recent years has
inclined somewhat more toward the multilateral approach, tradi-
tionally it has had a marked preference for bilateral agreements, as
has the Congress. Paradoxically, however, the United States has
not sought to benefit systematically from the exchanges or — what
would be more to the point — to establish parallel bilateral programs
centering on teclmology. (As noted in the Brain Drain study, it has
instead inadvertently gained by attracting technologically trained
human talent from other countries, especially physicians.) Such
programs might further legitimate U.S. independence interests
through the import of technologies developed in other countries, in
subjects in which U.S. industry is less advanced.

ISSUE five: brain drain

This study ^'* deals with the problem of talent migration — essen-
tially, migration from areas where the talent, though needed, i?
not held in place by economic and other attractions, but is drawn
to where it is less needed by the prospect of financial and other
rewards.

The relationship of the brain drain issue to the question of inde-
pendence versus interdependence focuses on the fact that the sum
of trained intelligence is a global resource. The problem is that like
almost every other resource it is unevenly distributed. And the prob-
lem is compounded by the extent to which human mobility across
national boundaries is unrestricted. There is thus a tendency on the
part of donor states to view the brain drain in international terms — a
problem of interdependence calling for common efforts at solution —
while the states attracting the talent tend to see it as a national
problem — a failure on the part of donor states to make themselves
attractive to those persons who desire to leave.

Of all the resources which contribute to the building of a civiliza-
tion, the trained human mind is the most indispensable. From time
to time throughout history, cultures have been strengthened, re-
newed, or transformed by infusions of fresh talent from outside — often
deliberately induced, and sometimes massive. Thus, the Ptolemies
made Alexandria a center of learning by attracting the best brains
of Greece, and during the Middle Ages in Europe the spread of

516 Ibid., 887.

6" Ibid.

5H Whelan, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Iss^ie of International Scientific Mobility, vol. II,

pp. 1037-1318.

1837

learning was facilitated by mass migrations of scholars in search of
greater intellectual freedom and material rewards.

Human brainpower — especially the skills of mind and hand working
together — is also indispensable to the balanced development which
is a goal of the United Nations today. However, unlike other re-
sources, human brainpower has built-in mobility; persons of talent
tend to seek out the best conditions in which to live and work. The
international migration of talent has been a widespread practice
historically, despite attempts of governments to dissuade highly
educated or skilled persons from leaving their domains; today the
right of free movement is a widely accepted principle in the non-
communist world.

But unplanned talent migration has its societal disadvantages. For
example, it was pointed out in the Global Health study (Issue Two)
that half the world's people have access to no health care at all. The
negative implications of this potent fact, both for global health and
for balanced development, are greatly out of scale with the small
investment which the public health/preventive medicine approach,
as contrasted with the private/curative, requires to reach large masses
of population. Yet, as the Brain Drain study shows, thousands of
physicians from less developed countries annually enter private
medical practice in the United States. ^'^ The process represents a
diminution of development aid where augmentation is needed; the
eflFect is a kind of reverse technology transfer.

There is a double irony in the fact that the United States, which
invented the highly effective institution of the county agent for the
transfer of agricultural technology, has had minimal success in
applying this technique ia aiding less developed countries and has
been tomioderately, if inadvertently, successful in attracting talent
from the aided countries.

This reverse aid, moreover, has substantially offset the benefits of
U.S. aid to those countries. Dr. Whelan observes that the brain drain
thereby contributes to the widening development gap between rich
and poor countries, which "constitutes a potential threat to U.S.
national security. This threat arises from two sources: (1) the in-
creased UkeUhood of confrontation between rich and poor caused by
poUtical, economic, and social differences; and (2) world competition
for vital mineral resources, the main sources of which are located
in the LDCs." ^^° Further: "As the requirements of interdependence
press in upon the Nation's security interests, a national policy choice
may compel reengagement on the broader scene of international
development. Meanwhile, as this study points out, the Nation is
not without recourse in providing at least some remedies for the
brain drain." ^^^

In his address of September 1, 1975, to the United Nations General
Assembly on "Global Consensus and Economic Development,"
Secretary Eassinger pledged that the United States would "contribute
to, and actively support, the new United Nations revolving fund for

5" /6idrSee especially ppl 112S-n26.

520 Ibid., pp. 1303-1304.

521 Ibid., p. 1313. The remexHes are discussed on pages 1254-1275 of the study. In speaking here of "reengage-
ment" the author is referring to an earlier comment (p. 1312) on "the indifference and apathy which char-
acterize the Nation's [current] response to development problems that specialists insist can be managed
only within the framework of an actively pursued policy of interdependence."

1838

natural resources. This fund will encourage the worldwide exploration
and exploitation of minerals, and thus promote one of the most
promising endeavors of economic development."

It has been noted that no resources are more important to the de-
velopment process, and to technology transfer in general, than is
human talent. For the most part, little systematic attention has been
given to that fact by the U.S. Government. U.S. Scientific Attaches
are not directed to observe and analyze the level of technical achieve-
ment in various disciplines or technologies in the countries in which
they are stationed.^^^ U.S. aid programs have suffered from lack of
knowledge and understanding of the appropriate level of technology
required by the receiving country, and have tended to aim too high.
The unresolved problem of the brain drain further testifies to U.S.
failure to take sufficient account of the role of trained human resources
in development.

"The United States proposes that 1976 be dedicated as a year of
review and reform of the entire U.N. development system," Secretary
Kissinger stated in the same address. Perhaps, as an element in such
reform continued into future years, consideration might be given to en-
couraging and assisting the United Nations to establish a country-by-
country inventory of available and needed human resources to parallel
the revolving fund for natural resources. (Even for the United States
no such inventory exists ; a partial effort by the National Science Foun-
dation to maintain one — the National Register of Scientific and Tech-
nical Personnel — was terminated several years ago.) Along with the
inventory, provision might be made for setting up an international
pool or registry of persons with needed technical and managerial skills,
providing suitable rewards and recog^iition, and enrolling qualified
persons who are willing and able to go wherever they are most needed.

ISSUE six: science and technology in the department of state

This last of the 12 studies in the series on "Science, Technology,
and American Diplomacy" is the most focal of the studies, in that it
examines the institution principally responsible for integrating the
substance of U.S. foreign policy with the conduct of U.S. diplomacy.
Addressing the theme of "Science, Technology, and the Growth of
Interdependence," it cites the technology of the atom as responsible
for a conversion of diplomacy into new directions:

The Congress appreciates fully the magnitude of the discontinmty that science
and technology have injected into the stream of history, beginning in 1945 with
the first atomic bomb and later confirmed with thermonuclear-tipped ballistic
missiles launched from silos or submarines. These developments have made general
war with its nuclear implications seem an exercise in suicidal foUy, thereby under-
mining the military power base of diplomacy and enormously compUcating the
practice of that obscure a.Tt.'^^^

At the same time, technology has forced the nations of the world
into closer contact by many means, such as:

— Instant communication and visual reports at great distances ;
— Unlimited recording and rapid manipulation of data;
— Photographic surveys of the total area of the Earth;
— Man-made nuclear energy;

522 Huddle, Science and Technology in the DepaTtment of State, vol. II, p. 1388.

523 jbid., pp. 1325-1326.

1839

— Global weather prediction;

— Cheap synthetic substitutes for many cash crops;

— Chemicals and drugs with global social and environmental impacts; and

— Massive and rapid air transportation.

No nation, it is pointed out, has been subject to more extensive
technological alterations in its culture or economics than has the
United States, as measured by:

— The substitution of machine power for manual power in homes and work
places;

— The move from field, forest, and mine to offices and service occupations;

— Personal transportation, commimications networks, and computer
services; and

— Consumption of fossil fuels and industrial materials.

As a result of these technological developments, the United States
has increased its dependence on foreign sources of energy, materials,
and industrial products, while other nations have increased their
dependence on the United States for food, educational faciUties,
technical assistance, and economic stability. "As a consequence of
technology, the United States has led the world in bringing about a
global structure of international interdependence." ***

A major theme of the study is that despite this leading role the
United States is not well organized to cope with interdependence.***
Traditional habits of thought and action persist in organizational
structures and procedures which tend to emphasize bilateral over
multilateral relationships and one-dimensionaf approaches to inter-
national problems over multidimensional.

Paralleling the growing interdependence among peoples, the study
emphasizes, is the growmg interconnectedness of different kinds of
diplomatic problems:

A feature of the world scene of today is the complex way in which so many of
the great global problems intersect. Materials shortages raise questions of political
jurisdiction over the deep seabed. World food shortages relate to fertilizer supply,
which is tied to energy and petroleum, materials carteUzation, weather modlnca-
tion, and water supply. Energy relates to petroleimi and world distribution of coal,
but also to nuclear power generation, which involves international technology
transfer, the environment, nuclear safeguards, and safe disposal of nuclear wastes.
Space utilization involves searches for materials, global commimications, detection
of agricultural blights, and information management. In fact, directly or indirectly,
mo3t of the large teclmological issues facing the world of the future in 1975 appear
to be closely interconnected. . . .

The implication of this demonstrated interconnectedness among international
technological issues is that organizations cannot operate effectively if they are
limited in scope to a particular function or issue. Coordination is essential to
ensure that each mission organization, national or international, does not operate
at cross-purposes with other organizations with other related missions, in the
United States this coordinating function on international technological issues
and functions is the responsibility of the Department of State. There does not
appear to be any clearcut assignment of corresponding responsibility for co-
oroinating international mission agency functions. Moreover, there does not
appear to be any extensive discussion of the need for such international agency
coordination. And, indeed, the extent to which the U.S. Department of State is
organized, equipped, and manned to coordinate U.S. aspecte of these functions
and issues is open to serious question.*^*

** Others, of coune, have made this point, and some have explored the question of what might be done
about It An example of an onofficlal Irqulry by the "National Commission on Coping with Interdepend-
ence" is footnoted earlier In this essay. Two recent official examples are the study by Bloomfleld etH.tat
the State Department and the Murphy Commission study, both also mentioned earlier. Chapter 10 of the
Report of the Murphy Commission suggests organlzatlonaJ concepts and procedures necessary for "Bbi4>lng
an international order or nmnaging intordependence. . . ." The substance of this chapter b discoased n
length in the essay to follow, on "Short- Range versus Long- Range Planning."

«26 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, pp. 1473-1474.

1840

In this connection the author cites a 1973 study by a panel of the
United Nations Association :

The United States Government [like American society as a whole] is increas-
ingly part of an interdependent world, but its organization and procedures still
reflect earlier, simpler times when nation states could on most matters safely
deal with each other at arms length and through career foreign services. In today's
world, international relations are of necessity pervasive, technical, continuous,
and intimately involved with domestic issues, and this requires new styles and new
systems of governmental organization and process, which rely far more than in
the past on a wide range of professional participation in policymaking.

Compared to the resources lavished on management improvements in a single
large multinational corporation, those being devoted to the far more important
and difficult problems of improving the organization of the government in a
multinational setting are pitiful. (United Nations Association of the United
States of America, National Pohcy Panel, Foreign. Policy Decisionmaking: The
New Dimensions, New York, UNA-USA, May 1973, pp. 101-102.)

Amon^ other things, the UNA panel report noted, "httle in FSO
diplomatic training prepares them for . . . diplomacy in multinational
forums." Yet ever since World War II a substantial and increasing
part of the diplomat's responsibiUties has concerned multilateral
matters. Harlan Cleveland comments in 1975 that:

In the late '60s, when I had occasion to visit every US mission in NATO
Europe, I made a point of asking what proportion of the business on each
Ambassador's desk was strictly bilateral business, and what proportion was
essentially bilateral conversation about business done multilaterally. My estimate
at the time was that the multilateral content of bilateral diplomacy ranged
between 60-76%; now, half a decade later, the average is probably at the high
end of that range. Some idea of the pervasiveness of multilateral processes can
be derived from the sheer numbers of meetings held each year. The United States
Government was officially represented at 740 international conferences last year,
and several thousand private international meetings eiigaged the attention and
attendance of private American organizations. 5"

Cleveland's analysis of the shortcomings of the State Department
and of the U.S. Government roughly parallels that of the present study.
Stating that "the organization of our Federal Government for the
management of international affairs is still based on . . . assumptions
which are quite inconsistent with the facts of international life," he
comments that the Government is unambiguously divided between
"domestic" and "foreign" affairs and that the management of "foreign
affairs" is heavily weighted toward the administration of bilateral
relations with other countries. "Because most of the talent is thinking
and working on bilateral relations, officials . . . have been mostly
unavailable to grapple effectively with the U.S. defense budget, CIA
operations, energy, population or food. . . . Planning for major
world conferences (Stockholm on environment, Bucharest on popula-
tion, Rome on food, the Special U.N. Assembly on a "New Intei*-
national Economic Order") tends to be late and ragged . . . there
is not nearly enough room in the foreign policy establishment for
strategic long-range planning, especially on the widening range of
"interdependence issues." "^

Science and Technology in the Department oj State examines
departmental weaknesses in detail and suggests a number of options
for improvement.^^^ Both Cleveland and Huddle offer suggestions

«2' Harlan Cleveland, The Management of Multilateralism. A paper prepared for the Commission on the
Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission), Princeton
N.J., Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; February 3, 1975, 35 pp. (p. 7).

'* Cleveland, The Management of Multilateralism , pp. 13-15.

«w The whole study is an analysis of departmental problems and weaknesses in terms of contemporary
demands. For the options, see pp. 1491-1500.

1841

for strengthening congressional capabilities, as well as those of the
executive branch, to meet the new requirements of interdependence.
These requirements are for improvements not only at the national
level but in the machinery of the United Nations. There is, moreover,
a reciprocal relationship between the international organization and
its national members with respect to both ends and means. To imple-
ment Secretary Kissinger's international development goals, his
Proposals for an International Industrialization Institute and an
ntemational Center for the Exchange of Technological Information,
and his suggestions as to a conference on science and technology for
development and other cooperative measures to achieve needed devel-
opment,"" would require corresponding structures and procedures at
national levels — especially in the governments of nations best able to
contribute leadership. It remains to be seen how many of these steps will
actually be taken.

A measure which could dramatize the interdependent relationships
between individual nations and the United Nations, and of domestic
and international interests within individual nations, might be a
technology alert system for the rapid dissemination of universally
needed technical information. This system could interrelate with
existing services like the World Weather Watch and the health ad-
visories of the World Health Organization, but might also embrace
the entire range of technical and related social issues bearing on human
security and well-being. It could address, for example, such diverse
matters as detection of toxic agents in the atmosphere, prevention of
the international transmission by air of insect pests, treatment of
childhood diseases, the sharing of constructive experience in the social
assimilation of the mentally retarded, and many others. Another effect
of such a step would be to emphasize that much of what is implied by
interdependence today lies outside the zero-sum formula and even
outside the area of healthy competition; "^ the cost in money and effort
of sharing it universally would be slight in proportion to the universal
gain. Two questions remain to be asked, however: would the United
States (or some other nation) sponsor such a proposal? And, if so,
would it persist in providing the organizational support for success-
ful foUow-through and in stimulating other nations, and the United
Nations itself, to do Ukewise?

Interdependence might also call for an awareness on the part of
developing countries whose chief exports are raw materials that
technology, no less than mines and railroads, costs money to develop.
The open-handed way in which the United States has dispensed tech-
nology since 1950 in the various foreign aid programs has constituted

**• Kissinger, "Global Consensus and Economic Development," p. 7.

"• Professor Robinson comments on this point: "As 1 see it, this is precisely why a fresh posture toward
the idea of 'the national interest,' in order to offset zero-sum expressions of nationalism, is essential. The
task of demonstrating the connection between 'the national interest' and the fashioning of a prudent, yet
encompassing, fabric of interdependence is, perhaps, the most vital one that pertains to the long-term success
of diplomacy and preclusion of nuclear war. In essence, I see no prospect that interdependence will be con-
sciously and aptly treated as a mandate of nature, as the twenty-first century nears, until the concept of the
national interest attains a revolutionary revision." There are, he adds, built-in psychological obstacles:
". . . major powers deem their sentiments of Independence (read superiority) not hghtly to be encroached
upon. At the same time, less-puissant nations are disposed to parade their 'independence' as compensation
for feelings of inferiority and to view interdependence a» a norm as camouflage for the (subtly alluring) re-
affirmation and perpetuation of their weaker condition. Thus, it appears to be interdependence-as-reahty's
mlsfortime that no grander or lesser power at all has much incentive to own up to the extent to which its
destiny is tightly enlaced with that of other nations." Further: "Much of contemporary diplomacy appears
to have the object of manipulatirm interdependencies in a way that will favor the maximization of inde-
pendence. . . ."

1842

a donation of billions of dollars without recompense. The developing
nations now propose that their exports be paid for more generously
and that they be given broader access to needed technology. Such
proposals allege economic justice in the name of interdependence,
feut the arrangement would be a blatant form of nationalism, wanting
in equity and not long lasting. Interdependence needs to be based on
fair dealing and improved opportunity for all.

A Concluding Remark

In the foregoing discussion the fact of interdependence is seen as
generally accepted by informed persons in the United States, however
inadequately its impUcations may be imderstood. And since Ameri-
cans are a "can do" people, acceptance of the fact tends to carry
the suggestion that appropriate steps are being taken, or will be
taken, to cope with it.

But is this the case? What is the present reality? There is a possible
view wliich has not yet been fairly dealt with; it is sunmiarized in a
recent New ForZrer article :^"

. . . when one turns one's attention away for a moment from one's hopes
of what interdependence may become in the future and examines what it is here
and now, interdependence begins to look like the source of nothing but trouble.
In fact, a large number of the crises of the last few years could be described as
crises of interdependence. The oil crisis, which launched the idea on its spectacular
career, is the prototype. . . . It is often debated whether the causes of the oil
crisis are fundamentally political or fundamentally a matter of dwindhng re-
sources. They are, at bottom, neither. The crisis is what happens when many
nations come to rely on the natural resources of a few nations for their economic
survival. It is a crisis of interdependence. What can be said of oil can also be said
of food. ...

Unions in many countries . . . have discovered on the national level what
the OPEC nations have discovered on the international level: that modern econ-
omies are fatally vulnerable and are an excellent target for blackmail. An alto-
gether different sort of actor on the poUtical scene — the terrorist — has learned to
make use of the pressure points of modern society in another way ...

What may be most dangerous of all is that interdependence makes every crisis
in every part of the world the business of everybody. . . . when every small
crisis ^n the world — so many of which seem to be entirely impervious to solution —
becomes the business of everybody, then each small group that has a role to play
in the functioning of the whole can hold the whole for ransom. One day, a planned
interdependence may develop that wiU resolve these difficulties. For the moment,
the unplanned interdependence that is actually with us seems only to multiply
the dangers the world faces.

It would be easy, perhaps, to brush aside this counsel of near despair
as the reflection of some weary and skeptical writer's overlong exposure
to the troubles of New York City — the product of a unique situation.
(But how unique, indeed, is that situation — or how symptomatic?)
How much overdrawn, after all, is this sardonic view of interdepend-
ence? The troubles of Beirut, Belfast, Lisbon, and Buenos Aires
cause repercussions around the world, and there is the danger (amount-
ing in the minds of many observers to a certainty) that by defaulting
New York City would wreak havoc on many banks in the United
States and Europe.

It is hard to gainsay the phrase, "the unplanned interdependence
that is actually with us." Where is the pohcy planning, fortified by

M« "Interdependence: On the Road to Moral Perfection?"— reprinted in The Inter Dependent, vol. 2, no. 8,
October 1975, p. 2. Another possible view is expressed by Gregory Schmld In the Winter 1975-76 issue of
Foreign Policy, in an article entitled "Interdependence Has Its Limits." Schmld poses the question of whether
the world may not have reached the end of a 30-year period of growing economic interdependence, and may
be entering "an era of new mercantilism."

1843

accepted procedures for reaching common understanding with other
responsible nations, to provide the context for ready solutions to
even elementary problems Uke the problem of international hij acking,
kidnapping, and terrorism? How can nations do a better job of fore-
seeing and heading off the larger "crises of interdependence?"

Some Questions jor Further Consideration

This essay has called attention to a djmamic factor in the affairs
of mankind which by its very nature has extensive implications for
the conduct of diplomacy and, indeed, of all human relations. That
factor, expanding interdependence, is not a cause of human problems
in the same primary sense that population growth and a shortage
(or maldistribution) of resources are causes. Nevertheless, for any
given sta/;e of global evolution, it represents a problem in itself —
a condition to be dealt with directly with the best insights that the
study of anthropology, sociology, and ps3Achology, as well as history
and politics, can afford, and the utmost creativeness in social invention,^^
national and international political leadership, and international
public administration.

"The world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of
gieat enterprise and creativity or an age of chaos and despair,"
declared Secretary Kissinger in his July 14, 1975, address at Mil-
waukee on the subject of the United Nations/^* "[We] had better
turn our American ingenuity loose on the humanistic management of
interdependence — in a world where, as we willed it, nobody is in
charge," writes Harlan Cleveland. ^^^ To which Marina v.N. Whitman
adds: ". . . the replacement of leadership based on hegemony with
leadership based on persuasion and compromise wUl be difficult,
perhaps impossible. But this nation was born of an 'impossible'
undertaking; and today, as two centuries ago, there is no acceptable
alternative." ^^® These three statements would seem to sum up the
intricate web of challenges, problems, and outright dilemmas which
face U.S. leaders in the executive and legislative branches today.
Obviously, there are no easy answers, and many of the questions can-
not yet be sharply posed. Some which seem worth raising for congres-
sional consideration are presented herebelow:

QUESTIONS

What structural and procedural reforms might it be politically
feasible and administratively practicable for the U.S. executive branch
to adopt in the near future to accommodate the growing needs of
interdependence? What further reforms should be planned for the
future?

What reforms should the United States seek to have the United
Nations adopt to the same end, now and later?

»" For a definition of this term see: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics.
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development. Science Policy: A Working Glossary. Prepared for
the Subcommittee by the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., July 1973, pp. 62-63. (Examples of social inventions
include parliamentary procedure, mass public education, the census, the land grant university, the coimty
agent, retirement pensions, public hygiene, the World Health Organization and other U.N. functional
agencies, and the United Nations itself.)

w* Kissinger, Henry A. "The Global Challenge and International Cooperation." Address at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, July 14, 1975. Printed and circulated by the United Nations Association of the United States
of America. New York.

K« Cleveland, Harlan. "A Leaderless World." Wathinffton Port, May 18, 1975.

«• Whitman, Marina v.N., "Leadership Without Hegemony: Our Role in the World Economy." Foreign
Policy, number 20, fall 1975. p. 160.

1844

What reforms might be appropriate in the Congress? For example,
should the Murphy Commission proposal for establishment of a Joint
Committee on National Security be adopted? What are the pros and
cons of such an arrangement? Should the scope of a joint committee,
if estabhshed, be broadened to reflect considerations of interdepend-
ence beyond those normally encompassed by the term "national
security" — e.g., international cooperation in science and technology,
and in the maintenance of global economic security and stability?

It is widely conceded that (a) interdependence is an increasingly
universal and compelling fact of lite today, closely tied to the proc-
esses of technological innovation, change, and growth, but also (b)
that the sovereign nation-state is firmly entrenched, at least for the
predictable future, as the principal instrument of growth and develop-
ment. What are the main implications of this seeming contradiction?

To what extent and in what ways can the United Nations be real-
istically expected to moderate and direct the forces of nationalism in
the interests of constructive interdependence?

Are temperate forms of nationalism to be encouraged as a means of
preserving cultural variet};^ and creativity in a world in which growing
interdependence might tend to produce a sterile uniformity? How
can the line be drawn between harmful excesses and differences worth
preserving? How can a Hegelian "higher s3Tithesis" be achieved in
which a blend of independence and interdependence embodies the
best values of both?

Is multinational regionalism a practical approach to striking a
balance between constructive interdependence and the protection of
valid national interests? Is the European Community or the Mekong
Project a useful model of the rogional approach?

Are economic alliances like OPEC potentially constructive from the
standpoint of world economic security? How can the excesses of such
alliances be reconciled with the interests of global interdependence
and development?

How can nationalist political leaders who seek the benefits of inter-
dependence be persuaded to assume commensurate burdens? -

At a time when a grooving acceptance of the reality of interdepend-
ence is accompanied by a paradoxical sense of drift and tendencies
toward world fragmentation and anarchy, leaders like those of the
early post-World War II period (who foresaw interdependence) are
conspicuously lacking. What can be done to encourage articulate
leaders with world visions to come forward — from small, as well as
large, nations?

This study has shown how the technology of transport, communica-
tions, space, the seabed, global health, and atomic control has been
eroding national sovereignty and bringing about the rise of inter-
dependence. But what other forces are at work to this end? Is the
multinational corporation one of them? Might the multinational
corporation itself be shaped into a constructive instrument of beneficial
interdependence?

What can be done, for example, to establish a code of conduct for
multinational corporations that would achieve a constructive balance
between the interests of private enterprise and those of interdepen-
dence?

Can a system be devised for sharing vital resources with have-not
nations in accommodation with the practices of both the free market

1845

uations and those with planned economies? Is it feasible — given the
consent of a sufficient number of nations with resources — to divide
resources into two broad categories: those which must be shared
within certain agreed hmits of pressing need, and those subject to
competitive exploitation? And how can the value of raw materials
exports be validly balanced against the value of exports of technology?

Should the United Nations, as a long-range planning measure,
consider seeking international consensus to divide the world into tech-
nological, economic/occupational, production-and-services regions —
i.e., countries within subcontinents, and regions within or cutting
across coimtries, in such a way that primary (but not exclusive)
emphasis in some regions would be on heavy industry, in others on
high-technology hght industry, in still others on recreation and tour-
ism— ^in accordance with their natural endowments and cultural
preferences? If this is an impractical concept, what steps might it be
feasible for the United Nations to take in the direction of planned and
harmonious world development? Should a start be made by encourag-
ing such variegated but balanced development within regions?

Would it be feasible and desirable to strengthen the modest pro-
gram of United Nations Volunteers as a vehicle, in the development
field, for promoting constructive interdependence? Would it be useful
to emphasize the regional approach in this field also?

Might it be desirable and feasible for the United States to encourage
the establishment under U.N. auspices of a futures research facility
staffed by social, poUtical, and physical scientists, technologists,
engineers, and speciahsts in futures research and forecasting, to study
and report on various growth and resource trends and their implica-
tions for balanced versus unbalanced growth and ecological overstress?

In what ways, if any, should the Federal Government involve State
and local governments in problems and issues of global interdepen-
dence, as was briefly attempted dming the Presidency of John F.
Kennedy?

In what ways might it be useful for the U.S. Government to pro-
mote cooperative efforts among government, private enterprise,
academic, and other interested elements in the United States, directed
toward the solution of problems of interdependence?

What steps might it be practical and useful to take toward develop-
ing a philosophy of interdependence?

Chapter 23 — Long-Range and Short-Range

Planning

CONTENTS

Page

Planning as a Proper Noun 1851

Weaknesses of Short-Range Planning 1853

Difficulties Imposed by Extended Time Frames 1854

Fundamental Virtues of Long-Range Diplomatic Planning 1855

Long-Range Planning Aspects of the National Security 1855

Need for Redefining National Security 1856

National Security Planning in a Broader Context 1857

Corporate Attitudes Towards Long-Range Planning 1858

Lessons from the Six Cases in the Study for Short- and Long-Range

Planning 1859

Case One: The Baruch Plan 1859

Case Two: Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe 1860

Case Three: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical

Year 1861

Case Four: The Mekong Project 1863

Case Five: Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed 1865

Case Six: U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations 1867

Lessons From the Six Issues in the Study for Short- and Long-Range

Planning 1867

Issue One: The Evolution of International Technology 1867

Issue Two: The Politics of Global Health 1868

Issue Three: Beyond Malthus 1869

Issue Four: U.S. Scientists Abroad 1870

Issue Five: Brain Drain 1871

Issue Six: Science and Technology in the Department of State 1872

A View of Strengthened Mechanisms of Long-Range Planning 1874

The Murphy Commission's Design for Foreign Policy Planning 1876

Suggested Planning Products 1877

Organization for Planning 1878

Some Further Comments on Executive Branch Planning 1880

Some Further Thoughts on Foreign Policy Planning in the Legislative

Branch 1882

Conclusions and Observations 1883

(1849)

CHAPTER 23— LONG-RANGE AND SHORT-RANGE

PLANNING

In this final essay a number of themes are drawn together in an
effort to suggest a broad direction for policy planning in the subject
area of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy.

A series of dichotomies have been presented — initiative/reactive,
bilateral/multilateral, high technology/low technology, pubUc/private,
and independence/interdependence. In aU of these Hegehan duaUties
the element of timing emerged as an important factor. The purpose of
this essay is to deal with the question of timing. On what time scale
should the United States address the problem of linking science and
technology to diplomacy? Can enough aspects of the future be reliably
forecast to prepare for them? Or is it better to deal with the present
and let the future take care of itself? Must U.S. diplomats and Mem-
bers of Congress content themselves with reacting to crises or can they
plan to avert at least some of them?

Planning as a Proper Noun

Before addressing the question of the time frame, however, it is
necessary to develop the rationale for planning at all. Why plan?
Is planning moral? Is it expedient? Is it technically feasible? Is it
pohtically acceptable?

It is remarkable how many different attitudes have grown up
around the idea of planning. A family plans a vacation. An architect
plans a house. A corporation plans a sales campaign. The retired
financier makes an estate plan. Many States, municipaUties, and
counties have planning offices, and urban planning is a degree subject
in many universities. Military planning is a widely practiced activity .^^^

What is it that is common to aU of these different kinds of planning,
and why do some people recoil from the idea of government planning
for the future of a democratic society?

Elements common to all planning seem to be :

(a) The estabhshment of goals;

(b) Examination of underlying assumptions, followed by sharper
focusing of goals;

(c) Definition of present status;

(d) Determination of a process or procedure for attaining the
goals ;

(e) Determination of the requirements of resources and effort
to achieve the intended progress toward the goals ;

(f) Identification of foreseeable obstacles to achievement of the
goals;

(g) Establishment of the time required to achieve the goals;
(h) Division of the total time required into increments in which

specific steps wiU be accomplished ;

^ However, when the author of this essay wrote the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1947, for the U.S.
Munitions Board, he was instructed not to use the word "planners" but instead to use "the makers of plans."
In the judgrment of senior military officers at that time there was a pejorative or perhaps socialistic tinge to
the word "planner," although the word "plan" was less pejorative. Even plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for national war emergencies were sanitized by being styled "concepts."

(1851)

1852

(i) Allocation of responsibility among the participants who will

cooperate in executing the plan;

(j) Review of the total plan for completeness and feasibility,

for adequacy of provisions for evaluating its effectiveness at

stated intervals after execution, and for foreseeable negative

impacts or side-effects of carrying it out; and

(k) Presentation and justification of the plan to those with

authority to decide on its acceptance and to order that it be

carried out.
There are many reasons for opposition to planning in a democratic
political system. Disagreement in any of the items of (a) through (k)
results in opposition to the process as a whole, and in a democratic
system "no" votes tend to carry more weight than do "yes" votes.
The size of the society itself impUes that plans are likely to be un-
manageably large in size and scope, and such plans are cumbersome
and imprecise. Definition of concrete and specific goals is sometimes
particularly difficult, and their acceptability is hard to attain. The
planning agents and the goals they choose may be partisan, and the
timing is thus finked to the electoral process rather than determined
by the inherent character and requirements of the plan itself. National
planning in the United States encounters one obstacle not widely
characteristic elsewhere: the fact that U.S. society has a pioneer
heritage and tradition in which self-reliance and individual planning
takes the place of large-group planning. »

In consequence, the word "planned" takes on a somewhat pejora-
tive character when used in such terms as planned economy, planned
social change, and planned redistribution of populations or racial
groups. The idea of a "five year plan," as employed by the leadership
of the Soviet Union, is held in general disfavor in the United States.
The philosopher John Dewey, writing in 1939, observed that this
lisage of "planning" had led to its wide condemnation in free societies:

What claims to be social planning [wrote Dewey] is now found in Communist
and Fascist countries. The social consequence is complete suppression of freedom
of inquiry, communication and voluntary association, by means of a combination
of personal violence, culminating in extirpation, and systematic partisan propa-
ganda. The results are such that in the minds of many persons the very idea of
social planning and of violation of the integrity of the individual are becoming
intimately bound together. (His emphasis.)^^

But Dewey does not dismiss planning as a legitimate function of
society. Indeed, he says, "Forethought and planning must come before
foresight." ^^' He makes an important distinction between the "planned
society" and the "continuously planning society."

The former [he continues] requires fixed blueprints imposed from above and
therefore involving reliance upon physical and psychological force to secure con-
formity to them. The latter means the release of intelligence through the widest
form of cooperative give-and-take. The attempt to plan social organization and
association without the freest possible play of intelligence contradicts the very
idea in social planning. For the latter is an operative method of activitj', not a
predetermined set of final "truths." (His emphasis.)""

6" Joseph Ratner (ed.). Intelligence in the Modern World. John Dewey's Philosophy. New York, The
Modern Library, 1939, p. 431.
M» md., p. 954.
MO Ibid., pp. 431-432.

1853

Formal adoption of mechanisms of economic planning in the United
States occurred by enactment of the Employment Act of 1946/"
Creation of the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of
State in 1947 gave recognition of the need for planning in support of
U.S. diplomacy.^*^ The need of the Congress for a planning institution
concerned with the impact of science and technology on U.S. society
led in 1972 to the creation of a congressional Office of Technology
Assessment.'^'

However, the area of interaction between diplomacy and both
science and technology has remained a kind of no man's land, insofar
as planning is concerned. Bits of responsibility are distributed through-
out both the legislative and executive branches, but no mechanism
exists to bring a general coherence to the various planning activities.
More importantly, no mechanism exists to mobilize and apply for the
achievement of diplomatic goals the two preeminent strengths of
the United States: technological skill and managerial expertise.
Although the principle of "planning" as an abstraction seems to have
won some measure of acceptance and respectability since John
Dewey's 1939 definition of its democratic role, the practice and
application of planning for diplomatic programs of action seem still
to be awaiting some kind of further confirmation and support. The
reason for this delayed acceptance may lie in the uncertainty over
whether diplomatic planning should address the immediate future or
the decades ahead. How indeed should American skills in technology
and management be employed to prepare to solve the diplomatic
problems of 1976 or 2001, in view of the many imponderables in the
way? On the other hand, is it possible that those who are expert
in technology and management might be able to help identify and
assess these very imponderables and translate uncertainties into
probabilities?

Weaknesses of Short-Range Planning

It is an oft-repeated truism of military lore that any plan promptly
implemented is superior to the best plan executed belatedly. Catastro-
phes as well as successes have resulted from adherence to this doctrine.
But even granting the virtue of speed in military tactics, there is a
profound difference between military combat and diplomacy. War
is a zero-sum game in which the enemy's loss equals the home force's
gain; when ideally pursued diplomacy is a non-zero-sum game in
which both sides win. A treaty that benefits only one signatory will
not be long preserved. For this reason alone, more skill is required in
diplomacy than in warfare. (The historical frequency of conffict
suggests that more attention should be given to the skills of diplo-
macy.)

The timing of international relations planning is conditioned by
the fact that the elements useful to modern diplomacy are slow in
developing. They center on technology, economics, and social action.

*" Public Law 79-304. However, for an account of earlier plannmg and goal-setting in the United States
see The Evolution and Dynamics of National OoaU in the United States (U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, prepared by Franklin P. Huddle. Science Policy Research Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971, 58 pages. Com-
mittee print.)

'*- Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 1412-1414.

^3 Ibid., p. 1501.

1854

The results are measured in terms of amicable and constructive
relations with neighboring countries, shared objectives with the rest
of the world, and evidences of lowered tensions generally.

Short-range planning in the diplomatic sphere tends to be action-
oriented, narrow in scope, and secret. It is inherently limited in
participation, administered by an exclusive elite, and accordingly,
when disclosed, is likely to elicit criticism from nonpar ticipants. Such
criticism can be based on the fact that the values of competing alter-
natives to the plan adopted are readily perceived by the outsiders,
while those conducting the planning have insufficient time for assess-
ment of these alternatives and tend to be committed to their own
chosen course. Thus there is an inherent divisiveness in short-range
planning for diplomatic programs. Above all, there is no time or
opportunity to win consensus in support of the plan adopted.

Another weakness is that short-range planning tends in its approach
to be reactive, rather than initiative. The weaknesses of the reactive
mode in diplomacy were discussed in a previous essay. Anticipating
all the possible actions and trends in other countries that are likely
to require U.S. response, and designing such responses, tends to over-
load the planning and decisionmaking structures.

A great danger in short-range planning is that the execution of a
reactive plan conceived in haste with narrow participation can set in
motion a chain of circumstances that becomes progressively and ir-
resistably disadvantageous.

Finally, there needs to be taken into account the special problem
of the conduct of diplomacy in a country with a democratic tradition,
universal suffrage, and a popularly elected leadership. Education of
the electorate to the evolving needs of the Nation for diplomatic
change, overcoming locjalized or specialized pockets of resistance to
otherwise popular courses, and achieving a general understanding
and acceptance of proposed diplomatic programs, can be impossible
in a short time frame.

Difficvities Imposed by Extended Time Frames

Long-range diplomatic planning is not without its obstacles. Plans
need to take into account the circumstances at the time they are to be
implemented; the more extended the time frame, the more uncertain
the circumstances will be. Public attention may wander if the issue in
question is perceived to be of insufficient moment or if there are
conflicting demands for public notice. A program long in development
can lead to entrenched positions in conflict, with resultant indecisive-
ness and inaction. Then, too, the leadership may grow impatient and
resort to quicker, if less promising, alternative solutions, expecially
when sensing the political necessity to produce a diplomatic success
for the public. Even when a diplomatic initiative has been well planned
and effectively implemented, there is a danger that the leadership,
having scored one diplomatic success, will feel the need to sustain the
momentum by a following succession of related action, each less care-
fully prepared than the initial stroke. Plans long in maturing are, of
course, unlikely to remain undisclosed and when they assume a change
in future normative values they can give rise to great controversies.
For example, had the Department of State undertaken a study in 1950
of the desirability of recognizing the People's Republic of China or
acceptance of the de facto Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, severe
criticism might well have been expected.

1855

Fundamental Virtues of Long-Range Diplomatic Planning

Still, the planning of national diplomatic measures on a very long
time scale lias many advantages. Plans thus developed can be broad
in scope, comprehensive, and durably massive in effect, rather than
merely clever or transient. They can be exposed to much critical
analysis in the course of their development to eliminate minor flaws
and revise incorrect assessments. Designs can comprehend more
aspects, phases, interfaces, and complications. The planners can bring
to bear a larger participation of relevant technical expertise as it is
needed. Open public discussion and debate can enable broad pubUc
understanding and acceptance.

From the point of view of the diplomatic community there are
advantages in the slow, deliberate evolution of a plan: quick decisions
on important matters involve elements of risk uncongenial to the
diplomatic style.

From the point of view of the technical community the long-range
plan has the advantage of allowing time to perfect technological
initiatives consistent with the broader diplomatic concept, based on
initial study of requirements for new technologies, and refined in
response to study of the effects of their deplojrment. Technological
development itself has its own built-in time frame.

From the point of view of the Congress the long-range plan has the
advantage of efficiency and effectiveness because such planning is
able to exploit those qualities in which the United States is strongest
and most admired : technological superiority and skill in administrative
management.

Not only does the slow unfolding of a long-range diplomatic plan
help to buUd a national consensus within the United States; it also
permits adjustment and revision to satisfy the differing needs and
views of other world powers as the planning process matures. In
addition, the slow evolution of broad diplomatic plans provides time
and opportunity for collaboration on a multilateral basis by many
other nations sharing the goals and aspirations on which the plans are
based. (Weaknesses of diplomatic organization based on a multi-
plicity of bilateral agreements or programs were discussed in an earlier
essay.)

Long-Range Planning Aspects of the National Security

There is an emerging dilemma as to the nature of war and national
security in a world of nuclear-armed superpowers. Nuclear weapons
are manifestly a product of technology. So are the high-precision
subnuclear weapons largely based on quantum effects of the laser.
However, the question remains: how do nuclear and subnuclear
technologies relate to national security and what other factors ought
to be taken into account?

MiHtary traditionahsts tend to focus strongly on the weaponry
aspects of technology. National security in these terms tends to be
equated with abihty to destroy an adversary by various means. The
fact that the principal adversary also has this capability means that
national security as an absolute condition, implying the complete
inability of an adversary to injure U.S. society, its institutions, and
its property, has disappeared. There is no foreseeable prospect that
the United States can regain this condition. Accordingly, the shared
possession of nuclear weapons, together with means of delivering them

1856

irresistibly against remote targets, calls for a revised definition of
national security as an important task of long-range planning.

Continuation of the arms race affords no additional security. Its
sole utility is to convince the adversary of U.S. determination to
maintain the political and military status quo despite the cost.

The technology encompassed by subnuclear high-precision weapons
is a remarkable achievement, but how it contributes to U.S. national
security is not evident. Used against a major foe it invites escalation;
used against a lesser foe it invites proliferation.

Thus, in dealing with the relationship of technology to national
security, and in formulating a strategic concept for the use of tech-
nology to enhance the national security, it is necessary, first, to define
what the national security is in 1975, and what aspects of technology,
present and future, have bearing — beneficial or adverse — on that
security.

It is the function of the Department of Defense to maintain the
national security. The Department is accordingly concerned with such
questions as: What threats are there against U.S. national security?
Whence do they come? How dangerous are they? In what ways are
they changing? How prepared is the United States to counteract
these threats? What must be done to counteract new or changing
threats?

As long as there is a credible "nuclear umbrella" to deter nuclear
attack, such an attack would be an irrational folly. Policy requires
that the nuclear umbrella be kept credible. But mutual reduction of
nuclear weapons is as reasonable a way of doing this as is a mutual
arms race, and it costs less.

The danger of escalation is offered by the continued proliferation
of subnuclear precision weapons: As these spread, are deployed to
NATO and other U.S. allies as in Latin America, and perhaps by the
Soviet Union to satelhte countries, the prospect is increased that
minor conflicts will grow in intensity and geographic spread. The
consequences for the national security surely need to be analyzed and
not assumed to be beneficial.

NEED FOR REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY

At this period of the development of the world and of the United
States a new epoch seems to be unfolding. It is one that appears to
offer great opportunities and to threaten great dangers. The epoch
demands a new definition of the national securitj^ and a new definition
of the role of the Department of Defense to provide this security. The
new definition of the national security requires that cognizance be
taken of such elements as :

— The assured flow of imported raw materials to mass-pro-
duction, low-technology industries;

— The availability of a sound railroad system, without which
the U.S. steel industry would close down in 10 days;

— The maintenance of the total flow of intelligence, including
data from satellite overflights, to assure stability and reliable
maintenance of the deterrent;

— The desirability of encouraging a consumer-oriented tech-
nological trend in the Soviet Union to reduce the Soviet resource
allocation to arms development;

1857

— The growing technological interdependence among nations
spurred by such developments as the rapidly spreading multi-
national corporations and the growing need for global allocations
of nonrenewable resources ;

— The serious shortage of capital required for maintenance of
the U.S. industrial plant, as well as for investment in innovation;
— The increasing vulnerabilit}^ of U.S. industry, transport,
communications, and other large services systems, to all kinds
of disruptions as technology becomes more complex and units
grow in size to exploit economies of scale ;

— The serious threat of nuclear proliferation in the absence of
adequate safeguards for nuclear fuel elements and fuel reproc-
essing facilities ; and

— The value of the highly developed U.S. agricultural tech-
nology with its great political leverage in the developing and
developed world.
One lesson of Sputnik was that feats of technology serve the pur-
poses of diplomacy and national prestige. The same lesson could have
been drawn from the Berlin airlift. If the increasing of this world
prestige serves the purposes of the national security, what new
initiatives should be in the planning stage to this end?

National Security Planning in a Broader Context

The pervasive influence of technology transforms most issues of
global polic}' for national security. It calls for a new conceptual frame
of reference and the adjustment of public institutions to chart new
courses. Foreseeable technological concepts must be assessed as to
the changes they are likely to bring in the political, social, economic,
and military environment. Planning is needed on a longer time scale
to shape policy, devise strategy, and make technological allocations.
Already-available technologies with global impact that warrant
assessment of their implications for the national security include :

— Cheap synthetic substitutes for cash crops;

— Chemicals and drugs with global social and environmental
impacts;

— Massive and rapid air transportation;

— Instant communications and visual reports at great distances;

— Unlimited recording and rapid manipulation of data;

— Photographic surveys of the total area of the Earth;

— Manmade nuclear energy; and

— Global weather prediction.
Emerging issues with a substantial technological content that need
to be analyzed to assist U.S. decisionmakers in the formulation of
national security policy include :

— Strategy of technological exports to U.S.S.R.;

— Consequences of raismg the level of mihtary technology in
the Middle East;

— Western Hemisphere stability and technology;

— Resource dependence;

— Weaponry and diminishing national security;

— Urban instability and technology;

— Wars of "national Uberation" and nationahsm; and

—General predictable shifts in the distribution of power, or the
ability to coerce or dissuade with relatively little power.

1858

Present institutions of the U.S. Government concerned with peace-
keeping and the national security need the expertise or means of
coordination to deal effectively with these emerging technological
problems and opportunities. One weakness may be that both executive
and legislative institutions are so enmeshed in short-term problems of
reaction to external stresses that they can spare no time or energy for
problems and issues of the longer-range future. Unfortunately, the
reactive mode of planning consumes too much time, for it must
anticipate and plan for an infinity of exigencies. By contrast, the
initiative mode of planning, being more self-contained, is more eco-
nomical of time while also more appropriate to a longer time frame.
But the initiative mode of planning requires a means of injecting
technological, economic, and social concepts of the future opera-
tionally into the decisionmaking structure.

It is suggested, therefore, that a new mode of planning, of wider
scope and longer time span, needs to be adopted to deal with the com-
plex factors that make up the national security in the modern, inter-
dependent, technologically oriented system of nations. Among the
factors to be addressed would seem to be the following:

1. A reexamination of the definition of national security in the
modern technological and interdependent world, including a state-
ment of the national goals that are implied by the new definition.

2. A re testing of traditional military assumptions regarding
priority programs in the light of the new definition of national
security.

3. Examination of alternative modes of planning — in particu-
lar, the reactive and initiative modes — to determine how future
U.S. strategy of national security should be formulated.

4. Determination of the scope of the interface of national secur-
ity with technology, and of diplomacy with technology.

5. Examination of the machinery of government available to
serve the purposes of the national security as newly defined, and
to achieve progress toward the national goals it implies, in order
to derive preliminary specifications for institutions to plan, to
decide, to authorize and fund, to implement, to coordinate, and
to assess results.

Corporate Attitudes Toward Long-Range Planning

An attitude of hostility to public planning is often ascribed to
leaders of private industry and corporate businesses. However, a
recent article in an industry-oriented journal took a new reading
of business attitudes toward long-range centralized economic planning
by the Federal Government, and concluded that "not all businessmen
are revolted by the idea." ^** The main thrust of the article was that
those responsible for the planning should not be given authority
also to implement the plans. Thus: "Plans and planners exist to help
those who properly bear the responsibility for decision-making, and
to help them make their decisions based on better information and
on as accurate a look ahead as humans can devise." Another point
made by the article was that information, properly used, helped to
reduce uncertainties: "So the information needs study, to see what
it may say. Hence the need for analysis, forecasting, selection of
desired goals — and plans to achieve them,"

»« George A. Weimer: "Is Central Planning Needed or Wanted?" Iron Age, July 14, 1975, pp. 17-19, 20t
25-26.

1859

Lessons from the Six Cases in the Study for Short- and Long-Range
Planning
The diplomatic consequences of the six cases examined in the
course of the study of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy
ranged from less than optimal to neariy disastrous. In most of the
cases, the evidence suggests that a more thorough and extended
study of the subject might have led to a more favorable outcome.

' CASE one: the baruch plan

The postwar effort of the United States to achieve by diplomatic
means the international control of atomic energy stands as a classic
example of the need for long-range, coherent planning of the interface
of science and technology with diplomacy.

One aspect of the situation was the rate and timing of postwar
demobilization of U.S. troops in Europe.

Another aspect was how long the wartime alliance of the Soviet
Union with the United States and Britain would persist after the
war ended in Europe.

A third question of timing involved the level of Soviet competence
in nuclear technology — how long an interval there would be before
the U.S.S.R. possessed atomic weapons.

Against these three time frames was the problem of the multi-
lateral negotiations toward a generally beneficial and acceptable
system of international control.

In retrospect it appears that the timing of demobilization was not
recognized as a factor and that the wartime alliance disintegrated
much faster than had been expected, while the technical competence
of the Soviets in nuclear science was underestimated by a factor of five.

The critical factor seems to have been the length of time during
which the United States could maintain nuclear supremacy, as some-
thing to bargain with. The bargain needed to be concluded during the
period of U.S. supremacy, with the United States in the end clearly
yielding up its strategic advantage for global benefit rather than wield-
ing force to compel acceptance of a preferential U.S. position. This
requirement set the time allowance for negotiation. The time allowance
to plan for the negotiation was the interval between the first disclo-
sure to the diplomatic planners that the nuclear capability existed and
the earliest point at which international negotiations could be^in.
Since the information about the bomb for reasons of security was with-
held from the planners until August 1945, the negotiations were
delayed for 2 years until a U.S. position could be developed. More-
over, the planners in tKe Department of State were denied essential
or accurate information even during these 2 years. Meanwhile,
it was being asserted by General Groves, in charge of the Manhattan
Project, that the Soviet Union would be unable to duplicate the work
in 20 years. And during the first 2 postwar years demobilization took
place as rapidly as possible, with preference given to those longest in
service and most experienced. (No effort was made to persuade troops
with long service records to reenlist.)

The passage of power from President Roosevelt to President Truman
in the spring of 1945 meant that a new and inexperienced leader was
serving as "Chief Diplomat." Confronted with an enormous array of
decisions, he could not possibly allocate adequate time to questions of

1860

planning future negotiations. Nor had he been fully briefed in the
highl}^ technical matter of nuclear weaponry before assuming the Presi-
denc}^ Planning was left to the Department of State, where knowledge
of the bomb had become available (as it had to the world) in August
1945, and where technical expertise was at something of a premium.
The obstacles to international agreement on a plan for nuclear con-
trol appear to have been both technical and political. In short:

. . . during the negotiations to devise a control system, both the United States
and the Soviet Union were faced with certain political and technological absolutes
which were directly opposite to certain fundamental features of their respective
countries. These features were integral to meeting what each country considered
the requirements for maintenance of its national security. The negotiations ne-
glected to reconcile these requirements with these dominating technological and
political factors of atomic energy in order to attain adequate and acceptable inter-
national control."'^

Factors that might have entered into the U.S. planning, had it been
begun in — 'Say — ^1944, could have included not only the postwar
durability of the alliance, the rate of U.S. demobilization, and the level
of Soviet nuclear technology, but also such important variables as the
U.S. policy toward the postwar occupation and reconstruction of
Europe, the achievement of high accuracy in communication between-
the scientific/technological and the diplomatic community, the recog-
nition of the importance of control of both fissionable materials and
radioactive byproducts, and such technology forecasts as: the possible
development of intercontinental ballistic delivery vehicles, rate of com-
mercial development of nuclear power, and the achievement of fusion
(H-Bomb) explosives. Of course, fusion would have been highly con-
jectural and IBMs hardly less so at that time, but a decade later the
first had been achieved and the second was nearing the point of practi-
cality (based on U.S. scientific work performed in the 1920s),

Clearl}^ the impact of nuclear energy on diplomacy was so massive
and opened up so many possibilities in the fields of diplomacy and
technology that the existing planning and decisionmaking abilities of
the United States — and of the Soviets as well — are scarcely to be
faulted for their inability to devise an effective international accom-
modation. Even equipped with the retrospective wisdom of 30 years
it is virtually impossible to prescribe what ought to have been done
and planned for. But perhaps this very dilemma might have been
considered as a factor in the decision to use the bomb against the
Japanese homeland. Throughout the opening years of the nuclear
age, in fact, options were lacking and decisions were reduced to "yes
or no" questions, with little heed for the long-range future.

CASE TV\^0: COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER IN EUROPE

While the United States and the Soviet Union, continued to expand
their nuclear arsenals, other nations elected one by one to join the
"nuclear club." France, the People's Republic of China, and then
India exploded nuclear devices. At least half a dozen other nations
possessed the technical and economic resources to follow suit if they
chose. However, the arsenals of the United States and the U.S.S.R.
exceeded any force structure within the reach of the others. Thus, at
the cost of tens of billions of dollars annually, the two powerful

515 Wu, The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age, vol. I, p. 120.

1861

nations have achieved what appears to be a fairly stable condition
of stalemate or "mutual deterrence."

It was the hope of President Eisenhower, in advancing his proposed
"Atoms for Peace" initiative in 1953, to divert the energies of the
Soviets and other nations, as well as of the United States, away
from a nuclear arms race. The means was to be the diversion of
fissionable material to the generation of nuclear power. As an initiative
it had the merit of previous planning, purpose, and direction. How-
ever, by the time the plan had begun to take effect, the basis of
weaponry had shifted to thermonuclear fusion weapons (the "H-
Bomb"), so that the Atoms for Peace program did not significantly
reduce the availability of atomic explosives for military uses.

After the Atoms for Peace initiative, long-range planning in the
nuclear field proceeded sporadically, with a mixture of objectives:
prevention of nuclear proliferation, exploitation of the U.S. monopoly
position in enrichment of nuclear fuel elements, control of nuclear
fuel, control of byproduct plutonium generated in nuclear power
reactors, development of the fuel-economizing breeder reactor, pro-
tection of populations against the spread of radioactive wastes, assist-
ance to developing countries in the acquisition of research reactors,
development of a nuclear power industry in Europe, pressing research
in the ultimate quest for power from nuclear fusion, and devising
technological means of "keeping ahead of the Russians" in weaponry
and delivery systems while also searching for a way to end or at least
retard the nuclear arms race.

The sum total of all this effort seems to have been the achievement
of a condition lacking in military security and progressively more
hazardous as fissionable materials are placed in the custody of many
additional groups. The prospect is that weaponry will not diminish
as a threat, while the opportunity expands for additional nations or
groups to secure enough fissionable material to make a weapon for
threat or blackmail.

Throughout this period, planning seems to have lagged consistently
behind the expanding risk. As the technology has spread, the U.S.
national security has diminished. The persuasiveness of international
control, tentatively advanced by the United States in 1947, has
become rationally compelUng in 1975. But the remarkable mixture of
goals and objectives being pursued by the United States, and the
absence of a coherent long-range planning process, appear to foreclose
effective control in 1977 as in 1947. The Donnelly study presents a
powerful array of questions urgently in need of attention. But current
anxieties over the energy situation and the consequent emphasis on
expanded resort to nuclear power appear to have further complicated
an already difficult set of problems.

CASE three: the political legacy of the international

GEOPHYSICAL YEAR

The attention of this study was centered on the nongovernmental
scientific community, international in character and scope of interest.
The International Geophysical Year was planned in the halls of
science and largely executed as a basic scientific program, free of
government direction. This aspect of the IGY was an important
scientific success.

1862

However, some elements of the IGY required government support
for logistics and technical equipment. One such program was the
elaborate series of studies in Antarctica. These led to the felicitous
Antarctic Treaty, which might reasonably be considered as a model
for extension to other geographic areas. Another was the effort by two
technologically advanced countries to place in orbit an instrumented
satelUte.

The Soviet Union announced the intention to orbit a satellite
April 16, 1955. The United States gave slight attention to the Soviet
announcement but announced, July 29, 1955, its own plan to orbit a
satellite. The Soviet effort succeeded October 4, 1957. After a number
of well-publicized failures, the United States succeeded some months
later, but the success was largely eclipsed by subsequent Soviet
achievements with successively larger payloads.

It is interesting to note that the "science office" of the Department
of State was inactive during the years 1955-57, and was restored only
after the first Soviet sputnik achievement.

Despite the extraordinary impact of the Soviet sputnik on U.S.
space activities, education, military research and development, and
science advisory organizations in the Executive Office of the President,
the Department of State was only modestly affected. While it is
understandable that diplomats in the Department of State could
regard the basic scientific aspects of the IGY as outside their scope of
concern (as well as their competence), they might still have been
watchful for the diplomatic implications of the program as a whole —
and those of its major geographic features. For example: Might the
cooperative principles developed in Antarctica be extended northward
and even into the Indian Ocean? What were the implications of
offshore research for a future seabed treaty and for resolving the
thorny questions of seaward territorial limits? What positive implica-
tions might be found in the move toward nuclear-free zones? What
would be the implications for national sovereignty of all the elements
of the IGY, taken together, including the prospective overflights of
numerous instrumented satellites? What durable and useful multi-
lateral institutions and understandings outside the traditional diplo-
matic sphere might be initiated and nourished by the IGY for future
projects to build on? How might the developing countries benefit most
from the IGY? What new opportunities were there to cement a more
constructive and cooperative world community of nations?

Because of the absence of an orderly mechanism for long-range
diplomatic planning, closely linked to the centers of political power in
the United States, these larger questions appear to have gone un-
explored. And U.S. decisionmaking machinery was soon to be over-
loaded with the problem of reacting expensively on a short time scale
to an alleged "missile gap," an apparent lag in the technology of
nuclear delivery systems, the space race, the decline in U.S. tech-
nological prestige abroad, the Cuban threat, and unrest in Southeast
Asia. In all these fields of action the United States lost control of the
situation and sought instead to react to outside forces and develop-
ments, piecemeal and incrementally.

1863

CASE four: the MEKONG PROJECT

The conclusions of this study can be summed up as a defect in
timing. What was proposed as a short-run, reactive solution to an
exasperating national problem might conceivably have been successful
as a larger-scale, longer-term international initiative that might have
obviated the problem before it ever emerged. But the timing was
wrong: a U.S. effort to help itself to wriggle out of an unfortunate
excursion into ''remote area confhct" proved unpersuasive. But a
constructive program of regional development in a backward but re-
source-rich region following soon after the Geneva accords of 1954
(instead of the building of the flimsy SEATO defensive military al-
liance) might have won over all the nations of Southeast Asia to a
partnership that would have rendered ideological conflict unneces-
sary, unrewarding, and unpopular.

The opportunity for massive but peaceful U.S. intervention in
Southeast Asia might have extended from any time after the initia-
tion of the Joint Study of Water Problems by ECAFE (U.N. Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East) in early 1949. It might have
been initiated after France withdrew from colonial domination in
Indochina at the time of the Geneva Accords in .1954. It might even
have been offered as a substitute for propping up an ineffectual post-
colonial government in Saigon in 1961.

As the study notes, there had been a progressive evolution of an
institutional framework for regional planning and development of
the Lower Mekong Basin from 1949 on: Studies were underway during
the years 1952-57; three important meetings took place in 1957, lead-
ing to the consolidation of effort in a permanent "Committee for the
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong." A program of
data collection was instituted following the institution of a special
project agreement between the United States and the so-called
"Riparian States" in November 1955, and the preparation of a "Re-
connaissance Report" in March 1956. Two years later, another report
was made on opportunities for regional planning and development of
the Lower Mekong; this report was by a U.N. team headed by Gen-
eral Wheeler of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and called for an
ambitious series of main stream civil works. Three years after that, in
early 1961, the Ford Foundation sent a study team to the area, and its
report — in July 1962 — envisioned primary reliance on the kind of
practical, small-scale but far-reaching, people-to-people program
characteristic of the early Tennessee Valley Authority operation in
the mid-1930s.

It is not easy, even in retrospect, to say at what time a massive U.S.
support for regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin might
have been politically most acceptable, as well as technologically effec-
tive. But as subsequent events proved, the offer by President Johnson
at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965, came too late. The
impetus of a nationaUstic-cum-ideological conflict in Vietnam was
already too strong, and U.S. initiative was replaced by a series of mili-
tary reactions of diminishing effectiveness and diminishing accept-
ability in both Saigon and the United States.

It is possible that the U.S. difficulty in exploiting the diplomatic
opportunities of regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin lay
in the locus of the planning activity during the 1950s and early 1960s.

1864

The close relationship between the National Security Council and the
Department of Defense during these years meant that most of the
planning was undertaken by officials with a military orientation, and
it was natural for them to regard the diplomatic problems of Southeast
Asia as military problems requiring a military solution. Having once
embarked on this course, the United States became increasingly com-
mitted to a military solution, the ultimate failure of which cost heavily
in lives, diplomatic prestige, military credibiUty, domestic tranquility,
national resources, and dollars.

As the study points out, "It is interesting to speculate on what
different course events in Southeast Asia might have followed had the
Johnson offer been made at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1954
that partitioned Vietnam." Although offering economic advantages,
the regional approach was ideologically neutral and pragmatic. It had
no evident-pohtical bias. The study quoted WiUard Hanna to the
effect that:

In a region in wliich discontinuity, or outright sabotage, of international
endeavor has heretofore prevailed, the Mekong Project may provide the long-
sought-for new formula for sustained, constructive development. Here, in the
past — at least in Laos and Vietnam — the familiar contemporary panacea of aid
had provided no answers. What seems absolutely basic is a massive, well-inte-
grated, areawide, peacetime program in which the riparian nations themselves can
swiftly build up experience and competence in modem development and adminis-
tration. Whether the Mekong Project is really appropriate or adequate to the need
remains to be proved, but it is certainly the most promising scheme which has yet
been proposed. The $10 billion project — to which two years ago President Johnson
pledged $1 billion, once peaceful regional development became possible — would
seem from almost any point of view a much better investment than $1 billion per
annum in an endless Vietnam War."'

The study admits "it is sheer speculation" that a U.S.-encouraged
Mekong Project in 1954 "might nave provided a focus for peaceful
economic progress, served as an educational process, and estabUshed a
basis for wider cooperation" among the Riparian States, including
both North and South Vietnam. However, to admit the possibiUty is to
suggest that a more realistic and hard-headed long-range planning
effort by the United States might have been able to convert a possibil-
ity into a practicality.

Moreover, the study goes on to suggest, a "slowly and deliberately
encouraged regional development" — ^i.e., the adoption of the Mekong
principles in other troubled regions of the world — "might serve U.S.
foreign policy objectives in the long run." The advantages of dealing
with multinational regions, for example, might take account of the
following considerations:

Emphasis is on local participation in development and planning;

Subregions in greatest need and offering greatest opportunity for advancement
tend to receive priority by local consent;

Nationalistic preoccupations appear to be moderated ;

Self-help is encouraged and stimulated by being made more effective in combined
actions with mutual support;

National sensitivities that bilateral aid would exacerbate are less abraded by
multinational arrangements;

Regional cohesiveness — the tendency for people of different countries working
together on a shared problem to lay aside their national differences — can result
from attention to geographic regional goals rather than formal national boundaries;

Burdens of foreign aid tend to be more widely distributed; and

"« Wlllard A. Hanna. "The Mekong Prolect," Part I, "The River and the Region, Ameri-
can Universities Field Staff Reports (July 1968), p. 10. However, Hanna made these observa-
tions at times when the Johnson proposal was already a dead Issue. The opportunity had
been lost. The question Is whether, had It been made earlier, It might have had the result
Hanna hoped for It.

1865

The process of applying technological means to social and economic objectives
can be made coherent and understandable to those who expect to enjoy the
benefits."^

Further study and planning might turn up additional advantages in
terms of the realignment of nations in regional multinational group-
ings. For example : What would be the consequences for U.S. security
of a "world system of economically and technologically better balanced
regions?" Might such a system reduce tensions among or between
nations in such regions, between developing and developed nations, or
even between the great superpowers? How might the People's Republic
of China react to such an initiative? And finally, the study proposes
the consideration of a possibility for the restructuring of the U.N.
General Assembly: "Might regional voting in that body and associated
U.N. agencies provide a better or more representative arrangement
than the present, admittedly awkward system of one-country-one-
vote?" 5*8

The concluding paragraph of the study warrants repeating at this
point:

The impUcation of the Hanna observation, and other like writings, is that the
cost-effectiveness of regional development projects is not fully measurable in
economic terms alone. If an economically marginal project advances a diplomatic
goal — stabilizes a region, inspires international cooperation, ameliorates tensions,
provides a peaceful alternative to insurgency, offers an ideological bridge and
teaches different ethnic groups how to work together — it might well be more useful
than a project yielding high economic return but without these intangible benefits.
There is, of course, no hard evidence that all these favorable outcomes are a likely
. . . outcome of a global policy of regionalism. However, the bare possibility — as
evidenced in what has been called "the Mekong Spirit" — that the concept might
serve as an instrument of long range diplomacy seems worth further examination
and putting to the test."'

The signal advantage of coupling U.S. long-range planning for
diplomacy with large-scale multinational regional initiatives is that
actions can be taken incrementally and developed slowly. A sense of
growing hope and self-confidence can be engendered in the region.
Mistakes can be seen early and corrected. And the diplomatic process
of initiation can be systematically replaced by a cordial cooperative
relationship among workers at the technical level in direct contact
with the human beneficiaries dwelling in the region. Such constructive
people-to-people contacts may indeed be the epitome of the purpose
of long-range diplomatic planning.

CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 5^"

From the earliest stirrings of international law and formal diplo-
macy the oceans possessed the character of an international commons.
Defining the territorial boundary that divided this commons from the
sovereign realms of nations and devising means by which the law of
nations could be extended to the international commons had promi-
nent place on the agenda of early international law. Relative success
attended these efforts until advancing technology showed the possi-
bility that first the continental shelves and later the deep oceans
themselves could b6 mined for oil, metals, and other valuable minerals.

M' Huddle, The Mekong Project: OppoTtunUies and Problems of Regionalism, Vol. I, p. 431.

54S ihid.

5" Ibid., pp. 431-432.

550 Doumani, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, A'ol. I, pp. 43')-524.

1866

Here, if anywhere, was an opportunity to foresee the consequences
of technology for international amity, and to plan long in advance
to solve an international problem by international agreement.

It is not remarkable that an area amounting to some three-fifths
of the surface of the Earth should be the subject of many conflicting
goals and purposes, not only among the nations that border it but
also for landlocked nations that still claun a share of the international
commons. Among the claims at issue are freedom of the seas, the right
to fish, oil deposits on continental shelves, deep ocean mineral deposits,
territorial right of transit through narrows, sovereignty, disposal of
radioactive wastes, control of oil spills, protection of environmental
quality generally, and the right to conduct scientific research.

With so many issues at stake it is also not remarkable that the
decisionmaking machinery for ocean policy is widely diffused, both
internationally and for the United States.^" Even so, it does not
appear that all interested parties have access to the processes of
decision. Those who ply the seas, research the weather, eat fish, or
have a concern for global tidiness, all share an interest in how the
seas are to be managed.

However, it was left to the tiny Kepublic of Malta, August 17, 1967,
to propose to the United Nations a broad-gauge approach to the
problem, ^^^ The U.S. policy on this large subject nearly 2 years
later was merely that this nation was "keeping our options open
until we decide where our national interests lie best and where inter-
national agreements may be reached." ^^

During the roughly 10 years since the Malta proposal, progress has
been agonizingly slow toward resolving this issue which had been so
long foreseen. Questions were unanswered as to whether nations pos-
sessing the technology for suboceanic exploitation should go ahead and
use it, as to whether landlocked nations had any rights to the ocean
floor, as to whether the poor countries of the globe ought to have some
kind of preferential rights, and as to the degrees of sovereignty to
assign to the near-shore, continental slope, and deep-sea parts of the
ocean. Should nationalism or internationalism prevail ?

One possible approach to the problem that does not seem to have
received much attention thus far is to recognize that technology has
changed the nature of the international commons itself. The seas were
once uniform; now they are becoming of value in some areas and of
little or no value in others. This technological effect may suggest the
proposition that the law of the sea can no longer be generalized but
must be tailored to specific parts of the oceanic whole. Each geo-
graphic subdivision of the oceans might be treated as a "region"
along with the nations directly associated with that part of the ocean.
These multinational regions, in consultation with each other, could
shape the separate rights and obligations, laws, and jurisdictional
principles to be applied within the region. Separate provision for the
rights of poor nations, nations outside the region, and the United
Nations as a general coordinating and planning body for all nations,
might then be less of a political issue.

"1 i-o. international machinery see ibid., pp. 484-495; for U.S. national machinery, see pp. 495-511.
«2 ]' "lo Malta proposal see ihid, i)p. 489-490.

5M Qu 1 in ibid at p. .'jIS, this statement hy the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis
Johnson, was promptly styled by Senator Pell as a "no-policy policy."

1867

This is, of course, only one of a variety of planning approaches
that might be explored. However, the main point of this essay and an
important conclusion of the study is that a great many decision points
and diplomatic forums are currently involved in attempting to fit a
new situation created by technology into an unaccommodating,
traditional framework. It is somewhat analogous to trying to preserve
the "three-mile limit" of seaward national sovereignty, originally
fixed as beyond the ultimate reach of cannon shot, while aircraft,
missiles, and satellites circle overhead. Planning for future changes
in diplomacy cannot ignore the consequences of technology when
these consequences effectively repeal the "law of nations."

CASE six: U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

The point of this study is that the efforts to increase the tech-
nological and economic relations between the two countries through
expanded bilateral trade was — at least potentially — more important
politically than economically. The effect of the developing U.S.-
U.S.S.R. detente seems to be a gradual move to include the Soviet
Union in the world economic and financial systems. A particular ad-
vantage of this move for the United States is that it could facilitate an
internal Soviet trend toward satisfying consumers while reducing al-
locations of resources for military purposes. The presumption is that
any Soviet move in this direction would be welcomed by the United
States by a response in kind, thus leading to significant slackening
in an arms race that has persisted for a quarter century.

The evident advantages of this development for both superpowers,
in terms of both national security and human welfare, suggests that
close attention be given to ways of buttressing and elaborating the
arrangement. It would seem that there is no more potentially reward-
ing subject for attention in the long-range future. Planning in the
short-term, to exploit momentary advantages (or disadvantages of the
"adversary") hke the Soviet short grain harvest of 1975, may be
tempting. Diplomacy in both countries has tended to pursue the
short-term course. But it is suggested that attention should be ad-
dressed instead to the longer-range consequences of the relationship
in order to build a durable diplomatic structure beneficial to both the
principal participants and to the world at large. The interests of the
People's Republic of China, needless to say, must not be neglected
in this context.

Lessons From the Six Issues in the Study for Short- and Long-Eange
Planning

All six issues studied reveal neglected opportunities for major diplo-
matic initiatives, and most of them also show evidence of unsatis-
factory data collection, pohcy coordination, and policy analysis.
Short-range planning is narrow in scope and impact; long-range plan-
ning appears to be negligible to nonexistent.

ISSUE one: the evolution of INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY

This study finds technology to be "the most obvious avenue to
national strength and international influence." It observes:

The emerging question posed by the onrush of technology, and its effect on
the relations among the countries of the world, is whether this potent factor of

1868

change and national power is to operate in a random way, or whether it is pos-
sible, and desirable, to devise a national strategy to guide and direct it, to stim-
ulate innovation in some directions, and possibly to slow and inhibit inncvation
in others.*^

The study then quotes a suggestion by Prof. Robert Gilpin to
the effect that thought might be given ". . , to the formulation
of a more explicit technological strategy designed to increase the
social return of its [i.e., the United States'] immense investment in
science and technology and to minimize its negative environmental
effects." Moreover, "In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited
the use of military power and where social and economic demands play
an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a
nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure its
place in the international pecking order. , . ." ^^^

The study suggests that there is a paradox in the fact that:

The United States, best equipped to apply science and technology to the
solution of man's global problems, and credited with the highest development of
managerial skills, has been reluctant to devise and implement a positive tech-
nological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no lack of opportunities:
earth resources satellites, ocean and ocean floor development, urban improvement,
recovery of resources from all forms of waste, the Oak Ridge proposal for large
agricultural-industrial-nuclear complexes, and many more.^^^

The possibility exists that in the absence of a positive effort at
long-range planning the United States will fail to innovate:

U.S. efforts have been concentrated in fields of high technology in a reaction
against external threats; the result has been to assemble large organizations in
the fields of military, space, and atomic technologies. That these fields continue
to be important is not questioned. But in the design of a total national strategy
of technology, the effect of their being already on the scene in great numbers
is to provide pressures for the United States to keep on doing what it has been
doing. Where can objective analysis and innovative policy be found that can
examine alternatives or additions to the national program?*^'

The study concludes with the suggestion that multilateral coopera-
tion in grand technological efforts may be a constructive alternative
for the achievement of peace and progress, and an antidote to the
invidious spread of nationalism.

ISSUE two: the politics of global health

The main point of this study was an asserted underemphasis in a
field of low visibihty but considerable diplomatic opportunity. How-
ever, the need for attention to global health, as a consequence of the
changes wrought by technology, is growing more serious: "Today the
world ... is rapidly becoming a unit, epidemiologically speaking, and
urban sprawl threatens to renew the dangers which were inherent in the
unsanitary conditions of the i:)ast." ^°'*

One of the difficulties facing the United States in embarking upon
any vigorous initiatives in the field of public health outside of U.S.
boundaries is that primary emphasis of U.S. programs abroad has been
bilateral while the character of global health problems is inherently
multilateral. The growing health-related problems of preventing the
spread of epidemics in the face of increased individual intercontinental

«< Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, Vol. II, p. 675.

555 Ibid.

558 Ibid., p. 677.
"57 Ibid., p. 678.
568 Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, \'ol. II, p. 707.

1869

mobility, and of dealing with problems of nutrition in the face of global
maldistribution of food, the problems growing out of increased con-
centrations of populations in urban centers, and other critical popula-
tion problems, all demand a renewed zeal in the global health field.
The place of such efforts in national planning for future initiatives has
not been high.

In view of the practical need for action, the moral imperative that
calls for action, the opportunities for improved diplomatic relations
that would result from such action, and the large benefits at relatively
small cost that could also accrue, it is suggested that global health
might justifiably command a large place in the long-range planning of
diplomatic initiatives. However, for such plans to be converted into
action would require a consensus that does not yet^appear to exist.
Accordingly, as Dr. Quimby suggests :

Perhaps there is need to mount an educational program so that a larger segment
of the public is included in the discourse surrounding the issues of national and
global public health. The status of the world's health might become a public issue;
and that issue could stimulate scientific, medical, and economic debate. For in the
United States, at least, debate is absolutely essential to both clarification and polit-
ical action.558

The question that emerges out of this study is: by what route does
the problem of U.S. action toward global health achieve consensus, how
does it reach decisionmaking levels in the U.S. Government, and what
kind of long-range planning effort might be mounted — and where — to
chart the future course of constructive action that might yield the
gains described above?

ISSUE three: beyond malthus

Along with the problem of bringing the atom under safe international
control, the problem of resolving the "food/people equation" ranks at
the top of the hierarchy of long-range global problems of diplomacy.
The technology is perhaps less abstruse, but the organizational and
administrative complexities are probably considerably greater in
bringing food and population into a humane and decent balance.
As the author of this study, Dr. Allan S. Nanes, observes:

Clearly, the two global tasks of producing enough but not too much food to
feed the world's population, and providing incentives and means for the world's
population to hold itself within reasonable bounds, are a tremendous challenge
for modern diplomacy. The rewards of success are less impressive than the terrible
consequences of failure. There is a regrettable tendency on the part of mankind
to respond eagerly to rewarding opportunities, but to ignore the prospect of
misfortune and delay action to avert it until convinced of its reaUty by its actual
onset. ^^^

It is possible to perceive, rationally, the adverse human conse-
quences of overpopulation. Analysis reveals that the human conse-
quences of a stable and balanced or declining population in a free
economy can also be adverse. Population growth in some instances,
the study points out, is a "powerful engine of economic growth and
expansion." If the poor, underdeveloped and developing nations
have encountered social and cultural obstacles to population control,
the developed countries have "... not yet accepted the consequences

«s Ibid., p. 703.
. m Nanes, Beyond Maltkus: The Food/People Equation. Vol. II, p. 801.

1870

of a steady state either in the numbers of their populations or in
their industrial productivity."

The study identifies as one requirement for long-range diplomatic
planning the establishment of a ". . . solid and scientific, factual base
of information about the food/population equation, for individual
nations, for the regions of the world, and worldwide." A priority item
which planning itself should address is the strengthening of the base
of education in all countries ". . . so that their peoples can understand
the reality of the problem, and to assure that the best available
technology bearing on the food/population equation is everywhere
available and in the hands of people competent to use it." ^^^

The complexity of long-range planning of the diplomatic aspects of
the global food/population equation results from the fact that the
problem ". . . cannot be considered in isolation." The separate
problems of food supply and population control interact with each
other and with investment, allocation of capital, job opportunities,
and social well-being in both urban and rural areas. Moreover, ". . .
population density affects the ability of human societies to preserve
the quality of life, to make available adequate resources to sustain
life, to maintain order, to govern, to insure the security of the individ-
ual from crime, to maintain the security of nations from tension or
even insurrection, and to reduce the possibility of international
conflicts." *®2

Another way of expressing the dilemma, as perceived in the United
States, is that U.S. diplomats "... are faced with the job of urging
technological change on the leaders of the LDCs, even though such
change may have unsettling social and political consequences." As
the study indicates, "It seems paradoxical for the United States to
encourage the LDCs to adopt the new agricultural technology knowing
that there is a high risk of social turmoil, if a principal aim of U.S.
development assistance is to help bring about stability in those
countries." ^^

The hard choices facing U.S. diplomacy in dealing with the food/
population equation are implicit in the proposition that the United
States is the foremost exporting nation of foods while the global food
supply to meet an expanding global population threatens in time
to become inadequate. On the other hand, quick solutions to the food/
population equation in any nation under less than totalitarian control
can be highly disruptive politically. The requirement for long-range
and comprehensive policy planning by U.S. diplomats and policy
analysts to resolve this dilemma is too obvious to need stressing.

ISSUE four: U.S. scientists abroad

This study of the various arrangements for funding overseas study
of U.S. scientists identifies a deficiency in these programs: viz., the
skimpy data on the foreign experiences, contacts, and observations of
U.S. visitors abroad. Neither short-range nor long-range planning is
feasible without a solid base of information about the results of past
programs.

56" Ibid., p. 862.
5«2 Ibid., p. 800.
M3 Ibid., p. 820.

1871

Another question involves the time of the results of overseas study.
Experience with foreign research methods and subjects of investigation
has undoubted value for U.S. science generally. But there is a time
lapse between the designation of overseas fellowships and the accrual
to this country of values from the program. This time lapse is, of
course, a general characteristic of all foreign scholarship programs.
The implication is that in the management of foreign exchange pro-
grams thought might be given to the needs of U.S. science .for strength-
ening of particular fields of research in future years, or for the re-
placement of cohorts of agiQg scientists soon facing retirement.

Another question is raised by the restriction of these programs to
basic research. The undoubted leadership of the United States in
technology is not necessarily durable; advances of other developed
countries in recent years have been notable. Many of these advances
have been assisted by extensive borrowings of U.S. technology.
Long-range planning by the United States might reasonably take into
account the signal technological advances of other countries and
identify areas in which U.S. technologists, engineers, and systems
people might usefuUy study abroad, to meet future U.S. needs in
these fields. Moreover, despite the general U.S. lead in technology,
there are still many pockets of outstanding expertise abroad that could
be beneficially tapped, especially in the area of low technology.

ISSUE five: brain drain

The primary direction of the flow of people with advanced training
in fields of science and technology is away from developing countries
and toward developed countries. The study of Brain Drain ^^^ in the
series thus identifies the phenomenon as a "symptom of underdevelop-
ment." The United States is in an equivocal position on this issue:
U.S. policy has long aimed at helping the developing countries to
advance technologically but the United States is also a principal desti-
nation of emigrant "brains" from these same countries where they are
needed in the development process.

Apart from the moral question involved, there are practical reasons
of policy for resolving this issue. The need to accept the diplomatic
imperative of interdependence confronts rich as well as poor nations.
One pragmatic reason for U.S. concern is the fact of this Nation's
dependence on mineral resources largely under control of the LDCs.

Awareness of this problem comes at the height of the current energy crisis and
suggests what may be a scenario for things to come with growing cartelization of
world mineral resources and growing consciousness of increased leverage among
the LDCs to be used against the advanced industrial nations. Reasons of self-
interest appear to warrant a reappraisal of the Nation's posture towards the
LDCs and the affirmation of a policy of interdependence. '"^

In a still broader sense, the need to take account of interdependence
in the treatment of the brain drain issue may involve the goal of peace
and national security. Thus :

It would seem beyond dispute that the LDCs, long the cockpit of international
tension and conflict in which the United States has not been able to stand aside
uninvolved, hold the potentialities for even deeper and more dangerous involve-
ment. War in South and Southeast Asia, recurring crises in the Middle East,

564 Whelan, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility, Vol. II, pp. 1037-
1318.
«" Ibid., p. 1317.

1872

famine and tribal strife in Africa, are only recent illustrations of the problems that
have been shaking the foimdations of this volatile, troubled third world. '^^

Thus, the argument runs, social and economic development is a requi-
site for peace in these regions, and technological leadership is a requi-
site for social and economic development. To the extent that techno-
logical expertise drains away from the LDCs, the root causes of unrest
are enlarged.

It is an inherent characteristic of the brain drain issue that it is
long range and requires attention over a longer time span. Even in the
long term, any effectively total solution to the problem is most un-
hkely. And in the present state of mind of the American people, when
attention is directed mainly inward, vigorous attention to the inter-
national brain drain on a short-term basis is even less likely. Thus, the
brain drain issue seems to belong on the agenda of long-range diplo-
matic poHcy planners. Its solution could contribute to a "world in
balance, with economic and social opportunity within the grasp of all
inhabitants and a sense of hope in all nations." ^®^

ISSUE six: science and technology in the department of state

"The thesis of this study is that the world environment of diplomacy
has changed in ways that make necessary a deeper involvement of the
Department of State in science and technology, a more perspicacious
outlook toward technical trends for the future, and a more positive
approach to the generation of innovative technical poHcy." ^^ An
essential ingredient wiU continue to be a strong capabihty for long-
range policy planning insulated from the day-to-day requirements of
reactive and operational planning but yet having access to decision-
making elements in the Department and in the White House. A
sei)arate requirement is also suggested : a parallel long-range planning
unit in diploma tic poUcy for the Congress.

The nature of the long-range planning process was described by
Roger Hilsman as "analyzing the nature of the problem and making
broad strategic choices for deaUng with it." It involved "a groping
effort at understanding the nature of the evolving world around us."
It was distinguished from short-range planning, which was "working
out the moves and coimtermoves in the midst of an ongoing
situation." ^^

Knowledge and the analysis of knowledge are the essence of long-
range planning. The study describes the information requirements as
f oUows :

— ^An understanding of the total decisionmaking process
involved ;

— A formulation of relevant national goals;
_ — A characterization of present and probable future prevaiHng
circumstances;

— The relation of the issue in question to all of these; and
— An elaboration of the factors that define the changing nature
of the issue.

M8 Ibid., pp. 1310, 1317.

«67 Jhid., p. 1318.

"' Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1491.

«M/6id., p. 1414.

1873

The planning process must go further. It must maintain a continuing
review of the information inputs because they are always in the process
of change. But also, the planners can help to prepare the issue for
decision at "high policymaking levels" by a preliminary decision
process involving the followdng seven steps:

1. Selection of a salient issue for analysis on the basis of general criteria of
importance and probable future urgency;

2. Integration of the parts of the information available bearing on the issue
and the search for further relevant information ;

3. Analysis of the information to identify the decisive elements ;

4. Formulation of alternative possible courses of action;

5. The ordering of the information in relation to the alternatives ;

6. Evaluation and comparison of alternatives as to probable costs and benefits,
technical feasibility, and political acceptability; and

7. Selection of one or more preferred alternatives for further analysis and presen-
tation to the ultimate decisionmaker. 5^°

To perform this long-range planning function, the study suggests,
requires a staff capability close to the Secretary of State or the White
House, or both, with the following characteristics :

1. Knowledge about technological trends to obtain -early knowledge of what is
likely to be technically feasible and also diplomatically important.

2. Enough technical sophistication to identify aspects of an ongoing develop-
ment (i.e., the diplomatic counterpart of "technology assessment") to determine
what might be done to enhance beneficial diplomatic consequences or minimize
adverse diplomatic consequences.

3. An early understanding of specific items of new technology (wherever
developed) that has a probability of perturbing the international balance of power,
destabihzing local societies, or introducing significant economic developments.

4. An appreciation of the possibilities of beneficially reacting to foreseen
technological developments by diplomatic means."^

The history of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of
Defense has shown a number of persistent or recurrent weaknesses.
When it was first created, in 1947, it was given five functions:

1. Formulating and developing, for the consideration and approval of appro-
priate officials of the department, long-term programs for the achievement of
U.S. foreign policy objectives.

2. Anticipating problems which the department may encounter in the discharge
of its missions.

3. Undertaking studies and preparing reports on broad political-military
problems.

4. Examining problems and developments affecting U.S. foreign policy in
order to evaluate the adequacy of current policy and making advisory recom-
mendations on them.

5. Coordinating planning activities withn the Department of State.^'

The essence of these functions was long-range. But as time went on the
efforts of the staff became more diffused and more addressed to current
problems. The very competence of the staff made it an attractive unit
to help the Secretary with major speeches, to help draft current policy
statements, and to contribute to the "NSC paper mill." One difficulty
was the sheer scope and rate of change of the subject matter: it was
difficult to look very far ahead with any useful degree of precision.
Difficulties were encountered in formulating goals and assumptions of
foreign pohcy. During some periods, the staff dropped out of touch

S!0 Ibid., p. 1415.
571 Ihid., p. 1416.
iT2 Ibid., p. 1418.

1874

with decision levels. There was even question as to whether the con-
cept of a long-range planning unit for diplomacy was realistic. How-
ever, the conclusion of the study is that some form of concentrated
unit is essential, that it must have access to decision levels, must be
insulated from current tasks, and must be able to tap all essential
information sources.

The study also suggests that a comparable source of long-range
planning — including both information and analysis in the diplomatic
area — -is needed by the Congress. The question was raised as to whether
the Congress "should rely mainly on policy studies and recommenda-
tions of the executive branch, or whether these sources should be
supplemented by information and analyses by competent authorities
directly and exclusively responsible to the Congress." ^" The study
observes "that the congressional resources for dealing today with the
great and complicated issues of science, technology, and American
diplomacy are widely diffused" and the "the need seems to exist for
some form of arrangement to bring to a focus, and into logical unity,
the diverse strands of diplomacy now being separately pursued by
perhaps a dozen committees of Congress." "*

A View of Strengthened Mechanisms of Long-Range Planning

At the invitation of the director and associate director of the Proj-
ect, Prof. Edgar A. Robinson of the American University undertook
an analysis and review of the study Science and Technology in the
Department of State. Extracts from his anal3^sis are presented in this
section. His particular interest was the enhancement of institutional
arrangements reflecting not only procedure but also the temper and
habit of mind of long-range planning, defined as the rational manage-
ment of irrational (i.e., undirected) events. He finds policy weaknesses
in short-range planning, which he describes as "Attendance to im-
mediate and imminent events with ensuing minimization of the
broad-scale determinants of these events," the result being "perpetua-
tion of crisis through serial short-range measures." He notes, also,
that what passes for long-range planning is too often built upon and
merely an extension of short-term techniques, with consequent
absence of consistency and continuity.

Short-range planning [Robinson suggests] may . . . properly confine itself
to one country, episode, or isolated issue, whereas long-range planning may never
do so. Long-range planning need invariably be supranational and suprasituational
in configuration. . . . Short-range planning is concerned with constricted . . .
situations; long-range planning . . . with . . . the transformation of inter-
national afifairs along lines congenial to our national interest. . . .

Perhaps it is not too much of an oversimplification to say that
short-range planning contrives adaptation to change whOe long-range
planning contrives and directs change itself. As Robinson puts it:

... The first goal of long-range planning should be to forge perspective,
i.e., long-range criteria of well-functioning and malfunctioning ihterdepend-
ences. . . . Short-range planning . . . cannot deal with interdependence on
other than a superficial, transient basis . . . and the outcome is nothing less
than the yielding of human aspirations and needs to the mercies of historical
determinism in the worst import of the phrase. The supreme purpose of long-range
planning is to ensure that the ceaseless, inevitable interdependences of peoples
today will be articulated in a wise, civilized and logically warranted manner.

"3 Ibid., p. 1500.
"< Ibid., p. 1503.

1875

Before the Department of State can become an effective center of
long-range policy planning, he writes, radical changes are necessary:
the Nation's intellectual resources must be mobilized for a multi-
disciplinar}^ effort to redefine foreign policy and its objectives.

As an interim measure, a truly long-range Office of Long-Range
Foreign Policy Planning could be established. The office should be
authorized to assign contract tasks to the academic community; such
tasks should be deliberately long-term in focus and cross-disciplinary
in scope. Instead of exposing Foreign Service generalists in-house to a
modicum of technological expertise, Robinson proposes (a) to in-
corporate science offerings into the curricula of academic programs
that prepare nascent diplomats, or perhaps (b) the seconding of
Department personnel (presumably generalists) for a 3^ear of con-
centrated academic study in a specially designed curriculum that
exposes them functionally to the physical and social sciences as tools
of diplomacy. (Robinson favors the first of the two options.)

Another bridge between Government and the academic community
might be the use of a wider range of qualified scholars as informal
consultants and reviewers of "think pieces" prepared within the
bureaucracy.

Another possibility might be for the Department of State to experi-
ment with a "Rand-style" affiliate entirely its own. As Robinson puts
it:

This group would ordinarily report to the Policy Planning Staff, nourishing it
with proposals, data, and ideas as requested, thereby deepening the pressure on
the Stafif itself to resist disruptive clamors (or operational manpower. As I construe
it, the optimum would be to entrust a portion of the tasks "farmed out" to pro-
fessionals in the academic sphere and another portion to the newly created "Long-
Range Foreign Policy Planning Corporation," initially allotting the two some
identical assignments.

Robinson suggests that one valuable direction of inquiry might be
to investigate "what selected foreign ministries do by way of encourag-
ing 'broad-gauge thinking' in the devisal of foreign policies." ("Are
they ahead of us, or behind us? In either event, what are the implica-
tions for the United States? What germane structural arrangements
exist, or are noticeably absent, overseas?") Is it possible that collabo-
rative studies might be launched with other States into these matters,
as for example through the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development?

Another need is for "Long-Term Forecasting." As he says, "To
predict, to project into the future with a decent confidence is, coinci-
dentally, to be able to act on the international stage with more pre-
dictability." Accordingly, he proposes that:

With the Office of Long-Range Foreign Policy Planning, there might be a unit
devoted exclusively to Long-Term Forecasting. It would not engage in any plan-
ning as such. ... its functions would be divided between research and the projec-
tion and interpretation of trends in international affaire and identification of their
causes.

As Robinson points out, the pace of technological change in the world
is so swift that there is a temptation to be defeatist about the ability to
look forward. However, a policy of drift and retrospection, in the last
analysis, needs to assume that all technological change is beneficial
and that technology cann t be subject to intelligent social direction.

1876

Thus he concludes: "the pubhc interest is what is at stake, rather than
the unrestrained prowess of technology." And to relate technology to
the public interest in the diplomatic sphere "mandates a long time
span of analysis" :

The indirect consequences of progressions in science and technology abso-
lutely do not lend themselves to valid forecasts by way of a cramped temporal
framework. I concede [Robinson continues] the dangers and difficulties of employing
more-expansive time-scales and the readier manageability of data when a time-
scale is slender in scope. I cannot, however, concede that a constricted time-scale
can comprehend much more than the d^ect consequences of science and tech-
nology— certainly not their still-more-portentous long-range import. Short-term
policy analysis too often ends up in vassalage to the regnant hour, artificially
elongated beyond a reasonable sway. (His emphasis.)

Robinson criticizes the present study for relying too much on what
has been popularly termed "The Estabhshment." He proposes that
"traditional" sources of policy studies be augmented by a "rotating
group of short-tenure professionals recruited from the 'non-Washing-
ton' world," drawn principally "from the intellectually supple, younger
elements" who would provide "provocative argumentation as well as
fresh approaches and perspectives, and would return to the private
sector before they became either stale or institutionalized." (The
Committee on International Relations, he adds, might with benefit
entertain the idea of incorporating such intellectual gadflies into its
own staff.)

An interesting challenge to the Department of State is the analyst's
proposal that it "assess and maintain unremitting scrutiny of the
activities of multinational corporations from the standpoint of the
diplomatic ramifications of their activities." Such a focused planning
activity, apart from its utility in diplomacy, would have educational
value in opening up the world of international technology transfer and
its subject matter to Foreign Service generalists. (While in Professor
Robinson's view the multinational corporation is now more a threat
than a benefit to ordered intercourse among nations, it is also possible
that cooperative relationships and diplomatic guidance might cast this
expanding institution in a more constructive and beneficial role.)

Another important subject for plarming, in Robinson's view, is the
"meaning and scope of the term National Security." A valuable
service would be the provision by statute of a definition of the criteria
of national security to "thwart its fiaunthig for devious and improper
purposes."

With respect to the congressional role in long-range foreign policy
planning, Professor Robinson endorses strongly the creation of a
separate entity for this purpose. Ai:id he further suggests that such
a staff institution for the Congress:

. . . Should help to redress the balance between the Congress and the Executive,
goad the Department of State to a higher level of performance by inspiring it to
strengthen its own policy-preparing mechanisms, and enable Members of the
Congress to inform and educate their constituents more confidently than can be
expected today. On the personnel side, it seems desirable that staff affiliation be
sufficiently enticing so that, while there is generous hospitality to newcomers
from time to time, there is constancy at the core.

The Murphy Commission's Design for Foreign Policy Planning

Specifications for reform in "planning for foreign policy" were
presented to the President and Congress in a report, June 27, 1975, by
the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the

1877

Conduct of Foreign Policy (the "Murpliy Commission," named after
its chairman, Robert D. Murphy). An eight-page statement^"
describes the function and suggests what the planning product and
organizational structure for foreign policy planning should be.
The context was briefly covered :

In a rapidly changing, interdependent world, foreign policy to be effective must
achieve coherence over time. Shaping an international order or managing inter-
dependence will be possible only by actions which reinforce each other over an
extended period. While it remains adaptable to changing conditions, policy must
therefore serve consciously developed long-term goals and priorities.

Although the conduct of foreign policy ought to be long range,
said the report, diplomatic officials tended to neglect long-term
consequences "under the press of the demands of the moment."
Greater attention needed to be given to planning as a "separate
function." Diplomacy should consist of: (1) the identification of
future trends offering problems and opportunities, (2) a definition
of long-term goals and priorities, (3) the relating of day-to-day
decisions to longer-term priorities, and (4) the modification of strate-
gies and courses to meet new conditions or to correct missteps. Four
planning functions were required (summarized) :

1. Coherent definitions of long-term purposes and priorities [and assumptions?!
developed from a broad perspective of national interest and called "strategic
concepts." What was needed was a periodic "State of the World Report."

2. Achievement of coherence and compatibility of day-to-day actions with
long-range strategy. Reconciling present diplomatic relationships with long-range
courses is difficult but necessary. Also, "the President and the Secretary of State,
if they are to affect the future, need planners, not encumbered with existing
arrangements, to look at the future impact of current decisions, constantly to
search for new directions and to suggest initiatives."

3. To counteract the tendencies of operational officials to become advocates
of their ongoing policies, the planners "must take an adversary role, testing the
the rationale of decisions, questioning assumptions, checking data, asking whether
full account has been taken of longer-term objectives."

4. Since policies may fail, correctives will be necessary; planners must "observe
the actual effects of policy, and reevaluate assumptions accordingly."

The report called attention to two considerations in planning: one
was the necessity for close relationship with the intelligence function,
especially in estimating "probable effects of alternative courses of
action"; and the other was the dilemma of the relationship of plan-
ning to operations. This dilemma was not resolved in the report."*

SUGGESTED PLANNING PRODUCTS

The products of planning, the Commission noted, take many
forms: oral assessments of alternative analyses and courses, memo-
randa, participation in interagency exercises, advocacy and forecast-
ing studies, and proposals for initiatives. The two formal products

»'* Repwrt of the Corninission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign PoHcy
(Murphy Commission), Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 1975: Chapter 10, "Planning for Foreign
Policy," pp. 143-150. For a brief note on the Commission see Huddle, Science and Technology in the Depart-
ment of State, vol. II, P- 1464.

5" Thus, on p. 143 the report notes that those associated with current operations tend to resist the need for
adaptation to long-range policy. But on p. 145, it asserts that to be "influential," planners need to be "close
to operations, at some cost to the quality and independence of their planning" because full insulation from
current business means that the planners have "little impact." It concludes that "A blend is needed."
However, as a practical matter, the demands of current operations will always take precedence over long-
range planning whenever the two are merged in a single staff unit.

1878

should be a "strategic concept for foreign policy" and a "Global
Systems Critical List." The former should be a comprehensive state-
ment of U.S. diplomatic and economic purposes, their structure, and
the boundaries of U.S. responsibility in the world. It should be pre-
pared under leadership of the Secretary of State, drawing upon the
National Security Council, and on the expertise of the many depart-
ments involved.

The "State of the World Report" was seen as a revival of a practice
initiated by President Nixon during his first term. However, the second
proposal, that of a "Global Systems Critical List," was something
of an innovation in the report as to both its content and proposed
implementation. This list would be an "authoritative inventory" of
"possible catastrophic effects and the major new^opportunities arising
out of the uses of the world's physical resources and environment,
and from new developments in science and technology." Preparation
of the list should be objective, expertly done, and politically insulated.
It should therefore be assigned by statute and Presidential directive
to a "prestigious and independent organization of scientists" such as
the National Academy of Sciences. The list should present problems
and o])portunities ranked in importance in relation to such specific
areas as oceans, atmospheric pollution, food, and the like. A role
was suggested for the Congress in exploring the further detailed
implications of items on the list. A role was also suggested for the
President's "principal science adviser" in preparing the list, in draft-
ing an "impact statement," and in following up on what the admin-
istration did about items listed.

ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

The Murphy Commission dealt briefly with delineation of the
organizational scheme necessary to implement its recommendations
for foreign policy planning. No reference was made to the legislative
branch in this discussion. In addition to the suggestion already cited
for assignment to the National Academy of Sciences of responsibility
for a Global Systems Critical List, the report proposed creation of a
new Council of International Planning (CIP), strengthening of the
Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State, and creation of
an Advisory Committee of outside experts to advise the Department.

The CIP, patterned after the Council of Economic Advisers, would
serve the President directly and "in a manner of his choosing in the
planning for foreign poUcy." It would give special attention to the
Global Systems Critical List and call for research support from
Government agencies and the academic community. The Commission
again sought here to deal with the dilemma of operational versus
long-range planning: "We would hope that the- CIP would be close
enough to operations to give its work a necessary relevance, but
sufficiently detached to give it freedom to walk less traveled roads."

The Policy Planning Staff, the Commission suggested, would ulti-
mately be what each Secretary of State made of it. "No planning
staff, however well organized and adroitly managed, will be effective
if the Secretary himself does not believe in the planning function."
With respect to the long-range versus operational planning dilemma
facing the Policy Planning Staff, the report again retreated: ". . .
Proposals to insulate planners from operations so that they do not

1879

become mired in day-to-day concerns are partially misguided. Unless
a planning organization is useful to the Secretary and the Department
in helping them cope with current situations, it is likely to atrophy
or decline into irrelevance." While the Commission attached little
significance to the way in which the Policy Planning Staff was or-
ganized, it offered (in italics) three suggestions:

A single, highly competent officer, personally selected by the Secretary, should
be given full time responsibility for the work on the "State of the World Report."

Regular members of the Pojicy Planning Staff would normally be expected to
involve themselves at one time or another in each of the planning functions —
anticipation, challenge, reevaluation, and the formulation of strategic concepts.

The Director of the Policy Planning Staff should have one deputy to lead
the work of the staff in fulfilling the role of anticipation and initiatives, and
another deputy responsible principally for the challenge and reevaluation
functions. *"

In considering means of tapping outside expertise the Commission
considered and abandoned the idea of creating by contract a Rand
type of analytical advisory service responsible to the Policy Planning
Staff. Instead it favored a "less restrictive" arrangement that would
"seek more widely, and more selectively, expert assistance whenever
it can be found . . . ." To assist in tapping the academic community
at large, the Commission recommended that:

An Advisory Committee be created by the State Department, consisting of
outside scholars and experts who can assist the Planning Staff [to] keep abreast of
new developments of substantive and methodological kinds. An officer of the
Policy Planning Staff should be charged with matching the Staff's needs with
outside researchers best qualified to meet them, and with being its link to the
Advisory Committee and the external research community. "*

The Commission's discussion of policy planning concluded with
suggestions for strengthening the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) and for a fuller exploitation of "new methodologies and
analytic techniques." With respect to INR, the Commission stressed
the functional importance for planning of the "external research arm"
of INR. It said:

The closest collaboration between the planning office and the external research
arm of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is of course imperative.
In order for this external participation in planning to be effective, additional
resources will be needed, and better management of the sometimes difficult
relationship between government and outside researchers and consultants must
occur. The responsible officer should identify needed policy research in time to be
relevant to poUcy concerns. He must establish necessary priorities among them.
Within the State Department, individual planners or groups of planners working
on specific projects should be allocated funds to acquire the services of con-
sultants. The relationship between planners and outside experts should not
necessarily be a comfortable one; a major purpose of the relationship between the
two groups would be to compel planners periodically to reevaluate their own
guiding assumptions.""

On the subject of new methodologies, the report cited "com-
puterized information processing and anal^'sis, more sophisticated
decision aids, gaming and simulations, and a variet}'' of forecasting
techniques for policy analysis." In the testing and use of such ap-
proaches, it would be necessary to maintain closer contact with the
academic community.

5^ Murphy Commission report, p. 14S.
5"8 Op cit., 149.
W" Ibid.

1880

Some Further Comments on Executive Branch Planning

Throughout the series on Science, Technology, and American
Diplomacy the need has been evident for deeper and more sustained
study of the larger canvas of foreign policy: the global context, U.S.
goals and priorities, future projections, the testing of assumptions,
the planning of constructive initiatives, and achievement of con-
sistency in present-day operations with well-charted courses for the
future. These appear to have been the concerns also of the Murphy
Commission.

However, it is possible that in its effort to be realistic in handling
the dilemma of short- versus long-range planning, the Commission
did not meet the issue head on. It ultimately opted for a Policy
Planning Staff that combined the two time scales. Another alternative
that warrants consideration is that proposed by Professor Robinson:
the creation of a dual Planning Staff, one short-term unit and a
separate (and well-insulated!) long-term unit. And an early item of
business of such a staff would be the study of the significance of time
spans in policy planning. How far into the future should long-range
planners try to look? How short a time frame is it safe for operational
planners to be constricted by? How do the broader analyses of long-
range planning become useful guidance for operational personnel,
short-term planners, and the decisionmakers in the White House,
the Secretary of State and his immediate associates. Members of the
Cabinet, and the National Security Council? Also, how might the
penetrating analyses of the Policy Planning Staff — both halves of it,
as Professor Robinson has suggested — become useful guidance for the
Congress? And finally, what in-house staff organization does the Con-
gress possess against which to play the findings of the Policy Planning
Staff of the Department of State?

The Murphy Commission's proposal that a Global Systems Critical
List be prepared by the National Academy of Sciences is a creative
addition to the literature of foreign policy planning. However, dif-
ficulties with its implementation can be foreseen. At least a part of the
information input required for such a list would need to be highly
classified data from intelligence sources. The assembling of the list
would need to be an iterative process, with items tabulated, organized
into groups, and then reexamined as to priorities of attention based
on futher information. If the seabed should be an item, for example,
its scope would need to be determined, and then experts would be
recruited for the NAS panel to cover the requisite scope, drawing oh
intelligence as well as unclassified sources for further infonnation.
The required succession of security clearances would virtually ensure
that the list was obsolete before it has been completed and analyzed
for priorities. Indeed, it would be interesting to consider how such an
arrangement could be accommodated within the Academy framework
and various requirements for "freedom of information" imposed on
consultative groups to the Federal Government.

An alternative possibility was offered in a bill reported from the
House Committee on Science and Technology, October 29, 1975.^^°

This bill was unanimously reported by the committee with admin-
istration support.*** A clean bill was introduced October 20 as H.R.

MO The National Science and Technology Policy and Organization Act of 1975, Report No. 94-595, 94th
Cong., 1st sess. Initial sponsors were Olin E. Teague and Charles A. Mosher, Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member, respectively, of the Science and Technology Committee.

M> By letter of October 8, President Ford declared the bill "acceptable and I wiU support it if your com-
mittee and the full House approve it essentially as it now stands."

1881

10230; as amended by the Senate to incorporate the substance of
S. 32, it was signed by the President on May 11, 1976, and became
Pubhc Law 94-282, the National Science and Technology Policy,
Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976.^*^ The new act contains
a finding —

Sec. 101(a)(2) the many large and complex scientific and technological factors
which increasingly influence the course of national and international events re-
quire appropriate provision, involving long-range, inclusive planning as well as
more immediate program development, to incorporate scientific and technological
knowledge in the national decisionmaking process.

Included among the policies enunciated in the act are "promoting
foreign policy objectives" and a requirement for the Federal Govern-
ment to "maintain central policy planning elements in the executive
branch . . . "to identify . , . "problems and objectives" . . . and
to anticipate . . . "future concerns to which science and technology
can contribute. . . . " To execute these policies, the bill would provide
for the establishment in the Executive Office of the President of an
OflSce of Science and Technology Policy, headed by a Director and
"not more than four Associate Directors." The Director, presumably
in consultation with his assistants, would "advise the President of
scientific and technological considerations involved in areas of national
concern including [among other matters] foreign relations. ..." He
would also "assess and advise on policies for international cooperation
in science and technology which will advance the national and inter-
national objectives of the United States." And he would "identify and
assess emerging and future areas in which science and technology can
be used effectively in addressing national and international problems."
In the performance of these functions the Director would " . . .
develop appropriate working relationships with the National Security
Council . . . ."

There would, of course, be no reason for the Director of the new
office to neglect the advice of both the National Academy of Sciences
and the National Academy of Engineering, along with their supporting
instrumentality, the National Research Council.

With respect to the Murphy Commission proposal for an Advisory
Committee to tap academic expertise in the foreign policy area, it is
possible that a twofold mechanism of external advice might be enter-
tained. Indeed, Professor Robinson has suggested just such an arrange-
ment. In view of the fact that the three military departments and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense all have dual advisory mechanisms
of this type, it does not seem unreasonable to provide the Department
of State with an equivalent system. Some advisory studies are more
appropriate for a relatively permanent Rand-type organization, with
personnel fully cleared for the handling of classified information, and
closely responsive to declared needs of the Policy Planning Staff and
the Secretary of State. Other studies of a broader, more exploratory
nature might be more suited to an academic institution or team under
the general guidance of such an advisory committee as the Murphy
Commission has recommended. The roles of the Policy Planning Staff,
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Bureau of Oceans

5S2 The bill was signed at a Rose Garden ceremony attended by leading scientists at which anthropologist
and A.A.A.S. Retiring President Margaret Mead "commented that the action was Mr. Ford's peace oflfering
to the scientific community, which has missed its entree into the Oval Office through a resident science
adviser" since the office was abolished by President Nixon 3 years ago. (Washington Post, May 12, 1976.)

1882

and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, in relation to
both sources of policy studies would be important.

Precisely how the Council of International Planning proposed by the
Murphy Commission would serve in relation to these various other
planning organizations is not entirely clear. The Commission's idea
that it would address "a few carefully selected problems" on the
instruction of the President has a ring of the short-term planning
approach. The President is rarely free to think about problems and
opportunities a decade hence. The Council of Economic Advisers (on
which the CIP would be patterned) is limited by statute to short-range
problems. It is not clear what would be gained by adding another
mechanism for operational planning of diplomacy to those already
available, if that is indeed the intention.

Some Further Thoughts on Foreign Policy Planning in the Legislative
Branch
The Murphy Commission in its section on planning addressed
mechanisms for the executive branch almost exclusively. Historically
the tendency has persisted to regard the President and the executive
branch as the primary locus of foreign policy and the custodian of
information on which the policy is based. As long as the President and
Congress are of the same political party, or as long as there is a tacit
agreement between the President and Congress that "politics stops
at the water's edge," congressional acquiescence in Presidential leader-
ship and direction of foreign policy may be no great issue. However,
when significant policy differences exist between the two branches,
a separate congressional role in the process of planning of foreign
policy may be demanded by the Legislature. There are a number of
reasons why such a planning instrument of its own might be desirable
and useful. For example, it could be made responsible for such services
as the following:

The testing and evaluation of the President's structure of
foreign policy decisions;

Determination of the alternative consequences of supporting,
or challenging, Presidential policy initiatives;

Identification of important problems and opportunities that
the President may have neglected for reasons of policy or other-
wise that still warrant legislative consideration;

Relating individual legislative actions to the long-range
directions of national policy for foreign relations;

Evaluation of policy options offered bj^ the executive branch
that require legislation for their implementation;

Evaluation of ongoing programs and operations of the diplo-
matic apparatus as to consistency with broader and long-range
national goals and priorities shared by the President and Congress;
Independent determination of the reasons for failures and short-
comings of policy decisionmaking by the executive branch;

Assurance that the policy planning processes of the executive

branch maintains a high quality of product and performance ; and

Achievement of coherence in the sometimes fragmented items

being separately offered as legislative proposals.

It is also possible that the same dilemma would exist for the Congress

as was encountered by the Murphy Commission in prescribing a

planning mechanism for the executive branch; i.e., congressional as

1883

well as executive needs exist for both a short- and a long-range
policy planning service. If a single planning unit should be created for
the Congress it is probable that its time and attention would be
preempted to satisfy requests for advisory services relating to current
problems. On the other hand, if it were totally insulated from day-
to-day problems, it might — as the Murphy Commission report sug-
gests— drift into atrophy and irrelevance. Accordingly, it may be
that a two-part service, separately structured but functionally
related, might be as appropriate for the Congress as for the Depart-
ment of State. The factor of timing in the formulation of foreign
policy is no less important to the legislative than to the executive
branch. Also, coherence in planning and coherence between planning
and operations, both essential in the field of foreign policy, are apt
considerations for legislative oversight.

Conclusions and Observations

In a steadily constricting world facing grim future decisions of
national equity, power competition, resource allocation, rational or
irrational uses of technology, and rational or irrational governance
in national states with the capability or potential for mass destruction,
the need is evident for the highest possible quality of thought for the
future.

In the cOmic strip "Beetle Bailey," one of the characters, learning
of the deterrent posture of mutual destruction, asks: "How did we
get into this mess?" It is now important to ask: "How do we get out
of this mess?"

The alternatives are to seek a rational way out, or to hope that the
random and irrational forces at play in the political interactions of
nations in international anarchy will somehow avoid disaster.

The resources of the Department of Defense to inflict ultimate
disaster upon an adversary have not been stinted. However, the De-
partment of State has been less well endowed. The reasons for this
disparity are complex, but reduce to the proposition that force is
concrete, measurable, and definite, while diplomac}^ is abstract, hard to
measure, and indefinite. So too are the consequences of public invest-
ment as between force and diplomac}^ The disparity also relates to
centuries-old differences in habits of thought about the conduct of war-
fare on the one hand and diplomacy on the other. It has always been
considered necessary to approach warfare systematically in organizing,
equipping, and drilling forces and in commanding them in battle.
Diplomacy, however, has tended to be approached on an intuitive,
seat-of-the-pants basis (often the seat of only one man's pants). In
short, the need for long-range planning has been acknowledged in the
military sphere, but disavowed — or at least neglected — in the
diplomatic.

Proof of the value of long-range policy planning is hard to document,
but only by sound policy^ planning would it be possible to establish the
true ultimate value of diplomacy. The justification for a strengthened
planning capability for U.S. foreign policy is that it affords the best
hope that the great destructive power in the Department of Defense
and in its foreign counterpart will increasingly become irrelevant and
unnecessary.

Chapter 24 — Some Concluding Observations

CONTENTS

Page

The Threat and Promise of Technology for the Future of Mankind 1889

Interactions of Technology With Diplomacy 1890

Three Guiding Principles 1890

A Framework for a Strengthened U.S. Diplomatic System 1891

A Sense of National Purpose 1891

A Sense of the Sweep of Historical Change 1892

Tools of Technological Diplomacy 1892

Institutional Tools 1893

The Technological Tools of Diplomacy 1 893

Strengthening Executive Branch Management of Technological Diplo-
macy 1894

The Executive Office of the President 1894

The Department of State 1894

Comparative Priorities of War and Diplomacy 1895

Opportunities To Strengthen Diplomatic Institutions 1895

External Technical Contacts of the Department of State 1896

Limits and Constraints on Institutional Reform 1896

Technological Mission Agencies 1897

Institutional Complexities 1898

The Need for Multi- Agency Policy Planning 1 898

Implications of the Study for the Congress 1899

The Increasing Congressional Role in Diplomacy 1899

Need for Strengthened Information Supply 1900

In-House Analysis Capability 1901

Congressional Foreign Policy Planning 1903

Congressional Oversight of Foreign Policy Programs 1904

Consultation on Presidential Initiatives 1905

Recapitulation of Major Points 1906

(1887)

CHAPTER 24— SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

This final statement attempts to distill the main problems disclosed
by the entire study and to offer some possible legislative options to
improve the national capacity to overcome these problems.

One fact is evident. The uses of technology in the service of di-
plomacy^ need to be made more rational, coherent, constructive,
effective, and sustained. Somehow the talents of diplomacy and the
expertise of technology need to be brought together to work in concert.

Technology — the systematic employment of rational and empirical
methods to achieve human purposes — has been shown to be a principal
element in the interactions among nations. It has given military
forces instruments of total destructive power. It has offered human
societies the means to overcome the Malthusian dilemma of population
pressure on food, resources, and land. It has generated serious, even
dangerous, degradation of the earthly environment of land, water,
and atmosphere. It has intensified age-old problems of diplomacy
like ocean sovereignty, and created new ones like space satellite
communications and surveillance. It has enabled the world's peoples
to change surroundings, life styles, habits of thought, and physical
capacities more in the past century than in the previous 2 million
years or so that mankind has lived on the earth. Technolog;y con-
tributes a large part of the substance of modern diplomacy. The
question is thus posed: what adjustments in organization, in institu-
tions, in plans and doctrine, and in operational procedures, are now
needed in response to this massive change steadily being wrought by
technology in the substance of diplomacy?

The Threat and Promise of Technology for the Future of Mankind

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has underway
a multimillion-dollar search for evidences of intelligent life in outer
space. Among other things, this program seeks — according to one
participant — to discover whether intelligent beings more advanced
than those on Planet Earth had found it possible to organize and
conduct themselves in such a way as to survive technological progress
for many millenia. The value of this knowledge would be incalculable. '
Can a planet of heterogeneous intelligent beings capable of self-
destruction refrain indefinitely from using this pov»'er? As a practical
matter can ways be found to resolve disputes, reduce intransigence
over values in conflict, distribute physical resources satisfactorily,
and evolve a system of global institutions based on the same aspira-
tions that are found in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution? Is it
possible for the nations of the world to recognize the interaction of
interdependence and national self-interest — and to comprehend that
their shared aims and goals are more important than the issues that
divide them?

Already, on Planet Earth, human technology has reached the pDint
at which it is capable of destroying human civilization. One obvious
goal of diplomac}^ is balanced quantitative reduction of this capability.

(18 89) '

1890

Another is the reduction of motivations that tempt nations to employ
the technology of destruction. The central goal of U.S. diplomacj'^ is
to achieve not merely national but global security. On this point alone,
diplomacy's relation to technology has unprecedented significance for
the future. In the individual nation-state, men make laws to protect
themselves from each other ; but in the anarchic world of states without
law, only fear, perceived self-interest, and sustained diplomatic efforts
stand in the way of destruction by technological means,

INTERACTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY WITH DIPLOMACY

Technology is linked to diplomacy in many ways. If technology pre-
sents mankind with the greatest threat of all time, it also presents the
greatest opportunities for mitigating sources of conflict rooted in dif-
ferences of access to and effective use of the basic resources needed for
human survival. Second, technological accomplishment can contribute
to diplomatic leadership and respect in the community of nations.
Third, the flow of technology from nation to nation is not only a
major subject of trade but a determinant of future economic well-being,
and as such should be a prime subject for diplomatic analysis ' and
jjolicjTnaking to eliminate a prime source of international conflict.
Fourth, technology supported by competent scientific underpinning
secures domestic economic opportunity and appropriate growth,
making possible a busy and productive society necessary for the back-
ing of peaceful diplomatic initiatives abroad.

Neither the evolution nor the transfer of technology is an unmiti-
gated good. The achievement of nuclear weapons may have put an end
to general war among major nations. But the threat of mutual destruc-
tion persists, as does war of more limited magnitude. On a lesser scale,
many of the technologies mankind has developed yield both goods and
bads; and as has been shown, these technologies and their consequences
diffuse rapidly across boundaries and oceans. Diplomacy has thus the
double task of maximizing beneficial consequences and minimizing un-
desirable consequences of technology in international application.

In short, technology, its translation into economic consequences,
and its management for purposes of global amity present the primary
variable as well as a principal substance of present and future diplo-
macy. If the interplay between technology and diplomacy is not
managed rationally, it will be conducted irrationally. The irrational
conduct of international-technological relations in an age of totally
destructive military weapons presents the extreme of danger. The
rational application of present and prospective technology for the
sustained achievement of generally improved health and living stand-
ards of the world's people presents the extreme of opportunity. The
challenge to American diplomacy is to design institutions and methods
to formulate and implement rational policies to reduce the danger and
exploit the opportunity.

THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

A useful political principle to guide the course of American di-
plomacy in this quest is one that has guided the American political
system for much of its 200-year history. The American political tradi-
tion is based on the principle that adversary parties compete for
power while rerognizing the fundamental constraint that the values

1891

they share are more important than the issues that divide them. The
animosity of conflict is mediated by the goodwill engendered by co-
operation. With one tragic exception, there is thus within the United
States a history of compromise and avoidance of intransigence.

This practical philosophical principle can — it is to be hoped — be
coupled with two other outstanding American qualities in the pursuit
of the overriding diplomatic goal. These two qualities, technological
skill and skill in administrative management, have produced in this
country a reasonably balanced national economy with diminishing
extremes of income, a generally superior level of education, and —
probably most important of all — a widely shared conviction that the
shortcomings of the American system can be corrected by a combina-
tion of political process, social organization, and individual effort.

One goal of American diplomacy, it would seem, is to resume the
export of this underlying optimism of the U.S. body politic. To lend
it substance, the machinery of U.S. diplomacy can — and, given
Presidential and congressional leadership with understanding of both
the compelling need and the dramatic opportunities, vnll — call upon
the American skills in technology and administrative management for
systems of social service and economic opportunity to be the basis
of diplomatic initiatives abroad.

If, as Ambassador Moynihan has said, the world is in a "hell of a
mess," the challenge is the greater and the more imminent. Many
recent observers of the American political system have described it
as motivated chiefly by crises. Things tend to get worse before they
get better. If so, the opportunity for betterment must be near at hand.

A Framework for a Strengthened U.S. Diplomatic System

American diplomacy, both in general and with particular reference
to its uses and management of technology for purposes of foreign
policy, has the opportunity to correct a number of operational weak-
nesses. These asserted weaknesses may be summed up as follows:
reactive diffusion of effort, neglect of priority elements, emphasis on
short-range reactions to crises, isolation from the public and its
political representatives, excessive attention to parochial interests,
inappropriately structured policy formation, limited capacity for
coordinating oVerseas activities of mission agencies, and uncertain
mechanisms for playing a constructive and influential role in multi-
national institutions. Even if overstated, these asserted defects
reflect a consensus of criticism from both outside and within the
diplomatic apparatus.

A review of the 12 studies in the present series suggests that three
organizing elements now lacking are required for the task of cementing
world peace and the turning of swords into plowshares. These three
items are a sense of national purpose in consonance with the thrust of
historical forces, a sense of the sweep of historical change, and an
appreciation of the what, the why and the how of technological diplo-
macy. From these three basics are derived many supporting require-
ments. For example:

A SENSE OF NATIONAL PURPOSE

National purpose is an expression of national leadership. The
qualities of leadership include the ability to listen, to evaluate, to
decide, and to persuade and educate. Leadership means choosing

1892

goals and mobilizing social energies for their achievement. It is a
moral or ethical function, because both the goals and the means of
their implementation must be compatible with national ethical
standards if they are to be accepted. They must be coherent goals to
be both understood and manageable. The sense of national purpose
will be incomplete if it lacks either the unifying force of the Executive
leadership or the mediating assessment and approval of concerted
legislative leadership. Leadership is needed also in the supporting
institutions of government, in the coordinating bodies that relate the
programs of these institutions, and in the groups and institutions of
academicians, technical people, and others who influence the public.
The goals that express the national purpose must be technically
feasible and practicable. They must be politically acceptable. And
they must awaken the sustained enthusiasm and willing support of
all those whose shared efforts must be enlisted in their achievement.

A SENSE OF THE SWEEP OF HISTORICAL CHANGE

Eras of change call for a capacity for orchestrated national adapta-
tion— the adjustment to an evolving external world. Courses of action
that originate in the centers of power tend to be formed in reaction to
the perceptions of the immediate world of affairs. The achievement of
coherent and sustained foreign policy requires the input from many
sources less pressed by events and forces of the moment. As national
goals take form, mechanisms of planning that relate them to the real
world must relate them also to the relevant historical past, the evident
trends of the present, and the probable courses of the future. A sense
of time and a sense of timing are necessary for the ordering of goals and
priorities, and for the allocation of effort to the design of program
options and institutional instruments for their execution. A sense of the
sweep of historical change must embrace the functions of negotiation,
relations among states, and sources of tension and disaffection across
national boundaries. It must also comprehend the changes that occur
in the sources and expression of national power, of which technology is
a foremost element. Timing and change call for a capacity for orches-
trated national adaptation — the adjustment to an evolving external
world.

TOOLS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIPLOMACY

The resources of technological diplomacy are a combination of
institutions (and their processes) and technologies. The institutions of
science provide a cultural base from which to establish bridges to the
rest of the world ; they are a training ground for technologists ; a source
of new technologies, and a means to an understanding of the workings
of new technologies. Diplomacy needs to find ways to exploit con-
structively the bridging function of world science. The institutions of
technology provide an innovative base for domestic industry and
foreign trade ; they generate the concepts, systems, and hardware that
are the substance of technology transfer. The innovations of technology
themselves, as well as the institutions that produce and manage them,
generate many, perhaps most, of the problems and opportunities of
present-day diplomacy. Out of the riches of technology should be
drawn diplomatic initiatives that best and most durably advance the
Nation's foreign policy goals.

1893

Institutional tools. — In the process of technological-diplomatic
policy, many nongovernmental institutions need to be called on for
support and brought into harmony: the colleges and universities, the
not-for-profit and interdisciplinary research organizations, scientific
and technical societies, the multinational corporations, labor unions,
private industry and its associations, and foreign policy study groups.
Many policies need the joint participation of other governments, work-
ing through bilateral, regional, and other multilateral organizations as
well as international nongovernmental organizations of scientists,
engineers, and others.

The numerous governmental institutions whose participation' in
technological diplomacy is essential fall into three classes: (1) those
concerned with policymaking, like the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State and his immediate associates, certain
congressional committees, military policymakers, and the principal
planning elements in the Department of Defense, NASA and ERDA;
(2) those concerned with coordinating the exercise of technological
diplomacy, like OES and 10 in the Department of State, the National
Science Foundation, the Department of the Treasury, and — again —
the Executive Office of the President; and (3) those concerned with
actual operations, which include virtually all mission-oriented depart-
ments and agencies of the Government.

These are the institutional resources (and doubtless there are others)
that need somehow to be mobilized in a concerted effort to apply the
technological and management skills of the United States in the
devising and execution of an effective technological diplomacy for the
future.

The technological tools of diplomacy. — The range of technological
resources applicable in future U.S. diplomacy is virtually limitless.
The technologies of agriculture, lumbering, mining, and food from
the oceans are all basic needs of developing countries and still vital
as a developing economy reaches higher levels. Manufacturing
technology extends over a vast range from cottage industry and hand
labor to computer-directed machine tools and mass production. The
design of products is comparable in scope. Basic to a nation's tech-
nological well-being, and thus of consequence for diplomac}^, is the
supporting infrastructure; it includes education at all levels, health
services and medical care, the collection and management of social
data, scientific research, libraries and information centers, and systems
for the distribution of goods and services. Also essential to the infra-
structure are technological systems for transportation, communica-
tions, and energy. Diplomacy, is now involved in the transfer
among nations of technology related to all of these.

More recently, growing mainly out of military developments,
aerospace, electronics, and atomic energy, the uses of "high tech-
nology" in diplomacy have become salient. Synchronous satellites
for communications, orbiting satellites for surveys of weather and
resources, computers for rapid processing of all kinds of social data
and technical information, nuclear powerplants, and processing plants
for nuclear fuel are all subjects of the diplomacy of "high technology."

More than the technology of military hardware, all these technologi-
cal systems today relate to the goals of the world's nations. Indeed,
their main significance for the diplomacy of the future is in the hope
they afford of diverting the efforts of the world's nations awaj^ from
the development and use of military hardware.

1894

Strengthening Executive Branch Management of Technological Diplomacy
In general terms, the institutions of U.S. diplomacy need to be
strengthened in three ways: First, it is necessary to improve their
knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of technology as a source
of diplomatic influence and as a means of advancing global well-
being. Second, their understanding needs to be improved of the
techniques and skills of human organization necessary to mobilize
and coordinate efforts toward generally desirable goals. Third, it is
necessary to enhance public and political understanding, support,
and participation in setting and implementing diplomatic goals.
More specifically, the U.S. diplomatic machinery needs to be strength-
ened at three points: in the Executive Office of the President, in the
Department of State, and more broadly in all mission agencies with
overseas programs, responsibilities, and contacts. Particular attention
can be given at all of these points to reinforcing the constructive
purposes of the United Nations.

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The institutional resources immediately available to the President
need to address themselves to providing intellectual leadership in
evolving intrinsically compelling diplomatic initiatives bearing on the
long-range future course of international events and trends. They
need to assure completeness in policies toward important contem-
porary questions of foreign policy generally. To these ends, there
would seem to be a need for (a) a review and broadening of the policy
definition of "the national security," (b) a close articulation by the
President's adviser on international affairs and his staff of the activi-
ties of the National Security Council with those of the President's
science and technology advisory apparat\is, and (c) a clear Presi-
dential insistence on effective performance by the Department of
State in coordinating U.S. policy in the United Nations and in the
exercise of international functions of U.S. departments and agencies.

The Executive Office of the President would also seem to need
broader and more comprehensive contact and interaction with
national public opinion leaders and with the technological community
to identify significant trends and opportunities for new initiatives in
technological diplomacy.

The Executive Office needs to be in position to challenge the
Department of State to analyze its data bearing on technological
diplomacy and to evaluate proposed policy initiatives in terms of
providing constructive options for their implementation.

Clarification is needed of the respective roles of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the Department of State, the mission agencies of
the Government, and the President's adviser on science and tech-
nology, in shaping U.S. participation in technical agencies and func-
tions associated with the United Nations,

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To some extent the role of the Department of State is analogous to
that of the Department of Defense. Both departments are concerned
with the maintenance of peaceful relations with other states, and with
the preservation of the national security. The methods differ: the

1895

Defense task is the maintenance of military potency and its use if
necessary ; the Department of State has the task of f acihtating peaceful
intercourse, negotiating the peaceful resolution of differences, and
constructing durable, mutually beneficial relations with other nations.

Comparative priorities of war and diplomacy. — It is striking how-
disparate are the resources allocated to these two sets of functions,
and how disparate also are the degrees of sophistication with which
they are exercised. Defense maintains numerous research institutes,
has contractual relations for studies with many universities, has a
central strategic planning staff, operates man}^ policy training institu-
tions (four War Colleges, Industrial College, Naval Postgraduate
School, Air University, etc.), three service academies, elaborate
intelligence s^^stems, and large publishing systems of manuals and
textbooks. State's resources in the fields of policy and training — even
in diplomacy — are dwarfed by comparison.

It could be contended that the conduct of diplomacy is a more
exacting intellectual art than the conduct of war or military pre-
paredness. And also, that preparation for diplomacy requires more
information, more academic preparation, more research and analysis,
than that for defense. And finallj^, that the investment in technology
relevant to peaceful relations among countries, including foreign aid,
bilateral programs, and multilateral projects of the United Nations,
amounts to less than the budget for the development of new military
technology. For both departments the study of technology, its appli-
cations and impacts, is of foremost importance in the present-day
world; but while the study of technological factors in modern warfare
is remarkably well developed, the study of ways to manage technology
on a national and global basis to avert warfare situations is largely
neglected.

Opportunities to strengthen diplomatic institutions. — The institu-
tions of the Department of State were explored in one study of this
series in an effort to identify those that could be amplified for the task.
Few were found that could serve this purpose strongly or durably.

What would seem to be needed is a stronger emphasis on long-range
and mid-range planning of technological aspects of U.S. foreign policy,
a gradual but steady increase in technological sophistication through-
out the Department, improved access of the Department's technolo-
gists to the policy structure in the Executive Office of the President, a
stronger role in coordinating the policy of international elements of
mission agencies, and a closer and more constructive relationship with
the technological community in the United States.

Separate units might be set up in the Department for planning on
different time scales, with the long-range planning institution insulated
from the day-to-day pressures of operational diplomacy and given a
strong mandate and support by the Secretary to remain thus insulated,
unlike its predecessors.

Both kinds of planning units might be supported by two kinds of
research assistance under contract — a wholly funded, private, not-for-
profit corporation like Rand or Aerospace, and a looser set of con-
tractual relations with a number of academic institutions to perform
research tasks on order or to conduct exploratory studies selected by
themselves. The latter institutions might also maintain training pro-
grams for Department personnel on leave, or for Foreign Service

1896

candidates. Another educational approach to prepare personnel for
policy planning assignments might be a program analogous to the
National War College programs in which the case study approach is
used.

External technical contacts of the Department of State. — Contact
between the Department of State and the technological community
could be enlarged in numerous ways: by reviving the Science and
Technology Advisory Panel, the Secretary's science luncheons, and a
vigorous science and technology program in the Foreign Service
Institute. If revived, the Science and Technology Advisory Panel
might be assured an increase in contacts not only with policy personnel
of the Department but also with the "international" leadership ele-
ments of technological mission agencies; its effectiveness would be
enhanced by the support of a strong and creative secretariat. Recruit-
ment of more technologically trained specialists in the Foreign Service
and "generalizing" them, or vice versa, is a possibility. A sabbatical
program of advanced degrees in science policy for "Foreign Service
personnel could be considered. The oft-repeated suggestion by the
House Committee on Science and Technology that the National
Science Foundation be asked to set up a training program for Foreign
Service personnel merits further attention. Extensive use of technologi-
cal consultants to initiate as well as to review program options might
be desirable. The use of the National Academy of Sciences, National
Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research
Council is sanctioned by statute and precedent. Selection of some
Ambassadors with technological expertise, and more generally the
preliminary biiefing of Ambassadors on the technological aspects of
their function, seems to be essential if they are to make proper use of
the technical people on their staffs. The availability to State Depart-
ment personnel of extension courses and textbooks on science and
technology policy might serve a useful purpose, assuming a motiva-
tion comparable to that of Department of Defense personnel. Exchange
of personnel on detail with technological mission agencies on a more
extensive basis would be helpful.

Limits and constraints on institutional reform. — All of these measures
are possible means of strengthening the capacity of personnel in
the Department to make use of technological expertise for diplomatic
purposes. But none of them is likely to have the desired effect sought
unless accompanied by an unequivocally strong commitment from
the top. From the Secretary on down, the message would have to
be clear that technology is a critical component oi diplomacy. The
Foreign Service never accepted the necessity to acquire language
skills until the word came down from the top that they were im-
portant. The same message could motivate the effort to bring tech-
nological expertise into the service of the U.S. diplomatic community.

To provide an organizational center or focus for science and tech-
nology in the Department of State, the Murphy Commission proposed
combining "science" and "economics" in the office of a new "Under
Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs." He would have
jurisdiction over four Assistant Secretaries: (1) for International
Economic and Business Affairs; (2) for Energy, Transportation, and
Communication Affairs; (3) for Oceans, En\Tronmental, and Scientific
Affairs; and (4> for Food, Population, and Development Affairs.

1897

It can be observed that these subdivisions are not as logical as one
might wish, nor are they complete in scope. Industrial technology,
materials matters, and health are neglected, for example. Also eight
"technologies" and a general "scientific" subject are subsumed under
"scientific affairs." However, the principle of elevating the tech-
nological concerns of the Department of State to the level of Under
Secretary could give status and visibility to a largely neglected,
decisively important area of diplomatic concern and help to motivate
Foreign Service personnel to familiarize themselves with the relation-
ships between technology (and science) and diplomacy.

However, it should be noted that technological diplomacy cannot
be concentrated within a single subdivision of the Department of
State. It is of concern in the regional bureaus, the embassies, and
the functional bureaus. Unless tliis fact is recognized in a practical
way, the elevation of "science and technology" to Under Secretary
status will remain a paper action. More functional change than
organizational rearrangement of titles is called for. For one example,
as the Murphy Commission pointed out, there is a "crucial link
between technological capabilities and the enhancement of important
military capabilities."

Moreover, it is unlikely that the strengthening of the Department
of State could take place to any significant degree without the sym-
pathetic understanding of the Congress and determined efforts by
the Department itself. For the Congress to agree to supplying
budgetary and legislative support for technology planning and
programing by the Department of State requires that the Congress
be satisfied not only that such support is needed in the public interest
but also that it can be effectively used by the Department. The
result of the congressional attempt to strengthen the Department's
science office provides some negative evidence here. Elevation of
the principal science officer to the level of Assistant Secretary and
concentrating important technological functions under this officer
did not of itself produce the result sought by the Congress. To elevate
the level of "science" one more notch without assurance that the
Department would take it seriously would not bring lasting change.

The Murphy Commission's emphasis on the relationship of tech-
nology (i.e., "science") and economics was reflected also in the
attention given to the international diplomatic role of the Treasury
Department. The point of this attention is the interaction of domestic
and foreign technological development -and economic growth. The
question is whether strengthened technological sophistication should
be provided in both Departments, and whether State should take a
more purposeful and constructive stance toward domestic technology
with international implications, or whether there should be a closer
and more effective working relationship among three interested
Departments, with Treasury leading in financial matters. Commerce
in domestic technological matters, and State in trade, international
technology, and diplomacy generally.

TECHNOLOGICAL MISSION AGENCIES

Seven departments and four independent agencies handle the bulk of
technological activities of the Federal Government. A few of these
have representatives in embassies abroad, and most have "inter-
national" offices to maintain contacts with foreign governments. The

1898

extent to which these contacts conform with U.S. foreign pohcy
depends on the influence exerted by the Department of State both in
Washington and over U.S. offices abroad. The scope of technological
subject matter encompassed by these 11 agencies is enormous: miUtary
hardware, health and medicine, patents, standards, industrial trends,
air transportation, geological surveys, mining and processing of ores,
production of food and fiber, problems of cities, atomic energy and
safeguards, aerospace, weather, technology transfer, scientific research
and information exchange, environmental quality, ocean science and
industry, and many more. Most of these technological subjects have
significant impacts, present or prospective, on U.S. international
relations. An abundant literature attests to the incapacity and dis-
inclination of the Department of State as now constituted to monitor
the policies of the mission agencies governing this range of subject
matter. Periodic efforts at coordination through interdepartmental
contacts, through the medium of the Federal Council for Science and
Technology, and through the State Department's own Interagency
Committee for International Science and Technology, have not even
begun to bound the problem.

Institutional complexities. — Several agencies may be involved in a
shared program with a single country. Bilateral and multilateral
programs may overlap substantively. The approach to concerted
technological diplomacy that involves all of these separate programs
may be bilateral or multilateral; multilateral programs may be global
or regional. The question that remains is how best to orchestrate the
overseas technological programs of mission agencies to maximize
their collective contribution to U.S. foreign policy objectives in ways
most acceptable to the other countries involved, and at least cost to
the United States. It is at least possible that the kind of regional
approach described in the case study of the Mekong Project, and
touched on further in the essay on bilateral versus multilateral
diplomacy, might offer insights on ways to resolve this problem of
coordination. Regionalism might provide the necessary combination
of coherence in programing and economy of operation, in the non-
controversial support of mutually acceptable activities.

As matters stand now, it is difficult to know what coherent and
purposeful U.S. policies are being pursued in Africa or Latin America,
in the export or import of technology, in the support of world health,
in the export of U.S. surplus grains, in the control of multinational
corporations, in the allocation of world resources of petroleum and
minerals, in the United Nations and associated institutions, in the
expansion of nuclear power with or without reference to conflict with
control of nuclear proliferation, in the encouragement of the world
science community, in the use of survey satellites, in global communica-
tions, and generally in defining the significance of the overused word
"interdependence" as a principle of U.S. diplomacy.

The need for multi-agency policy planning. — In the brief section up-
dating the study o| Science and Technology in the Department o/ State
(Vol. Ill, Chap. 17) reference was made to 19 initiatives proposed by
the Secretary of State in his address of September 1, 1975, to the
U.N. General Assembly. These 19 proposals covered a wide range
of technological matters on which policy was proposed. For example:
an International Energy Institute, an International Industrialization
Institute, an International Center for the Exchange of Technologic fil

1899

Information, a variety of agricultural institutions, and a system of
international stockpiles of materials. In the preamble to these pro-
posals the Secretary explained that they were being offered in recog-
nition of the growing interdependence among the world's nations.
However, before they can be converted from ideas to actualities, many
further preparatory steps will be necessary: studies of possible conse-
quences for United States and international economic and industrial
health, differential effects on various national systems abroad, magni-
tude and costs, allocation of costs, substantive organizational planning,
cost/benefit analyses at various levels of effort, justification before
budget analyses, negotiation with representatives of other partici-
pating nations on alternative approaches, and solicitation of the views
of the Congress, the executive branch, the informed public, and spe-
cialists in each particular field of concern.

The long-range implications of the whole package of 19 initiatives
in relation to anticipated world trends would make a substantial
separate study. All these are quite evidently time-consuming matters
and not likely to be accomplished soon enough or vigorously enough
to satisfy the impatient representatives of the "Third World" nations
who listened to the Secretary's proposal. That it was constructive
and conciliatory is evident; but whether it raised unrealizable ex-
pectations of early action remains to be seen.

Implications of the Study for the Congress

The Constitution divides responsibility for foreign policy between
the President and the Congress. Commitments to treaties require a
two-thirds Senate vote to approve of ratification. International actions
requiring funding are subject to the legislative functions of appropria-
tions and oversight. Appointments of diplomats and senior officials
of the Department of State require that the Senate "advise and
consent." However, the foreign relations of the United States at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution and for more than a century
thereafter were rarely so momentous as to engage the attention of the
Congress. Only one of the 85 Federalist Papers (Number 64 by John
Jay — dealing with the treaty power) addresses the subject at all.
And Alexis de Tocqueville remarks on the singular incapacity of a
democratic republic to maintain any sort of consistent foreign policy.
In his view, such policy needed to be secret and in the charge of the
smallest possible number of leaders, who would remain durably in
control of it.

Indeed, the Tocqueville formula seems to have prevailed, more or
less, from the early 1930s almost to the present, supported by the
prevailing political arrangement that "politics stopped at the water's
edge."

THE INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN DIPLOMACY

A number of coalescing factors have tended to excite a greater
congressional concern for foreign policy and to motivate an apparent
determination to participate in the process. These factors have
included':

— A recognition that under conditions of , the nuclear deterrent,
the involvement of the United States in foreign policy can flow
almost imperceptibly from peace into war, through successively
deeper commitments abroad, so that the congressional authority

96-243 O - 77 - 26

1900

to declare war requires continuous participation in decisions
short of war;

— A recognition that massive investment of U.S. resources in
particular initiatives of foreign policy (grain sales, for example)
can affect the domestic economy and well-being ;

— A recognition that global "interdependence" links the well-
being of the domestic U.S. economy to foreign nations in many
ways: dependence of U.S. industry on foreign minerals, depend-
ence of U.S. consumers on imported petroleum, dependence of
U.S. industries on foreign markets, the rise of a new attitude of
global sharing of resources, and the evolution of a global system
of money, credit, and trade ;

— A recognition that major industrial corporations affecting the
U.S. economy and employment are essentially international in
scope and control ; and

— A recognition that traditional reliance on the Presidential de-
cisionmaking role in foreign policy initiatives tends to present the
Congress with fails accomplis such that legislative support be-
comes virtually obligatory; to be a full participant in these initia-
tives the Congress must be a party to their planning.
Since the bulk of recent U.S. initiatives or reactive measures of
foreign policy have tended to involve technology, the factors cited
above are particularly germane to a study of the congressional role in
science, technology, and American diplomacy. It seems evident that
the onrush of technology requires that the Congress be systematically
supplied with factual information about the world scene, with an in-
house capability for the analysis of this information, with its own ex-
perts in policy planning, and with information about results of pro-
grams for its own analysts to assess as a part of the oversight process.
Presidential assurance of consultation on new initiatives before the}'^
are taken would be a logical further element.

NEED FOR STRENGTHENED INFORMATION SUPPLY

An oft-repeated assertion among political scientists is that foreign
policymaking is inherently an executive function and that the legisla-
tive role cannot be other than secondary because the executive brancli
has exclusive possession of the vast flow of information from abroad.
U.S. Embassies originate a flood of information cables and reports
concerning events and trends in other countries. Mission agencies
with offices or representatives abroad collect and publish statistics
on mihtary and naval force, agriculture, mining, health, education,
and other topics. Intelligence — information from all sources that has
been analyzed and evaluated — is a formidable (and closeh* held)
resource. The .systematic collection of detailed factual information is
partl}^ routine, partly in comment on significant new developments,
and partly in response to inquiries from the home office. Taken al-
together, this flood of information is an indispensable foundation for
the design of long-range strategy and short-range reactions to foreign
developments.

To reach independent judgments, the Congress needs a combination
of basic data generated by the executive branch and the results of
its own independent observations at first hand. However, it is un-
realistic to expect that the Congress could build an information base
comparable in depth of detail with that of the executive branch.

1901

Moreover, the limited exposure that Members of Congress can allow
themselves in overseas travel, while undoubtedly useful in establishing
contacts and dialogues with U.S. representatives in foreign countries,
has certain dangers as well. The information thus secured tends to be
restricted in scope, and the limits of time for in-depth interviews and
consultations subject such investigations to bias and superficiality
that only longer and broader exposure of information sources in the
country could balance out and correct.

Several legislative options are available to strengthen congressional
information-gathering pertinent to foreign relations (in addition to
those discussed below under the heading "Congressional Oversight
of Foreign Policy Programs"). One possibility is to arrange a more
extensive preliminary preparation for overseas investigations. Assign-
ments to the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research
Service could be used more systematically, in addition to assignments
of committee staff, to assemble background data for staff analysis.
These two services could be utilized for overseas data collection at
U.S. Embassies and other foreign installations for use by congressional
committees, members, and staffs. Additionally, CRS could make
greater use in Washington of its mandate under the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970: ". . . when so authorized by a
committee and acting as the agent of that committee, to request of
any department or agency of the United States the production of
of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and
documents as the Service considers necessary. ..."

Another possibility is the establishment of an intern or staff exchange
program between the Congress and the Department of State. Familiar-
ity with the information structure possessed by the Department (and
perhaps the various mission agencies as well) could be increased by
such a two-way exchange. This arrangement would help to obviate the
longstanding difficulty facing the Congress in asking the right ques-
tions. The answers tend to be either shallow and unresponsive or
excessively voluminous and unwieldy. Familiarity with the sj^stem
could help to sharpen the questions and enable the Congress to insist
on pertinent fact.

IN-HOUSE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY

Even the best information resources are of relatively little use if
wheat cannot be sifted from the chaff. The Department of State
wrestles perennially with this problem, and an improved flow of
information to the Congress would raise the problem in a new setting.

The Murphy Commission proposed to solve this problem for the
executive branch by creating a number of institutional modifications
to structure the information. These included combining economic and
political offices in embassies, better two-way communication to define
and respond to needs from home, selection of ambassadors on the basis
of technical qualifications, and strengthening of intelligence and analy-
sis capabilities of the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce,
and Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisers. (Why not
also Interior, Labor, HEW, ERDA, and the National Science
Foundation?)

The congressional need for analysis of information relating to U.S.
foreign policy is met in part by relevant committee staffs and three

1902

existing institutions: the General Accounting Office, the Congressional
Research Service, and the Office of Technology Assessment. To assist
Congress in coordinating major studies of these three offices and the
Congressional Budget Office in all public policy fields, a new system of
recordkeeping has been established as of January 1976. The purpose
is primarily to avoid unnecessary duplication. The records may also
indicate, however, where coverage is weak, and thereby serve to
point to capabilities in need of strengthening.

The evidence presented in the Science, Technology, and American
Diplomacy series of studies tends to support the frequently expressed
opinion that existing analytical resources available to Congress in the
foreign policy field are not adequate. It is for Congress to judge the
extent of any related gaps or weaknesses and to decide whether the
remedy lies in further strengthening existing organizations, adding
new ones, or both. Congress is currently engaged in absorbing several
new resources already available to it — the OTA, the CBO, and im-
portant new committees and subcommittees in both Houses. However,
although many of these contribute to meeting the need for foreign
policy analysis, collectively they fall short of providing full and
balanced coverage.

One reason for the deficiency may be that there is no resource
available to Congress which concentrates solely and comprehensively
on the foreign policy/foreign affairs/international relations area. A
sense that such a need may exist has given rise to various proposals
for creation of a congressional office of foreign policy and national
security analysis. If such proposals are considered unrealistic or pre-
mature, an alternative option might be to strengthen the foreign affairs
component of CRS and couple w^ith it a congressional service unit in
the Department of State to assure that legislative needs for field
research are met systematically and responsively.

Another possibility is that a study might be placed under contract
with one or more outstanding academic or not-for-profit institutions
to advise the Congress specifically on appropriate mechanisms for
congressional acquisition and analysis of the flow of foreign policy
information.

The Murphy Commission suggested the creation of a joint com-
mittee to weigh the interrelations among political, military, and
economic aspects of foreign policy. It would include "leaders of the
key foreign, military, and international economic policy committees
from each House" and would receive and analyze reports from the
President and from the intelligence community. However, there was
no discussion of the staffing of such a committee. Since the effectiveness
of the committee, and the calculations as to whether to establish it,
could depend on the caliber of its staff and the nature of their proposed
assignments, further exploration of this matter (e.g., by the House
International Relations Committee) would seem appropriate as a
guide to possible future action.

One indispensable element of analysis is continuity of information
flow. The analyst in the process of reviewing and assessing the data
given him must be in a position to go back to the source at any time
for clarification or amplification of the facts at hand. It is a truism
that policy is always made on the basis of incomplete information, but
it is also true that improved completeness and reliability of information

1903

and greater depth of analysis produces improved policy. By whatever
means, it seems important that the Congress provide itself with such
service.

CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING

Heavy emphasis on the importance of long-range strategic planning
of foreign policy, divorced from short-range preoccupation with re-
active diplomacy, was stressed by the Murphy Commission as well as
in the present study. However, the Murphy Commission focused on
strategic planning in the executive branch; the present study contends
that it is also an important function of the Congress and that some
long-range planning should be performed in the legislative branch.

As executive branch institutions for strategic planning the Murphy
Commission proposed (1) renewal of the practice of preparation and
publication of a periodic Presidential "State of the World Report";
(2) the periodic preparation, by a "prestigious and independent or-
ganization of scientists" under delegation from both the executive
and legislative branches, of a "Global Systems Critical List of Prob-
lems and Opportunities"; (3) creation of a "Council of International
Planning," patterned after the Council of Economic Advisers, to
concentrate on a few carefully selected problems; (4) assignment of
specific long-range planning functions to members of the State De-
partment's Policy Planning Staff; and (5) creation of an Advisory
Committee of outside experts to serve as a bridge between the Policy
Planning Staff and the scholarly community. The only reference to
the Congress in this context had to do with review and hearings on
the Global Systems Critical List.

Various legislative proposals were offered in 1975 for the creation
of a joint committee on national security or strategic planning. A
partial substitute might be a small congressional planning office,
protected from the pressures of both partisanship and current opera-
tions by attachment to a Washington area university or foundation.
Alternatively, the planning office could be associated with the Senior
Specialist Division of the Congressional Research Service. In either
case it should provide access to all appropriate congressional com-
mittees. The special requirements of the planning function in the
congressional setting seem to call for the highest possible level of
professional and technological expertise, insulated from short-range
problems and issues, with permanent tenure unaffected by changes in
political control or committee chairmanships. The planning office
would provide the Congress with objective studies of broad perspec-
tive on the long-range goals and prospects, and ideas for initiatives
to serve the goals and adapt to gradual changes in U.S. foreign re-
lations. Insofar as technology plays a major role in modern diplomacy,
this institution would require substantial technological expertise, but
necessarily in combination with a strong international affairs
capability.

The importance of insulation of such an institution from day-to-day
problems does not imply its exclusion from contact with the Congress.
On the contrary, the expert members of the institution could hold
seminars, colloquia, workshops, and open consultations with visiting
scholars for the benefit of interested Members of Congress as well as
preparing in-depth analyses of the strategic concepts and proposed
diplomatic initiatives for congressional consideration. An important

1904

function of the institution would be its help in the maintenance of
continuity of congressional diplomatic policy, including support for
pertinent executive programs, adjustment of national priorities and
resource allocation, and assessment of major initiatives being devel-
oped by the executiv^e branch.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAMS

The difficulty encountered by the Department of State in maintain-
ing policy control of all aspects of U.S. foreign policy finds its counter-
part in the difficulty of achieving comprehensive congressional over-
sight of the same field and for somewhat similar reasons. The
Department is not staffed to maintain close technical surveillance of
the foreign programs of mission agencies, of the broad array of United
Nations activities substantially funded by the United States, nor
of the long list of bilateral agreements and joint commissions with
individual countries. Accordingly, there is no single source from which
the Congress can obtain full factual reports on these activities for
oversight purposes. If such information were promptly and comprehen-
sively available to the Congress, it might be possible even with present
staff resources of the Congress to make broad assessments of foreign
policy programs. Even though the findings of an oversight committee
of Congress may include recommendations with respect to which
there is no assurance of executive compliance, experience has been that
compliance is in fact prompted to a significant degree by congressional
monitoring. During the past 5 years the House International Re-
lations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, in a joint effort
with analyst support from CRS, have undertaken a sustained program
of review and analysis of the several hundred executive branch re-
ports submitted annually in compliance with about 350 separate
requirements contained in foreign affairs legislation. A computerized
record is kept of reports due and received. While this effort is only a
beginning, it represents a more systematic and comprehensive ap-
proach in principle than the past practice of giving primary attention
to obvious flaws in programs rather than attempting to monitor
more broadly the totality of execution of U.S. diplomacy.

It is Hkely, therefore, that action to enhance foreign affairs ac-
(iountability to Congress will entail strengthening both the State
Department policy control of this field and the mechanisms of con-
gressional review-. Possible action regarding the Department might
include a statutory strengthening of departmental policy authority
over foreign activities of mission agencies. It might also include a
requirement for joint interagency reports to Congress on substantive
programs involving both State and another agency, or formalizing
interagency committees (like the Interagency Committee on Inter-
national Science and Technology) and charging them with responsi-
bility to prepare annual reports of programs and activities within
their cognizance. However, if the Congress is to be involved in the
detailed oversight of interagency programs abroad, the twin dilemma
must be faced of how, within constitutional bounds, to preserve
intact both the President's authority to act swiftly and effectively in
securing vital U.S. interests and the confidentiaUty of sensitive
foreign policy information.

1905

On the congressional side, strengthening moves could include
intensification of recent efforts to exploit the computer faciUties of
Congress to build and maintain a current data bank of international
activities and to enable more systematic checks on compliance with
congressional mandates.

The availability of computer management of data also facilitates
the analysis, for sustained oversight purposes, of the results of ques-
tionnaires addressed to foreign affairs action agencies by appropriate
congressional committees about programs within their jurisdiction.

The use of exchanges of personnel between congressional and
departmental staffs, already suggested as a possibility for other
purposes, might also strengthen the congressional oversight function.
At the same time, it could help to build a relationship between the
Congress and the executive branch on foreign policy matters charac-
terized by constructive cooperation and acceptance of the need to
understand and reconcile important differences.

CONSULTATION ON PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES

Over the 200 years of U.S. history it has been a characteristic of
some Presidents to act as their own Secretaries of State, for others to
work in close relationship with their appointed Secretaries, and for a
third group to leave diplomacy primarilj'^ in the hands of the Secretary.
Illustrative of the first group were Presidents Wilson and Franklin
Roosevelt. On the other hand, both Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon,
while keenly interested in diplomatic matters, worked for most of
their terms with Secretaries of State with strong personalities and a
style of personal diplomacy. In either of these two conditions there
was a tendency to bypass the Congress in the formulation of diplo-
matic initiatives. Only after decisions had been made and studies
completed was Congress informed. In the event that a treaty was
involved, however, the President took more pains to bring the Congress
into a share of the action, as for example the preparations of Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman for the general treaty creating the United
Nations and President Kennedy's preparation for the Limited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty of 1963. However, in view of the deeper interest
of the Congress in foreign affairs and the many reasons why this
interest is likely to be sustained in the future, it seems reasonable to
expect that congressional participation with the President in the
shaping and winning acceptance of future foreign policy initiatives
wiU involve greater scope and depth than in the past. If so, a deeply
perceptive analytical capabUity will be required of the Congress in
the exercise of its constitutional functions of foreign affairs. In this
circumstance, it appears particularly necessary that the Congress
provide itself with the technical support to match qualitatively the
expertise of the executive branch.

Examples of attractive areas of future joint initiatives are cited in
the present study. For example :

arms negotiations,

joint space ventures,

international technology assessment institution,

law of the sea,

enlarged program of global health care,

nuclear safeguards,

1906

regional development programs,

materials buffer stock network^

global food allocation and production enhancement,

food preservation technology transfer,

brain drain,

regulation of multinational corporations.
To these might be added other items cited by Secretary Kissinger's
September 1, 1975, address to the U.N. General Assembly. Also, in
the event the Murphy Commission concept of a "Global Systems
Critical List of Problems and Opportunities" becomes a reality, it
would open the way to congressional participation in the process of
strategic planning. The Commission's suggestion of the National
Academy of Sciences as a possible source to prepare such a list indi-
cates the importance of science and technology as contributing
elements of future diplomacy.

The prospect of congressional collaboration at the Presidential level
in the planning of foreign policy initiatives postulates the need for
senior-level expertise to backstop the congressional participants.
Such support could be provided by one or more (or perhaps a consor-
tium) of the Congressional Research Service, General Accounting
Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment. Alternatively, a new
institution suggested earlier in this study for long-range congressional
planning of world trends and strategy might be considered. Such a
group might also be organized as a special staff to support the proposed
joint committee on national security, in the event that "national
security" was redefined in broader than military terms.

Recapitulation of Major Points

The entire study of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy
has documented the importance of technical subjects for the content
of U.S. foreign policy of the future.

The importance of technology was shown to require strengthening
of the institutional arrangements for the conduct of diplomacy.

Planning of U.S. foreign policy was shown to require a longer time
frame, a more positive and systematic approach in the origination of
policy initiatives, and a recognition of the many ways in which the
national interests of many countries are becoming interlocked.

Participation of both executive and legislative branches in the
formulation of broad foreign policy goals and strategies was seen as
essential under the changing conditions resulting from advancing
technology. Increasing pubUc awareness and consensus with respect
to the national purposes from which foreign policy goals are derived —
and with respect to the foreign policy goals themselves — was also seen
as essential.

Congressional participation in the process was shown to require
substantial support in the form of senior expertise in both technology
and diplomacy.

The technical resources of the Department of State were shown to
require strengthening to balance, in the field of peaceful technology,
the organized intellectual resources of the Department of Defense in
the field of military technology, the latter providing some useful
models. A firm grasp of global strategy requires both kinds of ex-
pertise. In particular, the need was indicated for the State Depart-
ment to lead the way in marshaling American managerial skills and

1907

technological expertise in the service of peace, as the Department of
Defense has long been doing in support of mihtary plans and opera-
tions. And finallj^, the foreign policy of the future was shown to
require a cooperative approach by all participants, public and private,
executive and legislative, United States and foreign.

In sum, there is no safety in separateness or intransigence in a
nuclear-armed world; there is no moral justification for irrationahty
in a world in which technology can erase the sources of conflict.

A Selected, Annotated Bibliography

by Subject

January 1976, with Addendum of August 1977

Prepared by Genevieve J. Knezo, Analyst. Science and Technology, Science Policy Research
Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress

CONTENTS

January 1976 Biblograpiiy

Page

Introduction 1913

Key to Secondary Source Annotations 1914

Technology and Global Interdependence: General Issues 1915

Formulation of Foreign Policy With a Scientific or Technological Content:

The United States 1923

Formulation of Policies Dealing With Science and Technology: Regional

and International Organizations 1937

Science and Technology in NATO and OECD 1941

International Technology Transfer: General Issues and Processes 1944

International Technology Transfer and Technical Assistance : The Develop-
ing Nations 1 950

International Technology Transfer : The Developed Nations 1962

Multinational Corporations 1969

The Brain Drain 1973

Energy 1974

Environmental Quality: International Issues 1985

The Stockholm Conference 1992

Issues of Food and Population 1995

Global Health 2001

Natural Resources 2003

Ocean Resources and Policy 2010

The People's Republic of China: Cooperation and Scientific and Techno-
logical Infrastructure 2020

Physical Sciences Research: Cooperation 2023

Space Cooperation and Policy 2024

Space Satellite Applications 2029

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Cooperation and Scientific and

Technological Infrastructure 2031

International Standards and Related Issues 2037

Weather Modification: International Issues 2039

August 1977 Addendum

Technology and Global Independence: General Issues 2041

International Technology Transfer : General Issues 2042

International Technology Transfer: The Developing Nations 2047

International Technology Transfer: The Developed Nations 2052

Multinational Corporations 2055

The Brain Drain 2058

Energy 2000

Environmental Quality 2070

Food and Population 2075

Global Health 2077

Natural Resources 2079

Ocean Resources and Policy 2082

The People's RepubHc of China: Cooperation and Infrastructure 2091

Space Cooperation and Policy 2093

Space Satellite Applications 2097

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Cooperation and Infrastructure _. 2100

International Standards and Related Issues 2104

Weather Modification: International Issues 2106

(1911)

INTRODUCTION

Most of the topics included in the series of studies on Science,
Technology, and American Diplomacy continue to receive considerable
attention by the Congress, the pubHc, and academic and other re-
searchers. An increasing number of journal articles, books, and legis-
lative proceedings address these topics.

A principal purpose of this bibliography is to provide bibliographic
references to relevant materials which have appeared since the pub-
lication of each study in the series. An attempt is made to cite mate-
rials which describe the evolution of the case or issue and which may
collectively express contrasting points of view about programs or
policies to deal with an issue. Each study in the series has extensive
footnotes for primary materials consulted. Therefore this bibliog-
raphy does not attempt to embrace citations for source materials used
to prepare each of the separate studies. It does include a few signifi-
cant items from the first (1970) bibliography published in this series:
Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy: A Selected, Annotated
Bibliography of Articles, Books, Documents, Periodicals, and Reference
Guides.

A second purpose of the bibliography is to provide references for
issues which were touched upon but not emphasized in preparing the
analytical reports, and which have now surfaced as relevant compo-
nents of the interface between diplomacy and science and technology.

Each author of a study in the series has suggested items to be
included in this bibliography. Additional bibliographic services and
primary sources were also used. A brief discussion of these is given for
those readers interested in obtaining future publications dealing with
the subjects covered in the bibliography.

The Congressional Research Service's computerized data bases,
accessible through the SCORPIO system, were a major information
source, primarily for journal articles and Government reports.*
Citations for congressional publications were obtained from committee
calendars, annual reports, and the Congressional Information Service
Index. Several journals which customarily publish articles or book
reviews relevant to the topics covered yielded many citations. These
are : Foreign Affairs, Perspective, the Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Sciences, and the American Political Science
Review. All entries for papers cited with an FAR number were taken
from the bibliographic series Foreign Affairs Research Papers Available,
published monthly by the Foreign Affairs Research Documentation
Center, Ofl5ce of External Research, Department of State. This
office lends available papers to Government officials.

.• SCO RPIO is an acronym for Subject-Content-Oriented Retriever for Processing Information On-line.

(1913)

Key to Secondary Source Annotations

Annotations or abstracts are given for most of the citations in this
bibliography. In most cases the quoted material in the annotation
comes from the document itself. However, in some cases quotations
were taken from secondary sources, including book reviews of a
document. These are indicated with a number which immediately
follows the annotation. The sources are keyed as follows: (1) Foreign
Affairs, (2) Perspective, (3) CIS Index, (4) Annals of the American
Academy oj Political and Social Science, and (5) American Political
Science Review.

(1914)

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A SELECTED,
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY BY SUBJECT

TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE : GENERAL ISSUES

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. "Analyzing Global Interdependence: Vol. I — Analytical

Perspectives and Policy Implications." Report C 74-27, prepared for INR/XR^

U.S. Dept. of State, November 1974, by the Center for International Studies.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 138 p. USC/FAR Proj. No. 24002-73,
Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21043-S.

Other parts of the series deal with energy interdependence (FAR 21164-S) ',
methodology (FAR 21165-S); and summary (FAR 21166-S.)
Bronowski, J. "The Disestablishment of Science." Encounter, v. 37, July 1971:

8-16.

"I have proposed two steps in the disestablishment of science: first, re-
fusal to accept grants or contracts or projects directly from government
agencies, and second, demand for a single national grant which is then to be
allocated by the scientific community itself. There remains a third step in
the more distant future, and yet it is the crucial step: the allocation of
research as a single international undertaking."
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era.

New York, The Viking Press, 1970. 334 p.

The book attempts to define " . . . the emerging global political process
which increasingly blurs the traditional distinction ^ between domestic and
international politics" and its meaning for the United States. "The first part
deals with the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on world affairs
in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principal
disseminator of that revolution — the United States — and analyzing the
effects of the revolution on the so-called Third World. The second part ex-
amines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, and
format of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular refer-
ence to the changing role of ideology. The third part assesses the contemporary
relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at the experi-
ence of the Soviet Union and then examining the overall condition of inter-
national communism as a movement that once sought to combine inter-
nationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the United States, a
society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind * * *.
The fifth part outlines in very broad terms the general directions that America
might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussed
foreigia and domestic dilemmas."
Brown, Lester R. The Interdependence of Nations. [New York] Foreign Policy

Association [1972]. 79 p. (Headline series no. 212.)

Discusses economic, ecological, resource, technological, and social inter-
dependence.
Brown, Seyom. New Forces in World Politics. Washington, D.C., The Brookings

Institution, 1974. 224 p.

"The disintegration of cold-war alliances and various challenges to the
traditional nation-state system fundamentally affect world politics today.
The author . . . finds the sources of both these trends in technological,
economic, and cultural changes that can be reversed only at great political
cost. He foresees a world in the last quarter of this century in which nations,
groups within nations, and transnational special interest groups will be com-
peting for popular support and loyalty. The resulting lack of political co-
herence, he believes, is likely to coincide with technological developments
that render close coordination among societies imperative if basic security,
health, and welfare needs are to be met. He concludes that all this bodes 111
for world order and justice unless efforts to improve international decision-
making processes are successful. To that end, he offers guidelines for U.S.
foreign policy responsive to the urgent need for international coordination in
the years ahead."

1915)

96-243 O - V7 - 27

1916

Brown, Seyom and Larry L. Fabian. "Toward Mutual Accountability in the
Nonterrestrial Realms." International Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer
1975: 877-892.

"The inherited international regimes for the ocean, outer space, and the
weather — based largely on the principles of open access and free use — are
inappropriate to the emerging needs in these realms for efficient and equitable
allocation of resources and for conflict management. Neither a substantially
greater exercise bj' national governments of management authority, nor a
marginalist approach to increasing the authority of functionally-specific
international institutions will suffice. A major commitment to expand and
strengthen processes of international accountability among the users of these
realms is required. Institutional targets for the mid-1980's should include a
comprehensive ocean authority; an outer space projects agency; a global
weather and climate organization; and an international scientific commission
on global resources and ecologies. Transitional strategies, of a marginal and
functionally-specific nature, however, will be required in the meantime,
directed toward internationalizing information on the nonterrestrial realms,
drawing the relevant actors into consultative arrangements, and limiting
current imilateralist trends."
Camps, Miriam. The Management of I nterdependence: a Preliminary View. New
York, Council on Foreign Relations [1974]. 104 p. (Council on Foreign Rela-
tions. Council papers on international affairs, 4)

Looks at some of the "management" problems the international system
will face in the 1980's and at some of the relationships it seems to be desirable
to encourage in four major areas: security, management of natural resources,
development, and management of natural resources including the ocean,
space and seabed.
Casev, William J. "Science and Technology and World Economic Affairs."
Dept. of State Bulletin, v. 69, Nov. 19, 1973: 630-634.

U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic AiTairs discusses U.S. stake
in technological innovation and its relation to economic and international
affairs.
Choucri, Nazli and Robert C. North. Nations in Conflict: National Growth and
International Violence. San Francisco, Freeman, 1975. 356 p.

"Taking the period from 1870 to 1914 as case material, this controversial
work will no doubt rank as a landmark in the quantitative analysis of inter-
national relations and specifically of the sources of conflict. In particular, it
assesses the indices of power of the key nations and traces the origin of war
to the consequences of different paces of national growth — economic, demo-
graphic, and technological." (1)
Daddario, Emilio Q. "National Science PoUcy — Prelude to Global Cooperation."
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 27, June 1971: 21-24.

"A national science policy is needed to 'provide the goals, priorities and
needed direction for the nation's scientific enterprise in the last quarter of
this century,' suggests former Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario. He proposes
also a new type of cooperative mechanism, an International Science Policy
Committee."
Dahlberg, Kenneth. "The Technological Ethic and the Spirit of International
Relations." International Studies Quarterly, v. 17, Mar. 19.73: 55-88.

"... the attempt will be made here to show that the large-scale applica-
tions of technology that so influences national and international actions and
environments are inextricably tied to a particular constellation of Western
values and perceptions which I shall call the technological ethic."
"Enlarging Cooperative International Efforts in Science and Technology."
Message from President Nixon to the Congress (Excerpts.) Department of
State Bulletin, v. 66, April 10, 1972: 547-548.
Fox, W. T., "Science, Technologj^ and International Politics." International
Studies Quarterly, v. 21, no. 1, March 1968: 1-15.

"As the superpowers of the 1960's have been discovering that they can
neither make war on nor make peace with each other, the arms race between
them has been giving way to a space race, itself part of a larger science and
technology race. This article discusses the impact of science and technology
upon the international political scene. The post war experience, Fox states, has
been greatly affected by the power positions in nuclear weapons proficiency
and, on another level, success in the space race. He suggests that Soviet-
American competition in the science race is having a benign effect on world

1917

politics . . . the science race tends to keep the arms race qualitative, thus
keeping each side from feeling that it is sufficiently prepared to resort to trial
by battle. Thus, the science race may have promoted the 'deceleration of
history'. All over the world there are problems too important to ignore, but
not important enough to cause Washington and Moscow to choose to destroy
each other. So history slows down, the problems remain, and some of them
grow daily more menacing. On the other hand, Fox suggests that this com-
petition must look to the needs created by our national deficiencies and to the
requirements of less advantaged people. For the world as a whole the mini-
mum requirement is set by the competition of national systems not with
each other but with nature itself."

Goodwin, Geoffrey L. and Andrew Linklater. New Dimensions of World Politics.
New York, Halsted Press, 1975. 127 p.

"The symposium gives a survey of new scientific and economic develop-
ments and transnational factors influencing world politics, and of available
theoretical perspectives." (1)

Haberer, Joseph. "PoUticahzation in Science." Science, v. 178, Nov. 17, 1972:
713-724.

Discusses "first, the politicalization of science, then the shift from an
international to a national orientation of the scientific enterprise, and finally
the professionalization of the community of science."

Haas, Ernst B. "Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Inter-
dependence and the Construction of International Regimes." International
Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975: 827-876.

"This essay seeks to make the following points: (1) The search for hoHstic
intellectual constructs to legitimate the construction of international regula-
tory regimes is fruitless if it is based on some notion of naturalness suggested
by science itself. The purposes to be served by the use and regulation of
science and technologies cannot be subordinated to the scientific attributes
of the activities to be regulated. (2) Darwinian evolutionary propositions
concerning survival imperatives are not adequate guides for the definition of
political purposes governing the international regulation of science and
technology. (3) If holistic constructs are not fruitful as organizing devices
entirely disaggregated and fragmented solutions to technological problems
are self-defeating in terms of achieving political purposes. What kind of
knowledge do we have to suggest the creation of cognitive links among parts
which add up to wholes consistent with political purposes as units-to-be-
regulated? The identification of links demands a closer type of cooperation
among technical experts and political decision-makers than practiced
hitherto. Hence a notion of the pubUc interest is advanced to suggest the
identification of links through new types of institutions and procedures for
combining scientific with political knowledge. (4) Wholes to be identified
through such processes can be analyzed in terms of the language of com-
plexity and decomposability, leading to various notions of interdependence.
Pohtical purposes and technological developments are discussed jointly to
show how a given concern can be characterized by different kinds of inter-
dependencies at different times. 'Interdependence' then emerges as a multi-
dimensional and dynamic device for identifying wholes. (5) Various types of
interdependence are matched to various forms of international organizational
cooperation and the evolution of organizations is examined in terms of
learning to manage interdependence. (6) By combining organizational forms
with changing political purposes we arrive at provisional wholes called
'technology-task-environments' which permit the scientist and the politician
to contribute jointly to the management of interdependence issues triggered
by changing technologies and scientific ideas until the evolving mix of
knowledge and purpose leads them to construction of alternative (but
equally temporary) wholes."

Hamilton, David. Technology, Man and the Environment. New York, Scribners,
1973. 357 p.

"This exhaustive review of developments in major areas of technology
provides valuable concepts and data on the worldwide consequences of
technological progress." (1)

Jenkins, Brian M. "High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War; The Impact
of New Technology on Low-level Violence." RAND Paper P-5339, Jan. 1975.
26 p. Available from the State Department as FAR 21846-P.

1918

Kahn, Herman. A Slightly Optimistic World Context for 1975-2000. Croton-on-
HudsoH; N. Y., Hudson Institute, 1974. 13 1. (Hudson Institute. Research
memorandum no. 8). At head of title: Corporate environment program.

Expects "economic growth to continue to increase well into the twenty-
first century," and expects that "by the year 2000 most of the world's
population will be very well off by today's standards."
Kahn, Herman. Ten Alternative Global Projections for 1975-SOOO. Croton-on-
Hudson, N.Y., Hudson Institute, 1974. 12 1.

Presents ten projections of what might happen in the world (1975-2000)
six are described as "surprise-free projections" and the others are Msted as
"unlikely worlds".
Kahn, Herman and William Brown. A World Turning Point — and a Better
Prospect for the Future. Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y., Hudson Institute, 1975.
21 1. (Hudson Institute. Research memorandum no. 13). At head of title:
Corporate environment program.

"We are now or probably soon will be passing through an inflection point
for world growth rates of both population and production. In other words,
these rates are now at historic high points, after which they will gradually
decline and level off, producing a generally affluent world about a century
hence."
King, Alexander. Science and Policy: the International Stimulus. London, Oxford
University Press, 1974. 110 p.

The author is former director-general for scientific affairs of the OECD.
He notes "Science and technology have been important ingredients in the
building of the kind of world we enjoy and suffer today. Research activity has
expanded greatly in the last few decades in all industrialized countries and
now amounts to a sizeable proportion of the gross national product. Funds^
for research and development come mainly from governments, although
industrial contributions are great. These circumstances, in which the promise
offered by new discovery is greater than the resources available, have
necessitated the creation of national policies and priorities. Furthermore,
increasing scale and cost have encouraged the sharing of research inter-
nationally. This book sketches the evolution of such policies on an inter-
national basis, outlines the main issues, and gives some indication of future
trends, particularly in relation to the need to use the scientific approach to
solve not only material and economic problems but also those of society."
Kintner, William R. and Harvev Sicherman. Technology and International Politics:
The Crisis of Wishing. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath and Co., 1975. 175 p.
(Institute Book Series of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia.)
The authors attempt to describe the impact of technology on four aspects
of international politics: war and peace, political integration, modernization,
and resources. The book argues basically that the most important aspects
of modem technology, research and development, generate uncertainty in
nation-states. This is an ambiguous impact. Although it may weaken the
power of a state, in the end it will strengthen a nation's sovereignty. This
book therefore stands in contrast to those studies which hypothesize that
technology will automatically lead to interdependence of nations.
Meadows, Dennis and DoneUa H. Meadows., eds. Toward Global Equilibrium;
Collected Papers. Cambridge, Wright-Allen Press, 1973. 358 p.

"Technical papers by The Limits to Growth team dealing with raw materials,
pollution, population, methodology and ethics."
Mesarovic, Mihajlo and Edward Pestei. Mankind at the Turning Point: the Second
Report to the Club of Rome. New York, Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, 1974.
210 p.

"The quest for an alternative to the deadly endings traced in Limits to
Growth has produced a more sophisticated computer model. While stressing
global interdependence, this one deals separately with regions and permits the
testing of a variety of assumptions. The results reported here still point
to danger, but make a case for "differentiated growth," international coop-
eration, and coordinated action across a wide front." (1)
Morgenstern, Oskar, Klaus Knorr, and Klaus P. Heiss. Long-Term Projections
of Power: Political, Economic, and Military Forecasting. Cambridge, Ballinger,
1973. 229 p.

"This trenchant discussion of forecasting recommends skepticism and a
mixed approach. Energy, which the authors regard as particularly important
in judging power, and China, which they find the hardest country to make
projections about, receive special attention. Familiar faces such as the Club
of Rome and Herman Kahn are inspected rather quizzically." (1)

1919

Ogburn, William Fielding, ed. Technology and International Relations. Chicago,
The University of Chicago Press, 1949. 198 p. plus index.

Written soon after World War II when important developments in trans-
portation, communications, and power bfegan to impact upon the changing
political order, this compilation of readings assesses the implications of
scientific and technological developments on U.S. international policies.
Essays relate to acceptance of new technologies, impact of technology gen-
erally on political development, military weapons development and inter-
national relations, and impacts of specific developments, steam and steel,
aviation, atomic energy, and mass communications on international relations.
While much attention is devoted to the relations between the United States
and Europe, and the United States and the Soviet Union, some discussion
is devoted to relationships with the developing countries.
The Planetary Bargain: Proposals for a New International Economic Order to Meet
Human Needs. Report of an International Workshop convened in Aspen,
Colorado, July 7- August 1, 1975. A Policy Paper/ Aspen Institute for Humanistic
Studies. Program in International Affairs. 1975. 36 p.

"The 'planetary bargain' is our name for the sum of practical arrangements
for a new international economic order ..." required to perform global
functions. The report argues that governments, acting alone, do not look at
policy formulation from an international point of view; this view is required
to cope with increasingly interdisciplinary complex systems. The report lays
out the structure of the new international institution and the relationships of
governments to it. In particular the report describes new functions of the
organization: "The international system should work toward the use of
'extranational' bodies (comparable to the European Commission) — plural
executives which can take international initiatives at the political level. One
or more such bodies will be needed to (a) formulate international standards
for minimum ('first floor') human needs; (b) help countries evfl,luate alterna-
tive development strategies; (c) analyze national plans for meeting human
needs; (d) collect taxes and fees for the use of international 'commons';
(e) allocate these funds to carry out plans to meet human needs; and (f) moni-
tor the implementation of these plans."
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "Back into the Bottle?" Science and Public Affairs, v. 29,
Apr. 1973:19-23.

Discusses the downgrading of science by the administration and urges
more participation by scientists in man's affairs, including some sort of inter-
national science council.
Rettig, Richard A. Bibliography on Science and World Affairs. Prepared for the
Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State. Nov. 1964. [Washington],
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965. 179 p.

Partially annotated bibliography, topically arranged, of books and articles
on science and world affairs for foreign service officers ; inclusive to November
1964. Major social science and scientific periodicals are covered. Subject
areas include "science, society, and the polity, science and worid affairs,
World War II and the aftermath, the peaceful atom, systems and strategies
in nuclear war, arms control and disarmament, outer space, foreign aid,
cultural relations, international organization, international scientific co-
operation, and comparative systems."
Ritchie-Calder, Lord. "Global Science Policy." Science, v. 183, March 22, 1974:
1147.

Discusses the work on the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
on the topic of global science and technology policies. The author notes one
of the proposals to emanate from this work, i.e. ". . . that the now redun-
dant [U.N.] Trusteeship Council be replaced by a Scientific Council on the
level of the Security and Economic and Social Council so that the issues would
be aired and continually reviewed."
"Role of Science and Scientists in National and World Affairs." Pugwash News-
letter, V. no. 1, July 1969: 4-15.

"A report of the Fifth Pugwash Symposium (May 1969) on the above
topic is presented. The report lists the sjinposium participants and the
papers presented. The related discussions and recommendations are sum-
marized in some detail under seven headings:

Impact of Science and Technology on Society.
The Relationship Between Science and Politics.
Science and Society.
International Scientific Organizations.

1920

National Scientific Organizations.
Inter-disciplinary Research.

Responsibilities of World Scientific Community." (4)
Ruggie, John Gerard. "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and
Trends." International Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975: 557-584.

An essay which lays out the theoretical organizing concepts of the essays
which comprise the symposium issue dealing with international science, and
technology. The essay details concepts of collective action and collective
response created by the interaction of technology and international poUtics
and, based on the papers presented, gives a discussion of the imphcations
for the design of future international organizations.
In greater detail:

"Physical and technological parameters are important determinants of
international responses to technology when those responses concern research,
scanning and monitoring, and problem recognition in general — when, in a
word, the issue is to discover or understand some process or situation. When,
however, the issue is to manage some process or situation, the weight of
political purposes becomes preponderant. For, the same response that maxi-
mizes fisheries catch, to cite an example, may reduce employment, or the
same response that sets higher standards of environmental quahty may
reduce trade potential, or the same response that increases technological
efficiency may lower foreign exchange earnings. In fact, the same response
may well do all simultaneously. Deciding among them is not a question of
physical and technological determinants; it is a question of social choice."

"By introducing political purposes into the equation linking technological
change to international organization we considerably complicate our descrip-
tive and prescriptive tasks. International organization is itself then no longer
a simple response to technology, but, rather, a more complex product of the
intersection of two axes. Along the first is plotted the tension between science,
heavily informed by consensual knowledge of cause/effect relations, and
poUtics, heavily informed by normative purposes, negotiated priorities and
available capabilities. The outcome of this tension may be said to define the
situation which science and its products will have occasioned. Along the
second axis is plotted the tension between the need of states to respond
collectively to problems and opportunities such situations contain, and their
desire to maintain national autonomy and flexibility in so doing. The outcome
of this tension may be said to define the response which a new situation will
have occasioned. These two axes, together with the concepts of situation and
response taken over a group or collectivity of nations — that is, collective
situation and collective response — define the analytical boundaries of the
studies that follow."
Salomon, Jean-Jacques. Science and Politics. (Translated from the French by
Noel Lindsay.) Cambridge, The MIT Press [1973]. 277 p.

"Salomon objectively poses those questions about values, science, and
politics that lie at the heart of the contemporary debate about the moral
ends of science and technology. Most of his cases are drawn from the American
experience, and relate to research subsidized by the government for military
purposes." Chapter 9 deals with international science, and limitations posed
by nationalism.

The author is head of the science policy directorate of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Scheel, Walter. "Technology as an Element of Foreign Policy." Au^senpolitik,
v. 23, no. 3, 1972: 243-251.

West Germany'^ Minister of Foreign Affairs defines science and technology
as a new dimension of foreign policy.
Schilling, Warner R. "Technology and International Relations." In International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, v. 15, New York, the Macmillan Company
and the Free Press, 1968. p. 589-598.

Mr. Schilling describes "how technological developments of the past
three centuries have effected significant changes in every element in the
international political process (actors, ends, expectations, means, and sys-
tem)." He then analyzes major facets of the interaction: characteristics,
trends and prospects. Includes selected but extensive bibhography on the
subject.
Stanley Foundation. Fifteenth Strategy for Peace Conference Report, October 17-20,
1974. Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation, 1974. 76 p.

1921

The conference, which brought together academics and policy makers,
emphasized the interdependence of the world in foreign policy and techno-
logical issues. The following topics were covered: the Non-proliferation
treaty, Development decision-making, "Keeping the Peace," Southeast
Asian neutralization, Conventional weapons control, and International
cooperation in outer space.
Sterling, Richard W. Macropolilics: International Relations in a Global Society.
New York, Knopf, 1974. 648 p.

"Confronting the doctrine of political realism. Professor Sterling argues
persuasively that new global forces (compression of time and space, the
universal quest for development and justice, and the emergence of trans-
national actors) have transformed international society and necessitate the
macro-perspective . . ." (1)
Suttmeier, Richard P. "Revolution in Post-Industria or Revolutionary Post-
Industria? An Exercise in Speculation on the Future Political Role of Science
and Technology." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International
Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1975. 32 p. Available from
the State Department as FAR 22426-P.
"Symposium: The Impact of Science and Technology on International Law."
California Law Review, v. 55, no. 3, May 1967: 407-534.

"Advances in science and technology during the past few decades have ac-
celerated the growth of international law as a creative force in organizing
and regulating cooperative projects among nations. International control over
the utilization of new discoveries, however, has not been realized. Methods to
accomplish this goal must be discovered within our existing legal framework
or developed through other institutions. The topics discussed in this sym-
posium present a clear challenge for international law to acquire and maintain
effective control over the potentially destructive technological revolution."
Subjects included are "Scientific Advances and International Lawmaking,"
Oscar Schacter; "Communication SateUites: International Organization for
Development and Control," Stephen E. Doyle; "Law, Technology and the
Sea," Douglas M. Johnston; "Criteria for Long-Range Nuclear Control
Policies," Herman Kahn and Carl Dibble; "Weather Modifications and Con-
trol: Some International Legal ImpUcations," Howard J. Taubenfeld; and
"The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation," Ivan A. Vlasic.
Technology, The Nation-State, Population Control and the Third World. Including:
Alexander King, "The Challenge of Science and Technology to Traditional
Concepts of National Sovereignty; and Gerard Piel, "Population Control by
Economic Development. "In Neal, Fred Warner and Mary Kersey Harvey,
eds. American Foreign Policy in the Age of Interdependence. Vol. Ill of four
volumes edited from the proceedings of PACEM IN TERRIS III, A National
Convocation to Consider New Opportunities for United States Foreign Policy,
Convened in Washington, D.C., October 8-11, 1973 by the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, pp. 79-157 (including discussion).

King "draws on his experience as Director- General of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris and his activities as
a leader of the Club of Rome to make a powerful and comprehensive analysis
of the challenge of modern science and technology to traditional concepts of
national sovereignty. He is followed by Gerard Piel, publisher of Scientific
American, who returns to the need for development, especially as it affects
population growth."

The other edited volumes of proceedings are entitled: Vol I: The Nixon-
Kissinger Foreign Policy:' Opportunities and Contradictions, Vol. II, The
Military Dimensions of Foreign Policy, and Vol. IV, The Requirements of
Democratic Foreign Policy.
Todd, W. M. and John Voss. "The Consortium of Academies: a New ^yay to
Found International Scholarly Institutions." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Feb. 1971:29-32.

A review of proposals set forth for international cooperation between
national academies of science, including their rationale. Particular attention
is given to the proposal to create an International Foundation for Science,
originally called the International Science Foundation.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security Policy and Scientific Developments. Strategy and Science:
Toward a National Security Policy for the 1.970's. Hearings. 91st Cong., 1st
sess., March 1969. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969. (House Document
No. 91-185).

1922

Assessment of how science and technology have influenced foreign policy
considerations, both civilian and military.
ir.S. Council on International Economic Policy. International Economic Report of
dhe President; Together With the Annual Report of the Council on International
Economic Policy. Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print.
Oflf., 1974. 113 p. Contents. — U.S. international economic policies. — The U.S.
position in a changing world. — Some implications of the energy crisis for the
United States and the world economy. — The United States role in world agri-
cultural trade. — Policy issues concerning foreign investment in the United
States. — U.S. banking and securities regulation — some consequences for inter-
national finance competition. — International technology transfer. — New ap-
proaches to foreign trade in Communist countries. — Economic aspects of the
law of the sea.
United Nations. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 1973 Pro-
visional World List of Periodicals Dealing with Science and Technology Policies.
Paris, UNESCO, New York, Distributed by UNESCO pubhcations Center,
1974. 112 p. (Science policy studies and documents, no. 33(2).)
United Nations. Secretary General (Waldheim). Protection of Broad Sectors
of the Population Against Social and Material Inequalities, As Well As Other
Harmful Effects Which Might Arise From the Use of Scientific and Technological
Developments: Report. New York, 1975. 62 p. (United Nations. [Document]
A/10146)

At head of title: United Nations General Assembly.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). The Role of Modern Science and
Technology in the Development of Nations and the Need to Strengthen Economic
and Technico-scientific Co-operation Among Slates. New York, 1973. 10 p.
(United Nations. [Document] E/5238)

Presents general recommendations. A more detailed treatment, appears in
Lord Ritchie-Calder's addendum (E/5238/Add.l).

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
The White House Conference on International Cooperation. November 28-
December 1, 1965, Washington, D.C. Reports prepared by Committees of the
National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation for Presentation at
the White House Conference on International Cooperation. Washington, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1965.

Includes Committee reports on: Agriculture and Food, Arms Control and
Disarmament, Aviation, Business and Industry, Communications, Culture
and Intellectual Exchange, Disaster Relief, Education and Training, Finance
and Monetary Affairs, Health, Human Rights, Labor, Manpower, Natural
Resources Conservation and Development, Peacekeeping Operations,
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Popula-
tion, Research on Development of International Institutions, Science and
Technology, Space, Technical Cooperation and Investment, Transportation,
Trade, Urban Development, Women, and Youth Activities.

FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY WITH A SCIENTIFIC OR
TECHNOLOGICAL CONTENT: THE UNITED STATES

Bacchus, William I. "Diplomacy for the 70's: an Afterview and AppraisaL"
American Political Science Review, v. 68, no. 2, June 1974: 736-748.

The author was a staff member of the Commission on the Organization of
the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. "Numerous attempts
have been made since World War II to reform U.S. government structure and
procedures for managing foreign affairs, but success has been distinctly
limited. In evaluating the procedures, proposals, accomplishments, and
failures .of the most recent State Department reform program, this review
suggests some reasons why rationalization of foreign afiairs organization has
been so difficult to achieve. Unless fundamental questions of the Department
of State's appropriate relationship to the rest of government are confronted
directly, it is impossible to deal effectively with international organizations,
operations, and staffing. Yet because of a restricted mandate. Diplomacy for
the 70s did not address itself to these priority questions. And for a number of
reasons, including a misplaced belief in the efficacy of management reforms as
contrasted with political initiatives, lack of aggressive senior level support^
ineffective followup, and budgetary restrictions, it fared no better than
previous reform programs, even taken on its own limited terms. Unless such
basic problems are dealt with, future reform attempts are likely to be no more
successful."
Bacchus, William I. Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: the State Depart-
ment's Country Director System. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974.
350 p.

"The State Department in 1966 established a system of country directors,

individuals responsible for all American activities with particular countries,

single focal points in Washington to serve our Ambassadors. This study, a

sensible blend of empirical data and theory, describes the gap between

expectation and reality, based on interviews with 46 of the 49 country

directors and nearly 100 others involved with them." (1)

Berkner, Lloyd Viel. Science and Foreign Relations: International Flow of Scientific

and Technological Information. Washington, International Science Policy

Survey Group, 1950, VIII, 170 p. U.S. Department of State, Publication

3860, General Foreign PoUcy Series, No. 30.

"A report prepared by the Department of State and reviewed by a select
committee of the National Academy of Sciences. Covers such topics as
collection and dissemination of foreign scientific information; support of
international scientific organizations and conferences; educational exchange;,
technical assistance ; controls over international flows of scientific information
and persons ; and the role of science in formulation of foreign policy. Appendices-
document Department of State's international scientific activity."

Among the recommendations made by the group were creation of a Science'
Office in the Department of State and establishment of a science attache
program .at American embassies.
Chinn, Herman I. "International Scientific Co-Operation." Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, November 1969 : 34-5, 47.

"Everybody talks about international scientific co-operation, but what
are we reallv doing about it? Dr. Chinn, . . . Science Officer in Inter-
national Scientific and Technological Affairs of the U.S. Department of
State . . . takes a hard look at what is happening in thiit much-discussed
area, and makes viable suggestions for improvement."

(1923)

1924

Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.
[Report] June 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 27S p.

The Commission was established by P.L. 92-352, to submit findings and
recommendations to develop a more effective system to formulate and
implement foreign policy. This volume summarizes the major findings. It
treats: "The purposes of organizations, [which] outline the importance of
sound organizations and decision processes, and discusses the functions that
effective organization can and cannot perform. It then suggests the general
characteristics of the foreign policy problems of the near future with which
any organizational arrangements will have to contend." The next section
^'The President and the State Department, spells out the Commission's main
recommendations concerning the organization of the Executive Office of the
President, and the Department of State." The section entitled "The Conduct
of Foreign Policy, discusses changes in organization which might improve
the formulation and conduct of various specific aspects of foreign policy,
and contains additional recommendations concerning the White House and
State Department as well as the Departments of the Treasury, Defense,
and the Intelligence Community. Aspects of congressional organization are
also discussed." The last section, "Executive-Congressional Relations and
the Organization of the Congress," relates a number of the recommendations
made concerning the executive branch to proposed congres.-?ional changes,
and reviews the means by which executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment can work together more effectively to carry out their mutual re-
sponsibilities for foreign policy.

Contents of Appendix Volumes I Through VII

Volume I
appendix a: foreign policy for the future

1. The Future World Environment: Near-Term Problems for U. S. Foreign
Policy by Peter L. Szanton.

2. The International Community in the Next Two Decades by Zbigniew
Brzezinski.

3. The Tasks Ahead for U.S. Foreign Policy by Robert R. Bowie.

4. Toward an Open Foreign Policy by Mc George Bundy.

APPENDIX b: the management of global issues

Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdependence by
J. S. Nye, Robert O. Keohane, et al.

APPENDIX c: multilateral diplomacy

1. The Management of Multilateralism by Harlan Cleveland.

2. Foreign Policymaking in a New Era — The Challenge of Multilateral
Diplomacy by Richard N. Gardner.

3. Conduct of Multilateral Diplomacy by the United States Government
by Charles W. Yost.

Volume II

appendix d: the use of information

Towards a More Soundly Based Foreign Policy: Making Better Use of
Information by Alexander L. George, Stanford University, et al.

appendix e: field reporting

Towards the Improvement of Foreign Service Field Reporting by William
D. Coplin, Michael K. O'Leary, Robert F. Rich, et al, Prince Analysis, Inc.

appendix f: policy planning

1. Organizing for Policy Planning by Lincoln P. Bloomfield.

2. Commentaries by Robert R. Bowie, Chester L. Cooper, and Henry
Owen.

1025

APPENDIX g: analytic techniques for foreign affairs

Utilization of Computer Technology and Formal Social Science in Foreign
Policy Decision-making by Warren R. Phillips and Richard E. Haves.
CACI, Inc.

Volume III

appendix H: case studies on U.S. foreign economic policy: 1965-74

Cases on a Decade of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy: 1965-74 by Edward
K. Hamilton et al., Griffenhagen-Kroeger, Inc.

appendix i: conduct of routine relations

The Making of U.S. Policies Toward Latin America: The Conduct of
"Routine" Relations by Abraham F. Lowenthal et al.

appendix j: foreign economic policy

1. Economic Intelligence and Analysis by Kenneth W. Dam.

2. Personnel for U.S. Economic Activities Overseas by Mortimer D.
Goldstein.

3. The Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Economic Policy by
Sidney Weintraub.

4. A Critical Appraisal of U.S. International Economic Policy Coordina-
tion by Stephen D. Cohen.

Volume IV

appendix k: adequacy of current organization: defense

AND ARMS control

Findings, Recommendations and Case Studies on the Adequacy of Current
Organization: Defense and Arms Control, by Graham T. Allison, et al.

Volume V
appendix l: congress and executive-legislative relations

1. The Constitution and Foreign Policy.

a. "A More EfiFective System" for Foreign Relations: The Constitu-
tional Framework, by Louis Henkin.

b. Comments by Gerhard Casper, Thomas Ehrlich, Eugene Rostow,
and Richard A. Falk.

2. Congressional Organization

a. Foreign Policy Aspects of the House Select Commission on Com-
missions by Representative Richard BoUing.

b. The "Role of the President in Foreign Pohcy by Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr.

3. Congressional Leadership

a. Congressional Leadership and Foreign Policy by Senator Mike
Mansfield.

b. Congressional Party Leadership and the Impact of Congress on
Foreign Pohcy by Randall B. Ripley.

4. Foreign Economic Pohcymaking by Senator James B. Pearson.

5. Congress and Foreign Pohcy by Senator J. W. Fulbright.

6. Problems in the Conduct of Foreign Pohcy.

a. PubUc Participation in the Foreign Pohcy Process by Richard A.
Frank.

b. Foreign Policy Information by Stanley N. Futterman.

c. Executive Privilege in the Conduct of Foreign Pohcy by Rita A.
Hauser.

d. The Power to Make War by W. Taylor Reveley III.

appendix m: congressional survet

Report of a Staff Survey of Congressional Views on the Organization of
Government Conduct of Foreign Policy by R. Roger Majak.

1926

APPENDIX n: congress and national security

1. Congress and National Security: A Look at Some Issues by Representa-
tive Clement J. Zablocki.

2. Foreign Policy and Unnecessary Nuclear Secrecy — the Need for More
Coordination Among the Committees Involved by Senator Stuart Symington.

3. Department of Defense Response to Senator Mike Mansfield: Informa-
tion for Consideration by the Commission. . . .

Volume VI

APPENDIX O: making ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE EFFECTIVE: CASE STUDIES

Making Organizational Change Effective: Case Analysis of Attempted
Reforms in Foreign Affairs by staff and consultants of the National Academy
of Public Administration.

APPENDIX P: PERSONNEL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Foreign Affairs Personnel Management by James W. Clark.

2. The Foreign Service Personnel System by R. Bartlett Moon.

3. Developing the Military Executive by David S. C. Chu and John P.
White.

4. Executive Manpower Systems and Overseas Assignment Practices
in Multinational Corporations by Theodore P. Levino and William K.
Cordier.

5. Organization for Presidential Personnel Management Responsibilities
with Particular Reference to Foreign Affairs Personnel by Charles Parker.

APPENDIX Q: posts AND MISSIONS

1. The Role of the Ambassador by Foy D. Kohler.

2. Is the Ambassador an Endangered Species, or Merely Obsolete? by
J. Robert Schaetzel.

3. The Organization and Management of United States Overseas
Missions — Issues and Options by William O. Hall.

4. Overseas Posts and Missions by T. McAdams Deford.

appendix r: comparative foreign practices

Problems in the Organization of United States Foreign Policy: "Compara-
tive Foreign Practices," by staff and consultants of the Atlantic Institute
for International Affairs.

appendix s: advisory panels
The President's External Advisors in Foreign Policy by Chester A. Crocker.'
APPENDIX t: budgeting and foreign affairs coordination

1. Budgeting, Programming, and Foreign Policy by Arnold Nachmanoff.

2. Congressional Uses of its Many Powers to Control Foreign Policy by
Allen Schick.

Volume VII

APPENDIX u: intelligence functions analyses

1. Intelligence Functions by William J. Barnds.

2. Intelligence and Policymaking in an Institutional Context by William J.
Barnds.

3. Comments on Barnds' papers by John W. Huizenga, Lawrence E.
Lynn, Jr. and Harry Howe Ransom.

4. Issues on Intelligence Resource Management by Robert M. Macy.

5. Clandestine Operations by Taylor G. Belcher.

6. Intelligence Support for Foreign Policy in the Future by Russell Jack
Smith.

7. Congress and American Secret Intelligence Agencies by Harry Howe
Ransom.

8. Intelligence, Covert Operations, and Foreign Policy by Paul W.
Blackstock.

1927

APPENDIX V: COORDINATION IN COMPLEX SETTINGS

The Coordination of Complexity in South Asia by Lloyd I. Rudolph^
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Universitj' of Chicago, et al.

APPENDIX W: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FOREIGN POLICY

1. Ethical Considerations and Foreign Policy by Donald F. McHenrj', with
the assistance of Fred K. Kirfchstein.

2. Ethical Considerations and National Securitv Policj'^ by Francis X.
Winters, S.J.

APPENDIX X: THREE INTRODUCTORY RESEARCH GUIDELINES

1. The Commission's Studies Program by Peter L. Szanton.

2. Alternative Organizational Models for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
by William I. Bacchus and R. Roger Majak.

3. Problems in the Conduct of United States Foreign Policy : A Compilation
of Recent Critiques by J. Daniel O'Flaherty.

Crawford, Elisabeth T. and Albert D. Biderman, eds. Social Scienlists and Inicr-
national Affairs: A Case For A Sociology of Social Science. New York, John'
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969. 333 p.

"This book examines the relationship between social scientists and the
activities of the U.S. Government in the international ficki since the begin-
ning of World War II. The plan for this volume of reprinted articles, com-
mented on by the editors and supplemented' by an extensive bibliograph}-,
was developed in the course of a research i)roject supported by the Behavioral
Sciences Division of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research on the use of
social science knowledge in international and military affairs." The writings
of outstanding social scientists are representecj. Topics covered include:
"perspectives on the social roles" of social scientists; the social organization
of policy-oriented social science; the relationships between social science re-
search and policy needs, and the functions of policy-oriented social science.
Excellent annotated bibliographies treating many of the topics discu.ssed are
included. Also appended are materials on "the organization of policy-oriented
social science" in the government, governmental "decisionmaking structures
and use of social science research," and "the substance of social science
knowledge and policy concerns in international and military affairs."
DuBridge, Lee A. "Pohcy and the Scientists." Foreign Affairs, v. 41, no. 3, Apr.
1963: 571-588.

Assessment of the contributions and limitations of scientists and engineers
in government and those called upon for consultation in particular policy
areas. In-depth coverage of the Office of Scientific Research and Development^
the Atomic Energy Commission, the President's Science Advisory Committee,
the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration; cm-sory coverage of other agencies and departments. Illus-
trates the frequent disagreement among scientists and the difficulty of
characterizing the "rightness" or "wrongness" of scientific advice received
by the government. Mr. DuBridge concludes: "One who has had full access
to the record cannot help but be proud of the way in which the Nation's best
scientists, when brought intc) responsible posts in public affairs, have carried
out their tasks conscientiously, selflessly, intelligently — and often with great
brilliance and breadth of vision."
Etheredge, Lloyd S. "Personality & Foreign Policy: Bullies in the State Depart-
ment." Psychology Today, v. 8, March 1975: 37-40, 42.

"The man to watch out for is mature, sophisticated, proud of himself,

ambitious, and itching for power. If he's low in his trust of others, he projects

his private world on ambiguous international situations. The first good study

on the willingness to wage war — or dodge it — among miUtary and State

Department professionals.

"Federal Funding of Foreign Affairs Research." FAR Horizons, v. 7, no. 1,

Winter 1974: 5-8. (Newsletters of the secretaries committee, Subcommittee on

Foreign Affairs Research.)

Survey and analysis of foreign affairs research funding patterns in the
U.S. Government.

1928

Fischer, Glen H. Public Diplomacy and the Behavioral Sciences. Evanston, Uni-
versity of Indiana Press, 1972.

Use of behavioral and social research in understanding and formulating

foreign policy. t^ ,

"Foreign Affairs Research— FY 1974 External Research Program, Dept. of

State." FAR Horizons, v. 7, no. 3, Summer 1974: 1-3, 14-15. (Newsletter of

the Undersecretaries committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs Research.)

Describes content and objectives of the research support program.

Frye, Alton. A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security. New York,

McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1975. 238 p.

"A clear and vividly written account, beginning with the 1968 debate over
the ABM system, of the revival of congressional participation in setting the
goals and shaping the instruments of national security. The author, a Senior
Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and director of the Carnegie
Endowment's Congress project, favors the trend toward an even more
significant congressional role. On the basis of case studies and personal
experience as a congressional aid, he is optimistic." (1)
Gilpin, Robert and Christopher Wright (eds.). Scientists and National Pohcy-
mak'ing. New York, Columbia University Press, 1964, VIII. 408 p.

"The essays constituting this volume were prepared for the Council for
Atomic Age Studies of Columbia University. Comprises: Introduction:
Natural Scientists in Policymaking by Robert Gilpin, The Scientific Estab-
lishment by Don K. Price, Scientists and Politics : The Rise of an Apolitical
Elite by Robert Wood, The Scientific Adviser by Harvey Brooks, Scientists
and American Science Policy by Wallace S. Sayre, The President's Science
Advisers and National Science Policy by Robert N. Kreidler, Scientists,
Foreign Policy, and Politics by Warner R. Schilling, Strategy and the Natural
Scientists by Albert Wohlstettcr, The Scientific Strategists by Bernard
Brodie, and Scientists and the Establishment of Science Affairs by Christopher

Wright."

Halperin, Morton, et al. "The 'X' Factor in Foreign Policy. Highlights of Bureau-
cratic Politics and Foreign Policy." Brookings Research Report, 140. 1975. 9 p.
"If the proponents of rational politics toward other countries expect their
recommendations be adopted, they should understand the complex process
within the U.S. government, whereby agencies develop, defend, compromise,
and implement poHcy proposals. In Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy,
Morton A. Halperin (formerly a deputy assistant secretary in the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a
member of the senior staff of the National Security Council) explores with
two Brookings colleagues the influence of organizational behavior on the
conduct of foreign relations. Although the authors concentrate on national
security affairs, they believe that most of their findings would apply equally
to any governmental bureaucracy when the type of problem with which irt is
dealing requires a high-level decision."

Raskins Caryl P. "Technology, Science, and American Foreign Policy.' Foreign
Affairs, January 1962:224-243. , ' , .u o • .

Mr. Haskins discusses the international science imphcations of the boviet
flight of Vostok II. Among his topics are the following: the international
pyschological and prestige implications of application of a spectacular tech-
nology, the importance of "democratic"^ pluralism in scientific and techno-
logical research and development, and imphcations for improvement of
science organization and advisory activities in the American Federal Govern-
ment. He also treats the need for soUdarity in Western Europe, improvement
of NATO and OECD science activities, the establishment of international
universities and improvements in education. Among his other topics are
the need for each country to develop a poUcy for scientific research and
development which is appropriate to the conditions of that country.

International Seminar for Diplomats. Modern Science and the Tasks of Diplomacy.
Austria, Verlag Styria Graz Wien Koln, 1965. 238 p. t • i

This volume contains seventeen papers presented at an International
Seminar for Diplomats, held in Austria in 1965. The original versions of the
papers in French, German, and English are reprinted without translations.
Among the papers included are: "Medicine, Population and the New Tasks
of Diplomacy," Donald Darnley Reid; "Food and Population," B. R.
Sen; "The Impact of the Scientific Technology in the Development of New
States," Aharon Katchalsky; "The Supply of Energy in the Future," Sigvard

1929

Eklund; Geophysics and Its Impact on International Affairs," David A.
Davies; "Mass Communication in Society," Tor Gjesdai; "Social Sciences
and International Relations," John Goormaghtigh; "The Present State of
Economics and the New Tasks of Diplomacy," Gottfried Haberler; and
"The Development of Modern Science and the New Tasks of Diplomacy,"
B. H. M. Vlekke.
"International Cooperation and Foreign Aid; The United States in Technological
Competition." Chapters XV and XVI, In Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Reviews of National Science Policy: United
Stales. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969:
546 p.

General description of organization in the United States (in both the State
Department and other Federal agencies) for formulating and implementing
foreign policy with scientific and technological aspects; listing of expenditures
in such fields; other statistical data, and discussion of U.S. policies with
respect to technology transfer and promotion of scientific and technological
developments in Western European and other countries.
Killian, J. R., Jr., "Science in the State Department: A Practical Imperative."
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1965: 12-17.

" 'The ethos of our foreign policy should not be flawed by intellectual
parochialism; our policy and outlook need not fall in the crack between the
two cultures.' " "In dealing with [international] trends and needs-regional,
global, and superterrestrial, our government and its foreign officers will need
sophisticated, tough-minded technical advice on the feasibility of projects, on
the alternatives which should be considered, on the contribution we can
make to them, on their impact on our own manpower and economic resources,
and on their timing and need. With this kind of judgment available, however,
such large-scale programs of development and technology can multiply the
helpful political choices available to us and afford us new opportunities to
contribute to the welfare of the human community."

"The lecturer, Dr. James R. Killian, was addressing the U.S. Foreign
Service Institute's seminar on the interaction between science and tech-
nology and foreign affairs. The . . . article is based upon the seminar
lecture. . . . Dr. Killian is chairman of the MIT Corporation and was
appointed by President Eisenhower as the first official science adviser to an
American President."
Kissinger, Henry A. "The Global Challenge and International Cooperation."
Address by the Secretary of State, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 1975. 5 p.
"... A candid assessment of how the U.S. Government views the
contemporary United Nations — its capacities and its limitations, its promise
and the trends which threaten future progress." Addresses the topics of
global interdependence in economics and technology and opportunities and
drawbacks of the potential for cooperation in the United Nations.
Margolis, Howard. Technical Advice on Political Issues. Arlington, Va., Institute
for Defense Analyses, distributed by NTIS, 1972. 66 p. (AD 740-608.)

Uses three national security issues, Skybolt, SAM upgrade, and the
Serpukhov computer to illustrate a general discussion of the poUtics of
technical advice. Contrasts the receptivity to technical advice in two agencies,
the National Security Council and the Department of State and argues that
the State Department's apparatus for using scientific and technical informa-
tion should be strengthened.
Moynihan, Michael W. "Attitudes of Americans on Coping with Interdependence:
Findings of Opinion Research Organizations." A paper prepared for the National
Commission on Coping with Interdependence. Interdependence Series No.
1/Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Program on International Affairs.
Princeton, N.J., 1975. non-paginated.

A National Commission on Coping with Interdependence was created in
December 1974 by the Apsen Institute for Humanistic Studies on behalf of
the State Department. One of its tasks was to assess the attitudes of the
public regarding interdependence. This paper reports on the poU:

"The polls show a sharp decline in concern with international issues — as
these are conventionally measured by polls. In recent years, and particularly
in the past two years, people report to the pollsters that they are much more
worried about domestic issues, Uke inflation and unemployment than about
international matters. They place good relations with other countries low on
the fist of national priorities. There is other evidence; some specific, e.g.,

1930

mounting opposition to military aid. We believe, and many of the experts
agree, that these findings do not mean that the public is no longer concerned
with international issues but is quite sensibly giving its limited attention to
matters of immediate importance. Moreover, attitudes toward energy and
food sharing, trade and foreign economic assistance are not negative when the
fairness factor is taken into account."
National Academy of Sciences. Report of the Foreign Secretary, 1974- Washington,
National Academy of Sciences, 1974. 50 p.

Final report of Harrison Brown, foreign secretary until 1974, on the
activities of his office. Describes: the Commission on International Relations;
Board on International Scientific Exchanges; Board on International Orga-
nizations and Programs ; Board on Science and Technology for Development ;
relations with other academies; activities of the Office of the Foreign Sec-
retary, National Academy of Engineering; sources of support; members of
committees; professional staflF; and list of publications, 19G3 to date.
Platig, E. Raymond. "Research and Analysis." In Resources and Needs of
American Diplomacy. Special issue of The Annals of the American Academrj of
Political and Social Science. Ed. by Smith Simpson, v. 380, November 1968:
50-59.

"Our ability successfully to look forward in the conduct of our foreign
relations rests, in large part, upon how we develop and use our resources
for research and analysis. At present, these are broadly diffused in both
the public and private sectors; a number of stresses and strains indicate
that they are not as effectively deployed and utilized as they could be.
Improvements are possible on many fronts. Attention here is on the infor-
mation, research, and analysis needs of the U.S. Government, with par-
ticular attention to the Department of State. The Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) occupies a pivotal position. A sub-
stantial increase in its capabilities would have many desirable consequences.
Among these are: enrichment of INR's own influential analytical research
efforts; stimulation and support of the academic search for more coherent
and socially relevant knowledge; assurance that the Department will derive
the maximum analytical benefit from a modem information-handling c<j's-
tem; expanded opportunities to train Foreign Service officers in analytical
methods; more balanced and efficacious programs of Government contract
and grant support for foreign affairs research; and more systematic policy
review and development in support of planning."
Pollack, Herman. "Interaction of Science and Technology and Foreign Affairs."
Statement by Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and
Technological Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and
Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, April 19,
1966. Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1966, p. 946-948.

This article is a reprint of a statement made by Herman Pollack, Acting
Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of
State, in support of a bill to amend the charter of the National Science Foun-
dation to give the agency a more active role in support of international
scientific activities. In explaining his support for this proposal Mr. Pollack
discussed potential international political benefits resulting from an increase
in U.S. international scientific activities. He elaborated upon the need for
interdisciplinary research to meet today's problems and discussed NSF sup-
port of directing appropriate people to the Department of State's interna-
tional science office and State's seminar training programs for diplomats
involved in international science affairs.
The Potential Impact of Science and Technology on Future U.S. Foreign Policy.
Papers Presented at a Joint Meeting of the Policy Planning Council, Depart-
ment of State, and a Special Panel of the committee on Science and Public
policy, National Academy of Sciences. June 16-17, 1968, at Washington, D.C.
1968. 171 p.

Series of policy planning problem papers (with references) presented by
industrialists, academicians, officials of the Federal Government and mem-
bers of the National Academy of Sciences. Papers include: "Growth of World
Population— U.S. PoHcy;" "United States Public PoUcy with Regard to
World Food Problems;" "Approach to Assessment of the World's Mineral
R-^sources;" "Mineral Resources Form the Emerged Lands;" "Information
Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations in the Next Decade," "Current
Development in the Atmospheric Sciences and Some of Their Implications

1931

for Foreign Policy;" "The Oceans Fifteen and Fifty Years from Now;"
"Some International Aspects of Water Resource Development;" "Pollution
of the Environment;" and "The Rural to Urban Population Shift — A Global
Problem."
Primack, Joel and Frank von Hippel. Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political
Arena. New York, Basic Books, 1974. 299 p.

"Citing the supersonic transport, the ABM, pesticides, and other examples,
two scientists argue that 'concerned citizens' should be skeptical of govern-
ment use of scientific advice unless the data are made available for independ-
ent verification; 'concerned scientsts' should not rest with writing advisory
reports for Washington but should carry their message to the public." (1)
■"Science and Technology in Presidential Policymaking: Role in Foreign Policy."
Science and Technology in Presidential Policymaking: a Proposal. Report of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Science and Technology, National Academy of Sciences.
Washington, D.C., June 1974. In U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Science
and Technology, Federal Policy, Plans, and Organization for Science and Tech-
nology. Part II. Hearings, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., June and July 1974. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt- Print. Off., 1974: 489-492.
■"Science and the Foreign Service." Department of State News Letter, June 1968:
10-12.

This article contains two views of the State Department's Scientific and
Technological Exchange Program, begun in 1966. One article, by Thomas
Wilson, described his participation as a State Department official in the
Cooperative Project Division of the Office of International Affairs, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The other article, by Thomas G.
Gabbert, describes his duty as an official of the Atomic Energy Commission
with the Office of Atomic Energy Affairs in the office of International Scien-
tific and Technological Affairs, Department of State. Both individuals had
similar observations about the program. In the words of Mr. Wilson: "This
brief . . . description gives an idea of the fluidity of the U.S. national
science policy situation and the consequent opportunities for suggesting and
vesting new ideas and policies. State's role touches each where international
activities are involved, and ... it is clear why we need more men and
women equipped to respond effectively to this challenge to our contemporary
international relations."
•"Science, Technology, and the Policy Process." In U.S. Congress. Senate. Com-
mittee on Government Operations. Organizing for National Security. Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, v. I. Washington,
U.S. Gov. Print. OS^., 1961, p. 237-411.

Part 2 this volume of the Jackson Subcommittee hearings treats the
impact of science and technology on foreign and defense policymaking.
Policies and programs of the Departments of State and Defense, as well as
other facets of science policy are considered. Witnesses for this session of the
hearings included: Dr. James A. Perkins, Vice President of the Carnegie
Corporation; Dr. James B. Fisk, President, Bell Telephone Laboratories, and
Vice Chairman, The President's Science Advisory Committee; William H.
Pickering, Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Tech-
nology; Dr. Eugene P. Wigner, Professor of Mathematical Physics, Princeton
University; Edward M. Purcell, Professor of Physics, Harvard University;
and Dr. Herbert F. York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense.
Seitz, Frederick and Rodney W. Nichol.». Research and Development and the Pros-
pects for hiternalional Security. New York, Crane, Russak and Co., 1974, 74 p.
The authors "begin from the premise that American technological suprem-
acy which had developed throughout the post-war world has eroded, and that
our decision makers must coneequently select options in weaponry and basic '
research imder constraints of scarcity. They are attempting to alter a climate
of opinion within both Congress and the Department of Defense, which, they
contend, has been hostile to Research and Development projects not specifi-
cally linked to operational missions. Investment in 'fullscale prototyping'
(including testing and evaluational stages), which is costly, would produce
long term economies by eliminating gross cost overruns and outright failures.
The authors regard the sector of R and D, if expanded beyond specific mis-
sions, as an enduring realm of Western superiority, presumably because the
very existence of a vigorous extra governmental scientific community is both
more innovative and more critical, thus more robust. ... In brief, Seitz and

96-243 O - 77 - 28

1932

Nichols argue for: (1) a broadening of defense-relevant thinking to include

'civilian' science, (2) a budgetary commitment to R and D on this expanded

base; and (3) a more extended use of prototyping to evaluate operatipnal

alternatives." (4)

SkolnikofF, E. G. "History of U.S. Government Organization for Conduct of

Foreign Policy in Technology-Related Subjects." Prepared for the Commission

on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Tyoe-

script, March 16, 1975. 38 p.

The author deals generally with the following issue: "The general lesson
from postwar history in the conduct of foreign policy in technology-related
issues is the great difficulty the Department of State has in exerting anything
like a primary role. The technical, operating agencies of government tend to
have the initiative in determining policy in their areas of interest, with State
able to exert its presence usually only at the point at which issues become
specific and current. Even then, the momentum of earlier decisions, the
greater technical knowledge and the mobilizable resources of the operating
agencies, has meant that State has relatively little independent leverage
except in those issues for which it is able to moumt a special and unusual
effort. With regard to the direction of technological development itself, which,
will shape the future, the Department of State has essentially no role at all."
Several concluding observations are given about wa3's to increase State's
role in formulating foreign policj^ that deals with technology. Among these
are the following: better leadership for the science and technology office in the
Department of State ; more interaction between this office, the science office
and other offices in the Department and more and better technical support;
reestablishrnent of a White House science office, which uses the resources of
the Department of State's science and technolog}^ office in developing policy
advice; generally more and more-informed congressional interest in these
topics; and the need for better information and analysis capabilities in
government.
Skolnikoff, Eugene B. The International Imperatives of Technology: Technological
Development and the International Political System. Berkeley, Institute of Inter-
national Studies, University of California [c 1972]: 194 p.

Elaborates on the theme of the inevitable interdependence of the nations
of the world and the need for international responses to deal with the impacts
of science and technology on sovereign nation-states.
Skolnikoff, Eugene B. Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy. Cam-
bridge, The MIT Press, 1967. 316 p. plus index.

Written by former assistant to three Presidential Special Assistants for
Science and Technology (Killian, Kistiakowsky, and Wiesner) who is with
the MIT science and public policy program. Reviews the relationships
of science to many different aspects of foreign affairs and evaluates policy
machinery to formulate and administer foreign policies with a science content.
Recommends strengthening of foreign policj'^ organization and personnel, and
greater analysis by the government and university researchers of the scientific
and technological vectors of foreign policy. Regarded as a basic study on the
subject.
Skolnikoff, Eugene B. and Harvey Brooks. "Science Advice in the White House?
Continuation of a Debate." Science, v. 187, no. 4171, Jan. 10, 1975, p. 35.
The international dimension is treated.
"Strengthening the Department of State." Department of State Newsletter, July
1975: 2-5.

"On June 27, Secretary [of State, Henry] Kissinger welcomed the 119th
Foreign Service Officer Class. In his remarks, he announced the formation of
a new Priorities Policy Group to link decisions on resource allocation to the
broader considerations of foreign policy. He also announced several changes
in personnel policy to improve the recruitment, evaluation, assignment, and
career development of the Department's professional service." This article
contains his remarks.
U.S. Comptroller General. The Agricultural Attache Role Overseas: What He Does
and How He Can Be More Effective for the United States. Report to the Congress.
April 11, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 93 p. (ID-75-40.)
"GAO's review of agricultural attaches was prompted by the interest
generated in their activities resulting from the unexpected volume of Soviet
wheat purchases in 1972, the growing concern over the adequacy of infor-
mation on world food supplies and demands, and the Secretary of Agricul-
ture's emphasis on attaches as 'salesmen.' The review included attache post.s

1933

in South America, Western and Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Australia,
as well as U.S. Missions to the Food and Agricultural Organization . . . and
the European Community . . . ." The report recommends to the Congress
how the Dept. of Agriculture can and should make improvements to increase
the effectiveness of its foreign agricultural attaches. These include improve-
ments in management and the direction of attache activities; better coordina-
tion of training for attaches; better information-gathering systems; more
effective use of promotional resources; and the collection of more and better
information regarding agriculture in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc
countries.
U.S. Comptroller General. Commercial Offices Abroad Need fSubstantial Improve-
ments To Assist U.S. Export Objectives. Report to the Congress, Oct. 24, 1972.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 51 p. (6-1722.^.-).)

"This report examines the effectiveness of U.S. commercial offices main-
tained in other countries to assist American businesses to increase their
export sales." Among the recommendations made to the Secretaries of State
and Commerce regarding the offices were the follovv'ing: to (1) "formulate
long-range export expansion plans with specific goals and strategies, for
individual countries or major market areas; establish priorities for accom-
plishing the many commercial programs and services, implement a system
of reporting and evaluating program results, and strengthen procedures for
recruiting, assigning and training commercial officers to obtain better qualified
commercial staffs and consider upgrading the commercial office staffs."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation: A Critical Analysis. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Sept. 4, 1973. 93d Cong.,
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1973. 105 p. (Committee print.)
The principal instrumentality by which the U.S. Government seeks to
stimulate private investment in the developing countries is the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). This study analyzes the policies,
directions, and effects of OPIC. The first two chapters consider OPIC's his-
tory, organization, and programs. The third chaj^ter compares OPIC with
similar programs in other countries and with other insurance and finance pro-
grams in the U.S. Government. The fourth chapter analyzes OPIC's current
operations. Subsequent chapters discuss OPIC's financial status, its role in
balance-of -payments problems, and its impact on foreign relations.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Congress and
Foreign Policy: 1974. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress. April 15, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 72 p. (Committee print.)

This report describes congressional activities in 16 functional and geo-
graphic areas and highlights of significant events of congressional activities
relating to foreign policy during 1974. The topics covered are: the State
Department and related agencies; foreign assistance; international trade and
international economic policy; arms control and disarmament; the defense
budget; intelligence; international organizations and law; oceans, seabed,
and fisheries; international social issues; the Middle East; Asia; Latin
America; Africa; Western Europe; Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;
and other aspects.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. International
Science Policy. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971, 166 p.

A compilation of papers prepared for the 12th meeting of the Panel on
Science and Technology 1971. Statements by Federal officials, foreign
officials, and leading statesmen and scholars to define how science and tech-
nology can be utilized in solving critical national and international problems.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Coordination of
Foreign Scientific Policy. Staff Study Prepared for the . . . [by Spencer M.
Beresford.] November 9, 1962, Committee Print. 87th Cong., 2d sess. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963. 6 p.

A re\'iew of the history and work of the principal coordinating mechanisms
of the U.S. Government in dealing with international science activity and
policy — the scientific attaches and the Office of International Scientific
Affairs (SCI), in the Department of State.

Recommends that the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
periodically review the coordination of national science pohcy with respect
to: effectiveness, adequacy, cost, impact of science on foreign affairs, and
international scientific and technological cooperation.

1934

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Panel on Science
and Technology: Eighth Meeting; Government, Science, and International Policy.
Proceedings. January 24, 25, and 26, 1967. [No. 1.] 90th Cong., 1st sess. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967. 220 p.

Designed to provide the committee with background information, this set
of hearings and seminars includes statements about the impact of develop-
ments in science on political, econornic and social development abroad, as
well as statements about the objectives, formulation, and administration of
U.S. international science policies. Some of the witnesses before the committee
were: Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Dr. Philip Handler, Chairman,
National Science Board; Mr. Robert Major, director. Royal Norweigan
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige,
member. Council for Science and Technology, Japan; Dr. Harrison S. BroWn,
foreign secretary, National Academy of Sciences; Dr. Donald F. Hornig,
Director, Office of Science and Technology; Dr. C. Chagas, president,
Brazilian Academy of Sciences; Dr. Frank J. Malina, Trustee-Past President,
International Academy of Astronautics; and Dr. Fred L. Whipple, director,
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Panel on Science
and Technology: Ninth Meeting: Applied Science and World Economy. Pro-
ceedings before the . . . January 23, 24, and 25, 1968. [No. 1.] 90th Cong., 2d
sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 275 p.

Hearings and papers presented at the ninth annual meeting of the univer-
sity-government-industry Panel on Science and Technology, convened to
provide the House Committee on Science and Astronautics with the thoughts
and problems of the scientific community. Papers presented include a wealth
of background information on substantive and policy problems facing those
concerned with international scientific, technological and economic develop-
ment. Principal discussion topics include: utilization of technological re-
sources for human welfare; geographic distribution of technical resources,
market mechanisms in the application of technology, and coupling tech-
nology to the economy. Guest panelists were: Barbara Ward, Dr. Antonie T.
Knoppers, Dr. Walter J. Hesse, Dr. O. M. Solandt, Dr. Jorge A. Sabato,
Dr. Alexander King, Mr. Martin Goland, and Dr. Roger Revelle.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. The Participation
of Federal Agencies in International Scientific Programs. Report of the Science
Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress, to the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Develop-
ment. 90th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967. 167 p.
Charts and Tables. (Committee Print)

Highlights the nature and scope of the involvement of federal agencies in
international scientific activities. Described are the activities of: National
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council; International Committee
of the Federal Council for Science and Technology; Department of State;
relationships with international organizations; National Science Foundation:
Department of Agriculture; Atomic Energy Commission; Department of
Commerce; Department of Defense; Department of Health, Education and
Welfare; Department of the Interior; and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Prohibition of Chemical
and Biological Weapons. Hearings on Ex. J. 91-2 and Ex. Q, 92-2 and S. Res. 48,
Dec. 10, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 71 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Foreign
Policy. Hearings before the ... on Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Develop-
ments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United
States ; Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the
Foreign Policy of the United States; and United States Foreign Policy —
Africa." (Studies Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 336, S5th Cong., and S. Res. 31,
86th Cong.) January 28, February 11, and March 16, 1960. Part I. 86th Con-
gress, 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960. 237 p.

Included on pages 1-50 is the hearing on "Scientific Developments and
Their Impact on Foreign Affairs." The hearing was held as a follow-up to the
committee's receipt of the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), study,
"Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on
Foreign Policy Problems of the United States." The impact of developments
in the physical, natural and social sciences as well as the current State

1935

Department program in science and foreign relations are items discussed by :

E. Finley Carter, President, Stanford Research Institute, and Wallace R.

Brode, Science Adviser, Department of State. Mr. Brode also replied to some

of the criticisms made of the State Department's program in the SRI report.

U.S. Department of State. Science, Technology ani Foreign Affairs. Report on the-

Seminar held at the Foreign Service Institute, January 11 to February 6, 1965.

Prepared by L. F. Audrieth, Visiting Professor of Science Affairs at the Foreign

Service Institute, and H. I- Chinn, Science Officer, International Scientific and

Technological Affairs, Department of State. Washington. U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1965. 109 p.

Thi§ volume comprises the report of the Foreign Service Institute's first
seminar in "Science, Technology and Foreign Affajrp," aja effort to explore,
with foreign service officers and other governmental officiais, how science and
technology contribute to the development and execution of U.S. foreign
policy. Included in the volume are course outline, selected bibliographies,
copies of addresses presented and a resume and evaluation of the seminar.
Recommendations treating subsequent seminars are also included.
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Scientific and Technological
Affairs. International Science Notes, no. 31, January 1974.

Clontains the following articles: Outline of science and technology at the
State Department: 2-3; Western Europe's spacelab and the U.S. shuttle:
3-4; International scientific and technological conference on narcotics and
dangerous drugs: 4-5; C.C.M.S. holds an environmental roundtable: 5-8;
German science/technology policy and the 1974 budget: 8-10; The Weizmann
Institute of Science: 10-11; and Geothermal energy and foreign affairs: 11-14.
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Scientific and Technological
Affairs. International Science Notes, no. 32, July 1974.

Contains the following articles : Tangible benefits of international scientific
exchange: the Yugoslav example: 2-3; Instances of the United States/Poland
scientific research program: 3-4; P.L. 480 funding for scientific programs by
agency and country: 4; The acceleration of international scientific activity:
4-7; Public seminar on global food production: 7-9; Canada- France-Hawaii
telescope: 9-10: and Science and the State Department in 1973: 10^16.
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, International Science Notes, no. 33, January 1975.

Contains the following articles: The New Bureau: 2-3; Man and the
biosphere programme and its September meeting, 3-6; Foreign energy scholars
program: 6-7; The International Institute for AppUed Systems Analysis:
7-10; Recent 'Environment' Conventions: Status and prospects: 10-12; and
U.S. scientific and technological relationships with other nations: 12-14.
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs. International Science Notes, no. 34, June 1975.

Contains the following articles: A world conference for third world develop-
ment: 2-5; Notes on technology transfer to LDC's and the U.S. Government's
role: 5-10; A compendium of U.S.-Japan scientific and technological coopera-
tion: 10-13; and A review of science and technology in Israel and its relation
to the U.S.: 13-15.
U.S. Dept. of State. Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs.
International Scientific Cooperation — a Summary of Tangible Benefits. [Wash-
ington, 1974]. 12 p. (U.S. Dept. of State. General foreign pohcy series, 285.)
"All of the technical agencies of the government have contributed examples
of how improvements in our economy or quality of life have resulted from
international cooperation. This report is a summary of some of these examples.
It serves as a reminder that international cooperation can be justified in
terms both tangible and intangible."
U.S. Federal Council for Science and Technology. International Scientific and
Technological Activities. A report to the Federal Council for Science and Tech-
nology by its International Committee, June 20, 1961. Fur Authorized Com-
mittee Use. Mimeo, 1961. 25 p.

President Eisenhower's science adviser requested that the "International'
Committee of the [Federal Council for Science and Technology] 'undertake
to review the international scientific activities of the agencies represented
thereon' in accordance with . . . action of the National Security Council."'
This report forms one part of that review; separate task forces studied specific
phases of the problem ; their reviews are available separately.

1936

Among the recommendations made are the following: the need for "clarity
in our objectives and in the arrangements for attaining them; adequate coor-
dination amongst government agencies and with nongovernmental groups;
acceleration of many activities; initiation of new undertakings to fiS gaps;
and a coordinated series of guidelines for international activities." Also recom-
mended was improvement of mechanisms for formulating and administering
foreign policy with international scientific and technological components. This
would require: "better information on what we are doing; foreign policy evalu-
ation; operational evaluation; integration of U.S. scientific missions overseas
with other foreign policy missions; understanding of the role of science and
technology in technical assistance; an international role for NSF; [and]
greater assistance from the Federal Council for Science and Technology and
its International Committee."
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs Divi-
sion. Collier, Ellen and Martha Hutchinson. The Role of Advisory Committees
in U.S. Foreign Policy. Apr. 1975. 135 p.

Issued as a joint committee print, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

and House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess.

U.S. National Science Foundation. Justification of Estimates of Appropriations,

Salaries and Expenses, and Special Foreign Currency Program, Fiscal Year

1976 to the Congress. Washington, National Science Foundation, 1975, various

parts.

International or foreign science and technology activities, including
statements on recent awards and forthcoming plans for support are included
in the following sections: International Cooperative Science Activities ($8
million requested for: cooperative science programs, scientific organizations
and resources program, international travel, and support for special foreign
currency projects) ; Science Advisory Activities Summary ($4 million re-
quested, including funds for research on technology transfer with Latin
America, assessment of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. scientific and technological agree-
ments, international affairs, the role of international technology transfer
in world trade and implications for U.S. pohcies, scientific and technical
policy options from a national perspective in response to the emerging
number of new international multilateral and bilateral relationships, and the
role of U.S. science and technology vis-d-vis the Soviet Union) ; and the Special
Foreign Currency Program ($4 million requested for scientific research and
information exchange.)
Wohlstetter, Albert. "Scientists, Seers and Strategy." Foreign Affairs, v. 41,
no. 3, April 1963:466-78.

"This article is based on a longer monograph bearing the same title,
presented at a conference of the Council of Atomic Age Studies at Columbia
University . . . ." Mr. Wohlstetter discusses the merits of the political and
"scientific" adviser role displayed by scientists in decisions on national and
international security questions. He concludes: "Both the physical and the
behavioral sciences have a role to play in component research on cardinal
choices. And in the course of stvidying strategic alternatives the methods of
science can be used to reach conclusions going beyond the skills of any of the
individuals involved. The important point is that on these complex cardinal
questions, answers are won precariously and intermittently, in the course of
hard empirical inquiry into the major factors affecting choice. Intuition and
intelligence help, but do not make superfluous the study not only of the vital
technologies, but also of the behavior of men and nations using, and affected
by the use of, such technologies. No one has the gift of reliable foresight on
these cardinal choices. The primary thing, then, is not to be positive. The
basic failure of the physical scientists and engineers in their turbulent history
during the cold war is not their lack of prescience but their acting frequently
as if they had it."

FORMULATION OF POLICIES DEALING WITH SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Atlantic Council of the United States. Special Committee on Intergovernmental
Organization and Reorganization. Beyond Diplomacy. [Washington, 1975] 87 p.
". . . A study of the adequacy of present intergovernmental organiza-
tions relevant to the relations of the Atlantic nations and to their relationship
with the other nations of our common globe. The objective of the study is
to devise measures to improve the structure and functioning of existing orga-
nizations, or to recommend new ones if necessary, to deal with certain key
contemporary problems of a transnational nature, and some that are emerg-
ing over the horizon."
Brown, David. "New Supranational Institutions." Futurist, v. 6, Oct. 1972:
197-202.

"The problems that man faces today are increasingly global in scope, but

the institutions to cope with them remain national. The autnor describes

some new institutions that could enable the world to deal more effectively

with its problems."

Cox, Robert W., Harold K. Jacobson, Gerard and Victoria Curzon, Joseph S.

Nye, Lawrence Scheinman, James R. Sewell, and Susan Strange. The Anatomy

of Influence: Decision-making in International Organization. New Haven, Yale

University Press, 1973. 497 p.

A sophisticated analysis of power and influence in international organi-
zations, including in the science and technology area: UNESCO, WHO, and
IAEA. The authors note the importance of nationalism as opposed to func-
tionalist internationalism as a source of power and influence even in the
predominant bulk of issues studied by the organizations, which are geared
to assisting the developing countries.
"Europeans Set up a (Shakv) Science Foundation." Science and Government
Reju>rt, October 15, 1973: 7-8.

Describes evolution of activities to set up a science foundation under the
Common Market structure.
Gardner, Richard N. "To Make the World Safe for Interdependence." The Inter-
Dependent," July-August 1975: 14-18, 143-145.

A candid review of the failures and accomplishments of the United Nations
and other associated international organizations in promoting a harmonious
economic, social, and technological interdependence among nations.
Goodrich, Leland M. The United Nations in a Changing World. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1974. 280 p.

"Professor Goodrich presents an optimistic assessment of the United

Nations through the examination of several issue-areas, i.e., peacekeeping,

protection of human rights, etc. He foresees an expanded role for it because

of developments in economics and technology." (1)

Goodrich, Leland M. and David A. Kay, eds. International Organization: Politics

and Process. University of Wisconsin Press, 1973.
Haas, Michael. International Organization: an Interdisciplinary Bibliography.

(Bibliographical Ser., No. 41.) Stanford, Hoover Institute Press, 1974.
■Jordan, Robert S., ed. Multinatiojtal Cooperation: Economic, Social and Scientific
Development. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972. 392 p.

"This volume attempts to explain how multinational organizations operate.
It is a collection of eight original essays which examine multinational activities
directed toward economic, social, and scientific concerns. Each of the first
seven essays discusses a specific area of multinational activity, including such
topics as international administration of space exploration, uses of the oceans,
the International Monetary Fund and developing countries, and a study of
UNESCO. The last essay looks at international administration from a
behavioral science viewpoint."

(1937)

1938

Keohane, Robert O., ed. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Transnational Relations and"
World Politics." International Organization, v. 25, summer 1971: whole issue.
Partial contents. — The growth of international nongovernmental organi-
zation in the twentieth century. — The multinational business enterprise:
what kind of international organization? — Transnational networks in basic
science. — National autonomy and economic development: critical perspec-
tives on multinational corporations in poor countries. — Transnational relations
as a threat to the democratic process.
Later published as a book.
Killian, J. R., Jr. "An International Institute of Science and Technology." In Nor-
man Kaplan, ed. Science and Society. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1965.
p. 510-518.

Authored by the Chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and first Special Assistant on Science and Tech-
nology appointed by President Eisenhower in 1957, Dr. Killian "outlines
some of the major reasons for considering the establishment of an inter-
national institute of science and technolog}^" Among the issues he raises
in connection with the proposed institute are: "the possibility of having such
an institute grant a degree which would be international in status and be
recognized by the member nations; the explicit combination of science and
technology; the concentration en doctoral and postdoctoral students; the
combination of the research institute idea with the idea of a center for ad-
vanced studies; and finally, the breaking down of traditional university
departmental patterns of organization."
Macioti, Manfredo. "Science and Technology in the Common Market: A Progress
Report." Research Policy, v. 4, 1975: 29(>-310.

"This paper deals with science, technology and Europe. It purports to
show that the European Community (the Common Market of Nine European
Countries) has been quite successful in promoting trade, economic growth
and industrial competition, interpenetration and specialisation. However,
since a large, prosperous, unified market was created in Europe in the lat&
Sixties, a host of new problems has surfaced. These mainly concern the quality
of Man's life, the relations between Man and Society, the balance between
Man and Nature. These new problems cannot be solved bj^ the invisible hand
of the market, but require public intervention, common policies. Heje the
record of Europe is rather more doubtful, although common solutions t»
crucial issues such as energy, pollution and science and technology have
been under discussion within the Communitj for a number of years. On the
other hand, joint decisions taken in 1973 on the protection of the environ-
ment, the setting-up in early 1974 of joint machinery (CREST) for helping
to define a common policy in science and technology, first steps toward the
creation of a common capacity for long-range forecasting and assessment,
as well as the establishment of a European Science Foundation in 1974 and
recent moves toward a common energy policy, give some hope for the future
of European integration in science and technology."

The author is the director of science policy of the Commission of the
European Communities in Brussels.
McLin, Jon. International Institutions for "Planetary Bargaining.'^ [Hanover,
N.H., American Universities Field Staff, 1975] 10 p. (American Universities
Field Staff. Fieldstaff reports. West Europe series, v. 10, no. 1 [General])

"The Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, meeting in Berlin in February,
sought a practical basis for the reform of existing, and the creation of new,
international institutions to conceive and implement a collection of parallel
'bargains' on such matters as food, population, energy, investment, and
security."
Organization of American States. Department of Scientific Affairs. Regional
Scientific and Technological Development Program Newsletter, quarterly.

Short articles describe cooperative and national activities, legislation, and
research to develop science and technology in OAS states; also discusses
technology transfer.
Organization of American States. Secretary General. Ciencia Interamericana.
Published quarterly by OAS, Washington, D.C.

Contains detailed articles on scientific and technological developments
and cooperation, as well as important national regulations on cooperation
and science among the OAS member states.
Raiffa, Howard. "A Multinational Institute Explores Global Problems." Futurist,
V. 9, June 1975: 147-149.

1939

The director of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
describes the foundation and purpose of the Vienna based research organiza-
tion. The institute is a nongovernmental multi-disciplinary unit formed to
examine global problems.
Ruggie, John Gerard and Ernest B. Haas, eds. "International Responses to
Technology." International Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975.

Special issue which contains articles on the general topic of technology and
the international political system. The articles included are: "International
Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," John Gerard Ruggie;
"International Safeguarding as InstitutionaUzed Collective Behavior," Robert
Pendlev, et al. ; "Collective Responses to R and D Problems in Western
Europe; 1955-1958 and 1968-1973," Henry R. Nau; "INTELSAT: Tech-
nology, Politics and the Transformation of a Regime," Steven A. Levy; "In
Search of an Ocean Regime: The Negotiations in the General Assembly's
Seabed Committee 1968-1970," John L. Lovald; "Collective Arrangements
for Managing Ocean Fisheries," Charles B. Heck; "Technocrats and the
Management of International Fisheries," Barbara Johnson; "The Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission and the Stockholm Conference:
A Case of Institutional Non-Adaption," Michael Brenner; "International
Responses to Weather Modification," Edith B. Weiss; "Is There a Hole in
the Whole: Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence aad the Construction
of International Regimes," Ernest B. Haas; "Toward Mutual Accountability
in the Nonterrestrial Realms," Seyom Brown and Larry L. Fabian; "The
Cocoyoc Declaration;" and "Bibliographical Note."
Science and Technology in an Era of Interdependence. A report of a National Policy
Panel established by the United Nations Association of the United States of
America. New York, United Nations Association of the United States of
America, 1975. 85 p.

The panel of noted statesmen and scholars offers several major recom.-
mendations to enhance the ability of international organizations to deal with
advances in science and technology.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on- Banking, Currency and Housing. Sub-
committee on International Development Institutions and Finance. U.S. Par-
ticipation in Multilateral Development Lending Institutions. Hearing, 94th Cong.,
1st sess. July 8, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 286 p.

International agencies/ Government lending — [U.S.]— Law and legislation/
American economic assistance — -Law and legislation/Development credit
institutions/Foreign loans — [Developing countries]/ Economic assistance —
Statistics.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
International Organizations. United States Policy on Review of the United Na-
tions Charter. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess., on H. Con. Res. 206. July 17, 1975.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 63 p.

Foreign relations — [United Nations]— U.S./Foreign relations — [U.S.] —
United Nations/Treaties — [U.S.]/International agencies/ United Nations.
Charter.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Numerous Improvements Still Needed in Managing
U.S. Participation in International Organizations, Department of State and
Other Agencies. Report to the Congress bv the Comptroller General of the
United States. [Washington] 1974. 50 p. "B-168767, July 18, 1974."
United Nations. Economic Commission for Europe. Analytical Report on Industrial
Co-operation Among ECE Countries. Geneva, United Nations, 1973, 117 p.
(United Nations. (Document) E/CEC/844/Rev. 1)

Analysis of the factors that have contributed to the growth of industrial
cooperation among the ECE countries. The report includes descriptions of
the various types of industrial cooperation and a discussion of problems and
prospects for future development. Particular attention is devoted to industrial
cooperation between East and West European countries.
"United Nations. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. [Science Policy
Studies and Documents.] [Paris, UNESCO.]

Publications relevant to this bibliography include: La politique scientifique
et I'organisation de la recherche scientifique en Belgique [1965, No. 1]:
Science policy and organization of scientific research in the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic [1965, No. 2]; National science policies in countries of
South and South-East Asia [1965, No. 3]; Science policy and organization
of research in Norway [190G, No. 4]; Science policy and organization of

1940

research in the USSR [1967, No. 7]; Science policy and organization of
scientific research in Japan [1968, No. 8]; Science policy and the organization
of scientific research in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [1968,
No. 9]; National science policies of the U.S.A. Origins, development and
present status [1968, No. 10]; The promotion of scientific activity in tropical
Africa [1969, No. 11]; Science policy and organization of research in the
Federal Republic of Germany [1969, No. 12]; Bilateral institutional links in
science and technology [1969, No. 13]; La politica cientifica en America
Latina [1969, No. 14]; National science policies in Europe [1970, No. 17];.
National science policy and organization of research in Israel [1970, No. 19];
Politica cientifica y organizacion de la investigacion cientifica en la Argentina
[1970, No. 20]; National science policy and organization of research in Poland
[1970, No. 21]; National science policy and organization of research in the
Philippines [1970, No. 22]; La politique scientifique et I'organisation de la
recherche en France [1971, No. 24]; Science policy and the European States
[1971, No. 25]; National science policy and organization of scientific research
in India [1972, No. 27]; La politica cientifica en America Latina-2 [1972,
No. 29]; European scientific co-operation: priorities and perspectives [1972,
No. 30]; and National science policies in Africa [1974, No. 31.]
Weisband, Edward and Thomas M. Franck. "A Ratiorfale for International
Technology Assessment: Towards an Ethicq.1 Science." New York, New York
University, Center for International Studies, cl971. 40 p. (New York Univer-
sity. Center for International Studies. Policy papers, v. 4, no. 4)

Discusses the need for technology assessment on an international scale^
and makes suggestions for realization of this goal.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN NATO AND OECD

"AT OECD: Meeting of the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy."
OEOD Observer, October 1972 : 40-41.

Describes activities relating to research and development statistics;
research and developmeht in the service sector; development and utilization
of the social sciences; completion of studies on "research systems," organiza-
tion of information, computer, and communications systems: stimulation of
innovation in private and public sectors; technology assessment; international
cooperation in R and D; and science and technology for developing countries."
Blaney, Harry C. "NATO's New Challenges to the Problems of Modern Society."
Atlantic Comviunity Quarterly, v. 11, summer 1973: 236-247.

Assesses the work and potentialities of NATO's Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society which attempts to deal with problems that plague
modern society such as environmental purity.
"CCMS Plenary Session Inaugurates Three New Pilot Studies." NATO Review,
V. 21, 1973: 16-18.

The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) inaugurated
3 pilot studies in 1973 on disposal of hazardous substances, solar energy and
geothermal energy.
Davignon, Etienne. "The New International Energy Agency of OECD." OECD
Observer, no. 73, Jan.-Feb. 1975: 20-25.

"OECD's International Energy Agency, set up on 15th November, will

carry out a comprehensive programme of co-operation — both in the event of

emergency and over the longer term — among 16 oil consumer countries

belonging to OECD."

Doran, Charles F. "Can NATO Defend the Environment?" Environmental

Affairs, v. 2, spring 1973: 667-684.

"Which perspective is the valid one — the view on the one hand that NATO
can supply a credible defense of clean air and water and a higher quality of
life, or, on the other, the view that the machinery and purposes of military
security are incompatible with environmental values? A hard look at insti-
tutional priorities continues to be in order while the process of commitment is
still reversible."
Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. "Western Alliance Development and Technological Co-
operation." Written for the U.S. House of Representatives Republican Com-
mittee on NATO and the Atlantic Community. International Studies Quarterly,
v. 11, no. 4, December 1967: 339-52.

Review by the late director of the Mershon Center for Education in
National Security, Ohio State University, an authority . on NATO of
organizational and program needs for technological programs in the Western
alliance community. "Each country should be included ..." in the con-
tribution, administration and distribution phases of a Western alliance
program of technological cooperation. , Such programs might involve the
following substantive fields: communication, "war on poverty," transit and
transport, agricultural productive techniques, education, and space. Impli-
cations of such a program for American policy are also discussed.
Huntley, James R. Man's Environment and the Atlantic Alliance. 2d ed. Brussels
NATO Information Service, 1972. 63 p.

Details the environmental activities of NATO's Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society (CCMS) .
"The Influence of Science and Technology in Present Day Foreign Policy",
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France,
Science Policy Information 3, 1967: 47-48.

"An analysis of the interaction of science and foreign policy in industrialized
nations, by Manfred Schreiterer, a member of the German Delegation to
the OECD. Nowadays foreign policy, economic policy, military policy, and
science policy are interdependent; numerous examples of the important role
of science and technology in modern foreign policy are given (e.g., French
agreement on technical cooperation with Eastern European countries, and

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1942

the acceptance by the Soviet Union and others of the French color television
system) ; 'Could not Germany's old-established reputation in science and
technology be used to bring about a political detente with her Eastern
European neighbors?' Conversely, foreign policy could influence certain
aspects of science and educational policy, for instance, the determination of
scientific priorities, and the problem of scientific and technological disparities
has become one of the principal preoccupations of foreign policy." (4)
Kyba, Patrick. "CCMS: the Environmental Connection." International Journal,
V. 29, spring 1974: 256-267.

Describes the role assigned to NATO's environmental agency, the Com-
mittee on the Challenge of Modern Society, explains the difficulties of
performing those functions and goes on to suggest it shift its focus to study
the effect of the military on the environment.
"NATO Science." Chapter 6 of: Francis A. Beer. Integration and Disintegration in
NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community. A
Publication of the Mershon Center for Education in National Security. The
Ohio State University Press, 1969, p. 204-238. (314 pages plus index.)

This study is a comprehensive review of important facets of NATO's

Srograms, needs, and impacts as of 1969. Treated are: poHtical consultation in
fATO, integration of NATO military forces, leadership, functionalism, and
spillover of NATO, military forces, armaments, organizational infrastructure,
science, and future roles. The data base is derived from extensive field research
and interviews with NATO officials, and officials of the governments forming
the NATO alliance.

The chapter on NATO Science treats formal and informal organizational,
leadership, and decision-making structures. Programs, expenditures, the
objectives of member governments and trends in developing an integrated
science program relevant to member states and the Alliance are also reviewed.
With respect to development of an effective integrated science program, the
author observes that support for NATO science depends primarily on a
"common interest in Western political-military cohension, scientific progress,
and information exchange." However, this shared goal is not strong enough to
mitigate particular national interests weakening the program.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Environment Direc-
torate. Environmental Standards: Definitions and the Need for Iniernational Har-
monization. Paris, 1974. 26 p.

Pollution control — [OECD countries]/International environmental co-
operation .
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Iniernational Scientific
Organisations. Catalog preceded by an introduction of Some A.spects of Inter-
national Scientific Co-operation. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development, February 1965. 281 p.

Study compiled in preparation for the Ministerial Meeting on Science of
the OECD countries, held in Paris (October 3-4, 1963.) The introduction
describes the organization, history, structure and evolution of various types
of multilateral cooperation in science. The catalog, limited to international
science organizations to which members of the OECD countries belong,
includes both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations..
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. I Jiter national Scien-
tific Organisations: Supplement. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 1966. 84 p.

A supplement to the descriptive volume published in 1965. Organizations
covered in this review include: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, the World Health Organization, the International Hydro-
graphic Bureau, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the
International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean
Sea, the International Commission for Agricultural Industries, the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, and the Central Treaty Organization. With respect
to each activity the following topics are covered: background information,
objectives, membership, structure and procedure, personnel, finance, external
relations, activities, remarks, references and organization charts.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD at Work for
Environment. [Paris] 1971. 57 p.

Describes the principles and philosophy of OECD's action in this field.
Reviews the competent bodies of the organization and their functions. Ex-
amines prospects for the future .

1943

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD at Work for
Industry and Energy. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-Opera tion and
Development, 1973. 47 p.

Describes work in the industry and energy sectors carried out by the Com-
mittees and working parties of OECD with the Organisations, Industry and
Energy Directorate.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD at Work for
Science and Education. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 1972. 68 p.

Begins by describing OECD's structures and strategies in the fields of
science and technology, and then in education. These are followed by descrip-
tions of OECD's programs in the two areas, together with that of the OECD
Center for Educational Research and Innovation. Separate chapters deal
with the OECD's work on Road Research and Education.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Secretary Getieral.
Activities of OECD in 1973; Report. [Paris, c. 1974] 112 p.

Partial contents. — Economic policy. — Trade policy. — Capital movements,
financial and fiscal affairs. — Agriculture and fisheries. — Industry and energy. —
Manpower and social affairs. — Development cooperation. — Technical co-
operation.— Environment policy. — Road research. — Relations with other
international organizations.
O'Sullivan, Dermot, A. "World Science Leaders Examine Social Needs: Problems
Facing Developing Countries and a Closer Coordination of Natural and Social
Sciences Drew Attention At Paris Meeting." Chemical and Engineering News,
July 28, 1975: 15-16.

This is a news report on a two-day OECD ministerial conference on
Science and Technology in the Management of Complex Problems. Several
important themes were raised: the need to give greater recognition to
the potential of the social sciences in solving the world's problems; the
allocation of more scientific research resources to the social sciences; the need
for more public awareness of the purposes and utility of science ; the need for
studies of natural resources management; and improved methods to secure
technology transfer.
Rannestad, Andreas. "Scientific Co-Operation in NATO." NATO Review, v. 21,
no. 2, 1973: 23-26.

Summarizes the larger study, Scientific Cooperation in NATO: Information
on NATO Science Programmes, describing the multifaceted research and
educational activities of the civiUan NATO Science Committee.
Schrader, Rudolf. "AGARD — Model for International Cooperation." Aussen-
politik, V. 22, no. 1, 1971: 102-114.

Describes the organization, function and working methods of the Advisory
Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), a scientific
agency of NATO, emphasizing the growing role of West Germany.
Shuman, Jack Norman. An Analysis of the Science Policy Programs of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development. A dissertation submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Washington, D.C.,
June 1970. Mimeo, 422" p.

"This dissertation is an examination of the science policy programs of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It centers on
OECD's ability to provide a sharp focus on a central question, namely, what
are the basic problems in the relationship of science and technology to public
poHcy? Addresses also the shift in OECD science policy activities from look-
ing at the benefits to the disadvantageous consequences of investment in some
aspects of technology."
Smith, P. J. "NATO and Civil Science." Nature, v. 250, July 19, 1974: 174.

". . . NATO . . . sponsored 56 conferences on science subjects in
1972 in order to gain 'social respectability and prestige.' This sponsorship is
'totally unnecessary' as 60 percent of its science money is returned to agen-
cies in member countries to administer and many of its programs duplicate
other programs in these countries. ... If an overtly international pro-
gramme of science support is . . . desirable, it would be . . . preferable
to . . . hand over the NATO scheme to some . . . nonmilitarv organi-
zation such as UNESCO. However Paul Henri Spaak, NATO's 1957 Secre-
tary General, believed that NATO's support of science would 'strengthen
the Alliance and its political substance.' Perhaps, a little 'social respectability
and prestige' are needed to overcome antimilitarj^ prejudices toward NATO."

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: GENERAL ISSUES

AND PROCESSES

Adams, Scott. Information for Science and Technology: The International Scene.
[Champaign] University of Illinois, Graduate School of Library Science, 1973.
45 p. (Illinois, University. Graduate School of Library Science. Occasional
papers no. 109) "US ISSN 0073-5310"

Parital contents. — Information for postwar research and development. —
Freedom of information. — New dimensions of international cooperation. — -
Information transfer to developing countries.
Allen, Thomas J., James M. Piepmeier, and S. Cooney. "The International
Technological Gatekeeper." Technoloc/y Review, v. 73, Mar. 1971: 37-43.

"The international transfer of technology takes place through intermediary
agents called technological gatekeepers. For greatest effectiveness, these
men must be well integrated both into an external network of information
sources and an internal network of users to who the information can be
delivered."
Bar-Zakay, Samuel N. "Policymaking and Technology Transfer: the Need for
National Thinking Laboratories." Policy Sciences, v. 2, summer 1971: 213-227.
"The author suggests that National Thinking Laboratories should be
established to promote organized technology transfer and to act as catalysts
to organized policymaking. Their charter should be to match needs in one
context to capabilities in another context. This charter is outlined in opera-
tional terms by five general objectives listed by the author."
Bischel, Jon E. "Exportation of American Technology and the Federal Income
Tax; part 1: Direct Transfers." Syracuse Law Review, v. 22, no. 4, 1971: 867-893.
Bischel, Jon E. "Exportation of American Technology and the Federal Income
Tax, part II: Indirect Transfers." Syracuse Law Review, v. 23, no. 1, 1972: 1-32.
Follow-on to 1971 article on direct transfers of technology. Discusses
technology transfer abroad as affected by the Federal income tax. Focuses in
particular on nonrecognition and deferral tax provisions and on international
income allocation regarding the "use of intangible property.
Bobrow, Davis B. Technology-related International Outcomes: R and D Strategies to
Induce Sound Public Policy. Pittsburgh, International Studies Association,
University of Pittsburgh, Occasional paper no. 2, 1974. 60 p.

"The discussion presented in this paper seeks to provide a starting point for
a doctrine for making and shaping R&D decisions which are directed to the
production of desirable and feasible public policy for technology-related
international problems. Designs for purposeful action involve tliree related
statements : performance goals, operational requirements for their realization,
and the action instructions necessary to meet these requirements. The strategic
problem for the R&D decision-maker is to devise and induce those policy
institutions and actions which will make the probabilities of desired inter-
national outcomes substantially greater than they would be otherwise.
Explicitly or implicitly, the R&D results sought are sets of instructions which
if followed will either produce an outcome reflected in advance or at least

?rovide reasoned judgments about what outcomes are desired and feasible.
Ising these design standards, the paper focuses on the most prevalent
approaches now current to determine their premise in meeting these standards
and the extent to which they are adapted to the strategic problem mentioned
earlier. As a result of this limited appraisal an alternative approach is offered
at a high level of generality, based on the premise that if pursued for a number
of years at substantial expenditure for international incomes, it stands an
inherently better chance of meeting the strategic problem than do the
current approaches which are briefly analyzed. After a summary of the
notions introduced for R&D strategies for technology-related international
outcomes, the paper concludes with a recommended program of 'experi-
ments' to determine the value, to relevant officials, of the alternative R&D

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1945

approaches discussed in the paper. A bibliographic note is provided, along
with a list of participants in the NSF-ISA Conference on the subject held
May 16-17, 1974, in Washington, D.C." (Supported by NSF RANN award:
GI-39444.)
Boretsky, Michael. "Trends in U.S. Technology: a Political Economist's View."
American Scientist, v. 63, Jan.-Feb. 1975: 70-82.

"Decline in the rate of growth of technological innovation and rapid
dissemination throughout the world of U.S. technology in a 'naked' form are
having dismal repercussions on our economy."
Boretsky, Michael. U.S. Technology: Trends and Policy Issues. Program of Policy
Studies in Science and Technology. Washington, D.C, 1973. 175 p.

The loss of U.S. technological advantage is due to: (1) relatively low growth
of investment in new industrial plants and equipment since World War II;
(2) relatively small investment in economically-relevant-research and develop-
ment; and (3) a one-sided global diffusion of U.S. advanced technology in a
"naked" form. After detailing these issues, the author "argues the case for a
comprehensive national technological policy which he defines as the sum of
deliberate actions on the part of the U.S. federal government aimed at the
increase and improvement of technological options and alternatives for all
productive units in the economy for the furtherance of national objectives
within resource constraints." He discusses a number of options which could
be included in such a policj'.
Brad}'', Edward L. and Lewis A. Branscomb. "Information for a Changing Soci-
ety." Science, v. 175. Mar. 3, 1972: 961-966.

This article analyzes an OECD report entitled "Information for a Changing
Society." The report is concerned with national and international policy
relating to information sj^stems in science and technology.
Chang, Y. S. The Transfer of Technology: Economics of Offshore Assembly, the Case
of Semiconductor Industry. [New York] UNITAR, 1971. 59 p. (United Nations
Institute for Training and Research. UNITAR research reports, no. 11.)
"Civilian Technology Role Takes on New International Dimension." Professional
Engineer, v. 43, Apr. 1973: 42-45.

"Positive policy actions by Government can restore lost technological

momentum in the U.S. If American exports are to compete equally, they must

be able to enter the market supported by an export finance policy at least

equal to that of other nations."

Danhof, Clarence H. The Effects of International Technology Transfers on the

U.S. Economy: Present Understanding, and its Implications for Public Policy and

Research Priorities. Preliminary Papers prepared for a colloquium to be sponsored

by the National Science Foundation. October 1973: 117 p.

Includes: "Introduction and Summary," Rolf R. Piekarz; "A Summary
and Assessment of Research Findings on U.S. International Transactions
Involving Technology Transfers," Robert B. Stobaugh; "Effects of Interna-
tional Technology Transfers on the U.S. Economy," Richard E. Caves;
"Technology Transfers and the American Economy," Gary C. Hufbauer-
" 'International' Technology and the U.S. Economy; Is There a Problem?
Keith Pavitt; and "Selected BibUography."
Feld, Bernard T. "What Is Pugwash Anyway?" Nation, v. 215, 1972: 431-435.
"Scientists (mainly natural scientists, but later a significant fraction of
political, social and behavioral scientists as well) meet as individuals, infor-
mally and unofficially, to discuss world problems arising from science and
technology."
Grellman Research Associates, Inc. Economic Regulation and Technological In-
novation: A Cross-National Literature Survey and Analysis. Vol. I, prepared for
the National Science Foundation, National R and D Assessment Program,
Washington, D.C. January 1974. 203 p. USC/FAR Proj. No. 19118-73. Avail-
able from the State Dept. as FAR 2224 1-G.
'T^nternational Communications: Freedom of Information and Cultural Integrity."
FAR Horizons, v. VII, No. 2, Spring 1974: 1-4. (Newsletter for the Under-
secretaries Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs Research, U.S. Dept.
of State.)

Report on Conference, held in Feb. 1974, attended by representatives of
academia, the media, and the government on the topic of assisting the United
States to develop policy alternatives for "situations in which foreign govern-
ments assert the right to control or limit international communications in
order to protect the cultural integrity of their societies." A list of background
papers presented is included.

1946

Iniernational Information, Education, and Cultural Relations: Recommendations
for the Future. Washington, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1975. 85 p.
Janssen, Jules J. A. "Microprojects: Transfer of Technology by Mail." Inter-
national Development Review/ Focus, v. 17, no. 2, 1975: 9-12.

"The objective of a microproject is to ofiFer, through correspondence,
socially as well as technically sound advice for solving LDC technical prob-
lems. Certain measures have been identified which serve to alleviate the
difficulties inherent in the transfer of technology by mail."
Joelson, Mark R. "International Technology Transfers and the United States
Antitrust Laws." Journal of International Law & Economics, v. 8, June 1973:
85-112.

Covers the drafting of an international technology agreement with respect
to territorial restrictions, price restrictions, field of use restrictions, tying
arrangements, package licensing, royalty formulas, grantbacks, and cross-
licenses and patent pooling.
Kay, David. "International Transfer of Marine Technology : the Transfer Process
and International Organizations." Ocean Development and International Law
Journal, v. 2, winter 1974: 351-377.

"This article is concerned with describing and evaluating the approaches
by international organizations in their efforts to facilitate the transfer of
technology."
Knezo, Genevieve J. International Technology Transfer: A Selected Bibliography.
In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcom-
mittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space. International Science
and Technology Transfer Act of 1974- Hearings, 93d Cong. 2d sess. May 1974.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Ofif., 1974. pp. 161-166.
Kohler, B.M., A.H. Rubenstein, and C.F. Doubbs. "A Behavioral Study of
International Technology Transfer Between the United States and West
Germany." Research Policy, v. 2, Oct. 1973: 160-184.
Laszlo, Ervin, "World System Research and Information Bureau: A Proposal."
International Association, no. 1, Jan. 1974: 34-38. ■

This is a proposal for the creation of an international information gathering,
evaluating and disseminating agency, functioning in the supranational
interests of mankind.
McLin, Jon. "Technology and Transatlantic Relations; Part I: Export Controls
and Conditions of Competition." [Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field
Staff] 1970. 8 p. (American Universities Field Staff. Field staff reports. West
Europe series, v. 5^ no. 7 [General].)
"Measuring the Impact of Academic Exchange." FAR Horizons, v. VII, no. 2,
Spring 1974: 4-6.

Discusses the second phase of a two phase study by the International
Committee for the Study of Educational Exchange. The topics assessed
are: the long-term effects of international exchange and ways to cope with
problems that confront exchangee.
Nau, Henry R. Technology Transfer, U.S. Foreign Policy and the International
System. Paper prepared for delivery at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1975. 40 p. plus bibliog-
raphy. (Research is part of the project on "Technology Transfer and U.S.
Foreign PoUcy," funded by the NSF Grant ST-44205.)

"In the postwar period, the outflow of U.S. technology to foreign countries
has been dealt with in three separate and largely unrelated policy contexts :
(1) strategic-military emphasizing export controls on technology to communist
countries (2) foreign assistance involving the use of U.S. technology to obtain
political-diplomatic benefits and (3) the multinational company reflecting the
transfer of technology within an integrated economic structure cutting across
national boundaries. This paper assesses and compares the motivations,
mechanisms, and effects of technology transfer in these separate contexts and
•seeks to identify overall patterns affecting the use of American technology in
foreign affairs. The patterns identified include: (1) While strategic-military
and foreign policy motivations have dominated the use and evaluation of
technology transfer in the past, economic and social criteria have become
more important today, raising difficult issues concerning the pricing of tech-
nology in international economic exchanges. (2) While high-level government
.agencies have set the framework for foreign policy-related technology initia-
tives in the past and technical agencies or private industry have implemented

1947

these initiatives largely through the private sector, government and industry

may have to develop mixed public-private mechanisms for technology transfer

in the future, reflecting both the declining role of government in f undmg new

industrial technology- in the U.S. and the growing hostility to U.S. direct

investment abroad. (3) While the effects of U.S. technology transfer in the

past, particularly through private investment have been direct and associated

with American commercialism and mass culture, these eff"ects in the future

may be considerably attentuated, since U.S. technology may be exported

more frequently independent of equity or management control and thus be

influenced more by local inputs of materials and personnel."

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Towards CerUraL Oow-

ernment Computer Policies: Data Base Developments and International Dimensions,

By R. Pipe. Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

1973. 220 p. (OECD Informatics Studies, No. 5.) '

Presents and analyzes the important characteristics of government policies

in computer utilization in fourteen OECD member countries and a number of

findings relevant to automated data processing at government policy levels

are developed. u u u

Perspectives on International Scholarly Exchange. Report of a conference held by

the Committee on International Exchange of Persons at the National Academy

of Sciences Summer Studies Center, Woods Hole, Mass., August 24-25 1972.

Washington, D.C., Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 1974. 3(J p.

Peters, E. Bruce. "Are We Giving Away Our Science and Technology? The

Journal Of Business Communication, v. 12, no. 2, Winter 1975: 3-19.

The author offers empirical evidence to demonstrate that an open scientitic
and technical information policy does not necessarily disadvantage a Nation s
capabihty, but on the contrary tends to enhance it, by generating substantial
return information flow.
Peters E Bruce. "Cultural and Language Obstacles to Information Iransfer
in the Scientific and Technical Field." Management International Revievy^
V. 15, no. 1, 1975:75-88. _, ^ .

"Anyone who has ever tried to work through an interpreter doesn t nave-
to be told about cultural and language obstacles to an effective transfer of
information and thought. It's hard enough to gain real communication
within the homogeneous background of one's own family. As backgrounds ■.
become more divergent, the difficulties in comrounication increase in a^
corresponding manner.

"There is a voluminous body of writings by linguists, anthropologists',
psychologists, and sociologists which points to the many difiiculties of cross
cultural communication. These potential obstacles are concerned not only
with language but also the aspects of unspoken language, perception, cultural
and occupational mores.

"Despite these many actual and potential barriers to communication, a
body of recent empirical research shows that in some cases the obstacles have
apparently been overrated as impediments to effective communication. This
article first describes the potential obstacles and then the results of research
on information transfer in international scientific and technological meetings."
Peters, E. Bruce. "International, Scientific and Technical Meetings: Why Go?
Who Profits?" R and D Management, v. 5, no. 2, Feb. 1975: 139-147.

"A growing body of empirical research shows that information which is
actually put to use is most often transmitted by personal contact. This article
reviews the hterature to examine some of the reasons for the importance of
personal contact in the transmission of information and then focuses on
scientific and technical meetings as an environment designed to facilitate
the transmission of information in this way. The review of the literature is
included for completeness in Part II of the article. However, it is the founda-
tion on which the empirical research described in Part I is based.

Using the author's definition of meeting effectiveness this research shows
that the person who is giving the most is also the most effective in gaining and
utilizing information."
Pontecorvo, GiuHd and Maurice Wilkinson. "An Economic Analysis of the
International Transfer of Marine Technology." Ocean Development & Inter-
national Law, V. 2, Fall 1974: 255-283.

"This paper develops a general economic framework for the analysis
of international technology transfer, provides an analysis and categorization
of countries, and concludes with a case study on the Peruvian fish-meal
industry."

96-243 O - 77 - 29

1948

Priority Research Needs on Technology-related Transnational and Global Policy
Problems. Report of a workshop held on March 7-8, 1973, at Brookline, Mass.
under the joint sponsorship of the Center for International Studies, MIT,
and the Research Applied to National Needs Program of the National
Science Foundation. Cambridge, Center for International Studies, MIT, July
1973. 106 p.i

A detailed statement on hard and "soft" research required by the United
States to deal with technology related international policy issues.
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Proceedings of the Seventh In-
ternational Conference on Science and World Affairs: International Cooperation in
Pure and Applied Science. Stowe, Vermont, September 5-9, 1961. [1961] 209 p.
"Forty-seven participants from 12 countries met at Stowe, Vt., September
5-9, 1961, to discuss International Cooperation in Pure and Applied Science,
This conference was the seventh in the series of meetings between scientists
from many countries on Science and World Afifairs. . . . The papers in
this volume were prepared by the participants for presentation at the plenary
session and for consideration by the six working groups." Among the papers
included are the following: "International Scientific Cooperation and the
Prospects for its Development," A. V. Topchiev; "Recent Experiences in
International Cooperation in Pure and AppUed Sciences," Roger ReveUe;
"International Cooperation in Cancer Research and a Peaceful World."
"A Return Flow of Technology From Abroad." Fortune, v, 88, no. 2, Aug. 1973: 63.
Rotblat, Joseph. Pugwash — the First Ten Years. History of the Conferences of
^ Science and World Affairs. [By the Secretary General, Pugwash Continuing
^ Committee.] New York, Humanities Press, 1968, 231 p. plus index.

Documents and describes the history of the International Conferences on

Science and World Affairs (commonly known as Pugwash Conferences),

convened as a private effort by scientists from all over the world. Illustrates

the private international collaboration of scientists in common problems and

research efforts. Also included are the summary statements from each of the

conferences held. Conferences have treated: nuclear weapons and atomic

energy; arms control, biological and chemical warfare; pure and applied

science; role of scientists in world affairs and the potential role of science in

promoting development.

Schmidt-Kolmer, Eva. Report on the Implications of Scientific and Technological

Developments for the Situation of Women and Their Integration in Development: a

Point of View. [New York, United Nations] 1975. 24 p. (United Nations.

[Document] E/CONF. 66/BP/7)

At head of title: United Nations.

At head of title: World Conference of the International Women's Year,
Mexico City, 19 June 2 July 1975.
*'A Scientific and Technical Information Pohcy." The OECD Observer, No. 53,
AprU 1968: 36-38.

"This article summarizes some of the findings of an OECD Scientific and
Technical Information Policy Group set up 'to identify the main policy issues
on scientific and technical information and the scope for international co-
operation in deaUng with them.' The Group has shown the need for the fol-
lowing kinds of national and international action: (1) 'Identification of priority
areas for international cooperation, and of the consequent policy issues and
action for national bodies' ; (2) .'Cooperation in building up new international
systems,' and (3) A 'concerted approach to common problems.' "
Spencer, Daniel Lloyd. Technology Gap in Perspective: Strategy of International
Technology Transfer. New York, Spartan Books, 1970.

After assessing several factors important to U.S. technology transfer
policies, the author proposes an international technology agency to "exercise
surveillance at crucial points." "A framework is developed enabling American
and foreign interests to learn to live with efficient technology transfer and
adaptation requiring tradeoffs at the interfaces."
Technology and International Trade. Washington, National Academy of Engineering
[available from NTIS] 1971. 146 p.

Contents. — Technology and U.S. trade: a historical review, by R.
Cooper. — Concerns about the present American position in international
trade, by M. Boretsky. — Technology and industry structure, by A. Phillips. —
Computers and international trade, by J. Maisonrouge. — The automobile
and international trade, by R. Gerstenberg. — Textiles and international
trade, by B. Dent. — Machine tools, imports, and national security, by H.
Sharpe, Jr. PB 205 012.

1949

Teich, Albert H. "Politics and International Laboratories: a Study of Scientists'
Attitudes." In Scierdists and Public Affairs, edited by Albert H. Teich. Cam-
bridge, The MIT Press [1974]. pp. 173-236.

Evaluation of role of scientists in three European laboratories: CERN,
ESTEC, and ISPRA.
UA^ISIST: Synopsis of the Feasibility Study on a World Science Information
System. By the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion and the International Council of Scientific Unions. Paris, UNESCO, 1971.
92 p.

Deals with cultivating the exchange of scientific information and with
increasing international cooperation to improve its accessibility and use as
an international resource to promote the scientific, educational, social,
cultural, and economic development of all nations. Recommendations to
improve communication are included.
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Significant NASA Inven-
tions, Available for Licensing in Foreign Countiies. Washington [For sale by the
Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1974. 73 p. (U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. NASA SP-7038 (02))

"This pubUcation includes abstracts of those inventions in which NASA
owns the principal or exclusive rights and which have been made available
for patent licensing in the countries indicated."
U.S. National Science Foundation. The Effects of International Technology Trans-
fers on U.S. Economy: Papers and Proceedings of a Colloquium Held in Washing-
ton, D.C., November 17, 1973. Washington [For sale by the Supt. of Docs.,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1974. 109 p.
"NSF 74-21"

"The papers in this volume stem from interests and concerns expressed
by the Science Adviser to the President and by the Executive Office of the
President on the status of research and knowledge of international tech-
nology transfer."
United Nations. Transfer of Operative Technology at the Enterprise Level. New

Yorli, United Nations, 1972. E. 72. II.A.l.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Human Rights and Scientific
and Technological Developments: Uses of Electronics Which May Affect the
Rights of the Person and the Limits Which Should be Placed on Such Uses in a
Democratic Society; Report. [New York] 1974. 25 p. (United Nations. [Document]
E/CN.4/1142/Add.2)
Wolf, Alfred. "Trends in the International Licence Trade." Inter economics, no. 5,
May 1973: 150-153.

"The term 'international licence trade' signifies the worldwide buying and
selling, across national frontiers, of technical and industrial licenses. In
contrast to the trade in goods, which involves the exchange of material goods,
the transfer of licences concerns immaterial goods, i.e. legally protected
industrial property rights (patents, registered or ornamental designs, copy
rights) and unprotected technical knowledge and inventions (the so-called
'know-how')."

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE: THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

A. Genekal and International Issttes

Baranson, Jack. International Transfer of Automotive Technology to Developing
Countries. [New York} UNITAR, 1971. 95 p. (United Nations Institute for
Training and Research. UNITAR research reports, no. 8).
Bilateral Institutional Links in Science and Technology, No. 13, Science Policy
Studies and Documents, UNESCO, Paris, 1969. 98 p.

"Tliis report is a 'survey and analysis of the existing extent of co-operative
links in the field of science and technology, between advanced and developing
countries' and, in addition, it makes 'proposals for promoting the wider intro-
duction erf such arrangements.' Based primarily on questionnaires, the study
covers details of several hundred current bUateral institutional links. A
selected list of several hundred bilateral institutional links involving universi-
ties, research institutions, museums, private enterprises and cooperative
indiistrial research associations is presented, whirh includes the linking insti-
tutes from the developing country and the advanced country, and the subject
field. (This 'list is not presented as comprehensive; its purpose is rather
illustrative'). Other topics covered include: bilateral institutional links com-
bined with United Nations activities, role of non-government organizations,
advantages of institutional links, Unesco's programme for promoting insti-
tutional links, 'industrial research associations: their potential contribution
to overseas development,' 'bilatefal aid for development,' and 'East- West
co-operation in academic aid to developing nations.' " (4).
Caustin, Harold. The Search For New Methods of Technical Co-operation: a Report
on a UNITAR Weekend Seminar SO June-2 July 1972 at the Institute of De-
velopment Studies, Sussex University, England. New York, United Nations
Institute for Training and Research, 1974. 85 p. (United Nations Institute for
Training and Research. Conference report no. 4, 1974)
Hawthorne, Edward P. The Transfer of Technology. [Paris] Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development [1972] 148 p.

"The Ministers responsit^ for Science and Technology in the OECD
countries recommended, at their Third Meeting, that special attention should
be given to the problem of the technological gap in the less-developed member
countries of the Organisation. Accordingly, in October 1970 the OECD
organised a Seminar at Istanbul on the subject of the transfer of technology."
Holsti, K. R. "Underdevelopment and the 'Gap' Theory of International Con-
flict." American Political Science Review, vol. 69, no. 3, September 1975: 827-
839.

"A common hypothesis about the sources of international conflict holds
that war and turmoil will be an inevitable consequence of the widening
'gap' between the developed and imderdeveloped states. This view is based on
a common Western image of underdeveloped countries which assumes that
striving for economic betterment is universal in all underdeveloped countries,
and is primarily a grassroots phenomenon. This essay challenges the hypothesis
and the assumptions upon which it is based. It argues that the images of
underdevelopment generated by economists using aggregated data are in
many cases incorrect or distorted. Studies by anthropologists which are
based on micro- rather than macro-data produce quite different impressions
of the underdeveloped society. The human costs involved are for the most
part overlooked in development schemes, and the wholesale importation of
Western economic development strategies has led in many cases not only to
a poor allocation of resources but also to many of the problems the developed
societies are now facing, including urban congestion, rising crime rates,
higher incidence of mental breakdown, and the like." The paper criticizes
some "common liberal solutions to develop problems. . . ." (5)

(1950)

1951

Hutchins, Robert M. The Future of International Education. New York, United
Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1970. 22 p. (UNITAR lecture,
series #4.)
Meeting the Challenge of Industrialization: a Feasibility Study for an International
Industrialization Institute. Report of a special international panel of the Board
on Science and Technology for International Development, Office of the
Foreign Secretary. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences-National
Academy of Engineering. Washington, D.C. 1973. 131 p.

Assesses the concept and organization of creating an international indus-
trialization institute to perform research on new approaches to international
industrialization that would benefit developing countries. "The consensus
of those interviewed wa? that an institute as envisioned by the panel could
contribute invaluably to the more orderly and harmonious industrial devel-
opment" of both developing and developed worlds.
Moravcsik, Michael J. and J. M. Ziman. "Paradisia and Dominatia: Science and
the Developing World." Foreign Affairs, v. 53, no. 4, July 1975: 699-724.

The authors elaborate on the following themes: ". . . insufficient thought
and effort is being given to creating and maintaining indigenous scientific
activity in the less-developed countries. The actions of the countries concerned
are uncoordinated, and are often based on very poor grasp of the real issues.
The world scientific community is negligent of the plight of this small fraction
of its members. The international agencies lack the resource^., and the big
aid programs, such as those of the U.S. government, lack the understanding,
to act effectively. A highly significant fraction of general social and economic
development, with enormous long-term leverage, is being left at the mercy
of a variety of haphazard forces — political whim, crude economic theory,
intellectual fashion, administrative convenience."

Concluding observations address the need for additional study on inter-
action patterns and closer communications links between scientists of the
developed and developing nations.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Choice and Adapta-
tion of Technology in Developing Countries: an Overview of Major Policy Issues,
Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1974. 242 p.
Reviews major policy issues of technology for developing countries,
including terminology, and philosophy; factor prices and the dual economy;
multinational cooperation; the role of engineering and the cost of technology
transfer; science and industry; the measurement of technology; technology
assessment and modules of technology.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Development Center,
The Role of the Technical Assistance Expert. Paris, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 1975. 160 p.
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Development
Center. "Towards New Forms of Co-Operation in Development Research
and Training. International Meeting of Directors of Development Research
and Training Institutes. Abidjan, Ivory Coast, August 1974." Liaison Bulletin,
No. 1, 1975.

Various themes relating to the problems of collaboration in research and
training were discussed by representatives of regional and international
development associations. The papers in this Bulletin deal with the concept
of development, training for development, the roles of regional institutes in
development and training for development, development of a European
Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, a projected
association of Arab Development Research and Training Institutes, exchanges
of experiences on development training and research programmes and descrip-
tions about regional associations of development institutes.
Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Philip J. Stone and Alexander Szalai. Communications, Com-
puters and Automation for Development. [New York] UNITAR, 1971. 61 p.
(United Nations Institute for Training and Research. UNITAR research
reports, no. 6)

Futuristic speculations on the role of computers, automation, and com-
munications technology changes in developing countries during the Second
Development Decade.
Ritchie-Calder, Lord. "New Dimensions and Opportunities in the Application of
Science and Technology to Development and the Role of the United Nations
Family." [New York, United Nations] 1973. 69 p. (United Nations. [Document]
E/5238/Add. 1)

1952

This document is an addendum to the Secretary- General's report (E/5238),
The Role of Modern Science and Technology in the Development of Nations
and the Need To Strengthen Economic and Technico-Scientific Cooperation
Among States.
Seaborg, Glenn T. "Science, Technology, and Development: A New World Out-
look." Science, v. 181, n. 4094, July 6, 1973: 13-19.

Discusses problems of energy, education, environmental quality, urbaniza-
tion and the resulting need for cooperation in science and technology between
the United States and the Latin American nations.
Schumacher, Ernst F. "Intermediate Technology." Center Magazine, v. 8, Jan.-
Feb. 1975: 43-49.

Describes the operation of an organization to help developing countries
apply "intermediate" technology to their problems.
Sperling, Philip. "Evaluating Training Programs: the AID Experience." Inter-
national Development Review, v. 15, 1973-74: 9-13.

"A training evaluation system should be an instrument for reviewing past
experience in order to improve futiu'e planning, but it is difficult to devise a
system that both is easy to use and reliably reflects the opinions of partici-
pants and others involved in the programs."
Stobaugh, Robert B. The Interiiatiojial Transfer of Technology in the Establishment
of the Petrochemical Industry in Developing Countries. [New York] UNITAR,
1971. 65 p. (United Nations Institute for Training and Research. UNITAR
research reports, no. 12).
Tarapore, Savak S. "Financing Technology Transfer to Developing Countries."
International Development Review, v. 16, no. 2, 1974: 17-20.

"Changes in the international patents s3'stem and the establishment of an
international technology transfer bank could help reduce the costs of tech-
nology transfers and encourage research and development efforts oriented
toward the needs of developing countries."
United Nations. Conference on Trade and Development. Proceedings of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, third session, Santiago de Chile,
• 13 April to 21 May 1972. New York, United Nations, 1973. 138 p. (United
Nations. [Document] TD/180, vol. III). "United Nations pubUcation. Sales
no. E. 73.II.D.6"

Partial contents. — Economic growth and development financing: issues,
pohcies and proposals — report by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/118). —
Mobilization of resources for development: report by the UNCTAD secre-
tariat (TD/118/Supp. 1). — External development finance: report by the
UNCTAD secretariat (TD/118/Supp. 2).— The link: report by the UNCTAD
secretariat (TD/118/Supp. 4). — The outflow of financial resources from
developing countries: note by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/118/Supp. 5). —
Private foreign investment in its relationship to development: report by the
UNCTAD secretariat (TD/ 134) .—Tourism and developing countries: report
by the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/142).— Policies relating to technology of
the countries of the Andean Pact: their foundations: a study by the Board of
the Cartagena Agreement (TD/107).
United Nations. Conference on Trade and Development. Secretariat. Guidelines
for the Study of the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries; a Study.
New York, United Nations, 1972. iv, 59 p. 28 cm (United Nations Document,
TD/B/AC. 11/9) United Nations pubUcation. Sales no. E.72.II.D.19.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Advisor}'^ Committee on the
Application of Science and Technology to Development. World Plan of Action
for the Application of Science and Technology to Development. New York, United
Nations, 1971. 286 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/4962/Rev. 1)

At head of title: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "United
Nations publication. Sales no.: E. 71. II. A. 18"

Part one lists priority areas in which science and technology can make a
resounding impact and outlines proposals for implementation and financing
of the Plan. Part two consists of more detailed proposals, presented for a
wider range of areas.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Advisory Committee on the
Application of Science and Technology to Development. World Plan of Action
for the Application of Science and Technology to Development: Report. Volume I.
[New York] 1971. 54, 3 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/4962)
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Advisory Committee on the
Application of Science and Technology to Development. World Plan of Action

1953

for the Application of Science and Technology to Development: Report. Volume II.
[New York] 1971. 1 v. (various pagings). (United Nations. [Document] E/4962/
Add. 1 (pts. 1-12))
United Nations. Implementation of the International Development Strategy. Vol. I:
Papers for the First Over-All Review and Appraisal of Progress During the
Second United Nations Development Decade. New York, United Nations, 1973.
E.73.II.A.8.
United Nations. Implementation of the International Development Strategy. Vol. II:
Papers for the First Over-All Review and Appraisal of Progress During the
Second United Nations Development Decade. New York, United Nations, 1973.
E.73.II.A.3.
United Nations. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. Guidelines for the Acquisition of Foreign Technology in Developing
Countries. New York, United Nations, 1973. E.73.II.B.21.
United Nations. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Tra,de and De-
velopment. Perspectives for Industrial Development in the Second United Nations
Development Decade. New York, United Nations, 1973 E.73.II.B.7.
United Nations. Reviewing the Development Priority. Implementation of the Inter-
national Development Strategy: First Over-All Review and Appraisal of Progress
During the Second United Nations Development Decade. New York, United Na-
tions, 1973. E.73.II.A.7.
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Mid-term Review and Appraisal
of Progress in Implementing the I nter national Development Strategy; Programme
of Action 071 the Establishment of a New International Economic Order: the Role
of the Public Sector in Promoting the Economic Development of Developing Coun-
tries: Report [New York] 1975. 49 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5690/
Add.l)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Economic development — [Developing countries].
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Possible Future Topics for
Consideration by the Committee [on Science and Technology for Development].
[New York] 1973. 30 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.8/13)
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Presents the views of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, the
International Labour Office and the World Meteorological Organization on
their relationship with the Committee on Science and Technology for Develop-
ment of the Economic and Social Council. Includes as addenda (E/C.8/13/
Add.l and E/C.8/13/Add.2) the views of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Science and Technology in
the Second United Nations Development Decade: International Development
Strategy: Note. [New York] 1973. 18 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.8/10.)
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Concentrates on developing countries.
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Science and Technology in
the Second United Nations Development Decade: Regional Aspects: Note. [New
York] 1973. 38 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.8/9).

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Covers the areas of Africa, Asia, the Far East, Europe, Latin America, and
the Middle East.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Science and Technology in
the Second United Nations Development Decade: Role of Modern Science and
Technology in the Development of Nations: Question of Convening a United Nations
Conference on Science and Technology. Report on the Second Session, 11-29
Mar. 1974. [New York, United Nations] 1974. 5 p. (United Nations. [Document]
E/C.8/25).

At head of title: United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Committee
on Science and Technology for Development.
United Notions. Secretary-General (Waldheim). United Nations Technical
Co-operation Activities; Report. [New York] 1975. 69 p. (United Nations.
[Document] DP/RP/16)

At head of title: United Nations Development Programme.
United Nations. UNCTAD Secretariat. "Major Issues Arising from the Transfer
of Technology to Developing Countries: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat ""
New York, United Nations, 1975. 50 p. (75.ILD.2.)

yt

1954

United Nations. World Plan of Action. AJrican Regional Plan for the Application
of Science and Technology to Development. New York, United Nations, 1973.
E. 73. ILK. 3.
Wortzel, Lawrence H. Technology Tranter in the Pharmaceutical Industry. [New
York] UNITAR, 197 L 53 p.

"The purpose of this paper is to assess the present state of pharmaceutical
manufacturing and related technology in the developing countries, and to
make recommendations as to. if, and how this technology can be better
transferred to these countries. This paper, therefore is a study of technology
transfer, within a single industry."

B. Issues Relating to a Donor Nation

Beach, Nancy. Research Priorities on Technology Transfer to Developing Countries,
Vol. II: Survey of Selected Studies and Research on Technology Transfer to De-
veloping Countries. Evanston, Northwestern University, Northwestern Docu-
ment no. 74/61. June 1973, Rev. July 1974. 61 p.

"This literature survey and bibliography was prepared for use at two NU/
NSF workshops on technology transfer to developing countries held at North-
western University in Mav, 1973, and Washington, D.C., in September, 1973."
(Supported by NSF RAJifN award: GI-39239.)
Brown, Harrison, and Theresa Tellez. International Development Programs of the
Office of the Foreign Secretary. Prepared for the Board on Science and Tech-
nology for International Development. Washington, D.C., National Academy
of Sciences, 1973. 68 p.

Analytic description of the NAS and NAE workshops, studies, and special

projects performed in cooperation with AID to strengthen national science

and technology policies, priorities, and organizations in the developing

countries. Includes a list of publications to 1973.

Chudson, Walter A. The International Transfer of Commercial Technology to

Developing Countries. [New York] UNITAR, 1971. 58 p. (United Nations

Institute for Training and Research. UNITAR research reports, no. 13)

"The purpose of the project of which this paper forms a part is to describe,
.-Bnalyze and evaluate the transfer of 'commercial', that is marketed, tech-
mology to developing countries from industrialised countries through 'enter-
prise-to-enterprise' arrangements. These include direct investment (including
joint ventures), licensing, management contracts, 'turnkey' projects, and the
installation and servicing of purchased industrial equipment."
The Future of Our AID Programs." Remarks of Hon. Hubert Humphrey
on the floor of the Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.) June 12 and June 13,
1975.

Contains prepared testimony of witnesses at a hearing held by the Foreign
Assistance Subcommittee to review our foreign aid programs and develop
new priorities for new foreign assistance legislation in the light of changing
global realities. The reprinted testimony was delivered by: George Ball, Mc-
George Bundy, Joseph S. Nye, James Brant, C. Fred Bergsten and Edward
Fried.

According to Senator Humphrey, "The panelists called for a new re-
lationship with the Third World countries, stressing economic interdepend-
ence and cooperation. They expressed - the need to continue food and
technical assistance to the 'Fourth World' — the poorest of the poor."
Harari, Denyse. The Role of the Technical Assistance Expert, An Enquiry into the
Expert's Identity, Motivations, and Attitudes. Paris. Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, January 1975. 159 p.
Howe, James W. ed. The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action 1975.
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 277 p.

"This is the third annual summation of staff work by the Overseas De-
A^elopment Council. 'It concentrates on the shortrun future and the immediate
past, the typical and necessary focus of policy makers.' The crisis areas and
the responses it describes are: food and hunger (international machinery
-already set in motion includes international grain reserves) ; population
(underdeveloped countries have already begun to act, but international
commitment remains crucial) ; oceans (where international delay will produce
only unwise unilaterial actions) ; international trade (a need not yet recognized
by nationalists in their short-sighted concentration on restricting imports
and exports) ; recession and inflation (international mechanisms can reduce

^<(

1955

tlife fAoS't ^feribus consequences but are ftol yel adequate) ; the fourth, or least
developed world (the 42 countries containing a quarter of the world's popula-
tion, aoout which almost nothing hopeful or significant is said) ; and excessive
military expenditures in the developing countries (the U.S. responsibility,
based on arms sales, is double that of the Soviet Union.)" (2)
Hunter, Robert E. ed. The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for
Action, 1973. Washington, D.C., The Overseas Development Council, 1973.
162 p.

Analysis of "the most important issues in U.S. relations with the poor

countries, present alternatives for action by the U.S. Government . . .

and Council recommendations." Substantive issues addressed include:

trade and monetary systems, U.S. private investment in developing countries,

new financial resources for poor countries, security dimension of foreign

aid, the ocean and developing countries, energy supply and demand, energy

dependence, environment, and population.

The International Development Institute. A report of an Ad Hoc Committee of

the Board on Science and Technology for International Development, Office of

the Foreign Secretary. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences-,

July 1971. 57 p.

Endorses the concept of such an Institute as proposed by the President of
the United States. Sept. 15, 1970, to assist in developing a reorganized
foreign aid program.
Morris, Robert C. Overseas Volunteer Programs: Their Evolution and the Role of
Government in Their Support. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, Div. of
D. C. Heath and Co., 1973.
National Academy of Sciences. Research Management and Technical Entrepreneur-
ship: A U.S. Role in Improving Skills in Developing Countries. A report of an
ad hoc advisory panel of the BOSTID [Board of Science and Technology for
International Development]. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences,
September 1973. 40 p. Available as PB 225-129/6.
National Academy of Sciences. Scientific and Technical Information for Developing
Countries. A report of an ad hoc advisory panel of the BOSTID [Board of
Science and Technology for International Development]. Washington, D.C.,
National Academy of Sciences, 1972. 80 p. Available as PB 210-107.
Ozawa, Terutomo. Transfer of Technology from Japan to Developing Countries,
New York UNITAR, 1971. 50 p. (United Nations Institute for Training and
Research. UNITAR research reports, no. 7)

"The purpose of this report is to show the overall chaj^cteristics and!
general trends of Japan's transfer of technology to developing countries-."
Packenham, Robert A. Liberal American and the Third World: Political Develop-
ment Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences. Princeton University Press, 1973.
395 p.

"A study of how assumptions embedded in the 'American liberal tradition'
shaped the doctrines of U.S. officials and the theories of academic social
scientists about the nature and goals of foreign aid. The author argues that
both these sets of ideas were similar and usually inappropriate to conditions
in the recipient countries." (1)
Peters, E. Bruce, and Daniel D. Roman. "The Transfer of Scientific and Tech-
nical Information to Developing Nations." International Associations ^ no. 11,
Nov. 1973: 544-549.
Poats, Rutherford M. Technology for Developing Nations, New Directions for U.S.
Technical Assistance. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1972. 255 p.
The author builds an argument for a renewed commitment for U.S. tech-
nical assistance after reviewing some of the social effects of technological ap-
plication and the opportunities and limitations surrounding technological
attacks on key problems in each major sector — agriculture, industry, health,
nutrition, population, and education. He suggests research priorities and
methods in the Light of successful examples in both bilateral and multi-
national development programs.
Rubenstein, Albert H., Theodore W. Schlie, and Alok K. Shakrabarti. Research-
Priorities on Technology Transfer to Developing Countries, Vol. I., Evanston,
Illinois, Northwestern University, January 1974, Northwestern Document No.
73/61. 122 p.

"Results of a workshop held to identify important, researchable questions
in the area of technology transfer to developing countries, and to set prior-
ities among them. A list of questions was produced along with a recom-

1956

mended approach to doing research in the technology transfer field. The
document includes brief papers by researchers on various aspects of tech-
nology transfer and developing nations." Supported by NSF RANN award:
GI-39239.
Seitz, Frederick and Robert W. Kitchen, "United States Urges Practical Approach
in Applying Science and Technology to Development." Dept. 0/ State Bulletin,
V. 68, May 21, 1973: 661-669.

Speeches by 2 U.S. Representatives before the U.N. Economic and Social
Council Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology
to Development.
Solo, Robert A. Organizing Science for Technology Transfer in Economic Develop-
ment. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1975. 219 p.

Focuses on policy considerations and problems in a technology-supplying

country, especially four nations which are used for case studies: France,

Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany.

U.S. Agency for International Development. Office of Research and University

Relations. The A.I.D. Research Program, 1962-1971: Project Objectives and

Results. [Washington] 1971. 114 p.

Describes purposes, methodology and results of research projects in agri-
culture, health, nutrition, population, education, institutional and social
development, industrial and urban development and economics, and provides
information pertinent to the country where the project was performed.
U.S. Agency for International Development. Office of Science and Technology.
Science and Technology for I nterriational Development: A Selected List of Informa~
Hon Sources in the United States. Springfield, Va., Distributed by NTIS, 1972.
49 p. PB-210-104.

". . . Presents a list of libraries and other organizations which have
relatively complete and comprehensive holdings of publications pertaining to
science and technology in developing countries."
U.S. Agency for International Development. AID Research 1971-1973. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 97 p.

Summaries in nontechnical language of more than 80 projects in agriculture,
health, education, nutrition, population, science and technology, and eco-
nomics highlighting the nature, objectives and results of AID-financed
research.
U.S. Agency for International Development. Application of Modern Technologies
to International Development. A series. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Contains abstracts of research projects on the topic.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Reorganization of U.S.
Development Aid: Comparison and Summary Analysis of Some Official and Un-
official Proposals. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Re-
search Service, Library of Congress. May 1973. 93d Cong., 1st sess. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 48 p.

"The purpose of this report is to present a tabular comparison and a brief
summary analysis of various proposals made in recent years — including those
of the President submitted to the 92nd Congress — to restructure the U.S.
foreign aid program. Many of these proposals have been the work of official
bodies appointed for the specific task of examining the aid program and mak-
ing recommendations for its improvement, but a number have been advanced
by international development specialists and private organizations."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The United States and the
Multilateral Development Banks. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, March 1974. 93d Cong.,
2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 230 p. (Committee print.)
"Part I of this paper summarizes and compares the structure and operating
procedures of the world and regional lending banks of which the United States
is a member, and reviews briefly the operation of other international funding
mechanisms — the regional and subregional banks to which the United States
does not belong, consortia and consultative groups, and those programs of the
International Monetary Fund which may be defined as development assist-
ance. . . . Part 2 of the paper selectively discusses some of the implications of
U.S. participation in the multilateral lending banks, exploring issues fre-
quently raised in evaluating U.S. participation in and policy toward the
banks. These include the responsiveness of member countries to the concept
of burden sharing, the effects of the banks on the U.S. balance of payments,
and the implications of U.S. participation in terms of both congressional

1957

oversight and general foreign policy objectives. . . . The study [also] presents

some of the problems which would be encountered in designing an evaluative

comparison of the multilateral banks as well as an analytic comparison of

their operations. In conclusion, the researchers offer several observations,

highlighting problems which in their estimation have not received sufficient

attention and suggesting items which deserve further consideration."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Implementation of

"New Directions" in Development Assistance, July 22, 1975, 94th Cong., Istsess.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 86 p.

"AID report on implementation of reforms included in the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1975. Discusses policy and procedural issues and some of the
difficiilties involved in working with the nev/ legislation." (3)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa.
Crisis of Development and Interdependence. Hearings. 93d Cong. 2d sess. May,
June. July 1973 and Feb. 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 410 p.
Hearings to examine problems of African underdevelopment the extent
of economic interdependence between the United States and Africa, and
current U.S. policy."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee
on International Cooperation in Science and Space, rnternational Science and
Technology Transfer Act of 1974. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. May 21, 22, 23,
1974. Washington, U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 172 p.

Regarding a proposal to establish a global telecommunications system to
transfer technology.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
Study of International Housing; Reports from U.S. Agencies and International
Organizations. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 454 p.
At head of title: 92d Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Alternatives to Bilateral
Economic Aid. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress. June 18, 1973. 93d Cong., 1st sess. Washington,
D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 53 p. (Committee print.)

This study "proceeds on the assumption that there is interest in Congress

in maintaining a U.S. role in the development process free of the drawbacks

and shortcomings that have so often been ascribed to bilateral aid. Bilateral

aid has been under increasing critical fire in recent years, and has lost the

support of many people who formerly favored it. This report analyzes the

following alternatives to bilateral aid: one, multilateral assistance; two,

rescheduling and reduction of debt servicing by the developing countries;

three, preferential tariff arrangements for the developing countries; and four,

the encouragement of private investment by American Nationals in the less

developed countries."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Contribution to

IDA, Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Mar. 21 and 22, 1974. Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 103 p.

Continuation of hearings to authorize funding to replenish the Interna-
tional Development Association.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Ptclation;;. U.S. Participation in
ADB and IDA. Hearings, 93d Cong. 1st sess. Nov. 19, 1973. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 69 p.

Hearings on bills to authorize U.S. contriljutions to the Asian Development
Bank and the International Development A.ssociation.
U.S. General Accounting Office. More Effective United States Participation Needed
in World Bank and International Development Association, Department of the
Treasury, Department of State, and Other Agencies; report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General of the United States. [Washington]. 1973. 85 p. B-161470
Feb. 14, 1973.
U.S. National Technical Information Service. Application of Modern Technologies
to International Development. Washington, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Office of Science and Technology [available from NTISJ. 1972.
74 p.

Contains research reports sponsored by the U.S. Government in three
general subject areas: chemistr}'; materials; and mechanical, industrial, civil,
and marine engineering. AID-OST-72-1.
Wade, Nicholas. "Third World: Science and Technology Contribute Feebly to
Development." Science, v. 189, Sept. 5, 1975: 770-771, 774-77G.

1958

Discusses the "gad" state of affah-g with science and technology in develop-
ing cottntries, and what the advanced countries can do about it.
White, John. The Politics of Foreign Aid. New Yorlc, St. Martin's Press, 1974.
316 p.

Opens by describing the purposes, procedures and justffications for the
foreign aid program. Developttient should be viewed as a separate objective.
However "Discussion of both have often been empty. Criteria of success or
failure have Commonly been artifical and unreal. '^' All too often seatiment
guides policy.

The author follows With a useful analysis of the various theories of devel-
opmental aid, both bilateral and multilateral. The politics of the aid programs
are also examined with respect to both doner and recipient countries.

C. Issues Relating to a Recipient Nation

Balasubramanyam, V. N. International Trtmsfer of Technology to India. New
York, Prager Publishers, 1973. 143 p.

"The study focuses on the Indo-foreign technical collaboration agreements.
These agreements represent instruments of technological transfer in a relaf-
tively pure sense. [They] are of particular interest because of their arms-
length nature. In contrast to joint ventures and direct foreign investment . . .
they minimize the penetration of foreign interests and control into the less
developed countries. This is a matter of no small Ltnpoit^nce to nations still
in the shadow of yesterday's colonialism. . . ." The author's findings are not
entirely positive. ". . . he suggests that the degree of lender involvement
through asset ownership and managerial control or participation appears to
be positively related to the success of transfer. Because the collaboration
agreements offfer minimal scope for such involvement, they may be much less
effective than direct investment and joint ventures in bringing new raethodfi
to the less developed countries."
Baranson, Jack. "The Drive Toward Technological Self-Reliance in Developing
Countries." Paper presented at the Conference on Latin American-U.S. Eco-
nomic Interactions, University of Texas, March 1973. 21 p. Available from the
State Dept. as FAR 21050-P.
Baranson, Jack. "Technical Improvement in Developing Countries." Finance and
Development, v. 11, June 1974: 2-5.

"Industrial technology now supplied by multinational corporations to
LDCs contributes inadequately to their sustained growth and development.
But at the same time most LDCs lack indigenous design and engineering
capabilities. Japan and the People's Republic of China have found wayis out
of this dilemma."
Barrett, Patrick J. "The Role of Patents in the Sale of Technology in Mexico."
American Journal of Comparative Law, v. 22, spring 1974: 230-280,

Article discusses patent law in Mexico and its importance to a developing
country.
Bykov, A,N., M.P. Strepetova, and A.V. Letenko, Soviet Experience in Transfer
of Technology to Industrially Less-developed Countries. New York, United Nations
Institute for Training and Research, 1973. 187 p. (Research report, no. 15.)
"The Cocoyoc Declaration." International Organization, v, 29, no. 3, Summer
1975:893-902.

"On October 8, 1974, a special meeting was convened in Cocoyoc, Mexico,
by two United Nations bodies charged with questions of technological and
economic import, UNCTAD and UNEP. The meeting was composed of ex-
perts serving in their individual capacities, presided over by Lady Barbara
Jackson. Since the purpose of the gathering was to discuss the implications of
technologies destructive of the physical environment in terms of overall con-
siderations of quality of life, economic development, social harmony, and in-
ternational concord its conclusions speak directly to the issues addressed in
this volume. These conclusions are among the first systematic attempts to
state, under United Nations auspices, the connections between the issues of
environmental protection and the redistribution of global economic and social
resources. "This article reprints the ' Cocoyoc Declaration' in its entirety."
Education and Science Development: Three Years of Inter- American Cooperation.
Washington, D.C., General Secretariat, Organization of American States, April
1972. 48 p.

1959

A summary of the positive achievements of a "common inter- American
undertaking after three years of constant and sustained efforts." Limited to
the regional pro-ams in education, science, and technology.
Ganiere, Nicole. Transfer of Technology and Appropriate Techniques: a Bibliog-
raphy. Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Non-dated, 86 p.

Bibliography, in accordance with the terminology adopted by the I.L.O..
©n technology transfer to the developing countries. The materials address:
transfer process and diffusion of technology, the transfer of technology : case
studies, the selection and adaptation of technology: appropriate techniques;,
and how to improve innovation possibilities and promote R. & D. in devel-
oping countries.
Hall, Douglas E. and Alan E. Dieffenbach, "Compensation of Foreign Advisers.
in Developing Countries." International Development Review, v. 15, no. 3, 1973,
suppl. : 3-6.

"Advisers from developed countries are often overpaid, which can be
detrimental to development goals."
Hollman, Stephen N. "Mexican Restrictions on Foreign Investments and Tech-^
nology." Practical Lawyer, v. 20, Feb. 1974: 55-60.
Focuses on 2 Mexican laws enacted in 1973.
Lester, Jim. Technology Transfer and Developing Countries: A Selected Bibliography.
In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcom-.'
mittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space. International Science
and Techrwlogy Transfer Act of 197Jf. Hearings, 93d Cong. 2d sess. May 1974.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. pp. 167-172.
Linowitz, Sol M. "The Future of the Americas." Science, v. 181, September 7.
1973:916-920.

Adapted from address given at the Inter-American meeting Science and

Man in the Americas, sponsored jointly by the American Association for the

Advancement of Science and the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia

de Mexico, Mexico City, June 27, 1973. Addresses obstacles to and oppor-

timities for development as well as the need for improved U.S. scientific and

technological poUcies toward the Latin American nations.

Moravcsik, Michael J. Science Development: Toward the Building of Science in Less

Developed Countries. A Publication of the Program of Advanced Studies in

Institution Building and Technical Assistance Methodology of the Midwest

Universities Consortium for International Activities. Bloomington, Indiana,

Indiana University, 1974. 284 p.

Deals with the following aspects of the building of science in less developed
countries: the rationale; education and science; manpower; scientific com-
munications; scientific research; planning, poUcy, and management; inter-
national aspects; and future needs. A bibliography is included.
Myrdal, Gunnar "The Transfer of Technology to Underdeveloped Countries.'*
Scientific American, v. 231, Sept. 1974: 172-178, '180-182.

"The elimination of mass poverty is necessary to supply the motivation
for fertility control in such countries. Other countries should assist in this
process, not least because they have a moral obligation to do so."
Nelson, Richard R. "Less Developed Countries — Technology Transfer and
Adaptation: the Role of the Indigenous Science Community." Economic
Development and Cultural Change, v. 23, Oct. 1974: 61-77.
Patel, Surendra J. "Transfer of Technology and the Third UNCTAD." Journal
of World Trade Law, v. 7, Mar .-Apr. 1973: 226-239.

Argues that the resolution on the transfer of technology at the Santiago
meeting of the Third UNCTAD could serve as a charter for improving the
access of developing coxmtries to technology.
Saito, Masaru. "Technology Transfer as a Development Strategy in the ECAFE
Region." Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, v. 25, June 1974: 33-41,
Discusses poUcies for modernization of the technology transfer mechanism
and cooperation among Asian countries.
Science and Brazilian Development: Report of the Fourth Workshop on Contributions
of Science and Technology to Development. November 1-5, 1971, Washington,
D.C. Conducted by the Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy
of Sciences, in Cooperation with National Research Council of Brazil. Wash-i
ington, D.C, 1972. 87 p.

1960

■^'Science and Man in the Americas." Nature, v. 244, July 13, 1973: 66-67.

"The American Association for the Advancement of Science and the newly-
formed Mexican National Council on Science and Technology (Conacyt)
jointly sponsored a meeting in Mexico City from June 20 to July 4 on the
theme Science and Man in the Americas."
"Science, Technology, and Development: the Consensus of Brasilia." America, v.
24, Oct. 1972:S1-S15.

This supplement was excerpted from the official OAS document reporting
on the Brasilia Conference. "The primary purpose of the Spec'alized Confer-
ence on the Application of Science and Technology to Latin American
Development (CACTAL) was to explore the interdependent relationships of
science, technology, and development within the Latin American context.
The Conference was held in BrasiUa, Brazil, May 12-19, 1972."
Singer, H. W. "The Technology Gap and the Developing Countries." Interna-
tional Journal of Environmental Studies, \. 3, May 1972: 119-123.

"As the ability to analyse technical scientific and managerial problems has

grown in the rich industrial countries, the poor, low-income countries have

become increasingly dependent on technologies conceived and developed in

the rich countries and not suitable for their needs and resource endowments.

In the light of this situation, it is suggested that the rich-developed countries

should reorient a substantial part of their exnenditures on R. & D. so that

some of the resulting advances in science and technology are directly geared

to the problems of the less developed countries as pointed out in the U. N.

World Plan of Action for the application of science and technology to

development."

Sino-U.S. Workshop on Scientific and Technical Information Needs and Resources

of the Republic of China (T.-iiwan), Washineton, D.C., 1973. Scientific and

Technical Information Needs and Resources in the Republic of China (Taiwan);

Report of a Sino-U.S. Workshop. Washington, National Academy of Sciences,

1974. 77 p.

Jointly sponsored by Academia Sinica, Republic of China, and Board on
Science and Technology for International Development, Commission on
International Relations, National Academy of Sciences-National Research
Council, United States of America. The purpose of the workshop was to
identify the needs for scientific and technical information in Taiwan and
resources reqxiired, to make recommendations for strengthpning the informa-
tion structure, and to identify areas for further U.S. -Chinese Nationalist
cooperation.
Singer, Hans W. "Transfer of Technology in LDC's." Inter economics, no. 1, Jan.
1974: 14-17.

Discusses the controversial problems connected with the transfer of highly
sophisticated technologies to developing countries. Concludes that this trans-
fer and adaptation of technologies is necessary and advantageous, but depends .
on the development of a national technological capacity of a developing
country as a prerequisite.
Shapley, Deborah, "Science in Vietnam: The Postwar North Seeks American
Assistance." Science, v. 189, Aug. 29, 1975: 705-707.

Report of a visit by Yale Prof, of biology Arthur W. Galston to North
Vietnam in June 1975.
Thomson, David R. "Imported Technology and National Interests in Latin
America." Case studv prepared for the Sixteenth Session of the Senior Seminar
in Foreign Policy, U.S. D^pt. of State, 1973-1974. 29 p. Available from the
State Dept. as FAR 19877-S.
Timmer, C.P., et. al. The Choice of Technology in Developing Countries: Some
Cautionary Tales. Cambridge, Harvard University, Center for International
Affairs, 1975. 1 12 p. (Harvard Studies in International Affairs, 32.)

"This book focuses on the problem of why development policies, which
during the 1950s and 1960s were considered fairly successful in terms of
bringing about an overall rate of growth in the GNP, failed for the most
part in their articulated goal of bettering the lot of the bulk of the populations
in underdeveloped countries or in lowering their rate of unemployment."
Several case studies are included. These deal with Indonesia; irrigation
t.ubewells in East Pakistan, management techniques in Indonesia, and
petrochemical technology in Colombia. "All of these essays suggest that the
bias against more labor-intensive usages has been fostered by managers and

1961

policymakers in both developing and developed countries who have been
enamored by high technology and have encouraged its adoption. The authors'
message is that intermediate technology, using less capital and more of a
country's labor may well be part of the answer to the unemployment problems
of the developing co\mtries."(2)
United Nations. Appropriate. Technology and Research for Industrial Development.

New York, United Nations, 1972. E. 72.11. A.3.
U^nited Nations. Organization, Mancgc-rncni and Supervision of Public Enterprises

in Developing Countries. New York, United Nations, 1074. E.74.II.H.4.
United Nations. Secretary General (Waldheim). Arrangements for Broad-
ening the Experience of Young Specialists From- Developing Countries in Other
Countries in the Field of Natural Resources Exploration and Development. [New
York] 1972. 4 p. (United Nations. [Document] DP/L.252)

At head of title: United Nations Development Programme.
Vaitsos, Constantine V. "Strategic Choices in the Commercialization of Technol-
ogy: the I'oint of View of Developing Countries." Iniernational Social Sciences
Journal, v. 25. no. 3, 1973: 370-386.

"This article refers to some of the policy considerations arising from the
actual mechanisms of technology purchase by developing countries within
or outside the framework of direct foreign investment."
Yudelman, Montague, Gavan Butler, and Ranadev Banerji. Technological
Change in Agriculture and Employment in Developing Countries. [Paris] De-
velopment Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment [197]] 204 p. (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Development Centre. Development Centre Studies. Employment series, no. 4)

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE DEVELOPED

NATIONS

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, The Burke^Hartke
Foreign Trade and Investment Proposal. Washington [1973] 39 p. (American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Legislative analysis no. 4)
American Federation of Labor suid Congress of Industrial Organizations. Eco-
nomic Policy Committee. "Worid Trade in the 1970s." American FederaliomsL
V.80, Apr. 1973:16-24.

"The continuing deterioration of the U.S. position in world trade and the
export of thousands of U.S. jobs has made the revision of U.S. trade policies
one of the nation's most critical legislative needs. Among the developments
bringing about the crisis are the spread of managed national economies in
which foreign governments aid exports and penalize imports; the inter-
nationalization of technology; the skyrocketing rise of investments by U.S.
companies in foreign subsidiaries; and the spread of U.S.-based multinational
corporations."
Basiuk, Victor. "Future Technology and Western European Security." In Fox,
William T. R. and Warner R. SchilUng, eds. European Security and the Atlantic
System. New York Columbia University Press, 1973. pp. 35-71.

"This chapter explores how Eastern Europe's security and viability as a
region of major political significance will be aflfected by future technology.
It describes three alternative 'technologically influenced' future Western
Europes and discusses the variables that can bring them about. These
alternative future Western Europes are then analyzed in the context of the
American national interest and various possible policies for the United States
are considered."
Callaghan, Thomas A. Jr. U.S. /European Economic Cooperation in Military
and Civil Technology: an Issues-oriented Report. Prepared by EX-IM Tech.
Inc., Arlington, Va. for INR/XR, U.S. Dept. of State, August 1974. 97 pi
Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20688-S.
Canada, Science, and International Affairs. Report of the Science Council of
Canada. Report No. 20, April 1973. Ontario, Science Council of Canada. 66 p.
"This report is about the interaction of politics with Canada's participation
in international scientific aflFairs. The focus is on science rather than tech-
nology. The problems identified are not amenable to a quick organiza-
tional fix, and so we make no cook-book recommendations. Attitudes
must change before substantial progress can be made."

Recommendations are made for governmental and nongovernmental
action.
Commission of the European Communities. "Objectives and Instruments of a
Common Policy for Scientific and Technological Development." Bulletin of the
European Communities. Supplement, June 1972. 58 p.

Proposals for joint cooperative research and policy formulation.
A Comparative Study of Science Advisory Approaches of Selected Developed Countries.
Prepared for the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, by the Science and Technology Policy Office, Office of the Science
Adviser, National Science Foundation, November 1974. /n U.S. Congress.
House. Committee on Science and Technology. Federal Policy, Plans, and
Organization for Science and Technology. Part II. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d se.ss.
June and July 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. pp. 570-613.
ECE Seminar on the Management of the Transfer of Technology Within Industrial
Cooperation. Geneva, July 14-17, 1975. In press.

Among the papers presented by the United States delegation, are: "Laying
the groundwork for international technology transfer," Lowell W. Steele;
"East- West technology transfer — a case study of industrial cooperation,"
Angelo Leparulo; "Transfer of technology and East- West cooperative
ventures," Robert D. Klages; "Technical information, technical assistance
and technology transfer — the need for a synthesis," Albert H. Rubenstein;

(1962)

1963

"Manufacturing enterprLse relationships in East-West technology /transfer:
theoretical models ana practical experiences," Henry R. Nau and Eric VV.
Hayden; "The management process for transfer and development of tech-
nology from the transnational enterprise," Harvey W. Wallender, III;
"Mutual benefits in industrial cooperation," M. W. Duncan; "A Unique
manufacturing joint- venture in the computer industry," Hugh Donaghue.
Factors Affecting the International Transfer of Technology Among Developed Coun-
tries. Report of the Panel on International Transfer of Technology. U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 48 p.
Addresses factors that should be reviewed when transfer is considered
desirable. Includes: positive U.S. Government policies and practices, control
programs of selected U.S. agencies, selected Western European controls,
capital controls, procurement policies^ tax policies, patents, business policies,
social and labor policies, tariffs, international standards, and functions of
multinational organizations.
'Garnett, John. "The United States and Europe: Defence, Technology, and the
Western Alliance." Review article In International Affairs. Published quarterly
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press.
April 1968, pp. 282-89.

"The study of international politics is focused on the political relations
between independent sovereign states, and quite naturally, most of its
students are drawn from the related discipline of history and political science.
Unfortunately, students reared in these 'soft' subjects — and that is not a
term of disparagement- — are often reluctant to come to grips with develop-
ments in economics and technology, even when those subjects underpin and
determine a good deal of international political relations. If ever there was a
time when the student of international politics could get by with only a
casual knowledge of what was happening in the fields . . . that time is
past. Today, when so many defence and foreign policy decisions are taken
almost entirely on the basis of economic and technological considerations,
it is necessary for those whose interest lies in understanding those decisions
to probe more deeply into literature far removed from historical documents
and official records."

Mr. Garnett reviews these notions in his discussion of a series of six papers
which "explore the nature of the technological relationship between Europe
and the Unit<ed States, and . . . show precisely how national defence
arraneements have been complicated by technological developments."
Holsti, Kal J. and Thomas Allen Levy "Bilateral Institutions and Transgovern-
mental Relations Between Canada and the United States." International Organi-
zation, v. 28, Autumn 1974: 875-901.

Focuses "not only on the bilateral institutions but also on the phenomenon
that Nye and Keohane have called transgovernmental relations, that is, the
noninstitutionalized relationships between subunits of governments and the
acti\ities they undertake that remain reasonably immune from central
control."
Klaiber, Wolfgang and Wayne H. Ferris. The Emerging Industrial Policy of the
European Economic Community: its Future Evohdion and Impact on the Economic
Interests of the United States. Report prepared by the International Research
Group, Washington, D.C., for INR/XR, U.S. Dept. of State, June 1974,
Vol. 1-26 p.; Vol. 11-172 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20525-S.
Kenward, Michael. "Technology Transferred." New Scientist, v. 59, July 5,
1973: 26-27.

"As a meeting in Paris this week and last showed, the emergence of tech-
nology transfer 'reveals a healthy realisation that science is not just a neutral
tool for man's entertainment and comfort.' "
Kosobud, Richard. "The Role of International Transfer of Technology in Japan's
Economic Growth." Technological Forecasting and Social Change, v. 5, 1973:
395-406.

The author's tentative conclusion is that Japan's rapid economic growth
can be partly explained by economic policy and managing a large scale
tran.«fer of technology.
Long, T. Dixon. "Japanese Technology Policv: Achievements and Perspectives."
Research Policy, v. 4, 1975 : 2-26.

"The major thrust of national technology poUcy in Japan for over a century
has been the effort to catch up with the industrial nations of Western Europe
and North America. Technology poUcy today has two aspects: hardware, and

96-243 O - 77 - ?i

1964

organization. On the hardware side, Japan is the case par excellence of a natior*
whose policies acknowledge that technology with national security and defense
implications is inseparable from that involved with economic growth, the
Il&D effort, and industrial innovation. The 'national interest technologies'
that are important for Japan are nuclear energy, space research and develop-
ment, aircraft, and computers. The pursuit of domestic capabilities in these
technologies has been supported by new and strengthened organizations,
especially with regard to industrial innovation, scientific and technological
policy-making, and the acquisition and dissemination of information from
abroad — 'technological intelligence'. Based on these capabilities, Japan is
nearing a potential for nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, though
it is not Ukely that she will choose to develop them. Rather, Japan is likely to
be an increasingly strong competitor in nuclear and space-related technology
such as power generators and space communications. The potential for original
contributions in other fields of applied technology is also growing. Political
factors at home and in the East Asian region suggest that these will occur in
areas such as transportation and pollution control, technical assistance to de-
veloping economies, and resource exploitation — ^especially energy resources."
Lwinger, Thomas C. "The Technology Factor and the Export Performance of

U.H. Manufacturing Industries." Economic Inquiry, v. 13, June 1975: 221-236.
Concludes that "U.S. comparative advantage is most pronounced in
industries that are R&D intensive, giving the U.S. a temporary technological
lead in exports of their products. U.S. competitive position in world markets
is further enhanced through the effective use of its relatively abundant
factor — highly skilled labor."
Maddox, John. "New Science Policy Tasks for the European Community."

Public Science, January 1973: 4-6.

Discussion of functions, personalities, and institutions involved in estab-
lishing a coordinated science policy and joint research projects among the
members of the EEC.
National Research Council. Computer Sciences and Engineering Board. Computer

Technology/Resources Panel. The Computer Industry in Japan and its Meaning

for the United States. [Washington, Distributed by NTIS, 1973] 130 p. (PB-

220-000.)
Nau, Henry R. "A Political Interpretation of the Technology Gap Dispute."

Orbis, V. 15, summer 1971: 507-527.

". . . The purpose of this essay is to show that U.S.-European differ-
ences, whether manifested in trade, monetary, strategic or technological
disputes, have common roots in a growing divergence of broader political
interests between the United States and its West European allies. . . . This
is evident in the treatment of the technology gap dispute."
Nau, Henry R. "Collective Responses to R and D Problems in Western Europe:

1955-1958 and 1968-1973." International Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer

1975: 617-654.

"Collective responses to technology-related international problems inay
differ in terms of organizational outcomes (new, modified, or no organiza-
tions). Some of this difference may be accounted for by contrasting objectives
and capabilities of major actors. Actors may emphasize different dimensions
of the policy setting, possess varying amounts of resources and information
to affect that setting, and accordingly prefer alternative responses. Possibili-
ties of this sort are examined empirically in two separate, chronological
periods of Western European responses to collective R&D problems. In the
first period, major actors stressed different dimensions of the policy setting,
possessed unequal resources, and responded to the situation by the creation
of new organizations (Euratom and ENEA) ; in the second, they stressed.
the same dimensions of the policy setting, possessed roughly equal capabili-
ties, and decidedly resisted the creation of new organizations. The different
outcomes suggest that stratification of perceptions and capabilities, emphasiz-
ing complementarity, may be more conducive to organizational creativity
than similarity of perceptions and capabilities, emphasizing competition."
Nau, Henry R. "R and D Issues in Western Europe: Perceptions, Capabilities

and Responses." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American

Political Science Assoc, Chicago, August-September 1974. 36 p. Available

from the State Dept. as FAR 20586-P.

1965

"The Need for European Co-operation in Research." Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris, France, Science Policy Information 3, no.
22913, October 1967: 42-44.

" 'At the Annual Meeting of the Max Planck Society in June 1967 Professor
Adolf Butenandt, in his presidential address, discussed international co-
operation in scientific research and technology and its implications for the
organisation of research in the Federal Republic' Topics included: the rising
costs of research and the political considerations and measures needed: the
relative strengths in R. & D. of the U.S. and the Common Market countries
and the bases for the favorable U.S. position; European scientific cooperation
as necessary to keep pace with the U.S.; loosening of present funding pro-
cedures from the current 1:1 ratio between the Federal and 'Lander' govern-
ments (otherwise scientific progress would be determined by the financially
weaker 'party')." (4)
"New Commerce Office to Study World Technology Trends." Science and Govern'
ment, June 15, 1973: 7.

Describes creation of a new office of Technology Assessment and Forecast,
among whose functions would be to gather and assess data regarding inter-
national technology transfer.
Nichols, George C, et al. Tschnology Enhancement Programs in 'Five Foreign
Countries. Report prepared by the C)fiice of the Assistant Secretary for Science
and Technology, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Oflf., 1972. 334 p. Available from NTIS, Report No. COM 72-11412.

"Competition among nations to penetrate foreign markets for their
industrial prodiicts has led the governments of most of the advanced countries
of the world to use a variety of technology enhancement mechanisms and
programs. The purpose of these programs is to stimulate invention and inno-
vation and the development, transfer, and application of new technologies
through the use of subsidies, tax, and other incentives, government procure-
ment, joint ventures, R and D investment in designated industrial sectors, low
and no-interest loans, and other mechanisms in collaboration with the private
sector. This report examines the major technology enhancement programs
initiated in recent years by Canada, France, Germany (Federal Republic),
Japan, and the United Kingdom. The experience of these countries with such
programs is of interest to the United States at this time particularly in rela-
tion to the newly-initiated Experimental Incentives Program that is being
implemented by the National Bureau of Standards . . . and the National
Science Foundation. In addition to the technology enhancement programs,
the report contains a discussion of the involvement in each country within
which science and technology is developed and implemented and the govern-
ment-private sector interaction. A bibUography is included at the end of
each country's section."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Reviews of National
Science policy. Series [of separate books.] Paris, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development.

These comprehensive book length studies treat: Japan, 1967, 248 p.;
Italy, 1969, 212 p.; United States, 1969, 550 p.; Canada, 1969, 456 p.; Norway,
1971, 196 p.; Austria, 1971, 196 p.; Spain, 1971, 126 p.; Switzerland, 1972,
256 p.; France, 1966, 133 p.; Iceland, 1972, 159 p.; Netherlands, 1973, 375
p.; and Ireland, 1975, 132 p.
Ozawa, Terutomo. Japan's Technological Challenge to the West, 1950-1974: Motiva-
tion and Accamplishment. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1974. 162 p.

"In this thoroughly documented analysis, the author fijids the key to

Japanese economic dynamism in two factors: the appUcability of the

Schumpeterian model of development, where innovation stimulates growth,

and the intensity of the national need to catch and surpass the West." (1)

Pavitt, Keith. "Technology in Europe's Future." Research Policy, v. 1, 1971/1972:

210-273.

"European fears in the 1960s of U.S. technological domination have proved
to be unfounded. The continuing U.S. lead in aerospace and defense technology
has not spread to other sectors. European companies and governments have
steadily upgraded their capabilities in civilian science and technology.
However hopes that the 'imperatives of modern technology' would stimulate
closer European integration have been disappointed." There are imperfections

1966

in inte^ating European research, technological research, and production sec-
tore. The author reviews economic, political, and technological requirements
for such integration. He also discusses the implications for the United States
of such integration and concludes: "It would ... be an illusion to expect
the USA, in spite of its professed pohcy of encouraging European integration,
to be happy about some of the consequences of technological integration."
Pavitt, Keith. "Technology, International Competition, and Economic Growth:
Some Lessons and Perspectives." World Politics, v. 25, 1973: 183-204.

Concentrates "on how the growth of civilian science and technology has
interacted with national policies and international relations in the 1960s
and on what lessons for the 19703 can be drawn from the experiences of various
countries." Focuses on the need for R and D investment to confront the
issue, relevant to developing countries, of developing labor-using, not only
labor-saving, production methods.
Puchala, Donald J. "Domestic PoUtics and Regional Harmonization in the
European Communities." World Politics, v. 27, July 197.5: 496-520.

"Case studies of national attempts to implement EEC directives in the
field of regional aid, pharmaceutical marketing, investment control, and
fiscal harmonization point up important interplays be4-ween regional har-
monization and domestic politics. Evidence concerning the politics of re-
gional implementation shows that the ability of an integratioa depends
fundamentally upon its government's abihty to act poUtically in its domestic
arena."
Ths Research System, Vol. I: France, Germany, United Kingdom. Comparative
Study of the Organization and Financing of Fundofnental Research, by G. Caty,
G. Drilhon, G. Feme, and S. Wald, under the direction of J.-J. Salomon.
Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1972. 258 p.
"Study of the organization and financing of fundamental research which
identifies and anal5'^zes the following problems raised by scientific research in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom : decisionmaking at government
levels, university and industry. This very detailed analysis defines scientific
research as part of a system in which fundamental research cannot be dis-
associated from other kinds of research: nor can it be dissociated from the
social demands. This multidisciplinary study describes the institutional and
structural obstacles to the development of fundamental research and the
exploitation of its results."
The Research System, Vol. II: Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzer-
land. Comparative Survsy of the 'Organization and Financing of Fundamental
Research, by G. Caty, G. Drilhon, R. Enoch, G. Feme, M. Flory, and S. Wald,
under the direction of J.-J. Salomon. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
eration and Development, 1973. 195 p.

Continuation of the series which looks at the following dimensions of re-
search in the countries studied: national traditions and research policies in
relation to international cooperation, university and research in a teaching
oriented environment, research in the government sector, and the place of
industry, science, the university, and the foundations in the research system.
TTie Research System, Vol. Ill: Canada, United Slates, General Conclusions:
Comparative Study of the Organization and Financing of Fundamenial Research.
By G. Caty, G. Drilhon, G. Feme, N. Kaplan, and S. Wald under the direction
of J.-J. Salomon. Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, March 1975. 226 p.
Ritchie-Calder, Lord. "Scientists in the British Government — a Memoir." Center
Magazine, v. 7, Mar.- Apr. 1975: 52-60.

Concern of a scientist about the whole question of ethics and the scientist's
responsibilities to mankind in a technological world.
"Science in Europe: Poor Outlook for European Collaboration." Nature, v. 243,
May 18, 1973: 123-145.

Collection of ten articles on science in Europe dealing specifically with

cooperation, space, computers, manpower, and national situation reports

for Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain.

•Science Policies of Industrial Nations: Case Studies of the United States, Soviet

Union, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Sweden. New York, Praeger

Publishers, 1975. 233 p.

This is an anthology of analytical essays. It includes: "Science policy
institutions in six countries," T. Dixon Long and Christopher Wright;
■"The Development of science policy in the Soviet Union," Loren R. Graham;

1967

"Politics for science and technology in Great Britain : postwar development
and reassessment," Norman J. Vig; "Science, technology and French inde-
pendence," Robet G. Gilpin Jr.; "The Dynamics of Japanese science policy,"
T. Dixon Long; "Science and technology policy is in Sweden," Ingemar
N. H. Dorfer; and "United States gcience policy in transition," Jurgen
Schmandt.
Segal, Gerald. "Euroscience : Dahrendorf's Adagio." New Scientist, August 2,
1973: 267-268.

Background on Ralf Dahrendorf's appointment as EEC Commissioner
for research, science and education and how it has led to a rethinking of the
hardline Spinelli policies for a Community science and technology policy.
Tilton, John E. International Diffusion of Technology: the Case of Semiconductors.
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1972. 225 p.

"A few advanced countries, in particular the United States, create a large

share of the world's new technology. From these innovation centers, new

products and processes are disseminated throughout the world. This study

investigates the international diffusion of transistor, integrated circuit, and

other semiconductor technology in five countries — the United States, Britain^

France, Germany, and Japan."

TJ.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. To Restore Harmony:

New Efforts on Transatlantic Cooperation, Washington, 1973. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 75 p.

(At head of title: 93rd Cong. 1st sess. House Committee Print.)
Among the issues treated are energy, international trade in agricultural
commodities, and multinational corporations.
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Economic Growth.
Technology, Economic Growth, and International Competitiveness. A report
prepared by Robert Gilpin. July 9, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 87 p. (Joint Committee Print.)

"Professor Gilpin examines the thesis that the United States has lagged
in recent years in the development and application of new civilian technology
because, among other things, of a faulty conception of the innovative process
by Federal policymakers, an inappropriate allocation of Federal R and D
funds, and a lack of adequate communication and coordination between
research scientists and those in charge of industrial applications. The ex-
periences of other industrial countries also are brought to bear on the issue."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Meeting-
with Assembly of Western European Union Committee on Scientific, Technological,
and Aerospace Questions. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 18 and 20, 1975.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 44 p.

International cooperation in astronautics/Space policy — [U.S.]/Space
policy — [Western Europe].
U.S. European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civil Technology. 1974-
National Technical Information Service, Department of Commerce. AD
A009049.

The study was prepared in late summer 1974 by EX-IM TECH, Inc. for
the Department of State, with funding from several military research agencies.
"It assessed the costs in military and economic terms of duplication and
lack of standardization in NATO's miUtary procedure, analyzed the ob-
stacles to eliminating these costs, and set forth a comprehensive plan
to remedy the situation. The solution to the problem, [the author concludedT
lies in estabUshing a Common Defense Market wherein every defense
dollar Europe spends in the United States is matched over the long run
with a dollar spent in Europe, and where there is an agency for the European
NATO countries collectively to carry out nondupUcative bilateral defense
industry programs with the United States."
U.S. General Accounting Office. Benefits and Drawbacks of U.S. Participation in
Military Cooperative Research and Development Programs with Allied Countries,
Department of Defense; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General
of the United States. [Washington] 1974. 42 p. "B-167034, June 4, 1974"
Walsh, John. "In a Hard Year in Brussels, Things Look Up for Science." Science,
V. 184, May 31, 1974: 962-967.

"One sector in which the [EEC] seems to be going forward is science and
technology. This is perhaps surprising since the Community's science pro-
gram has for years been stymied by the problems of Euratom, the Com-
munity's atomic energy organization. If there was a milestone marking a
change in the fortunes of science and technology, it was the first Community

1968

summit meeting attended by the new member countries in the autumn of

1972. At this meeting the Community prime ministers gave a new high

priority to science and technology in the Community context. Last year,

Euratom was granted a 4-year budget after stumbUng along on stopgap

. 1-year budgets since 1968, and a reorganization of the agency was decreed.

The energy crisis gave impetus to energy R and D within the Community

framework. ... [This article] is an account of the first small steps toward

development of a genuine European science policy."

Williams, Roger. European Technology : the Politics of Collaboration. New York,

John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 214 pp.

An interesting and useful in-depth analysis of the major nationalistic
obstacles to technological cooperation even among countries which are
predisposed toward cooperation. Among the cases treated are those of the
aircraft industry, space, nuclear research, and computers.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

.'Aronson, Jonathan David. "The Multinational Corporation, the Nation-State,
and the International System: a Bibhography." Current Bibliography on
African Affairs, v. 7, Fall 1975: 378-436.

International corporations— Bibliography.
Barnet, Richard J. and Ronald E. Muller. Global Reach: The Power of the Multi-
national Corporations. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974. 508 p.

Gives in great detail a negative assessment the impacts of American
commercial investment in developing countries.
^Carroll, M. B. U.N. Proposals for the Regulation of Transnational Corporations.
New York, Presidents Association of the American Management Associations,
1975. 48 p.
Casey, William L., Jr. "U.S. Multinational Firms and the Exportation of U.S.
Jobs, Capital, and Technology." Atlanta Economic Review, v. 23, Sept.-Oct 1973:
22-25.

Discusses the complexities and ambiguities of the issues that have emerged
from recent congressional hearings and other public debates on those aspects
of the Burke-Hartke bill relating to multinational firm operations.
"Chudson, Walter A., The Acquisition of Technology from Multinational Corpora-
tions by Developing Countries. New York, United Nations, 1974. 50 p. (United
Nations. [Document] ST/ESA/12) At head of title: Department of Economic
and Social Affairs. "IJnited Nations publication. Sales No. E. 74. II. A. 7"
Courtney, William H. and Danny M. Leipzinger. "Multinational Corporations in
LDCs, the Choice of Technology." Paper prepared for INR, Dept. of State,
Oct. 1973, 20 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20069-S.
Duerr, Michael G. R and D in the Multinational Company: A Survey. New York,
The Conference Board, 1970. 77 p. (Managing International Business, No. 8.)
Analysis of survey of senior international executives describing ". . .
where their companies conduct research; how the international R and D
function is organized and coordinated; how R and D funds are allocated to
support international operations; and how the costs are recovered."
Eqea, Alejandro Nadal. "Multinational Corporations in the Operation and
Ideology of International Transfer of Technology." Studies in Comparative
International Development, v. 10, Spring 1975: 11-29.

"The analysis presented here will examine briefly the implications of the
operations of transfer of technology for the global strategy of a multinational
corporation as well as the attitude of multinational firms toward indigenous
scientific and technological development of undeveloped countries."
Flanigan, Peter M. "The Multinational Corporation." Dept. of State Bulletin, v.
68, Mar. 26, 1973: 359-365.

"A statement made before the Subcommittee on International Trade of

the Senate Committee on Finance on February 26 by Ian] Assistant to the

President and Executive Director of the Council on International Economic

Policy."

Gillette, Robert. "Latin America: Is Imported Technology Too Expensive?"

Science, v. 181, July 6, 1973: 41-44.

Discusses the growing concern in Latin America toward what are con-
sidered the excessive costs of imported technology and the role of multi-
national corporations.
•Goldfinger, Nat. "The Case for Hartke-Burke." Columbia Journal of World
Business, v. 8, Spring 1973: 22-26.

The growth of multinational corporations has resulted in a fundamental
change in America's role in the world economy. Concomitantly, the nature
of the U.S. economy is being altered. The author sees this as a net negative
change in both of tliese respects. The Hartke-Burke bill is offered as a specific
remedy to this situation of net balance-of-payments deterioration, loss of
technological advantage and an eroding of the diversity of the U.S. industrial
ibase.

(1969)

1970

Keohane Robert O. and Van Doom Ooms. "The Multinational Firm and Inter-
national Regulation." In "World Politics and International Economics,"
edited by C. Fred Bergsten and Lawrence B. Krause. International Organiza-
tion, v. 29, l<io. I, Winter 1975: IG9-212. .
Kindleberger, Charles P., ed. The International Corporation: a Symposium. Cam-
bridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press [1970] 415 p.

Partial contents. — A theory of direct foreign investment, by R. Aliber. —
The efficiency and welfare implications of the international corporation, by
H. Johnson. — Multinational corporations and international ohgopoly: the
non-American challenge, by S. Hymer, and R. Rowthom. — Technology,
United States investment, and European economic growth, by J. Dunning. —
The international firm and the national jurisdiction, by S. Rubin. — The
multinational corporation in world petroleum, by M. Adelman. — Australia
as host to the international corporation, by D. Brash.
Mason, R. Hal., "The Multinational Firm and the Cost of Technology to Develop-
ing Countries." California Management Review, v. 15, Summer 1973: 5-13.
Points oat that multinational firms are often accused of making excessive
profits, charging excessive fees for technology and not providing enough
training or high-level jobs for nationals. The author presents a comparative
analysis, using data from Latin America to represent developing countries
and Europe and Canada to represent advanced countries, that does not
support these criticisms.
Muller, Ronald; Raymond, Vernon, and Richard J. Bamet "(More) on Multi-
nationals." Foreign Policy, No. 13, Winter 1973-1974: 70-122.

Continuation of a debate in the fall 1973 issue. Muller, in "Poverty is

the product," presents a radical critique based primarily on Latin America

and research for a forthcoming book; Vernon gives a measured response

to both sides in the debate; and Bamet offers a comment on Vernon.

Negandhi, Anant R. and S. Benjamin Prasad. The Frightening Angels: A Study

of U.S. Multinationals in Developing Nations. Kent, The Kent State Universitj'"

Press, 1974-1975. 249 p.

"The objectives of this book are: (1) to compare the management practices
of American subsidiaries with those of local business firms in five developing
countries; (2) to examine the implications of such comparisons with respect
to management theory; (3) to study the contributions made by U.S. multi-
nationals to the host countries and to identify some of the conflicting issues
between the multinationals and the developing countries . . . The book is-
based on the findings of a study (largely interviews) of 47 U.S. subsidiaries
and 45 comparable local firms in Argentina . . . ; Brazil . . . ; India . . . ;
Philippines . . .; and Uruguay. ... In general the authors find that
American subsidiaries are operated and managed at a more advanced and
successful level than local firms. . . . On the impact of American firms the
authors find that, while the U.S. subsidiaries are using advanced manage-
ment practices, there is very little diffusion into local enterprises. There has
been very little mobility of executive and supervisory personnel between the
U.S. subsidiaries and the local firms. The authors suggest that the U.S.
multinationals should play a larger role than they have in developing high-
managerial personnel as well as technology in the host countries as the
latter have so demanded." (2)
Penrose, Edith. "International Patenting and the Less-developed Countries. "^
Economic Journal, v. 83, Sept. 1973: 768-786.

"The cost to non-industrial countries of acceding to the [international
patent] Convention and accepting its provisions regarding patents on inven-
tions which are patented and primarily worked abroad may be considerable.
We must now examine the nature of these costs as well as the nature of the
benefits. . . ."
Steele, R. D. Multinational Corporations, Technology Transfer, and the Developing
Countries: an Introductory Bibliography. Monticello, 111., 1975. 39 p. (Council of
Planning Librarians. Exchange bibliography 745)
Sutter, Rolf. "Multinational Corporations: Technology Transfer into LDCs."
Intereconomics, no. 12, Dec. 1974: 380-384.

"Multinational enterprises play an important role in the transfer of
technology into LDCs. The article examines the various aspects of the transfer
of technology and the attitude of multinational enterprises towards such
transfers."

1971

U.S. Congfess. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Multinationals: Their
Function and Future: Washington, 1974- Report on the Sixth Meeting of
Members of Congress and of the European Parliament, September 1974.
93d Cong. 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 139 p. (Com-
mittee print.)

"Report on a visit to Washington by an official delegation of the European
Parliament. Includes meeting agenda, list of participants, summaries of
discussion sessions, and texts of conference papers regarding U.S. -^European
economic and political relations. [Also includes a joint U.S. -European report
on] the goals and behavior of multinational corporations and [explora-
tion of] various international approaches to effective regulation of global
business activities." (3)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. The Multinationals:
the View from Europe — Munich: 1975: Report of the Seventh Meeting of Members
of Congress and of the European Parliament, April 1975 pursuant to H. Res. 315.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 130 p.

At head of title: 94th Cong^ 1st sess. Committee print.
International corporations/International economic relations/International
relations/International monetary system/Foreign economic relations —
[U.S.J-^EEC countries/Foreign economic relations — [EEC countries]— U.S.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Multi-
national Corporations. Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy,
Part 3. Hearings, 93d Cong. 1st sess. July 18-20, 30, 31 and Aug. 1, 1973.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 651 p.

This is part of the series of hearings on multinational corporations and
foreign policy. This session was devoted to review of the Overseas Private
Investment Corp. (OPIC) management and investment guarantee programs
for U.S. companies operating in developing nations. Testimony was also
taken on extending the OPIC program through the fiscal year 1976.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Multi-
national Corporations. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign
Policy. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Part 10. Washington, U.S. Gov't. Print.
Off., 1975. 405 p.

Hearings held June 17 . . . July 22, 1974. International corporations/For-
eign relations — [U.S.].
U.S. International Firms and R, D and E in Developing Countries. A report of an
Ad Hoc Panel of the Board on Science and Technology for International
Development with the collaboration of the National Academy of Engineering,
Office of the P'oreign Secretary. Washington, D.C., National Academy of
Sciences, 1973. 73 p.

Focuses on general issues related to the role of mviltinational firms in
advancing national development objectives, as well as specific issues relating
to U.S. firms operating in foreign countries. Discusses the potential for
strengthening indigenous research, development, and engineering capabilities.
Includes view from five firms, as well as conclusions and recommendations.
U.S. Tariff Commission. Implications of Multijiational Firms for World Trade
and Investment and for U.S. Trade and Labor: Report to the Committee on
Finance of the United States Senate and its Subcommittee on International Trade
on Investigation No. 3S2-69, under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 930 p.

Partial contents. — Summary of the findings of the study. — Impact of the
multinational firm on the U.S. and foreign balances of payments. — The
multinational firms in world trade. — Impact of the multinational firm on
world patterns of investment. — Multinational firms in international finance. —
Technology, R&D, and the multinational firm. — Impact of the multinational
firm on labor in the United States and abroad.

At head of title: 93d Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
United Nations. The Acquisition of Technology from Multinational Corporations

by Developing Countries. New York, United Nations. 1974. E. 74.11. A.7.
United Nations. The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on

International Relations. New York, United Nations, 1974. E. 74. II. A. 5.
United Nations. Multinational Corporations in the World Development. New York,
United Nations, 1973. E.73.II.A.11.

1972

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). "Draft Programme of Work
on the Full Range of Issues Relating to Transnational Corporations; Report."
. [New York] 1975. 2 v. (United Nations. [Document] E/C. lQ/2)
United Nations. [Document] E/C. 10/2/ Add. 1.
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Includes addendum entitled "Development of a comprehensive infor-
mation system."
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). "The Impact of Transnational
Corporations on the Development Process and on International Relations;
Views of States on the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons." [New York]'
1974. 9 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5595) International corporations/
International relations/Economic development.
United Nations. Summary of the Hearings before the Group of Eminent Persons to
Study the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on Inter-
. national Relations. New York, United Nations, 1974. E. 74.II.A.9.
United States. Transnational Corporations. A Select Bibliography. New York,

United Nations, 1974. E/F.75.I.5.
VanDam, Andre. "The Multinational Corporation vis-a-vis Societies in Trans-
formation: the Case for Intermediate Technology in the Developing Coun-
. tries." Technological Forecasting and Social Change, no. 5, 1973: 281-293.

Gives examples of labor intensive technology used by multinationals in
developing countries and argues that more should be done in this direction,.'
since "unemployment is really the greatest socioeconomic plague of the third
world."

THE BRAIN DRAIN

Dublin, Thomas D. "Foreign Ph5'sicians: Their Impact on U.S. Health Care.""
Science, v. 185, August 2, 1974: 407-414.

The author, with the office of the Director, Bureau of Health Resources
Development, Health Resources Administration, U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, notes that international migration aids domestic
supply but raises issues of quality.
Glaser, WilUam A. "UNITAR's Project on the Brain Drain and Study Abroad.
Focus: Technical Cooperation, 1974/2, 26-27." Supported by NSF. USC/FAR
Proj. No. 1679-73. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 22389-P.
Glaser, William A. "UNITAR's Project on the Brain Drain and Study Abroad.
Focus: Technical Cooperation." Special insert in The Intzrnalional Development
Review, v. 16, no. 2, 1974.
Glaser, WilUam, A. Habers, and G. Christopher. "The Migration and Return of
Professionals." International Review, v. 8, Summer 1974: 227-244.
Describes UNITAR's study on the brain drain.
Halle, Miguel. "Paying Lip Service." Ceres, no. 41, September-October 1974:
39-41.

The author argues that it is superfluous to complain about the brain drain
as long as governments are not ready to meet the needs of scientists.
Henderson, Gregory. Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower From the Developing
Countries. New York, United Nations Institute for Research and Training,
1970. 213 p. (UNITAR research report No. 3.)
Sharma, Prakash C. Migration and Brain Drain: a Selected Research Bibli-
ography: Part 1, 1925-1966; Part 2: 1966-197S. University of North Alabama
(mimeo), 1974. 19 p. [I.D. no. 664.] Available from: Council of Planning
Librarians, Exchange Bibliographies, P.O. Box 229, Monticello, Illinois.
Thomas, Brinley. "The Dynamics of Brain Drain." In Migration and Economic

Growth. Cambridge University Press, 1973. pp. 306-329.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Scientists
Abroad: Study of the International Movement of Persons in Science and Tech-
nology. Paris, UNESCO, 1971. 147 p.

"A study of the international movement of persons in science and tech-
nology. Attempts to trace the international movement of scientists, engineers,
and technicians, and to assess the relationship of this travel to national
development. Contains suggestions for both short-and-long-term solutions
to the problems posed."
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Outflow of Trained Personnel
From Developing to Developed Countries. Report New York, 1974. 26 p. Docu-
ment E/C.8/21, United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Wilson, James. A. and Jerry Gaston. "Reflux from the 'Brain Drain.' " Minerva, v.
12, October 1974: 459-468.

A discussion based on a survey of British scientists who had emigrated
to North America. It explores the motivations of those who had returned
to Great Britain by 1968 and those who stayed abroad.

(1973)

ENERGY

A. General Issueb

"An International Solar Energy Development Decade: a Proposal for Global

Cooperation." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 28, May 1972: 31-34.
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, v. 18, no. 1, Spring 1975. (Special issue on
energy.) Includes: "Energy: The Necessity of Decision, " Henry A. Kissinger;
"Reports of the Atlantic Council's Energy Policy Committees: "Chairman's
Forward": 23-25; "World Energy and U.S. Leadership," Harlan Cleveland,
26-45; "A CaU for Leadership," E. Keith Thomson and Richard R. Harbert,
46-56; and "Financing Free World Energy Supply and Use," John E. Gray,
57-93.
Blaney, Barry C, "The Energy Crisis: Challenge to the International System."
World Affairs, v. 136, Winter 1973-1974: 195-207.

"A broader per.spective on the international implications of the world
'energy crisis' indicates that the world community must create new and
better instituliions to deal with the problems of growth and the advance of
technology."
Buchanan, John E., World Energy Market Projections. Report, GC-A-427-74-
094. Prepared for the Federal Energy Administration, September 1974. 93 p.
USC/FAR Proj. No. 29005-74. AvaUable from the State Dept. as FAR
21673-G.
Choucri, Nazli. and Vincent Ferraro. "Analyzing Global Interdependence:
Vol. II — Energy Interdependence." Report, C174-28, prepared for INR/XR,
U.S. Dept. of State, by Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, November 1974, 192 p. USC/FAR Proj. No. 24002-73.
Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21164-S. Part of the larger series
analyzing global interdependence, under Uie director of Lincoln P. Bloomfield.
DeCarmoy, Guy, and others. "Cooperative Approaches to World Energy Prob-
lems: a Tripartite Report by Fifteen Experts From the European Community,
Japan, and North America." Washington, Brookings Institution [cl974] 51 p.
Reports on the results of a meeting of experts held in Brussels, March
25-29, 1974.
Erickson, Edward W. and Leonard Waverman, eds. The Energy Question: an
International Failure of Policy. V. 1: the World. V. 2: North America. Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1974. 2 v.

"... A remarkably rich set of papers (mostly on economics and tech-
nology) . . . tied together with helpful commentaries." (1)
Ehrhardt, Carl A. "Europe and Energy Policy at Top Level." Aussenpolitik, v. 26,
no. 1, 1975: 3-18.

Concerns the efforts of the EEC countries to ban together for common
energy goals, their strong dififerences, and the roles that OECD countries
and the International Energy. Agency have assumed aa a result.
Feld, Bernard T. Disarmament, Energy Problems, and International Collaboration.
Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Pugwash Conference on Science and World
Afifairs, Baden, Austria, August-September 1974. 492 p. Available from the
State Dept. as FAR 22053-P.
Hardesty, C. Howard, Jr. "The U.S. Energy Situation, and Its International
Implications." Natural Resources Lawyer, v. 7, Fall 1974: 569-580.

Provides a brief history of the recent energy crisis, a summary of the

options available to the U.S. and the world to solve the problems in the

future, and a list of steps to be taken immediately to solve the problems.

Horelick, Arnold L. "The Soviet Union, The Middle East, and the Evolving

World Energy Situation." Policy Sciences, v. 6, March 1975: 41-48.

"Surveying and summarizing the basic issues confronting Soviet decision-
makers in the next ten years as reflected in energy and international political
terms, this analysis treats the capacity and constraints mediating Soviet
influence in the resolution of the future world energy balance. A scenario
highlighting a "Soviet-Preferred Future World" is developed that focuses

(1974)

1976

on three classes of likely energy outcomes: (1) a gradual erosion of the Western
commercial position in Middle East oil, (2) repeated shortages in oil-consumer
states leading to a diversion of attention away from international matters
and increased preoccupation with "domestic" energy woes, and (3) a de-
terioration of the terms of trade for energy importers vis d vis Soviet and
noncommimist trading partners. The discussion concludes with an assessment
of several of the key choices confronting the major oil-importing nations and
requiring resolution."
Hunter, Robert E. The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York, Foreign

Policy Association, 1973. 79 p. (HeadUnes series no. 216.)
International Research Group. Energy Policies in the European Community.
[Washington, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, avail-
able from NTIS] 1975. 1 v. (various pagings) "ERDA-51"

"Examines the pohtical, economic, and technological aspects of the

EEC's energy consumption and production patterns, forecasts future trends

through 1990, and evaluates the prospects for energy cooperation and/or

conflict between the EEC and the United States."

Knop, D. R. and J. F. Roorda. "Economic Restraints on U.S. Energy Supply and

Demand." Journal of Petroleum Technology, v. 27, July 1975: 803-812.

"This paper analyzes the U.S. energy and economic situation through 1985
with emphasis on the necessary interrelationships. The relationships consid-
ered are those between prices and quantity demanded for various fuels
in each fuel-consuming sector, the quantity of various fuels in each fuel-
consumed sector, the quantity of various fuels suppUed from domestic sources,
oil imports and economic conditions."
Kooharian, Anthony. Survey of External Studies on International Energy Issues.
Report prepared for the Federal Energy Administration, July 1974, 94 p.
Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21873-G.
Kooharian, Anthony. "Technical Integration Plan for Project Independence:
International Assessment: Final Report." Report prepared for the Federal
Energy Administration, August 1974. 33 p. Available from the State Dept. as
FAR21872-G.
LaMori, P. "The National Security Policy Aspects of World Energy Supply
and Demand," 1980-2030 (U.S.). Report prepared by Battelle Columbus
Laboratories, Washington, D.C. for OASD/ISA, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Feb-
ruary 1974. 350 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20723-G or from the
Commerce Dept. as AD 920 339 L.
Lovins, A. B. World Energy Strategies. Cambridge, Ballinger (for Friends of the

Earth International) 1975. 131 p.
Nau, Henry R. "U.S. Foreign PoUcy in the Energy Crisis." Atlantic Community
Quarterly, v. 12, Winter 1974 75: 426-439.

In response to higher petroleum prices, production cutbacks, and selective
embargo, the U.S. sought to mobilize support for preexisting policies in the
international system. The author explains that the U.S. used the energy
crisis and its technological assets to pursue diplomatic aims.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Energy R&D: Prob-
lems and Perspectives. [Paris, 1975] 243 p.

"To provide a detailed analysis of the specific problems involved in the
formulation and implementation of a scientific and technological research
policy covering all aspects of energy. . . ."
Reports of the Atlantic Council's Energy Policy Committee. Atlantic Community
Quarterly, v. 13, Spring 1975: 23-93.

Contents. — World energy and U.S. leadership, by H. Cleveland. — An
approach toward resolution of energy problems throxigh international
coordination and cooperation, by E. Thomson and R. Harbert. — Financing
Free World energy supply and use, by J. Gray.
Rutz, Maj. Ernest F., Jr. The Energy Crisis in Europe: U.S. Interests. Research
Study, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1974. 84 p. Avail-
able from the State Dept. as FAR 21135-G or as AD 920 575L.
Schmidt, Maj. Paul R. "The Energy Crisis and Japan's Options to Secure Energy
in Asia." Report No. 2380, Air Command and Staff College, Air University,
May 1974. 41 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21815-G.
Simonet, Henri. "Energy and the Future of Europe." Foreign Affairs, v. 53, Apr.
1975: 4.50-463.

During the past year two methods have been used by the U.S. and EEC
countries to concert issues on energy policy. One, represented by the negotia-

1976

tions of the Energy Coordinating Group, has seen Europeans acting as indi-
vidual nations. But in the negotiations of financial solidarity the Community
has acted as a unit.
Tanzcr, Michael. The Energy Crisis: World Slrugcjls for Power and Wealth. New
York, Monthly Review Press. 197.5. 171 p.

"The author of this timely book, formerly an economist for Exxon's Asian-
African affiliate and now president of his own consulting firm specializing in
energy matters, asserts that there is actually no energy crisis in the sense of a
physical shortage of hydrocarbon fuel resources. Instead, an artifically con-
trived scarcity has been created by certain "forces" (viz., the international
oil companies) operating within the overall framework of the world capitalist
economy. From this premise the author then undertakes a multifaceted
analysis by examining these oil companies' relationships to their home gov-
ernments (especially the United .States), the OPEC countries, and the oil-
consuming nations, as well as the prospects for energy in a rational world."
Tater, WiUiam, et. al. "Energy: the Recent Crisis and Future Prospects of the
European Community and Japan." Report prepared for the Federal Energy
Administration, August 1974. 197 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR
207.50-G.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Foreign
Economic Policv. Foreign Policy Implicatiojis of the Energy Crisis. Hearings,
92d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 4.55 p.

Includes a 92-page summary and analysis (with detailed table of contents)
of the testimony of 14 experts and related discussion, and a 30-page bibliog-
raphy, prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs. The Energy Crisis: Impact on Development in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Hearing, 93d Cong., 2d sess. March 27, 1974. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 44 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittees on
International Organizations and on International Resources, Food, and Energy.
Legislation on the International Energy Agency, Hearings, 94th Cong. 1st sess.
March 26, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OflF., 1975, 79 p.

The purpose of the hearings was to obtain information for oversight

of the proposals that were made in the President's energy package to provide

the Executive with the authority to carry out the terms of agreement of the

international energy program.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on

International Resources, Food, and Energy. U.S. International Energy Policy.

Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. May 1, 1975. Washington. U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1975. 189 p.

Energ}^ policy — [U.S.]/Power resources — Conferences/Petroleum prices —

[OPEC countries]/Petroleum— [OECD countries]/International economic

relations/Energy policy — [OECD countriesj/International Energy Agency.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Energy and Foreign

Policy. Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess. May 30 and 31, 1973. Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 239 p.

Presents the state of poHcy as of May 1973. Foreign relations — [U.S.]/

Petroleum— [U.S.]/Energy policy— [U.S.]

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. International

Energy Program. Hearings, pursuant to S. Res. 45; the National Fuels and Ener-

gv Policv Studv, 93d Cong. 2d sess.- Nov. 26, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1975. 213 p.

Deals with energy pones'" i" OECD member countries.
Willrich, Mason. Energy and World Politics. Riverside, New Jersey, The Free
Press, 1975. 256 p.

"This book "looks at the world energy problems from a political view-
point." The author holds that "the political process operating within and
among nations will determine the future of the world energy situation. This
book probes these political processes from World War II to the present,
anal3'zing the major international political issues, such as national security,
the world economy, and the global environment, that have affected the
present situation." The author assesses ". . . whether a harmonious
pattern of international relationships is possible, and also considers the
development of international institutions to manage the world energy
problems in the future."

1977

Woodliffe, J. C. "A New Dimension to International Co-operation: the OECD
International Energy Agreement. International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly, V. 24, July 1975: 525-541.

Balance of payments/International cooperation/Energy policy — [OECD

countries]/Petroieum allocation — [OECD countries ]/International economic

relations/International Energy Agency.

"World Energy Consumption and Production Over the Next 50 years: Summaries

of Papers Presented at the 20th Pugwash Symposium, Arc-ct-Senans, France,

4-8 July 1974." Pugwash Newsletter, v. 12, Jan. 1975: 124-149.

Partial contents. — Crisis of resource scarcity. — Some limiting factors

in energy production, by F. Kohler. — Energy sources for the future: the need

for international research and development, by J. Gueron. — The advisabiUty

of creating new institutions in the energy field, W. Frank.

Wright, Arthur W. "Contrasts in Soviet and American Energy Policies." Energy

Policy, V. 3, Mar. 1975: 38-40.

"West Europeans, Japanese and Americans are accustomed to thinking
of their own market-based economic systems as more flexible, hence more
rational, than the rigid central planning systems employed in most Communist
countries. It is startling, however, to compare the energy policies of the two
different groups of countries. Dr. Wright contends that Communist planners
are, by and large, pursuing a course of cautious, deliberate, rational energy
decisions based (both domestically and internationally) on relative cost and
price. In contrast, capitalist governments have shown us a pattern of dra-
conian measures involving quantitative restrictions, suspension of the market
mechanism, government manipulation of prices, encouragement and pro-
tection of monopoly — and even, during the energy panic of 1973-74, the
attempted central planning of crude oil and refined products. In spite of
official claims to the contrary, the results in tlie capitalist countries have been
anything but rational."
Yager, Joseph A., and others. "Toward an International Energy Policy for the
United States." Washington, Brookings Institution, 1975. 9 p. (Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C. Research report 141).

Report is adapted from "Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy; a Report to the
Energy Policy Project of the Foundation," and is a review of U.S. foreign
policy choices in the field of energy.

B. Petroleum as a Source of Energy

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, National Energy
Project. Conference on World Oil Problems. Proceedings, Washington, D.C.,
October 1974. 290 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20819-P.
Bohi, Douglas R. and Milton Russell. U.S. Energy Policy: Alternatives for
Security. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press (for Resources for the
Future) 1975. 131 p.

". . . The book recommends finding U.S. oil security through accom-
modations and mutual "benefits between oil exporters and importers, rather
than through U.S. 'policies that seek confrontation and all-out independ-
ence.' " (2)
Elsasser, Maj. Robert L. "An Analysis of Middle East Oil and Power Politics."
Report No. 0975, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1974.
48 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21828-G.
Enders, Thomas O. "OPEC and the Industrial Countries: the Next Ten Years."
Foreign Affairs, v. 53, July 1975: 625-637.

Foreign economic relations — [OECD countries] — OPEC countries/Foreign
economic relations — [OPEC countries] — OECD countries/Petroleum/Energy
policy — [OECD countries]/Cartels — [OPEC countries]
Galdi, Theodor W. Data and Analysis Concerning the Possibility of a U.S. Food
Embargo as a Response to the Present Arab Oil Boycott. Prepared for the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1973. 7 p. At head of title: 93d Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

Argues that a U.S. food embargo would not have an effect comparable

to the Arab oil embargo owing to the multipUcity of Arab food sources.

Hannan, Timothy H. "The Battle for Energy Independence: How Much of a

Good Thing? "Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, July-Aug.

1975:3-10.

1978

Points out that America's vulnerability to periodic oil embargoes can be
lessened, but the goal of achieving energy self-sufficiency in the next few
years could cost more than it is worth.
Howell, Leon. "Asia, Oil, Politics, and the Energy Crisis: the Haves and the
Have-nots." (International Documentation Series.) New York, International
Pubhcations Service, 1974.
KlebanofiF, Shoshana. Middle East Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy, With Special
Reference to the U.S. Energy Crisis. New York, Praeger, 1974. 288 p.

"Competent, fairly conventional history of American oil policy since the

1930s. Writing prior to the embargo, the author warned against dependence

on Arab sources." (1)

Krueger, Robert B. The United States and International Oil: A Report for the

Federal Energy Administration on U.S. Firms and Government Policy. New

York, Praeger Publishers. 1975. 649 p. (Praeger Special Studies in International

Economics and Development.)

"The thesis permeating Krueger's FEA report rests upon the contention

that recent developments have rendered foreign but primarily U.S. based

multinational oil companies 'hostages' to the indigenous Middle Eastern

oil-producing governments. Thus, the oil companies have neither purposively

nor willingly perpetrated the present energy situation; father, they have

been compelled to acquiesce to political events in the absence of any real

bargaining leverage." Among the conclusions developed in this study are the

following: the U.S. government should obtain information from oil companies

concerning international petroleum arrangements which aflfect U.S. energy

supplies and security ; tariffs would be helpful to reduce demand for imports

and to increase domestic production; and "a federally owned and operated

petroleum corporation would, in the long run, be counterproductive for

preserving U.S. security of petroleum supplies and only create further

bureaucratic inefficiency." (2)

Lewis, Maj. John F. "The United States Energy Crisis and Saudi Arabia."

Report No. 1580, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 1974,

54 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21806-G.

The Middle East and the International System: II. Security and the Energy Crisis.

London, International Institute for Strategic Studies [1975] 41 p. (Adelphi

Papers, No. 115)

Partial contents. — Strengths and weaknesses of the oil weapon, by F.
Itayim. — Natural resources and national security, by R. Cooper. — The
energy problem and alliance systems: Europe, by K. Kaiser. — The energy
crisis, the developing world and strategy, by B. WariavwaUa.
Mikdashi, Zuhayr. The Community of Oil Exporting Countries: a Study in Govern-
mental Cooperation. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972. 239 p.

". . . The major role of OPEC seems to have been in speeding up the
learning process. As with any cartel, its success is far easier when swimming
with the tide of a seller's market. This makes it unlikely that OPEC will
prove to be a good model for other commodities for which the market tides
are less favorable."
Sharebaugh, H. Robert. "Petroleum and Energy." Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, v. 420, July 1975: 86-97.

"While the term scarcity does not describe precisely the short term world
energy supply situation, recent developments have focused world attention
on anticipated future scarcity. This article briefly defines scarcity as it applies
to energy today; considers some of the implications of scarcity; and examines
some considerations for the future. It emphasizes the United States petroleum
energy situation, as seen in the perspective of world energy supply, and calls
for more efficient use of energy, policies to stimulate new energy supplies,
and international cooperation on a long term basis. Finally, it discusses the
proper role of government in energy matters — specifically, domestic price
controls, tax policy, research and development funding, and a floor cost
for imported oil."
Solomon, Robert. "The Allocation of 'Oil Deficits' ". Brookings Papers on Economic
ActivUy, No. 1, 1975: 61-87.

Investigates the balance-of-payments adjustment of the "oil deficits"
among the OECU covm tries, arguing in favor of some fixity of exchange
rates and against any direct attempts to influence capital or trade flows
among the member countries.

1979

Syliowica, Joseph S. and Bard E. O'Neill, eds. The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign
Policy. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 258 p. (Praeger Special Studies in
International Politics and Government.)

"This book is essentially designed for the concerned citizen or student of

American foreign policy rather than the policy maker or scholar. It offers a

concise overview of the changing nature of U.S. energy requirements, the

make-up of the international oil industry, the major Middle East states and

their interests in the region, the political-military balance in the region, and

the implications of the oil crisis for American foreign policy. . . ." (2)

Trilateral Task Force on the Political and International Implications of the Energy

Crisis. Energy: the Imperative for a Trilateral Approach. New York, Trilateral

Commission, 1974. 35 p.

Deals with energy policies in OECD and OPEC countries and issues of
energy conservation.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Data and Analysis Concerning
the Possibility of a U.S. Food Embargo as a Response to the Present Arab Oil
Boycott. Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, November 21, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off. 7. p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee
on International Organizations and Movements and Subcomrftittee on Foreign
Economic Policy. U.S. Policy and the International Energy Agency. Hearings,
93d Cong. 2d sess. Dec. 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 59 p.
"Hearings , . . to review the potential impact on U.S. foreign and economic
policies of the creation of the International Energy Agency (IE A) under
the International Energy Program (lEP) signed by 16 oil-consuming members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation arfd Development, Nov. 18,
1974. lEP and lEA are established to developed cooperative approaches to
meeting future fuel shortages and price increases, currently associated with
the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries' export policies."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Special Subcom-
mittee on Investigations. Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study.
94th Cong. 1st sess. Aug. 21, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.
Ill p.

"Study prepared by CRS . . . examining difficulties and risks associated

with any possible military action against oil producing states in the event

of a cripphng oil embargo." (3)

U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on International

Economics. Energy Imports and the U.S. Balance of Payments. Hearings.

Nov. 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 162 p.

"Hearings ... to examine the relationship between the U.S. balance of
payments and future energy imports. Appendix . . . contains introduction
to and text of "Energy and the Balance of Payments" by the research and
planning staff. Domestic and International Business Administration, Com-
merce Dept. Oct. 18, 1973." (3)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The International
Petroleum Cartel, The Iranian Consortium and U.S. National Security. Hearing,
93d Cong. 2d sess. Feb. 21, 1974. Wasliington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.
158 p. (Committee print.)

This contains previously secret documents from the National Security

Council and the Departments of State and Justice, 1952-1961, which detail

the historj?^ of policy conflicts regarding antitrust actions of U.S. petroleum

companies.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on

Multinational Corporations. Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign

Policy. Part 4: Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy. Hearings,

93d Cong. 2d sess. Jan. 28, 30, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974.

214 p.

This is a continuation of the series of hearings on multinational corpora-
tions and foreign policy. These sessions dealt with the impact of multi-
national petroleum corporations and their effects on the energy crisis.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on- Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations. Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign
Policy, Part 6, Hearings, 93d Cong. 1st sess. and 93d Cong. 2d sess. Oct. 11,
Nov. 27, 1973 and Jan. 24, 28, 31, and Feb. 1 and 6, 1974. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 296 p.

96-243 O - 77 - 31

1980

This is a continuation of the series of hearings on multinational corpora-
tions. This volume looks at the relationships between multinational petroleum
companies and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations. U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab Oil Embargo: the
I nternalional Allocation of Constricted Supplies. Prepared by the Federal Energy
Administration, Office of International Energy Affairs, January 27, 1975.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 30 p. (Committee print.)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Petropolitics and
the American Energy Shortage. 93d Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off. 1973. 13 p. (Committee print.)

"Report by Committee Member Abraham A. Ribicoff on a trip to stud)'
international and European aspects of the energy problem. Contains findings
and conclusions regarding effective conservation measures, international co-
operation, and alternative energy shortages." (3)
U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services, "Current Foreign Policy: Energy;
Cooperative World Action to Solve Shortages." [Washington, 1973] 6 p. (U.S.
Dept. of State. Publication 8741) U.S. Dept. of State. General foreign policy
series, 281.

"The U.S. is in the same position in hard hydrocarbons as the Middle East

is in oil. By focusing harder on domestic oil production and accelerating the

development of alternative sources of energy, our dependence on imports

can be kept under control."

U.S. General Accounting Office. Issues Related to Foreign Sources of Oil for the

United States, Department of State; Report to the Congress by the Comptroller

General of the United Stales. [Washington] 1974. 65 p.

"This report discusses (1) the State Department's role before eruption of
hostilities in the Middle East in October and Arab curtailment of petroleum
exports and (2) the critical problems facing the Department in resolving the
issues connected with the current and future availability of this vital raw
material from sources outside the United States."
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. A Study of the Re-
lationships Between the Government and the Petroleum Industry in Selected Foreign
Countries: Japan. Prepared ... at the request of Henry M. Jackson,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate,
pursuant to S. Res. 45. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 37 p. "Serial
no. 94-10 (92-100)." At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
Prepared bj^ Larrj^ A. Niksch, Foreign Affairs Division, CRS.
Energy policj' — [ Japan ]/Pctroleum industry — [Japan]/ Government and
business — [Japan].
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. A Study of the Re-
lationships Between the Government ayid the Petroleum Industry in Selected Foreign
Countries: the Netherlands. Prepared ... at the request of Henry M. Jackson,
Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate,
pursuant to S. Res. 45. W^ashington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 33 p. At
head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print. "Serial No. 94-8 (92-98) '
Energy industries — [Netherlands ]/Petroleum industry — [Netherlands]/
Energy policy — [Netherlands]/ Government and business— [Netherlands].
U.S. Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs "Division. A Study of the Relationships
Between the Government and the Petroleum Industry in Selected- Foreign Countries:
the Federal Republic of Germany. Prepared by the Congressional Research
Service at the request of Henry M. Jackson, chairman. Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 45, the national
fuels and energy policy studv. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 99 p.
"Serial No. 94-21 (92-111).'' At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee
print.
U.S. Federal Energy Administration. Office of International Energy Affairs.
The Relationship of Oil Companies and Foreign Governments. Washington,
For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 205 p.

"The 30 countries included in this study were selected to provide a com-
prehensive view of foreign nations, both producers and consumers. All
members of OPEC are included as are most members of the International
Energy Agency."

)>

1981

U.S. Federal Energ.v Administration. Office of International Energy Affairs.
Report to Congress on: Foreign Ownership Control and Influence on Domestic
Energy Sources and Supply. Washington. For sale b}" the Supt. of Docs., U.S.
Govt. Print. OflF., 1974. 80 p.

". . . This report is an initial effort to assess the extent and character of
foreign participation in our domestic energy industries. It provides a basis
for evaluating the current status of that participation and for identifying
areas warranting more intensive investigations."
Yager, Joseph A. and Eleanor B. Steinberg. Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy. (A
report of the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project.) Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, Ballinger, 1974. 462 p.

Study which deals specifically with problems of international oil trade and
the judicious channeling of nuclear energy development.

C. NucLE.\R Energy: Research and Cooperation

Bloom field, Lincoln P. "Nuclear Spread and World Order." Foreign Affairs,
V. 53, no. 4, July 1975: 743-755.

An essay which assesses the need for international attention to controlling
the spread of nuclear weapons technology.
"Changing Role for OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency." OECD Observer, no. 6G,
1973:19-26.

Atomic energj- — [OECD countries]/Radiation safety — [OECD countries]/
International cooperation in science/International agencies/Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. Nuclear Energy Agency.
DiNolas, Massimo. "Nuclear Industry Prepares for Boom." Atlantic Community
Quarterly, v. 12, summer 1974: 205-212.

Argues that European nuclear industries must rationalize and cooperate in
order to prevent U.S. firms from dominating the atomic power plant market.
Donnelly, Warren H. "Some Notes on Congress and Nuclear Safeguards." Pre-
pared for the Workshop on Plutonium, Safeguards, and the Breeder; Session on
Safeguards and the Public of the Atomic Industrial Forum, October 23, 1974.
25 p.

Presents background on U.S. international cooperation agreements in
nuclear power and safeguards measures and congressional reaction to these
agreements.
Doub, William O. "A Compelling Priority: International Standards for Nuclear
Safety." Public Utilities F ortnighthj, v. 94, Sept. 26, 1974: 66-68.

"Disproportionate attention is being given development of new inter-
national safeguards against theft of nuclear materials, when in fact such
safeguards already exist. What is needed, however, is a great effort toward
international co-operation to write safety standards."
Doub, William O. and Joseph M. Dukert. "Making Nuclear Energy Safe and
Secure." Foreign Affairs, v. 53, no. 4, July 1975: 756-772.

The author elaborates upon the following: "... the International
Atomic Energy Agency is not without its problems. The Nonproliferation
Treaty is far from a perfect treaty. Yet both have been workable and valu-
able in the past. In order for both to remain so in the future, there is no .
choice . . . but to strengthen systematically the stature, capabilities, and
responsibilities of the IAEA. The best hope of linking substantial progress
at the 1980 NPT Review Conference with arms-hmitations agreements among
the nuclear-weapons countries lies in the rapid achievements of this
objective."
Droutman, Lawrence Julian. Nuclear Integration: the Failure of Euratom. Sub-
mitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty of PoUtical Science, Columbia University, 1973.
369 p.

Traces the history of Euratom and its failure to integrate European nations
through scientific cooperation.
Drozdiak, William M. "US-EC Uranium Relations." European Community,
no. 187, June 1975: 8-11.

Article discusses the problems and confusion over the supply of nuclear
fuels needed for European atomic programs. A recent change in U.S. export
policy is causing the Europeans to seek other sources of nuclear fuels.

1982

International Atomic Energy Agency. Recommendations for the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material. Vienna, 1972. 23 p.

Recommendations for physical protection of nuclear material in use,
transit, and storage by a panel of experts assembled by the IAEA.
Jacobson, Harold Karan, and Eric Stein. Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians:
The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations. Ann Arbor, The Univ-
versity of Michigan Press, 1966, 506 p. plus bibliography and index.

"This study began in 1961 as a limited attempt to assess the impact of

science and modern technology on the negotiating process and concepts

of international organization, using the test ban negotiations then in process

as a case study. When the Moscow Treaty was signed, however, it seemed

wise to broaden the focus and to capture as many of the details as we could

that might help to explain the first formal arms control agreement between

East and West in the nuclear age." Source materials include "the records of

the negotiations and the memoirs thus far published," and interviews with

a large number of the participants. A concluding chapter relates this case

to broader considerations in the formulation and execution of "American

Security Policy," and international politics.

Nau, Henry R. National Politics and International Technology: Nuclear Reactor

Development in Western Europe. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,

1974. 287 p.

"Through a careful analysis of the political dimensions of nuclear tech-
nology in Western Europe, Nau challenges present conventional wisdom:
'National politics, far from becoming an increasingly inappropriate perspective
for studying technological relations among modernized societies, may be a
more relevant focus than integration or interdependence.' " (1)
Nau, Henry R. "The Practice of Interdependence in the Research and Develop-
ment Sector: Fast Reactor Cooperation in Western Europe." International
Organization, v. 26, Summer 1972: 499-526.
Pendley, Robert and Lawrence Scheinman, with the collaboration of Richard W.
Butler. "International Safeguarding as Institutionalized Collective Behavior."
International Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975: 585-616.

"International safeguards refer to a set of international agreements
establishing control over the production, use, and final disposition of fission-
able materials. Before the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into effect,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards had been applied
to 75 reactors and ten other nuclear facilities under 51 different agreements.
The design of the first regime was largely a function of political, strategic,
and economic rather than technical considerations. After 1971, safeguards
were made an integral part of the NPT, and became obligatory with respect
to all peaceful nuclear activities in signatory states. Negotiations on the
NPT safeguards regime focused on efforts to minimize the major asymmetrical
costs that this implied, and particularly to meet the objections of major
nonnuclear weapons states. The focus of controversy centered less on re-
sistance to incursions on sovereignty than on demands for equity in incursion.
In these negotiations, techpological factors facilitated the construction of a
politically acceptable regime."
Petros'yants, A. M. "Cooperation Through the 'Atoms for Peace' Program."
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 3, Mar. 1974: 1-13.

Russian report on the Soviet-American cooperation in the use of atomic
energy for peaceful puposes.
Roberts, J. Tom. "Uranium enrichment: Supply, Demand and Costs." Bulletin
of the International Atomic Energy Agency , v. 15, Oct. 1973: 14-24.

Details international supply, demand, and costs of enriched uranium.
Scheinman, Lawrence. "Safeguarding Nuclear Materials." Science and Public
Affairs, v. 30, April 1974: 34-36.

Discusses the need for and problems in developing physical security
systems for safeguarding special nuclear materials in an international context.
Segal, George. "Euratom Seeks a New Role." New Scientist, February 8, 1973:
310-311.

Describes the major crises Euratom faces: a failure of the European
Economic Community to agree on the budget for the next proposed five
year program, strikes of personnel at the research bases, and the fundamental
question of whether or not the members of the EEC are prepared to accept
a meaningful community effort in advanced technology.
Shalmon, E. "International Reference Centre for Environmental Radioactivity."
Bulletin of the International Atomic Energy Agency, v. 15, Apr. 1973: 8-9, 11-12.

1983

Slawson, Robert N. "International Safeguards." Remarks by Robert N. Slawson,
Assistant Director for Agreements and Liaison, Division of International
Programs, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, at the AIF Public Affairs Work-
shop on Plutonium, Safeguards, and the Breeder. Oct. 10, 1974. 14 p.

Outlines the development of safeguards arrangements for material and

equipment exported by the U.S., describes procedures and regulations related

to implementation of arrangements, and examines current developments

affecting the further evolution of safeguards.

Smith, David. "What Price Commercial Enrichment?" Nuclear Engineering

International, v. 19, July 1974: 572-584.

Report on the Atomic Industrial Forum's conference on enrichment in
Reston, Va., April 23-26, 1974. Topics discussed: U.S. enrichment capacity
and future growth, implications for AEC contracts, enrichment projects
in the U.S. and abroad, enrichment technologies, and the status of enrich-
ment projects around the world.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Nuclear Proliferation Problems.
Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1974. 312 p.

Report of a group of experts assembled by SIPRI to review nuclear
technology, NPT safeguards, cooperation in the peaceful applications of
nuclear energy, and security problems of nonnuclear weapon states in
anticipation of the 1975 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Safeguards Against Nuclear
Proliferation. Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell/Cambridge, MIT Press, 1975.
114 p. ^

"An analysis of the important nuclear safeguards system of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, by an Agency official. The conclusions
emphasize the necessary element of cooperation by states: safeguards cannot
be imposed." (1)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Resolution of Inquiry Into
Proposed Nuclear Agreements with Egypt and Israel. Hearings on H. Res. 1189
and H. Res. 1219, 93d Cong. 2d sess. July 9, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1974. 6 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements and on the Near East and South Asia.
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Export of Nuclear Technology to the Middle East.
Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., June 25, July 9, 18; and Sept. 16, 1974. U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 333 p.

Hearings held on a proposed agreement to export nuclear technology to
the Middle East and examine U.S. policies toward nuclear proliferation and
international cooperation.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Amending the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, «s Amended, to Enable Congress to Concur in or Disapprove Certain
International Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation: report to accompany S. 3698.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 4 p. (93d Cong. 2d sess. Senate.
Report No. 93-964.)
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Amendment to Section 5 of
the Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958, as Amended; report ... to accompany
H.R. 8867. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 10 p. (93d Cong. 1st
sess. House. Report No. 93-385.)
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Subcommittee on Agreements
for Cooperation. Proposals for International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy.
Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 6, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1975. 16 p.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Subcommittee on Agreements
for Cooperation. Proposed Amendment to Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958.
Hearing, 93d Cong., 1st sess. June 22, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
1973. 57 p. . ^ ,

Hearings on S. 1993 and H.R. 8867, proposed amendments to section 5 of
the Euratom Act of 1958, to increase the quantity of contained uranium-235
transferred to the European Atomic Energy Commission.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Subcommittee on International Finance. Exports of Nuclear Materials and
Technology. Hearing, 93d Cong., 2d. sess. July 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1974. 120 p.

1984

"7

'Hearings ... to review export policy and controls on nuclear materials
and technology. Testimony covers present controls on nuclear technology,
the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and miUtary implications of exporting nuclear
materials." (3)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Peaceful Nuclear
Exports and Weapons Proliferation: A Compendium. April rl975. 94th Cong.,
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Oflf., 1975. 13.55 p. (Committee print.)
This is a comprehensive anthology of articles and reports deaUng with
nuclear exports and weapons proliferation. It was prepared for the committee
to assist in considering S. 1439, the Export Reorganization Act of 1975 —
to reform the present Federal interagency system of controlling peaceful
nuclear exports as well as the export of other strategically significant com-
modities. It was also intended to assist in considering the agenda of the
Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-ProUferation Treaty Conference in
Geneva in May 1975.

The document was prepared with the following objectives in mind: "It
is in the interest of the United States and all nations to estabhsh a strict,
uniform system of nuclear safeguards for detecting diversion and preventing
theft. Unfortunately, safeguards has long been a battleground for commercial
advantage among nuclear exporting nations, including the United States.
Short-term commercial interests have overshadowed long-term national
security interest. The inclination has been not to apply strict safeguards
conditions on commercial nuclear transactions out of fear that rival exporters
will permit weaker safeguards in order to win a sale. This compendium is
designed to provide a selected but comprehensive review of the legal, tech-
nical and policy aspects of this critical problem for all who seek an under-
standing of it."
Walsh, John. "Uranium Enrichment: Both the Americans and Europeans Must
Decide Where to Get the Nuclear Fuel of the 1980's." Science, v. 184, June 14,
1974: 1160-1161.

Examines crucial decisions the United States and the member nations of
the European Community must make concerning the creation of new uranium
enrichment capacity.
Walsh, Warren Bartlett. Science and International Public Affairs. Six Recent
Experiments in International Scientific Cooperation. [Syracuse,! International
Relations Program, The Maxwell School of Syracuse University, 1967. 161 p.
Historical description of international scientific projects participated in by
scientists at Syracuse University. The objective, according to the author, was
to "identify and trace some of the impacts of science and scientists on inter-
national public affairs." The author describes formal and informal modes of
interaction, contrasts the objectives of international cooperation with do-
mestic political and social factors, such as labor union organization, and traces
.the evolution of objectives and organization of cooperation in international
scientific research and development. Cases studied are : The European Center
for Nuclear Research; The European Nuclear Energy Agency; The Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency; The European Atomic Energy Community;
The European Space Research Organization; and The European Launcher
Development Organization.
Willrich, Mason, ed. International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry. Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 307 p.

A study of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Nonproliferation
Treaty safeguards system and the problems it must deal with.
Willrich, Mason and Theodore B. Taylor. Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards.
Cambridge, Ballinger, 1974. 252 p.

". . . The growing use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power

will result in large amounts of materials that can be used to make

nuclear weapons; these weapons are relatively easy to manufacture; terrorist

organizations, criminal groups, or even one individual may be able to steal

nuclear-weapons materials and threaten communities and governments.

This report to the Energy Pohcy Project of the Ford Foundation offers

specific recommendations for a system of safeguards." (1)

Wonder, Edward F. "Uranium Enrichment in American-European Relations."

Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University

of Virginia. 1973. 9 p.

Examines relations between the U.S. and Europe since World War II
with respect to three dimensions of the issue of uranium enrichment: security,
economics, and diplomacy.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Batisse, Michel, "Man and the Biosphere." Nature, v. 256, July 17, 1^75: 156-158.
UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program endeavors to develop an
integrated research approach to the management problems arising from the
interactions between human activities and natural systems. The MAB Pro-
gram comprises 14 project areas forming a kind of research matrix in which
the main ecological systems and physiographical units interact with major
activities, engineering works, or demographic changes.
Barros, James, and Douglas M. Johnston. The International Law of Pollution.
Riverside, New Jersey, The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan Pubhshing
Co., 1974. 385 p.

"Intended as a basic research tool for students and professionals, this is .
the first book to cover the entire development of international law relating
to the prevention and control of pollution and related environmental prob-
lems. Using international agreements and judicial decisions as a basis, the
volume provides the e\idence of transnational actions taken to date and
suggests the scope of future developments in the interdependent world
community."
Baxter, William. "International Implications of an Effluent Tax System: Some
Preliminary Observations." Stanford, CaUfornia Center for Advanced Study in
the Behavioral Sciences, Spring 1973, Report No. POST-BAXT-W-02: 16 p.
also published in Stanford Journal of International Studies, v. 8, 1973: 1-15.
"To obtain an optimum level of pollution, a tax per unit. of effluent could
be imposed on polluting activities equal in amount to the harm caused per unit.
This would cause the level of harm from pollution to faU until it was not more
than that justifiable by the essentiality to the society of the product yielded
by the activity. ' thin a nation, the tax rate should be determined for each
region to enco'^rage industry to relocate in less polluted areas. The authori-
ties who administer the tax rates should have national responsibilities so that
local industry is not economically protected. On an international level, pollu-
tion control should be administered by two bodies, one with world-wide
representation and another made up of regional organizations. The first
would coordinate the activities of the regional organizations and have direct
control over effluents with world-wide dissemination characteristics; the
second would have control over regional pollutants. The regions should be as
narrowly defined as possible to avoid greater sacrifices by the poorer nations."
(Supported by NSF RANN award: GI-29730.)
Bleicher, Samuel A. "An Overview of International Environmental Regulation."
Ecology Law Quarterly, v. 2, winter 1972: 1-90.

"This article proposes a classification of areas in which international
environmental regulation is inevitable: activities physically affecting other
states, activities aflfecting shared resources, and international regulation of
national environmental standards. The author discusses the current law
within these categories and urges that governments abandon their narrow,
piecemeal approaches to the problem in favor of consolidating these areas of
environmental regulation into an integrated framework."
Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., Washington, D.C. Study of Balance of Trade
Impact on U.S. Producers in Three Industries of Higher Costs of Environmental
Protection. Report prepared for the U.S. Dept. of State, January 1974. 186 p.
Available from the State Dept. as FAR 19908-S.
Busterud, John A., "International Environmental Relations." Natural Resources
Lawyer, v. 7, Spring 1974: 325-335.

Reviews U.S. involvement in international environmental affairs.
CaldweU, Lynton, K. In Defense of Earth: International Protection of the Bio-
sphere. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1972. 295 p.

Historical overview of behavioral and institutional modifications needed
to cope with problems of international environmental qualitj'.

(1985)

1986

Clemens, Walter C. Jr. "Ecology and International Relations." International
Journal, v. 28, no. 1, Winter 1972-1973: 1-27.

Ab interesting functionally oriented article on the relationship between the
needs of ecological harmony and of international relations. The author
concludes: "The true power base [in solving problems of international and
national environmental quality and natural resource utility] may lie in
education and consensus-building. Here, the ecologist and the poUtical
scientist should co-operate in stressing the interdependency of men and their
life-support systems; the necessity of long-term planning; and the reality
that non-zero-sum policies are in the long-term best interest of all."
Coan, Eugene V., Juha N. Hillis, and Michael McCloskey. "Strategies for In-
ternational Environmental Action: the Case for an Environmentally Oriented
Foreign Policy." Natural Resources Journal, v. 14, Jan. 1974: 87-102.

". . . The magnitude of the United States' impact on the world's en-
vironment demands that we undertake a variety of unilateral measures,
fronx new regulations on exports and imports to a basic reorientation of our
foreign policy. We must begin to assert greater control over the environ-
mentally significant activities of our private sector abroad. ..."
Contiiii, P. and P.H. Sand. "Methods to Expenditure Environmental Protection:
International Ecostandards." American Journal of International Law. Pro-
ceedings, V. 66, Jan. 18, 1972: 37-59.
Dienes, Leslite. "Environmental Disruption and its Mechanism in East-Central
Europe." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Assn. of American
Geographers, Seattle, April-May 1974. 13 p. Available from State Dept. as
FAR 19524-P.
"The Environment — One Year of Community Action." Industry and Society,
no.28, July 16, 1974:1-17.

"Now, nearly a year after the adoption of the European Economic Com-
munity programme, it is possible to draw up a balance sheet of the work done
and decisions taken by the Community to improve the environment in the
context of the action programme decided on."
Ferarn, Anne Thompson. "Transnational PoUtical Interests and the Global En-
vironment." International Organization, v. 28, winter 1974: 31-60.

This article attempts to "identify those transnational associations that
have participated in the elaboration of international environmental policy-
making, to characterize the functions performed by them, and to describe
the points of access they have to international and government officials."
French, Peter L. "Africa's Response to Ecological Imperialism: a Paradigm
on International Relations and the Third World." Paper presented at the First
Annual Meeting of the New York State African Studies Assn., New Paltz,
N. Y., April 1974. 18 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 18789-P.
Forester, William S. "Trade Consequences of Environment Cleanup." Environ-
mental Science & Technology, v. 7, June 1973: 498-499.

"Federal antipollution laws wiU place U.S. industries competing abroad
at a disadvantage unless foreign countries are required to pay fair shares of
their own pollution abatement programs."
Herter, Christian A., Jr. "Protecting the Environment: a Global Problem Calling
for an International Approach." Vital Issues, v. 23, Jan. 1974: 1-4.

A brief general review of world pollution problems and how the world

community is beginning to respond as it faces many difficult decisions in

the years ahead. Author is in charge of international environmental activities

at the State Department. '

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Environment and

Development. [Washington] 197.5. 33 p.

Explains how environmental problems arising with development can be

mitigated by taking precautionary measures. Paper proposes that the World

Bank Group continue its present project-by-project approach toward

environmental and health problems.

International Cooperation for Pollution Control, United Nations Institute for

Training and Research, 1972. 73 p. (UNITAR research report, #9.)
Kay, David A. and Eugene B. Skolnikoflf, eds. World Eco-Crisis: International
Organizations in Response. With an introduction by Maurice F. Strong. Madison,
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972. 324 p.

1987

"The essays in this volume address themselves to the role, both existing
and potential, of international institutions in coping with the environmental
impacts of the widespread application of an increasingly potent science and
technology." Among the institutions treated are: the UN, the WMO, regional
organizations, and organizations relating to the issues of trade and develop-
ing countries.
Kneese, Allen, Sidney E. Rolfe, and Joseph W. Hameds, eds. Managing the
Environment: International Economic Cooperation for Pollution Control. (Praeger
special studies in international economics and development.) New York,
Praeger Publishers, 1972. 356 p.

"This book adds a new dimension to the literature of international en-
vironmental problems. It goes beyond the usual discussion of oil spills or
river pollution crossing national boundaries and the consequent need for
bilateral or multilateral agreements between nations sharing common re-
sources or boundaries. It raises the more complex question of the international
trade consequences of varying national efforts to curb pollution and how
these economic effects might be moderated through international agreements
and agencies."
Kramer, John M. "Pollution in the USSR: A Partial Test of the Convergence
Theory." Paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Resource Management
and the Environment, University of Washington, Seattle, June 1974. 37 p.
Leider, Robert. "From Choice to Determinant: the Environmental Issue in Inter-
national Relations." [Washington] National War College, Strategic Research
Group, 1972. 21 p.

This article "attempts to classify the behavior of nations as they adjust
to the new environmental realities. From there it seeks to project the altered
concepts and power ingredients that may emerge and could redefine national
interests and supporting strategies in the coming decade."

Revised version printed in Orbis, v. 76, winter 1973: 881-891.
Lobanov, L. "International Cooperation and the Environment." International
Affairs, No. 11, Nov. 1973: 47-53.

Reviews Soviet involvement in international environmental affairs.
Merritt, Weldon I. "The Soviet-U.S. Environmental Protection Agreement."

Natural Resources Journal, v. 14, Apr. 1974: 275-281.
Miller, A. J. "Doomsday Politics: Prospects for International Cooperation."
International Journal, v. 28, winter 1972-73: 121-133.

Examines "a representative sample of the proposals that environmentalists
and concerned political scientists have suggested as the basis of future inter-
national co-operation and, more important, to assess their prospects of
success."
Muir, J. Dapray. "Legal and Ecological Aspects of the International Energy
Situation." International Lawyer, v. 8, Jan. 1974: 1-10.

"It is clear that the energy situation is going to complicate considerably

national and international efforts to resolve developing ecological problems.

Already, the lines are being drawn by those concerned with the environment

and those concerned with economic growth."

Natural Resources Journal. [Special number on international issues.] v. 13, April

1973.

Contents: Ian Brownhe, A survey of international customary rules of
environmental protection; Lynton K. Caldwell, Concepts in development of
international environmental policies; E. D. Brown, The conventional law of
the environment; Michael Hardy, The United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme; L. F. E. Goldie, International impact reports and the conservation
of the ocean environment; Albert E. Utton, International water quality law;
Howard J. Taubenfeld, International environmental law: air and outer
space; J. W. Samuels, International control of weather modification activities:
peril or policy; A. Dan Tarlock, Land use choice: national prerogative vs.
international policy and Ludwik A. Teclaff, The impact of environmental
concern on the development of international law.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Polluter Pays
Principle: Definition, Analysis, Implementation. [Paris, 1975] 117 p. Pollu-
tion control — [OECD countries]— -Finance/Environmental poUcy — [OECD
countries]

1988

Problems in Transfrontier Pollution: [Paris] Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [cl974] 316 p.

Partial contents. — Economic aspects of transnational pollution, by A.

Scott. — Economic and related aspects, by J. Cumberland. — Transnational

pollution and international law, by C. Bramsen. — Legal and institutional

aspects of transfrontier pollution control, by R. Stein.

Robinson, Nicholas A. "Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligations

of Foreign Affairs Agencies: the Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA." New York

University Journal of International Law and Politics, v. 7, Summer 1974:

257-270.

This article points out that "agencies charged with conducting the gov-
ernment's foreign affairs have resisted assessing the impact of their decisions
which affect the environment abroad."
Quigg, Philip W. Environment: the Global Issues. [New York, Foreign Policy

Association] 1973. 63 p. (Headline series, no. 217)
A Reader in International Environmental Science. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1971. 160 p. "Serial B" At head of title: Committee print. Prepared for
the Senate Committee on Commerce and the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics.

Contains a selection of materials as background information for the Joint
Senate-House Colloquium on International Environmental Science on May
25-26, 1971. These papers offer an insight into major problems areas, the
status of cooperative programs, and opportunities for further research.
Sammartano, Susan and James W. Howe. "Environment and Development."
In The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action, 1973. [Wash-
ington] Overseas Development Council [cl973] p. 101-108.

Today the environment debate has at least two international dimensions.
Environment problems face every country and, where they have trans-
national effects, require some international cooperation. And the environ-
ment debate has identified some areas of potential conflict between rich
nations and poor.
Sherman, Harvey. International Environmental Affairs in the 93rd Congress.
MultiUth, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C., May 21, 1975. 29 p. MultiUth 75-132 EP.
Shields, Linda P. and Marvin C. Ott. "The Environmental Crisis: International
and Supranational AppTo&ches." I nterjiational Relatio7is. v. 4, November 1974:
629-648.

"What are the implications of environmental decay for the international
political system? Will it generate additional sources of international instabil-
ity and instruments of conflict or, conversely, will it spur new forms of
transnational cooperation and integration? What governmental policies, if
any, promise to strengthen the latter possibility and weaken the former?"
Shields, Linda P. and Marvin C. Ott. "Environmental Decay and International
Politics: the Uses of Sovereignty." Environmental Affairs, v. 3, no. 4, 1974:
743-767.

Considers the potential impact of present and future environmental con-
ditions on international politics and examines the question of whether an
effective international effort to stem the tide of environmental abuse requires
the elimination of the nation-state in favor of novel forms of supra-national
authority.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. Multiple Vulnerabilities: the Context of
Environmental Repair and Protection. [Princeton, N.J.] Center for International
Studies, Princeton University, 1974. 66 p. (Princeton University. Center of
International Studies. Research monograph no. 40.)

Deals with the issues of environmental assessment and protection as they
relate to international relations.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth. New
York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971. 499 p.

An ecological/environmental approach to international relations. After
surveying a multitude of resource/interdependence issues, the Sprouts
"anticipate that a more integrated, less nationalistic, 'politics of the planet
earth' will be accomplished through cumulative increments of change.
Decision makers in all the capitals are still playing two sets of games — one
with foreign adversaries for such stakes as security, expansion, influence, or
prestige; another set with their fellow citizens for such stakes as public

1989

order, education, housing, welfare, or rate of taxation. Insufficient resources

will soon cause crises of priorities of domestic and external politics, possible

with 'sensationally revolutionary' implications for the future of international

politics."

Stausberg, Gary Igal. "The National Environmental Policy Act and the Agency

for International Development." International Lawyer, v. 7, Jan. 1973: 40-64.

Analyzes the position taken by the State Dept. in behalf of AID to the

effect that AID is not subject to certain procedural requirrmcnts of NEPA.

Strong, Maurice F. "A Global Imperative for the Environment." Natural Hialorij,

v. 83, Mar. 1974: 41-50.

"International cooperation is needed more than ever as we approach the
outer limits of world resources and the carrying capacity of the biosphere."
Teclaff, Ludwik A. and Albert E. Utton, eds. International Environmerilal Law.
New York and Washington, Praeger, 1974. 270 p.

The essays in the book lead to the general conclusion that international
concerns for the environment are increasingly impacting on international
law.

Essays deal with: international customary rules of environmental pro-
tection, concepts in development of international environmental policies,
controls over territorial, spatial and marine environments, the need for
advance reporting requirements, international law and ocean protection
pollution, international water quality law, the UN environment program,
environmental law and air and outer space, and potential legal problems
resulting from national attempts to control weather patterns.
Timberlake, James H. "The German Environmental Movement and the U.S.
Military Presence." Case study prepared for the Sixteenth Session of the Senior
Seminar in Foreign Policv, U.S. Dept. of State, 197S-1974: 20 p. Available
from the State Dept. as FAR 19878-S.
Trzyna, Thaddeus C., ed. World Directory of Environmental Organizations. [San

Francisco] Sierra Club, 1973. 155 p. "Preliminary edition."
U.S. Bureau of International Commerce. "U.S. Seeking to Lessen Impact of
Pollution Controls on World Trade." Commerce Today, v. 2, Apr. 17, 1972: 9-13.
"Efforts to get international agreement now under way; 'polluter paj^s'
idea is gaining."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. The Need for a World Environ-
mental Institute. 92d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972.
22 p. Committee print.

Presents the findings and recommendations of the Joint Colloquium on
International Environmental Science held to consider, primarily, the need
to deal with environmental problems at an international level, and the role
of scientific information — and information exchange — in doing so ; recognizing
(1) that man's mismanagement of technology and resources poses a threat to
global environmental quality, and thus to the long-term future of human
society, and (2) that effective international management and decision-
making processes are essential to the solution of global environmental
problems, the Colloquium accordingly recommended the establi<;hment
of a World En\ironmental Institute to'provide the necessary technical and
scientific information to those processes; appended is the U.S. Senate resolu-
tion caUing for the creation of a World Environmental Institute.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, and U.S. Congress. House.
Committee on Science and Astronautics. International Environmental Sciences.
Proceedings of the Joint Colloquium, May 1971. 92d Cong. 1st sess. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 241 p.

Includes statements from scholars and statesmen, experts in international

environmental problems, to "acquaint a broad sector of the Congress and the

general pubhc with the status, needs, and opportunities of international

environmental science."

U.S. Council on Environmental Quality. Environmental Quality: the Fourth Annual

Report. [Washington. For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.]

1973. 499 p.

Includes extensive footnotes, appendices, and tables. Deals with inter-
national environmental quality.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. The Effects of Pollution Abatement on International
Trade; the First Report of the Secretary of Commerce to the President and Congress
in Compliance with Section 6 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

1990

ments of 1972 (Public Law 92-500). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973.
32, A94 p. At head of title: 93d Cong., 1st sess. [House] Committee [on Public
Works] print.

Discusses "the potential economic impacts of the evolving pollution con-
trol programs in the U.S. and abroad."
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development. Office of International Affairs.
Report on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Working Group on the Enhancement of the Urban
Environment, Second Joint Session. Washington [1974] 60 p.

"The topics discussed were: comprehensive planning and development,
construction in permafrost areas, solid waste management, noise abatement
and control, urban transportation, historic preservation [and] new com-
munities. At the instigation of the U.S. delegation, discussions also were
held on recreation zones [and] housing management."
U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. World Environmental Quality: a
Challenge to the International Community. [Washington, For sale bv the Supt.
of Docs., U.S. Govt. Priut. Off., 1973] 37 p. (U.S. Dept. of State. PubUcation
no. 8730)

Reviews international environmental cooperation in recent years, with
emphasis on U.S. participation.
United Nations. Environment Programme. The International Referral System
for Sources of Environmental Information (IRS): report by the executive director.
[New York] 1975. 6 p. (United Nations. [Document] UNEP/GC/31/Add. 3)
International environmental cooperation
United Nations Environment Programme. 1974 Report on the World Social
Situation; Part Two. Sectoral Developments; the Environment. [New York] 1974.
13 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/CN.. 5/512/ Add. 17) At head of title:
United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Notes some of the "public-service" functions of the global environment
and offers a selective review of environmental problems needing action far
in advance.
United Nations. Environment Programme. Governing Council. Review of the En-
vironmental Situation and of Activities Relating to the Environment Programme:
Report of the Executive Director. [New York] 1975. 67. (United Nations. [Docu-
ment] UNEP/GC/30)

Contains review of the priority subject area, "Land, Water and Deserti-
fication:" arid and semi-arid lands, soil loss, tropical forests and woodlands
water quality.
United Nations. Environment Programme. Governing Council. Review of the En-
vironmental Monitoring System; Report of the Executive Director. [New York]
1975. 17 p. (United Nations. [Document] UNEP/GC/31/Add. 2)
United Nations. Organization and Administration of Environmental Programmes.

New York, United Nations, 1974. E. 74.II.H.5.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Statistics of the Environment;
Report. [New York] 1974. 32 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/CN.3/452)
At the head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

"To meet the request of the seventeenth session of the Statistical Com-
mission, this paper sets forth a draft programme of international work in
the short and medium term on statistics of the environment."
Utton, Albert E. and Daniel H. Henning, eds. Environmental Policy: Concepts
and International Implications. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973. 267 p.
Among the articles with international impUcations are the following:
"International environmental management: some preliminary thoughts;"
"Environmental policy and international institutional arrangements: a
proposal for regional and global environmental protection agencies;" "The
changing structure of international policy: needs and alternatives;"
"Environmental policy as a world order problem;" "Global pollution and
human rights;" "National sovereignty in international environmental
decisions;" and "The development of international environmental law and
policy in Africa."

The book concentrates more on the political aspects of environmental
degredation than do many other books of this nature which concentrate more
on describing environmental problems.
Verquese, Dominique. "Europe and the Environment: Cooperation, a Distant
Prospect." Science, v. 178, Oct. 27, 1972: 381-383.

". . . The antipollution movement has been slow in gathering momentum,
and already the usual stumbling blocks to any common European policy
inhibit progress."

1991

Wallen, Carl C. "Global Atmospheric Monitoring." Environmental Science &
Technology, v. 9, Jan. 1975: 30-34.

"Maintaining a watch on the weather and other air pollutants is becoming
a worldwide concern."
Walter, Ingo. Environmental Management and thz International Economic Order.
New York, New York University, cl973. 85 p. (New York University. Center
for International Studies. Policy papers, v. 5, no. 3)
Walter, Ingo. "International p]nvironmental Policy and Economic Development:
the Issues Reconsidered." Working papers series, 73-55, October 1973. 23 p.
Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20217-P.
Warne, W. Robert. "The European Communitv's Environmental Program."
SAIS Review, v. 18, no. 3, 1974: 38-47.

". . . Describes the history and current activities of the European
Community in its environmental protection effort, providing a case study
of supranational attack on problems of the environment."
Wolff, Edward A. "The World Environment and Resources Council (WERC)."
The J ournal of Environmzntal Science, v. 16, March/April 1973: 14-25.

Describes the activities being undertaken around the world for the estab-
lishment of an international, nongovernmental interdisciplinary forum for
the exchange of information among technical specialists on the environment
and earth resources.
"World Environmental Qualitv. A Challenge to the International Communitv.
Dept. of State Publ. 8730. General Foreign Policy Series 280, October 1973. 39 p.

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

Aaronson, Terri. "UN Environment Agency Sent to Kenya." IVew Scientist,
Jan. 11, 1973:72-75.

"The United Nations decision to site its Environmental Secretariat in
Nairobi represents a victory for the Third World view that malnutrition,
poverty, disease have a higher priority than pollution. But the new U.N.
agency starts life with severe problems."
Dosa, Marta L. "A View of the International Environmental Information Prob-
lem." Special Libraries, v. 64, Oct. 1973: 457-463.

"Report on the United Nations Environment Programme Governing
Council and on the World Assembly of Non-Government Organizations
Concerned with the Global Environment, June 5-26, 1973."
Engfeldt, Lars-Goran. "The United Nations and the Humjjn Environment —
Some Experiences. "International Organization, v. 27, summer 1973: 393-412.
"... a non-technical summary of some experiences from the five years
which have passed since the Swedish government took its initiative to place
the problems of human environment on the agenda of the United Nations
for the first time."
Environmental Studies Board. Committee for International Environmental Pro-
grams. Institutional Arrangements Jar International Environmental Cooperatio7i;
a Report to the Department of State. Washington, National Academy of Sciences,
1972. 74 p.

In a report prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment,
recommends that the U.S. participate in international environmental pro-
grams and support new institutions and adapt old ones to better serve this
end.
Gardner, R. N. "Role of the U.N. in Environmental Problems." International

Organization, v. 26, Spring 1972: 238-254.
Joyner, Christopher C. and Nancy D. Joyner. "Global Eco-management and In-
ternational Organizations: the Stockholm Conference and Problems of Co-
operation." Natural Resources Journal, v. 14, Oct. 1974: 533-555.

". . . tobriefly analyze the nature of the environmental crisis, to evaluate

international machinery presently available for implementing restorative

action, and to point out conflicting world priorities that are hindering genuine

international environmental cooperation."

Langway, Lynn and Jerry Edgerton. "The U.S. at Stockholm." Nation, v. 15,

July 10, 1972: 7-11.

Argues that the State Dept. dominated the U.S. delegation at the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment to the extent that the environment
often came out second-best to U.S. foreign policj^ objectives.
McLin, Jon. "Stockholm: the Politics of 'Only One Earth.'" [Hanover, N.H.]
American Universities Field Staff [1972] 12 p. (American Universities Field
Staff. Fieldstaff reports, West Europe series, v. 7, no. 4 [Europe])
Summarizes the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.
Schacter, O. et al. "Post-Stockholm: Influencing National Environmental Law
and Practice Through International Law and Policy." American Journal
of International Law. Proceedings, v. 66, Sept. 1972: 1-14.
Tinker, Jon. "World Environment: What's Happening at UNEP?" New Scientist,
v. 66, June 12, 1975: 600-613.

Discusses the structure, function, and operation of UNEP, the United
Nations Environment Programme.
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. World Environment and Inter-
national Cooperation Committee. "What's Happened Since Stockholm?
International Environmental Action Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on the Human Environment." In Extension of remarks of Don Fraser. Con-
gressional Record [daily ed.j v. 120, Dec. 20, 1974: H12741-H12746.
Reviews the activities of the U.N. Environment Program.

^e>*

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1993

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The United Nations Environ'
ment Program Participation Act of 1973; Report to Accompany H.R. 6788.
[Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Ofif.,] 1973. 3 p. (93d Cong., 1st sess. House
Report no. 93-124.)

"The purpose of H.R. 6768 is to provide the congressional authorization
necessary for U.S. participation in the United Nations environment program,
including authorization to contribute funds to the United Nations Environ-
ment Fund."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Conference Report on
United Nations Environment Program. Report 93-642. 93d Cong., 1st sess.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements. International Cooperation in the
Human Environment Through the United Nations. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
on H.R. 13116. Mar. 15 and 16, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OflF.,
1972. 101 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements. Participation by the United Stales in
the United Nations Environment Program. Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess., on
H.R. 5697. Apr. 5 and 10, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 82 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Public Works. Report on the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment. 92d Cong., 2d sess., Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. OflF., 1972. 39 p. (Committee print.)

Summarizes United States activities in conference and non-conference
work and gives conclusions of the congressional group and the conference
itself. In summary the report notes: "The above criticisms tend to show if
anything, that, even though the Conference may not have generated a great
many substantive proposals by which nations will be bound, it was realistic
in its narrow scope and modest objectives. In the end there were no debili-
tating political stalemates though one seriously threatened. By avoiding more
difficult and dangerous issues the Conference was able to end on a positive
note rather than in turmoil. It did provide a focus for attention and promote
discussion of worldwide pollution measures. As it is increasingly being
demonstrated, the parts of the earth are complexly interdependent. World-
wide measures are needed. The Stockholm Conference hopefully will be the
start of that tj^pe of action and the basis and examples for all future conferences."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. 1972 Survey of Environmental
Activities of International Organizations. Prepared by the Environmental Policy
Division, Congressional Research Service, 92d Cong., 2d sess. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Ofif., 1972. 187 p. (Committee print.)

Prepared for the June 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environ-
ment. According to Sen. Warren G. Magnuson: "A great wealth of scientific
knowledge on the environment abounds in the organizations identified in this
study. Perhaps more importantly, the large number of organizations repre-
sented here, together with the environmental specializations shown for them
in the matrix presentation, demonstrates the need for the establishnient of
an information center from which policy makers at both the national and
international levels can formulate efifective programs to keep this planet
habitable."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.N. Conference on
Human Environment: Preparations and Prospects. Hearings, 92d Cong. 2d
sess. May 3-5, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Ofif., 1972. 163 p.

Hearings on U.S. preparations for the U.N. Conference on the Human

Environment, Stockholm, June 1972. Much discussion was given to the

prospects for future international environmental cooperation.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on

Oceans and International Environment. Participation by U.S. In United

Nations Environmental Program. Hearings, 93d Cong. 1st sess. Apr. 16, 1973.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OflF., 1973. 26 p.

Hearings on bills to provide for U.S. participation in the UN Environment

program.

U.S. Department of State. U.S. National Report on the Human Environment.

Prepared for United Nations Conference on Human Environment, June 1972,

Stockholm, Sweden. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt.

Print. OflF., 1971] 53 p. (U.S. Dept. of State. Publication 8588).

1994

In preparation for the U.N. Conference on Human Environment, June
1972, Stockholm, Sweden, the United Nations member countries were re-
quested to prepare national reports describing their environmental problems
and discussing actions being taken to resolve them. This document is the
U.S. response to that request.
United Nations. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972.
Report. New York, United Nations, 1973. 77 p. (United Nations. [Document]
A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1) "United Nations publication. Sales no. E. 73.II.A.14."
United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social affairs. Organization and Admin-
istration of Environmental Programmes. New York, United Nations, 1974.
187 p. (United Nations. [Document] ST/ESA/16)

"The substance of the papers concerns those aspects of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment having special relevance for the or-
ganization and management of government."
Wilson, Thomas W., Jr. "Creating Mechanisms for International Environmental
Action: Requirements and Response." Stanford Journal of International
Studies, V. 8, spring 1973: 113-122.

This comment examines the possible effectiveness of the U.N.'s "action
plan" for the environment.

ISSUES OF FOOD AND POPULATION

Allen, James E. and Lynda P. Cole "Birth/Death Control: the Social Implications
of Using Half a Technology. Technology Assessjnent, v. 2, Oct. 1974: 235-239.
"By failing to introduce similarly effective birth control technologies, we
have placed many countries in the position of having to deal with staggering
growth rates and the chaotic economic and social problems caused by such
growth."
Bahr^ Howard M., Bruce A. Chadwick, and Darwin L. Thomas, eds. Population,
Resources, and the Future: N^on-Mallhusian Perspectives. Utah, Brigham Young
University Press, 1972. 352 p.
Berelson, Bernard, ed. Population Policy in Developed Countries. New York,
McGraw Hill, Inc., 1974. 793 p.
A Population Council book.
Berg, Alan, et al. The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in National Development. Wash-
ington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1973. 290 p.

The study was prepared under the auspices of the Brookings Institution
and the Foundation for Child Development. "The discussion, . . . covers
issues ranging widelj' from technology to the politics of nutrition. . . .
Chapters [deal] with malnutrition and development, nutrition and the popu-
lation dilemma, agricultural advances, problems in education . . ., infant
feeding practices . . . fortification of foods . . ., the potential contri-
butions of private industry, and public programs, lessons from the Indian
experiment, and a broad discussion of policy directions and program needs.
. . . The link between American domestic needs and foreign policy ap-
proaches to food distribution is very briefly but incisively explored. . . ."
With respect to implementation of successful nutrition efforts, "Berg exr
plores whether to fix administrative responsibility for nutrition programs on
an interministerial council, on an existing ministry, or on a separate agencj',
and tends to favor a separate agency. Councils, he says, have proven to be
ineffective" ; and an existing ministry, where nutrition programs may be under
the control of vested interests "is unlikely either to give support or to have
the breadth necessary for an effective nutrition program."
Brown, Lester R. hi the Human Interest. New York, W. W. Norton & Co. 1974.
190 p.

Discusses the problems arising from population growth on a finite planet.
Brown, Lester R. and Erik P. Eckholm. By Bread Alone. New York, Praeger,
1974. 272 p.

Explains how the spiraling rate of population growth plus increasing

affluence is creating a demand for food that is straining the world's production

capabilities. Calls for action now through population control and a change in

diet of affluent minorit}'.

Choucri, Nazli. Population Dynamics and International Violence: Propositions,

Insights, and Evidence. Lexington, Lexington Books, 1974. 281 p.

"A neglected side of the population problem and its political dynamism
is here examined rigorously and comprehensively. Interesting, suggestive,
but inevitably not altogether conclusive."
Cottam, Grant. The World Food Conference. [Hanover, N.H.] American Uni-
versities Field Staff, 1974. 10 p. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff
reports. West Europe series, v. 9, no. 5 [General])

"The World Food Conference's role in alleviating the imbalance between

population growth and food production must be judged by follow-up action."

Council for Agricultural Science and Technology. The Impact of an International

Food Bank; a Report by a Task Force. [Ames, Iowa] 1973. 16 p.
Delville, Robert. "A Food Law for the Future." Food, Drug, Cosmetic Law
Journal, v. 28, May 1973: 351-358.

Argues for international standardization in basic principles of food
regulation.

"O"-

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96-243 O - T"? - •J?

1996

Eckholm, Erik P. Fertilizer Scarcity and the Food Outlook. [Washington] Overseas
Development Council [1974.] 8 p. (Overseas Development Council. Commu-
nique on development issues, no. 26)

"The emergence in the mid-seventies of a global fertiUzer shortage is
clouding an already difficult world food outlook, and forcing close scrutiny
of global distribution and investment patterns in this key industry."
Food Science in Developing Countries: a Selection of Unsolved Problems. Compiled
by the Advisory Committee on Technology Innovation of the Board of Science
and Technology for International Development, Commission on International
Relations. National Research Council. Washington, D.C., National Academy
of Sciences, 1974. 79 p.
Grant, James P. "Food, Fertilizer, and the New Global Politics of Resource
Scarcity. In "Adjusting to Scarcity." Philadelphia, American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1975. (Annals, v. 420, July 1975) p. 11-30.

"Examines how the United States in its role as global food manager
contributed significantly through its actions in 1973 and much of 1974 to
the crises of themid-1970's which brought to the world double-digit inflation,
massive recession, and innumerable premature deaths, and how the World
Food Conference marked a sharp turn in United States — and world — policy
toward seeking a positive-sum game approach to the food and fertilizer
problems — -an approach by which all principal parties might gain."
Green, Stephen K. United States Agricultural Policy and World Food Production.
Discussion Paper No. 3, C/75-12, April 1975. Center for International Studies,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 163 p. Available from the State Dept.
as FAR 22020-P.
Gurr, Ted R. and Herman Weil. Population Growth and Political Conflict: a Cor-
relatiotial Study of 84 Nations. Report supported by the National Science
Foundation, Guggenheim Foundation and INR/XR, U.S. Dept. of State,
July 1973. 35 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 19451-G.
Humphrey, Hubert H. Hunger and Diplomacy: a Perspective on the U.S. Role
at the World Food Conference. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 169 p.
At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
Johnson, D. Gale. World Agriculture in Disarry. New York, St. Martin's Press,
1973. 304 p.

"A leading American expert digs deeply into the national farm policies

of the industrial countries to show their costs, effects and contradictions. His

proposals for national and international measures to improve trade and

production deal with the long-run conditions rather than current fears of

global shortage." (1)

Johnson, D. Gale and John A. Schnittker, eds. U.S. Agriculture in a World Context:

Policies and Approaches for the Next Decade. New York, Praeger (for the

Atlantic Council of the U.S.) 1974. 260 p.

"The policies of other countries as well as the United States are examined,

and then the editors . . . conclude with a set of proposals for international

agreements that would make for the better ordering of world agriculture." (1)

Klatt, W. "Asia After the World Food Conference." International Affairs, v.

51, no. 3, July 1975: 344-357.

The author notes that "Whilst the Rome conference dealt at length with
the technical, organizational and financial side of the business in hand it
paid only scant attention to the institutional aspects of the world food
problem." Institutional reforms are needed to cope with the food/population
crisis; these are detailed with respect to the situation in Asia.
Lee, Everett S. "Population and Scarcitj^ of Food." Ajinals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science, v. 420, July 1975: 1-10. (Research funded
by the RANN Program, National Science Foundation.)

"The world's population is growing at a rate which cannot be sustained.
Rapid growth, however, is seldom found outside developing countries, while
developed countries are close to zero population growth. Since World War
II there have been impressive gains in agricultural productivity in developed
countries, but in imderdeveloped countries there has been little or no im-
provement in per capita production. Western methods of agriculture, though
highly productive in yield per acre or yield per man-hour, are so extravagant
in the use of energy that these methods are not transferable. Agricultural
methods which are sparing in the use of energy must be developed for all
countries, but particularly for undeveloped countries. Still, no foreseeable

1997

improvements in agricultaral production will permit long term growth of
population in underdeveloped countries. The time remaining to niake the
necessary adjustments between population and natural resources is short,
and there is no time for social and economic developments to bring down
the birth rate in developing countries in the gradual fashion of developed
countries." .

McLin, Jon. "Western Europe and the World Food Problem." American Uni-
versities Field Staff, Inc. West Europe Series, IX, 6 (General), January 1975.
16 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 21832-P.
Nanda, Ved P. "The Role of International Law and Institutions Toward Devel-
oping a Global Plan of Action on Population." Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy, v. 3, spring 1973: 1-44.

This article reviews the population problem in terms of "(a) food and
nutrition; (b) resources, energy, and environment; (c) economic and social
aspects; and (d) global fertility trends and family planning programs."
National Academy of Sciences. In Search of Population Policy: Views From the
Developing World. Washington, D.C., 1974. 108 p.

A report on five regional seminars conducted in 1973 by the Office of the
Foreign Secretary, Commission on International Relations, National Acad-
emy of Science-National Research Council and co-sponsoring institutions in
developing countries.
National Academy of Sciences. Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and
Policy Implications. Prepared by a study committee of the Office of the Foreign
Secretarj^, National Academy of Sciences with the support of the Agency for
International Development. Baltimore, Md., and London, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971. Vol. I, summary and recommendations, 105 p. Vol. II, research
papers, 690 p.
Nau, Henry R. "Interpreting U.S. Foreign PoHcy on Food and Energy." Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science, New York City, January 1975. 21 p. Available from the
State Dept. as FAR 21314-P.
North, Robert C. and Nazli C. Choucri "Population and the International
System: Some Implications for United States Policy and Planning." In Nash,
A. E. Kier, ed. Governance and Population: the Governmental Implications of
Population Change. [Washington, U.S. Commission on Population Growth and
the American Future, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1973] pp. 251-278.

Presents a partial theory linking population growth, advances in tech-
nology and availability of resources with considerations of domestic and
international politics.
Partan, Daniel G. Population in the United Nations System: Developing the Legal
Capacity and Programs of U.N. Agencies. Durham, North Carolina, Ru-3 of
Law Press, 1973. 219 p.
Piotrow, Phyllis Tilson. World Population Crisis: The United States Response.
New York, Praeger, 1973. 276 p.

Focuses in detail on the various steps by which government policy toward
birth control was reversed.
Poleman, Thomas T. and Donald K. Freebairn, eds. Food, Population, and Em-
ployment— the Impact of the Green Revolution. New York, Praeger, 1973. 272 p.
Scali, John. "The Link Between Population and Other Global Issues." Dept. of
State Bulletin, v. 17, Mar. 24, 1975: 392-396.

Discusses the link between food and population issues, urging LDCs to
focus on the measures necessary to keep populations and food resources in a
favorable balance.
Steinhart, John S. "Food and Energy as Policy Determinants: More Questions
Than Answers." Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the American
Association of the Advancement of Science, New York, Jan. 1975. 20 p. Avail-
able from the State Dept. as FAR 21576-P.
Symonds, Raymond and Michael Carder. United Nations and the Population

Question, New York, McGraw Hill, Inc., 1973.
Teitelbaum, Michael S. "Population and Development: is a Consensus Possible?"
Foreign Affairs, v. 52. no. 4, July 1974: 742-760.

Concludes with recommendations for population policies based on con-
sensus positions which account for the following positions: "population-
programs-plus-development; accommodationist, pro-natalist; holistic de-
velopment; social justice; provision of services; and human rights."

1998

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Political Research. Poienlial Implica-
tions of Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate. [Washington]
1974. 42, [9] p. (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Political Research.
OPR-401)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture. Subcommittee on Department
Operations. World Population and Food Supply and Demand Situation. Hearings,
93d Cong., 2d sess., July 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 188 p.
"Hearings ... to examine problems and policy questions associated
with the world population and food supply and demand situation." Includes
testimony of public and private witnesses. (3)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 1. World Food Conference. 3.
European Security Situation. Report of the Special Mission to Europe, Nov.
6-17, 1974. 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, 16 p.
Examines aspects of the European security situation, particularly the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna; and reviews
issues relating to N.\TO and European security, food conference proceedings
and recommendations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the East-
West Trade Center, the Austrian transit facility for emigration, and the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. International Food Reserves:
Background and Current Proposals. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements by the Foreign Affairs and Environ-
m.ental Policv Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress. 93d Cong., 2d sess., Oct 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1974. 138 p. At head of title: committee print.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa
and Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. World
Food Security: A Global Priority. Hearings. 93d Cong., 2d sess., July 1973.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 109 p.

"Hearings ... on the capacity of the international community and its
organizations to insure food stocks in time of serious shortage." (3)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report on the World Food
Conference. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Nov. 26, 1974. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1974.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements and Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policv. U.S. Policy and World Food Needs. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Sept.
1974.' Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 163 p.

"Hearings ... to examine current world famine problems and the future

outlook for global food needs and availabilities." Relates specifically to more

equitable worldwide fertilizer distribution.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Famine Prevention

and Freedom From Hunger. Aug. 15, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 39 p. (Committee print.)

"Excerpts from the committee report on 'H.R. 9005, the International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, which focuses on the impact
of section 311 of the bill to add to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 a new
section XII entitled Famine Prevention and Freedom from Hunger. It in-
cludes an analysis of AID progress with development and technical assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act." (3)
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Report on the World
Food Conference. Official Report of the United States Delegation to the World
Food Conference, Rome, Italy, November 5-16, 1974. Hearings. Washington,
U.S. (iovt. Print. Off., 1974. 69 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Hunger and
Diplomaci/: A Perspective on the U.S. Role at the World Food Conference. 94th
Cong., 1st sess. Feb. 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 169 p.
Committee print.

Contains report for the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricviltural Policy on

preparations for work of the World Food Conference, held in Rome, Nov. 5-16,

1975.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Subcommittee

on Agricultural Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices. U.S. and

World Food Security. 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1974. 71p. (Committee print.)

Contains papers dealing with world food and fiber reserves.

1999

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Subcommittee
on Foreign Agricultural Policy. Implementation of World Food Conference
Recommendations. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. May 1, 197.5. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Ofif., 1975. 95 p.

Food — Conferences/Food supply/ Agricultural assistance/International
agricultural cooperation/Food relief/ World Food Conference, Rome, 1974.
U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Subcommittee
on Foreign Agricultural Policy. World Food Conference: Selected Materials for
the Use of the U.S. Congressional Delegation to the World Food Conference, Rome,
Italy, Nov. 5-16, 1974. 93d Cong. 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1974. 377 p. (Committee print.)

"Compilation contains two U.N. Secretarial documents together with

related documents from other sources.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on South

Asian Affairs and the Subcommittee on African Affairs. World Food Grain

Situation. Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1973. 94 p.

"Hearings ... to consider the world food situation and possible U.S.
measures to guide and assist in food supply emergencies. Witnesses focus
chiefly on food crises in Bangladesh, the African drought area, and Pakistan.
Witnesses also review recent U.S. foreign food aid under P.L. 480, and con-
tributions made to food programs sponsored by the Food and Agriculture
Organization and the U.N." (3)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Refugees
and Escapees and Subcommittee on Health, Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. World Hunger, Health, and Refugee Problems. Part 2: Food
Scarcity, Nutrition and Health. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Oct. 1973. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 370 p.

"Continuation of hearings ... on the relationship between world hunger
and health problems. This volume examines the extent of world food scarci-
ties, nutritional needs and associated health problems. Includes text of S. Con.
Res. 50, to express the sense of the Congress favoring a world food conference
and U.S. participation. Appendixes contain submitted statements, articles,
U.N. materials on international agriculture and food supplies." (3)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Refugees
and Escapees and Subcommittee on Health, Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare. World Hunger, Health and Refugee Problems. Part 3: Development
and Food Needs. Hearing, 93d Cong., 1st sess, Oct. 1973. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 152 p.

Examines the impact of food scarcities on developing countries.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Nutrition and Humaii Needs.
National Nutrition Policy: Nutrition and the International Situation — III.
Report on Rome: the Challenge of Food and Population. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., December 1974. 283 p.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Increasing World Food Supplies — Crisis and
Challenge, Department of State and other agencies; report to the Congress by
the Comptroller General of the United States. [Washington] 1974. 72 p.
B-159652, Sept. 6, 1974.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Assistance to Family Planning Programs in
Southeast Asia, Agency for International Development; report to the Congress
bv the Comptroller General of the United States. [Washington] 1973. 53 p.
B-173240, May 23, 1973.
U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Technical Assistance to Support Indian
Agricultural Development, Agency for International Development, Department
of State; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United
States. [Washington] 1972. 60 p. B-1618.54, June 22, 1972.
United Nations. Concise Report on the World Population Situation in 1970-1975
and its Long-range Implications: Summary and Conclusions Presented to the
Economic and Social Council in accordance with its Decision of 8 August 1968.
[New York, United Nations] 1975. 12 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5624.).
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force.
World Programme of Development Research and Application of Science and
Technology to Solve the Special Problems of the Arid Areas; Obstacles to Devel-
opment of Arid and Semi-arid Zones. [New York] 1975. 34 p. (United Nations
[Document] E/C.8/WG.1/3).

2000

Reviews obstacles to development in arid and semi-arid lands. Points
out that the development of stable agriculture — whether by grazing or by-
irrigation — is far more complex than had been thought.
United Nations. General Discussion of International Economic and Social Policy,
Including Regional and Sectoral Developments; World Economic Survey, 1974 —
part two; Current Economic Devslopments. [New York] United Nations, 1975.
4 V. (United Nations. [Document] E/5681). At head of title: United Nations
Economic and Social Council.

Contents. — World production. — World trade and payments. — Internal
balance. — Outlook. Industrial production/Agricultural production/Inter-
national trade/Economic conditions/Energy consumption/Petroleum.
United Nations. Population Studies. No. 56. Concise Report on the World Popula-
tion Situation in 1970-1976 and Its Long-Range Implications. New York,
United Nations, 1974. E. 74.XIII.4.
United Nations. "Report of the World Food Conference, Rome, 5-16, November

1974. New York, United Nations, 1975. 64 p. (75. II. A.3.).
World Food Conference, Rome, 1974. Report. New York, United Nations, 1975.
64 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/CONF. 65/20) "United Nations publica-
tion. Sales no. 75.II.A.3."

Food — Conferences/Food supply/Food relief/Agriculture — [Developing

countriesj/lnternational agricultural cooperation/Agricultural assistance/

Hunger/World Food Conference, Rome, 1974.

"World Food Resources; a Symposium, pt. 1." Current History, v. 68, June 1975:

whole issue. Seven articles explore population pressures and food resources

across the world in the first of a two-issue symposium on world resources.

Contents. — -Food and food policy in the industrial nations, by V. Sorenson
and L. Hamm. — The Soviet gram shortage, by D. Johnson. — The Asian
dilemma by I. Prybyla. — The land-population balance in Latin America, by
N. Sanchez-Albornoz. — Food and population in Africa, by D. Heisel. —
World population and food needs tomorrow, by T. Dow, Jr. — The world
food problem: possibilities of international action by F. Sanderson. —
Readings on food and energy.
Wriggins, W. Howard and James F. Buyot, ed. Population, Politics, and the
Future of Southern Asia. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974. 402 p.
A collection of papers given at a conference on Population, the Human
Condition and Politics in Southern Asia, November 1971, at the Southern
Asian Institute, Columbia University. The papers deal with the basic demo-
graphic changes, processes and effects of urbanization, and the particular
problems and opportunities resulting from the increased numbers of youth
in the population of the area.

GLOBAL HEALTH

"Aspects of International Health Work in 1974." WHO Chronicle, v. 29, no. 7,

July 1975: 264-282.
Belmont, Rose. "Twenty-five Years of World Health Organization Action."
War on Hunger, v. 7, August 1973: 6-10.

Reviews WHO action in the field of medicine and health for the last
twenty-five years.
Fry, John and W. A. J. Farndale, eds. International Medical Care: a Comparison
and Evaluation of Medical Care Services Throughout the World. Wallingford,
Pennsylvania, Washington Square East, Publishers, 1972. 341 p.

Attempts to define some of the problems in the provision of medical care
and to examine how some nations are trying to find solutions. Includes
~ sections on international trends; and care in Europe, the United Kingdom,
the United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R., AustraUa, the developing nations,
and the world medical association. A variety of functional topics are also
discussed.
Jus, Andrzej. "Social Systems and the Criteria of Health as Defined by WHO."

American Journal of Psychiatry, v. 130, Feb. 1973: 125-131.
Kaplan, Martin. "Science's Role in the World Health Organization." Science,
v. 180, June 8, 1973: 1028-32.

Methods for amplifying the effects of scientific resources on global health
problems are described. Especially emphasizes five areas of needed cooperative
research: development of a worldwide health information network; parasitic
diseases, the biology of human reproduction, toxic chemicals, and improved
technological diagnostic aids.
Kim, Joungwon Alex and Carol Campbell Kim. "The Divided Nations in the
International System." World Politics, v. 25, July 1973: 479-507.

Deals, in part, with activities of the World Health Organization.
Mahler, H. "Further Thoughts on WHO's Mission." WHO Chronicle, v. 29, no.

7, July 1975: 253-256.
Mahler, H. "Health Strategies in a Changing World." WHO Chronicle, v. 29,
June 1975: 209-218.

"Gives a broad survey of health priorities in the world today and outlines
some of the new approaches that have emerged in the field of international
public health."
Martin, Johns. "The WHO: 1948-1973." Intellect, v. 1028, Nov. 1973: 120-121.
Murray, Robert. "Transatlantic Occupational Health." Journal of Occupational
Medicine. Vol. 17, no. 4, April 1975: 225-230.

In this Sappington lecture for 1974, the author, a physician, gives historical
perspective to U.S. and British experiences in developing occupational
health programs and describes the role of international organizations. Trans-
atlantic cooperation has helped in stimulating programs to benefit workers,
but far more programs are needed and they must be supported by better
scientific understanding and research.
"Oh, New Delhi, Oh, Geneva." Nature, v. 256, July 31, 1975: 355-357.

Describes the controversy surrounding the Research United On Genetic
Control of Mosquitos, New Delhi, which was accused by India of being a
front for U.S. biological warfare experiments. The World Health Organiza-
tion withdrew from the organization after continued criticism.
National Heart and Lung Institute. Public Inquiries and Reports Branch. The
United States-Union, of Soviet Socialist Republics Joint Program in Cardio-
vascular Diseases. [Washington] U.S. National Institutes of Health [1975?]
28 p. (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. DHEW publication no.
(NIH) 75-726).
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements. U.S. Support for the South Pacific
Commission and the 1 7iter national Agency for Research on Cancer. Hearing,
92d Cong., 2d sess., on H. Res. 1211 and H.J. Res. 1257. July 20, 1972.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 34 p.

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2002

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International Agency
for Research on Cancer. Sen. Rept. 92-1113. 92d Cong. 2d sess. Sept. 13, 1972.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 13 p.

Report which recommends passage with some amendments to a bill to
authorize appropriations for annual U.S. contributions to support the
International Agency for Research on Cancer.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Special Sub-
committee on International Health, Education, and Labor Programs. Inter-
national Health Programs, 1972. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess., on S. 3023,
June 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 185 p.

Deals with health needs and resources of the developing countries. The
bill addresses creation of an International Health Agency to coordinate
fragmented efforts to provide health care through organizations such as
AID, WHO, and other private and voluntary groups.
U.S. Dept. of State. The Uyiited States-Japan Cooperative Medical Science Pro-
gram: Five Year Report, 1965-1970. Washington [for sale by the Supt. of Docs.,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] 148 p. (U.S. Dept. of State. Publication 8598).
Areas of study included cholera, leprosy, malnutrition, filariasis, schisto-
somiasis, tuberculosis and viral diseases. Includes bibliographies.
Venediktov, D. D. Initial Results of Cooperation in Health and Medical Re-
search." USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 9, Sept. 1973: 16-2G.
Cooperation in Soviet- American health programs.
Wallen, O. "Pharmaceutical Reference Standards." WHO Chronicle, v. 26, Sept.
1972: 389-393.

Reviews the development of a few national reference standard programs
and gives an account of WHO activities in this area.
"WHO: How It is Making Public Health a Global Cause." Hospital Practice,

v. 8, September 1973: 203-211; 214-215; 218.
World Bank Group. Health; Sector Policy Paper. Washington, 1975. 83 p.

Includes topics dealing with: health in developing countries; causes of

poor health; approaches to health policy; health policy for the future; and

World Bank funding for health related projects.

World Health Organization. Evaluation of Food Additives, Fifteenth Report of

Joint FAO/WHO Experts. Technical Report. Series No. 488 (FAO/UN report

no. 50.)

Assesses food additives in babj' foods and other issues relating to food
additives.
World Health 'Organization. Human Development and Public Health. Report of a

WHO Science Group. Geneva, 1972. 40 p. (Technical Report 485.)
World Health Organization. International Drug Monitoring. The Role of National
Centers. Report of a WHO Meeting. Geneva, 1972. 47 p. (WHO Tech. Report
498.)
World Health Organization. "Occupational Health Programs." WHO Chronicle,
v. 26, Dec. 1972: 537-546.

Based on a report presented by the Director General of the World Health
Organization to the 25th World Health Assembly.
World Health Organization. Implications of Individual and Small Group Learning
Systems in Medical Education. Report of WHO Study Group. Geneva, 1972.
29 p. (World Health Organization Technical Report 489.)

Assesses how the WHO can assist in developing learning materials and
disseminating them.
World Health Organization. "National Drug Policies." WHO Chronicle, v. 29,
Sept. 1975: 337-349.

Addresses questions of drug problems «nd policies; pleads for national
government to establish drug policies to handle questions of safety and
efficacy.
World Health Organization. Research on the Biomedical Aspects of Fertility Regu-
lation and on the Operational Aspects of Family Planning Programmes. New York,
United Nations, 1974. 29 p. (E/CONF.60/CBP/22.)

Deals with the WHO role in the world population conference.
World Health Organization. Reviews of Family Planning Aspects of Family Health,
With Special Reference to UNICEF/World Health Organization Assistance.
New York, United Nations, 1972. 40 p. (E/ICEP/L. (218).)

Reviews the joint activities of the World Health Organization and UNICEF
regarding development of common health policies.
World Health Organization. World Social Situation, 1974- Report. New York,
United Nations, 1974. 16 p. (E/CN.5/512/Add. 12.) UNESCO.

This is part 2, which addresses sectoral development in public health.

NATURAL RESOURCES
A. Minerals and Raw Materials

Canfield, Monte E., Jr. and John R. Hadd. "Government Response to Commodity
Shortages." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
V. 420, July 1975: 60-71.

"The federal government was ill-prepared to deal with the fuel, food and
nonenergy materials "shortages" experienced in the early 1970s. Future
shortages may well be anticipated, due not only to depletion of available
stocks, but also perhaps to economic (pricing), political (supply disruption),
and limited production capacity factors. Annually, the United States is
becoming more dependent upon foreign sources of supply. As the international
scene has become more volatile and unstable, thereby increasing the vul-
nerability of foreign supply sources, overall domestic exploration has declined.
New planning mechanisms are required if governmental capability to forecast
and deal with either gradual or abrupt changes in supply or price is to be
achieved. Alternative futures analysis is seen as a useful tool in the creation
and implementation of a viable nonenergy materials policy."
Dinsmore, John II., Raw Materials: Crisis for the 70's (an annotated bibliography
of selected U.S. Government publications concerning the national and inter-
national raw materials situation). Monticello, 111., 1975. 16 p. (Council of
Planning Librarians. Exchange bibliography 879).
Fox, William. Tin: The Working of a Commodity Agreement. London, Mining
Journal Books, 1974. 418 p.

"With commodity problems on people's minds, this valuable book —
probably the only account of a commodity agreement by one who played a
key part in administering it for many years — has great current interest.
While discreet, Mr. Fox is quite frank about mistakes and conflicts of views
and restrained in his assessment of the buffer stocks, export controls and
other devices of the tin agreements. Some of the most interesting passages
concern the Soviet Union's sales of Chinese tin in the 19503 and the Tin
Council's relations — sometimes cooperative and sometimes adversative with
that large outsider with the stockpile, the United States." (1)
Howe, James W. Interdependence and the World Economy. [New York, Foreign
Policv Association, 1974] 63 p. (Headline series. No. 222)

Contents: A New Era; Major Factors; Institutional Problems, Now
. Global Problems, The Need for International Cooperation, and Politics Tor
the United States.

Deals especially with raw materials.

"International Aspects of Materials Policy." Chap. 9 In U.S. Congress. Material

Needs and the Environment: Today and Tomorrow: Final Report of the National

■ Commission on Materials Policy. In compliance with section 201 of Title II

of Public Law 91-512. Jime 1973. 93d Cong., 2d sess. Senate document no.

93-97. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, various parts.

The substance of this chapter indicates, in part, that "The forces of the
marketplace, subject to considerations of public policy, have historically
served the Nation well in providing sufficient supplies of materials at reason-
able prices. Market forces must thus continue to be the prime determinant
of the mix of domestic production and imports. The role of public policy as
caretaker of the national interest, however, must be enlarged. In analyzing
the circumstances of any material, considerations of the health and viability
of domestic industry, national security, and fair international competition
must all enter into the determination of when to rely upon the market and
when to modify its operation. In this context, energy materials (particularly
petroleum and natural gas) deserve special attention."
Kissinger, Henry A. "U.N. Session on Raw Materials and Economic Develop-
ment." In Remarks of Hubert H. Humphrey. Coiigressional Record [daily ed.]
v. 120, Apr. 23, 1974: S6103-S6105.

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Reproduces Secretary Kissinger's address to the Apr. 15, 1974, session of
the U.N. special session on raw materials.
Mikesell, Raymond F. "Nonfuel Minerals: U.S. Investment Policies Abroad."
The Washington Papers, vol. Ill, no. 23, Sage Publications, 1975. 95 p. Available
from the State Dept. as FAR 22401-P.
Rogers, Joseph B. "A Decade of International Cooperation." Soil Conservation,
V. 38, Aug. 1972: 3-6, 14-15.

For 10 years the Soil Conservation Service has been sharing its knowledge

of soil and water conservation with foreign countries. Summarizes this

decade of international aid in conservation.

Smith, David N. and Louis T. Wells, Jr. "Mineral Agreements in Developing

Countries; Structures and Substance." American Journal of International Law,

v. 69, July 1975: 560-590.

Mineral production in most developing countries is still carried out through
contractual arrangements between foreign firms and host country govern-
ments. The article explores some of the recent innovations in the structure
of agreements.
Takeuchi, Kenji and Pension Varon. "Commodity Shortages and Changes in
World Trade." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
v. 420, July 1975: 46-59.

"The healthy expansion of trade relations experienced throughout the
postwar era has recently been interrupted. During the 1973-74 economic boom,
there were widespread shortages of commodities. As the world economy has
plunged into a deep recession, most of the commodity shortages have dis-
appeared. Looking ahead for the next 10 years or so, when the world economy
returns to a path of normal growth, are we likely to see widespread chronic
commodity shortages? An analysis of prospective market conditions leads us
to conclude: (1) that we are not on the threshold of an era of chronic and
widespread commodity shortages; (2) that, indeed, the trade picture that
• em.erges is not favorable for developing countries; (3) that the absence of
global shortages in most primary commodities in the coming decade points
up the soundness of interdependence through trade; and (4) that while
trade has not so far benefited all participants equitably — and this situation
should be corrected in the future — trade should not be strained to the point
of breakdown by treating it as the only means for correcting all the inequities
among nations."
Theberge, James D. "A Mineral Raw Materials Action Fiogram." Foreign Policy,
no. 17, winter 1974-1975: 75-79.

Recommends that the United States establish new structures to deal
with the threat of mineral raw materials collusion from Third World pro-
ducers.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Subcommittee
on Agricultural Credit and Rural Electrification and Subcommittee on Foreign
Agricultural Policy. U.S. and Woi-ld Fertilizer Outlook. 93d Cong. 2d sess. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 205 p. (Committee print.)

Compilation of two studies and other materials dealing with fertilizer
stocks and impacts on trade and agriculture.
U.S. Council on International Economic Policy. Special Report: Critical Imported
Materials. December 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 49 p.
plus appendix 61 p.

Prepared by an interagency task force under the direction of the CIEP

and the National Security Council, in response to a Presidential directive

to identify and assess potential threats to supplies of critical raw materials.

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Problems of Availability and

Supply of Natural Resources: Medium-term and Long-term Projections of

Reserves, Supply and Demand of Energy, Mineral and Water Resources: Progress

Report. [Now York] 1975. 14 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.7/52/Add. 1.)

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Problems of Availability and

Supply of Natural Resources: Survey of Current Problems in the Fields of

Energy and Minerals, Oveiview of the World Emrgy Situation: Report. [New York]

1975. 20 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.7/50) At head of title: United

Nations Economic and Social Council.

Partial contents. — The petroleum exporting developing countries. — The
special situation of the oil-importing developing countries.

2005

United Nations. Secretary- General (Wi^ldheim). Projections of Natural Re-
sources Reserves, Supply and Future Demand. [New York] 1973. 4 v. (United
Nations. [Document] E/C.7/40) At head of title: United Nations Economic and
Social Council.

"Consists of an introduction, and three parts issued as addenda, dealing
respectively with energy, mineral and water resources."
Varon, Bension and Kenji Takeuchi. "Developing Countries and Non-fuel
Minerals." Foreign Affairs, v. 52, no. 3, April 1974: 497-510.

Analysis of possibilities of developing producer's alliances modeled on
OPEC for non-fuel minerals, bauxite, and phosphate rock.
Woodbury, Wendell W. "The U.S., Japan, and Latin America's Mineral Re-
sources." Case study prepared for the Sixteenth Session of the Senior Seminar
in Foreign PoUcv, U.S. Dept. of State, 1973-1974: 14 p. Available from the
State Dept. as FAR 19855-S.

B. General Issues

Barraclough, Geoffrey. "Wealth and Power: the Politics of Food and Oil." New
York Review of Books, v. 22, Aug. 7, 1975: 23-30.

Essay on the role of food and oil in economic relations between the devel-
oped countries, led by the U.S., and the developing countries.
Bergsten, C. Fred. "The Threat From the Third World." Foreign Policy, no.
11, summer 1973: 102-124.

Assesses U.S. policies toward the "third world," with rich raw materials
in light of objectives of "third world nations." •

Brown, Lester R. The Global Politics of Resource Scarcity. [Washington, Overseas
Development Council] 1974. 48 p. (Overseas Development Council. Develop-
ment paper 17.)

Briefly notes factors contributing to the shortage of several key

resources — water, oceanic fisheries, waste absorptive capacity, energy,

minerals, food, fertilizer, timber — and examines the effects of global resource

scarcity on the economic and political relationships among countries.

Brown, Lester. "Rich Countries and Poor in a Finite, Interdependent World,"

Daedalus, v. 102, fall 1973: 153-164.

Examines briefly 3 of the resources on which global economic activity
depends: fresh water, oceanic protein, and waste absorptive capacity. Now
the expansion of economic activity is pressing against the Hmits of the Earth's
resources. The problem of how those resources which are in limited supply
are divided among countries is becoming a critical international political
issue.
Connelly, Philip and Robert Perlman. The Politics of Scarcity: Resource Conflicts
In International Relations. London. Published for the Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs b}^ Oxford University Press, 1975. 162 p.

Assesses ". . . the international imphcations of recent changes in the
ownership, supply, cost, and consumption of the world's natural resources."
The book includes a survey of the physical and economic background to the
resources problem. "The main focus, however, is upon the often contentious
policy choices now faced, individually or in concert, by particular groups of
countries; those with surplus resources to export, those which are self-
suflScient, and those . . . which must depend on others for their vital
raw materials. . . . [The authors] are clear in their view that neither
economic hardship nor international conflict will be avoided in the future
unless efficient national management is combined with the co-operative
international exercise of a coherent political will by the producers and con-
sumers of resources alike."
Cooper, R. N. "Natural Resources and National Security." Resources Policy, v.
1, June 1975: 192-203.

Believes that "the problem of resource scarcity is not so serious as has

often been supposed lately . . . and there are relatively conventional

means to increase our capacity to deal with possible short-run scarcities."

Gillette, Robert. "Endangered Species: Moving Toward a Cease-fire." Science,

V. 179, March 16, 1973: 1107-1109.

"The agreement formally initiated by the United States and 79 other
nations on 2 March (eight delegations were not empowered to sign) estab-

2006

lishes a worldwide system of export and import permits designed to ban all

commercial trade in 375 species or genera judged to be on the verge of

extinction."

Guttenberg, Albert Z. and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. "Transnational Land Use:

Toward a Conceptual Framework and Taxonomy of Issues." Land Economics,

V. 50, Feb. 1974: 3-14.

"This exploratory paper reports on the results of one phase of a project

in international planning research conducted cooperatively by the authors

at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign and at the University of

Michigan at Ann Arbor. It is intended as a first step in the direction of a

conceptual framework for transnational land use planning."

Howe, James W. The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action, 1976.

New York, Praeger [1975] 276 p. (Praeger special studies in international

economics and development.)

Partial contents.— Focus on the Fourth World, by H. Low and J. Howe. —

Next Steps Toward Global Food Security, by L. Brown and E. Eckholm. —

Trade Initiatives and Resource Bargaining, by G. Erb. — The OPEC

Nations: Partners of Competitors?, by J. Grant. — The Emerging Challenge:

Global Distribution of Income and Economic Opportunity, by R. Hansen.

"This volume is the third in the Agenda for Action series prepared annually

by the Overseas Development Council."

Malenbaum, Wilfred. "Scarcity: Prerequisite to Abundance." Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 420, July 1975: 72-85.

"The article argues that today's food, energy, materials and overall national
product scarcities are not caused by limitations of the earth's material
endowments, but rather follow from man's limited horizon and limited
performance. There is ample scope for continuous progress, particularly
in the poor lands of the world. The real problem is the political will of man,
operating through his private and public institutions, to create economic,
legal and social conditions that encourage the expansion of individual partici-
pation in productive activity and that enhance each individual's capacity
to contribute to national progress."
Mikdashi, Zuhayr, Stephen D. Krasner, and C. Fred Bergsten. "One, Two,
Many OPEC's . . . ?" Foreign Policy, no. 14, spring 1974: 56-90.

The assertion of economic and political power by OPEC oil-producing

nations has raised the prospect that certain developing countries may be

able to exercise similar control over other natural resources, particularly

mineral resources. Three authors look at this problem.

Morgan, Anne, Janice Baker, Warren Donnelly, Harvey Sherman, and Steve

Hughes. The Development and Allocation of Scarce World Resources: Selected

Excerpts and References Relating to the National Debate Topics for High Schools

1975-1976. May 1975. 399 p. Issued as Senate document no. 94-45, 94th Cong.,

1st sess.

Natural resources/Resource allocation/Raw materials/Food supply/
Nutrition policy/Energy consumption/Power resources/International co-
operation/Economic growth/International economic relations.
Okita, Saburo. "Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy."
Foreign Affairs, v. 52, no. 4, July 1974: 714-724.

Economic, political, diplomatic and resource utilization and conservation
strategies are discussed.
Piper, August, Jr. "Ecology: an Issue For Third World People?" Black Scholar,
v. 6, May 1975:23-31.

Author discusses resource depletion, modern war, pollution and food/

population as areas in which present policies are leading humanity toward

worldwide disaster.

Rostow, W. W. "The Developing World in the Fifth Kondratiefif Upswing."

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 420, July

1975: 111-124.

"The current world economic situation seems to fit the cyclical 40- to 50-
year commodities pricing pattern first identified by N. P. Kondratiefif. If the
pattern continues as it has for the past two centuries, the world, after the
price surge of 1972-75 in foodstuffs, energy and raw materials, wiU experience
a high and erratic protracted plateau for perhaps 20 years and then return
to relatively low levels. However, we may be in the early stages of a major
confrontation between man and the physical limits of growth on this planet.

2007

Conventional Keynesian economics no longer suffice in this context. Research
and development must be given highest priority, nationally and interna-
tionally, and new patterns of investment must be created. This will require
international attitudes of solidaritj^ and communal action policies to balance
inequities in life quality for the benefit of V^oth developed and developing
nations. Cooperation in resource expansion and conservation, technological
development, food production, birth control and trade relationships, to name
a few major areas, is essential. An international partnership is a minimum
condition for the survival of modern industrial civilization."
SEDAG Mekong Development Panel Seminar. Puttaya Thailand, August 1974.
Paper available from the State Dept. as FAR series.

Includes agriculture (FAR 20490- P) ; local development institutions
(FAR 2049.3-P) ; agriculture in the Mekong basin (FAR 2()49.5-P) ; agriculture
in Vietnam (FAR 20496-P) ; and land taxation (FAR 20497-P).
Slivitzky, Michel. "The Ptcsults of the International Hj^drological Decade."
Nature and Resources, v. 10, Oct.-Dec. 1974: .5-10.

Sums up the achievements of the International Ilydrological Decade.
Hydrology/International Hydrological Decade, 1965-1974.
"The Question of the U.S. Role in Allocation of Scarce World Resources."
Congressional Digest, v. 54, Aug.-Sept. 1975: 193-224.

Contents. — The U.S. and world resources scarcities.^Should the U.S.

participate in internationally-controlled allocation of world food reserves

to needy nations? pros and cons. — Is the proposed pursuit of U.S. "Energy

Independence" a sound national policy?

Trade in Primary Commodities: Conflict or Coonvaiicn? A Tripartite Report by

Fifteen Experts from Japan, the Europei n Cimmiinity, and North America.

Washington, D.C., The Brookings Instituiion, Decisniber 1974. 41 p.

Includes optimistic conclusions on ihe utlook for future supplies of
minerals, food, and other primary conunod ties apart from oil, derived at
a meeting held in October 1974 by fifteen priv.te experts from Japan, Western
Europe, and North America held in Tokyo, 0« tober 1974.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Banldng ano Currency. Developing Countries
and the United States in the World Ixononiy: Problems and Prospects. Report
of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Domesti^j and International Monetary
Effects of Energv and Other Natural Resource Pricing. 93d Cong., 2d sess., De-
cember 1974. Washington, U.S. 'iovt. Print. Of., 1974. 73 p. Committee print.
"This study examines hew recent changes in the world economy — higher
oil prices, higher ])rices for other primary commodities, inflation, and the
slowdown of growth in industrialized countties — have created an immediate
need in m.'iiiy developing countries for additional external capital. The
amoimt of capital required and the prospects for obtaining it are both dis-
cussed. Lionger term responses to the current economic situation — increased
cooDc ration or more cartels — are also outlined. Major policy problems are
i(i( ntitied and recommendations are developed."
IV rt five of a six-part series.
U :?. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Global Commodity Scarcities
in an Inierdependent World. A rep<">rt by the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy, Dec. 23, 1974. 93d Cong. 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 36
p. (Committee print.)
U.S. Congress. House. Connnittee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Foreign
Economic Policv. Global Scarcities in ait Interdependent World, Hearings, 93d
Cong., 2d sess.," May 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OfT., 1974. 259 p.
"Hearings ... on changes in the access to and assurance of energy,
minerals, and agricultural commodities supplies, and on adjustments needed
in U.S. economic policies and international trading relations to adapt to
current economic realities. Assesses impact on developed and developing
nations of scarcities and higher prices, and possible measures to offset them."
U.S. Department of State. World Wildlife Conference: Efforts to Save Endangered
Species. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1973. 30 p. (U.S. Dept. of State
publication 8729.)

A plenipotentiary conference to conclude an international convention on
trade in certain species of wildlife was held in Washington February 12-
March 2. Following are remarks made by Secretary of the Interior Rogers
C. B. Morton on February 12, a message from President Nixon read b\'
Secretary Morton that day, and statements made on February 12 and

2008

March 2 by Russell E, Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality,

who was head of the U.S. delegation, together with the report of the U.S.

delegation, excerpts from the final act of the conference, and the text of the

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna

and Flora.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Treaties and Other

International Agreements on FisJieries, Oceanographic Resources, and Wildlife

to Which the United States is Party. Prepared at the request of Honorable

Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, United States

Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 968 p. At head of tiUe: 93d

Cong., 2d sess. Committee print.

Prepared with the assistance of Marjorie Ann Browne and Brenda M.
Branaman of Foreign Affairs. Division, CRS.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Committee on Natural Resources.
Report on the Fourth Session (24 March-4 April 1975). New York, United
Nations, 1975. 43 p. (United Nations. Economic and Social Council. OflScial
records, 59th sess. Suppl. no. 3) United Nations. [Document] E/5663 United
Nations. (Document] E/C. 7/56

Partial contents. — The United Nations revolving fund for natural re-
sources exploration. — Water resources development. — Permanent sovereignty
over natural resources.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Comprehensive Plan of Action
For and Coordination of Programmes Within the united Nations System in
the Field of Natural Resources Development: Report. [New York] 1975. 23 p.
(United Nations. [Document] E/C.7/47/Add.l) At head of title: United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council.

Presents an overview of the United Nations system as a whole in the
field of water resources.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Co-ordination of the Work
of the United Nations System in the Natural Resources Field and Progress in the
implementation by the United Nations System of the Guidelines for Action in the
Development of Natural Resources. [New York] 1972. 31 p. (United Nations.
[Document] E/c. 7/38/ Add. 1) At head of title: United Nations Economic and
Social Council.

Discusses "areas of agreement and problems of interagency co-operation."
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Co-ordination of the Work of
the United- N'tions System, in the Natural Resources Field and Progress in
the Implementation by the United Nations System of the Guidelines for Action in
the Development of Natural Resources. [New York] 1972. 9 p. (United Nations.
[Document] E/C. 7/38/ Add. 3) At head of title: United Nations Economic and
Social Council.

Discusses "measures to co-ordinate the programmes of the organizations
and agencies of the United Nations system."
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Co-ordination of the Work
of the United Nations System in the Natural Resources Field and Progress in the
Implementation by the United Nations System of the Guidelines for Action in the
Development of Natural Resources: Work Programmes, Spheres of Competence.
Division of Responsibilities and Co-ordination Measures: Report. [New York]
1972. 78 p. (United Nations. [Document] B/C.7/38)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Developments in the Field
of Natural Resources — Water, Energy and Minerals; Recommendations of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Relating to Natural
Resources. [New York] 1972. 5 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.7/32) At
head of title: United Nations Economic and Social (Council.

International environmental cooperation — Conferences/Conservation of

natural resources/Power resources/United Nations Conference on the Human

Environment, Stockholm, 1972.

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Developments in the Field

of Natural Resources — Water, Energy and Minerals: Technical and Economic

Aspects of International River Basin Development: Report. [New York] 1972.

1 V. (various pagings) (United Nations. [Document] E/C.7/35) At head of

title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

International rivers/International environmental cooperation/ Water re-
sources development — Finance.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Developments in the Field of
Natural Resources — Water, Energy and Minerals: (United Nations Water Con-
ference: Report.) [New York] 1973. 9 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.7/39)
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

2009

Discusses the desirability, cost, and proposed agenda for a United Nations
Water Conference.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). United Nations Revolving
Fund for Natural Resources Exploration: Report. [New York] 1975. 15 p. (United
Nations. [Document] DP/53/Rev. 1) At head of title: United Nations Develop-
ment Programme.

"The Fund will provide a form of cooperation in the field of natural
resources to developing countries additional to the assistance available to
these countries through projects financed under their country programmes
within their indicative planning figures (IPFs), or through regional or inter-
regional projects when appropriate."
Wolfgang, Marvin E. editor, "Adjusting to Scarcity." Amials of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 420, July 1975.

The articles reprinted in the volume were presented at the 79th annual
meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, April
1975. In introducing the articles, the editor notes: "Whether certain com-
modities are trulj' in scarce natural supply relative to current use and de-
mand, or are available in amounts limited by political and economic pres-
sures, was one of the major issues considered by the participants. . . . The
contributors did not agree about: (1) the existence of scarcity; (2) the par-
ticular commodities believed to be in short supply; (3) the reasons for short-
ages; or (4) whether, or how, society should make adjustments to perceived
scarcity."

The articles are entitled: "Population and scarcity of food," "Food, fertil-
izer, and the new global politics of resource scarcity," "Natural distribution of
metals and some economic efi'ects," "Commodity shortages and changes in
world trade," "Government response to commodity shortages," "Scarcity:
prerequisite to abundance," "Petroleum and energy," "A Creative adapta-
tion to a world of rising shortages," and "The developing world in the fifth
Kondratieff upswing."

OCEAN RESOURCES AND POLICY

A. General Issues

Borgese, Elisabeth Mann and David Krieger, eds. The Tides of Change. New
York, Mason/Charter, 1975. 357 p.

"Brings together a wide variety of papers regarding international ocean
policy prepared in the 1971-73 period, but still timely.
Brenner, Michael. "The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and the
Stockholm Conference: A Case of Institutional Non-Adaption." International
Organization, v. 29, no. 3, summer i975: 771-804.

"This article considers how an established international organization
with responsibility for programs of pure and applied science adapts its
organizational format and purposes to newly defined taeks. It examines the
institutional response of IOC (the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com-
mission) to the specification of new obligations in the environmental field
as stipulated by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
and as developed by the Environmental Program that the Conference estab-
lished. Its main theme is the place of speciahzed knowledge, and the role of
experts at the various stages of policy formation, within national govern-
ments and international forums. In analyzing the adaptation of IOC through
expert and non-expert activities, our aim is to determine whether new pro-
grams and initiatives are fitted to the existing framework, or produce new
structures and institutional arrangements."
Burke, William T. National and International Law Enforcement in the Ocean.
Report prepared for INR/XR, U.S. Dept. of State, March 1975. 275 p. Avail-
able from the Dept. of State as FAR 22339-S.
Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations, Airlie House, 1974. Per-
spectives on Ocean Policy. [Washington, National Science Foundation, for sale
by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975] 435 p.

Ocean policy — Conferences/ Maritime law/Regionalism (International
organization) /Marine resources/Sea power/ Territorial waters/United Nations
Conferehce on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York and Caracas, 1973-1974.
Cotrell, Alvin J. "Iran and the Indian Ocean: Geopolitics Beyond the Persian
Gulf." Paper, March 1975. 16 p. Available from the State Department as FAR
21874-P.
Franssen, Herman T. "Understanding the Ocean Science Debate." Ocean Develop-
ment and International Law Journal, v. 2, no. 2, 1974: 187-202.

The author feels that developing countries "are not likely to relinquish
sovereign rights over parts of their claimed 'national territory' for a vague
promise of technical assistance."
Galey, Margaret E. "The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Its
Capacity to Implement an International Decade of Ocean Exploration."
Occasional Paper No. 20, University of Rhode Island, Law of the Sea In-
stitute, December 1973, 38 p. Available from the State Department as FAR
22498-P.
Galey, Margaret E. "The International Seabed Authority As a Creator of Grants."
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association,
Washington, D.C., February 1975. 57 p. Available from the State Dept. as
FAR 22413-P.
Gray, Oscar S. International Responsibility of States for Environmental Damage
with Particular Refert.cce to Damage Arising From Non- Navigational Uses of
International Waters. Report prepared for the U.S. Dept. of State, April 1974.
96 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 19449-S.
Handler, Philip. "Statement by Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, before Subcommittee III, on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, Mar. 29, 1973." In Remarks
of Warren G. Magnuson. Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 119, May 8, 1973:
S8530-S8532.

Statement urging international cooperation in oceanography and strong
national support for research funding.

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2011

Hardy, Michael. "International Control of Marine Pollution." In Fawcett, J.E.S.
and Rosalyn Higgens, eds. Inleriiational Organization: Law in Movement:
Essays in Honour of John McMahon. London, New York, Oxford University
Press^^ 1974. p. 103-141, 160-175.

Contents. — Classification of the main forms of marine pollution. — The
existing legal framework. — International proposals and discussions. — A
pattern of needs and of possible solutions.
Holliek, Ann L. and Robert E. Osgood. New Era in Ocean Politics. Baltimore,
John Hopkins Press, 1974. 112 p.

"Since 1967, the United States Government has been actively engaged
in formulating policy for the control and use of the oceans. The central
questions to be resolved relate to the allocation and use of ocean space. Of
paramount importance in international relations as well, these issues of
ocean politics are now being considered by the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. The political issues confronted here include the question
of an international regime for the seabed, the breadth of territorial area, the
nature and extent of coastal economic zones, straits used for international
navigation, and maritime environment. Ann HoUick describes these basic
issues and relates them to U.S. ocean policj-making. Robert Osgood then
examines the central concern of U.S. policy — the relation of the prospective
law of the sea treaty to U.S. security interests in the control and use of
oceans. These papers were produced as part of the Ocean Policy Project of
the SAIS, an ongoing program that will be analyzing the more enduring
aspects of ocean policy as it develops. (Supported by NSF RANN award:
GI-39643.)
Juda, Lawrence. Ocean Space Rights: Developing U.S. Policy. New York, Praeger,
1975. 300 p.

"The starting point of this analytical narrative of expanding American
claims of jurisdiction over the continental shelf is the Truman proclamation
of 1945. Includes documentary appendices." (1)
Luttwak, Edward N. The Political Uses of Sea Poxoer: a Theoretical Analysis of
the Political Application of Military Force. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1974. 79 p.

"In this innovative study, Luttwak defines the purposes for which naval
power is used by each of the great powers. He outlines the distinct modes in
which political effects are generated, relating these to specific cases and
instances of naval forces for purely political ends. He produces a framework
that takes account of different types of naval and military maneuvers, as
well as domestic, local, regional, and international considerations."
Pisarov. V. D. "Soviet-American Cooperation in World-Ocean Studies." USA:

Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 10, Oct. 1974: 7-19.
Prescott, J. R. V. The Political Geography of the Oceans. New York, Halsted
Press, 1975. 247 p.

"An exposition of the geographical factors and problems associated with
the extension of state sovereignty over the seas and the seabed.
Schatcher, Oscar, and Daniel Serwer. Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies.
New York, United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1970. 41 p.
(UNITAR research report # 4.)
Shinn, Robert A. The International Politics of Marine Pollution Control. New
York, Praeger, 1974. 220 p.

Traces development and status of marine pollution in international law,
identifies primary interest groups and forums, and analyzes proposals now
before the international community.
Quester, George H. ed. Sea Power in the 1970s: A Symposium Sponsored by the
Cornell University Program on Peace Studies. Dunellen, 1975. 248 p.

"In just a decade the Soviet Union has surfaced as the world's second
greatest sea power. What United States response to this situation should be is
the subject of this symposium, which presents nine expert opinions from a
variety of fields, ranging from the Navy itself, to applied physics, to inter-
national law.

"What are the dangers of overreaction or underreaction to Soviet sea
power? The precise nature of the Soviet buildup is examined in numbers and
technology, submarines and surface vessels, merchant and armed ships, and
nuclear and conventional weaponry. Polaris missile-type submarines receive
special attention. Individual essays examine the balance of power in three

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key areas: the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Far East. The vital issues^
of oil transport and fishing rights, and the naval capabilities of other nations
such as Britain, France, Japan, and China, are also considered.

"The participants in this symposium are sometimes at loggerheads, but
they present all the important facts and most cogent arguments in what is
already a controversial armament issue of the seventies."

Oceanographic research/ Marine pollution — Research/International coop-
eration in science/Marine resources — Research.
United Nations. The Sea: A Select Bibliography on the Legal, Political, Economic
and Technological Aspects, 1974-1975. New York, United Nations, 1975.
E/F. 75.1.7.
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Marine Co-operation: Report..
[New York] 1973. 7 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5332) At head of title:
United Nations Economic and Social Council.
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Uses of the Sea. [New Yorkf

1972. 12 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5120) At head of title: United
Nations Economic and Social Council.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Sub-
committee on Oceanography. Oceanography Miscellaneous. Hearings, September
and December 1974, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OflF.,
1975. 327 p.

Hearings ". . . to receive State Department briefings on establishment of
the Bureau of Ocean Affairs and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, and on progress at the third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. "(3)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Oceans and
Atmosphere. International Conference on Ocean Pollution. Hearings, 92d Cong.,
2d sess. Oct. 18 and Nov. 8, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972
126 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Oceans and
Atmosphere. Intervention on the High Seas Act: Report to Accompany S. 1070.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 6 p. (93d Cong., 1st sess. Senate.
Report no. 93-482)

Oil pollution of the sea — Treaties/International environmental coopera-
tion/International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Oceans and
Atmosphere. Ocean Dumping Convention ImplementcUion; Report on H.R. 6450.
(93d Cong., 2d sess. Senate Report no. 93-726.) Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1974, 21 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Oceans and
Atmosphere. Oil Pollution Act Ameiidments of 1973; Report to Accompany H.R.
6451. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 14 p. (93d Cong. 1st sess.
Senate. Report no. 93-405.)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution. Sen. Exec. Rept. 93-13. 93d Cong. 1st sess. Aug. 1,

1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 5 p.

Recommends Senate ratification of the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. The convention
would establish national systems to regulate ocean wastes disposal.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Comrnittee on Foreign Relations. Seabed Arms Control
Treaty. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 27, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 44 p.

Hearings to receive testimony and views about the Senate's ratification
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction the Seabed and the Ocean Floor.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Oceans Policy:
Report to accmipany S. Res. 82. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1973. 6 p.
(93d Cong. 1st sess. Senate. Report no. 93-296.)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Oceana
and Interniitional Environment. Conventions and Amendments Relating to Pollu-
tion of the Sea by Oil. Hearings, 92d Cong. 1st sess., on Executive G, 91st
Cong.', 2d session. May 20, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 197K
229 p.

2013

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Oceans
and International Environment. International Compensation Fund for Oil Pol-
lution Damage. Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess., on Executive K, 92d Cong.,
2d sess. and S. 841. Apr. 17 and 18, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1973. 202 p.

Hearings to consider: (1) the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
Brussels, Dec. 18, 1971; The 1971 Amendment to the International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil (tanker size) ; andl
the bill S. 841, to implement legislation for the Fund Convention.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Soviet Ocean Activities:
a Preliminary Survey. Prepared at the request of Hon. Warren G. Magnuson,.
Chairman, Committee on Commerce and Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman,
National Ocean Policy Study for the use of the Committee on Commerce and'
the National Ocean Study Policy pur.suant to S. Res. 222. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 81 p. At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee-
print.

"The report includes most of the important salient aspects of Soviet oceare
activities such as: fisheries, transportation, oceanography, deep-sea mining,
underwater activities, oil and gas developments on the Outer Continental
Shelf and Soviet response to marine pollution problems. The report concludes
with a chapter on the implications of Soviet ocean policy on U.S. policy."
U.S. National Science Foundation. Office of the International Decade of Oceani
Exploration. International Decade of Ocean Exploration: Program Description.
Washington [1973] 57 p. "Second report."
Wenk, Edward, Jr. The Politics of the Ocean. Seattle, University of Washington
Press, 1972. 590 p.

"This book . . . rang[esl . . . through every facet of U.S. ocean policy
over the past twenty years. The book is also a primer on bureaucratic,,
administrative and organizational politics . . . from firsthand observation.
Dr. Wenk assesses the strengths and weaknesses of every interest group,,
cognizant agency, congressional committee. White House officer and the
general pubhc as they bear on ocean pohcy." Emphasizing the politics and
bureaucratic tension surrounding resolution of oceans policy issues, the
author organized the book into three broad subjects. It first examines the
generation and development of U.S. ocean policy; a middle section cover*
the principal substantive issues that occupied the attention of the Marine
Science Council, of which W^enk was Executive Secretary; and the final part
of the book projects implications and postulates future management avenue.s
for marine policy. These include the author's assessment of problems facing
the recently created (1970) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion and extensive suggestions for U.S. leadership in the international devel-
opment of ocean resources. (5)
Wooster, W. S., "Interactions Between Intergovernmental and Scientific Organi-
zations in Marine Affairs." International Organization, v. 27, Winter 1973:
103-113.

B. Ocean Resources

Adams, M. V., and others'. Mineral Resoiirce Management of the Outer Continental
Shelf. [Washington, U.S. Geological Survey] 1975. 32 p. (U.S. Geological
Survey. Circular 720)

"Leasing procedures, evaluation of resources, and supervision of production;
operations on leased lands of the Outer Continental Shelf."
Barkenbus, Jack N. "International Implications of Manganese Module Mining."

World Affairs, v. 136, spring 1974: 306-320.
Blews, Maj. Monte E. (U.S. Air Force). "Treasures of the Deep — Potential for
International Conflict." Report Air Command and Staff College, Air Univer-
sity, May 1974. 69 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20794-G; or a.s
AD 920 536 L.
Doumani, George A. Ocean Wealth: Policy and Potential. Rochelle Park,. N.J.,
Hayden Book Co., 1973. 285 p.

Defines resources, technologies and economics of seabed; policy; inter-
national concern; role of science and technology. Contains relevant
appendices.

2014

Heck, Carles B. "Collective Arrangements for Managing Ocean Fisheries."
I tdernational Organization, v. 29, no. 3, summer 1975: 711-744.

"With the great spread and intensification of marine fisheries exploitation,
the traditional fisheries regime of free and oj^en access (part of traditional
"freedom of the seas") has been modified by many regional or stock-related
management arrangements, and is now undergoing drastic change through a
radical extension of coastal state jurisdictions. This article deals mostly with
the development of various regional and stock-related arrangements. After
sketcliing the overall purposes of management, the article details some of the
differences among competing states which have delayed or limited manage-
ment arrangements, or otherwise complicated their development. Issues of
allocation may be uppermost for competing interests, discussed here in the
• context of shifts from undivided to divided catch limits. The regulatory
powers of intergovernmental fisheries commissions have generally been quite
limited. While fisheries scientists have in some cases performed vital roles
in encouraging regional arrangements, their information and advice has
been of limited scope and influence in securing more restricti\'e regulatory
regimes. FAO's Committee on Fisheries (COFI) might be called a global
fisheries commission, though much of its most important work has related
to animating and supporting arrangements of a regional character. The
radical shift outward of national jurisdictions is rearranging fisheries ex-
ploitation in most parts of the world. Given the nature of the resource, how-
ever, some forms of regional or stock arrangements will still be needed if the
overall purposes of management are to be realized."
Jacobs, Michael J. "United States Participation in International Fisheries Agree-
ments." Journal of Maritime Law and Covunerce, v. 6, July 1975: 471-529.

The article reviews international fisheries agreements now in force to

which the United States is a party. Deals with the current status of the

agreement and highlights some of the key issues relative to the agreement

and its implementation in the United States.

Johnson, Barbara. "Technocrats and the Management of International Fisheries."

Internalional Organization, v. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975: 745-770.

"The paper examines the role of the world's fishery technocrats and experts
in international fisheries management. The system of management provided
by the regionally based international fisheries commissions is organized on
transgovemmental and transnational lines. Political delegates to the com-
missions are usually government technocrats, suggesting that the system
is basically transgovemmental. However, the role of scientific advisers to
the commissions is studied, since the group may preempt political control
through its control on expertise. Results of a questionnaire sent to 900
scientists throughout the world are given, using the data from a structured
.sample of 84 scientists. Most were found to be trained as natural scientists,
and most were employed directly by national governments or through gov-
-tTnment research institutes. 'Elite' scientists in the group, and some execu-
tive heads of commissions were also analyzed, and found to have a generally
•cautious approach to problems of fishery ownership and management. In
sum, the transgovemmental system itself was found to allow yet set the
limits of transnational role playing by fishery experts."
Knight, H. G. ed. The Future of International Fisheries Management. St. Paul
Minn., West Publishing Co. (Under the auspices of the American Society of
International Law.) 1975. 253 p.
National Research Council. Panel on Operational Safety in Marine Mining.
Mining in the Outer Continental Shelf and in the Deep Ocean. Washington,
National Academy of Sciences, 1975. 119 p.

"The study undertakes ... to examine the potential of the resource,

evaluate the state of the art of ocean mining, identify the legal, regulatory,

and jurisdictional problems involved, consider the possible environmental

questions, and determine how to meet the needs for trained engineers to do

the job."

McLin, Jon. "Resources and Authority in the North-East Atlantic. Part II:

Fisheries Conservation." [Hanover, N.H.] American Universities Field Staff

[1973] 13 p. (American Universities Field Staff. Fi^ldstaff Reports. West Europe

scries, v. 8, no. 6 [General])

"The exercise of conservation authority over fishing activities in North-
West Europe dates at least from the tenth century. Today the ICES-
NEAFC machinery embodies a serious attempt to base international poUcy
on scientific understanding. But the real teat is just beginning."

2015

McLin, Jon. "Resources and Authority in the North-East Atlantic; Part III:
Oil and Gas." [Hanover, N.H.] American Universities Field Staff, 1973. 12 p.
(American U niversilies Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. West Europe series, v. 8,
No. 8 [General])

"Offshore petroleum exploration and production in the North Sea and
other parts of the European continental shelf are experiencing a boom which
is still expanding. The European Community, and especially Norway and
the United Kingdom, must devise policies for settling jurisdictional disputes
and managing their new-found wealth."
Peterson, Russell W. OCS Oil and Gas — Environmental Asssssment. Report to
the President by the Council on Environmental Quality. Washington, April 1974.
341 p.
Smith, Wavne J. "International Control of Deep Sea Mineral Resources."
Naval War CoUege Review, v. 24, June 1972: 82-90.

A majority of nations appear to regard deep sea resources as "the property
of all mankind." Focusing on manganese nodules as a resource, the author
asserts that only by addressing first the fundamental question of how to
bring deep sea minerals onto the international market without upsetting
world metal prices can agreement be reached in this area.
Shapley, Deborah. "Law of the Sea: Energy, Econornj'^ Spur Secret Review of
U.S. Stance." Science, v. 183, Jan. 25, 1974: 290-292.

"At the urging of the Treasury Department, U.S. officials preparing for
the United Nations Law of the Sea conference are conducting a drastic
reassessment of previously stated United States positions on issues ranging
from offshore oil and gas development to international environmental policy."
United Nations. Secretary- General -(Waldheim). Additional Notes on the Possible
Economic Implications of Mineral Production From the International Sea-bed
Area: Report. [New York] 1972. 34 p. (United Nations. [Document] A/AC.
138/73) At head of title: United Nations General Assembly.
Ocean floor/Marine resources/Mines and mineral resources.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Economic Implications of Sea-bed
Mining in the International Area: Report. [New York] 1975. 17 p. (United
Nations. [Document] A/CONF. 62/37) At head of title: United Nations.
At head of title: Third conference on the Law of the Sea.

Focuses on policy issues in the context of the Law of the Sea Conference.

Emphasis is upon issues associated with the mining of manganese modules.

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Marine Qnestions: Coastal Area

Management and Development: Report. [New York] 1975. 19, 7 p. (United

Nations. [Document] E/5648) At head of title: United Nations Economic

and Social Council.

"The report, in defining and imderscoring the importance of coastal
areas on a global scale, endeavors to set forth the main phases of a planning
approach for managing and developing those areas for the benefit of de-
veloping coastal states."
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Marine Questions: Uses of the
Sea. [New York] 1975. 1 v. (various pagings) (United Nations. [Document}
E/5650) At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Partial contents. — Exploitation of marine resources. — Uses of ocean

space. — Research and support services. — Summary of existing arrangements

in the United Nations system for disseminating information on advances in

marine technology and for the transfer of such technology.

United Nations Source Doctwients on Se(^bed Mining. Compiled by the Editors of

Ocean Science News. Washington, Nautilus Press, 1974. 391 p.

"The documents contained in this volume are in all cases reproductions

of the originals — a^s delivered in Caracas, the summer of 1974; made available

in New York City by the U.N. ; or gathered in various places by the reporters

and editors of Ocean Science A^ews. No attempt has been made to edit the

documents, merely to shorten them where the repetition is obvious."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Int6r-

American Affairs. Fishing Rights and United States-Latin American Relations.

Hearinc, 92d., Cong., 2d sess. Feb. 3, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1972. 128 p.

Appendix 3 — The Latin American-United States Fishing rights con-
troversy, with specific reference to Chile, Ecuador and Peru, by Virginia M.
Hagen. LRS nmltilith F-356. — Appendix 4 — The Latin American-United
States fishing rights controversy; dilemma for United States foreign policy
(1969-1971). LRS multiUth 71-117 F.

2016

tJ.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subcom-
mittee on Oceanography. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals. Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st
sess., on H.R. 9 and H.R. 7732; and 93d Cong., 2dsess., on H.R. 12233. March 1,
28, 29, AprU 3, 1973; and February 26-28, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
OflF., 1974. 513 p.

Hearings on bills to promote the conservation and orderly development of
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed, pending adoption of an inter-
national regime relating thereto.

Includes "Deep-sea minerals: background analysis for legislation" by
Nancy P. Peterson and John R. Justus of the Science Policy Research Divi-
sion, Congressional Research Service, p. 333-354.
TJ.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. The Economic Value of Ocean
Resources to the United States. Prepared at the request of Hon. Warren G.
Magnuson . . . pursuant to S. Res. 222, National Ocean Policy Study, 93d
Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 109 p. (Committee
print.)

Estimates the current and projected value to the United States of all ocean

resources, 1972-1973 and projected to 1985 and 2000. Contract performed by

Robert Nathan Associates, for the Congressional Research Service.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Fisheries Management Under a

200-Mile Jurisdictional Limit. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1975: 23 p. (Committee print.)

"A primer on fisheries management under the 200-mile extended jurisdic-
tion. The study describes the existing situation of U.S. fisheries, notes the
values of fisheries to the Nation, presents some of the alternative suggestions
for change of the management structure, and raises some of the jurisdictional
and management problems which may arise under extended fisheries jurisdic-
tion." Prepared by Mark Zilberberg, Ocean and Coastal Resources Project,
CRS.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Special Sub-
committee on Outer Continental Shelf. Outer Continental Shelf. Report by the
Special Subcommittee on OCS. December 21, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1971. 224 p. At head of title: 91st Cong., 2d sess. Committee print.
Contains an evaluation of several policies and proposals relating to the
continental shelf and deep seabed based on the record of hearings (in 3 pts.)
on the Outer Continental Shelf. Legal and political aspects of the OCS
boundary controversy; economic and conservation considerations re alterna-
tive OCS boundary locations; interim policy; the Administration's proposals,
and numerous appendices.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcom-
mittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Mimral Resources of the Deep Seabed.
Hearings, 93d Cong. 1st sess. on S. 1134. May 17, and June 14, 15, 18, 19, 1973.
Part 1. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., '1973. 768 p.

Hearings on legislation to promote the conservation and orderly devel-
opment of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed, pending adoption
of an international regime therefor.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and In'?ular Affairs. Subcom-
mittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Mimral Raourczs of the Deep Seabed.
Hearings, 93d Cong. 2d sess. On Amendment no. 946 to S. 1134. March 5, 6,
and 11, 1974. Part 2. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 769-1355 p.
Continuation of hearings on legislation to promote the conservation and
orderly development of the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed,
pending adoption of an international regime therefor.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Recent Developments in Deep Seabed Alining.
Report. April 1975. 94th Cong. 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1975. 41 p. Committee print.

Analysis of a briefing to the committee by the Dept. of the Interior on
deep seabed mineral resources, preparatory to the Law of the Sea Con-
ference.
U.S. National Science Foundation. Office for the International Decade of Ocean
Exploration. Ferromanganese Deposits on the Ocean Floor. David R. Horn (ed.).
Papers from a conference. Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory, Columbia
University, Palisades, New York, January 20-22, 1972. 293 p.

"The collected papers in this volume are contributions which define the
'state of the art' in important areas of manganese nodule research . . . and
identify major problems which will require further study."

1

2017

Working Group on Living Marine Resources. Principles of a Global Fisheries
Management Regime. Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 4, May 1974:
29 p.

"Sets forth principles agreed to by an expert interdisciplinary working
group of the Society for the use of the Law of the Sea Conference and others
concerned with the rational management of the Living Resources of the Sea.
The principles concern the rationale, goals, and components of a management
regime, dispute avoidance, and problems of enforcement." The Group was
composed of members of the American Society for International Law.
Supported by NSF RANN award: GI-29927.

C. Law of the Sea Conference

Brown, Seyom and Larry Brown. "Diplomats at Sea." Foreign Affairs, v. 52
no. 2, Jan. 1974: 301-321.

Discusses factors which should enter into the U.S. position at the 1974
Law of the Sea Conference. "In its unfolding ocean diplomacy, the United
States must face two realities: it will not get all that it wants, and it will
have to cooperate intensively with many other nations in order to get what it
can .... This Conference must leave future ocean negotiators with a
legacy of accommodation and mutual trust in ocean affairs^ not a residue of
bitterness left by confrontationist diplomacy."
Christy, Francis T., Jr., et. al. Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond. Cambridge,
Ballinger, 1975. 416 p.

Contains the proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference, Law of the
Sea Institute.
Friedheim, Robert L. and Mary E. Jehn. "Anticipating Soviet Behavior at the
Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference; U.S.S.R. Positions and Dilemmas."
Professional paper 124, August 1974. 45 p. Available from the State Dept. as
FAR 20152-P.
Friedmann, Wolfgang. The Future of the Oceans. New York, George Braziller,
1971. 132 p.

Presents case against expanding national claims to large offshore areas,
and discusses freedom of the seas; creeping jurisdiction; marine resources;
Truman Proclamation; Geneva Convention; and Third Law of the Sea
Conference.
Goldie, L. S. E. "International Law of the Sea: a Review of States' Offshore
Claims and Competences." Naval War College Review, v. 24, Feb. 1972: 43-66.
"The problems of formulating effective concepts for managing states'
offshore claims and competences is well appreciated by the international
community. . . . Here, the author reviews many of the essential rules,
legal fictions, and institutions that deal with the problem, and also examines
some of the novel claims that states have made in their effort to exercise
exclusive authority over offshore areas."
Hollick, Ann L. "What to Expect From a Sea Treaty." Foreign Policy, no. 18,
spring 1975: 68-80.

Summary of issues to be discussed at the mid-March 1975 conference.
Law of the Sea Institute. University of Rhode Island. "Law of the Sea
Briefing: Reflections on the Caracas Session of the United Nations Law of
the Sea Conference." Occasional Paper no. 24, partially supported by NOAA,
ONR, and USCG, December 1974. 47 p. Available from the State Depart-
ment as FAR 22495-P.
Xay, S. Houston, Robin Churchill, and Myron Nordquist. New Directions in the
Law of the Sea. Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications, Inc., The British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 1973, vol. I, 502 p.
Collection of documents on national legislation; bilateral and multilateral
agreements; territorial seas; fishing limits; fisherj^ conservation zones; OCS;
pollution; regulation of marine activities; high seas; military activities;
and seabed activities.
Logan, P. M. Canada, the United Slates, and the Third Law of the Sea Conference.
[Montreal] Canadian-American Committee [1974] 122 p.

"... A study that would provide a background survey of the major
issues at the Conference, the Canadian and U.S. positions on these issues,
and bilateral Canada-U.S. offshore concerns."
Logue, John, (ed.) The Fate of the Oceans. Villanova, Pennsylvania, Villanova
University Press, 1972. 237 p.

U.N. debates; pollution; law of the sea; U.S. system and the ocean
regime.

2018

Lovald, Johan Ludvik. "In Search of an Ocean Regime: The Negotiations in
the General Assemblj^'s Seabed Committee 1968-1970." International Organi-
zation, V. 29. no. 3, summer 1975: 681-710.

"This study deals with the opening phase of the U.N. negotiations concern-
ing the future international r-^gime for ocean space. It seeks to establish how
the technological and economic capabilities of member nations condition the
manner and style of negotiation, the definition of national objectives, and
the growth of attitudes and expectations with regard to such a regime. By
the end of the 1968-70 period expectations about the future international
regime had narrowed noticeabl}'. Yet, for long-range tactical reasons many
delegations were still holding out in anticipation of a new Law of the Sea
Conference. The original Maltese seabed proposal envisaged a comprehensive-
international regime. In general, developing countries favored such a solution
in the beginning, while industrialized countries preferred an intermediate
solution. Eventually the Maltese proposal and the negotiating situation'
inadvertently set off a wave of claims for various forms of national jurisdic-
tion. This meant that the emphasis at the end was more on the rights of the
coastal states and less on the capacity of the world community to deal
collectively with the future of ocean space."
Marine Scientific Research and the U.N. Law of the Sea Nzgotiations. Report of
the U.S. National Committee for SCOR (Scientific Committee on Oceanic
Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions). Washington, D.C.,
U.S. National Committee for SCOR, Ocean Affairs Boa«d, National Research
Council, 1974. 12 p.
Maechling, Charles, Jr., "Freedom of Scientific Research: Stepchild of the-
Oceans." Virginia. Journal of International Law. v. 15, spring 1975: 539-559.
Survey of the general issues before the Law of the Sea Conference with,
specific attention paid to freedom of scientific research in the oceans.
Ocean Affairs Bibliography, 1971: A Selected List Emphasizing International Law,
Politics, and Economics of Ocean Uses. Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. September 1971. 201 p. (Oceans Series
no. 302)

"The bibliography is intended to be selective and to concentrate on recent
material essential to an understanding of the present state of international
law and ocean uses and major proposals to extend the coverage of law and-
sound cooperative practices in the uses of the oceans."

The bibliography is organized by subject matter and partially annotated.
Perspectives oh Ocean Policy. Prepared by the Ocean Policy Project. Johns Hopkins
University. Papers presented at the Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean
Relations, Airlie, Va., October 1974. Prepared for the National Science Foun-
dation, USC/FAR Proj. no. 19222-73. 435 p. Available from the State Dept.
as FAR 22267-G.

Contains discussions and papers relating to economics, political, geo-
graphical, and other aspects of the Law of the Sea.
United Nations. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Official'
Records, Vol. I: Summary Records of Meetings. New York, United Nations,.
1975. E. 75. V. 3.
U.S. Comptroller General. Information on United States Ocean Interests Together
With Positions and Results of Law of the Sea Conference at Caracas. Report of
March 6, 1975. ID-75-46.

"The report assesses U.S. positions taken at the Caracas session of the
Law of the Sea Conference and identifies types of problems that U.S. nego-
tiators will have to deal with during future sessions.

"The conference considered main trends on major issues, including terri-
torial seas, economic zones, straits, fisheries, continental margins, marine
scientific research, and dispute settlement."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Endorsing Objectives for
a Just and Effective Ocean Treaty: Report to Accompany H . Res. SSO. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 3 p. (93d Cong., 1st Sess. House. Report no..
93-96)

"The purpose of House Resolution 330 is to endorse ocean policy objectives
now being pursued by the United States delegation to the United Nations
Seabed Committee toward agreement on a just and effective ocean treaty
at the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference, to commend the delegation
for its excellent work, and to encourage the delegation to continue to work
diligently for early agreement on the treaty."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Status of the U.N. Law of the'
Sea Conference. Hearings, Nov. 19, 1974, 93d Cong. 2d sess. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off.. 1975. 49 p.

2019

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements. Law of the Sea Resolution. Hearings
93d Cong., 1st sess., on H. Res. 216 and 296, Mar. 21 and 27, 1973. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 187 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. The Third U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference. Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress
at the request of the Committee on Commerce and the National Ocean Policy
Study pursuant to S. Res. 222. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1975. 66 p. (Committee print.)

Essentially a primer on the Third Law of the Sea Conference, "the study
includes references to pre-treaty law making, the 1958 and 1960 Conferences
on the Law of the Sea, the preparatory conferences on the law of the sea,
the New York and Caracas sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference,
administration policy formulation, congressional views on the law of the
sea negotiations, and the role of the Senate in treaty-making in general
and the Law of the Sea Treaty in particular."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Oceans and
Atmosphere. Law of the Sea. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess. Oct. 3, 1972. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 137 p. "Serial No. 92-79".

Discusses topics for the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference, among them

"fishing jurisdiction, scientific research, marine pollution, breadth of the

territorial sea, passage through straits, and the international regime for the

deep seabed. . . ."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Oceans Policy.

Hearing, 93d Cong., 1st sess., and on S. Res. 82. June 19, 1973. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 95 p.

Reviews activities of the Executive branch preparatory to the Law of the
Sea Conference.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Third U.N. Law of the
Sea Conference. 94th Cong. 1st sess. Feburary 5, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt
Print. Off., 1975. 85 p. (Committee print.)

"Report to the Senate by the advisers to the U.S. Delegation to the Third

U.N. Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas during June-Aug. 1974. Contains

background, major conference issues, and an overall summary."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The Law of the

Sea Crisis. A staff report on the U.N. Seabed Committee, the outer continental

shelf, and marine mineral development. Prepared at the request of Henry M.

Jackson, Chairman. December 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972.

328 p. At head of title: 92d Congress, 1st session. Committee print.

A report of observations and developments at the July- August 1971 ses-
sions of the United Nations Seabed Committee.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference.
Hearing, 93d Cong. 1st sess. September 19, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off.. 1973. 819 p.

Hearing held to receive a status report from the U.S. Delegation to the

Summer 1973 Geneva U.N. Seabed sessions preparatory to the 3d U.N.

Conference on Law of the Sea.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee

on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Status Report on Laxo of the Sea Conference.

Hearing, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Sept. 17, 1974. Part 2. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1974. p. 821-1160.

Maritime law — Conferences/Marine resources — Conferences/United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York and Caracas, 1973-
1974.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference.
Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. June 4, 1975. Part 3. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1975. p. 1161-1422.

Maritime law — Conferences/Marine resources — Conferences/United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York and Caracas, 1973-
1974.
Vambery, Joseph T. The Law of the Sea: a Selective Bibliography of Articles,
Documents and Monographs. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, v. 13,
no. 1, 1974: 173-186.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COOPERATION AND SCIEN-
TIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Akhtar, Shahid. Health Care in the People's Republic of China: a Bibliograph,,
with Abstracts. Report, IDRC-038 e, 1975. 182 p. Available from the Stat„
Department as FAR 21679-P.
Brown, Harrison. "Scholarly Exchanges With the People's Republic of China."

Science, v. 183, Jan. 11, 1974: 52-54.
Craig, Jack. China: Domestic and International Telecommunications, 1949-74.
In Chiyia: a Reassessment of the Economy; a compendium of Papers Submitted
to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Oflf., 1975. p. 289-310.

Contents. — Historical development. — Organization and management. — •
Status of transmission media. — ^Telecommunication modes and services. — •
International telecommunications. — Broadcasting system.
Dean, Genevieve C. "Science, Technology and Development: China as a Case
Study." China Quarterly, no. 51, July-Sept. 1972: 520-534.

Economic development — [China]/Technological innovations — [China]/
Science policy — [China].
Dean, Genevieve C. Science and Technology in the Development of Modern China:
an Annotated Bibliography. Product of a workshop cosponsored by the Joint
Committee on Contemporary China, and the University of Sussex Science
Policy Research Unit and the Canadian International Research Center,
January 1972. London, Mansell, 1974. 279 p.
Dernberger, Robert F. "The Transfer of Technology to China." Asia Quarterly

no. 3, 1974:229-252.
Deshingkar, G. D. "Science and Technology in China: a Preliminary Enquiry."
China Report, v. 10, Sept.-Dec. 1974: 69-90.

A report on the developm.ent of science and technology in China which

seeks to build on the old Chinese practices to form their own independent

scientific base.

Directory u)f Selected Scientific Institutions in Mainland China. Prepared by Surveys

and Research Corporation. Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Public

Series no. 96, 1970. 469 p.

"This volume attempts to present the organization of research and
development in the People's Republic of China in the period prior to the
Cultural Revolution. It contains information about 490 selected scientific
institutions concerned with the physical, biological, medical, and agricultural
sciences "
"The East is Read." A^a^wre, V. 256, Aug. 21, 1975: 608-610.

Analysis of China's principle scientific journal Scientia Sinica, indicates
that the cultural revolution had little effect on China's international scientific
tradition.
Harrison, Selig S. "Time Bomb in East Asia." Foreign Policy, no. 20, fall 1975:
3-27.

Presents some of the preliminary findings of a year-long study of China's
oil policy. Investigation conducted on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. "Already, by drawing only on its onshore reserves
and those of Po Hai Gulf, Peking appears likely to reach the current produc-
tion level of Saudi Arabia by 1988 or soon thereafter."
Liao, T. R. "Science in China." LC Science Tracer Bullet, June 1975: 1-12.

Washington, D.C. Library of Congress.
Neilan, Edward, and Charles R. Smith. The Future of the China Market — Prospects
for Sino- American Trade. Washington, D.C, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1974. 95 p.
Orleans, Leo A. "China's Population: Can the Contradictions be Resolved?"
In China: a Reassessment of the Economy; a Compendium of Papers Submitted
to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. p. 69-80.

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2021

Concludes that "Peking does not really know the size of China's population
or the precise rate at which it is growing . . . There are no accurate statistics
in demographic estimates on Chinese population."
Orleans, Leo A. "China's Science and Technology; Continuity and Innovation."
In U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. People's Republic of China:
An Economic Assessment: a Compendium of Papers. 92d Cong., 2d sess. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. OflF., 1972. Joint Committee Print, pp. 185-219.
Review of China's policies for science and technology before and after the
cultural revolution. ". , . China continues to 'walk on two legs' in science
and technology, just as she has been doing in many other fields. Although
she is placing great emphasis on local industries and what may be termed
local science and technology, China continues to expand her urban economy
and to compete with the advanced countries in the modern industrial sector
and in advanced science and technology."
The Prospects for U.S.-China Relations. National Committee on United States-
China Relations. New York, 1975.

"A report of a National Committee conference held in May 1974 which

brought together 30 specialists in Chinese affairs and foreign policj'. It

summarizes and focuses on recent political developments, areas of potential

conflict in foreign policy goals, and key issues facing the People's Republic

of China and the United States."

Rifkin, Susan B. "The Chinese Model for Science and Technology: Its Relevance

for Other Developing Countries." Technological Forecasting and Social

Change, v. 7 no. 3, 1975: 257-271.

"This paper examines the growth of an indigenous scientific and techno-
logical capability through self-reliance (the 'Chinese model')-"
Shih, Joseph A. "Science and Technology in China." Asian Survey, v. 12, Aug.
1972: 662-675.

"This article attempts to summarize the general condition of science and
technology in the People's Republic of China during the past twenty years.
From this, we may be able to forecast the future trend, and ... be able
to gain some understanding of the interplay of technology and ideology."
Suttmeier, Richard P. "Chinese Scientific Societies and Chinese Scientific De-
velopment." Developing Economics, v. 11, June 1973: 146-163.
Suttmeier, Richard P. "Research and Revolution." Science Policy and Societal
Change in China. Lexington, Mass., Lexington, (Heath) 1974. 190 p.

"A major aspect of science policy in China after 1949 has been its continual
change. More precisely, China has not pursued a single science policy since
the People's Republic was founded. Rather, its policies have varied so
over time that it makes sense to speak of six science policies: 1949-1952,
1953-1957, 1958-1960, 1961-1966, 1966-1969, and 1970 to the present.
Each is incisively summarized in this major evaluation of science policy in
the People's Republic of China.

". . . The key to Suttmeier's analysis is his recognition that any set
of science policies maximizes some goals but not others. Given China's
traditional cultural, social, ajnd economic inhibitions to scientific advance on
the one hand and her low technological level on the other, any long-run
science policy must attack the environmental constraints while enhancing
the nation's storehouse of knowledge. . . . [These] tasks are not compatible
over the short run. Hence a successful science policy in China — and perhaps.
in other underdeveloped countries as well — must be flexible and
evolutionary." (2)
Suttmeier, Richard P. "Science Policy Shifts, Organization Change and China's
Development." China Quarterly, no. 62, June 1975: 207-241.

"This paper is part of a larger forthcoming study entitled Research and

Revolution: an Exploration Into Science Policy and Societal Change in

China (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books)."

U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. China: A Reassessment of the Economy:

A Compendium of Papers. July 10, 1975. 94th Cong. 1st sess. Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 737 p.

"This is a compilation of invited papers designed to meet the interests of
the committee and the Congress in an up-to-date body of factual data and
interpretative comment on the state of the domestic economy of China,
including the record of its recent experience in economic development and its
relations with the outside world." Research papers were prepared by aca-
demics, stafiF of research institutions and Federal officials, including staff of
the Library of Congress. The study was directed by John P. Hardt, of the

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Congressionol Research Service. Included among the topics assessed are
economic policy, the defense burden, agriculture, transportation, industry,
population, the environment, technology transfer, international trade,
financing, Sino-Japanese economic relations, and foreign aid. A summary is
included.

Among the papers, those that deal with science and technology as well
as scientific and technological infrastructure are: "China's Population: Can
the Contradictions Be Resolved?," Leo Orleans; "Balance in Coastal and
Inland Industrial Development," Charles R. Roll, Jr. and Kung-Chia Yeh;
"China's Environomics: Backing Into Ecological Leadership," Leo A.
Orleans; "Civilian Industrial Production in the People's Republic of China:
1949-1974," Robert Michael Field; "The Chinese Petroleum Industry:
Growth and Prospects," Bobby A. Williams, "China's Iron and Steel Indus-
try," Alfred H. Usack, Jr., and James D. Egan; "China: Domestic and
International Telecommunications, 1949-74," Jack Craig; "China: Agri-
culture in the 1970s," Alva Lewis Erisman; "Constraints Influencing China's
Agricultural Performance," Dwight H. Perkins; "Rural Industrialization in
China," Jon Sigurdson; "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China,"
Han Heymann, Jr.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. China: a Quarter Century
After the Founding of the People's Republic. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Jan. 29, 1975.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 91 p. (Committee print.)

"Report by Sen. Mike Mansfield . . . following his most recent visit to

China, Dec. 9-30, 1974 on: Chinese progress in implementing its internal

social and economic policies, with focus on health services and agriculture;

U.S.-China relations, emphasizing issues relating to Taiwan and trade

matters; and China's foreign policy."

U;S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Subcommittee

on Health. Health Care in China, 1973. Hearings, May 1973. Washington, U.S.

Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 265 p.

To examine the state of medicine in the Peoples' Republic of China.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Subcom-
mittee on Health. Health Policies and Services in China, 197 J^. 93d Cong., 2d
sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 42 p. (Committee print.)

"Report prepared ... by Leo A. Orleans, Library of Congress, examines
current health services in China emphasizing the extent to which conditions
have improved since 1948 through concentration on basic sanitation, preven-
tive medicine, and the widespread use of paramedics." (3)
Whitson, William W. "China's Quest for Technology." Problems of Communism,
V. 22, July- Aug. 1973: 16-30.

The author believes China will focus its attention on acquiring defense-
related technology.
Williams, Bobby A. "The Chinese Petroleum Industry: Growth and Prospects."
In China: a Reassessment of the Economy: a Compcndiuin of Papers Submitted
to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. p. 22,5-263.
Wu, Yuan-li. "Chinese Technological and Economic Capabilities: is the PRC a
Stabihzing or Destabilizing Influence?" Orbis, v. 17, fall 1973: 880-894.

"U.S. pnlicj'makcrs seem to have, in their own minds, ascribed to the

PRC a balancing role on the Soviet Union's Far Eastern front." The article

examines some of the assumptions implicit in envisaging such a role for

Peking.

Wu, Yuan-li and Robert B. Sheeks, et. al. The Organization and Siipport of

Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China. New York, Published

for the National Science Foundation by Praeger Publisher's, 1970. 593 p.

Deals with: history of science and technology to 1969, formulation of
goals and policy, trends in the structure of R and D, financing of R and D
activities, users of funds for science, R and D institutions in operation,
economic growth and the R and D effort, and various inventories of research
and development.

PHYSICAL SCIENCES RESEARCH: COOPERATION

Abelson, Philip H. "A New International Program." Science, v. 182, no. 4108,
Oct. 12, 1973. Editorial.

Describes the origins of a new international cooperative scientific project,
the Geodynamics Project in earth sciences. This was initiated by scientists
themselves. The author of the article describes how scientists are seeldng
government support for additional scientific research under the project.
Abelson, PhiUp H. "International Geophysics: Science Dominates Politics. (Dis-
cussion of the meet'iig of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics,
by the chairman of the U.S. National Committee for Geophysics.)" Science,
V. 190, October 3, 1975: 34-35.

Potential political obstacles to the meeting, which dealt with such politi-
cally sensitive topics as resources, development, natural hazards and pollu-
tion, were overshadowed by the useful exchange of information among the
delegates. The author also reports on the poor representation by Soviet
scientists and the position of scientists from the less developed countries in
an international scientific meeting.
The Antarctican Society, ed. Science, Technology, and Sovereignty in the Polar
Regions: Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1974. 240 p.

"Even as scientific and industrial activity increases in Antarctica and in
the Arctic, territorial sovereignty and civil and criminal legal jurisdiction in
the polar regions remain ambiguous, delicate matters of international political
balance. This work is a critical commentary and reference work, extensively
annotated, which examines polar developments and conflicts and their
implications for both international law and U.S. law affecting transnational
science and technology. It is the first guide to the dramatic lessons and issues
of the law in the polar regions to have been prepared by legal scholars and
science-policy specialists experienced in both polar regions and in problems
of foreign policy and law of the sea. It is intended for use by diplomats,
governmental officials, scientists, economists, political scientists and students
of international law. Notes, tables, and appendixes."
Ronner, Felix. "International Co-operation in Geology." UNESCO Chronicle,
v. 19, May 1973: 189-195.

Discusses an international program to establish the relationships between
geological phenomena occurring at different periods in different woi'ld regions.
Scott, John T. "International Cooperation in Physics." Physics Today, v. 28,
Jan. 1975: 69-71.

"Participants at AIP's (American Institute of Physics) Corporate Asso-
ciates Meeting call for increased internationalism on a world-wide scale."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on
Oceans and International Environments. U.S. Antarctic Policy. Hearings, 94th
Cong. Istsess. May 15, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 112 p»
"Hearing ... to review U.S. policy regarding mineral exploration and
exploitation in the Antarctic."
U.S. Program for the Geodynamics Project: Scope and Objectives. U.S. Geodynamics
Committee, Geophysics Research Board, Division of Earth Sciences and
Division of Physical Sciences, National Research Council; in collaboration
with the National Academy of Science, U.S. National Committee for the
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics for the International Union
of Geological Sciences, and for the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research,
International Council of Scientific Unions. Washington, National Academy of
Sciences, 1973. 248 p.

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SPACE COOPERATION AND POLICY

""ApoUo-Soyuz Test Project." Space World, v. 133. Jan. 1975: 21-27.

Describes the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. space mission with diagrams and
biographic sketches of the participants.
Bourgin, Simon. "Impact of U.S. Space Cooperation Abroad." In Symposium on
International Cooperation in Outer Space, 1971. International cooperation in
outer space: a symposium; prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1971. p. 163-172.
Bulban, Erwin J., and Craig Covault. "Special report: ASTP mission." Aviation
Week & Space Technology, v. 102, May 5, 1975: 36-53.

A two-part special report on the joint Apollo-Soyuz Test Project flight
scheduled for July 1975.
Davis, Philip C, and William G. Holder. "Keynote of the 1970s: Joint Ventures
Into Space." Air University Review, v. 24, Sept.-Oct. 1973: 16-29.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in space projects.
Draper, C. Stark, and Frank J. Malina. "International Academy of Astronautics
(I. A. A.)" In Symposium on International Cooperation in Outer Space, 1971.
International cooperation in outer space: a symposium; prepared for the
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate. Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. p. 567-574.
*'Europe and the Shuttle Programme." Flight International, v. 101, June 8, 1972:
831-832.

"It is now two years since the United States invited Europe to participate
in its ambitious space transport system. Much reduced since then, the so-
called shuttle programme now comprises the reusable Earth-to-orbit ferry
vehicle, an orbit-to-orbit reusable tug, and a shuttle-borne laboratory — the
sortie module. This article looks at the problems facing Europe as decision
date approaches."
Fouquet, David. "Europe into Space: New European Space Agency Emphasizes

U.S .Cooperation." European Community, no. 180, Oct. 1974: 19-21.
Frutkin, Arnold W. "International Cooperation in Space — What's Ahead?"
Aerospace, v. 12, May 1974: 8-14.

The article focuses on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Sojaiz mission then
assesses the possibilities of other joint U.S.-Soviet cooperative ventures in
space. The author, the Assistant NASA • Administrator for International
Affairs notes that joint cooperation probably is required for other future
large space ventures. "... Such bases on the Moon would be too ex-
pensive for one country alone. . . . manned expeditions to Mars will
likely be organized on an international basis. . . . By 1991 I anticipate
that it will be clear to all that if it is desired to proceed on the major space
missions of the future, there is no alternative to international cooperation' —
no alternative that is both feasible and appropriate in a world at peace."
Harvey, Dodd L. and Linda C. Ciccoritti. U.S.-Soviet Cooperatioji in Space.
Monographs in International Affairs, Center for Advanced International
Studies, University of Miami, 1974. 408 p.

A history of the U.S.-Soviet relationships in space prepared by presenting

large extracts and excerpts from the official documents and media accounts

of the formation of the relationships. The analytical interpretation provided

by the authors enhances the cogency of the materials.

"International Cooperation in Outer Space." In Stanley Foundation. Fifteenth

Strategy for Peace: Conference Report. October 17-20, 1974- Muscatine, Iowa,

The Stanley Foundation, 1974: 5.5-64.

The following issues were discussed and debated: "What should be the
foreign policy of the United States with regard to communication, remote
sensing and other application satellites (economic, social, military, political
and legal aspects)? What should be the role of international organization
in the field of international cooperation in outer space?" The importance of
international cooperation, as opposed to primarily unilateral initiatives
was emphasized.

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2025

LewiS; Howard. "The Soviet Agreement: How It Was Put Together." SPPSG
[Science and Public Policy Studies Group] Newsletter, v. 3, Aug.-Sept. 1972: 1-4.
Discusses the background to the October 1972 meeting between scientific
representatives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
Packard, Robert F. "Space Activities in the State Department." In Symposium
on International Cooperation in Outer Space, 1971. International cooperation
in outer space: a symposium; prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1971. p. 55-63.
Porter, Richard W. "International Scientific Community: International Council
of Scientific Unions and COSPAR." In Symposium on International Cooperation
in Outer Space, 1971. International cooperation in outer space: a symposium;
prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States
Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. p. 527-557.
Sedov, L. "International Cooperation in Space Exploration." International Affairs,
no. 11, Nov. 1973:16-21.
Soviet view of subject.
Shatalov, Vladimir. "Space Co-Operation." New Times, no. 19, May 1973: 3-4.
"Cooperation in space exploration is a notable aspect of the steadily
expanding contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The Soviet cos-
monaut Major-General Vladimir Shatalov, who is a member of the joint
Soviet-American working group engaged on the Soyuz-ApoUo experimental
space flight programme, answers questions. ..."
Sheldon, Charles S. United States and Soviet Programs in Space: Summary Data
Through 1972 and a Forward Look. Multilith, Science Policy Research Division,
Congressional Research Service, January 29, 1973. 73 p. (73-69 SP.)

Summarizes Soviet and American accomplishments in space since 1957.

Background comparisions are made contrasting and assessing the salient

economic, military, technical, and political considerations which surround

each nation's program.

Sheldon, Charles S. United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Summary Data

Through 197S and A Forward Look. Multilith, Science Policy Research Division,

Congressional Research Service. January 8, 1974. 74 p. 74-35 SP.

An update of the series of multiliths which summarizes Soviet and American
space programs since 1957.
Sheldon, Charles S. United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Some New Contrasts.
MultiUth, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service,
January 12, 1971. 71 p. (71-25 SP.)

The multilith summarizes the accomplishments of the two major space

powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, from 1957 and compares

some of the saUent economic, technical, military and political aspects of the

two programs.

Sheldon, Charles S. II. United States and Soviet Progress m Space: Summary Data

Through 1974 o^nd a Forward Look. Multilith, Science Policy Research Division,

Congressional Research Service, January 13, 1975. 87 p.

This is the 1975 updated version of the series of CRS multiliths which
describe and compare Soviet and American space programs since 1957.
"Soviet Academy Hosts Congenial International Space Conference." Astronautics
& Aeronautics, v. 11, Dec. 1973: 58-68.

Report on the first international space conference held in U.S.S.R.
Ulsamer, Edgar. "The U.S. Space Program Moves Toward New Frontiers." Air
Force Magazine, v. 57, Mar. 197,4: 62-69.

In an interview, the NASA Administrator reviews U.S. space program and
future U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation.
United Nations. Space Activities and Resources. A Review of the Activities and
Resources of the United Nations, of Its Specialized Agencies and of Other Competent
International Bodies Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. New York,
United Nations 1972. E.72.I.11.
U.S. Comptroller General. A Progress Report On United States-Soviet Union
Cooperative Programs. Report to the Congress, January 8, 1975. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off"., 1975. 98 p. ID-75-18.

The report is a comprehensive assessment of the accomplishments and
bottlenecks surrounding the U.S. -Soviet cooperative programs which resulted
from the 1972 agreement on scientific cooperation. The report finds generally
that cooperation is probably as good as can be expected under the constraints
of poor communications, differing priorities, misunderstandings, security

2026

considerations, lack of appropriate funding, and other problems which have
hindered the programs. Special attention is given to the science and tech-
nology agreement, cooperation in environmental protection and cooperation
in space exploration.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Review of the
Soviet Space Program With Comparative United Slates Data. Report prepared
by the Science Policy Research Division, Library of Congress. Washington^
U.S. Govt. Print. Oflf., 1967. 138 p. (Committee print.)

The study is a ten-year review of the Soviet space program which makes
relevant comparisons with corresponding programs in the United States,
"The study is intended to throw as much light as possible on the scope and
directions of the Soviet program, and also to provide a useful statistical
reference to the Soviet program in comparison with the U.S. program."

It was prepared by Dr. Charles Sheldon. "It uses only unclassified open
sources, both Soviet announcements and independent checks on such data,
derived from U.S. observational equipment whose findings are published in
this country and from corresponding British data."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee-
on International Cooperation in Science and Space. A General Review of the
International Cooperation in Science and Space. Hearings, 92d Cong., 1st sess.
May 18, 19, 20, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 359 p. "No. 4"
Statements presented by Federal officials responsible for international
scientific and technological activities in various agencies address the follow-
ing topics: nature and extent of international cooperative programs in*
science and space, perspective on functions, activities, and interrelationships-
of involved government agencies, understanding the problems and obstacles
encountered in pursuing international cooperative ventures, and determina-
tion of prospects for future cooperation.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Space Shuttle,
Space Tug, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project — 1974; Status Report. 93d Cong., 2d sess.
Washington, U.S. Govt, Print. Off., 1974. 784 p. At head of title: Committee
print. "Serial K"

Space shuttles — [U.S.]/Space propulsion — [U.S.]/Space poHcy — [U.S.]/
Space poHcy — [U.S.S.R.]/ Exchange of persons programs — [U.S.]/Exchange of
persons programs — [U.S.S.R.]
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee oa
Manned Space Flight. Manned Space Flight — U.S. -Soviet Rendezvous and
Docking. Hearing, 92d Cong., 2d sess. May 31, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1972. 30 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Convention
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Analysis and
Background Data. Staff Report. 92d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt,
Print. Off., 1972. 76 p. (Committee print.)

The report analyzes the Convention on International Liability for Damage

Caused by Space Objects and reviews the steps which led to its adoption

by the United Nations. It includes a brief review of congressional action,

on earlier space treaties. The report was prepared by the Congressional

Research Service with the assistance of the Department of State.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Inter-

national Cooperation and Organization for. Outer Space. Staff Report. 89thi

Cong., 1st sess. Sen. Doc. no. 56. August 12, 1965. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1965. 580 p.

The document, which was prepared by Mrs. Eilene Galloway, Congres-
sional Research Service, surveys organizations with space and space-related,
programs and their interrelationships. In particular it analyzes "the impact
of the frontier of outer space upon U.S. foreign relations; bilateral and multi-
lateral relationships among nations, the relationship between outer space
and arms control; international economic, technical, and scientific develop-
ments; and politics and programs pursued within the United Nations and
its specialized agencies. One of the main purposes of this study is to describe
the structure and functioning of international institutions and the relation
between national and international space activities to 1965."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Inter-
national Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium. 92d Cong., 1st sess. Sen,
Document 92-57, December,^9, 1971 Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,,
1971. 732 p.

2027

The symposium includes papers by 48 experts in international space

activities. It was designed to give the committee up-to-date baciiground

information on activities which had occurred since the previous symposium

volume was published in 1965. The articles deal with general issues in United

States and international space cooperation; the United Nations and outer

space; intergovernmental international space organization, the international

scientific community and professional associations, and U.S. foreign relations

and the future of international space cooperation.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet

Space Programs, 1962-1965; Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans, and

International Pmplications. Stafif report. 89th Cong. 2d sess. Dec. 30, 1966.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 920 p. (Committee print.)

This background document was prepared by experts in the Library of
Congress. One purpose was to update a previous report prepared in 1962. "The
present study, as in the case of its predecessor, has sought to identify, insofar as
possible, Soviet intentions, organizations, plans, capabilities and programs
in space, to discuss certain aspects of Soviet space sciences and space tech-
nology, and to survey and analyze their international political and legal
implications." No classified documents were used.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet
Space Programs, 1966-1970: Goals and Purposes, Organizations, Resources,
Facilities and Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Programs, Bioastro-
nautics. Civil and Military Applications, Projections of Future Plans, Attitudes
Toward International Cooperation and Space Law. Staff report prepared by the
Science Policy Research Division and the Foreign Affairs Division of the
Congressional Research Service and the European Law Division of the Law
Library, Library of Congress. 92d Cong. 1st sess., Sen. Doc. No. 92-51. De-
cember 9, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 670 p.

"This document is an update, since 1966, of the series of studies designed
to identify Soviet space goals and purposes, organizations, resources, facilities
and hardware; past and on-going programs of flights; research and applica-
tions ; and projections of expected future plans ; together with the international
political and legal implications of these policies."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet
Space Programs, 1971: A Supplement to the Corresponding Report Covering the
Period 1966-1970. Staff report by the Science Policy Research Division,
Congressional Research Service, April 1972. 92d Cong., 2d sess. V/ashington,
U.S. Govt. Print. OflF., 1972. 74 p. (Committee print.'

The study supplements the previous study Soviet Space Programs, 1966-

1970, adding new data on Soviet space programs. It also includes some refined

interpretations of earlier events and some more direct comparisons with

the United States effort in space.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Space

Agreements with the Soviet Union. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess June 23, 1972.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 97 p.

The hearing deals with the space agreements signed between the United

States and the Soviet Union, May 24, 1972. The purpose is to give some

perspective to the hearings with respect to both policies for U.S. international

cooperative program^s in space and general relationships with the Soviet

Union. Testimony was taken from officials of the Department of State and

NASA. Background information on the agreements is included.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Space

Cooperation Between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hearings, 92 Cong.,

1st. sess., March 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 30 p.

Hearings, with testimony from officials of the Department of State and

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to ui^date the Congress

on discussions held between the United States and the Soviet Union on

potential cooperation in space.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Statements

by Presidents of the United States on International Cooperation in Space: A

Chronology: October 1957-August 1971. 92d Cong, l.st sess. Senate Document No.

92-40. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 126 p.

"This is a compilation of statements of four 'space age' Presidents of the
United States, since October 1957 — the beginning of the era of space explora-
tion. It offers documentation on more than a decade of a consistent national
policy for international cooperation which has been a part of the American

96-243 O - 77 - 34

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space program. It submits that the idea of cooperation among Nations on
planet Earth was not only a natural technological consequence of space-
oriented science and technology, as it evolved, but also was to be one of the
purposeful reasons for the investment made by the American people in this
new venture in the history of mankind."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronuatical and Space Sciences. United
States International Space Programs: Texts of Executive Agreements, Memoranda
of Understanding, and Other International Arrangements, 1969-1965. Staff
report. 89th Cong. 1st sess. Sen. Doc. No. 44. July 30, 1965. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 575 p.

Includes the texts of executive agreements, memoranda of understanding
and other international arrangements dealing with space made between 1959
and June 1965.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 92d Cong., 2d sess. Sen.
Ex. Rept. No. 92-38, Oct. 4, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972.
14 p.

Report recommending ratification of the Convention on International

Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, signed on March 29, 1972.

U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Office of International

Affairs. International Programs. January 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.

Off., 1973. 70 p.

This short pamphlet gives a summary of major documents and statistics
to describe NASA international activities. Items deal with authority and
policy; data on cooperative projects, including: satellite and probe projects,
foreign experiments on NASA satellites, mission definition and systems
design studies, sounding rocket projects, earth resources survey, ground-
based projects; reimbursable launchings; tracking and data acquisition
cooperation, maps of station agreements, and data on personnel exchanges.
Valentine, Burl. "Obstacles to Space Cooperation: Europe and the Post- Apollo
Experience. Research Policy, v. 1, Apr. 1972: 105-121.

Discusses the problems connected with foreign participation in the

post-Apollo program and why the U.S. is interested in obtaining such

participation.

Waldmann, Raymond J. "The Changing Outlook for U.S. Aerospace Abroad:

a State Department Perspective." Dept. of State Bulletin, v. 70, May 27, 1974:

588-592.

An address by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and
Telecommunications.

SPACE SATELLITE APPLICATIONS

American Society of International Law. Panel on International Telecommunica-
tions Policy. The International Telecommunication Union: Issues and New
Steps: A Report. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1971.
•Codding, George A. Jr. International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in
International Control. International Propaganda and Communications Series,
New Yorlc, Arno Press, 1972.
Freivalds, John. "Bringing Space Down to Earth: Space Age Technology Transfer
and the Developing Countries." Journal of Developing Areas, v. 8, Oct. 1973:
83-92.
Galloway, Eilene. "International Aspects of Earth Resources Satellites." Aug. 2,
1974. 18 p. Appears in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences. Earth Resources Satellites. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. 1974. p.
264-281.
Galloway, Eilene. "Remote Sensing from Outer Space: Legal Implications of
Worldwide TJtiUzation and Dissemination of Data." Paper presented at a
Symposium on the Legal Implications of Remote Sensing from Outer Space,
October 16, 1975, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal
Canada. Typescript, 15 pp.

The paper addresses the current position regarding the use and dissemina-
tion of data, problems requiring attention, and hkely national and inter-
national ways of approaching the future. The author deals specifically with
the state of the art of the technology, the NASA agreement for ground
stations, U.S. poUcy on an open discussion of data problems, and space
treaties.
Kildow, Judith Tegger. Intelsat: Policy-maker's Dilemma. Lexington, Lexington
Books, 1973. 118 p.

"Somewhat sketchy, but an informative review of the development of
U.S. communications satellite policy during the 1960s which usefully high-
lights the policy issues involved in determining the character of our inter-
national participation."
Leive, David M. International Telecommunications and International Law: the
Regulation of the Radio Spectrum. Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana PubUca-
tions, Inc., 1970. 376 p.

Prepared under the auspices of the American Society of International Law.
Leive, Da\id M. "The Future of the International Telecommunications Union."
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, no. 3, September 1972: 69 p. (Available
from the American Society of International Law.)

A report under the auspices of the Society Panel on International Tele-
communications Policy which evaluates the basic functions and structures
of the ITU and recommends specific ways for improving the Union. Supported
• bv NSF RANN award: GI-29927.
Levy, Steven A. "INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the Transformation
of a Regime." International Organization, vol. 29, no. 3, summer 1975: 655-680.
"The question arises whether 'technological imperatives' or political
considerations will guide the activity and determine the structure of regimes
that support the use of technology on an international scale. In the case of
communications satellites, the establishment of such a regime involves the
search for structures that could satisfy technology and still remain responsive
to political forces that desired to affect the decision-making process. The
regime which has emerged resulted from the interplay of technology and
politics. Initially it consisted of a single global agency, INTELSAT, but as the
full potential of the technology became known, a single agency could not pro-
vide an ad9quate forum for the political interasts that were associated with
each new application that was discovered. Thus, the regime came to consist of
a number of related organizations each dedicated to particular uses of the
technology."

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2030

Misko, Carol. "Exploration in Intercultural Exchange by Satellite." Paper

presented at the Annual meeting of the International Communications Assoc,

New Orleans, April 1974. 5 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20267-P.

Pelton, Joseph N. Global Communications Satellite Policy: Intelsat, Politics, and

Functionalisni. Mt. Airy, Md., Lomond Books, 1974. 19'6 p.

"An examination of the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization by a member of COMSAT, the Communications Satellite
Corporation. The author tests and finds inadequate the functionalist theories
of Ernst Haas and David Mitrany when applied to international communica-
tions sateUite policy, but he sees value in INTELSAT as a prototype for
international cooperation." (1)
Stanley Foundation. "International Cooperation in Outer Space: a Report of
the 15th Strategy for Peace Conference." In Remarks of Frank E. Moss.
Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 121, Jan. 23, 1975: SS10-S812.

Conference focused on the foreign policy and space policy role of U.S.
toward communication, remote sensing, and other applications satellites and
the role of international organizations in international cooperation in outer
space.
StuU, Lee T. "United States Proposes Voluntary Principles on Direct Broad-
casting by Satellite." Dept. of State Bulletin, v. 70, Apr. 22, 1974: 445-451.

U.S. State Dept. official's statement to the U.N. Outer Space Committee's

Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites at Geneva on March 11-12.

United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. The Application of Space

Technology to Development. New York, United Nations, 1973. 78 p. (United

Nations. [Document] ST/ECA/161) "United Nations pubUcation. Sales no.

E.72.II.A.12"

The Advisorj'- Committee suggested that developing countries should pay

increased attention to the earth-oriented space technology applications, and

consider carefully which of those applications could help solve their own

priority problems and assist them in achieving a quantum jump in their

development."

United Nations. General Assembly. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space. Report. New York, United Nations, 1974. 39 p. (United Nations.

[Document] A/9620)

Deals primarily with a report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
on the United Nations and Space Applications, including a treaty to register
objects launched into space.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National
Security Pohcy and Scientific Developments. Foreign Policy Implications of
Satellite Communications. Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1970. 212 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Report on the
International Conference of States of the Distribution of Programme Carrying
Signals Transmitted by Satellite. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 45 p.
At head of title : Committee print. "Serial U"

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE: COOPERATION AND
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Ashbrook, John. "Soviet Military Might: Western Made." New Guard, v. 14,
Jan.-Feb. 1974: 6-9.

Congressman Ashbrook writes that "perhaps as much as 90 to 95 percent
of Soviet technology came directly or indirectly from the United States and
its allies. Now this may sound incredible, but the facts substantiate this
claim. Soviet aggression is dependent upon American-made and Western-
made technology."
Branscomb, Lewis M. Science, Technology and Detents. (Washington). Program
of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George Wasjiington University,
March 1975. 35 p. fProgram of Policy Studies in Science and Technology.
Occasional Paper No. 17.)

A revised version of a paper presented to a January 1975 seminar sponsored
by the Graduate Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy of the
George Washington University. The author examines the course of U.S. -
Soviet scientific and technological relations ^nd offers prescriptions for
maximizing U.S. benefits in this relationship.
Butcher, William S. "U.S.-U.S.S.R.: Expertise Exchange," Water Spectrum v. 5.
no. 1, 1973: 17-24.

"In the water resources field, U.S. and Soviet professionals will pool

information, discuss each other's ideas and plan research, using experience

developed in either country."

Campbell, Robert W. and Paul Marer. East-West Trade and Technology Transfer:

Proceedings of a Conference. Bloomington, Indiana University, International

Development Research Center, 1974. 85 p. (Studies in East European and

Soviet Dlanning, development, and trade no. 20)

"This report is a summary of the ideas and proposals for research generated
at a conference on East-West Trade and Technology Transfer sponsored by
the International Development Research Center at Indiana University.
The goals of the conference were (1) to arrive at some sort of expert con-
sensus regarding the state of knowledge and the issues in which more research
needs to be done as a basis for decisions regarding the increases in trade and
economic contracts with the Soviet Union, East Europe, and China expected
in the coming decade; and (2) to suggest approaches and priorities for such

Callen, Earl and Edward A. Stern, "Abuses of Scientific Exchanges." Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, v. 31, Feb. 1975: 32-35.

Argues that exchanges should be conditioned on the right of Soviet scien-
tists to travel freely and be allowed to pursue their scientific work unmolested.
Casey, William J. "Technological Exchange and Detente." Dept. of State Bulletin,
V. 70, Mar. 25, 1974: 308-311.

Address by the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs on Feb. 28 before
a seminar on technology exchange with the U.S.S.R. held jointly by the
representatives of 87 U.S. firms (press release 74).
Casey, William J., and others. "Technology Exchange With the U.S.S.R.
Research Management, v. 17, July 1974: 7-17.

A series of four "articles by Federal Government leaders, review our expe-
rience to date, explain National policies related to technology transfer, and
offer guidelines and suggestions on how to proceed in negotiating with the
Russians."
Conference on Soviet Resource Management and the Environment. Held at the
University of Washington, Seattle, June 1974.

Various papers dealing with water pollution, manpower, raw materials, the
environment, air pollution, non-fossil energy resources, agriculture, and
urban growth available from the Office of External Research, U.S. Depart-
ment of State.

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2032

DeHaven, James C. Technology Exchange: Import Possibilities From the U.S.S.R.
Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, 1974. 37 p. (Rand Corporation. [Report] R-1414-
ARPA.)

Report "discusses -vrhat forms of technological information from the
Soviet Union may be useful to the United States"for saving our own resources,
paying in kind for U.S. technology, or negotiating for transfer of our tech-
nology to the Soviet Union."
Dockum, Maj. Robert R. "United States Trade with the Soviet Union: Efifects
on United States National Security Policy." Report no. 0790, Air Command
and Staff College, Air University, May 1974. 58 p. Available from the State
Department as FAR 21801-G.
"East-West Think Tank Born." Science. October 13, 1972: 143.

Describe the origins of the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis and the role of the National Academy of Sciences in establishing
the research center.
Elliot, Iain F. The Soviet Energy Balance: Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and
Alternative Power Sources. New York. Praeger, 1974. 277 p.

"An admirable exposition of the Soviet Union's situation and prospects in
energy, bringing together a wealth of statistical information from scattered
Soviet sources. One of the main conclusions is that increasing domestic
consumption will intensify the problem of keeping up exports of oil and gas
to Eastern and Western Europe." (1)
Fedoseev, P. N. "The Social Significance of the Scientific and Technological
Revolution." International Social Science Journal, v. 27, 1975: 151-162.

A Marxist point of view bj^ the Vice President of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences. Science and social problems/Technology and social problems.
Ginsburgs, George. "The Soviet Union and the Biosphere." International Journal,
v. 28, winter 1972-73: 50-68.

Concludes that the U.S.S.R. is on a par with the "capitalist" countries in
the quality of its environmental policies.
Graham, Loren R. "Aspects in Sharing Science and TechnologJ^" In XJ.S.A.-
U.S.S.R.: Agenda for Communication. Philadelphia, American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1974. Annals, v. 414, July 1974) p. 84-95.

Discusses the problems of Soviet-American scientific exchange in light of
the human-rights issues of Soviet scientists.
Graham, Loren. R. "The Formation of Soviet Research Institutes: a Combina-
tion of Revolutionary Innovation and International Borrowing." Paper at the
annual meeting of the International Slavic Conference, Banff, Canada, Sep-
tember 1974. 25 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20020-P.
Gromyko, Anat. "Washington's New Technological Policy." International
Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, Feb. 1972: 42-69.

Discusses the concept of a "broad technological exchange" in the inter-
national arena as a new mode of U.S. foreign policy.
Hanson, Philip. "The Russian Connection." New Scientist, v.' 65, Jan. 23, 1975:
195-197.

"Despite its repudiation last week of certain terms of its trade agreement
with the U.S., the Soviet Union maintains a keen appetite for western tech-
nology. Though it should have much to gain from such trade, the U.S.S.R.
is still extraordinarily self-sufficient in machinery and plant."
Harvey, Mose L., Leon Goure, and Vladimir Prokofieff. Science and Technology
as an Instrument of Soviet Policy. (Miami) Center for Advanced International
Studies, University of Miami, 1972. 219 p. (Monographs in International
Affairs)

"The purpose of this book is to give a documentary account of the Soviet

leaders' views of scientific technological progress and the present and future

role they expect it to play, especially in the sphere of East-West competition."

Holden, Constance. "Soviet-U.S. Summit: Science Accords Open the Waj' to

Joint Projects." Science, v. 176, June 9, 1972: 1106-1108.

"The strategic arms limitation agreement was the crowning public achieve-
ment of the Russian-American summit meeting, but several other accords,
for which quiet preparations had been months in the making, promise to
to supply a coherent framework for cooperation in the areas of health, space,
the environment, and science and technology."
Horelick, Arnold L. "The Soviet Union, the Middle East, and the Evolving
World Energy Situation." Policy Sciences, v. 6, Mar. 1975: 41-48

An assessment of Soviet energy policy in the next ten years as reflected ini
international political terms.

2033

Irwin, Theodore. "Washington-Moscow Medical Hot Line." Parade [Washington
Post] Mar. 31, 1974: 14, 16-17.

A medical and scientific information exchange system between Moscow
and Rockvile, Md., was opened in the fall of 1973.
"Is U.S. Giving Away Too Much to Russia?" U.S. News & World Report, v. 77^
Sept. 23, 1974: 68-74.

"For the Soviet Union: a huge truck plant ... a fertilizer complex
... oil and gas development ... all made possible by U.S. know-how.
What next? Advanced computers? Aircraft factories? Critics ask what U.S.
gets in return? Includes an interview with Robert C. Seamans, Jr., president
of the National Academy of Engineering and a top Pentagon and NASA
official."
Kassel, Simon. "The Relationship Between Science and the Military in the
Soviet Union." Report R-1457 (RAND Corp.) DDRE/DARPA, prepared
for DDRE and DARPA, U.S. Dept. of Defense, July 1974. 53 p. Available
from the State Dept. as FAR 20756-G.
Kassofif, Allen H. "The Exchange of People and Ideas. In U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.:
Agenda for Communication. Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 1974. Annals, v. 414, July 1974: 73-83.

Paper focuses on the long-term exchange of individuals between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.
Korneyev, S. "Soviet Scientists' International Ties." International Affairs,
no. 6, June 1974: 76-80.

The Head, Foreign Relations Department, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
describes the Soviets' international foreign exchange program.
Lebedeva, Ye A. and P. A. Nedotko. "The National Science Foundation."
U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 10, Oct. 1974: 115-131.
Soviet view of the National Science Foundation.
Lent, Harold. "East European Chemical Production and Trade." In U.S.
Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Reorientation and Commercial Relations
of the Economies of Eastern Europe: a Compendium of Papers. Wasliington, U.S-
Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 394-405.

"This paper reviews the results of the 'chemicalization' campaign with

particular attention to its effects on East European trade in chemicals and

the demand for Western technology."

Levine, Herbert S. "An American View of Economic Relations With the U.S.S.R."

In U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Agenda for Communicatioii. Philadelphia, American

Academy of PoUtical and Social Science, 1974. Annals, v. 414, July 1974

p. 1-17.

"The current rise in U.S. -U.S.S.R. trade has its antecedents, which are dis-
cussed briefly in the first section of this paper. Attention is then focused on
the basic economic reasons which might be adduced for the manifest increased
Soviet interest in expanded economic relations with the United States.
Special emphasis is given to the Soviet desire to import advanced Western
technology. The salient issues in the current discussions of expanded
U.S. -U.S.S.R. economic relations are indicated and examined."
Longrigg, A. J. "Soviet Science and the Closed Society." World Today, v. -28,
May 1972: 216-228.

Discusses the restrictions placed on contacts between Soviet citizens and
those of other States, giving particular attention to recent developments
in international communication in the area of science and technology.
Longrigg, Tony. "Soviet Science and Foreign Policy." Survey, v. 17, autumn
1971: 30-50.

"This essay is concerned with Soviet international science policy — the
relations of Soviet scientists and science policy-makers with their opposite
numbers abroad, mainly in the Western capitalist countries, and particularly
with the consequences of these relations for Soviet foreign policy in
general . . ."
Mansfield, Edwin. "East-West Technological Cooperation and Competition."
NATO Review, v. 23, Aug. 1975: 16-19.

Maintains that technological cooperation ". . . can be of considerable
economic benefit to the Soviet Union . . ." but the benefit to West is
harder to demonstrate.
McMullin, Rod J. "U.S.S.R. Electric Power Technology Impresses American
Visitors." Public Power, v. 30, Nov.-Dec. 1972: 27-30.

"U.S. Technical Mission to Exchange Transmission Line Data inspected
Soviet EHV installations and other power facilities."

2034

Negru, Radu and Al Dragut. "Collaboration and Cooperation in the Domain
of Scientific Research Among Comecon Countries." Soviet and Eastern European
Foreign Trade, v. 8, fall-winter 1972: 363-372.

Economic integration — [Eastern Europe]/ Research and development —
[Eastern Europe]/ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Notzold, Jurgen. "East-West Cooperation and Communication." Aussenpolitik,
V. 25, 3d quarter 1974: 293-302.

Argues that managerial cooperation and technical advice need to be a part
of technology transfer to the Eastern European countries.
Oliver, John B and Elliott J. Weiss. "Is Selling Technology to the Soviets Danger-
ous?" Harvard Business Review, v. 53, Jan.-Feb. 1975: 18, 144-145.

Discusses the growing concern about U.S. security as the Soviets have
placed greater emphasis on acquiring American production technology.
Perry, Robert. Comparisons of Soviet and U.S. Technology. Springfield, Va.,
Distributed bv NTIS, 1973. 40 p. "AD-771 004"

"The military sector of Soviet R&D may be more efficient than the
civilian sector ... in aircraft development, the Soviet military R&D
systems appears to be more efficient than U.S. military R&D."
Petrov, Valdimir. U.S.-Soviet Detente: Past and Future. Washington, D.C. Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 60 p. (Foreign
Afi^airs Study 18.)

An analysis and appraisal of U.S.-Soviet detente, especially as seen by
the Soviets. The study is divided into two major sections. The first deals
with U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and the second deals with detente in the
world at large. Among the topics covered are the Soviet view of the United
States, SALT, and Soviet perceptions, and economic relations.
Radio Liberty Committee. The Diffusion of Imported Technology in the U.S.S.R.
New York, 1975. 10 1. "Radio Liberty Research, RL 194/75, May 9, 1975."
Discusses the problems of Soviet institutions "at diffusing imported
Western technology within the Soviet economy."
Haiflfa, Howard. "IIASA Ponders Initial Research Program." Public Science, v.
4, Mar. 1973: 7-14.

An outline of the 9 major research themes and 9 specific studies under
consideration by the IIASA, which is a center for the joint study of problems
shared bv industrial nations.
Schilling, Gerhard F. and M. Kathleen Hunt. "Women in Science and Tech-
nology: U.S./U.S.S.R. Comparisons." RAND paper P-5239, June 1974. 67
p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR 20647-P.
Shaplev, Deborah. "Detente: Travel Curbs Hinder U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges."
Science, v. 186, Nov. 22, 1974: 712-715.

Discusses exchange of scientists between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Sheydhna, I. L. "Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology." U.S.A.:
Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 1, Jan. 1974: 35-49.

Discusses Soviet-American cooperation in science and technology.
Stein, John. R. "Estimating the Market for Computers in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe." Report, R-1406-CIEP-ARPA, prepared by the RAND
Corp. for the Council on International Economic Pohcy and DARPA, U.S.
Dept. of Defense, May 1974. 31 p. Available from the State Dept. as FAR
19652-G.
Sutton, Antony C. National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union. New

Rochelle, New York, Arlington House Publishers, Inc. 1973.
Sutton, Antony C. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development,
1943-65. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 482 p.

"The theme of this work by an engineer and economist ... is the
total dependence of the U.S.S.R"^ on Western technology, and the refusal of
Western governments to recognize this and draw the necessary lessons from
it." (1)
Sutton, Antony C. "Western Technology in the Soviet Union— a Summation.
Washington and Lee Commerce Review, v. 1, winter 1973: 120-134.

Presents an analysis of Soviet use of Western technology from 1917 to

1965.

Symposium on Scientific and Technical Information. Moscow, 1973. The U.S.S.R.

Scientific and Technical Information System: a U.S. View. Washington, Office of

Science Information Service, National Science Foundation [distributed by

NTIS] 1973. 63 p. "NTIS-SR-73-01"

Report of an 8 man team of U.S. information specialists visit to mforma-
tion centers in Moscow, Novosibirsk, Akademgorodok, Yerevan, Kiev, and
Leningrad.

2035

"Trucks Will Soon Flow From Kama River." Industry Week, v. 183, Oct. 28,
1974:40-43.

"The world's largest truck plant may be located on Soviet soil, but, by .the
time it goes into production next year, Kamaz will include more than $1
billion worth of Western technology."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee
on International Cooperation in Science and Space. Research and Development
Collaboration with the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Report. September 1973. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 30 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee
on International Cooperation in Science and Space. The Technology Balance:
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Advanced Technology Transfer. Hearings. 93d Cong., 1st and 2d
sess. Dec. 4-6, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 249 p. [No. 27]
"Hearings ... to assess the value and implications of advanced tech-
nology transfer between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Includes a list of tech-
nology transfer examples involving individual American companies and
submitted statements."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee
on International Cooperation in Science and Space. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative
Agreements. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess. Hearings held June 13 . . . 21,

1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. 208 p. [No. 20]
Concerned with cooperative agreements on science and technologj^

medical science and public health, environmental protection and space
exploration.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee
on International Cooperation in Science and Space. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative
Agreements; Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1972. 28 p. (Committee
print.)
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Reorientation and Commercial Rela-
tions of the Economics of Eastern Europe; a Compendium of Papers. (Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off.) August 16, 1974. 771 p. At head of title: 93d Cong.,
2d sess. Joint Committee print.

An in-depth survey of economic policy and performance in the East

European countries. Approximately one-third of the volume is dev»ted to

foreign economic relations.

U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee.'- )Soi;zef Economic Prospects for the

Seventies; a Compendium of Papers. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. June 27,

1973. 776 p. At head of title: 93d Cong., 1st sess. Joint Committee print.
A compendium of articles on various aspects of the Soviet economy.

Coordinated and edited, with an introductory summary, bj' John P. Hardt,

CRS Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics.
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and
Economj^ in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China.
Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. April 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1974. 81 p.

"Hearings ... to receive testimony from the CIA regarding the com-
parative economic strength of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of
China, and the U.S."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Background Materials Relating to
the U.S.-Soviet Union Commercial Agreements. 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 100 p. (Committee print.)

"Staff document provides summaries and background information on
major commercial agreements concluded between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union during 1972 and 1973."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Multi-
national Corporations. U.S. Trade and Investment in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe: The Role of Multinational Corporations. 93d Cong., 2d sess.
December 20, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 45 p. (Committee
print.)

"Report on 7-part hearings and investigation into the role of mutinational
corporations in East- West trade and investment and the relationship of
trade expansion to detente. Also highlights hearings on the Siberian liquified
natural gas projects: the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. "North Star" project, and the
U.S.-Japanese-U.S.S.R. Yakutsk project." (3)

2036

XJ.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations. Western Investment in Communist Economies;
a Selected Survey on Economic Interdependence. (By) John P. Hardt, George D.
Holliday and Young C. Kim, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., July 29, 1974. 67 p. (93d Cong.,
2d sess.. Senate. Report No. 93-1033)

Analysis of the new industrial cooperation arrangements that have fostered
an expansion of East-West commercial relations. The study assesses the
prospects for economic interdependence between East and West.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. U.S /U.S.S.R. Technology Licensing Prospects. [Wash-
ington] 1973. 34 p.

"Summary report of U.S. delegation visit to U.S.S.R. for study of Soviet
management and licensing practices."
U.S. General Accounting Office, Comparison of Military Research and Develop-
ment Expenditures of the United States and the Soviet Union. In Extension of
Remarks of Michael J. Harrington. Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 117,
July 21, 1971: [E8607-E8619.]
U.S. General Accounting Office. A Progress Report on United States-Soviet Union
Cooperative Programs, Jan. 8, 1975. (ID 75-18.)

Identifies many problems in the administration of the cooperative agree-
ment. In addition to suggesting administrative remedies, the report recom-
mends far more congressional involvement in formulating and administering
the program.
■U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Joint Symposium on Congenital Heart Disease, Washington, 1973.
Proceedings. [Bethesda, Md., National Heart and Lung Institute, 1973] 609 p.
(U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare. DHEW pubUcation no. (NIH)
74^613.)
Wade, Nicholas. "Computer Sales to U.S.S.R.: Critics Look for Quid Pro
Quos." Science, v. 183, Feb. 8, 1974: 499-501.

Discusses the problem of preventing the U.S.S.R. from obtaining advanced
U.S. technology.
Walsh, John. "Soviet- American Copvright Deals: Better Where Barter Is Pos-
sible." Science, v. 186. Nov. 29, 1974: 805-807.
White, Edward P., ed. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Sale and License Prospects for Technology
and Patents. [Pittsburgh, Licensma Executives Society (U.S.A.), cl974] 152 p.
"Observations and suggestiiwfe on the buying and selling of patents and
technology with the U.S.S.R." A report based upon the July 10-28, 1973
trip of the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Union on Patent Management and
Licensing, supplemented with material and data made available later, in-
cluding the first English language printing of the new Soviet law on Indus-
trial Property Rights, a specific listing of Soviet FTO's Ministries, etc., with
the principal persons involved, and other pertinent reference material,
jointly sponsored by the United States Patent Office and the Licensing
Executives Society."
Wilczynski, J. Technology in Comecon: Acceleration of Technological Progress
Through Economic Planning and the Market. New York, Praeger, 1974. 379 p.
An analysis of the role of science and technology in various sectors of the
Comecon economies. Includes sections on technological cooperation in
Comecon and East- West technological relations.
Yalowitz, Kenneth. "U.S.S.R. — Western Industrial Cooperation." In Soviet
Economic Prospects for the Seventies. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1973. p. 712-718.

Considers forms of industrial cooperation, the U.S.S.R.'s perspective, and
possible obstacles.
Ziman, John. "The Problem of Soviet Scientists." Nature, v. 246, Dec. 7, 1973:
322-323.

The author expresses the view that scientific institutions should counter
the Soviet policy of repression of scientists.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RELATED ISSUES

International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The International Bureau of
Weights and Measures, 1875-1975. [Washington] U.S. National Bureau of
Standards [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1975. 248 p.
(U.S. National Bureau of Standards. NBS special publication 420).

A translation of the Bureau's centennial volume which describes their
development and function.
]MiddIeton, R. W. "Standardization and International Economic Cooperation."
Journal of World Trade Law, v. 7, Sept.-Oct. 1973: 500-517.

The author of the article is Assistant Secretary- General of International
Organization for Standardization.
]Miklovicz, Andras. "International Standards and Food Law." Food, Drug,
Cosmetic Law Journal, v. 28, May 1973: 332-339.

Argues for the establishment of international standards of weights and
measures and of additive regulation be applied to foods.
Teiser, H. Steffen, Michael L. McNeil, and Doris M. Bluebond, eds. Collaborative
Research Program Between NBS and Indian Scientific Institutions: Special
Foreign Currency Pronram 1973, Status. Washington, U.S. National Bureau
of Standards [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1973.
132 p. (U.S. National Bureau of Standards. Technical note 798.)
A review of NBS sponsored research in India.
Sturen, Olle. "Toward International Standardization." National Bureau of
Standards Technical News Bulletin, v. 56, Oct. 1972: 236-237, 250.

The Secretary- General of the I.S.O. discusses "pending legislation on inter-
national standards, the International Voluntary Standards Cooperation Act
of 1972, and the Bureau's heavy involvement in international standards
programs."
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Sub-
committee on Comrherce and Finance. International Voluntary Standards, 1974.
Hearings, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., March and April 1974, Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 233 p.

Hearings on H.R. 7596, the International Voluntary Standards Coopera-
tion Act to foster U.S. participation and representation in development and
use of international voluntary standards. The hearings considered j". . .
the advantages of increased U.S. involvement in international standardization
activities to protect the needs of American industry and prevent trade
barriers and the loss of export markets. TM hearings focused on the ability
of the bill's proposed traditional, voluntary methods to provide carefully
drawn standards which facilitate competition and avoid possible frozen
technology, damage to small competitors, and increased consumer prices."
U'.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Development. Conversion to the Metric System of
Weights and Measures. Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1973. 665 p. Hearings held Mar. 19 and May 10, 1973. "No. 3"
Metric system— [U.S.]/ Weights and measures/Standards/Intemational
cooperation in science/International economic relations.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Patent Cooperation
Treaty and Annexed Regulations. Sen. Exec. Rept. 93-20. 93d Cong. 1st sess.
Oct. 18, 1973. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 10 p.

Recommends ratification of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970,

which establishes centralized filing procedures and standardized application

formats for the same patent invention application filed in different countries.

"U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Office of Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology.

"Lack of U.S. Action in World Standards Costs Exporters [dollars]." Commerce

Today, v. 1, May 31, 1971: 4-7.

"Senate hearing to consider measures involving government/industry
approach to a solution."

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U.S. Library of Congress, Science Policy Research Division. Voluntary Industrial
S(a7idards in the United States: an Overview of Their Evolution and Significance
for the Congress. Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and De-
velopment of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of
Representatives, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1974. 122 p. At head of title: Committee print. "Serial T"

Standards — [U.S.]/Standards — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/International

cooperation in science/International agencies/U.S. National Bureau of Stand-

ards./American National Standards Institute. /International Electrotechnical

Commission. /International Standards Organization.

Vrethem, Ake T. "International Standards." ASTM [American Society for Testing

and Materials] Standardization News, v. 2, Oct. 1974: 9-33, 54-56.

A seven-part article on the International Organization for Standardization
and the general topic of international cooperation on standardization.

WEATHER MODIFICATION: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Caplan, Robert. "Weather Modification and War." Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars, v. 6, Jan.-March 1974: 28-31.

The author discusses the use of environmental weapons in Southeast
Asia.
Daniel, Howard. One Hundred Years of International Cooperation in Meteorology,
1873-197S, An Historical Review. Secretariat, World Meteorological Organiza-
tion, Switzerland, 1973.
"International Aspects of Weather Modification." Department of State Bulletin,

V. 67, Aug. 21, 1972: 212-217.
Shapley, Deborah, "Weather Warfare: Pentagon Concedes Seven- Year Vietnam

Efifort." Science, v. 184, June 7, 1974: 1059-1061.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
International Organizations. ProhibUion of Weather Modification as a Weapon
of War. Hearings on H. Res. 28, 94th Cong. Ist sess., July 29, 1975. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 51 p.

Hearings to discuss whether the United States should seek agreement with
other members of the United Nations to prohibit weather modification
activity as a weapon of war.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements. Weather Modification as a Weapon of
War. Hearings on H. Res. 116 and H. Res. 329, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Sept. 1974.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 39 p.

"Hearing . . . calling on U.S. Government to seek international agree-
ments prohibiting research, experimentation, and use of weather modification
as a weapon of war." (3)
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science. Planetary
Science and the Tiarth's Upper Atmosphere. Hearings, January 20, 1975. 94th
Cong. 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 212 p.

Testimony addresses composition of the upper atmosphere and studies
done to assess effects or impacts of technology and its by-products on the
upper atmosphere.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.- Prohibiting Environ'
mental Modification as a Weapon of War; Report To Accompany S. Res. 71.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973. 7 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Weather Modification.
Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. 123 p.
Hearings held Jan. 25 and Mar. 20. 1974.

"The need for an international agreement prohibiting the use of environ-
mental and geophysical modification as weapons of war and briefing on
Department of Defense weather modification activity."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Oceans
and International Environment. Prohibiting Military Weather Modification.
Hearings, 92d Cong. 2d sess. July 26, 27, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1972. 162 p.

Hearings on S. Res. 281, to determine whether the United States should
agree to an international treaty, prohibiting the use of weather or climate
modification research and experimentation for military purposes.
"Weather Modification As a Weapon." Technology Review, v. 78, Oct. to Nov.
1975: 57-63.

Gives the history of using weather modification as a weapon of war and
discusses the perilous political implications of such activities.

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Weiss, Edith Brown. "International Responses to Weather Modification."'
International Organization, v. 29, no. 3, summer 1975: 805-826.

"In the past few decades we have been improving our understanding of
the weather system and exploring ways to modify it. Over sixty countries
have experimented with modifjing the weather. The new technology of
weather and chmate modification will raise important political problems
which will demand new responses from the international community. Whether
states will be able to establish the cooperative measures necessary to develop
and manage new technology depends upon whether there are sufficient
incentives to do so. This article analyzes the historical patterns of interna-
tional cooperation in meteorology, and then plots against several time hori-
zons projected developments and capabilities in weather modification
technology and the potential problems emerging fr«m using the technology.
It derives a tentative picture of the responsibilities demanded, compares
the likely responses with those needed, and assesses whether they will be
adequate for the problems projected."
Weiss, Lawrence A. "Weather Modification as a Modest Proposal." Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law, v. 4, Winter 1974: 159-177.
The author proposes international laws and regulations governing weather
control and gives a rationale for his proposals.
WMO/IAMAP Scientific Conference on Weather Modification. Tashkent 1973^
Proceedings/ Geneva. Secretariat of the World Meteorological Organization, 1974..
539 p.

AUGUST 1977 ADDENDUM

TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL INDEPENDENCE: GENERAL ISSUES

Basiuk, Victor. Technology, World Politics and American Policy. Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1977. 409 p.

"With experience in the Washington policy-making process and an exten-
sive knowledge of science and international politics, Victor Basiuk analyzes
the present and projected state of technology, focusing on the dislocations
societies will experience from rapid technological advance. The dislocations
are contrasted with the ability of individual nations and regions to develop
coherent strategies to cope with the post-industrial society. Basiuk examines
the relationship between the dependent and independent effects of tech-
nology. . ."

"To avoid crises in readjusting to the new realities of the future, the
reponses to the semi-stationary society must begin now. The U.S. must
reasses."- its national purpose, emphasizing intellectual and cultural acliieve-
ment in its orientation of values and placing less emphasis on material
rewards. Throughout, Basiuk favors long-term and well thought-out struc-
tural changes over haphazard short-term responses."
Bergsten, C. Fred. "Interdependence and the Reform of International Institu-
tions." International Organization, v. 30, spring 1976: 361-372.

Bergsten proposes "to bring all issues of international interdependence
under the governance of effective international rules and institutional
arrangements. This requires the creation of a few new institutions and the
reform of several existing institutions, each to pursue functionally specific
tasks. It requires engaging all relevant actors in the decision- making process,
while at the same time developing collective leadership of the system through
joint management by a small group of the most powerful countries. It requires
both more national willingness to submit important issues to international
institutional determination, and more effective management in the institution
to spur the process."
Center for the Study of Social Policy. Assessment of Future National and Inter-
national Problem Areas. Vol. I. [Washington, National Science Foundation, for
sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977. 112 p.

"SRI project 4676"

"This is a report on an exploratory effort to anticipate emerging and future

problem areas that can be addressed productively by science and technology.

The aim of this report is to assist government decisionmakers with systematic

and credible early-warning techniques to better anticipate future national —

and international-scale problems so they can be dealt with before they become

serious or intractable."

Drath, L., M. Gibbons, and J. Ronayne. "The European Molecular Biology

Organization: A Case-Study of Decision-making in Science Policy." Research

Policy, V. 4, Mar. 1975: 56-78.

"This paper describes how, from the point of view of the British system

of science, the decision was taken to join the European Molecular Biology

Conference. The paper concludes that the decision-making process may be

more aptly described as incremental than rationalistic."

Haas, Ernst B., "On Systems and International Regimes." World Politics, v. 27,

Jan. 1975: 147-174.

Presents "a. four-fold typology of systems theories together with their
assumptions and relevance to the creation of international regimes. The
article then examines three specific proposals for international action on
science and technology, prepared under OECD auspices, in order to demon-
strate the extent to which they rely on systems theory and to determine
how persuasive the systemic justification is. The conclusion: there is an
inverse relationship between the elaborateness of the systemic justification
and the acceptability of the regime on logical, empirical, and moral grounds.' '

1 Prepared by Genevieve J. Knezo. analyst. Science and Teclinology, Science Policy
Research Division. Assistance provided by Elaine Carlson, research assistant, Senior
Specialist Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

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2042

Laszlo, Ervin, et. al. Goals for Mankind: A Report to the Club of Rome on the New
Horizons of Global Community. New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1977.
434 p.

Based on the theory that our growing socio-political constraints and the
failure of our organizational culture can be explained by an absence of an
international system of shared values, the report is the result of a survey of
the goals of 19 nations, conducted by an international project team of more
than 100 individuals representing various disciplines. Long-term commonly
shared goals are identified; encouragement is given to promoting worldwide
discussions on how commonly shared goals can be attained.
Low, Ian. "Science for Peace." New Scientist, v. 67, July 24, 1975: 208-210.

"Bernard Feld, a physicist whose career began in the heady atmosphere of

the Manhattan Project, has since devoted much of his life to bridge-building

between men of science (and goodwill) on both sides of the East-West divide."

McElrov, W. D. "The Global Age: Roles of Basic and Applied Research." Science

V. 196, Apr. 15, 1977: 267-270.

Believes we are on the edge of a new age which he calls "the global age."
"By that title [he means] to emphasize the problems of global scale-energy
production and expenditure, population, food production, conservation of
nonrenewable resources, and greater equity between rich and poor na-
tions. . . ."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Measurement of
Scientific and Technical Activities: Proposed Standard Practice For Survey $ of
Research and Experimental Development. [Paris, cl976] 139 p.

A revised edition of the "Frascati Manual" which was first put together in
1963 to aid in the standardization of R&D statistics. The manual provides
definitions and procedures of analysis to foster compatible statistics for easier
monitoring of national science programs and to facilitate international com-
parisons of R&D programs.
Science and Technology for International Development: A Selected List of Information
Sources in the United States and Bibliography of Selected Materials {Second Ed.)
Ithaca, Cornell University. (Prepared for the Agency for International Develop-
ment. February 1975. 124 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 243 701/9SL.)

This report is part of a continuing effort to identify and document the

services of relevant information sources in the U.S. which may be of use to

scholars and practitioners working on policies for science and technology in

developing countries.

Seltzer, Richard 'J. ICSU Pursues World Science Leadership Role. Chemical

and Engineering News, v. 54, Oct. 4, 1976: 15-18.

Harrison S. Brown, president of the International Council of Scientific
Unions (ICSU) "surveys ICSU's expanding activities and plans, and dis-
cusses developments and problems on the international scientific scene."
Technology and Foreign Affairs. A report by Dr. T. Keith Glennan to Deputy
Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
December 1976. 335 p.

Evaluation of how the Department of State and the Federal Government
in general can better organize to conduct foreign relations dealing with
science and technology.
Tinbergen, Jan, coordinator. Reshaping the International Order; A Report to the
Club of Rome. New York, E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc. 1976. 325 p.

The RIO project was established in October 1974 to formulate tentative
answers to important questions relevant to the creation of a new international
order. Organized by the Club of Rome, financed by the Dutch Government,
and directed by Jan Tinbergen, the study addressed the question: "What new
international order should be recommended to the world's statesmen and
social groups so as to meet — to the extent practically and realistically possi-
ble— the urgent needs of today's population and the probable needs of future
generations?" Conclusions address the topics of: the international monetary
order; income redistribution and the international financing of development;
food production and distribution; industrialization, trade and international
division of labor; energy, ores, and minerals, scientific research and tech-
nological development; transnational enterprises; human environment; arms
reduction; and ocean management.

2043

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Participa-
tion in International Organizations. 95th Congress, 1st session. February 1977.
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Off., 1977. 140 p. (Committee print.)
Describes U.S. participation in international organizations including data
and analytical studies dealing with: political trends in international organi-
zations, overlap between international organizations, assessment of the
effectiveness of international organizations, and personnel in international
organizations.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Alternative Methods For Funding U.S. Support of
International Atomic Energy Agency Activities, Department of State and other
Federal agencies: Report of the Comptroller General of the United States. [Wash-
ington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977. 50 p.
"ID-77-20, May 5, 1977"

"GAO is not recommending that the current method of funding U.S. sup-
port of the International Atomic Energy Agency from general revenues be
changed. Most alternative methods would encounter legal difficulties or
would be impractical. A few offer some potential but each also has disad-
vantages that must be considered."
U.S. President, 1974-1977 (Ford). International Economic Report of the President.
[Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977] 194 p.

Partial contents. — World economic conditions. — U.S. international eco-
nomic position. — U.S. international economic policy developments. — ^East-
West trade and finance. — Multinational corporations. — International anti-
trust developments. — Export promotion and market developments. — Air
transportation and tourism. — Ocean shipping. — Technology and U.S. trade.
United Nations. Secretary- General, 1972-(Waldheim). Review of Recent Global
Long-term Projections. [New York] 1977. 17 p. (United Nations. [Document]
E/5937/Add. 4)

Contents. — The limits to growth. — Mankind at the turning point. — The

next 200 years. — RIO: reshaping the international order. — The future of the

world economy. — Catastrophe or new society?

United Nations Association of the United States of America. National Policy

Panel on Science and Technology in an Era of Interdependence. Science and

Technology in an Era of Interdependence. [New York, 1975] 85 p.

96-243 O - 77 - 35

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: GENERAL ISSUES

An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology — A DOD Perspective: A Repor^
of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology. Wash-
ington, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Wash-
ington, February 4, 1976. 59 p. (Avaihxble from NTIS as A-0222 029/3SL.)
The assessment of selected technologies, their impact on U.S. strategic
requirements, transfer mechanisms, and current effectiveness of export
control restrictions reinforces the need for export controls and the CoCom
agreement as a defense necessity. The effectiveness of these controls for the
more critical technologies needs to be improved through definition of policy
objectives, simplified criteria, and a more pragmatic approach to the review
and approval of license applications. Products of technology not directly of
significance to the Department of Defense should be eliminated from controls
to enable more effective control of significant items. The findings and principal
recommendations of the Task Force are discu.ssed in this report.
Basche, James R., Jr. and Michael G. Duerr, International Transfer of Tech-
nology: A Worldwide Survey of Chief Executives. New York, Conference Board,
1975 21 p. (The Conference Board. Report no. 671)

Reports the experience and views of 128 business leaders of 45 countries
representing all stages of economic development on the need for technology
transfer, the price of technology, how technology should be transferred, and
the government's role in technology transfer.
Bischel, Jon E. "The Effect of Tax Treaties on Transfer of Technology." Inter-
national Tax Journal, v. 3, Apr. 1977: 325-343.

"This analysis focuses primarily on the considerations involved in at-
taining the benefits offered by tax treaties with regard to the transfer of
technology both from and to the United States."
Davidow, Joel. "United States Antitrust Laws and International Tranfers of
Technology — the Government View." Fordham Law Review, v. 43, Apr. 1975:
733-740.

Article by the chief. Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division.
Djerassi, Carl.' "A Modest Proposal for Increased North-South Interaction
Among Scientists." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 32, Feb. 1976: 56-60.
Proposes that developed countries send senior research scientists to
existing research facilities in less developed countries to assist in a research
program. These scientists would be sponsored by their own professional so-
cieties and be committed to a five-year program of development.
Driscoll, Robert F. Techiiology Transfer and Development: An Historical and Geo-
graphic Perspective. Edited and designed by Robert Driscoll and Harvey W.
Wallender III, New York, Fund for Mutinational Management Education,
1974. 301 p.
Gilpin, Robert. "Exporting the Technological Revolution." Saturday Review, v.
3, Dec. 13, 1975: 31-36.

Essay outlines the contribution of the U.S. to the world with its technology

and argues that only the U.S. "continues to be mankind's best prospect for

making technology serve human needs."

Lopina, Robert and James H. Schulman. Technology Transfer: A Report on the

NATO Advanced Study Institute, Les Arcs, Bourge St Maurice {France), 1975.

Conference Report. Office of Naval Research, London. October 29, 1975. 16 p.

(Available from NTIS as AD-A018 063/8SL.)

This report summarizes most of the papci-s given at a two-week meeting
on technology transfer (TT). The meeting dealt with TT theory, military/
public sector TT, and industrial sector TT, including the role of industry in
TT to lesser-developed countries.
National Academy of Engineering. "Technology Transfer from Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States." In U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States; Report of the Secretary of Commerce to the Con-
gress in Compliance with the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 (Public Law
93-479). [Washington] 1976. p. 01-070.

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"This report was prepared by the Office of the Foreign Secretary, National
Academy of Engineering, and the Assembly of Engineering, National Re-
search Council, at the request of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
National Science Foundation."

Summarizes the proceedings of four one-day seminars held in Feb. 1976
which examined foreign direct investment in the U.S. to determine how it
affects the transfer of technology into and out of the country. The seminars
were on the pharmaceutical industry; electronics, computers, and scientific
instruments; non-electrical machinery; and petrochemicals and their
derivatives.
Nau, Henry R. Technology Transfer and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York, Praeger,
1976. 325 p. (Praeger special studies in U.S. economic, social, and political
issues.)
Snyder, Ronald E. Impact of Foreign Investment on National Security. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. October 17, 1975. 27 p. (Available from NTIS
as AD-A024 974/8SL.)

The basic question regards the impact of foreign investment on our national

securit}^ and the role of the Department of Defense in ensuring that the

economic interests in the U.S. do not degrade our national security. An

examination of recent testimony before various Congressional committees

investigating foreign investment in the U.S. revealed a lack of adequate

information upon which to establish foreign economic policy. Although

national security was mentioned, the agencies providing information were

motivated by economic and political factors rather than military. Recent

investment jaatterns of OPEC indicate a possible desire to seek further

economic and political power through acquisitions in energy, raw material,

and aerospace industries. The impact cf the U.S. industrial base on the

military preparedness and ultimate national security is the responsibility of

the Department of Defense; therefore, it should closely review the analysis

being made by the Departments of Commerce and Treasury on foreign

investment in the U.S.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on

Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Technology

Transfer to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Hearings, 94th

Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 28-30, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976.

460 p. "No. 50"

Technology transfer — [OPEC countries]/Science policy— [U.S.]/ American

technical assistance — [Iran]/American technical assistance — [Saudi Arabia]/

U.S. Dept. of State. Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific

Affairs.

U.S. Domestic and International Business Administration. Foreign Business

Practices Division. Foreign Business Practices: Materials on Practical Aspects

of Exporting International Licensing and Investing. [Washington, For sale by

the Supt. of Does., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1975. 95 p.

Partial contents. — Laws restrain agency agreement terminations.— En-
forcement of foreign arbitral o wards under the U.N. convention. — World
patent laws reviewed. — Wel^b-Pomerene Act: overlooked by exporter. —
Licensing, joint ventures aid technology transfer.
U.S. Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Issues
Concerning the Transfer of United States Defense Manufacturing Technology:
Coproduction, Manufacturing Licenses, and Technical As.Hstance Agreements.
Report prepared for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representatives. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 28 p.
At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

Technology transfer — [U.S.]/Foreign license agreements — [U.S.]/Arms
sales — [U.S.]/Export control — [U.S.]/ American military assistance/ American
technical assistance/ Arms Export Control Act.
U.S. Library of Congress, Science Policy Research Division. Technology Transfer
to the Middle East O.P.E.C. Nations and Egypt, 1970-1975; Background Study.
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific
Planning and Analysis of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, second session. Washington,
Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 174 p.
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Significant NASA Inven-
tions Available for Licensing in Foreign Countries. Washington, 1975. 96 p.
"SP-7038 (03)"

Provides an abstract of the invention and indicates the foreign countries
where licensing agreements can be concluded.

2046

United Nations. Industrial Development Organization. Establishment of an

Industrial Technological Information Bank; Report of the Executive Director.

[New York] 1976. 5 p. (At head of title: United Nations General Assembly.)

International cooperation in science/technology transfer — [Developing

countries]/Data banks.

United Nations. Intergovernmental Group of Experts on a Code of Conduct on

Transfer of Technology. Report. New York, United Nations, 1975. 39 p.

[Document] TD/B.C.6/1.

"Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 5 to 16 May 1975."
Wilson, Robert W. and Merton J. Peck. The Sale of Technology Through Licensing.
New Haven, Yale University. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation.)
May 1975. 219 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-244 159/9SL.)

The study investigates the sale of technology by business firms through
licensing. Three questions are examined: the magnitude of technology sales
relative to the stock of new technology; the returns from technology sales
relative to internal use of technology by the firm; and differences and simi-
larities between domestic and international sales of technology. A theoretical
framework of technology sales is developed and is empirically evaluated,
using U.S. and Japanese data. Publicly available data are used in the statisti-
cal analysis.

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Adams, Scott. Scientific and Technical Information Services in Eight Latin American
Countries. Development of Technical Assistance Opportunities for Cooperation.
Louisville Universitj', Ky. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation.)
December 1975. 174 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-253-202/6SL.)

The study reviews the emerging national information systems of Argentina,

Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico, the technical

assistance programs of several national and international agencies, and the

self-identified needs in the eight countries. Following a review of optional

assistance strategies, the study makes seven recommendations for cooperative

action.

Askin, Peter W. Intermediate Technology: An Informal Survey. Eighteenth Sessio7i:

Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

[1976?], 59 p.

Definitions and concepts, the mandate of AID, and the attitudes and
applications of intermediate technology in three countries (The Philippines,
Indonesia and Sri Lanka) are addressed. An extensive bibliography is
included.
Bardhan, Pranab K. Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries on Some Implications of Technology Transfer for Trade,
Growth and Distribution in Developing Countries; A Study. [New York] United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1975. 20 p. (United Nations.
[Document] TD/B/C.6/0)
Baron Ritchie-Calder. "Science Is For All." Center Magazine, v. 10, Mar.-Apr.
1977: 2-11.

Traces the history of the development of science and technology and
urges increased international efforts aimed at assisting developing countries
acquire the technology to insure their continued survival.
Bhatt, V. V. "On Technology Policy and its Institutional Frame." World Devel-
opment, V. 3, Sept. 1975: 651-663.

Discusses the problems of "harnessing technology to the process of devel-
opment" in developing countries, outlines how conditions today differ from
19th century technical development problems, and suggests institutional
changes to aid in technology transfer.
Bhattacharwa, Debesh. "Development and Technology in the Third World."
Journal of Contemporary Asia, v. 6, no. 3, 1976: 314-322.

"The main purpose of this essay is to show that the Afro- Asian and Latin
American countries should not depend on the transfer of capital intensive
technolog.y from the rich countries. It is not possible for them to start or
expand industrialization programmes by simply borrowing the highly sophis-
ticated capital-intensive technology from developed countries."
Blake, David H. and Robert E. Driscoll. The Social and Economic Impacts of
Trans-National Corporations: Case Studies of the U.S. Paper Industry in Brazil.
New York, Fund for Multinational Management Education, August 1976. 133 p.
Designed in part to develop a methodology to measure favorable and
unfavorable impacts of multinational corporations abroad.
Chaudhuri, B. D. Naq. "Indian Science Policy in the Perspective of World Sci-
ence." /«c?za Quarterly, v. 31, Oct.-Dec. 1975: 371-381.

Gives an overview of the ways in which science and technology have dif-
fused throughout the developed and developing world, discusses the approach
of international scientific organizations toward developing countries, and
briefly examines the motivations, and cleavages within the Indian scientific
community.
Ciliniroglu, A. Transfer of Technology for Pharmaceutical Chemicals. [Paris]
Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development [cl975] 122 p.

"The present report summarises the findings of a study jointlj' carried
out under the auspices of the OECD Technical Co-operation Programme by
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia on the problems and poten-
tial for the transfer of technology, with special reference to pharmaceutical
chemicals."

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2048

Ebb, Lawrence F. "Transfers of Foreign Technology in Latin America: The
Birth of Antitrust Law?" Fordham Law Review, v. 43, Apr. 1975: 719-732.
Article discusses trade and investment regulations adopted in the Andean
Common Market, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.
Eckaus, Richard S. Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries. Prepared
for the Panel on Appropriate Technologies for Developing Countries. Na-
tional Research Council. Washington, National Academj' of Sciences, 1977.
140 p.

Analyzes the interrelationships between technological choices and eco-
nomic, social, and political aspects of the development process. It is intended
to assist decisionmakers become more aware of the complexities and con-
straints inherent in technological choice.
Erb, Guy F., and Valeriana Fallab, eds. Beyond Dependency: The Developing
World Speaks Out. [Washington] Overseas Development Council, 1975. 238 p.
Partial contents — Self-reliant development in an "interdependent" world,
by S. Parmar. — Multinational enterprises and North-South relations, by
F. Pena. — Population policy from the Southern perspective, by K. Roy. —
Ocean issues on the international agenda, by B. Varon. — The developing
world's "challenge" in perspective, by G. Erb. — Nongovernmental state-
ments.— Official declarations.
Ewing, A. F. "Transfer and Development of Technology: The Problems of
Developing Countries in Perspective." Journal of World Trade Law, v. 11,
Jan.-Feb. 1977: 1-14.

Examines the technological dependence of the developing countries on
the developed, and why the poor have little from the rich. Contends that a
substantially increased standard of living is not possible without industrializa-
tion, and for this technology is essential. Favors a policy of national self-
reliance in this respect, with collective self-reliance organized by developing
countries alone as a counterpart to OECD and Comecon.
Ewing, A. F. "UNCTAD and the Transfer of Technology." Journal of World
Trade Law, v. 10, May- June 1976: 197-214.

"The technology-poor developing countries find themselves in a weak

bargaining position in the process of the transfer of technology, facing

predominantly foreign control over sources and dissemination of technology

and a very feeble percentage of indigenous technological development.

UNCTAD's program for the transfer of technology, discussed in this article,

is directed to these problems."

Goldfrank, Walter L. "The Ambiguity of Infrastructure: Railroads in Prerev-

olutionary Mexico." Studies in Comparative International Development, v. 11,

fall 1976: 3-24.

This historical case study of modern technology transfer suggests that
there are 2 faces to infrastructure. On one hand, it promotes economic
growth and on the other, it permits penetration by advanced societies.
Goulet, Denis. "On the Ethics of Development Planning." Studies in Comparative
International Development, v. 11, spring 1976: 25-43.

"This essay links ethics to value conflicts in technology because technology
has now become the major resource of development."
Goulet, Denis, "The Paradox of Technology Transfer." Bulletin of Atomic Scien-
tists, V. 31, June 1975: 39-46.

Author concludes that technology has now become the major resource for
development and discusses policies that can help less developed countries
gain more technological autonomy.
Hammond, George S. and W. Murray Todd. "Technical Assistance and Foreign
Policy." Science, v. 189, Sept. 26, 1975: 1057-1059.

Authors claim that "virtually all of the basic problems confronting develop-
ment today could be eased by proper application of existing technologies if
'we' and 'they' have the political will and managerial competence to do so."
Janssen, Jules J. A. "Microprojects: Transfer of Technology by Mail." Inter-
national Development Review Focus, v. 17, no. 2, 1975: 9-12.

"The objective of a microproject is to offer, through correspondence,
socially as well as technically sound advice for solving LDC technical prob-
lems. Certain measures have been identified which serve to alleviate the
difficulties inherent in the transfer of technology by mail."
Jeffries, Pease. "Regulation of Transfer of Technology: An Evaluation of the
UNCTAD Code of Conduct." Harvard International Law Journal, v. 18,
spring 1977: 309-342.

Discusses the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries
and the Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology developed by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

2049

Kaplinsky, Raphael. "Accumulation and the Transfer of Technology: Issues of
Conflict and Mechanisms for the Exercise of Control." World Development, v. 4,
Mar. 1976: 197-224.

Author discusses the conflicts of interest in the transfer of technology from

developed to developing nations and suggests mechanisms which can be used

to settle these conflicts. He believes that control of the process is "allied to the

power to determine the rate and type of accumulation of capital."

Keay, Ronald. "Scientific Cooperation in Africa." African Affairs, v. 75, Jan.

1976: 86-97.

Traces the history of science and scientific cooperation in Africa, ending
with suggestions for improving cooperation in the future.
Lall, Sanjaya. "The Patent System and the Transfer of Technologj' to Less-
Dev^eloped Countries." Journal of World Trade Law, v. 10, Jan. -Feb. 1976: 1-16.
Argues "that the relationship between technology and development has
been over-simplified and the role of the instruments of transfer over-stressed:
that the role of the patent system in the present [developing country] frame-
work has not been clearly understood; and that its function in a [socialist]
socio-political framework is quite different [from that under capitalism]."
Matthies, Klaus. "Foreign Enterprises in Mexico." Inter economics, no. 10, Oct.
1975: 317-320.

"The uses and drawbacks of foreign capital and multinational enterprises
have been discussed more thoroughlj' in the past few vears also in Mexico.
The Third World Trade Conference of 1972 (UNCTAD III), at which
President Echeverria came forward with proposals designed to involve
foreign enterprises in the development process, and the introduction of two
laws dealing with investment and technology have stimulated this debate."
Nwosu, Emmanuel J. "Some problems of 'Appropriate' Technology and Tech-
nological Transfer." Developing Economies, v. 13, Mar. 1975: 83-93.

Argues that the disproportionate ratio of population growth to economic
growth in developing countries requires them to employ an "intermediate
technology" that is labor-intensive.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Development Centre.
Appropriate Technology: Problems and Promises. [Paris, 1976] 344 p.

Contains a review of major policy issues surrounding the choice of tech-
nology in developing areas, including topics such as acceptance of innovation,
information networks, educational responsibilities, and organizational tech-
niques. Also includes 19 case studies concerned with application of appro-
priate technology.
Primoff", L. Robert. "International Regulation of Multinational Corporations and
Business — the United Nations Takes Aim." Journal of International Law and
Economics, v. 2, no. 2, 1977: 287-324.

Article outlines UNCTAD efforts to deal with restrictive business prac-
tices and to develop a code of conduct on the transfer of technology; also, it
examines work by the Economic and Social Council and its Commission on
Transnational Corporations to develop an information base and code of con-
duct and to assist developing countries in dealing with international corpora-
tions.
RofTe, P. International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology. Journal of
World Trade Law, v. 11, Mar .-Apr. 1977: 186-191.

"Developing countries consider the adoption of a code of conduct for the
transfer of technology as an important element in setting up a new interna-
tional economic order."
Sarr, M. Lamin. Marine Technology Transfer as Foreign Aid to Less Developed
Nations from Oceanographic Institutions in Industrialized Countries: A Search
for an Effective Mechanism in the Educational Sector. Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, Massachusetts. (Prepared for National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.) September 1976. 59 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-262
039/lSL.)

This study examines systems of transferring marine technology through
education and training and suggests solutions to the problems that have
been the cause of failure in the process. In so doing, the nature of the educa-
tional institutions, both in the industrialized nations and in those developing
nations where they exist have been reviewed. Inadequacies have been identi-
fied at both levels; inadequacies that stem not only from the educational sys-
tems but also concerning government involvement as well as social attitudes.
This problem identification is followed l)y suggested solutions for each case
and in some instances such suggestions are supported and substantiated with
descriptions of cases where success or at least potential for success have been
achieved.

2050

Sagasti, Francisco N. "Technological Self-Reliance and Cooperation Among
Third World Countries." World Development, v. 4, Oct.-Nov. 1976: 939-946.
"This essay deals with the role of international cooperation among Third
World countries for the purpose of furthering self-reliant development. It
focuses on the role of science and technology and examines the content of the
concept of self-reliance in relation to technology, the changing pattern of
international relations and the possible strategies for cooperation among
underdeveloped countries. The paper ends with a proposal for action at the
institutional level."
Schroeder, Dennis. "In Search of an 'Appropriate' Technology." International
Development Review/ Focus, v. 18, no. 3, 1976: 2-7.

"Is intermediate, or appropriate, technology a panacea for problems of
underdevelopment, or is it another example of Western paternalism?"
Street, James H. "The Technological Frontier in Latin America: Creativity and
Productivity." Journal of Economic Issues, v. 10, Sept. 1976: 538-558.

In the context of Latin American economic development, considers tech-
nology transfer prospects and the educational system, particularly in Mexico.
U.S. Agency for International Development. Proposal for a Program in Appropriate
Technology; transmitted . . . pursuant to section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
Act. Rev." ed. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 382 p.
At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. [House]

Committee [on International Relations] print. Technology transfer/
American technical assistance/Technology and social problems — [Developing
countries]/Economic development — [Developing countries]/U.S. Agency
for International Development.
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Inter-American
Economic Relationships. The United States Response to the New International
Economic Order: The Economic Implications for Latin America and the United
States; A Study. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 32 p.
At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Joint committee print.

International economic relations/Foreign economic relations — [U.S.] —

Latin America/Foreign economic relations — [Latin America] — U.S. /Tariff

preferences— [U.S. ]/Technology transfer — [U.S.]/ American investments —

[Latin America]/Foreign loans — [Latin America].

United Nations. Conference on Trade and Development. Major Issues Arising

From the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries; Report. New York,

United Nations, 1975. 50 p. (United Nations. [Document] TD/E/AC.11/10/

Rev. 2)

"United Nations publication. Sales No. E.75.II.D.2"

Contents. — The experience of technology-receiving countries. — The expe-
rience of technology-supplying countries.
United Nations. Conference on Trade and Development. Secretariat. An Inter-
national Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology; Report. New York, United
Nations, 1975. 61 p. (United Nations. [Document] TD/B/C.6/AC.l/2/Supp. 1/
Rev.l)

"United Nations publication. Sales no. E. 75.11. D.15."

"This report was prepared Ijy the UNCTAD secretariat to serve as a

background to the deliberations of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts

on a Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology held at the Palais des

Nations, Geneva, from 5 to 16 May 1975."

United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. Appropriate Technologies

in Civil Engineering Works in Developing Countries: An Exploratory Appraisal

of the State of the Art. New York, United Nations, 1976. 64 p. (United Nations.

[Document] ST/ESA/37)

An in-depth study of appropriate technologies in the construction field.
Choice of technology — [Developing countries]/ Civil engineering — [Developing
countries].
United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. Advisory Committee on
the Application of Science and Technology to Development. Appropriate Tech-
nology and Research for Industrial Development; Report . . . on Two Aspects of
Industrial Growth. New York, United Nations, 1972. 51 p. (United Nations.
[Document] ST/ECA/152) "United Nations publication. Sales no. E.72.II.A.3."
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Report of the I nter governmental
Working Group of the Committee on Science and Technology -for Development.
New York, 1975. 15 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.8/28)

2051

United Nations. General Assembly. Report of the Preparalory Committee for the
United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development. Official
Records: Thirty-second session. Supplement no. 43 (A/32/43.) ; New York, 1977.
43 p.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Application of Science and Tech-
nology to Selected Problems of Development. "The Role of an International
Technological Information System in the Transfer and Assessment of Tech-
nology and in the Indigenous Growth of Appropriate Technologies in Develop-
ing Countries." New York, 1975. 10 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.8/32)
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Consideration of Appropriate
Changes in the Over-All Pattern of International Economic Relations in the Light
of the Co7istraints of a General Policy Nature on the Implementation of the Pro-
gramme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order . . .;
Report. New York, 1975. 62, 2 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/AC.62/8)
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Economic development — [Developing countries]/Raw materials/Foreign
trade — [Developing countries]/Economic assistance/International monetary
system/Technology transfer — [Developing countries]/International corpora-
tions— [Developing countries]/International economic relations.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Institutional Arrangements for
Science and Technology; Report. New York, 1975. 75 p. (United Nations. [Doc-
ument] E/C.8/29/Add.l)

Technology transfer/International agencies/International cooperation in

science.

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Policy and Coordination

Questions: Questioji of Convening a United Nations Conference on Science and

Technology; Costs of the Conferences; Note. New York, 1976. 26 p. (United

Nations. [Document] E/C.8/41)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Science — Conferences/International agencies/International cooperation in

science/United Nations Conference on Science and Technology Development.

United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). Science and Technology: The

Establishment of a Network for the Exchange of Technological Information;

Report. [New York] 1976. 22 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5839)

Describes the activities of organizations in the United Nations system
toward fostering the exchange of technological information aimed in par-
ticular at the transfer of technology to developing countries.
Utterback, James M. "The Role of Applied Research Institutes in the Transfer
of Technology in Latin America." World Development, v. 3, Sept. 1975: 665-673.
Wade, Nicholas. "Third World: Science and Technology Contribute Feebly to
Development." Science, v. 189, Sept. 5, 1975: 770-771, 774-776.

Discusses the sad state of affairs with science and technology in developing
countries, and what the advanced countries can do about it.
W^assermann, Ursula. Key Issues in Development; Interview with UNCTAD's
Secretary- General. Journal of World Trade Law, v. 10, Jan. -Feb. 1976: 17-23.
"The forthcoming UNCTAD IV Conference will treat such problems of
concern to developing countries as an integrated approach to trade in primary
commodities, debt reorganization, a proposed Code of Conduct on the trans-
fer of technology, and the indexation of prices in relation to reform of the
international monetary system. UNCTAD's Secretary- General here brings
his own views to bear upon these issues."
Wionezek, Miguel S. "The Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology: What
Do the '77' Want?" Worldview, v. 19, June 1976: 49-51.

Discusses the background and intent of the Code of Conduct on Technology
Transfer put forth by the Commission on Technology Transfer of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The code is considered
essential by the LDCs (less developed countries).

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER;
THE DEVELOPED NATIONS

Aked, N. H. and P. J. Gummett. "Science and Technology in the European
Communities: the History of the Cost Projects." Research Policy, v. 5, July
1976: 270-294.

"Until recently the best-known joint non-nuclear scientific endeavors
have taken place in intergovernmental organisations unconnected with the
EEC: this paper examines the history of some cooperative research work,
known as the COST projects (Cooperation Scientifique et Technologique)
which were formulated within the original Community of Six." The Aked-
Gummet article is followed by a comment by A. Klose.
Allan, Tom D. "Collaboration Within the Alliance Advances Marine Research."
NATO Review, v. 25, Feb. 1977: 12-19.

Describes the success in oceanographic research since the formation of the
NATO Subcommittee on Oceanographic Research.
Ancker-Johnson, Betsy and William C. Holt. Proceedings of the East-West Tech-
nological Trade Symposium, Held on November 19, 1975. Washington, D.C.
Commerce Technical Advisory Board. March 1976. 127 p. (Available from
NTIS as PB-251 383/6SL.)

This document consists of the edited transcript from a Department of

Commerce symposium held in November, 1975, on the subject of technology

trade with the centrally planned economies. Government officials gave an

overview of East-West technological trade in terms of trading volume,

export controls, and foreign policy. A panel of experts discussed problems

and benefits associated with selling American technology, such as creating

foreign competition, loss of market share, export of jobs, pricing levels, and

economic ramifications. A second panel discussed potential opportunities

for the transfer of Soviet computer, energy, and metallurgy technologies to

the United States. Case histories of American company dealings with the

People's Republic of China were given.

Baranson, Jack. International Transfers of Industrial Technology by U.S. Firms and

Their Implications for the U.S. Economy. [Washington, U.S. Dept. of Labor,

Bureau of International Labor Affairs] 1976. 1 v.' (various pagings)

Presents results of "a major policy study on the international transfers of
industrial technology by U.S. firms and their implications for the U.S.
economy. The study is based upon a series of case studies in five industries —
aircraft, automotive, computers, consumer electronics, and chemical engi-
neering— as well as a general survey of these five sectors. The analysis focuses
on the release of unique and proprietary technology by U.S. firms to non-
controlled foreign enterprises."
Baranson, Jack. "Technology Exports Can Hurt Us." Foreign Policy, no. 25,
winter 1976-1977: 180-194.

"Contrary to the conventional wisdom, U.S. firms may contribute to both
the deterioration of the U.S. trade balance and to the loss of U.S. technical
leadership by establishing foreign manufacturing affiliates and by licensing
their technology to foreign manufacturers."
Bundgaard-Nielsen, M. "The International Diffusion of New Technology." Tech-
nological Forecasting and Social Change, v. 8, no. 4, 1976: 365-370.

Analyzes the factors influencing such diffusion and tests a proposed model
of the process using data on two innovations in the Western European steel
industry.
Callaghan, Thomas A., Jr. U.S. /European Economic Cooperation in Military and
Civil Technology. Rev. ed. Washington, Georgetown University, Center for
Strategic and international Studies, 1975 [i.e. 1976] 125 p.
Cohen, Benjamin I., William T. Beck, and Jorge Katz. Innovation and Foreign
Investment Behavior of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry. Prepared in coopera-
tion with Yale University, University of Southern California, and Institute
Torcuato di Telia, Buenos Aires. New York, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation.) August 1975,
75 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 266 187/4SL.)

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2,053

This study analyzes the relationship between the development of new

drugs (distinguished between "innovative" and "imitative" new drugs) and

international activities of U.S. drug companies. It examines the causes

and consequences of innovation; trends in the rate of drug innovation and

factors influencing these trends; and characteristics of drug firms in terms

of size, research investment, and innovativeness; the relation of innovative-

ness to the foreign activities of individual firms ; and the diffusion of the use

of a sample of 7 new drugs and the effect of the presence of manufacturing

plants on the rate of diffusion.

Curhan, Joan P. and Robert B. Stobaugh. A)i Exploratory Study Concerning

Published Information Available on Channels Used by U.S.-Based Multinational

Enterprises to Transfer Technology Internationally. Boston, Mass. Harvard

University. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation). December 1974.

283 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 243 434/8SL.)

The report is an exploratory study to develop a conceptual framework
and determine the availability of data from public sources, in order to
assess the determinants and consequences of the selection of various channels
of marketing technology by multiproduct-multinational firms. Transactions
of three multinational firms are examined between 1946 and 1973. The
report provides a detailed method for collecting information, sources of
data, and available information on technology sales or transfer by product
for each firm. It provides preliminarj- insights into the complementarity
and substitutability of various channels for technologj^ sales by firms.
Developing World Industry and Technology, Inc. International Transfers of
Industrial Technology by U.S. Firms and Their Implications for the U.S. Econ-
omy. Jack Baranson, project director. Washington, Developing W orld Industry
and Technology, 1976.

A report prepared for the Office of Foreign Economic Research, Bureau of

International Labor Aff'airs, U.S. Dept. of Labor. Includes bibliographical

references.

Finan, William F. The International Transfer of Semiconductor Technology Throxigh

U.S.-Based Firms. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Prepared in cooperation with Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates,

Inc., December 197.5. 15.5 p. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation,

available from NTIS as PB-266 188/SL.)

This stud}" analyzes the international pattern of exports, licensing, and

foreign investments of the U.S. semiconductor industry, which has been

dominant in technological innovations. It examines the different transfer

channels and factors which determine a firm's selection of these channels to

supply foreign markets. It also investigates the characteristics of the American

firms most responsible for the transfer of technolog}' off-shore and the impact

of foreign direct investment on trade patterns

Foreign Direct Investment in the United States; Report of the Secretary of Commerce

to the Congress in Compliance with the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974

(Public Law 93-479). [Washington] U.S. Dept. of Commerce [for sale by the

Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1976. 1 v. (various pagings).

Volume 9: Appendix N — Policies and laws of other countries. — Appendix
O — Transfer of technology. — Appendix P — Accounting. — Appendix Q —
Federal agency sources of data. — Appendix R — Bibliography.
Gee, Sherman. "Foreign Technology and the United States Economy." Science,
V. 187, Feb. 21, 1975: 622-626.

"Foreign technology' could be as helpful to this country as U.S. technology
has been aiding economic growth abroad."
National Academy of Engineering. Office of the Foreign Secretary and National
Research Council. Assembly of Engineering. Technology Transfer from Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States. W'ashington, D.C., 1976. 74 p.

NAE and NRC seminars considered the question — Is the direct foreign

investment in U.S. research, engineering, and development companies

likely to lead to foreign takeover of U.S. technology? Seminar participants

provided a 2-part answer: (1) technology inflow increases the U.S. technology

!)ut doesn't diminish the supply elsewhere and outflow doesn't diminish the

U.S. stock, and (2) foreign investment seems to have augmented U.S.

technology.

National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Bibliography on Technology and Trade.

New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Aug. 1975. 351 p.

(Prepared for National Science Foundation, available from NTIS as PB-266

193/2SL.)

2054

An annotated bibliography is presented of the literature relating to the
economic impacts and causes of international technologj^ transactions in a
number of industries.
Ozdas, M. N. "Science, Technology and International Cooperation." NATO
Review, v. 25, Apr. 1977: 20-25.

Discusses the development of the international character of science and

goes to the specific scientific and technological activities in NATO.

Ozawa, Terutomo. "Japanese Technology: A New Element in International

Competition." Akron Business and Economic Review, v. 6, summer 1975: 10-16.

"Technological progress achieved through the creative adaptation of

Western technologies and through her own R&D efforts has been a major

variable that helps to explain Japan's success story in the postwar world

market. Attention is now increasingly directed at this Japanese experience in

both industrialized and developing countries — the former seek to find ways

to counter Japan's trade competiveness in high-technology products, and

the latter seek to learn lessons to help their own efforts to absorb technology

from the industrialized."

U.S. Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology. An Analysis of Export Control of

U.S. Technology — a DOD Perspective; A Report. Washington, Office of the

Director of Defense Research and Engineering [distributed by NTIS] 1976.

39 p.

"AD-A022 029."

Report focuses on four of the high-technology industries: airframes, air-
craft jet engines, instrumentation, and solid state devices. The implications
for United States national defense are presented along with recommendations
for export controls.
U.S. Technology and International Trade: Proceedings of the Technical Session at
the Annual Meeting {11th), April 23-2J,, 1975. Washington, D.C. National
Academy of Engineering. 1976. 115 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-264
829/3SL:)

A series of papers was presented at a public meeting and dealing with
some major issues underlying the relationship of U.S. technology and inter-
national trade. Following presentations included: Introduction; Technology
and Trade^ — Public Policy Issues; Technology and Trade — The High Tech-
nology Company ; The Chemical Process Industries in International Inv est-
ment and Trade ; Case Studies — Electronics — Japan, and Export-Imp ort
Bank; Panel Presentations — Mechanism for Policy Concerning Industrial
Technology;' Summation.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Behrman, Jack N. and Harvey W. Wallender. Transfers of Manufacturing Tech-
nology Within Multinational Enterprises. Result of a project sponsored and
administered by the Fund for Multinational Management Education. Cam-
bridge, Ballinger Publishing Company. 1976. 308 p.

Contains case studies of the actual process and effects of transferring

technology from U.S. based corporations into Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The studies analj^ze how the corporations are organized for transfer and how

the companies deal with a new environment as they utilize the technology

within the host country.

Caurso, John P., and Charles E. Schmidt. Beyond the Nation State: Managing

the Transnational Political, Social, and Cultural Roles of the Multinationals.

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. May 31, 1976. 240 p.

This document seeks to determine what extra-economic functions multi-
national corporations are performing. Additional questions proceeding from
the basic one address a future political role for the MNCs in the international
system and the- implications posed by the multinationals for management
and the nation-states. The proliferation of the MNCs, on the one hand, and
of nation-states on the other, gives rise to serious dilemmas when MNC
and host-nation goals are in conflict. The extra-economic functions performed
by MNCs in developed, developing and under-developed nation-states have
serious and far-reaching implications for MNC management and govern-
ments. The authors conclude that the extra-economic functions warrant
serious attention from political scientists and sociologists to determine appro-
priate roles and responsibilities for both actors. MNC management and
nation-state leadership must each become more aware of the other and learn
to deal with the v«ry real problems and dilemmas in a non-adversary environ-
ment.
"Conference on the Regulation of Transnational Corporations." Columbia Journal
Transnational Law, v. 15, no. 3, 1976: 367-383.

"The Conference panels, summarized here by their moderators, considered
the impact of the transnational corporation on the home country, its impact
on the host country, and the developments and the prospects for inter-
national regulation of transnational corporations." Conference was held at
Columbia University on Feb. 26, 1976.
Constantino, Renato. "Global Enterprises and the Transfer of Technology."
Journal of Contemporary Asia, v. 7, no. 1, 1977: 44-55.

"While this paper does not presume to add anything new to the theoretical
discussions on the transfer of technology, it offers some contributions to the
pool of information of Third World countries regarding the activities of
multinationals in the area of technology transfer."
Coonrod, Stephan. "The United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations." Harvard International Law Journal, v. 18, spring 1977: 273-307.
Examines current efforts to develop a U.N. code of conduct to govern
transnational corporations.
Creamer Daniel. Overseas Research and Development by United States Multi-
nationals, 1966-1975: Estimates of Expenditures and a Statistical Profile. [New
York, Conference Board, 1976] 130 p. (The Conference Board. Report no. 685)
Contents. — Survey objectives and summary of findings. — Data problems,
the response rate, and the character of the sample. — U.S. overseas expend-
itures for R and D — how much, how fast, and where. — R and D of foreign
affiliates and their parents — some comparisons.
The CTC Reporter. A periodical prepared by the United Nations Center on Trans-
national Corporations, United Nations, New York. Vol. 1, no. 1, Dec. 1976.
Articles deal with the Commission on Transnational Corporations, the
Centre on Transnational Corporations, a code of conduct, standards and
of accounting and reporting for transnational corporations, corrupt practices,
technical cooperation programs of the centre, current research, books on
transnational corporations.

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2056

Danielian, N. R. U.S. Multinational Corporations and National Security Policy.
Arlington, Va. Stanford Research Institute. (Prepared for Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Va.) August 1975. 94 p. (Available from
NTIS as AD-A014 933/6SL.)

This report presents a survey of the literature on the security aspects of

multinational corporations' activities. It identifies those aspects which have

been previouslj' researched and those requiring further study.

Eriksson, John E. and Jerry R. Ladman, "The Multinational Corporation and

Appropriate Technology in Less-Developed Countries." Arizona Business, v.

23, Nov. 1976: 3-10.

The authors examine criticisms that multinational corporations use tech-
nology in developing countries which is inappropriate to the economic and
social circumstances of those countries.
Helleiner, G. K., "The Role of Multinational Corporations in the Less Devel-
oped Countries' Trade in Technology." World Development, v. 3, Apr. 1975:
161-189.

Considers the general character of the international market in technology
and the multinationals' role in it, the transfer of production and consumption
technology, and the likely development of more appropriate technologies
for the developing coimtries.
Holland, Susan S., ed. Codes of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology: A Cri-
tique. New York, Council of the Americas and Fund for Multinational Man-
agement Education. 1976. 129 p.

"This monograph, which includes materials that have been developed by

sev'eral institutions and individuals, has been produced to help increase

understanding of the issues now being raised in discussions on codes of

conduct for transfer of technology and of the views concerning these issues

of the parties involved in the transfers. It also traces the evolution of these

discussions and attempts to determine the direction in which they may go in

the future."

Madden, Carl H., ed. The Case for the Multinational Corporation. New York,

Praeger [1977] 212 p. (Praeger special studies in international business, finance,

and trade)

Contents. — Do multinational corporations have market power to over-
price? by J. Weston. — More or less poverty? The economic effects of the
multinational corporation at home and in developing countries, bj^ L. Wells,
Jr. — Are multinational corporations depriving the United States of its eco-
nomic diversity and independence? by R. Hawkins. — Are multinational
corporations getting preferential treatment in U.S. tax policy? by T. Horst. —
The power of multinational enterprises in developing countries, by R. Ver-
non.— Are multinational corporations forcing us into national and interna-
tional economic planning? by R. Cooper.

"Proceedings of a two-day conference held in Washington, D.C. on No-
vember 25-26, 1975," sponsored by the National Chamber Foundation.
Morley, Samuel A. and Gordon W. Smith. "The Choice of Technology: Multi-
national Firms in Brazil." Economic Development and Cultural Change, v. 25,
Jan. 1977: 239-264.

The authors examine whether international corporations adapt their pro-
duction technology in Brazil in order to employ more labor and less capital
than in an advanced industrial country. Based on information from ques-
tionnaires and other sources, they conclude that there is considerable adap-
tation but that it stems from scale differentials, not from cheap labor.
Perlmutter, Howard V. "Perplexing Routes to M.N.E. Legitimacy: Codes of
Conduct for Technology Transfer." Stanford Journal of International Studies,
v. 11, spring 1976: 169-199.

Analyzes the role international codes of conduct for multinational enter-
prises (M.N.E.'s) "could play in finding a common area of agreement be-
tween M.N.E.'s and less-developed countries in the area of technology
transfer and development as well as the process through which such agree-
ment could occur." As part of this analysis the author notes in detail the
varying interests of the M.N.E., its host country, its home country, and the
technology recipient (usually a licensee).
Teece, David J. The Multinational Corporation and the Resource Cost of Interna-
tional Technology Transfer/David J. Teece. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Pub.
Co., C1976. XV, 129 p.

2057

Teece, D. J. "Technology Transfer l^y Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of
Transferring Technological Know-How." Economic Journal, v. 87, June 1977:
242-261.

Examines the level and determinants of the costs involved in 26 technology
transfers by U.S. multinationals.
Troub, Roger M. "Industrial Growth, Technological Innovation and the Social
Responsibilities of Large Corporations: Some Systemic Considerations."
Social Science Journal, v. 14, Jan. 1977: 95-109.

Discusses the "world problematique," which is "at the international
level, the mess associated with failuj-e to deal with fundamental social,
political, and economic problems effectively by defining them in isolation
and applying isolated policies to them." In particular, considers the world
problematique as a point of view about the systemic nature of prob-
lems involving growth, technology, and social responsibilities of large
corporations.
United Nations. Secretariat. Transnational Corporations: Views and Proposals
of Non-governmental Interests on a Code of Conduct; Report. [New York] 1976.
20, 2, 1 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C. 10/20)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
International corporations/Business ethics
United Nations. Secretariat. Transnational Corporations: Views and Proposals of
States on a Code of Conduct. [New York] 1976. 19, 1 p. (United Nations. [Doc-
ument] E/C. 10/19)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.
Wilczynski, Jozef. "Multinational Corporations and East- West Economic Co-
operation." Journal of World Trade Law, v. 9, Ma}^-June 1975: 266-286.
"Economic co-operation has taken various forms, including the sale of
licences and trade in embodied technology, industrial co-operation, or joint
ventures. The author examines the popularity of each type of agreement and
the safeguard clauses negotiated to ensure their mutual observation." Lists
numerous MNCs and their East European projects.

THE BRAIN DRAIN

Balacs, Peter and Anne Gordon. "Brain Drain and Income Taxation: A UK
Case Study." World Development, v. 3, Oct. 1975: 677-703.

". . . Summarizes the UK experience of professional immigraticn from
LDCs since World War II, with specific estimates for the period between
1964-72. . . . Assess[es] the potential revenue which might be raised through
imposition of a surtax on after-UK tax incomes of professional immigrants.
This revenue would then be recj^cled back to the LDCs. The paper considers
such influences on immigration policy as UK employment prospects and
immigration policy in the USA, and closes with a discussion of the scope and
implications of the proposed tax."
Bhaqwati, Jagdish N. "Taxing the Brain Drain." Challenge, v. 19, July- Aug. 1976:
34-38.

"There is a way to compensate for the brain drain from the less developed
countries to the developed countries. A supplementary income tax can be
imposed on immigrants' earnings in the developed countries; the funds raised
in this manner can then be routed to the less developed countries for devel-
ment spending."
Devoretz, Don and Dennis Maki. "The Brain Drain and Income Taxation:
Canadian Estimates." World Development, v. 3, Oct. 1975: 705-716.

"It has recently been proposed that a surtax be levied on the incomes of
skilled immigrants from LDCs to DCs, with the proceeds used for develop-
mental spending in LDCs. This paper presents estimates of the amounts
which would have been collected by such a surtax in Canada in 1972 if it
had been levied at a 10 per cent rate on disposable (after regular income taxes)
income, assuming skilled immigrants were subject to the surtax for a period
of ten years following immigration. Estimates of the elasticity of the response
of immigrant flows to such a surtax are also presented."
Gish, Oscar. "Medical Brain Drain Revisited." International Journal of Health
Services, v. 6, no. 2, 1976: 231-237.

Argues that "the international migration of doctors is primarily the result —
as well as a measure — of the maltraining and related malutilization of medical
manpower, and of graduates in particular."
Grubel, Herbert G. "Reflections on the Present State of the Brain Drain and a
Suggested Remedy." Minerva, v. 14, summer 1976: 209-224.

Author believes "that the magnitude and the effects on welfare of the brain

drain from poor countries do not warrant the institution of a tax on the income

of highly skilled migrants in their new countries of residence." He suggests

creating a tax exempt foundation in the United States for the benefit of the

developing countries, supported by these skilled migrants.

Immigration of Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools. Report of the Conference.

Bethesda, Public Health Service. 1975. 38 p. (Available from NTIS as HRP-

0015196/9SL.)

A report is presented of a conference convened by the Division of Nursing
to explore the question of establishing a preimmigration examination or other-
screening procedure for nurses immigrating to the United States. Data are
presented on the numbers, characteristics, and education of the foreign-trained
nurses, and results of licensure applications of foreign nurse graduates. In-
formation is provided on immigration laws and regulations, nonimmigrant
aliens, immigrant visas, and required documentation for a visa petition. It is
noted that securing clearcut information on foreign nurse graduates is difficult:
relevant informational needs and other data needs are discussed. A project to
investigate the feasibility of a preimmigration screening examination is de-
scribed, and recommendations are offered by an advisory council. The follow-
ing conclusions are drawn: information about graduates of foreign nursing
schools is incomplete and inadequate : no single universally accepted criterion
is available to determine if a visa applicant will meet State Boards of Nursing
requirements; State boards do not have a universally accepted credential for
issuing a temporary permit; indications are that the proportion of unlicensed
foreign-trained nurses will increase; and an organization should be established
as a central agency for all matters relating to immigration of foreign-trained
nurses.

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2059

Kabra, Kamal Nagan. Political Economy of Brain Drain; Reverse Transfer of
Technology. New Delhi, Arnold-Heinemann Publishers (India), 1976. 190 p. 23 cm.
LC CALI NBR: HD8038.15K22
"Manpower Supplement". Nature, v. 255, May 22, 1975: 283-305.

A series of eight articles on scientific manpower in several countries and
from different points of view. This is not a comprehensive survey but deals
with some of the main manpower problems.
Oldman, Oliver and Richard Pomp. "The Brain Drain: A Tax Analysis of the
Bhagwati Proposal." World Development, v. 3, Oct 1975: 751-763.

"To alleviate the pro))lems caused by the brain drain, Professor Bhagwati
proposes that professional, technical, and kindred persons who emigrate from
less developed countries be subjected to a special tax on the income they earn
in developed countries. This paper highlights political and legal issues raised
by his proposal and examines three approaches to implementation: a tax
levied Ijy the less developed country, a tax levied by the developed country,
and a tax levied by the United Nations. Specific aspects of the proposal
which require further study and refinement, such as administrative feasi-
bility, are outlined."
Partington, Martin. "The Brain Drain Tax Proposal: A Lawyer's View." World
Development, v. 3, Oct. 1975: 717-749.

Examines, in the context of the UK, the idea that developed countries

should impose a special tax on professionals from less-developed countries

who have settled in developed countries. Indicates that such a proposal is

neither unconstitutional nor does it offend international human rights

obligations.

Portes, Alejandro and Adreain A. Ross. "Modernization for Emigration: The

Medical Brain Drain from Argentina." Journal of Interamerican Studies and

World Affairs, v. 18, Nov. 1976: 395-422.

"Complement[s] descriptive data on the brain drain and general specu-
lation on 'push' and 'pull' forces affecting it with an illustration of the
situation and values held by participants in the process [and] show[s] how these
subjective definitions and values are linked with broader issues of under-
development and theories about sources of change in this situation."
Stevens, Rosemarv and others. "Physician Migration Reexamined." Science, v.
190, Oct. 31, 19'75: 439-442.

"The magnitude of the migration of foreign physicians to the United
States since 1965 has been overstated."
United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Outflow of Trained Personnel
from Developing to Developed Countries; Report. New York 1976. 18, 2 p.
(United Nations. [Document] E/CN.5/545)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Brain drain — [Developing countries]/Immigration — [Developed countries]/

Emigration- — [Developing countries]

United Nations. Secretary-General (Waldheim). Social and Other Aspects of Science

and Technology; Outflow of Trained Personnel From Developing to Developed

Countries: Report. New York, 1975. 8 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/C.8/34)

At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Report suggests improvements in the method of gathering statistics on the
l)rain drain in developing countries.
Vas-Zoltan, Peter. The Brain Drain: an Anomaly of International Relations. Trans-
lated bv Peter Tamasi, rev. by Harvey Shenker. Leyden, Sijthoff Budapest,
Skadem'iai Klado, 1976. 150 p.
Yudin, Elinor Barry. Human Capital Migration, Direct Investment, and the Transfer
of Technology: An Examination of Americans Privately Employed Overseas. New
York, Arno Press. 1976. 276 p.

96-243 O - 77 - 36

ENERGY

Arad, Uzi B. and Barry J. Smernoff. American Security and the International
Energy Situation. Vol. I. Introduction and Summary. Croton-on-Hudson,
Hudson Institute, Inc. April 15, 1975. 41 p. (Available from NTIS as AD-
A028 478/6SL.)

This report sets down the results of research on some of the significant
problems relating to energy and national security. The emphasis taken by
this study goes beyond the more obvious first-order issues, previously ana-
lyzed. It deals with less obvious but increasingly important problems,
including: (1) The relationship of the security of oil supplies to prevailing
market conditions in the past and in the future; (2) The more general ([ues-
tion of access to non-oil global resources and U.S. policy; (3) The scope of
oil revenues for domestic and foreign investment and patterns of economic
development and investment in Middle East oil producing countries; and
(4) The relationship of energj^ and American economic security and con-
comitant implications for security and foreign policy issues.
Arad, Uzi B. and Barry J. Smernoff. American Security and the International
Energy Situation, Vol. II. World Energy and the Security of Supply. Croton-on-
Hudson, Hudson Institute, Inc. April 15, 1976. 398 p. (Available from NTIS
as AD-A028 479/4SL.)

In this volume the primary intent is to uncover the objective functional
relationship between import and export dependencies as they affect the reli-
ability of supply in the past and the future. Until recently, under the aegis
of American hegemony, and due to the role the oil multinationals played,
both oil exporting and oil importing countries exhibited a sufficiently high
degree of dependence on the trade in oil to bring about a symmetry in their
reciprocal conditions. The manipulation of oil supplies during the 1956-57
and 1967 Middle East crises was ineffective as an instrument of international
influence due to the particular balanced form of interdependence. Beginning
in 1970, the rise of OPEC against the background of American decline
disrupted the fragile symmetry and caused a widening disequilibrium between
oil importers and exporters. The scope of remedial policies to re-tructure
the energy system so as to enhance its security is surve.yed in the last two
chapters. Two cooperative strategies are analyzed: horizontal multilateralism
and vertical bilateralism. The study concludes that either of two unilateral
approaches are more likely to characterize future events in the energy area
than complex cooperative arrangements.
Atcheley, Dennis B. "Air Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Passenger
Protection Under International Law." California Western International Law
Journal, v. 5, spring 1975: 425-445.

This is based on an analysis of the air transportation of radioactive materials
within the United States and evaluates the performance of domestic regula-
tions of these substances, as well as the impact of these regulations on inter-
national regulations.
Baker, Steven J. Conunercial Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation. [Ithaca,
N.Y., Cornell University, peace studies program, 1975] 66 p. (Cornell Uni-
versity. Peace Studies Program. Occasional paper no. 5)

"This paper surveys the development of the international nuclear energy
market, with particular reference to America's role in this process. The
emphasis is on the interplay between the commercial promotion of nuclear
energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ])etween domestic and
foreign policies, and the implications of domestic energy policy choices for
future nuclear weapons proliferation."
Bakr, Abdel Abu. "IAEA Technical Cooperation Activities: Africa." IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] Bulletin, v. 18, Fel)ruary 1976: 33-39.
Briefly outlines the distribution and value of International Atomic Energy
Agency technical assistance in Africa.
Barber (Richard J.) Associates. LDC Nuclear Power Prospects, 1976-1990: Com-
mercial, Economic & Security Implications. [Washington, U.S. Energy Research
and Development Administration, available from NTIS, 1975] 1 v. (various
pagings)

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2061

"ERDA-52, UC-2"

The purpose of the study was "[t]o evaluate and estimate the potential
market for products of the U.S. nuclear industry in the lesser developed
countries (LDCs) and to analyze the political, economic and security impli-
cations of U.S. nuclear technology exports to these countries."
Barnabv, Frank. "A Gentlemen's Nuclear Agreement." New Scientist, v. 73,
Feb. "24, 1977: 469-471.

"Early in March [1977] the 'London Club' of nuclear exporting countries
meets in London to continue its discussions of mutual controls to limit the
undesirable spread of nuclear technology."
Barnaby, Frank. "You and Nuclear War." Sweden Now, v. 11, No. 1, 1977: 14,
16-17, 46-48.

Interview with the director of SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, iii which Barnaby expresses his anxieties over the pro-
liferation of nuclear materials.
Bauser, Michael A. "United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peace-
ful Atom as a Commodity in International Trade." Harvard International Law
Journal, v. 18, spring 1977: 227-272.

". . . Article discusses the development of United States nuclear export

policy, focusing on activity during the term of the last (94th) Congress."

ben-Shaher, Haim, Uzi B. Arad, and Barry J. Smernoff. American Security and the

International Energy Situation. Vol. III. The Petromoney Question. Croton-on-

Hudson, Hudson Institute, Inc. Apr. 15, 1975. 102 p. (Available from NTIS

as AD-A028 480/2SL.)

This volume explores some possible outcomes of the recent increase in oil
prices. The study investigates the pattern of the future price structure of oil
and energy, the resulting flow of revenues to the OPEC countries, in par-
ticular to the Arab oil producing countries, and the implication of these
developments to the economic growth and foreign capital accumulation of the
Middle Eastern countHes on one hand and to the world economic, financial
and monetary structure on the other hand. Part 1 deals with the market for
energy and oil and derives scenarios with the emerging projections of oil
prices. Part 2 projects alternative levels of oil revenues to the oil-producing
countries and estimates the future economic growth of the Middle Eastern
countries and their accumulation of foreign capital. Part 3 discusses possible
investment strategies concerning the accumulated capital that may be
implemented by the Middle East oil-producing countries and analyzes the
implications of the world economy.
Broda, E. "Solar Power: The Photochemical Alternative." Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, v. 32, March 1976: 49-52.

Billions of 3'ears ago nature developed the technique for converting sunlight
into chemical energy. If man could harness this energy as efficiently as the
plants do, he might find an ultimate solution to the energy crisis. Creation
of an international research institute would be a good first step in
this direction."
Brown, Rex B., Cameron R. Peterson, and Jacob W. Ulvila. "An Ayialysis of
Alternative Mideastern Oil Agreements." McLean Va. Decisions and Designs,
Inc. December 1975. 63 p. (Available from NTIS as AD-A025 079/5SL.)
This report describes an application of prescriptive decision analysis to a
problem of choosing between alternative U.S. foreign policy options. More
specificall}', the choice relates to possible agreements with a Mideastern
country which involve different degrees of U.S. political and economic
concessions in return for improved prospects for the supplj' of oil to the U.S.
The analysis described in this report involved the development and use of a
flexible decision model to evaluate three sharply different negotiating
strategies regarding a possible agreement with a Mideastern country. A
baseline option involved no change now or later in U.S. policies toward this
Mideastern country and was used primarily as a reference point for purposes
of comparison. A maximum option involved an agreement which went
most of the way toward what certain Mideastern countries want. The third
option was an intermediate strategy reflecting a moderate change in U.S.
policy which would be attractive to the Mideastern country, but not po-
litically difficult for the U.S.

2062

Commodity Supply Restrictions Study: "Policy Implications of Producer Country
Supply Restrictions: The World Energy Market." Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Charles River Associates, Inc. (Prepared for the National Bureau of Standards.)
November 1976. 382 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-264 392/2SL.)

A number of policies have been proposed to reduce U.S. dependence on
imported oil or to reduce U.S. vulnerability in some other way. Among the
policies proposed are stockpiling, quotas and tariffs, subsidies to domestic
oil producers, accelerated development of nuclear power, and conversion of
oil fired generating plants to coal. Of special concern is the proposal that U.S.
government subsidize or offer other incentives to the development of syn-
thetic fuels, since these technologies have not yet been significantly developed
on a commercial scale in the United States. This study examines these dif-
ferent policies, their benefits and costs, and compares them as instruments to
reduce the impact of future supply disruptions. The policy measures chosen
for analysis are representative of types of actions currently under considera-
tion to mitigate the effects of OPEC.
Conant, Melvin A. and Fern R. Gold. Geopolitics of Energy, vol. I. 1976-2000.
Great Falls, Va. International Energy, Inc. October 1976. 169 p. (Available
from NTIS as AD-A038 683/9SL.)

This study highlights and interprets those aspects of energy supply which
will engage the interests of states from now until the early decades of the
21st Century. The study traces and amplifies themes which will preoccupy
the great industrial states until such time as solar power, nuclear fusion or
other energy sources relieve them of the challenge of securing access to ade-
quate and continuous supplies of energy. This study also discusses and makes
recommendations on energy policy options which would give the United
States and allies greater assurance of energy supply.
Conant, Melvin A. and Fern R. Gold. Geopolitics of Energy. Vol. II. Overview
and Options. Great Falls, Va. International Energy, Inc. October 197G. 87 p.
(Available from NTIS as AD-A038 684/7SL.)

Contents: Considerations Affecting U.S. Energy: The Nature of the
Threat: Emergency Situations; The Nature of the Threat; Longer Term
Supply Security Measures; Limiting Vulnerability; The Domestic Com-
ponent, and International Implications and Options; Nuclear Energy;
and Policy Recommendations.
Donnelly, Warren H. and Barbara Rather. International Proliferation of Nuclear
Technology. A report prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy and the En-
vironment of the. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House
of Representatives, Ninetv-fourth Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1976. 105 p.

At head of title: 94th Cong., 2d sess. Committee print no. 15.
Doub. William O. and Eugene R. Fidell. "International Relations and Nuclear
Commerce: Developments in United States Policy." Law and Policy in Inter-
national Business, v. 8, No. 4, 1976: 913-961.

Discusses "the current status of legislative attempts to regulate inter-
national nuclear trade, commencing with a brief history of nuclear regulation
as it has developed during the last 25 years. The principal focus is upon de-
velopments in the United States, although the authors have included some
foreign perspectives essential to an understanding of the issues."
Dukert, Joseph M. Making Nuclear Energy Safe anfl Secure. Foreign Affairs,
v. 53, July 1975: 758-772.

Argues that the safe exploitation of nuclear power can only be accomplished
through "the framework of an international agency and universally applicable
standards", and that IAEA should be strengthened for this role.
"Energy: Global Prospects, 1985-2000", Report of the Workshop on Alternative
Energy Strategies. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977.
Report on research involving officials from a number of countries to develop
a methodology for the study of global energy problems, carry out the analyses ,
and reach conclusions regarding national and international actions needed
to deal with energy resource growth.
Energy for Rural Development: Renewable Resources and Alternative Technologies
for Developing Countries. By the Panel on Renewable Energy Resources, Com-
mittee on Technology Innovation; Board on Science and Technology for Inter-
national Development; Commission on International Relations, National
Research Council (Board on Science and Technology for International Develop-
ment.) Washington, National Academy of Sciences, 1976. 306 p.

Evaluates alternative energy technologies "within reach of the world's
poor" and alternatives beyond their reach. Economic and political requisites
for development of the technologies are considered.

2063

Foerstner, Abigail. "Fermilab: the Russians are Coming! The Russians are

Going!" Chicago Tribune Magazine, Nov. 28, 1976: 31-33, 48-49, 51, 54, 56, 58.

Describes the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory located 35 miles

west of Chicago, and the international nature of the nuclear research being

conducted there.

Gillette, Robert. "Nuclear Proliferation: India, Germany May Accelerate the

Process." Science, v. 188, May 30, 1975: 911-914.

A discussion of the implication of the West German agreement to sell
Brazil the technology for self sufficiency in atomic power.
Greenwood, Ted, George W. Rathjens, and Jack Ruina. Nuclear Power and
Weapons Proliferation. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies
[cl977] 51 p. (Adelphi papers. No. 130)

"This paper examines the relationship between nuclear weapons develop-
ment and nuclear electric power. It starts with a brief description of nuclear
weapons design followed by a discussion of various aspects of nuclear power
technology and how they bear on a nuclear weapons programme. It con-
cludes with a discussion of possible political and institutional controls for
limiting nuclear proliferation."
Gugliamelli, Juan E. "The Brazilian — German Nuclear Deal: A View From
Argentina." Survival, v. 18, July-August 1976: 162-165.

The decision of the West German government to sell nuclear reactors and
uranium enrichment technology to Brazil has triggered concern in Latin
America and elsewhere. In the article General Gugliamelli argues that the
Agreement means that Brazil has chosen to build nuclear weapons. However,
he suggests that a nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina could be
forestalled by collaboration and free exchange of information on nuclear
matters by the two states."
Hayes, Denis. "The World-Wide Debate Over Nuclear Power: The Real Issues
are Values and Ethics." Science Forum, v. 9, August 1976: 3-7.

"Article discusses the issues behind the debate and concludes that an

international renunciation of nuclear technology is necessary in view of the

threats it poses to mankind."

Hersey, David F. Information on International Research and Development Activities

in the Field of Encrgxj. Washington, D.C. Smithsonian Science Information

Exchange. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation.) May 1976. 370 p.

(Available from NTIS as PB-254 315/5SL.)

This directory is the product of a data collection effort undertaken by the
Smithsonian Science Information Exchange (SSIE) on behalf of an inter-
agency committee formed under the U.S. State Department to provide
international cooperation in energy research and development. Included is
information covering 1,766 ongoing and recently completed energy research
projects conducted in Canada. Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and 25 other countries.
International Energy Analysis. Proceedings of a seminar on international energy
analysis held at Washington, D.C. on June 9-10, 1975. [n.p., Distribution by
NTIS, 1975] 228 p.

"ERDA-79, UC-2"

"The Seminar, as announced in the Federal Register on May 30, 1975, was
intended to be a forum for the exchange of information between government
decision-makers, analysts and information specialists dealing with inter-
national energy issues. Although the program was oriented towards the needs
of the decision-makers, it was not intended to be a meeting of an 'advisory
committee' as defined by the Federal Advisory Committee Act."
' 'International Diffusion of Energy Technology." Report of a Workshop Held on
June 2-3, 1976 at Dedham, Massachusetts. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Prepared for the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration. July 1976. 171 p. (Available from NTIS as MIT-EL-76-008.)

The workshop brought together corporate officers, government officials,
and academic specialists to discuss problems in the international transfer of
energy technology and international cooperation in energy R and D as seen
from industry's perspective. This report summarizes the highlights under the
following topics: government/industry relations in the international context;
industry participation in international R and D cooperation; problems in
acquiring foreign technology due to U.S. regulations for information dissem-
ination; ERDA patent policy; export controls; assistance al)roadfrom the U.S.
government; the significance of U.S. government regulation; and ERDA'a
role in the commercialization of energy technology.

2064

Maull, Hanns. Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon Examined. London, Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies [1975] 37 p. (Adelphi papers, No. 117)
Contents. — Oil power: a political reality. — Oil power: potential and limita-
tions in the future. — Oil power: the wider context. — Intentions behind the
oil weapon. — Conclusions.
Meckoni, Vinay. "Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres." IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency] Bulletin, v. 18, February 1976: 2-11.

Describes the objectives, scope, assumptions, and proposed implementation
of an International Atomic Energy Agency feasibility study of nuclear fuel
cycle facilities established on a regional basis.
Modig, C, and others. 1976 Reassessment of Noise Concerns of Other Nations.
Washington, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1976. 2 v.
"EPA 550/9-76-01"

Volume I — Summary and selected topics. — Volume II. — Country-by-
country reviews.

"A review of the noise abatement programs of countries around the world
(except the U.S.) including laws, regulations, guidelines, criteria, research,
governmental organization, plans, etc., with bibliography and contact
addresses to facilitate further inquiry. Also includes international organiza-
tions involved in noise control. Both environmental and occupational noise
are covered. Topics: Community noise, airport, aircraft, surface transporta-
tion, construction noise, occupational noise, noise from factories, noise in
buildings. A summary finds that compared to a similar 1971 review, the U.S.
has 'caught up', information has increase geometrically, many nations now
compensate citizens for noise from airports or roads, and noise limits in
industry are becoming stricter."
Morawiecki, Wojciech. "IAEA's Approaches to Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials." IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] Bulletin, v. 18, February
1976: 25-28.

Briefly reviews the responsibilities of individual states, the need for inter-
national cooperation, and the present and future role of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
Munn, R. E. "In Environmental Monitoring the Problem Is to Build Workable
Systems." Science Forum, v. 8, February 1975: 13-15.

". . . one of the programs approved by the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972) was a Global Environmental
Monitoring System (GEMS). There are, however, both institutional and
scientific difficulties in implementing the world monitoring system envisaged
at Stockholm."
Nanda, Ved P. "International Environmental Law — A New Approach." Journal
of International Studies, v. 4, autumn 1975: 101-112.

Briefly reviews existing standards and precedents regarding transnational
environmental injury, explores the applicability of the doctrine of public
trust to international environmental protection, and outlines a proposed UN
declaration creating a new agency to oversee proposed environmental efforts
from an international standpoint.
Nathanson, Eugene. "International Management of Radioactive Wastes."
Environmental Affairs, v. 5, spring 1976: 363-380.

"This article . . . briefly review[s] the problem of radioactive wastes. It
then discusses the degree of international cooperation now existing in
dealing with these wastes, and the possibility that world bodies may take
over full responsibility for waste management."
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "United States Policy on Nuclear Technology: Combining
Energy and Security." Department of State Bulletin, v. 76, May 30, 1977 : 550-554.
Address outlines American nuclear policy before the International Con-
ference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle held at Salzburg, Austria, on
May 2, 1977.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Energy Conservation
in the International Energy Agency. [Paris] 1976. 55 p.

"Three general observations can be made based on the 1976 assessment
of conservation programmes: Conservation accomplishments and progress by
lEA nations have been substantial. Nonetheless, significant potential
still exists for reducing future energy demand in almost every country. The
prospects for a continued aggressive conservation thrust in many lEA nations
are uncertain."

2065

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Nuclear Energy
Agency. Nuclear Third Party Liability. [Paris] 1976. 190 p.

Country by country review of the nuclear third party liability regulations
in OECD countries with attention paid to land installations, marine trans-
portation, and international agreements.
Pindyck, Robert S. International Comparisons of the Residential Demand for Energy:
A Preliminary Analysis {World Oil Project). Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Prepared for the National Science Foundation. September
1976. 89 p. (Available from NTIS as FB 265-108/9SL.)

This paper reports on some initial results from an econometric study of
the world demand for energy. It examines some preliminary estimates of
inter-country differences in the structure of demand in the residential sector.
Residential demand models are designed on the assumption that consumers
make two decisions in purchasing fuel: (1) what fraction of their total budgets
will be spent on energy; and (2) which fuels to purchase. Section 2 outlines
specifications of various models of residential energy demand, and describes
the characteristics of each specification. Section 3 discusses some methodo-
logical issues in the estimation of energy demand models using pooled data.
The issues discussed include the use of purchasing power parities to make
international comparisons, the question of accounting for thermal efficiencies
in the use of energy consumption data, the formulation of an aggregate price
index for energy, and the use of alternative estimation methods. Section 4
describes some of the characteristics and limitations of the data. Section 5
includes the statistical results.
Ribicoff, Abraham A. "A Market-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales
Problem." Foreign Affairs, v. 54, July 197G: 764-787.

A United States Senator examines the erosion of U.S. nonproliferation
policies as demonstrated by French and West German sales of nuclear fuel
facilities to Pakistan and Brazil. Recommends the estal)lishment of multi-
national enrichment plans and a shared-market arrangement covering reactor
sales so as to more effectively control proliferation.
Ris, William K., Jr. "The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to Inter-
national Environmental Protection." Ecology Law Quarterly, v. 5, 1976: 291-319.
Article discusses views among nations regarding threats to the environ-
ment, reviews the evolution and suitability of the public trust doctrine,
particularly in the United States, and recommends a modified version of the
doctrine for use internationally.
Salamon, Benjamin. Nuclear Power Plants and International Politics. Journal
of International Studies, v. 4, winter 1975-76: 200-219.

Examines the properties of nuclear fuels and the processes of nuclear

technology that might be susceptible to manipulation for political purposes

and describes actors who might be motivated to engage in such activities

under given sets of circumstances.

Sherfield, Roger Mellar, Baron. "Britain's Nuclear Story, 1945-52: Politics and

Technology." Rou7id Table, no. 258, Apr. 1975: 193-204.

Discussion of British nuclear policy and the British-U.S.-Canadian-

Belgian agreements on atomic power. Article is occasioned by a review of

"Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Power" by Margaret

Gowing.

Strohl, Pierre. Nuclear Energy: Safety and Public Information. OECD Observer,

no. 85, Mar. 1977:15-19.

"In order to prevent overdependence on imported oil in 1980 and beyond,
OECD countries must take positive action to expand the supply of 'con-
ventional' sources — oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear energy, OECD's
World Energy Outlook concludes. The article discusses some of the problems
involved in the development of nuclear energy."
Szyliowicz, Joseph S. and Bard E. O'Neill. Petropolitics and the Atlantic Alliance,
Washington, D.C., National Defense University. November 1976. 28 p. (Avail-
able from NTIS as AD-A037 807/5SL.)

More than three years have passed since the petroleum crisis of 1973
forced the United States to confront the multifaceted challenge posed by an
impending imbalance between energy supply and demand. The crisis posed
two special problems for the West regarding the linkage between energy and
the security of the Free World. First, the recognition that military power is
sustained by the economic strength of the alliance partners and, at present,
is contingent upon an adequate supply of petroleum. The second centered

20616

around the danger that the greater dependence of the European states and
Japan on imports of oil could lead to begger-thy-neighbor competition and
tend to undermine the cohesion of the Western alliance. The United Stf-tes
reaction to the latter issue is the subject of this first National Defense Uni-
versity moncgraph en national security affairs. In it, Professors Joseph S.
Szj'liowicz and Bard E. O'Neill have reviewed the interaction between the
United States and its allies. They have described short- and long-term effects
of the crisis on American-European relations and suggested several factors to
account for changes which occurred.
"The Technical Objective of Safeguards." International Atomic Energy Agency
Bulletin, v. 17, Apr. 1975: 13-17.

A discussion of the attempts to technically define the criteria necessary to
detect the diversion of nuclear materials.
Tinker, Jon. "Nuclear Technocrat Tilts at Windmills." New Scientist, v. 68,
Nov. 6, 1975: 340-342.

Dr. Ishrat Usmani, energy advisor to the UN Environment Programme,
advises against the use of nuclear energy to solve the energy requirements
of the third world.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Energy and the Environment. Oversight Hearings on Nuclear Energy —
International Proliferation of Nuclear Technology. Hearings, 94th Cong. 1st .«;ess.
July 21, 22, and 24, 1975. Part III. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.
118 p. "Serial no. 94-16"
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Affairs. Nuclear Proliferation : Future U.S.
Foreign Policy Implications. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 506 p.

Arms control — [U.S.]/ Arms control negotiations/International control of

atomic power/Nuclear security measures/Foreign relations — [U.S.]/Atomic

weapons/Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. /International

Atomic Energy Agency.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Selected Readings

on International Cooperation in Energy Research and Development. Prepared by

the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and

Analysis and the Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development and

Demonstration of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of

Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976.

199 p.

"Serial DD"

At head of title: Committee print.

Energy research/International cooperation in science/International Energy
Agency.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on
Energy Research, Development and Demonstration. International Cooperation
in Energy Research and Development. Joint Oversight Hearings. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development and Demonstration and
the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and
Analysis of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 94th Cong., 2d sess. June 29-30 and Julv 1-2, 1976. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 341 p.

Energy research/International cooperation in science/Energy policy —
[U.S.]/Science policy — [U.S.]/International Energy Agency. /U.S. Energy
Research and Development Administration.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Nuclear Explosive Pro-
liferation Control Act of 1976: Report Together with Additional Views (dissenting)
to Accompany H.R. 16419. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1976. 60 p.
(94th Cong., 2d sess. House. Report no. 94-1613)

Export controls — [U.S.]— Law and legislation/Arms control agreements/
International control of atomic power/Reactor fuel reprocessing/Nuclear
fuels/Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act (Proposed) /Atomic Energy
Act.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Nuclear Explosive Pro-
liferation Control Act of 1976: Report Together With Additional Views (dissenting)
to Accompany S. 3853. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 46 p. (94th
Cong., 2d sess. Senate. Report no. 94-1336)

2067

Atomic weapons/Arms control — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/International
control of atomic power/ Nuclear exports- — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/
Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act (Proposed) /Atomic Energy Act/
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. /U.S. Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Proposed Extension of Existing
Research Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Israel Con-
cerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy; Report to Accompany H. Con. Res. 114-
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 9 p. (94th Cong., 1st sess. House.
Report no. 94-8)

Peaceful uses of atomic energy — [Israel] — Treaties/International coopera-
tion in science/Peaceful uses of atomic energy — [U.S.]— treaties.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. S. 1439: Export Reorgani-
zation Act of 1976. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess. June 22, 1976. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 468 p.

Atomic energy — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Peaceful uses of atomic
energy/Export controls — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/International control
of atomic power/Arms control agreements/Nuclear security measures/
Fissionable materials/Technology transfer/Nuclear exports — [U.S.j/Export
Reorganization Act (Proposed) /Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. /U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. /Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency./U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on" Atomic Energ3^ S. 1439: Export Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1976. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 1439 and S. 3770 and
H.R. 15273. July 28 and Aug. 31, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1976. 252 p.

Atomic energ}^ — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Peaceful uses of atomic
energjVExport controls — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Nuclear exports —
[U.S.] — Law and legislation/International control of atomic power/Arms
control agreements/Nuclear security measures/Fissionable materials/Tech-
nology transfer/Export Reorganization Act (Proposed)/Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons./U.S. Energy Research and Development
Administration./U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission./International Atomic
Energy Agency.
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Ayi Analysis of the Department
of the Interior's Proposed Acceleration of Development of Oil and Gas on the Outer
Continental Shelf. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. Available from
NTIS as PB 252202.
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Analysis of the Feasibility of
Separating Exploration From Production of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental
Shelf. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. Available from NTIS as
PB 24831.
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy

Systems. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Export Reorganization
Act of 1976: Report to Accompany S. 1439. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off.] 1976. 81 p. (94th Cong., 2d sess. Senate. Report no. 94-1193)

Atomic energy — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Export controls — [U.S.] —

Law and legislation/Peaceful uses of atomic energy/ Arms control agreements/

International control of atomic power/Nuclear security measures/U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. /Export Reorganization Act (Proposed)/

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons./ U.S. Energy Research

and Development Administration. /International Atomic Energy Agency.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International Cooperation

to Curb Nuclear Proliferation; Report to Accompany S. Res. 94- [Washington,

U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977. 4 p. (95th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. Report no.

95-103)

International control of atomic power/Arms control — [U.S.] — Law and
legislation/Atomic weapons/Arms control.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Export Reor-
ganization Act of 1976: Report to Accompany S. 1439. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1976. 38 p. (94th Cong., 2d sess. Senate. Report no. 94-875)

Nuclear exports — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Export controls — [U.S.] —
Law and legislation/ Arms control agreements/Nuclear security measures/
International control of atomic power/Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. /International Atomic Energy Agency. /Atomic Energy
Act/U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. /U.S. Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration./U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency./
Export Reorganization Act (Proposed)

2068

U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. Office of International
Affairs. lEA, International Energy Agency, Background and Current Activities.
[Washington] 1976. 46 p.
"ERDA 77-21"

"This background docimient highlights the energy research and develop-
ment activities currently being conducted under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency in which ERDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey of the Department
of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency are participating.
[It] outlines the background, objectives, and organizational structure of the
International Energy Agency and then briefly describes the history, objec-
tives, scope, current status, and other pertinent data on its 15 energy research
and development working parties and the cooperative projects they are
conducting."
U.S. General Accounting Office. Assessment of U.S. and International Controls
Over the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Report to the Congress by the Comp-
troller General of the United States. [Washington] 1976. 131 p.

"The growing international market for nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology for peaceful purposes has increased the potential for nuclear
weapons proliferation. This report evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness
of United States and international controls over peaceful nuclear programs
designed to deter the proliferation of all nuclear explosive devices.
"ID 76-60, Sept. 14, 1976"
U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Financial Assistance in the Development of
Foreign Nuclear Energy Programs, Multiagency: Report to the Committee on In-
ternational Relations, House of Representatives by the Comptroller General of the
United States. [Washington] 1976. 29 p.
"ID-75-63, May 28, 1975"

Provides information on U.S. financial assistance to foreign countries under
international nuclear agreements. Government financial participation is em-
phasized in the report.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Facts on Nuclear Prolif-
eration: A Handbook. Prepared for the Committee on Government Operations.
United States Senate, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off"., 1975. 259 p.
At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

"The handbook brings together, for the first time, statistics on uranium
resources and demand; uranium exploration, mining, and milling; uranium
enrichment; fuel reprocessing and fabrication; nuclear power and trade;
peaceful nuclear explosions; weapons implications; and safeguards. It also
contains the texts of treaties and understar dings and related information."
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Polar Energy Resources
Potential; Report. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy Research, Devel-
opment and Demonstration, and the Subcommittee on Energy Research,
Development and Demonstration (Fossil Fuels) of the Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, U.S. Govt.-
Print. Off., 1976. 178 p.

At head of title: Committee print.

Power resources — [Polar regionsj/International cooperation in science.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. United States Agree-
ments for Cooperation in Atomic Energy; an Analysis. Prepared for the Com-
mittee on Government Operations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off"., 1976. 83, 60, 22, 16 p.

At head of title: 94th Cong., 2d sess. Committee print.

Export controls — [U.S.]/ Arms control agreements/Nuclear security meas-
ures/Peaceful uses of atomic power/Fissionable materials/Technology trans-
fer/Atomic energy — Treaties/International control of atomic power.
U.S. President, 1977- (Carter). Control of Nuclear Proliferation; Message From the
President of the United States. [Washington] 1977. 25 p. (95th Cong., 1st sess.
House. Document no. 95-331)

Energy law and legislation — [U.S.]/International control of atomic power/

Nuclear exports — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Arms control/Arms control

agreements/Nuclear security measures — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. /International Atomic Energy

Agency. /Atomic Energy Act/Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act (Proposed)

World Energy Resources: An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Material on the

Availability and Development of World Energy Resources. Washington, D.C.

Energy Research and Development Administration. 1975. 21 p. (Available

from NTIS as ERDA-53.)

2069

The bibliography provides references to 173 recent English language
publications covering the availability and development of world energy
resources. Citations dealing exclusively with energy resources of the United
States have been omitted. The references are sources of statistical and general
energy policy information, not technical descriptions of resource development.
Most of the items chosen (from books, journal articles, and reports) were
published since 1972. The bibliography is divided into sections and within
sections by year of publication and then alphabetically by title. The four
general sections include citations that cover several types of energy resources
in more than one country. Citations of energy resources in more than one
country are given for coal, peat, oil shale, tar sands, petroleum, natural gas,
geothermal, hydraulics, nuclear energy, solar energy, ocean thermal gradients,
tidal power, wind power, and wastes. Then entries that deal exclusively with
the resources of each of 27 countries are listed.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Appelbaum, George D. "Controlling the Environmental Hazards of International
Development." Ecology Law Quarterly, v. 5, 1976: 321-376.

Examines environmental hazards resulting from development projects,
describes key agencies administering foreign aid programs, and in view of
recent litigation and the National Environmental Policy Act, analyzes legal
problems involved in using the courts to prevent adverse environmental
outcomes abroad.
Barr, Philip B. "Environmental Law — A Survey of International Marine Pollu-
tion Controls: Prelude to Geneva." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnalioyial Law,
v. 8, spring 1975: 477-492.

Reviews briefly past efforts at preservation of the marine environment,

the issues before the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea and the

UN Environment Program, and suggests probable future approaches.

Busby, Richard H. "The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution

from Land-Based Sources: An Effective Method for Arbitrating International

Effluent Pollution Disputes." California Western International Law Journal,

v. 5, 1976: 350-375.

Considers arbitration, diplomacy, and litigation as methods "available to
the international community to control and combat . . . [effluent] marine pol-
lution. This comment [evaluates] each of these alternatives to determine which
method appears most effective in the control of transboundary pollution
problems."
Christol, Carl O. The International Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Strat-
osphere Ozone Problem; Staff Report. Prepared for the use of the Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1975. 132 p.

At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
DeHoyas, Debora. "The United Nations Environment Program: The Mediter-
ranean Conferences." Harvard International Law Journal, v. 17, summer 1976:
639-649.

Discusses the agreements issued at regional conferences on pollution of the

Mediterranean held in Barcelona in 1975 and 1976 and "evaluates them as

means of protecting the marine environment and as examples of functional

cooperation."

Dunlap, Riley E. Studies in Environmental Politics and Policy: A Bibliography

Monticello, 111., 1975. 26 p. (Council of Planning Librarians. Exchange Ijibli-

ography 917).

Includes empirical studies of recent issues; stresses articles, chapters, and
papers. Environmental policy— Bibliography/Conservation of natural re-
sources— Bibliography/International environmental cooperation — Bibliog-
raphy/Decision making in public administration — Bibliography.
The Effects of Pollution Abatemeyit on International Trade. III. Report of the
Secretary of Commerce to the President and Congress in Compliance with
Section 6 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.
Department of Commerce, April 1975. 523 p. (Available from NTIS as COM-
75-11159/lSL.)
Elkind, Jerome B. "Footnote to the Nuclear Test Cases: Abuse of Right — A Blind
Alley for Environmentalists." Vanderbilt Journal of Traiisnational Law, v. 9,
winter 1976: 57-98.

The article analyzes the 1974 International Court of Justice decision
regarding French nuclear testing in the Pacific by focusing on the issue of
international responsibilitj^ of a state for activities conducted on its own
territory which have harmful effect on another state. "The Court avoided
involving itself in an area of international law that promises to be of increas-
ing significance, i.e. international environmental law."
"The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Re-
quirement." Michigan Law Review, v. 74, Dec. 1975: 349-380.

Analyzes NEPA's "language and legislative history," concludes that "the
NEPA procedural requirements apply to federal activities anywhere in the
world."

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Guruswamy, Lakshman. "Eco-legal Conspection and the New World Economic
Order." Earth Law Journal, v. 2, Feb. 1976: 23-43.

Article explores "how newly perceived values for environmental protec-
tion must be incorporated into international commerce and law, and the
disciplines which shape these systems."
Hand), Gunther. "Territorial Sovereignty and the Problems of Transnational
Pollution." American Journal of International Law, v. 69, Jan. 1975: 50-76.

Article outlines "the legal rules applicable to situations in general where
the conduct of activities lawful per se entails environmental effects in the
territory of another state."
Hoffman, Kenneth B. "State Responsibility in International Law and Trans-
boundary Pollution Injuries." International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
v. 25, July 19, 1976: 509-542.

Article examines "the functions which the rules of State responsibility
perform in relation to a 'new' subject of international obligations — the en-
vironment— in an effort to foster the development of a suitable framework for
a world environmental order." In this context the author discusses the Trail
Smelter case involving the U.S. and Canada in order "to examine in some
detail the functioning or malfunctioning of traditional rules of State respon-
sibility for the protection of aliens, as applied to an environmental dispute."
International Bank for Reconstruction and IJevelopment. Environment and De-
velopment. [Washington] 1975. 33 p.

Explains how environmental problems arising with development can be
mitigated by taking precautionarj^ measures. Paper proposes that the World
Bank Group continue its present project-by-project approach towards en-
vironmental and health problems.
Jensen, Clayton B., Dail W. Brown, and John A. Mirabito. "Earthwatch." Science,
V. 190, Oct. 31, 1975: 432-438.

"Guidelines for implementing global environmental assessment programs
are presented."
Kay, David A. The International Regulation of Pesticide Residues in Food. A
Report to the National Science Foundation on the Application of Interna-
tional Regulatory Techniques to Scientific/Technical Problems. Washington,
American Society of International Law. January 15, 1975, 132 p. (Available
from NTIS as PB 247 969/9SL.)

The purpose of the research is to select, survey, and explore the possibilities
of actively applying the spectrum of existing international management and
regulatory techniques to the practical solution of six selected .scientific and
technological problems requiring international action, and to suggest condi-
tions under which these techniques might be applied toward the resolution
of technology-related trans-national policy issues. This report considers the
problem of pesticide residues in the world food supply. There are 7 sections:
international regulation of pesticide residues, the international dimension of
the problem, the establishment of Codex Alimentarius, other international
organizations dealing with pesticide residues, bilateral arrangements, CCPR
systems, and the U.S. in relation to international regulation.
Kindt, John Warren. "Providing for Environmental Safeguards in the Develop-
ment Loans Given by the World Bank Group to the Developing Countries."
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, v. 5, summer 1975:
540-557.

The World Bank is divided into three branches, each with different loan
policies and criteria. This note examines "those policies and criteria from the
standpoint of financing environmental safeguards for proposed projects"
and reviews the current policy of the World Bank in this regard.
Knox, J. B. Man's Impact on His Global Environment. Lawrence Livermore
Labr., University of California at Livermore. Prepared for the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration. July 1976. 8 p. (Available from NTIS
as UCID-17178.)

The experience and awareness growing from research activities leads to
several important concerns for policy makers: there is a need to move towards
a policy of conservation of our global air resources in its totality from earth's
surface to stratosphere; the technical data base and level of understanding
should be systematically improved for the rational implementation of
standards for the whole atmosphere; the U.S. should establish a focal point
for regional and global environmental assessments responsive to policy-

2072

makers' needs and concerns, and interactive with the UN's Global Environ-
mental Monitoring System; and the environmental consequences of in-
creased U.S. dependence on coal should receive greater attention so that
optimal choices between control technology, tall stacks, and synthetic fuels
may be achieved with conservation of total air resources.
Lawrence, Floyd G. "Where on Earth Does Industry Stand in Pollution Control?"
Industry Week, v. 192, Feb. 14, 1977: 42-45, 48-51.

Outlines the pollution control policies of West Germany, Japan, Belgium,
Sweden, Great Britain, Italy, France, Canada, and the United States. Com-
ments on how these pollution laws could impair the competitiveness of U.S.
industry.
Lemarquand, David and Anthony D. Scott. Canada-United States Environ-
mental Relations. In English, H. Edward, ed. Canada-United States Relations.
New York, Academy of Political Science, 1976. (Proceedings, v. 32, no. 2)
p. 149-163.

Discusses transfrontier air and water pollution problems of the United
States and Canada. Gives summary of the major environmental issues which
are current or potential International irritants.
Lutz, Robert E., II. "The Laws of Environmental Management: A Comparative
Study." American Journal of Comparative Law, v. 24, summer 1976: 447-520.
Article seeks "to uncover the general policies and approaches of national
environmental laws. It is a comparative study of the environmental legisla-
tion of sixteen countries [including most of the major developed countries],
some with significantly different geographic, economic, social and political
characteristics. It focuses primarily on the various institutional, adminis-
trative, judicial and citizen participation approaches for environmental
management used in these countries. The study emphasizes the areas of
commonality in these various approaches to environmental problems."
National Research Council. Commission on Natural Resources. International
Environmental Programs Committee. Early Action on the Global Environmental
Monitoring System. Washington, D.C., 1976. 26 p.

Recommendation on tasks for the U.N. Environmental Programme Global
Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS). In general, early actions by
or for GEMS purposes should meet two criteria: "(1) they are to produce prac-
tical information on contemporary problems, such as desertification and
contamination of food resources, (2) the resulting data are to be useful at
the same time in advancing the basic scientific understanding of the world
environmental system and its dynamics."
Nowak, Jolanti., ed. Environmental Law: International and Comparative Aspects;
A Symposium. Dobbs, Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1976. 193 p.

Reviews "the success (or otherwise) of some significant existing multi-
lateral and national legislation" and focuses "attention on some of the most
urgent problems which relate to the coordination of environmental action,
both national and international."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Environment Direc-
torate. Fluoro carbons: An Assessment of Worldwide Production, Use and Environ-
ment Issues; First Interim Report. Paris, 1976. 41 p.

"A scientific theory published in mid-1974 has linked a class of man-made
chemical compounds known as 'fluorocarbons' to possible depletion of the
ozone layer of the earth's stratosphere." "This report summarizes the state-
of-knowledge with respect to the origin and significance of the potential
problem, and describes worldwide fluorocarbon production, use, release to the
atmosphere, and possibilities for substitutions."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Economics of Trans-
frontier Polhdion. Paris, 1976. 218 p.

"This publication . . . serve[s] as a useful 'box of tools' for understanding
and solving transfrontier pollution problems. The main questions dealt with
are: General principles (e.g. the polluter-pays principle (PPP) and the non-
discrimination principle), instruments (including an original application of
reciprocal taxation to transfrontier pollution), and institutions."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Implementation of
Pollution Charges. Paris, 1976. 7 p.

"The conclusions which follow are based on the studies in depth carried
out mainly for the Group of Economic Experts with the aid of various case
studies describing various Member countries' practical experience of pollution
charges used in the different fields of environmental protection."

2073

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Pollution Charges;
an Assessment. Paris, 1976. 77 p.

Asses.ses the air, water, noise, and solid waste pollution charge systems

already implemented in OECD countries, and includes proposals for the

extension of the use of charges.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Recommendation of

the OECD Council and Report by the Environment Committee. Paris, 1976. 21 p.

"The principle of equal right of access is designed to make available to

actual or potential 'victims' of transfrontier pollution who are in a country

other than that where the pollution originates, the same administrative or

legal procedures as those enjoyed by actual or potential 'victims' of a similar

pollution in the country where such pollution originates." "A second aim of

the principle is to ensure that the victims of transfrontier pollution situated

in a foreign country receive at least the same treatment as that given to

victims of the same pollution who are situated in the country where the

pollution originated."

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Report on Use of

Surveillance and Control Techniques for Air Pollution Alert Systems. Paris, 1976.

85 p.

"The report . . . was prepared by a group of national rapporteurs from

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands." It "examines

and compares the experience of these countries in development and operation

of air pollution alert systems."

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Report on the Use of

Techniqxies To Provide Air Quality Information for Land Use Planning. Paris,

1976. 48 p.

"The report . . . was prepared by a group of national rapporteurs from
Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Japan." It "describes and evalu-
ates the experience of these countries, in particular the techniques employed,
in relation to incorporating air pollution considerations into the planning
process for new developments."
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Strategies for Urban
Noise Abatement: An Overview. Paris, 1975. 35 p.

Presents an overview of urban noise-abatement problems in OECD coun-
tries and suggests policies that may help member countries follow a coordi-
nated comprehensive effort.
"Paying to Pollute." Envirojiment, v. 18, June 1976: 16-20.

Lists examples of the use of pollution charges in OECD countries.
Schneider-Sawiris, Shadia. "The Concept of Compensation in the Field of Trade
and Environment." Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, v. 5,
summer 1975: 357-380.

Discusses the concept of compensation for trade losses due to environ-
mental measures as set forth in recommendation 103 of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972.
Schoenbaum, Thomas J. "Natural Area Preservation in the Soviet Union and the
United States: A Comparative Perspective." American Journal of Comparative
Law, V. 24, summer 1976: 521-539.

Article states that "international cooperation to protect the global envi-
ronment should go beyond mere concern with shared resources and should
include cooperation regarding national land use policies. Exchange of infor-
mation and coordination of national policies regarding the preservation of
natural areas would appear to be the point of departure for such an effort
since analogous institutions have independently developed in two countries
with radically different political and economic systems, the United States
and the Soviet Union."
Sherman, Harvey R. "The Role of the United States Congress in International
Environmental Conservation." Environmental Policy and Law, v. 2, Apr. 1976:
32-38.

Reviews 20 recommendations of the U.N. Stockholm Conference on then
Human Environment, 1972, and outlines U.S. environmental legislation
which furthers the goals of the conference.
Smets, Henri. "Transfrontier Pollution: Towards a Common Approach." OECD
Observer, No. 77, Sept.-Oct. 1975: 29-32.

Discusses concepts embodied in the OECD recommendation on trans-
frontier pollution.
Smith, John A. "Harmonization: Is it the Answer?" Farm. Chemicals, v. 139,
Sept. 1976: 16-18.

Discusses the international coordination of pesticide regulations.

2074

Stein, Robert E. "The OECD Guiding Principles on Transfrontier Pollution."
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, v. 6, winter 1976: 245-
258.

Article examines the problems of transfrontier pollution in OECD coun-
tries and reviews the recommendations and principles that have been adopted
for controlling pollution spread.
Teclaff, Ludwik A., "Harmonizing Water Resources Development and Use With
Environmental Protection in Municipal and International Law." Natural Re-
sources Journal, v. 16, Oct. 1976: 807-861.

The author traces three historical phases in the relationship between water
law and environmental protection.
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Oil Transportation by Tankers:
An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measures. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1975. Available from NTIS as PB 244457.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms
Control, Oceans, and International Environment. S. Res. Jf9. Hearing, 95th
Cong., 1st sess., on S. Res. 49. Mar. 31, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1977. 58 p.

"Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government
should seek the agreement of other governments to a proposed treaty re-
quiring the preparation of an international environmental impact statement
for any major project, action, or continuing activity which may be reasonably
expected to have a significant adverse effect on the physical environment or
environmental interests of another nation or a glot)al common area."
U.S. /USSR Symposium on Comprehensive Analysis of the Environment, 1st, Tbilisi,
Georgia, USSR, 1974 Proceedings. [Washington, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agencv, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976] 188 p.
"EPA-600/9-75-004"

"These proceedings include the 24 papers presented at the first U.S./USSR
Symposium on Comprehensive Analysis of the Enivironment. The papers
were orginally presented in English and Russian at Tbilisi, Georgia, USSR,
between March 25 and March 29, 1974."
United Nations. Environment Programme. Governing Council. The Global
Environmental Monitoring System; Report of the Executive Director. [New
York] 1975. 17 p. (United Nations. [Document] UNEP/GC/31/Add. 2)
International environmental cooperation.
United Nations. Secretary- General (Waldheim). International Conventions and
Protocols in the -Field of the Environment: Note. [New York] 1976. 59 p. (United
Nations. [Document] A/31/211)

At head of title: United Nations General Assembly.

Informs the reader of "any new international convention concluded in
the field of the environment and of the status of existing conventions, with
particular reference to ratifications, accessions and entry into force, as well
as of the intention to become parties to such conventions expressed by
Governments during the year between sessions of the Council."

FOOD AND POPULATION

Bell, Frederick W. and E. Ray Canterbery. Agriculture far the Developing Coun-
tries: A Feasibility Study. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Pul). Co. cl976, xviii,
266 p.: ill.; 23 cm.

LC CALL NBR: SH135.P44.
Brown, Lester Russell. Increasing World Food Output: Problems and Prospects.
New York, Arno Press, 1976. viii, 140 p.: ill.; 23 cm. (World food supply)
LC CALL NBR: HD9000.5.B72 1976.
Brown, Lester Russell. Alan, Land & Food: Looking Ahead at World Food Needs.
New York, Arno Press, 1976. viii, 153 p.: ill.: 23 cm. (World food supply).
LC CALL NBR: HD9000.5.B724 1976.
Condraski, Susan J. An Analysis of FDA's Bilateral Agreements on the Importation
of Foods. Rockville, Food and Drug Administration. February 1977. 45 p.
(Available from NTIS as PB 264 454/9SL.)

The study presents the results of an analysis of nine agreements which FDA

has with foreign governments regarding the regulation of imported dried

milk, shellfish, and frog legs. The purpose of the study is to determine whether

the agreements have resulted in a measurable change in product quality or

expenditure of FDA inspection resources.

Condraski, Susan, and Loren Lange. The World Food Crisis. The U.S. Food

Supply and FDA. Final Report. Rockville, Food and Drug Administration.

February 1976. 61 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 254 175-3SL.)

The study presents the results of research on several aspects of the world
food situation. First, it discusses present and projected world food surpluses
and their distribution. Last, it compares amounts of food diverted from
U.S. food suipluses and production. Data sources used are from the Food
and Agricultural Organization of the U.N., the U.S. Departments of Agri-
culture and Commerce and the FDA.
Feder, Ernest. "In Sheep's Clothing." Ceres, v. 9, July- Aug. 1976: 40-44.

Criticizes transnational agricultural corporations of the industrial nations
for "the elimination of the remnants of peasant agriculture and the depletion
of resources at terrifying speed with unpredictable results for future food
supplies" in third world agricultures. Discusses the adverse effect of capital
and technology transfer to developing countries.
Harlan, Jack R. "Our Vanishing Genetic Resources." Science, v. 188, May 9,
1975:618-621.

"Modern varieties replace ancient populations that have provided genetic

variability for plant breeding programs." Discusses international programs

for genetic resource conservation and also national programs in the United

States and other countries.

Population and Food/Crucial Issues. Washington, D.C. National Academy of

Sciences. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation.) September 1975.

60 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 248 257/8SL.)

The report examines those elements that act as constraints on providing
an adequate food supply to the world's peoples and certain ameliorative
measures that might be taken to relieve those constraints. The report deals
in turn, with population; food and health; agricultural resources; factors
such as affluence, climate, and aid programs; means to increase food supplies;
and certain research priorities. It concludes with five general recommendations.
Stein, John Picard and Rodney T. Smith. The Economics of United States Grain
Stockpiling. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation. March 1977. 80 p. (Avail-
able from NTIS as AD-A038 619/SL.)

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This report attempts to synthesize the written discussion of grain stock-
piling in the economics literature and to provide a structure for the policy
discussion of grain stock issues within the U.S. Government. In addition,
some new economic analysis is provided. While emphasizing the economic
dimension of the issues, how political considerations maj' modify conclusions
based solely on economic analysis is considered. International economic and
diplomatic issues are considered from a U.S. perspective to reflect the situa-
tion of U.S. policymakers. The report grows out of a survey of the literature,
supplemented by discussions with U.S. Government officials in the White
House Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), the sponsor of
this study; the Council of Economic Advisers; the Office of Management and
Budget; the Departments of Agriculture, State, and the Treasury; and the
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
World Food and Nutrition Study: The Potential Contributions of Research. By the
World Food and Nutrition Study Steering Committee; Commission on Inter-
national Relations, National Research Council. Washington, National Academy
of Sciences, 1977. 219 p.

The world can feed itself but economic and political measures are needed to
fulfill the promise of increasing world food production. Coherent food and
nutrition studies must be established at the highest levels of government to
deal with the development of policies to attain these international goals.

GLOBAL HEALTH

"Biomedical Research: WHO's Commitments Examined." WHO Chronicle, v.
29, Nov. 1975: 417-422.

Describes several aspects of biomedical research which affect the World

Health Organization's programs, including the controversial decision to

continue research on genetic manipulation.

Hughes, James P. Health Policies and International Corporations, Oakland, Calif.,

Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., November 1975, 15 p. (Available from

NTIS as HRP-0006853/6SL.)

The human health impact of developmeiit projects conducted in emerging
countries by international corporations is discussed. It is felt that the impact
of such a project should be considered from the point of view of people re-
siding in an area, the project's future neighbors, and those newly attracted
to the project site. The direct health impact of a development project is
examined in relation to communicable disease control, housing and sanitary
facilities, dietary change, and the increased risk of road accidents. Direct
health impacts of a development project on workers are concerned with work
accidents, exposure to chemical and physical hazards, exposure to local di-
seases, and new disease vectors. The introduction of a major new project into
a developing area is likelj^ to create significant demands for a variety of social
services, including medical care for project personnel and their dependents
■ and for people ordinarily attracted to a development site. In addition, public
health measures such as monitoring the safety of water and food supplies, the
enforcement of sanitary regulations, and the control of disease vectors must
be considered. Planning for health care in a development project must en-
compass therapeutic, preventive, and environmental services.
Futch, Helen N., "Steering a Course for Cancer Control." Laboratory Management,
v. 13, Mar. 1975: 26-28.

"Clinicians and investigators from 61 countries are challenging the disease

with new approaches to diagnosis, treatment and prevention. Here is a

summary of their latest findings."

Gardner, Barbara Jeremiah. "The Potential for Genetic Engineering: A Proposal

for International Legal Control." Virginia Journal of International Law, v. 16,

winter 1976: 403-430.

Examines the components of genetic engineering, reviews related legal

and ethical issues, disciisses regulation of scientific inquiry, and recommends

the establishment of an international ethics review board.

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Recent Advaiices in the Assessme7it of

the Health Effects of Environmental Pollution. Held at Paris, France on 24-28

June 1974, 4 volumes. (Prepared in Cooperation with the Commission of the

European Communities, the World Health Organization, and the Environmental

Protection Agency.) 1975. (Documents available from NTIS as PB 261-477 to

PB 261-480.)

Partial contents: The effect of environmental factors on health methods
for population studies; Relationship of air pollution to prevalance of lower
respiratory illness and lung function in Australian school children; Clinical
investigation in Northwest Quebec, Canada, of environmental organic
mercury effects; Dose-response relationships linking short-term air pollution
exposures to aggravation of cardio-respiratory illness; Methods for a European
study on possible effects of air pollution in children; Study on long-term
effects on health of air pollution; The CHAMP air quality monitoring pro-
gram; The effect of environmental factors on health methods for population
studies; A study on health effect indices concerning population in cadmium-
polluted area; Dose-response relationships linking short-term air pollution
exposures to aggravation of cardio-respiratory illness; Predictive models for
estimating the health impact of future energy sources; Sampling, analysis and
composition of airborne particulate material in Belgium.
U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Participation in the World Health Organiza-
tion Still Needs Improvement, Departments of State and Health, Education, and
Welfare Agency for International Development; Report to the Senate Commission
on Governmental Affairs by the Comptroller General of the United States. [Wash-
ington] 1977. 52 p.

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"ID-77-15, May 16, 1977'*

"Describes the activities of the World Health Organization, discusses
current issues affecting the Organization, identifies the lack of clear U.S.
policy objectives in the Organization, and makes recommendations to the
Secretary of State to improve U.S. participation."
U.S.-Japan Cooperative Medical Science Program. Second Five Year Report,
1970-1975. [Washington, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
national Environmental and Scientific Affairs, for sale by the Supt. of Docs.,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976] 180 p. (U.S. Dept. of State. Publication 8864)
"This report describes research progress made under the U.S.-Japan
Cooperative Medical Science Program during its second 5 years of scientific
studies." "The Program continues to focus upon diseases of importance in
Asia and to apply modern scientific approaches from fields such as cell
biology, immunology and genetics."
"The Work of I ARC, 1973-74." WHO Chronicle, v. 29, June 1975: 224-231.

Describes the work of the International Agency for Research on Cancer, on
independently financed organizations within the framework of the World
Health Organization.

NATURAL RESOURCES

Commodity Supply Restrictions Study: Policy Implications of Producer Country
Supply Restrictions: Overview and Summary. Cambridge, Charles River Asso-
ciates, February 1977. 264 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-264 391.)

This volume summarizes the other eight volumes of the study which seeks
to evaluate alternative federal policies which deal with restrictions initiated
by producer countries on supplies of major imported materials. A major
premise of CRA's effort was that rational policy analysis must proceed from a
realistic and market specific analysis of risks to a similarly concrete evaluation
of potential damage, and then to consideration of a range of policy instru-
ments including not only government encouragement of technological change,
but also stockpiling, tariffs and quotas, subsidies, and other measures. The
analytical approach combined an assessment of real dangers to the U.S.
economy in various materials markets with an analysis of the costs of different
policies designed to reduce the impacts of foreign supply restrictions.

Separate volumes contain studies on: alumunum/bauxite, chromite, coffee,
copper, manganese, platinum and palladium, and cobalt.
Darnell, Bezneat M. "Natural Area Preservation: The US/IBP Conservation of
Ecosystems Program." BioScience, v. 26, Feb. 1976: 105-108.

Examines U.S. activities conducted as part of the International Biological
Programme. The primary U.S. objective was "establishment within the
United States and its possessions of a comprehensive system of protected
research reserves. This system will include examples of intensively managed
ecosystems and of all important natural ecosystems. . . ."
DeMontbrial, Thierry. For a New World Economic Order. Foreign Affairs, v.
54, Oct. 1975: 61-78.

Says that "the main principles governing international economic relations
must be reexamined, taking into account the changes in power relationships
and attitudes during the past 30 years." Focuses on the international mone-
tary system, free trade, and the management of energy, raw materials, and
agricultural products.
Fano, Enzo. "The Role of International Agencies." Natural Resources Journal,
v. 16, Oct. 1976: 957-968.

Focusing on the U.N. water conference and on U.N. agencies, the author

discusses how the role of international agencies can be strengthened in the

areas of water policy and water management assistance.

Fisher, Anthony. Conference on the Political Economy of Depletable Resources Held

at Brookings Institution, Washington, B.C. on June 9 and 10, 1975. College

Park, Maryland University, Prepared for the National Science Foundation.

December 1975. 55 p.

This report summarizes the proceedings of a conference on the political
economy of depletable resources. The conference discussed problems and
issues in basic economic and related political science research whose resolu-
tion would be helpful in dealing with energy-related policy questions. The
first session on public choice and resource use dealt with the definition of a
depletable resource, problems associated with information and uncertainty,
efficiency and equity issues, and a discussion of how institutions of collective
choice determine the pattern of use of depletable resources. The second ses-
sion on cartels and coalitions identified four areas of research: cartel mod-
eling, testing cartel models, international trade theory, and economic devel-
opment. The third session focused on the political economy of shortages.
Ford, John J. Observations 07i Ecology and National Security. Menlo Park, Stan-
ford Research Institute. (Prepared for Defense Supply Service, Washington,
D.C.) March 1975, 91 p. (Availal)le from NTIS as AD-A026 597/5SL.)

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Indications of an impending systemic ecological crisis — such as world popu-
lation growth, mounting demands on finite mineral resources, and pollution
of the biosphere — have led to increased concern with the ecological determi-
nants of international economic affairs. The report reveals that there is a
serious mismatch between the scope and complexity of these issues and U.S.
practice to perform an ad hoc planning response option in connection with
crisis situations. The study concludes that national security policy research
must address ecological issues to provide proper consideration of the impact of
ecological factors on security planning and policy development. The formu-
lation of courses of action including technological measures is discussed.
Hill, Gary A. Resource Diplomacy: The Role of Natural Resources in International
Politics. Los Angeles, University of Southern California. Prepared for the
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Va. May 1975. 58 p. (Available from
NTIS as AD-AOIO 533/8SL.)

This is the first in a series of reports examining the role of natural resources
in international affairs. The paper presents an overview to the problem dis-
cussing historical relationships between resources and politics as well as
the meaning and implications of current resource diplomacy patterns. The
paper also presents three indicators used in the construction of a critical
mineral index that identifies critical minerals in terms of their availability,
economic importance, and geographical concentration of reserves.
Lawrence, Eleanor. "Seeds of Hope." Nature, v. 256, July 24, 1975: 248-250.
Supports the necessity for preserving the seeds which provide the genetic
raw material for the world's high-yield, hybrid crops. Discusses the new
International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR).
LeMarquand, David. "Politics of International River Basin Cooperation and
Management." Natural Resources Journal, v. 16, Oct. 1976: 883-901.

This paper points out the technical and political preconditions favorable

for the use and management of international rivers, "for the operation of

effective international basin organizations, and for more responsive domestic

and international planning of shared water resources."

Morgan, John D. Jr. World Distribution and Flow of Major Mineral Commodities.

Washington, D.C., Bureau of Mines. Apr. 28, 1976. 20 p. (Available from

NTIS as PB-255 96311 SL.)

World mineral production is closely related to world steel production.
World steel production for the past 25 years is graphed for five major areas:
USA, Common Market, Japan, USSR, and the rest of the world. Detailed
tables compare the following for major countries and land areas: area;
population; iron ore and raw steel production, scrap and steel consumption;
bauxite, alumina, and aluminum production, aluminum consumption; tin
mine and smelter production, and consumption; copper mine, smelter, and
refinery production and consumption ; crude oil and petroleum refinery
production and consumption; and coal production and consumption. The
role of minerals, including scrap, in the U.S. economy is assessed.
Paarlberg, Robert L. "Domesticating Global Management." Foreign Affairs, v.
54, Apr. 1976: 563-576.

Author argues that improved domestic policy leadership is the true pre-
condition for effective management abroad of such problems as food, energy,
and resource depletion. Global welfare, he concludes, begins with domestic
welfare.
Sirkin, Abraham M. "Living with Interdependence: The Decades Ahead in
America." Futurist, v. 10, Feb. 1976: 4-14.

Discusses the growing interdependence of nations and segments of the

national economy and what impact this will have on individual Americans

over the next 25 years. The areas of energy, environment, and food are

discussed in particular.

Skagestad, Gunnar. "The Frozen Frontier: Models for International Cooperation."

Cooperation and Conflict, v. 10, no. 3, 1975: 167-187.

Discusses international cooperation in the polar regions, with emphasis on
scientific, economic aspects, and regulation of sovereignty.
U.S. Geological Survey. International Cooperation in the Earth Sciences. [Washing-
ton] 1975. 32 p.

"Summary of Geologic, Hydrologic and Topographic Investigations in
Other Countries."

2081

U.S. Library of Congress. Science Policy Research Division. Problems and Legisla-
tive Opportunities in the Basic Materials Industries: Report. Prepared for the
Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technologj' of the Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, first session. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print.'Off., 1975. 150 p.
"Serial S"
At head of title : Committee print.

"To illustrate the problems confronting the basic materials indu.stries in
the United States, efforts undertaken b}^ a number of other countries to
improve the industrial competitiveness of their raw materials industries are
compared and the impact of international technology transfer in these indus-
tries is assessed."
United Nations. Secretar\^- General (Waldheim). Natural Resources: Strengthen-
ing of United Nations Information Services in the Natural Resources Field; Report.
New York, 1976. 11 p. (United Nations. [Document] E/5807)
At head of title: United Nations Economic and Social Council.

Concerns information control for "medium-term and long-term projections

of reserves, supply and demand with respect to energy, minerals and water

resources."

Wagner, J. Richard. Institutional Arrangements for Reducing Conflict Over Water

Quality in International Rivers. Tucson, Arizona Urliversity, August 1975:

50 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 244 821/5SL.)

Institutional arrangements coping with the problem of water quality in
international rivers were examineol. Findings are restricted to the evidence
available and are tentative only. Both the International Boundary and
Water Commission (United States- Mexico) and the International Joint
Commission (United States-Canada) are adequately meeting technical prob-
lems of quality control in their respective jurisdictions. Political aspects of
water policy, however, caused delays in solving the salinity problem on the
Colorado River and the downstream benefits issue on the Columbia River.

OCEAN RESOURCES AND POLICY

Abrams, Nancy Ellen. "The Environmental Problem of the Oceans: An Inter-
national Stepchild of National Egotism." Environmental Affairs, v. 5, winter
1976:3-32.

Article examines "the main international conventions relating to pollution
of the marine environment, especially the newest one now being negotiated
at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference." Concludes that the
conventions are inadequate and that the "practice of treating environ-
mental responsibility for the oceans according to traditional notions of
State sovereignty and as just one more branch of the 'Law of the Sea' con-
stitutes a serious error."
Alexander, Lewis M. "Regional Arrangements in the Oceans." American Journal
of International Law, v. 71, Jan. 1977: 84-109.

Assesses alternative regional arrangements for future management of
ocean resources.
Amacher, Ryan C. and Sweeney, Richard James, eds. The Law of the Sea: U.S.
Interests and Alternatives. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Pohcy Research [cl976] 196 p.

"This volume presents the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the
U.S. Treasury and the American Enterprise Institute to help focus attention
on U.S. interests in the law of the sea negotiations and to discuss possible
alternatives to a comprehensive treaty. This conference was held on 14
February 1975 and was attended by more than fifty private and govern-
ment lawyers, economists, and political scientists."

Partial contents. — U.S. Security Interests and the Law of the Sea, by R.
Osgood. — U.S. Economic Interest in Law of the Sea Issues, by D. Johnson and
D. Logue. — The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: Caracas
Review, by A. Hollick. — Alternatives to a Law of the Sea Treaty, by H.
Knight.
Bilder, Richard, B. The Settlement of International Environmental Disputes. (A
Series of Lectures Delivered at the Hague Academy of International Law. Sum-
mer 1975.) Madison, Wisconsin University. (Prepared for the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration.) February 1976. 90 p. (Available from NTIS
as PB 254 076/3SL.)

The monograph is the text of five lectures which were delivered under the
sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Au-
gust 11-15, 1975, at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands. These
lectures are on the subject of international environmental disputes. Included
at the end of the text is a selected bibliography of publications related to this
topic.
Bissell, William Kenneth. "Intervention on the High Seas: An American Approach
Employing Community Standards." Journal of Maritime Law and Com-
merce, V. 7, July 1976: 718-735.

Article discusses the issues involved in an international convention per-
taining to the intervention by a coastal state when a traumatic oil spill
occurs on the high seas off its coast. States that the importance of the con-
vention "arises from the community standards it applies to an exclusive
coastal state activity. The functional approach employed by the Convention
appears superior to any mileage parameters for limiting coastal state compe-
tence."
Bobrow, Davis B. "International PoHtics and High-Level Decision Making:
Context for Ocean Policy." Ocean Development and International Law Journal,
V. 3, no. 2, 1975: 171-180.

"Seeks to summarize in a necessarily oversimplified and somewhat sub-
jective fashion some relevant parts of the context that face professionals
working on research about or pertinent to ocean policy: the international
political environment and the milieu of high-level foreign policy decision-
making (including issue avoidance)."

(2082)

2083

Borgese, Elisabeth Mann. A Ten- Year Struggle for Law of the Sea. Center Maga-
zine, V. 10, May-June 1977: 52-62.

Looks -back on the ten-year struggle to resolve the international question
of ownership of the ocean floor and the resources to be found there.
Charney, Jonathan I. "The International Regime for the Deep Seabed: Past Con-
flicts and Proposals for Progress." Harvard International Law Journal, v. 17,
winter 1976: 1-50.

Article deals with the conflicting positions taken at the Law of the Sea
Conference on setting up the International Seabed Authority to control
marine resources.
Clarkson, Kenneth W. "International Law, U.S. Seabeds Policy and Ocean
Resource Development." Journal of Law & Economics, v. 17, Apr. 1975: 117-142.
"In this paper alternative proposals for the efficient development and use of
the oceans' services and resources are examined and appraised. Primary
attention will be given to the U.S. Government's proposed draft treaty articles
for a coastal seabed economic area for the United Nations conference on the
law of the seas to be held in 1974 and 1975."
Cochran, Charles L. Keeping the Seas Clean: An International Concern. United
States Naval Institute proceedings, v. 101, Feb. 1975: 97-100.

"Attempts to provide international standards for pollution control in

territorial seas have been consistently beaten back as being incompatible

with the sovereign jurisdication of the coastal nation over her own territory —

limited only by the right of innocent passage."

Cooper, Richard N. "An Economist's View of the Oceans." Journal of World

Trade Law, v. 9, July- Aug. 1975: 357-377.

Article indicates "how one economist, not an expert on oceans or any of its

particular aspects, looks at this relatively new range of issues and what

guidance he would offer for future management of the resources of the oceans."

Costlow, John D., Dana R. Kester, Frank T. Manheim, and Dennis S. Polls.

Evaluation of the International Decade of Ocean Exploration: A National Science

Foundation Research Program. Prepared for the National Science Foundation.

November 1976, 300 p. (Availal)le as NTIS PB-265 729/4SL.)

The report is an evaluation of the research sponsored by the National

Science Foundation for the International Decade of Ocean Exploration

(IDOE). The evaluation assesses the progress that each IDOE project has

made toward accomplishing its objectives and the degree to which the results

of projects have contributed or have the potential for contributing to the

broad goals of the IDOE. The study was conducted during 1975-76 at the

mid-point of the decade.

Eckert, Ross D. "Exploitation of Deep Ocean Minerals: Regulatory Mechanisms

and United States Policy." Journal of Law cfe Economics, v. 17, Apr. 1975:

143-177.

"The purpose of this paper is to apply economic analysis to available
information concerning the nature and mining of nodules to determine (1)
whether some form of regulation will promote their efficient exploitation,
and (2) if so, what powers the regulatory authority should possess."
Evans, Emmit B., Jr. "Marine Scientific and Technological Assistance to Develop-
ing Countries: Science for Development or Technology for Malintegrated
Growth?" Economic Development and Cultural Change, v. 24, Jan. 1976: 375-
385.

"With Third World governments likely to soon control access to much of

the ocean space within which marine scientists work, U.S. oceanographers

are making ready for the day when assistance in the building of indigenous

Third World technoscientific capabilities will become the standard quid

pro quo for clearance to conduct scientific research in Third World waters."

Frank, Richard A. Deepsea Mining and the Environment. Report of the Working

Group on Environmental Regulation of Deepsea Mining. St. Paul, West Pub.

Co. [1976] 54 p. (Studies in transnational legal policy, no. 10).

"... This study deals with the way in which the United States government
might effectively address the environmental aspects of a deepsea mining
regime. . . . The last part of the study addresses some of the international
ramifications of the development of an environmental regime for deepsea
mining, and calls for the involvement of other governments in the process,
both through the use of their own legal and administrative systems and
through the development of an international regime."

2084

Frank, Richard B. and Bruce W. Jenett. "Murky Waters: Private Claims to Deep
Ocean Seabed Minerals." Law and Policy in International Business, v. 7, fall
1975:1237-1270.

Briefly describes deep ocean mining and discusses its economic significance,

analyzes the Ely opinion, a private legal study commissioned by Deepsea

Ventures, Inc. on applicable international law, and examines international

and U.S. attempts to develop an international regime to control mining

operations.

Friedman, Lawrence A. "Legal Aspects of the International Whaling controversy:

Will Jonah Swallow the Whales?" New York University Journal of International

Law& Politics, v. 8, fall 1975: 211-239.

Gives the background and issues of the whaling controversy, "analyzes
the past failures and present efforts of the International Whaling Commission
to provide for the orderly development of the whaling industry while pro-
tecting the whale population," and considers "American activity in the inter-
national and domestic spheres, including the enactment of important new
legislation designed to protect whales and other endangered species."
Graham, Nancy W. Fisheries Law: Unilateral or Multilateral Formulation. Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution. (Prepared for National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration.) December 1976. 91 p. (Available from NTIS as
PB 264 266/8SL.)

The various claims to controls over fisheries, examining systems of exploi-
tation of the fishery resources, considering the goals of proper management,
international cooperation and conflict avoidance are studied. The historical
struggle between the philosophies of freedom of the seas and territorial
control, the historical actions of the United States, international disputes
that have arisen out of unilateral actions of others, and finally the actions
which have emerged from the Law of the Sea Conferences are reviewed.
The report concludes with a statement of belief that a synthesis may be
reached incorporating our unilateral action, the Fishery Conservation Act,
within the framework of the economic zone established multilaterally through
the Law of the Sea Conference. Such a synthesis would represent a con-
sensus and have a binding effect on the parties.
Gregory, Gene. "Japan and the Law of the Sea: Uncertainties of the New Order."
Contemporary Review, v. 229, Sept. 1976: 131-137.

Reviews the negotiations of the 3d Law of the Sea Conference through
the Geneva session in 1976, from the Japanese point of view.
Hill, Clarence A., Jr. U.S. Law of the Sea Position and Its Effect on the Operating
Navy: A Naval Officer's View. Ocean Development and International Law, v. 3,
No. 4, 1976: 341-359.

Argues that the U.S. should accept the 200 mile economic zone and insist
on acceptance of the 3 mile territorial sea. Hill asserts that Kissinger's
continued insistence on extending the 3 mile territorial sea to 12 miles "can
only be regarded as another 'clause' in the detente agreement with the
Soviets, representing a major setback for our defense, unless he is able to
demonstrate how a 12-mile territorial sea serves the real interests in resources
and fish of the remainder of the free world."
Hollick, Ann L. "National Ocean Institutions: Research Needs. Ocean Develop-
ment and International Law Journal, v. 3, no. 2, 1975: 155-170.

"This paper is concerned with research needs pertaining to national ocean

institutions and to the policy process in which those institutions are engaged."

Appendix provides a list of U.S. Government agencies engaged in ocean-

Hollick, Ann L. "U.S. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations." Virginia
Journal of International Law, v. 17, fall 1976: 23-55.

This article examines the decision making process which led to the issuance
of the Truman Proclamations in 1945. The proclamations provided for con-
trol of the natural resources of the continental shelf contiguous to the U.S.,
for determination of boundaries with adjacent states, anfl establishment of
conservation zones for fish in areas contiguous to the U.S.
Hollomon, J. Herljert, and others. An Analysis of the Potential Commercial and
Foreign Trade Impacts of the Sea Grant Program. Cambridge, Mass., Center for
Policy Alternatives, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977. 102 p.

Reports on the potential commercial value of the research being done
under the Sea Grant projects.

2085

Janis, Mark W. "Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention: The
Military Activities Exception." Ocean Development and I liter national Law Jour-
nal, V. 4, no. 1, 1977: 51-65.

"This paper considers the military activities exception in the settlement of
disputes part of the Law-of-the-Sea Conference's Informal Single Negotiating
Text. It notes that although the exception, on its face, seems to favor naval
powers, in practice it would not. The emerging rules of the law of the sea
are favorable to naval operations and it is more likely that the military
activities exception would be used by coastal states resisting superpower
naval activities."
Keil, Alfred A. H. The United States and the Oceans: Opportunities for Independence.
Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sea Grant Program. (Pre-
pared for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) September
1976. 41 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-261 991/4 SL.)

The proceedings contain the talk given by Alfred A. H. Keil along with
comments and discussion by J. H. HoUomon, G. F. Mechlin, and M. Pitkin.
Dean A. Horn served as moderator. Keil's main thoughts were that the key
to systematic and coherent development of United States ocean activities is
an integrated ocean policy, which can provide the framework for individual
marine actions. Such a policy must envision domestic ocean utilization in
the context both of international ocean developments, and the attitude of
many countries that ocean resources are "the common heritage of mankind."
Such a policy must assess the United States' position toward the oceans
within the broader framework of our country's aspirations in a changing
world.
Kissinger, Henry Alfred. "The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Coopera-
tion." Dept. of State Bulletin, v. 74, Apr. 26, 1976: 533-542.

Henry Kissinger discusses the need for a treaty, reviews the accomplish-
ment of the Law of the Sea Conference, and examines three remaining areas
of concern: marine scientific research, dispute settlement, and the super-
vision of deep sea mining.
Knight, H. Gary. The Potential Use of Reservations to International Agreements
Produced by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Louisiana
State University for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
1975. 54 p. (Available from ATIS as PB-261 429/5SL.)

The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss issues relating to the
possible use of reservations to a treaty or treaties resulting from the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Two different aspects of
the issues are examined: The desirability from any particular nation's point
of view of its being able to make reservations to a law of the sea treaty or
treaties; and the desirability from any particular nation's point of view of
other nations being able to make such reservations. United States procedural
and policy objectives in the law of the sea negotiations have l:)een used in
order to frame the issues and provide a basis for concrete analysis. Part B
of this paper identifies those aspects of United States ocean policy which are
directly related to the issue of reservations to international agreements.
Part C contains a discussion of the use of reservations and the effects which
their use might have and Part D discusses some specific non-agreement
situations which might emerge from the Third Conference and suggests how
reservations might be applied in those situations.
Kolb, Kenneth H. "Congress and the Ocean Policy Process." Ocean Development
and International Law Journal, v. 3, no. 3, 1976: 261-286.

Discusses the Congress' role in the formulation of ocean policy and in
particular on the relationship between the powers of the President and those
of the Congress in the formulation of this policy.
Kun, Joseph. Conference on Law of Sea Accentuates Sino-Soviet Differences.
Munich, Radio Liberty Research, 1976. 6 p.

"Radio Liberty Research, RL 178/76, April 5, 1976"

"This paper outlines the basic Chinese and Soviet views on [maritime

law] and calls attention to the competition between the two Communist

powers for the support of the developing nations, which comprise a substantial

percentage of the numl^er of countries participating in the conference."

"Law of the Sea: From Caracas to Geneva — A Time for Decision." Columbia

Journal of Transnational Law, v. 14, no. 1, 1975: 1-117.

Presents the proceedings and papers of a conference on the law of the sea
held at Columbia University, Nov. 14, 1974.

2086

Lazarev, M. I. "Scientific-Technological Progress and the Search for Legal
Regulation of Possible Seabed Uses." Ocean Development and International
Law Journal, v. 3, no. 1, 1975: 75-86.

Presents the Soviet view on the problem of who owns the sea l)ed and
its resources, beyond territorial waters.
Liana, Christopher B., John King Gamble, and Charlene Quinn. Law of the Sea:
A Bibliography of the Periodical Literature. Kingston, R.I., Law of the Sea
Institute, 1975. 80 p. (Law of the Sea Institute. Special publication no. 4)

Bibliography contains annotated citations to periodical literature pub-
lished in the 1970's in "most of the major journals." Items are arranged by
author and by subject.

Logue, John J. "Carter's Ocean Opportunity." Commonweal, v. 104, Apr. 29, 1977:
265-269. ^1 ^ , , f ,

Discusses the options the Carter administration faces in ocean policy,
prior to the opening of the next session of the Law of the Sea Conference
in New York on May 23, 1977.
Mielke, James E. Effects of Man's Activities oji the Marine Environment. Prepared
at the request of Hon. Warren G. Magnuson, chairman. Committee on Com-
merce and Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, chairman. National Ocean Policy Study for
the use of the Committee on Commerce and the National Ocean Policy Study.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 135 p.

At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

". . . Describes most of the salient aspects of ocean pollution beginning with
the importance of preserving the ocean resource, through man's activities
that generate marine pollution, specific marine pollutants, private interna-
tional organizations concerned with marine pollution. United Nations con-
ventions and United States legislative activities, and current technology for
abating ocean pollution."
Katz, Milton, and Richard R. Baxter. "Conference of Soviet and American Jurists
on the Law of the Sea and the Protection of the Marine Environment." Georgia
Journal of International & Comparative Law, v. 6, winter 1976: 1-197.

Collection of essays produced by a joint U.S.-Soviet conference held in

New York, Jan. 7-11, 1974. The main subjects of freedom of research, marine

pollution, freedom of navigation, fisheries, and marine mineral resources are

each covered by a Soviet and American author.

Mostert, Noel. "Supertankers and the Law of the Sea." Sierra Club Bulletin, v. 61,

June 1976: 13-16.

Discusses the environmental risks of accidental oil spills from supertankers
and the economics of the supertanker l)oom. Advocates the necessity for in-
dividual nations to draw up stringent national codes to regulate supertankers
since international laws cannot be enforced on the high seas.
National Research Council. Commission on International Relations. Ocean Policy
Committee. Marine Scientific Research and the Third Law of the Sea Conference,
2nd Substantive Session. Washington, D.C., 1976. 187 p.

"Although it is possible that a Law of the Sea treaty might be worse for
science than no treaty at all ... a treaty can offer a brighter future for science.
There is likely to be less dissatisfaction with a treaty and with negotiated
arrangements pursuant to it than there would be if looundaries, rules, and
resources were in a constant flux and were therefore a matter of dispute."
Nye, J. S. "Ocean Rule Making for a World Politics Perspective." Ocean Develop-
ment and International Law Journal, v. 3, no. 1, 1975: 29-52.

Discusses the ocean space and resources issues from historical and political
points of view.
Oda, Shigeru, and others. A New Regime for the Oceans; A Report of the Trilateral
Task Force on the Oceans to the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission.
[New York, 1976] 54 p. (Triangle papers, 9)

Reports the results of a private. North American-European-Japanese
oceans study, covering areas such as current and future uses cf the seas,
domestic and international pressure for more sophisticated regulation, issues
confronting the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, and interests and
perspectives of the Trilateral countries. Recommended courses of action by
these countries are included.
Ogley, R. C. "Birth-Pangs or Death-Rattle? The Common Heritage at Geneva."
International Relations, v. 5, Nov. 1975: 876-896.

2087

Discusses the difficult negotiations at U.N. Law of the Sea Conferences,

with attention being directed at the seabed ownership question. Author

recognizes that a comprehensive treaty is not likely, but urges that unilateral

actions by member states be delayed until the process has a chance to prove

itself.

Okidi, Charles Odidi. "Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation of Marine

Pollution: An Appraisal of Options." Ocean Development a7id International Law

Journal, v. 4, no. 1, 1977: 1-25.

"The unilateral decision by Canada in 1970 to extend its jurisdiction for

the control of pollution of the Arctic waters outward to 100 miles was attacked

by some people as a violation of international law. In this paper that model of

unilateralism, a regulatory regime by a global agency, and a regional approach

are analyzed and appraised with seme recommendations for an effective

arrangement for the control of pollution in the high seas."

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Review of Marine

Science arid Technology: Role of Science and Technology in Marine Resource

Development; Ireland. [Paris, cl975] 55 p.

Presents "an integrated view of the proposals put forward by the Marine

Science Committee of the National Science Council, of the questions which

were formulated by the experts in the light of the above report and their

visits to Ireland, of the responses of the Irish Authorities to these questions,

and the ensuing discussions at the review meeting and finally of the opinions

of the experts on the present situation and the desirable courses of action."

Osgood, Robert E., and others. Toward a National Ocean Policy: 1976 and Beyond.

Washington, Ocean Policy Project, School of Advanced International Studies,

Johns Hopkins University, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1976, 207 p.

Prepared for National Science Foundation, Research Applications Direc-
torate, by Ocean Policy Project, Johns Hopkins University, Washington,
D.C.

The objectives of this report are to: (1) illuminate the nature of U.S.
national interest in the oceans; and (2) suggest and evaluate alternative
strategies to achieve these interests.
Ostrovskii, I. A. "International Legal Protection of the Seas from Pollution."
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, v. 3, no. 3, 1976: 287-302.
Russian writer describes history of international legal efforts to cope with
oceanic pollution.
Pearson, Charles S. International Marine Environment Policy: The Economic
Dimension. Baltimore, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns
Hopkins University [cl975] 127 p. (Washington Center of Foreign PoUcy
Research. Studies in international affairs, no. 25)

"The purpose of this study is to explore the issues involved in efforts to
arrest the environmental deterioration of the oceans. The broad perspective
[is] that of economics, and the discussion draw[s] on the extensive recent
literature concerned with the economics of environmental control."
Power at Sea: I. The New Environment. London, International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies [cl976] 39 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 122)

Contents. — Sea power and political influence, by H. Bull. — Military
implications of the new ocean politics, by R. Osgood. — The protection of
resources, by E. Moberg. — The impact of new maritime technologies, by
H. Feigl. — Tactical anti-submarine warfare: the past and the future, by
G. Lindsey.
Shyam, Manjula. "Rights of the Coastal States to Fisheries Resources in the
Economic Zone: An Empirical Analysis of State Preferences." Ocean Manage-
ment, V. 3, Apr. 1976: 1-30.

Analyzes law of the sea pertaining to rights of countries to fisheries re-
sources in the economic zone. Examines economic and geographic data of
each of the 148 nations in the Law of the Sea Conference to determine the
position which best serves national interests.
Smith, Brian D. "Canadian and Soviet Arctic Policy: An Icy Reception for the
Law of the Sea?" Virginia Journal of International Law, v. 16, spring 1976:
690-634.

Comment focuses on the ocean policy positions of Canada and the Soviet
Union regarding the Arctic region, and how these policies react and interact
with the general Law of the Sea provisions currently being negotiated.
Swing, John Temple. "Who Will Own the Oceans?" Foreign Affairs, v. 54, Apr.
1976:528-546.

96-243 O - 77 - 38

2088

Provides a brief history of ocean use and related legal/political develop-
ments leading to the 3rd Law of the Sea Conference. Describes the devel-
oped/underdeveloped country and geographically advantaged/disadvantaged
country cleavages in the negotiations and reviews major issues including
management of navigation, development of non-living resources such as
oil, deep-sea mining, fisheries, marine pollution, scientific research and
dispute adjudication.
"A Symposium on Deep Seabed Mining: the Law of the Sea: A Choice and a
Challenge." Virginia Journal of International Law, v. 15, summer 1975:
792-868.

Symposium issue contains four articles discussing the economic, environ-
mental, technological, and legal aspects of deep seal^ed mining.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Energy and Environment. Radiological Contamination of the Oceans. Over-
sight Hearings, 94th Cong. 2d sess. July 26-27, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1977. 1030 p.
"Serial no. 94-69".
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Sub-
committee on Oceanography. National Ocean Policy. Hearings, 94th Cong.,
2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 210 p.

Hearings held on oversight to examine general oceans policy for the United
States — Sept. 9, 16, 17, 1976; Law of the Sea Conference briefing — June 15.
"Serial no. 94-43".
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Establishing a 200-Mile Fishery

Zone. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977.
U.S. Congress. Senate. National Ocean Policy Study. Geneva Session of the Third-
United Natio7is Law of the Sea Conference. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. June 3
and 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 85 p.

Maritime law — Conferences/Ocean policy — [U.S.]/United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York, etc., 1973-1975.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on
Oceans and International Environment. Law of the Sea. Hearing, 94th Cong.,
1st sess., on Achievements of the Geneva session of the Third United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference. May 22, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1975. 116 p.

Maritime law — Conferences/Ocean policy — [U.S.]/United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York, etc., 1973-1975.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on
Oceans and International Environment. Law of the Sea. Hearing, 94th Cong.,
2d sess. May 20, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 40 p.

Maritime law — Conferences/Ocean policy — [U.S.]/United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York, etc., 1973-1976.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Minerals, Materials and Fuels. Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference.
Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. June 4, 1975. Part 3. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print Off., 1975. 1161-1422 p.

Maritime law — Conferences/ Marine resources — Conferences/ United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York and Caracas, 1973-
1974.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee
on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels. Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference.
Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 29, 1975. Part 4. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1975. 1423-1592 p.

Ocean policy — [U.S.]/Territorial waters^Treaties/Marine resources —
Conferences/Maritime law — Conferences/Ocean floor ownership — Treaties/
International Seabed Authority (Proposed)/United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 3d, New York, etc., 1973-1975.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Information on United States Ocean Interests
Together With Positions and Results of Law of the Sea Conference at Caracas,
Multiagency; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United
States. [Washington] 1975. 72 p.
"B-145099, Mar. 6, 1975"

Ocean policy — [U.S.]/Maritime law — Conferences/Continental shelf/Ter-
ritorial waters/Navigation/Marine resources conservation/Fishery agree-
ments/Waterways/United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, New
York and Caracas, 1973-1974.

2089

U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Special Report: Translations on the Law
of the Sea. [Washington] 1975. 136 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Serv-
ice. JPRS, 65088)

"This special report contains translations from the world press and radio
of articles and commentary on the Law of the Sea Conference and subject
matter covered by that conference."
U.S. Librarj' of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Soviet Oceans Develop-
ment. Prepared at the request of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, chairman, Committee
on Commerce and Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, chairman, National Ocean Policy
Study for the use of the Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy
Study, pursuant to S. Res. 222. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 646 p.
At head of title: 94th Cong., 2d sess.. Committee print.

Ocean policy— [U.S.S.R.]/Sea power— [U.S.S.R.]/Naval strategy— [U.S.-
S. R. ]/Fisheries — [U . S. S. R. ]/Fishery agreements — [U. S. S. R.]/Marine mineral
resources — [U.S.S.R.]/Merchant marine — [U.S.S.R.]
U.S. Library of Congress. Ocean and Coastal Resources Project. Congress and the
Oceans: Marine Affairs in the 94th Congress. Prepared at the request of Hon.
Warren G. Magnuson, chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation and National Ocean Policy Study. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1977. 335 p.

At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

Ocean policy — [U.S.]/Fishery law and legislation — [U.S.]/Coastal zone
management — [U.S.]^ — Law and legislation/Marine mineral resources —
[U.S.] — Law and legislation/National Sea Grant Program — Law and legisla-
tion/Merchant marine legislation — [U.S.]/Maritime law — [U.S.]/Ocean pol-
icy— [U.S. S.R.]/Fishery management — [U.S.]
U.S. Library of Congress. Science Policy Research Division. Ocean Affairs in the
93d Congress. A Report Prepared Pursuant to the Request of the Subcommittee
on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House
of Representatives. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 227 p.
At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.
"Serial no. 94-C"
U.S. National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere. The International
Decade of Ocean Exploration: A Mid-Term Review. Washington [For sale by the
Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1975. 44 p.

Major review of the international cooperative oceanographic research
project, and in particular the U.S. role in the program.
U.S. National Science Foundation. Deep Sea Searches: t,he Story of the Seabed
Assessment Program. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1976] 22 p. "NSF 75-27"

"The purpose of this report is to describe the IDOE Seabed Assessment

Program in general terms that will be of interest to a wide audience without

extensive backgrounds in marine geology or geophysics."

U.S. President. (Carter). International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution

from Ships, with Annexes and Protocols; Message. Washington, U.S. Govt.

Print. Off., 1977. 108 p.

At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. Executive E.
The United States and the Oceans: Opportunities for Independence; Proceedings.
[Boston, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976. 40 p.] Report no.
MITS 77-1.

Presents the 5th annual Sea Grant Lecture and Symposium held at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The principal speaker was Alfred A.
H. Keil, Dean, MIT School of Engineering.
Wenk, Edward, Jr. Assessing Impacts of New Ocean Law. Woods Hole, Mass.,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution [1976] 31 1. "WHOI-76-104"

"This paper focuses on Law of the Sea as a critical influence on the future
because LOS has become a symbol of awakened interest in the sea for the
United States and many other nations. But secondly, as this inquiry argues,
by inflaming territorial imperatives, LOS entails the hazard of being part of
the problem rather than part of the solution."
Williams, Douglas H. "Enforcement of the 1973 Marine Pollution Convention."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 102, Dec. 1976: 39-45.

Describes the position of the U.S. with regard to international law designed
to protect the marine environment and states that "regardless of the degree
to which the new convention will be effectively enforced beyond U.S. juris-
diction, it should prove to be a powerful new instrument for the protection
of waters within U.S. jurisdiction."

2090

Wooster, Warren S. "Some Implications of Ocean Research." Ocean Development
and International Law Journal, v. 4, no. 1, 1977: 39-50.

Discusses the social and political implications of ocean research, using the
example of upwelling. The control of marine research is the subject of intense
negotiation in the law-of-the-sea conferences.
Yakovin, Ye. Ye. "World Ocean and Politics." USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology,
no. 5, May 1976: 54-62.

Soviet author defines and comments on the American position taken at the
3d United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Young, Elizabeth. "Sea- Use Planning: The Administration and Protection of Off-
shore Resources." Journal of International Studies, v. 5, spring 1976: 58-63.
Discusses the implications for governments of the trend for states to extend
their national jurisdiction farther out into offshore waters. This movement
tends to reduce the freedom of the seas and involves major economic questions
of the rights to marine resources.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COOPERATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Colm, Peyer W., Rosemary Hayes, and Edwin Jones. Implications of Prospective
Chinese Petroleum Developments to 1980. Final Report. Arlington Va. Institute
for Defense Analyses. July 1976. 81 p. (Available from NTIS as AO-AO30
017/8 SL.)

This paper examines the development of the PRC's petroleum industry and
subjects to critical analysis some of the more authoritative U.S. academic,
industry, and government projections of China's petroleum reserves, produc-
tion, consumption, and exports, through 1980. The projections used in this
paper strike a balance among conflicting estimates that is consistent with the
data that have been released by Peking, with the limited foreign observation
of China's petroleum industry, and with Peking's apparent plans for the
utilization of its petroleum resources in the domestic economy and as the
principal source of foreign exchange during the Fifth Five Year Plan (1976-
80). Finally, the paper discusses the implications of China's projected petro-
leum prosperity for the country's economic development strategy, political
stability, and international relations.
Heymann, Hans, Jr. " 'Self-reliance' Revisited: China's Technology Dilemma."
Stanford Journal of International Studies, v. 10, spring 1975: 15-35.

Technology transfer — [China]/Industrialization — ^[China]/Imports — [China]
Li, Y. T. "Self-reliance in China." Technology Review, v. 79, Oct.-Nov. 1976:
47-53.

Author suggests the United States might look at China as a model of how
to control economic growth in a world of increasing resource depletion and
increasing environmental concern.
Myers, Norman. "China's Approach to Environmental Conservation." Environ-
mental Affairs, V. 5, winter 1976: 33-63.

Views China's approach to environmental decision making as primarily a

political process and compares the Chinese method to that of other countries.

The Chinese believe environmental degradation is due to the institutional

framework of capitalist countries.

National Research Council. Commission on International Relations. Committee

on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China. Solid State

Physics in the People's Republic of China. A trip report of the American Solid

State Physics Delegation. Washington, D.C., 1976. 203 p.

Most of the research programs on Solid State physics in China appeared
to be device-oriented or were chosen in areas with practical application.
"Almost always the engineering aspects were stressed, such as sample size,
diffusion temperature and alloy composition at the expense of consideration
at the atomic or molecular level."
Ridley, Charles P. China's Scientific Policies: Implications for International
Cooperation. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research [1976] 92 p; (AEI-Hoover policy study 20)
Sobin, Julian M. "New Doors into China: The Role of Technological and Com-
mercial Exchanges." Harvard Magazine, v. 79, Oct. 1976: 53-57.

"Peking's goal is to maintain revolutionary independence while acquiring

advanced technology from abroad. Institutionalized exchanges with other

countries may offer the means."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technologj^ Subcommittee on

Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Annotated

Bibliography on Science and Technology in China: Science and Technology in

the People's Republic of China, Background Study No. 1. Prepared by the Science

Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

Sept. 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 55 p. (Committee print.)

Prepared by Claire Geier and Karen Guarisco.

Topics included are: science policy, technology policy, scientific organiza-
tions and institutions, agriculture, aviation and space technology, electronics
and computer technology, energy, environment, medicine, nuclear science
and technology economics and industry, education and manpower and
scholarly exchange.

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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcomniittee on
Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Science in China
and U.S.-China Scientific Exchanges: Assessment and Prospects. Science and
Technology in the People's Republic of China, Background Study No. 2. Prepared
by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. November 1976.
Washington D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 37 p. (Committee Print.)
Prepared by Leo A. Orleans.

Reviews the results obtained from the exchanges of scientific delegations
between the United States and China and includes a brief assessment of the
changing science policies of the Chinese government.
The author visited China in 1973.
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. China and the Chinese: A Compendium
of Papers. 94th Cong., 2d session. November 19, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1976. 139 p. (Joint Committee Print.)

Papers deal with resources and resource development, including implica-
tions for the United States; economic development, and summary on a con-
gressional staff trip to China.
Zivetz, Herman. "The People's Republic of China and the Law of the Sea:
Caracas 1974 and Geneva 1975." Naval War College Review, v. 28, summer 1975:
55-71.

Author believes that "People's Republic of China (PRC) has the potential
to be a third superpower. However, the positions taken by the PRC at the
Law of the Sea Conferences in Caracas and Geneva and her unwillingness to
compromise on even minor points are not consistent with this potential and
represent instead the more radical and disruptive line favored by certain
Third World nations."

SPACE COOPERATION AND POLICY

Baker, David and Michael Wilson. "Space Shuttle Debut." Flight International
V. 110, Sept. 25, 1976: 975-981.

Describes the Space Shuttle vehicle program, and the growing range of pay
loads and "add-on" equipment being planned, including the European Space-
lab.
Bennett, W. Tapley. "U.S. Reviews International Cooperation in Space Activities
and Work of the U.N. Outer Space Committee in 1976." Dept. of State Bulletin,
V. 75, Nov. 29, 1976: 668-673.

Statement was "made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on
Oct. 18."
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 18th, Lisl)on, 1975. Proceedings. South
Hackensack, N.J., Distributed by Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1976. 201 p.

Papers were presented on the legal aspects of the utilization of energy from
space, the legal status of geostationary orbit, and general questions of inter-
national legal cooperation in astronautics.
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 19th, Anaheim, Calif., 1976. Proceedinqs.
South Hackensack, N.J., Distributed by Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1977. 419 p.
Papers and discussion covered the future of space law, space law and energy,
space colonies, remote sensing, and direct broadcasting by satellite.
Council on Economic Priorities. "The Space Shuttle." CEP Newsletter, May 25,
1977: 1-7.

Examines the Space Shuttle Program for the possible effects of military
utilization, international CQoperative projects, and use by industry for manu-
facturing and research.
Deskau, Martin. "West Germjan Space Programmes: What Next?" Interavia,
V. 31, Apr. 1976: 339-341.

Presents a brief overview of current space program of West Germany
aerospace companies and their cooperative efforts and plans for cooperation
with European and American space projects.
Downs, Hugh. "The Resources of Space." Center Magazine, v. 9, July- Aug. 1976:
67-75.

Author argues for continued support of the United States space program
which he sees providing the breakthroughs necessary to solve many of man-
kind's problems, i.e. energy from solar satellites, space colonies, etc.
Finch, Edward R., Jr. and Amanda Lee Moore. "Ecospace: The Economics of
Outer Space — and the Future." American Bar Association Journal, v. 62,
Mar. 1976: 332-338.

"The space programs of both the United States and the Soviet Union
have been expensive, but maybe they have been 'bargains' after all. The
programs have yielded a cornucopia of practical and economically valuable
results. With the prospects of solar energy and other resources from outer
space, we should be careful not to curtail our space program but to look
toward more international co-operation."
Froehlich, Walter. Apollo Soyuz. Washington, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration 1976, 131 p.
"EP-109"

"This publication summarizes the Apollo Soyuz record and presents a

sampling of the thoughts and opinions this historic project evoked from the

participants, the press, and other observers around the world."

Galloway, Eilene, Charles S. Sheldon II, and Barbara A Luxenberg. Convention

on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space: Analysis and Background

Data. Staff report prepared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and

Space Sciences, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1975. 65 p.

At head of title: 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

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Gibson, Roy. and Werner J. Kleen. "Europe's 'NASA' Gets OS the Ground."
IEEE Spectrum, v. 13, Feb. 1976: 66-70.

"The new Paris-based European Space Agency has ten member countries,
a $500 million annual budget, and a wide range of future programs."
Haggerty, James J. ApoUo-Soyuz : End of an Era — Start of an Era. Aerospace,
V. 13, June 1975: 2-7.

Discusses the end of the "Apollo era" and the beginning of an era of
increased international cooperation in space.
Hamer, John. "Cooperation in Space." Editorial Research Reports, v, 2, no. 1,
1975: 485-502.

Describes the Apollo Soyuz mission, history of U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition
in space, and goals of future space explorations.
International Council of Scientific Unions. Committee on Space Research. State
of the Art and Assessment of Scientific and Technological Developments in the
Exploration and Practical Uses of Outer Space Within an International Frame-
work: Report. New York 1976. 48, 5 p. (United Nations. Document] A/AC.
105/165)

At head of title: United Nations General Assembly. International co-
operation in astronautics
International Telecommunication Union. Fifteenth Report . . . on Telecom-
munication and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. [Geneva, 1976] 156 p.

Reports on actions taken by the International Telecommunication Union,
member state activities in the peaceful uses of outer space, and UN resolu-
tions on the subject.
Leonov, A. A. Woodland Hills, Calif. Agnew Tech-Tran., Inc. The Problem of
Crew Interrelationships in International Space Flights. April 1976. 30 p. (Avail-
able from NTIS as N76-22905/3SL.)

The problem of forming international spacecrews is considered. The
essential purpose of uniting the crews by a common goal, mutual trust, and
friendship is discussed. Overcoming the languagte barrier and ideological
diflferences are obstacles mentioned in relation to the problem of crew selec-
tion. Some observations about the ApoUo-Soyuz Test Project mission are
given.
Murray, Bruce, and Merton E. Davies. "Detente in Space." Science, v. 192,
June 11, 1976: 1067-1074.

Article reviews "U.S. and Soviet interrelationships with regard to space
[identifies] the major space issues facing each country, and [focuses] on areas
of possible common interest."
Outlook for Space. Report to the NASA Administrator by the Outlook for Space
Study Group. Washington, D.C. National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion. January 1976. 373 p. (Available from NTIS as N76-18004/1SL.)

Future space activities within the context of national needs were examined,
and directions that the United States should take in the civilian use and ex-
ploration of space for the time period from 1980 to 2000 were identified. It
was decided that the following activities should be pursued: (1) those related
to the continuing struggle to improve the quality of life (food production
and distribution, new energy sources, etc.), (2) those meeting the need for
intellectual challenge, for exploration, and for the knowledge by which man
can better understand the universe and his relationship to it, (3) those
related to research and development in areas applicable to future space sys-
tems and missions. A continuing emphasis should be placed on orienting the
space program to the physical needs of mankind, to the quest of the mind
and spirit, to the vitality of the nation and to the relationship between
this nation and other nations of the world.
Petrov, Boris Nikolayevich. Outer Space at the Service of the People. Transla-
tions from Kommunist, no. 10, July 1975: 93-111.

Two senior Soviet space officials discuss "the objectives and nature of

outer space research at the present stage, the tasks and the meaning of the

program of the joint Soviet- American flight, and the prospects of astronau-

tical development."

Robinson, George S. "Earth Exposure to Martian Matter: Back Contamination

Procedures and International Quarantine Regulations." Columbia Journal of

Transnational Law, v. 15, no. 1, 1976: 17-39.

Discusses the international quarantine regulations necessary to prevent a
potentially catastrophic accident, if dangerous toxic materials were to be
introduced into the Earth's atmosphere from another planet.

2095

Ropelewski, Robert R. "Europe Weighs Shuttle Program Role." Aviation Week &
Space Technology, v. 105, Nov. 29, 1976: 32-35.

Discusses European participation in the Space Shuttle Program.
Smith, Arthur. "Spacelab: A Boost for European Technology, But What About
Britain and France?" Science Forum, v. 8, June 1975: 13-15.

Author describes Western European participation in the U.S. Spacelab
program. A consortium of European countries will design and produce space
laboratories to be launched via the space shuttle.
Steven, Fred R. and Christian Reinhold. "Spacelab Shaping Space Operations
Planning." Astronautics & Aeronautics, v. 14, Feb. 1976: 46-57.

Describes the plans for Space lab-Space Shuttle flights to begin in 1980,
and discusses the questions of international cooperation and coordination
that must be solved.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications. Future Space Programs 1976; a Compilation of
Papers. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 983 p.
At head of title: Committee print.
"Serial M".

Space policy — [U.S.]/Future — [U.S.]/International cooperation in astro-
nautics/Technology transfer — [U.S.]/Astronautieal research — [U.S.].
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications. International Space Law. Hearings, 94th Cong.,
2d sess. July 28 and 29, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 51 p.
"No. 85"

Space law/Space policy — [U.S.]/International cooperation in astronautics/

Space agreements/International agencies/ United Nations. General Assembly.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space./Treaty on Outer Space./

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration

and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Meeting

with Assembly of Wester?! European Union, Committee on Scientific, Technological,

and Aerospace Questions. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Mar. 18 and 20, 1975.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 44 p.

International cooperation in astronautics/Space policy — [U.S.]/Space
policy — [Western Europe].
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Space
Law: Selected Basic Documents; Staff Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1976. 464 p.
At head of title: 94th Cong., 2d sess. Committee print.

Space law/Space agreements/ Arms control agreements/Telecommunication
agreements/ Space policy — [U.S.]/International agencies/International co-
operation in astronautics/U.S. Treaties, etc., 1961-1963 (Kennedy) ./Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. /Agreement
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space. /Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects. /Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space. /International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization. /European Space Agency./International Telecommunication
Convention.
U.S. Library of Congress. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Soviet
Space Programs, 1971-75: Goals and Purposes Organization, Resource Allocations,
Attitudes Toward International Cooperation and Space Law; Staff Report. Pre-
pared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United
States Senate. Volume II. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 221 p.
At head of title: Committee print. Space policy — [U.S.S.R.]/Space pro-
grams— [U.S.S.R.]/International cooperation in astronautics/Foreign re-
lations— [U.S.S.R.]/Space law/ Apollo Soyuz Test project.
United Nations. Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs. Space Activities
and Resources. New York, United Nations, 1977. 251 p. (United Nations.
[Document] A/AC.105/193)

"A review of the activities and resources of the United Nations, of its
specialized agencies and of other competent international bodies relating to
the peaceful uses of outer space."

96-243 O - 77 - 39

20%

United Nations. General Assembly. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. Report. New York, United Nations, 1975. 21 p. (United Nations.
General Assembly. Official records 30th sess. Suppl. no. 20)

Committee report includes consideration of the legal problems associated
with remote sensing of earth from space and a United Nations program on
space application.
United Nations. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. State of the Art and Asscssmerit of Scientific arid Technological Develop-
ments in the Exploration and Practical Uses of Outer Space Within an Inter-
national Framework; Report Submitted by the International Astronautical Feder-
ation (lAP). [New York] 1976. 37 p. (United Nations. [Document] A/AC. 105/
173)
United Nations. Secretariat. Preliminary Study of the Organizational and Financial
Requirements of a Future Operational Space Segment of an International Earth
Resources Survey System; Report. [New York] 1976. 25 p. (United Nations.
[Document] A/AC.105/156)

At head of title: United Nations General Assembly.

Surveys existing remote sensing progi-ams and makes recommendations

for "an operational glo))al earth resources survey system" controlled by an

international organization.

United Nations. Secretariat. Review of National and Co-operative International

Space Activities for the Calendar Year 1976; Note. [New York] 1976. 139 p. {United

Nations. [Documeiit] A/AC. 105/167)

"In accordance with General Assembly resolution 222o (XXI), all Member
States are invited to submit annually reports on their national and co-
operative international space programs. . . . The present document con-
tains information provided in replies received from Meml^er States up to
20 February 1976."
Vonkries, W. European Utilization of the American Space Transport System Space
Shuttle, Washington, D.C. Transemantics, Inc. December 1976. 20 p. (Available
from NTIS as N77-15084/5SL.)

The significance of the space shuttle as a unique low cost space transport
system is considered, giving attention to the dependence of Europe on the
space shuttle for a utilization of space on a competitive basis. An investi-
gation is, therefore, conducted regarding the legal aspects of participation
of Europeans in the use of the space transport system of the future. Relevant
space related agreements between the U.S. and European countries are
critically examined, taking into account the regulations concerning the devel-
opment and manufacture of Spacelab.

SPACE SATELLITE APPLICATIONS

Edelson, Burton I. "Global Satellite Communications." Scientific American, v.
236, Feb. 1977: 58-68, 73.

"A 12-year-old system provides more than 400 microwave pathways to 80
countries. Its eight satellites stationed over three oceans now account for
some two-thirds of all transoceanic communications."
Gibson, Roy. "European Space Applications." Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, v. 29, 1976: 539-548.

Describes the current and future space programs of the European Space

Agency, which focus on communication satellites.

International Astronautical Federation. Actual and Predicted Costs and Benefits

Involved in the Practical Application of Remote Sensing Technology ; Report of the

Secretariat. New York, United Nations, 1976. 68 p. (United Nations. [Document]

A/AC. 105/153).

At head of title: United Nations General Assembly.

"This is the second study performed by International Astronautical
Federation for the United Nations with the twofold objective of (a) estimating
the costs which would be incurred by the international community if it chose
to acquire and operate the remote sensing system, including the space seg-
ment and (b) reviewing available studies on the benefits to be drawn from the
global remote sensing activities."
"International Satellite Controversy." Society, v. 12, Sept.-Oct. 1975: 30-40.

Discusses the international controversy over the regulation of television
broadcasting from satellites. On the one side the United States argues for
freedom of information with little in the way of explicit control and on the
other hand the Soviet Union wants strict controls spelled out to prevent
any interference with domestic affairs.
Lagarde, J. B. "Setting up a Worldwide Maritime Satellite System." Journal of
the British Interplanetary Society, v. 30, Apr. 1977: 123-126.

Discusses the problems and prospects "of setting-up by 1980 a worldwide
maritime satellite system which will provide primarily communications but
will have expansion potential to serve navigational purposes, distress and
rescue requirements, and even to become in the more distant future a com-
plete maritime traffic control facility."
Laskin, Paul L. and Abram Chayes. "International Satellite Controversy." Society,
v. 12, Sept.-Oct. 1975: 30-40.

Communication satellites/International propaganda/Nationalism/Cultural
relations/Television broadcasting/International cooperation in telecom-
munication/Space agreements.
Lesko, Nancy M. "Legal Implications of Direct Satellite Broadcasting — the
U.N. Working Group." Georgia Jouriial of International & Comparative Law,
v. 6, summer 1976: 564-579.

Comment presents "a survey of the legal problems created by direct
broadcasting and indicate[s] potential conflict areas."
Marks, Leonard H. "Politics of World Information." Society, v. 12, Sept.-Oct.
1975: 26-29.

Describes the importance of a world wide information system free of
international communications censorship.
Plasse, Jonathan M. "Recent Developments in the Law of Direct Broadcast
Satellites" Brooklyn Journal of International Law, v. 2, fall 1975: 139-171.

Recent advances in technology now allow the direct broadcasting of
television programs from satellites. This comment provides "a coherent
overview of the legal status of direct broadcast satellites and of the pro-
posals now before the international legal community."
Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "Direct-Broadcast SateUites and Cultural Integrity."
Society, v. 12, Sept.-Oct. 1975: 47-56.

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Saj's that while there is no imminent prospect of direct sateUite television

broadcasts to countries that do not wish to have them and while other media

pose more significant threats to the integrity of national cultures, many

people are still alarmed by the prospect of direct satellite broadcasting.

Powell, Jon T. "Direct Broadcast Satellites: The Conceptual Convergence of the

Free Flow of Information and National Sovereignty." California Western

International Law Journal, v. 5, winter 1975: 1-40.

"This article on the conceptual convergence of the policies surrounding

the international free flow of information and the protection of national

sovereignty, as precipitated by the direct broadcast satellite, begins with the

recognition that there are problems in discerning significant patterns of

contention amid a multitude of policy statements whose meanings are often

clouded by reservations and conditions."

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Remote Sensing of the Eiwironment

{10th), October 1976. Vol I and Vol II. October, 1975. Ann Arbor, University of

Michigan, October 1975. 721 p. and 838 p. (Available from NTIS as AD-A029

885/lSL ana AD-A029 886/9SL.)

These Proceedings contain papers presented at the Tenth International
Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment, held October 6th through
10th, 1975, on the campus of The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan. This symposium, conducted by the Environmental Research
Institute of Michigan, is part of a continuing program investigating current
activities in the field of remote sensing. The meeting is primarily intended to
stimulate an exchange of information on numerous aspects of the field,
through the presentation of reports on work planned, in progress, or com-
pleted. Presentations contained herein include those concerned with the
utilization of this technology in various national and international programs
as well as in numerous applications for monitoring and managing the earth's
resources and man's global environment. Ground-based, airborne and
spaceborne sensor systems and both manual and machine-assisted data
analysis and interpretation are included.
Resource Sensing from Space: Prospects for Developing Countries. By Ad Hoc
Committee on Remote Sensing for Development, Board on Science and Tech-
nology for International Development; Commission on International Relations,
National Research Council. Board on Science and Technology for International
Development. Washington, National Academy of Sciences, 1977. 207 p.

The committee concluded that land satellite -technology "is inherently

transnational," and that the "United States ought to commit itself promptly

to making this technology and its governance international."

Robinson, J. J. "Aeronautical Satellites — Progress Report on the Joint Aerosat

Evaluation Programme." Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, v. 29,

May 1976: 321-324.

Describes the Joint Aeronautical Satellite Evaluation Programme designed
to provide air navigation and communication services. The member states of
the European Space Research Organization, Canada, and the United States
have signed an agreement for experimentation and evaluation of this com-
munication satellite system.
"Space Communications." Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, v. 29,
Jan. 1976: whole issue.

Contents. — The problem of growth in the Intelsat system, by D. Withers. —
The Skynet system, the satellite communications network built in Britain,
by W. Lovell. — Station-keeping for Symphonie, by R. Metzer. — Business
and politics : the challenge and opportunities of satellites and communications,
by J. Jankovich.
Stowe, Ronald F. "United States Presents Guidelines for Remote Sensing of the
Natural Environment from Outer Space." Dept. of State Bulletin, v. 72, Mar. 31,
1975: 419-424.
Tinker, Jon. "Towards a European Freshwater Satellite." New Scientist, v. 65,
Mar. 27, 1975: 768-771.

Discussion of the use of satellites to monitor freshwater pollution in Europe
and the international problems involved.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Land Satellite Project, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. [Washington] 1970. 42 p.
"PSAD-76-74, Jan. 30, 1976"

2099

Examines a NASA experimental program to determine the utility of a

system for satellite acquisition and subsequent evaluation of earth resources

data. Covers LANDSAT status and progress related to cost, schedule, and

performance; user evaluation of the satellite-acquired data; cost-benefit

studies of the system ; and potential international involvement.

U.S. General Accounting Office. The Need for a National Ocean Program and

Plan: Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States.

[Washington] 1975. 75 p.

"GGS-75-97, Oct. 10, 1975"

"Marine science activities and oceanic affairs are being conducted by 21
organizations in 6 departments and 5 agencies. Because of the vital role the
oceans play in the Nation's welfare, economic self-sufficiency, and national
security, a concerted effort should be undertaken to establish a comprehensive
national ocean program and plan."
United Nations. General Assembly. Available Studies, Reports and Other Material
Relevant to the Consideration of Remote Sensing from Satellites. [New York] 1976.
18 p. (United Nations. [Document] A/AC.105/176)
United Nations. General Assembly. Report on the United Nalions/FAO Training
Seminar on the Application of Remote Sensing for Natural Resources Survey,
Planning and Development: Reading, United Kingdom: 22 July-10 August 1976.
New York, 1976. 17, 4 p. (United Nations. [Document] A/AC.105/185)

"The seminar was hosted by the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and jointly sponsored by the United
Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) in co-operation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The purpose of the seminar was to pro-
vide training in remote sensing techniques for participants from develop-
ing countries with the objective of enabling each participant to judge for
himself the value and limitations of remote sensing undsr the circumstances
of his country's needs and environment and in his own field of specialization."
United Nations. Secretariat. Feasibility Study on a Possible Co-ordinating Function
for the United Nations in Future Operational Activities in Remote Sensing From
Satellites: Revised Concept: Report. [New York] 1976. 12 p. (United Nations.
[Document] A/AC.105/154/Add.l)

At head of title : United Nations General Assembly.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE— COOPERATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

Berliner, Joseph S. The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry. Cambridge, Mass.,
The MIT Press, 1976. 561 p.

"The purpose of this study is to contribute to the new effort to evaluate
the Soviet economy with respect to its capacity to generate technological
innovation." The study is limited to the civiHan industrial sector.
Bucy, J. Fred. "On Strategic Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union." Inter-
national Security, v. 1, spring 1977: 25-43.

Examines the issue of strategic control of American technology and offers
some recommendations for improving it.
CoUen, Earl. "US-Soviet Scientific Exchange in the Age of Detente." Survey,
V. 21, autumn 1975: 52-59.

Discusses constraints on conversations among Russian scientists as well
as between Russian and American scientists and suggests that exchange
agreements between the two countries be amended to require freedom of
association and movement in scientific communication.
Geier, Claire Riley. Review of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements on Science
and Technology : Special Oversight Report No. 6. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1976. 32 p.
"Serial VV."

At head of title: Committee print.

"Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology."
Granick, David. Soviet Introduction of New Technology: A Depiction of the Process.
Prepared for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Stanford Research
Institute, Strategic Studies Center, SRI Project 2625, Jan. 1975.

"This paper presents a discussion of the difficulties involved in the intro-
duction of new technology into civilian industry in the Soviet Union." The
report deals with problems of incentives, transfering technology from the
laboratory to the production line, acquiring information about foreign
technology, and organizational pro))lems. Conditions and problems in these
areas in the Soviet Union are contrasted with the German Democratic
Republic.
Hayden, Eric W. Technology Transfer to East Europe: U.S. Corporate Experience.
Eric W. Hayden. New York, Praeger, 1976. xii, 134 p. (Praeger special studies
in international ))usiness, finance, and trade.)
LC CALL NBR; T174.3.H39
Hayden, Eric W. and Henry R. Nau. "East- West Technology Transfer: Theoreti-
cal Models and Practical Experiences." Columbia Joiirnal of World Busiriess,
V. 10, fall 1975: 70-82.

"Long-term manufacturing enterprise relationships involving technology
transfer have proved attractive to U.S. firms and Socialist partners."
Kiser, John W., III. "Technology is Not a One- Way Street." Foreign Policy, no.
23, summer 1976: 131-148.

Author argues that there are many Soviet technological innovations worth

importing from the U.S.S.R. and suggests methods and policies the United

States might consider to increase the fiow of useful technology from the

U.S.S.R. to the U.S.

Kroncher, Allan. The Significance of Western Technology for the Soviet Economy.

[Munich] Radio Liberty Research, 1976. 15 1. (Radio Liberty Research. RL

116/76)

Discusses the innovation design, construction, production, and mainte-
nance disincentives inherent in Plan fulfillment, the resulting low quality
output and consequent importation of western machinery, products, and
entire production facilities, and the overall disequilibrium in domestic produc-
tion and foreign trade sectors.
Levine, Herbert S., et al. Transfer of U.S. Technology to the Soviet Union: Impact
on U.S. Commercial Interests. Prepared for the Department of State. Strategic
Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, February 1976. 206 p.

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2101

NATO. Directorate of Economic Affairs. East-West Technological Co-Operation:
Main Findings of Colloquium Held 17th-19th March, 1976. Brussels. 350 p.
Colloquium on the issues of growth of technology transfers, its advantages
and risks. ". . . The discussions centered on the impact of this co-operation
on the economies of the Communist countries in Eastern Europe, and espe-
cially on the extent to which imports from the West of high technology
licenses and capital equipment could contribute to the growth of the Soviet
economy." Also discussed was the change in U.S.S.R. policies towards
importation from the West and the difficulties of Soviet absorption of imports
due to the Soviet bureaucracy.
Paxson, E. W. Computers and Strategic Advantage: III. Games, Computer Tech-
nology, and a Strategic Power Ratio. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation.
(Prepared for Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development (Air Force),
Washington, D.C.), May 1975. 50 p. (Available from NTIS as AD-A017/9SL.)
This is one of a series of reports that examine the nature and impact of
U.S. computer technology relative to that of the Soviet Union, and the
military advantages that the United States may be able to achieve through
applications of advanced computer technology. This particular report
presents a model for measuring the cost to both sides to realize in the future,
various U.S. to S.U. strategic power ratios, in terms of the percentages of
strategic forces that would need to be modernized, given different relative
military technology levels. A numerical run of the model shows that increases
in the Soviet growth rate in computer technology beyond the historical rate
can have significant implications for the required modernization of U.S. forces
if a desired strategic power ratio is to be maintained.
Peterson, Peter G. U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era. Dept. of
Commerce. August 1972.

Report by Secretary of Commerce includes a personal statement concern-
ing the timeliness of Soviet-U.S. trade initiatives, and two annexes, a corn-
parison of the U.S. and Soviet Economies and selected developments in
recent Soviet trade.
Reynolds, Lloyd G., ed. The Economics of Technological Progress. Papers Pre-
sented at a'U.S.-U.S.S.R. SjTnposium. Moscow, June 8-11, 1976. (Available
from Lloyd G. Reynolds, Dept. of Economics, Yale University, Box 1972,
Yale Station, New Haven, Conn. 06520) 230 p.

Papers presented by U.S. and Soviet economists at a conference sponsored
by American Economic Association.
Rushing, Francis W. and Anne R. Lieberman "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Soviet
Technology Requirements." Association for Comparative Economic Studies
Bulletin, v. 18, fall 1976: 61-77.

The authors discuss high technology machinery and equipment required

by the Soviets. They provide a listing of Soviet imports of U.S. products and

indicate the number of American firms trading with the Soviets in each

product area.

Schneiderman, Ron. "High Technology Flows Illegally From U.S. to Soviet

Bloc." Electronics, v. 49, Jan. 8, 1976: 58-70, 72-74.

"Restricted test instruments, components, other sensitive items leave the
country in diplomatic pouches or are simply diverted after being sold to
legitimate customers; officials are stymied."
Spielmann, Karl F. "Defense Industrialists in the USSR." Problems of Communism,
V. 25, Sept.-Oct. 1976: 52-69.

Surveys the key personalities and organizational elements of the Soviet

military-industrial complex. Also examines the role of defense industrialists

in the formation of Soviet policy regarding SALT and technology transfer.

Turn, R. and A. E. Nimitz, Computers and Strategic Advantage: I. Computer

Technology in the United States and the Soviet Union; A Report. Santa Monica,

Calif., Rand, 1975. 66 p. (Rand Corporation. [Report] R-1642-PR)

"This report is one of a series of three that collectively examine the U.S.

competition with the Soviet Union in computer technology and the military

advantages that the United States may achieve by imaginative application of

such technology. In particular, the present report compares the current

status and future outlook of U.S. and Soviet computer technology."

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on

International Trade and Commerce. Export Licensing of Advanced Technology:

A Review. Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.

1976. 277 p. Part II. Apr. 12, 1976. 27 p.

2102

Export controls — [U.S.]/Licenses — [U.S.] — Law and legislation/Technology
transfer — [U.S.]/East-West trade/Foreign trade — [U.S.] — Communist coun-
tries/Foreign trade — [Communist countries] — U.S.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on
Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Review of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements on Science and Technology. Special Oversight
Report No. 6. 94th Congress., 2d session. November 1976. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. OflF., 1976. 31 p. (Committee Print.)

Prepared by Claire R. Geier, Congressional Research Service.
Reviews the hearings held by the Subcommittee on policies and programs
included in bilateral agreements between the United States and the People's
Republic of China.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on
Domestic and International Scientific Planning & Analysis. U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Cooperative Agreements in Science and Technology Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st
sess. Nov. 18-20, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 551 p.
"No. 53"

Scientific exchanges — [U. S.]/Scientific exchanges — [U. S. S. R.]/Technology
transfer— [U.S.]/Technology transfer— [U.S.S.R.]/Science policy— [U.S.]/
Science policy — [U.S.S.R.]/Astronautical research — [U.S.]/Astronautical re-
search— [U.S.S.R.]/Agricultural research — [U.S.]/ Agricultural research —
[U.S.S.R.]/Transportation research — [U.S.]/Transportation research — [U.S.-
S.R.]/Atomic energy research — [U.S.]/ Atomic energy research — [U.S.S.R.]/
Energy research — [U.S.]/Energy research — [U.S.S.R.]/Oceanographic research
Energy research — [U.S.]/Energy research — [U.S.S.R.]/Oceanographic re-
search— [U.S.]/Oceanographic research — [U.S.S.R.].
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Soviet Economy in a New Perspective:
A Compendium of Papers. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 821 p.
At head of title: 94th Cong., 2d sess. Joint committee print.

Contains papers written by scholars and specialists on the recent perform-
ance of the Soviet economy, focusing on economic policy, the defense
burden, agriculture, politics, energy, industry, population, research, inter-
national trade, and foreign aid.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations. Transfer of Technology to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Hearing, 93d Cong. 2d sess. July 19, 1974. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 57 p.

Technology transfer — [U.S.]/Technology transfer — [U.S.S.R.]/Technology

transfer — [Eastern Europe]/Export controls — [U.S.] — Law and legislation.

U.S. Dept. of Defense. Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S.

Technology. Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. An

Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology — A DOD Perspective. Washington,

Feb. 4, 1976. 39 p.

"The control of design and manufacturing know-how is absolutely vital to
the maintenance of U.S. technological superiority. All other considerations
are of secondary importance." Four subcommittees studied technology trans-
fer in different sectors — airframes, aircraft jet engines, instrumentation and
solid state devices. The recommendations for control of technology transfer
of the subcommittees were used as the basis for the report.
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Technology Transfer
and Scientific Cooperation Between the United States and the Soviet Union: A Review.
Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific AlTairs
of the Committee on International Relations. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1977. 183 p.

At head of title: 95th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

Technology transfer — [U.S.]/Technology transfer — [U.S.S.R.]/Scientific ex-
changes— [U.S.]/Scientific exchanges — [U.S.S.R.]/Export controls — [U.S.]/
Foreign economic relations — [U.S.]/Foreign economic relations — [U.S.S.R.]/
Space agreements/International cooperation in astronautics/Oceanographic
research— [U.S.]/Oceanographic research — [U.S.S.R.]/ Atomic energy re-
search— [U.S.]/Atomic energy research — [U.S.S.R.]
U.S. Library of Congress. Science Policy Research Division. Background Materials
on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements in Science and Technology; Report.
Prepared for the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific
Planning and Analysis. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 93 p.
At head of title : Committee print.

Scientific exchanges — [U.S.]/Scientific exchanges — [U.S.S.R.]/International
cooperation in science.

2103

Wilczynski, Jozef. "Licences in the West-East- West Transfer of Technology."
Journal of World Trade Law, v. 11, Mar.-Apr. 1977: 121-136.

Analyzes licensing policy adopted in trade from the West to the East and
describes the extent to which western firms are accepting licences from the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.
Wilczynski, J. The Multinationals and East-West Relations. Boulder, Colorado,
Westview Press, 1976. 235 p.

A study of the relationship between multinational corporations and Com-
munist countries. The kinds of trade and industrial cooperation now pursued
are discussed.

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RELATED ISSUES

Baillie, Iain C. "Where Goes Europe? The European Patent." Journal of the
Patent Office Society, v. 58, Mar. 1976: 153-185.

Reviews the history of the European Patent and Community Patent
Conventions, comments on some of their procedural and substantive aspects,
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each type of patent, and
discusses implications for the U.S. applicant.
Cali, J. L. International Criteria for Reference Materials. Washington, National
Bureau of Standards. 1976. 15 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 251 096/4SL.)
In clinical chemistry, international organizations are now becoming aware
of and taking steps to integrate national measurement programs for use in the
international scene. The steps necessary to bring about compatible measure-
ment networks in clinical chemistry are briefly discussed — mainly in the con-
text of the measurement process. Reference materials, as well as definitive
and reference methods are important elements in the building and mainte-
nance of a compatible measurement system. International criteria for reference
materials, especially those that are certified are recommended. Factors to be
considered include: purity, homogeneity, stability, continuity of supply and
information, availability, and the certification process, including legally
imposed requirements. Each of these is discussed, together with examples
drawn from the NBS clinical Standard Reference Materials.
Dawid, Heinz. "Past and Present Developments in the International Law of
Trademarks." Brooklyn Journal of International Law, v. 2, fall 1975: 70-107.
Article considers the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial
Property, the nature of ownership in trademark law, attitudes of the socialist
countries, trademarks and technology transfer in the developing countries,
developments in the U.S. and other Western countries, and the future of
trademark law.
Implementation of the Provisions of the Proposed G ATT Standards Code. New York,
American National Standards Institute, Prepared for the Dept. of Commerce,
Washington. February 28, 1977. 64 p. (Available from NTIS as PB 266 254/2SL.)
The purpose of this report is to provide the U.S. Government with pro-
posals for implementing the provisions of the draft GATT 'Code of Conduct
for the Prevention of Technical Barriers to Trade' which relate to the vol-
untary standards activities of the U.S. private sector. The report recommends,
inter alia: the establishment of a U.S. National Standards Registry for all
recognized national and international standards and certification programs
applicable to international trade and commerce; an information exchange
system; and recognition of the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) as the U.S. focal point for private sector implementation of the
releva,nt provisions of the proposed Code. Also included are recommendations
affecting certification, technical assistance, and funding.
Kalikow, Martin. "An International Patent Department Looks at Multi-Country
Patent Arrangements and at its Future." Journal of the Patent Office Society,
v. 58, Nov. 1976: 723-734.

Discusses the changes that will occur in the international patent system

when the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent Convention

are ratified and implemented.

Landis, John W. "Should U.S. Industry Shift to New Engineering Standards

Based on Metric Measurement?" Professional Engineer, v. 45, May 1975:

30-34.

"By January 1, 1978, all members of the European Common Market will

have to transact business in SI units. The alternative to U.S. development

of metric standards is to let the Europeans develop them for us by default."

Rolf, W. F. and George C. Glenn. "Commercialization of the Liquid Metal Fast

Breeder Reactor and the Need for Standards Coordination and Cooperation."

ASTM [American Society for Testing and Materials] Standardization News,

V. 5, Apr. 1977: 28-31, 64.

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"This article is based on a presentation to ASTM Subcommittee E 10.10
on Matrix Approaches to Standards for Nuclear Systems Technology in
Denver, 16 November 1976."
United Nations. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. The Role of the Patent
System, in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries; Report. New York,
1975. 69 p. (United Nations. [Document] TD/B/AC.ll/19/Rev. 1) "United
Nations publication. Sales no. E.75.II.D.6"
Wakefield, Brian D. "Will ISO Standards Bring U.S. to Its Knees?" Iron Age, v.
215, Apr. 7, 1975: 43-47.

Discusses the political and technical problems involved in setting interna-
tional standards and the economic consequences.

WEATHER MODIFICATION: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Blackburn, Paul L. Weather Modification as a Weapon of War. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pa. October 17, 1975. 25 p. (Available from NTIS as AD-
A023 878/2SL.)

The basic question addressed in this paper is whether or not weather
modification can be used as a weapon of war. Possible tactical and strategic
uses of weather modification were examined. The national security implica-
tions and arguments for and against a ban on weather war were discussed.
Data was gathered using a literature search, and by writing letters to organi-
zations and individuals connected with weather modification efforts. Although
U.S. weather modification efforts are disorganized, weather modification has
great potential as a weapon of war. The advantages of a ban on weather
war outweigh the disadvantages because of its horrendous destructive
potential. Weather war should be banned, but weather modification research
should continue under a central agency because of the beneficial, peaceful
applications. .

Climate and Food: Climatic Fluctuation and U.S. Agricultural Production. By
Committee on Climate and Weather Fluctuations and Agriculture Production,
Board on Agriculture and Renewable Resources; Commission on Natural
Resources, National Research Council. Washington, National Academy of
Sciences, 1976, 221 p.

Discusses extent of variability in food production, national and interna-
tional, posed by climatic variations. Research and information strategies to
cope with unpredictability of climate and agriculture and discussed.
Gordon, D. S. Soviet Developments in Weather Modification, Climate Modification,
and Climatology. Rockville, Informatics, Inc. (Prepared for Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Arlington, Va.) September 1975. 92 p. (Available from NTIS
as AD-A017 675/9SL.)

This report focuses on Soviet developments in weather modification, climate
modification, and climatology during the period from late 1973 through
mid-1975. Current Soviet work in solar meteorology and laser applications
in atmospheric- sounding are also surveyed. The source literature includes
regular Soviet scientific journals, recent monographs, popular science periodi-
cals, and the daily press.
Kelley, J. I. and S. Ruttenberg. Proceedings of the Symposium on Meterological
Observations from Space: Their Contribution to the First GARP Global Experiment.
Held at Philadelphia, Pa. on June 8-10, 1976. Boulder, National Center for
Atmospheric Research. (Prepared for the National Science Foundation.) Sep-
tember 1976, 437 p. (Available from NTIS as PB-262 530/9SL.)

The symposium was held June 8-10, 1976, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvariia,
USA, to review the status of the global observing system coming into being
to support FGGE. It was sponsored by the international organizations that
have been intimately involved in designing and supporting the global observ-
ing system. Six sessions treated the following major topics: temperature and
humidity fields derived from satellite observations, surface characteristics of
importance to weather and climate, wind determination from geostationary
satellites, role of the earth's radiation budget in atmospheric dynamics, data
collection systems and some programmatic developments, and application
of satellite data to numerical analysis and prediction.
Mason, B. J. "The Global Atmospheric Research Programme (GARP): GARP
Atlantic Tropical Experiment." Royal Air Forces Quarterly, v. 16, spring 1976:
35-40.

Describes the coordination and utilization of the resources of 60 countries

in a three-month study of the structure, evolution, interaction, and transport

properties of weather systems in the tropical eastern Atlantic Ocean.

Orfield, Michael B. "Weather Genesis and Weather Neutralization: A New

Approach to Weather Modification." California Western International Law

Journal, v. 6, spring 1976: 412-428.

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2107

Proposes the creation of an international weather neutralization organiza-
tion, based initially on a joint Canadian-United States agreement which
would seek the cooperation and participation of Latin American states. This
organization would l^e limited to weather neutralization and would not get
into the problems of weather generation.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Oceans
and International Environment. Prohibiting Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques. Hearing, 94th Cong., 2d sess. Jan. 21, 1976. Washing-
ton, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 46 p.

Chemical warfare — Treaties/ Weather control — Treaties/International en-
vironmental cooperation/Arms control agreements.
World Meteorological Organization. WMO: The Achievement and the Challenge.
Geneva, 1976. 48 p.

Booklet traces the development of meteorology into a science of world
importance and in particular the developing importance of the World Me-
teorological Organization.
World Weather Program; Plan for Fiscal Year 1977. [Washington, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, for sale l)y the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976] 73 p.
Meteorological research — [U.S.]/Oceanographic research — [U.S.]/Interna-
tional cooperation in sci«nce/Meteorological satellites — [U.S.]