

Alonzo Baker

# STAR-SPANGLED MIKADO

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STAR-SPANGLED MIKADO



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*Dedicated to the late Ogden Reid and to Lord Camrose,*
*our editors, without whom this book would*
*not have been possible.*

## THE JAPANESE [1]

How courteous is the Japanese;
He always says, "Excuse it, please."
He climbs into his neighbor's garden,
And smiles, and says, "I beg your pardon";
He bows and grins a friendly grin,
And calls his hungry family in;
He grins, and bows a friendly bow;
"So sorry, this my garden now."

—Ogden Nash

[1] From *The Face Is Familiar,* by Ogden Nash. Copyright 1931, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1940. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Company.

# CONTENTS


| CHAPTER | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| One: | Into the Unknown | 3 |
| Two: | Japan under "The Hat" | 18 |
| Three: | "I Accept Responsibility . . ." | 42 |
| Four: | "Charlie" | 65 |
| Five: | "If I Were King. . . ." | 83 |
| Six: | The Way of the Gods | 100 |
| Seven: | Atomic Peace | 112 |
| Eight: | Suzuki-san | 127 |
| Nine: | Madame Butterfly, 1947 | 145 |
| Ten: | The Little Men around MacArthur | 169 |
| Eleven: | "Call It Whimsy, if You Like. . . ." | 186 |
| Twelve: | Tojo's Tammany | 208 |
| Thirteen: | The MacArthur Charter | 222 |
| Fourteen: | Wards of the United Nations | 232 |
| Appendices: | The Potsdam Proclamation | 251 |
| | The Moscow Conference Communiqué | 253 |
| | The White House Directive | 259 |
| | The Japanese Constitution | 267 |

# STAR-SPANGLED MIKADO

CHAPTER ONE

# INTO THE UNKNOWN

THE NEW MIKADO sat back in his overstuffed chair, lit the famous corncob pipe, stabbed the air with a half-filled matchbox and said:

"Gentlemen, even after fifty years among the Orientals, I still do not understand these people."

The speaker was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. The place was Tokyo. The time was January, 1946, six months after his invasion of the unknown.

On September 2, 1945, on the broad deck of the *Missouri*, he had sternly bade the Japanese to write an end to fifteen years of aggression. His voice was firm, but his hands shook—perhaps betraying advancing years. A stumpy-legged Japanese, looking slightly ridiculous and out of place amid all the freshly starched khaki and shining gold braid, stepped up to the table in top hat, cutaway, striped trousers. The Japanese scratched his name on the dotted line. The formalities of surrender were complete.

For MacArthur, it was the end of the road, the long road back from Bataan and Corregidor. For the Japanese, it was defeat, their first in two thousand years of history. For the Allies,

it was a first step into an enigmatic future, an uneasy, atomic peace.

The only guideposts along the route were the Potsdam Declaration, the Moscow and Cairo Agreements and a card index of intelligence reports. On the horizon were two dark clouds—atomic hysteria and a new, lusting Russia.

MacArthur's voice was heard round the world from the *Missouri.* It had a ring of finality, of purpose. But no one could fathom the terror and despair that gripped seventy million Japanese hearts. They had lost all confidence, all hope, when Emperor Hirohito, supposedly the almighty and infallible descendant of the Sun Goddess, told them over the radio that they had lost the war, and commanded: "Hostilities cease forthwith."

The Emperor's voice, squeaking over Radio Tokyo and satellite stations, stunned the Japanese people, even though it was a recorded voice. Never had the Japanese been beaten. Now they gave way to mass weeping, a demonstration of Hitlerian frustration on a large scale.

And scores of the Emperor's loyal subjects who had not been able to die for him on Saipan, or Okinawa, or Iwo Jima, or in the mountainous caves of the Philippines now came before the palace in Tokyo to disembowel themselves publicly. It was the same sort of defeatist reaction that some of us had witnessed in July, 1944, at the close of the brief but bloody campaign on Saipan. First came hordes of wild, drunken, half-armed Japanese soldiers to swamp our lines, kill as many Americans as they could and finally commit suicide. A few days later Japanese civilians on the northern tip of the island, who could not believe that Americans would feed them and bind their wounds, jumped into the sea after orgiastic sessions of prayer, song and bathing. Others—whole families of them—who did not wish to

drown stood in circles and tossed hand grenades at one another.

Now in Tokyo came the same sort of maniacal demonstration. It was to continue through the long first winter of the Allied occupation. The suicide rate in the capital soared. Some Japanese just couldn't take the Americans. Others were in despair for want of food, clothing and shelter. Many sorrowed for soldiers who would never come back from Palau, Borneo and New Guinea.

A small army of young hotheads wanted to fight on, to defy the Imperial Rescript announcing the end of the war.

Learning that the Emperor had recorded his rescript in advance for release at the appointed hour on August 15, hotbloods —including a goodly number of Kamikazes—rushed to the palace of the Imperial Guard Division just before midnight on the 14th. They roused General Susumu Mori, division commander, and demanded that he lead a search of the palace grounds for the imperial recording. Mori refused, and they shot him.

Another group of younger officers approached General Yoshisiro Umezu, chief of the general staff, suggesting he lead a *coup d'état*. He refused. The recalcitrants went after the War Minister, Korechika Anami. Anami had resisted earlier moves in the Cabinet for surrender, then had wept with remorse for opposing the Emperor's will. Now he told the hotheads to obey.

In Mori's blood-drenched headquarters the first band of rebels forged a series of orders for the arrest of Sotaro Ishiwata, minister of the Imperial Household; Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Emperor's most intimate adviser; Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, president of the Privy Council, and others.

Ishiwata, arriving home at 1 A.M. on the morning of the 15th, found troops outside his house. Just then an air-raid alarm

sounded. He ordered his chauffeur to return to the palace through blacked-out Tokyo. At the palace he overheard in the dark a conversation which revealed to him that his life was in danger. He found the crafty Kido (the man who advised the Emperor to pick Tojo as premier, and who later was plucked by MacArthur as a war-criminal suspect) and hid with him in an underground shelter.

Irate troops broke into the palace grounds and tramped through, looking for the recording of the Emperor's voice. They smashed up Ishiwata's office in their fury. Other groups hunted government offices elsewhere in Tokyo, and also in Yokohama. One gang raided the Radio Tokyo building. Others machine-gunned the home of the prime minister, Kantaro Suzuki, and set it afire. They also fired the home of Hiranuma. Roving bands wrecked several radio transmitters in and near the city, hoping to keep the Imperial Rescript off the air.

General Seiichi Tanaka, commander of the Eastern Army, rushed to the palace at about dawn of the fateful day. He confronted the ringleaders and told them resistance was useless. Suicide, he suggested, was the only way to atone for violation of the palace precincts. The four chief rebels walked off and shot themselves. The bewildered and befuddled Anami also committed suicide.

At noon the Emperor's voice was heard. It was all over.

Only once before in an Oriental country had the American military exerted full control. That was in the Philippines, in 1899, when the insurgent Aguinaldo set up his own government in pique over the refusal of permission to let his troops—which had co-operated in driving out the Spaniards—enter Manila. The United States had to send 60,000 troops to the

islands eventually, and it took them nearly two years to stamp out the Aguinaldo revolt.

Now, in Japan, military resistance had ended. There remained mental resistance, obstructionism, red-tape sabotage of American directives—a sort of slow-down strike against the occupation. Some of this stemmed from the age-old differences between East and West. Now the twain were meeting head-on.

With the end of formal, organized resistance, there died also our plans for invading Japan. These were in two stages. First, under "Operation Olympic," we had scheduled a three-pronged invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost main island of Japan, from the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, Saipan, Iwo Jima and all our far-flung bases and staging points in the vast Pacific. It would have been carried out about November 1.

Second, in January or February of 1946, we would have struck again with "Operation Coronet," this time in overwhelming force at the heart of the Japanese empire, the Kanto plain around Tokyo, on Honshu.

The success of American air raids over Japan and the knowledge that the Japanese were anxious for peace, plus confidence in our ability to mount a crushing offensive, led us for a while to plan on mounting "Coronet" ahead of "Olympic."

Either job would have been bloody, and it is possible that small-scale guerrilla warfare might have been going on even today in the mountain fastnesses of Japan. For the Japanese, although they died in great numbers in this war, did not die easily. They were dogged, determined fighters for a hopeless cause. If they had had German weapons and resources, plus their own fanaticism, who knows what turnings the war might have taken?

One thing is certain. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiro-

shima and Nagasaki did not knock the Japanese out of the war. They were beaten before the bombs ever fell. The bombs, and Russia's entry into the conflict, gave the Japanese the excuse they needed.

Had the war continued, some of our own commanders think, use of the atomic bomb against the "Olympic" and "Coronet" beachheads would not have made much difference toward easing our landings. For the Jap is a great burrower. He digs in well. And on the "Olympic" beachheads of Kyushu the Jap had made extensive plans to meet us with twelve to fourteen divisions, well dug in.

Major General Charles Willoughby, who was MacArthur's chief of intelligence, and Major General Harry Schmidt, of the Marine Corps, know the Jap as a fighter. And they know from our interrogations during the occupation that the Battle of Japan would have been a tough one.

Experts' investigations of the effects of the atomic bomb have shown, moreover, that an army well dug into the earth on or behind a beachhead will not suffer overmuch from blast or deadly rays.

So, the fanatic Japanese were ready. They even had a "home guard" of millions of civilians (down to the age of seven) versed in the art of grenade-throwing. That fanaticism would have been worse with the home team playing host on its own grounds. We would have fought over rice paddies that make tough going for tracked vehicles; along tortuous, narrow roads lined with Japanese-filled caves; across bulky, cold mountain ranges; against a foe who cared less for his own life than for a chance to die for the Emperor and to send his warrior-spirit to take its place with those of his ancestors at the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo.

Yet one man—thanks to the bargain we made in the surrender negotiations—stopped everything and turned night into day. The sense of discipline among the Japanese—however misguided during years of aggression—was superb. When the Emperor cried "Halt!" they halted.

Save for the few fanatics—who halted, too, when their miserable schemes faded in mid-August—seventy million Japanese were docile when we landed, even the three million or so who still bore arms in the mainland.

General MacArthur and others have called the initial occupation of Japan by a comparative handful of American airborne troops, equipped with light weapons, "one of the greatest gambles in history," dropping as they did into what seemed to be a vast, armed camp of people who only yesterday had been ready to tear hapless American airmen apart or to torture them in unspeakable ways.

The Japanese may have had their arms when we first landed, but there was no question of their using them. We have that flatly and on no less authority than that of General of the Army George C. Marshall. Testifying to the Joint Congressional Committee that investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Marshall was asked, among other things, about the breaking of secret Japanese codes by American experts early in the war.

The breaking of the codes enabled us to learn of many Japanese movements in advance during the war. And at the close of the war, as General Marshall testified, our knowledge of the codes enabled us to listen in on all sorts of Japanese radio chatter and official messages. From our tapping of these messages, we knew, General Marshall said, that our occupation of Japan would not be resisted; we knew we could go in with a small number of troops and that all would be well.

So much for the record. It just *was not* a colossal gamble. That is the fact, and it detracts in no way from the gallantry of the men of the 11th Airborne Division, who made the original landings at Atsugi Field, outside Tokyo, or from the efficiency with which our commanders—such as General MacArthur, Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commanding the 8th Army, and Major General Joseph Swing, leading the 11th Airborne—organized the bloodless invasion of Japan.

Of course we might have expected a slowly mounting wave of terrorism, of stealthy stabbings of lonely American sentries in the dead of night. There have been a few instances of gangster tactics by disgruntled Japanese, particularly by hotheads among demobilized servicemen. But the occupation as a whole has been peaceful, quiet. The Japanese have been licked and they know it, even if they don't like it.

No one in his senses would expect the vanquished to welcome the victor like a long-lost brother. Human beings are not made that way, particularly when they have been at each other's throats for three and a half years.

The Japanese had their normal dislike of the foreigner, the Westerner. They had the dislike of the Oriental for the Occidental. They also had a suspicion born of their own propaganda, and a smoldering resentment that carried over from the atomic bombs that smashed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The outgoing Prince Higashi-kuni, Premier at the time of the surrender and cousin of the Emperor, put it in a nutshell when, with some peevishness, he told an interviewer: "If you'll forget Pearl Harbor, we'll forget the atomic bomb."

It was an insolent remark, of course, but refreshing in its frankness. Just as refreshing as the words of the Mayor of Hiroshima, who told a party of visiting American correspondents:

"We're looking to you Americans to help rebuild our city. After all, we were the sacrificial guinea pigs who ended the war for you."

In late August General MacArthur dropped onto Atsugi Airdrome with the little band of willful men who had followed him from the dank tunnels of Corregidor in April, 1942. The emissaries who preceded them had been well fed and well beered by the Japanese at the field. For the Jap, if anything, is a pretty smart fellow. He's been doing (along with the Chinese) the buy-sell business in the Orient for a long time, and he knows there's nothing like a welcoming smile for the next customer—the big, handsome, forgetful American G.I. who drops his flame-thrower (even mentally) the moment the war is over and begins to hand out the cigarettes, the chocolate bars—and the compliments in pidgin Japanese to the kimonoed little girls of the conquered country.

The Allied Powers—and General MacArthur—had called for surrender, complete and unconditional. They made one bargain with Japan—the Emperor should be retained. It was, as General MacArthur remarked later, to be a stern but just peace.

To a waiting world, President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced from Potsdam on July 26, 1945, that they had agreed that Japan (about to be struck by the atomic bomb) should be given a chance to end the war without delay. They gave the terms, and gave notice they would brook no delay.

They said that the terms of the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, would be carried out. In that declaration they said Japan would be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she had seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World

War in 1914; that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, stolen from China, would be returned; that Japan would be expelled from all other territories which she had taken by violence and greed; that in due course Korea would become free and independent.

At Potsdam the three powers said that Japan's sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands—Honshu, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Shikoku—and "such minor islands as we determine."

The declaration also said boldly that the authority and influence of those who had deceived and misled the Japanese people must be eliminated for all time. Japan would be occupied until there was convincing proof that militarism and Japan's war-making power had been destroyed.

All Japanese forces would be disarmed and returned home to lead peaceful, productive lives. The Japanese would not be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice would be meted out to all war criminals. The Japanese government would remove all obstacles to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies in Japan. It would establish freedom of speech, religion and thought.

Japan would be permitted to maintain such industries as would sustain her economy and permit just reparations in kind. Eventually, Japan would be permitted to participate in world trade and have access to (not control of) raw materials.

As soon as these objectives had been accomplished, and there had been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government, the Allied occupation forces would be withdrawn.

"If they do not now accept our terms," said President Truman on August 6, 1945, "they may expect a rain of ruin from the

air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth." That very day the first atom bomb hit Hiroshima. Three days later Russia declared war on Japan.

These were powerful cathartics (the Russian action the more powerful of the two). Japan's war cabinet had been seeking a way out for months on terms less than unconditional surrender. The April 1 landings on Okinawa had started the search. In June, Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki, the new premier, handed to the Emperor a survey of Japan's inability to continue the war. He also told Foreign Minister Koki Hirota to sound out the Russian ambassador at Tokyo as to the Russian attitude toward interceding with the United States.

Japan's Supreme War Direction Council was squirming, too. Foreign Minister Togo, who was in on its deliberations, instructed the Japanese ambassador at Moscow, Naotake Sato, to see whether that old fixer and good-will expert, Prince Konoye, would not be welcome at Moscow with a plea for Russian intervention. Sato cooled his heels through the late spring. Anxiously he waited for Foreign Minister Molotov to get back from Potsdam. Konoye cooled his heels in Tokyo, armed only with instructions from the Emperor to get what terms he could from the Russians. Sato reported that the terms were unconditional surrender.

While the Japanese fretted and took more fire raids from the Marianas-based B-29's, Anami and his colleagues at the War Ministry felt that unconditional surrender was "too dishonorable." They were uneasy about the Emperor's future. They wanted Japan's "national polity" unchanged.

In the midst of this, a B-29 dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Next day, Premier Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo were telling the Emperor to take the Potsdam terms, and

take them quickly. The military held out, however, hoping for word from Moscow. It came on August 9, at 3 A.M., with the first flash that Russia had intervened by entering the Pacific war on our side.

Anami could think of nothing but staging a national suicide by mass hara-kiri of the entire country. Suzuki and Togo argued for acceptance of the Potsdam terms. They won.

But they tried to the last to keep the Emperor supreme. To the United States the Japanese government cabled on August 10 that the Postdam terms were acceptable provided they did not alter the Emperor's prerogatives. The American reply, received officially on the 13th, said that the powers of the Emperor and the Japanese government would be subject to the authority of General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

On the 14th the Emperor held a final Cabinet conference. The Army and Navy tried to stall. Hirohito squashed the wrangling by saying: "The American answer seems to me to be acceptable." At ten o'clock that night, as the Army diehards began their brief revolt, the Emperor went to a special studio and recorded the Imperial Rescript ending the war.

At noon of the 15th he was heard saying: "To our good and loyal subjects: After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement."

Our troops entered a battered, decaying, apathetic Japan, a Japan that had no will nor means to resist, no desire to do anything for itself. The tinderbox houses of great cities like Tokyo, Yokohoma, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe had been burned flat in great fire raids; Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been almost obliterated by two bombs. Japan's Navy had been sunk or bombed

into uselessness; her merchant marine had been blasted from the seas. Her air force, except for some 5,000 Kamikaze planes which were to have been expended in a final blow against the American beachheads on Kyushu (a few extremists thought of sending a Kamikaze wave against the *Missouri* as it lay in Sagami Bay for the surrender), had been clawed from the sky. Production was nearly zero.

Only the Japanese Army remained in being. Its backlog of bullets and weapons was limited. Its supporting factories were cut off from imported war materials. Japan, as General MacArthur put it, was not in position to make even a musket.

As the advance guard of the 11th Airborne Division carried the Stars and Stripes through Yokohama and on into Tokyo, they found skeletons of factories and a few burned-out concrete office buildings. A forest of concrete chimneys had survived the awful fires kindled by the B-29's, but they stood like ugly stumps in an otherwise toothless jaw.

The main streets were fairly clear of rubble; the Japanese had used Allied prisoners of war for that dirty work. Shacks of plywood and corrugated iron were rising like weeds among "Victory" gardens that burgeoned in heaps of dirt and ashes.

There was a horrible odor of latrines which the G.I. had hoped he was leaving behind. The odor came from the fields, which antlike Japanese were tilling. It was the odor of the human waste which the Japanese have used for centuries to fertilize their overworked acres. There, exploding in the G.I.'s faces, was the legend of Oriental cleanliness, of delicacy and daintiness.

Japan looked like a nation that had suffered a sudden and devastating paralytic stroke. Physically and mentally, the place was at a standstill. There was some traffic on the roads, some

sense of movement, and in the fields were the bent backs of patient serfs, tilling terraced acres. A few decrepit Toonerville trolleys banged along the rough tracks. There was, too, the usual daily parade of hand- or beast-drawn "honey wagons" bearing the "honey buckets" of human waste for the farms.

The G.I. was tired of slit trenches, of fly-blown latrines, of the filth and stench and acute discomfort of war. In Japan he was shocked and angered to find the drinking water polluted, the showers non-existent or rusted shut, his billets full of lice, fleas, rats, mice and the litter of a defeated people. He was shocked, too, to find his new latrines equipped with a porcelain type of slit-trench.

Only the beer was good, and it was plentiful. Local food was scarce, costly and prepared in the rodent-ridden, grease-caked hovels that pass for kitchens, even in Tokyo's better-known restaurants.

Even the colonels and brigadiers (it was a colonels' war, you know)—not to mention the correspondents, who had dug their foxholes and got shot at all through the Pacific—didn't fare much better. In Yokohama and Tokyo the hotels were dingy, dirty, dusty, smelly and inhabited by fleas and other multi-legged things that leaped gaily from soiled sheets to stained walls. From the dank cellars and kitchens came a whiff compounded of aging fish-heads, soybean sauce and souring rice.

The Japanese people were sullen, apathetic, without hope. They were not hostile. They were more than a little amazed that the conquering Americans failed to live up to Japanese propaganda portraits. The G.I. did not swagger, strut and brutalize. He lopped off no heads; raped no women; butchered no children. He smiled; he patted children on the head; he kidded the wooden-shoed, kimono-wrapped, slant-eyed girls he saw on the

streets. He relaxed; he worried about the delay in getting home; he plunged his pay on souvenirs and Jap whiskey; he began to play as hard as he had fought. He struck up baseball games and the Japs soon recovered their taste for the sport.

The amazing G.I. disturbed the Japanese no little. In general, he was the best ambassador the United States ever had. Up to a certain limit, he was the best living, walking and talking advertisement that democracy ever had. But he relaxed a little too much, and began to forget that his job did not end with the winning of the war. He became somewhat sloppy in his appearance and careless of his deportment in public. This was true of the younger men in the ranks; and it was true, too, of some officers. It was principally true of the green replacements who came out to Japan while the combat men sailed home.

These reflected a lack of indoctrination, a lack of preparation for the great task of the occupation. No one even today in the highest administration levels in Washington is making any serious public effort to "sell" to the American people and its young manhood the necessity for intelligent concentration on a long-term program of control and re-education of the Japanese.

The Japanese, like the Germans, offered us a tremendous task and challenge. The Japanese, even more than the Germans, were the great question marks of the future. We knew relatively little about the Orient, for all our years of doing business out there. The language barrier in Japan was tremendous; our language talent in the Army was scarce.

The Japanese were like a helpless patient upon the operating table, waiting for the surgeon's knife. They waited, too, for a transfusion of some sort of democracy.

CHAPTER TWO

# JAPAN UNDER "THE HAT"

Two wars were over. The war against the Japanese, the war of *publicity* for General MacArthur. Now began a third war, and in a sense a greater one than the actual clash of arms. It was to be the clash of minds, of the real opening of Japan to the West. It was the biggest job we had undertaken—that of bringing peace, permanent peace, to Japan and the Orient.

In a very real sense, we were faced—as we are still faced today and will be faced for many years to come—with our destiny in the Pacific. The end of the shooting war thrust upon us the task of demonstrating our responsibility and capability as the great power of the Pacific. It confronted us with the necessity of having a policy about Japan and of carrying it out wisely. The stakes were big. Any makeshift job on Japan would give us only a few uneasy years of peace and make another war certain. A weak, confused, untutored Japan would be easy prey to any power seeking it as a pawn in another struggle. Or a "quickie" occupation by homesick American, British and other Allied troops would leave Japan still at the mercy of scheming military resurgents and in danger of slipping back into the state of ignorant feudalism in which her people have dwelt for centuries.

At the outset, those on the sidelines in the United States—7,000 miles away—and in Great Britain, on the other side of the world, cut loose with an angry chorus of discontent, of impatience, with our handling of the Japanese problem. It was whipped by the long-smoldering humiliation of the disaster at Pearl Harbor, by the horrible stories of Japanese atrocities and bestiality in prison camps—stories that came tumbling from the thin, parched lips of thousands of Allied prisoners of war who had been inmates of the hell-spots at Omori, Shinagawa and Hongkong.

We knew then that the oh-so-artistic Oriental who had turned tea drinking and flower arrangement into somewhat mystic rituals was capable, too, of practicing cannibalism on captured American airmen. The supercivilized Jap also excelled in sticking bamboo stakes through the eyes of Allied prisoners. And the medical officers of the Japanese Imperial Army—the Army that hoped to bring the eight corners of the world under one roof—were wonderfully efficient at performing operations on Allied prisoners without benefit of anæsthetic, so that bored Japanese doctors might watch human organs functioning.

These were the Japanese who were in our clutches at long last as we entered Japan. The situation seemed to call for a little blood-letting on our part, and indeed there were some G.I.'s who had fought all the way up from Australia through New Guinea or through the Marshalls, Saipan and Iwo Jima who did an understandable bit of cuffing of the former enemy. It was inevitable, and much as you felt that you had to deplore it, you perhaps secretly thought that we might have done much more sabering of the Japanese in the first few weeks.

But we didn't. To those who'd never heard a shot fired except in a night club, to the "armchair boys" at home who were now

figuring out the occupation just as they'd figured out all the major strategy of the war, the Allies in Japan seemed to be playing ball with the people they had just whipped to a standstill.

This was not true. In the first few weeks we were feeling our way, building up our military strength in Japan. We were studying the beaten foe. And of highest importance was the necessity of releasing and accounting for the thousands of Allied prisoners from Japanese prison camps in Japan, China and elsewhere.

In defeated Germany, there had been the thrill of the hunt, the tracking down of Nazi ringleaders—the Streichers, Goerings and the rest who have since gone to the gallows. There had been a brief but phony scare about Nazi werewolves who were going to plague the occupation forces.

In Japan, things seemed to stand still after the brief flourishes accompanying the surrender aboard the *Missouri.* No one arrested the Emperor. Tojo lived in his house, unmolested, and we even saved his life after he bungled his suicide attempt. Those who were to be named as war criminals in a few months—such as the notorious Prince Konoye, who later took poison—mingled freely with our highest officers and threw plenty of dust in their eyes as to what had gone on and was still going on in Japan.

For the first time, the military men, such as General MacArthur, who had fought a long and hard war and had come out on top, now found themselves in a new realm, that of international politics and diplomacy, of intrigue and maneuvering, in which they were unskilled and untrained.

For MacArthur, the fruits of victory were sweet indeed after the long and tiresome road back from Bataan and Corregidor. But in many ways he was still an embittered man. The "armchair boys" back in Washington who had let him fight his part

of the Pacific War on a comparative shoestring were now issuing directives and statements and sniping at him from the sidelines. The General, always sensitive to criticism and ever conscious of his place in history, didn't like it. Neither did his Palace Guard —the small clique of faithful followers, the "Battling Bastards of Bataan" as they were known, who had been with him at Corregidor and were fanatically loyal to their chief.

And Supreme Headquarters had an easy, ridiculously simple way of finding out who among the press corps—and which papers —were the "good" ones and which the "bad." Daily the War Department shot back to MacArthur a wireless summary of the American press (to which was added later the Australian and British press). The summary was broken down into three parts. Part One included news, editorials and quotations that were "favorable to the occupation." Part Two included material that was "unfavorable to the occupation." In Part Three were lumped excerpts that someone in Washington thought were "controversial or likely to provoke further discussion" of the occupation.

Those correspondents who tried to do a factual job of reporting on the occupation usually wound up in Parts Two and Three, and in the "doghouse" at Supreme Headquarters. The sycophants among the press—and there were quite a few—the boys who took the handouts and stuck their by-lines on them—consistently made Part One. They got the special interviews, the inside tips—on items that of course would come back next day in Part One.

It was two months before MacArthur lifted censorship of occupation news going out from Japan. The resulting blast from half a dozen correspondents who had been in shooting wars in Europe long before Pearl Harbor—men who had covered the chancelleries of the world for ten to fifteen years and could smell

a phony communiqué a mile away—blew MacArthur's press agent and chief censor right out of his job.

The doors at headquarters suddenly flew open to anyone who wanted to do a serious, factual job of reporting. We began to know MacArthur as a soldier and as a gentleman, instead of the superman and demigod that his aides had made him out to be. We began to understand his ways, to savor his motives.

And back in the United States and in England, readers began to understand the purposes of the occupation. They began to have patience with MacArthur, who, they found, was doing a good job under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

The inevitable reaction set in at headquarters. There seemed to be too much news to please the old-line Palace Guard. Gradually, the strict wartime censorship came back in new guise—censorship at the source. Correspondents found they had to get "clearance" through the Public Relations Office in order to obtain interviews.

Sometimes the interviews had to be submitted for approval by the officers who granted them. Sometimes the questions had to be submitted in writing in advance. One general who headed an important section at headquarters demanded, and received, questions in advance from one correspondent. But the promised interview was postponed several times. Finally, the officer skipped homeward without even notifying the reporter.

The choice of General MacArthur to become Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was generally applauded—even by the Navy, which fought the Central Pacific phase that encompassed the Marshalls and Marianas and really made it possible to bring Japan to her knees with B-29 raids. With the Navy, of course, went the Marine Corps and a good portion of the Army and Army Air Force, while MacArthur's forces were leapfrog-

ging along New Guinea and into the Philippines for a campaign that probably was more important politically than strategically necessary or decisive for the defeat of Japan.

MacArthur was, and is, the romantic, hereditary, colonial soldier, a sort of Rupert of the Rhine. Beneath the scrambled-egg, gold-braided hat of his own design, the General at sixty-six is tall, erect, handsome and correct; his step firm, his jaw jutting, his eyes clear, his dress meticulous; his grasp of military and political history remarkable; his consciousness of his own role in history as acute as that of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt. And, like the late President, MacArthur has tremendous personal charm. He is a superb and interesting talker. His is a vivid and colorful character. He's the nearest approach to Winston Churchill that the United States has ever had, although he does not have Churchill's guile or Churchill's flair for politics. Of MacArthur's personal courage and intrepidity there is no question. He is without fear; during the war his aides quailed at the chances he took.

MacArthur would have been a "whiz" in the British Empire. He's just their cup of tea, except that there's nothing of the old school tie or stuffed shirt about him. By now, it is easy to imagine, he would have become Viceroy of India and a distinguished figure in the House of Lords. Or he would be quelling violence in Palestine, riots in Bombay, and leading a Royal Commission to inquire into the causes and cures of the Moslems' desire for Pakistan. Back in London, he'd arouse oh's and ah's at the charity matinees at the Haymarket or in his box for the Royal Philharmonic concerts at Albert Hall.

But MacArthur doesn't particularly care for the British. And what's more, he's an American and he's in Japan, where he ex-

pects to stay put until he's decided that he's done his job or until he's called home.*

"This is my last job for my country." The words were MacArthur's and the time was 1946, when there was a lot of guessing about his future and some talk that he might wind up as Republican candidate for President in 1948.

Long ago in Australia MacArthur's entourage floated a short-lived boom for him as President in 1944. But it backfired badly. MacArthur said then he had no political ambitions, and he says so again now. But there's no question that he would welcome a trip home now, with some sort of a triumphal tour. It would be a test of his popularity. And if it developed into a political boom, only he himself knows if he would consent to be "drafted" as a candidate against Harry Truman or anyone else the Democrats run next time. If it were Truman, MacArthur would win in a walk, despite his age, which is betrayed mostly by a shaking hand and certainly not by his mental powers and military prowess.

MacArthur was tremendously interested in the November, 1946, elections to Congress. For they were elections in which the Republican contenders for the Presidential nomination in 1948 were on view, like horses in a paddock.

And when the shouting and the tumult were over, the General sat down in his quiet office in Tokyo one day with one of his confidants. With pencil and paper they worked out a little racing form. To the General and his friend it looked like a hard gallop in 1948 between Senator Taft of Ohio and Governor Dewey of New York, although there were others in the field,

* In the spring of 1947, MacArthur said that Japan was ready for a peace treaty and that the United Nations could carry on from there. It has been suggested that this might be a bid to get home.

like former Governor Stassen of Minnesota (who later posted himself as a 1948 starter), Senator Bricker of Ohio, Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, and Governor Warren of California.

The General and his friend looked at the Republican horses and jotted down figures. The figures were the line-ups of delegates to the 1948 Republican convention. From so many angles, it looked like a stalemate between Taft and Dewey. (Fadeout . . . with MacArthur softly echoing that "this is my last job for my country.")

The scene now shifts to Albany, New York. The light is not so clear; the dialogue is probably apocryphal; the tag line is hilarious. But MacArthur's confidant is there, and he is paying a social call on Governor Dewey.

Says the confidant: "Looks close for '48, doesn't it, Tom?"

"Yes," says Dewey.

"Could be a stalemate between you and Taft, couldn't it, Tom?"

"Don't know. Could be," says Dewey. "Not even thinking about it."

"Suppose it were, Tom," says the confidant. "What would you do?"

"Why," says Tom, "in that case I'd go to the convention floor and nominate General MacArthur . . . and I'd sweep the house with him!" (Fadeout)

MacArthur toyed with the idea of a trip home in the summer of 1945, when Manila had been cleaned up and plans were well under way for the climactic smash at Japan on November 1. General Eisenhower—who once served under him as chief of staff when MacArthur headed the Philippines Department—had had a tumultuous reception, from London to New York to Abilene.

That aroused a little bit of envy around headquarters in Manila. Maybe they hadn't forgotten the crack—possibly apocryphal—attributed to Eisenhower after his service under MacArthur.

"Did you learn anything out there?" "Ike" was asked.

"Well, it was a fine course in dramatics," was the reply.

At any rate, MacArthur did not go home that summer. Since then, although it is not generally known, President Truman has suggested several times that he come back.

But the General stays on in Tokyo, living in the grand manner in the former American Embassy with his second wife, the former Jean Faircloth of Tennessee, and their son, Arthur, who is the apple of his daddy's eye and has a forthright personality of his own.

As MacArthur sees it, the job of keeping an Allied Occupation Army in Japan is going to last from three to five years after 1946—maybe longer, if complications develop with the Russians. After that, a long period of civilian control or checkup on the Japanese will be necessary. MacArthur doesn't want to stay around for that, and may go into permanent retirement in the Philippines, where he has so many prewar friends, if he does not wish to return to the somewhat less hospitable shores of the United States.

For Americans, much as they may admire MacArthur for his undoubted military ability, don't really know the man. He's been out of the country too long, for one thing. For another, they're just a little suspicious about him because of those purple, fulsome communiqués he used to issue during the war—communiqués that relegated the Navy and Air Force to second place, communiqués that always seemed to enlarge on the importance of some spit of an island in the grand scheme of things, com-

muniqués that did not tell of the hardship, the heartbreak and the mistakes of war.

But the Navy is getting its own back at him. Admirals swear that the following story is true:

A team of Navy historians from Washington went out to Tokyo about six months after the occupation began. For reasons of courtesy, they called upon MacArthur and asked him if he cared to give them a foreword or some sort of statement for inclusion in the archives of the Pacific War.

MacArthur, they say, ruminated a while, puffed on the pipe and remarked: "No, gentlemen, I have nothing in particular to say to you, except that *your* history shall agree with *my* communiqués!"

Old-timers in the Pacific say that MacArthur admitted, long ago in Australia, that his communiqués would not always be strictly accurate, in the sense that they would not tell the whole story, or might emphasize parts of it. His reasoning was that it was none of the enemy's business anyway, and that in the Orient, for psychological reasons connected with the behavior of the teeming peoples, you had to put on a good show or seem to be doing so.

MacArthur knew whereof he spoke. Sprung from a long line of warriors who could trace themselves back to Robert the Bruce, MacArthur had passed much of his youth and middle life in the Philippines. He saw service in World War I in the Rainbow Division in France, and was superintendent at West Point; but as U. S. Army Chief of Staff, he was forced in 1932 to call out troops against the Bonus Marchers.

His father, General Arthur MacArthur, had put down the Aguinaldo insurrection in the Philippines at the turn of the

century, and Douglas was out there as a young officer not long after leaving West Point. He came to know the Philippines like the palm of his hand.

President Harding sent MacArthur back to the Philippines in 1922 to strengthen island defenses. He returned in 1925 and went out again in 1928, to remain until 1930, when he became Chief of Staff. This four-year duty expired in 1934, but President Roosevelt continued him indefinitely by executive order. A year later, MacArthur went back to the Philippines as military adviser to the young Commonwealth Government. He stayed on in the islands. Quezon made him a Field Marshal. He was the unofficial king.

MacArthur was sixty-one and had retired from the United States Army when in July, 1941, President Roosevelt called on him again, this time to take command of all American forces in the Far East. He was at Manila when the Japanese struck.

MacArthur says he personally had to convince President Roosevelt in their meeting, with Admiral Nimitz, at Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1944 that the next major blows after the Marianas should fall against the Philippines and not, as the Navy wished, against Formosa and on to the China coast.

And he says, too, that if the high command in Washington had lavished upon him the ships and resources and manpower that were assigned to the Navy's "Central Pacific" route to Tokyo, the war would have been over in the Pacific six months to a year ahead of time, and there would have been no such "blood baths" as at Tarawa, Saipan and Iwo Jima.

This, of course, is all with the benefit of hindsight. Some of MacArthur's followers forget that if his original plan for attacking the Philippines at Davao, on Mindanao, had been carried out, he might have bloodied his nose there, for the Japs were in

good strength and fine fettle. It was Admiral Halsey (and the Navy—thanks to its reconnaissance) who convinced the strategists that MacArthur should hit first at Leyte and make good his promise, "I shall return."

But MacArthur, bitter though he was at the bureaucrats in Washington who let him fight a shoestring war, was a natural choice for the Supreme Command in Japan. He had the name, the presence, the manners of leadership. He had a knack for dealing with Orientals, and he could even recall that he and his father had served in the capacity of observers with the Japanese Army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Young Douglas was under Russian fire in the Battle of Mukden. Six times did the Japanese charge a Russian-held hill. Six times were they driven off. MacArthur was with them the seventh time. They took the hill.

Ninety-two years before MacArthur entered Japan as Supreme Commander, another American, Commodore Matthew C. Perry, came in with four warships and a letter from President Millard Fillmore extending an offer of friendship from the American people to the people of Japan, and seeking a trade treaty. Japan had been barred to foreigners for 250 years, but the Dutch and British were making trade overtures too.

Perry had been told to be politic and conciliatory, but to use force if necessary. He followed this last instruction to the extent of showing the guns of his steam-driven ships as they anchored twenty-seven miles down the bay from Tokyo. The Emperor appealed to heaven for aid. The shogun, or real boss of that time, talked things over with the leading warriors. Perry refused a command to move off to Nagasaki and said he was going to come ashore himself and deliver President Fillmore's letter, if he had to.

That brought action. Two Imperial Princes—who were actually disguised servants of the palace—received the Fillmore letter on shore. Perry went away until February, 1854, when he returned with seven men-o'-war. He was met at Yokohama with great fanfare. Six weeks later the Japanese signed a trade treaty giving American ships calling rights at two ports, providing for a limited amount of trade and establishing the first American consulate on Japanese soil.

And so, with a show of force, Perry opened Japan to the West. The Japanese saw what strength could accomplish.

MacArthur dropped into Japan at Atsugi Airfield, about seven miles from Yokohama, where Perry had set foot. He came into a country whose boastful militarism knew no concept of defeat or war guilt. He had with him the Cairo and Potsdam agreements as broad signposts on the highway of Japan's future.

Soon he received a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan, approved by President Truman and distributed to American government agencies. It was a stunner. It let the Allies know that in case of disagreement in Japan, American policy would prevail. It let the Japanese know they were in for a succession of hard winters.

In this statement, the United States declared that its ultimate objectives for Japan were to insure that Japan would never again menace the United States or the peace of the world, and that a peaceful and responsible government should be established which would respect the rights of other states and support American objectives as reflected in the United Nations charter. It said the Allies did not intend to impose upon Japan a government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

It restated the Cairo plan for cutting Japan down to the four main islands. It said Japan would be "completely" disarmed and

demilitarized, that militarism would be eradicated forever from political and social life. Freedom of speech, religion, assembly and press and such fundamental human rights would be encouraged among the people. They would be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations. They would be given the opportunity to develop an economy which would meet their peacetime requirements.

The statement also said, significantly, that every effort would be made to make it an Allied occupation, but in the event of any differences of opinion among the Allies, American policy would prevail.

It was specifically stated that the authority of Emperor Hirohito and of the Japanese government would be subject to General MacArthur, who would exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, "to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives."

MacArthur also was empowered to make any governmental changes he desired if his requirements were not met. It was stated explicitly that this policy "does not commit the supreme commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward attainment of the United States objectives." (The Jap Old Guard was in turmoil when the word "evolutionary" came garbled over the cables as "revolutionary"!)

"The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan—not to support it," the statement said.

And if the Japanese people used force to wipe out their feudalism and totalitarianism, MacArthur was to intervene only to preserve his own troops and to further the occupation objectives.

The White House statement also said that Japan would be

disarmed and demilitarized promptly. All equipment would be surrendered. All secret police would be dissolved. All top officials and ultra-nationalists and militarists would be taken into custody. There would be a purge of the educational system. War criminals would be rounded up.

Freedom of religious worship would be proclaimed promptly, and no religious cloak could be used for militarism or ultra-nationalism. Democratic political parties with the right of assembly would be encouraged. The judicial, legal and police systems would be overhauled; all discriminatory laws would be abrogated.

In order to destroy the economic basis of Japan's aggressive power, the White House statement said, industrial production would be carefully policed; economic activities would be inspected and controlled; scientific research would be watched. Labor unions would be encouraged. Income would be more widely distributed, as would ownership of the means of production and trade. The large industrial and financial combinations (Zaibatsu) which had controlled most of Japanese economy would be dissolved.

The statement absolved the Allies of any necessity for repairing war damage. Japan would have to support the occupation forces unless this caused hardship among the people. Japan would pay reparations through the transfer of property and equipment at home and abroad that would not be needed for a peacetime economy. Japan would make prompt restitution of her war loot.

This was hard, but the Japanese had asked for it. And the White House statement, in closing, gave them some hope. Eventually, they could resume world trade, to purchase needed raw materials and to export goods to pay for approved imports. For-

eign enterprises within Japan would have equal opportunities.

Almost as an afterthought, the statement closed with these words:

"Imperial Household Property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation."

This statement placed tremendous power in the hands of one man. In one sense, when you compared it with the Four-Power control and Four-Power squabbling in Germany, this was a distinct advantage. Only one cook could stir the Japanese broth: that cook was MacArthur.

But, in another sense, the Pacific War's end had caught us relatively unprepared for the job of remaking Japan. For Germany we had vast numbers of military government teams, well equipped with language talent. For Japan, we had less than 3,000 persons who had some working knowledge of the difficult language and who knew something about its people. Up to the time the Japanese surrendered, we had expected many bitter months of fighting inside Japan. Our planners thought the war would stretch well into 1947. We were caught short on trained personnel for occupation duties.

At first MacArthur tried to carry on with some of his military men who had fought the war with him. Several were inept, however gallant and efficient they had been as soldiers.

We were handicapped, too, by the fact that we knew relatively little about Japan. Japan had never been the open book to us that Europe had been. And during the war, espionage by white men among the Japanese was practically impossible. They were too easy to spot.

MacArthur soon found that there was only one way to handle the occupation, and that was to play it by ear. A very sensitive ear, one sharply tuned to catch any discords, was MacArthur's.

He timed every move he made. Never did he hit the Japanese with too many directives at once. Never did he give them too much to chew on. But he always kept them in suspense, wondering what next. He created a psychology of fear, wonder and awe. Japs on the top level, including the Emperor, never knew what might hit them. It's probable that many times MacArthur himself did not know.

The upper crust in Japan was stricken with apathy. They felt they were doomed, yet MacArthur was ordering them to do this and to do that, to draw up programs for this or for that, to work out the details of this or of that. The top dogs didn't like it at all. They started a slow-down strike against many directives. The fact that we were committed to use existing Japanese government machinery made it easy for the bureaucrats to tie up some directives with miles of red tape.

There wasn't any initiative in the early months of the occupation except from the Americans and the Japanese Communists, who came out of jail with whoops and hollers and set about their business with purpose. There was more initiative later from the Russians, when they took a very articulate role in the Four-Power allied advisory council in Tokyo.

But what could you expect from a people defeated as thoroughly as the Japanese had been? They had been running in one direction for a thousand years; overnight we could not expect them to turn around and run just as rapidly or beautifully in the other direction, toward democracy. The diehards in the Japanese government did not wish to stick their necks out. They knew the ax was coming anyway. They had no support from the people. They watched and waited, as did MacArthur. Each side felt the other out. And when the Japanese found we were inclined to be a bit easy-going, they soon took advantage of it.

The Japanese wound up the war with absolutely no leadership from their own government. The few handfuls of so-called "liberals" like Baron Kijuro Shidehara and the prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, were liberals in the sense that they had traveled in the Western world, wore English clothes, spoke English, and did not believe in cuffing and kicking everybody. They were about as enlightened as the carp that filled the Emperor's moat. The real liberals, if any, were shrinking violets who just would not come forward. For they felt that if the Americans got tired and went home too soon, they'd have little chance of escaping a purge by resurgent militarists.

Finding no leadership in their own ranks, the Japanese quickly looked to the Americans, once they found we were not there to beat them every half-hour. MacArthur was the one person who seemed to supply what they needed. In the past, the corner policeman had been the boss of the neighborhood Japanese. Suddenly, MacArthur figuratively kicked that policeman in the seat; he abolished the hated thought-control police, the mental Gestapo which had made Japan into the most police-ridden country in the world. He proclaimed freedom of thought, and proved it by springing the Communists, many of whom had spent fifteen years in jail.

This was one of the most important of MacArthur's early moves. He taught the Japanese to look upon the policeman as a protector, not a boss. He wiped out the Kempei-tai, or secret military police. He abolished all secret societies, which were breeding grounds of militarism and the police mentality.

He started to clean up the Japanese press, with a rigorous system of censorship that screened out the vestiges of feudal, militaristic thought and gave play to free comment and criticism of things Japanese.

He included the Emperor system as one of the subjects that could be freely discussed, believing that if it would not stand the test of free discussion, it ought not to be retained.

He ordered a new Constitution, under which the Japanese swore off war, stripped themselves forever of an Army and Navy and Air Force, put new life into the Diet (Parliament) as the voice of the people, and cut the Emperor down to the size of a constitutional monarch who was no longer supreme.

He ordered the dissolution of the Zaibatsu families, the closely knit clans that held the controls of Japanese industry and finance, and told them to turn their holding-company stocks over for re-sale to the public or to workers in subsidiary industries of the Zaibatsu parent concerns.

He ordered strict financial reforms, wiping out the great burden of military pensions that had unbalanced the budget for years and had fostered a class of do-nothing ex-soldiers. He slapped on a terrific program of taxation and monetary reform that squeezed war profits from dozens of big firms and hit even the Emperor's multi-million-dollar holdings.

He started a gigantic purge in all walks of Japanese life, cleaning out the militarists and ultra-nationalists from the schools, government, politics, banking and industry, and forbidding them to hold responsible positions.

He rounded up hundreds of war-criminal suspects, reaching right into the imperial circle to grab two of the Emperor's closest advisers.

He began early trials of Tojo and a dozen others considered responsible for starting the war and conducting it so brutally. He rubbed the noses of the Japanese in their own dirt by ordering the press to print factual accounts of the origins of the

war and of the lies and excesses with which the Japanese had fought it.

He began a large-scale shakeup of the Japanese school system, kicking out many scores of teachers and ordering textbooks to be rewritten.

He offered new hope that Japanese minds might really be opened to democratic tendencies and literature by encouraging the use of Romaji, or Roman characters, to replace in time the terribly difficult ideographs in which the Japanese language has been written for centuries.

He ordered the freeing of Japan's farms and farmers from their condition of slavery, believing that no democracy can exist which does not spring from the soil, as it did in America. He ordered the large land holdings broken up for re-sale at controlled prices to the farmers, who had been tenants and share-croppers.

He ordered new elections to the lower house of the Diet, and they were held in April, 1946. This date marks the first time that any Japanese election has been unfettered. The elections returned a Diet of new complexion, a Diet that did not seem bogged down under medieval ways, a Diet in which women—also emancipated and given the right to vote by MacArthur—took their seats for the first time. But such political reforms still had to reach down into the level of the ward boss and ward politics, which still are powerful influences in Japan.

And MacArthur imported an American woman as tutor for the Crown Prince, Akihito, who is twelve years old and some day will succeed his father, Hirohito, unless the monarchy is swept away.

MacArthur was jumpy, sensitive, in the early weeks. Even

the War Department's cables to him were cast in diplomatic language, calculated not to irk even a prima donna.

If MacArthur had to be handled with kid gloves, he vowed he was not conducting a kid-glove occupation. He warned the Japanese that their trials were just beginning, that hard days were ahead, and that by and large they would have to work out their own salvation under the broad lines of his directives. He was stern, always militarily correct, and the Japanese knew that they could expect justice and a certain Christian tolerance, nothing more. This commanded their respect. And it soon commanded their worship.

For the Japanese have nothing if not a capacity for reverence. When MacArthur told them to stop thinking of the Emperor as a God (by having the Emperor sing out a New Year's Rescript which conceded he was not of divine origin), they quickly picked up MacArthur as the new deity. To the Japanese, MacArthur can do no wrong. They like his aloofness, his smart military appearance. They like his crispness and air of finality. They like his big Cadillac, and most of all they like the way he strides out to it from headquarters twice a day to go home to lunch and dinner. They cluster round like bees to a honey pot, for a glimpse of the man. They write hundreds of pieces of fan mail to him each week. One woman went so head over heels that she wrote asking if she might come to live with him. A smart Japanese publisher whipped out a biography of MacArthur. At last count its circulation was near the million mark.

The crowds waiting to see MacArthur outside headquarters became so great at one point that a foolish colonel put up signs on the sidewalk bidding the Japanese stay away. That was bad psychology for the occupation. It was also bad public relations, and headquarters had always insisted on having good public rela-

tions at whatever the cost. MacArthur had the signs promptly removed. It was essentially democratic, a statement from headquarters implied, that a cat could look at a king.

Inside headquarters, however, MacArthur had his private elevator to whisk him to the sixth floor where he had his office. The correspondents' corps, wondering whether the new Mikado also claimed descent from a sun-goddess, complained and the elevator became public again.

The irreverent among the Americans—and there were many in Tokyo—often discussed the two divinities—MacArthur and Hirohito. The Marines had a poem which ended with "and while possibly a rumor now, someday it will be fact that the Lord will hear a deep voice say . . . move over, God, it's Mac . . ." There was another sally about MacArthur "walking on the waters of the Emperor's moat this morning, carrying the Emperor on his back." There came a Chicago *Tribune* cartoon, showing MacArthur dolled up as the new Mikado.

The Mikado smoked a corncob pipe and hummed this little ditty from Gilbert and Sullivan:

> "My object all sublime
> I shall achieve in time
> To let the punishment fit the crime,
> The punishment fit the crime."

As MacArthur saw it, he was giving the average Japanese a chance to enjoy his birthright of freedom. And to sum up his policy, he loved to quote Confucius to this effect: "Be kind to your enemy, for one day he may be your ally; be kind to your prisoner, for one day he may be your jailer."

MacArthur has a routine of living. He lives well and he lives

carefully, in the handsome American Embassy. It is a sturdy but luxurious mansion, fifteen years old. An immaculately dressed major greets visitors at the door and escorts them into the reception hall. He directs the visitors to a side room, where a kimono-clad servant bows low and takes the coats. The way to the living room leads over thick carpets, past a row of draped windows that look onto a fountain court. There are paneled walls and *objets d'art.*

In the living room, which strikes you as being about the size of the East Room at the White House but much more attractive, there is a cheerful wood fire. Above it is Mrs. MacArthur's own wall decoration, a riotous tapestry of color made from Japanese obis, the bustle-like sashes that Japanese women wear. There is a delicate, painted screen so placed as to catch the light. Through the windows, the visitor sees young Arthur, bored and rather pale, playing alone with his kites. (He has a few Japanese playmates.)

The telephone rings at about 1 P.M. The General is leaving headquarters to come home to lunch. The great man strides into the room, embraces his wife, plants a warm kiss on young Arthur's cheek. He leads guests into the state dining room. The table is laden with flowers and lit with candles.

Luncheon is served by eight Japanese manservants, clad in dark brown kimonos with the United States seal on them. They serve quietly, deftly. The General's silverware, which he had left behind in Manila when the war began and later miraculously found, gleams in the candlelight. It is a simple luncheon consisting of baked ham, cauliflower, beans, sweet potatoes and homemade fudge. The General does most of the talking and the talk goes on for about two hours. He is convincing, stimulating, and fond of digging back into history.

At three o'clock he is off to the office again, where he remains until seven, eight or nine at night, according to the amount of work on hand. The General does a lot of reading at home in the morning and again late at night.

But he takes good care of himself. He gets sufficient sleep, eats moderately, drinks very little. At sixty-six he's in far better shape than many of the younger colonels and brigadiers who surround him, and who often miss hot meals or bar hours at their hotels or billets because of the General's odd office hours.

There are many other Army families in Japan now to keep the MacArthurs company. In the early days there were a few visits from Red Cross girls, an occasional tea with a foreign diplomat, movies in the evening.

Mrs. MacArthur, a vivacious hostess, mixes well with Japanese women. But she sees no more of one woman who tried to set herself up in business as a seller of introductions to the General's wife. The Counter-Intelligence Corps put a stop to it. That wasn't the C.I.C.'s usual line, however; they were pretty busy chasing war criminals (and keeping correspondents from nabbing a few on their own). And the first on their list was General Hideki Tojo, prime minister and virtually dictator of Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor.

CHAPTER THREE

# "I ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY . . ."

IN THE EXCLUSIVE suburb of Tamagawa, some fifteen minutes from the center of Tokyo, the once all-powerful General Hideki Tojo, prime minister of Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor, searched frantically for someone to help him commit hara-kiri.

In that honored way of committing suicide, the self-victim, robed in a ceremonial white kimono, kneels before a Shinto shrine and, having "offered himself to the gods," plunges a short-bladed, razor-edged knife into his body just below the navel and, twisting it swiftly in an anti-clockwise direction, disembowels himself. Then, as he falls forward, his head comes in contact with a wooden block, and an assistant, who has been standing by, a mute witness to the bloody operation, raises a sword and with one blow neatly slices the head off.

Tojo had decided to "accept responsibility" for the war, and everything for his "atonement to the gods" had been prepared. The white silk kimono with its royal blue sash lay stretched to its full length before his personal shrine. The hara-kiri knife, in a purple, red-tasseled bag, lay to one side of the wooden head-

block, and above the "god shelf" of the altar a parchment, bearing the sentence, "If I cannot live with honor, then I must die with honor," had been placed. Everything was ready except one thing—Tojo could not find an assistant. Nobody loved him enough to do the job.

The ex-warlord, who had once held power over Japan's milling population of seventy-seven million, now found that he was hated and despised. To his friends he was merely a memory. The gates of the Imperial Palace were closed to him. Even the person who had first suggested him to the Emperor as the man to lead Japan had turned his back. This was the Marquis Kido, Hirohito's adviser, and he knew, as did Tojo's friends, that the former prime minister, who had held dictatorial powers from October, 1941, until July, 1944, was one man who would stand before the courts of Allied justice.

They, too, had their problems. Mostly from Japan's military clique, they were trying to decide whether to "accept responsibility" for the war in like manner, or sit it out in the faint hope that they might not be named war criminals by the Allies. They hated Tojo. He had brought national disgrace to the Japanese nation. Japan had "lost face" as a result of his faulty leadership, and consequently they had "lost face." Daily they "sweated out" the first war-criminal list, and daily Tojo wrote frantic letters begging them to help. His pleas fell on deaf ears. The wielding of a sword in a hara-kiri operation for Tojo, they felt, was one way of securing a passport to a war-crimes court. It was a question of necks. They wished to save theirs. Tojo didn't; he wanted some one to sever *his* just for old times' sake, but nobody wished to take a crack at his scraggy neck with a favorite Samurai sword.

Still wearing his uniform, bedecked with six bars of ribbons, which included the first World War Victory Ribbon—the others

he had awarded to himself from time to time—the beak-nosed, bald-pated Tojo lived quietly in a small bungalow across the street from his once palatial house, which had been destroyed in the bombing. His wife and family had long before left for the safety of the hills, and now he found that he had only two friends, his devoted secretary and his servant, who fondly believed that Hirohito with a wave of his "divine" hand would save Tojo from arrest. Tojo did not share the same view. He had made up his mind that he would not be taken alive and, unable to find an assistant, decided to end his life by using a bullet. In a letter to a certain Count Hiroishi, Tojo told of his decision and begged the Count to look after his wife and family. The Count, too, had "accidentally" forgotten him and did not reply.

Ten days after the arrival of the occupation troops in Japan, Tojo, quite calm and cool, gave an interview to several correspondents. He showed them over his house and was naively proud of an unexploded American incendiary bomb which had partly buried itself in the loose earth on top of his air-raid shelter in the back garden.

"They missed me with that one," he told them, "but they burned down my house on the other side of the street."

He explained away the twenty-five armed Kempei-tai police —Japan's Gestapo—surrounding the house, by saying that he had been threatened with assassination several times since he had retired the year before. He showed no emotion when asked if he expected to be arrested as a war criminal. In fact, his sharp, pointed features, which had earned for him the nickname, "The Razor," actually smoothed into a smile when one of the correspondents asked if he intended to end his life like Hitler. He did not answer that question. Outwardly he was perfectly cool; inwardly he was tense but prepared to wait until the very last

moment before pulling the trigger. He certainly was not going to advertise his intentions beforehand.

At eighteen minutes past four on September 11, 1945, Tojo decided to wait no longer. Two counter-intelligence officers, together with six correspondents, drove up to his bungalow shortly after four. They produced their credentials for Tojo's secretary and demanded to see his master. The secretary, a bland, smiling person, Shigetohatake by name, asked them to wait. He disappeared into the house for a period of five minutes, and returning, asked the officers if they would explain "their mission. Had they come to arrest Tojo?"

Tojo knew then the game was up. The first war-criminal list, issued that morning, had honored him by having him at the top. He calmly locked his study door and, removing his uniform coat, hung it neatly over the back of a chair. Then he took a drink to steady his nerves. He opened a window and looked out for a moment on the little crowd gathered about the porch. A faint smile crossed his face for a second, then was gone. He slammed the window shut, picked up a .38 Colt automatic, pulled the trigger and sent a bullet searing through his body a fraction of an inch from his heart. Just as he had bungled Japan's war, Tojo had bungled his suicide.

Somebody shouted, "The bastard has beaten us to it," and everybody charged into the house. Still standing outside were Tojo's armed guards, apparently oblivious of all that was happening. The study door was locked, but in a few moments it had been shouldered off its hinges.

Slumped in a chair in the middle of the room was Tojo, smiling quietly at us. He still held the automatic in his right hand. One of the officers, gun in hand, shouted, "Put down that gun or I will fire!" Tojo dropped the gun limply. The officer

promptly stepped into the room and picked up the weapon. From then on the whole thing was a cross between a Marx brothers' movie, "Hellzapoppin" and an Irish wake.

For a moment everybody was too stunned to do anything. Tojo leaned back and a long squirt of blood shot out from his chest like water coming out under pressure from a hole in a burst pipe. Then a fly which had been making an aerial reconnaissance of his sweating brow landed to make a closer inspection.

Tojo was wearing a white shirt open nearly to the waist, gray military riding breeches and brown riding boots. Behind him was a divan. Above it hung a painting, eight feet by six, depicting the ex-warlord on horseback, standing on a bluff, and behind him, members of his staff, also mounted, reviewing a stream of armored cars and tanks moving along a road. In the foreground of the picture lay a crumpled and dirty Chinese flag still on its short staff. The artist had painted on it the tire marks of vehicles which had passed over it. On a window sill was the glass which Tojo had used to take what he thought would be his last drink.

In one corner of the room stood a tall hatrack, in another a cedarwood cupboard. This cupboard was a veritable arsenal. It contained several Japanese, German and American-type automatic revolvers and hundreds of rounds of ammunition to fit. Hanging from the wall near the door was a red, white and purple tapestry, showing a dragon with blood dripping from its fangs.

Blood was now dripping from Tojo, too. It had seeped across his shirt to his breeches and down onto the upholstery of the chair. A large pool was slowly gathering on the floor. Tojo groaned, clenched and unclenched his hands in spasms of agony. He writhed and bent his knees, with his hands and face twitching—but the fly on his forehead never moved.

Everybody was trying to use the telephone. One correspondent, an agency man, was hanging on to the one phone for dear life. It was situated down the hall, and while he dictated his story, a second correspondent at the door of the study shouted out to him the latest developments. The conversation sounded something like this:

"The joint is swimming in blood . . . no, he's not dead . . . hold on for a minute until I find out. . . . Is the old boy dead yet?"

"No, but he's getting weaker."

"He's getting weaker . . . did you get that? . . . Yeah, he's getting weaker . . . better get a flash ready. . . . The fly is still there . . . yeah, sitting on his forehead . . . hold on. . . . Is the fly still there?"

"Yeah, it's still there . . . seems to be using the old boy's dome for a skating rink."

"Yeah, the fly's still there . . . no, he hasn't made a statement yet . . . hold on."

"He's unconscious, and he's getting cold . . . he won't last much longer. . . ."

"Get this quick . . . at four-thirty Tojo lapsed into unconsciousness . . . his body is going cold . . . no, he isn't dead . . . for God's sake hold that 'dead' flash. . . . Look, chum, I wish he would die too. . . ."

The correspondents' conversation was in the same vein.

"I hope this fish dies in time for me to make my deadline."

"Whereabouts do you say you lived in the States? . . . Oh, Chicago . . . used to live there once myself."

"Suppose we turned him over, would he die any quicker? . . . I'm an afternoon man, you know . . . you morning-paper men are lucky. . . ."

There was little pity among them for Tojo. They had seen hundreds of American and British troops die on the sweltering islands of the Pacific, and they had seen the living skeletons of men and women, ravaged by tuberculosis and beri-beri, released from Japanese prison camps.

Only one man showed real emotion—Tojo's secretary. Pushing his way through the crowd, he reached his master and with his hands joined began crying bitterly. He placed his arms around Tojo's head and held it lovingly, moving it gently back and forth to the accompaniment of a strange wailing. The fly on Tojo's head disappeared.

Suddenly Tojo opened his eyes. The two Japanese interpreters bent forward. Quite clearly and without difficulty he said, "I will become a god to protect our land after my death." Then he closed his eyes and began groaning again.

His shirt and trousers were now saturated with blood, and the small neat hole in his chest was turning blue around the edges. He appeared to be sinking rapidly when he suddenly opened his eyes once more.

"Give me a drink of water," he commanded. Then again he closed his eyes. His servant obeyed, and the water seemed to revive him.

"If, by mistake," he said, "I still live, I know a way to die. I have ended my responsibility."

Then, in a voice stronger than before, he said, "Let MacArthur have my corpse. . . . For my corpse I do not care . . . I have told my family all about it . . . but tell MacArthur that I am not to be shown in public." Then he lapsed into unconsciousness once more.

A doctor had been summoned, but few people in that room believed Tojo would survive. It was a gruesome pantomime, and

as the minutes ticked away everybody settled down patiently to await the death of this ugly little man.

Although the human body contains a very small quantity of blood, Tojo's supply seemed to come from a never-ending fount. The room looked as if somebody had upset at least twenty cans of thick tomato juice on the floor. Tojo's clothes, the upholstery of the chair and the rug beneath it had turned a deep red.

More people were arriving every minute. The room was now full of correspondents, officers and G.I.'s. The air was thick with tobacco smoke. Everybody was waiting for Tojo to die, but he would not oblige.

The photographers arrived. Press photographers are a special race of people. They are happy and good-humored, but nothing is sacred to them, and here was one of the biggest photographic stories of the year.

"Move Tojo's head a little to the right. . . . Hold it . . . swell. . . . Do you mind taking your head out of the way? . . . I want a shot of Tojo holding the revolver . . . do you mind pressing the gun into his hand? . . . Here comes the fly again . . . I must get one of that. . . ."

Flash bulbs exploded one after another. The photographers crawled all over the room. They stood on chairs. They lay full length on the floor. They crossed and uncrossed Tojo's legs. They photographed the house, his secretary and his servant. Never before had a suicide been so fully recorded.

An Army photographer, who seemed to have stepped straight from the pages of Damon Runyon, came into the room. A dead cigar hung from one side of his mouth. He walked up to the body and looked it over. Raising his camera, he took a photograph.

"Say, bud," he asked, "who is the character?"

A correspondent, busily making notes, answered off-handedly, "Tojo."

The photographer, moving his cigar to the other side of his face, took another picture.

"Who did you say it was?" he asked again.

"Tojo! Tojo!" snapped the correspondent.

The photographer turned to another correspondent. "Say, who is this guy Tojo?"

"Tojo, General Tojo, the Japanese dictator, prime minister at the time of Pearl Harbor," he was told.

The photographer's mouth opened in astonishment. Then he hurled his cigar out of the window.

"D'ya mean to say," he yelled, "that this character is the cause of it all? Only for him I'd be back home? Why, the old son of a bitch! I've a good mind to smack him a fast one with this camera!"

That about summed up the average G.I.'s pity for the bleeding Tojo.

In the meantime the house guards had gathered around the windows and were quietly watching the whole proceedings. Their faces, absolutely blank, were like those of a bored audience watching a very dull play. Their chief came into the room, bowed, smiled and begged permission to move Tojo to a bedroom. This request was refused, as the officers did not want to move him until the doctor arrived.

A full forty minutes had elapsed from the time Tojo pulled the trigger. The end seemed very near now. Minute by minute, he was fading rapidly before our eyes. Somehow he gathered strength, and between pauses and lapses into unconsciousness he made a statement.

"I wished to die by one shot," he said. "I am sorry it is taking

so long to die. The Greater Asiatic War was a just and righteous one, but I am very sorry for the Asiatic nations and all other races for having lost the war."

He stopped. The strain was too much. He twisted in his chair. There was a sudden silence in the room. Then a flash bulb went off. Tojo groaned and began again.

"I would not like to be judged before a conqueror's court. I wait for the . . . for the . . . righteous judgment of history. I wanted to commit hara-kiri. I wish to die . . . to die . . ."

His voice trailed away then suddenly came back. ". . . to die by one shot . . . and please do not make me breathe or care again. . . . I am happy if I can go to the land of the Emperors under the spiritual protection of his Majesty the Emperor. . . . I wish to help the healthy progress of our nation. . . . There are many ways to act as a man of responsibility, but I do not want to be judged by the conquerors."

His lips twisted into his "villain of the piece" smile. "The conqueror makes his own judgment," he said weakly. "I have asked Count Hiroishi to look after my family."

Then with his voice suddenly rising to a crescendo, he shouted: "Banzai to my family! Banzai to the Emperor! Banzai! . . . Banzai! . . . Banzai! . . ."

Nobody moved. The silence was heavy. Suddenly from the hall came the loud voice of a news-agency man on the phone: "I TELL YOU THE OLD BASTARD ISN'T DEAD YET!"

Everybody settled down once again to await the final gurgle. A Japanese doctor appeared on the scene, followed by a very grimy Japanese nurse. The doctor surveyed the wounded man casually; then shrugging his shoulders and spreading his hands, he turned to one of the officers.

"Through the heart," he said resignedly. "No hope."

The officer told him to do what he could, and the doctor asked that Tojo be moved to the divan. Four correspondents picked him up. As they raised him from the chair, blood gushed from his chest, covering their hands and clothes. Tojo was soundly cursed. But the four correspondents had saved his life. American doctors later said that his left lung had been slowly filling with blood; his own blood had been gradually drowning him, and had he been left in the chair another five minutes he would have died.

Tojo objected violently to being moved. He jabbered away to the doctor, and it took all the time of the interpreters present to keep up with the conversation.

"Don't plug the holes," pleaded Tojo. "This body is my own."

The doctor removed the blood-sodden shirt and began to clean Tojo's body. Tojo tried to push him away with his twitching hands.

"I command you not to touch me!" screamed the half-delirious ex-warlord.

"I must clean your body and the wound at least," answered the doctor.

Hearing this, a counter-intelligence officer seized the doctor by the shoulder. "You do everything in your power to help him," he ordered.

The doctor shrugged his shoulders and then smilingly refused point-blank to help him. "Anyway," he said, "he is beyond my care. He cannot live."

He was fully aware that Tojo wished to die. The officer sternly repeated the order, and forty-five minutes later—Tojo had now been bleeding for nearly two hours—the doctor began to plug the holes in a very haphazard manner without instru-

ments, stethoscope or drugs, his equipment consisting only of a few bandages and some cotton wool.

Tojo still fought off the doctor and talked incoherently. He begged and pleaded and threatened, but the doctor, under the stern eye of the officer, continued trying to stop the flow of blood.

"Why didn't you shoot yourself in the head?" asked the doctor disdainfully.

"I wanted to be recognized," Tojo replied.

Tojo now had bled for two hours and five minutes. His pulse was barely perceptible, and he had turned quite blue in the face. As he collapsed, the doctor solemnly announced to the officer, "I can do no more."

It seemed as if the death wait was nearly over. Blood was still oozing out of the cotton plugs and dripping onto the floor. Some ghoulish souvenir hunters were soaking their handkerchiefs in the gore, and some one had clipped a neat triangle out of Tojo's blood-sodden riding breeches. The bullet which had passed through his body had been gouged out of the back of the chair; the cupboard had been ransacked, and several of the automatics had vanished. Even the fins of the incendiary bomb on the air-raid shelter in the back garden had disappeared.

Tojo was barely breathing when an ambulance containing two doctors and a sergeant of the Medical Corps arrived. They rushed into the house, followed by a small army of military police who promptly cleared the room to the doors. Then began a fight for Tojo's life. It was a strange twist of fate. The two American doctors and the sergeant hated Tojo, yet they were fighting for his life.

The Japanese doctor was ordered to one side, and the Ameri-

can doctors deftly and swiftly began to treat the wounded man. Plasma injections were ordered, and the hatrack was hauled to the side of the divan to act as a stand.

Without giving the groaning Tojo an anæsthetic, the doctors sewed the wounds and padded and strapped them with adhesive tape. The Japanese doctor looked on in sheer wonderment. As the blood plasma slowly dripped into Tojo's veins—American blood which had arrived in Japan only a few days before—the senior doctor present, a captain, announced that Tojo had missed his heart by a mere fraction of an inch.

"It passed through the sixth and seventh ribs," he said, "barely touching the heart. There is just a chance that the blood plasma may save him." The two doctors continued working on the exhausted Tojo.

The sergeant, a practical man, had a large pad in one hand. "What is this fellow's name?" he asked.

"Tojo."

He wrote this down.

"Does anybody know his first name?" he inquired.

"Hideki."

"How do you spell that? Oh, well, I'll just put down H. Tojo," he said.

"Rank?" he queried.

"General," came the answer.

"Age?"

"About sixty-four."

"What does he do now? Is he still a general?" he went on.

"Just put him down as an ex-dictator," said a tired correspondent.

"Ex—dic—tat—or," spelled the sergeant as he wrote it down on his pad. "Thanks." Tojo was another body to be patched up

and accounted for, and the sergeant took his work very seriously.

Shortly afterward Tojo was moved to the 1st Medical Squadron, of the 1st Cavalry Regiment at Meiji Park, where he was given more blood. Later he was moved to the 98th Evacuation Hospital in the Ohtori Elementary School at Yokohama. Here he was immediately taken to the operating theater and given another blood transfusion. In all, that afternoon, he received about 1,100 cc. of blood.

On the operating table Tojo opened his eyes and calmly asked for a drink of water, and later for another. Both were given to him. To General Eichelberger, Commander of the Eighth U. S. Army, who was standing by his side, Tojo said, "Please don't go to any trouble over me. I am going to die anyway."

Gruff, beloved Eichelberger is reported to have said very simply, "You are going to get better if I have to pump blood into you myself."

Every possible care was lavished on Tojo. General Eichelberger saw to it that he had the best medical attention, including four pretty nurses, so that he would live to stand trial for his war crimes. Two months later Tojo was on his feet, and by the beginning of 1946 he had joined the other war criminals in Omori prison camp, the same camp in which Allied soldiers had lived and died so miserably. He was shunned by his fellow inmates. They had expected hara-kiri, not a pistol. They refused to eat with him or associate with him in any way. Tojo was once more alone, even in jail.

Tojo's attempt on his own life was the kick-off. The knives were sharpened all over Japan by those who knew they would be named too on later lists of war criminals. The atmosphere was

electric among the upper classes, and the whisper among them was, "Who is next?"

We knew who the guilty ones were, but why did General MacArthur, after the occupation began, let several weeks elapse before allowing the orders for the arrest of such obvious war criminals as Tojo, Prince Konoye and Marquis Kido to be issued? Tojo very nearly slipped through our fingers because of the delay. He would not have stood trial as Japan's Number One War Criminal but for the four correspondents who unwittingly saved his life.

*It was clear to everybody that the Supreme Commander was deliberately giving Japan's war leaders enough time to commit suicide. This may have been what General MacArthur personally wanted, but was it the wish of the Allies? Had they been consulted? Did they not want to know the full story of Japan's war of aggression from the lips of those who had contrived it?*

As Tojo lay in a hospital bed, creeping unwillingly back to life one month after his bungled suicide attempt, the Supreme Commander was screaming to Washington for permission to put him on trial then and there. Washington rightly said "No." The Allied Council, which was to try Japan's war criminals, had not even been set up. The delegates from the various countries had not yet been chosen. And, though the General was eager to put Tojo on trial, other equally important war criminals were still at large.

Correspondents seemed far ahead of the Counter-Intelligence Corps in the early weeks. Clark Lee of International News Service personally accepted the surrender of Colonel Josef Albert Meisinger, Germany's Gestapo chief in the Far East. For

his pains, Lee himself was arrested for a few hours for "interfering with Meisinger's rights as a war criminal."

One man was ready to grab them, Brigadier General Thorpe, head of Counter-Intelligence Corps, but he had to wait for the Chief to make up his prima-donna-like mind. With Meisinger safely behind bars, this quiet, gray-haired General had him questioned. He was not going to give him a chance to commit suicide if he could help it. The 260-pound Gestapo chief was an important captive, as he was also wanted in Nuremberg to stand trial as the "Butcher of Warsaw." But first Thorpe wanted to run a vacuum cleaner through every crevice of Josef's twisted little brain.

Every day for two whole weeks, twelve hours a day, Meisinger was grilled. The reports began piling up on General Thorpe's desk, but still Josef refused to give the full story. There was no mercy for him—the questioning went on. Finally General Thorpe told the authors that the Gestapo chief's evil doings in the Far East had been fully documented. "There isn't a thing on his mind that we don't know," the General observed calmly. "Josef has lost a little weight but he's much happier now."

Meisinger had been reduced to a nervous wreck when, in a blubbering, trembling condition, he was half carried, half dragged to a waiting plane for delivery to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. His clothes hung in folds about him as this crying hulk of a man was bundled on board. His crimes in Japan had been great, but he knew that at Nuremberg he would have to stand trial for the wholesale massacre of thousands of Poles, who had so aptly named him the "Butcher of Warsaw," and Josef Albert just didn't want to leave Japan.

Among the Japanese on the top level there was a lot of buck-

passing about war guilt, so much so that they began telling on one another.

"Not only have I my own Intelligence Service," commented Thorpe, "but now I find I have several thousand Japs helping me. I'm the most popular man in Japan. Everybody is telling me that they had nothing to do with the war; it's always the other fellow. But the only ones who come to me are those who are worried about appearing on my next list."

The buck-passers were equaled in number by the breast-beaters such as Prince Konoye, one of the old-school kimono boys, who, secretly hoping that the Americans did not know too much about his history in the China "incident," now clothed himself in the white robes of penitence and started a stampede for the renunciation of titles. He also posed as the architect of a new Constitution for Japan and told correspondents that it would be revised along "democratic lines but would preserve the Emperor and the Imperial Institution." His announcement that this new Constitution had the approval of General MacArthur nearly caused the collapse of the "Old Man's Cabinet" under the aged Baron Shidehara. Shidehara contended that General MacArthur was working behind his back in appointing Konoye to form a commission for the revision of the Constitution.

Though General MacArthur stoutly denied having ordered or approved the appointment of Konoye as head of this commission, somebody in headquarters had apparently "blessed" the idea, for Hirohito made the six-foot, flat-faced Prince an assistant to his personal adviser, the Marquis Kido. This gave him special entrée to the palace.

The Supreme Commander, always playing by ear, heard the rumble of criticism of Konoye in the world's press and particularly in the American papers, namely, the New York *Herald*

*Tribune,* the New York *Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor.* It appeared that these papers, like many of the Allied observers in Tokyo, were prepared to believe that the General had approved of Konoye's appointment.

They called the Prince an "evil scoundrel"; they said if he was fit to draft a new constitution, then "Quisling should be King of Norway, Laval should be President of France, and Goering should be the Presiding Officer of the United Nations." MacArthur again repudiated the idea that Konoye had any backing from his headquarters in revamping the constitution. But, like the newspapers, few correspondents believed this.

Konoye's clique wooed the correspondents with fancy luncheon parties at which the hypochondriac Prince, compromiser in the past, appeared after the tables had been cleared and his stooges had poured the preparatory oil.

Konoye had little to say. He was a good listener. He hoped to glean much from the tone and content of reporters' questions. His views were put out by others than himself, such as suave Amherst-educated Kasé, long the Foreign Office spokesman; wily Shimanouchi, also of the Foreign Office; and slinking Jiro Shirasu, the fisheries magnate who was also unofficial secretary to Shigeru Yoshida, then Foreign Minister.

These luncheons were, on the surface, rather gay affairs, but both the hosts and guests knew that each side was testing out the other.

Kasé would sooner or later turn the conversation to the question of the Emperor, and it was always the same. "Do you think the Emperor will be arrested as a war criminal?" he would ask. Or, "How long do you think the occupation will last?" His aide, Shimanouchi, Japan's "Lord Haw-Haw," who fully expected to be arrested at any moment, would eagerly ask in a

whisper if we thought "many" people would be taken into custody. Then would come the question, "Do you think I will be arrested?" The answer would be something like, "Well, you never can tell, Shimanouchi, you never can tell." Or, "Well, you lived for years in America; you went to college there—why, they might even accuse you of spying, Shimanouchi. But then you didn't, did you?" At these words his face would blanch slightly beneath its yellow pallor.

Most aggressive of them all was Shirasu, who felt that there were "too many American experts in Japan." On one occasion he said, "We bow to the Emperor—just as you take your hat off when passing a Catholic church; as you British say, 'Good morning,' whether or not it is a nice morning, so we bow reverently before our shrines."

Their wives were in on it too. They were eager to form "social clubs" for the "dear, lonely American soldiers," or provide them with "parties so that they won't feel homesick." It was all so gay, but there was a desperate terror clutching their hearts.

It was surprising how many people at headquarters thought Prince Konoye was a pretty good fellow. Konoye, three times prime minister, was probably the greatest scoundrel Japan had produced since before the Meiji restoration era, yet for some reason there were several senior officers who thought he might have been a great help to the occupation. It was not until early December that his name appeared on a war-criminal list, and if the press had not criticized General MacArthur for his delay, the Prince might still be at large "helping" our occupation. Again the Supreme Commander did not order an immediate arrest but gave Konoye nearly three weeks to settle his affairs. So apprehensive were the members of the "hush-hush" commission, known as the "Strategic Bombing Survey," that the Prince

might commit suicide before being interrogated, that they captured him and took him to a ship moored in Tokyo Bay where they questioned him for nearly two days. Other departments at Supreme Headquarters took their cue from this and questioned him; but "Prince Charming," as he was known to a stable of pretty girls, who fluttered about the Prince's many houses in Tokyo, had no intention of bungling his suicide as Tojo had.

Just nineteen hours before the time set for him to enter Sugamo prison to await trial as a war criminal, the Prince dosed himself thoroughly with a poison believed to have been a powerful sleeping draft, and calmly went to bed, leaving a note stating that he was "unable to stand the humiliation of being apprehended and tried by an American court."

The engineer of the "Chinese incident," the man who had virtually placed Japan on a wartime footing as far back as May of 1938, when as prime minister he pushed through Japan's Diet the National General Mobilization Bill, took the chance MacArthur had so kindly given him.

His death was discovered by Princess Konoye, who had been estranged from him for many years. The night before, the Prince had held an informal dinner party for his closest friends who had come to be with him on his last night of freedom. Earlier in the evening, he had been reading Oscar Wilde's "De Profundis" and "The Ballad of Reading Gaol." Underlined in red were some twenty passages which reflected his depression. These included:

> "I must say to myself that I ruined myself and that nobody great or small can be ruined except by his own hand. . . ."
>
> "Terrible as was what the world did to me, what I did to myself was far more terrible still. . . ."
>
> "Morality does not help me. . . . I am one of those that are

made for exceptions, not for laws. . . . Religion does not help me. . . . Reason does not help me. . . ."

"I ceased to be lord over myself. . . . I was no longer captain of my soul and I did not know it. . . . I allowed pleasure to dominate me. . . . I ended in horrible disgrace. . . . There is only one thing for me now, absolute humility. . . ."

"The external things of life seem to me now of no importance at all. . . ."

"Of course the sinner must repent. But why? Simply because otherwise he will be unable to realize what he had done. The moment of repentance is the moment of initiation. More than that—it is the means by which one alters one's past. . . ."

"People used to say of me that I was too individualistic. I must be far more of an individualist than ever I was. I must get far more out of myself than ever I got, and ask for less of the world than ever I asked. Indeed, my ruin came not from too great individualism of life but from too little. . . ."

"The final mystery is one's self. When one has weighed the sun in the balance and measured the steps of the moon, and mapped out the seven heavens star by star, there still remains one's self. Who can calculate the orbit of his own soul. . . ."

The last person to see him alive was his son, and it was believed that he knew his father intended to commit suicide. The Prince gave him a statement written in pencil but unsigned. The hurriedly written note said:

"I have been very gravely concerned with the fact that I have committed certain errors in handling State affairs since the outbreak of the China Incident.

"I cannot but feel responsible for the outcome of the China Incident. For this reason I have tried my best to reach an understanding between the United States and Japan in the hope that such understanding alone could solve the China problem.

"It is indeed a matter of regret to be named as a war criminal by the United States with whom I have wanted and tried to work for a peaceful solution of Pacific affairs.

"I believe my real intentions are even now understood and appreciated by my friends, including not a few friends in America. World public opinion, which is at present full of over-excitement, the passions of war, misunderstandings, innocent and otherwise, malicious libel and unfounded rumors, will in time recover calmness and balance. Only then will a just verdict be given at the Court of God."

The correspondents who took down this statement as it was read to them by the Prince's son, who spoke perfect English, were surprised that his father had not commented on the occupation. Japanese newspapermen, unable to understand English, had copied from the original document and reported that the Civil Censorship Department of Supreme Headquarters had censored one sentence which read: "The winner is too boastful, and the loser too servile." On investigating, correspondents found that Prince Konoye's son had been warned by officers from Supreme Headquarters not to give this sentence out to the Allied Press. It was a typical example of the manner in which General MacArthur's Public Relations Section endeavored to stifle any criticism during those early months.

Prince Konoye's death was lamented not only by his friends but by some people in Supreme Headquarters too. Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, General MacArthur's Military Secretary (at that time) who generally echoed "his master's voice," said to the authors in January, "I was sorry to see him go. I thought he was a pretty good fellow."

There were others on the war-criminal lists who seemed pretty good fellows too. But General Thorpe, who kept his own Social Register of Undesirables, was not impressed. He hesitated to name all of them outright, but bided his time until he had the "goods" on each one. His cautiousness stemmed, too, from the

comic-opera atmosphere that surrounded the first few lists. For example, two so-called Black Dragons, on an early list, had been dead for years. Two others had never been in the secret society. The actual leader of the Black Dragon Society was not named until months after he had been exposed by the authors.

But as each list came out, one man felt the long arm of justice whipping closer to him. He lived a lonely life amid the ruins of a palace surrounded by a carp-filled moat. He was prisoner of his dreams. His personal adviser, the Marquis Kido, had already been imprisoned. He did not know when the Allies might snatch him from his throne. He was emperor of a non-existent empire. His name was Hirohito. He waited. . . . So did MacArthur.

CHAPTER FOUR

# "CHARLIE"

In Germany, Hitler and his mistress, Eva Braun, ran out before the end. In Italy, Mussolini and his mistress, Clara Petacci, were shot, and hanged ignominiously by the heels in Milan. In France, Pétain and Laval went to trial; Pétain got jail, Laval got a bullet. Quisling got his death sentence from a Norwegian court.

In Japan, Prince Konoye—like Goering in Germany—cheated the hangman's noose by taking poison. Tojo nearly cheated justice through our failure to pick him up immediately and by his own bungled suicide.

But Tojo's stooge, Hirohito, was kept on the throne by Allied agreement, or, to be more exact, by an American-made prop. The man who had permitted Japan to start the war and whose word ended it was given a chance—the first he had had in twenty years on the throne—to prove himself a king and a leader.

The myopic little man with the fluttering hands, the curled-brim fedora and the snaggle-toothed, Chaplinesque mustache was no longer the real emperor, nor did he have an empire. He took his orders from the man across the moat at Supreme Allied Headquarters, Douglas MacArthur, the new Mikado.

Once Hirohito, who claimed descent unbroken for ages eternal from Japan's feudal gods—the Oriental counterparts of the Hitler-revived Wotan and Thor—had held sway over 130 millions of people and over vast territories. At the peak of Japan's headlong rush early in the war, the new and expanding empire stretched from the Kuriles in the north over through Manchuria and down to Malaya and Singapore. It swept in other great arcs through the Ryukyus, the Marianas, the Philippines, the Carolines, the Marshalls, New Guinea, the East Indies and Guadalcanal.

The end of the war, MacArthur's freedom of thought and speech directives, the seizing of war criminals close to the throne —all these turned the pitiless spotlight of publicity on to the Imperial Institution. For the first time, the once blindly obedient millions of Japanese began to question Hirohito's authority, his descent, his supposed divinity. Under prodding by headquarters, he issued a New Year's Rescript in 1946 that made history. For in it he shattered the legend that Japan's emperors were divine. He spoke openly of this conception as "false," and he told his subjects flatly that they were not superior to other races nor were they fated to rule the world.

We suspect to this day that the Emperor's rescript was written for him at Allied Headquarters, possibly by MacArthur himself. The General would be the first to deny this, but you may be sure the rescript was not issued without approval from on high.

During the war, such an admission by the Emperor might have caused a tremendous social and moral upheaval in Japan. For the myth of Hirohito's divinity, fostered down the years by the State religion of Shintoism and nurtured by Tojo and all the other modern Shoguns who ever held the Emperor in their grip, was something that no Japanese dared question except in

his innermost thoughts. And if he did so question it, he might rip his bowels out next day in shame.

Now the myth was exploded without a ripple. If there was any great tremor running down through the social strata in Japan, it was hardly noticeable. The upper-crust Japanese—those who, with Tojo, battened on keeping the rank and file under control—told us they had known all along that Hirohito was not of divine descent. They admitted that the myth of divinity wasn't at all bad for the "people" to believe. It was a sort of opiate, this Emperor worship. It was useful in helping a Japanese forget all his other troubles.

And in his "divinity," the Emperor was shown to the people by the militarists as proof that the world needed Japan's moral guidance. He was the symbol of Japan's destiny. Under the old Japanese Constitution, he was head of the Japanese State in an absolute sense; he was sacred and inviolable, and combined in himself all rights of sovereignty. The old Constitution styled him as coming from a "line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal."

As it happened, "Charlie," as he was known to irreverent Americans, was not divine. The War Department, in one of its pamphlets, put it very quaintly. In ironic officialese, the pamphlet which was distributed to front-line troops read: "The Emperor is divine to the Japanese people. . . . His person is not sacred, however, from the viewpoint of the Armed Forces of the United States. . . ." Nor did he come from an unbroken line. His line went back only 554 years—but that is another story and another chapter.

Japan's emperors have always been mouthpieces for the militarists, chauvinists and other members of the tight little clique of rulers that we have deposed in Japan. Hirohito was no excep-

tion. He issued for Tojo the Imperial Rescript that formally declared war on the United States. He knew in advance and approved in advance the general plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor, and, indeed, for all of Japan's major expansionist moves in the Far East.

But General MacArthur, who met and talked with him three times in the first year of the occupation, looks on him as "a great liberal who was so much a prisoner of the militarists that he almost had to get their permission to go to the bathroom." He also said of the Emperor after their first encounter that "Charlie" was the sort of fellow you might expect to find at the golf club. Except that "Charlie," when he went to call upon MacArthur the first time, was togged out in striped trousers, cutaway and silk topper. He did not have the counsel of his adviser, the Marquis Kido, at that meeting. Alighting from the plum-colored archaic Daimler which had brought them from the palace, they were escorted into the embassy, where the new Mikado waited quietly in his study. As Hirohito and Kido passed through the door an officer took the tall, bespectacled Kido by one arm and ushered him into an anteroom where he was left to cool his heels. Hirohito walked on . . . for the first time alone, to meet the man in the scrambled-egg hat.

The General wore his customarily immaculate khaki trousers and shirt. But he wore no tie. The pictures of that first meeting are historic, and slightly comical. The Army had an official photographer inside the Embassy in Tokyo. Like most press photographers, he took no nonsense from his subjects and shoved them around until he thought he had the right light, the fine pose, the good background. Well, there is MacArthur, towering above the Emperor and standing informally at ease, hands on hips. Not a flicker of a smile lights his face. At his

left, straining as if he is about to pop a button somewhere, is the stiff, awkward figure of the "divine" Emperor; his suit is not quite the right fit and he has rather a frantic look upon his face.

So far, MacArthur has not made public a transcript of the conversation at his three meetings with the Emperor. We are left to guess what went on. But we know that after the first two meetings, the General did not know whether the Emperor would abdicate. But he was firm on one thing: even if he did abdicate, Hirohito would not be tried as a war criminal.

The Emperor, according to his intimate advisers, has been uneasy about his future ever since the end of the war. Naturally so. He doubtless had an uneasy conscience about his role in the war. He was the trumpet that Tojo blew; how long would he relish the role of sounding off for General MacArthur? He probably would have left the throne many months ago, if Allied policy—or, to be exact, American policy—had not kept him on as a useful link between the occupation edicts and the people—a balance wheel, if you like.

MacArthur's own psychological warfare experts had held during the war that Hirohito must go. Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, during the war head of psychological warfare in the Pacific theater, and later Military Secretary to MacArthur, wrote of Hirohito shortly before the occupation began that "as Emperor and acknowledged head of the state, Hirohito cannot sidestep war guilt. He is a part of and must be considered an instigator of the Pacific War . . . whether or not Pearl Harbor was against the Emperor's will is of little consequence . . . inescapably he is responsible. . . ." He, like the others, sang a different tune once we entered Japan. They said the whole success of the occupation might be endangered if we got rid of this

insignificant-looking little man. MacArthur thought an occupation force of 2,000,000 soldiers would be needed, instead of 200,000. They said he really was an awfully nice guy, almost a Christian gentleman; just like the other fellow, Prince Konoye.

Hirohito had plenty of advice. Prince Naruhiko Higashi-kuni, the premier at the time of the surrender, and an imperial cousin, had already put the Emperor on the spot by revealing in response to persistent questioning from Allied newspapermen that the Emperor had heard of the general outline of the plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, although he didn't know the timing of the attack or its intimate details. And, of course, the Emperor had signed the rescript declaring war.

The Prince later suggested to the Emperor that one of three occasions would be appropriate for abdication. The first would be upon the surrender and demobilization of the Japanese forces. The second would be upon completion of the new Constitution, relegating the Emperor to the role of a constitutional monarch on the British model. The third would be at a time of the Emperor's own choice.

But MacArthur made no direct move to oust Hirohito. This negative procedure ran counter to the desires of the Chinese, the Russians, the Australians and the New Zealanders, all of whom had a stake in the occupation and in the future of Japan. They frankly wanted the Emperor out and named as a war criminal, and they said so, much to the embarrassment of MacArthur's headquarters, which wanted to see what kind of an emperor he would make when freed of the trappings of State Shintoism and the thraldom of militarists like Tojo.

The other powers saw the Emperor—however shorn of his prerogatives by the new Constitution—as the keystone of a

dangerous social edifice, the center of a system of jingoistic loyalty, a rallying point for nationalists of the future.

MacArthur said: "Let's not martyrize the Emperor; in their own good time the Japanese will whittle him down to size."

Even as he spoke, early in 1946, MacArthur was doing some of the whittling himself, and there is a good deal of suspicion (with no admission from headquarters) that the new Constitution was penned in large measure by the General. Certainly it reflects his lush prose style. And he has held this document up to the rest of the world as a model.

The General felt that the Emperor's "divine" powers had been proved incapable of defending the Japanese during the war; later the Emperor abjured his divinity. Moreover, he was forced to carry out the orders of an alien commander.

And the Japanese knew that MacArthur was not committed to permanent retention of Hirohito. The broad directive from the White House, issued in September, 1945, specifically said that the Supreme Commander could change the government machinery or personnel or act directly if the Emperor or anyone else did not satisfactorily meet the requirements of General MacArthur in putting the surrender terms into effect.

"This policy," the directive added, "does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of the United States objectives."

MacArthur showed, too, that he was no respecter of the old style Imperial Japan by cutting down three of the Emperor's intimates as war-criminal suspects. One was Konoye, who committed suicide the night before he was to give himself up. Another was the Marquis Koichi Kido, possibly the most danger-

ous man in Japan's years of aggression, after men of the Tojo stripe. For Kido had the Emperor's ear and could tell him what he liked.

MacArthur also nabbed Baron Hiranuma, head of the Privy Council, another who had been very close to Hirohito and had influenced him during the war.

So nervous was Charlie in December, 1945, that he tried a little public relations effort on Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who was then visiting Japan. One night Hirohito sent a courier with a small package addressed to the Secretary of War, to the Supreme Commander's residence, where Patterson was staying. The messenger was told to wait while the package was examined. Opening it, Patterson found that it contained a gold cigarette case . . . a present from Charlie. Patterson sent it back then. The overture failed miserably.

The scythe swung even closer to Hirohito. MacArthur put on the blacklist of war criminal suspects the octogenarian Prince Morimasu Nashimoto, who had been prominently identified with the hocus-pocus of State Shintoism. He later was turned loose.

As the old-time buffers disappeared, Hirohito, obviously worried, sought to find out something of his own fate. As a new "Kido," he appointed a fifty-two-year-old peer, the Marquis Yasumasa Matsudaira, who had been Kido's chief secretary for a decade, and with abolition of the Privy Seal's office, became "Keeper of the Imperial Documents."

Matsudaira is a descendant of one of Japan's oldest and most powerful feudal families. He is the embodiment of the old order. And he married into one of its best-established branches, the Tokugawa family. Under Kido, Matsudaira was really powerful. In times of cabinet crises (and Japan's political instability is a

matter of record) he would make the rounds of political headquarters and the imperial household, ascertaining sentiment for the choice of a new premier and reporting his findings to Kido. Kido would then approach Hirohito and virtually dictate to him the choice of the next prime minister. It was Kido who picked Tojo in the fall of 1941 to succeed Prince Konoye. That was less than two months before Pearl Harbor.

Matsudaira is fairly tall, a thin, aristocratic type. And he's practical in his politics. Just when MacArthur was cracking down with a series of major directives that had the old guard shuddering, Matsudaira summoned his "smoothie" from the Foreign Office, Kasé, whose command of English was excellent and who knew his way about town. Kasé passed along the word to one of the authors that Matsudaira would like very much to entertain him and Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, head of counter-intelligence, at a geisha dinner.

The big catch, of course, was General Thorpe, if he would consent to attend. For he kept the social register of undesirable Japanese. Now, the General is nothing if not curious and eager to sniff any new development. The dinner was arranged, and it was in good taste.

But, as usual, our Japanese hosts beat about the bush with a lot of chit-chat. General Thorpe went on the assumption that the Japanese wanted to pick his brains. He was right. Matsudaira, after some superb needling by General Thorpe, came out with it. He indicated that the Emperor was worried. The directives were getting harsher. Would MacArthur grab Hirohito? How could the Emperor save himself?

General Thorpe would not bite. If he knew that MacArthur might name the Emperor on the next war-criminal list, he did not say so. He gave the retort courteously and diplomatically: the

Emperor's future was up to himself and to the Japanese people. If anyone had a guilty conscience about the past, it was his own fault.

He said bluntly that nothing could save the Imperial Institution if Japan was to be run along the same old lines. He advised the Emperor and his government to get busy and do something about the plight of the people and not to sit around all day bewailing the sternness of the occupation policies. And he recalled, for Matsudaira's benefit, that there had been monarchies in France and in Russia which had been swept away forever on the tide of a revolution that sprang from just such oppressive conditions and "do-nothing-ism" as that which existed in Japan. If such a revolution came in Japan, General Thorpe warned, no one could stop it, not even the occupation forces. Moreover, they would not try to stop it unless their own safety was in peril.

If you Japanese love your Emperor so much, General Thorpe added, why don't you get to work and make of him a genuine, worth-while being? Matsudaira wanted to know how. So we at the dinner table handed out the prescription.

We said the Emperor had never struck us as being particularly human. We said he was too aloof from his people, particularly when the people were down on their uppers. We said we thought he ought to mix more in public and to indulge frankly in some un-Japanese public relations. We recalled that George VI in England (and his father and others before him) had been a success because he was a human being, a family man, and hobnobbed with the taxpayers.

It was on the tip of our tongues to recall Owen Lattimore's remark: "One of the important reasons why the British can be democratic and have a king, too, is that . . . the English people

cut off the head of an English king." But we weren't paying for the dinner.

It may have been just a coincidence, but it was not long before Hirohito began to be the busy little bee that he is today. He scurries all over his greatly reduced kingdom on visits to the sick and the halt and the just plain folks; to the factory workers and farmers. He lets his picture be taken in most un-divine attitudes: getting his feet wet on the beach in summertime (still wearing the fedora) and reading American funny sheets to the Crown Prince, Akihito. We've also been treated to photographs of the Emperor wheeling his youngest grandchild in a baby carriage. The Japanese are great imitators, of course; the Emperor is pulling all the corny stunts that Tammany politicians used years ago to sell difficult candidates.

General MacArthur, in a note that smacked of "Look-what's-going-on-here-now!" reported: "On one occasion he removed his hat and bowed his thanks to an ex-sailor for his 'effort.' "

E for Effort.

But that really was noteworthy. The Japanese no longer prostrate themselves when the Emperor passes. They look at him with curiosity, and with a new affection. They no longer pull down the shades when the royal car or the royal train rolls by. They watch with some amazement as he bows, nods, doffs his hat, moves in the jerky fashion of characters in an old Biograph film.

He's still pretty stiff about it, and nervous, too. His voice quavers; his phrases are still stilted. But he seems to be sweating it out manfully. He'd much rather go back to the carefree days of his youth and the early years of his reign (which he called "Showa," meaning "Radiant Peace") when nothing made him

happier than to spend hours chasing over the moors and rocks after a new bit of flora to add to his collection.

He still inspires reverential shouts of "Banzai!" and some hysterical tears from peasant women. But he certainly would not win any Gallup poll for popularity. They might give him E for Effort.

One middle-class Japanese put it this way:

"We would like to keep the Emperor because we are rather fond of him, and because he's a symbol. But we feel that he used his political power unwisely when he had it, and, therefore, it should be taken from him."

The new Constitution does just that. It will be effective in May, 1947, but it already has passed through the Diet. It waited, in the fall of 1946, only for an Imperial Rescript from Hirohito signifying his consent and approval, a gesture of political harakiri. The rescript was to be followed by a period of six months before the Constitution finally took effect.

About halfway through the first year of the occupation, headquarters woke up to the fact that physically, Hirohito, although only in his mid-forties, would not last forever. A handful of correspondents, including the authors, wandered one day into a headquarters office that concerned itself with the care and upbringing of the Japanese mentally. That was the Civil Information and Education Office.

Into receptive ears the correspondents dropped casually this thought: Have you considered the future education of the Crown Prince, Akihito, to fit him for the role of a democratic, constitutional monarch of a peaceful, industrious Japan that would take its place in the family of nations in a generation or so?

The answer was a startled no. But it was accompanied with a promise that something would be done.

The answer came early in 1946. General MacArthur invited to Tokyo a commission of American educators. They were to look into the school system in Japan and to recommend changes that had largely been decided upon beforehand by MacArthur's own team of educators.

On their return, the educators reported that by offhand decisions of Hirohito that twice rocked his court, a woman would get the job of American tutor to the chubby twelve-year-old heir who had been fiercely shielded from all feminine influence, including his mother's.

Dr. George D. Stoddard, Education Commissioner of New York State, who was chairman of the education mission to Japan, said he asked the secretary of the imperial household, "A man or a woman teacher?"

The astonished secretary ran back to the Emperor. He returned and reported: "A woman's touch is desired. He wishes an American woman of good cultural background and maturity."

Maturity, the secretary explained, meant someone over fifty. Dr. Stoddard confessed amazement. The secretary cut it down to someone over forty who could stand the climate. Dr. Stoddard said later he would not mind a teacher under forty who could stand the "climate" of Japan, not meaning the four seasons. He did not look for a flapper or a schoolmarm, but someone who was prepared to be an important person in Japanese life, someone who would replace Akihito's two tutors from the lad's early days, Admiral Togo and General Nogi.

The Japanese told Dr. Stoddard that they definitely wanted young Akihito exposed to "living, fresh, American thought" and wanted him taught English once a week. The American tutor,

as a regular member of the faculty of the Tokyo Peers' School, also was to teach Akihito's four sisters.

The State Department canvassed several recommendations for the post. It announced that the important job would go to Mrs. Elizabeth Gray Vining of Philadelphia, a graduate of Bryn Mawr and author of several books for children.

Mrs. Vining is a charming and attractive woman in her middle forties. She is a Quaker. One wonders now, as she takes the young prince in hand, whether, like Anna Leonowens in Siam, Mrs. Vining will have an important influence on the history of Japan, possibly of Asia as a whole.

The Crown Prince Chulalongkorn of Siam was adept at English, his English governess found. She was bold and impulsive, as the princeling found. Anna would not kneel to the king, who was a contemporary of Queen Victoria. And she handed round translations of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The royal pupil later abolished slavery; he also abolished the practice of prostration in his presence.

Mrs. Vining may have taken along to Tokyo in her baggage a copy of something she wrote two years ago. It was an introduction to *William Penn's Advice to His Children*. When Akihito is well along with his English lessons, he may be introduced to Item 5, Part 2, of Penn's advice: "Meddle not with government."

Before she left the United States, Mrs. Vining said she didn't know what copies, if any, of the books she has written for older boys and girls had been sent to Japan. They range from the story of a thirteenth-century minstrel boy to biographies of Walter Scott and Penn, and the story of a modern high-school girl.

Mrs. Vining, say those who know her, has a gaiety of spirit that takes hold upon children, and she enjoys such authors as Chaucer, St. Francis, William Blake, George Herbert, Emily

Brontë and Gerard Manley Hopkins. Her humor and the kind of people she does not enjoy are suggested in the lines she quoted from an unknown medieval writer in her *Anthology with Comments,* published in 1942: "Fleshy janglers, flatterers and blamers, ronkers and ronners, and all manner of pinchers, cared I never that they saw this book."

Then, commenting on a nature poem by W. H. Davies, Mrs. Vining wrote of the "minor ecstasies of life": "Something seen, something heard, something felt flashes upon one with a bright freshness, and the heart, tired or sick or sad or merely indifferent, stirs and lifts in answer."

Elsewhere, writing of sorrow, she says: "Whether it be sorrow for our own loss or sorrow for the world's pain, we must learn how to shoulder the burden of it, to carry it so that it does not break our stride or sap the strength of those about us through their pity for our woe."

Mrs. Vining has sorrow for unhappy Japan, too. Her reaction to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima: "I was sick at heart."

Mrs. Vining intends to introduce Akihito to such books as Carl Sandburg's *Abraham Lincoln Grows Up* and others on the American Library Association's specially prepared list for Japanese children. She is pleased most of all by the knowledge that she will receive in her Japanese home the prince and the princesses for a recreational period as well. She had been told beforehand that Akihito was "a real boy" with a good intellect and mature for his years. She undertook to study Japanese so that she might appreciate his difficulties in learning English.

Mrs. Vining has a contract for a year's work with Akihito. When the time is up, it may be extended by mutual consent. By the summer of 1947 we may have interesting news about her progress.

By then, too, Hirohito may have made up his mind about his future. Financially, it is secure enough: the new Constitution provides for payment of the imperial family from the regular budget of the government. But all property of the imperial household other than hereditary estates shall belong to the State. Further, under a special capital levy bill passed by the Diet, with prompting from Allied Headquarters, which wrote its major provisions, all imperial properties will be subject to a heavy tax that will cost Hirohito and his relatives the equivalent of about $450,000,000.

Politically, the war-crimes trials under way in Tokyo also may make the Emperor's future more shaky. MacArthur has said the Emperor will not be tried as a war criminal, whatever the other Allies say. However, headquarters has toyed for many months with the idea of having the Emperor discredit himself either by summoning him as a witness at those trials or by having certain evidence presented that will leave him no alternative but to get out.

There was another fear inside the palace, but it was somewhat lessened by American protection of the grounds and by MacArthur's insistence that no one see the Emperor without his permission. That was the fear of assassination. So strong was it that Hirohito wore a special white kimono with a vivid purple sash when he walked about in the evening in the palace grounds. This was for identification purposes, and enabled guards to keep an eye on him. And in the palace interior (the part that the B-29 raids did not burn to the ground), there was at night a special detail of female guards always near the Emperor as a double security precaution. For the regular Imperial Guards had shown signs of disaffection after the war. Some deserted the royal service. These guardsmen were the Japanese counterpart of

Britain's Coldstream Guards. They had a tradition and many had their jobs by inheritance. Supposedly, they were immune from bad thoughts. But now the disgruntled ones chanted a mournful little song entitled "Defeated Papa."

While court circles would have you believe that Hirohito led a Christian sort of life—despite the fact that he was symbol of Shintoism—Charlie's disgruntled palace guards told a different story. Counter-Intelligence officers learned that his domestic life was anything but a happy one. This meek little man had another hobby besides photography and botany—he was a perfect little devil with the women. The imperial apartments, they found, housed two or three concubines as well as the imperial family.

Each year girls from the best Japanese families were honored with a garden party in the palace grounds. The prettiest of them were chosen as maids-in-waiting for the following year. Charlie always picked two or three maids-in-waiting. . . . Prince Konoye hotly denied this when he was asked by the authors for comment, but he, too, relaxed from the cares of state with a few fluttering beauties.

The authors suggest that the Empress could throw more light on Charlie's *affaires d'amour* . . . for did she not surprise him one day in the palace grounds, arm in arm with one of his favorites? And did not the Son of Heaven take off like a frightened fawn, with the Empress minus all regal dignity in hot pursuit?

And was it not the Empress who screamed and shrieked with anger when the Emperor's bedside bell clanged twice at night—the signal for one of his favorites rather than for her to enter the sacred bedchamber? One bell was the call for the Empress; two, three and four bells for the other girls. Charlie, like the postman, always seemed to ring at least twice.

He had other troubles too, and one of them was a rival for his unhappy throne.

There was a humble shopkeeper at Nagoya who had also been a Buddhist priest. He traced his descent from the ousted Southern Dynasty of Japan. In this unsettled period the pretender tossed his claims right at the feet of MacArthur. And when Hirohito paid a visit to Nagoya, the pretender in some unexplained manner sneaked a ride in the rear car of the royal motorcade as it wound through the streets.

CHAPTER FIVE

# "IF I WERE KING. . . ."

THE BORED young lieutenant in the translation section of Supreme Headquarters thumbed through the bulky set of documents which had arrived that morning in General MacArthur's voluminous fan mail. It was early November. Japan had been occupied for just two months, yet already the Great Man's correspondence had increased by leaps and bounds. He had seen letters of praise and threats arrive for the General, but never before now had he encountered such an important-looking document. He could hardly believe his eyes as he quickly flicked through the pages which were carefully clipped together, neatly set up on heavy parchment with impressive seals and addressed to "Marshal MacArthur, Japan's Heavenly-sent Messenger." Shaking his head and laughing to himself, he tossed the file of papers into a basket labeled "for further reference" and remarked to a fellow officer at another desk that the country was "full of screwballs."

Japan and the world might never have known the contents of those papers but for Richard Lauterbach, associate editor of *Life,* who happened to be in the office at that moment, making in-

quiries about the General's fan mail, which rivaled that of a film star.

"I have read all sorts of things in this department," said the lieutenant, tapping the papers in the basket, "but this beats them all. Here is a character who claims he is the rightful emperor of Japan."

Thus began one of the strangest tales of a strange land. That bulky set of papers contained the grievances of 554 years, the claims of a humble shopkeeper of the city of Nagoya, Hiromichi Kumazawa, nineteenth direct descendant of the Emperor Gokameyama, the last monarch of Japan's Southern Dynasty, who reigned from 1383 to 1392 and who was in turn descended from Godaigo, the ninety-sixth emperor of Japan. At a time when Hirohito's future lay in the balance, Kumazawa had decided to petition the Supreme Commander to "restore the true dynasty to the throne and eradicate an historical injustice."

Many strange and unbelievable things had happened since the occupation had begun, but never had there been a murmur about a rival to the throne. Lauterbach's nimble brain worked swiftly. Here was a first-class story, if only he could lay his hands on the papers. He knew, however, that if he showed the slightest interest, the papers would promptly assume a greater importance to the young officer and might be placed on the restricted list of documents. He made no comment, and the matter was forgotten. Several days later he returned to the office, ostensibly to make inquiries about something else. The documents still lay in the "for further reference" basket. As he was leaving he casually suggested that if they ever got around to doing a translation of the petition from the "nut who claims to be emperor," he would like to see it just for "the fun of it." It might take some time to make a translation, he was told—but would he like to borrow the

original document? He left with the file tucked under his arm.

Interpreters worked for nearly a week, translating the pile of papers, and it was apparent upon completion of the job that it might take months to dig up all the facts. The petition itself was very complete, but it was so involved that to examine it thoroughly would have required the setting up of a full commission. It was just too big a story for one man to handle by himself. Lauterbach decided to share it with Robert Cochrane of the Baltimore *Sun* and the authors, and for nearly two months this little band worked on assembling the facts. Absolute secrecy was necessary, for one word to the sixty-odd correspondents in the press club would have sent them flying in search of the claimant to the throne. We could not even inform our editors, for we knew that our cables were carefully read before they left Japan. One word back to the Public Relations Section would have meant a "handout" to everybody. We gave our campaign the name of "Plan Untenable," and we never referred to it by anything else during the two months we worked on it.

The petition itself was an amazing piece of work. There were pages tracing Hirohito's line of descent and historical background, giving proof that Charlie's ancestors had by means of intrigue, trickery and murder stolen the throne from Kumazawa's family 554 years before. There were details regarding the whereabouts of certain shrines, mausoleums and temples which contained proof. Long tables showed Kumazawa's lineage. There were copies of petitions which had been sent to the Imperial Household during the previous seventy years, and numerous pages gave a record of these petitions and the dates they had been submitted to Japanese emperors in the past. These, the pretender claimed, were in the possession of the Imperial Household Minister and the family of Prince Konoye. With all these

papers was a long plea from Kumazawa, begging the Supreme Commander to investigate his case.

The more we investigated the petition, the more clear it became that it was no idle, mischief-making claim. It sounded fantastic, but Kumazawa's claims were made stronger by the fact that the very same demands had been submitted by his ancestors. Even in the previous seventy years, at least seven petitions had been made to the Emperor, but the answer had always been restrictive measures against the family. Japanese scholars and even members of Hirohito's court acknowledged the existence of a rival line of royalty long deposed by gangsters of another era; but those who knew the story kept it to themselves. To dare suggest that Charlie was not the real emperor might have proved extremely unhealthy, and even to hint that there was a pretender was to court disaster.

Kumazawa and his family had been hounded down and forced to keep moving. Their ancestors had been thrown into jail, murdered or forced to leave the country. One of the strongest pieces of evidence was the fact that after their deaths, they had been honored with titles, but never during their lifetimes had they been elevated to court rank or recognized. While they lived they were persecuted, and when they died they were rewarded. It was typical of the crafty, upside-down methods of the Japanese.

From the death of his father seventeen years before, Kumazawa had been constantly on the move, with the Kempei-tai, Japan's Gestapo police, always at his heels. They never allowed him to remain longer than a few months in any one place for fear that he might form a movement to back his demands. Always he was threatened with jail or death if he continued to press what they called his "silly and insane claims." For seven years Kumazawa hid behind the garb of a Buddhist priest, until

he was discovered and forced to move on. He worked as a farmer for a time, and again was tracked down with the same consequences. He then became a peddler, and finally at the start of the war had opened a small general store in Nagoya. This, however, was destroyed in the first air raid on the city and he was forced to move to the suburbs and try again. His second store was burned down. He moved again and opened a third, which did survive. Here he gathered the members of his family about him, all descendants of the Southern Dynasty, and with the coming of General MacArthur and the new democratic era to Japan, he decided to seek the aid of the Supreme Commander.

From the mass of evidence submitted, it was extremely clear that the Imperial Household Ministry knew of the case, but it was doubtful if the matter had ever reached Hirohito's shell-like ears. Throughout his reign Charlie had merely been a stooge. The militarists had in him their greatest weapon for controlling Japan's milling population, and they kept him cloistered. The Emperor was "not to be worried," they maintained, and the Imperial Household Ministry prevented him from being "worried." Later we learned that he had never heard of Kumazawa or his claims.

In 1935 the Imperial Household Vice-Minister offered Kumazawa a title which was to be a purely honorary one, not elevating him to court rank. In offering this biscuit for the pretender to chew on, the Emperor's Vice-Minister made it quite clear that even with the title he would not be recognized as the last true descendant of the Southern Dynasty. The title was merely to keep his mouth shut. Kumazawa's answer, given through his chief adviser, Chozo Yoshida, whom we were later to meet, was, "It is better to remain an ordinary loyal Japanese subject than to accept a title inferior to that of Emperor." On hearing this, we

were even more convinced that there was a skeleton in Charlie's imperial closet, whether he knew it or not, and we decided to make it dance.

Checking through Japanese histories used in Tokyo's schools and colleges, we found that they skipped very neatly over the years from 1335 to 1392, the period in which Kumazawa contended the throne was stolen by the Northern Dynasty. Hirohito traced his lineage, being the one hundred and twenty-fourth emperor in line, back to this dynasty which, according to the histories, had existed from the time of the first of Japan's monarchs, the Emperor Jimmu. Modern Japanese history books carried this line: "The Upper Exalted Being [in some cases they used the term "Son of Heaven"] is descended from a line unbroken back to 600 B.C. when the great Emperor Jimmu founded Japan." Jimmu was descended (according to the histories) from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, who had commanded him to bring the eight corners of the world under one roof—a Japanese roof. The great masses of the Japanese people believed this; but students of history and university professors knew of the two dynasties, and they were therefore fully aware that the Northern Dynasty had been in existence only from the end of the thirteenth century and could not have descended from an unbroken line stretching back into the ages. To have suggested that the Japanese histories prepared and issued by the State were wrong, however, might have cost them their heads. University professors whom we challenged about this admitted as much.

The pretender, Hiromichi Kumazawa, based his claims on the somewhat cloudy period of Japanese history from 1335 to 1392 when Japan was ruled by the Northern and Southern Dynasties. He traced his lineage back to the last emperor of the Southern Dynasty, Gokameyama, a descendant of the Emperor Godaigo.

Godaigo lost his throne when the Tojos of that period forced him to flee for safety to another palace at Mount Yoshino, and from that time on there came into being the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The revolutionaries elected a new monarch to ascend Godaigo's throne at Kyoto, which was then the capital of Japan, and this monarch began to administer his duties as monarch of the country. Meanwhile Godaigo was continuing to rule from his new palace. There were, therefore, two emperors ruling Japan at the same time.

This strange situation continued for sixty years, with constant warfare being waged between the two rival monarchs. The Emperor Godaigo's Southern Dynasty had more power over the Japanese than the newly elected monarch, for Godaigo was in possession of the three sacred treasures supposedly handed down by the Sun Goddess Amaterasu to Jimmu, the first emperor, and passed down from him to his imperial descendants as a sign of their "divinity" and imperial rank. These treasures, jewels, an eight-sided bronze mirror and a sword were the cause of much blood-spilling during this period. According to Japanese history, the mirror and the jewels were used to entice the Sun Goddess out of her hiding place to make Japan and her emperors "divine." The sword was supposedly found by the Sun Goddess's brother in the tail of a dragon. As long as the Southern Dynasty held these treasures, the Northern Dynasty could not completely win over the greater masses of the people, so the war raged on.

The Southern Dynasty began to lose ground, and when this happened, the Emperor Godaigo abdicated in favor of a gentleman named Gomurakami, who was later succeeded by the Emperor Chokei, and finally by the last of the southern monarchs, the Emperor Gokameyama. This emperor was eventually forced to hand over to the emperor of the Northern Dynasty, Goko-

matsu, the three sacred treasures, which are today in Hirohito's keeping. The jewels are in the imperial palace and the sword is kept in the imperial shrine of Atsuta. The mirror is the treasure of the huge shrine of Ise, where the Emperor, princes of royal blood, cabinet ministers and ambassadors "report" important events to the gods.

The handing over of the imperial symbols to the Northern Dynasty gave them full power over the people, but it was on Gokomatsu and his ancestors' accession to the throne that Kumazawa's family based their claims throughout the ages. They charged that the accession was unlawful, that the true heirs were the descendants of the last emperor of the Southern Dynasty.

This was the history behind Kumazawa's claim. Now, knowing that Hirohito might be arrested as a war criminal, the pretender decided to take advantage of the situation and petition the Supreme Commander.

We found his chief adviser a balding, wizened little man named Yoshida, who had brought the petition to Tokyo. He was living in abject poverty in a Tokyo slum with his wife, waiting for an answer from Supreme Headquarters. His clothes were threadbare; his shoes were in shreds; his once white collar and string tie had seen better days; but he hid the filth and shabbiness beneath a well-cut black morning coat. He chain-smoked our cigarettes with a horrible hissing noise as he told us the full story and begged us to visit the pretender secretly at his home in Nagoya. We agreed, but we had great difficulty in getting him to leave town. Desperately afraid that he might be seen leaving us and questioned by some other correspondent (who might have had more cigarettes than we had) we paid him to get out of Tokyo and stay out. We saw him off on a train to Nagoya, prom-

ising him that we would arrive the day after Christmas for the pretender's first audience.

We left Tokyo in the midst of the celebrations on Christmas night with a party of correspondents who were leaving on a tour of occupation zones under the command of the Sixth Army, which had its headquarters in Kyoto. The train, we knew, passed through Nagoya during the night, and we planned to slip off as it pulled into the station. Our party was under the guidance of a colonel from the Public Relations Section, and we knew he would be greatly displeased on finding that he had "lost" us on arrival at Kyoto. But we could not help that. As the train pulled into Nagoya, we quietly got out of our sleeping berths, and leaving a note for the colonel that we had gone "to report to our ancestors at a local shrine," we stepped off the train.

We spent the last few hours of that night at an army hotel, where we were very unpopular, as we woke several officers by barging into the wrong rooms. The following morning we drove to the railway station in a borrowed jeep. We had warned the pretender through Yoshida that we would arrive at the station at 10 A.M. sharp, but we had no idea that a reception committee would be there to greet us.

In the midst of milling, chattering Japanese at the station we saw Yoshida and his wife surrounded by a dignified group of people. They all wore brown ceremonial kimonos, but only when we were introduced to them did we notice the small imperial crests of the sixteen-petaled white chrysanthemum on each sleeve of their garments. All of them were members of Kumazawa's court, and were related in some way or another to the pretender. They were taking our arrival very seriously, and we gathered that they were under the impression that we had been sent by General MacArthur personally to examine Kumazawa's claim.

Immediately we set about correcting that impression (we were sure the General would not have liked it!).

They had walked a good two miles to the station to meet us, and apparently we were supposed to provide them with transportation back. Taking as many as we could, we drove to the pretender's home, and on arriving there sent the vehicles back for those who had been left behind.

Kumazawa's home was a humble, ramshackle store. It certainly was not in keeping with his royal blood. A long line of washing hung across the front of the building. A tinsmith squatted on the pavement near his door and hammered away, paying no attention to the sudden commotion caused by our arrival. It was a great occasion for the local children playing outside, and they proceeded to clamber over our jeeps shouting at the top of their voices. Others joined hands and danced about us, doing their very best to trip us. For a moment we thought we had come to the wrong place, but then a tall, dignified, olive-skinned man, magnificent in his brown kimono which bore larger imperial crests than the others, came striding through the crowd. This was Hiromichi Kumazawa, the pretender.

He looked more Korean than Japanese. Tall and handsome, with a small, carefully trimmed mustache and wide blue eyes, he had a certain regal bearing which set him apart immediately from the crowd. He greeted us warmly and apologized for his humble dwelling. A few bundles of firewood, some vegetables and parcels of dried herbs were all his shop displayed. He bade us follow and led us through his shop to the door of his living room. Here we removed our shoes before we entered.

We were really surprised at what we saw. The tiny room had been draped in purple, with huge imperial crests emblazoned on each strip of cloth. The crests were at least three feet in width.

It was obvious that Kumazawa no longer feared the police, for the royal white chrysanthemum crest, according to Japanese law, may be carried only by the emperor or princes of royal blood. Hiromichi took his place at the head of the room, squatting down behind a small table, while we sat on cushions on either side and the members of his court sat at the end of the room. On a table before Hiromichi was a small green vase which also carried the imperial crest in gold, and to its left was a small stunted tree growing from a delicately ornamented tray. His wife, Yae, and three of their children, aged between thirteen and two, sat near the door. Their eldest son, who was twenty-two, was in the Japanese army in Manchuria and had not been heard from in over two years.

One by one we were solemnly introduced to the pretender by his chief adviser, Yoshida. The pretender then presented each of us with parchment scrolls, inscribed with poetry written in our honor, and the audience began.

We asked him to start at the beginning and tell us his whole story. His blue eyes for a moment looked straight into the distance, then he said bitterly, "My family was the first to be aggressed upon."

He knew, he told us, that his ancestors were the direct descendants of the Southern Dynasty, and as he had studied ancient documents he had become "more and more convinced" that his family were the true rulers of Japan. When his father had died seventeen years before, he had left Kumazawa a will, urging him "to exert every effort to recover my family's position."

His eyes filled with tears as he spoke of his father, and of the persecution and jailing his father had had to endure during his lifetime. "Until my father's dying wish is carried out," he said, "I cannot inter his ashes or give him the name of a god."

He showed us a small, beautifully made bronze box about the size of a tea cup. "This," he said, "is all that remains of my father's sacred ashes. The original urn was destroyed in the bombing, and the sacred ashes were scattered in the destruction. I was able to save only a very small amount, but I cannot inter the ashes until my family as been elevated to its rightful position."

Unlike the voice of an ordinary Japanese, who suppresses all feeling, Kumazawa's voice was charged with emotion as he spoke. Occasionally it would crack with anger when he told of the unjust treatment he and his people had received from the various emperors through the centuries. He had the whole story at the tip of his tongue and was prepared to substantiate every detail with proof.

"The Emperor Meiji, who ruled from 1867 to 1912," he told us, "knew of the matter. He ordered a full investigation to be made in a just and righteous manner. He gave the work of forming a commission to his minister, but after a few weeks his minister informed him that if a full investigation was made it would bring untold results to his descendants. The investigation never took place.

"The Emperor Meiji did, however, order that all deceased members of the Southern Dynasty be elevated to court rank, but living members could not during their lifetimes receive titles or rank which would put them on a level with members of the imperial court," the pretender related.

"The present imperial family," he declared, "aggressed not only on my rights but on the rights of the world. How can there be democracy in Japan or good will to other nations as long as an illegal emperor sits on the throne?

"I consider Hirohito to be Japan's Number One war criminal,

but if I were emperor I would leave the disposal of that matter to General MacArthur, who is God's messenger to Japan," he said, the mere thought of Hirohito bringing a fresh determination into his face.

He told us how the police had kept him and his family always on the move. He had worked all over Japan in various jobs—he mentioned having been a farmer, a peddler, a Buddhist priest and a storekeeper. Even with the American troops occupying the country he was still watched, and he never knew just when he would be forced to leave Nagoya for some other place. His family had only recently been warned that they would be arrested if seen wearing the imperial crest. Therefore, he said, the crest was worn only on ceremonial occasions.

"Why," he said, "should we remove the royal crest when it is rightfully ours?"

There was complete silence among his listeners as he talked, and the members of his court nodded their heads in agreement with his every word.

"I am sure," he continued thoughtfully, "that a new Japan would arise with the restoration of the proper imperial family. The Japanese people are tired, and they have been deceived by Hirohito and his government. I was against the war from the beginning. I knew Japan must lose. So did many of the Japanese people. The United States helped set up the Emperor Meiji, and Japan should not have gone to war with the United States or any other country."

His years as a Buddhist priest had apparently affected him a great deal, for he reviewed at length the suppression of the various religious bodies throughout the country during the war. He was not against the Shinto religion, but he wanted complete religious freedom for the Japanese people.

"If I were emperor," he declared, "there would be complete freedom of religion. There cannot be a true democracy in this country unless the people are free to practice whatever religion they choose."

He had, he told us, received "spiritual training" and was prepared in every way to assume the "responsibilities of an emperor." First, however, our seller of firewood and herbs had to be made emperor. . . .

The two dynasties, we were told, had their separate shrines, and during the years many of Hirohito's court had traveled incognito to worship at the southern shrines. They did this, according to Kumazawa, because they were afraid that one day the "gods might take vengeance against them" for allowing the suppression of the rightful dynasty to continue.

Hirohito, he considered, was rapidly losing his power over the people. The present government would not succeed, because of the apathy which existed throughout Japan. This was his belief. Regarding Japan's future form of government, he said:

"If I were emperor, there would be a truly democratic government. There could be nothing wrong with its policies if they were based on the will of the people, and by the people I do not mean the upper classes. I mean the great masses who have been misguided through the years. Japan could be a free and beautiful country. It would prove itself to the world, and other countries would welcome it into their ranks."

The pretender still had more to tell us. The Japanese, it appeared, had never been told the story of the Southern Dynasty. Once a Japanese newspaper had investigated the matter and promised publication of the story, but the police had intervened and the story had never appeared. In fact, the pretender begged us to keep his whereabouts a secret and even asked us for mili-

tary protection in case the police took action against him when our stories appeared.

To us there was unquestionably something very impressive and wholly sincere about this fifty-six-year-old claimant to the throne, and we promised to give his case publicity. We prepared to leave the store, refusing some strange steaming balls of brown beans which his wife attempted to serve us. They had been prepared in our honor, but they did look repulsive, and we were glad to have an excuse to leave immediately.

Though the claim of Hiromichi Kumazawa and his family and followers seemed valid enough, we knew there was little hope of his realizing his dream. We could not greatly help him. The most we could do was to air the matter in the Japanese press. This would at least bring it to light for the first time in history.

We returned to Tokyo and filed our stories. When we were sure our papers had all the details, we returned the original documents to headquarters and gave the full story to the army newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*. Then we waited for the storm to break.

The following morning it did. The *Stars and Stripes* ran the full account, and at the same time it appeared in Great Britain and the United States. Had a bomb been dropped on headquarters, a greater commotion could not have been created. Instead of reading about the pretender's petition in a confidential memorandum, senior officers found out about it in their morning paper. How had the petition gotten out? Who had given the papers out? Where was it, anyway? They were baffled.

Then we gave the story to the Japanese press. This caused an even greater sensation. The Japanese were incredulous. Some Japanese papers, particularly the Foreign Office propaganda sheet, the *Nippon Times*, tried hard to belittle it. Court circles began to wonder what would happen, for many in the court

knew that Kumazawa's case was real. This, the court circles decided, had been arranged by Supreme Headquarters. Hirohito would first be arrested as a war criminal, then the pretender would be given the throne. These people viewed the whole matter with great uneasiness, for they did not know what would happen to them if Kumazawa's claim was recognized. The most anxious of them all was Charlie.

Still quaking lest he be arrested, Hirohito read of his rival in the *Stars and Stripes*. It was the worst news he had had in a long time. He had lost his empire, and now he might lose his throne. Only a few days before, in a New Year's message, drafted by headquarters, he had told his people that he was not "divine." Now they were being told he might not even be their rightful emperor! Charlie was indeed a very worried man. Would General MacArthur order a complete investigation? Charlie, according to court circles, had heard of Kumazawa for the first time that morning. He had read about it in the *Stars and Stripes,* like everybody else, and he did not know what to do about it. He waited, as he had always waited, for Supreme Headquarters to act. He did not know that the whole thing was also a great surprise to them too!

Meanwhile in Nagoya, Japanese police had called at the pretender's home and had questioned him about our visit. Kumazawa and his wife were later escorted to a police station and grilled for several hours. They quite calmly referred their questioners to Supreme Headquarters. This was promptly relayed back to police headquarters in Tokyo, and the matter was submitted to the Foreign Office, which became convinced that Supreme Headquarters was backing the pretender. General Thorpe, head of the Counter-Intelligence Section, on hearing that Kumazawa and his wife had been questioned, told the For-

eign Office that he would be "greatly displeased if anything happens to the pretender or his family."

Quite aside from the sensation the news was causing in headquarters and among the Japanese, it was raising a minor revolution among the other correspondents. Unable to comply with editors' frantic cables for stories about the pretender because we refused to give any details other than those which had appeared in print, they chased all over Tokyo, looking for possible "pretenders." One correspondent actually found a fellow who claimed to be king of Korea. We, determined to milk the story dry first, withheld Kumazawa's address from everybody. Eventually we were called "the bad boys of headquarters" and "small Zaibatsu" because of our attitude. Supreme Headquarters decided to put all papers concerning the case on the restricted list to all correspondents except us. This was the last straw—our fellow correspondents could have cheerfully killed us.

Hirohito's advisers were busy. They believed that the petition had been examined by Supreme Headquarters and a commission might be set up to examine the claim. They advised Hirohito to set up a royal commission without waiting for the humiliation of being ordered. Charlie formally announced that Kumazawa's claim would be examined. For the first time in five centuries the case was to be investigated. Our efforts were justified.

We were even more elated when we were officially told by a certain authority at Supreme Headquarters that the claim had been examined and "we find it valid, but it is up to the Japanese themselves." At least we had brought to light the strange story of the humble-born seller of herbs and firewood, and only time would write the finish. Within a year he was up for trial on charges of lese majesty. He was acquitted, but his claims were not denied.

CHAPTER SIX

# THE WAY OF THE GODS

GERMANY WENT TO WAR with Naziism as its creed. Italy had Fascism. Japan had State Shintoism. It was Hitler's master-race theory—but centuries older, and wrapped in a kimono. It was a super-nationalistic doctrine which held that the eight corners of the world one day must come under one roof—a Japanese roof, to be sure—with the Emperor as *pater familias* sitting at the head of the table.

There was nothing new about Shintoism, a peculiar religion compounded of pagan mythology and oriental hocus-pocus that surrounded the imperial line as it descended from Jimmu, the first emperor, who took the throne in 660 B.C. In its pure, original state, Shinto was nature worship, and it was as old as Japan. In its impure, modern state, Shinto had been manufactured by the militarists and ultra-nationalists into a State-supported and State-controlled "religion." It had as its basis the belief that Japan, its emperors and its people were of divine origin, of divine descent; that Japan was simply an earthly extension of Heaven; that all other dynasties and rules on the globe were man-made and mortal; that Japan one day was fated to rule the

world. It required unswerving loyalty and obedience to the State.

For seventy-five years, while Japan became a modern power, Shintoism had been foisted on the people. It had a prior, compulsory lien on their minds and pocketbooks. They were taxed for its support. They had to learn all about it in the school. It was tightly woven into their Constitution and public ritual. Its priesthood was strictly appointed and controlled by the government.

General MacArthur outlawed it with a stroke of the pen on December 15, 1945. But it did not die at his directive. It still enslaves the minds of seventy million Japanese. It still directs their mental postures. It will wither only gradually, and it may be generations before sectarian Shinto as a genuine form of worship—distinct from State Shinto—stands on its own to compete with Buddhism and Christianity for the adherence of the Japanese.

State Shinto will pass away only if the Allied occupation authorities cut its roots among the peasantry in the rural areas, and if they see to it that Hirohito or any other emperor of the future does not get away with the stunt that Hirohito pulled when he promulgated the new Constitution in November, 1946. For, although the new Constitution legally reduced the Emperor to a constitutional monarch and made the Diet supreme, Hirohito and the Japanese were able to invest the promulgation with all of the Shinto trappings of emperor worship.

For example, the prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, and various State officials clustered round Hirohito as, in a Shinto ceremony, he gave formal notice of the new Constitution to the souls of his imperial ancestors at three sanctuaries within the palace grounds. (MacArthur's directive outlawing State Shinto ex-

pressly forbade any State or official participation in such rites, and said any forms of Shinto worship would have to be done privately by the Emperor as a private citizen.)

Further, the Japanese government decided that this, Japan's second constitution, would be promulgated on the birthday of the late Emperor Meiji, Hirohito's grandfather, under whom the Constitution of 1889—into which Shinto was firmly bedded—was adopted. Meiji, like Hirohito, was worshiped by the Japanese; like Hirohito, he, too, was a prisoner of the military.

Score one for the Japanese against the MacArthur directive.

Score two was chalked up in the provinces, where Shinto agents persisted—nearly a year after the MacArthur directive—in tapping the gullible citizenry for contributions to maintenance of Shinto shrines and festivals. That was typical of what was happening in Japan. On paper, in Tokyo, the directives and public statements (in wartime they were communiqués) were resounding, sweeping, far-reaching, cataclysmic. Far off in the villages and hamlets, far from the eyes of MacArthur and his military policemen, the directives often had the impact of a pebble tossed lightly into a vast ocean. Sometimes they seemed like a brick, dropped from a B-29 at 40,000 feet into the great, swirling Pacific.

This is the sort of history Japanese schoolchildren had to learn about the origins of their country:

Ages ago, the first ancestral deity of the imperial family gave birth to the Nippon islands. The first sentences of the "Kojiki" (Antiquities) say: "In the beginning of Heaven and Earth there first appeared in the heavens Ame-no-Minaka-Nushi-no-Kami

[central god of heaven] by himself, next Takami-Musubi-no-Kami and then Kami-Musubi-no-Kami. These three gods were self-created beings and their bodies were invisible."

The next stage of creation is given in the "Nihonshoki" (Nippon Annals), which says: "The heavens were first created and the earth next, and then gods came into being: that is, in the beginning the earth was floating like a fish on the water, then one thing was born in the midst of heaven and earth, likened unto a bud of the reed, and it soon took form of a god, and the name of the god was Kuni-no-Tokotachi-no-Mikoto."

Both the Antiquities and the Annals tell of seven generations of heavenly ancestors of Hirohito. The last were parent gods named Izanagi-no-Mikoto, the male, and Izanami-no-Mikoto, the female.

The god of heavens ordered these two to make the floating land harden and take shape. He handed to them a spear. Standing on the floating bridge of heaven, Izanagi and Izanami dipped the spear into the primeval sea.

Then and there the drippings from the spear formed an island. The two parent gods descended to it, and there, in bliss, were united. Their union created the home islands of Japan, and they also gave birth to many gods. Izanami, the female, died giving birth to the god of fire. But Izanagi (the first Superman, we suppose) gave birth from his left eye to Amaterasu-Omikami, the Sun Goddess and highest ruler of the visible heavens and earth.

Amaterasu, the legend continues, sent to earth her grandson, Ninigi-no-Mikoto. Specifically, she sent him to Japan with the three sacred treasures—the mirror, the jeweled necklace and the sword—and told him to rule and to hand down the treasures to succeeding rulers as the symbols of the Heavenly Throne.

(Hirohito has the originals, or reasonable facsimiles thereof.)

With a retinue of five lesser gods, Ninigi swooped down to a hill in Hyuga province, on the southern main island of Kyushu. Ninigi in time became a great-grandfather. His great-grandson was none other than Kamu-Yamato-Iwarehiko-no-Mikoto, more familiarly known as Jimmu Tenno, or Emperor Jimmu.

Jimmu was founder and first emperor of the Japanese empire. He reigned from 660 B.C. to 581 B.C. Hirohito claims to be 124th in direct line of descent from Jimmu. (Hiromichi Kumazawa, the Japanese gentleman and pretender to the throne discussed in the last chapter, says otherwise.)

The Constitution of the Meiji Era, adopted in 1889, held that the line of emperors had been "unbroken for ages eternal" and that the Emperor was "sacred and inviolable." The Constitution of the MacArthur Era, adopted in 1946, discreetly eliminates this eyewash, and says only that the Emperor "shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people."

The old Constitution was the work of Prince Ito, who had been dispatched to Europe in the 1880's to study the governments of Western nations. He put in most of his time studying Bismarck's Germany, and when he returned to Japan the charter of 1889, with its marked Prussianism, was the result. Ito headed the first Japanese cabinet.

He wrote of the Constitution that "the Emperor is heaven-descended, divine and sacred. He is pre-eminent above his subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. He shall not be a topic of derogatory comment or one of discussion."

Ito also held that the Constitution was a gracious gift from Emperor Meiji (who was still in his youth and a virtual prisoner

of the conservative military of the time). There was a strange echo of this in 1946: Prince Iyemasa Tokugawa, president of the outward-bound House of Peers, said of Hirohito that "his august majesty has been graciously pleased to propose revision of the Constitution."

The old Constitution enshrined the Shinto teachings, which had been eclipsed by Buddhism (an importation from Korea, A.D. 500) and by Confucianism (also imported from the continent of Asia). Only the Emperor could amend the Constitution. Freedom of worship was granted, provided it did not conflict with the duties of Japanese as the Emperor's subjects.

Japan's feudal loyalties were directly transferred to the Emperor. As under the oppressive Shoguns and the warrior Samurai, there was to be unquestioning obedience to authority. And Meiji, like Jimmu, had reported his accession to the Sun Goddess at the Grand Shrine of Ise. Jimmu had declared his mission to be to bring all "eight corners of the earth under one roof." His words, expressive of this idea, "Hakko Ichiu," were echoed by all later emperors; in 1931 they became a political slogan.

Prince Ito and the other conservative Japanese of Victorian days were the real rulers. They worked on the Emperor through two groups of advisers—the council of elder statesmen known as the "Genro," and the Privy Council of 26, which became an instrument of absolutism.

The Privy Council named the prime ministers, and with the Genro's aid wrote the Imperial Rescripts uttered by the Emperor as his own.

Ito spoke of the Emperor as "the Most Exalted Personage" who held in his hands "all the ramifying threads of the political life of the country." The Emperor was given supreme command

of the army and navy; he could declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, convoke and dismiss the Diet, initiate amendments to the Constitution, issue imperial ordinances with the effect of law. The State gave the Emperor tremendous wealth in land and in stocks, bonds, treasures and palaces. (Hirohito, until the occupation, had an income of about $100,000,000 a year.)

The nationalists of Ito's time found in the old "pure" Shinto a purely Japanese religion which could be utilized to protect and enhance native institutions against the weakening forces of democracy. The military extremists found that Shinto would justify the place in the sun that they sought. The gods were formally ranked on Japan's side in the struggle for world power.

It was to become a test of loyalty and of patriotism to accept without question the divine origin of the Emperor and of the Japanese people, and their mission in life. Obedience to an authoritarian state was exalted; the individual was subordinated, the State glorified.

Ito wanted to keep Church and State separate. So, instead of the revived Shinto being called a religion it was called a cult, and all Japanese, regardless of whether they were Christians, Buddhists or Confucians, had to belong.

As long ago as 1871 the priesthood of the Shinto shrines was brought under national, prefectural and local control for appointment, support, discipline and dismissal. Shrines were graded in pyramidal fashion, surmounted by the Grand Shrine at Ise. In 1875 the national government drew up new rituals and ceremonies for use at official shrines. These provided minute directions, including texts of prayers, and could not be varied without special permission.

In 1899, the teaching of religion in schools, public or private, was banned. State Shinto was declared not to be a religion; its

instruction was made compulsory. Shinto traditions were embodied in the school curricula. History, geography, ethics—all were given the Shinto twist. Emperor worship was taught from infancy: military pictures of the descendant of the Sun Goddess were placed in all schools and the daily routine included obeisance to the pictures. (As a concession to the occupation powers, the picture of Hirohito in military regalia was withdrawn and a new one substituted, showing "Charlie" in a snappy civilian suit.) If a schoolhouse burned, heroic efforts had to be made to save the Emperor's picture.

Hitler's hysterical torchlight parades, his pagan processions to the Nazi shrines at Nuremberg and Munich, had their counterpart in Shintoism. Shinto had its shrines, too, such as the Grand Shrine at Ise, dedicated to Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, and the shrine at Yasukuni, on a hill in Tokyo, where the spirits of Japan's warriors and her modern war dead were enshrined.

The great shrines were the centers of public and state affairs. They were foci of nationalism. Into Ise Bay, Admiral Togo steamed with his victorious fleet after it had defeated the Russians; there he "reported" the victory to Amaterasu. To Ise also went Hirohito to report his accession to the throne, to echo Jimmu's cry, "Hakko Ichiu." To Ise went Japan's premiers and cabinet officers, all to report great events. At Ise, too, Amaterasu's spirit learned that Japan had surrendered.

Such shrines were elaborate affairs. They were rebuilt about every twenty years at public expense, and the removed structures were broken into splinters and sold as talismans to a gullible public. Schoolchildren were dragooned into annual pilgrimages to the great shrines, giving a fillip to their inculcation with Japan's divine mission.

The lesser shrines (there were 110,000 Shinto shrines in all, of

which about 250 were of the grand variety) were centers of nature worship, ancestor worship, phallicism and assorted witchery. Some shrines had replicas of the sacred mirror, treasure and sword. Others sold charms and amulets to the faithful. Women who wanted easy childbirth went off to one shrine in the mountains where they purchased bits of gravel that had been rubbed by the priests against a mystic "mother stone" in some inaccessible recess. In shape, the mother stone resembled the abdomen of a pregnant woman. Other shrines dispensed bits of paper that were supposed to purge intestinal parasites.

Every year Japanese functionaries visited households throughout the land and put the bite on the "faithful" for a few yen for Shintoism. Woe betide the housewife—even a Christian—who did not make a contribution. In return she received a bit of "divine flax" wrapped in a twist of paper. Can you imagine an Irishman refusing a bit of shamrock on St. Patrick's Day? Can you imagine an Englishman shunning a bet on the Derby? Can you imagine the minor civil servant in New York refusing to shell out for a Tammany block party?

The faithful also made contributions at the shrines. These averaged $800,000 a year. The government budget put in another $2,000,000 or thereabouts of taxpayers' money. The priests were on the public payroll. And big shrines such as Ise made more money from renting out forests and other lands owned by the shrines.

For forty-five years, until MacArthur came, there was a Bureau of Shrines inside the Home Ministry. Shintoism was part and parcel of the national government. It was a firm springboard for aggressive war.

Brigadier General Kenneth R. Dyke, whose section at Allied Headquarters prepared the directive outlawing State Shinto,

summed it up neatly. "Shintoism," he said, "was one of the most successful public relations and promotion jobs I have ever been privileged to review." (In peacetime, Dyke had been a successful advertising and promotion man in soap and radio.)

In December, 1945—to borrow a line from an irreverent song popular among Americans in Tokyo—"the Shinto hit the fan." Under Dyke's supervision and MacArthur's imprimatur, a young naval lieutenant from Ohio, William K. Bunce, got out a sharp directive. It ordered the Japanese government to end its sponsorship and financial support of State Shinto. It required removal of all forms of Shinto from public schools. It forbade any State or official participation in Shinto rites. It freed all Japanese from any compulsion to believe in or profess Shinto.

It preserved, however, all forms of non-State Shinto, or sectarian Shinto, that contained no militaristic or nationalistic elements, on an equal legal basis with all other forms of religion. And it permitted any Shinto shrines that had a real religious following to exist on voluntary contributions, if they could.

The directive also required the censoring and rewriting of all school texts that embodied Shinto doctrine. So cleverly had the Japanese woven Shinto into history, geography, ethics and morals courses that these had to be suspended for several months while completely new texts were prepared.

The directive further ordered the removal of the "god shelves" or kamidana from all public offices, institutions, schools and factories.

It still left the Emperor as the spiritual head of Japan, a possible rallying point for chauvinistic Shintoists of the future. But MacArthur, in ordering freedom of speech and the press, had made it possible for the people to discuss the Imperial Institution openly. And Lieutenant Bunce thought that public discussion of

the alleged divinity of the Emperor, bringing that belief into the light of day, would do most to rob it of its dangers. Time will tell.

Lieutenant Bunce conceded that if the Japanese wanted to continue believing that the Emperor was superior to other rulers, nothing could be done about it. He pointed out that peoples of other nations thought similarly of their leaders and rulers. He expressed the hope, however, that the elimination of government control of Shintoism would prompt the Japanese people to "take a saner view of the whole picture." And General Dyke thought it was "reasonable to assume that with the withdrawal of government support, Shinto will wither and go."

Soon after issuance of the directive, the chief Shinto shrine functionary, Prince Nashimoto, was tossed into Sugamo prison by MacArthur as a war-criminal suspect. The prince, a former field marshal, had urged military reservists, just two days before the end of the war, to fight on, and he said that sooner or later the terrible enemy would be destroyed. Nashimoto's apprehension alarmed Hirohito and the palace guard. For the prince was within the royal circle.

Politicians came whining to headquarters. They said such a distinguished old gentleman should not be placed in cold, dank Sugamo prison. Brigadier General Elliot R. Thorpe, MacArthur's counter-intelligence chief, recalled that Allied prisoners of war hadn't had much heat while in Japan, and he said it was too bad that the Japanese, when they built Sugamo, had not thought of installing an efficient heating system in it.

Later, Nashimoto was removed to private custody; finally, he was released without explanation.

The outlawing of State Shintoism left Japan with a waning sectarian Shinto that claimed 17,000,000 adherents; a thriving Buddhism that claimed 45,000,000; and Christianity. The latter

faith included 100,000 Roman Catholics, a roughly equal number of Protestants, distributed among the Presbyterian, Episcopalian and Congregational sects; and about 90,000 others who were Baptists, Quakers or members of other groups. Of Confucians there was no accurate count.

Freedom of religion, as ordered by MacArthur and guaranteed in the new Constitution, left the way open for a strengthening of Christianity. In the first year of occupation, about 160 missionaries were cleared for re-entry to Japan. They came back to find much of their church property destroyed by air raids, and their remaining churches and schools desecrated by the Japanese during the war. MacArthur ordered the government to restore Christian teachings and property to such despoiled institutions as St. Paul's College, Tokyo.

The old guard among the Japanese hoped that Christians would establish a united Christian church in Japan. That shows how little they understood the Catholics, for one thing, or the ambitions of other groups, for another.

It had long been accepted in Japan that the leader of non-Catholic Christians was Toyohiko Kagawa, a lay preacher, a misty-eyed mystic and darling of the missionary set who had strong beliefs, many of them anti-democratic and certainly anti-American. His writings and teachings were neatly exposed one day by Barnard Rubin, columnist in the Army newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*. For this and other pains he took as a good reporter, Mr. Rubin was later forced to quit the staff. MacArthur's headquarters labeled him a Communist, and that meant he had to go.

Japan has had Christianity since the visit of St. Francis Xavier in 1549. The good saint probably shuddered when the atomic bomb hit Nagasaki. For Nagasaki had been a center of Catholicism in Japan; the Japanese said the bomb killed some 20,000 Catholics there and destroyed many churches.

CHAPTER SEVEN

# ATOMIC PEACE

On a T-shaped bridge in the center of Hiroshima there is a symbol of what will happen to the last man in the last terrifying moment of the world. Burned into the asphalt, as though carefully etched by a master artist, are the footprints of a man. Behind them are the four hoofmarks of a donkey. Man and beast started across the bridge at fourteen minutes past eight on the morning of August 6, 1945. They reached the center one minute later. They never reached the other side. Their bodies, like those of thousands, were never found.

To a world, tired and ill, but throbbing with the expectancy of victory, President Truman announced from the White House: "We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history—and won."

In the atomic bomb plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, a general mopped his brow and telephoned his wife. There was a strange excitement and relief in his voice. "I suppose you've read the morning papers," he said. "Well, now you know. It was a new type of bomb—an atomic bomb. Thank God it worked!"

In Hiroshima, a half-naked woman, burned about the face

and body, one arm gone, crawled out from the wreckage of her burning house and gave birth to a child. She died shortly afterward. No one knows if the baby survived.

Three days later, at precisely 11:02 on the morning of August 9, a second bomb fell—this time on the city of Nagasaki. The atomic bomb had come of age; but in the milli-moment of destruction, when the bombs burst over Japan, the remnant of man's moral argument against the bombing of cities disappeared completely. The atomic armament race began, and the end of mankind and the world hove into sight.

It was inevitable that science would discover the secret of atomic energy, but 40 per cent of the nuclear physicists, who had worked on the bomb, had been against the use of it on a city. The other 60 per cent, had they known then the awful carnage it was to cause, might, too, have been against its use. From a purely scientific standpoint, the development of atomic energy had been a triumph for the scientists, but, unwittingly or not, they had presented mankind a hara-kiri knife on a velvet cushion.

To correspondents and observers, who visited the two cities shortly after our forces landed in Japan, two questions presented themselves: (1) Should the bomb have been dropped? (2) Is this the way the world will end?

The authors can safely say at least 90 per cent of the correspondents felt it *should not* have been dropped, and everybody who visited the two places and saw the unimaginable destruction by the atomic bomb, knew a perfect blueprint for the plan of mankind's destruction had been completed.

Much has been written about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the authors do not intend to burden the reader with a lengthy account here, but what happened must be repeated time and

time again until the public realizes the terrors the atomic bomb holds in store for them and the world.[1]

We do not know today just how many people were killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We can only guess.

The plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki was not as efficient as the uranium bomb used on Hiroshima. One-third of Nagasaki's twelve square miles was wiped off the map, while nearly three-quarters of Hiroshima's seven square miles was pulverized and laid waste.

The two cities had between them a population of approximately 650,000 before the bombing, but two pumpkin-shaped bombs—dimensions unknown—killed, at the very least, 200,000. No one can say with certainty exactly how many were slaughtered; the number can only be estimated. Thousands seem to have disappeared into thin air under the terrific heat released at the instant of explosion. Thousands more were burned alive in the huge crematories that the two cities suddenly became, and their bodies never were found. In July, 1946, charred, shriveled skeletons were still being found beneath the ruins. Today, bulldozers, clearing the piled debris, turned up blackened bones, teeth and skulls.

The Japanese estimated that in Hiroshima alone 100,000 were killed, with another 100,000 injured, and these figures are accepted by many people as being approximately correct. Figures released by Supreme Headquarters early in 1946 for Hiroshima are today considered to be out of date. They were: 78,150, killed; 13,983, missing; 9,428, seriously injured; 27,997, slightly injured—making a total of 129,458, killed, injured and missing.

[1] The authors feel the most detailed and complete document on the subject is John Hersey's *Hiroshima*. It should be printed in every known language and given free to the people of every country.

No official figures have been issued for Nagasaki. The most recent estimate, admittedly a Japanese estimate, for both cities, gave a total of 320,000 killed, missing and injured. Indeed, this may well be, but it is doubtful if final figures will ever be obtained.

The horror of Nagasaki and Hiroshima to those who visited the bombed cities is unforgettable. If you put a finger on a tiny fly and press it hard . . . that is what happened to the unfortunates within a 2,000-foot radius of a point directly beneath the explosion. Everything was laid flat. Nothing in that zone survived, for every building or living being was hit by a force equivalent to six tons per square foot. Farther from the immediate death zone, at a point 6,500 feet from the center, every living thing was either killed or terribly injured by the blast.

The only buildings left standing were those which had been specially reinforced to withstand earthquake. The other structures, however, were not tinderbox affairs, as calming stories indicated, but were approximately of the same average construction as frame buildings in the United States or Europe. Other cities are, therefore, no less vulnerable to atomic bombs than were Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

First, came the unbelievable heat, which seared everything with a terrible blow-torch effect. People directly beneath were instantly vaporized. Buildings caught fire. Girders and metal work twisted and collapsed. Farther away, clothes suddenly burst into flames. People's flesh became charred and black and peeled off in long, crackling strips. Water evaporated, and fish were instantly grilled. Wheat in near-by fields burned furiously, while at a distance of two miles it suddenly ripened. Trees a mile away began to smolder. The shadow of a soldier, working on a tank in Nagasaki, was stenciled neatly onto its side. Pat-

terns on women's kimonos, especially if of a light color, were etched onto their bodies. Men's suspenders, belts and buttons were tattooed onto their wearers. Every person within one mile of the flash at the explosion point received burns of varying degrees—and all this happened in one instant.

The blast was the most deadly. Screaming people, already burnt beyond recognition, were hurled through the air at fantastic speeds. Their bodies were squeezed and mashed to a pulp. In some cases, their insides ripped open as the natural gases of their bodies burst out under the awful pressure. Exceeding by far the strength of a hurricane, the blast tossed burning buildings into the air. It lifted trees and telephone poles like match sticks. It sent heavy vehicles high into the air, like huge projectiles. It lifted heavy machinery out of concrete beds. It twisted girders. It pushed over heavy concrete walls. It tore and twisted and wrecked, and then it was gone. The dead lay everywhere in its wake. Weeks later, when the bodies were collected, disintegration had been so complete they had become almost liquid. It seemed as if they had been sprayed, inch by inch, with a huge flame-thrower and then pounded from head to toe with mammoth sledge hammers.

The only lucky ones in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were those killed instantly. The injured really suffered. Some had been blinded by the flash. Many had their arms and legs violently wrenched off. Others had their faces horribly burnt to unrecognizable pulpy masks. Still others had become quite insane.

Many were crushed to death or burned alive in their flaming houses. There were no rescue parties—they had been wiped out along with the police force and fire brigades. People just lay where they had fallen or had been hurled. Many were pinned

beneath wreckage and could not move . . . these waited for the flames to put an end to their misery.

Survivors had no time to stop to help the injured, who begged and pleaded for help as they lay beneath the ruins. Everyone who could walk made for the open country—anywhere to get away. Dazed, hysterical women, clutching their babies, some of whom were dead, streamed out of the burning cities. To get to the roads it was necessary to crawl over the ruins, for the tiny streets had been blocked by the piles of masonry and debris. Some were cut off, unable to reach the avenues of escape. These perished in the flames. Children ran wild in the ruins. Some of the less burdened survivors brought many out; but many children, half-crazed with fear, were lost in the inferno and roasted alive.

Then there were the living dead, those who apparently had not been injured but died a few hours or days or even months later. These were the people who had been drenched with the infinitesimal atomic particles and gamma rays, which flashed out with the speed of light when the bombs exploded. These fragments and radiations—actually a form of terrible heat, a type of super X-ray—penetrated deep into their bodies, attacking the blood cells and the tissues of brain, heart and liver. The white blood corpuscles, the disease-killing agents of the blood, gradually died, and the person's blood count fell. The usual symptoms were that the victim suddenly felt exhausted and tired, the hair fell out, the teeth became loose. The skin became flecked with tiny red spots, as blood oozed beneath from broken blood vessels. With this acute form of anemia, a cut or insect bite invariably meant death, for it was impossible to stop the flow of blood. In the majority of cases, the victim felt no pain

and lay in bed, possibly for weeks or months, until death finally came.

There was no escape from the insidious rays within the immediate vicinity of the explosion. Even people who were safe—or thought they were safe—behind several feet of concrete, were saturated by them. Indeed, there would have been greater casualties from radiation but for the fact the bombs were set to explode at heights calculated to give the greatest blast effect while minimizing the radio-active effect. Had the bombs exploded lower, the death-dealing rays would have covered a much larger area. As it was, at least 25 per cent of the known casualties came from radiation. Many people who left the cities directly after the explosions did not return, and they died months later in other parts of Japan from radiation causes. It is possible these deaths have not been included in any official set of figures for either of the cities.

The undernourished condition of the victims, the shortage of doctors and medical supplies were perhaps the greatest factors in increasing the awful death roll from radiation causes. Many people, not so seriously injured by the rays, survived and are living in Hiroshima and Nagasaki today, but in January, 1946, there were still people in hospitals throughout Japan waiting to die, their blood counts steadily dropping.

Why did we, with the Japanese already reeling against the ropes under the blows of our B-29's; with Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and the Philippines wrenched from the enemy's grasp; and knowing—from breaking down their codes—that Japan was near the end, plunge the world into atomic hysteria?

The Japanese knew all was lost when the Russians threatened to enter the war. Our combined chiefs of staff had known at

Yalta that Russia would enter the war three months after the defeat of Germany, after the necessary troops had been shunted to the Asiatic front. Therefore there seems less reason, as we look back on it, for using the atomic bomb, *if that use was simply to defeat the Japanese.*

When our troops landed in Japan, they found the Japanese had literally been beaten to their knees long before the atomic bomb was dropped. The terrible pounding of the B-29's had been so thorough, the Japanese knew the end was in sight. We also knew this. Yet we dropped not one, but two atomic bombs, and coolly killed a quarter of a million people.

Was the dropping of the atomic bomb, however, a legitimate military experiment on a live enemy target?

Were the military experts in Washington aware of how close Japan was to defeat? We must have known of their blasted hopes ever since the battle of the Coral Sea, when the Japanese codes were first mastered.

*Was the bomb dropped simply to justify two years' experiments—to justify the outlay of two billion dollars?*

From what a senior officer, attached to the Manhattan District, told one of the authors a year later at Bikini, this did have an important bearing on the decision to drop the bomb. "The bomb," he said, "simply had to be a success—so much money had been expended on it. Had we failed, how would we have explained the huge expenditure? Think of the public outcry there would have been! Very few people knew about it, and when President Roosevelt died we began to feel very worried indeed. There was nothing on paper. There were no direct orders, everything had been kept completely secret. We did not know but that the very people who were in on the secret in high government quarters might have been the first to jump on the

band-wagon, shouting they had known nothing about it. The whole business was fantastic, and there was no way out. The bomb simply had to be a success. As the war in Germany rushed to a close, work in the plants was speeded up. Then, when Germany surrendered, we expected the Japanese to quit straight away. Frankly, we thought the Pacific war would finish before we had a chance to use the bomb. As the time grew shorter, certain people in Washington tried to persuade General Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, to get out before it was too late, for they knew he would be left holding the bag if we failed. The relief to everybody concerned, when the bomb was finished and dropped, was enormous."

Was Japan, therefore, the testing ground? Were the Japanese merely the guinea pigs?

The Japanese were quick to believe this. They had fought a barbaric war. They had subscribed to no code of treatment for war prisoners and civilian internees. Yet they quickly labeled the bomb an atrocity. The cry rose, "We were sacrificed, martyred, to end the war!" The surrender premier, Prince Higashikuni, put it this way: "If the war had ended a few months ago, where would the Allies have dropped it? There was nowhere else to drop it, to try it out, except on Japan, as the war had not finished. But don't you think it was a little inhuman?"

There were those in the United States, as well as in Japan, who suggested the use of the bomb had been a deliberate psychological attempt to frighten Russia or others who might err from the narrow and slippery path of the promised peace of the future.

The Japanese propaganda effort included many untrue stories from the now defunct Domei News Agency, relating all sorts of harrowing details from the atomic-bombed cities; and to get

the real details it was necessary to talk to many survivors and check and recheck their stories.

One such story put out was that rescue workers who entered the cities up to ten days after the explosion died from radio-active effects shortly thereafter. Another was that a black gas was given off by the bomb which suffocated many thousands directly after the explosion.

Allied experts who inspected both sites found much of the propaganda was medically false. They found whatever radio-activity remained was too light to harm people in the area. But the Japanese did not give up.

Early in 1946, a flood of fantastic stories reached Toyko about middle-aged women, past menopause, who suddenly had begun to menstruate and become girlish again. Eggless hens were supposed to have suddenly begun to lay. Women whose menstruation had stopped after the bombing found they were once more regular. Then came a story that some Japanese women, finding themselves pregnant for the first time in years, put it all down to "Mister Atomic Bomb!"

The experts knocked this propaganda on the head, but they agreed some people had been made temporarily sterile following the explosion. This was to be expected. X-ray treatment often induces a temporary sterility. (In some countries where sterilization is permitted this method is used.)

Then came the "rebuild the atom-bombed cities" propaganda. The new mayor of Hiroshima and the governor of the prefecture made a strong plea to eleven visiting correspondents to "listen to the cry of the people, and use your good influence to have the Allies rebuild Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

If the materials, like bricks, cement and girders, were supplied, they said, Japanese labor would erect "new, beautiful cities,

monuments to peace and democracy." They were surprised when the correspondents asked who was going to rebuild Pearl Harbor, Nanking and Manila. "I didn't know they were destroyed," said the mayor, in astonishment. "This is very surprising."

His plea for rebuilding the cities actually found support at a conference of Protestant clergymen in Columbus, Ohio. Possibly they had not been stung by Winston Churchill's remark, earlier in the year, when other clergymen had protested about the bomb: "Obviously, they had no intention of proceeding to the Japanese front."

No effort was made by the local government authorities to set up temporary shelters for the homeless in either of the two cities until early in 1946, and it seemed the two places were being deliberately left as ghastly memorials to man's first use of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war. The uninjured, who had fled to the hills, gradually returned to spend the winter in lean-to's, made from rusty, corrugated sheets, placed against the ruins of their homes.

To the Japanese of those cities, the bomb had no political meaning. To them it had meant a terrible, churning ball of flame, which left a graveyard behind it, and nothing else.

But within the first year of peace and the atomic age the Western World began to realize the awful potentialities of the atomic bomb. General MacArthur, who had not known of the bomb until the very last moment and had suggested it be dropped on Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, which had escaped bombing, or that the bomb be used to cause a tidal wave to rush in and inundate the land, put it this way, "The Generals are now ready to destroy themselves."

Most of the jitters, strangely, seemed to originate in the United States, possessor of the bomb. Major General Leslie

Groves ordered the destruction of Japan's five cyclotrons. These machines had certainly been used, among other things, for atomic research before and during the war, but the Japanese government had not financed the scientific work to any great extent. They were obsolete machines and considered useless for atomic research by some scientific authorities. But their value in other scientific fields was great, and the order for their destruction, therefore, seemed silly and thoughtless.

"The order for the destruction of Japan's puny cyclotrons is stupid to the point of constituting a crime against mankind," said the scientists at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, who had worked on the atomic bomb. "It is as disreputable and ill-considered as would be the burning of Japanese libraries or the smashing of Japanese printing presses," cried others. The scientists suggested the machines be dismantled and given to needy hospitals or scientific institutes in America or elsewhere for scientific research, but on direct orders from the War Office, the cyclotrons, reputedly worth several million dollars, were destroyed.

The message for their destruction came to General MacArthur, with Secretary of War Patterson's signature on it. Actually, General Groves issued it, and Patterson's signature automatically went on the bottom of the command. The head of the Scientific and Economic Section of Supreme Headquarters, Colonel R. C. Kramer, advised General MacArthur against it. Messages flashed between Tokyo and Washington, but so much delay ensued that the time limit of the order expired. The final decision lay with General MacArthur. Earlier, the Supreme Commander had issued a directive, banning all scientific research "which might lead to the making of atomic bombs in Japan." This order fitted well into the picture.

There were those, however, in Tokyo, who felt MacArthur

could have delayed destroying the precious scientific machines. The Great Man had, time and time again, dodged certain orders, simply because he had not agreed with them. He had suggested alternatives, which had been accepted. Yet on this occasion he stuck to the letter of the law.

General Eisenhower, who had once served under MacArthur in the Philippines, tried desperately to save the machines. He had been only a few days in office as Chief of Staff when he sent an urgent message, ordering the five cyclotrons be dismantled and shipped to the United States. The message (*we are told*) arrived one day late.

Assuming the message had arrived in time, one wonders what MacArthur's reaction would have been, for it was known there was no love lost between the two five-star generals. At any rate, Eisenhower was unable to save the machines. The engineers were already at work on them with cutting-torches and pickaxes in an orgy of destruction. The largest of them, which included a huge electro-magnet weighing 359 tons, in Nishina laboratory, Tokyo University, was dismantled and smashed within a day and the parts dropped into Tokyo Bay. Others at Osaka and Kyoto, much smaller machines, were dismantled and destroyed on waste ground by heavy charges of explosives.

Yoshido Nishina, celebrated fifty-five-year-old Japanese scientist, cried like a child as the cyclotron in the laboratory which had been named after him was smashed to pieces. All he could say was, "Ten years' work gone beneath a sledge hammer." A student of England's great scientist, Lord Rutherford, and friend of Nils Bohr, one of the main contributors to atomic research, the little Japanese could not understand the wanton destruction. Neither could other scientists throughout the world.

"A 'high authority' gave the instructions," said General Mac-

Arthur, in an official statement. That "high authority" was Secretary of War Patterson, who took full responsibility and the adverse publicity without a murmur. Everybody passed the buck, including MacArthur, and Patterson became the scapegoat.

When it eventually leaked out the order had come from General Groves, senior officers of the Manhattan District promptly stood up for their chief. It was not Groves. It was one of his staff, they said. This officer is supposed to have said when the matter was later investigated, "Well, I didn't know what a cyclotron was, but I knew it had something to do with atomic research." One of the few who heard this excuse wryly remarked, "If he had been a Russian, the Japanese scientists would have been promptly executed."

From Tokyo, it seemed the destruction of the cyclotrons was the first sign of nervousness. It was only the start. The bomb itself presented the world with the real terror. Could atomic energy be controlled? That was the problem; and those who faced it realistically knew there was only one control—outlaw the bomb and control the sources of atomic energy.

A visit to Hiroshima or Nagasaki convinces one the atomic bomb far transcends all other problems in the world today. There is no time to delay . . . the atomic arms race is in full swing.

The bombs used on Nagasaki and Hiroshima had the destructive power of twenty thousand tons of TNT. Today the United States can produce bombs one thousand times more powerful.

General MacArthur told three correspondents in an off-the-record interview in November, 1945, that the United States could produce a bomb a thousand times more powerful than those used on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The secret was kept by the correspondents, but early in January, 1946, an industrialist

visiting Japan was told the same thing by the Supreme Commander. He did not keep his mouth shut. Returning to the States, he gave a muddled interview partially disclosing the top-secret information. Not until January, 1947, was it revealed officially that the United States could produce such a bomb. In the *Infantry Journal,* John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War wrote: "Given the same intensive effort which was employed during the war toward the production of the atomic bomb, we were within two years at the close of the war of producing a bomb . . . of approximately one thousand times the power of the present bombs."

The emphasis is on the building of "bigger and better" bombs in the absence of international agreement. The world is now ready to commit suicide whenever it wants to.

*At precisely 8:15, on the morning of August 6, 1946, the sirens throughout Hiroshima wailed once more. And in the debris of their city, which had felt the full force of the first atom bomb one year before, the 180,000 survivors gathered to pray for their dead. They stood there, motionless, for one minute in silent prayer, as the sirens wailed. Perhaps the sirens were wailing for the world, too. . . .*

*Had you asked them, the survivors would have told you that one atom bomb, anywhere, constitutes the greatest threat to mankind and the universe . . . for they know more about it than the scientists, generals, politicians and moralists. They have felt its force; they have tasted its fire; they have been awed by its terrible power.*

CHAPTER EIGHT

# SUZUKI-SAN

Suzuki-san, the Mr. Smith of Japan, did not feel that the atomic bomb and the end of the war meant his liberation. He had no inner sense of guilt about the war; he had just done as he was told by his betters. In war he had proved himself a barbarian in temporary release from the fetters of feudalism that bound his mind. In peace he wondered, just what is this thing called democracy? How does it work? What do I do now?

His mind, his habits, had been going in one direction for centuries. He was such a hero worshipper that he soon began to worship MacArthur instead of the Emperor. He had lived in a mental, social, economic, political straitjacket. Overnight he was cut loose from it. His first reaction was to expect the Americans to slip him into a new one of their own making.

He did not know that under the occupation he was to get his first chance to enjoy his birthright of freedom. He and his nation had been thoroughly beaten militarily, but his new masters still had to break down the mental barriers that stood between them and a permanently peaceful Japan. In defeat, the Japanese got his first real break; in victory, the Allies took on a tremendous job.

Nearly a century before, Perry had "opened" Japan to the Western World. MacArthur was to open the West to Japan.

The comparative handful of Japanese who had traveled, studied, done business in the outside world since the time of Perry came home with certain ideas. They did not return "Westernized" or "democratized." Mentally, they retained almost all of their Japanese attitudes. They installed in their mother country only those Western ideas or ways of doing things that would give Japan a belated industrial revolution, that would enable her to catch up if possible with the flashy, powerful money-making countries they had seen. They gave Japan a facility for cut-rate imperialism. They put in a system of business that benefited the few at the top and enslaved the rest. They did nothing for the farmer, who until September 2, 1945, the Day of Surrender, had been a serf.

The millions of Japanese who had to stay at home were bound to their jobs, their overworked farm acres, by a feudalistic social set-up that had improved only slightly from contact with non-Japanese ideas. Never had Japan had a genuine agrarian revolution or evolution.

The rank and file had always lived in wood and paper houses. Suzuki-san did not know modern plumbing, decent sanitation, cleanliness in the kitchen. He lived on an improper, inadequate diet of rice and fish which contributed to his facial ugliness, his bad teeth, his notoriously poor eyesight, his affinity for tuberculosis.

He had an antiquated, hidebound family system that made slaves of the women, automatons of the children.

He used a weird language, a tongue borrowed from the Chinese and polished slightly by Korean, Manchurian and Polynesian influences. Astounding as it may seem, Suzuki-san has

never been able to read, speak or write his own language with fluency. The outside world has long been fed the idea that Japan as a nation is 85 to 90 per cent literate. The trouble with that is, it just isn't true. Approximately that percentage of Japanese cannot understand their complex language sufficiently to be able to read with understanding their own newspapers.

Japanese is written in characters, or ideographs, which were borrowed from the Chinese. There are about 56,000 such ideographs (or word, syllable, and idea pictures) in the language. In his lifetime the average educated Japanese—if he's intelligent—may acquire facility with 15,000 to 20,000 such ideographs.

The average Japanese of the "masses" does not comprehend some of the phrases, ideas and meanings used by the Emperor in his formal, stilted rescripts. He cannot read a simple news story in his daily newspaper without the benefit of side-writing, or explanatory notes, which the papers run alongside the main items or editorials. The newspapers—which incidentally are set by hand because no linotype has yet been invented that could contain and set the vast number of intricate characters—employ a reduced "vocabulary" of five to six thousand ideographs. The common man has command over three to four thousand of these.

How can you expect a Japanese among the "masses" to grasp readily such a radically different concept as "democracy" when he cannot follow more than the routine of current thinking in his own country? How can you expect the Japanese schoolchild to take readily to our way of life when in the lexicon of Nipponese youth there is no such word, no such concept as "civics"?

Abolition of these Chinese-derived ideographs that have been such a mental barrier, and their replacement with Romaji, or the Roman alphabet, was formally proposed in 1946 by the

American Education Mission to Japan. This plan already had been undertaken by officers in MacArthur's headquarters in revamping the educational system, and they were building upon the fact that Romaji had been taught in Japanese schools on a limited scale with excellent results. In fact, tests over a long period showed that a Japanese boy or girl could pick up Romaji in a few months, as against the six to eight years needed to acquire a working knowledge of the ideographs.

The abolition of the ideographs (except as a classical study) would not affect the present "sounds" of the Japanese language. These sounds would simply be written phonetically in Roman letters. And this would permit the use of linotypes in setting up newspapers, books and magazines. It would bring the world's great literature and thought within the reach of millions of Japanese without the laborious process of picture-writing. It would simplify and codify the sounds employed in the Japanese language, which vary from district to district and region to region. And in time it might be possible to eliminate the different types of the same language that are used on different layers of social and economic society in Japan, so that the Emperor and the man in the street could understand one another as the American understands the voice of the President speaking from the White House, or the Briton that of the Prime Minister in the Commons or the King at Buckingham Palace. Moreover, the use of Romaji would facilitate the study of Japanese by foreigners and enable us to fathom the Oriental mind to a greater extent.

The old guard in Japan is not overfond of Romaji and the proposal to substitute it for the ideographs. It means a break with the past, an opening up of the Japanese mind, which

would bode ill for the old order of things and the rigidly stratified social system of Japan.

If Suzuki-san did not know his own language, he naturally did not know much of what went on in his own country. Politically, Suzuki-san was unconscious. That led to his undoing at the hands of the Tojos. Suzuki-san was content to let others handle the politics; he placed supreme confidence in his leaders; the State-supported "religion" of Shinto taught him blind, unswerving obedience to authority and to the Imperial Institution. Suzuki-san was his own prisoner.

And Mrs. Suzuki was the prisoner of her husband under the ancient custom of primogeniture and arranged marriages. Under proposed changes in Japanese marriage laws, the consent of parents will not be necessary where both principals are adults. Marriage would require only the consent of both principals. That really is revolutionary in a country where the parents do the matchmaking, often of children who have not known or seen each other.

Proposed changes in the laws would abolish the institution of "the head of the house," who with rare exceptions is a male and has the legal right to make all the major decisions involving individuals in the family. The head of the family has had power to approve all marriages, divorces and adoptions within the family; to approve any change of residence by a family member, to expel any member if the decisions of the head were not obeyed.

It was Japanese custom, too, to ignore the widow in making a will. Estates were left almost entirely to the first-born son; sometimes to an illegitimate heir if there was no legitimate one. Now the widow is to rank with the children in receiving a stipulated share of an estate; no longer will a wife become financially

incompetent upon marriage; no longer will a wife's adultery constitute a crime.

General MacArthur gave women in Japan the right to vote for the first time, and he gave them the right to hold elective office. Thirty-eight women were elected to the Diet in April, 1946, and they have become a vocal group in the first freely elected Japanese parliament. The new Constitution specifically provides that "all natural persons are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.

Suzuki-san always felt somewhat inferior to the foreigners he aped. And when he held the whip, as he did early in the war, he loved to use it with swaggering brutality on the white man and of course any "inferior" Orientals like the Chinese and Filipinos. His cruelty cannot be explained racially, or it would be logical for the Chinese and Koreans to match him in blood-thirstiness. But it can be laid to the Japanese belief—fostered by the military and taught in the schools—that the Japanese people were of divine origin and fated to rule the world.

The ancient feudal lords, the Daimyos, who surrounded themselves with a class of professional soldiers known as Samurai, exalted prowess in war and established the cult of the sword. If a Daimyo were wronged, his followers had to exact vengeance. If a follower could not agree with the ideas of his master, he was expected to disembowel himself. Human life was of small value. The Japanese proved that in this war, both by their own conduct toward Allied prisoners and by the formation of the Kamikaze or suicide corps of airmen who found glory for themselves, their ancestral warriors and the Emperor in dashing themselves to death against American warships.

Japanese arts and literature have always exalted the military spirit, the ideals of the sword, disdain of life. ("The 47 Ronin," a classical "masterpiece" on Japan's stage until MacArthur outlawed it, was typical of the glorification of vengeance by the sword that has persisted in Japan.)

In politics, the Japanese conducted government by assassination. This was notably so in the mid-twenties and thirties, when anyone deemed too pacificistic, too "Western" in mind, was quickly dusted off by gangsters operating for the secret societies, such as the Black Dragon. Now all such societies have been prohibited by MacArthur; time will tell whether their members have gone underground. The Black Dragon leader, Yoshihisa Kuzuu, a seventy-two-year-old patriarch who looks as amiable as your grandfather and as distinguished as an international scientist, is in jail awaiting trial as a war criminal. He was at liberty for months until the authors caught up with him and exposed him to the Counter-Intelligence Corps. Kuzuu blandly denied, as he proffered tea and delicious sliced tomatoes to his newspaper guests, that he or the Black Dragon Society had been responsible for any of Japan's political murders. But he conceded that some members might have done someone in on their own hook.

The Black Dragon was typical of the vehicles which used the native talent of the Japanese for homicide in pursuit of "patriotism." Shintoism was the final embodiment of sword and Emperor worship. According to its faith, no one could sin in defense of the Emperor, and the soldier who died in battle entered a special heaven.

Poor little Suzuki-san was a sucker for this sort of business. Especially the Suzuki-san from the farm who was the backbone of the Japanese army and navy. The rough clod from the country

made good military material. He asked no questions, killed his quota of foreigners and, if he survived, retired to the farm with a comfortable military pension.

The feudal, Shinto-practicing, emperor-worshipping Suzuki-san never had more fun than when he mistreated the inhabitants of the International Settlement at Shanghai, raped Nanking, herded defenseless Filipinos into churches and set fire to the structures. In lovely old Kyoto, the so-called "art center" of Japan that had the smart international set by the ears before the war, the Japanese glorified their barbaric acts by building a shrine that is featured by an Ear Mound. The mound contains the pickled ears and noses of more than 30,000 Koreans and Chinese who were butchered in the sixteenth century.

The Suzuki-san who did not get drafted in this war never believed the atrocity propaganda aimed at him by Allied short-wave radio. For one thing, he could hardly understand the atrocious Japanese that was spoken. For another, it was worth his life to be caught listening in. For a third, he liked his own propaganda better.

Now he's getting a taste of his own medicine. Under Allied control of the Japanese press and radio, these media are presenting regular installments of the true story of the war to Suzuki-san, who now is pretty shamefaced, although he still doesn't quite believe it was his fault.

But the schoolchildren of Japan, the Suzuki-sans of the future, are learning from the ground up. Their history books have been scrapped and new ones written. (In the higher schools, all courses in ethics and morals were halted, pending their revision.) The new texts now being used emphasize that a Japan of non-divine origin fought "an unreasonable war" brought on by

military oppression of the people, and that in this war Japan was defeated.

Continuing the theme of discrediting the military, the new histories admit that the Manchurian "incident" occurred because "the power of the fighting services became dominant in politics and economy." The rape of Nanking is soft-pedaled, however, to the extent that the tots are informed that Imperial troops devastated the city. The so-called China "incident" is now taught as "a protracted war."

Suzuki-san, Jr., is also informed that the attack on Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack. He is told that the Imperial Navy could not advance after Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal; that one after another key islands like Saipan, Iwo Jima, the Philippines were taken, and finally Japan was encircled.

In closing, the new histories recite:

"The aim of the occupation is to establish peace and order in Japan, to overthrow the fighting services, to eliminate all militaristic thoughts, to give freedom to the people and to reconstruct Japan through democracy.

"For this purpose, the Constitution has been revised, many systems reformed, the Zaibatsu, who controlled the economy of Japan, have been overthrown. The establishment of a democratic state has been sought through democratization of the economy and freedom of religion.

"The government and the people are endeavoring to build up a peaceful Japan through collaboration with Allied Headquarters for the attainment of the aims of the occupation. The new politics has begun. This time, without failure and with united efforts, we are in a position to convert Japan into a democratic country."

It has often been said that democracy takes root in the soil.

It certainly springs from the idea that man shall be free, within limits, to enjoy the fruits of his labor. And so it was that MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to prepare a far-reaching program for freeing Japan's farmers from their long serfdom.

This is one of the fundamental reforms, one of the most important aspects, of the occupation. It parallels the effort to break up the power of the Zaibatsu, the ruling financial cliques who backed every expansionist move ever made by Japan, who took all the profits of industry and let the workers sweat it out.

Basically, the land reforms proposed by MacArthur will enable the farmer to stop being a share-cropper for the rest of his life. Sometimes he has paid more than half the yield of his over-worked acreage as rent for his land. The plan is to enable him to buy a farm on long-term, low-rate financing. The large landed estates, including Hirohito's, are to be broken up for sale.

The one catch was that the Japanese government, in planning a detailed law to meet MacArthur's directive, fixed it so that the landowner would surrender for sale only those acres he owned in excess of twelve, against an original proposal to put the maximum at five. This had the effect of withholding something like half of Japan's arable land from compulsory sale.

Suzuki-san who worked a farm had about two and a half acres from which to grub a living for his large family. Two years ago, half of Japan's farmers (there were 5,500,000 "farm households" and roughly 20,000,000 persons engaged in agriculture) tilled less than 1.3 acres each. In China the average farmer had 3 acres; in Korea, 3.5. In the United Kingdom, the grower of brussels sprouts, cabbage and turnips enjoyed 10 acres. In the United States, the average farmer had 47. In Canada, it was 80.

More than 80 per cent of Japan's farmers were tenants, wholly or partially. They paid rents, usually in rice, the staple crop, that amounted to half or more of the annual yield. And the rents were calculated at a fixed amount over a period of years on a "base" year, which the landowner usually saw to it was a good year. So, in a lean crop year, Suzuki-san paid a rent he could not afford. Sometimes his yield was so poor that he had to go into the open market and buy rice or another crop at the going price and turn it over to his landlord as rent.

Since the end of the war, rents and land values have skyrocketed in Japan, as the result of inflationary pressures and the increased competition for land from the great numbers of demobilized soldiers and the numbers of urban dwellers who are anxious to return to the country.

Suzuki-san the farmer had another burden: interest rates on loans. These were normally 3 to 10 per cent higher than on commercial loans. The average indebtedness of each farm household was 1,000 yen, or $66 at the present rate of exchange inside Japan. It doesn't sound like much in dollars, but it's tremendous inside Japan; and it's a debt that Suzuki-san never seems to clear up. He keeps on borrowing to retire current indebtedness. In the middle of the war, when Japan's people probably enjoyed the war boom as much as did those of any of the other powers, only two of each five farm households could live on their agricultural income.

Moreover, government fiscal policies discriminated against agriculture in favor of industry and trade. Direct taxes on agriculture were 70 to 100 per cent greater, usually, than those paid by business proprietors.

The farmer in Japan had joined cooperative movements for his protection, but these were easily dominated by the large

landholders or proprietor-farmers, and in time, especially under stress of war, they were taken under the wing of the government for obvious reasons. The government was authoritative. It left no choice of crops to be grown. It established crop quotas. It prevented the farmer from growing anything for his own needs or for his own economic advantage.

These agricultural cooperatives came in time to be agrarian Zaibatsu, to coin a term. Their members piled up savings in a central agricultural bank to the tune of something like forty billion yen ($3,000,000,000). This meant that the landlord farmers had a powerful interest in security, in the *status quo,* in business as usual. They were a source of pressure upon the government. And they were potential bidders for the stocks and bonds of the real Zaibatsu, the industrial, financial, commercial clans which under the surrender terms were to be dissolved and their holdings broken up for all time.

The possibility was interesting: Could the landed gentry of Japan either by themselves, or working through dummies, acquire the corporate interests of the forty or more big commercial holding companies which were marked for liquidation? Would it be simply a transfer of capital ownership from one clique to another, from one conservative class to another? Or, in certain cases where industrialists were also farmers, would they buy up their own "liquidated" holdings?

The farmer had never even had a gambler's chance at prosperity. To keep his chin anywhere near the level of the flood of debt he had to have more labor for his acres. The easiest way was to beget children. As Owen Lattimore remarked, "In Japan the crop per acre has been increased by increasing the *aches* of the cropper."

The farm problem in Japan is still unsettled as this is written.

Suzuki-san, as we have made him out so far, is a rather dull fellow. That's not quite fair to him, or to the Allied authorities who have to deal with him. In many ways, Suzuki-san is pretty smart, pretty sharp. He's a good buy-sell man in an Oriental sort of way. He keeps his ear to the ground, or his eye on the market, whichever you prefer.

We quote a letter of November 16, 1945:

To the Tokyo Correspondent,
New York Herald Tribune.
Dear Sir:

With a view to creating more friendship between America and Japan, and also introducing to the Japanese public the latest Broadway Hit Melodies, we have decided to record by special permission the selections as per attached sheet by U.S. 4th Marine Regiment Swing Band, Yokosuka Naval Base, starting at 1 P.M. November 19th (Monday) in our studio.

Your presence shall be greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,
Y. Muto
Columbia Gramophone Co. of Japan, Ltd.

That was typical of Suzuki-san as we came into Japan. Let's do business with the enemy; time's a-wastin'.

They made a good buy-sell business, too, out of the biography of MacArthur, which was pressing the million mark. They pestered American correspondents for luncheon and dinner lectures on "democracy," to which they invited hundreds of unwitting Nipponese at a few yen a head; the correspondent got nothing but a meal of whale meat or fishheads, occasionally a well-done dinner of beef, leeks and other vegetables cooked in a sugar sauce, or shrimp and fresh fish dipped in batter and fried in deep fat.

Suzuki-san also was after articles on "democracy" for the

Japanese magazines. If he could get them for nothing, so much the better. But he was also willing to pay $100 for an article. And, to spare you the trouble, you didn't have to write it. Suzuki-san invited you to lunch, brought along two professional hecklers and a facile interpreter, who could take shorthand notes in Japanese. As the hecklers heckled, the note-taker took notes. At intervals the American prisoner would demand and receive a translation back into English of his answers to important questions. And many times the American found that amazing liberties had been taken with his words and meaning.

The séance usually boiled down to: When are you Americans going to give up and go home?

Suzuki-san was eager for knowledge. And sometimes he was blunt. Such as the questioner at one of these sessions who said quite frankly the Japanese had been controlled and pushed around for a long time by Tojo and the others, and bigosh, here was MacArthur doing the same damn thing. We asked him if he wanted Tojo back. He was silent.

But others wanted to know, almost pathetically, how they could become democrats and get on with life. They didn't know what the word democracy meant. We couldn't define it in the one phrase they had patience for. We told them we had fought for it 170 years ago in the United States and were still perfecting it, still patching its fabric, tinkering with its machinery. We asked them if they expected us to hand to them, nicely wrapped and on a silver platter, the gradual fruition of the American dream that we find even in these days of shortages, strikes, quarrels, selfishness, lynchings, bureaucracy, bigotry, Bilbo, Talmadge, Father Coughlin and Gerald L. K. Smith.

Yet you could not suspect the motives of the middle-aged Japanese who asked us plaintively about the fate of the hundreds of thousands of Japanese in our Western states who had been

"relocated." He had heard nothing but horrors from his own propaganda machine.

And you choked just a bit on the plea of another: What would happen to him if he addressed a petition to MacArthur on the food question? You told him the right of petition was one of the things we had fought for, had established, long before in America and in England. You told him to go ahead and write a letter to MacArthur on any subject he wished.

And Suzuki-san did write. Mrs. Suzuki did too. She asked MacArthur when her soldier-husband would be brought back from Manchuria. A middle-class businessman complained about favoritism to the rich and to the farmers. A farmer complained that the city dwellers were squeezing him. An elderly Jap who had lived in the United States wanted permission to keep his hunting rifle.

Other writers of MacArthur's fan mail wanted the General to step up the electric current, increase the rice rations, curb the black market. A possible soap-opera fan said if he and his associates could form the "Rinse Association of Japan" they could clean up domestic politics in short order. A lawyer-doctor wrote: "If there were an Oliver Cromwell in Japan, Hirohito no doubt would pursue same fate as Charles I." Most letters thought the occupation policies were sound. Most said that Americans were "okay," and some indicated surprise at the discovery.

This was revealing and welcome. But many years, many mental barriers stood between us and the Japanese. For the Nipponese are still to shy or too polite to speak without careful thought; they refrain from too frank discussions among themselves of their own problems, and are inclined to tell the Allied conqueror only what they think the conqueror wants to hear.

Some of the schoolchildren were less inhibited than their

parents. "We read in the newspapers about democracy and we hear much talk," said a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl. "But if we ask about this in our classrooms, we are told to be still and just memorize our lessons."

That is a quotation from a letter written a year after the occupation began. It showed that the top-level Japanese in the Ministry of Education—one of the key points in the occupation—were still obstructing American directives; that the occupation looked good on paper, but would be a long time in having effect down to the humblest hamlet in Nippon.

"In our civics class," said another girl, "the principal told us the only reason Japan had to be democratic was because she had lost the war."

These girls were eager about other things. "Do American girls help their mothers?" "What is student government?" "How do you define American efficiency?" "How do American girls wear their hair and how do they dress?"

An elementary school teacher admitted: "None of us know what the words 'liberty' and 'democracy' mean. No one has told us."

A younger teacher confessed privately that any teacher in her school who expressed interest in studying and adapting forms of democratic education, such as classroom discussions, was branded as a Communist by other teachers.

Naval Captain Benton W. Decker, who commands fleet activities at the American base at Yokosuka, found that bureaucrats in the Japanese Home Ministry were still interested in re-establishing industries that would perpetuate the city as a naval base. When he wanted to improve local roads and the water-supply system, he found that all the Japanese do "is stall and say it can't be done."

"I tell them to forget all this folderol about tea ceremonies and flower arrangement and get in there and do some real work," Captain Decker said.

For all their faults, for all their quirks, the Japanese still have a sense of humor. Without prompting, they laughed heartily at a performance of Gilbert and Sullivan's "The Mikado," in which the authors poked sly fun at the Japanese upper crust of the Meiji Era.

And they got a kick out of a modern play called "Tarzan." It was the story of a Japanese left on a South Pacific island when the war ended. He found, while awaiting repatriation, a "Tarzan" who turned out to be Japanese. The ape-man is brought back to Japan. He advertises vitamin pills at a Western-style carnival. Eventually "Tarzan" realizes he has become a tool of moneymakers. He returns to the jungle amid thunderous applause.

Such is Suzuki-san, a strange, complex fellow, but worth understanding if we are to have peace in the Pacific. You just cannot write him off as a defeated enemy and let someone else refashion his mind.

Today, in a sense, Suzuki-san is a ward of the United Nations, or should be. He is the problem child, the unwanted child, of the Orient. Left alone, he would flounder in apathy, in inability to use his new opportunities. Much as you might detest the slant-eyed barbarian who bludgeoned your brother on the Death March from Bataan or violated your sister at Hongkong or Singapore, deep down inside you felt that you had to take him in hand, give him an appreciation of life, wean him from his Oriental disdain of life, his preference for death, his disregard of the sanctity of the human body.

Suzuki-san is gradually losing his hatred of the Occidental. He has to, of course, if he is to live on. He is finding out that we're not bad fellows after all, even if we bungle things a bit and behave like screwballs now and then.

The top-level Japanese will never like us, despite their hankering for Western ways, modes of dress, comforts, foods, ways of making money. We must make up our minds that we cannot do business, now or ever, with this type of Japanese. We must not play ball with him. We must not be timid or hesitant in kicking out the phonies from Japanese political life.

We must be on guard against the old guard in Japan. They are trying to kill us with kindness, with geisha dinners, with handsome presents (including girls for homesick men), with amusements. The old guardsmen want us to go home soon, before our ideas sink into the mass of Japanese. They rubbed their hands in glee when one general suggested—even casually—that we'd be going home in a year if the Japanese behaved themselves.

For the Japanese has been well schooled in the art of good behavior. He can turn on the obedience and the charm, and he knows he can fool the gullible ones among the Allied officers and men.

The longer we stay in Japan, the less the old-timers like it. For the disillusion of Suzuki-san with his former bosses is growing, however gradually. The bitterness of defeat, the promise of the future, are jogging the little man's consciousness. Everything we do in Japan makes Suzuki-san more conscious of himself, of his latent powers. That is bad, very bad, for the upper crust, which is fighting a rear-guard action against the occupation with all sorts of obstructionism and blandishments, including the geisha girl—the Madame Butterfly of 1947.

CHAPTER NINE

# MADAME BUTTERFLY, 1947

*There is nothing so sad as to be born a woman in Japan.*
—Japanese proverb.

THE MEN WHO had fought through the hot Pacific islands without ever seeing a Dorothy Lamour in a sarong—though their wives thought the jungles were full of them—found in Japan a woman without curves, but a woman nevertheless, and a woman who was willing.

She was flat-faced and flat-chested, and badly in need of a bath (one piece of soap was her year's ration). She wore a baggy wartime trouser-suit, "mompei," of synthetic material made from wood pulp, and she clacked along the street in wooden stiltlike sandals, called "geta." The nails on her fingers were cracked and broken, and her hands were calloused and rough from fourteen to sixteen hours a day at the factory lathe. Her teeth were bad, or if she had had the money to see a dentist, her mouth was full of shiny metal-alloy teeth. Her ankles did not taper. She went straight up and down and was "beef to the heel like a Mullingar heifer," as the Irish would say. She was a tired, disillusioned and, above all, ugly little woman, who had

known nothing but hardship for as long as she could remember.

But the Japanese woman had a certain winsomeness, a certain ability to wear a beautifully colored kimono and mince demurely along the street with downcast eyes. The cherished silken kimono, brilliantly colored, with a wide obi of matching colors, binding her tightly about the midriff, hid the fat ankles and lack of curves and gave her a grace and femininity all her own, and the G.I. was badly in need of femininity.

The G.I. had formed a mental picture of Madame Butterfly long before he reached Japan. He had heard of the charm and dignity of the Japanese woman, her delicacy and graciousness. In his magazines and school books, and in tourist agency advertisements, he had seen pictures of a woman with an elaborate hair-do, a stringed instrument over one shoulder, and a fan coyly held before a face that wore a come-hither look.

The G.I. thought that every Japanese woman was a geisha, and that a geisha was someone you went to bed with, just as he had imagined all French girls were bed companions. Nobody had told him that this was not the case; but in Japan, as in Europe, he soon learned by experience he was wrong. The geishas, he found, were a fast-disappearing class of professional entertainers, who lived respectable suburban lives with their husbands and children. The prostitutes were the ordinary kind found in any country.

During the war, Japan's girls of all classes went into the factories, if their homes or the rice planting in the hot, smelly, paddy fields did not keep them busy. Madame Butterfly was streamlined for war, and the fan-fluttering beauty, so well known to tourists, was tossed out of her kimono by order of the government, and into the drab dress of a factory worker. Her towering coiffure, built on a wicker cage, disappeared, and her hair was

clipped short, in a slick bob. She worked in the arsenals and aircraft factories, in the coal mines and steel mills. The trams and trains were run by her. She slept and ate in dormitories attached to the factory, where she was as carefully regimented as any Japanese soldier in the field. Her salary was about two dollars per day, and she worked twenty-seven days out of every thirty-one. She was vital to Japan's war economy, for the ladies of Nippon made up more than half of Japan's industrial labor force, which numbered in all eleven million workers at the end of the war. And Madame Butterfly had another important duty—to produce new sons for the Emperor, and it made no difference to "Charlie" who the fathers were.

The honored geisha profession almost went out of existence during the war. The mobilization of Japan's womenfolk for industry left the geisha schools empty. The geisha "waiting houses," or exclusive geisha restaurants, where wealthy Japanese went in peacetime to eat an expensive meal and watch his favorite geisha perform to the music of the guitar-like samisen, were closed by order of the government, and those which tried to remain open were eventually forced to put up shutters because of the lack of food.

With the war over, and thousands of young G.I.'s seeking excitement, the commercially minded Japanese knew there would be an entertainment boom. The G.I.'s wanted geishas, but they wanted a 1946 model, a fast-stepping, high-kicking jitterbugging girl, who could speak a little English, would not mind a little petting—and more, if the occasion presented itself. Japan's suave showmen knew the G.I. had plenty of money from many long months on Pacific islands, and would spend it for fun, without hesitation or stint. They knew he was lonesome and bored, and would get even more lonesome and bored during the

long months of occupation ahead. He was the perfect patient for the injection he was about to receive, and they knew it and were "so very happy to oblige."

With a kitty of well over two million dollars, the geisha entrepreneurs went to Japan's small villages and towns and through her underworld and bought up girls. It was an easy matter, for thousands of girls had lost their jobs with the ending of hostilities. Families were poor, and were only too glad to sell their daughters for a price of about one thousand dollars. And, too, the selling of girls was not new in Japan. It had gone on for centuries, and the Japanese did not think it was terrible.

The new crop of so-called geishas (a real geisha has to serve an apprenticeship of seven years) went through a fast, streamlining glamour course. "Okay, honey," "Oh, yeah, sweetheart?" and "How beautiful you are, Mr. Yank!" was the "English" taught them. At a later date, after they had mixed with the G.I.'s, their vocabularies and education were considerably broadened. Then it was not uncommon to have a kimonoed beauty explain, with a very dead-pan expression, that she was a "red-hot momma"; or say, "How do you do, you old son of a bitch," on being introduced.

They were taught billiards, too. Just why is not known. The G.I.'s were not interested in billiards. Card games, including a peculiar brand of bridge and poker, and popular songs were also parts of their curriculum. For some reason, they were all taught the four songs, "You Are My Sunshine," "Don't Fence Me In," "Shine On, Harvest Moon" and "The Rose of Tralee." The "students" found these difficult to sing in English, so they sang them in Japanese. They tried hard, but hearing a geisha singing "The Rose of Tralee" was like hearing a dog howl at the moon.

They were taught to dance. Their teachers found that the

kimono did not lend itself very well to the dance step of the average G.I.—it was too tight. But the illusion of the pre-war geisha could not be lost at any cost, so the kimono remained, and the geishas struggled.

With the new crop completely trained, Tokyo and other major cities blossomed overnight with places of entertainment. The "formal opening" of the "New House of Dance Joy," Tokyo's "Storky Club," and the "Heaven and You Club" was announced in all the newspapers. Large, lurid signs outside extolled the virtues of these establishments. One was outstanding:

"Please to come in and dance with beautiful geisha, Mr. Yank, to music of Susuki Kato and His Sixteen Hot-Shooters. Ten dances, two bottles of beer: 30 yen."

It was then the trouble started. The dancing partners found the G.I. was no foxtrotter or waltzer, but a maniac who raced about the floor, scooped them off their feet, tossed them over his hips and swung them in the air, while he tap-danced or high-kicked at the same time. The unfortunate taxi-dancers would stagger weakly across the floor in a lather of sweat at the end of a dance and pass out. They could justly use their newly acquired expression, "This beats the hell outa me!"

A minor revolution occurred in their ranks. Nobody had told them about the Lindy Hop or the Conga. They went on strike. Their work was too hard, and their shoes were wearing out. Higher wages, short dresses and a manual laborer's food allowance were their demands. Japan's showmen grudgingly agreed it was hard work being a modern Madame Butterfly.

In the meantime, Japan's houses of prostitution were working overtime. The red-light districts of Tokyo and the naval base of Yokosuka had never done such business. And for many months, both the Army and the Navy tolerated a situation which

has been quite rightly called "Japan's secret weapon." In February, 1946, just six months after the landing of the occupation forces, it was admitted by Colonel Phillip Cook, Chief Surgeon of the American Eighth Army, that the venereal disease rate among the troops had increased alarmingly. Twenty-seven per cent of the men were infected with syphilis or gonorrhea, and the figure was rising rapidly.

For months the houses were allowed to continue, and even when they were placed out of bounds, it was impossible to deny the G.I. his pleasure. Long queues of soldiers, four abreast, could be seen standing, waiting their turn, outside these sordid hovels. Some of the girls worked twenty-four hours a day, and it was not unusual for a house to have on its books at least five hundred girls, working in shifts.

Instead of stamping the whole thing out at the start, the Army set up prophylactic stations directly opposite each string of whorehouses. After standing in the queue for several hours, the G.I. would enter the house, and when he left very shortly afterward he was supposed to visit the prophylactic station. However, many drunken G.I.'s would stagger out and never reach the station. These lads would regret it several days later.

Just outside Tokyo, an exclusive and expensive red-light district consisted of several hundred densely cluttered, shacklike stalls. Sitting at the window of each one would be a heavily painted prostitute, who would shyly hide her face behind a fluttering fan as you passed. The actual appointment would be made by the local pimp, who also acted as a watcher for the military police. He would stop you and try to sell one of his syphilitic beauties to you for an hour or so. "There is the 'Beautiful Flower,' Mr. Yank" . . . "only seventeen yen, Mr. Yank, and

very very new" . . . "or 'Rose Blossom' . . . many like her, Mr. Yank, only one hundred yen. . . ."

As he talked to you, heads would appear at each window. Waving green or red lanterns illuminating the signs over each door. There was the "Brother and Sister House," and the "Love House," or the one with the mahogany sign swaying gently in the evening breeze with simply "Whorehouse" plainly written across it. As you tried to get away from this disgusting little man the price would get lower and lower, until finally he would hiss and bow and shuffle off into the shadows. The same thing would happen as you passed the next string of houses, until you reached the end of the twisting, garishly lighted street.

At the first sign of a raid, the pimps would blow shrill, piercing whistles, and in an instant the lanterns would be extinguished, the heads would disappear from the windows, and the street would become vacant. The M.P.'s, bursting into the houses, would find nothing but several prostitutes, apparently asleep, and a very irate madame, who would create a great commotion at the intrusion and very reluctantly allow them to search the house. Long before this, the G.I.'s would have made good their escape by the back door.

The larger, cheaper houses were situated on the main road between Yokohama and Tokyo, and at one time it was estimated they served a thousand enlisted men a day. The girls who worked in these places seemed quite unaware of their plight. They looked quite happy, though it was plain that many of them were syphilitic. There were large open sores on the hands and feet of many of them. Most of them had spent the greater part of their lives in bondage, trying to pay off debts which could never be paid off. They did not appear to receive periodic

medical examinations from Japanese doctors when they were supposed to, and when several American doctors examined a group of sixty, fifty were found to be in the advanced stages of syphilis.

Still there was no stopping the G.I. He saw their condition, knew he was taking a chance, and he was willing to take it. The real fault lay at the door of the occupation authorities, who allowed this situation to continue. A hue and cry in the world's press forced the matter out into the open. When Cardinal Spellman visited the naval area of Yokosuka, late in the fall of 1945, the red-light districts were promptly put out of bounds to all ranks. However, the following day, the houses were re-opened, and business started again as usual.

The returning Japanese soldiers were found to be riddled with venereal disease, and it is believed they were the principal cause of the increased rate of syphilis in the "houses." The "comfort girls," who had journeyed with the troops, went back to their former houses, and they were found to be 90 per cent infected. Although these facts were known, they were not told to the G.I. or sailor. No great effort was made by local commanders to discourage promiscuity, though the overall policy of the Army and the Navy has always been to suppress prostitution to safeguard the health of their men. The occupation forces totaled some 200,000 men by the beginning of 1946, and had action not been taken in the months between January and July of that year, it was estimated 50 per cent of them would have been infected. As it was, however, an all-out medical drive reduced the figure from 27 per cent in January to 13.5 per cent in July. This figure, though still high, was low in comparison with the rate among American troops in Germany. In August, 1946, authorities in the American Zone in Germany revealed

venereal disease had hit an all-time high. In every thousand men, three hundred and five were infected, while among the Negro troops (numbering approximately 30,000), the figure was estimated as seven hundred in every thousand.

The up-hill fight against the profession in Japan began late in 1945 when General MacArthur abolished licensed prostitution. But this had little effect. The authorities found it was too difficult to watch and control. The girls, after being released from their debts, wandered about, not quite knowing what to do with themselves. They either became street-walkers ("roten-imbai," or open-air prostitutes), as the Japanese called them, or they wound up in another red-light district.

Officials at headquarters scratched their heads one day in despair when they were officially notified by the prostitutes that they had formed a union to fight the street-walkers, who were encroaching on their "preserves." They asked General MacArthur to take steps against the street-walkers, and in a neat letter, written in English, stated their case.

"Through your kindness, we 'reception girls' were released from the restriction of freedom, which derives from the loan with our employer. And now we have awakened to democratic ideas and are filled with hope for a free life. But against our will, we must say we cannot provide for ourselves without continuing this calling in this place that has enough sanitary arrangements. For now we have no ability and fund by which we can be independent and make an honest life. But we are striving to make an honest life as soon as possible.

"And this time we have organized ourselves into a self-governing body, aiming at mutual aid, sanitation and cultivation. We shall be very happy to have your sympathy and mercy."

This letter, childish and simple as it is, is a good example

of how the women of Japan look on MacArthur—even the prostitutes knew their case would get a hearing.

Licensed prostitution had been a source of great revenue to the Japanese government through taxation. Sold at the age of fifteen or sixteen by ignorant parents, usually peasants, the girl signed a contract, which immediately placed her in debt. The madame of the house to which the young girl was sent would supply her with rich kimonos, obis and other garments, which would be charged against the young probationer at twice or treble their value. The young girl's only hope now was that some rich Japanese would buy her out of debt. This often happened. A new girl, untouched, would be advertised as such to a few very select clients, who would be invited to come and look at her. Having seen her in all her naked beauty, the clients would then bid for her. Sometimes a girl was bought outright and taken home by the purchaser. She would never know freedom, but this at least was better than a lifetime of service in a house of prostitution. If she was not bought, the highest bidder would have the pleasure of breaking her in. Then a few days later she would be returned, a frightened, nervous child, to begin work.

The house took about 90 per cent of all she earned. If she was very beautiful she earned good money, but few beautiful ones remained in the houses. They were bought for private use. In the prescribed government contract, which the young girl signed, it was clearly stated that all debts would be *"paid back by degrees from my profession. Seventy-five per cent of my earnings, however, shall be your due as your income, and the remaining twenty-five per cent shared to me as my income. And fifteen per cent of the above-mentioned proportion to be my*

*income shall be appropriated to repay my debt, the remainder being pocket money."*

She was forced to borrow money from the house because her own pocket money, no matter how much she earned, was always small. This loan would have to be paid back with interest. When she needed new garments, the house would supply them, and this amount would be added to her debts. Thus, no matter how hard the girl worked, she could never pay off her debt.

It was not surprising, therefore, that young girls begged officers and enlisted men to buy them. "If you do not take me away, I will die here. . . ."

Many young girls, when the Tokyo Press Club was seeking a staff, begged to be employed, for their parents were threatening to sell them into houses of prostitution. (Twenty-two girls were hired for the club, and seven of these were found to be suffering from syphilis.) With the occupation army gradually increasing, there was a brisk market for young girls, and their only escape from being sold by their parents was to run away and get a job with the Americans.

The situation was accentuated by the fact the Army and Navy were apparently allowing the G.I.'s full freedom. Naval Chaplain Lawrence L. Lacour brought the whole thing out into the open. In a letter which was read from the Senate floor by Senator William A. Stanfill of Kentucky, the Chaplain charged the local naval authorities at Yokosuka were *"permitting unrestricted access by all men on liberty in the Yokosuka area to houses of prostitution where the venereal disease incidence among the prostitutes is considered 100 per cent. The control is the prophylaxis administered by naval corpsmen on duty in the house."*

"I observed," the Chaplain wrote, "in company with four

other chaplains, a line of enlisted men, four abreast, almost a block long, waiting their turn at the Yokosuka house. M.P.'s kept the lines orderly and permitted only as many as could be served to enter at a time. As men were admitted to the lobby, they would select a prostitute (there were one hundred and thirteen on duty that day), pay the ten yen to the Japanese operator and then go with the girl to her room.

"True, many of the men were the type one might expect to patronize such a place, but the bulk of the customers were younger men. The open accessibility of prostitutes in this place has been a factor contributing to the first sex experience of some of my men."

The Chaplain's letter had the desired effect. The red-light districts in the area were put out of bounds, and guards posted on them. The streets of houses were "attacked" by a small army of soldiers, carrying cans of paint and brushes. Large "Out of Bounds VD" signs in yellow were painted on the doors. But even this did not stop the G.I. When one district closed, he somehow managed to find the new one which had just opened.

Girls were also used as "presents" by the Japanese "higher-ups" who were seeking favors from the occupation forces. This occurred to a correspondent, Duane Henessy of Associated Press, who was surprised one day to find a very charming young Japanese, complete with her baggage, waiting for him by his desk at the press headquarters. The perplexed correspondent did not know what to do about it. It took some fancy talking to make the donor take back the girl!

Real geishas, 1946 models—in fact, any girl who could wear a kimono and look like a geisha—were thrown at the occupation forces at parties and dinners. If a general was the guest of honor at a banquet, he and his staff would be surrounded by

beautifully-dressed young Japanese girls. They were taught that Americans liked to drink, and so at dinners, they encouraged the Yanks to drink great dollops of saké, or rice wine. One American general the authors know got a bit fed up with all this tomfoolery, and he neatly turned the tables. He brought a jug of bourbon to a geisha dinner held in his honor, and encouraged the geishas to match his dollops of saké with dollops of bourbon. The geishas will never forget him. In short order, they were passing out like flies all around the dinner table. While they were losing much face, the general sat there, looking quite happy as he drank his saké, and he smiled at the surprised looks on the faces of the Japanese businessmen who had arranged the dinner. Needless to say, they did not get the favors they were seeking.

There was a strange tie-up between the geishas and the giant Sumo wrestlers. These mountainous males grunted and heaved in a circular sanded ring to the shrill screams of delight from their lady fans. The geishas and the wrestlers, in ancient Japan, had been of the same social status and occupied a certain honored place. The geishas were regular patrons at the championship matches, and several rows of front seats were always reserved for the Japanese beauties.

One birdlike, emaciated, forty-five-year-old geisha was arrested in Japan early this year for claiming to be a "goddess." It took thirty Jap policemen to take her into custody. Her bodyguard, one of her disciples, a 380-pound champion Sumo wrestler, cracked their heads, threw tables, chairs and anything else he could lay his hands on, and only desisted when the tiny Japs brought him groaning and grunting to the ground by sheer weight of numbers.

The "goddess," known to her disciples as "White Light,"

claimed that General MacArthur, Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek, along with other world leaders, were "minor gods" under her. She had been collecting $16,000 a month in the province from Japanese people whom she had successfully convinced of her "divine" powers.

The "goddess" told Margaret Parton of the New York *Herald Tribune* that she was "particularly impatient with General MacArthur because he does not seem to recognize that he is a minor god under my command."

It is probable that Japan's underworld played a large part in helping "White Light" collect the monthly rake-off from her disciples, for the geishas have always had a strange fondness for the men of the underworld. These men had their own caste system, their own rules of procedure and methods of operation in each other's territory. In many ways, they were the most honest men in Japan. They cared not for emperor, police or occupation forces, and went quietly about their business of keeping other gangs out of their preserves. They caused as little trouble as possible for the police, who were, in fact, in deathly fear of them. And they were admired and upheld by the Japanese people.

Probably members of the best-organized vice system in the world, they did not look on themselves as gangsters but as keepers of law and order. Each district had a chief, deputy chiefs, brothers and junior brothers, who were all controlled by the big chief, a quiet little gray-haired man who lived in Tokyo. They didn't go in for murder, unless it was absolutely necessary, and rows between members of various districts were always settled over a conference table under the guidance of the big chief. Satisfaction on both sides was generally obtained when the offender chopped a finger off his left hand and sent it to

the chief of the district. Everybody was then appeased, and a geisha dinner usually followed. It was always possible to tell a gangster in Japan by the number of fingers on his left hand. The big chief had only two left on his.

The gangs controlled all types of crime, from petty thievery to prostitution. They bought and sold girls and kept a steady supply flowing into the houses. They controlled gambling and the black market. Although they soaked the rich for "protection" money, they never stole from the poor. A free-lancer, who tried to operate in a district, might wind up minus his ears when the matter was reported to the local gangsters' association. If a burglary took place in a village, it was rarely the police who were notified by the Japanese, but the local crime boss.

The most lucrative side of their business was, of course, white slavery. The abolishment of prostitution in Japan will be properly enforced only when the gangs, who procure the girls, are broken up.

There was no formal ban on "fraternization" by General MacArthur, as there had been in Germany at first. (The British contingent, which arrived early in 1946 and took over the areas of Hiroshima and Kure, was forbidden to "fraternize," but this may have been because of the high venereal disease rate in the district.) In troublesome areas such as Sasebo in southern Japan, where disgruntled Japanese ex-servicemen were flocking home from China, Marine Major General Schmidt slapped a 6 P.M. curfew on enlisted men, and an 8 P.M. curfew on officers. This ended night-time "fraternization" in the area. However, General Krueger (now retired) of the Sixth Army, allowed as how he

had not seen any "fraternization" but scrutinization! General Eichelberger, of the Eighth Army, a stickler for military etiquette and smartness, finally cracked down on the sloppier type of G.I., who ogled and fondled the Japanese girls in public. General Eichelberger ruled this out once and for all. G.I.'s were forbidden to offer girls cigarettes, candy or gum. They were not allowed to take them out to dinner, all restaurants being put out of bounds. Nor could they take the girls to army messes, movie theaters, swimming pools or the beach. It took a long time to make these rules effective, but as far as General Eichelberger was concerned, the honeymoon was really over.

It was regrettable that the G.I. had been introduced at the beginning to the fake geishas and prostitutes. They believed these to be typical of Japanese womanhood. But as the months passed, and headquarters gradually tightened the reins, many of the cabarets and fun houses were closed. Only certain approved dancing places were allowed to remain open, and in these the G.I. met a better type of girl. He began to realize that Japanese women were not all phony geishas.

In the tiny villages and towns he was also meeting the average Japanese girl and housewife, and unwittingly he was playing a major role in breaking the feudalistic bonds which had held Japanese women for centuries. He found in the Japanese woman a childlike, pleasant and hospitable person with an avid curiosity. She had been told if the Americans ever landed in Japan she would be raped and her family slain. Thus, when the first troops landed, she took to the hills, obedient, docile and unemotional as always. When she returned to her village she found no one killed or raped. In fact, the dreaded American soldiers had not even touched the Japanese soldiers. It is possible this was the dawn of understanding for the woman of Japan.

She found the "terrible" Yanks played with her children and gave them candy and gum. Her children liked Mr. Yank very much, so she asked him to come and share her humble repast with them, no matter what it was.

The war to her had meant years of hardship and misery, but she had never complained. She had never been allowed to complain. In school, she had been taught that her only duty was to bring into the world as many children as possible so as "to increase the population so that the national aims will be accomplished." She had never been sure what the national aims were, and she was never told. The menfolk would have considered it "indecent" had she shown any interest in her country's foreign affairs. Her mother had not inquired, so she did not.

Always subservient to the man, she did not know freedom such as the American and the British woman enjoyed. She thought she was free. She did not know she was shackled to an ancient feudal system which kept her inferior to the man. If she was of the upper classes, she had a little more freedom and was allowed to follow certain cultural pursuits such as painting or playing the three-stringed samisen. But if she belonged to the peasant class, she produced children and toiled in the fields, and she had no time for anything else. She believed in the Emperor; he was the beginning and the end of everything. He was the reason for living; he was Japan. After him, came her husband and her children. Her children absorbed what tenderness and love she could feel, for they were hers, though nothing else was. If the Emperor ordered her to produce children, she produced children. If he ordered them off to war, they went to war. If they were killed, then they had died for the Emperor. All pain and

grief were stifled. They had died for the Emperor and Japan. She was not to weep; she had performed her duty.

She was not supposed to ask questions, and she had no say whatsoever in the running of her own country. But what happened to the Japanese woman when her country lost the war? When the men, who had always run the country, failed, did a great revolution take place within her? Up to the very last hour she had been told Japan was winning the war. She had believed that, as she had always believed everything she was told. But now everything had collapsed about her.

Historians of the future may well examine this feminine revolution; for one day Japan's women were docile and restrained, and the next they became a force in a country which had always treated them as slaves and human incubators.

Letters for "The Great Marshal MacArthur," which at first trickled in, soon arrived in torrents. They asked about democracy and the outside world. They wondered why MacArthur was being so kind to them. Some promised to cooperate in everything he asked. Some even wanted to have children by him.

It was evident that the thinking of the average woman was: "We have always been slaves and inferior to the men. Now our men have failed us and Japan, and we must take the lead. You offer us a new life. Tell us what to do, and we will do it."

MacArthur realized that in the woman of Japan he had a powerful force for the future peace in Japan, and one of his first acts was to give them the vote and allow them to run for office in the government. This had an extraordinary effect on the women of Nippon. They suddenly realized their importance in the new Japan. Instead of spending the evening in her home, after a day's work in the fields, the peasant woman hurried off to a meeting in the village or to a lecture in a near-by town.

She listened to men of the occupation forces tell her about other countries and how the women took an active part in the running of those countries. In some remote villages, the women would gather at a certain time each day to have the *Stars and Stripes* read to them by a member of the occupation forces who could speak Japanese. The G.I.'s in lonely parts of the country found they were in great demand. These friendly ambassadors were helping to usher in an era of freedom that Japanese women were determined to have.

It had its funny side, too. One G.I. went to great trouble one evening at a dinner given in his honor to explain, through an interpreter, how every home in the United States possessed a refrigerator. This impressed the women greatly, and at a women's meeting a few days later one of the speakers, who had been present at the dinner, told her listeners refrigerators were essential to the new Japan.

"Every democratic nation," she said, "has refrigerators. If Japan is to become a great nation, we must have refrigerators too."

Everyone then asked what was this "refrigerator," and the G.I. had to mount the platform and explain, with the help of an interpreter. The interpreter found it difficult to translate the exact meaning, and so when the audience left, they were not sure whether this "democratic refrigerator" was an evil machine or a form of government. But whatever it was, every woman wanted one.

The G.I. was also eagerly sought after because he possessed American magazines and, above all, army rations. Pictorial magazines, such as *Life*, had a remarkable effect. The women could not read them, but they would follow the pictures. The young girls in one village changed their hair-do's after seeing one issue

of *Life*. Advertisements showing bright new cars, clothes and cigarettes all meant one thing—democracy. They did not know what democracy really was, but they were determined to find out.

Of course, the G.I. greatly endeared himself to the housewife because of his rations. The peasant had always eaten well. Even when the war ended, the tiny farming villages were well off in comparison with the cities. But the peasant woman was strangely surprised at the canned food the G.I. offered. She found she liked it. But there was, also, something else. The authors remember giving a one-pound can of bacon to a farmer's wife, and she said simply, when she had discovered its contents, "What sort of a great land is this which provides the soldiers of its emperor with such wonders?" That bacon was the pièce de résistance at the evening meal, but it was the way the strips had been neatly packed in the can that was the amazing wonder to this housewife. The American soldier and everything he had came from the land of democracy—to the Japanese women, that land and its way of life was to be their pattern for the future.

One of the first demonstrations of Japanese women occurred in Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan. Japanese miners refused to work the coal mines there because they claimed the mines were old and the equipment rotten. When the strike began, the women in the district called a general meeting. One of them, who was later elected to parliament, told them, "The miners, your husbands, fathers and brothers are striking for betterment of conditions throughout the whole laboring class. This is in the interest of you women too. You may be housewives, who never go underground, but the food you eat, the clothes you wear, the houses you live in depend on the issue. You cannot be onlookers. Do something."

There and then, the women, in a swarm of more than a thousand, descended on the officers of the company, demanded to see the officials, and then stated their case. It did not end the strike, but it startled the men, who simply could not believe it. Never before had Japanese women acted like this!

The men were aghast at another development in the occupation. Japanese actresses began to kiss on the screen, à la Hollywood. And the Japanese public flocked hungrily to American films which showed boy meeting girl in a passionate clinch.

A bright young reporter named Ernest Hoberecht, of the United Press, may go down in history as the man who put the kiss into Japanese films. The story goes that Ernie gave purely professional lessons in the American-style kiss to a young Japanese starlet; then he wrote a scenario about the romance between a G.I. and a Madame Butterfly. The starlet starred in the film, which packed them in.

The awakening was more noticeable among the peasant class than among their richer, middle-class sisters. Many of the latter, besides having been educated in Japan, had traveled abroad, or had gone to colleges in the United States or Europe. These had returned to Japan with Western ideas and Western clothes, and though they had a little more freedom, they were still not supposed to meddle in the matters which were considered to be exclusively the work of their menfolk. It was far more important for a young woman of the upper classes to know the strict etiquette of the Japanese tea party or tea ceremony than it was for her to take up a career. And for a woman in her position to participate in politics, or even discuss them, was an unheard-of thing in Japan!

Most of the homes of the upper classes had a tiny hut in the back garden, known as the tea pavilion, where the ancient

ritual of the tea ceremony, or Cha-no-yu, took place. It was a picturesque performance, but it didn't quite make sense to the G.I. The tea ceremony is, in fact, a tea party given to a special guest. The G.I., thinking it was a real party, was greatly surprised when he was shown through a tiny garden, containing a small stream or well, to the pavilion, which was merely a tiny house, perhaps ten feet square. He crawled through a two-foot-high sliding door, in one of the sides of the building, and inside, found himself in a room entirely bare of furnishings, with the exception of a parchment hanging on one of the paper-latticed walls. A few strokes of a paint brush illustrated the parchment. This was a poem, emphasizing the beauty and simplicity of the proceedings.

With the other guests, the G.I. sat at one side of the room, and if he understood Japanese he would hear the guests admiring everything—the poem, the room, and particularly himself, the guest of honor. (The guest of honor was supposed to be admired above everything else at the tea ceremony.) After a long enough time had elapsed to allow the guests to admire everything, the hostess made her appearance. She would bow low to her guests, and a servant behind her would bring in a brazier of charcoal with a copper dish in its top containing boiling water. Several tea bowls, a water dipper, a thin bamboo spoon, a small lacquered jar containing the green powdered tea, and a wooden whisk would also be brought in. The hostess then prepared the tea.

In absolute silence, during which the guests were supposed to meditate, they watched their hostess go through the ritual of the ceremony. First each tea bowl, about the size of a large coffee cup, was carefully washed out with hot water. Then a spoonful of the green tea was put into the first tea bowl, water

poured on it, and the whole potion beaten into a froth with the wooden whisk. It was then handed to the guest of honor, who, after admiring the beauty of the cup, drank the tea, either in one gulp or in three small ones. The other guests then received their tea bowls, and the same procedure took place. Before the war, the guests received small, thin pieces of sweet rice cake, but now the sugar shortage eliminated this delicacy.

To the G.I., the green tea was very bitter, and the whole business left him bored. He liked the simple peasants much better. But his rich hosts were never the wiser. The G.I. was too smart for this. He knew they, too, were interested in their future, and he found he was the guest at many tea ceremonies where he was plied with their questions about America and other countries, and above all, about the new democratic Japan.

Madame Butterfly took an active part for the first time on April 10, 1946, in the future governing of her country. Wearing her best kimono and getas, the geisha girl, the peasant woman, the upper-class beauty and the prostitute flocked to the polls on this day to cast their vote in Japan's first democratic post-war election. They came from the remotest tiny villages, carrying their babies on their backs, many of them walking all night to be first at the election booth to cast their ballot. Even the girls of the upper classes, wearing their most precious finery, left their rich houses, for it was a great event, in fact, a holiday. This day celebrated the first step toward the emancipation of Japanese womanhood!

The men were silent and amazed. They had not thought it possible that their women would turn out like this. But they had; and Madame Butterfly upset Japan's post-war political applecart completely. Slightly less than half of all the votes were cast by women; and of the eighty-two women candidates, thirty-

nine were elected. The women of Nippon had thrown off restraint and taken the lead.

The new women members of the Diet were received rather coldly by the men. This did not deter them one bit. They promptly formed an association known as "a feminine club of members of parliament." In an opening speech, the president of the newly formed club stated that though they belonged to different parties it was necessary to "concentrate the power of women in parliament by throwing overboard party differences" and to "take up any problem, even the tiniest, the settlement of which the power of woman alone can accomplish." Once more the men gasped. But they could say nothing. Japanese women were in the Diet—to stay!

Another important fact, which they reluctantly accepted, was that the women had the powerful backing of Supreme Headquarters. In their hands, General MacArthur saw a brake against other Konoyes or Tojos, who might once more plunge Japan into war. Their showing at the polls was, to the Allies, the most encouraging feature of the first year of the occupation.

But some of the old Japanese felt very bitter about the new Japanese woman. Their entry into politics meant only one thing to them—trouble. They were nostalgic for the old-fashioned pre-war geisha, and were proud of her entertainment talent. One tearful old professor, mellow after two beers, begged the authors to *"Venez, goûtez nos geishas . . .* it is there you will savor the real Japan."

CHAPTER TEN

# THE LITTLE MEN AROUND MacARTHUR

AN INNOCENT-LOOKING, white-haired, kindly-faced officer in his mid-forties sat benignly behind a desk in a second-floor office at MacArthur's headquarters in the early months of the occupation.

In many ways he was the most feared man in Japan. As head of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, he was the Allied police chief, a sort of J. Edgar Hoover of the F.B.I. on an international scale. He kept the roster and records of Japan's war criminals and other undesirables; he liked, with a twinkle, to call it his Social Register. His name was Elliot Thorpe, and he came from Rhode Island. He was a brigadier general—one of the so-called "Little Men" around the Big Chief, MacArthur, men who did a tremendous lot of hard work for the occupation and got some credit but none of the glory.

General Thorpe was a career man in the Army. At the outbreak of the Pacific war he was military attaché in Java and got out one jump ahead of the rapidly advancing Japanese. Possessed of a curious mind—he's always picking up bits of fascinating but seemingly valueless information and putting them

together like a jig-saw puzzle—he wandered into Washington and asked to see the military intelligence file on Java. It consisted of a few travel pieces from the *National Geographic Magazine* and a typewritten article by some fellow who had visited Java before, during or just after the first World War.

This was a shock to General Thorpe, and he won't forget it. It was typical of the lack of attention we had paid to things Oriental before the war. And it is one reason why General Thorpe suggested, when he returned to Washington in 1946, that 100 high-ranking West Point graduates be assigned to Japan each year to live among the Japanese in their cities, learning the language and customs and filing reports on what they learn.

In that way, General Thorpe reasoned, you would build up an intelligence file on the Japanese and their country and you would build up within the Army—for the future, if needed—a corps of men who knew something about the Orient.

Not that we had no intelligence on Japan. But it could have been better. It could have been more detailed. And we could have used thousands more men in the armed forces with even a rudimentary knowledge of the Japanese language. Even now in peacetime, we should be training hundreds in the languages of the peoples who are the problems, the question marks. The Army officer of today should be required to speak with some facility one of these four languages: Russian, Chinese, Japanese, German. French, Italian and Spanish have their importance, but they are not the ones on which we should be concentrating.

Better intelligence on Japan, for example, would have obviated some of the mistakes we made early in the occupation, when men who had been dead for some time appeared on the lists of war criminal suspects; when dead Black Dragons were

supposedly live fugitives from justice; when the Black Dragon chief wandered on the loose for three months; when war correspondents who had known Germany and Japan were sometimes one step ahead of the military in pouncing upon Japanese war criminals; when menaces like Tojo and Konoye were free for weeks on end to visit their friends, implant their ideas for Japan's future in a young generation of diehards; when the head of the Liberal Party (Ichiro Hatoyama) who was about to become prime minister was debarred under the "purge" directive at the last minute after he had been unmasked as pro-Fascist by Allied correspondents in Tokyo.

The fumbles of early occupation days cannot be laid at General Thorpe's door. The weaknesses in general intelligence on Japan stemmed from fundamental and long-standing Allied failures and indifference to the Orient. Konoye's suicide and Tojo's bungled effort were failures in the chain of command that went on up to high levels and across the seas to Washington, London and other capitals. Men such as General Thorpe were agents of policy rather than creators of it. They acted on the decisions of others. They could supply information, but then had to wait for the green light.

But on the policy side, General Thorpe and his staff were responsible for two of the major MacArthur directives that, on paper at least, were big steps toward the remaking of Japan. They constructed the early directive which granted freedom of speech and thought, and revamped the notorious Japanese police system, abolishing the "thought control" police. And they fashioned the political purge directive of the first winter which debarred all militarists and ultra-nationalists from all top layers of government, education and other official life in Japan and set up a screening system (Japanese-operated, however) whereby

office-holders were to be sifted and the bad ones thrown out so that they might no longer influence the people or the course of government.

The purge hit the top brackets of the Japanese civil service and then moved on to the 3,384 candidates who hoped to run for the 466 seats in the Diet in the April 1946 elections. Of these, 252 were disqualified by the purge directive's terms, and nine of the total elected to the Diet were removed later. By the end of the first year of the occupation, the Japanese claimed they had carried out a substantial part of the purge by barring or disqualifying from public office more than 186,000 persons suspected or proved of ultra-nationalist or militarist persuasion or connection.

There were two jokers in this. One was that only about 900 Japanese had been kicked out of their jobs; the rest were merely barred from getting jobs in which they could influence the people.

The second joker was that the Japanese were by no means through the task of screening 400,000 educators for similar purposes. They had screened only 212,846 members of the school system and actually had removed only 107.

A third joker had been removed. This was Tamon Maeda, who for the first nine months of the occupation was Education Minister, and before the war was director of Japan's propaganda mill in New York, the Japan Institute. Until headquarters woke up to Maeda, he had been "helpful" in molding the policy and machinery for revamping Japan's educational system.

Maeda and the old-timers in the Education Ministry were those who helped to slow up the impact of the purge on the schools. They worked in the prefectures of Japan, far from the eyes of Allied Headquarters. The so-called screening com-

mittees which were set up at prefectural levels to scan the teachers' qualifications played county and ward politics in a big way. Teachers who should have been tossed out found they had "cousins" on the screening committees who juggled the records. Frequently an official who had been bounced from the Education Ministry at Tokyo landed on his feet in a prefectural educational association and resumed selling his particular brand of chauvinism.

MacArthur finally cracked down and said the prefectural screening committees themselves would be screened. If more than 50 per cent of a committee's membership was purged, then all the teachers it had screened would be put through the mill again.

Constantly turning up in the school system were Japanese like the teacher at Sasebo, on the island of Kyushu, who told his class that democracy was a "sin" and that he preferred to be hanged or otherwise killed by the occupation forces rather than give up his militaristic and imperialistic ideas. He was a former naval lieutenant.

School systems in provincial towns and cities remained much as they had been, despite the introduction of revised history books. At one boys' school, students were threatened with "flunking" because they protested against retention of a teacher who was a notorious militarist. At a girls' school, a sixth-grade teacher was demoted to a sewing class because she urged classroom discussions of controversial topics. At a primary school, teachers were ordered not to explain why one of the state Shinto shrines was being demolished.

The purge also extended to the Japanese publishing world. Editors and leading writers for newspapers and magazines were ousted, some of them (especially from Tokyo's three big dailies)

by their own staffs, long before the purge directive took effect. Headquarters arrested Inosuke Furuno, long the head of Japan's propagandistic Domei news agency, as a war criminal, but later released him. He was one of a collection of Japanese Goebbelses. In the same group was Taketora Ogata, long-time cabinet secretary and Board of Information chief, whose arrest was unduly delayed.

At first the purge directive, issued January 4, 1946, hit such men as career officers in the Army and Navy, heads of secret patriotic societies and executives of the financial groups and companies that exploited the territories occupied by Japan. It cut like a scythe through the ranks of the political parties which were tuning up for the April elections and preparing to put back in the Diet a group that would have been stooges for the old-line nationalists.

But the January directive did not go far enough to suit many officers at headquarters, for it did not touch civil servants below the rank of "Chokunin" (imperial appointments). Preliminary drafts of the directive as prepared by General Thorpe's office were passed around to various section chiefs. They scissored out parts they didn't like. The result was a directive far less harsh than Thorpe had intended.

Later, under successive nudgings from headquarters, the Japanese government, issuing "interpretations" of the original directive, extended it to include additional classifications, such as the press. It was extended, for example, to former Ambassadors of Japan in Germany and Italy from 1937 to the surrender; to all who had important roles in negotiating treaties with the Axis or in puppet states in Manchuria, China and Siam, or who had a hand in financial enslavement of those countries; to key officials of war-production companies; to members of wartime

cabinets and their special sections; to officers of a score of banks and exploitation companies which financed and developed Japan's fifteen years of aggression.

The elimination of some officeholders under the terms of the purge was delayed from time to time, where the Japanese government could prove their services were temporarily needed. Often there was suspicion that too many were being retained in this fashion.

Headquarters itself was not inclined to push the purge too rapidly. This was on the ground that you could not yank hundreds of thousands of persons from government offices overnight and expect anything but chaos to result. Headquarters looked to a more gradual weeding out of the undesirables.

Japan's housecleaning had scarcely got under way when General Thorpe, like so many other brigadiers who had done good work for their country, was "busted" one rank back to colonel. Thorpe was nothing if not a realist. He knew that the Japanese would interpret his loss of "one star" as a merited demotion rather than a piece of red tape on the part of the American Army. He knew that in Japanese eyes, he had "lost face." He knew that his effectiveness in the policing job would be impaired if not destroyed. And so he came home.

Later, he received an Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal, and the citation said, in part, that "his measures . . . were an important contribution to successful occupation and administration of Japan."

One officer who did not get his star, and who for this and other reasons was eventually lost to the occupation, was Colonel Raymond C. Kramer, a former New York department-store executive and an economic wizard who gave up a brilliant mer-

cantile career to serve his country. At forty-four, he was MacArthur's chief economist and was handed the job of breaking up the Zaibatsu, or financial cliques, those moneyed families which had a stranglehold on Japan's financial and commercial life and which had been part and parcel of fifteen years of aggression.

Kramer had unlimited energy, an extraordinary capacity for analyzing complicated situations, an equally extraordinary capacity for work, and boundless enthusiasm for his job. But he had enemies in Washington, and even his own sturdy physique felt the strain of the high-pressure days of the occupation. One star, pinned to this officer's shoulder, probably would have kept him at headquarters for a longer time. But he was only human after all, and he was serving at great personal sacrifice. He went home and an artillery man was handed his job.

We suspect that Colonel Kramer was too efficient and set too fast a pace for the run-of-the-mine Army officer. He left them gasping. He had the Japanese on the ropes, too.

Koyata Iwasaki, president of Mitsubishi Honsha, one of the biggest financial combines, used to sit up late at night with Kramer, amicably plotting the dissolution of these great trusts. After one such session Iwasaki handed Kramer a glittering harakiri knife, and said with what amounted to a smile:

"Inasmuch as you are forcing Japanese industry to commit hara-kiri, perhaps you would like to have the knife."

As Colonel Kramer saw it, the breakup of the Zaibatsu was the key to economic democracy in Japan. It was, moreover, the key to economic peace in the Orient. Colonel Kramer argued that if you were going to destroy Japan's war potential, you would have to destroy the monopoly power of the few families as well as destroy the factories that made the guns, ships, tanks

and airplanes. For the power of the Zaibatsu over Japan's economy was unparalleled in any other capitalistic, industrialized country. It was a case of 1 per cent of the people controlling 99 per cent of the business.

Just fifteen of these gigantic combines turned out 51 per cent of Japan's coal, 69 per cent of the aluminum, 50 per cent of the paper and pulp, 20 per cent of the rayon, 88 per cent of the steam engines, 69 per cent of the locomotives, 50 per cent of the airplanes, 88 per cent of the soda, 43 per cent of the ammonia sulphate, 33 per cent of the silk, 49 per cent of the synthetic dyes and 30 per cent of the explosives.

Banks controlled by the Zaibatsu houses held 57 per cent of the assets and 71 per cent of the loans and advances of all ordinary banks. The Zaibatsu banks held 99 per cent of the assets of all of Japan's savings banks. They controlled 69 per cent of all trust company assets, 74 per cent of fire-insurance company assets, 38 per cent of life-insurance company assets.

The Zaibatsu had a grip on basic industries, on basic finance. There was no diffusion of business initiative in Japan, no reward for individual enterprise. There was little or no "middle class" such as developed in England and the United States under the industrial revolutions. Successive Japanese governments had played along with and married into the financial families since feudal times. Wages were held down, labor unions blocked, political independence stifled. The Zaibatsu were the paymasters of the Tojos and all the other rabid militarists who planned the major moves of Nippon.

Never had Japan had a Sherman Anti-Trust Act, a commissioner of corporations, a Federal Trade Commission, a Securities and Exchange Commission. In Japan, business had grown to bigness that reached absolute monopoly. The Zaibatsu were

collective trusts of unrelated enterprises. They were unholy alliances, in Colonel Kramer's words, of enterprises that had no business being under one roof.

The House of Mitsui was a beautiful example of the Zaibatsu technique. It showed how one family exercised financial control by acting as a unit under law, custom and family rules. There were eleven official Mitsui families, all operating as a unit under family rules. All major decisions were made by a family council of family heads. An individual member of the family could be dismissed for incompetence. Family members could not engage in business without consent of the council.

Mitsui had substantial investments in 173 companies. The parent holding company and its twenty-two major subsidiaries had total operating capital of more than seven billion yen. At pre-war rates of exchange, this was about $2,333,333,333. Many of the 173 Mitsui subsidiaries had subsidiaries of their own. One had 185.

Dating back 300 years to Sokubei Mitsui, who broke from the warrior tradition to enter the mercantile business as a brewer of saké the House led in foreign trade, mining, machinery, chemicals, shipbuilding, lumber, rubber, metal, banking, insurance, trusts, real estate, fertilizer, shipping, textiles and paper. It was the outgrowth of feudal days when trading companies and merchants lent money to the government and obtained favors in return, such as coal mines. Mitsui got in on the ground floor with the militarists and imperialists during the nineteenth century. It put its money mostly on the side of the emperors, an investment that paid off until the end of the war.

One of the seventeenth-century Mitsuis started a money-lending business in Kyoto. He branched into dry goods. In the middle of the last century the Mitsuis were issuing paper money

for the central government and local feudal lords. They founded cotton mills, paper mills, and silk-reeling plants.

In Japan's wars, Mitsui did well for itself by lending money and selling goods to the government. When the wars paid off with colonial gains, Mitsui was able to invest in Korea, Formosa, China and Manchuria. In less lush times, Mitsui gobbled up smaller companies that were having trouble.

With its control of banking, Mitsui, like the other Zaibatsu, turned its finances into simple, internal bookkeeping. Financial capital in Japan was hardly more than a revolving fund, revolving among the big families like Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. Those were the "Big Four." Fifteen other Zaibatsu were identified in the early months of the occupation. By the end of the first year, forty Zaibatsu groups had been "identified" as if under a microscope. They involved more than 1,200 separate companies.

It would take a Solomon to unravel the intricacies of Zaibatsu finance. There was tremendous pyramiding of capital, interlocking of directorates, agreements to share technology, credit arrangements. Someone who knew Wall Street, like Colonel Kramer, could make a start on the job.

It was complicated, too, by the compulsory cartelization which the Japanese, like the Germans, instituted during this war. This program required business firms to join "control associations" (most of which have not been liquidated) which established production quotas and allocations, fixed prices and wielded tremendous economic influence. Of course, Zaibatsu executives usually headed the most important control associations. Such groups were important factors in slowing Allied directives for reconversion of Japanese industry in the first occupation year.

In the provincial factory towns they slowed sizzling fast balls from MacArthur to gentle curves.

The breakup of the Zaibatsu was proceeding slowly at the time of this writing, but it was proceeding. Allied nations had already seized foreign properties of the Zaibatsu, which were roughly 14 per cent of their total assets. About 5 per cent more of their assets would be taken in Japan's reparations, with priority going to removal or stripping of war plants controlled by Zaibatsu interests.

Zaibatsu power also was threatened by Colonel Kramer's program—promulgated by MacArthur, worked into detail by the Japanese government—for stiff taxes and a capital levy. There was to be a 100 per cent tax on all war industries, and a tax steeply graduated up to 100 per cent for all other corporations and individuals. And to make the profiteers show their hidden deposits, a new yen issue was to replace the old. On top of this, there was to be a capital levy at rates as high as 70 per cent.

MacArthur and Kramer were determined to show the Japanese that war does not pay. For this purpose they included Hirohito in the war profits tax and capital levy plans. The overall yield from both measures was expected to be well over 100 billion yen, or 33 billion dollars at pre-war rates, which would provide a cushion for putting government finances on a peacetime basis.

After conferences among Kramer and the leaders of the Big Four Zaibatsu, a basic plan was evolved for smashing these economic monopolies. Only part of it has gone into effect because there are some "bugs" in it that will bear examination.

The plan, as put forward by the Japanese government, called for formation of a "holding company liquidation commission," to be Japanese-manned but subject to Allied control. All securi-

ties, cash and other assets were to be transferred from the Big Four holding companies to the liquidation commission. All holding company directors and auditors were to resign and retire from public life.

The commission would give the holding companies receipts for such transferred properties, but the receipts would be non-negotiable, non-transferable and ineligible for use as collateral.

Then the holding companies' shares were to be sold publicly at controlled prices and in controlled amounts, with identification of the new shareholders and their financial backing required. After such public sale, the receipts originally given to the Zaibatsu would be redeemed with bonds to be issued by the Japanese government. These would not be payable for ten years. They would be non-negotiable, non-transferable (except by inheritance) and ineligible as collateral. The bonds would be paid off, when due, from the proceeds derived from the sale of the properties and shares of the liquidated holding companies.

Preference was to be given in sale of the Zaibatsu shares to employees of the companies involved. None of the Zaibatsu was to be given permission to buy back any property.

"Eternal vigilance," said Colonel Kramer, "will be needed to make this plan work and to prevent puppets from getting control of the Zaibatsu shares."

The American government was not satisfied with this program beyond the stage of the formation of the liquidation commission and its possession of Zaibatsu assets. A special mission soon went out from the State Department to look into the question, and it formulated recommendations that were secret at the time of writing. They were to be hashed over in the Far Eastern Commission at Washington and sent out to MacArthur as policy directives for implementation.

Those who studied the original Zaibatsu dissolution plan wanted to be sure about several things. Some thought the scheme to pay off the Zaibatsu with government bonds did not penalize the Zaibatsu financially and created a vested, conservative clique of bondholders who could still exercise great influence in government policy. The one hope was that the stiff war-profits tax and capital levy would wipe out the Zaibatsu bondholders, or at least cripple them.

Second, there was doubt whether the public at large in Japan —even the Zaibatsu employees—had the money to buy up the shares that would be dumped on the market. Or, it was asked, if they did buy them, would they be acting as dummies for higher-ups in the pay of the dispossessed Zaibatsu families?

The State Department group of experts that looked into the question came back with this one: "Do alternative groups exist in Japan which have the funds and the ability to replace the Zaibatsu?"

They pointed out that savings by individuals in Japan were ordinarily scanty and badly distributed. But during the war years savings skyrocketed, and a total of 10 million Japanese individuals were able to amass savings that in 1944 totaled 80 billion yen. These were liquid savings, exclusive of savings in currency. This total was ten or more times the amount needed to buy up Zaibatsu holdings.

Such savings were reflected partly in the Postal Savings System and the Central Cooperative Bank of Agriculture and Forestry, in which they totaled 57 billion yen. These cooperatives have plenty of money and are looking for industrial properties to purchase. One trouble is that the agricultural cooperatives have come to be dominated by the government and by large landowners.

The question that was asked, therefore, was: Would you exchange a conservative industrial class for a conservative agrarian class? Would you merely create a new Zaibatsu?

There was another group in Japan that might bid for Zaibatsu holdings: the small and medium businessmen who had been crowded out during the war but still had the industrial know-how, even if not too much cash.

The answer may be nationalization (as the British have proposed for the war industries of the Ruhr). But that's a short cut from feudalism to socialism, or from feudalistic capitalism, if you will. The Americans are still in the driver's seat in Japan, and we have no reason to suspect they are willing to drive that far.

A third star at MacArthur's headquarters was Brigadier General Kenneth R. Dyke, a New York advertising and radio executive who had seen the occupation of Germany as a youngster in the first World War. During the second World War he had handled information and education activities for the troops in MacArthur's command. In Japan, he took over Civil Information and Education for the Japanese.

It was Dyke's job to watch over the mental intake and output of the defeated enemy. He generally did a good job. It was not his fault that the Japanese slowed the effect, in the rural schools, of the directives revamping the educational system. He had no police force at his call to check on compliance. The program was sound. It encompassed the rewriting of textbooks; the screening of 400,000 educators under the "purge" directive; and introduction of the Roman alphabet. Besides this, he started the ball rolling on the re-education of Prince Akihito.

Two other major jobs that General Dyke tackled were the

remaking of the Japanese press, radio, stage and screen along free, democratic lines, and the cutting of fetters that made millions of Japanese slaves to the State-sponsored religion of Shintoism, the "Way of the Gods."

The press, radio and theater had been tools of the military and the government in Japan. To Dyke was handed the task of making them free. Ironically, he had to be sure that the press did not become so free that it impaired the success of the occupation. So a censorship office was set up. It worked, actually, under General Thorpe's section of headquarters, but it worked closely with General Dyke's office because he supplied much of the new material for which the censors were to ensure a proper break in the press.

Dyke had to tell the Japanese the true story of the war. It was the story, factually, of Allied victories, Japanese defeats. And it was the story of Japanese war guilt, of war criminality, of war excesses. The press had to print large doses of it, week by week. It was effective. It started the Japanese thinking about the causes of their defeat. It gave the country a sense—slowly, of course—of its responsibility for the disaster. It discredited the military. It let the people know what a long road lay ahead to respectability.

Further, Dyke's office saw to it that the Japanese had access to all possible information about the democracies and how they worked. This involved everything from establishing libraries on dull, constitutional subjects to importing the best three or four dozen American motion pictures, for which the Japanese were literally starving.

General Dyke and his staff reviewed all Japanese movie scenarios and the manuscripts of stage plays. They scanned old-established repertoires in the classical and popular theaters,

weeding out the themes of blood lust, the cult of the sword, the ideal of revenge.

Dyke and the censors who were attached to General Thorpe's office had their hands full with the Japanese press. But they made it so free that inside of a year it was even taking veiled cracks at the occupation policy. This was permitted, however, on the theory that criticism was healthy if it was not subversive, if it was constructive and not combative to the broad purposes of the occupation. However, when the Japanese editors overstepped the bounds or cut corners, Dyke was after them like a terrier after a rat. There were frequent suspensions of papers for twenty-four hours because their contents strayed from the path toward freedom.

Finally, Dyke came home too. Like Colonel Kramer, he had served at great personal sacrifice. He had to think of his own future in radio. And some of the old-timers at headquarters were not sorry to see him go. He was far ahead of them in his knowledge and ability at public relations, and they assumed that anyone with so much on the ball must have been left of center, or slightly pink. Dyke, too, had become, *according to headquarters,* too big, too intelligent, for his brigadier's breeches.

Another on MacArthur's staff had been there since the prewar days in Manila. He was public relations man and actual chief censor during the war and in the first two months of the occupation. But when MacArthur's strict censorship of the Allied press corps was abolished, the correspondents put the skids under the General's publicity man and censor—Brigadier General LeGrande A. Diller.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

# "CALL IT WHIMSY, IF YOU LIKE. . . ."

"THANK YOU for helping me attain my goal of seeing that General MacArthur got credit for everything in the Pacific and making sure that he was appointed Supreme Commander." So, to his G.I. staff in Tokyo, said Brigadier General Diller, one of the little clique who had been with the New Mikado since the dark days of 1940–41–42.

Diller's job during the war and in the first two months of the occupation had been to sell MacArthur to the rest of the world. The General didn't need any "selling," as a matter of fact. He was a leader, a brilliant military man in many ways, colorful, and a personality in his own right. But, with the help of sycophantic correspondents who scrambled for small favors, and aided by a ruthless system of censorship which was political as well as military, the Public Relations Office of MacArthur's headquarters built MacArthur into a demigod.

Now, the General wasn't any more divine than Hirohito. He was a human being, like the rest of us, and he made mistakes, like the rest of us. But you never would have suspected either fact from the lush, purple prose that poured out of headquarters

during the war. The communiqués were as resounding as the Declaration of Independence, as romantic as a novel by Harold Bell Wright. High officers who served under MacArthur and who were privileged to read the top-secret operational dispatches as various battles progressed on the long road back from Australia have confessed privately that they shuddered when they compared the stark dispatches with the fulsome communiqués. And the G.I. up forward who was still getting shot at and seeing his buddies killed got just a bit tired of reading that the war was all but over and the enemy completely befuddled. Worst of all, the taxpayer and war-worker back home was inclined to slack off on the job when he read day after day that the war was just a breeze out in MacArthur's part of the Pacific.

The censorship under MacArthur was strictly controlled by the Public Relations Office. This was not only a contradiction of functions, but it violated accepted War Department practice. One side was supposed to put out the news and help correspondents get it. The other was the watchdog of military security. In MacArthur's command you hardly ever knew who was a censor and who was a publicity agent.

The principal rule of censorship was: you cannot contradict the official communiqué—even when it is wrong. In Australia, at the outset of the trip back to the Philippines, correspondents understood that communiqués would not always be strictly accurate, because it was an Oriental theater of combat, and face-saving meant a lot in the Orient.

The inaccurate communiqués were many. But the correspondents could do nothing—unless they wanted to get out, go home and tell the story there. Nothing was more useless to a newspaper than a correspondent whose credentials had been lifted.

In Japan, as we have noted in the Navy story, a team of Navy

historians was informed by MacArthur: "I have nothing particular to say to you, gentlemen, except that your history shall agree with my communiqués."

In Europe, the communiqués issued by General Eisenhower generally agreed with history. Eisenhower told his field commanders: "I consider the correspondents to be quasi-staff officers."

In the Pacific, General Diller said the correspondents were a bunch of "two-bit palookas and sportswriters." Some of those palookas had been all over the world as correspondents for leading newspapers and agencies. They had been shot at and bombed long before war came to the Pacific. They were to remember the epithet on October 6, 1945, the day that military censorship was lifted in Tokyo.

That was not long after correspondents had been prohibited from giving a truthful description of how they were fended off from the American Embassy in Tokyo at bayonet point (the bayonets were American, too) when they tried to get close enough to give a visual, factual account of the emperor's visit to MacArthur. Harold Isaacs, then correspondent for *Newsweek,* drew the retort classic when he protested to General Diller and asking the whys and wherefores of such censorship:

"Well, call it whimsy, if you like. . . ."

Whimsy, that was the word for it. There had been more of the same for a time under Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific, until the Navy Department and half a dozen correspondents conspired to "ax" the public relations officer. The Admiral didn't know what was going on; he was a fighting man and he had his hands full.

On the ending of censorship in Tokyo, Kelley was able to report—and the New York *Herald Tribune* stood by him—that

"one of the most disgraceful episodes of the war" had been terminated. He had been subjected, along with most of the press corps, to autocratic control, insults, arrogance and old-fashioned stupidity.

The public, which was entitled to a free press within security limits, was often given a distorted view of the war's progress. Through censorship, the belief was spread that American arms hardly ever suffered reverses, that our commanders never made mistakes, that our enemies never taught us lessons, that the Allied occupation of Japan was a bang-up success from the word go.

In the Philippines, censorship operated politically to prevent truthful reporting of the fact that many Filipinos did not want independence; that Filipinos engaged in looting and other violence. A communiqué claimed that Manila had fallen when the battle had just begun. Eyewitness stories of the terrible destruction wrought to the capital were blue-penciled or held up.

Nor could we tell what a hard battle it had been to wrest the Clark Field-Fort Stotsenburg area on Luzon from the Japanese. Homer Bigart (later awarded the Pulitzer Prize) was greeted on arriving at headquarters on Leyte with a plea that he begin his job by answering an "unfair" review in the *Herald Tribune* of a laudatory book on MacArthur. Later he was informed that he could send his magnificent eyewitness story of a "lost battalion" if he just called it a lost "patrol."

And at the opening of the battle of Leyte, radio correspondents who had recorded in advance some remarks by Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid (whose ships of the 7th Fleet brought in the troops) were informed that the speech would not be permitted to go on the air.

*"Nothing,"* said General Diller, *"shall be said or done this*

*day to detract from the personal publicity or glorification of the commander-in-chief."*

MacArthur, you see, was setting foot again in the Philippines.

On Leyte, too, an over-optimistic communiqué disclosed after two weeks of battle that the end of the Leyte-Samar campaign was in sight. (The battle was to be a hard one, and it lasted three months.) General Diller explained to the correspondents: "There's an election back home in a few days, and we've got to stay on the front page."

General Diller gave way in November 1945, to Brigadier General Frayne Baker, an affable, politically-wise National Guardsman from North Dakota. Doors that had slammed in our faces at headquarters suddenly flew open. We began to get the news. But this was too much for the old-time section chiefs; they instituted censorship at the source. They wouldn't talk without "clearance" from public relations officers; they wanted questions in advance.

So sensitive was headquarters to the free play of world opinion that it had daily digests of American dispatches radioed back from Washington. It was a quick check on "loyal" correspondents.

Today General LeGrande A. Diller holds the rank of colonel. The War Department's post-war shuffle of brigadier generals, reducing many of them to the rank of colonel, was in many respects a very bad plan. Some should never have been reduced; but in the case of "Killer" Diller, taking away the silver star was praiseworthy and commendable. In fact, if the "two-bit palookas and sportswriters" had been asked for their advice on the matter, they would have suggested that the thin-lipped Diller be given a rank not exceeding that of corporal.

It seemed to the press that Diller spent his short life as a

general trying to curry favor with General MacArthur. Indeed, after the first few weeks of the occupation, correspondents noted that there was a strange parallel between Hirohito's personal adviser, the Marquis Kido, and the Supreme Commander's propagandist. For example, Hirohito was carefully guarded from all visitors, and even from the members of his own government by his faithful servant. The foreign minister might have an audience with the "Son of God" only if Kido was present.

The star-spangled Diller employed the same tactics with correspondents and visitors. There were people who spoke *nastily* about General MacArthur, calling him such names as the "Second Divinity" or "The New Son of Heaven," and it is possible that Diller believed them and took a few pages from Kido's book. A correspondent representing an important syndicate, paper or magazine which idolized the Great Man could have an *audience* with him as soon as he arrived in the theater. The bad boys, those *nasty* people, who tried to tell the story of the occupation with a little more objectivity, and who were not above criticizing the Great Man, found that he was always "too busy" to see them. In fact, the General's mouthpiece would remark in a voice filled with pain, "How can you possibly disturb the General at a time like this?" or, with a slight note of sternness, would ask irritably, "Just what is it you want to know? The General has no time for silly questions," or with some other remark would delay or prevent altogether an interview with MacArthur.

This occurred to such "two-bit palookas" as William McGaffin of the Chicago *Daily News*, Robert Cochrane of the Baltimore *Sun*, Richard Lauterbach of *Life*, David Brown of Reuters, Lachie McDonald of the London *Daily Mail*, and many others. If a correspondent "saw the light," then all his troubles were

over. Of course, there were other ways to deal with a wayward correspondent. If he left Japan for a short visit to Korea or China, then it suddenly became very difficult to get back.

Some of these methods were carried on after Diller handed the reins over to Brigadier General Frayne Baker. Gordon Walker of the *Christian Science Monitor,* a correspondent who did a good job and criticized General MacArthur on many occasions, found after a visit to Korea that he was no longer welcome in Japan. Some *nasty* people say that General Baker did not want him back, while there are others who suggest the Great Man was not particularly happy about the *Christian Science Monitor* being represented at all in Japan.

One of the authors spent nearly seven months trying to interview the Supreme Commander. The event did not take place until the day before his departure. It had become noticeable that all correspondents were welcome to an off-the-record interview just as they were about to leave. This was called by the irreverent, "getting the MacArthur line for editors only." One correspondent came out of the Supreme Commander's oak-paneled office, after such an interview, looking slightly flushed. The General had talked for nearly one hour and at the same time had shaken a half-empty match box rhythmically up and down within two feet of the visitor's nose. The Supreme Commander showed clearly how thin-skinned he was toward criticism of any kind during that interview.

"Why are the British papers playing the Russian game?" the Supreme Commander asked at the start of the interview. There was no answer, because the General answered it himself immediately. "There is a letter in the London *Times,* criticizing me and the whole occupation, written by Sir Robert Craigie (pre-war British Ambassador to Japan). There was a silence for

a moment. "That," said MacArthur, with a note of finality in his voice, "is playing the Russian game." There *was* no reply.

Diller, of course, had a number of devoted assistants—particularly a certain Colonel Richard Powell, among others—whose main purpose in life seemed to be to misguide correspondents, and the fact that, in doing so, they succeeded in misleading the public on many occasions apparently never struck them. They lived well, never stepped out of line, and the only warlike sound they heard was perhaps a door banging behind a frustrated correspondent.

There were some among them, such as Lieutenant Colonel Luther Reid, who tried to do a good job and were conscious of Diller's attitude to the press. These officers honestly endeavored to help, but were themselves controlled.

Diller and Co. were expert at passing the buck. If the public relations section issued an order affecting correspondents, it was always "after careful consideration by General MacArthur." They rarely accepted responsibility for anything. Diller cracked the whip over the correspondents during the war, but two months after the end of the Pacific struggle, it broke in his hand.

Sure of MacArthur's backing on everything, confident that he had the "two-bit palookas and sportswriters" tied down, Diller decided to ration the number of correspondents from all over the world coming into Japan and Korea. Wearing his "100 mission" crusher-hat (he had never been attached to the Airforce), and with the huge silver stars hanging from his shoulders, Diller told a group of correspondents it was simply "a question of billeting." Colonel Powell, tall and gaunt, his eyebrows meeting over his eyes, stood by his chief, ready to repel all counterattacks.

The quota was not complimentary to Great Britain. It "allowed" that country only four "specials," and Reuters News Agency was not considered on a par with American agencies such as Associated Press and United Press. The British news agency was granted very few press representatives in Japan and none at all in Korea. Though the bulk of the press allotments went to the United States, the American correspondents stood solidly with the British correspondents and those of seven other countries in refusing to accept the quota plan because of the principles involved. The public relations section blamed the War Department and General MacArthur in the same breath, but it was generally believed the quota had been the handiwork of "Killer" Diller. The quota had its good points, for it unified the correspondents for the first time, and it resulted in the forming of Tokyo's first press club, known throughout the Far East today as "No. 1 Shimbun Alley."

The "counterattack" began when a general meeting of all correspondents took place in Radio Tokyo, and the "Tokyo Correspondents' Association" was founded, with Howard Handleman of International News Service as the first president and one of the authors as secretary. Diller's ears must have burned during that first meeting, for he was referred to in very uncomplimentary terms. It was clear the "two-bit palookas and sportswriters" were fed up with being pushed around. It was decided, at this first meeting, to notify (officially) the Supreme Commander that the association would set up its own press hostel and provide accommodation, no matter how bad, for all correspondents "whatever his creed, race, or color," arriving in Japan.

The quota died a sudden death. Already smarting under the outburst of stories which followed the lifting of censorship, Diller was once more lashed by hard-hitting, bitter stories in

such papers as the New York *Times*, New York *Herald Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Newsweek*, *Time* and others. General MacArthur was also sharply criticized for "applying dictatorial powers to the world's press." Diller cannot have been very popular with his chief as a result—unless, of course, the quota had been the Great Man's idea. This, however, the correspondents were unable to confirm. The Supreme Commander, whether he had been the originator of the quota or not, saved Diller's face by issuing a directive abolishing it. This ruling had the proviso, however, that the correspondents would billet themselves. Shortly after, "Killer" Diller left for a "forty-five-day rest" in the United States. When he returned, General Baker was sitting in his chair. For the first time, it seemed Diller's wrist had been severely smacked by his chief.

The correspondents, meanwhile, were house-hunting for premises which would be suitable for setting up a press club. In an alley behind Supreme Headquarters they found a large five-story building, which seemed to fit their purpose. The building, a Japanese restaurant called the Marunouchi Kaikan, smelled of fish. It was filthy from basement to roof, and was badly in need of repair, but the rain did not come in, and, above all, there was a bar.

Headquarters made it clear that, though they would help to install certain necessary equipment, such as showers on all floors, sit-down toilets instead of Japanese porcelain slit-trenches, field cooking ranges in the kitchen instead of dilapidated charcoal affairs, they would not requisition the building. Taking over the restaurant and signing a lease with its owner was to be left entirely to the correspondents' association.

Now, the "upside-down" methods of the Japanese are well known, and the three correspondents who were delegated the

job of securing the building by the association ran around in circles for weeks, trying to find somebody who had power to sign a lease. Apparently, several parties were interested in the building, and somehow they had heard the building was about to be taken over by the Army for the press, but that the correspondents were willing to pay the rent.

The only person found was the restaurateur, the original lessee. He, however, had a landlord, who paid rent to a second landlord, who owned all the buildings in the block. This gentleman, in turn, paid further rent to the Mitsubishi Company, which controlled everything.

It was impossible to get them all together at the same time for the negotiations to begin, and none of them would act without the others being present. Endless discussions took place at which much saké was drunk and much double-talk handed out but no agreement reached. The three "negotiators," at the end of two weeks, were completely mixed up, for they did not know who had power to lease the building. Was it the original lessee? The number one or number two landlord? Or was it the Mitsubishi Company?

They finally lost their already badly frayed tempers and told the original lessee and the Mitsubishi Company that if they could not bring all parties together so that the matter might be discussed, then the correspondents' association would ask the Army to requisition the building. The bluff worked. Discussions took place, and a lease was prepared and signed by the original lessee. How it was worked out with number one and two landlords and the Mitsubishi Company, the correspondents never found out. The most important clause in the lease stated that the owners of the building would make "incidental repairs." A wrangle then began between the various interested parties as

to who the "owners" really were. They all wanted to have a crack at the rent, but nobody wanted to pay for the repairs.

The "incidental repairs" were considerable. The building was a contractor's nightmare. The boilers and the pipes for the heating system had been requisitioned by the government for munitions. The sewers were choked, and somebody had stolen the manhole covers. The heavy doors to the banqueting rooms on every floor had been removed. The elevator did not work because somebody had taken several parts of the motor. The archaic lighting system was always exploding; the fuses had been removed and "jumped" with heavy electric wire. To top it all, one hundred panes of glass were missing. There was fresh water only in the kitchen, and the electric motor which ran the refrigeration room wouldn't work.

Then there was the dirt. Years of accumulated rubbish had been thrown in the back yard, providing a breeding ground for all sorts of multilegged things which, when they were disturbed, crawled out to peer at the new tenants. Rats ran across the kitchen floor, even with people in the room. The kitchen walls and ceiling were black with the soot of decades.

The Army supplied a contractor, who for a time worked under the direction of an engineer officer. Some fifty Jap laborers hammered, painted, and scrubbed night and day for nearly two weeks, until the contractor began to show some nervousness about his bill. The Japanese who signed the lease said he was not going to pay. Number one and two landlords said they had no intention of paying. Mitsubishi had not made up their minds. Then the Japanese government came into the picture. They decided Mitsubishi would pay. Mitsubishi promptly said it was not their affair, as they did not own the building—they only collected part of the rent. The correspondents persuaded the contractor

to continue, even though *they didn't know* who was going to pay.

At the end of a month the contractor, still very worried, but urging his men on to finish the repairs by a certain date, estimated that the bill would come to six thousand dollars. One thing was certain—the correspondents had no intention of paying for the "incidental repairs." The work, however, was going ahead. Showers had been installed; banqueting rooms had been partitioned; toilets had been put in; the elevator and the sewers had been fixed. New glass showed in the windows, though the Japanese were constantly putting ladders through them. The kitchen had been scraped and repainted; brand-new field kitchens now replaced the Japanese cookers; doors were hung; window sashes were renewed; and the refrigerator now worked.

Meanwhile, General Diller's promised supply of blankets, sheets, pillow-cases and beds arrived. In order to get the press men out of the Dai-Iti Hotel, to make room for the hundreds of colonels and other officers who arrived every week, Diller had the beds and other equipment flown from Manila in two special C-47's. To give Diller his due, he did not let the correspondents down on his part of the deal.

There was still no sign of the boilers, pipes or radiators for heating the building. The contractor explained that the Japanese government did not know where the heating equipment was. The Japanese government official, who visited the press club daily, told a different story. According to him, the Japanese government was not responsible for restoring the heating system, even though they had taken it out in the first place! Then came the old question, which was becoming very familiar to the ears of correspondents. If, he asked, the heating system was put back, who was going to pay?

Donald Starr of the Chicago *Tribune,* an experienced trouble-shooter with the Japanese—he had a running fight each week to bring out the *Tribune's* overseas edition—put it to the Japanese government official bluntly.

"You took the boilers, pipes and radiators out so that they would be turned into shells and thrown back at us. Now you put the damned things right back again.

"Let Mitsubishi pay, and they can charge you. Then the Japanese government can put the whole thing against the bill for the occupation. You know damned well you'll never pay that anyway."

Several weeks elapsed before the Japs decided to return the radiators and pipes, but on hearing more work was to be added to the already long list, the contractor threw up his hands and threatened to quit. He was pacified and promised everything but a house in the country by the correspondents, who by this time were themselves feeling worried. Just who *was* going to pay for all this work?

Meanwhile, the Army had given the press club a cook and an assistant. They began to recruit a staff, and the morning after advertisements appeared in the local press a queue of nearly 2,000 had gathered about the doors of the club. They rioted twice, as they tried to push through the doors to the table where Robert Cochrane of the Baltimore *Sun,* Donald Starr and one of the authors sat with the Army cook, interviewing applicants. Some spoke English, others a mixture of Japanese and Chinese, others just stood before the table and giggled. And everybody seemed to have the name of Suzuki.

There were cooks who had never been in a kitchen; barmen who had never opened a bottle of beer; boilermen who had never

seen a boiler; typists who had never typed; and so-called geishas, who wanted to do other things besides work.

They all had one idea—to get into an American-run establishment where it would be warm during the winter, and especially where there was the rosy prospect of food. They did not want wages. They wanted to be paid in food, and many of them left when they were told the club could not hire them on that basis.

Out of the 2,000 applicants, seventy were employed. Two excellent barmen who were promptly named Smithy and Jackson were chosen. Some twenty waitresses, who were later known as "Cochrane's children" (after Robert Cochrane, who taught them how to walk straight and set tables, not to mention the art of setting a plate of soup down before a guest, instead of pouring it down the back of his neck), began work immediately, cleaning and scrubbing. These girls, all about sixteen to twenty, were tired-looking, shabby little creatures who needed help, for most of them had suffered greatly during the war. Their clothes were filthy and verminous, and few of them had shoes. An Army nurse, Lieutenant Rosella Browning of New York, without whom the club would never have opened, took over the job of restoring the femininity these nervous little creatures had once possessed. "Brownie," an excellent "moonlight-requisitioner," procured from somewhere several parachutes and from the silk, togged out the waitresses. Stockings, shoes and underwear seemed to come out of the blue. She saw to it that the girls bathed twice a day, brushed their hair and manicured their nails. She even found lipsticks, powders and creams, and showed them how to use them. She saw to it they had absolute privacy in the dormitory, which the club provided for them, and their own bathroom and toilets. After a week of bathing, and eating regular

meals, the waitresses became new people, but at the end of two months they had put on too much weight. They were bursting out of their new clothes. Their diet had to be carefully watched, as the American food proved much too rich after years of rice and soya beans.

Then there were the room boys, the boilermen, the dishwashers, chefs and cooks, a carpenter and two little boys aged twelve, who had walked ten miles to get jobs and insisted on being porters. The place swarmed with people, and everybody seemed to bring their brothers and sisters and sometimes their parents to work with them. The correspondents knew they had hired seventy workers, but within a few days this number had increased to at least a hundred. They had to be carefully weeded out and watched. Half of Tokyo wanted to work in the new press club.

Laborers, painters, plumbers and electricians crawled all over the building, pushing in pipes and knocking down walls, while the new staff cleaned and scraped and scrubbed. Then the DDT unit from the Army arrived and sprayed the whole place from top to bottom, leaving behind a pungent smell of kerosene which lasted for days. Everything was confused—and in the confusion somebody started knocking off the silver.

When an inventory was taken, spoons, knives, plate and china had disappeared. For the first time, the Army authorities really became interested. A search was instituted and the missing articles, along with much more, were found in a basement in the next building. The restaurateur had been busy moving club property out during the hours of darkness. From that time on, a careful watch was kept.

The correspondents were extremely busy. Day after day trucks would pull up outside the club with liquor from the

Navy, or food from the Army, or PX supplies from the Air Force. Everybody was subscribing. The various Army units, remembering favors from the correspondents, helped nobly. General Eichelberger presented the club with a radio; the Red Cross gave hundreds of records and a phonograph.

Then came the great day. The name of the street was officially changed by the correspondents to "Shimbun Alley," meaning Newspaper Alley, and the 1st Cavalry division presented the club with a huge white sign, which was hung over the door. Correspondents also placed at strategic points all over Tokyo yellow signs, pointing out the way to the new club. That night, the correspondents, in a body, cleared out of the Dai-Iti Hotel and into the club. The plumbers and painters were still plumbing and painting, but the bar had officially opened and drinks were on the house. The first dinner was a great success, though the Japanese cooks put too much pepper in the soup and forgot to fry the steak until the very last moment. But nobody complained.

The opening was slightly marred by the contractor, however, who, without realizing the importance of the occasion, had to start asking the same old question—who was going to pay? Somebody told him not to worry . . . Hirohito and General MacArthur were personally looking into the matter. He brightened considerably.

The club became famous for three things. One was the food and the cooking, which was considered the best in Tokyo, and credit for this must go to two correspondents, Robert Cochrane of the Baltimore *Sun,* and, later, Duane Henessy of the Associated Press, who bought supplies from the Army and Navy and in local markets. The running of the kitchen was in the hands of Sergeant Santo Licata of New Jersey, who became so good that the brass hats pinched him for their own mess!

The second thing was the bar. It was the only one in the city where one could get scotch. At first, things were rather confused. If you asked Smithy or Jackson for an old-fashioned, you always got beer. If you asked for a Martini, or a Tom Collins, you still got beer. After a while they began to sort themselves out so that if you asked for a Martini, you got an old-fashioned . . . but apart from a few mistakes, the bar was an enormous success.

Two correspondents, Larry Tighe of American Broadcasting Company and Thomas Shafer of Acme, who was born with a cigar in his mouth and hasn't stopped chewing one since, kept the liquor cellars well supplied. Shafer once calmly bought up the entire liquor supply of a naval unit which was returning to the States, and commandeered two trucks to haul it fifty miles from the coast. There was enough in the two trucks to last the club one year.

The third thing was the overcrowding. There were five to six people in some rooms, and you were never sure who you would find occupying your bed! One Australian correspondent slept on the floor under his bed and put his gear on the bed, because he claimed there wasn't enough space when his roommates were present to fasten a button, let alone find space for his equipment. As far as he was concerned, it was a sort of "under the bed" strike. It worked—he was eventually given better quarters.

Life in the club was made exciting by several incidents which occurred during the first two or three weeks. The air-conditioning plant, which conducted fumes from the stoves in the kitchen, caught fire just after dinner one night, and the long metal chimney which ran up the side of the building became red-hot within a few moments. The correspondents stopped drinking

just long enough to put it out, then began again as if nothing had happened, though they groused a bit because the bar had closed for five minutes!

Another night, a correspondent who had imbibed too much, decided to try out his Colt forty-five and blew a hole through the door of the elevator, while people scattered in all directions.

On yet another occasion, a well-known correspondent, after a hectic party, returned to the club about 4 A.M. one morning with a horse. He led the horse into the lounge and very seriously told the animal how lucky it was not to be a correspondent. The conversation continued along those lines for some time, until the neighing of the animal brought other correspondents to the scene. The horse was put out and the correspondent put to bed, protesting that his best friend had been thrown out in the cold!

Then there was the incident of the dog. A certain correspondent, who will remain unnamed, had a small dog which persisted in leaving his "visiting card" beside another correspondent's bed. This gentleman invariably trod in it when he got up in the morning. Eventually he warned the dog's owner that although he was a very great friend of his, he would personally leave *his* "visiting card" by the owner's bed if he didn't teach his dog better manners.

Another correspondent, with bad nerves, was strongly advised to live somewhere else, when he complained that the contractor's men had partitioned his room four times, and each time in a different direction. They had pulled the plywood walls down again and again in his room, moving nearer and nearer to his bed, until he felt he had become a victim of claustrophobia.

Another correspondent claimed he had nearly been "crowned"

one afternoon when a pipe pushed through the ceiling by one of the plumbers stopped on his pillow just one inch from his head. The Japanese staff tried to do their very best, but it was a Japanese "best" which was just not good enough. One correspondent asked the Japanese porter one night to wake him at 6:30 A.M. the following morning to catch an early plane. He awoke the following morning at 9:30. He had, of course, missed his plane. Under the door he found a note from the porter. It read as follows: "Good morning, sir, it is now 6:30." After a while a resident either became a nervous wreck or accepted everything without turning a hair.

A few weeks after the club actually opened, it was officially opened with a formal dinner and dance. Nearly the whole of Supreme Headquarters was invited, but General MacArthur, the guest of honor, felt he could not attend without accepting many other invitations. The offer for better relations between the press and MacArthur thus failed. The General, however, sent the correspondents four boxes of PX cigars. . . .*

The opening, which was the first big social event in Tokyo since the arrival of the occupation forces, established the club throughout Japan. The most unhappy man there that night was the contractor, who hung around the kitchen still wondering who was going to pay for all the work.

The guests, who numbered close to six hundred, did not know of one wangle which had been pulled only an hour before they arrived and might have ruined their dancing. It was over the piano, which had been borrowed for the occasion three days before, from Radio Tokyo. The wrong date had been given to the young Japanese musical director, in charge of all instru-

* Nearly eighteen months later, in March 1947, MacArthur visited the club to give his first on-the-record press conference since before Pearl Harbor.

ments in Radio Tokyo, and he had been promised the piano would be returned the day after it was borrowed. Two hours before the party began, two representatives from Radio Tokyo arrived in a truck to take back the piano, which, according to them, should have been returned the day before. While one of the committee stalled them on the ground floor, the piano was up-ended and put into the elevator on the third floor. The committee member swore no piano had been received and offered to let the two Japs search the building. They began searching the first floor, then went to the second, and when they reached the third the elevator with the piano in it went down to the first floor. It remained there until the fourth and fifth floors had been searched. Then when the men from Radio Tokyo came down, the elevator went up again. The two Japs apologized and left, and the elevator took the piano back to the third floor again, where the club's ballroom and theater were located. The piano was safe for the moment, but shortly afterward the Japs returned, saying they had been assured the piano had been delivered to the club three days before. Once more they conducted a search. Once more the elevator shot up and down with the piano in it. Finally they gave it up and left. Everybody breathed again.

After the opening, many majors and colonels apparently got the idea that they could use the club any time they liked. The correspondents made it quite clear they could come in only as a guest of a correspondent. The press remembered only too well the signs which had hung over partitions in the dining room of the Dai-Iti Hotel, stating plainly: "Colonels and Majors only." They also remembered the order which forbade them to enter the front doors of the Imperial Hotel and forced them to use a side entrance.

The public relations section decided to talk the matter over with one of the committee. A certain colonel put it this way: "After all, the Army did procure the beds, blankets and linen for you. They also gave you stoves and kitchen utensils. There is very little to do in the city, and some colonels, majors and other ranks once in a while might like to drop in for a drink, but you people have ruled them out. Tell me, won't the committee consider it?" The answer was a definite no. The colonel was not abashed. "Before you go," he said, "tell me why the ruling was imposed."

The committee member, with his hand on the doorknob, smiled. "Oh," he said, "call it whimsy if you like. . . ."

CHAPTER TWELVE

# TOJO'S TAMMANY

JAPAN'S DECADE and a half of aggression required a supine political system that could be manipulated to suit the warlords. It had to be a streamlined set-up. It had to negate political parties, as the West knows them. It had to be a system that would vote "yes" when the whip was snapped. It had to be a system that would ask no embarrassing questions—about the military budget, about foreign policy.

The foundation for a militaristic political machine was laid in the "Meiji" Constitution of 1889, which supposedly made Japan a liberal country but actually made a mockery of political democracy. Under that Constitution, now supplanted by the Constitution of 1946–47, Japan had a legislature, or Diet, of two houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Peers.

The old Diet could enact new legislation, within limits. It had no voice in foreign affairs other than the right to put questions to cabinet members. It had only limited power over the budget, and none whatever over the budget figures submitted by the Army, Navy and Air Force. If it failed to pass a budget

which the cabinet sent in, the budget of the preceding year was re-enacted.

A cabinet could remain independent of the Diet. It could ignore a vote of no confidence if it (the cabinet) was willing to accept the previous budget. Moreover, the cabinet did not necessarily represent the party which had won a general election. This happened in 1930, when the Minseito, or moderate party, won the elections to the Lower House by 273 to 174, but the government was organized by the conservative party, known as the Seiyukai. It happened again four years later, when Minseito again won only to have a series of political assassinations of moderate, Western-minded Japanese. And whatever group formed a cabinet, it did not have the choice of War and Navy ministers. These were dictated by the War and Navy Departments.

Further, the Emperor retained the right of supreme veto over the Diet. He could order the lower house dissolved and new elections held. And he named each new prime minister upon advice of the Lord Privy Seal, who, as we know, in recent years was the Marquis Kido. Tojo was Kido's choice.

Under the old Constitution, the lower house of 466 was elected for four years, but only by men of twenty-five and over. Now the voting age has been extended to women and it has been lowered to twenty-one. Moreover, women may now be elected to the House.

The upper house, or House of Peers, was a strange assortment of aristocratic, hereditary and imperially nominated, privileged characters. It included princes, marquises, counts, viscounts, barons, men nominated for distinguished service, four from the Imperial Academy, and wealthy men appointed from the class of highest taxpayers. It totaled about 400. Sumner Welles has

called it an "oligarchy of aristocrats." The new Constitution has wiped out the peerage and substituted an elected House of Councillors, whose members hold office for six years. It is much like the American Senate, constitutionally.

Not long after the first World War the political parties in Japan came more and more under the domination of financial interests, including the Zaibatsu. And the Zaibatsu in turn took their orders from the military. The line of power from the Tojos through the Diet was unbroken. If Japan had won this war, that power might have been unbroken for ages to come.

Japanese politicians held office at the pleasure of secret societies and youthful hot-bloods. Those in the Diet who dared speak out were liquidated. The masses of voters knew nothing of what went on. They had been taught blind obedience through the State religion, Shinto.

The rank and file voted as the ward heelers told them to. They did so even in the elections of 1946, the first so-called "free" elections under the occupation banner. And the millions of women who voted in that election for the first time voted largely as their husbands told them to vote.

Aiding the political gangsters under the old order were the police. Japan had long been the world's most police-ridden country. The policeman had long been the symbol of espionage, of oppression. He controlled thoughts as well as deeds. He was not a protector, not a friend, not the guardian of liberty. By nature the Japanese had been, and will be, copyists. In their police they were original: German Nazis and Italian Fascists took notes.

Independents or liberals under the old order were only a handful, and they were liberal in name only. Never in the last seventy-five years has Japan had a large, cohesive, influential

liberal or progressive movement. By Western standards, Japan's liberals were extreme conservatives, or worse.

With control of politics, the militarists had control, too, of the press, the radio, the screen, the stage, the education system. The press took its party line from the Cabinet Ministry of Information, run by a succession of Japanese Goebbelses. The radio was a government show too. The schools took one radio program, piped efficiently throughout the land for compulsory listening periods every day. Appropriately, the radio fountainhead station in Tokyo had the call letters, JOAK.

Less than ten years after the first World War, Japan, in her repression of political freedom, banned the Communist party and conducted a roundup of its members and sympathizers. Under the catch-all laws that provided for maintenance of public peace and order, profession of Communism was a criminal offense. Some ten thousand suspected Communists were brought in for questioning. Thousands of these were to live in dank cells for the next fifteen years or more, until MacArthur ordered them all released. Some preferred to stay in jail. Their homes had been burned; they still had enemies among the extremists of the Right.

One of those who came out of jail was Kyuichi Tokuda, a fifty-two-year-old former lawyer who founded Japan's Communist party in 1922 and was its general secretary in 1928 when he was arrested. His wife and son had died of police brutality. Out of the same prison came Yoshio Shiga, forty-four, former editor of Communist and proletarian publications in Tokyo.

They came out of jail swinging a lot of outmoded political shibboleths, but their main purpose was fixed, immutable and right down the party line from Moscow. They were soon joined by another Japanese Communist named Sanzo Nosaka, who

was repatriated from China and had up-to-date ideas for revival of the party.

Within a year the Communists claimed more than 15,000 members. They staged hunger marches; they booed the Emperor, screamed praise for MacArthur. They wooed the Social Democrats, and lost. They founded a newspaper, *Akahata,* or *Red Flag*. They captured only five seats in the Diet that was elected in April 1946.

One of the five elected was Tokuda. So vociferous was he in demanding the ousting of Hirohito that a Right extremist and defender of emperor-worship, Motoaki Fukuda, filed charges of lese majesty under a law that had, curiously, remained on the books. Later the charges were dropped.

In the old Japan the police and the ward heelers kept tight rein on the people through the "neighborhood associations." The social and economic structure of Japan had long been based on neighborhood cooperatives, akin to block committees in the American political machines. The associations were useful. They got out the vote on election day. They offered an instrument for espionage on the thoughts and actions of association members. And in wartime the government used the associations for distribution of rationed items.

The associations remain a feature of Japanese life today. Until they are replaced or their power limited, they will be a danger to success of the occupation. Not long ago, for example, Allied Headquarters found that adherents of the outlawed "religion" of State Shinto were still using the associations to levy tribute upon the citizenry, much in the manner that a Tammany henchman in New York would dun his local cronies for tickets to the policemen's or firemen's ball.

For war purposes, Japan's ruling cliques found more than ten years ago that they needed better machinery at the top levels

of government. They seized control of Manchurian affairs in 1934 by forming a special Manchurian Affairs Board in the cabinet. In 1936 they established the Cabinet Planning Office, which a year later, after the outbreak in China, became the Cabinet Planning Board. It was to mobilize Japan and unify national policy. It has been described as an "economic general staff."

War needed human resources, and so in 1938 the Japanese found they had a Welfare Ministry, with charge of health, physical training, labor and compensation. War needed propaganda, and the cabinet was saddled with a special Board of Information that controlled press, radio, censorship and amusements and saw that all these media followed the official "line."

The war in China was so successful that the cabinet had to have a China Affairs Board, with the prime minister as president, and with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Army and Navy as vice presidents.

Politically, however, the militarists found they needed one authoritarian party to back this system of strong, central government. In 1940, under the sponsorship of Prince Konoye, then premier, there was founded the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, an extra-parliamentarian society that would "assist" Hirohito to get things done smoothly. It linked the Diet, the cabinet, big business and secret societies.

The political parties, such as the Minseito and the Seiyukai—which were run by the Zaibatsu anyway—were dissolved, and the I.R.A.A. was launched in October, 1940, with Konoye as its president. A year later Konoye was out as premier, Tojo was in, and the I.R.A.A. was taken over, lock, stock and barrel by the military. A corollary organization known as the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society was formed in 1942.

These were Tojo's instruments for making the Diet a rubber

stamp for his actions. In the elections of April, 1942, the Tojo government, through the I.R.A.A., "sponsored" 337 of the lower house's 466 members. Tojo never had to worry about a majority. (MacArthur's purge directive has since barred any of these Tojo-approved politicians from returning to the Diet.)

Tojo went on to combine in himself the office of premier and war minister. And the war minister in Japan, like the Navy minister, was responsible to no one else in the cabinet or government. No one had power to compel the military to explain their budget requirements. The occupation authorities found in the public treasury millions of unexpended yen which the military had obtained by outright plunder.

The old-line Zaibatsu were not completely under Army control until 1942, when Control Associations were established for each major industry to integrate them with the war economy. They controlled raw materials and production schedules. (They persist today, and are a major factor in delaying reconversion of Japan's industries to peacetime uses; they are still a means of softening the impact of Allied directives at the prefectural and city levels.)

On top of this setup Tojo and his gang established the Ministry of Greater East Asia Affairs, which took over the old China and Manchurian boards of the cabinet and wrested control of foreign policy in the growing empire from the Foreign Ministry.

Tojo was now a twentieth-century Shogun, who made of the Emperor a prisoner, a puppet; a monarch in name only. No underground, no clandestine opposition bothered Tojo; he did not have the problems of Hitler and Mussolini in this respect.

Geographically, modern, liberal ideas could not infect Japan. There was no island of liberal neutrality and freedom such as Switzerland to the south of Germany. There was no France west of Japan as there was west of Germany. There was only

a sprawling, teeming, incoherent and corrupt China. And to the northwest was a totalitarian Russia.

Unlike Germany and Italy, and unlike France, Norway and other lands that were occupied during the war, Japan had no "cells" of exiled Japanese abroad who could work for restoration of their country's freedom. About the only "cell" abroad was a unit of Japanese terrorists in Brazil who still live in the hope that the Japan of Tojo will return.

Moreover, those who had left Japan and had studied abroad returned before the war with the blueprints of developments in commerce, industry and diplomacy. Mentally, they made little impact on their mother country. And many of the thousands of Japanese who had settled in the western United States and were in protective custody under the "relocation" authority during the war preferred to go home after Japan's defeat; democracy had not taken root in them; they preferred the desolation of Japan. Some who went back insisted—until they'd passed a day on Japanese soil—that Japan had won the war, that the American ship that took them home did so under the terms of "American" surrender, that the American troops they saw in Tokyo and Yokohama were there merely to effectuate America's "capitulation." Such is the power that propaganda had over the Japanese mind.

The end of the war, the liberation of political prisoners by MacArthur, the cutting of the fetters from the press, the widening of suffrage, the beginning of the political purge—all these took the lid off in Japan. But the political pot did not boil over furiously. Politically, there was much lethargy. A people who did not know the use of the vote or any alternatives to the repressive governments they had had could not be expected to spring to action and make a clean sweep of the past.

Five main parties emerged. They were the Liberals, the Progressives, the Social Democrats, the Cooperatives and the Communists, and that was the order of their strength in the lower house of the new Diet that was elected April 10, 1946, in the first "free" elections in Japan since 1931.

The Liberals garnered 150 seats, the Progressives 106, the Social Democrats 97, the Cooperatives 85, and the Communists were a poor last with 6. But it was only their first six months of legal activity in more than fifteen years. (Twenty-two other seats went to minor parties.) Thirty-eight of the new representatives were women, including a Social Democrat named Mrs. Shizue Kato, the former Baroness Ishimoto. She was known as the Margaret Sanger of Japan for her advocacy of birth control. Another woman elected was Kyo Kiuchi, an educator, who was the only woman on the Progressive ticket.

The party labels worn by the Progressives and Liberals were misleading, and Allied Headquarters might do well to change them so that voters in future elections will not be fooled. For the platforms were vague generalities; the party memberships were holdovers from the Minseito and Seiyukai groups that had been swallowed by Tojo. The effect of the purge barred about 90 per cent, or all but 27 members, of the old Tojo Diet from re-election, but it took effect so short a time before the elections that there was genuine belief that the candidates who got in were merely "stooges" for the old-line politicians, who, though purged, operated on the sidelines.

Actually, the Progressives were conservative in outlook and program. The Liberals, who topped the poll without getting a clear majority, were only slightly less conservative. Both parties were old men's clubs; the outgoing Diet certainly looked like an old men's home.

A guiding spirit of the Progressives—later barred from the

Diet—was Yosuke Tsurumi, widely known in the United States before the war as a lecturer and writer. He wanted General Ugaki, former governor-general of Korea, or Prince Konoye to head the party. That's a sample of how progressive it was.

As for the Liberals, their stooge and former leader was Ichiro Hatoyama, who would have become prime minister in May 1946, had not American correspondents exposed his past. As it was, MacArthur waited until May 4, the day before Hatoyama would have taken over from the aging Baron Kijuro Shidehara, who had married a daughter of the House of Mitsubishi and was the only replacement that Japan found in the early months of occupation for Prince Higashi-kuni, the soldier-playboy who had made the rounds of Paris.

When Hatoyama was cut down by MacArthur—belatedly, on the ground that Headquarters had been waiting for the Japanese government to take action—the premiership passed to another so-called Liberal, Shigeru Yoshida, who had been Ambassador to the Court of St. James and had, in fact, been clapped in jail by the Japanese secret police for his pacifism. Whereas Shidehara in his first press conference had pleaded guilty to not having read any of MacArthur's directives when he became premier, Yoshida, as Shidehara's foreign minister, said he thought Japan's old constitution was democratic enough and that the Zaibatsu really were not so bad after all and had not profited from the war.

Yoshida clung stubbornly to office for five months, convinced that the Liberals alone could make the transition in Japan from war to peace. He hoped to remain in office until a peace treaty was signed; by that time, the roots of the "Liberal" party would be strong. But the Liberals faced a purge of their rural strength through application early in 1947 of the MacArthur housecleaning directive to prefectural levels. And another general

election was expected in 1947, as well as local elections, which were hurdles that Yoshida would have to get over.

Hatoyama's undoing was an interesting story, and had it not been for American correspondents who exposed him, it is a good bet that MacArthur's staff would never have got wise to him. Such was the state of their intelligence system.

Hatoyama boasted openly that he would be prime minister. He forgot about one man, a skinny little fellow with a racking cough and a shock of bushy hair. He was Kentaro Yamabe, a Communist who had spent four years in solitary confinement because of his political beliefs. He was a dangerous thinker, under Japanese law. The Home Ministry long ago had banned one of his pacifist pamphlets.

In his files Yamabe had an interesting book. Its title was *Sekai no Kawa,* or *The Face of the World.* Its author was Hatoyama, and he wrote it after a trip to Europe in 1937.

An industrious reporter for the Chicago *Sun,* Mark Gayn, borrowed the book and had it translated privately. Lo and behold! There was Hatoyama, lyrical in praise for Hitler and Mussolini, and proposing importation to Japan of their ruthless methods in dealing with labor.

Other evidence about Hatoyama came to light. There were election speeches from 1942, upholding the doctrine of territorial expansion by means of war. As chief secretary of the Tanaka cabinet from 1927 to 1929, he had been instrumental in strengthening the peace preservation law that stifled free speech and freedom of assembly, that made possible the terroristic seizure of tens of thousands of persons advocating simple reforms. He had stated, too, that the true cause of the war in Manchuria and China was anti-Japanese sentiment in China, stirred by England and America. He had gloated that the cabinet

had discarded its previous weak-kneed diplomacy toward England and America.

Hatoyama, himself wealthy and backed by other wealthy men, including Japanese rubber interests, gave $40,000 to the Liberal party, and spent nearly double that amount on furthering his own election from a Tokyo district. He claimed that his liberal views had excluded him from Konoye's and Tojo's Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

One night a week before the elections the Allied correspondents at Tokyo had Hatoyama around to the press club for a social evening and a forum discussion. They taxed him with quotations from his book and speeches. Confused and confounded, he defended himself on the ground of political expediency. He said the book was eight years old, that others had misjudged Hitler and Mussolini's intentions, too. He asserted he had later called Hitler a liar and Mussolini a country boy.

The correspondents hit him with another. They asked him why he had condemned China as unfit for self-government. He said he had been mistaken about Chiang Kai-shek, who, he thought, could not unify China. He said he had been afraid China would go Communist, and he claimed that Anthony Eden, former British Foreign Secretary, could testify that he, Hatoyama, had tried to end the China Affair. (He admitted that the Hatoyama plan for doing this called for forfeiture by China of six northern provinces.)

It took headquarters a long time, too, to get after Chuzo Iwata, a Zaibatsu adviser who miraculously stayed on as Minister of Justice in the Higashi-kuni and Shidehara cabinets, the first two of the occupation.

Other so-called Liberals may be purged. The Russians are after Hitoshi Ashida, former Welfare Minister in the Shidehara

cabinet, who was one of the chief mourners at Konoye's suicide and a trumpet for the wartime Foreign Office as writer for the government-dominated *Nippon Times.*

Japan's political set-up will have to be watched as closely as anything else in Japan, to prevent the Hatoyamas from climbing back. The authors believe that for the next ten years no Diet should be elected for more than a year at a time, instead of the four years provided in the new Constitution, as in the old. This will give fresh talent and new political forces a chance to emerge. And it will give Allied Headquarters an opportunity to screen frequently all candidates and those who are elected, providing a more frequent check on their performances, past and present.

Under prodding from headquarters, the first peacetime Diet did accomplish a few things, It passed the new Constitution, put through a record budget of the equivalent of $8,000,000,000 at the present artificial military exchange rate of 15 yen to the dollar; set up a model labor law protecting labor's right to organize but prohibiting strikes of government and municipal employees; put through the general principles of land reform advocated by MacArthur; adopted his plan for a capital levy, which will range from 25 to 90 per cent on fortunes over the equivalent of $6,600, will hit 500,000 persons and will raise about $3,000,000,000.

The Diet also wiped out a government and bank debt of more than six billion dollars in the form of war damages owed to industry.

The road to true political democracy promises to be long and hard in Japan. Genuine liberals and progressives were indeed delicate flowers in the first year of the occupation. They needed protection from the old guard of Japanese, who were fighting a delaying action against the occupation and seiz-

ing every chance to sow seeds of discord among the Allies.

Yoshida, while foreign minister in the Shidehara cabinet, sought the aid and sympathy of British correspondents against the sternness of MacArthur directives. Two British correspondents early in December, 1945, were invited to lunch with Yoshida and on arriving found that American correspondents had been discreetly "forgotten." They were told not to tell American correspondents that they had lunched with the foreign minister, but "if by chance they find out, tell them that my daughter invited you . . . please don't mention me. . . ." After a fine luncheon of black-market delicacies, Yoshida asked: "Just how soon do you think it will be before we have the British in here? For, as you can see, there are far too many American experts." According to Yoshida, the Americans were making "fools of themselves" with the Japanese people, and though he would "hate to be quoted" what was really needed was a British occupation. The two correspondents fully "agreed" with him and after this song and dance prepared to leave. As they were climbing aboard their jeep, they were told by his secretary that if they were ever short of liquor in the press club to let him know and the matter would be attended to.

Yoshida fully expected the correspondents to put out a story to the effect that the Americans were "botching" the occupation and that the Allies would be better off if the British were in the driver's seat. Instead of writing the story, both correspondents reported the matter to General Thorpe, Chief of Counter Intelligence.

Yoshida was on the mat the following morning. According to him, he had been "misquoted" and it was all "a dreadful mistake." Thorpe believed the correspondents' version, and told them that it was just another effort to split the Allies. It was typical of the methods of the Japanese old guard.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# THE MacARTHUR CHARTER

On October 11, 1945, General MacArthur was in fighting mood. He had been in Japan six weeks. The critics in Washington and in some portions of the American press were croaking like a pondful of frogs on a summer night. The State Department, without prior consultation with MacArthur, was broaching a scheme for an Allied Advisory Council of four nations to sit with the General in Tokyo, and for a Far Eastern Commission of eleven powers with policy-making authority to sit in Washington.

The General let it be known that if any nation (particularly Russia) had veto power over his actions, he would quit and go home. He had no intention of becoming a super-policeman or a messenger boy.

(In December, 1945, when the Advisory Council and the Far Eastern Commission became realities under the decisions of the Moscow Conference, MacArthur cut loose with two blistering statements, saying he'd never been consulted on the scheme, but promising to do his best to make it work. Nowadays, the Far Eastern Commission, sitting far off in Washington, hardly ever

bothers him except to change a semicolon in a directive or a tonnage figure in reparations projects. And the Advisory Council, sitting in Tokyo, is advisory and nothing more. MacArthur sees to that; Russian and British ideas and suggestions are promptly squelched if they seem to cast doubt on the wisdom of any action by Supreme Headquarters.)

On that same day in October, 1945, MacArthur summoned Baron Shidehara, the seventy-three-year-old prime minister, and read him the riot act. He told him bluntly to reform the social order of Japan as swiftly as possible. He slapped a five-point program for this at Shidehara.

Japan, MacArthur told Shidehara, would have to install:

Suffrage for women
Freedom of speech and of religion
Liberalization of schools
Democratization of industry
Unionization of labor

Shidehara was downcast as he rode down in the elevator. MacArthur's parting shot had been that this would "unquestionably involve a liberalization of the Constitution."

The Japanese fielded the shot deftly. Hirohito promptly appointed Prince Konoye to form within the office of the other war criminal, Marquis Kido, a Constitutional Problem Investigation Commission. That was simply a stalling device.

Headquarters claimed that Konoye had no sponsorship of MacArthur in dealing with the Constitution. But it took MacArthur nearly three weeks to disavow Konoye publicly, and then only after a bitter press campaign in the United States.

MacArthur hastily made it clear that Konoye's link with the constitutional question dated only from October 4 to October 5,

his last forty-eight hours as deputy premier in the collapsing "surrender" cabinet of Prince Higashi-kuni. The revision problem, MacArthur said, was handed later to Shidehara as the new prime minister, and any further connection of Konoye's with the constitutional puzzle was only because of his link with the imperial family.

It seemed a pretty lame explanation, but in any case Konoye's suicide ended the matter. The work of revising the Constitution got under way slowly.

Japan's political parties had their ideas on the subject, too. Run by old-line machine bosses, they all wanted to retain the Emperor. The Communists were the only exception. They listed Hirohito as a war criminal and wanted the emperor system wiped out. Later they found it expedient to declare that if the Japanese people wanted it, the Imperial Household might continue to exist.

MacArthur's directives were coming hot and heavy in those early months, and the beginnings of constitutional reform stirred the diehards. They crept around to high officers at headquarters with whining pleas of "Take it easy!" General Baker, MacArthur's press relations man, always had the answer:

"If you think we're tough, we'll go right home and let the Russians take over!"

Little was heard of the new Constitution until March 5, 1946, when Hirohito put out an Imperial Rescript expressing his desire that the Constitution of the Empire "be revised drastically upon the basis of the general will of the people and the principle of respect for the fundamental human rights."

Next day the draft of the new Constitution was issued. Officially, it was declared the handiwork of the Japanese government. Anyone who reads it carefully and compares it with the

American Constitution and the Declaration of Independence can pretty well guess that MacArthur wrote most of it himself.

The General was so proud of it that he said privately he would not change a comma to please the Russians or anyone else. That was when the Russians said the Americans had pulled a fast one in getting out the Constitution. Such a job, the Russians held, was to have been reserved for later agreement by all the Allied powers.

Just how much of MacArthur's style went into the new Constitution is plain from the fulsome wording of its articles, which will be found in detail in the Appendix. He drew heavily upon the United States Constitution and upon that bundle of laws, decisions and precedents that make up the unwritten British Constitution.

In its most revolutionary provision, the new MacArthur Charter renounced war "forever," banned the maintenance by Japan of an army, navy or air force. It whittled down the Emperor to the status of a constitutional monarch, abolished the peerage, revamped the political structure to make the Diet supreme and the cabinet responsible to the Diet. It gave the Japanese a Bill of Rights such as the barons of old England had had to wrest from King John at Runnymede, such as the Americans of colonial days paid for with their lives, and which, even today, is still being perfected against the resistance of the Bilbos, the Ku Kluxers.

In its very first article the new Constitution places sovereignty squarely in the hands of the people. It states: "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people."

Again, in Article III:

"The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for

all acts of the Emperor in matters of state and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor."

And in Article IV:

"The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state functions as are provided for in this Constitution. Never shall he have powers related to government.

"The Emperor may delegate his functions as may be provided by law."

And this, Article XXXVII:

"The Diet shall be the highest organ of State power, and shall be the sole law-making authority of the State."

In the old Constitution, which dated from 1889 and exemplified the concept of autocratic authority, the Emperor was head of the State in an absolute sense. He was sacred, inviolable. He exercised sovereignty with the assistance of state bodies. He issued ordinances for carrying out laws. He determined the organization of the armed forces, declared war, made peace. The Diet, although its lower house of representatives was elected and its upper house of peers appointed by the Emperor, was subordinate and subservient to the Emperor and to his Privy Council, which advised him on all affairs. Moreover, in military affairs the chiefs of the army and navy staffs had absolute control, and sought the Emperor's consent only as a matter of courtesy.

But in 1937 and afterward, when Japan was streamlining its government to meet the needs of aggression, various extra-Constitutional bodies were developed which concentrated power in the hands of the military clique and made the Emperor a rubber stamp.

The Cabinet Planning Board was one such body. So, too, was the Cabinet Information Board (only recently wiped out by MacArthur). The Greater East Asia Ministry was a third. And the

larger industries which were the backbone of war-making power were integrated into the Japanese national economy through the formation of control associations, which forced all concerns, large and small, into line with government policy. These associations exist today and are a major influence in slowing the impact of the occupation directives on the reformation of Japan's social and economic life.

In Article IX, the Japanese went all out for peace. The Constitution states:

"War as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force is forever renounced as means of settling disputes with other nations.

"The maintenance of land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized."

No other modern state had ever abrogated its right to make war, or at least its physical power to defend itself. This, possibly, was the *reductio ad absurdum* in fulfilling the Cairo and Potsdam plans for de-militarizing Japan. It certainly went far beyond the liberal treatment accorded to Italy and other Axis satellites on military matters in the Paris treaties of 1947. And we must take exception to MacArthur's insistence on holding up Japan, in this action (prompted by headquarters), as a model for all the rest of the world to follow.

That sort of thing stuck in one's craw. For the Japanese have not been models of probity and no mere legislative trick can confer on them the right to pose as the peacemakers of the world.

The Japanese probably suspect there is something "phony" about that part of the Constitution. Debate on the Constitution as it went through the Diet showed that the minds of the ruling class were by no means made up on renunciation of war capacity.

Premier Yoshida himself went on record as saying that this was a question that might well be taken up after the peace conference. And Hitoshi Ashida, influential member of the powerful Liberal party, observed with some sophistry that Japan might even be refused by the United Nations as a member if she did not possess some armaments. He said Japan would not be in position to execute the obligation to offer an armed force for police purposes.

The Japanese also argued that a defenseless country would be prey to international schemers and would invite aggression. They held that without a guarantee from the United Nations or a strong Pacific power, they should be permitted defensive arms.

The new Constitution also doomed the peerage and guaranteed to the people fundamental human rights to life, equality, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, with freedom of speech, religion and assembly.

MacArthur plunged ahead with the new Constitution without asking or getting much assistance from the other "Allied" powers. He got some objections from the Russians, but these made no difference. The Russians thought that the future Constitution was something that should be the subject of very careful deliberation, and that under all the Cairo, Yalta, Potsdam, Moscow and other "solemn" agreements it should have been reserved for thrashing out much later. Further, the Russians were angry because even the first drafts of the revised Constitution confirmed their worst fears: the Imperial Institution and all that it meant to the Japanese was to be preserved even in the mothballs of a constitutional monarchy, and in time could be dusted off, shaken loose, polished up and put forth as a thing of beauty and a joy forever. Time will tell whether they were right; they certainly had a good point.

But MacArthur wasn't taking the advice. The Constitution was jammed through the routine red tape with minor changes, just as all the major directives that will change the face of Japan were pushed through in the first six to ten months of the occupation.

And so the Emperor whom Mr. Lattimore has so aptly called Japan's "Sacred Cow Number One" is still with us. The pasture has been considerably reduced in acreage; even if the Americans take all the milk, the grass is still a very lush green.

The Constitution handed a new life to the Japanese on a silver platter. It was a brand-new, shiny gadget, the product of 175 years of American, and centuries of English democracy. Whether the Japanese can ever make this gadget work is something else again. Only time and at least 100 years of it will tell.

Already it is making itself felt, taken in conjunction with the early and basic MacArthur directives which put into effect on an immediate, emergency standing the fundamental reforms that were to be written into the Constitution.

Debate in the lower house of the Diet has proved within the past year that the Japanese political consciousness can be developed. The Diet clearly became conscious of its new role as chief organ of the government. The speaker of the House, Senzo Higai, was even forced to resign because he attempted to have modified a provision of the draft constitution. This was a healthy and distinctly un-Japanese recognition that the majority must rule.

Yet there were disquieting signs. State Minister Kanamori held that the new Constitution did not alter what he called the eternally unchangeable nature of Japan's national structure. And Prime Minister Yoshida insisted that the charter did not alter the "fundamental political character" of Japan.

Hirohito went cheerfully about his business, his wings sharply

clipped. The people no longer prostrated themselves before him; it was "Charlie" who doffed his hat and bowed to them.

Red-flag processions began to wind through Tokyo's downtown streets. There were riots by Communists, by Koreans, by hungry men on Prime Minister Yoshida's doorstep. Police guarded the processions, and stepped into the other demonstrations only when stones began to fly. Such things were not possible in Japan a year before.

Women were voting for the first time in their lives, and they were being elected to public office. They were rebelling against the slavery of the bedchamber and were talking of birth control.

The press was increasingly free, although MacArthur kept an eye on its performance. It purged itself of its militaristic writers, but still had to depend on the financial support of men who had been party to Japan's expansionist program.

Freedom of worship was restored. Labor unions garnered millions of workers, but they staged destructive strikes which Japan could ill afford.

But the first year was only the beginning. The masses had not read the Constitution, let alone understood it. It will take years for the document to make a real, lasting impact on Japan; they will be dangerous years and will require a vigilant occupation or at least control over political parties and government performance, including interpretations by the judiciary.

Out in the far provinces the Constitution made only a ripple. Ward politicians still went their way; reform of the educational system was slow and was often defied. Another potential war criminal, Welfare Minister Yoshinari Kawai, turned up right in the cabinet nearly a year after these basic reforms and purges got under way. His writings showed him to be, among other things, an admirer of Hitler and Tojo. Again, it was a news-

paperman, Ralph Chapman, of the New York *Herald Tribune,* who exposed him first, just as the press had exposed Hatoyama, the potential premier.

One of the biggest tests of the Constitution will be Japan's ability to revive economically. For food shortages, unemployment, inflation, strikes—these are current things in Japan that weaken the tenuous roots of democracy.

The democratic pattern for Japan is in the new Constitution. But Japanese democracy is in its infancy. It will have to be like the carp, the ancient, symbolical Japanese fish which fights its way upstream. It is one of the strongest-willed and the most stubborn of fish.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# WARDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

TODAY, the Japanese are still in a state of semi-paralysis; their future is still a gamble. On paper, the occupation is a great success—from the Allied and non-Russian point of view. In practice, the occupation will have to last a generation or more before we can really determine its success, or its failure.

We can check off certain beginnings of democracy in Japan, but, like the one swallow, they do not make a summer. We can note the burgeoning of free speech, the growth of political democracy, the emergence of healthy trade unionism. But we can note the slowness—some of it necessary—in reforming the education system, in the purging of undesirables from various levels of society and occupations.

And we can view with some misgiving the tendency of present Allied authorities, including General MacArthur, to "play ball" with some of the heirs apparent of the old order. We can view with uneasiness and irritation the tendency on the part of West and East to turn Japan into a battlefield of ideologies; the hesitancy on the part of the United States and Great Britain to make the policy for Japan truly an Allied policy

in the sense that full weight is given to China and Russia; the aggressive determination of the Russians to proclaim that nothing is good which is not Russian.

In Japan, as in Germany, we are running the grave risk that the country will become a pawn in the struggle for power between the Western and Eastern blocs. For the Japanese are still flat on their backs and showing only faint signs of new life. Their army of 5,000,000 has been disarmed, demobilized and most of it returned home. Their war factories have been smashed or silenced by defeat, and await removal for the reparations account.

Industrially, the Japanese are producing only a limited amount of the necessities of peacetime life. Mentally, they are stagnant. Politically, they are taking only the first few faltering steps on the road to rehabilitation.

The Japanese must be taught to walk, talk, think and play all over again. Whether we like it or not, they are the wards of the United Nations. They are the problem children of the Orient. They can become an important factor in peace, or the breeding ground of a new and terrible atomic war.

The Japanese problem needs our best brains, our undivided attention, our unlimited patience, our unfailing vigilance. Unfortunately, our supply of gray matter is limited; our attention is diverted to side issues like Trieste, the Dardanelles, Iran; our tendency is to look for miracles overnight, for a lasting peace to come full-blown from the heads of Molotov, Marshall, Attlee and Bidault; our vigilance lags because of our inherent indifference to the Orient.

But we can make a beginning on the Japanese problem. We have, in fact, made a beginning. Let us not think it is the end as well.

Above all, let us not tackle the task as one of building Japan into a buffer state or a useful ally or base in another war. Strategically, of course, the prospect is inviting to military-minded men in the United States, in Great Britain, in Soviet Russia.

We need only quote from an illuminating interview with Major General Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's chief intelligence officer, to show how firmly this notion takes root in the military mind. General Willoughby told the Hearst press early in 1946 that MacArthur's expert handling of the Japanese occupation would one day make Japan a strong ally of the United States. (Yet in their Constitution the Japanese renounced war, gave up their army and navy, barred all but civilians from the government.)

Said General Willoughby: "The situation in Japan today parallels the situation we had in the Philippines from 1904 to about 1908. During that time our fair treatment of the Filipino insurrectionists won them over to us, and when the time came, the Philippines fought gallantly at our side."

One may fairly ask: If the Japanese are to be our allies, for what purpose and against whom? Obviously, the Russians—unless we intend to take on the Chinese or the British or the Filipinos in the Orient.

Such talk is extremely loose, and extremely dangerous. And we have had other examples of it from "our side." It amounts to needless needling of the Russians and a gross misunderstanding of the desires and hopes of the average American.

We have, for example, the unnecessary pointing up of the situation by General MacArthur in his statement on the first anniversary of the occupation. He said that Japan might become a "dangerous springboard for war" because it is a focal point of

"impinging ideologies." And he suggested that Japan might fall prey to the "philosophy of the extreme, radical Left" because of the suddenness with which it had been torn from a theory and practice of life built upon 2,000 years of history, tradition and legend.

The General then launched into a thinly veiled attack on Communism. It was an attack which did our relations with Russia no good. He said:

"The ideologies of the extreme too often gain converts and support from the true liberals, misguided by slanted propaganda and catch phrases which hold as 'reactionary' all things which spring from the underlying concept of the past. Such propaganda seeks too often to exploit the knowledge common to all men that sociological and political changes from time to time are mandatory if we would keep our social system abreast of the advance of civilization.

"Should such a clash of ideologies impinge more directly upon the reorientation of Japanese life and thought, it would be no slight disadvantage to those who seek, as intended at Potsdam, the great middle course of moderate democracy, that a people so long regimented under the philosophy of an extreme, conservative Right might prove easy prey to those seeking to impose a doctrine leading again to regimentation under the philosophy of an extreme, radical Left."

To guide the Japanese along the path of true democracy, General MacArthur added, will require all the patience, determination and statesmanship of the democratic peoples.

"The goal is great," he concluded, "for the strategic position of these Japanese islands renders them either a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war."

Just the day before this statement turned the spotlight on the

fact that the Japanese main islands occupy roughly the same strategic position in relation to the Asiatic mainland that the British Isles do to Europe, six members of the House of Representatives of the United States had been closeted with MacArthur for a long session. When they came out, what they told reporters made screaming headlines, which we can only deplore.

The six representatives advocated a strong and mobile American striking force in the Pacific to meet the threat of Russian encroachment and the "imminent danger of another Pearl Harbor" in Korea and Alaska. This was completely irresponsible. It was war-mongering at its worst.

The Russian spokesman at Tokyo, Konstantin Popov, was restrained in his comment. Such statements, he said, "are not likely to contribute to strengthening the general cause of peace and security in this part of the world."

Now, the authors of this book are not Communists. One is an American who votes the straight Republican or straight Democratic ticket, or mixes them, as he sees fit. The other is an Irishman (who knows what war in his own country is like). We just want to see fair play on both sides, and an end to this interminable public debating of the merits of rival "ideologies," whether in Tokyo or Paris or Berlin or New York; we want a moratorium on oratory. The great issue is not Communism versus Democracy; it is simply peace—peace for the world's millions, which include our former enemies.

Japan is essentially a problem for the United Nations to handle. It is more than a problem for the Big Five or the Big Four, or for the eleven nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission at Washington, which is supposed to determine overall policy for Japan but which seems to have become lost in a sea of semantics.

Those who would seize a United Nations problem, such as Japan, and subvert it to their own purposes or ideas, are, in our opinion, failing in their duty. They are failing as tutors of the Japanese and in their obligations to the United Nations.

MacArthur and those around him who echo his voice speak of Japan as the no man's land of the future. The General speaks now of "the Muscovite" bulging his muscles, lusting for power; during the war he spoke of "the Jap" and "the Boche." He makes it clear that he will have no interference with the administration of Japan. He gives grudging acceptance of the Moscow Agreement setting up the Far Eastern Commission at Washington and the four-power Allied advisory council at Tokyo. He does not like the veto power that the F.E.C.—on paper, anyway—has over his conduct of the occupation. He told the advisory council at Tokyo that it would be advisory and nothing else.

Small wonder, then, that James M. Bertram, adviser to the New Zealand delegation to the F.E.C., said there was danger of Allied occupation of Japan becoming a single-power control; that the outspoken Sir Carl Berendsen, New Zealand's delegate to the F.E.C., thought that the Yoshida government and the 1946-elected Diet (which had American blessing) had given Japan a government about as Liberal as "a piece of smelly cheese." And small wonder that W. MacMahon Ball, British Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council in Tokyo, stoutly refused to go along with the statement of George Atcheson, Jr., MacArthur's political adviser and chairman of the council at Tokyo, that within a year after the surrender the performance of the Japanese government had been such that its aims and policies were virtually identical with Allied aims and policies.

Then there was the incident of MacArthur's "Allied" staff meetings which made the British rankle. The British sent an officer along to one of these weekly affairs. He was asked to leave. Two hours later MacArthur was on the telephone to the British commander with apologies. The British officer went back to these staff meetings, but they turned out to be sham affairs, with the real business done privately upstairs by the regular Headquarters staff.

As for the Russians, they met repeated rebuffs in the Tokyo council. Some were merited. But most seemed to be given on the theory that they had no business raising questions; theirs not to reason why. And American-professed desires for freedom of the press were given a strange twist in the handling of three Soviet newspapermen who had come to Japan for the war crimes trials. During a lull, they wanted to tour Japan. They were given an "arranged" tour by MacArthur's headquarters, which also saw to it that intelligence officers went along and noted carefully to whom the Russians spoke and what was said.

When the same Russian newspapermen wanted to tour northern Japan, particularly the island of Hokkaido, they were refused permission. This, on the ground that they had failed to "appreciate" their previous trip!

It was believed, however, that this treatment of Russian newsmen may have been deliberate policy, dictated from Washington, where it had long vexed American authorities and the American press that American reporters were not permitted freedom of movement inside Russia.

But let's look on MacArthur's side of the ledger. What spurred him and his officers to such behavior?

Primarily, it had been an "American" war in the Pacific. It was American blood and American treasure that defeated the

Japanese, little else. The British and the Australians had made genuine but only "token" contributions of men and material. They said they could not spare more. The Australians were particularly belligerent and free with advice, for a people (as MacArthur said) who had never really intended to fight north of the Equator. And the Russians came in at the tail end; all of Stalin's radio boasting about the "decisive" entry of the Russians could not alter the fact that American Marines, Navy and Army, in stemming the Japanese rush at Guadalcanal, in taking Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, had really won the war by making it possible for American airpower to be brought to bear upon Japan.

And MacArthur had had his rebuffs from the British. Early in the occupation, he had invited the British to take virtually co-equal status with him in Tokyo. He put it up to the Labor Government of Clement Attlee in London through the British commander at Tokyo, Lieutenant General J. H. Gairdner. The offer was turned down. And so were General Gairdner's requests to London for economic missions, specialists—even a public relations man—to help with the occupation.

Some Americans thought the British wanted the Americans to "stub their toes" in Japan, and wanted to take none of the blame for any American failures.

Other Americans, who had known Britain in wartime, said the British in their struggle for reconversion and rehabilitation just could not spare any *brain*power for Japan. They pointed out that on the *man*power score it took the British nearly six months to send a token occupation force of 40,000 Empire troops into Japan.

To some of the American military in Japan, however, it appeared that the British after the war were interested only in

re-establishing "business as usual" at Singapore and Hong Kong, with a dash of pepper in proposals for freedom of Burma and independence of India.

As some of MacArthur's staff saw it, American hopes for democracy in Japan were confronted with old-fashioned British Imperialism creeping up from the southwest, and new-fangled Russian Communism thrusting down savagely from the northwest. They figured the Americans were in Japan to hold the fort against all comers.

There were other things that provoked MacArthur. They may help us to understand his reactions and his treatment of the other Allied powers. For many months he could get no hope of cooperation from the Russians about sending in occupation troops. The Russians refused to have their men serve under a foreign commander. MacArthur said he would be the boss, no one else. Then, too, the Russians cast covetous eyes at Hokkaido, the northernmost island, which would have given them a strong foothold in Japan. They already had the Kuriles, thanks to one of those manifold secrecies of Yalta. They had the northern part of Korea. They were back in Sakhalin. Would the Sea of Japan become a Russian lake? MacArthur said no. He suggested that the British take over Hokkaido. They preferred a warmer climate. They got the battered area around Kure and Hiroshima, and they were told not to stray from this bailiwick.

MacArthur was irked, too, because the Russian military mission attached to his command had freedom of movement and was given complete, detailed information about the dispositions and activities of American forces inside Japan. But MacArthur was given no such reciprocal information by the Russians as to their troops in Korea, in Manchuria and elsewhere. He was rebuffed repeatedly when he asked the Russians of the whereabouts and treatment given to the 800,000 Japanese soldiers

who fell into Russian hands at the war's end. Only a year later was he told they were strung out in work camps behind the Russian lines. He suspected they were being infected with Communism against the day they would be sent back into Japan to work for Moscow.

The Russian behavior on reparations was another irritant. When the Red Army pushed into Manchuria and Korea north of the 38th Parallel, it not only lived off the land but plundered the factories and mines that legitimately might one day be operated by the Chinese and the Koreans. The Russians called it legitimate war booty, rejected all American efforts to check it, gave only grudging permission to Edwin W. Pauley, the reparations ambassador, to come inside their lines for a look-see.

Because the American policy was to check off such war booty against the final reparations bill, the Russians boycotted, month after month, all preparations by the Far Eastern Commission for a full-dress reparations conference on Japan. The American desire was to begin removal of machinery from Japan—particularly Zaibatsu machinery—to build up the shattered economies of the Philippines, China and Korea. There was no reason why an independent Philippine Republic should forever depend upon American charity. There could be no new, united China without work for its millions. There could be no independent Korea, either, without work for its people.

Ambassador Pauley, with MacArthur's help, set forth in the first winter of the occupation an interim reparations plan which, with modifications, could have served as the final plan. It stripped Japan to a peacetime level of economy, cut her off from sources of raw and war materials, gave her only a limited amount of merchant shipping; stripped the Zaibatsu industries first; abolished the aircraft industry.

The plan kicked around in Washington for a year. The Rus-

sians would not come in on it as long as we insisted on counting Manchurian war booty as reparations.

Manchurian coal mines became flooded because the Russians had ripped the machinery and power plants from the best mines; Manchurian coal supplies dwindled. The people began to tear out the insides of their homes and burn them for fuel. Industries were shut down for lack of coal, lack of electric power. Unemployment grew. Experts said the stalling on reparations was setting back the Far East at least a generation.

The F.E.C. in Washington and the State Department finally boiled over. Without Russian cooperation, they broached a plan for removing immediately 15 to 20 per cent of Japan's removable assets to get the industrial wheels moving in needy countries. The balance would be held, pending the decisions of a reparations conference, if any.

In Korea, American-Russian negotiations looking toward a trusteeship stalled because of Russian intransigeance and Russian reluctance to grant anything like freedom of the press and freedom of speech to the Koreans. The Russians, in turn, were cross because they could not understand why we permitted anti-Soviet, anti-Communistic activity in southern Korea.

There was more on MacArthur's side of the ledger. He was not informed in advance of the Moscow Conference decisions to set up the advisory council of four powers at Tokyo and the policy-making Far Eastern Commission at Washington. The commission had veto power over his actions, a fact which shocked MacArthur's headquarters. The General issued a bitter statement when he heard of the moves, and said with grudging acceptance that he would do his best to make the system work.

Strangely, the advisory council, more than the F.E.C., gave

the Russians their best chance to needle MacArthur. Naturally he didn't like it. For the council was on the spot, in Tokyo. The F.E.C. was far away in Washington. It seemed to be on another planet.

In Tokyo, the Russians raised a succession of issues. They resented the steam-rollering of the new Constitution, which preserved the Imperial Institution in modified form. They didn't like MacArthur's program for trade unionism on the American-British model, and suggested one of their own which embodied his and added the novel idea that workers on strike should have power to seize and operate industries. The British tossed in an irritant here, too, with a suggestion for socialization of some Japanese industries, such as the coal mines.

But headquarters, which had seen more than 4,000 unions formed, with more than 3,000,000 members, in the first year, charged that the Left was trying to seize control of the Japanese labor movement in the hope of regimenting the masses under Leftist leadership in place of the former domination of labor by the Right.

The Russians questioned, too, the effectiveness of Allied purge decrees in removing the undesirables from positions of influence. Here they were on sounder ground, for even Allied observers in Japan have reported that the process is slow, that it is being negated in the provinces although it looks good in the central bureaus at Tokyo; that it will not be successful until it reaches into prefectural and ward politics.

Russian ideas of a purge naturally did not jibe with American ideas. It was the difference between shooting and "screening." The Americans held that life in Japan would be disrupted if suddenly the top tenth of officialdom were consigned to oblivion. There was no other skilled tenth ready to step into the vacated

jobs; certainly the Allies did not have the personnel to run the government machinery.

Moreover, the Russians wanted expropriation of large landed estates without compensation to the owners. They wanted expropriation of large industrial holdings, too.

The persistent clamor raised by the Russians in Tokyo, where they had no real voice in the occupation policies, was in strange contrast to the mildness and good humor with which they attended sessions of the F.E.C. in Washington, where they had a voice. This led to the suspicion that the snorts and scuffling in Tokyo were staged for propaganda purposes, both for consumption in Russia and for encouragement of the weakling Japanese Communist party. The Russians had a "staff" of several hundred in the former Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. They needed only a handful, since they had no occupation troops to worry about.

These were some of the signs that showed all was not well in Japan, and that it was high time for concerted action by the United Nations to take the problem in hand.

More than a year after the surrender there was no sign of a Japanese peace conference. The framework of a treaty had been staked out in the Potsdam, Cairo and Moscow declarations and agreements. It should be possible now to write a basic peace treaty, with details to be filled in by yearly conferences of a special United Nations commission that should be set up specifically for Japan.

For peace is a living, growing thing. It cannot be laid down categorically in full and permanent splendor now for Japan any more than it can be for Germany. But the foundations for a peace treaty are at hand in both cases. The complete structure can be added later.

Take Japan's boundaries, for example. These are, of course, easier to settle than are Germany's. There are no ethnic problems, no tricky rivers, no meandering railroads, no customs zones of friction. Japan, the powers agreed two years ago, was to be limited in sovereignty to the four main islands and such minor outlying ones as would be determined later.

It seems clear that the United Nations should have trusteeships over, and security bases at, such key islands as Saipan, Iwo and Okinawa. Formosa has been handed back to China, so that is no problem. Korea, it was decided, should be free, so that country does not enter the treaty except in reparations.

The new Constitution gives Japan the political framework for a peace. It demilitarizes, democratizes, renounces war, whittles down the Emperor, provides a Magna Charta.

The Pauley reparations program is as sound a one as we are likely to find. It gives the Japanese the means of subsistence, gives them nothing better than the levels of the countries they despoiled. It would aid China and the Philippines and Korea. It would put the Japanese back on the seas to a limited extent, for they are a seafaring people and cannot be held off those seas forever.

It is a sure bet that peace for Japan will not come out of squabbling in the Allied council at Tokyo or from inaction by low-echelon diplomats in the Far Eastern Commission at Washington. It is certain, too, that it will not come if our governments and our people continue their apathetic attitude toward the Far East and its problems.

And the authors feel that it will not come unless the occupation of Japan takes on more of a civilian aspect in its high jobs. For the military—splendid as they were in war—are not the makers of peace. With few exceptions, the people at head-

quarters in Tokyo are way out of their depth now that they have to swim in international politics and diplomacy.

Our hope is that the military forces will rapidly be reduced to the status of policemen and watchdogs, while civilian experts (although they're hard to find) take on the policy-making and the running of the big sections at Allied Headquarters that are concerned with education, economics, government and the purge.

In Germany, for instance, the War Department has repeatedly begged the State Department to take over administration. To this, Secretary of State Byrnes replied, "No, thanks." He pointed out that the Department does not possess the necessary operating staff. Of course that is true for Japan, too. Where can the experts be found?

For one thing, there are many capable men in the Army. They ought to be got out of uniform and kept in Japan with decent salaries, housing, family life. Many of them are interested in their jobs, and want to make a career in Japan. There are many capable men in the State Department, too, who ought to be on the scene in Japan. That goes for the Far Eastern section of the British Foreign Office, and, we assume, the Kremlin.

Not only the State Department could contribute brainpower. There are men in the Commerce Department, the Treasury, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Maritime Commission, and even in Congress—who could be assigned or "drafted" to this big job in Japan. Industry ought to be asked to contribute its share of brainpower, too; steel, shipping, oil, trade—all have men who know something of the Orient.

If we could get top men and their families out to Japan, it seems to us they could do a double job by living in a model American community there. This would have to be built, of

course. But it would be a modern American town, governed by itself, providing its own essential services. It could be made a living example of democracy, of democracy in action, for the Japanese to study at first hand.

But that is something for the future. For the present, let's get the occupation off its narrow, militaristic base, and plunge now into the job of writing the peace.

Let's get Truman, Attlee and Stalin together on the Far East. Some have said it would be better to get Marshall, Bevin and Molotov together on the Far East, for even if they quarreled when they met, they at least would be carrying the load, doing the hard work.

But out of such meetings should come a United Nations conference on the Far East. It's more than a Big Three or Four or Five job. No set of powers, however big they are, has a monopoly on the answers about Japan. Let Japan in particular, and China and Korea and Manchuria in general, be talked over at such a conference. Let the festering sore of reparations be settled. Let a basic treaty for Japan be written. Let 70 million Japanese get on with their lives instead of dwelling in suspense.

Let's give the Japanese a limited sovereignty over their reduced acres. By no means should we get out of Japan for at least a generation. We should maintain veto power over the activities and performance of the government for at least that long. It may take a century before they can run on their own. But it should not be a century before they are admitted to the family of nations as a member of the United Nations, where they can learn the new ways of freedom more rapidly than by being kept outside.

We must be patient about the Japanese problem. But we must not be lethargic or apathetic. They have run hard in one

direction for hundreds of years. Only now are they turning in the opposite direction. We must be patient because they are a complex people; we must not be lethargic because they are an energetic people, whose energies can be turned to peaceful pursuits.

Whether we like to acknowledge it or not, the Japanese have certain basic good qualities. They work hard. They have understandable ambition. They can be taught. The masses are willing to learn. (We should write off the upper crust; they live on in the hope that we'll get bored and go home.)

The guideposts to Japan's future say that she shall be made into an accepted member of the family of nations. But we are committed, too, to building a strong, independent, united China; a thriving, independent Republic of the Philippines; a free, united Korea.

We must see to it that China, above all, is beholden to no one power, that she can stand on her own. That, like the problem of Japan, is the task of a century. The two jobs can and must be undertaken at the same time. When we take the brakes off the Japanese and give the final blessing to the Chinese, we should be able to see something like equilibrium in the Orient.

Attainment of that equilibrium should be our basic policy. It is our hope for peace. It would be based not on the balance of military forces but upon the natural interplay of resources and national capabilities. Such a balance, of course, would have to recognize Russia's new role as a Pacific power; it would have to take into account the lusty, vigorous infants of the Pacific—Australia and New Zealand.

Militarily, Japan can be controlled by controlling the sources of her raw materials. We can compute how much iron ore, how much oil, how much fertilizer she needs. We can regulate her

imports of those essentials. We can make her pay for them with exports.

It should not be difficult to put her economy on a peacetime basis. She came out of the war in pretty good shape, economically speaking. There was quite a bit of fat left on the carcass. She can divest herself of about 9,000,000 tons of steel-making capacity and still have 2,000,000 tons left each year to meet her needs. She still has so much steel and aluminum scrap left that she could go into the export business.

By regulating her imports of bauxite, the aluminum ore, we can prevent the rebuilding of an aircraft industry.

On the food side, Japan is experiencing temporary shortages. In time these will be overcome by far-sighted reforms of agrarian policy, of the sort MacArthur has begun. Japan, our experts say, could be 85 per cent self-sufficient in food if her agronomy were improved. Fertilizer is one great need; she has vast internal capacity for making nitrogenous fertilizers; she does not need to get back into the import-export business on that account.

We should stimulate the Japanese farmers to become breeders of livestock. The land area is limited for this, but it can be done. And we should stimulate the raising of crops other than the staple of rice. Both measures would improve the diet, and improve Japanese health and physique.

Correctly handled, Japan in time might become a peaceful, prosperous small country of the Orient. We certainly cannot afford to let her become again a vendor of cut-rate, cut-throat imperialism.

In Japan we must be on guard against the wiles of the hard-dying intelligentsia, those who speak our language, who understand us better than we do them, and who play upon our foibles and phobias, such as Communism. It is characteristic of the

Japanese top-layer to propagandize itself these days as the potential leaders of the world toward peace and the first to renounce war. Unfortunately, MacArthur gave this type of Japanese a good buildup with his over-enthusiastic recommendation to the rest of the world of the Japanese feat of war renunciation.

For the intelligent Japanese is a quick-change artist. He has an acute sense of theater, of what will please, what will sell. He can hop on a bandwagon faster than any Washington politician.

We must never fail to let the Japanese know he was beaten in this war, man to man, by Allied soldiers, sailors, airmen, science. Thus will we counteract the insidious Japanese propaganda that Japan bowed only to the atomic bomb, that her armies were still intact at surrender, that only his gracious majesty, the Emperor, terminated the war of his own volition.

And we must beware of the wily Nipponese who attempts to drive wedges among the Allies by playing on our suspicions of Russia, on Russian suspicions of the Western powers, on anti-British feeling in the United States, on anti-American feeling in Britain, on anti-Semitic tendencies everywhere. We must be careful, too, of the crafty Japanese who suggests that Japan would not make a bad dependency of the United States, or a fifty-first state of the Union, after Hawaii and Alaska.

Again we say, the job in Japan is a United Nations job. And it did not end with the surrender ceremony on the *Missouri* in Sagami Bay. Nothing less than the peace of the world is at stake in the Orient, as in Europe. The British, Russians, Chinese and others must be brought into whole-hearted sharing of the policy-making and policing. And Americans must be made to feel that nothing less than their country's destiny in the Orient is at stake in Japan, the springboard to the future.

# APPENDICES

## PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER

(The Potsdam Proclamation)

*July 26, 1945*

1. WE—THE PRESIDENT of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed

forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

7. Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials

shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

## THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUÉ

### (Partial Text)

The Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The United Kingdom, and the United States of America met in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference confirmed at the Berlin Conference that there should be periodic consultation between them. At the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers discussions took place on an informal and exploratory basis and agreement was reached on the following questions.

2. (Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan) A Far Eastern Commission Agreement was reached with the concurrence of China for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The terms of reference for the Far Eastern Commission are as follows:

### I. Establishment of the Commission

A Far Eastern Commission is hereby established composed of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, China, France, The Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth.

## II. Functions

1. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

(a) To formulate the Policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished.

(b) To review on the request of any member any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving Policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

(c) To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V-2 hereunder.

2. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to conduct of Military Operations nor with regard to Territorial adjustments. The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan including the chain of Command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commanders Command of Occupation Forces.

## III. Functions of the United States Government

1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with Policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government Agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the Policy decisions of the Commission.

2. If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II-1-(b) should be modified its decision shall be regarded as a Policy decision.

3. The United States Government may issue Interim Directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission when-

ever urgent matters arise not covered by Policies already formulated by the Commission provided that any directive dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese Constitutional structure or in the regime of control or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.

4. All Directives issued shall be filed with the Commission.

## IV. Other Methods of Consultation

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of Consultation on Far Eastern Issues by the participating Governments.

## V. Composition

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the States party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased by agreement among the participating powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East, or having Territories therein. The Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations as occasion may require with Representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such Nations.

2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Representatives including the Representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.

## VI. Location and Organization

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall have its Headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires including Tokyo if and when it deems it desirable to do so. It may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for

consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

2. Each Representative on the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate Staff comprising both Civilian and Military representation.

3. The Commission shall organize its Secretariat, appoint such Committees as may be deemed advisable and otherwise perfect its Organization and procedure.

## VII. Termination

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when action to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Representatives including the Representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Prior to the termination of its functions the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security Organization of which the participating Governments are members, those functions which may appropriately be transferred. It was agreed that the Government of the United States on behalf of the four Powers should present the terms of reference to the other Governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the Commission on the revised basis.

## VIII. Korea

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent State, the creation of conditions for developing the Country on Democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and Agriculture of Korea and the National culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of Representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, and in preparing

their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean Democratic Parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic Organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (Trusteeship) the Political, Economic and Social progress of the Korean People, the development of Democratic self-Government and the establishment of the National Independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the Joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both Southern and Northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in Administrative-Economic matter between the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, a Conference of the Representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

## IX. China

The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and Democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by Democratic elements in all branches of the National Government and for a cessation of Civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the Policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes had several conversations concerning Soviet and American Armed Forces in

China. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Forces had disarmed and deported Japanese Troops in Manchuria, but that withdrawal of Soviet Forces had been postponed until February 1st at the request of the Chinese Government and referred also to the primary responsibility of the United States in the implementation of the Terms of Surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of Japanese Troops. He stated that American Forces would be withdrawn just as soon as this responsibility was discharged or the Chinese Government was in a position to discharge the responsibility without the assistance of American Forces. The two Foreign Secretaries were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American Forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibility.

## Allied Council for Japan

The following agreement was also reached with concurrence of China for the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan.

1. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the Chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his Deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the Occupation and control of Japan and of Directives supplementary thereto and for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted.

2. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy) who shall be Chairman and United States Member. A Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member, a Chinese member, and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

3. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate Staff consisting of Military and Civilian advisors.

4. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

5. The Supreme Commander shall issue all Orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the Occupations and control

of Japan and Directives supplementary thereto. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander who is the sole Executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of Orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon those matters shall be controlling.

6. If, regarding the implementation of Policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on questions concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes in the Japanese Constitutional structure and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of Orders on those questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission.

7. In cases of necessity the Supreme Commander may take decisions concerning the change of individual Ministers of the Japanese Government or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual Cabinet members after appropriate preliminary consultation with the Representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Council.

## THE WHITE HOUSE DIRECTIVE

### United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan

The following is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan which has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate United States Departments and Agencies for their guidance:

1. Ultimate Objectives. The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan to which policies in the initial period must conform are to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world, and to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the charter of the United Nations. The United

States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

The objectives will be achieved by the following principal means: *a.* Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor outlying islands as may be determined in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party. *b.* Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarist and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed. *c.* The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion, assembly, speech and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations. *d.* The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

2. Allied Authority. *a. Military Occupation.* There will be military occupation of the Japanese Home Islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal Allied Powers acting in the interest of the United Nations at war with Japan. For that reason participation of the forces of other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States. Although every effort will be made by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory by the United States to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal allied powers in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern. *b. Relationship to Japanese Government.* The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will

be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan. In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies including the Emperor to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese government will be permitted under his instructions to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy moreover does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of the United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan—not to support it. Changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation. *c. Publicity as to Policies.* The Japanese people and the world at large shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation and of progress made in their fulfillment.

3. POLITICAL. *a. Disarmament and Demilitarization.* Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the military and naval leaders and those who collaborated

with them in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people. Japan is forbidden to have an army, navy, airforce, secret police organization or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff, and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and naval vessels, and military and naval installations, and military, naval, and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander. High officers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese government, leaders of ultranationalist and militarist organizations, and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultranationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and provoked militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, including military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militarism and ultra nationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions. *b. War Criminals.* Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelty upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals shall be arrested, tried, and if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nations. *c. Encouragement of desire for individual liberty and democratic processes.* Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak

of religion. The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled only to the extent necessary to further the policies and objectives of the occupation. Democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion shall be encouraged subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces. Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discriminations on grounds of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion shall be abrogated. Those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended, or amended as required, and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal, and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable and thereafter shall be progressively influenced to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

4. Economic. *a. Economic Demilitarization.* The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive. Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others: the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization. The eventual disposition of those existing produc-

tion facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations. *b. Promotion of Democratic Forces.* Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander: (1) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and (2) to favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry. *c. Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity.* The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time. Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress. The Japanese authorities will be ex-

pected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs that serve the following purposes: (1) to avoid acute economic distress, (2) to assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies, (3) to meet the requirements for reparation deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments, (4) to facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied. In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation. *d. Reparations and Restitution. Reparations.* Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made: (1) through the transfer—as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan, (2) through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces. Exports, other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution, may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization. *Restitution.* Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable property. *e. Fiscal, Monetary, and Banking Policies.* The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander. *f. International Trade and Financial Relations.* Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports. Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and

financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs. *g. Japanese Property Located Abroad.* Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities. *h. Equality of Opportunity for Foreign Enterprise within Japan.* The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity. *i. Imperial Household Property.* Imperial Household Property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

## GENERAL MacARTHUR'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR JAPAN

"It is with a sense of deep satisfaction that I am today (March 7, 1946) able to announce a decision of the Emperor and Government of Japan to submit to the Japanese people a new and enlightened constitution which has my full approval. This instrument has been drafted after painstaking investigation and frequent conference between members of the Japanese Government and this Headquarters following my initial direction to the Cabinet five months ago.

"Declared by its terms to be the supreme law for Japan it places sovereignty squarely in the hands of the people. It establishes governmental authority with the predominant power vested in an elected legislature as representative of the people but with adequate check upon that power as well as upon the power of the executive and the judiciary to insure that no branch of government may become autocratic or arbitrary in the administration of affairs of state. It leaves

the throne without governmental authority or state property subject to the people's will. A symbol of the people's unity, it provides for and guarantees to the people fundamental human liberties which satisfy the most exacting standards of enlightened thought. It severs for all time the shackles of feudalism and in its place raises the dignity of man under protection of the people's sovereignty. It is throughout responsive to the most advanced concept of human relations and is an eclectic instrument realistically blending the several divergent political philosophies which intellectually honest men advocate.

"Foremost of its provisions is that which, abolishing war as a sovereign right of the nation, forever renounces the threat or use of force as a means for settling disputes with any other nation and forbids in the future the authorization of any Army, Navy, Air Force or other war potential or assumption of rights of belligerency by the State. By this undertaking and commitment, Japan surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good faith and justice of the peace-loving peoples of the world. By it, does a nation recognizing the futility of war as an arbiter of international issue chart a new course oriented to faith in the justice, tolerance, and understanding of mankind.

"The Japanese people thus turn their backs firmly upon the mysticism and unreality of the past and face instead a future of realism with a new faith and a new hope."

## THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

*April 22, 1946* [1]

### Constitution of Japan

(simplified version submitted by japanese, 22 april 1946)

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for

[1] The first draft of the new Japanese Constitution was published on March 6, 1946. A revised draft was submitted by the Japanese Government to SCAP on April 22, 1946 and is the version which appears here.

ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim the sovereignty of the people's will and do ordain and establish this Constitution, founded upon the universal principle that government is a sacred trust the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people; and we reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

Desiring peace for all time and fully conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship now stirring mankind, we have determined to rely for our security and survival upon the justice and good faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society designed and dedicated to the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance, for all time from the earth. We recognize and acknowledge that all peoples have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We hold that no people is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all peoples who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other peoples.

To these high principles and purposes we, the Japanese People, pledge our national honor, determined will and full resources.

## Chapter I

### THE EMPEROR

*Article I.* The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people.

*Article II.* The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet.

*Article III.* The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.

*Article IV.* The Emperor shall perform only such state functions as are provided for in this constitution. Never shall he have powers related to government.

The Emperor may delegate his functions as may be provided by law.

*Article V.* When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a regency is established, the Regent shall exercise his functions in the Emperor's name. In this case, paragraph one of the preceding article will be applicable.

*Article VI.* The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet.

*Article VII.* The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following functions of state on behalf of the people:

Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties.

Convocation of the Diet.

Dissolution of the House of Representatives.

Proclamation of general elections.

Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers.

Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

Awarding of honors.

Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law.

Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers.

Performance of ceremonial functions.

*Article VIII.* No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, and no gifts can be made thereby, without the authorization of the Diet.

## Chapter 2

### RENUNCIATION OF WAR

*Article IX.* War, as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat

or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations.

The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.

## Chapter 3

### RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE

*Article X.* The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights.

*Article XI.* The enjoyment of the freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this constitution shall be maintained by the eternal vigilance of the people, and the people shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

*Article XII.* All of the people shall be respected as individuals, and their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, within the limits of the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in governmental affairs.

*Article XIII.* All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin. No peerage shall be granted. No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction; nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.

*Article XIV.* The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them.

All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any special group.

In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall be preserved inviolate, nor shall any voter be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made.

*Article XV.* Every person has the right of peaceful petition for the redress of damage and other matters, for the removal of public officials and for the enactment, repeal or amendment of laws, ordinances or regulations; nor shall any person be in any way discriminated against for sponsoring such a petition.

*Article XVI.* No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.

*Article XVII.* Freedom of thought and conscience shall be held inviolate.

*Article XVIII.* Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privilege from the State, nor exercise any political authority.

No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite, or practice.

The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

*Article XIX.* Freedom of assembly, association, speech, and press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.

*Article XX.* Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.

Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate.

*Article XXI.* Academic freedom is guaranteed.

*Article XXII.* Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation, with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. Laws shall be enacted considering choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.

*Article XXIII.* In all spheres of life, laws shall be designed for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.

*Article XXIV*. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education corresponding to his ability, as provided by law.

Every person shall be obligated to insure that all of the children under his protection receive elementary education. Such education shall be free.

*Article XXV*. All people have the right to work. Standards for working conditions, wages and hours shall be fixed by law. The exploitation of children shall be prohibited.

*Article XXVI*. The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed.

*Article XXVII*. The right to own property is inviolable, but property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor.

*Article XXVIII*. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.

*Article XXIX*. No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.

*Article XXX*. No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended while committing a crime.

*Article XXXI*. No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; he shall not be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel.

*Article XXXII*. The right of the people to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued only for probable cause, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article XXX.

Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued for the purpose by a competent judicial officer.

*Article XXXIII.* The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden.

*Article XXXIV.* In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.

He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and he shall have the right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf at public expense.

At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused be unable to secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the government.

*Article XXXV.* No person shall be compelled to testify against himself.

No confession shall be admitted in evidence if made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention.

No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession.

*Article XXXVI.* No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he in any way be placed in double jeopardy.

## Chapter 4

### THE DIET

*Article XXXVII.* The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making authority of the State.

*Article XXXVIII.* The Diet shall consist of two houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

*Article XXXIX.* Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people.

The number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law.

*Article XL.* The qualifications of electors and members for both Houses shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.

*Article XLI.* The term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be four years. However, the term may be terminated

before the full term is up, by dissolution of the House of Representatives.

*Article XLII.* The term of office of the members of the House of Councillors shall be six years. Election for half the members shall take place every three years.

*Article XLIII.* Matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses, electoral districts, and method of voting, shall be fixed by law.

*Article XLIV.* No person shall be permitted to be a member of both Houses simultaneously.

*Article XLV.* Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate annual payment from the national treasury in accordance with the law.

*Article XLVI.* Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt from arrest while the Diet is in session. Any member arrested before the opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of his House.

*Article XLVII.* Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates, or votes cast inside it.

*Article XLVIII.* An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once per year.

*Article XLIX.* The Cabinet may call extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Diet must be called into session.

*Article L.* When the House of Representatives is ordered dissolved, there must be a general election of members of the House of Representatives within forty (40) days from the date of dissolution, and the Diet must be convoked within thirty (30) days from the date of the election. When the House of Representatives is ordered dissolved, the House of Councillors must, at the same time, be closed, except that the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House of Councillors in emergency session. Measures enacted at such session shall be provisional and shall become null and void, unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.

*Article LI.* Each House shall judge disputes related to qualifica-

tions and elections of its members. However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

*Article LII.* Business cannot be transacted in either House unless at least one-third of the total membership is present.

All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as elsewhere provided in the Constitution. In case of a tie, the presiding officer shall decide the issue.

*Article LIII.* Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution therefor.

Each House shall keep a record of proceedings. This record shall be published and given general circulation, excepting such parts of proceedings of secret session as may be deemed to require secrecy.

Upon demand of one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes.

*Article LIV.* Each House shall select its own president and other officials.

Each house shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a member, a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present must pass a resolution.

*Article LV.* A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution.

A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection.

*Article LVI.* The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives.

Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a division different from that of the House of Representatives, and when a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, cannot come to an agreement, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within forty (40) days, the period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives will be considered the decision of the Diet.

*Article LVII.* The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to Diet approval required for the conclusion of treaties.

*Article LVIII.* Each House may conduct investigations in relation to national affairs, and may compel the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records.

*Article LIX.* The Prime Minister, and the Ministers of State, may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of debating on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations.

*Article LX.* The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted.

Matters relating to impeachment shall be provided by law.

## Chapter 5

### THE CABINET

*Article LXI.* Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

*Article LXII.* The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State as provided for by law.

The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

*Article LXIII.* The Prime Minister shall be designated by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business.

If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree and if a joint committee of both houses, provided for by law, cannot reach an agreement, or the House of Councillors fails to make designation within twenty (20) days, exclusive of the period of

recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

*Article LXIV.* The Prime Minister shall, with the approval of the Diet, appoint the Ministers of State. The second paragraph of the preceding article shall apply to this approval.

The Prime Minister may remove Ministers of State as he chooses.

*Article LXV.* If the House of Representatives passes a no-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten days.

*Article LXVI.* When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the convocation of the Diet after a general election, the Cabinet shall resign en masse.

*Article LXVII.* In the cases mentioned in the two preceding articles, the Cabinet shall continue its functions until the time when a new Prime Minister is appointed.

*Article LXVIII.* The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet, and exercises supervision and control over various administrative branches.

*Article LXIX.* The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall:

Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of State.

Manage foreign affairs.

Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet.

In accordance with standards established by law, administer the civil service.

Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet.

Enact cabinet orders in order to carry out the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law.

Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

*Article LXX.* All laws and cabinet orders shall be signed by the

competent Minister of State, and countersigned by the Prime Minister.

*Article LXXI.* The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, shall not be subject to legal action without the consent of the Prime Minister, but the right to take that action is not impaired hereby.

## Chapter 6

### JUDICIARY

*Article LXXII.* The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.

No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.

All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws enacted pursuant thereto.

*Article LXXIII.* The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs.

Public procurators shall be subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts.

*Article LXXIV.* Removals of judges shall be accomplished by public impeachment only unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent. No disciplinary action shall be administered by any executive organ or agency.

*Article LXXV.* The Supreme Court shall consist of such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges shall be appointed by the Cabinet and shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.

The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed

again at the first general election of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten years, and in the same manner thereafter.

In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters show that they favor the dismissal of a judge concerned, he shall be dismissed.

Matters pertaining to the review mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs shall be prescribed by law.

All such judges shall receive, at regular, stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

*Article LXXVI.* The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law. The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at regular, stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

*Article LXXVII.* The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.

*Article LXXVIII.* Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly. Where, however, a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press, and cases wherein the rights of the people as reserved in Chapter 3 of this Constitution are in question, shall be conducted publicly without exception.

## Chapter 7

### FINANCE

*Article LXXIX.* The power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall determine.

*Article LXXX.* No new taxes shall be imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as law may prescribe.

*Article LXXXI.* No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself, except as authorized by the Diet.

*Article LXXXII.* The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to the Diet for its consideration and decision an annual budget for each fiscal year.

*Article LXXXIII.* In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget a reserve fund may be authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet.

The Cabinet shall be held accountable to the Diet for all payments from the reserve fund.

*Article LXXXIV.* All property of the Imperial Household, other than the hereditary estates, shall belong to the State. The income from all Imperial properties shall be paid into the national treasury, and allowances and expenses of the Imperial Household, as defined by law, shall be appropriated by the Diet in the annual budget.

*Article LXXXV.* No public money or property shall be appropriated for the use, benefit or support of any system of religion, or religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent purposes not under the control of public authority.

*Article LXXXVI.* A final audit of all expenditures and revenues of the State shall be made annually by a board of audit and submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet during the fiscal year immediately following the period covered.

The organization and competency of the board of audit shall be determined by law.

*Article LXXXVII.* At regular intervals and at least annually the Cabinet shall report to the Diet and the people on the state of national finances.

## Chapter 8

### LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

*Article LXXXVIII.* Regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.

*Article LXXXIX.* The local public entities shall establish assemblies as their deliberative organs, in accordance with law.

The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their legislative assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities.

*Article XC.* Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and government and to frame their own charters within such laws as the Diet may enact.

*Article XCI.* A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.

## Chapter 9

### AMENDMENTS

*Article XCII.* Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast at a special referendum thereon or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be proclaimed by the Emperor, in the name of the People, as an integral part of this Constitution.

## Chapter 10

### SUPREME LAW

*Article XCIII.* The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan result from the age-old struggle of man to be free. They have survived the exacting test for durability in the crucible of time and experience, and are conferred upon this and future generations in sacred trust, to be held for all time inviolate.

*Article XCIV.* This Constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance hereof shall be the supreme law of the State and no public law or ordinance and no Imperial Rescript or other act of gov-

ernment, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.

*Article XCV.* The Emperor or the Regent, the Ministers of State, the members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

## Chapter 11

### SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

*Article XCVI.* This Constitution shall be enforced as from the day when the period of six months will have elapsed counting from the day of its promulgation.

The enactment of laws necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, the election of members of the House of Councillors and the procedure for the convocation of the Diet and other preparatory procedures necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may be executed before the day prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

*Article XCVII.* As regards those who hold peerage on the effective date of this Constitution, their title shall remain valid for their lives, but no right of peerage shall from this time forth embody within itself any power of government.

*Article XCVIII.* If the House of Councillors is not constituted before the effective date of this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall sit as the Diet on that date and until such time as the House of Councillors shall be constituted.

*Article XCIX.* The term of office for half the members of the House of Councillors serving in the first term under this Constitution shall be three years. Members falling under this category shall be determined in accordance with law.

*Article C.* The Ministers of State, members of the House of Representatives and judges in office on the effective date of this Constitution, and all other public officials who occupy positions corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution shall not forfeit their positions automatically on the effective date of this Constitution unless otherwise specified by law. When, however, successors are elected or appointed under the provisions of this Constitution they shall forfeit their positions as a matter of course.