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THREE
TREATISES.
The First
Concerning ART.
The Second
Concerning MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.
The Third
Concerning HAPPINESS.
By J. H.
LONDON:
Printed by H. Woodfall, Jun.
For J. Nourse, without Temple- Bar and P. Vaillant, facing Southampton-Jireet in the Strand,
M.dcc.xli V.
r ■
I
1
\ '
*
Advertifement to the Reader.
N the Treatifes here publijhed^ there
JL is the following ConneBion. T^he firft treats of Art in its mofl comprehenjive Ideay when conjidered as a Genus to many fubordinate Species. 7he fcond confders three of thefe fubordinate Species^ whofe Beauty and Elegance are well known to all, The lajl treats of that Arty which refpeBs the ConduB of Human LifCy and which may jujlly be ^aluedy as of all Arts the mofi hnportanty if it can truly lead us to the End propofed.
TREATISE the FirSt'T
CONCERNING
ART,
A
DIALOGUE
T O T H E
Right Honourable the EARL of
S HJ FtE spu RT.
■)
CONCERNING
A R T,
A
D I A L O G U E
To the Right Honourable the
Earl of Shaftesbury.
My Lord,
^ g '"^HE following Is a ConYerfatlon S in its kind fomewhat uncom- M mon, and for this reafon I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the fame Peculiarity prove a Reafon to amufe your Lordfhip, I fhall think myfelf well rewarded In the Labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is fome kind of Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no longer Preface, the Fad: was as follows.
B 2
A
Concerning ART,
A F R I E N D from a diftant Country hav^ ing by chance made me a Vifit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morn- ing in the Spring, to walk from S — r — m to fee Lord P-’-mir-’-rke's at The
Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Paint- ing, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subjedt pf great Entertainment to my Friend ; Nor was I, for my own part, iefs delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had fo well anfwpred his Expectations, We had given a large Scope to our Curioli- ty, when we left the Seat, and leifiirely be-? gan our return towards hpme,
And here, rny Lord, in paffing over a few pleafant Fields, commenced the Con- verfation which I am to tell you, and which fell at firft, as was natural, on the many curious Works, which had afforded us both fo elegant an Amufepient. This led us in- fenfibly to difcourfing upon ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been g.dmiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be
referred
'A Dialogue.
5
referred to no other Caufe. And here, I well rerriember, I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the Word ART : A Word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one ^ but for all that, as to its precife and definite Idea, this might ftill be a Secret ; that fo it was in fadt with a thoUfand Words befide, all no lefs eorhmon, and equally familiar, and yet dl of them equally vague and undetermined* To this he anfwered. That as to the pre^ tife and definite Idea of Art, it was a Que^ ftion of fome Difficulty, and not fo foon to be refolved ; that, however, he could not con- ceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by confidering thofe feverd Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It ‘is hardly probable, faid he^ that Mufic, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and fo many more fhould be all called by one common Name^ if there was not fomething in each^ which was common to all. It fhould feem fo, replied I. What
then, faid he, fhall we pronounce this to be ? At this, I remember, I was under B 3 fome
6 Concerning ART,
fome fort of Hefitation. Have Courage, cried my Friend, perhaps the Cafe is not fo defperate. Let me aflc you — Is MedL cine the Caufe of any thing ? Y es furely,
faid I, of Health. And Agriculture, of what ? Of the plentiful Growth of Grain, And Poetry, of what? Of Plays, and Satires, and Odes, and the like.
And is not the fame true, faid he, of Mufic, of Statuary, of Architedture, and, in Ihort, of every Art whatever ? I confefs,
faid I, it feems fo. Suppofe then, faid he, we fhould fay. It was common to every
Art to he a Caufe, Should we err ? I
replied, I thought not. Let this then, faid he, be remembered, that all Art isCauCe.
I promifed him it fhould.
But how then, continued he, all Art he Caufe ^ is it alfo true, that all Caufe is Art ? At . this again I could not help
hefitating. You have heard, faid he, without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Horfe, and not fucceeding to his Mind,
threw
Dialogue. 7
threw his Pencil at the Pifture in a Fit of Paffion and Defpair, and produced a Foam the moft natural imaginable. Now, what fay you to thfe Fad: ? Shall we pro- nounce Art to have been the Caufe ? By
no means, faid 1. What, faid he, if in- ftead of Chance^ his Hand had been guided by mere Compnljio?2^ himfelf diffenting and averfe to the Violence ? Even here, re- plied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if in- ftead of a cafual "Throw ^ or hwolunt ary Com- pulJion^hchsidL willingly deliberately dired- ed his Pencil, and fo produced that Foam,
which Story fays he failed in ? Would
not Art here have been the Caufe ? I replied, in this cafe, I thought if would.
It jfhould feem then, faid he, that Art implies not only Caufe^ but the additional Requifite of Intention^ Reafon^ Volition^ and Conjcioujnefs ; fo that not every Caufe is Art^ but only voluntary' or intentional Caufe,
So, faid I, it appears.
B 4
And ,
8
Concerning ART,
And fliall we then, added he, pronounce e^oery intentional Caufe to be Art ? I fee no reafon, faid Ij why not. Conlider, faid he ; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the Caufe ^ and that too the intentional Caufe^ of con- fuming certain Food : And yet will you refer this Confumption to Art ? Did you chew by Art ? Did you fwallow by Art ?
No certainly, faid I. So by
opening your Eyes, faid he, you are the intentional Caufe of Seeing, and by llretch- ing your Hand, the intentional Caufe of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that thefe things proceed from Art ? I fhould
be wrong, faid I, if I did : For what Art can there be in doings what every ojie is able to do by mere TVill^ and a fort of uninjirudled Injlin^ ? You fay right, replied he, and the reafon is manifeft. Were it otherwife, we fliould make all Mankind univerfal Ar- tifls in every Angle Aftion of their Lives. And what can be a greater Abfurdity than this ? I confefled that the Abfurdity ap- peared
A Dialogue.
9
peared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which 'we do by Com-* fuljioriy or without intending it, be Art ; and not even what we do intentionally^ if it pro- ceed from mere Will and uninjiru5ted In- ftindl 5 what is it we have left remaining, where Art may be found converfant ? Or can it indeed poffibly*be in any thing elfe, than in that which we do by Ufe^ FraBice^ Experie7icey and the like, all which are born with no one, but which are acquired all afterward by Advances unperceived. I, can think, faid I, of nothing elfe. Let therefore the Words Habit and Habitual^ faid he, reprefent this Requifite, and let us fay, that Art is not only a Caufcy but an intentional Caufey and not only an inten-- tionaJ Caufey but an intentional Caufe found-- ed in Habit y or, in other Words, an habi^ tual Caufe. You appear, faid I, to argue
rightly.
But if Art, faid he, be what we have now afferted, fomething learnt and acquired-, if it be alfo a thing hitejitmial
or
lo Concerning ART,
or wlunfaryy and not governed either by
Chance or blind Necejjity If this, I fay,
be the Cafe, then mark the Confequences.
And what, faid I, are they ? The firft, faid he, is, that no Events^ in what we call the natural Worldy muft be referred to Art^y fuch as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For thefe all happen by ftated Laws ^ by a curi- ous Necejjity y which is not to be-withftood, and where the nearer and immediate Caufes appear to be utterly unconfcious. I con- fefs, faid I, it feems fo. In the next place, continued he, we muft exclude all thofe admired Works of the Animal Worldy which, for their Beauty and Order, we me-^ tapborically call artificial. The Spider’s Web, the Bee’s Comb, the Beaver’s Houfe, and the Bird’s Neft, muft all be referred to another Source* — For who can fay, thefe ever learnt to be thus ingenious ? or, that they, were ignorant by NaturCy and knowing only by Education? None furely, re- plied I. But we have ftill, faid he, a higher Confideration, And what, faid I,
IS
^Dialogue. i i
is that? It is, anfwered he, this
Not even that Divine Power ^ which gave Form to all things, the7t aBedhy Art^ when it gave that Form. For how, continued he, can that Intelligence, which has all Perfection ever in Energy^ be fuppofed to have any Power, not original to its Nature ? How can it ever have any thing to learUy when it knows all from the Beginning ; or, being perfeCt and complete^ admit of what is additional and fecondary?^ I fhould think, faid I, it were impoffible. ' If fo, faid he, then Art can never be numbered among its Attributes : For all Art is fome- thing learnt^ fomething fecondary and ac-* quiredy and never original to any Being,’ which pofleffes it. So the Fad:, faid I, has been eftablifhed.
If this therefore, continued he, be true ; if Art belong not either to the Divine^ Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate
Nature, to what Nature fhall we fay it
does belong ? I know not, faid I, unlefe it be to the Human, You are right, faid
he;
12 Concerning ART,
he 1 for every Nature elfe you perceive is either too excellent to want it. Or too bafe tO be capable of it, Befide, except the Human, what other Nature is there left ? Or where elfe can we find any of the Arts already inftanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are Statuaries, but Men ? Who Pilots, who Muficians? This feems, replied I, to be the Fa£t.
Let us then, continued he, lay, not only that Art is a Caufe^ but that it is Man becoming a Caufe ; and not only Man, but Man intending to do what is going to be donCy and domg it alfo by Habit fo that its whole Idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is ^ ^ Man becoming a Caufe y Intent io?2al and Habit uaL I con-
fefs, faid I, it has appeared fo.
And thus, faid he, have you had exhi- bited a fort of a Sketch of Art. Y ou muft re^ member however, it is but a Sketch : there is Hill fomething wanting to make it a
finifiied
-^Dialogue. 13
finiflied Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a Paffage in your admired Horace. It is con*^ CQxnmg Alfenus I who (if you remember) he tells us, though his Tools were laid afide, and his Shop fhut up, was ftill an Artift as much as ever.— r--
- — Alfenus njafer omni AbjeBo injlrumento Artis y claufaq-y tabernd^
Sutor erat I remember,
faid I, the Paffage, ' but to what purpofe is it quoted ? Only, replied he, to fhew you, that I fhould not be without Prece- dent, were I to affirm it not abfolutely ne- ceffary to the being of Art, that it fhould be Man aBually becoming a Caiife ; but that it was enough, if he had the Power or Capa-> city of fo becoming. Why then, faid I, did you not fettle it fo at firfl: ? Becaufe, replied he. Faculties, Powers, Capacities (call them as you will) are in them- felves abftrad: from Adlion, but obfcure and hidden things. On the contrary, Energies find Operations lie open to the Senfes, and
cannot
14 Concerning ART,
cannot but be obferved, even whether we "will or no. And hence therefore, when firft we treated of Art, we chofe to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured fomewhat farther. Repeat then, faid I, if you pleafe, the Alteration, which you have made. At firfl:, anfwered he, we reafoned upon Art, as if it was only Man ciBually becoming a Caufe intentional and habitual. Now we fay it is a Power in Man of becoming fuch Caufe; and that, though he ^ be not actually in the Exercife of fuch a Power, I told him, his Amend- ment appeared to be juft.
There is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the fake of Accuracy, is equally wanting ; and that is with refped: to the Epithet, Intentional or Voluntary, And what, faid I, is that ? We have agreed it, replied he, to be neceffary, that all Art fhould be under the Guidance of Intejition or Volition^ fo that no Man adting by Com- fulfion^ or by Chance^ ftiould be called
an
^Dialogue. 15
an Artiji. We have. Now tho’ this, faid he, be true, yet it is not fufficient. We muft limit this Intention or Volition to a peculiar Kind. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a fufficient Foundation to conftitute an Art, we fhould make Art one of the lowell and moft defpicable of things. The meanell Trick of a common Juggler might, in fuch cafe, entitle a Man to the Charafter of an Artift. , I confeffed, without fome Limi- tation, that this might be the Confequencc. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species ? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it, by the Number and Dignity of the Precepts^ which go to the directing of our Intentions? You muft explain, faid I ; for your Meaning is ob- fcure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sow- ing ? Are there not Precepts in Archi- tedfure, about Orders and Proportions ? Are there not the fame in Medicine, in Navigation, and the reft? There are.
And what is your Opinion of thefe
feveral
1 6 Concerning ART,
fevcral Precepts ? Are they arbitrary ani capricious ; or rational and Jleady ? Are they the Inve?2tions of a Day ; or well- approved by long Experience ? I told him, I Ihould confider them for the moft as rational, fteady, and well-approved by long Experience. And what, continued he, lhall we fay to their Number ? Are they few ? Or are they not rather fo numerouSy that in every particular Art, fcarce any comprehend them all, but the feveral Ar- tifts themfelves ; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Appli- cation ? I replied. It feemed fo. Suppofe then We were to pronounce, that to every Art there was a Syjiem of fuch various a7id well-approved Precepts : Should we err ? No certainly. And fuppofe we fhould fay, that the Inteiition of every Artijly in his feveral Art, was directed by fuch a Syftem : Would you allow this ? Surely. And will not this limiting of Intentions to fuch only, as are fo diredled, fufficiently diftinguifli Art from any thing elfe which may refeinble it ? — — In other
words^
"A Dialogue; tj
Words, Is it likely, under this Diftinftion,' to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind ?
I replied, I thought not.
Let us then fee, faid he, and colledt' all that we have faid, together. We hav6 already agreed, that the Power of aSling after a certain' manner is fufBcient to con*' ftitute Art, without the adtually 'Operating agreeably to that Powers And We have BOW farther held the Intentions of every Artift to be direfted by a Syjiem of various and well-approved Precepts, Befides all this,’ We fettled it before, that all Art was founded in Habit • and was peculiar to Man ^ and was feen by becoming the Caufe of feme Ef- feB, It fhould feem then, that the whole Idea of Art was this— —An HABiTUAir’ Power in Man oE becoming the Cause of some Effect, accord*
ING TO A SVSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL- APPROVED PrECEPTSJ
I
I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and juft*
G §. 2;
Concerning A R T,
i8
§. 2. And nowthen> continued he, as we have gone thus faf, and have fettled between us what we believe Art to be ; fhall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end ?
Oh ! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked fo leifurely, that much remains of our Way ; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amufe ourfelves.
My Friend upon this proceeded with fay- ing, that if Art were a Caufe^ (as we had agreed it was) it muft be the Caufe of fome^ thing. Allow it, faid I, And if it be the Caufe of fomething^ it muft have a Sub- jeB to operate on. For every Agent has need of its Patient % the Smith of his Iron, the Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship.
I anfwered. It was true. If then, faid he, the Subjeds of particular Arts be thus evident : What Idea fhall we form of that miiverfal SubjeB^ which is common to all Art? At this Queftion, it muft be con-^ felTed, I was a little embarafled.
This
A Dialogue; 19
This induced him to afk me, How many forts of Subjects I allowed of ? Here I could not help helitating again. There
is nothing, continued he, fo difficult in the Qi^ftion. .You muft needs perceive, that «// Natures whatever can be but either con^ tingent or necejfary. This may be, re- plied I i but even yet I do not comprehend you. Not comprehend me! faid he j then anfwer me a Queftion : Can you con- ceive any Medium between Motion and No^ Motion^ between Change and No-Change ?
I replied, I could not. If not,' can you conceive any thing in the whole Order of Beings which muft not be either liable to thefe, or not liable ? Nothing, ' Call thofe things therefore, faid he,' which are liable to Change and Motion, con- tingent Natures ^ and thofe, which are not liable, necejfary Natures: And thus you have a Divifon, in which all things are eluded. We have fo, faid I.
C 2 In
20
Concerning A R T,
^ In which therefore, faid he, of thefe Na-^ tures fhall we feek for this common Subjedi of Art ?■ To this, I told him, I was unabk to ahfwer. Refledt, faid he, a little. We have found Art to be a Caufe.
We have. And is it not ejfential to 'every Caufe to operate ? or can.it be a Caufe, and be the Caufe of nothing ? Impoffible.
V/herever therefore there is Caufcy there is neceffarily implied fome Operation.
There is. And can there poffibly be Operation^ without Motion and Change ?
There cannot. But Change and 'Motion muft needs ho - incompatible with what is necejfary and immutable. They muft. So therefore is Caufe. It muft.
And fo therefore Art. It muft.
Truth therefore, faid he, and Know- ledge ; Principles and Demonftrations ; the general and intelledlual Eflences of Things ; in fliort, the whole immutable and necejfary Nature is no part of it reducible to a Subject of Art. It feems fo, faid I.
Ip
A Dialogue.
21
If therefore Art, faid he, have nothing p to do with the Jleady^ abjiraB^ and ne- cejfary Nature^ it can have only to do' with the tranjienfy the particular^ and' contingent one. ’Tis true, faid' I; for there is no other left. And fhall we then fay, ^replied he, it has to do with all contingent'^2Xsixt'$^ exifting in the Univerfe ?
For aught, replied I, which to me ap- pears contrary. What think you, faid he, of thofe Contingents of higher Order ? fuch as the grand Planetary Syftem; the Succeffion of the Seafons ; the regular and uniform Courfe of all fuperior Natures in the Univerfe ? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here ? No certainly, faid I.
Thefe fuperior Contingents then, fwhicb move without Interruption^ are, it feems, above it. They are.
And fhall we fay the fame of thofe of lower fort ; thofe, whofe Courfe we fee often inter^ rupted ; thofe, which the Strength and Cun-- ning of Man are able to influence and con- ' troulf Give Inftances, faid I, of what C 3 yoix
22 Concerning ART,
you mean. I mean, faid he, Earth, Water, Air, Fires Stones, Trees; Ani- mals s Men .themfelves. Are thefe Con- tingents within the reach of Art, or has Art here ho Influence ? I ihould think, faid I, a very great one.
If this, continued he, be true, it fhould feena that the common or universai. Subject of Art was-— all those con- TiNQENT Natures, which lie within THE REACH OF THE HuMAN PoWERS TO INFLUENCE, I acknowledge, faid it appears fo.
Thus far then, faid he, we have ad^ Vanced with tolerable Succefs. We have gained fome Idea of Art^ and fome Idea of its Subject, Our Inquiry, on the whole,
has informed us, that Art is an habi^
tual Power in Man of becoming a certain. Caufe^'-- and that its Subject is — every fuch contingent Nature^ which lies within the reach of the human Powers to infuence.
§• 3-
A Dialogue.
23
§. 3 . *Tis true, fald I, this appears to have been the Refult of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it feems to have been.
A long one, replied he, if you pleafe, but not a full and ample one. Can any thing, faid I, be wanting, after what you have faid already? Certainly, replied he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of Art^ confidered as a Caufe ; and much of the SubjeB^ on which it operates | but what moves thefe Operations to com* menccy and where it is they endy thefe are Topicks, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that we might now confider them.
He was willing, he faid, for his part,’ and immediately went on by afking, What I thought was the Beginning of Art ? I mean, faid he, by Beginningy that Caufe for the fake of which it operates, and which being fuppofed awayy Men would be never moved to follow it. To this, I told him, I was unable to anfwer. You will not C 4 think
24 Concerning A R
think it, faid he, fo difficult, when you have a little more eonlidered. Reflect
with yourfelf Was it not the Ahfence
of Health, which excited Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine ? I replied, it was.
What then, faid he, if the Human Body had been fo fair perfeB and felf-. fujicienf^ as never to have felt the Vicijjt’- tudes of IVell and III: Vv^ould not then tliis Art have been wholly unknown ?
I replied, I thought it would. And what, faid he, if we extend this Perfedtion 9. degree farther, and fuppofe the Body not only xhmMalthfuly but withal fo robufty as to have felt iio Uneafinefs from all Jncle-^ tnencies of Weather: Would not then the Arts of Building alfo and Clothing have been as ufelefs, as that of Medicine ?
J replied. It feemed they would. But what, faid he, if we bound not this Per-^ ^ feftion of ours even here ? What if we fuppofe, that not only Things merely necef- fcLryy but that thofe alfo conducive to Ele^^ game and Enjoyment were of courfe all Implied in the Conftitution of Human Na-* * ^ ture^
A Dialogue. 25
ture; that they were all Jleady] conjlant; and independant from without^ and as in- feparable from our Being, as Perlpiring, or Circulation : In fuch cafe, would not the Arts of Mufic, Painting and Poetry, with every other Art paffing' under the Denomi- nation of Elegant^ have been as ufelefs, as we have held thofe others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architedlure ? I replied. It feemed they would. It was then the Abfence of Joys, Elegancies, and Amufe- ments from our Confitution^ as left by Nature y which induced us to feek them in thefe Arts of Elegance and Entertainment.
It was. And what, faid he, are Joys, Elegancies, Amufements, Health, Robuftnefs, with thofe feveral other Objedis cf Defrey whofe Abfence leads to Arty but fo many different Names of that complex Being called Good, under its various^ and multi-r formy and popular Appearances f ' I re*’ plied, It feemed fo,
If this then, faid he, be granted. It Should feem that the Beginning or Prin^
cipk
26 Concerning ART,
ciple of Art was the Abfence of fomefhing thought Good 5 becaufe it has appeared that it is for the fake of feme fuch abfenf Good that every Art operates ; and becaufe, if we fuppofe no fuch Abfence to have been^ we Jhould never have known any Art^
J confefs, faid I, it feems fo.
But how then, continued he? If it be true that all Art implies fuch Principle^ is it reciprocally true, that every fuch Principle fliould imply Art ? I fee no reafon, faid I, why not, Conlider, faid he. It might be thought a Good by fome perhaps, to be as ftrong as thofe Horfes, which are ploughing yonder Field j to be as tall as thofe Elms, and of a Nature
as durable, Yet would the Abfence of
Goods, like fhefe, lead to Art ? Or is it not abfurd to fuppofe, there fhould be an Art of Impojfibilites ? Abfurd, faid I, cer- tainly. If fo, faid he, when we define " the Beginning or Principle of Art, it is not enough to call it the Abfeitce of femething thought Good^ unlefs we add^ that the Good
be
^Dialogue. 27
he a Good PoJ]ible\ a TChing attainable by Man ; a "Thing relative to Human Lifcy and conjijlent with Human Nature : Or does not this alfo appear a Requifite ? I replied,
J thought it did,
But ftill, continued he Is it a fuf-» ficient Motive to Art, that the Good dejired fliould be attainable In other Words, does every Abfence of Good attainable lead to Arty or is our Account ftill too loofey and in need of ftridter Determination ?
Of none, faid I, which appears to me* Refleft, faid he 5 there are fome of the pof fble Goods fq obvious and ealy, that e^ery Man, in an ordinary State of common na--* tural Perfebliony is able to acquire them, without Labour or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggeftiqns of Will and unin^ frudied Infindl, I granted, they might. It would be therefore impertinent, . jfaid he, to fuppofe that Goods, like thefe^
Ihould
28 Concerning ART,
fhould lead to Art, becaufe Art would be fuperfuous^ and in no relpect neceffary. Indeed, faid I, It feems, fo.
If therefore, faid he, neither ImpoJJibles lead to Art^ becaufe of fuch there can be no Art ; nor Things eafly pojjible^ becaufe in fuch Nature can do without Art : what is it we have left, to which we may refer it ? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that middle Clafs of Things^ which, however pof- iible, are ftill not fo eafy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Inftindt unin- ftrudled ? I replied, It feemed fo.
That there are many fuch things, faid he, js evident paft doubt. For what Man would pay Artifts fo largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain what- ever he defired ? Or who would ftudy to be {killed in Arts, were Nature’s original Powers to be in all relpefts fufftcient ?
I told him, It was not likely,
It fhould feem then, faid he, according to this Rsafoningj that the Beginning, Mch
tive^
//W, or Principle of Art ; that Caufe^ *which firft moved it to ABion^ and, for the fake of which its feveral Operations are exerted, is — the Want or Absence of some- thing APPEARING Good 5 relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural
AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.
I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable/
§. 4. Let this then, faidhe, fufEce,asto the Beginning of Art. But how fhall we defcribe its End ? What is it we fhall pro- nounce this ? My Anfwer, I replied, muft be the fame as often already ; which was indeed, that I could not refolve the Queftion. It fhould feem, faid he,
not fo difficult, now we have difcovered what Beginning is. For if Beginning and End are Contraries and oppofed, it is but to invert^ as it were, the Notion of Begin- ning, and we gain of courfe the Notion of End. I alked him, In what manner ?
Thus, faid he, the Beginning of Art has
been
3d Concerning ART,
been held to be fomefhing^ which^ if fuppofed away^ Men would be never moved to apply to Art. By Inverfon therefore the End of Art muft be fomethingy which^ while fuppofed away^ Men will never ceaje applying to Art ^ becaufe, were they to ceafe, while the End was wanting, they would ceafe with Im- perfeftion, and their Performance would be incomplete. To this I anfwered, That the Account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much Intelligence.
He replied. If it was, he would endea- vour to be more particular. And what, continued he, fhould we fay, that every Art, according to its Genius, will of courfe be accomplijhed either in fome Energy^ or in fome Work ; that, befides thefe two, it can be accomplifhed in nothing elfe ; and con- fequently that one of thefe miiji of necejfty be its End ? I could not here but anfwer
him with a Smile, That the Matter was now much obfcurer than ever. I find then, laid he, it is proper we lliould be more explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our
Reafon-
A Dialogue.
31
Reafonings from fome clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite necef- fary, if he intended to be intelligible.
Thus then,faidhe. You will grant, that X every Arty being a Caufcy mujl be produbtive of fome Effedt-y for inftance, Mulic, of a Tune j Dancing, of a Dance j Architefture, of a Palace; and Sculpture, of a Statue.
’Tis allowed, faid I. You will grant alfo, faid he, that in thefe ProduBiom they are all accomplijhed and ended: Or, in other words, that as Mufic produces a Tune, fo is it ended and accompliflied in a Tune; and as Sculpture produces a Statue, fo is it ended and accompliflied in a Statue.
^Tis admitted, faid I. Now thefe Pro-^ dudions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like Units or Mathematical Points , but, on the contrary, all confjl of a certain Number of PartSy from whofe accurate Or- der is derived their Beauty and PerfeBion^ For example; Notes, ranged after fuch a manner, make a Tune in Mulic ; and Limbs, ranged after fuch a manner, make a
Statue
Concerning ART,
Statue or a Pidure. I replied, They did^ If then the ProdudiionSy continued he, of every Art thus confift of certain Parts^ it will follow, that thefe Parts will be either €o-exiJlenty or not; and if not co-exijlenty then of courfe fuccejjive, Affift me, feid I, by another Inftance, for you are growing again obfcure* Co-exiflenty re- plied hej as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs^ Body, and Head all fnbjijl^ together at one in^- dividual Injiant : SucceJJivCy as in a Tune Dance, where there is no fuch Co-exiftence^ but where fome Parts are ever pajjing away*^ and others are ever fucceeding them.
Can any thing be faid to exijly faid I, whofe Parts are ever pajjing away ?
Surely, replied he, or how elfe exift Years and Seafons, Months and Days, with their common Parent y Pime itfelf ? - — Or indeed what is Human Lifcy but a Compound of Parts thus fleeting ; a Compound of various and multiform ABionSy which fucceed each other in a certain Order I The Faft, faid I, appears fo.
This
A DiALOGUU;
33
This then, continued he, being the cafe,’ and there being this Difference in Produc- tions, call every ProdudiioTty the Parts of which exijl fuccejjively^ and whofe Nature hath its Being or EJfence in a Pranfition^ call it, what it really is, a Motion or an Energy— Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; thus Riding and Sailing are Energies; and fo is Elocution, and fo is Life itfelf. On the contrary, call every Productions whofe Parts exijl all at once^ and whofe Nature de-^ pends net on a Pranfition for its EJfencCs call it a Work, or "Thing done^ not Energy
or Operation. Thus a Houfe is aWork,
a, Statue is a Work, and fo is a Ship, and^ fo a Pidure. I feem, laid I, to compre- hend you.
If then there be no Productions ^ faid he, but muft be of Parts^ either co-exijient or fuccejjive's and the one of thefe be, as you perceive, a Works and the other be an Energy's it will follow, there will be no Productions but will be either a Work or an D Energy.
34 Concerning A R T,
Energy. There will not^ faid 1. But QVtryArf^ faid he, you have granted, is dccomplijhed and ended in what it produces t I replied, I had. And there are no ProduBions^ but Works or Energies ? None.
It will follow then, faid he, that every Art will be accomplished and ended IN A Work or Energy.
T o this I anlwered. That his Reafoning I could not impeach ; but that ftill the Di- llinftion of Work and Energy was, what I did not well comprehend. There are feveral Circumftancesy faid he, which will ferve fufficiently to make it clear .>
I begged he would mention fome.
Thus then, faid he— —When the Pro- dudtion of any Art is an Energy^ then the Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy. For inftance, the Per- fection of a Mufician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Pro- duction
A Dialogue.
35
dudlion of any Art is a Worky then is not the Perfection vifble during the Energy y hut only after it. Thus the Perfedlion of the Sta- tuary is not feen during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over ; when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left, as the Refult of all,
’Tis true, faid L
Again, continued he, in confe-^’
quence of this, where the Produftion is an Energy^ there the Production is of Necefjity co-eval with the Artif , For how £hould the Energy furvive the Man ; the Playing remain, when the Mufician is dead ? But where the Production is a Worky then, is there no fuch Necefity, The Work may well remain, when the Artift is forgotten 5 there being no more reafon, that the Statue and the Artift ftiould be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You feem now, faid I, to have explained yourfelf*
D 3
If
36
Concerning A R T,
. If then, faidhe, Work and Energy" be made intelligible TermSy yotf cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before af-
ferted that every Arty according to its
GeniuSy mujl needs be accomplijhed in one of thefe 5 thaty except in thefe twOy it can be ac-^ complijhed in nothing elfe^y and confequently
that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY
BE ITS End. I anfwered, That the Reafoning appeared juftly deduced. So much then, replied he, for the Ending or Accomplijhment of Art ‘y and fo much alfo for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Difqui- fition.
§.5. He had no fooner faid this, than I was beginning to applaud him ^ elpecially on his having treated a Subje<fl: fo copioufly, darted, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by fay- ing, That as to my Praifes they were more than he deferved 5 that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called
it.
A Dialogue.
37
it, fo copious, when he had fo often before thought, on what at prefent we had been talking. In fhort, fays he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amufing myfelf, in forming an ElTay upon this Sub- jedl. I could not here forbear reproach- ing him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions. My Reproaches produced a fort of amicable Controverfy, which at length ended in his offering. That, to make me fome amends, he would now recite me (if I pleafed) a fmall Fragment of the Piece ; a Fragment, which he had happened acci- dentally to have about him. The Propofal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.
A s to the Performance itfelf, it muff be confeffed, in point of Stile, it was fomewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Excefs. At the time however of recital, this gave me lefs Offence, becaule it feemed, as it were, to palliate the Drynefs of what had paffed before, and in fome fort D 3 to
38 Concerning ART,
to fupply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows.
‘^OArt! Thou Praife of Man^ and Ornament of Human Life I PoffelTed of Thee, the meaneft Genius grows deferv-^ ing, and has a juft Demand for a Portion of our Efteem. Devoid of Thee, the Brighteft of our Kind lie loft and ufelefs, and are but poorly diftinguiflied from “ the moft Defpicable and Bafe. When we inhabited Forefts in common with Brutes, nor other wife known from theni than by the Figure of our Species ; Lhou taughteft us to aflert the Sovereignty of our Nature^ and to affume that Empire, for which Providence intended us. Thou^ fands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee 5 thoufands of Elegancies, Pleafures, and Joys, without which Life itfelf would be but an infipid Pofleffion.
^^WiDE and extenfive is the Reach pf thy Dominion. No Element is
“ there
A Dialogue.
39
there either fo violent or fo fubtle^ fo yield-* ing or fo JluggiJh^ as by the Powers of its Nature to be fuperior to thy Diredlion. Thou dreadeft not the fierce Impetuofity of Fire, but compelleft its Violence to be both obedient and ufeful. By it Thou fofteneft the ftubborn Tribe of Minerals, fo as to be formed and moulded into Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons, ^ Armour, , Coin ; and previous to thefe, and other Thy Works and Energies^ hence all thofe various Tools and Inftru- ments, which empower Thee to proceed ‘‘ to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is the fubtle Air lefs obedient to Thy Power, whether Thou willed: it to be a “ Minifter to our Pleafure, or Utility. At Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds, which charm the Soul with all the Powers of Harmony. Under thy Inflrudtion it moves the Ship o’er Seas, while that yielding Element, where otherwife we fink, even Water itfelf is by Thee ‘‘ taught to bear us ; the vaft Ocean to pro- mote that Intercourfe of Nations, which D 4 Igno-
40 Concerning ART,
Ignorance would imagine it was deftined to intercept. To fay how thy Influence is feen on Earth, would be to teach the meaneft, what he knows already. Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable and Failure 5 Lawns and Groves, and Gardens, and Plantations^ Cottages, Vil- lages, Caftles, Towns; Palaces, Temples, and Ipacious Cities,
Nor does thy Empire end in SubjeBs thus in^animate. Its Power alfo extends thro’ the various Race of Animals, who either patiently fubmit to become thy Slaves, or are fure to find Thee an ir- refiftible Foe. The faithful Dog, the patient Ox, the generous Horfe, and the mighty Elephant, are content all to re- ceive their Inftrudions from Thee, and readily to lend their natural Jnjiindts or Strength^ to perform thofe Offices, which thy Occafions call for. If there be found any Species, which are ferviceable when dead. Thou fuggefteft the Means to in- ll veftigate and take them. If any be fo
favage,
-/^Dialogue. 41
” favage, as to refufe being tamed ; or of Natures fierce enough, to venture an At- tack ; Thou teacheft us to fcorn their brutal Rage ; to meet, repel, purfue, and « conquer.
And fuch, O Art ! is thy amazing Influence, when Thou art employed only on thefe inferior SubjeBs ; on Natures In- animate^ or at beft IrrafionaL But when- e’er Thou choofefl: a Subjelt more noble^ and fetteft to the cultivating of Mind itfelf, then ’tis Thou becomeft truly ami- “ able and divine ; the ever flowing Source “ of thofe fublimer Beauties, of which no Subjebi but Mind alone is capable. Then “ ’tis Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man- kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of Orators ; the facred Train of Patriots and of Heroes 5 the godlike Lift of Philofo- phers and Legiflators; the Forms of - ‘‘ tiious and equal Politics, where private “ Welfare is made the fame with public \ “ where Crowds themfelves prove dif-
“ interefted
42 Concerning ART,
interefted and brave, and Virtue is made a national and popular Charadteriftic.
“Hail! facred Source of all thefc “ Wonders ! ^hyfelf inftrudl me to praife “ Thee worthily, thro* whom, whate’er “ we do, is done withElegance and Beauty ; without whom, what we do, is ever grace-
“ lefs and deformed. ^Venerable Power !
“ By what Name lhall I addrefs Thee r “ Shall I call Thee Ornament of Mind ;
or art Thou more truly Mind itfelf? — “■’Trs Mind Thou art, moftperfedt “ Mind y not rude, untaught, but fair and polilhed y in fuch Thou dwelleft, of fuch “ Thou art the Form y nor is it a Thing “ more poffible to feparate Thee from fuch, “ than it would be to feparate Thee from “ thy own Exiftence.”
My good Friend was now arrived to a very exalted Pitch, and was purfuing his Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency ; when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk
being
^ D I A L 0 G U E. ^ 43
being near finiflied. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with^Sur- prize ; which I, who was lefs engaged, having leilure to obferve, thought ’twas proper to admonilh my Friend, that he fhould give pver. He immediately ceafed reading ; put his Papers up j and thank’d me for flopping him at fo feafpnable a Time,
§. 6. What remained of our Difeourfe pafled oif with lefs Rapture, and was in.-» deed no more, than a kind of fliort Re-» capitulation.
H E obferved to me, that pur Inquiries had furniflied out an Anfwer to four diffe- rent Queflions, For thus, faid he, if it be alked us, Whaf Art is f We have to
Anfwer, it is — an habitual Power in
Many of becoming the Caufe of fome Effedly according to a Syfem of various and welU approved Precepts. If it be afked us. On what Subjedi Art operates ? We can anfwer. On a contingent^ which is within the reach
of
44 ‘ Concerning ART,
cf the Human Powers to influence. If it be afked us, For what Reafon^ for the fake of what Art operates ? We may reply, For the fake of fome abfent Goody relative to Hu’- man Lifcy and attainable by Many but fupe- perior to his natural and uninflruEled FacuU ties. Laftly, if it be alked. Where ’tis the Operations of Art end"! We may fay. Either in fome Energy y or in fome Work.
H E added. That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almoft tempted to fay. That we had been confidering Art, with refpedl to thofe four CaufeSy fo celebrated once among Profellbrs in the Schools. By thefe, upon Inquiry, I found that he meant certain CaufeSy called the ^Eflicienty. the Materialy the % Finals ‘and the || FormaU
But
* P. 17. f P. 22. t P. 28, 29.
P P- 34j 3^-
A Dialogue.
45 .
But here, without farther explaining, he begged for the prefent that we might conclude, being fufficiently, as he faid, fatigued with the Length of what had pafled already. The Requeft was reafon- able I could not but own, and thus ended our Cgnverfation, and foon after it our Walk,
rhe E N D,
TREATISE the Second :
DISCOURSE
O N
MUSIC,
PAINTING,
AND
POETRY.
( 49 )
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER the First.
INTRODUCTION Befjgn and
Dijlribution of the Whole — Preparation for the following Chapters,
CHAPTER the Second.
On the SubjeBs^ which Painting imitates — On the SubjeBs^ which Mufic imitates^’---’- Comparifon of Mufic with Painting,
CHAPTER the Third.
On the Subjecls which Poetry unit at es^ but imitates only thro' natural Media^ or mere
Sounds Comparifon of Poetry in this
Capacity^ firfl with Paintings then with Mufic,
E CHAP-
50
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER the F o u r t
On fhe Suije^fs which Poetry imitates^ not by mere Sounds or natural Media^ but by Words fignificant ; the SubjeBs being fuch^ to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is mpft perfedlly adapted, — Its Coni’- parifon in thefe SubjeBs^ firfi with Paint^ ing^ then with Mufic*
CHAPTER the Fifth.
On the SubjeBs^ which Poetry imitates by Words fignificant, being at the fame tim-e Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts,—— The Nature of thefe
' SubjeBs, The Abilities of Poetry to
imitate them,’ — — Comparifon of Poetry in refpeB of thefe SubjeBs^ frfl with Pa^tr ingy then with Mufic,
CHAP-
CONTENTS.
SI
CHAPTER the Sixth.
On Mufx conjidered not as an Imitation^ but as deriving its Efficacy from another
Source, On its joint Operation by this
means with Poetry, j^n ObjeBion to
Mufc folved, The Advantage arifng to
ity as well as to Poetry^ from their being united, Conclufon,
E 2
A
>
V
> \
I
( S3 )
A
DISCOURSE
O N ■
MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.
CHAP, I.
IntroduBion. Dejign and Diflribntion of
the Whole, — Preparation for the following Chapters,
L L Arts have this in common, Ch. I. ' that they refpeB Uurnaji Life,
Some contribute to its NeceJJl^ ties^ as Medicine and Agriculture; others to its Elegance^ as Mulic, Painting, and Poetry.
Now",
54
A DiscouJ^se on MUSIC,
Ch. I. Now, with refpeft to thefe two diffe-* rent Species^ the necejfary Arts feem to have been prior in time ; if it be probable^ that Men confulted how to live and to fupport themfehes^ before they began to deliberate how to render Life agreeable. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fad:, there being BO Nation known fo barbarous and ignorant, as where the Rudiments of thefe necejfary Arts are not in fome degree cultivated.
' And hence poflibly they may appear to be the more excellent and worthy^ as having claim to a Preference^ derived from their Seniority,
The Arts however of Elegance cannot be faid to want Pretenfions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for fomething more^ than mere Exifence, Nay, farther, if Well-- being be clearly preferable to Mere-^being^ and this without it be but a thing contemp- tible, they may have reafon perhaps to afpire even to a Superiority. But enough of this, to come to our Purpofe,
§. 2.
PAINTING and POETRY.
§. 2. The befign of this Difcourfe Is to treat of Music, Painting, and Poetry j to confider in what they agree^ and in what they differ ^ and which, upon the
WHOLE, is more EXCELLENT THAN THE ©THER TWO.
In entering upon this Inquiry^ It is firft to be obferved, that the Mind is made Gonfcious of the natural World and its Af- fedtions, and of other Minds and their AfFedtions, by the feveral Organs of the Senfes (aj. By the fame Organs^ thefe Arts exhibit to the Mind Imitations^ and imitate either Parts or Afedlions of this natural E 4 World,
(a) 1^0 explain fome future Obfervatlons, it will be proper here to remark, that the Mind from thefe Materials thus brought together ^ and from its own Ope^ rations on them^ a?2d in confequence of them, becomes
fraught with Ideas and that many Minds ft
fraught, by a fort ^Compact affigning to each Idea fome Sound to be its Mark or Symbol, were the firjl Inventors and Founders ^Language.
56 ^Discourse MUSIC,
Ch. 1. Worldy or elfe the Paffions, Energies, and other AfFedlions of Minds, There is this Difference however between thefe Arts and Nature that Nature paffes to the Percipient thro’ all the Senfes > whereas thefe Arts ufe 07ily two of them, that of Seeing and that of Hearing. And hence it is that the fen* fible OhjeBs or Media^ thro’ which (k) they imitate, can be fuch only^ as thefe two Senfes sffe framed capable of perceiving ; and thefe Media are Motion^ Sounds Colour^ and Figure.
Paint-
0) To prevent Confufion it mufl be obferved, that in all thefe Arts there is a Difference between the fenftbk Media ^ thro* vjhich they imitate^ and the Subjedfs imitated. The fenfible Media, thro’ which they imitate’, mull be always relative to that Senfe^ by which the particular Art applies to the Mind ; but the Subject imitated may be foreign to that Senfe^ and beyond the Power of its Perception,. Painting, for in- fiance, (as is fhewn in this Chapter) has no fenfible AlediaA^'to^ which it operates, except Colour and Figure : But as to Subjedfs., it may have Motions, Sounds, moral AfFedlions and Adlions ; none of which are either Colours or Figures., but which however are all capable of being imitated thro' them. See Chapter the fecond. Notes {c)y (d).
PAINTING and POETRY.
57
Painting, having the Eye for its Or- Ch. I. gany cannot be conceived to imitate, but ’”^~^ thro’ the Media of vijible Objedis. And farther, its Mode of imitating being always motionlefsy there muft be fubftradted from thefe the Medium of Motion. It remains then, that Colour and Figure are the only Media, thro’ which Painting imitates.
Music, paffing to the Mind thro’ the ^ Organ of the Ear^ can imitate only by Sounds and Motions.
Poetry, having the Ear alfo for its Organ y as far as Words are conlidered to be no more than mere Sou?jdsy can go no fur- ther in Imitating, than may be performed by Sound and Motion. But then, as thefe its Sounds fta?2d by ^ CompaB for the various IdeaSy with which the Mind is fraught^ it is enabled by this means to imitate, as far as
Lan^
* See Note (a) Peige
58
Discourse. MUSIQ
Ch, I. Language can exprefs ; and that ’tis evident will, in a manner, include all things.
Now from hence may be feen, how thefe Arts ^agree^ and how they differ.
They agree^ by being ^//Mimetic,
or Imitative.
The Y differ, as they imitate by different Media y Painting, hy Figure and Colour y Music, hy Sound 2inA Motion y Painting and Music, hy Media which are Natural y Poetry, for the greater Part, by a Medium^ which is Artijicial (c).
As
(c) A Figure painted, or a Compofition of Mu- fical Sounds have always a natural Relation to that, ef which they are intended to be the Refemhlance, But a Defcription in Words has rarely any fuch natural Relation to the feveral Ideas, of which thofe Words are the Symbols. None therefore underftand the Defcrip^ tion, but thofe who fpeak the Language. On the con- trary, Mufical and Pidure-Imitations are intelligible to all Men,
Why
PAINTING and POETRY,
59
§. 3. As to that Art, which upon the Ch. 1. whole is moji excellent of the three ; it muft be obferved, that among thefe w2inom Media of imitating, fome will naturally be ac- curate, fome lefs ; fome will bejt imitate one Subjedt; fome, another. Again, among the Number of Subjects there will be natu- rally alfo a Diiference, as to Merit and De- merit. There will be fome fublime^ and fome low ; fome copious^ and fome Jhort > fome pathetic^ and others void of PaJJion-, fome formed to infruSl^ and others not ca- pable of it.
Now, from thefe two Circumftances ; that is to fay, from the Accuracy of tlM Imitation^ and the Merit of the SubjeSI hnitatedy the Queftion concerning which Art is moft excellent^ muft be tried and de- termined.
This
Why it is faid that Poetry is not univerfally^ but Qnly for the greater part artificial, fee below, Chapter the Third, where what Natural Force it has, is ex- amined and eftimated.
6o
A Discourse on MUS I Q
Ch. I. This however cannot be done, without L.— ^ gj- Particulars, that fo there may
be formed, on every part, juft and accurate Comparifons.
To begin therefore with Painting.
CHAP,
PAINTING andVOETKY.
6i
C H A P. II,
On the SubjeBSy which Painting imitates. — - On the SubjeBs^ which Mujic imitates. — - Comparifon of Mujic with Painting.
The fittest Subjects forCLIL’ Painting, are all fuch Things’'"'"*'^^^ and Incidents, as are ^ peculiarly cba-- raBerifedbyPiGJj'Si'E.'and Colour.
Of this kind are the whole Mafs (a) of Phings inanimate and vegetable fuch as •
Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landfkips
The various Tribes of Animal Figures-^ fuch
as Birds, Beafts, Herds, Flocks The
Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal
Species,
* P. 57.
(a) The Reafon is, that thefe things are almoll wholly known to us by their Colour and Figure. Be- lides, they are as motionlefsy for the moft part, in JFfaturc^ as in the Imitation.
62
Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. II. Species, when accompanied with Conjigura^ tions^ which are obvious and remarkable ( b j— The Human Body in all its Appearances (as Male, Female; Young, Old; Handfome, Ugly ;) and in all its Attitudes^ (as Lying, Sitting, Standing, &c,) ^ The Natural
Sounds peculiar to the Human Species, (fuch as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c,) (c)-- All Energies^ Paffions^ and Affedlions of the
Souly
(b) Instances of this kind are the Flying of Birds, the Galloping of Horfes, the Roaring of Lions, the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reafon is, that though to paint Motion or Sound be impoffible^j^t the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an im- mediate and natural Connediion with a certain vifibl$ Configuration of the Parts^ the Mind, from a Profpe^ of this Configuration, conceives infienjibly that which is concomitant ; and hence ’tis that, by a fort of Fallacy, the Sounds and Motions appear to be painted alfio. On the contrary, not fo in fiuch Mo- tions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Filh ; or in fiuch Sounds, as the Purring of a Cat ; becaufe here is no fuch fipecial Configuration to be perceived.
(c) The Reafon is of the fame kind, as that given in the Note immediately preceding ; and by the fame Rule, the Obfervation muft be confined to natural Sounds only. In Language, few of the Speaker^ know the Configurations^ which attend it.
PAINTING md POETRY.
63
Soidy being in any degree more intenfe or Ch. II. violeyit than ordinary {d) — All Aciions
and Events^ whofe Integrity or Wholenefs depends upon a fl:^rt and fdf-evident Sue-
ceffion of Incidents (^e) Or if the Sue-
ceffion be extended, th^nfuch Adions at lead, whofe Incidents are all along^ during that SucceJJiony jimilar (f) — — All ABions^ which being qualified as above, open them-
felves
(d) The Reafon is ftill of thfe fame kind, vt%, from their Vifibk Eifeds on the Body. They natu- rally produce either to the Countenance a particular Rednefs or Palenefs , or a particular Modification of its Mufcles ; or elfe to the Limbs, a particular Attitude, Now all thefe Elfeds are folely referable to Colour and Figure, the two grand fenfible Media, peculiar to Painting. See Raphael' % Cartoons of St. Paid at Athens, and of his ftriking the Sorcerer Ely mas blind : See alfo the Crucifixion of Polycrates, and the Suf- ferings of the Conful Regulus, both by Salvator Rofa,
(e) F o R of neceffity every Picture is a Puntfum ^emporis In s t a n t .
fy) Such, for inftance, as a Storm at Sea ; whofe Incidents of Vifion naay be nearly all included in foam- ing Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their ered Pofiure, and Men hanging upon the Ropes.—
Or
64 ^ Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. 11. felves into a large Variety of Circumftances* concurring all in the fame Point of I’ime (g) — All Adlions which are known^ and known unherfally^ rather than Adlions newly invented^ or known but to few {h).
And
Or as a Battle ; which from Beginning to End pre- fents nothing elfe, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and Diforder. Now fuch Events may be well imitated all at once ; for how long foever they laft, they are but Repetitions of the fame,
(g) For Painting is not bounded in Exten- sion, as it is in Duration. Befides, itfeems true in every Species of Compofition^ that, as far as Perplexity and Confufion may be avoided, and the Wholenefs of the Piece may be preferved clear and in- telligible ; the more ample the Magnitude^ and the greater the Variety^ the greater alfo, in proportion, the Beauty and Perfection, Noble Inftances of this are the Pidures above-mentioned in Note (d). See Jrifot, Poet," cap. 7. 'o J'e dv'lm (pv'a-iv th 7rpo(,y[/^iXT(^ cp(^, dil y.h &c. See alfo CharaCieri- ficks^ V. I. p. 143. and Bojfu^ B. i. cap. i6. UAchille AHomere eft ft grandy See,
(h) The Reafon is, that a Pidure being (as has been faid) but a Point or Inftanty in a Story well known the Spe^Stator’s Memory will fupply the pre- vious and the fiibfequent. But this cannot be done,
where
PAINTING POETRY. 6j
And thus much as to the Subjedls ofCh. II.
Painting.
§. 2. In Music, the fittest Sub- jects OF Imitation are all fuch Things
where fuch Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it may be juftly queftioned, whether the mod cele- brated Subjeds, borrowed by Painting from Hiftory, would have been any of them intelligible thro" the Medium of Painting only^ fuppofing Hiftory to have been ftlent, and to have given no additional Information,
I T may be here added, that Horace^ conformably to this Reafoning, recommends even to Poetic Imi- tation a known Story, before an unknowtu
------ — Tuque
Pediius Ili^cum carmen deducis in adfus,
fi proferres ignota, indidaq; primus.
Art, Poet, V. laS*
%
And indeed as the b'eing underfood to others , either Hearers or Spedators, feems to be a common Requi- fte to all Mimetic Arts whatever ; (for to thofe, who underftand them not, they are in facft no Mimetic Arts) it follows, that Perfpicuity muft be EJfential to them all and that no prudent Artift would negledl, if it were poflible, any juft Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage 'greater, than the Noicriety of the Subject imitated,
F
66
'^ Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. II. and Incidents, as are moji eminently ^ cha- ra^erifed by Motion and Sound.
Motion may be either Jlow or fwifty even or uneven^ broken or continuous. Sound may be either foft or loudy high or low. Wherever therefore any of thefe Spe- cies of Motion or Sound may be found in an eminent (not a moderate or mean ) degree^ there will be room for Musical Imitat-
TION.
Thus, in the Natural or Inanimate Worldy Music may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Toflings, Roarings, and other Accidents of Watery as perceived in Foun- tains, Catarafts, Rivers, Seas,- —The fame of Thunder- — the fame of Winds, as well the ftormy as the gentle, — In the Animal Worldy it may imitate the Voice of jfbme Animals, but chiefly that of hnging
Birds, -It may alfo faintly copy fome of
their Motions. — In the Human Kindy it can'
alfo
A
PAINTING and POETRY.
alfo Imitate fome Motions (i) and bounds and of Sounds thofe mojl perfedily^ which are expreffive of Grief Anguifo (1).
And thus miich as to the Subjefts^ which Mufic imitates;
§.3. It remains then, that we compare thefe two Arts together. And here in- deed, as to Mufical Imitation m general^ it mufl be confeffed that — as it can, from its Genius, imitate ojily Sounds and Motions-- as there are not many Motions either in the F 2 Animal
(i) A s the tFalk of the Ghnt Pofypbe/ke^ in the Paftoral of Jds md Galatea, ----See what ample Stridil he takesy &c.
(k) As the Shouts of a Multitude, in the Corona- tion Anthem of, God fave the Kingy &c.
(l) The Reafon is, that this Species of Muilcsj Imitation moji nearly approaches Nature, For Griefs in mofl Animals, declares itfelf by Sounds^ which are not unlike to long Notes in the Chromatic Syjlem, Of this kind is the Chorus of BaaFs Priefts in the Oratorio of Deborah^ Doleful Tidings^ hm y$ mundy &c.
68 Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. II. Animal or iii the Inanimate World, which are exclujively peculiar even to any Species^
and fcarcely any to an Individual- as
there are no Natural Sounds, which cha- radierife at leaft lower than a Species (for the Natural Sounds of Individuals are in
every Species the fame ) farther, as
Mufic does but imperfedlly imitate even
thefe Sounds and Motions (m) On the
contrary, as Figures, Poftures of Figures, and Colours charadterife not only every fen- fMe Species^ but even every Individual ; and for the moft part alfo the various '^Energies and PaJJions of every Individual — and farther, as Painting is able, with the highejl Accuracy and ExaBncfs^ to imitate all thefe Colours and Figures 5 and while Mufical
Imita-
^ See Note (d) of this Chapter,
(m) The Reafon is from the Dijftmilitude he- tween the Sounds and Motions of Nature^ and thofe of Mufic, Muftcal Sounds are all produced from Even Vibration, mofl; Natural from Uneven ; Mufical Motwis are chiefly Definite in their Meafurc, mofr Natural are Indefimite^
PAINTING and POETRY.
Imitation pretends at moji to no more, than Ch,
the railing of Ideas Jirnilar^ itfelf afpires to
raife Ideas the very fame in a word, as
Painting, in refpedt of its Subjedls^ is equal to the Jioblejl Part of Imitation, the imw tating regular Actions conffing of a Whole and Farts \ and of fuch Imitation, Mufic is
utterly incapable from all this it
muft be confefled, that Musical Imita- tion IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OF
Painting, and that at bejl it is but an imperfed: thing.
As to the Ffficacy therefore of Music, it muft be derived from another Source, which muft be left for the prefent, to be confidered of hereafter
There remains to be mentioned Imi- tation by Poetry.
\
^ Ch. VI.
70
A Discourse on MUSIC,
CHAR III.
On the SuhjeSis which Poetry imifafeSy hut imitates only thro* natural Media^ or mere Sounds; — -'-'--‘Comparifon of Poetry in* this Capacity y frjl with Paintingy then with Mufe.
Ch.IIL'l^OETIC Imitation includes every. A thing in ity which is performed either by Picture-Imitation or Musical; for its Materials are Wordsy and Words arc y Symbols by Compact of all Ideas,
Farther as Words ^ belide their being Symbols by Compad:^ are alfo Sounds *vari- mjly diflinguifbed by their Aptnefs to be rapidly or fbwly pronounced, and by the refpedive Prevalence of MuteSy Liquidsy or Vowels in their Compofition ; it will follow that, befide their CompaB-Relationy they
will
Hu. I .. .Ml. , I ..... I I mil
2 See Note (a) Chap. L
PAINTING and POETRY.
71
will have likewife a Natural Relation to all Ch. III. fuch Things, between which and felves there is any Natural Refemblanceo Thus, for inllance, there is a Natural Re-^ femblance between all forts of harjh and grating Sounds. There is therefore (ex- clufive of its Signification) a Natural Rela- tion between the Sound of a vil^ Hautboy, and of that Verfe in * Virgil^
Stridenti miferum Jiipuld difperdere Carmenl
or of that other in Milton^
Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched Straw.
So alfo between the fmooth fwift Gliding of 'a River, and of that Verfe in || Horace,
-r— at ilk
Labitur, ^ labetur in Qum ^olubilis cevum.
And thus In part even Poetic Imitation has its Foundation in Nature. But then F 4 this
* Ed. 3. ver. 27. f In his Lycidas. 11 Epift.2, 1 1. V. 42, 43.
72 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. III. this Imitation goes not far; and taken without the Meaning derived to the Sound$ from Compact ^ is but little intelligible^ how- ever perfed and elaborate.
§.2. If therefore Poetry be compared with Painting, in refped of this its merely Natural and Inartificial Referii-
blance, it may be juftly faid that In as
much as of this fort of Refemblanee, Poetry (like Mufic) has no other Sources,
than thofe Ixo of Sound and Motion —
m as Hiiich as it often wants thefe Sources themfelves (for Numbers of Words neither i)ave^ nor can have any Refemblanee to thofe Jdeas^ of which they are the Sym^
hols ) in as much as Natural Sounds
and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, are themfelves but ^ loofe and indefinite Ac-- ddents of thofe Suhjedls^ to which they belong, and confequently do but loofely and indefinitely charaderife them — — laftly, in as much as Poetic Sounds and Motions do
but
PAINTING and POETRY.
but family refemble thofe of Nature^ which Ch.III. are themfelves confeiTed to be fo imperfeB
and vague -—From all this it will
follow (as it has already followed of Mufic)
that Poetic Imitation founded
IN MERE Natural Resemblance is MUCH inferior TO THAT OF PAINT- ING, and at bejl but very imperfeB.
§. 3. As to the Preference, which fuch Poetic Imitation may claim before Musical, or Musical Imitation be- fore THAT ; the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps equal They both fetch their Imitations from ‘f' Sound and Motion^
Now Music feems to imitate Nature bet- ter as to Motion^ and Poetry as to Sound.
The Reafonis^ that in Motiom (a) Mufic
has
t R 57-
(a) Music has no lefs than five different Length pf Notes in ordinary ufe, reckoning from the Semi- brief tg the Semi-quaver 5 all which may be mff
' nitefy
74
A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch.III. has a greater Variety ; and in Sounds^ thofe of Poetry approach nearer to Nature (b).
If therefore in Sound the one have the Preference, in Motion the other ^ and the Merit of Sound and Motion be fuppofed nearly equal ; it will follow, that the Merit of the two Imitations
WILL BE NEARLY EQ^AL ALSO.
nitely compounded^ even in any one Time, or Mea-
fure Poetry, on the other hand, has but two
Length or ^antities^ a long Syllable and a Jhort^ (which is its Half) and all the Variety of Verfe arifes Irom fuch Feet and Metres, as thefe two Species of Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce.
(b) Musical Sounds are produced by even Vibrations, which fcarcely any Natural Sounds are — on the contrary, Words are the Produdl of uneven
Vibration, and fo are moji Natural Sounds
Add to this, that Words are far more numerous, than Mufical Sounds, So that Poetry, as to Imitation by Sound, feems to exceed Muhc, not only in nearnefi of Refemblame, but even in Variety alfo.
CHAR
PAINTING and PQETRY,
CHAP. IV,
(p;; the SubjeBs which Poetry imitates^ not ' by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words fignificant ; the Subjebls at the fame time being fuch^ to which the Genius of each pf the other two Arts is moft perfedtly adapted, — Its Comparifon in thefe SubjeSis^ frjl with Paintings then with Mufic.
The Mimetic Art of Poetry hasCh.IV.
been hitherto confidered, as fetch- ing its Imitation from mere Natural Re- femblance. In this it has been fhewn much inferior to Painting, and nearly equal to Music.
It remams to be confidered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere Natural Sound, but by Sound fgnificant j by Words, the compact Symbols of all kinds of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine
Fosce.
7& A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch.IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find Sounds expreflive of every Idea, fo is there no Subjedi either of Pifture-Imitation, or Mufical, to which it does not afpire ^ all Things and Incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be defcribed ’by Words.
Whether therefore Poetry, in this its proper Sphere^ be equal to the Imitation of the other two Arts, is the Queftion at pre- fent, which comes in order to be difcuffed.
Now as SubjeBs are infinite ^ and the other two Arts are not equally adapted to imitate it is propofed, firfi: to compare Poetry with them in fuch Subjects, to which they are mofi perfedlly adapted,
§.2. To begin therefore with Paint- ing. A Subject, in which the Power of this Art may be 772ofi fully exerted, (whether it be taken from the Inanmate^ or the Animal^ or the Moral World) muft be a Subject, which is principally and emmently charadlerifed by certain Colours^
Figures^
PAINTING and POETRY,. 77
FigureSy and Pojlures of Figures whofe Ch. IV.
Co?7tprehenfon depends not on a Succejfion of '^ '^'^ Events ^ or at leafy if on a SucceJJiony on a fhort and felf-evident one-— -which admits a large Variety of fuch CircumfanceSy as all concur in the fame individual Pomt of Fime^ and relate all to one principal ABion^
As to fuch a Subjedl therefore In as
much as Poetry is forced to pafs thro* the Medium of CompaBy while Painting applies immediately thro’ the Medium of Nature ; the one being underftood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Lan- guage ^ only in as much as Natural
Operations mull needs be more affeBingy
than Artificial in as much as Painting
helps our own rude Ideas by its owny which are confiimmate and wrought up to the Per- fection of Art 3 while Poetry can raife 7io . other (a) than what every Mind is furnifhed
with
* Note (c) 58*
(a) When we read in Milton of Eve, that Grace was in all her StepSy Heav'n in her Eye y In etfry'Gefcure Dignity and Love 3
vve
7? A Discourse m MUSIQ
Ch^IV. with before — -in as much as Painting fhews all the minute and various concurrent Cir^ cumfances of the Event in the fame indivi- dual Point of Time, as they appear in Nature -y while Poetry is forced to want this Circumftance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into fome de- gree of Detail-- — in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either be- coming tediouSy to be clear 5 or if 7iot tediouSy then obfcure -- — laftly, in as much as all Imitations more f milary more imme--
diatCy
we have an Image 7tot of that Eve, which Milton conceived, but of fuch an Eve onlyy as every one, hy his own proper GeniuSy is able to reprefent, from refledling on thofe IdeaSy which he has annexed to thefe feveral bounds. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps bellowed one accurate Thought upon whatGr^^r^, Heaven y Lovey Dignity mean 5 or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of Beauty, or afked whence they are to be acquired, and by what Proportions they are conjiituted. On the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by an able Painter y we labour under no fuch Difficulty j becaufe we have exhibited before us the better Con-- £ options of an Artist y thQgenum Ideas of perhaps t Titian or sRaphael^
PAINTING W POETRV. 79
- dkte, and more intelligible^ are preferable Ch. IV. to thofe which are lefs foj and for the Reafons above, the Imitations of Poetry are lefs Jimilar, lefs immediate, and lefs /«- than thofe of Painting- — From ALL THIS it will follow, that -i- IN ALL Subjects, where Painting cam
FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITA- TIONS OF Painting are superiors TO those of Poetry, and gonse- QJJENTLY IN ALL SUCH SUBJECTS
THAT Painting has the Prefe-^
RENCE.
§. 3. And now to compare Poetry with Music, allowing to Mujic the fame Advantage of a well-adapted S\i\d]e&., -w\Ach has already been allowed to Painting in A? Gomparifon juft preceding.-
What fuch a Subject is, has already been * defcribed. And as to Preference, if
mull
* See Chap, II. §. 2,
2<y A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. IV. mull be confeffed, that In as much as
Musical Imitations, tho’ Natural^ afpire not to raife the fame Ideas, but only Ideas analogous 3 while Poetic
Imitation, tho’ Artificial^ raifes Ideas
the very fame in as much as the Definite
and Certain is ever preferable to the Indefi- nite and Uncertain y^nd that more elpeci- ally in Imitations^ where the principal • (b) Delight is in recognizing the Thing
imitated
!i P. 68, 69.
(h) That there is an eminent Delight in thh Recognition abftrad from any thing pleafing in the Subjetf recognized^ is evideht from
hence that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be
highly charmed with Imitations^ at whofe Originals in Nature we are Jhocked and terrified. Such, for in- ftance, as-Dead Bodies, Wild Beaifrs, and the like.
The Caufe, afllgned for this, feems to be of the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in the Sanity and Perfection,, but alfo in the juf and na- ' tural Energies of our feveral Limhs and Faculties, And hence, among others, the foy in Reasoning j as being the E?2ergy of that principal Faculty,, our In- tellect or Understanding. This Joy ex- tends, not only to the Wife, but to the Multitude. Por all Men have an Averfgn to Ignorance and Error ;
andl
I>AINTING W POETRY. 8i
imitated — it will follow from hence that — Ch. IV. EVEN IN Subjects the best adapted TO Musical Imitation, the Imita- tion OF Poetry will be still more
EXCELLENT;
and in fome degree, however moderate, are glad to learn and to inform' themfelves.
Hence therefore the Delight^ anfihg from thefe Imitations ; as we are enabled, in each of them, to exercife the Reasoning Faculty; and, hy com- paring the Copy v/ith the Architype in our Minds, to infer that THIS is such a thing; and that, ANOTHfeR; a Fa<51: remarkable among Children, even in their firft and earlibfr Days.
To, T£ G-vfx(pvrov ro7g
'jraiJws £5"!, T8TW J'ltxCpEp^art rm aAAcoy ort
^i/x?]7i)cwmToy Ir*, not) rtxg fxoiBwng TrOisTTOCi iix
fAtfAYKTlOO^ m? TT^COraj* 7^ TO ^OCl^ElV ToTg
''TrdvTOc^, XriiAiTov te TaT» to a-VfA.j3ocivov stt] rm
yoc^ dvrtx KvTntijDoog o'^w/xev, rt^rm rx^ slkovx^ rx<: jw.aA»f“04 rix.^iQcc(ASVxgy p^af^o^ei) S-eco^vvrBg* olov
T£ fA0^(pxg Tcov dy^iuTa,Tcov^ 7^ vex^m, ’^AtTiov
Tariff ort (xocvBxveiv a ^ovov roTg (pi?iocro(pcig aAAa ^ roig aAAoif ofAoitjcg * aAA* Itt] xoivm^-
CIV auTa. Aid ydp Taro rag eixovxg o^mngy
ou cvf^[3xim ^eco^^VTxg jxccvS’dvEiv cuXXoyi^i^xiy Ti ixxrov* oiov, oTi IxiTv^, Arifr. Poct. C.4,
G CHAP,
82
A D iscouRSE on MUSIC,
CHAP. V.
On the SubjeBs which Poetry imitates by JVords Jignijicant^ being at the fame time Subjedts not adapted to the Genius of
either of the other Arts Phe Nature of
thofe SubjeBs "Phe Abilities of Poetry
to imitate them- Comparifon of Poetry
in thefe Subjedls, firft with Pamtingy then with Mufc.
Ch.V. ^ I HE Mimetic Art of Poetry A has now been confidered in two Views—^Firftj as imitating by mere natural Media ^ and in tliis it has been placed on a level with Music, but much inferior to
Pa I n t I n g It has been lince con-
ildered as imitating thro’ Sounds fgnificant by CompaBy and that in fuch Subjedts re- fpedlively, where Painting and Music have the fulleft Power to exert themfelves.
Here
PAINTING W POETRY,
Here to Painting it has been held inferior^ Ch but to Mufic it has been preferred. '
It remains to be confidered what
other SubjeBs Poetry has left, to which the Genius of the other two Arts is npt fo per^ feBly adapted — -How far Poetry is able to
imitate them and whether from the
FerfeBion of its Imitation, and the Nature of the Subjefts themfelves, it ought to be called no more than equal to its Sifter Arts ; or whether, on the whole, it ftiould not rather be called fuperior.
§.2. To begin, in the firft place, by comparing it with Painting.
The SubjeBs of Poetry^ to which the
Genius of Painting is not adapted^ are
all Adlions, whofe (a) Whole is of fo G 2 • lengthefied
(a) For ajuft and accurate Defcription of TFhok- nefs and Unity ^ fee Ariji. Poet. Ch. 7 & 8. and Bojfuy his heft Interpreter, in his Treatife on the Epic Poem. B. 11. ch. 9, 10, n.
84 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Qh.N .lengthened a Duration, that no Point of Time ^ in any part of that Whole, can be given for Painting neither in its Be- ginnings which will teach what is Subfe- qiient's nor in its End, which will teach what is Previous •, nor in its Middky which will declare both the Previous and the Sub-
feque72t. Alfo all Subjedts fo frainedi as
to lay open the internal Conflitution of Man^ and give us an Infight into (b) Charadlers^ MannerSy PaJfonSy and Sentiments.
The
{h) For a Defcription of Character, Tee be- low, Note (c) oi this Chapter.
As for Manners, it may be faid in general, that a certain Syjiem of them makes a Charatfer ; and that as thefe Syhems, by being differently compounded^ make each a different Charadler, fo is it that one Man truly differs from another.
Pa s s I o N s are obvious \ Pity^ Feary Anger y kc.
Sentiments are difcoverable in all thofe Things, which are the proper Bufmefs and End of Speech Discourse. The chief Branches of this End arg to Affert and Prove ; to Solve and Re- fute I to exprefs or excite Paffions 5 to amplify In- cidents,
PAINTING and POETRY.
85
The Merit of thefe Subjedls Is obvious. Ch. V. They muft neceifarily of all be the moft affe6ting-y the moft improving and fuch of which the Mind has the JlrongeJl Com-* prehenjion.
For as to the affeEfing Part if It be
true, that all Events more or lefs affedt us, as the Suhje5ts^ which they relpeft, are more or lefs nearly related to us; then fiirely thofe Events muft needs be moft af- feBing^ to whofe SuhjeBs we are of all the moft intimately related. Now fuch. is the Relation, which we bear to Mankind ; and Men and Human Aftions are the Subjedts, here propofed foir Imitationp
G 3 As
cidents, and to dim'inijh them. ’Tis in thefe things therefore, that we muft look for Sentiment,
Ariji, Poet. c. 19. yaxloi rm Aiocvotccv
raula, oVa vtto ra Aoj/a 7rcc^(Z(rxsuoc(T9^voit, Msfijf J'l Ta^wv, TO, 7f aTTO^Einvuvcciy ro Ai'Ejv, to'
86
A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. V. As to Improvement there can be none
furely (to Man at leaft) fo great, as that which is derived from a juft and decent Reprefentation of Human Manners^ and Sentiments, For what can more contribute to give us that Majler’-Knowledge ( c with- out
r N n © I S A T T O N. But farther, befides obtaining this moral Science from the Con- templation of Human Life ; an End common both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry 5 there is a pecu- liar End to Tragedy^ that of eradicating the PafTions of Pity and Fear.
cTTii^oi'ocg rsXstocg — eAes Cpo^a Trs^odvacrx rw Twy roi^Toov xaOa^qy. Arift. Poet. c. 6.
Tragedy is the Imitation of an Adiion important and perfect., thro'* Pity and Fear working the Purga- tion OF SUCH-LIKE PaSSIONS.
There are none, ’tis evident, fo devoid of thefe tv/o Pajfions., as thofe perpetually converfant., where the Occafions of them are moft frequent ; fuch, for inflance, as the Military Men, the ProfeiTors of Medicine., Chirurgery., and the like. Their Minds, by this Intercourfe, become as it were callous'., gain- ing an Apathy by Experience.^ wTich no Theory can ever teach them.
Now
PAINTING W POETRY. 87
out which, all other Knowledge will prove Ch. V. of little or no Utility ?
G 4 As
Now that, which is wrought in thefe Men by the real Difajiers of Life^ may be fuppofed wrought in others by the Fictions of Tragedy 5 yet with this happy Circumftance in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Difaflers being real^ it can obtain the fame End.
I T muft however, for all this, be confelTed, that an Effedl of this kind cannot reafonably be expeded, except among Nations, like the Athenians of old, who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon thefe Theatrical Reprefentations. For ’tis not a fingle or occafional Application to thefe Paffions, but a con^ Jlant and uninterrupted^ which alone can lejfm or re- move them.
It would be improper to conclude this Note, without obferving, that the Philofopher in this place by Pity means not Philanthropy, Na- tural Affediion^ a Readinefs to relieve others in their Calamities and Difrefs 5 but, by Pity^ he means that Senseless, Effeminate Consternation, tvhich feizes weak Minds ^ on the fudden Profpedl of a7iy ^hing difaflrous ; which, in its more violent Effecfls, is feen in Shriekings^ Swoonings^ &c. a Paflion, fo for from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Infruence, of all Capacity to do tk^ leaf good Gftce,
88
A D iscouRSE on MUSIC,
Ch. V. As to our ComprehenJiGn there is no^
thing certainly, of which we have fo Jlrong Ideas, as of that which happens in the Morale or Human World. For as to the hiternal Party or A5iive Principle of the Vegetable y we know it but obfcurely ^ becaufe there we can difcover neither PaJJiony nor Senfation, In the Animal World indeed this Principle is more’feen, from the Paf- Jions and Senfations which there declare themfelves. Yet all ftill refts upon the mere Evidence of Sejife upon the Force only of external and unajjijled Experience, IBut in the Moral or Human World, as we have a Medium of Hno^dedge ^ far mors accurate than this 5 fo from hence it is, that we can comprehend accordmgly.
With regard therefore to the various EventSy which happen herCy and the vari- ous CaufeSy by which they are produced — r in other Words, of all Charadlers, Manners, Human Paffions, and Sentiments; belides |he FvHence of Senfcy v/e have the higheji
Evidence
PAINTING and POETRY. 89 Evidence additional, in having an exprefs Ch. V.
Confcioufnefs of fomething Jimilar- within-, of fomething homogeneous in the Recefles of our own Minds-, in that, which conftitutes to each of us his true and real Self.
Th E SE- therefore being the Subjefts, not adapted to the Genius of Painting.^ it comes next to be confidercd, how far Poetry can imitate them^
And here, that it hsiS Abilities clearly equal.^ cannot be doubted; as it has that for the Medium of its Imitation, through which Nature declares herfelf in the fame ^ Subjedts, For the Sentiments in real Life are only known by Men’s ^ Difcourfe. And the CharaBers^ Manners^ and Pajjions of Men being the Prompters to what they fay ; it muft needs follow, that their Dif courfe will be a corf ant Specinmi of thofe CharaBers^ Manners and Pajjions.
Format
90
Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch, V. ^ Format enim Natura prius nos inf us ad omnem
Forfunarum habitum ; juvat^ aut impellit ad tram :
Pojl efFert Animi Motus, Interprete Lingua*
• Not only therefore Language is an ade^ quate Medium of Imitation, but in Senti-^ meats it is the only Medium 5 and in Man'-^ ners and Fajjions there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that deary precife and definite Way^ as they in Nature ftand alotted to the various forts of Men, and are found to conftitute the feveral Cha^ raders of each (d)^
§• 3-
^ Hor. de Jrte Poet, v. 108/
(d) It is true indeed that (befides what is done by Poetry) there is fome Idea of Charadler^ which even Painting can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that fuch a Countenance may be found by Painters for Mneas^ as would convey upon view a
mildy
PAINTING WPOETRY,
91
§. 3. To compare therefore Poetry^ in Ch. V. thefe SuhjeBs^ with Painting- — In as much as no Subjects of Painting are * wholly fu-
perior
* P. 57, 58. 75, 76.
mild^ humane^ and yet a brave Difpofition. But then this Idea would be vague and general. It would be concluded, only in the grofs, that the Hero was Good, As to that Syftem of Qualities peculiar to Mneas only, and which alone properly conjlitutes his true and real Charatfer^ this would ftill remain a Secret, and be no way difcoverable. For how de- duce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance ? Or, if it were deducible, how few Spectators would there be found fo fagacious ? ’Tis here therefore, that Rccourfe muft be had, not to Painting,^ but to Poetry, So accurate a Conception of Character can be gathered only from a Succejfion of various^ and yet confijient Adlions ; a Succeffion, enabling us to conjec- ture,^ what the Perfon of the Drama will do in the future^ from what already he has done in the pajf. Now to fuch an Imitation, Poetry only is equal -j becaufe it is not bounded,^ like Painting,, to Jhort, and, as it were, Events, but may imitate Subjects of any Duration whatever. See Arijl, Poet, cap. 6.
*^Eri {J'e ^60? p-h to roivrovy 0 ^yiXoT rriv Trpoxl^cinv OTToHJi Tiq Irtv, £V OiV J'JJAoV, li TT^GXi^ilTXl ^
(pfjysi 0 See alfo the ingenious and learned
Book 4. ch. 4.
2
92 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch. V. perior to Poetry j while the Subjefts, here defcribed, far exceed the Power of Paint- ing— —in as much as they are of all Sub- jcfts the moft •f* affedtingy and improvingy and fuch of which we have the flrongejl
Comprehenfon ^further, in as much as
Poetry can mojl J accurately imitate them — in as much as, befides all Imitation, there is a Charm in Poetry, arifing from its very Plumbers (e)\ whereas Painting has Pre- tence
+ P. 85,
J P. 89,
(e) That there is a Charm in Poetry y arifing from its Numbers only, may be made evident from the five or fix firft Lines of the Paradife Loji ; where, without any Pomp of Phrafe, Sublimity of Senti^ ment, or the leajl Degree of Imitatiariy every Reader muft find himfelf to be fenfibly delighted ; and that, only from the graceful and fimple Cadence of the NumberSy and that artful Variation of the Cafura or Paufcy fo eflential to the Harmony of every good Poem.
A N Englijh Heroic Verfe confifts of ten Semipeds^ or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned
PAINTING and POETRY.
tcnce to no Charm, except that of Imita- Ch. V’.
tion only laftly, (which will foon be
* {hewn) in as much as Poetry is able to ajfociate Mujic^ as a mofl powerful Ally ; of which Affiftance^ Painting is utterly in- capable From all this it may be
fairly concluded, that Poetry is not
only Equals but^ that it is in fadi far Su- perior TO ITS Sister Art of Paint- ing.
§. 4. But if it exceed Painting in Sub- jeBsy to which Painting is not adapted ; no doubt will it exceed Music in SubjeBs to
Mufic
* Chap, VI.
the Paufes are varied upon different Semipeds in the Order, which follows ; as may be feen by any, who will be at the Pains to examine
Paradise LosTj B. I.
Verfe i
3 (has its Paufe
4 I fall upon
iSemiped 7
4
94 ^ Discourse MUSIC,
not adapted. For here it has been preferred^ even in thofe Subjefts, which have been held adapted the bejl of all,
§. 5. Poetry is therefore, on the
WHOLE, MUCH SUPERIOR TO EITHER OF THE OTHER Mimetic Arts ^ it having been Jhewn to be equally excellent in the .*f* Accuracy of its Imitation; and to imitate Subjects, which far surpass, AS well in t Utility, as in || Dig- nity.
* Ch. IV. §. 3, + P. 89. t P* 86.
II See p. 83, 84. atid p. 64, Nete (g). See alfi
P* 59*
PAINTING and POETRY.
95
CHAP. VI.
On Mujic conjidered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another
Source, On its joint Operation^ , by this
meanSy with Poetry, An Objediion to
Mufc folved, The Advantage arifing to
ity as well as to- Poetry y from their being united, Conclufon,
IN the above Difcourfe, Music hasCh.VL been mentioned as an ^Ally to Poetry.
It has alfo been faid to derive its ^ Efficacy from another SourcCy than Imitation, It remains therefore, that thefe things be ex- plained.
Now, in order to this, it is firft to be [
obferved, that there are various AffiebiionSy \
which may be raifed by the Power of I
* 93-
t P. 69.
A Discourse on MUSIG,
Yl,MuJic. There are Sounds to" make us chearful^ or fad\ martialy or tender \ and fo of almoft every other Affeftion, which we feel.
It is alfo further obfervable, th^t there is a reciprocal Operation between our Af- feBionSy and our Ideas ; fo that, by a fort of natural Sympathy y certain Ideas neceffa- rily tend to raife in us certain AffeBions ; and thofe AffeBionSy by a fort of Co'ilnter- Operation, to raife the fame Ideas. Thus Ideas derived from Funerals, Tortures, Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Aifeftion of Melancholy. And when, by any Phyjical CaufeSy that AffeBion hap^ pens to prevail, it as naturally generates the iame doleful Ideas.
And hence it is that Ideas y derived from et^ternal Caufes, have at difere72f times, upon the fame Perfon, fo different an Elfed:. If they happen to fuit the Affedtions, which prevail withifty then is their Impreflion mojl fenfibky and their Effedl
PAINTING and POETRY.
moji lajling. If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI. is the EfFed: contrary. Thus, for inftance, a Funeral will much more affed the fame Man, if he fee it when melancholy, than if he fee it when chearful.
Now this being premifed, it will fol- low, that whatever happens to be the JffeBion or Difpojition of Mind, which ought naturally to refult from the Genius of any Poem^ the fame probably it will be in the Power of fome Species of Mujtc to excite. But whenever the proper AffeBion prevails, it has been allowed that then all kindred Ideas^ derived from external Caufes, make the moJl fenjible ImpreJJion. The Ideas therefore of Poetry muft needs make the moft fenfible Impreffion, when the (a) Affedions, peculiar to them, are al- ready
(a) Quintilian elegantly, and exadlly appofite
to this Reafoning, fays of Mufic Namque ^
VQce ^ modulatione grandia elate^ jucunda dulciter^
mcdfrau
H
A D ISCOURSE on MUSIC,
VL ready excited by the Mufic. For here a double Force is made co-operate to one End. A Poet, thus ajjijled^ finds not an Audience in a Temper, averfe to the Genius of his Poem, or perhaps at beft under a cool difference ; but by the Preludes, the Sym- ' phonies, and concurrent Operation of the Mufic in all its Parts, rouzed into thofe ^ery Affediions^ which he would moil defire.
An Audience, fo difpofed, not only em- brace with Pleafure the Ideas of the Poet, when exhibited } but, in a manner, even anticipate them in their feveral Imagina- tions, The Superftitious have not a more previous Tendency to be frightned at the fight of Spedres, or a Lover to fall into Raptures at the fight of his Miftrefs ; than a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of
Mufic,
moderata Uniter canity totaq\ arte confentit cum eorum, quae dicuntur, Affectibus. Injl, Orator. L I. cap. 10,
PAINTING and POETRY.
99
Muiic, to enjoy all Ideas, which are fuitable Ch. VI. to that Temper.
And hence the genuine Charm of Mulic, and the Wonders^ which it works, thro’ its great Profeflbrs (b). A Power, which confifts not in Imitations, and the railing Ideas ; but in the railing Affe5iions^ to which Ideas may correlpond. There are few to be found fo infenlible, I may even fay fo inhumane, as when good Poetry is justly set to Music, not in fome degree to feel the Force of fo amiable an Union, But to the Mufes Friends it is a Force irrejijiible^ and pene- H 2 trates
(h) Such, above ^11, is George Frederick Handel i whofe Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exercife, and being itfelf far the fublimefl and moft univerfal now known, has juftly placed him with out an Equal, or a Second. This tranfient Tefti- mony could not be denied fo excellent an Artift, from whom this Treatife has borrowed fuch emi- nent Examples, to juftify its AiTcrtions in what it has offer’d concerning Mufic.
lOO
A D ISCOURSE on MUSIC,
Ch.VI. trates into the deepeft Receffes of the ^ Soul,
^ Pedius inaniter angif^
Irritate mulcet^ falfts terroribm impiety
§.2. Now this is that Source y frorrl whence Mufic was ‘f* faid formerly to de- ' rive its greatefl Efficacj. And here indeed, not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account alfo it has been called a J powerful Ally to Poetry. And farther, ’tis by the help of this Rea- soning, that the Objediion is folved, which is raifed againfl: the Singing of Poetry (as in Opera’s, Oratorio’s, &c,) from the want
of
^ Horat,EpiJl, i, 1.2. v. 211. t P. 69. % P. 93.
Jc) For the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of Music, confidered as a Mimetic or Imitative Art, fee Ch. II. §. 3.
PAINTING and POETRY.-
lOI
of Probability and Refemblance to Nature, Ch,Vl. To one indeed, who has no mufical Ear, this Objedtion may have Weight. It may even - perplex a Lover of Mufic, if it hap- pen to furprize him in his Hours of In- difference, But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry fo accompanied, let hini be angry (if he can) with that, which ferves only to intereft him more feelingly in the Subjedt, and fupport him in a Jlronger and more earnefi Attention ; which enforces, by its Aid, ' the feveral Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagi- nation with unufual Strength and Gran- deur. He cannot furely but confefs, that he is a Gainer in the Exchange, when he barters the want of a Angle Proba- bility, that of Pronunciation ( a thing merely arbitrary and every where different) for a noble Heightening of Affections which are fuitable to the Occafion, and enable him to enter into the Subjedl with double and Enjoyment,
H
3
1
102 A Discourse on MUSIC,
Ch.VL §,3, From what has been faid It is ^ evident, that thefe two Arts can never be fo powerful Jingly^ as when they are pro-- perly united. For Poetry^ when alone, muft be neceffarily forced to nvqfte many of its richeft Ideas^ in the mere railing of AfFedions, when, to have been properly relilhed, it fhould have found thofe Af- feftions in their higheft Energy. And Mufic^ when alone, can only raife Affec^- tionsy which foon languifh and decayy if not maintained and fed by the nutritive Images of Poetry. Yet muft it be re^ membered, in this Union, that Poetry ever have the Precedence ; its ^ Utility y as well as Dignityy being by far the more con- fiderable.
§. 4, And thus much, for the prefent, as to jf* Music, Painting, and Poetry ;
the
^ Ch. V, a. p. 83, t P 55^
PAINTING and POETRY.
103
the Circumftances, in which they agree ^ Cli.VI. and in which they differ ^ and the Pre- ’
FERENCE, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE THE OTHER TWO.
rhe END.
114
TREATISE the Third:
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS,
A
DIALOGUE.
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS,
A
DIALOGUE.
PART the First.
y. H. to F. s.
ATURE feems to treat Man, PartL as a Painter would his Difciple, to whom he commits the Out- Llnes of a Figure lightly Iketched, which the Scholar for himfelf is to colour and cornplete. Thus from Nature we derive Scnfes, and Paffions, and an Intellect, which each of us for himfelf has to model into a Charader, And hence (the reverfe
of
io8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 1. of every Species befide) Human Charafters alone are infinitely various ; as various in- deed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diverfity of Syftems, and of Dodtrines, refpedling the Laws, and Rules, and Condudl of Human Life,
’T I s in the Hiftory of thefe, my Friend, you have fo fuccefsfully employed yourfelf. You have been ftudious to know, not fo much what Greeks^ Romans^ or Barbarians have done ; as what they have reafonedy and what they have taught. Not an Epicure has more Joy in the Memory of a deli- cious Banquet, than I feel in recolledfing, what we have difeourfed on thefe Sub- jedts.
And here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contempt, in which we held thofe fuperficial Cenfurers, who profefs to refute, what they v/ant even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boafting (could that be
credited)
L4 Dialogue. ’ 109
credited) Sentiments are expofed, Opinions Part I. demoliftied, and the whole Wifdom of’ Antiquity lies vanquifhed at their Feet.
Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, they can with eafe difpatch a Lion, or dif- comfit a whole Legion, But alafs ! were they to encounter, not the Shadow, but the Subftance, what think you would be the Event then ? — Little better, I fear, than was the Fortune of poor Priam^ when the feeble Old Man durft attack the Youthful Pyrrhus,
^ Pelum imhelle fine i5iu
Conjecit : rauco quod protenus cere repulfum^
Et fummo Clypei nequicquam umbone pependit ^
Among the many long exploded and obfolete Syftems, there was one, you may remember, for which I profeffed a great Efteem. Not in the leaft degree con- vinced by all I had heard againft it, I
durft
* Mneid, 1. 2. v. 544,
no
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. durfl venture to affirm, that no Syftem was more plaujible * that grant but its Prhiciples^ and the rejl followed of courfe j that none approached nearer to the Per- feBion of our own Religion, as I could prove, were there occafion, by Authority not to be coritroverted. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypothefis fome- what -f* different ; fo I attempted to flip- port my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not fucceeding however fo happily in the Recolleffion, as I could wiffi, I have fince endeavoured to tran- fcribe, what at that time I would have re- hearfed. The Refult of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit v/ith Confidence to your Friendihip and Can- dour,
§. 2. *Twas at a time, when a certain Friend, whom I highly value, was my Gueft. We had been fitting together,
enter-
t Viz. the Platonic,
A Dialogue.
Ill
entertaining ourfelves with Shakefpear. Part I. Among many of his Charafters, we had ' looked into that of Woolfey, How foon, fays my Friend, does the Cardinal in Dif- grace abjure that Happinefs, which he was lately fo fond of? Scarcely out of Office, but he begins to exclaim
^ Vain Pomp and Glory of the World! Ihateye*
So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary with the Seafon ^ and that in Adverfity we are of one Mind, in Prolperity, of another.
As for his mean Opinion, faid I, of Human Happinefs, ’tis a Truth, which fmall Refledtion might have taught him long before. There feems little need of Diflrefs to inform us of this, I rather commend the feeming Wifdom of that Eaflern Mo- narch, who in the Affluence of Profperity, when he was proving every Pleafure, was yet fo fenfible of their Emptinefs, their In- fufficiency to make ' him happy, that he
pro-
* SnAKESPEAR’jf Hcury the Eighth.
1 12 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who fhould invent a new Delight. The Re- ward indeed was proclaimed, but the De- light was not to be found. If by
Delight, faid he, you mean fome Goodi fomething conducive to real Happinefs it might have been found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch’s Fancy.
Is that, faid I, poffible ? ^Tis poffible, replied he, tho’ it had been the Sovereign
Good itfelf- And indeed what wonder ?
Is it probable that fuch a Mortal, as an Eaftern Monarch ; fuch a pamper’d, flat- ter’d, idle Mortal y Ihould have Attention, or Capacity to a Subjefl: fo delicate? A Subject, enough to exercife the Subtleft and moil Acute ?
W HAT then is it you efleem, faid I, the Sovereign Good to be ? It fhould feem, by your Reprefentation, to be fomething very uncommon. Aik me not the Qi^Hion, faid he, you know not where ’twill carry us. Its general Idea indeed is eafy and plains but the Detail of Pa?'ticulars is
perplex’d
A DiALOGtJEi
pet^ple^’d and long— Paffions, and OpI- Part I.
nions for eVer thwart us a Paradox
appears in almoft every Advance. Befides, did our Inquiries fucceed ever fo happily, the very Subject itfelf is always enough to give me Pain. That, replied I, feeftis a Paradox indeed. ’Tis not, faid he,
from any Prejudice^ which I have con- ceived agaiiift it ; fof to Man I efteem it the nobleft in the World. Nor is it for being a Subjedt, to which my Genius does not lead, me ; for no Subjcft at all times has more employ’d my Attention. But the Truth is, I can fcarce ever think on it^ but an unlucky Story ftill occurs to my Mind. “ A certain Star-gazer, with his ‘‘ Telefcope, was once viewing the Moon ;
and defcribing her Seas, her Mountains,
“ and her Territories. Says a Clown to “ his Companion, Let him fpy what he “ pleafes ^ we are as near to the MooUi “ he and all his Brethren^' So fares it alafs ! with thefe, our moral Speculations. Pradtice too often creeps^ where Theory can foar. The Philofopher proves as weak^
1 as
1 14 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part L as thofe, whom he mojl contemns. A mortl- fying Thought to fuch as well attend it.
Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your ge- neral Idea of the Sovereign Good. This is eafy from your own Account, however in- tricate the Detail.
Thus then, faid he, fince you are fo urgent, ’tis thus that I conceive it. The Sovereign Good is that, the Pos- session OF WHICH RENDERS US HaPPY.
And how, faid I, do we polTefs it ? Is it Senfual^ or InfelleBnal? There
you are entering, faid he, upon the Detail, This is beyond your Q^ftion. Not
a fmall Advance, faid I, to indulge poor Curiofity ? Will you raife me a Third:, and be fo cruel not to allay it ? ’Tis not,
replied he, of my railing, but your own. Belides I am not certain, Ihould I attempt • to proceed, whether you will admit fuch Authorities^ as ’tis poffible I may vouch.
That, faid I, muft be determined , by their Weight, and Charader. Sup- .Y pofe.
A Dialogue.’
pofe, faid he, it fhould be Mankind; PartL the whole Human Race, Would you not think it fomething ftrange, to feek of thofe concerning Good, who purfiie it thou-- fand Ways^ and many of them contra- didtofy ? I confefs, faid I, it feems fo*
And yet, continued he, were there a Point, in which fuch Dijfentients ever agreed^ this Agreement be no mean
Argument in favour of its Truth and "Jujl- nefs. But where, replied I, is this Agreement to be found ?
He anfwered me by afking. What if it fhould appear, that there were certain Original Characteristics and Pre- conceptions OF Good, which were Na- tural, Uniform and Common to all Men ; which all recognized -in their various Purfuits-y and that the Difference lay only in the applying them to Particu- lars ? This requires, faid I, to be
illuftrated. As if, continued he, a
Company of Travellers, in fome wide Foreft, were all intending for one City, I 2 but
1 1 6 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part L but each by a Rout peculiar to hiitifelf^ The Roads indeed would be various^ and many perhaps falfe ; but all who travelled, would have one End in view. ’Tis
evident, faid I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with Mankind in pur- fuit of Good. The Ways indeed are Many^ but what they feek is One*
For inllance : Did you ever hear of any, who in purfuit of their Goody were for living the Life of a Bird, an Infedt, or a Fifli ? None, And why not ?
It would be inconMent, anfwered I, with their Nature. You fee then,
faid he, they all agree in this that what
they purfue, ought to be conjijienty and agreeable to their proper Nature. So
ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo, continued he, one Pre-conception is dif- covered, which is common to Good in gene- ral It is, that all Good is fuppofed fome-
thing agreeable to Nature. This in-
deed, replied I, feems to be agreed on all hands.
But
A D I A I, O G U E,
117
But again, fald he, Is there a Man Part I.
fcarcely to be found of a Temper fo truly mortified, as to acquiefce in the lowejl^ and jhortejl Necejfaries of Life ? Who aims not, if he be able, at fomething farther ^ fome- thing better ? I replied. Scarcely one.
Do not Multitudes purfue, faid he, infinite Objeds of Defire, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no relpedt Necejfaries ? Exquifite Viands, deli-
cious Wines, fplendid Apparel, curious Gar^ dens; magnificent Apartments adorned with Pidtures and Sculpture j Mufic and Poetry, and the whole Tribe of Elegant Arts ?
’Tis evident, faid I. If it be, continued he, it fliould feem that they all confidered the Chief or Sovereign Goody not to be that, which conduces to bare Exifience or mere Being ; for to this the Necejfaries alone are adequate, I replied they were.
But if not this, it muft be fomewhat conducive to thaty which is fuperior to mere Being. It muft. And what, con- tinued he, can this be, but JVell-Behig?
I 3 Well-
1 1 8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in which differing Opinions paint it ? Or can you fuggeft any thing elfe ? I replied, I could not. Mark here, then, con^ tinned he, another Pre-conception^ in which
they all agree the Sovereign Good is
fomewhat conducive^ not to mere Beings but to Well-Being, I replied. It had fo ap- peared.
Again, continued he. What Labour, what Expence, to procure thofe Rarities, which our own poor Country is unable to afford us ? How is the World ranfackjpd to its iitmoft Verges, and Luxury and Arts imported froni every Qmrter ? : — — - Nay
more — How do we baffle Nature herr
felf ; invert her Order 3 feek the Vegetables of Spring in the Rigours of Winter, and Winter’s Ice, during the Heats of Sum- mer ? I replied, We did. And what Difappointrnent, what Remorfe, when Endeavours fail ? ’Tis true. If this then be evident, faid he, it fflould feem, that whatever we delire as pur Chief and
Sove-
A Dialogue.
119
Sovereign Good^ is fomething which^ as far Part I, as pojjible^ we would accommodate to all Places and Times, I anfwered. So it appeared.
See then, faid he, another of its Cha-- radlerijiics^ another Pre-conception,
But farther ftill What Contefts for
Wealth ? What Scrambling for Property ? What Perils in the Purfuit ; what Sollicitude
in the Maintenance ? And why all this ?
To what Purpofe^ what End^——Oc is not the Reafon plain ? Is it not that Wealth may continually procure us, whatever we fancy Good 5 and make that perpetual^ which would otherwife' be tranfient ?
I replied. It feemed fo. Is it not far- ther defired, as [applying us from ourfelves*^ when, without it, we muft be beholden to the Benevolence of others^ and depend on their Caprice for all that we enjoy ?
"Tis true, faid I, this feems a Reafon. ^
A G A I N~— Is not Power of every degree ^s much contefled for, as Wealth ? Are not Magiftracies, Honours, Principalities, arid I 4 Empire,
120
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. Empire, the Subjefts of Strife, and ever- lafting Contention ? I replied, They were. And why, faid he, this? To
obtain what End ? -— Is it not to help us, like Wealth, to the PoJfeJJion of what we defined Is it not farther to afcertain^ to fecure our Enjoyments; that when others would deprive us, we may be Jirqng enough to refji themf J replied, It was.
Or to invert the whole — -—Why arc there, who feek Recedes the moft diftant and- retired ? fly Courts and Power, and fubtnit to Parctmony and Obfcurity ? Why all this, but from the fame Intention ? From an Opinion that /mail Poffeffions,
ufed moderately, are permanent r-that
larger Pofleflions raife Envy, and are more frequently invaded r-rrr-r fhat the Safety of Power a?id Dignity is more precarious^ than that of Retreat \ and that therefore they have chofen, what is mofi eligible upon the whole ? It is not, faid I, improbable^^ that they adl by fome fuch Motive.
Do
A Dialogue,
I2I
Do you not fee then, continued he, two Parti, or three more Fre-conceptions of the v.— reign Goody which are fought for by all, as Effential to conflitute it ? And what, , faid I, are tbefe ? That it fhould not he tranjienty nor derived from the Will of others y nor in their Power to take away ; but be durabky felf-derived^ and (if I may ufe the JExpreffion) indeprivable^
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. .
But we have already found it to be con^ fidered, as fomething agreeable to our Nature ; conducivcy not to mere Being, but to Welh Being ; and what we aim to have accommo^ date to all Places and Times, We have.
There may be other Charafteriftics, faid he, but thefe I think fufficient. Sec then its Idea j behold it, as colledted from the Origtnaly Natural^ and Univerfal PrCf conceptions of all Mankind, The Sove- reign Good, they have taught us, ought
to be fomething Agreeable to our
Nature 3 Conducive to Well-Being 3
Accom-
122
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Accommodate to all Places and Times 5 Durable, Self-derived, and Indeprivable. Your Account, faid I, appears juft.
It matters, continued he, little, how
they err in the Application if they covet
that as agreeable to Nature^ which is in it-
felf moft Contrary- if they would have
that as Durable^ which is in itfelf moft
Tranfient that as Independent^ and their
own, which is moft precarious and Servile, ’Tis enough for us, if we know their Aim — — enough, if we can difeover, ^what
^tis they propofe the Means and Method
may be abfurd^ as it happens. I an-
fwered. Their Aim was fufficient to prove what he had afferted,
’Tis true, replied he, ’tis abundantly fufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho* this w’ere ever fo certain, it would not be al- together foreign, were we to examine, hov/ they aft 5 how they fucceed in ap- plying thefe U?iiverfals to Particular Sub-
A Dialogue. 123
je5ts. Should they be found juft in the Part L
Application, we need look no farther
The true Sovereign Good would of courfe be Plain and Obvious and we fhould have no more to do, than to follow the beaten Road. ’Tis granted, replied I. But what if they err"^ Time enough for
that, faid he, when we are fatisfied that they do. We ought firft to inform our- felves, whether they may not poffibly be in the Right. I fubmitted, and begged him to proceed his own Way.
§. 3. Will you then, faid he, in this Difquifition into Human Conduct, allow me this — That fuch, as is the Species of Life, which every one choofes-, fuch Is his Idea of Happinefs^ fuch his Conception of the Sovereign Good ? I feem, faid I, to comprehend You, but fliould be glad You would illuftrate. His Meaning,
he anfwered, was no more than this
If a Man prefer a Life of Indujlry, ’tis be- caufe he has an Idea of Happinefs in Wealth if he prefers a Life of Gaiety y ’tis from a
like
124
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti, like Idea concerning Pleafure, And the famcy we fay, holds true in every other Inftance. I told him. It nauft cer-^
tainly.
And can you recolledl, faid he, any Life, but what is a Life of Bujinefsy or of Leifure ? I anfwered, None. And is not the great End of Bujtnefs either Power y or Wealth? It is. Mull not every Life therefore of Bujinefsy be either Political or Lucrative ? It mull.
Again Are not IntelleSi and Senfey
the Soul's leading Powers ? They are.
And in Leifure are we not ever fceking, to gratify oney or the other ?
We are. Mull not every Lfe there-
fore of Leifure be either Pleafurabky or Contemplative ? If you confine Pleafure, faid I, to Senfey I think it necelfarily mull.
If it be not fo confinedy faid he, we confound all Inquiry ^ Allow it^
Mark then, faid he, the two grand Qeneray the Lives of Business and of
Leisure
A Dialogue. 125
Leisure -mark alfo the fubordinate PartL
Species-y the Political and Lucra-^”'^'^ TivE, the ContemplAI"! vE and
Pleasurable Can you think of any
other, which thefe will not include ?
I replied, I knew of none. "Tis pof- fible indeed, faid he, that there may be other Lives framed, by, the blending of thefe, two or more of thetn, together.
But if we feparate with Accuracy, we fhall find that here they all terminate*
I replied, fo it feemed probable.
If then, continued he, we would be cxadt in our Inquiry, we muft examine thefe four LiveSy and mark their Confe-^ quentes. ’Tis thus only we fhall learn, how far thofe, who embrace them, find that Good and Happinefsy which we know they all purfue, I made anfwer. It
feemed neceffary, and I fliould willingly attend him.
§.4. To begin then, faid he, with the Political Life. Let us fee the Good,
ufually
126 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti, ufually fought after here. To a private Man^ it is the Favour of fome Prince, or Commonwealth i the Honours and Emo- luments derived from this Favour ; the Court and Homage of Mankind * the Power of commanding others— —-To a Prince, it is the fame Things nearly, only greater in Degree 5 a larger Command ^ a flridler and more fervile Homage ; Glory,
Conqueft, and extended Empire Am I
right in my Defcription ? I replied, I thought he was. Whether then, faid he, all this deferve the Name of Good or not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or the other, it affeds not our Inquiry. All
that I would aik concerning it, is this
Do you not think it a Good (if it really be one) derived from Foreign and External Caufes ? Undoubtedly, replied I.
It cannot come then from ourfelves, or be felf-derived. It cannot. And what lhall we fay as to its Duration and Stabi- lity ? Is it fo firm and lafiing^ that we can- not be deprived of it ? I fhould imagine, faid I, quite otherwife. You infift not
then,
A Dialogue. 127
then, faid he, on my appealing to Hijlory. Part I. You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, of Empires, and their Owners. I re- plied, I did.
If fo, faid he, it fliould feem that this Political Goody which they feek, correfponds not to the PrC’-conceptions of being Durable^ and Indeprivable, Far from it. But it appeared juft before, not to be felf- derived. It did. You fee then, faid he, that in three of our Pre-conceptions it intirely fails. So indeed, faid I, it appears.
But farther, faid he We are told of
this Goody that in the Poffejfon it is attended with Anxiety^ and that when lofy it is ufually lofi with Ignominy and Idifgrace ^ nay, often with Profecutions and the bit- tereft Refentments; with Mulcts, with Exile, and Death itfelf. ’Tis frequently, faid I, the Cafe. How then, faid he, can it anfwer that other Pre-cojiceptioriy of contributing to our Well-Being ? Can that
contribute
1 28 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. contribute to Well - Beings whofe Confe^ quences lead to Calamity^ and whofe Pre-- fence implies Anxiety ? This, it muft be confeffed, faid I, appears not probable.
But once more, faid he There
are certain Habits or Difpojitions of Mmdy called Sincerity, Generofity, Candour, Plain-dealingj Juftice, Honour, Honeily, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that thefe are agreeable to Nature, Affiiredly.
But it has been as generally believed, that the Political Good^ we fpeak of, is often not to be acquired but by HabitSy contrary to thefe y and which, if thefe are Naturaly muft of neceffity be unnatural. What Habits, faid I, do you mean ? Flattery, anfwered he, Diffimulation, Intrigue: upon occafion, perhaps Iniquity, Falfhood, and Fraud. ’Tis poffible indeed, faid I, that thefe may fometimes be thought necef- fary. How then, faid he, can that
Good be agreeable to Nature y which cannot be acqiiiredy but by Habits contrary to
Nature ?
A Dialogue.
129
JSIature? Your Argument, faid I, Parti,
feems juft,
If then, faid he, we have reafoned rightly, and our Concluftons may be de- pended on -y it fhould feem that the sup- posed Good, which the Political Life purfueSy correfponds nofy in any Injiancey to cur Pre-conceptions of the Sovereign Good.
I anfwered. So it appeared.
§. 5. Let us quit then, faid he, theP^?//- tical Lifey and pafs to the Lucrative, The Obje<ft of this is Wealth. Admit it.
And is it not too often, faid he, the Cafe, that to acquire thisy we are tempted to employ fome of thofe HabitSy which we , have juft condemned as Such,
I mean, as Fraud, Falfliood, Injuftice, and the like ? It muft be owned, faid I, too often.
Besides, continued he What fhall
I we fay to the Efeeniy the Fi'iendfipy and { Love of Mankind? Are they worth having?
(
i
130 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Is it agreeable^ think you, to Nature^ to endeavour to deferve them ? Agreeable, faid I, to Nature, beyond difpute. If fo, then to merit Hatred and Contempty faid he, muft needs be contrary to Nature.
Undoubtedly. And is there any thing which fo certainly merits Hatred and Contempty as a mere Lucrative Lifcy Ipent in the uniform Purliiit of Wealth?
I replied, I believed there was nothing* If fo, faid he, then as to correjpond'^ ing with our Pre-conceptions y the Lucrative Goody in this refped, fares no better than the Political It appears not*
And what diall we fay as to Anxiety? Is not both the Pojfejjion and Purfuit of Wealth, to thofe who really love it, ever anxious? It feems fo. And why anxiouSy but from a Certainty of its Injla- bility \ from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every crofs Event ; how eafy to be loft and transfer^d to others, by the fame Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to Qurfelves ? — —This Is indeed the triteft of
all
A Dialogue; 131
ail Topics. The Poets and Orators have Part I.’ long ago exhaufted it. ^Tis true, faid I, they have* May we not venture then, faid he, upon the whole, to pafs the fame Sentence on the Lucrative Life, as We
have already on the Political that it
pro^ofes not A Good, correfpondent to thofe Pre-conceptionSy by which we would all be governed in the Good, which we are allfeeking? I anfwered, We might juftly.
§.6. If then neither the Lucrative Life^ nor the Political^ faid he, procure that Good which we delire : lhall we feek it from the Pleasurable? Shall we make Pleasure our Goddefs?
, — i — Pleafure^
WhofJi Love attends^ and foft Dejire^ and Words
Alluringy apt the JleadieJi Heart to bend.
So fays the Poet, and plaufible his Doc-’ rine. Plaufible, faid I, indeed.
" K 2 Let
cn
2 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Let It then, continued he, be a plea^ furable World ; a Race of harmlefs^ loving Animals % an Elyfian Temperature of Sun- fhlne and Shade. Let the Earthy in every garter ^ ref^ble our own dear Country j where never was a Froft, never a Fog, * never a Day, but was delicious and ferene.
I was a little embarralTed at this un- expedled . Flight, 'till recolledling myfelf, I told him, (but ftill with fome Surprize) that, in no degree to difparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either fo exquilite, as he now fuppofed them. There are then it
feems, faid he, in the Natural Worlds and even in cur own beloved Country, fuch things as Storms^ and Tempers 5 as pinching Colds^ and fcorching Heats.
I replied. There were. And confe*
quent to thefe^ Difeafe^ and Famine ^ and infinite Calamities. There are.
And in the Civil or Human World, we have Difcord and Contention 3 or (as the
Poet
^DiALOGtJE.
133
Part I.
Poet better * dcfcribes it)
Cruel RevengCy and rancorous De/pitCy Dijloyal Treafony and heart-burning Hate.
We have. Alafs ! then, poor
Pleafure ! Where is that Good, accommo- date to every Thne ; fuited to every Place 5 felf-derivedy not dependent on Foreign Ex- ternal Caufesf Can it be Pleasure, on fuch a changeabky fuch a turbulent Spoty as this ? I replied, I thought not.
And what indeed, were the Worlds faid he, modelled to a Temperature the moji exadl? Were the Rigours of the Seafons never more to be knov/n j nor Wars, De- vaftations. Famines or Difeafes ? Admit- ting all this, (which we know to be im- pojjible) can we find ftill in Pleafure that lengthened Durationy which we confider as an EJfentialy tp conftitute the Sovereign
Good ? Afk the Glutton, the Drinker,
K 3 the
* Spencer’s Fairy ^igmy B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.
134 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 1. the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether ‘"*'*'‘'***^ they know any Enjoymeitt^ not to be can- celled by Satiety ? Which does not haftily pafs away into the tedious Intervals of In- difference ? Or yielding all this too,
(which we know cannot be yielded) where are we to find our Goody how poffefs it in Age ? In that Eve of Life, declining Age, when the Power of Senfey on which all de- fendsy like the fetting Sun, h gradually for- faking us ?
I SHOULD imagine, faid I, that Pleafure was no mean Adverfary, lince you em- ploy, in attacking her, lb much of your Rhetoric, Without heeding what I faid, he purfued his Subject — — Belide, if this be our Goody onv Happinefsy and our End^ to what purpofe PowerSy which bear no
Relation to it ? Why Memory ? Why
Reafon ? Mere Senfation might have been a« esquiftCy, had we been Flies or Earth- worms— —Ox can it be proved otherwife ?.
I replied, I could not lay. No Ani-
maly continued he, pffffes its Facidties in
'vatn.
A D I A L b G TJ X.35
vain. And ihall Man derive no> Good Parti, from his hefty his moft eminent'^ From That, which of all is peculiar to himfelf ?
For as to Growth and Nutritiony they arc not wanting to the meaneft Vegetable ; and for Senfes, there are Animalsy which per- haps exceed us in them alU
§.7, This feems, laid I, no mean Ar- gument in favour of Contemplation.
The Contemplative Life gives Reafon all the Scope, which it can defire. And of all Lives, anfwered he, would it furely be the beft, did we dwell, like Milton^
Uriely in the &un's bright Circle, Then might we plan indeed the moft Romantic Kind of Happinefs, Stretch’d at Bale, without Trouble or Moleftation, we might pafs our Days, contemplating the Uni- verfe ; tracing its Beauty ; loft in Wonder ; ravilhed with Ecftacy, and 1 know not
what But here alafs ! on this fublunarVy
this turbulent Spot, (as we called it not long fince) how little is this, or any thing
like it, pradlicahk f Fogs arife, which
' K 4 dim
136 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. dim our Profpedls — the Cares of Life per-
petually moleft us Is Contemplation fuited
to a Placcy like this ? It mull be owned, faid I, not extremely. How then is it the Sovereign Goody which Ihould be Ac- commodate to every Place ? I replied. It feemed not probable.
But farther, faid he Can we enjoy
the Sovereign Goody and be at the fame time vexedy and agitated by Pajjion ? Does not this feem a Paradox ? I anfwered. It did. Suppofe then an Event were to happen — not an Inundationy ov Maffacre — but an Acquaintance only drop a difrefpedl- ful Word-y a Servant chance to break a favourite Piece of Furniture — What would
inftru(5l us to endure this ? Contempla-
tiony Theory, Abllraftions ? Why not, faid I ? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not
« ^ho* all the Stars
Thou knewf by Name 5 and all the Etherial Powers, For
* Par, Lojiy B, 12. v. 576.
I.
!j
A Dialogue. ^ 137
For does not Experience teach us, abun- Part i, dandy teach us, that our deepeft Philofo- phers, as to Temper and Behaviour y are as very Children for the moft part, as the meaneft and moft illiterate ? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Prefumption of what they know, but not a grain more of Magnanmityy of Candour and calm Indu-- ranee.
You are fomewhat too fevere, faid I, in cenlliring of all. There are better and worfe among Them, as among Others.
The Difference is no way propor- tionedy faid he, to the ^antity of their Knowledge 5 fo that whatever be its Caufe, . it can’t be imputed to their Speculations. — Befides, can you really imagine, we came here only to Think ? Is A5iing a Circum- ftance, which is foreign to Our CharaBer ?
Why then fo many Social AffeBionSy
which all of us feel, even in fpite of our- felves ? Are we to fupprefs them All, as ufelefs and unnatural? The Attempt, replied I, muft needs be found impracti- cable.
J38 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. cable. Were they once fupprejjedy faid he, the Confequences would be fomewhat ftrange. We fhould hear no more of Fa^ ther. Brother, Hutband, Son, Citizen, Ma- glftrate, and Society itfelf. And were this ever the Cafe, ill (I fear) would it fare with even Contemplation itfelf. It would certainly be but bad Speculating^ among iawlefs Barbarians Unaffociated Ani- mals where Strength alone of Body was
' to conftitute Dominion^ and the Conteft canre to be (as ^ Horace defcribes it)
-rr-r- glandem atque cubilia propter , Ufiguibus & pugnis^ dein fujiibus
" Bad enough^ replied I, of all con-»
fclence.
It fhould feem then, faid he, that not even the best Contemplative Life, however noble its ObjeBy was agreeable to our present Nature, or conjijlenf
with
* Sat. 3. 1. I. V. 99j
A Dialogue.
J39
with our prefenf Situation. I confefs. Part faid you appear to have proved fo.
But if this be allowed true of the the moft Excellent 5 what fhall we fay to the Mockery of Monkery i the Farce of priars^ the ridiculous Mumraery of being fequeftred in a Cloyfler ? Tjii§ furely is top low a Thing; even to merit an Examina- tion. I have no Scruples here, faid I, you need not wafte your Time.
§.8. If that, faid he, be your Opinion, let us look a little backward. For pur Memory's fake it may be proper to reca- pitulate. I replied, 'Twould be highly
acceptable. Thus then, faid he
We have examined the four grand Lives^ which we fipd the Generality of Men em- brace j the Lucrative^ and the Political-^ the Pleafurabky and the Contemplative.
And we have aimed at proving that
to fuch a Being as Man, with fuch a Body^ fuch Affeldions^ fuch Senfes, and fuch an In-
telleB r- placed in fuch a World, fubje5l
fo fuch IncidenU — not one of tbefe Lives is
pro-
140 ' Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part produBive of that Good, which we find all Men to recognize thro' the fame uniform Pre-conceptions ; a7td which thro' one or other of thefe Lives they all of them purfue,
§. 9. You have juflly, faid I, collefted the Sum of your Inquiries. And
happy, faid he, fliould I think it, were they to terminate here. I afked him.
Why ? Becaufe, replied he, to in-
finuate firft, that all Mankind are in the wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, to fhew one's felf only to be right ; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here to lay. That I thought he need not be fo
diffident that a Subjed, where one's
own Interefi appeared concerned fo nearly^ would well juftify every Scruple^ and even the fevered: Inquiry, There, faid he,
you fay fomething there you encourage
me indeed. For what?— — Are we not cautioned againft Comiterfeits^ even in Mat- ters of meaneft Value ? If a Piece of Metal be tender’d us, which feems doubtful, do
we
A Dialogue* .141
We not hefitate ? Do we not try it the Part I. TCeJly before we take it for Current"? — And is not this deem'd Prudence? Are we not
cenfured, if we a6l otherwife ? How
much more then does it behove us not to be impofed on here? To be diffident and fcrupuloufly exafl:, where Impojiure^ if once admitted, may tempt us to a far worfe Bar- gain, than ever Glaucus made WithDio?ned ?
What Bargain, faid I, do you mean ?
The Exchange, replied he, not of Gold for Brafsy but of Good for Evil^ and
of Happinefs for Mifery But enough of
this, lince you have encouraged me to proceed— We are feeking that Goody which we think others have not found. Permit me thus to purfue my Subjed:, «
§. 10. Every Being on this our Ter^ rejirial Dwellings exifts encompajled with infinite ObjeBs 5 exifts among Animals tamCy and Animals wild-, among Plants and Ve- getables of a thoufand difierent Q^lities; among Heats and Colds, Tempefls and Calms, the Friendffiips and Dilcords of
betei'o-
. r42
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. heterogeneous Elements - — What fay you ? Are all thefe Things exadtly the fame to \i ; or do they differ^ think you, in their Ef^ fe5ts and Confequences? They differ,
faid I, widely* Some perhaps then,
faid he, are Apt^ Congruous^ and Agreeable to its Natural State. I replied, They
were. Others are In-apty Incongruous^ and Difagreeable. They are.
And others again are Indifferent* They are^
It fhould feem then, faid he, if this be allowed, that to every individual Beings without the leafi Exception^ the whole Mafs of "Tbrngs Externaly from the greatejl to the 7nearLefy food in the Relations of either Agreeable^ Difagreeahky or Indifferent.
I replied. So it appeared.
But tho’ this, continued he, be true in the general^ ’tis yet as certain when we defcend to Particulars, that what is Agrees Me to one Species is Difagreeable to another ; and not only fo, but perhaps Indifferent to
A Dialogue. 143
.a third. Inftances of thk kind, he faid. Part L were too obvious to be mentioned.
I REPLIED, ’Twas evident. Whence theri^ faid he, this 'Oiverfity ? — . It cannot arife from the Externals for Water is equally Water ^ whether to a Man^ or to a Fift)-^ whether, operating on the one, it fuffocatey or on the other > it give Life and Vigour-. I replied. It was. So is Fire, faid he, the fame Fire, however Various in its Coniequcnces 5 whether it harden or fofteHy give Fleafure or Pain*
I replied. It was. But if this Z)/-*
Verfityy continued he, be not derived from the Externals^ whence can it be elfe ?
Or can it poffibly be derived otherwife thaa from the peculiar Confitutiony from the Natural State of every Species itfelf ?
I replied, It appeared probable.
Thus then, faid he, is it that Every particular Species /r, itfelf to itfelfy the Meafure of all Things in the Univerfe — that as Things vary in their Relatwis to /V, they
• vary
144 Concerning HAPPINESS, 'i
Part L vary too in their Value and that if theiri^
Value be ever doubtful^ it can no way he ad-- jujiedy but by recurring with Accuracy the Natural State of the Species ^ and tO ' thofe feveral Relations^ which fuch a State, of courfe creates. I anfwered, He ar- gued juftly.
§. II . To proceed then, faid he — Tho* i it be true, that every Species has a Natural . State y as we have afferted ; it is not true, that every Species has a Senfe or Feeling of it. This Feeling or Senfe is a Natural , Eminence or Prerogativey denied the Vege- ' table and Inanimatey and imparted only to , the Animal I anfwered. It was.
And think you, continued he, that as many as have this Senfe or Feelmg of a Natural State, are alie7tated from it, or in- | different to it ? Or is it not more probable, 'i that they are welUaffeBed to it ? Experience, faid I, teaches us, how well they are all alFedled. You are right,
replied he. For what would be more
abfurd.
A Dialogue.
HS
abfiird, than to be indifferent to their own Part L Welfare ; or to be alienated from It, as tho’
’twas Foreign and Unnatural? I replied. Nothing could be more. But, con- tinued hej if they are njoell-affedled to this their proper Natural States it fhould feem too they muft be welUaffeBed to all thofe Externals i which appear apty congruous y and agreeable to it. I anfwered. They
muft. And if fo^ then ill-affeBed or
averfe to fiich, as appear the contrary.
They muft. And to fuch as appear
indifferent^ indifferent. They muft.
But if this, faid he^ be allowed, it will follow, that in confequencc of thefe AppearanceSy they will think fome Exter-- nals worthy of Purfuit\ fome worthy of Avoidance -y and fome worthy of neither^
’Twas probable, faid I, they ftiould.
Hence then, faid he, another Divif on of Things external ; that is, into Purfuabky Avoidabky and Indifferent — a Divifion only belonging to Beings Senftive and Ani?natey becaufe all, below thefe y can avoid
L nor
Concerning HAPPINESS,
I. nof purftie, I replied. They could
^not.
iFy then, faid he, Man be allowed in the Number of thefe SenfJive Beings, this
Divifion will affedt Man or to explain
more fully, the whole Mafs of things exter- nal will^ according to this Divifion^ exijl to the Human Species in the Relations of Pur- fuable^ Avoidable^ and Indifferent, I re- plied, They would.
Should we therefore delire, faid he, to know what thefe things truly are, we muft firft be informed, what is Man's truly Natural Constitution. For thus, you may remember, 'twas fettled not long lince — that every Species was its own Standard, and that when the Value of Phings was doubtfid, the Species was to be f udied^y the Relations to be deduced, which were confequent to it 5 and tn this manner the Value of Phings to be adjufed and afcer- tained, I replied. We had fo agreed it. I fear then, faid he, we are en-
gaged
A Dialogue/
H7
gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Part I. Talk of more Difficulty, than we were at
firft aware of But For tuna Fortes — we
muft endeavour to acquit ourfelves as well as we are able.
§. 12. That Man therefore has a ! Body^ of a Figure and internal Structure peculiar to itfelf ; capable of certain De- grees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the like; this I believe is evident, andffiardly wants a Proof. I anfwered, I was
willing to own it. That he is capable too of Pleafure and Pain ; is poffefs’d of Senfes^ Affedlions^ Appetites^ and Averjions-y this alfo feems evident, and can fcarcely be denied. - I replied, ’Twas admitted.
We may venture then to range Him in the Tribe of Animal Beings.
I replied. We might.
And think you, faid he, without Society, you or any Man could have been bo?'n?
Moft certainly not. Without
Society, when born, could you have been L 2 brought
148 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. brought to Maturity ? Moft certainly ‘"*'^'*^***^ not. Had your Parents then had no*
Social Affeblions towards you in that feri-^ lorn State, that tedious Infancy, (fo much longer than the longejl of other Animals) you muft have inevitably perifhed thro' Want and Inability. I muft. You perceive then that to Society you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the Beginning of Beingy but for the Continue- ance, * We are.^
Sut^POSE then we pafs from^ this Birth and Infancy of Man, to his Maturity and Perfedlion’^^— Is there any AgCy think you, fo felffufficientj as that in it he feels no Wants? What Wants, anfwered I,
do you mean ? In the firft and' prin-
cipal place, faid he, that of Food-y then perhaps that of Raiment % and after this, a Dwellmg, or Defence againft the Wea- ther, Thefe Wants, replied I, are
furely Natural at all Ages. And is it
not agreeable to Naturey faid he, that they Ihould at all Ages be fupplied? AP
furedly.
A Dialogue. 149
furedly. And is it not more agreeable Part I. to have them well fupplied, than ///? ^
It is. And mpjl agreeable, to have
them bejl fiipplied ? _ . Certainly.
If there be then any one State, better than all others^ for the fupplying thefe Wants ; ^ this State^ of all others^ muft needs be moji JSfatural^ It muft,.
And what Supply^ faid he, of thefe Wants, ftiall we efteem the meanefi^ which, we can conceive ? — Would it not be feme- thing like this ? Had we nothing beyond Acorns for Food ; beyond a rude Skin, for Raiment ^ or beyond a Cavern, or hollow;
Tree, to provide us with a Dwelling ?
Indeed, faid I, this would be bad enough*
And do you not imagine, as far as this^ we might each fupply ourfehes^ tho’ we lived in Woods, mere folitary Savages?
I replied, I thought we might.
Suppose then, continued he, that our Supplies were to be 7nended---r-ios: inftance, that we were to exchange Acorns for L 3 Bread—.
j^o Concerning HAPPINESS,
Parti. Bread — Would our Savage Charafter be llifEcient here ? Muft we not be a little better difeiplined ? Would not fome Art be requifite ? The Baker's^ for example.
It would. And previoufly to
the Baker’s, that of the Miller ? It
would. And previoujly to the Miller’s, that df the Hujbandman? It would.
Three Arts then appear necejfary^ even upon the lowejl Eftimation. ’Tis admitted.
But a Queftion farther, faidhe— Gan the Hufbandman work, think you, with-5 out his Tools? Mufl he not have his Plough, his Harrow, his Reap-hook, and the like ? He muft. And muft not thofe other Artifts too be furniflied in the fame manner ? They muft. And whence muft they be furniftied ? From their own Arts ? — Or are not the making Tools, and the ufing them, two different Occupations ? I believe, faid I, they are. You maybe convinced, continued he, by fmall Recolledlion. Does Agricul- ture
^Dialogue. 151
iiire make its own Plough, its own Harrow ? Part I. Or does it not apply to other Arts^ for all Neceffaries of this kind ? It does.
Again Does the Baker build his own
Oven y or the Miller frame his own Mill ?
It appears, faid I^ no part of their Bulinefs,
Wh AT a Tribe of Mechanics then, faid he, are advancing upon us ? — ^-Smiths, Car- penters, Mafons, Millwrights — - — and all thefe to provide the Jingle Necejjary of Bread, Not lefs than feven or eight Arts, we find, are wanting at the feweji. It appears fo. And what if to the pro- viding a. comfortable Cottage^ and Raiment fuitable to an indufirious Hindy we allow a dozen Arts more ? It would be eafy, by the fame Reafoning, to prove the Number double. I admit the Number, faid I, mentioned.
If fo, continued he. It fliould feem, that towards a tolerable Supply of the three Pri- mary and Common NeceJjarieSy Foody Raiment ^
L 4 and
152 CoKc:rmng HAPPINESS,
Part I. and a Dwellings not lefs than twenty Arts were^ on the loweji Account^ requijite.
It appears fo.
And Is one Man equal, think you, to the Exercife of thefe twenty Arts ? If he had even Genius^ 'which wc can fcarce Ima- gine, is it poffible he Ihould fin4 Leifure ?
I replied, I thought not. If fo, then a folitary^ unfocial State can never fupply tolerably the common Necefaries of Life,
It cannot.
But what if we pafs from the Neceffor. Ties of Life, to the Elegancies ? To Mulic,
Sculpture, Painting and Poetry ? What
if we pafs from all Arts^ whether Neceffary or Elegant^ to the large and various Tribe of Sciences ? To Logic, Mathenlatics, Aftro^ nomy, Phylics ? ^ — Can one Man, imagine you, mafter all this ? Abfurd, faid I, im- poffible. And yet in this Cycle of Sciences!
andArtSy feem included all the Comfort Sy ^ well as Ornaments of Life 3 included all
|:onducive, either to Beings or to Well-Being,
..... ...
A Dialogue.
153
It muft be confeffed, faid I, it has Part I. the Appearance.
What then, faid he, muft be done?
In what manner inuft we be fupplied? ^
I anfwered, I knew not, unlefs we made a Dijiribution — Let one exercife one Art ; and another a different — Let this Man ftudy fuch a Science 5 and that Man^
another Thus the whole Cycle (as you
call it) may be carried eafily into Perfec- tion. ’Tis true, faid he, it may; and every Individual, as far as his own Art or Science^ might be fupplied completely^ and as well as he could wifti. But what avails a Supply in a fingle Inftance ? What in this cafe are to become of all his numerous other Wantst You conceive, replied I, what I would have faid, but partially. My Meaning was, that Artifl trade with Ar^ tifi ; each fupply where he is deficient , by isxchanging where he aboujids-, fo that a Portion of every thing may be difperfed f hroughout all, Y ou intend then a StatCj
faid
154 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. faid he, of Commutation and Traffic,
I replied, I did.
. If fo, continued he, I fee a new Face of things. The Savages, with their Skins and their Caverns, difappear, In their place I behold a fair Community riling. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is Social^ Civile and Cultivated — And can we doubt any farther, whether Society be Natural? Is not this evidently the State^ which can bejl fupply the Primary Wants ? It has ap- peared fo. And did we not agree
fome time lince, that this State^ whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the mof agreeable to our Nature? We did. And have we not a'dded, lince this, to the Weight of our Argument, by palling from the Necef'ary Arts to the Ele^ gant'y from the Elegant ^ to the Sciences?
We have, The more, faid he, we conlider, the more llaall we be con- vinced, that All thefcy the noblell Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, with^> out that LeifurCy that ExperwicCy that Emu-
latioiiy
Dialogue, 155
lation^ that Reward^ which the Social State Part I. alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found ExiJlencCy or been in the leaft recognized. Indeed, faid I,
I believe not.
Let it not be forgot then, faid he. In favour of Society^ that to it we owe, not only the Beginning and Continuation^ but the Well-Beings and (if I may ufe the Ex- preffion) the very Elegance^ and Rationality of our Exifence, I anfwered. It ap-
peared evident.
And what then, continued he? — If Society be thus agreeable to our Nature^ is there nothing, think you, within us, to ex- cite and lead us to it ? No Impulfe^ no Pre- paration of Faculties! It would be
ftrange, anfwered I, if there fhould not.
’Twould be a Angular Exception^ faid he, with refpedl to all other herding Species — Let us however examine — Pity, Benevolence, Friendlhip, Love ^ the general Diflike of Solitude, and Defire of Com- pany;
156 ’ Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part L pany ; are they Natural AffeBions^ which come of themjehes ; or are they taught us by Arty like Mulic and Arithmetic?
I fliould think, replied I, they were Na-^ turaly becaufe in every Degree of Men fome Traces of them may be difcovered.
And are not the Pow^s and Capacities of Speechy faid he, the fame ? Are not all Men naturally formed, to exprefs their Sen-^ f intents by fome kind of Language ? I re^ plied. They were.
If then, faid he, thefe feveral Powers^ and Difpoftions are Naturaly fo fhould feem too their Exercife. Admit it. And if their Exercifey then fo too that Statey where alone they can be exercifed. Ad- mit it. And what is this Statey but the Social? Or where elfe is it poffible to con- verfcy or ufe our Speech ^ to exhibit Adlions of Pity, Benevolence; Friendlhip or Love ; to relieve our Averfion to Solitude y or gratify pur Defre of being with others ? I re*^ plied. It could be no where elfe.
Yoi;
A Dialogue,
You fee then, continued he, a Prepa-- Part 1. ration of Faculties is not wanting. We are fitted with Powers and Dilpolitions, which have only Relation to Society > and which, out of Society, can no where elfe be exercifed^
I replied. It was evident. Y ou have feen
too the fuperior Advantages of the Social State y above all others. I have.
Let this then be remember’d, faid he,' throughout all our fiiture Reafonings, re- member’d as a firrt Principle in our Ideas of Humanity y i^2X Man by Nature is truly a Social Animal. - I promifed it fhould.
§.13. Let us now, faid he, examine, what farther we can learn concerning Him.
As Social indeed. He is diftinguiflied from the Solitary and Savage Species -y but in no degree from the reft, of a milder and more friendlyN^Xxsxt. ’Tis true, replied I, He is not. Does He then differ no more from
thefe
158 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. thefe feveral Social Species, than they, each of them, differ from one another ? Mnft we range them ally and Man among the rejty under the fame cotnmon and general Genus ?
I fee no Foundation^ faid I, for making a Diftindion.
Perhaps, faid he, there may be none ; and 'tis poffible too there may. Conlider a little — Do you not obferve in all other Species, a Similarity among Ijidivi duals’? a fiirprizing LikenefSy which runs thro' each F articular? In one Species they are all Bold ; in another, all Timorous ; in one all Ravenously in another, all Gentle. In the Bird-kind only, what a Uniformity of Voiccy in each Species, as to their Notes ; of Ar- chitedlurey as to building their Neils ; of Foody both for themfelves, and for fup- porting their young ? ’Tis true, faid I.
And do you obferve, continued he, the fame Similarity among Men ? Are thefe all as Uniformy as to their Sentiments and Anions ? I replied, By no means.
One
^ Dialogue, 159
Part I.
One Queftion more, faid he, as to the Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed the Expreffion — Are thefe^ think you, what we behold them^ by Nature or otherwife?
Explain, faid I, your Q^ftion, for I do not well conceive you. I mean,
replied he, is it by Nature that the Swallow builds her Neft, and performs all the Offices of her Kind : Or is fhe taught by Art^ by DifcipUney or Cujlom? She afts, re- plied I, by pure Nature undoubtedly.
And is not the fame true, faid he, of e^ery other Bird and Bead: in the Univerfe ?
It is. No wonder then, continued he, as they have fo wife a Governefs, that a uniform Rule of ABion is provided for each Species. For what can be more worthy the Wifdom of Nature^ than ever to the fajjie Subjlances to give the fame Law f It ap-
pears, faid I, reafonable.
But what, continued he, fliall we fay as to Man ? Is He too actuated by Nature purely ? I anfwered, Why not ?
If
l6o tloncerning HApPINESS,^
Part I. If He be, replied Ke^ ’tis ftrange in Nature^ u relpecl to Man alone ^ ihe fliould
follow fo different a Conduit. The Particu- lars in other Species, we agree, fhe renders Uniform-, but inOur* s, gw tvy Particular feems a fort of Model by himfelf If Nature,' laid I, do not aituate us^ what can we fup-’ pofe elfe ? hxQ Local Cufoms, faid he^ iure ? Are the Polities and Religions of par- licular^Nations, Nature ? Are the LxampleSi which are fet before us; the Preceptors who inftruil us ; the Company and Friends^ > -With whom we converfe^ all Nature f
No furely, faid L And yet,^ faid he^
"^tls evident that by thefe^ and a thoufand incidental Gircumftancesf equally foreign to Nature, otir Adtions^ and Manners, and Charaiters are adjufted. Who then can imagine, we are adluated by Nature only f 1 confefs, faid Ij it appears con- trary;
You fee then^ faid he, one remarkable bifinBion between Man and Brutes in ge- neral In the Brute^ Nature does all ; in
Man.
^ Dialogue.
i6i
Man^ but Part only, faid I.
*TIs evident, Part I;
But farther; continued he Let us tonfider the Powers^ or FacultieSy poffelTed by each— -Suppofe I was willing to give a Brute the fame InJiru6lioni which we give a Man, A Parrot perhaps^ or Ape, might arrive to’ fome fmall Degree of Mimicry i but do you think, upon the whole,* they would be much profited or altered?
' I replied, J thought not. And do you perceive the fame^ faid he, with relped: to Man ? Or does not Experience fhew us the very reVerfe ? Is not Education capable of moulding us into any thing — of making us greatly Goody or greatly Bady greatly Wifcy or greatly Abfurd? The Fait, faid I, is indifputabki
MarIc then; laid he, the Difference between Human Powers and Brutal — The Leading Principle of Brutes appears to tend in each Species to one fingle Purpofe — to this, in general, it uniformly arrives j and here.
M
i62 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. in general, it as uniformly flops — it needs no precepts or Difcipline to inftruft it j nor will it eafily be changed^ or admit a differ rent DireBion. On the contrary, the Lead- ing Principle of Man is capable of infinite
DireBions is convertible to all forts of
Purpofes^ — ^equal to all forts of SubjeBs
negleded, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfedlion — cultivated, becomes adorned with Sciences and Arts — -can raife us to excel, not only Brutes^ but our own Kind — with relpedl to our other Powers and Faculties, can inftrudt us how to ufe them, as well as thofe of the various Natures^
, which we fee exifting around us. In a word, to oppofe the two Principles to each other — -The Leading Principle of Man^ is Multiform^ Originally UninfiruBedy Pliant and Docil — the Leading Principle of Brutes is Uniformy Originally InfiruBed'y but, in moft Inftances afterward, Infiexible and
Indocil Or does not Experience plainly
(hew, and confirm the Truth of what wc affert ? I made anfwer. It did.
A Dialogue.'
163
You allow, then, faid he, tht Human Parti. Principle, and the Brutal^ to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do they not each then deferve a different Ap- pellation ? I fhould think fo. Sup- pofe therefore we call the Human Principle I Reason; and the Brutal^ Instinct:
I would you objedt to the Terms ? I re- j plied, I fhould not. If not, continued j he, then Reafon being peculiar to Man^ of j all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may ij we not affirm of Him, by way of Diffinc- ii tion, that He is a Rational Animal? j I replied. We might juftly.
i
Let this too then be remember’d, faid n he, in the Courfe of our Inquiry, that Man I h by Nature a Rational Animal.
I promifed it fhould.
§. 14. In confequence of this, faid he, as often as there is Occafion, I fhall appeal as • well to Reafon^ as to Nature y for a Standard.
What, faid I, do you mean hy Nature?
\ M 2 Its
!
I ' • ’
I 164 Concerning HAPPINESS,
I Part I. Its Meanings, replied he, are many I j various. As it flands at prefent op-
I pofed, it may be enough perhaps to fay,
[I that Nature is thafy which is the Caufe of
every things except thofe things aloney which i j are the immediate EffeBs of Reafon, In 'I
other words, whatever is not Reafony or _ I the EffeS of Reafon, we would confider as '
Naturey or the Effedl of Nature. I an- -i fwered, as he fo diflinguifhed them, I ! thought he might juftly appeal to either, si
And yet, contintied he, there Is a fe- S markable Difference between the Standard .P of , and ‘ that of Nature -,^2^ Diffe- £
rence, which at no time we ought to for- ; get. What Difference, faid I, do you mean ? ^Tis this, anfwered he — In ^ Naturey the Standard is fought from among | the Many ; in ReafoUy the Standard is fought | from among theK’^z^;. You muft ex- plain, faid I, your Meaning, for I mull confefs you feem obfcure. i
'1
Thus ^
A Dialogue.
Thus then^ fald he Suppofe, as an Parti.
Anatomift, you were feeking the Strufture
of fome internal Part To difcover this,
would you not infpedt a Number of Indi- viduals ? I fhould. And would you not inform yourfelf, what had been dif- covered by others ? • I fhould. And fuppofe, after all, you fliould find a MuU titude of Inftances for one Structure, and a few fngular for a different : by which would you be governed ? By the Mul- titude, faid I, undoubtedly. Thus then continued he, in Nature the Standard^ you fee, exifs among tjoe Many^ I replied,
It had fp appeared,
And what, faid he, were we to feek the Perfedion of Sculpture, or of Paint- ing ? Where fhould we inquire then ? —
- Among the numerous common Art’fis, or among the few and celebrated ? Among the Few, faid I. . What if we were to feek the Perfedion of Poetry, or Oratory —
Where then ? Among the Few fiill.
M 3 What
1 66 Part I.
Concerning HAPPINESS,
What if we were to feek the Per- fedlion of true Argument, or a found
Logic Where then ? Still among
the Few. And is not true Argument, or a found Logic, one of Reafon's greateft PerfeSions? It is. You fee then, continued he, whence the Standard of
Reafon.is to be fought ’Tis from among
the Few^ as we faid before, in contradi- ftindlion to the Standard of Nature.
I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.
And happy, faid he, for us, that Provi- dence has fo ordered it happy for us, that
what is Rationaly depends not on the Multi- tude ; or is to be tried by fo pitiful a Teft, as the bare counting of Nofes. ’Tis bappy,
iaid I, indeed— -But whence pray the Dif- ference ? Why are the Many to determine in Nature y and the Few only, in Reafon ?
To difcufs this at large, faid he, would require fome time. It might in- fenfibly perhaps draw us from our prefent Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reafon, in as few words as poffible ; which fhould they chance to be obfeure, be not
too
A Dialogue.
too felicitous for an Explanation.
I begged him to proceed his own way.
The Cafe, faidhe, appears to be this — > In Natural Works and Natural Operations, we hold but one Efficient Caufe^ and that confummately wife. This Caufe in every Species recognizing what is beji^ and work^ ing ever uniformly according to this Idea of PerfeBion^ the ProduBions and Energies^ in every Species where it afts, are for the moft part fmilar and exaidlly correfpondent. If an Exception ever happen, it is from fome hidden higher Motive^ which tran-^ feends pur Comprehenfion, and which is feen fo rarely^ as not to injure the general Rule^ or render it doubtful and precarious. On the contrary, in the Produftions and Energies of Reafon^ there is not one Caufe but infinite— many indeed, as there arc Agents of the Human Kind. Hence Truth being but one^ and Error being mfoiite^ and Agents infinite alfo : what wonder they {hould oftener mifs, than hit the Mark ? — r that Multitudes fliould fail, where one alone M 4. fuc-^
167 Part I.
i68 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part L fucceeds, and Truth be only the Pofleffion the chofen^ fortunate Few"? You fecm to have explained the Difficulty, faid I, with fufficient Perfpicuity.
Let us then go back, laid he, and re- colledt ourfelves ; that we may not forget, what ’tis we are feeking. I replied, Moft willingly. We have been feek- ingj continued he, the Sovereign Good, In confequence of this Inquiry, we have dif- covered: — -that all Things whatever exiji to the Human Species in the Relations of either Turfuabky Avoidable y or Indifferent, To determine thefe Relations with Accuracy, we have been fcrutinizing the Human Nature | and that, upon this known Maxim, that every Species was its own proper Standard 3 and that where the Value of Thmgs was dubiouSy there the Species was to be fudiedy and the Relatiofis to be deducedy which naturally flow from it. The Refult of this Scrutiny has been — — that \ve have firft agreed Man to be a Social Animal ; and lince, to be a Rational, So that if wc
can
A Dialogue, 169
jcan be content with a defcriptive, concife Part I, Sketch of Human Nature^ it will amount to thisr-— that Man is a Social Ra-^ TioNAL Animal, I anfwered, It had appeared fo.
§. 15. If then, faid he, we purfue our Difquifitions, agreeably to this Idea of Hu- man Nature, it will follow that all Things will be Purfuabky Avoidable^ and Indiffe^ rent to Man^ as they refpedt the Being and Welfare of fuch a Social^ Rational Animal I replied, They muft;
Nothing therefore in the firft place,
Slid he, can be Purfuable, which is jiruBive of Society. It cannot.
Adis therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and all acquired by them, whether Wealth, Power, Pleafure, or any thing, are evir dently from their very Charadler not fit to be purfued. They are not.
But it is impoflible not to purfue many filch things, unlefs we are furnifhed with fome Habit or Difpofition of Mind, by
which
170 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men their own, and to regard the Welfare, and Intereft of Society. It is impoffible.
But the Habit or Difpojition of ren-~ dering to all their own^ and of regarding the Welfare and Intereft of Society, is Justice. It is. We may there- fore fairly conclude, that Nothing is natu-^ rally Purfuable^ but what is either correfpon’* dent to fufice^ or at leaf not contrary^
I confefs, faid I, fo it appears,
But farther, faid he-— ’Tis poffible we may have the beft Difpolition to Society ; the moft upright Intentions \ and yet thro’ Want of Ability to difcern, and know the Nature of Particulars, we may purfue many things inconfiftent, as well with our Private Intereft, as the Public. We may even purfiie what is Right y and yet purfue it in fuch a manner, as to find our Endea- vours fruitlefsy and our Purpofes to fail, I anfwered, ’Twas pofiiblc.
But this would ill befit the Character of a Rational Animal. It would. It is
necef-
A Dialogue. 171
neceffary therefore, we fhould be furnlflied Part t with fome Habit or Faculty y inftrufting us how to difcern the real Difference of all ParticularSy and fuggefting the proper Means, by which we may either avoid or obtain them. It is. - And what is this, think you, but Prudence ?
I believe, faid I, it can be no other.
If it be, faid he, then ’tis evident frorri this Reafoning, that Nothing is purfuabkj which is not correfpondent to Prudence.
I replied, He had Ihewn it could not.
But farther ftill, laid he — ’TIs pofliblc we may neither want Prudence^ nor Jufice to dired: us ; and yet the Impulfes of Appe-^ they the Impetuofties of Refe?itmenty the Charms and Allurements of a thoufand flat- tering Objedls, may tempt us, in Ipite of ourfelves, to purfue what is both Impru-- denty and Unjuji. They may. But if fo, ’tis necelTary, would we purliie as becomes our CharaBery that we fliould be furnifhed with fome Habity which may moderate our Excffes ; which may temper
our
tj2 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. our Adions to the Standard of a S^ocial ^Y\d to the Intereft and Welfare, not of a Part, but of the ffhle Man. Nothing, faid I, more neceffaiy. And what, faid he, can we call this Habits but the Habit of Temperance ? You
name It, faid I, rightly. If you think fo, replied he, then Nothing can be Pur^ fiiable^ which is 720t either -corn efpondent to Temperance^ or at leajl not contra^'y.
I replied, So it feemed,
On ce more, continued he, and we have done— ’Tis pofTible that not ovAjRelhttfnent and Appetite^ not only the Charms and Ah lurements of external Objeds, but the Terr^ rors too, and Dread of them may ?narr the Redlitude of our Purpofes. ’Tispoffible,
Tyranny and Superftition may af- fail us on one hand ; the Apprehenfions of Ridicule, and a Faife SJoame on the other— ^ ’Tis expedient, to withftand thefe,welhould be armed with fome Habits or our wdfeft bed Purfuits may elfe at all times be de- feated. They may. And what is
that
A DiALOGuii. 175
that generous, manlike and noble Habit ^ Part I. which fetS' us at all times above Fear and Danger^, what is it but Fortitude?
I replied. It was no other. If fo
then, continued he, befides our former Conclufions, Nothing farther can be Pur-^ fuabky as our Inquiries now have fliewn us, which is not either correfpondent to For-- titude^ or at leaf not contrary, I admits faid I, it is not^
Observe then, faid he, the Sum, the
Amount of our whole Reafoning No-^
thing Js truly Purfuable to fuch an Animal as Man^ except what is correfpondent^ or at leaf not contrary^ to Justice, Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude. I al^ low, faid I, it appears fo. * But if no^ thing Purfuable^ then nothing Avoidable or Indifferent^ but what is tried and eftimated after the fame manner. For Contraries are ever recognized throl the fa772e Habits one with another. The fame Logic judges of Truth and Falfhood; the fime Mufical Art, of Concord and Difeord. So the fame
Mental
174 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. Mental Habitudes^ of Things Avoidable and ^’“*‘''***^ Purfuable, I replied. It appeared pro- bable.
T o how unexpedted a Conclufion then, faidhe, have our Inquiries infenfibly led
us ? In tracing the Source of Human
Adlion, we have eftablifhed it to be thofe Four Grand Virtues, which are efteemed, for their Importance, the very H INGES OF ALL MoRALITY.
We have.
But if fo, it fhould follow, that aZ/^, whofe Purfuings and Avoidings are go- verned by thefe Virtues^ is that True and Rational Lifey which we have fo long been feeking ; that Lifey where the Value of all things is jufily meafured by thofe Rela^ tionSy which they bear to the Natural Frame and real Conflitution of Mankind — in fewer Words, A Life of Virtue appears to be THE Life according to Na- It appears fo.
But
ture.
A Dialogue.
J7S
But in fuch a Life every Purfuity every Part I. Avoi dingy (to include all) every Action will €>f courfe admit of being rationally jujlijied^
It wilL But Thaty which being
DonCy admits of a Rational fujtificationy is the ElTence or genuine Charadter of an Office y or Moral Duty* For thus long ago it has been defined by the beft ^ Au- thorities, Admit it. If fo, then A Life according to Virtue, is A Life according to Moral Offices or Duties. It appears fo. But we have already agreed it, to be a Life according to Nature, Wc have. Obferve then: A Life ac-
cording to Virtue, according TO Moral Offices, and accord- ing TO Nature, mean all the SAME Thing, tho’ varied in the Ex- preffion. Your Remark, faidi, feems juft.
§• 15*
* By Tully in his Offices, and by other Authors of Antiquity.
176 Cmcerni-dg HAPPINESS^
Parti. §. 16. We need never therefore,^ re-^
plied he, be at a lofs how to chufe, tha’ the Objefts of Choice be ever fo infinite and diverfified. As far as nothing is confflent with fuch a Life and fuch a Cha- racter^ we may jiiftly fet Exiftence before Death 3 prefer Health to Sicknefs 3 Inte- grity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated 3 Pleafiire to Pain 3 Wealth to Poverty 3 Fame to Difhonouri Free Go^ vernment to Slavery 3 Power and Magi-
ftracy, to Subjedlion and a private State
Univerfally, whatever tends either to Beings or to Well-Beings we may be juftified, v/hen^ we prefer to whatever appears the con-^ trary. And when our feveral Energies, exerted according to the Virtues above, have put us in Pofleflion of all that we require : what then can there be wanting to complete our Happinefs 3 to render our State perfectly confonajit to Nature 3 cr to give us a more Sovereign Goody than that which we now enjoy ? Nothing,* re- plied I, that I can at prefent think of,
Therj;
1
A Dialogue, 177
There would be nothing indeed, laid Parti, he, 'were our Energies never to fail % were ^//our Endeavours to be ever crowned with due Suceefsi But fuppofe the contrary--- Suppofe the worjl Succefs to the mojl up-- right C6nduB\ to the wifeil: P^eftimde of Energies and Aftions. T is poffible, nay Experience teaches us ’tis too often fact, that not only the Purfuers of what is con- trary to Nature^ but that thofe who purfue nothing but what is JlriEily congruous to if^ may mifs of their Aims ^ and be frujlratecl in their Endeavours, Inquifitors and Monks may deteft them for their Virtue, and purfue them with all the Engines of Malice and Inhumanityi Without thefe,
Pefts may afflifl: their Bodies ; Inunda- tions overwhelm their Property; or what is worfe than Inundations, either Ty- rants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They may fee their Country fall, and with it their braved: Countrymen ; themfelves pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or ■ N perilhing
jyS Concerning H A P I N E S
Parti, perifliing with the reft in the general Maffacre^
^ cadit & Ripheus^juJliJJimus unus ' fuit in "Teucrisy & fervantijjimus cequii
It muft be owned, faid I, this has too often; been the Cafe.
Ok grant j continued he, that thefe
greater Events never happen that the
Part allotted us, be not in the Tragedy of Life, but in the Comedy, > Even the Comic
Diftrefes are abundantly irkfome
Domeftic Jars, the ill Offices of Neigh- bours^— — Sufpicions, Jealouftes, Schemes .
defeated —The Folly of Fools; the
Knavery of Knaves ; from which, as Mem--^ bers of Society, ’tis impoffible to detach ourfelves.
Where
'A Dialogue,
179
Where then fhall we turn, or what Part I. have we to imagine r W e have at length placed Happiness, after much Inquiry, in ATTAINING the primary and jujl Requififes of our Nature^ by a Conduct fuitable to Virtue and Moral Office, But as to correfponding 'with our Pre-conceptions (which we have made the Teft) does this Syftem correfpond better, than thofe others^ which we have rejefted ? Has it not appeared from various Fadts, too obvious to be dilputed, that in many l^imes and Places it may be abfolutely unattainable ? That in many, where it exifts, it may in a moment bt cancelled^ and put irretrievably out of our Power, by Events not to be ref fled? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be queftioned, our fpecious long Inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to fhew us a Good, of that Chai'adter which we require; a Good .Durable, Indepri^ vable, and Accommodate to every Circum^
fance — --Far from it Our Speculations
o N 2 (I
i8or Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that low Opinion of Happinefs, which you may remember you * expreffed, when we firft began the Subjed:. They rather help to prove to us, that inftead of a Sovereign Goody 'tis the^ more probable Sentiment, there is no fuch Good at alh I Ihould indeed,- faid I,
fear fo. For where, continued he,
' lies the Difference,- whether we purfue what is congruous to Nature^ or not con- gruous 3 if the Acquifition of one be as dtf- jiculty as of the other y and the PoJJ'eJJion of both equally doubtful and precarious"^ If Ccefar fall, in attempting his Country’s Ruin 3 and Brutus fare no better, who only fought in its Defence ? It muft be
owned, faid I, thefe are melancholy Truths, and the Inftances, which you alledge, too well confirm them.
W E were in the midft of thefe ferious Thoughts, defcanting upon the Hardfhips
and
I
A Dialogue,
i8i
and Miferies of Life, when by an Inci- Part L dent, not worth relating, our Speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time,
I thought, could have happened more un- luckily — ^ — our Queftion perplexed r—- its Ifliie uncertain — r- and myfelf impatient to know the Event. Neceffity however was not to be refifted, and thus for the prefent our Inquiries were ppftponed.
- r
N 3
C O N-
i
- . • >
CONCERNING
H AP P I NE S S,
A
DIALOGUE,
PART the Second,
RUT US perijhed untimely^ ^a'WPartll. Caefar did no 7nore — Thefe Words J was repeating the next day to myfelf, when my Friend appeared, and chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, fomewhat more than ufual, on what had paffed the day before.
Seeing this, he propofed a Walk into the Fields. The Face qf Nature, faid he, will perhaps difpel thefe Glooms. No Afliftance, on my part, diall be wanting,
N 4 you
1 84 Concernipg HAPPINESS,
Part 11. you may be alTured. I accepted his Pro- pofal 5 the Walk began ; an4 our forrner Converfation infenlibly renewed.
Brutus, faid he, perijked untimely^ and Casfar did no more 'Twas thus, as I re-
member, not long iince you were expref- iing yourfelf. And yet fuppofe their For- tunes to have been exactly parallel -
Which would you have preferred ? Would you have been Ccejar or Brutus ? JBrutus^ replied I, beyond all controverfy. He afked me. Why ? Where was the Dif- ference, when their Fortunes, as we now fuppofed them, were confidered as the fame?
There feems, faid I, abftrad: from p[iQiv Fortunes, fomething, I know not what, intrinjically preferable in the Life and Cha- rafter of Brutus. If that, faid he, be
true, then moft we derive it, not from the Succefs of his &ideavours, but from their ^ruth and ReBitude. He had the Comfort to be confcious, that his Caufe was a juft pne, ’Twas impoffible the other fhould
have
A Dl ALOQUE. 185
/ iiave any fuch Feeling. I, believe, Part IJ.
faid I, you have explained it.
Suppose then, continued he, (*tis but merely an Hypothefis) fuppofe, I fay, we were to place the Sovereign Good in fuch
ciRedlitude of ConduB in the Conduct
merely^ and not in the Event. Suppofe we were to fix our Happiness, not in the aBual Attainment of that Health, that Per- fedlion of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of Externals, which is con- gruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to purfue ; but folely fix it in the mere Doing whatever is correfpondeiit to fuch an End^ even tho’ we never attain, or are near attaining k. In fewer words —
What if v/e make our Natural State the Standard only to determine our ConduB 5 and place our Happinefs in the ReBitude of this
ConduB alone? On fuch an Flypothefis
(and we confider it as nothing farther) we fhould not want a Good perhaps, to cor-^ refpond to our Pre-conceptions ; for this, ’tis pvident, would be correfpondent to them
all
1 86 Concerning HAPPINESS, J
. a
Wzct 11. alL Your Doftrine, replied I, is fo a
new and ftrange, that tho’ you been copi- fl ous in explaining, I can hardly yet coni' 1 prehend you. j
f
I T amounts all, faid he, but to this — ^ || Place your Happinefs^ where your Praife i is. I afked, Where he fuppofed
plat ? Not, replied he, in the Plear
fiires which you feel, more than your ^ Difgrace lies in the Pain — -—not in the - cafup Prolperity of Fortune, more than
your Difgrace in the cafual Adverlity ^
but in juft complete Adiion throughout every Part of Life^ what ever be the Face of \ Things y whether favoiirable or the con-: 1 trar'^. f
■ . t'
But why then, faid I, {wdi Accuracy about Externals ? So much Pains to be in- form.ed, what are Purfuable^ what Avoid-’, able ? It behoves the Pilot, replied he,
.to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempefts, Calms and Tides. They are the Subjedls^ about which his Art
is
A Dialogue^
187
is converfant. Without a juft Experience Part IL of them, he can never prove himfelf an Artiji, Yet we look not for his Reput ac- tion either in fair Gales, or in adverfe^ but in the Skifulnefs of his ConduEi^ be thefe Events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the Moral Artift. He, for
a Subjedi^ has the Whole of Human Life ?
Health and Sicknefs ; PlealUre and Pain ; with every other poffible Incident, which can befal him during his Exiftence. If his Knowledge of all thefe be accurate and exaft, fo too muft his Condu5ly in which we place his Happinefs. But if this Know^ ledge be defective, muft. not his ConduB be defedive alfo ? _ I replied, So it ftiould feem, And if his Condud, then his
Happinefs ? ’Tis true.
You fee then, continued he, eventho* Externals were as nothing j tho’ ’twas true, in their own Nature, they were neither Good nor Evil ; yet an accurate Knowledge of them is, from our Hypothecs, abfolutely
tiecejfary.
HAPPINESS, Indeed, faid I, you have
He continued Inferior Artifts may be
at a ftand, becaufe they want Materials, From their Stubbornefs and IntraBabilityy they may often be difappointed. But as long as Life is pafling, and Nature con- tinues to operate, the Moral Artiji of Life has at all times, all he defires. He can never w'ant a Subje5l fit to exercife him in his proper Calling; and that, with this b^appy Motive to the Conftancy of his Endeavours, that, the crofier, the harlher, the more untoward the Events^ the greater his Praifey the more illuilrious his RepUr tation^
All this, faid I, Is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumftance there ap- pears, where your Similes feem to fail. The Praife indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his ConduB ; but ’tis in the Succefs of that Conduit, where we look for his Happinefs. If a Storm arife, and the Ship
be
88
Concerning
Part II4 neceffary. proved it^
J Dialogue^ 189
I be loft, we call him not happy ^ how well Part II. ■ foever he may have condudled. ’Tis then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the defired Haven. Your
Diftindion, faid he, is juft. And ’tis here • lies the nobk Prerogative of Moral Artijlsy
above all others But yet I know not how
to explain myfelf, I fear rny Doftrine will appear fo ftrange. You may proceed, faid I fafely, fince 'you advance it but as art Hypothefs.
Thus then, continued he ThtEnd
in others Arts is ever difiant and removed.
It confifts not in the mere ConduB^ much lefs in a fngle Energy ; but is the juft Re- Cult of many Energies^ each of which are elfential to it. Hehce^ by Obftacles un- avoidable, it may often be retarded: Nay more, may be fo embaralfed, as never pof Jibly to be attained. But in the Moral Af^t of Life, the very Conduct is the End; the very ConduB^ I fay, itfelf, throughout every its 772inuteft Energy ; becaufe each of thefe, however mmute^ partake as truly of
ReBitudey
19^ Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. Rectitude y as the largefl Combination of them^ when conlidered colledtively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one perpetually complete in every Infant y becaufe it needs iiot, like other Arts, Hime to arrive at that Perfeftion, at which in every Inf ant ’tis arrived already. Hence by Duration it is not rendered either more or lefs perfedli Completion y like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no fenfe capable of either Intenfon or Remifion. And hence too by neceffary Connexion (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that Happi-^ nefs or Sovereign Goody the End of this Moral Art, is itfelf too^ in every Inf ant y Confummate and Complete ; is neither heigh- tened or diminijbed by the Qi^ntity of its Durationy but is the fame to its Enjoyers, for a Moment or a Century^
Upon this I fmiled. He afked me the Reafon. ’Tis only to obferve, faid I,
the Courfe of our Inquiries A new Hy-
pothefis has been advanced Appearing
fomewhat ftrange, it is defired to be ex- plained--^
'A Dialogue.
191
plained—— You comply with the Requeft, Part It and, in purfuit of the Explanation, make it ten times more obfeure and uninfeUigibky than before. ’Tis but too often the Fate, faid he, of us Commentators. But you know in fuch cafes what is ufually done. When the Comment will not ex- plain the Text, we try whether the Text will not explain itfelf.^ This Method, ’tis poffible, may affift us here. The Hypo- thefis, which we would have illuftrated,
was no more than this -That the Sove-^
reign Good lay in Redlitude of ConduB ; and that this Good correfponded to all our Pre-^ conceptions. Let us examine then, whether, upon trial, this Correfpondence will appear to hold> and, for all that we have advanced fince, fuffer it to pafs, and not perplex us.
Agreed, faid I, w;illingly, for noW I hope to comprehend you.
§. 2. Recollect then, faid he. Do you not remember that one Pre-conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be accomf?iodate to all Times and Places ? I remember it.
And
igz Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part IL And is there any T^ime^ or any
whence ReBitude of ConduB may be ex- cluded? Is there not a right Adtion in Proiperity, a right Aftion in Adverfity ? — - May there not be a decent^ generous, and laudable Behaviour ^ not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in ' Oppreffion, in Sicknefs and in Death ?
There may^
And what fhall we fay to thofe oihe^
Pre-conceptions to being Durable^ Self-
derivedy and Indeprivable ? Can there be any Good fo DUrabky as the Power of al- ways doing right ? Is there any Good con- ceiveable, fo intirely beyond the Power of others ? Or, if you hefitate, and are doubt- ful, I would willingly be informed, into what Circumftances may Fortune throw a brave and honeft Man, where it fhall not be in his Power to aB bravely and honefly ? If there are no fuch, then ReBitude of Con- duBy if a Good^ is a Good Indeprivable,
I confeS, faid I, it appears fo.
But
A Dialogue.
^93
But farther, fald he — Another Pr^- Part II. conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be ^ Agreeable to Nature. It was. And can any thing be more agreeable to a Rational and Social Animal^ than Rational and Social Conduct ? Nothing. But Redlitude of Conduct is with us Rational and Social ConduSl. It is.
Once more, continued he-— Another Pre-conception of this Good was, to be Con^ ducive^ not to Mere-being, but to Well* being. Admit it. And can any thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to the Well-being of a Rational Social Animal, as the right Exercife of that Reafon^ and of thofe Social AffeBions ? Nothing.
And what is this fame Exercife^ but the highejl ReBitude of ConduB ? Certainly.
§.3. You fee then, faidhe, how well our Hypothefis, being once adrhitted,' tal- lies with our Original Pre-conceptions .of the Sovereim Good, I replied, it in-
O deed
194 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. deed appeared fo, and could not be denied.
who, think you, ever dreamt of a Happinefs like this ? A Happinefs depen- dent, not on the Succefs^ but on the Aim ?
Even common and ordinary Life, replied he, can furnilh us with Examples. Aik of the Sportfman where lies his En- joyment ? Aik whether it be in the Pof- fejjion of a flaughter’d Hare, or Fox ? He would rejed:, with Contempt, the very Suppofition — He would tell you, as well as he v^as able, that the Joy was in the Furfuit — in the Difficulties which are ob- viated; in the Faults, which are retrieved; in the Condudi and Diredion of the Chace thro* all its Parts — that the Completion of their Endeavours was fo far from giving them Joy, that inftantly at that Period all their Joy was at an end. For SpOrtf- men, replied I, this may be no bad Rea- foning. It is not the Sentiment, faid he,
of Sportfmen alone. The Man of Gal- lantry net unoften has been found to think after the fame manner.
— Meus
A Dialogue. 195
^ Mens ejl amor huic nam Part 11;
T^ranjvolat in medio pojifa^ & fugientiacaptat,
To thefe we may add the Tribe of Buil- ders and Projeflrors, Or has not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the Building and Laying-out^ have expreffed the higheft Delight ; but fliewn the utmoft Indifference to the Refult of their Labours, to the Manfion or Gardens, when once finifhed and complete ? ^
The Truth, faid I, of thefe Examples is not to be difputed. But I could wifh your Hypothelis had better than thefe to fupport it. In the ferious View of Happi- nefsy do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we faid before) not on the Succefsy but on the Aim?
More, even in this light, faid he, than perhaps at firft you may imagine. There are Inftances innumerable of Men, bad as well as goody who having fixed, as their Aimy a certain ConduB of their own, have O 2 fo
* Hor. Sat, H. L. I. V. 107.
196 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. fo far attached their Welfare and Happinefs to it, as to deem all Events in its Profecu- tion, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their Regard, I called on him for Examples.
What think you, faid he, of the Af- faffin, who flew the firfl: Prince of Orange ; and who, tho’ brought by his Condudt to the mofl: exquifite Tortures, yet confeious . cf what he had doney could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that llurdy Romany who would have difpatched Porfenna ; and who, full of his Defign, and fuperior to all Events, could thrufl: a Hand into the Flames with the fteadiefl: Intrepidity ?
I replied. That thefe indeed were very un- common Inilances*
Attend too, continued he, to Epi-‘ curus dying, the Founder of a Philofophy,
little favouring of Enthujiafm T’his I
write you (fays he, in one of his Epiilles) while the laji Day of Life is paffng^ and
that
A Dialogue. 197
^ that a Happy One. I'he Pains indeed ^Part II. my Body are not capable of being heigh-- tened. Tet to thefe we oppofe that Joy of the Souly which arifes from the Memory
of our pajl Speculations'' Hear him,
conlbnant to this, in another Place affert- ing, that a Rational Adverfty was better than an Irrational Profperity,
And what think you ? — Had he not placed his Good and Happinefs in the fup- pofed Rediitude of his Opinions^ would he not have preferred Profperity^ at all rates, to Adverfty ? Would not the Pains, of which he died, have made his Happinels
perfedt Mifery ? And yet, you fee, he
difowns any fuch thing. The Memory of his paft Life, and of his Philofophical In- ventions were, even in the Hour of Death it feems, a Counterpoife to fupport him.
It muft be owned, faid I, that you appear to reafon juftly.
Pass from Epicurus^ continued he, to Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that O 3 divine
198 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. divine Man, fpeaking of his own unjuft Condemnation ? 0 Crito^ fays he, if it
“ be pleajing to the Gods this way\ then be
“ it this way'' And again “ Anytus
and Melitus, I grants can kill me ; but to hurt or injure mCy is beyond their ‘‘ Pcnver," It would not have been be- yond it, had he thought his Welfare de- pendent on any thing they could do ; for
they were then doing their worft —
Whence then was it beyond them?
Becaufe his Happinefs was derived not from without, but from within ; not from the Succefsy which perhaps was due to the Redlitude of his Life, but from that Redli^ tude alone, every other thing difregarded. He had not, it feems, fo far renounced his own Dodtrine, as not to remember his
former V/ords 5 that “ To whom ever
‘ ‘ all things, conducive to Happinefs, are de- rived folely, or at leaf nearly from him-- felf and depend ?20t on the Welfare or Adverfty of others, from the Variety of whofe Condition his (nvn miijl vary alfo : He it is, who has prepared to himfelf the
“ moft
A Dialogue.
199
“ mojl excellent of all Lhes — He it is^ who Part II. is the Temperate^ the Prudenty and the
Brave He it isy whoy when Wealth or
Children either come or are taken awayy will bejl obey the Wife Man's Precept — i- For neither will he be feen to grievcy nor to rejoice in excefsy from the Trujl and Confidence which he has repofed in himfelfj\
---Y o\i have a Sketch at leaft of his Mean- ing, tho’ far below his own Attic and truly elegant Expreffion. I grant, faid I,
your Example ; but this and the reft are but Angle Inftances. What are three or four in Number, to the whole of Hu- man Kind ?
If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have joyfully met Death, rather than defert their Country, when in danger ? They muft have thought furely on another Happinefs than Succefsy when they could gladly go, where they faw Death often inevitable. Or what think you of the many Martyrs O 4 for
200 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. for' Syftems wrong as well as right, who *“"*"'''**^ have dared defy the worft, rather than fwerve from their Belief? You have
brought indeed, faid I, more Examples than could have been imagined.
Besides, continued he, what is that Comfort of a Good Conscience, cele- brated to fuch a height in the Religion’ which we profefs, but the Joy arifing from a Confcience of right Energies •y a Con- fcience of having done nothing, but what is confonant to our Duty ? I replied. It indeed appeared fo.
Even the Vulgar, continued he, re- cognize a Good of this very Charafter, when they fay of an Undertaking, tho* it fucceed noty that they are contented 'y that they have done their befy and can accufe themfelves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their Content y their Goody their fJappinefsy not in the Succefs of Endeavours, but in. the Rectitude ? If it be not the Reditude which contents them, you muft
> tell
A Dialogue.
20 f
tell me what ’tis elfe. It appears, Part II. replied I, to be that alone,
I HOPE then, continued he, that tho* you accede not to this Notion of Happinefs, which I advance; you will at leaft allow it not to be fuch a Paradox, as at firft you feemed to imagine. That indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.
§. 4. Granting me this, faid he, you encourage me to explain myfelf- — ^We have fuppofed the Sovereign Good to lie in ReBi-- tiide of ConduB. We have. And think you there can be Redtitude of Con- duft, if we do not live confjlently ?
In what Senfe, faid I, would you be un^ derftood? To live mifjiently^ faid he, is the fame with me, as To live agreeably to fome one fingle and confonant Scheme^ or Pur-- pofe. Undoubtedly, faid I, without this^ there can be no Reftitude of Conduft.
All ReBitude Condudt then, you fay, implies fuch Confflence. It does.
And does all Cojififience^ think you, imply
fuch
202
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. fuch ReBitude ? I alked him, Why not ? ’Tis poflible, indeed it may,
faid he, for aught we have difcovered yet to the contrary. But what if it fhould be found that there may be numberlefs Schemes, each in particular confident with itfelfy but yet all of theni different^ and fome perhaps contrary ? There may, you know, be a confijlent Life of Knavery, as well as a conjijient Life of Honefty^ there may be a uniform Praftice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abllemiouf- nefs. Will the Confiftence, common to all of thefe LiveSy render the ConduB in each, right ? It appears, faid I, an Abfur- dity, that there fhould be the fame Refti- tude in two Contraries. If fo, faid he,
we mull look for fomething more than mere Confifence^ when we fearch for that ReBitudey which we at prefent talk of A conffent Life indeed is requilite, but that alone is not enough. We mufl de- termine its peculiar Species, if we would be accurate and exaft. It indeed ap- pears, faid I, necelTary.
Nor
'A Dialogue.
203
N o R is any thing, continued he, more Part II. eafy to be difcuffed. For what can that peculiar Confijience of Life be elfe, than a Life, whofe feveral Parts are not only con- fonant to each other y but to the Nature alfo of the Being, by whom that Life has been adopted ? Does not this Iqft De- gree of Confiftence appear as requilite as the former? I anfwered, It could not
be otherwife.
You fee then, faid he, the true Idea of right Condudt. It is not, merely To live confflently j but ’tis To live confjiently with Nature. Allow it.
But what, continued he ? Can we live confflently with Naturey and be at a lofs how to behave ourfelves ? We cannot.
And can we know how to behave ourfelves, if we know nothing of what befals US; nothing of thofe Things and EventSy which perpetually furround, and affedtus? We cannot. You fee
then.
204 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. then, continued he, how we are again fallen infenfibly into that Doftrine, which proves the Neceffity of fcrutinizingy and knowing the Value of Externals. I re- plied, ’Twas true. If you aflent, faid he, to this, it will of courfe follow, that, To live confiftently with Nature^ is. To live agreeably to a juft Experience of thofe Things, which happen around us. It appears fo.
But farther ftlll, faid he.— Think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to fuch Experience, if he feledi not, as far as poffible, the things moft congruous to his Nature ? He cannot. And by the fame Rule, as far as poffible, muft he not rejedi fuch as are contrary^ He muft. And that not occafionally, as Fancy happens to prompt; but fteadily, conftantly, and without Remiffion.
I fliould imagine fo. You judge, faid , he, truly. Were he to afl: otherwife in the le^ft inftance, he would falfify his Profeffions; he would not live according to that Experience, which we now fup-
pofe
A Dialogue,
205
pofe him to pofTefs, would not.
I replied. He Part IL
It fliould feem then, faid he, from hence, as a natural Confequence of what we have admitted, that the EJJence of right ConduB lay in Selection and Rejection. So, faid I, it has ap- peared. And that fuch SeleBion and RejeBion fliould be confonant with our pro-- per Nature. "Tis true. And be Jleady and perpetual^ not occafional and in- terrupted. "Tis true. But if this be the Effence of Right ConduBy then too it is the ElTence of our Sovereign Good ; for in fuch Condudl we have fuppofed this Good to confift. We have.
See then, faid he, the Refult of our Inquiry. — The Sovereign Good, as conftituted by ReBitude of ConduBy has, on our flrifteft Scrutiny, appeared to be this — To LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS
TO Nature, and rejecting what is
CON-
2o6 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part IL CONTRARY, MAKING OUR EnD THAT
Selecting and that Rejecting only. ’Tis true, faid I, fo it appears.
§.5. Before we haften then farther, faid he, let us flop to recolledt, and fee whether our prefent Conclufions accord with our former. — .We have now liippofed the Sovereign Good to be Rectitude of Con-- and this Conduct we have made con- fift in a certain SeleBing and RejeBing,
We have. And do you not imagine
that the SeleBing and Rejediing^ which we propofe, as they are purely governed by the Standard of Nature^ are capable in every inftance of being rationally juf if ed?
I replied, I thought they were.
But if they admit a rational fufification^ then are they Moral Offices or Duties -y for thus ^ you remember yefterday a Moral Office was defined. It was. But if fo, Tb live in the Practice of them, will
be
^ Sup. p. 175.
A Dialogue,
207
be To live in the Difcharge of Moral Offices. Part II, It will. But To live in the Dif charge of thefe^ Is the fame as Living ac^ cording to Virtue^ and Living according to Nature, It is. So therefore is.
Living in that SeleBion^ and in that Rejec- tion^ which we propofe. It Is.
W E need never therefore be at a lols, faid he, for a Defcriptlon of the Sove- EEiGN Good.- We may call it, Rec- titude OF Conduct. If that be too
contrafted, we may enlarge and fay, ’tis—
To LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING AND
Rejecting according to the Stan- dard OF our Being.— If we are for ftill different Views, we may fay ’tis— —
To LIVE in the Discharge of Mo- 1 RAL Offices — To live according to i Nature — —To live according to
I Virtue To live according to
I Just Experience of those Things,
^ which happen around us. Like
' fome finifhed Statue, we may behold it every way; ’tis the fame Objeft, tho*
varioully
2o8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part IL varioiifly viewed ; nor is there a View, but is natural, truly graceful, and en- gaging-
§.6. I CANNOT deny, faid I, but that as you have now explained it, your Hypothefis feems far more plaufible, than when firft it was propofed. You will
believe it, faid he, more fo ftill, by con-
fidering it with more Attention. In the
firft place, tho’ perhaps it efteem nothing really Good but Virtue, nothing really Evil, but Vice, yet it in no manner takes away the Difference^ and DiJiinEiion of other Things. So far otherwife, it is for eftabliftiing their Diftinftion to the greateft Accuracy. For were this negled:- ed, what would become of SeleBion and Rejediion^ thofe important Energies, which are its very Soul and Eflence ? Were there no Difference, there could be no Choice.
"Tis true, faid I, there could not.
Again, faid he. It is no meagre, mor- tifying Syftem of Selff denial — It fupprefles
no
A Dialogue^
209
no Social and Natural AfFedllons, nor takes Part II.
away any Social and Natural Relations^ v— J
It prefcribes no Abftainings, no Forbear- ances out of Nature ; no gloomy, fad, and lonely Rules of Life, without which ’tis evident Men may be as honeft as withy and be infinitely more ufeful and worthy
Members of Society, It refufes no Plea-
fure, not inconfiflent with "Temperance
It rejedls no Gain, not inconfiflent with fufice — — Univerfally, as far as Virtue neither forbids nor difuades^ it endeavours to render Life, even in the mofi vulgar Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and eafy as poflible. Nay, could it mend the Condi- tion of Exiftence in any the mofi trivial Cir- cumftance, even by adding to the amplefi: Polfefllons the poorefi: meaneft Utenfil, it would in no degree contemn an Addition
even fo mean. Far other wife It would
confider, that to neglefl: the lead: Acqui- fition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall fhort of that perfect and accurate Condudty which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends^
P
And
210
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. 'And yet, tho’ thus exad in every the minutell: Circumftance, it gives us no Soli- citude as to what Rank we maintain in Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor ; whether merged in Bulinefs, or confined to Inadivity, it is equally conjijient with every Condition^ and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choofe its own Life, it would be always that, where mofl: focial Affedions might extenfively be exerted, and moft done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But "if Fate order otherwife, and this be de- nied ; its Intentions are the fame, its En- deavours are not wanting 5 nor are the Social^ Rational Powers forgotten, even in Times and Circumftances, where they can leaft become confpicuous.
\
I T teaches us to conflder Life^ as one great important Drama^ where we have each our Part allotted us to ad. It tells us that our Happhiefs, as A5lors in this Drama^ confifls not in the Length of our
Part,
A Dialogue.
211
Part, nor in the State and Dignity^ but in Part II. ithey^, the decent y and the natural Fer^
! formance^
If its Aims are'fuccefsful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, de- rived from their Succefsy and feels them as • fully, as thofe who know no other Happi- : nefs. The only Difference is, that having a more excellent Good in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its Happinefs on Succefs 1 alone, well knowing that in fuch cafe, if Endeavours faily there can be nothing left i behind but Murmurings and Mifery. On the contrary, when this happens, ’tis then ; it retires into itfelf, and reflefting on what is Fairy what is Laudable and Ho?ieJi (the truly beatific VifioUy not of mad Fnthufiafisy but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wife I and the Good) it becomes fuperiour to all { Events 5 it acquiefces in the Confcioufnefs of 5 its own Rectitude 5 and, like that Manfion ( founded, not on the Sands, but on the Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempefl and Inundation.
P ^ , §• 7'
I
212
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. §. 7. Here he paufed, and I took the Opportunity to obferve, how his Subjedt had warmed him into a degree of Rap- ture ; how greatly it had raifed both his Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder, faid he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration ; the Beauties of ' Art, whether Energies or Works ; the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And ihall we expedl lels from this Supreme Beauty ; this morale mental^ and original Beauty \ of which all the reft are but as "Types or Copies? Not how-
ever by high Flights to lofe Sight of our Subjeft, the whole of what we have ar- gued, may be reduced to this— -
All Men pursue Good, and would be happy ^ if they knew how 3 not happy for Minutes, and miferable for Hours, but happy y if poffible, thro* every Part of their Exifence. Either therefore there is a Good of this fteady durable Kind, or there is none. If 7ione^ then all Good muft be
tranfent
I
Dialogue. 213
tranfient and uncertain ; and if fo, an Oh- Part II. jeB of loweji Value^ which can little de- ferve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a better Good^ fuch a Good as we are feeking ; like every other thing, it \ mujl be derived from fome Caufe ; and that > Caufe muft be either external^ internal^ or I mixt^ in as much as except thefe three,
I there is no other poffible. Now a fteady^
I durable Good^ cannot be derived from an
[external Caufe, by reafon all derived from Externals muft fuBuate,^ as they fiuBuate. j By the fame Rule, not from a Mixture of the Two ; becaufe the Part which is external will proportionally defroy its EJfence, What • then remains but the Caufe internal -y the very Caufe which we have fuppofed, when we place the Sovereign Good in Mind-, in ReBitude of ConduB-, in juft SeleBing and RejeBing? There feems indeed no
other Caufe, faid I, to which we can pof- fibly affign it.
Forgive me then, continued he,
Ihould I appear to boaft— — We have P 3 proved.
214 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. proved, or at leaft there is an Appearance have proved, that, either there is no Good except this of our own \ or that ^ if there be any other ^ 'tis not worthy our Re-^ gard. It muft be confeffed, faid I,
you have faid as much, as the Subjeft feems to admit.
§, 8. By means then, faid he, of our Hypothefis, behold one of the faireft, and moft amiable of Objefts, behold the TRUE AND PERFECT Man : that Or- nament of Humanity ; that Godlike Being; who, without regard either to Pkafure or Pain^ iminfluenced equally by either Profpe^ rity or Adverfty^ fuperiour to the World and its befi and worfi Events^ can fairly reft his All upon the ReBitude of his own ConduB ; can conftantly^ and uniformly ^ and manfidly maintain it \ thinkmg that^ and that alojie^ wholly fufticient to make him happy.
And do you ferioufly believe, faid I, there ever was fuch a Character ? And what, replied he, if I fhould admit, there
?ie'Vcr
A Dl ALOGUE. 215
never was, is, or will be fuch a Char abler F — Part II. that we have been talking the whole time of a Being, not to be found ;
Afaultlefs Monjler, which the World ne'er faw ?
Suppofing, I fay, we admit this, what then?
Would not your Syftem in fuch a cafe, faid I, a little border upon the chimerical ?
I only afk the Queftion. You need
not be fo tender, he replied, in exprefling yourfelf. If it be falfe, if it will not in- dure theTefl:, I am as ready to give it up, as I have been to defend it. He mufl: be a poor Philofopher indeed, who, when he fees ^ruth and a Syjiem at variance, can ever be felicitous for the Fate of a Syftem.
But tell me, I pray Do you objedl
to mine, from its Perfeblion, or from its . ImperfebtionF From its being too excel- lent for Human Nature, and above it ; or from its being too bale, and below it ?
It feems to require, faid I, a Perfeblion, to which no Individual ever arrived.
That very 'Tra^ifcendence, faid he, is an P 4 Argu-
2 1 6 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a Rank inferior, it would not be that Per-^ fedion, which we feek. Would you
have it, faid I, beyond Nature ? If you
mean, replied he, beyond any particular or individual Nature^ moft undoubtedly I would.” — As you are a Lover of Painting, you lhall hear a Story on the Subjed.
In ancient days, while Greece was flourilhing in Liberty and Arts, a cele- brated Painter, having drawn many ex- cellent Pidures for a certain free State, and been generoufly and honourably re- warded for his Labours, at laft made an Offer to paint them a Helen^ as a Model and Exemplar of the moft ex- quifite Beauty. The Propofal was rea- dily accepted, when the Artift informed them, that in order to draw 07ie Fair, ’twas neceffary he fhould contemplate ma?iy. He demanded therefore a Sight of all their fineft W omen. The State, to affift the Work, afiented to his Re- qneft. They were exhibited before
him j
A Dialogue, 217
« him ; he feledled the moft beautiful ; Part II. and from thefe formed his Heleriy more ’ beautiful than them all.’’
1
\
You have heard the Fad, and what
are we to infer? Or can there be any
other Inference than this that the Stan-
dard of PerfeBion^ with refpedi to the Beauty of Bodies^ was not (as this Artift thought) to be difcovered in any Individually hut being difperfed by Nature in Portions throl the many^ was from thence y and thence onlyy to be collected and recognized'?
It appears, faid I, he thought fo. The Pidure, continued he, is loft, but we have Statues ftill remaining. If there be Truth in the Teftimony of the beft and faireft Judges, no Woman ever equalled the De- licacy of the Medicean VenuSy nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the Farnhefian Hercules. ’Tis generally, faid I, fo
believed.
And will you, faid he, from this unpa- falelled and tranfeendent Excellence, deny
thefe
2x8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. thefe V/orks of Art to be truly and ftriftly Natural? ' Their Excellence, replied I, muft be confefled by All; but how they can be c^Jled fo ftridly Natural^ I muft own a little ftartles me. That the
Limbs and their Proportions^ faid he, are feledled from Nature^ you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story juft related.
I replied, ’Twas admitted. The Parts therefore of thefe Works are Na-- turaL They are. And may not the fame be afferted, as to ^^ArrangC’- ment of thefe Parts ? Muft not this too be natural^ as ’tis analogous we know to Nature ? It muft. If fo^ then
is the JVhoky Natural So indeed,
faid I, it ihould feem. It cannot, re- plied he, be other wife, if it be a Fadl be- yond dilpute, that the Whole is nothing more, than the Parts under fuch Arrangement.
Enough, faid I, you have fatisfied me.
If I have, faid he, it is but to transfer what we have afferted of this fubordinate Beauty, to Beauty of a higher Order it is
but
A Dialogue.
219
but to pafs from the External to the Part IL Moral and InternaL For here we fay, by parity of Reafon, that no where in any particular Nature is the perfect CharaSler to be feen intire. Yet one is brave % an-» other is temperate^ a third is liberal and a fourth is prudent. So that in the Multi^ tude of mixed imperfedl CharaBerSy as be- fore in the Multitude of i^perfeB Bodies^ is cxpreffed that Idea, that Moral Stan- PARD of Perfection, by which all are tried and compared to one another, and at laft upon the whole are either juftified or
condemned that Standard of Perfedlion,
which cannot be but mof Natural^ as it is purely colledled from Individuals of Na^ turey and is the Teft of all the Merit to which they afpire. I acknowledge,
faid I, your Argument.
I might add, faid he, if there were Occafion, other Arguments which would furprize you. I might inform you of the natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of Specific Ideas -y — that every Individual was 2 but
220
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part 11. but their 7ype^ or Shadow; that the
Mind or IntelleEi was the Region of Pof-
fbles ; that what ever is PoJJible^ to the
Mind adlually Is ; nor any thing a Non-- entity^ except what implies a Contradict tion that the genuine Sphere and ge- nuine Cylinder, tho’ Forms perhaps too perfebi^ ever to exijl conjoined to Matter^ were yet as true and real Beings, as the grojfeji ObjeBs of Senfe ; were the Source of Infinite Truths^ which wholly depend on them, and which, as Truths, have a Being moft unalterable and eternal. But thefe are Reafonings, which rather belong to another Philofophy ; and if you are fatisfied with- out them, they are at beft but fuperfluous.
He waited mot for niy Anfwer, but proceeded as follows. ’Tis thus, faid he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the perfect Character : a Character, which I am neither fo abfurd, as to impute to myfelf ; nor fo rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. We have propofed it only, as ’an Exem- 2 PLAR
A Dialogue.
^21
PLAR OF Imitation, which tho’ A/c/^^PartlL
we think can eqml^ yet All at leaft may
follow an Exemplar of Imitation, which
in proportion as we approach, fo we ad- vance proportionably in Merit and in
Worth an Exemplar, which, were we
moiifelfijhy we fhould be Fools to rejed: 5 if it be true, that to be Happy y is the ultimate Wijh of us ally and that Happinefs and Moral Worth fo reciprocally correfpond, that there can be no Degree of the oney without an equal Degree of the other. If there be Truth, faid I, in your Reafonings, it can- not certainly be otherwife.
He continued, by faying The Pro^
ficiency of SocrateSy and indeed of every honeft Man, was fufhcient to convince us, could we be fteadfaft to our Purpofe, that fome Progrefs at leaf might be made toward .this PerfeBion — How far, we knew not —
The Field was open The Race was free
and common to All Nor was the Prize,
as ufual, referved only to the Firft^ but All, who run, might depend on a Reward,
having
222
Conceniing HAPPINESS,
Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they liflen, to alTure them,
^ Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatm abibit.
§. 9. Here he paufed, and left me to meditate on what he had fpoken. For fbme time we palTed on in mutual Silence, till obferving me on my part little inclined to break it. What, faid he, engages you with an Attention fo earneft ? I was
wondering, faid I, whence it fliould hap- pen, that in a Difcourfe of fuch a nature, you fhould fay fo little of 'Religion^ of Providence^ and a Deity. I have not, replied he, omitted them, becaufe not in-- • timately united to Morals 5 but becaufe what ever we treat accurately, fhould be treated feparately and apart. Multiplicity of Mat- ter naturally tends to Confufion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a ra- tional Sufpence ; and much more fo, when in the Event, it only leads to a furer Know-
ledge.
* i?LNEID. 1. V. V. 305.
A Dialogue. 223
ledge, and often ftrengthens the very Sub- Part IL jed, on which we fulpend. Could I how- ever repeat you the Words of a venerable Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom once I heard diflerting on the Topic of Religion, and whom ftill I hear, when ever I think on him; you might accept perhaps my Religious Theories as candidly, as you have my Moral. I prelTed him to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.
The Speaker, faid he, whofe Words I am attempting to relate, and whom for ; the prefent I name "TheophiluSy was of a Charafter truly amiable in every part.
When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal Education ; had been a Friend to I the Mufes, and approved himfelf fuch to i the Public. As Life declined, he wifely ! retired, and dedicated his Time almoft ‘ wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he never forget the Mufes, whom once he I loved. He retained in his Difeourfe (and I fo in the Sequel you will foon find) a large 1 Portion
j
!
224 Concerning HApPINESS,
Part 11. Portion of that rapturous, anti-profaic Stile^ in which thofe Ladies ufually choofe to ex- prefs themfelves.
W E were walking, not (as now) in the chearful Face of Day, but late in the Even- ing, when the Sun had long been fett. Cir- cumftances of Solemnity were not wanting to affedl us 5 the Poets could not have
feigned any more happy a running
Stream, an ancient Wood, a ftill Night,
and a bright Moonfhine. 1, for my own
part, induced by the Occafion, fell infenfibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what. ■
Who lives in the Moon, faid he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. ’Tis enough, if we can be fatisfied, by the help of our beft Faculties, that Intelligence is not confined to this little Earth, which we in- habit; that tho' Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate
, its
A Dialogue. 225
its Beauty, and adore the Wifdom of its Part II.
Author,
This whole Universe itfelf is but
ONE City or Commonwealth
a Syjlem of Subjlances varioufly formed, and varioufly aBuated agreeably to thofe
Forms a Syflem of Subfiances both
immenfely great and fmall, 'Rational, Animal, Vegetable, and Inanimate.
As many Families make one Village; many Villages one Province, many Pro- vinces one Empire; fo many Empires, Oceans, Wafles and Wilds, combined, compofe that Earth on which we live.
“ Other Combinations make a Planet or a Moon; and thefe again, united, make “ one Planetary Syflem.; What higher Combinations fubfifl, . we know not.
“ Their Gradation and Afcent ’tis impof- “ fible we fhould difcover. Yet the ge- nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im-' menfity, intrepidly palTes on, thro’ Re- '' gions unknown, from greater Syflem 9w !! to
226 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II.' to greater, till it arrive at that greatejiy ^*“''V***^« where Imagination flops, and can ad- vance no farther. In this lafl, this mighty, this flupendous Idea, it beholds the Universe itfelf, of which every Thing is a Part, and with relpedl to which not the fmalleflAtom is either foreign or detached.
Wide as it's Extent, is the Wifdom of its Workmanfliip, not bounded and narrow, like the humbler Works of Art. Thefe are all of Origin no higher than Human, We can readily trace them to their utmofl Limit, and with accuracy difcern both their Beginning and their End. But where the Microfcope that can fliew us, from what Point Wifdom begins in Nature ? Where the Telefcope that can defcry, to what Infinitude it extends ? The. more diligent our Search, the more accurate our Scrutiny, the more only are we convinced, that our Labours can never finifli ^ that Subjefls
inex-
A Dialogue. 227
inexiiauftible remain behind, ftill un- Part II. ‘‘ explored. -v-^
“ Hence the Mind truly wife, quit- ting the Study of Particulars, as know- ing their Multitude to be infinite and in^^ comprehenfible, turns its intelledlual Eye to what is general and comprehenliye, and thro' Generals learns to fee, and re- cognize what ever exifts.
It perceives in this view, that every Subftance, of every degree, has its Na- ‘‘ ture, its proper Make, Conftitution or Form, by which Vi aBs, and by which it fuffers. It perceives it fo to fare with every natural Form around us, as with thofe Tools and Inftruments, by which Art worketh its Wonders. The Saw is deftined to one Ad; the Mallet, to an- other; the Wheel anfwers this Purpofe; and the Lever anfwers a different. So Nature ufes the Vegetable, the Brute, and the Ratiofial, agreeably to the proper Form and Cojifiitution of every Kj7id. The
« Vegetable
I
228
Part II. “
<C
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc
cc‘
cc
cc
cc
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Vegetable proceeds with perfedP Injenji- bility. The Brute polTelTes a Senfe of what is pleafurable and painful, but flops at mere Senfation^ and is unable to go far- ther. The Rational^ like the Brute, has all the Powers of mere Senfation^ but en- joys fuperadded a farther tranfcendent Fa-- culty^ by which it is made confcious, not only of what it feelsy but of the Powers themfelveSy which are the Sources of thofe very Feelings; a Faculty^ which recognizing both itfelf and all Things elfe^ becomes a Canon, a Corredlor, and a Standard TJniverfaL
Hence to the Rational alone is im- parted that Master-Science, of what they are, where they are, and the End to which they are deflined.
Happy, too happy, did they know their own Felicity; did they reverence the Dignity of their own fuperior Cha- ra(fler, and never wretchedly degrade themfelves into Natures to them fubor-
dinate.
A Dialogue.
229
dinate. And yet alafs ! ’tis a Truth too Part II. certain, that as the Rational only are fufceptible of a Happinefs truly excel- lent, fo thefe only merge themfelves ‘‘ into Miferies part Indurance,
Assist us then. Thou Power Divine, with the Light of that Rea- SON, by which Thou lighteneft the World ; by which Grace and Beauty is diffufed thro’ every Part, and the Wel- fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up-r held ; that Reafon, of which our own is but a F article or Sparky like fome Pro- methean Fire, caught from Heaven above.
So teach us to know ourfelves^ that we may attain that Knowledge, which alone is worth attaining. Check our “ vain, our idle Refearches into the Laws, and Natures, and Motions of other Be- “ ings, till we have learnt and can prac- “ tife thofe, which peculiarly refpeft our- felves. Teach us to be fit Adlors in that general Drama, where Thou haft allotted every Being, great and fmall, its 0^3 pro-
230 Part IL
Concerning HAPPINESS,
proper Part^ the due Performance of which is the only End of its Exiftence.
‘‘Enable us to curb Desire within “ the Bounds of what is Natural Enable “ us even to fufpend it, till we can employ “it to our Emolument. Be our firjl Work, to have efcaped from wrong Opi- “ 7iion^ and bad Habit that the Mind, “ thus render'd fincere and incorrupt, may “ With Safety proceed to feek its genuine Good and H^ppinefs.
“ When we are thus prevloufly ex- “ ercifed, thus duly prepaied, let not our “ Love there flop, where it firft: begins \ “ but infenfibly conduit it, by thy invi- “ fible Influence, from lower Objeits to “ higher, till it arrive at that Supreme^ “ where only it can find what is adequate “ and full. Teach us to love Thee, and
“ Thy Divine Administration
“ to regard the Univerfe itfelf as our true “ and genuine Country, not that little ca- fual Spot, where we firft drew vital
Air.
-^Dialogue. 231
Air. Teach us each to regard Himfelf^ Part II. but as a Part of this great Whole ; a Part which for its Welfare we are as patiently to relign, as we refign a Angle Limb for the Welfare of our whole “ Body. Let our Life be a continued Scene of Acquiescence and of Grati- TUDE 'y of Gratitude, for what we enjoy-y ‘‘ of Acquiefcence, in what we fuffer ; as both can only be referable to that con- catenated Order of Events, which can- not but be bejly as being by Thee ap- proved and chofen.
In as much as Futurity is hidden ‘‘ from our Sight, we can have no other Rule of Choicey by which to govern our Condudl:, than what feems confonant to the Welfare of our own particular Na-- tures. If it appear not contrary to Duty “ and moral Office, (and how fliould we judge, but from what appears?) Thou canft not but forgive us, if we prefer ‘‘ Health to Sicknefs; the Safety of Life “ and Limb, to Maiming or to Death.
Q_4 But
232 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II.
‘‘ But did we know that thefe Incidents, or any other were appointed us \ were ‘‘ fated in that Order of incontroulable ‘‘ Events, by which Thou preferveft and adorneft the Whole : it then becomes “ our Duty, to meet them with Magna- nimity^ to co-operate with Chearfulnefs in what ever Thou ordaineft; that fo we may know no other Will, than thine alone, and that the Harmony of our ^5 particular Minds with thy Univerfal, may be fteady and uninterrupted thro’ '' the Period of our Exigence.
Yet, fince to attain this Height, this “ tranfeendent Fleight, is but barely pof- fible, if poffible, to the moil perfedl “ Humanity: regard wliat within us is Congeinal to Hhcc', raife us above our- felves, and warm iis into Enthufiafm, But let our Enthuiiafm be fuch, as befits the Citizens of Tliy Polity ; liberal, gentle, rational, and humane-— not fucli as to debafe us into poor and wretched Slaves, as if Thou wert our Tyrant, o ‘‘ not
A Dialogue.
233
not our kind and common Father j Part II.
much lefs fuch as to transform us into favage Beajis of Prey^ fallen , gloomy, dark and fierce 5 prone to perfecute, to “ ravage, and deftroy, as if the Luft of ‘‘ Maflacre could be grateful to thy Good- nefs. Permit us rather madly to avow Villany in thy Defiance, than impioufly to aflert it under colour of thy Service. Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea of this Charadter ; from the Servile, Ab- jedt, Horrid and Ghaftly, to the Gene- rous. Lovely, Fair and Godlike.
Here let us dwells be here our
Study and Delight. So fliall we be en- abled, in the filent Mirrour of Conteni’- ^ plation^ to behold thofe Forms^ which
‘‘ are hidden to Human Eyes that ani-
mating Wisdom, which pervades and
“ rules the Whole that Law irrefiftible,
immutable, fupreme, which leads the Willing, and compels the Averfe, to co- operate in their Station to the general Welfare-^ — that Magic Divine, which
234
Part II. “
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tc
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Concerning HAPPINESS,
by an Efficacy paft Comprehenfion, can transform every Appearance, the moft hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit all Things Fair and Goo-d to Thee, Essence Increate, who art of purer Eyes^ than ever to behold Iniquity.
Be thefe our Morning, thefe our Evening Meditations — with thefe may
our Minds be unchangeably tinged
that loving Thee with a Love moft dif- interefted and lincere^ enamoured of thy Polity, and thy Divine Admi- nistration ; welcoming every Event with Chearfulnefs and Magnanimity, as being bejl upon the Whole, becaufe or- dained of Thee) propofing nothing of ourfelves, but with a Referve that Thou permitteft ) acquiefcing in every Obftruc- tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro- vidence in a word, that working this
Condudt, by due Exercife, into perfed Habit -y we may never murmur, never repine ) never mifs what we would ob- tain, or fall into that which we would
‘‘ avoid )
A Dialogue,
235
avoid j but being happy with that tran- Part II. fcendent Happinefs^ of which no one can deprive us ; and bleft with that Di- vine Liberty^ which no Tyrant can aii- noy; we may dare addrefs Thee with « pious Confidence, as the PhilGfophic Bard « of old.
Condu5i me^ Phou^ of Beings Caufe Divine^ Where-e're Tm defin'd in thy great De/ign. “ A5live I follow on : for Jhould my Will Reffy Tm impious -y but mufi follow filL
In this manner did TheophiluSy faid he, purfue the Subjeft, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with Expreffions even more fplendid, than I have now employed. The Speaker, the Speech, the happy Circumftances which concurred, the Night’s Beauty and Still- nefs, with the Romantic Scene where we were walking, all together gave the Whole fuch an Energy and Solemnity, as ’tis im- poffible you fliould feel from the Coldnefs of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for
my
2
236 Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. my own part, returned home fenfibly touched, and retained the ftrongeft Feel- ings of what I had heard, till the follow- ing Morning. Then the Bufinefs of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philofopher, as I had ever been before.
§. 10. And is it poflible, faidi, fofoon to have forgotten, what feems fo ftriking and fublime, as the Subjeft you have been now treating? ’Tis Habit, replied
he, is all in all. 'Tis Pra^ice andExer^ cifcy which can only make us truly any thing. Is it not evidently fo, in the moft; com- mon vulgar Arts ? Did mere Theory alone ever make the meancft Mechanic ? And is the Supreme Artijl of Life and Manners to be formed more eafily, than fuch a one ? Happy for us, could we prove it near fo eafy. But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not fo cheap. Nothing is to be had gratis^ much lefs that which is moft valuable.
Yet
A Dialogue.
237
Yet however fgr our Comfort, we have Part II. this to encourage us, that„ tho’ the culty of acquiring Habits be great and painful, yet nothing fo eafy, fo pleafant, as their ’EjiergieSy when once wrought by Exercife to a due Standard of Perfedtion.
I know you have made fome Progrefs in Mufic. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way— Y ou can do that, which without Habit, as tnuch exceeds the wifeft Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to afeend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with' Facility ; and (left you fhould think I flatter) not you yourfelf alone, but a thoufand others befide, whofe low Rank and Genius no way raife them above the Multitude. If then you are fo well alTured of this Force of Habit in one Inftance, judge not in other Inftances by your own prefent Infufficiency, Be not fhocked at the apparent Creatnefs of the perfeB Moral CharaBer^ when you com- pare it to the Weaknefs and ImperfeBion of your own. On the contrary, when thefe
dark^
23 8 Concerning HAPPINESS,
PartIL dark, thefe melancholy Thoughts affail you, immediately turn your Mind to the Confideration of Habit, Remember how eafy its Energies to thofe, who pojjefs it ; and yet how impraBicable to fiich, as pof^ fefs it not,
I T mufl: be owned, faid I, that this is a Satisfadlion, and may be fome kind of Affiftance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Dodlrine naturally leads to another Objedlion. — Does not the Difficulty of attaining Habit too well fupport a certain Affertion, that, defend Virtue as we wili^ *tis but a Scheme of Self denial?
By Self-denial^ faid he, you mean, I
fuppofe, fomething like what follows
Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon bids me for- bear If I obey Reafon, I de?iy Appetite;
and Appetite being a Part of myfelf to deny it, is a Self-denial. What is true thus in Luxury^ is true alfo in other Subjedls ; is evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of Refentment, or whatever elfe we purfue
by
A Dialogue; 239
by the Didlate of any PafTion. You Part II. appear, faid I, to have ftated the Objeftion ■ juftly.
To return then to our Inftance, faid he, of Luxury. Appetite bids me eat ; Reafon
bids me forbear If I obey Reafony I deny
Appetite and if I obey Appetite y do I not
deny Reafon ? Can I a6t either wayy 'withr- out rej elding one of them ? And is ‘ not Reafon a Part of myfelf as notorioufly as Appetite ?
Or to take another Example — I have a Depofite in my Hands. Avarice bids me retain — Confcience bids me reftore. Is there not a reciprocal Defiialy let me obey which I will? And is not Confcience a Part of mey as truly as Avarice?
Poor Self indeed muft be denied, take which Party we will. But why fhould Virtue be arraigned of thwarting it,
more than Vice her contrary ? Make the
moft of the Argument, it can come but to
tliis —
Concerning HAPPINESS,
. this If Self-denial be an Objeftion to
Virtue^ fo is it to Vice If Self-denial be
no Objection to Vice^ no more can it be to Virtue. A wonderful and important Con- clulion indeed !
He continued by faying, that the Soul of Man appeared not as a fngle Faculty^ but as compounded of many that as thefe Fa-
culties were not always in perfed: Peace one with another, fo there were few Ac- tions which we could perform, where they would be all found to concur. What then
are we to do ? Sulpend till they agree ?
Abfurd, impoffible. Nothing therefore
can remain, but to weigh well their feveral Pretenlions^ attend to all, that each has to offer in its behalf 3 and finally to purfue the Didates of the Wifefl and the Befl. This done, as for the Sef-denial^ which we force upon the reft 3 with regard to our own CharaBer^ ftis a Matter of Honour
and Praife with regard to the Faculties
deniedy ftis a Matter of as fmall Weight, as 1^0 contemn the Noife and Clamours of a
mad
A DlAtOGUE. 241
mad and fenfelcfs Mob, in deference to the Part II. fober Voice of the worthier, better Citi- zens. And what Man could be juftified, ftiould he reje<3: thefc, and prefer a Rabble ?
§. 10. In this place he paufed again, and I took occafion to acknowledge, that my Objeftion appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he advifed that We might return home; and walking along leifurely, thus refumed to himfelf the Dif* courfe.
' I dare fay, continued he, you have fecn many a wife Head fhake, in pronouncing that fad Truth, honjo we are governed all by
Interest. And what do they think
fliould govern us elfe ? Our Lofs, our
Damage, our Dijinterejl ? Ridiculous
indeed ! We fhould be Idiots in fuch cafe, more than Rational Animals. The only Queftion is, where Intereji truly lies : for if this once be well adjufted, no Maxim can be more harmlefs.
« I
R
24a
Concerning HAPPINESS,
PartIL I find myfelf exifting upon a little a Spot, fbrrounded every way by an im-
menfe unknown Expanlion. ^-Where
“ am I ? What fort of Place do I inhabit ? Is it exaftly accommodated, in every Inftance, to my Convenience ? “ Is there no Excefs of Cold, none of Heat, to offend me ? Am I never an- noyed by Animals, either of my own kind, or a different ? Is every thing “ fubfervient to me, as tho’ I had ordered
all myfelf ? No — nothing like it
the fartheft from it poffible. The
World appears not then originally made for Hit private Convenience of me alone? — “ It docs not.— But is it not poffible fo to ‘‘ accommodate it, by my own particular
“ Induftry? If to accommodate Man
‘‘ and Beaff, Heaven and Earth, if this be “ beyond me ; 'tis not poffible. — What “ Confequence then follows ? Or can “ there be any other than this — ^^if I feek ‘‘ an Interefl of my own^ detached from that
u of
243
A Dialogue.
I
of others y I feek an Interefl which is chi- Part 11. meric al^ and can never have Exijience ? -v-— ^
How then muft I determine ? Have ‘‘ I no Intereft at all ? — If I have not, I “ am a Fool for flaying here, ’Tis a ‘‘ fmoaky Houfe, and the fooner out of it, the better. ~’But why no Interefl? — »
‘‘ Can I be contented with none, but one “ feparate and detached ? — Is a Social ‘‘ Interest joined with others fuch an ‘‘ Abfurdity, as not to be admitted ? The Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd- ing Animals, are enough to convince me, that the thing is, fome where at leafy poffible. How then am I affured,
that ’tis not equally true of Man ?—
‘‘ Admit it ; and what follows ? — If fo, then Honour and Justice are my Interest — then the whole Train OF Moral Virtues are my Inte- “ REST; voithout fome Portiofi of which y «« not even ’Thieves can fnaintain Society,
R 2
But
244
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. “But farther ftill — I flop not here— I purfue this Social Intereji^ as far as I can trace my feveral Relations. I pafs from my own Stock, my own Neigh- bourhood, my own Nation, to the whole Race of Mankind^ as difperfed through- out the Earth. — Am I not related to them ally by the mutual Aids of Commerce ; by the general Intercourfe of Arts and ‘‘ Letters; by that common Nature y of
which we all participate? Again
I muft have Food and Clothing.
Without a proper genial Warmth,
‘‘ I inftantly perifh. Am I not rela-
ted, in this view, to the very Earth “ itfelf ? To the diftant SuHy from whofe Beams I derive Vigour? To that ftupendous Courfe and Order of the inf-- niteNojl of Heaven y by which the Times and Seafons ever uniformly pafs on ?— — €< Were this Order once confounded, I could not probably furvive a Moment ; fo abfolutely do I depend on this common ** neral Welfare.
What
A Dialogue.
245
What then have I to do> but to Part IL enlarge Virtue into Piety? only Honour and JuJlice^ and v/hat I ** owe to Man, is my LjtereJi 5 but Gratis tude alfo, Acquiefcence^ Kejignation^ Ado- “ ration^ and all I owe to this gr.t2X Polity ^
“ and its greater Governor, our com- MON Parent.
But if all thefe Moral and Di- VINE Habits be my Interest, I need not furely feek for a better. I “ have an Intereft compatible with the
Spot on which I live 1 have an In-
“ tereft which may exift, without altering “ the Plan of Providence j without mend- “ ingy or marring the general Order of ‘‘ Events — I can bear what ever happens,
“ with manlike Magnanimity ; can be contented, and fully happy in the Goody which I poffefs ; and can pafs thro’ this turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with- “ out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur- ” murings, or Complaints,’’
ANi>
Concerning HAPPINESS,
And thus, my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged ; my Sen- timents on that Subjed:, which engages every one of us. For who would be un- happy ? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy one perpetual Felicity ? Who are there exifting, who do not at every inftant feek it ? ’Tis the Wifh, the Em- ploy, not of the Rational Man only, but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very loweft of our Herd, For my own Syftem, whe- ther a juft one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only fay on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, ’tis a grateful Error, which I cherilh and am fond of. And yet if really fuch, I lliall never deem it fo facred, as not wil- lingly, upon Convidlion, to refign it up to Truth,
Little pafs’d after this worth rela- ting. We had not far to w^alk, and we ..fell into common Topics, Yet one Obfer-
vation
A Dialogue.
247
vation of his I muft not omit. ’TwasPartll,
what follows. When we are once,
faid he, well habituated to this chief, this MORAL Science, then Logic and Physics become two profitable AdjunSls: Logtc^ to fecure to us the PolTelRon of our Opinions; that, if an Adverfary attack, we may not bafely give them up : Phyjics^ to explain the Rcafon and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that we may know fomething of that Univerfe, where our Dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a Saying (and may its Remembrance never efcape you) while you find this great, this Majler-Science •wanting^ value Logic but as Sophijiry^ and Phyjics but as Raree-Jhew ; for both, afliire yourfelf, will be found nothing better.
’Twas foon after this that our Walk ended. With it ended a Converfation, which had long engaged us ; and which, according to my Promife, I have here en- deavoured to tranfcribe.
THE END.
' ., _ ..'yyy-'y^
;:■ : 'j ' :
■: ■ >>■ ^ ’
\-r.S: ti
■ ■•■i >
i
. '■„ ,-.
Advertifement to the Reader.
E Author has chofen to feparate all ^ Notes from his firji and third Trea~ tifeSy and thus fubjoin them to the Endy becaufe thofe Threat ifeSy being written in Dialoguey from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption, One of his Reafons for adding Notes waSy to give Weight to his AJfertions from the Autho- thority of antient Writers, But his chief and principal Reafon was, to excite (if pojjible) the Curiofty of Reader Sy to exa- mine with flriHer Attention thofe valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this Endy he Jhall think his Labours (Juch as they are) abundantly rewarded.
NOTES
O N
TREATISE the Firft;
CONCERNING
A R T.
Note I. p. 6. All art is Cause.]
maxume proprium^ creare iff glgnere. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 22.
•n-a,(Toc TTfpt 'ym(Tiv, All Art is employed in Produc- tion^ that is, in making fomething to he, Arijiot, Ethic. Nicom, 1. 6. c. 4.
The ahfive efficient Caufes have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the fame Ethics, they are enumerated thus — yci^
^oxao'iv slv(x,i (pvcTic^ t\i Jg vs?,
TT^v TO ol avOpwVy. The fever al Caufes appear to be Nature, Neceffity, and Chance ; and befides thefe. Mind or Intelle5l^ and zvhatever operates by or thro"* Man. 1.3. c. 3. The Paraphraft Andronicus in explaining this laft Paffage, nay to J*/ avSpwTrs, adds oiou V a A At] TIC Tz-pa^jfj as for injlance Art, or any other human AEtion.
Alex-
252 NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
Alexander Aphrgdisiensis fpeaks of effi- cient Caufes as follows : ’AAAa jcupjw? aina
'TTQiYiriytoi^ (pva-iq te, TTpoctipscn^. The
Caufes^ which are ftriSfly and properly efficient y are Nature y Arty and each Man's particular Choice of Action, vtpi p. 160. B. £ch’t* Aid*
In what manner Art is diftinguiflied from the reft of thefe efficient Caufes, the fubfequent Notes will attempt to explain.
Note II. p. 6. Of that Painter famed IN Story, ^c.] See Faler. Max, 1. 8. c. ii.
Note III. p. 12. Art is Man becoming A Cause, Intentional and Habitual.] Ari^ fiotky in his Rhetoricy thus accurately enumerates all the poflible manners, either diredt or indi- redl, in which Mankind may be faid to ail or do any thing, jjdvlig TTpalrycrt TcdvTOCy roc y^lvy » J'i dvlvg* roc J't ccvl^g' rcov fxh bv /t/,r aula?, roc fch ^loc rix*iv TTpcclmiriy roc J'l Ig 'oivocj^xrig* ruv djocyaug,^ roc jSia, rd (pvarr core TrdvloCy croc [Mn J'i du]^g Trpd'lrvtriy rd fiVy dico rv^ng' rd ^iy (pvir£i* rd J'e ^ipc, *'0(roi dvl^gy nod Zv dvloi
dilioiy rd fAv £0®?, rd xocl rd f/.h ^id
Xoyiria^v rd J'£ dXoy'if'ov, sg'i Je v fAv
/xala Xoyn dycxh^ dXoyoi
i^yvi 3cdi £7ri0iijU,fa, urs Trdvloc oroc n-^ocIraa-iVy ocvocy- an TT^dlrtiv dll^g I't/Iqo* $id Tup^»jv, ^id QlocVy ^td
(p\j(riVy
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
(p'JO'lVf £00?, AoJ^JiTjUOV, OujU,o\, CTTiSu*
fAlXV.
All Men do all Things either of themfelves^ or not of themfelves. The Things which they do not of themfelveSy they do either by Chance^ or from NeceJJityy and the Things done from Neceffty^ they do either by Compulfion^ which is External Necejity^ or by Nature^ which is Internal, So that all Things whatfoevery which Men do not of themfelveSy they do either by Chance^ or from Compulfiony or by Nature,
Again y the Things ^ which they do of themfelves ^ and of which they are themfelves properly the CaufeSy feme they do thro' Cujiom and acquired Habits others thro* original and natural Defer e. Farther^ the Things done thro' natural Defercy they do either thro* fetch Defer t ajfefled by Reafeuy or thro* fuch Defer e devoid of Reafen. If it be ajfefeed by Reafen^ then it ajfumes the Denomi^ nation of Will ; — on the contrary y the irrational Defer es are Anger and Appetite,
Hence it appears that all Things whatever y which Men doy they necejfarily do thro* one of thefe feven Caufesy either thro' Chance, Compulfeony Naturey Cu- fiom, Willy Anger, Appetite, Arijl, Rhet, 1, i.
C. 10.
It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to confider with which of thefe Caufes we ought to arrange Art. '
As to Chance, it may be obferved in general of all Cafual Events, that they always exclude Inten* tion or Defegn : But Intention and Defegn, are from
Art
253
254 notes on Treatise the FirJI,
Art infeparable. Thus is the Difference between Art and Chance manifeft.
As to External Compulsion, we have it
thus defcribed J's, s 77 That h
an Ati of Compulfion^ the efficient Principle of which is from without^ independent of the Doer. Ethte. Nic, 1. 3. c. I. Again, in the fame Treatife, 1. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of Art^ that they are fuch, coi' v do^ri h Iw the efficient Principle
of which is in the Doer or Agent. Thus therefore is Art diflinguifhed from Compulfton.
These two Caufes, Chance and Compulfion^ are rnentioned and confidered in the Dialogue, Pages 6 , and 7.
Nature, or rather Natural Necessity, is that Caufe, thro’ which we breath, perfpire, digeft, circulate our Blood, ^c. JVill^ Anger and Appetite y are (as already obferved) but fo many Species of Natural Desire, confidered either as affifled by Reafon, or elfe as devoid of it. Now tho’ Natural Defire and Natural Neceffiity differ, becaufe in the one we adf fpontaneoufly y in the other not fpontane- Quflyy yet both of them meet in the common Genus of Natural Power. Moreover this is true of all Na- tural Power y that the Power itfelf is prior to any Energies or Ad:s of that Power. ’Oj £>cN ttqK-
xdytig l^slvy ^ TroXXocKig dy.iscroity rdg ocio'^wsig lAaeO- fASVy dxA dvccTTuKiV^
y-ivot For [to inflance in the natural Powers
of Senfation] it was not from often feelngy and often
hearingy
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
hiaring^ that we acquired thofe Senfes ; hut on the eon- trary^ being firji pojfejfed of them^ we then ufed them^ not through any Ufe or Exercife did we come to pojfefs them, Ariji. Ethic. 1. 2. c. i.
Now the C9ntrary to this is true in the cafe of any Powers or Faculties not natural^ but acquired by Cujiom and Vfage. For here there are many Ener- gies and Aits^ which muft neceffarily precede the Exiftence of fuch Power or Habit^ it being evident (as is faid in the fame Chapter) that lye 7wv ivs^'ysiuv dll yiyvovloii^ from fimilar and homoge- neous Energies., it is that Habits are obtained. So again, in the fame Place, a hi Tromv^
rdvla, TTcMsg y.ocv^dlvoy.tv* oTov diKohfxSy'lsi dmddofJt.oi ymvlxiy Koc) Kt^a^if’oci, P'hePhings which
we are to do by having learnt we learn by doing. Thus by building Men become Builders^ and by pratiifng Mufc they become Mufuians.
Thus therefore is Art diftinguilhed from all Natural Power of Man, whether Natural Necejfty., Will., Anger., or Appetite. But Art has been already diftinguilhed from Chance and Com- pulsion. So that being clearly not the fame with fix of thofe feven Caufes by which all Men do all Things, it muft needs be referred to the feventhy that is, to Custom or Habit.
It muft be obferved, the natural Caufes or Powers in Man, confidered as diftineft from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9,
255
And
256 NOTES 'oh Treatise the Firjl.
And iiow as we have fhewii Art to be a certain Caufe working in Mah^ it reffiaifts to (hew how it ii diftinguifhed from thofe other Caufis befide Man.^ which we fuppofe to operate in the Univerfe. Thefe are either fuch Caufe s as are below him, like the Vegeta^ true Power^ which operates in Vegetables, the Sen* fitive in Animals; or'elfe fuch Caufetz^ 2x0 above him, like God, and whatever is elfe of Intelligence more than human.
The Causes below us may be all included in the common Genus of Nature; and of Nature may fay univerfally, as well of Nature without us ^ as within us, that its feveral Operations-^ contrary to thofe of Art, are not in the leaf degree derived from
Cufiom or Ufage. Thus the Author above cited
’OuiJ'w Tcoy (pucsi o'fl'jjv aAAwf oTou 0
(pC(T£i xaijo) ay uvu
uv {^v^lccKig dvjov t9i^v riq uvit) piTrluv, TO TTV^
•Acclw, None of thofe Things, vuhich are what they are by Nature, can be altered by being accufomed. Thus a Stone, which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accufomed to mount upward, no not tho* any one Jhould ten thoufand times attempt it by throwing the Stone upward. The fame may be faid of accufoming Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. i. Again, in the Works of Nature, fuch as Trees, Animals, and the like, the efficient Principle is vi- tally united to the Subjects, wherein it operates. — h dvloTg £%8(r» rixuloc rm Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6.
c. 4. But in the Works of Art, fuch as Statues or Houfes, the efficient Principle is difunited from the Subjedis, and exifts not in the Things done or made,
but
257
N O T E'S on Treatise the Firjl.
but in the Doer or Artljl — wv h tw
&AAa {/.^ Iv 7w TToinfxEvu, Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. t. 4* It is indeed pofTible that, even in Works of Jrt^ the Subject and efficient Caufe may be united^ as in the Cafe of a Phyfician becoming his own Patient, and curing himfelf. But then it rnufl be remembered that this Union is jcam merely acci--
dental^ and no way effiential to the conftituting of Art, confidered as Art. By this therefore is A r t clearly diftinguilhed from Nature, whofe Defi- nition informs us that it is — rig koc,) ocilicc
xtvfkS’ai Ti^E^AEiv Ev w VTrdpysi Trpwlojf, xaS’ du]o
y.7] xoild Tvi^Qs^mg, A certain Principle or Caufe of moving and ceafing to move., in fome Suhjedi wherein fuch Principle exifs immediately., effientially, and not way of Accident. Arift. Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. i.
The Cau s e s, which are of Rank superioUr to Man., fuch as the Deity, can have nothing to do with Art, becaufe being (as is laid in the Dialogue, p. ii.) perfedl and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and fecondary. Art therefore can only belong to Beings, like Men, who being imperfetf know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps fecondary and fubfequent. It was from a like Confideration that Pythagoras called himfelf a Philosopher, that is to fay (according to his own Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of what was wife and 'good, but not a Poflelfor, which he deemed a Charader above him. Con- fonant to' this we read in Platons Banquet, Gfu)» S
NOTES on Treatise theFirJi,
CptAo(ro(p£r, ernGuf^sT (ro(pog ym^oci* fr*
&c. No Gob philofophizes^ or defires to become wifie^ FOR He is so already. Nor^ if there he any other Being wife^ doth he philofiophize for the fame Reafon. On the other handy neither do the Indocil philofophize ; for this is the Misfortune of Indocilityy without being virtuousy good or prudenty to appear to onefef fufficknt in all thefe Refpedls. In general there- forey he who thinketh himfelf in no wanty defireth not thaty which he thinks himfelf not to need. Who iheny faid Socrates to Diotimay (the Speaker of this Narration) Who are those who philoso- phize, if they are neither the Wife nor the hidocil? That (replied (he) may be now confpicuous even to a Child. They are those of middle Rank,
BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203.
tom. 3. Edit. Serrani.
Here we fee (agreeably to what is faid in the Dialogue, pages ii. and 12.) that as to acquired or fecondary HabitSy fome Beings are too excellent for themy and others too bafe y and that the Deity above all is in the Number of thofe tranfcen- denty and is thus, as a Caiifcy diftinguifhed from Art.
There are, befides the Deity and Nature now fpoken of, certain other external Caufes, which are mentioned in the firft Note as diftind from Art ; namely Chance and Necejfity. But of thefe hereafter, wlv'n we conlider the Subjelt of Art.
Not5
NOTES on Treatise the Fir ft.
Note IV. ^ 13. Faculties, Powers,
ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN ThINGS ENER-
GIES AND Operations lie open to the Se-NSES.J ’Ei (J's Xiym ri exacr'ov Ta1wv, oTcv 'll TO voyfjixov^ 5) ri to dii^yfjixov^ TT^ol^pv tTricr-
XSTtIsOV^ Tt TO VOSJV, XOi) Tl TO d^d.VS^Oil* TT^O- Isocci ya^ xccl (TCclpEr'^pcci TTfiO^ ^y.oi.q Twv cuua|a£Coy lifTi di ivipysixi, Tr^oEvJvy^dvoi’j.sv ydp ddjxTq^ xxl ja; ^nvdfxeiq diTo Ittivo^ixbv, If we are to ex-
plain what each of thefe things are^ as for inflance^ what the intelligent Principle^ what the fenfitive^ we mufi frft inquire what it is to thinks what to fee^ hear^ and ufe the Senfes, For with refpeli to us Men, the Energies aj^e prior and more evident than the Powers, becaufe it is in the Energies we are frft cmverfant^ and comprehend the Powers from them, Themift. in lib. 2. de Anima, p. 76. Edit. Ald.Fol.
Note V. p. 15. Are there not Pre- cepts, b’f.] Vid. Plat, in Min. tom. 2. p. 316, 17. Edit, S err an.
As to thofe low Habits here mention’d, from which we diftinguilh Art by the Number and Dignity of its Precepts, they fall in general under tlie Deno- mination of Ma7aioT£X,J^/a, of which ^intilian gives the following Account. Mx1<xio1sx^id quoque ejl quesdam^ id ef^ fupervacua Artis Imitatio^ quce nihil fane nec boni nec mali habeat^ fed va?tum laborem : qualis illius fuit^ qui grana ciceris^ ex [patio diftante miffa^ in acum continuo iA fne frufratione infer ebat : quem^ cum fpeblajfet Alexander y donajjl didtur ejujdem S 2 Ugu-^
259
z6o
NOTES t?// Treatise theFirft.^
leguminh modio, ^od quldem pramium fuit illo opere dignijjimum, Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 20.
Note VI. p. 17. An Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Ef- fect, ACCORDING TO A SySTEM OF VARIOUS AND WElLL-APPROVED PrECEPTS ]
The Peripatetic Definition of Aft is yMd AoT« TroiTfliKv aa efficient Habit ^ joined with
found and true Reafon, Ariftot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4.
The ^toic Definition, as we find it in ^ext, Empir. adverfus Logicos^'^^, 392. is, £>c
XOcloiXilll'SCOV IfysyUfAVOitTf/dvCiOV TT^oV^t) T£A(^ £vp(^^v}rov rm Iv Tw pM. ' Thus tranflated by Cicero in Dio- demes de Grammat. L 2. Ars eji Perceptionum exerci- tatarum colledtioj ad mum exitum vita utilem perti- nentium. And again by ^intilian^ Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 18. Artem con ft are ex perceptionibus confentientibus itf coexercitatis ad finem utilem vita. The fame De- finition is alfo alluded to in the Academics of Cicero,
1. 2. c. 7. where it is faid Ars vero qua poteji
effie, nifi qua non ex una, aut duabus, fed ex multis animl perceptionibus conjiat?
There is a third Definition of Art cited by ^intilian in the fame place, and afcribed by him to Cleanthes — Ar^ eft potejias via. ( id eft, or dine ) efficient.
Now if we compare thefe Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we fhall find them all to correfpond. The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Caufe of feme. Effiedi, is the fame as TroivliKri in the
Peripa-
26i
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
Peripatetic Definition. According to a Syjlem of vari- ous and well-approved Precepts^ is 'the fame as ^{\(^ Xoy>s For found and true Reafon muft needs
be the Bafis of all fuch Precepts^
Again, as to the fecond Definition— The Words Xornfji^oc y.odlcx,Xrii\;suv [a Syjlem of Comprehenfions^ or of certain and evident Truths'] correfpond to the latter
Part of the Definition in the Dialogue According
to a Syfem of various and well-approved Precepts. The Word [that is to fay, worked in hy
Habit and Excercife] correfponds to the firft Part, that Art is a Caufe founded in Habit, And the reft ^c. that is to fay, a Syfem which has refpedi to fome ufeful and ferviceahle End or Purpofe in Human Life] fhews the Syftem here mentioned to regard Pradfice and Adiion^ not Theory and Specu lation. And thus does it correfpond with the Defi- nition of the Dialogue, where it is faid that Art is an Habitual Power not of merely contemplating and knowing., but of becoming the Caufe of fome Effedt, It is not indeed exprefied in the Dialogue, that this Effe<5t has refpe<5l to the Utility of Hutnan Life., be- caufe this latter Circumfance is referved to the Defi- nition of the final Caufe of Art, given page 29.
As to the third Definition of Art, poteflas via effciens, a Power operating ?nethodically., it may be obferved, that by being called an operating Power, it is diftinguiihed from Powders purely fpeculative ; and as it is faid to operate methodically , or hi a Road and regular Procefs., it is diftinguiihed from Chance as w?ll as blind NcceJJity. And thus far it coirefponds S 3 with
NOTES on Treatise the Firft,
with what is offer’d in the Dialogue. But it doe<? not appear from this Definition, v/hether the Power therein mentioned be Original and Natural^ or Se- tondary and Habitual^ becaufe Powers of either fort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to diftinguilh fo far, but took Art in that larger and more general Senfe, adopted fome- times by the Stoics j as when they defcribe Nature herfelf to be, a riu^ o>Ico Tr^bg j/mcriv,
an artificial Fire^ proceedmg methodically to Production or Creation- For it is not to be im.agined, they in- tended by this to infmuate that Nature was a Firey which had learnt by Flabit fo to operate. On the contrary, by artificial it is probable they intended no more than foine adtive efificient Prbicipley working with Reafion^ Order y and Method ^ of which Principle they confider’d Fire to be the proper eft Vehicle, as being of all Bodies the mofr finbtUy and that into wdiich the refr are all ultimately refolvable. Vide Diog. Laert. 1. 7. Sedt- 156. Cic. de Nat, Deor. I. 2. c. 22.
Note VII. page 22. It should seem that
THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF Art
WAS All those contingent Natures;
WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF HuMAN
Powers to influence.]
The Cause here treated is the Material, the "'TAv, or or to 8 yivdldt rt
hv7rd^'/rcv]^.
Of 3. Contingent y we have the following Defihi-
fron — hFdi(^£dtoci^ 5^ TO lvu£)(pg(,iVOVy OV
NOTES c« Treatise theFlrfl.
TiSal©^ S i^cti
^ Me t?T aj^uvjcTov. / call that a Co ntingent, which not being necejfary^ hut being fuppofed to he^ there will follow nothing impojfihle from fuch Suppofition. Arift. Anal, prior. 1. i. c. 13.
That this is true in Works of Arty is evident. It is not' necef ary y that a given Fragment of fuch a Rock (hould affume the Figure of Hercules: but there follows nothing mpojftbley if we fuppofe it fo figured. ’Tis for this reafon, that the huhjeSt of Art is in the Dialogue called a Contingent,
But however, to explain the whole of what is faid in this Place, it is neceffary to go backward, and deduce what we would fay from fome remoter Confiderations.
The Peripatetics held the End or Aim of their Philofophy to be the difcovering and knowing the ’AfX^> the primary and creative Principle of all Tubings, They purfued this Inquiry, by beginning their Contemplation from thofe things, which are to us firft in the Order of our Comprehenfion, and fo afcend- ing gradually to that which is truly firjly in the real Order of Beings.
• The firft and original Ohjebfs of our Comprc- henfion are thofe nearer and more immediate, VIZ. the Objehfs of Senfcy with which we are fur- rounded on every Side. Theft Objehis we perceive to be all in motion ; and the Motions are multiform^ various y and often to each other.- The Con-^.
S 4 fequences
263
264
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
fequences of this we perpetually behold. By fuch Motions we fee that not only the mere local Site of thefe Beings is changed, but their very and Figure^ and ^alities', n^ more than this, even the Beings themfelves are made to feparate and perijh^ while new Beings arife from the Re-afTemblage of the fcattered Parts, which Parts different Motions can as well concrete^ as difunite. The Beings or ObjeSls of the Gharader here defcribed, the Peripatetics denoted un- der the common Appellation of the ra 7^
(pS-cc^ld^ the Beings tnoving and corruptible.
From thefe moving and perijhable Objedls^ they paffed to thofe fublimer and more tranfcendent Obje^s of Senfe^ which they faw adorn the Heavens. Here likewife they difcovered Motion ; but then this Mo- tion was uniform and conjlant \ affedling not the Be-- ings moved^ fave in the relation of local Site. As therefore they beheld no Change in the Form and EJfence of thefe Beings, they deemed them {upon their Hypothefis) incorruptible., and out of them efta- blifhed another Clafs of Beings, that is to fay, the -ra y.ocl the Beings moving and in-
corruptible.
From thefe fublimer Objedis of Senfe., they paffed to Objedis of pure Intelledi ; to Bodies devoid of all Motion, and of all ^ality, fave that in- feparabie one of Figure ; fuch Bodies for infrance as the Cube, the Sphere, and the reft of Bo- dies mathematical. From mathematical Bodies, and the Fruths refulting from them, they paffed to the Contemplation of Fruth in general ; to ^he Soul, and its Powers both of Intuition and Syl-
Icgization ;
NOTE S on Treatise theFirJl.
logization ; to Being mlverfal^ and above both Time and Place j and thus at lafl: to that fupreme Caufe^ the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the fame^ immutable and eternal. The feveral Objebls of this intellectual Comprehenfton they Ailed not merely a(p9^p1x, but ol(p9(zfJoc xj Beings incorrup-
tible and immoveable.
In this manner did the Peripatetics Ipeculate.- And hence was it they eAablifhed to themfelves three
Species of Philofophical Employment one about
Beings motionlefs and eternal j another, about Beings moveable and eternal'^ and a third, about Beings moveable and perijhable. The firft they held the proper" Employment of the Metaphyfician ; the two laft of the AJlronomer and the Naturaliji.
Afo' Tr^ccyfAOclsTui* v dwfflo'u' ^
TTf^i jweu, ol(pB‘oi^'lov 11 J'f, 'nno] m
(pBocfA, Idcirco Tres funt TraCiationes \ una^ de im- mobili i altera de eo<, quod moveiur quidem^ fed ejl interitus expers\ tertia de rebus ^ interitui obnoxiis. Ariftot. Natural. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 7. Aio r^sTg oilt 'Traoi’yy.OilsTocf i (pBxfx’ Cr
TTSOl XlVlif/,£VXy (Z(p^xplx Ci' 11 TTf^i X'/AvTllx ^
Themijiii Paraphrafis in loc.
This threefold Subject of Philofophic Inquiry is elegantly explained in the following PalVage. Tt cl's to' t£A(^ £r*l Tr\g ^A^irolsXiXvg (pitiO(roplccg ;
Pxfi'J on yvcovxi TKV TTOCvluV '*>?y TCOV TTCCVT'XV
^ripti^s^yov dirUv^ rvv de] u(rx'Jlcog sy^vcrxv* diro-
2.66
NOTES Tre AT iSE Firjl.
^eUwtrt 7rav\u:v duui/.Gt\iiv' Ik£it>vc
ra ■n-mla Tra^aytSat, TiW Js ra ayovlx fiV TKTO to' tsA©^ ; (poc^/Xv on ^ ^i^cKTy-OcXioc rm ev p/^cuw fAslcclSoX'^ uVa^p^oulwy* loioiVToc ifi roc
El/ yEV£(Tii (p^ofiix. cc'To Tiiluv, §i'2 ^scTcov ^a<«
^sf^alixcov, dvizfo^usv iocvl^t; ettI roc ub) wroculoog S^ovloc * loioivlcc 20 TOi OV^CCViOC* KOc) yVoO, jU,£Ta TOi? atTLCfjcxT^g yV/a?, £7rl T>?y Tr^'Jo'JrtV ttccvIoov a^p^'/v. IToicr'ri; xiviicrsws’, kccT ^(tiocv yVri?, ^ xa7a ttojoi;, ? xoi7a roTToVy roc fjch Iv ysvirsi ^ (pB'oox xocloc Trocroiv 7{iiri(Tiv xivu'Jloii 'roc h ov^dvioc xccl^ fjcovrjv r'^v xccl^ tottov. Aio Bvrdxloog q^bve^v octto tcov ttoAut^ottw? Xm/OCEVUV eit\ rcz Kocjd ^iccv^ ^ fj.Qvnv Xii/ncrtv xivs/ucEvoi, yrw?
£VI THN AKINHTON KAl AEI nSAT- rnx EXOT2AN APXFIN. A,w^oy»» slg ro^g ncclnyc^i'ocg^ p. I2. Edit. Venet. 8vo, 1545.
The Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this threefold Divifion of Subjedfs.^ as may be feen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occafion to the prefent Comment. He has chofen however to flile the ’Ojoayia, or Heavenly Bodies rather Continge?its of higher Order than Beings necejfary., as imagining the former to be their truer Charader.
It may be here added, that the Peripatetics con- fined ^uVj-: or Nature y for the moll part, to this Earth of our’s, where they confidered her as the aP/ive Principle of Life in Plants and Animals. Hence therefore they did inguilhed not her from thofe
of Art^ by their Necejfty (for the Effedts of both they treated as contingeiit) but from the Caufe in 2 Natural
NOTES on Treatise the Firji. 267
Natural Subjecfls operating within^ in Artificial with- €uty as has been already oberved, p. 256, 257.
I T may be farther added, that they placed thefe Efi^eSls of Art and Nature^ and indeed all other Contingents whatever, in a middle Rank between Things Necejfiary^ and Things Impojfiihle. The Rea- fon was evident. Things NecejJ'ary could not but be ; Things ImpoJJible could not be ; but Contingents were ra hvcci Itvai, that is, were
equally fiufceptlhle both of Being and Non-beings
But yet tho’ all Contingents admitted on their Hypothefis both of Being and Non-being, yet they juppofed fome to have a greater Tendency to Ex- ifkAce, and others to have a lefs. The fird: Species of thefe they ftiled rd, cog sttI to ttoaO the ^Things which happen for the mofi part ; the Lad:, td W b^ccrloif, the Things which happen lefs frequently.
Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art oftener obtain their End^ than mifs it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monllers, and the Mufician, if an Artid:, drikes oftener the right String than the WTong) hence it was, that they ranged the Effects of Nature and Art among thofe Contingents which were td dg iirl to ttoAu, Contingents of greater Frequency. But yet as thefe Efrects were not from the Hypothefis necefjary\ and contrary to thefe upon occafion happened, hence it was, that whenever either Nature or Art became Caufes of the td Itt sXocrloj^ thofe rarer Events., in fucii cafe they ('Nature and ArtJ were confidered
by
268
NOTES oa Treatise theFirft.
by thcfe Philofophers as a’lnjii x«1a (rufipEiSuxs'f Caufes by way of Accident^ and not according to their own EJJence and diftinguifhing Charabler. In fuch Inftances it v/as that they afTumed the Name of T'jxn or Fortune or Chance,
T'JX’i having moftly Reference to Works of Men^ dvlofcc%y to Works of Nature. The Inftances given by Tketiiifius^ in Cafes of Chaiice and Fortune.^ are as follow, A Tile falls from a Houfe. The End of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither Nature would carry it by the common Law of Gravity. In falling it firikes and wounds a Paf- fenger. This lafl Event is from Chance. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he difcovers a hidden Treafure. This laft Event is from Fortune. And thus, adds Themif ius^ dvln
fAv ccvjr.v diVicc, dXXti A
xizrd The fame individual Action is the
Caufe of one Thing from its own peculiar Charadlery and of another Thingy by way of Accident. And again, fiv ay Twv iSTcag <rvf/,f3ixivovloov n rm (pva-tv v rnv TT^odiosat'j diTccv Troog sItteTv, ccXX* a xaS"’ dvlrv . a raL^y '^^oYjXS'BV 0 are r yJ^auig
xoilrjVE^^Tjy dxX^ £i Xixljd (ri)u piPfiKog. ^—Of thefe Events we may call Nature or Human Will in a man- ner the Caufe^ but yet not fo from themfelveSy and ac- cording to their own peculiar Effence ; for it was not for the Jake of what happened that either the Pafenger went forth y or the Tile fell dow^nward, but if any thing it was by Accident. Themift. in lib. 2. Natur. Aufciilt. p. 26. Edit._ Aid. See alfo Ariflot^ Natur. Aufeult. 1. 2* c. 4, 5, 6.
It
NOTES Treatise jF/^. 269
I T muft be here obferved, that nara (TujwjSfpuxoV [fy accident] means in no Part of thefe Quotations accidental^ as {landing for cafual ; for this would be mere Tautology j as to what is here faid concern- ing Chance, It means rather fomething by way of Appendage ; fomething Adventitious ; in other Words, it means Accident^ as adhering to Subjiance^ without which it can have no Beings tho’ fuppofe it ahfent or tahen away, the Nature of Subjiance is no way affedied. It was in this Senfe, the Peripatetics fuppofed Chance and Fortune to be Accidents or Ap^ pendages to Nature^ and Mind. According there- fore to them, the Suppofition of Chance and Fortune was fo far from excluding Nature and Mind from the Univerfe, that they demonftrably proved their Exiftence in it. For admitting their Account of Chance and Fortune to be juft ; if we grant the Acci- dents to exift, much more muft we grant the Sub- jedtSj and this too with that fuperior Dignity and Priority of Exifence^ which is evidently due to all Subjedls above their Accidents, Well therefore did the Philofopher conclude ilrs^ov rd ’Auro^arov, ^ rj Tu^v T8 N«, T7\<; Subfequent in Ex-
ijience^ Chance and Fortune to Mind and .Nature, Arifot.Natur, Aufc. 1. 2. c. 6.
From what has been faid, we fee the Reafon of that Enumeration of Caufes mentioned in the Be- ginning of the firft Note, where they are defcrjbed to be Necessity, Nature, Man, and For-^
TUNE.
To
NOTES on Treatise tlx Firjl,
To Necessity they refexred all thofe Things and Events, which they fuppofed of necejfary Ex^ ijlence. ; fuch as the Univerfe, the Heaveply Bodies, and their Motions j Truth, and all Univerfals, together with the or Principle,, or firji Caufe
pf all fhlnp.
To Nature, Man, and Chance, they re- ferred all, Cpntingmts \ to Nature and Man^ obtaining their End^ they referred Contingent^ of greater Fre- qiiency \ to the fame Caufes, confidered as operating befide their. Endj and thus becoming Chance or For- iu?ie^ they referred, thofe oppofite Contingents^ of Ex- igence left ufual.
And hence as Art and; Fortune were both con- verfant abouf the fame Subjects {viz, the Contingent y and not the Necejfary and were both referable to the fame Origin ( viz. Many becoming a Caufe, ei- ther defignediy or undefignedly ) hence the Meaning of that Verfe, cited hy Arifiotle from Agatho v
TiX^n Tu;^'/5y ^
Art loveth Fortune^ ; Fortune loveth Art,
A s much as if he had faid, that thefe were Undred Powers^ which amicably confpired to afiift each other y that Art often helped Fortune y by judi- cious ConduSi y and that Fortune often helped Arty by lucly Incidents, See Arifot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4. More might be cited, but we cannot lengthen a Note, which has proved, ’tis to be feared, too long already.
Note
NOTES Treatise theFirJl. 2ji
Note VIII. ^p. 23. I mean, said he, by
BEGINNINb, THAT CaUSE FOR THE SaKE OF WHICH,
As the Cause here fpoken of, is that Caiife ufually called Final, it may be afked, how it comes in this place to be conhdered as a Beginning.
The Anfwer is, that what comes laji in Pra^ice^
Hands in Theory firft ; or in other Words, the Order of Ideas in the IntelleH of the Artift is exadly in- vertedy with refpedl to the Order of his Energies.
Thus Jmmonius^—^o(,^oX\s ydp t?? pch
TO t£A©^ ytyviroit dp^v rv? Trpa^ew?* i^irocKiv cl's TY\q Trpajfw? TO teA©^, dp^v tv^ ^soopiocg, oiov 0 Ot>£oJo]w(^j i7rirocfe]g olxov, Xiysi koS* Iocvtov^ Ittstoo^ yw olnov ZTOl^TCCl * OTJip £0 (nii’U70Ca‘l/>lXy XwAuTiXO'^ ofJi.Ppuv xau/X(j6Ti;v t»to il hK dv yivoiro^ yivo- fxivng opo(pvg, ^E'jteoQev Iv app^frat rrig ^soopixg. zrpo- Qocivoov (PvTlV ’^AAAa T^TO dv yhoiTO, yi- yo^ivoov Tol'xj^v’ Ztoi vx. dv ymivTOy f/>‘n ozTo[^Xri9h- TWV Ge/XEA/wW* oV J'e ^S^sKlOk ix dv j3An9ii£Vy jUV o'pUX"
Gewjus- Tf}g y^g. evT0iv9tx xfcriXn^ev 'n ^Ecopioc, EmuGsy »v dpx^roci ri 'srpd^ig, zs-pOTipov yd^ opvTTst t>'v ym* ii9' arw |3aAAEi tov 9£p<.£Xiov’ hrcc iysipsi rotyyg* vg-epGV Iwiri^ncri tw opG(pvVy nrtg eV* teA*!^ z!-pd^£'jjg. >1 f dp^ij Ts-pd^sug^ teA^ Tvg 9€U)plxg,
AfxiA. stg xxTYiy. p. 15. Edit. Venet. 8vo, ' -
For in general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice \ and fo reciprocally y the End of PraPrice^
the
NOT ES an Treatise theFirJi.
the Beginning of Theory, Thus for Inftance : An Ar- chlte^j being ordered to build a Houfe^ fays to himfef^ I am ordered to build a Houfe ; that is to fay^ a certain Defence,, to protedl againf the Rains and the Heats, But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds
and fays But there can be no Roof if there be no
fValls y and there can be no Waltsy without fome Foun- dations ; nor can there be laid Foundations ^ without open- ing the Earth, At this Pointy the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Practice or Adiion. For fir ft he opens the Earth ; then lays the Foundation ; then raifes the Walls \ and laftly puts on the Roof which is the End of the Adiion or Pradficcy [but Beginning of the Theory'] as the Beginning of the Pradlice was the End of the Theory, See alfo Arijl. Ethic, Nicom. i-3- C.3.
Note IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abfence of Health, ^f.] Fide Platon, de Rep. 1. i. tom. 2. p. 34^’ T.dit. Serrani. *^X2(r7r£^ ^ ’ipoio
£1 (TOOfJ^XTAy Eivxi dOOfj.xTi^ « zrpotrdsiTxi tIv^'
ilzTcif av, on ZTocvruzeoLCi yAv zepoadCriXi. did rx'j'cx ^ n TB^vri IxTpiyrn v'ov EpsyAvriy ort (Tuyd
is~f zro'j?!pd,v, Jx E^xpKsT dvrcp roArcp sivoci, ^uem- adrnodumy inquamy fi a me quarereSy an fatis fit Corporiy ut fit Corpus y an alia quapiam re indigent : refponderemy, omnim indigere. Atque hdc quidem de Caufd medicina: ars itunc eft inventay quoniam Corpus per fie profligatum efty neque ipji fatis efty ut fit hujufmodi.
Note X. p. 26.. Or is it not absurd
TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ArT OF
Imp OS-
273
NOTES on Tk-e AT nt the Firjl.
Impossibilities?] What is here faid concerning the Difference between thofe things for which we may poffibly wijh^ and thofe which we actually purfuey is expreffed in the Ethics of Arijiotle^ 1. 3. C. 2* Tlpoocipeo-ig [/\v 5/ctp an rm st
rig (pocin ■srpoaipek&cui, ^oKofyi ay slvai. f3^\n(ng
J*’ Ig-] ruv d^vvc6TCi)v, oTov dc^oc'joca-ioig, T’here is indeed no determined Choice of Adiion with refpedi to Things impojfihle ; and if any one Jhould fay he had fo deter- minedy he would appear to be a FooL But there mays be a Willing or Longing after things impofible \ as for infanccy never to die.
Note XL p. 27. The Suggestions of Will, and uninstructed Instinct.] Willy jSsXwKj or ’'ops^ig ; uninflrudfed Infindly
cpegij oiKoyir^. See before, Note IIL
Note XII. p. 29. The Want or Absence OF something appearing good; relative TO Human Life, AND attainable by Man,
BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNIN- STRUCTED Faculties.]
The Cause here defcribed is the to' %
Vvfxa, or FINAL. Ariflotk in his PhyficSy 1. 2.
c. 3. in enumerating the various forts of Caufes,
reckons among the reft to' dg to' ts-
^ T ayaSov twu aAAwv. to » iviy.oc jSeA-
hrovy t£A(^ twv aAAwv iS-gAst sivxi. To thefe may be added that Caufcy which is conftdered as the Endy and Good of all the ref. For thaty for whofe fake all T the
274
N OT ES on Treatise theFtrJl,
the Others are deemed necejfary^ has jujl Pretenfms to be beft^ and to be the End of them all. To this he fubjoins, confonant to what is faid in the Dialogue— J'iaCpepETw pxTiJ'Ey auro iWm dyoc^ov ^ (poctvofxmv ccyMv — Let it make no Difference whether we call this End^ real Good^ or only apparent Good. So in the Beginning of his Ethics — Yldaot, TroitTOi /xe-
0|U,oiw? h Tf 7^ dyoc&S
7iv^ B(pt£<^txi ^oxsZ Alo y,oiXug a7rf(pi?vavT0 t dyx^ S-ov, » •sravra l(pt£Tat. Every Art^ and every orderly Speculation^ fo likewife every Adlion^ and determined Choice ofPurfuity appear all of them to tend toward fomt Good. Well therefore have they pronounced Good tube that^ toward which all things tend.
In the Definition here treated, the Words \rela ' tive to Human Life^ exprefs that Part of the Stoic Definition of Art tI rjp^^pvrov ruv fy
Tw ^<w.] They were omitted in the Definition, p, 17. as more properly belonging to the prefent Defini- tion, which refpe(Jls Art in its final Caufe. Sec page 261,
That what is perfect and felf-fufficient is above the fecondary Helps of Art j that our own Weaknefs and Infufficiency and the Profpedl of procuring that ab~ fent Good, by which we all hope to fupply ourfelves, where deficient j that this is the Source not only of all Arts.^ but (joined to focial Affedlion) is the Origin., and Cement of Human Society; fee (befides the Place here treated) pages ii, 12; and of the third Treatife^ p. 147 to p. 157.
Thus
275
NOTES on Treatise the Firfl.
Thus the Poet in Stobceus^ p. 515.
Xpftw TToivY rt « Xpfiw KEv ayfupot;
Need all things taught : What cannot Need invent ?
Acre A ELY alfo to this, Virgil^ in his firft Georgicy having told us of the various Changes to the worfe, which happened in the natural ^ox\d immediately fubfequent to the Golden Age, goes on to enumerate the feveral Inventions of Men, which were the na- tural Refult of this their newly indigent State, He at lafl fums up the whole by faying
Turn varies venere artes : labor omnia vicit ImprobuSy ^ duris urgent in rebus ege.stas.
Where (according to the Dodrine in the Dia- logue) Want is made the Beginning or Origin of Arts. The Poet even refers this Difpenfationy this Introdu(5tion of Indigence^ CarCy and Solicitudcy to the immediate Will of Providence, aefling for the Good of Mankind; left Plenty ftiould lull them into floathful Lethargy y fo as to forget their noblejt and mojl atiive Faculties.
Fater ipfe colendi
Hand facilem efe viam voluity primu/q-, per artem Movit agrosy curis acuens mortalia cor day Nec torpere gravi pajfus fua regna veterno.
Note XIII. p. 32. Co-existent, replied HE, AS IN A Statue, ^c. Successive, as in T 2 A
NOTES on Treatise tbeFirfi,
A Tune or Dance, 6’^.] This Divifion of Beings or Produ<5lions we find mentioned by Jri~ Jiotle in his Phyfics^ (1. 3. c. 8.J where explaining
his Do(5lrine concerning Infinite^ he fays ’axa*
Itte) ro ftvat, 'K{/.£^cc eV), koc) 0
dyooVy rtp ccs] uXXo koc] dxXo yiv£(Boiiy aVw xoci to dis-sipov. In as much ^7; Being /V manifoldy fuch as is the Being of a Day or public Feftivaly ( which exiji by continually becoming fomething farther ) fuch alfo is the Being and Nature of Infinite, The fame Sentiment foon after is more fully explained and opened.
TO ^TTiipOV J XoCf/>(3oCVSlVy Wf TodV Tt * oloV
d]^^po}zroVy V oixiccD * aAA* cog -^ixipoc Xeyelocty xod i dywy olg ro iivooiy cog ^rtoc rig yiyovsvy aAA* del £v yeverei xoci (p9opd. We are not to conceive of Infi- nitCy as of a pofitive particular Subfiance, like a Man or a Houfe ; but rather as we pronounce Exijlence of a Day or public Feftivaly which have their EJfencey fiot as fenfibky individual Subfiances y but by a continued Procedure of Being a?id ceafing to be, ^
Note XIV. p. 32. ^What is Human Life, BUT A Compound of Parts thus fleet- ing, ^c.] It is not inelegantly faid in the
Ethics fo often referred to *H ^cov mp-
yeid lig £fiy Koc) txocg~\^ ■srept rodoroc xocl r^lroig evspyeTy cc xccl pcooXiToc dyxurd * olov 0 y.vj jwyo-tHoV, r'/] dxoYi zrepi rd yJXviy 0 J'g (piXoy.x9ijgy rij J'tccvoi'x wepl rd 9coop'^y.x'lx * Je xxl rcov Xofziroov exxg~^. Life is a certain Energy, and each Man energizes about thofe Subje^Sy and with thofe Faculties y for which he hath the greatefi Affedlion j the Muficiany with his
Hearingy
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
Hearings about Sounds harmonious ; the Studious^ with his intelledf^ about Matters of Speculation ; and in like manner each Man elfe of the various forts befide. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 10. c. 4.
Note XV. p. 34. Every Art will be
ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WoRK OR
Energy,] The Cause here treated is the For- mal, called by various Names ; the the
the Ti Iri, the rb rl h sTvui,
f
I N the Beginning of the above-cited Ethics^ after the Author has told us that every Arty and Human Adlion tend to fome Good or Endy he adds
Ti; (poAviixi Tcov TiXm • rd, fji.lv' yd p sktiv hspyeioct*
rd (J'g dvrdg^ ’ipyoo rivd--- But there appears a Difference in Ends : For fome are Energies; fome, ever and above thefe Energies y are certain Works. In ^intilian's Injiitutes the fame Dijiindfiony with refped to the End of Arts, is mentioned /. 2. <*. 181
But here perhaps it may be afked, if dXXArts are ended and accomplilhed in fome Energy or TVorky and this Energy or Work be almoft univerfally that abfent Goody toward which they all tend, and for the fake of which they are all exerted ; ffor a Dance y which is an Energy, and a Houfsy which is a Work, are certain abfent Goods or Pleafures, for the fake of which certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be alked, whence then the Difference between the Formal Caufe and the Fhialy the Pinal y as in Note XIL it has been already treated ?
T3
277
The
NOTES on TREivxisE the Firjl^
The Anfwer to this is, that they concur and ate the fame. To fiv ri eo, Jcai to » ivix,<Xy iv lo.- 7he Formal Caufe and the Final are one. Arifi, Nat. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 7. If they differ., it is (as Joannes Grammaticus obferves in commenting on this Place ) a Difference rather in the Dime and Manner of our view- ing them, than in their own Effence and Nature. It may not perhaps be improper to tranfcribe his own Words, Tuvlov tw aptO/xw to' teAo? xcal to t^
^i<T£l [XOVV} J'nx(p£pOV, COg £fp7IT<Xl, Koil TW ^pOVW, 0TlXl>
fxh ydp wg yivof^svcDy xocl y.'^7rw ov ^supv^at^ TiXog iriv * OTXv J'e, ccg y£vofAsvoVy £l^og. Dhe End and the Yorm are numerically the fam,e^ differing (as has been f aid) /;z Relation and Dime. For thus the fame Thing, while confidered as in its Progrefs to Completion, but as not yet complete, is fo long an End ; zvhen confidered as adfually complete, is no longer an End, but a Form. And thus is this Queftion one way anfwered, by acknowledging that thefe two Caufes co-incide, and differ not in their Effence or real Charadler, but rather in the Time and Manner of our contemplating them.
But there is another Anfwer, and that is derived from the twofold Nature of final Caufes. According to this Doctrine, Arts have not only a nearer and more imm-ediate End, (as a Ship is the End of Ship- building, or Navigating the End of Pilotry) but they have a fcill remoter and higher Etid, a riXo; Tf- ?,iKWTcc\ov, that is to fay, Man, Human-Kind, or (in other V/ords) tho. Utility or Elegance of Human Life. Thus the Stagirite. ’EryJv ydp J'-a* il^lg TiXog ' ^iyjwg ydp to » iviv.oc. For WE OUR- SELVES
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
SELVES alfo are in fome fort an End ; for the final Caufe is twofold, Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have refpedi to this ultimate End, thefe two Caufes will be found to differ ^ and be really diilinc^ from each other.
And thus it is that in fome refpedls they agree y and in others they differ^ according to the above Diflindions eflablifhed by this Philofophy.
Note XVI. p. 38. O Art ! Thou Praise OF Man, Eufiratiusy in the Beginning of his
Comment on the Ethics of Arijiotle^ has the follow- ing elegant Encomium on Arts, Aer r"oi; laulw VTTOcp^m rov £v9pcozcrov^ dviTriT'n^svTov fxi- vovlocy xx\ y(jetpo(Sk Kxl d^pvroi^ Twv dXoym
aAA* Iau7w re kcc\ olxXoig S'loc r^g
ri JcalopOav. ’^Ert (^6 itc&\ f/.£pn <ro(pixg di
dg 7^v (pC<riv p*ijU,8jW£yai, aou uXixig p^pc«/U£va<, xal raulatf €?3>j Tsspili^i/Mvoci • dg axl dioc r^'Jo juv ^£iv dvTccg Tov (piXoa-opov a7ro7r£|U7re<3-aj, STrslloc xot,) (rdfjt.0^1 ZToXuTTOi^sT xa) zjoXvfAeIix.poX(a (sm^s^sfxmg d dv9pcc-nTog, ddiroci xal ttoAAwv twv e^u)9£v efg j3oii9eiccVy Iva, 'srpo'g Tw OrZS’Xdg^ xa) to su ^vv dveixirodig-ug avid TTspiyivoiloj xal per did rm ruv ^pm^fjem svdeiav dvaaouloirlo, ’Et f/>h »v rdv peet^ovoov ^eooprpedroov pAfuo^, oux £^ei xa] zjpdg rd Ixdrloo xal rd ztrpbf zripi’’ ZTotriTiV .(7WaaT©^ KOcla(p£p£^aiy V'TrrpelrTna'iv di rsyyat dvldy oTcai rd Toig dv^ptczjtvoig (Tw^aatrt Ipyd^ovlai p^pWijUa, d(p£Xi([A£voov Tcdv ^eipcovaiilovvluv dvrd
zrpog rd TfAiWTfpa.
279
Note
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl.
Note XVIL p. 44. The Efficient, the Material, the Final, and the Formal.] That is to fay, to Kivwccvy ^ to » hsaxy to
Thus in his 65th Epiflle. Caufam Art-
Jfoteles putat tribus modis did. Prima^ inquit^ caufa ejl ipfci Materia., fine qua nihil potefit effidi. Secunda, Opifiex. Pertia^ Forma quee unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam fiatuat^ nam hanc Arijioteles Idos (sT^og) vocat, ^Mrtct quoque^ inquit^ his accedit, Propojitum totius eperis.
Quid filt hoc^^ aperiam. Ms prima Jlatua caufia ejl : nunquam enim fiadia ejfiet., nifii fiuififiet id^ ex quo ea fiunderetur., ducereturve. Secunda caufia., Artifiex ejl ; non potuijjet enim ces illud in habitum Jlatuee fiigurariy nifit accejfiijfient perit^ manus. Tertia caufia ejl Forma :
^ neque enim Jiatua ijia Doryphoros aut Diadumenos voca- retur, nifit hcec illi ejfiet imprejfia fiacies. ^arta caufia efi, fiaciendi Propojitum : nam nifit hoc fiuififiet., fiadla non ejjet. ^id eji Propojitum f ^od invitavit arid fit cent, quod ille fiecutus fiecit. Vel pecunia eJi hoc., Ji yendlturus fiabricavit vel gloria, Ji laboravit in no- wen vel religio, fit donum templo paravit. Ergo & hecc Caufia eji, propter quam Jit. An non putas inter caufias fiadli operis numerandum, quo remoto fiadlum non eJJ'et ?
Aristotle’s own W ords ai'e as follovy. y.lv Q-j rjTTOV tzdUov Asysrut to e? s ylviroci rt IvDTvdp'xovT^ • oTcu, d y^ocX'^iQi; t» 3^ 0
(plciX'AC, T5J T'cT'XV yiTO, KXKOV Fz,
NOTE onTRZ&.Ti%^ the FirJ}. iSi
TO ^ TO Tzroi^x^nyij.oc * t8to eov o Xoy(^
0 T8 t) SlVXt, ^ rcc ThTH yivYI * oIoV T» TT^iT^V TX duo wpof £u, oAw? o apt9^^of, ra y.s^ri rx ci*
Tw A03/W. *'£ti, o3-fv 71 ap;)(^ii f^sIxf^oXvi v zs-piOTn^
V 7? T»f TlpfpxWeWf * OiOV 0 ]3&’JA£U (TiZ?, xC[m* 0
‘rrxlvpy T» Ts>cj;» * oAw? to Trotsy t« 7rotx/>t£y», to
[xslxpxXXov Ta fxslxPxXXoi^svn. w? to' t£A(^ '
T«T0 (5^’ eV* to' « f^'EHOS • oTov Ta TTSpiWXTsTv ij •
t/ TTspiTTXTsT ^ <^<xpA£y Iva )Co:l EioroyTEj
ouroogy o^op^s^x XTro.Si^cjoaivxi to' umov.
I N manner that may he called a Caufe^ out of which y exi fling as a Fart of ity any thing is made or compounded. Thus is Brafs the Caufe of a Statue^ Silver of a Cupy and fo alfo the higher Generay in which thefe are included [as Metal, the Genus in- cluding Brafs and Silver ; Body, the Genus including Metal, ^c. b’r.] In another wayy the Form and Ex- emplar of any thing is its Caufe \ that is to fayy in other Words y the Definition or Rationale of its EJfence [that which, charadlerizing it to be fuch a particular thing, diftingui flies it from all things elfe] and of this Ra- tionale the feveral higher Genera. Thus the Caufe of the Diapafon or OcStave is the Proportion of two to ofte ^ and more generally than thaty is Number ; a?id is more- over the feveral PartSy out of which this Definition is formed. Add to this Caufey that other y from zvhence the original Principle of ChangOy or of Ceafing to change ; as for inflancey the Perfon who deliberates is the Caufe of thaty which refults from fuch Delibera- tion ; the Father is the Caufe of the Son ; and in gene- ral the Efficicnty of the thing offered ; the Power changingy of th'a thing changed. Befldes theje CaufeSy
there
2S2
NOTES on Treatise theFirJl.
there is that alfo^ which is confidered as the End ; that is to fay^ the Caufe^ for the fake of which the thing is done. Thus the Caufe of Exercifing is Health, For if it be ajked^ IVhy does he ufe Exercife ? JVe fay^ To preferve his Health ; and having faid thus much, we think we have given the proper Caufe, Ariftot. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 3.
Addition to NOTE III.
The Peripatetic Definition of Nature, given p.2S^- tho' in fome degree illuftrated p, 266. yet being flill from its Brevity perhaps obfcure, the fol- lowing Explication of it is fubjoined.
In the fir ft place, by Nature Xhit Peripatetics meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes and Men, by which they are faid to live, and to be di- ftinguifhed from .things inanimate. Nature therefore being another Name for Life or a vital Principle, the firft AFt of this Principle, throughout all Sub- je<5ls, is univerfally found to be of the following kind ; namely, to advance the Subject, which it en~ livens, from a Seed or Embryo to fomething better and more perfect. This Progrejfton, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that Nature is a Principle of Motion. — — But then this Progrejfton or Growth is not infinite. When the Subject is m.ature, that is, hath obtained its Com- pletion and perfect Form, then the Progrejfion ceafes. Here therefore the Bufinefs of the vital Principle becomes different. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a Form, but to preferve to its Suhjebi a Form already acquired. And thus is
it
NOTES Treatise theFirfl.
it that Nature is 2l Principle of Reji^ Stability^ or Ceafing to move. And fuch indeed fhe continues to be, maintaining, as long as pojfihle^ the Form com- mitted to her Care, till Time and external Caufes in the firft place impair it, and induce at length its Dijfolution^ which is Death.
And thus has it been (hewn how Nature may be called a Principle both of Motion and Ceasing to move.
As to the reft of the Definition, namely that Nature is a Principle^ which inheres in its Sub- je(ft immediately^ ejfentially^ and not by way of Acci- dent \ no more is meant by this, than that the Nature or Life in every Being, which hath fuch Principle, is really and truly a Part of that Being, and not detached dead feparate from it, like the Pilot from the Ship, the Mulician from the In- ftrument. For to thefe Subje^s are thofe Artijis the Principles of Motion and Reft., yet do they in no Senfe participate with them of vital Sympathy and Union.
283
END NOTES on Treatise ihePirft.
N O T E S
O N
TREATISE the Third;
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS.
Note L p. 107. Nature seems to TREAT Man, ^c.] Ut Phidias potejl a primo injiituere fignum^ idque perficere ; potejl ab alio inchoatum accipere ^ abfolvere : huic ejl fapientia fimilis. Non enim ipfa genuit hominem^ fed accepit a natura inchoatum ; hanc ergo intuenSy debet injiitutum illudy quafi fignumy abfolvere. Cic. de Fin. IV. 13. p, 304. Edit. Davif.
Note II. p. 113. Practice too often CREEPS, See p. 136. and Note X.
Note III. p. 114. The Sovereign Good IS that, the Possession of which renders us happy.] Klr,(T£i ycc^ oi
By the Pojfeffwn of Thwgs good, are z > ike
286 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
the Happy made happy* Platon. Conviv, p. 204. tom 2. Edit. S errant, Arrian. EpiSf. 1. 3. c. 22*
P* 453*
The Reader will be pleafed to obferve, that, in all Quotations from the Difrertations of EpiSfetus colledled hy Arrian the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes ^artOy publifhed by his learned and ingenious Friend, Mr. UpTOPt,
Note IV. p. 115. Certain original Characteristics and Pre-concep- . TioNs, The Pre-conceptions here fpoken
of, are called by the Latins^ Prcenotiones^ or Antici- pationes 5 by the Greeks^ or ’'Emiuty with
the occafional Epithets of either xoivc&l, £/x(p\j]ot^ or (puo-iJca).
>
^Tis evident that all Men, without the leaft Help of Art, exert a kind of Natural Logic ; can ia fome degree refute^ and proue^ and render a Reafon.
Now this cannot be (as the meaneft Proficient in Logic well knows) without general IdeaSy and general Propofitionsy becaufe a Syllogifm of Particu- lars is an ImpofTibility. There mufr be therefore fome natural Faculty y to provide us thefe Generals. This Faculty cannot be any of the SenfeSy for they all refpedt Particulars only. Nor can it be the rea- foning or fyllogizing Faculty y for this does not form fuch Generals, but ufe them when formed. There only therefore remains thQ Faculty that is to
fay, the Inductive Faculty ; the Faculty, which by Induction of fmilar Individualsy forms out of the 2 particular
NOTES on Treatise the I'hird,
particular and the many what is general and one. This Species of Apprehenfton is evidently our firjl and earliejl Knowledge, becaufe all Knowledge by Reafoning dates its Origin from it, and becaufe, ex- cept thefe twoy no other Knowledge is poflible.
A s therefore every Ear, not abfolutely depraved, is able to make fome general DiJiinSfions of Sound ; and in like manner every Eye, with refpedl to Objects of Vifton y and as this general Ufe of thefe. Faculties, by being diffufed through all Individuals, may be called common Hearing, and common Vifion, as op- pofed to thofe more accurate Energies^ peculiar only to Artijis : fo fares it with refpedl to the Intelle£i. There are Truths, or Univerfals of fo obvious a kind, that every Mindy or Intellebl not abfolutely de- praved, without the lead Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The Recognition of thefe, or at lead the Ability to recognize them, is called Common Sense, as being a Senfi common to ally except Lunatics and Idiots,
Farther, as this Power is called Ko*vo\ Nar, fo the feveral Propofitionsy which are its proper Objeds, are called or Pre-conceptions y as
being previous to all other Conceptions. It is eafy 40 gather from what has been faid, that thefe
muft htgeneraly as being formed by Indu^ion ; as alfo naturaly by being common to all Meuy and previous to all Inftrudion. Hence therefore their Definition, ’^Eo ^ ^ 7rpoA»)\)y»?, moioc (poa-tmi tm'j xaOoAa. ‘‘ A Pre-conception is the ?2aturalAp^ prehenfm of what is general y or univerfaW Diog.
Laert,
287
288
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Laert. /. 7. f. 54 SesuKo Arrian. EpiSl. 1. 1. c. 12. I. 3. c. 6. Cic, de Naturd Dear, 1. i. c. i6> 17. Pint, de Placit. Philofoph, 910. c.
Note V. p. 115. — And that the Dif- ference LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO Particulars.] This was called 'E'pccpfAoyv ruv -nrpoAji^/fcov Itt) — ra? (puciJca?
7!TpoXv\p£i^ l(poipy.o^£iv TOiTg Itt) aVtai?,
Epii^. 1. 1. c. 22. p. 1 14, 1 16. Edit, Upt, See an eminent Inftance, illuflrating the Truth of this Rea- foning, in the fame Author, /. 4. c, i, p, 545.
’Evvoi#jw,£y oTty &C.
' Note VI. p. 120. Why are there, who SEEK Recesses, Multi autem ^ funt^ ^
fuerunt.^ qui earriy quam dicOy tranquilitatem expetenteSy a negotiis publicis fe removerlnty ad otiumque perfu-
gerint. His idem propojitum fuity quod regibus y ut
ne qua re egerenty ne cui parere7ity libertate uterentur : cujus proprium eji' fic viverey ut velis, ^are cum hoc commune fit potentia cupidorum cum iisy quos dixiy otiofis : alteri fe adipifici id pojfe arbitrantury fi opes magnas habeant 5 alteri fit contenti fint ^ fiuoy ^ parvo, Cic. de Offic. 1. I. €.20,21.
Note VII. p. 121. — The Sovereign Good^ they have taught us, ought to be,
The original Pre-conceptions of the Sove- reign Good here recited, may be juftified by the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted.
Agreeable
NOTES on Treatise theT!hird.
Agreeable to Nature. Neque ulla alia
in rsy nifi Natura, quarendum ejfe illud Sum- mum BONUM, quo omnia referrentur» Cic. Acad. 1. I. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif.
Conducive to well-being. — EpiSfetui c2l\\% that Truth or Knowledge^ which refpe£fs our real Hap^ pinefs dxiidsiav tijv zsrfpt tv; Bv^oii/u.ovfccc] the Truth or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living^ but which conduces to Living well [» tw vspi ZHN, aAAa rvv 7rpo; to EY ZHNJ Jrrian. Epi£t, 1. I. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Upt. ‘At xotval iTzpX Uociixovioc; moioci — TO ZHN KATA ^TSIN, ^ Tov xdjcc (pvcrtv ^iov, E T A AIM ON I AN *
Ts-po; THTOi;^ To ET ZHN, to iZ ^tsv,
Tvv iv^wfocv, ’ETAAIMONIAN (pach iTmi, Our common Pre-conceptions concerning Happiness call it the Living according to Nature 5 farther than thisy they fay it is Living or Exifing well^ the Life of well-being. Alex. Aphrod. ttsq] iLvy, p. 157. Edit. Jld. ^ ^ ^
Accommodate to all Places and Times— Antoninus^ fpeaking of that Happinefs^ which he deemed our Sovereign Goody calls it fomething which was in our Power HANTAXOT AIHNE- KOS, every where and perpetually. 1.7. f.s4.
Durable — and Jndeprivable. — Nifi sta<*>
EILI lA FIXO ^ PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS
tjfenemo potefi. Tufc. Difp. 1. 5. c. 14. p-372. Edit.
U Davif
2g6
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Davif. So immediately after, in the fame page — ^ An dublurh ejl^ quin nihil fit habendum in eo generCy quo ' vita beat a completiiVy fi id poffit amitti ? nihii ehim intehdreficersy nihil exjlinguiy &c. Ka» t/? dl\j\Y\ "A svpoKXy iiv 0 rv)(fiv ^ Xiyot
JCaiWp >5 Koci<rxpog (piXog^ oixXx y^dpcc^, dvXmg, -urv-
pslog^ ccXXoi rpKTf^^vpicn ; r\ J'’ ETPOIA ^Tug txi^^ TO AIHNEKEE ANEMHOAI- 2TON. And what fiort ofi Happinefis is thiSy which any thing intervening may embarrafis ; I fiay not Caefar, cr Csefar’^ Friendy but a CroWy a Piper y a Fever y a thoufiand things bejide? Happiness fiurely, implies nothing fo muchy as Perpetuity and being su- perior TO Hindrance or Impediment. Arrian. Epidf. 1. 4. c. cp* p. 585. Edit. Upt. See aifo, /. 2. c. II. 227.
Self-derived. — Atque hoc dabitisy ut opinory fii modo Jit aliquid ejfie beatum, id oportere totum poNi IN poTESTATE Sapientis: namy fii amitti vita beata potejly beata ejfie nonpotejl. Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. C. 27. p. 163. — roTg fiiv xaT dxihhi'Xv jcxKoif Ivx piTl TTspizji'osr'ip 0 Itt dvlcp [ot Gfoi] to ttxv
sOivlo. That Man might not^all into real Evils y the Gods have put the whole in his own Power. M. Ant. 1.2. f. II. Iriv, 0 TCoig a^Gpw7r(^ ;
VjjroL^wyAy.l^^cciiJ.ovYi<rxiy IIANTA HE 0EAEI IIOIEIN, JcwAufdGai, avxfHd^£cr9xi. For vjhat is ity that every Man living fie eh ? To be fiecurely fiixedy to be happ'jy to do all things accord- ing to his own Will, not to be hinderedy not to be compelled. Arr. Epidl. 1. 4. c. i. p. 539, 540.
Note
NOTES on Tr EATISE the nird.
Note VIII. p. 125. The Political and Lucrative, th e Con te mpl ati ve and Pleasurable.] This fourfold Diftindlion of Lives is mentioned in Jriftotle's Ethics^ 1. i. c. 5.
Note IX. p. 131. ^“Pleasure
Whom Love attends,
alluding to Horner^ Iliad, H. V. 214*
Note X* p. 136. Suppose an Event were TO happen — not an Inundation, &c.] ^ee Arrian. Epidt. 1. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly addreflfed to the Seekers of Leifurey Retirement^ and Study. Part of it has been already quoted p. 290.
Tig HuTYi n ’ivpoioiy ^ c. See alfo the fame Author, i. 4. c. I. p. 567. n^g dytHsig^ ^c. and of the . Dialogue here commented, p. 113.
Note XL p. 137. — Is Acting a Circum- stance, ^r.] Etenim cognitio eontemplatioque na^- turre mama quodammdo atque inchoata fity ft nulla aSlio rerum confequatur. Ea autem adfio in hominurfi commodis tuendis maaime terhitur. Cic. de Offic. /. i. c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subfequent, is well worthy of Perufal.
Note XIL p. 140. — If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, ^V.] Sqq Arr. Epi^. 1, i. c. lOi p, no. ’Oparg IttI Td vojWj’o-jocce']©-’, &C.
Note XIII. p. 144. — Are alienated from IT, OR ARE indifferent TO IT?] Placet hiSy in- quity quorum ratio mihi prohatury fmul atque natum fit U 2 animal
^91
292 NOTES on Treatise theT^hird. .
animal (him enim eji ordiendum) ipfum fibi conciliari^ ^ commendari ad fe confervandum^ ^ fuum Jlatum^ ^ ad ea^ qua confervantia funt ejus Jiatus^ diligenda ; alienari autem ab interitu^ iifque rebus^ qua interitum videantur afferre, Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit, Dav. See alfo /. 5. 9. DeOffic, 1. i. c. 4.
TrpeV aulaV iv9vg ^zvo^Aivoi, Plut, Mor, p. IG38. b.
Note XIV. p. 155. Let it not be forgot
THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY,
The whole Argument to prove Society natural to Man, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken from the fecond Book of Plato'' s Republic, Sec Plat, tom. 2. p. 369, lAc, Edit, Serrani,
Note XV. p. 156. — Are not the Powers AND Capacities of Speech, The Argu-
ment in favour of Society, from our being poflefled of x6y(^^ or the /peaking Faculty, feems to have been much infilled on by the beft Authors of Anti- quity. ^
Atolt J'e TToXiTixov 0 ''Av9poi)wi^ fwoy, 'srocG-ri; fxc- XiTTTj^y xoc) "UTCiVTt^* ^doH jwaAAw, SiiXov,
*0'j91v ug ^«T?5v ^ (puVi? Xoyov J'g
fAOVO'J ^Au9p0d7ir^ £^£t TWV ^ccccv, *H p>h XV (pC^VV ra Ti^sog xcci AuTtTtjpa ig-i CTiy^sTov * Jio' xal roTg aAAwf xizdpyji ^ (py(rtg dvlcov eAiiAu-
6fv, cci3dvs(r9oii tx XvTrtjpx 3^ r(Aj\so
CTiixdivEiv dxXriXoig, *0 Xoyog bit\ to AtiXxv
TO (TU^CpfpOV, xal TO (^Xoc^spov • wrf iiOil TO ^Uociov,
xx,l TO aJ'ixcv. Talo yd^ Trpo'f too MxXet rof?
293
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
sluQpuzjoig TO [xovov hoc] xan?, hoc) Jixaia x«i
fltcTjxa ai(r6>i(rtv ’ V ^6 r^TU)v xotifcovioc ztoieT oihiocv
y.oc] ‘croAiv. The Rea/o» why Man is a Social Ani- mal than any Bee ^ or any herding Species whatever^
is evident from hence. Nature^ we fay.^ makes nothing in vain ; and Man, of all Animals^ is only poffefed of Speech. Bare Sound indeed may he the Sign of what is pleafurahle or painful ; and for that reafon is it com^ mon even to other Animals alfo. For fo far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Senfe of thofe Feelings, and ftgnify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in confequence of this, what is juji and unjujl. It is therefore given to Men, becaufe this, with refpeli to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Jufl and Unjuji, they only pojfefs a Senfe or Feeling, Now *tis the Participation or Com^ munity of thefe, which makes and conjiitutes both a Family, and a Polity. Arijiot, Polit, 1. i. c. 2.
’Eixovf? ydi^ Imv h tj? tcov isrpccy/j.ccTuv [tx
VOVfJt'XTx] • OCl J'i ipiOVXt TUV VOVJ^CCTCOV ItTiV
Kxt' iix THTO JfJ'ovrai VTTO tv; (pua-eco;, 7rpo;
TO ccvTuv cvfJt'Cctvnv r/xaf aAAiiAoj? rv; roc
vovi^ocrx — -IW xal hoivuvsTv aAAiiAoif, axl
eVfXTTOMTSVSTGxi * XOiVCOVlHOV yd^ ^COOV 0 ^AvSpCOTT^,
Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul ; and Sounds are declarative of thefe Ideas. And for this reafon were thefe Sounds imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other thefe Ideas, but that we might be enabled to communicate and LIVE IN Associations. For Man is by Nature a Social Animal; Ammon.ini, deinterpr. p. i6. b, U 3 Thus
294 NOTES on Treatise thel^hird.
Thus Cicero^ fye2ik!\n% Human Nature — Ornlm apportunitates kahilitatefque rellqui corporis^ modern- tlonem vocis, or at ion is vim^ qua conciliatrix eft human a maxume focletatls. De Legg. 1. i. c. g. p. 35. Edit. Davif.
Again in \i\% Offices ^ed qua natura principia
fnt communitaiis focietatis humana^ repetendum altlus videtur. Eft enim prhnum^ quod cernitur in univerfi generis humani focietate. Ejus enim vinculum eft R.atio^ & Or at 10; qua docendo^ difcendo^ com- municando., difceptandoy dijudicando., conciliat inter fs homines., conjungitque naturali quadam focietate De Ofiic. 1. I. c. 16.
Thus too in his Treatife De Nat. Deor. — — Jam yero domina rernrn (ut vos foletis dicere) Eloquendi VIS quam eft pr a clar^., quamque divina? ^a primum efficit^ ut ea^ qua ignoramus^ difcere^ ^ ea, qua fcimuSy alios docere poffimus. Deinde hac cohortamur^ hac per^ fuademus^ hac confolamur afflidios^ hac deducimus per- territos a timore^ hac geftie'ntes comprimimuSy hac cupi- ditates iracundiafque refinguimus : hac nos juris, le- gum, urbium focietate devinxit : hac a vita immani & ferd fegregavit. De Nat. Deor. 1. 2. c. 59.
р. 243. Edit. Davif. — See alfo ^int. Inji. 1. 2.
с. 16. and Ale/. Aphrod. Tripi P‘ ?5S’
Edit. Aid.
Note XVL p. 166. ’Tis from among the FEW,^V.] In Omni enim arte., vel fudio^ vel quavis fcientia., vel in ipfa virtute., optumum quodque rarijft- mum. efl. Cic.de Fin. 1. 2. c. 25. p. 158* Edit.Dav.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the Tmrd.
295
Note XVII. p. 167. — Working ever uni- formly ACCORDING TO THIS IdEA OF PeR- FECION, ^C.]
Thus Boethius^ addrefllng the Deity,
0 qui perpetua mundum ratione guhernaSy Terrarum ccelique SatoVy qui tempus ab avo Ire juhesy Jiabilifque mahens das cunbia moveri ; ^em non externce pepulerunt fingere caufce Materia fluitantis opus ; verum insita Summi Forma boni, livore carens : TucunSfa superno Duels ab EXEMPLO, pulchrurn pulcherrimus ipfe Mundum mente gerensy fmillque in imagine formans.
Confol. Philof. 1. 3. Metr. g.
Note XVIII. p. 167. — From some hidden HIGHER Motive, &e.] Mwolf ToivTdk
[fc. Toi TEpara] (pv(Tiv hg-lvy dkXcc /aev
(pu(r£i « (pvtrsiy uXX<x 'UToc.pcc (pvciv • xoc^oXHy
Kodi (puasi xodi xoctoc (pvo'iv, *H fAv /AfptJtii (pu(ng |yo\ xoc) g^ipwiv (pivysi, Aio^
TSTO ryj ^\v T8 dv9pco7Sjrii (Pucii, TO ripoeg ^rs (pva-ii lg~\vy ^Ti xocrd (pvTiv * ryj iJ’ oXyj (p^csiy etteI rca
TTCCVr'i TTOipd (pociv (ovdiV yee^ XOCXOV iv TW TTOtd]]) OVJC
£0 TToepd (pvtnVy dxxd (pJo-Ei xx\ xocld (pvTiv, Joannes Gram, in Ariftot. lib. 2. Natural Aufcult. Nibi/ enim fieri fine caufici potefi r nec quicquam fity quod fieri non potejl : necy ji id fiaSlum eft quod potuit fieri y portentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. 1. 2. c. 28. p. i8g. Edit. Davif.
U4
Nots
296 NOTES on Treatise the T!hird,
Note XIX. p. 169. Man is a social Rational Animal.] ^^oyiKov TroMnxovy Xcyixov xoivwviKov, XoyiKov rf/'Spov, thefe are Defcriptions of Humanity^ which we meet in every Page of EpiSfetus and Antoninus.
I T feems indeed to have been a received Opinion of old, that fo intimate was the Relation between thefe tv/o Attributes., that wherever there was Ra- tionality, Sociality followed of courfe. Thus Anto- ninus J'e to Xoyixov, fuSuV TroXmxov, !• 10.
f. 2. And again, more fully — - roww ttxv to
rng vospag (pva-scog tt^oj to' (rvyysvlg ofj^oiug
crTTiu^si, V [^c^KXov * oVw lg~^ apsilrov vrapd rd dxXoi, TctraVw Trpog to <rvyxipvx(r9iXt rd oIksIu ffVyycAo-^OH lTOt^.OT£pOV. 1. 9. f. 9.
I T is not perhaps foreign to the prefent Subjedt to obferve, that were the Eyes of any two Men what- ever to view the fame Obje^, they would each, from their different Place, and their different Organization^ behold it differently, and have a different Image. But were all the Minds in the Univerfe to recognize the fame Truth, they would all recognize it as one, their Recognition would be uniform, and themfelves in a manner would be one alfo. The Reafon is. Per- ception by the Senfes admits of more and lefs, better and worfe ; but Perception by the Intelledi, like Truths its Objedt, admits of no degrees, and is either no- thing at all, or elfe total, uniform, complete, and one. Hence therefore one Source of the Society, and as it
were
NOTES e« Treatise th Third.
were Communion of all Minds^ confidered as Minds, namely, the^Unity of Truths their common Objedt.
Again, every juft and perfect Society ftands on the Bafis of certain Laws. But Law is nothing more, than right and feen in bidding and forbidding.^ according to the Nature and Eflence of thofe Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefor* this Universe be whole, or general Society, there muft be fome common, general Law for its Conduct and Welfare ; and this Law muft, of con- fequence, be fome right and perfedl Reason, which paftes thro’ all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore wiv^X. Antoninus fay in the Beginning of this Note., that every thing rational., was of courfe foetal., fince Reason and Law appear to be the fame., and Law to be the Support and Bafts of all
Society. Thus too Cicero fequitur., ut eadem fit
in his [fc. Dus'] qua humano generi Ratio ; eadem Veritas utrobique fit ; eademque Lex, qua eji redii praceptio, pravique depulfio. De Nat. Deor. I. 2. c. 31. p. 180. See alfo the fame Author De Legg, i. I. c. 85 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davif. De Fin. 1. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See alfo Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 88. M, Anton. 1. 5. c. 16. 1. 6. c. 23, Ariji. Polit. as quoted in Note XV.
Note XX. p. 169. Nothing can be pur- suable, WHICH is destructive OF SoCIETY.] Si enim fic erimus affedlt, ut propter fuutn quifque emo- lumentum fpoliet, aut violet alterum, difrumpi necejje ejl earn, qua maxime efi fecundum naturam, humani generis Societatem. Cip. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5.
Noti
29S NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Note XXL p. 173. — For Contraries are
EVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME Ha- BIT, Aoxn o^£ 7^ % CX-TTOCTn^ ^ iTTlf^y.Tl TWy
svixvilccv, n dvl'n shai, TThere feems to he one and the fame Error ^ and one and the fame Science^ with refpedf to things contrary, Arift. de Anim. 1. 3. c. 3. This by Themifiius^ in his Paraphrafe^ is thus illuflrated. Twy Ivocvliociv f^loc. dcyvoia, * 0'
TO dyoi^o]) dg (o(pBhiy,ov yiv(d(TKOiVy 7^ to iC(Zxov OTi pAa^fpo'y (rvvi7n'g-a>T0Ci • 0 zss^] Gdrspov s^aTra-
'IcOjUSV^^ i^CX-TToflcCTOH 7^ TTfpt OotTfpOV. Of ’ThwgS contrary there is one Science,, and one Ignorance, For thus he-> who knows Good to be fomething beneficial y knows Evil at the fame time to be fomething pernicious ; and hey who is deceived with refpodl to one of thefe^ is deceived alfo ivith refpeSi to the other.
Note XXII. p. ^74. — Those four Grand Virtues, ^c,'] Stoboeus having told us, that of the Virtues fome vv^ere primary y fome fubordinatey adds — Trpdrocg J'e 'iilr(X.pocg ftWt, (ppbvwtVy (rwCppoiTUuw, dv- ^psiocVy S'lKdioc-vmv • xcc) Tr,v fvj (ppdvwiVy wspl rd xoidriKo'Jliz ylvST^oii * rvv di (rco(ppocrvvy]v Tuspl rdg dpfxdg T8 dv^pooTTn * rnv di dvdpsGvy Trspl rdg VTropxovdg * rrv Es PixoitoG-dvyjVy zTipl rdg dTrovs/j-'/KTsig, Ehe primary Vir- tues are four-y Prudence, Temperance, Forti- tude , and Justice: Prudence is employed in moral Offices y P’emperancey in Mens natuial Appetites and Furfuits ;i Foriitudcy in Endurings j a?id JuJlice^ in Dijlributicns, Eel. Ethic, p. 167.
That
'NOTES on Treatise the Third.
299
That the Life according ^<9 Virtue, was deemed the Life according Nature, appears from what is laid by the fame Author, in the Page following—^ TLcctoov Je r^roov ruv dp/luv to rix^ sivoii^ to dno~ AsOwf' (pVTSi lyidrriv J'e t»twv ^id toov jcTicov
zr(zp£^£(r9cci Tvf^dvovl a, rov dv^pcoTrov. Tdhe End of all thefe Virtues is^ to live agreeably to Nature ; and each of them^ by thofe Means , which are peculiar to itfelf h found to put a Man in pojfejfon of this End,
So likewife Cicero Etenim quod fummum
honum a Stoicis dicitur^ convenienter naturae vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor^ fententiam^ cum virtutQ congruere femper. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 3.
Note XXIII. p. 174. That Life, where THE Value of all Things is justly mea-^ suRED, b’r. ] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 204.
Note XXIV. p. 175. — That, which being
BONE, ADMITS OF A RATINOAL JUSTIFICA- TION.] In the Original it is 0 zrpoix^h ’ivXoyov
dTToXoyKTpt.ov. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 107. oVep ivXoyov ’(yyi tw diroXoylocv. Sext. Emp, Adv, Mathem. 1. 7. Thus rendered by Cicero — Officium id ejfe dicunty quod cur fadium fity ratio probabilis reddi pojft. De Offic. 1. I. c. 3. The Reafon of its "Greek Name, kMkov, is given by Simplicius. Ka- ^y}Koyld £0 rd yivbu.£voc TtOild rd movlcn liri^dX- Xo'jIcc r — Moral Offices are thofe things which are done
agreeably
300
N OT ES on Treatise the Third.
agreeably to what is fittings and expedient, Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.
Note XXV. p. 176. — And when our VERAL Energies, exerted according to THE Virtues above, have put us in pos- session OF,b’f.] This was the of Happiness, adopted by the old Academy^ or Platonics, Secun- dum natiiram viverCy fie affeSiumy ut optime affici pojjity ad naturamque accommodatijfime, Cic. de Fin. 1. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics y who were originally of the fame School, held the fame, ’e*
^ bToOy 70 dv^pccTTivoi; Ivipysioc yiyvilcci
xAl' dpslviv — rm dplrfiv >9 rsKsidldrYiv — 1\> Qico TsXuca, If this be admitted y it follows that Human Good or Happiness is y the energizing of the Soul according to the bejl and mojl confumjnate Virtuey in a perfedl and complete Life, Ethic. Nic. 1. i. c. 7. A perfedi and complete LifCy they explained to be fuch a Life as was no way deficient either as to its Durationy its bodily Healthy and its being attended with a proper Competence of external Goodsy and Profperity, By the beji and pwft confiimmate Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in its kind mod: perfedl, but which was the Virtue alfo of that Party which is in each of us mofi excellent. For there are Virtues of the Body, fuch as Strength and Agility ; and there arc Virtues of the Senfes, fuch as accurate Seeing, ac- curate Tafting; and the fame of every Faculty, irom the loweft to that which is fupreme.
The fovereign Good or Happinefs here fpoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, p, 179. where it
is
301
NOTES o« Treatise the Third.
is called, the Attaining the primary and juji Re- quifites of our Nature^ by a Condu^ fuitable to Virtue eind moral Office,
The primary and just Requisites here mentioned, are all Things requifite to the life and Enjoyment of our Primary and Natural Perfections. Thefe Primary and Natural PerfeSiiom mean the Natural Accomplish- ments of both our Mind and Body. They were allied by the Latins^ Prima Natura^ Prima fecundum Naturam \ by tht Greeks y roc zrpura- ytxldc (pvcrtv^ roc zrpoorx rv^g (Puts cog. In them were in- cluded Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Senfations, Memory, Docility, Invention, ^c. See Stob. EcL Eth, p. 163. Cic, de Fin, 1. 5. c. 7. p. 364. A, Cell, 1. 12. c. 5.
A like Sentiment of Happinefsy to this here fpoken
of, is that mentioned by Cicero Virtute adhibitdy
frui PRiMis a naturd datis, De Fin. 1.2. c. il. p. 1 13. ’Tis there called the Opinion of the old AcademicSy and Peripatetics, It is again repeated by the fame Author. Honefe vivere^ fruentem rebus iisy quas prima s homini natura conciliet, Acad, i. 2. c. 42. p. 240.
In is to be obferved that Cicero y fpeaking of this Hypothefis, fays that it propofed an Idea of Happi- nefSy which was not properly in our own Power, Hoc non ef pofttum in nofrd abiione : completur enim ^ ex e» genere viteey quod virtute finitury dsf ex Us rebus qua fecundum natura?n funty neque funt in ?iofra po- tefate, De Fin. 1, 4. c. 6. p. 2871^
Hence
/
302
N O T £ 8 on Tr£atise the Third.
Hence therefore the Deficiency of thh Dac^ trine. However juftifiable, however laudable its Endy it could not infure a due Succefs to its En- deavours, And hence too the Force of what is ob- jected to it in the Dialogue y from p, 177. to th^ End of the firfr Part.
Note XXVI. p. 1%. — To place the Sove- reign Good in Rectitude of Conduct,
As the Condudi here mentioned implies a Condu(51: under the Direction of a befitting Rule or Lawy and that, as oppofed to wrong Conducfr, which has either no Rule at all, or at leaft one erroneous ; it may not be an improper Place to inquire, what was the antient Opinion concerning Law universal, that great and general LaWy which flood oppofed to the municipal Laivs of particular Cities, and Com- munities.
Est quidem vera^EXy redia ratioy natures con^ gruenSy diffufa in omneSy con/lanSy fempiternay ques vocet
ad officium juhendoy vetando a fraude deterreat nec
erit alia lex Romesy alia AtheniSy alia nuncy alia pojl- hac ; fed & ornnes genteSy & omni tempore una lex y cA fempiternay & immo?-talis contmehit ; unufque erit com- munis quafi magiftery & imp er at or omnium Deus, Ilk hujus legis inventory difceptatory lator, Cui qui non parehity ipfe fe fugiety ac naturam hominis afpernahitur ; hoc ipfo luet maximas poenaSy etiamfi catera fupplicia^ qnee putantUTy effugerit, Fragm. Gic. de Rep. I. 3.
Lex
KOT£S on Treatise theHhird.
Lex ejl ratio fumma^ Infita In natura^ quce jubet ia qua facienda funt^ prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio^ cum ejl in hominis mente confirmata & confedia^ lex eji. Cic. de Legg. 1. i. c* 6. p. 22.
Again. Lex vera — ratio ejl redla fummi Jovls« To which he fubjoins, as above, Er^o ut Ilia divina mens fumma lex ejl ; Ita cum In homlne eji^ perfedia ejl in mente faplentls, De Legg. 1. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88.
’Tis in this Senfe xh^Apoflle tells us of the Gen- tiles^ or Mankind In general^ that they Jhew the Work, ef the Lavj written in their Hearts^ their Confclence clfo bearing wltnefs^ and their Thoughts the mean while accufmgy or elfe excufmg one another, Rom. i. ii.
As Cicero^ in his Book of Laws above cited, follows the Stoic Difcipline, fo is it agreeable to their Rea- foning,' that he make the original natural La w, of which we here treat, to be the Sovereign Rea- son OF THE Deity himfelf. Thus Chryfippus — Ide7n [fcil. Chryfippus'] legls perpetua ^ aterna vlm^ qua quafit dux vita ^ magijira officlorum Jit^ JovEM dicit ejje, Nat. Deor. 1. i, 0,15. p. 41.
So by the fame Philofophers in Laertius^ wc are ordered to live according to Kature^ lotg m ixTrccyofivnv 0 0 oo’tts*
iriv 0 o^OoV di(Z zrdvluv °
iv Tw AtJ, xa6»5/f|Uovi t8tw t?i? tcov ovIcov (for. oAwi;)
ovli, doing nothings forbidden by the Uni-
VERSAt
304 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
VERSAL Law, that is to fay^ by that right Reafon^ which pafleth thro* all Things^ and which is the s awe in Jove himfelf^ the Governor and Conductor of this univerfal Adminijiration^ Laert. 1. 7. f. 88.
Agreeably to this Reafoning, Plutarch correds thofe, who made a Goddefs, and the AJfeJfor
cf Jove 5 for, fays he, 0 ZfJ? ovx. fxh rm At>oi» •wd^s^oov^ aAA* dulo; Alxv ^ er*), vof^oov ®
Z7p£(r^v^ccl^ ^ TfActoVa?©^, Jove has not Alxv or Right for his AJfeJfor^ but is himfelf Plight ^ and Justice, and of all Laws the moji antient le/ziPERFECT. Moral, p. 781. B.
Thus Antoninus — tiA^ J"! Xoyixuv ^wwv, t»
sTTiiT^ai Tw Tvif 7roXs(ag 7^ TroXiJiiccg r^g Tr^str^vJccTrjg
A05/W XO61 OfTjytw. The End of Rational Animals is to follow the Reason and sacred Law^ that City and moJi antient Polity, [in which all rational Beings are included.] 1. 2. L 16.
The moft fimple Account of this Law^ which the Stoics gave, feems to be that recorded by Stobaus ; according to which they called it Aoj/ov, o^Oov Mcc, zs^orocxlixov jwL ruv wotJjlfwv, dTrotyo^svJixov twv h zroivUm, Right Reason, ordaining what is to be done^ and forbidding what is not to be done. Eel. Ethic. 178. See alfo the Notes of Tiirnebus and Davis upon Cic, deLegg, 1. 1. c. 6.
Having premifed thus much concerning Law univerfal^ it remains to fay fomething of that Rec- titude OF Conduct, which is in this Part of the
Dialogue
Notes on Treatise the Third,
Dialogue propofed as our Happinefs. Rectitude OF Conduct is intended to exprefs the Term Kxlo^9co(rig^ which Cicero tranflates retia Effe^io, K'x,']o^9cofX(x he tranflates Return Fa£ium, See Dt Fin. L 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definitibn of a Kcilo^Ooofxa^ was N0//.8 n Fhtng com-
manded by Law ; to which was oppofed oi^diflnfxu^ a Sin or Offence.^ which was defined NoV-» yo^svfxoiy a Thing forbidden by Law. Plut. Mor. 1037 What Law is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been fhewn above.
Hence therefore may be feen the Reafon, why we have faid thus much on the Nature and Idea of Law univerfal^ fo intimate being the Union between this and right Condudf^ that we find the latter is no- thing more than a perfedi Obedience to the former.
Hence too we fee the Reafon, why in one view it was deemed Happiness, to be void of Error or Offence dvoc/xccplvlov sTvon, as we find it in Arrian, Epidt. 1. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable was the neceffary Refult of Rediitude of Condudiy or .rather in a manner the fame thing with it.
I cannot conclude this Note^ without remarking on an elegant Allufion of Antoninus to the primary Signification of the Word KalopOwcri?, that is to fay, Y.A\di op6o\, right onwards., Jlraight and direddly forwards. Speaking of the Reajoning Faculty^ how, without kokifig farther., it refs contented in its own Energies, he adds KaOo di TOidvlat
‘srpu^ng ovofxd^ovlxiy JpOoTtjra rrg oda
Tijr which Reafon are all Adtions, of this
X Species,
305
Ck1>
o6 N O T E S Treatise the I’hird.
Species y Rectitudes, as denoting the Diretf-^ nefs of their Progrejfion right onwards. 1. 5. f. 14, So again in the fame Senfe, Iv^iTccv -zs-epau/uv, to keep en^ the Jiraight Road. 1. 5. f. 3- I. 10. f. ii.
One would imagine that our Countryman Milton had this Reafoning in view, when in his 19th Son- net fpeaking of his own Blindnefs, he fays with a becoming Magnanimity,
Yet I argue not
Jgainjl Heav^n^s Hand or Will ; nor hate one jot Of Heart or Hope ; but fill bear up^ and feer Right onwards
The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perufa^ being both fublime and fimple.
Note XXVII. p. 185. — The mere doing whatever is cc^rrespondent to such an
End, even tho’ we never attain it ]
Thus Epibfetus in Arrian., fpeaking of Addrefs to Men in Power, and admitting fuch Addrefs, when juftined by certain Motives^ adds that fuch Addrefs ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Obje^^lor demands of him, td-w?
s iiGy-oci ; But how then am 1 to obtain that^ which I want ? Philofopher anfwers, ’£;/«
(TQt on cJ; T E TH O E N O 2 *
TO (Tccvlip ujpiTTov ; Did I ever fay to thee., that thou Jhouldf go and addrefs., as tho' ihou wert to succeed^ and not rather with this only View, that thou rnightf do that, which is be- coming THY Character — And foon after,
whea
NOTES Tr E A T i‘sE the Third,
■when an Obje<5lion is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he anfwers o7(r()'
§Tt dvvi^ ycocXog dyoc^og yisv zroisT ra
dxxd T» nEnPAX0Al KAAflS; Knowe/i thou noty that a fair and good Man does nothing for the fake of Appearance^ hut for the fake only of having DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? Arr.Epi^, 1. 3. C. 24.
p. 497, 498. This Dohfrine indeed feems to have been the Bafis of the Stoic Morals \ the Principle, which included, according to thefe Philofophers, as 'well Honour and Honefty^ as Good and Happinefs. Thus Cicero — Facer e omnia^ ut adipifcamur qucs fecun- dum naturam fint^ etfi ea non adfequamur, id ef'e & honefum^ ^ folum per fe expetendum ^ fummum boniirn Stoici dicunt. De Fin. 1. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is confonant that Sentiment of theirs in Plutarch — T'/jv (pucTiy dvrm doicc(popov ilvoci * 70 J'l ttj Cpocrst ofjcoXoysTv^ dyc)c9ov——And again — to' >cccld (pva-iv^ t£A(^ bIvui — TOJ Koc]d (pucriv^ dJ'i(z(popcc bIvoci, Plut. Mor, 1060. D. E. See below. Note XXX*
NoteXXVIII. p. 185. — What if we make
OUR NATURAL StATE THE STANDARD ONLY TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, ’Tis in
this Senfe we find it elegantly faid in Plutarch by the iaft mentioned Philofophers — rotxs^cc rrig ii^xiaovlxg
rm (pv<TiVy TO Kccld (puTiv that our natural
State a?id what is confonant to it^ are theEhi. m e n t s of Happinefs— 2cs\d juft before, the fame natural State is called ra y.aSwovI©^ uA>i rlig the
Source of moral Office \ and the Subject Mat- ter of Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. Atque etiam illud perfpicuum efl^ confitui neceffie effie initiumy quod fapientia^ cum quid agere incipiaty fequatur ; id- • X 2 quo
3o8 notes on Treatise the Third.
que initium ejfe natura accommodatum : nam aliter ap^ petitioy^c, Cic.Acad. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Initia pro- poni mceffe eJfe apta ^ accommodata natures.^ quorum ex feleSfione Virtus poffit exijiere. De Fin. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 316. Cum vero ilia., qua officia e(fe dixi, proficif- eantur ah initiis natura ; ea ad hac referri necejfe eji : ut redfe diet pojfit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipifea- mur principia natura ; nec tamen ut hoc fit bo no rum ULTiMUM — De Fin, 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217.
Note XXIX. p. 185. AVe should not
WANT A Good to correspond, ^c.'] Plutarch quotes the following Sentiment of Chryjippm, who
patronized this Idea of Good Toy 'onpl aj/afiwv
xal Xoyov, o\ dvlog Udot/yn xal
CVpf.pcCVOTCC%V .slvoci (pTidl. TW Ctw, Kodi fXcUXlT'Oi TWy
j/A(puTwy <x7rj£o-9cn zrpo^.iirpiccv, Plut. Mor. 1041. E.
Note XXX, p. 187. — Yet we look, not TOR HIS Refutation, ^c.~\ What ^intilian fays of Rhetoric, may with great Propriety be tranf- ferred to Morality, Nofier orator, Arfque a nobis finita, non funt pohta in eventu. Tendit quidem ad vidloriam, qui dicit : fed, cum bene dixit, etiamfi non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, effecit, Nam ^ gubernator vult fialvd nave in portum pervenire : fi tamen tempefiate fuerit abreptus, non idea minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud ; dum clavum redlum •‘teneam. Et medicus fanitate7n agri petit: fi tamen aut valetudinis vi, aut inteiriperantid agj'i, aliove que cafiu furnma 7ion contingit ; dum ipfe oTfmia fiecundum rationem fecerit, 7nedicina fine non excidit, Ita oratori
bene dixijfe, finis efi. Na7n eft ars ea in actu
pofita, non in eventu. Inil. Orat. 1. 2. c. 17.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Note XXX. p. 187. — He for a Subject
HAS THE WHOLE OF HuMAN LlFE,^^-.]
T8 cc)/cc9^y ■srpoatpfflTt? zjoiiz • T« jcxyts ’Grpooiipi(ri^ zjokx,
T/ Tcc IkIo; ; *'TKoci T? TsrpoxtpEcrety zj-epl aV aua- f~p£PojtA,ivv Tiu^/Jai T8 t^ia ^ xa>c8. EJJence of Good, is a peculiar Dire^ion of Mind’, and the EJfence ^ Evil, is a peculiar Dir ediion alfo. What Externals ? They ferve as Subjects to the Mind^s Diredtion, from converfing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil* Arr. Epidt. 1. 1. c. 29.
Again *At u^Aai, oi^iol(popoi * n TCpw*? dvluy ovx
d^i’Cc(pop^, The Subjects are indifferent, but not fo theX^z's. of them* An*. Epidl. 1. 2. c. 5.
Thus Horace:
Non pofftdentem multa vocaveris Redle heatum \ reSlius occupat Nomen bead, qui Deorum Muneribus sapient er uti,
Duramqtie callet patiperiem pad,
Pejufq', leto flagidum timet :
Non ille, ^ c.
Od. 1. iv. 9,
Even the Comic Poet feems not to have been unacquainted with this Dodlrine :
Ch, ^id ndrrat? Cl. ^id ille? mtferum fe effe* Ch. Mjfcrum ? quern minus credere ef ?
10 NOTES 0/2 Treatise//6^ Third.
^lid relUqui ejl^ quin hdbeat qius quidem in hdmine dicuntur bona ?
Parhtis^ patriam incdlumemy amicos^ gfnuSy cognatos^ divitias :
Atque haec perinde funt ut illiiis animus^ qui ea pof- fidet :
UTi fcit^ ei bona; £///, qul non utitur re5ie^ mala,
Heauton. Ad. I. S. 2. V. 18.
Note XXXI. p. 189.— The End in other Arts is ever distant, &c.] Sed in cateris artl'bus -cum dicitur Artificiose, pojlerum quodam modo iff confequens putandum eji^ quod illi iTriymn^ocliyLO]) appellant ; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur^ id ad- primo redtijjime dicitur : quicquid enim a fapiente pro- ficifcitur^ id continuo debet expleturn ejje omnibus fui^ partibus ; in eo enim pofitum eft id., quod dicimus eJJe expetendum. Nam ^t peccatum, ejl patriam prodere^ parentes violare, fana depeculari, qu^ funt in effedlu : ftc timer e, ftc mtzrere, fic in libidine ejfe, peccatum ejly ftiam fine efifediu. Verum ut hcec^ non in pofieris & in confequentibus, fed in primis continuo peccata funt : jic fa, qua proficificuntur a virtute, susceptione prima^ non^ perfectione, redia fiunt judicanda, Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 9. p. 228. Tii TEAys" Tvf^dvEi ['/1 Ao-
ytyf oTTis uv TO ry Qla XTEpx^ £7rjf-^ *
ETtI Kcdi JttOJCO / VfCO? XXI TCOV roi^TcaVy
ccrE?r?ig yiv&lai n oXn' Idv ri aAA*
IttI zrx'fiQg yNi ottu oii/ zrXnpsg vtodi
XTTpoTodig IccSlvi to TnpoTc^i)) zjotei' COT'S EtTTEi;), syd stTTsy^co Toi liJ.cc, M. Ant. 1. II. f. I. Et quemad-
modiim
NOTES on Treatise the Third,
modum opportunitas (fie enim adpellemus ivnxipiav) non fit major produdione temporh ( hahent enim fuum mo-- dum quacunque opportuna dicuntur) fic redfa effediio, (xxjo'p^cca-iv enim ita adpelloy quoniam re£ium fadlum nocldp^wfxoc) redta igitur ejfie5iio^ item convenientia^ de~ nique ipsum bonum, quod in eo pofitum efi ut natura confentiat^ crefeendi accejjionem nullajn habet. JJt enim fipportunitas illa^ fu hcec de quibus dixi^ non fiunt tern-- poris produbiione major a : cb eamque caufam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda vita beata^ fi fit longa^ quam fi brevh : utunturque fimili^ ut^ fi cothurni lam ilia efi ad pedem apte convenire^ neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur^ nec majores minoribus : fic quo- rum omne bonum convenientid atque opportunitate finitur^ nec plura paucioribuSy nec longinquiora brevioribus ante- ponentur. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See alfo Dio. Laert. 1. 7. f. loi. M. Ant. 1. 6. f. 23. 1. 3. f. 7. Senec. Epifl. 66.
■ Note XXXIII. p. 191. — Recollect then,
SAID HE, Do YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE.
Pre-conception, ^V.] In this, and the fubfequen t Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied to the particular Hypothefis of Goody advanced in this Treatife, See before, pag. 115, 121, 122.
Note XXXIV. p. 192. And is there
any Time or Place, whence Rectitude OF Conduct may be excluded?] n a N- TAXOT xa) AIHNEKDS ittI <rol Iriy axl
TV ZTiXp'dTV (rvf/.^X(r£i Ivapsriiv, xxt roTg tz-x-
pdiTiv xv9poo7roi$ tytxlx ^i}txi0(r(ivr\v 'uspoo'^i^eT^xi
M. Ant. I, 7, f. 54.
X4
Note
NOTES on Treatise tbe’Third.
Note XXXV. p. 192. —Where it shall
NOT BE IN HIS PoWER TO ACT BRAVELY AND HONESTLY.] ay fXOi ttw? yivYi^
lai ; oTT^q ay yh?flat, cru dvio Qro'eiq xaAwc, xai (TOi ro aTTpSay hlCy^rii^cc. Arrian. Epidl. 1. 4* C, 10. p. 650.
Note XXXVI. p. 195. There are In- stances INNUMERABLE OF MeN BAD, AS WELL AS GOOD,^^.]' Scc a long Catalogue of thefe in Cicero's Tufculan Difputations ; spartan Boys ; Barbarian Sages ; Indian W ives 5 Egyptian Devotees, ^c. itfc. The whole Paffage is worth reading. Tufc, Pifh !• 5- c. 27. p. 400, 401,
Note XXXVII. p. 196. — This I write you (says he in one of HIS Epistles) while, Tm fxtxxapii^^ (xyovlsq jtal rE?v£v]xioiV pav T? b/a, lypix(ppy.£v vp/AD 'taZra ■ rpOfdyspicPiE Tsra-s xat ^vg-EvlspiKOC VTrsp^oXriv hx dnc-r
AfiTTovla ra £y socvloTg pisyi^i^g * (Z'j]t7roip ETaiJrllo Je zjxci r^roig ro xocjai i^vyyjv y^aTpov etti t7j toov ysyov voToov “nyAv S'lxXoyiry'^v yviiyYi—I^io. Laer. 1. 10. f. 22. Cum ageremus vitos beatum (sf eundem fupremum dwn^ fcribebamus here. Tanti autem morbi aderant veftca & vifeerum., ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem poJ]it acce^ dere. Compenfabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lie- iitia^ quarn capiebam nmnorld ratwium inventorumque nojlrorum — Cic. de Fin. L 2. c. 30. p. 173.
Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epietu fus^ that ^ rational Adverftty was better than an irra~
NOTES onliR^ AT 1^1^ the Third.
313
tioml Profperlty. The original Words are — xpnr- Tov Eivxi evXoyi'rooy xtv^eTv, ^ d'Ao'yl^uig
Dio. Laert. 1. 10. f* 135-
Note XXXVIII. p. 198. O Crito, if it be PLEASING TO THE GoDs, The three Quo-
tations in this Page are taken from Plato ; the firfr from the Crito^ quoted by Epi5ietus at the End of the Enchiridion^ and in many other Places ; the fe- cond from the Apology^ quoted as frequently by the fame Author; the third, from the Menexenm or Epitaph, Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p. 248. Edit, Serraii, See alfo'C/V. Tufcul, 1. 5. c. 12.
Note XXXIX. p. 199. If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of THE numerous Race of Patriots, &£.] Sed quid duces ^ principes 7iominem\ cum legiones fciibat Cato fcepe alacris in eum locum profedias^ unde redituras fe non arhitrarentur ? Pari animo Lacedamonii in Thcrmopylis occiderunt : in quos Simonides y
Die hofpes Spartrcy nos te hie vidijfe jacenteSy Pum fantlis patria legibus obfequimur,
Tufcul, Difp. 1. 1, c. 42. p. loi.
Note XL. Ibid, Martyrs for Sys-
tems WRONG, That there may be a bigotted Objiinacy in favour of what is abfurdy as well as a rational Conflancy in adhering to what is rights thofe Egyptians above mentioned may ferve as Examples. /Egyptiorum jnorm quis ignoret ? quorum imbutts men- ies pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificifuwi prius fubi- eriijty quam ihim aiit afpidetn ant feleni aiit canetn aut
croco-
314 NOTES onTR-EATi%-E theTbird.
crocodilum violent: quorum etiam fi imprudentes quid- piam fecerint^ pcsnam nullam recufent, Tufcul. Difp. i. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before. Note XXXVI.
Note XLI. p. 200. — Celebrated to such A Height, in the Religion, which we PROFESS, ’Tis probable, that fome Analogies
of this fort induced a Father of the Church (and no lefs a one than St. Jerom ) to fay of the ^toict^ who made moral Redtitude the only Good, no-
stro DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT.
Vid. Menag. in D, Laert. 1. 7. f. loi. p. 300. and Gatak. Prafat, in M. Anton, See alfo of this Treatife page no. and below, NoteJuKlY ,
Note XLII. p. 201. To live consistent- ly, To LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here ex-
plained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE SINGLE CONSONANT ScHEME OR PuRPOSE ; and
our Good or Happiness is placed in fuch Con- sistence, upon a Suppofition that thofe, who live inconfifently^ and v/ithout any fuch uniform Scheme^ are of confequence miferahle,^ unhappy. To t£- A(^ 0 |a.£v Z'/ivoov aVw? dTrioocats^ to 0 fAoXo'yHy.img * T»ro J'’ I ft sVa Xoyo)) (TU[j^(puvov 00; ruv
i^dvloov aoiKoJ'oiifj.oviivloov. Stob. Eel. Ethic.
p. 171.
This Consistence was called in Greek o^aoXo- in Latin Co7ivenientia^ and Vv^as fometimes by itfeif alone confidered as the End. Tw cy.oXoylccy xivHdi. fTvcit. Stob, Eel. Ethic, p. 172. See
alfo Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 216. So alfo in the fame lafi named Treatife, c. 7. p. 220, — Utenimhifri-
Giii
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
mi a£fio^ faltatori motus^ non quivis^ fed certus quidam eji datiis : fie vita agenda efit certo genere quodam^ non quolibet\ quod genus conveniens consentane- UMQUE dieimus. Nee enim gubernationi aut medtcina fitmilem fiapientiam ejfie arbitrarnur fied adioni illi potius^ quani modo dixi^ & faltationi ; ut in ipfia arte infiit^ non foris petatur extremum, artis efifePlio.
’T I s upon this Principle we find it a Precept
in Cicero’’ s Offices In primis autem conflituen-^
dum eft., quos nos £sf quales effie velimuSy ^ in quo genere vitae 1. i. c. 32. So likewife in the En- chiridion of EpiSletuSy c. 33. nvd rih
p{Z>cJvpoi (tocvI'jc TVTTovy ov Itti TS (TStZvlu cov,
^ dv9pco7rotg ETrirvfxdvcov, Ordain to thyfielfi fiome Cha- rail er and Model ofi Lificy which thou mayji maintain both by thyfielfiy and when thou art converfiant with Mankind,
So much indeed was refled upon this Prin- ciple of Confiifiencey that even to be any thing con- Jifientlyy was held better than the contrary. Thus Epiltetus — ''Evcc <t£ Je? avOpcoTToy fi’yat, ^ dyoc^ov ^ yiccytov * ^ to ^y£'^Qviy,6v cs i^spyd^scrdcci to (rau1»,
3 rd Ulo\ It behoves thee to he one uniform
Man, either good or bad , either to cultivate thy own
Mindy or to cultivate things external Arr. Epid.
1. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he exprefs himfelf in a Place fubfequent ; where having firft counfelled againft that falfe Complai- fance, which makes us, to pleafe Mankind, forget our proper Charalfery and having recommended as
our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds Ti ds
dp£<T£i rdvliXy dTrbiiXmv Itt) toc'jxvVoc.* ysvH
fTf ruv mvoii'hvy aV rm /A0tp(,coy l^id(popx f
315
3i6
NOTES on Treatise thenird.
ZJ^O(T(^'TrOC pu fxiyvu'lcci • OV ^6vC(.(T(ZI ^ ©fpCTiTVlV OTTOXpi-
vxcr^oii ' AyccfjJfj-vova, — Arr. Epidt. 1. 4. c. 2. p. 580. But if what I recommend thee do not pleafe^ then turn thee totally to all that is contrary ; become a profligate of
the 7nofl proflitute kind Characters fo different are
not to be blended ; thou canfl not aCt at once Therfites arid Agamemnon.
So too Horace:
-^anto CONST ANTioR idem
In vitiis^ tanto levins mifer^ ac prior ilk ^ui jam contento^ jam laxo fine laborat.
Sat. 7. 1. 2. V. 18,
See alfo CharaCteidJiics^ V. i. p. 131.
Note XLIII. p. 203. — It is not merely, TO LIVE consistently; but to live con- sistently wiLH Nature.] ri?
Cleanthes in Stob. Eel. Eth. p. 17 1. — Co7igruenter natures convenienterque vivere. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The firft Defeription of our End fo live co7ififtently'\ was deemed defective^ and therefore was this Addition made. See Stobaus in the Place cited. Arr. EpiSt. 1. 3. c. i. p. 352.
Note XLIV. p. 204. To live consis-
tently WITH Nature is, to live accord- ing TO just Experience of those things,
WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.] eVI TO
(pvosi ^ViV * 0 ora-
(plrtpov ^i^Aousnog '^oir.rro'A^ ro'j rpoTrov rvrovy
Yacv xzT £f.c7rEipfxv rx'j (pxxrsi crvfj.^xivdvloov, Stob. Ecl. Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. c. 87. His verbis
[fcil.
NOTES ci« Treatise the Third.
ffcil. vivere fecundum naturam'] tria fignlficari Stoici 4icunt, Unum ejufmodl.^ vivere adhibentem fcientiam
earum rerum^ quce naturd evemrent De Fin. 1. 4.
c. 6. p. 286. See alfo the fame Treatife, /. 3. c, 9.
р. 227. /. 2. c. II. p. 1 13- where ’tis exprefled —
Vivere cum intelUgentid earum rerum.^ qua naturd eve^ nirent.
Note XLV. p. 205.— To live perpetually
SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NaTURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR EnD THAT
Selecting, and that Rejecting only.]
*^0 Tf " AvllTTO.'] TO T£A©-» JCSi'tBcCi, ’Ev
TW J'iWEHW? CCTTXpOiSu'JcCi: OCl jOCty TOC Kocloc
(pVClVf CC7r£X\£y£(T9xi Je TOJ ZTCCpiZ (P'JCTlV^ hTToXoC^^dvH,
Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.2. p. 497. Edit, Potter, This Sentiment was fornetimes contrasted.^ and exprefled
as follows TO IvXoyiT’s'iV h rocTg IxAoJ/a;?
fornetimes, more concifely ftill, by the fingle Term TO IvXoyiriTv. See Plutarch 1071, 1072. Cicers joins this^ and the foregoing Defcriptions of Happi- nefi.^ together. Circumfcriptis igitur his fententiiSy quas pofui., ^ fi qua fmiles earum fnt ; relinquitur^ ut fummum bonmn ft^ vivere fcientiam adhibentem earum rerum^ qua naturd evenlant.^ feligentem qua fe- cundum naturam.^ &’ qua contra naturam funt rejicien- tem., id eft.^ convenienter cofjgruenterque natura vivere, De Fin. 1. 3. c* 9. p. 227. See alfo De Fin, 1. 2.
с. II. p* ii3» See alfo Diog, Laert, 1. 7. c. 88. — ^tob. Eel, Eth, 17 1.
Note XLVI. p. 207. To live in the dis- charge OF MORAL Offices.] Jt
( T£ A(^
317
3i8 notes on Treatise the Third.
(pmi] TO zrctvlx rcc aoSwovla. iiriTeX^-Jlix
Laert. I. 7. c. 88. — Stob. Ed. Eth. 17 1. — O^cia mnia — fervantem vivere. Cic. de Fin. 1. 4. c. 6. p. 286.
Soon after we meet the Phrafes — To live ac- cording TO Nature ; To live according TO Virtue, ’o Z'^’jwv — rfA©-* fiVf, to o'^oAoj/a- fxBvoog (pu(TBi ottb^ lr"l x<%T ccp/lriv Laert,
1. 7. c. 87. Conf entire nature ; quod ejje volunt e
virtute^ id eji^ honejiate vivere — De Fin. 1. 2. c. ii, p. 1 13. Where, as has been already obferved page 1 74, and in the Note likewife on the Place, we find the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are con- fidered as the fame.
However to make this AfTertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps fufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to confider, what Idea thefe Philofo-^ phers had of Virtu^.
In Laertius (where he delivers the Sentiments of Zeno and his followers) Virtue is called
a confiftent Difpofition ; and foon after,
zs’STTOtrifABVTi ZTpog Tw o^oKoy'iav TSTUvlog ry
A Mind formed to Confifence thra" every Part of Life. Laert. 1. 7. c. 89.
In Stobeeus (according to the Sentiments of the fame School) it is called AiaOfO'i? dvl^ ■sTfpl oAov 70 V Qiov. A Difpofition of Mind^ con-- fonant to itfelf throughout the whole of Life. Ed. Eth. p. 167.
So
NOTES OT Treatise ‘Third.
3*9
So Cicero in hhLaws — Conjlam ^ perpetua rath •vltiSy qua eji ViRTUS. — 1. i. c. 17. p. 55.
So Seneca in his 74/Z? Epiftle Virtus enim
CONVENIENT! A conjiat : omnia opera ejus cum ipfd eoncordanty & congruunt.
Thus therefore Confiftence being the Effence of Virtue^ and upon the Hypothefis here advanced^ the EfTence alfo of Happinefs j it follows firll: that a Vir- tuous Life will be a Happy Life. But if a Happy one, then of courfe a Life according to Nature ; lince no- thing can be Good, which is contrary to Nature, nor indeed which is not confoiiant, in ftridleft manner, to it.
And here (as a proper Opportunity feems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great Simi- litude of Sentments j it may be even faid, the Unani- mity of almofl all Philofophers, on this important Subjed concerning Ends, and Happiness.
Those, whofe Hypothefs we have followed in this Dialogue, fuppofed it to be Virtue and con- sistent Action, and that without regard to For- tune or Succefs, But even they, who from their Hy- pothefis made fame Degree of Succefs requifte ; who refted it not merely on right Astion, but on a Propor- tion of bodily IVelfare, and good Fortune concomitant, even thefe made right Action and Virtue to be principal.
Thus
320
NOTES on Treatise the 'Third.
Thus Archytas^ according to the Doc5lrine of the
'Pythagorean School. '‘EvSxifxocrvvx. ^p^cri;
Happinefs is the Ufe or Exercife of Virtue^ attended with external good Fortune, Opufc. Mytho- log. p. 678. Confonant to this Sentiment, he fays in the Beginning of the fame Treatife, 0 dyu- Sof dvvp oxra Iv^iocg ivdcctfAoov ocvdyytug sflu * 0
IjddifAiav, 7^ dyix^og Iri, *Phe good Man is not
of necejfity happy ; [becaufe, upon this Hypothefis, external Fortune may be wanting ;] but the happy Man is of necejfity Good, [becaufe, upon the fame Hypo- thecs, without Virtue was no Happinefs.] Ibid,
p. 673. Again ’Ate) dvdily.x
iQ]i xxvdv, dili uAav (naxw? Is yd^ dvla ^pssjxi) dlls (TTrocvl^Qi. — The bad Man (fays he) muft needs at all times be miferable, whether he have or whether he want the Materials of external Fortune \ for if he have them, he will employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus we fee this Philofgpher, tho’ he make Externals a Requifite to Happinefs, yet ftill without Virtue he treats them as of no Importance. Again — Auo d' Xi TSfA,vovloii sv Tw • d fsv (rKv9pco7rolspu, dv d rXdyiuv 'Oh<T(Tsdg * d J's sv^isivoVpoc, rdv STropsCslo NcV"wp. Tc6U dv dpsldv (pocfM J'ri?iw9xi (lege dyiXtcr9oci, Dorice pro OsAfrj) fsv rdvlocv, J'Jyao'Oat cl's r'f.vav. There are two Roads in Life diftinSf from each other ; one the rougher, which the fuffering UlyiTes went \ the other more fmooth, which was travelled by Neftor. How of thefe Roads (fays he) Virtue de fires indeed the latter ; and yet is Jhe not unable to travel the former. Ibid. p. 696. From which laft Sentiment it appears, that he thought Virtue, even in any Fortune, was capable of producing at leafi fome degree ^Happiness.
As
NOTES on Treatise the Third,
321
As for the Socratic Do(5lrine on this SubjecSl, it may be fufficiently feen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue pag, 198, 199. And as the Senti- ments, there exhibited, are recorded by PlatOy they may be called not only Socratic^ but Platonic alfo. However, leaft this friould be liable to difpute, the following Sentiment is taken from Xe?iocrates^ one of Plato's immediate Succeflbrs, in the old Academy by him founded. (p-i^trhy 'EvSdifAOVcc sTvxt
Tov 7VU s^ovjoc (TTru^oAoi)) * rctvlnv exar’W
sTmi Alipova. Xenocrates held that he wjjEudaemon,
Happy, who had a virtuous Mindy for that the Mind was every one's Daemon or Genius. Ariji. Top, I. 2. c. 6.
Here we fee Virtue made the Principle of Happiness, according to the Hypotheiis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant Allufion in the Paf- fage to the Etymology of the Word ’EuJ'ai'iwwu, which fignifies both \Happy'\ and \^po£'eJfed of a good Ge?iius or Damon ;] an Allufion which in tranflating ’twas not pofTible to preferve. See below, Note LVIII.
A s for the Peripatetic School^ we find their Idea of Happiness, as recorded by Laertius y to be in a manner the fame with that of the Pythagorea?is. It was dpslv? iv Clu TfAs/w — The JJfe or Exer-
dfe of Virtue y in a complete and perfect Life. Laert. 1. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited the fame Dodrine (tho’ fomewhat varied in Ex- preflion) from the Founder of the Peripatetics y in his firft Book of Ethics, So again we learn from him——— oTi nph ^ Ivlpysiui A£-
y ye:^ixi
< o
22
NOTES on Treatise the 7hird.
yovJai TO teA^, that'tis certain Jtf ions and Energies^ which are to he deemed the End. Ethic. Nic. 1. 1.
c. 8. And again — -^Ert dJln v tuTrpagia, t£-
A(^. Eor ^tis the very Retiitude of Adiion^ which is itfelf the End. Ibid. 1. 6. c. 5. And again, 'H lu-
^atuxov/a, IvEpysid rig in, Happinefs is a certain
Energizing. 1. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all thefe PafTages in that elegant Simile, /. i. c. 8. — cl's oXv[A7rioc(nv 01 xaAAtrot iVp^upo7a1ot f-£(poiv^vlxt^ aAA* ot dyoovi^o [aivoi (tu'tuv yd^ rivig vindriv •) STW Twu IV tw Qico xaAwu ccyoi^cov O I nPATTONTES OP0JQ2 iTTn^oXot yiyvovloci. For as in the Olympic Games^ not thofe are crowned^ who are handfmejl and ftrongejl^ hut thofe who combat and contend., (for ^tis from among thefe come the Vitiors ;J fo^ with refpedi to things laudable and good in human Life^i ’tis the right ASfors only that attain the PoJJeJfton of them. Nay, fo much did this Philofopher make Happinefs, depend^ on right Adtion^ that tho’ he re- quired fome Portion of Externals to that Felicity^ which he held fupreme ; yet ftill ’twas Honour and Vir^ tue which were its principal Ingredients. Thus fpeak- ing of the Calamities and external Cafualties of Life, which he confelTes to be Impediments to a Happinefs
perfellly complete^ he adds o^cog ^i iv r^roig Jia-
Kd^TTii 7Q ynxXoVy iTrei^dv rig lujto'Aw? TroAActf
3^ lAgydXocg drv^iugy pcj} S'd dvixXywlocv^ aAAa yev^ vd^ug coy (AsyocXo^v^og, *£t J'’ ocrly di Ivepyuxi Hu^ixi rng ^mg^ xaOocTTfp siTrofxsVy k^£]g dv yLoiJo ruv fACcr^a^ijiiv * a^iTrdJs yd^ Trpd^si rd juiirrild 3^
(pOivXx. Toy yd^ ug xXyj9ug dyxSou 3^ £p.(Ppovoc zsd- rxg oiopf.E^x rdg rvx,ocg Ivr^npAO voog (p£p£<y, ex rm i7r<x>pp^oylm del rd xdxXiroc zrpdr'Jsiv * xoiAditip 3^
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
^yoc^ov TW TJxpo'vli rpoiTOTTE^u) p^pwOai ZToXe. fxtucoTtZTiXy aycvlorof/^ov Ik twv (tjcuIuv xaA-
Ai5”oy Ctto^^ixoc, TroitTy rov dvTov J^e rpoirov ra; aA- A8? ’Ti'xylTXt; dn-ccvlx^, ’Et J'’ ol^Xi^ f^h yVg-
-ttoIe yevoiT dv o And yet y even In fuch Inci~
denUy the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue Jhines forthy when a Man with becoming Calmnefs endures many and great Misfortunes y and that not thro^ Infenfi- hility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay morey if it be truBy as we have already affirmed y that dis AbiionSy which are predominant in conffituting a happy Lifey then can no one he completely miferabhy who is happy in his right Conduct y becaufe he will never be the Adior of what is deteffable and bafe. For 'tis our Opi- nion that the Many truly wife and goody endures all .Fortunes with becoming Decency y and from whatever . happens to arifiy fill frames the fair eft Adlions ; like as the good Commander ufes the Armyy which he happens to -findy after the manner moft agreeable to 'the Rules of War ; and the Shoemaker y from fuch Skins as others provide himy makes a ShoBy the beft that can be made from fuch Materials ; and fo in the fame manner all other Artifts beftde. But if this be truey then hcy who is happy in this Rediitude of Genius, can in no Inftance be truly and ftridtly miferable. Eth. Nic. 1. i. c. lo.
As for Epicurus y tho* he was an Advocate for Pleafurcy yet fo high was his Opinion of a wife and right Condudly that he thought rational Adver- iity better than irrational Profperity. See Dial. p. 197. Hence too he reprefented that Pleafurey which he efteemed our Sovereign Happinefsy to be- as infeparable from Virtucy as Virtue was from that,
Ovx TiJ'fW? l^VVy UViV T8 (ppOvfto)^y XUXu^y xctl
Y 2 •
323
324
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
^iKocioog • yVs (ppov/jixw?, aocXwg iccc) JtJta/coCj ^vsv t« ■‘^^£wg, ’Tis impojjible to live pleafurably^ without ■living prudently., ^and honourably., ajid jujily ; or to live prudently, and honourably and jujily, without living pie afur ably. Epic, in Laert. 1. lo. f. 132.
T o conclude the whole, our Countryman Tho- mas Hobbes, though he profefledly explodes all this Dodlrine concerning yet feems infenlibly to
have eftablifhed an himfelf, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain Energy or Action. For thus ’tis he informs us, in his Treatife called Human Nature, that there can be no Content- ment, but in Proceeding and that Felicity confijieth, not Having — -but in Prospering. And again, fome time after, having admitted the Comparifon of Human Life to a Race, he imme- diately fubjoins But this Race we muji fuppofe to
have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being roliEMOsT and it.
And thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of Philofophers on the Subjed: of Ends, here treated.
Note XLVII. p. 208. — Yet it in no man- ner TAKES AWAY THE DIFFERENCE AND DI- STINCTION OF OTHER THINGS.] Cu?n cnlm vir- ■tutis hoc proprium ft, earum rerum, quce fecundutn natura?n fmt, habere dele.£ium 5 qui omnia fic exaqua- verunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti imlld feleSiione uterentur, virtutem ipfam fufulerunt* Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 4. p. 207.
Quid autejn apertius, quam, fi felediio nulla ft ab ns rebus, qrn^ contra natura?n fnt, earum rerum quce fint fecundutn natuvam, tollatur omnis ea, qua queer a*
tur
NOTES on Treatise the T'hird. 325
tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. g.
р. 227.
Deince PS explicatur differentia rerum: quam ft non ullam effe diceremus^ confunderetur omnis vita^ ut ah Ariftme j nec uUum fapientia munus aut opus in- veniretur^ cum inter eas res, qua ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino intereffet ; neque ullum delec- turn haberi oporteret* Itaque cum effet fatis confitutuni, id folum effe honum quod effet honefum, ^ id malum fo- • lum quod turpe •, turn inter hac ^ ilia, qua nihil vale- tent ad heate mifereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo dif- ferrent, effe voluerunt, ut effent eorum alia afimahilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Ibid. 1. 3. c. 15. p. 246.
CjETERA autem etfi nec hona nec mala effent ; ta- men alia fecundum naturam dicebat, alia natura effe contraria : iis ipfis alia interjeSla ^ media numerabat,
Acad. 1. 1, c. II. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187.
•
Note XLVIII. p. 208. It suppresses no
SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, As
much has been laid concerning the Stoic Apathy, or Infenfibility with refpeSl to Faffion, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real Senti- ments on this Subject.
IlaGi^, which we ufually render a Paffion, is always rendered by Cicero, when fpeaking as a Stoic, Perturbatio, a Perturbation. As fuch therefore in the firft place, we fay it ought always to be treated.
The Definition of the Term 7raG(^, as given by thefe Philofophers, was op '.<,71 tranl-
lated by Cicero, Appetitus vehementior. Tufc. 1. 4.
с. g. p.273. Now this Definition may be more
Y 3 eafily
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
eafily explained, if we firft inquire, what they meant by they defined to be (popa IttI
Ti, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward fomethlng. Stob* Ed. Ethic, p. 175. A 7ra6(^ therefore, or Perturbation muft have been, according to tfieir De- finition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul^ which was excejfive and beyond Bounds, Stobceus^ from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it ob- ferves, a xiyn, oS£(pvKLjoc ocX\' vdv) ev
zcrXsovixarfJLM ^croc * a yoc^ Juuapxfi, juaAAou Ivspysiff. — that Zeno (its Author) does not call a riaO^ fQ?ne- thing capable by Nature to pafs into Excefs^ but fome^ thing actually in Excefs already^ as having its EJfencey ftot in mere Capacity ^ hut in Aduality. Ed. Eth. p. 159.
There is another Definition of the fame Term, which tnakes it to be ^ olhoy(^ >9 (pva-iv
^ Motion of the Soul y irrational and contrary to Nature. D. Laerf. *1. 7. f. no. Andronicus Rhodius adds, to this latter Definition, the Words J'f uVo- waxy U fim the Opinion of fomething
Good or Evil, Ilspl !!«§. p. 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. A Perturb ation^ or Stoic Paffton^ is a Motion of the Souly irrational and contrary to Naturcy arifing from the Opinion of fomething Good or Evil. Thefe lafi: Words, founding the na9(^ or Perturbation on Opiniony correfpond to what Cicero fays, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the Stoic PhilofopherSy 07nnes perturbationes judicio fieri iA opinione. Tufc. 1. 4. ,c. 7. p. 276. Laertius mdorms us, that they even made the Perturbations themfelves to he fudgmcfits. /SoxC d,uio7g rd xp<a-£i? mxi, Lqert. 1, 7. f. in. He fubjoins an Infiance to illuf- trate. ‘Kis ydi^ (piKx^yvfx in Tb to' dp-
yjpio'j
NO T E S o« Treatise the Third.
yifuv xxAo\ Jmi. For thus (fays he) the Love of Money is the "Judgment or Opinion^ that Money is a thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the fame Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. — Xoy^ ^ ix
(pdvXvjg xpltrsug aipo^poTnrx ^ pco^»y
■srpdo-Xa^co!/. Perturbation is a vitious and in-^ temperate Reafoning.^ which ajfumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. p. 441. D.
The Subftance of what is faid above, feems to amount to this ; that 11^9®^, in a Stoic Senfe, implied a Perturbation^ and not a PaJJion ; and that fuch Perturbation meant an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul^ founded on Opinion or Judg-^ menty which was erroneous and faulty.
Now from hence it follows, that the Man of PERFECT Character (according to xh.€\x Hypo^ thefts) muft of neceffity be Apathetic,
OR VOID OF Perturbation. For fuch a Cha~ radfer^ as has been fhewn, implies perfedl Rediitude of Condudt. But perfect Redlitude of Condud im- plies perfcdl Rediitude of Judgment ; and fuch Redi- tude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judg~ ment : but if Error and wrong Judgment, then Perturbation of confequence, which they fuppofe to be derived from thence alone.
That this was the Senfe, in which they under- flood Apathy, we have their own Authority, as given us by Laertius* yoxX ilvxi tov
(ro(pov^ iiol 70 dvifATrloolov sTvxt, Laert. I. 7. p. 117.
Y 4 They
327
328 NOTES on Treatise theThird.
T^ey fay the ivife Man is apathetic^ hy being fuperior to Error — by being fuperior ^<7 Error, if they may be credited themfelves ; not, as for the moft part vve abfurdly imagine, by being fuperior to all Senfe, and Feeling^ and AffeSlion, The Sentence imme- diately following the foregoing, looks as if thefe Philofophers had forefeen, how likely they were to be mifunderftood. Etuat J'L aAAov cc7r£c9v^ tov
(pizuMv, iv iVw Xsyofx^vov tw cclpSTrJu
There is alfo another fort of Apathetic Man^ who is bad ; who is the fame in CharaSier^ as the hard and inflexible. To the fame Purpofe Epibietus. ’Ou h't ycc^ (xe iTvai coj dv^pidvlcCy cxKkoc, rdg
rvjpvvlx roiq (pv(nxd^ ^ tViOery?, dg eucte^h, 00^ ug db£X(pov, dg Trotlipot^ dg ttoXitw. FoR I AM NOT TO BE Apathetic, like a Statue, but I am withal to obferve Relations^ both the natural and adventitious i as the Man of Religion^ as the Son ^ as the Brother^ as the ^-Father as the Citizen. Arr. Epia. 1. 3. c. 2. p. 359.
Immediately before this, he tells us in the fame Chapter, riaS©-* olxxtog J yivslat^ h fj.y]
opsJfWf ia^XiOScog TsrspiTrnrl^a-Tigy
that a Perturbation in no other way ever arifes^ but either zuhen a Defire is fruflrated^ or an Averfion falls into that which it would avoid. Where ’tis ob- fervable, that he does not make either Defire or Averfion 11x9 n, or Perturbations., but only the Caufe of Perturbations^ when erroneoufly conduced.
Agreeably to this, in the fecond Chapter of the Enchiridion., we meet with Precepts about the Conducfl and Management of thefe two Affebiions—
Not
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
329
Not a word is faid about lopping off either ; on the contrary, Averfion we are directed how to employ immediately, and Defire we are only ordered to fuf- pend for the prefent, becaufe we want a proper Sub- jed: of fit Excellence to excite it.
T o this may be added, what the fame Philofo- pher fpeaks, in his own Perfon, concerning himfelf. Arr , EpiSf. 1. I. C. 21. au opg-
yooixoci ExxX/vw xa1a (pvtnv-^ — fior my party am fiatisfied and contentedy ifi I can desire and avoid agreeably to Nature* He did not remain it feems dilfatisfied, till he had eradicated thefe AffeSiions^ but he was fatisfied in reducing them to their ttatu- ral Ufie*
In Laertius we read recorded for a Stoic Senti- ment, that as the vitious Man had his 7ra0»j, or Per^ turhations 3 fo oppofed to thefe, had the Virtuous his ’EuTraOfi'at, his Eupathies or Well-fieelingSy tranflated by Cicero Conjlantics, The three chief of thefe were 3«Ar]<rK, WiLL, defined op£?i? euAo}/©^, rational Dejire ’EuA^tfi^x, Caution, defined ’^ExxAto-i?
rational Averjion ; and Xi&pa, Joy, defined fTrapo-jc rational Exultation. To thefe three
ycmQrp2X Eupathies belonged many fiubordinate Species ; fuch as suvotay dyccTrria-i^y ajdw?, TfpJ/t?, iv(ppo(TVvriy IvQvfiiccy^c. SeeLaert, 1. 7. f. 115, 116. Andi'on, Rhod. TTSpl 7ra06OV, Cic. Vufic. 1. 4. C. 6.
Cicero makes CatOy under the Charader of a Stoicy and in explaining their Syftem, ufe the following Exprefllons. Pertinere autem ad retn arbilrantur y in- tellegi natura fieriy iit liberi a parentibus amcntur : a
quo
33°
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
quo initio profe^am communem humani generis focie^ tatem perfequuntur, De Fin. 1. 3. c. 19. The fame Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius,
^xcr\ J'g (oi XrcoiKol) rm Trpog tcc riyivoc (piXoropyia,))
(pvs'ixw sivxi dujoTg Tdey fay Parental Affe6iion is
natural to them, 1. 7. f. 120.
Again, foon after, in the fame Treatife de Pint-*
bus, ^odque nemo in fumma folitudine vitafn agere velit^ ne cum infinlta quide?n voluptatum ahundantia \ facile intellegitury nos ad conjundlionem congregationem-- que hominum^ ad naturalem communitatem ejfe natos. So Laertius, hX>^dl fxw Iv ipyi/^toc (jpoitr)') ^idfrslcci b (TTrabiztog * xoivctovtycbg yd.^ (pvasi^ TTpaxItubg, The virtuo7is Man (fay they, the Stoics) will never be for living in Solitude ; for he is by Nature facial^ and fwmed for Action, 1. 7. f. 123.
Again, Cicero,, in the above-cited Treatife. Cunt autein ad tuendos confervandofque homines hominem natum eJfe videamus ; confentaneum eji huic natura^ ut fapiens velit gerere^ ^ adminijirare rempublicafn ; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere, & velle ex ed liberos. Ne amores quidem fancies a fapiente alienos
ejfe arbitrantur , XJt vero confervetur omnis homini
erga hominem focietas,, conjunefio,, caritas ; ^ emolu-
menta & detrimenta communia ejfe voluerunt. De
Fin. 1. 3. c. 20, 21.
In EpiSietus,, the leading Duties,, or moral Offices of Man, are enumerated as follows. UoXirive^^ociy -cjcciboTroisTa-^cciy hbv (TeSsiv, yovicev l7ritj.i\s7(j^cHy opiyiT^oHy lK>:Xi'j£iVy bpixixv, dCpopiA-piVy cog Exacfov
TUTCOU
N OTES on Treatise the Third.
rirm ttoisTv, J? 7r£(pvyioc[xEv, Arr, EptSf, 1. 3. C. 7. p. 386. The fame Sentiments may be found re- peated both in Stobaus and Laertius,
I (hall only add one more Sentiment of thefe Philofophers^ and that is concerning Friendjhip, Af-
yei{(ri rm (piXlccv iv f^ovoig roig (TTru^ocioi? slvoct
They fay that Friendjhip exijis among the Virtuous only, Laert. 1. 7. f. 124.
The Sum of thefe Rotations appears to be this ; that the Stoics, in the Character of their virtuous Man,, included rational Defire^ Averfion^ and Exul- tation ; included Love and parental AffeSlion ; Friend- Jhipy and a general Charity ox Benevolence to all Man- kind \ that they confidered it as a Duty,, arifing from our very Nature,, not to negledt the Welfare of pub- lic Society, but to be ever ready, according to our Rank, to acfl either the Magiflrate or the private Citizen j that their Apathy was no more than a Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and ex- ceffive Agitations of the Soul ; and confequently that the Jirange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge, and in the demolifhing of which there have been fo many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for which they were no way accountable.
Note XLIX. p. 209. It rejects no Gain, NOT inconsistent WITH JUSTICE.] The Stoics were fo far from rejecfling Wealth, when acquired fairly, that they allowed their perfect Man, for the fake of enriching himfelf, to frequent the Courts of Kings, and teach Philofophy for a Stipend. Thus
Plutarch from a Treatife of Chryfippus Tov fxh
<ro(pov
333
NOTES on Treatise the Third,
(ro{ph Qoc(ri\eii(n (ruysVecrSat (pncrlv ivsKO, ^p>?jw,a]Kr^.8*, 7^ (ro(pis~£^(7Siv Itt dpyv^iic — Alor, p. 1047*
So like wife the Stoic Hecato^ in his Treatife of Offices^ as quoted by Cicero, Sapienth ejfe^ nihil con- tra mores^ legeSy injiituta facientem^ habere rationem ret familiaris, Neque enim folum nobis divites ejfe volumusy fed liberisy propinquity amicisy mammeque reipublic^, Singulorum enim facultates & copiesy divities funt civi- tatis, De Offic. 1. 3. c. 15.
Note L. p. 209. — Universally as far as Virtue neither forbids nor dissuades, it
ENDEAVOURS TO RENDER LiFE, EVEN IN THE MOST VULGAR ACCEPTATION, AS CHEARFUL, JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] Etcnim quod fummum bo?ium a Stoicis dicitury Convenienter natures ‘viverey id habet hanc { ut opinor) fententiamy Cum vir- tute congruere femper : caetera autem, quse fecundum naturam effent, ita legere, fi ea virtuti non repug- narent. Cic. de Offic, I. 3. c. 3.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis, fpeaking of the Stoic Do(5trine concerning the external ConveniencieSy and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Senti- ment in the following Words — dwa. hei-
yjvodv dpslii^ re erjy rnroig fAOvrjgy pn^ieTroT
rbv <To(pO]> rm JtEp/copicrpsyjiy EALSaj, £t eivi dulu ^vvoUbv rriv fxeld ruv ucKXm Xoc^eTv. Suppofing there lay Vir- tue on the 07ie fdcy attended with thefe ExteimalSy and Virtue on the other fidoy alone by herfelfy the wife Man would never choofe that Virtuey which was defitute and ffigky if 'twas in his power to obtain that other y
which
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
333
which was accompanied with thefe Advantages. Ilfpl P* ^57-
Note LL p. 209. — Nay, could it mend THE Condition of Existence — by adding
TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST,
MEANEST Utensil, it would in no degree CONTEMN, ^4-.] — Si ad illam vitam^ quce cum vir- tute degatur^i ampulla aut Jlrigilis accedat^ fumpturum fapientem earn vitam potius^ cui hac adje^a fint — De
Fin. 1. 4. c. 12. p. 300.
Note LII. p. 2io--Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that,
WHERE MOST SOCIAL AFFECTIONS MIGHT BE EXERTED, Itemque magis eji fecundum naturam^ pro omnibus gentibus (ft fieri pojfit) confervandis autju- vandis^ maximos labores molejiiafque fufcipere^ imitan- tern Herculem illum^ quern hominum fama^ beneficiorum memor.^ in concilio ccelefiium conlocavit ; quam vivere in folitudine^ non modo fine ullis molejliis^ fed etiam in maximis voluptatibus^ abundantem omnibus copiis ; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine ^ viribus. ^ocirca optmo quifque iff fplendidijfimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5.
Note LIII. ip. Ibid. It teaches us
TO CONSIDER LiFE, AS ONE GREAT IM- PORTANT Drama, where, iffc.‘\ Thus.
Arifio the Chian Elvon o/xoiov tw dya^i^
ttTTQxpiUyj lov (To(poi/ * Of uvls 0£p(7»T» ai/]f * Ayoi^ey.vo-^ 1/©^ 'arpoVcoTTov ocvoiXocQyi^ IxocTspov vyraxplvilcui irpoorr xo'vicof. The wife Man is like the good Adior 5 %vho^ whether he ajfums the Charaller of Therfites or Aga- memnon,
334
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
memnon, a^s either of the two Parts with a coming Propriety, D. Laert. 1. 7. f. 160.
This Comparifon of Life to 2l Drama or Stage- play^ feems to have been a Comparifon much ap- proved by Authors of Antiquity. See EpiSi. Enchi- rid, c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor Mr. Upton, See M, Anton, 1. 12. f. 36. and the lAotes of Gataker,
Note LIV. p. 211. — It accepts all the Joys derived from their Success, It
FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS
ON Success alone, One of the wifefl Rules that ever was, with refpeSi to the Enjoyment of external good Fortune^ is that deliver’d by EpiSfetus ; to enjoy 2iy dg o(tov J'gJblat, in fuch manner as
it is ^iven^ and for fuch Time as it is giveuy remem- bring that neither of thefe Conditions we have the Power to command. See Arr, Epi£l, 1. 4. c. i. p. 556. See alfo p. 573. of the fame.
Note LV. Ibid, On the contrary, when
THIS HAPPENS, ’TIS THEN IT RETIRES INTO ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR,
WHAT IS LAUDABLE, See before, p. 322.
Je 7^ lu T8T01? J'iaAa/XTTSi, &C.
Note LVL p. 212. All Men pursue Good, ^r.] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics j and inculcated thro’ every part of the Diflertations of Epi^etus, Take an Example or two out of many. ^i)<ng au7j) Travio?, to J'jwkejv to dyoc^ov^ (pivysiv to' xooHQv dyoc^S ^vtymrt^Qv sVev. ^Tis the
Feature
335
NOTES on'Tvi'EArii'E. theThird.
Nature of every one to purfue Good, and fly Evil — - for nothing is more intimately allied to us than Good. Arr. Epidt. 1. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, /. 2. e, 22. />. 313. Hay Zcoov aVcyi alco? cJx/iwTai, wf tw i’jTjw (ru/tA(f>£povT;, nothing is every Animal yo intimately allied^ as to its own peculiar Welfare, In- terest.
So Cicero » Omnes enirn expetimus utilitatem, ad eamque rapimur^ nec facere aliter ullo modo pojfumus, De Ofiic. 1. 3. c. 28.
Note LVIL p. 213. — All derived from Externals, must fluctuate as they fluc- tuate.] See before, pag, 126, 130, 133.
Note LVIIL Ibid. — When we place the Sovereign Good in Mind — ] D^mon or Genius means every Man’s particular Mind, and Reasoning Faculty. AoclfAuv — aro? H Iriv d lycocra M. Anton. 1. 5. p. 27. Ge^
nium ejfe uniufcujufque animum rationalem ; ^ idea ejfe flngulos flngulorum — Varro in Fragm. ’Tis from this Interpretation of Genius that the Word, which in Greek exprefres Happiness, is elegantly etymolo- gized to mean a Goodness of Genius or Mind. ’EuJai|Uoyia £5“* dixlfMcov M. Anton. 1- 7. f. 17.
See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came originally from the old Academics, See before, page
Note LIX. p. 214. Behold the true
AND perfect Man : that Ornament, &c.] ^am gravis vero^ quam magniflca, quam conjlans con- ‘ • •• ficitur
336 NOTES on Treatise the Third.
ficltur perfona fapienth f cum ratio docuerlt^ quod
honejlum ejfet^ id ejfe folum honum^ femper fit necejfe •.£ji beatus^ vereque omnia ijia nomina pojfideat^ qms inrideri ab inperitis folent. Regius enim appellabitur rex^ quam Tarquinius^ qui nee fe nec fuos regere po- tuit : rediius magijier populi^ &c. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 22. p. 269. £rgo bicy quifquis ejty qui moderatione conjlantia quietus animo efty fibique ipfe placatus ; tit nec tabefcat molejiiisy nec frangatur timorCy nec ft- tienter quid expetens ardeat defiderioy nec alacritate futili geftiens deliquefcat ; is eft fapienSy quern quari- muSy is eft beatus : cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animumy aut nimis lata'- bile ad eeferendum videri poteft. ^id enim videatur ei magnum^ ^c, Tufe. Difp. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 298.
Note LX. p. 215. — Would not your Sys- tem IN SUCH A Case a little border upon THE Chimerical ? &c.] Chryfippus feems to have been fenfible of this, if we may judge from a PafTage of his, preferved in Plutarch, Ajo' ax) iid Tfiv virepCoXw tste tcx) t8 ijeXxcriAxcci
Q(xoix XsysiVy Hal J xxtoc rov auSpw'S'ov Hal 'Tw dv^pccTrtvviv (pva-iv. For this reafouy thro" the exceft five Greatnefs and Beauty of what we ajferty we ap- 'pear to fay things which look like FibiionSy and not fuch as are fuitable to Man and human Nature. Mor. 1041. F.
Note LXI. p. 216. In antient Days,
when Greece, See Cfr. de Invent. 1.2. c. i. See alfo Maximus TyriuSy Dijf. 23. />. 277. of the late Quarto Edition 5 and Xenoph, Memor, 1. 3. c. 10.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Note LXII. p. 2ig. No where in any
PARTICULAR NaTURE IS THE PERFECT CHA- RACTER TO EE SEEN INTIRE.] The to/Vj them- felves acknowledged, as we learn ^romClemem oiAlex^ andria^ that their o a-opo;., or perfect Man, was difficult to he found to an exceeding great degree \ cvteC^ Trdw apoJ'px, Strom, p. 438. Sextus E?npi^ ricus gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as yet found him^ iw-sx.p* dvsvpsTa ovl(^ kxT aulaj
(Top^. Adv. Phyf. p. 582. Edit. Liphenf.
What Sextus fays, feems to be confirmed by Cicero., who fpeaking in his Offices the Language of a Stoic., has the following Expreffions. Nec vero^ cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones., fortes viri commemo- rantur, aut cum Fabricius Ariffiidefue jufli nominantur ; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his juftitier^ tanquam a Sapientibus, petitur exemplum,. Nemo enim horum SIC Sapiens {/?, ut Sapientem volumus hit elk gi, Nec i7, qui fapientes hahlti funt, ^ nominati, M. Cato lA C. Leslius., fapientes fuerunt ; ne illi quidem feptem : fed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia fimilitudinem quandam gerebmt., fpeciemque fapientum. De Oific. 1. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Latlius., fpeaking of the fame confummate Wifdorn, he calls it, Sapientia, quam adhuc mortalis nemo ef confecutus*
S o too ^intilian. ^od ft defuit his viris fumma virtus., fc qucerentibus, an oratores fuerint, refpondebo, quo modo Stoiciy ft interrogentur ., an Sapiens Zeno., an Cleanthes, an Chryfippus, refpondeant ; magnos qui^ dem illos ac verier abiles ; non tamen id, quod natura
Z minis
337
NOTES Treatise the7hird.
minis fummam hahet^ confecutos. Inft. Orat. 1. 12. c. I. p. 721,722. Edit. Caper.
So likewife Seneca : Scis, quern nunc bonum vlrum dicam f Hujus fecundse nota, Nam ille alter for- iajfe^ tanquam phoenix j femel anno quingentefmo nafci- tur, Epift. 42.
Note LXIII. p. 219. — I might inform you
OF THE NATURAL PrE-EMIN ENCE, AND HIGH
Rank of specific Ideas.] See Cicero in his Orator^ near the Beginning. Sed ego fic Jiatuo^ nihil ejfe in ullo genere tarn pulchrum^ quo non^ l^c. ^c. See sdfo the Verfes of Boethius before cited. Note XVII. p. 295.
Note LXIV. p. 220, 221. — An Exemplar of Imitation, which tho’ none we think
CAN EQUAL, YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOL- LOW AN Exemplar, ^r.] Seneca gives it as a
general Confeflion of the greatejl Philofophers, that the Dodbrine they taught, was not -quemadmo- dum ipft viverent^ fed quemadmodum vivendum effet. De Vita beatd^ c. 18.
. There appears indeed to be one common Reasoning with refpedl to all Models, Exem- plars, Standards, Correctors, whatever we call them, and whatever the Subjedis^ which they are deftined to adjuft. According to this Reafoning, if a Standard be lefs perfedl than the Subjedi to be adjufted, fuch Adjufting (if it may be fo called) be- comes a Detriment, If it be but equally perfedt, then
NOTES on Treatise the ‘Third.
339
is the Adj Lifting fuperfluous. It remains therefore that it muft be more perfect, and that to any Tran- fcendence^ any Accuracy conceivable. For fuppofe a Standard as highly accurate as can be imagined. If the Subjedts to be adjufted have a Nature fuitabky then will they arrive, by fuch Standard, to a degree of Perfections which thro’ a Standard lefs accurate they could never pofTibly attain. On the contrary, if the Subjeds be not fo far capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they fhould not become as perfects as their Nature will admit.
It feems to have been from fome Sentiments of this kind, that the Stoics adorned their o (ro(poV, or perfect Characters with Attributes fo far fuperior to ordinary Humanity, iy,sTv(^ dTrpoa--^
^svjgs dvlc^pxvgs 'Twas
he was fortunate ; Uwas he was above want ; ’twas he was felf-fufficient s and happy s and perfect, Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. See LXIL
Some Philofophers have gone fo far, as not to reft fatisfied with the mof perfect Idea of Hu?nanitys hut to fubftitute, for our Exemplars e\Tn the fupreme Beings God Himself. Thus PlatOs in his TheatetuSy makes the great Objed of our Endeavours, to be o/xuwtTK Tw Ofw xcc\<x TO J'uvalov, the becoming like to God, as far as in our poiver. He immediately ex- plains, what this Refemblance is. Cl-
xonov ^ odiov juslcc (ppovwsoog ysvia-Qon, It is the be-^ corning juft and hofys along ivith Wifdom or Prudence, Plat. tom. I. p. 176. Edit. Serrani.
Z 2
The
340
NOTES on Treatise the Hird.
The Gofpel appears to faivour the fame Hypdthefis. Be ye therefore perfeSf^ even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect. Matt. v. 48.
What has been above faid, will be, ’tis hoped, a fufficient Apology for the Tranfcendence of the Cha^ rader, defcribed in the Dialogue.
Note LXV. p. 221. The Proficiency of Socrates— WAS sufficient to convince us— that some Progress, See Diog. Laert.
I. 7. C. 91, p, 420. j'g to' VTTUpJiT^V SlVOCt
Tjjy dpslw — to' 'yivst^Oii £v TTpoKOTryi Tag TTSpi X(/oyipoc]nVy xj AioyivWy
Note LX VI. p. Nor was the Prize,
AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIRST; BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A
Reward, having, Verumut tranfeundi fpes non fity magna tamen eji dignitas fubfequendi. Quindl. Inft. 1. 12. II* p. 760.’ Exigo itaque a me., non ut optimis par ftm^ fed ut malis melior. Senec. de Vita beata, c. 17. ’OuJ'e MiAwv 59 o[xcog ax.
ccpxiXoj tS* cr(jopf.oc1^ * Kporc^, op^w? dx Tn$ xJweug * d^''U7rXCdg aKXa rivog r^g l7rt/A£A£iaf,
T^v ccTToyvucriv twv ajcpwv, For neither
Jhall I be Milo, and yet I negledf not 7ny Body ; nor Croefus, and yet I negleSl not my Efate ; nor in general do we defijl from the proper Care of any thing., thrcP Defpair of arriving at that ivhich is fupreme. Arr. Epid. 1. 1, c»2'. See alfo Horat. Epiji. i. I. i. V. 28,
Note
NOTE S on Treatise the T*hird.
341
Note LXVII. p. 225. — This whole Uni-»
VERSE IS ONE CiTY OR COMMONWEALTH ]
'O THoXig lg~] ^rr, EpiSi. 1. 3.
c. 24. p. 486. This was a Do(5lrine5 of which Epi£ietus and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual mention. See of the lafl, /. 12. / 36.
So Cicero. Unlverfus hie mundus una civitas com- munis Deorum atque hominum exijiumandus. De Legg. I. I. c. 7. p. 29. ^Q^DeFin. 1. 3. c. ig. DeNat, Deort 1. 2. c. 62,
Note LXVIII. p. 227.— ’--Hence the Mind TRULY wise, quitting THE StUDY OF PAR- TICULARS, b’r.] ThQ Platonics, confidering Sci- ence as fomething definite, and fieady,
would admit nothing to be its Object, which was vague, infinite, and pajfitng. For this reafon they excluded all Individuals, or Objects of Sense, and (as Ammonius exprefles it,) raifed themfelves, in their Contemplations, from Beings particular to Be- ings univerfial, and which as fuch, from their own Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Paf- fage is worth tranferibing. E’lpvJon on ^ CptAoa-o(p/a, yvucrig TrdvlccV tcov ovlcov yj ovloc foV *E^^Tr](rxv ot (piXo(To(poi, rlvoc av tqottov 'yzvoovloci Twy ovloov l7ng~riy.o- V£g • ^ STTsAii scopco'J rcc xAIcc fjt.£p(^ J/fV'/iTa (pdxploo oy/a, £Ti o£ (ZTTSipcc, rj d£ £7rtg~V/^V ondicevl£ 'sreTTf- poi(ri/.£voov If] yvucTig (to yee^ yviofov uVo Tr,g
^ytoTfcof TS'£piXoc[xQuy£(r^on * TO ol^7r£tpov, cl7r£plXij7rlov') dv^yocynv l(xv]vg diro Twy fA£piyAv £7rt rd
’vyiTTspxTf/.ivx, *f2,; ydo OtiW 0 nx^Twy^
Z 3 ’ETTirrV*!
42 NOTES 0/2 Treatise the Third,
"‘'E'Trir'niJ^n si'p'yfloii, Tirixp^ ro iig ’ETriroc^iv xj ^pov
rtvcc zjpooc.y£iV Twu Tss'pixyy.ixrm" raro J'g TD'opi^o/j.i^cc
J'lix Itc Tcc xaOoAa dvxapofA^';, Aminofiius in hi$ Preface to Porphyry's Ifagoge^ p. 14. Edit. 8vo.
Consonant to this, Vv^e learn ’twas the Advice of Plato ^ with refped to the Progrefs of our Specu- lations and Inquiries^ to defceni from thofe higher Ge- nera^ zvhich include many fubordinate Species^ down to the lowejl Rank of Species^ thofe which include only In- dividuals, But here 'twas his Opinion,^ that our InquB ries fould fiop,^ and,, as to Individuals,, let them wholly alone ; becaufe of thefe there could not pofibly he any Science, i\},o h^mooldTm diro rm y£viK0)-
luTm Kocllovliz; zu-ccpsKsXsv/jo 0 JJXd'lcov 'srcy.VEO'Qixi — -- rx ^£ &.TV£{pd (pYKTiv Ipov * yd^ olv -cools ysvsa-^pit
rkhv i-Trirriy^nv, Porphyr. Ifagog. c. 2.
Such was the Method of ^;^z/zV;z^ Philofophy. The Faihion at prefent appears to be fomewhat altered, and the Bufinefs of Philofophers to be little elfe, than the colleding from every Quarter, into voluminous Records, an infinite Number of fen- ftble^ particular,, and unconnected Fa(5ts, the chief Ef- fe(5l of which is to excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known Saying of Antiquity be true, 't^joas JP^onder which mduced Men firf to philofophizey we may fay that Philofophy now ends, whence ori- ginally it began.
Note LXIX. p. 228. — A Faculty, which
RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS ELSE, becomes a CaNON, A CORRECTOR, AND A StandaPvD universal.] See before, p. 162.
In
V.
343
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
In Epidetus^ I. i. c. i. p. 6. the or rea fining Power^ is called the Power ti au1)?y SsoopacTiZ^ T* oixXoi, ttccvIoc, So Mcitcui — Ta Trig
Ao^jjc^i? °P^9 loivlw J'tapOpos &C. *The
Properties of the reafining Soul are^ it beholdeth itfilf 5 it formeth itfilf See, I. ii. c. i. So again Epidtetus^
- — UTTEp juJu T» o'pay dyciiStVy 3^ vti At<z VTrlp dvj^ T» xoil Twv (TuyEpJ^wy tepoV duloy vTrlp xoepTruv
^npooVy VTrlp oivvy VTrla iXeem iv^^ocpifii tw * /AEpA- i/)]cro J'’ on uXXo ri croi JeJw^ce Kpsirlov ccTnzuruv r^roov^
70 X,?miX£VQ]) oivTo'lq.y TO TO TVV CC^ISCV
sxc^fit Xoyiiifxsvov, For feeing^ for hearing .y and indeed for Life itfilf and the various Means which co-operate to its Support ; for the Fruits of the Earthy for Wine and Oily for all thefe things he thankful to God: yet he mindful that he hath given thee fomething elfiy which IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE; fimething ivhich is to ufe themy to prove themy to compute the Value of each. Arr. Epid. 1. 2. c. 23. p. 321.
Note LXX. p. '228. That Master-
Science, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY ARE, AND THE EnD TO WHICH, See ^/T.
Epift. 1.2. c. 24. p. 337. See alfo I. i. c. 6.
p. 36. and Perf Satyr. 3. v. 66.
Note LXXI. Ibid, — And never wretch- edly DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] StQ Ar. EpeU. 1. I.
c. 3. p. 21. A^drdvTYiv Tr)y (TV'yymux'jy ot fiv ^tto- xX/vayrec, Xvxoig ofioioi arriroi xx] iTrlhuXot
xal ^Xccjjspoi* 01 J'e A£»(r<y, olypioi kx\ Gr,piuJ'iis xxt
dvny^spoi* oj wXefv^ f r/xuv dxoonsyjc.. See, Lhro^ this
Z 4 ■‘iffimty
344
NOTES on Treatise theThird,
Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or bafer Part) fome of us^ degenerating^ become like Wolves y faithlefSy and treatherouSy and mifchievous \ others^ like Lions ^ fierce y and fiavage^ and wild ; but the greater Part turn Foxes y Utile ^ fraudulent y wretched Animals, Cum dutem duobus modisy id efity aut vi aut fraude fiat in- juria ; frauSy quafit vulpeculcoy visy leonis videtur, Cic. de Offic. 1. 1, c. 13. Sec zMo Arr, EpiSl, I. 2. c. 9. p. 210. In our own Language we feem to allude to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, Sheepi/hy Bearijhy Hog- gijhy RavenouSy See,
Note LXXII. p. 229. That Reason, of
WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PaRTICLE, OR
Spark, ^c.~\ fiiv Urug lifiiv
yteoi cmcc(Piiq Tu Oea', aVf acrai, kou aTTocr-
7rdi>7iJ,ocr(x—Arr,Epidl, 1. I. C. 14. p. 81. 0 J'at-
p-cov, ov ladf-cc 'srporocTW kcc) ‘^yei^bvix 0 Zsvg d7r0 77rix7pAix> Eaura * J'e If’iv 0 lyAr>s v^g y,ot\
Xoy(^. Mar. Ant, 1. 5. f. 27. Huilnanus autem ani- rnuSy decerptus ex mente divindy cum nullo alio nifit cum ipfio Deo {fit hoc fas ejl didfu) comparari poteji, Tufc, Difp. 1. 5. c. 13. p. 371.
Note LXXIII. Ibid. — Fit Actors in that GENERAL Drama, where thou hast al- lotted EVERY Being, great and small, its proper Part, &c.] See before, p,2io. and Hote LIII. See alfo Arr. Epidf. I. 3. c. 22. p. 444 — 2u H * djvix70Hy ^c. The Paflage is fublime
and great, but too long to be here inferted.
Note
NOTES on the Third.
345
Note LXXIV. p. 230.— Enable us to curb Desire, ^c. Enable us even to suspend IT, ^c. Be our first Work to have
ESCAPED, dffr.] 'sroTE ■sravTaTrao-ty opE^fcof,
7voc 'sroTE 7^ IvXoyug Ahflaln for a titne fTom
Defire altogether^ that in time thou mayjl be able to defiire rationally, Arr. Epic5t. 1. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the fame Author — Siijuspev — opE^E^ oux sp^pr-
cocfxsvy EXJcXtVEt -cTpoi; (J.QV0C rd urpoizipsltzcic To day
my Faculty ofi Defiire I have not ufied at all ; my Aver^ jion I have employed with refipebl only to things^ which are in my power, 1. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See alfo Enchir^ c, 2, and Charabi, V. III. p. 202.
Horace feems alfo to have alluded to this Doctrine :
Virtus efil^ vitium finger e ; ^ fiapientia prima^ Stultitia caruijje Epifl. i. 1. i. v. 41.
Note LXXV. Ibid, — Let not our Love there stop, where it first begins, but
INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, "biQQ Plat. Sy??ip,
p. 210. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani. Asf >^«p, E(p)j, roy o’pGwj lovrx ettI Taro '5rp«/]t>ta, app^EcrGa;, &C.
Note LXXVI. Ibid. — Not that little CASUAL Spot, where, b’r.] Arrian, Epicf, 1. I. c. 9. p. 51. Socrates quidem^ cum rogaretur^ cu~ jatem fie efife diceret., Mundanum, inquit: totius e?iiin mundi fie incolam & civem arbitrabatur, Tufc. Difp, 1.5. t. 37. p.427.
Note LXXVII. p. 231. — Teach us each TO regard himself, but as a Part of
THIS
46 NOTES on AT 1%-E the Third.
THIS GREAT Whole; a Part, &V.] IIm?
Twy Iktoi; rivoc v.cl'v^ (pvG-tv, &c. In what Senfe then (fays the Philcfopher, fmce all is referable to one univerfal Providence) are foms things called agreeable to our Nature., and others the contrary ? The Anfwer is^ They are fo called., by confidering ourfehes as detached, and feparate from the Whole. For thus may 1 fay of the Foot, when confdered fo apart, that 'tis agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we confder it as a Foot, that is, as fomething not detached, hut the Member of a Body, it will behoove it both to pafs into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occafion to be lopped off, for the Prefer^ vation of the Whole. Were not this the cafe, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind
Jhould we conceive with refpebl to ourfelves. What
art thou f A Man. If thou confder thy Being as fomething feparate and detached, ^tis agreeable to thy Nature, in this View of Indep evidence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou cojifider ihyfclf as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole ; for the fake of that Whole, it will dccalionally behoove thee, at one while to he fck, at another while to fail and rifque the Perils of Naviga- tion, at another zvhile to be in zvant, and at lafl to die perhaps before thy time. Jlloy therefore doft thou bear tkefe Events impatiently P Knoivef thou not, that after the fame inanner as the Foot ceafeth to be a Foot, fo dof thou too ceafe to be longer a Man ? Arr. Epidl. !. 2. c. 5. p. 191.
Kote LXXVIII. p. 231.— -In as much as
f UTURITY5 filV, j doY\Kd fxoi ^ rd
reev to 7'jfp(^diciv TCOi/ xocrd
(pVTiU *
347
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
ipvtnv • auToV ycK^ tJu 0 GeoV to;«twv laXeKTixov Inoi- 7](r£V • U (S'e ys VjJ'ftV, on V0(Ts7v [XOt K(X,^£lf/>0C^T0il VUVy y.x\ wpjuwv ay £7r’ dvro^'xoc] yu^ o li (p^ivoa;
wp/aa av £7ri to ■si’/iAyo'Gat, Jrr. Epia, 1. 2. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment was of Chryftppus, In the tenth Chapter of the fame Booh we have it repeated, tho’ in words fomewhat different. AjaT«To >caAwf Atj/ytriw oi (pi?<o(To(po]y on^ See.
Note LXXIX. p. 232. — That we may KNOW NO other Will, than thine alone, AND that the Harmony of our particu- lar Minds with thy universal,
ElVOil f dulo T«T0 TW T8 £V^GitfJt.OV(^ OCpslm EVpOlOiP GTiXV Tirclvjoi zrpthlTyfJiXt xoclix ttiv (rvfj(,(puviuv ts zrc'.p’ iKocrip ^at|W,oy(^ zjpog tyiv t» oAi# ^aA^-
g■^v. The Virtue of a happy Man^ and the Felicity of Life is this, when all things are tranfa^ed in Harmony of a Man's Genius^ with the JVill of Him^ who admini ft ers the Whole. Diog. Laert. 1. 7. c. 88.
р. 418. This is what Epiaetus calls rm dvlv ^yAv;-
<Tiv (Tuvappoo-at toT; to attune or har?nonize
Okie's Mind to the things ^ which happen. DifT. 1, 2.
с. 14. p. 242.
Note LXXX, Ibid. Yet since to at- tain this Height is but barely pos- sible, See before, page 215, ^c. See alfo
Holes LX. and LXII.
Note LXXXI. p. 233. — Such as to trans- form us into Savage Beasts of Prey, sul- len, ^r.] See before. Note LXXI,
Not£
NOTES on Treatise the T^bird.
Note LXXXII. p. 233. That animating Wisdom, which pervades, and rules the Whole, This Power is called by the Em- peror Marcus — rdv ^imQvJa Koyov^ —
Oi)C0U^:f/>^vlcC TO TSTO^V, 1. 5* 3^*
Note LXXXIII. Ihid. — That Magic Di- vine, WHICH, TO A£ov-
*1^, TO ^7]Xnfvpio'j^ wxa-Qt, Jiaxapyioc^ ccg cJ? j3opSop(^, ixsiviov iTnymipcaloc twv (ri^vuv xal xa- Awu, [4A ocvl(2 aAAjVpictt T»T», » crlCffS’, (pavJd^H*
dxXoc Tm ZTCcvJm nrviym iTriXoyii^if, M. Ant. 1. 6, f. 36. — See alfo 1. 4, f. 44. 1. 3. f. 2. *'X2(r7rf^ 5/a^ di, xojpicoS'iai (Cpiicrlv) iTriypoLpt^pf^ocloc. ysXoToi (pipatriv^ d xa§’ £au7a ]U£U £0 (pauAiii, tw J'e oAw ’usorofj.ocli ^dpiv Tivd Torpor i9?](riv * htw? 4^£jfia? av au7>!v locvlvg tt^v xaxjixu, TOK (J'’ olxXoig sx ‘xy^pfjrd^ is~t. Chryfip. apud Plutarch, p. 1065. D,
OJde r; yiyvslcci spyov Itt] era AocdpK^uVy Oj r£ y.a,T di^spiov ^sTov WAov, »V Itt) mdvlcOy ^A^^y ottojOC kockoI a-lpsVpvTiv dvoiuig^
’AAAa (TO xai j^r^picrcroc STTifo^crai <zp']ioc Gstloity Kcil }CO(T[/.s7v to. UKOfTIXOC * Xpl 8 (pjAiSi (Tol (plXOO ifiV, ’^nh yd^ iig £y aTrotvJix trvvripfAQxxg i<Qxd ^(ZKOiiTiVy
e'vix. ytyvs^cci ’urdcvlm xdyov oldv idvjoyv, forf. idvia,
Cleanthis Hymn, apud Steph. in PoefiPhilof. p. 49, 50.
[The Reader will obferve that the fourth of the above Verfes is fupplied by the MifcelL Obfervationes
CritUay
notes o« Treatise thelHird. 34-9
Critics, V0I.VII. fromaManufcript of at
Leyden,^
KoteLXXXIV. P..34.-W1TH thesh m^av OUR Minds be unchangeably ti ^ >
M. Ant. 1. S- f- 16‘
.KT tyvyv Ibid — With a Re-
Note LXXXV. ^^.l^^Enchirid.
SERVE, p9’ Seneca tranf-
c 2. M.Ant. 1.4- ‘-I- ‘-S- 1 , f
htJ; it, ^^DsBeneficus, 1. 4- f- 34-
TwT tyYXVI Ibid. — Never miss what
NoteLXXAVI. iw«
WHICH WE WOULD AVOID, i^C-i f*n«
.o» «7r»Turx»»ov, /xeT kKX.wv1« t^EfiTr.Trlu..
Epia. I- 3- *=• P'
Note LXXXVII. p. 235. -—Conduct me. Thou, ^c-]
>'Ays P, »
•'0;rii» ®-o6’ 'V'”
•a? e'4'o;***
X««? J'£V0>E»®',
Ckanthes in Epilf. S-'
Thus tranflated by Seneca:
Due me, parens, eelfsque dminatcr poli, ^mnque placuit : nulla parendt mm ejt :
Adfuni
35°
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
Adfum impiger» fac nolle : comitahor gemens^ Malnfque patlar^ quod hono licuit pati,
Epifl. 107.
Note LXXXVIII. p. 236. ’Tis Habit, re- plied HE, IS ALL IN ALL. ’TiS PRACTICE AND Exercise, which can only,
to the End of the Paragraph*'] *AAAa xstoAAt^?
p^pf ,'sri«paa-x6u5?$’, xat mova ujoKX^ xal
T/ »u ; IXTrd^Eig^ on rm f/.s'ylr'nv ri’xyw utto oxlym
Iriv dTToXccQiTv ; But (fays one, with refped to
the virtuous Charadler) there Is need of much Pre- paration^ of much Labour and Learning, And what P Doji thou expeS it Jhould be pojfible (anfwers the Philofopher) to obtain^ by little Pains^ the chiefeji GREATEST Art ? Arr,Epi£i, 1. i. c. 20. p. III.
Taup(^ 8 ylvslociy JJ'e 'yewocTog *
dxxd J'gf p^gt^aacrx^trat, zcapacrxeuaVa^ctt, xal juii ukv zjpoorTTTi^dv Itt] rol zrporwovltx. No robuji and
mighty Animal is complete at once ; nor inore is the brave and generous Man, ’Tis necejfary to undergo the fe- verejl Exercife and Preparation^ and not rajhly plunge into things^ which are no way fuitable, Ejufd. DifTert. I. i. c. 2. p. 18. See alfo the idimQ Author , L I. c. 15. p. 86. 1.2. c. 14. p. 243. Sedutnec 7nedici^ nee imperatoreSy nec oratoreSy quamvis artis prcecepta perceperinty quidquam magna laude dignum fine ufu exercitatione confequi pofunt : fic officii confervandi pracepta traduntur ilia quidem ( ut facimus ipfi ;J fed rei magnitudo ufum quoque exercitationemque defiderat. Cic. de Offic. 1. i. c. 18. ^ ’H0IKH Ig ’^E0OTS zTEpiyivelcct * o$£v xixt —
Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. i.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the T!hird,
Note LXXXIX. p. 236. Nothing is to
BE HAD GRATIS, zrpowoc ymloci. Arr,
Epi6f, 1. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The fame Sentiment is often repeated by the fame Author,
Note XC. p. 241. We are all go- verned BY Interest, See of the Dia-
logue^ p. 212, 246. See alfo Notei LVI. and XCIL.
Note XCI. p. 243. ’Tis a smoaky
House, KocTrvog e’o * d'rrip’XOfJ^a.i, M, Ant<»
!. 5. c. 29. See Arr, Epigf, 1. i. c. 25. p. 129.
Note XQll,Ibid. Is a social Interest,
As the Stoics, above all Philofophers, oppofcd a lazy inaSfive Life^ fo they were perpetually recom- mending a proper regard to the Public^ and encou- raging the Practice of every focial Duty. And tho* they made the original Sprmg of every particular Man’s Adion, to be Self-love^ and the profped of private Intereji ; yet fo intimately united did they efteem this private Intereft with the public^ that they held it impojfible to promote the former^ and not at the fame time promote the latter, ToAvlm (pva-tv
T« XCchcDcivCClTSVy iVX [XVi^SllOg TWV i^iiOV
9uv rvf^dvsiVy it ti it; ro xoivov d(pBXiy.ov
ZupoapEpvloit * OVKiri CCKOiVCOVyfloV ytv/]iXly TO
rarxvloc aula bveko. zs-oieTv. God hath fo framed the Na-‘ ture of the rational Animal,, that it fiould not be able to obtain any private Goods ^ if it contribute not withal fome thing profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer any thing unsocial, in doing all things for the sake of self. Arr,Epidi, 1. 1. c. 19. p. 106.
The
NOTES on Ti^e atise the Third.
The Peripatetic Doctrine was much the fame.
Iloivjoov d[^iXX(a[xlvoov wpog ro kocXov, kcc) aiocnm- IA£WV ra KccXXirix, zrpiz'lTSiVy xoti.'? t* av zravll £in T(% jicul \§lo(. Ixixr’w T(x [^lytroc, rm dyx^cavy
i^TTs^ r dpsrn roi^Tov Iri * tlrs rov [/.h dya^ov^ ^s7 (plxavrov sTvoit * xoii yd^ auroV ovricsron rd KocXd zypdrrcov, xat t»V dxXac d(p£X7i(7£i, Were all to aim jointly at the fair Principle of Honour^ and ever ftrlve to a£l what Is falref and moji laudable^ there would be to every one In common whatever was wanting^ and to each Man In particular of all Goods the great eji^ If Vir- tue deferve jujlly to be fo efteemed. So that the good PAan is necejfarlly a Friend /<?sELFt For by doing what is laudable^ he will always hlmfdf be profited^ as well as at the fame time be beneficial to others. Ethic. Ni- com. 1. g. c. 8.
Note XCIII. p. 243. — If so, then Honour AND Justice are my Interests, ^c,'\ Thus Cicero^ after having fuppofed a foclal common Interefi to be the natural Intereft of Man, fubjoins imme- diately ^od fit Ita efi<y una contlnem.ur omnes ^ ea-
dem lege tiatures. Idque Ipfium ft ita efi^ certe violare alterum lege natures prohibemur, De Offic. 1. 3. c. 6.
NoteXCIV. Ibid. — Without some Por- tion OF WHICH not even Thieves, ^V.] — Cujus (fc. Juflitics) tanta vis efi^ ut ne llli quidem, qui maleficlo ^ fcelere pafcutitur., poffint fine ulla par- tlcula jufiities vivere. Nam qul eorum culpiatn^ qui una latroclnantur^ furatur allquid aut erlplt^ is fibi ne in latrocinio quldem relinquit locum, llle autem^ qui
archie
353
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
archipirata dicitur^ nifi aquabiliter prcsdam^ ^ e. De Offic. 1. 2. C. II.
’AXA’ eov dvccfxyi^ (pu<riy.v<; «V/i? ttic jcotvwvjac,
sTvxt (pv(r£i Ta Jocata, m >con/ajv/a. ^'oli
TO ^laotiov (TuvE^p^ft TW mimvlxVy §^Xov e’ov Itt) tw> cc^ixu/lxTcov slvxi ^oyt^vjuv ' Je eictiv Oi Knr'xi ' o*j j? TTpoV aAAi^Ay? y.0ivu'jlx itto J'ixxiOTVvyig a’oo^'slxi rng Trpo'f aA^iiAyf, Ata te to jw^ ttXeovekIeTv dx- XvXag^ 7^ ^id to fj.v if/suJ'fcS'a;, to' tiux’j to
ycpEnlov to tx Tuf^EijocEi/oi (pvXdcTrEiv,
TO ^OllOErv TOr? X^EVEg^EpOig^ J'iOt TxZlx 11 TTpo'c dXXri-
Xag dvJoZg Koivccvfx G-'o^x^mi • wv Tran t^vxv1;ov hg aj ^d^iycitri, ttoi^tiv, ’Tis necejfary^ Society being natu- ral^ that Justice Jhould be natural alfo^ by which Society exijis. For that JuJiice holds Society together^ is evident in thofe^ who appear of all the mofl u?ijuji., fuch I mean as Robbers or Banditti^ whofe Society with each other is preferved by their fuflice to each other. For by not afpiring to any unequal Shares^ and by never falfifying^ and by fubmitting to what appears expedient^ and by jujily guarding the Booty amajfed to^ gether^ and by ajftjiing their weaker CompatnonSy by thefe things it isy that their Society fubftjis ; the co?itrary to all which they do by thofe^ whom they injure, Alex. Aphrod. TTEpt •^\)X- P* I5^* Edit. Aid. See alfo Plat, de Repub, 1. i. p. 351. tom. ii. Edit, Serrani,
Note XCV. p. 245. What then have I
TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE ViRTUE INToPlETY I
Not only Honour,
A 7k
All
354 NOTES Treatise the Third,
All manner of Events, which any way affedl a Man, arife either from within himfelfy or from Caufes independent. In the former cafe, he main- tains an adfive Part ; in the latter, a pajfive. The active Part of his Charader feems chiefly to be the Care of Virtue, for ’tis Virtue which teaches us what ^ye are to adf ov do the pajjive Part feems to belong more immediately to Piety, becaufe by this we are enabled to reftgn and acquiefce^ and bear with a manly Calmnefs whatever befals us. As there- fore we are framed by Nature both to adf and to fuffer^ and are placed in a Univerfe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither Virtue nor Piety is of itfelf fufficient, but to pafs becomingly thro’ Life, we ftiould participate of each.
Such appears to have been the Sentiment of the
wife and good Emperor, avwfv oXov socvlovy iiycaio-
(Tvvyj f^lv itg vp* h roTg uX-
Xoig (TVfji^ociviitny ry] toov oXuv (puVft. Ti ^ spiT ti?, 5 VTroXvrJ^/joii TTspi ^ y,tzT iig
t!8v ^dXXsl(x,i^ J'uo Tvloig dvjog
Trpxys'lv ro vuv Trpao-orojUfvov, piXiiv ro vuv ccttove- fjLo/usvov s»vju- — He (the perfedl Man) commits Mm- felf wholly to Justice, and the universal Na- ture ; TO Justice, as to thofe things which are done by himfelf-, and in all other Events^ to the Na- ture OF THE Whole. TVhat any one will fay^ or think about him, or adi againjl him, he doth not fo much as take into confideration ; contented and abun- dantly fatisfied with thefe two things, himfelf to do JUSTLY what is at this infant doing, and to ap- prove
355
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
PROVE and love what is at this injlant allotted him, M. Anton. 1. lO. f. II. JJdcvJoi a ^*<54
TTipiO^iS ’iv^V} IX^iTvy ^VVXTOCI, idv (TOC'JltO
(P^or/ig • t«7o (?£ £Ov, TT^v to' TrapfAOov xxTocXi7ry]<;^
7^ TO fxiXXoV iTTirpST^'t}; tJ TTpOVOia,^ ^ TO TTXpOV y.ovov
dTTB’j^suMipg TTpog *OSIOTHTA AIKAIOSTNHN*
0(TiOT‘i)TX [xhy Hvx (PiXipg TO d.7r0V£IXOpi.£VO7* col yoi^ dvlo ^
(pvTig sfpcpe, tI T^'lip • ^lyixioaur/iv J'e, Tvct eXsvSspcog ^wp'ig TTspnrXoyc^g Xiyvg ts t* dxM^ Trpdiravig tcc
'xxld voy.ov xxT ag/av Jll thofe things^ at which
thou zviJJoeJi to arrive hy a Road round about,, thou rnayjl injiantly peffefs,, if thou doji not grudge them to ihyfelf \ that is to fay,, in other words,, if every thing paji thou intirely quit, if the future thou truf to Pro- vidence, and the prefent alone thou adjuf according to Piety and Justice : according to Piety, that fo thou mayft approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever it he, Uwas Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it ; ) ac- cording tojuftice, that fo thou mayf generoufy and zuith- tut Difguife doth fpeakthe Truth, and a£i what is confo- nant to [the general] Law, and the real Value of things, M. Ant. 1. 12. c. I. See alfo 1. 7. c. 54,
Note XCVI. p. 245. I have an Inte-
rest WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTER- ING THE Plan of Providence ; without
MENDING, ^r.] naidfuEcS-aj jLliri to
vsiv iy.xg~x stoo 9iXsiv, cog Scc, To be infirudlcd
that is to fay, to learn fo to vcill all things, as in fab? they happen. And how do they happen As He zvho ordains them, hath ordained. Now He hath ordained that there fmld be Summer and f Vinter, and Plentv A a 2 and
f
NOTES Treatise the Third.
and Fcrnhie^ and Virtue and Vice^ and all manner of Contrarieties ^ for the Harmony of the Whole ; aiid to each of us hath He given a Body\ and its Members^ and a Fortune and certain Afociates. Mindful there- fore of this Order ^ ought we to come for Infruclion-^ not indeed how we tnay alter what is already efahlifoed^ (for that neither is permitted us^ nor would it *be better fo to be i) but hoWy while thmgs continue around u$^ juft as they are^ and as is their Nature^ we may fill preferve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens, Arr. Epid. 1. i. c. 12. p. 74,
Note XCVII. p. 246. Who would be un- happy ? Wpio WOULD NOT, IF HE KNEW HOW, ENJOY ONE PE RPE TUAL FeLICIT Y ?
- — rdulv]; (fc. luJat/xovia?) ^onrix ttoIv-
'Jsg TTtxvlcx. TrpdrlofAsv. ^Fis for the fahe of Happinefs^ we all of us do all other things whatever. Ethic. Ni-
com. 1. I. c. 12. fub.fin, ^-See before, of the
Dialogue pages 212, 241. and Notes LVI and XCII.
Note XCVIIL Ibid. — — If it happen to
BE ERRONEOUS, ’tis A GRATEFUL ErROR, which I cherish, ^V.J l^a,7rocl7}^ev](x rivob
bit Tcov SKTog dwpoatpETcov Ir** Trpog / rilj.ag^ lyco fxh rm TauT>]v,
'^jjleXXov Evpbccg :ix'i ^idasBat. Were a
Man to be d.eceived^ in having learnt concerning Ex- ternals^ that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing ; Vfor my own part ^ would defire a Deceit., which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and un- dlfiurhed. Arr. Epid. 1, i. c. 4. p. 251.
Note
NOTES on Treatise the Third.
257
Note XCIX. p. 247. When we are
ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS
MORAL Science, then Logic and Phy- sics BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS,
eafque virtutes, de quibus difputatum eji^ Dialebti^ cam etiam adjungunt ^ Phyficam^ eafque ambas vir^ tutum nomine adpellant : alteram^ quod habeat ratio-- nem^ ne cui faljo adfentiamur^ neve^ Cic. de
Fin. 1. 3. c. 21. p. 265.
The threefold Division of Philosophy into Ethics, Phyfcs, and Logic, was commonly received by moft Sedls of Philofophers. See Laert, 1.7. c. 39. See alfo Cicero in his Treatife de Legi^ bus, 1. I. c. 23. and in His Academics, 1. 1. c. 5. Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philofophandi ratio, triplex, ^c. Plutarch, de Placit. Philof. p. 874.
END of the NOTES Treatise the Third,
P. 304. 1. 6. for a'h»?, read P. 349. I, 20.
for f\|yO|U,at oloxv^, read, f ^okv'^.
f
(
\ '
A '
Sf&lfH. c
J‘101
V''